Springer Geography

Kirk Helliker
Patience Chadambuka
Joshua Matanzima *Editors*

Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe

Springer

Springer Geography

The Springer Geography series seeks to publish a broad portfolio of scientific books, aiming at researchers, students, and everyone interested in geographical research.

The series includes peer-reviewed monographs, edited volumes, textbooks, and conference proceedings. It covers the major topics in geography and geographical sciences including, but not limited to; Economic Geography, Landscape and Urban Planning, Urban Geography, Physical Geography and Environmental Geography.

Springer Geography—now indexed in Scopus

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/10180

Kirk Helliker · Patience Chadambuka ·
Joshua Matanzima
Editors

Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe

Springer

Editors
Kirk Helliker
Department of Sociology
Rhodes University
Makhanda, South Africa

Patience Chadambuka
Department of Community Studies
Midlands State University
Gweru, Zimbabwe

Joshua Matanzima
Department of Social Inquiry
La Trobe University
Bundoora, VIC, Australia

ISSN 2194-315X ISSN 2194-3168 (electronic)
Springer Geography
ISBN 978-3-030-94799-6 ISBN 978-3-030-94800-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book is the fifth in an ongoing series of books published under the auspices of the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies, Department of Sociology at Rhodes University (South Africa). The first book published is titled *The Political Economy of Livelihoods in Contemporary Zimbabwe* (2018) and the following two appeared in 2021: *Fast Track Land Occupations in Zimbabwe—In the Context of the Zvimurenga*, and *Everyday Crisis-Living in Contemporary Zimbabwe.* The fourth book, which is forthcoming (2022), is titled: *Capital Penetration and the Peasantry in Southern and Eastern Africa: Neoliberal Restructuring.*

The Unit was formed in 2015 and seeks to contribute to the development of emerging and mid-career Zimbabwean (and other) scholars, through its Master and Ph.D. programme as well as publications.

Kirk Helliker
Research Professor, Head, Unit of
Zimbabwean Studies

Contents

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Kirk Helliker is a Research Professor in the Department of Sociology at Rhodes University in South Africa, where he also heads the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies, which he founded in 2015. He publishes widely on Zimbabwean society and also supervises a significant number of Ph.D. and M.A. students, mostly on Zimbabwean topics. His most recent books focus on crisis-living in contemporary Zimbabwe and the fast track land occupations in the context of *zvimurenga*.

Patience Chadambuka is a lecturer and Acting Chairperson in the Community Studies Department (formerly Sociology Department), in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. She holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Rhodes University, South Africa and a M.Sc. in Sociology and Anthropology as well as a Post Graduate Diploma in Tertiary Education from the Midlands State University. Her areas of interest include land and agrarian studies, migration, ethnicity, livelihoods and gender studies.

Joshua Matanzima is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Social Inquiry at La Trobe University, Australia. He is also a member of the Gwembe Tonga Research Project. He has done extensive fieldwork in the Zambezi Valley among the Tonga people. His research interests lie in the fields of human-wildlife interactions, anthropology of landscape and resettlement as well as religion and social change. His previous publications appear in such journals as *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, *African Identities, Water International* and *Oryx*.

Contributors

Ben Begbie-Clench Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia

Patience Chadambuka Department of Community Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe

Taderera Hebert Chisi History Department, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe

Oppenheimer Chiweshe ZADRT, Harare, Zimbabwe

Anusa Daimon International Studies Group, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

Codelia Govha Dhodho Department of History, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

Kirk Helliker Department of Sociology, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa

Robert K. Hitchcock Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

Vincent Jani Geosciences, Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa

Melinda C. Kelly Kalahari Peoples Fund, Albuquerque, NM, USA

Ivan Marowa Department of History, Heritage and Knowledge Systems, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

Joshua Matanzima Department of Social Inquiry, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC, Australia

Joseph Mujere National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho;
Research Associate, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

Emmanuel Ndhlovu Freelance Researcher, Pretoria, South Africa

Davy Ndlovu Tsoro-O-Tso Development Trust, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Nicholas Nyachega Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

Vongai Olivia Sagonda Department of History, Heritage and Knowledge Systems, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

Chapter 1
Theorising and Historicising the Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Zimbabwe

Kirk Helliker, Joshua Matanzima, and Patience Chadambuka

Abstract This chapter introduces the ensuing chapters in this volume on the livelihoods of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe. It does so by offering theoretical comments about ethnicity and livelihoods as well as providing historical details pertaining to the development of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe. As the chapter shows, the volume sits at the intersection of two sets of scholarly literature, namely, literature on ethnicity and literature on livelihoods. As a general trend, these two sets of literature do not adequately engage with each other, and this volume seeks to contribute to addressing this problem through a number of case studies of various ethnic minorities in both past and present Zimbabwe. Much of the literature on ethnicity in Zimbabwe focuses on the two main ethnic groupings (Shona and Ndebele), including the significance of ethnic contestations between these two groupings in post-1980 Zimbabwe. This has tended to crowd out studies about ethnic minorities in the country. This volume, thus, brings to the fore the importance of studying ethnic minorities in offering a more refined ethnic analysis of Zimbabwean history, politics and society.

Keywords Ethnic minorities · Zimbabwe · Livelihoods · Ethnicity · Belonging

> The important characteristics of many of the new states that emerged at the end of colonialism included ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. Because the colonial powers that created these states were insensitive to the ethnic makeup of these states, what emerged in Africa were states that consisted of not only a multiplicity of ethnic and linguistic groups but arbitrary division of ethnic groups across national borders, thus making many indigenous peoples a minority. (Umbanaso and Korieh 2010: 5)

K. Helliker (✉)
Department of Sociology, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa
e-mail: k.helliker@ru.ac.za

J. Matanzima
Department of Social Inquiry, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC, Australia

P. Chadambuka
Department of Community Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_1

1.1 Introduction

This book is about the lives and livelihoods of ethnic minorities in past and present Zimbabwe, and, more specifically, ethnic minorities within the rural African population. We speak of 'ethnic minorities' not in terms of their limited demographic presence, but in relation to their overall subordinate status in Zimbabwean history, politics and society, existing on the margins of state and economic power.

Ethnicity is central to the economic, social, political and cultural history of Zimbabwe, and there is now a significant body of Zimbabwean scholarly literature on ethnicity, including stretching back to pre-colonial times. In this literature, however, there is a pronounced focus on the colonial construction (and re-construction) of what are considered to be the two most important African ethnicities—Shona and Ndebele—and how colonial state ethnic practices conditioned the character of anti-colonial struggles and became embedded in various ways in the (ethnic) practices of the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe, with reference to nation-building, socio-economic development, democratic processes and social cohesion. Other African ethnicities also exist in Zimbabwe ('ethnic minorities') and, in recent years, numerous scholars have sought to recover their histories and to identify the significance of their lives for wider Zimbabwean politics and society.

Studying ethnicity is never an easy task, as it entails complex analytical and conceptual issues because of the multiple but uneven entanglements between ethnicity, language, memory, history, culture, religion, nationhood and citizenship, as the Zimbabwean literature clearly demonstrates. Even the very existence of particular African (and other) ethnicities in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, is open to considerable controversy, in part because of the fluid, porous and situational character of ethnic boundaries. The literature on ethnicity, in fixated often on the intense rivalries between Shona and Ndebele as part of broader narratives about Zimbabwean history and politics, has tended unintentionally to crowd out and inhibit the possibility of writing about ethnic minorities. In this respect, this book contributes to highlighting the growing pertinence of literature on African ethnic minorities, including for facilitating a more complete understanding of Zimbabwean history and society.

The African ethnic minorities covered in this book include those identified as wholly indigenous to what is now Zimbabwe's territory, and those often defined as 'foreigners' or 'aliens' (i.e. entering the territory from outside, mainly from the early days of Rhodesian colonialism). This incorporates ethnicities which at times have been subsumed discursively and materially under other ethnicities and those with a transnational presence in southern Africa. The ethnic minorities literature, emerging alongside current cultural-political efforts at linguistic and ethnic revitalisation among minorities in Zimbabwe, quite appropriately centres on ethnic recognition, identity and belonging as crucial in telling the stories of these minorities.

This book offers a fresh angle into ethnicity and ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe by 'hanging' the study on 'livelihoods'. Though the existing literature on ethnic

minorities in Zimbabwe discusses ways of making a living (i.e. livelihoods), it tends to do so indirectly, that is, in the context of a more explicit focus on questions around culture, identity, belonging and citizenship. At the same time, an almost separate body of literature exists on livelihoods in Zimbabwe (though not always drawing explicitly upon a livelihoods analytical framework), and this livelihoods literature pays insufficient attention to ethnicity. Due to the dual focus of this book (on ethnicity and livelihoods), it is of great relevance to Zimbabwean scholars of both ethnicity and livelihoods.

By way of the various chapters, this volume seeks to demonstrate and analyse the complex relationships existing between (minority) ethnicities and livelihoods, including the ways in which projects of ethnic belonging (and identity-formation) become entangled in the diverse and shifting livelihood projects of ethnic minorities, and vice versa. The key themes in this regard focus on: land, livelihoods and ethnicity; wildlife, livelihoods and ethnicity; and crisis, livelihoods and ethnicity. The ethnicities covered in the book include Chewa, Tonga, Tshwa San, Shangane, Basotho, Ndau, and Hlengwe. The chapters highlight an emergent scholarship among young black scholars in Zimbabwe who are (or are becoming) acknowledged experts on particular ethnic minorities. Together, they provide a rich empirical basis for understanding the livelihoods of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe. All chapters are rooted firmly in original fieldwork or archival research and, individually and collectively, they weave together a rich tapestry of stories that unpack and analyse 'ethnic minority' livelihoods in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Ethnicity and Ethnic Minorities

The very notion of ethnicity, as presented conceptually, is subject to significant and unresolved contestations across disciplines within the scholarly literature (Bilge et al. 2021) and we make no attempt to offer a clear and concise definition, in part because it is subject to different articulations (at least implicitly) in the following chapters. Certainly, at an abstract level, ethnicity encompasses a range of possible characteristics such as: common descent, history or national origin; familial ties or kinship relationships; similar cultural and/or spiritual arrangements; and shared linguistic attributes. When some of these characteristics overlap or reinforce each other, their loose combination leads to the existence of reasonably distinct—ethnic—categories or groupings. These categories might appear as bounded ethnic groups self-declaring their ethnicity or deliberately enacting their ethnicity in clear and identifiable ways. The situational intersectionality of gender, class, race and ethnicity, though not central to this volume, also adds considerable complexity to the real world presence of ethnicities and ethnic groups.

Ethnicities are neither ascribed nor fixed as static states of being, as they require understanding within and through the prisms of fluidities, contingencies and circumstances. Insofar as it is possible to speak about the presence of specific ethnic identities and particular quests for ethnic belonging, these are processual (or processes of becoming) and involve reconfigurations over time. As well, at a fundamental level, ethnicity is relational and is typically conditioned by social-power differentials. Although ethnic identities are sometimes imposed from above, or at least restructured from above, ethnicity cannot be reduced to instrumentalist machinations through access to (and manipulation of) political power. The human agency of ordinary people is crucial to thinking about ethnicity, including 'desires to fit in (such as via belonging or compliance) and strategies to opt out (via distinction, resistance, or defiance)' (Forsyth and Michaud 2011: 9). In the case of Africa, ethnicity is one of the most enduring forms of identity and it has withstood the supposedly homogenising effects of the modern nation-state (Batibo 2006). In fact, ethnicities in Africa are very pronounced despite the modern state (both colonial and post-colonial) and most likely because of it as well.

At first site, the phrase 'ethnic minority' seems ambiguous. As Ndhlovu (2007: 131) argues, this is a 'highly contested subject that cannot be fully explained in terms of demographic facts alone as it is indexically linked to struggles over socio-political power, cultural domination and control'. In other words, and for our purposes, an ethnic minority is not a category of people (an ethnicity or ethnic group) demographically small in size, though this is often the case with ethnic minorities. Rather, the key question entails the relationship between ethnicity and power in a particular nation-state or even within a sub-region of a nation-state. Because of the relational character of ethnicities, an ethnic minority at national level may be an ethnic majority at sub-national level. As a general trend, then, ethnicities excluded from power or incorporated into power in a subordinate manner are minority ethnicities. Further, ethnic minorities should be conceptualised as 'fluid and transitory phenomena mediated and reconstituted by various forms of discursive practices' (Ndhlovu 2007: 131). In this way, the presence and character of particular ethnicities as minority ethnicities is contingent upon the outcomes of ongoing power contestations.

In their important study of ethnic minorities in Africa, Umbanaso and Korieh (2010) argue that, prior to European colonisation, African societies were not demarcated, at least spatially, by ethnic boundaries to any significant degree. States, kingdoms and chiefdoms all flourished, but their spatial, social and political boundaries were fluid as a result of wars, conquest and migration. The colonial period, as indicated in the epigraph (at the beginning of this chapter), led to state-systems that constructed fixed ethnicities and coercively included or excluded specific ethnic groups as indigenous colonial subjects within particular territorial boundaries: these groups became enclosed within fixed spatial (national) boundaries in a manner insensitive to pre-colonial ethnic (and religious and linguistic) socio-spatial arrangements. This resulted in fundamentally reconfigured ethnicities among the indigenous populations within African colonies. It was also not unusual for groups sharing a common ethnicity (as well as culture and language) to be located across two or more colonial nation-states.

The socio-spatial fixing of indigenous populations in terms of ethnicity continued under post-colonial conditions because of the maintenance of colonial boundaries. Additionally, the shift from colonial to post-colonial society in Africa led to the emergence of ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities within the modern nation-state, depending on the outcome of the post-colonial political settlement. As a colonial legacy, ethnic minorities are often spatially located along territorial borders (i.e. in the borderlands as marginalised borderland communities). Borderlands have become hotspots for armed conflicts and insurgencies. In the end, contemporary African states rarely uphold and protect the rights of ethnic minorities occupying figuratively the margins of state power, irrespective of their spatial location. Ethnic minorities inhabit the margins of the state and, as a consequence, of the nation as well. Those in post-colonial Africa experience discrimination, political violence, and serious violations of human rights, mainly by dominant ethnic group(s) (Umbanaso and Korieh 2010). Ethnic minorities typically are not incorporated in any meaningful way into the development programmes of African states. As a result, their sub-regions have, for instance, inadequate health and education facilities, very poor transport and communication networks, and soils with low-agricultural potential.

Through colonial land appropriation and dispossession, particularly pronounced in white settler societies, indigenous Africans lost access to their ancestral lands, disturbing not only indigenous people's access to resources (and thus their livelihoods), but their assertions of ethnic belonging and autochthony to particular landscapes as well. In post-colonial Africa, and perhaps more so than is the case for ethnic majorities, ethnic minorities lay claim to particular landscapes and landscape features such as trees, rocks, caves, fountains, rivers and mountains (Merino and Tileaga 2011; Carruthers 2003). Simultaneously, these are claims to past, present or future livelihoods. Such assertions or claims may involve the evoking of ethnicity situationally. Plus, assertions of autochthony regarding particular landscapes may be reinforced during times of conflict, whether conflict over land and resources or broader political conflicts. Conflicts around resource access entail each group seeking to exclude 'the other' from accessing local resources (Carruthers 2003). These politics of identity are bolstered by the need to demystify the 'stereotypes' and 'derogatory' labels regularly placed upon them by majority ethnic groups, portraying them as uncivilised if not animalistic (Merino and Tileaga 2011). In Zimbabwe, for instance, the physiology of the Tonga and the Doma people has been misrepresented, with suggestions that they have 'tails' (McGregor 2009).

There is significant global literature on ethnicity, including ethnicity in Africa, and it focuses mainly on ethnic-based contestations, processes of othering and the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davies 2010; Antonsich 2010; Youkhana 2015; Anthias 2013; Yuval-Davies et al. 2018). There are also many studies concentrating on the realities of ethnic contestations among Europeans, 'foreigners' and migrants in Europe (Zenker 2011). There is less of a focus on livelihoods in the ethnicity literature, just as the livelihoods literature tends to downplay the importance of ethnicity.

1.3 Livelihoods and Ethnicity

The (Sustainable) Livelihoods Framework, as an actor-orientated framework (Long 2000), is an important perspective within development studies, particularly when analysing the lives and livelihoods of marginalised groups and households (Chambers and Conway 1992; Carney 2002; Ellis 1998; Scoones 1998; Solesbury 2003; Morse and McNamara 2013). As set out by Helliker et al. (2018: 3), the framework makes the following overall argument:

> A livelihood is said to be sustainable when it can cope with (and recover from) stresses and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets while not undermining the natural resource base. Overall, the LF encompasses analysis of the context in which people live (i.e. their socio-economic, technological, demographic, agro-ecological and political context); their access to natural, human, social, physical and financial capitals or assets (and their ability to put these capitals to productive use); the institutions, policies and organisations which determine people's access to these assets and the returns they can achieve on assets; and the priorities that people identify in confronting the problems, including stresses and shocks, which they face as well as the different strategies (even of only a coping character) they adopt in pursuit of these priorities …. The framework therefore links inputs ('capitals' or 'assets') and outputs (livelihood strategies), which are connected in turn to livelihood outcomes … Households and individuals living under conditions of poverty – in both rural and urban settings – juggle 'capital assets' in actively seeking (hopefully) positive livelihood outcomes, and this juggling is mediated through different structures and processes which may either constrain or enable livelihood activities.

Significant criticisms have been levelled against the framework, but in large part to strengthen it (Scoones 2009; Speranza et al. 2014; Banks 2015; Thieme 2008; Prowse 2010; Sakdapolrak 2014; van Dijk 2011; Levine 2014; White and Ellison 2006; Wilshusen 2012; de Haan and Zoomers 2003; Zoomers and Westen 2011; Harriss 1997). We briefly mention some key criticisms. First of all, 'structure' (including relations of power and inequality) is not given proper weight as a constraining factor in the micro-study of local livelihoods, as if households exist outside structures. Secondly, the framework's notion of 'agency' implicitly draws upon methodological individualism, with households treated as distinct rational subjects pursuing livelihood goals, rather than considering the historically conditioned dispositions of households moving along established pathways. Thirdly, 'capitals' (as a concept central to the framework) are conceptualised as things (or possessions), when in fact they embody and are nestled within power-infused social relations. Finally, there is a failure to fully comprehend the spatial and temporal dynamics of livelihoods, including their cross-national and multi-local spatial settings, and their fluctuating rather than stable character over the long term (see Helliker et al. 2018).

Surprisingly, the absence of a sustained focus on ethnicity is not normally raised as a key criticism of the Livelihoods Framework, though questions of structure, power and inequality speak to ethnicity, as they do to gender, race and class. Overall, 'current approaches to the analysis of livelihoods do not take … ethnicity sufficiently into account' (Forsyth and Michaud 2011: 15). More fully, ethnicity is:

> [A]t times overlooked or reduced to background elements in livelihood studies … [but] but can play pivotal roles in how individuals and households determine what constitutes an appropriate livelihood strategy, taking into consideration culturally embedded understandings of right and wrong, success and failure, and benefit and loss. (Turner 2012b: 406–407)

Studies exploring the linkages between ethnicities (notably ethnic minorities) and livelihoods have emerged. Below we discuss some relevant literature. Some of this examines ethnicity explicitly in the context of the livelihoods framework, but other literature considers more broadly the relationship between ethnicity, livelihoods and belonging.

Notable literature focuses on the Southeast Asia's Massif high borderlands region that covers parts of India, Thailand, China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (Trincsi et al. 2014; Forsyth and Michaud 2011; Mao et al. 2020). These studies reveal the vulnerability and marginality of ethnic minorities in that region, showing as well how ethnic communities depend mainly on natural resources for their survival. For instance, Turner (2012a, b) examines ethnic minority livelihoods in upland Northern Vietnam, specifically Hmong farmers in the context of state-sponsored agrarian change, highlighting how they have 'constructed, negotiated and experienced' (Turner 2012a: 544) livelihoods as part of everyday life. Turner (2012b) speaks of 'the Hmong way' of making a living (an ethnic-informed livelihood pathway) but nevertheless argues that these farmers culturally appropriate rural livelihoods in highly pragmatic ways.

Forsyth and Michaud (2011) analyse the relationship between livelihoods and ethnicity in Highland China, Vietnam and Laos, also highlighting that 'the role of cultural and ethnic networks' is 'an under-acknowledged influence in …. livelihood strategies' (Forsyth and Michaud 2011: 1). Like Turner, they speak about how ethnic minorities 'fashion livelihoods'; and they seek 'to question how ethnicity affects, and is influenced by, economic and political changes in relation to these livelihoods'. In criticising both an essentialist and instrumentalist conception of ethnicity, and stressing its relational quality, they refer to ethnicity as a possible 'agent of access, or indeed as an asset itself' in seeking 'to better understand ethnic minority livelihoods' (Forsyth and Michaud 2011: 14). Just as ethnicity may condition livelihood strategies, changes in livelihood options likely affect ethnic identity. In a similar study of two ethnic minorities in the forests of Bangladesh, Islam and Sato (2013: 431) demonstrate that 'the livelihood of ethnic minorities is not stable'.

Studies elsewhere, including in the Americas, also bring to the fore the absence of a meaningful focus on ethnicity and livelihoods, such as Torres et al. (2018: 23) with reference to migrant settlers and indigenous populations in the Ecuadorian Amazon—in particular, they consider 'the effect of ethnicity on the households' adoption of [specific] LS [livelihood strategies]'. In their work on urban foragers in Seattle (Washington State, USA), Poe et al. (2014: 908) make an intriguing argument about 'relational ecologies of belonging', specifically 'the connections between foraging [as a livelihood] and cultural belonging … made by foragers who self-identified as newcomers or immigrants'. Additionally, linkages are established between the rhythms of (livelihood) work and the construction (and loss) of belonging

in the favelas of Rio de Janiero (Brazil), including with regard to evictions from the favelas and displacement of people to apartment blocks (Arrigoitia 2017).

Closer to home, namely the African continent, the importance of studies of ethnicity and livelihoods for Zimbabwe become clearer. Chome (2020: 318) for instance studies the linkages between land, livelihoods and ethnic belonging in Kenya's Lamu county and, in a manner which makes the reader think of Zimbabwe, states:

> In a country [Kenya] where identity and land are inexorably linked, … claims to 'belong' as autochthonous 'sons of the soil' were more often than not, synonymous with narratives of ethnic territorial exclusion. In Lamu, as elsewhere in Kenya, such narratives were providing the dominant language for debating belonging and citizenship. ….. [D]ebates were also becoming more public and bitter, as people sought to secure land (and other land-based resources).

Other studies of Kenya indicate similar trends. For Quandt (2019: 3), in a study of Isiolo County, ethnicity in Kenya 'not only influences the normal range of livelihood activities for an individual (pastoralist, agriculturalist, etc.) but is politically and socially salient'. The complexity of the relationship between ethnic identity and livelihoods appears in the following quotation from Kratli and Swift (2014: 3) in the study by Rodgers (2020: 241–242):

> The term 'pastoralist' can be used to indicate a cultural identity and a production/livelihood system, but while the latter implies the former, the former does not always imply the latter …. People can identify with a 'pastoral' background without necessarily being involved in pastoral production. Conversely, people can be involved in pastoral production … without necessarily sharing a pastoral cultural identity.

In this light, the relationship between ethnicity and livelihoods is not straightforward or without ambiguity (as there is no one-to-one connection) as 'people shift fluidly and opportunistically between an array of livelihood options' (Rodgers 2020: 242), or they may be compelled to do so. As Vawda (2017: 41) demonstrates in relation to Senegalese Muslims in Durban (South Africa), ethnicity is evoked and performed at times for "mobilising and accessing resources" in pursuing livelihoods.

1.4 Ethnicity and Ethnic Minorities in Zimbabwe

Past and present Zimbabwe is marked by a diverse array of African ethnicities. Whether or not, and in what sense, ethnicities existed in the pre-colonial territory of Zimbabwe is open to considerable debate (MacGonagle 2007; Msindo 2012). In terms of African ethnic identities, two groupings came to dominant colonial Zimbabwe (at least with regard to demography), namely, Ndebele and Shona (with the Shona comprising most of the country's total population). The colonial government recognised, if only begrudgingly, the Ndebele and Shona as autochthonous to the territorial boundaries of the colony and it initially labelled separate regions of the country accordingly, that is, as Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The Shona

and Ndebele are descendants of migrant groups originating from the north, with the Shona settling in the colonial territory of Rhodesia in the 1500s and the Ndebele arriving later from South Africa in the 1800s (Beach 1980). Though the Shona and Ndebele were considered by the colonists as the indigenous 'tribes', the San and Khoisan were likely the original occupiers of the whole southern African region, including Zimbabwe.

In relation to post-colonial Zimbabwe, Shona is the main ethnic majority (in terms of power relations) in that Shona-speakers provide the support base for the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), leading to what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 533) refers to as an 'ethnocracy' whereby the 'distinction between nation and ethnicity is eliminated. In an ethnocracy, nationality is defined in terms of majority ethnicity'. While the Ndebele are an ethnic minority vis-à-vis the Shona, as reflected in the overall marginalisation and victimisation of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the region of Matabeleland since 1980, they are numerically an ethnic majority when compared to the various ethnicities discussed in this volume. As well, within Matabeleland, they might at times dominate over these other ethnicities, including the Kalanga and Tonga—in this context, they become an ethnic majority in the main sense used in this volume.

Though both the Ndebele and Shona are treated often as homogeneous ethnic groups, they incorporate sub-ethnic clusters. For example, it is common to speak of distinct ethnic sub-categories within the Shona, notably, the Manyika, Zezuru, Ndau, Karanga and Korekore. The original identification and naming of Shona sub-ethnic clusters was undertaken by the colonial regime and entailed reference to the topographical regions in which they were found. For instance, Korekore means 'Northerner' with respect to the northern plateau in which they were located. Other clusters derived their names from powerful local chiefs, such as the Manyika (after chief Manyika). As well, Shona sub-ethnicities consist of, linguistically, various sub-dialects (Doke 1931), with the Zezuru for instance incorporating the Gova, Nohwe, Hera and Harawa.

1.4.1 Ethnicities in Colonial Zimbabwe

The white settler state in colonial Zimbabwe constructed and fuelled, in large part intentionally, ethnic and sub-ethnic divisions among the indigenous African population, as a divide-and-rule strategy. This involved the emergence of political programmes, administrative structures and territorial spaces focusing on ethnicity. Hence, colonially constructed ethnic identities were mapped onto fixed territories (initially called the Reserves) and this took place alongside the reinventing of tribal or ethnic polities regulated by way of the dictates of British-inspired indirect rule, overseen by salaried and appointed chiefs (Moore 2005). In alliance with the colonial state, Christian missionaries performed a significant role in the construction of—in particular—Shona as a separate and all-embracing ethnicity. Early missionary efforts in translating the Bible into the Shona language clearly

illustrate this. Catholic missionaries based in Chiwasha, for example, translated the Bible using the Zezuru language. Meanwhile, the Dutch Reformed Church at Mogenster College in Masvingo developed Karanga, and the Methodists in Manicaland used Manyika. Standardising one official Shona language was subject to contestation and erased a diverse range of dialects, with the Zezuru dialect eventually becoming the official Shona prototype. Ultimately, ethnic-based administrative structures arose, such as Mashonaland for the Zezuru and the Fort Victoria area for the Karanga. On this basis, '[m]any groups, especially those speaking minority languages, were lumped into these ethnicised administrative units and their alternative identities ignored' (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 278), and this continues today.

The embedding of particular ethnic and sub-ethnic groupings in specific socio-spatial sites had real material effects, as ethnic categorisations increasingly became an integral part of self-identity for indigenous Africans. As one example, Ranger (1984) argues that, in relation to colonial urbanisation and the development of capitalist waged-employment and labour migrancy in towns and cities (including in South Africa), Manyika migrants tended to amplify sub-ethnic categorisations, as they classified themselves based on their rural ethnicised origins. More broadly, Africans contributed to the consolidation of distinct ethnicities over time by performing ethnicity in their lives and, at times, this resulted in inter-ethnic conflicts—as in the case of the Bulawayo 'faction fights' of 1929 (Msindo 2006). The formation of ethnically based mutual aid societies, alongside ethnic responses to the repressive urban work environment, was also clearly evident (Yoshikuni 1989).

Building nationalism from the 1940s and into the 1960s entailed grappling with seemingly competing political and ethnic identity claims, beyond emerging class differentiations and the growing divide between urban and rural sites (Mlambo 2009). In this sense, early attempts at forging a national anti-colonial identity and 'nationalising the struggles' were undercut by the pervasiveness of regional-ethnic politics, including among the (typically, male) African elite (Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). However, ethnic identities were not always and inherently antagonistic to nationalism as there is evidence of ethnicity providing local expressions of anti-colonial discontent (Msindo 2007). Indeed, ethnic groups provided leaders who would become prominent nationalist figures, with the latter articulating the pre-colonial history, personalities and sacred monuments that sparked the nationalist imagination. The nationalist movement became closely aligned to the revival of ethnic-cultural nationalisms, and propagators of nationalism drew upon pre-colonial languages and cultures and reinterpreted pre-colonial histories even as they mobilised across ethnic lines (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009). This highlights the fluidity of identities and the possibility of multiple forms of belonging existing simultaneously. As Bhebhe and Ngoepe (2021: 3) argue, African ethnicities in Zimbabwe are 'situational, contested and fluid'.

Beyond African ethnic identities said to be indigenous to Rhodesia's colonial territory, the colonial creation of territorial boundaries cut through the fluid territories of pre-colonial 'ethnicities'. This was, for instance, the case with the Ndau along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border (MacGonagle 2007), who became lumped under

'Shona' in then-Rhodesia. Schmidt (2013), in focusing on the borderland communities in the Honde Valley along the Mozambique border, notes this in relation to the colonial border also running through the pre-colonial territory of Manyika-speaking people. Other studies of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border highlight this, such as Duri (2010) and Kachena and Spiegel (2019), as well as the examination by Francis Dube (F. Dube 2020) of public health along and across the Zimbabwean and Mozambican border up until 1940. A similar issue arose with the Tonga people along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border (McGregor 2009). In the case of the Tonga, in Zambia, they became a majority group (if only demographically) whereas, in Zimbabwe, they remain as an ethnic minority in both senses of the word. The ways of life of these and other pre-colonial entities were disrupted in multiple ways by colonial border construction, though many cross-border movements and networks remained in place. As Hughes (1999: 536) highlights with reference to Vhimba along the Mozambique border, a 'flexible citizenship' exists in post-1980 Zimbabwe because of the ongoing population flows in and out of Zimbabwe.

Labour migration into Rhodesia from neighbouring colonies gave birth to ethnic minorities as well. These include migrant workers who came as either covenanted or autonomous labour into the colony, mainly from Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, with less significant numbers coming from Botswana, Tanzania and Namibia (Johnson 2000). Once in the country, they were openly denied (the limited) rights accorded to indigenous colonial subjects (i.e. autochthonous African ethnic groups). Though Zimbabwe is now typically understood as a migrant-sending country, there have been both permanent and temporary flows of refugees into the country post-1980, including from Mozambique in the context of that country's civil war, with these refugees initially 'self-settled in rural villages, farming and mining areas' (Chikanda and Crush 2016: 3) along the border. Groves (2020) and Daimon (2018) offer comprehensive historical and contemporary accounts of migration of Malawians into Zimbabwe and their lives once there.

Furthermore, ongoing forced displacements by the state internal to colonial Zimbabwe contributed to complicating the ethnic landscape, leading to ethnic appropriations, assimilations and conflicts. Together, these processes led in some instances to the creation of multi-ethnic chiefdom-governed areas, as propagated and recognised by the colonial state. The ongoing (forced and sometimes voluntary) movements of indigenous and 'foreign' Africans into and out of kraals, villages, wards and districts brought about significant confusion over land entitlements, adding to the multiplicity of ethnic-based land and boundary conflicts, which were overlain at times by a modernity-tradition 'divide' related to class and religious sensibilities. Certainly, the 1960s saw an upsurge in land disputes, some brought before local chiefs for mediation and others not. In Gokwe, for example, ethnic clashes arose between the Shangwe and 'Madheruka' over differences in farming and religious practices, with the former following traditional religion and the latter adopting Christianity (Nyambara 2001; Alexander and McGregor 1997; Maravanyika 2012). Nyambara (2002) speaks of waves of immigrants moving into the Gokwe region

(originally sparsely populated by indigenous Shangwe), including labour migrants from Malawi who worked on mines and settler farms and wanted a piece of land for homes on retirement.

1.4.2 Ethnicity and Anti-colonial Struggles

The presence and significance of localised ethnic identities became increasingly apparent as nationalist struggles emerged in the last 1950s (Scarnecchia 2008) and the guerrilla struggle, though haltingly, began a decade later. There is now significant literature which does not reduce—simplistically—the war of liberation to two political-military-ethnic alliances, namely ZAPU, its guerrilla army and Ndebele people on the one hand, and ZANU, its guerrilla army and Shona people on the other. This literature considers localised belongings and the rural nationalisms of ethnic minorities during the war, such as Tonga (McGregor 2009), Hlengwe (Chisi 2019) and Basotho (Mujere 2012). Nyachega (2017: 77, 78) focuses on the frontier area of Honde Valley, arguing that the valley 'remained on the fringes of the colonial state' up until the 1950s (with minimal state intrusions), such that a 'strong anti-colonial consciousness' had not arisen. In a deep ethnography of the Honde Valley, Schmidt (2013) likewise argues that, in the case of agitation around land, 'grievances were expressed in vernacular mode, not in nationalist discourse' (Schmidt 2013: 119). McGregor (2009) notes that, in Binga, Tonga cultural nationalism articulated with ZAPU's overall political message, with ZAPU organisers stressing the marginalisation of Tonga language and culture, as well as the broader anti-colonial message based on national-based grievances. Maxwell (1993) examines the Katerere area historically. Progressive, and relatively wealthy, Manyika immigrants from Makoni had been evicted to Katerere, and they occupied a higher rank than the local Hwesa and Barwe in the ethnic hierarchy. When ZANU's guerrillas entered the area, they first contacted the African Christian elites at the missions and those in the Manyika-dominated villages.

All this implies that, as a general trend, ethnicisation became intrinsic to many of the localised struggles of (and within) the African population, and that it characterised the politics of mass nationalism from the late 1950s and the war of liberation specifically in the 1970s. As well, to emphasise, just as ethnic projects and struggles among the African population in colonial Zimbabwe are not reducible to the colonial state's configuration and stabilisation of ethnic identities, they are not wholly explainable in terms of the machinations of anti-colonial elites and their high-politics (Msindo 2012). In 1979, Masipule Sithole published *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle* (Sithole 1999) in which he details the ongoing and intense conflict within the nationalist movements (ZANU and ZAPU), dating back to the early 1960s, with the key focus on ethnic tensions and battles in explaining this conflict (between Shona and Ndebele generally, and within the sub-ethnic clusters among the Shona). This inspired other studies to consider the instrumentalist use of ethnicity by political elites (sometimes labelled as tribalism) within the nationalist movement during

the 1960s and 1970s, without concluding though that ethnicity was the key factor in intra-nationalist antagonism and splits or that, in articulating projects of ethnic belonging, ordinary people were simply borne along by the tribalism of nationalist leaders.

1.4.3 Ethnicity in Post-1980 Zimbabwe

Colonial ethnic realities, as well as memories of a pre-colonial past, remain alive in post-colonial Zimbabwe. In contemporary Zimbabwe, 'ethnicity continues to impinge on the ongoing nation-building processes' (Mhlanga 2013: 48). Even Zimbabwe's current ten administrative provinces tend to be geographically demarcated along ethnic and sub-ethnic lines, and the identity cards of 'indigenous' Africans still bear the numbers of their ethnic districts of origin. Overall, the post-colonial state inherited the colonial ethnic structures, practices and discourses (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009) and reproduced these as well, and quite deliberately so. As Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007: 275) argue, ethnicity has 'continued to shape and influence the economic, social, and political life of Zimbabwe since the achievement of independence in 1980'. This includes a strong element of outright tribalism, or the exploitation of ethnicity as a coalescing factor or rallying point in building alliances of inclusion and exclusion.

There has been an array of instances of people from different ethnic affiliations (such as the Karanga, the Manyika, the Zezuru and the Ndebele, among others) trying to outwit each other in achieving certain political outcomes in the name of a truncated form of nation-building. Certainly, ethnic categories and contestations are important to the internal politics of the ruling ZANU-PF party (under both Mugabe and Mnangagwa), and to the party's conception of national belonging. Such exclusionary and parochial approaches to post-colonial nation-building are carried out and legitimised through discourses which construct 'ethnic minorities' as irrelevant to national debates and politics. Elite members of socio-politically powerful ethnic groups (notably, Shona) have adopted authoritarian approaches to nationhood that have so far constricted democratic space for those perceived to be ethnic minorities (Ndhlovu 2007). As Ndhlovu (2007: 133) argues, though perhaps too boldly: 'The issue of ethnic differences and the politics of [ethnic] minoritisation have come to constitute the major determinants of struggles for socio-political and economic influence and the subsequent domination of ethnic polities that have limited access to the corridors of power'.

In part, the ethnic question continues to loom large because of the legacy of the massive state repression and violence (known as *Gukurahundi*) against Ndebele-speakers (in the Matabeleland provinces and Midlands province) by ZANU-PF-linked security forces during the first half of the 1980s, a political-military project which sought the extermination of ZAPU and the establishment of a one-party state by ZANU-PF (Doran 2017). Officially 'resolved' through the Unity Pact of 1987, this period of extreme violence appeared to depict Zimbabwean society as consisting

exclusively of two ethnicities in battle for the soul of the nation. It formed part of a larger narrative increasingly propagated by ZANU-PF about its fundamental role in the war of liberation and its exclusive (almost divine) right and capacity to rule over the post-colonial nation—a narrative (known alternatively as Patriotic History or the *Chimurenga* Monologue) which became entrenched at the turn of the century. Muzondidya (2007) demonstrates how this authoritarian and narrow form of nationalist discourse further marginalised a range of 'subject minorities' which existed outside the parameters of national belonging and citizenship (including foreign African workers and ethnic groups like the Tonga).

While the *Gukurahundi* episode saw ZANU-PF building and consolidating its ethnocracy, and victimising and killing Ndebele people in the process, it is important not to reduce any part of Zimbabwe to one ethnicity, including Matabeleland. As Msindo (2012) notes, Matabeleland is not Ndebele-land as ethnic minorities live in the area—not only Kalanga but also Tonga and Venda. Often in tension with others, or in subordination to them, ethnic minorities in post-colonial rural Zimbabwe pursue livelihoods to the best of their ability, as this volume seeks to show. In the case of Matabeleland, Dzingirai (2003: 446), for example, examines conflicts in the early 1990s between Ndebele and Tonga in Binga District specifically, with 'powerful Ndebele migrants' showing hostility towards the Tonga. The Tonga benefitted (at least officially) from a Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) project, with Ndebele-speakers opposing the project and seeking to replace it with commercial agriculture. The latter did this with the support of 'big men' in ZANU-PF. Similarly, Madzudzo and Dzingirai (1995) analyse a CAMPFIRE project in Bulilimamangwe and Binga districts, with a particular focus on resource-based contestations between the Tshwa San and Kalanga/Ndebele. Later, with respect to the national elections of June 2000, McGregor (2009) shows that Binga District delivered the highest opposition vote for the new political opposition (Movement for Democratic Change—MDC) of any rural constituency in the country. In this case, ZANU-PF's discourse on land (and race), as part of the emerging fast track land reform programme, did not fully resonate with the memories of local Tonga people, as those in Binga did not lose land to white farmers but to state conservation bodies. Hence, 'they did not want to be resettled on former commercial farms but wanted access to state resources and reparations for unsettled grievances relating to the [Kariba] dam and displacement' (McGregor 2009: 170) dating back to the 1950s. The strident nationalist rhetoric of ZANU-PF did not displace local Tonga claims and aspirations.

Despite the fact that fast track land reform was a land redistribution programme and not a restitution one, numerous cultural, ancestral and ethnic claims to particular tracts of land were prominent during the land occupations underpinning fast track (see Helliker et al. 2021). Because of forced removals during the colonial era, many occupiers cited the importance of reclaiming (specific pieces of) ancestral lands lost (Mkodzongi 2016). For example, while Shona and Ndebele 'immigrants' occupying farms and other lands in the Lowveld did so for redistributive reasons, Shangaan people were motivated by ancestral-ethnic claims (Wolmer 2007). Likewise, Ndau identity was of some significance for land occupations in Chipinge

(Maposa et al. 2010). Additionally, those occupying the Eastern Highlands Plantation in Nyanga claimed it as the original home of the Tangwena, Zindi and Chavhanga people (Marongwe 2003). During the occupation of Wolfscrag farm in Chipinge, claims to ancestral lands were strong among those displaced under colonialism (Zamchiya 2011). In Chiweshe, villagers from the Hwata/Chiweshe and Zumba dynasties, then scattered around the country, organised to occupy an area called Gomba on autochthonous grounds. In the Save Valley conservancy, many occupations of the ranches there related to ancestral longings and thus revealed 'long-term contests over the landscape' (Wolmer 2007: 210). For instance, the (ethnically) Ndau Gudo occupiers from Sangwe communal areas had burial sites and ritual pools on Levanga Ranch. The literature abounds with such examples, often entailing ethnic conflicts, with Mujere (2011) and Fontein (2006) providing examples from Masvingo Province.

More generally, the land occupations, unintentionally, provided political space for numerous and diverse indigenous African ethnicities and sub-ethnic clusters to assert claims of belonging to lost lands which would, simultaneously, offer new opportunities (on reclaimed lands) for livelihood construction. It is known though, as Fontein (2009) shows in relation to certain occupations near Lake Mutirikwi, that some occupiers made autochthonous claims ex post facto, or only after occupying a farm. This entailed reinventing their reasons for the occupation based on somewhat dubious claims around cultural-ethnic belonging. Meanwhile, alien Africans (i.e. those of foreign origin) were typically not among the 'fast track' occupiers, but they felt the brunt of the occupations insofar as many laboured on white commercial farms. Like indigenous African farm labourers, they belonged to the white farm or white farmer; unlike the latter, though, they struggled to access communal (previously, Reserve) land because of their allochthonous status. Some workers of foreign origins (for instance, Malawians) were able to replace belonging to the farm with new forms of belonging. In a study from Mashonaland West, Daimon (2021: 2) argues that specific ex-migrant farm labourers (mainly former senior employees) 'were and have been able to reinvent themselves and act as intermediaries between war veterans, ZANU-PF officials and white farmers, and subsequently benefit from the land reform'.

1.4.4 Language and Ethnicity

The original Independence constitution dating back to 1980 and adopted as per the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 recognised only three languages (Shona, Ndebele and English) for purposes of communication. English became the official language of Zimbabwe while Shona and Ndebele were labelled as national languages. The rest were categorised as minority languages and given neither priority nor prominence (Hachipola 1998; Ndhlovu 2007). This historically perpetuated and cemented the minority status of linguistic-cum-ethnic minorities. However, over time, the languages of a number of linguistic minorities became increasingly promoted by

ethnic minorities, and by the Zimbabwean state at times. In 1997, the Zimbabwean government set up the Language National Advisory Policy Panel that researched and submitted recommendations to the government concerning a comprehensive national language policy. Subsequently, the Education Minister (David Coltart) in the Government of National Unity (2009–2013) invoked the Language Act to introduce Tonga, Kalanga and Nambya languages into the education curricula. This process led to further languages being officially recognised by the Zimbabwean state (by way of the 2013 constitution), though likely at the expense of other minor languages (Dziva and Dube 2014).

Thembani Dube (T. Dube 2020) notes how the Kalanga, through cultural societies, has sought recognition in the context of marginalisation and subordination to Ndebele-speakers, particularly by promoting TjiKalanga language. In the case of the Shona, Ndau-speakers have pursued autonomous recognition, with Sithole (2018: 427) arguing that 'a sense of being Ndau continues to exist into the present albeit in a modified form'. The languages recognised by the 2013 constitution are as follows: Chewa, Chibarwe, English, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Sign Language. Though ethnicity is not reducible to language, giving formal status to minor languages goes a long way to acknowledging the presence of ethnic minorities (Magwa and Mutasa 2007; Dziva and Dube 2014). There is ongoing evidence in Zimbabwe of ethnic minorities, under their own initiatives, pushing for social, economic and political inclusion (Manyena 2013). In this light, Bhebhe and Ngoepe (2021) discuss a number of ethnic associations in Zimbabwe which document the history of ethnic minorities (including Tonga, Nambya, Kalanga, Tshwa San, and Shangaan).

In 2012, Zimbabwe joined the rest of the world in celebrating the 20th anniversary of the unanimously adopted United National Declaration for Minorities (1992), as the key international document pertaining to the granting and protection of rights for minority groups by states in all spheres of life (Dziva and Dube 2014). Among other points, the Declaration stresses: 'States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity'. For most African states, Zimbabwe included, the declaration's anniversary came amidst ubiquitous marginalisation of minority groups, including ethnic minorities. In the case of Zimbabwe, despite some important advances, this continues to be the case, with far-reaching implications for the livelihoods of ethnic minorities.

1.4.5 Ethnic Minorities and Livelihoods in Zimbabwe

As discussed, a large body of literature on ethnicity in Zimbabwe exists, but often in relation to the colonial invention of ethnicity and with a focus on Shona and Ndebele ethnicities and contestations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Ranger 1984; Beach 1980). Questions around citizenship, nationhood and the nation-state with reference to ethnicity and ethnic politics have captured the attention of a number of scholars

(Muzondidya 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Mlambo 2013). Importantly, there is now increasing literature giving purposeful attention to ethnic minorities, including the agency of ethnic minorities in promoting and protecting their languages (Dziva and Dube 2014; Makoni 2011; Mavesere 2010; Mumpande 2020), and the intersections between ethnicity, language and politics in the context of nation-building in Zimbabwe (Ndhlovu 2007).

On the ground, though, regions and communities inhabited by ethnic minorities continue to be marked by significant levels of underdevelopment and deprivation. The lives and livelihoods of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe entail high levels of precariousness, vulnerability and poverty (Zishiri et al. 2021; Zhou 2014). In this context, there is a growing number of studies on ethnicity which examine the livelihoods of ethnic minorities, mainly through the prisms of landscape and belonging. These studies unearth how ethnic minorities engage in a politics of landscape-belonging as a basis for incorporation into national development processes—primarily through recognition, on an ethnic basis, of a legitimate claim and access to specific localised natural resources (McGregor 2009; Matanzima 2021; Mashingaidze 2020; Matanzima and Saidi 2020). The contributors to this volume, who write from the perspective of ethnicity, have been central to the development of this new body of literature and their work provides an important bridge between two disparate sets of literature: one on ethnicity and the other on livelihoods.

As with ethnicity, there is significant research explicitly on livelihoods in Zimbabwe. But, generally, this literature does not incorporate questions of ethnicity. These studies typically make some attempt to draw upon an analytical framing of livelihoods via the Livelihoods Framework (Kabonga 2020; Mudimu 1997; Chiweshe and Muzanago 2016). This includes a number of livelihood studies of rural Zimbabwe (Bird and Shepherd 2003; Scoones et al. 1996; Shackleton et al. 2000; Scoones 2015; Goebel 2007; Nyamwanza 2012). There are only a few livelihood studies which seek to understand the relevance of ethnicity to livelihoods (Scoones 2015). These include a study by Dube et al. (2021), using the Livelihoods Framework, on the ongoing marginalisation of the Tshwa San in Tsholotsho and Bulilima districts, where they engage in casual labour for Kalanga and Ndebele neighbours; and the book by Matsa (2021) which, in the context of ongoing climate change, examines the marginal areas of Bulilma, Binga and Beitbridge in southwestern Zimbabwe and the farming livelihood activities of ethnic minorities such as Venda, Tonga, San and Suthu. This literature, alongside the ethnicity literature with a livelihoods dimension, is beginning to provide us with a fuller understanding of the lives of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe, as well as with ways of framing analytically and linking projects of belonging and projects of livelihoods.

At least implicitly, Mutopo (2014) considers the dual projects of identity and livelihoods in relation to gender, by examining—from the perspective of women—the simultaneous quest for belonging and land on a fast track farm. The work of Rutherford (2011) opens up a similar approach with respect to the world of work, specifically farm labour. In discussing the turbulent lives of Zimbabwean migrants in northern South Africa, Rutherford talks about 'working and belonging' or 'strategies of livelihoods and belonging': 'the concept mode of belonging is used to examine the

relations through which people … can make claims to reside in, and possibly access means of livelihood, in different spaces' (Rutherford 2011: 1305). Belonging means staking a claim and accessing resources on this basis, and this process constitutes an important dimension to the livelihood projects of ethnic minorities, in both past and present Zimbabwe.

1.5 Volume Outline

The book has 12 chapters, including this introductory chapter which theorises and historicises the livelihoods of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe. The following eleven empirical chapters appear in three parts: *Land, Livelihoods and Ethnicity*; *Wildlife, Livelihoods and Ethnicity*; and *Crisis, Livelihoods and Ethnicity*. The first two parts cover the colonial and post-colonial periods, while the third part has a more specific focus on the post-2000 period of economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. The chapters recognise the relational and situational character of ethnicity, and hence the (often) troubled interactions between the ethnic minority studied and other ethnic groups are brought to the fore, as is the shifting character of these ethnic minorities in the context of disruptions and changes to their livelihoods.

The first three chapters, in Part I, focus on land, livelihoods and ethnicity. In Chap. 2, Davy Ndlovu, Ben Begbie-Clench, Robert Hitchcock and Melinda Kelly examine the Tshwa San living primarily in Tsholotsho District of Matabeleland North and Bulilimamangwe District in Matabeleland South. Recent surveys indicate that the population size of Tshwa is approximately 2,800. The vast majority of Tshwa today are subsistence farmers, though some of them work for other groups including Kalanga and Ndebele as cattle and goat herders, agricultural field hands, and domestic workers. Many Tshwa supplement their subsistence with gathering of wild plants and insects. After their forcible relocation from what is now Hwange National Park in the late 1920s, Tshwa moved to commercial farming areas and worked as field hands. Some Tshwa worked at the colliery in the town of Hwange, and a few were employed by the wildlife department in the park. Currently, most live in communal areas. This chapter documents the colonial and post-colonial issues facing the Tshwa, including government policies, environmental factors, and economic stress. In the past decade, the Tshwa have engaged in cultural empowerment and revitalisation efforts and are organising themselves to promote social justice and human rights in the Zimbabwe nation-state.

The following chapter by Joseph Mujere (Chap. 3) examines how Basotho migrants from South Africa established livelihoods based on freehold land ownership and agriculture in Southern Rhodesia. Basotho farmers migrated from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia in the 1890s and were among the first Africans to purchase freehold land in the colony. They were later displaced to African Purchase Areas in the 1930s following the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act. Their early success resulted in colonial officials viewing them as progressive Africans whose work ethic needed to be emulated by indigenous Africans. They were also hailed for

being among the first African farmers to supply milk to creameries that had been established in the colony. Basotho's farmers sought to become examples to other African farmers and to be considered 'men of the soil.' Despite their early success, Basotho farmers faced several challenges that include displacement from their farms and land disputes. The chapter concludes that Basotho migrants' livelihoods were intricately linked to their ownership of freehold farms and their quest for belonging.

In Chap. 4, Taderera Hebert Chisi provides an analysis of the Hlengwe people of the south-east Lowveld of Zimbabwe, who are commonly known as Shangaan/'Machangana' or Tsonga. Their traditional livelihood activities such as hunting, fishing, gathering, agriculture and trade were unique to the extent that they could be easily used as features of identity differentiation between the Hlengwe and neighbouring 'ethnic others' such as Duma and Karanga. However, the uniqueness of some of these activities has diminished over the years. This chapter is premised on the argument that the livelihood activities of ethnic communities are not static but shift with time in response to changes in the social, political and physical environment. In this context, it analyses the transformation of the Hlengwe livelihood activities from 1890 (the time of British colonialism) to the twenty-first century. Overall, the Hlengwe livelihood activities morphed over the years to a point where, by the early twenty-first century, ethno-commerce or commodification of marketable features of identity such as cultural symbols, art and craft and living cultures remained the main livelihood activity which still reflected Hlengwe ethnicity more than any other activities in the modern multi-ethnic society of the south-east Lowveld.

In the following four chapters (in Part II), the central theme is wildlife, livelihoods and ethnicity. Vincent Jani (Chap. 5) examines Zimbabwe's community-based natural resource management programme, called CAMPFIRE, which was aimed at integrating biodiversity conservation with community livelihoods. This integration is far from simple, especially when two ethnic groups with different livelihood practices are drawn into one project under local political leadership. Such is the case in Chapoto Ward, in the north of Zimbabwe, where the Doma and Chikunda ethnic groups co-exist. Thus, the focus of this chapter is on how the livelihoods of the minority Doma group have been affected by the local CAMPFIRE project. Specific objectives include: identifying the livelihood practices of the Doma; assessing the impact that CAMPFIRE has had on their livelihood practices; and demonstrating the negative reinforcement of politics and ethnic bias regarding Doma livelihoods. Fieldwork-based research findings demonstrate the variety of livelihood practices in existence and show how these practices were hampered by the CAMPFIRE initiative. Ethnic discrimination and stigmatisation, which placed the Doma in a subordinate position vis-a-vis other dominant groups, further demonstrate their restricted circumstances.

In Chap. 6, Joshua Matanzima and Ivan Marowa draw upon the concept of precarious livelihoods to unpack the conflicts occurring between people and wild animals in the Tonga communities of north-western Zimbabwe. The chapter considers the uncertainties and vulnerabilities of Tonga livelihoods due to the presence of, and attacks, from wild animals. On a day-to-day basis, the Tonga experience harm caused by animals to their lives, livelihoods and/or properties. The Tonga communities

studied survive mainly on fishing in Lake Kariba or the tributaries of the Zambezi River as well as subsistence farming. Along Lake Kariba, they have conflicts with such animals as hippos and crocodiles, their fields are often trampled by elephants, buffaloes and duikers, and their livestock especially cattle and goats are attacked by lions, leopards and hyenas. These human-wildlife conflicts take place within a particular historical and spatial context, notably the forced displacement of the Tonga from the Zambezi River in the late 1950s and their post-displacement presence in an area of Zimbabwe marked by an arid ecosystem (in large part unsuitable for agriculture) alongside poverty and hunger. Thus, currently, they are placed between a rock and a hard place, between threatening wildlife and an arid environment. The chapter is based on extended ethnographic fieldwork among the Tonga communities of in particular the Mola, Musampakaruma and Sinakatenge chiefdoms.

In the case of Chap. 7, Emmanuel Ndhlovu provides a comprehensive examination of the livelihoods of the 'Shangane' nation (and specifically the Chisa of Gotosa) in south-eastern Zimbabwe. The Chisa people have a complex and convoluted history because of multiple forced displacements including from their ancestral lands which now form part of the Gonarezhou National Park. The chapter traces the origins and livelihoods of the Chisa people from pre-colonial times, through the colonial period, and into the post-independence period including in the context of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The history of the Chisa people is a story of incessant land displacements, but it is also one of resistance against top-down colonial projects. Though they may have benefited from the FTLRP through access to redistributed land, this falls far short of calls for restitution, that is, regaining access to their ancestral lands in Gonarezhou and the sense of identity and nationhood which would come with this. Hence, using the Chisa of Gotosa as a case study, the chapter demonstrates how Chisa livelihoods were distorted with each displacement (since the 1950s), with the FTLRP, in fact, actually pushing them further away from their ancestral lands.

Oppenheimer Chiweshe, in Chap. 8, examines the lives and livelihoods of the Nambya people of Hwange district in north-western Zimbabwe. This entails detailing their origins, convoluted history, interactions with other African ethnicities (such as the Ndebele), the barrenness of the lands occupied, and the involuntary and coerced displacements to which they were subjected. Hwange is regarded as unproductive land as it is characterised by sandy soils, and hot and dry conditions, such that pursuing livelihoods there is deeply problematic. Despite this, the Nambya devised diverse survivalist strategies to make a living out of the arid environment, and this entailed adapting their agriculture to this marginal environment. The Nambya and their livelihoods were affected by numerous waves of displacements. For example, one wave saw the Nambya being displaced for making way for the mining of coal and another involved the Nambya being removed to make way for Hwange National Park. In each case, broad-based development was not forthcoming in the district and the Nambya did not benefit in any significant manner. This is demonstrated by a sweeping historical analysis from pre-colonial to post-colonial times.

In Part III, the focus becomes ethnicity and livelihoods in the context of the current crisis in Zimbabwe. In Chap. 9, Codelia Govha Dhodho examines the Tonga

of Binga District, in particular the severe food crisis in 2008 which caused mass starvation, given in particular the Zimbabwean government's ban on the distribution of relief food after the contested presidential elections. This chapter considers the long-term marginalisation of the Tonga people and its contribution to the food crisis, and the Tonga's responses to the crisis. It traces events after the involuntary displacement of the Tonga from the banks of the Zambezi River in the late 1950s and their ensuing neglect by both the colonial and post-colonial governments. The political and economic challenges in the country from 2000 to 2009 pushed the Tonga to the edge of starvation. While non-governmental organisations (NGOs) distributed food aid to the Tonga post-1980, this led to dependency as the people abandoned their traditional coping mechanisms thereby weakening their livelihood resilience. Further, the Zimbabwean government argued that NGOs were in a regime-change alliance with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with strong Tonga support for the MDC. The government banned NGOs from providing food aid to the Tonga during the 2008 drought, leading the Tonga to fall back on their traditional food crisis coping mechanisms, notably wild foods.

Patience Chadambuka, in Chap. 10, highlights that the marginalisation of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe has been authored and reinforced by the nation-state and, historically across both the colonial and post-colonial periods, this has had profound implications on the livelihoods of ethnic minorities. These ethnic groups include Africans of 'foreign' origin whose roots are often traced to neighbouring countries, mainly Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi. These ethnic communities are today mainly a 'colonial residue', consisting of various generations of migrants who came into the country mostly as covenanted labour during the colonial era. This chapter focuses on one specific group, namely the Chewa originally from Malawi, who lived and worked on white commercial farms in Zimbabwe for decades and over generations. From the year 2000, they were displaced from the farms in the context of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme and some migrated to communal areas, as they had lost ties, or had no ties, to their purported country of origin. Through a case study of Bushu communal areas in Shamva District, this chapter focuses on the re(invention) of livelihoods by the displaced ex-farm workers in ethnicised communal areas in the face of disputes around agrarian spaces and land access, and how they sought to belong to these areas in the process.

In Chap. 11, Anusa Daimon emphasises that, in the aftermath of the Zimbabwean crisis, communities have sought alternative livelihoods to survive the economic meltdown that has characterised the Zimbabwean political economy since 2000. Existing historiography has detailed the numerous strategies and tactics that have been deployed by Zimbabweans in the last two decades to circumvent the resultant economic challenges. However, it has not detailed how some African ethnic minorities, including those which have been pushed to, and subjugated at, the margins of the Zimbabwean nation and are living in a 'state of unbelonging', have uniquely engaged their cultural cosmologies as an alternative economic livelihood. Using the case of people of Malawian ancestry and their Nyau/Gule Wamkulu cultural dances, the chapter demonstrates how, among other survival strategies, these people have distinctly resorted to their cultural practices for economic survival in the face of a

crisis that systematically displaced the majority of them from their traditional occupations as farm workers and miners (through the agrarian-land reform, industrial retrenchments and mine shutdowns). Malawian communities have thus uniquely used their ethnicised Nyau cultural dances for income generation through performances on Zimbabwean farms, mines and urban areas during local and national events.

Finally, Nicholas Nyachega and Vongai Olivia Sagonda (in Chap. 12) demonstrate how borderland livelihoods are always impacted, in significant ways, by the changing economic and socio-political developments in both the "edges" and the "inlands" of the state. The chapter explores how the Honde Valley's ethnic minority groups of Ndau, Malawian and Mozambican origins, as well as the majority Shona families of Manyika roots undertook various forms of livelihoods from the late 1970s to 2020. Although historically diversified, working in the tea plantations, subsistence farming, small businesses and cross-border trading have always remained central to the Honde Valley communities' livelihoods. The Zimbabwean economic and political crisis that started in the early 2000s affected the operations of tea estates such as Aberfoyle and Katiyo where most im/migrant families worked. The crisis affected the livelihoods of people of foreign roots and the locals too. However, for the locals, banana farming became the main source of their livelihoods, leading to what has been termed the Honde Valley 'banana boom' which started in the early 2000s. While the banana boom has witnessed a significant transformation of the Honde Valley people's livelihoods, it has been characterised by many challenges, including land disputes, unstable markets and state meddling in the face of Zimbabwe's deteriorating economic and political contexts.

References

Alexander J, McGregor J (1997) Modernity and ethnicity in a frontier society: understanding difference in north-western Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 23(2):187–201

Anthias F (2013) Identity and belonging: conceptualisations and political framings. KLA Working Paper Series No. 8; Kompetenznetz Lateinamerika—Ethnicity, Citizenship, Belonging. http://www.kompetenzla.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/WP_Anthias.pdf

Antonsich M (2010) Searching for belonging—an analytical framework. Geo Compass 4/6 (2010):644–659

Arrigoitia MF (2017) Unsettling resettlements: community, belonging and livelihood in Rio de Janeiro's *Minha Casa Minha Vida*. In: Brickell K, Arrigoitia MF, Vasudevan A (eds) Geographies of forced eviction: dispossession, violence, resistance. Palgrave Macmillan, London

Banks N (2015) Livelihoods limitations: the political economy of urban poverty in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Dev Change 47(2):266–292

Batibo HM (2006) Marginalization and empowerment through educational medium: the case of the linguistically disadvantaged groups of Botswana and Tanzania. In: Putz M, Fishman JA, Aerstlaer JA (eds) Along the routes to power: explorations of empowerment through language. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin and New York

Beach D (1980) The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900–1850. Heinemann, London

Bhebhe S, Ngoepe M (2021) Ethno-community archiving: selected case studies in Zimbabwe with emphasis on oral history. Afr Identities. https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2021.1910012

Bird K, Shepherd A (2003) Livelihoods and chronic poverty in semi-arid Zimbabwe. World Dev 31(3):591–610
Bilge N, Marino MI, Webb LM (2021) Definitions of Ethnicity in Communication Scholarship: A New Perspective. Howard J Commun 32(3):213–234
Carney D (2002) Sustainable livelihoods approaches: progress and possibilities for change. DFID, London
Carruthers J (2003) Past and future landscape ideology: the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park. In: Beinart W, McGregor J (eds) Social history and African environments. James Currey, Oxford, pp 225–266
Chambers R, Conway G (1992) Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century. IDS Discussion Paper 296, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
Chikanda A, Crush J (2016) The geography of refugee flows into Zimbabwe. Afr Geogr Rev 35(1):18–34
Chisi TH (2019) Hlengwe memories of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, 1975–1979. Oral Hist J South Afr 7(1):1–13
Chiweshe MK, Muzanago K (2016) Livelihoods in a sack: gendered dimensions of sack potato farming among poor households in Urban Zimbabwe. In: Fletcher A, Kubik W (eds) Women in agriculture worldwide: key issues and practical approaches. Routledge, London, pp 91–102
Chome N (2020) Land, livelihoods and belonging: negotiating change and anticipating LAPSSET in Kenya's Lamu county. J East Afr Stud 14(2):310–331
Daimon A (2018) 'Totemless Africans': the historical antecedents of the anti-Malawian discourse in Zimbabwe, 1920s–1979. J South Afr Stud 44(6):1095–1114
Daimon A (2021) In the shadows of the third Chimurenga? African migrant intermediaries and beneficiaries within Zimbabwe's agrarian reform matrix. Crit Afr Stud 13(2):183–196
De Haan L, Zoomers A (2003) Development geography at the crossroads of livelihood and globalisation. Tijdschrift Voor Econ En Soc Geo 94:350–362
Doke CM (1931) Report on the unification of the Shona dialects. Stephen Austin, Hertford
Doran S (2017) Kingdom, power, glory—Mugabe, ZANU and the quest for supremacy, 1960–1987. Sithatha Media, Johannesburg
Dube F (2020) Public health at the border of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, 1890–1940: African experiences in a contested space. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (Switzerland)
Dube T (2020) Language, resistance and multilingualism in post-colonial Zimbabwe: The Kalanga and their struggle for recognition. J South Afr Stud 46(6):1183–1201
Dube T, Ncube C, Moyo P, Phiri K, Moyo N (2021) Marginal communities and livelihoods: San communities' failed transition to a modern economy in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe. Dev Southern Afr. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2021.1955660
Duri FPT (2010) Informal negotiation of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border for survival by Mutare's marginalised people. J Dev Societies 26(2):125–163
Dzingirai V (2003) 'CAMPFIRE is not for Ndebele Migrants': the impact of excluding outsiders from CAMPIRE in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 29(2):445–459
Dziva C, Dube B (2014) Promoting and protecting minority languages in Zimbabwe: use of the 1992 UN Minorities declaration. Int J Minority Group Rights 21:395–413
Ellis F (1998) Survey article: household strategies and rural livelihood diversification. J Dev Stud 35(1):1–38
Fontein J (2006) Languages of land, water and 'tradition' around Lake Mutirikwi in Southern Zimbabwe. J Modern Afr Stud 44(2):223–249
Fontein J (2009) 'We want to belong to our roots and we want to be modern people': new farmers, old claims around Lake Mutirikwi, Southern Zimbabwe. Afr Stud Q 10(4):2–35
Forsyth T, Michaud J (2011) Rethinking the relationship between livelihoods and ethnicity in Highland China, Vietnam, and Laos. In: Michaud J, Forsyth T (eds) Moving Mountains: highland livelihoods and ethnicity in China, Vietnam and Laos. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, pp 1–27

Goebel A (2007) We are working for nothing: livelihoods and gender relations in Rural Zimbabwe, 2000–06. Canadian J Afri Stud 41(2):226–257
Groves ZR (2020) Malawian migration to Zimbabwe, 1900–1965: tracing Machona. Palgrave MacMillan, Chan (Switzerland)
Hachipola SJ (1998) A survey of the minority languages of Zimbabwe. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare
Harriss J (1997) Policy arena: 'missing link' or analytically missing? The concept of social capital. J Int Dev 9(7):919–971
Helliker K, Bhatasara S, Chiweshe MK (2021) Fast Track Land Occupations in Zimbabwe: In the Context of the Zvimurenga. Springer, Cham
Helliker K, Chiweshe MK, Bhatasara S (eds) (2018) The political economy of livelihoods in contemporary Zimbabwe. Routledge, London
Hughes DM (1999) Refugees and squatters: immigration and the politics of territory on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. J South Afr Stud 25(4):533–552
Islam KK, Sato N (2013) Protected Sal forest and livelihoods of ethnic minorities: experience from Bangladesh. J Sustain For 32(4):412–436
Johnson D (2000) World War 2 and the scramble for labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939–1948. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare
Kabonga I (2020) Reflections on the 'Zimbabwe crisis 2000–2008' and the survival strategies: the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) analysis. Afr Rev 12(2):192–212
Kachena L, Spiegel SJ (2019) Borderland migration, mining and transfrontier conservation: questions of belonging along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Geo J 84:1021–1034
Levine S (2014) How to study livelihoods: bringing a sustainable livelihoods framework to life. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Working Paper 22
Long N (2000) Exploring local/global transformations: a view from anthropology. In: Arce A, Long N (eds) Anthropology, development, and modernities: exploring discourses, counter-tendencies and violence. Routledge, London, pp 184–201
MacGonagle E (2007) Crafting identity in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. University of Rochester, NY
Madzudzo E, Dzingirai V (1995) A comparative study of the implications of ethnicity on CAMPFIRE in Bulilimamangwe and Binga districts in Zimbabwe. Zambezia XXII(i): 24–41
Magwa W, Mutasa E (2007) Language and development: perspectives from sub-Saharan Africa. NAWA J Lang Com 1(1):57–68
Makoni S (2011) A critical analysis of the historical and contemporary status of minority languages in Zimbabwe. Curr Iss Lang Plann 12(4):437–455
Manyena S B (2013) Ethnic identity, agency and development: the case of the Zimbabwean Tonga. In: Cliggett L, Bond V (eds) Tonga timeline: appraising sixty years of multidisciplinary research in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Lembani Trust, Lusaka, pp 25–66
Mao S, Qiu S, Li T (2020) Tang M (2020) Rural households' livelihood strategy choice and livelihood diversity of main ethnic minorities in Chongqing. China. Sustainability 12:1–15
Maposa RS, Hlongwana J, Gamira D (2010) 'Aluta continua': a critical reflection on the chimurenga-within-third Chimurenga among the Ndau people in Chipinge district, southern eastern Zimbabwe. J Afr Stud Dev 2(6):191–200
Maravanyika S (2012) Local responses to colonial evictions, conservation and commodity policies among Shangwe communities in Gokwe, Northwestern Zimbabwe, 1963–1980. Afri Nebula 5:1–21
Marongwe N (2003) Farm occupations and the occupiers in the new politics of land in Zimbabwe. In: Hammar A, Raftopoulos B (eds) Zimbabwe's unfinished business: rethinking land, state and nation. Weaver Press, Harare, pp 155–190
Mashingaidze TM (2020) Risk and vulnerability in an untamed landscape: The Zimbabwean Tonga in the Aftermath of the Kariba Dan Induced Displacements, 1956–1980s. J Human Sec Stud 9(1):21–44

Matanzima J (2021) Thayer Scudder's four stage framework, water resources dispossession and appropriation: the Kariba case. Int J Water Res Dev. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2020.1866505
Matanzima J, Saidi U (2020) Landscape, belonging & identity in North-west Zimbabwe: a semiotic analysis. Afr Identities 18(1–2):233–251
Matsa M (2021) Climate change and agriculture in Zimbabwe: sustainability in minority farming communities. Springer, Cham (Switzerland)
Mavesere M (2010) Situating African languages in the global village for sustainable development: attracts and challenges for Zimbabwe and Africa cultural renaissance project. In: Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute International Conference. Sandton convention centre, Johannesburg, South Africa
Maxwell D (1993) Local politics and the war of liberation in North-East Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 19(3):361–386
McGregor J (2009) Crossing the Zambezi: the politics of landscape on a central African frontier. James Currey, Suffolk
Merino MC, Tileaga C (2011) The construction of ethnic minority identity: a discursive psychological approach to ethnic self definition in action. Discourse Soc 22(1):86–101
Mhlanga B (2013) Ethnicity or tribalism? The discursive construction of Zimbabwean national identity. Afr Identities 11(1):47–60
Mkodzongi G (2016) 'I am a Paramount Chief, this land belongs to my ancestors': the reconfiguration of rural authority after Zimbabwe's land reforms. Rev Afr Polit Eco 43(S1):99–114
Mlambo AS (2009) From the Second World War to UDI, 1940–1965. In: Raftopoulos B, Mlambo AS (eds) Becoming Zimbabwe: a history of Zimbabwe from pre-colonial period to 2008. Weaver Press, Harare, pp 75–114
Mlambo A (2013) Becoming Zimbabwe or becoming Zimbabwean: identity, nationalism and state-building. Afr Spectrum 48(1):49–70
Moore D (2005) Suffering for territory: race, place and power in Zimbabwe. Weaver Press, Harare
Morse S, McNamara N (2013) Sustainable livelihood approach: a critique of theory and practice. Springer, New York
Msindo E (2006) Ethnicity not class? The 1929 Bulawayo faction fights reconsidered. J South Afr Stud 32(3):429–447
Msindo E (2007) Ethnicity and nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950 to 1963. J Afr History 48:267–290
Msindo E (2012) Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele Societies, 1860–1990. University of Rochester Press, New York
Mudimu G (1997) Urban Agricultural activities and women's strategies in sustaining family livelihoods in Harare, Zimbabwe. Singapore J Trop Geogr 17(2):179–194
Mujere J (2011) Land, graves and belonging: land reform and the politics of belonging in newly resettled farms in Gutu, 2000–2009. J Peasant Stud 38(5):1123–1144
Mujere J (2012) Autochthons, strangers, modernising educationists, and progressive farmers: Basotho struggles for belonging in Zimbabwe 1930s-2008. PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Mumpande I (2020) The revitalization of ethnic minority languages in Zimbabwe: the case of the Tonga language. MA Dissertation, University of South Africa
Mutopo P (2014) Belonging and rural livelihoods: women's access to land and non-permanent mobility at Merrivale Farm, Mwenezi District, Zimbabwe. Erdkunde 68(3):197–207
Muzondidya J (2007) Jambanja: ideological ambiguities in the politics of land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 33(2):325–341
Muzondidya J, Ndlovu-Gatsheni S (2007) 'Echoing silences': ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980–2007. Afri J Conflict Resolut 27(2):275–297
Ndhlovu F (2007) The role of discourse in identity formation and the manufacture of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe. J Multicultural Discourses 2(2):131–147

Ndlovu-Gatsheni S (2009) Do 'Zimbabweans' exist? Trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crisis in postcolonial state. Peter Lang, Bern
Ndlovu-Gatsheni S (2012) The death of the Subject with a capital 'S' and the perils of belonging: a study of the construction of ethnocracy in Zimbabwe. Crit Arts 26(4):525–546
Ndlovu-Gatsheni S, Willems W (2009) Making sense of cultural nationalism and the politics of commemoration under the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 35(4):945–965
Nyachega N (2017) Beyond war, violence, and suffering: everyday life in the Honde Valley borderland communities during Zimbabwe's liberation war and the RENAMO insurgency, c.1960–2016. Unpublished MA thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa
Nyambara PS (2001) The closing frontier: agrarian change, immigrants and the 'squatter menace' in Gokwe, 1980–1990s. J Agrarian Change 1(4):534–549
Nyambara PS (2002) Madheruka and Shangwe: ethnic minorities and the culture of modernity in Gokwe, northwestern Zimbabwe, 1963–1979. J Afr Hist 43(2):287–306
Nyamwanza AM (2012) Resiliency and livelihoods inquiry in dynamic vulnerability contexts: insights from Northern Zimbabwe. Unpublished thesis, University of Manchester
Poe MR, LeCompte J, McLain R, Hurley P (2014) Urban foraging and the relational ecologies of belonging. Soc Cul Geogr 15(8):901–919
Prowse M (2010) Integrating reflexivity into livelihoods research. Progress Dev Stud 10(3):211–231
Quandt A (2019) Variability in perceptions of household livelihood resilience and drought at the intersection of gender and ethnicity. Clim Change 152:1–15
Raftopoulos B, Mlambo A (eds) (2009) Becoming Zimbabwe: a history from the pre-colonial period to 2008. Weaver Press, Harare
Ranger TO (1984) Missionaries, migrants and the Manyika: the invention of ethnicity in Zimbabwe. Seminar Paper Presented to the African Studies Institute. University of the Witwatersrand, 2 April 1984
Rodgers C (2020) Identity as a lens on livelihoods: insights from Turkana, Kenya. Nomadic Peoples 24:241–254
Rutherford B (2011) The uneasy ties of working and belonging: the changing situation for undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in northern South Africa. Ethnic Racial Stud 34(8):1303–1319
Sakdapolrak P (2014) Livelihoods as social practices: re-energising livelihoods research with Bourdieu's theory of practice. Geographica Helvetica 69:19–28
Scarnecchia T (2008) The urban roots of democracy and political violence in Zimbabwe, Harare and Highfield, 1940–1964. Rochester University Press, Rochester
Schmidt HI (2013) Colonialism & violence in Zimbabwe: a history of suffering. James Currey, Woodbridge
Scoones I (1998) Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis. IDS Working Paper. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
Scoones I (2009) Livelihoods perspectives and rural development. J Peasant Stud 36(1):171–196
Scoones I (2015) Sustainable livelihoods and rural development. Practical Action Publishing, Rugby
Scoones I, Chibudu C, Chikura S, Jeranyama P, Machanja W, Mavedzenge B, Mombeshora B, Mudhara M, Mudziwo C, Murimbarimba F, Zirereza B (1996) Hazards and opportunities: farming livelihoods in dryland Africa: lessons from Zimbabwe. Zed Books, London
Shackleton S, Shackleton C, Cousins B, (2000) Re-valuing the communal lands of Southern Africa: new understanding of rural livelihoods. Natural Resource Perspectives, 62 (November) ODI, London
Sithole M (1999) Zimbabwe: Struggles-within-the-Struggle (1957–1980). Rujeko Publishers, Harare
Sithole E (2018) Identity consciousness among the Ndau people in Zimbabwe: unravelling mysteries, misconceptions and justifications. Afr Identities 16(4):412–428
Solesbury W (2003) Sustainable livelihoods: a case study of the evolution of DFID policy. ODI Working Paper 217. London.
Speranza C, Wiesmann U, Rist S (2014) An indicator framework for assessing livelihood resilience in the context of social-ecological dynamics. Global Envir Change 28:109–119

Thieme S (2008) 'Sustaining livelihoods in multi-local settings: possible theoretical linkages between transnational migration and livelihood studies. Mobilities 3(1):51–71
Torres BS, Gunter R, Acevedo-Cabra KT (2018) Livelihood strategies, ethnicity and rural income: the case of migrant settlers and indigenous populations in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Forest Policy Econ 86:22–34
Trincsi K, Pham H, Turner S (2014) Mapping mountain diversity: ethnic minorities and land use land cover change in Vietnam's borderlands. Land Use Policy 41:484–497
Turner S (2012a) 'Forever Hmong': ethnic minority livelihoods and agrarian transition in upland Northern Vietnam. Prof Geogr 64(4):540–553
Turner S (2012b) Making a living the Hmong way: an actor-oriented livelihoods approach to everyday politics and resistance in Upland Vietnam. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 102(2):403–422
Umbanaso MU, Korieh CJ (2010) Minorities and the State in Africa. Cambria Press, Amherst and New York
Van Dijk T (2011) Livelihoods, capitals and livelihood trajectories: a more sociological conceptualisation. Progress in Dev Stud 11(2):101–117
Vawda S (2017) Migration and Muslim identities: Malawians and Senegalese Muslims in Durban. South Africa. J Study of Religion 30(2):32–74
White S, Ellison M (2006) Wellbeing, livelihoods and resources in social practice. In: Gough I, McGregor JA (eds) Wellbeing in developing countries: from theory to research. Cambridge University Press, Gough Cambridge, pp 157–175
Wilshusen PR (2012) Capitalizing conservation/development: misrecognition and the erasure of power. In: Büscher B, Fletcher R, Dressler, W (eds) Questioning the market panacea in environmental policy and conservation. University of Arizona Press, Tuscon
Wolmer W (2007) From wilderness vision to farm invasions: conservation and development in Zimbabwe's South-East Lowveld. James Currey, Oxford
Yoshikuni T (1989) Strike action and self-help associations: Zimbabwean worker protest and culture after World War I. J of South Afr Stud 15(3):440–468
Youkhana E (2015) A conceptual shift in studies of belonging and the politics of belonging. Social Inclusion 3(4):10–24
Yuval-Davies N (2010) Theorizing identity: beyond the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy. Patterns of Prejudice 44(3):261–280
Yuval-Davies N, Wemyss G, Cassidy K (2018) Everyday bordering, belonging and the reorientation of British immigration legislation. Sociology 52(2):228–244
Zamchiya P (2011) A synopsis of land and agrarian change in Chipinge District. Zimbabwe. J Peasant Stud 38(5):1093–1122
Zenker O (2011) Autochthony, ethnicity, indigeneity and nationalism: time-honouring and state-oriented modes of rooting individual–territory–group triads in a globalizing world. Critique of Anthro 31(1):63–81
Zhou M (2014) Segmented assimilation and socio-economic integration of Chinese immigrant children in the USA. Ethnic and Racial Stud 37(7):1172–1183
Zishiri C, Mapolisa T, Magumise J (2021) Post-secondary education challenges of students from ethnic minorities groups living on Commercial farms in peri- urban areas in Zimbabwe. IJHSS 2(1):32–40
Zoomers A, Westen G (2011) Introduction: translocal development, development corridors and development chains. Int Dev Plann Rev 33:377–388

Kirk Helliker is a Research Professor in the Department of Sociology at Rhodes University in South Africa, where he also heads the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies, which he founded in 2015. He publishes widely on Zimbabwean society and also supervises a significant number of PhD and MA students, mostly on Zimbabwean topics. His most recent books focus on crisis-living in contemporary Zimbabwe and the fast track land occupations in the context of *zvimurenga.*

Joshua Matanzima is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Social Inquiry at La Trobe University, Australia. He is also a member of the Gwembe Tonga Research Project. He has done extensive fieldwork in the Zambezi Valley among the Tonga people. His research interests lie in the fields of human-wildlife interactions, anthropology of landscape and resettlement as well as religion and social change. His previous publications appear in such journals as *International Journal of Water Resources DevelopmentAfrican Identities, Water International* and *Oryx*.

Patience Chadambuka is a lecturer and Acting Chairperson in the Community Studies Department (formerly Sociology Department), in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. She holds a PhD in Sociology from Rhodes University, South Africa and a MSc in Sociology and Anthropology as well as a Post Graduate Diploma in Tertiary Education from the Midlands State University. Her areas of interest include land and agrarian studies, migration, ethnicity, livelihoods and gender studies.

Part I
Land, Livelihoods and Ethnicity

Chapter 2
The Tshwa San of Zimbabwe—Land, Livelihoods, and Ethnicity

Davy Ndlovu, Ben Begbie-Clench, Robert K. Hitchcock, and Melinda C. Kelly

Abstract Tshwa San live primarily in western Zimbabwe in Tsholotsho District of Matabeleland North and Bulilimamangwe District in Matabeleland South and are one of two groups in Zimbabwe who self-identify as indigenous people. Recent surveys indicate that the population size of Tshwa is approximately 2,800. The vast majority of Tshwa today are subsistence farmers, though some of them work for other groups including Kalanga and Ndebele as cattle and goat herders, agricultural field hands, and domestic workers. Many Tshwa supplement their subsistence with gathering of wild plants and insects. After their forcible relocation from what is now Hwange National Park in the late 1920s, Tshwa moved to commercial farming areas and worked as field hands. Some Tshwa worked at the colliery in the town of Hwange, and a few were employed by the wildlife department in the park. Currently, most live in communal areas. This chapter documents the colonial and post-colonial issues facing the Tshwa, including government policies, environmental factors, and economic stress. In the past decade, the Tshwa have engaged in cultural empowerment and revitalisation efforts and are organising themselves to promote social justice and human rights in the Zimbabwe nation-state.

Keywords Tshwa · Indigenous people · Resettlement · Agropastoralism · Land reform · Labour migration

D. Ndlovu (✉)
Tsoro-O-Tso Development Trust, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
e-mail: mdavadavy@gmail.com

B. Begbie-Clench
Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia

R. K. Hitchcock
Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

M. C. Kelly
Kalahari Peoples Fund, Albuquerque, NM, USA

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_2

2.1 Introduction

There has been a long-standing debate in Zimbabwe about the human rights of indigenous people and other marginalised communities in the country (Human Rights Watch 2000; Howard-Hassmann 2009, 2010; Ndlovu 2010, 2013, 2017; Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission 2017; Chingwe 2019). The Tshwa San of Zimbabwe were among the first indigenous people in southern Africa whose communities were relocated involuntarily from a protected area and whose rights were seriously abrogated. This relocation was a result of decisions by the then Southern Rhodesian administration to create a game reserve in the western part of the country bordering on the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which was done in 1927. The plan was to appoint a warden to oversee the game reserve, part of whose job was to remove any people who were living inside of its boundaries. The relocation focused mainly on 'Bushmen', otherwise known as Abatwa or Amasili, many of whom now self-identify as Tshwa San.

This chapter focuses on the Tshwa San of western Zimbabwe. It draws on research undertaken over the last three decades by the authors and their colleagues. After a discussion of the ethnohistory and ethnography of the Tshwa in Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe Districts, we examine the ways in which the Tshwa were treated by other people including the Ndebele, Kalanga, and European settlers. An important event affecting the Tshwa was the creation of the Wankie Game Reserve in 1928 by the Southern Rhodesian administration and the relocation of the resident Tshwa populations to places outside of the reserve. As we show, the Tshwa were also affected by government-imposed land reforms beginning in the 1920s and 1930s which reduced the amounts of land available for Tshwa use. We then discuss what happened to the Tshwa during the Zimbabwean liberation war (1965–1980) and their subsequent experiences in the post-independence period, when Tshwa, Ndebele, and Kalanga were dealt with harshly by the new Zimbabwean government in the period known as Gukurahundi (1981–1987). After this, we assess the impact of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme that began in 2000, which the Tshwa did not benefit from. The economic downturn of 2008 affected the Tshwa and other Zimbabweans, resulting in increased poverty and declining economic and nutritional well-being. We conclude with a discussion of the current livelihood and socio-political status of the Tshwa.

2.2 The Tshwa

The Tshwa are a San-speaking group who today occupy western Zimbabwe and northern Botswana. Numbering 2,800 people in Zimbabwe and 7,900 people in Botswana, the Tshwa are former foragers who now are agropastoralists and wage labourers who engage in foraging primarily as a source of supplemental food or, to a lesser extent, cash income. Tshwa are found in western Zimbabwe, where they

reside primarily in Tsholotsho District in Matabeleland North Province and Bulilimamangwe District in Matabeleland South. The Tshwa speak a 'Central San' (Khoe) language similar to the G/ui and G//ana of the western and central Kalahari and the Naro San of the Ghanzi Ridge (Güldemann 2008, 2014; Vossen 2013; Fehn and Phiri 2017; Pratchett 2018, 2020). The Tshwa are sub-divided into a number of different named groups, including /Aise, Ganade, and Danisan (Hitchcock 1988: 66, Table 1; Hitchcock et al. 2018). All of the Tshwa have totem animals which they honour and generally avoid eating, and there are a sizeable number of different sub-groups among the Tshwa with particular totems (Dornan 1925: 68; Cashdan 1979: 41–45; Hitchcock 1982: 135–137). Tshwa differ somewhat from other peoples of hunting and gathering origin in southern Africa in that they were generally sedentary for a substantial portion of the year but engaged in mobile foraging the balance of the year. It should be stressed that most Tshwa were heavily integrated into the regional economies of Kalanga, Ndebele, and other agropastoral populations by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Tshwa were organised into bands of 20–60 persons in size. The bands were connected through kinship, affinal (marital), and friendship ties. In the early twentieth century, they were mobile, moving approximately three to eight times a year, depending on the season and the availability of water, wild plants, and wild animals. The Tshwa were generally egalitarian, though they did have local leaders (*//Aiha*) from whom individuals and other groups sought permission to enter their territories. They also had healers (*ʧóò-khòè*, plural: *ʧóò-rà)* who healed people through going into trances, laying on of hands, or through recommending specific plants to treat illnesses and infections. Long-distance hunts were led by specialised hunt leaders (*káè-tcá-bá-tcò*).

In the late nineteenth century, the area along the border between Zimbabwe and Botswana was called 'the Hunters' Road', because of the number of European hunters and traders who passed through this area on their way to Victoria Falls (Tabler 1963, 1966). Some of these hunters later established trading stores where goods were available for purchase by travellers and local people. These stores served as information nodes along the road, as well as depots for the purchase of wildlife products such as ostrich feathers, ivory, and skins in exchange for a variety of goods provided to people including sugar, maize meal, blankets, and metal tools. The Tshwa were known throughout southern Africa for their hunting abilities, and they sometimes served as guides or trackers for people hunting large animals (Mohr 1876: 156–157; Holub 1881: 82–83; Oates 1881: 25, 28; Hodson 1912: 205–206, 227–228). The ethnohistoric literature on the Tshwa indicates that they underwent certain social, economic, and technological transformations in part as a result of their contacts with other groups. Exchanges of goods, ideas, and information between Tshwa and their neighbours led to transformations in Tshwa social, economic, and political organisation, including the rise of specialists such as hunt leaders and professional healers.

2.3 Creation of the Wankie Game Reserve

The Tshwa were heavily affected by the creation of the Wankie Game Reserve in the late 1920s. Wankie Game Reserve was originally declared in 1927 and was established as Wankie (now Hwange) National Park on January 29, 1950. The protected area is 14,651 km^2 in size and is the largest national park in Zimbabwe. The declaration of Wankie as a game reserve came about partially because of the Southern Rhodesian administration's recognition of the large numbers of animals, plants, and insects in the area (for a description of the wildlife in Wankie and adjacent areas, see Wilson 1975; Smithers 1983).

In the latter part of the 1920s, the Southern Rhodesian administration required substantial numbers of people, possibly up to 1,000 or more, to move out of the Wankie protected area. According to oral testimony, some of the Tshwa moved south towards Tsholotsho and Plumtree, while others moved into what is now Botswana. Some Tshwa also moved north towards Wankie (now Hwange) District. According to ethnohistoric information and contemporary ethnographic interviews, the livelihoods of Tshwa declined significantly as a result of these moves. At the same time, some Tshwa chose to enter into the local and regional economies, working in the coal mines of Hwange and on commercial farms owned by Europeans. Others opted to remain as foragers, engaging in wildlife utilisation and wild plant collection. About a dozen Tshwa joined the National Parks and Wildlife Management Service, some of them working in Wankie Game Reserve and later, Hwange National Park (Fanuel Nangati, personal communications, 1992, 1993; David Cumming, personal communication, 2013; Gary Haynes, personal communications, 2014, 2020, 2021).

At the time that the British South Africa Company began devising its land policies in what was to become Southern Rhodesia, the plan was to establish various land categories, including freehold (private) land, reserved for whites; native reserves, designated for black farmers; and state land, which would be protected areas (Palmer 1977; Ncube 2004; Mlambo 2014). Two native reserves, Gwaai and Shangani, were designated around Wankie, Gwaai to the south and Shangani (Lupane) to the north of the game reserve.

In the park area itself, in the nineteenth century, Tshwa were mobile and obtained water through digging pits close to pans or in the beds of seasonal rivers. There was some use of Wankie by groups other than Tshwa San, including Nambiya, Ndebele, and Kalanga, most of whom entered the area briefly for purposes of hunting or seeking labourers to work on their farms. There is evidence in Wankie of Iron Age archaeological sites, a number of which are stone-walled villages, indicating that agropastoralists had occupied the Wankie area previously (McGregor 2005; Wriston 2013; Simon Makuvaza, personal communication, 2020). Today, some of these archaeological sites attract tourists and, in a few cases, Tshwa serve as guides to the monuments.

Hwange and Tsholotsho initially were occupied by the ancestors of the Abatwa San. The original name (Tjolotjo) was derived from the Tshwa word 'Tsoro-o-tso' meaning 'the head of an elephant'. The area in the nineteenth century was a favoured

haunt of elephant herds which attracted early ivory hunters. When the Ndebele arrived in western Zimbabwe in 1838, the area supported large herds of elephants and other large animals (rhinoceros, lions, giraffes), a wide variety of predators, and a diverse assemblage of smaller species.

The rinderpest epidemic of 1896–1897, combined with extensive hunting of large mammals by both Europeans and local people, led to a reduction in wildlife numbers in Southern Rhodesia and many other parts of southern Africa (van Oselen 1972). Elephant populations in particular were disturbed considerably by hunters in the latter part of the nineteenth century. As indicated by local people, one response of the elephants in the Wankie and Tsholotsho regions was a tendency to bunch up in small mixed herds. Without the leadership of the matriarchs, there was greater destruction of crops, according to local community members. Some of the local farmers responded accordingly, opting to shoot the animals on sight, especially if they were in their fields.

The depletion of wildlife fuelled concerns in the British South Africa Company and the colonial government of Southern Rhodesia that the resource potential of the region would be lost unless steps were taken to stop the killing. One way to deal with the problem, it was decided, was to utilise the 'royal game' principle of the Ndebele and Kalanga chiefs and to declare wildlife species as state property. It was made illegal for individuals to kill wild animals even if animals invaded their fields or threatened their lives. As one Tshwa put it, '[t]he Europeans became the gamekeepers, and the Africans became the poachers'. Killing of wild animals was thus disallowed in the early part of the twentieth century.

In the period between 1890 and 1923, the Department of Agriculture oversaw the administration of game in Southern Rhodesia. The first full-time officer with responsibility for overseeing game management in the Wankie Game Reserve, Ted Davison, was appointed in 1928. Davison undertook trips into the Reserve area to assess its status and to tell Bushmen and other residents that they were breaking the law for continuing to live in Wankie (Davison 1977: 17–24). These efforts were not easy, as noted by Davison, who said, 'Bushmen who knew the area kept their secrets, refusing to divulge any information at all – probably because they felt this might lead to the arrest of relatives engaged in poaching' (Davison 1977: 16). One of his tasks, as Davison noted, was to warn people that the area was now a game reserve and that they were not allowed to live there (Davison 1977: 20). Davison, unlike other Southern Rhodesian wildlife personnel, had a certain amount of empathy for Bushmen. This is revealed in a statement he made in his book:

> These Bushmen, in fact, evoked a degree of sympathy. They were not really poachers in the worst sense. Just like a pride of lions, they killed only for their own needs, amounting to not much more than an animal a week. However, the law had come to Wankie Game Reserve, and it had to be implemented. (Davison 1977: 21)

Unfortunately, there were other, less positively inclined individuals, some of whom worked for the Southern Rhodesian government, and others who were self-appointed conservationists. One of these men, H.G. Robins, was a former hunter who resided on a farm to the north of Wankie Game Reserve. Davison (1977: 23)

highlights that Robins was obsessed with the idea that the region was 'infested with poachers, all of whom were concentrating their efforts on his land'. Robins carried out patrols both by vehicle and on foot, looking for the tracks of Bushmen who he believed were responsible for what he saw as declining numbers of large game. Tshwa in the region described how Robins hunted people down and either beat them or turned them over to government authorities. Tshwa remember all too well the one-humped camels (*Camelus dromedarius*) used by Southern Rhodesian police and the military to search for alleged poachers and lawbreakers (Wilson 2007).

Davison concluded after his initial surveys of the Wankie region that the poaching problem was not nearly as serious as he had been led to believe (Davison 1977: 23–24). He admitted that there were indeed Bushmen families moving around the area, some of them with muzzleloaders (Davison 1977: 24). These Bushmen apparently were not using either poisoned arrows or wire snares, items that were considered by game rangers to be highly lethal to game populations. In Davison's opinion, the biggest constraint affecting wildlife populations in Wankie was not poaching but rather the availability of surface water.

In the period between 1927 and 1930, the Tshwa were informed that they had to move out of the Wankie Game Reserve. As noted above, some of them did so, but others retreated into the dry interior of the game reserve along the Botswana-Zimbabwe border. Patrols were sent in to arrest people and to remove them from the game reserve. While people were arrested and jailed, their families attempted to eke out an existence in areas south of the park. A few Tshwa went to areas north of the Wankie Game Reserve, and some moved to the Gwaai and Lupane areas where they worked for African farmers.

2.4 Processes of Resettlement

Tshwa San are a transboundary people, living on both sides of the Botswana-Zimbabwe border. Some Tshwa utilised areas on both sides of the border, with territories ranging in size from 50 km^2 to 200 km^2 in size (Hitchcock 1982, 1988). Like the Tshwa in Zimbabwe, those living in Botswana experienced forced removals. Thus, many of the Tshwa in Botswana who were living in what were known as the Northern Crown Lands of the Bechuanaland Protectorate were rounded up and relocated away from their ancestral areas, after an incident in which two Royal Air Force flyers vanished while on a training flight from Kumalo in 1943 and local Ganade Tshwa were blamed for their disappearance (Laverick 2015; Hitchcock et al. 2017; Skidmore-Hess 2021). The Bechuanaland Police Service and members of the Bamangwato Tribe went into the Northern Crown Lands mounted on camels and forced Tshwa families at gunpoint to relocate to places south of the Nata River in what is now Central District.

Prior to their removals, groups of Tshwa who resided in the Wankie area utilised the seasonal pans and rivers, wildlife, and vegetation before their eviction and resettlement. The majority of Tshwa in Southern Rhodesia were moved from the Wankie

area in the late 1920s to 'Native reserves' which consist of communal lands. In line with colonial government policy, all communal land is state land, as is also the case in post-colonial Zimbabwe (Scoones et al. 2011). The Tshwa, therefore, did not have *de jure* (legal) rights to the land that they occupied. They were able to obtain access to plots of land for residential, agricultural, and income generation purposes from traditional authorities or the central government, but they potentially could lose their land at any time, as several informants noted happened to them in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as well as more recently, particularly after 2000.

The colonial government was reluctant to have Native reserves of farmers inside of Wankie because (1) the soil fertility was low, (2) water distribution was problematic, and (3) there were patches of a plant that was poisonous to cattle, known locally as *m'khauzaan* (or *mogau*, *Dichapetalum cymosum*) (Bromwich 2014; Haynes, n.d.: 114). People who were relegated to the Native reserves on the boundaries of Wankie thought of them as 'cemeteries, not homes' (Haynes, n.d.: 114). One reason for these beliefs was that the Native reserves, as well as Wankie itself, were known to have tsetse fly (*Glossina morsitans*) which carried sleeping sickness which caused high rates of mortality among livestock and affected human beings as well.

Oral history testimony underscores the privation and hunger that occurred among the Tshwa who were resettled and prevented from engaging in hunting and gathering activities. As one Tshwa elder put it: 'We were so hungry that we were forced to eat leaves and bark of trees' (Tshwa informant, December 1980). Famine occurred among the Tshwa and their neighbours in 1901–1902, 1933, 1947, and after Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980. 'Famine and hunger were the order of our lives', said one elderly Tshwa woman in December 2013.

Oral history data indicate that the Tshwa shifted towards a more mixed economic system. Some of the Tshwa households raised crops, especially sorghum, millet, melons, and, by the mid-twentieth century, maize and beans. During these ongoing troubled times, the Tshwa were no longer mobile, and they depended as much as they could on wild foods. An important source of protein for many Tshwa was mopane worms (*Imbrasia belina*) which they sun dried to eat year-round or to sell (Hitchcock et al. 2016: 40–44). Interactions between Tshwa and Kalanga also expanded during this time (Ncube 2018). In this context, working for livestock producers played a significant role. Tshwa male household heads became herders (*badisa*) for Ndebele, Kalanga, and Ngwato cattle owners, receiving milk, grain, and sometimes a cow a year in exchange for their labour.

In communal villages such as Tsholotsho, Tshwa were exploited as domestic workers by Ndebele and Kalanga and they were paid little for their work. Some Tshwa left the villages and moved out to places west of Tsholotsho to work as cattle herders for Kalanga and Ndebele. In return for their work, they were sometimes allowed to drink the milk of the livestock they were caring for, but they did not receive any wages or other food. A few Tshwa said in interviews that they felt the conditions they were working under were tantamount to slavery.

The Tshwa and other people in the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe were well-acquainted with military activities. During the Zimbabwean war of liberation (1965–1980), they had been subjected to repeated military attacks by government forces and

were forcibly resettled into 'protected villages' where they were not allowed to have weapons, carry out hunting activities, or even protect their crops from marauding wildlife. Both sides of the war (Rhodesian and guerrilla forces) sought to utilise the Tshwa for their own purposes. Most Tshwa, for their part, wanted to be simply left alone, so some of them moved into remote parts of Tsholotsho or across the border to Botswana.

After Zimbabwe achieved its independence on 18 April 1980, tensions continued to be felt in Matabeleland, where one of the major groups of freedom fighters, the Zimbabwe Peoples Liberation Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), had its primary base of support. Some of the former guerrillas felt that they had not been treated appropriately by the new government under Robert Mugabe, and tensions erupted into conflict in late l980 and early 1981. Some of the former guerrillas returned to the bush and began what turned into a low level insurgency. Beginning in 1982 and continuing into the mid-1980s, the Zimbabwean government carried out counter-insurgency operations against those they termed 'dissidents'. These operations included military attacks on villagers, kidnappings of suspected terrorists, torture and murder of detainees, a wide range of atrocities against the civilian population, and restriction of the movement of food into the area.

This period was described by the Tshwa, Ndebele, and Kalanga, as 'the time of troubles'. It is known as '*Gukurahundi*' in Shona, a term which is used to describe the spring rains that wash away the chaff from the wheat (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation 2008; Mpofu 2016; Ngwenya 2018). Tshwa and others have helped to recover some of the human remains from mass graves and old mines into which they were dumped during the course of the genocide (see Eppel 2014; Fontein 2014 for a discussion of the recovery of the remains). Testimonies from Tshwa provide insights into the ways in which the genocide was carried out (see, for example, Hitchcock and Twedt 1997).

The government of Zimbabwe has since imposed strict censorship on discussions and depictions of what transpired during that period. Tshwa remember this period as one of state terror, and they, like the Ndebele and Kalanga, want to see a national level investigation into what happened during this time, and have called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission along the lines of what was done in South Africa after the end of Apartheid in 1994. The government of Zimbabwe, for its part, refuses to acknowledge that *Gukurahundi* was a genocide.

The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) saw some early benefits for Tshwa communities, but those have declined considerably in the past two decades (Rihoy et al. 2010; Ndlovu 2020). One of the problems with the CAMPFIRE programmes is that the benefits were given directly to district councils, which used them for such projects as road development and the construction of community centres (Peterson 1991; Patel 1998). In Tsholotsho, the setting aside of an area in the west for use by safari hunting operations led to a reduction in the amount of land available for Tshwa for residences, agriculture, and grazing (Patel 1998). There were few direct impacts on Tshwa household economic systems from CAMPFIRE.

Overall, the socio-economic status of the Tshwa in contemporary Zimbabwe remains deeply problematic. A report on the nutritional situation among the San in southern Africa (Dieckmann 2018) contains a section on Zimbabwe which indicates a trend towards increased nutritional stress and impoverishment in recent years. Some of the nutritional hardship among Tshwa has been offset by government social safety net programmes as well as programmes of international agencies such as United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

2.5 Post-2000 Land Reform and Other Events

Beginning in 2000, Zimbabwe embarked on an extensive land reform programme, the Fast-Track Land Reform (Chimhowu and Hulme 2006; Scoones et al. 2011), which saw the resettlement of farmers and agropastoralists from communal lands in other parts of Zimbabwe into areas historically inhabited by the Tshwa. Hence, according to Tshwa in Tsholotsho, they did not move to the new fast track farms, as an influx of farmers from other areas moved into western Zimbabwe to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the land reform programme, a process that increased the local competition for land. The Tshwa applied for fast track land through village headmen and headwomen and through the provincial administrations in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. However, they were largely unsuccessful in having farming land allocated to them. At the same time, as of 2021, no Tshwa had been granted *de jure* rights to land in communal areas, an issue that was raised with three government ministers who visited Tsholotsho in July 2021 (Zimbabwe Cabinet Report, August 2021: 4–7).

In 2008, Zimbabwe, like much of the rest of the world, was affected by the global slowdown in the economy brought about in part by the banking and real estate crisis. During this period of hyperinflation, incomes of Tshwa and other people in Zimbabwe declined, and poverty increased substantially (Larochelle et al. 2014; Zhou 2014; UNICEF Zimbabwe 2019). In some cases, Tshwa sought employment in other countries, including Botswana and, to some extent, Zambia and South Africa. Labour migrants would send remittances back to their households in Zimbabwe. Cross-border migration has been affected by Botswana and South African government immigration policies and the establishment of an increasing number of cross-border checkpoints in the past decade.

In recent years, the government of Zimbabwe has complained about Botswana's construction of fences along the Botswana-Zimbabwe border. There are no fences along the western side of Hwange National Park, so elephants have been moving out of the park into Botswana because some of the water points in Hwange have been shut down periodically to save fuel. A problem is that northeastern Botswana has been also experiencing a drought and many of the pans which elephants had visited in Botswana in the past were dry. As a result of this situation, elephants and buffalos were entering into more heavily-populated areas where they came into greater contact with both domestic animals and people, causing human-wildlife conflict. Several

people have been injured by wild animals in the Manxotae area along the Nata River in northeastern Botswana, and local people were pressing the government to protect them from elephants and buffalo (Masego Nkelekang Mogodu, personal communication, 2013). There were also concerns about the potential spread of foot-and-mouth disease from Zimbabwe into Botswana.

Resettlement pressures around Hwange increased substantially in September 2013, when the carcasses of elephants and other animals were discovered in the southern portion of the park and in areas outside of the park in Tsholotsho District. There were indications that cyanide was used to kill the animals (Muboko et al. 2014, 2016). Ivory was taken from some of the elephant carcasses, indicating potential poaching or scavenging. Subsequently, over two dozen people from Tsholotsho, Bulawayo, and other places, were arrested for alleged involvement in the procurement, distribution, and use of cyanide. After the elephant and other animal deaths were discovered, people residing in the areas close to the southern boundary of Hwange National Park, including some Tshwa and Ndebele families, were told by government and provincial officials that they had to move to new places away from the southern boundary of the park. However, as of September 2021, they have not been informed of any relocation plans or compensatory measures.

The security situation for the Tshwa was exacerbated by the killing of a well-known collared lion named 'Cecil' by Walter Miller, an American dentist from Minnesota, on 29 June 2013 (Lindsey et al. 2016; Buhrmester et al. 2018; Mkono 2018; McCubbin 2020). As it turned out, Cecil was lured out of Hwange National Park by a professional safari guide who worked for a company known ironically as Bushman Safaris, using a dead animal dragged by a vehicle. A worldwide outcry about the ethics of trophy hunting ensued, which called into question the ethics of the hunters and companies involved in the killing of Cecil. This incident worried some local people (including Tshwa) because they felt it might contribute to a reduction of safari hunting—or the outright banning of hunting—in Zimbabwe, which they believed would reduce potential sources of jobs and income. The Tshwa community in Tsholotsho lobbied for hunting permit waivers when they met with three government ministers in Tsholotsho in July 2021, though no hunting permits were granted (Tshili 2021a).

The Zimbabwean government has been pressuring the Tshwa to acculturate—to adopt settled agriculture and to send their children to school. On a visit to Tsholotsho in May of 2013, President Robert Mugabe said that the Tshwa 'were a culture that is resistant to change' (Staff Reporter, *New Zimbabwe* 2013: 2). He went on to say that the schools in Tsholotsho should have a deliberate policy to recruit children from Bushman families, and that the aim should be to incorporate them into the larger Zimbabwean society and, in doing so, to modernise them. The Tshwa resented the idea that they were considered 'vagrants' or 'nomadic' and that they were 'totally dependent on other groups for their very existence' (Tshwa elder, personal communication, November 2013).

2.6 Contemporary Livelihoods of Tshwa San in Western Zimbabwe

In order to get some idea of the livelihood situations of Tshwa, surveys were undertaken in Tsholotsho in 2013 (see Hitchcock et al. 2016) and in Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe in 2020 (Ndlovu 2020). The survey methodology that was employed consisted of (a) individual and group interviews, (b) participant observation, (c) archival research, (d) assessments of government and non-government organisation (NGO) reports and documents, and (e) conducting interviews of government, provincial, and district officials. Approximately 2,000 Tshwa lived in Tsholotsho District in 2013. Data were collected in five wards which had a population of 1,021. A total of 150 interviews were conducted. Several conclusions can be reached based on evidence about the livelihoods of the Tshwa and the challenges that they are facing.

Tshwa households had gardens of their own, ranging from 100 square metres to half a hectare in size, and approximately 15 different crops were grown, with the majority of the domestic crops consisting of maize, sorghum, millet, and cowpeas (Hitchcock et al. 2016: 39–41). Table 2.1 presents data on the livestock holdings of the Tshwa sampled households, as well as on livestock-related labour being performed by Tshwa household members. The number of households involved in livestock-related labour, usually herding and livestock management for other non-Tshwa people, is 10 (out of a total of 150). In most of these cases, herders were allowed to drink the milk of the animals they cared for and, in three cases, they were given food in the form of a 50 kilogramme bag of maize meal for their work, but they were not paid in cash.

Judging from the data collected in 2013, none of the 10 people involved in livestock-related labour were given cash for their work, a situation which differs substantially from the Tshwa on the Botswana side of the border. In terms of small stock (sheep and goats) and livestock (cattle, donkeys, horses) holdings, the Tshwa had relatively few small stock (totalling 64), only four households had cattle (for a total of 18); and there were six donkeys in six households. Because of the lack of livestock (notably, cattle), Tshwa used individual human labour to pull ploughs or, in a few cases, they borrowed cattle, horses, or donkeys to form ploughing teams to cultivate their fields (Hitchcock et al. 2016: 41). When they did this, they usually had to provide a portion of the crops they produced to the (non-Tshwa) people from whom they borrowed the draught animals. The system whereby Tshwa had to give up some of their crops was relatively well-institutionalised, but there were numerous complaints about its unfairness from people who took part in this system. Overall, the majority of those Tshwa households that were interviewed said that they were food insecure. Food insecurity and poverty have been on the increase in the past several years, especially with the deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe and the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic.

Considerable concerns were also expressed about the water situation faced by the Tshwa. Some Tshwa households obtained water from the Gariya Dam and from digging in the Amanzanyama River. In 2013, a dozen households reported obtaining

Table 2.1 Numbers of Livestock and Livestock Labour per Tshwa Household in Tsholotsho

Household interview number	Chickens	Goats	Sheep	Donkeys	Horses	Cattle	Livestock related labour
11	4						X
13	1						
15	6	5					
16		1					
17	5						
32		2					
38	9					1	
49	2			2			
50	5						
54	4						
55	10	4					
56	5						
57		2					
60	4	5					
62	4					1	
66	6						
83		5					
84		1					X
92	2						
93	3	2					
103			2				
104	9						
105	5						
107	10			1			
108	10						
113	10						
116							X
118							X
119				1			
124	7	2					
130	1						
136	5	2					
137	2						X
138	11						X
140	3						

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Household interview number	Chickens	Goats	Sheep	Donkeys	Horses	Cattle	Livestock related labour
141							X
181		4					
183	4	5					
190	1					10	
193		5					X
194							X
198		2					
199	15	5		1			
201						6	X
205	4	2		1			
233	6	2					
234	5						
Total 47 households	173	62	2	6	0	18	10

Source Adapted from fieldwork in Tsholotsho, November–December, 2013
Note The household numbers in the first column go beyond 150 because the sample of 150 is part of a larger research sample

water from puddles on the landscape after rains, which they said was their only source of water. The local water quality was poor, and there were reportedly toxins from petrol and other sources. Tshwa who would go under cover of darkness into Hwange National Park said that they were worried about the quality of water in the pans, which they had heard was affected by cyanobacteria—this was in fact thought to be causing the deaths of elephants in 2020 (Farai 2020; Wang et al. 2021). Nearly all the Tshwa to whom we spoke in 2013 and to whom Davy Ndlovu spoke in 2020 said that they believed that access to water was a human right and that they were aware that international organisations such as the United Nations guaranteed that right. Some people pointed out that they were getting far less than the 3.7 L of water per person that they required. They also said that the daily water needs of their domestic animals were not being met, which was leading, they argued, to poor productivity and high rates of animal mortality.

Carrying water to provide for people and livestock is very labour intensive, since water weighs 1.0 kilogramme per 1.0 L. In this regard, the most common domestic animal among the Tshwa (a goat) requires up to 7.5 L of water per day. Nearly 90 per cent of the Tshwa households in Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe reported that they were suffering from lack of adequate water and food in 2020 (Ndlovu 2020). Some Tshwa who worked in Hwange National Park witnessed the degree of investment by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management in artificial water supplies for wild animals (see, for example, Sungirai and Ngwenya 2016). They said

that they wished that these artificial water supplies could be developed for people in areas to the south of Hwange, enabling people to reduce their time and energy investment in water procurement for themselves and their livestock.

Members of indigenous groups are often blamed for involvement in illegal hunting even though the evidence suggests that they play a minor role in poaching. Pressure on the San and other indigenous peoples continues in southern Africa, with arrests and sometimes shootings of people for suspected violation of hunting laws expanding, at least in Zimbabwe. The numbers of people arrested for alleged poaching have increased during the coronavirus pandemic, despite the fact that the numbers of wildlife department personnel have been reduced as a result of cost-saving measures (Koro 2020). Resettlement of people away from the borders of Hwange National Park continues to be a major issue in Zimbabwe, amongst Tshwa, Ndebele, and Kalanga.

The number of Tshwa who crossed the border for employment and other purposes rose in the period between 2013 and March 2020, when there were lockdowns declared by the Zimbabwe and Botswana governments due to the coronavirus pandemic. Tshwa children left school in order to help their parents take care of household chores and watch over younger siblings (Ndlovu 2021). Household incomes declined substantially in the period between March 2020 and September 2021 due in part to coronavirus movement restrictions and the lack of food availability in the small general dealerships and stores in Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe. The government's social safety net programmes were stretched thin by the coronavirus pandemic, and sizable numbers of Tshwa households missed benefits in the past year and a half, setting in motion a downward spiral in their well-being.

2.7 Conclusion

Tshwa in Zimbabwe have been dispossessed as a result of colonial and post-colonial government policies. They were not only removed from Wankie Game Reserve in the late 1920s, but their land rights were compromised by colonial laws including the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. Their land rights have not been recognised by the Zimbabwean government. Because of a combination of factors, including environmental conditions and government policies, in the period from 1980 to the present, the majority of Tshwa today live below the poverty line, and many are food insecure. The periods of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe (for example, in 2008) have led to an increase in poverty among Tshwa. Tshwa have also been affected by land reform and poverty alleviation policies, with some Tshwa receiving commodity support from the Zimbabwean government, NGOs and faith-based organisations. Most Tshwa, however, continue to fall below the poverty datum line (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 2019; UNICEF Zimbabwe 2019; Ndlovu 2020).

Current concerns among the Tshwa include the pandemic, climate change, economic and political uncertainty, land tenure insecurity, the desire to expand employment, education access, and the need to improve their health status and overall

social well-being in the Zimbabwean nation-state. Tshwa women say that they are suffering from what they see as a 'double injustice'—coping with the impacts of climate change and the effects of the pandemic (for a comparable situation in the Nyanga area of Zimbabwe, see Nyahunda et al. 2021). One of the outgrowths of the impacts of climate change is that Tshwa and others believe they are experiencing the loss of indigenous and cultural heritage knowledge, like many groups of indigenous people in other parts of the world (Pearson et al. 2021). Another apparent impact of climate change in western Zimbabwe is an increase in malaria and dengue and Nile Valley Fever, which the Tshwa are worried about. The traditional mechanisms for coping with climate change, such as mobility and diversifying their foraging strategies, are no longer available for the Tshwa, so they are seeking to learn new techniques for coping with drought, floods, disease, and climate change.

Access to education has been a general concern of Tshwa, who have the lowest rates of primary and secondary school attendance of all groups in Zimbabwe. This position is beginning to change, with grants being made by NGOs to Tshwa families to cover school fees. Rates of school attendance were increasing up until 2020 when the pandemic hit (see Phiri et al. 2020). The Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage has promised that additional primary and secondary schools would be established in Tshwa San areas. In 2021, it was noted that the first trio of Tshwa students have made it to university (Tshili 2021b).

One issue raised with the three government ministers that visited Tsholotsho in July 2021 was the lack among the Tshwa of birth certificates and identity documents, which even affected the ability of the Tshwa to bury one of their community members. The lack of identity documents also leaves some Tshwa unable to get access to food and other commodities from government or NGOs when distributions occur. Tshwa argue that the lack of identity documents 'renders them stateless' (Dibiti 2021). The Tshwa in fact are sometimes described as Zimbabwe's forgotten people (Ndlovu 2013; Rankomise 2015), but their efforts to gain national recognition have expanded considerably in the past decade.

In 2012, the Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust (TSDT) was founded, and this organisation has pressed for human rights and fair treatment of Tshwa San, as has the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC). Relatively few Tshwa speak their mother tongue language (Tjwao), so efforts are being made to promote cultural and language revitalisation. The very ethnicity and identity of Tshwa have been questioned by government officials and even some scholars, but the Tshwa have contested these assertions and point to their work in providing mother tongue language and cultural heritage education at the local level. Some Tshwa do tend to hide their identities in order not to be discriminated against, but this strategy appears to be on the decline in recent years. Many Tshwa see themselves as indigenous people first and Zimbabwean citizens second. The reason for this is that the Tshwa believe that the government does not recognise their citizenship or give them credit for their cultural identity.

The Tshwa continue to push for their rights to participate in government development programmes, get formal education opportunities, and have their own traditional authorities recognised by government. The Zimbabwean government has given the

San the green light to start the process of identifying a person to take the position of Chief among the San. In 2021, the Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust undertook investigations of the historical background of all the prominent Tshwa families and has helped to create genealogies and family trees. These materials have been submitted to the local government and the Tshwa are awaiting further instructions from government on this matter.

The Tshwa, for their part, continue to proclaim their cultural identity proudly at every opportunity, particularly when they meet government officials and visiting members of NGOs and faith-based institutions. Tshwa are expending enormous effort in promoting their human rights and demonstrating their unique cultural heritage in Zimbabwe today, something that they hope to do at the international level once the coronavirus pandemic situation is resolved.

Funding Funding for the research upon which this chapter is based was provided by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) (Grant No. 2098), the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) (Grant No. 2650), and the Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust.

References

Bromwich M (2014) National Parks and Wildlife Management: Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, 1928–1990. Michael Bromwich and SA Media Services, Johannesburg

Buhrmester MD, Burnham D, Johnson DDP, Curry OS, Macdonald DW, Whitehouse H (2018) How moments become movements: shared outrage, group cohesion, and the lion that went viral. Front Ecol Evol 6:54. https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2018.00054

Cashdan E (1979) Trade and reciprocity among the River Bushmen of Northern Botswana. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation (2008) Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: a report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980–1988. Columbia University Press, New York

Chimhowu A, Hulme D (2006) Livelihood dynamics in planned and spontaneous resettlement in Zimbabwe: converging and vulnerable. World Dev 34(4):728–750

Chingwe S (2019) The San People of Zimbabwe: decades after land dispossession. In: Kangira J, Nhemachena A, Mlambo N (eds) Displacement, elimination, and replacement of indigenous people: putting into perspective land ownership and ancestry in decolonizing contemporary Zimbabwe. Langaa Research and Publishing CIG, Bamenda, Cameroon, pp 167–194

Davison T (1977) Wankie: the story of a great game reserve. Irwin Press, Salisbury (Harare)

Dibiti N (2021) San community finally obtains an Ear from Govt. Community Podium News, 31 July 2021

Dieckmann U (2018) The status of food security and nutrition of San Communities in Southern Africa. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen

Dornan SS (1925) Pygmies and Bushmen of the Kalahari. Seeley, Service and Company, London

Eppel S (2014) 'Bones in the Forest' in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe: exhumation as a tool for transformation. Int J Transitional Justice 8(3):404–425

Farai M (2020) Zimbabwe elephants died from bacterial disease, say experts. Washington Post, 26 September 2020.

Fehn A-M, Phiri A (2017) Nominal marking in Northern Tshwa (Kalahari Khoe). Stellenbosch Pap Linguist 48:105–122

Fontein J (2014) Remaking the dead, uncertainty and the torque of human materials in Northern Zimbabwe. In: Stepputat F (ed) Governing the dead: sovereignty and the politics of dead bodies. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp 114–140

Güldemann T (2008) A linguist's view: Khoe-Kwadi speakers as the earliest food-producers of southern Africa. South Afr Humanit 20:93–132

Güldemann T (2014) 'Khoisan' linguistic classification today. In: Guldemann T, Fehn A-M (eds) Beyond 'Khoisan': historical relations in the Kalahari Basin. John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam, pp 1–44

Haynes G (n.d.) Hwange national park: the forest with a desert heart. Manuscript in author's possession, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, Nevada, USA

Hitchcock RK (1982) The ethnoarchaeology of Sedentism: mobility strategies and site structure among foraging and food producing populations in the Eastern Kalahari Desert, Botswana. PhD dissertation, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. New Mexico

Hitchcock RK (1988) Settlement, seasonality, and subsistence stress among the Tyua of Northern Botswana. In Rebecca H-A, Curry J, Hitchcock RK (eds) Coping with seasonal constraints. MASCA Research Papers in Science and Archaeology, University Museum, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, pp 64–85

Hitchcock RK, Acheson-Brown D, Self E, Kelly MC (2017) Disappearance and displacement: The San, the Bamangwato, and the British in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1943–1945. South Afr Hist J 69(4):548–567

Hitchcock RK, Begbie-Clench B, Murwira A (2016) The San in Zimbabwe: livelihoods, land, and human rights. Report No. 22. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs and Johannesburg: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Copenhagen

Hitchcock RK, Begbie-Clench B, Ndlovu D, Murwira A, Mberengwa I (2018) Land, livelihoods, and empowerment among the San of western Zimbabwe. In: Fleming Puckett R, Kazunobu I (eds) Research and activism among the Kalahari San today: ideals, challenges, and debates. Senri Ethnological Studies, vol 99. National Museum of Ethnology, Japan, Osaka, pp 251–282

Hitchcock RK, Twedt TM (1997) Physical and cultural genocide of various indigenous peoples. In: Totten S, Parsons WS, Charny IW (eds) Genocide in the twentieth century: eyewitness accounts and critical views. Garland Publishing, New York and London, pp 483–534

Hodson AW (1912) Trekking the great thirst: sport and travel in the Kalahari Desert. T. Fisher Unwin, London

Holub E (1881) Seven years in South Africa: travels, research and adventures between the diamond fields and the Zambezi (1872–1879), 2 volumes. Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, London

Howard-Hassmann RE (2009) Zimbabwe. In: Forsythe DP (ed) Encyclopedia of human rights, vol 5. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 399–406

Howard-Hassmann RE (2010) Mugabe's Zimbabwe 2000–2009: massive human rights violations and the failure to protect. Hum Rights Q 32(2):898–920

Human Rights Watch (2000) Crisis without limits human rights and humanitarian consequences of political repression in Zimbabwe. Human Rights Watch, New York

Koro E (2020) COVID-19 Plunges Zimbabwe into wildlife management crisis. *Chronicl*e, 9 July 2020.

Larochelle C, Alwang J, Taruvinga N (2014) Inter-temporal changes in well-being during a period of hyperinflation: evidence from Zimbabwe. J Afr Econ 23(2):225–256

Laverick J (2015) The Kalahari killings: the true story of a wartime double murder in Botswana, 1943. The History Press, The Mill, Brimscombe Port, Stroud, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom

Lindsey PA, Balme GA, Funston PJ, Henschel PH, Hunter LTB (2016) Life after Cecil: channeling global outrage into funding for conservation in Africa. Conserv Lett 9(4):296–301

McCubbin SG (2020) The Cecil Moment: celebrity environmentalism, Nature 2.0 and the cultural politics of lion hunting. Geoforum 108:194–203

McGregor J (2005) The social life of ruins: sites of memory and the politics of a Zimbabwean periphery. J Hist Geogr 31:316–337

Mkono M (2018) The age of digital activism in tourism: evaluating the legacy and limitations of the Cecil anti-trophy hunting movement. J Sustain Tour 26(9):1608–1624
Mlambo A (2014) A history of Zimbabwe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Mohr E (1876) To the Victoria Falls of the Zambezi. Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, London
Mpofu W (2016) Zimbabwe's Gukurahundi genocide: beyond the forgetfulness and silences of coloniality. In: Muchie M, Gumede V, Oloruntoba S, Check N (eds) *Regenerating Africa: bringing African solutions to African problems*, pp 114–137. Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria
Muboko N, Gandiwa E, Muposhi V, Tarakini T (2016) Illegal hunting and protected areas: Tourist perceptions on wild animal poisoning in Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe. Tour Manage 52:170–172
Muboko N, Muphoshi V, Tarakini T, Gandiwa E, Vengesayi S, Makuwe E (2014) Cyanide poisoning and African elephant mortality in Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe: a preliminary assessment. Pachyderm 55:92–94
Ncube GT (2004) A history of North Western Zimbabwe 1850–1960. Mond Books, Kadoma
Ncube SM (2018) An examination of the impact of the historical cultural contact between the Kalanga and San Groups in Western Zimbabwe since the pre-colonial period: the case of Bulilima. B.A. thesis, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe
Ndlovu D (2010) *Tsorowotsho: the land of our fathers*. Creative Arts and Educational Development Association, Dlamini, Zimbabwe
Ndlovu D (2013) In their own words: a contemporary history of the lost and forgotten San People in Zimbabwe, 2nd edn. Creative Arts and Educational Development Association, Dlamini, Zimbabwe
Ndlovu D (2017) A new age for the San in Zimbabwe. Bhabhu Books, Harare
Ndlovu D (2020) Decades of land dispossession and loss of ancestral land: cultural assets and livelihoods: a case for the San in Zimbabwe. Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust, Bulawayo
Ndlovu D (2021) A case study on How COVID-19 lockdown is impacting continued access to education for Indigenous Minority San Students in Tsholotsho. Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust, Bulawayo
Ngwenya D (ed) (2018) Healing the wounds of Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: a participatory action project. Springer, Dordrecht
Nyahunda L, Chibvura S, Tirivangasi HM (2021) Social work practice: Accounting for double injustices experienced by women under the confluence of Covid-19 pandemic and climate change impacts in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. J Hum Rights Soc Work 6:213–224
Oates F (1881) Matabele land and the Victoria falls: a naturalist's wanderings in the interior of South Africa. Oates CG (ed). C. Kegan Paul and Company, London
Palmer R (1977) Land and racial domination in Rhodesia. Heinemann, London
Patel H (1998) Sustainable utilization and African wildlife policy: the case of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). Indigenous Environmental Policy Center, Boston, MA
Pearson J, Jackson G, McNamara KE (2021) Climate-driven losses to Indigenous and local knowledge and cultural heritage. The Anthropocene Review, April 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019621100548 2
Peterson, J (1991) CAMPFIRE: A Zimbabwean approach to sustainable development and community empowerment through wildlife utilization. Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), University of Zimbabwe, Harare.
Phiri K, Ndlovu S, Dube T, Nyath D, Ncube C, Tshuma N (2020) Access to formal education for the San community in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe: Challenges and prospects. *Heliyon* 6. https://doi.org:/10016/j.heliyon.2020.e04470
Pratchett LJ (2018) Towards a reclassification of the Kalahari Khoe: arguments from the Tshwa pronomial system. Paper presented to the Department of African Languages and Literatures, University of Botswana, 17 August 2018

Pratchett LJ (2020) Language contact and change in eastern Botswana: new insights from the pronominal system of an undocumented Kalahari Khoe language. Lang Afr 1(1):34–64
Rankomise AO (2015) *The Tshwa: Zimbabwe's forgotten people.* Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Harare, Zimbabwe
Rihoy L, Chirpzva C, Anstey S (2010) 'People are not happy': crisis, adaption, and resilience in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Program. In: Nelson F (ed) Community rights, conservation, and contested land: the politics of natural resource governance in Africa. Earthscan, London and Washington, DC, pp 174–201
Scoones I, Marongwe N, Mavedzenge B, Mahenehene J, Murimbarimba F, Sukume C (2011) Zimbabwe's land reform: myths and realities. James Currey, Suffolk; Weaver Press, Harare; Boydell & Brewer, Inc., Rochester, New York; Jacanda Media, Auckland Park, South Africa
Skidmore-Hess C (2021) Murder in nata: landscapes of colonial justice and authority in colonial Bechuanaland. J Colonialism Colonial Hist 22(1)
Smithers RHN (1983) The mammals of the southern African subregion. University of Pretoria, Pretoria
Staff Reporter, New Zimbabwe (2013) Bushmen resistant to change: Mugabe. New Zimbabwe, 9 May 2013.
Sungirai M, Ngwenya M (2016) An investigation into the efficiency of utilization of artificial game water supplies by wildlife species in the North Eastern Kalahari region of Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe. Appl Ecol Environ Sci 4(1):7–14
Tabler EC (1963) Trade and travel in early Barotseland: the diaries of George Westbeech, 1883–1885 and Captain Norman MacLeod, 1875–1876. University of California Press, Berkeley
Tabler EC (1966) Pioneers of Rhodesia. C. Struik, Cape Town
Tshili N (2021a) San community lobbies for hunting permit waivers. Chronicle, 20 July 2021
Tshili N (2021b) First San trip makes it to varsity. Chronicle, 19 June 2021
UNICEF Zimbabwe (2019) *Zimbabwe child poverty report: an analysis using the Poverty, Income, Consumption, and Expenditure Survey (PICES) 2017 Data.* UNICEF Zimbabwe, Harare.
van Oselen C (1972) Reactions to rinderpest in southern Africa 1896–1897. J Afr Hist 13(3):473–488
Vossen R (ed) (2013) The Khoesan languages. Routledge, New York
Wang H, Xu C, Liu Y, Jeppesen E, Svenning JC, Wu J, Zhang W, Zhou T, Wang P, Nangombe S, Ma J, Duan H, Fang J, Xie P (2021) From unusual suspect to serial killer: Cyanotoxins boosted by climate change may jeopardize megafauna. Innovation 2(2):1–3. 100092
Wilson V. (1975) Mammals of the Wankie National Park, Rhodesia. Museum Memoir No. 5. Salisbury: Trustees of the National Museums and Monuments of Rhodesia
Wilson RT (2007) The one-humped camel in Southern Africa: their presence and use in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in the early twentieth century. South Afr J Anim Sci 8:21–28
Wriston TA (2013) The late stone age to early iron age in Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe: using archaeology, soils, sediments, and stable isotopes to trace past peoples and environments. PhD. Dissertation, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, Nevada
Zhou M (2014) The persistence of extreme poverty among ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe: a case of the San Community in Tsholotsho District, Matabeleland North. BA Dissertation, Development Studies, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Government (2021) *Press Briefing, Zimbabwe Cabinet Report*. Government of Zimbabwe, Cabinet Report, 3 August 2021
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (2017) Validation report: report on the Visit to the San Community of Tsholotsho. Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), Harare.
Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) (2019) Zimbabwe poverty report 2017. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT), Harare.

Davy Ndlovu is the founder and director of the Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust (TSDT) which was established in Zimbabwe in 2012. He has been living and working among Tshwa San in the Tsholotsho District of Matabeleland North for over 20 years. Mr. Ndlovu has published

numerous articles, book chapters, and books on the Zimbabwe San. He is one of the leading advocates for the human rights and the social, cultural, economic, and political empowerment of San people in Zimbabwe.

Ben Begbie-Clench has worked with San communities in southern Africa for 15 years. He is a former director of the regional indigenous peoples' NGO, WIMSA (Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa) which represents the San peoples in the Southern African region. He has been an independent consultant since 2011, working in Namibia (for example, for the Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia) and regionally (for instance, for for the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.

Robert K. Hitchcock is a professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of New Mexico and a Board Member of the Kalahari Peoples Fund, a non-profit 501©3 organisation that provides assistance to indigenous and minority peoples in southern Africa. He has done anthropological and development work with indigenous peoples, refugees, and farmers in Zimbabwe and 12 other African countries, and in North and South America. Much of his work is on indigenous peoples' rights, particularly those of the San peoples of Southern Africa.

Melinda C. Kelly has worked with Tshwa and other San since 1975 in Botswana and Namibia. She has a B.A. from the University of Michigan and has done fieldwork in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and the United States. She is a member of the Kalahari Peoples Fund, a non-profit 501©(3) organisation which was set up in 1973 to assist the peoples of Southern Africa. She has done research with Tshwa in Botswana, most recently in 2015, and G/ui and G//ana San in 2019.

Chapter 3
'Men of the Soil': Basotho Farmers in Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1950s

Joseph Mujere

Abstract This chapter examines how Basotho migrants from South Africa established livelihoods based on freehold land ownership and agriculture in Southern Rhodesia. Basotho farmers migrated from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia in the 1890s and were among the first Africans to purchase freehold land in the colony. They were later displaced to African Purchase Areas in the 1930s following the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act. Their early success resulted in colonial officials viewing them as progressive Africans whose work ethic needed to be emulated by indigenous Africans. They were also hailed for being among the first African farmers to supply milk to creameries that had been established in the colony. Basotho's farmers sought to become examples to other African farmers and to be considered 'men of the soil'. Despite their early success, Basotho farmers faced several challenges that include displacement from their farms and land disputes. The chapter concludes that Basotho migrants' livelihoods were intricately linked to their ownership of freehold farms and their quest for belonging.

Keywords Belonging · Basotho · Ethnicity · Southern Rhodesia · Livelihoods

3.1 Introduction

In 1924, Johannes Mokwile, a member of the Basotho community in Victoria Province in Southern Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe), published an article in the *Native Affairs Department Annual* (NADA) in which he discussed entrepreneurship among Africans who owned farms (Mokwile 1924). The article was based on a discussion he had had with an Indian man during a train journey from Gwelo to Victoria town. The Indian man had criticised Mokwile and other Africans who owned freehold land for not being productive on the farms and for lacking entrepreneurial skills. After the train conversation, Mokwile was left convinced that the Indian

J. Mujere (✉)
National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho
e-mail: j.mujere@nul.ls

Research Associate, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_3

community was doing better than African farmers economically because they were more enterprising on their farms. He concluded that the economic success of Africans in Southern Rhodesia did not lie in them acquiring education but in how they utilised their land (Mokwile 1924: 97). Johannes Mokwile's chance encounter with an Indian entrepreneur during his train journey and the conclusions he drew from the conversation encapsulates how the livelihoods of African migrants in Southern Rhodesia were tied to ownership of freehold land and their aspirations to be leading African farmers or what he called 'men of the soil'.

Using the case study of the Basotho community in Victoria Province, this chapter examines the interface between ownership of freehold land, livelihoods, and an ethnic minority's construction of belonging. In particular, the chapter considers how livelihoods were central to the belonging project of this migrant ethnic minority group during the colonial period. This approach helps to unravel the entanglement between ethnicity, land ownership, belonging, and livelihoods. The chapter also examines how African colonial migrants or 'alien Natives' as they were sometimes called, participated in the colonial economy as well as the privileges they had over indigenous Africans in accessing freehold farms. This entails examining the effects of colonial perceptions about African migrants from South Africa as 'progressive' or 'more advanced Natives' compared to indigenous Africans and how it impacted their access to freehold land. The Basotho used their ownership of freehold land to develop livelihoods such as agriculture, dairy farming, and stock breeding. These livelihoods were augmented and complemented by transport riding, rental collection from tenants, and running of grocery shops. The chapter contributes to debates about African migrants and ethnic minorities' access to freehold land and their livelihoods during the colonial period in Zimbabwe.

This chapter is mainly based on an analysis of archival files on Basotho farmers in Southern Rhodesia that are housed in the National Archives of Zimbabwe. Being pioneer African freehold farm owners in Southern Rhodesia, Basotho farmers' struggles to purchase farms as well as their farming activities generated significant correspondence, especially with colonial administrators who included Native Commissioners, the Superintendent of Natives, Chief Native Commissioner, and the Director of Native Lands, among other colonial officials. In addition, Basotho interacted with Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) missionaries who sought to patronise them. For instance, Basotho's struggles to purchase freehold land in Southern Rhodesia saw them writing several letters to colonial administrators and seeking the support of DRC missionaries. The large collection of correspondences reveal much about Basotho struggles for belonging and their farming livelihoods. The chapter also makes use of newspaper reports and commentaries by both Basotho farmers and colonial officials published in the Native Affairs Department Annual.

3.2 Basotho Migrations and Struggles Over Freehold Land in Southern Rhodesia

Although the largest community of Basotho in Zimbabwe is found in the Matabeleland region, in Gwanda district specifically, this chapter focuses on the Basotho farmers who purchased farms in Victoria Province in 1907 and 1909. The latter's migration to Southern Rhodesia in the late nineteenth century was connected to the evangelisation of the southern Shona as well as the colonisation of the country (Mujere 2019). Basotho in Lesotho and South Africa were among some of the earliest converts to the Paris Evangelical Mission Society (PEMS), the DRC, and the Berlin Mission Society (BMS), and a number of them became evangelists and lay preachers (Beach 1973: 27). Consequently, when the missionary societies set out from Transvaal to evangelise communities to the north of the Limpopo River, they relied on several Basotho converts. From the 1870s to 1894, the missionary societies launched several expeditions from Goegedacht, a mission station that had been established by Rev. Stephanus Hofmeyr in Transvaal in 1865 (van der Merwe 1981: 37). By 1890, several African converts, among them Basotho, Bapedi, Zulu, and Coloured, had crossed the Limpopo as evangelists, porters, interpreters, and lay preachers.

Basotho evangelists and lay preachers were instrumental in the BMS's establishment of Zimuto Mission in 1892 and Gutu Mission in 1894 as well as the DRC's establishment of Morgenster Mission in 1891 (Mujere 2013: 140). Rev. Louw of the DRC journeyed from Transvaal to Chief Mugabe's area close to Great Zimbabwe in the company of seven Basotho evangelists—Joshua Masoha, Lucas Mokole, Micha Maghatho, Jeremiah Morudu, Petrus Morudu, David Molea, and Izak Kumalo—who worked as preachers, interpreters, porters, and teachers (van der Merwe 1981: 52).

The Basotho gradually established a community around Fort Victoria town that was composed of evangelists who had worked with the DRC, PEMS, and BMS in forming mission stations in the late nineteenth century among the Shona and their relatives as well as African migrants who had worked as part of the Pioneer Column that colonised the country in 1890. It is important to highlight that although Basotho migrants had already received education and worked in the colonial civil service and mission stations, most of them saw farming as providing a more sustainable livelihood. Consequently, they sought to acquire freehold farms where they could engage in agricultural activities. However, although Section 83 of the 1898 Southern Rhodesia Order In Council had clearly stated that Africans 'may acquire, hold, encumber and dispose of land of the same conditions as a person who is not a native..', white settlers had largely blocked Africans from fully benefitting from this law by making it difficult for Africans to purchase freehold land (Mujere and Mseba 2019).

The fact that white settlers were reluctant to sell freehold to Africans made it very difficult for Africans who wanted to purchase freehold land. Another complication was that Africans who wanted to purchase land were required to obtain testimonials from missionaries and colonial officials before they could be judged to be fit to

purchase farms. The colonial administration and white settlers, who were generally averse to allowing Africans to own freehold land, treated African migrants differently. Generally, 'colonial Natives' were viewed as 'more advanced Natives' with a better appreciation of ownership of freehold land and good land husbandry compared to indigenous Africans in Southern Rhodesia. As a result of this, colonial administrators were generally amenable to the idea of allowing African migrants such as Basotho, Mfengu, Xhosa, and Zulu to own freehold land. The first of these African migrants to purchase freehold land in Southern Rhodesia were the Mfengu (Fingo) from the Cape Colony, who settled in Bembesi in Matabeleland in Southern Rhodesia at the behest of Cecil John Rhodes who wanted them to provide labour to the new colony (Steele 1972: 451). The Fingo were allowed to own freehold land on condition that they would provide labour 'for at least three months (later changed to four months) per year' (Makambe 1982: 7; 1979: 310).

It is against this background that, when a group of ten Basotho migrants applied to purchase land in Matabeleland in 1901, the Surveyor-General wrote a letter to the Chief Magistrate of Griqualand inquiring about their suitability. The Chief Magistrate responded:

> The applicants are Basutos and are therefore the best class among the Native tribes as agriculturalists and stock-breeders and are of a very progressive tendency. I imagine they would wish to locate Basuto tenants on their farms in the same way as they are in the habit of doing in this District. The farms owned by Natives in this District have been purchased by them from the government and are held under similar conditions to farms held by Europeans, viz at a perpetual annual quitrent of 2 pounds (together with stamp duty of 7/6) redeemable as freehold at any time at twenty years purchase. The farms so held vary in size from 500 to 1500 morgen, and as a rule are excellent for agriculture and stock of all kinds, including sheep.[1]

The fact that some members of the Basotho community in Southern Rhodesia had owned freehold land in South Africa put them in a better position when they applied for land in Southern Rhodesia. This is because they could demonstrate that they had prior experience with individual tenure. As Steele (1972: 451) argues, 'not only had the typical Union Native been exposed to the cash nexus for a longer period of time than local Africans, but also he was more familiar with the concept of individual tenure'.

In this context, members of the Basotho community around Fort Victoria made group purchases of two farms close to Fort Victoria. In 1907, Jacob Molebaleng and three other Basotho farmers purchased Erichsthal Farm near Fort Victoria for £1,000.[2] Following that successful group purchase, in 1909 a group of ten Basotho purchased Niekerk's Rust Farm, a few kilometres from Erichsthal Farm.[3] The Basotho's group purchase of the two farms became the springboard for the establishment of livelihoods that revolved around agriculture and stock breeding. It is important to note that the farms were not officially sub-divided but part-owners had portions they farmed. As will be demonstrated later, this loose arrangement later became a source of tensions among members which forced colonial officials to recommend official sub-division of the farms.

Although the Basotho and some indigenous Africans (who were mostly teachers) had managed to purchase freehold land around Fort Victoria, white farmers continued to oppose such purchases as they argued that they devalued the neighbouring farms owned by white settlers. Writing about a group of indigenous African teachers who had purchased Rugby Farm, a white settler complained about how the African owners of Rugby Farm were stealing his cattle.[4] In complaining that African freehold farm owners were devaluing their farms, other white farmers called for the amendment of laws to place a ban on African purchase of freehold land.[5] As one white farmer wrote:

> Now as regards the proposal to establish a native settlement in our midst, I cannot conceive that any authority could be guilty of such a crime. If the law of the land permits such a thing being done by private individuals then the sooner the law is amended so as to prevent Europeans unloading their landed property onto natives the better.[6]

The white settlers were using colonial newspapers to register their disquiet at having African farmers as their neighbours. This was based on, among other issues, the perceived backwardness of African farming methods and racial segregation as well as the claim that African farmers were still stuck in the communal mode of existence even though they were farming on freehold land. The image of African farmers in the eyes of their white neighbours was not helped by the fact that they had made group purchases of the farms which engendered significant conflicts among the part-owners.

3.3 Becoming 'Men of the Soil': Freehold Land and Agricultural Livelihoods

Despite white settler farmers' negative perceptions about Africans' ownership of freehold farmers especially close to their farms, Basotho farmers were keen to prove that they were progressive farmers. They were also encouraged by colonial administrators who viewed them as better farmers than locals. As soon as the Basotho purchased their two farms, colonial administrators started making effusive reports about developments on the farms and the many agricultural activities. In his 1911 Annual Report, the Native Commissioner for Victoria District reported that the Basotho on the two farms owned twenty-one ploughs while indigenous Africans in Victoria District owned twenty-seven.[7] This was meant to demonstrate that Basotho farmers, who were a minority ethnic group in the area, were adopting the plough at a faster pace than the indigenous farmers. The adoption of the plough was revolutionising African agriculture as it enabled farmers to produce more crops and more economically. Because of their experience in South Africa and their comparatively higher levels of education, Basotho were quick to acquire ploughs and other farming implements that made their farming activities more efficient.

Basotho farmers also were among the first African farmers to adopt cash crops such as wheat (some of which they grew under irrigation), cotton, and tobacco.[8] Several annual Native Commissioner's reports for Victoria District commended Basotho for

being the best African farmers in the district and for managing to produce a surplus which they sold at the Victoria market. In 1926, under a section titled 'Agriculture', the Native Commissioner reported that Basotho owners of Erichsthal and Niekerk's Rust farms together with the Karanga owners of Rugby farm were successful farmers who owned wagons and grew a variety of crops, and were doing better than ordinary communal farmers.[9]

A series of Native Commissioners in the district saw the African owners of the three farms as 'progressive' and 'more advanced'. In 1924, the Native Commissioner reported about how Basotho owners of Erichsthal and Rust farms, Karanga owners of Rugby Farm, and African teachers had joined a cotton farming experiment in the district with the assistance of the colonial government and missionaries.[10] Although the plants were affected by pests, the Native Commissioner was impressed by the initial results and the potential for cotton farming undertaken by what he characterised as 'intelligent Natives' in the district.

Although dairy farming was largely a preserve of white settlers, as African farmers were viewed as not being capable of observing the high levels of hygiene required in the industry, several African farmers who were viewed as 'intelligent' and 'progressive' did engage in dairy farming. Their involvement in dairy farming was by no means easy given white settlers' stereotypes about Africans' hygienic practices. According to Hove and Swart (2019: 922), 'the general perception among settlers and some government officials was that African producers were too slovenly to produce clean milk and cream for commercial purposes, and hence had to be eliminated from the trade'. White settlers expressed their discomfort with the involvement of African farmers in the dairy industry through letters to the editor in *The Rhodesian Herald*, with some going as far as threatening to boycott the industry if Africans continued to supply dairy products (Hove and Swart 2019: 922).

Despite the settlers' anxieties about the perceived unhygienic practices of African dairy farmers (including the practice of milking in the kraals), Basotho farmers developed a reputation as being some of the best dairy farmers and purveyors of dairy produce in Victoria. The Native Commissioner of Victoria District was particularly impressed by Basotho's dairy farming and he estimated that half of the butter that was being sold at the Fort Victoria market was being produced by the Basotho.[11] Although this might have been an exaggeration, especially given that the Native Commissioner did not provide any statistics, it nonetheless demonstrates how Basotho farming activities attracted so much attention from colonial officials. By the 1920s, together with the Karanga owners of Rugby Farm, Basotho farmers had become the leading producers of milk, butter, and cream among African farmers in Victoria.[12] This took place without any financial and technical support from the colonial government. Ultimately, the colonial government believed that only a few 'intelligent' African farmers such as Basotho farmers could pursue dairy farming because it was a highly specialised industry requiring very high levels of hygiene.

Besides agriculture, Basotho also engaged in transport riding, especially after the farmers would have harvested their crops. Transport riders in Southern Rhodesia were predominantly white itinerant traders who used ox or donkey-drawn wagons to trade a variety of consumer goods. Initially, they were trading in goods they brought

from South Africa, but later they traded mostly in grain and other types of farm produce they bought from peasant farmers (Krammer 2001: 5). As Krammer (2001: 4) notes, transport riders 'provided the service of buying cattle, grain, and other food requirements from the peasant producers which they resold to the townsmen, miners or railway builders'. Although transport riding was dominated by white traders, some Basotho farmers also took it up as one of their livelihood options. They would travel around the district and beyond buying grain and other farm produce which they would, in turn, sell at markets in Fort Victoria and mining settlements.

In 1911, the Native Commissioner of Victoria District reported that, apart from agricultural activities, members of the Basotho community were involved in 'considerable transport riding', selling mostly farm produce or bartering.[13] Their transport riding activities were greatly aided by the fact that the Basotho owners of the two farms were entrepreneurial and already owned at least twelve wagons.[14] In the following year, the Native Commissioner again reported that transport riding was one of the economic activities in which the Basotho and indigenous African farmers in the district were engaged. He noted that 'the main industry of the Natives is agricultural and pastoral farming. The Basutos [sic] who have farms in the district and also several indigenous Natives do a certain amount of transport riding', he wrote.[15] Writing about transport riding in Victoria during the early years of colonial rule, Sayce (1978: 59) described how transport riders 'trundled the district in their rickety carts and wagons buying grain and meal and selling in Victoria'. The Basotho's two farms were located close to Fort Victoria where there was a large market, therefore enhancing their opportunity to sell farm produce.

Apart from farming activities, another way Basotho accumulated wealth was through charging rentals on tenants on their farms as well as running grocery shops (Mujere and Mseba 2019: 41). Some of the Basotho owners of Erichsthal Farm had tenants who they charged an annual fee of 10/- or a bag of grain per individual (Mujere and Mseba 2019: 41). Tenants provided an extra income to African farm owners and were a common feature even on farms owned by white settlers. Furthermore, farm owners also charged tenants dipping fees for dipping their cattle at the farm dip tank (Mujere and Mseba 2019: 41).[16]

In the 1920s, Matthew Komo and Ernest Komo, who were part-owners of Erichsthal Farm, established a general dealer shop in the late 1920s in partnership with a Coloured man called Van Blerk.[17] This, however, caused tension with other part-owners of the farm (Jacob Molebaleng, and Jona Makula) who felt that it was unfair for the Komo brothers to establish a General Dealer Shop with an outsider without first consulting other part-owners of the farm.[18] The matter was taken to the Magistrate Court and the court resolved that the Komo brothers pay rentals to the other part-owners of the farm or the farm be sub-divided. Col. Carbutt, the Superintendent of Natives of Victoria, recommended that the farm be sub-divided to resolve the disputes (Carbutt 1927: 42).

3.4 'Men of the Soil' or Mere Communal Farmers?

Although throughout the 1900s and into the 1920s, Native Commissioners were writing glowing reports about Basotho farmers' successes in growing different types of food and cash crops as well as in dairy farming, some colonial administrators observed that Basotho farmers did not appreciate freehold tenure and continued with some communal practices.[19] The communal practices were accentuated by the fact that the two farms owned by the Basotho as well as the one owned by Karanga farmers were all syndicate purchases and the farms were not sub-divided. This led to constant tensions among the part-owners. It also made some colonial administrators recommend the sub-division of the farms into individual shares so that individuals could fully appreciate the value of freehold tenure (Carbutt 1927: 42). Thus, notwithstanding the general colonial administrators' perception of Basotho as 'progressive', 'more advanced' or 'intelligent Natives', the reality was that they were facing the same challenges experienced by other farmers who had concluded syndicate purchases of farms, especially the constant bickering—and this affected their livelihoods.

Against this background, Johannes Mokwile, whose father was part-owner of Rust Farm, published an article alluded to in the introduction, reflecting on what he had learnt from a conversation with an Indian man on a train journey from Gwelo to Fort Victoria in 1922. The Indian had challenged him about his failure to make money out of his father's farm: 'Why did your father buy a farm, yet you do not know how to make money out of a farm?' (Mokwile 1924: 94). Mokwile was left convinced that Africans needed to improve their farming methods if they wanted to make a livelihood out of farming. Although racial segregation was a reality, Mokwile refused to blame it on Africans' economic conditions compared to the Indians, reasoning thus:

> It is so far clear that the way these Indians have worked or used the soil, even if it is only rented, has overloaded them with profits. These profits, derived from the soil, came from the character of the Indians themselves, and not from any special privileges given them which Natives do not enjoy....Now then, unless we who live side by side with these White men resolve to depart from primitive conditions, progress is impossible. Natives then must move with times, use their opportunities, talk less, work more. Today I cannot go in where an Indian goes, just because he is a worker and I am a talker. (Mokwile 1924: 96)

Mokwile implored his fellow African farmers to emulate Indian farmers who were arguably making more profits from their farming activities. He also encouraged his fellow African farmers to stop communal practices and embrace new methods of farming. Mokwile felt that African farmers had to modernise their agriculture and abandon some of their communal practices, and invest more in their land to be successful farmers.

It is crucial to highlight that Mokwile's article was, in part, aimed at criticising an article that had been published earlier by John Tengo Jabavu titled 'Native Opinion' and to dissuade African farmers from following the radical politics of Jabavu. In particular, he expressed discomfort with Jabavu's claim that Africans had reached a stage where they could see and speak against colonial injustices (Ranger 1970: 105). He dismissed the radical politics of Jabavu by concluding that:

> It will not be those who seek high education that natives will always listen to. Their real leaders will be men of the soil; men who have learned how to use the soil, and who are not ashamed to be seen with their coats off; because education is not a garment which a man puts on to secure material advancement and to secure the applause of a crowd. (Mokwile 1924: 97)

Mokwile's repudiation of Jabavu's radical politics needs to be understood within the context of him (Mokwile) having been the president of the Southern Rhodesia Native Association (SRNA), a pliant association dominated by farmers. He was thus addressing both his fellow Basotho farmers as well as broader membership of the SRNA. Ranger (1970: 105) characterised the association as having been 'a movement of the "men of the soil", the progressive farmers of Mashonaland'. It was also given the moniker 'Good Boy Association' by rival associations such as the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association.

3.5 Colonial Displacement and Establishment of Purchase Areas

As has already been highlighted, Basotho's livelihoods and their belonging project were tied to their ownership of freehold land. As a migrant and minority ethnic group, they felt that without ownership of freehold land they could not effectively establish themselves in the colony. Ownership of land was therefore an emotive subject to the Basotho given the uncertainties surrounding colonial policies and Africans' access to land. When the colonial regime enacted the Land Apportionment Act in 1930, that segregated land on racial grounds and established separate areas where Africans and Europeans could purchase land, it created much anxiety among Basotho farmers. The Land Apportionment Act effectively expunged Section 83 of the 1898 Order in Council, and established areas of exclusive land purchase for Europeans and Africans. African farmers who had purchased farms in areas designated as European areas were expected to vacate the farms and purchase farms in the newly established African Purchase Areas.

When by operation of the Land Apportionment Act, Basotho were evicted from Rust and Erichsthal farms in 1932 and 1933 respectively, they were given the option to take up land in the African Purchase Areas in lieu of their farms (which had been deemed to fall in a European area according to the Land Apportionment Act). Their eviction disrupted not only their livelihoods but also their belonging project. To address this, Basotho asked to be allowed to purchase farms in a block of farms in the Dewure Purchase Areas in Gutu. They argued that this would allow them to re-establish their community and preserve their culture. In lieu of Niekerk's Rust Farm, Basotho owners (including Samuel Melete, Reuben Mphisa, Petrus Morudu, Joshua Masoha, David Molea, and Peter Rasitoo) were offered 5,228 acres in the Dewure Purchase Areas. In addition, they were paid a total of £374 as compensation.[20] The part-owners of Erichsthal Farm (Jacob Molebaleng, Ernest Komo, Matthew Komo, and Joana Makula) were offered initially offered 11,656 acres in Mungezi Purchase

Areas in Bikita District in exchange for their farm and £2,118 compensation (Palmer 1977: 280). They, however, turned down the offer arguing that they preferred to take up farms close to other Basotho who had already settled in the Dewure Purchase Areas. They were eventually allowed to settle in the Dewure Purchase Areas.

Although the majority of Basotho farmers either took up farms offered them in exchange for Rust and Erichsthal farms or purchased farms independently in the Dewure Purchase Areas, others purchased farms independently in the adjacent Mungezi Purchase Areas in Bikita District. Several Basotho migrants who were working in the colonial civil service or had recently migrated from South Africa to join their relatives in Southern Rhodesia took the opportunity to purchase farms and to settle close to other Basotho farmers in the Dewure and Mungezi Purchase Areas. As I have argued elsewhere, the Native Land Board (NLB) encouraged all Basotho who desired to purchase farms in the newly established African Purchase Areas to buy farms in the Dewure Purchase Areas so that a Basotho community could be formed there (Mujere 2019). Basotho were also considered 'more advanced Natives' who would be emulated hopefully by indigenous Africans. In 1935, the Native Commissioner of Gutu District wrote: 'I find these Basutos [sic] decent law-abiding members of the district and consider their presence among the Karanga will induce a general urge amongst local natives to copy the Basutu's [sic] more advanced ideas and ideals'.[21] Indigenous Africans were, though, largely against the settlements of 'alien Natives' in the African Purchase Areas. They based this on the Chief Native Commissioner's claim that 'the purchase areas were available for acquisition by indigenous Natives only'.[22] Although the NLB allowed Basotho to purchase farms in the Dewure Purchase Areas, the remonstrations by indigenous Africans against what they considered to be a 'distasteful and undesirable' settlement of 'Alien Natives' demonstrates the uncertainties around Basotho's belonging and access to freehold.[23]

Basotho took advantage of the fact that they were allowed to settle in the Dewure Purchase Areas to both develop their agricultural livelihoods and to construct a renewed sense of belonging. Basotho farmers who previously owned Niekerk's Rust farm purchased individual farms that were close to each other in Dewure Purchase Areas. Although, generally, the NLB was against syndicate purchases of farms, arguing that it will create miniature chiefdoms, the Board acceded to Basotho's request to settle in one area and constitute themselves as a community (Shutt 2002: 496). Consequently, Basotho farmers were able to purchase individual farms in both Dewure and Mungezi Purchase area and to coalesce in the area.

Apart from individual farm purchases, Basotho farmers also requested to be allowed to purchase a communal farm on which they would establish a school, a clinic, a dip tank, and a cemetery. In 1934, the Superintendent of Natives (Victoria) wrote to the Chief Native Commissioner supporting Basotho's application for a communal farm, arguing that:

> The Basutos [sic] have been scattered throughout this area and now wish to grasp the opportunity of building up the tribe into one harmonious whole and restoring their old customs and manners which have to a large extent been lost through detribalisation.[24]

The Superintendent of Natives added that the farm would be run by Jacob Molebaleng (who had been selected as the chief of the Basotho community) alongside a committee of four. After a significant back and forth between Basotho farmers and colonial authorities, the NLB finally granted Basotho the permission to purchase farm Number 24 in the Dewure Purchase Area. The farm was located in an area where most of the Basotho evicted from Nierkerk's Rust had purchased farms.

Unlike individual farms, Basotho's communal farm, which they christened 'Bethel Farm', was never meant for farming purposes. Instead, its main purpose was to help Basotho maintain and develop a sense of belonging in Southern Rhodesia. As a result, when they established a school on the farm, they insisted that only Sesotho and English would be the languages of instruction, even though children of non-Sotho farmers also attended the school. The Native Commissioner for Gutu district was, however, concerned about what he considered to be Basotho's attempt to form a 'miniature nation'. In his 1935 Annual Report to the Chief Native Commissioner, the Native Commissioner for Victoria district warned that Basotho's desire to establish a community for themselves in the Native Purchase Areas would set a bad precedent for other Africans:

> …were the government to aid in this isolation other settlers might feel that they, too, should be aided in self-isolation and that eventually the government might be faced with the requirements and demands of a number of nations in miniature, all seeking to avoid coalescences one with the other rather than unite and thus simplify a general programme of general control and advancements as a whole.[25]

Although they succeeded in purchasing the communal farm and establishing a school, a dip tank, and an exclusive cemetery, it is evident that Basotho's strategies of constructing their belonging and eking out a living in the purchase areas caused some uneasiness in the colonial administration. Basotho's purchase of a communal farm and their desire to make it the centre of their construction of belonging in the Dewure Purchase Areas evinces the imbrication between Basotho's struggles for belonging and their different forms of livelihoods.

In terms of their agricultural activities, most of the Basotho farmers continued to grow different kinds of crops, breed cattle, and also engage in dairy farming. The establishment of Native Councils in 1937 saw the Basotho farmers increasingly working with other farmers towards the development of the Dewure Purchase Areas. Native Councils were an attempt by the colonial government to introduce democratic institutions in local government while avoiding a situation whereby Africans in communal (Native Reserve) and African Purchase Areas would be radicalised. They were also viewed as structures that would aid 'Native Development' programmes. The Native Councils were chaired by Native Commissioners and were composed of chiefs and elected members. They were generally loathed by Africans in African Purchase Areas as they were seen as exploitative and enhancing the powers of Native Commissioners.

Because they considered themselves more progressive than other African farmers, in 1938 Basotho requested to have their own Native Council. In addition, Basotho felt that, 'as more advanced Natives', they would be able to foster development if they

were separated from the rest of the African Purchase Areas farmers. Eventually, it was agreed that Basotho would not have a separate Native Council but be integrated into the Dewure Native Council. This created discord in the Native Council as tensions emerged between the indigenous farmers and the Basotho farmers over issues such as taxation. In 1948, the Native Commissioner for Gutu wrote a report in which he praised Basotho councillors for realising they needed to levy higher taxes to develop their areas. At the same time, he demonstrated his concern with the indigenous African farmers' reluctance to levy high taxes. He wrote:

> We have in this division a minority of progressive Basutos and a majority of Karanga. The two sections number at present about 150 farmers and for the success of any council it was stressed that high taxation would be necessary. While the Basothos agreed and used all forceful arguments in favour of taxation being from £2 to £5 a male, the Karanga were bemoaning poverty and benefits of taxations from 2/6 to 10/-. One decision being called the majority the Karanga voted for 5/- taxation and it was only when the disappointed Basuto cast their votes for 10/- tax, that the higher taxation governed the majority to carry it through… It is a pity that the advanced Basutos are to be held back by the cautious Karanga. A division of the area, however, it is thought, would be a mistake from the points of emphasising tribalism and the small yearly totals of revenue collected by each section.[26]

The Native Commissioner's report reveals not only the tension between the indigenous Karanga farmers and the Basotho farmers but, most importantly, the enduring colonial perceptions about Basotho as more progressive compared to the indigenous farmers. Basotho's position was also strengthened by the fact that, of the ten councillors in the Dewure Native Council in 1948, five were Basotho. Basotho's support of higher taxes was, arguably, influenced by their desire not only to develop their areas but also to be perceived by colonial administrators as progressive.

By the 1950s, several purchase area farmers across Southern Rhodesia were subdividing their farms and selling sub-divisions for various reasons (Shutt 2002: 292). The reasons varied from family squabbles and a desire to pay off their arrears for the purchase of the farms. Commenting on the farm sub-divisions among the Basotho in 1964, the Delineation Officer for Gutu, C. J. Latham noted that Basotho's farms were very large and the majority of them had been sub-divided.[27] The farm divisions helped farm owners to clear their debts and to make their farms smaller and more manageable as well. Thus, for a short period, farm sub-divisions were a form of livelihood for farmers who desired to invest in their farms or were struggling to raise money to pay off the arrears. It was generally difficult for purchase area farmers to prosper because the farms were far from road and rail networks, had poor soils, and were located in areas that received poor rains.

Although Basotho and their Karanga neighbours occasionally clashed, especially in the Dewure Native Council where Basotho saw themselves as more progressive compared to the Karanga farmers, the relationship between the two groups could not be described as antagonistic. Several Basotho farmers sold portions of their farms to the Karanga. Since the majority of Basotho farmers were members of the DRC, it allowed them to interact closely with other non-Sotho members of the church (Mujere 2019). Overall, in spite of their desire to establish a community where

they would maintain a sense of belonging, Basotho continued to closely interact with their Karanga neighbours through the Dewure Native Council, the DRC and schools, among other social areas.

3.6 Conclusion

Basotho migrants in Southern Rhodesia always felt vulnerable if and when they were without access to freehold land. This was largely borne out of the fact that, as migrants or 'alien Natives', they did not have any rights to communal lands. Consequently, both their construction of belonging and forms of livelihoods hinged on ownership of freehold land. It is evident that Basotho's belonging strategy revolved around ownership of freehold land and maintaining their language and culture. By the same token, their livelihoods were also dependent upon ownership of freehold land. Having been among the first Africans to purchase land on the basis of individual tenure, they valued the security that came with individual tenure and the opportunities to accumulate. They established different forms of livelihoods that included agriculture, stock breeding, and dairy farming. These livelihoods were complemented by the operation of grocery shops and transport riding. Although it is difficult to ascertain the production levels in the absence of statistical data, reports by colonial officials indicate that Basotho were among the best African farmers when they owned Rust and Erichsthal farms and later when they took up farms in the purchase areas. Basotho strove to become 'men of the soil' as well as an example for other African farmers in Southern Rhodesia. While members of the Basotho community believed that education was important, their livelihoods were mainly based on farming. In this respect, then, individual tenure was central to Basotho's construction of belonging and establishment of livelihoods.

Notes

1. L2/2/8 Basutos January 1901–21 January 1902, Application by Basutos for particulars regarding the purchase price of Government and other land in Matabeleland, 14 March 1901.
2. AT1/2/1/10 Land owned by Natives in 1925.
3. S1542/F2/1 Superintendent of Natives (Fort Victoria) to C. Bullock Assistant Chief Native Commissioner Salisbury, 2 August 1933. This group of ten Basotho farmers was led by Ephraim Morudu. See also Palmer (1977).
4. Letter by E.W. Evans to the editor, *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 23 March 1916.
5. Letter by H.M. Oakley to the editor, *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 15 March 1916.
6. Letter by H.M. Oakley to the editor, *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 15 March 1916.
7. N9 /1/14 Victoria District: Report for the year ended 31 December 1911.
8. N9 /1/14 Victoria District: Report for the year ended 31 December 1911.
9. N9/1/17 Victoria District: Report of the Native Commissioner for the year ended 31 December 1926.

10. N9/1/17 Victoria District: Report for the Year ended 31 December 1924.
11. N9/1/14 Victoria District: Report for the Year ended 31 December 1911.
12. N9/1/17 Victoria District: Report for the Year ended 31 December 1924.
13. N9/1/14 Victoria District: Report for the Year ended 31 December 1911.
14. N9/1/14 Victoria District: Report for the Year ended 31 December 1911.
15. N9/1/15 Victoria District, Report for the Year ended 31 December 1912.
16. S1044/9 Native Purchase Areas 1934–1942, Superintendent of Natives to Assistant Director of Native Lands, Salisbury, 23 June 1934.
17. S1042 1924–1937, Letter from the Superintendent of Natives (Fort Victoria) to CNC, 20 December 1927.
18. S1042 1924–1937, Letter from the Superintendent of Natives (Fort Victoria) to CNC, 20 December 1927.
19. For a detailed discussion of this, see Mujere and Mseba (2019) and Carbutt (1927).
20. S1542/F2/1 Assistant Director of Native Lands to Chief Native Commissioner, 9 December 1932.
21. S1859 Schools 1933–1949, Basuto Settlement, NC Gutu to CNC, 6 November 1935.
22. S1044/10 NC Victoria to CNC, 10 October 1935.
23. S1044/10 NC Victoria to CNC, 10 October 1935.
24. S1044/9 Native Purchase Areas 1934–1942, Superintendent of Natives to Chief Native Commissioner, 28 March 1934.
25. S1859 NC Gutu to CNC Salisbury, 6 November 1935.
26. S2797/4663 NC Gutu to Provincial NC, Fort Victoria, 12 August 1948, Dewure Division Council.
27. S2929/8/3 Delineation Report-Gutu: Report on Dewure NPA, By C. J. K. Latham, 19 February 1964.

References

Beach, DN (1973) The initial impact of Christianity on the Shona: the protestants and the southern Shona. In: Dachs AJ (ed) Christianity south of the Zambezi, vol. 1. Mambo Press, Gwelo

Carbutt CL (1927) Communal land tenure. Native Aff Depart Annu 5:43

Hove G, Swart S (2019) "Dairying is a White Man's industry": the Dairy Produce Act and the segregation debate in colonial Zimbabwe, c. 1920–1937. J South Afr Stud 45 (5): 1465–3893

Krammer E (2001) Transport riders and traders in colonial Zimbabwe until 1923. Unpublished Seminar Paper, Economic History Department, University of Zimbabwe, 1 June, pp 1–24

Makambe EP (1979) The African immigrant factor in Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1930: the origins and influence of external elements in a colonial setting. PhD Dissertation, York University

Makambe EP (1982) African protest movements in Southern Rhodesia before 1930: an ideological appreciation of the socio-political roots of the protest movements. Munger Afr Libr Notes 65–66

Mokwile J (1924) Native ideals. Native Aff Depart Annu 2:95–97

Mujere J (2013) African intermediaries: African evangelists, the Dutch Reformed Church, and the Evangelisation of the Southern Shona in the late 19th century. Stud Historiae Ecclesiasticae 39(2):133–148

Mujere J (2019) Land, migration and belonging: a history of Basotho in Southern Rhodesia c.1890–1960s. James Currey, Suffolk
Mujere J, Mseba A (2019) The politics of African freehold land ownership in early colonial Zimbabwe, 1890–1930. Afr Econ Hist 47(1):32–53
Palmer R (1977) Land and racial domination in Rhodesia. Heinemann, London
Ranger TO (1970) The African voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898–1930. Heinemann, London
Sayce K (1978) A town called Victoria or the rise and fall of the Thatched House Hotel. Books of Rhodesia, Bulawayo
Shutt AK (2002) Squatters, land sales and intensification in Marirangwe purchase area, colonial Zimbabwe, 1931–65. J Afr Hist 43(3):473–498
Steele ML (1972) The foundations of a native policy: Southern Rhodesia, 1923–1933. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Simon Fraser University
van der Merwe WJ (1981) From mission field to autonomous Church in Zimbabwe. N. G. Kerkboehandel, Transvaal

Joseph Mujere Ph.D., is a senior lecturer in History at the National University of Lesotho and a Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg. He published his first book in 2019 titled: *Land, Migration and Belonging: A History of Basotho in Southern Rhodesia c.1890-1960s* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2019).

Chapter 4
Transformations in the Livelihood Activities of Hlengwe People of the South-East Lowveld of Zimbabwe, 1890–2014

Taderera Hebert Chisi

Abstract The Hlengwe people of the south-east Lowveld of Zimbabwe are commonly known as Shangaan/'Machangana' or Tsonga. Their traditional livelihood activities such as hunting, fishing, gathering, agriculture and trade were unique to the extent that they could be easily used as features of identity differentiation between the Hlengwe and neighbouring 'ethnic others' such as Duma and Karanga. However, the uniqueness of some of these activities has diminished over the years. This chapter is premised on the argument that the livelihood activities of ethnic communities are not static but shift with time in response to changes in the social, political and physical environment. In this context, it analyses the transformation of the Hlengwe livelihood activities from 1890 (the time of British colonialism) to the twenty-first century. Overall, the Hlengwe livelihood activities morphed over the years to a point where, by the early twenty-first century, ethno-commerce or commodification of marketable features of identity such as cultural symbols, art and craft and living cultures remained the main livelihood activity which still reflected Hlengwe ethnicity more than any other activities in the modern multi-ethnic society of the south-east Lowveld.

Keywords Livelihoods · Ethno-commerce · Transformation · Identity · Hlengwe · Karanga

4.1 Introduction

The Hlengwe people, who are commonly known as 'Machangana', 'Shangaan' or Tsonga, inhabit parts of the south-east Lowveld of Zimbabwe between the Save and Limpopo Rivers, mainly in what is now known as Chiredzi District (Bannerman 1978: 483). Their Shangaan label is problematic especially given that the term was first applied only to the subjects of Soshangane, who fled from Nguniland to southern

T. H. Chisi (✉)
History Department, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe
e-mail: chisith@staff.msu.ac.zw

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_4

Mozambique in the early 1820s (Niehaus 2002: 101; Mtetwa 1976: 159; Rasmussen 1979: 293). It is clear that the Hlengwe were not descendants of the Shangaan and also did not come to the south-east Lowveld with Soshangane. As Chisi (2018) highlights, 'Shangaan' is merely a political label for the Hlengwe ethnic group which only gained importance in the public domain because of a combination of the colonial politics of ethno-cartography and the politics of ethnic labelling by the Shona and Ndebele who settled among the Hlengwe from the 1950s.

This chapter, however, is not focused centrally on arguments about Hlengwe ethnicity but, rather, seeks to analyse Hlengwe livelihoods from the colonial to the post-colonial period. It argues that, prior to the 1950s the Hlengwe were a visible ethnic community, with livelihood activities which could be clearly used as Hlengwe ethnic identity markers and could easily distinguish the Hlengwe from neighbouring ethnic others such as Duma, Karanga and Ndebele. However, these Hlengwe livelihood activities underwent major changes as a result of the implementation of colonial policies, to a point where they ceased to be clear markers of Hlengwe ethnicity or their identity in the south-east Lowveld. In this regard, for purposes of this chapter, ethnicity entails 'the capacity in people to classify themselves as social others' (Msindo 2007: 268).

As shown in this chapter, most Hlengwe livelihood activities which in the past were associated with 'being Hlengwe', did not remain static but changed to a point where the only activities which still pointed to Hlengweness were found in Hlengwe ethno-commerce. Ethno-commerce refers to the commodification of marketable features of an ethnic identity, such as cultural symbols, arts and crafts and living cultures or cultural artefacts for tourists or other buyers as souvenirs by members of the ethnic group. A clear example of ethno-commerce is where a group like the Zulu or—in this case—the Hlengwe make and sell items pertinent to their cultural identity such as bead necklaces, head rings, clay pots and baskets. To remove any confusion when reading this chapter, it should be noted that Chiredzi District was created in 1967 out of areas previously under the colonial Chibi, Nuanetsi and Ndanga Districts, so reference will be made to these latter areas in the discussion. So, whenever these former districts are mentioned, it is with reference to those parts of the districts which were excised to create the current Chiredzi District.

4.2 Contextualisation

The south-east Lowveld of Zimbabwe, in which the Hlengwe chose to settle from the eighteenth century, was generally a hostile and fragile environment and for a long time was treated as uninhabitable by agricultural communities. It is an area of harsh climatic conditions characterised by excessive heat and dryness. The area receives very low and often uncertain rainfall ranging between 300 and 700 mm per annum, and only receives sufficient rainfall for crop growth in one out of every three or four years (Bannerman 1978: 483; Chisi 2018). The annual temperatures range between 20 and 35 degrees centigrade but extreme temperatures reaching 40 degrees

centigrade are not uncommon in hot months (September to November) especially in lower parts of the area towards the Limpopo valley. Though dry, it is an area through which big rivers with sources in the Highveld (such as Runde, Mutirikwe, Tokwe, Bubye, Mwenezi, Save and Limpopo) pass through on the way to the Indian Ocean.

Generally, the south-east Lowveld environment discouraged dense human settlement leaving the Lowveld as an area of vast expanses of sparsely populated forest land rich in flora and fauna. Bannerman (1978: 483) indicates that the whole area is classified as Region 5, which means an area not suitable for crops of economic importance. For this reason, it was an area of little interest to most people except the Hlengwe and few scattered ethnic others like the Venda and Lomwe. At the time of the colonisation of Zimbabwe, the area had no known mineral deposits to be of interest to the colonialists, which explains the little interference with the Hlengwe livelihoods up to the 1950s. In this environment, the livelihood activities that developed and became associated with being Hlengwe were hunting, gathering, fishing and agriculture though livestock rearing, salt-production, pottery, and basketry were also practised (Chisi 2013: 168).

The 'sparsely' populated south-east Lowveld became one of the areas that the colonial regime could turn to in dealing with the problem of overpopulation, and releasing and creating land for whites. The 1940s, and even more so the 1950s, witnessed massive relocations of Hlengwe, Ndebele and Karanga people by colonialists into Matibi 2, Sangwe and Sengwe reserves—which are all in Chiredzi District, Masvingo (former Victoria) Province in the Lowveld. So, to create new farms for whites in the Lowveld, the Hlengwe were driven from the area which became Hippo Valley, Triangle and Mkwasine Sugar Estates as well as surrounding European alienated land. To reduce overcrowding in Matabeleland and northern Victoria (Masvingo) provinces' densely populated reserves, the excess population of Karanga and Ndebele was relocated to the south-east Lowveld as well (Bannerman 1978, 1981; Chisi 2013). The overcrowding in the reserves was a consequence of the increased evictions of Africans from their original homes, as more and more Europeans took over African land following the promulgation of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930. The LAA created racial categories of land ownership so all Africans except workers on European land had to move to the African reserves (Moyana 1984). The evictions increased after the Second World War following an influx of poor Europeans who were seeking for opportunities in Africa.

While saving the environment in overcrowded areas was pursued with vigour, animal enthusiasts weighed in with the thought of conserving wild animals through the creation of safaris, ranches and game parks. This saw the Gonarezhou National Park being established first as a protected area in 1936 and then as a national park in 1975; by these deeds, Hlengwe access to most of the Park and the resources therein was thereby blocked. As a result of this development, change in Hlengwe livelihoods was inevitable, for the Hlengwe still had to survive.

4.3 Methodology

The research for this study adopts a historical design and, in reconstructing the history of the Hlengwe livelihoods, a number of sources were used. This includes archival documents dated from 1902 to 1961, especially letters and reports of colonial administrators such as early Native and District Commissioners obtained from the National Archives of Zimbabwe from 2012 to 2017. As well, I conducted oral interviews among the Hlengwe in Chiredzi District in villages under *tiHosi* (chiefs/headmen) Gezani, Chilonga, Masivamele, Tshovani, Mpapa and Sengwe (mainly during the period from 2012 to 2014). Added to this were numerous secondary sources including books by one former District Commissioner of Nuanetsi, and a missionary Tillman Houser, both of whom worked among the Hlengwe for a long period of time.

4.4 Hlengwe Livelihood Activities from Pre-Colonial Times Up Until the 1950s

Up to the 1950s, there were clear livelihood activities with which the Hlengwe could be identified, and these could be easily used as Hlengwe ethnic identity markers vis-à-vis neighbouring ethnic others in the Lowveld. This section looks at these major livelihood activities such as hunting, gathering, fishing, agriculture, migrant labour and trade, in some detail.

4.4.1 Hunting

It is difficult to establish with a high degree of accuracy the frequency with which individual households hunted and how much game meat contributed to their diet, but colonial records prove that most Hlengwe men devoted more time to hunting than the neighbouring Shona groups. The records demonstrate that hunting contributed immensely to the food basket of the Hlengwe, and hence it was a key livelihood activity which took up much of their time until it was banned by the colonial government, forcing them to venture into other activities. The Hlengwe devoted so much time to hunting that early colonial administrators advanced the narrative that the Hlengwe were mainly a 'hunting tribe'. The Native Commissioner (NC) of Ndanga District said of the Hlengwe:

> They are born hunters and spend a great deal of their spare time in shooting game. (NAZ N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.)

The NC for Chibi District described the Hlengwe under Chief Chitanga in Chibi District as follows:

> The *Bashlangwe* tribe have always been hunters, and until quite lately have not gone in for agriculture; even now it is only those who have Makalakas [Karangas] living with them who do so to any extent. (NAZ, N3/33/8, Tshitanga Tribe, Bashlungwe People, n.d.)

Likewise, Wright (1972: 201) calls the Hlengwe 'fearless and effective hunters'.

The Hlengwe hunter-gatherer's bag would contain all sorts of animals and creatures even those which neighbouring ethnic communities shunned. Oral sources reveal that the Hlengwe ate the meat of most animals (such as impala, kudu, bush-buck, eland and warthogs) and even killed animals as big as elephants and rhinoceroses in their environment (Matsuve, interview, 09/08/2013). They also consumed creatures like bull frogs (*makuthla*), big monitor lizards (*makwahle*) and tortoises (*swibhotse*) which *Nyai* groups did not eat (Musengi, interview 5/7/2014). Even up to the 1930s, the Native Commissioners continued to indicate in their reports that that the Hlengwe survived on 'game meat and mulala palm' (NAZ, S235/1/18, Assistant NC, Nuanetsi, Annual Report, 31 December 1934).

4.4.2 Gathering

Alongside hunting there also existed gathering, i.e. foraging for food. This was mainly a woman's pre-occupation but women were assisted at times by children and their male counterparts especially during droughts. Also, from early colonial records, it is evident that gathering was a key livelihood activity which the Hlengwe could not do without in their hostile natural environment. Chisi (2013: 169) notes that gathering secured diverse food items for the Hlengwe which included vegetables, insects and wild fruits. The fruits included *mawuyu* (baobab fruit), *makwakwa* (wild oranges or fruits of the *Strychmos Madagascariensis* tree), and *mapfura* (marula or fruits of the *nkanyi* or Sclerocarya Caffra tree). They also brought back from the bush grasshoppers, *magandari* and *macimbi* (green and black caterpillars respectively), the sap of *minala* or ilala palm (*hypahene natalansis*), and honey.

Two of the gathered forest products appear to have been particularly important to the Hlengwe. This does not mean that the other gathered products were not important food items or raw materials for their art and craft. These were *makwakwa* (wild oranges) and the ilala palm (called *minala* by the Hlengwe). *Makwakwa* and ilala palm were important food resources in the Hlengwe diet, so that considerable time was given to gathering them. Ilala palm was important in the brewing of an alcoholic beverage called *njemani*, which learned Hlengwe jokingly call 'German wine'. The collected *makwakwa* were fire dried through a process called *ekhurimba* which required large volumes of hot charcoal, such that large amounts of dry wood were required. They were consumed either as *fuma* or *mabhewu* also called *hwakwa. Fuma* was a powder made from the fire-dried seed cover of *makwakwa* fruits which were ground or pounded into a tasty powder (Muninginisi, interview, 03/07/2014). *Mabhewu* was the unground fire-dried soft seed cover of the *makwakwa* fruit. *Makwakwa* was an important source of food during droughts and many Native

Commissioners' reports talk of the Hlengwe surviving on wild oranges and ilala palm in dry years. During the 1911–1912 droughts, the Hlengwe are said to have survived on roots, milk and edible wild fruits (NAZ, N9/1/15, NC Annual Report 1911 and 1912). The 1913 NC Chibi Report talks of a people living between the Lundi (Runde) and Bubye Rivers who survived on *makwakwa* and ilala palm shoots due to food shortages in that year. The NC says:

> They are of the hunting or Bahlengwe tribe and are able to obtain food from their more fortunate neighbours in the north and live on the wild oranges '*wakwa*' and palm shoots supplemented with fish and what game they kill or take away from wild carnivores. (NAZ, N9/1/16, NC Chibi Annual Report, 1913)

During the 1914 drought, many Hlengwe left the country for Mozambique in search of *hwakwa*, according to the NC's annual report (NAZ, NVC2/1/1 Chibi District: Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 December 1914). Also, in 1927, the Acting NC for Nuanetsi said that the Hlengwe reaped 'practically nothing', but:

> Subsisted throughout the year almost entirely on products of the *malala* palm combined with a herbaceous diet. (NAZ S235/505 ANC Annual Report Nuanetsi Sub-District 1927)

These reports prove that gathering was an indispensable livelihood activity of the Hlengwe. More so, considering that they lived in a hostile environment where droughts were more common than wet seasons, this shows that the Hlengwe spent time foraging for food over extended periods. The archaeological research by Thorp (2005) highlights that the south-east Lowveld was a forager's paradise in that it was rich in flora and fauna from which the Hlengwe obtained sustenance.

4.4.3 Livestock Herding

The Hlengwe kept big and small livestock and fowls, as proven by the fact that the initiates *va ka hogo* (attending the Hlengwe initiation school) paid their *muxeki* (or the man responsible for circumcising males during initiation ceremonies) with cattle (*tihomu*), goats (*timbuti*) and fowls (Johnston 1974: 346). Further, the Hlengwe had indigenous names to denote these domestic animals which show that the keeping of livestock was a traditional practice. What points in particular to the significance of livestock to the Hlengwe is that, even after modern schools were opened in the twentieth century, most Hlengwe boys were barred by their parents from attending so as to tend the family herd (Chauke, interview, 10/07/2014; Gezani, interview 08/07/2014). This became a key difference marker between Ndebele and Karanga on the one hand and Hlengwe on the other, from the 1950s. As cattle herders, most Hlengwe were described by colonial administrators as 'lackadaisical agriculturalists, untidy hut-builders and not even good stockmen – they do not emulate the Ndebele, their cousins who are fine cattlemen' (Wright 1972: 201). So, from the perspective of livelihood activities, it was still possible to distinguish Hlengwe from their ethnic-other neighbours even as late as the 1950s.

4.4.4 Migrant Labour

While the Hlengwe rural economy was dominated by hunting and gathering and other rural-based activities, some young Hlengwe men had started to seek job opportunities in the South African mines before the colonisation of Zimbabwe. From colonial records, it appears that there were more male Hlengwe migrant labourers than male Shona migrant labourers from the south-east Lowveld in colonial times. One of the earliest Ndanga NCs said that the Hlengwe were poor agricultural workers but admitted that:

> They are very good mine boys and go regularly to work without any persuasion. (NAZ, N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.)

In the same report, he acknowledges that the opposite was true of the Karangas and he therefore says:

> It is difficult to persuade them [Karanga men] to go to work and they care very little for clothes or money as long as they have their paltry 10/- [shillings] or £1 to pay the government hut tax. (NAZ, N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.)

In 1917, the Chief Native Commissioner reported that for quite some time a considerable percentage of Hlengwe from Ndanga (southern portion) and Chibi were 'in the habit of seeking employment in the Transvaal' (NAZ, S246/716 CNC in a letter to the Secretary Department of Administrator, Salisbury, 11 October 1917). This trend had not changed by 1939 because the NC Chibi reports that:

> [L]ocal natives from Nuanetsi go to the Union [of South Africa] for employment. This exodus is nothing new…. (NAZ, S235/517 Report NC Chibi, 31 December 1939)

It is clear that labour migration took root much earlier among the Hlengwe than the Karanga, which is why migrant labour came to be mainly associated with the Hlengwe and not Shona-speaking groups. Mtetwa (1976: 289) asserts that, by the 1890s, a very strong tradition of labour migration to South Africa had already been established and he identifies three routes used by Hlengwe labour migrants to reach the labour markets. One route was called the Shangaan route and passed through the Save-Runde Rivers' confluence area to Pafure in South Africa. A second route was called *Posokufa*, which literally meant 'you have risked death' because of the hazards on the way, while the third route was called *Jibinjobo* which meant: 'The skin-attire was snatched from behind by wild animals, particularly lions, from men who were fleeing' (Mtetwa 1976: 0020289).

The reasons for going to the mines were numerous. Cecil Barnard a European poacher met some 'Shangane' speaking people close to the border with Mozambique (which was the area of chiefs Ngwenyeni, Shilotlela and Masivamele) who had been forced by drought to go and labour in South Africa, but they had worked the shortest contract because they:

> [W]ere hastening home with what little money they had earned hoping that the families they left behind were still alive. (Bulpin 1955: 44)

In his 1917 letter to the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) states that most migrant workers went to South Africa with the desire to earn money with which to settle their government debts for grain advanced to them during famines and to meet their other obligations (NAZ, S246/716, CNC, letter to the Secretary Department of Administrator, Salisbury, 11 October 1917). Houser (2007: 76) says they brought from South Africa colourful clothing, tools, blankets and money for debt and tax payment. Some went to earn money for buying food from the Makaranga and other traders (NAZ, N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.). Wolmer (2007: 77) says that, among the Hlengwe, the 'repatriated wages became an important part of the local economy'. This shows that migrant labour was a very critical livelihood activity among the Hlengwe and, in the early years of colonial rule and even well after the 1950s, it was mainly a Hlengwe activity with specific reference to the south-eastern Lowveld of Zimbabwe.

In South Africa, they worked in copper mines around Messina, in Natal's sugar plantations and farms in Transvaal, and a few made it to the Rand mines. Most of the Hlengwe were engaged as general hands. Some also worked for Europeans as hunters and cattle herders, while many became house servants, farm labourers in fields and citrus orchards, labourers in construction companies or tool boys for white mechanics in garages (Bannerman 1978: 490; Houser 2000: 7).

4.4.5 Agriculture

Based on agricultural practices, colonial administrators were able to tell the difference between the Hlengwe and their Karanga neighbours. Describing the Karanga and Hlengwe in his district, the NC Ndanga says:

> Most natives in the northern part of the district are Makarangas….they are however, splendid agricultural workers and excel almost any native race in South Africa in this respect. (NAZ, N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d)

Describing the Hlengwe, he indicates:

> In the Southern part of the district are to be found a totally different tribe of natives called the Hlengwi…This tribe is quite the reverse to the Makarangas in nearly every aspect. They are very poor agricultural workers. (NAZ, N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.)

This difference between Karangas and Hlengwe was confirmed by the Karanga who were resettled among the Hlengwe of Chiredzi District in the 1950s. One Karanga informant said that it was very easy to distinguish between the Hlengwe and Karanga back then, at least until the 1960s. He argued that, though the Hlengwe practised agriculture, they only cleared very small patches of land where they simply broadcast seed while the Karanga had big fields and would plant in lines. After germination, the Hlengwe did not practise weeding until harvest time, so most of their crops were choked by weeds. He attributed this to laziness and even said that a few of those who weeded their crops with hoes did so while sitting down or on their knees (Manhumba,

interview, 17/07/2014). Even the Hlengwe confirmed that they had small patches of land where they grew very few crops (Chikahu, interview, 02/07/2014). Beach (1983: 247) also confirms that the Tsonga-Hlengwe speakers in the south-east placed less emphasis than the Shona on agriculture. The main reason for this was that the Hlengwe knew that:

> Only in one year out of three or four would they have sufficient rainfall for good crops. They therefore relied more heavily than the plateau-dwellers on fishing, hunting and gathering. (Beach 1983: 250)

With all this said, there is still evidence suggesting that agriculture was an important livelihood activity among the Hlengwe. Bannerman (1981) says that the Hlengwe grew about six types of sorghum called *xikombe*, *chibedlane*, *chiraxavane*, *maxalane*, *xiponda* and *xitishi*. They also grew *matimba* (sweet-reeds), *marhakarhaka* (cucumbers) *timangha* (pea-nuts) *tinyawa* (beans) *tindluwu* (roundnuts), *lininga* (sesame) from which they extracted oil, *mahonti* (pumpkins) *mihlata* (sweet potatoes) *makhavathla* (sweet-melons) and *fole* (tobacco) for making snuff. Bannerman (1981: 20) says that one of his informants evicted from the Save-Runde junction in 1968 told him that: 'During the dry spells, we were always assured of having a crop. We could irrigate with water at hand. We could grow pumpkins, maize and sweet potatoes'. It is abundantly clear that in wet seasons and when the situation allowed, agriculture was a significant Hlengwe livelihood practice. Most used very simple technology (hoes and sticks) until when they adopted the plough after the 1950s.

4.4.6 Fishing

Fishing was a Hlengwe livelihood activity which also had a social function of uniting the Hlengwe, as observed by Jubb (1981: 28–31) on a visit to the Marumbini area close to the confluence of the Runde and Save Rivers in 1958. A similar fishing event which was witnessed along the Runde River was recorded in *The Rhodesia Annual* of 1926. Jubb (1981: 28) observed a Hlengwe annual fish drive, which he describes as 'a traditional event in which all able-bodied men took part'. He says that it was a community event in which the event date was set by the chief. It was carried out before the first thunderstorms of mid-October or November brought the floods. About 500 to 600 Hlengwe took part in the drive and he describes the event as follows:

> First a fence of river reeds (*phragmites*) of some 500 metres in length is made with the reeds space at about 50mm. Several hundred practically naked men man this fence and advance with an encircling movement from the shallow end of the pool. With one end on the bottom, the whole fence is carried forward in an upright position, the inner area being reduced until there remains a small circular space of some 20m [metres] in diameter just boiling with fish. The large fish are then speared, but in the end no fish, which cannot slip through the spaced reed fence escapes. The haul is then examined and carefully distributed amongst the community. (Jubb 1981: 28)

So, besides providing food, fishing had a social-cohesion purpose among the Hlengwe. The fish caught included saw-fish locally called *chinyabanga* (*Pristis microdon*) which was said to be poisonous and had a fatal bite (unless the wound was immediately treated with milk from a feeding mother), small sharks, tiger fish, breams, tarpon and some unknown species (*The Rhodesian Annual* 1926: 71; Jubb 1981: 28; Wright 1972: 26, 40). The fish were a source of food and items of trade which were exchanged for grain in times of drought and food shortages (Mtetwa 1976). Interestingly, it was believed that the Hlengwe had crocodile repellent '*murhi*' or charms that they kept in leather pouches fastened to the waist to ward off any crocodile attacks (Jubb 1981: 28).

4.4.7 Trade

Mtetwa (1976) argues that trade was very important in the Hlengwe household economy. Beach (1983: 250) also hints on trade when he says that, during the dry periods, the Hlengwe were able to obtain food from their plateau neighbours. One NC Chibi (NAZ, N9/1/16, NC Annual Report Chibi, 1913) simply talks of Hlengwe depending on their northern neighbours for food during droughts without mentioning in detail how it was obtained. NC Ndanga (NAZ N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.) states in one report that most of the food consumed by the Hlengwe was purchased with cash from the Makarangas and traders. In the absence of extensive literature and evidence about it from NCs, it is difficult to say with much certainty how much it was practised—but it must have been very important in times of food crises.

However, Mtetwa (1976) claims it was in fact extensive. He says that the Hlengwe were better craftsmen, fishermen and hunters than groups on the Highveld which devoted more time to agricultural production because of the better climatic conditions they experienced. This meant that the Hlengwe's finer mats, baskets, pots, blankets and bags had a ready market in Shona-speaking areas on higher ground. Mtetwa (1976: 263–264) says that these Hlengwe items were sold in areas as far west as beyond the Mutirikwe and Tokwe Rivers. He further notes that the dried game meat and fish were also sold in areas around Great Zimbabwe and Chivi District. Salt which was produced as well by the Hlengwe found a ready market among the Highveld people mainly the Shona groups. One Hlengwe explained that salt was obtained from a plant called *dangala* which used to be found in the Gonarezhou (Chisi 2013: 171). Most of it came from salt pans and it was abundant at Chizenjele and Manyoweni which are areas now enclosed in the Gonarezhou National Park (Chisi 2013: 171).

4.5 Changes in Hlengwe Livelihoods

The livelihood activities of some Hlengwe began to be affected negatively as from the 1920s, as chiefs Mpapa and Masivamele's Hlengwe were evicted by the colonial government to the Matibi 2 reserve. However, it was the end of the Second World War in Europe coupled with existing colonial land segregation policies which quickened the demise of key Hlengwe livelihood activities while simultaneously transforming some. The post-war era was followed by an influx of whites from war devastated Europe to Zimbabwe. The colonial regime responded by radically implementing the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and enacting the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 in a bid to protect white interests (Phimister 1986; Nyambara 2002). As a consequence of colonial policy shifts and enforcements, the period from 1952 to 1968 saw major evictions of Hlengwe from areas earmarked for European settlement (as well as of Karanga and Ndebele from overcrowded reserves) into Matibi 2, Sengwe and Sangwe reserves. which were predominantly Hlengwe areas in Chiredzi District. The Ndebele came from Filabusi and Fort Rixon (Matabeleland) while Karanga came from Gutu, Victoria and Shabane Districts (all in Victoria, now Masvingo, Province), and were resettled in Matibi 2 and Sengwe reserves (Bannerman 1978: 492; NAZ, S2827/2/2/7/3 Annual Report of the NC, Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1959).

The resettlement of the Ndebele and Karanga among the Hlengwe had a profound impact on Hlengwe society, which made a missionary who was working among the Hlengwe to comment:

> Hlengwe culture is fast disappearing under the impact of relocation schemes where Karanga are moving into the Nuanetsi District. (Houser 1972: 2)

It was in the context of interacting with each other in the rural space of the south-east Lowveld that cultural diffusion (and rejection) began to take place among the different ethnic groups. In this shared space, it was mainly through and because of ethnic labelling and ridiculing of Hlengwe (who were seen as 'primitive' by Shona and Ndebele) that many Hlengwe gradually withdrew from certain historical practices, such as the eating of monitor lizards, bull frogs and tortoises because they were associated with 'primitive diets' (Mupereri, interview, 14/7/2014). This adversely affected the composition of the Hlengwe forager's bag as they became more selective in hunting and gathering activities.

The coming of the Ndebele and Karanga into the south-east Lowveld also transformed Hlengwe agricultural practices to a point where agriculture as a Hlengwe livelihood activity ceased to be a Hlengwe identity marker. By 1955, the Hlengwe were still practising their traditional ways of farming as indicated by one NC's annual report. He says:

> The stumping of lands in the newly settled areas is progressing, the older inhabitants [Hlengwe] are more difficult to persuade; they do not like innovations. (NAZ, S2827/2/2/3/2 Report of the NC, Nuanetsi for the Year Ended 31 December 1955)

However, one year later in 1956, some changes were beginning to take place and, in his annual report, the same NC says:

> The people [Hlengwe] are very backward in this district and improvement in farming methods is very slow…A certain amount of winter ploughing was done by new settlers [Karanga and Ndebele] from other districts. This apparently aroused the interest of old residents [Hlengwe] of whom a number followed suit. (NAZ, S2827/2/2/4/2 Report of the NC, Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1956)

Wolmer (2007: 84) sums up the changes that took place in the agricultural practices of the Hlengwe as a result of their interaction with Karanga and Ndebele, as follows:

> [A]n influential factor in encouraging the adoption of 'modern' and 'improved' methods of agriculture in the communal areas of the lowveld proved to be, not the activities of the agricultural demonstrators, but the increasing immigration of Shona and Ndebele families to the area from the 1950s. They brought maize, grew cash crops and practised winter ploughing and planted in lines rather than broadcasting seeds. Initially Shangaan (Hlengwe) speakers rejected many of these modern techniques but increasingly began to adopt some of them.

A noticeable change among the different ethnic groups was how each group adopted the other groups' crops. There is evidence that the Ndebele and Karanga quickly adopted Hlengwe crops (especially the different types of sorghum as staple crops) and *mhunga* (finger-millet), because maize their staple was not doing well in the south-east Lowveld (Chisi, interview, 23/02/2013). The Hlengwe also adopted the Karanga's *rukweza* (rapoko) and maize though it was planted mainly in gardens. By the 1960s, in areas with a mixture of Hlengwe, Karanga and Ndebele, crops grown had ceased to be identity markers as all ethnic groups were now growing similar crops.

The other Hlengwe activities such as hunting, fishing, gathering, trade and salt-making also suffered as a result of implementation of colonial conservation policies, including the Herbage Preservation Act of 1913 and Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929. The Herbage Preservation Act forbade the cutting of trees, shrubs, bush, brushwood, undergrowth or grass and even made illegal the removal of honey or bees from other people's land. The 'other' simply referred to Europeans since, among the Hlengwe, land was communally owned. These measures starved the Hlengwe of resources that sustained most of their livelihood activities including trade. The acts also barred hunting and fishing and any breach of these laws attracted hefty fines of about British £100 (Chisi 2013: 180). Therefore, the creation of European ranches and safaris as well as the Gonarezhou National Park actually suffocated most of the Hlengwe livelihood activities as the Hlengwe were no longer allowed into the European or wildlife areas where they used to hunt, fish, collect *dangala* and access salt pans in areas like Manyoweni and Chizenjele (Chisi 2013: 171). To appreciate the negative impact of colonial policies on Hlengwe livelihoods it is important to emphasise that hunting, gathering and fishing were not sports for the Hlengwe, but a means of survival.

This is why the daring Hlengwe responded by resorting to illegal hunting. As observed by Steinhart (1989: 250) in colonial Kenya, as a new ethos of game preservation emerged, the Africans who survived through hunting, fishing or gathering

found themselves 'transformed into poachers'. This was true of the Hlengwe and the growth in Hlengwe 'poaching' by 1958 made the NC Nuanetsi to say in his report:

> Only two butcheries operate in the area [Matibi 2]. Both are fairly patronised but the Shangaans (Hlengwe) prefer game meat and continue to hunt and snare game in the traditional manner. (NAZ, S2827/2/2/6/2, Annual Report of the NC, Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1958)

In 1961, the NC Nuanetsi even lamented that the heavy fines were not having a deterrent effect on Hlengwe poaching (NAZ, S2827/2/2/8/3, Annual Report of the Native Commissioner Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1961). Poaching was only effectively reduced after the full enforcement of game protection laws in the 1970s, but not without resistance from the Hlengwe.

From the above discussion, it is clear that Hlengwe livelihoods were drastically affected by colonial policies, leading to the demise of most of these activities and the transformation of others, especially agriculture. However, as control of their livelihood activities by colonial administrators intensified, the Hlengwe like their Karanga and Ndebele counterparts devoted more time to agriculture while most young men joined the long trek to South Africa in search of jobs. From then on, it became increasingly difficult to use livelihood activities as accurate identity difference markers between the Hlengwe and their Ndebele and Karanga neighbours. However, it is ethno-commerce activities which still reflect aspects of Hlengwe identity to some extent.

4.6 Hlengwe Ethno-Commerce

Ethno-commerce is the commodification of cultural artefacts associated with an ethnic identity. The growth of this business worldwide was spurred by the recognition that indigenous or ethnic groups have a cultural entitlement to gain from products of their way of life (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). Ethno-commerce thus entails the business of marketing unique cultural artefacts with which an indigenous group is identified, for example, their traditional craft work such as baskets, attire, mats, rugs, necklaces, headgear, bangles and even their performing arts especially cultural dances. This is why Comaroff and Comaroff (2009: 29) say 'otherness' or identity is now, 'increasingly claimed as property by its living heirs who proceed to manage it, —brand it, sell it—in self-consciously consumable forms'. This section examines the Hlengwe ethno-enterprises with which the Hlengwe identity is still associated, and argues that though ethno-commerce is practised at a very low scale, it represents the livelihood activities which still clearly portray Hlengwe identity, more than any others in the south-east Lowveld of Zimbabwe. The Hlengwe ethno-enterprises are discussed under three categories: Hlengwe craft, cultural village and cultural dances.

From the pre-colonial era, Hlengwe were great craftspeople making all kinds of articles such as finer mats, baskets, clay pots, blankets and bags for trade and

domestic use (Mtetwa 1976). In the colonial period, this arts and crafts industry almost collapsed, though there were many old men and women who continued to make these items for everyday use within their communities. In the 1990s, a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which had realised the potential of this indigenous industry to grow into a profitable venture, came to the assistance of the local Hlengwe communities, including helping to set up ethno-businesses in the Sengwe Communal lands. The NGOs included SEVACA a craft trading organisation, Terre des Homes, Environmental Development Activities—Zimbabwe (ENDA-Zimbabwe) and Southern Alliance of Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE). They offered financial support and training with regard to capacity building and aided in marketing of craft wares (Sola 2004: 256).Two craft centres to facilitate the marketing of products were established in Sengwe along popular tourist routes. The NGOs equipped women in particular with skills in production of wares for sale, marketing and financial management (Sola 2004: 256–258). However, the craft centres have since been abandoned due to the economic meltdown and political instability following the Fast Track Land Reform Programme which started in 2000.

Nevertheless, the Hlengwe women who saw the economic benefits of participating in these ventures began to make a number of cultural objects and even modified some to suit the tastes of the market. They made winnowing baskets called *lihlelo* and baskets for carrying grain, fruits and other food items called *nzala* which were miniaturised for easier handling by tourists on planes. Through the training received, they also diversified the range of commodities that they made as they began to make items such as sugar basins, wall hangings, washing baskets, fruit and shopping baskets, brooms and mats. Though diversification resulted in a deviation from marketing of 'authentic' Hlengwe products, the business was built around the uniqueness of Hlengwe cultural artefacts. An informant revealed that the Hlengwe products especially *nzala* and *lihlelo* were unique and different than those made by Ndebele women in that, while the Ndebele also made baskets using *minala* like the Hlengwe, they either made plain baskets or decorated them using artificial dyes (Mathose, interview, 20/06/2014). The Hlengwe made stronger baskets using *minala* and *misisi* which is a type of a climber, and their winnowing baskets (*lihlelo*), *nzala* and most of their products are coloured with natural dyes. According to Sola (2004: 78), the Hlengwe dye was made from the bark of the *Munyii* tree (bird-plum or *Phyllogeiton discolour*) and is at times darkened by mixing the bark with charcoal.

In 2000 and 2001, the women produced up to 6,000 items of four different products which they sold to SEVACA and, at the time that business was booming, craft sales were ranked the third most important source of household income for the Hlengwe (Sola 2004: 253). Their markets included the National Handcraft Centre and National Art Gallery in Harare and international buyers in South Africa, Mexico and Europe. Unfortunately, by 2014, there existed only a few individual Hlengwe who were making these items and selling them to South Africa. However, though there were very few Hlengwe still involved in the craft sales business, it is evident that this Hlengwe livelihood activity was one of the few remaining livelihood activities that had qualities of a Hlengwe identity marker, and it also derived most of its uniqueness from being associated with an activity from the Hlengwe pre-colonial past.

Cultural villages are also a way of commodifying features of a people's identity. In the 1970s, the former District Commissioner of what was then Nuanetsi District saw the Hlengwe as people with a marketable ethnic identity, as he described them as '- a group of unsophisticated Africans, who would make a wonderful tourist attraction' (Wright 1972: 349–350). For this reason, he wanted them to be part of his big vision about the Gonarezhou National Park but the colonial regime rejected this idea.

However, in 2011, the uniqueness of the Hlengwe ethnic identity was packaged and commoditised in the form of a Hlengwe cultural village called Kambako Museum of Living Bushcraft, which was located on the border of Malilangwe Conservancy which adjoins the Gonarezhou National Park. The role of the local Hlengwe from surrounding villages who were employed there was to re-enact the traditional Hlengwe way of life. The village set up depicted a Hlengwe homestead (*muti*). The architecture of traditional Hlengwe dwelling structures *(tiyindlo*), grain storage facilities (*nghula*), a cattle pen (*xivala xetihomu*) and fowl run (*xilugwi xatihuku*) which were found there, were typical of traditional Hlengwe homesteads in pre-colonial times. The cultural village was popular with tourists to the conservancy and in December 2012 it even attracted big names such as Bill Gates.[1] Tourists came to see and learn about the traditional Hlengwe way of life.

On my visit to the place in 2013, it was the work of Julius Matsuve, the 'patriarch' of the village and his 'sons' to teach about the Hlengwe traditional fire-making skills (using sticks) and the making of spears and arrow heads, while his many 'wives' (representing the Hlengwe polygamous marriage) and daughters wove baskets, fibre-mats and other items from grass and cooked on open fires. They also performed colourful Hlengwe cultural dances. The only problem with this kind of livelihood activity is that, in an attempt to improve the market value of the portrayed identity, its uniqueness tends to be falsified to sufficiently mystify it, because the more it is mystified the better it sells. In this way, its authenticity may be compromised, which is what Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) refer to as duping the market. However, at the Shangaan/Hlengwe village, the greater part of the script tried as much as possible to give the market or tourists a fair appreciation of the traditional Hlengwe way of life.

Finally, the other ethno-commerce based livelihood activity which could be associated with Hlengwe identity in the early years of the twenty-first century is the commoditisation of Hlengwe cultural dances. The cultural dances have been marketed through dance performances for tourists, or cultural dance groups being hired to perform at special occasions or at dance competitions sponsored by the corporate world, or at cultural galas organised by various institutions including the state. But, for most dancers this was a part-time activity. Matsuve (interview, 09/08/2013) said that the Hlengwe dances include *xinombela*, *muchongolo*, *xigubu*, *xifasi*, *xibelani* and *mukhinyavezo*. The Hlengweness in the cultural dances was seen in the dancers' unique Hlengwe attire and dance styles which are different from those of the Ndebele and Karanga. One common feature of cultural dances is that, in whatever form they

are presented, there is a sense of ethnic pride that is exuded by the dancers and audience of the same identity. So when the Hlengwe cultural dances were performed, there was a sense of Hlengwe pride exuded by the dancers and Hlengwe audience.

One other observation made about Hlengwe cultural dances was that, in the selection of cultural dance groups from the Lowveld to participate at local, regional, national and international festivals, politics of identity was strongly played out in Chiredzi district. For most of the regional, national and international events where cultural dances were performed, Hlengwe ethnic strategists took advantage of every opportunity to promote Hlengwe dance groups. To the Gaza Trust, an organisation spearheading the Hlengwe fight for recognition, cultural dances became much more than a form of social entertainment, as they were a declaration of intent. Cultural dances became a mechanism for promoting Hlengwe culture, which the Gaza Trust strongly felt was at the verge of collapse due to an onslaught from a combination of sources—such as the presence of ethnic others who perceived themselves to be superior ethnic groups than the Hlengwe and also government policies which did not seem to take cognisance of the existence of Hlengwe as the dominant group (at least in terms of numbers) in the south-east Lowveld (Director Gaza Trust, interview, 23/06/2013). The Gaza Trust was still very active in 2013and 2014, and different Hlengwe cultural dance groups were being hired ahead of other groups to perform at various cultural events such as Mapungubwe Heritage Tour Celebrations in South Africa, the Harare International Carnival and the CISA commemorations.[2] It is therefore quite evident that, by 2014, commoditised cultural dances could still be used as Hlengwe identity markers in the south-east Lowveld.

4.7 Conclusion

In the pre-colonial and early colonial period up to the 1950s, the Hlengwe pursued unique livelihood activities that could be labelled and understood as Hlengwe identity boundary markers. However, the vigorous implementation of colonial policies, such as the evictions of Hlengwe to reserves, the resettlement of Ndebele and Karanga among the Hlengwe and the creation of the Gonarezhou National Park, were a direct attack on Hlengwe livelihoods. The Ndebele, Karanga and Hlengwe social interactions in the shared social space led to a major transformation in livelihood activities for Hlengwe, especially gathering and agriculture, while colonial policies also undercut their hunting and gathering activities as Hlengwe access to game- and flora-rich areas was curtailed through the creation of the Gonarezhou National Park. Now, in the Chiredzi District and the south-east Lowveld as a whole, the multi-ethnic community (composed of Hlengwe, Karanga, Ndebele and other smaller groups) grows similar crops, follows similar agricultural practices and generally pursues similar livelihood activities, dominated by agriculture and migrant labour to South Africa. It is only in pockets scattered throughout the district, that there are Hlengwe people who pursue ethno-commerce based livelihood activities which still portray Hlengwe identity. These are people who make and sell Hlengwe cultural artefacts, with some

having formed cultural dance groups while a few are employed at the Shangaan Village, where they make a living out of mimicking the traditional Hlengwe way of life.

Notes

1. "Bill Gates on Zimbabwe Safari," http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-9816-Bill+Gates+on+Zimbabwe+safari/news.aspx.
2. www.facebook.com/pages/GazaTrustZimbabwe/156070247842575.

References

Bannerman J (1978) Towards a history of the Hlengwe people of the south of Rhodesia. NADA X I(5):483–496
Bannerman J (1981) "Hlengweni:" the history of the Hlengwe of the lower save and Lundi rivers, from the late-eighteenth to the twentieth century. Zim Hist 12:1–45
Beach D (1983) The Zimbabwe plateau and its peoples. In: Birmingham D, Martin P (eds) History of Central Africa, vol 1. Longman, London, pp 245–277
Bulpin T (1955) The ivory trail. Howard Timmins, Cape Town
Chisi T (2013) Colonial economic disempowerment and the responses of the Hlengwe peasantry of the south east Lowveld of Zimbabwe: 1890–1965. Afr Zam 20(21):165–194
Chisi T (2018) Transformations in Hlengwe ethnicity in Chiredzi, Zimbabwe 1890 to 2014. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa
Comaroff J, Comaroff J (2009) Ethnicity Inc. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Scottsville
Houser T (1972) The extent of Karanga speaking spirit possession among the Hlengwe in Rhodesia. Hist of C Afr Rel Syst Con: Lusaka, Aug 30-Sept 8: 1–10
Houser T (2000) Free methodist and other missions in Zimbabwe. Priority Projects Publishing, Harare
Houser T (2007) Let me tell you…a memoir. Self-Publication, USA
Johnston T (1974) Secret initiation songs of the Shangana-Tsonga circumcision rite: a textual and musical analysis. J Amer Folk 87(346):328–339
Jubb R (1981) In search of fish: a visit to the South-Eastern Corner of Zimbabwe. Zim Wildlife 27:28–31
Moyana H (1984) The political economy of land in Zimbabwe. Mambo Press, Gweru
Msindo E (2007) Ethnicity and nationalism in urban colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950–1963. J Afr Hist 48:267–290
Mtetwa R (1976) The political and economic history of the Duma people of south-eastern Rhodesia from the early eighteenth century to 1945. Unpublished D.Phil. Thesis, University of Rhodesia
Niehaus I (2002) Ethnicity and the boundaries of belonging: reconfiguring Shangaan identity in the South African Lowveld. Afr Affairs 101:557–583
Nyambara P (2002) Madheruka and Shangwe: ethnic identities and the culture of modernity in Gokwe, north western Zimbabwe, 1963–79. J Afr Hist 43:287–306
Phimister I (1986) Discourse and the discipline of historical context: conservationism and ideas about development in Southern Rhodesia 1930–1950. J Sou Afr St 12(2):263–275
Rasmussen R (1979) Historical dictionary of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The Scarecrow Press, London

Sola P (2004) Weaving ilala: palm leaves in communal areas of Zimbabwe, In: Lopez C, Stanley P (eds) Riches of the forest: for health, life and spirit in Africa. CIFOR/DFID, Jakarta Steinhart E (1989)
Steinhart E (1989) Hunters, poachers and gamekeepers: towards a social history of hunting in colonial Kenya. J Afr Hist 30:247–264
The Rhodesia Annual (1926)
Thomas J (1974) Secret initiation songs of the Shangana-Tsonga circumcision rite: a textual and musical analysis. J Amer Fol 87(346):328–339
Thorp C (2005) Landscape and environmental change in semi-arid regions of east and southern Africa: Developing interdisciplinary approaches: summary of results on Malilangwe Trust, south-eastern Zimbabwe
Wright A (1972) Valley of the ironwoods. Cape and Transvaal Printers, Cape Town
Wolmer W (2007) From wilderness vision to farm invasions: conservation and development in Zimbabwe's south-east lowveld. James Currey, Oxford

Interviews

Baloyi M (14/06/2014) interview, Great Zimbabwe University-Mashava Campus
Chauke N (10/07/2014) interview, Gezani, Chiredzi
Chikahu R (02/7/2014) interview, Chilonga, Chiredzi
Chisi A (23/02/2013) interview, Village 12, Mushandike Resettlement Scheme, Masvingo
Director of Gaza Trust (23/06/2013) interview, Nesbitt Castle Inn, Chiredzi
Gezani A (08/07/2014) interview, Gezani, Chiredzi
Manhumba M (17//07/2014) interview, Masivamele, Chiredzi
Mathose E (20/06/2014) interview, Sengwe Communal area, Chiredzi
Matsuve J (09/08/2013) interview, Kambako Museum, Malilangwe Conservancy
Mbalati D (14/06/2014) interview, Great Zimbabwe University—Mashava Campus
Mupereri J (14/07/2014) interview, Chikombedzi, Chiredzi
Musengi T (05/07/2014) interview, Chibwedziva, Chiredzi

National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) Files

(NAZ, N3/33/8, History of Ndanga District, n.d.)
NAZ, N9/1/15, NC Annual Reports Chibi, 1911
NAZ, N9/1/15, NC Annual Reports Chibi, 1912
NAZ, N9/1/16, NC Chibi Annual Report, 1913
NAZ, NVC2/1/1 Chibi District: Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 December 1914
NAZ, S246/716 CNC in a letter to the Secretary Dept. of Administrator, Salisbury, 11 October 1917
NAZ, S235/1/18, Assistant NC, Nuanetsi, Annual Report, 31 December 1934
NAZ, S235/517 Report NC Chibi, 31 December 1939
NAZ, S2827/2/2/3/2, Report of the NC, Nuanetsi for the Year Ended 31 December 1955
NAZ, S2827/2/2/4/2, Report of the NC, Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1956
NAZ, S2827/2/2/6/2, Annual Report of the NC, Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1958
NAZ, S2827/2/2/6/2, Annual Report of the NC, Nuanetsi, for the Year Ended 31 December 1961

Taderera Hebert Chisi is a senior lecturer in the History Department at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. He has a Ph.D. (History) from Rhodes University and specialises in Hlengwe ethnicity. His research passion focuses on ethnicity, land reform and Chinese in Africa. He has published in books and journals and has also presented papers at international conferences, in Uganda, Algeria, Botswana and South Africa.

Part II
Wildlife, Livelihoods and Ethnicity

Chapter 5
Resource Management, Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities: The Case of the Doma, Northern Zimbabwe

Vincent Jani

Abstract Zimbabwe's community-based natural resource management programme, called CAMPFIRE, was aimed at integrating biodiversity conservation with community livelihoods. This integration is far from simple, especially when two ethnic groups with different livelihood practices are drawn into one project under local political leadership. Such is the case in Chapoto Ward, in the north of Zimbabwe, where the Doma and Chikunda ethnic groups co-exist. Thus, the focus of this chapter is on how the livelihoods of the minority Doma group have been affected by the local CAMPFIRE project. Specific objectives include: identifying the livelihood practices of the Doma; assessing the impact that CAMPFIRE has had on their livelihood practices; and demonstrating the negative reinforcement of politics and ethnic bias regarding Doma livelihoods. Using a qualitative approach, data were collected using in-depth interviews with heads of households and key informant interviews, as well as document analysis. Thematic analysis was used to code responses using both Open and Axial procedures. Findings demonstrate the variety of livelihood practices in existence and show how these practices were hampered by the CAMPFIRE initiative. Ethnic discrimination and stigmatisation, which placed the Doma in a subordinate position vis-a-vis other dominant groups, further demonstrate their restricted circumstances.

Keywords CAMPFIRE · Doma · Livelihoods · Ethnicity · Marginalisation

5.1 Introduction

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) plays a potentially important role in the sustainable development of rural people in poorer countries (Machena et al. 2017; Mbaiwa 2015; Tantoh and Simatele 2017). It does this by advocating for local community livelihoods to be integrated into biodiversity conservation projects to achieve such development (Machena et al. 2017). This approach,

V. Jani (✉)
Geosciences, Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa
e-mail: vinjani2009@gmail.com

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_5

which emerged during the 1980s, was aimed at conferring the stewardship of natural resources on local communities to spur them to use the resources sustainably (Child 1996; Gandiwa et al. 2013). The justification for the approach was that communities would only use natural resources in a sustainable manner if they derived meaningful economic benefits from them (Machena et al. 2017; Mbaiwa 2015; Tantoh and Simatele 2017).

However, the CBNRM initiative seems to have resulted in severe restrictions on the livelihoods of minority ethnic groups, especially those that depended on foraging for nature-based resources (Hasler 1996; Ross et al. 2011). This results in the reduction of livelihood options for ethnic minorities and the escalation of illegal activities such as bushmeat hunting by them (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Furthermore, CBNRM has been criticised for focusing on the commodification of resources instead of supporting indigenous rights to land and biodiversity (Dressler et al. 2010). It has also been observed that some ethnic minority groups are marginalised in natural resource management programmes as they, in certain cases, fail to benefit in the same way as dominant groups (Hasler 1996). As a result, minority ethnic groups view wildlife conservation as infringing on their natural resource-based livelihoods (Hitchcock et al. 2016; Mukamuri et al. 2013). For many of these communities, foraging for wild foods is both a cultural practice and a way of attaining livelihoods (Dieckmann et al. 2014).

Zimbabwe pioneered a CBNRM initiative, the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) programme, in marginal areas in 1989, to alleviate poverty and improve the livelihoods of local communities neighbouring protected areas (Martin 1986; Taylor 2009). However, the creation of safari hunting areas to pave way for the introduction of CAMPFIRE resulted in the forced relocation of minority ethnic communities from their erstwhile homes, leading to a sedentary lifestyle and thereby depriving them of access to natural resources based livelihoods (Mombeshora and Le Bel 2009). For instance, the San in Tsholotsho were moved to Pelandaba Ward to pave way for safari hunting under the CAMPFIRE programme (Mukamuri et al. 2013). Similarly, the San, who led a nomadic lifestyle of hunting and gathering in Bulilimamangwe before the introduction of the CAMPFIRE programme in 1990, were also resettled on the fringes of Makhulela Ward (Madzudzo 1996). Likewise, the VaDema (Dema) or VaDoma (Doma) or Tembomvura (Mvura), who form the focus of this study, were moved from the Chewore Safari area, their established home, to an area closer to the Mwanzamtanda River to pave the way for safari hunting (Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1995; Mberengwa 2000).

While the relocation of these groups is relatively well documented, detailed studies of the plight of ethnic minorities and their livelihood activities are still in its infancy. This lack of information means that it is difficult to implement viable measures to improve the conditions of such minorities. Other issues further complicate the lives of ethnic minorities. For example, Zimbabwe has no laws on indigenous people's rights and, as a result, these communities are neglected and marginalised. In response to the above situation, the focus of this chapter entails an examination of the livelihoods of the minority Doma group in the context of the effects of the local CAMPFIRE project. Specific objectives include: identifying the livelihood practices of the

Doma; assessing the impact that CAMPFIRE has had on these livelihood practices; and demonstrating the negative reinforcement of politics and ethnic bias on the said livelihoods. The result should be greater clarity on how resource management, livelihoods and ethnic issues interact in this and similar situations.

5.2 Context

The CAMPFIRE programme was introduced in 1989 following the amendment to the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act in 1982, which bestowed appropriate authority (AA) status on Rural District Councils (RDCs) to manage and market wildlife to international trophy hunters on behalf of the communities neighbouring protected areas and for their economic benefit (Gandiwa et al. 2013; Muyengwa and Child 2017; Taylor 2009). It was premised on the idea that communities would cooperate with conservation authorities to sustainably manage natural resources if they benefited from them (Machena et al. 2017). The programme envisioned that benefits from wildlife conservation would mitigate the impacts of human-wildlife conflicts (HWCs), compensate for crop and livestock losses, minimise illegal hunting, reduce poverty among the rural communities and instill positive attitudes towards wildlife conservation (Gandiwa et al. 2013; Machena et al. 2017; Taylor 2009; Tchakatumba et al. 2019).

The AA status was bestowed on RDCs on condition that benefits and wildlife management would be further devolved to the producer (local) communities (Child 1993; Mushayavanhu 2017). Yet, it has remained at the RDC level (Machena et al. 2017) for over 30 years. When CAMPFIRE was introduced in 1989, local people were told that they would be 'owners' of wildlife even though AA status was devolved to RDCs (Dzingirai 2003). However, producer communities have not been made owners of wildlife resources because they lack legal rights over wildlife (Dzingirai 2003; Machena et al. 2017). The communities' lack of property rights over wildlife is reaffirmed by Section 6 of the Communal Land Act, which states that communities only enjoy use rights over land (Mushayavanhu 2017). This means the Zimbabwean state is the ultimate owner of wildlife, as well as the communal land (Balint and Mashinya 2006; Dzingirai 2003; Machena et al. 2017; Mushayavanhu 2017).

The CAMPFIRE programme was initiated in Chapoto Ward in 1989 following the granting of AA status to Guruve RDC in 1988 (Muyengwa and Child 2017; Taylor 2009). Chapoto Ward is a 300m^2 area located in Mbire District in the mid-Zambezi Valley, northern Zimbabwe. The mid-Zambezi Valley is characterised by low and variable annual rainfall averaging 450–650 mm and a mean annual temperature of 25 °C (Gaidet et al. 2003). Because of rainfall variability, most of the people in Chapoto engage in the subsistence-oriented growing of maize (*Zea mays*), mainly in riverine fields as well as drought-tolerant crops such as sorghum (*Sorghum bicolor*) and pearl millet (*Pennisetum glaucum*) (Mberengwa 2000). Chapoto Ward is considered to be a major wildlife producer ward because of the heavy wildlife presence in the Chewore and Dande Safari areas (Jani et al. 2020). HWCs, which occur when interactions

between humans and wildlife become detrimental for either party (Gandiwa et al. 2013), are prevalent because of human encroachment into the wildlife habitat. HWC poses a threat to local communities since it results in crop damage, competition for resources, livestock predation and human injuries and deaths (Matema and Andersson 2015).

In Mbire District, the Doma are found on the margins of the Chewore Safari Area in Ward 1 (Chapoto) and Ward 11 (Masoka) (Nyamwanza 2012). In Masoka, the Doma are found in Mawocha to the north of Angwa River where they are isolated from the Korekore (VaKorekore) and some Karanga (VaKaranga) immigrants who are found in Chemapango A, Chemapango B, Kanungwe and Mavabvu to the south of the river (Jani 2013). In Chapoto Ward, the study area, the Doma (on the margins of the Chewore Safari area) are along the western side of the Mwanzamtanda River in Chiramba and Mariga and are isolated from the Chikunda (VaChikunda) who are located in Chansato, Chiruhwe and Nyaruparo on the eastern side of the Mwanzamtanda River (Jani et al. 2020). In Chapoto Ward, the Doma and Chikunda (VaChikunda) comprised 296 and 695 households, respectively, as of December 2016 (Jani et al. 2019).

The main ethnic group in Chapoto Ward, the agriculturally-oriented Chikunda (VaChikunda) or 'the conquerors', are believed to be the descendants of slaves and soldiers in the Portuguese-run colonial estates called *prazos* along the Zambezi River in contemporary Mozambique (Derman 1995; Isaacman and Peterson 2003; Mberengwa 2000). They called themselves Chikunda to distinguish themselves from the local peasantry and to celebrate their physical prowess (Isaacman and Peterson 2003).

The history and origins of the Doma are not well understood (Matema and Andersson 2015) and remain subject to much speculation (Derman 1995). The Doma people are believed to be descendants of the VaTawara people who originally came from Mozambique around the Songo Hills near Lake Cahora Bassa where they led a life of hunting, fishing and gathering wild fruits, honey and tubers (Mberengwa 2000). They are believed to possess significant traditional knowledge of wildlife species (Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1995; Mberengwa 2000). After migrating into Zimbabwe, they are believed to have settled on the Chirambakudomwa Mountain and Karemwa Hills in the now Chewore Safari area where they continued to lead a life of hunting and gathering as well as fishing (Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba 1995; Mberengwa 2000). According to Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba (1995), the Doma people were relocated to a place closer to the Mwanzamtanda River on the margins of the Chewore Safari area when it was discovered that they were assisting freedom fighters to cross into neighbouring Zambia for military training to fight the Rhodesian government during the 1970s' war of liberation. Since then, the Doma have continued to isolate themselves on the western side of the Mwanzamtanda River and have not been integrated into mainstream society.

5.3 Research Methods

To gain a rich understanding of the livelihoods of the Doma, a qualitative approach was employed (Drury et al. 2011). In this regard, the study employed in-depth interviews with heads of households and key informant interviews, which were complemented by document analysis. The qualitative approach, unlike quantitative research, is designed to seek a deep and intensive understanding of issues under investigation and not to make broad claims about a population (Drury et al. 2011). Thus, in-depth interviews were conducted with 24 randomly selected Doma heads of households in Chiramba and Mariga. Data was collected from January to March 2017. In-depth face-to-face interviews with ten key informants knowledgeable about issues under investigation also took place. Purposive and snowball sampling were used to select key informants who included the Chief, ward Councilor, agricultural extension officer, Safari Operator, ward anti-poaching unit (APU) chairperson and a field officer for a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), namely, the Lower Guruve Development Association (LGDA). Purposive sampling involved selecting interviewees based on the researcher's judgment (Etikan et al. 2016) while, in snowball sampling, initial respondents identified other knowledgeable persons who were interviewed (Evely et al. 2008). Data on illegal hunting, arrests of the Doma and CAMPFIRE benefits were obtained from the ward APU and Ward Wildlife Management Committee (WWMC).

Thematic analysis was used to code interviews for themes and sub-themes (Elo and Kyngäs 2008; Thomas 2006). The analysis was done using the coding procedures suggested by Thomas (2006). Open coding was used to identify the emerging themes in the data (Thomas 2006) while Axial coding was then used to further interconnect the categories and organise the identified themes, after which quotes from the interviews were selected to support the themes and trends in the data (Creswell 2013).

5.4 Doma Current Livelihood Strategies

The Doma reside on the margins of the Chewore Safari area on the western bank of the Mwanzamtanda River where there is abundant wildlife. Because of this, the Doma mainly live in scattered pole-and-grass thatched enclosures on raised platforms beyond the reach of wildlife in the midst of the thick bushes in Chiramba (which has two villages) and Mariga (with three villages). The Doma have small landholdings (between 0.4 and 0.8 of a hectare), and their area has no proper roads, boreholes or toilets. The Chikunda live in dispersed homesteads on larger landholdings (1.6–2.7 hectares) on the eastern side of the Mwanzamtanda River in Nyaruparo, Chiruhwe and Chansato which comprise four, seven and eight villages, respectively. The Chikunda graze their small herds of cattle in areas amongst thick bushes close to their homesteads away from large carnivores. Chapoto Business Centre and all other

infrastructure constructed using CAMPFIRE revenue are found in the Chikunda area. The Doma's livelihoods are mainly based on subsistence-oriented field crop production, gardening, rearing of small stock, fishing, drought relief provisioning, pottery, and labour provision for the Chikunda, as well as harvesting non-timber forest products (NTFPs) such as wild plant foods, wild fruits and honey.

5.4.1 Field Crop Farming

Field crop farming is an important livelihood activity for household survival. The Doma are involved in the subsistence-oriented growing of maize and drought-resistant crop varieties such as millet and sorghum. A few of them grow maize on small riverine fields (*minda yekugova*) along the banks of the Mwanzamtanda River because the majority of the local fields are owned by the Chikunda. Most of the Doma cultivate small pieces of land in upland fields (*minda yekunze*) using hoes and have very low agricultural production levels because they have no source of income to purchase inputs (such as fertilisers and certified seeds), lack farming implements and have inadequate farming knowledge. Similar observations were made by Mberengwa (2000). Likewise, the San in Tsholotsho and Bulilimamangwe lack farming implements, draught power, ploughs and seed (Madzudzo 1996), as highlighted as well for Tsholotsho by Mukamuri et al. (2013). Furthermore, the Doma's failure to pay for the transportation of free agricultural inputs provided by the government from Mahuwe Business Centre about 150 kms from Chapoto perpetuate their poverty as these are collected by the Chikunda who can afford to pay for them. As a result, most of them end up planting maize seed from the previous harvests, hence the low yields. Additionally, crop production is constrained by insufficient rainfall or droughts. Similarly, among the San, low crop yields and food insecurity have been attributed to unfavourable climatic conditions (Hitchcock et al. 2016).

Moreover, the location of the Doma's settlements on the margins of the Chewore Safari area results in their crops being destroyed mainly by elephants (*Loxodonta africana*), hippopotamus (*Hippopotamus amphibius*) and buffaloes (*Syncerus caffer*), which severely affects the Doma's food security. In a parallel situation, the San in Bulilimamangwe were prone to crop-raiding since their fields were located away from the rest of the village and closest to areas of wildlife incursion (Madzudzo 1996; Madzudzo and Dzingirai 1995). Crop destruction among the Doma occurs despite the mitigation measures that are employed, such as guarding fields using makeshift crop guarding structures, using chili bombs, lighting fires at the edge of fields and beating drums or tins.

5.4.2 Gardening

Gardening is used for supplementing livelihoods by a few Doma people who grow onions (*Allium cepa*), pumpkins (*Cucurbita pepo*), tomatoes (*Solanum lycopersicum*), cabbages (*Brussica oleracea*) and pumpkin leaves or muboora (*Cucurbita maxima*) in their small gardens along the Mwanzamtanda River, during the dry season from April to October. Some of them sell muboora in the Luangwa area of Zambia across the Zambezi River about 12 kms from Chapoto Business Centre.

5.4.3 Rearing of Small Stock

The Doma keep a few goats (*Capra hircus*) and free-range chickens (*Gallas domesticus*) for family consumption, but this does not contribute much to livelihood security because the goats are depredated by spotted hyena (*Crocuta crocuta*) and lion (*Panthera leo*), while free-range chickens are killed and taken by the African wildcat (*Felis silvestris lybica*) during the night.

5.4.4 Casual Agricultural Work

The Doma's poverty and livelihood vulnerability result in their exploitation in the Chikunda's fields (*maricho*), working in exchange for a bowl of mealie meal or maize. Men, women and children labour on Chikunda fields performing tasks such as land preparation, planting, weeding and harvesting. In a similar vein, the Tshwa in Tsholotsho worked in the fields of the Kalanga and Ndebele and also as herders and domestic workers for a relatively low payment in cash and kind (Hitchcock et al. 2016). As well, the San in Namibia provided cheap labour to other dominant groups (Dieckmann et al. 2014) and those in Botswana were involved in herding cattle (Cassidy et al. 2001).

5.4.5 Drought Relief Provisioning

Because of poverty and food insecurity, the Doma rely on drought relief which they occasionally received from a local NGO (the LGDA) and the government's Department of Social Welfare. However, the share for the majority of the Doma is collected by the Chikunda because the former cannot afford to pay for its transportation from Mahuwe Business Centre, and no effort is made to ensure that the Doma's share is delivered to them. One respondent said:

> We have no food to eat. We rely on maize we occasionally receive from the donor and government, but we have not been receiving the maize because we cannot afford to pay for its transportation. (Middle-aged Doma female respondent, Chiramba)

The Doma's reliance on food assistance has also been reported by Matema and Andersson (2015). Drought relief from NGOs was also an important source of livelihood for the Tshwa in Tsholotsho, (Hitchcock et al. 2016) and the San in Namibia (Dieckmann et al. 2014).

5.4.6 Gathering Non-timber Forest Products

Despite the fear of wildlife attacks and restrictions imposed on their movements by the conservation authorities, the Doma gather NTFPs mainly for family consumption and to mitigate chronic food shortages. These NTFPs include wild fruits such as matohwe (*Thespesia garckeana*), masawu (*Ziziphus mauritiana*), matufu (*Vangueria infausta*), mawuyu (*Adansonia digitata*), nharara (*Gardenia thunbergia*), chenje (*Diospyros mespiliformis*), shuma (*Diospyros mespiliformis*), tsvanzva (*Ximenia caffra*), maroro (*Annona senegalensis*), nhunguru (*Dovyalis caffra*) and matohwe (*Azanza garckeana*). Some respondents revealed that they bartered masawu for basic commodities such as cooking oil, sugar and soap which were brought in by traders from Bindura and Harare.

The Doma also gather edible tubers and indigenous wild vegetables for family consumption. These include manyanya (D*ioscorea steriscus*), idiya (D*ioscorea bulbifera*), bepe (*Tacca leontapetaloides*) and mupama (*Boscia angustifolia*). These plants are also used for medicinal purposes because most of the Doma people do not seek medical attention at Chapoto Clinic since they trust their herbs. One respondent said:

> We collect wild foods such as manyanya from the forest which we eat. But we cannot gather the food freely because our movements are restricted. (Elderly Doma female respondent, Mariga)

Likewise, the Tshwa in Tsholotsho relied on gathering bush foods such as mopane worms (*Gonimbrasia belina*), wild fruits and tubers as part of their livelihoods (Hitchcock et al. 2016). Furthermore, harvesting honey from natural beehives, which is another livelihood strategy for the Doma, is constrained by the fact that the Doma's movements are inhibited by the conservation authorities. Some of the honey is supplied to the Chikunda in exchange for maize grain and sorghum while some is used for family consumption.

5.4.7 *Pottery*

The Doma mould clay pots using clay soils which they collect from Kamota and Mhembwe Hills in the Chewore Safari area. They exchange the clay pots locally in the ward, for maize and sorghum for family consumption. Collecting good clay soil for pottery is, however, hampered by the fact that the Doma's access to the Chewore Safari area is regularly undermined by game rangers and Safari Operator personnel. This has also been reported by Matema and Andersson (2015). Respondents indicated that the production of clay pots had significantly dropped in recent years because of lack of access to good clay soils emanating from these restrictions. The Doma wanted rights of access to forests to freely collect good clay soils without being put under surveillance by game rangers and Safari Operator personnel.

5.4.8 *Fishing*

Finally, fishing plays an important role in the livelihood security of the Doma. It is mainly carried out along the banks of the Zambezi and Mwanzamtanda Rivers. The fish is exchanged for maize in the ward as well as for other basic commodities such as sugar and cooking oil in the Bawa and Luangwa areas of Mozambique and Zambia, respectively. Fishing along the Mwanzamtanda River is done using fish baskets (*duwo*), lines and hooks, while those who fished along the Zambezi River use only lines and hooks. The types of fish caught include barbels (*Barbus barbus*), African sharp-tooth catfish (*Clarias gariepinus*) and Kurper bream (*Oreocromis mortimeri*). Fishing was also a livelihood strategy among the Tshwa in Tsholotsho (Hitchcock et al. 2016). The Doma are, again, impeded from freely engaging in fishing because they are always under surveillance by the conservation authorities who accuse them of engaging in poaching (of wildlife), as indicated by one respondent:

> We can't even go fishing on the banks of the Zambezi River because our movements are always monitored. Zimparks [Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority] rangers accuse us of intending to engage in poaching when we go fishing. (Young Doma male respondent, Chiramba)

5.5 Disruptions to Doma Livelihood Strategies by CAMPFIRE

The Doma, whose way of life was based historically on fishing, hunting, gathering, making clay pots and using traditional medicine, experienced the introduction of CAMPFIRE as impeding these activities. This was because their movements were restricted by conservation authorities which outlawed hunting and restricted other traditional livelihood practices (such as foraging for NTFPs). These restrictions limit the Doma's livelihood options resulting in an indifferent attitude towards wildlife

conservation on their part. The restrictions in fact impoverished the Doma villagers as they found it difficult to survive and feed their families. Importantly, the Doma also saw wildlife conservation laws, which inhibited their traditional lifestyle, as infringing on their identity. The Doma's predicament was captured by a respondent who said:

> Our way of life as hunters and gatherers was disrupted by the introduction of CAMPFIRE. The conservation authorities have put restrictions on our movements, which makes it difficult for us to look for plant foods, fruits, honey and good clay soil for pottery. We treat ourselves using herbs, but it is now difficult to look for herbs since we are accused of intending to poach game for meat. (Elderly Doma male respondent, Chiramba)

This tendency has been reported by others, including Marindo-Ranganai and Zaba (1995), Matema and Andersson (2015) and Mberengwa (2000). It is also a broader tendency going beyond the lives of the Doma, including for the Tshwa in Tsholotsho (Hitchcock et al. 2016). Likewise, the restriction of the Khwe's movements by the community game guards and resource monitors in the Bwabwata National Park in Namibia negatively affected their access to natural resource-based livelihoods (Dieckmann et al. 2014; Paksi and Pyhälä 2018). As a result, they felt that the Namibian government prioritised wild animals and monetary benefits from tourism at the expense of their food security and well-being (Paksi and Pyhälä 2018). Other minority ethnic groups whose livelihood options have been inhibited following the introduction of CBNRM initiatives include the San communities in Botswana (Bolaane 2004; Magole 2009).

The Doma felt that the CAMPFIRE programme prevented them from preserving their practices as well as continuing with the traditions and survival skills inherited from their ancestors. A Doma respondent highlighted:

> We have been forced to abandon the ways our ancestors taught us. We can no longer eat plant foods that our ancestors used to eat. It has been difficult for us to make a transition to a new lifestyle. (Elderly Doma male respondent, Mariga)

In this context, the CAMPFIRE programme disturbed and undercut the only forms of livelihood that the Doma had known their entire life. This made the Doma feel that they were being punished because of a lifestyle that defined their very identity.

The Doma saw benefits from CAMPFIRE as insufficient to offset losses caused by wildlife. They indicated that they preferred the payment of dividends directly to households, which was abandoned in 1997 in favour of funding community projects. It was clear that the Doma were not supporting, and participating in, the CAMPFIRE programme because they were no longer receiving wildlife-related benefits at the household level. As one Doma respondent claimed:

> At the inception of CAMPFIRE, we were told that wildlife belonged to us and that revenue from wildlife would be used to improve our livelihoods. We also used to receive cash which helped us a lot. Now we are not receiving anything at all. CAMPFIRE is now benefitting the Chikunda, Council and the Safari Operator. (Elderly Doma male respondent, Mariga)

Although the local communities were told, at the inception of CAMPFIRE, that they owned the local wildlife, this was not the case because AA status was devolved

to RDCs. Furthermore, as noted, devolution of ownership rights over wildlife to sub-district institutions could not be implemented because local communities have no property rights over land and its natural resources (Child 1996; Dzingirai 2003; Machena et al. 2017; Mushayavanhu 2017).

CAMPFIRE did not bring about any meaningful improvement in the livelihoods of the Doma as they did not benefit from even the limited employment opportunities that were created by the programme. There were only two members from the Doma ethnic group, out of the 11 community members, who were directly employed by the programme as game scouts. Furthermore, the Doma community had one representative only in the seven-member WWMC. Additionally, all community members employed by the Safari Operator and in 13 lodges across the ward were Chikunda. Similarly, less than five Tshwa people were employed by the CAMPFIRE programme in Tsholotsho (Hitchcock et al. 2016). The insignificant number of Doma employed by the CAMPFIRE programme is attributable to lack of formal education, which made the Doma less competent to secure employment in the formal sector and in generating income to improve their livelihoods. Only one educated Doma village head from Chiramba, who owned three canoes, had managed to acquire assets.

The outlawing of hunting, which was traditionally a legitimate activity before the advent of CAMPFIRE, is another way in which CAMPFIRE has undermined Doma livelihoods. Before the introduction of CAMPFIRE, the Doma, who were intimately connected to nature-based resources, hunted game for family consumption. However, following the introduction of CAMPFIRE, they were barred from even hunting small game as indicated by one respondent:

> We are not allowed to hunt but white people from far away come here to kill our animals for fun. We are not even allowed to hunt small game or catch mice for family consumption. (Elderly Doma female respondent, Mariga)

The constriction of the Doma livelihoods following the introduction of CAMPFIRE as well as the subsequent imposition of restrictions on the movements of the Doma gave rise to clandestine snaring of wildlife for meat for family consumption. Their reasons for engaging in illegal snaring of wildlife included loss of crops and livestock to wildlife, erratic provisioning of game meat from wild animals killed during problem animal control and from safari hunts, deprivation of game meat by the Mbire RDC officials, vulnerability to hunger because of drought, and failure to access free food aid and agricultural inputs. Doma respondents complained that RDC officials, who did not experience the damage caused by wildlife, were benefiting from game meat at the expense of the local people who bore the negative consequences of wildlife management. As one respondent explained:

> People are expressing their disgruntlement over their failure to receive game meat by engaging in illegal snaring of wild animals. Council officials share the bushmeat from problem animal control instead of giving it to the people whose crops are destroyed by wildlife. (Elderly Doma male respondent, Mariga)

Likewise, in Tsholotsho, game meat distributed from trophy hunting and problem animal control was erratic (Hitchcock et al. 2016).

Another cause and form of illegal snaring was revenge-killing in protest against failure by the authorities to effectively deal with damage-causing animals which raided crops and depredated livestock, thereby compromising the Doma's livelihood security. The Doma indicated that their livelihood insecurity was compounded by the fact that the conservation authorities did not attend to reports of damage-causing animals. The conflict between the Doma and wildlife evolved into human–human conflict as the Doma blamed the conservation authorities for prioritising the protection of wildlife instead of their livelihoods and safety. This has also been reported by Matema and Andersson (2015) and Mberengwa (2000). As articulated by one Doma respondent:

> Game rangers are not responding to our reports of crop destruction by elephants and hippopotamus. Lions and hyenas have also been depredating our goats. We are not compensated for the losses. (Elderly Doma female respondent, Chiramba)

The prevalence of illegal wildlife snaring by the Doma was evidence of their desperate food security situation. Thus, out of a total of 838 recorded snares removed from 2007 to 2016, 705 were removed from the Doma areas of Chiramba and Mariga. Furthermore, out of the 23 people who were arrested for illegal hunting from 2008 to 2015, 18 were Doma while 5 were Chikunda. Most of the illegal hunting occurred specifically in Mariga where 16 Doma poachers were arrested during that period as indicated in the ward anti-poaching unit's records. The ward anti-poaching unit indicated that the most snared animals in Chapoto Ward were kudu (*Tragelaphus strepsiceros*) and impala (*Aepyceros melampus*). It added that illegal hunters preferred hunting impala because the species was easy to carry and also difficult to detect by game scouts. The prevalence of illegal snaring of wildlife in the Doma villages resulted in strained relations between the Doma and game rangers. This culminated in the Doma being physically assaulted by game rangers and Safari Operator personnel. The Doma felt that the Chikunda played a role in their arrest and persecution by the conservation authorities since the latter, who were also involved in illegal hunting, albeit on a small scale, were rarely arrested. The selective law enforcement demonstrates the conservation authorities' perception of the Doma as poachers.

The occurrence of illegal wildlife snaring is contrary to the objective of the CAMPFIRE programme of minimising illegal hunting. The illegal snaring of wildlife in Chapoto Ward was a consequence of not receiving adequate CAMPFIRE benefits at the household level as well as limited livelihood alternatives overall. Such clandestine hunting also continues among the San communities in Tsholotsho (Hitchcock et al. 2016) and the Basarwa (neighbouring Moremi Game Reserve in Botswana) (Mbaiwa 2005) because of limited livelihood activities. This is buttressed by other studies which argue that illegal hunting emanates from the fact that local communities are expressing frustration with reduced or no returns accruing to them (Gandiwa et al. 2014). Incidents of illegal hunting of wildlife have resulted in significant questioning of the effectiveness of the CAMPFIRE programme in conserving wildlife outside protected areas (Machena et al. 2017).

5.6 Constrictions to Livelihoods by Discrimination and Stigmatisation

In addition to the disruption of their livelihoods by the CAMPFIRE programme, the Doma have had their activities further constricted by practices of discrimination and stigmatisation that occurred before CAMPFIRE and continued after the introduction of the programme. The Doma's survival skills and lifestyle of foraging for veld resources, which defined their identity (at least in the past), were devalued by others whose lifestyle differed from theirs. Because of their lifestyle, the Doma endured marginalisation and negative stereotypes by Zimparks rangers, Safari Operator personnel, Mbire RDC officials and the Chikunda (Jani et al. 2020). Constant surveillance and stereotypical perceptions of the Doma as poachers by conservation authorities further curtailed their traditional livelihoods and livelihoods-based identity (Mukamuri et al. 2013). The game rangers and Safari Operator personnel always had a preconceived view that the Doma were responsible for illegal hunting since they were stereotyped as poachers.

The circumscription of the Doma livelihoods was compounded by the unequal power relations manifested in the strong disparities existing between the Doma and more powerful groupings. This was demonstrated by the dominance of the weaker Doma (who comprised five villages) by the more powerful Chikunda, who comprised 19 villages, during Ward Development Committee (WADCO) meetings, which deliberated on CAMPFIRE issues. As well, the conservation authorities clearly did not accept the Doma as equals of the Chikunda as evidenced by the marginalisation of the former. For example, community projects funded by CAMPFIRE revenue were only found in the Chikunda area on the eastern side of the Mwanzamtanda River. Additionally, government structures and traditional leadership did not attempt to address the Doma's problems as shown by their failure to ensure that the Doma benefitted from seed packs and drought relief from government. Because of their position at the lowest rung of the Chapoto hierarchy and their location on the western side of the Mwanzamtanda River, the Doma had no sense of belonging to the mainstream community. Their socio-spatial position meant that they suffered the most from food insecurity at the local level. Such an ethnic hierarchy also exists elsewhere in Zimbabwe. For instance, the Tshwa were dominated by the Kalanga and Ndebele ethnic groups which made most of the decisions related to the CAMPFIRE programme in Tsholotsho (Hitchcock et al. 2016). A similar situation existed for the Basarwa in Botswana, who were not empowered to participate in the decision-making related to CBNRM (Bolaane 2004; Magole 2009).

The restrictions placed on Doma livelihoods emanated from the fact that the conservation authorities and the Chapoto Ward leadership did not consider—sympathetically and seriously—the values, beliefs and needs of the Doma. The Doma hunter-gatherer livelihood activities, as linked to their particular worldview and value system, placed them in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Chikunda, Mbire RDC, park authorities and the Safari Operator, which further demonstrates the

Doma's disabling circumstances. As a result, the Doma excluded themselves from decision-making by adopting an indifferent approach to the CAMPFIRE programme.

Since the Doma depended on nature-based resources to make a living, authorities should have involved and empowered them at the inception of the CAMPFIRE programme. If the Doma had been empowered to participate fully in the CAMPFIRE programme from the beginning, they would have made the best scouts and the best assistants to professional hunters because they were intimately connected to those activities and to the local landscape. Because of their erstwhile lifestyle of hunting and gathering in the Chewore Safari area, the Doma knew the roles played by animals in their culture, including delivering messages from their ancestors and providing information about a potential drought or flooding. This expertise could have been used by the local leadership and conservation authorities for the well-being of the Chapoto community.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the interaction between resource management, livelihoods and ethnicity with specific reference to the Doma. It has shown that the introduction of the CAMPFIRE programme disrupted the Doma's traditional livelihoods and increased their vulnerability to food insecurity. Additionally, the CAMPFIRE programme failed to demonstrate that wildlife utilisation is a viable livelihood option for the Doma. The Doma community did not receive assistance following their switch from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle to subsistence-oriented farming. The Doma's agriculture-based livelihoods were inhibited by recurrent droughts, HWCs, and shortages of agricultural inputs and draught power. The inability of CAMPFIRE to improve the livelihoods of the Doma can be attributed to the misplaced assumption that the integration of traditional livelihoods with natural resource management would be relatively simple. However, the restriction of Doma livelihoods shows the difficulties associated with trying to impose participatory wildlife management on people whose way of life contradicts such top-down practices. This has led to the undermining of the Doma's self-identity as defined in terms of their historical livelihood practices of foraging for veld resources. Their failure to receive tangible CAMPFIRE benefits at the household level resulted in the Doma withdrawing from participating in the programme.

The plight of the Doma has not been the subject of significant scholarly, media or political attention. In this context, Zimbabwe's First Lady, Auxillia Mnangagwa, visited Mariga in May 2018 to develop an understanding and appreciation of the way of life of the Doma. Through her Angel of Hope Foundation, she then launched castor bean projects and nutrition gardens in Chiramba in August 2019 and also started donating drought-tolerant small grain seeds in November 2019 to boost food self-sufficiency and alleviate poverty among the Doma. As well, her Foundation has started to fund income-generating projects for Doma women and provide support for Doma education and health. In a related development, in April 2019, Zimparks

trained a group of 23 rangers, including 10 from the Doma community, in anti-poaching operations, tracking, weaponry, problem animal control and monitoring hunts, as a way of encouraging them to participate in the CAMPFIRE programme. This is meant to also assist in reducing illegal hunting among the Doma. However, other initiatives regarding CAMPFIRE are required to enhance the lives and livelihoods of the Doma, including: devolving property rights over wildlife on a formal basis to sub-district institutions after capacity building to enhance local ownership (Balint and Mashinya 2006; Tchakatumba et al. 2019), and enable the Doma to engage in problem animal control (Mutanga et al. 2017) with conservation authority oversight (Gandiwa 2014; Mushayavanhu 2017). In addition, building alternative income streams (Tchakatumba et al. 2019) beyond CAMPFIRE is necessary, as well as policies which specifically seek to enhance the participation and power of minority ethnic groups in decision-making, as in for example Vietnam (Hardcastle 2002). Zimbabwe could also learn from Namibia which is the only country in Southern Africa that has a policy on indigenous people's rights specifically focusing on the San and other marginalised communities (Dieckmann et al. 2014).

References

Balint PJ, Mashinya J (2006) The decline of a model community-based conservation project: governance, capacity, and devolution in Mahenye Zimbabwe. Geoforum 37(5):805–815

Bolaane M (2004) The impact of Game Reserve policy on the river BaSarwa/Bushmen of Botswana. Soc Policy Adm 38(4):399–417

Borrini-Feyerabend G, Kothari A, Phillips GOA (2004) Indigenous and local communities and protected areas: towards equity and enhanced conservation. IUCN, Cardiff

Cassidy L, Good K, Mazonde I, Rivers R (2001) An assessment of the status of the San in Botswana. Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek, Namibia

Child B (1993) Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme: using the high value of wildlife recreation to revolutionize natural resource management in communal areas. Commonw Rev 72(4):284–296

Child B (1996) The practice and principles of community-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe: the CAMPFIRE programme. Biodivers Conserv 5(3):369–398

Creswell JW (2013) Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five approaches, 3rd edn. Sage, Los Angeles

Derman B (1995) Environmental NGOs, dispossession, and the state: the ideology and praxis of African nature and development. Hum Ecol 23(2):199–215

Dieckmann U, Thiem M, Dirkx E, Hays J (2014) Scraping the pot: San in Namibia two decades after independence. Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek, Namibia

Dressler W, Büscher B, Schoon M, Brockington D, Hayes T, Kull CA, McCarthy J, Shrestha K (2010) From hope to crisis and back again? A critical history of the global CBNRM narrative. Environ Conserv 37(1):5–15

Drury R, Homewood K, Randall S (2011) Less is more: the potential of qualitative approaches in conservation research. Anim Conserv 14(1):18–24

Dzingirai V (2003) The new scramble for the African countryside. Dev Change 34(2):243–264

Elo S, Kyngäs H (2008) The qualitative content analysis process. J Adv Nurs 62(1):107–115

Etikan I, Musa S, Alkassim R (2016) Comparison of convenience sampling and purposive sampling. Am J Theor Appl Stat 5(1):1–4

Evely AC, Fazey IRA, Pinard M, Lambin X (2008) The influence of philosophical perspectives in integrative research: a conservation case study in the Cairngorms National Park. Ecol Soc 13(2):52

Gaidet N, Fritz H, Nyahuma C (2003) A participatory counting method to monitor populations of large mammals in non-protected areas: a case study of bicycle counts in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe. Biodivers Conserv 12:1571–1585

Gandiwa E (2014) Population dynamics of large herbivores and the framing of wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe. Open J Ecol 4:411–420

Gandiwa E, Jonga C, Mufute O (2014) Proceedings of the CAMPFIRE Stakeholders Workshop: towards the development of a new Elephant Management Plan and Policy, 17–18 November 2014. Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, Harare, Zimbabwe

Gandiwa E, Lokhorst AM, Prins HH, Leeuwis C, Heitkönig I (2013) CAMPFIRE and human-wildlife conflicts in local communities bordering northern Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe. Ecol Soc 18(4):1–15

Hardcastle J (2002) Opportunities for indigenous community management of forest resources in the central Truong Son uplands, Quang Nam. WWF, Washington

Hasler R (1996) Agriculture, foraging and wildlife resource use in Africa: cultural and political dynamics in the Zambezi Valley. Routledge, London

Hitchcock RK, Begbie-Clench B, Murwira A (2016) The San in Zimbabwe: livelihoods, land, and human rights. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen

Isaacman A, Peterson D (2003) Making the Chikunda: military slavery and ethnicity in southern Africa, 1750–1900. Int J Afr Hist Stud 36(2):257–281

Jani V (2013) CAMPFIRE and rural livelihoods in marginal areas: a comparative study of Masoka Ward in Mbire District and Gutsa Ward in Muzarabani District, Mashonaland Central Province. Unpublished MSc thesis, Bindura University of Science Education, Bindura

Jani V, De Wit AH, Webb NL (2019) Conflict over wildlife conservation in the Mbire District, northern Zimbabwe. Afr J Wildl Res 49(1):137–141

Jani V, De Wit AH, Webb NL (2020) Disputes, relationships, and identity: a 'levels of conflict' analysis of human-wildlife conflict as human-human conflict in the mid-Zambezi Valley, Northern Zimbabwe. S Afr Geogr J 102(1):59–76

Machena C, Mwakiwa E, Gandiwa E (2017) Review of the communal areas management programme for indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE) and community based natural resources management (CBNRM) models. Government of Zimbabwe and European Union, Harare

Madzudzo E (1996) Producer communities in a community-based wildlife management programme: a case study of Bulilimamangwe and Tsholotsho districts. University of Zimbabwe, Centre for Applied Social Sciences

Madzudzo E, Dzingirai V (1995) A comparative study of ethnicity on CAMPFIRE in Bulilimamangwe and Binga Districts of Zimbabwe. Zambezia 22(1):25–35

Magole LI (2009) Common pool resources among San communities in Ngamiland, Botswana. Dev South Afr 26(4):597–610

Marindo-Ranganai R, Zaba B (1995) Animal conservation and human survival: a case study of the Tembomvura people of Chapoto Ward in the Zambezi Valley. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe

Martin R (1986) Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). Branch of Terrestrial Ecology, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, Harare, Zimbabwe

Matema S, Andersson JA (2015) Why are lions killing us? Human–wildlife conflict and social discontent in Mbire District, northern Zimbabwe. J Mod Afr Stud 53(1):93–120

Mbaiwa JE (2005) Wildlife resource utilisation at Moremi Game Reserve and Khwai community area in the Okavango Delta, Botswana. J Environ Manage 77(2):144–156

Mbaiwa JE (2015) Community-based natural resource management in Botswana. In: Van Der Duim R, Lamers M, Van Wijk J (eds) Institutional arrangements for conservation, development and tourism in eastern and southern Africa. Springer, London, pp 59–80

Mberengwa I (2000) Small-scale indigenous rural communities and community-based natural resources management programmes (CBNRMP) in marginal areas of Zimbabwe: a study in sustainability. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe

Mombeshora S, Le Bel S (2009) Parks-people conflicts: the case of Gonarezhou National Park and the Chitsa community in south-east Zimbabwe. Biodivers Conserv 18(10):2601–2623

Mukamuri B, Chirozva C, Matema C, Matema S, Nzuma T (2013) Ethnic heterogeneity and its implications for natural resources management on the edge. In: Andersson J, de Garine-Wichatitsky M, Cumming D, Dzingirai V, Giller K (eds) Transfrontier conservation areas: people living on the edge. Routledge, London, pp 89–105

Mushayavanhu D (2017) Review of laws and policies relating to community-based natural resource management in Zimbabwe. Government of Zimbabwe and European Union, Harare

Mutanga CN, Muboko N, Gandiwa E (2017) Protected area staff and local community viewpoints: a qualitative assessment of conservation relationships in Zimbabwe. PloS One 12(5):e0177153

Muyengwa S, Child B (2017) Re-assertion of elite control in Masoka's wildlife program. Zimbabwe. J Sustain Dev 10(6):28–40

Nyamwanza A (2012) Resiliency and livelihoods inquiry in dynamic vulnerability contexts: Insights from Northern Zimbabwe. PhD Thesis. Institute for Development Policy and Management School of Environment and Development, The University of Manchester

Paksi A, Pyhälä A (2018) Socio-economic impacts of a national park on local indigenous livelihoods: the case of the Bwabwata National Park in Namibia. In: Puckett R, Ikeya K (eds) Research and activism among the Kalahari San today: ideals, challenges, and debates. National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan, pp 197–214

Ross A, Sherman KP, Snodgrass JG, Delcore HD, Sherman R (2011) Indigenous peoples and the collaborative stewardship of nature: knowledge binds and institutional conflicts. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, USA

Tantoh H, Simatele D (2017) Community-based water resource management in Northwest Cameroon: the role of potable water supply in community development. S Afr Geogr J 99(2):166–183

Taylor R (2009) Community-based natural resource management in Zimbabwe: the experience of CAMPFIRE. Biodivers Conserv 18(10):2563–2583

Tchakatumba PK, Gandiwa E, Mwakiwa E, Clegg B, Nyasha S (2019) Does the CAMPFIRE programme ensure economic benefits from wildlife to households in Zimbabwe? Ecosyst People 15(1):119–135

Thomas DR (2006) A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative evaluation data. Am J Eval 27(2):237–246

Vincent Jani holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Geography from Nelson Mandela University, South Africa. His research interests include biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use of wild resources, including the interface with local communities' rights and livelihoods, as well as community-based wildlife management. He has published articles in the *South African Geographical Journal*, *African Journal of Ecology* and *African Journal of Wildlife Research*. He currently works for the government of Zimbabwe.

Chapter 6
Human–Wildlife Conflict and Precarious Livelihoods of the Tonga-Speaking People of North-Western Zimbabwe

Joshua Matanzima and Ivan Marowa

Abstract Using the concept of precarious livelihoods, this chapter examines the conflicts occurring between people and wild animals in the Tonga communities of north-western Zimbabwe. It focusses on the uncertainties and vulnerabilities of Tonga livelihoods due to the presence of, and attacks from, wild animals. On a day-to-day basis, the Tonga experience harm caused by animals to their lives, livelihoods and/or properties. The Tonga communities studied survive mainly on fishing in Lake Kariba or the tributaries of the Zambezi River as well as subsistence farming. Along Lake Kariba, they have conflicts with such animals as hippos and crocodiles, their fields are often trampled by elephants, buffaloes and duikers, and their livestock especially cattle and goats are attacked by lions, leopards and hyenas. These human–wildlife conflicts take place within a particular historical and spatial context, notably the forced displacement of the Tonga from the Zambezi River in the late 1950s and their post-displacement presence in an area of Zimbabwe marked by an arid ecosystem (in large part unsuitable for agriculture) alongside poverty and hunger. Thus, currently, they are placed between a rock and a hard place, between threatening wildlife and an arid environment. The chapter is based on extended ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2017 and 2020 among the Tonga communities of, in particular, the Mola, Musampakaruma and Sinakatenge chiefdoms.

Keywords Animals · Tonga people · Conflict · Livelihoods · CAMPFIRE

J. Matanzima (✉)
Department of Social Inquiry, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC, Australia
e-mail: matanzimajosh@gmail.com

I. Marowa
Department of History, Heritage and Knowledge Systems, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_6

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the livelihoods among the Tonga people of north-western Zimbabwe, with a particular focus on the Musampakaruma, Mola and Sinakatenge chiefdoms. As members of a minority ethnic group, they are situated at the periphery of national power so that their presence is insignificantly felt within wider Zimbabwean society and politics (Marowa 2010: 173). In fact, the Tonga became—under colonialism—the forgotten orphans of the empire (Tombindo 2017). In the late 1950s, they were forcibly displaced from the Zambezi Valley paving way for construction of the Kariba Dam (Scudder 2005; Saidi and Matanzima 2021), and this involuntary move affected negatively their social, economic and religious practices (Colson 1971). As well, since independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean state has in large part not been committed to curbing and overcoming the marginalisation of the Tonga.

The region to which the Tonga were moved in the late 1950s was vastly underdeveloped, with for example minimal transport and communication networks as well as health and education facilities (Matanzima 2021). Additionally, since then, they have been denied full access to the Kariba Dam, with only a few fishing camps having been opened to them. In the main, fishing and tourism industries along Lake Kariba have been dominated by whites and other African groups like the Shona and the Ndebele (McGregor 2008; Matanzima 2021). However, in trying to redress this situation, the Tonga have engaged in a politics of the landscape at Lake Kariba, in which their past interactions with the Zambezi is used to claim belonging and entitlement to Lake Kariba and its resources (Matanzima and Saidi 2020; Tombindo 2017).

In examining the lives of the Tonga, the specific focus is on their precarious livelihoods in the face of conflicts between them and local wildlife. The ways in which people interact with animals in a particular area change over time and space. Therefore, this study situates human–wildlife conflict in north-western Zimbabwe within the timelines of change and continuity. For the Tonga people, their interactions with animals during the pre-resettlement and post-resettlement have been significantly different. During the pre-resettlement era (prior to Kariba's construction), there was co-existence; whereas, in the post-resettlement era until now, there are increased conflicts. This chapter examines the contemporary precariousness of Tonga livelihoods by examining human–wildlife conflicts on a historical basis.

6.2 Context: Human–Wildlife Conflicts and Precarious Livelihoods

The phrase human–wildlife conflicts (HWCs) is commonly used to describe situations that involve any negative interactions between humans and wildlife. These conflicts can be real or perceived, economic or aesthetic, social or political (Messmer 2009: 11). They are pervasive in both developing and developed countries, frequently not only in rural areas but also along urban fringes. As humans increasingly impinge

upon wildlife habitats, and as local wildlife populations increase, humans experience damages and losses regarding their livelihoods (Messmer 2009: 10). Conflicts are not limited to selected species, but rather involve a variety of mammals, birds, fish, insects and reptiles (Manfredo and Dayer 2004: 317).

Around the world, HWCs pose problems for people such as decreased food security, increased workloads, decreased physical and psychological well-being and economic hardship (Gore and Kahler 2012; Khumalo and Yung 2015). Conversely, human retaliation leads to the killing and injuring of wild animals, including by way of a rise in illegal or dangerous activities such as poaching, which further poses conservation challenges and disrupts fragile ecosystems. These increasing wildlife impacts on peoples' lives and livelihoods generate and consolidate negative attitudes towards animals (Mormile and Hill 2016). Thus, understanding local peoples' attitudes about wild animal conservation, particularly in complex biodiversity areas, is of major importance for conservation efforts (Yang et al. 2010).

Wildlife encroachment onto people's fields and homesteads threaten their livelihoods, especially for those residing in the immediate vicinity of game corridors, game parks and conservancies. This leads to precarious livelihoods. Precariousness is a condition of vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity that people encounter during part or all of their lifetime (Hlatshwayo 2019; McKee et al. 2017), due to fluctuating or ongoing socio-economic, political and environmental factors. The notion of precariousness relates to the concepts of precarity and precariat which emerged within the study of work, involving irregular, insecure and temporary employment devoid of decent work characteristics. Contemporary class analysis highlights the growth of this 'precariat' class marked by the instability of work and income (and, by extension, livelihoods) that in turn impacts negatively on individual and household well-being (McKee et al. 2017).

In this study, we therefore extend the use of precariousness to examine the precarity of livelihoods, without making claims about the Tonga existing as a social class. As McKee et al. (2017) write precariousness is not restricted to the spheres of work, as it has been applied in different fields of study such as migration (Banki 2013), involuntary resettlement (Wilmsen and Adjartey 2020) and livelihoods (Gukurume 2018; Scoones et al. 2018). Our particular focus is on the state of precariousness characterising people's livelihoods as engendered by wildlife encroachment, which undercuts the sustainability of rural livelihoods. Certainly, the fishing and agriculturally based livelihood activities of the Tonga people are rendered precarious by the existence of wildlife in the spaces where these activities are carried out. They engage in these activities unsure of the outcome or output due to marauding animals.

The notion of precarity is entangled as well with issues of resistance, or what scholars have termed 'precarious resistance' (Hlatshwayo 2019; Lewchuk and Dassinger 2016). When applied to the sphere of work, precarious resistance describes the individualised, informal and under-the-radar strategies that workers adapt to shape workplace outcomes to their benefit, and how these strategies might translate into broader collective action (Lewchuk and Dassinger 2016). This study also draws upon the idea of precarious resistance in order to understand, more broadly, the strategies and tactics of Tonga people to address the challenges arising from HWCs.

This includes the use of snares, chasing away wild animals with dogs, and fighting with local conservationists, among many other responses Arguably, these retaliatory actions are a threat to the conservation of wild animals, as they potentially engender the depletion of wildlife.

6.3 Research Methods

This chapter draws upon qualitative research conducted in Musampakaruma and Mola (Nyaminyami District) and Sinakatenge (Binga District) of north-western Zimbabwe, which lay along the Zambezi Valley, between 2017 and 2020. The majority of the Tonga people under study are victims of the involuntary resettlement of the late 1950s which was necessitated by the construction of the Kariba Dam (Colson 1971; Matanzima 2021; Scudder 1962). The research involved interviewing both women and men across generations, carried out at people's homesteads, fields and along the Kariba lakeshore. A total number of 60 informants were interviewed (30 females and 30 males). Informed consent was sought before any interview session, with the topic and objectives fully and openly detailed to the interviewees prior to any substantive questions raised. Observation was utilised as well, as the researchers traversed through the Zambezi Valley landscape in a bid to learn more about HWCs and how and why it occurs. Some evidence provided in the chapter is also based on findings from previous research, conducted by other scholars, in north-western Zimbabwe regarding the interactions between humans and wildlife.

6.4 Conflicts with Animals After Displacement

The Tonga argue that wild animals were not a problem, prior to displacement, in the Zambezi Valley, unlike it is today. During fieldwork, one elder from Musampakaruma stated that:

> Although wildlife attacked people in the Zambezi Valley, they were not much of a problem. We had many ways of dealing with animals such as building huts on stilts to avoid attacks from wild animals. We made log fences where we fetched water for domestic purposes to avoid crocodile attacks.

Similar sentiments were expressed to another scholar (Langely) by one elder who compared his experiences with animals before and after relocation, highlighting that:

> Down there, we used to raise crops. We would harvest without problems. But here, we plant crops but then the elephants invade our fields. We report these elephants to the authorities but are told that elephants are now the people and you people are now the animals. But down there, the elephants feared us, if they were troublesome, we reported them to Sikanyana [District Commissioner Cockcroft]. They would kill some and scare the others away. Now, we have buried four people who have been killed by elephants, not anyone from the authorities has come to grieve with us. (cited in Langely 2007: 269)

Another elder told Langely that, before their displacement, the Tonga would go across the Zambezi river (into Zambia) and obtain homemade guns to scare the elephants to go away but the National Parks officials confiscated the guns after displacement (Langely 2007: 270). Combined, the displacement and the National Parks' policies disempowered the Tonga regard the presence of wildlife, and they bemoaned the loss of the specialised skills they had developed for dealing with problem animals.

In the Zambezi Valley, Tonga people hunted wild animals for meat and this is one of the crucial resources they were robbed of by the forced movement away from the valley. In fact, they now required a permit to hunt (or fish) along the lakeshore such that it is illegal to do so without one (Hughes 2010). What was 'hunting' for the Tonga is now seen as 'poaching' by the National Parks' authorities, which attracts payment of a fine or possibly imprisonment. In the 1980s, Reynolds recorded a case of a man who was arrested because he was found with some wire in the bush, and he was likely to spend six months in jail if convicted (Reynolds 2019: 33).

In the past, Tonga people sought—successfully—to co-exist with certain wildlife species, as dictated by their cultural practices as intertwined with particular aspects of their local environment. For instance, one Tonga man (Mapfunde) narrated that an eland could not be killed by just anyone and if, by mistake, it was caught in a snare and was killed, the chief and spirit medium had to perform a cleansing ceremony and intercede to the ancestral spirits for the community wrongdoing (see Sibanda 2004: 252–253). In fact, spirit mediums were consulted all the time regarding culturally appropriate interactions with land and wildlife (Sibanda 2004). The Tonga also avoided hunting during the rainy season, and this was another way of sustainably making use of the wildlife resources. They believed that May to September is the period when hunting produces the least harm to wildlife. Animals generally produce offspring in October and November, so hunting before these months helps with the breeding process and protection of the young ones. The killing of female animals with young offspring was prohibited to protect breeding patterns (Sibanda 2004). Thus, the Tonga's interaction with animals had its checks and balances that sustainably safeguarded them from extinction.

The displacement and subsequent creation of Conservancies and National Parks in the resettlement areas (i.e. where they were forcibly relocated) undermined the co-existence between human and wildlife which soon culminated in the emergence of hostilities between the two. Conservation efforts in north-western Zimbabwe from colonial times have taken away the Tonga's rights to defend themselves and their fields from wildlife. Conservation policies have focussed on the rights of wildlife and neglected the needs and fears of the local people (Langely 2007). As Langely (2007: 266–268) observes, the proximity of the resettlement areas to the National Parks placed the Tonga in close and inevitable contact with wildlife in the area. Tonga elders claim that, during the 1990s, National Parks' officials were not assisting those living in the chiefdoms studied, in terms of ensuring the latter's protection against wildlife. Instead, most of the Tonga's interactions with National Parks' officials have been very negative.

Since displacement, and the Tonga's presence in areas characterised by an abundance of wildlife, significant conflict between the Tonga and wildlife has taken place.

Previous researches testify to the occurrence of human–wildlife conflicts among the Tonga in their resettlement areas (Langely 2007; Reynolds 2019; Weinrich 1977). For instance, in her field diary for Mola Chiefdom in 1984–85, Reynolds recorded nearly 40 accounts of human–wildlife conflicts resulting from attacks by such animals as elephants and buffaloes, as well as birds (Reynolds 2019). These animals trampled on people's fields and even injured and killed people. Some Tonga elders pointed out that water and wildlife were the two main constraints to livelihoods in their area (Langely 2007).

Our research found out that during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, there was serious underreporting of human–wildlife and specifically human–crocodile conflicts in north-western Zimbabwe. This was partly because the region was marginalised and far removed from National Parks' offices. Consistently, research has shown that under-recording of crocodile attacks is common in cases where Conservancy officials have considerable distances to travel to report incidents and often forget or fail to do so (Aust et al. 2009). Many of the unreported incidences (of wildlife generally) across the globe may involve minor injuries only (Pooley 2015), as they do it appears among the Tonga, but deaths are not uncommon—how many, though, remains unclear. The Tonga have endured isolation over the years (Weinrich 1977), including undeveloped transport and communication networks, and this does not allow for the easy transfer of information from local villages to government's district offices. Even in the 1980s, Mola Chiefdom had no post office, no bank, no library, no market and no public means of transport (Reynolds 2019). Much of the HWC that occurred immediately after resettlement in the 1960s went unreported, particularly in colonial newspapers as this would tarnish the image of the resettlement programme. Overall, then, there are no accurate records about the number of Tonga people who are attacked by wildlife, including currently.

6.5 Wildlife, Livelihoods and the CAMPFIRE Programme

Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) programme was an early post-independence effort to implement community-based wildlife management on a national scale aimed at increasing the participation of rural Zimbabweans in wildlife management and conservation (Sibanda 2004; Dzingirai 2003). In keeping with community-based management practices, the programme proposed the passing of management benefits—in particular, game meat, wildlife-generated revenue and protection from animal crop-raids—to the 'producer community', i.e. those people who lived alongside wildlife (Murphree 1995).

CAMPFIRE received international publicity and acclaim as an innovative approach to natural resources management (Sibanda 2004: 248), as it was developed in response to failed wildlife conservation approaches that relied primarily upon policing and law enforcement. It was also believed that the supposed lack of interest in wildlife conservation by local people (such as the Tonga) might be

resolved by giving them ultimate ownership and control over wildlife resources. In this way, CAMPFIRE represented an attempt to find ways of facilitating communities to develop and prosper without depleting their natural environment, including wildlife. It sought to enable communities to utilise natural resources, to grow crops and to build roads and settlements without destroying forests, wildlife and degrading soils (Sibanda 2004); and it hoped to alter the perverse incentives that otherwise lead to conflicts between local livelihoods and protection of wildlife and associated habitats (Balint 2006).

Before the implementation of CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe's government asserted full authority over wildlife both in protected areas (for example, national parks) and in communal lands. The locals bore the costs of wildlife conservation as they were not permitted to hunt, either for subsistence purposes or to protect themselves from depredation of crops and domestic livestock. Outsiders benefited as the Zimbabwean government and safari companies earned substantial revenue from the lucrative trophy-hunting and game-viewing tourism ventures that depended on the presence of protected wildlife (Balint and Mashinya 2008). CAMPFIRE was supposed to move away from this scenario by somehow devolving control over wildlife to communities themselves, thereby incentivising them to care for wildlife and alter the perverse incentives that otherwise lead to conflicts between local livelihoods and the protection of wildlife and associated habitats (Balint 2006). Cash and material benefits from CAMPFIRE to local communities were viewed as major incentives for conservation.

Advocates of this wildlife management programme have stressed community incorporation and inclusion as the only path to conservation (Murphree 1995). This minimises everyday human–wildlife conflicts which threaten both wildlife conservation and livelihood sustainability. Undoubtedly, at times, CAMPFIRE did strengthen the efficacy of conservation in north-western Zimbabwe. To its credit, it also redefined the once-labelled poachers of wildlife as conservers of wildlife. In its initial years, including in Nyaminyami and Binga, CAMPFIRE may have produced solid and meaningful results (Sibanda 2004; Dzingirai 2003), including through some cash benefits at household level and the provision of grinding mills, education and health facilities at community level. However, control over CAMPFIRE was delegated to rural district councils and never to communities themselves, and there is some evidence of embezzlement of wildlife-generated revenue by councils (Sibanda 2004). In Sibanda's study of Nyaminyami, 50% of respondents did not receive any benefits (Sibanda 2004), including very vulnerable households and female-headed households.

Despite the possible and actual benefits associated with CAMPFIRE, poverty in participating Tonga and other communities remained entrenched, and human activities often continued to threaten the protected wildlife and habitats (Balint and Mashinya 2008). During the time of this research, CAMPFIRE only existed in local council books and on billboards, as nothing was happening on the ground in terms of providing benefits to the concerned people. The Tonga communities continued to lead precarious lives (Matanzima 2021), with ongoing wildlife-human tensions.

6.5.1 Weaknesses of CAMPFIRE Among the Tonga

Though its aims have been laudable, CAMPFIRE has been beset with the same ongoing problems during its decades of operation: animals destroying crops, a flawed hunting contract system, lack of transparency by councils in the disbursement of dividends, corruption at all levels, human settlements in the CAMPFIRE production zones, intensified poaching and, above all, lack of community proprietorship over wildlife (Manyena et al. 2013: 87–88).

The efficiency of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe generally was seriously impacted by the national economic and political turmoil in the post-2000 era. As Balint and Mashinya (2008: 783) argue, 'in 2000, local CAMPFIRE projects began to feel the impact of two powerful external shocks: the end of international funding, and the beginning of Zimbabwe's severe political and economic crisis'. Hence, contrary to expectations prior to the turmoil, programme revenues and conservation benefits were rarely sustained, even in the most productive CAMPFIRE cases such as Mahenye in Chipinge. From 1990 to 2000, USAID (the major international donor for CAMPFIRE) had contributed approximately 30 million USD for programme development (Balint and Mashinya 2008). This funding supported various national and international NGOs that provided capacity building, monitoring and evaluation for CAMPFIRE. Following the previously scheduled end of the USAID cycle funding in 2000, these NGOs were no longer able to provide these services with any consistency and certainty.

The fast track land reform programme from the year 2000 took place after weak national economic performances during the 1990s (in part because of the unsuccessful structural adjustment programme) and the emergence of a viable political opposition in the preceding year which raised deep concerns about the legitimacy of the ruling ZANU-PF party. In combination, the suppression of political opposition, reoccurring droughts and uncompensated land seizures via fast track had further severe repercussions for Zimbabwe's agrarian and national economy. International donors and investors withdrew or withheld funding, productivity in the agricultural sector plummeted, supplies of hard currency constricted and inflation and unemployment soared. The systemic economic crisis lowered the prospects of sufficient state funding for local governments in urban and rural spaces, and well as inducing high levels of corruption within the rural district council system of Zimbabwe. In this respect, the Binga and Nyaminyami Rural Districts were no exception. Council officials misappropriated CAMPFIRE funds which only served to weaken the efficacy of the programme for the Tonga villagers.

Though fast track brought about a significant redistribution of land, it did not alter the ownership status of communal land. Like the new fast track farms, communal areas remain as state land under state ownership, with communal residents having usufruct rights only. The reluctance of the Zimbabwean government to grant outright ownership of land to rural communities tends to inhibit the sustainable management of land-based natural resources such as wildlife by these communities under CAMPFIRE. Communities have often failed to fully support CAMPFIRE not only because

of the ownership question but also due to the nagging control question. More specifically, under CAMPFIRE, the administration of land and its resources continues to be decentralised based on the notion that the district councils are the 'appropriate authority'—and, hence, Tonga communities are still in large part devoid of power.

Additionally, there exists the inadequate incorporation of Tonga's indigenous knowledge, traditional practices and local values into CAMPFIRE, and this affects the responsiveness and efficiency of the programme. Admittedly, some indigenous practices were incorporated such as traditional hunting seasons, but most were ignored. For example, CAMPFIRE failed to include Tonga's spiritual and worship needs around hunting (in relation to, for example, the healing of the mentally sick) (Sibanda 2004: 253), as well as for the *masabe* (alien) hunting spirits that require the Tonga to act out the alien spirits possessing them through real hunting (Matanzima and Saidi 2020). CAMPFIRE's failure to recognise this, while granting permits for sport hunting, has only served to create serious misunderstanding and mistrust. One elder interviewed by Sibanda commented that:

> Our people now die from mental illness because they can no longer hunt, as this is prohibited. We are told that we cannot kill animals; but we see white men coming and killing even the most sacred animals, such as elephants and the eland. We wonder if the white men from overseas are coming to kill these animals in order to meet their own spiritual needs or maybe to heal their own mental illness. The law forbids the Tonga from killing animals. Why are white people allowed to kill animals and we cannot? If it is bad for Tonga to kill animals, it is bad for White people to kill animals. (quoted in Sibanda 2004: 253–254)

Our own research observed that those possessed by the *masabe* among the Tonga of Sinakatenge could suffer from chronic diseases for not having acted out as their spirits required. Barring local people from hunting, while allowing White people to hunt, caused frustration among many Tonga people which, in turn, weakened the effectiveness of CAMPFIRE. The Tonga people were demotivated to participate in the programme, as their embodied desire for hunting was/is defined as poaching.

In addition, there has been sabotage from communities near to (but outside of) areas in which CAMPFIRE exists. People or districts excluded from benefitting from CAMPFIRE became frustrated to the extent that they attempted to sabotage the whole programme. For example, in specific parts of the Zambezi Valley, there were contestations between the Tonga and Ndebele immigrants regarding access to benefits from wildlife. The title of the article by Dzingirai (2003), 'CAMPFIRE is not for Ndebele immigrants', brings to the fore the politics surrounding wildlife benefits. The excluded Ndebele people never supported CAMPFIRE and indeed came to oppose it, seeking its replacement with commercial agriculture that directly benefits them. Ndebele migrants have sought to kill wildlife, the very basis of CAMPFIRE, arguing that it constitutes a costly threat to their agricultural production. As Dzingirai (2003) argues, excluding certain social groups makes them hostile to CAMPFIRE initiatives and possibly wildlife conservation more broadly. In Nyaminyami District, our research found that, while Tonga locals protected their wildlife, neighbours from Gokwe (who are Tonga and Shangwe speakers) illegally hunted animals from Nyaminyami. Similarly, in the case of Mola, Zambian-based poachers are said to encroach into the Matusadona National Park for hunting purposes.

6.6 Livelihoods and Human–Wildlife Conflict: The Contemporary Situation

Human–wildlife conflict has worsened in the contemporary period as a result of the growing human population and the increase in numbers of wild animals. The Tonga people find themselves in conflict with wild animals in the different spaces that they carry out their livelihoods. Those who are carrying out hydro-based livelihoods like fishing in Lake Kariba are prone to attacks from crocodiles and hippos. Those who engage in farming also bemoan the trampling or destruction of their field crops by wild animals such as birds, elephants and buffaloes. Livestock rearing has also been made difficult by the prevalence of carnivores such as lions, leopards and hyenas that frequently roam their villages.

6.6.1 Hydro-Based Livelihoods, Crocodile and Hippo Attacks

The Tonga people of Zimbabwe now engage in riverine cultivation along small local rivers. These rivers are either tributaries of the Zambezi River such as Semwa River or tributaries of the tributaries of the Zambezi (such as Tyuunga River which is tributary to Semwa River in eastern Binga District). Though these rivers are not perennial, they shelter huge crocodilians during the rainy season. These crocodiles migrate seasonally from the Kariba Dam into (further inland) rivers. In rivers such as the Semwa and Tyuunga of Sinakatenge (in Binga), cases of livestock (particularly goats) eaten by crocodiles are very common. The keeping of goat has become precarious because of the presence of crocodiles in local rivers. Goat keeping is an important dimension of Tonga livelihoods, particularly for households which cannot afford cattle. The Tonga keep goats for sale and exchange with other basic commodities like soap, sugar and cooking oil, and they are used as a form of payment for children's school fees and bus fares. Ultimately, as with cattle, they are a measure of household wealth for the Tonga (Cliggett 2007); hence, any reduction in their numbers has significant implications for household livelihood viability. However, not only livestock (such as goats) are attacked by crocodiles but also humans residing close to or encroaching near water sources are also at risk from attacks by crocodiles (and hippos).

In the case of human–crocodile conflict at Lake Kariba, Tonga people residing in certain chiefdoms, such as the Mola chiefdom, that lie along the lake's littoral encompass fishing camps where Tonga gillnet fishers live. These fishing camps were opened in the 1960s by the colonial government for a few Tonga fishers. The colonial government restricted black people's access to Lake Kariba and its resources and, as indicated, much of the littoral was reserved for white-owned commercial fishing and tourism (Matanzima 2021). Upon independence in 1980, whites almost lost control over the lake as many black people began making use of the fishing camps and the number of gillnet fishers increased significantly—alongside an increase in the Nile crocodile populations in Lake Kariba. The increased presence of crocodiles

arose from its official protection and conservation as an endangered species by the Zimbabwean government (McGregor 2005). This resulted in growing competition for space between fishers and crocodiles in the Lake. Dwindling fish resources due to climate change and low water volumes added to the intensity of the competition for fish between humans and wildlife (Muringai et al. 2020).

Gillnet fishing is precarious in the sense that when fishers lay nets at night, they are unsure if their nets will survive crocodile encroachment. Crocodiles steal fish from the fishermen's nets and destroy nets in the Lake, and replacing these nets has been difficult for the Tonga in the crises-laden situation in Zimbabwe (McGregor 2005). In our research, many fishers revealed their anger against crocodiles as they bring uncertainties and losses to their livelihoods. They actually want to see the crocodile population reduced as they feel that the crocodile population is increasing at an alarming rate. Such fishers' negative attitudes 'threaten the future of crocodile conservation programmes' (McGregor 2005: 353), as local villagers may resort to lethal means when retaliating for problems the crocodiles cause. In Binga, for example, McGregor (2005) found that fishermen often killed problem crocodiles with spears. Rod and line fishers, mostly women, are also attacked by crocodiles. They fish on the shores of the Lake and are the most vulnerable to crocodile attacks, either being attacked while sitting on the shores fishing or as they enter into the Lake to waist level to catch large fish. Given the high levels of poverty among the Tonga, these fishers often take major risks to catch sizeable fish in shallow water for purposes of income generation through market sales.

As Dunham et al. (2010) argue in the case of Mozambique, poverty may prompt fishermen to risk crocodile attacks by entering rivers or lakes (Dunham et al. 2010). Fishermen often have specific spots, such as river estuaries, with good potential for catching fish, and where crocodiles often attack them clandestinely. Crocodiles will be highly concentrated in such sites where both fish and humans are available as prey (Marowa et al. 2021). Pooley (2016) argues more broadly that crocodiles observe where animals (including humans) regularly cross water-courses or go to drink or bathe, and, when hungry, they will wait patiently near these places for the prey to approach. Crocodiles may, as well, steal the bags of fishers containing caught fish they store in the water during fishing to protect them from rotting.

Further, not only are the gillnetters exposed to crocodile attacks but they may become victims of hippo attacks. During fieldwork, we found that hippos cause many serious problems for Tonga fishing communities, including capsizing boats, disturbing the laying of nets, killing people, chasing people on harbours, damaging boats, drowning people and biting people. Thus, both lives and livelihoods are under threat from hippos. Regarding livelihoods, the damaging of boats and disturbing the laying of nets impact on fishing, including in terms of the costs of repair or replacement. Disturbances of nets leads to fishermen spending considerable time looking for good fishing spaces without a high concentration of hippos. Hippos move in groups including babies and, when with babies, they tend to be very hostile which disturbs fishers from laying nets and accessing specific fishing spots.

6.6.2 Animal Encroachment on People's Fields

Aside from the attacks from crocodiles and hippos along the Lake and local rivers, the Tonga people in rural homes also face attacks from elephants, buffaloes, lions, birds and so on that encroach on their farming fields and livestock kraals and thereby disturb their crop production and cattle rearing. Currently, there are no schemes to compensate the victims of wildlife attacks in north-western Zimbabwe and CAMPFIRE is no longer effective in this region. Because of this, Tonga people are not even benefitting from living close to wildlife. Consequently, their attitudes towards wildlife are negative and increasingly so. Though we emphasise the vulnerability of farming in the context of wild animal encroachment, farming in this region is also vulnerable to climate changes and natural resource conservation policies which prohibit certain agricultural practices (Tombindo 2018).

Different kinds of birds eat crops such as millets (*nzembwe*) and sorghum (*maila*) in people's fields. For example, in 2017, people from Chitenge Village in Mola complained to us that birds were a major menace, just like elephants. As one Tonga man highlighted, 'birds are tiny creatures but they cause much damage in our fields'. Birds enter into the fields during the day and not at night and, due to their tininess and swift encroachment, they are also difficult to monitor. The deer (antelopes) also cause problems, eating legumes (*nyemba*) and groundnuts during the night. During our research in 2017, it was observed that people made dummies of humans from tree branches, which they clothed with bright colours so as to scare away the deer. To make matters worse, deer are small animals difficult to monitor as compared to elephants. Another problem comes from lions and hyenas. In situations where wild animals become scarce due to poaching or in the rainy season when it is difficult for these carnivores to sight this prey, they encroach on the villages where easier domestic prey can be found. Lions attack cattle and goats while hyenas attack goats.

Elephants trample on people's fields throughout the Zambezi Valley. Elephants were mentioned several times during our research as a major problem-animal especially in the chiefdoms of Musampakaruma and Mola that lie close to the Matusadonha National Park. In Musampakaruma, where a few Tonga people live and farm along Marowa River, elephants caused major damage in the peoples' riverine fields in the 2019 farming seasoning and some people were in fact killed. People who had farmed there for several years had built *busanza/tsaka* (storey huts) in which they lived protecting their crops from animals. During the 2019 farming season, though, the sheer extent of the elephants' encroachment displaced them such that, in the 2020 farming season, no one returned to farm along the Marowa River. Commenting on the problems caused by elephants along Marowa River, one male informant stated that:

> We farmed along Marowa for many years. People started farming there in 2008 due to drought and poverty. Even though elephants were coming, they were not a big problem. But since 2019 they became a big problem. Big elephants were coming trampling on our riverine fields and gardens, destroying our storey huts, and chasing away people. The place became dangerous, it was no longer habitable. All the maize we planted was destroyed and eaten by elephants.

Another local, commenting on the same elephant problem, stated that:

> *Gore rino hakuna kana chatikabva nacho* (This year we did not harvest anything). There were many elephants this year. We farmed for elephants. … [S]even years ago, there were few elephants and we could chase them away. I could see 2 or 3 elephants a day. But, last season huge numbers of elephants were encroaching our fields. they came in hundreds, 300 to 400 elephants every day. And when they could enter into one field, they left nothing but their foot prints. The elephants that are now there are big elephants and not small elephants. *Kune mazikarakata.* (Extraordinarily huge elephants)

People had their crops eaten and the majority survived by working for local elites within Musampakaruma. To make matters worse, there were no government social grants in the second half of 2020, leading to hunger among the impacted households. Besides challenges at riverine fields, elephants also trampled on maize fields that are closer to their homesteads. In Musampakaruma, this typically occurs during the harvesting season around March to April. These elephants come from the nearby Matusadona park so that, each year, Tonga people harvest early and quickly prior to the arrival of the marauding elephants.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the interactions between humans and animals in north-western Zimbabwe with particular reference to the Tonga people. Though, in the past, the Tonga had a symbiotic relationship with wildlife, there are now a multiplicity of negative socio-economic effects inflicted on the Tonga people's lives and livelihoods by wild animals, particularly from the time of the Kariba Dam construction. These ongoing human–wildlife conflicts perpetuate the impoverishment of the Tonga people, as indicated by way of the many challenges they face when undertaking fishing and farming. Because of this, the livelihoods of the Tonga people are rendered precarious by the presence of wild animals. Their fishing gear, crops and livestock are always insecure due to the encroachment of wild animals; yet, despite the laudable goals around the CAMPFIRE programme, the government and local conservation authorities have made only minimal efforts to mitigate human–wildlife conflicts and their effects in any meaningful way. In order to alleviate these problems, the government should seriously consider formulating HWC mitigation policies that promote co-existence between animals and humans in north-western Zimbabwe in particular and Zimbabwe in general. Currently, Zimbabwe has no HWC policy, and the absence of this serves to perpetuate the occurrence of HWCs.

References

Aust P, Boyle B, Fergusson R, Coulson T (2009) The impact of Nile crocodiles on rural livelihoods in northeastern Namibia. S Afr J Wildl Res 39(1):57–69

Balint PJ (2006) Improving community-based conservation near protected areas: the importance of development variables. Environ Manag 38(1):137–148

Balint PJ, Mashinya J (2008) Campfire during Zimbabwe's national crisis: local impacts and broader implications for community—based wildlife management. Soc Nat Resour 21:783–796

Banki S (2013) Urbanity, precarity, and homeland activism: Burmese migrants in global cities. Moussons 22

Cliggett L (2007) Gendered support strategies of the elderly in the Gwembe Valley, Zambia. In: Lancaster C, Vickery KP (eds) The Tonga speaking peoples of Zambia and Zimbabwe. University Press of America, pp 219–236

Colson E (1971) The social consequences of resettlement. Manchester University Press, Manchester

Dunham KM, Ghiurghi A, Cumbi R, Urbano F (2010) Human–wildlife conflict in Mozambique a national perspective, with emphasis on wildlife attacks on humans. Oryx 44(2):185–193

Dzingirai V (2003) 'CAMPFIRE is not for Ndebele migrants': the impact of excluding outsiders from CAMPFFIRE in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe. J S Afr Stud 29(2):445–459

Gore ML, Kahler JS (2012) Gendered risk perceptions associated with human wildlife conflict: implications for participatory conservation. PLoS One 7(3):1–10

Gukurume S (2018) Navigating precarious livelihoods: youth in the SME sector in Zimbabwe. IDS Bull 49(5):89–104

Hlatshwayo M (2019) Precarious work and precarious resistance: a case study of Zimbabwean migrant women workers in Johannesburg, South Africa. Diaspora Stud 12(2):160–178

Hughes MD (2010) Whiteness in Zimbabwe: race, landscape and the problem of belonging. Palgrave Macmillan

Khumalo KE, Yung LA (2015) Women, human–wildlife conflicts, and CBNRM: hidden impacts and vulnerability in Kwandu conservancy, Namibia. Conserv Soc 13(3):232–243

Langely S (2007) Marginalization and response: lingering effects of the Kariba Dam project in Zimbabwe. In: Lancaster C, Vickery KP (eds) The Tonga speaking peoples of Zambia and Zimbabwe. University Press of America, pp 263–284

Lewchuk W, Dassinger J (2016) Precarious employment and precarious resistance: "we are people still." Stud Polit Econ 97(2):143–158

Manfredo MJ, Dayer AA (2004) Concepts for exploring the social aspects of human–wildlife conflict in a global context. Hum Dimens Wildl 9(4):1–20

Manyena SB, Collins AE, Mudimba F, Mudimba D (2013) 'Are you serious to ask me about who owns wildlife?': politics of autonomy over wildlife resources in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe. Forum Dev Stud 40(1):87–109

Marowa I (2010) The Tonga people of Zimbabwe: historical memories and contemporary challenges of a minority society. In: Mbanaso MU, Korieh CJ (eds) Minorities and the state in Africa. Cambria Press, New York, pp 171–194

Marowa I, Matanzima J, Nhiwatiwa T (2021) Interactions between humans, crocodiles, and hippos at Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe. Human–Wildlife Interactions 15(1):212–227

Matanzima J (2021) Thayer Scudder's Four Stage Framework, water resources dispossession and appropriation: the Kariba case. Int J Water Resour Dev. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2020.1866505

Matanzima J, Saidi U (2020) Landscape, belonging and identity in North-west Zimbabwe: a semiotic analysis. Afr Identities 18(1–2):233–251

McGregor J (2005) Crocodile crimes: people versus wildlife and the politics of postcolonial conservation on Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe. Geoforum 36:353–369

McGregor J (2008) Patrolling Kariba's waters: state authority, fishing and the border economy. J South Afr Stud 34(4):861–879
McKee K, Hoolachan JE, Moore T (2017) The precarity of young people's housing experience in a rural context. Scott Geogr J 133(2):115–129
Messmer TA (2009) Human–wildlife conflicts: emerging challenges and opportunities. HWC 3(1):10–17
Mormile JE, Hill CM (2016) Living with urban baboons: exploring attitudes and their implications for local baboon conservation and management in Knysna, South Africa. Hum Dimens Wildl 22(2):99–109
Muringai TR, Naidoo D, Mafongoya P (2020) The challenges experienced by small-scale fishing communities of Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe. J Transdiscipl Res Southern Afr 16(1):1–6
Murphree MW (1995) Optimal principles and pragmatic strategies. Creating an enabling politico-legal environment for community based natural resource management. In: Rihoy E (ed) The commons without the tragedy: strategies for community based natural resources management in Southern Africa. SADC Wildlife Technical Coordination Unit, Lilongwe, pp 47–52
Pooley S (2015) Using predator attack data to save lives, humans and crocodilian. Oryx 49(4):581–583
Pooley S (2016) A cultural herpetology of Nile. crocodiles in Africa. Conservation and society. 14:391–405
Reynolds P (2019) The uncaring, intricate world: afield diary, Zambezi Valley, 1984–1985. Duke University Press
Saidi U, Matanzima J (2021) Negotiating territoriality in North-Western Zimbabwe: locating the multiple-identities of BaTonga, Shangwe, and Karanga in history. Afr J Inter/Multidiscip Stud 3(1):61–74
Scudder T (1962) The ecology of the Gwembe Tonga. Manchester University Press, Manchester
Scoones I, Mavedzenge B, Murimbarimba F, Sukume C (2018) Labour after land reform: the precarious livelihoods of former farmworkers in Zimbabwe. Dev Chang 50(3):805–835. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12449
Scudder T (2005) The Kariba case study. Social Science Working Paper 1227. California Institute of Technology
Sibanda B (2004) Community wildlife management in Zimbabwe: the case of CAMPFIRE in the Zambezi Valley. In: Fabricius C, Koch E, Magome H, Turner S (eds) Rights, resources and rural development: community-based natural resource management in Southern Africa. Earthscan, London, pp 248–431
Tombindo F (2017) Critical analysis of landscape and belonging in Mola, Nyaminyami District, Zimbabwe. Masters Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa
Tombindo F (2018) Livelihoods vulnerability among riverbed farmers in Negande, Nyaminyami District. In: Helliker K, Chiweshe MK, Bhatasara S (eds) The political economy of livelihoods in contemporary Zimbabwe. Routledge, London, pp 154–169
Weinrich AKH (1977) The Tonga people on the southern shore of Lake Kariba. Mambo Press, Gweru
Wilmsen B, Adjartey D (2020) Precarious resettlement at the Bui Dam, Ghana—unmaking the teleological. Geogr Res 58:331–343. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-5871.12411
Yang N, Zhang E, Chen M (2010) Attitudes towards wild animal conservation: a comparative study of the Yi and Mosuo in China. Int J Biodivers Sci Ecosyst Serv Manag 6(1–2):61–67

Joshua Matanzima is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Social Inquiry at La Trobe University, Australia. He is also a member of the Gwembe Tonga Research Project. He has done extensive fieldwork in the Zambezi Valley among the Tonga people. His research interests lie in the fields of human-wildlife interactions, anthropology of landscape and resettlement as well

as religion and social change. His previous publications appear in such journals as *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, *African Identities, Water International* and *Oryx*.

Ivan Marowa holds a Ph.D. in African History from the University of Bayreuth, Germany. He is a senior Lecturer in the Department of History, Heritage and Knowledge Systems at the University of Zimbabwe. His research interests are: forced movement, social memories, Zimbabwe's liberation history, livelihoods, environmental history and human-wildlife conflict. He has done extensive research in the Zambezi Valley and its escarpment focusing on human and non-human agents of history.

Chapter 7
Political Economy of Chisa Livelihoods in Rural Zimbabwe

Emmanuel Ndhlovu

Abstract This chapter provides a comprehensive examination of the livelihoods of the 'Shangane' nation (and specifically the Chisa of Gotosa) in south-eastern Zimbabwe. The Chisa people have a complex and convoluted history because of multiple forced displacements including from their ancestral lands which now form part of the Gonarezhou National Park. It traces the origins and livelihoods of the Chisa people from precolonial times, through the colonial period, and into the post-independence period including in the context of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The history of the Chisa people is not only a story of incessant land displacements but it is also one of the resistances against top-down colonial projects. Though they may have benefited from the FTLRP through access to redistributed land, this falls far short of calls for restitution, that is, regaining access to their ancestral lands in Gonarezhou and the sense of identity and nationhood which would come with this. Hence, using the Chisa of Gotosa as a case study, the chapter demonstrates how Chisa livelihoods were distorted with each displacement (since the 1950s), with the FTLRP, in fact, actually pushing them further away from their ancestral lands.

Keywords Colonial regime · Chisa of Gotosa · Gonarezhou · Livelihoods · Shangane

7.1 Introduction

The people commonly referred to as the 'Shangane' in Zimbabwe represent minority groups that fought and won a liberation war, but still lost a nation—defined as the land and the culture, identity, and livelihood strategies embedded in the land. Ever since the Shangane were first displaced from Gonarezhou National Park (GNP) in the mid-1950s following a 1934 declaration of their land as a game reserve and then as a national park in 1975, they have always been people on the move. The GNP, which

E. Ndhlovu (✉)
Freelance Researcher, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: matahemanu@yahoo.co.uk

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_7

is now the second-largest national park in the country after the Hwange National Park, is located in south-eastern Zimbabwe along the border with Mozambique. It covers a surface area of 5,053 km^2 incorporating a vast expanse of open grasslands and dense woodlands (Gandiwa 2011: 305).

The area historically belongs to the Shangane who, as of today, are scattered outside of the GNP where they continue to see their ancestral lands as a remote object of veneration. As a result, unlike other ethnic groups, the Shangane people have not been able to reclaim their nation (in the Gonarezhou). With their initial forced removals from the GNP between 1957 and 1959, they became incorporated into nearby Reserves (now communal areas), including Marhumbini to the south and Sangwe and Chizvirizvi to the north. The Ndali communal area was later formed from a severed piece of the Gonarezhou in the far northern tip along the Save River to ease overpopulation in the Sangwe communal area. Some Shangane also crossed the Save River to settle in the adjacent communal areas of Vheneka, Chitepo, Mtandahwe, Maparadze, Chipote, and Mahenye in the Chipinge District, while others crossed the border to settle in Zambareja and Masenjeni, in Mozambique. Currently, the Shangane inhabits the communal areas of Sangwe, Ndowoyo, and Chizvirizvi to the north; Matibi No. 2 to the west; and Chikombedzi, Malipati, and Sengwe to the south.

In the year 2000, Zimbabwe initiated the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) to correct the racially skewed landownership pattern designed by the colonial regime and which had been inherited at independence in 1980. Less than 6,000 white farmers owned about 51% of all the farming land, while blacks, who made up 72% of the national population, eked out a living in agro-ecologically dry areas (Mugandani et al. 2012). While the Shangane participated in the radicalised land reforms of the 2000s, the FTLRP did not provide for any land restitution. Instead, those who managed to acquire land under the programme were placed further away from their ancestral lands (the Gonarezhou) to 'foreign nations' such as Fair Range, Mhandababwe, and Nyangambe—areas that originally belong to Karanga-speaking people. All of these displacements and relocations have had huge implications not only for citizenship, identity, and culture but also for the Shangane capacity to construct resilient livelihoods—central to this has been their relationship with wildlife.

In this context, the chapter examines in particular the livelihood trajectories of the Chisa people of Gotora, since their colonial displacement from the Gonarezhou ancestral lands and with regard to their ongoing placement in 'foreign nations'. After noting the research methodology, the chapter sets out the context by discussing the question of wildlife conservation and human displacements, as well as the origins of the Shangane nation and the repression and resistance story of the Chisa people of Gotosa. The chapter focuses specifically on the Chisa community by identifying and analysing the trajectory of their livelihoods since the first displacement from Gotosa and their relocation to Chingoji; and then to the Seven Jack area, to Ndali, into the Protected Villages during the 1970s' liberation war, back to Ndali and nearby communal areas, and lastly to the nearby farms acquired under the FTLRP.

7.2 Research Methods

Based on a qualitative research methodology, this chapter makes use of archival sources, including colonial government documents and reports by colonial officials such as Allan Wright who, during the Shangane colonial displacements, served as the Commissioner of the Nuanetsi District. It also draws heavily from secondary sources on the colonial empire, forced displacements, and national parks. Most importantly, the chapter incorporates informal day-to-day oral testimonies, which the author continuously gathers from Shangane elders who either experienced and witnessed, or have in-depth knowledge about, the Shangane evictions from the Gonarezhou. It also benefits from the author's lived experiences as a 'Shangane'.

7.3 Wildlife Conservation and Human Displacements

Protected areas are considered to offer the best protection for conserving biodiversity and ecosystems worldwide (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau 2004; Rai 2019). As a result, whole communities worldwide have experienced displacements to accommodate wildlife. The Yellowstone National Park, established in 1872 in the United States, was the world's first protected area which thus became the model for park planning globally (Brandon and Wells 1992). The park was created for tourism, and the 'natives [living there] were seen as an unfortunate blight' (Poirier and Ostengren 2002: 333). Accordingly, the park was cleared of native inhabitants who then were confined to native Indian reserves. This top-down approach of order and discipline was executed through a policy of expulsion, fences, and fines (Brandon and Wells 1992). The same strategy was used in the creation of game reserves elsewhere, including in Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa, Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda (Adams 2005; Borgerhoff and Coppolillo 2005).

Since the creation of the Yellowstone National Park, more than sixty million people have been displaced by conservation projects worldwide, often handicapping livelihoods (Brockington and Igoe 2006; Ndhlovu 2020). In Africa alone, just over a decade ago, an estimated 14 million people had been displaced in the creation of parks and protected areas (DeGeorges and Reilly 2008). Where such projects were colonially motivated, such as in Zimbabwe (Tavuyanago 2017), the disregard of the social and economic lives and objectives of local people have had huge consequences for indigenous or native livelihoods. In fact, Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2003) posit that evictions during park creations result in at least eight impoverishment risks, namely: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property, and social disarticulation.

Tavuyanago (2017) views these evictions in Africa as permeated by racial notions whereby natives were (and are) regarded as unrepentant poachers who fail to appreciate nature and, therefore, had to be moved away from it. This view motivated

the massive and callous eviction of natives during the establishment of the Kruger National Park in South Africa. In Rhodesia, the creation of the Wankie and Matopos game reserves was characterised by determined efforts by colonial administers to evict natives from their lands (Gandiwa 2011). Likewise, the declaration of the Gonarezhou land area as a game reserve in 1934 would be accompanied by eviction of the Shangane natives who inhabited the area and were viewed as 'of a most undesirable type … not properly looked after, being apparently too far away from a Native Commissioner to be visited in person. Also they are in, or claim to be in, a perpetual state of semi-starvation as the country has too little rainfall to support crops'[1] The land was considered to be arid, scorched, boring, disease-ridden, impractical for cropping, and unhealthy for human occupancy (Bulpin 1967).

The Gonarezhou land could only assume a value after being converted to a game reserve. This conversion of the land into a Game Reserve was viewed not only as having the potential for revenue generation through tourism but also the capacity to create jobs, alleviate poverty, and consequently improve the livelihoods of the Shangane nation (Mombeshora and Le Bel 2009). It was also considered largely intolerable to have a game sanctuary and an insubordinate Shangane nation within it, particularly as the Shangane were viewed by the colonial regime as having wasteful and destructive conservation practices (Tavuyanago 2017). Furthermore, colonial authorities claimed that most of the land designated for the park had been unoccupied in 1890 when they took over (Gandiwa 2011), without the presence of indigenous people including the Shangane.

The description of the Gonarezhou as inhabitable is unfortunate as the Shangane had always lived and fared well in their nation, located in the Gonarezhou area. They also did not welcome the proposed 'assistance' arising in the context of the establishment of this wildlife sanctuary. In protest to the evictions of the mid-1950s, headman Ngwenyeni Maguwu of Marhumbini openly told officials from the Wildlife Department that:

> We cannot leave the area where we have lived all our lives. Our fathers and grandfathers were born here. They lived and died here without harming anybody. The spirits of our ancestors are here. The area is said to be a game reserve—but how can this be? We have lived here since before the Europeans came to this country … When we were told we would have to leave, we asked the District Commissioner [Wright] if we could remain in our ancestral area. The District Commissioner consulted with the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management, and later informed us we could remain … now we were again being told we cannot remain here forever, and that we should move.[2]

The quiet diplomacy of resistance to eviction by the Marhumbini and the open defiance by the Chisa communities demonstrated a clear case of the Shangane's self-assertion and a rebuttal to being taken for granted by the colonial regime. It was also a declaration and confirmation of the Shangane nation's rootedness in the Gonarezhou area, and an affirmation of the value they placed on a heritage which they would defend. Their satisfaction with the Gonarezhou environment exposes the barbarity of the self-imposed duty by colonial imperialists to improve the lives of natives by removing them from their land. If anything, for the regime, the conversion of the Gonarezhou into a game reserve was part of its continued commitment to place the

Shangane nation within the jurisdiction of colonial administrative power (such as the Native Commissioner's office) so as to control and use them to advance the colonial project. However, the likely eviction of the Shangane from their land stirred mixed views in government departments. While the Department of Commerce required an immediate eviction, the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands disapproved of the displacement due to its large scale and possible implications for livelihoods (Wolmer 2007). The Chief Native Commissioner was particularly wary of the resettlement of the people in Matibi No. 2 which was very small and unlikely to support a larger population due to its poor agro-ecological conditions (Tavuyanago 2017).

In the end, Shangane displacements did not start immediately in 1934 due to tsetse fly control priorities (Mavhunga 2008). Evictions only commenced in earnest in the mid-1950s with the Chisa, Ngwenyeni, and Xilotlela communities being the first targets for eviction. Communities located around the Sabi-Lundi junction were temporarily spared, although labelled and earmarked as illegal occupancies, and hence they would have to vacate the area sooner or later. The Chisa of Gotosa, Ngwenyeni of Marhumbini, and Xilotlela of Vila Salazar communities put up fierce resistance to eviction from their ancestral home which did not only harbour their culture and identity but also formed the basis of their livelihood strategies.

7.4 Origins of the Shangane Nation and the Chisa People

The Gaza-Nguni Kingdom, which at its full strength stretched from southern Mozambique up to the Zambezi River in the north, was founded by Soshangane Manukosi Nxumalo (1780–1858). Soshangane was one of King Shaka's greatest generals who, tired of the Zulu king's dictatorship, migrated from South Africa during the Nguni wars and settled at Biyeni on the lower Limpopo River in 1821, far away from Shaka's harm (Mavhunga 2008). Through military prowess, Soshangane conquered and assimilated the various clans in the area, namely: the Tsonga, Hlengwe, Rhonga, Chopi, Ndau, and Tswa, to establish the Gaza-Nguni kingdom (Ndhlovu 2020). Soshangane ruled over the Gaza-Nguni state from 1825 until his demise in 1858. It is, therefore, untrue to claim that all the people who are labelled as 'Shangane' migrated from South Africa.

To highlight, Soshangane arrived with a small group of military men with their households and then conquered local clans. These clans, in their diversity are now commonly known as 'Shangane'—a label derived from Soshangane's name. But Soshangane did not only assimilate through conquest but also by consent. In this respect, various families from different clans accepted intermarriages with Soshangane's group possibly as a strategy to escape the status of being minorities or in exchange for protection during battles. This enabled the establishment of a strong kingdom which would remain intact and undisputed until the occupation by white settlers in 1896 (MacGonagle 2007).

In south-eastern Zimbabwe, the Hlengwe clan conquered by Soshangane traces its origin to Zari who migrated from Mozambique to Zimbabwe around 1600

(Bannerman 1980). Zari had several sons, the eldest of whom were Mihingo and Tshovani (with the latter founding the Tshovani dynasty). Mihingo had two sons, namely Chisa (who founded the Chisa dynasty) and Banga (who founded the Mahenye dynasty). The other Hlengwe chief in the Chiredzi District is Sengwe who is descended from Mantsena the grandfather of Zari and is located south of Runde River. There are disagreements on which of these chiefly dynasties is more senior. Chisa, whose chieftainship was downgraded by colonial settlers to headman, contends that Mihingo was senior to Tshovani and that, therefore, Chisa should be the senior figure in the current royal hierarchy. Chisa considers his current status as headman to be an anomaly that must be corrected. While he acknowledges common descent, Chief Tshovani requires the current status hierarchy to be maintained. Importantly, in the past, all of these dynasties, in harmony and cooperation, once inhabited the Gonarezhou and pursued their lives in the face of shared challenges.

7.5 Repression and Resistance

Of the Shangane dynasties, the Chisa of Gotosa community quickly gained a label as a disobedient people due to its vocal and open rejection of colonial encroachment in the Gonarezhou. On several occasions, the community mounted open confrontation with the colonial government which its members viewed as a direct threat to its age-old livelihood sources and strategies in their ancestral lands. The conflict first started in the 1890s when the community's land was identified by colonial officials as a Controlled Hunting Area prior to 1933 and it became more pronounced when the Chisa lands were quarantined as a tsetse fly selective animal elimination zone in 1962 (Mombeshora and Le Bel 2009). Both these developments prohibited the development of household livelihood strategies, including hunting, fishing, gathering, and cropping. The protests of the Chisa manifested in various forms, including open resistance to the game reserve scheme, disregard of imposed laws, poaching, grazing livestock in prohibited areas, and insulting wildlife officials. Defiance to colonial impositions was accompanied by threats of eviction during the post-1934 period (Tavuyanago 2017).

The revision of game boundaries in 1957 deliberately saw the downgrading of the Chisa chieftainship to a headmanship. The demotion was meant to punish Chief Chisa for opposing the Game Reserve project and for his general insubordination (Mombeshora and Le Bel 2009). It was also meant to disempower the entire community since a people without land of its own has no right to claim equality with others. Contrary to colonial expectations, the demotion further transformed the Chisa people into a tough, restless, and uncooperative nation for the rest of the colonial period. The people of Chisa were finally forcibly ejected from their Gotosa ancestral land and resettled in Chingoji in 1957, after they were given a 15-day notice to vacate Gotosa. The open refusal by the people of Chisa to move was to have major consequences in terms of household livelihoods, as discussed later in the chapter.

In 1960, overpopulation saw the colonial regime moving the people of Chisa back into the GNP, albeit to the Seven Jack area, just inside the park periphery. Two years later, in 1962, and in response to the tsetse fly outbreak, the people of Chisa were moved again from the Seven Jack area to the Ndali locale in the adjacent Sangwe Tribal Trust Land. A tsetse-control fence was erected along the Chivonja Hills, barring entry into the game park by the people of Chisa, who now struggled for pastures, could no longer hunt and were unable to have gatherings for their traditional practices (in their Gotosa lands). They were promised that they would return to the Seven Jack area after the elimination of tsetse flies—a promise that was never honoured as the area was afterwards leased to Ray Sparrow of the Lone Star Ranch who, ironically, converted it into a cattle-grazing area (Tavuyanago 2017). The loss of the Gonarezhou land and the livelihoods it offered was cemented in 1975 when the Game Reserve status was changed to a National Park, with all the Gonarezhou lands being incorporated into it.

In protest, some of the Chisa people crossed the border into Mozambique, and others joined the Karanga-speaking people in the neighbouring Ndanga District, or Chief Tshovani, while still others joined Chief Sengwe. Further, some people crossed the Save River into the now Checheche District.[3] For the Chisa people who chose to resettle in the Ndanga District, tribal animosities arose with the Karanga who accused the Shangane of overpopulation and stealing their lands, and for being backward and unhygienic. This animosity further complicated the Chisa people's capacity to integrate and forge alliances for livelihoods development. A significant number of people moved into nearby sugarcane and citrus plantations in Triangle, Hippo Valley, and Mkwasine, thus totally abandoning the notion of *emuti* (homestead) which is so revered in Shangane cosmology as the basis for household livelihood development.[4] The defiance of the people of Chisa, therefore, should be placed within the context of the broader liberation efforts across the country at the time (Tavuyanago 2017), with eviction from Gonarezhou virtually leaving the people of Chisa with no land on which to base livelihood activities. Indeed, every displacement to which the people were subjected resulted in property and livestock losses due to its hurried and violent nature as people resisted the move (Ndhlovu 2020).

At the height of Zimbabwe's national liberation struggle against colonial rule (1975–1979), the people of Chisa were moved into Protected Villages (called 'keeps') along the Save River, stretching from Ndali to Muteo via Rupangwana near the Jack Quinton Bridge. These 'keeps' were strategically meant to thwart the people's participation in the national liberation struggle. Survival in the 'keeps' was dependent upon the hand-outs distributed by the state and donor agencies. Households from Tshovani and Sangwe Tribal Trust areas, although also residing in the 'keeps', had the opportunity to continue cropping activities in their Tribal Trust areas to supplement the meagre donations received. On the contrary, the people of Chisa had no communal area to which to return. Thus, while in the 'keeps', they constantly offered their labour to the people of Chief Tshovani and Sangwe in exchange for wages or for pieces of land to cultivate for livelihoods. Some also created gardens in which they grew vegetables along the Save River, and the Machoka and Mkwasine streams, for personal consumption and for sale. The Save River offered fish as a supplementary

source of food although the catch dwindled each day due to overpopulation. The use of fishing nets and funnel traps were also prohibited, thus limiting the size of the catch. This placed further strain on the people of Chisa whose livelihoods assets continued to be exhausted—both by the ongoing liberation struggle and by personal sale to meet basic household needs such as food, clothing, and medication. In this context, the next section focuses on the changing livelihoods of the Chisa community over a long duration.

7.6 Shangane Livelihoods

The changing of Chisa livelihoods over a long duration can best be observed by paying particular attention to four periods in the nation's history: before colonialism; during colonialism; after independence in 1980; and after the infamous FTLRP in the 2000s.

7.6.1 Livelihoods Prior to Colonialism

The GNP area experiences harsh climatological conditions. It experiences two seasons: a wet season of an annual average rainfall of about 466 mm typically between October and March and a dry season normally between April and September (Gandiwa and Kativu 2009). It also has an average monthly maximum temperature of about 25.9 °C in July and 36 °C in January while average monthly minimum temperatures range between 9 °C in June and 24 °C in January (Gandiwa et al. 2011). Due to the harsh climate as well as traditional skills possessed by various assimilated clans, the Shangane developed pastoralist livelihoods and a subsistence mixed economy consistent with the conditions. This economy involved small-scale cropping, raising of livestock and flocks, fishing, hunting, and gathering of fruits and plants (Carruthers 1995; Gandiwa 2011; Ndhlovu 2020; Tavuyanago 2017). The Shangane became strategic crop producers specialising mainly in drought-resistant crops, such as sorghum (*mabele*), millet varieties (such as *mahuvu* and *mpowo*), and cassava. They, however, also excelled in maize (*xifake*), sweet potatoes (*muhlate*), and groundnuts (*timanga*) production which they adapted to the extremely hot weather and low annual precipitation characterising the Gonarezhou. Adaption included practicing crop rotation on dry lands, growing small grains that required little moisture, and pursuing irrigated riverbed farming (Tavuyanago 2017). Although persistent droughts and diseases compromised production efforts, the adaptation practices by the Shangane allowed them to excel in crop production, thereby forging a food security status at the communal level (Ndhlovu 2020). This evidence contradicts European narratives on the laziness of the Shangane as the major cause of poor agricultural activities (Alvord 1929).

The Shangane were also renowned *vahloti* (hunters), whose stalking and tracking skills were equivalent to those of modern soldiers (Parker 2006). There is a wide

variety of large herbivore species in the area, including African buffalo, giraffe, roan antelope, waterbuck, sable, zebra, blue wildebeest, elephant, and hippopotamus (Zisadza et al. 2010). The presence of bows and arrows (*vurha ne paxa*) in almost every Shangane home underlined the importance of hunting as a livelihood strategy for the Shangane (Tavuyanago 2017). Other instruments used for hunting included the assegai, sling shots (*xipelupelu*), and traps (*thaka*). Poison was also smeared on arrows for an instant kill. Hunters killed only enough game at a time to meet their immediate needs (Mavhunga 2008).

The Gonarezhou forest offered wildlife upon which they relied for food, medicine, and clothing. Hunting was a mobile task which entailed tracking the spoor, and it was a skill the training of which began in early boyhood. Before teenage years, every boy would be able to identify and interpret the implications of most game footprints. Starting off early in the morning, Shangane hunters relied on the spoor to lead them to game, hence the importance of starting off before the dew had dried (Junod 1927). The status of the spoor determined whether the animal should be tracked or not. Where there was no spoor to track, other means existed. The Shangane developed a symbiotic relationship with flora and fauna and would take cues from animals. When the hunter or any person got into the forest, he became part of it and was even able to communicate with animals through signs (Mavhunga 2008). Since the tsetse frustrated livestock rearing, wild animals were the major sources of meat and skins.

Fishing was also an important source of food. A number of rivers which are home to different varieties of fish run through the Gonarezhou—the Save, Runde, Mwenezi, Mutirikwi, Guluweni, and Chileji. Pools such as Tembohata, Chasuku, Chipinda, and Chivhileni, provided fish as well as a supplementary food source (Ndhlovu 2020). Various methods, such as the use of *vutavala* (fishing nets), *xivasa* (funnel traps), *xivejo* (fishing lines), and herbal poison (*Zombwe*) were used to catch fish. Women, in addition, used long nets (*masaka*) to drag fish to the shores (*ku kukuta*). Poison was used sparingly and subject to approval by chiefs who first needed to inform their ancestors prior to its use, which ensured that fish were not poisoned with abandon. It also protected the *zombwe* plant from overuse since it was fed to livestock during droughts, thus sustaining the physical capital of household livelihoods.

Further, the pastoralist Shangane were gatherers—an activity in which women excelled more than men. Women harvested *masonja* (mopane worms), baby birds, and ants, which they fried and dried in the sun. These would be eaten as a snack or with *vusva* (pap). Women also collected various edible tree roots and fruits. Marula (*mankanyi*) and palm fruits (*kwangwali*), in particular, were processed into wines used during get-togethers and ceremonies while *mabuwu* (baobab fruits) were used to make sour porridge (Ndhlovu 2020).

The Shangane reared livestock, flocks, and poultry. In fact, despite the existence of tsetse flies and diseases such as rinderpest, foot and mouth, and theileriosis, Rennie (1973) observes that the Shangane economy was largely based on livestock rearing rather than crop production. This is because, historically, the Shangane were in large pastoralists but, over the years, they engaged in crop production to diversify their livelihoods in the face of rampant animal disease and frequent droughts. Hence, the

Shangane excelled in livestock rearing, even in tsetse fly belts such as Malipati, as is the case with the Chisa of Gotosa (Garlake 1978).

The Gonarezhou provided not only food but also trees and grasses used to meet the Shangane people's physical capital needs, including farm agricultural equipment and shelter for people and livestock. The Shangane also discovered many salt pans that supplied them with iodine, collecting the earth, dissolving it in water, and extracting salt using processes of evaporation. The Gonarezhou offered good locations for circumcision schools (*ngoma* for males) and initiation schools (*khomba* for females) in which young men received training in multiple skills, such as hunting, farming, and self-defence skills tips, while young women received training on how to run future households. Shared natural assets such as pastures, trees, and water bodies were collectively protected from contamination and abuse. As well, chiefs mobilised their subjects to construct infrastructure such as roads and also to dig wells. These activities enabled the people to cooperate for their collective good. This sustained the Shangane social capital which they drew upon to survive in the Gonarezhou.

Traditional healers obtained medicines from the forest, thereby sustaining the Shangane's human capital, including labour, skills related to farming knowledge, and quality of health. Chiefs ensured social protection through the regulation of traditional health services offered by *sangomas* (traditional healers). *Sangomas* who endangered others were expelled or stopped from practicing, while those who displayed ability received recommendation, promotion, and fame (Ndhlovu 2020). The Gonarezhou lands, therefore, offered a generously diversified natural capital which the Shangane 'exploited' for their livelihood needs: housing and farming equipment, food, fuelwood, medicines, graveyards, pastures, and space for traditional functions. The land also defined their nationhood and citizenship.

7.6.2 Livelihoods Under Colonialism

Under colonialism, the people of Chisa continued to practice a number of their livelihood strategies, particularly farming. They were, however, prohibited to hunt as a livelihood strategy. Livestock movements were also now controlled as a result of the tsetse disease. Further assessments of the suitability of the Gonarezhou for human habitation resulted in the total eviction of the people from the area. The consequences of their evictions were dire, as households lost their livelihood means.[5] With the callous and hurried evictions, households left behind diverse assets (natural, physical, and social assets) on which their livelihoods were based. These included fields in which they practiced farming, *svithlati* (granaries) in which they stored food and farming inputs (such as seeds); *svifuyo* (livestock and flocks); and farming equipment, such as ploughs, cattle yokes, and plough chains, as well as ancestral graves which were the main source of unity and cooperation. Men also left behind game traps (*thaka*), bows, and arrows, fishing nets and rods which, although prohibited by colonial authorities, provided families with meat and fish for own consumption or for exchange with other goods (Ndhlovu 2020). Households also lost medicines

and traditional schools which nourished their human capital.[6] Women left hoes, grinding stones, mortar and pestles, clay pots, winnowing baskets, blankets, and clothes, among others, by which they ensured household livelihoods (Tavuyanago 2017). They also left rivers and lakes (natural capital) where they caught fish as a livelihoods strategy.

Overall, in losing access to Gonarezhou, the people of Chisa left behind the land that had provided them with food, shelter, and medicines for decades, a land which was the basis for their livelihoods and in which their fathers and umbilical cords were buried (Mombeshora and Le Bel 2009). They left behind a land in which their livelihoods and identity had been crafted over the years. In the Shangane cosmology, the burial site of the ancestors, as well as the land where an individual's umbilical cord is buried give people the duty and obligation to protect and defend that land.[7] The Shangane evictions in the Gonarezhou were, therefore, not only insensitive and callous but also traumatic for people whose livelihood sources and assets (gathered over many years under adverse climatological conditions) were being destroyed in a single day by colonial forces. The evictions not only shattered the Shangane's capacity to produce but also disrupted social cohesion and cooperation which are basic assets required for resilient livelihoods.

7.6.3 Livelihoods After Independence

The 'keeps' were dissolved in 1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence. The dissolution of 'keeps' saw people returning to their respective Tribal Trust Lands (now named communal areas). The people of Chisa had no land of their own to which to return, since their agreement with the District Commissioner of the Nuanetsi District (Allan Wright) to be offered their land back had already been undercut by the upgrading of the Gonarezhou from being a Game Reserve to a National Park. The Chisa people simply sojourned in nearby communal areas. With no natural capital of their own (land, pastures, and water sources, among others), and with their physical capital (livestock, farming, and hunting equipment) virtually depleted, the people of Chisa became the most vulnerable. The human capital (young able-bodied men and women) that was most needed to invent new livelihood strategies in the Gonarezhou area migrated to towns, but most crossed the border to work on South African farms to send remittances back home. Others migrated permanently, thereby undermining the social capital (social networks, affiliations, or cooperatives) that local households could have used to forge new ways of survival.[8] Those who remained cooperated with other members of communal areas to establish irrigation schemes. The only known successful example today is the St Joseph Irrigation Scheme in Rupangwana, while others either failed or did not even take off, such as the Machoka Irrigation Scheme.

7.6.4 Shangane and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

The main focus, after independence, is the post-2000 fast track period. The people of Chisa participated in the nationwide occupations from the year 2000 in which indigenous Zimbabweans moved onto white commercial farms, after which the FTLRP was implemented (from mid-2000). Affectionately named the Third *Chimurenga* (the ideological banner under which the programme was undertaken), the FTLRP emanated initially from grassroots initiatives which had, out of desperation and frustration, arisen to reclaim land dispossessed under colonialism. Led in part by the poverty-stricken *Svosve* community in Hwedza in Mashonaland East Province (Ndhlovu 2017), the occupations and then FTLRP were embraced by the people of Chisa as a cost-effective method of land acquisition. Teaming up with the inhabitants of Tshovani and Sangwe, the people of Chisa participated in the acquisition of the Sangwe and Fair Range farms. On the Sangwe, unlike in other nearby farms in the Chiredzi District (Fair Range, Chizvirizvi, Mhandamabwe, and Uswaushava) where the invasions or occupations were led by war veterans (Marongwe 2004), the invasion of the Sangwe farm was initiated by the inhabitants of the Sangwe communal area. They undertook this together with the people of Chisa on the basis of a long-standing dispute they had with Mr. Otterson, a white commercial farmer whose Wildlife Conservancy had fenced in the people's traditional sacred sites, a burial site for traditional leaders, and a sacred pool from which the people harvested fish as a supplementary source of food (Ndhlovu 2017).

At the national level, the FTLRP was meant to be undertaken in a short-circuited manner relying on domestic resources to acquire over 3,000 farms and redistribute them to indigenous blacks under the A1 small-sized model and A2 (commercial farming) fast track models (Utete 2003). At the district level in Chiredzi, a total of 7,598 people acquired land on a total area of 125,009 hectares under the FTLRP and benefiting about 6,009 males (71%) and 1,589 females (29%) (Marongwe 2004). There is no disaggregated data on the exact number of Shangane nationalities who acquired land under the FTLRP. However, there is evidence that some people of Chisa finally managed to acquire land as a physical asset which they could identify as their own. In this respect, Ndhlovu (2020) found that about 50% of the Shangane households on the Sangwe and Fair Range farms indicated that they were able to produce enough food for personal consumption on their plots. He thus argues that, although the FTLRP did not bring about redistributive justice in returning lost ancestral land to the Shangane in the GNP, it offered some relief in that households could now settle down, produce their own food, and enhance their livelihood status.

In terms of income generation, Ndhlovu (2017) notes that while sources of income had emerged, farming was not the major activity for the Shangane. Instead, only a total of 16.6% of Shangane households depended entirely on crop production on the Sangwe, while another 4.1% relied on livestock and poultry as a major source of income. The remaining participants in that study pursued the mixed economy

of Gotosa (Ndhlovu 2017). On the Fair Range farm, Chaumba (2006) discovered that, instead of farming, most households relied on off-farm activities for income, including: sales of fruit and vegetables, home-brewed beer, *marijuana* and firewood; war-veteran pensions; remittances; prostitution; poaching; traditional healing; and money changing. Muregerera (2009) also demonstrates that, at Sangwe, the sale of crafts, mats/baskets, and construction materials, as well as hunting were crucial income sources. While the production tendencies and levels of the Shangane do not translate into a meaningful contribution to the national economy, this should be seen in the context of a beleaguered community trying to forge and revive its lost mixed economy that flourished in the Gonarezhou prior to displacement. Chaumba (2006) also found that, while some farmers fared well at Fair Range, a significant number continued to sink steadily into poverty. While this evidence is disturbing, considering how agriculture was expected to transform livelihoods and boost the rural economy, it does expose the lack of context-specific solutions to the country's land challenges by the government which expected a pastoralist community to engage in full-time farming.

Another issue that highlights the government's lack of touch with the Shangane people is its disregard for social capital which, for minority ethnic groups such as the Shangane, is a livelihood asset more important than the acquired land itself. While multi-faceted, social cohesion is generally expressed under four main classes: social relations; task relations; perceived utility; and emotion. It is the degree to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion, but with self-interested motivation (Burns et al. 2018). It involves 'understanding the social infrastructure, institutions, customs, and material and non-material relations that either constrain or enable the individual in whatever pursuit they are engaged' (Murisa 2007: 2). On the Sangwe and Fair Range farms, social cohesion in the form of networks (political and communal), cultural norms, and other social attributes were found to have played huge roles in livelihoods development through promoting knowledge sharing and cooperation among households, thereby increasing productivity. Households engaged in ploughing, planting, weeding, and harvesting cooperatives (Chaumba 2006; Ndhlovu 2017). However, overall, social cohesion under FTLRP beneficiaries in south-eastern Zimbabwe is generally problematic (Ndhlovu 2020).

The FTLRP did not regard the different backgrounds, cultures, and beliefs of people when resettling them. The local people had initially successfully cooperated on basic issues relating to the occupation of targeted white farmland, including intimidating the former farmers not to reoccupy the land and pushing for recognition as new owners. Despite this, ethnic tensions were quickly revived between the Shangane on the one hand, and the Karanga and Ndau speakers on the other, as the latter groups viewed the former as foreigners who needed to focus on fighting for the restitution of their Gonarezhou lands. When the Shangane were displaced initially from Gonarezhou, some joined the Ndau and Karanga, thereby igniting contests for space. Hostility arose between the Karanga and the Shangane over the ownership

of land stretching from Chiredzi town to Zaka Jerera, which is inhabited by both ethnicities, but which falls under Chief Hlaisi Tshovani of the Shangane nation. When people were resettled at Sangwe and Fair Range, these issues were not considered of significance, thereby sustaining age-old tensions which in turn compromise the realisation of collective livelihoods development.

Identity and nationhood in the Gonarezhou had enabled Shangane clans to stick together and to cooperate as they developed their livelihoods through farming, hunting, and other activities that enabled them to survive. The cohesion and cooperation challenges witnessed on the Sangwe and Fair Range farms are very different from other FTLRP farms where beneficiaries were not victims of repeated land displacements and where ethnic issues are not at play. For example, using the numbers of farm networks and network sizes to measure social cohesion, it was found that social cohesion had greatly increased with the FTLRP in areas such as Mazowe (Chiweshe 2014), Mhondoro Ngezi (Mkodzongi 2013), Goromonzi, and Zvimba (Murisa 2007). The displacement of the Shangane nation from the Gonarezhou, therefore, did not only disrupt livelihoods and compromise their identity, as it also gave birth to a huge spectrum of integration and cohesion challenges which now affect other nations, such as the Karanga and Ndau, thus creating a vicious cycle of livelihood-based development challenges in the entire south-eastern part of Zimbabwe.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the livelihoods of the Shangane people, with a particular focus on the people of Chisa, in south-eastern Zimbabwe prior to their displacement from the Gonarezhou and then through their various relocations since the 1950s until the FTLRP of the 2000s. It shows how Chisa livelihoods changed continuously over a long duration since their original displacement following the declaration of their land as a Game Reserve in 1934. The original displacements, including during the 1970s, were part of a broader colonial project meant to deprive indigenous people of the use of their lands to disarm them socio-economically and politically such that they succumb to colonial domination perpetually. In their ancestral lands of Gonarezhou, and despite adverse agro-ecological conditions, the Chisa people had developed a vigorous mixed economy, forging ‘alliances with nature’ in constructing their livelihoods. The Gonarezhou land provided them with land for cropping, pasture lands, meat, fruits, and vegetables, as well as medicines. Its conversion to a Game Reserve (and later National Park) by colonial administrators was based on a distorted ‘metaphysical obligation’ to redeem the Shangane from the harsh conditions of the land. However, this served to disfigure and shatter their livelihoods while compromising their notions of identity and nationhood. The FTLRP of the 2000s, instead of bringing

about land restitution, actually pushed the Shangane further away from their ancestral lands. The result of this has been, as Fanon (1963: 175) would have called it, 'individuals without an anchor, without a horizon, colourless, stateless, rootless—a race of angels.'

Notes

1. NAZ: S914/12/1B, Acting Secretary, Commerce and Transport to Col. the Hon. Deneys Reitz, Minister of Lands, Pretoria, 'Gona-re-Zhou Game Reserve, National Park and Game Reserve Scheme, Government Proclamation Gazetted', 28 September 1934.
2. MRC: MS 22, Delineation Report on Ngwenyenye or Marumbini Headmanship and Community, p 87.
3. Informal oral testimonies by Shangane elders.
4. Informal oral testimonies by Shangane elders.
5. Informal oral testimonies by Shangane elders.
6. Informal oral testimonies by Shangane elders.
7. Informal oral testimonies by Shangane elders.
8. Informal oral testimonies by Shangane elders.

References

Adams A (2005) Beyond yellowstone? Conservation and indigenous rights in Australia and Sweden. In: Cant G, Goodall A, Inns J (eds) Discourses and silences: indigenous peoples, risks and resistance. University of Canterbury, Christchurch, pp 127–138

Alvord ED (1929) Agricultural life of Rhodesian natives. Native Affairs Department Annual

Bannerman JH (1980) A short political and economic history of the Tsovani, Chitsa and Mahenye dynasties of Ndanga, Chiredzi and Chipinge districts to CA.1950. National Archives, Zimbabwe Access No. 32514

Borgerhoff M, Coppolillo P (2005) Conservation: Linking ecology, economics and culture. Princeton, Princeton University Press

Brandon KE, Wells M (1992) Planning for people and parks: design dilemmas. World Dev 20:557–570

Brockington D, Igoe J (2006) Eviction for conservation: a global overview. Conserv Soc 4:424–470

Brockington D, Schmidt-Soltau K (2004) The social and environmental impacts of wilderness and development. Oryx 38(2):140–142

Bulpin TV (1967) The Ivory Trail. Books of Africa, Cape Town

Burns J, Hull G, Lefko-Everett K, Njozela L (2018) Defining social cohesion. Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT. SALDRU Working Paper Number 216

Carruthers J (1995) The Kruger National Park: a social and political history. University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg

Cernea MM, Schmidt-Soltau K (2003) The end of forcible displacements? Conservation must not impoverish people. Policy Matters 12:44–46

Chaumba JA (2006) Opportunities for and constraints on crop production within Zimbabwe's fast track resettlement programme: a case study of fair range estate, Chiredzi District, South Eastern Zimbabwe. University of Western Cape: PLAAS (Unpublished MPhil thesis)

Chiweshe M (2014) Understanding social and solidarity economy in emergent communities: lessons from post fast track land reform farms in Mazowe: potential and limits of social and solidarity economy. UNRISD, Geneva
DeGeorges PA, Reilly BK (2008) A critical evaluation of conservation and development in sub-Saharan Africa. The Edwin Mellen Press, New York
Fanon F (1963) The wretched of the earth. Penguin, Middlesex
Gandiwa E (2011) Wildlife Tourism in Gonarezhou National Park, Southeast Zimbabwe: Opportunities for Wildlife Viewing. J Sustain Dev Africa 13(1):304–315
Gandiwa E, Kativu S (2009) Influence of fire frequency on Colophospermum mopane and Combretum apiculatum woodland structure and composition in northern Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe. Koedoe 51(1):1–13
Gandiwa E, Magwati T, Zisadza P, Chinuwo T, Tafangenyasha C (2011) The impact of African elephants on Acacia tortilis woodland in northern Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe. J Arid Envi https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaridenv.2011.04.017
Garlake P (1978) The Kingdoms of Africa. Elsevier-Phaidon, Oxford
Junod HA (1927) The life of a South African tribe. Macmillan & Company, London
MacGonagle E (2007) Crafting identity in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. University of Rochester Press, Rochester
Marongwe N (2004) Masvingo provincial profile: Interrogating Viability Project. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) University of Western Cape, Bellville
Mavhunga CC (2008) The mobile workshop: Mobility, technology, and human-animal interaction in Gonarezhou (national park), 1850-present. PhD thesis: The University of Michigan
Mkodzongi G (2013) Fast tracking land reform and rural livelihoods in Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe: Opportunities and constraints, 2000–2013. PhD Thesis. School of Social and Political Science. University of Edinburgh
Mombeshora S, Le Bel S (2009) People-park conflicts: The case of Gonarezhou and Chitsa community in South East Zimbabwe. Biodiversity Conservation 18:2601–2623
Mugandani MW, Makarau A, Chipindu B (2012) Re-classification of agro-ecological regions of Zimbabwe in conformity with climate variability and change. Afr Crop Sci J 20(2):361–369
Muregerera H (2009) The importance of communal rangelands: a case study of three districts in Zimbabwe. Fort Hare University (unpublished PhD thesis)
Murisa T (2007) Social organisation and agency in the newly resettled areas of Zimbabwe: the case of Zvimba District. Monograph, Harare: AIAS Monograph Series
Ndhlovu E (2017) An analysis of household livelihoods under the fast track land reform programme in Chiredzi, Zimbabwe (MA dissertation) University of South Africa
Ndhlovu E (2020) Land acquisitions and relocations of the Shangane in Zimbabwe: disintegratory or transformative? Africa Insight 49(4):55–71
Parker J (2006) Assignment Selous Scouts: inside story of a Rhodesian special branch officer. Galago Books, Alberton
Poirier R, Ostengren D (2002) Evicting people from nature: indigenous land rights and national parks in Australia, Russia, and the United States. Nat Resour J 42:331–351
Rai J (2019) Displacement versus co-existence in human wildlife conflict zones: an overview. J Geogr Env Earth Sci Int 19(4):1–16
Rennie JK (1973) Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism amongst the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1935. PhD thesis, University of Chicago
Tavuyanago B (2017) 'Our fathers and grandfathers were born here…' Shangaan eviction experiences from the Gonarezhou National Park, 1957–1968. Historia, 62:46–67
Utete CMB (2003) Report of the presidential Land Review Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. Charles MB Utete Vol. 1: Main Report to His Excellency, The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Harare: Government Printers
Wolmer W (2007) From wilderness vision to farm invasions, conservation and development in Zimbabwe's South-East Lowveld. Weaver Press, Harare

Zisadza P, Gandiwa E, van der Westhuizen H, van der Westhuizen E, Bodzo V (2010) Abundance, distribution, and population trends of hippopotamus in Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe. South African J Wildl Res 40(2):149–157

Emmanuel Ndhlovu is a peasant scholar-activist. He does research on peasant livelihoods, food security, migration and the political economy of development. He holds a Ph.D. in Development Studies obtained at the University of South Africa.

Chapter 8
Land, Displacement, and Livelihoods Strategies Among the Nambya in North-Western Zimbabwe

Oppenheimer Chiweshe

Abstract This chapter examines the lives and livelihoods of the Nambya people of Hwange district in north-western Zimbabwe. This entails detailing their origins, convoluted history, interactions with other African ethnicities (such as the Ndebele), the barrenness of the lands occupied, and the involuntary and coerced displacements to which they were subjected. Hwange is regarded as unproductive land as it is characterised by sandy soils, and hot and dry conditions, such that pursuing livelihoods there is deeply problematic. Despite this, the Nambya devised diverse survivalist strategies to make a living out of the arid environment, and this entailed adapting their agriculture to this marginal environment. The Nambya and their livelihoods were affected by numerous waves of displacements. For example, one wave saw the Nambya being displaced for making way for the mining of coal and another involved the Nambya being removed to make way for Hwange National Park. In each case, broad-based development was not forthcoming in the district and the Nambya did not benefit in any significant manner. This is demonstrated by a sweeping historical analysis from pre-colonial to post-colonial times.

Keywords Hwange · Displacements · Livelihoods · Coping strategies · Nambya

8.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the livelihoods of the Nambya people located in north-western Zimbabwe, how they were affected by waves of displacements during the colonial period and, briefly, their post-independence lives and livelihoods. This entails a focus on the Hwange area and the ways in which this area was regarded as a wilderness where no productive resources for human habitation existed. The chapter demonstrates the diverse survival strategies devised by the Nambya under colonialism in making a living in an environment deemed inhospitable. After considering the origins of the Nambya people and their establishment within the Hwange area, the

O. Chiweshe (✉)
ZADRT, Harare, Zimbabwe
e-mail: oppenheimertale@gmail.com

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_8

different waves of displacements experienced by the Nambya, and the effects of these displacements, are brought forth. These displacements were influenced by the changing priorities of the colonial government, including the establishment of the Hwange National Park and the broader history of racial land alienation in the country. After independence, there has been no significant improvement in so far as the livelihoods of the Nambya are concerned, despite development projects initiated by the Zimbabwean government and non-governmental organisations. Because of this, the Nambya people have shown significant agency in constructing post-colonial livelihoods under highly vulnerable conditions.

8.2 Research Methodology

This chapter was written from primary published literature, field notes, interviews, and documentary materials which included correspondences, official operational records, and annual and monthly Native Commissioners' reports. Since the period of the study is situated primarily in the colonial period, the National Archives of Zimbabwe was utilised to access the pertinent historical reports and correspondences. Unstructured oral interviews, based on the life history approach, were carried out in order to probe deeply into the daily experiences of those who were evicted. Interviews were conducted when the researcher went to the field in November 2018 and June 2020, and they entailed a semi-structured and informal format (Patton 2002). The researcher preferred this to structured interviews as unstructured interviews facilitate an atmosphere conducive to intimate conversations about past lives. Snowball or chain sampling was used in order to identify well-informed Nambya people with knowledge about dislocations and livelihoods. This technique was used to locate the elders who have knowledge and history of the colonial period and Nambya culture.

8.3 Origins of the Nambya People

The Nambya people are said to be a breakaway group from the Changamire Rozvi dynasty (Ncube 2004). It is alleged that one of the Rozvi Mambo's sons (named Dhende Sadunhu) decided to set himself up as an independent ruler and this infuriated the Rozvi Mambo; as a result, the latter ordered the abduction and execution of Dhende. Under these circumstances, Dhende was able to escape with a considerable following early in the eighteenth century, heading northwards towards the Mafungabusi plateau, then turning westwards following the Kana River until they got to Lumbi in Tonga country where they stayed for some time (Beach 1994: 49). They later continued with their migrations and reached today's Hwange area. When they arrived in the Hwange district, they settled at a strategic hill which they named Shangano near the junction of the Lukosi and Chibungo rivers. The Nambya settled on hill tops for security reasons, so that they could spot any intruders or enemies

from a distance. They announced their arrival in the area through the building of a stone-walled enclosure at the top of a hill. The stone enclosure was a sign of wealth, prestige, and authority of a ruling class. Their first capital was called Shangano.

In this regard, the Nambya did not find the land which they inhabited empty. The area was inhabited already by, for example, the Leya, Dombe, Dama, and Haka; and, under such circumstances, wars had to be waged in trying to assert Nambya control. Most of the existing groups submitted peacefully and without resistance, if only because Dende had a strong army which made his authority difficult to challenge. Before settling in Hwange district, the Nambya were called the Nyai. Oral traditions indicate that Dende, after conquering the district, changed his name to Hwange (related to *kuhwanga*, or 'to mend') and his people became the Nambya based on the word *kunambisa* ('to smoothen') Ncube (2004). Their language came to be known as Nambya as well.

8.4 Nambya Coping Strategies in Hwange

Hwange was not a desolate wilderness devoid of human presence and unproductive activities. Contrary to this widely accepted perception commonly set out in the colonial archive, evidence gathered for this study demonstrates that though the Hwange landscape was characterised by sandy soils and erratic rainfall, the occupiers of this area were not simple victims of it. Rather, during this historical period, they devised diverse livelihood strategies to make a living out of such a seemingly unproductive environment. In doing so, they accessed and used 'any number of resources that they identif[ied] as important for their well-being' (Owuor 2006: 11).

The land which was occupied by the Nambya upon their arrival in Hwange in north-western Zimbabwe offered only limited patches of good land for cultivation. Most of the Nambya, like their neighbours (the Tonga), were able to adapt their agriculture to the marginal environment by growing their crops in river valleys and developing preferences for certain crops depending on local suitability for growing specific crops (Ncube 2004: 46). In Nambyan society, bulrush millet was grown in abundance and was the staple crop followed by sorghum and maize, and these crops became essential to their socio-cultural lives as well. After harvesting, the grains were pounded into fine flour used to prepare thick porridge which formed the staple food of the Nambya people, and this porridge remains crucial to Nambyan diets today. The flour was also used for brewing traditional beer which was consumed during social gatherings like work parties and many rituals.

Among the many Nambya rituals that required beer was the rain-making ceremony (*Kutebula ivula*). Beer for rain-making ceremonies was brewed by elderly women, strictly in the postmenopausal stage as it was believed menstrual blood was unclean. Beer was consumed by both male and female elders during the ceremony, usually held annually between September and October. Some of the beer was put in clay pots and left in the sacred place. The elders believed that it would be consumed by the spirits of the land who guarded the area against enemies. The Nambya interacted

with their physical space in establishing areas where other ceremonies were held. For instance, sacred places were established for ceremonies like *Mande* or *Kubatwa nompempo* involving possession by the ancestral spirits of a spirit medium. During such ceremonies, the spirit medium would predict drought, good rainy seasons and the outbreak of diseases. These ceremonies involved visiting ancestral gravesites, so that the Nambya embedded their histories in their landscape in creating a cultural landscape. Apart from *Mande*, *Chipelu* was another ceremony, taking place after the death of a Nambya member in order to bring home the spirit of the deceased. Also involving visiting gravesites, this ceremony would take place over seven days and, on the seventh day, drums would be played throughout the whole night, with people merry-making and drinking traditional beer. The continuous performance of these many ceremonies saw the Nambya maintaining a close link with their land and helped in maintaining kinship ties. Local Nambya chiefs were crucial in all aspects of Nambya culture through their co-ordination of rituals performances, rain supplication ceremonies, and control over the general populace.

Family connections and kinship networks were essential for mobilising resources. Traditional grain crops tied the Nambya people socially through teamwork needed in everyday life, in particular during the planting and harvesting seasons. Work parties thus were organised during high labour-demand periods of the year like sowing, weeding, and harvesting. On the day of the work party, an indigenous brew from sorghum or millet flour was made available to the people (usually neighbours) to consume while working. The need for more suitable land for crop cultivation (of bulrush) saw the Nambya moving from or abandoning their first capital (Shangano) (Tauyanago 2002). Besides food crop cultivation, evidence suggests that, as a way to survive, the Nambya at some point were involved in cotton cultivation (sometime before the Mfecane period from 1815 to 1830s) (Beach 1980: 264).

The landscape on which the Nambya lived abounded with wild animals and, because of this, their crops in some instances were damaged or destroyed by game, usually towards the harvest period. At the same time, because wild game existed, hunting and gathering was also another source of food that could supplement agricultural produce. Any harvested grain would be stored for as long as possible before use, but at least one explorer (Livingstone) noted that in most cases the grain stored after each harvest was almost exhausted before the next harvest because of storage problems (Livingstone 1865: 221). Livestock (cattle and goats were also kept). Although rainfall was erratic in Hwange, the area was favourable for livestock production. The thick forests were full of mopane trees and provided nutritious leaves for cattle and this encouraged people to keep large herds of cattle.

Livestock was crucial in the day-to-day life of the Nambya as cows and goats provided milk and meat. Besides this food function, livestock acted as a stored surplus of wealth that could be exchanged for surplus crops from other areas in the event of local scarcity. Thus, due to the challenges of poor harvest and poor storage, animal husbandry existed as the main insurance against scarcity of food throughout the area. Indeed, the slaughter of livestock in times of food shortages occasioned by crop failure became the major solution to the woes of food shortages. Although cattle in particular were important for a number of reasons like draught power, paying bride

wealth, and for indicating economic status, they were particularly essential in times of food shortages/drought Schmidt (1992: 16–20). During times of food shortages, people who possessed cattle were left with no option than bartering the cattle for grain with people from neighbouring communities.

However, the spread of tsetse flies around the 1830s is said to have affected livestock in the Nambya state in a significant manner. In 1855, Livingstone observed that the people of the region could not keep any livestock except goats due to the widespread prevalence of tsetse fly (Livingstone 1865: 25). Besides agriculture and hunting, the Nambya engaged in iron smelting and trade in order to sustain themselves. The Nambya iron trade before the Ndebele invasions dominated the upper-middle river areas of Gwembe. This was supported by the archaeological discovery of heavy Nambya hoes; the iron trade, though, was affected by the Ndebele invasions in the 1850s.

8.5 Effects of the Ndebele Invasions on Nambya Livelihoods

The year 1850 onwards was characterised by succession disputes. Lusumbami the Nambya chief is said to have been killed by the Ndebele in 1853 (Ncube 2004: 52). It is argued that Mzilikazi gave orders to have Lusumbami killed because he suspected Lusumbami of playing off the Ndebele and Kololo in a sporadic war (McGregor 2009: 29). There had been a feud between Mzilikazi and Sebetwane (king of Kololo) over the control of the Nambya and Tonga in the middle Zambezi valley, hence they apparently competed for allegiance of those residing there. The major attraction and reason for raids among the Nambya and Tonga was the seizing of herds of cattle. The Nambya and Tonga are said to have realised this vying for control and they decided to pursue a bi-partisan policy, and thus Mzilikazi suspected that Lusumbami was also scheming with the Kololo. In these clashes, hundreds of people were killed. Under these circumstances, Wange Chilisa (who came into power after the death of Lusumbami) was forced to flee across the Zambezi in October 1862. In 1862 after Wange Chilisa and his people fled, James Chapman and Thomas Baines travelled through the region of today's Hwange National Park, and they mention the presence of burnt-out houses arising from the Ndebele raiding (Haynes 2002; Ncube 2004). Not all the Nambya crossed the Zambezi, as some remained scattered in the rough hilly country near the mouth of the Deka River. The Nambya, having lost their land and form of life, now had to find a way to survive.

Due to the Ndebele invasions, the Nambya lost their control of the iron trade, with this trade now dominated by the Tokelo iron trade from the Lozi kingdom (Ncube 2004). However, while on the north bank of the Zambezi, the Nambya under Hwange Chilisa did engage in trade. Thomas Baines observed that Ovimbundu traders came from Angola to Hwange Chilisa in the 1860s. As well, Livingstone noted that Chikunda traders visited Hwange Chilisa to buy slaves. This is supported by Henry Stabb who came across a Nambya village in 1875 where he observed that the people around the village had plenty of Portuguese cloth, beads, and guns (Ncube

2004). Leach (NAZ, N9/1/11) also indicates that, in 1869, the north bank Nambya were engaged in weaving, which means that they continued with cotton cultivation across the river as a way to survive. Further, as noted by Blockey (NAZ, N3/24/35), the Nambya were involved in the ivory trade, with the trading house being located on the Zambezi River at the mouth of the river Deka opposite the Hwange village on the north bank. Traders came as far away as South Africa to buy ivory (Ncube 2004).

Over two decades after fleeing the Ndebele, the Nambya crossed back to the south of the Zambezi River, around 1888 and 1893 (McGregor 2009: 29). The major reason for the return of the Nambya during this period was in fact the Ndebele invasion on the north bank and the defeat of the Ndebele by the white settlers who entered from South Africa. During these movements, the Nambya incorporated the Leya and the Tonga through intermarriages, leading to a fusion of cultures. McGregor (2009) argues that, while on the north bank, Nambya leaders never forgot their home on the south bank and they did not succumb to Tonga assimilatory pressures (NAZ S2929/5/7).

8.6 The Nambya and the Early Settlers

The coming of British colonialism affected the social networks and livelihood strategies of the Nambya. Before the rulership of the British South Africa Company and Native administration was established in the Hwange (then, Wankie district), Europeans set up farms by force, thereby dispersing the Nambya (NAZ S707 W193/12). For instance, a Geise is said to have acquired two extensive farms on the Nambya's land in the upper Deka area, and another farm was surveyed on other Nambya land in the far west near Victoria Falls (Ncube 2004: 75). The European settlers who were present during this period recommended the forced removals of all Nambya who were living on what had been now designated as European land, to areas where a Reserve would be established. Most of the Nambyas who were evicted moved to the Nyantuwe valley, which was mountainous and relatively dry, leading to significant pressure on the little arable land available. What made the removal of Nambyans from the European farms most problematic was the fact that most of the farms were not put to productive use after the forced removals.

Giese was appointed as a government pass officer over the Hwange district and he was expected to register the Nambya and others in the district. In trying to achieve this, he introduced the use of rations (NAZ S707 W193/12). More specifically, because they were alienated from their lands, the Nambya were forced by harsh conditions and shortage of food to settle on or near European farms and work for the white settler in return for rations. Giese stated that: 'Rations reclaimed 'Bushmen,' in ordinary years any bushmen wishing to settle down would find no difficulty in obtaining rations in return for their services' (NAZ S707 W193/12). The displacement of the Nambya was further worsened by the pegging of coal concessions after the discovery of major deposits of good quality coal in the Hwange area. In 1895, Giese pegged 1,036 square kilometres of southern Nambya land that lay between the Deka and Lukosi rivers (the Bumbusi area) as coal claims on behalf of Mashonaland Agency.

When the development of the railway line and Hwange coal concession area began in 1903, all the Nambya who lived within the concession area were moved to the east of it and settled in the Lukosi and Nyantuwe area. The only way the Nambya could survive was to work at the Hwange colliery or nearby farms.

At the same time, the livelihood prospects and strategies of the Nambya were affected adversely by the need for labour on the mine and railway construction. The object of colonial taxation was to force Africans into the labour market and sell their labour to earn their tax money—the greatest requirement of the Rhodesian mining industry in those early years was a supply of cheap African labour (Ncube 2004). Hence, as a way of ensuring a supply of labour, Nambyans were meant to pay hut tax. The hut tax had been inaugurated in Southern Rhodesia by Ordinance No. 5 of 1894, which demanded each household to pay a tax of 10 shillings for every hut in the homestead (this was to be paid in cash or kind). An extra 10 shillings were charged if the man was polygamous for each extra wife's hut, with polygamy very common among the Nambya. Most Nambya people resented paying tax. A record of tax payments from the Native Commissioner indicated that only seven pounds was collected from the Nambya (NAZ S2929/5/7). In a bid to escape working in mines and elsewhere, the Nambya sought to raise the required tax money by selling their herds of small stock and also through the sale of small-leaf tobacco (which they grew at a very small scale) to the mineworkers at Hwange coal mine and the Ndebele villages in Nyamandhlovhu (Ncube 2004: 69). Also, Nambya women from the surrounding villages were selling traditional opaque beer to the workers at the colliery, despite the fact that the Kaffir Beer Ordinance had made it illegal to trade in beer at the colliery and railway compounds. Van Onsleen (1976: 7) highlights as well that, during the colonial era, women sold large quantities of grain and fresh produce to the mine and, by so doing, earned sufficient income for tax and other purposes. In a bid to get the Nambyas under their total control, the colonial officials appointed chiefs who were loyal to them (such as Nemanga and Nekatambe).

In his work, Theodore Downing notes that displacements are associated with resettlement effects, defined as the loss of physical and non-physical assets, including homes, communities, productive land, cultural sites, and social structures, networks, and ties (Downing 2002: 3). This notion is pertinent in trying to understand the effects of continuous evictions on the Nambya, as land alienation resulted in the loss of access to natural resources, cultural sites, and social structures. Typically, the colonial government never considered where those who were evicted were to be settled or they would provide alternative places to settle which could not support their agricultural activities. As one interviewee exclaimed:

> The Europeans chased our forefathers like dogs; they were forced to take refuge in the Rocky Mountains which could not support any agricultural activities. At the same time, those who wished to settle near the Settler farms were subjected to forced labour and had to submit to the European farmers. Those who wanted their freedom settled on the mountains without any help from the colonial officials. (Interview with Clemence Chinyati, Mpumalanga residential area, Hwange, 1 November 2018)

In 1914, the Native Reserves Commission demarcated 317,481 acres of extremely hilly and waterless country (that had only a small proportion of land suitable for crop

cultivation) as Hwange Reserve. The Nambya population was opposed to moving into the reserve, given their knowledge of its arid environment. A land rent imposed on the Nambya (who had refused to move into the Reserves) was met with overt resistance and it failed to achieve the desired goal of driving the Nambya into the reserve (Ncube 2004). Prior to colonialism, the Nambya were sparsely settled and they followed the system of shifting cultivation, rarely using the same piece of land for an extended period of time (Robertson 1969). Further, they were familiar with a genuine form of communal tenure, where individual land ownership was alien to them and where the chief owned the land. This land and farming arrangement did not exist under the colonial reserve system.

In addition to this, in 1928, 4,000,000 acres of unalienated land was demarcated as Hwange Game Reserve (Davison 1971: 343). The game reserve took up the whole southern part of Hwange district and all of the Nambya land south of the railway line between Dete and Lukosi rivers. This establishment of the game reserve saw the Nambya being forcibly removed from the north of the railway line in 1928 and resettled in the Native reserves. The declaration of the game reserve reduced the size of the land which was not alienated in the district from 4,286,000 acres to 286,000 acres, and this was soon followed by the formation of the Deka Native Purchase Area in 1930 (Ncube 2004). Making the area a game reserve saw the Nambya being relegated to the margins of the park while the settlers increasingly occupied the surrounding area. It was recommended by the government that the Nambya be removed from the margins of the park so that they would become a ready labour force to work on farms and the mine.

As a consequence of the white settlers' ongoing penetration into Hwange district, including via commercial farms, the game reserve, and the Wankie colliery, the Nambya were continuously being alienated from their land, thereby losing their political autonomy as well. In 1930, as land dispossession was taking place, the chiefs of the local African people were called together by the colonial administrators. Despite the fact that the area received low rainfall, some of the Nambya chiefs like Nekatombe and his people lived in an area within the confines of the game reserve, around Tshakabika, Mzizi, and Nehimba springs, a good place to raise cattle and plant millet—they were told to 'go back to where they came from,' which, in the eyes of the colonial government, was the Nata River area which is in Botswana at the present day (McGregor 2009: 131–136). However, they refused to go since it was not where most of them had come from. The government relented somewhat, and said they could go in the other direction (i.e. east), as long as they crossed the railway line and left behind the lands where new farms for white settlers were to be pegged (McGregor 2005). In the end, Nekatombe's people moved eastwards and settled in the northern hills in the Inyantue River region. Some of the evicted people though had other ideas; they headed to the newly established white farms such as the one at Sinamatella, on the river originally called Lumbambala, where the white farmer was prepared to receive them as a ready labour force (NAZ A 3 2/8). They lived on the farms and cultivated fields for white farmers as a way of securing a living.

In spite of the fact that the Nambya were not completely barred from visiting and maintaining their past cultural–social places, they became alienated from their

previous lands and landscapes. For instance, when the Nambya wanted to visit Bumbusi for ritual purposes, they could apply for permission to do so from the Park authorities. In this context, one Nambya elder noted that:

> My grandfather was bitter about how the European treated them with regards to visiting the graves of their ancestors, performing ceremonies at sacred sites. They were treated like foreigners as if they were not the real owners of the land. (Interview with Nhanhanga F, St. Marys, Hwange, 03 November 2016)

This alienation also affected their livelihoods. Hence, through the establishment of the game reserve, the Nambya people lost the option of hunting wild game as colonial administrators laid down rules forbidding snaring, mass-driving of game, and the digging of game pits, which were the methods mostly used by Nambya hunters. After the evictions, the Nambya had two choices in order to survive in the new unfamiliar landscape: they could go to work for strangers as wage labourers, or they could stay in their unproductive Native reserves and struggle to survive. In fact, having fewer cattle now, and with minimal stored food and without access to their ancestral fields, many sought work in the white man's mines, farms, and warehouses, or on the rail line.

As well, the town of Wankie grew up around the colliery, and both the colliery and the town itself tended to employ foreign Africans rather than locals, including the Nambya (Phimister 1994). Most notable was the coming in of foreigners who came as employees at the Colliery. In an interview, a Nambya member named Sikula noted that:

> We were being disadvantaged because we had very little influence in our own area. We had very little say, even the language spoken in the Colliery was foreign. When job opportunities came, they were not given to us because those with important positions were from Zambia and Malawi. Also our language and culture was dying. (Interview, Maxwell Sikuka, 17 March 2001) (quoted in McGregor 2005: 328)

When local Nambya people from the Native reserves (later called Tribal Trust Lands) went to Wankie for whatever reason, including to buy or sell goods, they had to use a non-Nambya (or foreign) language and found themselves stigmatised as uncivilised and backward. Government administrative policies compounded this problems. The north-western part of the country had always been part of Matabeleland and, as colonial authorities consolidated Southern Rhodesia's supposedly two dominant 'tribes' and languages, they did so to fit prior administrative boundaries (Doke 1931), Thus, Ndebele continued to be central as a vernacular language throughout Matabeleland.

Missionary activities were also gaining pace from the 1930s. In 1935, St. Marys Mission centre was established in Hwange and this saw the development of evangelism. Missionaries imbued with thenineteenth and twentieth Century Western attitude of 'bringing light to the dark continent' sought to instil the concept of God and moral rules of conduct and civilisation in the minds of the Nambya. This included Spanish missionaries who came through to the district in the late 1940s. The conversion of the Nambya met with some resistance as they were told to do away with their traditional religion. However, some Nambya were converted to Christianity.

The fact that Hwange is located in the north-western part of Zimbabwe meant that the area was strategically important during the war of liberation (the Second *Chimurenga*). This was mainly because Zambia was independent, and it served as the launch pad for the guerrilla forces of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). With the escalation of the war in the mid- 1970s, the social networks and livelihood strategies of the Nambya were profoundly disrupted. In this regard, the Rhodesian government created protected villages as part of its counter-insurgency campaign. Displacement into protected villages had detrimental effects on people's ways of securing a living, including crop cultivation. This is because, by isolating the guerrillas from the local population, the government also separated people from their crop fields—at times, this led to food shortages and starvation in Rhodesia's rural areas (Chadya 2005). Agricultural activities were interrupted by dawn-to-dusk curfews and the often long distances between the crop fields and the Protected Villages, thereby reduced the time that Nambya and other villagers could work in their fields. Hence, although the colonial government claimed that protected villages were created to protect the civilian population from the brutalities and food demands of the guerilla insurgents, and other devastating impacts of the war, the fact remains was that, protected villages undermined the villagers' ways of securing a living.

8.7 Nambya's Survival Strategies Post-Independence

After independence in 1980, the Native Reserves/Tribal Trust Lands became known as communal areas. The Nambya continued to live on these lands, which could not yield much in the way of harvests, certainly without expensive inorganic fertilisers which few farmers can afford. Historically, rains within the Hwange district are unpredictable and the soils often stony, and climate change has put further stress on agricultural livelihoods. From the mid-1980s onwards, Nambya people had to combine food production with diverse ways of generating income like beer brewing, making charcoal, repairing shoes, queuing for food aid, undertaking casual wage-labour, receiving remittances and pension payments, and selling livestock.

The Hwange Colliery mine remains the life-blood of Hwange district, providing employment to over 3,000 people (Machoma 2017). The many infrastructural and social services now existing in the area (including schools and hospitals) were established in large part to offer services to colliery employees, their families, and the nearby villages. However, of late, Hwange Colliery has been in sharp decline owing to deficient management practices following the takeover of the majority shares by the government during the period from 2000 (through the gradual introduction of the indigenisation policy). Interviewed workers and community members reveal significant changes in their lives in Hwange over time due to the scaling down of colliery operations. For instance, there was once a welfare department run by the colliery company providing support for orphans, sponsoring social activities, and giving out Christmas presents each year.

As it stands, locals are usually employed at the colliery on short-term contracts as general-hand workers which do not give them any sense of job security. Furthermore, the contract workers are not paid on time and, at the time of the fieldwork, they had not been paid in six months. One interviewee, who has been working at the colliery company since 1992, claimed that they had gone for over four years without getting their salaries (Interview with anonymous worker on 20 June 2020 at Hwange Colliery). Failure by the company and contractors to pay their workers has had a huge effect on the entire Hwange community, including the business sector. Further, only a few Nambya locals are employed by either the power company or the coal mining company. In most cases, these companies prefer outsourcing workers from as far away as Harare and Bulawayo, leaving the locals with no concrete job opportunities. The absence of meaningful alternative livelihoods (apart from coal) is a major problem in the area, and it has led to illicit activities such as petty crime and prostitution.

The attainment of independence witnessed the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with the main aim of rural development. Hwange became one of the favourite destinations of NGOs because of inadequate infrastructural development, unemployment, and climatic conditions which affected food production. The NGOs in Hwange include World Vision, Intengwe, and Caritas Zimbabwe (European Union 2014). In a bid to improve the food security and livelihoods of the local communities, food items have been distributed by these NGOs, including maize, sorghum, millet, beans, cowpeas, and cooking oil. Besides food items, income-generating projects have been introduced into the study area. Although irrigation schemes were initiated by the government, the lack of necessary inputs and maintenance has inhibited their functionality. One interviewee (Mr. Muleya) indicated that NGOs like World Vision helped in reviving the irrigation schemes and irrigation gardening projects, thereby enhancing food supply among the communal areas of Jambezi and St. Marys (Interview with Mr. Muleya on 6 June 2020 at Hwange Colliery). The gardening projects are watered by borehole water provided by World Vision, hence helping to solve the water crisis within the area.

In also trying to resuscitate livestock production in the area, there is a goat breeding project run by Caritas Zimbabwe in Hwange. Caritas has provided male goats which are being circulated for breeding purposes among a defined group of households. With the study area being arid and having little or no grazing grass in many places, goats by their nature are the most suitable livestock (Makiwa et al. 2017). In and of themselves, these projects have not provided Nambya households with meaningful cash in hand. Projects without substantial financial benefits are insufficient as cash is required for the local monetary economy. Because of this, men tend to delegate participation in these projects to women and children as they search for sources of cash income.

There are other projects being run by organisations such as Cosv, Lead Trust, and Lubancho House. Their projects seek to address food and nutrition insecurity challenges faced by households in the Hwange area. They seek to increase food access through sustainable livelihood choices and more diverse food production techniques, therefore improving household sustenance by way of increasing agricultural yields, enhancing diet, generating income from surplus production, and creating viable and

enduring links between beneficiary farmers and the market. The main component of the intervention involves increasing small grains productivity alongside Conservation Agriculture techniques. These projects are not inclusive as they are targeted at specific vulnerable groups (for example, persons living with HIV, orphans, and widows).

Currently, the Nambya replies on multiple sources for accessing food and earning income. These include own crop production, livestock production, remittances, wild food sales, purchasing food, payments in cash or kind, gifts, and food aid. Combined, crop and livestock production are the most important, including vegetable sales from their gardens and irrigated areas. In most cases, though, households rarely own cattle and they rely upon goats and chickens as a food and income source. Labour and self-employment activities are essential for acquiring cash. Self-employment among the Nambya comprises a range of activities which includes firewood and grass collection, carving, construction work, the sale of handicrafts and petty trade. However, the harvest of wild products is by far the most common self-employment activity. Very vulnerable members of Nambya communities (for example, the aged and orphans) are exposed to chronic levels of poverty, and hence the need for NGO support.

The operation of shebeens, taxi/minibus transport services, vending, and cross-border trading are new survival strategies adopted by the Nambya living within the Hwange township. Women from the nearby villages have joined the vending trade in Hwange town. They became part of the vendors who occupied the space available at the Colliery 1 bus terminus. Vending was an immediate option for trying to secure a living for those who had some capital to buy goods at a wholesale price and re-sell them to the public. It is mostly undertaken in places regarded as illegal by the city authorities—in particular, in front of shops, and on the pavements in the central business district of Hwange. Selling firewood has also become increasingly visible, but this entails the use at times of child labour and disruption of learning since children perform this during school days when they are supposed to be attending classes. The advantage of proximity to labour markets in South Africa and Botswana has seen some Nambya migrating to these countries. This is an increasingly important aspect of the Nambya household economy, as having someone working elsewhere provides the basis for remittances.

Overall, the general Nambya community is bitter about being neglected by the government and the companies within the region. Thus, despite the area generating electricity that powers other parts of Zimbabwe, the majority of the households use candles for lighting and firewood for cooking.

8.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the lives and livelihoods of the Nambya people of Hwange district in north-western Zimbabwe, with a pronounced focus on the colonial period. It detailed their origins, convoluted history, interactions with other African ethnicities (such as the Ndebele), the barrenness of the lands occupied, and the involuntary and coerced displacements to which they were subjected. The Nambya and their livelihoods were affected detrimentally by numerous waves of displacements. For example, one wave saw the Nambya being displaced for making way for the mining of coal and another involved the Nambya being removed to make way for Hwange National Park. These interventions, involving the establishment of capitalist enterprises and wildlife sanctuaries, failed to bring about any meaningful socio-economic development for the Nambya. As a result, even up until, the Nambya struggle to pursue livelihoods beyond the survivalist stage. In this way, their ethnic minority status remains firmly fixed within the broader Zimbabwean political economy.

References

Beach DN (1980) The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900–1850: an outline of Shona history, Africana Publishing Company, New York

Beach D N (1994) A Zimbabwean past: shona dynastic histories and oral traditions, Mambo Press, Gweru

Chadya M.J (2005) The untold story: war, flight and the internal displacement of rural women to Harare During the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, 1974–1980. PhD Thesis, The University of Minnesota

Davison (1971) Report on Hwange game reserve. In: Ford J, The role of the trypanosomiases, in African ecology. Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 343

Doke C (1931) Report on the unification of the Shona dialects, Southern Rhodesia Government Printer, Salisbury

Downing T. E (2002) Avoiding new poverty: mining-induced displacement and resettlement. International Institute for Environment and Development, Report no. 58

European Union (2014) Livelihoods diversification programs in Hwange and Binga districts, Final Evaluation, Flippo Fossi-Consultant

Haynes G (2002) The forest with a desert heart: Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe. Hwange Research Trust, p 216

Livingstone D (1865) Narrative of an expedition to Zambesi and its tributaries and the discovery of Lakes Shirwa and Nyasa, 1858–1864. John Murray, London

Machoma S (2017) Environmental impact assessment report for Hwange

Makiwa R et al (2017) The effectiveness of non-governmental organisations in rural livelihood development: the case of Hwange East in Matabeleland North Province, Zimbabwe. Scholars J Arts Humanit Soc Sci 5(3):202–208

McGregor J (2005) The social life of ruins: sites of memory and politics of a Zimbabwean periphery. J Hist Geogr 31(2):316–333

McGregor J (2009) Crossing the Zambezi: The politics of landscape on a Central African Frontier, James Currey, Suffolk

National Archives of Zimbabwe, S2929/5/7: Report on, The Hwange Tribal Trust Land Communities: Hwange District, Chief Wange

National Archives of Zimbabwe, A 3 2/8, folio 129
National Archives of Zimbabwe, N3/24/35 Native Commissioner Hwange to Superintendent of Natives Bulawayo
Ncube GT (2004) A history of Northwestern Zimbabwe 1950–1960. Mond Books, Kadoma
Owuor OS (2006) Bridging the urban-rural divide: multi-spatial livelihoods in Nakuru town, Kenya. African Studies Centre, Leiden, p 11
Patton MQ (2002) Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
Phimister I (1994) Wangi Kolia: coal, capital and labour in colonial Zimbabwe 1894–1956. Baobab books, Harare
Robertson N (1969) the saga of soil conservation in tribal trust lands in Rhodesia. NADA 10(1): 1–20
Schmidt E (1992) Peasants traders and wives: shona women in the history of Zimbabwe 1870–1939. Baobab, Harare
Tauyanago B (2002) Renamo war and it's impact in South Eastern Zimbabwe, 1982–1992. M.A Thesis, University of Zimbabwe
Van Onsleen C (1976) Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900–1933. Pluto Press Ltd., London

Oppenheimer Chiweshe graduated with a Master of Arts in African History from the University of Zimbabwe. He is currently working for a local research company (ZADRT) in Zimbabwe. His research focuses on land, displacements and livelihoods, but other research interests include gender and environmental history. He is looking forward to starting his Ph.D. studies in 2022.

Part III
Crisis, Livelihoods and Ethnicity

Chapter 9
Letting Them Starve: The 2008 Food Crisis and Marginalisation of the Tonga of Binga in Zimbabwe

Codelia Govha Dhodho

Abstract The Tonga of Binga District faced a severe food crisis in 2008 which caused mass starvation, given in particular the Zimbabwean government's ban on the distribution of relief food after the contested presidential elections. This chapter examines the long-term marginalisation of the Tonga people and its contribution to the food crisis and the Tonga's responses to the crisis. It traces events after the involuntary displacement of the Tonga from the banks of the Zambezi River in the late 1950s and their ensuing neglect by both the colonial and post-colonial governments. The political and economic challenges in the country from 2000 to 2009 pushed the Tonga to the edge of starvation. While non-governmental organisations (NGOs) distributed food aid to the Tonga post-1980, this led to dependency as the people abandoned their traditional coping mechanisms thereby weakening their livelihood resilience. Further, the Zimbabwean government argued that NGOs were in a regime-change alliance with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with strong Tonga support for the MDC. The government banned NGOs from providing food aid to the Tonga during the 2008 drought and, leading the Tonga to fall back on their traditional food crisis coping mechanisms, notably wild foods.

Keywords Tonga · Binga · Marginalisation · Food crisis · Coping mechanisms · Wild foods

9.1 Introduction

This study identifies and examines the marginalisation and neglect of the Tonga people and their livelihoods by the Zimbabwean government and how this contributes to their impoverishment, with particular reference to the food crisis among the Tonga in Binga District in 2008. At this time, there was mass starvation in Binga because of poor harvests due to drought and the government's decision to ban relief food aid in the context of broader political contestations in Zimbabwe. The Tonga people make

C. G. Dhodho (✉)
Department of History, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
e-mail: dhodhoc@gmail.com

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_9

up most of the population in Binga District which lies in the Zambezi Valley in the north-western part of Zimbabwe. Living in nearby districts as well, the Tonga are an ethnic minority group whose lives and livelihoods have been a constant struggle due to their adverse treatment by both the colonial and post-colonial governments (McGregor 2009: 140). Marginalisation for the Tonga is both a process and a state of discrimination, based on their ethnic identity and status as well as their spatial location along the country's border (Mowat 2015), such that Tonga people have also been pushed to the periphery of the nation and away from the centre of socio-political power (Mashingaidze 2013; Manyena 2013).

This chapter argues that traditional food crisis coping mechanisms are a significant basis for survival of marginalised communities, particularly the Tonga of Binga. It examines how the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis between 2000 and 2009 threatened the food security of the Tonga of Binga and analyses how the protracted food aid and the politicisation of this aid weakened their resilience to the food crisis. In doing, it highlights the agency of the Tonga and how living off wild foods saved them from starvation.

9.2 Research Methodology and Research Site

The Binga District is a marginal area consisting of minority ethnic groups located in the northwest of the country along the border with Zambia. About 58,000 Tonga-speaking people were evicted from the banks of the Zambezi River between 1956 and 1958 following the construction of the Kariba Dam during the colonial era. The majority were resettled in Northern Rhodesia while an estimated 23,000 were resettled in Binga District in Southern Rhodesia (Colson 1960). Most of the people on the southern bank of the Zambezi River lived at the upper end of Lake Kariba in chiefdoms of Binga, Siachilaba, Sikalenge, Siansali and Sinakoma (Weinrich 1977: 14). This study of Binga District focuses on Tonga people living under some of these chiefdoms. They are largely illiterate because there are few schools in the district. They make a living through cultivation of drought-tolerant crops, goat-rearing, fishing, crafts and petty trading. There are very few formal employment opportunities, and the people possess only minimal livelihood assets.

As a case study, a qualitative research paradigm was adopted to select, interpret and analyse evidence obtained from secondary and fieldwork sources. Oral testimonies were collected in Binga District in December 2020 using in-depth interviews, as evidence about the Binga food crisis in 2008 is not well reported or documented. The in-depth interviews with Tonga villagers took place specifically in the Sinakoma, Siachilaba and Binga chiefdoms of Binga District. These included seven women and four men whose ages ranged from twenty to seventy years, who provided narratives of their experiences after displacement up to and including the 2007/08 food crisis. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with two health officials at Binga hospital and two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leaders at Binga

Centre. Real names are used for all interviewees in the chapter, as they consented to being openly identified. Some of the oral evidence was obtained through telephonic interviews due to Covid-19 virus restriction regulations in Zimbabwe.

9.3 Context

Like all indigenous people, the Tonga people were excluded from participating in the political and economic affairs of the colonial state. Further, they had their own specific and unique experiences and challenges under colonialism. Most dramatically, this entailed their involuntary and forced displacement from the banks of the Zambezi River following the construction of the Kariba Dam in 1958. They were violently evicted from their lands along the Zambezi River and those who resisted were killed by Rhodesian soldiers (Howarth 1961: 73). The soldiers violently shot and killed eight men and wounded many people in Chipepo village in 1958 when they resisted eviction (Tremmel 1994: 31). The police also burnt huts and arrested thirty Makaza villagers in Chief Sinakoma's area who refused to leave the river when Lake Kariba started to expand (McGregor 2009: 38). Particularly disturbing was that the Tonga were simply dumped in an arid environment with no compensation forthcoming from the state. As a result, the people lost access to and control over crucial resources necessary for making a living, such as alluvial soils and water, as well as fish from the new Lake Kariba formed. The colonial government turned its back on the hardships of the Tonga people in not restoring any of their past entitlements to the Zambezi River and its shoreline.

The people were resettled in a harsh and hostile environment that was not fit for human settlement, and this left them with few opportunities to craft a living (Colson 1960). Dam-induced displacement affected detrimentally their livelihoods and made meeting their food needs a major challenge. None of the crucial assets and capabilities necessary for constructing and pursuing sustainable livelihoods (Ellis 1999; Scoones 1998) were available to the Tonga post-displacement in Binga. Binga District is in agro-ecological Region V which receives less than 650 mm of rainfall on average annually. The Tonga people thus began to face immediately the challenge of perennial food shortages due to persistent drought and erratic rainfall patterns. In addition, the poor sandy soils on the Zambezi plateau were not conducive for farming, despite the new centrality of agriculture to displaced Tonga in Binga (Reynolds and Cousins 1993: 47). Moreover, the proliferation of wildlife in the district made farming risky due to day and night crop raiders such as birds, baboons, buffalos and elephants. The region was infested with tsetse fly which made rearing livestock for food a serious problem, with cattle, sheep and goats dying of trypanosomiasis (Weinrich 1977: 21). Availability of adequate food for survival was also constrained by the state's prohibition of hunting and fishing after forced resettlement, which could have provided them with sources of cash as well as food.

Despite all these formidable challenges to livelihoods after resettlement, notably chronic food shortages, the Tonga survived for more than two decades up until

independence in 1980 without any external assistance. The colonial government did not provide them with relief food to supplement their poor harvests after the inundation of their well-watered lands with the damming of the Zambezi River and simultaneous formation of Lake Kariba (Colson 1960: 204). As well, there were no international or local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) of any significance during the colonial era which could distribute food aid. Hence, the Tonga had to find ways of supplementing their meagre harvests by using "traditional" food crisis coping mechanisms.

The term "traditional coping mechanisms" describes the temporary strategies instituted historically to minimise the risk of losses, for example, crop losses due to drought and to manage and limit the effects of food shortages. The Tonga's traditional coping mechanisms included intensive cultivation of alluvial riverbank fields, hunting, fishing and gathering wild foods. However, following displacement, they lost their riverbank fields and were prohibited from hunting and fishing, and this undermined their way of making a living on the drought-prone Zambezi plateau (Colson 1971). They had to be innovative and create new coping mechanisms which could somehow increase the prospects of a reasonable harvest in Binga District by practising extensive shifting cultivation, intercropping, and staggered planting as agriculture became their main livelihood (Interview with Sialubbe, in Sinakoma, on 21 December 2020). They also defied the ban on hunting and fishing, illegally killed animals for food and regularly guarded their fields from wild animal crop raiders. Further, they lived on "famine foods" during periods of total crop failure (Scudder 1971). These famine foods were mostly unpalatable and less nutritious forest foods which were only eaten during times of severe food shortages.

Overall, as a regional study shows, the food crisis coping mechanisms of people in Southern Africa are shaped by the local context such as the socio-cultural, economic and political factors embedded within communities (Schrimpf and Feil 2012). Soon after Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the Binga District was identified as a major food-shortages area that needed food aid because it was one of the poorest and underdeveloped regions in the country (McGregor 2009). This led to the proliferation of NGOs which started to continuously distribute food to the people in the district on an annual basis. After the formation of the MDC in 1999 and the electoral challenge it posed to the ruling Zimbabwe Africa National Union—People's Front (ZANU-PF) party, food became increasingly politicised. The NGOs were interpreted by the Zimbabwean government as in a firm alliance with the MDC in a regime-change strategy, with food aid being used to bolster MDC support in rural areas. This had serious food insecurity implications for the Tonga. For instance, in 2008, the politicisation of food aid during national elections led to a temporary ban on food aid distribution in the Binga District. Coupled with the drought in the area, this pushed the Tonga into a condition of absolute destitution. In not sitting back and waiting to die, the Tonga in Binga fell back on their historically configured indigenous knowledge and coping systems by surviving on wild foods, a food-crisis coping mechanism that had supported them for centuries before their forced resettlement.

9.4 Factors Contributing to the Tonga Food Crisis in 2008

From colonialism onwards, the Tonga people became vulnerable to chronic poverty and severe food shortages due to deprivation and denial of access to key resources. The general region where the Tonga reside is endowed with rich resources but the people have lived in abject poverty without access to water, electricity and fish from Lake Kariba, as well as wildlife and tourism opportunities (Mashingaidze 2013), including in the Binga District. Food shortages and food insecurity challenges for the Tonga were pronounced in 2008, and this section details three key factors contributing to the Tonga's food crisis in this year.

9.4.1 National Political and Economic Crisis

The Tonga people's food crisis in 2008, and their lack of resilience to it, can be largely blamed on the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis from 2000 to 2008, as adverse conditions in the country impinged widely on both urban and rural livelihoods (Manyena 2009). Deepening political polarisation and contestation between the ruling ZANU-PF party and the MDC opposition, along with a marked economic decline from the year 2000, were key characteristics of the systemic crisis, which likely reached its nadir in 2008. Though the economic decline began in the 1990s under the influence of a neoliberal structural adjustment programme, the fast track land reform from the year 2000 was undoubtedly central to the post-2000 economic crisis, leading to a shrinkage in the agrarian and national economies. The government-led fast track programme redistributed land from a minority of white farmers to black Zimbabweans without compensation for the reclaimed land. The global community, as well as both international and local NGOs, condemned this programme for its gross violation of human rights, with targeted sanctions being imposed by Great Britain and the United States in response.

The decline of the economy from 2000 to 2008 led to massive declines in the production of key agricultural crops such as maize and wheat, with the fast-track resettled farmers unable to cover the production losses arising from the undermining of the white commercial agricultural sector. The large white-owned commercial farms were parceled out into A1 small plots as well as A2 medium scale commercial farms which were allocated to black farmers. With only minimal if any state support, the resettled farmers on both A1 and A2 farms could not meet the national demand for food because they lacked capital and other key agricultural resources, with most A1 farmers relying on rain-fed agriculture (like their counterparts in the communal areas) and prone to risks of crop failure. Economic shocks in the country were compounded by climate change and the ensuing successive droughts from the year 2000 which ravaged the Southern African region more broadly. The Meteorological Services Department in Zimbabwe recorded that there were mild or serious droughts in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 which deepened the food crisis

as the country became a net importer of foodstuffs such as the staple food of maize (Nangombe 2015). In part at least, Zimbabwe had the ability to respond to droughts prior to 2000 but the fast track land reform programme collapsed and incapacitated the national agricultural system (Manyena 2009: 112).

The post-land reform economic downturn led to deindustrialisation, loss of formal employment and a massive rise in the informal economic sector, hyperinflation and shortages of foreign currency, which in turn increased the likelihood of shortages of food, fuel and other imported goods (Madimu 2019). The local currency in fact collapsed due to the spiraling inflation and this further affected the capacity of urban and rural households to purchase essential commodities (Raftopoulos 2009). Those on the margins of society, including the Tonga, suffered the most. Certainly, in the context of ongoing poor harvests, Tonga people typically depended on buying mealie meal every year to supplement these crop failures. During the 2002/2003 nationwide drought, for instance, many rural households in Binga had to barter for grain using livestock, because of shortfalls in subsidised food aid relief from government as well as the temporary ban on Save the Children (UK) to distribute food in the district.

International NGOs responded to the deepening agricultural crisis in the country by intensifying their distribution of relief food to the Tonga during successive years of drought and crop failure to avert starvation. Food aid therefore became a more reliable food source for Tonga households in meeting their food needs, compared to farming, in the drought prone area of Binga, where they also often spent months sleeping in fields guarding crops against elephants as well as scaring birds and baboons from destroying their crops during the day.

9.4.2 Drought and Dependency Syndrome

The Tonga survived successive droughts from the second year of forced resettlement using traditional coping mechanisms which both increased food production and sustained communities during periods of food shortages. There were droughts in 1959, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1968, and 1978, 1980, and 1982, but the people survived without accessing any drought relief food from the colonial government (Muyambi 1980: 137). However, their traditional food crisis coping strategies were affected by the influx of protracted emergency food which poured every year into the district in the post-independence period, notably from 1983. National media first drew international attention to Binga by publicising the district's leading status as a hunger-prone area during the 1982/3 nationwide drought (McGregor 2009: 155). This publicity led to an influx of international NGOs which set up various development projects and started issuing out relief food aid. Since 1983, NGOs such as Save the Children (UK), Adventist Development and Relief Agency Zimbabwe (ADRA), and Catholic Agency for Development (CADEC) have been distributing food in all of Binga District, and every year, because of chronic food shortages due to frequent periods of drought and famine.

This provision of long-term food aid significantly affected food production among the Tonga, as evidenced by the 2008 food crisis when households and communities had literally nothing to eat. More than 90% of the people in Binga were so food insecure that they received emergency food aid every year (Maclaine 2006; World Commission on Dams 2000). The NGOs brought relief rather than development aid, which largely failed to empower the Tonga to deal with the challenge of pervasive food insecurity. The pouring in of food aid entrenched poverty among the Tonga people as the NGOs regarded food insecurity as a technical problem that could be solved by regular distribution of food handouts—without addressing the root causes of the problem which continued to threaten livelihoods. As Schrimpf and Feil (2012) argue, the distribution of food aid (even in times without food crises) tends to lead to a dependency syndrome such that people become incapable of maintaining sustainable food security mechanisms (Schrimpf and Feil 2012). At the same time, the Tonga were regularly labelled as lazy by the Shona and Ndebele people due to their dependence on food aid, as if they sought to exploit donor food as a panacea for their food insecurity (Manyena 2013). In fact, the incapacity of the Tonga to pursue meaningful and resilient livelihoods in the barren and game-infested district of Binga, without access to their traditional ways of coping during times of food crisis, left them with no option but to rely on food aid. Their livelihoods in fishing and hunting had been decimated by displacement and resettlement, hence they now regarded food aid as a food crisis coping strategy.

9.4.3 Politicisation of Food Aid

The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe peaked in 2008 with the highly contested and controversial national parliamentary and presidential elections. By the beginning of 2008, an estimated nine million people were facing severe hunger in Zimbabwe, as the national granary was empty (WFP Annual Report 2008). The pertinent parastatal, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), had been importing maize and wheat to meet the increasing demand for food in the country. However, due to shortages of foreign currency, the parastatal was not able to import sufficient maize to meet the demand for grain in the country, as witnessed in 2008.

The GMB had a monopoly on the sale and distribution of staple grains in the country as the government had banned the private sector from importing and selling maize since 2001. To alleviate starvation of vulnerable rural populations, the government launched a subsidised maize distribution programme. The level and figures of vulnerability of households, districts or provinces was determined by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC). However, in 2008, the committee did not carry out surveys because of financial constraints as resources were channelled towards the presidential elections (ZIMVAC 2009). Therefore the extreme vulnerability of the Tonga during that year was largely not reported and this affected the delivery of food to the district.

To add to this, the GMB subsidised maize was used to support political objectives and largely distributed to districts that supported and voted for the ruling party during national elections. The Human Rights Watch reported that the government manipulated the GMB food for political gain as perceived supporters of the opposition were denied access to maize (Relief Web 2007). Binga District was perceived as largely supporting the MDC party which received significant numbers of votes in both Binga North and Binga South constituencies during national elections from the year 2000. The MDC officials interviewed in Binga pointed out that very few people were card-holder members of ZANU-PF hence they were not legible to receive the GMB maize, even during times of crisis. This caused critical shortages of maize and mealie meal as only the GMB could legally import food and distribute it throughout the country.

The politicisation of relief food also implicated international NGOs which were offering emergency food aid in the country and, in the end, this caused chronic food shortages in Binga. These NGOs were at loggerheads with the government, as the former were reluctant to provide food aid and agricultural implements to those in need in fast-track resettled areas. This is because of the on-farm violence and violation of private property rights which formed part of fast track land reform programme. Organisations such as Christian Care and World Vision did, however, distribute food in drought-prone regions of the country (outside of fast track areas). But the government sometimes accused them of using food handouts to influence people to vote for the main opposition party, the MDC (Muderedzi 2017).

There had been very little development in Binga after independence because of neglect and negligence by the government, and hence the Tonga people had not been voting in any significant way for the ruling party (Mashingaidze 2013). The ruling ZANU-PF party blamed NGOs, as part of a foreign-driven regime change agenda inclusive of the MDC, for using food handouts in Binga to gain and consolidate support for the opposition party. As well, the governor of Matabeleland North for over a decade after the formation of the MDC blamed the Tonga's support for the opposition party as the main reason for their poverty, implying that the central government refrained from using public funds for Binga's development because of its political affiliation to the MDC (*Zimbabwe Daily* 2015). This is part of a broader national project of uneven development propagated by the ruling party since 1980, with Matabeleland broadly speaking being penalised for its anti-ZANU-PF stance.

The work of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in the Binga district likely increased the tension between the government and NGOs in the region. The CCJP, as part of the Catholic Church which spoke out strongly about the Gukurahundi in the first half of the 1980s, implemented a programme from 1996 to 2005 to address the root causes of poverty in Binga through increasing awareness of the local people's developmental rights and entitlements (Manyena 2009: 118). It was blamed for stirring the pot and being stridently opposed to the ZANU-PF government when the Tonga started questioning the government over their developmental neglect in the district. The work of CCJP was allegedly associated with the opposition MDC party when its presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai won more than 27,000 votes out of 37,000 in Binga, accounting for the largest votes in any rural constituency in

Zimbabwe for the presidential election in 2002 (Manyena 2009: 138). CCJP was also linked to long-term food aid distribution in Binga through CADEC.

In using liberation war-like language, the ZANU–PF-led national government called most NGOs operating in Binga at the time as sell-outs, leading to the absence of the GMB subsidised food aid distribution in the district during times of dire need. Indeed, the food shortages in the country during the 2002 period of drought and starvation were particularly pronounced in Binga which had no government aid, with some relief food received mainly from Save the Children (UK) and CADEC. The government temporarily banned Save the Children (UK) from distributing food in Binga for five weeks following the 2002 elections (Meldrum 2002). Again, during the 2005 Senate elections, the government temporarily barred food aid distribution in the district as it accused NGOs of "playing politics with food" and "using food handouts to influence our people to vote for imperial lapdogs, the MDC" (Muderedzi 2017: 5). However, in averting a major food security disaster, food aid distribution resumed soon after the elections.

There was a mild drought throughout the country during the 2006/07 and 2007/08 cropping seasons which, however, was severe in Binga due to long dry spells and the inability among most Tonga to harvest any grain. There were widespread food shortages in the country but the government became more repressive and intolerant as it concentrated mainly on retaining power (Madimu 2019). However, the food crisis in Binga was largely state-induced. The district voted significantly for the MDC party in both the parliamentary and presidential elections. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, MDC received 16,335 votes (85% of the votes) against ZANU-PF's 2,946 (15%) in Binga North Constituency, accounting for the largest voter turn-out for the MDC in any rural constituency in Zimbabwe (Manyena 2009: 138). The Presidential elections were also held on 29 March 2008 but results were only released on 2 May 2008 with the opposition candidate (Tsvangirai) winning but with no overall majority—he won with 47.9% and Robert Mugabe had 43.2%, necessitating a run-off election. The lead up to this election was marred by violence and intimidation of voters by ZANU-PF's militias, leading to the withdrawal of Tsvangirai from the run-off. Meanwhile, the government through the Minister of Home Affairs banned all NGOs on 5 June 2008 as it once again used food as a political weapon by blaming them for the loss of the ruling party during the 2008 elections (Shoko 2008). Binga Rural District Council effected this ban immediately as the NGOs were seen as part of the political agenda. This took place at a time of massive food insecurity in the Binga District, when there was no government relief aid either.

9.5 Living Off the Wild

In the context of these factors, there was the possibility that the Tonga would gradually abandon their traditional food crisis coping mechanisms, or that a generation of Tonga people might experience a fundamental loss of the knowledge and practice of these mechanisms which had been passed down through generations. For instance, by 2008

there was a generation among the Tonga in Binga which was not acutely aware of these coping strategies because they were born, grew up and got married at a time when food aid was being distributed annually.

Despite this, the Tonga in Binga during the crisis year of 2008 were able to draw upon historical ways of coping with food shortfalls. In particular, gathering wild foods provided them with cheap food which could sustain them, if only on a survivalist basis, until the next harvest. Most studies show that wild foods played a more important role in the food economy of the Tonga than has generally been recognised in any agricultural society (Scudder 1971: xi; Reynolds 1968; Cliggett 2005; Muyambi 1980: 137). Scudder (1971) adds that the Tonga tended to gather even more plants than the hunter-gatherer Khoisan of the Kalahari Desert to enhance food supply.

A number of chiefdoms, such as Binga, Sinansengwe, Sinakoma Siachilaba, and Sikalenge in Binga North, experienced major food shortages from the 2006/07 agricultural season because of the drought in the area. The 2007/08 drought worsened food shortages. The people could not get sufficient food from fishing in areas designated for fishing camps and cooperatives on the Lake because of restrictions by the government. Illegal hunting of big game such as buffalo, elephants and hippopotamus for food could not sustain households and communities because of conflict with game rangers. Tonga people underwent untold suffering as basic commodities such as bread, cooking oil and flour were being sold on the informal market only and in foreign currency; and these were even hard to come by, for most people who had nothing to sell. Their common response to "good morning" greetings became *twabuka a nzala*, which means that they were always hungry, without knowing where, when and how they would obtain their next meal.

When all the harvested sorghum, millet, cucumbers and watermelons were finished around Ma 2008, villagers ate sorghum and millet husks with the hope that food aid would soon be restored. Tonga in Simatelele under chief Siachilaba who had not used the agricultural inputs received from CADEC during the previous farming season because of drought, crossed the Lake using canoes and sold their maize seed and fertiliser in Zambia and bought grain with the cash received (Interview with Judith Munenge on 19 December 2020 at Simandala, Siachilaba). As hunger persisted, other women simply washed the maize seed and boiled it for food as children fainted from hunger. Most families could not afford or access a single meal per day, and they skipped days without eating. The situation became so dire that people survived on picking up the droppings of goats which they then dissolved in a cup of water and drank just to remain alive.

The food crisis further impoverished the Tonga who possessed cattle, sheep and goats as they bartered livestock for grain. Unscrupulous Shona-speaking businessmen from other provinces brought truckloads of maize or mealie meal to business centres such as Manjolo, Siachilaba, Sianzundu or Muchesu which they exchanged for livestock. Families lost their valuable assets as they tried to cushion themselves against hunger. In Sinansengwe, a goat was exchanged for only five to ten kilogrammes of mealie meal and a cow for fifty to one hundred kilogrammes of mealie meal (Ndlovu

2010: 14). Famine led to many deaths of young children and the elderly due to malnutrition as Tonga households no longer received monthly packages of maize, beans and cooking oil from donors.

The food crisis at the time was complicated by the fact that there was no transport coming into Binga Centre, and to areas such as Tyunga, Kariangwe, Mabobolo, or Simatelele, from outside, and hence the district literally became cut off from the rest of the country for many months. There was also no local radio nor television transmission and telephone lines had not been repaired and working for years. It thus became difficult to transmit information about the presence of hunger and famine in the district to government authorities even if they would listen, and it also inhibited people from travelling outside the district to buy food if indeed they had the resources to do so. Those who could afford to purchase food had to canoe across the crocodile-infested Lake to Zambia. The situation was so desperate that, when there was an outbreak of cholera in Siabuwa, the Ministry of Health officials at Binga District Hospital could not communicate with the Provincial epidemiological response team in Bulawayo for three weeks. They had to call them via the neighbouring country Zambia when many people had lost their lives due to the epidemic (Interview with a health official on 22 December 2020, Binga District Hospital).

The food crisis of 2008 thus required indigenous knowledge systems and coping mechanisms for most Tonga communities and households to survive. In this light, gathering wild food became one of the key adaptation strategies in response to the food crisis. It is quite common that wild foods for rural Zimbabwe communities are mainly used to supplement the diet during periods of severe stress (Zinyama et al. 2010). However, foraging in Binga during the 2008 food crisis was done to survive, and not for supplementing any crop harvest and relief food which were not available. Women in particular were responsible for food provision because of the Tonga's matrilineal inheritance practices and polygamous marriages. Women were able to draw upon their indigenous knowledges so as to unlock the potential of rarely used wild foods. Most families had to survive on a wide variety of wild fruits, tubers, vegetables and insects which could assist in coping with hunger and contribute to nutrition.

Tonga communities mobilised themselves along kinship relations to gather food as they shared knowledge of edible flora and fauna from the forest. There was widespread exploitation of wild foods as the elderly women who were knowledgeable of edible roots crucial for survival accompanied groups of younger women and children into the bushes and forests. They displayed a level of assertiveness as they even looked for food from the ecologically rich but dangerous Chizarira National Park which teemed with elephants, buffalos and lions. Out of sheer desperation, these old women would even climb tall trees to access the precious fruits for survival (Interview with Kandimba Mudimba on 21 December 2020 in Sinakoma). There were also some bitter and poisonous roots, tubers and fruits which were collected and well prepared for purposes of fighting off starvation. The older women also showed their ingenuity as they passed on their knowledge of collecting and preparing toxic edible roots and bulbs as a buffer against hunger to the younger generations.

Scudder (1971: 29) notes that, traditionally, during periods of severe food shortages, the Tonga used to identify and use certain plants and roots which they normally did not consider edible, cooking them only as famine food for survival. Though the Tonga in 2008 were indeed forced to eat whatever food they could obtain, they had to find certain types of wild food which contained carbohydrates that would supplement their traditional sorghum or millet staple foods. They thus collected tiny seeds of wild grasses in the mountains and pounded them to make flour, but this provided very little food. As noted by Cliggett (2005: 4), this was a traditional famine food but it would take at least three hours to collect enough grains to make a bowl of food for just one person.

The *busikka* fruit (Tamarindus indica) which the people used in the past on an annual basis was widely used during the food crisis. During better years, the Tonga mixed the pulp of tamarind with some millet porridge to make a nutritious beverage called *muvwipwa.* However, there was no grain to mix with the pulp during the 2008 famine. Instead, they used ash from Mopani trees to make a type of porridge called *chintobola* which though caused diarrhoea. The Tonga have always argued that this meal was only prepared as a survivalist strategy when the situation became particularly desperate (Tremmel 1994). The people also collected the pods of the apple-ring thorn (Acacia albid)—which ripened between September and November—when there was nothing in the fields. Women and children gathered these (*maunga*) pods in large quantities for their bean seeds, but they contained hydro-cyanide which is toxic. Scudder (1971: 28) confirms that, before their forced resettlement, the Tonga relied on these pods as famine foods. They had to carefully prepare them for twenty-four hours to remove the toxicity. They boiled the bean seeds to remove the hard outer cover and later reboiled them with ashes during the night, before soaking them in clean water (Interview with Chipego Msaka on 20 December 2020 in Sikalenge). Seeds of blanket mahogany (*nsikili*) were boiled as well as beans and eaten to abate hunger during 2008, as were *sozwe* fruits and seeds although they were unpalatable.

Additionally, the Tonga resorted to eating dangerous toxic tubers which they dug from the forest, again a practice undertaken only during times of critical food shortages. They dug the plant called *Amorpholous abyssinicus* until they obtained a white potato-sized tuber which was cut into small pieces and washed (Maclaine 2006: 62). This willowleaf *(kabombwe*) tuber had to be boiled throughout the night to remove all the poison, and tamarind leaves were added to purify it and improve the taste. This plant intoxicated people, as they became drunk and slept as a way of conserving energy and forgetting about food for a while (Tremmel 1994). Tubers like morning glory (*lusale*) and *bwidi* were also boiled and eaten to fight against hunger, and they boiled the sweet roots of *masangu* and drank the juice for energy. Women and children spent considerable time looking for edible leaves, barks and stems from trees which they boiled with salt and ate. The most popular drought-resistant bushes included the *nkomba* plant which grew to about half a metre in height and whose leaves were used to prepare *telele* soup for energy to alleviate the effects of famine. The Tonga continued living off wild foods until the rains came and they were able to access some food from their fields in December 2008. This included cucurbits,

beans, or watermelons, but they had to continue to forage to obtain supplementary foods until the main harvest of sorghum (which came from March 2009).

The signing of the Global Political Agreement led to a power sharing deal between the main political parties which saw the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. The formation of this inclusive government was, however, merely a temporary solution to the political and economic crises marking the country. Consequently, for a few years, this political solution helped to stabilise the economy up until the contested national elections of 2013, which brought ZANU-PF back as sole ruling party. Although the country's political environment between 2009 and 2013 became more conducive for pursuing livelihoods, the marginalised Tonga could not easily escape from poverty and food insecurity due to the entrenched structural constraints inhibiting their capacity to make a living. Though food aid distribution was soon restored, poverty remained. What clear lesson for the Tonga during the 2008 food crisis was the significance of traditional food crisis coping mechanisms as a basis for sheer survival.

9.6 Conclusion

Food security is central to cushioning rural people against poverty and it is enhanced by traditional food crisis coping mechanisms in drought-prone areas such as Binga. Although the Tonga suffered significantly from the famine of 2008 which pushed them towards destitution, they were culturally conscious of the uniqueness and strengths of their indigenous knowledge systems of living from wild foods. Living off the wild as a traditional food crisis coping mechanism was crucial for fighting famine and it enabled the Tonga in Binga to survive pronounced food insecurity and the food aid crisis. Marginalisation and neglect by the government, over an extended period of time, has impoverished the Tonga and this contributed significantly to the food crisis of 2008. Although facing severe famine under conditions of massive livelihood constraints, the Tonga were not passive victims of disaster unable to enact agency. They displayed their resilience by living off the wild, with the collection and use of wild foods increasing significantly when food aid stopped. While, on humanitarian grounds, it makes sense for NGOs (and government) to provide relief food aid during periods of food crisis, if done over lengthy periods it negatively affects traditional coping mechanisms in the face of food shortages by stimulating a dependency syndrome. This requires more development-focused (not aid-focused) programmes which focus on medium- to long-term food security, for instance by facilitating Tonga access to water from Lake Kariba through extensive irrigation schemes in the face of climate change and increasing episodes of drought. There is also a need for further research on how forest foods can be harnessed to improve food security in Binga.

Funding Research for this chapter was partly funded by Rhodes University's African Studies Centre through its funding from the DFG, the German Research Foundation under Germany's Excellent Strategy (Funding No. EXC2052/1).

References

Cliggett L (2005) Grains from grass: aging, gender, and famine in rural Africa. Cornell University Press, London

Colson E (1960) Human problems of Kariba VI social organisation of the GwembeTonga. Manchester University Press, Manchester, London

Colson E (1971) Kariba studies IV: the social consequences of the Kariba resettlement: the impact of the Kariba resettlement among the Gwembe Tonga. Manchester University Press, Manchester

Ellis F (1999) Rural livelihoods diversity in developing countries: evidence and policy implications. https://odi.org/publications/

Howarth D (1961) The shadow of the dam. Collins Press, London

Maclaine A (2006) Infant feeding practices in Binga and Nyaminyami, Zimbabwe, in relation to HIV. Save the Children UK

Madimu T (2019) Food imports, hunger and state making in Zimbabwe, 2000–2009. J Asian and African Stud. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909619868735

Manyena S (2009) Disaster resilience in development and humanitarian interventions. Doctoral Thesis, Northumbria University, Britain

Manyena SB (2013) Ethnic identity, agency and development: the case of the Zimbabwean Tonga. In: Cliggett L, Bond V (eds) Tonga timeline: appraising sixty years of multidisciplinary research in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Lembani Trust, Lusaka, Zambia, pp 25–66

Mashingaidze TM (2013) Beyond the Kariba Dam induced displacements: the Zimbabwean Tonga's struggles for restitution, 1990s–2000s. Int J Minority Gr Rights 20:381–404

McGregor J (2009) Crossing the Zambezi. Politics of landscape on the central african frontier. James Currey, Oxford, UK

Meldrum A (2002) Mugabe stops charities famine work. The Guardian, 17 October 2002. https://www.theguardian.com

Mowat JG (2015) Towards a new conceptualisation of marginalisation. Eur Educ Res J 14(5):454–476

Muderedzi J (2017) Exploring structural violence in the context of disability and poverty in Zimbabwe. Afr J Disabil 6:924

Muyambi R (1980) R.K. Muyambi, some Tonga notes. The Rhodesian Min Intern Aff Annu NADA VXII(2):137–139

Nangombe SS (2015) Drought conditions and management in Zimbabwe. In Proceedings of the Regional Workshops on Capacity Development to Support National Drought Management Policies for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Near East and North Africa Regions

Ndlovu T (2010) An analysis of the impact of continuos external support on community resilience in Sinansengwe Community in Binga District in Zimbabwe. Masters in Disaster Management, Universuty of the Free State, Bloomfontein, South Africa

Raftopoulos B (2009) The crisis in Zimbabwe 1998–2008. In: Raftopoulos B, Mlambo AS (eds) Becoming Zimbabwe: a history from the pre-colonial period to 2008. Weaver Press, Harare, Zimbabwe, pp 201–232

Reynolds B (1968) Kariba studies volume III: the material culture of the peoples of the Gwembe Valley. Manchester University Press, Manchester

Reynolds P, Cousins CC (1993) Lwaano Lwanyika, Tonga book of the earth. Panos Publications, London

Schrimpf B, Feil P. (2012) Traditional food crisis coping mechnisms: a regional perspective from Southern Africa. Diakonisches Werk der EKD e.V, Stuttgart, Germany
Scoones I (1998) Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis. IDS Working Paper, Brighton
Shoko J (2008) Mugabe turns screws on rights activists and lawyers, Zimbabwe crisis reports. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting. http://www.refworld.org
Scudder T (1971) Gathering among African savannah woodlands cultivators. A Case Study: The Gwembe Tonga, University of Zambia Institute for African Studies, Zambian Papers No.5, Lusaka, Zambia
Tremmel MM (1994) The People of the Great River, Silveira House Social Series No.8, Mambo Press, Gweru
Weinrich A (1977) The Tonga people of the southern shore of Lake Kariba. Mambo Press, Gwelo
World Commission on Dams (2000) Dams and Development: a new framework for decision making. Earthscan, London
Word Food Programme Annual Report (2008) https://www.wfp.org.publications
Zimbabwe Daily Newspaper (20 January 2015) Binga MP blasts Obert Mpofu
Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) (May 2009) Interim rural food security assessment
Zimbabwe Food Security Outlook October 2007 to March 2008, Relief Web, September 2007 https://www.reliefweb.int/report/zim-foodsecurity-outlook
Zinyama LM et al (2010) The us of willd foods during periods of food shortages in rural Zimbabwe. https://doi.org/10.1080/03670244.1990.9991144

Codelia Govha Dhodho writes about the social history of the Tonga of Binga District, and she has a keen interest in their livelihoods. She is a Ph.D. student studying African History at Rhodes University, South Africa, and is also a Lecturer at the Catholic University of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo, teaching History and Development Studies.

Chapter 10
(Re)Inventing Livelihoods Amid a Quest for Belonging—The Case of (Chewa) Ex-Farm Workers in Shamva's Communal Areas

Patience Chadambuka

Abstract The marginalisation of ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe has been authored and reinforced by the nation state and, historically across both the colonial and postcolonial periods, this has had profound implications on the livelihoods of ethnic minorities. These ethnic groups include Africans of 'foreign' origin whose roots are often traced to neighbouring countries, mainly Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi. These ethnic communities are today mainly a 'colonial residue', consisting of various generations of migrants who came into the country mostly as covenanted labour during the colonial era. This chapter focusses on one specific group, namely the Chewa originally from Malawi, who lived and worked on white commercial farms in Zimbabwe for decades and over generations. From the year 2000, they were displaced from the farms in the context of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme and some migrated to communal areas, as they had lost ties, or had no ties, to their purported country of origin. Through a case study Bushu communal areas in Shamva District, this chapter focusses on the re(invention) of livelihoods by the displaced ex-farm workers in ethnicised communal areas in the face of disputes around agrarian spaces and land access, and how they sought to belong to these areas in the process.

Keywords Chewa · Ex-farm workers · Livelihoods · Belonging · Autochthon · Allochthon

10.1 Introduction

The marginalisation of Africans of foreign origin in Zimbabwe remains deeply rooted in their historical colonial migration into the country. The origins of these ethnic groups can be traced to neighbouring countries in the region, mainly Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, including the Chewa from Malawi (who are the focus

P. Chadambuka (✉)
Department of Community Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe
e-mail: pchadambuka@gmail.com

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_10

of this study). These Africans of foreign origin incorporate a number of generations of migrants who entered into the country mostly as covenanted labour during the colonial era (1890s–1980), with migration persisting after 1980 albeit in less numbers.

As people who were engaged strictly for labour purposes in white settler mines, farms and urban areas, they were (and continue to be in many instances) excluded from mainstream autochthonous privileges including voting and access to common goods and welfare (Rutherford 2001; Muzondidya 2007; Daimon 2014). Effectively, they have led precarious lives under both colonial and postcolonial conditions. While those in mines and towns, including people born in the country as descendants of earlier migrants, continue to provide their labour, the situation is different for those who worked in white commercial farms. Their lives were permanently altered by Zimbabwe's widely documented Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), starting from early 2000. This chapter focusses on the livelihood strategies adopted by former farm workers of Chewa origin who moved into communal areas following displacements in the context of Zimbabwe's FTLRP.

10.2 Chewa (Ex-Farm Workers) in Zimbabwe

The Chewa constitute the largest ethnic group in Malawi, and their disputed origin (together with other ethnic groups found in present-day Malawi, including the Bemba, Nsenga, Senga and Tumbuka) is often traced to present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (Groves 2020; Juwayeyi 2020). Others claim the Chewa originate from North Africa notably Libya and Egypt (Juwayeyi 2020). In short, like most ethnic groups existing in Southern Africa, the Chewa are part of the 'millions' who migrated in complex patterns within Africa particularly during the precolonial era and thus their origin story is not short of contestations (Groves 2020: 15).

Chewa migration in general and into Zimbabwe in particular became more pronounced, controlled, and documented through state regulations during the colonial era, with the rate slowly waning in the late 1970s and into postcolonial Zimbabwe (Groves 2020). The need for labour in the newly established settler mines, farms and growing urban centres in Southern Rhodesia (named simply Rhodesia from the early 1960s) catapulted state regulated and unregulated (i.e. autonomous) waged labour migration from the nearby colonies of mainly Nyasaland (now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) and, to a lesser extent, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Bechuanaland (now Botswana) (Scott 1954; Chadya and Mayavo 2002). At the same time, the reliance of indigenous or autochthonous blacks in Southern Rhodesia on farming, particularly subsistence farming in the Native Reserves (later named Tribal Trust Lands, and then communal areas post-independence), made them reluctant to join the settler economy labour force.

Because of this, the Southern Rhodesian government entered into labour agreements (such as the Tripartite Agreements of 1936 and 1942) with the colonial

governments of other southern African nations (including Nyasaland) in order to facilitate the controlled or regulated migration of covenanted Nyasa and other labour into Southern Rhodesia (Scott 1954; Johnson 2000). The (Foreign) Migrant Labour Department and a labour recruitment parastatal, the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC), were established to facilitate recruitment and repatriation of foreign workers (Groves 2020).

Most Nyasa migrants including the Chewa though migrated clandestinely (i.e. unregulated), often on foot, evading tax obligations and forced repatriation (which habitually accompanied covenanted labour conditions). A panoply of dynamics ensuing in both Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia created the need for Nyasas (including the Chewa) to move into Southern Rhodesia. A series of colonial tax regimes, land appropriation by white settlers and discriminatory suppression of African agriculture among other factors in Nyasaland compelled the Chewa and other ethnic groups from Malawi to opt for labour migration into Southern Rhodesia and also South Africa (Chadya and Mayavo 2002). Others fled forced First World War army conscription. Higher wages and wider employment opportunities attracted the Chewa to Southern Rhodesia, or beyond to South Africa. In fact, some Chewa who ended up permanently settling in Southern Rhodesia initially planned to use Southern Rhodesia as a temporary stopover on their intended journey to South Africa (Johnson 2000).

Most Nyasas entered the country through the central and northern parts of Southern Rhodesia (Scott 1954) and this explains why the Chewa tended to dominate the farm labour forces in Mashonaland districts including in the research site for this study (Shamva). The number of Malawians signed up by official recruitment agencies peaked at 78,492 by 1970, with clandestine migration rates thought to be even higher (Groves 2020: 44).

Nyasa migrants differed in terms of ethnic origin, class and gender variables, which had profound effects on their livelihood chances once in Southern Rhodesia (and later, Rhodesia). Ethnic groups originating in the Northern and Southern provinces of Malawi, including the Tonga and Tumbuka, were relatively better educated, making it easier for them to secure privileged jobs such as mission teachers, evangelists and police officers (Groves 2020). These esteemed professions (at least by African standards at the time) often facilitated access to a variety of goods and services including, though on a limited basis, stands in the Native Reserves once in the country. The situation was, however, quite different for the mostly uneducated Chewa found in the marginalised central Nyasaland provinces. Lack of education implied that they often landed in inferior jobs in Rhodesia—working mainly as unskilled farm and mine labourers (Groves 2020). Their inferior status, as poor and deprived farm labourers, limited both their livelihood strategies and chances of obtaining stands in the Reserves, thus confining them to a cycle of farm poverty.

10.3 Chewa Farm Labourers and Fast Track Land Reform

Chewas are some of the first foreign workers to be employed in the white settler-owned commercial farms (Johnson 2000). Together with most foreign farm workers, they constituted the poorest of the poor labourers in both colonial and independent Zimbabwe, living and working 'on the margins' (Rutherford 2001). Their physical, socio-economic and political marginalisation differentiated them from other workers living in other rural as well as urban areas. Exclusion from the nation (as articulated by the state) implied exclusion from any social welfare or benefits flowing from the state. Instead, farm workers generally (local and foreign) existed within the confines of what Rutherford (2001) calls 'domestic government' on white farms, whereby farmers provided welfarist measures for their workers, including education, health, food, groceries, credit and, at times, portions of land to specifically permanent employees. These measures though were not guaranteed, as they were overseen by the farmer at his own whim, and they came with coercive conditions meant to control and retain farm workers while subjecting them to 'conditional belonging' on and to the farm (Rutherford 2001). In essence, conditional belonging entailed that farm workers would access work, housing and farm-based welfare in exchange for their commitment and allegiance to the farmer. Failure to observe the 'rules of the farm' meant loss of employment and all the benefits arising from it, including access to land and shelter. Farm labourers' 'right' to the farm was conditional on labouring properly for the farmer. Domestic government, by ensuring that labourers came under the direct and independent control of the farmer (thereby belonging to the latter), legitimised the state's exclusion of farm workers from national belonging, diminishing their livelihood chances in the process. This was reinforced because of the foreign status of many if not most farm labourers.

The position of farm labourers post-1980 did not undergo significant changes over the first two decades, with domestic government remaining in force and land reform being insignificant. However, fast track land reform from the year 2000 brought about massive insecurities for farm labourers on white farms, particularly labourers of foreign origin. While autochthonous labourers might have access to communal land if displaced from the farms, this was not necessarily the case for foreign labourers. Loss of work and farm displacement within the context of FTLRP led to the need to reinvent life in general and livelihoods in particular for ex-farm workers, especially migrant ex-farm labourers and their families.

Following the FTLRP, many ex-workers remained on the farms under precarious and insecure conditions. But there were massive displacements as well, with some ex-farm workers migrating to towns, informal settlements or other farms, while a few ended up in the highly ethnicised communal areas, places specifically and exclusively created for autochthones and thus closed off to Africans of foreign origin. At least initially, scholarly attention neglected the fate of ex-farm workers (post fast track), with any pertinent literature tending to document those who stayed on the farms, therefore falling short of capturing the lives of those who migrated off-farm and particularly those who moved into communal areas in relation to livelihoods. As

Hartnack (2017: 279) highlights, '[it] is not clear how displaced former workers now living in communal areas have fared given the severe lack of literature on their situation'. This chapter contributes to filling this scholarly gap by focussing on how Chewa ex-farm workers have re(invented) livelihoods in communal areas in Shamva, particularly given the exclusionary ethnic undertones that characterise these areas.

10.4 Zimbabwe's Communal Areas, Belonging and Livelihoods

Native Reserves were set aside for native Africans following the 1890s' annexation of the territory by the British South African Company. Settler administrators also promulgated indirect rule through autochthonous patriarchs in their various forms (as chiefs, headmen and village heads). Colonial administrators accorded autochthonous Africans rights to access land in the Reserves (later, Tribal Trusts Lands), while openly denying Africans of foreign origin, including the Chewa, the right to settle in the Reserves. Early colonial legislation such as Government Notice No. 223 of 1898 decisively prohibited the settlement of non-autochthonous Africans in African Reserve villages. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which racially bifurcated the country into black and white landscapes on an official basis, also made it illegal for non-autochthonous Africans and their descendants to possess land. Later, the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 clearly stated that land should not be occupied by non-autochthonous Africans, but should be used and occupied exclusively by 'tribesmen' (or 'aboriginal natives'). This system was inherited and reproduced by the postcolonial government, which adopted an exclusionary stance towards Africans of foreign origin in relation to communal areas. By the year 2000, when the FTLRP took centre stage, up to 180,000 farm worker households (of foreign origin) lacked access to land in communal areas because of their foreign origin (Moyo et al. 2000: 196).

Communal land is vital for rural Zimbabweans who form the bulk of the country's population and thrive on land-based livelihoods. Lack of access to land for non-autochthonous Africans, particularly for those displaced from white farms post fast track, thus entails limited access to livelihoods in rural Zimbabwe. These livelihoods include on-farm activities mainly in the form of subsistence crop and livestock production. Crops grown by communal farmers include the staple maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts and lately beans. As well, cash crops including cotton and tobacco are becoming more important sources of income for many communal households. Most communal households also possess small gardens in which they grow various vegetables such as leafy vegetables, tomatoes and onions, which act as a relish for the staple food of sadza (i.e. thick porridge made from maize meal). Off-farm activities include the pursuance of artisanal mining and petty trading. However, households are differentiated in socio-economic terms (Scoones et al. 2017). Despite the presence of poverty in communal areas, they do provide a socio-spatial arrangement for rural

livelihoods, which Africans of foreign origin are denied typically (despite even being born in Zimbabwe).

10.5 Methodology

This study is framed within a constructivist-interpretive methodology and, resultantly, I adopted qualitative research methods as they help 'to understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences of a group of people' (Kumar 2011: 103). It entailed a semi-ethnographic case study of two villages within Ward 13 of Bushu communal areas in Shamva District, into which a number of former (Chewa) farm workers moved subsequently to fast track. For purposes of ensuring confidentiality of my participants, I do not provide the names of the villages. There is no claim to the effect that the two sites represent (at least statistically) sites more broadly in Shamva or other communal areas in the country. However, the evidence collected, and conclusions reached, should have relevance in terms of understanding similar dynamics around livelihoods and politics of belonging for former farm labourers of foreign origin in similar or comparable sites.

The two villages were selected through non-random purposive sampling, as sub-case studies. Formal clearance was sought and received from the Provincial Development Coordinator and the Shamva District Development Coordinator (DDC). From the DDC's office, I went to the Ward Councillor who introduced me to the village heads. The village heads assisted me by identifying potential research participants who then introduced me to more participants, thus a snowball effect became part of my data sampling. Fieldwork entailed simultaneous and multiple data collection methods (interviews and participant observation), including in-depth semi-structured interviews with 18 former farm workers of Chewa origin now residing in Bushu communal areas. The fieldwork was undertaken between September 2019 and March 2020.

Shamva District falls under the auspices of Chaminuka Rural District Council in Mashonaland Central Province. Shamva town is 86 kms northeast of the capital of Harare. Currently, Shamva consists of communal areas, older resettlement areas from the 1980s, model A1 and model A2 fast track farms and a few remaining white- and black-owned commercial farms. Shamva is a politically volatile area with a large support base for the ruling ZANU-PF party. For an extended period, predating 1980, communal areas in Shamva District were characterised by 'frequent and bitter struggles' (Matondi 2001: 8) over the finite communal land and limited livelihoods available, with these struggles taking place among the autochthones. Hence, historically, practices of social and spatial boundary making, including clashes over livelihoods and ancestral land claims, were prevalent in the district. Chewa ex-farm labourers migrated into Shamva's Bushu communal areas during fast track within this historical and political context.

10.6 Conceptualising Livelihoods and Belonging

In this chapter, I consider how livelihoods are embedded in broader projects of belonging in ethnicised communal areas of Zimbabwe. In doing so, I pay particular attention to how ethnic identity and belonging form the basis on which livelihood chances are enhanced or confined. In this context, ethnic identity is framed, at least initially, within the prism of the autochthone–allochthon dichotomy. The concept of autochthony has been popularised by scholars such as Geschierre and Nyamnjoh chiefly to analyse political dynamics ensuing in Africa since the dawn of democratic movements on the continent. These scholars highlight how Africans believed to have a primordial origin to a particular geographical location (autochthones) are considered (or consider themselves) as 'sons and daughters of the soil', thus belonging to a particular nation, while using the same claim to marginalise those Africans said to have originated elsewhere or beyond the territorial and social boundaries of the nation (allochthones) (Geschiere 2009, 2011; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). The autochthone/allochthone dichotomy becomes the basis of ethnicised belonging (inclusion and exclusion).

For the former farm workers of foreign origin in Zimbabwe, the allochthone identity has earned them an outsider status which legitimises their exclusion from access to common goods (particularly land) that are accorded to autochthonous ethnic groups labelled as belonging to Zimbabwe. In an agro-based rural economy where access to land configures life and livelihood chances, ethnic exclusion compels Africans of foreign origin into conditions of perpetual vulnerability and poverty. Lack of access to (communal) land entails lack of residential and agricultural plots together with accompanying land-based livelihoods. Seeking to move into communal areas, as many foreign former farm labourers sought to do after the fast track disruptions, goes beyond a mere change in geographical location and residency. It raises questions of belonging, given in particular their 'white farmers' people' identity, and thereby entails a broad project of belonging in relation to communal land and other sources of livelihoods long closed to these farm workers and reserved exclusively for autochthonous Zimbabweans community members and its landscape.

In this way, former farm workers' ability to reinvent livelihoods in communal areas entails a quest on their part to belong to (and in) a territory from which they have been historically excluded. Interfaces and interactions ensuing between the newcomers (Chewa) and autochthonous villagers, as the newcomers negotiate entry into the communal area and start engaging in livelihood strategies, become key in structuring the degree of acceptance and belonging of the former farm workers. The following section discusses my empirical findings in Bushu.

10.7 Former Chewa Farm Workers and Livelihoods in Bushu Communal Areas

Most of those displaced by fast track and now living in communal areas left (the once) white commercial farms for Bushu communal area between 2000 and 2002 when fast track was at its peak. A few left between 2002 and 2007, while the number escalated in 2008 as farm takeovers resurfaced around the time of the presidential elections in that year. Some came to Bushu after 2010. By 2020, when I was conducting my fieldwork, some former farm workers of foreign origin were still seeking access to communal land stands. The stands were accessed through various means including clandestine purchases from ordinary villagers and village heads. Others were formally settled through the DDC and chief's offices. Social networks also facilitated access to stands, through relatives and friends who negotiated the stands on behalf of the ex-farm labourers.

Generally, the Chewa ex-farm workers living in Bushu communal areas expressed mixed feelings about their new forms of livelihoods. While the majority bemoaned the economic hardships that they now faced, some were quick to point out that their lives have improved compared to white commercial farm life. Most stated that they now had diversified sources of livelihoods in the communal areas, compared to the monotonous and singular on-farm work (i.e. as labourers) on the commercial farms. Most former farm workers currently earn a living through farming, gold panning, brick laying, petty trading and piece work.

They linked this pursuit of a range of livelihood activities to the newly felt freedom in the communal areas, after leaving behind the domestic government and conditional belonging of the white commercial farm and, in many cases, the subsequent fast track farm. Caleb for instance notes that he is now free to purchase and own possessions for his homestead without some authoritative figure asking him about the source of his new possessions (Interview with Caleb, 19 September 2019). At the commercial farms, farm labourers were under surveillance, with the farmer constantly checking on his workers' possessions and their sources, fearing the workers were stealing from him. At the same time, the end of paternalism under farm-based domestic government, particularly in relation to the availability of farm-store credit and food handouts, limited their safety nets in Bushu. Below, I discuss some of the key livelihood strategies that the former farm workers pursue in Bushu, including the challenges they face with reference to their quest to belong to Bushu.

10.7.1 Farming

Some former farm workers were able to secure only residential plots in Bushu, while others were demarcated agricultural plots as well. However, even those who failed to secure agricultural plots claimed to now have at least a piece of land (i.e. their residential plot) on which to practice some level of subsistence farming. Overall,

the land available for crops among former labourers remains inferior to those of the autochthones in terms of both size and quality. Some had residential stands together with farming stands located in rocky areas, making it difficult to realise sufficient agricultural yields and contributing to their vulnerability.

Augusto, for example, bemoaned the poor-quality land that he possessed. He claims that former work colleagues remaining at the commercial farm were resettled later in a grazing area on that farm, receiving better land than what he got in Bushu. He complained that most Africans of foreign origin are treated as 'second class citizens' in Bushu, as they were often fed with leftovers and crumbs in the form of land that the indigenes no longer wanted (interview with Augusto, 21 September 2019). For the former farm labourers, the inferior land received signified at least a limited belonging in the communal area, but one that often reminded them of their foreign origin. The newcomers' ongoing 'otherness' was symbolised by the rocky areas where they lived and farmed. As Augusto narrated:

> Sometimes you only have to look and you can tell that that place belongs to a former farm person. They [autochthones] don't give their relatives such types of land. It's for us. When we came here in our numbers, they probably said "let's settle them in places where no one else wants". We are given crumbs every time. (Interview with Augusto 21 September 2019)

Still, the land available for cropping was significant compared to any land which white farmers gave them as workers, which sometimes was no land at all. The former workers also added that they felt more secure and freer to control and use the land compared to their regimented lives as farm labourers. As a result, those who worked hard could realise good crop yields in Bushu, and they could even sell surplus produce since they now had many years of farming experience. Crops grown included maize, groundnuts and vegetables. They used any cash proceeds from crop sales to purchase basic household goods and to pay for their children's school fees. They yearned, however, for larger and more productive pieces of cropping land, as they could improve their lives on this basis. In this regard, they complained that some autochthones were holding on to large tracts of land that they were not utilising at all. Some autochthones possessing land in Bushu let it lie fallow, opting to farm in the former commercial farm (now fast track) lands, or becoming employed in urban centres.

Some former farm workers received agricultural plots in the grazing lands of Bushu that, historically, were for collective usage. Typically, these grazing lands required extensive land clearance that was inherently tiresome to the newcomers in the absence of advanced technologies. The new Chewa occupiers had to work extremely hard using hand axes and hoes in order to clear the land for cropping purposes. Establishing themselves as farmers in Bushu was a longer and more strenuous process, compared to those receiving well-used agricultural plots.

Besides growing crops, the former farm workers also spoke about the capacity to keep livestock in Bushu, something which white farmers denied them. In communal areas like Bushu, cattle are indispensable for draught power by way of ox-drawn ploughing and weeding (alongside scotch carts for transporting agricultural inputs and produce). Livestock more generally (including goats and sheep) serve as a safety

net as they can be sold for cash for paying for school fees and other critical household needs, or during times of emergency (for instance, family funerals and illnesses). Domestic animals are slaughtered as well for family gatherings and celebrations, or during the dry season when homestead gardens cannot produce vegetables as a relish. Finally, cattle form a crucial component of bride price (*lobola*) which is so central to Shona culture in Bushu.

In this context, in an interview (25 October 2019), John highlighted that it used to be difficult for farm workers (before fast track) to marry autochthones, as they did not own cattle. But, they are now able to accumulate livestock (including cattle) and, because of this, they felt like 'human beings' (Interview with Bazil, 15 November 2019). Thus, livestock ownership could facilitate a sense of personhood (or manhood) as well as belonging in the autochthonous communities of Bushu. Those ex-workers who now own cattle were able to meet required social obligations (for example, bride price) on an easier basis, and cattle enhanced their overall social status. They were, at least from their perspective, becoming like the autochthones.

However, not all former farm workers of Chewa origin managed to accumulate even small herds of livestock. At a very minimum, they all had chickens. For example, Chipo reared boschveld chickens in association with other villagers, and she had 23 chickens at the time of the fieldwork (Interview with Chipo, 11 February 2020). Some had a significant number of goats, which are relatively cheap to buy (compared to cattle) and breed faster. The majority of ex-farm labourers in fact still failed to acquire or purchase cattle, even those who entered Bushu almost twenty years ago. Those who did own cattle had less than three cattle, except for two who had four cattle. Overall, their livestock holdings fall far short of the status of successful communal area subsistence farmers.

10.7.2 Gold Panning

Most male ex-labourers reported that they were now actively involved in gold panning to earn a living. Shamva is a mineral-rich area, being home to one of the country's wealthiest gold deposits. Large-scale mining takes place, but there is also informal gold panning in nearby rivers such as the Mazowe River. Just before the time of my fieldwork, there was the discovery of a gold deposit at Shamva's New Line farm village. Part of this farm was once designated solely as a grazing area for A1 farmers who initially occupied the farm in 2000; and it later became a former farm workers' place of residence (with most of the workers being of foreign origin, mainly Chewa). A gold rush arose at New Line, specifically where the former farm workers reside, and former (Chewa) labourers living in Bushu communal areas became involved in this. Located near Kajakata and Chakonda villages in Bushu, to where many former farm workers migrated and now resided, this A1 farm became a haven for the former workers involved in gold panning. Most former farm workers living and 'plying their trade' at New Line happened to be well acquainted with the former farm workers who presently lived in Bushu, having worked and lived together on commercial farms

prior to fast track. Thus, the pre-existing social networks between the two groups facilitated the entry of the latter into the goldfields.

Gold panning further signalled the former farm workers' freedom from domestic government, as they had the leeway, liberty and autonomy to act out their working lives according to their own tempos and rhythms. Certainly, on white farms, gold panning was prohibited, and labourers were expected to devote their working time exclusively to the agricultural demands of the white farmer. Though experiencing the loss of full-time and permanent agricultural employment because of fast track, they were now free to venture into multiple sources of income (including gold panning). For some ex-labourers (such as Shadreck and James), gold panning was their primary source of livelihood as Bushu villagers, earning more than they did formerly as agricultural labourers (Interview with Shadreck, 18 October 2019; Interview with James, 19 September 2019).

Because of the vigorous labour involved in gold panning, it was more appealing to the younger and able-bodied men. Others preferred on-farm labour (within Bushu) since it was less cumbersome and safer compared to gold panning. Likewise, women indicated that gold panning was a male-dominated activity, and none of the former female farm workers indicated that they were actively involved—at least directly—in gold mining. Instead, the women would sell goods and services such as beer, food, clothes and sex to the gold panners. The Chewa former farm workers turned gold panners were quick to point out as well that not all was rosy in the world of gold panning. They panned for gold illegally without the proper documentation, and the activity was very risky and full of hazards. There were reports that some panners had succumbed to mysterious deaths, and others died or suffered injuries through accidents. Incidences of infighting, deceit and jealousy also characterised the life of the panners.

Despite its challenges, gold panning proceeds ensured at times the acquisition of certain possessions for the former labourers. One mentioned that he built a five-roomed brick house in Bushu. Another mentioned that, on top of building a four-roomed house in Bushu, he managed to make a deposit on a residential stand in Shamva town's Wadzanai Township. He hoped to build a decent house in Wadzanai and possibly diversify his income through collecting rentals from the house (Interview with Shadreck, 18 October 2019; Interview with Ndoro, 18 October 2019). Others indicated that they were able to buy such goods as radios, television sets and cell phones, and they were paying their children's school fees through funds accrued from mining proceeds.

10.7.3 Piece Work

Besides farming their own crops in the communal areas, many former farm workers still worked in the former white-owned commercial farms, but now as part-time employees. The A1 and A2 farmers would arrange to ferry the ex-labourers from their communal homes in the morning to nearby fast track farms where they would

work during the day. In the evening, they would return to their homes. For former farm workers of foreign origin, working in this way (only as and when they wanted) signified a break from domestic government—as they could choose when they wanted to work or rest, thereby giving them time to concentrate on their own communal agricultural plots when necessary. Conditional belonging, whereby they traded their labour and loyalty to the white farmer in return for work and shelter, no longer existed.

Former permanent now turned part-time farm workers, however, complained that their new farm employers (both A1 and A2 farmers) did not want to pay them at the same wage standard as set by their former white bosses. Ndebvu, for instance, had this to say:

> Our very own [black farmers] are just stingy. They want to get rich overnight. White farmers invested patiently, for years, even though what they paid us was low. These people are worse. They see us as donkeys and a cheap gateway to getting rich. They just do not want to pay. (Interview with Ndebvu, 31 October 2019)

Others pointed out that sometimes the new farmers did not pay them at all. The ex-labourers would not demand their payments or seek recourse for fear of victimisation. Caleb, for example, feared the new fast track farmers would follow him to his communal home and cause a scene. As such, in an endeavour to avoid noise and raising alarm (and prevent any further harm), Caleb would ignore pursuing the new farmers who owed him wages for work done (Interview with Caleb, 19 September 2019).

Beyond performing part-time work on the A1 and some A2 farms, some former farm workers performed piece work on the agricultural plots of certain Bushu villagers. They would weed and harvest crops for autochthonous Bushu villagers in return for money, clothes or groceries. Communal piece work, though, was hard to come by considering the general poverty characteristic of communal areas including Bushu. Due to the subsistence character of Bushu agriculture, most homesteads in fact depended upon family labour exclusively. There were, however, a few (comparatively) well-off communal villagers who could afford to hire additional labour. These included small business owners, successful full-time communal farmers, salaried communal workers and those who depended on remittances from grown-up children or spouses.

Most interviewees indicated that the few villagers who could afford to employ part-time labourers preferred former (Chewa) farm workers because they were hard-working. The Chewas' years of experience on white-owned farms gave them superior expertise and dexterity in performing agricultural labour. One ex-worker, for instance, claimed that he was capable of weeding in one day a portion of a plot that an autochthone would take four days to finish. The former labourers also pointed out that, back in the days before fast track when they worked together with communal area autochthones on the former commercial farms, the latter (labouring on a part-time basis) would struggle to complete their required tasks. Overall, they claimed that white farmers preferred Africans of foreign origin as farm labourers to even

permanent autochthones labouring on their farms. The former farm workers therefore migrated with their competitive labour advantage over autochthones into the communal areas.

Additionally, tensions existed between the Chewa ex-labourers and some autochthones over scarce communal piece work in Bushu. The Chewa indicated that some of their autochthonous piece work-labouring counterparts blamed the newcomers for taking away their jobs. The autochthones' ostensible bitterness became manifested in different ways, including gossip, name calling and witchcraft accusations. Thus, in their endeavour to earn a living, the former farm workers would at times unintentionally spark tensions with the autochthones. Realising their vulnerability, most former workers as newcomers would try to avoid confrontations, as the case of Caleb shows.

10.7.4 Petty Trading

Most female interviewees were trying to make a living through buying and selling commodities that included groceries, footwear and clothing. Only a handful of men were engaged in this trade. Generally, petty trading was highly gendered (and feminised) and it involved low safety risks compared to masculinised trades such as mining. The women bought commodities in the nearby Wadzanai township (in Shamva town) or as far as South Africa, which we then sold in the communal areas, fast track farms or nearby mines. Social networks established during years of commercial farm life enabled the petty traders to sell their merchandise in the former white-owned farms. Most of their customers were labouring people who once or still lived on the farms, the majority being Chewa and other Africans of foreign origin. Their shared foreign origins, alongside their common experiences as allochthones, facilitated this.

For petty trading with the gold panners, the Chewa women sold commodities to both autochthones and those of foreign origins. However, as with the fast track farms, the petty traders indicated that most of their gold panning customers were Chewa ex-labourers and non-Chewa of foreign origin. Though gold panners are feared because of their tendency for violence, the female traders were comforted by the fact that they knew some of the panners, as they were also living in Bushu. As well, the large Shamva Gold Mine closed in 2018, resulting in former mine workers using their mining expertise to seek personal fortunes by gold panning informally in the district. Most of the former mine workers are of foreign origin, including Chewa. Again, the shared 'foreign' language, culture and origin significantly enhanced business opportunities for the former farm workers turned traders. Most panners were reliable customers since they were accumulating a reasonable amount of wealth. Commodities in demand from the panners included alcohol, cigarettes, clothes and food.

Apart from selling to the farm and mining communities, the petty traders had a customer base among the autochthones in the communal areas. Business transactions

enabled the establishment of social networks with their new autochthonous neighbours. As they were selling, the petty traders would sit down with their communal area customers, ask for drinking water and engage in conversations, leading at times to the formation of friendships. Some commodities were sold on credit to certain neighbours, and trust based on anticipated payments was often formed between the Chewa traders and their autochthonous customers. Social relationships were therefore established, helping to bridge the social distance between the autochthones and allochthones.

However, in some instances, relationships were not consequentially cordial. Nyasha for instance complained that some autochthones thought that former farm workers in general and former Chewa farm workers in particular were dull, uneducated and possibly lacking business skills. Hence, in their exchanges, autochthones would attempt to cheat the Chewa traders. Intended non-payment and negotiating for ridiculously low prices were some of the dishonest ploys that the buyers would use in an attempt to manipulate the traders. Failure to pay debts often resulted in threats engraved in claims of witchcraft and sorcery, used by the traders in attempts to coerce autochthones to honour their debts. The Chewa were indeed thought to possess supernatural powers by the autochthones, and they used this supposed divine capacity to recover their money. Thus, at one level, traders of foreign origin were able to build social capital to sustain their livelihoods. At another level, strained autochthone–allochthone relationships developed in Bushu, putting any quest for belonging to Bushu in question.

10.7.5 Mukando

Communal area people particularly women are actively involved in small savings and lending groups, known as *mukando* in the vernacular. Former (Chewa) farm workers in Bushu joined these small savings groups and participated in them alongside autochthones. Villagers paid monthly contributions into a common pool (i.e. fund) between USD1 and USD2 each. Withdrawal from the fund involved payment of a debt at a 10 per cent rate of interest. The funds served a panoply of purposes. For instance, at times, a member would withdraw a lump sum from the accumulated funds to start or boost her income-generating projects. Those who needed emergency funds such as school, funeral or health expenses would also borrow from the fund.

Generally, *mukando* provided a readily available albeit small loan scheme for the former farm workers, whose lack of collateral security rendered them ineligible to borrow from banks and micro-finance institutions. Due to the meagre amounts accumulated in the fund, and the constant demands by members for various expenses, the fund was often depleted (notably towards school opening days), leaving potential borrowers in a precarious state. Nonetheless, *mukando* became a key source of credit for the former farm workers in Bushu.

To the former farm workers, though, *mukando* was reminiscent of how the white farmer would always lend them money, only to deduct it from their wages in accordance with the dictates of domestic government. Nevertheless, the amount of credit made available to labourers by white farmers far exceeded the amounts drawn through *mukando*. The former farm workers spoke about the *mukando* funds as very insignificant and insufficient to meet their most basic needs, thus reflecting favourably on their former lives with reference to this particular issue.

Besides serving as a social safety net for women specifically, *mukando* also became an important form of social capital for Chewa and other women in the Bushu villages. *Mukando* meetings gave the female villagers (including ex-labourers) a chance to meet and interact at least once a month, and to exchange thoughts about income-generating activities. Sometimes government employees (notably the Ward Coordinator from the Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development) would visit villagers during their *mukando* gatherings. The Ward Coordinator would speak to the female *mukando* members about income-generating skills, as well as about domestic and gender-based violence. At the *mukando* meetings, the Chewa female ex-labourers interfaced with the female autochthones, entailing the developing and nurturing of friendships. Becoming and staying as a member of the lending schemes facilitated cross-cutting ties between allochthones and autochthones, and this enhanced a sense of belonging for the allochthones, thereby undercutting their strangeness in Bushu.

However, the economic crisis in the country (post the Mugabe era) threatened constantly the viability of most *mukando* groups in Bushu. By February 2020, female interviewees indicated that the vibrancy of the *mukando* groups had deteriorated significantly because of challenges around currency owing to the government's inconsistent currency policy. Female members of the *mukando* also highlighted that the hyper-inflationary environment coupled with a perpetually weak Zimbabwean dollar threatened the sustainability of *mukando*. They were, therefore, insisting on forex-based *mukando* contributions. However, 'forex' (foreign exchange) in the form of the US dollar was difficult for members to access, since other sources of income were in local currency. As a result, there were signs of a decline in the Bushu *mukando* groups, including through the withdrawal of members.

10.7.6 Food Handouts

The elderly and orphans received food handouts availed by the government and non-governmental organisations in Bushu communal areas. In times of drought (notably the years 2007, 2008, 2018, 2019 and 2020), food handouts (mainly maize, Zimbabwe's staple food) were also availed to vulnerable households. The elderly received 50 kilogrammes of maize on a monthly basis through the Department of Social Welfare. Former farm workers of foreign origin residing in Bushu, who met the overall requirements of the programmes, received maize. The ward councillor highlighted to me that there was no exclusion whatsoever in terms of beneficiaries

of the maize packages and, on two visits, I witnessed maize being distributed among former farm workers of Chewa origin. The interviewees stated that, in most cases, a 50-kilogramme bag of maize was sufficient for the whole month and they might share their maize with neighbours who had maize shortfalls. At times, they also sold part of the maize package in order to have money to grind the rest of the maize into mealie meal (for cooking *sadza*).

The former farm workers benefiting from the maize expressed their gratitude highlighting that, when they were working and living on the commercial farms, no maize support was forthcoming from central government. Instead, the farms' domestic government implied that the farmer was solely responsible for his employees' welfare, as farm spaces were privatised spaces under the sole control of the white farmer. At the same time, they claimed that what they now received in the communal areas (in terms of maize donations) was less—comparatively speaking—to what white farmers used to give them. Martha and Mary, for instance, both stated that the farmer would give them 'enough' food handouts—not just maize, but also kapenta, beans, cooking oil, sugar and salt (which they deemed indispensable for their diet). Now it was only maize. As a result, Chewa ex-labourers spoke about suffering from hunger and malnutrition in the Bushu communal areas.

In this regard, it is important to note that not every former farm worker of foreign origin was eligible to receive maize handouts in Bushu. The able-bodied and those of working age were not eligible, even for those in autochthonous households. This was a serious problem, again compared to working and living on white farms—where permanent employment guaranteed a monthly wage along with any available handouts. As Shadreck indicated with reference to the communal areas, there was simply no steady income-stream, as crop production was seasonal.

Despite the inclusiveness of governmental food handouts, the former labourers spoke about certain hidden dynamics that bordered on the politicisation of food. As Augusto stressed:

> You have to be obedient for you to have peace and get something [maize]. You saw what was happening there. You heard the slogans. (Interview with Augusto, 19 September 2019)

Augusto was referring to a government maize programme witnessed by me. By slogans, Augusto was speaking about the ZANU-PF slogans chanted at the Department of Social Welfare's food-handout distribution point at Kajakata Business Centre. Ward-based party leaders took the opportunity to campaign for ZANU-PF, even though food handouts are not supposed to be 'politicised'. Augusto, like other food beneficiaries, reasoned that he had to chant political slogans so that he would benefit from the handout programme on an ongoing basis. More broadly, from the perspective of Augusto and other ex-labourers, the showing of allegiance to the ruling party (or 'performing ZANU-PF') was a necessary condition for belonging fully to the Bushu community. This form of belonging would, in turn, bring about food benefits, the type of benefits enjoyed by the former farm workers when they conditionally belonged to the farm.

10.7.7 Family Members' Support

Elderly former farm workers relied quite significantly on family members' financial support, with remittances from children providing a reliable social safety net for most parents. Admittedly, most of their children were working merely as unskilled general labourers on fast track farms, while others were involved in mining or working in towns such as Shamva and Bindura. The majority of these children, born and raised on commercial farms, were not professionals and they had only minimal education (attending farm schools, which usually ended at primary school level and involved basic reading and writing skills only). Despite their low standard of living and precarious existence, children remitted money to help their parents purchase basic food and groceries. Similarly, husbands working elsewhere would send money to their wives and children.

Generally, young widows among the ex-labouring villagers in Bushu experienced especially harsh economic conditions, since their dependent children were too young to look after them. With children to care for, they often found it difficult to work their lands on a sustainable basis or even to find local casual work. Some young widows did rely on piece work, particularly weeding fields and harvesting crops in both communal areas and nearby fast track farms. Young children would assist their parents in accomplishing the agricultural work. Young boys would also complement the meagre family income through herding neighbours' cattle, specifically during school holidays (with the earnings put towards paying school fees). Therefore, child labour acted as a safety cushion for these de jure female-headed households in Bushu. These strategies were, though, not unique to the 'newcomers' (ex-farm labourers) but were practiced by female-headed households among the autochthones. Simultaneously, the former farm workers had weaker and less extensive social networks compared to the longer-established communal area autochthonous villagers, and the latter could draw more readily on networks (including kinship relations) for support.

10.8 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how new livelihoods (including farming, piecework, mining, petty trading and saving schemes, among others) have been constructed and practiced by the Chewa newcomers in Bushu. In this way, moving to Bushu communal areas involved the adoption of a panoply of livelihoods which were not accessible to the Chewa ex-farm workers when they were still living and working on the commercial farms. Thus, moving into Bushu has meant liberty and freedom to pursue farm-based, off-farm and non-farm livelihoods, allowing a handful of the former farm labourers to pursue standards of life comparatively better to those they had on white farms. At the same time, their lives in Bushu are conditioned by ethnic identities.

As newcomers (allochthones) entering the space of an autochthonous ethnic community and seeking to establish a home there for the first time, conflicts arise over limited resources (including land). This tends to lead to and perpetuate fixed boundaries between the newcomers and the long-established residents (autochthones) in Bushu. In other ways, though, the quest by the Chewa newcomers to earn a living facilitates interactions with autochthones, resulting in the development of mutual relations which appear to facilitate and enhance a wider project of belonging for the newcomers. For the Chewa ex-farm workers, coming to Bushu in the aftermath of the FTLRP was not an easy and linear process, as it happened against a troubled background of loss (of home and livelihood). As well, it has entailed contradictory tendencies in terms of communal area belonging—both breaking down and reinforcing ethnic boundaries. Belonging to Bushu thus remains an ongoing process and an act of becoming for the Chewa.

References

Chadya JM, Mayavo P (2002) "The curse of old age": elderly workers on Zimbabwe's large scale commercial farms, with particular reference to "foreign" farm labourers up to 2000. Midlands State University Publications, Gweru

Daimon A (2014) Politics of 'othering' and the struggle for citizenship in independent Zimbabwe: voices from Malawian descendants. J Afr Insight 44(1):137–150

Geschiere P (2009) The perils of belonging: autochthony, citizenship, and exclusion Africa and Europe. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Geschiere P (2011) Autochthony, citizenship and ex-clusion: new patterns in the politics of belonging in Africa and Europe. In: Albiez S, Castro N, Jüssen L, Youkhana E (eds) Etnicidad, ciudadanía y perte-nencia: Práticas, teoría y dimensiones especiales. am Main, Frankfurt, pp 175–198

Geschiere P, Nyamnjoh FB (2000) Capitalism and autochthony: the seesaw of mobility and belonging. J Pub Culture 12(2):423–452

Groves ZR (2020) Malawian migration to Zimbabwe, 1900–1965: tracing Machona. Palgrave Macmillan, Cambridge

Hartnack A (2017) Discursive hauntings: limits to reinvention for Zimbabwean farm workers after fast-track land reform. Anthropol Southern Afri 40(4):276–289

Johnson D (2000) World war 2 and the scramble for labour in colonial Zimbabwe, 1939–1948. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare

Juwayeyi Y (2020) References. In Archaeology and oral tradition in Malawi: origins and early history of the Chewa. Boydell & Brewer, Rochester NY.

Kumar R (2011) Research methodology: a step-by-step guide for beginners, 3rd edn. Sage, New Delhi

Matondi PB (2001) The struggle for access to land and water resources in Zimbabwe: the case study of Shamva district. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden

Moyo S, Rutherford B, Amanor-Wilks D (2000) Land reform and changing social relations for farm workers in Zimbabwe. Rev Afr Polit Econ 27(84):181–202

Muzondidya J (2007) Jambanja: ideological ambiguities in the politics of land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 33(2):325–341

Rutherford B (2001) Working on the margins: Black workers, White farmers in post colonial Zimbabwe. Weaver Press, Harare

Scott P (1954) Migrant labour in southern Rhodesia. J Geo Rev 44(1):29–48
Scoones I, Mavedzenge B, Murimbarimba F, Sukume C (2017) Tobacco, contract farming, and agrarian change in Zimbabwe. J Agr Change 18(1):22–42

Patience Chadambuka is a lecturer and Acting Chairperson in the Community Studies Department (formerly Sociology Department), in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. She holds a PhD in Sociology from Rhodes University, South Africa and a MSc in Sociology and Anthropology as well as a Post Graduate Diploma in Tertiary Education from the Midlands State University. Her areas of interest include land and agrarian studies, migration, ethnicity, livelihoods and gender studies.

Chapter 11
Cultural Economic Survival under Crisis—Malawian *Nyau/Gule Wamkulu* Dances and Zimbabwe's Economic Meltdown

Anusa Daimon

Abstract In the aftermath of the Zimbabwean crisis, communities have sought alternative livelihoods to survive the economic meltdown that has characterised the Zimbabwean political economy since 2000. Existing historiography has detailed the numerous strategies and tactics that have been deployed by Zimbabweans in the last two decades to circumvent the resultant economic challenges. However, it has not detailed how some African ethnic minorities, including those which have been pushed to, and subjugated at, the margins of the Zimbabwean nation and are living in a 'state of unbelonging', have uniquely engaged their cultural cosmologies as an alternative economic livelihood. Using the case of people of Malawian ancestry and their Nyau/Gule Wamkulu cultural dances, the chapter demonstrates how, amongst other survival strategies, these people have distinctly resorted to their cultural practices for economic survival in the face of a crisis that systematically displaced the majority of them from their traditional occupations as farm workers and miners (through the agrarian-land reform, industrial retrenchments and mine shutdowns). Malawian communities have thus uniquely used their ethnicised Nyau cultural dances for income generation through performances on Zimbabwean farms, mines and urban areas during local and national events.

Keywords Cultural dances · Economic livelihoods · Migrant minorities · Malawian migrants · Zimbabwean crisis

11.1 Introduction

In the aftermath of the Zimbabwean crisis, communities have sought alternative livelihoods to survive the economic meltdown that has characterised the Zimbabwean political economy since 2000. Existing historiography has detailed the numerous strategies and tactics that have been deployed by Zimbabweans in the last two decades to circumvent the resultant economic challenges. However, it has not detailed how

A. Daimon (✉)
International Studies Group, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa
e-mail: adaimon4@gmail.com

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_11

some African ethnic minorities, including those which have been pushed to, and subjugated at, the margins of the Zimbabwean nation and are living in a 'state of unbelonging', have uniquely engaged their cultural cosmologies as an alternative economic livelihood. Using the case of people of Malawian ancestry and their *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* cultural dances, the chapter demonstrates how, amongst other survival strategies, these people have distinctly resorted to their cultural practices for economic survival in the face of a crisis that systematically displaced the majority of them from their traditional occupations as farm workers and miners (through the agrarian-land reform, industrial retrenchments and mine shutdowns). Malawian communities have thus uniquely used their ethnicised Nyau cultural dances for income generation through performances on Zimbabwean farms, mines and urban areas as well as during localised and national competitions.

The volatile Zimbabwean crisis was pregnant with toxic and partisan political rhetoric aimed at excluding a formidable opposition movement, both its white minority funders and by proxy its proletarianised urban, farm and mine workers' support base, a number of whom were of migrant descent. The crisis saw systematic othering of invisible subject minorities through the agrarian-land reform, the infamous urban clean-up exercise Operation *Murambatsvina*, and reconfigurations of citizenship and belonging, as well as their systematic disenfranchisement during numerous post-2000 political elections (2002, 2005 and 2008). For the Malawian diaspora and other migrants from Zambia and Mozambique, the crisis saw a deepening reconfiguration of their identity and belonging in the context of the broader Zimbabwean nation-identity and nation-state. The protracted and multi-staged Zimbabwean economic and political crisis was accompanied by politically charged, narrowed-down definitions of national identity and citizenship (Mano and Willems 2010). All this drastically altered the economic livelihoods of Malawian communities as the Zimbabwean state's methodical victimisation and displacements of regime change advocates suffocated all their traditional economic spaces on the farms, mines and industrial towns, leaving many in destitution.

Despite encountering numerous untold hardships, migrant minorities have remained active in navigating obstacles emerging from the crisis. Many have ingeniously employed alternative forms of subaltern agency or what Jeremy Jones (Jones 2010) loosely terms '*kukiya-kiya*' (multiple forms of making ends meet), during the Zimbabwean crisis. Some have stayed on the farms (now fast track farms) and mines in the hope that the situation will improve, while others sought sanctuary elsewhere. On the farms, the sexual division of labour has been shelved as men and women continuously seek alternative livelihoods, engaging in insecure and poorly paid casual or piecework jobs, commonly known as *maricho*. Some have diversified into informal occupations like gold panning, fishing, hunting and gathering, poultry, shoe repairing and vending (Sachikonye 2003; Daimon 2014). In order to benefit from government food aid, many have perfected the art of 'shifting political identities' by conveniently associating with ZANU-PF through the acquisition of its party cards during electoral seasons. Rutherford (2008) observes that most former farm workers have sought new forms of dependencies, typically more precarious and generating fewer resources and services than they had accessed on commercial

farms (when under the authority of the white farmer). This entails developing their own particular cultural politics of recognition, often tied to demonstrating support to the ruling political party.

Amidst all this, some Malawians have uniquely engaged their cultural motifs as an alternative economic livelihood to survive the economic obstacles of the Zimbabwean crisis. As the mines, farms and industrial complexes shutdown, Malawian cultural practices such as the *Gule Wamkulu/Nyau* dance became pivotal in providing income streams (in cash and kind) to sustain families of the dance groups across Zimbabwe. Faced by an unprecedented economic meltdown which was complicated by systematic political persecution, various *Nyau* members resorted to and ramped up *Gule Wamkulu* performances in their localities and across the Zimbabwean landscape. The chapter unpacks these dynamics using mainly ethnographic oral material gathered from Malawian migrant communities and custodians of the *Nyau/Gule Wamkulu* tradition in selected case study farms, mines and urban locales across Zimbabwe.

11.2 *Nyau* Secret Societies and the *Gule Wamkulu* Dance in Zimbabwe

The *Gule Wamkulu* dance or *Nyau/Gule/Zvigure* (as it is known in Zimbabwe) has been the most notable cultural trait associated with Malawian descendants. *Gule Wamkulu* literally means 'the big or great dance'.[1] It involves dancers wearing masks representing human beings or animals, intricate footwork and high tempo drum rhythms. The dance reflects religious beliefs in spirits and is connected to the activities of secret societies in which dancers (termed *zilombo* or wild animals) are dressed in ragged costumes of cloth and animal skins, wearing a mask, and occasionally performing on stilts. *Gule Wamkulu* is thus a name for the masked dance performed by *Nyau* secret societies for purposes of initiating members into adulthood and for entertainment (Schoffeleers 1972, 1976). These societies treat *Nyau* as their tradition or *mwambo*, the totalising ritual system, which defines contours and categories of the specifically Chewa community, a spiritual institution that forms an important part of their cosmology and religious beliefs. Gough (2004) adds that *Gule Wamkulu* consists of formally organised initiation rituals and dances of masked individuals in a spiritual state. Albeit Chewa in character, the dance has been an important platform for expressing a broader migrant Malawian identity and visibility as well as fostering mutual relations between different ethnicities in Zimbabwe. Though forming a critical component of the Malawian cultural paraphernalia and rites, the dances assumed new significance in generating income during the Zimbabwean crisis through entertainment and national competitions in the new millennium.

The dance is indigenous to the Chewa of central Malawi and eastern Zambia, but other smaller Malawian groups such as the Manganja and Chipeta also enjoyed it (Daimon 2008).[2] The practice originated in Malawi and spread to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa through labour migration and regional

ethno-linguistic commonalities. In the late nineteenth century, Southern Africa experienced an extensive quest for a cheap regional African migrant labour supply, under the infamous '*Chibaro*', '*Wenera*' or '*Mthandizi*' labour migration system, to work in Rhodesian and South African colonial economic enterprises (Gelfand 1961; Groves 2012). This saw a southern influx of trans-Zambezian labour migrants from colonial Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique such that, by 1936, there were a total of 74,266 migrant labourers working in Rhodesia, rising to 150,150 in 1948 and 246,772 by 1951.[3] With the further opening of the transnational boundaries at the inception of the Central African Federation in 1953, the figures grew steadily with many migrant workers involuntarily and voluntarily flocking to Rhodesia to seek employment under the colonial capital economy (Daimon 2016). By 1966, about 229,000 Malawians were working elsewhere, to which could be added 22,000 women and 33,000 men over 50 who had settled permanently outside Malawi (Daimon 2018). Of these 139,000 were in Rhodesia and 68,000 in South Africa (Boeder 1974).

While some remained genuine migrant labourers, maintaining strong transnational continuous connections with their homeland, others settled permanently across the Rhodesian territory. In Malawi, those who migrated to the southern labour markets and never returned to their ancestral homeland were commonly referred to as the *Machona* (or lost ones) and their offspring were also deemed sons and daughters of the *Machona*.[4] These were individuals who got entrapped by the ravages and comforts of the diaspora and had cut ties with their homeland and were unlikely to return. No one knew where they were, and they were written off as 'lost' to the village. Creech Jones of the Central African Council explained in 1947 that many were 'reluctant to return home without something to show for it, while the expense of the journey is a formidable charge on their savings; so their general tendency is to stay away for long periods, a proportion being permanently lost to Nyasaland.'[5] Some left relatives behind; others left wives and children, starting new families with local women or fellow Nyasa females who had independently migrated to Rhodesia.

These *Machona* entrenched their cultural cosmology in the localities of settlement in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe with *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* being the most popular, reputable and ingrained cultural motif in Zimbabwe. Early evidence of *Gule Wamkulu* in colonial Zimbabwe came from the Native Commissioner of Lomagundi, E.G. Howman, who in 1935 reported that the dances were performed by alien Natives, particularly those from Nyasaland.[6] The Chief Native Commissioner, Sergeant H.M.G. Jackson, also echoed in 1930 that 'the Minister of Internal Affairs was informed that *Gule Wamkulu* dances are practiced on farms and mines and have been introduced from outside the colony by native aliens, from Nyasaland.'[7] By the start of the liberation war in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many of these African labour migrants had permanently settled and become proletarianised as farm workers, miners and urban dwellers. These spaces became theatres in which the *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* flourished as Malawian migrant labourers relived and remembered their homeland as well as expressed their cultural identity in foreign lands.

Nyau has traditionally thrived on mystery and secrecy. The fact that *Nyau* was shrouded in mystery and secrecy created infinite myths and curiosity amongst

Zimbabweans. For years, people of Malawian origin in Zimbabwe have been generally associated with sorcery, witchcraft and magic. Such prejudices are entrenched in oral traditions, with Linden (1974) stating that Malawian mythology is full of sorcery narratives involving hyenas, owls, snakes, and flying saucers and brooms. Oral histories about the escapades of Kamuzu Banda, Malawi's founding president have also fuelled the stereotypes. Though he was a qualified medical doctor, many classified him as a Sangoma (traditional witchdoctor) president, namely, a practitioner of traditional medicine who always carried around a flywhisk, the Sangoma's ultimate prop.[8] One of the popular myths that followed the Banda cult, claimed that he left his jacket hanging in mid-air in a Gweru prison cell in Zimbabwe when he was incarcerated for political activities from March 1959 to April 1960.

Nyau myths lost nothing in the telling. It was alleged that initiated members spent nights at cemeteries, ate raw chicken and drank its blood. If anyone fell when chased by a *Nyau* dancer and was injured, the wound would not heal. *Nyau* members always denied such myths. One *Nyau* associate, Aaron Wemba, insisted that 'we are not witches and do not socialise with the dead; ours is just like other cultures that serve social and spiritual purposes.'[9] The fact that *Gule* dancers emerged from sacred ritual wildernesses, known as the *Runde* or *Dambwe*, and then performed wearing masks to hide their identities, greatly contributed to preserving the mystery of *Nyau* (Mukonyora 2000/01; Wolmer 2007). Examples of *Runde/Dambwe* sacrosanct ritual shrines include cemeteries/graveyards and protected bush camps/shrines where *Nyau* members converged to initiate, train and keep their paraphernalia.[10] Graveyards mystified the practice by linking it to the dead. It is also claimed that *Gule Wamkulu* operated from graveyards because of an environment that scared off intruders and provided an ideal location for secret rituals.[11] The precincts of bush camps, often near a village or urban settlements, were marked and protected by red cloths planted on visibly strategic locales. This transformed the area into a sacred space of power and control for its custodians.

Gule Wamkulu was sanctified by various types of masked dancers (*zilombo*) who emerged out of the *Runde* to perform. These included the *Akapoli* or *kamwimwi* (the semi-naked dancer), *Makanje* (the tall dancer on stilts), *Mwanawamasiye* (the orphaned dancer), *Chisimoni* (the cruel white colonial official) and *Maria* or *Dona* (Mary mother of Jesus).[12] Each of the *zilombo* plays a particular character representing forms of misbehaviour to teach moral and social values to the audience. These figures perform dances and artistic movements with extraordinary energy, partly entertaining and partly frightening the audience (Bell 2010). The masks come in different forms and include traditional representations of ancestral spirits, ghostly creatures, flora and animals such as lions, elephants, hyenas, snakes and giraffes. Research on the meaning of masks and the *Nyau* was conducted by the renowned anthropologist, Laurel Birch de Aguilar, in Malawi from 1984 into the late 1990s. She sees masks as metaphoric social phenomena or texts projecting various interpretative meaning over life and death (de Aguilar 1994, 1996). They are rich in narratives about social roles and community, historical experience, ritual and religious beliefs, leadership, warfare, resistance to foreigners, colonisation, labour migration and modernity. De Aguilar emphasises that *Nyau* masks convey a sense of dread, so

the word '*Nyau*' makes some people 'catch their breath and step back' (de Aguilar 1996). The secrecy of masquerading in masks is an important subtext and a crucial means by which *Gule Wamkulu* mystifies *Nyau* society and earns respect through fear. Contemporary *Gule Wamkulu* masks, attire and dances are a site of discourse on history, social relationships and experiences of Africans in foreign lands.

Nyau societies traditionally reasserted male patrilinity through its gendered delegation of duties during performances, with women usually at the peripheries. Women were never initiated into the secret society, just as the females barred their male counterparts from their '*chisamba*' female initiation rites. There were no female dancers and the inclusion of the feminine male '*Maria*' dancer was thus a cosmetic gimmick to engender *Gule Wamkulu*. Women simply played a supportive role and were confined to singing, ululating and praising the male dancers. Nyau outfits thus employed a minimum of three women, known as *Man'ombe*, as backing vocals to sing traditional songs.[13] As echoed by de Aguilar (1996), those who create and wear the masks for the *Gule Wamkulu* are male, and those who sing and clap with the masked dancers are female; and only men are masked dancers, whose identities are intended to be hidden by the masks they wear.

11.3 Zimbabwean Crisis and Suffocation of Minority Livelihoods

Beginning in early 1998, Zimbabwe entered a period that has come to be generally known as the 'Crisis in Zimbabwe' (Raftopoulos 2009). This chaotic phase witnessed 'a once vibrant and dynamic society and economy virtually collapsing as political instability, lawlessness, mis-governance and a relentless economic meltdown transformed this erstwhile leading southern African nation into an international pariah and the proverbial basket case' (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010: 1). It was characterised by a mosaic of trajectories or 'crises within a crisis' that adversely transformed people's livelihoods and altered the country's socio-economic and political landscape. For Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010), what was occurring in the country since the turn of the new millennium was a complex and inter-related multi-layered and pervasive catastrophe that could, perhaps, best be described as a series of 'Zimbabwean crises', for no aspect of Zimbabwean existence escaped the deleterious effects of this phenomenon. The crisis exhibited itself varyingly. It involved confrontations over land and property rights; contestations over nationalism and citizenship; the emergence of critical civil society groups campaigning around trade unionism, human rights and constitutionalism; state authoritarianism; the broader pan-African and anti-imperialist meanings of the struggles in Zimbabwe; the cultural representations of the crisis in Zimbabwean literature and the central role of Robert Mugabe (Raftopoulos 2009). These multiple crises were related but had heterogeneous effects that varied according to gender, identity, class, age, geographical and spatial variables. The multi-faceted character of the crisis has generated significant debate, with

a surfeit of studies, known as crisis literature or historiography, grappling to make sense of the cataclysm of the post-2000 period (Raftopoulos 2009; Phimister 2005; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004; Bond and Manyanya 2003; Hammar et al. 2003; Primorac and Chan 2007; Chiumbu and Musemwa 2012).

The crisis worsened the experiences of migrant descendants in Zimbabwe. For Pilossof (2012), it marked a fundamental shift in Zimbabwean politics that had been building since the mid-1990s. In response to these new political currents, ZANU-PF changed the rules of engagement and the start of the new millennium witnessed a new era of political, social and economic violence (authoritarian nationalism) that accelerated Zimbabwe's slide into crisis. Southall (2013) demonstrates that the period was characterised by ZANU-PF's negation of electoral democracy with the party ascribing the rejection of the proposed constitution via a referendum (in February 2000) to a conspiracy between the black urban middle class, white farmers and their workers, and the government's external enemies, and the ruling party saw an opportunity to fight the subsequent elections as if they were a re-run of the war for liberation. For Phimister (2005), the post-2000 period was generally marked by increasing autocracy, ruthless repression and widespread human rights abuses, forcing many into exile and impacting with disastrous effects on the lives of workers and peasants. A key characteristic of this process was the restructuring of the state itself, through dramatic re-organisation and militarisation of state structures (judiciary and civil service); passing of repressive laws such as Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in 2002; widespread violence, murder, torture, rape and disappearances perpetrated by ZANU-PF youth militia and war veterans against the opposition and the recasting of the party's nationalist ideology in more authoritarian, selective and racialised notions of citizenship and belonging, constituted around the centrality of the land question and the contribution of ZANU-PF to the liberation struggle (Raftopoulos 2009). The crisis reached a crescendo in 2008, with Zimbabwe experiencing a world record inflation rate for countries not at war; total political and governmental dysfunction and epic food shortages and starvation (Nyambi 2013; Mason 2019).

The ZANU-PF regime thus spearheaded narrow and exclusionary nationalism which discriminated against people of migrant descent in its fight to consolidate and hold on to power in the face of rising civil and political opposition. In the process, Malawian diaspora and other minorities were denied the right to suffrage. Mugabe and his supporters blackmailed them on the pretext that, unlike the autochthons who had totems that attached them to Zimbabwe as 'children of the soil' (*vana vevhu*), immigrants or the so-called 'aliens' did not have a sense of identity and belonging to Zimbabwe. The resultant anti-migrant discourse became overtly rhetorical and detrimental during the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis in the new millennium, with descendants of regional migrants being systematically objectified or 'othered' by hegemonic socio-political structures during Zimbabwe's agrarian reform and electoral processes (Daimon 2018). Migrant descendants experienced unprecedented victimisation during the fast track land reform exercise, the 2005 urban clean-up

exercise (Operation Restore Order or *Murambatsvina*), the subsequent denial of citizenship rights with amendments of the Citizenship Act in 2001 and 2003 and during the volatile 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 political elections (Daimon 2016).

Despite this, Malawians and other regional migrants exuded agency and tried to mediate the crisis through various forms of adaptation and resistance in the face of systematic victimisation, with *Nyau* dance groups uniquely employing their cultural dance for economic reprieve. They thus enacted diverse collective agency to cope with the challenges, anxieties and uncertainties of the Zimbabwean crisis. Many made their own history and found ways to assert and express themselves through inventing intricate everyday modes of survival anchored in gender and class dichotomies, historical configurations, ethnic orientation and cultural interests.

Malawians in Rhodesia and later Zimbabwe were men, women and juveniles toiling as first, second, third and fourth generation descendants. Some of them are, or were, farm workers, miners, factory workers, maids, gardeners, the educated and uneducated, students and house owners from diverse ethnic backgrounds. It is in this diversity that they reproduced a sense of their own identities moored in ethnocultural motifs, as have other minority groups—for instance, the Yao being visible through their Islamic initiation customs and Beni dances, while the Tonga became renowned for the Watchtower movement. In the context of the post-2000 crisis, the Chewa propped themselves up through their *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* dances, with their culture assuming a pivotal role as an economic livelihood in the new millennium.

11.4 *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* as an Economic Survival Practice during Zimbabwe's Crisis

Other than being traditionally critical as a rite of passage in initiating its members into an exalted status of adulthood, *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* was initially used as a mechanism for resistance against colonial civil law in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. As Kerr (1995: 46) notes, '[m]any adaptations of pre-colonial art forms in a colonial context displayed resistance by peasants to capital's penetration into a pre-capitalist economy and one form of indirect resistance was for peasants to pour aesthetic energy into festival drama/theatre performances associated with local celebrations, especially for commemorating historically significant events.' According to Kaspin (1993), colonial governments were seriously concerned about *Nyau*'s potential threat. The British South Africa Police's Criminal Investigation Department and Native authorities across Southern Rhodesia produced numerous reports concerning the dance's mystery and the possible hazards it posed. Many police investigations were conducted following various incidences linked to *Nyau* members such as: the poisoning of a Tonga at Shamva Mine in 1917; assault of individuals in Salisbury in 1926 and 1927; malicious injury to animals in the Gatooma area in 1926 and the higher degrees of excitement that the dances generated amongst locals across the colony.

In Malawi, *Nyau* emerged as a vehicle of political opposition to the British colonial administration and the power of missionary churches. Kaspin (1993) asserts that *Nyau* members exercised their licence as 'wild animals' to attack the uninitiated, a behaviour justified by members as part of the dancers' mystique as beasts and spirits, creatures ungovernable by the laws of humans. However, *Nyau* 'animalism' was not a ritual entitlement but an act of defiance against civil law (Kaspin 1993). Curran (2005) adds that Christian missionaries and colonial administrators viewed *Nyau* as an exhibition of obscenity, sensuality and cruelty and a national evil. Authorities remained suspicious of the dance throughout the colonial era. Parry (1999) claims that the *Gule Wamkulu* culture threatened the 'colonial peace' in Rhodesia and was banned in the mid-1920s. Its continued underground operation subsequently enhanced its reputation for being a law unto itself (Parry 1999). Despite concerted efforts to outlaw *Nyau* culture, it retained its hold on the spiritual imagination of the Chewa in Malawi, as well as migrant labourers in Zimbabwe (Curran 2005).

After Zimbabwe's independence, and faced with the anxieties and uncertainties over *Gukurahundi* and national belonging in the 1980s and 1990s, *Nyau* became increasingly useful for coping with these challenges. *Nyau* communities turned into bastions of cohesion amongst the Malawian diaspora. Over time and space, *Nyau* communities in Zimbabwe defined and negotiated territorial autonomy and space by exploiting elements of secrecy, sacred environments and masked dances to create a collective identity and forge cohesion amongst members. Malawian descendants used *Gule Wamkulu* as a means to distinguish themselves from outsiders, particularly hegemonic Zimbabwean groups. As Linden (1975) notes, cultural practices such as the *Gule Wamkulu* are an institution of remarkable resilience and vitality, which serve to unite people in times of social stress and act as powerful curbs on the influence of foreign or dominant identities. Migrant communities expressed their identity and views in order to counter incidences of exclusion, domination and popular images of 'foreignness'. This was achieved by the symbolic ritualisation of the *Nyau* initiation rites where members have to drink chicken blood and undergo required training.[14] This shared initiation experience, emotion, symbolism, masked dances and secrecy generated a collective bond within the Nyau community.

Nyau deeply entrenched itself within Zimbabwean local communities following the government's accommodation of the dance as part of local culture through invitations to perform at national and local functions from the mid-1980s onwards. This mimicked the promotion of Chewa culture by Kamuzu Banda in independent Malawi. Curran (2005) argues that Banda used *Nyau* to maintain political power at a national level. It graced national functions in becoming the face of Banda's presidential rallies. Likewise, the ZANU-PF government sought to exploit the dances' popularity on migrant-dominated farms and mines. As a result, the dances were performed weekly or sometimes daily on farms, plantations, mines and towns. They ordinarily took place on Friday and Saturday nights, followed by a Sunday afternoon performance, though they could be performed on any day of the week.[15] Resultantly, *Gule Wamkulu* became a common feature at Zimbabwean public holidays, anniversaries, national events such as the Independence, Workers and Heroes celebrations, cultural festivals, at special functions or community gatherings such as funerals,

weddings and the initiation of members. *Nyau*'s popularity was further enhanced by the 25 November 2005 classification and inscription of the *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* dance as one of the 90 masterpieces of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity, a programme by UNESCO to preserve intangible cultural heritage.[16] The significance of this proclamation was not only confined to Malawi but also reverberated across the Southern African region where multitudes of Malawian immigrants, a large number of whom are products the colonial labour migration system, have continued with the *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* practice and its associated cults/rites. The UNESCO listing thus resonated with all the *Nyau* and *Gule Wamkulu* custodians and practitioners in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique who have maintained the tradition for generations.

Numerous *Nyau* dance clubs emerged after Zimbabwean independence such that, by the late 1990s, about 450 dance groups existed in Zimbabwe with membership in excess of 20,000 members.[17] Almost every major Zimbabwean mine, as well as migrant-dominated urban and farm localities, had a *Nyau* club. The dance groups had their own names, songs and dance routines. These include the Chegutu Nyau club, the Chitungwiza-based Amanyawa under the leadership of Albert Luke Suwane, Zikuvave Zambia from Kwekwe, Zikuvave Gure Malawi from Zvishavane, Tagwilizana in Mbare, Mufakose Gule in Mufakose, Dalny Gule in Chakari, DZ Nyau in Dzivarasekwa Harare, Kitsiyatota in Alaska and Ayrshire Mine Nyau club in Banket, amongst many others. The Zimbabwe National Dance Organisation of Gure, under the presidency of Kennedy Kachuruka, administered the community of *Nyau* dancers. The organisation represents traditional dancers and has a mandate to preserve their culture.

Nyau groups usually dominate traditional dance competitions such as the *Chibuku Neshamwari* traditional dance competition, which has been held in collaboration between Delta Beverages, Zimbabwe Traditional Dancers Association and the National Arts Council of Zimbabwe. Inaugurated in 2001, the competition has become a lucrative high-stakes event. It has managed to bring different cultural dance groups from across Zimbabwe together, giving people a glimpse of how elders used to entertain as well as convey several messages, rituals, customs and taboos through dance. Some *Nyau* dance groups have received sponsorship from their employers on farms and mines across Zimbabwe. At Ayrshire Mine near Banket in Mashonaland West Province, the local club receives sponsorship for its uniforms, transport and subsistence from the Mine and normally performs for entertainment during weekends. The group sometimes travels to neighbouring mining communities such as Muriel, Arcturus, Mhangura and Alaska for performances.[18]

It was from these gatherings and performances that *Nyau* dance groups began to generate income in cash and kind to survive the Zimbabwean crisis. The *Chibuku Neshamwari* competition was particularly lucrative. For example, on Saturday 14 May 2016, the Mbare based *Nyau* dance outfit, Agure Maramure or Maramure Gure won the *Chibuku Neshamwari* annual provincial traditional dance competition at Warren Park 1 Bar in Harare after stiff competition and battling it out for top honours

with more than ten other traditional dance groups from Harare Province. The group walked away with US$500 while second-placed Pasichgare of Glen Norah pocketed US$300, who staged a medley of *Isithsikithsa*, *Mbende*, *Muchongoyo* and *Mbakumba* dances.[19] Another *Nyau* dance group Kondanani of Dzivarasekwa went home with US$200 for clinching third position. Other *Nyau* dance groups that took part in the festival were Dedza Chitandizo Gure, Gasani Moto and Landilani Amanyau. The Maramure leader was ecstatic about winning the competition, with his goal being to win the national festival, saying it was just the beginning as they sought to claim the top position at national level: 'Winning at provincial level is good for us as we have already booked our ticket to the national finals and this prize money will be shared equally among our members for their upkeep', he said.[20]

Indeed, national finals were more rewarding. Five years before Maramure Gure had won the provincial event, another *Nyau* dance outfit from Harare, the Villa 1 Nyau group beat nine other traditional dance groups on 3 September 2011, and walked away with the prize money of US$4,000 at the *Chibuku Neshamwari* Traditional Dance Festival which was held at the Harare Gardens.[21] Umkhathi Theatre Works, a *sepata* dance group which was representing the Bulawayo Province, settled for second position and walked away with US$3,000 while Budiriro Cultural Arts (Mashonaland West), a *mbakumba* dance group, came third and walked away US$2,000 richer.[22] Other groups which participated were drawn from the country's 10 provinces and performed to different traditional dances including: *sepata*, *jerusarema*, *amabhiza*, *chihodha*, *bira*, *dinhe* and *gure*; and included Redwing Mine (Manicaland), Zevezeve (Mashonaland), Black Amakhwezi (Matabeleland North), How Mine (Matabeleland South), Lundi Dance Group (Masvingo), Mangoma Ngaatsve (Mashonaland Central) and Malawi Globe and Phoenix (Midlands).[23]

Financial proceeds from provincial and national competitions proved critical for *Nyau* members in navigating the economic meltdown. Some went as far as buying tangible properties from their winnings. When Villa 1 Nyau won its US$4,000 in the 2011 *Chibuku Neshamwari* festival, its leader Kennedy Kachuruka used his portion of the money and other savings from other performances to eventually buy a car a year later, on 20 June 2012.[24] The reward in foreign currency was also useful in Zimbabwe's hyper-inflationary environment of 2008 as *Nyau* members could exchange it for the almost worthless Zimbabwean currency at huge margins: 'We used to exchange (burn) our American dollars with forex dealers on the streets and get large amounts of the Zimbabwe dollar at a profit', said Kachuruka. Some even used the forex to become money changers on the streets, which has continued to be a lucrative informal business in an unstable Zimbabwe economy.

Nyau female support singers also used income from the groups to sustain their families with some wisely investing in other informal business such as vending, cross-border trading and kindred societies. Emma Banda of Tagwilazana Nyau group stated that, in 2014, 'I invested the income that we got as our share for singing for the *Nyau* dancers around Harare into vending of vegetables, a business that I still use to sustain my family'.[25] Laiza Phiri went into cross-border trading buying groceries and clothes

from South Africa and Zambia for resale in Harare.[26] Some women joined hands using their *Nyau* income to establish a mutual kindred welfare society. As Esther Chaponda, Alice Malunga, Violet Chiromo and Asiyatu Kwenda (who sang for the Aryshire Mine Nyau club) note, 'we realised that we could increase our savings and purchasing power from the *Nyau* income by establishing a self-help club in 2009 where we sometimes buy groceries in bulk or give money at intervals to members for the welfare of their families.'[27] Regarding such welfare societies in Zimbabwe more broadly, Hall (1987: 49) notes that they 'provided mutual help and were examples of self-reliance in practice that generally offered a measure of financial security in the event of bereavement and also catered for some of the other social needs of their members.' Thus, the current *Nyau* societies functioned as self-supporting social networks that assisted members during the crisis.

While regular *Nyau* performances on farms, mines and urban residential areas mainly during weekends traditionally provided a regular source of cash income for the members, the crisis saw rewards taking the form of in-kind payments. As the crisis intensified in 2008 with food shortages and hyperinflation becoming the order of the day, *Nyau* groups increasingly accepted food packages and other sellable goods as rewards during performances. As Harare based Tagwilizana Nyau member, Admire Banda, narrates, 'between 2006 and 2008 we could no longer accept the Zimbabwe currency due to inflation and were left with little option but to receive food donations as rewards during our routine dances.'[28] Audiences came with groceries such as mealie-meal, salt, sugar and beer amongst other basic foodstuffs to give out to *Nyau* dancers during events. Performing at anniversaries, Zimbabwean national events and other functions or community gatherings also guaranteed at least basic foodstuffs and thus became a common tactic to survive the crisis.

Additionally, *Nyau* offered employment opportunities to desperate Malawians during the crisis. Faced with unprecedented job losses due to the land reform and industrial shutdowns on the farms and mines, some migrant descendants turned to their *Nyau* dancing skills to obtain alternative employment across Zimbabwe. Going by the *Nyau* moniker, Tsemura Ndinde, Brian Kanjanda was able to get employed at Dalny Mine in Chakari near Kadoma in 2005 because of his *Nyau* membership.[29] Having grown up and worked at a former white commercial farm prior to fast track land reform, Edward Malunga used his *Nyau* dancing prowess and membership to gain employment at Aryshire Mine in Banket at the height of the crisis in 2008. He narrates that after he lost his job at Peji farm and became destitute, he went to Aryshire mine and joined the local *Nyau* club, and it was during his first dancing performance (which thrilled the audience) that an impressed mine manager, News Phiri, decided to offer him a job on the spot.[30] Malunga had never worked on a mine but his skills gave him the chance to escape poverty and earn a steady income as a mine worker. News Phiri's ambition was to turn the Aryshire Mine Nyau club into a formidable outfit through consistent sponsorship and methodical recruitment of excellent dancers from surrounding farms and mines. This he did by recruiting and employing such brilliant performers as Aaron Wemba from Muriel mine, Isaac

and Lameck Chaponda from Sutton mine and Papura Kamuchikunda from Hydock farm.[31] As Kamuchikunda remembers, getting a job at Aryshire through *Nyau* was uplifting because it not only rescued him from the ravages of Zimbabwe's economic meltdown but also significantly increased his income as compared to his previous farm wage. He indicated that his salary increased almost tenfold from about US$30 at Hydock farm to close to US$300 at Ayrshire mine and this went a long way in sustaining himself as well as his extended family (relatives) during the crisis.[32]

Through its entertainment value, *Gule Wamkulu* also had a therapeutic function for its audience and dancers during the Zimbabwean crisis. A *Gule Wamkulu* performance brought people together in times of celebration and mourning. It made people to briefly forget about the daily political and economic hardships after 2000. The practice became part of the everyday cosmology, or what David Chaney termed 'part of daily activities that are so widely shared … that they have become unremarkable' (Chaney 2002: 34). *Nyau* weekend performances and festivals such as the *Chibuku Neshamwari* became a way of passing time and not only brought excitement and thrills to the large crowds but helped in relieving the stress and trauma of Zimbabwe's political and economic meltdown: 'It's quite exciting because it is the only entertaining activity on a Sunday … At times, electricity will be gone so we will be just killing time,' said Tatenda Masayiti, a Unit L resident of Chitungwiza.[33]

11.5 Conclusion

In the two decades that the Zimbabwean political and economic quagmire has panned out, ordinary citizens and communities have responded to the crisis varyingly. The crisis historiography has extensively captured the resultant strategies showing how communities employed various everyday socio-economic mechanisms to survive the Zimbabwean crisis. However, by emphasising how ethnic minorities have uniquely deployed their cultural motif as an alternative economic livelihood, this chapter has punctured the orthodox crisis narrative in showcasing how culture has been instrumentalised in becoming part of the multiple forms of making ends meet. In the face of a crisis that systematically obliterated the proletarianised livelihoods of migrant minorities on commercial farms, industrial complexes and mines, Malawian descendants, who for decades have been living on the margins of the Zimbabwean nation, have ingeniously and distinctly engaged their *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* cultural dance to navigate economic challenges in the new millennium. *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* became a critical source for income generation through performances during weekends, anniversaries and competitions. *Nyau* members generated revenue as well as received rewards in kind such as food hampers. Not only did *Nyau* help in relieving stress of the audience during the crisis, but it also enabled many to acquire gainful employment through their dancing skills. Others also manged to use the proceeds

from the practice to establish self-help societies as well as venture into informal businesses such as vending and cross-border trading. In a way, the *Nyau*/*Gule Wamkulu* culture became an economic weapon of the weak for its Malawian practitioners which, in their 'state of unbelonging', became pivotal in offering a unique platform for economic survival during Zimbabwe's economic meltdown.

Notes

1. Interview with Isaac Chaponda, Leader of Ayrshire Mine *Nyau* Club, Ayrshire Mine, Banket, 18 July 2021.
2. National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ) S715/1, Chinyao Dance, CID Salisbury, Chinyao Dance at Shamva Mine, 20 September 1926.
3. National Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter NA) CO525/201/1, Report of the Central African Council, 1947; NA CO936/62/3, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, and Director of Native Development, 1948; NA CO936/62/3, Report of the Commissioner of Native Labour, 1949; NAZ S2960, Department of Native Labour, Male Non-Indigenous Natives in Employment, 1951; NA CO936/62/3, Report of the Commissioner of Native Labour, 1949.
4. "*Machona*: Come Back Home," *Mutende*, 21, November 1937; Malawi National Archives (hereafter MNA) Com8/1, Report on the Commission to Enquire into Emigrant Labour (Travers Lacey Report), 1935.
5. NA CO525/193/5, Nyasaland Native Labour: Recruitment for the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Creech Jones personal minutes on Recruitment of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Labour, 1947.
6. NAZ S308, Native Commissioner Lomagundi at Sinoia: Miscellaneous, 01 August 1916 - June 25 1935.
7. NAZ/S235/392–393, Native Dances and Immorality, Chief Native Commissioner, Sgd. H.M.G. Jackson, Salisbury, Circular Letter No. C551/4150/N/M, 02 September 1930.
8. Percy Zvomuya, "Of Power, Presidents and Medicine Men," *Mail and Guardian*, 20 April 2011.
9. Interview with Aaron Wemba, Member of Ayrshire Mine *Nyau* Club, Ayrshire Mine, Banket, 18 July 2021.
10. Interview with Edward Malunga, Deputy Leader of Ayrshire Mine *Nyau* Club, Ayrshire Mine, Banket, 18 July 2021.
11. Interview with Edward Malunga.
12. Interview with Lameck Chaponda, Nyau Member, Ayrshire Mine, Banket, 18 July 2021.
13. Interview with Isaac Chaponda.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview with Edward Malunga.
16. http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/src/Leaflet-2011_inscriptions-EN.pdf. Intangible cultural heritage includes practices, representations, expressions, knowledge and know-how that communities recognise as part of their

cultural heritage. Passed down from generation to generation, it is constantly recreated by communities in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, providing them with a sense of identity and continuity. *Gule Wamkulu* dance was declared a world heritage under the UNESCO cultural tradition list of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity on 25 November 2005. The dance was put on the Representative List under the 2003 Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions under which Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique are signatories. The UNESCO listing was important for all the regional *Gule Wamkulu* custodians and practitioners who have stuck to the tradition for generations.

17. Andrew Moyo, "*Nyau* Gun for Prophet Magaya," *Sunday Mail*, 17 May 2015.
18. Interview with Isaac Chaponda.
19. https://www.herald.co.zw/maramure-gure-wins-chibuku-dance-showcase.
20. Ibid.
21. https://www.newsday.co.zw/2011/09/2011-09-04-harare-group-wins-chibuku-neshamwari-national-finals/.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Interview with Kennedy Kachuruka, Dzivarasekwa, Harare, 11 July 2021.
25. Interview with Emma Banda, Mbare, Harare, 11 July 2021.
26. Interview with Laiza Phiri, Mbare, Harare, 11 July 2021.
27. Focus group discussion with Esther Chaponda, Alice Malunga, Violet Chiromo and Asiyatu Kwenda, Aryshire Mine, Banket, 18 July 2021.
28. Interview with Admire Banda, Mbare, Harare, 11 July 2021.
29. Interview with Brian Kanjanda, Chakari, 25 July 2021.
30. Interview with Edward Malunga.
31. Interview with Isaac Chaponda.
32. Interview with Papura Kamuchikunda, Aryshire Mine, Banket, 18 July 2021.
33. A. Rushesha, *Nyau* Dancers Gain Popularity, https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/10/nyau-dancers-gain-popularity/, 30 October 2012.

References

Bell D (2010) Mask makers and their craft: an illustrated worldwide study. McFarland and Company, Jefferson, NC

Boeder RB (1974) Malawians abroad; the history of labour emigration from Malawi to its neighbours, 1890 to the present. DPhil Thesis, Michigan State University

Bond P, Manyanya M (2003) Zimbabwe's plunge: exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism and the search for social justice. Weaver Press, Harare

Chaney D (2002) Cultural change and everyday life. Palgrave, London

Chiumbu S, Musemwa M (eds) (2012) Crisis! what crisis? The multiple dimensions of the Zimbabwean crisis. HSRC Press, Cape Town

Curran D (2005) The Elephant has four hearts: Nyau masks and ritual. Presentation House Gallery, Vancouver
Daimon A (2008) Migrant Chewa identities and their construction through *Gule Wamkulu* dances in Zimbabwe. In: Bahru Z (ed) Society, state and identity in African history. Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa
Daimon A (2014) Politics of othering and the struggle for citizenship in independent Zimbabwe: voices from Malawian descendants. Africa Insight 44:1
Daimon A (2016) ZANU (PF)'s manipulation of the 'Alien' vote in Zimbabwean elections: 1980–2013. S Afri Histor J 68:1
Daimon A (2018) 'Totemless Aliens': the historical antecedents of the anti-Malawian discourse in Zimbabwe, 1920s–1979. J South Afr Stud 44(6):1101
de Aguilar LB (1994) *Nyau* masks of the Chewa: an oral historical introduction. Soci Malawi J 47(2): 3–14
de Aguilar LB (1996) Inscribing the mask: interpretation of *Nyau* masks and ritual performance among the Chewa of Central Malawi. University Press, Fribourg
Gelfand M (1961) Migration of African labourers in Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1890–1914. Cent Afr J Med 7:8
Gough A (2004) The Chewa. http://www.peoplesoftheworld.org/hosted/chewa
Groves Z (2012) Urban migrants and religious networks: Malawians in colonial salisbury, 1920 to 1970. J South Afr Stud 38(3):491–511
Hall N (1987) Self-reliance in practice: a study of burial societies in Harare, Zimbabwe. J Soc Dev Afr 2:1
Hammar A, Raftopoulos B, Jensen S (eds) (2003) Zimbabwe's unfinished business: rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis. Weaver, Harare
Jones J (2010) Nothing is straight in Zimbabwe': the rise of the Kukiya-kiya economy 2000–2008. J South Afr Stud 36(2):285–299
Kaspin D (1993) Chewa visions and revisions of power: transformations of the *Nyau* dance in Central Malawi. In: Comaroff J, Comaroff J (eds) Modernity and its malcontents: ritual and power in postcolonial Africa. Chicago University Press, Chicago
Kerr D (1995) African popular theatre: from pre-colonial times to the present day. James Currey, London
Linden I (1974) Catholics, peasants and Chewa resistance in Nyasaland: 1889–1939. Heinemann, London
Linden I (1975) Chewa initiation rites and Nyau societies: the use of religious institutions in local politics at Mua. In: Ranger T, Weller J (eds) Themes in the Christian history of Central Africa. Heinemann, London
Mano W, Willems W (2010) Debating 'Zimbabweanness' in diasporic internet forums: technologies of freedom? In: McGregor J Primorac R (eds) Zimbabwe's new diaspora: displacement and the cultural politics of survival. Berghahn, Oxford
Mason PR (2009) Emerging problems in infectious diseases: Zimbabwe experiences the worst epidemic of Cholera in Africa. J Infect Dev Ctries 3(2):148–151
Mlambo A, Raftopoulos B (2010) The regional dimensions of Zimbabwe's multi-layered crisis: an analysis. Paper presented at the Election Processes, Liberation Movements and Democratic Change in Africa, Maputo, Mozambique
Mukonyora I (2000/01) Marginality and protest in the sacred wilderness: the role of women in shaping Masowe thought pattern. South Afri Fem Rev 4(2): 1–10
Nyambi O (2013) Nation in crisis: alternative literary representations of Zimbabwe post-2000. PhD Thesis, Stellenbosch University
Parry R (1999) Culture, and class: the African experience in Salisbury: 1892–1935. In: Raftopoulos B, Yoshikuni T (eds) Sites of struggle: essays in Zimbabwe's urban history. Weaver Press, Harare, pp 66–77
Phimister I (2005) Rambai Makashinga (continue to endure)': Zimbabwe's unending crisis. S Afr His J 54(1):112–126

Pilossof R (2012) The unbearable whiteness of being: farmers' voices from Zimbabwe. Weaver Press, Harare
Primorac R, Chan S (eds) (2007) Zimbabwe in crisis: the international response and the space of silence. Routledge, London
Raftopoulos B, Phimister I (2004) Zimbabwe now: the political economy of crisis and coercion. Hist Mater 12:4
Raftopoulos B (2009) The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998–2008. In: Raftopoulos B, Mlambo A (eds) Becoming Zimbabwe: a history from the pre-colonial period to 2008. Weaver Press, Harare
Rutherford B (2008) Conditional belonging: farm workers and the cultural politics of recognition in Zimbabwe. Dev Chang 39(1):73–99
Sachikonye L (2003) The situation of commercial farm workers after land reform in Zimbabwe. A Report Prepared for the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe
Schoffeleers M (1972) The meaning and use of the name Malawi in oral traditions and pre-colonial documents. In: Pachai B (ed) The early history of Malawi. North-Eastern University Press, Evanston
Schoffeleers M (1976) The *Nyau* societies: our present understanding. Soc Malawi J 29:1
Southall R (2013) Liberation movements in power: party and state in southern Africa. University of KwaZulu Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg
Wolmer W (2007) From wilderness vision to farm invasions: conservation and development in Zimbabwe's South East Lowveld. James Currey, Oxford

Anusa Daimon is a postdoctoral fellow with the International Studies Group (ISG) at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa. His research interests include migration, diaspora, citizenship, minorities, borders, belonging, culture, state and politics in Africa. He has published on these themes in numerous journals and is currently working on a book monograph on Malawians in Southern Africa. He has worked closely with the Council for Development and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Harry Guggenheim Foundation.

Chapter 12
Changing Livelihoods and Coping Strategies Among Ethnic Minorities and the Manyikas in the Honde Valley Borderlands Since the 1970s

Nicholas Nyachega and Vongai Olivia Sagonda

Abstract Borderland livelihoods are always impacted, in significant ways, by the changing economic and socio-political developments in both the "edges" and the "inlands" of the state. In this chapter, we explore how the Honde Valley's ethnic minority groups of Ndau, Malawian and Mozambican origins, as well as the majority Shona families of Manyika roots undertook various forms of livelihoods from the late 1970s to 2020. Although historically diversified, working in the tea plantations, subsistence farming, small businesses and cross-border trading have always remained central to the Honde Valley communities' livelihoods. The Zimbabwean economic and political crisis that started in the early 2000s affected the operations of tea estates such as Aberfoyle and Katiyo where most im/migrant families worked. The crisis affected the livelihoods of people of foreign roots and the locals too. However, for the locals, banana farming became the main source of their livelihoods, leading to what has been termed the Honde Valley "banana boom" which started in the early 2000s. While the banana boom has witnessed a significant transformation of the Honde Valley people's livelihoods, it has been characterised by many challenges, including land disputes, unstable markets and state meddling in the face of Zimbabwe's deteriorating economic and political contexts.

Keywords Honde Valley · Borderlands · Livelihoods · Manyika · Ndau · Mozambicans · Malawians

N. Nyachega (✉)
Department of History, University of Minnesota, 1110 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave S, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA
e-mail: nyach006@umn.edu

V. O. Sagonda
Department of History, Heritage and Knowledge Systems, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

K. Helliker et al. (eds.), *Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe*,
Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94800-9_12

12.1 Introduction

On 19 January 2021, it was reported that a parastatal organisation named Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA) Katiyo arbitrarily slashed villagers' crops which included maize, bananas, yams, avocado pears and sugarcane in the Honde Valley along the Mozambican border. The parastatal wanted to construct "a perimeter fence" boundary to protect its estate lands.[1] A few months after this incident, another community (Chilonga) near the southern-eastern border of Zimbabwe, in Chiredzi, was also reported to be facing displacement from their ancestral homelands to set aside land for lucerne grass production for stockfeed. In Chiredzi, thousands of people on 12,940 hectares of Chilonga communal land were given a legal notice to "leave immediately unless they acquire fresh rights of use or occupation to that land" (Mavhinga 2021). In Honde Valley, following the Katiyo incident, the villagers wanted ARDA, the local Mutasa Rural District Council and the Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement Minister (Anxious Masuka) to be held accountable for the slashed crops and interdicted from encroaching into their homelands.

ARDA Katiyo's management justified its actions, arguing that the villagers were trespassers whose livelihood activities undermined the power of the estate. The map of ARDA Katiyo, as villagers recently learned from the estate's representatives, showed that the estate "was so big that their homesteads and fields were under the estate's map". As narrated by Dafren, a migrant of Nyasa (Malawian) origin who lives in Mazirwe village along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, near Katiyo,

> We were told that our homes are under ARDA Katiyo's land. All those living in the Mazirwe area, from Nyamukombe River up to the Kamba area, have been warned to look for other places where they can be moved. It has been said that the Binya road is the boundary of Katiyo to the north and, to the eastern side of Mazirwe, the boundary would be the Rwera River and Pungwe River junction. This is surprising news to me. Since I came here during the 1960s, no one told us about these boundaries. We had lived in the keeps [protected villages] from 1976 to 1980 [during the war], and we were given new places to settle at independence by the village heads. I did not know that someone would one day tell us to leave this place. Is this what we fought for? We were here first before Katiyo. (Interview)

Another Honde Valley resident, but of (Barwe) Mozambican origin (Mr. Manyanga), who in fact lives on the Mozambican side of the border noted that,

> As a village head in this area, I have under my jurisdiction, people who live on both sides of the border. The news about Katiyo, and the possible displacement that the people living near Katiyo are facing, is not only sad, but an example of how things are very uncertain for us who live in the border [area]. When war comes, we are always in difficult situations. When RENAMO came, they attacked us in the border villages. Now, it is Katiyo, and they want people moved. I hope that the responsible authorities can intervene and help people. No one wants to lose their homes. This land is fertile, and it will be difficult for people to get an equivalent of this land. There are good rains, food, and everything you want throughout the year. We live from our land. Where can you get this Honde richness elsewhere in Zimbabwe? (Interview)

Both Dafren and Manyanga's stories, and the recent developments in the Honde Valley area, highlight the predicaments, uncertainties and insecurities that communities along borders (or borderland communities) have always faced in the light of state-sponsored projects or even non-state initiatives and developments. Understandably, scholars of borders in Africa have long investigated the creation and character of African borders, including their policing aspects, conflicts and permeability, to demonstrate that borders are barriers and conduits vis-à-vis nation-states (Asiwaju 1985; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). Others have explored borders as constraints by emphasising the centrality of experiences of violence and suffering especially during wars and crises (Schmidt 2013; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013). However, there is an uncharted story of livelihoods along territorial borders among groups labelled as ethnic minorities.

Using the case study of the rural Honde Valley borderland communities stretched along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, we investigate the changing borderland livelihoods and coping strategies among several ethnic minorities such as the Ndaus from Chipinge, Nyasas and Chewas from Malawi and Barwes from Mozambique, since the 1970s. Because these ethnic minorities live in an area inhabited by the Manyika people, who are the ethnic majority of the Honde Valley populations, we explore the livelihood experiences of ethnic minorities vis-as vis those of the Manyikas. While the Honde Valley has people of Ndebele origin, whose existence in the region can be traced to the long history of trans-territorial migrations during the nineteenth century, it is almost impossible to clearly identify them. The Rhodesia officials for Katiyo Tea Estates reported in 1972 that:

> The tribal population of the valley has never been large, the majority being of Shona extraction. There are a few Ndebele descendants of Lobengula's Impis who, when they failed to carry out his orders in the area, decided to settle rather than return to Matabeleland and face the royal wrath. (NAZ, Katiyo Tea Estates, *Rhodesia Calls* No. 96, March 1976: 33)

Our study shows that Zimbabwe–Mozambique borderlands are zones of opportunities, where communities of different ethnicities have historically exploited various social-economic and political boundaries to earn a living. Existing strands of scholarship principally emphasise experiences of violence and suffering in the Zimbabwe–Mozambique borderlands, and thus our study revises a long-held notion that borders are "barriers", "battlefields" and "bloodlands". Borders are an everyday reality, yet they become irrelevant or at best insignificant when livelihoods and identity formations are embedded in local perspectives and local circumstances. As Hoehne and Feyissa (2010) argue, borders are frequently of no importance when transnational and global processes of exchanges and identity formations are considered.

We argue that borderland livelihoods in the Honde Valley have been historically conditioned by the fluidity and porousness of the border(s) since the colonial period. Because the Honde Valley region is highly "unpoliced", people from either side of the border engage in various socio-economic and political activities that have enabled them to sustain their livelihoods since the establishment of the Anglo-Portuguese colonial border in 1891. Although the livelihoods of Honde Valley's ethnic minority and majority groups are historically diverse, *maricho* (piece jobs), working on the tea

plantations, subsistence farming and banana farming are central to their livelihoods. Im/migrant families have also become entrepreneurs, selling second-hand clothes and *mabakayawo* (dried fish) that they obtained from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Zambia. Their livelihoods, overall, are influenced by the historical socio-economic and political relationships that transcend national boundaries.

12.2 Interdependent Borderlands and Cross-Border Networks

Conceptually, we view the Honde Valley as an interdependent borderland, an area that offers many corridors of opportunities. In particular, interdependent borderlands create many options for border people to establish socio-economic and political networks across state boundaries (Asiwaju and Adeniyi 1989). In the Honde Valley borderlands, as Nyachega (2016) argues, borderlanders establish for themselves various frontiers of opportunities and sanctuaries for self-determination, even in the context of heightened state surveillance and wartime situations. Often, the everyday activities of the borderlanders are viewed within state lenses of criminality. Such views obscure the enduring socio-economic and political networks that state borders have historically sought to undermine since the colonial period. Historians of borders and borderlands have thus argued that the creation of colonial borders and the subsequent enforced partitioning of ethnic populations did not entail an end to fluid migrations and interactions between ethnically related communities residing on either side of borders (Nugent 2019; Eilenberg and Wadley 2009). Global scholarship on borderlands also highlights how the interdependent nature of borderlands turns borderlands into centres of ordinary people's livelihoods rather than peripheries of state power (Zartman 2010; Scorgie 2013).

Because borders and border controls exist as an everyday reality, borderland communities such as the Honde Valley engage with state borders in ways that challenge fixed ideas of nation-states and technologies of state control. As Herbst (1989) argues, state borders do not resonate fully with people's daily lives, expectations and beliefs, and thus borderlands become contested spaces, places of both constraints and opportunities (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). In everyday life, border communities practice different kinds of "daily cross-border commuter migrations" (Daimon 2016: 4) that enable them to sustain their livelihoods. In Honde Valley, as this study shows, while borders impose restrictions on people's livelihood choices and mobilities, creating insecurities especially during wars, they are also corridors of opportunities. As well, in the Honde Valley, cross-border ethnic relations play a very important role in structuring borderland populations' everyday socio-economic and political strategies. Because the Honde Valley populations have overlapping ethnic relations that cut across the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, traceable indeed to as far as Zambia and Malawi, their livelihoods are usually shaped by their cross-border ethnic relations and kinship ties that state borders tend to disregard.

In the Honde Valley, people have enduring cross-border networks that help them forge imaginative livelihood strategies even in the most difficult circumstances of war. The ways in which cross-border connections and disconnections shape the enterprising perspectives of individuals and their communities for purposes of exploiting the various corridors of opportunities that borders and borderlands offer has been illuminated by a number of scholars (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996; Martinez 1994; Daimon 2016; Musoni 2016). However, very little is known about how groups characterised as ethnic minorities rely on their historical cross-border networks that not only shape but transform their livelihoods. While cross-border networks can be volatile and dangerous, narratives from Honde Valley's minority groups, mostly Ndaus but also Nyasas and Barwes, reveal how their cross-border networks and their lives as "dual citizens" provide many livelihood options. At the same time, while many people use their cross-border networks, and exploit local authorities including chiefs to validate either or both their "foreignness" and Zimbabweanness, very few officially hold two national identity cards or passports.

12.3 Methodological Note

Our independent research projects happened at different times and were shaped by different research questions, but we recently discovered the intellectual interests we shared. Nyachega (2016) focussed on the experiences of Honde Valley communities during the Zimbabwe war of liberation, extending the narratives beyond the war, violence and suffering accounts. Sagonda (2019, 2021) has examined the history of banana farming and African entrepreneurs in Honde Valley. The questions and methodological approaches we employed in our previous researches inspired us to combine our research, themes and understandings for this current study.

The current study builds on a mixed-method approach to historical sources, originally an outgrowth of the "triangulation of methods" argument (Dunning et al. 2008). One main goal of triangulation is to confirm a study's results by using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The sources used for this study include primary and secondary sources, ranging from interviews, archival sources and published literature mainly on borderland livelihoods.

We examined data gathered from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter, NAZ). Most of the archival files record events which happened on tea estates during the war, mainly terrorist atrocities against minority ethnic groups. Other archival files provide insights into how colonial officials perceived the experiences of the Honde Valley people especially during the early years of the establishment of tea estates in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, they show how the Zimbabwean liberation war disturbed the livelihoods of the Honde Valley inhabitants. The Rhodesian newspapers consulted also document the livelihoods of the Honde Valley inhabitants in the Protected Villages (PVs) or keeps which were established during the liberation war as part of Rhodesia's counterinsurgency measures.

Though archival sources were useful in many ways, the co-creation of oral histories has been an intrinsic part of our methodology. While oral sources have social content, and hidden and multiple meanings, they offer an obvious although not always easily accessible opportunity to incorporate people's voices into our scholarship (Isaacman 1990). Oral sources have provided us with views of the complexities of everyday life; how shared border life experiences change over time and how borderlanders re-imagine their social, economic and political sovereignties in response to state projects, wars and economic crises. As Maynes et al. (2008) argue, oral sources like personal narratives vary greatly, yet they can provide unique insights into the connections between individual life trajectories and collective experiences beyond the individual when carefully read. Although oral sources can be very subjective and are also affected by memory loss, they enabled us to understand aspects of everyday life experiences that state archives and other historiographies have overlooked.

In co-creating oral histories, we interviewed people who identified as indigenous Manyika, Mozambican, Ndau and Malawian im/migrants. We co-created these oral histories through interviewing people from Sagambe, Chavhanga, Aberfoyle, Katiyo Muparutsa, Murara and Hauna (see list at end of chapter). The stories of people like Mr. Dafren and Manyanga (above), both retired migrant workers who once worked at the Aberfoyle tea estates, but now seriously engaged banana farmers, have helped us shape our arguments. Their stories facilitate a critical examination of ethnic minorities' transnational and transborder connections, exploring their changing goals and desires, predicaments and triumphs in the context of changing livelihoods.

12.4 The Historical Contexts and Honde Valley Populations

Different historical contexts have shaped Honde Valley people's livelihoods as well as how individuals have responded to challenges and exploited opportunities that the borderlands offer. In precolonial times, particularly before the coming of the white settlers and the establishment of the Anglo-Portuguese (Zimbabwe-Mozambique) colonial boundary in 1891, the Honde Valley people, of both Manyika and Barwe (Makombe) descent, had a diversified economic, social and political life that was not confined to a single location. Their livelihoods were always mobile, spanning across different territories, hunting grounds, trading centres and homelands. While agriculture was important to the Honde Valley people, hunting, mining and long-distance trading formed the backbone of their everyday livelihoods.

Historians have long studied the economic activities of the Manyika people, with Machiwenyika (NAZ, MA 14/1/1), Beach (1997) and Bhila (1982) likely the most cited works. Bhila (1982), however, specifically covers Honde Valley, showing how Manyika hunters and gold miners in the Honde Valley participated in the flourishing Portuguese trade that was connected to the extensive networks of Indian Ocean trade. Beach (1997) also notes that, before the predominance of agriculture, the Manyika people were hunters, using various techniques. Farming in the Manyika region was made possible by the abundance of rich loamy soils and of water from the perennial

rivers of Odzi, Nyamukwarara, Rwera, Pungwe and others. As Nyachega (2016) notes, Honde Valley communities grew (*rukweza*) finger millet, (*mhunga*) bulrush millet, (*mapfunde*) sorghum, (*magwere*) maize and (*nyemba*) cowpeas among other crops during the rainy season in the fertile valleys of the Honde, Rwera and Pungwe rivers. While remaining diverse, their livelihoods increasingly became dominated by agriculture during the twentieth century (Nyachega 2016).

The majority of the Honde Valley populations are Manyikas whose ancestors are the original inhabitants of the area as suggested by Manyika oral traditions (see Machiwenyika, NAZ, MA 14/1/1). The minority groups are mostly of Ndau, Barwe and Nyasa origin who themselves or their forefathers came to settle in the area for different reasons including labour migration. The long history of socio-economic and political mobilities, including long-distance trade and labour migration as well as other kinds of everyday travels in the region, historically enabled people of Mozambican, Malawian and Zimbabwean origin to move back and forth across borders in search of new livelihood practices and to escape forced labour, enslavement and other evils since the precolonial period. Trans-frontier wars between the Manyika under Mutasa, the Barwe under Makombe and the Nguni under Gungunyana facilitated the movements of people across boundaries. As Manyika traditions suggest, Makombe and Gungunyana raided the Honde Valley, and some of their warriors settled in Zindi and Ngorima areas of Honde (see Machiwenyika, NAZ, MA 14/1/1). During the Zimbabwe liberation war in the 1970s, people living on the Zimbabwean side of the border escaped Rhodesian atrocities and forced villagisation programmes (i.e. keeps) by skipping the border to seek refuge in Mozambique. During the Mozambican civil war (1975–1992), a large number of Mozambicans also crossed the unpoliced border and moved into Honde Valley. In more recent times, with renewed RENAMO attacks in Mozambique, individuals of either Mozambican or Zimbabwean origin have continued to cross to Zimbabwe where they sought refuge and "new" ways to earn a living.

The Honde Valley borderlanders' lives and livelihoods have undergone several changes, adaptations and innovations over time. Difficult conditions have forced people to adopt new forms of livelihoods. For example, the drought years of 1991/1992 across Zimbabwe, known in Honde Valley as *gore rendongwe* (the year of red locusts), compelled many people to adopt and pursue new alternative livelihoods such as cross-border trading, (including selling rapoko in Mozambique), *kusunza* (begging for food from relatives) and digging *nyamutata* (a huge tuber turned into flour). As Sekuru Sauranda, a Honde Valley resident who experienced the drought noted,

> People also learned to fry bananas or pound them into powder for cooking some food closer to sadza [the staple food]. Others searched for *nyamutata* in Tangwena Mountains across the border with Mozambique. But many of the im/migrant labourers remained tea workers, and they could get food portions from the Aberfoyle, Katiyo, and Rumbizi tea estates as part of a food-for-work programme. (Interview)

The Zimbabwe economic meltdown, especially between 2000 and 2008, "pushed" members of different ethnic groups into Mozambique and other destinations such as

South Africa in search of greener pastures. Those who had remained home diversified their livelihoods, engaging in banana farming and cross-border trading in areas such as Nyandiro, Tepera, Musinzi and Honde in Mozambique. While our study highlights that banana farming changed people's lives in the Honde Valley, it also shows how the centrality of banana farming to people's livelihoods opened new challenges around land conflicts. In telling the story about the ways in which Honde Valley people earned their living, we emphasise how various contexts of historical change shaped people's lived experiences, as well as the varying coping strategies they have used overtime.

12.5 The Tea Industry and Honde Valley Livelihoods

The establishment of the Aberfoyle company by W. A. K. Igoe in 1952, and Katiyo Estates under the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Limited (TILCOR) in 1969, created many job opportunities for the locals, and for migrant labourers who had come to the Valley area as individual job seekers or had been recruited by the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB). Labour migrants, mostly Ndau, Nyasa and Barwe people, found employment in Aberfoyle (later named Eastern Highlands Plantation Limited (EHPL) in Honde Valley. Since the establishment of the tea estates, tea-picking work became a central form of livelihood for both ethnic minority and majority groups in the Honde Valley. Tea production in the area did not only provide incomes to the migrant labourers but livelihoods for the indigenous populations as well. By the end of 1969, Katiyo Estates employed approximately 170 Africans on a 300-hectare tea farm.

Most of the employees at Katiyo were of Ndau, Nyasa and Barwe origins who had come mostly from nearby Chipinge (in Zimbabwe) and Catandica (in Mozambique) and Malawi. However, considering that a large number of young local Manyika men had left for urban areas in search of better jobs, the estates used different strategies to encourage the participation of locals in the tea industry's cash economy. Katiyo aimed "to convert the local Tribesman from subsistence to cash economy level by generating employment opportunities brought about by the establishment of tea factories, processing plants and ancillary installations" (NAZ, 21,437, Katiyo Tea Estates-Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Limited: Katiyo Tea Estates Information Pamphlet 1972).

Tea growing in both Katiyo and Aberfoyle was done on land privately owned by multinational companies and the colonial state. The lands were acquired through systematic removals of Africans enabled by colonial capital and Rhodesia's Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which set the legal boundaries between "European Land" and African Land. However, outside of the private lands, tea companies such as Eastern Highlands Plantations Limited (EHPL, formerly Aberfoyle) and Katiyo Tea Estate (under TILCOR) promoted the development of a number of small-scale tea growers, locally known as out-growers, mostly in the 1980s and 1990s. To boost tea production in their estate factories, both EHPL and Katiyo supported the out-growers

scheme under which they promoted the local Honde Valley people to engage in tea farming across the Holdenby and adjoining Mutasa communal areas. The estates offered loans, farming implements and inputs (mainly fertilizers), and they bought the tea from local farmers plus providing transportation to the factories.

While the development of out-growers schemes would seem to affect the local Manyika population's labour supplies to the estates, some Manyikas continued to work in the tea estates. However, it was the migrant labourers who stayed at the estate compounds who continued to supply labour consistently to the estates even during the Zimbabwe liberation war. Thus, as the following section shows, during the Zimbabwe liberation war, guerrilla war strategies also targeted tea workers in the compounds to destabilise the operations of the tea estates.

12.5.1 Caught-in-Between: Changing Wartime Livelihoods

In December 1976, 27 people were massacred in Honde Valley in what became known as the Aberfoyle Massacre. Describing the event in the *The Rhodesian Herald* of December 1976, Brian Thomas said that the incident was nothing more than the massacre of innocent civilians, mostly migrant workers who were targeted by the "insurgents" for providing labour to the Aberfoyle Company (NAZ, *The Rhodesian Herald*, 21 December 1976). Thomas reported that:

> A Malawian man with a wife and five children said that "the terrorists have been here before, telling us not to work for the white man and when they came last night, they told us that we had disobeyed their instruction as they told us…. so they were going to shoot us". (NAZ, *The Rhodesian Herald*, 21 December 1976)

The Aberfoyle Massacre incident highlights that the late 1970s proved to be a challenging time not only for im/migrants or ethnic minority groups but for civilians broadly in various parts of Rhodesia and across the border as well. In other parts of the eastern border regions, such as Nyanga and Vumba, reports were made of "terrorist massacres". The most widely reported was the Elim Mission massacre of 23 June 1978 in Vumba.

Both the Aberfoyle and Elim Mission massacres indeed tell a story of brutal war strategies and the violence that affected the livelihoods of civilians living especially in border zones. In this respect, the shifting patterns of war strategies and counterinsurgency measures in the Zimbabwean war of liberation significantly impacted people's livelihoods regardless of ethnicity and race. Civilians were always caught in the middle, as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) report title "the man in the middle" suggested (CCJP 1977). In the case of the Honde Valley, the tea estate massacre of December 1976 and other related attacks such as the Pimayi massacre of 10 May 1976 (where Rumbizi tea workers travelling in an African Development Fund (ADF) lorry were killed in a landmine explosion) highlight the uncertainties and dangers of war for civilian populations regardless of their ethnic statuses. The war violence disrupted various forms of livelihoods among the Honde

Valley people who were working on the tea estates, as well as those who did not work on the estates. Increased attacks that targeted civilians and colonial institutions like schools, clinics and tea estate premises led the then Mutasa district commissioner, Mr. Hamish Peters, to describe the Honde Valley as a "Death Valley" (*Umtali Post*, 13 April 1977). Rhodesian reporter Chris Ashton also named Honde Valley the "Ambush Valley" (Ashton, NAZ, S/Il53).

These attacks not only affected civilians' day-to-day livelihoods but worried the Rhodesian government whose officials feared that the tea estate would lose its workers due to "terrorist attacks" (Nyachega 2016). The tea estate officials also worried about the shortage in the migrant labour supply and reduction in sales. For example, on 13 February 1976, Katiyo Estate's Financial Coordinator, A.S. Davies, wrote in his budget review, for the year 1975/76, to the Secretary for Internal Affairs, Mr. Fleming, that "a reduction in sales was anticipated because of the security situation and particularly, because labour from Mozambique is likely to be stopped from crossing into Rhodesia" (NAZ, S3700/104/3/6 Internal Affairs, Correspondence and Other Papers, Katiyo Tea Estate: Inyanga District: 1970 Jan-1976 Dec).

While the majority of reports on the Aberfoyle massacre seem to suggest that the massacre was nothing more than a callous massacre of innocent civilians by "terrorists" who wanted to sabotage Rhodesian industries, there is an ethnic dimension concealed by this narrative. Although it is not clear who the terrorists were, Rhodesia Defence Reporter, Chris Reynolds, suggested that the killings were targeted at migrant workers living in the Aberfoyle Compounds, and was carried out by "Shona speaking terrorists" (NAZ, *The Rhodesian Herald*, 21 December 1976:1). He reported that,

> Terrorists massacred 27 unarmed African workers as their wives and children watched on [at] a tea estate here on Sunday night…the terrorists, numbering between 20 and 30, entered a compound at 8.38 pm and rounded up all men, women, and children they could find…The men were forced to lie on the ground. For three or four minutes, the terrorists fired at the helpless bodies. Nine Mozambique nationals died. Eight Malawians nationals died. So did 10 Rhodesians. Eleven other men were injured, some of them Zambians.

Most guerrilla activities in the Honde Valley were directed against the plantations (Katiyo, Aberfoyle and Eastern Highlands tea estates) as well as the Rumbizi tea scheme. As Schmidt (2013) reveals, guerrillas attacked the workers and damaged the estates' equipment to curb production on the plantations. According to Schmidt (2013), the Pimayi massacre of 10 May 1976, was part of these sabotage tactics used by the guerrillas. The incident disturbed people's lives as workers were afraid to go to work. Mrs. Mapirwe of Barwe origin (in an interview) said that "they were afraid to go to work and sometimes they didn't go because they were afraid to lose their lives". On the same note, Mr. Dafren also revealed that

> It was difficult for the tea workers who lived in areas far away from the estates to come to work because they were targeted for not obeying the ZANLA [guerrilla] forces' command to stop working for the whites. (interview)

Following the Aberfoyle Massacre and several other raids on tea estates in Honde Valley, the Rhodesian government introduced the protected village (PV) scheme,

forcibly removing people from their ancestral homes to "win back the Honde Valley from the terrorists" (Ashton, NAZ, S/Il53). To this end, as Msindo and Nyachega (2019) argue, while guerrillas ardently believed that peasants would help them win the war, the Rhodesian security forces thought that depriving their opponents' access to civilians was akin to removing the fish (guerrillas) from the waters (peasantry). Dafren noted that

> Because of the need for labour mostly and to protect the indigenous and the im/migrants from the guerrilla atrocities, the Rhodesian government forcibly moved the Honde Valley inhabitants into the Protected Villages from where they could pick up tea workers to work at 6 am and return them before 6 pm in accordance with the six-to-six curfew laws. (interview)

There were several livelihood difficulties that people encountered in the fifteen PVs that were created (Schmidt 2013). The difficulties included "being denied access to their fields and hunting grounds as the Rhodesians were determined to stop the guerrilla-civilians' interactions" (interview). Yet, although Zimbabwe's liberation war transformed the Honde Valley into a new and bitterly contested frontier, characterised by hardships in PVs, civilians were innovative and realigned their lifestyles in response to—or in opposition to—the state's routine controls and guerrilla incursions at PVs (Msindo and Nyachega 2019).

12.6 Post-Liberation War Livelihoods

The year 1980 was a turning point in the history of Zimbabwe, following the attainment of political independence from white minority rule. For the Honde Valley borderland communities, independence not only marked the end of the brutal war but a return home, a moment of recovering a deep sense of belonging (Schmidt 2013). Considering that the war displaced people from their homes, disrupting livelihoods in the process, the early years of independence were also times of difficulties in terms of making choices for both ethnic minorities and the Manyikas. Many people who had been forcibly moved into PVs and those who had crossed the border into Mozambique, living in areas such as Gonakudzingwa in Tangwena and Tangwena mountains, took more than two years to even return. As noted by Mr. Chazanewako Dzinduwa, a Manyika (interview), who during the war had crossed the border into Mozambique, "a lot of people continued living across the border. They would return to the Zimbabwean side to check the situation, considering security issues, and start building homes too [in Mozambique]". Dzinduwa's narrative also reveals that some families of Mozambican origin, particularly those who had come from the Villa Catandica area during the Mozambican civil war (1975–1992), decided to stay on the Mozambican side of the border. But others, considering their Mozambican civil war experiences, decided to quickly move to the Zimbabwean side fearing that they would be targeted by RENAMO units. Njonda, a Honde Valley resident of Barwe origin, who had immigrated from Mozambique's Catandica region to escape RENAMO's forced recruitment, shared the following view:

> It was safer for me to cross the border back to independent Zimbabwe than to stay in Mozambique where anything could happen. In the forests where [RENAMO] bandits were known for brutally murdering innocent civilians, we didn't feel safe. I had left Catandica to escape RENAMO's forced recruitment, and because of REMANO's networks and intelligence, they probably knew I had moved to Rhodesia. I didn't want to take any risks, I crossed back and settled here in Kumadzi area. (interview)

For people like Njonda, there were many opportunities that came with independence and crossing the border into Zimbabwe. For members of both the majority and minority ethnic groups, returning home meant a possible return to their pre-war jobs in the Tea Estates. While some seized the opportunity to work in tea estates again, others left Honde Valley for towns in search of new jobs. However, others, as argued by Schmidt (1997), utilised the post-independence socio-economic opportunities to "heal their wounds" and to establish or adapt to the new forms of livelihoods available to themselves.

While ethnic identities heavily influenced post-war livelihoods, there was a gendered dimension to the choices people made and the livelihood opportunities they had. Men and women did not have the same choices and livelihood means in the post-independent era. The majority of local Honde Valley men left their villages looking for better jobs in towns. Dzinduwa (interview) noted that most Manyika men preferred working in hotels like Troutbeck, Sheraton and others. Others worked at the local Aberfoyle Country Club in Honde Valley as golf-carriers after independence, as did Mr. Sauranda, a Manyika (interview). However, the majority of women were left with no option than to work in the tea plantation as mostly tea-pickers. Mrs. Dirwayi (interview) recalled that, by 1980, she had four children and she needed money to take care of her family. As a widow, the only option she had was to work in the Aberfoyle plantation together with her first-born child.

12.6.1 The "Banana Boom" and Changing Livelihoods During the Economic Meltdown, 2005–2018

This section shows how borderland economic activities such as banana farming and vending transformed people's lives during an era of deteriorating economic standards and living conditions in the country. From 2005, the Honde Valley communities started to seriously engage in banana farming. There are several factors that explain the increase in banana production in Honde Valley, and why families turned to this even to the extent of replacing their tea and coffee crops with banana plants. Most of the Valley inhabitants, such as Mr. Sauranda, Mr. Dafren and Mr. Nheredzo (of Barwe origin) (interviews) removed tea and coffee trees to pave way for bananas. With the favourable local conditions of banana growing, including availability of water and rich soils, there was a sudden increase in banana farming, leading to the Honde Valley being called the "Banana Valley".

Many Honde Valley people testified how banana farming transformed their lives amidst serious economic challenges in the country. Many farmers testified that despite

practicing other forms of livelihoods (such as cross-border trading, small businesses and grocery shops), banana farming is one of the leading income sources for the Honde Valley inhabitants. For example, Mr. Chitungo (Manyika) (interview) pointed out that for close to two decades now, his family has benefited from banana farming. His wife, a professional teacher at the time of our research, highlighted that they ventured into mixed farming, bananas have given them a lot of profits since the time her husband retired from his job to work permanently on the farm (*The Sunday Mail,* 28 October 2018). Employing more than 20 permanent workers on his 9-hectare banana farm, Mr. Chitungo has won an award as the leading banana farmer, hosting a workshop at his farm in 2015 attended by one of the researchers (Nicholas Nyachega), then working as a history teacher at Muparutsa Secondary School.

Another Honde Valley farmer, Mrs. Mate (interview), a widow of Ndau origin living in the Murara area, testified that she managed to send her children to school because of the profits generated from banana farming. Another informant, Mr. Nheredzo, a Headmaster at Sagambe Primary School, said that due to an increase in banana farming locally, "more pupils are being enrolled in school and mostly their school fees are being paid in time" (interview). Nheredzo also stated that many schools are engaging in banana farming, with St. Peters Mandeya Primary, and Muterere and Gatsi Secondary, schools being most significant in this respect. This is without doubt an indication that banana farming in Honde Valley has changed for the good many aspects of Honde people's livelihoods, from individual and household level to community level, including schools. However, these shifting patterns of livelihoods, particularly tea farming and the banana boom, are not without conflicts.

12.7 "*Munyasarandi Haana Pake*"[2]: Othering, Minority Groups, Land Conflicts and Market Access

The Honde Valley people's livelihoods are deeply entrenched in the politics of "othering" with regards to land access and market opportunities. The framework of "othering" has been used often to examine the basis in human behaviour for "disliking the unlike", which can take the form of ethnocentrism, racism and xenophobia towards minority groups (Kagedan 2020). In Honde Valley, the othering of ethnic identities significantly plays out in how both Manyika groups and ethnic minorities access land and market opportunities. In addition to this, political views and associations with political parties have come to shape how individuals access or do not access opportunities. For the Honde Valley, the emergence of the Guri, Pungwe and Mapokana Tea Growers Associations reveals these dynamics of land and market access as well as the conflicts between locals and ethnic minority groups.

The Honde Valley tea out-growers produced a significant amount of tea that was being exported to other countries (Mtisi 2002). The EHPL and ARDA Katiyo Tea Estate (formerly under TILCOR), as the only two tea buyers in the Honde Valley, thus monopolised the tea market, leaving out-growers without wide choices for selling

their tea. Despite the lack of market choices, Honde Valley tea growers earned a reasonable living by selling their tea to the estate buyers. Several disagreements arose though between out-grower farmers, which were caused by market competition deeply rooted in ethnic conflicts. For example, local Manyika members of the main Honde Valley Tea Growers Association accused members of Malawian origin in the association of conspiring with the tea estate officials to cut (or lower) out-grower tea prices to get job promotions. Discussing the splits in 1988 and 1999, Mtisi (2002) notes that the leadership of the Honde Valley Tea Growers' Association (as the mother body) considered the new co-operatives (namely, Guri, Pungwe and Mapokana) as simply rebels who wanted to oust the leaders of the Honde Valley Association. Mtisi (2002) also stresses the lack of financial transparency and unpopular constitutional amendments as the main reasons for splits in this association in the late 1990s. However, from our research, three former Honde Valley Tea Growers' Association members (Mr. Paza, Mr. Mlambo and Mr. Marikopo), of Ndau and Manyika origins, emphasised ethnic conflicts and selling out to get promotions in the Estates as the main reasons leading to the splits.

The emergence of a banana regime in Honde Valley has also witnessed serious land conflicts as well as land grabs inspired by Zimbabwe's fast track land reform programme. In an interview, Mrs. Mapirwe said that, in 2000, the Aberfoyle Tea Estate was under threat by war veterans led by a man identified as Mareya, who began to claim land for agricultural activities, to which bananas were at the centre. Mareya and other war veterans like Madzitire decided to name a fertile section of the Aberfoyle in Chipote, *kuma War-Vet* ("the war veterans' area"). While it has been generally said that the Aberfoyle company lost land to the war veterans through violent means, others suggest that there was a peaceful takeover of land facilitated by the company itself in support of Zimbabwean land reform. Whether this is true or not, our research discovered that land occupiers of "the War-Vet area" excluded people of Ndau, Barwe and Nyasa origin. Only Manyika locals, led by Mareya, acquired land. One of the reasons cited by informants for the exclusion of minority ethnic groups in the land acquisition programme was that "*munyasarandi haana pake*" meaning "those of foreign roots cannot be trusted". The word *Nyasarandi* derives from Malawi's colonial name Nyasaland. In Honde Valley, the word is used for all people of foreign roots (including Mozambicans), and it is generally used for labelling anyone who stays in tea estate compounds. In this way, the "othering" of people of minority groups influence their lack of access to land.

Despite the politicisation and othering of minority ethnic groups in land access projects, some members of minority groups who do not own land in Honde Valley have resorted to buying land from local village heads and Manyika individuals, "to move out of compound life". Those who managed to acquire land through individual purchases established new homes in local villages outside of the tea estate lands, without necessarily discontinuing working for the tea estates. Some have started growing bananas around their homesteads to supplement the income they receive by working in the tea estates. Mrs. Mudzinganyama a Ndau woman (interview), who lived in the Aberfoyle tea estates, bought land from a Manyika family in Zindi village, where she started growing bananas in 2006. She further stated that "banana

production brings quick money; for example, one can just send children along the roads or to go and sell in the schools and get money to buy essentials unlike waiting for month-end salaries".

Other known farmers of Mozambican origin (like Manyanga, Belo and Mujangu—interviews) have also acquired land on the Mozambican side of the border where they have kinship connections with local authorities, or a village head locally known as *Masabhuku.* Manyanga, who is a *sabhuku* himself, expressed how land access in Mozambique and market access in Mbare (in Harare) has helped him raise his family, sending some of his children to Mozambican colleges. However, other people from other minority groups face hardships in terms of market access as

> They cannot travel to urban areas like Harare because they do not have identity cards which are frequently inspected on roadblocks, especially for farmers who travel at night. They, thus, rely local buyers [*vahodhi* or *magweja*] who come from other villages and districts. Others sell their bananas locally to companies such as FAVCO Zimbabwe, and Matanuska Zimbabwe.

12.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined changing rural livelihoods in the Honde Valley borderlands, showing how the Honde Valley's Shona families of Manyika roots and im/migrant families of Ndau, Malawian and Mozambican origins undertook various forms of livelihoods from the late 1970s to 2020. Although their livelihoods are historically diversified, working in the tea plantations, subsistence farming, small businesses and cross-border trading have always remained key to their means of living. Different historical circumstances such as war, and people's cross-border networks have shaped the livelihoods of Honde Valley communities in significant ways. Further, the establishment of tea estates such as Aberfoyle provided employment opportunities for individuals of both local origins as well as ethnic minorities who worked mostly as migrant labourers in the tea estates. The livelihoods of migrant labourers (mainly from ethnic minorities) were not limited to the boundaries of the estates. Even during the liberation war and in the face of Rhodesian state violence and counterinsurgency operations, these people forged creative livelihood strategies despite their difficult circumstances. In protected villages, small businesses emerged and people continued supplying labour to the tea estates.

In the post-independence era, and though experiencing numerous constraints such as limited access to land and markets as well as marginalisation in tea growers' associations, minority ethnic groups have exploited many opportunities. While some have bought their own land, engaging in banana farming, others have utilised their cross-border networks to trade especially during the Zimbabwe economic meltdown from the early 2000s. While the Honde Valley communities have overtime shown enterprising attitudes in different economic situations, decisions by political elites in post-colonial Zimbabwe continue to affect their livelihoods and futures. While most banana farmers currently face transport challenges due to poor road networks, as well

as unstable markets, they have managed to deal with these challenges by employing various strategies. Also, the Honde Valley residents who include both indigenous and minority groups living in the Katiyo area currently confront new predicaments and uncertain futures because of a possible forced removal from their ancestral lands by ARDA Katiyo. Not only does this affect the indigenous populations but also individuals of foreign roots who were born in the tea estates and had, as one migrant of Nyasa origin put it, "secured their futures by buying land in the villages from village heads and individuals".

Notes

1. https://twitter.com/ZLHRLawyers/status/1351534229440647169.
2. The translation for this is: "those from Nyasaland cannot be trusted".

References

Asiwaju AI (1985) Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa's international boundaries. C Hurst and Company, London

Asiwaju AI, Adeniyi PO (1989) Borderlands in Africa: a multidisciplinary and comparative focus on Nigeria and West Africa. University of Lagos Press, Lagos

Baud M, Van Schendel W (1997)Towards a comparative history of borderlands. J World Hist 8(2). University of Hawai'i Press

Beach DN (1997) The Shona economy: branches of production. In Palmer R, Parsons N (eds) The roots of rural poverty in central and southern Africa. Heinemann Educational Books, Ibadan

Bhila HK (1982) Trade and politics in a Shona kingdom: the Manyika and their African and Portuguese neighbours 1575–1902. Longman, Harlow

Daimon A (2016) Commuter migration across artificial frontiers: the case of partitioned communities along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. J Borderl Stud

Dunning H, Allison W, Sylvia A, Valorie C (2008) A mixed method approach to quality of life research: a case study approach. Soc Indic Res 85(1)

Eilenberg M, Wadley RL (April 2019) Borderland livelihood strategies: the socio-economic significance of ethnicity in cross-border labour migration, West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Asia Pac Viewp 50(1)

Gukurume S (2015) Livelihood resilience in a hyperinflationary environment: experiences of people engaging in money-burning (kubhena mari) transactions in Harare, Zimbabwe. Soc Dyn 41(2): 219–234

Herbst J (1989) The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa. Int Organ 43(4):673–692. The MIT Press, Boston

Hoehne MV, Feyissa D (2010) Borders & borderlands as resources in the horn of Africa. East Afr Stud. James Currey, Rochester

Isaacman A (1990) Peasants and rural social protest in Africa. Afr Stud Rev 33:1–120. Cambridge University Press

Kagedan A (2020) The politics of othering in the United States and Canada. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland

Korf B, Raeymaekers T (2013) Violence on the margins: states, conflicts and borderlands. Afr Borderl Stud. Palgrave Macmillan

Martinez OJ (1994) Border people: life and society in the US-Mexico borderlands. The University of Arizona Press, Tucson

Mavhinga D (2021) Chilonga evictions show government insensitivity, 12 March. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/12/chilonga-evictions-show-government-insensitivity
Maynes MJ et al (2008) Telling stories: the use of personal narratives in the social sciences and history. Cornell University Press, London
Msindo E, Nyachega N (2019) Zimbabwe's liberation war and the everyday in Honde valley, 1975 to 1979. S Afr Hist J
Mtisi JP (2002) Green harvest: the out-grower tea leaf collection system in the Monde valley. Department of Economic History, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe
Musoni F (2016) Cross-border mobility, violence and spiritual healing in Beitbridge district, Zimbabwe. J South Afri Stud 42(2):317–331
Nugent P (2019) Boundaries, communities, and state-making in West Africa: the centrality of the margins. Cambridge University Press, New York
Nugent P, Asiwaju A (1996) African boundaries: barriers, conduits, and opportunities, printer. London
Nyachega N (2016) Beyond war, violence, and suffering: everyday life in the Honde valley borderland communities during Zimbabwe's liberation war and the RENAMO insurgency, c.1960–2016. MA Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa
Pophiwa N (2012) Mobile livelihoods—the players involved in smuggling of commodities across the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. J Borderl Stud 25:2
Sagonda VO (2019) Borderland livelihoods in post-colonial Zimbabwe: a case of honde valley farmers, vendors and traders, 1980–2018. BA Special Honours Dissertation, University of Zimbabwe
Sagonda VO (2021) A history of African entrepreneurs in Honde Valley, Zimbabwe, 1980 to 2020. MA Thesis, University of Zimbabwe
Samatar A (1993) Structural adjustment as development strategy? Bananas, boom, and poverty in Somalia. Econ Geogr 69(1), African Development
Schmidt HI (1997) Healing the wounds of war: memories of violence and the making of history in Zimbabwe's most recent past. J South Afri Stud 23(2), Special Issue for Terry Ranger Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd
Schmidt HI (2013) Colonialism and violence in Zimbabwe: a history of suffering. James Currey, Woodbridge, Suffolk
Scorgie L (2013) Prominent peripheries: the role of borderlands in Central Africa's regionalized conflict. Crit Afri Stud 5(1):32–47
Scott P (1954) Migrant labor in southern Rhodesia. Geogr Rev 44(1):29–48. https://doi.org/10.2307/211784
Zartman W (2010) Understanding life in the borderlands: boundaries in depth and motion. University of Georgia Press, Georgia
Zindi E Agriculture: Honde valley going bananas. https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/agriculture-honde-valley-going-bananas

Archival Files

NAZ, S/Il53 Illustrated Life in Rhodesia, 1978, Protected Villages: Chris Ashton Visits the Honde Valley, Vol 11, No. 4
NAZ, 'One man died- my father', The Rhodesian Herald, 22 December 1976a.
NAZ, 'Terrorists massacre workers, wives and children watch 27 die', 21 December 1976b.
NAZ, 21437, Katiyo Tea Estates-Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Limited: Katiyo Tea Estates Information Pamphlet, 1972.
NAZ, Katiyo Tea Estates in *Rhodesia Calls No. 96* (March 1976).

NAZ, S3700/104/3/6 Internal Affairs, Correspondence and Other Papers, Katiyo Tea Estate: Inyanga District: 1970 Jan-1976 Dec).
NAZ, MA 14/1/1 Jason Machiwenyika, 'A history and customs of the Manyika'.

Interviews of the authors with:

Mrs. Mapirwe, Sagambe, Honde Valley, 5 December, 2018.
Mr. Boterere, Sagambe, Honde Valley, 16 December, 2018.
Mr. Dafren, Mapureti, 17 December, 2018.
Sekuru Sauranda, Sagambe, Honde Valley, 17 December, 2018.
Mbuya Dirwayi, 82 years, Sagambe, Honde Valley, 17 December, 2018.
Mr. Nheredzo, Sagambe. Honde Valley, 16 December, 2018.
Mr. Chitungo, Muparutsa, Honde Valley, 19 December, 2018.
Mrs. Mukupe, Murara, 19 December, 2018.
Mrs. Mate, Murara, Honde Valley, 19 December, 2018.
Mrs. Mudzinganyama, Eastern highlands, Honde Valley, 21 December, 2018.
Mr. John Mlambo, Aberfoyle, Honde Valley, 14 December, 2018.
Mr. Philemon Paza Aberfoyle, Honde Valley, 14 December, 2018.
Mr. Belo, Mbare Musika (market) Harare, 5 August, 2019.
Mr. George Manyanga, Mbare Musika (market) Harare, 5 August 2019.
Mr. Beneditto Njonda, Rwera, Mozambique, 2 October, 2019.
Mr. Manyanga George, Mbare Musika, Harare, 20 September , 2019.
Mr. Charles Muyambo, Mbare Musika, Harare, 20 September , 2019.
Mr. Chazanewako Dzinduwa, Chimuswe Village, Honde Valley, 06 February, 2020.

Nicholas Nyachega is a doctoral candidate in African History at the University of Minnesota. His research examines the local quotidian experiences of borderlanders living along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. In particular, he is interested in how borderlanders' everyday life goals and desires have changed over time and across space, working sometimes in harmony with, or in defiance of, nation-state apparatuses of control.

Vongai Olivia Sagonda is a student of African History at the University of Zimbabwe. Her MA thesis focuses on African entrepreneurship (small and medium) as a form of livelihood in Honde Valley. She examines in particular the history of entrepreneurship from 1980 to 2020, emphasising the social dimensions of African businesses.