Chapter 6
Globalisation: Meta-ideological Hegemony and Challenges in Education

Holger Daun

Abstract This chapter offers a critical analysis of the dominant paradigms and ideologies and their positions along selected dimensions. The globalised meta-ideology was assumed to define and influence changes in education and policy reforms, both locally and globally, but other reasons for or causes of the changes in education policy might be an object of future, in-depth, research. In the past years populism has come to challenge the prevailing hegemony. Despite frequent incompatibilities with local economic structures and cultural patterns, the meta-ideology and its paradigmatic features described above are taken for granted by politicians and policymakers around the world. The educational features that have been globalized are ostensibly biased towards academic achievement, standards, cognition and purposive rationality.

6.1 Introduction

Political parties, politicians and governments in various countries around the world have in the past four decades accepted or been pushed to formulate educational policies that they were unlikely to favour earlier. They have formulated and often implemented policies that are alien or strange to their traditional core programs and constituencies. One principal reason for this is that new types of structures, cultures and challenges have emerged, to which established cultures and ideologies have been compelled to respond. As a result, ideological changes or shifts are taking place both locally and globally (Zajda 2020a). Some of the frontiers between the prevailing ideologies have been blurred (Miller 1989). Also a gap has emerged between rulers and ruled. In this vacuum populism has emerged and grows. The early modern ideologies were formed primarily along lines of the left – right division but new phenomena have emerged to be evaluated, explained and acted upon along new ideological dimensions, for instance: large-scale arrangements versus

H. Daun (✉)
University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: daun@mbox.su.se

small-scale arrangements, 'ecologism' versus 'economism', and so on. Some political and educational ideologies have revived certain of their classical elements.

Islam itself is a globalising force. Thus, we have to deal with two principal types of globalization – Western and Islamic – and may therefore use 'globalisations (in plural), even if there among Muslims are different views on the relationship between Islam and the Western-style globalization' (Daun and Arjmand 2018).

It is argued here that since the 1990s, ideological and policy changes are conditioned by the challenges from the globalized meta-ideology, which is hegemonic in that it determines the discourse and argues, for example, that education is first and foremost for making countries economically competitive and modern. In the second place comes education for the sake of e.g. Human Rights and Liberal democracy (Zajda 2020b). Thus, the Western globalization carries a meta-ideology with strong elements of some Western ideological features – principally individualism, the uniqueness of the individual, freedom of choice, and so on, which are among the elements that neo-liberalism and modern communitarianism share, and this common denominator may be called the *global hegemonic meta-ideology*. Ideological adaptations towards this meta-ideology have taken place in many places in the world, but since the beginning of this millennium populism has emerged as a counterforce. Populism is not a coherent ideology, but populist movements and ideas around the world have certain features in common (Mackert 2018; Stockemer 2019a, b).

The ideologies linked to Western globalization wield hegemonic power as globalization is presented as an inevitable and unavoidable process, and global competition as an indispensable feature for a society in order to progress or at least survive (Brown 1999; Burbules and Torres 2000; Cox 2000; Mittelman 1996; Spring 2009; Zajda 2015). In a similar vein as many other social, religious and cultural phenomena, Islam and its educational practices, institutions, and the manner of organizing them need to be studied in a global context. The world system and Western globalization processes challenge Islam and its educational institutions in different ways, while at the same time, Islam itself, as a world religion, is also a globalizing force (Beeley 1992; Berger 1999; Haynes 1999).

Education for children and youth, both secular and religious, has been globalized (Daun 2006, 2011; Spring 2009). During the past decades, Islam has been extended to new areas and it has been the most expansive religion in terms of new adherents, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia and Latin America (An-Náim 1999; Berger 1999; Martin 1999). In most contemporary Muslim societies Western globalisation has produced uneven and differentiated effects. Increased human mobility and global connectedness have resulted in greater contact between Muslims of differing orientations and has created significant Muslim communities in the West (Mandaville 2016). This chapter will analyse certain issues related to globalization and then focus on some key concepts that will be examine critically in the later sections.

6.2   Globalization

Globalization is something more than internationalization. The latter is resulting from state as well as non-state actions taken from within countries in relation to bodies and people in other countries. Western globalization is processes of compression of the world (in space and time) through ICT; economic interdependencies of global reach; an ideology (Cox 2000; Zajda 2015), or "the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" (Robertson 1992, p. 8). Usually, globalization processes are classified into different categories, such as financial globalisation, military globalization, cultural globalization, political globalization, and economic globalization.

The de-regulations implemented on the basis of neo-liberal ideas from the 1980s imply that multinational companies are not bound to any specific countries but may have units in different countries and they make decisions that many times ignore national borders. This fact makes them able to steer economic matters more or less independently from the states. Such de-territorialization also takes place in the case of religions.

Western globalization implies among other things: a challenge to and a questioning of national and local cultures; universalization of certain aspects of knowledge and ideas and particularization of others; a new role for the national state to mediate universalization and encourage competitiveness; and extension of liberal democracy and human rights. It is also the near-global spread of ideas, discourses, a standardized culture, institutions, organizations, technology and so on. Of particular importance is the general penetration of capitalist forms, market principles and purposive rationality (Touraine 1971). In the realm of institutionalized education, it is the dissemination of the world model – illuminated by Meyer et al. (1997), among others – that constitutes another feature of globalization.

With the dissemination of the market model, commodification and rationalization of non-economic spaces is spreading (Camps 1997; Sears and Moorers 1995). This might provoke resistance in the form of exaggeration of the importance of local ideas and traditional values (particularism). Revival movements and withdrawal from the state institutions may to some extent be seen as resistance or counter-hegemonic attempts. Complex and sometimes contradictory processes occur. Culturally, national societies and local communities experience 'constraints to produce their own unique accounts of their places in world history' (Robertson 1992, pp. 289–290). The taken-for-granted aspects of cultures are challenged and 'Traditions have to explain themselves…' (Giddens 1994, p. 23). Populism may partially be seen as one of the important responses to the uncertainty experienced due to these processes.

Western globalization contributes to new and sometimes contradictory requirements in relation to education, some of which are: religious-moral versus secular; formation of human capital versus broad personality development, competition and elitism versus equality and democracy (Benhabib 1998; Chabbot and Ramirez 2001; Hannum and Buchmann 2003). Globalisation of capitalism and the market

economy is perceived by politicians and policy-makers to require competitiveness, and the way to achieve this is by the same actors believed to be found in the world models as they are defined and studied by Meyer et al. (1997), and in the meta-ideology. The ideologies linked to the world models may be seen as part of the meta-ideology.

Among Muslims and governments in Muslim states at least four views on globalization: (i) Islam as a powerful globalising force; (ii) Islam as a potential globalising force; (iii) Islam and Muslims as excluded from the favourable aspects of Western globalisation; and (iv) Islam as threatened by the predominating (Western) globalisation forces.

These views on globalisation correspond to some extent to four principal Muslim ideological orientations: secularism, traditionalism, modernism/liberalism, and fundamentalism/Islamism (Daun and Arjmand 2018; The Levin Institute 2008; Saadallah 2018).

In the Western view, two sets of theoretical perspectives deal with the global phenomena affecting education: (i) World System (WS) perspectives and (ii) globalization perspectives. The World System perspectives include more long term and historical aspects than globalization perspectives generally do (Clayton 2004). Western globalization may be seen as taking place within the framework of a world system. Two World System perspectives are relevant in the present context: the political-economic world perspective and the neo-institutionalist world perspective. According to the former, the drive for competitiveness, profit and accumulation is the principal 'cause' of or condition for what occurs globally (Dale 2000; Elwell 2006; Wallerstein 1991, 2006). Wallerstein (2006) defines four different categories of countries or areas, among them peripheral and core areas, but practically all countries now at least pay lipservice to involvement in the drive for competitiveness. In what is labelled the Third World, differences and inequalities existing after the Second World War have since then been reinforced. We now, according to Cardoso (1993) and Castells (1993) have to count with 'four worlds': (i) Winners in the new international division of labour; (ii) potential winners (Brazil, Mexico); (iii) large continental economies (India, China); and (iv) clear losers that could be called the Fourth World. Most of Africa, the not-oil-producing Middle Eastern countries, large parts of Asia and Latin America belong to the Fourth World. Many Asian and most sub-Saharan countries, including those having a substantial proportion of Muslims, belong to the fourth category.

Economically, the position countries have in the world system may thus vary from marginalized to strongly incorporated into competitive world markets (Castells 1993; Foreign Policy 2007; Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 1999). Western Neoliberal globalization results in economic growth in some countries or places, but also results in marginalization of other countries and increasing gaps between the North and the South (Griffin 2003; Lipumba 2003). High technology activities, growth and richness are concentrated in certain geographical zones (East and Southeast Asia, Europe, Oceania and North America). Countries situated outside of the most intensive flows are indirectly influenced; their position in the world system is more or less cemented and their frame of action, even internally, is conditioned by their positions.

Economic actions and processes aim at and contribute to encouraging or compelling people to enter into commodified, monetized and priced exchanges as producers and consumers. Market forces are spreading to most areas of life, among them education. The market order on a global scale is country-wise mediated by national and local history, and politics (Bretherton 1996a; Cox 2000). Predominantly Muslim countries belong to both the highly involved category (principally oil producing countries) and the marginalized category (Beeley 1992; Daun and Arjmand 2018). From this World System perspective, education of the Western type is seen as subordinated to the requirement to contribute to competitive human capital.

On the other hand, the neo-institutionalist World System perspective, as defined by Meyer et al. (1997) assumes the existence of a world polity, which is a symbolic cultural construction and a discursive entity, including world models consisting of a complex of cultural expectations and tacit understandings, including 'cognitive and ontological models of reality that specify the nature and purposes of nation-states and other actors' (p. 144). The models stipulate how the relationships between e.g. the state, civil society, the citizen and education should be arranged. Beyond these relationships, this package of ideas and values or meta-ideology consists of 'a distinct culture – a set of fundamental principles and models mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the nature and purposes of social actors and actions' (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). Although merely consisting of recommendations and suggestions, the world models have enforcing characteristics. Paradoxically, while world models signal and promote plurality, individualization and multiculturalism, they also standardize and secularize cultures and ideologies (Burbules and Torres 2000).

According to this perspective, the world models embody the Western worldview and include features as diverse as, for instance, human rights, children rights, emphasizing individual autonomy and the like, modern Communitarian views, with its focus on altruism, solidarity etc., Neoliberal views (the self-interested and utility maximizing man), consumerist ideals, liberal democracy, education as a private and individual good etc. (Ahmed 1992; Barber 1996; Spring 2009; Zajda 2020a). Thus, the Western set of world models may be seen as containing or representing the market-oriented discourse as well as the modern communitarian-oriented ideology.

With regards to culture and religion, globalizations may result in intensive encounters between Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism. The world religions compete and challenge one another, each of them claiming to possess 'exclusive and largely absolute truths or values' (Turner 1991, p.173). The outcomes of the encounters between Islam and other globalized belief and value systems differ from one geographical and cultural area to another. In the pre-dominating world models, competing features, such as Islam and Buddhism, etc. are not considered in the same way and to the same extent as Western belief and value systems. That is, although Islam is being globalized it does not make part of the Western-oriented world models (Ahmed 1992; An-Náim 1999; Beeley 1992; Carney et al. 2012; Turner 1991).

Traditionally, culture has tied individuals, social systems and territories to one another. The local, in this sense, implies different holistic or totalitarian collectives

ranging from loose voluntary associations and networks to extended families, lineages, clans, kinships and fundamentalist groups. In areas less influenced by market forces, sections of the economy are driven not primarily by profit-seeking or individual utility maximization, but by the need for collective: extended family, clan, and tribe, and their survival. Culturally complex and sometimes contradictory processes occur around the world. Economic activities 'remain embedded in the social fabric' and have 'another logic, another set of rules' (than the capitalist) (Esteva and Prakash 1998, p. 86). Individuals make part of networks and there is a low degree of individualism (Hoerner 1995).

The spread of Western cultural features has different outcomes, ranging from revitalization of local cultures, which is particularization, to the emergence of syntheses or what Robertson (1995) labels 'glocalization' and Nederven Pieterse (Nederven Pieterse 1995) calls 'hybridization', to the elimination of local cultures (Goontilake 1994; M'Bokolo 1994; Stavenhagen 1994). When glocalization occurs, universal features are transformed and translated into local cultures, while in hybridization, the universal and the local more or less merge. Both glocalization and hybridization cover the outcomes of the encounter between global, standardized cultural aspects and local and/or value-oriented cultural aspects. According to Touraine (1971), the social has been decomposition, individualism has become the principal of 'morality', and society has fragmented into communities.

The market ideology and the modern communitarian orientation have a common denominator that largely corresponds to the world models. The core of the policy documents produced in and disseminated from international non-Islamic organizations (e.g. OECD, UNESCO, and the World Bank) may be seen as constituting world models, although rarely explicitly. Since the world system, as such, does not have an overall physical or material world state, government or polity, governance is performed not only by nation-states but to a large extent by market forces, the enforcing characteristics of the world models and through the activities performed by a myriad of networks and organizations (Garsten and Jacobsson 2007; Messner 1997; Mundy 2007).

Awareness of one's rights and demand for them has increased, as a result of globalization and civil and human rights have become important themes in the globalizing discourses and policies (Scholte 2008; Zajda 2020b). Global pressure for human rights and pressure from IGOs and INGOs concerning political freedom and freedom of organization have made many governments organize multiparty elections (Bretherton 1996b; Giddens 2002). However, this has not materialized at any large extent in pre-dominantly Muslim countries (Kurzman 2002). The neoliberal and human rights globalizations and the spread of the Western worldviews and lifestyles (Liberal, pluralist and market oriented) thus have come to challenge also Islamic beliefs, ideologies, institutions and way of life, which previously seemed to be valid (Ahmed 1992; Zajda 2020a). As Giddens (1994, p. 22) argued, 'Globalization is not just about the creation of larger systems, but about the transformation of the contexts of social experience'. That is, global processes also reach the individual level. Individuals can less than before trust the immediate and experienced past and present (Robertson 1992; Waters 2001; Zajda 2020c).

6.3   Education

In regard to the influences of international and global forces on education, it is necessary to make a distinction between: (i) general processes of globalization, and (ii) direct and specific educational processes such educational borrowing (Meyer et al. 1997; Steiner-Khamsi 2004). The former includes general economic, cultural, and political forces affecting education indirectly, while the latter takes place in the domain of education and thus affects education directly. In the latter case, the spread of educational policies takes place through, for instance, borrowing, learning (from others), and imposition (Dale 1999). The Western-style modern education has been globalized through its massive expansion around the world. The changes within this type of education are taking place in the direction proposed in the world models: in overall goals, educational organization, type of governance, administration, mode of finance and organization of educational provision and delivery and regulation as well as the curriculum (Daun 2002, 2006; Spring 2009). The culture of Western-style primary and secondary education is increasingly biased towards cognitive and measurable elements, and quality is assessed in terms of achievement on test scores rather than socialization skills, personality formation or moral training. In such a context, education tends to be seen as a commodity, while moral training and ethical virtues are neglected. Expansions and changes of the curriculum and developments within the aspects of education affect Islamic education in different ways.

Western-style education is generally seen as the means to achieve a large number of goals, including development, economic growth, upward social mobility, peace, and democracy. The processes of neo-liberal globalization generally drive countries to at least attempt to make people technologically and economically competitive; and more specifically to enhance students' cognitive and technical skills. However, in reality education has maintained its different complementary as well as contradictory functions: transformation of society, reproduction of power relations, sorting, selection, qualification of pupils, and so on. Some of these features seem to apply to some types of Islamic education as well, partly because Islamic knowledge is stratified; as some groups are not entitled or able to reach the highest levels of knowledge (see Nasr 1975).

6.4   Key Concepts

In many countries a gap has emerged between, national leaders and voters (see, for example, Andeweg 1996; Bakker and Bal 2010). However, values have not changed as much, when compared with societal structures, economic patterns and technology (World Values Survey 2015). Paradigm, culture, ideology and policy are interrelated concepts. A paradigm is one of the most abstract concepts, at times defining and shaping aspects of cultures, ideologies, and major social theories, and these features are situated at the level of (a) epistemology and ontology (view of man,

view of society, view of the state, view of knowledge, and so on); (b) view of the role of education in society and for the individual, and (c) discourse and policies (Burrel and Morgan 1992; Watt 1994). Culture is an ongoing construction of shared world views, visions and meanings (Zajda and Majhanovich 2020).

Ideologies are aspects of culture(s); they are visions used programmatically to justify a certain state of affairs or vision of certain states of affair. When ideological elements are transferred into the policy-making arena, they tend to adapt to the context and concrete circumstances (Sörensen 1987). Ideologies were originally to a large extent linked to socio-economic class and material conditions of people but are now being de-linked from class structures and group interests and more and more linked to the drives for individual autonomy, competitiveness, 'modularity',[1] new types of governance, uncertainty, risk, etc. (Gellner 1994; Reich 1997; Touraine 1971).

Political party programs and ideologies are more concrete than paradigms and often have to deal and negotiate with the concrete realities. Therefore, political programs and ideologies may borrow from different paradigms, and different political parties may borrow from one and the same paradigm. That is, the content of the paradigm does not necessarily correspond completely to, for example, actual political party programs or ideology, nor can paradigms be applied to specific societal or educational situations or problems. Instead, they have to be operationalized and negotiated in order to become applicable in policies.

Policies are political decisions and their implementation, and they can vary in a number of dimensions, but here it will suffice to mention the ideological dimension, which may range from utopian to remedial and pragmatic. In the first case, policies are oriented towards goals that correspond to existing realities. Remedial policies are defensive, since they, at least at the discursive level, aim at solving existing problems. However, there are various perceptions of what constitutes a problem and still more so of the solution of problems. Events, processes and states of affair need to have a certain structure in order to be perceived as problems (Sörensen 1987).

It is evident that, apart from globalization processes, certain aspects internal to each country contribute to the ideological and political shifts. For example, the expansion and prolongation of education and a higher material standard of living among the populations in some areas in the world, have contributed to the changed basis and nature of ideologies (Inglehardt 1990, 1997; Norris and Inglehardt 2004; World Values Survey 2015).

Hegemony, as it was once conceptualized by Gramsci (1971), operates at the national level and implies consensus within the framework of a national, industrialized capitalist economy, based on the fact that the capitalist class is able to make the dominated class(es) accept the dominant culture and ideology as 'common sense' (Sears and Moorers 1995). Thus, hegemony is an ideological domination. Moreover, Sears and Moorers (1995: 244) refer to Laclau, who argues that hegemony is a

---

[1] This term has been coined by Gellner (1994), and means that individuals are socialized in such a way that they fit in and behave appropriately in many different situations and contexts.

discursive matter: it is the ability to extend the dominating discourse and make its alternatives converge with itself. However, hegemony can reasonably be expanded to fit a global framework, in the context of global processes.

Despite the uniform pattern of ideologies and policies deriving from the hegemonic paradigms, nation-states, education systems and schools do not adapt immediately, or in a uniform way (McGinn 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). This indicates inertia, resistance or some type of counter-hegemony (Camps 1997).

As far as education is concerned, its value tends to be perceived in two principal ways: (i) as a value in itself, or (ii) as an instrumental value. In the first case, it is seen as a human right, a basic human need or an indispensable aspect of welfare and well-being. In the second case, it is an investment and qualification for future roles in the spheres of production and consumption or a means to create democratic citizens, for instance (Colclough 1990; Cornia et al. 1987; Farrell 1992). Furthermore, the relationship between society and the education systems has, during different historical periods, been seen in four different ways: (i) Education is conditioned by and adapting to societal changes; (ii) education is the motor driving societal changes, (iii) society and education are in a mutual interrelationship, or (iv) education is more or less independent of or isolated from society (Karabel and Halsey 1977). The second (ii) view, for example, has dominated since the beginning of the 1990s and it corresponds to the liberal market view (see human capital theory). Against this background, describing globalization and its conceptual distinctions, the most common ideologies and their shifts will now be discussed.

6.5 The Most Influential Western Ideologies

6.5.1 *Liberalism, Social Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism*

The principal ideas of the political branch of Liberalism were realized in the countries in North America and parts of Europe with the breakthrough of liberal democracy and implementation of human and civil rights. With the economic depression and the application of Keynesian policies in the 1930s, classical liberalism eventually accepted a range of state interventions for the sake of economic growth, economic stability and equality. This version of liberalism came to be called *social liberalism*. On the other hand, some central elements of the classical liberal ideology, especially in the economic domain, have been revived and sometimes refined under the label neo-liberalism (Crowley 1987).

Neoliberalism promotes two important assumptions: that everything could be marketized and that human beings are driven by their needs and desire to maximize their own needs and utility, regardless of time and place. Structural adjustment programs initiated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in a large number of countries around the world are based on the neoliberal assumptions.

Crouch (2017, p, 8) argues that neoliberalism is '… a political strategy that seeks to make as much of our lives as possible conform to the economist's ideal of a free market'. (Crouch (2017, p, 8). And development aid implies that 'the recipient countries should develop and implement policies ensuring privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, liberalisation of imports and foreign direct investment inflows and interest rates, as well as legislate to minimise the role of government intervention into the economy' (Crouch (2017, p, 8). In the market discourse, education is seen as a good or commodity. Moral issues and moral education (honesty and other values) are assumed to be acquired through the workings of market mechanisms (Giddens 1994, Giddens 2002).

6.5.2   Conservatism

Contemporary conservatism is impregnated by ideas from earlier periods and its principal goal is to revive societal features and values that formerly existed. Locality and territory are important in the conservative ideology, be it the local community or the nation. For nationalists among the conservatives, it is the nation that is the context of decision-making and identity, while it is the local community among locally oriented conservatives (similar or akin to one of the early – traditional – communitarian branch) (McCarthy et al. 1981). As in liberalism, inequalities were (and are) seen to be due to inherited biological differences; differences in efforts made by the individual himself or herself; or both. Individual freedom is important but earlier as well as certain later conservatives do not believe as much as neo-liberals in individual rationality and market solutions. They see a need for moral training in accordance with specific conservative values, and, in the Western context, dissemination of Christianity. Also, there is a need for a state guarding the nation and for religious institutions and families that guarantee moral values (Held 1995, p. 139). For example, if the dissemination of Christian values and nationalist elements are perceived to be at risk, with the implementation of decentralization, then late conservatives are reluctant to accept such a reform (Lauglo 1995).

In addition, Held (1995) finds within the New right 'severe tensions between individual liberty, collective decision-making and institutions and processes of democracy' (Held, p. 495). Brown et al. (1997) argued along the same lines, when they, within the New Right, found argument for international competition as well as romanticization of the past of the ideal home, family and school. In conservatism, education is generally seen as promoting moral values and citizenship.

Conservatism exists also in cultures and civilizations other than the ones in Europe, America and Oceania. Among adherents to Islam, for instance, there are conservative groups, whose values and beliefs have many features in common with conservatives in the non-Muslim countries. (See Ahmed 1992; Ayubi 1991; Saadallah 2018).

6.5.3 Communism, Utopian Socialism, Syndicalism, Anarchism, Cooperative Socialism

These ideologies have one thing in common: the belief in a classless and stateless society with emancipated individuals who are collectively oriented and rational. The locus for decision-making is the local, be it a community, a factory or another collective entity. However, the means to reach this state of affairs and the solutions these ideologies suggest for reaching this utopian society differ considerably (Bakunin 1981; Kropotkin 1981; Sabine 1964; Woodcock 1962). In communism, revolution is the means to radically change society into a classless society. Anarchism implies individualism, but it is an individualism which is collectively oriented. The classical anarchists believed that individual (and sometimes violent) actions, such as sabotage, strike, etc. could make the capitalist society collapse and that an egalitarian society could be created from the ruins of the capitalist society. Utopian socialism and cooperative socialism existed mainly in England and France during the nineteenth century. These socialists were convinced that the establishment of cooperative movements and firms (not-for-profit) could lead to a better society without capitalism and a strong, central state. A general theme in syndicalism is the belief that society can change in the direction mentioned above through massive participation in trade unions and their strategic general strikes.

6.5.4 Socialism and Keynesianism

Reformist socialism eventually became Social Democracy that rejected the revolutionary way of changing the capitalist society (Sabine 1964). Instead, it was seen as possible to seize the state through general elections and then use it for societal transformation. Before reformist socialists ever came into power position, they tended to see the education system as one of the ideological apparatuses of the state, an apparatus that defended the interests of the privileged class (Althusser 1972). When they had implemented universal primary and secondary education, this view changed, and nowadays education by them is seen as a way to a more egalitarian society (even if the sorting function of education systems is still recognized to be working) (Blackledge and Hunt 1985).

6.5.5 Communitarianism and Populism

Communitarianism is not a paradigm in the same sense as the others. Rather, it consists of various ideas and practical approaches that have a certain common denominator, different from the core of the other paradigms. Communitarians have a common denominator in what Thomas (1994) calls 'college' (the local or

voluntary organisations as the platform for decision-making and locus of intent); decisions are made at the local level and for the common good at that level. That is, a 'community' or an association should be the context for decision-making and ties of solidarity. The common is not necessarily the nation-state but a 'community'.

Communitarians argue that a strong civil society and social capital are necessary for the preservation of individual liberty and at the same time solidarity. Many communitarians do not question the state and capitalism as such. They see both as a necessary foundation for freedom and welfare per se, but reject their extreme forms, such as a high degree of state centralization and alliances between lobbying pressure groups and the state. Also, they argue that communitarianism is a third alternative – between capitalism and centralized political bureaucracy (Etzioni 1995; Wesolowski 1995). In this view both welfare bureaucracy and market forces undermine altruistic incentives and create anonymity and alienation (Green 1993; Hunter 1995). On the other hand, the state is seen as the only guarantor against the complete take over by the capitalist and market forces. Communitarians fear elitism and tend to see the Keynesian approach as suppression of difference, of individual rights and freedom. What is needed is solidarity and a feeling of belongingness (McCarthy et al. 1981).

A basic idea of early communitarianism was that the individual once belonged by birth to his/her community. Each community formed an organic whole. Such conditions of life have now, according to them, got lost and have been substituted by a direct "contract" between the individual and the state (McCarthy et al. 1981). Still today, in many places in low income countries, the community is more important than the individual. The communitarian-oriented ideology includes a traditional and a modern branch. The traditional branch is based on the idea that a geographical area and its population form an organic whole. Traditional communities are those in which people are born, or are related by religion, family or kinship. The adherents to traditional branch aim at restoring community or at least the spirit of community and see education as a holistic matter. Muslims, wherever in the world they live, tend to form communities of the traditional type, communities that are perceived to belong to *umma.*

There are thus two branches of communitarianism. One is the early conservative communitarianism, based on the local community traditions. The other branch is the late communitarianism that emerged in the 1960s. Waters distinguishes between two categories of communitarians: (a) the New Right, conservative, that is searching for an organic and integrated association between people who have many features in common; and (b) the New Left, the radical communitarians, according to which communities based on some common interests or common life styles are good for democratic participation. The New Right stress individual autonomy and the right to consume. The New Left are critical to the neo-liberal concept of freedom, as something neutral and independent of social and cultural context. They see the common good as resulting from shared activities and transmitted values but also as the context from which the individual derives his or her freedom and choice possibilities (Haldane 1996).

For some of the late communitarians, the goal is to restore the spirit of community (Etzioni 1995), while early communitarians go still further and argue for a restoration not only of the spirit but of the functions and forms of the old communities (McCarthy et al. 1981). Late communitarians do not see 'community' as something necessarily based on common residence or locality but as some type of 'sameness' (Offe 1996) or shared life style, be it ecological issues, feminist issues, gay life styles, etc. This branch seems to have been influenced by anarchism, utopian socialism and post-modernism. It is internationally oriented and defends individual autonomy and civil society (Held 1995).

Populism is understood by some researchers to be socialist, while others see it as conservatism (or even fascism). In this chapter, no attempt will be made to classify populism, but it is included here, because it is sometimes an ingredient of communitarianism, and during the past decades it has become widespread (Stockemer 2019b). Today, 'populism' is often used in everyday language to mean 'opportunistic', and folk'-oriented, etc. However, the term populism was originally used for the view that once upon a time, people lived in a 'natural' or 'innocent' state of affairs; there was no urbanization, no large scale capitalism or big state, and leaders were locally based and came into power position either by tradition or through elections at the local (village) level. Life was not very complicated, there were no national elites and people at the grassroots level knew what was best for them (Ionescu and Gellner 1969). Society is by populists seen as divided into folk and elite. Directors and owners of big companies, intellectuals and national politicians are seen the elite, that does not know and understand the desires and needs of the folk.

Mackert (2018) argues that one of the reasons for the appearance of populism is the global financial crisis in 2008, 'All these manifestations of right-wing populism share a common feature: they attack or even compromise the core elements of democratic societies, such as the separation of powers, protection of minorities and the rule of law' (Mackert (2018, p. 1). Crouch (2017, p. 13) summarizes populism with the following characteristics: (1) anti-establishment, (2) all the left (populist) parties are against austerity, which indicates against some aspects of neoliberalism, (3) many populist parties are anti-globalisation, (4) most right wing parties against EU, (5) all of the populist parties on the right are anti-immigration and anti-Islam. Populists 'see themselves as neglected … feel marginalised … marginalisation is potentially a loss of identity' (Crouch 2017, p. 14). Everyday life of people is impregnated by competition, '… individual egoism and utility maximisation…' and 'old social cleavages' have been reactivated and new ones have been triggered – 'citizens vs. migrants, old vs. young, urban vs. rural, wealthy vs. poor'. (Crouch 2017, p. 14).

According to Jakupec (2018), Trumps's politics and policies are a variety of populism. They are 'challenging the neoliberal ideology of the Washington Consensus institutions (e.g. World Bank, IMF, WTO)' (Jakupec (2018, p. v). What he terms 'Trumponomics' is 'based on isolationism, protectionism, antiglobalisation, anti-neoliberalism' (p. ix). '…today's populism … a mediate consequence of neo-liberalism's destruction of the social fabric, norms and values, and democratic

institutions of Western societies' (Jakupec (2018, p. 6). In general, populism is seen as a 'thin' ideology (Green and White 2019).

6.6 Meta-ideological Dimensions and Education

An educational paradigm is a whole package of the principal ideas concerning the ideal relationships between the political, economic, cultural spheres of society, on the one hand, and the role of education in society, on the other hand (Burrel and Morgan 1992; Watt 1994). Using ideal types, in the Weberian sense (see Gerth and Mills 1970), which directs attention towards cores of categories and emphasize differences between categories, the dominating paradigms and some of their principle themes and elements are described below. As ideal types, the paradigms correspond neither directly to any present-time political parties and various movements, nor to particular varieties of educational policies. Three paradigms, behind educational policies and surrounding educational issues, have been the most influential in many areas of the world during the past decades. These paradigms will be referred to as: the market-oriented paradigm, the etatist-welfarist-oriented paradigm, and the communitarian-oriented paradigm. However, etatism has lost a lot of its attraction since the 1980s and during the 2010s, populism has arised as a reaction to the changes in the world, especially globalization and neo-liberal changes (Colliot-Thélène 2018).

6.6.1   The Market-Oriented Paradigm

The whole philosophy and terminology of this paradigm derive from liberal micro-economics (as opposite to Keynesian policy which is macro-oriented). Consequently, for the basic assumptions of the market-oriented paradigm, reference may be made to the previous description of liberalism. Market proponents believe in individualism and individual rationality, features which have been specified by philosophers such as Hayek (1960). Individualism in this context means that the individual is a utility-maximizing individual, who acts rationally (purposively) through self-seeking behaviour of the market-place (Held 1995). For the individual to be able to do so, there should be as much freedom as possible and as little steering as possible from forces (called externalities) other than the market mechanisms (Miller 1989). Tradition, family, clan and nation are externalities that are anachronistic and irrelevant for rational action or an obstacle to development to a higher stage of efficiency and material standard of living (Crowley 1987). When individuals can maximize their own utility, this accumulates and favours the development of society at large. Deregulation of markets worldwide will make the world more conducive for individual utility-maximization and, thus, higher stages of societal development (Hayek 1960).

The basic assumptions mentioned above are used in the educational domain. To base education on market principles is an idea that comes from Friedman (1962) and Schultz (1961). More specifically, education is seen as a good or commodity, and when all consumers can choose, the quality of the goods and services improves. The market paradigm has been applied to education either literally or as a metaphor. In the first case, actions and arrangements in the educational field follow the market principles. The prototype is a private agent who calculates the revenues in relation to the costs of organizing education. The owner as actor does not have any other revenue from the educational supply than the fees paid by the parents (or per pupil subsidies from the central state or from the community authorities). Marginal profit from accepting each new pupil is estimated. Unlimited choice and school fees are two of the most important features in the first case. There is competition between suppliers. In the second case, the educational field is treated as if it were a market (quasi-market). Choice among public schools is one such example. 'Marketization' of the field of education can, in this view, be partial – the ownership and delivery are private but the owners or their customers receive public funds. The market paradigm has impregnated the educational and other discourses during the past three, four decades. These discourses have adopted terms such as entrepreneur, delivery, efficiency, consumer, client, etc. from the market paradigm.

6.6.2 The Etatist-Welfarist-Oriented Paradigm

The assumptions of this paradigm are often not as explicit as those of the market approach. However, the following assumptions may be derived or inferred from different sources (Cuzzort and King 1976; Dow 1993; Sabine 1964; Vincent 1994). The role of the state is to eliminate, or at least reduce inequalities or inefficiencies, resulting from the workings of the capitalist system. Capitalism itself should not be abolished, but regulated (Curtis 1981; Sabine 1964). The individual is seen as a self-actualizing agent. Due to societal inequalities and different phases in individuals' biography (childhood, for example), there are always individuals who are not able to satisfy some of their basic needs through own efforts. Satisfaction of their needs has to be guaranteed by the collectivity (the public sector) and efforts are made to optimize needs satisfaction (Doyal and Gough 1991).

Inasmuch as the etatist-welfarist orientation assumes that education and individual positions are conditioned by macro structures, measures to improve education have to deal not only with the formal education system, but also with societal structures. Due to an emphasis on the state as guarantor of individual and societal prosperity and development, a liberal world market is useful only to the extent that it can serve in the construction of human welfare; economic growth is not seen as a value in itself but as a means to achieve maximal or at least optimal well-being (Cornia et al. 1987; Doyal and Gough 1991).

Proponents of this paradigm suggest political means to achieve goals and political solutions to social problems. To the extent that issues are transferred to the

political platform for public decision-making, democracy is enhanced (Dow 1993). Educational reforms should be decided upon and accomplished through the state, and proponents of this paradigm have traditionally been reluctant to decentralized and private solutions (Lauglo 1995). Coordination at the central level is necessary so as to guarantee equality or equivalent provision of services. On the other hand, decentralization of the state apparatus will give schools enough autonomy to improve education and choice among schools within the public sector will make schools more accountable and stimulate them to improve.

School education is a human right that must be guaranteed by the state. Through schooling, economic and other equalities in the larger society can be achieved. In turn, society benefits from a schooled population. Thus the state has an interest in organizing or, at the very least, supporting formal education. Agents other than the state would not concern themselves with issues such as democratic training, democratic participation and equality (Carnoy 1992).

6.6.3   The Communitarian Paradigm and the Populist Perspectives

In regard to education, schools should be locally owned and run, either by local communities, NGOs or other associations. Communitarians argue that many children grow up without a network in which they can be properly socialized and supported. Schools are expected to repair this 'under education' but are today too narrow in their task and too test oriented. They should teach morals, solidarity and responsibility and produce social capital. Democracy should be learnt by experiences of cooperation, moral training, and so on, in school life (Etzioni 1995). As mentioned earlier, populism can to some extent be seen as a sub-category of traditional communitarianism. In the populist view, education should be principally locally based and owned and it should be for local purposes (Lauglo 1995).

6.7   Meta-Ideological Dimensions

From studies on values and morals (e.g. Inglehardt 1990, 1997; Norris and Inglehardt 2004: World Values Surveys 2015) we may derive or distil certain ideological features, which here are considered as dimensions of paradigms. Certain features of paradigms are highly relevant in an educational context. If we take these features to be dimensions with opposite poles, the paradigms can then be located along these dimensions. The choice of dimensions and the number of positions along them may vary in relation to the purpose of studying them. Provisionally and for heuristic purpose, the dimensions have here been scaled into seven positions. The dimensions selected here are:

(i) Materialism/consumption vs. post-materialism;
(ii) centralism vs. decentralism;

  (iii) big state vs. small state;
  (iv) purposive rationality vs. value rationality;
   (v) representative democracy vs. direct democracy;
  (vi) secularism vs. sacredness;
 (vii) self-orientation vs. other-orientation;
(viii) individualism vs. collectivism;
  (ix) autonomy vs. equality; and
   (x) universalism vs. particularism.

In principle, the paradigms and ideologies can be placed along the dimensions as in Table 6.1.

Materialism/consumption vs. post-materialism: This dimension is used by Inglehardt (1990, 1997; Norris and Inglehardt 2004; World values survey 2015) in their analysis of the values in a number of countries. Materialism and consumption means that acquisition of goods and services takes place principally for its own sake. Post-materialism means that priority is given to non-material ideals (morals, ecology, humanitarianism, and so on).

Centralism vs. decentralism: This is an 'old' dimension that has been debated ever since the emergence of classical ideologies, but has been revived since the 1980s. It concerns the level of decision-making and implementation.

Big state vs. small state: This is also an old dimension. It deals with the legitimacy and desirability of state intervention in society. Logically and semantically, this

Table 6.1 Principal paradigm and ideology dimensions

Materialism, consumerism, materialist values	M		E		C1	P, C2		Humanistic, post-materialist values
Centralism			E	C1		P	M, C2	Decentralism
Big state	E				C2	P, C1	M	Small state
Representative democracy	E		M[a]			P	C1, C2	Direct democracy
Secularism	M, E				C2	P	C1	De-secularism
Self-orientation	M	C2			E	P	C1	Other-orientation
Individualism	M			C2	C1	P, E		Collectivism
Autonomy, freedom	M[c], C2[b]	P, C1[b]				E		Equality
Universalism	M	E		C2		C1	P	Particularism
Purposive rationality	M, E					P, C2	C1	Moral rationality

M Market orientation, *E* Etatist orientation representative, *C1* Early Communitarianism, *C2*: Late Communitarianism; *P* Populism
[a]Apart from democracy (elite competition for running of the state), choice is democracy
[b]Not individual but local autonomy in relation to the central state
[c]Individual autonomy

dimension does not have to accompany the centralism-decentralism dimension. That the state is centralist does not necessarily imply that it is big.

Representative democracy vs. direct democracy: This is also an old issue but is has been actualized with the new movements' demands for direct democracy. It is visible i.a. in the type of boards or councils that are implemented when decentralization (school-based management) takes place.

Secularism vs. de-secularism: This dimension should not be perceived to apply to the religious aspect only. Apter (1965) and Gellner (1994), for instance, see strong de-secularist elements in utopian ideologies as the opposite of secularism, especially in connection with revolutionary changes in a society.

Purposive vs. value rationality: Purposive rationality means that means and goals are estimated to correspond to one another in an optimal way. Revolutionary ideologies, for example, tend to be value rationalist during their early phases.

Individualism vs. collectivism: Refers to the arrangements for attaining goals – whether the goals should be predominantly individual or collective and whether the goals should be attained through individual or joint efforts (Thomas 1994).

Self-orientation vs. other-orientation: Refers to the goals themselves (ego vs alter) – whether self or other is the object for goal achievement (ibid).

Autonomy/freedom vs equality: The attainment of the former tends to imply increasing inequality and vice versa. When resources are or are seen as limited, this dimension is articulated.

Universalism vs particularism: Universalists assume that social, political and educational phenomena are transferable to any cultural context in the world, regardless of time and place, while the opposite applies to particularists, who argue that cultures, values, etc. are local and specific.

Three of the most globalized paradigms, namely the market paradigm, the etatist paradigm and the communitarian paradigm are placed along these dimensions in Table 6.1. Populism is not a paradigm, but has been included here, because of it spread during the past decade. The placements of the paradigms in positions along the defined dimensions should be seen as approximations based mainly on the sources mentioned (see, for instance, Inglehardt 1990, 1997). Movements are not shown in the Table, but it may be mentioned that several Social Democratic and Socialist parties around the world have moved on the dimension of centralism-decentralism (in the direction from an 'etatist' to a 'communitarian' position or even to a market position. Market proponents researchers and late communitarians share position on decentralism, while early communitarianism is closed to etatism on self-orientation and autonomy. We also find that communitarians are opposite to the other paradigms on representative vs. direct democracy.

Approximations of positions of paradigms along certain, relevant dimensions can also be made specifically for the domain of education, and we once again use ideal types in the Weberian sense (Table 6.2).

Since the 1980s, certain developments in the educational policy community have laid the groundwork for the spread and main streaming of the Market paradigm to many areas of the globe. Ideological elements such as 'the agent', 'the micro' and 'the rational individual' took a leading position in the educational policy

Table 6.2 Principal paradigm and ideology dimensions in the educational domain

Education as skills formation	M		E	C2		P, C1			Education as broader personality formation
Education principally as an instrument for achieving higher productivity and citizenship competence	M		E	C2		P	C1		Education as a value in itself
Limitless choice	M		C2		E	C1	P		No choice
Education run as a market	M		C2			P, C1	E		Education as a public matter
Centralized governance		E		C2		P, C1	M		Decentralized governance
Competition among schools and among students	M		C2		E	P, C1			Cooperation among schools and among students
National curriculum	E	M			C1	P		C2	Local curriculum
Education as individual good	M		C2		P	E	C1		Education as common good
Secularism	M	E	C2			P	C1		De-secularism
Diversified		P, M	C2		C1		E		Unitarian

communities (Ball 1990; Craib 1992; Morrow and Torres 2000; Popkewitz 2000). These are typical features of the market-oriented paradigm. However, another discourse stemming from the communitarian paradigm emerged with a focus on cultural issues and human rights. The elements of these two dominant paradigms are now articulated in the form of globe-wide policies, their common denominators (See Fig. 6.1) are attaining global spread.

Much of the adaptations to the meta-ideology takes place through borrowing (Steiner-Khamsi 2004), various types of pressure from the international organizations, such as donors and lenders (Dale 2000; Mundy 2007) and/or through states' own efforts to be modern, up to-date and reliable (Meyer et al. 1997). Populism, whatever we think about it, has now come to challenge the meta-ideology, especially the neoliberal aspect of it.

6.8 Evaluation

Governments perceive themselves compelled to or have the ambition to be globally competitive and dominant, and the meta-ideology is seen as the answer to the requirements of competitiveness and modernity. This is one of the principal reasons for the ideology and paradigm shifts (Burbules and Torres 2000; Camps 1997; McGinn 1997; Meyer et al. 1997; Steiner-Khamsi 2004). On the other hand, at various levels and in different places, the meta-ideology and Western globalisation has

Market-oriented	Meta-ideology (Globally hegemonic common denominator)	Communitarian-oriented
	Generally	
Civil society as society minus state; profit or utility maximization; effectiveness; efficiency; competition; human capital.	Individualism; freedom of choice; technical (purposive) rationality; participation; individual autonomy. Private actors, entrepreneurs	Civil society as society minus state and market) Human Rights; NGOs; solidarity; values; multi-culturalism; local community
The common denominator educationally		
Individualism; freedom of choice; purposive (technical) rationality; decentralization; per pupil funding of schools; accountability; participation; individual autonomy; state withdrawal; privatization; education as an individual issue. Education as The Motor of development. Lifelong learning.		

Fig. 6.1 Basic features of the market-oriented and communitarian-oriented paradigms and their common denominator

met resistance and opposition, if not from governments, than from segments of the populations and certain politicians, among them populists.

To use dimensions for analytical purpose can be fruitful in different ways: (a) we can place the policies of one and the same political party or government on the scales at different moments in time and establish if and what shifts have taken place and investigate why; and (b) we can discover what positions different political parties in a country have at certain phases in time. The dimensions make evident what positions different ideologies or political parties have at different moments in time, but also how they compare at a specific moment in time. When there are shared or close positions, there is space for 'alliances' and a middle position makes it possible to negotiate with both 'sides', such as the one between the market paradigm and the communitarian paradigm in individualism. However, in many cases unanticipated moves towards or adaptations to the meta-ideology have taken place.

Islam is being globalized; all countries with a Muslim presence have Quranic education organized by and in the civil sphere of society. Most rural areas in the Middle East, parts of Asia and in Central and West Africa and Africa's Horn have at least one Quranic school and/or some madrassas, organized by civil forces. The spread of Western education has resulted in different educational outcomes and responses from the Islamic educational institutions: renovation, revivalism, ritualism. Efforts at integration between the Western and Islamic types of education have been and are being made in many places in the world. One principal way is when previously established religious (Islamic) schools place secular or 'neutral' subjects in the framework of an otherwise Islamic education, and another one is when state schools in Muslim countries include Islamic subjects in an otherwise secular curriculum. In general, globalization is likely to affect changes in Muslim and non-Muslim societies, while globalization of specific educational policies, tend to neglect or under-emphasize moral and values education.

6.9   Conclusion

This chapter has analysed dominant paradigms and ideologies and their positions along selected dimensions. The globalised meta-ideology was assumed to affect changes in education and society, but other reasons for or causes of the socio-economic changes might be an object of future, and in-depth, research. In the past years populism has come to challenge the prevailing hegemony. Despite frequent incompatibilities with local economic structures and cultural patterns, the meta-ideology or paradigmatic features described above are taken for granted by politicians and policymakers around the world. The educational policy and reforms features that have been globalized are ostensibly biased towards academic achievement, global competitiveness, and purposive rationality.

References

Ahmed, A. S. (1992). *Postmodernism and Islam. Predicament and promise*. London: Routledge.

Althusser, L. (1972). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. In R. Cosin (Ed.), *Education: Structure and society*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Andeweg, R. B. (1996). Élite-mass linkages in Europe: Legitimacy crisis or party crisis? *Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs, 22*, 143–164.

An-Náim, A. A. (1999). Political Islam in National Politics and international relations. In P. L. Berger (Ed.), *The desecularization of the World. Resurgent religion and world politics*. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman Publishing.

Apter, D. (1965). *The politics of modernization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ayubi, N. N. (1991). *Politics and Islam. Politics and religion in the Arab world*. London: Routledge.

Bakker, A., & Bal, P. M. (2010). Weekly work engagement and performance: A study among starting teachers. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 83*, 189–206.

Bakunin, M. (1981). God and the state. In M. Curtis (Ed.), *The great political theories* (Vol. 2). New York: Avon Books.

Ball, S. (1990). *Politics and policy making in education. Explorations in policy sociology*. London: Routledge.

Barber, B. R. (1996). An American civic forum: Civil society between market individuals and the political community. In R. F. Paul & F. D. Miller Jr. (Eds.), *The communitarian challenge to liberalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Beeley, B. (1992). Islam as a global political force. In A. G. McGrew & P. G. Lewis (Eds.), *Global politics*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Benhabib, S. (1998). Democracy and identity. In search of the civic polity. *Philosophy & Social Criticism, 23*, 85–100.

Berger, P. L. (Ed.). (1999). *The Desecularization of the world. Resurgent religion and world politics*. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman Publishing.

Blackledge, D. A., & Hunt, B. (1985). *Sociological interpretations of education*. London/Dover: Helm.

Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (Eds.). (1997). *Constructing world culture. International nongovernmental organizations since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bretherton, C. (1996a). Introduction: Global politics in the 1990s. In C. Bretherton & C. Ponton (Eds.), *Global politics. An introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Bretherton, C. (1996b). Universal human rights: Bringing people into global politics? In C. Bretherton & G. Ponton (Eds.), *Global politics. An introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Brown, T. (1999). Challenging globalization as discourse and phenomenon. *International Journal of Lifelong Education, 18*(1), 3–17.

Brown, P., Halsey, A. H., Lauder, H., & Stuart Wells, A. (1997). Politics, markets and school effectiveness. In A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown, & A. Stuart Wells (Eds.), *Education. Culture, economy, society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burbules & Torres. (2000). Globalization and education: An introduction. In N. C. Burbules & C. A. Torres (Eds.), *Globalization and education. Critical perspectives* (pp. 2–26). London: Routledge.

Burrel, G., & Morgan, G. (1992). *Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis*. Hants: Angle.

Camps, V. (1997). *Education for democracy* (pp. 493–499). XXVII: Prospects.

Cardoso, F. H. (1993). North-South relations in the present context: A new dependency? In M. Carnoy, M. Castells, S. S. Cohen, & F. H. Cardoso (Eds.), *The new global economy in the information age*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University.

Carney, S., Rappleye, J., & Silova, I. (2012). Between faith and science: World culture theory and comparative education. *Comparative Education Review, 56*(3), 366–420.

Carnoy, M. (1992). Education and the state: From Adam Smith to Perestroika. In R. Arnove, P. Altbach, & G. Kelly (Eds.), *Emergent issues in education, comparative perspective*. New York: State University of New York.

Castells, M. (1993). The informational economy and the new international division of labor. In M. Carnoy, M. Castells, S. S. Cohen, & F. H. Cardoso (Eds.), *The new global economy in information age*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University.

Chabbot, C., & Ramirez, F. C. (2001). Development and education. In M. T. Hallinan (Ed.), *Handbook of sociology in education*. New York: Plenum.

Clayton, T. (2004). Competing conceptions of globalization revisited: Relocating the tension between world-systems analysis and globalization analysis. *Comparative Education Review, 48*(3), 274–294.

Colclough, C. (1990). Structuralism versus neo-liberalism: An introduction. In C. Colclough & J. Manor (Eds.), *States or markets? Neo-liberalism and the development policy debate*. Oxford: Clanderon Press.

Colliot-Thélène, C. (2018). Populism as a conceptual problem. In G. Fitzi, J. Mackert, & B. S. Turner (Eds.), *Populism and the crisis of democracy, Vol 1: Concepts and theory*. London/ New York: Routledge.

Cornia, G. A., Jollby, R., & Stewart, F. (1987). *Adjustment with a human face*. Oxford: Clanderon Press.

Cox, R. W. (2000). Political economy and world order: Problems of power and knowledge at the turn of the millennium. In R. Stubbs & G. R. D. Underhill (Eds.), *Political economy and the changing global order* (2nd ed., pp. 25–37). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Craib, I. (1992). *Modern social theory* (2nd ed.). London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf.

Crouch, G. (2017). *Can neoliberalism be saved from itself?* London: Social Europe Ltd.

Crowley, B. L. (1987). *The self, the individual and the community. Liberalism in the political through of F.A. Hayek and Sidney and Beatrice Webb*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Curtis, M. (Ed.). (1981). *The great political theories. Vol 2*. New York: Avon Books.

Cuzzort, R. P., & King, E. W. (1976). *Twentieth-century social thought*. New Jersey: Little Falls.

Dale, R. (1999). Specifying globalization effects on national policy: A focus on the mechanisms. *Journal of Education Policy, 14*(1), 1–17.

Dale, R. (2000). Globalization and education: Demonstrating a "common world educational culture" or locating a "globally structured educational agenda"? *Educational Theory, 40*(4), 427–428.

Daun, H. (2002). Globalization and national education systems. In H. Daun (Ed.), *Educational restructuring in the context of globalization and national policy* (pp. 1–32). New York: RoutledgeFalmer.

Daun, H. (2006). Globalization and the governance of national education systems. In H. Daun (Ed.), *School decentralization in the context of globalizing governance. International comparison of grassroots responses*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Daun, H. (ed. with G. Strömqvist) (2011). *Education and development in the context of globalization.* New York: Nova Science Publisher.

Daun, H., & Arjmand, R. (2018). Islam, globalizations and education. In H. Daun & R. Arjmand (Eds.), *Handbook of Islamic education*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Dow, G. (1993). What do we know about social democracy. *Economic and Industrial Democracy, 14*(1), 11–48.

Doyal, L., & Gough, I. (1991). *A theory of human need*. London: The MacMillam Press.

Elwell, F. W. (2006). *Macrosociology: Four modern theorists*. Paradigm Publishers. Retrieved from http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Elwell/MajorWorks.html

Esteva, G., & Prakash, M. S. (1998). *Grassroots postmodernism. Rewaking the soil of cultures*. London: Zed Books.

Etzioni, A. (1995). *The spirit of community. Rights, responsibilities and the communitarian agenda*. London: Fontana.

Farrell, J. P. (1992). Conceptualizing education in the drive for social equality. In R. F. Arnove, P. G. Altbach, & G. P. Kelly (Eds.), *Emergent issues in education. Comparative perspectives*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Foreign Policy. (2007). *The seventh annual A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index*.

Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Garsten, C., & Jacobsson, K. (2007). Corporate globalisation, civil society and post-political regulation – Whither democracy? *Development Dialogue, 49*, 143–157.

Gellner, E. (1994). *Conditions of liberty. Civil society and its rivals*. London: Harnish Hamilton.

Gerth, H. H., & Mills, C. W. (Eds.). (1970). *From max weber. Essays in sociology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

Giddens, A. (1994). Brave new world: The new context of politics. In D. Miliband (Ed.), *Reinventing the left* (pp. 21–38). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (2002). *Runaway world. How globalization is reshaping our lives*. London: Profile Books.

Goontilake, S. (1994). The futures of Asian cultures: Between localization and globalization. In *UNESCO: The futures of cultures*. Paris: UNESCO.

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from prison notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.

Green, D. G. (1993). *Reinventing civil society. The rediscovery of welfare without politics*. London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit.

Green, M., & White, J. K. (2019). Populism in the United States. In D. Stockemer (Ed.), *Populism around the world. A comparative perspective*. Cham: Springer.

Griffin, K. (2003). Economic globalisation and institutions of global governance. *Development and Change, 34*(5), 789–807.

Griffith-Jones, S., & Ocampo, J. A. (1999). *The poorest countries and the emerging international financial architecture. Report 1999: 4 from the EGDI group*. Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Haldane, J. (1996). The individual, the state and the common good. In R. F. Paul & F. D. Miller Jr. (Eds.), *The communitarian challenge to liberalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hannum, E., & Buchmann, C. (2003). *The consequences of global educational expansion*. Cambridge, MA: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Hayek, F. (1960). *The road to serfdom*. London: Routledge Classics.

Haynes, J. (1999). Introduction. In J. Haynes (Ed.), *Religion, globalization and political culture in the third world*. London: Macmillam Press.

Held, D. (1995). *Political theory and the modern state*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hoerner, J.-M. (1995). *Le tiers-monde. Entre la survie et Í informel* (The Third World. Between survival and the informal). Paris: Harmattan.

Hunter, A. (1995). Rethinking revolution in the light of the new social movements. In M. Darnovsky, B. Epstein, & R. Flacks (Eds.), *Cultural politics and social movements*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Inglehardt, R. (1990). *Culture shifts in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehardt, R. (1997). *Culture shift in advanced industrial societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ionescu, G., & Gellner, E. (1969). *Populism. Its meanings and national characteristics*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Jakupec, V. (2018). *Development aid – Populism and the end of the neoliberal agenda*. Cham: Springer.

Karabel, J., & Halsey, A. H. (Eds.). (1977). *Power and ideology in education*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kropotkin, P. P. (1981). Anarchist communism. In M. Curtis (Ed.), *The great political theories* (Vol. 2). New York: Avon Books.

Kurzman, C. (2002). The globalization of rights in Islamic discourse. In A. Mohammadi (Ed.), *Islam encountering globalization*. London: Routledge Curzon. Retrieved from http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/cv/Kurzman_Globalization_of_Rights.pdf.

Lauglo, J. (1995). Forms of decentralization and their implications for education. *Comparative Education, 31*(1), 5–29.

Lipumba, I. H. (2003). *Globalization and economic development: Can sub-Sahara Africa avoid marginalization?* Paper presented at the conference on "rich and poor: Current development research and its condition in Sweden", January, 2003, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.

M'Bokolo, E. (1994). African cultures and the crisis of contemporary Africa. In *UNESCO: The futures of cultures*. Paris: UNESCO.

Mackert, J. (2018). Introduction. Is there such as thing as populism? In G. Fitxi, J. Mackert, & B. S. Turner (Eds.), *Populism and the crisis of democracy, Vol 1: Concepts and theory*. London/New York: Routledge.

Mandaville, P. (2016). Globalisation and Muslim societies. In K. Fleet, G. Krämer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, & E. Rowson (Eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Brill Online, 2016. Lund University. 16 February 2016 http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/globalisation-and-muslim-societies-COM_27486

Martin, D. (1999). The evangelical upsurge and its political implication. In P. L. Berger (Ed.), *The Desecularization of the world. Resurgent religion and world politics*. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman Publishing Co.

McCarthy, R., Oppewal, D. P., & W & Spykman, G. (1981). *Society, state & schools. A case for structural and confessional pluralism*. Grand Rapids: William B. Edwards Publishing Co..

McGinn, N. (1997). The impact of globalization on national education systems. *Prospects, 27*(1), 41–54.

Messner, D. (1997). *The network society: Economic development and international competitiveness as problems of social governance*. New York: Routledge.

Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M., & Ramirez, F. O. (1997). World society and nation-state. *American Journal of Sociology, 103*, 144–181.

Miller, D. (1989). *Market, state and community*. Oxford: Clanderon Press.

Mittelman, J. H. (1996). The dynamics of globalization. In J. H. Mittelman (Ed.), *Globalization: Critical reflections* (pp. 1–14). London: Bouldner.

Morrow, R. A., & Torres, C. (2000). The state, globalization, and educational policy. In R. A. Morrow & C. Torres (Eds.), *Globalization and education: Critical perspectives* (pp. 27–56). New York: Routledge.

Mundy, K. (2007). Educational multilateralism and the world (dis) order. *Comparative Education, 42*(4), 448–478.

Nasr, S. H. (1975). *Islam, perspectives et réalités*. Paris: Éditions Bachet/Chassel.

Nederven Pieterse, J. N. (1995). Globalization as hybridization. In M. Featherstone, S. Lash, & R. Robertson (Eds.), *Global modernities*. London: Sage Publications.

Norris, P., & Inglehardt, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Offe, C. (1996). *Modernity and the state. East, west*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Popkewitz, T. S. (2000). Reform as the social administration of the child. Globalization of knowledge and power. In N. C. Burbules & C. Torres (Eds.), *Globalization and education. Critical perspectives*. London: Routledge.

Reich, R. B. (1997). Why the rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer. In A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown, & A. Stuart Wells (Eds.), *Education. Culture, economy, society* (pp. 208–224). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Robertson, R. (1992). *Globalization, social theory and global culture*. London: Sage Publications.

Robertson, R. (1995). Globalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity. In M. Featherstone, S. Lash, & R. Robertson (Eds.), *Global modernities*. London: Sage Publications.

Saadallah, S. (2018). Changes in Muslim orientation and views on education. In H. Daun & R. Arjmand (Eds.), *Handbook of Islamic education*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Sabine, G. H. (1964). *A history of political theory* (3rd ed.). London: Georg G. Harrap & Co.

Scholte, J. A. (2008). Global civil society – Opportunity or obstacle for democracy. *Development Dialogue, 49*, 15–27.

Schultz. (1961). Investment in human capital. *American Review of Education, 51*(1), 1–17.

Sears, A., & Moorers, C. (1995). The politics of hegemony: Democracy, class and social movements. In M. Zavarzadh, R. L. Ebert, & D. Morton (Eds.), *Post-Ality: Marxism and postmodernism* (pp. 216–242). Washington: Maisonneuve Press.

Sörensen, R. (1987). Bureaucratic decision-making and the growth of public expenditure. In J.-E. Lane (Ed.), *Bureaucracy and public choice*. London: Sage Publications.

Spring, J. (2009). *Globalization of education*. New York: Routledge.

Stavenhagen, R. (1994). Cultural struggles and development in Latin America. In *UNESCO: The futures of cultures*. Paris: UNESCO.

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (Ed.). (2004). *The global politics of educational borrowing and lending*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Stockemer, D. (2019a). Introduction. In D. Stockemer (Ed.), *Popuplism around the world. A comparative perspective*. Cham: Springer.

Stockemer, D. (2019b). Conclusion. In D. Stockemer (Ed.), *Popuplism around the world. A comparative perspective*. Cham: Springer.

The Levin Institute. (2008). Globalization vs. Westernization. The Levin Institute, The State University of New York. What the Muslim world thinks about globalization. http://www.globalization101.org/news1/Muslim_World_Globalization

Thomas, H. (1994). Markets, collectivities and management. *Oxford Review of Education, 20*, 21–56.

Touraine, A. (1971). The post-industrial society. In *Tomorrow's social history: Classes, conflicts and culture in the programmed society*. New York: Random House.

Turner, B. S. (1991). Politics and culture in Islamic globalism. In R. Robertson & W. R. Garret (Eds.), *Religion and global order*. New York: Paragon House Publishers.

Vincent, A. (1994). *Theories of the state*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wallerstein, I. (1991). Culture as the ideological battleground of the modern world system. In M. Featherstone (Ed.), *Global culture. Nationalism, globalization and modernity*. London: Sage Publications.

Wallerstein, I. (2006). *Modern history sourcebook: Summary of Wallerstein on world system theory*. Retrieved from https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/wallerstein.asp

Waters, M. (2001). *Globalization*. London: Routledge.

Watt, J. (1994). Political philosophy of education. In N. Postlethwaite & T. Husén (Eds.), *International encyclopaedia of education* (pp. 4571–4575). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Wesolowski, W. (1995). The nature of social ties and the future of post-communist society: Poland after solidarity. In J. A. Hall (Ed.), *Civil society. Theory, history and comparison*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Woodcock, G. (1962). *Anarchism*. Chicago: The World Publishing Company.

World Values Survey. (2015). https://www.google.se/search?source=hp&ei=R6w4XcXhHoOtrgS voLnQAg&q=world+values+survey&oq=World+values+su&gs_l=psy-ab.1.0.0l10.207.1826. .4213…0.0..0.620.2945.1j3j1j0j1j3......0....1..gws-wiz.......0i10.3cefioJIFAc

Zajda, J. (Ed.). (2015). *Second international handbook of globalisation, education and policy research*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J. (Ed.). (2020a). *Globalisation, ideology and neo-liberal higher education reform*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J. (Ed.). (2020b). *Human rights education globally*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J. (Ed.). (2020c). *Globalisation, ideology and education reforms: Emerging paradigms*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Zajda, J., & Majhanovich, S. (Eds.). (2020). *Globalisation, cultural identity and nation-building: The changing paradigms*. Dordrecht: Springer.