Chapter 1
Introduction: Trust and Higher Education

Paul Gibbs and Peter Maassen

Introduction

It is difficult to argue compellingly against the significant progress that has been achieved in the human condition, which goes beyond improvements in the basic level of survival and economic flourishing for many. Humanity has made significant strides in moving from what was 'fate'. Inevitable we can ascribe to the university that it has played a significant part in awakening social responsibility and global citizenship, radically improving basic public services such as health care and education, understanding and addressing grand societal challenges, including climate change and energy sustainability, and encouraging and providing innovation and the knowledge which drives economic growth in a digital economy. At the same time, like many other sectors, higher education has recently been subject to a series of fundamental challenges, which confront many of its traditional values. However, we argue in this Volume that there are fundamental differences among countries when it comes to the nature and consequences of these challenges. For that purpose, the Volume will focus on two very different country cases, that is, the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway. Higher education used to be considered a public good around the world, provided by institutions, which had clear societal missions and were positioned outside the market. This, we maintain, is still the essence of higher education in Norway, but not in the UK. Overall higher education in the UK has become more public managerial than public good, resolved to be delivered in an ever more complex and competitive knowledge marketplace where value is in transferability to practice and economic value and students are revealed as skilled workers. Apart

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from the elite universities in the UK, this is a common trend in universities' strategic position as a response to government pressures. In negotiating their relationships with government, host and internal communities, trust has been subject to challenges of accountability, performativity, materialism and managerialism in ways that many consider have depleted that trust which was critical to their essential identity and the truth-telling that went with that trust, warranting the freedom afforded to academic communities. In Norway on the other hand, there is still a strong commitment to the public good nature of higher education, in a political and societal context where there is a continuous high level of trust in the public domain and the central role of public authorities, also when it comes to stimulating more competitive and market-like interactions in public sectors such as higher education.

For interpreting the impact of this growing variety among national contexts, we used Olsen's (2007: 30) four visions of university organisation and governance[1] as a means to select from the four overriding ideas, which will allow us to identify relevant differences among the countries, and the role of trust in these. The four visions interpret the University as:

1. A community of scholars – where the University is an institution with a raison d'être and constitutive normative and organisational principles of its own.
2. An instrument for national purposes – a rational tool for implementing the purposes and policies of democratically elected leaders.
3. A representative democracy – the University as an instrument for internal, not external groups.
4. A service enterprise embedded in competitive markets – where the University is an economic enterprise operating in regional or global markets

While in practice one will always be able to find elements of each vision in a national higher education governance context, in most cases one or two of the visions are dominant. We would argue that the Norwegian higher education governance approach is best illustrated by combining Visions 1, 2 & 3, and that the UK has rapidly emerged as a country where higher education governance is dominated by a type 4 Vision. This implies that we can expect to see the following differences in the constitutive logic of the systems:

- Norway being more open to freedom of expression and research of fundamental forms, whereas the UK has a growing focus on the market, competitive research funding, and transfer of valuable knowledge to industry and commerce.
- Norway's system, like the UK is predominately public but in Norway, there is tuition fee free higher education. Financial funding and grants for students in England is also significantly less attractive compared to that in Norway (European Union, 2018).

[1] The organising principles for these models are respectively: constitutive rules, command and hierarchy, bargaining and majority votes, and market prices and competitive selection (Olsen, 2007: 28–33).

- In the UK, the criteria of success for the system heavily reflect an efficiency imperative, whereas for Norway it settles more on the quality of the academic outputs.
- In Norway, its constitutive authority comes from the best qualified and in the UK from responsiveness to "stakeholders" and external exigencies.
- For the UK, change relates to entrepreneurship and adapting to changing circumstances, whereas for Norway it is mainly driven by the internal dynamics of the academy with slow reinterpretation of institutional identity.

We assume that these differences between the two higher education systems illustrate the variety of ways in which the above-mentioned challenges affect trust relationships between higher education and society at large in different national contexts. Consequently, the focus on the two different higher education cases can be expected to allow us to contribute in a meaningful way to the societal debates and the academic literature addressing the concept of trust in higher education.

Attacks on Higher Education

So what should worry us about Higher Education? We might consider this question along with Winand, who suggests that, "Among the phenomena that characterise the early twenty-first century, the most significant must be the disappearance of the landmarks that society uses to find its bearings and the increasing difficulty that individuals have in visualising an optimistic future for themselves – a feeling exacerbated by following a daily spectacle of wars and mass migrations" (Winand, 2018: 221). UNESCO seems to agree, for the quote opens a Courier article entitled Universities and the 'democracy of the gullible'. What can be inferred is that trust can be interpreted as being rhizomatic: it is the foundation of the university and it appears in predictable places where it can be codified in policy, process and practice and it can occur in unforeseen ways where only a disposition of trust, an ethic of trustworthiness can offer assurance against deceit, mistrust and lies. In order that this approach might flourish, we need our higher education institutions, as well as those who work and study in them, to be independent and to envision their work in the public interest to seek to benefit the common good and not to structure their work to follow a system of metrics, rather than follow their curiosity. Recognised common good is traditionally argued to lead to public trust, which affects students' decisions, research funders and the community at large. It leads to a form of trust without obligation to account specifically how and for which purposes they have spent or used the resource offered to the university (Trow, 1996). Such trust is being lost as institutions face an evolving and competitive global ecosystem.

This trust is not the warranted where shifts to individualism, personal profit and self-grandeursement become self-serving machines to generate knowledge – and power – for a specific segment of society. It is not the way to increase credibility in universities and in those to whom this trust is entrusted. Trust is only enhanced

when there is a clear purpose for compliance and that is to ensure that universities (or public ones at least) work for the good of the many in society. This provides a reason why the general public should trust them to the detriment of other institutions. Indeed, what may be required of higher education is a new moral compass; one that can enhance trust, and direct society. This is not a call for blind, unconditional trust in anything or anybody, but rather an educative process that enables bestowing trust on someone who is demonstrably trustworthy. As Žalec (2013: 67) suggests, if "we want to reach an improvement in the field of (higher) education we must take care of moral and professional virtues and competencies of teachers and pupils/students and then trust them".

Universities have generally suffered a range of attacks on their sustainability. In the UK, these attacks imply significant changes in funding and shifts in priorities towards research that is practical rather than fundamental and serves to increase interconnectivity with institutions outside the university (predominantly businesses). These changes are less prominent in Norway where the levels of public funding for higher education and research have consistently increased beyond inflation rates the last decades. While there is also in Norway a growing interest in the impact of research, the public funds invested in 'free' fundamental research have remained a prominent component of the Norwegian Research Council's programs.

A global eagerness for increased participation has changed the structures of universities and the power relationships within them, with an expansion of communities of scholars to include 'market workers'. This economic rationalism is typified in the notion of 'new public management' (NPM) in universities (e.g. Bleiklie, 1998; Ferlie et al., 2008). In the UK, this approach has put in place vertical line management hierarchies (and power relations) that cut across traditional forms of academic trust built on genuine academic leadership rooted in notions of collegiality. This is in tension with the professionalism implicit in the peer relationship at the cornerstone of modern science and journal knowledge systems, one of trust and a horizontal set of (power) relations. This movement has had an unsettling effect on educational cultures, identities and workloads (Jawitz, 2009). In Norway on the other hand, the professionalisation of institutional management is strongly anchored in a continuous democratic foundation. One basic rule is, for example, that students should be among the key decision makers in universities and colleges, while the influence of external actors in university governance remains relatively limited.

At the same time, the level of trust of society in scientific knowledge and academic experts remains an issue of concern. According to the Edelman Global Assessment Report an increase of 1% was recorded in the credibility of academic experts from 2017 to 61%: second only to technical experts, but still worryingly low (Edelman, 2017). Moreover, education is the second most trusted sector worldwide at 70%, behind technology at 75%. Yet in a survey carried out in the USA by 2018 Edelman Global Assessment Report barely half of US citizens stated they had 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot of' confidence in higher education. The proportion slipped below 50% when the question specifically addressed colleges and universities (Edelman, 2018).

Considering Trust

We first consider if trust is a viable concept to consider: how does it, for instance, differ from other concepts, such as reliability, veracity, dependability or confidence?

Does It Exist or Is It Imaginary?

Somewhat like time, as elegantly expressed by Augustine, we might paraphrase trust as being something that we do not know what it is until we try to define it. This has not hampered its use in many functions of higher education or in the justification that ties higher education to its cultural dependence. The concept of trust as used in everyday language is ambivalent. Indeed, in line with Sitkin and Roth (1993), and Bigley and Pearce (1998), trust might be collected into five basic categories, as (1) an individual attribute; (2) a behaviour; (3) a situational feature; (4) an institutional arrangement; or (5) economic transactions.

In this clearly incomplete list, we see categories of trust that relate to personal relationships, economic exchange, social structures and ethical principles, all of which help to define how we live, co-operate and undertake what we take to be worthy of knowing. To achieve the benefits potentially attached to these forms of trust, we are prepared to give up our freedom and to embrace a social contract to ensure that we might find great security in consensus, from being in a world with others that is not “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1991: 62).

Implicit is that these notions of trust refer to a human desire, individually and collectively, to alleviate uncertainty, risk and vulnerability and their counters: mistrust, lack of trustworthiness and deceit. We expect those in whom we trust to behave in ways that are relevant to the trust that we invest in them and, when this expectation is found to be false, we have a sense of betrayal and a strength of feeling that is more intense than a negation of a reliance on someone. Indeed, the other side is a risk that trust’s wide and diverse usage makes our plausible assumptions questionable, leading to it becoming reified and rendered unhelpful. However, useful as these interpretations are – and, in this form, they are used in several different ways in this Volume – what they have in common is that they address what trust does, rather than what it is.

Lahno (2017) offers a definition that, although unable to capture all the aspects above, has the benefit of linking two key features of perception whereby people can be held responsible for their acts and that others, in whom one trusts, share a conviction in the notion of trust and its normative realisation, thus distinguishing it from mere reliability. Lahno (2017: 32) suggests the following: “Trust is an emotional attitude towards a person that includes a participant’s attitude and a feeling of connectedness to him or her by shared aims (intentions), values or norms. This attitude allows the trusting person to incur risks concerning actions of the trusted person, as

they are perceived as being guided by the normative foundation of trust, which is felt to be shared."

By putting the emphasis on the subjective and institutive rather than the logical, trust is unable to be explained by rational decision-making. Moreover, as Jones (2017: 90) observes, it suggests that we are incumbent "to exercise care in the expectations that we lead others to form about what we will do," and of course to make reasonable, albeit optimistic, situational decisions in assessing trustworthiness.

A Normative/Cognitive Perspective of Trust

Jones' trust notion assumes that our knowledge and actions of being-in-the-world are insufficient for us to deal with the difficulty that the world presents to us in resolving our being. In this sense trust offers, in the face of our own negation, existential security. To trust others, we need to be open to them and trust in ourselves to grasp, in the course of creative activity, possibilities yet to be realised by ourselves and others. In this very real sense, being with others in 'existential trust' is the collaboration that enables personal freedom to be grasped. It is the antithesis of dependency and exploitation. The revelation, infrequently achieved, requires us to seek openly the mutuality of our relationship with others without losing what is our-self in the process. Clearly, such openness requires trust of an existential type. One's possibilities can be realised through existential trust: trust experienced not as calculative performance but as Buber (1955: 98) described as, "clad in the silver mail of trust." A notion of Buber's existential trust requires a dialogue that seeks to reveal the sentiments and feelings of others based on a disposition of respect. But it requires much more than that; it requires altruism, benevolence and, above all, empathy, realising that trust often involves dependence, and that this dependence will be a reason for why those who are being trusted will do what the trusted party is expecting. Indeed, in aligning trust with a form of belief, we can find a way to argue for trust as a core disposition for co-operation.

To act benevolently and to feel sympathy for others, we have to perceive the essential nature of the needs and emotions of another. The concern is to seek an understanding, an interpretation, of the experience of the others that informs us sufficiently of the emotions of another for us to experience an emotional reaction ourselves, as a response to the others' plight. First to perceive and then to comport towards the sentiments of another needs a form of perception that is empathetic. It carries a moral obligation. Baier (1986: 235) takes this position when she considers that, in moral trusting, "one leaves others the opportunity to harm one… and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it. Reasonable trust will require good grounds for such confidence in another's goodwill". If this trust is proven to be misplaced or misunderstood, then even contemplating a small risk to an expected outcome, specifically in relation to a highly cherished aim, may prove intolerable. In such a vulnerable state, those who accept the trust offered are in a privileged and

powerful position. They are trusted not to use this authority to manipulate and exploit the trustee. Trust of this type can be shown to satisfy a moral test and assumes benevolent motives as a necessary condition for parties to trust each other. As argued by Baier (1995: 213), "I tentatively propose a test for the moral decency of a trust relationship, namely, that its continuation need not rely on successful threats held over the trusted or on her successful cover-up of breaches of trust." In this, it has a resonance with the popular meaning of caring for others. It is more specifically a case of respect for humanity proposed by Williams (1985). However, trust needs more than respect for others; it requires one to be sympathetic to the others' woe.

There seems, then, a coalescence of sentiments that may form a disposition, and this can be accepted as trustworthiness. These sentiments are respect, sympathy and compassion for others. All three lead us to act benevolently towards others and indicate our capacity to put aside personal interests when accepting the moral obligations of trust. Trust requires more than merely having confidence in what others are required to do. It is based on the belief that the relationship will not be exploited. It is the betrayal of this trust that leads to the irreversible conclusion that, "I'll never trust you again."

A Rationalist/Instrumental View of Trust

We know by trusting what it is that others tell us and what they do. We act on that basis, trusting in both the epistemic and practical experience that others can do what they say. Much of what we take as trust is the functions of reliance or as social competence (Luhmann, 1979; Barber, 1983; Misztal, 1996; Seligman, 1997), woven into our social realities as calculable risk reduction; it is the consent that we give to an already determined future, created by limiting the range of possibilities that are formed (Giddens, 1991). As described by Williamson (1998: 23), what we understand is "rooted in the tacit agreements with others about how that world is constituted and its function." This requires social competence, which is the confirmation of usually rational expectations. From this perspective, competence and reliability are sufficient to cover the risk reduction conferred upon the holder of these skills.

Our belief in the competence provides trust with a practical imperative; it is the adequate fulfilment of commitments and functions at the centre of social structures. It is the domain of the contractual promise of performance and of the obligation of reciprocity, and is unlikely to have authority other than that based on the equalisation of an exchange. Further, competence of trust is based on verifiable evidence, which leads Hollis (1998: 159) to state, "economic rationality can destroy trust, and hence, among other ties, the trust which markets need". The moral intentionality is not necessarily absent from competent performance – indeed, in many cases it will be the motivation for that competent performance – but it need not be there for the performance of the mere function of the competence of trust. Pettit's trust requires that there is a personal recognition of the other and an intention specifically to relate to that person trustworthily (Pettit, 1995). To deliberately construct behaviours in

ways that, by social convention, would be expected to be founded on a disposition of trustworthiness yet which are, in fact, designed to manipulate others are mere acts of deceitfulness. This view is similar to that of Hollis (1998: 13), who states, “trusting people to act in their self-interest is one thing and trusting them to live up to their obligations to another is different. The former does not capture the bond of society, since the bond relies on trusting people not to exploit trust”.

Interweaving of Trusts

In most situations, we use both forms of trust to make decisions. For example, it is important how universities play their role in a marketized context, such as the UK, and how they may behave differently in an environment where such a model has less dominance, such as Norway. To allow others to assume a moral intention when none exists is to act in bad faith and is a sham of trust that can lead to unjustified manipulation. Equally misleading, but perhaps less morally problematic, is where a deeper notion of trust may be present yet personal efficacy, through competence, may be missing. Here, there is no wilful deceit, just ignorance. The two are not mutually exclusive and the relevance of their coalescence is central to a trusting relationship. This distinction draws from Kant’s own distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. Skills in the competence of trust would be considered to represent “practical necessity for a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may possibly want)” (Kant, 1993: 25). This does not mean that these actions could not bring about good for others, but that they are achieved merely as a means to something else. Competence of trust becomes expedient and, in Kant’s terms, carries no moral authority.

Where the Volume Might Take Us

We set ourselves two tasks within this Volume, the first to discuss trust in universities from a number of perspectives: economical, sociological, philosophical and anthropological. This creates a multidisciplinary panoply through which trust might be explored. It builds on the work of scholars in these areas such as Lane and Bachmann (1997), Gibbs (2004), Tierney (2006), Vidovich and Currie (2011), and Stensaker and Maassen (2015), drawing on these from experiences in two different European nations, both of which are in the European Higher Education Area, but neither of which is a member of the European Union.

The interacting relationship between state, university leadership and management, academic staff, and students is fragile and can be easily disrupted by deliberate ambiguity about the trustworthiness of the system. If trust in its relationships with higher education is weakened by the state, then the role of higher education in creatively questioning, and thus shaping, the nature of the state is also in danger of

becoming weaker. The dialogue between higher education and state then becomes a one-way monologue of ideology, given the force of the financial rather than the intellectual. Yet the response from higher education cannot be whether to co-operate with the state, but how to do so. The dilemma in such co-operation is how to retain its reputation for academic autonomy and excellence for its students and also negotiate a stronger reputation with the state to secure future funding. The same applies to other stakeholders in the context of higher education: local, national, European and global communities have direct influence on what the defining activities of a university are and how it undertakes these activities. These external stakeholders are also brought into relationships with the internal membership of higher education institutions with their own needs for trust in order to beat their creative best in teaching and research. We have tried to reflect these realities in the way we have structured the Volume.

The first section, entitled ‘Trust in Various Settings – Exploring Norwegian and UK Higher Education Practices’, contains seven chapters that are indicative of trust in activities in higher education but are taken from two countries, which engage in governing, organising and funding higher education in different ways. This achieves diversity in the chapters, which is intended, while a comparative analysis is not. This section concerns the practicality of practice; the issue that faces the academic community as it delivers its mission of knowledge creation, transformation and learning.

Peter Maassen and Bjørn Stensaker open this section with a discussion of trust from a higher education governance perspective. They consider the university as a “trustee of the European humanist tradition,” which implies that rather than seeing the university as a tool for economic and social goals, it has been conceptualised, for example, in the Magna Charta declaration as a specialised, rule-governed institution with a constitutive academic identity, purposes, and principles of its own. The chapter discusses how personal and social trust can be of relevance for getting a better understanding the role of higher education in enhancing social trust. For getting a better understanding of the challenges higher education is currently facing in playing this role the socio-political institutional context in which higher education operates has to be taken into account. Referring to this institutional context as the pact (or social contract) among higher education, political authorities, and society at large, the chapter discusses how higher education’s pact has been eroded in both Norway and the UK, and the different ways in which ways in both countries the main actors involved in higher education governance are looking for a new pact. This is followed by a discussion on recent developments in national and organisation level governance in higher education, and the relationship between trust and formal control in organisational governance.

The second chapter is written by Alex Elwick and Philipp Friedrich, who consider the nature of higher education policy in the two countries and its development. In this chapter, the authors take a rather counter intuitive stance to investigate whether higher education policy-making can lead to an erosion of trust amongst key stakeholders, including higher education institutions, sector bodies and unions. They do this by examining how policy is developed in the higher education sectors

of England and Norway. They discuss the governance structure; policy contexts; policy-making processes; and the levels of inter-institutional trust in each. Their approach is based upon documentary analysis of key higher education policies and associated evidence. The chapter assesses the effect of socio-cultural and political factors on policy-making; whether the state contributes to the building of or the weakening of trust, the future direction of policy-making in higher education in each country and the effect this might have on inter-institutional trust.

How trust is internalised within an institution and then communicated and managed through instructions, is taken up in the third contribution to the section by Jill Jameson. Reflecting on the increase in the influence of the forces of marketization, globalisation, government policy intervention, new public management-led corporate governance and systematic rankings, she takes a UK context to consider trust and leadership in post-compulsory and higher education. She suggests some ways in which the potential of collective academic leadership might be more understood and valued to enable higher levels of trust in higher education institutions. As we have indicated earlier in this chapter, there is a growing local emphasis in the UK on managerial 'command and control' solutions which have been imposed on staff by university managers in a performative drive to try to 'be amongst the best' at all cost. The uncertainties unleashed in this maelstrom of institutional tensions have widened gaps between senior leaders and their more collegially oriented academic staff. In the process, trust in the senior leadership of UK higher education institutions has been diminished. Addressing a significant gap in the literature on informal leadership in higher education, she argues that a greater recognition of the power of informal distributed academic leadership can assist in this.

The fourth chapter in the section is written by Mari Elken and Silje-Maria Tellmann and examines how new accountability mechanisms in Norwegian higher education contribute to altered trust relationships in higher education. The authors take as a starting point Luhmann's notion of institutionalised distrust, where procedures and schemes are established to maintain trust in a system. They then relate this to different forms of trust, looking at the introduction of learning outcomes and qualifications frameworks and the introduction of formalised councils for cooperation between higher education and the labour market. Building on multiple data sources, they find that both developments are concerned with transparency, information exchange and communication, and in this manner represent a transformation from blind trust in higher education towards a form of institutionalised distrust.

Bruce Macfarlane's contribution in the fifth chapter questions our understanding of academic trust relationships with students. He draws on illustrations from the historic literature on UK higher education, and argues that contemporary concerns about the extent to which students can be trusted as learners, in the wider sense, are nothing new and largely based on a mythology about a Golden Age of hard working and intrinsically motivated undergraduates that never was. He explores trust as a meta-concept consisting of elements including competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability. It is argued that many of these elements of trust have deteriorated in the context of the changing relationship between universities and their students in the UK. This decline will be attributed to the altered nature of the relationship

between students and their institutions and the manner in which a reciprocal exchange has been replaced by a negotiated exchange, based on business principles. It is concluded that whilst there is little, if any, empirical evidence to suggest that students are now less trustworthy as learners than in the past. They are, nonetheless, increasingly distrusted by their own institutions.

Karen Jensen addresses in the sixth chapter in this section professional work as embedded in knowledge cultures that safeguard and warrant knowledge for professional practices. A knowledge culture comprises a range of epistemic practices related to selecting, validating, developing and applying knowledge. However, the ways in which these practices are distributed are not well understood. Taking the nursing profession in Norway as a case study, she explores the theme of trust, with special attention given to how tasks, roles and agencies are distributed within the field of nursing. She demonstrates how practices of trust and credibility are essential elements in professional work in Norway, but that the significance of these cannot be studied at a single analytical site, requiring researchers to study multiple locations, sites and occurrences. Furthermore, education is important, as it provides the basis for judgements on trustworthiness in terms of skills, orientations, values and interpretations in all these settings providing a foundation for relying on nurses' capacity to function as an expert community.

This section closes with the chapter by Thomas de Lange, Anne Line Wittek and Audun Bjerknes, which considers the prerequisite of internal trust when academics risk vulnerability and allow colleagues to review their teaching. The setting of the underlying study is a group involved in faculty-based peer review of teaching at a university in Norway. The authors' data analysis shows the members' reflections on their experiences related to the peer review processes and reveals the implication of trust in this collaborative setting. The authors conclude by discussing the significance of trust in building supportive, collaborative communities in higher education.

Having illustrated the importance of trust in different cultures and contexts, the second section, entitled 'Trusting in higher education – multiple perspectives', takes four different disciplinary approaches towards trust, which produces a patchwork of lenses to view how trust can be conceptualised in higher education.

Andreas Hoecht discusses in the first chapter in this section the relationship between trust and control from an accountability perspective. He argues that neither the traditional, highly autonomous accountability model of the liberal professions nor the control-heavy bureaucratic accountability model of New Public Management is suitable for higher education. Consequently, he suggests that an approach inspired by self-determination theory can be used to reconcile accountability and professional responsibility. He considers this approach especial in regard of research suggesting that science norms, which should underpin integrity of researchers, appear to be eroding. He then explores the extent to which current approaches to managing research at universities undermine the foundations of the traditional professional accountability model that lies at the heart of the professional norms that sustain research integrity. He concludes with the suggestion that the current output-oriented approach to accountability in research management can undermine key norms, in particular the disinterestedness norm that is key to research integrity. A different

form of accountability in research management is required that rebalances accountability with professional responsibility and thereby strengthens Merton's norms that safeguard against research misconduct.

Kate Maguire takes a refreshingly frank anthropological perspective in the second chapter in this section: an open and underutilised approach to higher education studies in general, but trust in the particular, and complements the perspective presented in Hoecht's chapter. For her, the notion of trust works as a dialectical concept; a concept that requires to breakdown (or purify) its own context of action to convey meaning. Trust works by creating its own preconditions of existence, which must in turn be certified as trustworthy. Audit cultures are the classic example: the audit makes the culture trustworthy, which in turn holds trust as a value capable of audit.

Alison Scott-Baumann provides in the third chapter in the section a philosophical approach through her discussion of the UK Prevent process. She discusses how trust is a complex and emotive concept that will be interpreted in the chapter as a phenomenon that relies on reciprocity, in the specific context of the university. Reciprocity is complex yet vital for effective societal functioning. She illustrates the complexity with the example of how the UK government asks universities to demonstrate that they are indeed keeping students safe from being radicalised into extremism, universities ask students and staff to trust them that they will keep them safe. In doing so, universities are trying very hard to prove to government that they are trustworthy with students in a reciprocal way. However, in order to do this they are weakening their trust promises to students to provide safe places for the discussion of difficult issues. She uses empirical research findings, philosophical analysis and interrogation of national counter-terror policy, as she believes such policy weakens rather than strengthens trust.

The final chapter in the section, offered by Paul Gibbs, takes a values perspective. He advocates that university education has, at its core, a mission to enables its communities of scholars (staff and students) to make judgements on what can be trusted, and that they, themselves, should be truth-tellers. It is about society being able to rely upon academic statements, avoiding deliberate falsehoods. This requires both trust in oneself to make those judgements, an obligation to do so and the courage to speak out when such judgements might be unpopular, risky and potentially unsafe.

With this Volume, we have sought to offer a combination of views on trust, its nature and its importance in and to higher education. Each chapter has a distinctiveness of its own and also contributes in a meaningful way to the sections as we have clustered them together. Obviously, we have to be careful in drawing far-reaching conclusions about the possible impacts of recent higher education reforms and changes. Nonetheless, we hope that the chapters in this Volume can contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which differences in national settings affect the role of higher education in creating social trust and the factors that influence the level of trust society and individual citizens have in higher education.

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