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Peter Maassen *Editors*

Trusting in Higher Education

A multifaceted discussion of trust in
and for higher education in Norway and
the United Kingdom

Higher Education Dynamics

Volume 57

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ISSN 1571-0378

ISSN 2215-1923 (electronic)

Higher Education Dynamics

ISBN 978-3-030-87036-2

ISBN 978-3-030-87037-9 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87037-9>

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Foreword

This is an important and interesting book. Through two case studies (Norway and the United Kingdom) it explores the concept of ‘trust’ in the relationship between the State and the University where the State (politicians representing taxpayers) is funding the delivery of higher education to (or, better, ‘for’?) its citizens (see Palfreyman & Temple, 2017, on the idea and ideal of The University). And it explores the concept of ‘trust’ as the ideal of collegiality within the University in terms of its governance and management, and in its inter-actions with students (on the collegiality versus managerialism debate, see Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, 2011).

Although there is some variation nation by nation, it is arguable that since the 1980s, the willingness of the State to trust the University and its professors (academics, faculty) as professionals has declined and the State has demanded increasing accountability, efficiency, and value for money from higher education, subjecting it to greater interventions and also increased control via a battery of metrics and performance indicators, rankings and league-tables. In many nations, the same shift from a trust model to an accountability model has also happened for, say, schools, healthcare, and policing – a trend toward New Public Management within an Audit Society (Pollitt, 1990; Power, 1997).

Within the University, the balance of trust and power/authority within the Governance Triangle has also changed – a triangle with the lay governors exercising in most nations’ formal constitutional sovereignty in one corner, with the executive or management in another corner, and with the professors in the third corner (Farrington & Palfreyman, 2012). When, for example, the English civic universities of the 1900s were set up, power lay very clearly with the lay-controlled Governing Body; by the 1960s, power had shifted, informally but not constitutionally, to the academics/faculty such as the Senate, and especially in the wave of ‘new’ universities created in this age of Donnish Dominion (Halsey, 1992); then power shifted to the Executive tasked with accounting to the State, and more recently also back to the governing body. In the UK, the result is declining trust notably between the Executive and the academics, of the latter in the competence of the former and of the former in the professionalism of the latter.

What has driven this shift of power towards accountability and efficiency, this shift away from trust whether between the State and the University or among key groups within the University – and indeed between the University and its students in some nations? The massification of higher education in every nation has made it a very much more costly part of public spending – the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) has climbed steadily and that growth seems unstoppable as a matter of parental aspiration propelling ever more nations into having High Participation Systems of Higher Education (HPSs). The GER for Norway is given as 76%, for the UK as 57%, for South Korea as 97% and the USA as 89% (Cantwell et al., 2018).

Usually the taxpayer is unwilling and/or unable to fund this expanded HE activity at the same generous rate per student per year (referred to as the Unit of Resource, UofR) as in the 1960s Welfare State earlier expansion of HE – the UofR in the UK halved 1985–2000; a similar trend can be observed more recently in The Netherlands.

The politicians then face a difficult public policy issue – presiding over an overcrowded and under-resourced HPS or introducing tuition fees as cost-sharing between taxpayer and student/family so as to inject more money into universities. The UK began that process of charging fees to UK undergraduates at £1000 in 2000, ratcheting up (in England) to £3000 in 2005 and so to £9000 in 2012 (now £9250, and currently under review since there is some degree of political backlash over graduates emerging with debts of £50k and the massive cost to the taxpayer of student loans). Thus, a neoliberal political choice shifts HE from a free public service/good to operating in a quasi-market of fee-paying students – it is commodification, commercialisation, and consumerisation (Willetts, 2017). And that HE market has to be regulated to protect the consumer interests of the fee-paying student (Palfreyman & Tapper, 2014) – since universities as businesses cannot, like all businesses cannot, be trusted not to cheat the customer given the unregulated chance (Martin, 2011). In England, the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 created the Office for Students (OfS) as the new regulator of English universities – the word ‘for’ is meaningful!

Deciding where to position a nation on the fees spectrum – free HE at one end and the student/family paying the whole cost, as almost the case now in England – is a purely political process: the politics of HE in terms of its lobbying power to command State resources relative to other areas of public spending, especially during the past decade or more of Austerity. There is no algorithm or formula to give ‘the right answer’ in terms of the economics of HE (McMahon, 2009). And universities are often a weak political constituency compared to schools, hospitals, policing, and pensions in a nation with an ageing demographic. In the case of Norway, however, as a rich oil nation and one which wisely has not squandered its oil wealth in reducing taxation but has preserved the Nordic Welfare Model as well as building up a Sovereign Wealth Fund of cUS\$1 trillion, there has seemingly (so far) not been the same public funding pressures, leaving more room for the concept of trust to thrive in terms of the relationship between the State and the University and also within the University – the State not subjecting the University to relentless funding cuts, while demanding greater accountability and efficiency gains, and the Executive within the University not needing to pressure the faculty into delivering more with less.

Finally, perhaps the (over?) expansion of HE in recent decades had meant increased familiarity has bred increased contempt at a time when across Society also deference to institutions and professions has declined – and all this has led to reduced trust by the public in universities and academics? The University is no longer such a special and rather secretive or mysterious place for the privileged few. The portrayal of university life in the genre of the university novel, in the UK, has changed from the quaint and quirky characters in ‘Lucky Jim’ (Amis, 1954) to the odious manipulative lefty academic Howard Kirk as ‘The History Man’ (Bradbury, 1975) – and at the same time in the late-1960s the university campus became the venue for revolting students at Berkeley, in Rome, at the Sorbonne, at Essex, at the LSE. The 1980s ‘A Very Peculiar Practice’ novels (Davies, 1986, 1988) then put the spotlight on a scheming and incompetent executive seeking to manage the unmanageable in the form of an unprofessional professoriate. All these novels ended up as TV series, and after such exposure it is not surprising that the idea and ideal of the University emerged a tad tarnished, and hence the University and its professors found it harder to get away with a stance of ‘Send the money and ask no questions, just trust us to get in with the job!’ (Table 1)

So, Norway is a much wealthier country than the UK, and has not only grown its HE supply so that more young people enter HE than in the UK but also has not (yet?) found it necessary to introduce undergraduate tuition fees as in the UK (notably at England’s £9250 level). As in the UK, expansion of the GER into an HPS has been by way of a 1960s wave and then a second wave in the 1990s, accelerating in recent years (Cantwell *op cit.*, Chapter 14 on Norway). That same chapter asserts that massification has brought ‘more corporate forms of governance’ as ‘institutions become increasingly accountable to external actors’ – implying a reduced quantum of collegiality and trust. The chapter concludes that, although ‘Norway has not adopted a neoliberal quasi market’, the relationship between the State and the University ‘has shifted from one based on trust towards a transactional approach more based on results’. Comparing the UK (and especially England) not with wealthy Norway but with, say, Spain or France or Poland might have been a different story – or is the declining trust in and deference towards universities and their inmates a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon problem?

Table 1 UK-Norway comparative HE data

	United Kingdom	Norway
Gross enrolment ratio	57%	76%
GDP in US\$	37.3k	63.3k
Enrolled in HE, age 20–24	40.5%	44.7%
Enrolled in HE, age 25–29	11.7%	20%
Having had HE, age 25–34	49%	49%

Source: Cantwell et al. (2018), chapter 2

(David Palfreyman writes in a purely personal capacity and in no way is to be taken as representing the policies and views of the OfS, of which he is a Board Member.)

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Trust and Higher Education



Paul Gibbs and Peter Maassen

Introduction

It is difficult to argue compellingly against the significant progress that has been achieved in the human condition, which goes beyond improvements in the basic level of survival and economic flourishing for many. Humanity has made significant strides in moving from what was 'fate'. Inevitable we can ascribe to the university that it has played a significant part in awakening social responsibility and global citizenship, radically improving basic public services such as health care and education, understanding and addressing grand societal challenges, including climate change and energy sustainability, and encouraging and providing innovation and the knowledge which drives economic growth in a digital economy. At the same time, like many other sectors, higher education has recently been subject to a series of fundamental challenges, which confront many of its traditional values. However, we argue in this Volume that there are fundamental differences among countries when it comes to the nature and consequences of these challenges. For that purpose, the Volume will focus on two very different country cases, that is, the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway. Higher education used to be considered a public good around the world, provided by institutions, which had clear societal missions and were positioned outside the market. This, we maintain, is still the essence of higher education in Norway, but not in the UK. Overall higher education in the UK has become more public managerial than public good, resolved to be delivered in an ever more complex and competitive knowledge marketplace where value is in transferability to practice and economic value and students are revealed as skilled workers. Apart

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P. Gibbs, P. Maassen (eds.), *Trusting in Higher Education*, Higher Education Dynamics 57, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87037-9_1

from the elite universities in the UK, this is a common trend in universities' strategic position as a response to government pressures. In negotiating their relationships with government, host and internal communities, trust has been subject to challenges of accountability, performativity, materialism and managerialism in ways that many consider have depleted that trust which was critical to their essential identity and the truth-telling that went with that trust, warranting the freedom afforded to academic communities. In Norway on the other hand, there is still a strong commitment to the public good nature of higher education, in a political and societal context where there is a continuous high level of trust in the public domain and the central role of public authorities, also when it comes to stimulating more competitive and market-like interactions in public sectors such as higher education.

For interpreting the impact of this growing variety among national contexts, we used Olsen's (2007: 30) four visions of university organisation and governance¹ as a means to select from the four overriding ideas, which will allow us to identify relevant differences among the countries, and the role of trust in these. The four visions interpret the University as:

1. A community of scholars – where the University is an institution with a *raison d'être* and constitutive normative and organisational principles of its own.
2. An instrument for national purposes – a rational tool for implementing the purposes and policies of democratically elected leaders.
3. A representative democracy – the University as an instrument for internal, not external groups.
4. A service enterprise embedded in competitive markets – where the University is an economic enterprise operating in regional or global markets

While in practice one will always be able to find elements of each vision in a national higher education governance context, in most cases one or two of the visions are dominant. We would argue that the Norwegian higher education governance approach is best illustrated by combining Visions 1, 2 & 3, and that the UK has rapidly emerged as a country where higher education governance is dominated by a type 4 Vision. This implies that we can expect to see the following differences in the constitutive logic of the systems:

- Norway being more open to freedom of expression and research of fundamental forms, whereas the UK has a growing focus on the market, competitive research funding, and transfer of valuable knowledge to industry and commerce.
- Norway's system, like the UK is predominately public but in Norway, there is tuition fee free higher education. Financial funding and grants for students in England is also significantly less attractive compared to that in Norway (European Union, 2018).

¹The organising principles for these models are respectively: constitutive rules, command and hierarchy, bargaining and majority votes, and market prices and competitive selection (Olsen, 2007: 28–33).

- In the UK, the criteria of success for the system heavily reflect an efficiency imperative, whereas for Norway it settles more on the quality of the academic outputs.
- In Norway, its constitutive authority comes from the best qualified and in the UK from responsiveness to “stakeholders” and external exigencies.
- For the UK, change relates to entrepreneurship and adapting to changing circumstances, whereas for Norway it is mainly driven by the internal dynamics of the academy with slow reinterpretation of institutional identity.

We assume that these differences between the two higher education systems illustrate the variety of ways in which the above-mentioned challenges affect trust relationships between higher education and society at large in different national contexts. Consequently, the focus on the two different higher education cases can be expected to allow us to contribute in a meaningful way to the societal debates and the academic literature addressing the concept of trust in higher education.

Attacks on Higher Education

So what should worry us about Higher Education? We might consider this question along with Winand, who suggests that, “Among the phenomena that characterise the early twenty-first century, the most significant must be the disappearance of the landmarks that society uses to find its bearings and the increasing difficulty that individuals have in visualising an optimistic future for themselves – a feeling exacerbated by following a daily spectacle of wars and mass migrations” (Winand, 2018: 221). UNESCO seems to agree, for the quote opens a Courier article entitled *Universities and the ‘democracy of the gullible’*. What can be inferred is that trust can be interpreted as being rhizomatic: it is the foundation of the university and it appears in predictable places where it can be codified in policy, process and practice and it can occur in unforeseen ways where only a disposition of trust, an ethic of trustworthiness can offer assurance against deceit, mistrust and lies. In order that this approach might flourish, we need our higher education institutions, as well as those who work and study in them, to be independent and to envision their work in the public interest to seek to benefit the common good and not to structure their work to follow a system of metrics, rather than follow their curiosity. Recognised common good is traditionally argued to lead to public trust, which affects students’ decisions, research funders and the community at large. It leads to a form of trust without obligation to account specifically how and for which purposes they have spent or used the resource offered to the university (Trow, 1996). Such trust is being lost as institutions face an evolving and competitive global ecosystem.

This trust is not the warranted where shifts to individualism, personal profit and self-grandeursement become self-serving machines to generate knowledge – and power – for a specific segment of society. It is not the way to increase credibility in universities and in those to whom this trust is entrusted. Trust is only enhanced

when there is a clear purpose for compliance and that is to ensure that universities (or public ones at least) work for the good of the many in society. This provides a reason why the general public should trust them to the detriment of other institutions. Indeed, what may be required of higher education is a new moral compass; one that can enhance trust, and direct society. This is not a call for blind, unconditional trust in anything or anybody, but rather an educative process that enables bestowing trust on someone who is demonstrably trustworthy. As Žalec (2013: 67) suggests, if “we want to reach an improvement in the field of (higher) education we must take care of moral and professional virtues and competencies of teachers and pupils/students and then trust them”.

Universities have generally suffered a range of attacks on their sustainability. In the UK, these attacks imply significant changes in funding and shifts in priorities towards research that is practical rather than fundamental and serves to increase interconnectivity with institutions outside the university (predominantly businesses). These changes are less prominent in Norway where the levels of public funding for higher education and research have consistently increased beyond inflation rates the last decades. While there is also in Norway a growing interest in the impact of research, the public funds invested in ‘free’ fundamental research have remained a prominent component of the Norwegian Research Council’s programs.

A global eagerness for increased participation has changed the structures of universities and the power relationships within them, with an expansion of communities of scholars to include ‘market workers’. This economic rationalism is typified in the notion of ‘new public management’ (NPM) in universities (e.g. Bleiklie, 1998; Ferlie et al., 2008). In the UK, this approach has put in place vertical line management hierarchies (and power relations) that cut across traditional forms of academic trust built on genuine academic leadership rooted in notions of collegiality. This is in tension with the professionalism implicit in the peer relationship at the cornerstone of modern science and journal knowledge systems, one of trust and a horizontal set of (power) relations. This movement has had an unsettling effect on educational cultures, identities and workloads (Jawitz, 2009). In Norway on the other hand, the professionalisation of institutional management is strongly anchored in a continuous democratic foundation. One basic rule is, for example, that students should be among the key decision makers in universities and colleges, while the influence of external actors in university governance remains relatively limited.

At the same time, the level of trust of society in scientific knowledge and academic experts remains an issue of concern. According to the Edelman Global Assessment Report an increase of 1% was recorded in the credibility of academic experts from 2017 to 61%: second only to technical experts, but still worryingly low (Edelman, 2017). Moreover, education is the second most trusted sector worldwide at 70%, behind technology at 75%. Yet in a survey carried out in the USA by 2018 Edelman Global Assessment Report barely half of US citizens stated they had ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot of’ confidence in higher education. The proportion slipped below 50% when the question specifically addressed colleges and universities (Edelman, 2018).

Considering Trust

We first consider if trust is a viable concept to consider: how does it, for instance, differ from other concepts, such as reliability, veracity, dependability or confidence?

Does It Exist or Is It Imaginary?

Somewhat like time, as elegantly expressed by Augustine, we might paraphrase trust as being something that we do not know what it is until we try to define it. This has not hampered its use in many functions of higher education or in the justification that ties higher education to its cultural dependence. The concept of trust as used in everyday language is ambivalent. Indeed, in line with Sitkin and Roth (1993), and Bigley and Pearce (1998), trust might be collected into five basic categories, as (1) an individual attribute; (2) a behaviour; (3) a situational feature; (4) an institutional arrangement; or (5) economic transactions.

In this clearly incomplete list, we see categories of trust that relate to personal relationships, economic exchange, social structures and ethical principles, all of which help to define how we live, co-operate and undertake what we take to be worthy of knowing. To achieve the benefits potentially attached to these forms of trust, we are prepared to give up our freedom and to embrace a social contract to ensure that we might find great security in consensus, from being in a world with others that is not “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1991: 62).

Implicit is that these notions of trust refer to a human desire, individually and collectively, to alleviate uncertainty, risk and vulnerability and their counters: mistrust, lack of trustworthiness and deceit. We expect those in whom we trust to behave in ways that are relevant to the trust that we invest in them and, when this expectation is found to be false, we have a sense of betrayal and a strength of feeling that is more intense than a negation of a reliance on someone. Indeed, the other side is a risk that trust’s wide and diverse usage makes our plausible assumptions questionable, leading to it becoming reified and rendered unhelpful. However, useful as these interpretations are – and, in this form, they are used in several different ways in this Volume – what they have in common is that they address what trust does, rather than what it is.

Lahno (2017) offers a definition that, although unable to capture all the aspects above, has the benefit of linking two key features of perception whereby people can be held responsible for their acts and that others, in whom one trusts, share a conviction in the notion of trust and its normative realisation, thus distinguishing it from mere reliability. Lahno (2017: 32) suggests the following: “Trust is an emotional attitude towards a person that includes a participant’s attitude and a feeling of connectedness to him or her by shared aims (intentions), values or norms. This attitude allows the trusting person to incur risks concerning actions of the trusted person, as

they are perceived as being guided by the normative foundation of trust, which is felt to be shared.”

By putting the emphasis on the subjective and institutive rather than the logical, trust is unable to be explained by rational decision-making. Moreover, as Jones (2017: 90) observes, it suggests that we are incumbent “to exercise care in the expectations that we lead others to form about what we will do,” and of course to make reasonable, albeit optimistic, situational decisions in assessing trustworthiness.

A Normative/Cognitive Perspective of Trust

Jones’ trust notion assumes that our knowledge and actions of being-in-the-world are insufficient for us to deal with the difficulty that the world presents to us in resolving our being. In this sense trust offers, in the face of our own negation, existential security. To trust others, we need to be open to them and trust in ourselves to grasp, in the course of creative activity, possibilities yet to be realised by ourselves and others. In this very real sense, being with others in ‘existential trust’ is the collaboration that enables personal freedom to be grasped. It is the antithesis of dependency and exploitation. The revelation, infrequently achieved, requires us to seek openly the mutuality of our relationship with others without losing what is our-self in the process. Clearly, such openness requires trust of an existential type. One’s possibilities can be realised through existential trust: trust experienced not as calculative performance but as Buber (1955: 98) described as, “clad in the silver mail of trust.” A notion of Buber’s existential trust requires a dialogue that seeks to reveal the sentiments and feelings of others based on a disposition of respect. But it requires much more than that; it requires altruism, benevolence and, above all, empathy, realising that trust often involves dependence, and that this dependence will be a reason for why those who are being trusted will do what the trusted party is expecting. Indeed, in aligning trust with a form of belief, we can find a way to argue for trust as a core disposition for co-operation.

To act benevolently and to feel sympathy for others, we have to perceive the essential nature of the needs and emotions of another. The concern is to seek an understanding, an interpretation, of the experience of the others that informs us sufficiently of the emotions of another for us to experience an emotional reaction ourselves, as a response to the others’ plight. First to perceive and then to comport towards the sentiments of another needs a form of perception that is empathetic. It carries a moral obligation. Baier (1986: 235) takes this position when she considers that, in moral trusting, “one leaves others the opportunity to harm one... and also shows one’s confidence that they will not take it. Reasonable trust will require good grounds for such confidence in another’s goodwill”. If this trust is proven to be misplaced or misunderstood, then even contemplating a small risk to an expected outcome, specifically in relation to a highly cherished aim, may prove intolerable. In such a vulnerable state, those who accept the trust offered are in a privileged and

powerful position. They are trusted not to use this authority to manipulate and exploit the trustee. Trust of this type can be shown to satisfy a moral test and assumes benevolent motives as a necessary condition for parties to trust each other. As argued by Baier (1995: 213), “I tentatively propose a test for the moral decency of a trust relationship, namely, that its continuation need not rely on successful threats held over the trusted or on her successful cover-up of breaches of trust.” In this, it has a resonance with the popular meaning of caring for others. It is more specifically a case of respect for humanity proposed by Williams (1985). However, trust needs more than respect for others; it requires one to be sympathetic to the others’ woe.

There seems, then, a coalescence of sentiments that may form a disposition, and this can be accepted as trustworthiness. These sentiments are respect, sympathy and compassion for others. All three lead us to act benevolently towards others and indicate our capacity to put aside personal interests when accepting the moral obligations of trust. Trust requires more than merely having confidence in what others are required to do. It is based on the belief that the relationship will not be exploited. It is the betrayal of this trust that leads to the irreversible conclusion that, “I’ll never trust you again.”

A Rationalist/Instrumental View of Trust

We know by trusting what it is that others tell us and what they do. We act on that basis, trusting in both the epistemic and practical experience that others can do what they say. Much of what we take as trust is the functions of reliance or as social competence (Luhmann, 1979; Barber, 1983; Misztal, 1996; Seligman, 1997), woven into our social realities as calculable risk reduction; it is the consent that we give to an already determined future, created by limiting the range of possibilities that are formed (Giddens, 1991). As described by Williamson (1998: 23), what we understand is “rooted in the tacit agreements with others about how that world is constituted and its function.” This requires social competence, which is the confirmation of usually rational expectations. From this perspective, competence and reliability are sufficient to cover the risk reduction conferred upon the holder of these skills.

Our belief in the competence provides trust with a practical imperative; it is the adequate fulfilment of commitments and functions at the centre of social structures. It is the domain of the contractual promise of performance and of the obligation of reciprocity, and is unlikely to have authority other than that based on the equalisation of an exchange. Further, competence of trust is based on verifiable evidence, which leads Hollis (1998: 159) to state, “economic rationality can destroy trust, and hence, among other ties, the trust which markets need”. The moral intentionality is not necessarily absent from competent performance – indeed, in many cases it will be the motivation for that competent performance – but it need not be there for the performance of the mere function of the competence of trust. Pettit’s trust requires that there is a personal recognition of the other and an intention specifically to relate to that person trustworthily (Pettit, 1995). To deliberately construct behaviours in

ways that, by social convention, would be expected to be founded on a disposition of trustworthiness yet which are, in fact, designed to manipulate others are mere acts of deceitfulness. This view is similar to that of Hollis (1998: 13), who states, “trusting people to act in their self-interest is one thing and trusting them to live up to their obligations to another is different. The former does not capture the bond of society, since the bond relies on trusting people not to exploit trust”.

Interweaving of Trusts

In most situations, we use both forms of trust to make decisions. For example, it is important how universities play their role in a marketized context, such as the UK, and how they may behave differently in an environment where such a model has less dominance, such as Norway. To allow others to assume a moral intention when none exists is to act in bad faith and is a sham of trust that can lead to unjustified manipulation. Equally misleading, but perhaps less morally problematic, is where a deeper notion of trust may be present yet personal efficacy, through competence, may be missing. Here, there is no wilful deceit, just ignorance. The two are not mutually exclusive and the relevance of their coalescence is central to a trusting relationship. This distinction draws from Kant’s own distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. Skills in the competence of trust would be considered to represent “practical necessity for a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may possibly want)” (Kant, 1993: 25). This does not mean that these actions could not bring about good for others, but that they are achieved merely as a means to something else. Competence of trust becomes expedient and, in Kant’s terms, carries no moral authority.

Where the Volume Might Take Us

We set ourselves two tasks within this Volume, the first to discuss trust in universities from a number of perspectives: economical, sociological, philosophical and anthropological. This creates a multidisciplinary panoply through which trust might be explored. It builds on the work of scholars in these areas such as Lane and Bachmann (1997), Gibbs (2004), Tierney (2006), Vidovich and Currie (2011), and Stensaker and Maassen (2015), drawing on these from experiences in two different European nations, both of which are in the European Higher Education Area, but neither of which is a member of the European Union.

The interacting relationship between state, university leadership and management, academic staff, and students is fragile and can be easily disrupted by deliberate ambiguity about the trustworthiness of the system. If trust in its relationships with higher education is weakened by the state, then the role of higher education in creatively questioning, and thus shaping, the nature of the state is also in danger of

becoming weaker. The dialogue between higher education and state then becomes a one-way monologue of ideology, given the force of the financial rather than the intellectual. Yet the response from higher education cannot be whether to co-operate with the state, but how to do so. The dilemma in such co-operation is how to retain its reputation for academic autonomy and excellence for its students and also negotiate a stronger reputation with the state to secure future funding. The same applies to other stakeholders in the context of higher education: local, national, European and global communities have direct influence on what the defining activities of a university are and how it undertakes these activities. These external stakeholders are also brought into relationships with the internal membership of higher education institutions with their own needs for trust in order to beat their creative best in teaching and research. We have tried to reflect these realities in the way we have structured the Volume.

The first section, entitled ‘Trust in Various Settings – Exploring Norwegian and UK Higher Education Practices’, contains seven chapters that are indicative of trust in activities in higher education but are taken from two countries, which engage in governing, organising and funding higher education in different ways. This achieves diversity in the chapters, which is intended, while a comparative analysis is not. This section concerns the practicality of practice; the issue that faces the academic community as it delivers its mission of knowledge creation, transformation and learning.

Peter Maassen and Bjørn Stensaker open this section with a discussion of trust from a higher education governance perspective. They consider the university as a “trustee of the European humanist tradition,” which implies that rather than seeing the university as a tool for economic and social goals, it has been conceptualised, for example, in the Magna Charta declaration as a specialised, rule-governed institution with a constitutive academic identity, purposes, and principles of its own. The chapter discusses how personal and social trust can be of relevance for getting a better understanding the role of higher education in enhancing social trust. For getting a better understanding of the challenges higher education is currently facing in playing this role the socio-political institutional context in which higher education operates has to be taken into account. Referring to this institutional context as the pact (or social contract) among higher education, political authorities, and society at large, the chapter discusses how higher education’s pact has been eroded in both Norway and the UK, and the different ways in which ways in both countries the main actors involved in higher education governance are looking for a new pact. This is followed by a discussion on recent developments in national and organisation level governance in higher education, and the relationship between trust and formal control in organisational governance.

The second chapter is written by Alex Elwick and Philipp Friedrich, who consider the nature of higher education policy in the two countries and its development. In this chapter, the authors take a rather counter intuitive stance to investigate whether higher education policy-making can lead to an erosion of trust amongst key stakeholders, including higher education institutions, sector bodies and unions. They do this by examining how policy is developed in the higher education sectors

of England and Norway. They discuss the governance structure; policy contexts; policy-making processes; and the levels of inter-institutional trust in each. Their approach is based upon documentary analysis of key higher education policies and associated evidence. The chapter assesses the effect of socio-cultural and political factors on policy-making; whether the state contributes to the building of or the weakening of trust, the future direction of policy-making in higher education in each country and the effect this might have on inter-institutional trust.

How trust is internalised within an institution and then communicated and managed through instructions, is taken up in the third contribution to the section by Jill Jameson. Reflecting on the increase in the influence of the forces of marketization, globalisation, government policy intervention, new public management-led corporate governance and systematic rankings, she takes a UK context to consider trust and leadership in post-compulsory and higher education. She suggests some ways in which the potential of collective academic leadership might be more understood and valued to enable higher levels of trust in higher education institutions. As we have indicated earlier in this chapter, there is a growing local emphasis in the UK on managerial 'command and control' solutions which have been imposed on staff by university managers in a performative drive to try to 'be amongst the best' at all cost. The uncertainties unleashed in this maelstrom of institutional tensions have widened gaps between senior leaders and their more collegially oriented academic staff. In the process, trust in the senior leadership of UK higher education institutions has been diminished. Addressing a significant gap in the literature on informal leadership in higher education, she argues that a greater recognition of the power of informal distributed academic leadership can assist in this.

The fourth chapter in the section is written by Mari Elken and Silje-Maria Tellmann and examines how new accountability mechanisms in Norwegian higher education contribute to altered trust relationships in higher education. The authors take as a starting point Luhmann's notion of institutionalised distrust, where procedures and schemes are established to maintain trust in a system. They then relate this to different forms of trust, looking at the introduction of learning outcomes and qualifications frameworks and the introduction of formalised councils for cooperation between higher education and the labour market. Building on multiple data sources, they find that both developments are concerned with transparency, information exchange and communication, and in this manner represent a transformation from blind trust in higher education towards a form of institutionalised distrust.

Bruce Macfarlane's contribution in the fifth chapter questions our understanding of academic trust relationships with students. He draws on illustrations from the historic literature on UK higher education, and argues that contemporary concerns about the extent to which students can be trusted as learners, in the wider sense, are nothing new and largely based on a mythology about a Golden Age of hard working and intrinsically motivated undergraduates that never was. He explores trust as a meta-concept consisting of elements including competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability. It is argued that many of these elements of trust have deteriorated in the context of the changing relationship between universities and their students in the UK. This decline will be attributed to the altered nature of the relationship

between students and their institutions and the manner in which a reciprocal exchange has been replaced by a negotiated exchange, based on business principles. It is concluded that whilst there is little, if any, empirical evidence to suggest that students are now less trustworthy as learners than in the past. They are, nonetheless, increasingly distrusted by their own institutions.

Karen Jensen addresses in the sixth chapter in this section professional work as embedded in knowledge cultures that safeguard and warrant knowledge for professional practices. A knowledge culture comprises a range of epistemic practices related to selecting, validating, developing and applying knowledge. However, the ways in which these practices are distributed are not well understood. Taking the nursing profession in Norway as a case study, she explores the theme of trust, with special attention given to how tasks, roles and agencies are distributed within the field of nursing. She demonstrates how practices of trust and credibility are essential elements in professional work in Norway, but that the significance of these cannot be studied at a single analytical site, requiring researchers to study multiple locations, sites and occurrences. Furthermore, education is important, as it provides the basis for judgements on trustworthiness in terms of skills, orientations, values and interpretations in all these settings providing a foundation for relying on nurses' capacity to function as an expert community.

This section closes with the chapter by Thomas de Lange, Anne Line Wittek and Audun Bjercknes, which considers the prerequisite of internal trust when academics risk vulnerability and allow colleagues to review their teaching. The setting of the underlying study is a group involved in faculty-based peer review of teaching at a university in Norway. The authors' data analysis shows the members' reflections on their experiences related to the peer review processes and reveals the implication of trust in this collaborative setting. The authors conclude by discussing the significance of trust in building supportive, collaborative communities in higher education.

Having illustrated the importance of trust in different cultures and contexts, the second section, entitled 'Trusting in higher education – multiple perspectives', takes four different disciplinary approaches towards trust, which produces a patchwork of lenses to view how trust can be conceptualised in higher education.

Andreas Hoecht discusses in the first chapter in this section the relationship between trust and control from an accountability perspective. He argues that neither the traditional, highly autonomous accountability model of the liberal professions nor the control-heavy bureaucratic accountability model of New Public Management is suitable for higher education. Consequently, he suggests that an approach inspired by self-determination theory can be used to reconcile accountability and professional responsibility. He considers this approach especial in regard of research suggesting that science norms, which should underpin integrity of researchers, appear to be eroding. He then explores the extent to which current approaches to managing research at universities undermine the foundations of the traditional professional accountability model that lies at the heart of the professional norms that sustain research integrity. He concludes with the suggestion that the current output-oriented approach to accountability in research management can undermine key norms, in particular the disinterestedness norm that is key to research integrity. A different

form of accountability in research management is required that rebalances accountability with professional responsibility and thereby strengthens Merton's norms that safeguard against research misconduct.

Kate Maguire takes a refreshingly frank anthropological perspective in the second chapter in this section: an open and underutilised approach to higher education studies in general, but trust in the particular, and complements the perspective presented in Hoecht's chapter. For her, the notion of trust works as a dialectical concept; a concept that requires to breakdown (or purify) its own context of action to convey meaning. Trust works by creating its own preconditions of existence, which must in turn be certified as trustworthy. Audit cultures are the classic example: the audit makes the culture trustworthy, which in turn holds trust as a value capable of audit.

Alison Scott-Baumann provides in the third chapter in the section a philosophical approach through her discussion of the UK Prevent process. She discusses how trust is a complex and emotive concept that will be interpreted in the chapter as a phenomenon that relies on reciprocity, in the specific context of the university. Reciprocity is complex yet vital for effective societal functioning. She illustrates the complexity with the example of how the UK government asks universities to demonstrate that they are indeed keeping students safe from being radicalised into extremism, universities ask students and staff to trust them that they will keep them safe. In doing so, universities are trying very hard to prove to government that they are trustworthy with students in a reciprocal way. However, in order to do this they are weakening their trust promises to students to provide safe places for the discussion of difficult issues. She uses empirical research findings, philosophical analysis and interrogation of national counter-terror policy, as she believes such policy weakens rather than strengthens trust.

The final chapter in the section, offered by Paul Gibbs, takes a values perspective. He advocates that university education has, at its core, a mission to enable its communities of scholars (staff and students) to make judgements on what can be trusted, and that they, themselves, should be truth-tellers. It is about society being able to rely upon academic statements, avoiding deliberate falsehoods. This requires both trust in oneself to make those judgements, an obligation to do so and the courage to speak out when such judgements might be unpopular, risky and potentially unsafe.

With this Volume, we have sought to offer a combination of views on trust, its nature and its importance in and to higher education. Each chapter has a distinctiveness of its own and also contributes in a meaningful way to the sections as we have clustered them together. Obviously, we have to be careful in drawing far-reaching conclusions about the possible impacts of recent higher education reforms and changes. Nonetheless, we hope that the chapters in this Volume can contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which differences in national settings affect the role of higher education in creating social trust and the factors that influence the level of trust society and individual citizens have in higher education.

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Part I
Trust in Various Settings – Exploring
Norwegian and UK Higher Education
Practices

Chapter 2

Trust and Higher Education Governance in Norway and the United Kingdom



Peter Maassen and Bjørn Stensaker

We are producing generations of cynical citizens with little trust in one another, much less in their governments. Given the central role of trust in solving social dilemmas, we may be creating the very conditions that undermine our own democratic ways of life

Elinor Ostrom (1998: 20)

Introduction

With the emergence of the modern research university in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, a new academic era started which laid the groundwork for the massified higher education systems emerging around the world from the 1950s on. In the early part of this new era, Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Henry Newman introduced highly influential ideas on the ‘modern university’, which formed an important part of the foundation for the pact (or social contract) that has cemented a relatively stable relationship between higher education and society for most of the last two centuries.

The ideas of the university introduced by Newman and von Humboldt are still regarded as relevant, in the sense that they are regularly turned to for insights on

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P. Gibbs, P. Maassen (eds.), *Trusting in Higher Education*, Higher Education Dynamics 57, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87037-9_2

how to deal with current higher education challenges.¹ However, these ideas were developed at a time when enrolment levels were low and students male, white, and elite, without major societal or political worries about costs, socio-economic relevance, and hardly any international competition for students, staff, funding and prestige. These circumstances are very different from the situation universities and colleges face nowadays: traditional trust-based relationships between higher education and society are being eroded and higher education is searching for a new pact with society² (Gornitzka et al., 2007: 183–184; Olsen, 2007: 25).

In this chapter, recent developments in the relationship between higher education and society are discussed from the perspective of higher education's changing pact with society. Starting-point in this discussion is the growing inter-country variety when it comes to public governance in general and higher education governance in particular (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000; Graf, 2009; Capano et al., 2015), as illustrated by the two national cases covered in this Volume, Norway and the United Kingdom. The varieties in public governance among the two countries are significant, despite some common features and intentions in their higher education reform agendas. These can be argued to be inspired by a global New Public Management (NPM) reform narrative that has dominated policy discourses on higher education governance in the OECD member states since the 1980s (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2014). Key elements in this narrative are:

- Less government steering and more direct interactions between higher education and society, especially the private sector.
- Traditional higher education funding models that are characterised by high levels of input-oriented basic public funding have a negative influence on higher education quality and efficiency. They should be replaced by more competitive, diversified funding regimes, including tuition fees and competitive private funding.
- The need for professional and executive leadership and management functions in HEIs and executive institutional boards, with external members.
- Enhanced institutional autonomy combined with increased accountability and reporting requirements/obligations.
- Performance agreements or contracts, not only between HEIs and public authorities, but also within the universities and colleges.

Despite the similarities in the reform agendas, the implementation of the reforms reveals quite fundamental differences between Norway and the United Kingdom in the higher education funding approaches and institutional governance structures, including less reliance on competitive funding and more emphasis on democratic co-determination in institutional governance in Norwegian higher education. The

¹On the assumed enduring relevance of John Henry Newman's idea of the university, see, for example: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/oct/20/john-henry-newman-idea-university-soul>; for the continuous relevance of Wilhelm von Humboldt's ideas, see, for example, Nybom (2007).

²As an example of national initiatives for developing a new pact, see Germany, with its federal Pact for Research and Innovation (<https://www.research-in-germany.org/en/research-landscape/r-and-d-policy-framework/pact-for-research-and-innovation.html>), and its federal *Hochschulpakt 2020* (Higher Education Pact 2020), <https://www.bmbf.de/de/hochschulpakt-2020-506.html>

differences in reform outcomes can be explained, for example, from the perspective of ideological differences underlying the political economies of United Kingdom and Norway (Hall & Soskice, 2001). The Norwegian case is in this illustrative for the relatively moderate adaptations introduced in higher education funding and governance in Northwestern Continental Europe over the last two decades (De Boer & Maassen, 2020) compared to the more fundamental changes in the United Kingdom (Collini, 2020).

The impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic have seriously challenged key aspects of the NPM higher education governance narrative, in the sense that they show the vulnerability of higher education systems that have become very dependent on competitive sources of income. The pandemic has caused, for example, a dramatic drop in international student mobility (both full degree and exchange students). This resulted in serious budget problems for universities in the United Kingdom and other countries that over the last decades have increasingly relied on tuition fees income from their international students. In Norway on the other hand, the government has continuously rejected to introduce tuition fees for national and/or international students, despite recommendations in this from, for example, the OECD. As a consequence, while also Norwegian higher education institutions have to deal with the impact of the pandemic on its primary processes, e.g. in the form of shifting to online education, and disallowing international travels for academic staff, the pandemic has had negligible budgetary consequences for the Norwegian universities and colleges.

The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed in a number of respects the one-sidedness of the NPM governance narrative in its emphasis on, for example, the benefits of diversified, private sources of income, the positive impact of competition and executive institutional leadership, and the need for high levels of formal institutional autonomy combined with far-reaching accountability and reporting requirements. While in both Norway and United Kingdom the possible long-term impacts of the pandemic on higher education are being discussed, the chapters in this Volume provide various insights into the differences between the two countries in the nature of these discussions, the national and institutional contexts in which they take place, and the level of trust in higher education.

We will start in this chapter with introducing some general features of the concept of trust, followed by a discussion of how personal and social trust can be of relevance for getting a better understanding of the role of higher education in enhancing social trust. Next, we will discuss current challenges with respect to higher education's pact with society, after which we will reflect upon the current position of higher education in society. This is followed by a discussion on recent developments in national and organisation level governance in higher education, and the relationship between trust and formal control in organisational governance.

The Concept of Trust

Lane (1998) identified three elements academic definitions of trust have in common. First, there is a degree of interdependence between the trustor and the trustee. Second, trust is a way to deal with risk and uncertainty in exchange relationships. Third, there is the assumption that the vulnerability caused by taking a risk in trusting another actor will not be misused. While practically all definitions of trust share these three features, the main difference among them lies in the interpretations of how a trusted relationship between the trustor and the trustee can develop. In these interpretations, disciplinary differences in the approaches to the concept of trust can be identified (Lane & Bachmann, 1998). From an economic perspective, for example, developing trust can be regarded as a matter of rational calculations about whether it is advantageous to trust others or not. From a sociological perspective, trust can be established either by a moral belief that trusting others is the right thing to do or by various forms of cognitive processes, for example, by social similarity or cultural congruence (Zucker, 1986). Following this divide, Stensaker and Gornitzka (2009) have argued that there are two main perspectives on how to achieve trust – a rationalist-instrumental and a normative-cognitive perspective.

The rationalist-instrumental perspective assumes that individual actors will follow the logic of consequentiality. This implies that an individual is expected to pursue his/her self-interest and maximise his/her own utility. Social order and predictability are realised through making sure that behaviour can be controlled and incentives are in place so that it is in the individual's self-interest not to cheat, lie, and engage to get a free ride (Olson, 1965). Others can be trusted to the extent that there are effective mechanisms of control or appropriate incentives, especially when it comes to regulating the behaviour of individuals when the rational pursuit of individual gains might produce outcomes that would be collectively undesirable (Sako, 1998). Without sticks and carrots, others will not necessarily act in trustworthy ways. This implies that according to this perspective social order in essence is based on rationality and exchange (March & Olsen, 1989, 1995). An important aspect in the establishment and maintenance of trust in higher education from this perspective is the role of independent actors and auditors, who are assigned to check the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of higher education and are assumed to be trusted by all actors involved. Consequently, procedures, standards, and rules established by independent quality assessment agencies and auditors are proxies of trust. However, the need for agencies and auditors to introduce procedures, standards and rules, with the aim to build trust, could produce the opposite outcome, in the form of decreasing levels of trust, thereby leading to the need for further rule-based valuation, monitoring, auditing and assessment (Power, 1997, 2004; see also Sahlin, 2016: 131–132).

From a normative-cognitive perspective, trust is created by the existence of strong norms, rules, and values concerning the right behaviour of actors involved in a relationship. It is assumed that the internalisation of these norms, rules, and values by all involved actors results in trust, since it is taken for granted that everybody should and will adhere to them. Relatively stable sets of norms, values, and rules

underpin social relations and create a sense of belonging to a community. Social order is based on a common history, on obligation and reason (March & Olsen, 1989). It involves the socialisation into rules, values, and norms, but also the accumulated tacit knowledge rooted in experience-based learning. Norms, values, and rules are carried and embodied in social institutions and trust is created through the existence of institutions at which trust is directed. This implies that trust is achieved when actors, over time, demonstrate accountability through the results and outcomes produced. In a higher education setting, the reputation and status of a given university or college, involved politicians and bureaucrats, and sector agencies, will then become proxies for trust.

These two perspectives and their variants can be combined in a number of ways; they are sometimes blurring and overlapping, but they can also be read as an overview of how trust has been conceptualised in recent years (Stensaker & Gornitzka, 2009). Hence, a trustor will normally not engage in 'blind trust', but will use a combination of calculative (if possible) and norm-based judgements pointing to the indication that trust is a 'hybrid phenomenon' positioned between calculation and predictability, and goodwill and voluntary exposure to risk (Bachmann, 1998). In addition, time and resources are limited and hence overcoming low levels of trust by information seeking and checking the accuracy of information incurs heavy costs. Trusting may only be rational if the costs of low trust weigh heavier than its gains.

These two disciplinary perspectives are also of relevance for understanding how trust relates to other concepts. Hardy et al. (1998) have, for example, discussed the relationship between trust and power. They argue that cooperative relations that appear to reflect trust can hide asymmetrical power relationships where one of the actors is forced to trust the other because of the potential negative sanctions the other actor controls (see also De Boer, 2002). In this way, power can, at least in some situations, be seen as a way to replace trust in coordinating social interactions. Hence, trust, power, and risk are heavily intertwined concepts. As underlined by Bachman (2001: 342) "trust absorbs uncertainty and diffuses complexity, but, at the same time, it produces risk".

Finally, an important question is how trust relates to distrust. While in the academic literature, trust and distrust have traditionally been regarded as polar opposites on one continuum, March and Olsen (1975) have presented a cyclical view on trust and distrust. This implies that building trust, for example, in government, can only be achieved in a context where a minimum level of trust is already present. In a context of distrust, any effort by government to build trust can be expected to fail either because these efforts are not noticed or because they are looked upon highly suspiciously. Consequently, trust and distrust should be seen as different constructs, implying that distrust is not equal to mere low trust (Van de Walle & Six, 2014: 169). There are fundamental differences in the basic levels of trust across countries, which implies that the study of trust and distrust needs to take the national contexts into account, and aim at contributing to our understanding of why in some countries, for example, Norway, political institutions and public administrative systems are to a larger extent based on an assumption of trust than they are in other

countries, such as the United Kingdom, where distrust in government among part of the population is much more common (Van de Walle & Six, 2014: 171).

The trust – distrust distinction is of relevance for the study of trust in higher education and science. An (active) distrust in higher education among part of the population can be interpreted as part of a disposition to be suspicious of any aspect of higher education's role in society, independent of the possible contributions of higher education to improving the quality of life for all citizens. Active distrust in higher education is in general part of a broader disposition. Therefore, distrust in higher education has to be understood from the perspective of the relationship between attitudes towards higher education and more general aspects, such as "satisfaction with one's own life, ethnocentric attitudes, feelings of insecurity, or other emotions" (Van de Walle & Six, 2014: 170).

Personal and Social Trust

The concept of trust is described in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as "assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something".³ This 'assured reliance' is necessary for reducing complexity and uncertainty in social relationships (Bachman, 2001). Consequently, a preference for one course of action in social relationships over any other alternative can be defined as a situation of trust (Luhmann, 1988: 97). In developing a preference for one course of action, "trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another" (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). How does trust at the individual level relate to trust at the societal level? What does trust in the meaning of assured reliance based on personal insights into other individuals' moral and political preferences, etc., tell us about the level of social trust when individual citizens have to deal with people in their society for whom they do not have this personalised information (Denzau & North, 1994; Rothstein, 2011: 167–168)? A possible answer to these questions starts with seeing social trust as an informal institution in society, in the sense of "an established system of beliefs about the behaviour of others" (Delhey & Newton, 2004; Rothstein, 2011: 168). While the causal relationship between personal and social trust is a complex and multi-faceted issue, there are strong indications that countries with the highest level of personal trust also have the highest levels of social trust, and vice versa. For example, the level of personal trust is consistently highest in the Nordic countries, while also the percentage of the population that is convinced that most other people can be trusted is highest in the Nordic countries (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). As stated by Rothstein (2011: 147), "social trust correlates so systematically with a great number of other variables, it is difficult not to believe it captures something that is important for individuals as well as societies". This implies, according to

³ See: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trust>

Rothstein (2011: 151), that, “there is a causal link between trust in public governance institutions, social trust and equality”. Therefore, there is a considerable political and scientific interest in how to generate social trust, including the role that (higher) education can play. Building on Rothstein’s arguments for making investments in universal education programs, the following reasons can be identified that support the argument that (public) higher education plays an important role in enhancing social trust. First, high levels of participation in higher education contribute to social mobility and equal opportunity, as well as to generating more economic equality. Second, participation in higher education has the potential of strengthening the belief of parents in the future of their children, and this optimism can be assumed to strengthen social trust. Third, at the individual level, participation in higher education can be expected to stimulate the enhancement of social trust among students. Finally, higher education brings young people from different national, ethnic, religious and social groups together in a relatively open setting with access to a global knowledge environment, which in general has a positive impact on social trust (Rothstein, 2011: 163). Whether, and if so, how each of these four reasons affects social trust requires additional empirical studies. Nonetheless, the chapters in this Volume present relevant insights into how differences in the national contexts of higher education in Norway and the United Kingdom play a role in the extent to which higher education in the two countries contributes to enhancing social trust. In addition, they also allow for a better understanding of how the overall level of societal trust in the two countries relates to the trust the citizens of the two countries have in their national higher education institutions.

The Role of Trust in Higher Education’s Pact with Society

Since its establishment in the eleventh century, the European university’s relationship with society has gone through periods of apparent stability as well as crisis and change, related to the level of mutual trust and commitment, and the level of agreement on the university’s role in and for society, and society’s role in governing, organising and funding higher education. In its first centuries of its existence the European university was in essence a professional school organised around theology, medicine and law, without activities that we would consider ‘scientific’ from today’s perspective. Even though after the mid-seventeenth century the relationship between the university and the emerging nation state authorities in Europe became closer, the European university of the late eighteenth, early nineteenth century was still a “private, self-governing, property-owning and self-financing corporation” (Neave, 2001: 23). Even in countries with a very tight state control, such as Russia, the traditional universities were allowed to continue some form of self-governance.

The emergence of the research university formed a crucial transition point in the development of the European nation state and the role of the university as one of its core social institutions, as is argued in detail by Watson (2010) for the role of the

university in the development of Germany as a nation-state between 1750 and 1933.⁴ How does the current relationship between higher education and society relate to the transformation of the university from a professional school to a research-intensive scientific institution? For answering this question, the notion of a ‘pact’ (or ‘social contract’) is of relevance. This notion emerged in the Age of Enlightenment as the leading doctrine of political legitimacy. A number of scholars contributed to the development of this doctrine, including John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose book *Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique* (“Of The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right”) from 1762 proposed reforms that would imply a government that prioritises the interests of its people over its own interests. Using, amongst other things, Locke’s and Rousseau’s ideas, various scholars (see, e.g. Gough, 1936; Riley, 1973; Gourevitch, 1997) argue why and how a rational citizen would voluntarily consent to give up his or her natural personal freedom to obtain the benefits of political order. Anchored in this original political philosophical interpretation, a ‘pact’ with respect to the higher education – society relationship has been interpreted as

a fairly long-term cultural commitment to and from higher education, as an institution with its own foundational rules of appropriate practices, causal and normative beliefs, and resources, yet validated by the political and social system in which higher education is embedded (Gornitzka et al., 2007: 184).

An important component of the pact has been that higher education is regarded as a “trustee of the European humanist tradition”. This perspective is emphasised in the original Magna Charta Universitatum Charter from 1988 with European university leaders as the main initiators.⁵ The Magna Charta Universitatum initiative highlights the university’s basic institutional characteristics, and its essential academic identity, purposes, and principles. In the 1988 Charter, the initiators distanced themselves and their universities from an instrumental interpretation, which emphasizes specific economic or social purposes of the university (Maassen & Olsen, 2007). With a reference to the European humanist tradition, “the Humboldtian model”, with *Bildung* as a key principle, is in many respects honoured in the Magna Charta Universitatum, and regarded as still highly relevant in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century, as illustrated by the 2019 update of the Charter. The ideas referred to in the Charter emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, and promote the university as a carrier of classic Enlightenment values, such as rationality and a scientific attitude, serving the common good. From this perspective university education is to form individuals in academic-humanist attitudes and make them informed and responsible citizens. This represents a great deal of confidence in humanity’s intellectual powers, as reflected in Kant’s definition of Enlightenment as “humankind’s release from its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one understanding without guidance from another” (Kant, 1784).

⁴For a more comprehensive discussion of the role of universities and colleges in the development of European nation states, see: Rüegg (2004).

⁵See: <http://www.magna-charta.org/index.html>

The Humboldtian ideology of the early nineteenth century glorified *Wissenschaft* and creativity in the sense of the creation of new knowledge, which was regarded as the main driving force for the development of a new, enlightened German society and citizen. As argued by a number of scholars (see, for example, Turner, 1971; Rüegg, 2004; Watson, 2010), the German research university has become the template for the modern research university, carrying the enlightenment values into the twentieth century. This template has not been static, but was adapted through the incorporation of innovations in the basic organisational model, such as graduate education, liberal arts education, professional schools, research centres of excellence, and knowledge transfer offices. The question can be raised how these innovations and the underlying forces that produced them have affected the role and importance of the classic enlightenment values in the twenty-first century University. These values incorporate that academic work creates the conditions under which, for example, meaningful thinking and the making of sound judgements take place. In addition, they form the basis for the protection of academic freedom (Angus, 2009; Karran & Mallinson, 2018).

In the first decades after 1945 higher education profited in many respects from a pact that was founded in a fundamental trust in the contributions of universities and colleges to social progress and socio-economic development. In this pact, the modern university played a central role in the rapid socio-economic development in the 1950s and 1960s of the then OECD members in North America, Western Europe, and Australasia. University research produced the knowledge that formed the foundation under the biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information and communication technology revolutions, and university graduates became the core knowledge workers in the industries that emerged and blossomed in the wake of these technology revolutions (Mazzucato, 2013). In addition, new types of higher education institutions were established, focusing on welfare state professions in the public as well as private sector, including nursing and other health care professions, teaching, business administration, engineering, and more recently ICT, security, entertainment, and media. Many of these new types of institutions and sectors enrolled first generation students in higher education, and practically guaranteed for most of these students an entrance into the middle class for them and their families. The new types of higher education institutions were in the beginning to a large extent public, while more recently the private component of professional higher education is growing in many respects especially in the US, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia. These institutions have a more direct relationship with their political and socio-economic environments than the research universities, both in their study programs and their emerging research mission (Kyvik & Lepori, 2010).

The assumed relationship between economic growth, social progress and higher education that formed the trust-based foundation under higher education's post-1945 pact with society has been challenged in many respects from the 1960s on. First element in this was the dramatic growth of higher education, in the sense of the masculification of student numbers followed by rapidly increasing staff numbers, and an increase in the number of higher education institutions, all leading to a significant rise in the costs of higher education. Second, from the 1970s on the belief in the

linear relationship between publicly funded basic research and socio-economic innovation faltered, and various alternative models on the relationship between research and innovation were introduced (Lundvall, 1992; Mazzucato, 2013). Third, in a number of countries and regions, including the USA, Brazil and various East Asian countries, a large private, for-profit higher education sector emerged. While private non-profit higher education has a long history and is like public higher education anchored in the enlightenment values, for-profit higher education is a relatively new phenomenon, and differs in its basic values fundamentally from the traditional non-profit institutions and systems (Morey, 2004; Douglass, 2012).

Olsen (2007) has discussed how the development of the modern university as a specialised institution committed to academic teaching and research was one part of the large-scale transformation from pre-modern to modern societies in Europe. In this transformation, the modern university constituted a particular institutional sphere, distinct from other autonomous domains of the economy and the market, state and bureaucracy or religion. However, Olsen (2007: 44) notes that at the onset of the twenty-first century public trust in higher education's problem solving capacity has decreased drastically. The main consequence is the need for (re-)negotiating the terms of the pact between higher education and society. In historical and institutional perspective, Olsen argues, the institutional foundations of universities and colleges are based on underlying social contracts involving long-term cultural commitments. However, in radically changing circumstances even entrenched institutions can encounter "widely-agreed-upon performance crises", typically through the intrusion of values, criteria and procedures derived from other and alien institutional spheres. Olsen (2007: 28) terms this a form of "institutional imperialism (which) (...) may threaten to destroy what is distinctive about (...) institutional spheres".

The distinctive nature of this notion of higher education institutions (re-) negotiating their underlying social contract with society may be clarified by contrasting it with competing notions, such as the responsive university (Keith, 1998) or the enterprise university (Marginson & Considine, 2000). In both cases the underlying assumption is that, in response to changing social conditions and demands, universities and colleges should change the distinctive nature of their academic operations. However, these interpretations of the consequences of changing conditions for higher education institutions ultimately neglect their basic institutional characteristics and principles that are responsible for their long-term robustness.

This implies that in its broadest terms a pact concerns the relationship between society and its institutions, and presumes that in order to form a social order there has to be a mutual understanding of, trust in, and commitment to the roles and responsibilities of all partners involved. This implies that there is a 'pact' concerning an appropriate set of rules for behaviour and a mutual understanding of included obligations. Arguably, we can witness a shift in how the sectoral pact for higher education is interpreted, especially in the context of its current socio-economic and political contexts. Higher education's pact has traditionally been understood as a broad 'gentlemen's agreement' on roles and responsibilities, but is now increasingly seen as a formal, mainly economic agreement (Gornitzka et al., 2007).

In the 1980s and 1990s it was assumed that global reform agendas would have a standardising and homogenising impact on the governance, organisation and funding of higher education systems and institutions, both public and private (Goedegebuure et al., 1994; Meyer et al., 2007). However, the implementation of higher education reforms at the national level is affected by national filters (Musselin, 2007; Gornitzka & Maassen, 2014). This implies that generally accepted ‘global reform scripts’ instead of leading to standardisation and converging, are characterised by reform instrumentation and reform outcomes which are adapted to specific national institutional arrangements, path dependencies, and policy interplays. The result is that the implementation of global reform agendas in higher education instead of resulting in homogenisation, is leading to very specific national outcomes, as further discussed in the next section.

Higher Education’s Position in Society

As indicated, a dominant factor in the far-reaching internal and external changes that characterise higher education’s developments over the last decades is its unprecedented growth. At the beginning of the 2020s, over 200 million students are enrolled worldwide in higher education, with the three largest higher education systems (China, USA and the EU-27) enrolling together almost 80 million students. This massification is responsible for the rapidly increasing costs of higher education, in many countries at an inflation plus rate. Consequently, there is a shift in the funding of higher education from the public to the private purse, amongst other things, through the growing reliance on tuition fees in public higher education.

While the key formal responsibilities for higher education governance and funding are still concentrated at the national or sub-national (e.g. state, province, Land, or canton) level, globalisation has strongly affected the understanding of the relevance and quality of higher education. An important component in this has been the political focus on the notion of the knowledge economy (Powell & Snellman, 2004) leading to a general interest in higher education as the key knowledge institution in any society. In this context, a global reform agenda emerged, which emphasises a growing reliance on market forces and competition, and promotes the strengthening of the economic impact of higher education. Key reform elements are the enhancement of institutional autonomy, the professionalization of institutional leadership, management and administration, the growing centralisation of executive boards in institutional governance structures, and the development of strategic institutional profiles. As discussed in the previous section, ensuing higher education reforms did not produce homogeneous effects around the world, amongst other things, because of the working of national and institutional filters that interpret and modify the global reforms ideas (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2014). Consequently, while in some countries, for example, Norway, the impact of the reforms has been relatively moderate, in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the reforms have led a weakening of the embeddedness of

higher education in the public domain, with accompanying impacts on the level of trust in and the existence of distrust towards higher education. From a public governance perspective, this can be related to the ways in which generic ideas of New Public Management (NPM) have been used in the implementation of the governance reforms.⁶ Varieties among national public governance approaches will be discussed in more detail below.

Of further relevance for understanding the position of higher education in society is the impact of a number of global crises taking place since the early twenty-first century, that is, the global security crisis (since 09–11), the financial crisis of 2007/08, and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of these rather sudden, unexpected crises required an effective response of the government, which led to a rapid dominance of the crisis in national policy arenas. The political urgency to find solutions and the societal pressure on political leadership to implement solutions ('show decisiveness') led especially in the Covid-19 crisis to a central role for the science system and higher education in providing relevant knowledge and human capacity with a key role of experts and scientific expertise. At the same time, the nature and impact of the role of the science system differs from country to country and is, amongst other things, dependent on the political order and public administration. Here we can refer to the differences between the British response and the ways in which Norway responded in March 2020 to the Covid-19 pandemic. This encompasses, for example, differences in the extent to which the political leadership of the two countries worked closely with scientists in agreeing upon the measures to be taken, including a national lockdown. Overall, the Norwegian response reflected a high trust in science and consisted of an approach in which the political leadership of the country worked closely with scientific experts, putting medical expertise central in the development and public presentation of measures. In the United Kingdom, there was in the early stages of the pandemic a greater political emphasis on possible economic consequences of a national lockdown and a political reluctance to share the national stage with scientists. While also in the United Kingdom medical expertise played an important role in the development of national measures to deal with the pandemic, the level of trust in science and higher education seems to be less pronounced and obvious, at least in the initial period, than in Norway. This difference in the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic is also reflected in the development of the national governance modes of higher education in the two countries.

⁶For a discussion on the NPM inspired higher education reforms in the Nordic countries, see Christensen et al. (2014). A wide range of academic publications is addressing NPM inspired governance reforms of British higher education, see, e.g. Ferlie and Andresani (2009), and Collini (2020).

Varieties in the National Governance of Higher Education

The ideas of the modern university by Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Henry Newman referred to in the Introduction, outline two alternative development trajectories for the modern research university and its relationship to society. Von Humboldt's ideas were gradually transformed throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth century into a global template for the research university as an institution. Newman on the other hand has taken an existing formal organisational form, that is, the Oxford College, as the foundation for his idea of the university (Rothblatt, 1997; Nybom, 2007). Newman's work is still being referred to in British deliberations when it comes to current university challenges and policy issues, and von Humboldt's ideas are still prominently featuring in Continental European debates on higher education. As argued by Nybom (2007: 79), von Humboldt's main ideas are currently "... either hailed as an eternally valid ideal-type or disdained as a suitable scapegoat, which is responsible for nearly all our alleged present miseries". As regards the latter position, various political actors have argued that we need new basic ideas and models for justifying societies' commitment to and investments in higher education. This can be illustrated by the following quote from the then European Commissioner for Education, Training and Culture, Jan Figel (2006: 12): "We need a new model – we need something which can demonstrate to countries where university models still hark back to the days of Humboldt, that today there are additional ways of doing things". This plea for a radical departure from ideas that have formed for a long time the foundation under continental European universities' relationship with society was presented at an annual conference of British heads of university administration.

As indicated above, and discussed in various chapters in this Volume, the governance of British higher education has developed in a significantly different direction than the governance of continental European higher education. There are various conceptual perspectives that can be used to interpret the nature of public governance models, for example, the 'varieties of capitalism' (VoC) perspective, which provides a comparative framework that can be used to interpret the role higher education institutions play in the political economy of modern capitalist societies. The VoC perspective introduces a basic distinction between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 8–9). The United Kingdom is an example of an LME, and Norway an example of a CME. In LMEs, the main mechanisms of coordination are hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, while in a CME coordination is achieved through non-market relationships, that is, through processes of strategic interaction where institutions play a role in the formation of commitments and deliberation (Graf, 2009: 570–572; see also: Maassen et al., 2019).

What is specific from a VoC perspective about the Norwegian approach to higher education governance can be illustrated by the way in which the topic of state ownership of universities and colleges was addressed in 2002/03 by a national committee, and the reactions to the committee's recommendations. Norway has a long

tradition of using national committees for developing what can be regarded as a Norwegian version of a green paper.⁷ One of such committees, the ‘Mjøs-committee’, was established in 1998 and presented its report in 2000. The report led to a higher education reform in 2002–03, the Quality Reform, which introduced far-reaching changes, amongst other things, in order to make Norwegian higher education comply with the Bologna Process (Gornitzka, 2007). The changes included a new academic degree structure, a new funding model for higher education, the establishment of two formal higher education agencies, and the opening up of the Norwegian higher education structure for the upgrading of professional colleges to university status. The Quality Reform did not change the legal status of the public higher education institutions though, implying that they remained state-owned. This was regarded as ineffective by the then government, which established a new committee already in 2002, the Ryssdal-committee, with the mandate to produce a set of recommendations about the legal follow up of the Quality Reform, including the possibilities for changing the legal status of the higher education institutions from state-owned to self-owning public corporations. Fear for the role of the market and competition in the governance of Norwegian higher education inspired a massive protest in Oslo outside Parliament buildings against the committee’s proposals the day before its report was formally handed over to the responsible Minister. The Minister, even though positive about the report and its main proposals, decided not to follow the majority of the committee members’ recommendations and maintained the state-ownership of Norwegian higher education institutions. This situation continues until today. In 2018, a new national committee was established with a mandate for proposing major changes in the comprehensive higher education law. The public debates after the establishment of this committee were dominated by worries about the possibilities of changing the legal status of the Norwegian higher education institutions in the direction of the status proposed in 2003 by the Ryssdal committee. The outcry against a change in the legal relationship between state authorities and higher education institutions was so strong that the responsible Minister in spring 2019 announced that a Ryssdal-like proposal indicating a legal decoupling of Norwegian higher education from state-ownership would not be considered.

As shown in this example, policy change in Norway is of an incremental nature, taking place through strategic interactions of representatives of key institutions, which in the case of higher education include the Ministry of Education and Research and the universities and colleges, as well as other Ministries, agencies, unions, employers’ organisations, and other stakeholders. This implies that public authorities attempt to realise changes in higher education policy and practice in essence through consultation, compromising, institutional development, instead of through market interactions and competition. Consequently, in Norway the state

⁷A green paper can be defined as a “First-draft document on a specific policy area circulated among interested parties who are invited to join in a process of consultation and debate. The objective of a green paper is to arrive at a general consensus before drafting the official policy document, the white paper” (see: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/green-paper.html>)

remains a key governance actor, with a relatively high level of mutual trust characterising the relationship between higher education and society. This is visible, amongst other things, in the continuous high level of public funding of higher education (and science), and in the specific balance between trust and formal control in the governance structures of universities and colleges.

Trust and Formal Control in Organisational Governance

In the organisational literature, there has traditionally been a focus on formal control as the main mechanism for governing intra- and inter-organisational relationships in the private sector (Das & Teng, 2001). Because of various political, economic and social developments, formal control is assumed to have become less effective, with an accompanying interest in trust as a possible mechanism of private sector organisational governance. Consequently, new questions emerge on how control and trust might be related in the governing of organisational relations, such as: “Can trust-based and control-based modes of governance go hand in hand? Does control chase out trust or does trust diminish the need for control?” (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005: 260).

The reduced focus on formal power in private sector governance relates to the fact that control is argued to be dependent on certain features that are currently under pressure. First, for formal control to be effective the expected outcomes of decisions and activities have to be specified beforehand. This assumes that tasks and behaviour are programmable, codifiable, and measurable, and that outcomes can be predicted. However, these basic conditions can seldom be satisfied anymore in current private sector work and organisational practices. Key words used to characterise current organisational governance practices in the private sector are ambiguity and uncertainty.

Second, formal control requires the possibility of monitoring to determine if the behaviour of persons employed by the organisation deviate from the agreed upon rules. However, the assumption that behaviour and actions in organisations can be monitored up close have been challenged more and more, amongst other things, from privacy rights perspectives. In response, efforts have been made to introduce ‘monitoring from a distance’ approaches, incorporating elements of trust. More recently, ‘intelligent monitoring systems’ have been introduced, without it being clear yet how effective these are in combining the respect of private rights and providing relevant governance information.

Third, effective governance through formal control requires an organisational structure that enables the enforcement of organisational rules and regulations so that credible threats can be made in cases in which they are not abided. This requires a suitable juridical structure to sanction deviant behaviour, which in modern organisations has become increasingly problematic, amongst other things, as a consequence of organisational boundaries becoming more unclear.

In addition, several developments over the last decades have been further weakening and challenging the foundation for formal control as the main governance mechanism in private organisations, including the speeding up of markets, flexibilisation and virtualisation of organisational forms through the increasing use of digital technologies, and work relationships having become looser and more distant (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005).

Contrary to the situation in the private sector, governing organisational relationships in universities and colleges has traditionally relied more on trust in 'primus inter pares' leadership practices than formal control mechanisms. This reliance on trust was a consequence of the acknowledgement that universities are unique organisations with specific characteristics, such as goal ambiguity and primary processes (education and research) with unpredictable (and therefore uncontrollable) outcomes (Olsen, 2007: 27). However, while in the private sector there is a growing interest in trust as a governance mechanism, governmental reforms in higher education emphasise the need to strengthen formal control elements in institutional governance, for example, professional, executive leadership positions and structures, more hierarchical decision-making structures, and formalised accountability demands. This implies that while organisations in the private sector are undergoing a transition from governance based on formal control to governance through interaction of trust and control, higher education institutions are experiencing a development from governance based primarily on trust to executive forms of governance in which formal control is expected to take a more prominent place. This reflects the important understanding that trust is not static (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005: 262).

Concluding Reflections

As argued by Rothstein (2011: 147), an important reason for discussing and analysing key aspects of the role of trust in society is its relevance for the quality of life: "Cities, regions, and countries with more trusting people are likely to have better working democratic institutions, more open economies, greater economic growth, and less crime and corruption." High levels of personal and social trust are assumed to reinforce central 'quality of life' variables, such as low levels of corruption, equality, low crime rates, and high quality public governance institutions, just as low levels of personal and social trust are assumed to reinforce negative variables, such as high levels of corruption, inequality, high crime rates, and low quality public governance institutions. Consequently, societies with high levels of social and personal trust function and perform better, and are therefore preferable to societies with low levels of personal and social trust. In this, higher education is argued to have the potential to contribute to the enhancement of social trust, which has been an important element in the pact between higher education and society that emerged in the early nineteenth century and has functioned as such until recently. The erosion of the traditional pact, however, does not imply that the role of higher education in

strengthening social trust has become less important. As we have discussed in this chapter, the emergence of a global NPM-inspired public governance narrative has also affected the relationship between higher education and society. This narrative promotes, also in higher education governance, competition and diversified funding, executive leadership and management, and sector and institutional accountability. Higher education governance reforms following this narrative have been implemented in both Norway and the United Kingdom. However, there are significant differences in the extent to which the reforms have affected the higher education funding practices, institutional governance structures, and accountability requirements in the two countries. Consequently, also the role of higher education in generating social trust in Norway and the United Kingdom is affected differently. In Norway, we can observe relatively moderate governance adaptations and a continuous high level of belief in the role of higher education in generating social trust, as exemplified by the high level of basic public funding and lack of tuition fees, the nature of the student support system, and the importance of democratic, co-determination principles in institutional governance. In the United Kingdom, we can observe more significant changes in institutional governance, including more competitive funding regimes and high levels of tuition fees, and a dominance of executive principles in institutional governance, including high salary levels and executive mandates for university leaders. As a number of the chapters in the Volume illustrate, these governance changes are accompanied by worries about the role of higher education in generating (or eroding?) social trust in general, while they also might have contributed to an erosion of public trust in higher education.

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Chapter 3

Trust in Higher Education Policy-Making



Alex Elwick and Philipp Friedrich

Introduction

In this chapter, we focus on system-level governance changes in higher education (HE) policy-making processes across the past 25 years and in particular the role of academics within such processes. We illustrate these changes with a specific focus on recent white papers in England and Norway, as our two sites of study. Furthermore, we ask the question: to what extent might policy changes lead to an erosion of trust among the involved stakeholders, especially from the perspective of academics? We argue that changes in the very process of policy-making in HE have far-reaching consequences for whole HE systems because of the central role of academics.

Our underlying assumption is that the latest system level governance changes in English and Norwegian HE have modified the policy-making process and thereby the degree of involvement of different stakeholders. Central to governance changes in both countries has been the issue of accountability and moves towards so-called quasi-market-based systems (see e.g. Brown, 2015), though to different degrees in the two countries. In particular, debates around tuition fees can be seen as a central element in the quasi-marketization of HE, shifting the primary burden of paying for HE from the state to the individual (student). The nature of a HE system in England in which students contribute to the costs of their education has fundamentally changed the relationship both students and the wider public have with the system, which has been extensively explored in debates around consumerisation, marketization and neo-liberalism (see e.g. Olsen & Peters, 2005). Because of such changes, trustworthiness has become an ever-more important ongoing concern for HE

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institutions (Kharouf et al., 2014). In contrast, in Norway, the HE system is characterised by a high degree of public elements and a relatively low degree of market instrumentation. Continuous reform attempts and changes in the sector can be seen as a response to overall societal changes, both nationally and internationally. As a result, the Norwegian HE sector is typified by a growing number of (mainly public) actors that contribute increasingly to a more horizontal-type of policy-making process. This is in line with a general high level of public trust in state institutions, and certain (public) scepticism in market-like elements, especially in (higher) education (Læg Reid et al., 2013).

Modern HE systems such as those of England and Norway face numerous challenges; of particular concern in the context of this chapter is the ever-expanding massification of both systems, with an ever-growing number of actors and stakeholders (Trow, 1973; Maassen & Cloete, 2006). From special interest groups and unions to (public) agencies dealing with quality assurance or ethics councils: governance at the system level has become more complex (Chou et al., 2017). In other words, we hold that the HE sector has experienced a growing plurality of opinions as well authorities when it comes to policy-making. An important question we consider is whether a general erosion of trust can be perceived due to the growing number of (unknown) actors and stakeholders and the challenge of each maintaining an input and influence over HE policy-making. Specifically, our focus here is on the role of academics within this process and, although Norway and England have had distinct journeys to the current point, we argue they have both reached comparable situations. This chapter will explore both their journeys and their current positions in order to shed light on the role that academics play in conceptions of trust in HE policy-making.

Policy-making and policy-makers function at the intersection in that respect between overall societal needs and HE institutions. They ensure and assure accountability through the above-mentioned instruments, like performance agreements, performance-based funding, and strategic plans and agreements. Changing the rules of policy-making leads to uncertainties, as the new *modus operandi* has to be explored and experienced by stakeholders first. This transition period can present a burden to formerly established trust. In the negotiations and discussions of policy-making processes, factual occurrences might be mixed with misconceptions, and inevitably the acceptance, modification or opposition to new mechanisms can take considerable time.

Our assumption is that the level of trust in HE is very different when it comes to policy-making in both countries. In Norway the involvement of academics (and other stakeholders) in HE policy-making has remained relatively stable, although one could claim that there have been some far-reaching changes in the organisational, funding and governance conditions under which Norwegian HE institutions function and operate. As a consequence there is no reduction in the level of trust in policy-making (as can be observed e.g. in the nature and content of the policy hearings). Whereas, in England there has been a definite shift away from the involvement of academics – which erodes trust in this context.

The next section in this chapter provides some background to the HE policy environments in both England and Norway, as well as some background to the quasi-marketized approach, which has become so prevalent. There then follows a discussion specifically around the policy-making processes that have developed and their relationship to trust, along with two case studies – one each from England and Norway – based around recent HE white papers. The chapter ends with a comparison between the countries and a discussion around the role of academics within the policy-making process and the resultant effect on trust in HE policy-making.

Background

In the past decades, English and Norwegian HE have undergone several system governance reforms comparable to reforms in a number of other European HE systems. One of the first profound changes in HE governance came with the general public sector and performance crisis of public institutions in the 1970s (Blum & Schubert, 2009). The reorganisation of the public sector coincided with an ever-growing HE sector and led to the modification of traditional governance arrangements. Following the neoliberal nature of the state reform trends of the 1970s/1980s in the Anglo-Saxon world, HE institutions required greater autonomy in order to act within a competitive environment based on market forces and to fully exploit their capacity. Under an assumption that universities would know best what to do and how to achieve it, and to enable them to respond more flexibly to the market, it was viewed as important to shift more authority to the institution (Huisman et al., 2009). However, HE was simultaneously regarded as too important for both state and national purposes to be left alone to the whims and dangers of a pure market.

Because of this dilemma, nation states have introduced quasi-markets for their HE sectors (Dill, 2013). In these environments, HE is confronted with competition in order to overcome problems with efficiency and effectiveness; yet, the supply and demand nature of the market is regulated by governments. Performance-based funding with agreements on goals and aims between HE and the state has become the norm: public money is now increasingly distributed on the basis of performance indicators and measurements (Teixeira & Dill, 2011). Focusing on the European context one can observe variation among those indicators that are considered as important and the instruments used to measure them. Independent from differences in layout, structure and parameters: the rationale underlying performance-based funding is that the money is not otherwise spent efficiently; and even though HE institutions require a certain degree of freedom, the state as the principal desires to hold the university accountable in areas that are of national interest, like the number of graduates or overall system performance. In other words, what is the value one gets for public money invested in HE? For these reasons, a number of adjustments and negotiations around institutional autonomy are often perceived as a deceit from an institutional point of view, because they offer more freedom but at the same time demand more accountability. Some would even argue that due to this, actual

institutional autonomy has diminished, even though it appears to have increased in formal terms (Christensen, 2011). This can be also read as an erosion of trust in the university and its ability to fulfil society's expectations.

With regard to the English HE sector, there has been a shift in at least three different ways over a period of around 50 years, with HE institutions moving from private control to state control; policy moving from being driven largely by the sector itself, to being shaped predominantly from the centre, by politicians; and HE moving from being a public good to being regarded largely a private benefit. We will focus on changes in the sector, in terms of both policy and policy-making, over predominantly the last 25 years.

Firstly, slightly before this period, in the 1980s universities shifted from being privately to publically governed (Brown, 2013) – a shift described by Shattock as the “absorption of universities into the machinery of the state” (2008: 184) – precipitated by a regime which now held them formally accountable for the funding they received. As such, policy in the sector altered, “from being intrinsic to the issues that actually arose out of HE to being derived from a set of public policies designed for the reform and modernisation of the public sector of the economy” (Shattock, 2008: 181–182). Secondly, there was a shift in the actors who actually drove policy around HE. Originally the University Grants Committee (UGC) allocated funding to universities, a body largely composed of academics themselves – what Palfryman and Tapper described as ‘inbred’ (2014: 21). However, as the sector and issues around funding of HE became more politicised (The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997), so too did the policy decisions to the point where the policy agenda was exclusively driven by the government of the day. Funding councils replaced the UGC and have, as noted by Filippakou and Tapper (2016), taken on more of a regulatory role acting as, “agents of government...to implement government's predetermined objectives through second order politics” (Scott, 1995). Speaking from direct experience, Brown (2013: 120) noted that whereas previously civil servants were the main advisers on policy, “now [they] have to share this role with political advisers, the political parties, various ‘think tanks’, and of course the media.”

Similarly to England, the HE sector in Norway has also been confronted with a number of governance changes over the past decades, most profoundly also with regard to the general crisis of Western public administrations in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the strong Norwegian welfare-state orientation tended to blur or modify NPM-reforms and market-oriented mechanisms, leading to a distinct approach in modern public administration (Painter & Peters, 2010). A more recent development in Norwegian HE consisted of the changes at the end of the 1990s, when an expert commission installed by the government (the so-called Mjøs-committee), addressed the challenges of a continuous massifying HE system (Kwiek & Maassen, 2012). The results were manifested in comprehensive HE reforms (the Quality Reform 2003) and a new university law in 2005 (Bleiklie, 2009). As the number of students and staff at universities grew, so too did the importance of various stakeholders, actors, and interest organisations around HE (Pinheiro et al., 2014). A key development in that respect has been the emerging role of state

agencies administering the public mandate in specific HE policy areas, such as quality assurance, international program coordination, and the digitalisation of HE. This development in HE policy-making created new interests that needed to be accommodated and integrated. At the same time, Norwegian HE institutions gained substantial institutional autonomy, which promoted the development of a more coherent organisational identity (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2012). The new ‘confrontation’ lines now did not only run along groups’ interests (e.g. those of academics, students or politicians), but also increasingly along a growing number of organisational identities (e.g. university colleges striving for university status) (Krücken & Meier, 2006). In a system that emphasises the equality and legitimacy of every voice and concern (Læg Reid et al., 2013), the accommodation of manifold interests in the policy-making process therefore presents a specific challenge.

Policy-Making, Markets, and Trust

Dramatic changes to the policy-making sphere – and particularly with respect to those actors who played a central role in policy creation – have led to the prominence of policy based upon ideological lines, and specifically in England, ideological belief in the creation of a (quasi-) market in HE (Radice, 2013). Such a stance owes its routes to the Robbins Report of 1963; was the rationale for the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act which removed the binary divide; and lays at the heart of the introduction of tuition fees, the introduction of variable fees and the legislation following the Browne Review (2010) which increased fees substantially:

Our proposals are designed to create genuine competition for students between HEIs, of a kind, which cannot take place under the current system. There will be more investment available for the HE institutions that are able to convince students that it is worthwhile. This is in our view a surer way to drive up quality than any attempt at central planning (Browne Report, 2010: 8).

The 2010 reforms in England were described by Brown and Carasso (2013: 2) as, “the latest but also the most significant and far-reaching, stage in a long process of marketization under which, through the policies of successive governments of all political parties since 1979, British higher education...has increasingly been provided on market or ‘quasi-market’ lines.”

Policy in HE has more recently been made through a complex web of inter-governmental relationships (Shattock, 2012), in particular encapsulating the Treasury as well as variously renamed departments for education, skills, business, science and industry. As Shattock (2012: 5) notes, “policy more often emerged from the interactions and dialogues within and between different parts of Government than specifically from the department formally charged with responsibility for higher education.”

However, a fundamental criticism which underlies this whole approach, and the shift to a marketized system, is that the market created does not (and cannot) operate

as a ‘pure’ market (Brown & Carasso, 2013) – there has to be some level of government control retained. Why would a university offer a more expensive resource-intensive course that experiences difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of students (but is important for society and our economy more generally, e.g. chemistry) if this university can only charge the same fees as they would charge for a low-resource course? Consequently, the ‘public good’ nature of at least some elements of HE necessitate that the HE market cannot operate as a pure free market. Ultimately trust in policy-making is arguably eroded because of the shift towards a quasi-market, the shift in the way policy is made, and the inherent problems with this ideological approach that underpin higher education policy. As stated by Shattock (2008: 185), “It is hardly surprising that the higher education policy literature has been permeated with a sense of injustice over funding policies, resentment at increased bureaucracy and grievance about isolation from the decision-making process whether at the local institutional level or about national issues.”

Criticisms of government and politicians can be taken as criticisms of the policy-making process too. Pritchard (2011: 145) suggests that “government rhetoric has become inconsistent with its practice”, while Brown and Carasso (2013: 179) state that, “in higher education as elsewhere, political decisions are not always the rational conclusion to a reasoned debate.”

In Norway, in contrast, market type elements in HE are generally met sceptical but also seen as an unavoidable necessity by a number of stakeholders (Lægread et al., 2013). A special challenge in that respect is the competition discourse and a drive towards creating excellent HE institutions in an increasingly interconnected world. However, movements towards more market-orientation like in other countries have so far been weakened by overall favourable framework conditions for the HE system, consisting of the general positive financial situation of the state budget and the continuous importance of higher education as a public good. This seems to reduce the pressure of introducing more market-like elements.

Policy-making in HE tends to be more professionally oriented rather than ideologically. One possible explanation can be given with regard to the overall administrative system and tradition: career paths and staffing are less party-determined than, for example, in the Germanic bureaucracy (Painter & Peters, 2010). The effects of ideological confrontations in policy-making processes are therefore mitigated by professional considerations (Bleiklie & Michelsen, 2013). Still, these traditions are not embedded in an ideology-free environment. One persistent, underlying discourse, for instance, has been that HE ought to be free to its citizens and international students (West, 2013).

Another important aspect refers to the role of expert committees and commissions in the policy-making process, which form a key feature in the formulation of governmental policies. On a regular basis, commissions are established in order to generate input on a specific policy-problem. These commissions consist of renowned experts from the sector (amongst others distinguished academics) that formulate policy suggestions based on input and talks with stakeholders from inside and outside the sector. In the white paper that is discussed below, there was not a direct expert commission involved but also a broad consultation process initiated,

requesting input on a discussion of the notion of quality culture in HE (Regjeringen, no, 2016).

This underlines the continuous importance of (academic) expertise in policy-making. An undermining of the role of academics in policy-making processes is therefore not directly related to a political pushback, but a consequence of a growing pluralisation of organisational identities and opinions, which are juxtaposed to the input of academics. Arguably, this might be a consequence of indirect market-logics as growing systems create new actors/stakeholders that occupy certain niches (e.g. representatives of university colleges, international students, union for administrators, etc.) (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011). However, this is also a question of how much weight is assigned to different opinions. It is, for instance, fair to assume that input from the traditional universities of Oslo and Bergen has more importance than input from small rural university colleges. In general, one could argue that academic expertise is formally acknowledged as a crucial contribution to policy-making processes. By taking these opinions and considerations in a broad and transparent way into account, legitimacy and acceptance are secured. This has created a system that tends to be strong in identifying and analysing the problems of current policy issues. Yet, the question remains if that also translates into successful policy implementation.

An English Example

Our discussion of recent changes in England, as a means to demonstrate the policy-making process and the input of various institutional actors starts with the publication in 2015 of a green paper – ‘Fulfilling our Potential: Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility and Student Choice’ (DBIS, 2015) – which was put out for consultation. Responses to this consultation were summarised and published (DBIS, 2016a) and a formal government response appeared as a white paper – ‘Success as a Knowledge Economy’ (DBIS, 2016b). Sector comments on this document immediately after its publication were generally positive, as can be illustrated by the following quotes:

In maintaining its focus on these areas, the views of the sector have not been ignored by government. The responses to the Green Paper have clearly helped shape the way these core objectives will be taken forward. For example, a revised timetable for the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) has been put forward, called for by the sector, which will facilitate a more measured implementation (UUK, 2016).

The Higher Education Academy (HEA) welcomed the White Paper as an important contribution to rebalancing and reinvigorating HE’s focus toward teaching and research-informed teaching. We are pleased that a number of suggestions made by members of the HEA’s PVC network have had influence on BIS thinking underpinning White Paper policy. These include a reduction in TEF levels from four to three to avoid undue complexity, the inclusion of Commendations to further acknowledge and encourage distinctive approaches to excellence and the inclusion of qualitative evidence in support of TEF submissions – something the HEA has argued for since day one (HEA, 2016).

Indeed, the summary of statements from the sector by the specialist HE policy/news site WonkHE (2016) is awash with senior actors and bodies ‘welcoming’ the paper – although there is certainly the question of maintaining influence and whether these actors needed to adopt such a position in order to continue to have such influence, and project to their members and constituents such influence. Notably the National Union of Students (NUS) and University and College Union (UCU) were both more cautious and critical, as can be illustrated by the following interpretation by the UCU (2016): “Despite repeated warnings from UCU about the danger of opening up UK higher education to private, for-profit providers, the government is setting out on a clear course to privatise higher education”.

The overarching narrative of the proposals sets out the most aggressive reforms to open up the higher education sector to new providers for decades. New entrants or ‘challenger institutions’, as they are described in the paper, will no longer have to prove a strong track record, or meet other key requirements before getting degree awarding powers, raising significant concerns for students. NUS will be mounting a challenge to these plans (NUS, 2016). While the NUS (2016) stated that the white paper “represents some solid wins for students’ unions and the NUS”, the paper is clearly, at least in part, self-congratulatory in order to emphasise the success of their lobbying.

Alongside the white paper, a consultation was published on the TEF, and subsequently a government response emerged, which did largely seem to take on board sector feedback on its specific set of questions (DfE, 2016). Ultimately, the white paper led to the Higher Education and Research Bill and subsequently to the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 when this was passed into law. However, the passage of this bill into law was fraught with difficulties and challenges: around 500 amendments were tabled in the House of Lords (Cuthbert, 2017), making it arguably one of the most contested pieces of legislation of recent times.

Crucially, despite the responses from the sector more widely, and from bodies claiming to represent the interests of the sector, the Bill and Act were heavily criticised by academics, who suggested that it was “a direct threat to the autonomy of our existing institutions” (Curry, 2016) and would result in an “American-style catastrophe” (Alison Wolf quoted in Ratcliffe, 2016).

A Norwegian Example

A recent white paper in Norwegian HE (“Culture for quality in higher education”) was launched in January 27th, 2017 and aimed at offering:

[...] the option for institutions to set own intake criteria, instruments related to increasing the status of education by creating mechanisms for awarding merit for excellence in education, higher requirements of pedagogical competence when applying for professor positions, a new portal for quality, and peer review of education to name a few (Quality of Norwegian Higher Education, 2017a).

In 2016, the process for input to the white paper started which was in essence a follow up on preceding white papers (the ‘Long-term plan for research and higher education 2015–2024’ and ‘Quality concentration – structural reform in the university and higher education sector’). The white paper itself was succeeded by a number of hearings and revisions in the HE law (e.g. about the role of the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance (NOKUT), and recruitment and promotion in teaching and research positions) (Regjeringen.no, 2017).

Input to the white paper was requested from all institutional actors related to higher education. This included public and private HE institutions, unions, agencies, umbrella organisations, associations, etc. In general, different types of organisations and actors were invited to respond (in total 154) that are in various ways connected to higher education and training, either linked directly to the main activities (e.g. teaching and training) or more indirectly (e.g. interest representation and policy-making). Eventually, 91 organisations are listed to have given a response (Regjeringen.no, 2016).

The white paper was in principle well received, especially because it emphasised the role of education and introduced instruments that are expected to lead to a more prominent role of education in the HE system. Student and study related groupings, such as the Norwegian Student Organisation were rather positive about the proposed changes. In their view, the government finally emphasised the equal importance of education to research, with appropriate incentives to institutionalise this approach (Student.no, 2017). The academic side was more sceptical in that respect. The Norwegian Association of Researchers, for instance, welcomed a stronger emphasis on a quality culture, but criticised the ministry that it placed too much responsibility on the institutions without investing the necessary resources (Forskerforbundet.no, 2017). The criticisms of the rectors of the University of Oslo and the then University College of Oslo and Akershus were going in a similar direction but were expressed harsher, questioning the ways quality is measured and relevance defined (universitas.no, 2017). Experts groups were rather more moderate in their assessment, presenting some sort of middle ground. They asserted that the white paper presented a continuation of processes and practices in the HE system that already had been at place before. In that respect, the paper was not introducing new drastic measures (Quality of Norwegian Higher Education, 2017b)

In general, one could argue that the white paper was not abandoned categorically. Legitimisation was achieved beforehand by a thorough consultation process, and there was general agreement on the need of discussing the issues covered in it. Since the final results did not go into a complete different and radical direction, critical voices were more related to specific incentives or ways of measurements. This seems, though, like an expected development, given the number (and variety) of actors and stakeholders who were involved in the consultation process.

Comparing the White Papers: An Erosion of Trust in Policy-Making?

The national cases serve as recent examples of policy-making in their specific context and provide a useful barometer in terms of both process and reception. It is notable that both white papers discussed above were largely received positively by many sectoral agencies and representative bodies, while in both countries the more vocal criticisms largely came from academics themselves.

The processes of policy-making in both England and Norway usually involve a consultation stage, which are detailed in the above case studies. However, “to be consulted about the direction of higher education policy is not the same as having a voice that determines what that policy will be” (Palfryman & Tapper, 2014: 196) – and arguably academics in both countries have less trust in policy-making because they have less influence than previously.

Either as a result of the shifts in HE described in this chapter, or underlying them, higher education in England has moved from being seen as essentially a public good to a private one – benefitting individuals more than society as whole. As Williams (2016: 132–133) suggests, as well as financial and socio-political factors, ideological pressures have “played a part in bringing about the shift of higher education away from being treated as a public service towards becoming a marketable commodity subject to the laws of supply and demand by individuals and organised groups.” When variable fees were introduced in England, in 2012, “the critical issue was the switch away from subsidising institutions to subsidising students. This reflected the view, also held by the Browne Committee, that student education was now essentially a private good” (Brown & Carasso, 2013: 93). This has been driven by the move towards marketization, as argued by Marginson (2016: 5), “higher education has been reimagined, moving from a set of public agencies to a set of HE institutions as private corporations competing with each other in a market”.

HE in Norway remains a predominantly public good with the explicit notion of equally benefiting the individual and society. For this reason, tuition fees are not an issue in HE policies. Market forces in general are greeted with scepticism but competition is perceived as a necessary systemic feature. Due to the growing number of actors and stakeholders in the sector, academics are one of many voices in the policy-making process, however, because of the approach to include all affected actors in policy-making, the absolute influence of academics has been diluted and thus reduced. However, it could be argued that in contrast to the English system, the reduction of academics’ influence in Norway is somewhat mitigated by their status within the HE system, which does still secure them some relative power.

The role of academics within the HE policy-making processes in England and Norway has evolved and changed in recent years, alongside wider sectoral changes. While the HE sectors differ greatly, the relative position of academics in the HE

policy processes in both countries can be seen to be diminished, although for different reasons. As a result and somewhat evidenced by recent developments in each jurisdiction, there are strong indications that academic trust in the policy-making process is compromised.

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Chapter 4

Trust in the Informal Leadership of UK Higher Education in an Era of Global Uncertainty



Jill Jameson

Introduction

This chapter argues that greater recognition and exploration of the inherent distributed informal academic leadership of UK higher education is needed to build collegially-focused trust in an era of global uncertainty. The chapter distinguishes between formal, top-down, visible leadership exercised by authoritative individuals at or near the top of institutional hierarchical management positions and informal, more invisible leadership interactively practiced by the larger mass of academic staff. The chapter adopts a deductive approach, drawing on prior research literature, combined with selective inductive data derived from ongoing long-term research surveys ($n = 130$), a focus group ($n = 6$) and interview responses ($n = 24$) collected in 2010–19 on trust and leadership in post-compulsory and higher education. It argues that the current unhelpful emphasis on hierarchical managerialism in the UK as an arguably necessary approach to the management of large-scale higher education institutions has tended to overlook the underestimated yet quietly influential presence of collegial academic leadership that already exists in higher education amongst the mass of staff.

From this analysis, the chapter puts forward a recommendation for greater recognition of and trust in informal collective leadership, with reference to self-reflexivity (McKenzie, 2000). Drawing on the data, successive findings (Jameson, 2012, 2018) suggest that, paradoxically, ‘less is sometimes more’ regarding leadership visibility and trust-building. To examine this, it is necessary to consider the definitions and prior literature relating to trust and higher education leadership.

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P. Gibbs, P. Maassen (eds.), *Trusting in Higher Education*, Higher Education Dynamics 57, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87037-9_4

Definition of Trust in and of Higher Education Leadership

Trust is a complex interactive relational concept. It is the subject of much previous literature in many disciplines, including philosophy, economics, psychology, education, business and computing. Research on trust has grown since the 1980s (Kramer & Tyler, 1996), during which time hierarchical models of institutional authority have been critiqued in favour of flatter, more consensual, egalitarian structures in which all staff are seen to have both leader and follower roles in creating and sustaining trust. Given this context, the following definition of trust is useful:

The willingness of a person to be vulnerable to the actions of another ... based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that action (Mayer et al. 1995).

This defines trust as a relational psychological state involving confident expectation, despite vulnerability, that others will behave in benevolent rather than harmful ways. Trustors invest belief in those trusted, despite risks of problematic trustee actions. Estimations of ‘trustworthiness’ are based on cognitive, social and affective perceptions of the competence, benevolence, reliability and integrity of people or institutions trusted. Trust therefore involves the possibility of betrayal. As a result, although ‘stranger trust’ exists, on the whole trust tends to be built slowly, but is quickly lost. It can be neither ‘bought’ nor forced, and the benefits it brings are priceless.

In higher education, and elsewhere, building and maintaining trust is essential for the achievement of quality leadership situations in high trust environments in which staff feel valued and fulfilled. Given the challenges of higher education institutions facing increasing change, complexity, competition and uncertainty, high trust collegial institutional cultures fostered by good leadership are essential for survival to cope with the unprecedented emergence of global changes and increasing inequalities.

Formal Management Versus Informal Leadership: ‘Less Is More’ in High Trust Cultures

The concept of ‘less is sometimes more’ recognises the paradoxical complexity and elusive quality of leadership as a necessary influencing process for creating and sustaining high trust environments. But what is leadership? Despite more than 3000 attempts to define ‘leadership’ in prior literature, there are as yet no universally accepted definitions, although, as Fairholm notes (2015), many theorists clearly distinguish between leadership and management. Kotter’s (2001: 4) definition is that, “Management is about coping with complexity”, whilst “Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change”. While management is focused on control and organisation of operations, tasks and structures, leadership directs, influences and motivates people through the vision, mission, values and human-centred culture of an

organisation (Kotter, 2001; Jameson, 2008; Jameson & McNay, 2007; Jameson & Andrews, 2008).

Leadership may therefore reside within the responsibilities of those in positional authority and is sometimes effectively practiced by formal managers, but it may also be exerted by those without formal position or status in any hierarchy. There is a significant gap in the literature on informal leadership. Although Bolden et al. (2009) discuss the complexities and difficulties of distributed notions of informal emergent leadership, they acknowledge that their data does not really deal with informal leadership, as all their participants held official positions with devolved authority. In one of few works on informal leadership, Pielstick (2000) compares formal with informal leadership, concluding that although informal leaders cannot rely on powers of authority from any position, they tend to be more effective at authentic leadership than managers with formal titles. In his study, informal leaders performed well across the leadership themes of “shared vision, communication, relationships, community, guidance, and character” (Pielstick, 2000: 99).

Ideally, senior managers will function effectively as leaders as part of their official ‘manager’ roles, acting as leader-managers. However, there is a general tendency in higher education to confuse management with leadership, and to assume that managers are automatically leaders. Yet this is far from the case in many organisations, as Pielstick demonstrates. Some managers lack leadership capabilities and neither positively influence nor attract voluntary followers, positioning themselves as task-focused transactional, problem-solving and controlling managers, with little interest in inspiring followership or in taking up the demanding communications role of leading and supporting staff. If such managers behave fairly to staff, they may attract cautious levels of trust for instrumental purposes, to get tasks done, monitor work systems and ensure compliance, but are unlikely to inspire high trust in staff, particularly if a social breakdown or crisis of confidence occurs.

Trust Culture Leadership

Amongst the models of leadership that may inspire staff trust in higher education, complex adaptive systems perspectives and servant leadership models (Greenleaf, 1977; Obolensky, 2014; Wong & Page, 2003) seem particularly aligned to the spontaneous collective emergent properties of informal leadership. These perspectives tend to see leadership as a dynamic flow of interacting relational processes occurring amongst social actors in uncertain, organic, somewhat paradoxical ways, rather than as fixed traits of one or more authoritative individuals. Recognition of leadership as an organic process in which less control is both necessary and more effective is by no means new. The following quotation from the ancient Chinese Tao Te Ching (C. 600 BC) notes this paradoxical situation, whereby the least visible, most subtle and least heavy-handed leaders are also those who are carrying out the best forms of selfless leadership as part of a natural process:

The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to [his/her] subjects. Next comes the ruler they love and praise; Next comes one they fear; Next comes one with whom they take liberties. When there is not enough faith, there is lack of good faith. Hesitant, [s/he] does not utter words lightly. When [her/his] task is accomplished and [his/her] work done, the people all say, 'It happened to us naturally' (Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, Trans. Leu, XVII).

Formal, effective leader-managers, by this account, are best placed quietly to stimulate an effective distribution of leadership (Obolensky, 2014) to encourage the sharing of influence throughout an organisation by trusting, making space for and summoning up the collective leadership of the mass of staff. In high trust situations, the power of well-orchestrated collective academic leadership, where the term fits correctly as a designation, is invested in the authenticity and moral authority with which many staff in higher education continue to undertake their work in a conscientious but understated form. Fairholm's definition of 'trust culture leadership' is helpful here:

Trust culture leadership is a process of building trust cultures within which leader and follower (in an essentially voluntary relationship) relate to accomplish mutually-valued goals using agreed-upon processes from a variety of individual cultural contexts. Some key elements of this perspective include: unified, effective, harmonious culture of mutual trust; planned actions to create trusting environment based on common values; volunteerism based on trust ... and trust as the "organizational glue" that allows unified collective activity (Fairholm, 2015: 29).

Trust culture leadership recognises the often-understated reality that interactive bottom-up and horizontally distributed leadership already exists amongst the wider body of academic staff in UK higher education, which is populated by large numbers of talented, knowledgeable, highly qualified academics who may have no official management positions but act as academic leaders as part of their roles (Bacon, 2014; Parr, 2013). These staff continue in under-celebrated but usually effective ways, to lead the teaching of students, of research fields, disciplinary knowledge-based teams, academic and enterprise ventures that make up the greater proportion of work in higher education institutions in the UK, in one of the highest performing systems in the world (Hazelkorn, 2015).

The shared common purposes of this wider group of academic staff, who are both larger than and often also include academic managers, form a relatively 'invisible' collective form of higher education leadership, distributed extensively amongst staff. This intrinsic but largely under-recognised form of leadership continues, mostly in trusting and trustworthy ways, to sustain and motivate the common values and purposes of UK higher education institutions, often without positional leadership roles or formal authority (Hickman & Sorenson, 2013). For the most part, while those in formal positions of power and authority are both nominally and officially designated as the only recognised hierarchical 'leaders' and 'managers' of the institution, this wider academic group are assumed to be 'followers', with few or no appointed leadership roles.

However, it is becoming evident that the normative UK 'managerial template' (Lea, 2011), a model of hierarchical management with leadership perceived to exist only at the top or upper tiers, based on traditional principles of oligarchic power, is

too primitive, outdated and insufficient to handle the complexity of higher education in an increasingly competitive mass global environment. Increasingly, it seems that those who are meant to be merely ‘followers’ tend to exert as much or more influence and understated power at various levels and in as many ways as those at the top management levels of institutions. The problem is that the growth of a ‘managerial template’ approach leads to progressive undervaluing and misrecognition of the power and importance of informal academic leadership.

This chapter therefore proposes that we modify and expand our existing understanding of the power dynamics of leadership in UK higher education. There is a need for increased recognition and exploration of the influential role of distributed informal academic leadership amongst the wider group of academic staff, who arguably carry between them, at different levels, a large share of the weight of tasks in higher education, notably as regards the practice of a, “shared vision, communication, relationships, community, guidance, and character”, the key themes in Pielstick’s comparative analysis of formal and informal leadership (2000: 104). In this respect, we can learn from Harris’s research on school leadership (2003: 317), in which she draws attention to the power of informal teacher collective leadership in school education as a shared form of agency, drawing from Gronn’s (2000: 334) views on leadership “as a flow of influence in organizations which disentangles it from any presumed connection with headship.”

In summary, to create high trust cultures, it is necessary to have both good leadership and effective management, operating smoothly in the kind of ‘flow of influence’ that Gronn identifies (*ibid.*). The functions of aligning people, direction-setting, inspiring and motivating staff are those of leadership rather than management. For the establishment and maintenance of trust, it is therefore particularly important not only that managers are observed to be trustworthy, but that they act as capable, skilful leaders in inspiring and sustaining trust in concert with informal leadership during changing situations. For this, self-reflexive capability is needed.

Self-Reflexive Capability in an Uncertain Higher Education Landscape

This chapter argues that notable numbers of academic staff who form the wider group of academic post holders are increasingly ‘doing’ many of the tasks of leadership, but in under-recognised, frequently invisible ways. This is in recognition of a duty to continue to perform their roles in a professional way for the sake of students and the integrity of subject knowledge. This is effected without expectation of additional reward, status, institutional recognition or additional pay, and often despite problems or difficulties with management. Simultaneously, in some cases, such academics may endure the relative ignominy of being regarded as lower level minor ‘followers’. These academics are positioned as ‘less important’ people in comparison to the sometimes less qualified higher paid bureaucratic managers in the hierarchies above, regardless of informal academic leaders’ expertise, multiple

qualifications, many years of study, dedication to students and unrelentingly hard work. Such academic leaders, positioned at various levels amongst senior research, professorial, academic, middle and junior levels of research and lecturer grade staff, tend, furthermore, to be highly skilled in critical analysis and self-reflexive awareness. To lose the trust and cooperation of such staff is therefore potentially a serious problem for management.

In effect, self-reflexive capability may be amongst the key qualities that enable academic staff to cope with the supercomplexity of higher education environments (Barnett, 2000). Reflexivity here is defined here as a steadfast thoughtful capacity to examine and critique instinctive reactions to resist the ‘false necessity’ of performative ‘quick fixes’, building long-term trust in coping proactively with ambiguity and change (Simpson & French, 2006). This complex attribute promotes more subtle ways of thinking about the motivations of academic leadership and management than zero-sum conceptions of managerialism and collegiality, while simultaneously resisting the ‘false necessity’ of deterministic solutions (Unger, 2007: 134; Jameson, 2012, 2018).

Although ‘strong’ and ‘visible’ top-down formal leadership in higher education management is frequently lauded in policy documents, this chapter argues that quieter forms of relatively ‘invisible’ bottom-up distributed informal leadership amongst the mass of academic staff may be, paradoxically, as much if not more effective in maintaining quality high trust institutions than visibly dominant forms of corporate managerial authority. These two kinds of institutional leadership: the formal/senior management, high status, visible form; and the informal, lower status, collectively distributed, invisible form, participate in an ongoing interactive relationship that is complex and indeterminate. It is difficult exactly to quantify the ways in which these differing leadership forms interact and the effects on institutions deriving from each.

Fluid Emergence of Patterns of Leadership

These leadership forms are melded together and separated out from each other in continuously interweaving local patterns of social, cultural, power, influence and authority dynamics in particular contexts, as in Engeström’s activity theory (1999), discussed by Harris (2003) regarding the fluid, emergent nature of informal distributed leadership. Observing these patterns is similar to watching a shoal of fish veer suddenly from following one leader to following another, for complex reasons of persistence, predation or hunger rather than solely dominance (Ward et al., 2013). In similar ways, human actors may nominally give transactional allegiance to managers, while at the same time being influenced informally by colleagues to act collectively in different ways to lead staff initiatives. Therefore, to analyse a constantly shifting highly complex kaleidoscope of differing interactive leadership forms, findings from prior literature on UK higher education and from empirical data provide selected insights into some of the dynamics that may be occurring.

From prior literature, it is clear that UK new public management institutional systems are now mostly based on economic, marketized concepts reliant on notions of self-interest amongst people playing active roles within them (Brown & Carasso, 2013). These ambitious performative concepts do not sit well with trust-based systems. As Goldspink (2007: 33–34) explains in relation to general notions of educational reform across international public sector education systems:

... structuring contracts on the basis of assumed opportunism and subjecting the agent to close scrutiny signals lack of trust. Assuming self-interest may diminish a felt sense of responsibility and professionalism ... and make opportunism more likely. ... Christensen and Laegreid (2001: 89)... argue that such approaches have: "... replaced a system based on mutual trust ... with a system which potentially furthers distrust.... This is particularly concerning given that both public and private sector organizations are increasingly realising that where complex services are to be delivered high trust is an essential characteristic of the relationship.

Given the complexity of higher education institutions, if Goldspink is correct, high trust is essential for the effective functioning of such institutions. In considering this issue, this chapter analyses findings from respondents to trust and leadership surveys, interviews and a focus group during 2010–19 who overwhelmingly agreed that high trust was essential for their institutions but was not necessarily being achieved in environments facing global competition and many challenges.

Global Changes and Inequalities in Higher Education

Global higher education has been changing over the past few decades. One significant trend is the emergence of technological and managerial changes within massified higher education systems. Higher education is now affected more radically by innovations in technology than ever before (Dziuban et al., 2005). Marketization, globalisation, government policy intervention, and new public management-led governance have accompanied a worldwide technological shift. Systematic ranking of institutions in global league tables has accelerated massive competition amongst universities and colleges for more status, money, prestige and students.

These developments, linked with global competition in higher education have, arguably, led to a growing local emphasis in the UK on managerial ‘command and control’ solutions imposed on staff by university managers (Deem, 1998; Deem et al., 2007) in a performative, sometimes seemingly desperate, drive to try to ‘be the best amongst the best’ at all cost, or at least appear to be (Cribb & Gewirtz, 2013). A resultant lack of diversity in provision is linked to the impetus for all institutions to charge the same level of high student fees. This chapter’s focus on developments in the UK notes similarities with trends in North America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, although global higher education reform trends of the last 20–30 years have arguably led to divergence in leadership and management practices in other countries with differing systems such as Norway and the Netherlands (Amaral et al., 2002, 2003; Maassen, 2003).

Loss of Trust

In the UK, the uncertainties unleashed in this maelstrom of tensions have widened gaps between senior leaders and collegially-focused academic staff. Many UK researchers have argued that trust in the top leadership and management of higher education institutions has been eroded, as ‘command and control’ managerialism has increased in a growing audit culture (Allen, 2003; Deem, 1998; Deem & Brehony, 2005; Deem et al., 2007; Elton, 2008; Winter, 2009). Simultaneously, global trust in authorities has declined, as reported by 33,000 respondents in 20/28 countries participating in global surveys on public trust (Edelman, 2017, 2018). The 26 Edelman trust-building mandates, including guardianship of fairness and equity, taking care of and educating people, are measured using a robust long-term methodology (ibid.) that aligns with definitions of trust in this chapter, based on cognitive, social and affective estimations of the competence, benevolence, reliability and integrity of people or institutions who are trusted (Mayer et al., 1995).

Later editions of the Edelman Trust Barometer have revealed that elite groups and authority figures across sectors are regarded by the public as out of touch, too controlling, untrustworthy, greedy and arrogantly self-interested (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), with 7/10 respondents stating that the major role of top managers is to establish trust in organisations (Edelman, 2018). Where trustworthiness is absent, anger about inequality has focused on excessive high pay for executive management (Carnell, 2018), exacerbating unrest and distrust in authority. A sense of injustice is linked to the growth of a global ‘superclass’ with vastly more power and status than anyone else on the planet (Rothkopf, 2009). Dorling’s work on UK social inequality, injustice and education critiques wealth and power inequalities undermining social mobility and well-being. He records that by December 2014, the average CEO pay of UK FTSE 100 firms was 342 times greater than that of their staff on minimum wage levels, increasing by 243%, three times faster than employees’ pay, since the introduction of the minimum wage in 1999 (Dorling, 2015). As Brown notes on the growing ‘inequality crisis’, the causes for this arise from financial markets, institutions and neoliberal political and government policies favouring the 1% and .01% wealthiest classes (Brown, 2017). The perceived injustice of such levels of inequality is gradually eroding the complex social fabric of trust.

Higher Education UK National Senior Management Survey

In some UK higher education institutions, related inequalities can be observed regarding senior management and their relationship with their staff, where some top levels of managers appear to have lost the goodwill of many staff. Reisz (2017) reported on initial results from a UK Survey on Senior Management (SMS) in higher education with responses from more than 2000 staff: “Early data from the National Senior Management Survey, which is being developed by academics at

eight universities, find that barely one in 10 (10.4 per cent) respondents is satisfied with the way their institution is managed; 76.5 per cent are not.”

Cuthbert has argued that this survey provides ‘leading questions’, that there is, “something wrong with the methods’ and that it has only collected responses from a ‘self-selecting sample ... of those who want to complain” (Cuthbert, 2017). Nevertheless, confirmatory evidence from the literature on managerialism from UK researchers (Avis, 2003; Davies, 2003; Deem, 1998; Deem & Brehony, 2005; Elton, 2008; Nixon, 2008; Lea, 2011; Winter, 2009) and even from critics of the survey itself (Cuthbert, 2017) acknowledge that much is adrift in higher education ‘command and control’ managerial systems, in which those in charge are sometimes unsympathetically regarded as exploiting the higher education environment and their staff to enrich themselves (Lea, 2011).

The final results of the above University National Senior Management Survey, reported in October, 2017, were based on the responses of 5888 staff in higher education. Only 8.8% of respondents felt their senior managers deserved to be paid at the level of their salaries, while only 15% felt valued and respected by institutional senior managers. A massive 78% were dissatisfied with the way in which their institution was managed (SMS, 2018). Given the discrepancy in numbers between the 5888 survey responses and the total number of 206,870 full time plus 135,650 part-time academic staff in higher education, in addition to many staff on atypical contracts whose numbers are almost impossible to report (HESA, 2018), it is difficult to estimate how accurately these views reflect the whole sector. Nevertheless, the authors contend that the survey results do continue to represent the realities of UK HE (Erikson et al. 2021).

UK Managerial Template

In view of the above, despite counter-arguments about the need for tough corporate management in mass higher education systems, an ultimately inestimable but significant number of UK staff seem to be more or less dissatisfied with top management in the sector. Institutional management has changed to embrace corporate approaches, with marketization and ‘institutional branding’ at their core. Although policy rhetoric in theory embraces student-centred, staff-supporting values, in practice institutions emphasise the management of economically rational targets, performance measurement and control of staff at the expense of leadership of people through collegiality and relations of trust. Prior UK literature on new public management, neo-managerialism and neo-liberalism has criticised this trend for a long time (Clarke & Newman, 1997; Deem, 1998; Deem & Brehony, 2005; Elton, 2008; Lea, 2011; McNay, 2005), leading to calls for neo-collective leadership (Bolden et al., 2008), nostalgia for and restoration of collegiality (Elton, 2008; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2002; Bacon, 2014), despite recognition that the dichotomy of managerialism versus academic collegiality is not necessarily as fixed as is often assumed (Tight, 2014).

In recognition of the difficulties involved in large scale management of higher education institutions with massive student numbers, Lea noted in 2011 that a pragmatic UK ‘managerial template’ has become the dominant organisational structure, in which a “discourse of quantification” is the norm, linked to “performativity indexing and accountability” (Lea, 2011: 816–835). This ‘managerial template’ can be traced to the economic rationalism of industrial models of corporatisation, which are arguably inappropriate for charitable public sector higher education institutions with higher purposes in fostering both public and private good (Marginson, 2011). Lea identifies in this ‘managerial template’ potentials for a decline in critical academic thought and an increase in moral risk (Lea, 2011: 835–836). Although Tight (2014) argues against an over-simplified divergence of views on managerialism and collegiality, Lea (2011) cautions against blind trust of management, suggesting managerialism should be subordinate to academic leadership. Bacon (2014: 1) takes such arguments further to propose that collective academic leadership could operate in a structural ‘neo-collegiality’ to restore more “collegial decision-making processes to create a professional, efficient and appropriately 21st century management approach”.

Most critical of all are analyses which conclude that NPM regimes have so undermined the character of the university as to change its purposes completely. Cribb and Gewirtz (2013), for example, argue that UK higher education is at risk of being ‘hollowed out’ into a marketized entity without ‘intrinsic value’, in which ‘gloss and spin’ have replaced ‘academic substance’ (ibid.). However one positions oneself in relation to this critique, it seems evident that overt forms of hierarchical top-down UK institutional management emphasising economic rationalism, measurement of performance to target and social control are now dominant in UK higher education.

Research Findings on Trust and Leadership

Having considered the above literature, a snapshot of selected empirical findings from UK trust and leadership surveys (n = 130), a focus group (n = 6) and interviews (n = 24) develops and begins to concretise the above trends through analysis of individual respondents’ feedback. A fuller analysis of this data is also available in other prior and forthcoming publications (Jameson, 2012, 2018).

In response to the survey on trust and leadership, a representative academic lecturer wrote with some cynicism and disdain regarding his views on senior management in his institution:

I have absolute trust that senior management will achieve the set targets for student/client satisfaction – however this will come at the cost of staff and more importantly trust in staff. Performativity will reign supreme.... Trust is an issue. Staff do not trust those above. And the actions of managers, not their rhetoric, however, is that of no trust – rather audit. Even at the same level, there is always a perception of others not pulling their weight. (Q10 and Q13: Respondent #104, Male, FT Lecturer, 30–40 age group).

Echoing the findings from the literature review on the economic drivers and self-interested nature of managerialism as it operated in his institution, this respondent felt that university management situations and actions that reduced trust in the organisation were the following:

They [top managers] get bonuses while we get larger class sizes, less research funds and teach in under-resourced Schools. Sure they achieve nice budget bottom lines, but numbers only impress the uninformed ...” [Trust-reducing behaviours are:] “Neo-liberal performativity. Measurement of performance by numbers and simplistic reading of data. Management forget what it is like to be at the other end. (Q12 and Q24: Respondent #104, Male, FT Lecturer, 30-40 age group).

From this quotation, which is representative of survey, interview and focus group responses from academic staff at lower levels in situations in which there was low or no trust in management, it seems clear that the characteristics of trust-reducing behaviours by managers in UK higher education institutions include over-controlling, narrowly focused monitoring through performance management, unequal and unfair treatment in which management are seen as self-serving. A further response, this time from a part-time lecturer in a university, is illustrative of the complexity of trust in and from leadership or the lack of it. This lecturer had ‘a total lack of trust’ in senior institutional managers but high trust in his line manager and immediate team for their ‘honesty, candour, participation, consultation, communication, fairness’:

Q9 How far do you trust the senior leadership and management team in your institution to achieve the following? (Rate your level of trust between absolute trust and total distrust):

- *Good management standards* – A total lack of trust
- *Student/client success* – Low level of trust
- *Well-being of staff* – A total lack of trust
- *Success of the institution* – A total lack of trust
- *Good financial management* – Low level of trust
- *Comment:* Senior leadership seems self-serving, self-interested, and out to shaft everybody!

(Q9: Respondent #9, Male, PT Lecturer, 61–70 age group).

This kind of open-ended written response is complemented by quantitative data in response to the closed questions in the trust and leadership surveys.

In Table 4.1, quantitative data are reported from 101 respondents in one of the surveys who ticked the various options relating to Question 9: *How far do you trust the senior leadership and management team in your institution to achieve the following?* Mixed responses on trust and leadership here include positive replies from a very high number of participants in management and administrative positions (87) and only a smaller number from lecturer level staff (5). In this context, the fact that 80% of respondents had an absolute or high level of trust in good financial management and 73% in success of the institution needs to be interpreted with caution, while the 18% low trust or total lack of trust in the well-being of staff, with 17% responding with low or total lack of trust in good management standards can be drilled down to relate to individual postholders mainly but not exclusively at subordinate levels.

Table 4.1 2010–18 Trust and Leadership Survey Responses (n = 101) to Q9: How far do you trust the senior leadership and management team in your institution to achieve the following? (Rate your level of trust between absolute trust and total distrust)

	Absolute trust	High level of trust	Medium level of trust	Low level of trust	A total lack of trust	N/A	Total	Weighted average
Good management standards	18%	38%	28%	10%	7%	0%		
	18	38	28	10	7	0	101	2.50
Student/client success	16%	54%	21%	6%	1%	2%		
	16	53	21	6	1	2	99	2.21
Well-being of staff	8%	42%	33%	12%	6%	0%		
	8	42	33	12	6	0	101	2.66
Success of the institution	21%	53%	18%	6%	2%	0%		
	21	53	18	6	2	0	100	2.15
Good financial	23%	57%	11%	6%	3%	0%		
	23	58	11	6	3	0	101	2.09

Amongst the responses were those from institutions in which there was a relatively high level of trust and a consciousness of the importance of this. Interestingly, some of the more thoughtful replies came from those in management roles who were clearly concerned to ensure that they acted in a trustworthy way. The following respondent, at DVC/PVC level in a higher performing modern university reported that it was essential to establish high trust to underpin her work with staff:

... [It is n]ot possible to operate in an environment where trust is not in place. I work on the basis of trust and would wish this to always be my starting point. Once this breaks down there can be serious consequences for an organisation ... Would not be able to function effectively if staff did not trust my judgement and actions (Q6 and Q22: Respondent #98, Female, DVC/PVC, modern university).

Within the responses of this senior manager, the characteristics of both trust-building and trust-reducing behaviours were identified as the following:

Q23 *What kinds of leadership behaviours have built trust in your team and/or organisation generally? Can you give examples?*

- Be seen to listen and hear what is being said
- Delegate and trust those to whom you delegate
- Clear vision and understanding of how to get there
- Clear messages 'walk the walk' and 'talk the talk'
- Lead by example

Q24 *What kinds of leadership behaviours have reduced trust between staff in your team and/or organisation? Can you give examples?*

- Lack of communication
- Lack of transparency
- Lack of inclusivity
- Failure to hear messages

(Q23 and Q24: Respondent #98, Female, DVC/PVC, modern university).

Conclusion

The above responses indicate that trust is much valued by those in higher education: 98% of participants indicated that it was vitally connected with leadership in their institutions. Participants recognised that trust is also not easy to build once lost in higher education. Those giving low trust responses in all phases of data collection were particularly negative about distrusting senior levels of management but generally more positive about lower level managers. They tended also to narrate stories about restructuring, redundancies, bullying or other forms of unfair procedural conduct from managers in which trust was definitively lost.

What is interesting, also, is that many of these respondents appeared to have remained silent in their institutions about this issue, neither complaining nor carrying out any retaliatory action. Therefore, it is possible that the managers involved in these situations may never have known that a loss of trust had occurred. These situations hence provided subterranean unarticulated reasons for related poor performance or breakdown in communication in the organisation. However, in general, participants tended to pick up the pieces of low trust situations and carry on working despite this, demonstrating an enduring strength of informal leadership through restraint and silence.

While 'stranger trust' may be easily acquired and serendipitously occurs in many work situations in the first occurrence of setting up new employment relations, once that early bond is broken, for example, by over-controlling, unfair and/or otherwise poor management practice, it becomes increasingly hard to rebuild the shattered confidence and faith of staff. Unfortunately, as in the cases above, since trust is an underpinning relational socio-environmental phenomenon that is seldom accurately observed or even noticed before it is lost, higher education managers may unwittingly lose the trust of their staff without realising what has occurred until it is too late to do much about it easily. Some survey and interview respondents were at a point of no return as regards distrust in management. There is a huge loss of well-being, collegial relations, higher work performance and effective outputs that potentially accompanies this kind of loss of cooperation.

To rebuild trust in senior leader-managers, it is therefore important to consider greater formal recognition for the role of informal distributed academic leadership across the greater part of UK higher education institutions, in contrast to a more routine focus on formal positional leadership. Informal leadership is already occurring in wide-ranging ways within institutions and frequently functioning effectively even when taken for granted. Since trust in the formal senior leadership and management of higher education institutions appears to have been diminished in a significant if inestimable number of institutions, there is a need to consider widening out institutional and policy conceptions of leadership to include informal leaders distributed right across institutions.

The adaptive self-reflexive authentic leadership capabilities of academic staff are needed to develop more effective trust-building behaviours, including assurance of moral authority, competence, benevolence, integrity and reliability in leading higher education institutions. The evidence from the literature and data indicates that trust in some UK management situations has broken down. The ‘invisible’ informal distributed leadership of academic staff is vital to re-establish trust. From the snapshot of deductive and inductive evidence considered here it is clear that trust-building potentials of informal collective academic leadership, particularly at non-managerial levels, needs to be further researched, more understood and valued. The ‘managerial template’ approach has undervalued the power and importance of informal academic leadership. This chapter therefore proposes an expansion of understandings of the power dynamics of leadership in UK higher education to increase recognition and further explore the influential role of emergent distributed informal academic leadership amongst staff. In summary, to create high trust cultures, both good leadership and effective management are required. Senior managers need to be recognisably trustworthy, acting as capable, subtle leaders to inspire and develop trust in natural, skilful ways in concert with informal leadership during changing situations.

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Chapter 5

Institutionalising Distrust? The Changing Relationship Between Higher Education and the Labour Market in Norway



Mari Elken and Silje-Maria Tellmann

Introduction

Over the past decade, a range of new instruments and approaches have been developed with the aim to create new linkages between higher education and society, symptomatic of the so-called ‘relevance agenda’. Initially, discussions on the ‘third mission’ of the university were a way to address universities’ relevance and contribution to the society. More recently, however, these discussions concern the core organisation and functions of higher education institutions. This includes developments such as the involvement of external members in governing boards at central and faculty levels (Larsen, 2006; Magalhães et al., 2018), the introduction of qualifications frameworks (Elken, 2016) and the transformation of study programs through the introduction of learning outcomes (Caspersen et al., 2017). While the introduction of externally imposed arrangements has been outlined as symptomatic of a ‘trust-crisis’ (Enders, 2013) in higher education, this chapter explores how such instruments can also be a means to transforming the notion of trust. In particular, the focus in this chapter is on two such instruments and approaches, that is, the introduction of learning outcomes and qualifications frameworks, and the introduction of formalised councils for cooperation between higher education and the labour market.

As a form of a societal formalisation and rationalisation process (Bromley & Meyer, 2015), this trend has been seen as symptomatic of the expanding audit society and the decline of the professional state (Enders, 2013), implying a lack of trust in higher education institution and the academic profession that inhabits this system. However, as argued by Luhmann (1979), the presence of procedures and schemes that put organisations under control by providing checks and balances can also be viewed as measures that are put in place to maintain and preserve society’s trust in a system. The ‘institutionalised distrust’ provided by control mechanisms

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that counteract misconducts or the misuse of power is according to this view a precondition for trust in institutions' inclination to produce positive outcomes.

Although scholars differ in opinion on the degree to which the role of higher education institutions in society has transformed over the past decades, Maassen and Stensaker (in this Volume) argue that the relationship between higher education institutions and society indeed has changed and is in need of (re-)negotiation of a new social contract. As Olsen (2007) observes, society's trust in higher education as a problem-solving force is decreasing, and universities are under pressure to remodel their role as responsive or entrepreneurial institutions. The relationship between higher education institutions and society is increasingly viewed as a formal relationship, founded mainly on economic exchange. While expansion of formal autonomy has been observed (Musselin, 2005), this implies that higher education should at the same time be subject to more thorough steering through inter alia contract arrangements (Gornitzka et al., 2004) or regulations (Gornitzka & Stensaker, 2014). This means that while institutional autonomy has been enhanced, the notion of autonomy itself has transformed (Enders et al., 2013; Maassen et al., 2017). In this context, the widening web of formalised means and measures introduced to ensure that higher education institutions are performing according to their roles and tasks, that they are providing society 'value for the money' invested in higher education, has been promoted as an indicator of society's declining trust in higher education institutions. Trust is understood here as an alternative solution to control and authority, which is found in arrangements that are based on negative expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998). In this chapter, we conceptualise such instruments as instruments for institutionalised distrust. Following the argument outlined above, such external accountability mechanisms then are a means for restoring society's trust in higher education institutions by institutionalising distrust. This restoration represents a different kind of trust relationship.

Managing Trust/Distrust Through New Structures and/or Participation

Trust is frequently emphasised as an important element in governance arrangements. It represents a substitute for direct control (Rousseau et al., 1998: 399) and in complex organisational interactions, it is in this manner also a means to assure efficiency and avoid burdensome detailed control mechanisms. Yet, trust can also remain a rather elusive concept. It has multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions, depending on the disciplinary lens, the object and level of analysis. While broadly considered essential to social interaction and exchange, it is also viewed as an intractable, complex and dynamic concept, with respect to which conceptual clarity is needed regarding analysis of trust as an independent or dependent variable, and how it changes over time (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). For the purposes of this analysis, trust is treated as a dependent variable, which implies that the core focus is on the role and impact of specific formal instruments on the

transformation of trust. In this section, we introduce three propositions that will be empirically explored.

One way to operationalise trust is to view it as a set of expectations by those involved in the interaction (Zucker, 1985), thus being a key characteristic of any interaction process between both actors and organisations. In particular, trust can be seen to refer to positive expectations of the intentions, motives or behaviour of another (see, among others, Rousseau et al., 1998: 395; Sitkin & Roth, 1993), while distrust can be placed on a different continuum, referring to expectations of negative behaviour (Lewicki et al., 1998). This relational emphasis implies that there is a trustor and trustee relationship between the social entities involved in the transaction, which can also be reciprocal. Yet, it also remains a multi-level context as trust relationships can be identified on multiple levels – between individuals, or organisations and institutions (Sydow, 2006). Thus, analysis of trust needs to take into account this multi-level character (Rousseau et al., 1998). This implies that a trust relationship between higher education and society would on the one hand concern the trust granted to higher education by society. On the other, it would concern the degree of trust higher education has towards society, both in terms of maintaining an appropriate institutional and resource framework, but also in terms of being a relevant contributor to the primary processes within higher education. A multi-level approach implies that the data that underpins this chapter is also drawn from multiple levels with an aim to unpack these relationships.

The considerations above suggest that trust can take multiple forms, both in terms of the basic mechanisms that underpin the specific form of trust relationship as well as the factors that would contribute to maintaining such a relationship. For interpersonal relationships, a basic form of trust is relational trust. This form of trust derives from repeated interactions over time and thus represents a form of endogenous trust emerging from within the interaction, built on a development of shared identity and shared norms (Lewicki et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998). This form of trust retains its focus on the micro processes and interpersonal relationships, and in this manner is only a contributing aspect to the broader processes of trust building as a multi-level process. The broader institutional arrangements that can substitute interpersonal trust would instead be referred to as institutional trust (Rousseau et al., 1998; Sydow, 2006: 380; Zucker, 1985). In such instance, it is not the interpersonal relationships that form the backbone of a trust relationship, but the broader normative setting of acceptable behaviour.

A shared aspect of all of these conceptualisations is that trust is not a property of a single interaction or transaction process; it includes generalisations from a single instance to expectations of future behaviour. Thus, if the aim is for a mechanism to facilitate trust, it needs to contribute to the creation of intersubjective and taken for granted notions (Zucker, 1985: 12). For the subject matter in this chapter, not only do the introduced measures need to produce generalised expectations of behaviour over time, but these should also be able to be generalised broader to the institution. Thus, (proposition 1) the new instruments to facilitate transparency and relevance can be seen to facilitate trust if there are spillovers beyond the single interaction, both over time and across the organisation.

However, in a number of interaction processes, trust is conditional of specific characteristics of the interaction. A form of trust that can often be found in professional relationships is calculus-based trust, which essentially refers to a rational view on trust relationships that builds on sets of credible information about the other party in the transaction. This form of trust is limited to specific exchanges with an underlying idea of ‘trust, but verify’ (Lewicki et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998). In interpersonal relationships, this could be seen as trusting specific professional authority in the form of diplomas or recognitions – essentially suggesting that there are various proxies to trust. Translating this to broader social entities and organisations, this could refer, for example, to certifications (e.g. ISO). For higher education institutions, a relevant example could be an international accreditation of business schools (e.g. EQUIS). In some instances, the conditional aspects represent also direct sanctions that frame the specific interaction. Stensaker and Gornitzka (2009) referred to this as the rational-instrumental form of trust where logic of consequentiality is an underlying drive. Elsewhere, this has also been referred to as deterrence-based trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). Essentially this implies that there are specific sets of checks and balances, and that breach of trust would have a higher cost than the possible positive gains. However, it has been questioned whether this form of trust really is trust, or whether the notion of deterrence and assumption of checks and balances actually represents a form of distrust.

In Chap. 2 in this Volume, Maassen and Stensaker argue that universities and colleges are currently in a transition period, where the traditional pact with society is being renegotiated. This implies, they argue, that the process of initial deinstitutionalisation of existing arrangements can be expected to be followed by a new institutionalisation process of external and internal responsibilities and the appropriate governance model. Accounts of change processes in universities’ role in society frequently refer to diminishing trust as an explanation for the necessity of accountability structures when autonomy is being enhanced (Enders, 2013). These processes have two characteristics – they represent the formalisation and standardisation of potentially unstructured relationships, and they imply the inclusion of new actors (from the society) in these formalised structures. However, while formalised and legalistic approaches can address the reliability of transactions, they are poor at addressing the value issues (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Moreover, formalisation of relations can create an ‘inflationary spiral’ of formalisation processes (Sitkin & Roth, 1993), which do not necessarily lead to enhancement of trust as it actually increases transaction costs of interactions (Zucker, 1987: 454). Thus, when systems of checks and balances are put into place, they would also be complex to dismantle, as they can over time become taken for granted. Having this in mind, the issue of trust in higher education becomes considerably more complex as the notion of trust itself becomes multi-layered and multifaceted. Mechanisms that are being put in place could emphasise one form of trust, but not necessarily another. Following this (proposition 2), when the new instruments emphasise calculus- or deterrence-based trust, these contribute to institutionalisation of distrust by creating an architecture of checks and balances.

The mushrooming of structures that formalise the relationships between different actors and institutions in society have been seen as expressions of the desire to

establish structures that enable citizens and stakeholders to hold those in power and position accountable. This trend may be viewed in terms of accountability as a virtue (Bovens, 2010), which is emblematic of responsive and trustworthy organisations that defer to transparency and good governance. Yet, as an empirical phenomenon, this drift has resulted in a range of instruments that institutionalise the relations whereby one organisation can be held accountable by another organisation. In analysing these expressions of accountability, Bovens (2010) distinguishes between arrangements whereby organisations are held to account *ex post facto* for their conduct by a forum, and frameworks, which rather stress the continuing practices of accountability. The latter typically points to the active participation of stakeholders in debates and decision-making as well as the monitoring of outcomes and results. In this vein, accountability mechanisms are established to counter misconduct of those in decision-making power, and to allow for the critical examination of the performance of an organisation. Yet by establishing arrangements that bring stakeholders in on decision-making processes, and keep them informed on outcomes and results, stakeholders are not only offered a legitimate role in the organisations. They are also given the authority to control and question the activities of organisations, and thus the opportunity to express distrust in the organisations. On the other hand, participation and interaction are seen as key conditions in building trust.

From the point of view of higher education institutions, the introduction of new instruments of accountability is met with mixed reactions. While it may be seen as an indicator of the democratisation of higher education institutions or as a response to the increased complexity of organising higher education (Maassen et al., 2017) the introduction of accountability instruments in the higher education context has more commonly been linked to new public management ideas and to new steering approaches in higher education (Huisman & Currie, 2004). Following this, it is possible to argue that (proposition 3), higher education and labour market actors who participate, would retain different positions on the function and purpose of these instruments. While one can expect that this formalisation process is seen by labour market actors as a means to democratise higher education institutions, higher education institutions are expected to view such structures as an added transaction cost.

An overarching concern for the three propositions is how these instruments of formalisation and inclusion contribute to the trust relationship between higher education and society, and in this manner contribute to the overall institutionalisation of a new societal pact (Gornitzka et al., 2007).

Empirical Illustrations

Higher education institutions in Norway have been the object of several minor and larger reforms over the past decade, which are concerned with higher education institutions' capability to produce relevant results. Here, we will discuss the introduction of two different arrangements, which were designed to strengthen the

linkages between higher education institutions and external stakeholders, and which were expected to bring about more relevant and responsive study programs. Yet their origins and their implementation in the higher education institutions are different:

- The decree on the establishment of Councils for Working Life (*Råd for samarbeid med arbeidslivet* – RSA) was a distinctively Norwegian initiative, which sought to increase the relevance of study programs by establishing Councils with external stakeholders from working life on the rectorate level of higher education institutions. Their main obligation was to develop a strategy for strengthening the cooperation between the higher education institutions and working life.
- The introduction of the Norwegian qualifications framework for lifelong learning¹ and the incorporation of learning outcomes in Norwegian study programs was first introduced as a consequence of the Norwegian commitment to the Bologna Process, and later associated with the European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning. The target of this framework was the study program level of higher education institutions, and it encouraged the participation of relevant external and internal stakeholders in the development and formulation of new learning outcomes.

By comparing these two cases, which are introduced at respectively the bottom and the top of the higher education organisations, yet with a similar use of participation of external stakeholders as a means to increase the relevance of educational programs, we will discuss whether, and if so how, these arrangements restructured the relations and possibly the trust between the institutions and their stakeholders from working life.

Data sources in the two cases include the following:

- The data for the study of the Councils for Cooperation with Working life was collected in a mixed methods study, designed to provide a mid-term evaluation of the arrangement. The study was conducted in 2017; 6 years after higher education institutions were instructed to establish such councils. The study included a mapping and a survey among members of all councils established since 2011, as well as in-depth studies of councils from four institutions. The population of the survey included 571 persons, of which 40% answered. The in-depth study of councils included document studies and in all 23 interviews with rectors, secretaries, and members from the councils of the four institutions.
- The study of qualifications frameworks and learning outcomes is based on a project that studied the implementation of learning outcomes in Norway. The data for this chapter are derived from a work package that examined how learning outcomes created links to the world of work. The analysis of the learning outcomes introduction was based on 10 interviews with representatives from trade unions and professional organisations. This project was completed in early

¹ See: <https://www.nokut.no/en/norwegian-education/the-norwegian-qualifications-framework-for-lifelong-learning/>

2016. In addition, the case study also draws on background data on an earlier qualitative study on the introduction of qualifications in Norway (completed in 2015) and a range of secondary studies.

Case Study 1: Councils for Cooperation with Working Life

Following White paper 44 (2008–2009), all Norwegian universities and university colleges were required to establish Councils for Cooperation with Working life. The Councils should gather members from organisations and businesses representing working life, which in cooperation with members from the institution should develop strategies for cooperation with working life, and facilitate cooperation between higher education and working life that would be, “more structured and better rooted in the institutions’ plans and strategies” (Ministry of Education and Research, 2009). The topic of the White paper was education’s adaption and contribution to the future competence needs of working life in Norway. It was rooted in an assumption that higher education in Norway faced challenges related to both quality and capacity, and that the relevance of higher education to the needs of working life was inadequate. On declaring the necessity of a Council for Cooperation with Working life in White paper 44, the responsible Ministry thus stated that “Government-funded education must be relevant to later working life. Close and long-term cooperation between education and working life is necessary to ensure such relevance and to achieve important competence-policy objectives” (Ministry of Education and Research, 2009: 75).

The decree thus engaged in a broad national and international trend towards reinforcing educational institutions’ socio-economic relevance and involvement with local and regional working life. Such collaborations, as well as contributions to innovation, value creation and continuing education are statutory tasks for universities and university colleges in Norway. Especially since the beginning of the century, expectations of institutional interaction with the outside world have increased, and in recent years, the importance of interactions for the quality of education has gained ever-increasing attention. As such, the decree forms part of the same broader trend as the introduction of learning outcomes and the wider Bologna Process. Yet the decree also formed part of a larger trend whereby the state makes claims on the outputs of its investments in higher education. Investments in higher education are seen as a tool to achieve policy goals, in this regard to supply working life with relevant degrees and competent labourers. For this purpose, the government required educational programs to become more relevant and responsive to the needs of working life, and stronger interaction and collaboration with working life were outlined as one of several other means to prepare for this.

A Trust Deficit?

The establishment of Councils for Cooperation with Working life was not merely the result of top-down governmental policies. It was an arrangement that was sought by several organisations representing working life in Norway, including the main representative organisation for employers in Norway, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), and the largest workers' organisation in Norway, The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions. They reported frustration among their members with higher education institutions that did not sufficiently meet the needs nor demands of the working life. The dimensioning of the higher education system was one aspect of this, but they were even more concerned with the content of education, which they thought was too theoretical and too little up to date on the ongoing change processes in working life. In addition, there was a sense that the academic drift of many educational programs took place at the expense of practical training and an orientation towards the realities of 'the outside world'. Hence, there was a sense of a gap between the world of working life and higher education, and a place at the table at a strategic level of higher education institutions was the sought-after remedy, which was found in the establishment of Councils for Cooperation with Working life.

However, the arrangement did not open new and uncharted terrain: Already a number of other bodies was designed to facilitate interaction between higher education and working life, either by their composition or responsibilities. The institutions' governance structures, both at the top level and on the level of faculties and departments are required to have external members (Larsen, 2006; Magalhães et al., 2018). In addition, most subject areas or study program councils include representatives of working life and society. National councils for the professions and framework committees are also examples of bodies with representation from working life. The most extensive cooperation is found in nurse education, where cooperative bodies between the health enterprises and the educational institutions are established to collaborate on both candidate production, practice and the content of education. In addition, studies have found that there is extensive informal cooperation between higher education institutions and working life at the study program level (Thune et al., 2014).

The establishment of Councils for Cooperation with Working life may still be outlined as an innovation in the governance structure of higher education institutions in terms of facilitating the accountability of higher education institutions towards stakeholders from working life. However, it was not particularly welcomed by the institutions themselves. In a commentary, the two rectors of the largest higher education institutions in Oslo² stated that the councils represented a "drop in the sea" in terms of cooperation between working life and academia (Ottesen & Rice, 2016). They rather interpreted the introduction of the councils as representing

²These were in 2016: the University in Oslo and the Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences. In 2018, the latter transformed into Oslo Metropolitan University.

governmental micromanagement and bureaucratisation, and as such not contributing to the enhancement of trust. Instead, they claimed that, “it is the academic communities themselves who know best how to organise a study program to respond to today’s and tomorrow’s needs – and to the needs we do not yet know” (Ottesen & Rice, 2016).

However, a closer look at the requirements towards the councils reveals that institutions were awarded large discretion regarding how the councils should be organised and how they should operate, as long as some minimum requirements were met. As far as the composition of the councils was concerned, the letter of allocation to higher education institutions for 2011 stated that, “it is up to the institutions to assess the form of council/councils, but it is assumed that the parties of the working life and students are represented. In addition, it will be natural to invite actors from other sectors, voluntary organisations or elected representatives.” Relating to the activities of the councils, they were instructed to work out a strategy for cooperation with working life which “must be rooted in the institution’s management and have clear objectives and criteria for goal attainment” (ibid). Beyond this, the institutions were given extensive freedom to operate the councils at their own discretion.

Councils as Forums for Holding the Institutions Accountable

As an instrument for holding higher education institutions accountable regarding their activities to develop more relevant study programs through closer cooperation with working life, the councils may be analysed to operate in a two-folded manner. Firstly, they bring representatives from working life organisations, industry and public sector as well as students together with the leadership of higher education institutions with the purpose of debating the relevance of higher education’s study programs. As such, the representatives are given the formal role of external stakeholders, which have a legitimate role and license to hold the institutions accountable. Within the councils, this should be done by giving voice to concerns and interests of their constituencies, and expecting the institutions to follow up or explain themselves. Secondly, the councils are expected to agree upon strategies for cooperation with working life with ‘clear objectives and criteria for goal attainment’ that the members of the councils, as well as other stakeholders, may use to make claims on the activities and developments of the institution. The Ministry’s emphasis on criteria suggests that the strategy is expected to be used as a steering instrument by which the institutions must answer to.

As a forum for holding higher education institutions accountable, the councils accordingly place great responsibility on their members’ involvement and commitment to follow up their institution’s strategy for cooperation with working life that they have developed. Without such involvement, there is indeed a risk that the councils end up as mere window-dressing. How did this work out in practice?

The mapping of the councils established since 2011 showed that a large share of the members represented industry interests, either by being appointed as representatives of industry directly or by representing business organisations. However, public organisations were also represented, as well as students, and well-known partners of higher education institutions, such as hospitals. When members were asked in the survey about their current impression of the study programs at the higher education institutions where they took part in the council, attitudes were surprisingly positive compared with the understanding of the situation underlying the origin of the councils. More than 85% of the councils' external members agreed that the studies offered reflected the needs of the workforce, and a clear majority also believed that the institution's leadership took into account the needs of working life, with a somewhat smaller majority also being positive about the academic communities' responsiveness to working life. In addition, a very clear majority disagreed with the claim that there is low labour relevance in the bachelor studies. However, nearly 70% of the external members agreed that there is too little practice in the educational programs.

Although these numbers alone cannot account for the councils having restored working life's trust in higher education as such, they nevertheless raise the question of whether taking part in Councils for Cooperation with Working life may have contributed to provide the councils' members with a more positive outlook on the relevance of higher education than communicated by the organisations ahead of their establishment. So, do the councils operate as forums where higher education is held accountable by stakeholders, and thereby enhance the trust in higher education institutions?

Looking into the agendas of the councils' meetings reveals that prepared posts with subsequent discussions is the modus operandi of most meetings, across all the councils. What is happening at the university/university college in different disciplines, and what work the institution does to enhance the relevance of education is the overall theme. When asked about the content of the meetings, about two thirds of the respondents of the survey to members answered that the meetings are largely characterised by one-way information from the institution, and even more answered that the discussions were largely of a general and a non-binding character. The survey also revealed that the agenda of the meetings is mostly decided by the rector/secretariat of the council.

These general glimpses into the meetings suggest that the councils to a little degree operate as forums where stakeholders hold higher education accountable. Rather, they suggest that the meetings are characterised by information-giving and general discussions. So how come that the external stakeholders on the councils report such a positive outlook on the relevance of higher education?

The survey provided some suggestions, which is further confirmed by the qualitative interviews with members, which allowed for more in-depth information on the workings of the councils. Firstly, while the survey revealed that the members found that the councils had resulted in little concrete measures or changes in the study programs of the institutions, a large share of the members claimed that the councils had strengthened the mutual understanding between higher education and working life. This was also a main message in the qualitative interviews with

stakeholders. While they found that little had changed in the study programs of the institutions they were affiliated with, most of them could tell that they had acquired a greater understanding of how higher education programs were run, and of the competing claims and various tasks that the programs had to take care of. To some, this implied that they now had a more realistic view on the potentials of reforming higher education, but also on the responsibilities demanded of working life if they were to engage in closer cooperation with higher education. In addition, several emphasised that they now knew more about how the institutions were organised, and therefore could navigate more easily in the organisation. In this way, the councils functioned as an ‘entrance’ into the institution, which the councils’ members could use for their own purposes. As such, they had to some degree obtained an ‘insider’s’ view of the higher education institutions.

Building Trust Through Accountability?

The study into the Councils for Cooperation with Working life illustrates how an instrument, which was designed to strengthen the relevance and responsiveness of higher education institutions, had a different function than originally intended. After 6 years, few of the councils could point to concrete effects and a stronger relevance of the study programs at the affiliated institution. Still, most members were satisfied with the councils, and they endorsed the arrangement. This may suggest that the members rather than using the council as an arena for holding the institutions accountable on measurable outputs, had engaged in joint discussions and learning which resulted in increased understanding of the institutions. One outcome of the interaction between institutions and working life in the councils may be framed in terms of calculus-based trust-building, as stakeholders’ perceptions of higher education’s relevance and responsiveness were surprisingly positive after taking part in interactions in the councils.

However, the discrepancy between stakeholders’ perceptions and the lacking measurable outputs of the councils, suggest that the councils are not sufficient to work as an instrument for institutionalising distrust – and thereby ensuring trust on an institutional level. The case rather illustrates the multilevel character of trust and that trust on one level is insufficient to produce trust on other levels without a mechanism for ensuring spillover effects.

Case Study 2: Learning Outcomes as a Means to Structure Cooperation on Study Programme Level

In the last few decades, learning outcomes have been introduced across Europe, with multiple aims related to the transparency and mobility of graduates. Another frequently stated aim is the need to make the content of education more transparent to the labour market and contribute to lifelong learning processes. At the same time,

the process in general has not been a bottom-up transformation of educational systems, and has instead largely been driven forward by the Europe-wide process of introducing qualifications frameworks. Both the Bologna Process and the EU have been involved in putting qualifications frameworks on the agenda (Elken, 2015). At the European level, the processes of introducing learning outcomes and qualifications frameworks are driven forward by Bologna Process (the Qualifications Framework for the European Higher Education Area – QF-EHEA) and the EU (the European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning – the EQF). The two represent two distinctly different views on qualifications frameworks: while the former is focused on higher education as a sector, the latter represents a much more wide transformation process, where learning in and outside of formal (higher) education institutions was expected to be on equal standing (European Parliament and the Council, 2008). The underlying argument in the EQF is that when qualifications are defined by the learning outcomes, it should no longer matter where such learning is obtained, in this manner also putting emphasis on in- and non-formal learning opportunities. The rhetoric also echoes the general view of higher education in a number of EU documents as cumbersome, slow, inflexible, lagging behind and not catering to the needs of Europe in becoming the world's foremost knowledge economy. It is this rhetoric that is underpinning arguments of the need for joint European action in this area.

The introduction of learning outcomes remains rather ambiguous as a policy solution, as it has been linked to multiple different policy objectives and thus also to different interpretations in practice (Caspersen et al., 2017; Elken, 2016). Nevertheless, the overall introduction of qualifications frameworks represents a means to make the content of education more transparent, accountable and flexible (Young & Allais, 2011: 212) and in this manner contribute to the enhanced relevance of higher education (Allais, 2014: 140) and the Europeanisation of higher education by enhancing mobility of labour force in Europe. However, does the introduction of learning outcomes contribute to enhanced trust in higher education by the labour market?

Importing Distrust Through Qualifications Frameworks?

In Norway, as was the case in a range of other European countries, the impulse to develop a national qualifications framework came from European developments. The process for developing the initial framework for higher education, sparked to motion by the Bologna Process, took place in 2006–2009, later followed by the wider development of the overall Norwegian Qualifications Framework for lifelong learning (NQF) that included also other levels of education, with reference to the developments related to the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) in the EU. The final NQF was adopted in 2011, a result of a comprehensive process of deliberation in the context of tripartite collaboration in Norway, including strong involvement from labour market actors (Elken, 2016). The Norwegian framework

largely took a starting point in the formal educational system with an explicit statement that the purpose of the framework was to describe and not change the existing national educational system. While the introduction of the NQF echoes the calls for relevance by labour market actors in the Norwegian system, the impetus and rationales for developing the framework were largely borrowed from European processes, as its emergence was initially not necessarily linked to any specific policy problem at the time. Yet, in the process, a range of local interests became involved as well, which viewed the framework as an opportunity for reform (Elken, 2016).

In the document that established and described the framework, the NQF was primarily presented as a way to communicate towards different societal actors, as the framework was, “for employers and employees, and all who want to apply to education or are in education” (NKR, 2011: 11). The document emphasises that the Norwegian system is considered to be relatively simple and structured, thus negating any need for system wide reform. Thus, the main aim of the framework was to ‘improve communication’. Yet, the themes that were expressed in the document that established the Norwegian NQF still also echoed the purposes and aims that had been expressed at the European level in the EQF, and references were made to validation of informal learning, and lifelong and -wide education among else.

In a sense, one way to view the NQF is to view it as an instrument that also has the capacity to import a view on higher education where trust is calculus-based and conditional – what was earlier also conceptualised as a form of distrust. While labour market representatives also in Norway have expressed the need for more relevance, the introduction of the NQF can also provide a means to import and formalise the language to express distrust regarding higher education’s capacity to cater to their needs. By establishing this as the overarching framework for how to discuss study programs, this can be seen as a way to institutionalise distrust, albeit in different ways than suggested earlier. The form of distrust is less about checks and balances as would be the case in deterrence-based trust, and more about establishing and formalising a whole new vocabulary for how higher education institutions are demonstrating their accountability. In that sense, the process represents a wider transformation process of what a study program is and how it is defined.

Learning Outcomes as Transparency Tools

Essentially, both the overarching NQF and the local learning outcome descriptions can have an effect on the level of trust put in higher education producing relevant graduates for the society. If the NQF can be interpreted as a way to redefine how study programs need to demonstrate accountability and relevance, what about local learning outcome descriptions? In terms of the internal perspective of how learning outcomes are being developed and used within institutions, earlier studies have indicated that learning outcomes take multiple disciplinary shapes (Sweetman et al., 2014), but they are generally viewed by academic staff as a more relevant tool than other quality assurance measures (Aamodt et al., 2018). Moreover, it has been

emphasised that they can function as means to start the discussion regarding the relevance of higher education. For example, in humanities it sparked along a discussion on what ‘humanistic competence’ means (Bleiklie et al., 2017) and was in this manner an opportunity for change that was valued. Caution has been expressed about viewing learning outcomes as a singular shift towards bringing in a stronger market orientation in education; learning outcomes also reiterate existing professional values (Olson et al., 2018). Thus, despite the fact that the introduction of the NQF in itself opened up potential avenues for institutionalised distrust, the local implementation processes seem to be more concerned with the specific rather than the general and seem to be somewhat disconnected from the wider rhetoric that was attached to the process.

At the same time, in the interviews with the labour market representatives, their perspectives and views on learning outcomes varied substantially. While labour market representatives and trade unions had been active in the establishment of the framework during the hearings and initial process of developing the NQF, their involvement and interests in the process of managing learning outcomes at the study program level became less prominent. Among the actors interviewed, there was varied knowledge about learning outcomes, what they mean and what they could be used for. Thus, while the case of humanities referred to above could suggest that the introduction of learning outcomes could open up the discussion of relevance in traditional disciplinary fields in higher education, it is not given that this in all instances translates to new patterns of communication, participation and involvement. Instead, some of the organisational representatives interviewed expressed how learning outcomes were something in the domain of higher education institutions, where the labour market did not have the competence to intervene. In this manner, while learning outcomes are a means to formalise the outcomes of study programs, they do not induce new patterns of participation.

Instead, the interviews with trade unions and professional organisations indicate that the introduction of learning outcomes cements existing patterns of communications, rather than creating new ones (Elken & Tellmann, 2019). The respondents more often refer to a lack of knowledge in the labour market regarding the whole issue of learning outcomes. In some professionally oriented fields, professional organisations are closely involved in the development of study programs. Yet, they have already been closely involved also before, thus learning outcomes represent some degree of formalisation of these relationships, but do not substantially alter existing patterns. It was not very clear to all the respondents that the labour market had an issue with transparency regarding graduate competences in such professional fields, as ‘the employers think they know what an engineer is, so they already knew what they would get when they hire someone’ (interview, professional organisation). For the disciplinary fields that were examined, the picture regarding this was more varied and more often, they would retain the position that learning outcomes were under the auspices of higher education institutions. However, it was not evident that new channels of communication had been established. Thus, in terms of the patterns of interaction between organised interests and higher education, learning outcomes have not been a game changer.

Learning Outcomes as Means of Institutionalising Distrust?

In some sense, it seems that more was at stake during the introduction of the NQF. Qualifications frameworks can be interpreted as a way to import and potentially institutionalise distrust, that is, a more formalised and calculative view on trust. This does not imply a lack of trust, but a different expectation of how relevance and accountability should be demonstrated. Different from the conceptualisations of calculus-based trust presented earlier, this form of institutionalised distrust does not take place through checks and balances, but instead takes the form of a new language for how study programs are described that formalises a number of phenomena that were earlier more implicit and open-ended.

The routine day-to-day work with learning outcomes does not seem to have radically altered the patterns of involving new actors. There is considerable variation regarding the way in which learning outcomes play out at the local level. For those who had considerable cooperation (in the professionally oriented fields), learning outcomes provided an additional means to collaboration. In this manner, more general opportunities for spillovers were limited, as learning outcomes' work reinforced existing communicative patterns. Overall, learning outcomes can be seen as a transformation of a trust relationship – where earlier 'blind' trust is being replaced by a more calculative approach.

Concluding Remarks

The empirical cases presented in the chapter show varied ways to address the issue of trust through the two instruments: the introduction of the Councils for Cooperation with Working life and the shift towards learning outcomes. In these concluding remarks, we turn to the three propositions proposed and reflect on these.

First, the new instruments to facilitate transparency and relevance can be seen to facilitate trust if there are spillovers beyond the single interaction, both over time and across the organisation. Regarding the first proposition, it was clear that neither the establishment of the councils nor the introduction of learning outcomes showed clear signs of producing definite spillover effects. While there was broad satisfaction with the councils, their effects to some extent was condensed to the specific context. The primary function of the councils seemed to be an arena of communication and information exchange. An optimistic interpretation of this is that such information exchange and socialisation process would contribute over time to the development of shared norms, and by involving a broad enough set of relevant actors, the councils can lead to production and reinvigoration of trust in higher education. The somewhat less optimistic interpretation is that while relational trust can be developed within these councils, it would not be given that this would translate to inter-organisational trust as the councils so far have failed to produce the outputs at the study program level they were intended to do. At worst, this could lead to an

image of the councils as ‘talking shops’ that do not deliver. With qualifications frameworks and learning outcomes, the picture that emerged was even more varied. The assumed lack of knowledge among society and labour market about the existence of learning outcomes and their function, raised questions whether they can deliver their promise in terms of making study programs more transparent to labour market actors.

Second, when the new instruments emphasise calculus- or deterrence-based trust, these contribute to the institutionalisation of distrust by creating an architecture of checks and balances. Neither of the instruments showed clear indications of calculus or deterrence-based trust as conceptualised earlier in this chapter. Yet, qualifications frameworks could be interpreted as one form of calculus-based trust by significantly changing existing the vocabulary for how study programs are described and conceptualised. If calculus-based trust is conceptualised as a means for institutionalised distrust – establishment of routines and procedures to maintain trust through checks and balances as argued by Luhmann (1979) – then learning outcomes are a means to do this at the study program level. Learning outcomes represent a way to formalise the competence graduates are expected to have and can in this manner also represent a means to hold higher education institutions accountable for the graduates actually having the described knowledge, skills and competences. In this manner, learning outcome schemes do represent a form of institutionalised distrust. While learning outcome descriptors have the potential for this, at this point it is not clear yet whether learning outcome descriptors function in this manner and whether they in fact have taken this function.

Third, higher education institutions and involved labour market actors would retain different positions on the function and purpose of these instruments. In both of the empirical illustrations in this chapter, it seems that the instruments have an important communicative function. Moreover, in the case of learning outcomes there is still considerable room for improvement regarding this function as well. What this suggests is that the troublesome notion of the ‘relevance agenda’ that is now entering the institutions is as much about uncertainty as it is about lack of trust.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, the accountability agenda and the audit society are associated with a lack of trust in higher education (Enders, 2013). This chapter also emphasises that the discussion concerns more than just more or less trust, as the notion of trust itself is multifaceted and nuanced. New accountability instruments – such as the councils and learning outcomes presented in this chapter – can also produce a form of trust. Yet, the kind of trust that is being produced in a context of an audit society is not a return to the ‘good old times’ of high (and largely blind) trust in higher education producing graduates with relevant competences, skills and knowledge. Other forms of trust become emphasised, either based on deterrence-based trust or a more calculus-based trust. It is precisely these forms of trust that are being generated and cemented that Luhmann (1979) referred to as a form of institutionalised distrust. The way in which both learning outcomes and the councils emphasise transparency, information exchange and communication, is an indication of such new reality – where trust can be granted, once results are demonstrated. This represents a form of formalisation process of specific arenas and relationships,

which over time can become difficult to dismantle, due to the ‘inflationary spiral’ of formalisation processes (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Given that both the councils and learning outcomes at this point remain a rather new development in the system, it is too early to maintain whether they would stand the test of time. However, it is possible to argue that they represent two examples of a much wider web of formalisation processes. Thus, the question is less about more or less trust in higher education, but instead about what kind of trust.

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Chapter 6

The Distrust of Students as Learners: Myths and Realities



Bruce Macfarlane

Introduction

The decline of trust in professional and public life is closely associated with the audit culture and the increasingly performative expectations placed on public sector professionals such as teachers, doctors and medical staff, social workers, and university academics. Performance indicators and targets are now an established part of the lexicon of public sector work. However, the decline of trust may be equally observed in relation to the treatment of university students as well as those entrusted to teach them. There are many symbols and dimensions of this phenomenon that may be linked to the growing distrust of students in higher education. In addition to attendance registers at lectures and other classes, there is now the ubiquitous use of anti-plagiarism software in respect to student assignments, theses and doctoral proposals, along with the increasingly widespread use of learning analytics to purportedly track levels of student ‘engagement’ (Glendinning, 2014; Slade & Prinsloo, 2013).

Drawing on illustrations from the historic literature on British higher education, this chapter will demonstrate that contemporary concerns about the extent to which students can be trusted as learners, in the wider sense, are nothing new. They are largely based on a mythology about a Golden Age of hard working and intrinsically motivated undergraduates that never was rather than empirical evidence. The chapter will also explore the way trust is being undermined through the changing relationship between universities and their students. A shift has occurred from a culture of trust based on a reciprocal exchange to one that is more akin to a negotiated exchange as more commonly found in a business context. This, it will be argued, demonstrates a decreasing level of trust in students as learners on the part of institutions.

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A Question of Trust

In 1936, a report of the British university grants committee (UGC) rejected the idea that attendance at lectures should be made compulsory for higher education students stating such a requirement is “appropriate to a mental age considerably younger than that of University students” (UGC, 1936: 22). 28 years later the Hale report (1964) on university teaching methods stated that, “...the main purpose of a university education, apart from the acquisition of knowledge, should be to teach the student to work on his own and think for himself” (Hale, 1964: 76). This was one of the reasons why the report contended that the long vacations were important to retain in order that students could develop intellectual independence. The report went on to argue that, “if one of the main purposes of a university education is to teach students to work on their own, reading by students must be preferable to attendance at a lecture unless the lecture is superior in presentation or content to the available literature” (Hale, 1964: 96).

These examples from the history of British higher education illustrate that rules on student attendance at university classes were quite different to the way in which this matter is treated today. Independent learning was seen as the ultimate purpose of a higher education and students were trusted to use their time in a way that was going to be most constructive in achieving this goal for them. Moreover, the UGC and Hale reports on British higher education date from a time prior to the lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 at the end of the 1960s before which the University was *in loco parentis* to the student as a minor. By contrast, today compulsory attendance is much in vogue both in the British university and internationally, a standard part of so-called ‘student engagement’ strategies principally designed to improve retention rates. It is a trend symbolic of the decline of trust in students and their capacity for learning independently as mature persons. Compulsory attendance is just one element of a much wider phenomenon that will be illustrated in this chapter by reference to a definition of trust incorporating competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability.

The Trust Literature

Although there is a common sense understanding of trust as a word in the English language, there is a further literature that seeks to analyse or break down its constituent elements in the context of using the term within interpersonal relations. Butler and Cantrell (1984) provide a synthesis of previous literature in identifying five components of trust: integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty and openness. Trust, as this synoptic analysis suggests, is largely about moral values (i.e. integrity, consistency, loyalty and openness) in addition to the knowledge and skills to accomplish a task (i.e. competence). A relatively similar synoptic set of trust dimensions – competence, honesty, openness, reliability and benevolence – are identified by Van

Houtte (2007: 826) in relation to school teaching drawing on organisational theory. These two sets of trust components are self-explanatory and largely overlap – e.g. openness is common to both definitions – with some semantic differences. Butler and Cantrell refer to integrity, while Van Houtte uses the term honesty. In the context of interpersonal trust relationships integrity means making good faith agreements, telling the truth and keeping promises, essentially a proxy for integrity. Benevolence means a sense that the person in whom trust is placed cares and acts in the interests of the trust giver rather than selfishly or opportunistically. Reliability and consistency are relevantly similar components that appear in the two definitions of trust. A number of authors point to the central relationship between trust and risk given that trust depends on taking a risk with the trustee. Here it has been argued that trust is in fact a subcategory of risk (Williamson, 1993).

Much has been written about trust in relation to a range of academic disciplines including psychology, sociology, political science, and business and marketing. Some of this literature relates directly to the higher education context where it can be conceptualised both at the institutional and the individual level. At the institutional level trust is sometimes approached on the basis of considering why students might be more likely to trust an institution as a means of understanding how to market universities (Ghosh et al., 2001; Carvalho & Mota, 2010). Several studies have focused on macro and meso level relationships of trust within higher education systems with relevance to governance (Tierney, 2006; Vidovich & Currie, 2011). Trust may also be understood as about an interpersonal relationship between students and university teachers without which the former will never reach their true potential as learners (Curzon-Hobson, 2002). Hence, trust is a topic attracting considerable interest in higher education at the heart of which is the relationship between students and their institutions. Yet the focus of most writers and researchers has been on the extent to which students trust their institutions from a business or marketing perspective (e.g. Harris et al., 2008). These types of studies are interested in exploring how to build trust with the customer. My concern in this chapter is to examine the question of trust from a different angle by asking: Why is it that students do not appear to be trusted to learn by their universities anymore?

The Elements of Trust

It is clear from the literature that trust is a meta-term that consists of various elements. These can be summarised as competence, benevolence, integrity/honesty, and predictability (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Van Houtte, 2007). The remaining part of this chapter will consider how these components of trust can be understood in the context of the relationship between universities and their students and how confidence in students as learners appears to have been eroded.

Competence

Competence may be understood as someone possessing the abilities to complete a task or job. In a higher education context there is a need for confidence in the intellectual capacity of an individual to undertake studies successfully at university. An individual's cognitive competence to be at university is normally determined on the basis of their prior qualifications sometimes allied to work-based experience. However, competence may also be interpreted as possession of the necessary psycho-social capacity to cope with being at university and managing the various demands that this entails. It is widely recognised that university life can be a demanding experience personally especially for those students who are less mature, have not previously lived away from home or have pre-existing mental health issues. Hence, students also need emotional competence to cope with the mental demands of studentship in a higher educational environment that can feel both lonely and competitive.

Critics have long expressed concerns that students may not possess sufficient intellectual capacity to benefit from a higher education. As systems of higher education have expanded this has invariably been accompanied by recurring anxieties about whether the additional students enrolled will have the ability to cope with the demands of a university education. This is the 'more means worse' argument (see for example, Amis, 1960). In other words, there is nothing new in the notion that students may lack the cognitive competence for higher education study.

The majority of students today enter university with little idea how to organise their studies and the first year in the university is a critical one (Holliman, 1968: 100).

Holliman's statement has a timeless quality to it inasmuch that it might have been made at more or less any time over the last few hundred years on the basis of the almost constant expansion of enrolment and matriculation from university. John Venn's analysis of matriculation statistics from Oxford and Cambridge between 1544 and 1906 indicates that matriculation rates for these institutions rose steadily from the 1800s (Saunders, 1947). In terms of both the numbers of universities and students attending them, the move from an elite to a mass system in the UK has been very gradual indeed. Full-time students in British higher education were just 25,000 in 1900/01, 61,000 in 1924/25, 69,000 in 1938/39, 122,000 in 1954/55, and 216,000 in 1962/63 (Robbins, 1963). Further expansions have occurred in the wake of the Robbins report (1963) and again in the 1990s and the 2000s. As these figures indicate, there were quite dramatic expansions of the system that took place between the two World Wars, as well as in the 1950s following the recommendations of the Barlow report (1944). By today's standards, the numbers in higher education before the early to mid-1960s may appear modest and the expansions all took place when considerably less than 10% of young people went to university. However, each of these expansions represented a very large percentage rise in student numbers. This is why debates about expansion, and with it the suitability of students to enter the system, are nothing new.

The definition of a ‘mass’ higher education system, arbitrarily defined by Martin Trow as between 15% and 40% enrolment (Trow, 1973), has long been surpassed in many developed systems, such as the UK, by what he described as a universal one (i.e. beyond 40%). Hence, although Trow asserted that 15% as the tipping point that ends an elite system this is purely a subjective figure. As Scott (1995) recognised, the feeling that a system is elite takes a lot longer to disappear than the reality. Hence, as new waves of expansion have occurred in British higher education so have predictable anxieties about lowering of standards and lamentations about the ill-preparedness of students entering it. Despite this trope about standards, graduation statistics indicate that degree results have steadily improved.

In addition to conventional concerns about the cognitive competence of students, there is a wide range of indicators that students are regarded by institutions as lacking emotional competence as well. Universities promote the availability of counselling services and justify their attendance policies, at least partly, on the basis of a social welfare argument that they wish to ensure that absentee students are not ‘at risk’ (Macfarlane, 2013). There is now a growing literature about ‘well-being’ tapping into anxieties about the extent to which students are able to cope emotionally with university life. Concerns about the extent to which students can manage the stresses and strains of studying at university though are nothing new either. The mental health of students, including analyses of incidents of suicide, was a focus for a number of researchers and writers in the 1960s and early 70s (e.g. Atkinson, 1969; Ryle, 1969). The notion of an ‘anxious campus’ dates back to at least the 1960s if not well before. Ferdynand Zweig’s book entitled *The Student in the Age of Anxiety*, published in 1963, commented on “a more harassed, more anxious and more worried type of student, and a more harassed atmosphere at the university” (Zweig, 1963: xvi).

One of the most visible symbols of the decline of trust in the emotional competence of students is the trend toward compulsory attendance rules at lectures and seminars. This has become a routine element of the culture of surveillance at university and is commonly used as a pre-condition affecting student progression and graduation even though attendance is rarely, if ever, included as a learning outcome or objective within the curriculum. Universities tend to justify the monitoring of attendance on the basis of concern for student well-being but it has also become a convenient means of grading students. This is part of a wider trend for universities to assess students on the basis of their “academic non-achievements” (Sadler, 2010: 727) or “bodily performativity” (Macfarlane, 2017).

The extent to which the student population consists of mature individuals and those with other indicators of life experience has always been neglected in assumptions about their emotional competence. There is little or no evidence to suggest that students are less able to manage the demands of higher education now than they ever were. Indeed, the growing proportion of students who are mature or combining full time work with part time study might very reasonably be considered as a contradictory indicator to any such assertion. Nevertheless, the myth prevails that students are infantile learners with little or no life experience often lacking the commitment or skills needed to survive at university.

Benevolence

This moral value in an interpersonal relationship means that the person in whom trust is placed acts selflessly rather than selfishly and without regard to the trust giver. In higher education, trust is placed in the student by the university teacher as someone worthy of his or her place at the institution. Part of a positive relationship between university teachers and students is the extent to which the former feels she/he can trust the latter to be studying in the ‘right’ way. This means working hard on their studies and adopting a ‘deep’ approach to learning by trying to understand the underlying meaning of ideas and concepts as opposed to taking a ‘surface’ approach more concerned with passing examinations than understanding the structure of the subject (Marton & Saljo, 1976). The emergence of the popular dichotomy between ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ learning has, in effect, provided an intellectualised shorthand for accusing some students of lacking benevolence in their attitude to learning. Here, if students are perceived, or perhaps more accurately labelled, as acting instrumentally by not engaging ‘deeply’ in learning the subject or being lazy this is akin to a breach of trust demonstrating a disrespect for the virtues of academic life at the heart of which is a desire to pursue truth and understanding. Students are accused of lacking motivation or, perhaps more accurately, the right type of motivation (i.e. an intrinsic as opposed to an extrinsic one).

Students are increasingly distrusted or demonised in higher education as having the ‘wrong’ attitude to learning, something often attributed to the effects of massification and the pressures that have come to bear on students in terms of results and obtaining a graduate level job. However, there is little evidence that there was really any kind of Golden Age when students went to university purely for the love of knowledge and plenty of testimonies to the contrary. Remarking on his time as an undergraduate at the University of Leeds before the First World War, the English art historian and poet, Herbert Read (1940: 75), commented:

It astonished me to find when I first entered the University of Leeds that the ambitions of ninety out of every hundred of my fellow-undergraduates were crude and calculating. They were interested in one thing only – in getting the best possible degree by the shortest possible method. They were anxious to memorise and eager to anticipate the testing questions.

Writing about his impressions of undergraduates in the 1940s under the pseudonym Bruce Truscot (1943: 162), Edgar Allison Peers came to a relatively similar conclusion,

It is comparatively easy, as anyone who moves among undergraduates knows, to divide them into the apathetic and the keen; and it is probably not an exaggeration to put the proportions at five to one.

Meanwhile, modern-day historian William Whyte (2015: 237), commenting on students in the expanded higher education system of the 1950s and 60s, states:

There were still lazy and disengaged students, and many who had ended up at university by default, with no real sense of commitment to academic study.

Herbert Read and Bruce Truscot, both writing in 1940s, together with William Whyte, a historian looking back at the 1950s and 60s, question the commitment of university students to deep as opposed to a surface or instrumental view of learning. An editorial in an issue of *Universities Quarterly* from 1950 similarly bemoans the fact that, “we are still told that the student of today likes to be spoon-fed and that he tends to get from the university little more than one can get by spoon-feeding” (Editorial, 1950: 321). These comments about students relate to a time when going to university was only open to an elite few, a period when, it might be presumed, students were more intrinsically motivated and less concerned about pragmatic concerns connected with getting a job. Yet, this is perhaps another example of golden ageism.

Hence, there is very little evidence that students of past generations worked any harder than their contemporaries and are in any sense less trustworthy on this basis. Suggestions otherwise would appear to buy into a myth about the past as a time when students, who enjoyed the privileges of an elite education, were somehow more likely to engage in deep rather than surface learning. If anything, students now study for longer each week. Doris Thoday’s survey work from the early to mid-1950s shows that undergraduates studied formally and informally for an average of 36 hours per week during term time and a quarter of all students did no work at all at the weekend (Thoday, 1955, 1957).

Integrity/Honesty

Perhaps the strongest contemporary symbol of the declining trust in students as learners is the almost ubiquitous use of electronic plagiarism detection software in checking the originality of their academic work. Ten years or so ago such software was seen as having the potential to change the nature of the relationship between university teachers and students in a positive way. It was originally introduced and justified as a ‘developmental’ tool, but such software is now routinely deployed for both undergraduate and postgraduate work including the submission of proposals for doctoral degrees. The use of plagiarism detection surveillance has institutionalised the distrust of students as learners and made it the norm (Evans, 2006). In effect, this means that it is the electronic detection service that is trusted rather than the student and it is up to the students to prove that they are not cheating when a high proportion of ‘matching’ material is detected by the software in one of their assignments.

There is a substantial academic industry around plagiarism detection, both administrative and academic, including a large literature on the subject, specialised networks and conferences dedicated to the subject. This is almost exclusively concerned with discussing ways in which student cheating can be defined, detected, punished and deterred. Reflection about the role of plagiarism in wider society, among academic faculty and other creative professionals, though is in much shorter supply. The historical context of plagiarism is also overlooked and assumptions

prevail that cheating behaviour has increased due to access to the internet and the associated use of ‘cut and paste’ techniques. Very few researchers seriously address the question as to whether plagiarism has grown or whether the use of software has, in itself, simply uncovered behaviour that previously went undetected. Moreover, flying in the face of this received wisdom, research indicates that there may be less plagiarism now than at the dawn of the internet age (Ison, 2015).

There are many other symbols of the presumption that university students are dishonest: the use of hand-in sheets attesting to their authorship of an assignment being submitted, or the insistence of some institutions that students provide written evidence in respect to any absence requests, including death certificates when this might involve attending a family funeral. These are the depths that higher education institutions have plummeted to in their treatment of students. While it would be naïve to imagine that any groups of individuals – including university students – are incapable of acts of dishonesty, the onus appears to have shifted from trusting students to distrusting them as a default position.

Predictability/Reliability

There are many popular tropes or myths based on folklore about students in higher education. Three of the most powerful of these myths appear above, namely that they are ill-prepared intellectually and emotionally for university, have the wrong attitude to learning, and are prone to cheating behaviour. They constitute a negatively minded interpretation of the predictability of student behaviour: students will not ‘do the reading’ before the seminar, students will willfully refuse to participate in class, students will only study for the examination and not for the love of the subject, students are not interested in reading assessment feedback on graded work, and so on.

A good interpersonal relationship depends on positive predictability (e.g. ‘she/he will keep their word’) as opposed to negative expectations. Such assertions are now increasingly linked to the notion of the ‘student as customer’ as an explanatory narrative linked to market-driven reforms to the higher education system in the UK, symbolised at the beginning of the last decade by the Browne Review (2010). The phrase ‘neoliberal’ has become a practically ubiquitous term used as a shorthand pejorative to describe the spread of a market-driven approach to higher education globally. Few writers acknowledge that the phrase ‘student-as-customer’ dates back at least to the 1960s and possibly much earlier. Shulman (1976: 2), Joan Stark (1975) and Pernal (1977: 2) were all writing about ‘student consumerism’ in the 1970s, while as far back as 1949, the industrialist Ernest Simon writing as Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, contributed an article to *Universities Quarterly* entitled ‘University Crisis? A consumer’s view’ (Simon, 1949). This article referenced his commercial identity as a ‘consumer’ of both university graduates and research. Perhaps again, less has changed than we might imagine.

There is also nothing new about students working for a grade as opposed to taking a deep love or interest in their subject. It is a timeless phenomenon. What is new is the blame culture that has emerged on the basis of the ‘student-as-customer’ trope. This phrase appears frequently in the contemporary literature and has become practically a received wisdom (e.g. Delucchi & Korgen, 2002). Another aspect of supposedly consumer-like behaviour is referred to derogatively as ‘grade grubbing’ where the academic judgement of a university teacher marking an assignment is questioned by a student. There is a strong sense of defensive indignation about the way in which this behaviour is condemned even when it might only involve a small minority of students in a mass higher education system and in the context of a less deferential age.

Whatever Happened to Trust?

The question that is really interesting is why universities demonstrate a declining level of trust in students given the almost complete lack of evidence that students are any less trustworthy than in the past. The answer to this question appears to be closely related to the introduction of risk management systems associated with mass (or universal) higher education and the way this has converted the nature of the trust relationship between the institution and the student.

There has been a shift from a reciprocal exchange culture to a negotiated exchange culture in higher education. A negotiated exchange takes place where each party agrees upon a set of benefits and responsibilities that will flow from an agreement (Molm et al., 2000). This is typically the case with most business contracts and is based on a bilateral agreement. Indicators of this contemporary culture are things such as strictly applied institutional rules and penalties in respect to attendance and standardised penalties in relation to missing an assignment deadline. The student side of the coin of this contractual learning culture might involve things such as learning and teaching materials made available online, return dates for marked assignments and better publicised and supported appeal procedures.

The negotiated exchange is strictly binding on both parties symbolised in higher education by students being required to sign statements that they have not plagiarised every time they hand in an assignment. This negotiated exchange has replaced a reciprocal exchange, one where there is no explicit negotiation or contract and each party to the relationship initiates individually without expectation as to how or whether the other party will reciprocate. For example, in a reciprocal exchange culture a tutor may offer a student a tutorial discussion if they think they might benefit from it without being compelled to do so, whilst in a negotiated exchange culture the tutor is now required to offer one or more tutorials to a student as an entitlement that forms part of university or course regulations. This change is significant as what was an essentially personal relationship, based on reciprocation between the parties, has been replaced with an institutional one, based largely on a negotiated exchange. Theorists who have written about these different types of

relationships agree that trust is much more likely to develop in a relationship based on reciprocity than on a negotiated exchange.

The distrust of students is now institutionalised and has become something akin to a ‘moral panic’ in society (Cohen, 1972). The youth culture represented by so-called ‘mods’ and ‘rockers’ in the 1960s, paedophiles, cheating in sport, and dangerous dogs have all been the subject of moral panics. This does not mean that, like dishonest students, such problems do not exist but simply that their scale has been exaggerated and significance in relative terms. The scale of student dishonesty and cheating needs to be understood in the context of the massification of higher education. Secondly, in relative terms, there is little evidence that students are significantly less trustworthy than previous generations.

At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted from the Hale Report on university teaching methods published in the early 1960s and referred to the interim report of the committee, which argued that the long vacation in the summer months was essential as a means to allow students to develop their intellectual independence. Here there was a sense of trust that the time away from university, and hence little in the way of regular surveillance of their learning, would be used fruitfully. In February, 2017, the UK government announced plans to introduce ‘fast track’ two-year degree programmes, an indication not just that the purpose of university education has changed dramatically in the intervening 50 years but come full circle in respect to the extent to which students are trusted to use their time to learn independently.

Conclusion

The distrust of students as learners is rooted, to a large extent, in folklore. This presents itself as a series of unsubstantiated tropes about their collective lack of intrinsic motivation, inability to adapt to the ‘rigours’ of university education, and preference for cheating over honest intellectual endeavour. These myths underpin popular images of ‘the student’ in terms of their (lack of) competence, benevolence, integrity and negative interpretations of their predictability. In a marketized environment that conceives of a higher education as a private rather than public good, this urban myth has resulted in increasingly defensive and litigation-conscious university policies. These have, in turn, altered the basis of the relationship between student and institution (and between student and university teacher) from a reciprocal to a negotiated one, essentially a business exchange. Higher education institutions increasingly risk-manage their student population on the basis of principles derived from the assumptions of marketization and new public management. This has eroded the basis of trust in students as learners who are treated as customers even if there is limited evidence that they act like one.

Even though students are contractually attached to institutions, the basis of trust is an interpersonal relationship between the university teacher and the student. In marketing terms, this is sometimes described as ‘the moment of truth’ when the

customer meets the front-line employee. All the marketing hyperbole is then put to the real test. If someone is not a name, or perhaps not even a face, it is much easier to distrust them and their motives for studying in higher education.

The argument I have made in this chapter is that we do not trust students to learn anymore. Instead, they are required to be seen to be learning in various ways such as attending lectures and participating in class. By ‘we’, I am referring to universities and their academic staff in a chain of distrust that stems from governments funding of higher education systems downwards. Governments do not trust universities, who no longer trust their academic staff as professionals to teach who, in turn, no longer trust their students to learn. It is a sad state of affairs.

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Chapter 7

Epistemic Cultures and Trust in Professional Work in Norway: Explorations into Three Settings in Nursing



Karen Jensen

Introduction

Professions may be conceptualised as expert communities which, on the basis of specialist knowledge and competencies, are entrusted with responsibilities for core services in society. The basis for professional work today lies, as in previous times, in the capacity to perform work in ways that are informed, guided by and validated against shared knowledge and established conventions for practice. At the same time, it is recognised generally that a profession's knowledge is not stable, but rather contested and subjected to continual transformations (Bechmann et al., 2009; Jensen et al., 2012). Knowledge is marked by uncertainty, in both trustworthiness and how it should be best employed. This ambiguity generates different efforts and strategies for restoring trust, securing the quality of practice and enhancing the further development of professions as expert communities.

One aspect in this regard is the ways in which discourses of managerialism enter professions and pave the way for new accountability regimes and their related allocations of responsibilities. A culture of performativity comes to the fore, in which professionals are entrusted on the basis of their ability to achieve a set of performance indicators audited by external actors and systems (Brint, 2001; Dent & Whitehead, 2002). Researchers have expressed concern that this development may lead to deprofessionalisation or deskilling, as these indicators give rise to direct regulation of work, decreasing the space for professional judgement (e.g., Forrester, 2000; Strathern, 2000; Carey, 2007; Broom et al., 2009).

Another aspect is that several professional communities, including the nursing profession, now reorient themselves and establish new or closer links to science. The quest for certainty in an ambiguous world, as well as the general emphasis given to science-generated knowledge in today's society, give rise to new

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relationships between research and professional practice, generating an overall emphasis on making practice 'knowledge-based'. New subfields of science emerge, with special responsibilities for serving professions. Today, typically in many professional fields, an extended research orientation toward education and work exists (Nerland & Jensen, 2014).

In the wake of these developments, expectations on practitioners are changing in ways that also open up new responsibilities for knowledge. From the perspective of the sociology of professions, professional work is described as a matter of, "applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases" (Abbott, 1988: 8). While one can argue that this description always has been simplistic as a way of conceptualising professional work, it is increasingly one-sided. Professionals today often are faced with tasks that imply active engagement with knowledge beyond contexts of application. Also included are responsibilities for selecting, validating and safeguarding knowledge in the context of work; analysing and documenting incidents and activities; and engaging oneself in exploring opportunities for improvement (Callon, 2002; Levay & Waks, 2009; Jensen et al., 2012).

In a wider context, professionals' knowledge world and its related standards and strategies for producing and warranting knowledge stretch beyond the nation-state and into an extended globalised space (Brint, 2001). As explained by Collier and Ong (2005), more abstract and symbolic modes of representation give rise to 'global forms' of knowledge, i.e., forms that have a "capacity for decontextualization and recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across diverse social and cultural situations and spheres of life" (op.cit, 11). Such forms of knowledge circulate quickly across various sites, while simultaneously needing to be 'localised' to become useful in specific practices. This localisation, in turn, highlights critical questions with respect to epistemic trust, such as, "Whom or what do we believe? How do we decide?" How does one "design arrangements to facilitate these judgments?" (Van House, 2002: 2).

The above developments have led to researchers arguing that today's society and work realms are infused with knowledge. Knorr Cetina (2002), a researcher in science studies, describes this development in terms of knowledge processes spreading in society, which also elicits ideas about unbounded processes and outcome uncertainty. Not only are products of science dispersed – i.e., science-generated knowledge in different material and symbolic forms – but also modes of practice characteristic of scientific institutions. As Knorr Cetina (2002: 177) expresses it, the emergence of the knowledge society involves "more than the presence of more experts, more technological gadgets, more specialists rather than participant interpretations. It involves the presence of knowledge processes themselves (...) It involves the presence of epistemic practice." However, what this means in professional contexts is not clear. Knorr Cetina argues that despite all the discussions about contemporary Western society as a knowledge society, little attention has been paid to the nature of knowledge processes and the workings of expert systems. Furthermore, as expert communities become increasingly specialised and positioned with responsibilities for continuous services and problem-solving, epistemic practices and processes are likely to be distributed in different ways among various

settings, roles and tasks that simultaneously depend on each other and come together to form the profession's local and extended knowledge base. To understand how trust in knowledge is established and maintained today, we need to consider this wider dynamic.

To shed light on knowledge processes and the workings of expert systems, Knorr Cetina introduces the concept of epistemic cultures, which she asserts are structural features of knowledge societies and are not limited to science. She defines *epistemic cultures* (emphasis in original) as “those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms...which, in a given field, *make up how we know what we know*” (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1). This chapter employs perspectives and concepts from Knorr Cetina to discuss how professional work is embedded in knowledge cultures. Our interest is not to map the knowledge culture as such, but rather to discuss how the safeguarding of knowledge in and for professional work poses challenges that involve professionals in different types of epistemic practices. The challenges resemble ‘wicked-problem situations’ (Kastenhofer, 2011) that typically are marked by uncertain facts, disputed values, high stakes and the need for urgent decisions. Moreover, they include problems related to a multitude of sites for the production of evidence, and many epistemic cultures and actors are involved (*ibid.*). Taking the nursing profession in Norway as an example, we explore how such problems generate safeguarding and warranting practices in different knowledge settings, with special attention given to how tasks, roles and agencies are distributed and how they form different epistemic orientations that intersect, producing and safeguarding professional knowledge.

The chapter is organised as follows. First, we present more in-depth core premises and concepts in the epistemic culture perspective. Next, we provide a short portrait of the nursing profession as embedded in epistemic cultures. Then we draw on research carried out in two Norwegian projects on nurses' knowledge work to illustrate how the perspectives and concepts launched in this chapter may be used to explore issues related to ensuring trust. We conclude by discussing what the chosen perspective may contribute to our ways of conceptualising how trust in knowledge is established and maintained in professional work.

Epistemic Cultures and Trust Practices

Delineated as, “cultures that create and warrant knowledge” (Knorr Cetina, 1999), the concept of epistemic culture highlights the logics and arrangements through which knowledge comes into being and is circulated, approached and collectively recognised within expert communities. On the one hand, such logics and arrangements incorporate common characteristics of how knowledge is produced and recognised in contemporary society. For instance, in our times, we have witnessed a general expectation to make processes related to knowledge production transparent and to include user value as one criterion for recognising valuable knowledge (Gibbons et al., 1994; Knorr Cetina, 2002; Bechmann et al., 2009). On the other

hand, they carry features that are distinctive for the knowledge domain in question, thereby providing analytical means to distinguish between different domains and disciplines. Knorr Cetina suggests that the word ‘culture’ is appropriate as it alludes to a richness of factors, including history and ongoing events; attention to symbols and meaning; and especially, diversity.

She further roots her definition of culture in practice: the acts of making knowledge and the dynamic patterns of activity that vary in different settings of expertise. She is interested not in the production of knowledge, but in the construction of “the machineries of knowing composed of practices”, technical (e.g., tools and instruments) and social (e.g. how decisions are made). She argues that these machineries comprise knowledge and actors, i.e., epistemic subjects (in our case, individual professionals and collectives, in addition to their tools and instruments), which are shaped and determined by the practices and machineries of knowing. Hence, one might say that in this perspective, it is the community that knows. What we consider ‘good’ work, whom we believe and how we decide, are determined and learned in the wider epistemic communities of professions. While epistemic cultures operate in specific knowledge settings, their knowledge and practices reach far beyond the immediate contexts of local work. For example, in nursing, we see the emergence of new organisations and community formations that operate on different levels in society to produce, as well as safeguard and warrant, knowledge. Knorr Cetina (2007: 367) uses the concept of macro-epistemics to draw attention to increasing knowledge-verifying units and organisations that, “take on specific knowledge-related tasks in larger knowledge contexts.” For example, these may include organisations responsible for synthesising evidence and setting standards for knowledge-based practice in specific domains, such as the Cochrane centres¹, or agencies that certify knowledge products and expertise on a multi-national scale. She claims further that in today’s society, such entities and organisations form networks and linkages that come to constitute what she terms as the larger ‘machineries’ of knowledge construction.

Accordingly, knowledge and practice in a profession like nursing are embedded in complex machineries that comprise a range of organisations, levels and agencies. Focusing on nursing and its ways of handling knowledge, it also becomes clear that nurses typically are embedded in a multitude of epistemic cultures. For example, nursing’s knowledge basis comprises contributions from bio-medical research, clinical practice and population studies, and it is formed at the intersection of different epistemic orientations. Knorr Cetina argues for magnifying this aspect of contemporary knowledge because it reveals the fragmentation of contemporary science, displaying, “different architectures of empirical approaches, specific constructions of the referent, particular ontologies of instruments and different social machines” (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 3). In other words, it elicits diversity within various fields,

¹These are regional centres that contribute to evidence-based decision making in healthcare by producing high-quality independent research and systematic reviews that are free from commercial sponsorship. See <https://consumers.cochrane.org/cochrane-and-systematic-reviews> for more information.

producing vastly different products. For nurses, navigating this landscape requires the ability to handle the simultaneous presence of varied logics and knowledge representations, as well as negotiate different concerns and dilemmas. How this complexity is dealt with needs to be investigated empirically, but the concept of epistemic orientations provides a means for doing so. To discuss different epistemic orientations, we distinguish between orientations directed toward control, complexity and experience. At the same time, roles and responsibilities may be distributed across the profession in ways that generate different orientations, or ways of envisioning knowledge, among practitioners in different knowledge settings. Thus, epistemic cultures are complex loci of behaviours, and questions of authority, credibility, trust and expertise are, from this perspective, complex and contingent.

In the following sections, we illustrate how this perspective can be employed to explore epistemic practices in Norway's nursing profession by focusing on three settings in which knowledge credibility is at stake: the regulatory knowledge work of the nurses' professional association, the work of clinical nurse educators, and work that concerns validating and developing clinical nursing procedures in a hospital ward. Our focus is on epistemic trust, and the starting point for this investigation is the following question: By what means and practical devices is trust in knowledge generated? We begin by describing the nursing profession's characteristics and relation to science.

The Nursing Profession and the Development of an Expert Culture

The nursing profession has a long history of creating and maintaining links to science as a strategy to render knowledge credible². Beginning in the context of establishing national and international nurses' associations at the beginning of the twentieth century, efforts to base the profession on science gradually moved toward university-based education (Wingender, 1995) and more overall efforts to prepare nurses by ensuring relevant education, competence development and further understanding of the profession's ethical standards.

In Nordic countries, nursing science was established as an academic discipline in Norway, Sweden and Finland in 1979–1980, with Denmark following soon afterward (Nieminen, 2008; Laiho, 2010). The discipline has been concerned with developing a research-centric knowledge basis for nursing and has been characterised by orientations toward complexity and experience, in the sense that human care and holistic work models have been emphasised. At the same time, keeping abreast of

²In line with other science-technology study (STS) researchers, Knorr Cetina rejects the assumption that science is a special form of knowledge production. However, because science has been much studied and is generally considered “the premier knowledge institution throughout the world” (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1), it is often considered to be a useful source for understanding critical issues in society.

international developments has been important, facilitated by nurses' international cooperation and the embeddedness of nursing education in higher education institutions with international outreach (Hvalvik, 2005; Laiho, 2010). More recently, requirements for a scientific knowledge core of professional practice have been formalised in an overall agenda for evidence-based best practices (Nieminen, 2008). Professional associations play a key role as mediators, as do macro-epistemic organisations, e.g. the Cochrane collaboration (Holleman et al., 2006; Van Achterberg et al., 2006). Hence, an extended evidential culture geared toward validation and control has emerged. Efforts to 'scientise' different aspects of nurses' work form a core discourse today. However, organisations and professionals have implemented this differently. While evidential cultures create forms of knowledge that, "aspire to become a global standard" (Featherstone & Venn, 2006: 2), they need to be recontextualised to become relevant in local settings. This generates new roles and practices in the profession, which call for intellectual work (Purkis & Bjornsdottir, 2006), as well as a variety of epistemic practices, to be carried out. Moreover, to handle wicked problem situations, new strategies and arrangements come to the fore that seek to maintain a space for other epistemic cultures to influence professional knowledge and work. For example, this is reflected in efforts to balance experience-based knowledge development with a conceptualisation of nursing as 'intuitive' and care-oriented work (Purkis & Bjornsdottir, 2006; Nieminen, 2008).

In the wake of these developments, the nursing profession is characterised by a multitude of epistemic cultures and concerns, by transnational circuits of knowledge as well as a richness of epistemic practices related to vetting and warranting knowledge. The profession is embedded in larger machineries of knowledge construction, comprising a range of epistemic settings and agencies at macro, meso and micro levels. At the same time, activities carried out in different settings share an overall ambition of contributing to good practice and patient care.

In the following section, we focus on hospital nurses in Norway and how their work is framed through epistemic practices and machineries. Drawing on two larger Norwegian projects that investigated knowledge relations and learning across four professions, we look into the three aforementioned settings, where knowledge is at stake.

Trust Practices in Three Knowledge Settings in Norway

Our first example is taken from two studies that explore how professional associations engage themselves in efforts to produce, secure and disseminate knowledge in their professional domains (Karseth & Nerland, 2007; Nerland & Karseth, 2013). These studies focused on the different responsibilities and strategies taken by four associations in this respect, by means of analysing documents and debates and by interviewing core representatives in respective associations. In the following

section, we draw on a Norwegian Nurses Organisation (NNO)³ analysis to illustrate ways in which this association has engaged in issues concerning trust in knowledge through several means.

From the time of its foundation, NNO has worked to ensure higher education at all levels for their students and have through this strategy been able to consolidate the profession of nurses as highly respected and trustworthy (Karseth & Nerland, 2007). In recent years, acknowledging the complexity of knowledge, NNO has expanded its engagement in several ways. One is by taking an intermediary role between the macro-epistemic landscape, nursing research, and professional practice. A core concern for NNO has been to uphold the importance of the value of various sources of knowledge in clinical practices. In describing the knowledge basis of nursing, NNO tries to combine different approaches and argues that different sources of knowledge lay the groundwork for knowledge-based practice. As stated in a document describing the discipline of nursing: “The use of knowledge-based practice implies that nurses use various sources of knowledge in clinical practice, among others research-based knowledge. At the same time, research-based knowledge is insufficient. Professional judgement based on clinical experience and ethical assessment, together with the patient’s wishes, must be the basis for nursing actions” (NNO, 2008a: 6). To secure the development and availability of different types of knowledge, NNO engages actively in ordering research and reports on different aspects of professional practice. For instance, if insufficient research exists on certain medical issues within the wider epistemic culture, NNO may initiate and finance research on such issues, such as elderly home care.

Despite the aforementioned emphasis on a variety of knowledge, NNO exhibits overall concern about the lack of systematic documentation and uniformity in nurses’ clinical work and its possible consequences for patient care. Hence, NNO is heavily engaged in standardising practice and promoting evidence based modes of work. NNO has a publishing house, Akribe, which provides a structure for developing and circulating knowledge on nurses’ work. Akribe has, in partnership with NNO and research communities, developed ‘Practical Procedures for the Nursing Service’, a commercial ICT-based repository containing a set of basic, standardised nursing procedures that adhere to legal regulations, national standards, professional guidelines and research-based knowledge (Nes & Moen, 2010). The development of this repository stretches across epistemic settings and comprises a range of actors, from science communities to expert professional practitioners. Its embedded epistemic orientations are also manifold, as the procedures draw on results from laboratory sciences, which are oriented towards control; system-oriented research oriented towards complexity; and experience- oriented approaches based on medical practice (Kastenhofer, 2011).

These efforts also are directed toward other infrastructures for information and documentation, e.g. the electronic patient-record system. In 2008, NNO established

³This organisation was established in 1912 and is the only organisation for registered nurses in Norway. NNO speaks on behalf of all registered nurses, nurse specialists, midwives and public health nurses in Norway and has about 88,000 members.

a council to examine and assess the terminology used in this system. The council recommended creating the International Classification of Nursing Practice to establish terminology for documentation in Norway's nursing sector (Rotegaard & Ruland, 2010). In this way, NNO promotes a standardised professional language to link nurses' practice to scientific output and provide tools to categorise and generalise local experiences. This in turn becomes a structure for circulating research-based and experience-based knowledge across geographical regions, while simultaneously structuring how this can be done.

However, this concern for the evidential and standardised is balanced with efforts to promote experience-based knowledge. NNO argues for establishing a practice-based route toward a master's degree in nursing, a philosophy reflected in the formal organisation of NNO, which comprises more than 30 specialised professional interest groups through which NNO aims to create a meeting place for professional development and contribute to the development, application and dissemination of knowledge gained through both research and experience (NNO, 2008b). Through these groups, practitioners are invited to participate in epistemic practices beyond the contexts of local work. The interest groups form arenas for connecting local experience with general advancements in the discipline, as well as taking part in the profession's object-centred practices (Knorr Cetina 2001). In sum, the NNO's efforts constitute an important extended context for nurses' work and learning. In the next section, we move into the hospital setting and explore how knowledge is engaged within the professional setting of clinical nurse educators.

'Localising' Knowledge: The Work of Clinical-Nurse Educators in Norway

This example is taken from a study among clinical-nurse educators (hereafter CNEs) as they engage themselves in selecting, validating and translating knowledge for professional work (Christiansen et al., 2009). In Norway, the CNE position is held by registered nurses who have proven to be successful in their clinical practices and ideally (but not always) hold master's degrees. Currently, this position is being further academised with the introduction of the title 'research nurse'. In short, the CNEs have a twofold mandate. The first is directed toward bringing new and relevant science-based knowledge into the workplace, and the second is facilitating the use of it in professional practice. Hence, they are engaged in developing and warranting knowledge for practice within their different specialist areas. Such work previously has been described in terms of knowledge brokering (Meyer, 2010), in which the professionals involved move around to facilitate the distribution, translation and transformation of knowledge to render it more accountable and robust. It involves several vetting processes through which nurses' knowledge is managed, explored, locally materialised and circulated. In the present study, we held in-depth interviews with five CNEs and visited their respective departments within two large

hospitals. The data gathered also comprised photos and copies of material artefacts utilised and developed in their work.

Among CNEs' tasks is to identify science-generated knowledge to be utilised in the context of patient care and transform it into ready-to-use tools. The CNEs emphasise the development of handbooks containing procedures with related explanations and illustrations, which become material instantiations of good practice that nurses carry in their pockets. As one CNE described it, these handbooks are used frequently in daily care: "The nurse knows that the procedures in their books can be trusted. And particularly for the new ones (..), it becomes a checklist". The CNEs' role is to validate knowledge and ensure that the descriptions in the handbook are correct and properly understood. As one informant said, "To be 100% sure that no one makes a mistake, it is very detailed (...). We have even included pictures of the medical equipment so that no one will make a mistake."

The epistemic practices involved here are marked by validation and predominantly oriented toward control and closure. However, the CNEs simultaneously are very concerned about continually updating the handbooks. This implies remaining in touch with wider circuits of knowledge and comparing their work and artefact production with that carried out by colleagues elsewhere. To do this, CNEs form specialised networks between geographically dispersed hospital departments through which they share 'freebies' (e.g., reference lists, keywords for online searches and procedures) and insights in the latest developments within their areas of expertise. This represents explorative and investigative approaches to knowledge objects directed 'outward' and which temporarily are more complexity-oriented. While linking with macro-epistemic structures and more global circuits of knowledge, the CNEs express concern for not only 'absorbing what is out there', but also critically considering cultural differences and assessing knowledge that they bring into practice. In this regard, the distinct tradition of nursing in Scandinavia, which emphasises individual integrity, is highlighted. As one CNE put it:

Even if the large, heavy results come from continental Europe, the caregiving nursing is different here. We think that Scandinavia is leading in this area, so we find it important to cooperate with those that we find to be leading thinkers in the field.

Viewed from an epistemic culture and practice perspective, two points should be made here. First, the notion of a distinct Scandinavian tradition gives rise to epistemic communities and practices at the meso-level, comprising specialists from different hospitals in a national and Scandinavian context. Second, the work taking place here involves negotiating different epistemic cultures when knowledge is explored. The human-centred tradition described above generates orientations toward experience, while more global evidential culture proposes an orientation toward control. The CNEs are positioned at the intersection of these ways of thinking. Through their identifying, validating and justifying practices, their work may lead to the development of a knowledge culture that integrates ideas from both human-centred approaches and control-oriented ones.

Another activity that CNEs organise is called Workplace Learning Forums (WLFs), comprising a more explorative site in which new questions and

possibilities open up. In this context, the nurses are oriented toward exploring knowledge complexity based on the many questions nurses have during their daily work. By taking notes on questions that arise between forums, the CNE can explore the issues raised. If the theme catches on, they may agree to invite colleagues from other hospitals to give a talk at a WLF, or even take things further by arranging a seminar open to all staff in the hospital. As one CNE expressed it, regarding her particular theme of interest (postnatal care):

You can start with something, but it spreads. I work with newborns, but if you do that, you touch on themes like pain management and prenatal care (...) It's like throwing a stone in the water and watching the rings spread. (...) So, even if all our nurses are specialised, when people from Newborn, Pain and Prenatal meet (...) it's not hard to get a conversation going....

This quote points to how knowledge is interlinked in multiple ways and forms specialist areas. At the same time, it has the capacity to 'branch off' into new instantiations and practices. With reference to Knorr Cetina (2007), we can say that knowledge is self-multiplying, and in the context of nursing, its different expressions become assembled in new configurations in some activities, or dispersed in others. For nurses, workplace-learning forums provide other, more explorative knowledge practices than in the context of patient care. These contexts are interlinked through multidirectional mobilisation of questions and possible interpretations that interplay in forming conditions for nurses' learning. The workplace learning forums also function as access points to wider knowledge worlds beyond the frames of specific questions. The meetings are used to distribute information about conferences, seminars and new journals, and increasingly to 'leak results' from ongoing research by colleagues pursuing master's or PhD degrees.

In summary, CNEs' evolving practices comprise several modes of epistemic practice geared toward safeguarding knowledge. A third activity, in which CNEs are allocated core responsibilities, is the safeguarding and development of clinical procedures for nurses' work. This task engages both clinical nurse educators and nurses in the ward, and implies not only efforts to 'localise' knowledge, but also to document and standardise ways of working from 'below' in the local community.

Generating Trust 'from Below': Developing and Validating Clinical Guidelines

Our third example pertains to the setting and practices of revising and/or developing procedures for nurses' work and draws on results from the aforementioned study of CNEs, as well as on a longitudinal interview study in which the 'epistemic trajectories' of 10 clinical nurses were followed for over 8 years (Jensen, 2014). The interviews revealed how the clinical nurses increasingly became involved in epistemic practices that stretched beyond the context of local work, engaging themselves in efforts to create standards for good practice. One example is from an interview in

2005 with a nurse with 2 years of work experience who attended international conferences for ‘lung people’ to learn more about issues like ‘running tests, asthma and the like’. Back home, she played an active role in forming a lung group in Norway that meets regularly for the purpose of standardising the way tests are performed. As she explains:

Doctors do not normally conduct tests themselves, so we are aiming to form our own subgroup to develop procedures, real procedures, for different tests because I think it is a bit here and there around the country.

Other stories provide related descriptions of how clinical nurses assume responsibilities for developing standards and procedures, often based on interests and voluntary participation. When re-interviewed in 2009, all the nurses, in one way or another, had been engaged in activities related to procedural development in collecting and summarising clinical-trial reports, in scoring and ranking these according to their level of evidence or in summarising results and representing them in an easily understandable form. Whether reflecting greater work experience or shifts in knowledge arrangements, the nurses describe a shift in focus from how to process information to how to produce and secure knowledge. As described by one informant:

Now I have experienced nursing from a different angle and, hence, have a different outlook. For example, I now look for the difference between effective and ineffective ways of organising not only mine, but nurses’ collective work.

So you take a different approach to knowledge than before?

Yes, I think we all do. We are far more systematic ... and channel our attention. One may or may not contribute to further development, and most nurses pay attention to what is going on and want to learn more. But that’s not going to make a difference in patient treatment. It is more about universal rules, what happens in other places (...) It is more about finding your place in a wider framework.

These examples point to how nurses become involved in efforts to safeguard knowledge and how they understand that their work is embedded in a wider machinery of knowledge construction. They also indicate efforts to bridge gaps between orientations toward experience and control. Procedural development represents complex problem situations marked by uncertainty and a multitude of evidence and concerns.

In the hospitals where informants work, procedures had a life span of 2 years, after which they needed to be looked over and reapproved. However, initiatives to revise or produce new procedures could come from nurses’ own needs. In the first case, the collective exploration and discussion of the validity of established procedures contribute to making the evaluation criteria that are present in their production explicit. In this context, rules, conventions and technologies developed by the Cochrane centre and other macro-epistemic agencies are used as a framework. Hence, the very principles for warranting knowledge for nursing practice are in play, and since this profession is embedded in several epistemic cultures, the principles need to be negotiated and justified. In the second case, principles for identifying knowledge and standardising procedures are also in play, but in this case, the epistemic practices comprise more explorative work prior to validation. In the case

in question, the nurses engage in work to develop a model for developing procedures and protocols in one of the hospitals (Jensen, 2014). The history behind this model entails one of the CNEs working in Australia for a while, where nurses became accustomed to asking questions about clinical practice and working according to the principles of evidence-based practice (EBP), then introducing this system to Norway upon his return. He initiated a pilot project in his department with a goal of developing evidence-based nursing protocols in the intensive care unit where he worked (which turned out to be successful). From this experience, it spread throughout the hospital and was on its way to being utilised in other hospitals. The model's core component entails small interdisciplinary groups trained in EBP, facilitated by a clinical educator and nurses working in the wards. The work is organised in line with a five-step model developed by Sackett (2000). Our description is based on an interview with the CNE, as well as the materials he supplied.

First, the group meets to discuss clinical scenarios and formulate questions. A 'PICO' form – Patient/problem (type of patient and illness, e.g., prenatal), Intervention (what type of treatment it concerns), Comparison (what the intervention is compared with) and Outcome (intended effect) – can be completed. By considering these issues, a question that serves as a basis for extant-literature searches is formulated. Say your question is: 'In the neonatal population, what amount of sucrose is safe and efficient to relieve pain?' The next step is to search relevant databases. Hospital librarians, who have extensive experience facilitating searches, can provide lists of possible websites. All searches are described comprehensively, and this documentation is included as an appendix to the finished protocol/guideline. The third step is to evaluate the quality of the search. It is recommended that group members read all the articles they have found to ensure they can discuss their content and quality. Here, knowledge claims are judged in relation to the amount and quality of evidence mustered in their support. The group also fills out a form stating the relevant evidence and each article's quality. In the fourth step, the protocols are written or updated based on the evidence found and group members' clinical experiences. In this process, what is possible to do in the relevant wards is considered within the context of the hospital's resources. The best evidence found is combined with their own clinical experiences to write protocols that are usable in the wards. The fifth step involves signing off on the procedures. The signature here serves as a proxy confirming the procedures' validity and truth-like status.

What becomes clear here is that the nurses have taken on and become involved in strategies for producing and warranting knowledge for use in their local environments. Furthermore, while knowledge is in some contexts subjected to validation efforts, testing and types of evidence-making oriented toward closure and (preliminary) fixedness, other contexts form an explorative tool in which new questions and possibilities are opened up in an elaborative manner.

Concluding Discussion

This chapter has introduced an epistemic culture perspective and its related concepts as a framework for exploring issues related to epistemic trust. In developing the notion of epistemic cultures, Knorr Cetina has opened the black box on knowledge processes, introducing concepts that are useful for capturing the inner workings of expert communities and the ways in which they work to safeguard and warrant knowledge. Four aspects of Knorr Cetina's framework are particularly important here.

First, this perspective foregrounds the collective nature of knowledge essential to professional work, in which we rely on others who are present or distant (known and unknown) (e.g. Van House, 2002). Hence, the framework brings into focus the type of trust of most interest in this chapter, which has been called epistemic trust; i.e., how knowledge is made sufficiently trustworthy for use.

Second, the idea that knowers are produced by epistemic cultures highlights that professionals' understanding of what is important and valuable stems from education and the communities in which they participate and are trained. Our research shows the key role that the Norwegian Nurses Organisation (NNO) has played with respect to preparing individual knowers by ensuring relevant education and competence development. It also shows that the NNO has worked to ensure that collective infrastructures exist to safeguard knowledge. Indeed, a key strategy with respect to safeguarding professional knowledge and work has been to affirm the significance of shared standards that can be promoted as research-based and aligned with what the organisation perceives as 'best practices'.

Third, Knorr Cetina's framework emphasises the amalgam of practices and mechanisms, i.e., the variety of efforts and strategies related to ensuring trust in knowledge. By doing so, it provides a tool for theorising trust relationships beyond the boundaries of a single site. Hence, we see how both education and work activities undertaken in other settings are important, as well as how these come together to make knowledge accountable. The work and roles of clinical nurse educators, along with the described models and arrangements for creating local repositories, protocols and work procedures, represent intermediate sites where knowledge is vetted and epistemic trust becomes materially instantiated through practices of signing procedures. Thus, by emphasising practice – the actual day-to-day work activities in which people in different settings perform to make knowledge accountable – we observed how trust and credibility are essential elements in professional work. However, the significance of these cannot be studied at a single analytical site, so we call for researchers to study multiple locations and occurrences.

Fourth, the framework emphasises diversity and discontinuity. By viewing the challenges of safeguarding knowledge in and for professional work as a matter of negotiating different epistemic cultures for handling complex, wicked problem situations, we have illustrated how nurses become oriented toward control and establish standards that aim to link their work with standards for identifying, validating and justifying knowledge in their profession. At the same time, they emphasise the

importance of experience-based knowledge and patient-centeredness, while creating work arrangements that allow experiences and questions from practice to emerge and fuel collective exploration. This chapter shows how the tension between control and complexity is resolved in nurses' work through roles and agencies in different knowledge settings that interplay in complex ways to produce and safeguard nursing knowledge.

Last, but not least, the notion of epistemic cultures and their distinct strategies and orientations provides a basis for distinguishing between different expert cultures, revealing specific ways in which knowledge is produced and warranted in different areas of expertise. Hence, the framework is useful, for comparative purposes, in revealing how professions differ in their strategies and orientations toward developing and safeguarding knowledge. Taken together, the examples above show how the nursing profession is infused with strategies, arrangements and epistemic practices designed to generate trust in knowledge.

Inevitably, aspects of importance in trust exist that Knorr Cetina's perspective does not address sufficiently. By focusing on knowledge and its related processes, other aspects of social and organisational life may fall out of scope. For instance, the epistemic culture perspective does not address power mechanisms or questions related to social standing. This means that the variety in professions' social positions and history in different countries is not addressed. Furthermore, regarding other perspectives on trust, we may argue that this perspective does not sufficiently address how professional work rests on affect-based trust and may conceal the role of trust in expectations. Thus, rather than basing conceptualisations of professional practice and learning solely on this chapter's spotlighted perspectives, Knorr Cetina's approach should be further developed and combined with other perspectives to highlight the epistemic dimensions of such activities.

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Chapter 8

Trust in Peers: Conditions of Trust in Faculty-Based Peer Review of Teaching in Norway



Thomas de Lange, Anne Line Wittek, and Audun Bjerknes

Introduction

Teaching in higher education has traditionally been conceptualised and acted upon as an individual responsibility in higher education institutions (Biggs & Tang, 2010). One challenge related to such a culture is that the levels of consciousness, attitudes and the sharing of experiences become limited. This lack of sharing among teachers is a particularly known challenge in education in general and higher education in particular (Edwards, 2010; Hargreaves, 2000; Thomas et al., 2014). Previous research has documented the positive outcomes related to activities that engage teachers in peer interactions to enhance their awareness of teaching (Thomas et al., 2014). Based on these insights, higher education is currently meeting new demands for university educators across disciplines to develop their teaching based on collaborative peer review (Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, 2017). However, involving peers to ask challenging questions and offer constructive critiques necessitates discussing issues related to trust/distrust. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the development of trust in a peer review setting where teachers expose their teaching to colleagues. We take particular interest in what appears as presuppositions for the trust created within these groups, on the one hand, and the enactment of trust as collective in-group consistency, on the other.

The term ‘collective’ refers here to the relational dynamic in which norms and structures are not necessarily clear-cut and ready-made, but are created through negotiations and interactions in the group (Fenwick, 2008). From this analytic

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P. Gibbs, P. Maassen (eds.), *Trusting in Higher Education*, Higher Education
Dynamics 57, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87037-9_8

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perspective, the individual is not considered a separate participant but is seen as an intersubjective relation achieved through interaction in the social group (Wenger, 2000). In the study underlying this chapter, this relational dynamic has been analysed through video-recordings of interactions in a peer group of four participants who review one another's teaching throughout a semester. The analyses aim to identify the significant elements in creating a dynamic of trust enacted in a micro-social setting.

Peer Review of Teaching

By involving trusted peers who can ask challenging questions and offer a constructive critique, peer-based feedback in groups has been suggested as a productive measure to enhance the quality of teaching and learning in higher education (Costa & Kallik, 1993; Kohut et al., 2007). This is particularly the case when involving peer observation and critical reflection about actual teaching practices (Martin et al., 2000; Donnelly, 2007). Although substantial literature exists on reflective practice as an important measure in developing teaching and instruction, empirical studies on the nature of productive peer-based reflectiveness about teaching are scarce (Hammersly-Fletcher & Orsmond, 2005). Previous research has typically raised questions on the types of activities that facilitate reflexivity, as well as the role that interaction with peers and faculty members plays in enhancing supportive reflections about teaching (Thomas et al., 2014). Especially when considering the outcomes of feedback processes, recent studies have not emphasised dyadic comments but social and dialogic acts instead (Steen-Utheim & Wittek, 2017; Ajjawi & Boud, 2015).

There is a particular focus on feedback as a long-term dialogic process in which all parties are actively engaged (Price et al., 2011). Findings suggest that feedback based on the participants' joint meaning-making with clear contextual relevance appears to be a productive approach (Price et al., 2010; Scaratti et al., 2017). This notion of situatedness and active engagement has a particular relevance in the study underlying this chapter. However, we do not focus on individual reflection but instead emphasise the interactional process in which reciprocal trust is developed. The research questions we address in this respect are formulated as follows:

- What premises can be identified as crucial for how trust is constituted in faculty-based peer groups?
- How is trust enacted in this kind of group setting?

The conceptual basis for this chapter is a sociocultural approach. The chapter will start with an exploration of sociocultural notions on trust. This is followed by a description of the context, methods and empirical basis of our study, followed by our analysis. Then, from our analysis and empirical findings, we will discuss how trust unfolds in this context and what premises appear significant with respect to creating spaces of sharing and collaboration in higher education, as well as enacting

trust. Finally, we highlight the possible implications for peer review as a faculty development measure.

Conceptual and Analytic Framework

Trust is commonly defined as the interdependence between the trustor and the trustee involving risk and vulnerability (Stensaker & Maassen, 2015). This dyadic notion is frequently discussed in relation to rationalist calculations of predictability and vulnerability (Kramer et al., 1996). However, trust is also defined in terms of primary versus reflective notions, with the former referring to an ontological pre-conception and the latter achieved through learning, experience and reflective thinking (Markova, 2007). In this study, we use a definition that aligns with the latter tradition. We conceptualise trust as a relational process, something that unfolds and develops through the interaction between participants within specific contexts.

An overview of how trust is considered a sociocultural phenomenon is thoroughly discussed in the edited volume ‘Trust and Distrust’ by Markova and Gillespie (2007). In the introductory chapter of this work, the authors present a general structure of trust, which is relevant to our study, with Fig. 8.1 providing a helpful overview.

As we can see in Fig. 8.1, basic and primary trust is something we take for granted and normally do not question. Basic and primary trust on the lower left




Fig. 8.1 General structure of trust. (Markova et al., 2007: 11)

quadrant refers to the pre-moral and affective attachments between the caregiver and the caretaker. A priori generalised trust on the top left quadrant refers to how we learn to trust in social settings, such as closely-knit communities, and friendship and kinship relations. This generalised notion concerns dependency on others and security against threats. This kind of trust is rarely conceptualised and primarily taken for granted. The third quadrant on the top right is based on a different kind of human relation typical of complex and modern societies, where we need to rely on people we do not know. In this kind of social structure, trust is more affiliated to roles and role-based expectations. This kind of generalised trust is more bound to the specific social practices established between strangers within organisations and institutions (Markova et al., 2007: 19). The fourth quadrant on the bottom right concerns interpersonal and intrapersonal trust and communication. The concept of inner dialogicality (dialogues within the self) relates here to the capacity of internal dialogue, such as evaluations of one's and others' past and present conduct, with a reflection on one's personal issues and making predictions about future conduct and intentions (Markova et al., 2007: 20).

For the purpose of addressing trust in this chapter, we emphasise the third quadrant of context-dependent institutional and organisational settings. Here, peer groups are considered a constellation involving employees from one institution with similar roles and obligations, but within a setting where the participants are personally unknown to one another, as well as affiliated with different disciplinary domains and parts of the organisation. This combination of shared norms, unfamiliarity and divergent affiliations brings about a cooperative setting where trust has to be established between the participants. At the same time, in settings like this, trust is rarely directly thermalized and therefore often remains implicit (Gillespie, 2007).

In our analysis of peer groups, we are especially interested in identifying how trust is revealed through interactions in professionally cooperative settings. Given the implicitness of trust in settings like this, our analysis will need to identify trust as specific occurrences. We will draw on the notion of Kramer et al. (1996) that trust is made visible when interactions open opportunities and represent vulnerability. Opportunity represents here perceived gains, both individually and collectively, that accrue when acts of trusted vulnerability are responded to by others. The vulnerabilities are derived from the potential costs associated with misplaced trust and loss of face, respect, self-confidence, and so on. In this way, the participants' behaviour entails a more or less conscious decision when they expose themselves to these risks. In light of this, we take interest in how a specific 'exposure' is enacted in the observed groups and how the participants reflect on their experiences of participating in a peer review group.

In this analysis, we specifically examine the vulnerability emerging when the participants open up to alternative perspectives and suggestions on their teaching from their peers. We will also consider acts of closing down, in which the participants choose to disregard suggestions. Although trust is not explicitly addressed in these conversations, through the analysis, we hope to empirically identify the core presuppositions on how trust is cooperatively and collectively formed. Based on this focus, in the final section, we will discuss the potential of this particular trust-based

space in higher education, the organisational framing that is presupposed and the factors that might threaten trust in this context if it is used for purposes other than those originally intended.

Context and Methods

The peer group examined in the underlying study is part of a professional development program at a large research university in Norway. The focus in this program is to provide theoretical and research-based perspectives on teaching and student learning in higher education, as well as to relate these concepts to the participants' teaching. An important part of this program consists of establishing peer groups, in which colleagues observe, discuss and give peer-based feedback on one another's teaching. These peer groups are usually composed of four university teachers from different faculties and disciplinary backgrounds. These groups arrange to visit, observe and give feedback during the period of one semester. Table 8.1 illustrates how this set-up is organised.

The main purpose of this activity is to provide a collegial forum in which teachers discuss and reflect on one another's teaching practices. This arrangement is purely formative, building on the idea that formative reflection on one's own and others' instructional practices is imperative for opening up to alternative perspectives and motivating for experimental change and improvement (Bransford et al., 2000; Curlette & Granville, 2014; Lauvås et al., 2016). These groups rely on the participants' mutual trust to contribute productively when observing one another's teaching spaces. Table 8.2 shows the four participants in the observed group, their fields of expertise and their affiliation.

As we can see in Table 8.2, the members of this group have various disciplinary and organisational affiliations ranging from medicine to the social sciences and the humanities. The empirical data collected when following this group draw on longitudinal observations spanning a period of 5 months. These observations are related to the KUPP-project, which was financed by the Norwegian national fund *Norgesuniversitetet*¹ with a project period stretching from spring 2015 to fall 2016.

Table 8.1 Structure and organisation of peer group work

Part 1	Part 2	Part 3a	Part 3b
Establishing groups in the introductory course – The members get to know one another and select the teaching sessions	Pre-observation meeting – The preparation is based on written memos by each member describing his/her teaching sessions	Observation of teaching – Each group member is visited separately by the others based on the memos and discussions (part 2).	Feedback discussions – Each observed session is discussed immediately after the observation based on part 2 and 3a.

¹ See: <https://web.archive.org/web/20180130150624/https://norgesuniversitetet.no/>

Table 8.2 Overview of the participants, their fields of expertise and affiliation

Participant	Affiliation/field
Andrew: Associate Professor	Music sciences Faculty of mathematics and natural sciences (informatics) Specialisation in music technology, acoustics, sound theory and programming
John: Professor	Medical behavioural sciences, faculty of medicine Specialisation in clinical disciplines and infectious diseases Teaches medical students in both small groups and lectures
Peter: Professor	Political science and health politics, faculty of medicine Teaches mainly in the bachelor's program in health organisation, management and health politics
Kate: associate Professor	Sociology and welfare society, politics and state regulations, faculty of social sciences Teacher, head of the master's-level course in work-life and social affairs

Table 8.3 Overview of the collected data

Observation of peer-group activities	Main data	Background data
Pre-observation meetings	Video recordings (5 h)	Memos, task descriptions, lesson plans
Teaching observation	Video recordings (6 h)	Lesson plans, PowerPoint presentations
Feedback and discussions	Video recordings (5 h)	Lesson plans, written memos
Participants' reflections	Audio recordings (2 h)	Task descriptions, conceptual notions

The current data are based on observations for one particular track in this project focusing on peer-based feedback on teaching. Table 8.3 provides an overview of all the data collected in this part of the KUPP-project.

Our overall analytic approach to this material is based on a thematic analysis with the aim of providing an overview of the corpus (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). With the themes emerging from this thematic analysis, we examine the interviews, which represent the reflective data of the participants immediately following the last session of the peer group meetings. Drawing on a combined analysis of interview examinations and the thematic analysis (Silverman, 2013), we have selected representative samples from the interviews in providing illustrations of how trust is emerging in the micro-social setting of the peer group.

The extracts selected for detailed scrutiny represent incidents on how the participants reflect on their participation. Our take on this material is how these reflections mirror how trust unfolds in this social constellation. To illustrate this, we follow two themes that have emerged in the thematic analysis – on the one hand, what appears as premises for trusting one another, and, on the other hand, how this trust is enacted during the group sessions. It needs to be noted that these themes are not mutually

exclusive and therefore overlap in several occasions. We still consider these thematic categories as a productive distinction between conditions for and the enactment of trust.

Some additional notes on our analysis are required. The primary focus of this study is how trust emerges in close collegial constellations. A primary tool for our inquiry is an in-depth analysis of large amounts of data, in which we systematically search for indications of trust. An important premise in this analysis is that the informants rarely address trust explicitly (Riva et al., 2014; Markova et al., 2007). The identification of indications of trust is therefore not based on fixed meanings but on cues. These cues are typically marked by the willingness to expose oneself, the reliance on peers not exploiting this exposure and confidence in peers' willingness to invest effort in productive contributions to their peers in the groups. Looking for these cues of trust and making assumptions about their significance will therefore frequently appear in the analysis presented below.

Empirical Analysis Based on Participant Reflections of Peer Group Participation

In the analysis below, we will present the main results from our more extensive analysis of the material collected through longitudinal observations. We will discuss the above mentioned two themes, where the first theme (i.e. what appears as premises for trusting one another), relates to what we, in our thematic analysis, have discovered to be an important starting point for the participants' trust in one another as university colleagues.

Premises for Trust in the Peer Group

We will examine data showing what we consider as presuppositions for the trust created in the group. This is revealed in several ways in the participants' interview data. An interesting pattern that emerges from these data is how the participants describe the respect they experience in relation to their colleagues. This is addressed in Kate's statement below:

Kate: “(It) has been inspiring; it is, in a way, fun to see that you are at a workplace where people are engaged in so many different things and that there are so many competent people that work here. And I had a very nice peer group that gave me a lot of positive energy. So I think this simply was very enjoyable.”

In this extract, Kate both emphasises the diversity in her colleagues' affiliation, as well as displays her respect for her colleagues' competencies as experts in their own fields. This contrasting feature is a basic characteristic of how these peer groups are organised. It also creates an interesting dynamic of mutual respect and a neutral

ground given their distributed institutional attachment. These notions are likewise confirmed by John:

John: "... it has been enjoyable... because it have been completely different special fields. It is, it is rather fun... It is quite enjoyable, yes... to have feedback from these persons that do not look at the academic content. Well, I mean, that are not bound to the special field, but that have focus on how you, how you present the academic content and how you make contact with the audience."

John also emphasises the value of disciplinary diversity. He elaborates this value with reference to not judging the content, but the pedagogy and how this relates to the audience of the teaching. This appears to create a more open and less vulnerable atmosphere for critique, compared with a setting that involves colleagues from the same discipline or community. According to these statements, this disciplinary mixture appears to provide an opportunity to expose oneself.

The question is how this mixture of diversity and respect creates an atmosphere of trust. A plausible assumption is that on the one hand, respect implies that the teachers trust their colleagues to have valuable insights to contribute; on the other hand, their differences in disciplinary expertise simultaneously contributes to the teachers' reduced vulnerability which, in turn, creates greater openness in the group. Nevertheless, the participants clearly express that they still experience this setting as slightly frightening:

Andrew: "... very challenging is the fact that you, in a way, are being pushed out on thin ice... and, I mean, you're pushed out there, and you become exposed to colleagues and not only to students. (...) Yes... perhaps, perhaps... well, challenging is not... I mean challen ... I don't know if challenging is the right word, but it was... well, a bit scarier to give a lecture to a colleague than to a student. Merely (...) Simultaneously, I had plenty of good feedback, and a lot of that was useful, things that I will bring along further."

What Andrew here describes, which is representative for the whole group, is that inviting colleagues clearly makes him more vulnerable compared with just teaching students. The experience of being pushed therefore appears to involve taking a risk, but by allowing this exposure, the professors also open up themselves for very productive feedback. Again, we see this simultaneous relation between exposure and the opportunity, which presupposes trust. These perspectives provided by Andrew are elaborated further by Peter:

Peter: "This really challenges us. The real challenge is there, of course, when people come and watch you in the authentic situation... I mean, in the teaching here. That part is a very important part to include."

As Peter explains, the fact that they are being observed in genuine teaching settings is essential. This means that the group does not discuss abstract notions, but it engages in real performance that shows what the members actually do as teachers. This exposure is considered risky, but it also represents a valuable potential for making feedback count. Peter states this clearly in the next extract:

Peter: "Well, you are being confronted and it makes you more conscious about what you are doing. So, it means that you have to stop and think, you have to reflect on 'OK, how do I do this and why am I doing it?' And there are other things I

actually could, actually could do to become better or to develop the... how can I formulate it, the pedagogical aspects, aspects of teaching, helping students learn.”

In these comments, Peter also notes that his colleagues’ perspectives have challenged him to both see more clearly what he actually does as a teacher and realise what this implies in his role as a teacher. A reasonable supposition drawn from the notions so far is that trust in this group setting is based on the assumption that one’s peers are capable of giving fruitful feedback with the best intentions. It is important to note here that no internal competition exists in these groups, compared with what often is the case in ordinary academic settings.

Whilst this peer group setting appears to open an arena where the participants are willing to take the risk of exposing themselves, the participants still consider this as somewhat challenging. We saw this in Andrew’s description above, but it also resurfaces in an interesting way in Kate’s elaboration below:

Kate: “No, it was, it was challenging in a way, to invite people to the classroom. So, yes, of course, I was nervous the first, the first time. It was, well, as I said, it was exciting both because it was a new subject and new students to me. But it was also exciting to have colleagues that you... don’t know very well in that setting.”

As we see from this extract, Kate, like Andrew, considers this setting slightly stressful. We also see here that Kate, in one sense, opens up by inviting other people to her class, but she also seems to protect herself by lowering her expectations when describing herself as a novel teacher in an untested course. The sense of risk is apparent here, despite the organisational distance and the difference in the areas of expertise of the peer group members.

In summary, what we see from the analysis so far is that not only a combination of respect and difference in areas of expertise, but also the challenge of being observed in genuine settings creates a dynamic of trust, which the participants experience as potentially valuable. The question now is how this space of opportunity is accomplished in practice.

Enactment of Trust

The main aspect we observe in this part of the analysis is how the participants approach one another when observing and giving feedback on their teaching. The data we draw on here are still mainly based on the interviews, but to a limited extent we also draw on observations to illustrate how trust is handled in the group. We first start with Kate and how she describes her experience of receiving feedback:

Kate: “I believe that we were rather considerate with one another. It was a lot of positive feedback. But also a few things that they grasped, that will be useful to take hold of. That I can... yes, perhaps not so much critique, but somehow more of how to see things from the outside. It was peculiar to listen to how they explained that I gradually thawed up. In the beginning, I was a bit nervous... and then I got up the steam. Well, that kind of thing is a bit interesting to hear actually. Because you seldom see yourself from the outside... that way.”

Kate emphasises that her peers were being thoughtful in the way they gave their input but that they were still able to address aspects in her teaching that could be improved. This indicated a respectful relation, in which the teachers approached one another with caution or even avoided a direct critique. This was partially achieved by mirroring descriptions and elaborating accounts of the teaching. Simultaneously, a range of episodes in our data reveals how this attentiveness is being enacted. The following extract from our observational data illustrates a particular incident of this sort:

Peter: “(You can) give a theme to your students, let them know that ‘This is what we will be discussing next lecture, and I will ask questions randomly; I will let each one give a two-minute presentation of the theme’. But it is a bit pushy, though, to make them read and prepare themselves.”

Kate: “Mmm.”

Peter: “But, then, it means that everyone is, well, everyone risks to be asked.”

Kate: “Mmm.”

Peter: “But it can, I mean, I have never tried it myself, but...”

Kate: “No, but...”

Peter: “... This is something I have wanted to try myself in seminars.”

Kate: “But it might tip over, so that people... well, if they don’t manage to prepare themselves, they might not dare show up in the lecture.”

The above excerpt displays first how Peter responds to a previous invitation by Kate to develop her teaching in a student-engaging way. This invitation has set off a string of suggestions on how to accomplish the suggestion. At the end of the excerpt, we see how Kate respectfully rejects this because of what she fears as a negative consequence of the proposal. In the following parts of this conversation, Peter respects this demarcation by not pursuing his idea further. This mutual respect and attentiveness are seen in numerous incidents in our material. It indicates that the peers in the group have developed a form of interaction, which allows them to regulate the theme of the discussion in their own teaching. The productiveness of this dialogic form in the group is underlined by all members, as illustrated by Peter in the following:

Peter: “I believe that there could have been even more of this type of group work. Because there, you, well, that is where you really get the greatest opportunities to exchange experiences and to try out thoughts. And you can listen to others that try out their thoughts (...) Exactly this, this interplay between colleagues and the opportunity to share experiences... and to have these discussions...”

As we also saw in the conversational excerpt, testing out thoughts and ideas but retaining full independence to follow up on these within one’s own context and by one’s own choice safeguards the autonomy of all members of the group. Peter also underlines that this way of discussing teaching could be implemented on a wider basis. However, emphasising that this dialogic form is fundamentally based on trust is vital. This is both rooted in the teachers’ willingness to open up their teaching and the respect they show in the dialogue, which appear to be essential elements that constitute the level of trust in this peer group.

The above notion also relates to the respect shown by the participants when engaging in this group work. Because participating in the peer groups is compulsory, an important premise for this participation is not to compel the teachers to follow a specific spectrum of ‘correct’ teaching methods. Rather, the point is to let them explore and reflect openly on their teaching and to receive mirroring perspectives from thoughtful peers. This relatively open framework for peer review teaching appears to be productive for these purposes. The approach is in itself based on the trust that the participants are capable of efficiently handling this setting on their own, a point, which is well described by John:

John: “What I think has been of importance and that I have learned is that you are not supposed to... you are not going to play a role that differs a lot from who you really are. I believe that it is of importance in a teaching situation, that you dare be yourself. (...). You can use different measures, but it is you as a person that attends to the situation. And I, well, I liked the way this was organised. The arrangement highlighted that we, as participants, should not be pressured into ways of acting that felt affected.”

A final remark in this second part of our analysis is that the enactment of trust in this setting is partially ingrained in an open and exploratory procedural framework, a relational respect between competent colleagues and a dialogic form, which allows the participants to maintain autonomy and ownership of their own teaching practices.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the discussion of our results, we consider it relevant to revisit the introductory part of the chapter and the research questions posed. In the introduction, we underlined that relational trust in social groups is not based on clear-cut norms and easily available labels. This is clearly also the case in our studied peer group setting. What is important to understand, though, are the value and significance of trust in how such constellations are created and maintained. This kind of relational trust is assumed to be something that we deeply depend on in order to function well in complex modern societies and professional institutions where personal closeness and familiarity are often an exception rather than the rule. This means that we need to trust colleagues although we are often unfamiliar with them. This is especially important in higher education in which we are completely dependent on colleagues trusting one another by virtue of their formal positions and professional roles. Formal obligations here are not assumed as the only premise for trusting one another. We constantly need to actively build trust in the relations we have with other people.

The first research question addressed in this chapter, which concerns the premises that can be identified as crucial for how trust is constituted in faculty-based peer groups, can provide a peek into this relational realm. Drawing on our findings from the underlying study, we see that this relational trust is embedded in the

development of personal relationships in which we depend on one another. This dependence, at a certain point, is unquestioned or taken for granted because the participants have faith in one another's competence and ability to understand what counts as productive. It also rests on a basic assumption that the participants can feel safe in this environment and that they mean well with the perspectives they contribute.

In re-addressing our second research question concerning how trust is enacted in the group, we simultaneously see a restless feature in that the participants constantly negotiate implicitly about trust. In this perspective, not only is trust made visible through interactions that represent vulnerability, as well as through open opportunities for supporting contributions from colleagues, but it also allows maneuvering away from or around less-relevant themes or issues that are also considered challenging. This relational integrity appears to be vital both in establishing and in maintaining trust.

In this sense, the analysis can provide an explanatory confirmation of how trust-based group expectations, norms and relational stability are established. In the theoretical section, we established this as a conceptual grounding of cooperative settings relevant to our study of peer groups. Our analytic approach to this relational basis of trust and how it is achieved through interactions is an interesting perspective, which we would expect to be more thoroughly explored in educational research. This counts both for collegial relations and the relation between teachers and students in higher education. The former perspective might prove important in the timely pressures on productivity and quality assurance, which, in many respects, directly undermine trust not only from an organisational perspective but also between colleagues. The latter focus on students might provide us with more insights into establishing trust, which is supportive to student learning, without diminishing the confidence we need to have in higher education teachers.

A concluding remark in this regard is vividly illustrated in the trust emerging from the group observed in this study. An efficient removal of basic trust in this setting would mean replacing the reliance on the willingness to support one another with formal measures of quality control. In this sense, the value of trust both reaches beyond corporate control and presupposes institutional success. As a final concluding remark, we would also like to mention a limitation in our own study, as we realise the fine line between respect and fear of criticising colleagues because they might be offended. At this point, we suggest more research based on thorough interactional analyses to reveal these complexities.

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Part II
Trusting in Higher Education: Multiple
Perspectives

Chapter 9

Trust, Control, and Responsibility in Research – An Accountability Perspective



Andreas Hoecht

Accountability and Control

Trust is very important for higher education, both for teaching and research. Macfarlane (2009) provides examples of how different personal characteristics that underpin trust, namely benevolence, integrity, competence and predictability, are essential for students to develop trust in their teachers and how this trust erodes if these expectations are not met.¹

For higher education research, trust is as fundamental as for university teaching. After all, knowledge that is taught should reflect the knowledge gained by research and the pursuit of new scientific knowledge builds on trust in the existing knowledge, produced by (hopefully) trustworthy members of the scientific community in a highly complex collaborative way and supported by institutions that ensure that until it is proven otherwise, the knowledge is the best we can have (Hardwig, 1991).

Academics have for a long time enjoyed a status that came close to being a 'profession' (MacDonald, 1995),² that is, being recognised as having ownership over an area of expertise that encompasses a common range of tasks and

¹ See also Macfarlane's, Chap. 6 in this Volume.

² Based on MacDonald (1995), Hoecht (2006) argues that in order to qualify as a profession, academics would need to be able to pursue a project of social closure that entails striving for a legal monopoly for its services from the state. To achieve this, the group will need to establish a controlling influence over the nature and the provision of its knowledge and have the ability to gain trust and respect in society for the role it plays in it, for instance, by being seen as advocating universal principles for the good of society as a whole. In the UK today at least, these conditions are not or no longer met by academic employees as a generic group.

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competences, having a significant role in the governance of institutions in which they serve and having a substantial degree of autonomy and the ability to organise their work in collegial occupational relationships rather than being subjected to hierarchical managerial control (Shattock, 2014). Whether academics have ever really met the conditions that would qualify them as a profession is a different matter, but there is little doubt that alongside other public services, managerial control has increasingly shaped the work of academics in the last two decades in the UK and potentially eroded their individual and their group autonomy (Oeberg et al., 2016). Judging by the extensive literature on New Public Management (NPM) in general and in higher education in particular (see, for example, Henkel, 2000; Chandler et al., 2002, for NPM in higher education, and writers, such as Beck 1992, and Power 1997, more generally), it appears that one key argument that has been advanced by governments to justify more managerial control over their public sector employees is their claim that there has been a public loss of trust in ‘professional’ services and the need to justify taxpayers’ expenditure for which they are legally and morally responsible. Moreover, as the public has lost its trust in the professions and their ability to self-regulate so as to ensure that they can maintain their standards, the professions need to be made more accountable to the government agencies that oversee them on behalf of the public. Increased accountability, so this argument, will restore lost public trust in the professions.³

Accountability is, like ethics, one of these concepts that is very difficult to argue against.⁴ Surely, nobody would want to argue the case for unethical behaviour and similarly rejecting the need to be accountable comes close to condoning potentially despotic behaviour (Trow, 1996). As Trow (1996: 311) puts it, “accountability is a constraint on arbitrary power, including fraud, manipulation, malfeasance and the like. In serving these functions, accountability strengthens the legitimacy of institutions...” However, he also considers accountability to be a double-edged sword. “For one thing, accountability is an alternative to trust; and efforts to strengthen it usually involve parallel efforts to weaken trust” (Trow, 1996: 311). What Trow suggests here is that accountability functions as a constraint on the behaviour of a person who is accountable to a principal and comes

³One reason why accountability and auditing are so much in demand in particular in the public sector may be that as a concept and administrative tool, they are ideally suited to serve a legitimisation need of governments. Faced with an erosion of generalised trust, governments can respond by making their own subordinate public institutions more accountable. In doing so, governments can act as the guardians of the public interest, distract from any deficiency they may have in terms of their own accountability and gain better control over their subordinate and dependent institutions.

⁴Ethics has a very powerful legitimacy claim: it is about doing the right thing, doing what is good, proper and moral, following a moral course of action. Anyone arguing against its principles and objectives can easily be accused of being a (moral) egoist and of pursuing his/her narrow self-interest. While the right ethical judgements can be difficult to make, ethics as a discipline largely stands above criticism. As a consequence, individuals and committees that have been put in the position to make decisions on ethical issues carry a significant amount of prestige as well as expert and moral power (Hoecht, 2011).

very close to establishing (a degree of) control over this person's behaviour that limits his/her ability to betray the principal. However, as I will discuss in more detail below, while control can be seen as a substitute or as an alternative to trust under certain conditions, it is all too easily exercised in a way that gives the one who is accountable the justified perception of not being trusted (very much) by the principal and thereby erodes his/her commitment and motivation to the principal. Before we can take this further, however, the question that needs to be asked is not whether accountability is a good or bad, but what we mean by accountability: accountability by whom; to whom; for what; and in which way? Bovens (2007) argues that accountability has developed into an umbrella concept that covers a range of other related concepts, such as transparency, responsiveness, responsibility and integrity and that this common broad usage of the term has made accountability more of an evaluative rather than an analytical concept. To regain accountability as an analytical concept, one should go back to a narrow definition, such as, "accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences" (Bovens, 2007: 450). This narrow definition of accountability as a specific social relation allows for a distinction to be made between, for example, accountability and transparency – transparency does not necessarily involve scrutiny by a specific forum. More importantly, it allows for a distinction between accountability and control. Control means 'having power over' and it can involve proactive means of directing conduct, for example, through straight orders, directives, financial incentives or laws and regulations. But these mechanisms are not mechanisms of accountability per se, because they do not in themselves operate through procedures in which actors are to explain and justify their conduct to forums. "Accountability is a form of control, but not all forms of control are accountability mechanisms" (Bovens, 2007: 454). According to Bovens then, the need to justify and explain one's behaviour is the key difference between control and accountability, but Bovens does not tell us more about the terms of this justification apart from "for one's conduct" (Bovens, 2007: 452) and we will see that the "for what?" question is an important one in the analyses of accountability relations.

If we understand control as the ability to influence someone else's behaviour in a way that we desire, then this person's need to justify is imposed by us as the controlling principal and may be or not be met by the accountable agent's own desire to justify his or her actions. We do, then use the power of potential sanctions over the agent to make the agent justify his/her actions and determine the form in which this justification has to take place. This means that while not all forms of control are accountability mechanisms, accountability uses at least latent control and power mechanisms to make sure that the agents will justify and explain their actions – and also in the exact terms that the principal has the power to determine.

Accountability and Trust: The Limitations of the Principal-Agent Theory

In my attempt to clarify the concepts of accountability and control, I have resorted to the principal-agent theory, which is also the basis and conceptual framework for the predominant part of the accountability literature (Gailmard, 2014) and, as we will see, in part at least responsible for the sometimes dysfunctional effects of accountability regimes put into practice.

Accountability conceptualised from a principal-agent theory perspective allows us to answer the key questions – who is responsible for what to whom and in which way? – in a straightforward way. However, principal-agent theory comes with some fundamental assumptions about the motivation and behaviour of the agent: the agent is a self-interested individual who will pursue his or her own interest rather than the principal's interest unless their self-interest can be aligned with incentives and with the exercise of direct supervision and control (Gailmard, 2014). This assumption plays down any intrinsic motivation that the agent might have and ignores commitment to professional norms and values (Mansbridge, 2014; Greiling, 2014). The agent will not behave responsibly by his/her own accord, but needs to be 'called to account' by the threat of sanctions and reward incentives. The monitoring, supervision and control required come at a considerable direct economic cost to the principal as well as indirect costs (Mansouri & Rowney, 2014) as these interventions do not normally inspire commitment by the agent who may easily be demotivated by the constraints put on his/her autonomy and his/her subjective perception of not being trusted (as much as the agent would prefer to be). Hence, the agent is likely to behave in the desired way only as long as he or she believes that his/her actions are known to the principal and that the principal has the ability to sanction the agent's behaviour in a way that violates his/her interests. Trust, on the other hand, works in a very different, mutual commitment producing way, as it creates a moral obligation of the trustee to be worthy of the trustors' trust bestowed onto him or her. Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind that trust, although able to create commitment, is always by nature 'a leap of faith' (Moellering, 2001) and hence can always be betrayed.

Trust and control, however, are neither straightforward substitutes nor complements. Weibel (2007) investigates the relationship between formal control, trust and trustworthiness and uses self-determination theory to explain under which conditions formal control can improve rather than undermine the trustworthiness of the trustee. According to self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Weibel, 2007), the degree of value internalisation (as opposed to mere compliance) leads to trustworthy behaviour of the trustee (in a subordinate position) and hence justifies the trust given by the trustor (in a superordinate position). This is supported by contextual conditions that satisfy three essential needs of the trustee: the need for autonomy, the need for competence and the need for relatedness. In essence, if formal control is organised in a way so that autonomy is supported (by offering choice), competence is supported (by positive feedback and non-controlling information),

and relatedness is supported (by signalling care and benevolence), then formal control can be trust enhancing rather than trust-eroding. If these observations are valid for superordinate-subordinate relationships, then they should be even more important for professional contexts where competence and autonomy are key to professional identity.

These insights might help us to find a third way between the traditional self-responsible, highly autonomous and peer-oriented accountability model of the traditional liberal professions that has lost its support not least because of a number of high profile misconduct scandals in accountancy (e.g. the Enron case) and scientific research (for example, the case of Professor Hwang Woo-Suk – falsely claiming to have achieved a breakthrough in stem cell research by falsifying data in 2009), and the formal control heavy accountability model based on principal-agent theory that is widely used in NPM and that tends to undermine the commitment of the public employees called to account. Value internalisation, self-determination and trust versus compliance are also key to the distinction that Solbrette and Englund (2011) make between professional accountability and professional responsibility. Solbrette and Englund (2011: 855) argue that while, “the practices of ‘accountability’ are oriented towards control rather than trust ... ‘responsibility’ implies proactive action, which the professional initiates and voluntarily takes responsibility for in accordance with commitments embedded in the purpose of his or her profession.” They stress that they do not argue for, “a nostalgic view of the autonomy of the professions, with professionals held in awe and not required to account for their outcomes” (Solbrette & Englund, 2011: 856), but for the creation of enabling conditions of a “social trustee professionalism” that combines and reconciles accountability and professional responsibility.

Having made the general case for an accountability approach that strikes a balance between accountability and professional responsibility, I will now turn the specific case of science and research to explore whether the type of accountability employed in the management of research at UK universities is more likely to help reduce research misconduct, or, is in itself a factor that could contribute to the misconduct problem that it should aim to contain using accountability as its core instrument.

Research Management, Value Internalisation and Trust in Research

In theory at least, malpractice in science and research should not happen. A number of sociologists and in particular Robert Merton have investigated the normative basis of the science and research in the post-war period and have identified a set of norms that should ensure that scientists and academics have a very strong self-interest in research integrity. Merton (1973) has singled out four norms in particular, namely disinterestedness, communalism, universalism and organised scepticism.

The disinterestedness-norm should commit researchers to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in their field with their research for the benefit of society and not for pursuing their own personal financial gain. The communalism-norm should ensure that researchers share their findings openly with all members of the scientific community and with their students for the benefit of society. The universalism and the organised scepticism-norms finally should ensure that researchers scrutinise each other's work constructively, honestly and rigorously without regard of the career status and professional rank of whoever makes a claim to advance knowledge in their field. As and if all researchers are meant to believe in these norms and contribute to firmly establishing and promoting them in their midst, research malpractice should be a rare exception and trust among researchers as well as public trust in science and research assured. This should be even more the case if we also consider the different types of trust involved, the role of professional reputation as well as institutional-level safeguards, such as research funding organisations and professional bodies that have a strong self-interest in preserving their own and the privileged status of their members.

Hoecht (2004: 227–8), among others, explains how these factors should work together:

Research networks illustrate particularly well the relationship between academic credibility, reputation and trust. Academic credibility relies on openness and publication of research findings as only published findings can be scrutinised, peer-reviewed and credited to the research team that made the discovery (Merton, 1973). The credibility of researchers, the scientific community's trust in the validity of their research and, closely linked, their personal integrity or trustworthiness, tends to be directly related to their accumulated social capital in the research community: accumulated direct interpersonal experiences with other researchers (process-based trust), reputation (intermediated trust), academic peer-review and recognition by research organisations (institutional trust) all contribute to the professional standing of established researchers. The dimensions of trust are mutually reinforcing. From a certain level in a professional career, reputation or intermediated trust facilitates, or may even predetermine a positive outcome of peer-reviews for publications and research awards (institutional trust) and will lay the foundations for further opportunities to build process-based trust in select research circles and networks. As peer assessment is the key to academic and scientific careers, reputation becomes the most precious career asset and needs to be zealously guarded. Trust in professional competence and in the personal integrity and credibility of a researcher are very closely interwoven.

But we do know, on the other hand, and not only since high profile cases, such as the case of Hwang Woo-Suk in 2009, that research malpractice is unlikely to be just a rare and exceptional occurrence in an otherwise well-functioning system (see for example Martinson et al., 2006; De Vries et al., 2006; Fanelli, 2009). While it is difficult to know whether research malpractice has risen over the last decades with any real certainty as the detection rates are not known and may vary and similarly the media attention that research malpractice attracts, it is not unreasonable to assume that there is a problem with research integrity that merits further investigation.

A useful starting point is to explore whether the norms that have been identified as ensuring research integrity by Merton and others are (still) working well under the conditions of current research practice and research management in higher education. A number of developments may undermine Merton's norms of science, including:

- **The erosion of the norm of ‘disinterestedness’:** Career progression is increasingly based on the number and ranking of outputs. The easiest way to achieve this is by building networks that provide opportunities (conference tracks, specialist journals, panel memberships on funding bodies) and restrict access to outsiders (social closure). ‘Organised scepticism’ is held at bay via boundary control and the self-promoting and self-protecting behaviour of researchers (Anderson et al., 2007).
- **Limits to ‘organised scepticism’ and ‘universalism’ norms:** There is growing evidence that peer review, the cornerstone of the organised scepticism, and universalism norms are no longer functioning effectively (Fox, 1994; Hojat et al., 2003; Wood et al., 2004; Ren, 2009; Teixeira da Silva & Dobranski, 2015). Lower ranking journals increasingly rely on inexperienced reviewers while high-ranking journals can be reluctant to approve challenges to accepted wisdom that is the basis of their own reputation. Reputational capital can be a hindrance to new insights being admitted.
- **The size of networks, the role of cliques and the enforcement of norms:** The need for trust-based cooperation and trust-based accumulation of knowledge is more important than ever before, while the size of the research community has grown beyond the scope of familiarity-based trust, i.e. direct knowledge based trust and intermediated trust (professional group membership and reputation). The enforcement of norms that underpin trust depends on institutions and their willingness and ability to ‘police’ behaviour of their members (Fox & Braxton, 1994). This is not helped by replication and checking being considered a low esteem task that does not advance one’s career. The resultant low probability of detection and relative leniency of punishment makes cheating a rational choice for newcomers who wish to get promoted quickly. Established researchers have their reputational capital to lose but may feel safeguarded by the same.
- **The importance of professional socialisation in a profession under career pressure:** Internalisation of norms of professional behaviour depends on the quality of the socialisation experience of young researchers (Anderson et al., 1994; Braxton, 1991) and this in turn depends on the experience they have with the behaviour of PhD supervisors and senior colleagues in a ‘publish or perish’ environment. Their access to networks, which are so crucial for their career advancement may depend more on their supervisor and departmental prestige (Burris, 2004) and their strategic behaviour and impression management than on their competence and professional integrity.

If these observations are correct, then research integrity is under pressure mainly from the erosion of peer-review scrutiny (Lenz, 2014) and the crumbling of the mechanisms that ensure the internalisation and sustenance of professional values (see Ben-Yehuda, 1986; Hackett, 1994; Sztompka, 2007, for an overview over these and theories that attempt to explain research misconduct). This raises a number of interesting questions with respect to the relationship between accountability and research integrity. Firstly, it appears that the traditional self-referential accountability model for

the liberal professions, although it is the key component of accountability in research management (the reliance on peer-review processes), cannot be relied upon to sustain research integrity and hence public trust in research. Secondly, the alternative principal-agent-based managerial accountability model that has been increasingly employed in higher education research management, such as the Research Assessment Exercise/Research Excellence Framework in the UK, may have been instrumental in undermining the foundations of the traditional professional accountability model in research (Oancea, 2008) due to its emphasis on individual career achievement at the expense of communal professional norm development. Consequently, it can be argued that both the traditional professional accountability model and the managerial accountability model are no longer working sufficiently well to ensure research integrity and need to be replaced by a more robust approach.

In order to begin to sketch such an approach, it is important to understand how Merton's norms should in theory support trust in research and how this may be eroded by current common research management practices. Table 9.1 shows some of key actor-roles and responsibilities in research and how they relate to trust and professional norms. It also shows which norm-based behaviour should result from these norms in practice.

For example, journal editors should filter the manuscript submissions they receive by their quality and organise reviews of the manuscripts that they decide to accept for review by competent reviewers who have no conflict of interest or self-interest in their judgements. The norms this relates to are universalism (i.e. the status of who sent the manuscript should not matter), disinterestedness (i.e. the editor and the reviewers should not consider the potential impact of the submission on the standing of their own work), organised scepticism (i.e. rigorous, honest and constructive review) and general norms of professional behaviour as demonstrated by constructive feedback that is given within a reasonable timeframe. To the degree that journal editors are willing and able to live up to these expectations, they are able to foster trust in their integrity by being impartial, in their competence by making judgements on academic criteria that are clearly referred to, in their benevolence by ensuring that comments are constructive and not aggressive and dogmatic, and in their predictability by ensuring that feedback and decisions are given in a timely manner. However, as we have seen above, there are some grounds to question whether the peer review process organised by journal editors is consistently living up to these expectations (see above references on the quality of peer reviews).

Research Integrity and Professional Responsibility: A Need for Further Research

We can see from Table 9.1 that norms, such as disinterestedness, organised scepticism and universalism, are very important norms that support the different categories of interpersonal trust within the science community. Although the table covers only interpersonal trust, these norms are also important for the maintenance of

Table 9.1 Responsibilities of key actors in Higher Education research: Related categories of trust and supporting science norms

Actor	Responsibilities	Trust category	Demonstrated by	Important related professional norm
Journal editor	Filter submissions by quality and organise review by competent reviewers	(a) Integrity (b) Competence (c) Benevolence (d) Predictability	(a) Being impartial (b) Judging by academic criteria (c) Ensuring constructive comments are made (d) Timely processing of submissions	(a) Universalism (b) Disinterestedness & organised scepticism (c) Universalism & general professionalism (d) General professionalism
Peer reviewer	Impartial judgement of article or research grant to be reviewed	(a) Integrity (b) Competence (c) Benevolence (d) Predictability	(a) Being impartial, not judging by degree of support for own research (b) Only accepting articles own field of expertise (c) Making constructive comments (d) Reviewing within time limits and with care	(a) Universalism & disinterested (b) Disinterestedness (c) General professionalism (d) General professionalism
Doctoral student supervisor	Guide student's research, develop their research skills and research ethics	(a) Benevolence (b) Competence (c) Integrity (d) Predictability	(a) Care for student welfare as well as academic development (b) Accepting students only whose project falls with their expertise (c) Not claiming student's research achievements as their own (d) Having regular meetings, giving regular feedback	(a) Communalism & universalism (b) Disinterestedness (c) Disinterestedness (d) General professionalism
Individual researcher	Conduct research with integrity	(a) Competence (b) Integrity (c) Benevolence (d) Predictability	(a) Conducting research with the required skill and care (b) Not overstating or misrepresenting results (c) Not claiming other researchers' achievements for themselves (d) Being reliable when working with others	(a) Disinterestedness & organised scepticism (b) Disinterestedness (c) Disinterestedness & communalism (d) General professionalism
Senior academic/professor	Give guidance to less senior academics, conduct high quality research, exercise academic citizenship	(a) Integrity (b) Competence (c) Benevolence (d) Predictability	(a) Not claiming the work of others for their own & not creating closed cliques of peers (b) Not claiming expertise outside own area (c) Providing support based on merit without preference for own or close peers' career interests (d) Exercise peer review impartially and in timely manner	(a) Disinterestedness, communalism, universalism (b) Universalism (c) Disinterestedness (d) Communalism and general professionalism

system-level and institutional trust, which are ultimately upheld or undermined by the behaviour of individual researchers as constituent actors. One of Merton's norms in particular, the norm of disinterestedness, is important in this context. As discussed in this chapter, disinterestedness has a close link to the dominant principal-agent-theory based version of management accountability in that principal-agent theory stresses the importance of incentive alignment between principal and agent for the agent to behave as intended by the principal. In research management programs such as the national Research Assessment Exercise/Research Excellence Framework (RAE/REF) in the UK, a key feature has been a heavy emphasis on the use of performance targets expressed as research output (highly ranked publications and research grants) measured at the level of the individual as means to assess performance (Oancea, 2008). University employers have reacted to the RAE/REF assessment criteria by providing strong career incentives and professional opportunities based on these targets for their academic staff (Murphy & Sage, 2015) and by making hiring decisions to recruit new staff to boost their performance ranking. This has, as can be expected, contributed to a strong position of UK research in international university rankings, but may have come with some cost as well. From Table 9.1 we can see that creating a strong interest incentive for individuals to become self-interested rather than disinterested is likely to have significant adverse consequences for interpersonal trust within the academic research community and can undermine important professional values and the socialisation of new researchers to adopt these values. This is not to deny that research management has also had positive elements, such as the requirements imposed by research councils that research has to be publicly available and that negative research results should not be allowed to be kept secret, in particular in pharmaceutical research (communalism-norm). It also must be said that research management initiatives, such as the RAE/REF, do not aim to undermine collaboration between researchers. However, it appears that the internalisation of key communal values among researchers needs to be strengthened to counteract powerful self-interest motives created by the principals that could erode the basis of generalised trust in scientific research as a whole and would thereby defeat the principals' own key concern. What is needed, is a new balance to be struck between management accountability and professional responsibility and a rebalancing of research management practices so that individual career interest incentives of researchers are held in check by management practices that promote the development of professional norms of responsibility. Research on accountability in public administration and on the accountability of professional groups shows increasing awareness of the need to backtrack from an overreliance on performance targets, monitoring and control and to reintroduce conditions that enable the exercise of professional responsibility (Mansouri & Rowney, 2014; Olssen, 2016; Vriens et al., 2016). Further research is needed to investigate how this rebalancing can be best achieved in higher education research in practice. In this, Table 9.1 can be a useful initial conceptual tool for investigating in more depth the links between professional norms, categories of trust and conditions for accountability in research management.

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Chapter 10

Trusting in Higher Education: An Anthropological Perspective



Kate Maguire

Introduction

I have taken an anthropological perspective to this complex notion of trust in higher education due to a form of fatigue in reading about higher education institutions, and the challenges facing them, through a lens that seems more confined by the very thing it is exploring than illuminating the dark areas and finding a voice to say what is known and felt, but unspeakable or unsayable for many employed in higher education in the UK today. Some may not need such a voice or perspective; however, my experience with a range of higher education institutions, students and staff would indicate that some would welcome perspectives which may contribute to understanding and improving the environments in which they spend most of their working lives, and in which they would like to recover joy through a commitment to learning and teaching, and a sense of belonging to a culture that celebrates such contributions. It is a conceptual lens on trust in higher education. It positions higher education as an amorphous object posing challenges to how we communicate with it and the role of leadership in higher education institutions which has a strong influence on whether the culture is enabling or disabling for its members. A cautionary note here is that an anthropological lens does not offer any solutions, but can only claim that a different perspective might lead to different understandings and different attitudes and actions.

Anthropological writings on values rarely include trust in their index while it is implicitly present in every discussion from alliances and exchanges to symbolism of totems. Trust, and recognition of its betrayal as heinous, is universal. It is probably our single greatest achievement and the barometer of the cohesion of any organised human system. It is arguably one of the most useful products of our imagination. It is both basic and complex, expected and given, initially in most cases, without much

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checking for its worthiness. It is a superlative fantasy in which we collude because, even on a bad day, it maintains a kind of order in the system. We understand it better when we look at it retrospectively or as Corsín Jiménez (2011: 193) puts it, “We need a realm that lies after trust to make trust meaningful. There is, in a sense, no trust in society except in an ‘after-trusting’ mode.”

As a member of a higher education institution in the United Kingdom, increasingly characterised by an audit culture, my instinct is sometimes not to trust it but I cannot explain why. Higher education has shown that it delivers on its promise – for many people – and many advances are unlikely to have been made without it. My reasoning trusts it. My emotions, which are informed by my social background, want to tell many young people today to go and learn on the job, a university education is not worth the debt and its promises cannot be trusted. Yet without the free university education I received, I would not have had so many opportunities in my life. I do not think it is unusual for the average university teacher to hold such contradictory views, views that can change from day to day. That is why I agree with Campbell when he says, “Rather than using trust to explain things away, it is trust itself that requires to be explained itself and it is trust that needs to be made a central object of enquiry” (Campbell, 2011: 37).

This chapter explores concepts familiar to the field of anthropology that may contribute some ideas to this exploration of trust: its contradictions, discontinuities, use and abuse, and obstacles to having a dialogue with it including the obstacles of institutionalised authorities and vested commercial interests. It starts with the notion of a cultural ecology and moves on to the human relationship with objects and how objects have grown beyond the extrinsic teleos we have been able to impose on them, beyond the functions of the emic-etic and beyond the endogamous and exogamous principles in keeping the cultural ecology sustainable. This chapter considers how such conceptualisations can guide research into such objects and the values, such as trust, which have become enmeshed and misused in the imperative to control them through forms of reductionism and functionalism as defined by, for example, managerialism in higher education. According to Krawinkler (2013: 7), the state of research into trust is at this stage:

There is no single definition of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998: 394) which has been accepted by scholars from diverse backgrounds. However, there is an agreement that the willingness to be vulnerable and confident in one’s own expectations are constitutional factors to trust relationships. Trust fulfils important functions such as: enabling cooperation (Gambetta, 1988), reducing complexity (Luhmann, 2009) decreasing transaction costs, and supporting response to crises (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust is dynamic and changes over time.

But what if one no longer has confidence in one’s own expectations?

Conceptualising the Context

Since the contributions of Bateson (2000), Finke (2013) and Steward (1972), a number of anthropologists have come to conceptualise any groupings, such as disciplines, and societies generally, as cultural ecologies, which can be further

conceptualised as integral parts of a superorganism. These cultural ecologies exhibit similar behaviours to any other ecology system in nature, that is, interdependent, interconnected and adaptive to internal and external influences. The nature and role of culture and human societies have been the major preoccupation of twentieth century anthropologists seeking the source, function and maintenance of human beings in organised systems. Fundamental to this gaze is that human beings are both individuals and members of groups and are cursed or blessed with imagination. Organisation on such a level requires both coercion and persuasion, and cultural transmission through individuals and groups reinforce both. Culture then is both enabling and disabling (McDermott & Varenne, 1995). Culture is a construct that wields considerable power controlling our relationship to objects for the price of identity and belonging. In the anthropological sense, objects are everything in our environment and relationships with objects can be both transactional and symbolic. Each ecology, like the human body, has interlinked systems. If the purpose of an individual higher education ecology is a learning function, it has to demonstrate it is sustainable and is of value to the superorganism in which it sits. If the ecology ceases to be useful, it will not be sustainable. It will die and be replaced or merged into a more successful ecology.

Trusting Objects

Krawinkler (2013) focused on trust in an Austrian company during a period of economic crisis. The title of her book is: “Trust is a Choice: Prolegomena of Anthropology of Trust (s).” Prolegomena is an introduction, a word taster (literal translation – before a meal), an amuse bouche. Keeping with the metaphor, I am not a master chef of anthropology, more an amuse bouche, as I use my formative discipline to inform approaches to research across difference. For me anthropology is an attitude to research and its function is reflected in its methods rather than being a discipline with a structured apparatus. This attitude to research and its function helps to penetrate the most resistant ingredients and release their secrets; and there are a lot of secrets around trust; many unexplored and misused implicits (taken on trust, assumed contracts) and often ill-used or misunderstood pragmatic explicits (quality assurance). There is no shortage of descriptions of trust, its criteria, function and indicators. There is, however, a scarcity of what it is to be in its presence or absence, to experience its positive use and misuse.

Anthropology is about the exploration of relationships with objects, hence its vast writings on tools and artefacts, purpose and meaning, rituals, functions and structures, the sacred and the profane, the shaman and witchcraft, and kinship and clans. Our organisation of the world into cultures and societies is constructed around our relationships with everything and the extrinsic teleos we impose on these objects (including humans); that is, their purpose, directive principle or goal, is harnessed to our human needs and desires; a kind of ontological narcissism on our part.

The nature of human existence therefore is defined by this constant engagement with objects. On a rough scale, objects can be classified as animate, living entities, and inanimate, those currently considered as organically lifeless. Such inanimate objects include those that are shaped, managed and exploited for human purpose, and those that are the products of human imagination. Objects range from the simple to the complex, from the coffee cup and spear, to amorphous objects, such as ideologies and other belief systems, and to hyperobjects, a term coined by the academic ecologist Timothy Morton (2013) to describe objects that were here before us and will be here after us, or those we have created which we cannot get rid of or control, like climate change. A hyperobject might be a biosphere, the solar system and human produced microplastics. He postulates that objects like these are on such a scale that they defy any metalanguage, making having a meaningful relationship with them problematic for humans. Although Morton includes ideologies, such as capitalism as a hyperobject, I would prefer to keep these within the amorphous range. On the whole, Morton's hyperobjects challenge our relationship with temporality, as indeed does technology, but in fact, more importantly, call into question our capacity to have a balanced relationship with them at all. This helps us to question whether the complexity of objects is reversing the equation and imposing teleos on humans so we become tools unable to communicate or bridge the relational gap. In other words, we can be in a situation in which we are no longer able to do much beyond react. This raises the question of the role of trust in such a relational dynamic.

In anthropological terms, let us put higher education into the amorphous object category. With a coffee cup or a spear, we are clear that they are to serve our purpose. We experience an element of control over them. Higher education, on the other hand, is an object we have created through our imagined futures for certain purposes, purposes which have rapidly changed in the last 20 years posing increasing challenges in terms of the kind of relationship that can be had with it within our limited capacities or rather the limitations imposed on our capabilities. This creation has taken on a life of its own, shifting and shaping in its growing complexity with rivals vying to wrest control of it for a variety of ends. Perhaps the anthropological lens we might find ourselves using in the exploration of trust, is that of salvage anthropology be rituals that both directs us to what it is that can be saved or is worth saving about its previous purpose, and the objects it produced, before it becomes extinct.

For the anthropologist, the cohesion of society is based on implicit and explicit compliance to norms in exchange for identity and safety, supported by rituals which both confirm trust (rewards for good service) and release people temporarily from its compliance obligations (shamanistic practices of ecstasy and release) to avoid rebellion or social norm disintegration. For example, in higher education institutions in the UK, there are the periodic 'consultations' between the executive and staff which can, on occasion, be like rituals of temporary releases from relentless environments of compliance and conformity to the expectations of the higher order of the culture's guardians. For the leadership, they are about permitting the letting off of steam. For staff, they know that it is a ritual and not likely to produce much change but they partake and even enjoy it, not unlike highly trained soldiers

partying before a battle who get to throw the rulebook out of the window for a short time. For a moment we can be who we are without fear of punishment. We can be righteous and angry, critical and rebellious then mumble on the corridors before becoming silent and compliant again. Our task, like soldiers, is in the end to trust each other, look out for each other, rather than trust in the system, which can be a serial betrayer of principles that were once held dear. This task is not always successful as mistrust is contaminating and divisive in any culture.

Such cleansing rituals are repeated in a number of contexts, such as the quarterly 'meet the management' events in major railway stations in the UK where the public can have their say. It is a modern take on pillories. The management put themselves in the stocks to comply with government franchising requirements masquerading as care and to defuse dissent. For a moment we feel good complaining about the state of the railways to the guardians and operators of the system and then squeeze into crowded carriages for the long journey home without a seat and for which one is charged substantial amounts of money knowing that the listening is only a ritual, and that there is no point taking the complaints further as no one has time to take on the monoliths which are the rail companies. The most we can do is to give someone our seat. Pollock (1995) concurs with a number of other anthropologists (Lévi-Strauss, 1982; Urban & Hendriks, 1983) that this masking or masquerading is to do with semiotic identity.

I consider masking to be an aspect of the semiotics of identity, that is, one of a variety of means for signalling identity, or changes in identity. My argument is that identity is displayed, revealed or hidden in any culture through conventional means, and that masks work by taking up these conventional means, iconically or indexically. In semiotic terms, an icon is a variety of sign that bears a resemblance to its object (Pollock, 1995: 582).

At any one time, communication could be solely based on exchanges between masks, which can be acceptable if one is aware of the game and adjusts expectations accordingly. It is when masks get in the way of authentic communication, through switching, for example, from demon to angel, that trust is eroded. Then there is a tendency to bow out and leave the stage to the most skilled masqueraders. However, a critical point in the betrayal of trust, or expectations of trust that have been disappointed over time, is soon reached; when truth is eventually spoken, it can no longer be recognised as truth and believed.

Trusting higher education is like trusting the United Nations or trusting wealth or indeed trusting trust. Within this amorphous range of complex objects different phenomena arise and disappear on a regular basis as, being objects themselves, they have their own ecologies subject to the nudges, penetration and stickiness of other ecologies around them. This raises the question of how communication is managed between objects. In ancient Egypt, where the realm of the gods could be seen as an amorphous object to mortals, the mortals created a translator god, Thoth, a neutral facilitator of understanding, between the two vastly different realms of experience. Thoth is the antecedent of the Greek god Hermes (less neutral), whose name is given to Hermeneutics, the philosophy of understanding. Such a translator is also known as the trickster god indicating that 'tricks' are often needed to facilitate

understanding between differences. Metaphors are 'tricks'. Even the most basic of societies, with no contact with the so-called high cultures, have produced such an interlocutor in the form of the shaman who translates messages from, for example, the realm of the dead or spirits to those still living. At the individual and group level the dialogue with the amorphous object of higher education has become more challenging, the characteristics of the dialogue superficially metaphoric, confusing and fragmented. It is a dialogue which has, for the most part, been taken over and interpreted by shamans who themselves, I would argue, belong in the masquerading category as masquerading is also part of the translator – trickster's portfolio harnessed for increasing understanding (if the shaman is skilled and neutral) by drawing attention to contradictions from which insights can be gained and creativity released (Hyde, 2008).

Such conceptualisations can bring more fully into the open not the function of trust, which seems quite clear, but in what we trust and whether our trust is deserved. For example, returning to the amorphous object notion, a manifestation of the amorphous object of higher education, dwelt among us, is a higher education institution. Like the Hindu gods, there are many manifestations of the same god. The guardians of each manifestation are the governors who need to ensure its ecology has an going value to the superorganism by competing successfully with other higher education institutions for resources; by persuading smaller units, such as families of new generations, looking for nurturing nests for their young, that their particular higher education ecology is better than another and can mature their young enough to negotiate successfully into bigger nests (external organisations who will employ them) and by attracting the big nest headhunters to look for talent in their ecology over another one. Here we begin to see the different ways in which higher education ecologies translate the sacred words of government policy.

Policy then comes forth from the amorphous object of higher education to which the manifestation has to respond if it is to survive. Its guardians choose, through fairly secret means, a shaman (a vice chancellor) to interpret this, often Delphic, riddle of the future. This shaman may or may not have the hermeneutic translator skills of the old interpreter gods nor the neutrality, which was their origin. The shaman is trusted to listen to the amorphous object (god) and interpret its Word, which is passed to the tribal chiefs in the form of pro vice chancellors and deans who create systems and roles to deliver the Word. Both the guardians and the tribal chiefs do not require trust from their ecology members but compliance to the Word. Quality assurance and human resources then manage and monitor compliance of the delivery to limit any deviations of the Word. Teachers and researchers are tasked with the delivery of the Word to students in a way that will engage students and ensure that the brand and identity given by the university is carried into the outside world as one to trust, generating new adherents and new investment from headhunters. A good experience of the university is what influences students to be ambassadors and icons of trust in the brand.

With respect to quality assurance in higher education, trust is generally regarded to be a central issue. However, a key problem when dealing with a more internationally active higher education sector is the historical lack of formal organisational and

institutional arrangements that stimulate, build, and maintain trust with respect to the quality of higher education across national boundaries. Consequently, there are considerable knowledge and information gaps on the quality of higher education if one moves beyond the national policy arenas and higher education governance structures. These gaps restrict trust among the actors involved and potentially limit effective cross-national higher education activities (Stensaker & Maassen, 2015: 3).

However, the higher education shaman also has a more purposeful duty to the ecology. The shaman is the guardian of the sacred, which is not the role of the guardians of the entity and the tribal chiefs. The shaman has a duty to keep the sacred and the structure in delicate balance. The sacred are the intangibles, from notions of truth and knowledge to compassion and trust, to the spirit of the culture. Members of higher education institutions in the UK, it can be argued, experience a growing imbalance, which is causing concern, resulting in a range of negative perceptions and an absence of the spirit, usefully and loosely translated here as creativity and belonging. There is a fear that the shamans, like Hermes, have moved from guardian and facilitator of truth to instrument of the gods. There is the perception that the teachers, managers and monitors do not have to trust the executive, they comply, or they may lose their jobs. Losing a job could mean displacement from other social ecologies to which they belong and which also define their status contributing to their identity in the world. The students trust the university to deliver what they need and the quality of the learning experience is intricately tied up with the quality of the teacher. Ironically, it is only in this delivery space that teachers can carve out some autonomy and be creatively non-compliant, which forms the basis of the trust the students have in the university. The sense of belonging comes from being happy with peers and trusting their teachers with, in many cases, all aspects of their lives. They trust them to guide them through the liminal and dangerous space (Turner, 1969, 1985) between young adulthood and responsible adulthood. They trust them with the rite of passage. Perhaps they trust them not to comply.

The Emic and Etic Principles of Cultures and Societies and the Endogamy Exogamy Principles of Alliances and Exchange

These refer to internal and external behaviours and practices, and the differences or anomalies between them. Trust in an emic context is often a mixture of mutual reciprocity and compliance especially when mutual reciprocity is a form of compliance to the rules of the cultural ecology. Trust in the etic context is that which needs to be engendered in the outward facing brand of the cultural ecology to attract etic or exogamous reciprocity, in other words trade for mutual benefit.

The emic and the endogamy principles are about awareness of the dirty washing in the bedrooms and the collusion is in concealing this from outsiders. An aspiring aim would be for these two sets of principles, the emic and endogamy and the etic

and exogamy, to be in closer alliance, resonant not dissonant. This was one of the original purposes of quality assurance, that is, to demonstrate reliability, and internal and external consistency of high standards to the other ecologies, particularly the big nests of the corporate and public sectors who are now having increasing influence on curricula development, perhaps because higher education has been too slow to respond to the requirements of the market. Reliability is a key indicator of trust (Lyon et al., 2011) and both staff and students need to explore with more awareness whether to trust their higher education institution to deliver on its promise to them of reliability, accountability and imagined futures and convince external employers that what they teach, and students respectively learn, will bring value to their organisation, their ecology through the institution's graduates.

One failure of reliability is the dissonance between espoused and practised values, between a promise and a deception, which raises expectations leading to disappointments and betrayal. In higher education this could be the mission statement promising a rich learning environment and the latest technology when the reality is everyone is doing their best to provide a rich learning environment, but the technical systems are outdated inhibiting a positive experience; or when the institution claims to prepare young people for employment when UK figures show that a large number of graduates feel unprepared for work CMI (Chartered Management Institute) research *Are graduates ready for work* September 2021. Additionally, young people are accepted on to courses to prepare for careers in a market that higher education knows will be saturated by the time they graduate. Young people engaged in the new Apprenticeship schemes in UK universities will not be so concerned with trust in higher education, but with trust in their employers to have co-created their higher education courses, which will facilitate their career development and with trust that their employers will follow through on expected promotions if they graduate.

Trust is not one thing. It is an amorphous object too. It is a shape shifter depending on the context and the purpose it is used for at any one time. For example, trust in a marriage contract does not need the same indicators of trust as a transactional contract that has limited or no emotional involvement of the parties involved. Trust should not be confused with compliance. Trust, like elusive dark matter, seems to be the cohesive stuff that holds everything else in delicate balance. At the same time, it can be difficult to pin down and have an honest conversation with because checking if someone or something is trustworthy can be seen as an act of mistrust. For example, the espoused function of staff work plans in higher education is to check whether anyone is above or below the required hours of their work contract to ensure fairness. In practice, because institutions tend to only respond to deficits in the hours and not to the considerable amount of free hours given to a university by many of its members, some managers actively discourage stating the real hours, and so a sense of the untrustworthiness of the university grows. Monitoring comes to be perceived as an act of mistrust towards staff. The lack of recognition of such a demonstration of commitment to education through free hours is a reinforcement of mistrust in the university's espoused care of its staff. The staff then see their extra

hours as commitment to the students and not to the university. The cohesion of the institution's culture then becomes fragile.

A cultural ecology can, to borrow from Snyder (2018), be committed to the politics of inevitability, for example, accepting technological advancement will drive the juggernaut into the future and that there is little that can be done to prevent its trajectory as a hyperobject so it focuses on STEM subjects; or it can be committed to the politics of eternity, for example, embedding itself in the historical narrative of identity, going round and round forever constantly re-enacting the historical drama of the chosen: for example, fascism, fundamentalism. In the higher education context, this could mean it is slow to change, with divisive discipline based claims to knowledge and truth. Both are replicative systems. A cultural ecology can also be generative, committed to Snyder's notion of the politics of responsibilities. "If we see history as it is, we see our places in it, what we might change, what we might do better. We halt our thoughtless journey from inevitability to eternity, and exit the road to unfreedom. We begin a politics of responsibilities" (Snyder, 2018: 279). This is not unlike Graeber's notion of possibilities (2007). Responsibilities could be seen as a precursor to possibilities: "the word encompasses much of what originally inspired me to become an anthropologist...because it opens windows on other possible forms of human social existence" (Graeber, 2007: 1).

Replicating systems will eventually fail in the fast moving markets of today. Therefore the pragmatic ecology of the higher education institution has to provide the conditions for generative learning to take place. Generative conditions or spaces are often sacrificed, squeezed or suffocated by compliance systems. The space that was once used for doctoral students to collaborate and for staff to share ideas is now an eatery or a classroom on a booking system. The system does not trust the space will be used wisely otherwise. The institution does not trust its members to be replicative or generative. It monitors the desired replicative of compliance and obstructs the desired generative by its lack of trust in creativity and our capacity for navigating uncertainties. The choice of 'politics' dictates or influences the preferred endogenous and exogenous alliances and exchange resulting in a cleansing of members to make way for those who can be trusted to be compliant to the processes and procedures of the Word, to be more compliant with the new order, although, in an interconnected world, the new order is fast becoming an old order as organisations look for the creative edge which higher education institutions are inhibiting through trust in compliance. Returning to the shaman, the interpretation responsibilities therefore are considerable, the balancing increasingly precarious as Jameson (2012) recognises by arguing that,

the ability to resist the 'false necessity' of deterministic solutions in building staff trust to cope proactively with ambiguity and change. This capability is needed for academic leaders to maintain their role in shaping the enduring purposes of higher education during a recession, both in England and in the wider international environment. (Jameson, 2012: 391)

Anthropological Understandings

Anthropology expects contradictions and discontinuities. It is suspicious of uniformity as this can be an indicator of atrophy. It understands the positive nature of disruption and the value of negative capability in leadership. Negative capability in higher education leadership would be providing the conditions for understanding (Gadamer, 2013) to take place between all the parts and such a condition is a culture of trust. In such a culture, solutions can emerge appropriate to the context of complexity, which is rife with uncertainties rather than an intense all-consuming focus on government prescribed problems and government prescribed solutions that may set up a culture of mistrust. Higher education leadership often has to concern itself with financial sustainability, but leadership has also to protect and enrich the 'livingness' of its members just as a good shaman would. Livingness is also about the recognition that the larger part of human life is acted out in work and that not recognising that results in alienation of the worker and a failure to harness the array of talents in higher education that remain hidden because the conditions of compliance do not evoke their appreciation and contribution. Returning to masks as semiotic identity (Pollock, 1995: 582), the shaman leader/vice chancellor can become an icon, a "variety of sign that bears a resemblance to its object". This raises the notion that the object can become the resemblance of the icon, shaped in the image of the leader who wears it. The shaman is supposed to be comfortable in complexity and engage with the value of balance, which is dependent on trust. The shaman needs to be trusted and to trust the members of the culture to be able to support the structural, functional and creative, and differentiate the purposes. The shaman needs to trust that members too can hold uncertainties and not knowing (Jameson, 2012: 391).

How can we know more? Anthropological methods have been undergoing something of a renaissance since the world has become more complex and in which negotiating difference and learning from it becomes a necessity. As we are dealing with an amorphous object in which phenomena arise and disappear, where the locus of negotiation is a social context, that is the cultural ecology, and as the object has significant influence on whether an individual or group thrives or not, it is important to follow that other key concept in anthropology which is to explore the understanding of the members of the ecology's understanding of what anything is. It would seem then that ethnography, looking at something closely for a long time, non judgementally, may offer insights. Margaret Mead conducted the whole of her evaluation of the first Salzburg reconciliation conference after the Second World War through ethnography because of the complexities and sensitivities of the gathering together of human objects representing amorphous objects who had just committed considerable atrocities (Maguire, 2015; Russon & Ryback, 2003). Higher education institutions, as manifestations of higher education, can use more imaginative methods to explore how a manifestation can go beyond its reliance on compliance trust. There is a fear which has developed around trusting anything that cannot be measured. Yet, rarely is attention given to the appropriateness of the measuring tool to what is being measured. One would not use a ruler to measure the flow of water nor

a two dimensional template to evaluate a three dimensional object, yet such instruments are trusted as reliable while an approach, such as close observation is not. Perhaps this is because in the new management paradigm, if something does not lend itself easily to metrics, it cannot be trusted.

Autoethnography, an offspring of anthropology, has endeavoured against the odds to make reflexivity in researching human societies reliable and there are examples of its insights influencing practitioners, policies and systems at the site of practice. At its core is an examination of reflexive impact. Leadership in UK higher education institutions could benefit from a close examination of their own impact on the cultures in which they are shamans and chiefs; increase their hermeneutic skills in translating policies and grapple with presence and absence of trust and its impact on the health of the ecology. Such research could reveal the flexibility, or existence even, of the adaptive capacities of the ecology and the role senior management might have in reducing them or expanding them, and the direction in which they are going and developing. Narrative and phenomenology approaches can reveal much of what is hidden because they go beyond metric testing that replicates information within the bounds of the instrument itself. They embrace all forms of human expression not just the word. Anthropology excels in the interpretation of metaphors in diverse forms. It captures the discontinuities and contradictions of any cultural system. It surfaces the grey areas and the assumptions, such as the impact of the epidemic of hot-desking on student and staff experience and on the reputation of a higher education institution as one that can be trusted. “It treats the familiar as though it were strange” (Linstead, 1997: 85).

Trust Unchained

Trust has always been about making oneself vulnerable in the relational dynamic with objects. Trust mitigates risk; it forges alliances and strengthens as well as facilitates cohesion of groups. In the case of higher education where systems are notoriously hierarchical, the shaman becomes the pivotal figure who impacts the wealth, health and direction of its students and staff through the maintenance of a cultural ecology that is in a constant state of negotiation within and outside itself.

The shaman requires negative capability further explained by Jameson (2012: 394):

As discussed by Simpson et al. (2002) ‘negative capability’ was first described by Keats in a letter to his brothers in 1817 with reference to the capability of a poet to exist in a state of ‘uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’ (Keats & Scott, 2005, p. xxii). Applied to leadership, Simpson et al., citing Handy (1989), noted that the concept of ‘negative capability’ includes the ‘capacity to sustain reflective inaction’ to ... ‘create an intermediate space that enables one to continue to think in difficult situations...to create the conditions for fresh insight’ (Simpson et al., 2002: 1210–1211). Inspired by the work of the psychoanalyst Bion (1965), Simpson and French (2006) took their analysis further in relation to the capacity of leaders to “think in the present moment” and, in dealing adeptly with the present, to employ “patience and the ability to tolerate

frustration and anxiety” (Simpson & French, 2006: 245). Arguably, if leaders are able to focus, listen, act with discretion and skilfully contain negative emotions arising from uncertainties rather than rush to implement imprudently deterministic solutions, they are more likely to inspire trust within their institutions.

To be deemed trustworthy, the shaman has to be an able interpreter of the amorphous object of higher education in a way that will not result in the sacrifice of the whole culture. The shaman is trusted by the guardians to deliver the message and to select those most suitable to enact the Word. The shaman figure is both apart from and part of the culture who has to facilitate understanding between different realms of experience: gods and humans. According to Heidegger (2000), understanding is a mode of practical involvement or concern with others in the world. Bruns (1992: 3) explicates Heidegger:

Understanding is of forms of life, and also internal to them. It entails being able to speak the languages spoken around you and taking as natural or intelligible (not needing explanation) the ways of acting, thinking and feeling that are local and current.

The shaman is also a trickster but only in the service of deepening or facilitating understanding (Hyde, 2008). The higher education shamans need to embody trust in uncertainties and trustworthiness by reflecting on them. Most importantly, shamans have to provide the conditions for the creativity of its members to thrive, and engendering trust as it is the antecedent of the other values.

Trust is analogous with the cohesive dark matter of the universe. It links truth, freedom, reciprocity, cohesion, bridging, difference, complexity, relationship, belonging, identity, purpose, knowledge, everything that is held to be fundamental to organised systems and maintains them in some kind of intricate balance. Trust perceived as an amorphous or hyperobject is in constant flows and ebbs as it shapes and is shaped by its encounters in the in-between relating of humans and objects. Without it, cooperation cannot be sustained. Trust is visible and hidden; it favours neither the good nor the bad. There can be as much trust and distrust among politicians as there is among thieves. Its value can never be underestimated. There is a wealth of literature on its description and a paucity of literature on insights into its absence and presence and the impact this has at the individual and collective levels. It is like being able to analyse the construction, materials and design of a car and the functions of all the parts, but never see it in motion. Perhaps research approaches can be selected that have the apparatus to reveal the intricate layers of its dynamic being. It is elusive like dark matter, which in part is likely to be composed of some, so far, undiscovered subatomic particles. The humanities analogy here is trust is in part composed of, as yet, undiscovered insights.

The value of its presence in higher education is currently seriously underestimated, as symbolic and cooperative trust gives way to compliance trust in which transparency is a transparency of regulations, authenticity is loyalty to the brand. Trust is considered a positive value. There is currently an earnestness about this pursuit of such values in higher education perhaps because trust, truth and freedom have been eroded and we are desperately seeking all the soothing human attributes that might heal the loss of trust in a relationship: compassion, grace, happiness,

love. Graeber (2002) offers an amusing turn towards the end of his work on theory of value where he has examined ideas, including those of Mauss [1924] (2001) and Marx [1846] (1970) on values in terms of theories of desire, desire for what things could be. For Marx it is perhaps the notion of, “unalienated labour” (Graeber, 2002: 260) and for Mauss, “the delight in generous artistic expenditure, the pleasure of hospitality in the public not private feast” (Mauss, 1965). Graeber muses on a social theory of pleasure and the wrong footedness of contemporary market theorists to model pleasurable, rewarding experience (like eating) as solitary ones. “The idea seems to be an almost furtive appropriation, in which objects that had been parts of the outside world are completely incorporated into the consumer’s self” (Graeber, 2002: 260).

In this context, trust facilitates a preventative measure against this form of cannibalism, the obsessive self-relating and extends the possibility of pleasure if trust is harnessed for the common good. What is not to like in a higher education environment that nurtures learning through a trusting relationship with all its members that is then reflected in the relationships it develops with its external alliances? It would be a pleasure.

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Chapter 11

Trust Over Surveillance: Understanding Reciprocity – A Philosophical Perspective



Alison Scott-Baumann

Introduction

Trust will be discussed here as a reciprocal phenomenon to be negotiated within certain parameters and honoured – here seen in the specific context of the university. Two research projects will provide rich evidence of breakdown in trust in British higher education (AHRC 2015–18 Re/presenting Islam on campus, and the SOAS 2016–18 Charity Commission investigation). In the current climate, British higher education seems torn between being a provider of world-class research (Collini, 2012), an accreditor of improved functional workforce capacity (Browne Report, 2010) and a dangerous place that requires policing (Higher Education Funding Council HEFCE, 2015). Various models of trust will be explored in order to describe what happens on campus. My first model is based on Freud’s joke about kettles. Kettle logic gives us insight into what trust is. In his funny and perceptive analysis of how we reveal, in jokes, the secret thoughts we have that we often fail to conceal, Sigmund Freud tells us the ‘joke’ about the broken kettle (1905/1966). In this anecdote, A. returns a kettle broken to a friend and in his defence, he argues:

First, I never borrowed the kettle, secondly the kettle had a hole in it already when I got it from him and thirdly I gave him back his kettle undamaged. (Freud, 1905/1966: 62)

Derrida found this very amusing and called it kettle logic (1984). This is a person to whom you may not want to lend your kettle. They are not to be trusted by you, nor should they trust themselves. Lack of reciprocity is the point of this ‘joke’

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P. Gibbs, P. Maassen (eds.), *Trusting in Higher Education*, Higher Education Dynamics 57, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87037-9_11

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accompanied by the desire to show trust as a worthwhile venture, even when trust has clearly been broken. I will contrast it with Ricoeur's understanding of attestation: kettle logic shows untrustworthiness and lack of reciprocity and attestation shows how we can attempt to be trustworthy. Attestation requires self-belief and conviction that one has agency and can make and keep promises, and requires that we own up to breaking the kettle, apologise and make amends. The kettle anecdote also exemplifies the power of a story: in the social sciences, we are both supported and constrained by the double hermeneutic that affects our storytelling – we are part of our stories because our perception of events and people and phenomena will affect the way we tell the story and the content of it. Our quest for evidence is vital, but will inevitably be shaped and weakened by the hermeneutic imperative, which shows time and again that what we believe to be our rational choices may seem irrational to others, and that we may feel the same way about theirs. The hermeneutic circle necessitates the impossible: that we attempt to understand how we and others perceive the world around us, even when we would wish to dismiss the actions and beliefs of others that are different from our own. I will return to the kettle later.

How can we come closer to an understanding of what 'trust' is and fixing the kettle? Part of this chapter will function as a critical response to Onora O'Neill's influential book "A Question of Trust" (2002), and reflected in her more recent lectures on the same subject. I will return later to O'Neill and also to the kettle. In order to look at trust we need to attempt to understand how it functions in society, and also to look at what sort of society students build on campus. First, we will look briefly at society and trust generally.

Trust Within Reason and Societal Values: What Is Trust?

We place trust both predictively and normatively: I predict that you will be on time for our meeting and I expect that you should be on time as we promised this to each other. Similarly, I predict that laws and norms that govern our behaviour will be developed by the government and I expect that they should apply to all. Even if democracies do not actually ensure equality, nevertheless they may do it better than other governmental systems, but they need to be kept to this promise by their citizens. What happens if we apply different predictive and normative trust to different groups within our society? If we have evidence to back up different responses to different groups that seems potentially reasonable, e.g. we may avoid going into parts of our hometown, which we know to have higher crime rates than other parts. This means we have certain expectations of the people who live there, hang about there, which, whether we like it or not, may also have a self-fulfilling prophecy component, because our expectation may have an effect upon the population of such an area.

How does this square up with theories about trust? John Locke asserted that trust is the 'bond of society'. He believed that self-interest cannot be the basis for human

conduct (Locke, 1663/1953: 213). A ‘rule of morals’ will make society work when we adhere to it. I will return to this, because it seems to be a rational assertion, but we will have trouble justifying that assertion, just as we will have difficulty defining what ‘reason’ is and what human behaviour is, that can call itself rational. Indeed, we can see a different view of trust in Fukuyama’s (1995) book ‘Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity’ in which he argues that pragmatism, not reason, will rule the day and be softened by social phenomena and cultural habits, such as trust. Therefore, Fukuyama does not see trust as related to reason, nor does he see reason as key to social functioning. There is a stark difference between Locke and Fukuyama, as Locke seeks the rules for moral living whereas Fukuyama seeks efficient living. This will be a question we need to return to, to decide what we expect campus life to achieve and what universities can reasonably promise students.

So is trust rational or emotional or a combination of both, and can it be theorised or is it so unpredictable that it only works in practice? I will attempt to theorise, but we must always bear in mind that there is much about human trust that defies rational explanation, such as the giving of blood to blood banks: students sometimes give blood abroad for financial reasons, but mostly, as in the non-student population, it is done because the person reasons that they might need blood themselves someday.... this is not rational, as blood donors don’t show off about their acts, so they cannot influence others to give blood and they have no control over the generosity of others who may have their blood type (Titmuss, 1970). This is an example of generalised reciprocity, which presumes a kind of promise that may be one-sided and has to be seen as a component of a sort of blind trust, whereas making a promise usually assumes some sort of reciprocity. It seems likely that we need to contextualise this within the student body, having set the scene in general terms.

Students on Campus as Possible Change Agents

Secondly then, what about the sort of society that students build on campus, as university life is different from life outside? Students are living different lives from those outside the campus; of course, students can vote, they can be employed, yet they are rather loosely affiliated to wider society and function like a passer-by community. Wider societal issues, such as constraints and laws can pass them by. This shows itself in that they often do not vote, they cannot effectively put pressure on government by withdrawing their labour from their jobs, which are by definition part time, and they often do not engage with mainstream societal interests, becoming instead affiliated to campus matters or to no issues at all. Yet students fulfil key criteria as potential change agents. Rogers proposed that change agents are often young, privileged and well educated, and can disseminate new ideas to the general population (Rogers, 2003). In addition, we know that when students decide to act, they can have dramatic impact. Youth activism erupts at times when established political structures and players prove unable or unwilling to tackle a problem: racism in Birmingham, Alabama 1963, capitalism in Paris 1968, Russian control in the

Prague spring 1968, oppression in Soweto 1976, desire for democracy in the Arab spring 2011, gun control protests in USA 2018, and there are many more examples. Students can be moved to protest against injustice, they sometimes protest for specific change, and they are capable of achieving a mood swing in a population that puts inescapable pressure upon the political classes. However, my research findings on the Charity Commission's current actions demonstrate how interruptions to free speech and other forms of freedom of expression may weaken students' capacity to be innovators and we will consider the risks of this.

Indeed, over the last decade (2007–2017) the government has become increasingly interested in the university campus, suggesting on the one hand that terrorism may originate there, due to too much campus talk of an extremist nature and, on the other hand, that students are like 'snowflakes' and melt in discussions of controversial topics. It seems hardly likely that both can be true, and my research suggests that neither assertion can be trusted, due to lack of evidence. Yet the government's interest in controlling campus life means that students can no longer be passers-by who are themselves bypassed – through government politicisation of the campus, students are affected by societal issues more than they used to be. Whether they realise what is going on is another matter, as this state intervention is not highly visible and not well understood.

What expectations do students have of campus life and what do they do on campus? This appears variable; some engage fully with student union activities, others have a lot or a little student society contact and many find that their subject studies, sporting endeavours or other pursuits will form the main focus for their lives. Religion and culture may or may not play a significant role, but certainly cannot be dismissed, despite the modern university asserting that it offers a secular, i.e. supposedly neutral space. The campus itself embodies many contrasts: it has become more like a large café in many instances and yet the security guards seem more present than they were a decade ago: as I will demonstrate with empirical evidence, the monitoring by counter terror mechanisms and by the Charity Commission of student activities, discussions and choice of guest speakers is significant. There are a lot of students to manage. Instead of several thousand students on campus 50 years ago, the student population of Britain is over 2 million now.

With regard to societal management generally, there are of course wide-ranging views to draw upon. Hobbes (1651/1991) believed that societies have to be ruled by fear, whereas Hume (1739/1978) asserted that our affection for other humans is the glue that keeps us together. Rousseau (1762/1994) proposed a general will that must ensure stability of a social contract. Promises must be made and kept among humans. The General Will of Rousseau exists to be followed by groups of individuals in order to ensure that they function for each other's good. Thus, on campus, as in wider society, there may be conflicts of interest arising from different versions of the General Will (which is not how Rousseau conceived of it). The students' unions may be very active and left wing or the Christian Students' Union may follow an evangelical line: these approaches may affect students differentially depending on their affiliations, and demonstrate that Rousseau's General Will probably has to be

modified in the twenty first century as society has become so varied. If this is true, then how is campus life working?

The Securitised Campus

I will measure trust on campus against the securitised campus because of research evidence that gives cause for concern. What is weakening trust on campus? To answer this question we need to see what the law says, as we know that our trust in the law is twofold: we trust predictively, i.e. we trust government to pass laws for the nation to follow. We also trust normatively, i.e. we trust that laws will be for the common good. The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) places certain duties on higher education authorities, of which three are worth discussing. Firstly, the Act includes a reiteration of the 1986 Act instruction to universities to ‘have particular regard’ to actively protecting academic freedom and freedom of speech, secondly a duty to ‘have due regard’ to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and thirdly a duty to ‘have due regard’ to the guidance that accompanies the Act. This privileges free speech over the risks of radicalisation because in legal parlance the term ‘particular’ trumps the term ‘due’. The Act gives the Secretary of State the power to issue guidance about how the duty should be exercised and universities must ‘have regard’ to such guidance. Contrary to what many public and media discussions assume, this does not place a statutory duty on universities to monitor or record information or to use surveillance techniques (Scott-Baumann & Tomlinson, 2016). Moreover, as one would expect, if the guidance to a law goes beyond or is contradictory of the law, the law takes precedence over the guidance.

Thus we can see that the 1986 Education Act, to which the CTSA 2015 refers, pays particular attention to the importance of free expression. It confers on universities not just a duty to “have regard” to freedom of speech, but a much stronger duty to, “take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees ... and visiting speakers.” Universities must ensure, insofar as is reasonably practicable, that no individual is denied use of university premises on any ground connected with, “the beliefs or views of that individual”. This is a promise that universities are supposed to make to students, and they are supposed to be trusted to keep this promise because the universities have been instructed in law that this is their duty.

In England and Wales, all public social spaces for education and health care are now monitored for signs of extremism, including universities. In England and Wales, debates about whether there is a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression and academic freedom in universities act as proxies in media and academic commentary for wider discussions (Cram, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Bromwich, 2016). In a court ruling, Judge Ouseley rejected the assertion that a chilling effect is present on campus, or that it is partly caused by counter-surveillance policies (Butt, 2017). Yet Brown and Saeed (2015) argue that security discourses constrain students’

activism, university experience and identities, while Heath-Kelly (2017) believes that policy implementation was intensified between 2007 and 2017 such that now, “all bodies are potentially vulnerable to infection by radicalisers and thus warrant surveillance” (Heath-Kelly, 2017: 297). This requires exploration of the constraints upon free speech and academic freedom. Universities in England and Wales currently promise to keep students and staff safe and see this as more important than open discussion. This expectation of trust has always been the case, with Duty of Care statements available in public documentation and now online. Counter terror work is now subsumed under new safeguarding guidelines. Specifically since 2015, universities seek to reduce the possibility of students being radicalised on campus into violent or non-violent acts, despite there being no evidence of campus radicalisation taking place. Staff are trained to notice signs of distress, depression, increased religiosity etc. and to report individuals who may therefore be considered to be undergoing radicalisation – and to be less than trustworthy.

In her analysis of trust O’Neill (2002: 38) takes the conventional approach to terrorism as the ultimate act that destroys trust, “Terror is the ultimate denial and destroyer of trust. Terrorists violate the spectrum of human duties and thereby the spectrum of human rights”. Since 2002 when O’Neill wrote, the counter terror agenda has evolved. I believe she was wrong then and is still wrong now to see terrorism as such a great threat. Our secret services work tirelessly to protect us and thanks to them the incidents of tragic criminal violence are kept to a minimum. I believe the implementation across civil society of an amateur surveillance culture goes against human rights by singling out Muslims and we should explore what is happening when people assert lack of trust:

Many people know about the Prevent policy,¹ which is the government anti-radicalisation policy, which has turned a lot of mosques and prayer rooms in universities into kind of like quite surveyed places. And so I do actually think that the trajectory is a negative one. (AHRC Re/presenting Islam on campus 2015–18 research respondent)

This approach leads university management to seek to demonstrate to government that it is trustworthy by showing that the university can identify radicalisation/extremism/potential terrorist acts. None of these are clearly defined and in fact attempting the task requires discrimination on grounds of religion and/or ethnicity, in line with the government’s focus upon Muslims. As O’Neill (2002: 53) comments, “Some of the new modes of public accountability are in fact internally incoherent”.

Such a policy as the counter terror one leads to restrictions of free speech and reduction of political activities in student unions. It also goes against the Equality legislation that requires universities to protect staff and students from discrimination based upon their protected characteristics (such as colour, ethnicity and belief) (Equality Act, 2010):

I think that the way that Prevent is fielded sort of ignores the people who aren’t terrorists and just says, ‘This is what Islam is’. (AHRC research respondent, as above)

¹This concerns the government counter-terror plan.

These approaches are incoherent and contradictory. I will argue that students need to activate their own sense of entitlement, and trust, less in the consumerist understanding of university as ‘value for money’ although that is very real, and more in the sense of their adult agency and right to act. In order to be clear about our sense of equality for all, Ricoeur developed the notion of attestation, that is, “the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering” in his powerful book “Oneself as Another” (Ricoeur, 1990/1992: 22). I will show how that potential for agency is being limited by the government actions that are related to the counter terror implementation, including the vetting of outside speakers:

...in terms of the students’ Union where it [Prevent] comes to play is with things like speaker policy, who’s allowed to speak on campus, and the severe background checks. Now if an Islamic Society or a Free Palestine Society invites a speaker check there are ten more procedures that they have to go through as opposed to another society. (AHRC research respondent, as above)

Mostly the research respondents who were critical of Prevent saw no possibility of agency; they could not discuss the situation with staff and most staff similarly felt unable to act, despite understanding the injustice of Prevent. Occasionally we received reports of action being taken:

Well, what I did was, I organised a symposium, away from site, with the University of X, and invited academics, activists, journalists, NUS, NUT, Home Office, and the Met[ropolitan Police]. Thirty two people to discuss openly, frankly, what was happening. And, we were very dispassionate about it, we weren’t going to go against Prevent, because there are lots of Muslims who support Prevent, we included them. But, what came out, really strongly, at the end of that symposium, and I have done follow up interviews with people, is that this policy is creating massive mistrust, and without trust in a population, you can’t go anywhere with the policy. And, it is, as David Anderson, the independent reviewer said, it is self-defeating, it’s counterproductive. (AHRC research respondent)

This view is echoed by the JCHR (2018: 33) report, “But the Prevent programme will be counterproductive if it provokes mistrust.”

O’Neill (2002: 33) finds Kant useful for setting out a framework for trust. She mentions his belief that we are all moral equals and that we all have equal duties to each other. We need to explore Kant (1784/1970) to see what he offers, what his strengths and shortcomings are and what to seek as improvement and I will use the work of Paul Ricoeur to achieve this. Ricoeur takes Kant’s conditions of possibility to see whether suspicion can be viewed as a condition of possibility. He concludes that this must be proportional to risk. Doubt about others must be based on something, not on government ideology that provides no evidence (Scott-Baumann, 2017a). Trust, as Locke and Hume argued, should be understood to be vital, and to be reciprocal at several different levels, depending upon the degree of reciprocity, the situation in which each party finds themselves and the expectations that each party may have of the other.

Free Speech and Applied Philosophy

I will explore assumptions about trust in order to show how catastrophic the surveillance culture is for free speech in the light of Kant's categorical imperative, which proposes that we should treat others as we wish them to treat us. Yet our data analysis from the AHRC research shows us that Muslim students and staff comment much more on Prevent than non-Muslim students and staff do. Does this suggest that some people are being treated differently to others on campus? David Anderson (2015: 58), erstwhile Independent Reviewer of counter-terror legislation, explains that 'Prevent' is "predominantly though not entirely focused on Islamist extremism."

Perhaps this suggests that Muslims are less deserving of trust than others, and therefore that it is acceptable, indeed necessary for the sake of the nation, to mistrust Muslims. However, if we conjecture that this is the case, we need to find evidence for it, as it transgresses Kant's imperative and the assumption that in a democracy all are equal in law until proven otherwise. This requires justification of some sort. Yet we find that there is no evidence to support this approach, as there is no proof that any student or staff member has been radicalised on campus. If we have both predictive and normative expectations of people who look like Muslims, then we risk muddling up the predictive and the normative component. If we tell them that their views on the Middle East are extremist then we are trusting them to be extremist, although their views may be reasonable and legal, just not the norm in a majority non-Muslim population. The predictive and the normative have become entangled in each other. This can then segue into an impasse, which precludes open discussion, as Prevent and the Charity Commission both advise strongly against having 'extremist' discussions.

The Bureaucracy of Fear

I believe we need to explore assumptions about trust for the possibility of mechanisms that will facilitate and strengthen reciprocity between government and universities. The very same mechanisms may weaken trust between the university and their staff and students. We will benefit from looking at the plethora of administration and bureaucracy created by the counter terror agenda with Onora O'Neill. I believe she is absolutely right to censure the government's accountability structure. She presents the increase in bureaucracy and accountability as designed to increase trust: "The new legislation, regulation and controls are more than fine rhetoric. They require detailed conformity to procedures and protocols, detailed record keeping and provision of information in specified formats and success in reaching targets" (O'Neill, 2002: 46).

O'Neill (2002: 49) then argues, rightly I believe, that trust cannot be enhanced by the increased use of such measures, because measurements that are codifiable into bureaucratic processes are simplistic and banal, and cannot capture what makes a

good academic or doctor: “Each profession has its proper aim, and this aim is not reducible to meeting set targets following prescribed procedures and requirements.”

Therefore, she argues that these administrative mechanisms are counterproductive and even corrosive of trust: “The pursuit of ever more perfect accountability provides citizens and consumers, patients and parents with more information, more comparisons and more complaints systems: but it also builds a culture of suspicion, low morale, and may ultimately lead to professional cynicism, and then we would have grounds for public mistrust” (O’Neill, 2002: 57).

In this respect, I will go further than O’Neill. She proposes that people often state in questionnaires that they distrust governments, doctors etc., but she believes they may not in fact mean that, as they continue to place trust in those individuals. To her perceptive analysis, I would add that when people say they do not trust university management, they may believe that this exonerates them from any reciprocal responsibilities. They feel thereby freed from any obligations. They may not approve of the counter terror policies implemented on their campus so they disclaim responsibility – at one level this is correct as neither students nor academic staff introduced Prevent. At another, deeper and Kantian level, I will argue that we cannot be freed from our bond to try and be trustworthy on campus or at the voting box simply because a person or a political party lets us down. We are societal actors and as such, we have obligations to the society we live in. If staff are more aware of the extent of Prevent, then attestation can be developed; taking responsibility for one’s actions. Let us consider this specific case to hand that stretches trust beyond credible limits: the case is the Prevent Duty Guidance – securitisation that is based on no evidence and thereby invalidates protestations of trust.

Conditions of Possibility for Trust

What are the conditions of possibility for trust to exist? In other words, in a Kantian sense, what concepts would trust be impossible without? I believe reciprocity and mutual need are the vital concepts. Let us look at them in turn, with reciprocity first. Trust among adults should be understood to be reciprocal at several different levels, depending upon the degree of reciprocity, the situation in which each party finds themselves and the expectations that each party may have of the other. There is a paradox with regard to reciprocity: as argued earlier, we trust each other to behave predictably in a way that fulfils procedural expectations (governments issue laws and guidance in order that citizens can follow them) and we also trust each other to behave normatively in a way that is substantively reliable (generally we trust that laws and guidance provide for the general good). In return for placing trust both predictably and normatively, we expect that others will do the same for us. Or do we? If reciprocity is the key to trust then trust relies upon a paradox: how can we trust each other and those in power, given that reciprocity is often weakened by an imbalance of power in relationships? Mutual need is relevant here. Even amongst adults who appear to trust each other, some will have more authority or be in

possession of something that the other person wants. If I am a white student on campus, I may not even notice the Prevent restrictions and if I do, I will not find them dangerous to me. But if made aware of them I may accept that they are unjust and use my voice to challenge them.

How does Prevent affect Muslims and those of colour who look as if they may be Muslim? As shown in Scott-Baumann (2017b), most students are busy on campus developing their personal identity: this personal project is a form of labour. My personal identity becomes valuable capital in the form of data: with online scraping of sites like Facebook now common, this labour of creating a personal identity becomes separated from the worker and turned into capital in a way analogous to Marx's theory of capital. In a similar way personal data are taken from its owner through Prevent strategies and made immensely valuable and marketable, leading to considerable spending on securitisation. Data are capital, as we see from Facebook and other giant collectors of personal information. Personal data are taken from us and they can be used to market products and emotions, such as desire and fear. In this way a hijab or a beard, a library book on Daesh or a propensity to pray can be reduced to objects of suspicion, rather than being seen as an integral part of the British-Muslim identity of a student. The securitisation approach often makes Muslim students feel that they are being observed so that their identity markers can be 'scraped' and used to show how suspect they are. A staff respondent in the AHRC project told us:

I think the only practical day to day thing that affected us a lot about Prevent was the impact that it had on Muslim students. So, mentally, a lot of Muslim students became quite scared, they didn't really know what was going on, they felt like they were being targeted. And so there was that. And even if necessarily they weren't specifically on this campus, because of the way the policies were made it was like they were very broad and they weren't very specific, it doesn't really matter because, at the end of the day, the Muslim students practically felt like they were, even if they weren't, just simply by reading the news, by hearing what other students in other universities were having to go through, it felt like they couldn't say as much as they used to because, "Oh, what if it got reported, what if ..." this kind of stuff. (staff respondent AHRC Re/presenting Islam on campus)

This approach is discriminatory and it also leads to self-censorship. Many respondents in my AHRC project Re/presenting Islam on campus gave evidence about self-censorship and difficulties in discussing issues that involve their identity as British Muslims. As well as the Prevent Duty Guidance, the Charity Commission is playing an active role in policing thought. In 2010 student unions changed status from exempt charities to full charities under the direct instructions of the Charity Commission. Student unions wish to continue to draw the block grant that keeps them going as charities, which is even more necessary now that students drink less alcohol at the SU bar; takings have fallen nationwide. The Charity Commission has no remit to protect free speech; rather its job is to ensure that charities do not bring the charity sector into disrepute and thus ensure ethical charity activities and continued public support (Charity Commission, 2000). One aspect of this is the assertion that a charity must not be political. Thus SUs are instructed by the Charity Commission that they can support students as students, but not as political actors.

Specific examples are given of what should be avoided by student societies and the Student Unions: environmental issues, whale hunting, the conditions of political prisoners abroad, Prevent, Israel/Palestine and Boycotts, Divestments and Sanctions (Charity Commission 2016).

The Joint Committee for Human Rights (JCHR), in its enquiry into free speech on campus in 2017–18, commented in its 2018 final report, that the Charity Commission should reconsider its approach:

The Charity Commission is under legal obligation to regulate charities, and does so through guidance, but its current approach does not adequately reflect the important role student unions play in educating students through activism and debate. Moreover, the generic guidance on protecting a charity's reputation does not place due weight on the fact that inhibiting lawful free speech can do as much damage to a student union's reputation as hosting a controversial speaker. (JCHR, 2018: 46)

The conditions of possibility for trust are not being met in this context: suspicion, i.e. a rupture of trust, is being systematically directed against a minority group with no evidence-based justification.

Conclusions

As an accountability mechanism the securitisation programme has, over the last decade, been well-funded and ultimately rolled out to all British schools, universities, GP surgeries and hospitals, as Heath–Kelly demonstrates (2017). The Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015) instructs all places of educational and health provision to monitor the people who use their services for possible signs of extremism. Importantly, the Act instructs universities to pay more attention to the protection of free speech than to the possibility of radicalisation. However, the Prevent Duty Guidance inverts this hierarchy of importance and asks universities to demonstrate that they are keeping students safe from being radicalised into extremism, which privileges Prevent over all else, including free speech. In fact, the Prevent Duty Guidance is not legally binding and is not secondary legislation, being merely guidance, and yet all universities follow it. Some universities attempt to use a 'light touch', not insisting, for example, upon extremism training being provided for all staff. Some universities make it a condition of continued employment. This causes concern among staff, as we were told in our AHRC research:

And, again, it's to do with trust, if it was directed at radicalisation across the board, in schools they're trying to do that, but in university it seems very focused, in my view, on the Muslim question. (AHRC research respondent)

I will return here to the kettle logic that Freud and Derrida found so amusing: 'First, I never borrowed the kettle, secondly the kettle had a hole in it already when I got it from him and thirdly I gave him back his kettle undamaged.' Kettle logic has parallels in the counter terror agenda, in which it seems as if the government is saying the following: 'First, we never discriminate against Muslims, secondly Muslims are terrorists anyway and thirdly we cause no harm to them and their communities.'

If staff become more aware of the situation and if they encourage discussion about free speech this will facilitate strengthening of trust on campus (Scott-Baumann, 2018). The current approach instructs university management to discriminate on grounds of religion and/or ethnicity, in line with the government's focus upon Muslims. It also leads to restrictions of free speech and reduction of political activities in student unions. So these very issues cannot easily be discussed. Universities are trying very hard to prove to government that they are trustworthy. In order to do this they are weakening their trust promises to students to provide safe places for discussion of difficult issues. Many students may not even notice, but those who wish to speak, be they Muslim or political activists, are less and less able to do so. It is possible that, with high tuition fees, the student appetite for justice is diminished and understandably replaced by concerns about employability, but this bodes ill for the future of democracy. The current situation weakens the potency that Rogers identified in groups, such as university students to be change agents who trust themselves and others to act reasonably. Their ability is diminished to challenge societal wrongs taking place on their campuses and demonstrate attestation: standing up for what they know is right in the interests of fairness.

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Chapter 12

Self-Deception and the Duty of the Truth-Teller in the University – A Values Perspective



Paul Gibbs

Introduction

Trust has attracted the attention of higher education scholars in a number of forms and for a number of purposes. Moreover, this trust is often conceptualised as a form of public trust, a form of social contract resulting from a reasoned expectation and confident of what the privileges conferred on the academy to critically and in informed ways contribute to society and be accountable by society (funding, freedom of speech and other academic freedoms) are providing for society in many and various ways: employment, income to local communities, holding power to account and increasing knowledge and entrepreneurship. The contract implicitly is reliant upon universities, “acting responsibly and for the common good” (Bird, 2013: 25). However, when political authority and the media pronounce negatively to confront this trust, for example, about vice chancellors’ pay, how can the university maintain this trust? Of course, trust is multi-layered and is in the control of institutional administration as well as in the practice of members of the institution. These may not be aligned. The chapter focuses on how the individual academics in their role and way of moral being can protect the public trust they must claim if they are to function well, especially in this epoch of post-truth and fake news (see Peters et al., 2018).

This is important, for in the current era of marketization,¹ it has been argued that there is a “loss of trust” (Jameson, 2012: 411) in UK universities, manifest in government rhetoric and its agencies of quality control. This is not a new

¹Marketization is defined here as the attempt to put the provision of higher education on a market basis, where the demand and supply of student education, academic research and other university activities are determined by the force of a free market place.

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observation. As early as 1992, Bok was seeking ways in which US universities could go about restoring public trust. Ten years later, O'Neill wrote of "crises of trust" (2002: 45) and, after another decade, Collini referred to an "erosion of trust" (2012: 108) in a context where free speech interacts with social media and all are subjected to the force of the transient present.

In what has been termed a post-truth and trust era (see Harsin, 2015, for a formal discussion), statements are made, lies are modified and apologies given, and cynicism rules – a cynicism that we do not have time to answer. Resistance in the form of an assembled evidence basis takes too long. It might be argued, as Peters (2015) does, that in the political field this is nothing new, but, as Ferriss (2016) suggests, post-truth seems to be a media – especially a social media – driven strategy. Its relationship to truth is strategic. Its goal is the exploitation of emotion in the way that sophism eroded the importance of rhetoric in our ways of persuasion. Yet it is a strategy, I suggest, that is not countered by checking facts, but by a moral imperative against lies, deception and deceit.

One of the consequences of the massive changes in universities is that of the power relationship between teacher and student, due to their marketization and their nesting within society rather than being outside of, but critically commenting upon, society. This has led to an assimilation of values, not a questioning of them through critical reasoning and speaking out, with authority, against what is morally wrong, dehumanising and self-serving about society. Without addressing such issues, any notion of an educated person as one with freedom to think and act becomes superficial, leaving scholars and students in a place that can lack personal integrity and thus compromise their duty to be trustworthy. Moreover, in support of Sockett² (1989), this seems counter to liberal, transformative principles and leaves many universities in a state of self-deception, because they are espousing policies and procedures that undermine what they believe, broadly, a liberal education ought to be.

Trustworthiness of the University

Trust has attracted attention in the general field of education, where Tschannen-Moran and Hoy's (2000) study of schools is seminal, but relatively little work has been done in higher education institutions.³ The nature of liberal education and the ideal of emancipation through rational autonomy have led to an evolving, enduring and empathetic delivery. Because of its transformative, rather than

²His opening line of his paper is, "I take education to be a moral business" (1989: 33).

³Ghosh et al. (2001), Shoho and Smith (2004), Gibbs (2007), Macfarlane (2009), Carvalho and de Oliveira Mota (2010), and Gibbs and Dean (2015) have, for example, provided reviews of the significance of trust within the university and the building of student-institutional relationships. In the study by Smith and Shoho (2007), the authors found, "an inverse relationship between trust and academic rank". To that end, their data suggests that the level of faculty trust tends to diminish with ascending academic rank (Smith & Shoho, 2007: 133).

economically-defined, purpose, neo-liberal education is dependent on a trusting relationship between the provider of the educational process and the recipient; one does not know what one is expected to receive, as it has to be jointly created. In this sense, having trust in the hegemony of state control of education is to believe that it will not be used to exploit and manipulate recipients. A relationship of this nature between student and academic without enduring evidence of the trustworthiness in terms of their authorship, accurate assessment of work, their competence in pedagogical practice and in a verifiable command of appropriate knowledge, much like that of authority, may be cynically received. This is because it appears to grant power, coercion and control to the party in whom trust has been vested. Such an imbalance of power is accepted, because the powerful in the relationship are experts and students are not. But, it is more than that. It requires that the lecturers recognise and deliver to their obligation of truth-telling within the academy. Moreover, it requires students to take a stance on what they can trust in themselves; not succumbing to what Furedi (2016) calls the ‘infantilisation’ of higher education in universities, but to make existential judgements and assertions based on what they know is feasible and likely to be the truth and, from that position, not to fear the lies of a post-trust era.

This obligation remains even when students become consumers, imbued with certain sovereignty to question delivery methods, value for money and appropriate assessment mechanisms. When academic institutions accept the performative ideal of their function, the students’ views on matters are granted equal authority. The expert is stripped not of inherent, but of ascribed, expertise by the digitally literate and populistically informed student.

I will argue that if higher education institutions, especially universities, like any institution in society, are to sustain themselves, then faith in their truth-teller needs to be continually evaluated and renewed, for faith implies a lowering of the level of scrutiny in the acceptance of what they say (see also Gornitzka et al., 2007). In order to do that, they must confront the notion of self-deception that allows for the seeking of truth to be turned into faith, or believing in and appeasement towards others. We must hold ourselves and others to account. As O’Neill (2002) proposes, we need ways of distinguishing trustworthy from untrustworthy informants. Moreover, if society trusts what universities say about how they can facilitate choice and opportunities for a student’s future, our appointment to the academy should signal that. Carelessly embracing league tables when it suits and critically objecting to them when it does not, arguing for social mobility, which is not evident or leading academic authority to populist media programs, do nothing to build confidence in the university as a site of truth-tellers.

Amongst the things that we can do to help students is to tell them the truth of what they have been offered for their futures. This is a role that is a duty, I believe, of academics to transcend their disciplines in preparing students for a world in which their contribution is significant and worthy. Indeed, these duties of truth-telling, as Weil (1952/2002: 2) has advocated in the first line of her book *The Needs for Roots*, “... come before that of rights, which is subordinate and relative to the former.” One of these obligations explored by Weil (*ibid.*: 35–39) is truth and the

obligations of the truth-teller. If so accepted, this might require us to consider a reorientation of the notion of the rights-based contemporary university (O'Neill, 2002). This seems to have roots in the Socratic notion of the harmony of truth-telling and behaviour as revealed in 'Laches' as care for the soul: a caring for the morality of oneself through knowing, trusting and being the stance that one takes for oneself (Plato, 1997b). This requires a sense of courage to grasp freedom to be for oneself amongst others and, as universities become more instrumental, extended and digital, they are less conducive to such freedoms. In doing so, they may act in ways that encourage a fiction of the 'good' future, built upon oppression, super-surveillance and a lack of hope. At policy level, for instance, it can be seen in the UK duplicitous encouragement of free speech in the government's 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act, which reaffirms universities' obligation to protect the freedom of speech yet requires them to have 'due regard' for the risk of 'radicalisation' among students. Its implementation guidelines (National Archives, 2017) introduced in 2015 have been considered discriminatory, and even racist (see also Chap. 11 by Scott-Baumann in this Volume).

One of the consequences of the massive changes in the contemporary higher education sector is the shift in the power relationship between teachers and students and between teachers and administrators (where the administration has become a key actor in the power relationships with respect to education), due to the marketization of the sector and the changes in role for institutions to reflect, rather than critically comment, upon society. This has led to the assimilation of market values in their own practices, away from a Socratic questioning of them through critical reasoning and speaking out – but this is not new. The essence of Socrates' Apology, Athenians can be seen today if one takes the liberty of substituting the target audience:

[*Students and Academics*] from the city that is greatest and best reputed for wisdom and strength: are you not ashamed that you care for having as much money as possible, the reputation, and the honour, but that you neither care for not give thought to prudence, and truth, and how your soul will be the best possible? (Plato, 1997a, 29d) (*italics* are my addition)

However, a lack of originality is no reason to accept self-serving and self-deceptive, politically motivated directives that are imposed upon educational institutions ostensibly to enable greater transparency and accountability, but whose functions are more to do with controls. In the UK, this can be seen in the confusion and inaccuracies of the excellence frameworks in research, teaching and knowledge in terms of what they do and what they are meant to measure. For instance, the teaching excellence framework measures outcomes with little attempt to measure the consequences of the teaching that may or may not have contributed to those outcomes: most significantly degree level and employment. That is, there is no measurement of how teaching might have contributed to such success.

Self-Deception and the Erosive Effect of Post-Trust and Post-Truth

Amongst those who have contributed to the notion of self-deception (and a notion of self-consciousness) are Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Sartre. Indeed, as Neuber (2016) suggests, in spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre's ontological account of 'bad faith' as intentional self-deception unclear, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Sartre's strong assertion that self-deception is intentional is contested. The basis of such contention is in the paradox concerning our ability to believe that which is unbelievable (Dupuy, 1998). The development of non-intentional models, such as Barnes' (1997), does not cast doubt on the notion of self-deception, but offers different explanations to explain its genesis, not its purpose.

For Sartre (1969), self-deception is accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states that provide claims of certainty, nevertheless accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. If one does not care about the thoughts of the masses, then one has no reason to self-deceive. One is morally isolated, hedonistic and prudent. Furthermore, if one is concerned about how others might perceive oneself or if one wants to avoid the painful and harmful consequences of one's actions, then self-deception seems feasible and rational, in the sense of the protection of one's social identity or how one wants to be seen.

In Sartre's view, one is culpable for one's own self-deception; it is always intentional. The same applies to Kierkegaard's willed deception, which extends beyond the immediate and ignores the phenomenological reality of one's agency in favour of a personal interpretation that is counter to the evidence presented by one's behaviour— the game of flirting or waiting.⁴ As Lopez (2016: 23) has suggested, "a lie or deception can be almost about anything, but bad faith is always, at its root, a lie to oneself about one's facticity and transcendence." That is a tension between what one is and what one might become; that is a free choice turned into any evitable fact. As a lecturer, I might feel forced to comply with pedagogical practices of a certain type, even though I disagree with their value (online learning, for example), because that is what is required, rather than building arguments against this approach based on student learning models and a lower quality of engagement. I forgo my options to act as an expert pedagogue, because I deceive myself into believing that I have no option and thus abdicate my responsibilities, both as a pedagogue and as a truth-teller. I deceive myself and become compliant with that to which I object. This remains true of the acts of compliance of senior managers with regard to the multiplying excellence framework, which was designed to control but is accepted readily, although seen as flawed, as in the public's interest and its protection.

Indeed, Sartre (1992: 38) compares bad faith with ignorance, claiming that ignorance, "conditions knowledge and is defined by it, that is both as possibility of

⁴See Constanti and Gibbs' (2004) discussion on emotional labour and university teaching.

knowledge and as possibility of remaining in ignorance” (ibid.: 28). When we fail to act to verify the truth, we hide behind three forms of ignorance: innocence; contemplation; and abstract knowledge. It is the second of these where truth is already constituted before us by a superior authority, leaving us not to question but to act upon what it ascribes as truth. Confronting this ignorance by making conspicuous that which is intended to be hidden is brave, when academics are contracted employers and notions of academic freedoms are questioned (Fish, 2014).

In its extreme, self-deception is the ploy of using a deliberate and irresponsible misreading of situations to avoid facing one’s responsibility or the negation of self by others.⁵ This is both being-with-others and observing them for one’s benefit. It is using others as a means to an end, or giving up to others that which is central to one’s autonomy, the responsibility for one’s actions. What is more, it can readily lead to alienation or self-estrangement from what one might become, by losing oneself in the dualism of object and subject or in the determinism of others.⁶ To avoid commitment through which authenticity can be realised, the competencies of being-for-others may be used as a sham of security for inauthentic relationships and engagements. Deception is irrational, for one remains personally culpable for the consequences of one’s actions. These self-deceptive acts are destructive and, if they are rendered against others, “the withdrawal of respect is its only fit punishment” (Kant, 1992: 91).

Such condemnation makes it imperative that members of the academy are able to recognise in their practice where they are self-deceiving themselves and, because of it, the contagion where such self-deception affects and inchoates others. Moreover, the social contagion of self-deception leads to a state of negation of trust in the trustworthy. This is evident in examples of academic and managerial practice in the institution. These may include: sticking with favoured theories rather than seeking evidence that might contest them; attributing more effort to one’s contribution to a paper than is fair; interrupting government policy in a way that is in one’s own self-interest rather than the institution’s; allowing unintended grade inflation to increase student satisfaction; and allowing one’s own ideological perspective to contort the needs of students.

Deception and self-deception may be identified in the policy and practice of university education. They can be seen in how education has drifted from being an end in itself towards a supply economics imperative or where scholars seek

⁵In an interesting passage, MacMurray (1995: 69–70) writes: “Since mutuality is constitutive for the personal, it follows that ‘I’ need ‘you’ in order to be myself. My primary fear is, therefore, that ‘you’ will not respond to my need, and that in consequence my personal existence will be frustrated.” Clearly, to question others, particularly those in authority, is a risky business for the affirmation of oneself.

⁶Sartre deals with the nature of lying as a universal in both ‘Being and Nothingness’ (1969: 48–49) and in ‘Existentialism and the Emotion’. There he writes when confronting the liar, “what would happen if everyone looked at things that way? There is no escaping this disturbing thought except by a kind of double-dealing. A man who lies and makes excuses for himself by saying “not everyone does that” is someone with an uneasy conscience, because the act of lying implies that a universal value is conferred upon the lie” (1990: 18–19).

favourable student evaluations rather than stretching their capabilities, fuelled by emotional labour and creating personal brands! Although such practices seem counter to principles of liberal, transformative education, they present a dilemma. Should we facilitate students and staff to speak the truth to each other when this might not be in their best interests, in a world that encourages compliance rather than free thinking, a world where we are under constant surveillance and are often herded by the industrial and commercial global powers? How, morally, should we prepare students to help them to flourish?

What Can the Universities Do?

Those privileged to work in universities ought to confront others, when others' opinions are not worthy of acceptance. Since self-deception leads to loss of trust in the trustworthy, and a construction of reality in which sources of authority lose all saliency as a source of truth and become providers of personal justification, where one's own judgement overrides that of others. These deceptions may be hidden in the pretext of a university education that is value for money, for the majority of students, rather than as a social mechanism to manage an increase in age-group demographics.

Such political interventions intent on deceiving the public are typified by the revelation of Arendt (1972). In her paper on the systematic lies, deception and self-deception in the Pentagon during America's involvement in Indochina, she shows clearly how these were used to manipulate public opinion. It takes little imagination to understand that the notion of facts and evidence in a post-truth era affects not only politics and science, but "becomes a burning issue for education at all levels" (Peters, 2017: 565). Moreover, Peters (2017) suggests that, as education has seemingly undergone a digital turn, criticality has been mostly avoided and replaced by narrow conceptions of standards, and state-mandated instrumental and utilitarian pedagogies. Further, he suggests that this has led to a change of focus on to job training, "rather than a broader critical citizenship agenda for participatory democracy" (ibid).

Indeed, Carvalho and de Oliveira Mota (2010) identify what might be termed empathetic trust and loyalty in higher education institutions as a foundational premise for student engagement. The development of trust within educational institutions and the sector is important to the study of higher education, yet they claim that, "research on higher education institutions has yet to include student trust as an antecedent of student loyalty" (2010: 146). Perhaps this is because, as Kovac and Kristiansen (2010: 276) add, "it seems that researchers across specific disciplines are in agreement that [empathetic] trust is a theoretically and methodologically elusive, context-dependent, multilevel, discipline – as well as culturally and historically changeable – phenomenon."

Reflection, evaluation and monitoring are acts of autonomous thinkers of the type that liberal education, and indeed industry, claim to want (CBI/PEARSON,

2017). These reflective practices also contribute to self-belief, knowledge and truth, which differentiate the self from others. To trust in one's own ability to make decisions on one's own preference is central to liberal ideals of autonomous, free action. To be able to accept the responsibility that this implies, of constituting a reasoned world reality, facilitates the ontological integration of self. It encourages creativity, confidence and community through the negotiation of shared realities.

In building this reasoned network of preference and acceptances of 'truth', in the sense of everydayness of action, students should reveal themselves both as self-trusting and as trustworthy people. To reach that position, they must be able to distinguish between their justified confidence in their competence in certain arenas and where they are incompetent. Students are likely to retain their self-trust only while that which they hold as trustworthy maintains its social validity; they are able to argue rationally for what they hold to be true or to assimilate into what their community holds as truth. This revelation process, as we have seen, is interpreted by Tierney (2006) as a 'grammar of trust'.

To maintain the implicit social contract that balances institutional autonomy and public support for universities it needs to be clear about the university's function and the risks this incurs for society. One way to achieve this is to take serious the needs of society for its leaders' policy and actions to be held to critically account for these actions. Should this pact be weakened, trust in both parties also weakens. Academics have a dependency relationship with students that requires empathetic trust to avoid the potential for exploitation of the vulnerabilities of both student and academics. In relation to the discipline, academics are trusted by their peers to share common goals that include: responsible conduct in research and authorship practices; no form of harassment; and the avoidance of conflict of interest. These support the fabric of trust on which worthwhile social interactions are constructed and a test of this trust may take place when one of its number contravenes these principles. Society's pact of the common good depends on it having confidence in any sanction made against an academic based upon incompetence, assuming moral good intent, or is deceit.

Teaching in universities also carries privileges and associated obligations: "If we can clarify our perception of duty and gain public acceptance of it, we will have fulfilled an important obligation to the society that nurtures us. These obligations constitute the highest institutional form of academic duty" (Kennedy, 1997: 22). These are the closing sentences in the first chapter of Kennedy's book entitled 'Academic Duty'. By placing duty central to the notion of academics in universities, Kennedy identifies a moral responsibility for academics that offers a way of establishing the trust that was shared between the university sector and the general public. Duty in the existential sense is not, however, the Kantian imperative of following given universals (although we might choose to act as if they did), nor the liberal balance of rights, but is an accountability to oneself to have the courage and skill to interpret one's individuality within our world as a dialectic between oneself and humanity. In this, it is an ethical exercise and is built through trust as an implicit obligation – voluntarily accepted, in the case of an academic – to pursue worthy activities and not the mechanisms of competencies.

To re-establish such an obligation, if indeed it has really been missing, will not be a quick fix in this environment where managerialism has undermined the strength of the traditional pact between higher education and society (Gornitzka et al., 2007). It might require a fundamental commitment to excellence for the revelation of the potentialities of those who offer themselves to the pursuit of higher education. It requires the denial of post-truth, which academics ought to speak out against and not be complicit, either by commission or omission. To confront post-trust, an academic should not be an apologist for those who speak of their power, rather than to it. In this sense, I am reminded of Foucault's Paris lectures (2010) on parrhesia, of speaking to the truth and of Peters' (2003) discussion of truth-telling as an educational practice. To speak out when the consequence may be unfavourable to oneself requires courage and a reconstitution of what universities have become. This is a return to an ethos of personal growth that better represents what humanity might become, rather than offering a service of blinkered higher skill training. Moreover, it requires the teacher to be trustworthy. It requires a form of self-trust that can avoid the deception of society and of oneself, a deception that was prevalent even before a post-trust era, but which is more acute and acceptable within it.

Concluding Remarks – Self-Trust at the Foundations of the University

Trust education between student, tutor and institution has, in the main, been considered as a virtue of 'good' higher education. Within it, there are opportunities to question the importance of self and one's contribution to society, and this might well help to settle the purpose of higher education and why it ought to have public trust. Certainly, in an educational framework where the self has to expose its vulnerability to another, anything other than a moral duty of trusting care would make the offer of education potentially loaded and exploitative. Indeed, I follow Olafson (1998) in that a failure to respect others is a violation of the trust placed in us, as academics, by those to whom we are responsible.

The most important question for the future of higher education seems to be, 'Can we trust those who control it to deliver anything other than competencies aimed at securing employment, thus placing education in the hands of the industrialist, or is there a role for the professional educationalist?' To hold someone accountable for their use of state-sponsored education in the sense of value (of money, citizenship and morality) requires a clear statement of the expected responsibility and output. A competence model of education has benefits for those who feel attracted to this economic expediency model. However, the appropriateness of such business comparisons is debatable and, even if valid, changes not only the process of becoming, but the very nature of the autonomous individual.

I suggest that a failure to speak out against bad faith in our engagements with students and with the institutions within which we work and for them, likewise to

speak out to policy, can easily result for both students and educators in the objectification of the other, which is to say unwarrantedly placing an individual into one of the categories above, “so that his or her independence and responsibility as a human being is denied, and thereby stultifying his or her potential learning gain” (Blenkinsop & Waddington, 2014: 10). As the primary aim of higher education, competency of trust replaces moral trust with the pragmatic and short-term notion of uncontextualised competency, which ultimately dilutes the moral dimension of the relationships embedded in being educated. The issue has to be addressed through an assessment of what we expect from the university: quite simply, in what can we trust?

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Chapter 13

Coda



Paul Gibbs and Peter Maassen

Among the phenomena that characterize the early twenty-first century, the most significant must be the disappearance of the landmarks that society uses to find its bearings, and the increasing difficulty that individuals have in visualizing an optimistic future for themselves – a feeling exacerbated by following a daily spectacle of wars and mass migrations

Winand (2018: 221)

The dominance in higher education of the discussion of trust in, rather than the trustworthiness of the sector, is accompanied in the UK by an audit culture and intensifying use of performance indicators. The growing belief in the untrustworthiness of higher education, especially in England, has even spread to one of the pillars of university self-identification – academic freedom. UK national policy has substituted a trust for the guardianship of academics to facilitate a clear educative purpose of higher education for a raft of simulacra of trust and, in so doing, has diverted meaningful discussion from the inherent importance of trusting in higher education's many forms and contexts, from governance to student plagiarism. In such turmoil, academics' own trustworthiness, revealed in their practice, is questioned. Adopting measurements for everything distorts the importance and wonder of academic discovery and the universities' focus on learning. This has left the sector incurring high costs without securing substantial benefits. Indeed, the opacity of many metrics have led to concerns being raised, or at least suspicions voiced,

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reflecting diminishing social and individual trust in the higher education institutions and the members who constitute them.

This does not have to be inevitable as is shown by the developments in higher education in Norway, which has a long tradition of a rather homogeneous and parliamentary-based political leadership having a stable and transparent governance relationship with the higher education sector. This implies that the political leadership of the country has maintained also in recent years a close, interactive connection with the leadership and academic communities of the universities and colleges, characterised by mutual trust, which favours incremental administrative reforms, control by cooperation, and a democratic, communicative way of policy-making for the sector. Nonetheless, also in Norway maintaining a mutually acceptable balance between trust and accountability is seen as a challenge, even though there are relatively few accountability mechanisms in Norwegian higher education compared to England.

As the contributions to this Volume illustrate, trust is used in a wide range of contexts and with a variety of meanings in higher education. In line with this, the approaches to 'trust' used in the various chapters of this Volume vary widely, from structural versions, such as Luhmann's 'institutionalised mistrust' (Luhmann, 1979), to existential and psychological ones, with varieties in between. In addition, the relation between social trust and trust at the individual level has been discussed in a number of chapters. While trust at both levels has remained high in Norway and other Nordic countries (Rothstein, 2011: 146), in countries such as the UK and the USA, both have declined. As argued in a report by the Pew Research Center (2019: 5), "personal trust turns out to be like many other personal attributes and goods that are arrayed unequally in society, following the same overall pattern as home ownership and wealth, for example. Americans who might feel disadvantaged are less likely to express generalized trust in other people." The decline in levels of trust in the UK has been accompanied by the emergence of an audit culture designed to augment trust, but which, at its core, creates alternatives to trust, favouring external standards, control and sanctions. This changes the disposition of trustworthiness to one of compliance to rules and regulations: it allows expertise to be placed not in the wise and the worthy, but in the hands of technicians and pragmatists.

Higher Education

The above quote by Winand opens a UNESCO Courier article on Universities and the democracy of the gullible. In this Volume, we have addressed one of those landmarks of society referred to by Winand (2018) and its relationship with the university: trust. This has been done from the perspective of the eroding pact between higher education and society, and levels of societal trust in higher education varying from country to country. In addition, the authors in this Volume have discussed trusting within academia, from trusting in students and peers, to trust in teaching and research and from trusting colleagues to trusting institutional leadership and

management. What can be inferred is that trust is rhizomatic: it is the foundation of the university and it appears in predictable places where it can be codified, in policy, process and practice and it can occur in unforeseen ways where only a disposition of trust, an ethic of trustworthiness, can offer assurance against deceit, mistrust and lies. In order for a pact between higher education and society to flourish, we need our higher education institutions, as well as those who work in them, to be independent and to envision their work in the public interest to seek to benefit the common good and not to structure their work to follow a system of metrics, rather than follow their curiosity. From this perspective, it is important to acknowledge that forms of accountability can be made to support rather than supersede intelligent forms of trust¹.

However, this is not warranted where shifts to academic capitalism (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004) in the form of individualism, personal profit and self-aggrandisement become self-serving machines to generate knowledge – and power – for a slim sector of society. It is not the way to increase credibility in universities and in those to whom trust is entrusted. Trust is only enhanced when there is a clear purpose for compliance and that is to ensure that universities work for the good of the many in society. This provides a reason why the general public should trust them. Indeed, what may be required of higher education is a new moral compass; one that can enhance trust and direct society. This is not a call for blind, unconditional trust in anything or anybody, but rather an educative process that enables the development of astute persons who would bestow trust on someone who is demonstrably trustworthy. As Žalec (2013: 67) argues, if “we want to reach an improvement in the field of (higher) education we must take care of moral and professional virtues and competencies of teachers and pupils/students and then trust them.”

At the same time, in many countries consumerist forces – driven in the United Kingdom by high tuition fees, quality assurance, managerialism and the student-consumer paradigm – are reducing the power of the academics to, “define the curriculum, determine acceptable standards of student achievement and decide appropriate pedagogic strategies” (Naidoo & Jamieson, 2005: 268). These changes are having an impact on the very nature of academia through changes in students’ and academics’ pace of work and their time perspectives of the form of education that universities and colleges deliver and the knowledge that is produced at these institutions. Under these changing circumstances, as has been argued in a number of the chapters in this Volume, leadership is required. Such changes need to generate justice, equality and participation, which require leadership itself to be participatory and democratically distinguished to achieve these goals (Maassen, 2017). Here we can refer to Gross (2015) who claims that without trust, the connectivity so central to the creation of community and the capacity to learn and take risks, diminishes.

¹For a detailed presentation of various meanings of the term accountability, see Stensaker and Harvey (2011) and Maassen et al. (2017).

Trust and Trustworthiness in Higher Education

The authors that have contributed to this Volume have approached trust from various perspectives and disciplinary lenses. This reflects the state of the art of the academic interest in the concept of trust in the field of higher education studies, and the fact that it is still too early for a conceptual synthesis of the terrain. What the Volume's authors have in common, though, is an interest in studying tensions that emerge as a result of NPM inspired governance reforms in higher education, whether far-reaching, as in the UK, or more moderate, as in Norway. This concerns, for example, tensions between:

- Student autonomy and effectiveness of securing learning outcomes.
- Student and academic well-being and revenue growth.
- Academic and administrator satisfaction, economic realities and common goods.
- Intra-university and external values and norms.
- Individualism and the common good.

With this as a starting point, we can point to the insights the chapters of this Volume provide in the importance of context in the study of trust in higher education. As discussed in the introductory chapter, and addressed throughout the Volume, the national context for the governance of higher education as well as the developments in higher education for Norway differ from that of the UK, and especially England. Therefore, the impact of the (national) context on the role of higher education in the generation of personal and social trust should be one of the core issues addressed in a future research agenda.

In addition, the future research agenda on trust in higher education should be multi-disciplinary, and be aimed at contributing to a better understanding of the factors that affect trust in and for higher education. This would include macro level investigations, such as the study of the shift from a trust-based to an executive governance approach, and the analysis of how macro level developments affect the level of individual and social trust among the population of universities and colleges. Does an executive governance model in higher education institutions erode or free up the positive role of higher education in generating social trust, as presented in Chap. 2 of this Volume (see also Rothstein, 2011: 163)? Does a move away from the emotional and ethical notion of decline in social trust among students imply that the level of education will become less significant as a variable explaining variance in our citizenships? At the micro-level, we need more knowledge, for example, on how trust relates to the learning outcomes of students in higher education. In this, it will also be of relevance to analyse the relation between trust and its attributes and other variables, such as disciplines, type and geographical location of higher education institution, level of study program (Bachelor – Master – Doctoral), etc.

This preliminary agenda is obviously far from exhaustive. As shown in the chapters in this Volume, there are many issues and questions with respect to trust in and for higher education that need to be addressed in a more structured and valid way.

Instead of seeking a synthesis of the views expressed in this Volume, we hope that the questions and issues that have emerged in this Volume, as exemplified by the research issues presented above, offer a worthy approach to further conceptualizing trust (in higher education) and developing and implementing a more comprehensive research agenda. The chapters in this Volume offer meaningful illustrations how this approach might be achieved.

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