Global Political Demography

The Politics of Population Change

Edited by
Achim Goerres · Pieter Vanhuysse

Global Political Demography

"Political demography takes a major step forward in this volume, whose global scope is unprecedented. The relationships among population change, immigration, ethnicity and regimes, political conflict, and revolutions are delineated with great skill and insight. This book is filled with essential findings for all scholars of politics and development."

—Jack A. Goldstone, *Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, USA*

"The uneven pace of the demographic transition around the world is altering the age and ethnic composition of countries. This is recasting the domestic and international politics of the twenty-first century. Covering every continent, Global Political Demography performs the vital task of bringing together the world's leading scholars of the politics of population change. They help us make sense of the trends that are shaking the foundations of our modern world."

—Eric Kaufmann, *Birkbeck College, University of London, UK*

"This book is a foundational contribution to establish 'political demography'. The individual chapters address key areas of demographic change – including urbanization, migration and population aging – and ask how these processes impact politics, public policies, political behaviour, political institutions and the political order of a country. The book overcomes the narrow view of prior research by adopting a truly global perspective. It is not only a must-read for scholars and students in the field, but of interest to a wider audience interested in the global challenges posed by demographic change."

—Michaela Kreyenfeld, *Hertie School, Berlin, Germany*

"This state-of-the-art and original book is much-needed at the present time of global economic uncertainties. The focus on changes in demographic structure and composition as a driving force shaping political and policy landscapes and the feedback loop offer a new perspective. Its comprehensive coverage of low-, middle- and high-income countries in all world regions and in-depth analysis of population heterogeneity provide a holistic picture of the relationship between population dynamics and politics for the very first time."

—Raya Muttarak, *International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, OeAW, University of Vienna)*

"This book is a tour de force. Achim Goerres and Pieter Vanhuysse provide the first comprehensive treatment of the interplay of demography and politics around the world over half a century. Leading researchers from each continent analyze the many political causes and consequences of population change, from silver populations to migration flows, from youth bulges to religions. This is a must-read for everyone concerned about global demographic shifts and the big forces shaping our common future."

—Tomáš Sobotka, *Vienna Institute of Demography, and Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, Austria*

Achim Goerres · Pieter Vanhuysse
Editors

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palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Achim Goerres
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Universität Duisburg-Essen
Duisburg
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

Pieter Vanhuysse
Department of Political Science, Danish
Institute for Advanced Study (DIAS),
and Interdisciplinary Centre on
Population Dynamics (CPOP-SAMF)
University of Southern Denmark
Odense, Denmark

For
Hannah, Anna, Alexander, Jana and Andrea
and in memory of
Dennis C. Spies (1981–2021)

Preface

This book is about the politics and public policies of population change across the globe. It is our attempt to make interdisciplinary progress at the intersection of demography and political science in order to fully understand the breadth and pace of demographic change worldwide.

This book grew out of an idea that we tossed around at a workshop in Gothenburg in autumn 2015. In 2012, we had edited a volume on the comparative politics of population ageing in advanced industrial democracies in an attempt to make some advances in the fields of political sociology, comparative politics, comparative political economy and welfare state research ("Ageing Populations in Post-industrial Democracies: Comparative Studies of Policies and Politics, Routledge", Routledge). In late summer 2016, we met in Odense to sketch out the first ideas for this book and identify suitable experts from across the globe. Since we had been working mostly on the OECD world ourselves, this was a steep learning experience. In 2017, we approached the Käte Hamburger Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen with the question whether they could fund an international conference to bring together such a global group of experts. Luckily, they were able to do so, leading to a conference that took place on 23–24 November 2017 in Duisburg. We would like to thank the Centre's directors Tobias Debiel, Dirk Messner and Sigrid Quack for supporting this project, and Matthias Schuler for administrative help during the workshop.

For this volume, we wanted to adopt a wide scope across three dimensions. First, we wanted not only to include population ageing as the dominant driver of change in the age composition of modern societies, but to also add an in-depth analysis of migration as a fundamental factor of population change. Second, we wanted to expand the perspective beyond advanced industrial democracies to cover all major macro-regions of the world in order to develop a fuller picture of the dynamics of the politics of population change. Third, we wanted to broaden the time period under consideration, from 1990 to today and into the near future, up to 2040.

Takeshi Hieda, Eric Kaufmann, Achim Kemmerling, Daniel Lambach, Paul Marx, Attila Melegh, Miquel Pellicer, Micheline van Riemsdijk, John Sidel, Tomáš Sobotka and Marianne Ulriksen.

We thank Jonas Elis and Sebastian Krause for managing this book's companion, the Global Political Demography Database. Further thanks go to Erik Wenker at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Frederik Pfeiffer and Klaus Petersen at CPOP-SAMF, University of Southern Denmark, and Ambra Finotello at Palgrave Macmillan.

A special thanks goes to Josra Riecke who acted as our book manager for over a year to deal with the authors, reviewers, publishers and two editors who were at times "snowed under" with various extraordinary tasks, both professionally and privately.

We have both contributed equally to this volume, just as we did back in 2012. We continue rotating the order of names in the edited volume and in the introductory chapters, meaning that this edited volume is Goerres/Vanhuysse (eds.) whereas the first was Vanhuysse/Goerres (eds.) and vice versa for the introductory chapters.

The book is accompanied by a project homepage at the Open Science Framework. The current URL is https://osf.io/xcvdh/.

The project homepage contains the Global Political Demography Database with documentation that is free to access:

Goerres, Achim, Vanhuysse, Pieter, Krause, Sebastian and Elis, Jonas (2020): Global Political Demography Database, current version 1.4.1, November 2020.

The online project page also contains the online appendix with detailed material for some of the chapters.

As we draw this project to a close in December 2020, the world is experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2019 and that put many lives upside down in 2020 all over the world. Whereas this book does not analyse the impact of COVID-19 from the point of view of political demography, we experienced vividly how this global pandemic impacted on our global group of contributors in remarkably similar ways.

This book is about the macro-politics of population change. We dedicate it to those with whom we actively experience population dynamics at the micro-level every day:

Our children, Hannah, Anna, and Alexander,
Our partner and wife, Jana and Andrea

Finally, we would like to honour our colleague and friend Dennis C. Spies, Professor of Political Economy at Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf, who passed away unexpectedly much too young (1981–2021).

Odense, Denmark   Pieter Vanhuysse
Duisburg, Germany   Achim Goerres
December 2020

About This Book

This ambitious open-access book draws the big picture of how population change interplays with politics across the world from 1990 to 2040. Leading social scientists from a wide range of disciplines discuss, for the first time, all major political and policy aspects of population change as they play out differently in each major world region: North and South America; sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region; Western and East Central Europe; Russia, Belarus and Ukraine; East Asia; Southeast Asia; subcontinental India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; Australia and New Zealand. These macro-regional analyses are completed by cross-cutting global analyses of migration, religion and poverty, and age profiles and intra-state conflicts. From all angles, the book shows how strongly contextualized the political management and the political consequences of population change are. While long-term population ageing and short-term migration fluctuations present structural conditions, political actors play a key role in (mis-)managing, manipulating and (under-)planning population change, which in turn determines how citizens in different groups react.

Contents

Contributors

Arun Balachandran Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Catherine Promise Biira Institute for Regional Integration and Development, Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, Kenya

Alessandra Bonci Laval University, Québec, Canada

Francesco Cavatorta Laval University, Québec, Canada

Richard Cincotta The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, USA

Clara Galeazzi Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (CEENRG) at the Land Economy Department, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Stuart A. Gietel-Basten The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Sai Kung, Hong Kong SAR

Achim Goerres Department of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

Vitor Goncalves Cavalcanti World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

Christof Hartmann Department of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

Moritz Hess Niederrhein University of Applied Sciences, Mönchengladbach, Germany

K. S. James International Institute for Population Sciences, Deemed University, Mumbai, India

Rza Kazimov Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Berlin, Germany

Axel Klein Department of Political Science and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

Andrew Markus Emeritus Professor, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia; Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Peter McDonald Emeritus Professor of Demography, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia; University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Hannes Mosler Department of Political Science and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

Elias Naumann University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

Jose Navarro Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Nele Noesselt Department of Political Science, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

Jolanta Perek-Białas Institute of Sociology and Center for Evaluation and Analysis of Public Policies, Jagiellonian University, Cracow and Warsaw School of Economics, Cracow, Poland

Jennifer D. Sciubba Rhodes College, Memphis, TN, USA

Ronald Skeldon Emeritus Professor, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Honorary Professor, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

Vegard Skirbekk Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Pieter Vanhuysse Department of Political Science, Danish Institute for Advanced Study (DIAS), and Interdisciplinary Centre on Population Dynamics (CPOP-SAMF), University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

Diego Wachs Care Policy and Evaluation Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Hannes Weber University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (HSE IDEM), National Research University, Moscow, Russia

Patrick Ziegenhain President University, Cikarang, Indonesia

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Introduction: Political Demography as an Analytical Window on Our World

Pieter Vanhuysse and Achim Goerres

1 WHY WE NEED A POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY LENS

Much has happened to the world's populations in the past three decades since 1990. Migration flows have become large and volatile, making news headlines and firing up political rhetoric on an almost monthly basis. Nearly every society in the rich world has been ageing for decades, yet

P. Vanhuysse (✉)
Department of Political Science, Danish Institute for Advanced Study (DIAS), and Interdisciplinary Centre on Population Dynamics (CPOP-SAMF), University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
e-mail: vanhuysse@sam.sdu.dk

A. Goerres
Department of Political Science,
University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
e-mail: Achim.goerres@uni-due.de

some of the world's poorest countries still have a population make-up revealing massive youth bulges (clearly higher population shares in young age groups). Urbanization has changed the ways in which individuals live and interact on many continents and is likely to accelerate even further in the near future. The majority of the United Nations (UN) member states have policies in place to attempt some form of population control or demographic engineering, traditionally mainly in order to manipulate fertility rates, now increasingly also migration variables. With many key variables of population structure in flux wide across the world, there has rarely been a more urgent time to ask key questions at the interface of demography and political science, population change and politics. What have been the political and policy consequences of these population changes in the world's macro-regions since 1990 until today? And what can we reasonably expect to happen up to 2040?

Political demography, or the systematic study of population change and politics, public policies and polities, sees population dynamics (structure and change) as one of the main drivers of politics at the meso- and macro-level. As an approach, it can be defined as the study of the dynamics in the size, composition and distribution of populations and their effects on political and policy processes.[1] As such, rare exceptions notwithstanding (Goldstone et al., 2012; Teitelbaum, 2015; Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001), political demography is still a surprisingly marginal discipline, both within demography and within political science with no major research networks, loose or institutionalized, or standard works of reference. And yet, 'the human tide' of ever-shifting and changing population trends has been a key shaper of the political and sociological outlines of the world we inhabit today (Dorling & Gietel-Basten, 2018; Morland, 2019). Indeed, however widespread it still may be, the very idea of analysing populations and politics *separately* seems futile. As Robbins and Smith (2017: 212) put it, "[t]here is a close relationship between observations of births, deaths, and fertility and normative urges to govern these same things: population research is political research".

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[1] In the words of Myron Weiner, one of its earliest advocates, political demography is "the study of the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to both government and politics. It is concerned with the political consequences of population change, especially the effects of population change on the demands made upon governments, on the performance of governments, on the distribution of political power within states, and on the distribution of national power among states" (cited in Teitelbaum, 2015: S88).

    This book posits that it is both timely and fruitful to adopt a political demography lens as an analytical window on our fast-changing world. We try to do so by bringing together a truly global group of scholars from area studies, demography, economics, geography, political science and sociology, to trace and think through political and policy processes of demographic trends in the macro-region of their expertise, under the editorial guidance of two died-in-the-wool political scientists. Our aims are, first and foremost, descriptive: to track, synthesize and summarize the key demographic developments across these large macro-regions between 1990 and 2040. Then, in a second instance, we aim to theorize, sometimes speculate, about the domestic and intra-regional political and policy repercussions of these developments.

2   DEMOGRAPHIC MEGATRENDS: GLOBAL POLITICAL GAME CHANGERS

We define population change for our purposes as: (a) the change in the relative size of the age groups in those societies (mostly due to changes in fertility, longevity; realized as population ageing or rejuvenation), (b) international migration and (c) changes in the absolute size of the population. Political consequences refer, here, to political processes such as voting outcomes, political rhetoric, power balances and various expressions—peaceful or otherwise—of political conflict, public policies (e.g. pensions, education, family policy, population control) and political institutions. We largely leave aside related important questions of military strategy and geopolitical balance (e.g. Goldstone, 2002; Haas 2012; Sciubba, 2012) or of population ethics (e.g. Coole, 2018; Dasgupta, 2019; van Parijs, 1998). In terms of geographic scope, we aim for a truly all-encompassing global scope. We present comparative analyses, written by area experts, of major countries in the following macro-regions: North Africa (Tunisia and Morocco) and sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda); Southern America (Argentina and Brazil) and Northern America (Canada and the US), South Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines); East Asia (South Korea and Japan; China, Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan); Australia and Oceania (New Zealand); and Europe (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus); Continental Western Europe; and East Central Europe. Figure 1 shows a map highlighting which countries are covered in which chapter.

Fig. 1 Overview of countries covered in the book and their chapter (*Source* Own computation)

In addition, to better frame these macro-regional analyses, we also present overarching synthetic overviews of three hugely salient issues of global political demography today: migration flows (Skeldon, this volume), poverty and religious affiliation (Skirbekk & Navarro, this volume) and youth bulges (Cincotta & Weber, this volume). Extending our analytical time horizon up to 2040, a frequent practice in demography, may rightly be a cause of scepticism to many political scientists or sociologists. After all, predicting the future is a notoriously perilous activity, the graveyard of many an expert's reputation (Tetlock, 2006; Tetlock & Gardner, 2015). Human societies are complex systems in which agentic actors must navigate uncertain landscapes, and which have emergent properties (Jervis, 1997; Room, 2016). As Karl Popper (1957) noted long ago, an important set of major social trends are *by nature* unexpected and *essentially* hard to predict and plan for. These include 'black swan' shocks such as financial, environmental and economic crises that are extremely hard to predict, yet, when they occur, radically perturb the game plans of policymakers and social actors (Taleb, 2001, 2013). However, population developments are at least partially an *exception* to the inherent unpredictability of social and political life. True enough, as Europe has observed since 2015, massive migration streams can arise in the scope of days and weeks, significantly shaping political actions,

discourses and policies. Rare, devastating pandemics such as COVID-19 since late 2019 can have even swifter, and strongly age-asymmetric, effects on population mortality rates. But in other respects, populations better resemble massive, slow-moving elephants. Once a cohort has been born, we know with relative statistical certainty key elements of its future life course, such as its infant mortality, gender balance, expected life span and remaining life span at ages 40, 60 and 80 (but, crucially, *not* its net migration rate). It is this mixture of certainty and unpredictability of population change and its interdependence with politics that fascinated us throughout this book.

So we do know a few things with some confidence, extrapolating into the near future from currently ongoing global population trends. And what we know points to both major turbulences and disparities ahead. Already today, half the world's population is younger than 30, but half the rich world's voting population is over 55. In other words, within global trends there is substantial variation in population changes and political reactions. As Kaufmann and Toft (2012: 5) note, the demographic trends of the twenty-first century will lead, almost inevitably, to "aging great powers with shrinking labour forces alongside youthful and rapidly growing developing nations home to terrorism and turbulence".

For instance, *youth bulges* are near-certain to arise or even grow in places like Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. And when they do, they are likely, though not predestined, to be accompanied by a higher incidence of crime, violence and unemployment (Cincotta & Weber, this volume; Cincotta & Doces, 2012; Urdal, 2012). By contrast, the labour force is near-certain to shrink significantly as *silver populations* will continue to grow in super-sized economies such as Japan, Brazil, China and every single one of Europe's key economic powerhouses (Bloom et al., 2015; Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012). Unlike Coleman and Basten (2015), Goldstone (2012: 25–27) posits that globally, the next few decades will see the relative decline of Europe and the Americas compared to Asia and Africa, "a fun house mirror of aging" of older rich countries and very young poor countries, and "migration, migration everywhere".

But—what is ageing? It is certainly true that Europe, like East Asia and South America, are becoming demographically older continents when the aggregate age is measured by standard (chronological) old-age dependency ratios (henceforth OADRs, the number of 65plussers per 100 people aged 18–64). But of course, especially in the richer regions of

these same continents and among the richer classes within them, chronologically elderly citizens are also likely to grow both cognitively fitter and *prospectively* younger, with longer remaining life expectancy at later ages (Kristensen et al., 2009; Sanderson & Scherbov, 2010, 2019; Skirbekk, 2012). As Vanhuysse and Perek-Bialas (this volume) put it, with few notable exceptions, many of the world's rich societies today are *simultaneously* ageing (chronologically) and not ageing or even rejuvenating (prospectively).

However, these observable trends—themselves a result of better lifestyles, health policies, health treatments and technologies, and early-life conditions—are unlikely to translate *proportionately* into outcomes of political economy importance, whether in terms of increased productivity, economic growth, faster technology adoption or higher levels of labour market participation on the part of older workers through later retirement or even unretirement (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017; Gordon, 2016). Neither are they likely to be compensated by massive (and politically unpalatable) immigration boosts. Despite improvements in prospective old-age dependency ratios, the continued increase of chronological old-age dependency ratios therefore implies that there will be fewer young and prime working-age people burdened with providing fiscal foundations for ageing welfare states (Sanderson & Scherbov, 2019; Vanhuysse, 2015a). For instance, the UN Population Division estimated that already by 2030 the number of 60plussers will be two-thirds larger than that of children below 15 in France and more than twice as large in Germany. As Goldstone (2012: 26) notes, these are "astonishing numbers, never before seen in human history".

3   GREY POWER AND VOTING: PRO-ELDERLY POLICY BIAS AND THE RISE OF GERONTOCRACY?

In political science and political economy, the near-universal acceleration of population ageing since the 1990s in the advanced democracies has led to renewed debates about elderly power. This literature puts forward three main propositions: (1) currently, older persons receive more overall public transfers than in past decades (Kotlikoff & Burns, 2012); (2) older persons receive more than children (Vanhuysse, 2013) when looked at cross-sectionally; and (3) the elderly/children public transfer ratio has been increasing. The tendency is alternatively referred to as 'grey power',

'gerontocracy' (Sinn & Uebelmesser, 2002), or 'pro-elderly bias' (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2010a). More alarmist accounts even speak of generational 'storms' or 'clashes' (Kotlikoff & Burns, 2012). Here, too, non-linear and non-functionalist thinking would be welcome. Direct evidence of resource grabs by elderly voters is mixed at best thus far.[2] True enough, advanced welfare states do indeed appear to be distinctly, if variably, elderly oriented in their *public transfer* patterns (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2010a; Vanhuysse, 2013, 2014). But once we shine a wider light on what resources generations give each other and also look at private transfer patterns (cash and time), the ensuing picture is not just more complete but also radically different. These same welfare states, it turns out, are actually embedded within societies composed of strongly *child*-oriented families (really, parents) (Gal et al., 2018; Vanhuysse & Gal, 2021). Also, the social status of older people is lower in some contemporary societies, even though their relative numerical share is higher (Foner, 1984). In other words, it may be that grey power is talked about most in contexts in which the social status of older people (especially, older men) has never been lower. That said, changes in the distribution of political power and other key resources are highly likely to follow from the *uneven* demographic growth rates of key ethnic, religious and age groups within the population (Goldstone, 2012; Teitelbaum, 2015). Uneven growth is crucial for politics—these *relative* power changes in turn are likely to lead to distinct political developments and conflicts at the meso-, macro- and inter-state level.[3]

Our overarching question in this book is how the ever-evolving political economy and political sociology traits of some population groups relative to others—notably in terms of numerical size, economic clout and political capacity—can be expected to affect public policies, political actions and political order, via the intermediary of political and institutional processes, and how this may then produce various feedback effects. What does the demographic profile in terms of statics and dynamics tell us

[2] See, for instance, Vanhuysse (2001), Goerres (2007a, 2009), Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009, 2010b, 2012) and Goerres and Vanhuysse (2012).

[3] To quote Kaufmann and Toft (2012: 5): "Unbalanced age (and sex) ratios tend to alter rates of economic growth, unemployment, instability, and violence. Urbanization creates dislocations that have traditionally been associated with religious, ethnic, class, or nationalist movements. And differential ethno-religious population growth may set the stage for ethnic, religious, and nationalist violence, value conflict, or challenges to the unity of what are often fragile states".

about the political problems that a country or a macro-region was facing in 1990, is facing today, and will be facing by 2040? This demographic structure in turn reflects stages of socio-economic modernization. Cohort sizes influence citizens' demand on the state in certain policy areas, as mediated by institutions, notably constellations of trade unions and age-relevant interest groups, electoral, legal and constitutional rules, policy and governance cultures, and welfare state regimes. The degree to which these factors affect a cohort's relative political power will then affect its command of policy resources and the cornerstones of political order. To analyse these many variables empirically and coherently, we have built the Global Political Demography Database (Goerres et al., 2020) as an empirical companion to this book, which covers many more countries than we can analyse in depth here.

4   Putting the Global Political Demography Database to Work

4.1   The Age Composition of Societies

It is worth pointing out from the outset that the observation that a larger number of people can expect to live longer lives (of quality) is, perhaps first and foremost, a yardstick of social progress (Vanhuysse, 2015b). Moderately low levels of fertility may actually imply improvements in living standards (Lee, 2014). In fact, they may even be desirable as long as human capital levels increase and environmental costs decrease (Dasgupta, 2019; Striessnig & Lutz, 2013). Population ageing is therefore not a moral problem as such. Nor is it necessarily a political *problem* everywhere, as many of the chapters in this volume demonstrate. Globally, the median age rose from 23.4 in 1990 to 29.3 in 2015. It is projected to rise even further to 35.6 in 2040. Let us turn towards the share of older people as more directly relevant indicator from an ageing perspective. Globally, the proportion of people aged 65+ had a mean of 6.0% in 1990, 8.4% in 2015 and is estimated to rise to 14.5% in 2040. This implies an increase by a factor of 2.4 in 50 years. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the share of older people is also increasing strongly, from a standard deviation of 3.9% in 1990 to 8.9% in 2040. In other words, the population make-up with regard to older people will be getting more heterogeneous as we progress into the future. The per-country change in the proportion of older people relative to the population across the period 1990–2040

varies dramatically, too. Seven countries, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Chad, Sao Tome and Principe, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Burkina Faso are projected to experience a small decline in the proportion of older people between 1990 and 2040, with the 1.2 percentage point decline in Equatorial Guinea being the largest. Among all other 193 countries and regions in the sample, the projection points towards an increase in the proportion of the older people between 1990 and 2040. South Korea is the world leader in population ageing with an estimated increase of +25.9 percentage points from 5.2 to 31.1% (also Klein & Mosler, this volume). This almost universal picture of population ageing does not go hand in hand with a universal awareness of population ageing as a political issue. In fact, surprisingly, even some countries with rapid ageing, such as India, show no indication yet of that being problematized (James & Balachandran, this volume).

Other demographic indicators mirror a similar pattern. To touch briefly on the young end of the distribution, globally the relative proportion of young people (aged 0–17) had a mean of 41.2% in 1990 and is projected to decline to only 26.8% in 2040. But even in 2040, there will still be a lot of cross-country-heterogeneity as to the variation of the share of young people between the minimum of 13.8% in Portugal and the maximum of 53.2% in Congo. In 2040, the proportion of young people will be roughly four times as high in Congo as in Portugal with a large potential for conflict in the former compared to the latter (Urdal, 2012; Cincotta & Weber, this volume).

Another key demographic indicator is the OADR. This measure is politically very relevant since many age-redistributive systems are built around the notion of taking from the working-age population (with a censoring of working age at 15 and around the mid-60s) and giving it to people aged older than mid-60s, and typically retired around that age (Gal et al., 2018; Vanhuysse & Gal, 2021). Even though the age demarcation lines are likely to change, this idea of cross-age group public redistribution is likely to remain valid into the future of welfare politics. In 1990, across the globe there were on average 9.8 65plussers per 100 people aged 15–64. This number rose to 12.9 in 2015 and is projected to rise to 23.6 in 2040. This means that on average the OADR is estimated to rise by the factor 2.4 in 50 years. In 2040, the minimum (4.8) will be slightly above that in 1990 (1.7), but the maximum will rise from 27.7 in 1990 (Sweden) to 69.3 in 2040 (Martinique). Some countries will see such an OADR increase of 54.7 (Martinique). Other countries that started from

a low OADR level in 1990 will see an unprecedented relative rise by a factor of more than 8, such as the United Arab Emirates (from 1.7 to 16.3). In other words, any system based on cross-age redistribution in the United Arab Emirates is undergoing a drastic change in the relative group sizes that are part of that redistribution. Such drastic changes minimally need political mediation and can maximally lead to political conflict about how to manage such changes politically.

4.2   *International Migration*

In the five-year period 1985 to 1990, most countries experienced relatively little net migration in percent of their 1990 population size (the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants divided by 1990 population size). The mean was −0.7%, meaning that on average countries experiences a slight emigration averaged across the previous 5 years, worth about 0.7% of their 1990 populace. Indeed, the bulk of countries in the middle 50% of the distribution, within the interquartile range, reached values between −1.7 and +0.6%. There were some stark outliers in that period, too. Ten countries had a negative net migration worth more than 10% of its 1990 population size with Liberia at the minimum of −19.0% due to its civil war at that time. Four countries had more than 10% positive net migration with Djibouti at the maximum of 15.3%. The overall picture remained pretty similar in 2015, with a mean of 0.1%, an interquartile range between −1.2 and +0.7%, a minimum of −22.5% (Syria due to its civil war) and a maximum of +26.9% (Qatar, due to massive domestic investment attracting migrant labourers). These few descriptive statistics suffice to show how single country episodes can drastically change the net migration experience of a country (also Skeldon, this volume). This, we speculate, is the reason that the projections for net migration in the period 2035–2040 (medium UN projection) are much more homogeneous, compared to the historical numbers because single episodes cannot be predicted well. The 200 countries are projected to have much less extreme values as to their net migration. When we compare net migration relative to population size in 2010–2015 with net migration in 1985–1990, we see again the importance of single episodes shifting the migration profile of some countries dramatically, sometimes even from a strong emigration profile to a strong immigration profile. Lebanon, for instance, changed from relative net migration of −8.4% in 1990 to +21.3% in 2015 due to the combination of its own past civil war

and the civil war in adjacent Syria. This foreshadows some of the patterns that the contributors in this book observe (for instance, Skeldon, this volume).

4.3   Patterns of Covariation Between Population and Political Indicators

Let us look at three political indicators and see how they co-vary with central indicators of demography: age group composition, net migration and fertility. For our Global Political Demography Database (Goerres et al., 2020), we compiled, more extensively than ever before to our knowledge, age group specific estimates of electoral turnout (see online Appendix A.1 for a detailed table).

Figure 2 reveals an almost universal political demography observation: older people are more likely to go to the polls compared to young people in the same country. Only few countries are on or to the right

Fig. 2 Estimated turnout rates in the last national election in or just before 2015 for young people (aged 18–29) and older people (60+) (*Source* Own computations from Global Political Demography Database [Goerres et al., 2020])

of the 45-degree line (which captures countries where the turnout rates are the same), possibly due to a rather universal process of habituation and growing norm-abidance associated with individual ageing (Goerres, 2007b). If we combine these two pieces of information into one data point by producing a ratio (estimated turnout of older people divided by estimated turnout among young people), we get a variable of the turnout of older people (those aged above 60) relative to that of younger people (those aged 18–29). This relative turnout ratio varies between 0.89 (Pakistan) to 4.4 (Lebanon), with a mean of 1.5. This means that on average turnout among older people is 1.5 times as high as that of younger people. Can we predict this relative turnout by demographic indicators, with simple controls for electoral system, average turnout and GDP? When we run a multivariate regression, we find that higher net migration relative to the 2015 population positively predicts the ratio. Countries with more immigration also tend to have an electoral turnout ratio skewed more in favour of older people. For every percentage point more of net migration, the turnout ratio is estimated to increase by 0.04 (90% c.i. [0.013; 0.07.3]). Recall that the turnout ratio ranges from 0.9 to 4.4. There is thus a correlational pattern between the ratio of turnout rates and migration even after we have included simple control variables.

Let us now go one step further and add the relative population size of each age group to the relative turnout measure. We multiply the relative turnout ratio by the age group size ratio (those aged above 60 divided by those aged 18–29). This new variable, *relative elderly power*, proxies the electoral-numerical strength of older relative to younger age groups. It can take high values when the relative share of older people gets bigger and when the turnout of older people gets bigger relative to that of younger people (Table 1). Japan comes out top because it has both a high share of older people relative to that of younger people and a relatively high electoral turnout among older people (also Klein & Mosler, this volume). All five other countries in the top six of the 'relative elderly power' ratio globally are European. Three of these are demographically still somewhat younger countries from East Central Europe, a macro-region where many countries have developed strong tendencies towards premature gerontocracy and pro-elderly bias (Vanhuysse, 2006; Vanhuysse & Perek-Bialas, this volume). These East Central European countries have remarkably low turnout rates among young people relative to older people, placing these countries high on that measure.

Table 1 Relative elderly power across the world in 2015

Top 6	5.9 Japan
	5.0 France
	4.1 Latvia
	3.8 UK
	3.4 Croatia
	3.3 Slovenia
Mean	1.3
Bottom 5	0.25 Sao Tome and Principe
	0.27 Sierra Leone
	0.29 Burundi, Uganda, Liberia

Source Own computations from Global Political Demography Database (Goerres et al., 2020)

At the bottom of Table 1, we find a number of demographically very young societies in Africa where young people are relatively active in terms of turnout. We take the natural logarithm of this variable in order to stretch out the range between 0 and 1 and to make the ranges below and above 1 more comparable unitwise. We plot this variable against GDP per capita in 2015 (Fig. 3) and find a relatively clear relationship. Richer countries tend to have higher values on the ln (relative elderly power) variable. The increases are particularly large among the poorer countries and less so at higher levels of GDP/per capita. This relationship holds in a regression set-up when we control for net migration and voting turnout. That is, richer countries tend to have an old-age power measure more tilted in favour of older people, and this relationship is much steeper among the bottom half poorest countries than in the top half.

In 2015, the 183 countries for which our Global Political Demography Database has information showed government revenue of between 7.6 and 160% of GDP, with a mean of 29.6%. Stronger states can collect more revenue relative to the size of their economies. Such stronger state capacity is clearly related to population structure: government revenue is predicted to be higher in countries with a higher share of older people, but it is not significantly associated with net migration. The significant estimate from the share of older people takes the predictive power away from GDP per capita, which otherwise positively predicted revenue. In other words, government revenue is higher in richer countries, but this effect is ultimately mediated by the share of older people: population structure beats economic prosperity in terms of explanatory power.

Fig. 3 The curvilinear relationship between relative elderly power (logged) and GDP per capita (around 2015) (*Source* Own computations from Global Political Demography Database [Goerres et al., 2020])

This short exploratory analysis has revealed a number of striking patterns. First, population ageing is a near universal experience across much but not all of the world. Second, population ageing shows increasing heterogeneity across societies. The world is becoming more different in terms of its population ageing experience with sometimes stark differences between 1990 and 2040 as to measures of ageing. Third and in contrast, international migration does not change much if we compare the aggregate snapshot pictures of 1990 and 2015. However, there are strong differences in the experience of migration change across countries. Fourth, we have explored electoral turnout of older people relative to younger people, relative elderly power and government revenue as key variables of political demography. For all three variables, we detect patterns of association with various demographic measures that introduce a number of patterns worth exploring.

5 GLOBALLY CROSSCUTTING THEMES OF POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY: MIGRATION, RELIGION AND AGE PROFILES

After three overarching globally comparing chapters, this book analyses selected countries in all the world's major geographic macro-regions. We are reminded of the central place of migration in the political founding myths of states and nations in history by Ronald Skeldon (this volume). The social construction of migration has always been a powerful narrative to explain political change. Moreover, Skeldon points towards a global shift in the politics of migration. Seen from the countries with low and further declining fertility, there is a growing need for immigrants from other countries that also tend to have higher fertility. At the same time, there is an increasing fear of 'the others' who are migrating, with extreme right-wing and/or nationalist-populist parties and other political actors capitalizing on that fear. How democratic polities with low fertility navigate the political consequences of their need for immigration may be one of the most important open questions for political demography. Finally, Skeldon analyses the importance of diaspora politics, both for the countries of residence and for the sending countries (also Collier, 2014). Members of the diaspora may be transnational drivers of political change. In their countries of residence, they might influence the foreign policy towards the countries they or their ancestors originally came from. Financial remittances and the diffusion of, for instance, democratic norms may fundamentally change elements of political life in these sending countries.

Vegard Skirbekk and José Navarro (this volume) provide a novel description of the religious composition of the poorest one-fifth of people worldwide, around a billion individuals. They argue that religions traditionally offer ways of coping with poverty, including meaning and hope, and could also steer flows of financial wealth. The religious composition of a country or a region may also affect the level of social support and level of financial transfers, as welfare and social welfare systems can be organized through religious groups and indirectly affected by the degree of social welfare. Some religious groups have relatively large shares living in poverty, such as the Hindu community. These religions may motivate different political behaviour if a large share of their compatriots is poor. For instance, this could motivate a stronger preference for transfers within the particular religions—but may also lower the ability to implement an effective, universal and sufficiently generous social security scheme as the

economic burden would be too high on the rest of the community whose members might be unwilling to shoulder it.

Richard Cincotta and Hannes Weber (this volume) analyse the relationship between age transition of countries (the shift in the mean age) and intra-state conflicts across the globe. They demonstrate that societies at an early stage of the age transition, as characterized by a 'youth bulge' on the age pyramids, have a higher likelihood of experiencing revolutionary conflicts. This pattern is also visible for separatist conflicts, but not as clearly. The authors thus add to the theoretical notion that higher numbers of younger people with low risk aversion and not enough social and economic mobility create political conflict (also Goldstone, 2002; Urdal, 2012). Interestingly, Cincotta and Weber's findings can be juxtaposed with the literature about gerontocracy in advanced industrial democracies (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009, 2010a). Cincotta and Weber demonstrate that young societies have a particularly high likelihood to experience intra-state conflict, but this likelihood decreases as societies age. In mature welfare states, in contrast, older societies with a higher share of older people are feared because they mean a higher number of beneficiaries that need to be financed.

6   The 'Old' Continent: Is the European Phoenix Going Back to Ashes?

The countries in Western Europe, broadly defined, are prime examples of the political consequences of population ageing. Increasing life expectancy and low fertility have for decades led to older and continuously ageing societies. Elias Naumann and Moritz Hess (this volume) show that Germany, Italy and Sweden, despite having very different welfare state regimes, have dealt with the political challenges of ageing very similarly. They have introduced various measures to reconcile paid work and unpaid parental care and integrate more women and older people into the paid workforce. Immigration has not met the demands for more workforce thus far. Although there is little evidence that mass immigration has de-legitimized the welfare state, it has contributed to the rise of right-populist parties wide across Western Europe. It remains to be seen whether these countries will remain able to maintain their extensive welfare states despite continuously ageing populations merely by gradual and marginal adjustment of their welfare state structures (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009, 2010b, 2012).

In East Central Europe, a quarter-century-long demographic window after 1990 offered extensive opportunity to prepare for fast population ageing ahead. But this opportunity has largely been spurned, and the window is now shut. As Pieter Vanhuysse and Jolanta Perek-Bialas (this volume) note, the new East Central European democracies, despite having started the post-communist era with comparatively young populations, subsequently adapted their policy models insufficiently for the predicted accelerated greying of their populations. Especially in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak republics, this failure is reflected in comparatively low ranks in active ageing and child well-being indexes, small social investment in early human capital, weak improvements in prospective old-age dependency ratios, and often dramatic levels of outmigration of young people. The latter four countries and Slovenia, but not the Baltics, also developed into "pensioners' welfare states" with prematurely high levels of pro-elderly policy bias. In some cases, massive politically induced early labour market exit worsened pension system unsustainability while boosting pensioners' electoral power (Vanhuysse, 2004, 2009). However, around the time when the demographic window started closing (2010–2015), the political salience of family policies, work-family reconciliation policies and active ageing policy increased, often spurred by the same Christian-conservative and/or nationalist-populist parties that also drove a larger trend of weakening governance and significant democratic backsliding alongside. But as Vanhuysse and Perek-Bialas note, by that time the relative political power of elderly voters during elections in East Central Europe was among the highest in the world (see our comparative data above). This macro-region will catch up fast with Western European population structures in the two decades ahead, while facing the added challenge of the consequences of large-scale (young) brain drain to Northern and Western Europe, especially from Romania and the Baltics.

Going geographically further to the east, Rza Kazimov and Sergei Zakharov (this volume) systematically compare the politics of population change in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. They shed light on the politics of three main developments that set these societies apart from both Eastern and Western European countries: fertility rates vary massively across regions and ethnic groups (with minorities often showing higher fertility rates in the geographical and political periphery), there are large gender gaps in mortality (with men having much shorter life spans) and there is sizable emigration driven by violent conflict and economic

recession. These three countries differ from the other European countries (apart from Hungary) analysed in this book in that they are not full liberal democracies. According to the 2020 Freedom House Status (2020), Belarus and Russia qualified as not free and Ukraine just as partly free. The authoritarian governments of these three countries recognize the problems by incentivizing higher fertility by more cash transfers. However, Kazimov and Zakharov see these policies as insufficient and point to the risk of political destabilization in these three countries.

7   The Politics of Routine Mass Immigration: Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand are intriguing country experiences. Both countries belong to the OECD world and share many institutional features with other liberal democracies, such as established welfare states. However, as Peter McDonald and Andrew Markus (this volume) demonstrate (with a particular emphasis on Australia), the political experience of population change here differs in significant ways from the rest of the OECD world. Mass immigration has been more typical of these two countries since they opened the way to a more diverse group of immigrants in the 1970s. The increase, especially of citizens of Asian descent, has not led to a politicization of race and has not significantly altered election results despite some recent episodes of anti-immigrant public sentiment. Multicultural values find widespread support in the populace. The main political challenge of population change is the concentration of more and more citizens in the large metropolitan areas with ensuing pressures on housing prices; population ageing is relatively mildly politicized and race/ethnicity is remarkably silent as a political issue.

8   The Ever-Diverging American Continent

For the Americas, this volume contains comparative analyses of Argentina and Brazil by Diego Wachs, Vitor Calvalcanti and Clara Galeazzi and of the United States and Canada by Jennifer Sciubba. While these four countries are on the same continent, their political-demographic experiences differ and further diverge widely. In South American Brazil and Argentina, immigration has decreased significantly in the last decades, so that the populations stabilized. Increases in life expectancy and decreases

in fertility further increasing population ageing that cannot be compensated by immigration. At the same time, both countries are characterized by high levels of social inequality. Social policy was primarily used to alleviate poverty. Given the change in population with much less immigration and population ageing, social policies have come under pressure to adapt because the numerical balance between contributors to and beneficiaries from redistribution measures is becoming increasingly unsustainable. In that dynamic, the two South American countries show similarities to Western Europe even though the levels of social spending are different. Southern American countries face the political challenges of providing sensible social policies in the face of population ageing, and high levels of social inequality. Some social groups, such as the older poor, will significantly increase in size, creating a double driver of increased demand for redistributive policies.

In North America, Canada and the United States experienced two similar demographic developments: population ageing and an increasing diversity of the workforces as to race and immigrant background. The former experience makes it necessary for both countries to adapt their redistribution systems to maintain financial sustainability. Currently, the United States may face a bigger problem in the long run with financing Social Security than Canada with its public pension system. The later experience leads to two different ways of dealing with the increasing cultural diversity. Canada shows an elite and media system that is largely united behind the ideal of a multicultural society. In contrast, the United States shows a starkly divided public sphere with strong media outlets that incite part of the populace against the increasing shares of non-Whites. Sciubba (this volume) goes further by pointing out that the electoral registration system in the United States has prevented a sizeable proportion of (new) non-White voters into the electorate whereas Canada is relatively successful at integration visible minorities into the electoral process. On balance, Canada thus seems better equipped to deal with the consequences of population ageing and increasing ethnic diversity.

9   The African Continent: Frustrated Youth as a Simmering Threat to Political Order

Christof Hartmann and Catherine Promise Biira (this volume) discuss political demography in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire. In line with most other sub-Saharan African states, the population of both countries is still

growing steadily and becoming more youthful. At the same time, both Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda are net importers of immigrants, albeit for different reasons (economic or conflict-induced). The growing number of young people without economic opportunities and the consequent precarious prospects of leading decent lives and starting families have, on the whole, not led to massive eruptions of political violence, nor to the questioning of the legitimacy of the existing political order. Incidents of youth becoming violent in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire seem to occur in a context of elite-instigated and -controlled mobilization. Economic exclusion makes it easier for politicians to manipulate youth into attending election rallies or intimidating political opponents. In both Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, the dominant, and thus far successful, strategy of state elites has been to manage access to jobs in the official police and military apparatus and to other private benefits for youth leaders.

The political demography picture looks much different in the northern countries of the African continent, where the Arab Spring occurred a decade ago. As Alessandra Bonci and Francesco Cavatorta point out (this volume), long-standing structural problems (political and economic) are key to understanding the uprisings and demands for radical change in Tunisia and Morocco. Bonci and Cavatorta note that, while youth unemployment is a considerable problem in this part of Africa too, it would be erroneous to focus exclusively on the youth bulge as the 'bulge' is more a myth than a demographic reality when one looks to the medium and long term. The authors emphasize the way in which the political and economic systems in place benefit only a small elite and lead to long-simmering frustrations, rather than offering aspirations and hope, to the sizable young populations in permanent 'waithood'.

10   THE ASIAN CONTINENT: POPULATION GIANTS ON THE MOVE

Nele Noesselt (this volume) compares the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. She paints the picture of a constellation of countries very unequal in size, with the People's Republic heavily influencing the other three entities with its policy decisions about how to deal with heavy population ageing. This is a region where population aged heavily due to the One-Child-Policy in place between 1979 and 2015. Different than in other countries, this process of population ageing thus began forcefully before later stages of the socio-economic modernization

process could be reached. Most importantly, labour shortage is at the centre of policy change and the decision taken in the People's Republic as to dealing with shortages affect the labour markets of the other three, too. Next to the theme of ageing before modernization, we also witness an overall successful adaptation of dealing with population change in this region that did not de-stabilize the system.

Axel Klein and Hannes Mosler (this volume) discuss Japan (the world's frontrunner in population ageing) and South Korea (which in many demographic ways seems to follow Japan closely). Both societies aged a lot (Japan being further ahead) in the last decades and face population shrinkage. Both countries experience the political problems of labour shortage, which is only partially met by foreign labour, by the activation of women into the paid labour market and by keeping senior citizens in the workforce. Furthermore, there is, especially in Japan, the strategy to develop further various technologies in order to deal with the insufficient supply of labourers (see also Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017). In politics, especially on the right side of the spectrum, the perception of what is going on in other countries with similar demographic profiles creates the impression that a further influx of immigrants could create problems that should be circumvented.

KS James and Arun Balachandran (this volume) discuss the three South Asian super-size countries India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, with a special focus on India as the world's largest democracy. They show that while India and Bangladesh have similar patterns of changes in age-structure and fertility transition, Pakistan is at an earlier stage of such demographic transitions. Consequently, in the coming three decades, India and Bangladesh will show signs of ageing society, whereas Pakistan will still remain a young country. James and Balachandran discuss striking differentials in regional and religious patterns of demographic heterogeneity within both India and Pakistan and illustrate at length the enormous importance of demographic patterns on the political order among these South Asian giants.

The Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, as Patrick Ziegenhain shows (this volume), have all witnessed an enormous demographic transition within a very short period. One major future problem for especially Indonesia and the Philippines could be that economic growth stalls before these societies transition into high-income status. Getting old before getting rich is therefore one of the biggest medium-term structural challenge. Ziegenhain also analyses the

challenges that occurred in relation to the pension system, the labour market, the migration movements, the urbanization as well as the consequences of demographic change in different regions and among different ethnic/religious groups in the respective countries.

11   Political Demography as a Perspective on Global Challenges

At the end of this volume, Stuart A. Gietel-Basten steps back from the detailed, geographically focused analyses of the macro-regional chapters to again look at the big picture. He observes that there always seems to be a political need for managing population change: too many people here; too few there. Fertility rates are too low in some places; too high in others. Population ageing brings unprecedented challenges to social welfare systems and economic growth, while 'youth bulges' are associated with security threats. Migration, a partial answer to some of these issues, is frequently seen as politically toxic. Gietel-Basten argues that these apparent demographic travails are, perhaps, downstream consequences of broader institutional malfunctions: symptoms, rather than causes, of ongoing challenges in our societies. As such, any effort to tackle these 'demographic problems' with solely demographic solutions may be destined to fail. Only by understanding how these demographic issues have come about can we have any hope of shaping holistic policy solutions to ensure sustainable population development.

The contributions in this book reveal a few major takeaway messages:

The political consequences and the political embeddedness of population change lie at the heart of the social sciences at large. The chapters demonstrate that population change tends to generate major opportunities and challenges in any society or political system. It is difficult to think of any minor issue of population change that does not need societal and political reaction. Therefore, political demography as a sub-discipline deals with core questions of the social sciences at large. Paradoxically, this is a study area that is underdeveloped even though its main themes lie at the core of what constitutes societies and political systems.

Population change creates short-term and long-term challenges, both of which require political solutions. Among the two major themes of population change in this book, population ageing and migration, there seems to be a clear difference on the time dimension. International migration is much more event-driven and therefore subject to short-term fluctuation

than population ageing, which is due to structural, more slow-moving changes. From a citizen perspective, short-term changes create stronger reactions, as people tend to compare against their recent own status quo *ante*. International migration is therefore not just more volatile but also more politically unpredictable than population ageing.

Political reactions to population changes follow very context-specific paths because their level of 'problematicness' is socially and politically constructed. The contributions in this volume demonstrate the richness and heterogeneity in political reactions to and for population change. Some themes re-emerge again and again: a fixation on a certain level of fertility rate, a management of the question who is "the other" and a predominant view of population ageing as something bad. However, how policymakers and the public deal with questions of population change is strongly context-dependent. This seems to be a function of the complexity of the manifestations of population change. What constitutes a problem (and if so, which kind of problem), what constitutes an opportunity (and if so which opportunity) is the outcome of complex political processes in which the histories, institutions and co-occurring discussions matter. This also implies that population change is not political destiny. It requires the active social construction of problems by actors, which can then lead to political reactions.

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CHAPTER 2

Migration in Political Demography: A Review of Evidence

Ronald Skeldon

1 Introduction: The Problem Stated

While political demography may be "under-represented in political science" (Weiner & Teitelbaum in Kaufmann & Toft, 2012: 3), population has been a highly politicized topic for over two hundred years, certainly since the times of Robert Malthus. Whether there are too many people in the world, and what should be done about it, has exercised minds of various political persuasions for many decades and particularly since the Second World War. This was a time in which two issues relevant to the theme emerged: first, the very real rapid population growth in what was termed the 'developing world', today the 'global south', and second, the emergence of a number of international organizations that could address the issue in the context of 'development'. Today, however, it is population decrease in certain parts of the world and its consequences for, among other things, increased migration that is exerting politicians and

R. Skeldon (✉)
Emeritus Professor, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
e-mail: r.skeldon@sussex.ac.uk

Honorary Professor, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

public alike. That is, fertility decline, which has led to decreasing growth in labour force and, ultimately, towards population decline in many parts of the developed world, has increased pressure to import labour. Hence, politics has reacted both to the fear of growing numbers of "the other" and to the need for "the other". The policy challenges of stagnating and declining populations will be as great in the future as those of expanding populations in a previous age.

In contrast to these lofty ideas, political demography has a much more focused remit, which is to study "the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to both government and politics" (Kaufmann & Duffy Toft, 2012: 3). The same writers go on to view migration studies as occupying "an academic archipelago isolated from associated questions on the political impact of migration on sending and receiving societies" (Kaufmann & Toft, 2012: 4). One need not necessarily agree with this statement to accept that some disconnect exists between migration studies and other major branches of the social sciences. However, one might add that a disconnect also exists within political demography itself, between its primary focus on the impact of age structures on the one hand and an adequate consideration of migration issues on the other. To these disconnects must be added one of the two major schisms in migration studies: that between refugees against all other forms of migration.[1] This division is so marked that, for many, refugees are not migrants and cannot be considered within the same category (e.g. UNHCR, 2016). Yet, refugees do add to or subtract from, populations of destination and origin, respectively. As such they must be considered, demographically at least, to be 'migrants' even if, from the points of view of international legal definitions and of managing migration, they might best be considered as separate entities. The division clearly reflects a distinction that is often not as clear: that between forced and voluntary population movements. It is the purpose of this chapter to work towards a framework that can try to encompass these various disconnects and divisions in order to link migration more securely to the political demography mainland.

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[1] The other major schism in migration studies is between studies of internal migration and studies of international migration, a division that will not be directly addressed in this chapter, but see King and Skeldon (2010) and Skeldon (2018).

The chapter begins by introducing broad historical, geographical and political themes that provide a context for the more specific and contemporary case material to be presented later. Population size, the role of migration in the creation of political units and differences in these units will all be raised. The focus, however, is on that basic building block of our world, the state, and how migration has contributed to both its construction and its transformation. The role of migration in nation and state building will be considered from two points of view, exclusionary and inclusionary, to cover both refugee and 'voluntary' movements. Given that more established literature linking population movement and political change exists on the former, greater attention in this chapter will be given to the latter, with just a cursory discussion on refugees. The transformation of the state will be considered in terms of immigration, and its impact on compositional and political changes, and in the context of emigration and the impact of the diaspora or transnational-induced political change. Thus, state building and state transformation illustrate a two-way interactive process, with political change giving rise to migration and migration giving rise to political change. Some of these movements may involve large numbers of people but it must also be emphasized that the migration of very small numbers, perhaps even of individuals, can also generate political change. The focus in this chapter will be on the relatively recent past, between about 2000 and 2018, in both the developed and the developing worlds.

2 Populations, Migrations and Political Development: Broad Perspectives

At the simplest level, the sheer size of a population in the envelope of a powerful state can project power to dominate any rivals. China, Russia (and the former Soviet Union) and the United States of America (USA) are the obvious examples. Less obvious, perhaps, is why relatively small populations such as Ancient Greece, Portugal, England and Wales or the Netherlands came to dominate significant parts of the world at particular times. How important was demography in explaining the rise to power of these particular countries? While the role of numbers and political power may not always be clear, one can say that migration was central to this process of the creation of empire.

As will be seen below, migration is central to the creation of all states irrespective of size, not just physically, but also in terms of national

mythology. Implicitly or explicitly, migration is an integral part of the narrative of state creation irrespective of what might have been occurring with the other two demographic variables, fertility and mortality. The "frontier", the "great trek" and the "long march" are all examples of participatory experiences, narratives that bring a sense of unity to previously disparate groups that became foundation myths of nation and state. Long before the emergence of the modern state, circuits of mobility in the form of pilgrimage brought widely dispersed peoples into common belief systems around the experience of travelling to Jerusalem, Mecca, Rome, Varanasi, Haridwar, Bodhgaya, Ise or Mount T'ai that underlay the great world religions. Yet, migrations not only provided the basis for the identification of separate belief, imperial or state territories and populations, they also linked them together through trade and the exchange of ideas. Civilizations were rarely hermetically sealed units but learnt from each other through traders and travellers, as well as through military expansion.

Conflict was central to the expansion of these separate civilizations and to competition among them. Conflict that displaced populations and the history of violence and forced migration runs throughout history, yet, it is a violence that has not just fluctuated over time but has undergone a long-term secular decline (Morris, 2014; Pinker, 2011). Violent deaths appear to be endemic in pre-modern societies but are punctuated by periods of more organized warfare that paradoxically lead to lower levels of violence. Warfare might make a wasteland but the victors make the peace in which recalcitrant populations can be stabilized and new techniques and populations introduced. Agricultural production is then increased, leading in turn, to expanding populations that can be taxed (Morris, 2014). Groups that were once shifting, nomadic or migratory become more sedentary and one might argue that migration, in the sense of a shift in usual place of residence, only takes meaning once a population becomes more sedentary, paradoxical though this might seem. Why these periods of warfare to extend the peace should erupt have been attributed in various ways to 'epochal wars' as political systems, in one interpretation, moved progressively through constitutional orders from princely states to kingly states, territorial states, state-nations, nation states to market states (Bobbitt, 2002). The shifts in constitutional orders may have been underpinned by successive cycles of growing inequalities that eventually exposed populations to shocks that brought about demographic and economic collapse that would give rise to a new cycle of accumulation (Scheidel, 2017), which included the development of new political orders.

The role of demography in conflict, with the exception of increasing mortality, is unclear. That is, whether growing population numbers by bringing pressure upon local resources, result in conflict in a classical Malthusian interpretation might seem intuitive but is almost certainly overly simplistic. Robust evidence is scarce but must come from more recent times to test ideas about the role of population growth in political change. Political demography has tended to focus more on the changing population structures in terms of age and the implications for political change. Certainly, the incidence of civil conflict appears greater among youthful populations while democracy is more likely to emerge in ageing, more "mature" populations (Madsen, 2012: 82). Whether a youth bulge provides fertile ground for revolution and demand for radical change has also been examined, particularly in the context of parts of the Islamic world today, as part of explaining and predicting political change (Cincotta, 2009; Urdal, 2012). However, any role for migration in this process is largely invisible. Nevertheless, as implied above, migration was an integral part of all of these developments. The movement of 'surplus' agrarian populations to towns and cities, the dispersal of peoples due to conquest or fleeing epidemics, the movement of armies and their camp followers and the excursions of pilgrims suggest societies in constant movement. However, just how these movements in response to changes in those same societies may have contributed to those political changes remains unclear. Certainly, one of the few generalizations that can be made about migration is that the majority of those who move are young adults. Hence, one might assume that youth bulges might generate greater incidence of human movement (Biira & Hartmann, this volume). This chapter seeks to illustrate the ways in which migration and migrants can contribute to this process of political change, albeit still in a tentative and speculative way.

3   Migration and the Creation
of the State: The Exclusionary Dimension

The most explicit linkage between migration and political change, or perhaps more exactly between refugee studies and political change, has been in the work on forced migrants. That political conflict gives rise to forced migration is perhaps the closest we come to a simple cause and effect relationship in political demography. The emergence of new states upon the dissolution of empires and decolonization has been considered

to be central to the creation of refugees as the new leaders pursued ideas of nationhood and who should and should not be members (Zolberg, 1983, with a more recent review in Maley, 2016). Those who did not fit the image of a more homogeneous state were expelled, re-educated or otherwise dealt with.

Those expelled include two main groups: those "forced to flee for a well-founded fear of persecution"—refugees according to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention[2]—and asylum seekers, or those who flee across an international border and seek recognition as refugees. The former are de jure forced migrants recognized by the international community and the latter are de facto but not yet recognized forced migrants. At worst, they are considered 'irregular migrants' whose right to remain in a destination has to be determined. Irrespective of these legal differences, their migration has been driven by policies of the state of origin to exclude groups from their territory. The majority of refugees are both generated and found in just a few locations in the world today: around Afghanistan, in the horn of Africa, in Central and Eastern Africa and, most recently, around Iraq and Syria.

While the emergence of countries from years of direct external control as a driver of major political change leading to forced population movements seems well-taken, any easy association with the other population trends in fertility and growth is more problematic. Certainly, refugees tend not to be generated among more developed, low fertility, slow growth populations with the majority emerging in areas of high fertility, although exceptions certainly exist. For example, Myanmar has a total fertility rate around the replacement level but has been engaged in the expulsion of the Rohingya, who have a much higher fertility of around 3.8, a difference that is but one driver in the conflict (Blomquist & Cincotta, 2016). While refugees also flee to be registered in areas of high fertility, too, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Pakistan, they are also found in areas of low fertility, in West Asia in the Lebanon and Turkey.

However, any high fertility/high population growth/conflict/forced migration nexus would provide an all too simple interpretation of the causes of political conflict and refugee production, which lie as much in the involvement of low fertility outside powers becoming involved in real

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[2] Technically, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, augmented by a Protocol of 1967, is the key document relating to the identification and treatment of refugees.

or perceived threats and rivalries. Low fertility Iran, for example, uses Afghan proxies in the conflict in Syria in which low fertility Russia also participates. Parallels in this geopolitical game can be found in the USA and its European allies becoming involved in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, while the association between conflict and migration can be well established through the creation of refugees, links with other dimensions of demography appear more tenuous. Yet, a focus on conflict and forced migration downplays the role of migration in political change, drawing attention away from arguably more significant issues.

4 Migration and the Creation of the State: The Inclusionary Dimension

While states seek to create their citizens through expelling some, they also seek to include other groups, as well as consolidate control over designated territory. Thus, the state uses institutions to establish control over previously disparate groups and marginal territories, the most important of which are security, through conscription, and education, through the construction of schools to which youth must move to embark upon, or to continue, their training to be members of the larger polity. Military recruitment, which may involve some degree of coercion, and participation in post-primary schooling both generally involve movement to barracks or schools that are only to be found beyond the village. In essence, circuits of migration, or more accurately of mobility, come to define the state. These allow the control of territory, the penetration of centralized administration, as well as the denial of entry to outsiders at border points. The creation of national armies and a civil service brought unified ideas that could be diffused rapidly across territory. This idea was well captured by Arlacchi (1983: 200) displayed with the Italian case. More recently, in the introduction to a collection of essays on states in Africa, Quirk and Vigneswaran aver that "[a]ll states – historical and contemporary - have consistently made sustained efforts to legitimize, condition, discipline and profit from human mobility […] that it is necessary to treat mobility as a central factor when it comes to both the constitution and everyday operation of state authority" (2015: 6).

Migrations around urban and religious centres of soldiers and administrators are used to bring unity to a territory through the extension of the area under effective control. In the post-colonial period, when borders previously imposed or negotiated among external powers were bestowed

on newly independent governments, marginal territories were often only notionally under control. These areas, and particularly in mountainous or desert regions, were populated by groups that were culturally distinct from urban and settled agricultural peoples. Political boundaries in these regions held little meaning for long-established shifting cultivators or nomadic herders whose way of life transcended the borders. The central state often viewed the inhabitants of these marginal areas as 'tribals', 'hill tribes' or 'minorities'. Modern states find the incorporation and stabilization of such populations problematic. While specific differences in approach have varied, the common theme of land colonization emerged across the developing world. These programmes were given strongly developmental objectives to extend agricultural production and to give land to the landless, while downplaying the fact that members of the dominant groups were being settled among, or close to, groups of more questionable loyalty or of separate identities. Apparently vacant lands, too, were settled on the perhaps not unreasonable assumption that if they were not settled, an ambitious neighbour might claim them instead.

Perhaps the largest example, in terms of numbers, has been the *transmigrasi* programme in Indonesia, a programme that dated from Dutch colonial times but reached its apogee after independence from the Netherlands. Some 941,000 families were moved between 1969 and 1986, primarily from the densely populated island of Java into more sparsely populated outer islands in Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya (Hugo et al., 1987: 179). A second case in Asia relates to the post-reunification of Vietnam in April 1975. The government in Hanoi began moving people from the densely populated parts of the north into more sparsely populated lands in the central highlands, an area where considerable conflict had occurred during the war and where sympathies towards the northern government might have been ambivalent. Between 1976 and 1997, over 740,000 individuals were moved into just one province, Dak Lak, in central Vietnam (Hardy, 2003: 313). A third example is virtually all the South American republics with borders in the Amazon basin that have pursued land colonization at one time or another as they sought to consolidate their territories in sparsely populated areas open to dispute. As a final example: the Chinese government has pursued a consistent 'civilizing' policy of moving Han populations into Muslim and Tibetan areas. In many of these areas, land is given to retired soldiers, to those who have served their country and will presumably promote national values in the areas allocated to them. In all these projects, spontaneous migrants also

move into the designated zones to take advantage of established support programmes and infrastructure and are often more committed than the sponsored settlers to the physical hardships of settlement. Whether these migrants have the same ideological views as the retired soldiers is not so clear.

Thus, the circuits of mobility that created Italy, cited earlier, are promoted by governments to make people into 'modern' Indonesians, Vietnamese or Peruvians and to consolidate national territory. Political considerations lie behind the emphasized developmental objectives. In fact, the results of land colonization programmes are often negative for development, with environmental damage being common following deforestation and the discovery that logical environmental reasons existed to explain the sparse populations of these areas in the first place. Nevertheless, these rural-to-rural and urban-to-rural migrations, while representing a minority of those who moved internally, do illustrate an important example of migration being used to promote state building.

Nevertheless, not all groups living in these marginal areas wish to be incorporated into the state and the interesting ideas of the "art of not being governed" and "regions of refuge" have emerged from studies of these areas (Aguirre Beltrán, 1967; Scott, 2009; Skeldon, 1985). In these cases, groups native to the margins migrate further into the mountain fastness to escape from the intruding lowland groups in a strategy to avoid sedentarization and incorporation into the expanding state. In this way, they preserve their identity, which in itself is predicated upon their continued migration. However, detailed analyses of minorities in this situation in Southeast Asia have suggested that the real situation is much more complicated, with the minorities seeking shifting alliances not just with the immigrants from the lowlands but also with other minority groups being so affected (Mazard, 2014). Nevertheless, irrespective of the variations found, the longer-term endpoint does appear to be some kind of incorporation into the state in a process of gradual sedentarization. Thus, migration and the control of migration have been a central component of the creation and consolidation of the state itself. Migration is a key narrative and the political demography of the state is essentially one revolving around migration and mobility, a theme central to the arguments in Vigneswaran and Quirk (2015) for states in Africa.

5   MIGRATION
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE

The discussion in the previous section looked primarily at internal migration and centrifugal forces of incorporation. This section deals mainly with international migration and centripetal forces of inclusion that may lead to the social transformation of society and the state itself. Two perspectives will be adopted. The first is the political impact of immigration on destinations and the second focuses on the impact on the places of origin of the migration.

a. *Immigration and political change—Destinations*

The immigration of large numbers of migrants into a country has captured the attention of the public, policymakers and academics alike. It is perhaps *the* issue in much of the more developed parts of the world and an issue so toxic that it has led to the downfall of governments. As fertility has decreased and societies are well on their way through the second demographic transition towards declining and ageing populations, it is migration that has come to be a significant component of overall growth. While migration cannot necessarily compensate for cohorts lost to fertility decline, it can contribute to a slowing in the process and to filling specific gaps in the labour market (UN, 2001, also Naumann & Hess, this volume).

Nevertheless, a fear has arisen in the host populations that control over the borders has been lost and that national identity is being eroded through the arrival of so many different cultural groups. However, the contribution that migrants make to the economies and societies of destination is highly contested. They do provide skills that local populations lack or undertake the types of jobs that local populations are unwilling to do. Their very presence increases demand that can generate new jobs across a broad spectrum of activities from house building, through retailing, to employment within small companies established by the migrants themselves. On the other hand, migrants are seen to compete with local workers and depress wages. They bring pressure to bear on local education, health and housing services and on the provision of welfare. While the real costs and benefits of migrant labour are difficult to define and to calculate accurately, the consensus appears to be that their overall impact, in one direction or the other, is quite small. Migrants, however,

do appear to generate more income than they consume. Variations exist by host country and by the country of origin of migrants but in the United Kingdom (UK), for example, a country that politically and popularly became hostile to immigrants in the lead-up to the referendum on continued membership of the EU ('Brexit'), their contribution to the economy has consistently been positive (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014).

Yet, the impact of the migration to most parts of the developed world is more than just about economics and the possible positive or negative costs and benefits. Certainly, the most common refrains in the popular press are economic: the migrants are stealing the jobs that should go to locals and that they are coming in order to live off the welfare systems that are characteristic of European economies. These underlying views are reinforced by identity politics, by a fear of the outsider and whether "Europe can be the same with different people in it" (Caldwell, 2009). Immigrants coming from areas of different cultures and beliefs result in a growing feeling among the domestic population that they have 'lost control' over their own lives. This fear of migrants, driven by a right-wing press but rooted in communities that have been marginalized by the forces of globalization, fed a xenophobia that was a factor in two of the most profound shifts in political direction in recent history: the results of the Brexit referendum in the UK and the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the USA. The resurgent political right self-identifies as the saviour of Western liberal values. Whether this trend towards populism remains sustainable over more than just the short term in the face of the demographic transformation of their societies through low fertility, as well as by immigration, will determine the fate of western-style democracy and provide one of the most intriguing questions for political demography (Polakow-Suransky, 2017).

These questions are addressed in a major study by Kaufmann (2018) who envisages four possible scenarios: first, that the dominant group will fight their declining numbers through right-wing conservative and nationalist movements and resist entry of newcomers and encourage their exclusion. Second, that the dominant group will repress its feelings and eventually accept ongoing transition to a more varied community; third, to flee the increasing diversity to maintain its distinctive nature elsewhere; four, to join the incoming groups eventually through intermarriage to produce a mixed identity. One could possibly imagine all of these scenarios operating concurrently and/or sequentially because none are mutually exclusive. What is more difficult to imagine is the idea of

homogeneous white majorities acting as single entities. These are highly factionalized, not the least by class, including the emergence of transnational capitalist classes that transcend the more visible ethnic or racial groupings. Classes that are created by the migration of elites through the expansion of multinational corporations (see Sklair, 2001), but also through globalization more generally by means of international migration for education. The political role played by this mobile transnational class is not so clear, although it may act as a safety valve for dissidents rather than presenting an active challenge to national governments. Nevertheless, within states, dominant groups, no matter how factionalized, that perceive they are being marginalized or even threatened by immigration are likely to react in negative ways.

In such a highly-charged environment, it is challenging to have a rational debate. Too many myths about migration and migrants exist. However, accepting a neutral to positive economic interpretation of the impact of migration on the main destinations does little to counteract the popular image that migrants are transforming destination countries: the rise of ethnic neighbourhoods, the construction of mosques or Hindu temples, languages unintelligible to locals being heard on the street and shops specializing in foreign foods and goods emerging on the high streets. Such change might also be interpreted as enriching the mainly urban landscapes because it is in the largest cities in any country that the vast majority of immigrants concentrate.

It is in these urban areas that the idea of super-diversity is most manifest, and a diversity, not just by place of birth or ethnicity but also within each group based upon education, nature of employment and wealth, too (Vertovec, 2007). This fracturing across and within groups has to be built into the scenarios envisaged by Kaufmann (2018) above, with, for example, only part of the host population leaving the cities because of the diversity created by immigration. Most of the local population that leaves the city will have specific demographics. First, young families, or those about to have children, will be escaping inflated property prices and the costs of childcare in the global cities more than any perceived diversity. Second, retirees, who may also see economic incentives in the move but who may indeed have more conservative views and consider the urban environments to have changed dramatically from their heyday. Hence, economic fundamentals will drive any migration from metropolitan areas, not just increasing diversity or perceived declining political influence.

Paradoxically, the anti-immigrant rhetoric appears to be strongest in areas away from the metropolitan areas. Much of the political reaction in democracies has been driven by opinion either in small towns and rural areas dominated by fairly homogeneous, middle-income and older populations or by those older working-class populations in areas that have been left behind by the rise of the finance and technology industries central to what is known as 'globalization'. This debate takes us far beyond the central concerns of political demography, but migration, or the lack of it, is again an important component of the debate. Younger, educated and highly mobile residents of metropolitan areas and smaller university cities, or those who belong to the "transnational capitalist class" (Sklair, 2001), the people from "anywhere", are in opposition to those rooted in particular places with a clear sense of identity from "somewhere" (Goodhart, 2017). This great divide in the politics of the anglophone world has its parallels in the divergence between the metropolitan classes in their citadels and those in the periphery in modern France: a divergence that may bring about the "twilight of the elites" of neoliberalism through flight from resurgent populism (Guilluy, 2019). Whatever the outcome, the evolving tensions between metropolitan and national governments will be one of the key global challenges of the twenty-first century.

This divide essentially reflects a rural-urban distribution of population and should surely be an important dimension of political demography as both mobility and migration policy are central to a full understanding of the issue. The progressive upward concentration of the young and educated through "escalators" of internal migration gave rise to high rates of social mobility (Fielding, 1992) in metropolitan regions that, in turn, have acted as nodes in transnational migration systems. This mix created cosmopolitan populations with very different political values from those in the rural hinterlands and is presenting searching questions for the future of national systems of democracy in the western world.

The impact of migration on destination areas has one other and more obviously demographic implication. Given the sharp decline in fertility across much of the developed world and the tendency for the majority of migrants to be young adults, an increasing proportion of the total number of births is to migrant women. In the UK, for example, about one quarter of all births are to foreign-born mothers, and this proportion is considerably higher in London. The frequency of intermarriage among groups is also increasing (Kaufmann's fourth scenario) both between native and immigrant populations and among members of the immigrant groups

themselves, even if this intermarriage is variable by group. The prospect of states becoming multi-ethnic through a combination of immigration and the reproduction of immigrants have led to the idea of a "third demographic transition" in these societies of sustained low fertility (Coleman, 2006). Nevertheless, subsequent modelling has suggested that any trend towards a totally "mixed" population and a modification of the dominant European identity is likely to be a very long process indeed (Coleman, 2012).

Perhaps as important as the immigration are cohort effects among both migrants and locals. Immigration produces change and the younger generation is more responsive to change and the acceptance of new ideas and values. Hence, later generations of migrants arrive into a very different type of society compared with that of their predecessors. Assimilation takes on a more nuanced meaning. Both, the host and immigrant populations assimilate to the new realities. Through their adjustment to the arrival city, the previous generation of migrants set up new ideas of what it means to be an "American" (or British, or German), to which the later generations of migrants have to adjust. Nevertheless, these relatively short-term cultural shifts, termed "relational assimilation" (Jiménez, 2017: 10–12), may ultimately be of lesser importance to institutional change. It is the institutions of liberalism and democracy and the shared experience that brought these about that determine the values and ultimately the identity of peoples. It is the protection of these values, which will be the ultimate responsibility of governments, that is fundamental if the identities of Europe or America are to persist. If this can be achieved, and it is an 'if', the idea of 'a Europe' will be able to remain, even with different people in it. The way host populations and immigrants are identified and classified by governments, and the way that they see themselves, are constantly changing and being re-negotiated as they create new populations or "shifting boundaries of belonging" (Pries, 2013).

b. *Emigration, diaspora, democratization and change—Origins*

The diaspora, or the transnational community of migrants outside their country of origin, is seen as a source of both money and skills that can aid development at home in the form of remittances and returned skills (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006; Lucas, 2014). Much less examined is the role of the diaspora in political development and particularly whether these

migrants can play a role in the spread of democratic or more participatory systems. This consideration is part of the broader debate in migration and development that covers both remittances, in this case social or rather political remittances, and diaspora and the return of the skilled. Essentially, this section examines, in a speculative way, the impact that the ideas migrants have gained either in the city, nationally or internationally, have had on the politics of their home areas upon their return. Do they use these ideas to change their societies, either violently through revolution, or progressively through bureaucratic or political process? The data needed to answer this question remain elusive but are sufficient to be indicative.

Whether migrants in the diaspora can influence the direction of political transformation will largely depend upon the nature of both the origin and the destinations of the migration. Where migrants come from relatively poor groups in origin areas and are recruited as labourers to countries with authoritarian systems, their political impact on home areas is likely to be low, as in the case of South Asians in Gulf states. However, in cases where groups in the origin areas are more highly educated, perhaps even more so than in destination areas, they can play a major role. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in cases of internal migration as in examples in the more developed world, such as the Scot in the UK (Stenhouse, 2005) or Georgians in the former Soviet Union (Scott, 2016).

The evidence from the developing world of elites going overseas for education and experience is suggestive, if contradictory. Evidence from a large panel data set of students from a diversity of origins indicates that they can promote democratic reforms on their return home but only in those cases where they received their training in open democratic countries (Spilimbergo, 2009). Another large-scale study of leaders from more authoritarian regimes who have subsequently returned seems to associate this with a trend towards more open and democratic systems of government during their leadership (Mercier, 2016). In these cases, however, institutional political change could have begun to emerge in the origin countries that encouraged the migrants to return in the first place and consequently provided more fertile ground on which their political ideas could flourish. In the specific case of Mali, those who returned from France and Côte d'Ivoire had different political perceptions, both one from the other, and from those who had never migrated (Chauvet et al., 2016). In this case, the institutions in destination areas were clearly

significant in producing different political aspirations: those from more advanced economies with longer residence were more likely to promote effective change than those from neighbouring countries. The return migration to Mali was associated with increasing participation in elections, not just because of the increasing number of returnees themselves but also because of the diffusion of the ideas brought by the returnees and their adoption by those who had not migrated (Chauvet & Mercier, 2014).

As the demographic giant and second largest economy in the world, the example of China provides a useful perspective. In 2012–2013, it was estimated that there was a stock of 712,157 Chinese students overseas, a sharp increase from 417,351 in 2005–2006, with a flow of 523,700 leaving China in 2015 alone (IIE, 2021). The principal destination by far was the USA, followed by the UK and Australia. The majority do return and, taking a longer-term perspective, it is estimated that since the reforms that were initiated from late 1978 on, over 4.5 million Chinese students had studied abroad, with some 82% returning to China, with the incidence of return increasing over time (Fan, 2017). While students are not the only return migrants who could be involved in political change, they are among the largest and, as educated citizens, among the most influential. A study published in 2006 (He, 2006) argued that, although the returned students did not advocate radical political change, they would play a significant role in transforming China. Yet the situation appears to have changed since then. Economically, so many have returned that an overseas degree, unless from one of the best universities in the most applied subjects, no longer has the earning power it once had (Fan, 2017). However, politically China seems to have embarked upon a transition very different from that of the West. It would be too easy to fall back on an argument of Chinese exceptionalism but it also gives pause to drawing equally easy conclusions about returning migrants from developed economies and the promotion of democratic values.

Despite these contradictory findings, the diaspora is increasingly seen as a means to extend the state transnationally through incorporating citizens living abroad as part of the electorate. The initiative may originally have emerged in the diaspora itself when exiles abroad actively sought to support the liberation of their homelands and/or facilitate the building of independent nations. However, more recently, origin states themselves have created institutional frameworks to allow their citizens overseas to be stakeholders in their countries of birth even though they

no longer live there. The most comprehensive examination of this evolution of diaspora organizations and their political role to date is by Gamlen (2019), although see also the essays in Délano Alonso and Mylonas (2019). Perhaps the most striking factor to emerge from this literature is the recency of the establishment of these institutions, not just as a means towards the management of migration, but as political models of transnational citizenship that transcend the borders of the traditional state.

Thus, the diaspora contributes to a more developmental view in harnessing the potential offered by managing migration through remittances and leveraging talent. On the other hand, its political involvement in conflict in home countries has also attracted attention. Conflict itself can add to, or even create, a diaspora by generating numbers who flee overseas to create groups that do not have the interests of home governments at heart and which will actively seek to undermine them. The uses of remittances to promote conflict at home through the purchase of arms and the training of armed groups appear logical consequences for which researchers have sought explanations in terms of diaspora size or length of establishment in destination country (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Subsequent research, however, has produced contradictory results that suggest that remittances, through sustaining livelihoods, can "better prepare populations for peace" (Brinkerhoff, 2011: 135). Thus, diasporas can act as both a peace-wrecking and a peace-building institution, depending upon a number of factors among which the degree of fragmentation of the diaspora, as well as its various capabilities to seek support from wider political interests, are important.

Wide-ranging global, more statistical approaches to the association of the volume of emigration with political change in origin countries, although without the association with transnational interaction, can be found in Docquier et al. (2016) and Moses (2011). The results showed that the emigration of nationals was associated with shifts to more open societies at home, although, like the students studied by Spilimbergo (2009) above, those emigrants had to go to more open OECD countries in order for that association to be significant. Hence, the so-called South-South migration, which according to World Bank estimates was larger at 93.1 million in 2013 than South-North migration at 84.3 million,

may not be such a major factor in promoting political change across the developing world.[3]

The importance of the nature of the specific destinations for the emigrants was also shown in a detailed micro-study in Moldova where the migration to European destinations was clearly associated with voting behaviour against the communist party in the villages of origin, which ultimately led to the fall of the last communist government in Europe, whereas no such association could be seen in those villages where migrants had gone to Russia (Barsbai et al., 2017). However, the important examples of China and some other countries must always give pause. Moses is perhaps the more ambivalent, noting that even if a role in the past for emigration leading to political change can be identified, because of the relatively small proportions of populations emigrating, the "likelihood of emigration playing a subsequent role in political development is limited" (Moses, 2011: 232).

Returning to the inclusion of transnational interactions through diaspora involvement, a wide-ranging review of evidence has led to the mathematical formulation of a model that appears to be consistent with the various outcomes of diaspora involvement in conflict in origin countries as either peace-wrecking or peace-building (Mariani et al., 2018). The relative sizes of diaspora promote conflict but, in so doing, cause the other side to invest more in men and material, thus increasing the cost of the war that may ultimately lead to a negotiated settlement. However, much more research is required, particularly on the degree of factionalism within diasporas and how these groups vary not just in terms of education and identity with the home area, but also in how they seek support from outside powers and in destination countries, but also multilaterally, in order to prosecute their interests. Nevertheless, it is the ideas circulating within the diaspora that are important for both economic and political change and, as these may not be best measured through the aggregate number of emigrants or the size of diasporas, it is to the role of individuals that we must now turn.

c. *Individuals in a matrix of institutions*

Within these broad diaspora institutions, the agency of individual and small groups of migrants have had a profound impact on political change in areas of origin, particularly in radical or revolutionary change. Among

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[3] Estimates for the number of international migrants are taken from World Bank (2016).

the majority of migrants who move short-term or circulate between village and city are a few who seek to enter more long-term into the urban environment. Some fail, perhaps rejected by urban society, others simply return later to try to apply their new knowledge in their villages of origin in order to recreate a new society. Perhaps the most famous example of the rejected migrant was Hong Xiu-quan, who became the leader of the Taiping rebellion that devastated much of south-central China between 1840 and 1864, but many smaller examples of such messianic movements exist, and particularly in the small islands of the Pacific. Certain common features appear to apply: the leaders are charismatic; they come from the middle-upper echelons of their respective societies, they are perhaps better educated and aspiring; they have grievances that they attribute to immigrant groups but they also feel that they can use their understanding of these same groups to overturn the established order to create the new heaven and new earth. The movements are almost always destructive rather than constructive. In Hong's case, he was also from a minority group, the Hakka. A particular combination of factors is thus required and the movements appear to occur at relatively early phases in the evolution of a migration system and shortly after initial contact with external groups. The role of the circular migrant as a catalyst in this process is discussed in more detail elsewhere (Skeldon, 1987).

The migrant as a driver of political change can also be seen at the international level and here the resultant movements can be as much constructive as destructive. These movements can also be conceptualized as being part of the diaspora from any group and are often linked to the colonial policy of educating the elites of the time. For example, Ho Chi Minh was only one of the more prominent returnees to embark upon, initially a nationalist and then a communist, struggle, but he was only one of many Vietnamese in France at the time among the "revolutionaries they could not break" (Ngo, 1995). Others from countries that were never under direct colonial rule such as Deng Xiao Ping, Zhou Enlai and the earlier Sun Yat-sen all spent time overseas, the former in the Paris commune, Zhou in the UK, France and Germany, and the latter in London as well as Japan. The leaders of the Thai revolution of 1932, Pridi, Phibun and Prayoon had also been in France and Lee Kwan Yew, Jinnah Gandhi and Nehru had been in London. It was not just the elites who were important in the establishment of revolutionary and independence movements. Ordinary Chinese who had gone to France as coolies during the First World War "returned to China, literate and wise in the

ways of the world, often with a decent balance of cash stored up safely with their families [...] would be in a position to play a new kind of active role in Chinese politics" (Spence, 1990: 292–293). One of the few scholars to have considered the importance of migratory experience for revolutionary leaders has been Moses (2011: 197–219), who, building initially upon the earlier record of Goldstone (1999), showed that virtually two-thirds of two separate samples of 73 and 115 leaders, widely separated in both time and space, had been migrants before embarking upon their exploits. This indeed seems to indicate the past and continuing role of the return migrant in political change.

While the impact of migrants in these movements is clear, it is not just a return into roles in revolutionary and independence movements that migrants can play. They also move into 'normal' parliamentary life. For example, in 2006, 25 of the 45 members of the cabinet in Taiwan had completed advanced degrees outside Taiwan, mainly in the USA but also in Japan, France and the UK. It is known, although numbers are largely unavailable and certainly vary over time, that migrants return to play a role in the administration of countries, in the civil service and also in civil society. While specific impacts are difficult to measure, migration, as a component of political demography, is an integral part of the political development of both developing and developed countries and the role of what some would term "political remittances" have yet to be fully understood.[4]

6   Conclusion: Towards More Systematic Approaches to Migration in Political Demography

This chapter has attempted to sketch an approach to bring migration, both internal and international, into political demography through an examination of the literature on how the state both creates, and is created by, migration. It has not examined the literature on the more specific topic of migration policy through which states attempt to manage migration and which has emerged as a significant sub-field within migration

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[4] On political remittances, see Tabar and Maalouf (2016).

studies.[5] In looking at the role of the state, this chapter has considered both exclusionary, essentially the expulsion of refugees and asylum seekers, and inclusionary dimensions. Within the latter, it examined how migrants make the state through circuits of mobility and through the incorporation of new populations. It also considered the other side of the coin, how migrants can modify and transform the state by impacting upon race, ethnicity and class, as well as ideas. The role of the diaspora in promoting political change at home was examined within the context of transnational citizenship. Finally, case studies of individual return migrants to states of origin are briefly described to provide examples of their various roles in revolutionary political change.

Research into migration shows that it changes over time: destinations and origins change associated with development. Over the *longue durée*, and at the highest level of generalization, Europe evolved from a region of net outmigration to one of net immigration, for example. However, specific shifts over shorter time periods for specific areas have also been identified, with these shifts diffusing across space through time (Skeldon, 1990, 1997, 2012). As patterns of migration evolve over time and across space, can these then be associated with the shifting patterns of mortality and fertility that make up the demographic transition in a way first hypothesized by Zelinsky (1971)? In turn, can these demographic shifts then be associated with political change in any systematic way?

We are probably some way from satisfactorily answering these questions, but political demography is surely well placed to attempt to address them. Although still strongly focused on the impact of shifting patterns of fertility and resulting changes in age structures, migration is an integral part of the work of those who study political demography (see Kaufmann, 2018 and the essays in Goldstone, 2012, for example). However, this integration is associated primarily with immigration in the context of ageing populations and the potential for conflict among migrant and ethnic groups rather than a broader search for linkages among the three demographic variables and how these might be related to changes in political systems. Given that most migrants are young adults, the role of migration or mobility in youth bulges, for example, needs much further examination. The political implications of declining internal migration

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[5] For comprehensive introductions to the particular field of migration governance by a range of authors, see Czaika and De Haas (2013), Hollifield et al. (2014), and Betts (2011).

seen across much of the developed world (Champion et al., 2018) and the increasing tensions between national and urban governance described above provide other pressing questions for states in these areas.

Political demography, as its name implies, accords primacy to examining demographic change in all three of its components, fertility, mortality and migration, and political change. The other side of the coin, that political change can impact upon all three variables in terms of the types of policies implemented by governments and their consequences at national, local and multilateral levels, is well studied. However, so too can demographic change have impact upon political change. This chapter has attempted to review the main ways in which migration can impact upon that political change, with other chapters in this book outlining how all three variables interact with political systems in other parts of the world. Using demographic change as a lens through which to view political change not only brings political systems more fully into debates that so often accord priority to economic and social change but also provides a different perspective in the whole population and development debate. Optimistically, this book and this chapter may contribute towards improving the representation of political demography in this debate.

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Youthful Age Structures and the Risks of Revolutionary and Separatist Conflicts

Richard Cincotta and Hannes Weber

1   INTRODUCTION

Concerns focused on the political instability of states with persistent high fertility and large cohorts of young adults—what some have called a "youth bulge" (e.g. Urdal, 2006; Weber, 2018)—are really nothing new. Inspired by the theorizations of Coale and Hoover (1958), Herbert Möller (1968–1969) convincingly argued that the unprecedented surge of young men into Europe's rapidly growing population during the mid-nineteenth century contributed to the ease of recruitment, the rise of militarism and the high frequency of political rebellion and war on the

R. Cincotta (✉)
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: rcincotta@stimson.org

H. Weber
University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

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continent. Möller's theorization laid the foundations for later historical research on fertility and age structure's role in rebellions during the early modern era (Goldstone, 1991), and for more recent efforts to strengthen the conceptual and statistical understanding of vulnerabilities to intrastate conflict that are associated with a state's position in the age-structural transition.[1]

The objective of the following article is to address two research questions that recognize inconsistencies and gaps in the current theory:

Q_1:   Does the youth bulge model apply equally to both non-territorial intrastate conflicts (revolutions) and territorial conflicts (separatist conflicts)?

Q_2:   Does a state's recent conflict history differentially affect the risk of intrastate conflict in various parts of the age-structural transition?

The first research question (Q_1) reflects the results of a recent study by Yair and Miodownik (2016). They conclude that the presence of a relatively large country-level youth bulge[2] statistically explains the onset of recent non-ethnic armed conflict. However, they find that this measure fails to explain the onset of ethnic conflict. Moreover, observational evidence appears to support their findings. Examples of ethnic separatist conflicts emerging in non-youthful states abound. These include armed separatist conflicts in eastern Ukraine, in Russia's Caucasus region, in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, in Thailand's Pattani Muslim region and in Bosnia in the 1990s. In each case, deep ethnic and religious cleavages and a resilient minority identity remain tightly coupled to unresolved ethnic grievances and incompatibilities, despite the advancement of the country-level age structure and the economic and social development that typically accompanies this demographic shift.

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[1] The age-structural transition describes the transition from a population numerically dominated by children, adolescents and young adults, to distributions with large proportions of older adults and seniors (cf. Cincotta et al., 2003; Goldstone, 2002, 2012; Hegre et al., 2013; Leahy et al., 2007; Mesquida & Weiner, 1999; Sciubba, 2011, 2012; Urdal, 2006, 2012).

[2] This is measured as the proportion of young adults, ages 15–24, in the adult population.

The latter research question (Q_2) relates to the observation that most revolutions (non-territorial conflicts) arising in states with mature populations are brief, as opposed to those among youthful states, which tend to persist or frequently re-emerge. For example, the decline of the Soviet Union precipitated two non-territorial revolts in two non-youthful states, both lasting under two weeks and both enduring a significant number of battle-related deaths: a successful revolution in Romania, in December of 1989, and, in late September and early October of 1993, a decisive showdown over constitutional powers in Russia. In July 2016, armed violence associated with an attempted coup in Turkey ended in just two days. While politically pivotal events in terms of their duration, they contrast sharply with the numerous decades-long revolts that sub-Saharan states have recently endured, or with the 4 or 5 that have dragged on in Latin America through much of the latter part of the twentieth century (UCDP/PRIO, 2018). Nonetheless, analysts have yet to determine whether variation in age structure statistically affects the duration of revolutionary conflict—a dynamic that is every bit as critical to diplomatic and defence policymakers as the risk of its onset.

The research described in this chapter revises the youth bulge hypothesis by disaggregating cases by conflict type and by recent conflict history. The methodology employed is age-structural modelling (Cincotta, 2012, 2017), an application of logistic regression analysis structured to generate readily interpretable, repeatable and testable two-dimensional probability functions in the age-structural domain, **M**, an *x*-axis representing the path of the age-structural transition. We check the validity of these models by testing extended models, which feature independent variables that are hypothetical competitors of median age. We also present panel models that include country and year-fixed effects to explore the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we use the (United States) National Intelligence Council's (NIC) four-phase system to determine if the patterns expected by hypotheses that are posed in this study are visually apparent in the observed data, both within the sample (1975–2010) and beyond the sample (2011–present) (NIC, 2012).

The chapter's analysis indicates that a youthful country-level age structure is indicative of an elevated risk of onset and a high risk of an intermittent or persistent *revolutionary conflict*, which is defined as a non-territorial intrastate conflict in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set (2018) (UCDP/PRIO-ACDS) where the ultimate objective of opposition forces is to alter the political form of the central government or to

replace or modify its regime. Movement out of the youthful portion of the age-structural transition turns out to be an excellent predictor of a decline in the risk of a future revolution. A simple model of this dynamic forecasts a very slow, erratic decline in the five-year count of states in revolutionary conflict, from now until 2040.

Our analyses also indicated that a statistically significant decline related to the country-level age structure can be expected for *separatist conflicts* defined as an intrastate conflict in which the armed opposition aims to alter the political status of a territory (i.e. a territorial conflict, as disaggregated by UCDP/PRIO's data). However, the statistical risk gradients of models of this type of conflict are very shallow, suggesting that measures of country-level age structure are typically poor predictors of separatist conflict onset or termination. This analysis suggests that armed separatist conflict has a much higher probability of persisting or re-emerging, despite the majority's progress through the age-structural transition. Thus, we see no way to confidently predict trends in separatist conflict using population age structure. However, we note that the trend in the number of states engaged in separatist conflict has been on the rise since 2014.

2   Theory

Theoretical expectations that relate human population age structure to the risk of various forms of conflict are part of a larger body of theory referred to as the age-structural theory of state behaviour (Cincotta, 2017). According to this theory, the probabilities of realizing certain social, economic and political conditions shift as the population moves through the age-structural transition.

This article employs a discrete four-phase classification system, developed from a schema conceived by Malmberg and Lindh (2006: 68). Each of the four phases is defined in terms of country-level median age, a scalar measure used by population biologists and demographers to crudely characterize and compare the age distributions of populations. This system is based on country-level median age, m (the age of the person for whom 50% of the population is younger). The system divides the transition into four discrete phases: youthful ($m \leq 25.5$ years), intermediate ($25.6 \leq m \leq 35.5$ years), mature ($35.6 \leq m \leq 45.5$ years) and post-mature ($m \geq 45.6$ years).

2.1   *The Youth Bulge Hypothesis*

Put simply, proponents of the youth bulge hypothesis postulate that states with populations where there are large proportions of young adults in the adult population—i.e. states in the youthful phase of the age-structural transition—are expected to face an elevated risk of political violence and intrastate conflict, whether perpetrated by non-state or state actors (Urdal, 2006; Mesquida & Weiner, 1999). States that experience sustained declines in fertility and enter the transition's intermediate phase are expected to face substantially reduced risks of conflict. In recent history, states that have ultimately entered the intermediate phase, have first dropped below a total fertility rate (TFR) of about 2.8 children per woman (Cincotta, 2017).

Since its earliest elaboration (Möller, 1968–1969), proponents of the youth bulge hypothesis have focused on the ease of mobilizing idealistic, risk-taking young-adult males where alternative options for economic and social mobility are perceived as limited (Goldstone, 1991; Fuller & Pitts, 1990; Huntington, 1997).[3] Generally, the hypothesis has been coupled to the recognition that states with the pyramid-shaped age structures, which is characteristic of a youthful population (e.g. Nigeria's age structure, depicted in Fig. 1), face upward pressures on demand for health care, education, jobs and basic infrastructure, but typically demonstrate low levels of state capacity and political stability. Due to these characteristics, youth bulge countries are often expected to experience relatively high rates of out-migration (Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001: 17–21).

2.2   *Hypotheses*

The study tests six hypotheses: three concerning revolutionary conflicts and three concerning separatist conflicts. Each hypothesis is a statistical expectation of a trend in the five-year probability of a state being in conflict (either revolutionary or separatist) over the length of the age-structural domain, **M**, measured in median age. To limit the spikes and troughs that are characteristics of the annual count of states in intrastate conflict, the five-year count is used to predict the risk of intrastate conflict.

For revolutionary conflict:

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[3] For a critique of this argument see Sommers (2011) and for a reply, Cincotta (2018).

Fig. 1 Population pyramids. Examples of the (U.S.) NIC's four age-structural phases (NIC, 2017). The data represent the proportions of five-year groups (males on the left, females on the right) in the total population and are projections drawn from the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017; hereafter cited as UNPD, 2017; medium fertility variant for the year 2025. The four phases are (from left to right): youthful [YTH] (Nigeria); intermediate [INT] (Morocco); mature [MAT] (USA); and post-mature [PMT] (Japan)

H_1: The five-year risk of revolutionary conflict declines among states that have not recently experienced revolutionary conflict as their median age increases (i.e., as the age structure matures and the youth bulge dissipates).

H_2: The five-year risk of revolutionary conflict will be greater among states that have recently experienced revolutionary conflict.

H_3: Despite a recent history of persistent revolutionary conflict, the five-year risk of revolutionary conflict will decline as median age increases.

For separatist conflicts:

H_4: The five-year risk of a territorial conflict declines among states that have not recently experienced territorial conflict as their median age increases.

H_5: The five-year risk of territorial conflict will be greater among states that have recently experienced territorial conflict.

H_6: Despite a recent history of persistent territorial conflict, the five-year risk of territorial conflict will decline as median age increases.

3   Methods

Age-structural modelling repositions state behaviours—i.e. categorical political, social and economic conditions—that occur over the course of chronological time, **T**, onto **M**, a domain that represents the path of the age-structural transition (Cincotta, 2012, 2017). Rather than attempt to discern causality, the methodology's objective is to generate a set of readily interpretable two-dimensional graphic models that portray the probability of observing a discrete category of social, economic or political behaviour, π, among states across a range of median ages, *m*, that span the age-structural transition. These graphs are designed to visually provide analysts with expectations that help to: (a) improve their current assessments; (b) identify unexpected behaviours; and (c) statistically anticipate the future. Their use by analysts provides a continuous test of the age-structural models from which these expectations were generated.

Age-structural modelling employs logistic regression analysis to statistically transform a set of dichotomous observations made among states, to a simple logistic function, $\pi(m)$, in the age-structural domain, **M**. For each state, each yearly datum includes:

- the dichotomous observation of an outcome variable, π, which records the absence (0) or presence of a categorical condition (1);
- the quantitative observation of the domain variable, *m*, which is measured in years of median age;
- dichotomous observations of independent control variables, C_i, C_{i+1}, ..., C_j, which set apart the effects of exogenous factors that are known (from previous studies) to statistically explain the outcomes of exceptional cases; and
- dichotomous observations of experimental variables, E_j, E_{j+1}, ..., E_n, which are hypothesized to statistically explain differences in outcomes.

For age-structural models, the estimated logit, $g(m)$ is represented as:

$$g(m) = b_0 + b_1 m + \sum_{i=2}^{j-1}(b_i C_i) + \sum_{j}^{n}(b_j E_j)$$

when fit by iteration to the set of dichotomous observations of states, the logistic regression algorithm yields a dependent variable, $\pi(m)$, read

on the vertical axis as the likelihood of observing the discrete categorical outcome in the age-structural domain.

$$\pi(m) = \frac{e^{g(m)}}{1 + e^{g(m)}}$$

The categorical outcome of the model (referred to as the outcome variable) can be either a discrete condition (e.g. a country that will experience a revolutionary conflict during next five calendar years) or a discretely bounded category within the transition of a continuous indicator (e.g. less than 25.0 childhood deaths per 1,000 live births).

Besides computing the fitted parameter values and their standard errors, commercial software typically computes the probability function, $\pi(m)$—in this research, referred to as the age-structural function—and

The plotted cumulative proportion (points) and smoothed cumulative distribution function (CDF) are shown for the underage-five mortality rate of less than 25.0 deaths per 1,000 live births. The CDF, $\pi(m)$, was estimated using logistic regression. Its first derivative, $\pi'(m)$, is expected to peak at $\pi(m) = 0.50(Max)$. **E** marks early attainers, and **L** marks late holdouts (also see online Appendix A.3.2)

its upper and lower 0.95 confidence intervals. To communicate the probability of a state being a member of this category over the length of the age-structural domain, **M**, the corresponding probability function is plotted over the present range of country-level median ages (currently a median age of 15.0–47.0 years, although **M** extends to 55.0 years).

In addition to a (pooled) logistic regression, we also present panel models including country- and year-fixed effects. Usually one of the most important questions in cross-country comparative research is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Countries differ with regard to a large number of socio-economic, demographic, political, historical, cultural and other factors, and many of these potential explanatory variables are often highly co-linear (e.g. see Schrodt, 2014). This makes it difficult to attribute differences in the risk of violent conflict between countries to specific independent variables. A popular approach to remedy this issue is the within-transformation, most often referred to as the fixed-effects estimator in econometric terminology. Rather than looking at differences between countries, a fixed-effects approach examines differences within each country over time. For our application, the crucial question is whether a country's risk of experiencing violent conflict decreases during times when median age is below the long-term average value of the same country.

With a binary outcome, including fixed effects into panel regression models becomes less trivial but feasible. We estimate the conditional logit model discussed in Allison (2009) and implemented in the survival package (Therneau, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2019). We replicated the results using the binary fixed effects (bife) package (Stammann et al., 2016) which applies an analytical bias correction to an unconditional logit model. Since the results are virtually identical, we only report the findings from conditional logit models (Tables 1 and 2).

3.1 The Sample

As a matter of consistent practice, the list of recognized independent political entities is drawn from the United Nations (UN). From this list, two types of entities were eliminated from the analysis: (1) non-independent political entities (e.g. Palestine, Western Sahara) whose state behaviour may be constrained or induced by an occupying power; and (2) independent states with a population under 500,000 (including Belize, Iceland, Brunei and numerous small island states).

Table 1 Panel models of revolutionary conflict, 1975–2010[a]

	Model							
	Pooled logit	Fixed effects conditional logit						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Median age[b]	−0.128***	−0312***	−0.247***	−0.309***	−0.256***	−0.315***	−0 269***	−0330***
	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.069)
Population <5.0 million[c,d]	−0.321*							
	(0.138)							
Oil + mineral rents >15% of GDP[c]	0.441*							
	(0.174)							
0 conflicts					−2.030***	−2.025***	−3.211***	−3.638***
					(0.196)	(0.226)	(0.236)	(0.292)
1 or 2 conflicts[c]	2.954***		1.832***	1.744***	1.066***	1.407***	−1.392***	−1.920***
	(0.221)		(0.215)	(0.246)	(0.243)	(0.291)	(0.303)	(0.368)
3 or 4 conflicts[c]	4.175***		2.704***	3.043***				
	(0.177)		(0.201)	(0.243)				
GDP/cap (log)[b]	−0.312*			2.605***		2.707***		2.658***
	(0.132)			(0 641)		(0.654)		(0.658)
Late secondary attainment[b]	0.218			−5.541**		−5.896**		−6.178**
	(0.350)			(2.068)		(2.112)		(2.134)
Anocracy (Partly Free)[c]	−0.067			0.201		0.243		0.263
	(0.113)			(0.169)		(0.172)		(0.173)
Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity (ELF[1])[b]	0.647*							
	(0.282)							
Constant	1.416							
	(0.416)							
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	Model							
	Pooled logit	Fixed effects conditional logit						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4133	5355	5240	4249	5240	4249	5240	4249
Log Likelihood	−1184	−1064	−896	−686	−876	−669	−875	−667

*$p < 0.050$, **$p < 0.010$, ***$p < 0.001$, Standard errors in parentheses
[a]Data from 2011 to 2015 were withheld from the analysis for out-of-sample testing; [b]Continuous variable, [c]Dichotomous variable, [d]Not resource reliant (oil + mineral rents ≤15.0% of GDP)

Table 2 Panel models of separatist (territorial) conflict, 1975–2010[a]

	Model							
	Pooled logit	Fixed effects conditional logit						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Median age[b]	0.058**	−0.226***	−0.218***	−0.418***	−0.232***	−0.426***	−0.239***	−0.425***
	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.098)	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.057)	(0.100)
Population <5.0 million[b,d]	−1.542***							
	(0.294)							
Oil + mineral rents >15% of GDP[c]	0.765**							
	(0.234)							
0 conflicts[c]					−2.918***	−2.640***	−4.243***	−4.348***
					(0.357)	(0.380)	(0.379)	(0.426)
1 or 2 conflicts[c]	4.354***		2.635***	2.430***			−1607**	−1.943***
	(0.374)		(0.394)	(0.423)			(0.511)	(0.561)
3 or 4 conflicts[c]	5.473***		3.574***	3.788***	1.208**	1.680***		
	(0.243)		(0.311)	(0.361)	(0.390)	(0.432)		
GDP/cap (log)	−0.757***			5.929***		5.859***		5.603***
	(0.191)			(1.337)		(1.353)		(1.339)
Late secondary attainment[b]	−1.059*			−1.515		−1.664		−1.816
	(0.498)			(3.080)		(3.130)		(3.111)
Anocracy (Partly Free)[c]	0.372*			−0.002		−0.031		−0.080
	(0.167)			(0.273)				(0.277)

	Model							
	Pooled logit	Fixed effects conditional logit						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity (ELF[1])[b]	2.027*** (0.414)							
Constant	−2.002 (0.545)							
Country fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4131	5311	5198	4247	5198	4247	5198	4247
Log Likelihood	−670	−515	−376	−288	−362	−278	−362	−280

*$p < 0.050$, **$p < 0.010$, ***$p < 0.001$ Standard errors in parentheses
[a]Data from 2011 to 2015 were withheld from the analysis for out-of-sample testing; [b]Continuous variable, [c]Dichotomous variable, [d]Not resource reliant (oil + mineral rents ≤15.0% of GDP)

A substantial number of states have entered the active data set between 1975 and 2010. These include several states, which became part of the data pool the year that they surpassed a population of 500,000 (e.g. Bhutan, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Solomon Islands) and a large group of newly independent states (e.g. Eritrea, former Soviet republics, former Yugoslav republics, Slovak Republic, South Sudan, Timor-Leste). Thus, the annual active data set has grown from 136 states in 1975 to 166 in 2018.

The use of states as the unit of analysis has several analytical limitations. The country-level median age may obfuscate the presence of significantly populous minorities who display demographic dynamics differing substantially from the majority. Even when the country-level age structure has matured, minority-majority demographic differences can be associated with ethnic tensions (Leuprecht 2010; Cincotta, 2011).

3.2   *Temporal Extent of Data*

The age-structural models generated in this research are built upon data assembled from international agency sources and drawn from a period beginning in 1975, or when first available after 1975, and ending in 2010. This selection of 35 years corresponds to a period after the dissolution of the remaining European overseas empires (British, French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese) and begins after the year that Freedom House first made its annual assessment of civil liberties and political rights (1972). This end date (2010) provides several decades of data, yet it leaves a period—2011 to the present—for out-of-sample model testing.

3.3   *Outcome Variables*

- *The future five-year risk of revolutionary conflict*. Dichotomous: 1 = one or more years during which a revolutionary conflict is noted in the next five years; 0 = no revolutionary conflicts during the next five years. Data source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, Version 18.1.
- *The future five-year risk of separatist conflict*. Dichotomous: 1 = at least one separatist conflict in the next five years; 0 = no separatist conflicts during the next five years. Data source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, Version 18.1.

3.4   *Independent Variables*

- *Median age*. Continuous domain variable: indicator is the age of the median of the country-level population, measured in years. Source: UNPD (2017).[4,5]
- *Small population states*. Dichotomous control variable: 1 = a state with a population less than 5.0 million and petroleum and/or mineral revenues comprising less than 15.0% of GDP (i.e. not a resource-reliant state); 0 = a state with a population equal to or greater than 5.0 million, or any state that qualifies as resource reliant. Source: UNPD (2017).
- *Resource-reliant states*. Dichotomous control variable: 1 = a state with petroleum and/or mineral revenues that are equal to or greater than 15.0% of GDP; 0 = a state with petroleum and/or mineral revenues less than 15.0% of GDP. Source: World Development Indicators Data Base, World Bank Group (2017).
- *Conflict absence*. Dichotomous experimental variable: 1 = cases in which there have been zero (0) conflict years of the same type of conflict (revolutionary or separatist) during the prior four-year period (revolutionary conflicts in this category are noted on graphs as R_{Abs}; separatist conflict, S_{Abs}); 0 = all other conflict histories. Source: UCDP/PRIO (2018).
- *Conflict intermittence*. Dichotomous experimental variable: 1 = cases in which there have been 1 or 2 conflict years during the prior four-year period (graphed as R_{Imt}, S_{Imt}); 0 = all other conflict histories. Source: UCDP/PRIO (2018).
- *Conflict persistence*. Dichotomous experimental variable: 1 = cases in which there have been 3 or 4 conflict years during the prior four-year period (graphed as R_{Per}, S_{Per}); 0 = all other conflict histories. Source: UCDP/PRIO (2018).

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[4] Note: For the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), median age is computed from estimates and projections of citizen residents (excluding temporary labour migrants), which were originally provided by the US Census Bureau's International Program Center. These data are not publicly available via the centre's International Data Base (USCB-IPC, 2015).

[5] The median age projections for the GCC states' citizen-resident populations be obtained from the author via email or downloaded from his website (www.politicaldem ography.org).

3.5   Age-Structural Models Versus Extended Models

In the fixed effects analysis, the age-structural form (where median age is the only continuous independent variable) was expanded to include other continuous and dichotomous independent variables that represent competing hypotheses. In this research, four competing variables—per capita income, educational attainment, anocracy and ethnolinguistic heterogeneity (each discussed below)—were added to the age-structural model to generate a set of expanded models.

3.6   Alternative Independent Variables

- *Per capita income.* Continuous variable: Log_{10} transform of GDP per capita, in 2010 US$. Source: World Bank's World Development indicators, World Bank (2017).
- *Late-secondary attainment, 20–29 years of age.* Continuous variable: the proportion of the population from ages 20–29 years, male and female combined, who have attained late-secondary school levels or higher. Source: Wittgenstein Center, Lutz et al. (2011).
- *Anocracy.* Dichotomous variable: Partly Free Status in Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties. Source: Freedom House (2018).
- *Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity.* Continuous variable: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ELF(1), indicating heterogeneity in terms of major world linguistic groups. Source: Desmet et al. (2011).

4   RESULTS

Notably, median age was determined to be highly significant in all fixed effects models of revolutionary conflict (R_{Abs}, R_{Imt}, R_{Per}) and separatist conflict (S_{Abs}, S_{Imt}, S_{Per}), as were each of the dichotomous conflict history variables (absence, intermittence and persistence) in each model (Tables 1 and 2). Other general findings include:

- In pooled models, states with small populations (less than 5.0 million) yielded significant coefficients indicating a reduced risk of intrastate conflict when compared to more populous states.

- In pooled models, both resource-reliant states (oil + mineral rents >15% of GDP) and ethnolinguistically fractionated states, as a group, were statistically different from other states for both revolutionary conflict (R_{Abs}, R_{Imt}, R_{Per}) and separatist conflict (S_{Abs}, S_{Imt}, S_{Per}), suggesting an elevated five-year risk of intrastate conflict across the age-structural transition.
- In the fixed effects conditional logit models of revolutionary conflict (see Table 1), GDP per capita and late secondary educational attainment were found to be statistically significant. Their net effect was to drive down the five-year risk of revolutionary conflict. Elevated levels of GDP per capita apparently tended to slightly increase the five-year risk of revolutionary conflict across the age-structural transition, while elevated levels of late secondary attainment tended to decrease that risk. Anocracy, which political analysts often assume to be a conflict-risk factor, had no apparent statistical effect.
- In the fixed effects conditional logit models of separatist conflict (see Table 2), GDP per capita was found to be statistically significant. Its net effect was to drive down vulnerability to revolutionary conflict. Apparently, elevated levels of income tended to increase the five-year risk of conflict across the age-structural transition. However, among fixed effects models, neither late secondary attainment nor anocracy were significant.

4.1   Age-Structural Models: Revolutionary Conflict Hypotheses

H_1:   As median age increases, the risk of experiencing an onset of revolutionary conflict declines among states that have not recently experienced revolutionary conflict.

Failed to reject H_1.

Rationale. In the revolutionary conflict absence model (Table 1, R_{Abs}), the coefficient for median age is negative and highly significant, indicating a decline in risk as states advance through the age-structural transition. Moreover, the model's functional form (and ± 0.95 confidence intervals), graphed in the age-structural domain (Fig. 2), indicates that the probability of revolutionary conflict in the next five years, while relatively low (roughly one-fifth of risk associated with states with recent conflict) is

Fig. 2 The functional forms and 0.95 confidence intervals for three mutually exclusive categories of 4-year conflict history: R_{Abs} (0 conflict years over the past 4 most recent years), R_{Imt} (1 or 2 conflict years) and R_{Per} (3 or 4 conflict years). Youthful (YTH), intermediate (INT) and mature (MAT) phases of the age-structural transition are shown above the graph. Data are from non-territorial conflicts, 1972–2010 (UCDP/PRIO, 2018)

highest among states that chronically experience the most youthful age structures (*m* < 20.0 years).

> H_2:   The risk of revolutionary conflict will be greater among states that have recently experienced a revolutionary conflict.

Failed to reject H_2.

> H_3:   Despite a recent history of persistent revolutionary conflict, the five-year risk of revolutionary conflict will decline as median age increases.

Failed to reject H_3.

Rationale. The coefficients and functional forms of the series of revolutionary conflict history models indicate that both conflict intermittence

(R_{Imt}) and conflict persistence histories (R_{Per}) carry very high risks of future revolutionary conflict (at $m = 15$ years, $p > 0.85$ and $p > 0.95$, respectively). Nonetheless, these models' functional forms (Fig. 2) display a tendency for risks to decline as states advance through the intermediate phase of the age-structural transition (Fig. 2).

4.2 Age-Structural Models: Separatist Conflict Hypotheses

H_4: As median age increases, the five-year risk of experiencing an onset of separatist conflict will decline among states that have not recently experienced separatist conflict.

The results of tests of H_4 were ambiguous. Both the pooled and fixed-effects models indicate that an onset of separatist conflict is statistically more likely to occur at the youthful phase than at the mature phase of the age-structural transition. However, median age is a poor competitor in extended models and, in non-statistical tests using the four-phase age-structural system, it is an inconsistent predictor.

Rationale. Whereas the coefficient values in the separatist conflict absence (S_{abs}) model (Table A.3.2, S_{Abs}) are negative and statistically significant, its coefficient is small and its functional form (Fig. 3, S_{Abs}) is nearly flat—i.e. the risk of an onset of separatist conflict is spread almost evenly across the age-structural domain (Fig. 3). The small margin—for states at a median age of 15.0 years, a five-year risk of only one in fifteen ($p < 0.07$)—offers very little information to foreign affairs analysts or policymakers who might seek guidance from this theory.

In the extended onset model, each of the hypothetical alternatives is statistically significant (Table A.3.2, S-Onset-X). Moreover, this competition reverses the sign of the coefficient of median age and vastly reduces its contribution to the model ($p = 0.16$).

H_5: The five-year risk of separatist conflict will be greater among states that have recently experienced separatist conflict.

Failed to reject H_5.

Fig. 3 The functional forms and 0.95 confidence intervals for three mutually exclusive categories of 4-year conflict history: S_{Abs} (0 conflict years over the past 4 most recent years), S_{Imt} (1 or 2 conflict years) and S_{Per} (3 or 4 conflict years). Youthful (YTH), intermediate (INT) and mature (MAT) phases of the age-structural transition are shown above the graph. Data are from territorial conflicts, 1972–2010 (UCDP/PRIO, 2018)

H_6: Despite a recent history of persistent separatist conflict, the five-year risk of separatist conflict will decline as median age increases.

Similar to tests of H_4, tests of H_6 produce ambiguous results. Both the pooled and fixed-effects models indicate that an onset of separatist conflict is statistically more likely to occur at the youthful phase than at the mature phase of the age-structural transition. However, median age is a poor competitor in extended models and, in non-statistical tests using the four-phase age-structural system, it is an inconsistent predictor.

Rationale. For separatist conflicts, re-emergence and persistence are the most powerful drivers of future risks of separatist conflict. Unlike the functional form representing persistent revolutionary conflict, age-structural maturation appears to have very modest effects on states with persistent separatist conflict (Fig. 3, S_{Per}). Thus, the risk of persistence

of an ongoing separatist conflict remains high, even as the state-level age structure traverses the intermediate phase and enters the mature transitional phase. Nonetheless, there is some suggestion (S_{Imt}) that, as age structure matures, future risks of re-emergence could slowly dissipate among some weakened separatist conflicts.

4.3 Models with Fixed Effects

Tables 1 and 2 present the results from panel models including country- and year-fixed effects. Model 1 is a pooled logistic model replicating the results from the previous between-country regressions. From Model 2 on, fixed effects are included and the interpretation changes to a within-country comparison. Time-constant variables such as ethnolinguistic heterogeneity or the oil dummy are dropped from these models since only time-varying variables can affect the outcome within a specific country. Model 2 shows a model with only median age and fixed effects as a benchmark and the subsequent models add controls and rivalling explanatory variables, mirroring the previous setup.

The intriguing finding here is that median age is a robust and statistically significant predictor of lower risks of both revolutionary conflict (Table 1) as well as separatist conflict (Table 2). This means that as countries become more mature in their age structure, their risks of violent internal conflict usually decline. This finding holds when we control for past conflict, per capita income, educational attainment and regime type. Among the latter variables increases in late-secondary education lower the risks of revolutionary conflict, while the effects on separatist conflict are weaker and not statistically significant. Per capita income has positive effects on both outcome variables which is a marked difference to the pooled model. This means that increases in economic development are usually followed by an increased, rather than decreased, risk of violent conflict if other factors such as age structure and education are held constant.

Note that the interpretation of the within-country (fixed effects) models is slightly different from the between-country (pooled) models. Both models have their strengths in different domains. With the fixed-effects model, a stronger causal claim can be made for the effect of the independent variable of interest. The absolute values of median age are no longer important; rather, the change within a specific country over time is what affects the change in the risk of violent conflict. We

observe that as countries progress through the demographic transition and median age increases, the risks of both separatist and revolutionary conflict usually decrease for the very same countries. By contrast, the pooled logistic model can more easily be used for pragmatic out-of-sample predictions which are less straightforward with the conditional logit model. These predictions can tell analysts what will likely happen if countries enter new, previously unseen stages within the demographic transition from the lessons we have learned from other countries (i.e. a between-country comparison). There is some uncertainty with regard to unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. countries that are projected to have a mature age structure by 2050 might differ from countries that currently have a high median age with regard to factors that are not in the model which might influence the risk of future conflict. But from what we know about the mechanisms today, these predictions are the "best guess" for the future.

5   Looking Back: A Discrete Test of the Models

In this section, the basic expectations of the revolutionary and separatist age-structural models are summarized and then compared to age-structural trends in conflict observed across seven five-year periods, from 1976–1980 to 2011–2015 (the 2011–2015 period provides an out-of-sample test). The observed conflict trends are produced by disaggregating states into the NIC's (2017) discrete age-structural categories (Fig. 4)—youthful (Y), intermediate (I) and mature (M)—based on their median age (because only a few states have recently entered the post-mature category, mature and post-mature are aggregated). Because of the consistent statistical significance of small population size (states with less than 5.0 million population), a category was created for small youthful states (Y^*).

5.1   Revolutionary Conflict

Based upon the conflict history models of revolutionary conflict (R_{Abs}, R_{Imt}, R_{Per}), analysts should expect:

- youthful states to be the most vulnerable to the onset of revolutionary conflict, as well as to its persistence—substantially more likely than states in the intermediate or mature age-structural categories.

Fig. 4 The proportion of states engaged in (**a**) revolutionary conflict and (**b**) separatist conflict in each of four age-structural categories. Conflicts are grouped in five-year periods from 1976–1980 to 2011–2015. Categories are based on median age: youthful (m ≤ 25.5 years); intermediate (25.6 ≤ m ≤ 35.5 years); and mature (35.6 ≤ m ≤ 45.5 years). Whereas states with youthful populations under 5 million residents experienced intrastate conflicts (second category), conflicts among similarly small states with intermediate and mature populations have been extremely rare. Data are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set (UCDP/PRIO, 2018) and UN Population Division estimates (UNPD, 2017)

Table 3   Parameter values for revolutionary conflict forecasts (in Table 4, Fig. 5)

Forecasts	a_1	a_2	a_3	a_4
Middle	0.359	0.129	0.107	0.044
Upper (+1.0 std. dev.)	0.412	0.167	0.166	0.057
Lower (−1.0 std. dev.)	0.306	0.092	0.048	0.030

- youthful states with small populations (less than 5.0 million) to be less likely to experience revolutionary conflict than youthful states with larger populations.
- states with a mature population only rarely experience a revolutionary conflict, which would be unlikely to persist.

The observed age-structural pattern of revolutionary conflict (Fig. 4a) is generally consistent with the expectations generated by the conflict history models (R_{Abs}, R_{Imt}, R_{Per}). Close inspection of the data indicates that the peak in the five-year count of states in revolutionary conflict in the 1991–1995 period was preceded by a decade of relatively large numbers of youthful states (15–18) engaged in persistent revolutionary conflict (i.e. conflict in three or four of the past four years).

This early 1990s peak was the product of coinciding peaks in persistent revolutionary conflict in southern and eastern Africa, as well as in Latin America, plus relatively large numbers onsets and intermittent revolutionary conflicts (5–8). By the 1996–2000 period, the prevalence of revolutionary conflicts in Latin America had dropped precipitously.

5.2   Separatist Conflict

Based on functional outcomes of the conflict history models of separatist conflict (Fig. 3, S_{Abs}, S_{Imt}, S_{Per}), analysts should expect:

- a weak age-structural pattern disrupted by patterns driven by conflict persistence and re-emergence.
- states with small populations (less than 5.0 million) to be less likely to experience separatist conflict than states with larger populations.
- modest declines among mature states that have experienced persistent separatist conflict.

The observed age-structural pattern of separatist conflict (Fig. 4b) was generally consistent with expectations derived from the separatist models (S_{Abs}, S_{Imt}, S_{Per}). Whereas a defined age-structural pattern among separatist conflicts held up through much of the Cold War, the pattern broke down in the 1996–2000 period and is no longer apparent. Without strong age-structural patterns in the onset and persistence of separatist conflict, and the propensity of this type of conflict to re-emerge regardless of age structure, forecasting separatist conflicts using age-structural methods seems inappropriate.

Until the 2011–2015 period, the five-year count of countries in revolutionary conflict was consistently about 50% higher than separatist conflict (there are states in which both types have occurred in a year). The most recent data (UCDP/PRIO, 2018) indicate that the number of countries in separatist conflict is nearly equal to the number with revolutionary conflict—a reversal generated by onset in some youthful states, and the persistence and re-emergence of separatist conflicts in states in the intermediate phase of the age-structural transition.

6   Looking Forward: A Forecast of Trends in Revolutionary Conflict

Whereas the previously present conflict history models of revolutionary conflict (R_{Abs}, R_{Imt}, R_{Per}) provide numerous insights, their dependence on recent conflict histories—details that they are unable to generate (as in a simulation) and then use to calculate future risks—makes these models unsuitable for forecasting. In the following section, forecasts of R_T, the global five-year count of states experiencing at least one year of revolutionary conflict during that period, are generated using a linear model:

$$R_T = a_1 \mathbf{Y} + a_2 \mathbf{Y}^* + a_3 \mathbf{I} + a_4 (\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{P});$$

where $\mathbf{Y}$, $\mathbf{I}$, $\mathbf{M}$ and $\mathbf{P}$ represent counts of states, all with populations greater than 5.0 million, in the youthful, intermediate, mature and post-mature age-structural phases, respectively.[6] $\mathbf{Y}^*$ is the count of least populous states in the youthful phase, each with a population under 5.0 million. There is no corresponding term in this relationship for the least

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[6] See Methods for definitions of categories, based on median age.

populous states in more mature phases (since 1972, no state in a more mature phase, with a population under 5.0 million, has experienced a revolutionary conflict).

In this model, each categorical count is multiplied by an estimate (a_k) of the proportion of states in revolutionary conflict, a, in each age-structural category, k, over a five-year period. In the middle forecast, a_k, is the categorical mean of 5 five-year post-Cold War periods, from 1991–1995 to 2011–2015. The categorical mean plus one standard deviation is used to generate the forecast's upper bound; the categorical mean minus one standard deviation marks its lower bound (Table 3).

The forecast of revolutionary conflict begins in the ongoing five-year period, 2016–2020, and ends in 2036–2040. In the latter period, it suggests a global count between 13 and 22 revolutionary conflicts, down from 28 in the 2011–2015 period. This slow downward trending forecast (Fig. 5)—a speculative departure from the slightly upward trend in revolutionary conflict since 2010—appears superficially similar to the forecast made from a detailed model of all intrastate conflicts by Hegre et al. (2013). However, these two forecasts are not comparable. Because we find that separatist conflicts are largely unresponsive to changes in country-level median age, separatist (territorial) conflicts have been omitted from our forecast.

Despite its simplicity, this model is quite robust. When applied to the in-sample period from 1976 to 2010, the model does well at tracking the conflict trendline. Its upper and lower estimates completely envelope all recorded 5-year estimates of the number of states in conflict, even rising and falling with the peak in revolutionary conflicts, which was recorded in the early 1990s (see observed peak in Table 4, Fig. 5)—a feat that other models have been unable to perform.

This model provides reasonable regional expectations (Table 4). However, the observed five-year count of states in revolutionary conflicts has generally exceeded the model's expected count in the three most youthful regions: (1) West and Central Africa; (2) East and Southern Africa; and (3) the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia Region. Observed counts have generally been slightly lower than expected in the three remaining regions: (1) Europe; (2) North and South America; and (3) the East Asia, India and Pacific Region.

How is the forecast holding up? The most recent UCDP/PRIO (2018) data show that 25 states have already experienced a revolutionary conflict during the 2016–2017 period, which is within the forecast's lower

Table 4 Five-year expected and observed regional counts of states in revolutionary conflict

| Regions | 1991–1995 | | 2011–2015 | | 2031–2035 (forecast) | | |
	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed	Lower	Middle	Upper
East Asia, India, Pacific	5	4	3	2	1	2	3
Europe	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Middle East, N. Africa, Central Asia	7	11	6	9	2	3	4
North & South America	6	7	4	2	1	2	3
South & East Africa	6	9	6	7	5	6	7
West & Central Africa	5	4	6	7	6	7	8

(18) and upper (30) bounds for the 2016–2020 period. The same data set records 24 states engaged in separatist conflict during the 2016–2017 period.

7   CONCLUSIONS

The leading story of this chapter concerns the limited duration of revolutionary conflicts; but *not* their duration in years of chronological time, as political scientists would naturally assume. Instead, revolutionary conflicts do not persist across the age-structural transition. Analysts should expect revolutions to be settled, fade, or of short duration after states enter the intermediate phase of this transition. Advances in country-level median age—particularly beyond the median age of 30 years—tend to dampen the statistical risk of a revolution.

Our conclusions concerning separatist conflict are more tenuous. Separatist conflicts appear somewhat more likely to occur in the more youthful phase of the age-structural transition—however, an onset is relatively rare. However, once a separatist conflict has begun, it can persist or re-appear intermittently, even as the country-level median age advances into the intermediate and mature phases of the age-structural transition. For

example, ethnic conflicts in Myanmar (intermediate phase), the Ukraine (mature phase) and Azerbaijan (mature phase) have erupted periodically, despite the age-structural maturity of these states.

Notably, separatist conflicts in the youthful phase dominated those in more mature phases of the age-structural transition until the late 1990s. Since then, separatist conflicts have been just as prevalent or more prevalent among states in the intermediate phase of the transition, as they have in the youthful phase (Fig. 4b). Whereas the ratio of countries experiencing revolutionary conflict to those experiencing separatist conflicts remained around 2–1 since the early 1980s, that ratio has been close to 1 since 2015 (UCDP/PRIO, 2018).

When disaggregated by conflict type and conflict history, a stronger, sturdier model of the relationship emerges between states with youthful populations and the onset and persistence of revolutionary conflict. Several means of testing—i.e. using statistically generated age-structural functions (Fig. 2), empirical patterns generated by discretely categorized conflict data (Fig. 4a), and testing against hypothetical alternatives in an extended model (see Table A.3.1)—provide evidence that the five-year risk of an onset of revolutionary conflict remains elevated in the youthful phase of the age-structural transition (i.e. states with a youth bulge). And, this evidence indicates that this measure of risk to the onset of revolutionary conflict declines as these states approach, and traverse, the intermediate phase of the age-structural transition—a window on the age-structural domain that is associated with the growth of institutional capacity and political development (Cincotta & Madsen, 2017; Cincotta, 2017).

More importantly, the study provides evidence that persistent and intermittent revolutionary conflicts are likely to fade if and when states head deeply into the intermediate phase of the age-structural transition— much in the way that Colombia's long-running Marxist insurgencies appear to be nearing a close. Moreover, where revolutionary conflicts have arisen in intermediate and mature states, they have typically been relatively brief (in chronological time). Examples are the recent revolt of a military faction in Turkey (in 2016), and insurrections in Russia (1993), Romania (1989) and Georgia (1991–1993) following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

The exceptions to this general rule have been non-territorial, mostly civilian-targeted efforts in industrial countries, some of which have been

generated by overseas organizations using foreign travellers or immigrants—a difficult to classify melding of international actors and resident discontents. Others have been generated by self-motivated individuals, often influenced by social media.

7.1   Discussion: The Persistence of Separatist Conflict

The lack of a strong relationship between separatist conflict and the country-level age structure reflects ethnic conflicts' apparent ability to persist and re-emerge through much of the age-structural transition. This should not surprise analysts. Unlike revolutionary conflict, which has been geographically widespread among youthful states, the vast majority of separatist conflicts currently arise and re-emerge in states whose borders enclose a multi-ethnic mix reflecting the territorial conquests of empires that endured into the twentieth century. These extinct empires include the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires (dismantled in 1918); the British, French, German, Netherlands, Belgian and Portuguese Overseas Empires (nearly fully dismantled by the early 1970s), and the Russian Empire (ultimately dismantled at the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the close of 1991). Conversely, the states that once made up Spain's New World empire, most of which had gained independence in the early nineteenth century, have suffered much less from separatist conflict over the past 70 years. According to UCDP/PRIO (2018), separatist conflicts have been absent from the Americas since 1950, when Puerto Rican separatists engaged the US government in armed conflict.

What explains the divergence in separatist and revolutionary conflict dynamics? According to Yair and Miodownik (2016), the sources of grievances matter most. While advances in age-structural maturity and the dissipation of the youth bulge tend to relieve much of the employment-related grievances and inequities felt by young adults, separatists' core grievances, centred around their identity and the lack of political autonomy granted to their identity group, are often unresolved.

In addition, Cincotta (2011) has argued that minority youth bulges can facilitate separatist political movements. Economically and socially marginalized ethnic minorities, particularly in rural enclaves, often retain high levels of fertility while fertility among the more urbanized and better educated majority declines (e.g. Lebanese Shiites, rural Kurds in south-eastern Turkey, Pattani Muslims in Thailand and some Caucasian minorities in Russia). Under these conditions, the country-level median

age advances, majority-minority economic and social conditions diverge, and the marginalized minority grows more rapidly than the majority—a situation that tends to fuel fears among the politically endowed majority particularly when articulated by political entrepreneurs (Blomquist, 2016; Blomquist & Cincotta, 2016; Cincotta et al., 2003; Leuprecht, 2010).

Does separatist warfare preclude the settlement of conflict? Of course, that is not the case, theoretically or empirically. The age-structural function for intermittent separatist conflicts (Fig. 3, S_{Imt}) suggests a very slow and uncertain decline (shown by wide confidence intervals) in the five-year risk of conflict. This function's slow decline across the age-structural transition alludes to the protracted warfare and costly interventions that ultimately led to the successful mediation, violent termination or slow ideological disintegration of separatist movements in Spain (Basques), the UK (Irish Catholics), Indonesia (Timorese, Aceh), India (Nagas, Punjabi Sikhs) and Ethiopia (Eritreans).

7.2   Outlook: Intrastate Conflict's Future

What can demographic projections tell defence and intelligence analysts about the future of armed conflict? Assuming that the UN Population Division's medium fertility variant provides a reasonable projection of the pace of regional demographic change, over the next two decades (to 2040), foreign affairs analysts should expect:

- a slow downward trend in the global number of states engaged in a revolutionary conflict (Fig. 5) with notable regional declines in Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Southeast Asia, the Maghreb, Central Asia and southern Africa (Table 4); and
- sustained, and possibly increasing, counts of states in revolutionary conflict in the remaining contiguous clusters of youthful states, situated in: the Greater Sahel, tropical Africa (West, Central, East); the Horn of Africa-Yemen; Pakistan-Afghanistan; the Mashreq-Levant (Syria, Iraq, Jordan); and possibly in parts of the South Pacific Region (Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands).

With the exception of the South Pacific group, there are currently few indications that these youthful clusters are maturing. Whereas the UNPD's current medium fertility variant projects that about 30% of

Fig. 5 The trend in the number of states engaged in revolutionary conflict (but not intrastate separatist conflict) over seven five-year periods (1976–1980 to 2011–2015). Forecasts are for 2016–2020 to 2036–2040. Five-year counts of states in revolutionary conflict (observed) are drawn from non-territorial conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set (2018)

today's 69 youthful states are likely to exit the youthful category by 2035, only a handful of these are located within the most war-torn youthful clusters.

Given this outlook, the world's developed states would do well to increase support for peace operations, as well as for regional efforts to contain the spread of spill-over conflicts in and around the most youthful regions: the Sahel, tropical Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa-Yemen. As a long-term strategy, development donors should increase their support for the suite of programs and policies that, in youthful countries, have promoted the transition to a more mature age structure—including those that lengthen girls' educational attainment, provide access to modern contraception and information, and secure equal rights for women.

In the long-run, separatist conflicts could present the most persistent threat to regional stability. To lower the risks of separatist conflicts, there is a need to encourage greater participation of now-marginalized ethnic and religious minorities, and to support those political leaders who

show the motivation and political will to implement integrationist policies. Where these measures fail, it may be useful to consider in extreme cases (e.g. the Sahel, Somalia, Yemen, the Mashreq, Afghanistan) the formation of new nation states with more realistic borders, replacing multi-ethnic colonial-era entities and post-colonial conglomerates that have become sites for recurring ethnoreligious conflict (for a critique of partition theory, see Sambanis, 2000). To reduce the risk of post-independence revolutionary conflict (e.g., South Sudan, Timor-Leste), age-structural theory would suggest that populations in those fledgling states should be within, or beyond, the intermediate phase of the age-structural transition (beyond median age of 26 years)—conditions that, unfortunately, have rarely been achieved by states at independence.

7.3   Future Research

For researchers who are intent on further clarifying demography's relationship with revolution, this chapter's conclusions open several avenues for research. Among these opportunities, studies that focus on the cessation of revolutionary conflict are (in the authors' opinion) likely to yield the most return. Because the models presented in this chapter indicate that foreign affairs analysts should expect the risk of revolutionary conflict to decline to low levels during the transition's intermediate phase (26–35 years), one should ask:

- What qualities best characterize those revolutionary conflicts that come to a sustained conclusion early in the age-structural transition?
- And, what qualities characterize revolts that start and end much later in this transition - within and beyond the demographic window?

While academic researchers have argued that anocracies (partial democracies) are more vulnerable to intrastate conflict than democracies or autocracies (Regan & Bell, 2010), among intelligence analysts the hypothesis has a reputation as a poor predictor of future conflict. That said, investigations of revolutions among more specific regime types—e.g. single-party autocracies, military regimes and multi-party authoritarians—when observed across the age-structural domain might provide clues to the timing of the onset and/or cessation of revolutionary conflict.

Predicting the course of ethnic separatist conflict is another matter. As Yair and Miodownik's (2016) research first suggested, legitimate clues to a future onset or cessation of separatist conflict are more likely to exist at the sub-national level (ethnic group or provincial level) than in country-level data sets. While there are suggestions that majority-minority gaps in fertility and age structure may reflect acute inter-ethnic tensions that are difficult to resolve, the fact that many central government agencies do not collect ethnicity-coded data, or do not release those data to the public, limits research on this topic to case studies.

Here, again, the researchers' dilemma is in full force: the more one learns, the more one comprehends how little one really understands. Whereas Herbert Möller's most basic observations on the relationship between demography and conflict—published more than 50 years ago—still hold up today, the dynamics that underlie those observations turn out to be less simple than political demographers (including ourselves) believed them to be.

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Poverty and Religious Affiliation Worldwide, 1970–2010

Vegard Skirbekk and Jose Navarro

1   Introduction: Poor Man's Religion?

There is a significant risk that social and political conflicts arising from the changing religious composition of states could increase over time, especially when overlapping with high inter-community levels of social inequality. This is particularly important in an era of high migration and significant fertility gaps, which results in differences in age structures and different population growth. In this chapter, we focus on social inequality, poverty, and one central dimension of cultural identity, religion. We

V. Skirbekk (✉) · J. Navarro
Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: vs2551@cumc.columbia.edu

therefore study social inequality in a different context than the geographic entities often considered—such as countries or subnational areas. Understanding the interlinkages between religion and poverty is relevant to several domains, including to assess how (a) poverty levels across religions coincide with religious tensions, conflicts and societal divisions around the world, (b) policies, which may be most effective at poverty alleviation, could depend on the religious composition of the economically deprived, (c) poverty can both draw some to religion when financial, social or moral support and a sense of belonging could be found, however, how it could also alienate others from religious beliefs, and (d) behaviours that can be grounded in religious convictions may alleviate or perpetuate or even raise poverty.

To describe and understand the relationships between economic deprivation and religious belief, one needs to assess faith and economic deprivation in tandem. Until now, there has not been any worldwide assessment on the relationship between religion and poverty. This chapter seeks to do so by combining unique global data on religious affiliation and economic inequality—and by assessing trends over time. We present new data and estimates on poverty grouped by religious belief worldwide, and we combine religious and income distribution data to produce a distribution of poverty by religion and country. Our sample comprises 152 countries and encompasses 95% of world population. Apart from small (less than 500,000 inhabitants) states, we provide estimates for all major countries. See Table A.4.1 in the online appendix for a list of countries that we include.

Demography can directly or indirectly affect political processes, particularly when different groups have opposing social and economic interests: it can serve as a catalyst or a conditioning factor for political decisions. Population change needs to be considered as a political force in its own right. The unprecedented global demographic turbulence created by the accelerated rise in world population of the last 200 years is likely to crest around the middle of this century. The next few decades will present substantial changes in long-term demographic trends, including the shrinkage of Europe's labour force, the extreme ageing of advanced industrial societies, as well as the advanced ageing of China, a global shift from rural to urban habitation and a substantial turn in global economic growth towards the developing world, where 9 out of every 10 of the world's children now live, 22% of those in India alone (UN, 2019).

Inequality can be a powerful driver of political action. In contexts where economic inequality levels are high (and perceived as unfair), those at the bottom levels of the income distribution who are (or feel) disadvantaged may try to alter the system, while others who benefit from the current system may try to maintain the status-quo. If large enough, groups are constrained with few economic opportunities, low levels of wealth and lack of social mobility, it can act as a mobilizing force for political action that could lead to political instability and possibly societal change and reordering. In an era with public data on income distributions across the world and social media and television, it is increasingly clear that people compare their own wealth and well-being to others not only within their own regional community and country, but also within and across comparison groups with others, including people of the same or different religious denomination.

A key marker of group identity is one's religious affiliation (Castells 2003; Goujon et al., 2006). Religion and religious denominations have been suggested to be key markers of conflict lines in terms of, for instance, attitudes towards same-sex marriage or attitudes towards abortion (Halman & van Ingen, 2015; Norris & Inglehart, 2011; van den Akker et al., 2013). Religion and the degree of religiosity are often also strong markers of political behaviour, influencing whether one votes, which political allegiances one has and which parties one chooses to vote for (Gayte et al., 2017; Gerber et al., 2016).

Population increases are fastest among those who are more religious and at the lower end of the income distribution globally. Demographic growth in the world is mainly taking place among those with less education and lower income, while those with higher education and greater income tend to have close to replacement fertility (Madsen et al., 2018; Skirbekk, 2008; Vogl, 2015). Demographic growth is mainly taking place among certain religious groups such as Muslims and Hindus, while it is negative among those with no religious affiliation (Stonawski et al., 2015). The relations between demography and politics are complex: demography can drive political and religious behaviours (e.g. high fertility can lead to more conservative views), and population groups can drive political processes (greater degree of religious populations can vote more conservative parties). One of the drivers of demographic behaviour is religion, a cultural institution pervasive globally and with a very high impact on political processes across societies.

Poverty does not take place in a vacuum, but rather within a set of defined group identities, which help delineate identity within a subset of individuals across a variety of domains (Banks, 2008; Huddy, 2015; Sachdeva, 2016). Such group identities could lead to motivation for collective action, help motivate and coordinate political action that could help to reduce poverty. Group memberships could, however, also lead to apathy and disenchantment, create a victim-based explanation for why development has led to one being poor and lead to fatalistic views that entail a belief that one cannot escape poverty and thereby demotivate actions that could have helped one escape poverty (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Jenkins, 2014; Lewis, 2017). The combination of high levels of social inequality and rapid demographic change along religious lines can have important ramifications. Global demographic religious change implies that more individuals will have a religion in the near future, and that these individuals will be increasingly likely to be situated in regions with high levels of economic deprivation (Stonawski et al., 2015).

2   Religion and Poverty

As Figure A.4.1 (online appendix) indicates, religion is powerfully intertwined along a number of causal pathways with the production of economic, environmental and social outcomes in societies. Poverty and riches, like other social outcomes, are not likely to be randomly distributed across religious groups. Modern organized monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Islam have at their core a very strong redistributive message and foster behaviours conducive to reciprocity and equality between its members. Indeed, the world's four major religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam—all include doctrines of salvation and damnation that provide sets of different incentives for performing economic activities and charitable deeds. Comparative analysis of the four religions has shown that each promotes accumulation of wealth and hard work, while discouraging idleness, debt and poverty. The primary difference across these religions is with respect to charity. Religions that allow believers to contribute to their own salvation tend to emphasize varieties of selective charity. Religions that hold salvation is only possible through divine selection stress universal charity (McCleary & Barro, 2006).

Religions and religious institutions and movements both have played major roles in supporting established social order, but also in advocating

change, rebellion and revolutionary movements, from Ancient Rome to the English Civil War, the Islamic revolution in Iran and many more (Lincoln, 1981). Finding effective policies to deal with poverty can hinge on the type of religious convictions and beliefs of those who are disproportionally poor. For instance, religion may relate to the likelihood of attaining higher female education and prioritizing a career ahead of alternative life goals, such as marrying at a young age and having a large family. Some religious groups have a fatalistic view of life, where one's economic position is predetermined at birth—including the Hindu caste system, which prescribes occupational opportunities based on caste. According to their religion, Hindu populations may respond differently to incentives advocating change through own actions than other religions.

Poverty has a subjective and an objective dimension. Individuals may compare themselves to others within a specific region, but they may also compare themselves to others with a similar group identity (Bhuiyan, 2018; Clark & Oswald, 1996). One typically compares one's economic standing not with a global mean, but with a reference group closer to one's own social context. For instance, some may consider their own relative income rank in relation to others with similar ethnic background, from the same linguistic group or the same type of profession. One important dimension that has received very little attention is religion and income; the aim of the current study is to fill that gap.

Religious groups belonging can act as a strong determinant of group belonging and may help define who one's compatriots, competitors and adversaries are. Religious communities, in which many are economically deprived and which at the same time are growing demographically in absolute and relative terms, can represent a growing political and demographic challenge. It could potentially lead to more conflict, as has been the case in recent decades. More inequality across religious groups, where some religious groups are at different ends of the income distribution, can lead to greater likelihood of social upheaval, political instability, tensions and violent conflict (Bartusevičius, 2014; Nordås, 2014).

Economic growth and educational expansions have been found to correlate with religious and cultural groups, and inference models suggest that these relations are of causal nature (Becker & Woessmann, 2013; Bonsang et al., 2017; Cantoni, 2011; Iyer, 2016). Diversity may affect the willingness to support political institutions or to pay taxes (Alesina et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2015). Religions represent a new line of tensions in the global order and may be a key dimension of regional and global disputes

and conflicts (Burstein, 2018; Huntington, 1993; Philpott, 2018). This has also lead to widespread beliefs and tensions, where majorities of Europeans seek bans on Muslim immigration (Goodwin et al., 2017), and the majority of adolescents in the Norwegian capital of Oslo believe that the West and Islam are in a state of war (Vestel & Bakken, 2016).

Despite declines in financial hardship in recent decades, high shares of the world population still live in poverty (Inklaar & Rao, 2017; Kraay & van der Weide, 2017). Great progress has been made in reducing poverty, but as rates decrease, reducing poverty any further seems to be getting harder (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2018). If one believes that one's fate (in terms of, for instance, becoming wealthy or maintaining good health) is an outcome of God's will, then one may be less likely to rationally plan for or adapt one's behaviour to improve one's conditions and prospects. Religion could influence important human behaviours that have a direct impact on economic outcomes such as whether one chooses to pursue higher education, whether one seeks career-oriented positions or whether one wants to have a family and higher or lower fertility levels (Buber-Ennser & Skirbekk, 2016; Lehrer, 2004; McQuillan, 2004). Economic inequalities and time trends can differ by country and religion around the world. Although part of this variation could be ascribed to demographic and human capital differences across religions, religion may well have a bearing on key aspects of human behaviour that influence poverty risks as well as socio-economic outcomes among the poor. This could, for instance, include how religion may affect education, labour force participation and career choice by gender. Religion may also relate to health risk behaviours including diet, exercise patterns, alcohol use, vaccinations and choice of health treatment. Importantly, religious views may exert influence on financial behaviours such as savings and investment behaviours.

Economic inequality and religion have substantial links and a traditionally interwoven relationship. Religion has been found to relate to poverty-relevant outcomes, including economic aspirations and family size (Becker et al., 2016; Heaton, 2011). Religion also affects intermediaries of poverty, including the likelihood and timing of getting married and the age of having children as well as cohort fertility[1] (Bakibinga et al., 2016). Those who are more religious tend to have a greater number

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[1] Cohort fertility describes the number of children at the end of one's reproductive period.

of children—and to have them at earlier ages, which may conflict with educational attainment and lower capacity to attain high earnings. Inter-generational transmission of wealth could imply that poverty is more likely to be concentrated in religious groups as long as the more religious tend to have on average lower education and lower earnings. Religious influences may affect human capital formation and occupational choice (Abbasi-Shavazi & Torabi, 2012; Barnes & Brownell, 2016; Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2008). Fertility timing and the resulting sibship size can also be related to individual impoverishment and national economic growth (Berman, 2000; Canning & Schultz, 2012; Teller, 2011).

Moreover, of particular importance for the poor and in poorer countries that lack developed welfare systems is the provision of welfare goods through religious entities (Göçmen, 2013; Kagawa et al., 2012; Olivier et al., 2015). Frequently, there is a lack of old-age care systems, and universality and generosity of public systems may be inadequate. Also, in many nations, religious organizations manage key aspects of care, including old-age care, hospitals, childcare and free education. Access to such services may depend on membership and participation in activities in religious beliefs and organizations. If poverty is concentrated in certain religious groups, this may motivate others to carry out services for these groups.[2]

3   DATA AND METHODS

The poverty assessment data are taken from the World Bank´s PovCalNet initiative (World Bank, 2018), which tracks and measures poverty through a variety of measures of absolute and relative poverty of income. We use two measures of poverty to enable a global comparison from the World Bank's PovCalNet database:

1. Absolute poverty. It is measured as the percentage of population living on less than 1.90 USD per capita 2011 (International USD

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[2] Conflicts and war are increasingly concentrated and likely to be based between religious groups (Gleditsch & Rudolfsen, 2015; Isaacs, 2016). Income inequalities are an important determinant of conflict (Braithwaite et al., 2016; Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014; Murshed, 2002). Jointly understanding the relationship between income and poverty could help one build an understanding of how and where religious and poverty-driven intergroup conflict interrelate.

at Purchase Power Parity as defined by the World Bank). Under this level of income per person and per day, it is deemed that on a global level the basic needs of a person cannot be fully met, irrespective of the country he or she is living in. This would be the lowest common denominator of poverty globally.

2. Relative Poverty. This is a measure of poverty that takes into account the distribution of income. It is based on national poverty lines that vary considerably across countries. It is measured as the share of the population under a certain percentage of disposable national income that, compared to the rest of the population of the country, counts as poor. While basic needs may be satisfied, the level of income does not enable an individual to live an inclusive and fulfilling life within its society. For the OECD, the standard is to take the share of the population earning less than 60% of median income. For countries where the measure is not available, we have constructed the measure by using that approach in our sample. The PovCalNet database contains income/consumption distributional data from about 1200 household surveys spanning 1979–2015 and 138 developing countries. More than 2 million randomly sampled households were interviewed in these surveys, making them representative for 96% of the population of developing countries. More information and a brief discussion on the comparability of poverty measures used in PovCalNet in the online Appendix, A.4.1

3.1   Religious Affiliation Data

PEW-ACC religious projections were the first ever global estimates of religion that considered global religious demographic detail. It incorporated age-sex variation and took into account more than 2500 demographic databases.[3] The 2015 PEW-ACC estimates of religious population have opened a wide avenue for research on religious development of the world

population: ACC and PEW produced the first global data set on affiliation by age and sex, covering 199 nations and more than 99% of the global population. Based on a large database of more than 2,500 surveys, registers and censuses (Pew, 2015; Skirbekk et al., 2016; Stonawski et al., 2010, 2015), data on religious affiliation were taken from a separate unique project that estimated global religious affiliation by age and sex globally. Religious affiliation information from more than 2,500 data sources, including censuses, demographic surveys, general population surveys and other studies, was analysed—the largest project of its kind to date (Stonawski et al., 2015). These data were used to obtain country-specific estimates on religious affiliation by 5-year age groups separately for men and women. Census, survey, focus group and other demographic data collection methods were used to identify belief systems as they relate to the demographic make-up of society, age and sex distribution, and geographic factors. 83% of the world had a religion in 2010 according to our estimates, and this proportion is projected to increase to 87% by 2050, with changes taking place more rapidly among the young groups (Hackett et al., 2015; Skirbekk et al., 2016; Stonawski et al., 2015).

We study religious affiliation data based on self-identification of religious beliefs from surveys and censuses. We do not use registries from religious communities or proxy interviews, as these may be biased or inflated due to overcounting, skewed due to political or economic reasons and many may not fully register religious conversions.

4   Findings and Discussion

Extreme or absolute poverty is defined as living on less than USD 1.90 a day, measured in 2011 Purchasing Power Parity prices. According to the most recent estimates (World Bank, 2017), in 2013, 10.7% of the world's population lived at or below USD 1.90 a day. That is down from 35% in 1990 and 44% in 1981. Many countries have experienced dramatic shifts in poverty in this time span, but the most dramatic has been the decline in absolute poverty experienced by countries in Asia, where the combined absolute poverty went from 81% in the 1970s to less than 13% in 2013.

In this timespan, the world population doubled from 3.8 billion to over 7 billion people. If we look at the distribution by religions in Fig. 1a, b, we can see the distribution of the world's 1.4 billion poor in 1970, and how the numbers evolve until 2010. At 968 million people, the

Fig. 1 **a**, **b** Absolute poverty by religion, 1970 and 2010 (*Source* Own calculations and databases on global religion and poverty [Stonawski et al., 2015; World Bank, 2018])

number of poor broke the billion people barrier around 2010. In terms of religion, there has been a marked increase in the number of Christians and a stagnation of Hindus. In addition, the shifts have been dramatic for the unaffiliated and folk religionists, driven by China's growth that has accounted for lifting 200 million unaffiliated and 130 million folk religionists out of poverty.

From Fig. 2a, b, we can see the sharp drop in rates of poverty for all religious groups globally, which is particularly marked for the unaffiliated and folk religionists. The unaffiliated, spread in numbers equally between China and nine other countries with high levels of development (Germany, France, Japan, Korea, US, Canada, Italy, Brazil), show the lowest levels of poverty together with the Buddhists and Jews, who are concentrated in the US and Israel.

In Figs. 3 and 4, we show the respective values for relative poverty distributions according to national poverty lines. The orders of magnitude and trends are comparable and similar to the absolute poverty numbers. This points to the fact that while there has been a marked growth of inequality in the distribution of income globally, at national levels for most countries income inequality has been driven by a relative stagnation of the middle sections of society, while the poor have grown at or faster than the global average.

We find that poverty is disproportionately concentrated in the Hindu populations (between 24 and 29.3%), mostly driven by poverty in India—followed by Christianity (12.9 and 19.7%) and Islam (14 and 22%). Folk religionists (12.4 and 13%) as well as other religions (14 and 18%) tend to rank mid-ways when it comes to poverty incidence. Finally, the unaffiliated (8.5 and 9.7%) and Buddhists (6.8 and 10%) have low levels of poverty, and the Jews (0.3 and 1.2%) have the lowest of all shares living in poverty. This holds true for both relative and absolute levels of poverty.

India and China are two countries that have elevated more citizens out of poverty in the past 30 years, and which will be crucial in bringing down poverty further if the world wants to meet the SDGs set for 2030 to eradicate absolute poverty. We therefore hone in on the religious characteristics of the least well-off citizens in these two countries in the context of political demography developments in the last few decades analysed in further context in the respective chapters by Noesselt as well as Balachandran/James (this volume). Table 1 highlights the respective numbers of people living in absolute poverty in India and China in 2010.

Fig. 2   **a**, **b** Absolute poverty by religion in 1970 and 2010 (in %) (*Source* Own calculations and databases on global religion and poverty [Stonawski et al., 2015; World Bank, 2018])

**Fig. 3** Relative Poverty by religion in 2010 (*Source* Own calculations and databases on global religion and poverty [Stonawski et al., 2015; World Bank, 2018])

Fig. 4 Relative poverty by religion in 2010 (in %) (*Source* Own calculations and databases on global religion and poverty [Stonawski et al., 2015; World Bank, 2018])

Table 1 India and China, population living in absolute poverty by religion, 2010

Religion	India, population living in absolute poverty (in thousands)	China, population living in absolute poverty (in thousands)
Christians	7,863	4,447
Muslims	44,507	1,605
Unaffiliated	221	45,544
Buddhists	2,337	15,867
Hindus	245,969	1
Folk religions	1,476	19,129
Other religions	6,962	590

Source Own calculations and databases on global religion and poverty (Stonawski et al., 2015; World Bank, 2018)

In 2010, India had the largest number of people living in absolute poverty worldwide, with more than 300 million citizens. Since 2010, the trend towards poverty reduction on the back of overall strong economic growth has accelerated. According to the latest estimates (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2018), the ratio of India's population living in absolute poverty since 2010 has more than halved from 30% in 2000 over 21% in 2010 to less than 8% in 2018. By contrast, barely 1% of China's population had been living in absolute poverty, which according to the latest estimates has also more than halved to less than 0.5% in 2018.

It is important to highlight that both countries had very similar levels of absolute poverty, close to 80% of their populations, just a generation ago (World Bank, 1990). With different but broadly similar development plans and insertion into the global economy, these two countries have achieved significant progress in poverty reduction with very different political approaches and institutional constellations, but that can be characterized as having had very similar outcomes in their development trajectories. One of the factors that may explain the differential development paths of these two large countries is the relationship between identity and inequality.

To explore the relationship between identity and redistribution of resources, Shayo (2009) proposes an analytical framework that finds that (1) national identification is more common among the poor than among the rich, (2) national identification tends to reduce support for redistribution, and (3) across democracies, there is a strong negative relationship

between the prevalence of national identification and the level of redistribution. The longer persistence of poverty in India in relative terms to China could therefore perhaps be due to the democratic processes in India and the differential national and ideological identification of the respective citizens, and their relative tolerance of absolute poverty.

Religion in Indian politics has played an increasing role since the 2000s, with political formations playing national and religious cards. Hinduism's role in politics is marked and pervasive since the ongoing electoral successes by the BJP in the mid-2000s. Of relevance to the redistribution debates is that by religious affiliation, India's Muslims have a higher relative poverty headcount than the majority of Hindus. Whereas absolute poverty among Hindus affected almost 246 million people (about one in five of the overall Hindu population), Muslim poor numbered close to 45 million (more than one in three).

By comparison, China's absolute poor population numbered 45 million unaffiliated and almost 16 million Buddhists—all living in rural regions far from the economic centres of activity. As highlighted in the chapter on China by Noesselt (this volume), social care, which has relied in China mostly on families, will come under increased stress because of demographic pressures. To establish an all-encompassing social insurance system, China would have to increase its tax-revenue, which at 9.6% of GDP is comparatively low for its level of development and is far below the world average of 14.6%.

The difficulty to further raise the tax base in these conditions is also a worry for the least well-off citizens, or those in danger of sliding back into poverty in old age. China's successful fight against poverty may be at risk of regressing as older generations face uncertain retirement and social security conditions. Therefore, religious institutions may see increased demand for social charity and step into fill the demand.

By contrast, in India, differentials in income among religious groups (as highlighted above) and in fertility (as highlighted by James & Balachandran, this volume) have created intense political discussions around demography. According to Indian survey findings, total fertility rate (TFR) for Hindus is 2.1, while it is 2.6 for Muslims (Ranjan et al., 2017). The finding that differential fertility could result in differential population growth gradually shifting population composition has led to intense political debates and several instances of regional conflicts. Some Hindus fear that they will be 'outbred' by growing demographic weight of the Muslims—and that they will lose political and cultural influence. An important aspect of whether some groups will feel challenged by other demographic group is the economic level and growth among the different

population groups and their relative age structure. As noted by James and Balachandran (this chapter), the Indian sixty-plus population is expected to triple from 92 million today to 316 million by mid-century. With ageing, there has been a growing demand for introducing social security schemes. Possibly, the introduction of higher coverage and more generous social security measures could lead to a greater feeling of economic security, reducing fertility differences between groups and lowering group level opposition.

5   CONCLUSION

Religion can offer several ways of coping with poverty, including offering meaning and hope for people in need, particularly those who are impoverished or lack resources. It could also strongly affect the level of financial wealth flows. The religious composition of a country or a region may also affect the level of social support and level of financial transfers, as welfare and social welfare systems can be organized through religious groups and indirectly affected by the degree of social welfare (Gruneau Brulin et al., 2018; Feldman & Scherz, 2017; Herbert, 2018). In poorer countries, religious organizations often offer basic health and poverty relief systems and tend to be more prominent in the provision of education, psychological and social services compared to in more developed countries, where these services are more likely to be provided by branches of the government (Chiswick, 2010; Young, 2009).

That some religious groups have a relatively large share living in poverty can have a number of implications. These religions may motivate different political behaviour if a large share of their compatriots is poor. For instance, this could motivate a stronger preference for transfers within the particular religions—but may also lower the ability to implement an effective, universal and sufficiently generous social security scheme as the economic burden would be too high on the rest of the community.

Moreover, it may also be that a greater religious share of the poor could lower income inequality (Elgin et al., 2013; Filipova & Bednarik, 2009). The very high levels of economic inequality and poverty within Hinduism may, for instance, be linked with a greater worship of Lakshmi, the goddess of luck, economic prosperity and wealth (Dwyer, 2013; Young et al., 2011). If one believes poverty is the outcome of an act of God, destiny or outcomes too difficult to decipher, then one may be opposed to policies that may effectively reduce this.

Several religions, including the largest ones, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, encourage transfers. For instance, Muslims are encouraged to give a certain percentage of their income (2.5%) to the *Zakaat* as one of the five pillars of Islam. Similar encouragements exist both within Hinduism and within Christianity. Such systems may be easier to effectuate if the share of poor within any religion is smaller or the contributing part of the population is rich enough to be able to pay for transfer systems without suffering from too strong reductions in own living standards.

Our finding that large shares among the Hindu, Muslim and Christian communities are living in difficult economic conditions can influence the likelihood that conservative interpretations of religious traditions will be more common. Poorer religious adherents may benefit less from adjusting to more liberal views of, for instance, marriage, gender roles, family forms and fertility choices. When sufficiently high shares are conservative due to poverty, this may imply the entire religion is practised more conservatively.

In effect, a greater share of poor also implies that the behaviour of the religion as a whole may be different—they may be more likely to emphasize the aspects of religion that relate to how to live with dire conditions, in distress, how to cope with uncertainty and low levels of stability. These findings on poverty coincide with other factors, including low or lacking educational attainment, which is more prevalent among certain religions compared to others, and long-term determinants of wealth in the world areas where the particular religion is dominant, including schooling investments, capital investments and investments in family planning and stabilization or reductions of population growth.

Finally, the growing religious discordance between richer and poorer communities in many nations could lead to growing challenges in terms of willingness to pay, such as the case in many Western countries where poverty is concentrated in minority groups with different religions. One should then consider, when possible, ways of dealing with these and try to find policies that may at least in part alleviate some of these challenges associated with religious variation in poverty. Further studies are needed to try to better understand trends and variations in poverty across countries and how this may influence challenges related to poverty alleviation.

In terms of policy recommendations, for countries dominated by religions that exhibit high inequality, there may be a case for governments to

collaborate with religious groups to reduce inequality by increasing transfers to its poorest members. There could be a high tolerance of poverty abetted by religious practices that could be detrimental to the affected groups and to society overall. Also, by understanding that poverty is not only randomly distributed across religious groups, we can better elucidate religions' potential roles in affecting poverty risks and how different religions may offer different pathways to escape poverty. This includes welfare/transfer/social security systems, both of organized religion and of religion as a guidance system. We need to better understand why different religions have different economic outcomes, and under which circumstance the poor are more likely to belong to certain religions.

Conversely, religious actors in countries with high levels of economic inequality should be persuaded to reconsider their approach to their poorest members and to consider aligning poverty alleviating measures to be sensitive to the needs of particular religious groups. We also find that religion-based poverty support may be stronger in less secularized societies. There may be scope for more secular societies to interact with religious organizations that take care of poorer members. Or it could be that more religious organizations should concentrate on shifting its redistributive systems towards those of non-religious entities, such as has been the transition in several Western countries.

In increasingly less labour-intensive societies, religions may come to provide increasingly social activities, help to minimize loneliness and feelings of worthlessness, for instance through spiritual work that enhances the level of well-being in society. Providing more funding for religious organizations that have an explicit focus on not only material necessities but also providing spiritual well-being could represent one way of dealing with new measures of poverty within religions and act as a way of channelling workers towards activities with positive social influence. Clearly, more research and better data on why large sections of some religious groups end up in poverty are a matter of importance to public policy and political order in the twenty-first century.

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CHAPTER 5

Ageing China: The People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan

Nele Noesselt

1   INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (PRC), the world's second largest economy, is faced with high-speed population ageing and a shrinkage of its domestic labour force. This aggravating demographic trap of China's economy is closely intertwined with regime stability and regime persistence—as the one-party state heavily relies on growth-based output legitimacy and positive economic performance. To re-stabilize the system and to secure the survival of the one-party regime, China's political elites have hence intensified their efforts to steer the Chinese economy towards socio-ecological sustainability, reflecting the changing domestic demographic dynamics. New policies have been issued to build a modern social insurance system with a strong focus on elderly care.

This chapter assesses the past developments and prospective future trends of China's changing population pyramid(s) and critically discusses

N. Noesselt (✉)
Department of Political Science, Institute of East Asian Studies,
University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
e-mail: nele.noesselt@uni-due.de

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the countermeasures and reform policies launched by the central government in Beijing. This is done by reflecting the policies and instruments used by the political elites in Beijing to secure strategic majorities for their revised development roadmap. The political elites have to deal with a widening gap between rural and urban areas as well as with severe developmental disparities between the flourishing coastal areas and the remote, less developed Western provinces. Furthermore, they have to calculate the development of the Special Administrative Regions (SAR). The chapter hence includes three case studies on population change in the PRC's two SARs, Hong Kong and Macao, as well as in Taiwan. These three local societies and their labour markets are closely intertwined with the mainland and directly affected by Beijing's labour market reforms and updates to the country's general development blueprint. The chapter concludes with some reflections upon Beijing's efforts to stabilize or even to increase China's economic power despite demographic changes via intensified interactions with the global system. These efforts, as this chapter argues, have to be read in the light of the refined re-stabilization and re-legitimation strategies of hybrid authoritarian systems. While, for quite some time, economic crises (and the demographic trap might all too easily trigger a major one) had been seen as main drivers of regime transformation, the Chinese case evidences that the Chinese one-party state has, at least so far, successfully managed to launch and to justify major reforms in times of stability and prosperity via the active coining of 'crisis narrations'.

2   The People's Republic in the Post-Mao Era: Constructing a Modern Socialist Society

The PRC's 2010 National Population Census documented a rapid ageing of China's population (National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC, 2011) in combination with a declining population growth rate. For the years 2000 to 2010, average population growth was about 0.57%. By contrast, during the Maoist years (1950s to 1970s), China's population rose from 450 million people in 1949, the founding year of the PRC, to 695 million in 1964 and, finally, 1.3 billion people in 2010 (Peng, 2011). The focus of the Maoist years had been on 'great leap' modernization and industrialization relying on China's incessantly growing workforce—population growth was hence neither controlled nor restricted. Even the 'failures' of Maoist mass campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward (triggering

a devastating famine in the 1960s) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), causing millions of deaths, did not result in any visible decline of China's population growth rate. In sum, the overall mortality rate declined while life expectancy almost doubled.

Centrally coordinated family planning in China via the one-child policy was only introduced in the late 1970s, i.e. towards the end of the Mao era, to serve the building of a modern, educated Chinese 'socialist' society. China's total fertility rate went down from 5 in the 1950s to 1.5 births per woman in the late 1990s. The one-child policy, infamous for forced abortions and severe financial sanctions in case of non-implementation, did, however, not apply to all groups of Chinese society. National minorities were allowed to have a second child; population growth in rural areas was partially beyond the direct control of the party-state. China's rural society still favoured having male heirs, as only these were seen as increasing the family's workforce and, traditionally, the worshipping of the ancestors can only be done by the family's sons. Pre-birth sex diagnosis thus led to abortions of females and caused a severe gender imbalance. The nationwide sex ratio at birth shifted from 104.88 in 1953 to 118.06 in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC, 2011).

Nonetheless, China's family planning and top-down steering of the society have brought positive effects such as a deep rise of the people's general level of education. The illiteracy rate dropped from 33.6% in 1964 to 4% in 2010—and, documenting a noticeable increase of people's welfare, GDP per capita rose from 528 Renminbi in 1982 to more than 64,640 Renminbi in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC, 2011; World Bank Data, 2018). In spite of that, the long-term negative side-effects have also become visible: as a rapidly ageing society, China will suffer from a lack of labour force to maintain its economic growth and will also have to cope with the insufficiency of the social pension systems and healthcare service that is, following the abolition of Mao's 'iron rice bowl' (job security and free access to social insurance granted by the party-state) pattern, still undergoing tremendous restructurings (Hu, 2012). The dependence of the non-working retired older generation on financial support from their family members implies that one child has to sustain two parents and four grandparents (in the Chinese debate referred to as the '4-2-1' dependency dilemma). This puts a lot of pressure on the shoulders of the currently working generation and also explains the additional efforts taken by parents to secure the best education for their child—as his/her career will decide about their own past-retirement lives.

In the long run, the shortage of available labour force and the financial pressure on the younger generation might cause a steep interruption of China's impressive economic performance of the past few decades (Eggleston et al., 2013). While in 1953 only 4.4% were over 65 years old (Sun, 1998: 4), in 2010 they accounted already for about 9% of China's population (Statista, 2020). In 2017, 71.8% were aged 15–64 years and 11.4% fell into the age group of 65+ (Statista, 2020). The prospective negative effects of these demographic changes will be unevenly distributed among China's regions and provinces. The overall dependency ratio (number of people aged 0–14 or above 65 related to the number of working people, i.e. aged between 14 and 65) for major cities and modern industrialized provinces is much lower than in the still rather underdeveloped remote Western and Central China provinces (Wang, 2006).

Projections that did not yet calculate the possibility of an abolition of China's one-child policy predicted that China's population would reach its peak in 2026, before rapidly declining in number from 2030 onwards (Cai, 2013). However, even calculations taking into account the revised policy that allowed couples of one-child families to have two children forecasted a decrease in China's populace before 2050 (Liu et al., 2016). Finally, in 2016, the PRC's one-child policy was officially substituted by a two-children policy (Zhang, 2017). However, the long-term effects are difficult to predict. In 2017, the Chinese state media even stressed that the ageing of the Chinese society should *not* be seen as the direct outcome of the Maoist one-child policy (Renmin Ribao, 2017). By constructing a causal relation between the population changes in China and the trends in other post-industrial societies, the Chinese Government prevents the emergence of civil society debates on the negative aspects of the late Maoist era and the early period of reform and opening after 1978, which would indirectly also question the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) one-party rule. In fact, the ageing process in those parts of 'China' that were not governed by Beijing's birth control regulations—i.e. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan—is similar or, in some regards, even faster and more severe than the one of the mainland Chinese societies.

2.1   *Macao*

According to the data published by the Statistics and Census Service of Macao, the Special Administrative Region's local population has already entered the stage of an ageing society (Statistics and Census Service

of the Government of Macao, 2018). At the same time, however, the official number of registered inhabitants is increasing. While the 2011 census reported a total number of 552,503 registered inhabitants (+26.5% compared to 2001), in 2016 the official population number amounted to 650,834 people (an increase of 17.8%) (Statistics and Census Service of the Government of Macao, 2016). As main drivers, the 2016 census survey identified the growing number of (labour) migrants as well as positive birth rates. Even if one excludes non-permanent residents and exchange students (the 2011 census listed 62,304 non-resident workers plus 4,944 foreign students, i.e. 12.2% of the total population), the number of local people witnessed a growth of around 10% from 2011 to 2016. However, in 2016, the percentage of people aged 65 or above reached 9%. According to projections, the age group of 65+ is expected to increase to almost 20% of the total local population in 2031 due to declining birth rates, which had peaked in the mid-1980s, and higher life expectancy (Statistics and Census Service of the Government of Macao, 2018).

Refugee waves during the Second World War, Chinese people returning from Southeast Asian countries, especially during times of anti-Chinese sentiments and actions, and the influx of people from Europe and the US attracted by Macao's casino sector and related businesses also had an impact on the composition of local society. Beyond these partly international migration waves, after the partial economic liberalization triggered by the CCP's Third Plenum's decisions on reform and opening-up (*gaige kaifang*) in 1978, there was also a high inflow of people from mainland China who got granted local resident status by the local administration. While these groups caused a temporal increase of Macao's economic performance, they will also pose a major challenge to Macao's social insurance and healthcare system. The handover of Macao from Portuguese control back to China in 1999 caused further demographic shifts, as parts of Macao's external administrative elites as well as their local cooperation partners decided to leave Macao due to the uncertainty of the area's future socio-economic and political development (Leitão, 2013).

Given Macao's history, it is no surprise that the major share of the local population is Chinese. In 2009, a new policy by the administration of Macao granted full residence rights to children of people from Macao born in mainland China, which further changed the demographic scenario. The second biggest community used to be Portuguese; however,

the 2016 census depicted a new scenario, according to which 4.6% of residents born outside Macao originated from the Philippines, a rise by 98.3% compared to the 2011 census, followed by people from Vietnam (2.4%, equalling an increase by 123.4%). Portuguese people only counted for 1.8% of Macao's locally registered society in 2016. The proportion of people born outside Macao is obviously comparatively high, amounting to roughly 60% (Statistics and Census Service of the Government of Macao, 2016).

Given Macao's special status, the unemployment rate is comparatively low (1.9% in the fourth quarter of 2017). The total number of working people—375,900 (in late 2017)—also indicates that Macao is, at least so far, not suffering from a shortage of labour force. In 2017, a total number of 179,456 non-resident labour migrants were officially registered (given the shadow sector of the gambling industry, the real numbers might be even higher). The net outflow of labour force in 2016 got substituted by a net inflow of 3,800 people in 2017. The gender ratio is almost balanced (47% male inhabitants; 53% female inhabitants), at least compared to mainland China. 10.5% of the registered people belonged to the 65+ age group. The majority of Macao's current population, around 77%, however, are aged 15–64. This seems to be the combined effect of high birth rates during the mid-1980s, influx of labour force from mainland China and the neighbouring Asian countries—as well as the internationalization of Macao's economy (though the group of international entrepreneurs and employees is most likely to leave the area after a rather short stay at one of the local branches of international companies and banks based in Macao). The elderly dependency ratio is hence slightly mounting (2016: 12.7%; 2017: 13.7%). However, one should also keep in mind that the interim rise of the adult generation had caused a partial relaxation of the situation: in 2011, the median age was between 37 and 38 (not calculating non-permanent migrant workers and exchange students). The local share of the elder population displays an extreme geographic variety; it is rather high in the remote islands of Macao and relatively low around the financial and touristic centre. According to the government's official demographic projections, the number of inhabitants is expected to rise to 793,600 by the year 2036 with the group of people aged 65+ amounting to almost 25% (2016: 10–12%, depending on the data sets analysed). The median age might rise to 46 (Statistics and Census Service of the Government of Macao, 2018).

The Government of Macao responded to these projections by revising the official migration policies and by encouraging the idea of active ageing, including the idea of a postponement of the retirement age and of opening new jobs and activities for the elder generation. In addition, the administration has reformed the insurance sector by promulgating a central provident fund system (Tang, 2017).

2.2   Hong Kong

In 2017, Hong Kong had a registered population of 7,391,700 people (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2018). From 1996 to 2016, the proportion of Hong Kong residents aged 65+ increased from 310,357 to 1,163,153 (+36.4%) (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2016). The share of the 65+ group increased from 12.4% (2006) to 15.9% (2016). The elderly dependency ratio rose from 14.2 to 21.8. Projections predict that one-third of Hong Kong's society will belong to the group of elderly people beyond the official working age around 2040. Also, the share of people aged 80+ is growing: in 2006, 204,148 registered citizens fell into this category; in 2016, their number was reported as having reached 340,249.

The rapid ageing of Hong Kong's society accelerated after the handover of the former British protectorate to (the People's Republic of) China in 1997 (Chan & Philipps, 2002). From 1961 to 1991, Hong Kong's population increased at an annual average rate of 2.5%. During the 1960s and 1970s, this was driven by rising fertility. Following the reform and opening-up process of the Chinese mainland, population growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s was mainly due to the waves of illegal Chinese migrants. In 1991, about 60% of Hong Kong residents (3 million people) were British; 34% belonged to the group of Chinese (Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong, 1991). The 1991 Census report (Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong, 1991) documented a total population of 5,674,114 people (also counting 151,833 residents temporarily away from Hong Kong). Population growth was reportedly slow (around 1%). At the same time, Hong Kong's population was already ageing: The 1981 census calculated a median age of 26; the 1991 census already listed a median age of 32. The sex ratio also witnessed some changes: For the age group 25–44, it declined from 1,223 (1981) to 1,028 (1991). This trend, which is still continuing, seems to be due to the inflow of female service personnel (especially from the Philippines

and Thailand) and the partial outflow of high-skilled male labour force (Skeldon, 1995).

According to projections (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2017), Hong Kong's population is expected to reach its peak around the year 2046. Despite the rather high life expectancy of Hong Kong residents, the declining population rates will be due to low birth rates and natural death rates among the group of elderly people (80+). Even though the One-Way-Permit allows the reunification of families in Hong Kong by legalizing immigration of spouses and children based or born in mainland China (HKSAR Immigration Department, 2015), in the long-term perspective, the general number of this group of 'migrants' entering Hong Kong is expected to drop significantly (see also Table 1), which indicates a rapid ageing and shrinking of Hong Kong's populace over the next two decades. In the next 50 years, according to projections, Hong Kong might be going to lose 14% of its labour force.

Due to the lack of a universal common social insurance network, about one-third of Hong Kong's elder inhabitants live in poverty. In addition, there is a shortage of nursing home places; the service sector for Hong Kong's ageing society is completely underdeveloped (Flynn, 2016). In 2014, the Elderly Commission of Hong Kong hence published an Elderly Service Plan (Elderly Commission Hong Kong, 2014) stressing the idea of community-based service provision.

Hong Kong, since the handover of 1997 a SAR, officially falls under the principle of 'one country, two systems', which implies that Hong Kong is allowed to have its own capitalist economic system structures and a multi-party system—superseded by the one-party regime based in Beijing. In connection with the handover process, further elements of future democratic participation got written down, especially targeting the elections scheduled for 2014. The perceived interference of the central

Table 1 Hong Kong: demographic projections

	2016	2031	2046	2066
Population (in 1,000)	7,336.6	7,996.2	8,207.2	7,723.2
Sex ratio (women per 1,000 men)	852	791	728	691
People aged 15–64 (in %)	73	63	60	58
People aged 65 and above (in %)	16	27	32	34

Source Based on Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2017)

government in Beijing finally fuelled the so-called umbrella revolution that joined forces with Hong Kong's Occupy Central initiative. The largest share of people joining the protests was aged between 18 and 29 (60.7%), while less than 1% of all demonstrators were aged 64+ (Yuen & Cheng, 2015). Surprisingly, at least at a first glance, most people did not protest driven by the fear of losing previously held rights and freedoms, but rather by the feeling of uncertainty regarding their future. Exploding housing costs, perceived lack of upward mobility chances, and the silent decline of Hong Kong's special status as capitalist financial zone and renminbi hub are, in retrospect, identified as core drivers of mass mobilization (see also: Bush, 2014). Nonetheless, in general, the struggle for universal suffrage has become a symbol for political reform of Hong Kong, including the socio-economic sub-sectors and the labour market. Some researchers have also identified the fear of losing the specific Hong Kong identity and of being sold out to mainland Chinese companies as a main determinant of local contestation movements (inter alia Yam, 2020).

The government in Beijing seems to calculate this point. Although the comprehensive reforms passed by the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in 2013 include the partial liberalization of renminbi trade outside Hong Kong and the formation of free trade pilot zones in mainland China, the 13th Five-Year Plan still acknowledges Hong Kong's special status and its contribution to the PRC's overall economic and financial importance. The New Silk Road (OBOR/BRI) China is constructing is hence presented not as a connectivity network bypassing and outplaying Hong Kong, but as part of China's going global strategy that still relies on the corridor functions of its SARs and their connections with Europe (NDRC, 2016).

2.3   Taiwan

According to the official statistics, by 1993 Taiwan has reached the stage of an ageing society and is expected to turn into a hyper-aged society by 2025 (Republic of China National Statistics, 2018). In February 2017, Taiwan's official statistics documented an ageing index of 100.18. The index relating the ratio of people aged 65 or above to the number of people under the age of 15 displays that the number of older people has started to exceed the number of Taiwanese youth. This is partly due to the uneven generational pyramid caused by the influx of mainland Chinese Guomindang officials and of members of the Republican Army

after their defeat by the Chinese Communists in the late 1940s. By 2060, the Taiwanese population is expected to amount to less than 20 million inhabitants equalling a decrease of about five million people. Since 2013, the number of people in their working age has started to decline (Taiwan National Development Council, 2016).

This is also illustrated in the population pyramids (see Fig. 1), which document increased population growth due to migration waves from the mainland, but also a general stagnation and shrinking of the local population over the past 20 years. Taiwan, already classified as an 'aged' society, is going to become a hyper-aged society in the near future—if the current trends continue and if demographic change is not actively compensated via a formal legalization of immigration.

The main reason for this development is seen in the changing career paths and value orientations of Taiwanese women leading to later marriage and an overall decline of Taiwan's fertility rate. Societal change and modernization are hence the main drivers of demographic change. To prevent an implosion of Taiwan's pension systems, local political elites are debating the idea to lift the pension age added by models of part-time retirement. Moreover, the Taiwanese economy has discovered the platinum society as a new consumer group for which they are offering not only special elderly care services but also entertainment programmes. In general, as a counterstrategy, Taiwan focuses on 'active ageing' (Chen, 2010; Lin & Huang, 2016).

Labour migration is also discussed—so far, as the Sunflower Protests against the implementation of the service sector pact as agreed to by the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait clearly evidences, large groups of the Taiwanese society are more than afraid of seeing their country flooded by "cheap" labour forces coming from the Chinese mainland and of being dominated by Chinese firms entering the local service sector (Ho, 2015). Finally, however, the above-sketched development in the mainland Chinese economy and society might imply that the party-state's authorities might be willing to provide novel incentives to direct labour migration to the PRC's own industrial and urban sites rather than accepting a brain-drain and "outflow" of skilled labour forces.

Fig. 1 Population pyramids of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

3   CCP Counter-Measures:
Post-2013 Top-Level Coordination

In 2013, the 60-point reform package passed by the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee responded to the gloomy predictions of China's economic performance and global competitiveness by formally turning to a two-child policy. In the long run, this might lead to demographic stabilization at a much lower level than in 2013 but could definitely not counter the already started shrinking and ageing of China's current labour force. Surveys conducted in Chinese cities even document a widespread averseness to having more than one child: the costs of raising up a child and paying for its school education are extremely high. Many couples could hence not afford having a second, if the state does not launch any initiatives to lower these costs or set financial incentives. Furthermore, housing and daily life have been designed to serve the needs of families composed of three. Future construction planning would hence also have to be adapted accordingly. Finally, however, modern societies do often display low fertility rates. And the PRC might not be an exception, especially given the fact that birth rates started to decline already before the official introduction of the one-child policy. Central family planning might have accelerated this trend, but is not its sole cause. Following these survey data showing a preference for one-child families, one might be tempted to suggest a general lifting of any birth control and family planning to stop the ageing of China's society. However, one should not forget that central family planning was accompanied by the setting up of bureaucratic institutions supervising its implementation (Kaufman, 2003; Scharping, 2003). Abolishing these would trigger not only a rise of China's unemployment ratio, but also fuel tensions between the central party elites and the local bureaucracy which might all too easily facilitate a cascading system crisis.

The recent legalization of China's 'informal' population (Gordon, 2015), i.e. second- or third-born children whose existence has not been officially documented to evade penalties, another measure to secure the market's supply with labour forces, will most likely not solve the demographic dilemma. Informally, these people are already contributing to China's economic growth. To count this group into the official labour statistics would hence not change the overall picture of demographic crisis. However, the legalization of this group would at least endow them with more citizen rights. So far, they did not have any formal contracts or

access to social services. As people without any ID card, they were neither allowed to rent an apartment nor to marry. Nonetheless, as most of them did not have access to higher education, they are normally only employed as unskilled workers trained on the job.

Another precarious group is China's floating population, i.e. labour migrants that enter the industrial areas in search of work. Although this group did not only facilitate the PRC's high-speed economic growth, but also helped to maintain the quality of life of China's urban population at a rather stable level, these labour migrants were deprived from the modernization benefits of the cities they worked in. Officially, rural-urban migration is still restricted by the household registration system (*hukou*). Introduced in 1958, the *hukou* system was a core steering element of China's socialist command economy, as it allowed the control and restriction of rural-urban migration. The Maoist *hukou* system was decisive for people's access to grain ratios, housing and public services (Chen & Selden, 1994). Following the opening up and reform of the Chinese economy by the decisions of the Third Plenum in 1978, the state-owned, centrally managed economy was supplemented by capitalist market elements—first restricted to only select sectors and local experimental zones. Given the need for additional labour forces in the country's booming economic centres, labour migration was silently accepted. Yet the *hukou* system, dividing people into rural versus urban inhabitants, remained in place and hence blocked migrants' access to social services in areas outside their official *hukou* domain. Since the 1990s, the registration system has gradually been reformed by the introduction of temporary urban residence permits, added by the revision of the law(s) on custody and repatriation (as a response to widespread criticism regarding the infamous Sun Zhigang incident in 2003)[1] (Chan & Buckingham, 2008).

At the National People's Congress in March 2013, then outgoing Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao openly requested a speeding up of *hukou* reform. This was taken up by the Third Plenum in November 2013 and further pursued by the Xi-Li administration. One year later, on 4 December 2014, the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council published a draft for the incremental relaxation—and in the long run abolishment—of the *hukou* registration system via easing the regulations for small- and

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[1] Sun Zhigang, who forgot to carry his ID card, was arrested by the police as suspected unregistered migrant worker, based on the custody and repatriation regulations, died in jail—causing an official debate on the discrimination of China's floating population.

medium-sized cities and towns (Guan et al., 2016). In December 2015, this was followed by a reform proposal that would reduce the time a rural migrant would need to have lived and worked (and paid social insurance fees) in a city before being allowed to apply for urban residence permit down to six months. The *hukou* regulations of China's megacities such as Beijing or Shanghai, by contrast, remain generally based on a point system (Zhang et al., 2016: 60)—thus allowing the recruitment of *high*-skilled labour force.

The 2013 reform plan came with reform policies that facilitate rural-urban migration not only with regard to the granting of urban *hukou* status, but also with regard to land use rights. New regulations include the right to lend or sell land use rights, so as to provide China's rural migrants with a financial basis that enables them to start an "urban" career.

The *hukou* system generally enforces a socio-economic segregation of China's rural versus urban inhabitants. In 1997, the Urban Employees' Pension Programme was initiated to provide social insurance services for urban workers, excluding, however, government and state employees. The contribution rate to this programme varies across China; the central government recommends a general rate of 28%, of which about 8% should be paid by the employee. The final monthly rate upon retirement depends on the years an employee contributed to the pension programme and the calculated average wage upon retirement. Monthly rates can later on be adjusted depending on changing average wages and price levels. In addition, in 2009, the government launched two voluntary programmes, the National Rural Pension Scheme and the Urban Residents Pension programme, for people aged 16 or older without regular employment. Some cities have merged these two programmes and provide social insurance without differentiating between people's formal rural or urban registration. While for provinces located in the central and western regions these programmes are financed by the central government, for the more prosperous eastern provinces, the system is co-financed by the central and the local government. For government officials, party cadres and the military, pensions were paid out of the state's general revenues. The benefits and final monthly rates provided by this separate pension system are much higher than those from the public programmes outlined above (Pozen, 2013). The PRC's 13th Five-Year Plan put forward the goal of setting up a unified pension system until 2020 (China Daily, 2014), seeking to overcome the divide between rural and urban social service provisions. The main driver behind these increased efforts to

establish a nationwide, unified system is the perceived demographic trap in combination with rising social inequality. As China's society is rapidly ageing, solutions for the elderly care sector are urgently needed. Especially as the perceived weakness of the social insurance systems creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and might trigger a decline of diffuse regime support. Community-based and informal elderly care structures "supplement the traditional family care and […] fill in the gaps between needs and the care that the government is unwilling and the family is unable to provide" (Xu & Chow, 2011: 380). Nonetheless, these informal patterns can only provide an interim solution—they often function as 'self-help' systems, especially in those regions characterized by large-scale outflow of the younger (working age) generation. Finally, as neither the partial relaxation of the *hukou* system and the legalization of rural-urban labour migration nor the abolition of the one-child policy will suffice to counter the approaching demographic trap, the Chinese Government is heavily investing in e-health innovation and AI-based (artificial intelligence-based) elderly care to substitute human labour force by self-learning systems and robots (Lee, 2018).

4   NARRATING AND FRAMING THE REFORMS

To win people's support for the re-steering of the Chinese socio-economic system structures, the central government in Beijing is operating with strategic 'crisis narrations'.[2] A closer look at the CCP's governance strategy reveals that narratives of 'crisis' are proactively coined to facilitate policy reform and institutional adjustments. The current restructuring and reorganization of the PRC's national pension system, which abolishes the privileges of state officials and eliminates the division into rural versus urban inhabitants, is presented as a necessary element of the final stage of China's post-revolutionary state-building process. In line with the demands and expectations of the 'New Left', the government claims to re-strengthen social justice and social equality. Addressing the business sector and targeting China's neoliberal camp, the reforms also include new liberties for private insurance companies, hence providing new opportunities for Chinese investors. Given the experimental, 'anything goes'-approach that characterized the PRC's early reform period, the substitution of old,

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[2] On the ideational dimension of policy change and strategic narratives (Blyth, 2002; Cox, 2001).

inherited institutions and the establishment of a nationwide social security net are logical steps in China's still unfinished state-building process. By combining these general restructuring tasks with the communicated reform needs caused by the identified demographic trap, the political elites manage to present the re-steering of the economy not as a correction of past errors, but as a response to a challenge that many post-industrialized systems are facing—not just those falling into the category of socialist one-party states (Noesselt, 2018).

At the same time, as China's development is directly intertwined with the ups and downs of the world economy, the Chinese Government is working on roadmaps to diversify export markets and trading routes to be less vulnerable to turbulences and crises in other world regions. In this vein, China's political leaders have re-activated the narration of 'national rejuvenation', whose origins can be traced back to the years of the infamous Opium Wars of the mid-eighteenth century. The narrative of a re-ascent to global power and status has been used by all generations of Chinese political leaders since the late Qing Dynasty. The reference to the traumatic experience of having been colonized and controlled by external powers is strategically used to win support for China's 'going global' initiative and the 'New Silk Road'—as the dream of rejuvenation is shared by almost all groups of the Chinese society despite their internal socio-economic cleavages and tensions.

Moreover, given the overcapacities of the Chinese economy, the CCP government seeks to strengthen its 'going global' efforts. The 'New Silk Road' initiative is not only an attempt to diversify the PRC's import and export corridors, but also a strategy to stabilize the Chinese domestic economy via outsourcing and subcontracting (Summers, 2016). Chinese enterprises and companies have started to establish production sites overseas, preferably in less developed regions on the African and the Latin American continent. This might allow China to secure high-speed, stable economic growth despite demographic change. However, the construction of the 'New Silk Road' and the further internationalization of the Chinese economy—via the opening of free trade pilot zones and the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi—have implications for the economies of the Chinese SARs and Taiwan. As a response to growing negative reactions to Beijing's refined development strategy in Hong Kong and in Taiwan, the political elites and their advisers are trying to co-opt local business elites and civil society by stressing the positive spill-over effects of the PRC's growth model. However, as the anti-Beijing

protests in Hong Kong (Umbrella Movement) and the Sunflower Protests in Taiwan evidence, there is a remaining and even growing fear of an economic take-over by mainland Chinese companies.

Furthermore, as China is heavily investing in AI innovation—see the strategy paper published by the State Council in July 2017 which is guided by the idea to establish the PRC as the global leader in AI by the year 2030 (State Council, 2017)—the long-term plan also includes the setting of new global standards based on Chinese AI technologies. Given that the PRC is running several large-scale experiments in AI-based social governance—including e-health, e-mobility, smart cities, e-government—these AI solutions might include features that could also be adapted by other post-industrial societies. Hence, investment in AI-based elderly care solutions and e-health might, first of all, focus on domestic needs of the Chinese ageing society. Moreover, as a general response to the anticipated 'demographic trap' and its impact on the Chinese national economy, the PRC has also started to encourage research and development in the fields of Industry 4.0 and robotics. Over the past few years, fully automated factories have been set up; large parts of industrial production now rely on intelligent robots (Forest, 2015).

As a second step, however, Chinese companies, supported by the central government, might offer their AI solutions on the global market and, potentially, at a much lower price than the solutions offered by US and European companies. This means that the lurking demographic crisis has an unexpected effect on the PRC's innovation strategy: Solutions developed in China to face negative socio-economic side-effects of high-speed post-industrial development might be exported to other world regions and will increase the global competitiveness of the Chinese economy.

5   Conclusions and Outlook

The focus of the centrally controlled steering of the Chinese population during the Mao era had been on socialist modernization and development. The following introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s served the goal of fighting absolute poverty and setting up an educated well-off socialist society. In a relatively short amount of time, China transformed itself into the world's second largest economy and stands out of the group of developing countries in terms of the level of education

(especially regarding alphabetization) of its society. However, the operationalization and implementation of the one-child policy did not reflect the long-term effects. The top-down organized shrinking of the Chinese society causes a severe decline of domestic labour force—hence, sooner or later, reducing the PRC's global economic competitiveness and causing trouble for China's weak social insurance and healthcare system. While the economies of China's SARs Hong Kong and Macao have always relied on the influx of international capital and labour force, China's mainland economy was (and is) a rather closed system. Modest reforms are in the making, including the setting up of pilot zones for free trade and increased efforts to further internationalize China's economy. Migration policies, however, prioritize internal urban-urban or rural-urban labour mobility.

Beijing's 'New Silk Road' initiative seeks to establish a global connectivity network of transportation corridors and trade hubs. China is trying to export domestic overcapacities by securing international contracts for Chinese companies in the fields of infrastructure, telecommunication and grid architecture. In the long run, given China's demographic development trap, the New Silk Road—if successfully realized—would also allow China to hire additional labour force along these transportation lanes and to outsource resource-intense production. First steps in this direction have been made by China's textile and shoe manufacturing companies which have started to set up production branches in Africa and Eastern Europe (primarily in non-EU member states). This, however, does not solve the accelerating lack of labour force in the service sector, especially regarding the support of China's aged and hyper-aged society. Due to internal labour migration, many villages and small towns are mainly inhabited by old people and 'left-behind' children. The elderly care and healthcare sector are often underdeveloped; given the absence of the parent generation, the family-based care system does no longer function.

To establish an all-encompassing social insurance system, China would have to increase its taxes. This, however, would mainly target the middle- and upper-income classes—and hence destabilize the fragile symbiotic relationship between the party-state and the business elites (Dickson, 2016).

The top-down steering of population growth has triggered a rapid ageing process before the PRC could even enter the stage of a stable well-off society. The modernization process in 'Western' societies took longer and did hence not result in a similar instantaneous overheated

hyper-ageing process. While Beijing's counter-measures mainly target the mainland Chinese socio-economic structures, including the insurance and elderly care sector, Hong Kong, Macao and also Taiwan have to calculate the impact of Beijing's reform initiatives on their local labour markets and the composition of local inhabitants. Given the demographic transition in mainland China, new monetary incentives might be launched to steer the flows of skilled labour force in the direction of China's mainland industrial centres to secure the maintenance of the urban living standards and to prevent a downturn of economic growth. These incentives might trigger an outflow of labour force towards the mainland, which implies that the ageing process in the two SARs and Taiwan would further accelerate. In addition to competition for talents and trained labour force, driving the waves of internal labour migration in new directions, campaigns might be launched to recruit labour force from the neighbouring countries or to further outsource parts of the production process. Finally, given that a pension system based on a contract between two generations would be bound to fail, due to the demographic imbalance, private insurance packages and state-sponsored programmes will most likely be expanded—with unpredictable implications for the configuration of the Chinese variety of capitalism and the power relationship between state-owned companies and the private business sector. Innovative approaches also include the opening of the Chinese insurance service market for (private) foreign companies, so far, however, restricted to select special pilot zones.

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CHAPTER 6

Demographic Politics in Asia's Super-Size Democracies: India, Bangladesh and Pakistan

K. S. James and Arun Balachandran

1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the political implications of demographic changes in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, with a special focus on the world's largest democracy—India. With a share of around 23% of the world population today and throughout the first half of the twenty-first century, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan play a critical role in shaping developments in world demography. These countries, which were part of the erstwhile Indian subcontinent, all received independence nearly at the same time. Their populations continue to grow, albeit at different speeds. India is projected to overtake China as the country with the world's largest population before 2030. The populations of Bangladesh and Pakistan are also growing in recent times but at varied pace. Pakistan has been registering much faster growth than both India and Bangladesh.

K. S. James (✉)
International Institute for Population Sciences, Deemed University,
Mumbai, India
e-mail: ksjames@iipsindia.ac

A. Balachandran
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

All three countries are also known for their demographic diversity across regions. What makes these countries stand out most in recent times are the fast changing demographic profiles, with rapid decline in fertility both in India and in Bangladesh, though less so in Pakistan (Bongaarts et al., 2013; Caldwell et al., 1999; James, 2011; Sathar & Casterline, 1998). These demographic changes in India and Bangladesh have been unprecedented during the last three decades and they created a drastic shift in the age structure of the population which is widely discussed in terms of a demographic dividend (Amjad, 2013; Jalal Uddin & Karim, 2016; James, 2008). The share of children (ages 0–14) to the total population in Bangladesh and India has decreased dramatically from 45 and 41%, respectively, in 1970 to 29% by 2015. Pakistan, by contrast, lags behind in this demographic shift, although the trend towards low fertility is clearly observable. In general, there is no doubt to the fact that a bulk of the youth population will define the political demography of these countries in the coming decades. The share of children continues to be around 35% in the year 2015 as against 42% in 1970. Therefore, the adult population growth and its characteristics are vitally important to understand political demography in the region. While the age structure transition is clearly evident, so is the growth of the elderly population, albeit less pronounced (Alam & Barrientos, 2010; Giridhar et al., 2014). In India and Bangladesh, the fastest growing population group across different ages are the elderly, which is likely to lead to political power shifts in favour of the elderly, but not yet in the next three to four decades.

It is important to understand that the pathways through which these countries achieved demographic changes are considerably different from the experience of developed countries (Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012). While socio-economic changes defined demographic changes in most countries of the world, it was considerably different in the South Asian context—particularly in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Here, the fertility transition was driven mostly by the strong implementation of family planning programmes (Bhat, 2002; James, 2011; Khuda, 2000; Robinson, 2007; Srinivasan, 1995). The onset of the fertility transition was not preceded by any significant improvement in living standards. In the case of India, it was driven by the fact that a vast majority of the poor and illiterate accepted family planning and thereby the small family norm (Bhat, 2002). Such a push towards population control along with other antenatal policies has been the subject of intense political debate, particularly in India (Srinivasan, 1995).

As a result, the characteristics of the current adult population in these countries are significantly different as compared to many other countries undergoing fertility transitions. While the demographic changes are visible among the current youth population, the educational and skills levels are rather weak (James, 2011; Wazir et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important that these countries are dealt with differently in terms of both theory and framework while analysing the impact of demographic changes on political demography. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the current demographic profile and changes in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The second section focuses on the demographic changes and its diversity in these countries with a special focus on regional and religious demographic diversity. Section three brings out the major impact of demographic changes on the political landscape.

2   DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE AND CHANGES, 1990–2040

As pointed out, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan constitute a little less than a quarter of the world population currently and this will remain so until the middle of this century. The demographic profiles of India and Bangladesh have close similarities; that of Pakistan lags behind in demographic change. For instance, the population growth rate between 1990 and 2015 was around 1.6% per annum for India and Bangladesh, but around 2.3% for Pakistan. In the coming 25 years, from 2015 to 2040, the Indian and Bangladeshi population growth rate will decline significantly to 0.8%. Pakistan, on the other hand, will grow at nearly the same rate as at which these two countries have grown in the past 25 years. Note that while the population sizes of Bangladesh and Pakistan were nearly equal in 1990, by 2040, Pakistan's population will be almost 82 million larger than the population of Bangladesh (Table 1). All these indicate that India and Bangladesh have undergone rapid demographic changes in recent decades, while Pakistan is lagging.

The causes of population change are dominated by the fertility transition and mortality changes to a minor extent, and the impact of emigration on population dynamics has been rather negligible in all three countries. In Bangladesh, emigration has been slightly higher than in India and Pakistan (1.6% of net migration), but given the size of Bangladesh's population, its overall impact on the population growth rate is negligible. Fertility rates in Bangladesh and India are nearly at replacement level in 2015, with rates of 2.1 and 2.3, respectively. While

Table 1 Population size and percentage to the world population in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, 2015–2040

Country & year	Net migration (in'000)	Share of age-groups in %				Ratio of (65 +) to (18-64)	Population Size (in '000)	City density (per sq. mi.)
		0–17	20–34	65+	80+			
Bangladesh 1990	−219.36	48.97	23.93	3.12	0.25	6.50	105983	19.81
Bangladesh 2015	−2526.48	35.51	26.82	4.97	0.94	8.36	160996	34.28
Bangladesh 2040	−1500.00	23.81	21.97	10.99	1.96	16.85	197134	
India 1990	45.15	44.12	24.15	3.83	0.45	7.36	870602	19.81
India 2015	−2578.21	34.48	25.57	5.62	0.86	9.37	1311051	32.75
India 2040	−2000.00	25.75	21.92	10.72	1.99	16.88	1633728	
Pakistan 1990	139.79	49.19	22.43	3.91	0.49	8.33	107608	30.58
Pakistan 2015	−1181.92	41.17	25.96	4.49	0.65	8.27	188925	38.76
Pakistan 2040	−800.00	32.38	24.69	6.72	0.94	11.03	278987	

Source Authors' calculations using data compiled from United Nations (2015), and World Bank (2015a, b)

Bangladesh is already at the replacement level fertility rate of 2.1, India's fertility rate is likely to reach replacement level in a few years. On the contrary, the fertility rate in Pakistan is more than one child higher and is unlikely to reach replacement level even in 2040. Contrary to the differentials in fertility, life expectancy at birth is very similar in India and Pakistan (69 and 67 in 2015), and slightly higher in Bangladesh (73). By 2040, Bangladesh is projected to reach a life expectancy of over 80 years while India will be around 75 and Pakistan around 70.

Figure 1 presents the age-sex pyramid of these three countries for the three time periods (1990, 2020, and 2040). The median ages are presented in Table 2. For all the three countries, the population pyramid base was broader in 1990. The median age was relatively low: at below 20 in Bangladesh and Pakistan and just above 20 in India. Bangladesh showed a faster transition in the last 25 years with an increase in the

Fig. 1 Age-sex population pyramid for Bangladesh, India and Pakistan for 1990, 2020 and 2040 (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

median age of 6 years by 2015. India's progress in median age was to the tune of 4 years and that of Pakistan less than 4 years. Thus, the age distribution has become broader at the middle ages in Bangladesh and India by 2015 and it continued by 2040. By 2040, Bangladesh will have the highest median age value among the three countries at 36 years, followed by India at 35 years, while Pakistan will only have a median age of less than 30 years.

The ageing scenario will be nearly the same in India and Bangladesh in 2040, with almost 11% of the population aged 65 and above, while Pakistan will have only 7% of the population in the elderly group. Thus,

Table 2 Median age of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan in 1990, 2015 and 2040

Country	Year	Median age
Bangladesh	1990	18.56
	2015	25.64
	2040	35.91
India	1990	21.10
	2015	26.68
	2040	34.55
Pakistan	1990	18.50
	2015	22.46
	2040	28.18

Source Authors' calculations using data compiled from United Nations (2015)

not only the demographic dividend but even the ageing of the population will be substantially delayed in Pakistan compared to India and Bangladesh, primarily due to slow fertility decline. The ageing index computed as the ratio of 65 and above against the 18–64 age group shows nearly the same pattern (Table 1). Around 8% of the elderly was depended on the working-age population in 2015 in all three countries. It will have doubled both in India and in Bangladesh in the coming 25 years but increased only by 3 percentage points for Pakistan.

Table 1 also shows that the proportion of people in the 20–34 age group constitutes nearly 26% in all three countries. This, perhaps, indicates that a higher proportion of the population are entering the eligible voting ages. Over 20% of the population will continue to belong to this age group, indicating that young adults will dominate the socio-economic and political landscape of these countries in the coming few decades.

3   FACTORS LEADING TO DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

Another important aspect of the uniqueness of the fertility transition in these countries is the factors contributing to fertility decline. The factors that led to demographic changes in these countries are considerably different from a classical fertility transition. The mortality decline in the Indian subcontinent started prior to independence in 1947, much earlier than the fertility transition. The region experienced a very slow increase in population until about 1921, primarily due to famines and epidemics of plague and cholera. The influenza epidemic of 1918–1919 is

estimated to have killed nearly 5% of the population in the subcontinent (Visaria & Visaria, 1994). However, there has been progressive control of cholera and plague resulting in a drastic decline in the death rate since 1921.

The decline in fertility, however, only began in the 1960s and only in certain selected regional pockets. The first state to show signs of rapid decline in fertility in India was Kerala, located in the south-west, and at the time of the onset of fertility transition one of the poorest states in the country (Bhat & Rajan, 1990; Krishnan 1976). Since then, Kerala has attracted international attention because of its 'Kerala model' of development. The Kerala model prioritized social indicators such as education and health care, rather than merely economic growth. The state differed from other regions in terms of literacy levels, particularly among women. The female literacy level in Kerala was found to be much higher when fertility started to decline. The Kerala model thus resulted in an uncommon trajectory of development with the state achieving high social development (in indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality and birth rate), even though its per capita income was low. Later, several other states in India and also Bangladesh experienced a faster fertility transition, which was neither backed by improvements in living standards, nor by significant educational levels (Basu & Amin, 2000; Mahendra Dev & James, 2002; Srinivasan et al., 1991). The unconventional fertility transition of Kerala meant that the majority of couples adopting a small family norm were poor, illiterate or rather with considerably low skill levels (Bhat, 2002).

The role of a strong family planning programme in reducing fertility levels in these countries is often emphasized. It is considered that the widespread acceptance of small family norms, irrespective of socio-economic status, is due to the strong implementation of the programme by the government (Srinivasan, 1995). India's rapid population growth has been a concern for many, especially in terms of its relationship with economic development (Coale & Hoover, 1958). India was the first government in the world to introduce an official family planning programme as early as 1952, shortly after its independence in 1947. The objective was to make family planning services widely and easily accessible. Since then, the programme was fully subsidized and provided free of cost through the public healthcare system. The consecutive decadal census in the second half of the last century has shown increasing growth of population within the vicinity of 2% per annum. This has led to the

introduction of several other measures like a target-oriented family planning programme wherein each health worker is given targets to achieve certain number of female sterilizations. A variety of incentives were introduced and offered to acceptors of the family planning programme as part of the strategy to voluntarily promote family planning and fertility control (Srinivasan et al., 2007). Similar family planning programmes have been adopted in Bangladesh and Pakistan, mainly through collaborations with NGOs and through female health workers.

India's family planning programme, indeed, has a checkered history (Rao, 2004). The increasing concern over the population growth has led to its forceful implementation, particularly in the emergency years (1975–1977) (Srinivasan, 1995). The fall of the government shortly after emergency is often squarely attributed to undue government interference in the forceful implementation of family planning (Srinivasan, 1995; Visaria & Chari, 1998). Another major criticism was the large-scale promotion of female sterilization in the country with women bearing the main burden of contraception. Female sterilization continues to be the major contraceptive method in India, accounting for nearly 86% of the total use of modern contraceptives (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2017), compared to just 7% in Bangladesh, where pills and condoms are the leading methods of contraception (DHS Bangladesh, 2016). In Pakistan as well, the female sterilization constitutes only 28% of the total contraceptive use (Carton & Agha, 2012). It is therefore clear that the demographic transition in these countries is also not without any political upheavals. The role of the state in promoting family planning, and particularly from the point of view of women, has been widely criticized in all these countries (Sen et al., 1994). Although other explanations of fertility transition are at times suggested—such as diffusion of contraceptive knowledge (Guilmoto & Rajan, 2005; Mahendra Dev & James, 2002), poverty-induced fertility transition (Mencher, 1980) and the role of social development (Bhat & Rajan, 1990)—government intervention remains one of the strongest factors behind the fertility transition especially in India and Bangladesh.

4   Regional and Religious Demographic Diversity

Perhaps, one of the important factors that define the political demography of these three countries is the wide regional heterogeneity in demographic patterns. India's vast diversity in languages, cultures and religions is well

Table 3 Share of population in major religious groups in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, 2015

Country	Hindu	Islam	Christian	Other religions
India	79.5	14.4	2.5	3.1
Pakistan	1.9	96.4	1.6	0.03
Bangladesh	9.1	89.8	0.2	0.60

Source Central Intelligence Agency (2017)

known (see also Skirbekk & Navarro, this volume). But it is also important to note that the country displays a considerable heterogeneity in socio-economic and demographic patterns across its various regions. This is also true with regard to Bangladesh and Pakistan, though less than in India. Both in India and in Bangladesh, some regions have achieved replacement level fertility several years back while other parts are yet to reach that level leading to considerable differences in the age structure as well as the population growth patterns. This also has implications for the internal migration in these countries. In Pakistan, most regions are far above replacement level fertility, but at the same time there are considerable differences in fertility across regions. Religious differences in fertility, particularly among minorities, are also a subject of wider political debates (Devine & White, 2013; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2013). While India and Bangladesh have significant subpopulations other than the major religious group (Hindus and Muslims), in Pakistan only 3% of the population are non-Muslims (Table 3).

Such differences in regional and religious demographic patterns have wider political implications. In this section, regional and religious differences are brought out separately for the three countries, and the implications of such changes are discussed in the subsequent section.

4.1 India: Countries Within a Country

The fertility transition in the south of India was relatively early. Kerala was one of the pioneers in the fertility transition as early as in the 1960s (Bhat & Rajan, 1990; Krishnan, 1976). Later on, in the 1980s, other southern states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh had also entered into the rapid fertility transition (James, 2011). Subsequently, the transition also spread to many other states in the western and eastern

regions of the country. However, the Hindi-speaking central Indian states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh), constituting 42% of the India's population, showed negligible signs of changes in fertility in the 1980s. This has led the famous Indian demographer Ashish Bose to call these states *BIMARU*, meaning sickness in Hindi (Mishra, 2014). Later, each of these states was divided into two, resulting in a total of six states. Even today, these states continue to have high fertility compared to the other parts. According to the latest data available for the year 2016, fertility levels in three of these states continued to be above 3 children per women (SRS Statistical Report, 2016). The southern, eastern and western states mostly have fertility levels of less than or near to 2. Figure 2 shows the differentials in total fertility rate (TFR) across Indian states. Similarly, the rural-urban fertility differentials are also striking in India. The urban India, constituting nearly 30% of the total population, has already reached a fertility level of less than 2.

Not only the demographic patterns but also the differences in other socio-economic characteristics between these regions are striking. Along with the fertility transition, the socio-economic conditions of southern states have improved considerably. Therefore, the regional heterogeneity in India cannot be viewed only in terms of demographic pattern but has clear demarcation for both, the social and economic development. The per capita income of southern states is invariably higher than the national average. Central India, on the contrary, has the lowest socio-economic development in the country (Economic Survey, 2018).

Most of the states with lower levels of fertility have become an attractive destination for labour in-migrants due to severe scarcity of manual labour and higher wages within these states (Rajan, 2013). This is entirely legal as the internal movement of the citizens does not have any legal constraints in India. Most of these labourers are working in the construction sector which has grown significantly in the 2000s as a result of an economic boom in the southern states. However, it can be observed that the in-migrants are subjected to bad working and living conditions (Rajan & James, 2007). The discrimination due to differences in language, culture and adverse living conditions is often concerned with regard to the migrant workers. There are instances where the resident population perceives that the in-migrants bring an alien culture and are responsible for increasing crime rates (Basheer, 2015; United Nations, 2015).

Religious differentials in subpopulation growth have become a subject of intense debate in India, particularly since the late 1990s (Alagarajan &

Fig. 2 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) across Indian States, 2016 (*Source* Data from http://www.censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/SRS_Report_2016/7. Chap_3-Fertility_Indicators-2016.pdf)

Kulkarni, 2008; Bhat & Zavier, 2005; Dharmalingam & Morgan, 2004; James & Nair, 2005). The growth rate of the Muslim population has been around 30% between 1961 and 2001 and around 25% since then; that of the Hindu population has been around 25% between 1961 and 1981 and

around 20% between 1981 and 2011 (Bhat & Zavier, 2005). According to the latest round of the National Family Health Survey, the number of children for Hindus is 2.1 as against 2.6 for Muslims (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2017). Such differences are frequently the subject of wider political debates on the future religious composition of the country.

In addition to religion, the *caste* factor also plays a pivotal role in understanding population dynamics and fertility transition in India. The socio-economic backwardness of the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are well recognized in the country. The SC consists of 16.6% and ST 8.6% of the total population (Census of India, 2011). As a result of the backwardness, the fertility levels have been higher among these caste groups. The fertility rate among SC is 2.3 children per women while that of ST is 2.5 children per women as against 1.9 children for the upper caste group (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2017). A Socially Backward Classes Commission headed by the Indian parliamentarian B P Mandal was set up by the government in 1979. It also identified that there are 'other backward castes' (OBC) in India that are out of the category of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Earlier, the reservation in government jobs and admission to the public educational institutions were implemented only for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. With the Mandal Commission Report, the government had decided to extend the reservation policies for the OBC category as well. Around 40% of India's population are classified into this OBC category. The fertility rate among OBC was slightly lower than among the SC and ST groups, but higher than the forward caste (2.2 children) (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2017). Overall, diversity by region, religion and caste has both demographic and political significance in the country. These factors have often been considered as the reason for success or failure of the different political parties in the country.

4.2   Pakistan: Regional Diversity with Religious Homogeneity

Interstate and rural-urban differentials can be observed in Pakistan as well. While the state of Punjab has a high Human Development Index (HDI) with high achievements in health, education and economic growth, the state of Balochistan has very low achievements in these domains (Pakistan National Human Development Report 2017, 2018). District level differentials in human development are even more stark. While the capital city

of Islamabad has a fertility rate of 3.0 (much lower than the national level of fertility of 3.8), the province of Balochistan has a fertility rate as high as 4.2 children per women. Undoubtedly, such variation also has direct links with the prevailing socio-economic conditions of the region. While around 60% of women use contraceptives in the province of Islamabad, only around 20% do so in Balochistan (Pakistan National Human Development Report 2017, 2018).

Furthermore, urban areas have better levels of human development than their rural counterparts. Levels of human development in urban Pakistan can be compared with those in South Africa (HDI value of 0.66), whereas those in rural Pakistan are as low as in Togo (0.49). While the fertility rate of urban Pakistan is lower at 3.2, it is nearly one child higher in rural Pakistan. Pakistan is currently also experiencing a high rate of urbanization, at 2.77% annual growth (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017; Pakistan National Human Development Report 2017, 2018).

Religious diversity is rather negligible: around 96% of the population of Pakistan are Muslims. Christians and Hindus form only a minority, with around 1.6 and 1.9%, respectively. The fertility rate is nearly the same for Hindus and Muslims in Pakistan (Hackett et al., 2015).

4.3 Bangladesh: Densely Populated; Sparsely Heterogeneous

Bangladesh is among the countries with the highest population density in the world. Compared to India and Pakistan, the regional differences are relatively small. Although there are urban-rural differences in fertility, they are not as sharp as in the case of Pakistan or India. The fertility rate is around 1.7 in urban areas and 2.2 in rural areas. Divisions such as Mymensingh and Barishal have higher fertility rates of 2.44 and 2.34, respectively, while the divisions of Rangpur and Sylhet have lower fertility rates of 2.22 and 2.09, respectively (DHS Bangladesh, 2016). In the past 25 years, Bangladesh has registered a sharp reduction in fertility and an increase in life expectancy in almost all the regions and reduced the regional diversity significantly. While Islam is the official and dominant religion of Bangladesh, the constitution of the country guarantees freedom of religion and grants equal rights to citizens irrespective of their religious affiliation (Bangladesh's Constitution, 2018). Bangladesh has a higher share of Hindus compared to Pakistan. The fertility levels among Hindus and Muslims are nearly the same in Bangladesh.

5   THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSION OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

The changing demographic profiles and the considerable regional and religious diversities in these countries have considerable political repercussions. The rapid age structure transition itself has its own effect in India and Bangladesh, particularly on the voting pattern. As all three countries follow a parliamentary form of democracy, public policies and public discourse are likely to be affected by the demographic changes. Five major implications deserve discussion.

5.1   Age Structure and Voting Pattern

The demographic transition and the resulting shifts in the relative size of age groups have various impacts on democratic processes, particularly in India and Bangladesh. Salient political debates in both countries now consider how to take advantage of the youth bulge. Job creation has therefore become a critical part of government policies. In India, the number of graduates entering the labour market is much higher than the employment opportunities available to them at present. This phenomenon is often called "educated unemployment" (Gandhi et al., 2014). As already pointed out, the characteristics of the youth populations in these countries are significantly different from what is expected from a country with similar drastic demographic changes. Most young citizens are semi-literate or with only elementary education, which pushes them to work in the countries' informal sector. Generally, nearly 90% of the Indian workforce is in the informal sector (ILO, 2018) and similar levels are obtained in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Women in particular find it hard to get into the labour market (Desai, 2010). South Asia in general has a very low female labour force participation compared to the world. The work participation of females is as low as 23.9% in Pakistan, 27.3 for India and 33.4% for Bangladesh in 2015 (World Bank, 2015a). Thus, it is often argued that these countries are unable to take advantage of the demographic dividend (Basu, 2011; Bloom & Canning, 2008; Desai, 2010).

The lack of employment opportunities for the youth has caused serious and direct political reactions and has been among the major debates in several central elections in India over the past two decades. Successive governments formulated different policies aiming at improvement of

employment levels and quality of the workforce. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA) launched in India in 2005 was directed at giving 100 days of assured employment to every rural household in 600 districts in India. One-third of the proposed employment in the scheme was reserved for women. The applicant for the scheme was also entitled to a daily unemployment allowance in cases where he/she was not provided employment within 15 days. Along with other schemes aimed at improving the levels of employment in the country, the Government of India also made efforts to improve the skills of the workforce and improve the quality of employment. The government created a Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship apart from the already existing Ministry of Labour and Employment in 2014. However, the unemployment situation in the country is still grave. In 2018, the Indian Railways (which employs the largest number of people in the country) received 23.7 million applications to fill 0.13 million vacancies (Express, 2018). These issues are on the verge of becoming more politically salient in the near future.

Voting turnout is relatively low in the subcontinent, although it did increase between 1990 and 2015 from around 62 to 66% for India, and from around 46 to 54% for Pakistan. Bangladesh's voting turnout has remained more or less constant at around 51% during the same period, in part due to instances of violence during recent elections (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2015). Already the largest democracy in the world, India keeps on growing. According to the Election Commission of India, 814.5 million Indians were eligible to vote in the 2014 elections. Around 23.1 million of the total eligible voters in India were of the age group of 18–19 years alone. There are also substantial regional variations within these countries in terms of participation in democracy. For instance, the Indian state of Bihar had a low voting turnout of 56 percent whereas the state of West Bengal recorded a rate of around 82% (Statistical Reports of Lok Sabha Elections, 2014). Similarly, there are variations in voting patterns across gender. The number of women voters is significantly lower than their male counterparts. In India, around 20% of the eligible female voters, which constitute around 65 million women, are 'missing' from the electorate (Kapoor & Ravi, 2014). Women have also been underrepresented in the central and state assemblies of these countries. Questions pertaining to this are rising in India's public sphere. Major political parties in India are assuring more women participation in electoral politics in their manifestos. The

Women's Reservation Bill was introduced in India in 2008 to ensure women's representation by reserving one-third of seats in central and state assemblies to women. However, this bill could not be passed in the parliament due to differences among the political parties. Similarly, the low voting percentage is also due to increases in levels of internal migration. Presently, due to lack of well-developed official documentation, there is no system to accommodate the short-term and informal migrants in the electorate (Rajan et al., 2019). Thus, the increasing levels of internal migration are further decreasing the already low voting percentage.

Not surprisingly and despite the fact that in all three countries youth dominate in terms of proportion as well as the voting share, the parliamentarians are much older compared to the population age distribution. In India, most of the members of the parliament are between 46 and 60, whereas the median age of the country is 28. In 2014, around 25% of the members in the lower house still belonged to a cohort that was born before the independence of the country (Statistical Reports of Lok Sabha Elections, 2014).

The demographic dividend is likely to continue to have an effect in India and Bangladesh over the next few decades, and for Pakistan much longer still. Undoubtedly, India and Bangladesh will probably continue to feel the pressure of ageing populations beyond the 2030s (Balachandran, 2020; Balachandran et al., 2019). The sixty and plus population is expected to triple from 92 million today to 316 million by mid-century, when it will constitute one-fifth of the population in India. With the increasing elderly population in different states, there has been a huge demand for introducing social security schemes. With the majority of the population both in India and in Bangladesh working in the informal sector, there is hardly any old-age security available. Currently, the old-age security burden is being borne by the family. With the changing demographic profiles, that may no longer be possible in the future. Governments launch programmes to ensure old-age security at least among the poor sections of the population from time to time (Barrientos, 2012). The Department of Social Services under the Ministry of Social Welfare in Bangladesh, in 1998, launched a monthly allowance programme for disabled older population from poor backgrounds. In Pakistan, a scheme called Employees Old Age Benefits Institution was launched in 1976 to support retired poor elderly. In India, the Indira Gandhi Old Age Pension Scheme was launched in 2007 and provided a monthly pension for the poor elderly population. However, the amounts

provided are relatively small and, due to poor targeting, do not cover the eligible. The work-based pensions are allotted only to workers from certain formal sector, whereas most of the workers in these countries are working in the informal sector.

5.2 Regional Diversity and Constitutional Politics

Demographic disparities across regions have serious implications at different levels of politics and policies, and even for larger questions of political order and stability. This is perhaps less the case in Bangladesh than in the more regionally diverse India and Pakistan. As Pakistan has not entered the last stages of demographic transition, the political repercussions are likely to last much longer than in India, where an advanced demographic transition goes hand in hand with considerable regional heterogeneity already today. For instance, the Indian Constitution specifies a fixed number of members to the parliament per state, which has been fixed in accordance with the population Census of 1971. Initially, the parliament seats were frozen till 2001. However, the date has been extended to 2026 due to severe opposition from regions with rapid demographic changes, who stood to lose many seats. The states with advanced demographic changes argued that they were being punished because they were successful in implementing governmental family planning initiatives. The Constitution requires this arrangement to be re-analysed in 2026, and undoubtedly, it will have serious political implications. It is expected that the representation in the Indian Parliament will undergo rapid changes, with the central Indian states receiving a substantially higher number of seats once the number of seats is unfrozen. This in turn is likely to create more political imbalances and conflicts. As mentioned, the laggards in the fertility transition are mainly the Hindi-speaking central Indian states, which currently account for nearly 42% of the total population. At the same time, it is pertinent to mention that there is an inherent imbalance in the number of seats based on population at present. For instance, the four southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala account for just over 21% of the population but get 129 Lok Sabha seats. By contrast, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the two most populous Hindi states, account for 25.1% of the population, but get only 120 seats (Firstpost, 2011). Hence, an average person from the South Indian state of Kerala is 1.5 times more represented than an

average Bihari. A change in seat allocation can have significant impact on the Indian electorate.

Nevertheless, the demographic heterogeneity in India also provides a unique opportunity to fill the labour deficit within the country through inter-state migration. Of late, there has been a large inflow of migrants from the northern belt, having high a fertility rate, to the southern region with below-replacement level of fertility. This is known as replacement migration. These migrants are generally drawn from less privileged sections in terms of both caste and class hierarchy in India and as such may have to circumvent various hardships. Although migration as such may be development driven, there is the possibility of increased conflict and unrest in the destination regions (Rajan & James, 2007). A study using cross-regional, time-series data on violence in Indian states (1989–2009) reveals the possibility of escalating violence due to demographic heterogeneity in the country (Forsberg et al., 2011).[1]

Another major impact of demographic heterogeneity in India is on allocation of federal resources across states. The Finance Commission is a constitutional body which is appointed every five years and decides, among other functions, on the terms of allocating federal funds to different states. Since 1971, the allocation of federal funds has been based on a formula that gives weight to states chiefly based on their population share (based on the 1971 Census) and their level of economic backwardness. However, the new finance commission formed in 2017 proposed in its Terms of Reference (ToR) to convert the formula into population based on 2011 Census data. This proposal saw a massive resistance from the southern Indian states, which argued that they are being penalized for successfully implementing a national policy aimed at reducing fertility. Moreover, these states are also economically well-off, and they substantially contribute to the total tax share going to the federal government. Southern states therefore argued that though

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[1] For instance, Bengaluru, a city in the southern state of Karnataka saw agitation against excessive use of Hindi in communication. This anti-Hindi agitation needs to be seen from the backdrop that Hindi is the lingua franca of the migrant population to the city which grew tremendously over the past two decades. Similarly, the state of Maharashtra saw several agitations seeking reservations to the Marathi population (who are the natives of the state) in employment. This happens in the backdrop of Maharashtra being a state with highest number of migrants. Migrants are mainly from the states with lower levels of developments and higher number of youths, such as the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.

they contribute significantly to federal funds, they do not receive enough in re-allocations from the finance commission. The same is true with respect to the allocation of budgets from federal government to the states for different health programmes. In the year 2005, the Government of India has made much bigger budget allocations to improve population and health indicators particularly in the demographically lagging states in the northern and eastern part of the country. The states which have progressed in demographic and health indicators got a much lower share than the demographically backward states. This is often considered as a disincentive for performance.[2]

5.3   *Religious and Caste Diversity*

Other important aspects of political demography in these countries are the religious differences in population and its growth differentials. Again, this dimension is most relevant in India, with its huge religious and caste differences in demography and socio-economic standing. Such differences are not found in Bangladesh, while Pakistan has a 96% Muslim population. The higher growth rate of the minority Muslim population in India has often been a matter of intense concern in certain political circles (Joshi et al., 2003; Reddy, 2003). While it is true that Muslim fertility is high, it is important to note that Muslims generally tend to live in areas with the highest fertility in India, particularly in the northern states (James & Nair, 2005). Studies also found that the Muslim fertility follows nearly the same pace of transition as the Hindus', particularly in the period of accelerated fertility decline in the country (Krishnaji & James, 2005). Although many apprehensions on Muslim fertility and Muslim population becoming a majority religion in the future are not valid, the growth differences have significant political repercussions in the country (Bhat & Zavier, 2005). Politicians have often used this as a tool to scare the majority religion into voting for them.

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[2] Interestingly, major political leaders from all southern Indian states have been raising this issue as discrimination against them and discussed it as one of the major election propagandas against the ruling party at the federal government (Balachandran, 2018; Daniyal, 2018; *New Indian Express*, 2018). A formal meeting of the South Indian finance ministers took place in early 2018 to form an alliance to raise voice against such decisions. A small fraction of leaders from South India are also raising slogans to form a new South-Indian country (*The News Minute*, 2018).

The growth differentials among caste groups in India, however, have not led to direct criticism on their demographic behaviours as it is considered that caste diversity and backwardness are the result of centuries of discrimination against them. The reservation policies in the realms of jobs and education were specifically introduced for SC and ST groups in India[3] and this limitation was enshrined in the Indian Constitution. However, the Government of India adopted a 'reservation policy' in the late 1980s whereby people from OBC are given a quota in various governmental educational institutions and employment opportunities (Thorat & Newman, 2010). Since then, several caste groups in India have been claiming for status of 'OBC' to gain the benefits of the reservation policies. The 'upper caste' voices are also raised on the non-efficiency of caste system and on the 'unfairness' that it has created for them. Various political parties have been raising the issues related to caste with regard to different benefits from the government. Caste is seen as a major determinant of many socio-economic outcomes and the Government of India conducted a first Socio-Economic and Caste Census in independent India in 2011. The results of the census showed that the performance of lower castes is lower (Census of India, 2011). Given the likely demographic developments of lower castes, caste and caste composition will no doubt play a major role in Indian politics in coming decades.

The minorities in Pakistan are mostly concentrated on few areas (Mahmud, 1995). There are reserved seats for minority communities in different provincial and national elections. However, there is criticism that religious minorities are discriminated against and there are apprehensions about the decrease in the share of religious minorities (Roche, 2016). Not only across religious groups, but even within the majority religion, vast differences exist in Pakistan. Instances of sectarian violence have occurred between the Sunni and Shia Muslims since the 1980s. With considerable demographic and socio-economic differences between them, there are increasing possibilities of conflicts between these groups even in future.

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[3] Additionally, several political parties were eager to get support of the caste groups by announcing different policies and programmes for them. Even political parties were formed primarily to unite such caste groups and these were also successful in different contexts (Lee, 2013). There is also strong criticism and counter-criticism of parties that favour certain caste groups or discriminate against others (Jaffrelot, 2012).

6   Conclusion

Overall, it is clear that demographically India and Bangladesh show very similar patterns of change, with fertility levels and age structure currently at almost the same level. Pakistan, on the other hand, shows only early signs of fertility transition and has a substantial proportion of child population. Even in the coming 25 years, Pakistan will remain a young population while India and Bangladesh will show signs of an ageing society. What is striking, particularly in India and Pakistan, is the wide regional and religious heterogeneity in demographic patterns. Such differences are narrow in the case of Bangladesh. All this will lead to significant political upheavals in these countries.

As democratic countries, all three nations are struggling to address the large challenges posed by the demographic transition, and the political implications of demographic changes are numerous. Tensions in the resource distribution across regions, decisions on the number of parliamentary seats and chances for conflict due to demographic defences can all be observed in India and to some extent, in Pakistan. A major challenge for these nations will be to provide employment opportunities for the young population, particularly the youth, to take advantage of the demographic dividend. All three countries have a very poor record in providing female employment despite drastic fertility transition. All these critical challenges are at the heart of discussion, both in the public and among political classes, but initiatives to address them had limited success. Undoubtedly, demographic changes in these countries will continue to have immense importance for the demographic and political order of the globe, if only because of their sheer population size, at currently almost a quarter of the world's population.

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CHAPTER 7

Getting Old Before Getting Rich (and not Fully Realizing It): Premature Ageing and the Demographic Momentum in Southeast Asia

Patrick Ziegenhain

1 Introduction: Political Demography in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are three major countries in Southeast Asia with a total current population of around 400 million people. They share many common characteristics in terms of culture, language and history. All of them became independent from their respective colonial power countries in the aftermath of the Second World War.[1] As will be explained in more detail, they all started as poor developing countries, and in the decades following independence witnessed remarkable population growth accompanied by major improvements in living

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[1] Indonesia from the Netherlands in 1945/1949, Malaysia from the UK in 1957/1963 and the Philippines from the United States of America in 1946.

P. Ziegenhain (✉)
President University, Cikarang, Indonesia
e-mail: p.ziegenhain@web.de

conditions in these countries. Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world in terms of population size (after China, India and the US). The country is home of at least 400 hundred different ethnic groups and cultures. However, nearly 40% of the population can be classified as *Javanese*, the dominant ethnic group of Indonesia. Indonesia's national motto is "unity in diversity" (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) and reflects the multitude of ethnic, cultural and linguistic features in the world's largest archipelago, which stretches more than 5000 kilometres from West to East. In the latest (2016) Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Indonesia is ranked 113th in the world (out of 188). Indonesia's neighbour Malaysia has a similar cultural, linguistic and historic background as the western parts of Indonesia. However, the country is much smaller and has seen, not least due to the British colonial past, a massive influx of labour migrants from South China and India in the first half of the twentieth century. After independence in 1957, Malaysia progressed quite fast and developed markedly better in socio-economic terms than Indonesia. Malaysia is now (together with the small city states of Singapore and Brunei) one of the wealthiest and most developed states in Southeast Asia. In the HDI, Malaysia is ranked 59th in the world (out of 188). The Philippines is another densely populated archipelagic state in Southeast Asia. With more than 100 million citizens, it is the 12th most populated country worldwide. The largest part of its population is relatively closely connected to Malaysians and Indonesians in ethnic and linguistic terms. However, after centuries under Spanish colonial rule, almost 90% of the Filipinos are Roman-Catholic. Another major external influence was the colonial period under the US from 1898 to 1946, which greatly impacted the current economic, cultural and political system. In the latest HDI, the Philippines are ranked 116th in the world, only three places below Indonesia.

This chapter will first give a concise description of the major demographic trends in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and then give a condensed explanation of these population developments, before drawing some tentative conclusions about the demographic implications for all the three countries in a comparative perspective. I will specifically focus on the challenges which have arisen in relation to the pension system, the labour market, the migration movements, the urbanization as well as the consequences of demographic change in different regions and ethnic/religious groups. In terms of methodology, I performed a critical examination of the existing literature on demographic changes in Southeast Asia and

interpreted demography data in a comparative perspective. For the demographic data, I relied on the Database Global Political Demography (Goerres et al., 2020). Another source was the World Bank Development Indicators, which are available online. Additionally, international literature with a specific focus on Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines was used to gain insights into the political and economic consequences of demographic change in Southeast Asia.

2   DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, 1990–2040

Since their respective independence shortly after the Second World War, all three countries have witnessed remarkable population growth. In Indonesia, the population more than doubled within 40 years—form 72.8 million people in 1950 to 181.4 million people in 1990. The first census in Malaysia in 1970 counted a population of about 11 million people. As Table 1 shows, a significant rise in the population has taken place since

Table 1 Demographic data

	Indonesia		*Malaysia*		*Philippines*	
Size of age groups:	1990	36.43	1990	37.10	1990	40.94
0–14 as % of	2015	27.69	2015	24.52	2015	31.95
population	2040	21.36	2040	18.97	2040	25.84
Size of age groups:	1990	59.78	1990	59.29	1990	55.92
15–64 as % of	2015	67.17	2015	69.64	2015	63.47
population	2040	67.21	2040	68.26	2040	65.92
Size of age groups:	1990	3.78	1990	3.61	1990	3.14
>65 as % of population	2015	5.17	2015	5.86	2015	4.58
	2040	11.43	2040	12.76	2040	8.24
65+/15–64 ratio	1990	1:15.80	1990	1:16.42	1990	1:17.80
	2015	1:12.98	2015	1:11.81	2015	1:13.86
	2040	1:5.88	2040	1:5.35	2040	1:8.00
Absolute size of the	1990	181,436.8	1990	18,211.1	1990	61,947.3
population in mio	2015	257,563.8	2015	30,331.0	2015	100,699.4
	2040	312,439.3	2040	38,852.9	2040	137,020.5
Population	1990	100,154	1990	54,903	1990	207,758
density/(people per sq.	2015	142,507	2015	93,511	2015	341,135
km of land area)						
International in and	1990	−0.21	1990	1.64	1990	−0.82
out migration as % of	2015	−0.32	2015	0.82	2015	−0.65
population	2040	−0.22	2040	0.64	2040	−0.33

Source Goerres et al. (2020)

then. The number of citizens has nearly tripled to over 30 million people. It is expected that the population of Malaysia will continue to grow up to 38.5 million people in 2040. Similarly, the Philippines witnessed enormous growth in the first decades after their independence in 1947. The population grew from 20 million citizens in 1950 to 61.9 million in 1990, thus tripling within 40 years. The growth has continued, but at a lower speed, reaching 100.7 million citizens in 2015. For the year 2040, the UNDP predicts a population size of 137.0 million people.

As Table 1 shows, the similarities between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, despite their country-specific and historic differences, are remarkable in terms of political demography. All three countries have witnessed an extremely high population growth between the 1950s to around 1990. At the same time, the fertility rate declined to a great extent and life expectancy grew. Compared to other countries worldwide, the transformation from a very young to an ageing society within a few generations in these three Southeast Asian countries is very fast. The same transition took almost 150 years in the more developed countries of Western Europe or the US (Goldstone, 2012: 19f.). The transformation within these societies becomes more visible when we analyse the age structure over time. Table 1 shows the distribution of different age sectors in all three countries in 1990, 2015 and 2040. In 1990, Malaysia still had a very young population, with a high number of young people under the age of 15 years and only very few senior citizens over the age of 65 years. This had already changed to some extent by 2015, when the proportion of young people under 15 years dropped quite steeply from 37.1 to 24.5%. This trend will continue. By 2040, the share of young people will decline (despite only a slight decrease in absolute numbers) to 18.9% of the total population. In correlation with the rising life expectancy, the median age in Malaysia will further rise. While it was only 21.56 years in 1990, it had already grown to 27.68 years in 2015. For 2040, the UN predicts a further increase up to 37.65 years.

In Indonesia, young people under 15 years of age were a quite large group, accounting for 35.43% of the total population in 1990. Their absolute number grew only slowly until 2015. However, their share of the total population was nearly 10 percentage points lower in 2015 than in 1990. This trend will continue until 2040, when the proportion of young people under the age of 15 years is expected to drop to 21.36% of the total population. Slowly, the age structure of the population will shift

from a still relatively young population pyramid to one characterized by a significant ageing of the population, with the share of the population above the age of 65 years increasing from 5.17% to 11.43%.

The median age in Indonesia has also increased significantly from 21.3 years in 1990 to 28.0 years in 2015. It is expected to grow to 34.3 years by 2040. But even then, Indonesia will still not yet have an 'old' population. In 2015, countries such as Germany or Japan already had a median age of over 46 years. Nevertheless, the number of old people will increase to a great extent. In particular, the number of people above the age of 80 years will more than double between 2015 and 2040. The number of elderly people (aged 65 or older) in the Philippines grew from 1.94 million in 1990 to 4.61 million in 2015, which is equal to an increase from 3.1% to 4.6% of the total population. The UNDP predicts the share of elderly people to reach 8.2% by 2040. Consequently, the median age in the Philippines rose from 19.3 in 1990 to 24.1 in 2015 and is predicted to reach a median age of 29.6 by 2040. As mentioned above, the key drivers of the ageing of the population in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines relate to longer life expectancies and declining birth/fertility rates. The birth rates in all three countries fell dramatically after 1960. In Indonesia, this meant a fall from 44.56 births per 1,000 citizens in 1960 to 25.81 in 1990 and—less dramatically—to 19.35 in 2015.

Malaysia's crude birth rate fell from 42.69 in 1960 to 28.09 in 1990 and 17.09 in 2015. The birth rates of the Philippines declined to a lesser extent. In 1960, the birth rate was at 44.32 births per 1,000 citizens, very similar to that of Indonesia and Malaysia. It then fell to 33.02 in 1990 and 23.45 in 2015, higher than in Indonesia and Malaysia. The declining birth rates are closely connected to the decline in the total fertility rates. In Indonesia, this rate has dropped drastically from an average of 5.48 children per woman in 1970 to 2.39 children per woman in 2010–2015. In Malaysia, too, the total fertility rate has declined enormously over the last 55 years from an average of 6.45 children per woman in 1960 to 3.55 in 1990, and a comparatively very low 2.06 in 2015. The birth rate in the Philippines also fell dramatically from 7.15 children per woman in 1960 to 4.32 in 1990 and to 2.96 in 2015. However, the total average fertility rate in the Philippines is currently still significantly higher than in Malaysia and Indonesia.

Not only the declining birth rates are leading to ageing societies, but also the sharp rise in life expectancy due to better nutrition as well as

medical and hygienic progress. Life expectancy in Indonesia increased drastically from 1950 (38.8 years) to 1990 (62.67 for males and 65.67 for females) and 2015 (67.35 for males and 71.65 for females). It is expected to be over 70 years for both sexes by 2040. A Malaysian born in 1955, on average, reached an age of 55.4 years. This number climbed to 64.9 in 1970. The average life expectancy at birth continued to rise to over 70 years in 1990 and about 75 years in 2015 and is expected to grow further to near 80 years in 2040. Somewhat lower, but still impressive, is the rise in life expectancy in the Philippines. While the average life expectancy at birth was only 58 years in 1960, the number for men rose to 63.0 years and that for women to 68.6 in 1990. Life expectancy continued to grow, and by 2015, it was 66.0 for men and 72.9 for women. For 2040, the UNDP forecasts life expectancy to be 68.0 years for men and 76.4 for women.

The ageing process in the three countries is clearly visible when one looks at the ratio of people over 65 years of age compared to people between 15 and 64 years of age. In Malaysia, the ratio in 1990 was 1:16.42, meaning that for every elderly person there were 16.42 persons between the age of 15 and 64 years. This ratio dropped to 1: 11.81 in 2015 and will be 1: 5.35 by 2040. In absolute numbers, this means a rise from 1.78 million elderly people in 2015 to 4.86 million by 2040. The numbers for Indonesia are similar and only slightly lower. The ratio was 1:15.80 in 1990, fell to 1:12.98 in 2015 and for 2040 a ratio of 1:5.88 is predicted. In absolute numbers, the number of Indonesian older than 65 years will rise from 21.12 million in 2015 to 26.52 million by 2040. Again, the Philippines have the slowest ageing process. The ratio of people over 65 years compared to people between 15 and 64 years was 1:17.80 in 1990, 1:13.86 in 2015 and will be 1:8.00 in 2040.

As shown in Fig. 1, the shape of the population pyramids in these three countries in 1990 is that of the classical developing countries, where the largest group is made up of children and young people. In 2020, the largest group is that of persons in working age providing a favourable demographic profile for the labour market. The number of young people is no longer as dominant as it used to be, and the number of elderly people is not yet as high. In 2040, however, the pyramids in all three countries will probably have more features of ageing societies.

Fig. 1 Population Pyramids, 1990, 2020, 2040 (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

3   Reasons for the Demographic Developments

In the 1950s, all three countries were poor and underdeveloped. There was a high rate of illiteracy of more than 80% and poorly developed healthcare and education systems. Since then, all of them have steadily developed and are now regarded as lower middle-income countries. In so far, one of the explanatory factors of the rapid population growth is the improvement of living conditions for the average citizen. This in turn has led to higher rates of life expectancy. Furthermore, birth rates in all three

countries sharply declined at the same time as living conditions improved. What were the reasons for these developments? Malaysia and Indonesia (and to a lesser extent the Philippines) have sustained a long period of consistent economic growth since the 1970s, with average annual growth rates of more than 5%. This economic progress has led to advances in medical science, which resulted in improved healthcare systems and a sharp decline of child mortality. As the countries became more developed, the demographic behaviour of the respective populations changed, and in accordance with classic theories of demographic change (Goldstone, 2012: 19), the fertility rates declined and the number of elderly people grew.

At the same time, new social norms relating to more Malaysian and Indonesia women pursuing their education and career aspirations led to later marriage and less children per woman (Sumra, 2016). In Malaysia, it had been observed that the mean age at first marriage of women has increased from 21.6 to 25.1 years between 1970 and 2000 (Mahari, 2011: 4). The opportunity for women to pursue higher education and skills level empowers them to participate in the labour market. This contributed to delay in their marriages (see also Hirschman & Bonaparte, 2012: 30f.). Another reason for the declining birth rates was the availability and acceptance of contraceptives in both countries. The Indonesia government, coordinated by the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (NFPCB), actively promotes and financially supports family planning since the late 1960s until today. The use of contraceptives and the government promotion of them met with resistance from societal organizations, including Muslim groups, only initially in both countries. In the late 1960s, major Islamic groups in Indonesia expressed their unease with family planning because they saw family planning as the replacement of the will of God with the will of individuals in relation to procreation (Shiffman, 2004: 29). However, the authoritarian government under General Suharto made the family planning programme one of its major development targets and used pressure as well as financial incentives to counter any resistance. After intensive consultations with government officials, the most influential Islamic groups such as *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdatul Ulama* changed their point of view and supported the family planning programmes (Shiffman, 2004: 30).

Among the three countries, the highest population growth took place in the Philippines although the mortality rates declined at similar rates

to those in the other countries. Whereas in other Southeast Asian countries, population growth rates dropped substantially to below 2% a year, the population growth rate in the Philippines declined much slower. Many researchers argue that "the persistence of poverty in the Philippines has to do largely with its inability to achieve —and sustain — an income growth substantially higher than its population growth" (Balicasan, 2007). They complain about "the vicious cycle of high fertility and poverty: high fertility rate prolongs poverty in households and poor households contribute to high fertility rates" (Mapa et al., 2012: 15).

One reason for the comparatively high fertility rate in the Philippines is "the teachings of the influential Philippine Catholic Church (no divorce, contraception or abortion) and the active sexual life of young Filipinos. Many women become pregnant at a very early age, soon after puberty" (Boquet, 2017: 117). Besides the Vatican, the Philippines is the only country in the world where divorce is not legal. "The use of government money, taxpayers' money to give out contraceptive pills is corruption", Archbishop Socrates Villegas was quoted (see Alave, 2012: n.p.).

The Catholic faith of most Filipinos, however, "does not exercise a strong direct influence on fertility desires, but that it is a major factor influencing population policy and programmes. Church opposition to contraception has been a major factor in preventing the government - both national and local - from committing funds for population programmes. This in turn fosters a social climate that works against coalescence around an explicit two-child norm" (Costello & Casterline, 2002: 533). The slow pace by which the total fertility rate has dropped from 6.96 in 1960 to 3.30 in 2008, a measly 1.6% per year, "can be attributed to a lack of concrete and proactive government policies on population management aimed at accelerating the demographic transition" (Mapa et al., 2012: 12). In recent years, the last two Philippines presidents supported an active family planning policy. Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino (2010–2016) supported the 'Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012' against bitter resistance from conservative politicians and the Catholic Church. Current President Rodrigo Duterte (since 2016) has stated to champion contraception to reduce poverty during his term. He stated that he wants to reduce unwanted pregnancies among poor Filipinos and that overpopulation is a threat to the country's economic development (Corrales, 2016). Both presidents followed their own ethical beliefs and risked part of their popularity with citizens and voters who followed the pro-life policy of the Catholic Church. On the

other hand, their progressive approach on family planning brought both support from reform-oriented people in the middle and lower classes.

Remarkably, there is a huge contrast between the Catholic Philippines and the majority Muslim countries of Indonesia and Malaysia which had no significant internal political debates about state-led family programmes. In Malaysia, the Family Planning Act No. 42 was already passed in 1966 and was widely approved by the population (Nai Peng Tey, 2007: 269). In the mid-1980s and 1990s, the government under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad proclaimed a pro-natalist (and Islamist) agenda to raise the number of Malaysians. He publicly stated that Malaysia should have 70 million citizens by 2100 (Nai Peng Tey, 2007: 268). But at this time, the use of contraceptives and active family planning policies were already well-spread over Malaysia so that an enormous population growth did not take place and the fertility rate continued to decrease.

In so far, the main reason for the demographic change in all three countries is not culture, geography, climate or religion, but rather improved living conditions. As in most other countries in the world, economic modernization goes along with a relative decline in the agricultural sector in terms of employment and percentage of the GDP (Martin & Warr, 1993: 381), while the importance of the industrial and service sectors is growing. Therefore, more people are moving to cities, where living space is expensive. Since education is an increasingly important way to get ahead, parents want to invest more in the education of their children, which is also costly. Additionally, parents are gaining confidence that nearly all their children will survive to adulthood, and thus, they will not need more than two children. It is not only access to birth control (although it is a contributing factor) but particularly the educational level of women that effectively limits the number of children they bear (Goldstone, 2012: 19).

4   Political Implications of the Demographic Changes: The Illusions of Demographic Momentum?

What has been the impact of the above-described population changes on the domestic policies of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines? It is remarkable how little awareness there is of the dramatic demographic changes in all three countries. The general public, but also the political elites, still regard their country as young and tend to ignore the decline in fertility that has already occurred. Of course, there are demography

experts and scholars who are aware of the demographic changes, but the public perception of an ageing society is not widespread in all three countries. Why? First, the change in population is not so clearly visible. As has been pointed out above, the major increases will be in the years leading up to 2040. In Malaysia, for example, the percentage of people above 65 years grew from 3.6% in 1990 to 5.8% in 2015. This is an increase which is significant, but not really dramatic. The increase during the next 25 years will draw more attention with a rise from 5.8% (2015) to 12.9% by 2040. Second, the three populations are still growing due to the demographic momentum (Goldstone, 2012: 20). Despite dramatically declining birth rates, the population is still growing due to a large proportion of its population being in its reproductive years. Therefore, there will be a population increase in all of the three countries in the years to come, which will presumably last until 2060 or 2070.

The executive director of the Philippine Commission on Population (PopCom), Juan Antonio Perez III, stated in 2015: "We can say our population is not yet aging. We are still a young population but we are on the boundary of a demographic transition stage of an aging population" (Chrisostomo, 2015: n.p.). Compared to other countries in Asia and the rest of the world, Malaysia, Indonesia and particularly the Philippines will still have relatively young populations in 2040. Therefore, Deloitte Malaysia risk advisory leader Cheryl Khor stated that "compared to a number of nations, the impact of ageing on Malaysia's economic growth is relatively gentle and will not really be felt until the 2050s. Our economy will avoid many of the more challenging downsides of population ageing for some time yet, although those challenges will eventually arrive here too" (quoted in Dhesi, 2017: n.p.).

However, in the years to come, the consequences of an ageing population will surely become a major policy concern for Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Population ageing in lower middle-income countries, such as Indonesia or the Philippines, brings potentially more challenges as in the upper-middle-income economy of Malaysia. Nevertheless, in all the three countries, two important national development goals will conflict: How to sustain robust economic growth while at the same time provide welfare to the growing number of old people? Achieving these two goals simultaneously "will require new policies, most importantly policies that encourage saving, and investment in health and education to improve productivity" (Kohler & Behrman, 2017: 11).

One of the socio-political challenges, however, which is likely to affect all three countries, is the financial aspect of ageing. If their populations continue to age, the proportion of elderly dependents will increase. Accordingly, all three governments will have to address this challenge through their fiscal policies, including the provision of healthcare spending. They will have to respond proactively, anticipating the rising number of elderly people. It is already clear that financial pressures and challenges of human capital (Sumra, 2016) will most probably emerge. Malaysia and Indonesia in particular have to plan for the time after the end of their demographic window of opportunity now. After 2050, both countries are predicted to become "aged nations", defined as nations where post-working population (65 years and older) constitutes 14% or more of the total population. For the Philippines, this will take some more years, but in the second half of the twenty-first century they are also predicted to obtain this status.

4.1   Pension Systems and Retirement Age

So far, all three countries have not yet sufficient welfare state capacities in terms of pensions. Indonesia, for example, has not yet developed a general pension system for old people. Except for public servants, including the staff of police and army, who receive a modest state pension, the care for old people is generally regarded as a family affair. In recent years, however, the government has taken the first step towards a welfare state programme that includes a mandatory universal pension programme for all citizens. The Social Security Administration Body for Employment (BPJS *Ketenagakerjaan*) is responsible for dealing with the policy implementation of this ambitious programme and it is difficult to predict whether BPJS will be successful or not. Indonesia, as a recent study of the UN Population Fund (UNPFA) concludes, "is not ready for population ageing. Ideally, older people should enjoy life upon retirement. But the 2010 Population Census show that half of them are still working, a large number of them create their own employment or are working as unpaid workers. These situations indicate a general lack of social protection for older people" (UNPFA, 2014: 59).

There are not many Indonesians who get a pension. Currently, 53.1% of males of 65 years and older are required to work (or have a business) to have an income, and only 12.7% can rely on a pension or income from social security. The numbers of Indonesian elderly women who have

to work is lower (23.7%), but so is the number of those who receive a pension (7%). More than 50% of them (28.6% males) are dependent on the money of their children/family (Arifin et al., 2012: 20).

Without much public outcry or political debates, the governments of President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono (2004–2014) and President Joko Widodo (since 2014) have increased the pension age of public servants. In 2011, it was extended from 55 to 56 years without any opposition from the parties represented in the national legislature. In 2014, the Ministry for the Empowerment of the State Apparatus developed a proposal, which was later approved as Law No. 5/2014 by the president and the legislature. This law increased the pension age for civil servants to 58 years. Government Regulation No. 11/2017 on Civil Servant Management regulated the pension age according to position: 58 years for administrative officers and junior experts, 60 years for medium ranking officials and 65 years for chief functional officers (Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2017). Again, there were no protests from any major social group or political party against this government regulation. Political experts explain that it is more attractive for public servants to work a few years longer with their relatively high salaries than to retire and face financial loss due to the relatively low pensions (Sikumbang, 2015).

Malaysia has also witnessed an increase of the minimum retirement age for government servants. It was gradually raised from 55 to 56 in 2001, before further increasing to 58 in 2008 and to 60 in 2012. The Minimum Retirement Age Act, which took effect in July 2013, increased the retirement age for the private sector from 55 to 60. For the private sector, Malaysia has a pension scheme called EPF (Employee Provident Fund). The fund is managed by the national Ministry of Finance and both employers (12% of payroll) and employees (11% of payroll) must contribute to the fund. At the age of 60, any person paying into that fund will get a monthly pension after retirement. However, this amount is seen as very low. Out of over 14 million members in the EPF system, less than seven million are active contributors and 72% of the members do not meet the basic savings requirement at the age of 54 (Hussein, 2016). In short, as DM Analytics Malaysia chief economist M. Abdul Khalid stated: "Malaysia at present does not have a comprehensive policy to address the issue of ageing population" (Toh, 2018: n.p.). Other Malaysian academics agree and already proposed to raise the general pension age from 60 to 65 (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2017: 35).

In the Philippines, the retirement age is determined in Article 287 of the Labour Code, which mentions 60 years as the earliest and 65 years as the latest retirement age of employees when there is no retirement plan or contract provision on the matter. Government employees are subject to a mandatory retirement age of 65, while uniformed personnel such as the Armed Forces are required to retire by 56 years old. Recently, there has been a proposal to adjust the mandatory retirement age for uniformed personnel from the current 56 to 60 years (Roxas, 2017), but otherwise there have been no other proposals to increase the retirement age. Compared to Malaysia and Indonesia, the retirement age is already relatively high.

However, the above-mentioned PopCom director Juan Antonio Perez III stated that the social protection systems have yet to catch up with social conditions: "People are living longer but in poorer health and socio-economic conditions. They are only partially reaping the benefits of better health and social conditions" (Chrisostomo, 2015: n.p.). He also demanded an action programme from the government to be developed in the next ten years, since older persons need the government's help as they will be "the poorest members of the population because usually their pensions are not enough for them" (Chrisostomo, 2015: n.p.).

The Population Institute of the University of the Philippines published a study with the title "The Future Aging in the Philippines: Demographic Trends, Human Capital and Health Status", which concluded that "while Filipinos are living longer, their sunset years are being increasingly troubled by poor health and poor socioeconomic conditions" (Kritz, 2015: n.p.). The authors warned the government that it has only 10 years to find solutions before "the graying of the population starts to drag on the country's overall well-being" (Kritz, 2015). Other government officials added that the ageing population will also need larger amounts of resources because of rising costs for the health services of an ageing society (Chrisostomo, 2017).

In the current National Development Plan (2017–2022), which was prepared by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), population policies play an important role. NEDA seeks to reduce the fertility rate by decreasing unwanted pregnancies and increasing the age of first births. However, no concrete measures are proposed to meet the challenges of an ageing society.

In all three countries, the provision of adequate healthcare services to an increasing number of older people with deteriorating health or

multiple illnesses will place a financial burden on the states' budgets. So far, very few measures have been planned by public or private actors to meet the healthcare needs of the rapidly increasing number of older persons.

The biggest financial challenge for pension systems in all three countries, however, is the lack of a universal national pension and healthcare system, which can support those not working in the formal sector. For public servants and those having worked in the formal private sector, there are some pension schemes already in place, but for the large part of the population, who work in the informal sector or as housewives, there are no universal national pension systems. The traditional form of elderly care by family members is still widespread in Southeast Asia. Respect for elderly people is still higher in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines than in many other parts of the world. However, these attitudes are expected to decline in the near future as traditional family ties are loosened by modernity, urbanization and increasing material wealth.

4.2   *The Demographic Dividend and Youth Unemployment*

All the three countries have enjoyed a relatively favourable demographic environment in recent years, characterized by a high percentage of working-age population, which was growing at a higher rate than the overall population. Malaysia in particular, but also Indonesia and to a lesser extent the Philippines, has been very successful in translating this demographic window of opportunity into a sustained economic growth path, poverty reduction and achievement in the non-income dimensions (Nori, 2017). The so-called democratic dividend is thus a major topic in all three countries. As it has a favourable ratio of productive workers compared to child or elderly dependents in the population, it is often seen as an ideal condition for economic growth. In the Philippines, the latest National Development Plan gave one of the 21 chapters the title "Reaching for the Demographic Dividend" and generally sees great opportunities for the Philippine economy (National Economic and Development Agency, 2017).

Several financial service companies also predict a rosy future for the Philippines. Deloitte, for instance, writes that millions of new jobs will be provided by the construction sector and by Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) from the US (ibid., 2017). Standard & Poor's stated that in the Philippines "a growing and educated middle class would continue to

be absorbed by a combination of overseas employment and a booming outsourcing industry" (Agcaoili, 2016: n.p.).

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), the working-age population between the ages of 15 and 64 is expected to rise from about 58 million people in 2010 to about 96 million in 2045, which equals about 67.5% of the total population. This high amount of people in a productive age will, according to the PSA, be on the one hand attractive for domestic and foreign investors as a big labour pool and on the other hand stimulate the economy since it is a huge consumer market (Kritz, 2015). Former Philippine senator Edgardo Angara is more critical, writing in 2015 that a "challenge for early-dividend countries […] is to accelerate job creation to a rate faster than the growth of the working-age population. For the Philippines, such an undertaking is big, but not formidable—as more than a million Filipinos enter the labour force each year, up to 4.3 million are unemployed, and close to 14 million are underemployed, according to the July 2015 Labour Force Survey" (Angara, 2015: n.p.).

The National Economic and Development Agency also sees difficulties and warned that the unemployment rate among 15–24 years olds is more than twice the overall unemployment rate. In addition, the share of youth not in education and not in employment is 22.1% of the total young working population. This has serious implications because the demographic dividend will largely depend on a productive working-age population (National Economic and Development Agency, 2017: 205).

In Indonesia, the government is also relatively cautious concerning the benefits of the demographic dividend. President Joko Widodo stated in October 2017 that the demographic window of opportunity can be a blessing, but it can also be a disaster if the quality of the country's human resources is not good enough to find good jobs (Yulianto, 2017). Around 60% of the Indonesian workforce are only graduates of primary and junior high schools. There are currently millions of (educated) unemployed Indonesians who cannot be absorbed by the labour market (Van der Schaar Investments, 2017) and the unemployment rate for people between the age of 15 and 24 is far above the country's national average.

Malaysia's prospects regarding the demographic dividend are somewhat similar, but the country is in a different position. It has reached the so-called sweet spot, which provides the optimal balance of demographic costs and benefits. In addition, the population with ideal demographics is still growing so that the country can look forward to a longer period of

favourable demographic dividends. Consequently, a study by the Research Unit of CIMB wrote that for "Malaysia to seize the dividend, the time is now. Given that Malaysia is currently undertaking structural reform measures to elevate its GNI per capita to US $15,000 by 2020, the potential to yield a high demographic dividend that coincides with higher incomes can be substantial over the next two decades" (CIMB, 2015: 15).

However, the key to this endeavour is reducing youth unemployment. The World Bank estimated that Malaysia's unemployed youth had declined from a peak of 11.6% of the total labour force aged 15–24 years in 2009 to 10.2% in 2012 (Teo, 2015). The Malaysian Employers' Federation (MEF), on the other hand, argued that a smaller manpower pool might not be the biggest problem in a country with an ageing population because industries would opt for increased automation. "The types of jobs needed in the future won't be labour intensive," said MEF executive director Shamsuddin Bardan (quoted in Augustin, 2017: n.p.).

4.3   *Migration and Urbanization*

Migration movements will also affect the population policies in all three countries. Currently, and as the UNDP predicted in the next 25 years as well, Malaysia will be a destination for net immigration whereas Indonesia and the Philippines will be migrant-sending countries. As a comparatively rich country, Malaysia attracts labour migrants from nearly all its neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia, but also the Philippines and more distant countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, China and India. Many of these migrants aim to live permanently there and/or become Malaysian citizens as the socio-economic situation is regarded as more favourable than in their countries of origin.

Indonesia and the Philippines, in contrast, will have a continued outflow of (mostly relatively unskilled) labour migrants to neighbouring countries and the Middle East. Official figures are difficult to obtain, because a high number of migrants are not officially registered. However, it is estimated that at least 3 million labour migrants and 2 million unregistered immigrants (together around 15% of the total population) are currently in Malaysia. The UN predicts that there will be increased migration to Malaysia in the future, which will add to its population growth (Goerres et al., 2020).

In the Philippines, more than 10 million citizens (or more than 10% of the total population) are working outside of the country and are registered as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Nearly every family, especially in rural areas, has family members abroad and, in the absence of a welfare state, waits for their remittances. The Philippines are the third-biggest remittance-receiving country (after India and China) with around 33 billion US-Dollars (World Bank, 2018), which is more than 10% of the total GDP of the Philippines. In the Philippines, emigration is a common way to escape poverty and is openly promoted as such by the government and various private agencies. This is similar in Indonesia, but the percentage of people and remittances is significantly lower. Only around 1% of the total GDP comes from remittances of Indonesians working abroad. According to Minister of Manpower Hanif Dhakiri, the number of these so-called TKI (*Tenaga Kerja Indonesia*) is around 9 million people, 55% of whom are working in Malaysia. In contrast, only around 85,000 foreigners are working in Indonesia (Putera, 2018).

In so far, Indonesia's contemporary population issues are very different from those of the 1970 s and even the 1990 s, when high fertility rates and population growth were regarded as pressing problems. Nowadays, population ageing and migration have become increasingly important emerging issues (Ananta & Arifin, 2014: 29). Much later than the Filipinos, Indonesians have become highly mobile in their search for income, and the labour market for them is no longer confined to their districts or provinces, but has expanded to the entire world (Ananta & Arifin, 2014: 39).

Another dramatic population trend in Indonesia is rapid urbanization. In 1990, around 69.4% of the Indonesians lived on the countryside and only 30.6% in cities with more than 100,000 citizens. Only 25 years later, in 2015, the urban population has become the majority (with 54.5%). For the future, the UN projected that by 2050 two-thirds of Indonesia's population will live in urban areas. Similar developments have taken place in the Philippines over the last 50 years. With 337 inhabitants per square kilometre in 2013, the country is among the ones with most pressure on land resources worldwide (Boquet, 2017: 118). Metro Manila is regarded by many to be the most densely populated urban area in the world (Deloitte, 2017). Urbanization has also considerably transformed the Malaysian population over the last 50 years. In 1960, only 26.6% of Malaysians lived in urban areas and 73.4% in the countryside. By 2015,

the living situation has reversed, with nearly 75% of the Malaysians living in cities.

For the respective national economies, the above-described processes constitute a positive development, as urbanization and industrialization are necessary to grow into the ranks of a middle-income country (Van der Schaar Investments, 2017). However, urbanization also creates many problems and raises new challenges for political decision-makers. Currently, Malaysian and even more so Indonesian and Philippine cities are already plagued with problems such as air pollution, smog, noise, lack of access to safe water, inadequate sewer systems, limited living space and lack of infrastructure. Limited public transport possibilities and a huge rise in private car ownership in recent years led to frequent traffic collapses and regularly to huge traffic jams in Southeast Asia's cities. The capitals of Indonesia and the Philippines, Jakarta and Manila, belong to the most congested cities worldwide, causing enormous economic damage. Due to time loss and higher transport costs, these cities are estimated to account for 2–5% of the national GDP (Dancel, 2017). The expected substantial rise in urban population over the next 25 years, especially among the urban poor, will compound these problems.

4.4 Regional, Ethnic and Religious Differences of Population Growth

Another important issue for population policies in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is the fact that there are remarkable *regional* differences in terms of demography in all three countries. Additionally, all three countries have significant variations concerning the fertility rates of certain ethnic and religious population groups, which has an impact on population policies (see also Skirbekk and Navarro, this volume). A general trend is that more rural and less developed parts have higher birth rates than urban and richer parts of the country. In Indonesia, the Eastern provinces of East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, North Maluku and West Papua have the highest average fertility rates of more than 3 children per woman. All of them belong to the provinces with the highest incidents of poverty and underdevelopment. Not surprisingly, the lowest birth rates can be found in the urban (and rather developed) provinces of Jakarta and Yogyakarta as well as in the provinces of East and Central Java, which have population sizes of more than 30 million people, but can be rated as rather well-developed. Yogyakarta, Central and East Java are also the only provinces

in which people older than 65 make up more than 10% of the population (UNPFA, 2014: 25).

As Indonesia, the Philippines also have the highest fertility rates among the provinces with the poorest people. In general, the very high spatial diversity in the Philippines is quite remarkable (Balicasan, 2007). Metro Manila's HD for 2016 is comparable to that of Poland or the Baltic States, whereas that of the Bangsamoro area in West Mindanao is comparable to Eritrea and Niger. The two Philippines regions have also the lowest and the highest total fertility rate in the country, with an average of 2.3 children per woman in the National Capital Region and 4.2 in the Bangsamoro province.

In the latest National Development Plan, it can also be seen that the level of education and wealth of women is a decisive variable for the number of children. While Filipinas with no or only elementary education on average have 3.8 or 4.6 children, those with a college degree or higher have on average only 2.1 children. The lowest education quintile of the Philippine women gets an average of 5.2 children, whereas this number is only 1.7 among the highest quintile (National Economic and Development Authority, 2017: 203).

Malaysia also has some remarkable regional differences in birth rates. The birth rates in the rural and rather traditional Islamic states of Kelantan and Terengganu at the East coast of Peninsular Malaysia are significantly higher than in the rest of the country, whereas the birth rate on Penang Island, a rather urban state with a high percentage of Chinese population, is the lowest in all states. The birth rate in the rural and less developed East Malaysian states Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo Island, with a lower percentage of Islamic population, is also remarkably low.

What makes Malaysia a special case in terms of population policies is the sensitive issue of race and religion in the country. The Malays, who are considered indigenous to Malaysia and have Islam as their religion, were only a very narrow majority compared to other ethnic groups. But since the Malays had a much higher fertility rate than the other ethnic groups, population growth has resulted in significant changes in the ethnic composition of Malaysia. This trend will continue over the next 25 years. The proportion of Malaysian Chinese and Malaysian Indians is predicted to shrink as their birth rates are significantly lower than those of the Malay Muslims. The fertility rates of the latter have remained relatively high due to pro-natalist cultural values and, to some extent, the traditional role of women as housewives and mothers in traditional Islamic

lifestyle. Another reason is that the Muslim-Malay are living in rather rural areas and have less income than the other ethnic groups (Zin, 2013: 236, 238). Particularly, the Chinese community in Malaysia (which is generally more urban, wealthy and educated than other ethnic groups) but also other ethnic and religious minorities in Malaysia fear that they will be further marginalized economically and politically due to the growing Malay-Muslim birth rates.

Another major issue of political demography in Malaysia is the claim that the national government, which is dominated by Muslim-Malays, is actively encouraging the immigration of Muslims from other countries (including Indonesia and the Philippines) in order to improve the ratio of *bumiputera* towards other ethnic groups. Particularly, in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, which historically did not have a Muslim-Malay majority, the so-called Project IC, which allegedly gave identity cards to several hundred thousands of "illegal" Muslim immigrants, has been debated intensively (Sadiq, 2005), but until 2018 has not been resolved completely. Not only in Malaysia, but also in Indonesia and the Philippines, the issue of regional, ethnic and religious differences of demographic developments will remain a political topic in the years to come. All three countries have very heterogeneous populations and their respective demographic behaviour will have an impact on domestic politics, internal conflicts and economic transformations. Thus, political demography, as defined by Kaufmann and Toft (2012: 3) and Vanhuysse and Goerres (this volume), will be of utmost importance for the assessment and analysis of socio-economic and political developments in these countries.

5   Conclusion: The Risk of Premature Ageing

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are typical examples of a demographic transition. In this process, "societies move from having a combination of low life expectancy and high fertility to the opposite condition with high life expectancy and low fertility" (Goldstone, 2012: 18). Whereas wealthier countries have completed their demographic transition, the three Southeast Asian countries are still medium-developed and thus currently still in the process of their respective demographic transitions. The Philippines have just entered the early stage of the demographic window of opportunity that promises high economic growth rates, whereas Indonesia is already a bit longer in the era of demographic

dividend. Malaysia is feeling the ageing of society the most of the three countries. The demographic change towards an ageing population with a significant percentage of elderly people will be a huge challenge for all of the three countries. The existing pension and healthcare systems are not fitting the increasing demand in future. At least two out of the three countries have reacted and increased the retirement age for public servants. This is, however, a small step compared to other, mostly highly unpopular measures, which the respective governments have to implement in order to deal with the multifaceted problems of an ageing population.

The major problem for emerging economies such as Indonesia or the Philippines—which have not yet reached a middle-income country status and where poverty is still widespread—could be that economic growth stalls before they transition into high-income status. Getting old before getting rich is one the biggest medium-term structural challenges for developing countries in Asia and other parts of the world. The premature ageing of their respective populations might inhibit their ability to join the group of high-income developed countries (Lee, 2017). Indonesia and the Philippines, but to a lesser extent also Malaysia, thus face the potential problem that they cannot reap the benefits of the demographic dividend due to problems in their labour markets. Migration within Southeast Asia is increasing, but it is mainly unskilled labour which is looking for job opportunities across borders. Regional imbalances also hamper the chances of the three Southeast Asian countries to become rich before the ageing process will set in. Rural and underdeveloped regions contrast with some developed parts of the respective countries, which already exhibit a demographic behaviour similar to fully developed economies.

When looking at the challenges facing the three countries, one has to be aware that the demographic transition has taken place within the lifetime of only one or two generations. The population of all the three countries more than tripled in the second half of the twentieth century and will further grow until the end of the first half of the twenty-first century. At the same time, Southeast Asia has transformed from one of the poorest regions in the world in the 1950 s (and in some parts into the 1980 s) to a quite developed region with an impressive increase of life expectancy, income and level of education over the last 50 years.

Therefore, the demographic change went hand in hand with a positive economic development. It is thus a challenging task for the governments of the three countries to manage the necessary adjustments for the societal transformation into ageing societies at a time when further economic

progress will be more difficult to achieve and societal demands (e.g. on a welfare state, a national pension system or an affordable state-sponsored healthcare system) will continue to grow. Due to its advanced ageing process, Malaysia will be the first of the three countries to deal with a full-fledged ageing society, but at the same time it is also by far the most developed and smallest of the three countries. For Indonesia and the Philippines, these problems are likely to be greater, but they will have more time to adjust.

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The Oldest Societies in Asia: The Politics of Ageing in South Korea and Japan

Axel Klein and Hannes Mosler

1   General Demographic Development

Japan and South Korea (hereafter: Korea) both display typical demographic features of highly industrialized nations. The percentage of the young population (age group 0–14) is similarly low (2019: Japan: 12.1%, Korea: 14%), population ageing has been a well-known and well-predicted characteristic of both societies, and most people live in urban areas (2019: Japan: 91.7%, Korea: 81.4%) (UNPD, 2020) creating a high population density there while leaving rural regions to suffer from the effects of depopulation (cf. Table 1).

Most of the demographic differences between the two countries indicate a time lag with Korea following in Japan's footsteps, a development that the Korean War (1950–1953) and the belated economic growth in South Korea appear to explain to a large extent. The speed of Korea's

A. Klein (✉) · H. Mosler
Department of Political Science and the Institute of East Asian Studies,
University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
e-mail: alex.klein@uni-due.de

Table 1 Selected demographic data on Japan and Korea (2019)

	Japan	*Korea*
Population size	126,166,948	51,225,320
% of 0–14 year olds	12.1	12.7
% of 15–64 year olds	59.5	72.2
% of 65+ year olds	28.4	15.0
% of 75+ year olds	14.7	6.4
ratio of 65+ to 15–64 year olds	2.3	4.8
Population density relative to habitable land area	347	514

Sources COJ (2020), SBJ (2020), and UNPD (2020)

"catching-up" is partly determined by the difference in fertility between both countries. While Japan's total fertility rate (TFR) belongs to the lowest worldwide (2019: 1.36), Korea not only became the first OECD country to fall below 1 in 2018 (0.97) but the country saw its TFR decrease even further in 2019 (0.92) (COJ, 2020: 10).

As Table 1 shows, the share of elderly people (65 years and older) in Korea (2019: 15%) is still lower than in Japan (2019: 28.4%), but growing steadily and expected to rise by a more than twofold increase predicted for the next three decades. The same is true for the working-age population (15–64 year olds), which in South Korea comprises a large share (2019: 72.2%), particularly when compared to Japan (59.5%), which is situated on the lower end of the OECD spectrum. However, once the "baby boomer" generation (1968–1974) in Korea retires (a process that Japan was undergoing from 2007 to 2011), the share of elderly people will increase considerably (UNPD, 2020).

The development of the "old-age dependency ratio" (OADR)[1] has shown a similar "trailing" of Korean development. In 1990, both countries featured the same OADR of about 43.5. While Japan's ratio, however, began its rise from there on until it reached 68.3 in 2019, Korea's OADR was still on the decline and continued to fall until 2014

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[1] The OADR "is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64." Data show the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population (Data taken from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND?locations=JP-KR. Accessed 19 September 2020). The World Bank calculated the values based on data of United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision.

(36.2) before it then followed Japan's trend and increased to 38.5 in 2019 (Worldbank, 2020). Korea's ratio is projected to surge in the coming decades to more than 50 (Schwekendiek, 2016).

Longevity contributes considerably to this effect. Life expectancy at birth quickly increased in Korea from 55.4 years in 1960 to 82.6 years in 2018, positioning the nation in the middle of all OECD countries, but the rate by which life expectancy has been growing over the last decades is remarkably high in comparison with other OECD countries. Korea has continuously closed the gap to Japan from twelve years in 1960 to less than two in 2018 (Japan: 84.2 years).[2] Research by the Imperial College London even projects that Korea will "take Japan's life expectancy crown", which is forecasted with 85.7 years in 2030, while the average for South Koreans is expected to be 87.4 years at that time (Harris 2017: n.p.).

In terms of overall population growth, a similar trailing effect could develop, but in 2019 both countries were still moving in different directions (cf. Fig. 1). Japan's population had already begun to shrink in 2011, which, in 2019, had resulted in almost two million fewer Japanese than in 2010 (COJ, 2020). This is also reflected in the age structure graph for 2020 with a thinned-out bottom—a mismatch that will have exacerbated even more over the next two decades. The National Institute of Population Research (IPSS, 2017b) published forecasts that predict a decrease in the number of people to 100 million by 2053.

In comparison, Korea's population is still growing, although the looming stagnation has already become apparent. After having experienced a twofold increase from 20 million to 42 million between 1949 (right after the Republic's establishment) and 1990, Korea's population had increased by almost another ten million by 2017. Predictions for 2020 demonstrate a disproportionate middle-aged bulge with a simultaneous decrease in the youth population—a trend that will continue over the next twenty years. That is why the UN Population Division expects that negative growth rates in Japan and Korea will be similar around 2050, as will the age structures of both populations.

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[2] World Bank at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=JP-KR. Accessed 19 September 2020.

Fig. 1 Population pyramids, Japan and Korea (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

2   Political Institutions

Japan and Korea are parliamentary democracies scoring similarly to European states, for example, on the Polity IV Project scale of country regimes (CSP, 2016). The literature on both political systems also strongly suggests that Japan and Korea do indeed belong to the category of well-established democracies in free-market OECD countries (Choi, 2012; Kil & Moon, 2010; Klein, 2005; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011; Mosler et al., 2018; Schoppa, 2011; Yang, 2001).

In both countries, political institutions are receptive to demands from society originating out of demographic change. They were occasionally altered to address changes in the countries' populations, albeit in different ways. While in Japan only citizenship provides residents with voting rights, in Korea non-citizen foreign residents holding a certain visa were granted voting rights at the local and regional levels since 2005. Thus, Korea is the only country in Asia to have introduced enfranchisement of foreigners (cf. Mosler & Pedroza, 2016; Pedroza & Mosler, 2017).

Although the number of foreign-born residents exercising their voting right is steadily increasing, by 2020 it has not yet reached a level that would incentivize all political parties to address this group of voters in party platforms. Still, in 2004, at least the leftist-progressive Democratic Labor Party (DLP) included respective items in their election pledge, and in 2012, other major political parties started to incorporate related issues and policy plans into their programmes. Furthermore, in the light of growing numbers of incoming foreigners and concomitant needs as well as social conflicts, it is predictable for the near future that parties will direct substantial attention to issues related to foreign residents, refugees and asylum-seekers.

Japan, on the other hand, saw a different kind of institutional change. All major Japanese parties agreed in 2007 to include the nation's 2.4 million 18 and 19 year olds in the electorate for national elections (in Korea, the voting age is 19 years). The government's explanation for this change may not comprehensively reflect the set of motives that led the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan's dominant party, which has no history of appealing to the young in any prominent way, to initiate and implement this institutional change.[3] However, the main reason presented by all parties involved in the decision was the granting of more political weight to the shrinking younger generations who have to shoulder the burden of an aged society.

3 Demographic Change, Political Power & Voter Mobilization and Turnout

Election results in Japan show a mixed picture regarding the acceptance of this new opportunity. In the 2017 General Election, when overall voter turnout reached 53.68%, 47.87% of the 18 year olds and 33.25% of the 19 year olds cast their ballot. In other words, both groups showed less interest in their newly given voting right than the average population. Other cohorts are larger and also mobilized to a higher degree. Political parties in Japan would clearly find more incentives to address the group of those in the midst of their life (35–54) and the (soon-to-be)

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[3] Lowering the voting age was very much the result of a political deal struck in 2007 that won the opposition's approval to a bill regulating a public referendum on constitutional reform. In exchange, the LDP agreed to the opposition's demand to also allow 18- and 19-year olds to vote.

pensioners (60–74). In Korea, on the other hand, cohorts between 20 and 59 are of roughly equal size and retirees make up a smaller portion of the population (Fig. 2).

Over the last decades, there has been a positive correlation (with very few exceptions) in both countries between age and turnout that levels off at 60+ in Korea and 70+ in Japan (cf. Figs. 3 and 4). One part of an explanation could be that voting is a learned experience, which means that older voters are more likely to turn up at the polling stations than younger ones (cf. Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012: 1). With regard to political influence of age groups, especially the 18/19–29 year olds seem to renounce their potential position in both countries. Consequently, political parties appealing to younger voters seem to fish in more difficult waters.

While there is not yet enough research in Japan to understand the partisan positions of young voters, preferences of age cohorts in Korea have been analysed since the beginning of the 1990s. Whereas the majority of voters from their 20s to their 40s tend to vote liberal, the majority of voters from their 50s upwards traditionally tend to vote conservative (cf. Shin, 2001: 172–179). As a result of the ageing society,


Fig. 2 Population by age (persons) (*Source* United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division [2017]. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data acquired via website, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population)

Fig. 3 Voter turnout by age in the Republic of Korea (presidential elections, in percentage) (*Source* National Election Committee, Republic of Korea)


Fig. 4 Voter turnout by age in Japan (general elections, in percentage) (*Source* Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [Japan])

the number of eligible voters from their 20s to their 40s has been shrinking while the voters from their 50s upwards grew over the last two decades turning the relation between the oldest and youngest age cohort upside down. As a logical consequence, older citizens' interests will increasingly affect policy decisions (cf. Kim, 2004).

Still, more decisive factors regarding voting outcomes in Korea are related to the regional distribution of voters. Regional sentiments or regionalism has been a pervasive factor in elections since the late 1980s and still is one of the major factors deciding elections. Many voters chose a candidate, party or camp based on their hometown's province. People living in the south-eastern region of Yŏngnam tend to vote conservatively while those who reside in the south-western region of Honam vote liberally.

What is more, the number of inhabitants of the region of Yŏngnam is more than 2.5 times larger than the Honam population. This naturally translates into respective proportions of election districts for the National Assembly—there are more than twice as many districts of the Yŏngnam region (68) compared to the Honam region (31) (cf. Jung, 2015; Kang, 2015: 131). This regionalism, however, is not an expression of historically grown and/or based on religion, ethnicity or other typical cleavages, but is the artificial outcome of economic discrimination and political mobilization. This, in turn, provides the conservatives with a significant advantage, because they have their stronghold in the far more populous Yŏngnam region.

This advantage has been incrementally alleviated since the 1990s by the fact that the proportion of liberal candidates elected in Yŏngnam is higher than that of conservative candidates elected in Honam. In addition, while the recent years showed a somewhat decreasing impact of regionalism on voter behaviour, the nation is still far from a "normalization" of these peculiar voting patterns, even though lately age generation emerged as yet another significant factor (Kim & Park, 2018; Mosler, 2017: also see Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012).

4   Public Policies of Population Ageing

Political debates on redistributive public policies in both countries have been taking place against different demographic and political backdrops. For reasons explained above, the economic burden that social systems put on state budgets is considerably smaller in Korea than in Japan. In

addition, Korea's general gross government debt in 2017 stood at 39.6% of the country's GDP while Japanese governments had driven their state debt to 250.4%, by far the highest figure among all OECD countries.

There are more differences. In 2017, Korea's social security spending stood at the lower end (11.1% of GDP) compared to European free-market democracies. Japan's expenditure, however, reached 23.6% of the country's GDP, similar to many European countries with considerably higher tax revenues (MoFJ, 2020). Even though social security expenditure in Japan is mainly funded by social insurance contributions, the Japanese Ministry of Finance commented on the situation in Japan: "This means that its fiscal balance is in a dire position" (MoFJ, 2017).

The cost of social security in Japan almost doubled from Yen 66.2 trillion in 1990 to Yen 123.7 trillion in 2020. The social security budget consumed 34.9% of the national budget in 2020, an increase from 17.5% in 1990 (MoFJ, 2020). Population ageing was the major factor behind the growth of expenditures in the fields of pension, health and long-term care. Especially, the increasing age group 75 and older has been contributing heavily to social welfare costs. According to data published by the Ministry of Finance in Japan (MoFJ, 2020), the state covered average costs per citizen in the age cohort 65–74 of Yen 14,000 annually for long-term care, while the same amount for citizens 75 and older amounted to Yen 137,000. The state share for medical care was Yen 81,000/person/year for the 65–74 cohort and Yen 335,000 for those 75 and older (data for 2017) (MoFJ, 2020).

Korea, too, increased its budget for social welfare from Kwn 129.5 trillion to Kwn 146.2 trillion, which is about one-third (34.1%) of the total 2018 budget of Kwn 429 trillion, and amounts to an increase of 12.9% in budget. The largest items related to population ageing are public pensions (Kwn 47.8 trillion), housing (Kwn 23.8 trillion), elderly and youth (Kwn 12 trillion), and basic social security benefits (Kwn 11.3 trillion) (No, 2017).

Clearly, with a growing share of senior citizens, the ability of the pension and health systems to sustain a satisfying standard of living at low costs is of high political significance. In addition, both countries reacted to the growing share of senior citizens and the weakening capacity and willingness of family members, especially women, to act as caregivers by introducing public long-term care insurance (Japan: 2000, South Korea: 2008). It is in these public policy fields that political parties immediately

feel negative reactions of voters to measures that reduce social welfare benefits or raise costs like co-payments.

On the other end of the age distribution, however, younger voters are not only fewer in number but remain comparatively disinterested and unorganized in political matters. What makes their political influence even smaller than in many European countries is the absence or weakness of civil society organizations and other non-party actors that can function as stakeholders such as welfare organizations, labour unions or socially active religious organizations. Still, low fertility rates have created economic and social pressure on policymakers to facilitate having children. In both countries, measures directly related to pregnancy, birth, childcare and other forms of child support have been discussed and sometimes implemented.

A look at the composition of the state budgets for social welfare shows that only comparatively small percentages have been designated for child support. In Japan, Yen 35.9 trillion of the national budget for the fiscal year 2020 was allocated to social security. These resources complemented another Yen 84.4 trillion from insurance contributions and other sources to make up a total budget for social security of Yen 123.7 trillion. Of those, only 12.6% were designated as child support (childcare, child allowance etc.) (MoF, 2020).

For similar reasons, in Korea, childbirth and child-rearing are increasingly supported by the government, too. The 2018 budget saw a 13.7% increase in financial support for child-rearing, family and women in comparison with 2017. Child-rearing allowances payment was increased so that a parent can receive 80% of her/his salary for the first three months of parental leave, and a bonus system for fathers took effect as of July 2018 which amounts to a sum of up to Kwn 2 million (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2018: 66). Starting from September 2018, another form of child allowance is a monthly payment of Kwn 100,000 to lowest income families with children of up to five years of age. In addition, one-parent families' child allowance was raised from Kwn 120,000 to Kwn 130,000 per month (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2018: 96). Also, the budget for elderly and youth was enlarged by 15%. The largest increases among the social welfare items were in employment at 30.4% and general social security by 35.9% (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2018: 104).

While the public financial burden of demographic change is still comparatively small in Korea, Japanese governments have been looking

for ways to fight an increasing gap in state budgets triggered by population ageing (MoFJ, 2017, see for a comparative analysis of Japan, Germany and Italy Sciubbba 2012). Since 1989, when a 3% consumption tax was introduced, most prime ministers were confronted with demands of their financial bureaucracy to increase this tax and use the revenue for social welfare services. With tax increases being unpopular and Japan's industry continuously pointing at the risk a tax increase could pose for the country's economy, the issue was often taken off the political agenda again. Prime Minister Abe Shinzô postponed the increase from 8 to 10% two times (in 2014 and 2016, Klein & McLaughlin, 2018: 56–57), finally implementing it in October 2019, thus considerably increasing tax revenues (cf. MoFJ, 2020).

In 2017, Abe also announced a change in the designated use of the consumption tax revenue by dedicating a share of it to lowering the cost of education for families. By doing so, he addressed an important issue that has kept young adults (in both countries) from having (more) children. Surveys reliably show that the financial burden of an education system that promises better jobs mostly to those who attend expensive private schools and universities works as impediment for young couples. Educating children in Korea and Japan is an economic burden and, as Holthus and Klein (2010) suggest, produces an 'educational spiral' that has an increasingly negative effect on fertility.[4] As a consequence, the economic costs for children in both countries vary considerably according to—above all—the educational institutions attended. Based on the data collected by Benesse, a Tokyo-based private institute for social research, costs for child-rearing (from birth to the age of 22) amount to somewhere between Yen 26 million to Yen 41 million (Benesse, 2015). In Korea, recent calculations estimate an average amount of close to Kwn 400 million to raise an infant up to the age of around 20 years (Chi & Yu, 2017; Song, 2018).[5]

Efforts were made by non-conservative governments in both countries to support young (potential) parents. During the little over three years that the LDP was replaced as ruling party by the Democratic Party of

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[4] Holthus and Klein argue that education-related social processes reinforce each other in their impact on fertility.

[5] To offer some comparison: the average annual wage (2019) in Japan was Yen 4.4 million; in Korea, it was Kwn 41.8 million (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE. Accessed 19 September 2020).

Japan in 2009, a substantial increase in child allowance was proposed to support families with children. The DPJ hoped that giving more money to families would help them pay for education and thus encourage them to have more children. In the end, the policy had only been implemented halfway when the LDP regained power and shelved the increase. In Korea, the Moon administration introduced a monthly child allowance of Kwn 100,000 per offspring up to the age of five. In addition, a set of support measures was created to address marriage, childbirth and childcare. Public housing for newly wedded couples was to be increased by 30,000 households and favourable options to be provided when purchasing or renting houses or when taking out loans. Moreover, not only were medical centres for childbirth to be extended, but also an additional 150–450 different public kindergarten facilities to be newly created (Ministry of Strategy and Finance Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2018: 30).

In Japan and Korea, women who stopped working after giving birth created the typical M-shaped curve of female paid employment.[6] This phenomenon can be observed in both countries, although the labour force participation rate of Japanese women is considerably higher than that of Korean females. In both countries, however, the 'dint' has flattened continuously over the last decades. In 2017, 82.1% of Japanese women of the age cohort 25–29 were employed. For the next two cohorts (30–34 and 35–39), the share does not decrease further than 75.2% and 73.4%, respectively, returning to 79.4% for the 45–49 year old (GoJ, 2020). In Korea, the labour force participation rate of women as of 2016 stood at 58.4%, even though in international comparison this level is still under the OECD average of 63.6% (Statistics Korea, 2018a).

These figures do not say anything about the type and quality of employment mothers can find after returning to the job market. As many studies showed, career options are drastically reduced, and many women work part-time and/or as irregulars with less social security and job protection than regular full-time employees. What is more, pressure from employers, general working conditions and a lack of daycare facilities impede efforts made by many women to reconcile paid employment with child-rearing. In both countries, women are generally expected to

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[6] In many countries, graphs illustrating female employment rates by age group resemble the letter "M" because they show high percentages for women gainfully employed in the years after graduation from school/university and again from their late 30 s on. In between those years, however, fewer women are employed, mostly because of child-rearing.

take responsibility for raising their children and household work, even though numbers of housemen and spouses who take longer child-rearing leaves from work are slowly rising. Still, giving care is constructed to be a female chore. Work-life balance has been declared a political goal by governments in both countries but remains unattainable to a large part for female and male employees (for Japan, cf. Aronsson, 2014; for Korea cf. Park, 2019)

5   IMMIGRATION

Given the demographic development and budget restraints described so far, the immigration of younger working populations seems like a promising alternative solution to the challenges faced by both societies. Like in other advanced economies, however, there are various factors that keep governments from simply allowing the needed labour force to immigrate. One major factor is that while highly qualified workers are usually welcome in specified sectors, the ruling parties assume there is little enthusiasm among voters for substantial labour immigration from abroad, resulting in 'stealth policies' that open doors for (mostly) temporary foreign-born workers under the label of, for example, 'internship programs'. Japan has proven more restrictive in this field than Korea.

In migration research, Japan and Korea belong to the group of 'new immigration countries' (Hollifield et al., 2014). Both countries have seen a steady increase in foreign-born immigrants and mixed (multicultural) families since 1990, albeit to different degrees. In Japan, the number of registered foreigners more than doubled between 1990 and 2015 from one to more than two million, equal to a share of 1.78% of Japan's total population (IPSS, 2017a). In Korea, there was a 20-fold leap from about 50,000 foreigners in 1990 to more than 2 million students, blue and white-collar workers, and wives[7] in 2016. Altogether, 2.3 million foreigners are registered as living in Korea, a share of 4.5% of the country's total population (KOSIS).

Less than demographic developments, it was the labour-intensive industries in both countries that created pressure on governments to allow for immigration. With growing income and higher education levels,

[7] These are women mostly from Southeast Asian countries who marry farmers in the South Korean countryside who have difficulties to find domestic women who are willing to work in agriculture.

fewer Japanese and Koreans needed to accept physically demanding and dangerous jobs, resulting in labour shortage in the respective industries including agriculture. With East Asia having turned into a migration region in the 1980s (Chiavacci, 2014), governments in both countries seemed to have a new option to tackle their respective labour shortages.

In Japan, however, many voters have associated low-skilled labour immigration with potential social tensions, wealth gaps and a loss of public safety (Tajiri, 2017: 20).[8] Politicians closer to industry interests, however, pushed pro-immigration initiatives. The relevant ministries fought for their respective (sometimes conflicting) agendas. Consequently, the political debate on immigration over the last three decades has been characterized by phases of different intensities and a number of different policy approaches, most of which resulted in backdoor immigration as a compromise, while the issue was mostly ignored in the public debate. As a result, by 2020, Japan had not developed any kind of (social) integration policy but continued to open its doors to immigration.

In 2016, Prime Minister Abe had declared in the Japanese Parliament that his LDP government "is in no way thinking about immigration policies" (Tajiri, 2017: 19), even though measures leading to similar results had been in place for years. One such measure had been 'educational visas' that created a considerable increase in applications of potential language students who would rather work and not attend lessons. Liu-Farrer referred to this as "disguised labor migration".[9] Another measure was the government's 1990 strategy targeting so-called *nikkeijin*, Japanese emigrants and their offspring, mostly living in Latin America. The expectation was that even though *nikkeijin* were born in a foreign country, their Japanese heritage would enable them to adapt with little difficulty to Japanese society. They were offered renewable working visas and mostly found employment in blue-collar professions. Starting in 1990, about 300,000 second- and third-generation Japanese made use of the offer. Adaptation to the Japanese work environment, however, did not always go as desired and when the financial crisis in 2008 hit, the Japanese Government even offered money to those immigrants who would return to their home country.

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[8] Among others, in a large-scale survey ($n = 6{,}000$) conducted in late 2015, Facchini et al. (2016: 19) found that only 29% of Japanese "supported an increase in levels of immigration."

[9] Personal communication, June 21, 2018.

Another political compromise was created in 1993 with the so-called technical intern trainees programme which has allowed participants to stay in Japan for up to five years. The official reasoning behind this programme was to offer people from developing countries an option to acquire (technical) skills during their stay in Japan. Avoiding the label 'immigration', this programme has allowed hundreds of thousands of foreign workers into the country as 'trainees', most of whom were placed with SME, providing these companies with a badly needed and cheap labour force. The wide-spread abuse of this programme, however, led even the U.S. State Department in 2016 to state in its 'Trafficking in Persons Report' that the programme "has effectively become a guest-worker program" with many interns being "placed in jobs that do not teach or develop technical skills" (Iwamoto, 2016).

In late 2017, the government also included caregivers to the groups permitted into the country on the trainee programme. This decision was among others the result of an unsuccessful attempt to attract care workers under an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) from Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Insisting on care workers from these countries to pass the same national care examination as Japanese care workers in Japanese proved too much of a hurdle for the vast majority of those who tried (Hirano, 2017). In 2018, pressure from labour-intensive industries (agriculture, construction, the hotel industry, elderly care, etc.) moved the government to allow for the immigration of up to 345,000 low-skilled workers for a period of five years.

Based on these programmes and labels (and similar to some Western democracies), the de facto labour immigration did not show in official statistics. In the case of Japan, the government's definition of immigration only includes those in Japan with a permanent resident status, a definition that is substantially different from that of the United Nations. According to the count of Hennings and Mintz (2018: 112), the "size of Japan's foreign workforce has been continuously underestimated, mainly because the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has published, on behalf of the Japanese government, incomplete and flawed data, which has been disseminated in research publications and mass media reports". In fact, in late 2016, close to 20% of foreigners working in Japan belonged to the above-mentioned trainee programme. Another 20% were students who were allowed to work up to 27 hours per week and since the late 1980s increasingly filled positions in restaurants, shops and services (Hennings & Mintz, 2018).

To keep labour immigration as low as possible, measures were implemented to facilitate workforce participation of women and senior citizens. In the field of care, the LDP also expected technology to lighten the workload (e.g. care robots). There was no attempt by any LDP government to change the (sometimes not at all) subliminal narrative of labour immigration as a threat to social peace. This goes hand in hand with the almost complete refusal of the state to take in asylum-seeking refugees. For the time being, pointing at the experience of other democracies with large-scale immigration seems to suffice to leave the narrative as it is.

The first important trigger for immigration to Korea was government-led programmes in the early 1990s—the Industrial Trainee System—which invited foreign workforce to do dangerous, difficult and dirty work, which the uprising Koreans did not want to do any further. At the beginning of the 2000s, a new system—the Employment Permit System—was introduced to meet the rising needs of Korean SME allowing foreigners to stay for three years with the option of one-time extension for another two. Under the new scheme, even foreigners enjoy Korean labour law protection and are eligible for the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance.

Yet another increase in the influx of foreigners was due to marriage immigration that also began to take off in the beginning of the 2000s, only to grow from almost 5,000 marriages in 1990 to more than 20,000 marriages in 2016 (KOSIS) with wives coming mostly from China and Vietnam, and husbands from China or the US. A major share of the foreign spouses (about 72% in 2016) is female (KOSIS). Marriage immigration has been strongly supported and promoted by the central as well as local governments for two reasons: foreigners were welcomed because they could alleviate the lack of women willing to marry Korean men living in the countryside, and to ease the general labour shortage.

The Korean Government initiated the legislation of the Act on Treatment of Foreigners in Korea in 2008 as basic framework on the basis of which central and local governments can react to challenges in the process of increasing foreigners pouring in. Also in 2008, the Multicultural Families Support Act (MFSA) was legislated, which focuses mostly on marriage migrants and children of mixed families as well as the whole family. Since then, based on the MFSA, every five years, government agencies develop another Basic Plan for Multicultural Families Policy. The current Basic Plan stretches from 2018 to 2022 and envisages that state agencies assist

not only in bride recruitment and family formation, but also in integration and family stability, raising the next generation, and integration into the formal labour market (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2018: 10–12; cf. Kim & Kilkey, 2017: 7–10).

Additionally, the government has been actively promoting a systematic immigration policy for which there are continuously updated versions of the Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (BPIP) since 2008. At its centre is an Immigration Policy Committee that serves as a hub to coordinate policy planning and implementation between the involved government ministries. The government evaluates immigrants as a determinant to the creation of new jobs and innovation in society and thus plans to invite more talented foreigners to contribute to the economy (Immigration Policy Committee, 2012: 18).

The perception of Korean residents about immigrants is increasingly negative though the degree is not dramatic, yet. In general, Koreans have become more reserved in their attitudes towards an increasingly multicultural society, which also has negative repercussions for the adaptation of immigrants (Choi & Lee, 2016; Kim & Kim, 2017; Yoon, 2016). Still, more and more Koreans tend to think[10] that crime rates increase because of immigrants (33.1%→46.6%), and that immigrants steal the jobs of Koreans (23.6%→29.7%). Fewer Koreans think that immigrants help the economy (53.9%→44.9%), and that through them new ideas and culture will be introduced (28.6%→22.4%). In line with that evaluation, less Koreans think that the number of immigrants should be increased (25.4%→15.6%). At the same time, people tend to think the present number of immigrants should be maintained (38.4%→58.7%), and even less think the number of immigrants should be decreased (36.2%→25.7%), which makes clear that the attitude is not necessarily in principle against immigrants as such, but against 'too many'—a phenomenon that can be observed in many other countries as well.

However, this does not seem to translate into pressure for anti-immigration policies or such content in party platforms. Rather, it pressures political parties and the government to develop policies to alleviate related issues, which is why political parties have recently become increasingly interested in the issue of immigration and multicultural society. Since the early 2000s, more and more parties and individual candidates

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[10] See Pak (2016) on survey results comparing answers from the year 2003 with those from the year 2015.

include immigration- and integration-related items in their platforms and campaign pledges. In 2004, the minor leftist-progressive DLP was the first political party that mentioned respective items in their manifesto. Major mainstream parties only started from 2012 on to incorporate related issues and policy plans in their programmes.[11]

6   Conclusion

In offering an overview and comparison of Japan and Korea, this chapter has added evidence that political reactions to demographic change are crucial and complex but because consequences of demographic change develop incrementally, political decision makers can easily be tempted to procrastinate and postpone the search for appropriate policies into the future. Pressure to act, however, is clearly increasing due to labour shortages and a rapidly ageing and shrinking society—a trajectory that Japan has been on for decades and Korea has entered with considerable speed.

While the demand for foreign workers is expressed by labour-intensive industries in both countries, governments are also facing an unwillingness of large parts of the population to allow (more or 'too much') immigration. With the share of foreign-born citizens still much lower than in European and Anglo-Saxon democracies, many in Japan and Korea look at social developments in the West and conclude that their country would be better off pursuing different approaches to counter labour shortages and an ageing society. It remains to be seen whether technology and the 'activation' of women and senior citizens for the labour market that Japanese governments are striving for will be an attractive option for Korea to copy. If not, it will be of great interest to observe whether both countries will see xenophobic, populist parties grow into relevant political forces as soon as immigration takes place on a larger scale. So far, and in contrast to many democracies in Europe, the political systems of Japan and Korea do not feature such parties.

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[11] This is also the year in which the Philippine-born Jasmin Lee who married a Korean man entered as the first foreign-born Korean naturalized the National Assembly for the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP). The only other representative-turned immigrant is Cho Myŏng-Chul (NFP), who fled North Korea.

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Demographic Change and Political Order in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda Deal with Youth Bulge and Politicized Migration

Christof Hartmann and Catherine Promise Biira

1   Introduction

Africa's share of global population has grown from 9% in 1950, 14% in 2005 to 17% in mid-2017. The continent is projected to account for more than 50% of the global population growth between 2017 and 2050. During this period, Africa's population is going to increase by 1.3 billion making the continent home to 26% of the world's population in 2050 (UN, 2017). The African Development Bank Group states that, going by current demographics, the continent shall be home to the

C. Hartmann (✉)
Department of Political Science,
University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
e-mail: christof.hartmann@uni-due.de

C. P. Biira
Institute for Regional Integration and Development, Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, Kenya

world's youngest population by 2040 and by 2050, 55% of the continent's population shall be living in urban areas (Cleland & Machiyama, 2017: 267).

While the broader contours of these demographic dynamics are well known, and there is some research exploring specific aspects of the demographic change and its more direct developmental effects (Cleland & Machiyama, 2017). The broader political implications of demographic change in Africa have not been analysed in a more systematic way and differ markedly from those observed in rich democracies (Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012). Population changes have ramifications within and beyond the confines of the state but the mechanisms by which such changes influence domestic political order, democracy, peace and security have not been thoroughly explored (as an exception Green, 2012). The African Youth emerged as a "powerful category" (Oinas et al., 2018: 2) at the turn of the millennium and gained currency within debates about development, social policies and migration (Abbink, 2005). Even though there have been incidents of intergroup conflict in some countries, which were related to youth protests or internal and international migration, this has not been subject of major scholarly interest. State responses to ensuring political stability in the face of the changing population structure have also not been systematically documented and evaluated.

One reason for this relative lack of scholarly production might be the quite recent emergence of the research field of political demography. As pointed out by inter alia Kaufmann and Toft (2012) and Vanhuysse and Goerres (this volume), there has been little dialogue between demographers and political scientists, and migration researchers have additionally created their own interdisciplinary community where many aspects of political demography are discussed without being labelled as such. Within African studies, low population density has played a central role in making sense of African history (Iliffe, 1995), failed state-building and the difficulties of broadcasting political power (Herbst, 2000) and in explaining the manifold attempts by African peasants to avoid taxation and commercial modes of agricultural production (Hyden, 1983). The academic debate about political change since the continent-wide process of political liberalization and democratization in the early 1990s, however, has put little emphasis on demographic variables.

In line with the broader research programme of the book (and its understanding of demographic change), we want in this chapter to

explore some effects of demographic change on political order in sub-Saharan Africa. As Cleland and Machiyama (2017) note, the central forces of demographic change will be broadly similar across the majority of countries. While differing population growth and migration affect dynamics of *trans*national conflicts, and potentially prospects of regional integration as well (by changing the relative size of populations and markets within regional arrangements), we will nevertheless concentrate here on *domestic politics*.

We want to single out in particular two aspects of demographic change, which are of relevance to many African states: first, the rapidly growing number of young people, and second the strong migratory flows, which move towards some African countries. Other interesting political dimensions of demographic change such as the role of urbanization or religion (Nordås, 2012) will be left out. By using two case studies from different parts of the continent, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire, we will first ask how these demographic dynamics (youth bulge, net import of migration) have affected peaceful engagement with the political system, in particular political participation. In a second step, we will take up the argument that links youth bulge to the onset and dynamics of violent conflicts (Richards, 1997; Urdal, 2012) and ask to which extent demographics have shaped violent conflict in both countries. We will argue that the stronger mobilization of youth violence in Côte d'Ivoire can be explained by the particular combination of youth bulge and strong inward migration.

2   Demographic Change in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire

2.1   *Demographic Trends*

Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa bordered by Kenya in the East; South Sudan in the North; the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) in the West; Tanzania in the South; and Rwanda in the South-west. With a population of 36.7 million in 2016, Uganda is listed alongside the DR Congo, Ethiopia, Philippines, Egypt, Vietnam, Iran and Turkey as the emerging demographic heavyweights that shall have a population of over 100 million in 2050 (Demeny & McNicoll, 2006: 4). According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, over a period of 25 years between 1991 and 2016, the country's population grew by 20 million. Between 1991 and 2002, the population growth rate was 2.5%. It rose to

3.2% between 2002 and 2013 and fell slightly in 2014 to its current level of 3.0%.

Côte d'Ivoire is located in West Africa. While smaller in population compared to Uganda, it has been the economic powerhouse and one of the more populous countries in this region of Africa, which features many smaller and thinly populated countries (especially in the Sahel zone). Côte d'Ivoire has remained the key state for continued French influence in the region, and the spectacular growth of the agriculture-based economy between the 1960s and 1980s attracted many millions of migrant workers from neighbouring countries (Fig. 1).

Notwithstanding some notable differences, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire represent typical cases of the demographic and socio-economic features in sub-Saharan Africa (Canning et al., 2015). Uganda still has a fertility rate above the African average (and is therefore to have one of the strongest

Fig. 1 Demographic trends in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

population growths over the next 30 years) but has managed to signif-
icantly reduce the fertility rate over the last two decades (see Table 1).
Côte d'Ivoire's demographic dynamics have been more in line with the
African average than Uganda's.

Côte d'Ivoire has a high population of young people with youths 15–
29 constituting 28% of the total population (OECD, 2017) and an age
dependency ratio of 84% (UN, 2017). Uganda's high population growth
is fuelled by a combination of continued high birth rates and slowly
declining mortality rates. Life expectancy improved from 48.1 years in
1991, to 50.4 in 2002 and to 63.3 in 2014. Uganda has a high popu-
lation of young people with 55% being under the age of 18, and the
age dependency ratio is 103%. The perentage of Ugandans depending on
subsistence agriculture has remained more or less stable since 1990, with
69.0% in 1990, to 67.9 in 2002 to 69.4 in 2014 being engaged in the
sector (UBOS, 2016).

Population changes induced by migration have been a constant feature
of post-colonial Africa. Both the artificial character of the boundaries
of the post-colonial states and the peculiarities of the land regime
contributed to migration within and across state territories. Colonial rule
had formalized different systems of communal land tenure in Africa that
attributed property of land formally to the state while leaving the attri-
bution of user rights to traditional authorities (Boone, 2007). While
traditional rulers' authority was based on ethnic belonging, immigrants
from other parts of the country or abroad were often invited to settle
and farm within these communities. Private land ownership was relatively
rare in what predominantly remained a smallholder agrarian mode of
production. This was an effective system under conditions of relative low
population density prevailing under both colonial and early decades of
post-colonial rule. The demographic changes led, however, to increased
migration towards the more fertile farmland of a country, as many rural
Africans could no longer access sufficient land in their own ethnic areas
(Green, 2012). In both Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire, there is thus a strong
legacy of internal migration, caused by violent conflicts or facilitated by
public authorities in their attempt to promote the economic fortunes of
specific ethnic groups. No reliable data for these population movements
exist.

With regard to international migration patterns, there are significant
differences between the two countries. The size of the non-Ugandan
population has been declining both in absolute terms and as a proportion

Table 1 Key demographic trends in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda

	1950–1955	1965–1970	1985–1990	1995–2000	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2025–2030	2045–2050
Population (in mio.)									
Africa	179.6	283.3	493.3	645.0	845.1	969.2	1106.5	1418.3	2167.6
CIV	2.6	5.2	12.3	16.7	20.4	23.1	26.1	33.3	51.4
Uganda	5.2	9.5	17.5	24.0	33.9	40.1	47.2	63.8	105.7
Population growth (in %)									
Africa	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.4	1.9
CIV	2.8	3.9	3.7	2.8	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.0
Uganda	2.7	3.3	3.5	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.3
Fertility rate (in %)									
Africa	6.57	6.70	6.49	5.90	5.40	5.10	4.75	4.12	3.20
CIV	7.45	7.90	6.85	6.05	5.40	5.14	4.81	4.25	3.45
Uganda	6.90	7.12	7.10	6.95	6.38	5.91	5.46	4.62	3.36

Source Own compilation on the basis of UN (2017)

of the total population. In 1991, non-Ugandans were 3.6% of the total population. This reduced to 1.5% in 2014. However, Uganda has experienced a rise in the influx of refugees entering the country from war-torn neighbouring countries. As at end of 2019, the entire officially recognized refugee population on the African Continent was 6,348,744 with almost 1,359,464 being hosted in Uganda alone (UNHCR, 2020). In August 2017, refugees from South Sudan alone entering Uganda had hit the 1 million mark making Uganda the continent's top-ranking refugee-hosting country, with Bidi Bidi refugee camp in Yumbe District in Northern Uganda believed to be the largest refugee settlement camp in the world (USAID, 2017: 1).

Table 2 clearly shows that Côte d'Ivoire has historically attracted even more migrants from neighbouring countries than Uganda. This was related both to the personality of the country's first President Houphouët-Boigny who saw himself as a regional leader in West Africa and to the necessity to attract labour for the expanding export agriculture sector in Côte d'Ivoire. It "was an economic El Dorado that attracted West Africans from the wider region to come to make their fortunes" (McGovern, 2011: 103). Africans mainly from Burkina Faso and Mali

Table 2 International migration patterns in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda

Year	Total Pop.	Immig %	Total Immig	Top immigrant sending Countries			
Uganda							
1990	17,384,369	3.21	558,307	Rwanda	219,499	Sudan	126,304
1995	20,412,966	3.11	634,620	Sudan	273,062	Rwanda	141,160
2000	23,757,366	2.67	634,703	Sudan	360,660	DRC	95,138
2005	28,042,121	2.33	652,968	Sudan	360,477	DRC	106,170
2010	33,149,416	1.60	529,160	DRC	166,901	Sudan	166,124
2015	39,032,383	3.07	1,197,162	Sudan	611,827	DRC	303,580
Côte d'Ivoire							
1990	12,165,908	14.93	1,816,426	Burkina	927,756	Mali	422,476
1995	14,404,340	14.42	2,076,394	Burkina	1,114,233	Mali	445,636
2000	16,517,948	12.07	1,994,135	Burkina	1,117,062	Mali	395,346
2005	18,132,702	11.09	2,010,824	Burkina	1,162,273	Mali	363,010
2010	20,131,707	10.41	2,095,185	Burkina	1,246,597	Mali	342,891
2015	22,701,555	9.58	2,175,399	Burkina	1,294,323	Mali	356,019

Source Own compilation on the basis of UN (2017). Uganda has seen a sharp increase of Sudanese refugees since 2015; The IOM database covers only all years until 2015; Burkina Faso is abbreviated here as 'Burkina'

were staying for the harvesting seasons or permanently in Côte d'Ivoire and were allowed to use land to grow cocoa and coffee. A national census held in the mid-1990s revealed that close to 15% of the Ivorian population had foreign citizenship and many others were second-generation immigrants. Migration to Côte d'Ivoire was thus not caused by civil wars in the regional environment but linked to the economic prospects offered there.

2.2 *Youth Unemployment*

Between 2005 and 2050, the proportion of young people aged 0–14 relative to the whole population in sub-Saharan Africa shall fall from 41.5% in 2005 to 36.9% in 2025 to 28.7% in 2050 (UN, 2017). However, young people on the continent are struggling to find meaningful employment opportunities. Standing at 10.9% in 2016, it is commendable that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a fall in youth unemployment rates since 2012 (ILO, 2016: 5). Albeit appearing positive, this picture veils the actual experiences of the continent's young people. Sub-Saharan African countries generally exhibit the highest youth working poverty rate globally which stood at 70% in 2016 (ibid.: 8) and there are huge disparities in employment participation experiences across states. Uganda as one of the countries with the youngest age structure globally has 93.5% of its employed youths in the informal sector. Determining who classifies as "youth" in Africa is not easy. While the United Nations (UN) define youth as those between the ages of 15–24, the African Union defines 15–35 as the appropriate range (Fig. 2).

Available data on youth unemployment in Côte d'Ivoire show that 35.7% of all citizens between 15 and 29 are officially unemployed, in the sense of not working, not going to school or undergoing professional training (OECD, 2017). Young people and especially young women are less likely to be employed in the formal sector (18%), with a total of 55% among all working having jobs in the family-business or being self-employed (68% among young women). According to survey data from 2013, in the rural parts of Côte d'Ivoire less than 10% of all young persons (15–29) have a regularly paid job in the formal sector. About 54% of respondents declared not having been to school in their lives, and less than a third of having completed primary education. In assessing these data, one should keep in mind that due to the civil war most schools in the northern half of Côte d'Ivoire remained indeed closed for most of

Fig. 2 Annual new job requirements for Uganda 2007–2037 (*Source* National Population Council Secretariat, Uganda)

the time between 2002 and 2007/8. Both countries thus face a similarly dramatic scenario of a considerable and strongly growing number of young people who live in precarious situations and face an uncertain future. Such prospects are certainly not rendered less bleak by the strong presence of immigrants.

2.3   *Institutional Responses to Demographic Change*

During the last decades, both states have developed an institutional architecture to plan and implement population-related policies. Uganda's Vision 2040 recognizes the country's rapid population growth, young age structure and consequent high child dependency burden among the threats to the achievement of socioeconomic development. As such, Vision 2040 pronounced "harnessing the demographic dividend" as one of the strategies for benefiting from the country's abundant and youthful population. Population issues should thus be prioritized in development planning. There is a minister for Youth and Children's Affairs under the Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development (MGLSD) as well as youth Members of Parliament (MPs) representing the different regions in the country. In response to the high unemployment rate and poverty

among the youth in the country, from the late 1990s, the Government of Uganda started directly funding youths to venture into business through the Youth Entrepreneurial Scheme (YES). The model failed to meet its objectives because the fund was perceived as a political tool, and although the monies were given as loans, most of them were never recovered (Ahaibwe & Mbowa, 2014). In the 2011/2012 financial year, the Youth Venture Fund, Graduate Venture Fund and Youth Livelihood Program (YLP) were conceived. Access to the Youth Venture Fund was dominated by urban males mostly from the central region (Ahaibwe, 2014: 16). The most resilient of these programmes has been the YLP whose implementation started in the 2013/2014 financial year. The programme targets unemployed and poor youth aged 18–30 years from different socio-economic backgrounds. Of the 111 billion Uganda Shillings dedicated to the total development budget of the concerned Ministry, for the 2019/2020 financial year, 59% (66 Billion) has been allocated to the YLP (Ministry of Gender, 2018).

Due to the civil war and the territorial separation of Côte d'Ivoire in a government-controlled and rebel-held zone between 2002 and 2010, neither population growth nor youth unemployment were addressed as key policy issues. With the establishment of a more legitimate government in April 2011 and the demobilization of rebels and youth militia, however, the need to develop more specific policies became obvious. In 2016, a separate Ministry for the Promotion of the Youth, Youth Employment and Civic Education was finally established. Until then, youth-related questions had been allocated to the responsibility of different and changing ministerial portfolios. In a parallel move, the government enacted a policy document with its main strategies for 2016–2020 (PNJ, *Politique Nationale de la Jeunesse*), to be coordinated by the newly created Ministry. While similar plans had been elaborated since 2004, they had never been formally endorsed by the government (OECD, 2017).

The PNJ now claims to provide youth-specific orientations for various sector policies (education and training; employment, communication, health, citizenship and civic education) and to coordinate the implementation of activities by different state agencies (at both national and sub-national level) and non-governmental organizations, but both the administrative capacities and the financial resources of the new Ministry have been considered inadequate for this task (OECD, 2017). In the strongly presidential government system of Côte d'Ivoire, there are few

established mechanisms for inter-ministerial coordination, and the President has also put in place an additional Presidential Council for Youth Employment (CPEJ) whose role with regard to the Ministry remains unclear. The presidency also directly manages all programmes that should benefit the demobilized former rebels (OECD, 2017). The government has further developed a more participatory approach to working with youth associations. In 2012, a National Youth Council of Côte d'Ivoire (CNJCI) had been created with the aim of coordinating eight officially recognized youth associations among themselves and with the government, but the council became operational only in 2016. Youth-specific civic education has certainly been the weakest part of previous policies, with youth associations unorganized and poorly sensitized for the different policy issues.

With regard to migration, both countries have historically practised an open border policy to refugees, which includes provision of land on which to build a shelter and grow crops, freedom of movement, the right to work and access to public services such as health care and education. In both cases, this also heightened the tensions created as a result of competition for resources. In Uganda, there have been reports of host communities registering as refugees in order to benefit from the supplies being given to the refugees. There have also been reports of rising tension between the host and refugee communities because the host communities are also in need of food but cannot access it (USAID, 2017). In Côte d'Ivoire, migrants have been progressively deprived of their economic and political rights, as will be explained more in detail below.

3   Demographic Change, Political Participation and Youth Violence

In 1990, the CIA postulated that the mismatch between growth of jobs and high fertility could lead to "expanded military establishments in affected countries as a productive alternative to unemployment" (Liagin, 1996: 28). To the extent that the Youth Bulge might create a huge potential of mostly unemployed young men, it was considered to also result in political instability, provide a potential for rebel movements or cause revolution (Flückiger & Ludwig, 2018; Goldstone, 2002; Urdal, 2012). There has been some speculation why the Arab Spring did not spill over to African regimes, and the economically and politically frustrated youth did not go to the streets to demand change (Oinas et al., 2018;

Cavatorta and Bonci, this volume). In exceptional circumstances, such as in Senegal in 2012, by staging mass protests in the capital city Dakar, youth mobilization was instrumental in obstructing a manipulative constitutional amendment (which would have allowed for a quasi-monarchical succession). But Senegal has one of the most urbanized societies in Africa, and the protests were highly efficient in hindering an authoritarian turn of an otherwise democratically constituted government (and not a struggle against long-standing dictatorships as in the Maghreb). In the following section, we will first discuss how the two major demographic features outlined above (youth bulge, strong migration) impacted on political participation, before the second section moves towards an assessment of effects on the dynamics of violence and warfare in both countries.

3.1   *Formal Political Engagement*

There is very little systematic and comparative research on youth political behaviour on the African continent. As age-disaggregated turnout data are not available, existing research relies on survey data from Afrobarometer, a multi-national research project, which has been collecting standardized individual data in a growing number of African countries since 1999. These empirical data show lower rates of political engagement among African youth (aged 18–35) in comparison with elders (Chikwanha & Masunungure, 2007; Lekalake & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). This includes a growing abstention from voting in national elections and from civic activities such as attending community meetings or demonstrations. In addition, country-specific research shows that turnout declined in national elections after a reduction in voting age (Resnick & Casale, 2013: 1173). The finding that younger people tend to be less engaged in formal participation in the democratic process, particularly voting, is, of course, not specific to African countries (Wattenberg, 2007). The survey found, however, that youth engagement levels in Africa have *declined* over time despite the introduction of regional and national youth empowerment policies. In contrast to OECD societies, low turnout is also not compensated by a growing relevance of other forms of political participation, including protest activities or community meetings, which are still less common than voting for Africa's youth (Resnick & Casale, 2013). Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire record very different levels of political interest, with only one out of four youth in Côte d'Ivoire showing

political interest, the lowest share among all African countries included in the survey (Fig. 3).

A closer look at the country data from the last three survey rounds, which obviously do not reflect actual voting patterns but self-reported voting behaviour, confirms both the general trend of lower youth participation and the differences among our two cases. When the surveys were organized, Côte d'Ivoire had gone through a phase of turmoil. A rebellion in 2002 had led to the de facto separation of the country with the northern part held by rebels and to a strong political mobilization on both sides. Following a disputed presidential election in November 2010, a civil war broke out which eventually led to the demise of the incumbent regime in April 2011 (which had lost the election but did not accept it). Alassane Ouattara, the candidate of Northern Côte d'Ivoire, then took power. After nearly nine years of warfare, and de facto collapse of many state authorities in the rebel-held zones (including schools, judiciary, medical services), there was certainly a will to reconstruct the economy, but also a fatigue with regard to political engagement. Many Southerners continued to consider their previous President Gbagbo (accused at the International Criminal Court in The Hague) and the former ruling party

Fig. 3 Political interest among young people in Africa (Based on Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi [2016])

Fig. 4 Age-specific voting patterns in Côte d'Ivoire (*Source* Own compilation on the basis of Afrobarometer: Question was: Did you participate in the last national elections?)

(with many leaders in prison, and the party properties confiscated) as their legitimate government, and the current President as installed by foreign actors such as France and the UN without any legitimacy. This constellation might explain the considerable disillusionment with politics, which emerges from the Afrobarometer data (Fig. 4). The exceptionally low participation in the cohort 18–25 years is, however, also explained by the legal voting age of 21 years in Côte d'Ivoire, with 20–40% of respondents (depending on survey round) claiming they had been too young to vote.

The much higher interest within the Ugandan youth is probably a legacy of a tradition of relatively strong political mobilization under the long-ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) of President Museveni (since 1986). The Museveni government introduced a five-tier system of local government back in the 1980s, initiated a broad-based and participatory constitutional reform process between 1986 and 1993, and has facilitated constituency-based politics with some downward accountability. With the President in power for now more than 30 years, the regime has turned increasingly authoritarian which might have increased political interest in a country of 'distrusting democrats' (Moehler, 2007). Some of the Afrobarometer data remain puzzling, as elections were held in February 2011 and February 2016, and actual voting behaviour in the last elections should be the same between Round 5 and 6, while the self-reported behaviour strongly varies (see Fig. 5).

Low youth turnout in African countries has been explained by two main explanatory factors: individual variables such as youth's differential access to political information, knowledge and socio-economic resources,

Fig. 5 Age-specific voting patterns in Uganda (*Source* Own compilation on the basis of Afrobarometer: Question was: Did you participate in the last national elections?)

and structural variables highlighting the political-institutional context of elections, such as partisan affinities, the competitiveness of elections and the importance of external political efficacy (Resnick & Casale, 2013). Access to information and knowledge about electoral processes might indeed explain the difference between Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire. In Uganda, elections have been regularly organized at all tiers of government during the last three decades, and an electoral system was applied (plurality in single-member constituencies) which is easy to understand. In Côte d'Ivoire, on the contrary, no local elections have been organized, and since the beginning of political liberalization in the early 1990s, only four national elections were held, in 1995, 2000 and then again in 2010 and 2015, with the 2000 and 2010 elections ending in popular rebellion and civil war, respectively. The electoral system is a party-list-based plurality system (in single or multi-member constituencies) which creates higher thresholds for candidature. Côte d'Ivoire is one of a few countries in Africa (and beyond) which continues to restrict suffrage to voters of 21 years or older. One could thus argue that lower turnout in Côte d'Ivoire could be explained by a generalized lack of trust in the electoral process. 2014 Afrobarometer data show indeed that in Côte d'Ivoire many youth respondents, especially in the rural areas, found electoral registration too cumbersome (OECD, 2017: 40) or could not identify themselves on the electoral lists.

Structural variables seem to matter in Africa as well but can hardly explain the strong variation among our cases. Competitiveness of elections, which should increase participation, is lower in Uganda than in Côte d'Ivoire, and opposition parties more fragmented and less institutionalized. The perception of the efficacy of elections might, on the contrary, be stronger in Uganda, especially taking into account the multi-tier electoral system. While Ivorian parties function on a quite gerontocratic basis and the leaders of the three main parties are all above 70 years, in Uganda, there is some representation of young MPs in parliament (6.35% at age 18–34; 1.59% at age 18–29). The Ugandan Parliament (2016–2021) had seven MPs who joined parliament below 30 years of age, while the youngest MP in Côte d'Ivoire's Parliament at the time was 31 years old. The narrative about why President Museveni of Uganda should leave power has increasingly become dominated by the argument that the country has a huge population of young people who should be left to take charge. In fact, in late 2017, during the process of changing Uganda's Constitution to remove the presidential age limit of 75, opposition from within parliament came to be notably associated with Robert Kyagulanyi (a.k.a. Bobi Wine), 35 at the time, who was seen as an embodiment of the aspirations of Uganda's young people. Bobi Wine then emerged as the de facto leader of a movement named 'people power' which was developed into the National Unity Platform (NUP) as the political party through which Bobi Wine shall contest for the country's presidency in 2021. However, instead of serving to consolidate the opposition, 'people power' has also somewhat contributed to the breakup of Uganda's most formidable opposition political party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and has drawn membership from other opposition parties thus further dividing rather than consolidating the country's opposition.

To what extent did migratory patterns have an effect on political participation and regime legitimacy? The open-door policy initiated by President Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1960s granted not only economic but also political rights to several million immigrants from neighbouring countries. Under the mostly non-competitive elections of the single-party era, foreigners were even allowed to vote (and useful to increase turnout). Due to the economic crisis starting in the 1980s, and a combination of growing land pressure and rapid demographic growth, many Ivoirians returned from the cities to their ethnic homelands finding 'their' land cultivated by Ivorian immigrants and 'foreigners'. After the

death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, a succession crisis broke out, and competition mainly turned the President's designated heir from his own ethnic group (Henri K. Bedié) against the Prime Minister who originated from the North of Côte d'Ivoire (Ouattara). Bedié then opened a pandora's box by introducing controversial new citizenship rules restricting political and economic rights to 'autochthonous' Ivoirians, who could prove their descent from Ivorian parents (*ivoirité*). The main cause behind this policy was elite competition and voting rights, as Ouattara's mother apparently was from Burkina Faso, but the policies led to a general politicization of ethnic relationships and land conflicts. As some of the populations living in Northern Côte d'Ivoire shared ethnic identity with people from neighbouring Sahel states, they were disenfranchised in the process, or saw their careers in the administration or the military blocked. Formal political participation of (assumed) migrants, both as candidates and as voters, and controversies about their numbers took centre stage in the politics of Côte d'Ivoire since the 1990s and have remained so ever since.

Given its liberal refugee policy, Uganda has played host to Rwandan refugees since the 1950s. Several formerly Rwandan refugees found their way into Uganda's public administration and many played major roles in the intelligence services and the NRA which brought the current regime to power in 1986. They subsequently launched the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) war that brought Rwanda's current regime to power in 1994. Several Banyarwanda live in two worlds, playing significant roles in business and politics, owning properties and educating their children in both Uganda and Rwanda. As a result, there is a complex relationship between Uganda and Rwanda. With accusations and counter-accusations of interfering in each other's security affairs, over the years, Uganda and Rwanda's relationship has oscillated between cordial and sour. It is clear that the return of many Rwandan refugees to Kigali in the wake of the 1994 military victory did not mark an end to their involvement in Uganda's politics. It simply transformed it from direct to covert involvement this time based on suspicion, not trust, of the Ugandan Government. Given the limited number of Rwandan immigrants (see Table 1 above), discussion of Rwandan influence on Ugandan politics has never reached the level of open politicization as seen in the case of Côte d'Ivoire.

In contexts of mass migration, we observe, both between Uganda and Rwanda and between Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, the emergence of transnational elite coalitions. Such coalitions may promote good bilateral

relationships and facilitate further migration, or, depending on changing frame conditions, allow for the politicization of immigrant influence in the economic sphere or high politics, and have a deep impact on political order and the legitimacy of aspiring 'nation' states.

3.2   *Youth-Specific Mobilization*

While formal political participation seems not to be valued as an instrument of political empowerment and translation of numerical weight into political influence, both countries feature nevertheless significant forms of youth-specific political mobilization. According to Afrobarometer data, over the last decade, both in Côte d'Ivoire and in Uganda, around 10% of respondents consistently confirmed they had participated in a demonstration or protest march, with only a minimally stronger participation among the younger and more urban respondents (own analysis of Afrobarometer data), and a slightly higher participation in Côte d'Ivoire in comparison with Uganda. In Uganda, youth has been mobilized both by and against the regime mainly during electoral campaigns. Oppositional mobilization has occurred through opposition party youth wings. Other opposition-led activities that attracted mostly youth included mass campaigns during general and by-elections, and demonstrations such as the 'walk to work' campaigns that followed the 2011 general elections and occurred again in October 2017. This was spurred by the government's (eventually successful) plan of changing the constitution by removing the presidential age limit of 75 so as to allow for President Museveni who shall have passed that age to run again in 2021. At various occasions, opposition leader Kiiza Besigye called for mass protests, saying that the people's power can bring down the regime and has called on citizens to use defiance to sabotage the regime (Kiiza Besigye 2017 Press Conference, see YouTube Video in references).

If no Arab Spring-like protests have taken root in Uganda yet, this is probably caused by both structural features of the regime and the much stronger youth mobilization by the incumbent government. There is a highly centralized and all-powerful presidency anchored on a unique marriage of military and politics (Kaka, 2016). As commander in chief, albeit unconstitutionally, the President has used this power to turn the military into an instrument against anti-regime sentiment, evidence of which is police and military action on opposition in 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016 and in by-elections that have occurred since. After decades of civil

war, the NRM regime has also maintained relative peace and stability, and the less urbanized features of Uganda create a cushion against the effects of unemployment and make sustained resistance difficult, giving a semblance of stability to the coercive capacity of the regime. The regime has employed several strategies of mobilizing the youth to serve its purposes. While we return to formation of non-state *armed* groups below, the ruling party has used patronage to either co-opt organized youth groups to serve its interests or has mobilized groups for rent seeking and political mobilization in its favour. Given its financial muscle, the sitting regime has outcompeted the opposition in getting such opportunistic groups on their side thereby eating into the mobilization base of the opposition for potential mass protests. Veiled as support for poverty erad-ication, President Museveni has personally and through his aides donated several billions of shillings to Youth and Women's groups to win their support in elections over the years (Daily Monitor, April 16, 2018).

Youth protest in Côte d'Ivoire has unfolded in different ways. Univer-sities and in particular Abidjan's main public university in Cocody have been hotbeds of political mobilization practically since the early 1970s. President Laurent Gbagbo (2000–2010) had been a university history lecturer before becoming President, and both rebel leader Guillaume Soro (Speaker of Parliament until 2019) and Gbagbo's key ally and militia leader Charles Blé Goudé (now also in The Hague) were members of the Student Union and representing their parties within university politics (Konaté, 2003). FESCI, the main student union, had gained importance as a basis for (often violent) oppositional activity during the 1980s and 1990s. Following the military coup in late 1999, their leaders perceived the opportunity to claim power and wealth for their generation (McGovern, 2011).

3.3 Youth Violence and Civil War

The descent of Côte d'Ivoire into civil war (2002–2007) cannot be explained without taking into account the two demographic patterns discussed in this article, the youth bulge and a strong tradition of immi-gration. The war started with a rebellion in 2002, when disgruntled army officers from the North staged a military coup, which after some months of fighting led to a de facto separation of the country in a rebel-held zone in the North and a government-controlled zone in the South (including the cocoa-producing areas). The Government of Burkina Faso

(and President Blaise Compaoré) served as main ally of the rebels. The Peace Accords of Ouagadougou (2007) eventually allowed preparations for elections, a reunification of the two territories and the demobilization of rebels and militias. The presidential elections were finally held on 31 October 2010. No candidate managed to gain an absolute majority in the first round, and in an increasing violent atmosphere, a presidential run-off was held between incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara on 27 November 2010. A dispute soon emerged about who had won the elections leading to a military intervention by France, the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and a short civil war that led to the military victory of the rebel forces, supported by French and UN troops in early April 2011. After many failed attempts, Ouattara eventually became President of the Republic (and was re-elected in 2015), but the supporters of Gbagbo continue to see him as an immigrant and foreigner, who has been imposed on autochthonous Ivorians by an international conspiracy. Former rebel leaders with strong connections to the Burkinabè security services continue to have important roles in the Ivorian security apparatus.

During the civil war, youth militias (Young Patriots) became a loyal pillar of Gbagbo's regime and were instrumental not only in terrorizing the opposition-loyal suburbs of Abidjan, but also in claiming to be the representatives of a new national project in which no role was left for Northerners and 'allochthones' (Banégas, 2006). The politically active young generation perceived itself as the most radical flag-bearers of an autochthony movement, which linked the generational quest for emancipation and power ('second independence' from France) to specific ideas about the contours of the political community. According to such radical ideas, citizenship (and the benefits linked to it such as legal access to land) should be reserved for true Ivoirians. One could thus argue that the bulk of young people who became politicized in the specific context of the rebellion and civil war, affiliated with politico-military movements which allowed them to get access to material resources and social recognition as part of a legitimate 'political project'. At the same time, none of these movements emerged in opposition to the regime, but rather with more or less open financial support by the Gbagbo government. When Gbagbo was defeated in April 2011, most of these militias were disbanded and disappeared practically overnight. The civil war has thus left a legacy of violent mobilization and politicization, with thousands of young people without prior military training using control of means of

violence to protest and to order around others. It has also left a legacy of extreme frustration as a 'conspiracy' of France and a part of the established elite ultimately defeated this emancipatory nationalist project, and only previously marginalized youth involved on the side of the rebels had a chance of being integrated into the new national army.

One can observe a militarization of Ugandan youth as well, but this has led neither to civil war nor to the articulation of an alternative political project. Creation and/or co-option of groups like *Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers' Association* (UTODA) 1986–2012, *Black mambas* (2005), *Kiboko Squad* (2007), *BodaBoda 2010* from 2010 to 2017, *Crime preventers* 2016–2018, *Kifeesi* (2010–) as militias to supplement the coercive machinery of the state has been a long-term strategy of maintaining political control by the regime (Goodfellow, 2017). These groups are created or activated either in the run-up to a general election or after a major political occurrence that the state is keen to contain or manage. They have meted out violence on real and perceived opponents of the regime, attacked courts of law and rearrested acquitted persons or protested the trial of their benefactors, enabling the regime to maintain a grip on their areas of influence.

Uganda's transport sector is dominated by motorcycle taxis locally known as 'bodaboda'. It is estimated that *bodabodas* number at between 200,000 and 300,000, meaning that they are the second highest source of employment after agriculture in Uganda (Kigambo, 2017). The sector is dominated by youthful males who would have otherwise been unemployed. One could argue that the first battle line during electoral periods is drawn on the *bodaboda* field as aspirants outdo each other to hire *bodabodas* to accompany them for nomination. In 2011, the *bodaboda* were used by the opposition in Uganda's urban areas to accompany and draw crowds for the main opposition presidential candidate Besigye. Sensing that the opposition had moved ahead of it in mobilizing *bodabodas* to serve its political ends, in a knee-jerk reaction, the ruling party through the Uganda Police decided to create and activate camps within the *bodaboda* sector. *Bodaboda 2010* was thus a deliberate creation of the Uganda Police Force, which organized its structures and even chose the leader who happened to be the chairman of the NRM in one of the city's divisions (Interview Police Officer, June 8, 2018). Having been deployed to maintain the control of the regime over the city, and supported by the government in this endeavour, *Bodaboda 2010* started engaging in criminal acts and violent murders with impunity as the

police watched on. The military eventually raided their offices, arrested the leaders and had them charged in the military martial court. The Inspector General of Police who had created and sanctioned the work of the group and the Security Minister were subsequently relieved of their duties.

About two years before the 2016 elections, Uganda witnessed a rise in the activity of so-called Crime Preventers. Although the concept of crime preventers which is similar to the 'Neighbourhood Watch' in other countries existed and took shape under the community policing strategy of the Uganda Police Force since the early 1990s, the 2014 activity was different in two respects: it was a massive recruitment unsupported by any clear policy or guideline and it was highly politicized. Having realized how unemployed youths had ironically been used by the opposition to demonstrate in the 'walk to work' protests after the 2011 elections, the 2014 massive recruitment of such people countrywide was meant to 'withdraw' them from the pool which the opposition could have used to mobilize supporters in the 2016 elections. The recruitment of Crime Preventers was not supported by any regulatory framework or policy within the police and they were recruited through pre-existing structures of Local Councils (LCs) at village level and the Police Community Liaison officers. When the group was being commissioned in October 2014, the Inspector General of Police at the time informed the President that the recruits were 11 million, but other sources within the police suggest that realistically speaking they are not more than 5 million (Uganda had a total population of 40 million at the time). Although they were recruited as volunteers, a budget was set aside for their lunch facilitation thus making the alleged inflation of their number neither accidental nor inconsequential (Interview Police Officer, June 8, 2018). According to their website, the group is a registered NGO comprised of 80% youth launched after the guidance of the President who 'assigned the youth a mission to establish a patriotic movement aimed at diagnosing the society's problems and finding practical solutions to the problems'.[1] When their National Coordinator declared that the group was ready to die for the President and would stand against those opposed to changing the constitution to allow him to run for another term in 2021, it could no longer be denied that they see their mission as that of serving partisan interests intended to keep

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[1] http://www.ncpfug.org/.

President Museveni in power. After training, the treatment of the Crime Preventers varied from one group to another. Some were given yellow uniforms, which is the colour of the ruling party, some were ferried to work elsewhere contrary to the idea that they should be working within their communities of residence and there were rumours that they were going to be armed. These concerns were shared by the leader of the opposition with the government, which was urged to enact a law governing the operations of the group. A draft policy was eventually submitted to cabinet but has not been discussed yet. Following the dismissal of the Inspector General of Police in March 2018, the new management of the police was planning to disband the Crime Preventers because they were readily slipping out of the control of the police. Recognizing the political value of maintaining the group, however, the President declared the Crime Preventers a reserve force of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) in an address to representatives of the group drawn from the districts.

4   Conclusion

Our analysis of demographic trends in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire has revealed a number of interesting results. The population of both countries is still strongly growing and becoming more youthful, in line with developments in most other sub-Saharan African states. This represents a major challenge for policymaking, especially with regard to the provision of jobs and quality education. At the same time, both Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda have been and continue to be net importers of migration, albeit for different reasons (economic or conflict-induced). The political management of youth bulge is thus becoming even more complex, and emigration apparently does not work as an effective exit option for the vast majority of frustrated and unemployed young people.

The growing number of young people without economic perspectives and precarious prospects of leading a decent (family) life has led neither to a massive eruption of political violence, nor to the questioning of the legitimacy of the existing political order and established modes of political regulation. The trajectory of youth political engagement and mobilization is thus quite different from the countries of the Arab Spring (Cavatorta and Bonci, this volume). It is, however, also different from Sierra Leone or Liberia, where massive youth violence was a main characteristic of protracted civil wars (Richards, 1997). Where the youth become

violent in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire, this seems to occur in a context of elite-instigated and controlled mobilization, with violence being one instrument among others in the political competition. Economic exclusion makes it easier for politicians of all parties to manipulate youth when small amounts of money suffice to make young people attend election rallies or intimidate political opponents. And the cyclical use or abuse of public employment for political or electoral purposes, notably in police and domestic security jobs, is of course a key manipulation tool of powerholders everywhere (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009, 2013). In Uganda, the incumbent autocratic regime learned quickly to massively invest in unemployed youth as a political instrument, especially in the pre-electoral phase. It temporarily recruited a considerable section of the youth as para-military forces and managed so far to maintain stability for the government of President Museveni. Three conditions, namely low appreciation of their agency and an over-reliance on individual leaders, a social safety system that encourages dependency on relatives and friends especially during difficult economic times, as well as the use of violence to quell demonstrations, obstruct a stronger anti-regime mobilization.

In Côte d'Ivoire, political mobilization led to a civil war and a division of the country. The negative scenarios related to the Youth Bulge became more manifest in this context, but the Gbagbo regime was largely successful in maintaining a strict control over the youth militias it had created. It seems more complicated for the current government of President Ouattara to uphold discipline and non-violent behaviour of both the official security apparatus and the demobilized former security forces, among them many youths. In both Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, the dominant, and ultimately successful, strategy of state elites remained their capacity to manage access to the official police and military apparatus, and to other private benefits for youth leaders.

Finally, the *ivoirité* project, where at least some youth leaders were searching for an alternative political order, could be interpreted as a populist but quite rational attempt to secure a more meaningful socio-economic citizenship, by artificially reducing the size of the political community. Marginalizing and effectively disenfranchising migrants and people with migrant background would certainly have increased the prospects of securing access to land or to a career in the public service or the military apparatus. Strong migration might thus indeed affect the mobilization of the youth.

Political demography will remain an important research agenda for students of African politics. While youth bulge or migration does not present uniform challenges to all African countries, they should be included as important explanatory factors for our understanding of the political trajectories of African regimes and states (Van Gyampo & Anyidoho, 2019). Most African states have started to develop an array of policy instruments to manage demographic change and migration. African governments know very well that the demographic changes and the youth bulge are an opportunity but also a major liability, especially in a context of raising civic awareness and educational levels, as well as more competitive elections where leaders risk being voted out of office. Government performance in fighting youth unemployment might not be decisive for political survival any time soon, but political strategies to deal with the youth bulge will remain on the political agenda.

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The Maghreb Region: Waithood, the Myth of Youth Bulges and the Reality of Frustrated Aspirations

Alessandra Bonci and Francesco Cavatorta

1   Introduction: Political Demography in Tunisia and Morocco

Demographic change in the Maghreb is central today to a better understanding of social and political dynamics across the Mediterranean region. As the uprisings of 2010–2011 powerfully illustrated, demographic trends have considerable domestic and international implications, particularly when young people are the protagonists of revolutionary change. This chapter focuses on the political demography of Tunisia and Morocco. Our aim is to move away from an obsession with youth bulges or 'hordes' of young people at the doors of Europe and to understand the relationship between demography and political outcomes. Morocco and Tunisia

A. Bonci (✉) · F. Cavatorta
Laval University, Québec, Canada
e-mail: alessandra.bonci.1@ulaval.ca

F. Cavatorta
e-mail: francesco.cavatorta@pol.ulaval.ca

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have been chosen for two interrelated reasons. First, they present similar demographic trends, having experienced massive migratory movements over several decades and a decreasing fertility rate in the early 1980s. In recent years, fertility trends have continued to decline in Morocco and have risen slightly in Tunisia. Second, both countries were at the forefront of the 2011 Arab uprisings, but they experienced contrasting trajectories. The Ben Ali (Tunisia) regime collapsed in early 2011, leading to a successful process of democratization, which culminated with the approval of a new liberal-democratic constitution in January 2014. Conversely, the Moroccan regime implemented cosmetic institutional reforms to assuage protesters and its political system based on the institutional and constitutional primacy of the executive monarchy remains unchanged. Thus, Morocco and Tunisia are useful cases to discuss divergent political outcomes despite reasonably similar demographic trends.

This chapter develops into three sections. We first discuss demographic changes in Morocco and Tunisia, and then their socio-political implications and demographic politics (on ageing politics, see, e.g., Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012; this volume). We take into account variables such as unemployment rates, inactivity rates, the role of education, the spread of the informal sector and the 'waithood' phenomenon, to ask two questions: first, do Morocco and Tunisia face a youth-related crisis? And second, what are the consequences of broad demographic changes for regime stability and legitimacy in Morocco and Tunisia? In this regard, we address the problems and opportunities these countries face. We focus specifically on the role of the supposed youth bulge, its meaning and its mediatized impact. What is the political role of demographic changes in Morocco and Tunisia? Is there a dominant political discourse on demography? We consider the institutional arrangements the Moroccan and Tunisian governments introduced to cope with the main challenges of demographic shifts. We conclude our chapter with a brief summary and broaden our discussion to future scenarios.

2   Demographic Trends in Morocco and Tunisia

The data we use in this chapter come from multiple sources, namely the Open Science Framework—Global Political Demography Database, the National Statistics Institute of Tunisia (INS), the High Commission for Planning (HCP) in Morocco, the Economic Research Forum (ERF) based in Cairo and the World Bank. The lack of data that some

countries experienced in the post-Arab uprisings years impacts overall reliability (Pellicer et al., 2015); moreover, there are justified concerns when collecting data from authoritarian countries. For instance, throughout the Ben Ali era in Tunisia, public information was manipulated to serve propagandistic claims about the regime's successes (Al-Issawi, 2012). While data about the real rate of unemployment, and in particular youth unemployment, have always been a source of dispute between national governments and international financial institutions and investors (Hibou et al., 2011),[1] this is less of a problem for population data.

The total population of Morocco in 1990 was just below 25 million people. It increased to above 34 million in 2015 and might reach 42 million by 2040. The same trend occurs in Tunisia, where population size surged since 1990 from above 8 million to above 11 million people in 2015, with more than 13 million people expected by 2040 (Goerres et al., 2020). But while total population has been growing in Tunisia and Morocco since 1990, the average annual rate of population growth has decreased. This leads us to address two mythical phenomena: massive population growth and the 'youth bulge'. Moroccan and Tunisian population growth is inferior to the Arab world average (UN Population Division, 2017). When compared with the African and sub-Saharan African growth trend, it is even much lower. As Fig. 1 shows, the average annual rate of population change in North Africa is decreasing, especially in Tunisia. Thus, when compared to the rest of Africa, North Africa is not undergoing a demographic explosion. In addition, it should not be assumed that a demographic explosion is, in itself, negative.

The composition of the population in the region today is mainly youth-based. However, the median age is increasing over time: from 19 in 1990 to 27 in 2015 and 36 in 2040 in Morocco and from 21 to 31 and 38 in Tunisia, respectively. The so-called youth bulge for the future

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[1] Hibou et al. (2011) analysed the data diffusion in the Maghreb after the revolutions and observed specific trends. First, knowledge is carefully 'selected' to fit a shared discourse. Second, scholars focus on the manipulated representation of numbers, which are negotiated according to the international power balance and to political and ideological self-serving needs. Third, data can be omitted or hidden. Hibou et al. (2011) again explain that there are many techniques for data falsification, such as non-publication or rewriting of data, as well as the circulation of raw data. This latter technique is very insidious, since if data are available and 'transparent' on the one hand, they are nothing but messy and incomprehensible noise on the other. So, to overcome the reliability problem, we used multiple sources and we grounded our arguments on the literature when numbers were not available.

Fig. 1 Average annual rate of population change in comparison (*Source* UN Population Division (2017); World Population Prospects. The 2017 Revision, custom date acquired via website)

may thus need to be reassessed. Cincotta (2017) highlights that political demography has been crucial in identifying which countries can or cannot hope for a democratic future and points to the strong correlation between increasing median age and increasing liberal democracy: "the younger a population is, the less likely it is to be a liberal democracy". This correlation, for Cincotta, is "political demography's most tested relationship" (Cincotta, 2017: 2). Interestingly, Cincotta puts forward eight main rules about political demography forecasting. First, the most age-structurally mature states are expected to have the best chance to be liberal democracies. Second, the age-structurally youngest states (below 25.5 years' median age) are the least likely to become liberal democracies in the short run. Third, "where a revolution occurs in a state with a youthful population, expect either the authoritarian regime to remain in power or to be replaced by another authoritarian regime" (Cincotta, 2017: 2). Fourth, youthful states reaching the 'free' status of Freedom House can lose it within a decade, as Mali did for example. Fifth, to states whose population is less than five million, rules one to four do not

apply. Sixth, "expect states that are ruled by an ideological single-party regime or another type of ideological political monopoly—for example, Iran's theocracy—to mature without liberalization" (Cincotta, 2017: 2). Seventh, states led by revolutionary leaders or a strong man are less likely to attain the 'free' status. And eighth, "expect a state ruled by a military junta/ruler or absolute monarch to yield to a more democratic regime before the population attains a mature age-structure (before a median age of 35.5 years)" (Cincotta, 2017: 2).

Political demographic rules work well because age structure affects both society and state capacity. The potential of political demography as a field is growing quickly (Cincotta and Weber, this volume; Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012; Vanhuysse and Goerres, this volume). Forecasting is only one aspect of it. In fact, political demography is deeply linked to security, too. Changes in demographic conditions, migrations, population growth, changing proportions of ethnic and religious groups have serious political and socio-economic outcomes within societies (Cincotta, 2004). Cincotta employs eight 'demographic topics' usually linked to conflict, violence and regime-instability. These are the 'youth bulge', a rapid urban population growth, a low level of per capita cropland/fresh water, high mortality rate among working-age adults, differential growth rate among ethnic and religious groups, migration, ageing and high sex ratios.

The population pyramids in Fig. 2 provide crucial insights into the socio-political conditions in Morocco and Tunisia. We can see a 'bulge' in 1990, which disappears in 2020 and in the 2040 projections. Morocco and Tunisia are thus getting 'older', and following Cincotta, they are more likely to manage potential future unrest without descending into widespread chaos. In fact, although the democratic process is likely to have ups and downs in Tunisia, it would be 'statistically uncommon' for the country to experience a civil war: the Cincotta threshold for stability is met in countries where the median age is 26 years old (the borderline between a 'youth bulge' and a 'young population').

Table 1 shows the demographic shift on different socio-economic indicators such as migration, absolute size of the population, population density, urban density, home ownership by age group, youth/prime age unemployment gaps, electoral turnout rate by age groups and fiscal revenue as percent of GDP. We briefly discuss the data to illustrate the demographic change in our case studies.

Political demographers focus their attention on the relative size of age groups and the political implications of changing demographic trends.

Fig. 2   Population pyramids for Morocco and Tunisia (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

Both Morocco and Tunisia show a decrease in the size of the youngest age groups (5–9 and 10–14) since 1990. There is a slight growth for the group of 15–19-year-olds between 2015 and 2040. The strongest growth is among 30–34- and 80–84-year-olds. In other words, Tunisia and Morocco are growing old. This is also confirmed by fertility trends. In Tunisia, the fertility rate dropped from 2.98% in 1990 to 2.25% in 2015 and it will keep on falling to 1.9% by 2040. The same trend is occurring in Morocco, where a 3.7% fertility rate in 1990 falls to 2.6% in 2015 and will drop to 2.0% by 2040. How can we explain such a decreasing trend? What are the main political demography consequences?

3   Young People's Social and Economic Circumstances

Tunisia and Morocco now have the lowest fertility rates in North Africa. The variables most likely to have influenced the fertility rate over time are the unemployment rate, the inactivity rate (NEET), the role of education, the spread of the informal sector and the waithood phenomenon.

Table 1 Demographic shift on different socio-economic indicators

	1990	2015	2040
Tunisia			
Net.migration	140.341 (1990–1995)	−20.000 (2015–2020)	−20.000 (2040–2045)
Pop.density	52.9	72.5	86.4
Urban.pop	57.9	66.8	
Absolute.size.pop	8232.7968	11,253.5537	13,165.833
Median.age	21	31	38
Youth.unemp.			
Home.own.age			
Turnout.age			
Fiscal.%GDP			
Morocco			
Net.migration	−466.627 (1990–1995)	−257.096 (2015–2020)	−257.096 (2040–2045)
Pop.density	55.7	77.9	97.9
Urban.pop	48.3	60	
Absolute.size.pop	24,950.1289	34,377.5117	42,148.4257
Median.age	19	27	36
Youth.unemp.	31%		

Source Compiled by authors

Sutton forecasted that the fertility rate in the Maghreb region would have soon reached "projections to near zero […] by the year 2025" thanks to birth control policies (Sutton, 1999: 111). This projection was based on the belief that urbanization, the education of women, a greater participation in employment and family planning would lead to a strong fertility decline. However, this has not materialized. For instance, family planning policies did not perform well because of governments' negligence and lack of investments. Family planning in Tunisia was launched after independence in 1964 (Lapham, 1970: 241). In Morocco, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and later, in 1966, the Ministry of Health supported similar policies. However, both the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes progressively abandoned the policy because of a mixture of lack of funding, backlash from traditional sectors of society and changing political priorities. Government policies facilitated the decrease in fertility rates, as Sutton had argued, in a context of increasing urbanization, female education and slight diminutions in conservative social attitudes over time in both countries. Conservative political and social

views persist in Tunisia for instance, but they have been decreasing over time, particularly with regard to the role of women in society (Teti et al., 2018). The problem is that increased urbanization and education did not translate into employment for many young people, especially women. As Fargues argues (2017: 3), "[r]ising education levels naturally translate to rising expectations"; however, these expectations were frustrated. Fargues (2017: 4) claims that such a frustration is one of the leading causes of emigration and youth discontent.

Employment is crucial in determining young people's economic stability, their choice to form new families and their political behaviour everywhere.[2] Moreover, "there is still considerable public anxiety around the institution of marriage and the ability of young people to marry in a timely fashion in the region" (Assaad et al. 2017: 10). Marriage in North Africa is considered a "high-risk endeavor" (ibid.: 2), because of its costs and its effects on potential living conditions, especially for brides. Sabha (2014) analysed youth unemployment by comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan after the Arab Spring, and shows that in Egypt and Tunisia the condition of youth in the labour market has worsened after the Arab Awakening. The unemployment rate in 2013 was higher among youth in Tunisia and Egypt, which directly experienced the short-term negative economic effects of the uprisings. In contrast, Morocco and Jordan, which did not go through institutional upheavals, did better. If we look at the unemployment rate for females, we can observe that the deepest cleavage before and after the Arab uprisings is, again, in Egypt, followed by Tunisia. As Sabha (2014) highlights, the only country where more women joined the labour force is Morocco. The inactivity rate remained stable in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab uprisings. Jamoussi & Gassab (2011) demonstrates that unemployment in the region and especially in Tunisia (estimated by the International Labour Organization at 42.57% in 2011) is a structural problem which became even more pronounced after the uprisings, but which was not caused by these uprisings. Achcar (2013) argues that the uprisings across the region broke out mainly because of widespread unemployment and underemployment which affected both the middle and lower classes (el-Meehy, 2013). The structural problem of youth unemployment in North Africa can be linked to the difficulties of planning for a family life without income.

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[2] On the cyclical use of public employment for political purposes, a key manipulation tool of powerholders everywhere, see, for instance, Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009, 2013, 2014).

As the African Development Bank (AFDB, 2012) reports, Tunisia was already experiencing tourism reduction and the effects of the Libyan and the European economic crisis well before the revolution, with a negative impact on its rate of employment (Tsourapas, 2013). It should be highlighted that although Morocco has not undergone a radical political-institutional change, it has experienced considerable upheaval in 2011, largely for the same reasons as Tunisia (Chomiak & Entelis, 2011), with the movement of unemployed graduates leading the protests. Thus, widespread unemployment is not the product of the Arab Spring, but rather one of its main causes. Fewer young people chose to start new families without financial stability.

Another important element is the NEET rate—people Not in Employment nor Education, or Training (OECD, 2017). An interesting parallel can be drawn between the Maghreb and the northern bank of the Mediterranean, such as Italy. Although the political outcomes are unlikely to be the same given the considerable differences between authoritarian and democratic political systems, the Italian case is revealing of a broader trend related to economic instability and lack of opportunities for young people. Youth unemployment in Italy was 42.7% in 2014 and decreased to 34.7% in 2017, making it comparable to its North African neighbours. The rise of populism and extremist parties is an indicator of profound dissatisfaction with a status quo where unemployment, underemployment and precarity dominate the labour market. Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, the population in much richer, more democratic Italy is rapidly ageing, but Italy and Tunisia are in the same range of NEET percentage: 37% in Italy versus 36% in Tunisia and 21% in Morocco (World Bank, 2016).

Despite different socio-political conditions, we register a fertility rate decrease in Morocco and Italy, but a slight increase in Tunisia since 2011, the year of the revolution. Thus, blaming the uprisings or the 'youth bulge' seems misplaced. Changes in demography do have an impact on political choices, but the exclusive focus on countries' age structure should be challenged. It would be more useful to highlight young people's perceptions of empowerment or uselessness. A society in which most people are young, educated and unemployed produces specific political consequences. Young Moroccans and Tunisians today are better educated than the previous generations, having benefitted from the expansion of mass education and exposure to a global culture, creating a "revolution of aspirations" (Malik & Awadallah, 2013: 296). There is an "on-going generational struggle for inclusion to have access to better living conditions, better employment and mobility" (Malik & Awadallah,

2013: 296). Building on Gurr's work, Fargues (2017: 2) argues that the logic of relative deprivation is a strong drive for revolution and can motivate international migration.

The OECD (2017) shows that 30.28% of Moroccan 'advanced' educated people were unemployed in 2003. In the same year, Moroccan 'basic' educated people were unemployed at 14.5%. Paradoxically, in Morocco, the more literate people are, the less likely they are to find a job (*The Economist*, 2013: 3). In Tunisia, the situation is similar to Morocco's. Unemployment rates are higher among university graduates (Honwana, 2013). Poverty has fallen across the Maghreb, but inequalities and unemployment persist: "sadly, for Tunisia, with its relatively well-schooled young population, unemployment has been stubbornly large, particularly for women (22%), recent university graduates (31.2%), school leavers and other youth (31.8%). Ensuring equal access to economic opportunities is a priority for the new government in Tunisia, as with other governments across the region" (World Bank, 2016).

While young people were told that education was the way to a better life, reality is a constant reminder that for many of them this is not the case. The political repercussions of this 'expectations gap' have been significant and are likely to remain so in the near future. Boughzala and Kouki (2003) argue that unemployment persistence in countries like Tunisia is not only caused by labour market rigidities and by population growth, but also by the size of the informal sector and low levels of investment within the formal sector and in public infrastructure and services. According to Malik and Awadallah (2013), "the political system has been unable to find a recipe to create what can be termed as 'good' and reasonably secure jobs. For instance, the public agencies responsible for granting subsidized credit to small entrepreneurs and encouraging growth in this sector were often ineffective" (el-Meehy, 2013: 8). This is because authoritarianism does not genuinely 'liberalize' markets and networks of privilege are created between private businesses and political elites. In any case, the absence of opportunities drives young people to make alternative choices. Many tend to opt out of the job market altogether, particularly young women. These young women often tend to see marriage as a way out of the family home, but face difficulties in finding suitable young men with stable and reasonably well-paid jobs.

Therefore, many young men and women make their livelihood in the informal sector and/or the illegal economy (*The Economist*, 2013: 4). It is not only relevant to emphasize the formality or informality of jobs

per se, but also the formality or informality of the job-seeking process, whereby institutions are bypassed in favour of patronage links (*wasta* in Arabic). Similar dynamics take place also in more developed economies and more democratic political systems (see e.g. Facchini, 2017 on Italy). In Morocco, "networks matter intergenerationally for finding employment. All else being equal, the chance of a worker holding a formal job in Morocco increases significantly if his or her father also has a formal job" (Gatti et al., 2014: 20).

Job market data for Morocco and Tunisia are fuzzy. In both cases, we do not know the true percentage of young people voluntarily choosing the informal sector. Quillen (2017: 31) reports that from 2011 to 2015 the number of people employed in the informal sector jumped from 28% to more than 32%, topping 1 million workers in 2015, and that the parallel economy accounted for as much as 38% of Tunisia's GDP in 2013. According to Merouani et al. (2017), there can be strong reasons for young people to choose the informal job sector, e.g. higher incomes and more time flexibility. The issue is to understand whether people choose informal jobs as a last resort or not. Even though highly educated people are more likely to be insured, the same people often choose to work in the informal sector. Ultimately, "Moroccan youth working in informal jobs reported being significantly less satisfied than youth working in formal jobs" (Gatti et al., 2014). Interestingly, if the informal sector is a curse for the economy of a country, it can also be a blessing for poor people who could not survive otherwise. That said, the informal sector certainly discourages youth in the Mediterranean region in building new families or leave the family home because precariousness rules the way in which they find or hold on to a job.

4   Waithood

Another crucial factor influencing the fertility rate across North Africa can be labelled the 'waithood effect' (Dhillon & Yussuf, 2009), as many young adults in each cohort entering the labour market cannot find stable jobs. As Malik and Awadallah (2013: 309) explain: "the future of the Middle East crucially depends on whether it can convert this youthful transition into a productive transition". The economic prospects of large sectors of North African youth have not changed significantly since the uprisings. In fact, high unemployment, lack of social mobility and absence of hope remain the most significant problems according to their own

citizens (Abbott & Teti, 2017). Many young men and women live in a permanent state of waithood, simply waiting for life to happen. Interestingly, Honwana (2013) explains that the concept of waithood today can be extended to young people tout court, and not only to MENA countries' youth. Honwana considers that 'youth' is shaped by society's expectations, such as economic independence and family building. But such expectations are difficult to meet because the social contract between state and citizens is broken and the socioeconomic system is 'rigged'. Young people's inability to reach these goals is perceived to be the outcome of contemporary neoliberal dynamics, which both Tunisia and Morocco are incapable of exiting. In an 'optimistic scenario', according to Honwana, such a socioeconomic context could push young people to challenge the system and attempt to free themselves from their waithood condition. Young people are not passively waiting for change: they are reinventing their survival in non-socially conventional ways. "Waithood represents the contradiction of modernity, in which young people's opportunities and expectations are simultaneously broadened and constrained" (Honwana, 2013: n.p.). However, the many localized loci of activism and 'youth escapism' in Tunisia and Morocco do not seem to have the capacity to generate a national widespread momentum for radical economic change (Hanieh, 2015).

In Tunisia, as Muldering (2013: 3) argues: "the most basic of societal contracts—that children will one day grow up, begin to contribute productively to society, and then raise families of their own—has been broken for an entire generation of youth in the Arab world trapped in a liminal period: waithood". Kovaceva et al. (2018: 10) point out that actual waiting is longer for women than for men in North Africa (but see Pontiggia 2016 on young men). In Morocco too, waithood is a characteristic of youth. According to a SAHWA national case study, we observe that Moroccan youth are politically sensitive, but not active in the public sphere for sure. "This could be explained by the weak impact of education and employment policies on knowledge, the importance of virtual and alternative spaces for observing youth practices and giving them new opportunities, and the lack of confidence in institutions and migration alike. Young people's representations, in the post-2011 context, are thus directed inwardly, more towards personal success than collective actions" (Aït Mous, 2016: n.p.). According to Aït Mous though, we have to be mindful of the fact that youth in Morocco is not a homogeneous group. There are huge differences between rural and urban areas, women

and men and social classes. The Moroccan Government has attempted to be proactive in tackling waithood by both protecting youth from being engaged in work too early (minimum work age raised from 12 to 15 years) and promoting youth participation in politics (voting age lowered from 20 to 18 years) (Aït Mous, 2016). However, youth participation in politics is low and raising the working age has not mattered much in a country where illegal work is widespread. What matters to young people is achieving labour market conditions that deliver a fair living. If entrepreneurship was deemed the 'magical solution', the reality is that the informal economy is still one of the most important sources of income for young people. Morocco creates more than 40,000 units of informal jobs every year (Boukhriss, 2016). For Moroccan women, work is also not emancipatory, because most of the time, they work until they find a husband. Finally, state-sponsored programmes do not seem to deliver the changes needed. For instance, the 2006 *Moukalawati* (My Firm) programme aimed at reducing administrative procedures and facilitating access credit in order to boost private entrepreneurship. However, the programme did not succeed, because credit was not easily obtained and, at the same time, entrepreneurs in Morocco complained that prospective employees did not have the skills required because the educational system does not prepare young people sufficiently and it lacks coordination in promoting entrepreneurship. One of the effects of the waithood is also a loss of interest and trust in politics. Fargues (2017) links waithood to migration, since relative deprivation makes young people particularly keen on leaving their birth country to find opportunities abroad. As Fargues (2017: 3) argues, demographic change is a key contextual or 'predisposing' factor for both migration and revolt: "a lack of opportunities combined with a demographic bulge among the young accounts for many migratory and political processes at play in the Arab world today".

5 Migration

Given the high unemployment rates and the inability to fulfil their potential, many young people opt for emigration when possible. While both Tunisia and Morocco have long exported their labour force, it was initially assumed that it was a price to pay before economic development kicked in at home. Migrants were considered as net contributors to the country's development because they would send remittances home

and contribute to domestic economic growth by boosting household spending. Economic growth, however, either stagnated or benefited only the few selected, with remittances simply serving to fill the vacuum of decreasing state spending on services. In a context of slow or unequal growth, emigration remains a priority for many young people in both Morocco and Tunisia because they see very few economic opportunities at home (Abbott & Teti, 2017). However, emigration has considerably changed over time as the issue has been 'securitized' in Europe, the US and Canada, the countries of choice for the clear majority of potential migrants from North Africa (although many Tunisians also made their way to Qaddhafi-led Libya). The closure of borders and the increasing difficulties in accessing legal migration—reserved only for the selected, connected and educated few—have pushed many thousands into the arms of human traffickers, boosting the number of 'illegals'. Precise numbers are notoriously difficult to obtain, but Italy, for instance, received 4500 'illegal' Tunisians in 2017 alone. Spain, for its part, detected 22,900 people in 2017 coming via Morocco or Algeria. In any case, changes in migratory policies on the part of receiving countries have led to more young people being 'confined' at home. Migration to the Gulf States has not been able to compensate for the loss of widespread and open access to Europe.

This has far-reaching political implications. Gubert and Nordman (2009) argue that while the Gulf region was the natural destination for many Mashreqi citizens, Europe—and Libya before 2011—was the favourite destination for Maghrebi migrants. Gubert and Nordman (2009: 3) claim that the migration issue has always been present in the Moroccan and Tunisian political debate, particularly in Morocco, where emigration is considered as a form of export to be promoted for the benefit of the country. Moreover, Moroccans are the most numerous in Europe. The authors show that the push factors for massive migration from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are both GDP per capita and demographic pressures. In the first case, GDP exerts a push effect in particular for low-educated workers who need to overcome poverty constraints in order to afford the fixed costs of migration. The second push factor—the demographic pressure—expressed itself in the 'brain drain' of the most educated people. A crucial indicator here is migration pressure, defined as "excess domestic labour supply in the presence of negative per capita income differences with other countries" (Groenwold et al.,

2016: 4). Bruni and Venturini (1995) make a distinction between migration pressure and actual migration, namely between the macro-level and the micro-level phenomenon. While migration pressure is about the macroeconomic level, actual migration depends on "the propensity of an individual to migrate, i.e. the probability that an individual willing to migrate will indeed migrate" (Groenwold et al., 2016: 4).

Tunisia has always had a migration policy based on two main principles: encouraging Tunisians to emigrate and checking on Tunisians abroad. Natter (2015) analyses Tunisian migration after the Arab Spring and assesses that the revolution had three main effects on migration. First, the absence of Tunisian border checks in 2011 allowed a consistent non-controlled flow of Tunisians to reach Europe. Second and most crucially, Tunisia experienced massive immigration from Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. For Tunisia, which had not experienced high immigration since colonial times, this prompted immediate practical challenges of accommodation, health care and food provision, and led to new migration and asylum laws (Natter, 2015: 2). Recent immigration from Libya to Tunisia has been strictly limited though. Tunisia acquired the status of a transit country, so that Libyans are allowed into the country only if they can prove their exit. Third, the democratization process suddenly made Tunisia attractive to Western civil society activists and NGOs.

In 2012, Tunisian emigrants accounted for 11% of the total Tunisian population (Natter, 2015: 2). What changed over time in terms of migration flows is their composition. During the 1990s, most Tunisian migrants were low-skilled workers, but today the trend is for young graduates to leave (Natter, 2015). Another new trend is the influx of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Tunisia, although total numbers are small (Natter, 2015: 3). Recently, Tunisia has had to enforce immigration policies in reaction to the securitization of the issue by its European partners in the early 2000s. In fact, between 2003 and 2010, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania adopted controversial laws on immigration, emigration and smuggling, which "targeted transit and penalized irregular exit" (Perrin, 2016: 5), rather than regulating migration fluxes, but were badly implemented.

In the hands of Ben Ali, the Tunisian law of 2004, which was initially intended to combat human traffickers, became a powerful tool both to meet EU needs and to extend control over Tunisian society, particularly over young people. The Arab Spring uprising did not produce the changes that young people might have expected. Quite the opposite: young people

became Tunisia's first problem because they were and are perceived to go hand in hand with violence, crime, terrorism, revolution, unemployment and migration (International Alert, 2015). In 2012, Islamist Party leader Rashid Ghannouchi declared that Tunisia should stop to "give as a gift" its graduates to Europe. However, the reality is that very poor socioeconomic prospects for many young Tunisians push them to seek a different life outside the country. Tunisian emigration will likely continue at high levels, driven by political discontent and economic precariousness (Natter, 2015: 14).

Interestingly, migration policies today are used as a commodity to maintain and (re)negotiate relations with the European Union and readdress the balance of power. The Mobility Partnership promoted by the European Union "are unattractive to Arab leaders in their current form, and migration will most likely continue with or without such a management tool" (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012: 12; see also Groenwold et al., 2016: 6).

6   Do Morocco and Tunisia Face a Youth-Related Crisis Nowadays?

The socio-economic and political crises that Tunisia and Morocco experience do concern the young, but the youth themselves have little agency in this. After the Arab uprisings, women and youth should have become the focus of governments' resource and energy investments, but this did not happen. Moroccan and Tunisian youth began organizing and creating social movements to demand the actual implementation of the changes promised: "These movements reveal new modes of action, new practices and new representations that these social groups have developed in relation to their societies, authorities (…) and to the future" (Kadri, 2014: 1).

New movements growing out of youth's marginalization, feelings of injustice and lack of recognition are reshaping Moroccan and North African societies, as civil society actors are mushrooming. Young people today are more concerned with economic reforms than the previous generations (Kadri, 2014). This has significant repercussions on the political system because 'new values' are being injected into it. According to an Anna Lindh Foundation report (2014), the Tunisian context has been rapidly changing, with an increasing number of associations. The 2013 International Alert Report argues that Tunisia is now at a delicate juncture: after the uprising, the Tunisian political context is far from being

cohesive and efficient. Religious and regional divides reinforce people's perception of the Arab Spring's failure and Tunisian youth is not satisfied with the post-revolutionary setting. It is therefore a time of contradictory trends with young people still mobilizing to obtain the changes they had demanded in 2011, but still plagued by political inertia and economic difficulties, which make many young people opt for emigration.

As Urdal (2006) notes, youth can be both a resource and a danger in the context of a fragile economy. However, youth bulges represent a challenge that government has to address by providing opportunities for youth to participate in education, in the labour market and in governance. This brings the analysis back to the issues of frustrated expectations and political responses to such frustrations. Bricker and Foley (2013: 179) argue that the mere presence of a 'youth bulge' is not enough to generate violence; the real challenge these countries face today is the transition of youth into the labour market, regardless of their education level and total numbers. Bricker and Foley (2013) argue that while Tunisia had an above average Youth Risk Factor (the ratio of the young to the total labour force), its youth bulge score remained average, indicating the mere presence of young people or the size of older populations was not a main reason for the unrest (ibid.: 189).

As the MENA market cannot absorb all the job seekers, frustration can turn to political violence. At the same time, violent upheaval also depends on the level of economic crisis, the youth's education, the presence or lack of democracy and the geographic position. Urdal (2006: 613) observes a difference in behaviour among rural and urban youth cohorts and "youth often constitute a disproportionately large part of rural-to-urban migrants; hence, in the face of large youth cohorts, strong urbanization may be expected to lead to an extraordinary crowding of youth in urban centres, potentially increasing the risk of political violence". Binzel and Carvalho (2016) argue that religion is useful (and maybe crucial) to relieve frustration and marginalization (see also Skirbekk and Navarro, this volume). Islam is the best tool for young Egyptians to cope with their unmet expectations because it represents a safe space and can be then employed to make sense of one's situation to eventually provide the symbols and language for political and social mobilization. Although religion should not be conflated with extremism, such conditions can in part explain the growth and continued appeal of political Islam in all its forms, even violent ones (Merone, 2015).

In short, there is indeed a youth-related crisis in both Tunisia and Morocco despite the demographic changes that have taken place, but the problem is not the greater share of younger people in the distribution of the population. There is no demographic explosion of young people. The real issues are linked to the inability of political institutions to respond to socio-economic challenges. The absence of a strong labour market, the inability to relieve pressure through emigration and an unequal distribution of wealth negatively affect young people. Before the uprising, the Gini index was stable, but it proved to be unreliable in the light of the revolutions. Wealth inequality may be much higher and more socially divisive, but harder to detect than expenditure inequality, especially in developing MENA (MENA Economic Monitor, 2015: 17).

Despite the similarities in the reasons for the uprisings, the institutional trajectories differed among MENA countries. In fact, the impact of the 'Spring' in Tunisia and Morocco was very different when it comes to the management of the protests and the outcome of the uprising itself. Mohammad VI of Morocco knew how to channel the explosive energy in the streets into more moderate demonstrations and initiated reforms pre-empting further popular demands. As Storm (2012: 119) highlights: "at no point, the situation spiralled out of control, rather, the monarchy stayed firmly in command, and even managed to utilize the Arab Spring protests to its own advantage by overseeing the introduction of a new constitution". In other words, it did not fundamentally alter the balance of power in favour of elected officials. Thus, the king managed to marginalize the opposition and maintain the control of the country (Berg & Rossi-Doria, 2015). Conversely, in Tunisia, the uprisings broke the previous authoritarian political system and allowed political actors to build a democratic one, which was consolidated in 2014 with the approval of a new democratic liberal constitution.

As already highlighted, participants to the uprisings were not necessarily 'democracy-driven' but were more 'economy-driven'. When asked to rank the top two reasons for the uprisings, both Moroccan and Tunisian citizens mentioned the economy as number one and corruption as number two with the state of the political system farther down the list (Beissinger et al., 2011; Teti et al., 2018). In addition, they were not members of organized associations and parties, they were rather ordinary citizens—many of them religious and not all of them marginalized or disadvantaged people. The economic aspect of the uprisings is indeed connected to changes in the population and Achcar (2013: 12) attributes

the low GDP level to an "exceptionally rapid demographic growth" during the period between the 1970s and the 1990s. Later, demographic growth among North African countries stabilized and even decreased, in the period at the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2010, suggesting that the more recent economic crisis might have been too quickly pinned on the youth bulge when in fact the problems are structural.

7 Consequences of Demographic Changes for Regime Stability and Legitimacy

The impact demographic change has had on regime stability and legitimacy differs in Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco managed to defuse the revolutionary challenge through cosmetic reforms and minor concessions. But complicated economic conditions remain even if the country fares better than its revolutionary neighbour in the post-uprising period. In Tunisia, the whole political system has been changed, but political reforms might not be sufficient to spur growth and reduce unemployment. They are perceived as a compromise between old and the post-revolutionary elites to the detriment of the wider population (Boukhars, 2017; Marzouki, 2015; Merone, 2015). Clawson (2009: 1) writes that the MENA population today is undergoing a "demographic transition" which potentially carries "the opportunity from much of the population being of working age with a low burden for caring for the youth and elderly; then, in coming decades, the opportunity of increased capital from the savings of middle-aged workers preparing for retirement". Yet, if governments do not create enough jobs to make youth's energies converge in the labour market, the optimistic scenario is unlikely to occur. Clawson (2009: 4) calls youth unemployment and the retirement hope the "twin challenges" MENA governments must face today.

However, the traditional policy response to these "twin challenges" is not working. The political trend is to get youth 'ready' for the job market by enhancing their skills and delaying young people's professional access. This dynamic can be useful in the short term, but it cannot last and it does not lead to development. Malik and Awadallah (2013) argue that the most significant factor preventing the absorption of the youth into the labour market over time is the inability to create a large and innovative private sector that could gradually replace the state in terms of job creation. But problematic political conditions prevent the private sector from expanding. Malik and Awadallah (2013) suggest that neither the

oil sector nor the governments can absorb the huge mass of unemployed youth and these two sectors have been unable to do so for quite some time. It follows that the Arab world should have focused on giving an impulse to the manufacturing sector, as many Asian and Latin American countries did, to satisfy the needs of a growing population. The inability and unwillingness to do so should not be blamed primarily on a growing population and the 'youth bulge'. The explanations for such failure are to be found in the deeply divided political environment across the region, the self-serving authoritarianism of the leadership in place and the narrow interests of the rising bourgeoisie to exploit rents rather than investing in expanding the economy through private enterprise. While the Arab uprisings seemed to challenge both Arab divisions and authoritarian practices, the post-uprisings Arab world does not seem to have changed much. If anything, there is greater chaos, greater insecurity and therefore greater inability to deal with the problem of socioeconomic development even in countries that democratized such as Tunisia.

In addition to the lack of regional economic integration, there is the problem of ruling elites who are unwilling and unable to provide meaningful change. The absence of accountability and the very limited role of civil society in economic policymaking undermine most efforts of reform (Cavatorta & Rivetti, 2018). In fact, vested interests tend to prevail to avoid upsetting the political system: "There is growing realization in the wake of recent Arab revolts that the status quo is unsustainable and that governance system need to be more responsive to citizens" (Malik & Awadallah, 2013: 309). Heydemann's work on corrupt networks (2004) demonstrates that liberalizing policies simply resulted in the transfer of public assets into private hands without any real benefit for the population at large. This resulted in the creation of private monopolies that did not contribute to growth and therefore employment—the outcome of a very deliberate policy of ensuring that key social actors would continue to support authoritarianism (Dillman, 2001). As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, a nation's wealth or poverty is based on the inclusiveness of political and economic institutions. What is crucial is the extractive nature of institutions: both economic and political institutions are resource-extractive and drain nations' wealth. The increasing extractiveness of North African regimes over time is one reason for, the Arab Spring occurred (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

It is crucial in economic reforms to actively involve young people, but this would provide them with the means to have a genuine political voice,

which might disrupt the networks of patronage still in place despite the move away from authoritarianism. As the political and individual values of the youth are increasingly diverging from those of previous generations in favour of more liberalism in both politics and economy. Paciello et al. (2016) find that youth policy in Tunisia has worsened after the fall of Ben Ali, as social conflicts caused by rising inequalities and a failed development model are increasingly reduced to a question of juvenile extremists and to Islamist/non-Islamist cultural divides, which are dealt with using "a mix of repression and the preaching of tolerance through educational programs".

8   Conclusions

Instead of focusing on supposed 'youth bulges' or youth extremism or youth apathy when explaining the crisis of the Arab world, it is more fruitful to analyse the structural problems—political and economic—that have led to uprisings and demands for change. As Inayatullah (2016) notes, it is better to look at the young population in Morocco and Tunisia both as a challenge and as an opportunity for their governments. What makes a difference is how political and economic institutions operate, as this has tremendous repercussion on the private choices and public stances of ordinary citizens. Radical policy changes are needed in the region to ensure that the youth does not remain a constant source of problems and worry, but despite the 2011 uprisings such changes have not been implemented. It is clear that the presence of active, educated and jobless—or at best precariously employed young people—can become a further source of destabilization for an already economically struggling country. Many young Moroccans and Tunisians cannot meet such social expectations linked to family, status and consumption. Forming families and earning a good life is impossible for the majority, leading to dissatisfaction, a feeling of uselessness and desire to escape through emigration. Interestingly, these feelings and grievances are not confined to the Maghreb region, suggesting that structural problems linked to the economic system in place are to blame. As we observed in the 2018 municipal elections in Tunisia, youth participation was dramatically low and this trend must be rapidly inverted to put youth potential at the core of the policies, as observed by the NGO *Mourakiboun* (Delmas, 2018), but this is unlikely to occur in a worsening economic environment.

Inayatullah (2016) reflects on the opportunities of demographic change in the MENA region in terms of four future scenarios in 2050. In the first scenario, the development of a peer-to-peer sharing economy and cyber cooperatives would bring governments and economies to work together resulting in greater development. This is unlikely to occur given the existing structural problems and inequalities that plague Tunisia and Morocco. In addition, the concentration of wealth coincides with political power, preventing most likely the creation of a larger middle-class. The second scenario foresees unemployed and disempowered youth stuck in an economic system where the human labour is substituted by automated machines. The outcome of this scenario is the break of social links, especially the intergenerational one. In the third scenario, 'digital' natives and the elderly do not communicate at all: they live in different techno-cultural enclaves. This might indeed occur, but it would simply be a social division with the economic problems remaining and the (in)ability of the labour market to absorb young people as unchanged. In the last scenario, Inayatullah (2016: 30) foresees the end of the capitalist system, where the youth bulge is no longer a security threat: "in a post-capitalist society where technology allows for survival for all, fighting over scarce resources becomes a non-issue". Inayatullah's predictions about MENA youth are strictly linked to technological revolutions, namely digital, genomics, manufacturing and energy-based. The economy would increasingly move to a "peer-to-peer cooperative and sharing economies challenging traditional capitalism" (Inayatullah, 2016). More prosaically, it appears that without a fundamental rethink of the role of the state in the economy as both an employer and a legislator limiting the reach of large business interests and in fostering citizens' rights, the Tunisian and Moroccan economies are destined to muddle through. In this case, demographic change might indeed coincide with greater public liberties and even full democratization, but from an economic perspective not much would change for the vast majority of the young citizens.

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It Is All About the Numbers of Immigrants: Population and Politics in Australia and New Zealand

Peter McDonald and Andrew Markus

P. McDonald (✉)
Emeritus Professor of Demography, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
e-mail: Peter.McDonald@anu.edu.au

University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

A. Markus
Emeritus Professor, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

1   Introduction: Recent Demographic Trends in Australia and New Zealand

Australia's rate of population growth was relatively constant from 1992 to 2005, averaging about 1.2% per annum. Subsequently, its rate of growth shifted to a higher plane, averaging 1.7% in the decade, 2007 and 2016. The rate of population growth in New Zealand has fluctuated much more widely being as low as 0.5% in 1999 and 2000 and in 2011–2012, but as high as 2.2% in 2016 (Fig. 1). In recent years, both countries have had population growth rates that are on the high end among OECD countries (UNPD, 2017). In both countries, the annual rate of natural increase has fallen from 1992 to 2016, from 0.9% to 0.6% in New Zealand and from 0.8% to 0.6% in Australia.

In both countries, the wide fluctuations in the rate of population growth after 1992 have been due almost entirely to changes in rate of

Fig. 1   Age pyramids in 1990–2020–2040 in Australia and New Zealand (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

international migration. Political debate has therefore been focused upon levels of migration except for a short period in the early 2000s, when declining fertility was a topic of political conversation in Australia (see Fig. A.11.1 in the online appendix for details).

As debate about population growth in the two countries has been confined largely to changes in the level of international migration, this chapter focuses on the politics of international migration. Other issues that have drawn attention but with less controversy include population distribution, population ageing and ethnic composition. In relation to population distribution, the recent debate is about the concentration of 10 million of Australia's 25 million population in just two cities—Sydney and Melbourne. Australia's two largest cities have grown rapidly on the back of strong labour demand. Melbourne's growth has been particularly rapid in recent times, growing at around 2.5% per annum. Not only does Melbourne attract large numbers of international migrants, it experiences net positive migration from its hinterland in the State of Victoria and from every other state and territory in Australia. Sydney, in contrast, experiences a net loss to the rest of Australia from internal migration but slightly higher international migration than Melbourne (ABS, 2019). The current debate on population distribution is considered at the end of the chapter.

If present demographic trends continue, Australia and New Zealand will be two of the youngest countries in the OECD with their age structures still concentrated in the working ages long into the future (see the age pyramids in Fig. 1). If net international migration continues at 200,000 per annum and the fertility rate remains around 1.8 births per woman, 20.5% of the Australian population will be aged 65 years and over in 2051, a level below that applying today in some OECD countries (McDonald, 2018a). The age composition of Australia and New Zealand in 2020 was not typical of other OECD countries with the centre of gravity of the distribution still clearly in the lower half of the pyramids and is projected to remain relatively young for the year 2040.

Population ageing is an important issue in Australia and New Zealand but the capacity to deal with its consequences is better than in most other higher-income countries (in contrast to other OECD countries, see Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012). In the past decade in Australia, the labour force has been growing faster than the population. The essential issue with the ageing of the population is not the rate of growth of the

older population but the rate of growth of per capita government expenditure on aged persons. In Australia, between 1980 and 2010, per capita public expenditure on health for persons aged 75 and over increased six times in real terms while the population aged 75 and over increased less than three times (Australian National Transfer Accounts). Population ageing enters political debate about population mainly through the deflating impact that international migration has upon population ageing and, hence, upon the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018; McDonald & Temple, 2009, 2010, 2014).

Australia and New Zealand both have very high and increasing proportions of their populations born in another country. In the case of New Zealand, at the 2013 Census, 25% of the population was born outside of New Zealand, compared to 19% in 2001. For Australia, the equivalent percentage at the 2016 Census was 27% compared to 23% in 2001. Over 15% of New Zealand's citizens live in another country with 13% of its citizens living in Australia.

There has been some debate about the extent to which international migration alters the ethnic composition of the two countries, but this debate does not extend to the fertility rates of international migrants. On average, the fertility rates of immigrants have been very similar to those of the native-born population. This is largely because immigrants to Australia and New Zealand are skewed to the skilled, more highly educated end, different from many European countries that took up refugees in large numbers on humanitarian grounds with larger shares of low-skilled individuals. Changes in the ethnic composition of births are not due to differences in fertility rates across ethnic groups but due to the young age distribution of immigrants. Immigrants to Australia and New Zealand have their children soon after they arrive (McDonald, 2018b). In 2016, about 25% of all births in Australia had at least one parent born in Asia. Furthermore, the increment to the non-Australian-born population between 2011 and 2016 was 100% Asian because the numbers of persons born in most European-source countries in Australia, except the UK, are declining as deaths exceed new arrivals. Thus, the composition of the Australian population is shifting relatively rapidly towards Asian-origin countries. In 2006, 5.5% of the Australian population had been born in Asia; in 2016, this percentage had risen to 13.5% (McDonald, 2019). Political debate related to the origins of the Australian population and attitudes and opinions are discussed below.

The chapter begins with a historical review of population and politics from the 1940s to 1991. This is followed by analysis of formal immigration trends and policies from 1991 onwards and political debate about these policies. As irregular migration has been an important aspect of Australian politics since 1991, the politics surrounding irregular migration are then discussed. Then, the chapter examines public opinion on population and migration in Australia based on opinion polls. The chapter ends with a review of contemporary opinion on population policy, still fluid in the context of the 2019 federal election.

2 Background: The Period to 1991

During the first 200 years following the European settlement of the Australian colonies, concern arose from time to time about the viability of Australia and New Zealand given their small populations. Assisted migration programmes began in the 1830s, there was a royal commission into the decline of the birth rate in 1903, and, in the 1930s, the phrase 'populate or perish' was coined by William Morris Hughes, a former Prime Minister. Following the Second World War, the population of Australia was around 8 million and official projections showed it would be still 8 million in 2000 given the relatively low levels of migration and fertility that had prevailed since the 1930s (Borrie, 1948). In this situation, the then government of Australia embarked upon a vigorous post-war migration programme (Calwell, 1949). Later, following the increase of the birth rate in the 1950s, there was an implicit policy target of two percent per annum for the rate of population growth, half of which would be contributed by international migration (APIC, 1977). On average, for the years 1949 to 1972, this target was met. Nation building was the main rationale for the post-war migration programme. The levels of annual net migration to Australia from 1947 onwards are shown in Fig. 2.

The vertical line shown at year 2006 delineates a change in the definition of the Australian resident population that made it more likely that temporary migrants would be counted into the population. Prior to 1 July 2006, a person was counted into (or out of) the Australian population if he/she had been resident (not resident) in Australia for a continuous period of 12 months. From 1 July 2006, this criterion was changed to being resident in Australia for a total of 12 months in the previous 16 months, irrespective of any absences during the 16 months.

Fig. 2 Net International Migration to Australia, 1947–2016, numbers (*Source* Australian Bureau of Statistics [2019])

In the 1970s, following a quarter of a century of rapid population growth and with the emergence of the 'limits to growth'-movement, for the first time in earnest, voices emerged in opposition to rapid population growth and hence, to the size of the migration intake (Betts, 1999). However, not in response to the 'limits to growth' argument, the Australian birth rate fell in the 1970s from its relatively high 'baby-boom' levels to around replacement level and the Australian Government cut the migration intake in response to worsening economic conditions. Throughout history, even back into the nineteenth century, migration intakes were reduced in consequence of economic downturns and reductions in the demand for labour and boosted in the good times.

3   Fertility as an Object of Policy Since 1991

Falling fertility was one of the main policy issues at the 2004 federal election at which the main parties had similar but competing policies to support families with children. The then conservative government won the election by winning the outer suburban seats in the big cities where families with children predominate. The policies introduced at the time

provided substantial income support for families with children and a major subsidy to childcare costs. Subsequently, the total fertility rate rose and remained well above its 2001 level until 2017. While there is debate about whether the policy changes stimulated the increase in fertility (McDonald, 2015b), the level of the fertility rate has remained off the political agenda since the 2004 election.

3.1   The Rationale of Australian Migration Policy Is Changed—The 1990s

The formal Australian programme of permanent migration is divided into two streams: the Skilled Stream consisting of people selected on the basis of their employment skills and the Family Stream that consists of family members of Australian citizens or permanent residents. In the early 1990s, the Family Stream, which had little relationship to labour demand, constituted two-thirds of the permanent migration programme (Department of Home Affairs, 2018: Table 3.1). Also, in 1991, the unemployment rate of immigrants was 3.3% points higher than that of the Australian-born population (Productivity Commission, 2006: Table 4.7). These circumstances led the then Labor Government to instigate a major reassessment of policy towards migration that was in the interests of Australia's economic development targeting occupations where skill shortages were impeding productive investment.

Following a review of the system, two radical changes of direction took place in 1995. First, the existing points system for the selection of new permanent residents was revised with the points being determined by the skill level of the applicant, and entry was limited to those with higher-level skills as defined by a list of eligible occupations. Points were awarded for qualifications, work experience, age and English proficiency (Boucher, 2016). Second, in response to the increasing internationalization of the Australian economy and to assist international companies to move their workers from country to country, the view was taken that a more comprehensive and efficient form of temporary skilled migration was required (Khoo et al., 2007; Roach, 1995). Thus, temporary migration served as an incentive for such companies to have a base in Australia. The permanent migration process and the then existing forms of temporary migration were slow, cumbersome, sometimes complex and somewhat unpredictable. Later, the temporary skilled migration scheme provided a central role for employer sponsorship in the migration programme by

providing a streamlined approach in a market where speed plays an important role. Only managers, professionals, para-professional and skilled trades occupations were included on the list of allowable skilled migration occupations. Workers without these skills could enter Australia only as New Zealand citizens (who have had free entry to the Australian labour market since the early 1980s), as humanitarian migrants or through the now much more restricted family stream (for more detail, see McDonald, 2015a).

The new policy approach had relatively broad political appeal as employers were more able to deal with their skill shortages and had a major role in the selection of at least temporary skilled workers. Unions also saw the new direction as offering them the opportunity to argue, if necessary, that there were already sufficient workers available in Australia in certain occupations and, hence, that these occupations should not be included on the list of allowable occupations for skilled migration. Since the mid-1990s, there has been continuing debate in Australia, especially between employers and unions, about which occupations to include on the list of occupations eligible for migration, either permanent or temporary. The temporary skilled migration programme (until 2017 designated as the '457' visa sub-class), which covers a much wider range of occupations than the permanent skilled programme and, on the margins, is open to nefarious practices by employers, has been particularly prone to such debate. Successive governments have dealt with this debate through relatively frequent independent or parliamentary enquiries into the organization and operation of the 457 visas.[1] This debate about the inclusion or exclusion of occupations tends to occur mainly at the higher levels of policymaking and political lobbying rather than at the level of the broader population, although both major political parties, in tweaking migration policy, will state that they are doing so in order to prioritize 'jobs for Australians'.

3.2   Formal Migration Since 1991

These major policy changes were instigated by a Labor Government soon before they lost government in 1996 but were operationalized by the

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[1] See Azarias et al. (2014) for the latest of the independent enquiries and a history of previous enquiries.

new Coalition Government led by John Howard. The new conserva-
tive government supported the change in policy direction but initially
restricted immigration to a relatively low level (72,000 net in 1997,
Fig. 2). Howard's opposition to Asian migration expressed in 1988 had
been subject to public criticism before his election in 1996 and had not
been in evidence at the time of the 1996 election. By 1996, his own
middle-class electorate in Sydney had become heavily Asian. The non-
discriminatory foundation of Australian migration policy that came into
being in the 1970s remained in place under the new government and
the conservative Liberal-National Coalition Party has never returned to
the idea of a racially, discriminatory migration programme. Indeed, it
has defended non-discriminatory immigration against the more extreme
right-wing groups that have emerged in the past 20 years (discussed
below).

Importantly, from the inception of the post-war migration programme
in 1947 until today, Australia has had a Department of Immigration
(under various names across time) and a Minister for Immigration.
Although the intake levels in the annual Migration Programme are deter-
mined by the Cabinet with input from many sources, public and private,
the Minister for Immigration and the Department of Immigration have
played a central role in the development of migration policy. This concen-
tration of power over the directions of migration has tended to yield
a more coherent approach to migration than is the case in many other
countries where debate about migration has no centroid where decisions
are taken. It has also helped to generate largely bipartisan support for
migration policy across the two major political parties.

Since 1995, this centralized policy-making has led to the gradual tran-
sition of the permanent and temporary skilled migration programmes,
initially quite separate, into a more integrated system in which perma-
nent migration is most often preceded by a period of temporary residence
and application for permanent residence on-shore by temporary skilled
migrants, international students and even working holiday makers. Thus,
the broad story of policy change in Australia over the past 20 years is
one of movement from a cumbersome, inflexible, untargeted migration
programme to one that is highly flexible based on initial temporary resi-
dence and responsive to shifts in labour demand both in terms of numbers
and occupations. The shift to temporary residence in Australia has meant
that 4.6% of all employed persons in Australia were temporary residents,

excluding New Zealand citizens (ABS, Australian Census and Temporary Entrants Integrated Dataset, 2016 Census).

Debate about population growth in the two countries is dominated by debate about the number of immigrants. As is evident from Fig. 2, annual net international migration increased in the years of the Howard conservative government from 72,000 in 1997 to 244,000 in 2007. This occurred without opposition from the Labor Party. In 2008, the first year of the new Rudd Labor Government, net migration rose to the unprecedently high level of 316,000, that is 1.5% of population (see Fig. A.11.2 in the online appendix). This was caused by a sudden increase in the numbers of international students in the Vocational and Further Education sector (53,000 increase in grants in one year from 2007–2008 to 2008–2009) consisting mainly of persons from South Asia taking short courses in the hope of qualifying for permanent residence in Australia (Department of Immigration & Border Protection, 2014), aided by less-than-honest migration agents in South Asia and unscrupulous education providers in Australia. This strategy was scotched in February 2010 through a revamp of the skilled migration occupation list. Since then, net migration has fallen back to an average of around 200,000 per annum (about 0.8% of population).

Since 2012, the Australian Government has set the Migration Programme at 190,000 per annum every year, two-thirds being skilled migrants and one-third being family migrants very largely consisting of spouses and partners of Australian citizens and permanent residents. On top of this, there has been an intake of between 13,000 and 22,000 humanitarian immigrants, the highest level being set to accommodate Syrian and Iraqi refugees in 2016–2017 (ABS, 2019). The 190,000 level is in the centre of a range that economic-demographic modelling has shown produces the most favourable effect on the age distribution of the population defined by the impact of the level of net migration on GDP per capita (McDonald & Temple, 2009, 2010, 2014).

New Zealand's skilled permanent and temporary migration policies have been broadly similar to Australia's, although certain outcomes differ. Hawthorne (2011) provides a detailed comparison of the skilled migration policies of the two countries and the outcomes. At the time to which she referred the first decade of the twenty-first century, New Zealand's skilled entry consisted largely of persons already working in New Zealand as temporary skilled workers, and the largest source country was the UK. A smaller percentage of the skilled stream entry in Australia

applied on-shore and consisted mainly of former students. Because of this emphasis on students, the main source countries were India and China. New Zealand and Australia also have similar Family and Humanitarian programmes. In numerical terms, net migration to New Zealand has been subject to much greater volatility than has been the case for Australia. While net migration to Australia from 1947 onwards has never been negative and rarely even close to zero, in New Zealand, negative or near-zero net migration has been a common occurrence since 1992 (see Fig. A.11.3 in the online appendix). On the other hand, in 2016, net migration rose to 1.52% of the total population, a level above any level reached by Australia since 1991. In recognition of this very high level, the New Zealand Labor Party introduced a policy to reduce migration by 20,000 to 30,000 to the 2017 election and was duly elected (Trevett, 2017).

The fluctuations in net migration to New Zealand are to a large extent the result of the number of New Zealand citizens that move to Australia. Under the long-standing Trans-Tasman agreement, Australian and New Zealand citizens are free to move between the two countries. At times when economic conditions are favourable in Australia, migration from New Zealand to Australia tends to be high. In 2001, Australia moved to restrict movement from New Zealand by excluding New Zealand citizens from eligibility for Australian social security benefits and simultaneously making it difficult for New Zealand citizens to obtain Australian citizenship. Despite this policy shift, New Zealanders moved to Australia in very large numbers during the economic boom of the 2000s. In September 2016, there were 677,000 New Zealand citizens in Australia, equivalent to about 15% of the total population of New Zealand. Despite the continuing concerted efforts of the New Zealand Government to convince the Australian Government to provide New Zealanders in Australia with Australian citizenship, the Australian Government resisted until July 2017 when a pathway to citizenship was opened to New Zealand citizens of 'good character' who had lived in Australia for five years and had an annual income above $53,900.

4   The Politics of Regular International Migration in Australia Since 1991

4.1   Discrimination on the Basis of Race

As already observed, the conservative government of Howard transformed both the level and composition of migration to Australia in its 11-year term (1996 to 2007). Despite an earlier objection (1988) by Howard to the level of migration from Asia, the majority of migrants during this period came from Asia, especially China and India. These two countries are by far the main source countries of international students and the transition from international student to permanent resident (often via periods on other temporary visa types) has been a major reason for the high proportion of new permanent residents coming from these countries. Between 2006 and 2011, 87% of the increment to the overseas-born population of Australia was Asian-born. This percentage rose to close to 100% in the 2011–2016 period with 59% of the increase in the Asian-born component of the population coming from China and India (McDonald, 2019).

Upon his rise to Prime Minister in 1996, Howard was confronted by the election to the House of Representatives of an independent, disendorsed member of his own party, Pauline Hanson, who, for the past 20 years, has attempted to position herself and her One Nation Party as the voice of the radical right. In her maiden speech in 1996, Hanson said that Australia was in danger of being "swamped by Asians" (Hanson, 1996).

Howard set out to distance himself and the government from these views essentially by ignoring Hanson. In his first term of office, Howard and the then Leader of the Labor Opposition, Kim Beazley, led a successful bipartisan motion in the Australian Parliament against racial discrimination and reaffirming support for a non-discriminatory immigration policy. In 1988, Howard had voted against a similar motion brought to the parliament by the Hawke Labor Government.

In 2018, organized opposition to Asian migration tends to be confined to the electorally unpopular, extreme right, especially the Australia First Party. Being on the fringe, this party expresses its views very forthrightly calling for the reinstatement of the White Australia Policy and inviting all non-White Australians to leave Australia permanently (Australia First Party, 2019). At the 2016 federal election, it did not run any candidates

and, in 2018, its leader ran for the federal seat of Longman (Queensland) in a by-election and won 0.3% of the vote.

4.2 Environment, Infrastructure and the Economy

The level of immigration in Australia rose during the 2000s because of very strong labour demand during the long, economic boom that was centred primarily upon mining development (Fig. 2). In this period, there was a considerable increase in migration to then mining boom state of Western Australia while the traditional centres of Australian immigration, Sydney and Melbourne, continued to receive large numbers. The opening of new onshore pathways to permanent residence was supported by both major political parties during this time and net migration from New Zealand to Australia ballooned reaching a peak of around 40,000 in one year.

There has been no major increase in unemployment in Australia since the early 1990s and the country has gone without an economic recession for over 26 years. Even during the global financial crisis commencing in late 2008, the Australian economic growth rate never dropped below zero for two consecutive quarters and the increases in unemployment were moderate. For the first time in an economic downturn, the Australian Government did not cut the migration intake and there is a belief in government circles that that decision coupled with the economic stimuli put in place by the then Rudd Labor Government saw the country through the crisis. This perceived success has seen subsequent governments maintain a relatively high and constant level of migration; that is, the economic imperative has prevailed in immigration decision-making.

This constancy of migration policy occurred despite occasional blips along the way. Following the release of official population projections by the Australian Treasury showing a population of 36 million people by 2050, in October 2009, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd welcomed this future saying that he believed in a "big Australia" (ABC, 2009). The broad sentiment was supported by the then Leader of the Opposition (later, Prime Minister) Malcolm Turnbull, but he added that this result was good "so long as we have the infrastructure to enable us to live here in a sustainable way" (ABC, 2009). This statement, echoed by a number of other commentators at the time, is typical of the tension in the Australian debate between the negative effects of immigration on infrastructure in

cities and the positive effects on productive investment through facilitation of the entry of skilled labour. The debate received further impetus in 2010, when Julia Gillard, wishing to establish differences between Rudd and herself in her successful attempt to unseat Rudd as the Labor Prime Minister, distanced herself from the 'big Australia' position (cf. Gordon, 2010). Gillard also launched an attack upon the temporary skilled visa scheme saying that it was taking the jobs of Australians. When she became Prime Minister, however, there was substantially no change to migration policy and there was an essentially bipartisan approach to immigration at the 2010 federal election.

Since the decline of construction activity in the mining industry, international migration to Western Australia has fallen away to a low level and instead has been concentrated heavily on Australia's two major cities, Sydney and Melbourne. Both cities, especially Melbourne, have been experiencing rapid population growth. In 2015–2016, Melbourne had net positive migration from the rest of the State of Victoria and from every other state and territory in Australia, besides considerable international migration. Its population grew by 120,000 in one year (2.7% per annum) (McDonald, 2018b). This very high level of growth put pressure on urban infrastructure, especially on transport and upon the housing market. Consequently, the anti-migration lobby that has continued to operate at a low level since the early 1970s has been given new impetus (ABC, 2019).

Concern has been expressed about the emergence of 'two Australias', Sydney and Melbourne, on one hand, and the rest of Australia on the other, with Sydney and Melbourne being affluent and Asian and the rest of the country being non-affluent and non-Asian (Megalogenis, 2017). However, since Australian federation, Sydney and Melbourne have always been considered to be different worlds compared with much of the rest of Australia. This is the reason that the National Party exists—to look after the interests of 'country' people. Continued and very strong support for multiculturalism with 83–86% agreeing that multiculturalism has been good for Australia (see discussion below) tends to argue against adding a new racial dimension to this very long-term political reality.

So far, the relatively high and constant intake of migrants has not encountered major opposition from the main political parties including, importantly, the Greens Party, which says little about regular migration. Even Hanson's One Nation Party is sitting on the fence in stating in its

aims that migration should take economic investment into account while not overloading infrastructure or creating unemployment.

The Liberal-National Coalition Government has recently merged immigration policy with homeland security and border control. Some policy directions give the strong impression that the border control authorities wish to subject new immigrants to greater scrutiny from the security perspective. This includes a proposal to introduce a provisional permanent residence visa for skilled immigrants—provisional until they have proven themselves to be good Australians—and a bill to make citizenship much more difficult to obtain. This latter bill proposed an English test at university entry level as a prerequisite for citizenship. This would have precluded a very large number of refugees from obtaining citizenship along with many partners of Australian citizens (Mares, 2017). The bill was opposed by the Labor Party and was defeated in the Senate. While these policy directions may not affect the number of people migrating to Australia because labour demand remains high, it could affect the quality of the skilled arrivals and be highly discriminatory in relation to refugees accepted into Australia whose levels of English language proficiency are very often low. By 2020, the Coalition Government appeared to have moved away from increasing the English language requirement as a condition of citizenship.

5   THE POLITICS OF IRREGULAR
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

In Australia today, the general perception of migration policy is that it is policy on irregular migration, essentially people arriving by boat and claiming asylum. The two major political parties and Hanson's One Nation Party are in agreement that irregular arrival by boat must be stopped completely. This is based on a fear that very large numbers will arrive if the border was open, on the concern that asylum seekers will die while attempting to reach Australian landfall (and there have been some very graphic incidences of this), that this route may be used by terrorists wishing to infiltrate Australian society, that many people will arrive who are not political refugees, and that this route serves the interests of people smugglers and comes at the expense of already assessed refugees in UNHCR camps around the world. Based on polling, a majority of Australians are strongly opposed to irregular arrival by boat. The Liberal-National Coalition ran very heavily upon a 'stop the boats' agenda at the

2013 election and considers that this position was an important element in its resounding victory in that election. Since 2013, the government has implemented draconian policies that have indeed stopped the boats.

The approach has been to break the people smuggler business model and research among potential Afghan refugees in Iran has shown that this goal has been achieved (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2017). Before the flow of boats stopped, boats were intercepted on the high sea and sent back to Indonesia, sometimes by transferring the occupants to unsinkable life vessels. While the Indonesian Government expressed objection to this approach, there is also a degree of acceptance because the Indonesian Government does not want to deal with large flows of irregular migrants through its country heading for Australia. Most controversially, asylum seekers who arrived on Australian territory immediately after the crackdown were shifted off to processing centres on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and on Nauru. The number held offshore rose from 571 to 2,342 from July 2013 to February 2014 (Parliament of Australia, 2016). Women and children in these groups were gradually moved to Australia but many men remain in these dire circumstances. The Greens Party has been largely alone in promoting a softer policy on irregular arrivals by boat. This has not emerged as a major area of policy debate at the May 2019 federal election. Neither of the major parties wishes to be perceived by the electorate as soft on irregular arrivals by boat.

In 2018, it emerged that asylum seekers are arriving in large numbers by plane on tourist visas. Having arrived, they claim asylum and apply for residence usually on the ground they are unable to practise their religion in their own country. The largest group are Christians from Malaysia and China (Administrative Appeals Court, 2019). On claiming asylum, they are given a bridging visa and allowed to remain in Australia while their case is being heard. This process can last 2 to 4 years. During this time, they are permitted to work. As it is relatively well known that there is a low success rate for these applications and as the people concerned usually do not employ legal advice, there is a suspicion that this is a strategy for lower-skilled people to obtain temporary work rights in Australia. Cases are heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for which the caseload rose from 17,480 in July 2016 to 50,887 in October 2018. As the volume of cases is clogging up the court system thus extending the stays of the applicants, it can be expected that some action will be taken to restrict this activity (Crowe, 2018).

6   Public Opinion on Australia's Immigration Policy

There is substantial evidence to indicate that among Western nations Australia and Canada rank as the most receptive to immigration (Markus, 2012; Reitz, 2011). A major survey conducted between 2012 and 2014 in 142 countries by Gallup World Poll provides scope for comparison across regions. The aggregated results (see Table A.11.1 in the online appendix) indicate that support for immigration at current or higher levels was at 69% in the Oceania region (Australia and New Zealand), 57% in North America (Canada and the US), and at 38% in Europe (IOM, 2015). The Gallup 2016–2017 Migrant Acceptance Index found that Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) ranked first and North America second. In the ranking of 138 countries, Australia ranked seventh (Gallup, 2017).

Questions similar to North American surveys used in Australian polling provide the basis for cross-country comparison (see Table A.11.2 in the online appendix). 83% of respondents agreed that 'immigrants are generally good for the Australian economy', while only a minority at 29% agreed that 'immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Australia' (ANU Poll, 2015).

The 2016 Lowy Institute Poll, an annual survey with a focus on foreign policy, found that just 24% of respondents disagreed with the proposition that 'overall, immigration has a positive impact on the economy of Australia, while 73 percent agreed'; 25% disagreed with the view that 'immigrants strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents, 72 percent agreed'. A larger proportion, but still a minority at 35%, were in agreement that 'immigrants take away jobs from other Australians' (Oliver, 2016). In 2018, the Scanlon Foundation survey found agreement with this proposition at 31% (Markus, 2018).

Beginning in 2007, and on an annual basis since 2009, the Scanlon Foundation has conducted surveys of Australian attitudes to immigration, cultural diversity and social cohesion. Eleven national surveys have been conducted, with additional local area and experimental surveys to test the impact on results of different modes of surveying (Markus, various years). The Scanlon Foundation surveys include a question which has been a staple of Australian surveying since 1951, which asks respondents if they consider the immigration intake to be too high, about right, or too low (Goot, 1999). The record of polling indicates considerable volatility of

response. In periods of increasing or relatively high unemployment, there has been majority of support for the view that the intake is too high. In times of economic growth and low unemployment, there is majority support for the level of current immigration or its increase. During the recession of the early 1990s, a large majority (over 70% at its peak) considered the intake to be 'too high' while, since 2000, this has been a minority viewpoint in most surveys.

Over the years 2001–2009, most surveys found that the proportion who considered the intake to be 'about right' or 'too low' was in the range 54 to 57%. In 2010, in the context of the 'big Australia' debates, the Scanlon Foundation survey found that agreement that the intake was 'about right' or 'too low' fell to 46%, while the 'too high' response increased by ten percentage points to 47%. This finding was almost identical to the 46% average result from five polls conducted by survey agencies in the period March–July 2010 (The Age 2010 as cited in Markus, 2012; Roy Morgan, 2010). This suggests that public opinion is at least somewhat sensitive to fluctuations in the public debate.

The increased negativity towards immigration was temporary. Between 2011 and 2013, the proportion in agreement that the intake was too high was in the range 38–42% and, between 2014 and 2016, a lower 34–35%. In 2016, a substantial majority (59%) considered that the intake was 'about right' or 'too low' and, in 2017, a marginally lower 56% (Table 1). Since 2016, there has been an increase in the proportion who consider the intake to be 'too high', an increase of nine percentage points to 43% in 2018, although the finding of the Scanlon Foundation surveys is that

Table 1 'What do you think of the number of immigrants accepted into Australia?' 2012–2018

	Too high (%)	About right (%)	Too low (%)	Refused/Don't know (%)
2012	38	42	14	7
2013	42	38	13	7
2014	35	42	17	8
2015	35	41	19	5
2016	34	40	19	7
2017	37	40	16	7
2018	43	35	17	4

Source Scanlon Foundation (Markus, 2012–2018)

the majority (52%) are of the view that the intake is 'about right' or 'too low'.

Several surveys conducted in 2016 and 2017 support the pattern indicated by Scanlon Foundation surveys, with those who consider the intake to be too high being in the range 34–42%. Thus, the 2016 Australian Election Study found support for a reduction in immigration at 42%, the 2017 Lowy Institute Poll obtained agreement with the view that the intake was too high at 40% and the 2017 Life in Australia survey an identical 40%. In 2018, the October Fairfax-Ipsos poll found 45% in favour of a reduction in the intake and the Life in Australia survey 44%. But a number of other polls, using a range of questions and sampling methodologies, found 54% to 72% in support of a reduction in the intake, findings that received prominent attention in the Australian media (Markus, 2017, 2018).

In sum, majority public opinion in Australia, in contrast to a number of European countries, accepts the reality that Australia is a country of immigration. Thus, the eleven Scanlon Foundation national surveys conducted since 2007 have obtained a consistent measure of agreement, in the range 62–68%, with the proposition that 'accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger'.

Also, in contrast to Europe, the concept of multiculturalism continues to obtain a high level of positive support. Since 2013, the Scanlon Foundation surveys asked for response to the proposition that 'multiculturalism has been good for Australia'. Agreement has been consistent, in the range 83–86%. Of those who are favourable towards multiculturalism, the support of a substantial proportion is conditional on signs indicating a commitment to integrate, to accept what are seen as Australian values. For the majority, multiculturalism is understood as a two-way process of change, requiring adaptation by both Australia-born and immigrant. The 2016–2018 Scanlon Foundation surveys presented respondents with two propositions that 'we should do more to learn about the customs and heritage of different ethnic and cultural groups in this country', and 'people who come to Australia should change their behaviour to be more like Australians'. Close to two out of three respondents (in the range 60–66%) indicated agreement with both propositions. Immigration is an issue which can evoke very strong feelings, with entrenched negative views held by close to 10% of the population, indicated by the 10–15% who disagree that multiculturalism has been good for Australia. When those with strongly held negative views and those tending negative are

combined, surveys find that more than one-third of Australians agree that the immigration intake is too high (43% in 2018) and 26–30% disagree with the value of a diverse intake.

There are a range of views on immigration and cultural diversity, as on all issues within the political realm, and relatively high levels of negative opinion towards Muslims. Strident minority viewpoints are in evidence in social media, public campaigns and during elections. The populist One Nation Party, which received 4.3% of the national vote in the 2016 Senate election, but stronger levels of support on a regional basis, with voter support in excess of 25% in a number of Queensland state electorates, channels discontent with a particular focus on immigration. The 2017 Scanlon Foundation survey found that 78% of One Nation supporters 'strongly agree' with the proposition that 'people who come to Australia should change their behaviour to be more like Australians' and 82% disagree with the value of a diverse immigration intake (Markus, 2017).

Australia does as well as any country in its immigration and settlement policies—but there is no shortage of evidence of the challenges posed by immigration for host society and immigrant.

7   The Contemporary Situation

In response to the calls for lower migration from their Coalition colleagues, the two Ministers most involved in setting the level of the Australian migration programme, the Treasurer and the Minister for Home Affairs, in rapid-fire, made strong statements in support of current migration policy and their two departments published a joint report which supports the continuation of migration at its present level (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). On 4 May 2018, a *National Compact on Permanent Migration* (Migration Council of Australia, 2018) was issued with the signatories being the leading business organizations, unions including the Australian Council of Trade Unions and community organizations. This Compact is a powerful statement in support of current migration levels and of migration in general, stating:

> Australia is a country based on multicultural values where migrants enjoy the equality of opportunity to participate and benefit from Australia's social, economic and political life. As our economic opportunities in the Asia Pacific continue to advance and our population ages, Australia will need migrants to bring skills and youth to complement and develop our

domestic workforce and to help to grow the national income needed to support our high standard of living. (Migration Council of Australia, 2018)

The strength of this statement and the inclusion of several unions as signatories suggest that it is unlikely that Australia will move very far from its present migration programme targets in the short term. This conclusion is reinforced by a recent analysis of future labour demand in Australia that projects a 16% increase in the number of employed persons in the next eight years and little capacity to meet that demand from local sources (McDonald, 2018b; Shah & Dixon, 2018).

In the 2018 election in the State of Victoria, the Labor Party won with a massive majority while supporting the high immigration levels that have led to the rapid growth of Melbourne. Of the eight states and territories, only New South Wales has called for a lower migrant intake and six of the eight would like to see more immigrants coming to their jurisdictions.

In December 2018, the level of the migration intake was the leading agenda item on a meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) at which the Prime Minister meets with the Premiers and First Ministers of all the states and territories. At the invitation of the Prime Minister, an author of this chapter, Peter McDonald, was asked to present the argument to COAG on why migration should be continued at its present level. He focussed on two main arguments: (1) that at least for the next decade, labour demand will outstrip labour supply with migration as the only option for balance, and (2) that migration (as discussed earlier in this chapter) has a beneficial effect upon population ageing. At this meeting, it was agreed that the states and territories will have a greater role in setting the migration target and that efforts should be made to spread the immigrants more broadly across Australia.

The forces calling for much reduced levels of international migration in Australia rallied again with the 2019 federal election in view. Dissident members on the right wing of the ruling Coalition Government such as the deposed former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, were among those calling for a much lower migration level (a reduction from 190,000 to 70,000). The Premier of the largest state New South Wales, Gladys Berejiklian, called for a halving of net migration to that state in order to relieve pressure upon the city of Sydney. She set up a review panel to advise her on this strategy (cf. SBS Korean, 2018). The NSW panel's report was provided to the Premier but not published. Berejiklian and her party won the 2019 election in New South Wales despite taking no specific approach

to immigration, and she won the election. A prominent former retailer, Dick Smith, poured money into advertising to substantially reduce the migration intake on the grounds of congestion in the two major cities. He also intended to fund anti-migration candidates in the 2019 federal election.

Those opposed to present migration levels pointed to the recent lowering of the migration intake by the new Labor Government of New Zealand—without pointing out that, before it was reduced, the rate of net migration to New Zealand was almost twice the Australian rate and that the new, lower New Zealand target remains above the current Australian rate.

The new objections to the level of immigration have been based largely upon congestion and housing prices in the two large cities of Sydney and Melbourne. In announcing a small cut in the immigration programme (190,000 to 160,000), the Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, referred to congestion in Sydney and Melbourne as justification for this cut (cf. Greene, 2019). The housing price argument, however, fell away in 2019 with substantial and continuing falls in prices in Sydney and Melbourne due primarily to more stringent lending restrictions by the banks. Both major political parties at the 2019 election supported the growth of the satellite cities surrounding Sydney and Melbourne through the construction of fast and connecting train services. For example, a new 32-minutes service between the regional city of Geelong and Melbourne was proposed by the Coalition Party. And both major parties emphasized infrastructure spending to relieve congestion.

8   Conclusion

Australia has a long history of migration and, since the cessation in the 1970s of discriminatory selection, immigrants have come to Australia from all of the countries of the world. In particular, there has been rapid growth in the numbers of people with Asian origins. Opposition to regular migration on the grounds of race or religion exists in Australia but it carries very little political weight and has virtually no impact on election results. The policy of multiculturalism is supported by five out of six Australians. It could be said that as Australia has taken people from a vast array of cultures, it has become more and more accepting of multi-culturalism. Opposition to undocumented migration remains very strong across the political spectrum in both Australia and New Zealand and, in

this regard, it has been argued that the cessation of irregular arrivals by boat has enabled successive governments to provide greater legitimacy to higher levels of regular migration. In the Australian case, very strict border controls have led to higher rather than lower levels of migration.

A majority of Australians consider that migration provides economic benefits to Australia and both the major political parties hold this view as well. There are pockets of opposition to the population growth that migration brings based on impacts to the environment and crowding in the major cities, but these objections do not feed through to a major impact on the ways that people vote. Improved economic well-being is one of the principal factors that influence the way that Australians vote and, from this perspective, migration and population growth are seen to be positives by most voters.

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The Politics of Demography in Unequal Societies: Argentina and Brazil Compared

Diego Wachs, Vitor Goncalves Cavalcanti, and Clara Galeazzi

1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the most important demographic issues in Latin America generally, with a focus on Argentina and Brazil, and how these issues interact with economic, political and social trends. The first section introduces the reader to major demographic trends of population ageing, migration and ethnicity, and urbanization. The following sections discuss each of these trends in greater detail, linking them to the region's pervasive problem of inequality. Last, the chapter discusses how the salient

D. Wachs (✉)
Care Policy and Evaluation Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
e-mail: d.wachs2@lse.ac.uk

V. Goncalves Cavalcanti
World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

C. Galeazzi
Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (CEENRG) at the Land Economy Department, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

demographic challenge of population ageing may exacerbate inequality, populism and macroeconomic crises.

With a current population of 44 million, Argentina is the third most populous country in South America, surpassed only by Colombia and Brazil (Fig. 1). It ranks 31st in world population and its population has been growing at a rate of 1.09% since the 1990s, very close to the median across countries worldwide (1.32%). Argentina is expected to keep growing at a declining rate and to reach a population of 52.6 million by 2040. With a population of 210.8 million in 2018, Brazil has the world's fifth largest population. The country grew at an annual average of 1.27% between 1990 and 2016 and is expected to reach a population of 231.6 million by 2040 (UN, 2017). The change in shape of the population pyramid depicted in Fig. 1 depicts the rapid ageing process both countries are facing. The median age in Argentina is expected to increase by nine years between 1990 and 2040. The case is more acute in Brazil,

Fig. 1 Population pyramids in Argentina and Brazil (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey], Median age [MA], ageing stage [AS]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

Table 1 Main demographic indicators for Argentina and Brazil in 2015

	Argentina	Brazil
Net migration[a] (% of population)	0.07%	0.01%
Size of age groups (% of population)		
0–17	30.0%	28.4%
18–35	56.1%	56.4%
65+	10.9%	8.0%
80+	2.7%	1.6%
65 + (% population 18–64)	18.5%	12.5%
Total population	43,417,765	205,962,108
Population density relative to CROP land area	39.7	30.8
City density[b,c] (population per km^2)	4,650	2,969

[a]Average 2010–2015
[b]2016 in Argentina
[c]Top 33 urban agglomerates in Argentina based on population size
Source Goerres et al. (2020), Lanfranchi et al. (2018), Embrapa (2017), and World Bank (2018)

where the expected age increase is almost 20 years. This steep increase in median age is a shared problem across Latin America, which will be the world region with the fastest increase in the old-age dependency ratio in the next decades (UN, 2017).

In stark contrast to their histories, neither Argentina nor Brazil have experienced important international migratory flows in recent decades. In 2015, net migration was less than 0.1% of the total population in both countries (Table 1). Moreover, the countries of origin of migrants have shifted. Whereas they previously migrated from overseas, they now migrate from neighbouring countries. The following section will delve deeper into the important connection between migration and ethnic composition of the two countries.

South America is the world's most urbanized region (when including Central America, Latin America is second only to North America). Argentina and Brazil surpass regional averages, with over 90 and 85% of their population residing in towns and cities, respectively. This high level of urbanization occurred in the twentieth century, within the span of two generations. Influencing factors included a push away from rural areas due to the introduction of capitalist modes of production, and a pulling towards industrial clustering in cities, which offered significant labour opportunities.

2   Migration and Ethnicity

2.1   Migration

Migration has shaped the history of Argentina. First inhabited by indigenous populations, the area now known as the Argentine Republic was a Spanish colony between 1580 and 1810. Great waves of immigrants, mainly European males from Italy and Spain (but also other European, Asian and Jewish minorities), arrived between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Argentina had the highest immigration to population ratio in the world (Glaeser et al., 2018). Immigrants mixed with the relatively smaller local indigenous population, an African base that had been brought during the Spanish conquest and the Spanish colonists. Brazil has had similar migration flows. Before the sixteenth century, it was home to native tribal societies. As a Portuguese colony between 1500 and 1815, the country experienced mainly Portuguese immigration, followed by an influx of Africans brought as slaves primordially from the African west coast. From 1884 until the decade preceding the Second World War, 4.2 million people migrated to Brazil from Western and Southern Europe, Japan, Syria and Turkey (IBGE, 2000).

Despite their history of immigration, Argentina and Brazil have not experienced substantial migratory flows in recent decades. In 2015, net migration was less than 0.1% of the total population in both countries, and their stock of migrants (those already in the countries) was very close to the world average (UN, 2017). Additionally, as shown in Fig. 2, the immigratory flow today comes mostly from other Latin American countries. Immigrants from Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia made up about 75% of the migratory flow to Argentina in 2015. Brazil shows a very similar composition, except that it also received a high number of immigrants from Haiti.[1] Notably, there is discrimination against immigrants from some of Argentina's neighbouring countries, likely because they are often associated with specific social classes.[2] Hence, migration

[1] This may be due a willingness by Brazilians to receive Haitians and because Brazil led the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti between 2004 and 2017. The mission arguably led to a greater reciprocal awareness by officials in both countries.

[2] A paper by Meseguer and Kemmerling (2018) found that fears of greater tax burdens due to increasing social expenditure are strong and robust predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments in Argentina. The authors attribute these findings to a differential in skills

Fig. 2 Immigration to Argentina and Brazil in 2015, top origin countries. In thousands (*Note* South American countries in Blue. Please note the different scales of the Y axis. *Source* Direccion Nacional de Migraciones [2018] and Policia Federal do Brasil [2017])

might already be indirectly addressed in the political agenda through the lens of social class and inequality, an important topic which we will expand on in the following section (Grimson, 2006; Pascucci, 2010).

Perhaps due to the relatively small number of immigrants in the last decades, immigration is neither an important issue of political debate nor an established topic in the agenda of major political parties in either country. One contemporary exception is the recent increase in Venezuelan migrants fleeing the political and economic crisis in their country. The United Nations Human Rights Council estimates that more than 4 million Venezuelans left their country between 2015 and 2019, with almost 208,000 and 150,000 migrating to Argentina and Brazil, respectively (UNHRC, 2020).[3] Given its size and speed, it is one of the largest migratory events of recent decades in the region. The influx to Brazil and Argentina has increased more than 10-fold and almost 4.5 times between 2015 and 2017, respectively (Mely Reyes, 2018). Up to the time of this

between immigrants and the local population, high inequality, informality and a generous welfare state.

[3] The figure includes only those that obtained a residence permit. The total number of migrants is higher.

manuscript (August 2020), most countries in the region, including Brazil and Argentina, have welcomed Venezuelan migrants. However, as the exodus accelerates, many question whether or not the region will maintain its open-door policy. For example, Chile and Colombia have already tightened their documentation requirements for Venezuelan immigrants (Charles & Wyss, 2018).

Argentina's two largest political parties, Frente de Todos and Juntos por el Cambio, have expressed an open arms attitude towards Venezuelan migrants, and even though the above paragraphs highlight discrimination against migrants in Argentina, there are two reasons that explain this apparent contradiction. First, Venezuelan migrants in Argentina are younger and better educated than their counterparts from other countries in the region (Himitan, 2017). This is particularly important in the context of population ageing that we address in the next sections. Second, although Juntos por el Cambio is usually associated with the right side of the political spectrum (possibly due to a cohort effect, see Goerres, 2008), the party has been an outspoken critic of the Venezuelan regime. This has been partly in an effort to differentiate itself from its predecessor, main political adversary and long-time supporter of the late Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.

Even though Argentina has approved more residence requests, the conditions have generated more friction in Brazil. Roraima, which borders Venezuela and is one of Brazil's poorest states, has received the highest concentration of migrants. In 2018, local populations in Roraima claimed an increase in crime rate linked to the arrival of Venezuelan migrants and their grievances escalated into violent demonstrations. The government declared a state of emergency and mobilized military troops with the aim of assuring the safety of both Brazilians and Venezuelans. However, according to the President, "the problem of Venezuela is no longer one of internal politics. It is a threat to the harmony of the whole continent" (BBC, 2018). Moreover, Brazil's economy has been unable to accommodate the number of Venezuelans that arrive. The government has been unable to provide the basic services of health, security and housing, or even to coordinate the distribution of Venezuelan migrants across Brazil. Hence, half of the Venezuelan migrants that came to Brazil between 2017 and 2018 returned to Venezuela (Polícia Federal do Brasil, 2018).

2.2 *Ethnicity*

The large flows of migrants who have arrived in Argentina and Brazil played an important role in shaping the ethnic and religious composition of both countries.[4] In Argentina, the mixture of indigenous populations, European immigrants, African slaves and other minorities created a blend denominated *crisol de razas* (equivalent to the term "melting pot" used in the United States) in the national culture. European immigration greatly surpassed other flows, thus Argentina has been labelled a "transplanted population", a term used to describe countries where "transplanted" migrant vastly displaced the indigenous inhabitants (Ribeiro, 1985). During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many countries in Latin America wrote immigration and citizenship laws that reflected European preference. At the same time, Argentina was one of the most attractive destinations for European immigrants due to a confluence of political and economic factors that include the conquest of new territories, rapid economic growth and improved trade and transportation technologies (e.g. port infrastructure) (Cook-Martín et al., 2015).

As a result, the prevalent discourse usually favours the country's European heritage, overlooking the importance of other ethnic influences in the Argentine *crisol de razas* (Hopenhayn, 2001; Izquierdo Iranzo et al., 2016). This helps explain the primordial dilemma related to ethnicity in Argentina: a denial of diversity. Immigrants from adjacent countries and working populations with indigenous ancestry are stigmatized and merged into one perceived social class that is minimized in the mainstream national identity and Argentina's popular discourse (Grimson, 2006; INADI, 2005).

Like Argentina, Brazil's population is the result of a mixture between indigenous populations and descendants from Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. However, its population is comparatively more intermixed and the national discourse is relatively more balanced (Dos Santos

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[4] Migration has also influenced the religious composition of Argentina and Brazil. European influence generated a Catholic majority in both countries. Nevertheless, the political influence of Catholicism and religion differs in both countries. Despite recent controversy over a vote by the Argentine Senate in 2018 to continue to penalize abortion, in general, Argentina shows less influence of religion in the political agenda in comparison with Brazil, where the influence of Protestant political groups has been growing at national and local levels (Esquivel & Mallimaci, 2016; Teixeira da Silva, 2017). This topic requires an extensive discussion, and unfortunately, we will not be able to tackle it due to length constraints.

& Anya, 2006). Still, non-Europeans are underrepresented in positions of power. For instance, although 44.2% of the population was European-descendent as of 2016, they made up 75% of the congress in 2018 (Câmara dos Deputados do Brasil, 2018; PNUD, 2018).

3   Urbanization and Class Division

3.1   Urbanization

With about 80% of its population residing in towns and cities, Latin America is the developing world's most urbanized region. Furthermore, urbanization is expected to rise to almost 85% by 2030 (UN-Habitat, 2018). Argentina and Brazil exemplify the regional trend. As shown in Fig. 3, 92% and 86% of their populations reside in urban areas, respectively (UN-Habitat, 2018).

The current rural-urban distribution is a consequence of economic developments of the twentieth century. In the 1930s, a significant increase

Fig. 3 Share of total population residing in urban areas (*Note* High Income Countries [HIC], Medium Income Countries [MIC], Low Income Countries [LIC], Latin America and the Caribbean [LAC]. *Source* UN [2017])

in labour opportunities in cities generated by industrial clustering, and the introduction of capitalist modes of production in rural areas, fuelled massive rural-urban migration. Both "pull" factors spurred the transition from a rural to a highly urban society within only two generations.[5,6] Despite being usually associated with rural areas, the region's indigenous population has also been affected by "pull" factors towards towns and cities, and experiences additional "push" factors. For example, while indigenous populations tend to be disproportionately excluded from basic services like electricity, sewage and piped water in both settings, the gap is higher in rural areas (World Bank, 2015). As a result, in Latin America as a whole, indigenous populations are almost equally likely to live in rural as in urban areas.

On the high end of the spectrum, 82% of Argentina's indigenous population reside in urban areas, the highest in the region (World Bank, 2017). And, while indigenous urbanization tends to correlate with overall urbanization in the region, only 39% of indigenous populations reside in cities in Brazil. For comparison, Chile and Venezuela have similar levels of general urbanization to Brazil (about 85%) but have a higher level of indigenous urbanization (about 65%) (World Bank, 2015).

3.2 Socially Fractured Cities

A look at the history of urbanization in Latin America reveals a fractured society. The massive and rapid migration to urban centres created peripheral settlements rife with unemployment, poverty, inadequate infrastructure and crime. This affected the structural development of the city that further entrenched urban segregation. On the one side, there were developed neighbourhoods with densely-packed houses in precarious condition

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[5] Even though, as explained in the next section, external migration was an important source of population growth in cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, internal (rural-urban and inter-urban) migration surpassed it as a source of population growth in the cities in the twentieth century.

[6] As a consequence of massive urban growth, Latin America has a primacy index (the ratio of the primate city to the second largest in a country or region) that stands out when compared to other regions in the world. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, the region has seen a relative decline of traditional primate cities. This is due to, among other factors, a decrease of internal and international migration, lower levels of fertility and the economic attraction of new hubs created by local and regional export booms (Rodgers & Beall, 2011).

(so-called slums, shantytowns and squatter settlements).[7] On the other side, there was a proliferation of "fortified enclaves", privatized, enclosed and monitored spaces of residence, consumption, leisure and work, aimed at keeping its residents and their property safe from the outside world. This set-up affected not only the spatial distribution of cities, but also the dynamics between social groups. The physical division of inhabitants disrupted community cohesion, and slums were increasingly regarded as formations apart from cities itself. Urban development initiatives often failed to consider marginalized areas and peoples, furthering segregation and amplifying class conflict (Hernández et al., 2010; Rodgers & Beall, 2011). Indigenous populations suffered disproportionately from these disadvantages because they were overrepresented in slums (World Bank, 2015).

Post military regimes of the 1950s–1980s, a wave of democratization transformed the status quo in Latin America (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005). During this period of increased affirmation of political rights, the perception of slums mutated from unintended and politically irrelevant consequences of development to untapped sources of political activity. Together with the flourishing of social movements of the time, this transformation was crucial for the advancement of otherwise marginalized groups, allowing them to gain the necessary clout to push their interests into the political decision-making process (Rodgers & Beall, 2011).[8] While it undisputedly improved the political participation of marginalized groups, the new reality did not solve segregation in cities or the related problem of inequality.

3.3   Inequality

Fractured cities exemplify a pervasive problem of inequality. Research over the past decades has shown that inequality should be a matter of concern for political and economic reasons. It can decrease social

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[7] In the Latin American vernacular: *asentamientos*, *favelas*, *barriadas*, *poblaciones*, and *villas miserias*.

[8] Social movements are forms of collective action. In Argentina, Brazil and the region, these have been so diverse that a single label cannot encompass their motivations and ambitions. From squatters to ecologists, to food kitchens in poor urban neighbourhoods, socialist feminist groups, human rights and gay and lesbian coalitions, the spectrum of Latin American collective action covers a broad range of issues (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992).

cohesion and generate mistrust in the government, decimating public institutions. It can also weaken the pace of the accumulation of physical and human capital and affect productivity growth, which are sources of economic growth (IADB, 1999; Peterson, 2017). Sadly, Argentina and Brazil, as many other countries in Latin America, are quintessential case studies of these relationships. Despite recent improvements over the past 15 years, Latin America is arguably the most unequal region in the world (Lustig, 2015; Robinson, 2010). While the world average Gini Index between 2000 and 2016 was 38.9, the indicator was 46.1 and 54.7 in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. Following world trends, inequality measured by the Gini coefficient is even higher when measured through land ownership (Fig. 4).

In the region, the largest one percent of farms concentrate more than half of agricultural land. In other words, that one percent holds more land than the remaining 99%. In South America, the Gini coefficient of land ownership is even higher than in Latin American as a whole, reaching 0.85 (FAO, 2017). Argentina and Brazil are no exceptions to regional

Fig. 4 Wealth and land distribution in Latin America (*Source* OXFAM [2016], World Bank [2018], and GRAIN [2014])

trends; their land Gini coefficients are 0.83 and 0.87, respectively (FAO, 2017).[9] If, on top of quantity, the distribution could somehow measure quality (e.g. incorporating measures of soil quality, proximity to markets, availability of water, etc.), inequality would be even higher (OXFAM, 2016). In the next sections, we shall see how high inequality in Argentina and Brazil feeds class conflict, affects the political rhetoric and influences economic policy in political cycles originally described by Sachs (1989).

4   POPULATION AGEING

Pension systems and conditional (non-contributory) cash transfer schemes are responsible for a great share of Latin America's reduction in inequality over the last two decades (Lustig, 2015; Rossignolo, 2016; Veras Soares et al., 2010). However, population ageing may jeopardize the sustainability of these programmes. Due in large extent to a high level of spending in Brazil's pension scheme, as well as a high coverage of formal sector workers by contributory pensions, public spending by age group shows a clear bias towards the elderly. A representative measure is the ratio of elderly poverty to overall poverty in Brazil, which is the lowest in Latin America (OECD/IDB/The World Bank, 2014).[10] In Argentina, the results are not as extreme, but social transfers are also biased towards the elderly (Gragnolati et al., 2015).

In addition to their substantial retirement schemes, both countries have sizable non-contributory conditional cash transfer programmes that target poor families with children. The programmes are aimed at reducing poverty and are contingent on the provision of education and on the health of children. In Argentina, the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* (Universal Child Allocation) was created in 2009. By January 2018, the programme had 3.9 million beneficiaries and accounted for 1.3% of government spending. In Brazil, similar initiatives started in 2001 and were expanded and centralized in 2003 under the name of *Bolsa Família*

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[9] The Land Gini coefficients belong to studies in 1998 and 2004 in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. These are the most recent estimates according to the source (OXFAM, 2016).

[10] Another representative measure is the share of children in poor families, which is five times higher than that of elderly citizens (Pérez et al., 2006).

Fig. 5 Old-age dependency ratio (*Source* UN [2017])

(Family Grant). Today, it benefits 14 million households.[11] In 2018, the programme remains active and was described by Veras Soares et al. (2010) as the largest conditional cash transfer programme in the world.

As previously discussed, Argentina and Brazil's demographic transition is underway and will accelerate in the next decades. Specifically, between 1950 and 2015, life expectancy increased from 63 to 76 in Argentina, and from 51 to 75 in Brazil. During the same period, fertility decreased from 3 to 2 children per woman in Argentina and from 6 to 2 in Brazil (UN, 2017). Consequently, there has been an increase in the ratio of those in retirement age to those in working age, or the old-age dependency ratio (Fig. 5). However, between 2015 and 2050, the indicator is expected to

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[11] These programmes are highly controversial, especially in Argentina where the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* captures an important share of the political discussion, probably due to its non-contributory nature. Opponents have argued that the programme reduces labour force participation, increases fertility in an irresponsible manner and even raises poverty. Nevertheless, the existing research found no, or marginal, undesirable effects (Garganta et al., 2017; Veras Soares et al., 2010). The amount of attention devoted to these programmes is evidence of the polarizing effects that high levels of inequality have in Argentina and Brazil. Contributory programmes, like old-age pensions, comprise a much larger portion of the national budget and will be severely impacted by demographic dynamics.

increase at a faster pace—from 19.5–30 in Argentina, and 13–40 in Brazil (UN, 2017).

Based on the population dynamics described above, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates an increase in social spending of 140% in Argentina and of 190% in Brazil (IMF, 2017, 2018a, b; Wachs et al., 2017). The IMF projections depict unsustainable scenarios, and the system would implode before reaching such levels. The correlation between dependency and social spending has been debated in many studies. For example, Sanderson and Scherbov (2015) argue that the indicator omits the effects of changes in labour force participation, which may offset the impact of population ageing. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that labour force participation rates will increase significantly soon. It has been decreasing in both Argentina and Brazil since the mid-2000s, and the levels are close to, or higher, than those of comparable countries (World Bank, 2017). Some studies have suggested that closing the gap between male and female labour force participation could help offset the impact of decreasing population growth rates (Adamchak & Friedman, 1983; Bloom et al., 2011). Female participation in the labour force in Argentina and Brazil increased significantly in the 1990s and today is around two-thirds of male participation. However, the increases of the past decades have not continued since the turn of the century (World Bank, 2017). Moreover, population ageing does not only decrease the share of the population in the working age. In fact, it may also discourage labour participation of individuals of working age through an increase in inter-generational dependency in the household, where unpaid labour tends to fall disproportionately on women (Bussolo et al., 2015; Gál et al., 2018). Additional work is needed to understand how the interactions of female workforce participation, population ageing and long-term care will play out in Latin America.

As shown in Fig. 5, there is a window of opportunity before the demographic transition accelerates. However, addressing social spending in Latin America is complex. Due to the high inequality in the region, social spending is the main cause of recurrent social conflict, ahead of issues like ethnicity, religion and immigration. This societal backdrop also helps explain the populist rhetoric that makes part of pervasive political and macroeconomic cycles. The connection between inequality, populism and macroeconomic crises has been well documented, starting with Sachs (1989) and Dornbusch and Edwards (1991). These studies argue that persistent poverty and inequality in Latin America influences the political

agenda by creating intense political pressure on macroeconomic policies, often tasked to raise the income of lower income groups. In many cases, this pressure contributes to poor policy choices and consequently, weak economic performance (Birdsall et al., 2011; Dornbusch & Edwards 1991; Glaeser et al., 2018; IADB 1999; OXFAM, 2016; Sachs 1989).[12]

Governments that are, genuinely or otherwise, concerned about inequality have tended to initiate myopic and overly expansionary macroeconomic policies. While these policies may increase wages and boost the economy in the short run, they eventually lead to high inflation and severe balance of payments crises that culminate in economic crises. Ultimately, the cycle exacerbates poverty and sluggish development (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Sachs, 1989). The same dynamics were present in the recent economic and political cycles of Argentina and Brazil. In fact, recent protests against social spending reforms in both countries limited the capacity of the government to legislate (Cohen & Misculin, 2017; Marcello & Marcelino, 2017). Even though the protests were grounded in real necessities of poverty alleviation, the current welfare systems of both countries are unsustainable under the expected demographic trends (IMF, 2017, 2018; Wachs et al., 2017).

The context of population ageing, unsustainable welfare and social unrest depicts the two sides of social conflict (for a broader discussion see Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012). On the one hand, it is an expression of needs for tangible improvements in life quality, issues that must be addressed (UNDP, 2013). On the other hand, under certain conditions, social conflict can polarize the political debate and obstruct policy development, as has been the case with social spending. If political parties and the population in Argentina and Brazil are unable to reach an agreement that puts social spending in a sustainable path, demographic change will likely intensify the conflict over resources.

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[12] Already in 1975, Mallon and Sourrouille highlighted the complications associated with the myopic economic policy carried out by each successive minister of economy in these countries, which produced massive short-run fluctuations in the economy. Today Argentina and Brazil rank 11th and 7th internationally when ranked according to the volatility of their nominal gross domestic product. These numbers are calculated using Gross Domestic Product growth rates between 1990 and 2016 from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database. Rodrik (1999) made the same argument using gross national product growth rates between the 1990s and the 1980s, finding that, in these periods, Latin American economies experienced twice as much volatility as industrial economies.

5   Conclusion

Argentina and Brazil have transitioned in the last century from rapidly growing centres of international immigration to having relatively stable populations. Perhaps due to the small number of immigrants in the last decades, migration is neither an important issue of political debate nor an established topic in the political agenda of both countries. Nevertheless, this has been recently interrupted by the current Venezuelan political and economic crisis, which triggered the most important surge of migration in the region of the last decades. The structural development of cities and the distribution of land ownership in Argentina and Brazil attest to the region's inequality, a topic that permeates most economic and political disputes. While the democratization of the 1980s increased political representation of marginalized groups, Latin American cities are still socially and structurally fractured and inequality in the region also remains high. Social spending has been a major contributor against poverty and inequality in the last decades. However, like most countries in Latin America, Argentina and Brazil are transitioning into having older populations, a demographic process that tends to increase the share of the population entitled to pension and healthcare benefits, while reducing the share of contributors (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009; Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012; this volume). Without reforms, the situation will make healthcare, pension and other social benefits financially unsustainable. Yet, due in part to inequality, Argentina and Brazil have repeatedly shown an inability to successfully reform their welfare system. Without the social cohesion necessary to generate the appropriate policies addressing this issue, the countries will face new crises, undermining gains in poverty and inequality over the last decades. Argentina and Brazil, like other countries in the region, are quintessential case studies of the relationship between inequality and social conflict. Incorporating this dynamic is fundamental to understanding the political, economic and societal implications of the region's most pressing demographic issues.

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Intergenerational Controversy and Cultural Clashes: Political Consequences of Demographic Change in the US and Canada Since 1990

Jennifer D. Sciubba

1 INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the violent White Supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, Mayor Catherine Pugh decided that Baltimore's 1887 statue of Roger B. Taney, a Supreme Court Justice who argued that free Blacks had no claim to citizenship, was out of sync with contemporary American attitudes. Against intense backlash from activist groups across the US, Pugh skirted the bureaucracy needed for consensus on removing the Taney statue and unilaterally ordered the city's four monuments commemorating the Confederate cause in the US Civil War removed in the middle of the night on August 15 (Associated Press, 2018).

J. D. Sciubba (✉)
Rhodes College, Memphis, TN, USA
e-mail: sciubbaj@rhodes.edu

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Two years later and three-thousand miles away, outside the New Westminster courthouse in Canada's westernmost province of British Columbia, the statue of a bearded and simply dressed man named Matthew Begbie, celebrated as British Columbia's first chief justice, faced a similar fate. Begbie is also known for overseeing a trial in the 1860s that led to the hanging of six Tsilhqot'in chiefs, heads of one of Canada's indigenous groups, or "First Nations" (Lirette, 2019). In May 2019, the New Westminster council voted to remove that statue from New Westminster and thus rewrite history, a history that commemorates White settlers and overlooks their atrocities.

The controversies and cultural clashes in both Baltimore and New Westminster reflect larger debates over population change in the US and Canada. As this chapter shows, the demographics of both have changed along multiple dimensions, including age and generation, national origin and race, and even ideology and linguistic heritage. Along with those population changes, the economic power and political voices of various demographic groups have changed as well. If politics is about who gets what, then the distribution of economic resources, political power and even social or cultural capital are relevant to understanding the political consequences of demographic change. In line with the other chapters in this volume, this chapter explores what the political consequences of demographic change in the US and Canada have been since 1990, and what trends today portend for future political developments to 2040.

Over the last 40 years, the populations of both the US and Canada have grown larger and more diverse. Along with the inevitable generational shifts, the passage of time has brought a shift in proportions of young and old. Fertility rates have declined, while immigration has been robust. Sources and proportions of immigrants have been changing dramatically and, along with natural changes in fertility and mortality, are shifting the composition of various ethnic and racial groups. The politics of population change in both the US and Canada have been prominent, but dissimilar. For example, the decision in New Westminster, British Columbia, came just a few months after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau formally apologized to the Tsilhqot'in community for the hangings (Lirette, 2019). No such apologies have issued from a US head of state, although local leaders across the US have made decisions similar to Mayor Pugh's and Confederate monuments have toppled like dominos.

In the US, given projected fertility, mortality, and migration trends, the ageing of the US population will be one of the top two population-related issues there over the next 30 years, primarily because of the insolvency

of America's pay-as-you-go social security system. The other will be the shrinking White population and increasing proportions of Hispanics and Asians, which, if past is precedent, will elevate racial issues within political debates (see Hudson [2012] for an US-centred discussion of ageing).

Canadian society will continue to have difficult debates over the meaning of multiculturalism as the population grows less White, although multiculturalism has general support in most of the country. Similar to the US, population ageing is likely to take centre stage as low fertility continues and policies to address support for those at different ages and stages of life are politicized.

The following sections of this chapter progress from a general introduction to demographic trends and projections in the US and Canada between 1990 and 2040, to sections on the economic fortunes of various groups, their mobilization capacity, influence of institutions and a discussion of the rhetoric of population change. Despite similar demographics, the political outcomes are different. In particular, this chapter shows that the mobilization capacity of US minorities is hampered by voter eligibility rules, an issue less relevant in Canada. In both, federalist institutions devolve power to state or provincial levels, but when combined with demographics yield different political impacts in the two countries. The tenor of rhetoric surrounding demographics has been nearly opposite in the two countries, although demographics are important in both. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the continued salience of population issues in the political arena in the coming decades.

2   Demographic Context

The demographics of the US and Canada mimic those of other developed countries in terms of declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy over time, but the two countries stand out for higher population growth than most of their peers. The US and Canada have grown at a hearty clip over the last three decades: the US population has increased by 27% and Canada's by 30%. In terms of median age, the US and Canada are the youngest G-7 countries[1]—in part due to near-replacement fertility in the US case, and robust immigration in both cases.

Understanding why US fertility stayed higher than its peers' is complicated, as is understanding why it may be starting to fall. However, some

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[1] The G-7 is comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.

Fig. 1 Population pyramids for US and Canada (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

have argued that Black[2] and Hispanic fertility was just high enough, and White fertility at around 1.8 children per woman on average—not too low—to keep the country's total fertility rate around replacement level of 2.0 for the last several decades (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006: 693). This exceptionality seems to be fading. Births in the US are now at a 30-year low and its total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.76 is the lowest in 40 years (Hamilton et al., 2021). Births are even rarer in Canada. The last time Canadian fertility was at replacement level was in 1971 and since 1999 immigration has been the primary driver of population growth. In fact, natural increase (births over deaths) only accounted for one-third of population growth in Canada in 2018 (Statistics Canada, 2018b). As Fig. 1 shows, the population is concentrated in prime working ages, but

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[2] In line with US Census categories, this chapter uses the term Black instead of African-American. The latter term can be inaccurate, as not all Blacks in the US are African-American.

the narrowing base of the pyramid indicates low fertility and a future of population ageing.

What has changed? As is the case across most developed countries, women in the US and Canada seem to be postponing childbearing in order to complete their education and begin a career, as we know from rising ages at first marriage and first birth (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006: 669). In Canada, data clearly show that actual age-specific fertility rates peak from 30–35 years, which is relatively "old" for childbearing, demographically speaking (Statistics Canada, 2018a). US fertility has trended downward, in part because births among adolescents and teenagers have fallen over the past several years—the birth rate among those aged 15 to 19 was down 8 percent in 2020 alone (Hamilton et al., 2021).

Populations in the US and Canada have also grown because of immigration. As Table 1 shows, both the US and Canada are net recipients of migrants. Compared to the US, the annual influx of migrants as a proportion of population in Canada is over twice as high as in the US. By the mid-1990s, immigration, not natural increase, was the key driver of growth in America's potential workforce, even with near-replacement fertility (Passel & Cohn, 2017). This trend is not new—historically, the US and Canada are countries of immigration. European settlers displaced native people centuries ago and high numbers of immigrants from diverse

Table 1 Key demographic statistics, US and Canada, 1990–2040

	1990	2015	2040
Net migration as percentage of population			
US	+1.36%	+1.40%	+1.34%
Canada	+3.16%	+3.19%	+2.59%
Population ages 0–17 years			
US	26%	22.7%	21.4%
Canada	25%	19.4%	18.1%
Population 65+			
US	12.5%	14.8%	21.9%
Canada	11.2%	16.1%	25.3%
Population 80+			
US	2.8%	3.8%	7.5%
Canada	2.3%	4.2%	9.2%
Total population			
US	252,847,800	321,773,600	373,766,700
Canada	27,662,440	35,939,930	42,478,670

Source Goerres et al. (2020)

continents have since sought both North American countries out as lands of promise. The US and Canada remain top destinations for migrants worldwide and today 13.5% of the US population (Zong et al., 2018) and more than one in five Canadians are first-generation immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2017). Immigration is relevant to fertility as well; in Canada's case, immigrant fertility has been about 20% higher than native-born (Adserà & Ferrer, 2013: 18), helping drive Canada's population growth.

While younger than their peers, Canada's and America's populations are still ageing. As Table 1 shows, the proportion of Canadians ages 0–17 will have decreased by 7% between 1990 and 2040; Americans of that same age group will have decreased by 4.5%. In contrast, the proportion of those at the opposite end of the age spectrum have ballooned, and at an increasing rate. The proportion of the US population over 65 years of age will be 9% higher in 2040 than in 1990, but most of that growth will take place between 2015 and 2040. Canada's population aged 65+ is growing even more rapidly, from 11.2% of the total population in 1990 to 25.3% by 2040. Proportions of the "oldest-old", those aged 80+, will reach 7.2% and 9.2% in the US and Canada, respectively. In 2017, for the first time, there were more seniors aged 65 and over in Canada than children aged 0–14 (Ciolfe, 2017).

In the US, non-White groups have lower median ages than Whites, but all racial groups in the US are ageing. In 2015, the median age for Asians was 36 years, for Blacks was 34 years and for Hispanics was 28 years, although the lowest median age, still up from 25 in 2000. For Whites, it was significantly older: 43 years (Flores, 2017). In Canada, 2011 data showed that non-White groups—what Canada terms 'visible minorities'—followed a similar pattern to the US. While the population as a whole had a median age of 40.1, Blacks had the youngest median age, at 29.5 years, Arabs second youngest at 30.2, South Asians at 32.8 and Chinese at 38.6 (Ministry of Finance, 2016).[3]

Together, these trends in fertility, mortality and migration are leading to a shift towards mixed-race, non-White populations in both the US and Canada. Although Hispanics were still the fastest growing ethnic group in the US as of 2015, growth has slowed because of both reduced immigration and falling Hispanic fertility rates. The proportion of Hispanics of Mexican origin peaked in 2008 and other Latin American countries, such

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[3] The Canadian statistics bureau did not report the median age of the non-visible minority population, only the population total.

as El Salvador and Honduras, are increasingly important in shaping the makeup of US Hispanics. The share of US-born as opposed to foreign-born Hispanics is increasing as well, from 59.9% in 2000 to 65.6% in 2015 (Flores, 2017). Over the next decades, those of Asian descent will see some of the most remarkable growth—since 1990, Asians have increasingly comprised a greater proportion of new US immigrants. India was the top country of origin for new US immigrants in 2015 with 110,000 immigrants, followed by Mexico with 109,000, China with 90,000 and Canada with 35,000 (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). Taken together, these trends mean that non-Hispanic Whites will lose their majority status in the US by 2055 (Pew Research Center, 2015); that shift will happen sooner in certain US states. By 2010, 22 of the biggest 100 metropolitan areas in the US were majority non-White. Racially, Canada is relatively White, but like the US, by 2050, will be majority-minority. That shift has already happened in the greater Toronto area and Vancouver is on the cusp (Kaufmann, 2018).

As the following sections will show, the ageing populations and increasing minority populations of the US and Canada are important drivers of political rhetoric and policy change. Age and race also correlate with economic power.

3 Economic Clout

The economic fortunes of those in Canada and the US are intimately tied to broader demographic trends. There are vast differences between the socioeconomic attainments of subgroups in the US and in Canada. In the US, especially, non-White populations have less wealth than the White population; younger generations have been slower to accumulate wealth than preceding generations were. These trends are intertwined, as younger generations are more diverse than older ones. While such differences by race or generation are less pronounced in Canada, in both countries generational issues are exacerbated by ageing populations. Over time, greater proportions of older people and fewer workers magnify the impact of socioeconomic differences among generations.

Increasing wealth disparities track age and racial lines in the US. Fortunes for minorities have trended downward over the last few decades—the wealth of Black and Latino families decreased by 75% and 50%, respectively, between 1983 and 2013. During that same time period, White families saw a 14% increase in their median wealth from $102,200

to $116,800 (Collins et al., 2017: 5). The Institute for Policy Studies calculated that other than the value of their durable goods like furniture and cars, in 2013 the median US Black family had net wealth of $1,700, the median Latino family $2,000 and the median White family $116,800 (Collins et al., 2017). A 2015 study in Boston, one of America's major cities, found that the wealth of the median White family was $247,500, while the wealth of the median Black family was a mere $8 (2018). In a country where wealth yields political influence, as in the US, these disparities have meant that political power continues to be concentrated in the hands of a shrinking White population, even as the proportion of non-Whites increases.

If we look just along age lines, not, we see major differences in economic clout among various generations in the US as well. In general, US Millennials, those born between 1981 and 1996, are hitting the milestones of adulthood—like moving out of their parents' homes, starting a career, getting married and having kids—about five to seven years later than did their Baby Boomer parents (Benedict-Nelson & Taylor 2012). This "failure to launch" is especially pronounced among Blacks and Hispanics. Fortunes for younger generations have gotten worse in the last few decades, in part because of macroeconomic changes, such as the 2008 financial crisis. While 55% of those aged 25–34 years owned homes in 1980, only 39% did by 2015 (Frey, 2018: 9). Millennials are poorer, too (Frey, 2018: 14). Among those aged 18–24, poverty rates have increased from 12% in 1980 to 20% in 2015, and for those aged 25–34 from 8% to 15% over the same time period.

The relatively low levels of wealth younger generations are accumulating are likely to affect their old-age income security, meaning that today's economic problems will reverberate for decades to come. For example, Black and Hispanic US Millennials, aged between 18 and 34 in 2015, have low savings rates and low credit so their purchasing power is stunted. The 2008 housing crash and economic recession affected Millennials of all races and their parents. Financial losses of the latter affect the ability to pass on wealth to younger generations (Frey, 2018: 40). It is too early to tell whether Millennials' slow start in asset accumulation will hinder the wealth positions of their own children. In their favour is the higher education rate among Millennials, which could end up offsetting negative effects. Working against them and the generation that follows them is the economic downturn expected from the 2020 COVID-19.

According to the OECD, in 2015, the average American household had wealth of $411,044 while the median wealth was $56,724 and the bottom quintile was *negative* $19,059—meaning that there are incredibly high rates of debt among America's poorest (OECD, 2018). Taking the difference in wealth between the top 5% and the median household as a share of the median wealth, the US has a wealth ratio of 90.7, which is well above the OECD's 18-country average of 20 (OECD, 2015). In Canada, that ratio is only 15.1—almost 5 points below the average (OECD, 2015: 249).

In Canada, wealth inequality is not nearly as high as in the US and younger Canadians are much more economically secure than American youth. In terms of markers of adulthood and accumulation of wealth, Canadian Millennials are nearly the opposite of US Millennials. Despite the extraordinary price of homes in Canada (where the average price is almost six times higher than income), over half of Canadian Millennials owned a home in mid-2015, and notably, they achieved this milestone at a younger age than did their parents. As Caranci and Petramala (2015: 1) point out, job conditions post-2008 recession were better for Canadian Millennials than for American ones, and they have much lower student debt than their US counterparts, who often have crushing burdens. Still, the gap between the unemployment rates of youths and adults has not decreased since the early 1990s. The 2008 recession, while not as bad for Canadian Millennials as for American ones, exacerbated youth unemployment, which in 2012 was 2.4 times that of workers aged 25–54, the widest gap since 1977 (Bernard, 2013: 1). Globally, it is common for youth unemployment to be higher than for older age groups, and it seems that as Canadians enter their late twenties they have found job security.

While wealth inequality is not as big of an issue generally in Canada as it is in the US, there are racial gaps. A study of university-educated and Canadian-born groups found that those of 'visible minority' status earned 87.4 cents for every dollar earned by Whites. Quebec had the highest racial wage gap of any of the provinces (defined as gap in earnings between 'visible minorities' and Caucasians), nearly 20%. The gap in the province of Nova Scotia was only 7.3%. With the exception of Canadian-born individuals of Japanese ethnic ancestry, 'visible minorities' earned less than Whites (2017). Worst off were those of Latin American heritage born in Canada, who earned 31.7% less than Whites (2017).

In sum, socioeconomic issues in the US are also demographic issues; in Canada, the same dynamics exist but are much less pronounced. In

both, though, population ageing adds strains to the economic fortunes of the various generations. In particular, the large size of the US and Canadian Baby Boomer generations will have tremendous impact on economic dynamics in both countries in the next several decades. Population ageing in the US is not as intense as in Japan and Western Europe, but although the US population is still growing due to both population momentum and continued immigration, the growth rate of the US workforce will still slow down. According to estimates by demographers Passel and Cohn, adults aged 25–64 will grow only from 173 million in 2015 to 183 million in 2035. Although that number is positive, it is the lowest since the Baby Boomers entered the workforce in the 1960s (ibid., 2017). Because the US social security system is pay-as-you-go, the current workers contribute to a pot of money from which retirees draw. When the proportion of workers is declining relative to retirees, the system is strained. As is the case for any ageing country, Canada will face rising health care and pension costs over the next several decades. In both the US and Canada, a wide gap between life expectancy and age of eligibility for social services means that the entitlements systems are strained and policymakers in both countries have shown little will or ability to narrow the gap and make the systems more solvent.

By 2035, the youngest Baby Boomers will be 71 years old, meaning they will all be eligible to draw social security benefits, and in fact, by that time those on the upper end of the following generational cohort (Generation X) will have approached retirement age. Whether they will expect to retire in their 60s or expect to work into their 70s will depend on several factors—cultural, economic and political.

4   Mobilization Capacity

In this and the following section, we turn our attention to politics. The relative sizes of demographic groups can indicate what authors in this volume (Vanhuysse & Goerres, this volume and other contributions) are discussing as 'mobilization capacity', or the ability of demographic groups to translate their numbers into political power. As we see in this section, voting patterns reflect that youth are less likely to vote in elections than are older people. The existence of that gap has remained steady over time—the size of the gap, though, has fluctuated.

US voter turnout is extremely low compared with its OECD peers, and in the US, mid-term voting (between general elections for the President) has far lower turnout rates across age groups than years in which a president is being elected. In 2016 (a presidential election year), only 55.7% of the voting age population voted. There are also racial and ethnic disparities: as Table 2 shows, Hispanics have the lowest voting rates of the major racial groups in the US and Whites the highest.

Turnout is one aspect of mobilization; eligibility to vote is another. Voter eligibility in the US is highly political and, as with wealth, correlates with demographics. Compared to their overall percentage of the US population, Hispanics are relatively disenfranchised because relatively more are under age 18 (the US legal voting age) than are Whites and because a higher proportion of Hispanics are non-citizens, and thus ineligible to vote. In 2012, Hispanics were 11% of eligible voters but 17% of the US population. In contrast, Whites were overrepresented in the electorate: 71% of eligible voters but only 63% of the US population (Frey, 2016). US Blacks are also underrepresented, but for a different reason. The US is well known for having one of the highest felony conviction and incarceration rates in the world, an issue that is both political and demographic, as it disproportionately affects the Black population. One in 13 Blacks has no voting rights due to felonies, versus 1 of every 56 non-Blacks (The Sentencing Project, 2017). In 2012, 69% of the US Black population was eligible to vote, compared to 79% of Whites (Frey, 2016: 267–268). When non-citizens and ineligible felons are removed from the equation and overseas voters are added, voter turnout of the

Table 2 US election data by race (select presidential election years)

Turnout rate	1992	2000	2008	2016
Non-Hispanic White	61.6	57.6	65.2	64.7
Non-Hispanic Black	50.6	52.9	69.1	59.9
Hispanic	41.5	38.9	46.5	44.9
Other	42.8	39.8	48.0	46.3
Share of electorate	1992	2000	2008	2016
Non-Hispanic White	84.9	81	76.6	73.6
Non-Hispanic Black	9.8	11.2	12.3	12.3
Hispanic	3.7	5.4	7.3	9.1
Other	1.7	2.4	3.8	5

Note Data from Current Population Survey, corrected for vote over report and non-response errors
Source McDonald (2018)

eligible population in 2016 is 3.6% higher than the number reported in Table 2, at 59.3% (McDonald, 2018). In large part, that's because in 2016, 3,249,802 felons were ineligible to vote, the vast majority non-White (The Sentencing Project, 2017). From this review, we can conclude that mobilization capacity of Blacks and Hispanics in the US is constrained by political institutions, namely by citizenship and felony status and the lack of voting rights such statuses confer.

Mobilization capacity in the US is not just a racial issue, it is also an age issue. In the US, youth consistently have lower turnout rates than older voters, but the gap between older and younger citizens differs across elections. Youth were particularly inclined to show at the polls for the 2008 election of Barack Obama, as Table 3 shows. Still, in recent mid-term (non-presidential) elections, turnout of voters under age 30 was close to the lowest rate in the last 50 years. Baby Boomers' voting rates were 30 percentage points higher than Millennials' (Thompson, 2016). The gap is even more pronounced at the local level, as researchers from Portland State University found—the median age of voters in mayoral elections is 60 years (Keisling, 2015). To the extent that political power is concentrated in the hands of those who actually show at the polls, White, older Americans have the lion's share of influence in the US.

In the US, voter turnout also differs by educational level, with highly educated voters overrepresented and the least educated underrepresented. Those with post-graduate education turn out at the highest levels, although as a share of the electorate they are generally under 15%, the second smallest group. Those with less than high school education are

Table 3 US election data by age (select presidential election years)

Turnout rate	1992	2000	2008	2016
18–29	42.7	34.5	48.4	43.4
30–44	59	54	60.7	56.9
45–59	68	64.3	69.5	66.2
60+	68	67.3	71	71.4
Share of electorate	1992	2000	2008	2016
18–29	17.7	14.3	17.1	15.7
30–44	33.1	30.3	24.8	22.5
45–59	23.6	28.9	30.6	28.2
60+	26.6	26.5	27.6	33.6

Note Data from Current Population Survey, corrected for vote over report and non-response errors
Source McDonald (2018)

the smallest share of the electorate and have the lowest turnout rates of any educational group, typically under a 40% turnout rate (McDonald, 2018). Since younger cohorts are more educated than older ones, if past is precedent, then that generation may end up with high voter turnout when they reach older ages, meaning that their mobilization capacity will increase between now and 2040.

Although Millennials are on the cusp of becoming the largest generation in the electorate, they are far underrepresented in national elected offices. People who were born after 1981 are 46% of the US population. While in 2016 Millennials comprised 27% of the voting-eligible population, just 4% less than Baby Boomers, as of 2018 there were no Millennials in the US Senate, whose youngest member is 40-year-old Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas (Fry, 2018, 2018b). There were only five elected Millennials in the House of Representatives, while there were 117 of Generation X, 270 of the Baby Boomers and 42 of the eldest generation (the Silent Generation) (Frey, 2018). Boomers are far overrepresented at 62% of the House of Representatives although they only make up 23% of the population. To the extent that having policymakers in place who share one's background confers political influence, the proportion of representatives of different generations means younger generations are absent from the echelons of power. However, we should recognize that elected leaders represent the interests of all of their constituents, in theory, and the demographics of the representative are not necessarily indicative of their favouritism towards particular groups, age or otherwise.

Similar to Americans, Canadian youth also have lower voter turnout than older Canadians and minority populations have lower turnout than the White majority. Among Canadians aged 35 and older, only 10% report not voting in federal and provincial elections, but 31% of those aged 25–34 and 47% of those 18–24 claim not to vote. Only 14% of majority Canadians report not voting but 29% of 'visible minorities' do (Bilodeau & Turgeon, 2015: 4). There are competing research findings on the role of minority status, though. Using a 2002 survey, Bevelander and Penndakur (2009), for example, found that immigration status and ethnicity are unimportant determinants of voting at the federal and provincial levels, but that age, level of schooling and level of civic engagement determined propensity to vote.

Lending support to the preceding claim, studies show that younger Canadians feel less connected to political parties than do older Canadians, and that proclivity intersects with immigration status as well (Bilodeau &

Turgeon 2015: 6). Of course, as the section on demographic context showed, age and minority status are related, as 'visible minorities' tend to be younger than majority Canadians. The effect of immigration status dissipates over time: recent immigrants are less likely to vote than immigrants who have been in Canada at least 10 years. The latter group shows no voting differences compared to the native-born population (Bilodeau & Turgeon 2015).

In contrast to dynamics in the US, where minorities are often politically marginalized, the high numbers of those with an immigrant background in Canada elevate 'visible minority' status politically. Canada has a diverse electorate—Elections Canada provides information in 26 heritage and 11 Aboriginal languages (Bevelander & Pendakur 2009). To be viable at the polls, Canadian political parties have to demonstrate openness to immigration issues. As one analyst argued, "[s]ince 40 percent of voters in Canada are either first- or second-generation immigrants, any party that questions the value of immigration for Canada would either sink in the polls or have to quickly revise its message" (Hiebert, 2016: 11).

In sum, while the non-White populations are growing as a proportion of Canada's and America's total populations, they have not expressed themselves to the full extent of their voice by voting at the polls. 'Visible minority' status in Canada is a less significant predictor of voting than in the US and immigrant status may even confer some political privileges. For Canada then, increasing diversity and a growing 'visible minority' population are likely to influence political outcomes. In the US, the disenfranchisement of non-White populations may mean continued political and economic marginalization over the next few decades.

5   INSTITUTIONS

In both the US and Canada, population characteristics—such as age and race—confer little political influence on their own. Instead, each country's particular political institutions magnify or minimize particular voices. In the US, the two-party system and the Electoral College boost the voices of rural and White Americans, with the opposite effect for residents of large cities and for non-Whites. Canada's federal structure gives greater power and voice to certain regions and its residents, over others. Multiculturalism functions as an institution, shaping political discourse and policy outcomes.

In the US, the two-party system of Democrats and Republicans gives outsized influence to the rural, White population, which played the key role in the 2016 presidential election of Republican Donald Trump, who received 63.2% of the rural vote, compared to 31.3% for Democrat Hillary Clinton. Trump's vote share increased with increasing levels of rurality—a pattern common for Republicans in recent decades. Such voters are only 15% of the US population (and were about that percentage of voters in 2016) but US institutions magnify their voices, as Donald Trump's successful candidacy shows. National distribution is one reason: more than 4 out of 10 rural persons live in the Southern US. These rural areas have dire challenges, with declines in economic and social conditions, and reductions in life expectancy (Monnat & Brown, 2017: 229). Trump performed better in 2016 in counties with such struggles. Some scholars have invoked reference group theory to explain these voting dynamics because Whites are doing worse than their reference group (the previous generation) and Blacks and Hispanics are doing comparatively better than those Whites (Monnat & Brown, 2017: 233). If the lot of non-Whites continues to improve relative to rural Whites, the latter group's support for Trump-like populist candidates will likely continue.

Another institution that magnifies the power of some demographic groups and minimizes others is the US Electoral College. In the US, as of 2018 there were 538 electoral votes apportioned among the 50 US states according to the state's total number of Congressional representatives. Rather than awarding the presidential election to the winner of the nationwide popular vote, a candidate must get half (270) of the electoral votes in order to win. Dionne et al. have noted that "[i]n the case of the 2016 election, the Electoral College's distance from the popular vote was aggravated because so many Clinton voters cast ballots in large, reliably Democratic states like California and New York. Her big margins in these states had no payoff in the electoral vote" (ibid., 2017: 29). Because of the electoral system, presidential candidates perform best when they focus their efforts on key states, rather than on winning a pure majority of votes. Unless the presidential election system changes, presidential politics will likely look similar in 2040.

People of an immigrant background also have their power as a voting bloc tempered by the US electoral system. Immigrants have disproportionately settled in US urban areas. In 2015, the top 20 metro areas held 65% of the nation's total migrants, according to the Pew Research Center (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). As the preceding section showed, this dilution

is in sharp contrast to dynamics in Canada, where political parties must show sympathies with immigrant heritage to gain popular support. The state of California had the largest number of immigrants as of 2015, nearly 11 million. However, while immigrants tended to settle in just four main states—California, Florida, Texas and New York—after liberalization of immigration policies in 1965, they began to disperse more widely across the US. Indeed, since 1960, "the foreign-born populations in Georgia, Nevada and North Carolina have increased more than 30-fold" (Pew Research Center, 2015: 72–73). Between 2015 and 2040, these new settlement patterns are likely to influence political control, although it is as of now unclear how exactly.

Certainly, Canada's start as a bilingual country with strong Francophone elements shaped the country's institutions from then to now. In Canada, federalism significantly influences policymaking. One way is by empowering and legitimizing the cultural and linguistic claims of Quebec province, which has a strong French heritage. Population changes in Quebec have played a role in both the call for an independence referendum and the failure of that referendum to pass. When a 1995 referendum on sovereignty for Quebec failed to pass, with "no" votes receiving 50.6%, many thought the issue disappeared, in part because of demographic defeat of low-fertility francophones. Yet, the issue continues to resurface in Canadian politics and separatist factions remain (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998: 117f.). In Quebec, these divisions "add another layer of anxiety about numbers, relative power, and cultural hegemony […]" (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998: 180).

In Canada, federalism helps shape the form immigration policies take. For example, Quebec has had autonomy over its immigration and refugee policy since 1991 (Hiebert, 2016: 13). But even beyond Quebec, provincial and local governments and the private sector help decide whom to admit and civil society helps provide integration services in partnership with the government. According to Hiebert (2016: 13), "[t]his decentralized approach has created a wider sense of ownership over immigration and integration […] and greatly facilitates the legitimacy of immigration policy and provides a kind of insulation against the potential demands of populist groups […]". The contrast with the US is striking, as Kaufmann states: "As in other Western nations, there is an important constituency of conservative and authoritarian voters in English Canada who want fewer immigrants in the country. The difference is there are no political vehicles channelling this at the federal level" (2018: 276). Again, the institution

of federalism, which devolves power away from the core, means that different issues will resonate at the local versus national level and calls for anti-immigrant measures or discrimination against non-Whites have a harder time gaining traction in federal policymaking.

While federalism is an important institution in Canadian political demography, the party system is less influential, particularly when compared with the US. Much of the Canadian electorate is unattached to particular political parties, as evidenced by the significant number of Canadians who support different parties in federal and provincial politics and who have changed their party identifications over time. As related by Kaufmann, Professor "Joshua Gordon at Simon Fraser University, remarks that the English-French divide splits the anti-immigration constituency between Anglo-Canadians who vote for the Conservative Party and French-Canadians who vote for the separatist Bloc Quebecois. This means the federal Conservatives can't pool Anglo and French anti-immigration voters into a united voting bloc" (ibid., 2018: 277). These party dynamics mean that Canada is likely to remain sanguine on immigration over the next several decades.

One of the most influential institutions in Canada is multiculturalism, a norm that pervades Anglo-Canada and has been codified as an official government policy at the national level. As the Canadian Government defines it, the purpose of multiculturalism is "ensuring that all citizens keep their identities, take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging" (Government of Canada, 2018a: n.p.). Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's formal apology to the Tsilhqot'in chiefs for Canada's past atrocities was one example of many where Trudeau, as head of state, has drawn attention to Canada's First Nations as equal and important members of Canada's population. Bringing these two institutions, federalism and multiculturalism, together, is controversial among many, including French-Canadians, who "were not interested in being demoted to one of many 'cultures'" (Kaufmann, 2018: 275). In fact, Quebec rejects multiculturalism and instead uses an integration policy of interculturalism. As Kaufmann describes, "[w]here Quebec identity is territorial, historical and cultural, the contemporary Anglo-defined Canadian identity is futuristic: a missionary nationalism centred on the left-modernist ideology of multiculturalism" (ibid., 2018: 282).

Institutions in the US and Canada, then, seem to create opposing politics of demographic change. In the US, the two-party system for a long time remained neutral on immigration, with neither party adopting

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an overly pro- or anti-immigrant stance. In recent years, though, and in concert with electoral institutions, the Republican Party has capitalized on existing pockets of anti-immigrant sentiment among the citizenry and scored important victories at the polls. Canada remains fairly pro-immigration, in part because of its political institutions, namely federalism and multiculturalism.

6   Rhetoric

The final area this chapter charts is the politics of population in political rhetoric. Rhetoric surrounding changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the US has been consistently hostile, although that rhetoric has only sometimes translated into restrictive laws, in part because it has been difficult to get those changes passed through the US Congress. In Canada, rhetoric has been more sanguine, in part because the influence of multiculturalism is so pervasive—institutions matter.

In the US, there is a generational divide in opinions on immigration. According to the Pew Research Center, "[y]ounger Americans are more likely than older Americans to see the impact of immigrants on the U.S. in the long run positively: 54% of those ages 18–29 say this, compared with 44% of those ages 30–49, 41% of those ages 50–64 and 39% of those ages 65 and older" (ibid., 2015: 54). As in Canada, though, younger generations are more ethnically and racially diverse than older ones. Since people with an immigrant background comprise greater proportions of younger generations, it makes sense that they would be more favourable to immigration issues.

In recent US history, there is no greater example of hostile rhetoric towards particular segments of the population than in the statements of candidate, then President, Donald Trump. In his first month in office in January 2017, President Trump issued a series of executive orders on immigration. One of these was an order to build a border wall with Mexico; construction commenced in February 2018. Another was designed to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the US. In effect from January 25 until 16 March 2017, the order reduced the number of refugees that could be resettled in the US in 2017 to 50,000, suspended the US refugee programme for 120 days, suspended the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely and suspended entry of those from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Historically, the US has resettled more refugees than any other country, about 3 million since the

1980 creation of the refugee resettlement programme (Lopez & Bialik, 2017). Compared with countries bordering intense conflict, that number is minuscule. The more remarkable aspect of this policy change is the shift in tone surrounding immigration. Trump's executive order restricting entry of those who might be "foreign terrorists" became nicknamed the "Muslim Ban" and discussed in the media as such. Trump has used incendiary language and slurs towards non-Whites throughout his time in the political spotlight and in doing has found favour among his White, rural base. Religion also plays a role in determining how the American populace reacts to ethnic change, as Trump has lamented that the US is moving away from its Christian heritage (Whitehead et al., 2018: 5).

Discourse on multiculturalism[4] in Canada has undergone significant changes since the policy was enacted in 1971. Elke Winter, analysing media and government discourses along with policy changes, found that Québécois nationalism played a major role in constructing Canadian multicultural identity in the 1990s, mainly in opposition to what Winter found was termed "Quebec's allegedly backward-oriented nationalism" (ibid., 2015: 637–638). In the decades following, though, the rhetoric of multiculturalism has been less about overall Canadian identity and more about minority identity. As part of this ongoing change, "multiculturalism is no longer viewed as dealing with majority–minority relations, but rather portrayed as an 'intra-minority affair' to be managed by the dominant group" (ibid.: 638). One group that has resisted the multicultural frame is the First Nations, some of whom want to be recognized as separate and have their land and other rights strengthened. Multiculturalism can dilute their message (Guo & Guo, 2015). But with all of its problems, Hiebert (2016) says multiculturalism at least provides a framework for resolving cultural conflicts. There has been some backlash against Muslim immigrants in Quebec but "[a]s elsewhere, it's still taboo to openly defend majority ethnicity or ethno-traditional nationalism. Instead, ethnic conservatism is sublimated into state-nationalist and liberal rationales such as protecting women's equality, secularism or defending the language" (Kaufmann, 2018: 284). Kaufmann says the salience of immigration in Canada is best explained by "the boundaries of acceptable discourse in English Canada". In particular, Canada's media is united "behind a set

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[4] In a multicultural model, immigrants are not expected to give up their customs and culture wholesale and there is an expectation that the state and society will work to rectify any disadvantages accorded by their minority status (Castles et al., 2013: 12).

of liberal norms", with no conservative tabloid like Fox in the US (ibid.: 277–278).

Reitz argues that "[m]ost Canadians support the longstanding high rates of immigration, and few see immigration as one of Canada's most significant problems. Majority Canadian support for high levels of immigration has been remarkably stable over time and relatively unaffected by recessions, the threat of terrorism and negative reports on specific immigrant groups" (ibid., 2011: n.p.). Population ageing is a serious concern among Canadians, and intergenerational issues—if we count health care and education as such—are the top concerns. In polls taken in 2016 and 2017, Canadians listed health care as the most important issue, followed by education and then population ageing. A 2015 poll, taken during the tenure of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, showed similar results, but with jobs and the environment tied with ageing for third place (Nanos). Immigration, in contrast, is not a top issue. Reitz found that Canadians' personal beliefs that immigrants are an economic benefit and their support for multiculturalism boost support for immigration. Reitz says that "many Canadians would like immigrants to blend into society rather than form separate communities; however, pride in multiculturalism helps to allay this concern" (2011: n.p.). Hiebert agrees and adds that Canada still has racial and ethnic tensions, but percentages of those with immigrant backgrounds or non-European heritage are so high in some areas that it has become normalized: "[…] in the contemporary era, cultural complexity and change are no longer considered exceptional developments to be feared" (Hiebert, 2016: 3). In 2014, Canada admitted permanent residents from almost 200 countries—that diversity means there is no single conception of "the immigrant" and it helps dilute antagonism (ibid.: 3). Hiebert also notes that Canada also does not have immigrant-related terrorist attacks like Europe and US, so immigration as a national security rhetoric is less present (ibid.: 4).

Of course, there is still some resistance to immigration in Canada, particularly in French-Canada (Quebec). In 2011, the city of Gatineau, Quebec "published a 'statement of values' for new immigrants that cautioned against 'strong odors emanating from cooking' and […] informed migrants that, in Canada, it was not OK to bribe city officials" (Mehta, 2017). In Canada's 2015 election campaign, the press and the major parties debated the circumstances in which Muslim women could wear a veil (niqab), but the general public were mostly disinterested in that issue or other cultural concerns (Clarke et al., 2017). For

the most part, the rhetoric around immigration in Canada is neutral, in stark contrast to the US and most of Europe (Hiebert, 2016: 1–2).

Certainly, trends in rhetoric about political demography are hard to project to 2040. We cannot know how technology will continue to develop the media and communications landscape, nor how those changes will interact with the rapidly shifting demographics of the US and Canada. However, if we consider rhetoric as a product of demographic change or a reaction to that change, then we can more confidently predict that in concert with the economic changes outlined in an early section of this chapter, and tempered by the political institutions discussed previously, rhetoric about demographic change in the US is likely to remain inflammatory in the near future; Canada will be more insulated from such fires.

7   Conclusion

In both the US and Canada, population change—assumptions about it, fears of it and actual change—shapes policies about social security and retirement, about family benefits and about immigration, among other areas.

Racial tensions across the US have not abated even with greater diversity of the population. As the opening vignette of this chapter related, winds are shifting in the US towards acknowledging the legacy of enslaving and then restricting the rights of Blacks. As with any cultural change, though, resistance is strong. As the Confederate monuments have been removed across the US, protests and counter-protests accompany the cranes sent to remove the statues. If immigration continues at a robust level, immigrants and their descendants will be an increasing proportion of the US workforce as the large Baby-Boom generation continues to move into retirement (Passel & Cohn, 2017). But if it does not, the working-age population in the US will actually shrink by over 17 million people between 2015 and 2035 (Passel & Cohn, 2017). Even though the US is a populous country, it is remarkable that the US alone holds one-fifth of the world's total migrants (Pew Research Center, 2015). The country has been a desirable destination since its genesis, but its identity as a 'country of immigration' is still controversial. And those migration numbers do not necessarily translate into more political power for non-White groups. US demographics are changing so dramatically and rapidly that American institutions will have to change in order to preserve—or

initiate—economic growth. The first large Baby Boomer cohort collected its first social security checks in 2008, and to keep a sizeable labour force, immigrants need to step into fill the spots on the manufacturing floor or the engineer's draft table.

Continuing high immigration is a policy choice, made by politicians balancing demands from the political left and right, which simultaneously pressure politicians to open and close the borders. Comprehensive immigration reform in the US is at an impasse because immigration does not fall along the traditional left-right divide. Unions pressure Democrats to restrict immigrants who might fill their jobs and provide non-union employees. Nativists pressure Republicans to restrict immigration of non-Whites and non-Christians who further 'muddle' American identity. We can be sure that demographic change will continue to shape US politics, but the direction in which it will do so is unclear.

The Canadian population is growing increasingly diverse, and identity politics are fading compared with the US so issues around immigration are much less political. Issues with how to simultaneously support ageing Canadians and ensure economic growth, however, will grow in importance as Canada's population ageing intensifies over the coming decades. In both countries, the political institutions, particularly federalism and in the US the electoral system, and the population distribution across the territory will play a significant role in the policies that will be out at the polls.

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Population Ageing, Immigration and the Welfare State: The Political Demography in Western Europe

Elias Naumann and Moritz Hess

1 Introduction

From a global perspective, similar demographic forces are changing Western European societies.[1] Increasing life expectancy and low fertility rates are the main endogenous drivers of population ageing. Moreover, some countries might even enter a phase in which their populations shrink since in-migration is too low to outweigh the effects of low fertility rates.

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[1] We define Western European countries from a political-institutionalist perspective, which sometimes does not conform to the geographical description (see, for example, Crouch, 2000). This includes the EU-15 plus Norway and Switzerland: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain (UK).

E. Naumann (✉)
University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
e-mail: naumann@uni-mannheim.de

M. Hess
Niederrhein University of Applied Sciences, Mönchengladbach, Germany

Yet migration to Western European countries itself has far-reaching social and political consequences. In this chapter, we explore how these two demographic trends—population ageing and migration—shape social and political life in Western European societies and focus in particular on political responses to these challenges. The main contribution of our chapter lies in the combination of several strands in the literature—demographers, political scientists, welfare state researchers and migration researchers—all of whom focus on these demographic changes, but whose work has to date remained rather separate (but see Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012).

We start with the numbers and describe the demographic transition of population ageing caused by declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. We argue that, from a global perspective, all Western European countries face similar challenges despite slight differences in respective degrees of population ageing. Moreover, all Western European countries turned into net migrant-receiving countries during the period from 1990 until 2015. Hence, our case selection of three countries, Italy, Germany and Sweden, is motivated by institutional differences in the various welfare states and not by differences in their population trends. We will focus on two dimensions of the theoretical framework which are of relevance to many Western European states: first, how population ageing affects the welfare state and the labour market (economic clout and policy dimension), and second, how migration affects solidarity and political conflict (the order dimension). Our analysis shows that demographic change shapes political dynamics in Western Europe. Yet despite institutional differences between the welfare states, we find more similarities than context-specific policy responses. In the conclusion, we discuss to what extent these strategies of dealing with an ageing population are sustainable or whether the welfare state needs to be further adapted in future.

2   Population Ageing in Western Europe

Population trends in Western European countries are very similar in global comparison. In 2020, they have old populations and continue to age but in comparison, in particular to Asian countries like Japan or China, this occurs at a moderate pace. The main reason for population ageing in Western Europe is low fertility rates that have been declining since the mid-1970s. Whereas most Western European countries still had total fertility rates above 2.1 in 1970, fertility rates had dropped to numbers below 2.1 by 1990. In particular, Southern European countries

have very low fertility rates (e.g. Italy with 1.35) and only some countries like Sweden, Ireland or France come close to 2.0 children per woman in 2015. Since 1990, fertility rates have remained stable (or even recovered slightly) but at a very low level (Table 1). These trends seem not to be related to changing attitudes towards children as the intended and ideal

Table 1 Key population indicators of Sweden, Germany and Italy

		1990	2015	2040
Migration				
International in-migration as % of population	Sweden	0.62	1.17	
	Germany	1.07	2.5	
	Italy	0.17	0.42	
International out-migration as % of population	Sweden	0.19	0.32	
	Germany	0.60	1.06	
	Italy		0.07	
Net migration (in millions) (UN indicator) 5-year indicator	Sweden	0.13	0.40	0.15
	Germany	1.7	1.8	1.0
	Italy	−0.01	0.26	0.5
Stock of foreign born (as % of the total population)	Sweden	9.2	16.8	
	Germany	7.5	14.9	
	Italy	2.5	9.7	
Size of age groups (as % of population)				
0–17	Sweden	21.8	20.2	20.1
	Germany	19.14	16.07	15.9
	Italy	20.9	16.5	15.2
65+	Sweden	17.8	19.6	23.9
	Germany	14.9	21.1	30.0
	Italy	14.9	22.4	33.6
80+	Sweden	4.3	5.1	8.2
	Germany	3.7	5.7	9.9
	Italy	3.3	6.7	11.4
65+/18–64 ratio	Sweden	30.8	34.6	44.8
	Germany	23.4	34.9	60.1
	Italy	24.2	37.9	68.6
Absolute size of the population	Sweden	8.6	9.8	11.3
	Germany	78.96	80.69	77.3
	Italy	57.0	59.8	58.1
Population density relative to CROP land area (not general land area)	Sweden	0.33	0.26	
	Germany	0.15	0.14	
Arable Land (hectares per person)	Italy	0.16	0.11	

Table 1   (continued)

		1990	*2015*	*2040*
City density (Urban Population % of total)	Sweden	83.1	85.8	
	Germany	73.1	75.3	
	Italy	66.7	69.0	
Fertility Rates Total fertility: live births per woman (UN indicator)	Sweden	1.91	1.90	1.92
	Germany	1.43	1.43	1.59
	Italy	1.35	1.43	1.65

Source Goerres et al. (2020)

family size in Western Europe has remained quite stable at an average of around 2.3 (Sobotka & Beaujouan, 2014). There are two factors that contribute to this gap between intended and actual fertility rates: first, the availability and more extensive use of contraceptives since the 1960s and second, the postponement of motherhood mainly due to women's education and labour market participation, partnership changes and economic uncertainties (Mills et al., 2011). Such a postponement first has a tempo effect leading to temporarily lower fertility rates. But the postponement of motherhood also has the effect that women have fewer children than they would have liked or remain unintentionally childless. These trends show up in the population pyramids of all three countries (Fig. 1), which indicate that the 1950s and 1960s birth cohorts, i.e. those between 25 and 35 years old in 1990, are the largest and that the subsequently born cohorts steadily decline. This so-called baby-boom generation will enter retirement age between 2020 and 2030.

The second demographic trend contributing to population ageing is increasing life expectancy. All three population pyramids grow taller between 1990 and 2040 and life expectancy at age 65 increased from 82.1 years in 1990 to 85.3 years in 2010.

These trends have considerable consequences for the relative size of age groups within a society (Table 1). First, the share of older people is increasing. The old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the share of people 65 and older compared to the working-age population who are between 18 and 64, is increasing in all Western European countries. For example, in Italy in 1990, there were 24 individuals aged 65 and over for every 100 persons aged 18 to 64. Germany had a similar old-age dependency ratio in 1990 while in Sweden there were already 30 persons aged 65 and

Fig. 1 Demography in Germany, Italy and Sweden 1990, 2020 and 2040 (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

over for every 100 persons aged 18 to 64. The old-age dependency ratios increased to around 35 in all three countries by 2015 and are projected to further increase to 68 and 60 in Italy and Germany, respectively, by 2040, whereas Sweden's population is ageing at a slower pace, with an estimated old-age dependency ratio of 44.8 by 2040. In other words, the relationship between people of working age compared to the population in retirement age decreased from around 4:1 in 1990 in Italy and

Germany to a ratio of 3:1 in 2015 and might eventually drop below 2:1 in Italy and Germany by 2040. Moreover, the composition of the age group 65 years and older will also change and the share of those 80 years and older, the old-old, will increase. In 1990, only around 4% of the population in all three countries were 80 years or older. By 2040, this share is expected to double in Sweden (to 8.2%) and almost triple in Germany (9.9%) and Italy (11.4%) (see Table 1).

In addition to fertility and mortality rates, migration is the third factor shaping the demographic situation of a country. Concerning migration, we need to distinguish between countries that experienced strong economic growth after the Second World War (WWII), such as the UK, France, Germany, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries, and Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy. From 1950 until the 1973 oil crisis, many migrants moved from the poorer Southern European countries to the economically more successful countries in Western and Northern Europe. Migration was further encouraged by a number of West European countries, like Belgium, Germany or France, who actively started recruiting guest workers to address the labour shortage in the course of the economic recovery after the Second World War. Migrants also came from Turkey (mainly to Germany) and from former colonies to the respective colonial 'motherlands' (like the UK, France or the Netherlands). This is also reflected in a liberalization of migration policies (de Haas et al., 2016). With the end of the Cold War, a second wave of migration from Eastern to Western and also to Southern Europe began in the 1990s (see Vanhuysse and Perek-Bialas, this volume). Political instability and armed conflicts, for example in Syria and many African countries, became the main drivers of migration flows in the 2000s and increasingly in the 2010s (Bacci, 2018). These trends are also apparent in the migration flows and the stock of foreign born in the three countries. Sweden and Germany already had an above average share of foreign born in 1990 (9.2 and 7.5%) and in-migration has always been higher than out-migration (Table 1). Consequently, the share of foreign born increased to 16.8% in Sweden and to 14.9% in Germany by 2015. In contrast, only 2.5% of the population was foreign born in Italy in 1990 and net migration was negative; that is, out-migration was higher than in-migration. This pattern changed in the late 2000s and the share of foreign born in Italy almost tripled from 3.7% in 2000 to 9.7% in 2015 (UN Population Division, 2017).

With fertility rates below 2.1 and without external migration flows, populations would shrink. While migration has the potential to balance this effect and to ensure that population size is not declining (Bacci, 2018), population simulations show that the in-migration necessary to halt population ageing exceeds actual migration flows by far (Bijak et al., 2008). It is therefore unlikely that replacement migration will reach levels which would substantially change the support ratios described above. Nevertheless, migration has always been and still is one important aspect that has the potential to both affect the composition of the working population in the short or medium term and affect the composition and heterogeneity of a population more generally.

3   The Challenges of Population Ageing for the Welfare State

As described above, all Western European countries follow a very similar demographic transition. After a period in the 1970s and 1980s with comparatively few children to care for and a low old-age dependency ratio, these countries now entered a transition phase in which support ratios increased. Hence, population ageing as a result of decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancy has become an unavoidable prospect for all Western European countries (Coleman, 2006) as migration and eventually increasing fertility rates will continue to affect the pace of ageing. Pensions, health care and long-term care are particularly affected by population ageing. Moreover, pensions and healthcare spending are already the most expensive areas of the welfare state and the average total expenditure in Western Europe amounts to around 13% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on pensions (around 2 trillion $) and 10% of the GDP on health care (around 1.6 trillion $). Increases in the costs of health care and pension expenditures therefore have the potential to strongly affect state budgets and the economy as a whole. The increasing costs of the pension system arise from the expected increase in the number of pensioners. At the same time, current contributions to the pension system will decline if the labour force is shrinking and this trend is of course accelerated by generous early retirement pathways which existed in most European countries in the 1990s (Ebbinghaus, 2006).

Support ratios are a good means of illustrating this trend. Whereas in 2015 about 3–3.5 persons of working age were responsible for one person of pensionable age, this support ratio is estimated to go down to

2:1 or even lower by 2040. As for the costs of health care and long-term care, it is mainly the share of the old-old, i.e. those who are 80 years and older, which seem to matter most. This period of life is characterized by increased risks of physical dysfunctionality and psychological pressures testing the limits of resilience (Higgs & Gilleard, 2015). It is estimated that per capita healthcare spending on the old-old will triple compared to healthcare spending for the old, aged between 65 and 74 (Jackson, 2006). As we have outlined above, increasing life expectancy will lead to a doubling of the share of the old-old between 2015 and 2040.

Hence, under the current circumstances, population ageing would indeed threaten the financial sustainability of the welfare state and many see reforms as inevitable (e.g. World Bank, 2004). Yet comparative political studies suggest that it is very difficult to reform and retrench pensions and healthcare systems (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009, 2010). The main reason is that such a pro-elderly bias in spending is expected to find political legitimacy as health care and pensions are the most popular areas of the welfare state (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2018). Moreover, preferences of older voters and their interests are expected to gain more political weight in the reform process as they grow in number and are also politically more involved reflected in a higher turnout among the elderly (Goerres, 2010). Party competition for these voters (Immergut et al., 2007) and also trade unions defending acquired pension rights (Häusermann, 2009) create further barriers to reform. According to the new politics argument, pension policies are path dependent (Pierson, 1996) as the introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system has created large groups of current beneficiaries and people of working age who also expect to benefit from pensions. Backed by such a generational contract, it is very unlikely that radical, path-departing reform is feasible. Of course, there is some institutional variation in the degree of these challenges and the financial sustainability of social insurance countries is more sensitive to the demographic change. While at the same time it seems also more difficult to reform these pension systems whose budgets are mainly controlled by the government (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2006).

Yet there are some doubts about such an inevitable, demographically determined pension crisis. Whereas old-age dependency ratios are mostly predictable for the next decades and population ageing is inevitable, the mere numerical ratios between old and young do not determine the extent of the financial burden on the welfare state. It is instead economic

dependency ratios that matter, i.e. the *ratio* of employed persons to the inactive population (Ebbinghaus, 2016). These ratios can be improved if labour force participation of the elderly increases, for example by closing early retirement pathways or by encouraging working beyond retirement age. Also, an earlier entry into the workforce after education and increasing female participation rates have the potential to increase the share of the active population. Empirical evidence also shows that such (incremental) reforms have been possible even in pension policy (Ebbinghaus, 2011; Häusermann, 2009). Finally, it is even possible to change the economic dependency ratios by increasing immigration rates. Although potentially unpopular, it could shift the old-age dependency ratios towards the younger generation. However, such policy will have an effect not only on the country to which people at a younger age will migrate, but also on the countries they are leaving. Their absence as part of the labour force and as carers of children and older relatives will be felt (Lutz & Palenga-Möllenbech, 2012).

More generally, economic theory suggests that there are other means to address labour shortages and a decreasing workforce. Investing in physical capital, attracting skilled migration or shifting production abroad promises productivity gains and economic growth which have the potential to outweigh the unfavourable economic dependency ratios (Schulz, 2002). Most of the more pessimistic commentaries might also be focused too narrowly on monetary aspects alone. With increasing life expectancy, there is usually an increase in healthy life expectancy (Salomon et al., 2012) and thus older people have the potential to remain active and productive beyond paid work if policies allow flexible pathways to retirement (Schulz, 2002). Related to this, Gál et al. (2018) show that the often-claimed pro-elderly bias of European welfare states does not capture the actual transfers between generations. Focusing not only on public budgets but also on transfers of time and money within families, children receive more than twice as many per capita resources than older persons.

4   Changing Pension and Family Policies in Italy, Germany and Sweden

As we have outlined above, the main focus of this chapter is on the political consequences of demographic change for the welfare state. We aim to explore whether political reactions to comparable demographic trends differ depending on the existing welfare institutions. Hence, we have

chosen three country cases, Germany, Sweden and Italy, representing different types of welfare states. Germany represents the continental-conservative, Sweden the social-democratic–Scandinavian and Italy the familiaristic-southern. In terms of political reactions, we mainly focus on policies in two areas of the welfare state, pensions and family policy, which are most relevant to political demography. The first is under long-term financial pressures from demographic ageing as the pay-as-you-go pension systems rely on a balanced ratio of contributors and beneficiaries. The latter is a policy that allows for alteration in fertility rates—in the case of the three countries to increase them.

Germany has a prototypical Bismarckian pension system with statutory old-age income security, which is financed on a pay-as-you-go principle and covers about 80% of the employed population (Schulze, 2009). From the late 1980s on, concerns were raised that this pension system was financially not sustainable due to population ageing, as described in the previous section. This resulted in several reforms aimed at delaying retirement and extending working lives (Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012). Several early retirement options were abolished, made financially less attractive or the eligibility criteria tightened (Buchholz et al., 2013). The official retirement age is to be increased from 65 to 67. Furthermore, there are efforts towards privatization and marketization in old-age security by means of public subsidies for occupational and private pension schemes (Ebbinghaus & Hofäcker, 2013). Finally, training programmes and measures for life-long learning have been implemented aimed at increasing older workers' workability. These pensions and labour market reforms seem to have been effective, as older workers' employment rates and the effective retirement age in Germany are increasing (Buchholz et al., 2013). However, it should be acknowledged that there might be other reasons for the increase in older workers' employment rates as well. The German labour market has been comparably robust across all age groups. In addition, cohort effects are resulting in older workers that are healthier and more qualified than their predecessors. Thirdly, female labour market participation has increased overall and in particular among older workers (Hess, 2016).

This steep increase in the women's employment rate in Germany can be partly explained by a shift in family policies. The male bread-winner model—in which the husband is in paid employment, while the wife specializes in domestic work—was one main principle of the (West) German welfare state until the early 1990s. This has been changing slowly

but steadily. Germany has experienced a substantial expansion in child-care, in particular for children younger than three years (Morgan, 2013). The aim is to make the reconciliation of childcare and work easier and, thus, increase the fertility rate. In addition, parental-leave periods with a wage replacement of about 67% have been extended in the last decade to 12 months and even 14 months when both parents take leave (Bünning, 2015).

Pension policies in Italy have shifted in a similar way to those in Germany, however less fundamentally. Like in Germany, Italian pension and labour market policies were characterized by several early retire-ment schemes, which allowed older workers to retire well before the official retirement age with only small pension reductions. In particular, the disability pension was used as a 'bridge' to retirement (Contini & Rapiti, 1999). Mirroring the development in Germany, several reforms were implemented from the mid-1990s on, to counteract the financial pressures that this policy of early retirement in combination with popu-lation ageing was putting on public pensions. The official retirement age was increased to 67 and the minimum period of contribution require-ments was raised from 35 to 40 years (Bertolini et al., 2016). In addition, the official retirement age will be linked to life expectancy from 2021 on. This means that if life expectancy increases, the official retirement age will automatically increase also (Lallo & Raitano, 2018). These efforts have been complemented by marketization and privatization measures to strengthen the occupational and private pensions, which are supported by public subsidies (Bertolini et al., 2016).

In both Italy and Germany, family policies were characterized by a male breadwinner model, which made it difficult for women to reconcile work and care work (Lewis et al., 2008). Parental leave payments and family allowances are comparable to those of other Central and Southern European countries (Bünning & Pollmann-Schult, 2016). This leads to low employment rates among married women and mothers in particular, especially in Southern Italy (Oliver & Mätzke, 2014). One reason for this is the different provision of childcare in Northern and in Southern Italy; while it is comparatively high in the North, it is low in the South.

Pension policies in Sweden differ substantially from those in Germany and Italy. Employment rates of older workers have always been rather high and have never fallen as low as in Germany and Italy, despite the use of disability pensions as a measure of early retirement policies, particularly during the economic crisis of the early 1990s (Wadensjö,

2002). Swedish policymakers still acknowledged the financial pressure stemming from population ageing and in addition wanted to cut the national budget and retrench the cost of social insurance (Fleckenstein & Lee, 2014). They aimed at extending working lives with stricter eligibility rules for the disability pension and requalification programmes for older unemployed persons (König & Lindquist, 2016). Furthermore, a flexible statutory retirement was introduced. Older workers can draw their pensions between 61 and 67, but with actuarial pension reduction for early retirement and a higher pension for late retirement. The returns to replacement rate are comparably high for the ages 61 to 67 given older workers' strong incentives to delay their labour force exit (ibid.). The closing of early retirement options and the flexibilization of the statutory retirement age were complemented with a strong tradition of life-long learning and qualification also at a higher age which sustains and even improves workability as well as the employability of older workers (König et al., 2016).

Sweden also has high female employment rates in older age groups. The main reason is the generally high level of gender equality in Sweden. In comparison with other European countries, the male breadwinner model is not as important in Sweden and in more families both partners have been in employment, while childcare and also long-term care were provided by the state (Sundström, 2003). This is also reflected in Swedish family policies. Parents have an unconditional right to daycare services for children in pre-school age resulting in one of the highest enrolment rates in Europe with over 90% of children between 3 and 6 years and over 50% of children from between 0 and 3 years in day care (Gehringer & Klasen, 2017). In addition, parental leave pay is also comparably generous (Sundström, 2003).

In summary, from a global, broad perspective, we observe similar trends in the pension and family policies in all three countries, policies that are mainly aimed at increasing employment rates among women and among the elderly. Pension policies have undergone a shift from policies of early retirement to policies of extending working lives. Family policies have shifted from a principle of a male breadwinner model to a family in which both parents work. A high coverage for childcare and more generous parental leave policies have been introduced to facilitate the reconciliation of work and childcare—and to increase fertility rates. Yet there are also differences in how countries have reacted to population pressures and these are linked to the institutional differences between

the respective countries. The most generous family and parental leave policies are found in Sweden, whereas Italy lags behind in this respect. These differences are possibly largely a result of the existing differences in gender norms which are more favourable in Sweden. As for pension policies, Sweden has also implemented the most progressive measures to encourage longer working lives, e.g. flexible arrangements for the transition from work into retirement and policies to allow life-long learning. In contrast, Germany introduced more liberal measures to enforce higher participation rates among older workers, e.g. by increasing the retirement age and closing early retirement options. One reason for this difference might be that German policymakers lagged behind in finding responses to the demographic pressures and hence chose measures that promised to have more immediate effects on participation rates.

While we mainly focused on policy reactions here, the demographic trends might also affect the politics of the welfare state. It is often argued that an age-bias in policies, i.e. policies benefiting young families and at the same time encouraging older workers to work longer, might enforce a conflict between generations (Lynch, 2006). Empirically, however, the potential for such an inter-generational conflict over welfare-state resource seems unlikely in Europe (Hess et al., 2017) as the inter-generational solidarity is rather strong.

5   Migration, Public Attitudes and the Welfare State

Migration has always been one important factor affecting the demographic composition of Western European societies—and as many countries have become net migration-receiving countries, immigration is also one factor which is likely to be of high relevance in addressing anticipated labour shortages in particular and the challenges of population ageing for the welfare state more generally. As a result, the ethnic heterogeneity of European countries is increasing, and this would occur even if in-migration did not increase further. In the following, we summarize research on how migration and increasing heterogeneity affect European societies. We will first focus on attitudes towards migration and then explore how migration and support for the welfare state are linked.

Migration policy is at the top of the European political agenda especially since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, when high numbers of migrants and asylum seekers travelled by sea and land to Europe

and many died making the dangerous journey. Albeit there are some moderated tones that praise the potential positive externalities of migration in times of demographic change (United Nations, 2000), the debate was largely dominated by populist outcries warning that migration increases competition for jobs and increases the tax burden. The rise of right-wing parties in most Western European countries suggests that anti-immigration messages tap into widespread anxieties among the public (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2013). Theoretically, two motives underlie attitudes towards migration: culture and identity concerns, but also natives' economic self-interests, for example tax concerns or perceived competition with migrants for jobs (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Naumann et al., 2018). Empirical research has consistently shown cultural aspects to shape immigration attitudes (see, e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007). For example, valuing cultural homogeneity proves an especially strong predictor (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Yet objective indicators of individual-level economic self-interest show little explanatory power (Naumann et al., 2018). Most importantly though, country-level characteristics such as immigration levels or economic conditions did not foster anti-immigration attitudes (Dunn & Singh, 2011; Mudde, 2013, but see also Semyonov et al., 2006). Mudde (2013: 1) concludes that the political impact of populist right-wing parties "is largely limited to the broader immigration issue, and even here populist right wing parties should be seen as a catalyst rather than initiators, who are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the introduction of stricter immigration policies".

A second much debated concern about migration is that ethnic diversity might reduce social cohesion and solidarity and would lead to a decline in support for redistributive welfare state measures (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Moreover, migrants usually have a lower level of education than the native population face a higher risk of being unemployed (Boeri et al., 2002) and are often perceived as a net fiscal burden (Gilens, 1995), which would lead to a decline in support for redistributive welfare state measures. Empirical evidence though does not support these claims about the general negative impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion and solidarity (van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). Studies on solidarity and welfare state support show that the experience of migration at the local or occupational level matters for welfare state support (Burgoon et al., 2012; Eger, 2009; Schmidt-Catran & Spies, 2016)—but there are considerable doubts whether migration per se leads to an erosion of welfare state support in European countries (Naumann & Stoetzer, 2018).

One reason why migration might not lead to a decline of welfare state support in general is the increasing prevalence of chauvinistic welfare attitudes. Natives who want to prevent redistribution to the outgroup of immigrants might favour the introduction of exclusionary measures so that migrants do not get access to welfare benefits. A more implicit version of welfare chauvinism is the preference for welfare programmes to which migrants do not have access over programmes from which they already benefit. Yet the empirical evidence provides little support that migration and ethnic heterogeneity are related to support for welfare chauvinism (Mewes & Mau, 2012; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). Römer (2017) also demonstrates that generous welfare states are more likely to grant immigrants access to welfare benefits whereas less generous welfare states are more likely to exclude immigrants from access.

In summary, there is limited evidence that migration indeed leads to stronger opposition to migration and also little evidence that migration results in an erosion of solidarity and public support for the welfare state. Yet in times of increasing migration, populist right-wing parties have the opportunity to increase the salience of migration. Tapping into already existing concerns about the perceived consequences of increased ethnic heterogeneity might lead to the emergence of new conflict lines sometimes cross-cutting the old primarily political cleavage over economic conflicts.

6   Conclusion

We set out to explore the political and social consequences of the two dominant population trends in Western Europe: migration and population ageing. We have shown that Western European countries face similar pressures in this respect, at least from a global perspective. Increasing age dependency ratios will increase costs for the welfare state, in particular for pensions and care, and might also lead to (skilled) labour shortages. In-migration is too low to balance these demographic trends. Yet migration has itself become a politicized topic with unclear consequences for the politics of the welfare state. Hence, public perceptions of migration but also public perceptions of population ageing shape the political opportunities to further adapt the welfare state in future. Our analysis of three countries shows that policy reactions in the most affected areas of the welfare state—pensions and family policies—are comparable

across Western European countries. This suggests that existing institutional differences have less effect on how countries react to demographic pressures. Yet all three countries only gradually re-calibrate their welfare systems. Moreover, changes in family policies only very slowly have an effect on fertility rates (if at all). Hence, low fertility rates, shrinking populations and increasing dependency ratios will continue to shape the demography of Western European countries in the coming decades. We therefore expect a continuous need to adapt the welfare state to these changing circumstances in future. Policy measures in this vein include adaptations of the legal retirement age and active ageing policies to enhance older workers' abilities to remain in the workforce. This also includes family and labour market policies which help to reconcile work and family, in particular for women. In this respect, the continuing high popularity of the welfare state shows that the public perceives it as a powerful tool to address the demographic challenges facing our societies. But such a high level of popularity also makes far-reaching reforms difficult, and it remains to be seen whether gradual adjustments of the welfare state will be sufficient to address the challenges posed by demographic changes.

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The Political Demography of Missed Opportunity: Populations and Policies in a Younger but Faster-Ageing East Central Europe, 1990–2040

Pieter Vanhuysse and Jolanta Perek-Białas

1 Political Demography in Postcommunist Europe: A Long Demographic Window of Opportunity, Now Closed

This chapter analyses the political and policy repercussions of recent, current and predicted demographic changes in postcommunist East Central Europe (henceforth ECE). Countries in this region are united by

P. Vanhuysse (✉)
Department of Political Science, Danish Institute for Advanced Study (DIAS), and Interdisciplinary Centre on Population Dynamics (CPOP-SAMF), University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
e-mail: vanhuysse@sam.sdu.dk

J. Perek-Białas
Institute of Sociology and Center for Evaluation and Analysis of Public Policies, Jagiellonian University,
Cracow and Warsaw School of Economics, Cracow, Poland

a common communist past. But more than thirty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, they are today remarkably diverse as regimes of social policy (Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009; Kuitto, 2016), of political economy (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; Pop & Vanhuysse, 2004), of demography (Sobotka & Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, 2020), and, as this chapter shows, of political demography. We focus especially but not exclusively on four ECE cases: Hungary (population size 9.7 million), Latvia (1.92 million), Poland (37.9 million) and Romania (19.4 million). The latter two countries are the largest in ECE. The first three countries have been EU member states since 2004, Romania only since 2010. Like the rest of ECE, all four countries have seen a marked shift from demographically relatively younger populations around the fall of communism to fast-ageing societies approaching a nearly reversed demographic pyramid structure well before mid-century (Fig. 1; see also Goerres et al., 2020).

The ECE demographic context, while perhaps not as tragic as the severe drops in male life expectancy in some post-Soviet republics (Kazimov & Zakharov, this volume), is in some respects dramatic, too. As a result of the uncertainties, changing family values and material hardships generated by the postcommunist transition, fertility rates have fallen sharply and have remained low well into the twenty-first century (Frątczak, 2011; Sobotka, 2003). This is visible in Fig. 1 in the shrinking of the bases of the population pyramids between 1990 and 2020. Specifically, at the beginning of the 1990s, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.06 for Poland, 1.83 for Romania and 1.87 for Hungary 1.87 (Eurostat database, 2019). It had dropped to much lower levels still by 2000: respectively, 1.37, 1.27 and 1.31.[1] In addition, since 1990, many ECE societies have had to cope with rising life expectancy at birth and, notably in the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria, very significant outmigration. Throughout the post-1990 period, these demographic trends have often fluctuated significantly, and even reversed, as a result of changing external conditions (Sobotka & Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, 2020).

All three trends—decreasing fertility, rising life expectancy and significant outmigration—have had a tremendous impact on demographic trajectories and population pyramids, and will continue to do so in the

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[1] For Latvia, the TFR (available only from 2000) was 1.25. After joining the EU, the TFR increased somewhat but remained below replacement level (2.1). By 2015, it stood at 1.32 in Poland, at 1.45 in Hungary, at 1.62 in Romania and 1.7 in Latvia (Eurostat database, 2017, 2019). See furthermore Sobotka and Fürnkranz-Prskawetz (2020).

Fig. 1 Population pyramids for Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Romania for 1990, 2020 and 2040 (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

next decades. Until around 2010–2015, Eastern Europe has been significantly younger than Western Europe (on which see Naumann and Hess, this volume). The old-age dependency ratio (henceforth OADR; the number of 65plussers as a share of those aged 18–64) has been rising steeply and steadily since at least 1990 in the Baltic states, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, but from relatively low levels. And it only started increasing significantly, albeit fast now, as late as 2010–2015 in the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics) (see also Table 1). These Visegrad Four thus benefited from a particularly long and ample demographic window of opportunity to reform their policy models to better prepare for the widely predicted population ageing ahead. Even as recently as 2015, the average OADR for the 'Western' EU-15 member states as a whole was 32.7, but still only 26.7 for the new 'Eastern' EU members combined. All this is now changing fast. By 2050, the OADR is projected to increase by 25.3% points for the 'Western' EU-15 and by nearly 30 points for the 'Eastern' EU-11. By mid-century, ECE ageing processes will have essentially caught up with Western Europe, at OADR values of, respectively, 56.6 and 58 (European Demographic Datasheet, 2016). For instance, the OADR is expected to nearly double in Hungary and to more than double in Latvia, Poland and Romania between 2015 and 2040, to reach, respectively, 40, 42, 43 and 47 (Table 1).

Poland, long one of Europe's youngest societies, is now fast becoming one of its oldest. Compared to 1990, median age will have increased by 2040 by, respectively, 11, 14, 15 and 18 years in Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Poland. All four countries will have seen their population size shrink by then. Table 1 also sketches further components of the fast-changing demographic landscape in ECE over half a century. Between 1990 and 2040, the share of the oldest-old (aged above 80) will have more than tripled in Hungary and Latvia, and more than quadrupled in Romania and Poland. There will be more than three million Poles aged above 80 by 2040—more than the entire population of Latvia. The share of the electorally crucial group of 65plussers will have almost doubled in Hungary (to reach 25%), more than doubled in Latvia (to reach 26%), and will have gone up two and a half times in Romania and Poland (to reach, respectively, 25 and 26%). Population structures in 1990, 2015 and 2040 are shown in Fig. 1. In the decades ahead, in all four cases smaller young cohorts will need to support much larger old and very old

Table 1 Overview of the demographic situation in selected countries of East Central Europe in 1990/1995, 2015 and with projections for 2040

Indicators	Country	1990	2015	2040
International migrant stock as % of population	Hungary	3.35	4.56	X
	Latvia	24.25	13.35	X
	Poland	2.95	1.60	X
	Romania	0.58	1.16	X
Immigration as % of population	Hungary	X	0.59	X
	Latvia	X	0.48	X
	Poland	X	0.57	X
	Romania	X	0.67	X
Emigration as % of population	Hungary	X	1.48	X
	Latvia	X	0.20	X
	Poland	X	0.68	X
	Romania	X	0.98	X
Size of age groups 0–17 as % of population	Hungary	25.02	17.46	16.45
	Latvia	25.61	17.62	16.86
	Poland	29.74	17.92	14.41
	Romania	28.74	18.68	17.00
Size of age groups 18–35 as % of population	Hungary	24.73	22.94	X
	Latvia	25.19	23.54	X
	Poland	25.39	26.33	X
	Romania	26.64	23.20	X
Size of 65+ as % of population	Hungary	13.45	17.49	24.81
	Latvia	11.87	19.28	25.9
	Poland	9.95	15.61	25.93
	Romania	10.40	16.99	25.18
Size of 80+ as % of population	Hungary	2.5	4.03	7.76
	Latvia	2.7	4.85	7.86
	Poland	2.0	3.99	9.3
	Romania	1.79	4.15	7.39
Median age	Hungary	36.40	41.69	47.65
	Latvia	34.65	42.53	48.20
	Poland	32.21	39.69	50.17
	Romania	32.57	41.25	47.56
Old-age dependency ratio 65+/18–64 (×100)	Hungary	22.44	27.70	39.7
	Latvia	21.77	30.75	41.55
	Poland	17.95	23.20	42.8
	Romania	19.03	26.45	46.5
Absolute size of the population	Hungary	10,385,060.55	9,855,023.438	8,784,323
	Latvia	2,663,985.107	1,970,503.052	1,692,476
	Poland	38,195,257.81	38,611,792.97	35,286,450
	Romania	23,489,361.33	19,511,324.22	16,448,540

(continued)

Table 1   (continued)

Indicators	Country	1990	2015	2040
Population density: persons per square km	Hungary	114.63	108.07	96.73
	Latvia	42.83	32.03	26.08
	Poland	123.94	124.95	113.16
	Romania	102.05	86.35	75.87
Urban population as % of total	Hungary	65.838	71.227	X
	Latvia	69.25	67.382	X
	Poland	61.27	60.539	X
	Romania	53.217	54.564	X
Urban population density (people per sq. km of urban land area (1990 and 2010)	Hungary	X	X	X
	Latvia	562.52	433.09	X
	Poland	765.56	759.48	X
	Romania	791.76	698.87	X

Source Goerres et al. (2020), World Bank and own calculations based on Population (total) & Agricultural land (sq. km)—World Bank, own calculation from Eurostat database
Remark If data for 1990 not available in some cases data from 1995 are presented in Table 1

cohorts, who, in addition, are likely to become even more powerful electoral groups (see Sect. 2). All in all, this adds up to a picture of dramatic demographic changes that, one would expect, contains multiple repercussions for politics and policies. Adopting a political demography lens (Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012; this volume), this chapter discusses how these developments have affected the politics of age group-relevant policies such as family and work-family reconciliation policy, pension policy and ageing policy.

2   "Pensioners' Welfare States" on the Path to *Premature* Pro-elderly Bias: Political Push Before Demographic Pull

With the exception of significant Russian minorities in two of the Baltic states, ECE is a region of relatively ethnically homogeneous societies. Among our four cases, Poland is the most homogeneous country by ethnicity, while Latvia has about 25% of ethnic Russians (Table 1). Yet this comparative absence of ethnically heterogeneous populations has not altogether prevented ethnically motivated population politics in ECE. Political economy (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005) and social capital theory

(Putnam, 2007) have documented the manifold negative effects of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, both on public policies and on socio-economic variables such as productivity, growth, public good provision and other forms of social solidarity. The power strategies of the new elites in early postcommunist Latvia (as in Estonia) have actively taken advantage of the ethnic cleavages within the population by proactively remodelling the distribution of transition winners and losers along ethnic lines, as part of a post-Soviet nation-building project and to the disadvantage of Russian minority populations (Laitin, 1998). Baltic powerholders have designed public policies in ways that made existing levels of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity politically more salient, at the expense of age, class and other existing social cleavages (Vanhuysse, 2009).

In Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Czech Republic, similar ethnic cleavage strategies were used to different degrees to target the smaller Roma minority populations (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). But especially in the Visegrad countries and Slovenia, *age* became a politically more important cleavage line.[2] For instance, Hungarian and Polish elites have similarly reshaped the distributions of economic winners and losers in transition, but along lines of risk and age, rather than ethnicity. In so doing, they have proactively modified the subsequent patterns of distributive conflict in the polity, for instance by reducing the political salience of class cleavages and significantly increasing the electoral size and political clout of the pensioner constituency (Vanhuysse, 2009). The political consequences of the social costs of reforms, notably of large-scale job loss, can be far-reaching (Golden, 1997; Przeworski, 1991; Vanhuysse, 2008). Early in the socially costly ECE transitions to market democracy, a key political aim was therefore to try and temper these consequences one way or another. Some postcommunist governments have proactively reduced the threat of large-scale reform protests by splitting up formerly homogenous groups of at-risk workers into new heterogeneous and now-competing work-welfare status categories (Vanhuysse, 2019).

To this effect, they used public pension systems as buffers against large-scale transitional unemployment. Post-1989, Hungary and Poland, but also Slovakia and Slovenia though not the Czech Republic, have witnessed 'great abnormal pensioner booms' as a result of historically unprecedented exit of working-age citizens into early and disability pensions

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[2] On age politics generally, see Pampel and Williamson (1989), Lynch (2006), Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009, 2012), Vanhuysse and Goerres (2012).

(Vanhuysse, 2006). In the first seven years of postcommunist transition alone, hundreds of thousands of working-age Hungarians and Poles were incentivized to exit into early and disability pensions by means of more generous and better protected pension eligibility conditions and benefit generosity relative to 'younger' programmes such as unemployment and education. These policies led to large-scale increases in the number of pensioners, with significant macro-fiscal and political-electoral consequences. Whereas the number of 60-plussers remained stable in Hungary and grew by 10% in Poland between 1989 and 1996, the number of old-age pensioners increased by respectively one-fifth and 46%. In the same period of just seven years, the number of disability pensioners also increased by one-half in Hungary and by one-fifth in Poland (Vanhuysse, 2004). In the first six years of transition alone, and at a time of still modest population ageing, the estimated share of pensioners within the electorate increased from 32 to 40% in Hungary and from 27 to 34% in Poland (Vanhuysse, 2006: 120). By contrast, the Czechoslovak, and later Czech, approach was to altogether prevent unemployment as much as possible, by continuing to subsidize firms and larger active labour market spending. But in Slovakia, 80% of new pensioners retired early by 1994, compared to just 3% back in 1990 (Svorenova & Petrasova, 2005: 127). Slovenia, in turn, was one of just three 28 European countries (with Croatia and Luxemburg) to record sustained electoral success for narrow pensioners' parties (in the sense of polling four percent of the national vote in two or more parliamentary elections; Hanley, 2012).

This politically 'pushed', rather than demographically 'pulled', boom in pensioner numbers set in motion a powerful new political logic of "pensioners' welfare states" (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009, 2012). Simply put, the suddenly much enlarged electoral constituencies now composed of 'regular' (post-retirement age) pensioners and large groups of new 'abnormal' (early and disability) pensioners made it concomitantly harder to retrench pro-elderly policies (except through grandfathering clauses affecting only younger cohorts) or to tackle special pension regimes for farmers, police, military and manifold other especially privileged occupational groups (Vanhuysse, 2006). The electoral power of elderly voters relative to younger voters in ECE can be estimated with the measure of 'relative elderly power' proposed by Vanhuysse and Goerres (this volume). This variable multiplies the electoral turnout ratio of elderly people (those aged 60plus) relative to younger people (those aged 18–29) by the ratio

of these two age groups' numerical sizes. East Central European countries recorded very high values on this relative elderly power measure by international comparison around 2015. In fact, six ECE countries—Hungary (with a value of 2.53), the Czech Republic (2.92), Estonia (3.04), Slovenia (3.33), Croatia (3.38) and Latvia (4.11)—ranked among the top-twenty highest values within the entire 109-country sample in our Global Political Demography database.[3]

These electoral power balances of the elderly and pensioners were reflected in policy outcomes. The relative generosity and inflation-protection of pension policies in turn led to an immediate reversal of the high pre-1989 poverty trends for pensioners, relative to other age groups and to other transition risk groups. For instance, in Hungary and Poland by 2002 the relative incomes of pensioners were not just higher than they had been in 1991, they were also significantly higher than those of unemployed people and of workers with few economic resources in every single year after 1991 (Verhoeven et al., 2009: 113–4). More comprehensively, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, unlike the Baltic states, now started evolving along new pathways towards *prematurely* high levels of pro-elderly welfare state bias as a result of pensioners' boosted electoral power.[4] Already by around 2007–2008, in addition to three 'usual South European suspects' (Greece, Italy, and Portugal), much younger societies such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and, most notably, Poland recorded among the most heavily pro-elderly biased welfare states in the OECD world (Vanhuysse, 2014).

Pairwise comparisons on Vanhuysse's (2013: 27) synthetic elderly bias in overall social spending (*EBiSS*) ratio, which aggregates a wide range of elderly and nonelderly oriented social programmes and controls for demographic structure, are illuminating. For instance, around the time of the global economic crisis (2007–2008), the welfare state in then still 'middle-aged' Hungary, with an old-age support ratio of 3.9 non-elderly persons to every 65plusser, spent around 4.8 times more on every elderly as on every non-elderly citizen. But in slightly older Estonia (with a lower

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[3] Values in this global sample ranged from a minimum of 0.25 (Sao Tome) to a maximum of 5.89 (Japan) (Goerres et al., 2020).

[4] See Vanhuysse (2014). On intergenerational resource transfers and measures of pro-elderly policy bias, see also Lynch (2006), Gamliel-Yehoshua and Vanhuysse (2010), Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010), Gal et al. (2018), Vanhuysse and Tremmel (2019), Vanhuysse and Gal (2021).

old-age support ratio of 3.6), the welfare state spent only 2.9 times more. Similarly, the demographically young Slovak society spent 6.6 times as much on every elderly Slovak as on every nonelderly Slovak. Yet in the comparably young Irish society, the state spent only 2.7 times as much. And Poland already occupied pole position within the entire OECD on the *EBiSS* by the time of the global economic crisis. In this (then) still demographically younger society (old-age support ratio 4.8), the state spent 8.6 times as much on every elderly Pole as on every non-elderly Pole. Yet in the equally young New Zealand, the state spent only 2.7 times as much (Vanhuysse, 2014). A recalculation of the same EBiSS indicator for 2010–2011 reconfirms Poland as the single most pro-elderly biased welfare state within the OECD, with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary in, respectively, 5th, 7th, 9th and 12th-highest rank (Vanhuysse & Tremmel, 2019).

In sum, as foretold in Vanhuysse (2006), these were cases where political push before demographic pull set political pathways in motion towards premature "gerontocracies" or "pensioners' welfare states". All five ECE countries had smaller welfare states than the 'Western' EU-15 average throughout the 1990s and 2000s (measured by total social spending as a share of GDP). But Slovenia, Poland (from 1994) and Hungary (from 2005) spent more on old age and survivors cash programmes than the EU-15 average despite being younger societies.[5] This evidence, like that of the high *EBiSS* and relative 'elderly power' values, strongly indicates but does not conclusively demonstrate unsustainability and inequity in how different generations are treated by the welfare state in the Visegrad Four and Slovenia. This risk of unsustainable welfare state models is aggravated by the fact that after EU accession, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states have also witnessed 'young brain drain'—massive emigration waves of young people voting with their feet to seek better economic opportunities and better public goods (like infrastructure and education) and higher levels of democratic governance in Western and Northern Europe. In the first two decades of the twenty-first century alone, Latvia and Romania lost, respectively, 12 and 9% of their population to net emigration (European Demographic Datasheet, 2020). Subsequently, sustained economic growth in the 2000s lowered the salience of fiscal and sustainability worries in Poland, as has

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[5] Own calculations from OECD Social Expenditure Database; see also Kuitto (2016: 116).

a more recent refocusing on education investment and PISA tests performance (Vanhuysse, 2015b). In addition, whereas the Czech Republic also witnessed low levels of emigration for most of the postcommunist period, other Central European countries, notably Poland (though not the Baltics), have started receiving rising immigration flows in the past decade (Sobotka & Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, 2020).

3   Pension Policies: The Belated Closing of Early Labour Market Exit Windows

While the postcommunist countries in ECE have generally tended to develop smaller welfare states than their much richer West European neighbours, these were already larger welfare states than in comparably rich countries in Latin America and Asia (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008, 2009). Total social spending in 2015 stood at 19% of GDP in both Hungary and Poland, but only 14 and 15% in Romania and Latvia; significantly below the EU average of 27% (Eurostat database, 2019). In addition, the prematurely large ECE welfare states have also become prematurely *elderly-oriented*, as described in Sect. 2 above. Massive early exit in the 1990s has set powerful pro-elderly political-electoral logics and path-dependent reform constraints in place. In classic policy feedback fashion, effect became cause.[6] Once enlarged by political push, the electorate of pensioners subsequently became a stronger political force, constraining and biasing the ways in which governments could conduct social policy down the line (Vanhuysse, 2006).

As a result, Visegrad countries were prematurely overspending on pensions as they entered the twenty-first century. By 2010, old-age pension spending alone was 7.4% of GDP in Romania, 6.8% in Hungary, 6.9% in Poland and 8.7% in Latvia, compared to a 9.2% EU average (Eurostat database, 2021). As a result of double fiscal-electoral strait-jackets and looming fiscal instabilities, pension reforms have been implemented in different years in all four ECE cases, typically affecting non-pensioners more strongly (Müller, 1999). As effective retirement ages were very low by international standards wide across ECE except in the Baltic states, these reforms typically included increases in the pension

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[6] On path dependence and feedback processes in pension politics, see, e.g., Pierson (1993, 2004), Myles and Pierson (2001), Vanhuysse (2001), and Tepe and Vanhuysse (2012).

eligibility age. As a result, once the great abnormal pensioner booms of the early 1990s had run their course, effective retirement ages have gone up steadily and markedly over the next two decades. This happened wide across the region, including in the Czech Republic and the Baltic states (which did not witness such booms), with the sole exception of Slovenia (Gal & Rado, 2019).

In Poland, at a time of not (yet) significant population ageing, pension spending more than doubled between 1990 and 2014, from about 5% to 11% of GDP. Poland did not change the retirement age even during an otherwise significant systemic (three-pillar) pension reform in 1999 (Chłoń-Domińczak et al., 1999). For all insured persons born after 1948, a new defined-contribution pay-as-you-go system with notional accounts (and obligatory saving in private open funds) was introduced. But in line with Vanhuysse's (2006) pro-elderly pathways theory, electorally powerful groups such as farmers/peasants and politically mobilized groups such as prosecutors, the uniformed services and miners were exempt, and they remain so today (Gora, 2013). In 2011–2012, a liberal government increased the official pension age to 67, by 2020 for men and 2040 for women (Clemens & Parvani, 2017). But two-thirds of contributions to the second (fully funded) pension pillar were redirected to the first pay-as-you-go pillar in 2011 (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). And again in line with the pro-elderly pathways theory, even the increase of the retirement age in 2011/2012 was reversed after the presidential elections in 2015, when the newly elected President, with the support of the right-wing populist Law and Justice party-led government, decreased the eligible retirement age to be again 60 for women and to 65 for men (Kamola-Cieślik, 2017). This decision reduced the financial stability of the pension fund and it will lead to lower pension benefits and more taxes for future working generations (Russel, 2016). It made Poland unique in Europe in actually lowering pension eligibility age at a time of faster population ageing (Goettig, 2017). The 2016 measures also announced the complete elimination of 'open' (private) pension funds (Oręziak, 2014). Future older generations (especially women) will not be able to count on similarly generous public pensions as current ones (Chloń-Domińczak & Strzelecki, 2013). Retired women and those employed on so-called junk contracts (from which social security contributions were not deducted) are expected to have a particularly severe risk of old-age poverty in future (Żuk & Żuk, 2018).

In Hungary, pension spending remained subject to electoral business cycles throughout the late 1990s and 2000s. A systemic three-pillar pension reform was implemented in 1998,[7] though older workers could still choose between the new mixed public–private system or remaining with the public pension (on reformed rules) (Müller, 1999). More limited changes were enacted in 2006–2007, to restrict the ability to combine working and claiming an early retirement pension and to reduce pension benefits for people taking early retirement (Ageing Report, 2009). In 2009, the statutory retirement age was legislated to increase from 62 to 65 between 2014 and 2022 (Ageing Report, 2018). Additionally, from 2011, a special allowance was introduced to give women the opportunity to retire without actuarial benefit reduction after 40 eligibility years (including years in employment or pregnancy benefit and others related to raising children)—the Female 40 law. In 2011, the two-thirds majority FIDESZ government went as far as de facto renationalizing a previously privatized pensions pillar worth around 10% of GDP (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Kemmerling, 2013).

In Latvia, the standard age requirement for women (59.5 years in 2003) increased by 6 months each year to reach 62 already by 2008 (for men it reached 62 in 2003). In 2012, a further pension reform gradually increased retirement age by 3 months a year, until reaching 65 years and the minimum contributory to 20 years in 2025. Latvian pension legislation provides an opportunity to retire 2 years before the normal retirement age (if the insurance record is 30 years or more), but only at 50% of the full pension amount. In Romania, a three-pillar pension system was introduced only in 2007. The retirement age for men is supposed to increase from 64 to 65, while for women it will increase to 63 by 2030 but with only 15 years of contribution required (Ageing Report, 2015). Penalties for early retirement have been increased, while eligibility for disability pensions has been tightened. But here for active military police corps and special public servants within national defence, public order and national security, the standard retirement age will increase gradually only up to 60 in 2030. Early retirement pension can be granted up to 5 years before the insured person reaches the standard retirement age.

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[7] Based on OECD (2008: 88–89).

4   Pro-Family Policy as a Belated
Remedy for Lower Fertility?

Family spending encompassed 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6% of GDP in Romania, Poland and Latvia in 2015—but 2.3% in Hungary, similar to the EU average (2.4%) (Eurostat database, 2019). In terms of spending effort, these ECE countries (Hungary excepted) are comparable to classic Southern European familializing countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. After 1990, ECE countries have tended to erode some of the de-familialisation elements of communist family policy regimes and have moved back towards re-familialisation with gendered policies incentivising women to leave the labour market to raise children (Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2006: 186). Obligations of extended families have become stronger and state responsibilities weaker, in part as a result of widespread societal dissatisfaction with state intervention in family life (Appleton & Byrne, 2003: 211). The post-2000 social investment paradigm has seen significant extra spending in public childcare infrastructure and early education in Western and Northern Europe (Léon, 2016; Vanhuysse, 2015b). Not so in ECE countries. Poland and Latvia even saw a decline in spending on early, primary and secondary school spending between 2000 and 2010 (from 4.4 to 4% and 6.1 to 4.2% of GDP), whereas Hungary and Romania saw stable spending trends (at 3.9 and 2.5%) (Eurostat database, 2019, OECD stats).

However, more recently there have been indications of significant shifts in this field, too. From 2010 onward, in Poland and Romania early education and family spending acquired higher political salience as a result of low fertility rates (Sobociński, 2016). Poland has been the European country with the lowest family spending since the 1990s (around 1% of GDP). But this indicator has been rising since 2010 to reach 2.6% of GDP by 2017 (Eurostat database, 2020). Polish local authorities invested in providing better access to childcare services and pre-school education, supported by the national government in a concerted effort to activate more women via better work-family reconciliation conditions. At the same time, maternity and childcare leaves were extended to up to one full year, made accessible to a larger group of beneficiaries and made more financially generous. More generous tax reliefs for families with children and additional support for large families were also introduced (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2013). Making good on electoral promises, the *Rodzina 500+ (Family 500+)* programme was implemented by the

new right-wing-conservative Law and Justice party government after its 2015 election victory. It offered financial support to all families raising two or more children, and low-income families with one child; this was later extended to all families regardless of income even with one child (Perek-Białas et al., 2017).

In Romania, the family support system was traditionally built around cash benefits, notably child allowances. After 1990, the value of child allowances severely declined in real terms (Popescu, 2014; Stănescu, 2014). But in 2008, child allowances were set at 85% of the previous wage, and the parental leave extended to up to 2 years. In 2010, austerity policies imposed cuts in parental leave benefits. The value of all cash and benefits for working parents amount to around 1% of GDP (Stanescu, 2014). Even in 2017, Romania is the second-lowest spender on family social protection within the EU (1.1% of GDP) (Eurostat database, 2020). Within ECE, Hungary was always an outlier in family policy (Inglot et al., 2012), and even more so after the explicitly conservative-Catholic and nationalist-populist FIDESZ party regained and kept on to power in 2010. FIDESZ governments have increased spending on family allowances, new tax reliefs and additional housing grants, as well as subsidized or heavily co-financed services such as daycare centres, child catering, school book supplies for families with financial difficulties and the promotion of work-family life balance.[8] As a result, Hungary's public spending on family has been above the OECD average of about 3.5% of GDP in 2010–2013, compared to less than 2% in Poland, Romania and Latvia.

5   A Belated Active Ageing Policy Paradigm?

Long-term care policy, another domain strongly affected by demographic changes, has not traditionally been a policy priority in ECE, the occasional strategic policy document notwithstanding (Lipszyc et al., 2012; Spasova et al., 2018). To this day, this policy domain is generally characterised by low availability of care services, lack of coordination between health and social care services and a strong reliance on informal care (Perek-Białas & Racław, 2014; Popa, 2010). Care for the elderly today is still predominantly family provided as public services are either insufficient (in

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[8] Peer Review (2015), based on *Conditional cash transfers and their impact on children Hungary* (2015).

terms of quality or accessibility), or there is moral stigma associated with their use (Popa, 2010). But as population ageing gathers pace in the next decades (Fig. 1), this lack of political salience is likely to change. The same distinct lack of political salience used to also characterize active ageing policies in ECE (Perek-Białas et al., 2006; Ruzik-Sierdzinska et al., 2013). However, in this domain recent years have seen significant policy shifts, spurred in no small part by EU accession and the European Year of Active Ageing and Intergenerational Solidarity in 2012 (Ruzik-Sierdzinska et al., 2013).

The ECE region's general lag in preparedness for active ageing is clearly evident in Zaidi et al.'s (2013) four-domain, 22-dimensional Active Aging Index (AAI) developed for the EU's 'Year of Active Aging and Solidarity between the Generations'. Poland occupied the *bottom* position in the 27-country sample on the overall AAI, with Hungary ranking third lowest, Latvia ranks sixth lowest and Romania eighth lowest. In addition, Hungary occupied the bottom position on the AAI's four-dimensional 'elderly workers' employment' domain index, with Poland ranking fourth lowest but Romania and Latvia ranking eighth and twelfth highest. Poland, Romania and Latvia also occupied the lowest, fourth and sixth lowest position on the AAI's 'participation in society' domain. Latvia ranked lowest on the 'independent, healthy and secure living' domain. And Romania, Latvia and Hungary occupied the three bottom positions on the AAI's six-dimensional 'capacity and enabling environment for active aging' domain, with Poland ranking 6th lowest (Zaidi et al., 2013; see also Vanhuysse, 2014). These AAI findings are congruent with a different measure specifically on children—UNICEF's (2013) five-domain, 26-dimensional indicator of child well-being for 29 countries. Romania and Latvia occupied the two bottom positions with Hungary and Poland occupying ninth and tenth lowest rank.

In reaction to this, in Romania the concept of active ageing was promoted by the government through a range of events organized in collaboration with National Council of Elderly Persons, NGOs and

local authorities. Strategic documents[9] show a strong central government commitment to the active ageing agenda. In Poland, parliament voted in December 2013 for a new set of ageing policies, covered under rubrics such as 'Assumptions of Long-Term Senior Policy', the 'Social Activity of Older Persons Programme', and a revised 50+ Solidarity Programme (Szatur-Jaworska, 2015). The spending on these active ageing programmes had been about 15 million euro in 2012–2013, but the budget was determined by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy at up to 70 million euro for 2014–2020. New policies were also announced in Hungary in 2009 (a National Old-age Policy), in Latvia in 2014 ('Latvia: Developing a Comprehensive Active Ageing Strategy for Longer and Better Working Lives') and in Romania in 2015 ('National Strategy for Promoting Active Ageing and the Protection of the Elderly for the period 2015–2020').

The ways in which the 'European Year of Active Aging and Solidarity between the Generations' served as a catalyst for various government initiatives in active ageing policy for senior citizens at the national, regional and local levels is illustrated by the case of Poland. In reaction to its lowest score in the first AAI (Zaidi et al., 2013), the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, led by the leader of the Peasant Party whose constituency was mainly rural and older voters, moved to promote active ageing concepts in various ways. First, a new Department of Seniors Policy was established within this Ministry and in this way for the first time 'older people' were recognized in this national institutional context not linked to social assistance or pension systems. A special funding mechanism was implemented to support active ageing projects via open calls. At the Ministerial level, the Council of Senior Policy consisting of experts, seniors' organizations, stakeholders and representatives of public institutions at various levels of governance for seniors was created opening for dialogue and consultations about the structure of senior policy in Poland (Szatur-Jaworska, 2015).

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[9] 'National Strategy for Promoting Active Ageing and the Protection of the Elderly for the period 2015–2020' and the corresponding 'Strategic Action Plan for 2015–2020' (Government Decree no. 566/15 July 2015). Adoption of an active ageing strategy was one of the preconditions for accessing funding in the 2014–2020 programming period (a condition fulfilled by Romania in 2015–2016). At the heart of the Strategy lies the background study 'Living Long, Staying Active and Strong: Promotion of Active Ageing in Romania'.

6   Conclusions: The Pervasive
Political Failure to Prepare
for the Demographic Elephant-on-the-Move

This chapter has discussed the political and policy processes surrounding the significant, in some respects even dramatic, population changes in ECE from initially comparatively younger societies around 1989–1990 to unusually fast-ageing societies since around 2010–2015. It is worth repeating how much ECE countries were truly demographically younger at the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain than their 'Western' EU members. Yet, subsequently, these societies have largely spurned their roughly twenty-to-twenty-five-year-long subsequent demographic window of opportunity for policy reform. This has prepared ECE democracies, notably Romania, Bulgaria and the Visegrad Four and Slovenia, badly for the coming three decades, as ECE has now entered a period of accelerated future demographic ageing.

Most of this was thoroughly predictable—indeed, predicted. While the size and pace of the early postcommunist drops in fertility and the post-EU-accession westbound emigration flows were arguably partially unexpected, the larger fifty-year demographic picture summarized in Fig. 1 was anything but a black swan. Rather, accelerating population ageing resembled elephants on the move: enormous, momentous, but slow in getting started. And yet, with the partial exception of pension policy, ECE countries have, on the whole, comprehensively failed to sufficiently adapt and reform their policy models to better prepare for the faster population ageing ahead. Likely reasons are multiple. They include policy overload and low levels of administrative human capital and state capacity after 1989–1990 (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; O'Dwyer, 2004), patronage politics and other semi-corrupt political practices (Mares & Young, 2019; O'Dwyer, 2004) and, subsequently, significant democratic backsliding, especially but not solely in Hungary and Poland (*Journal of Democracy,* 2007; Vanhuysse, 2008), and/or much reduced elite accountability because of weak interest representation (Rozbicka et al., 2021; Vanhuysse, 2007), (younger) citizen exit, and democratic hollowing—reduced political voice (Greskovits, 2015; Vanhuysse, 2019).

This political failure to prepare for demographic change is reflected in synthetic policy or outcome indicators. Well into the twenty-first century, ECE countries mainly occupied the bottom ranks on the European Commission's Active Aging Index and UNICEF's child well-being index.

Notwithstanding the new post-2000 social investment paradigm, they were also among the lowest spenders within the OECD on early childhood education and early human capital investment (Vanhuysse 2015a, 2015b). With notable exceptions such as Poland (which has made major strides in PISA scores since 2010) and the Czech Republic (which has consistently performed well in mathematics), ECE democracies have on the whole not sufficiently boosted the future human capital basis of their now fast-ageing welfare states. Even in the most recent PISA waves, the 'Eastern' EU scored lower on average than the 'Western' EU on mathematics and problem solving, with Romania, Hungary and even more so Bulgaria as particularly bad performers (Vanhuysse, 2015b). All four Visegrad countries plus neocorporatist Slovenia, though not the more neoliberal Baltic states, recorded prematurely high elderly bias in social spending (EBiSS; Vanhuysse, 2013, 2014). As we have noted, the former five countries have evolved into pensioners' welfare states or gerontocracies, far along the path to premature pro-elderly bias. Their high-EBiSS values are all the more remarkable precisely because the Visegrad Four and Slovenia were, until at least around 2010, demographically much younger societies than other high-EBiSS countries such as Italy, Greece and Japan.

Given that the Visegrad Four (though not Slovenia) also benefited from a slower pace of population ageing (OADR growth) than the rest of ECE until at least 2010, and that Slovenia in turn barely managed to raise effective retirement ages, these five countries can be said to have most comprehensively squandered their demographic window for policy reform. Sustainable and balanced intergenerational resource transfer constellations are the cement of society over time, the glue that allows societies to reproduce (Vanhuysse & Gal, 2021). Premature imbalances of the kind shown in high-EBiSS values are therefore an ominous telltale, indicating a potential risk of future societal fragility. Alarm bells should ring all the louder given related trends such as the relative lack of early human capital investment and the large-scale 'young brain drain' from Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (but also Romania and the Baltics) since EU accession.

We have given the great abnormal pensioner booms in Hungary and Poland as a case of policies that, if anything, further decreased the degree of societal preparedness for fast population ageing (Vanhuysse, 2006). Here, early retirement massively increased the electoral weight of pensioners and the fiscal burden of pension systems, while directly

contributing to prematurely high levels of pro-elderly bias in social poli-
cies (political push *before* demographic pull). In Latvia and Estonia, the
new postcommunist elites primarily accentuated ethnic cleavages instead
of age cleavages as part of a nation-building strategy to create new
groups of welfare state winners and losers and target Russian-speaking
minorities (Laitin, 1998; Vanhuysse, 2009). These exclusionary ethnic
strategies were mimicked, albeit more for conservative-populist reasons,
in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Czech Republic to target Roma
minorities (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012).

Another indication of how ECE democracies appear to have largely
missed the opportunity for policy reform can be seen when juxtaposing
the standard (chronological or backward-looking) OADR given in Table
1 with alternative forward-looking old-age dependency ratios that aggre-
gate residual or *prospective* (remaining) life expectancies (Sanderson and
Scherbov, 2019). In most advanced societies, in terms of physical and
cognitive fitness or dependency a chronological age of, say, 70 today
simply does not mean the same thing as it did three or four decades ago.
In a real sense, "seventy is the new sixty": on average, a seventy-year-old
Swede or German today is actually younger (with more life years left to
live) than a seventy-year-old Swede or German was back in 1980.

It is useful to compare these alternative *prospective* old-age depen-
dency ratios (the number of people in age groups with life expectancies
of 15 or fewer years, divided by the number of people at least 20 years
old in age groups with life expectancies greater than 15 years) with
standard (chronological) OADRs. Such comparison shows markedly *less*
dramatic trends in terms of 'prospective population aging' for the rich
societies. Even notoriously old Japan suddenly appears less gerontocratic
(Sanderson & Scherbov, 2010). This means that most rich democracies
seem *simultaneously* to be ageing fast (chronologically) and to be ageing
slowly or even to be rejuvenating (prospectively). As this reflects better
health policies, health technologies, healthier behaviour and lifestyles
and similar cultural changes, this can be interpreted as a measure of
how cultures and policy models adapt to prepare their populations for
(chronological) ageing.

However, there is one notable exception to this general observation.
The ECE democracies are among the few cases *not* to post markedly
lower levels of prospective OADR as compared to the standard OADR.
This is likely to reflect a host of variables negatively affecting remaining
life expectancy, among them still unhealthy (especially male) lifestyles and

insufficient health spending.[10] In 2015, OADR values for the 'Western' EU-15 members were on average 31.2 but prospective OADR values were almost half as low (17.4). This was not the case for the 'Eastern' EU-11, however. Here, OADR values were 28.7 but prospective OADR values only somewhat lower at 22.1.[11] In other words, as mentioned at the start of this chapter, 'Eastern' Europe will have caught up with 'Western' Europe in terms of standard (chronological) ageing by mid-century. But crucially, Eastern Europe is *prospectively* older than Western Europe already today. By this yardstick, ECE's quarter-century-long demographic window has already closed. Going forward, this divergence is set to continue further. By mid-century, the prospective OADR is projected to increase to 24.1 for the EU-15 by 2050. But it will have reached 30.9 for the 'Eastern' EU-11.[12]

All in all, as foretold in Vanhuysse (2006), this seems to add up to a particularly bleak' generational politics' picture for ECE in the decades to come. Modifying this picture somewhat, we have shown that since around 2010–2015, the political salience of age group relevant policies (such as family and work-family reconciliation policies and active ageing policy) appears to be on the increase. This, too, has been the result of multiple factors, including the proactive use of social policies by the same strongly Christian-conservative and/or nationalist-populist parties that have in some cases (notably Hungary and Poland) caused fast democratic backsliding—an illiberal ECE variant of welfare chauvinism. But by then, as Vanhuysse and Goerres's yardstick of relative elderly power shows (this volume), the electoral influence of elderly voters relative to younger

[10] See Sanderson and Scherbov (2010: 1287; 2019). With the single exception of Slovenia, ECE democracies have been spending significantly lower proportions of their GDP on health care than Western European ones over the past quarter century (Kuitto, 2016: 118). As effective retirement ages have generally gone up since the mid-1990s, remaining life expectancy at retirement has actually stayed stable or even declined in ECE, again with the exception of Slovenia and, somewhat, Latvia (Gal & Rado, 2019).

[11] Own calculations from European Demographic Datasheet (2016); for demographic detail see Sobotka and Fürnkranz-Prskawetz (2020). Applied to our four cases, in Hungary the standard OADR for 2015 was 28.7, whereas the prospective OADR was only a little lower, at 23.5. In Poland, the 2015 OADR was 24, whereas the prospective OADR was significantly lower, at 16.1. In Romania the OADR for 2015 was 27.4, whereas the prospective OADR was only a little lower, at 23.2. In Latvia the OADR for 2015 was 31.7, whereas the prospective OADR was only a little lower, at 27 (European Demographic Datasheet, 2016).

[12] Own calculations from European Demographic Datasheet (2016).

voters in ECE was among the highest in the world, with predictable policy consequences. In sum, the political demography of postcommunist East Central Europe from 1990 into the near future is one of long-spurned policy opportunities to prepare for fast population ageing, belatedly and only very partially realised.

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Combating Low Life Expectancy and Low Fertility in Tumultuous Political Times: A Comparison of the Ukraine, Russia and Belarus

Rza Kazimov and Sergei V. Zakharov

1 Introduction

Demographic trends in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine have diverged in several notorious ways from other European countries, even from those in postcommunist East Central Europe (Vanhuysse & Perek-Bialas, this volume).[1] These include fertility differentials across regions and ethnic groups, a substantial gender gap in the mortality rate, widely varying life

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[1] This chapter uses results from a project supported by the Basic Research Program at the Higher School of Economics (Moscow). For further data, see also Goerres et al. (2020).

R. Kazimov (✉)
Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Berlin, Germany
e-mail: kazimovr@hu-berlin.de

S. V. Zakharov
Institute of Demography (HSE IDEM), National Research University, Moscow, Russia

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expectancy, and increasing emigration fuelled by economic recessions, regional conflicts and repressive laws. In this chapter, we combine two disciplinary perspectives—demography and political science—to establish bi-directional causal links between population changes and politics in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Analysing the three demographic trends of fertility, ageing and mortality, and migration, the chapter aims to show that the population dynamics of each country have considerable political implications on both domestic and regional levels.

To that end, this chapter refers to both directions of their causal links. Applying the basic reasoning, however, that a politics cannot exist without a population, the chapter places considerable focus on the first direction (demography to politics), which is also an understudied causal link that this chapter aims help remedy. In the following, we introduce some of these trends and their political implications, to show the increased political entanglement between the countries since 1990. With this background, the rest of this chapter discusses the impacts of population change on the demands placed on governments and on the distribution of political power within states. Following this, in the conclusion, we discuss the disciplinary concepts—namely demography and politics—that link demographic variables to the political structure of a society. Given this discussion, we conclude that, due to the failed economic development and an absence of deliberative policymaking leading to poor governance, the current demographic trends can destabilize these countries.

2   Demographic Trends and Political Entanglement

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, structural changes in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine destabilized their demographic processes. The post-Soviet transformation reflected and magnified the demographic trends, as each economy transitioned from oversized, state-driven industry and agriculture to a privatized, market-driven economy. For instance, this region—Belarus, Russia and Ukraine—entered historically low fertility rates (Frejka & Zakharov, 2012; Perelli-Harris, 2008) while mortality remained high throughout the 1990s. At the same time, the lift of a fully regularized migration policy as an after-effect of the Soviet demise led to unprecedented levels of internal and external population movement.

On a country level, the demographic trends can be linked to specific political factors. For instance, in Belarus, families with higher-order births in rural and economically deprived areas long formed a homogeneous

group supporting Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, which has dissipated over time alongside a declining population, potentially undermining the regime's authoritarian rule. Fertility differentials across regions and ethnic groups also determine Russia's particular fertility decline and so later labour shortages that policymakers must address, and Ukraine experiences similar challenges that are further exacerbated by a period of political instability between 2004 and 2014 following the Orange Revolution and EuroMaidan. Meanwhile, between 1998 and the mid-2000s, life expectancy in these countries either decreased (Russia) or stagnated (Belarus, Ukraine), followed by a rebound between the mid-2000s and 2018. Thus, we can tie fertility to ageing and mortality up to the present through stages. In a first stage, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine experienced an initial decline in infant and childhood mortality followed by declines in fertility rates. The second stage remains mostly in the future, but—as in Europe—we may see a rapid decline in mortality at older ages (Gavrilova & Gavrilov, 2009), with dire economic and so political implications.

In contrast to the above declines, emigration in all three countries increased sharply, remaining high during the last two decades. In Ukraine, this culminated in a crisis that caused a massive population reshuffling in Eastern Europe. With 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), the war in Ukraine's east and high emigration rates delay the current democratization process, putting Ukraine's chances for economic prosperity into question. These examples and background show that country-level demographic trends are linked to their particular political landscapes, which are in turn linked to regional-level demographic trends resulting in political entanglement in the region. The rest of this chapter analyses these links in detail, which will end in a discussion of the underlying concepts that show these links to be bi-directional—all of which is the basis for our conclusion as a first step towards more research.

3   Declining Fertility Rate and Government Responses

The total fertility rate (TFR) in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine followed a downward path from the late 1980s until the turn of the century (Frejka & Zakharov, 2012; Philipov, 2003). While achieving temporary growth in the 2000s, the TFR has remained below the pre-transition periods. More importantly, it is also below the stable replacement rate level approximately defined as 2.1 live births per woman. In 2017, the total fertility

rate in Russia was 1.62 births per woman (Federal State Statistics Services, 2017). In Belarus and Ukraine, this rate was even lower—1.54 in Belarus[2] and 1.37 in Ukraine[3] (Timonina, 2017). Belarus, Russia and Ukraine mainly pursue a pro-natalist public policy model in which the primary objective is to raise fertility and the principal instruments to achieve this goal are financial. These include large birth allowances, in combination with other increased benefits and well-compensated parental leaves. The following elaborates on population policies in the recent years in each of the three countries.

3.1   Belarus

Low fertility occupies a major political and public discourse in Belarus. The 'National Programme of People's Health and Demographic Security of the Republic of Belarus 2016 – 2020' is the most recent legislative attempt to stabilize population and increase the total fertility rate from 1.73 to 2.1.[4] Policy measures aimed at boosting fertility include a lump sum payment for each birth. As of 2018, the payment is equivalent to $1,006 for the first and $1,412 for higher-order births, or 10 and 14 times the subsistence level budget, respectively. Under the universal child-care benefits, families receive 35% of the average wage for the first child and 40% for subsequent children.[5]

The key task of the family policy in Belarus is to promote the image of a larger family. In fact, higher-order births were traditionally more widespread in this country compared to Russia and Ukraine, receiving larger financial incentives from the government (Frejka et al., 2016; Zakharov, 2008). In 2015, the government introduced a family capital programme, offering a one-time allowance of $10,000 to families that

[2] Демографический ежегодник Республики Беларусь, 2011–2018 [Demographic Yearbook of the Republic of Belarus, 2011–2018]. Национальный статистический комитет Республики Беларусь (Белстат).

[3] Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions are not included.

[4] Государственная программа ”Здоровье народа и демографическая безопасность Республики Беларусь“ на 2016–2020 годы [“Public Health and Demographic Security of the Republic of Belarus” for 2016–2020]. Постановление Совета Министров Республики Беларусь 14 March 2016 No 200.

[5] О государственных пособиях семьям, воспитывающим детей [On State Benefits for Families Raising Children]. Закон Республики Беларусь от 29 December 2012.

decided to have a third child. Other benefits for higher-order births include tax incentives and low interest mortgage plans, while the state lifts the mortgage burden if the family has four or more underage children. However, economic insecurity combined with a poor housing situation reduced the number of Belarusians considering having more than two children (Amialchuk et al., 2011), with social rejection and stereotyping of large families being further reasons for that decline (Denisov et al., 2012). Moreover, a major discrepancy in family sizes exists between cities and villages, with a significant number of large families living in rural areas, contributing to the staggering gap in TFR that reaches 3.1 in rural and 1.3 in urban areas in 2017.[6] Nevertheless, both fertility rates and overall population are also declining in rural areas.

The 'strategic family' policy envisages the fertility decline in considerably narrow terms, using it instrumentally to mobilize the social support for the regime by consolidating public opinion. The incentives for higher-order births are deployed to maintain higher fertility rates in economically deprived rural regions that represent the bulwark of the regime since the mid-1990s (Beichelt, 2004; Manaev, 2006), rather than among the potentially less loyal urban population. On the other hand, a declining TFR in rural areas could be seen as a factor contributing to the erosion of the social support of Lukashenko (Ioffe, 2014).

3.2   Russia

The Russian Government has prioritized the demographic crisis as one of the most pressing problems since 2006. However, the challenge has been largely perceived within the context of national security and the conservative geopolitical rationale. The 'Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2025', formulated by the President's directive in 2007, set the goal of increasing the cumulative fertility rate by 1.5 times until 2025, i.e. to around 2.1.[7] The government announced

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[6] Демографический ежегодник Республики Беларусь, 2011–2018 [Demographic Yearbook of the Republic of Belarus, 2011–2018]. Национальный статистический комитет Республики Беларусь (Белстат).

[7] Об утверждении Концепции демографической политики Российской Федерации на период до 2025 года [Presidential degree [decree] on general demographic policy of Russian Federation until 2025]. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 9 October 2007 г. № 1351.

a revamp of the demographic policy at the end of 2017 to further stimulate the growth of the fertility rate through four policy channels.[8] First, it introduced monthly payments to families with first-child or second-child births or adoption if their income does not exceed 1.5 times the subsistence level of employed population in the respective region. This measure indicates a transformation of pro-natal policies with the focus shifting from multiple births per family to low-income families, who are often young. The current measures thus stimulate more families to have children at a younger age, at the same time risking an increase in child poverty.

Second, the 'maternity capital' programme introduced in 2006 was prolonged for 3 more years, i.e. until the end of 2021. Under the programme, individuals giving birth or adopting second or higher-order children are entitled to receiving a certificate for the sum of $6,804.[9] The certificate can be redeemed for the following purposes: improving housing conditions, children's education, the mother's pension funds, the purchase of goods and services needed for the integration of disabled children into the society. Under certain conditions, the certificate can also be used for receiving monthly payments.[10] The third policy direction expands the number of regions receiving co-financing for payments to families with the third and higher-order births from the federal budget from 50 in 2017 to 60 in 2018, covering all regions with a cumulative fertility rate below 2.0.[11] Finally, mortgage subsidies were introduced for families with second or third children born between January 2018 and

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[8] Заседание Координационного совета по реализации Национальной стратегии действий в интересах детей [Session of the Coordination Council for the implementation of the National Action Strategy for Children], November 28, 2017.

[9] Indexed for inflation from the original $3,755 in 2007 at 20 September 2018 exchange rates.

[10] О дополнительных мерах государственной поддержки семей, имеющих детей [On additional measures of state support for families with children]. Федеральный закон 29 December 2006 N 256-ФЗ.

[11] Об утверждении перечня субъектов Федерации, в которых в 2018 году будут софинансироваться расходные обязательства по поддержке семей в связи с рождением третьего ребёнка или последующих детей [On approval of the list of constituent entities of the Russian Federation in which in 2018 expenditure commitments to support families in connection with the birth of a third child or subsequent children will be co-financed]. Указом Президента России от 7 мая 2012 года №606.

the end of 2022, whereby the state subsidizes interest rates of above 6% per year.[12]

These monetary measures, temporary in nature, are taken in addition to the general (non-temporary) child and maternity allowance policy, which includes maternity allowance and childcare allowance during maternity leave and monthly child benefits. The President's 2017 guidelines also included two qualitative goals: first, reducing the waiting time to kindergartens for children between 2 months and 3 years old and, second, improving the access to and quality of medical services for children.[13] While the monetary incentives of the four above mentioned points already found realization in legislation and specific measures, the latter two were only delegated to the government to be included into the 2024 strategy planning.[14]

The sustainability and the lasting effect of monetary measures are questionable. Monetary incentives were in place since the introduction of the maternity capital in 2007, but the fertility rate remained below the goals (Frejka & Zakharov, 2012). The existing fertility policies confirm the government's short-term focus on mobilizing electoral support during the political-business cycles, rather than achieving intergenerational improvement of fertility rates. The episodic growth in TFR was widely used during the presidential campaign in 2012[15] as a 'success story', a success that was actually due to a slowdown in the postponement of childbearing (Frejka & Zakharov, 2013).

An interesting development in fertility in Russia concerns discrepancies in different population groups. Despite the overall decline, the

[12] Предоставление субсидий гражданам Российской Федерации, имеющим детей [Provision of subsidies to citizens of the Russian Federation with children]. Правительства Российской Федерации от 30 декабря 2017 г. No 1711.

[13] Заседание Координационного совета по реализации Национальной стратегии действий в интересах детей [Session of the Coordination Council for the implementation of the National Action Strategy for Children], 28 November 2017.

[14] О национальных целях и стратегических задачах развития Российской Федерации на период до 2024 года [On the national goals and strategic objectives of the development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024]. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 7 May 2018 г. № 204.

[15] Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию [Message from the President to the Federal Assembly], Administration of the President of Russia. [Online] http://kremlin.ru. Accessed 7 September 2018.

TFR of several ethnic groups living in Russia is still above the replacement rate (Zakharov, 2018: 50). Ethnic Russians have the second lowest fertility rate of all major ethnic groups living in the country. These differences contribute to the changing ethnic composition of Russia alongside migration. Ethnic groups with higher fertility rates are also becoming more indigenized. For instance, among federal subdivisions, Chechnya has one of the highest birth rates in Russia (Sievert et al., 2011), and the federal unit is the most mono-ethnic area (Rosstat, 2013). Formerly, this region was a flashpoint of internal conflict in the country (Lieven, 1999). In this regard, the fertility differential and indigenization of the region may lay ground for potential ethnic-nationalist mobilization as hypothesized by the effect of young men bulges on political violence (Sommer 2018; Urdal, 2004). However, the recent demographic trends show the convergence of birth rates between minorities, including Muslims and the Russian majority.

3.3   Ukraine

The fall in fertility rate, coupled with increased emigration and high mortality, presents a major demographic challenge, contributing to the prospect of a rapid population decline in Ukraine by 2050 (Lutz et al., 2017). Ukraine's total fertility rate of 1.374 births per woman in 2017 was the lowest since 2008, while total live births declined dramatically from 520,700 in 2012 to 465,900 in 2014 to 364,000 in 2017[16] (Timonina, 2017: 51). Economic and political turmoil in preceding years, along with the unresolved conflict in the east of the country, aggravated the fertility crisis in that families consciously delay childbearing or decide to have fewer children. Additionally, the average salaries in Ukraine are among the lowest in Europe, and GDP per capita is around two times smaller than in Belarus and four times smaller than in Russia (World Bank, 2014), further discouraging family planning. Moreover, the fertility rate is higher in villages, where socio-economic conditions are worse than in cities. In 2017, the rural fertility rate was 1.522 compared to 1.283 in urban areas (Timonina, 2017: 51). Relatedly, the UN medium variant population projection estimates that Ukraine will undergo a more dramatic population decline than Belarus or Russia, with a population

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[16] Crimea, Sevastopol, and parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblast were not included in statistics from 2014 on.

decrease of 7.8 million or nearly 18% population decrease by 2050 (UN, 2017).

Occupied with economic and political reforms, the Ukrainian Government has not paid much attention to fertility policies, which remain largely limited to monetary incentives. The National programme provides family incentives via payment of $1,473 for one birth. The payment is made in two parts: a lump sum payment of $368 in the two to three months after birth and the rest in monthly payments of $31 for 3 years.[17,18] Additionally, there is monthly monetary support to families with an income below subsistence level for each family member, including single parent families and single parents who do not receive alimony. The amount of the payment is limited to 75% of the subsistence minimum and based on its difference to the current income. [19]

4   Political Determinants of Pension Reforms

Although the three countries share similar features of population ageing (low fertility but high adult mortality rate), the frequency and high amplitude of demographic waves are more pronounced in case of Russia. Moreover, Russia's ageing is characterized by an unusually high excess mortality for men, with the latest data showing the gap standing at 11.1 years (Zakharov, 2018). As the population pyramid in Fig. 1 illustrates, the higher proportion of women spreads from the age of 40 onwards and will not disappear by the middle of the century. The gender gap in mortality is 11 years for Belarus and 9 years for Ukraine, which are likewise among the highest in the world (WHO, 2014) (Fig. 1).

The life expectancy differentials appear across the regions of Russia and between rural and urban areas in Belarus and Ukraine. The Caucasus holds the highest rankings within Russia, with a life expectancy of

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[17] Про державну допомогу сім'ям з дітьми [State program on family with children]. Редакція від 20 January 2018. [Online] http://zakon.rada.gov.ua. Accessed 17 October 2018.

[18] Про Державний бюджет України на 2018 рік [About the State budget of Ukraine for 2018]. Редакція від 13 December 2018. [Online] http://zakon.rada.gov.ua. Accessed 14 December 2018.

[19] Про державну соціальну допомогу малозабезпеченим сім'ям [On State Social Assistance to Low-income Families]. Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 2000, № 35, ст.290; ВВР, 2016, № 34, ст.590.

Fig. 1 Population Pyramids of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine 1990–2020–2050 (*Note* Males are to the left [black], females to the right [grey]. *Source* Computations by Richard Cincotta)

80.8 years in Ingushetia, followed by Dagestan (77.2) as of 2016. The lowest life expectancy is observed in Tuva, at 64.2 years (Timonin et al., 2017). Given the ethnic differentials in life expectancy, Russia's latest census from 2010 shows that the adult mortality rate is higher among Russians than other ethnic groups. As urbanization progresses in Belarus, the age composition of rural areas is changing. The number of older citizens living in rural areas is growing, being exclusively dependent on intra-family transfers which alter the traditional patterns of rural life of the elders (Dobrinsky et al., 2016). The patterns are similar in Ukraine, yet magnified by a higher death rate (Grigoriev et al., 2010; Richardson et al.,

2018). Though adult mortality rates dropped significantly in these countries when compared to the early 1990s, life expectancy at birth is still lower than in Western Europe (Rechel et al., 2013) (Fig. 2). However, with an increasing number of elderly people, the key challenge for the governments is the need for the pension reforms.

The following paragraphs discuss the pension reforms in connection to the political consequences of population ageing. Despite the abundance of coverage on the economic consequences, the effects of an ageing population on the political structure have received far less attention in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine (Vanhuysse & Goerres, 2012; this volume).

Fig. 2 Key Demographic Indicators (*Source* [1] UN Population Division [2017]. [2] University of California, Berkeley, and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. The Human Mortality Database. [3] Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus [BELSTAT]; Russian Federation, Federal States Statistics Service [ROSSTAT]; State Statistics Service of Ukraine [UKRSTAT])

4.1   *Belarus*

The pension system of the post-Soviet Belarus is characterized by a PAYG (pay-as-you-go) system that uses conventionally defined benefit formulas for the calculation of pensions (Grishchenko, 2016). Rapid ageing places the Belarusian economy under pressure, with a shrinking working population ratio. The government responded to the situation by rising the pension age to 58 for women and 63 for men in 2017.[20] A more radical pension reform would be politically unacceptable for the ruling regime for two reasons. First, Lukashenko's supporters among the Belarusian population have distinct demographic characteristics (Manaev, 2006). The largest group consists of retired or economically inactive elderly citizens in rural areas, many of whom are less educated and have minimal contact with people outside of their immediate social circle (Ioffe, 2014; Nikolyuk, 2011). Convinced supporters of President Lukashenko are against privatization of the public sector and state property and see no problematic issues with democracy, electoral freedom or the state of human rights in Belarus (Wilson, 2011: 83). Most importantly, pension benefits are their primary income support, making them susceptible to pension reforms.

Second, the *sine qua non* of the pension reform is reforming PAYG-based public pensions including various defined benefit (DB) schemes, point schemes, and notional defined contribution (NDC) schemes (Grishchenko, 2016). An extensive systematic pension reform, therefore, needs modernization of the economy and the establishment of stronger links between tax-based contributions and pension benefits (Myles & Pierson, 2001; Wang et al., 2016). However, these reforms would contradict the authoritarian political conditionality, a mechanism that allocates and uses financial resources to sanction or reward recipients to aggrandize authoritarian leadership (Brooker, 2013).

4.2   *Russia*

The Russian pension system is based on social insurance notional and individual accounts (Grishchenko, 2016). Financing is based on contributions, but these are primarily covered by the employers, the state or the

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[20] О пенсионном обеспечении отдельных категорий граждан [About pensions for certain categories of citizens] Указ № 233 от 29 июня 2017 г.

self-employed. With the intensifying population ageing, financing pension benefits become increasingly difficult for the government. Also, a cyclical increase in pension benefits is not due to the structural changes in the economy but mostly due to the oil-led welfare policy (Cerami, 2009).

During the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2012–2018), pension reforms were formulated to develop individual accumulative accounts, diversify the financing of the system and increase the age of pension eligibility (Aasland et al., 2017). However, public opinion was strongly against the increase of age in pension eligibility (Avtsinova et al., 2018). Indeed, Putin won re-election for his fourth overall term in office in 2018 through the campaign promise not to increase the pension age. This promise did not last long, as Duma introduced pension reforms in June 2018, increasing the pension ages from 55 to 63 for women and from 60 to 65 for men (Kluge, 2018). The incumbent politicians justify the reform in a narrative similar to Western European countries, but the realities of Russia in terms of lower healthy life expectancy, poverty among the elderly population, an ineffective health system and a gender gap in mortality are noticeably different.

The pension reforms are a necessary predicament to elevate the fiscal burden from the national budget given the increasing ratio of pensioners in Russia to the employed. However, similar to Belarus, the pension reforms contradict the conceptual premise of the competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Way, 2005). Pensioners are a critical electoral demographic for Russia's current political regime, mostly comprising women who dramatically outnumber men and live considerably longer. Infamously defined as 'The regime of Babushkas', Russia is thus facing a dilemma in its attempt to cope with the demographic crisis, specifically population ageing and guarding its core electorate (Robertson, 2009).

4.3 Ukraine

The solidarity pension insurance system of Ukraine is financed on a PAYG-basis and administered by the Pension Fund of Ukraine (Slobodyanyuk et al., 2017). Ukraine's pension reform was introduced in October 2017, aiming to tackle poverty among elderly citizens, albeit without much success. Recalculations of pension benefits only marginally increased the pensions.

Ukraine's population is not only shrinking, but also increasingly ageing. By 2050, one-third of Ukraine's population is projected to be above 60 years old, the highest rate among the three countries studied (UN, 2017). Ukraine hosts 12 million pension beneficiaries in various categories who depend on 14 million contributors.[21] Furthermore, the cohorts entering retirement will be considerably larger than the young cohorts entering the labour market, which further increases the age dependency ratio.

The most common explanation of population change in countries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East is that it is underpinned by the distribution of 'youth bulges' in the society causing political instability and conflict, inimical to the democracy (Cincotta, 2005; Urdal, 2004). In a positive way, demographic progress could support movement from autocracy to democracy (Sommer, 2018). In the case of Ukraine, rapid population ageing, unprecedented outward migration and low fertility rates do not allow the country to recuperate from the political disturbances of the past two decades.

5   UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION POLITICS

As a key demographic driver, immigration presents policy leverage and counteracts the ageing effects of persistent low fertility levels (Grant et al., 2004). In contrast, emigration interrupts human capital formation and calls into question the future of the economic development (Beine et al., 2008). Moreover, migration has a political impact upon population composition in terms of its ethnicities, religions, races, languages and national origins (Teitelbaum, 2014). Belarus, Russia and Ukraine actively pursued similar population policies; however, their migration policies and situations are notably distinctive. Additionally, the Ukrainian crisis accelerated population shifts in the region.

The principal Soviet tools for regulating internal migration were the internal passport and *propiska* (residence permit) designed to realize certain economic goals (i.e., distribution and rationing), coercive ones (the repression of dissent, surveillance) and regime adherence (Light, 2012: 405). The central Soviet Government administered population

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[21] Демографічна та соціальна статистика, Рынок труда [Demographic and Social Statistics, Labor Market]. Публікація документів Державної Служби Статистики України. [Online] https://ukrstat.org/uk. Accessed 11 November 2018.

relocation across the Union to propel the industrialization and urbanization to create a shared identity. Policymakers in the three studied countries began supporting immigration in the early 1990s by adopting market regulations. However, the countries were not able to respond effectively to the wave of newcomers.

5.1 Belarus

Belarus presents a unique situation when it comes to migration policy. The government strictly regulates the migration process, monitors Belarusian emigrants in Europe and only allows limited numbers of immigrants to live in the country. This approach can be rationalized through the political economy of migration, which suggests that immigrants living in a democratic host country are more likely to export democracy to their countries of origin through the grassroots organizations entrenched in transnational political activities (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2011; Baubock, 2003; Walzer, 1983). However, this political stance became difficult to maintain in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis insofar as Belarus has become a major host country for Ukrainian migrants.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, migrants usually used Belarus while *en route* to the European Union (EU) (Greenhill, 2010; Jandl, 2007). However, since the conflict erupted, Belarus has become a safe place for migrants from the Donetsk region. Furthermore, migrants from Ukraine have historically been treated differently, demonstrating high degrees of adaptability and integration due to cultural and linguistic similarities (Gentile, 2017). Additionally, specific regulations were set to address Ukrainian migrants, lifting barriers in the application process and informing migrants on jobs available.[22] Nonetheless, Ukrainian migrants still do not have access to health care and other social benefits, and there is no legal obligation on the government to provide refugees with shelter and necessary allowances.

Overall, Belarus has become the host to more than 150,000 migrants from Ukraine, including refugees, economic migrants and people with

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[22] О пребывании граждан Украины в Республике [About the stay of citizens of Ukraine in the Republic of Belarus]. Norms of Presidential Decree of 30 August 2014, №420.

family ties in Belarus in the period 2014–2017.[23] The total contribution of the Ukrainian migrants increased Belarus' population by more than 1%. Consequently, Belarus has more Ukrainian migrants per capita than any other country. At the same time, the sheer volume of migrants has put pressure on Belarus' economy. The Belarusian Government is particularly interested in allocating migrants in rural areas as labour force shortage is omnipresent in agriculture (Gentile, 2017).

5.2   Russia

Starting in 1991, large movements of migrants from post-Soviet countries have been a demographic reserve to the declining population in Russia, which today interplays with a resurgence of Russian nationalism. For instance, the ethnically-motivated migration reached its peak in 1994 with an official influx of 1.2 million immigrants (Sievert et al., 2011). However, while immigration eases the labour shortage in the period of population decline, it is not enough to prevent the trend (Ioffe & Zayonchkovskaya, 2010).

   In 2007, the first attempt to liberalize the legislation on migration was made by the Russian Government, which was caused by the concern over labour market demand (Zayonchkovskaya, 2007). The legislation defined more favourable conditions for the employment of migrants from the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) (Malakhov & Simon, 2014). However, the liberal attempts were soon curtailed by the restrictive measures when the state replaced the simplified work permits without a quota with a system of 'patents' with much higher requirements for foreigners to work in Russia (Malakhov & Simon, 2018). The new regulation of migration soon became the subject of corruption at the

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[23] We refer to several data sets and official statements to estimate the migrants from Ukraine to Belarus. However, the discrepancy is registered across various sources. For example, Lukashenko has repeatedly mentioned 150.000 migrants from Ukraine in his statements. In contrast, the Internal Affairs Ministry Statistics report about 42,000 refugees from Ukraine in the period 2014–2017 while not including the general number of the migrants. The Ostrogorski Centre, a non-profit organization dedicated to analyse Belarus in transition to market economy and the rule of law, conducts migration barometers that confirm 150.000 Ukrainian migrants in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. Also, we examined quarterly reports by the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus between 2014 and 2017. The number is close to 151.000 Ukrainian migrants. Finally, we estimate overall 150.000 migrants moved to Belarus since 2014.

regional level. The authorities intentionally increased the price of patents to bargain, which forced potential migrants into illegality (Malakhov & Simon, 2016). Though the regulatory framework has evolved, the government failed to effectively integrate migrants into the labour market. Moreover, immigrants from the CIS are often low-skilled workers and face barriers to integrate into the society. Conversely, increasing numbers of highly qualified Russians are moving to Europe and the United States of America (Zayonchkovskaya, 2007).

The fear of immigration is widespread, commenced with the perception that 'newcomers would tilt the demographics in their favor' and that a so-called Islamization of Russia could follow (Center, 2017). Opinion polls show germinating xenophobia against immigrants (Sievert et al., 2011), almost exclusively against immigrants from non-Slavic or non-European origins (Gorodzeisky, 2019: 205). In the course Russia's political system consolidating towards authoritarian rule (Riabov & Riabova, 2014), however, the Kremlin has increasingly manipulated the inclusiveness of national identity. Due to the increasing ethnic prejudice in the country, as well as the perceived threat to national identity, the Kremlin ruling elite now faces an immigration dilemma, as its manipulative narrative directly contradicts Russian migration policy and its labour needs.

Indeed, as an example, the main policy narrative during the Russian annexation of Crimea was that it safeguarded the national identity of Russian-speaking people in post-Maidan Ukraine. While this line of argumentation was mainly used to mobilize the domestic audience, the attempt at outbound legitimization of the foreign-policy decisions was related to the contested international norms concerning self-determination, secession, independence and the Kosovo-Crimea parallel constantly drawn by the Russian Government (Rotaru & Troncotă, 2017). Subsequently, Crimea's status referendum in 2014 resulted in favour of the unification of the peninsula with Russia. Following the referendum, Russia attempted to affirmatively expand in-migration with the considerable impact of 'russification' of the peninsula as implicitly stated in the Regional Development Strategy.[24] Though with serious discrepancies, official statistics show that at least 140,000 people have moved to

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[24] Стратегия социально-экономического развития республики крым до 2030 года [Strategy socio-economic development of the republic of Crimea until 2030]. [Online] https://rk.gov.ru. Accessed 17 September 2018.

the peninsula, mainly from Russia, while simultaneously a similar number of former residents of Crimea have moved to Ukraine.

The shifts in the ethnic composition of Crimea may help to further cement Russia's position on the peninsula. At the same time, the number of asylum seekers from Ukraine in Russia reached almost 430,000 people (UNHCR, 2018). Similarly to Ukraine, the influx of forced migrants was also considered a threat to security and social stability by host communities (Borisova, 2014). During the first wave of post-conflict immigration, people settled close to the borders. However, migrants were constantly re-allocated to other areas, up to the East, the Volga region and to the Urals via pre-assigned refugee quotas with further restrictions imposed on moving to Moscow, Saint Petersburg and some other areas (Kuznetsova, 2015; Mukomel, 2017).

5.3   Ukraine

During the period of Yanukovych's presidency (2010–2014), Ukraine witnessed popular discontent with the political order and faced a zero-sum choice to accept either Russia's or the West's terms of agreement into their respective regional integration projects. The country has strictly fractionalized into two political camps: one fundamentally pro-Russian and the other fundamentally pro-European. The regime change brought about by Maidan in 2014 threatened Russia's interests in the region, validating the possibility that oligarchic-capitalist regimes could be ousted by a sustained popular uprising. The consequent Ukrainian crisis was ultimately militarized and internationalized with social, cultural and political consequences.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), mass population shifts from Ukraine resulted in the fifth largest number of IDPs in the world, reaching 1.5 million, predominantly uprooted from the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and Crimea (GRID, 2016; MoSP, 2018). As previous studies have shown, the arrival of IDPs into host communities is often embroiled in complex intergroup dynamics, frequently defined by stereotyping, discrimination and power relations further accelerated by poor socioeconomic situation and political instability (Bohnet et al., 2018). Similar patterns have been recorded in

the case of Ukraine categorizing IDPs as a social threat.[25] Moreover, Ukrainian Government has consistently failed to address problems of IDPs, resulting in policy and protection gaps. Only in September 2018, the Supreme Court ruled to entitle IDPs to pension benefits. At the same time, the Court ruled that the residence registration of an IDP is temporary in its nature, thus constituting no grounds for its holder's participation in local elections, effectively restricting political representation of the IDPs. This ruling bears important electoral consequences for the upcoming elections in 2019, since 75% of the respondents among IDPs voiced their distrust of the incumbent President in the survey on the political preferences and attitudes of IDPs (IFES, 2018).

Furthermore, Ukraine is one of the major sending countries in international migration, with more than 10% of Ukrainians living and working abroad (Van Mol et al., 2018). While Russia had previously been a top destination for immigrants from Ukraine, the political re-orientation following the so-called EuroMaidan, coupled with the conflict between the two countries and a downturn in the Russian economy, caused a major change in this pattern (Düvell & Lapshyna, 2015). EU countries are increasingly becoming a major destination for migrants from Ukraine. The introduction of the visa-free travel regime with the EU is expected to further contribute to this trend. Young people especially are prone to move from Ukraine to European countries in search for higher salaries and better opportunities (Van Mol et al., 2018). Outflow of skilled labour and young people contributes to the overall population decline in this country. Around one-fifth of Ukraine's working population live abroad (Strielkowski & Sanderson, 2013: 315), exacerbating the repercussions of ageing and undermining the prospects of economic growth.

6   Conclusion

The interdisciplinary study of the link between population change and political developments resides in the nexus among demographic processes,

[25] Іващенко, К., Стегній О. "Між близькістю та відчуженням: ставлення населення України до вимушених переселенців з Криму та Донбасу (проблеми, тенденції та рекомендації), Українське суспільство: моніторинг соціальних змін (під ред. Ворони В., Шульги М.). Київ: Інститут соціології НАНУ, с.295" [Between closeness and alienation: the attitudes of the Ukraine's population towards IDPs from Crimea and Donbas: problems, tendencies and policy recommendation] [in Ukrainian]," 2015.

discourses and policies. Based on this interplay, we have shown that population policies in the three countries reflect the resurgence of Russian nationalism, the authoritarian attempt to consolidate the public opinion in Belarus and the emergency attempt to save the declining population in Ukraine. To conclude, we now discuss these concepts.

As concepts and disciplines, demography and politics draw bi-directional causal links between demographic variables to the political structure of society (Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012). For instance, first going from demography to politics, population change influences political transitions (Cincotta, 2005; Organski et al., 1984), revolutions (Goldstone, 1991) and participation in regional and international conflicts (Cranmer & Siverson, 2008). In the second direction, e.g. democracy increases life expectancy (Mathers et al., 2001), depresses infant mortality (Nussbaum, 2010), and decreases fertility rates (Da Rocha & Fuster, 2006).

For reference to European demographic trends, Teitelbaum (2014) conceptualizes that demographic changes on political representation depend fundamentally upon the nature of the political systems. Thereby, the electoral institution is the central mechanism that transforms changing population preferences into the legislative norms and registers the source of political leadership in European democracies (Billingsley & Ferrarini, 2014). Therefore, e.g. family policies and pension reforms are the outcomes of democratic deliberation. It would be misleading, however, to assume a similar mechanism is applicable in the cases of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, although the demographic shifts placed demands on the governments, as we have shown, deliberative and decision-making bodies within authoritarian parties and legislatures adopted policies to pervade authoritarian rule rather than genuinely address demographic challenges (Boix & Svolik, 2013). Thus, while the above analysis used the European examples to guide the usage of concepts, we applied those concepts as perspectives that require attention to the realities of demographic trends and political structures in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

All in all, given the bi-directional links, we conclude that the demographic trends, if not addressed by policymakers in these countries, could destabilize these countries or indeed the entire region. As we show, the distinct characteristics in population change Belarus, Russia and Ukraine include fertility variation across ethnic groups, a major gender

gap in mortality, unstable life expectancy trends and migration tendencies aggravated by conflicts and economic downturns. As we have shown throughout, unlike in established European democracies, governments in authoritarian and transitional regimes are generally less able to mitigate the risks arising from the demographic change, as they are less flexible and less responsive to the transformational processes taking place in societies as their result. Specifically, the monetary-based, pro-natalist family policies deployed by all three countries are only oriented to the short-term and do not sufficiently address the need for qualitative change in e.g. childcare and health systems. However, the way that demographic variables influence the political structure still remains largely unexplored, especially in relation to Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, and this chapter and its conclusion are at best a first step for future research.

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Epilogue: Global Political Demography—A Depressing Outlook?

Stuart A. Gietel-Basten

1 Introduction

This book and its corresponding Global Political Demography database (Goerres et al., 2020) represent an ambitious attempt to survey the global state of political demography in a coherent and streamlined fashion. Between them, the country-level chapters cover more than half of the world's population, while the thematic chapters at the start draw linkages across ideas and issues which run through the book. Each chapter offers something new—or at least presents a novel spin or interpretation—on the familiar. And yet, when read in combination, a key question which emerges is whether we are nonetheless left with the same, rather bleak outlook of the future which has thus far seemed to be the 'destiny' of demography? From several angles, this may be hard to deny.

At first sight, the chapters seem to suggest that we are trapped in a 'world of two demographies'. Western and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet republics (Kazimov & Zakharov, this volume; Naumann & Hess,

S. A. Gietel-Basten (✉)
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Sai Kung, Hong Kong SAR
e-mail: sgb@ust.hk

this volume;Vanhuysse & Perek-Bialas, this volume), Japan and South Korea (Klein & Mosler, this volume) are well known for being 'hotspots' of population ageing. We can also show that southeast Asia (Ziegenhain, this volume), China (Noesselt, this volume), Brazil and Argentina (Wachs et al., this volume), Australia and New Zealand (MacDonald & Markus, this volume) and the US and Canada (Sciubba, this volume) are struggling with this phenomenon. Whether there is an advanced welfare and pension system in place or only a residual one, the notion is that the process of ageing is proceeding too quickly. Meanwhile, in other parts of the world it could be said that the process of population ageing is not proceeding quickly enough. In the Maghreb (Bonci & Cavatorta, this volume), in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (James & Balachandran, this volume), in sub-Saharan Africa (Biira & Hartmann, this volume), and in the other areas explored in the thematic chapters by Skeldon (this volume), Skirbekk and Navarro (this volume) and Cincotta and Weber (this volume), there is a perceived link between the persistence of (relatively) high fertility and negative policy and political consequences.

The political consequences of these different (albeit well-characterized) pathways of demographic change can be expected to be different in different places (Vanhuysse & Goerres 2012; this volume). In a significant advance on the extant literature, Cincotta and Weber (this volume) explore the relationship between the transition from a younger to an older society and particular types of conflict. Meanwhile, managing democratic systems with some kind of equity in extremely heterogeneous settings such as the 'super-size democracies' of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (James & Balachandran, this volume) could be extremely challenging. The challenges associated with population ageing (and stagnation) are well known. Ageing can represent not only a threat to productivity, economic growth and the functioning of state institutions; but is also a potential threat to political legitimacy which must be carefully navigated. On the one hand, intergenerational injustice (Vanhuysse, 2012, 2013, 2014) can be a profound threat to the polity, and one which can lead to further political and demographic alienation among the young (Lutz et al., 2006; Sabbagh & Vanhuysse, 2010; Torres-Gil & Spencer-Suarez, 2014). Without doubt, courting older voters makes much political sense in many different settings. On the other hand, enacting reforms to extant systems (Russia) or not moving fast enough to develop institutional frameworks to cope with population ageing (Suwanrada, 2008) can be politically very damaging. In other words, politicians must walk a kind of

political tightrope to try to keep all competing parties in check in these times of demographic change.

2 DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES; DEMOGRAPHIC RESPONSES

A natural response for a policymaker would be to move beyond this passive tightrope to an active approach of 'stacking the cards' of this particular demographic game in their favour. In this sense, we see the instinctive reaction would be to view the whole system in a two-dimensional manner—delivering demographic solutions to demographic problems. Perhaps the most well known are the various policies designed to spur fertility, often under the guise of family policy. Whether in Eastern Europe (Kazimov & Zakharov, this volume; Vanhuysse & Perek-Białas, this volume), Western Europe (Naumann & Hess, this volume), Japan or Korea (Klein & Mosler, this volume) or elsewhere (Frejka & Gietel-Basten, 2016; Gietel-Basten, 2019), these policies have represented an expensive, yet largely ineffective means of tackling the root cause of contemporary population ageing. In what would seem a truly remarkable development just a decade or so ago, China is moving into the field of promoting childbearing (Noesselt, this volume). While rather more under the radar, some south-east Asian countries recently highlighted pro-fertility policies as a means of demographic renewal (UNFPA, 2016). Even in areas previously considered almost immune to (very) low fertility such as the US (Sciubba, this volume) and the Nordic countries, (period) total fertility rates are moving towards levels not seen for many, many years (UNPD, 2019). This is already prompting discussion of how such governments should move to spur childbearing in an explicit manner (Green, 2017). Raising fertility as a means of offsetting population ageing is a very crude tool. Remembering that children do not work (and, indeed, divert resources away from the state and economy), any potential gain from increasing the fertility rate would take two decades to show itself—by which time we might assume the political, social, and economic landscapes may well have moved on anyway.

Clearly, migration is the other major 'demographic lever' to tackle perceived political travails derived from demographic change. Lutz (2007), for example, described migration as a kind of 'mitigation' policy for the challenges of population ageing in Europe. As an extreme example, the so-called European Migrant Crisis of the past decade

was perceived by some as offering an opportunity for 'demographic revitalisation' (Adam, 2015). Of course, it has been comprehensively demonstrated that the notion of 'replacement migration' as a means of holding stable support ratios is a fantasy (Bijak et al., 2007; Coleman, 2002; UNPD, 2001). Plus, as Skeldon (this volume) observes, while the economic and social benefits of migration are well known in certain circles, those voices are drowned out by those who focus on the (perception of) more negative aspects. In some settings, this narrative has become the central feature for discussions of population policy (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Indeed, as Peter MacDonald and Andrew Markus (this volume) argue, migration 'is all about race and immigration'.

These specific challenges related to migration are usually associated with immediate policies or actions in the context of much longer histories. Here, we might take Japan/Korea and the US as some paradoxical, provocative comparators. In terms of ethnic heterogeneity, the two settings could hardly be further apart. Japan and Korea have, for many centuries now, been characterized by an inward-looking, monocultural focus. The US, meanwhile, has been the archetypal cultural and ethnic melting pot of the world. In Japan and Korea, against this backdrop of a monocultural society, it is hardly surprising that politicians are struggling to convince their electorates that immigration is a viable (even necessary) way of shoring weaknesses in their labour force and the economy in general. But, the US hardly show that five or so centuries of immigration (forced or voluntary) has all of the answers. To be sure, race, ethnicity, and, by extension, migration was egregiously weaponized by President Trump. The issues surrounding questions relating to citizenship (Wines, 2019) and ethnicity in the latest US Census show the depth of the challenge and distrust on all sides (PRB, 2020). Yet this is just the end point of centuries of extreme inequalities and the use and manipulation of ethnicity as a factor in shaping domestic politics by all parties.

This 'weaponization of the population' is, as we know, not just associated with migration and ethnicity. Gerrymandering is as old as the hills (Erikson, 1972; Issacharoff, 2002). The manipulation of boundaries and populations in India, the world's biggest democracy, is well known (Shashidhar, 2019). As Biira and Hartman (this volume: 244) show, not only was the 'youth bulge' "weaponized" as part of an "elite-instigated and controlled mobilization, with violence being one instrument among

others in the political competition" but the very process of migration itself was politicized.

Of course, the weaponization of fertility—or 'wombfare' (Toft, 2012)—for political or other ideological purposes has a long history. Examples from the past of both coercive and non-coercive pro-natalist drives in Europe (Pendleton, 1978; Rossy, 2011); the Middle East (Cetorelli, 2014); and East Asia (Gietel-Basten, 2017) segway neatly into the recent pro-natalism of Turkey and Iran (Karamouzian et al., 2014) which link into nationalistic discourses. While the policies in Turkey (Yılmaz, 2015) and Iran catch the headlines, pro-fertility messaging around the world has equally nationalistic overtones. Whether it is the 'Give Birth to a Patriot' scheme in one Russian city (Weaver, 2007); Italy's 'Fertility Day' (which was called 'sexist, ageist, and anachronistic' and 'echoing a fascist past'; Coppolaro-Nowell, 2016: n.p.; Payton, 2016: n.p.); or the reference to low fertility rates in Taiwan as a 'national security threat' (Focus Taiwan, 2011), there is an indelible link between 'fixing' birth rates and some appeal to national renewal—even mentioned in the chapter by Noesselt on China (this volume). Indeed, the recent policy in Italy to 'reward' parents who bear three children with a small plot of land has been termed 'neo-medieval' by opposition politicians (Wyatt, 2018). Within the context of such policies, a eugenicist angle was/is often to be found lurking in the midst (Palen, 1986). At the very least, it is clear that a conservative worldview of the family frequently prevails. Many of the family policies enacted in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, have some root of supporting childbearing explicitly within the maintenance of a 'traditional' family unit (Frejka & Gietel-Basten, 2016; Vanhuysse & Perek-Bialas, this volume). In Hungary, pro-natalist policies are undoubtedly part of a broader suite of policies designed to spur national strength and identity, while imposing a more rigid, conservative notion of the family (Hašková & Saxonberg, 2016), including curtailing the rights of sexual minorities (Haynes, 2020).

More broadly, the responsibility for the various population crises seems to be placed on the shoulders of particular groups of society. Migrants are told that they do not integrate enough, or that they are seeking a 'free ride', or at least an 'easy life' at the expense of the good, honest taxpayer. Younger people in some countries are told that they are feckless and individualistic and are foregoing their 'responsibility to reproduce' their nation. Women predominantly bear the brunt of this. In other countries, meanwhile, the same young people are labelled a security threat—in

this case, though, the main burden lies on the shoulders of men. Meanwhile, older people are simultaneously cast as a drain on society, intent on hoarding power and resources at the expense of younger (and future) generations.

These 'blame games' seem to be interpreted in different ways by different people. Baby boomers, for example, might see the phrase 'OK Boomer' as one of ageism and entitlement on the part of the young. On the other hand, it can be argued that for the Gen-Zers and Millennials who use the phrase, it is as much about "economic anxiety, the threat of environmental collapse, and people resisting change" (Romano, 2019: n.p.). In South Korea, younger people are often referred to as the sampo generation—who have 'given up' on marriage, children and dating (Gietel-Basten, 2019; KJD, 2016). From an intergenerational perspective, this is presented by some as further evidence of a weak, feckless youth culture, 'infected' with 'western' notions of individualism and self-actualisation. For younger people themselves, however, it is just a rational rejection of a life which they feel is either outside of their scope of possibility, or would require so many personal sacrifices as to be existentially very difficult.

The political use of demography appears to have become toxic, then. A constant, never-ending battle between groups who believe (or have been convinced) that somehow their interests are not just misaligned, but either at odds with each other or, worse still, threaten their own. This battle is carefully choreographed by the people who rarely (if ever) are implicated in the blame game: leaders (political, business, religious and otherwise). In this 'demographic race to the bottom', people—especially in democratic societies—are commodified. They are votes, not voters; producers or receivers of economic goods and services, rather than active citizens contributing to the commonweal.

3   Into the 2020s: Going from Bad to Worse?

As I write this in June 2020, the US is in the midst of the most significant protest and mass racial violence seen since the 1960s. The immediate catalyst, this time, being the death of George Floyd on the streets of Minneapolis. At this very moment, crowds are surrounding the White House and more than 40 cities across the country have implemented a curfew or other lockdown policy (Bungard et al., 2020). Without doubt, the roots of this conflict can be traced back to both the legacy of inequalities within American society, coupled with the 'weaponization of race and

ethnicity' which has gained ground under President Trump. Joe Biden's comment that "if you have a problem figuring out whether you're for me or Trump, then you ain't black" (BBC, 2020a: n.p.) epitomizes both the polarisation of race and politics in the US, as well as the level of discourse to which it has stooped. It has been widely argued that the 'demographic power' of the core Trump base (white, working class) has further eroded since 2016 (Zitner & Chinni, 2020). This may well lead to even more extreme measures being taken to consolidate the 'base' in order to win in 2021.

In India, despite growing unemployment, the problems associated with demonetization and agricultural woes, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) roared to a second election victory. Of course, the nationalist discourses of the BJP were already familiar by 2019, but they were arguably even stronger in their second election win—for example, the 2014 policies concerning "equal opportunity", "empowering the Waqf Boasts, promotion of Urdu, a permanent Inter-faith Consultative mechanism to promote harmony and trust" were notably absent this time around (Kim, 2019: n.p.). Illegal immigrants were explicitly targeted, with the manifesto stating that they represent "a huge change in the cultural and linguistic identity of some areas" and "result […] in an adverse impact on local people's livelihood and employment" (Kim, 2019: n.p.). In parts of India (such as Assam), measures associated with the Citizenship Amendment Bill were claimed to be tools to affect the demographic make-up of certain areas and to tip the balance of power (further) in favour of a Hindu nationalist agenda (Sharma, 2019). This issue over citizenship was the immediate catalyst to the Delhi Riots which began in February 2020, which resulted in the 53 deaths and thousands of arrests—but, again, the roots lie in much deeper systemic inequalities.

In Britain, the process of Brexit continues apace. The narrative of such a major convulsion in the economy, society and body politic being foisted upon the young by the (English) old still prevails (Schuster, 2016). In that fateful referendum, of course, the narrative of uncontrolled migration placing an unbearable strain on public services (as well as the British 'way of life') was central (Gietel-Basten, 2016). Boris Johnson's mandate to lead the Conservative Party (and hence become Prime Minister in 2019) was decided by a party membership of 160,000, of which 71% were male, 97% were white, 86% were middle class and 44% were over 65 years old (*The Economist*, 2019). Suffice it to say, this is hardly representative of the country as a whole.

Of course, these are just a few of the ways in which demography is at the forefront of political wrangling around the world. The plight

of displaced Rohingya (Zarni & Cowley, 2014), Venezuelans (Tobon-Giraldo et al., 2019; Wachs et al., this volume), Syrians (Newsham & Rowe, 2019) and Afghans, to name but a few, periodically feature in the news cycle. Populist leaders and politicians around the world may hit the headlines for some especially outlandish remark. Consider the new Brazilian Minister of Women, Family and Human Resources proclaiming a 'new era in Brazil: boys wear blue and girls wear pink' (Watson, 2020). Elsewhere, in the past year we saw the imposition of death by stoning for gay sex and adultery (Westcott, 2019) in Indonesia; the adaption of its Criminal Code to impose a ban on sex outside of marriage (punishable by a one-year prison term) and a maximum of four years in prison for women who have an abortion (unless there were circumstances of medical emergency or rape) (BBC, 2019). In both of the latter cases, an international outcry led to a partial walking back on these promulgations. What we do see, however, is a common thread whereby socio-demographic issues are 'weaponized' for either political gain, or at least, consolidation.

At the time of writing in June 2020, however, there is one particular issue which seems to be all-encompassing in many parts of the world: the COVID-19 pandemic. At the moment, it is impossible to foresee the entire consequences of the pandemic and how this might impact the landscape of political demography in different parts of the world. Despite this, I might dare to suggest that there may be some lessons which can come out of it. The pandemic has brutally exposed and brought to the fore many of the inequalities and multiple vulnerabilities which are so often 'swept under the carpet'. Firstly, there is clear evidence that the older population around the world has been disproportionately hit by the virus—both in terms of infection and fatality (cf. Cruz et al., 2020; Dowd et al., 2020). In particular, mortality among care homes has been especially high in many settings (Holt & Butcher, 2020). There may be a sense that the vulnerabilities of older persons have been brutally exposed in the pandemic and, in certain countries, it may be the case that this could be punished at the ballot box. A second group for whom multiple vulnerabilities have been exposed is migrants. Whether in the dormitories of Singapore (BBC, 2020b; Han, 2020), performing "dirty, dangerous and demanding" (Dempster & Smith, 2020: n.p.) work in essential services, as refugees (Daniels, 2020) or stuck in limbo trying to return to their home villages in India (Adhikari et al., 2020: 37)—the physical, social and economic well-being of migrants has been 'neglected' (Daniels, 2020). International (labour) migration has been 'throttled'. According to the

World Economic Forum, "everyone from a migrant agricultural worker relying on a paycheck in Portugal to a foreign healthcare worker living in Sweden is potentially impacted by a dramatic tightening of borders" (WEF, 2020: n.p.). This will likely have a profound effect not only on the global Gross Domestic Product (MGI, 2016; WEF, 2020), but also on remittances affecting families, communities and economies at the national level (Abel & Gietel-Basten, 2020). Meanwhile, given that the spread of COVID-19 around the world is still ongoing, it has even been suggested that migrants fleeing the disease could well be the next vector of migration flows (Karim, 2020). Of course, the likely economic depression caused by COVID-19 will bring its own challenges.

4   A Multidimensional, Intersectional Approach

Taking the themes from the first section, and coupling them with the global news stories from the past couple of years discussed above, there is perhaps a temptation to just give up; to write off political demography as a doom-laden misery-fest which only masochistic scholars and nationalistic ideologues wish to inhabit. Yet, I think this completely misses the point. Bonci and Cavatorta (this volume) really capture my own sentiment in thinking about the real power of not just political demography, but demography as a whole (Dorling & Gietel-Basten, 2017). For Bonci and Cavatorta (this volume: 269), "instead of focusing on supposed 'youth bulges' or youth extremism or youth apathy" to explain, in their case, the "crisis of the Arab world", they argue that "it is more fruitful to analyse the structural problems – political and economic – that have led to uprisings and demands for change". If I interpret them correctly, this is essentially arguing that the issue is not the youth bulge itself, but rather everything else that led to it and operates along with it. This accords with how I see the very low fertility rates in east and southeast Asia. It has been commonplace to see these low rates as the 'problem' that needs to be 'fixed'. As is well known, such efforts to 'fix' the problem have been met with little success. Rather, what we should do is consider such low fertility as the downstream outcome of various other processes or institutional malfunctions. Low fertility is not the problem itself; rather it is one symptom of bigger, broader problems in society, economics and politics.

The Dutch demographer Nico van Nimwegen said that "states get the fertility rates they deserve" (quoted in Gietel-Basten, 2019: 162). We could expand upon this to say that states get not only the demography

they deserve, but also the interaction between politics and demography. When we look at political demography in this way, we can go beyond the superficial, dismal perspective and embrace a more complex, more multifaceted story. This view forces us to stop and think carefully about just why some countries have such profound problems with race, ethnicity and migration. We can think really carefully about why women (and men) in some places want to have fewer children than they end up having; and, at the same time, why women (and men) in other countries consistently state a preference to have more children than they do.

Thinking deeply about these questions forces us to confront some of the deepest, darkest, most uncomfortable aspects of the societies in which we live and the things which are taken for granted. How can we just accept that migrants are treated worse than 'native' citizens? How can we accept that black lives seemingly 'don't matter'? How can we accept that a Democratic nominee can take black votes for granted, and demonise anyone who dares to think otherwise? It can force us to realize that simply handing women a few hundred dollars to have another child, with the aim of propping up a pension system or making a country a little bit more populous is not only a fool's errand, but actually adds insult an affront to dignity.

As the chapters in this book show, there are as many solutions as there are challenges. Cincotta and Weber (this volume: 88) recognize that the promotion of a "transition to a more mature age structure" will only come about through the "lengthen[ing] of girls' educational attainment, provid[ing] access to modern contraception and information, and secur[ing] equal rights for women". Of course, these aspirations should be ends in their own right. Skeldon (this volume) consistently talks about the notion of inclusion for migrants, majestically showing how over longer periods of history, a more inclusionary approach yields rewards for one and all. Skirbekk and Navarro (this volume) point out that religion can be a mechanism by which transfers could be elucidated and poverty relieved. Biira and Hartmann (this volume) note the well-known maxim that a young population can just as well be an economic boon as a factor in a security risk. Vanhuysse and Perek-Bialas (this volume) rightly observe that active ageing programmes in Central and Eastern Europe are ranked pretty much rock bottom in the world. But, still, these programmes have been shown in other parts of the world to make a real difference to both the lives of older persons themselves, and the macro-level impact of population ageing.

Recent crises have revealed areas where we really must do better if we stand a hope of a sustainable demographic social future. Foresti (2020), for example, remarks that rather than gratitude for the work of migrants during the COVID-19 pandemic, what is really needed is more reform. Yet, we need to be realistic. Despite the obvious macroeconomic challenges caused by the potential throttling of migration in the immediate post-COVID world, Foresti (2020) anticipates that we can "expect even more of an 'us first' approach in politics: 'our' vaccines, 'our' PPE [personal protective equipment], 'our' health, 'our' borders, 'our' people first" (Foresti, 2020: n.p.). This jars with the celebration of key workers as heroes; with the 'clapping' and accolades. So what will it take to turn this gratitude into policy and practice change?

Of course, all of these changes require a choice. This, to me, shows the true power of studying and understanding political demography. A common definition of the sub-discipline is that it is the study of "the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to both government and politics" (Goldstone et al., 2012: 3; Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012; Vanhuysse & Goerres, this volume). Clearly, governments (and other stakeholders) go beyond a passive acceptance of the 'size, composition, and distribution of the population', and desire to either manipulate it, weaponize it, or at the very least harness it. In order to understand how they do this, we must therefore clearly study the manner in which these demographic characteristics materialize, and the broader universe in which they operate. On the flip side, however, if we are thinking about government and politics, we must also deconstruct how this is built and operates. At an abstract level, it could be argued that government and politics is inseparable from power and a desire or need to control and manage. The kinds of changes set out above will, inevitably, require some kind of compromise. This might be a ceding of real political power, or 'sailing against the wind' by pushing through unpopular changes. It may require lending a megaphone to voices which are often ignored. It may require standing up to vested interests in business, and even religion.

This real-world approach shows us the real power of political demography. 'Standard demography' (if you will) can often descend into a kind of "spreadsheet" exercise (Wang et al., 2018: 694) which can have a tendency to extrapolate from observational and regression analyses of relationships between x and y to produce a 'perfect (demographic) world'. From my office on the ninth floor of a white-tiled university (a literal ivory tower), the answer to the world's demographic problems are clear:

investment in education, health and infrastructure; completion of the gender and contraceptive revolutions; improved governance, transparency and accountability; tackling inequality in all its forms; developing and reforming institutions to meet the needs of our ageing populations in the twenty-first century; and so on. But, how on earth do we get there—especially when our studies show us that there is not only little appetite to change 'for the better', but that there appears to be a desire to exploit the present travails for political gain? In other words, 'thinking politically' about demography forces us to be realistic about not only what changes we would like to see, but also what the pathways would be to actualize them. Given the state of the world today, though, it is reasonable to withdraw back into our shells and see the futility of hoping for the kind of world which we might aspire to.

On this note we might return to Bonci and Cavatorta (this volume), who use an important study by Inayatullah (2016) to project a possible way forward. Inayatullah's (2016) study mapped out four possible future scenarios for the MENA region to 2050. Some of these 'storylines' were hopeful—of a system of peer-to-peer sharing economies and cyber cooperatives which bring governments and economies together to work on shared challenges. Others, however, are bleak—unabated automation further delivers an unemployed and disempowered youth, stuck in a broken economic system in which social links, especially intergenerational ones, are fractured. In response to these (and other) scenarios, Bonci and Cavatorta (this volume: 270) take a more typical, pragmatic approach, suggesting that "without a fundamental rethink of the role of the state in the economy […] and in fostering citizen's rights, the Tunisian and Moroccan economies are destined to muddle through". "In this case", they continue, "demographic change might indeed coincide with greater public liberties and even full democratization, but from an economic perspective not much would change for the vast majority of the young citizens".

From a future studies perspective, the 'prosaic' approach taken by Bonci and Cavatorta is entirely to be expected. Yet, the approach of painting scenarios where political, economic, social and cultural storylines interweave with each other to create better (or worse) futures—normatively speaking—is still extremely powerful. In the same way that looking back into history (and across into other spaces) can help us understand where we are today, so too can looking at various different futures help us to see where we might be going. More importantly, it can show us that

demography is not destiny, but rather some factors in a multidimensional set of parameters which we need to negotiate. For this reason, the use of scenarios in considering population futures is becoming more widespread, being adopted in the Wittgenstein Centre forecasts (Lutz et al., 2017) as well as in the IPCC shared socio-economic pathways (Kc & Lutz, 2017). By explicitly including a political/security/international relations dimension, these scenarios (or shared pathways) allow for a more holistic (and realistic) view of how the future might pan out, rather than the more hopeful, theory of change approach which we might more naturally favour.

As we survey the future, it may well appear that the bleakest scenarios are the most likely to come to pass. Aside from the impact of COVID-19, the most 'optimistic' scenarios in the Wittgenstein Centre projections would require not only a tremendous investment in human capital but for this to occur in some of the countries with the least resources and the poorest infrastructure and governance systems (WiC, 2015). Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals at a universal level by 2030 seems a distant hope; and progress in other areas (such as the implementation of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging) has been weak.

Despite this, there is still room for optimism. Big changes can and do happen, whether deliberately or organically. A few decades ago it would have been very hard to predict that Thai people would have access to universal healthcare (Sumriddetchkajorn et al., 2019); that there would be a social pension in Myanmar (albeit accessible at a very high age) (Win, 2017) and that the link between marriage and childbearing would be effectively severed in the Catholic countries of southern Europe. Even in the past few, changes in the legal rights of sexual minorities, including the right to marry, have continued apace. Taiwan became the first Asian setting to permit such marriages (Cho & Kam, 2019), while in Switzerland voters approved a ban on anti-gay discrimination in February 2020 (Fitzsimmons, 2020). In Japan, the #KuToo movement shows how women are fighting back against regressive dress codes at work in a move which is prompting a national discussion on work culture (Rachelle, 2019). In South Korea, the government have shifted away from explicitly pro-natalist messaging towards offering more holistic support for families to more effectively combine work and family according to their own needs (Lee, 2018; Jang, 2019). China is on course to eliminate 'absolute poverty' (CGTN, 2019) and, through the implementation

of Healthy China 2030, aims to decrease "the health effects of second-hand smoking, reduc[ing]e obesity, increas[ing]e overall physical activity, and prevent[ing] chronic diseases" (Chen et al., 2019: e447). Finally, in response to COVID-19, Portugal has temporarily granted all migrants and asylum-seekers citizenship rights (Foresti, 2020).

In other words, changes which may well have been difficult to foresee in the recent past have happened—many negative but many of them also positive. Surveys increasingly tell us that the next generations have entirely different value systems, and wish to organize their lives, work and families in a completely different manner from ours (Gietel-Basten, 2020). Perhaps they will succeed in that. There is a strong temptation to look at the world today and have a bleak outlook of the future—where perhaps the best we can hope for is to 'muddle through'. However, by better understanding how we have got to where we are (including our significant achievements); by seeing our demographic travails as symptoms of other challenges rather than 'problems' in themselves, we can keep a more open mind as to what the future might deliver, and grasp a better sense of what we need to do to craft a better one for us all.

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