



# Batch Verification and Proofs of Proximity with Polylog Overhead

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*In Memoriam: Uriel G. Rothblum*

**Abstract.** Suppose Alice wants to convince Bob of the correctness of  $k$  NP statements. Alice could send  $k$  witnesses to Bob, but as  $k$  grows the communication becomes prohibitive. Is it possible to convince Bob using smaller communication (without making cryptographic assumptions or bounding the computational power of a malicious Alice)? This is the question of *batch verification* for NP statements. Our main result is a new interactive proof protocol for verifying the correctness of  $k$  UP statements (NP statements with a unique witness) using communication that is *poly-logarithmic* in  $k$  (and a fixed polynomial in the length of a single witness).

This result is obtained by making progress on a different question in the study of interactive proofs. Suppose Alice wants to convince Bob that a huge dataset has some property. Can this be done if Bob can't even read the entire input? In other words, what properties can be verified in *sublinear* time? An Interactive Proof of Proximity guarantees that Bob accepts if the input has the property, and rejects if the input is far (say in Hamming distance) from having the property. Two central complexity measures of such a protocol are the query and communication complexities (which should both be sublinear). For every query parameter  $q$ , and for every language in logspace uniform NC, we construct an interactive proof of proximity with query complexity  $q$  and communication complexity  $(n/q) \cdot \text{polylog}(n)$ .

Both results are optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors, under reasonable complexity-theoretic or cryptographic assumptions. The second result, which is our main technical contribution, builds on a distance amplification technique introduced in a beautiful recent work of Ben-Sasson, Kopparty and Saraf [CCC 2018].

## 1 Introduction

The power of efficiently verifiable proof-systems is a central question in the study of computation. It has been the focus of a rich literature spanning cryptography and complexity theory. This literature has put forth and studied different notions of proof systems and different notions of efficient verification.

Interactive proofs, introduced in the seminal work of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89], are one of the most fundamental notions in this field. An interactive proof is an interactive protocol between a randomized verifier and an untrusted prover. The prover convinces the verifier of the validity of a computational statement, usually framed as membership of an input  $x$  in a language  $\mathcal{L}$ . Soundness is unconditional. Namely, if the input is not in the language, then no matter what (unbounded and adaptive) strategy a cheating prover might employ, the verifier should reject with high probability over its own coin tosses. Interactive proofs have had a dramatic impact on complexity theory and on cryptography. Opening the door to randomized and interactive verification led to revolutionary notions of proof verification, such as zero knowledge interactive proofs [GMR89, GMW91] and probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) [BGKW88, FRS94, BFL91, BFLS91, FGL+96, AS92, ALM+98]. Interactive proof-systems also allow for more efficient verification of larger classes of computations (compared with NP proof systems), as demonstrated in the celebrated  $IP = PSPACE$  Theorem [LFKN92, Sha92].

Still, foundational questions about the power of interactive proof systems have remained open. Our work studies two such questions:

### 1.1 Batch Verification

Can interactive proofs allow for more efficient *batch verification* of a collection of NP statements?

#### Question 1:

*How efficiently can an untrusted prover convince a verifier of the correctness of  $k$  NP statements?*

A naive solution is sending the  $k$  witnesses in their entirety. An honest prover, who knows the witnesses, runs in polynomial time, but the communication grows linearly with  $k$ . For the case of UP statements—NP statements with a unique witness—we show a protocol where the communication complexity grows polylogarithmically with  $k$  (and the honest prover remains efficient):

**Theorem 1 (Informally Stated, see Theorems 4.2 and 4.1).** *Let  $\mathcal{L} \in \text{UP}$  with witnesses of length  $m = m(n)$ . There exists an interactive proof for verifying that  $k$  instances  $x_1, \dots, x_k$ , each of length  $n$ , all belong to  $\mathcal{L}$ . The communication complexity is  $\text{poly}(\log(k), m)$ , where  $\text{poly}$  refers to a fixed polynomial that depends only on the language  $\mathcal{L}$ . The number of rounds is  $\text{polylog}(k)$ . The verifier runs in time  $\tilde{O}(k \cdot n) + \text{polylog}(k) \cdot \text{poly}(m)$ , where  $n$  is the length of each of the instances. The honest prover runs in time  $\text{poly}(k, n, m)$  given the  $k$  unique witnesses.*

This resolves the communication complexity of batch verification for UP up to  $\text{poly}(\log(k), m)$  factors: under complexity-theoretic assumptions, even for  $k = 1$  there are UP languages (e.g. unique SAT) for which every interactive proof system requires communication complexity  $\Omega(m)$  [GH98, GVW02]. When the number of instances  $k$  is large, this can be a significant improvement over the naive solution in which the prover sends over all  $k$  witnesses.

We note that for UP relations that are checkable in log-space uniform NC, we can reduce the communication complexity to  $m \cdot \text{polylog}(k, m)$ . As discussed above, this is tight up to  $\text{polylog}(k)$  factors (under complexity assumptions). We also note that, assuming the existence of one-way functions, our batch verification protocol (which is public coin) can be made zero-knowledge using standard techniques [BGG+88].

*Comparison to Prior Work.* A different solution can be obtained via the  $\text{IP} = \text{PSPACE}$  theorem, by observing that the membership of  $k$  inputs in an NP language can be decided in space  $O(\log k + m \cdot \text{poly}(n))$ , where  $n$  is the length of a single input and  $m$  is the length of a single NP witness. Thus, by the  $\text{IP} = \text{PSPACE}$  Theorem, there is an interactive proof for batch verification with communication complexity  $\text{poly}(\log k, n, m)$ . A major caveat, however, is that the complexity of proving correctness (the running time of the *honest prover*) is *exponential in*  $\text{poly}(n, m)$ . We, on the other hand, focus on batch verification where the honest prover runs in *polynomial time* given the  $k$  NP witnesses. We refer to such an interactive proof as having an *efficient prover*.<sup>1</sup> Another significant drawback of this solution is that the number of rounds becomes  $\text{poly}(m, \log k)$ .

Two recent works have constructed protocols for efficient batch verification of UP statements. Reingold, Rothblum and Rothblum [RRR16] gave a protocol with communication complexity  $\text{polylog}(k) \cdot \text{poly}(m) + k \cdot \text{polylog}(m)$ . In a subsequent work [RRR18] they eliminated the additive  $k$  factor but increased the multiplicative factor, by showing a (constant-round) protocol with communication complexity  $k^\varepsilon \cdot \text{poly}(m)$ , for any  $\varepsilon > 0$ . Our main result achieves the best of both worlds: eliminating the additive linear factor while preserving the polylogarithmic multiplicative factor (although our protocol has a larger number of rounds than that of [RRR18]).

## 1.2 Interactive Proofs of Proximity

A different question (which turns out to be related) asks which statements can be verified in *sublinear* time, i.e. without even reading the entire input. This immediately raises the question of what computational model is used to capture “sublinear time”. Drawing inspiration from the literature on sublinear *algorithms*, a natural choice is to adopt the perspective of property testing, a study initiated by Rubinfeld and Sudan [RS96] and Goldreich, Goldwasser and Ron [GGR98], which considers highly-efficient randomized algorithms that solve approximate decision problems, while only inspecting a small fraction of the input. Such algorithms, commonly referred to as property testers for a set  $S$  (say the set of objects with some property), are given query access to an input, and are required to determine whether the input is in  $S$  (has the property), or is far (say, in Hamming distance) from every string in  $S$  (far from having the property). A rich literature has put forward property testers for many natural properties.

<sup>1</sup> Efficiency of the honest prover (given an NP witness) has been central in the study of zero-knowledge interactive proofs [GMR89, GMW91]. It has also been central to the study of efficient batch verification in recent works [RRR16, RRR18].

Analogously, in the proof verification setting, Interactive Proofs of Proximity (IPPs) aim to verify that a given input is close to a set (or a property). Given a desired proximity parameter  $\delta \in (0, 1]$ , the soundness condition of standard interactive proofs is relaxed: it should be impossible to convince the verifier to accept statements that are  $\delta$ -far (in fractional Hamming distance) from true statements (except with small probability). Such proof-systems were first introduced by Ergün, Kumar and Rubinfeld [EKR04] and were more recently further studied by Rothblum, Vadhan and Wigderson [RVW13] and by Gur and Rothblum [GR13]. The verifier’s query complexity and running time, as well as the communication, should all be sublinear in the input length. Other parameters of interest include the (honest) prover’s running time and the number of rounds.

The hope is that IPPs can overcome inherent limitations of property testing: for example, demonstrating specific properties where verifying proximity can be significantly faster than the time needed to test (without a prover). Another goal is showing that sublinear-time verification is possible for much richer families of properties than those for which property testers exist. In particular, research on property testing has focused on constructing testers for languages based on their combinatorial or algebraic structure. This limitation seems inherent, because there exist simple and natural languages for which (provably) no sublinear time property testers exist. In contrast, it is known that highly non-trivial IPPs exist for every language that can be decided in bounded-polynomial depth or space [RVW13, RRR16]. However, the optimal tradeoffs between the query and communication complexities needed for proof verification were not known, and this is the second foundational question we study:

### Question 2:

*What are the possible tradeoffs between the query and communication complexities in interactive proofs of proximity, and for which statements?*

For the case of languages in (uniform) NC—languages that can be decided by polynomial-sized circuits of polylogarithmic depth—we show that the product of the query and communication complexities can be quasi-linear.

**Theorem 2 (Informally Stated, see Theorem 4.1).** *Let  $t = t(n) \leq n$  be a parameter. For every  $\delta \leq \frac{t \cdot \text{polylog}(n)}{n}$  and every language  $\mathcal{L}$  in log-space uniform NC, there exists an IPP for  $\mathcal{L}$  with respect to proximity parameter  $\delta$ , with communication complexity  $t \cdot \text{polylog}(n)$  and query complexity  $O(1/\delta)$ . The verifier runs in time  $\tilde{O}(t + n/t)$  and the prover runs in time  $\text{poly}(n)$ .*

For example, by setting  $t(n) = \sqrt{n}$  we obtain an IPP for NC with query, communication and verification complexity all  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ . This result resolves the question for such languages, up to polylogarithmic factors, as Kalai and Rothblum [KR15] showed that (under a reasonable cryptographic assumption) there exists a language in  $\text{NC}^1$  for which the product of the query and communication complexities cannot be sublinear.

*Comparison and Relationship to [RVW13].* Theorem 2 shows that the product of the query complexity and the communication can be quasi-linear (for a distance parameter that is the inverse of the query complexity). Rothblum, Vadhan and Wigderson [RVW13] showed a similar statement, but the product of the query and communication complexities was  $n^{1+o(1)}$ .

Our protocol builds on the framework developed in their work, introducing several new ideas and using a key distance amplification technique from a beautiful recent work of Ben-Sasson, Kopparty and Saraf [BKS18]. We find the improvement from  $n^{1+o(1)}$  to  $\tilde{O}(n)$  to be significant: beyond the fact that it provides a nearly-optimal (up to  $\text{polylog}(n)$  factors) trade-off for a foundational problem, it allows for IPPs with  $\text{polylog}(n)$  communication and sublinear query complexity. In prior work, achieving sublinear query complexity (for NC) required  $n^{o(1)}$  communication. The importance of this distinction is exemplified in the application of IPPs towards batch verification for UP [RRR18]. That construction repeatedly uses IPPs with slightly-sublinear query complexity. The communication of the resulting batch verification protocol is dominated by the communication complexity of the IPPs. Indeed, the improved IPP of Theorem 2 is the key component behind the improved UP batch verification protocol of Theorem 1.

### 1.3 Related Works

*Batch Verification with Computational Soundness.* If one is willing to settle for *computational* soundness (i.e., soundness holds only against polynomial-time cheating strategies) and to use cryptographic assumptions, then efficient batch verification is possible for all of NP. In particular, Kilian [Kil92] gave an interactive argument-system for all of NP based on collision-resistant hash functions with only poly-logarithmic communication complexity. Since verifying the membership of  $k$  instances in an NP language is itself an NP problem, we immediately obtain a batch verification protocol with communication complexity  $\text{poly}(\log(n), \log(k), \kappa)$ , where  $\kappa$  is a cryptographic security parameter.

More recently, Brakerski, Holmgren and Kalai [BHK17] obtained an efficient *non-interactive* batch-verification protocol assuming the existence of a computational private information retrieval scheme. Non-interactive batch verification protocols also follow from the existence of *succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments (zkSNARGs)*, which are known to exist under certain strong, and non-falsifiable, assumptions (see, e.g. [Ish], for a recent survey).

We emphasize that the batch verification protocols of both [Kil92] and [BHK17] only provide computational soundness and are based on unproven cryptographic assumptions. In contrast, the result of Theorem 1 offers statistical soundness and is unconditional.

*Interactive Proofs of Proximity.* Beyond the works [EKR04, RVW13, GR13] that were mentioned above, interactive proofs of proximity have drawn considerable attention [FGL14, GGR15, KR15, RRR16, GR17, BRV18, RRR18, CG18, GLR18, RR19, GRSY20].

In particular, we mention that a recent work of Ron-Zewi and Rothblum [RR19, Theorem 3, see also Remark 1.3] shows that for every constant  $\epsilon$ , every language computable in polynomial-time and bounded polynomial space has an IPP with communication complexity  $\epsilon \cdot n$  and constant query complexity. Note that the product between the query and communication complexity in their result is  $O(n)$ , rather than  $n \cdot \text{polylog}(n)$  as in Theorem 2. However, in contrast to Theorem 2, their result is restricted to the regime of constant query complexity and only yields communication complexity that is smaller by a constant factor than that of the trivial solution (see Proposition 3.3).

## 1.4 Organization

Section 2 contains a technical overview of our techniques. In Sect. 3 we provide preliminaries and our main results are stated in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we introduce the PVAL problem and show how to amplify its distance. Our efficient PVAL IPP is in Sect. 6. Lastly, in Sect. 7 we use the results established in the prior sections to prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.

## 2 Technical Overview

To prove Theorem 1 we rely on a recent result of Reingold *et al.* [RRR18] who showed how to reduce the construction of UP batch verification protocol to that of constructing efficient IPPs. In particular, via the connection established in [RRR18], in order to prove Theorem 1, it suffices to prove Theorem 2 with respect to  $cc = \text{polylog}(n)$ .

Thus, in this overview we focus on proving Theorem 2. Our starting point for the proof of Theorem 2 is the IPP construction for NC from [RVW13] (which achieves weaker parameters than those of Theorem 2).

The [RVW13] protocol is centered around a parameterized problem called PVAL, which stands for “Polynomial eVALuation” and is defined next. A key step in the [RVW13] proof is showing that PVAL is “complete” for constructing IPPs for NC. In more detail, for every language  $\mathcal{L} \in \text{NC}$ , [RVW13] show an *interactive* reduction, in which the verifier *makes no queries to its input*. At the end of the reduction, the verifier generates a “parameterization” of the PVAL problem so that if the original input  $x$  belonged to  $\mathcal{L}$  then  $x$  belongs to PVAL, whereas if  $x$  was *far* from  $\mathcal{L}$  then, with high probability,  $x$  is also far from PVAL.

Thus, an efficient IPP for PVAL immediately yields an efficient IPP for  $\mathcal{L}$  as follows: the prover and verifier first engage in the interactive reduction to obtain a parameterization of the PVAL problem. Then, the two parties run the efficient IPP protocol to check proximity to the newly generated PVAL instance.

In this work we follow the same strategy. We do not modify the interactive reduction step from [RVW13]. Our improved efficiency stems from a more efficient IPP for PVAL (than that of [RVW13]), which suffices to obtain our main results.

We start by defining a specific variant<sup>2</sup> of the PVAL problem that suffices for our purposes.

*The PVAL Problem.* Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a (sufficiently large) finite field. The PVAL problem is parameterized by an integer  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , which we refer to as the *arity*, and a *dimension*  $m \in \mathbb{N}$ . In addition the problem is parameterized by  $t$  vectors  $\mathbf{j} = (\mathbf{j}_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$  and  $t$  scalars  $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$ . The main input to  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  is the truth table of a function  $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ . We say that  $f \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  if it holds that  $\hat{f}(\mathbf{j}_i) = v_i$ , for every  $i \in [t]$ , where  $\hat{f} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  is the multi-linear extension of  $f$ .<sup>3</sup> Thus, the goal of the PVAL verifier is to distinguish the case that (1) the multilinear extension  $\hat{f}$  of the input function  $f$  is equal, at  $t$  given points, to  $t$  corresponding values, or (2) is far from any such function. Note that the verifier is only allowed to make a sub-linear (i.e.,  $\ll 2^m$ ) number of queries to  $f$ , but is allowed to communicate with the (untrusted) prover who has full access to  $f$ .


Our main technical contribution is an IPP for checking  $\delta$ -proximity to  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  with communication complexity roughly  $t \cdot \text{poly}(m)$  and query complexity  $O(1/\delta)$  (see Theorem 6.1 for the formal statement). (Note that setting  $\delta = 2^m \cdot \text{poly}(m)/t$  results in the product of the query and communication complexities being  $\tilde{O}(2^m)$ , which is quasi-linear in the input length.) We proceed to describe the new IPP for PVAL.

*Attempt 1: Divide and Conquer.* Fix a parameterization  $(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  for PVAL, where  $\mathbf{j} = (\mathbf{j}_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}_t)$  and  $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_t)$ , and consider a given input  $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ . Following [RVW13], we would like to first decompose the  $t$  claims that we are given about  $f$  into claims about the underlying functions  $f_0, f_1 : \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ , where  $f_0(\cdot) \equiv f(0, \cdot)$  and  $f_1(\cdot) \equiv f(1, \cdot)$ . To do so, the verifier asks the prover to provide the contributions of  $f_0$  and  $f_1$  to the linear claims  $\hat{f}(\mathbf{j}_i) = v_i$ , for all  $i \in [t]$ . In more detail, let us view each vector  $\mathbf{j}_i$  as  $\mathbf{j}_i = (\chi_i, \mathbf{j}'_i)$  where  $\chi_i \in \mathbb{F}$  and  $\mathbf{j}'_i \in \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$  (i.e., we isolate the first component of  $\mathbf{j}_i$  as  $\chi_i$  and the remaining components as an  $(m-1)$ -dimensional vector  $\mathbf{j}'_i$ ). The prover sends the vectors  $\mathbf{v}_0, \mathbf{v}_1 \in \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$ , where  $\mathbf{v}_0 = \hat{f}_0|_{\mathbf{j}'}$  and  $\mathbf{v}_1 = \hat{f}_1|_{\mathbf{j}'}$ . Note that the prover cannot send arbitrary vectors since the verifier can check (and indeed *does* check) that  $\mathbf{v}_0$  and  $\mathbf{v}_1$  are consistent with  $\mathbf{v}$ . (I.e., that  $\mathbf{v} = (1 - \bar{\chi}) \cdot \mathbf{v}_0 + \bar{\chi} \cdot \mathbf{v}_1$ , where  $\bar{\chi} = (\chi_1, \dots, \chi_t)$  and the multiplication is pointwise.) See Fig. 1 for an illustration.

A natural idea at this point, is to try to combine  $f_0$  and  $f_1$  (and the corresponding claims that we have about them) into a single  $m-1$  variate function on which we can recurse. For example, we can take a random linear combination of the two functions as follows: the verifier chooses random coefficients

<sup>2</sup> In particular, for simplicity and since it is sufficient for our results we consider a variant of PVAL with respect to the *multi-linear* extension rather than a more general low degree extension considered in [RVW13].

<sup>3</sup> Recall that the multilinear extension  $\hat{f} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  of  $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  is the unique multilinear polynomial that agrees with  $f$  on  $\{0, 1\}^m$ . See Sect. 3.1 for details.



**Fig. 1.** Decomposing the claims  $f|_j = \mathbf{v}$ .

$c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}$ , sends them to the prover. The two parties then recurse on the input  $f' = c^{(0)} \cdot f_0 + c^{(1)} \cdot f_1$  wrt the claims  $\hat{f}'|_{j'} = \mathbf{v}'$ , with  $\mathbf{v}' = c^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{v}_0 + c^{(1)} \cdot \mathbf{v}_1$ .<sup>4</sup>

Note that the input has shrunk by a factor of 2 and it is not too difficult to argue that if  $f$  was  $\delta$ -far from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  then  $f'$  is about  $\delta$ -far from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}')$ . Thus, with very little communication (i.e.,  $O(t \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$ ) we have reduced the input size by half and preserved the distance. We can continue recursing as such until the input reaches a sufficiently small size so that the verifier can solve the problem by itself (or, rather, verifier can employ a “trivial” protocol, with  $1/\delta$  query complexity and linear communication in the size of the final input).

The problem with this approach is that while the input size has shrunk by half, as we recurse we will need to emulate each query to  $f'$  by using two queries to  $f$ . Thus, while the input length has shrunk by half, the query complexity has doubled and essentially no progress has been made. Indeed, if we unwind the recursion, we see that the total query complexity in the proposed protocol is linear in the input length.

*Doubling the Distance: A Pipe Dream?* For every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , let  $\delta_b$  be the distance of  $f_b$  from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}_b)$  and let  $P_b \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}_b)$  such that  $\Delta(f_b, P_b) = \delta_b$  (without getting into the details we remark that  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  will be unique in our regime of parameters). Note that if  $f$  is  $\delta$ -far from  $\text{PVAL}$  then  $\delta_0 + \delta_1 \geq 2\delta$ , since otherwise  $f$  is  $\delta$ -close to the function  $P \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  defined as  $P(\sigma, \mathbf{x}) = (1 - \sigma) \cdot P_0(\mathbf{x}) + \sigma \cdot P_1(\mathbf{x})$ .

<sup>4</sup> Intuitively, the reason to use a *random* linear combination rather than some fixed combination such as  $f_0 + f_1$  is avoiding (w.h.p) the possibility that the differences of  $f_0$  and  $f_1$  from their corresponding  $\text{PVAL}$  instances (i.e. the 0/1 vectors that can be added to  $f_0$  and  $f_1$  to reach vectors in  $\text{PVAL}$ ) cancel each other out.




For every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , let  $I_b \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$  be the set of  $\delta_b \cdot 2^m$  points on which  $P_b$  and  $f_b$  disagree (we refer to these as the “error pattern”). Suppose momentarily that  $I_0$  and  $I_1$  have a small intersection (or are even disjoint). In such a case,  $f'$  is roughly  $\delta_0 + \delta_1 \geq 2\delta$  far from  $c_0 \cdot P_0 + c_1 \cdot P_1 \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}')$ . This leads us to wonder whether  $f'$  could actually be  $2\delta$  far from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}')$  even when the error patterns have a large intersection (rather than just  $\delta$  far as in the analysis above).

Note that if it is indeed the case that  $f'$  is  $2\delta$  far from the corresponding PVAL instance then we have improved two parameters: both the distance and the input size, while only paying in the query complexity. If we continue the recursion now (stopping when the input size is of size roughly  $t$ ) we obtain an IPP for PVAL with poly-logarithmic overhead, as we desired.

Unfortunately, the above analysis was centered on the assumption that  $I_0$  and  $I_1$  have a small intersection, which we cannot justify. As a matter of fact, for all we know, the two sets could very well be *identical*. In such a case, the distance of  $f'$  from PVAL will indeed be (roughly)  $\delta$  and we are back to square one.

See Fig. 2 for an illustration for the possible “error patterns” of  $f_0$  and  $f_1$  and how they affect the “error patterns” of  $f'$ .



**Fig. 2.** Possible alignments of the “Noise”

We pause here for a detour, recalling the approach of [RVW13] (this is not essential for understanding our construction and can be skipped). They observe that if  $\delta_0$  and  $\delta_1$  are roughly equal, then the verifier can simply recurse on one of them. This roughly maintains the distance, while avoiding doubling the query complexity. On the other hand, if say  $\delta_0 \gg \delta_1$ , they show that the random linear combination technique described above does increase the distance (intuitively, the row with smaller distance cannot “cancel out” the error pattern

of the row with larger distance). We remark that they lose a constant multiplicative factor in this argument, which leads them to consider a decomposition into  $\text{polylog}(n)$  many rows, rather than 2. Of course, the verifier does not know whether  $\delta_0 \approx \delta_1$  or  $\delta_0 \gg \delta_1$ . However, they show that the verifier can “cover its bases” by considering a small number of (approximations to the) decompositions of the distance across rows. This results in the creation of  $O(\log \log n)$  smaller recursive instances, where the product of the new distance and the new effective query complexity of at least one of these instances is “good” (the definition of “good” allows for losing super-constant multiplicative factors). Over the course of  $\Omega(\log n / \log \log n)$  recursive steps, the losses and the ballooning number of recursive instances add up, and result in a roughly  $2^{\log n / \log \log n} = n^{o(1)}$  overhead in the product between the final query and communication complexities.

*Reducing the Intersection Size.* A key new ingredient in our protocol is randomly permuting the truth tables of the functions  $f_0$  and  $f_1$ , in order to make the sets  $I_0$  and  $I_1$  (pseudo-)random, and therefore likely to have a small intersection. This is inspired by the beautiful recent result of Ben Sasson, Kopparty and Saraf [BKS18] on amplifying distances from the Reed-Solomon code. More precisely, the verifier chooses random permutations  $\pi_0, \pi_1 : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  (from a suitable family of permutations, to be discussed below). We consider the new functions  $f_0 \circ \pi_0$  and  $f_1 \circ \pi_1$ . The hope is that the entropy induced by these permutations will make the error patterns in  $f_0 \circ \pi_0$  and in  $f_1 \circ \pi_1$  have a small intersection. Then, rather than recursing on  $c_0 \cdot f_0 + c_1 \cdot f_1$ , we will aim to recurse on  $f' = c_0 \cdot (f_0 \circ \pi_0) + c_1 \cdot (f_1 \circ \pi_1)$ .

To make this approach work we have to overcome several difficulties. First, we need to ensure that we can translate the claims that we have about  $\hat{f}_0$  and  $\hat{f}_1$  into claims about  $\widehat{f_0 \circ \pi_0}$  and  $\widehat{f_1 \circ \pi_1}$ . We do so by choosing  $\pi_0$  and  $\pi_1$  as random *affine* maps over  $\mathbb{F}^m$ , while ensuring that the restriction of these maps to  $\{0, 1\}^m$  forms a permutation. We argue that this ensures that:

$$\widehat{f_0 \circ \pi_0} \equiv \hat{f}_0 \circ \pi_0, \tag{1}$$

and similarly for  $f_1$ . To see that Eq. (1) holds, observe that if  $\pi_0$  is an affine function, then both sides of the equation are multilinear polynomials that agree on  $\{0, 1\}^m$ . Therefore they must also agree on  $\mathbb{F}^m$ .


Equation (1) implies that the claims that we have about the multi-linear extensions of  $f_0 \circ \pi_0$  and  $f_1 \circ \pi_1$  are simply permutations of the claims about  $f_0$  and  $f_1$ , respectively.

A second difficulty that arises at this point is that the claims that we have about  $f_0 \circ \pi_0$  and  $f_1 \circ \pi_1$  are not “aligned”. The former claims are about positions  $\pi_0^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')$  and the latter about  $\pi_1^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')$  (in the multi-linear extensions of  $f_0 \circ \pi_0$  and  $f_1 \circ \pi_1$ , respectively). Since the claims are not aligned, it unclear how to combine them to get  $t$  claims about the input  $f'$ .

As our first step toward resolving this difficulty, we have the prover “complete the picture” by providing the verifier also with the (alleged) values of  $\hat{f}_0 \circ \pi_0$  at positions  $\pi_1^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')$  and those of  $\hat{f}_1 \circ \pi_1$  at positions  $\pi_0^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')$ .

Note that the prover can cheat to its heart’s desire about these claims, but the point is that we now have a single set  $I = \pi_0^{-1}(\mathbf{j}') \cup \pi_1^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')$  so that each function  $f_b$  is still  $\delta_b$  far from the claims that we have about  $f_b|_I$ . Since the claims are now properly aligned, we can derive a new sequence of claims about  $f'$ . More importantly, we prove a technical lemma (building on the result of Ben Sasson *et al.* [BKS18]), showing that if  $f$  is  $\delta$ -far from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  then, with high probability,  $f'$  is roughly  $2\delta$ -far from the corresponding PVAL instance (induced by the prover’s new claims).

To summarize, the approach so far lets us double the distance in each iteration as we desired. Unfortunately, it also raises a new problem: the arity of the new PVAL instance that we generated has doubled - rather than just having  $t$  claims we now have roughly  $2t$  claims (corresponding to the size of the set  $I$ ). See Fig. 3 for an illustration.



**Fig. 3.** Permuting the inputs and resulting arity growth

*Arity Reduction Step.* We resolve this final difficulty by once more employing interaction, and using the prover in order to reduce the  $2t$  claims that we have about  $f_0 \circ \pi_0$  and  $f_1 \circ \pi_1$  to just  $t$  (aligned) claims each, while preserving the distance.

The idea here is to consider a degree  $O(t)$  curve  $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^m$  passing through the set of points  $I$ . The prover sends to the verifier the values of  $\hat{f}_0 \circ \pi_0|_{\mathcal{C}}$  and  $\hat{f}_1 \circ \pi_1|_{\mathcal{C}}$ . The verifier checks that that the provided values lie on a degree  $O(t)$  univariate polynomial (since  $\hat{f}_b \circ \pi_b \circ \mathcal{C}$  has low degree, for both  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ). The verifier also checks that the values that correspond to points in the set  $I$ , are consistent with the claims that it has. The verifier now chooses a set of  $t$  random points  $\rho = (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t)$  on the curve. The new claims about  $\hat{f}_0$  and  $\hat{f}_1$  are those that correspond to the set of points in  $\rho$ . In particular, this lets us reduce the number of claims from  $2t$  to  $t$ .

We want to argue that this arity-reduction sub-protocol preserves the distance. This is accomplished by taking a union bound over all inputs that are

(roughly)  $2\delta$ -close to  $f'$ , and showing that for each of them, the probability that it satisfies the new claim is tiny. We conclude that  $f'$  is indeed (roughly)  $2\delta$ -far from the resulting PVAL instance (a similar idea was used in the proof that PVAL is complete [RVW13]).

### 3 Preliminaries

For a string  $x \in \Sigma^n$  and an index  $i \in [n]$ , we denote by  $x_i \in \Sigma$  the  $i^{\text{th}}$  entry in  $x$ . If  $I \subseteq [n]$  is a set then we denote by  $x|_I$  the sequence of entries in  $x$  corresponding to coordinates in  $I$ .

Let  $x, y \in \Sigma^n$  be two strings of length  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  over a (finite) alphabet  $\Sigma$ . We define the (relative Hamming) distance of  $x$  and  $y$  as  $\Delta(x, y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} |\{x_i \neq y_i : i \in [n]\}|/n$ . If  $\Delta(x, y) \leq \varepsilon$ , then we say that  $x$  is  $\varepsilon$ -close to  $y$ , and otherwise we say that  $x$  is  $\varepsilon$ -far from  $y$ . We define the distance of  $x$  from a (non-empty) set  $S \subseteq \Sigma^n$  as  $\Delta(x, S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \min_{y \in S} \Delta(x, y)$ . If  $\Delta(x, S) \leq \varepsilon$ , then we say that  $x$  is  $\varepsilon$ -close to  $S$  and otherwise we say that  $x$  is  $\varepsilon$ -far from  $S$ . We extend these definitions from strings to functions by identifying a function with its truth table. For a set  $S$ , take its minimum distance to be the minimum, over all distinct vectors  $x, y \in S$  of  $\Delta(x, y)$ . We use  $\Delta(S)$  to denote the minimum distance of  $S$ . Fixing a vector space, for a set  $S$  and a vector  $x$ , we denote  $(x + S) = \{x + y : y \in S\}$ . For a scalar  $c$ , we denote  $(c \cdot S) = \{c \cdot y : y \in S\}$ .

#### 3.1 Multivariate Polynomials and Low Degree Extensions

We recall some important facts on multivariate polynomials (see [Sud95] for a far more detailed introduction). A basic fact, captured by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma is that low degree polynomials cannot have too many roots.

**Lemma 3.1 (Schwartz-Zippel Lemma).** *Let  $P : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  be a non-zero polynomial of total degree  $d$ . Then,*

$$\Pr_{x \in \mathbb{F}^m} [P(x) = 0] \leq \frac{d}{|\mathbb{F}|}.$$

An immediate corollary of the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma is that two distinct polynomials  $P, Q : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  of total degree  $d$  may agree on at most a  $\frac{d}{|\mathbb{F}|}$ -fraction of their domain  $\mathbb{F}^m$ .

Throughout this work we consider fields in which operations can be implemented efficiently (i.e., in poly-logarithmic time in the field size). Formally we define such fields as follows.

**Definition 3.1.** *We say that an ensemble of finite fields  $\mathbb{F} = (\mathbb{F}_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  is constructible if elements in  $\mathbb{F}_n$  can be represented by  $O(\log(|\mathbb{F}_n|))$  bits and field operations (i.e., addition, subtraction, multiplication, inversion and sampling random elements) can all be performed in  $\text{polylog}(|\mathbb{F}_n|)$  time given this representation.*

A well known fact is that for every  $S = S(n)$ , there exists a *constructible* field ensemble of size  $O(S)$  and its representation can be found in  $\text{polylog}(S)$  time (see, e.g., [Gol08, Appendix G.3] for details).

Let  $\mathbb{H}$  be a finite field and  $\mathbb{F} \supseteq \mathbb{H}$  be an extension field of  $\mathbb{H}$ . Fix an integer  $m \in \mathbb{N}$ . A basic fact is that for every function  $\phi : \mathbb{H}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ , there exists a unique extension of  $\phi$  into a function  $\hat{\phi} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  (which agrees with  $\phi$  on  $\mathbb{H}^m$ ; i.e.,  $\hat{\phi}|_{\mathbb{H}^m} \equiv \phi$ ), such that  $\hat{\phi}$  is an  $m$ -variate polynomial of individual degree at most  $|\mathbb{H}| - 1$ . Moreover, there exists a collection of  $|\mathbb{H}|^m$  functions  $\{\hat{\tau}_x\}_{x \in \mathbb{H}^m}$  such that each  $\hat{\tau}_x : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  is the  $m$ -variate polynomial of degree  $|\mathbb{H}| - 1$  in each variable defined as:

$$\hat{\tau}_x(z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i \in [m]} \prod_{h \in \mathbb{H} \setminus \{x_i\}} \frac{z_i - h}{x_i - h}.$$

and for every function  $\phi : \mathbb{H}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  it holds that

$$\hat{\phi}(z_1, \dots, z_m) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{H}^m} \hat{\tau}_x(z_1, \dots, z_m) \cdot \phi(x).$$

The function  $\hat{\phi}$  is called the *low degree extension* of  $\phi$  (with respect to  $\mathbb{F}$ ,  $\mathbb{H}$  and  $m$ ). In the special case in which  $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{GF}(2)$ , the function  $\hat{\phi}$  (which has individual degree 1) is called the *multilinear extension* of  $\phi$  (with respect to  $\mathbb{F}$  and  $m$ ).

### 3.2 A Useful Permutation Family

Let  $m \in \mathbb{N}$ . For every  $a \in \mathbb{GF}(2^m)$ , let  $f_a : (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m \rightarrow (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  be defined as  $f_a(x) = a \cdot x$ , where we identify elements in  $\mathbb{GF}(2^m)$  with vectors in  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  in the natural way. Thus, for every  $a \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ , there exists a matrix  $M_a \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^{m \times m}$  such that  $f(x) = M_a \cdot x$ . Note that if  $a \neq 0$  then the matrix  $M_a$  is invertible, and its inverse is given by  $M_{a^{-1}}$ .

Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field that is an extension field of  $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ . For every  $a, b \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  consider the function  $\pi_{a,b} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^m$  defined as:  $\pi_{a,b}(x) = M_a \cdot x + b$ . Let  $\pi_{a,b}|_{(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m}$  denote the restriction of  $\pi_{a,b}$  to the domain  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  and let  $\Pi_m = \{\pi_{a,b} : a, b \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m, a \neq 0\}$ .

**Proposition 3.1.** *The following holds for every  $a, b \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ :*

1. *The function  $\pi_{a,b}$  is an affine map over  $\mathbb{F}$ .*
2. *If  $a \neq 0$  then the function  $\pi_{a,b}$  forms a permutation over  $\mathbb{F}^m$  and  $\pi_{a,b}|_{(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m}$  forms a permutation over  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ .*
3. *The function family  $\{\pi_{a,b}|_{(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m}\}_{a,b \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m}$  is pairwise independent.*
4. *If  $\mathbb{F}$  and  $\mathbb{GF}(2^m)$  are constructible, then given  $a, b \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  and  $x \in \mathbb{F}^m$  it is possible to compute  $\pi_{a,b}(x)$  in time  $\text{poly}(m, \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$ .*

*Proof.* Item 1 is evident from the construction. For Item 2, let  $a \neq 0$  and take any  $x, x' \in \mathbb{F}^m$ . Observe that if  $M_a \cdot x + b = M_a \cdot x' + b$  then  $M_a \cdot (x - x') = \mathbf{0}$ . Multiplying both sides on the left by  $M_{a^{-1}}$  (a matrix in  $\mathbb{GF}(2)^{m \times m} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{m \times m}$ )

we get that  $x = x'$ . Thus,  $\pi_{a,b}$  is a permutation over  $\mathbb{F}^m$ . Since the image of  $\pi_{a,b}|_{(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m}$  lies in  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  this also means that  $\pi_{a,b}|_{(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m}$  is a permutation over  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ .

For Item 3, let  $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \in (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$  with  $x_1 \neq x_2$ . Then:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{a,b}[M_a \cdot x_1 + b = y_1 \wedge M_a \cdot x_2 + b = y_2] &= \Pr_{a,b}[a \cdot x_1 + b = y_1 \wedge a \cdot x_2 + b = y_2] \\ &= \Pr_{a,b} \left[ \begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 & 1 \\ x_2 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{pmatrix} \right] \\ &= 2^{-2m}, \end{aligned}$$

where in the first expression the arithmetic is over the field  $\mathbb{GF}(2)$  and in the second and third expressions the arithmetic is over  $\mathbb{GF}(2^m)$ , and the last equality follows from the fact that  $\det \begin{pmatrix} x_1 & 1 \\ x_2 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = x_1 - x_2 \neq 0$ .

Lastly, for Item 4, observe that  $M_a$  can be generated in  $\text{poly}(m)$  time by taking the product of  $a$  with a basis of  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ . Given the full description of  $M_a$ , the product  $M_a \cdot x + b$  can be computed in  $\text{poly}(m, \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$  time.

**Proposition 3.2.** *Let  $\phi : (\mathbb{GF}(2))^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  and let  $\hat{\phi} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  be its multilinear extension. Let  $\psi = \phi \circ (\pi_{a,b}|_{(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m})$  (a function over  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ ), and let  $\hat{\psi}$  be the multilinear extension of  $\psi$ . Then:*

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{F}^m, (\hat{\phi} \circ \pi_{a,b})(x) = \hat{\psi}(x).$$

*Proof.* By Proposition 3.1, the function  $\pi_{a,b}$  is an affine map over  $\mathbb{F}$ . Thus,  $(\hat{\phi} \circ \pi_{a,b})$  is multilinear. By definition,  $\hat{\psi}$  is also multilinear (since it is a low degree extension). We have that  $\hat{\psi}$  and  $\hat{\phi} \circ \pi_{a,b}$  are both multilinear, and they agree over  $(\mathbb{GF}(2))^m$ . By uniqueness of the multilinear extension, they must also agree over  $\mathbb{F}^m$ .

### 3.3 Succinct Descriptions

Throughout this work we use  $\text{NC}^1$  to refer to the class of logspace uniform Boolean circuits of logarithmic depth and constant fan-in. Namely,  $\mathcal{L} \in \text{NC}^1$  if there exists a logspace Turing machine  $M$  that on input  $1^n$  outputs a full description of a logarithmic depth circuit  $C : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  such that for every  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  it holds that  $C(x) = 1$  if and only if  $x \in \mathcal{L}$ .

We next define a notion of succinct representation of circuits. Loosely speaking, a function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  has a succinct representation if there is a short string  $\langle f \rangle$ , of poly-logarithmic length, that describes  $f$ . That is,  $\langle f \rangle$  can be expanded to a full description of  $f$ . The actual technical definition is slightly more involved and in particular requires that the full description of  $f$  be an  $\text{NC}_1$  (i.e., logarithmic depth) circuit:

**Definition 3.2 (Succinct Description of Functions).** *We say that a function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  of size  $s$  has a succinct description if there exists a*

string  $\langle f \rangle$  of length  $\text{polylog}(n)$  and a logspace Turing machine  $M$  (of constant size, independent of  $n$ ) such that on input  $1^n$ , the machine  $M$  outputs a full description of an  $\text{NC}^1$  circuit  $C$  such that for every  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  it holds that  $C(\langle f \rangle, x) = f(x)$ . We refer to  $\langle f \rangle$  as the succinct description of  $f$ .

We also define succinct representation for sets  $S \subseteq [k]$ . Roughly speaking this means that the set can be described by a string of length  $\text{polylog}(k)$ . The formal definition is somewhat more involved:

**Definition 3.3 (Succinct Description of Sets).** *We say that a set  $S \subseteq [k]$  of size  $s$  has a succinct description if there exists a string  $\langle S \rangle$  of length  $\text{polylog}(k)$  and a logspace Turing machine  $M$  such that on input  $1^k$ , the machine  $M$  outputs a full description of a depth  $\text{polylog}(k)$  and size  $\text{poly}(s, \log k)$  circuit (of constant fan-in) that on input  $\langle S \rangle$  outputs all the elements of  $S$  as a list (of length  $s \cdot \log(k)$ ).*

We emphasize that the size of the circuit that  $M$  outputs is proportional to the actual size of the set  $S$ , rather than the universe size  $k$ .

### 3.4 Interactive Proofs of Proximity

Loosely speaking, IPPs are interactive proofs in which the verifier runs in sub-linear time in the input length, where the soundness requirement is relaxed to rejecting inputs that are *far* from the language w.h.p. (for inputs that are not in the language, but are close to it, no requirement is made). Actually, we will think of the input of the verifier as being composed of two parts: an *explicit* input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  to which the verifier has direct access, and an *implicit* (longer) input  $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$  to which the verifier has oracle access. The goal is for the verifier to run in time that is sub-linear in  $m$  and to verify that  $y$  is far from any  $y'$  such that the pair  $(x, y')$  are in the language. Since such languages are composed of input pairs, we refer to them as *pair languages*.

**Definition 3.4 (Interactive Proof of Proximity (IPP) [EKR04, RVW13]).** *An interactive proof of proximity (IPP) for the pair language  $\mathcal{L}$  is an interactive protocol with two parties: a (computationally unbounded) prover  $\mathcal{P}$  and a computationally bounded verifier  $\mathcal{V}$ . Both parties get as input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and a proximity parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ . The verifier also gets oracle access to  $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$  whereas the prover has full access to  $y$ . At the end of the interaction, the following two conditions are satisfied:*

1. **Completeness:** *For every pair  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{L}$ , and proximity parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$  it holds that*

$$\Pr \left[ (\mathcal{P}(y), \mathcal{V}^y)(x, |y|, \varepsilon) = 1 \right] = 1.$$

2. **Soundness:** *For every  $\varepsilon > 0$ ,  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $y$  that is  $\varepsilon$ -far from the set  $\{y' : (x, y') \in \mathcal{L}\}$ , and for every computationally unbounded (cheating) prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$  it holds that*

$$\Pr \left[ (\mathcal{P}^*(y), \mathcal{V}^y)(x, |y|, \varepsilon) = 1 \right] \leq 1/2.$$

An IPP for  $\mathcal{L}$  is said to have **query complexity**  $q = q(n, m, \varepsilon)$  if, for every  $\varepsilon > 0$  and  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{L}$ , the verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  makes at most  $q(|x|, |y|, \varepsilon)$  queries to  $y$  when interacting with  $\mathcal{P}$ . The IPP is said to have **communication complexity**  $cc = cc(n, m, \varepsilon)$  if, for every  $\varepsilon > 0$  and pair  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{L}$ , the communication between  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  consists of at most  $cc(|x|, |y|, \varepsilon)$  bits. If the honest prover's running time is polynomial in  $n$  and  $m$ , then we say that the IPP is *doubly-efficient*.

The special case of IPPs in which the entire interaction consists of a single message sent from the prover to the verifier is called MAPs (in analogy to the complexity class MA) and was studied in [GR17, GGR15]. We will use the following simple observation:

**Proposition 3.3** (See, e.g., [GR17]). *Every  $\mathcal{L} \in \text{DTIME}(t)$  has an MAP with respect to proximity parameter  $\delta \in (0, 1)$  with communication complexity  $n$  and query complexity  $O(1/\delta)$ . The verifier runs in time  $t + n + O(\log(n)/\varepsilon)$ . The prover runs in time  $O(n)$*

*Proof (Proof Sketch).* The prover sends to the verifier a full description of the input  $x$  (i.e., an  $n$  bit string). Given the message  $x'$  received from the prover (allegedly equal to the input  $x$ ), the verifier first checks that  $x' \in \mathcal{L}$  (this step requires no queries to  $x$ ). The verifier further checks that  $x$  and  $x'$  agree on a random set of  $O(1/\delta)$  coordinates.

Completeness is immediate, whereas to see that soundness holds, observe that the prover must send  $x' \in \mathcal{L}$ , since otherwise the verifier rejects. If  $x$  is  $\delta$ -far from  $\mathcal{L}$  then  $x$  and  $x'$  disagree on a at least  $\delta$  fraction of their coordinates and so the verifier accepts with probability at most  $(1 - \delta)^{O(1/\delta)} = 1/2$ .

## 4 Our Results

Our first main result is an IPP for any language in NC with optimal query/communication tradeoff (up to poly-logarithmic factors).

**Theorem 4.1.** *Let  $\delta = \delta(n) \in (0, 1)$  be a proximity parameter and let  $\mathcal{L}$  be a pair language that is computable by logspace-uniform Boolean circuits of depth  $D = D(n) \geq \log n$  and size  $S = S(n) \geq n$  with fan-in 2 (where  $n$  denotes the implicit input and  $n_{\text{exp}}$  denotes the explicit input). Then,  $\mathcal{L}$  has a public-coin IPP for  $\delta$ -proximity with perfect completeness and the following parameters:*

- *Soundness Error:*  $1/2$ .
- *Query complexity:*  $q = O(1/\delta)$ .
- *Communication Complexity:*  $cc = \delta \cdot n \cdot D \cdot \text{poly log}(S)$ .
- *Round Complexity:*  $D \cdot \text{poly log}(S)$ .
- *Verifier Running Time:*  $\delta \cdot n \cdot n_{\text{exp}} \text{poly}(D, \log(S)) + (1/\delta) \cdot \text{poly log}(n)$ .
- *Prover Running Time:*  $\text{poly}(S)$ .



Furthermore, the verification procedure can be described succinctly as follows. At the end of the interaction either the verifier rejects or in time  $\delta \cdot n \cdot \text{poly}(D, \log(S))$  it outputs a succinct description  $\langle Q \rangle$  of a set  $Q \subseteq [n]$  of size  $q$  and a succinct description  $\langle \phi \rangle$  of a predicate  $\phi : \{0, 1\}^q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  so that its decision predicate given an input function  $f$  is equal to  $\phi(f|_Q)$ .

Our second main result (which relies on Theorem 4.1) is an interactive proof for batch verification of any UP language, with communication complexity that is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors.

**Theorem 4.2.** *For every UP language  $\mathcal{L}$  with witness length  $m = m(n)$ , whose witness relation can be computed in logspace-uniform NC, there exists a public-coin interactive proof (with perfect completeness) for verifying that  $k$  instances  $x_1, \dots, x_k$ , each of length  $n \leq \text{poly}(m)$ , are all in  $\mathcal{L}$ . The complexity of the protocol is as follows:*

- Communication complexity:  $m \cdot \text{polylog}(k, m)$ .
- Number of rounds:  $\text{polylog}(k, m)$ .
- Verifier runtime:  $(n \cdot k + m) \cdot \text{polylog}(k, m)$ .
- The honest prover, given the  $k$  unique witnesses, runs in time  $\text{poly}(m, k)$ .

Using the Cook-Levin reduction, any UP language can be reduced to Unique-SAT which is a UP language whose witness relation can be computed in logspace-uniform NC, with only a  $\text{poly}(n, m)$  blowup to the witness size. Hence, Theorem 4.2 yields the following corollary.

**Corollary 4.1.** *For every UP language  $\mathcal{L}$  with witness length  $m = m(n)$ , there exists a public-coin interactive proof (with perfect completeness) for verifying that  $k$  instances  $x_1, \dots, x_k$ , each of length  $n \leq \text{poly}(m)$ , are all in  $\mathcal{L}$ . The complexity of the protocol is as follows:*

- Communication complexity:  $\text{poly}(m, \log(k))$ .
- Number of rounds:  $\text{polylog}(m, k)$ .
- Verifier runtime:  $(n \cdot k) \cdot \text{polylog}(m, k) + \text{poly}(m, \log k)$ .
- The honest prover, given the  $k$  unique witnesses, runs in time  $\text{poly}(m, k)$ .

## 5 The PVAL Problem

In this section we define the PVAL problem and state properties related to it that we will need in our proof. Due to lack of space, all proofs in this section are deferred to the full version.

Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a finite field,  $\mathbb{H} \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  and  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  be an integer.

**Definition 5.1.** *The PVAL problem is parameterized by an ensemble  $(\mathbb{F}, \mathbb{H}, m)_n$ . The explicit input to the problem is  $(n, t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$ , where  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\mathbf{j} = (j_1, \dots, j_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$  and  $\mathbf{v} = v_1, \dots, v_t \in \mathbb{F}^t$ . The implicit input is a function  $f : \mathbb{H}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ . YES instances of the problems are all functions  $f : \mathbb{H}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  such that for every  $i \in [t]$  it holds that  $\hat{f}(j_i) = v_i$ , where  $\hat{f}$  is the low degree extension of  $f$ .*

Since the low-degree extension is an error correcting code with high distance, for sufficiently large randomly chosen location sets  $\mathbf{j}$ , the induced PVAL problem has large minimum distance:

**Proposition 5.1 (PVAL on random locations has large distance).** *Let  $\mathbb{H} \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  be finite fields, and let  $m, d$  be integers s.t.  $|\mathbb{F}| \geq 2m|\mathbb{H}|$ . For  $t \geq (d \cdot \log(|\mathbb{H}|^m \cdot |\mathbb{F}|) + \kappa)$  it is the case that:*

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{j} \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t} \left[ \Delta(\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{0})) \leq \frac{d}{|\mathbb{H}|^m} \right] < 2^{-\kappa}.$$

The following key lemma builds on the distance amplification theorem for Reed Solomon codes of Ben-Sasson, Kopparty and Saraf [BKS18].

**Lemma 5.1.** *Fix a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  of characteristic 2 and integers  $m, t > 0$ . For  $\mathbf{j} \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$ , suppose that  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{0})$  has size strictly larger than 1 and minimal distance  $\lambda$ . Let  $\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{v}'' \in \mathbb{F}^t$  be vectors s.t. both  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v}')$  and  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v}'')$  are non-empty. Let  $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  be at distance  $\delta'$  from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v}')$ , and let  $f'' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  be at distance  $\delta''$  from  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v}'')$ . Consider permutations  $\sigma, \pi \in \Pi$ , where  $\Pi$  is the useful collection of permutations over  $\mathbb{F}^m$  defined in Sect. 3.2. For scalars  $c', c'' \in \mathbb{F}$ , define:*

$$f \triangleq c' \cdot (f' \circ \sigma) + c'' \cdot (f'' \circ \pi),$$

and let  $S_{\sigma, \pi} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{2t}$  be the set of pairs of vectors  $(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w})$  s.t. the sets  $\text{PVAL}(2t, (\sigma^{-1}(\mathbf{j}), \pi^{-1}(\mathbf{j})), (\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{u}))$  and  $\text{PVAL}(2t, (\sigma^{-1}(\mathbf{j}), \pi^{-1}(\mathbf{j})), (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}''))$  are non-empty. For  $(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}) \in S_{\sigma, \pi}$ , define:

$$\delta_{\sigma, \pi, c', c'', \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}} = \Delta(f, \text{PVAL}(2t, (\sigma^{-1}(\mathbf{j}), \pi^{-1}(\mathbf{j})), (c' \cdot (\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{u}) + c'' \cdot (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}'')))).$$

Then for every  $\varepsilon \in [0, 1/2]$ , taking

$$\delta = \max \left( \frac{\delta' + \delta''}{2}, \min(\delta' + \delta'' - \delta' \delta'' - 2\varepsilon, \lambda/3 - 3\varepsilon) \right),$$

it is the case that:

$$\Pr_{\sigma, \pi \leftarrow \Pi} \left[ \exists (\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}) \in S_{\sigma, \pi} \text{ s.t. } \Pr_{c', c'' \leftarrow \mathbb{F}} [\delta_{\sigma, \pi, c', c'', \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}} < \delta] > \frac{1}{\varepsilon |\mathbb{F}|} + \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \right] < \frac{\min(\delta', \delta'')}{\varepsilon^2 \cdot 2^m} + \frac{2}{2^m} \quad (2)$$

## 5.1 Interactive Proof for PVAL Emptiness

Our PVAL IPP will also utilize the following (standard) interactive proof for checking whether a given PVAL instance (specified by the vector sequence  $\mathbf{j}$ ) is empty.

**Lemma 5.2.** *Let  $t, m \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathbb{F}$  a finite field. There is a public-coin interactive proof for the language  $\mathcal{L} = \{\mathbf{j} \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t : \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{0}) \neq \emptyset\}$  with perfect completeness and the following parameters:*

- *Communication complexity*:  $\text{poly}(m, \log(t))$ .
- *Round Complexity*:  $\text{poly}(m, \log(t))$ .
- *Verifier running time*:  $t \cdot \text{poly}(m, \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$ .
- *Prover running time*:  $\text{poly}(2^m, t)$ .

## 6 Efficient IPP for PVAL

In this section we show our efficient IPP protocol for the PVAL problem.

**Theorem 6.1 (IPP for PVAL).** *Let  $t, m \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $m \in [\log(t), \frac{t^{1/5}}{14}]$ . Let  $\mathbb{F}$  be a constructible finite field ensemble of characteristic 2 such that  $|\mathbb{F}| = \Theta(2^m \cdot t^2 \cdot m^2)$ . Let  $\mathbf{j} = (\mathbf{j}_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$  and  $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$  such that  $\Delta(\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{0})) \geq (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{14m^2}$ .*

*Then, for every proximity parameter  $\delta \geq \frac{200m^3}{2^m}$  the set  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  has a public-coin IPP with respect to proximity parameter  $\delta$ , with perfect completeness and the following parameters:*

- *Soundness Error*:  $1/2$ .
- *Query complexity*:  $q = O\left(\max\left(1/\delta, \frac{2^m}{t} \cdot \text{poly}(m)\right)\right)$ .
- *Round complexity*:  $\text{poly}(m)$ .
- *Communication Complexity*:  $cc = t \cdot \text{poly}(m)$ .
- *Verifier Running Time*:  $(t + q) \cdot \text{poly}(m)$ .
- *Prover Running Time*:  $\text{poly}(2^m)$ .

*Furthermore, if  $\delta > (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{\text{poly}(m)}$  then, the entire verification procedure can be described succinctly as follows. At the end of the interaction either the verifier rejects or in time  $\text{poly}(m)$  it outputs a succinct description  $\langle Q \rangle$  of a set  $Q \subseteq [2^m]$  of size  $q$  and a succinct description  $\langle \phi \rangle$  of a predicate  $\phi : \{0, 1\}^q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  so that its decision predicate given an input function  $f$  is equal to  $\phi(f|_Q)$ .*

The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 6.1.

The IPP protocol for PVAL is recursive. In each step we reduce the dimension  $m$  by 1 (which shrinks the input size by half), while simultaneously (roughly) doubling the distance of the problem from the relevant PVAL instance but also doubling the query complexity.

We denote the starting dimension by  $m_0$  whereas the current dimension (within the recursion) is denoted by  $m$  (initially we set  $m = m_0$ ). With that notation, the efficient IPP protocol for PVAL is presented in Fig. 4. Its completeness, soundness and complexity are analyzed in the subsequent subsections.

### 6.1 Completeness

We prove that completeness holds by induction on  $m$ . The base case (i.e.,  $m \leq \log(t)$ ) follows from Step 1 in the protocol (while relying on Proposition 3.3). We proceed to analyze the case  $m > \log(t)$  (under the inductive hypothesis that the protocol is complete for dimension  $m - 1$ ).

**Efficient IPP for PVAL**

**Fixed parameters (unchanged in the recursion):** PVAL arity parameter  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , a maximal dimension  $m_0 \in [\log(t), t^{1/5}/14]$ . A finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  of characteristic 2 such that  $|\mathbb{F}| = \Theta(2^{m_0} \cdot t^2 \cdot m_0^2)$ .

**Parameters (modified in the recursion):** dimension  $m \in [\log(t), m_0]$ , proximity parameter  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ . A sequence of vectors  $\mathbf{j} = (\mathbf{j}_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$  and field elements  $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$ .

**Invariants:** let  $\lambda = \Delta(\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{0}))$ . We require that  $\delta \geq \frac{200m_0^3}{2^m} \cdot (1 - \frac{2}{m_0})^{m_0-m}$ , and that  $\lambda \geq (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{14m_0^2}$ .

**Verifier Input:** oracle access to  $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ .

**Prover Input:** direct access to  $f$ .

**Goal:** verify that  $\forall i \in [t]$ ,  $\hat{f}(\mathbf{j}_i) = v_i$  (recall that  $\hat{f} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  is the multilinear extension of  $f$ ).

**The Protocol:**

1. (Base Case:) If  $m \leq \log(t)$ , then the prover and verifier simply emulate the trivial MAP protocol of Proposition 3.3 (with soundness error 1/100). The verifier accepts if the underlying MAP verifier accepts and otherwise it rejects.
2. Otherwise (i.e., if  $m > \log(t)$ ), the protocol proceeds as follows.
3. For every  $i \in [t]$ , decompose  $\mathbf{j}_i$  into  $\mathbf{j}_i = (\chi_i, \mathbf{j}'_i) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$ .
4. For every  $i \in [t]$  and  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , the prover computes and sends  $\zeta_i^{(b)} = \hat{f}(b, \mathbf{j}'_i)$ .
5. The verifier receives  $(\tilde{\zeta}_i^{(b)})_{b \in \{0, 1\}, i \in [t]}$  and checks  $v_i = (1 - \chi_i) \cdot \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(0)} + \chi_i \cdot \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(1)}$ ,  $\forall i \in [t]$ .
6. The verifier random permutations  $\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)} \leftarrow \Pi_{m-1}$ , where  $\Pi_{m-1}$  is the useful collection of permutations over  $\mathbb{F}^{m-1}$  defined in Section 3.2. The verifier sends  $\pi^{(0)}$  and  $\pi^{(1)}$ .
7. The verifier chooses  $t$  random points  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t \in \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$ . Let  $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$  be a low degree curve passing through the set of  $3t$  points  $\left\{ (\pi^{(b)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'_i) \right\}_{b \in \{0, 1\}, i \in [t]} \cup \{\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t\}$ .  
In more detail, fix a canonical set of distinct field elements  $\{\lambda_i^{(b)}\}_{b \in \{0, 1, \perp\}, i \in [t]} \subset \mathbb{F}$ . Let  $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$  be the unique degree  $3t - 1$  curve such that  $\mathcal{C}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) = (\pi^{(b)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'_i)$ , for every  $i \in [t]$  and  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , and  $\mathcal{C}(\lambda_i^{(\perp)}) = \rho_i$ , for every  $i \in [t]$  (such a curve can be found by interpolation). The verifier sends the values  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t$  (which determine  $\mathcal{C}$ ) to the prover.
8. The prover sends to the verifier the degree  $O(m \cdot t)$  univariate polynomials  $g^{(0)}$  and  $g^{(1)}$ , where  $g^{(b)}(\cdot) = \hat{f}(b, \pi^{(b)}(\mathcal{C}(\cdot)))$ , e.g., by sending their coefficient representations.
9. For every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , the verifier receives  $\tilde{g}^{(b)}$  from the prover. The verifier checks that for every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and  $i \in [t]$ , it holds that  $\tilde{g}^{(b)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) = \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(b)}$ . The prover and verifier also run the interactive proof of Lemma 5.2, with soundness error  $\frac{1}{100m_0}$  to check that  $\text{PVAL}\left(2t, \{\lambda^{(b)}\}_{b \in \{0, 1\}, i \in [t]}, \{\tilde{g}^{(b')}(\lambda_i^{(b)})\}_{b \in \{0, 1\}, i \in [t]}\right) \neq \emptyset$ , for both  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ .
10. The verifier chooses at random  $\xi_1, \dots, \xi_t \in \mathbb{F}$  and  $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}$ .
11. The parties recurse on the implicit input function  $f' : \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  defined as  $f'(\mathbf{x}) = c^{(0)} \cdot f(0, \pi^{(0)}(\mathbf{x})) + c^{(1)} \cdot f(1, \pi^{(1)}(\mathbf{x}))$  and the claim that for all  $i \in [t]$ , it holds that  $\hat{f}'(\mathcal{C}(\xi_i)) = c^{(0)} \cdot \tilde{g}^{(0)}(\xi_i) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}^{(1)}(\xi_i)$  (a PVAL instance of dimension  $m - 1$ ). Each of the verifier's queries to  $f'$  in the recursion are emulated by making 2 queries to  $f$ . The proximity parameter in the recursion is set to be  $\delta' = \min\left(2\delta \cdot (1 - \frac{2}{m_0}), (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}\right)$ .
12. If any of the verifier's checks failed then it rejects, otherwise it accepts.

**Fig. 4.** Efficient IPP for PVAL

Let  $\mathbf{j} = (\mathbf{j}_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$  and  $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$ . Suppose that  $f \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$ . As in the protocol, for every  $i \in [t]$ , decompose  $\mathbf{j}_i$  into  $\mathbf{j}_i = (\chi_i, \mathbf{j}'_i) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$ . Let  $\mathbf{j}' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{j}'_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}'_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^{m-1})^t$ .

We show that all the checks made by the verifier in the protocol pass (when interacting with the honest prover):

1. In Step 5, for every  $i \in [t]$ :

$$(1 - \chi_i) \cdot \zeta_i^{(b)} + \chi_i \cdot \zeta_i^{(1)} = (1 - \chi_i) \cdot \hat{f}(0, \mathbf{j}'_i) + \chi_i \cdot \hat{f}(1, \mathbf{j}'_i) = \hat{f}(\mathbf{j}_i) = v_i,$$

as required.

2. In Step 9, for every  $i \in [t]$  and  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ :

$$g^{(b)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) = \hat{f}(b, \pi^{(b)}(C(\lambda_i^{(b)}))) = \hat{f}(b, \pi^{(b)}((\pi^{(b)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'_i))) = \hat{f}(b, \mathbf{j}'_i) = \zeta_i^{(b)},$$

as required.

3. For Step 11, for every  $i \in [t]$ , it holds that:

$$\hat{f}(C(\xi_i)) = c^{(0)} \cdot \hat{f}(0, \pi^{(0)}(C(\xi_i))) + c^{(1)} \cdot \hat{f}(1, \pi^{(1)}(C(\xi_i))) = c^{(0)} \cdot g^{(0)}(\xi_i) + c^{(1)} \cdot g^{(1)}(\xi_i),$$

where the first equality follows from Proposition 3.2.

Since all the verifier's checks pass, it accepts, and completeness follows.

## 6.2 Soundness

We prove, by induction on  $m$ , that the soundness error of the protocol is at most  $\frac{m}{10m_0} + \frac{1}{100}$ . The base case (i.e.,  $m \leq \log(t)$ ) is immediate from Step 1 (while relying on Proposition 3.3). We proceed to analyze the case that  $m > \log(t)$  (under the inductive hypothesis that the protocol has soundness error at most  $\frac{m-1}{10m_0}$  for dimension  $m-1$ ).

Let  $\mathbf{j} = (\mathbf{j}_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^m)^t$  and  $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$ . Let  $\delta = \Delta(f, \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v}))$ . Fix a cheating prover strategy  $\tilde{P}$ . Assume without loss of generality that  $\tilde{P}$  is deterministic (otherwise fix its best choice of randomness).

We start by defining several important values that will be used in the analysis. Let  $(\tilde{\zeta}_i^{(b)})_{b \in \{0,1\}, i \in [t]}$  be the (fixed) values sent by  $\tilde{P}$  as its first message (i.e., in Step 4). We may assume that

$$(1 - \chi_i) \cdot \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(0)} + \chi_i \cdot \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(1)} = v_i, \quad (3)$$

for every  $i \in [t]$ , since otherwise the verifier rejects in Step 5.

Define  $\mathbf{v}^{(b)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\tilde{\zeta}_1^{(b)}, \dots, \tilde{\zeta}_t^{(b)}) \in \mathbb{F}^t$ . Also, for every  $i \in [t]$ , decompose  $\mathbf{j}_i$  into  $\mathbf{j}_i = (\chi_i, \mathbf{j}'_i) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$ . Let  $\mathbf{j}' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{j}'_1, \dots, \mathbf{j}'_t) \in (\mathbb{F}^{m-1})^t$ . Lastly, for every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , let  $f^{(b)}(\cdot) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} f(b, \cdot)$  and let  $\delta^{(b)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Delta(f^{(b)}, \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}^{(b)}))$ .

Our goal will be to show that the input  $f'$  for the recursive step (i.e., Step 11) has distance roughly  $2\delta$  from the corresponding PVAL instance (i.e., the distance doubles). This is done in two steps: showing that  $f'$  has distance roughly  $\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)}$ , and that this quantity is lower bounded by  $2\delta$ . Since it is simpler, we start with the latter step.

**Claim 6.2**

$$\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)} \geq 2\delta.$$

*Proof.* For every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , let  $P^{(b)} : \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  such that  $P^{(b)} \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}^{(b)})$  and  $\Delta(P^{(b)}, f^{(b)}) = \delta^{(b)}$ . Such a  $P^{(b)}$  exists as long as  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}^{(b)}) \neq \emptyset$  and note that otherwise  $\delta^{(b)}$  is infinite and the claim clearly holds).

Consider the function  $P : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  defined as  $P(b, \mathbf{x}) = P^{(b)}(\mathbf{x})$ . Observe that  $\Delta(P, f) = \frac{\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)}}{2}$ . On the other hand, for every  $i \in [t]$ ,  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and  $(j_1, \dots, j_m) \in \mathbb{F}^m$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{P}(j_1, \dots, j_m) &= (1 - j_1) \cdot \hat{P}(0, j_2, \dots, j_m) + j_1 \cdot \hat{P}(1, j_2, \dots, j_m) \\ &= (1 - j_1) \cdot \hat{P}^{(0)}(j_2, \dots, j_m) + j_1 \cdot \hat{P}^{(1)}(j_2, \dots, j_m), \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where both equalities can be verified by observing that they hold for all  $(j_1, \dots, j_m) \in \{0, 1\}^m$ , and therefore hold also for all  $(j_1, \dots, j_m) \in \mathbb{F}^m$  (since two multilinear polynomials that agree on the Boolean hypercube agree everywhere).

Thus, for every  $i \in [t]$ , it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{P}(\mathbf{j}_i) &= (1 - \chi_i) \cdot \hat{P}^{(0)}(\mathbf{j}'_i) + \chi_i \cdot \hat{P}^{(1)}(\mathbf{j}'_i) \\ &= (1 - \chi_i) \cdot \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(0)} + \chi_i \cdot \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(1)} \\ &= v_i, \end{aligned}$$

where the first equality is by Eq. (4), the second equality follows from the fact that  $P^{(b)} \in \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}^{(b)})$  and the third equality from Eq. (3).

We conclude that  $f$  is  $\left(\frac{\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)}}{2}\right)$ -close to  $\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}, \mathbf{v})$  and so  $\frac{\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)}}{2} \geq \delta$ .

Now, let  $\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)} \leftarrow \Pi$  be the permutations sampled randomly by the verifier in Step 6 and let  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t \in \mathbb{F}$  be the random values sampled in Step 7. As in the protocol, let  $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$  be the unique degree  $3t - 1$  curve such that  $\mathcal{C}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) = (\pi^{(b)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'_i)$ , for every  $i \in [t]$  and  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , and  $\mathcal{C}(\lambda_i^{(\perp)}) = \rho_i$ , for every  $i \in [t]$ . Let  $\tilde{g}^{(0)}$  and  $\tilde{g}^{(1)}$  be the degree  $O(m \cdot t)$  univariate polynomials sent by  $\hat{P}$  in Step 8. Note that  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\tilde{g}^{(0)}$  and  $\tilde{g}^{(1)}$  are all random variables that depend on  $\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}$  and  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t$ .

We may assume without loss of generality that for every choice of  $\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_t$  made by the verifier it holds that

$$\forall i \in [t], b \in \{0, 1\} : \tilde{g}_i^{(b)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) = \tilde{\zeta}_i^{(b)}, \quad (5)$$

since otherwise the verifier immediately rejects in Step 9. Thus, we can modify the prover  $\tilde{P}$  to *always* send polynomials satisfying Eq. (5) without decreasing  $\tilde{P}$ 's success probability.

For every  $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}$ , define the function  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}} : \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  as  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}}(\mathbf{x}) = c^{(0)} \cdot f(0, \pi^{(0)}(\mathbf{x})) + c^{(1)} \cdot f(1, \pi^{(1)}(\mathbf{x}))$ .

Recall that  $\delta^{(b)} = \Delta(f^{(b)}, \text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{v}^{(b)}))$ . We now invoke Lemma 5.1 on  $f^{(0)}$  and  $f^{(1)}$  with  $\varepsilon \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \delta_{\text{avg}}/m_0$ , where  $\delta_{\text{avg}} = (\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)})/2$ . We obtain that:

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)} \leftarrow \Pi} \left[ \exists \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w} \in S_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}} \text{ s.t. } \Pr_{c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}} \left[ \delta_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}} < \delta^* \right] > \frac{1}{\varepsilon |\mathbb{F}|} + \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \right] \quad (6)$$

is less than  $\frac{\min(\delta^{(0)}, \delta^{(1)})}{\varepsilon^2 \cdot 2^m} + \frac{2}{2^m}$ , where  $\delta_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}}$  is defined as the distance of  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}}$  from

$$\text{PVAL} \left( 2t, \left( (\pi^{(0)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'), (\pi^{(1)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}') \right), \left( c^{(0)} \cdot (\mathbf{v}^{(0)}, \mathbf{u}) + c^{(1)} \cdot (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}^{(1)}) \right) \right),$$

and

$$\delta^* \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \max \left( \delta_{\text{avg}}, \min \left( \delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)} - \delta^{(0)} \cdot \delta^{(1)} - 2\varepsilon, \lambda/3 - 3\varepsilon \right) \right), \quad (7)$$

and  $S_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{2t}$  is the set of pairs of vectors  $(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w})$  such that the sets  $\text{PVAL}(2t, ((\pi^{(0)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'), (\pi^{(1)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')), (\mathbf{v}^{(0)}, \mathbf{u}))$  and  $\text{PVAL}(2t, ((\pi^{(0)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'), (\pi^{(1)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')), (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{v}^{(1)}))$  are non-empty.

We have that  $\frac{\min(\delta^{(0)}, \delta^{(1)})}{\varepsilon^2 \cdot 2^m} + \frac{2}{2^m} \leq \frac{\delta_{\text{avg}}}{\varepsilon^2 \cdot 2^m} + \frac{2}{2^m} = \frac{m_0^2}{\delta_{\text{avg}} \cdot 2^m} + \frac{2}{2^m} \leq \frac{1}{50m_0}$  and that  $\frac{1}{\varepsilon |\mathbb{F}|} + \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \leq \frac{m_0}{\delta_{\text{avg}} \cdot 2^{m_0}} + \frac{1}{2^{m_0}} \leq \frac{m_0}{\delta_{\text{avg}} \cdot 2^m} + \frac{1}{2^m} \leq \frac{1}{100m_0}$ , where for both we used the fact that  $\delta_{\text{avg}} \geq \delta \geq \frac{100m_0^3}{2^m}$  (by Claim 6.2 and our invariant on  $\delta$ ) and our setting of  $|\mathbb{F}|$  and  $m$ . Thus, Eq. (6) implies that:

$$\Pr_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)} \leftarrow \Pi} \left[ \exists \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w} \in S_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}} \text{ s.t. } \Pr_{c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}} \left[ \delta_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}} < \delta^* \right] > \frac{1}{100m_0} \right] \quad (8)$$

is less than  $\frac{1}{50m_0}$ . We proceed to show that  $\delta^*$  is lower bounded by (roughly)  $2\delta$ .

**Proposition 6.1.**  $\delta^* \geq \min \left( 2\delta \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{2}{m_0} \right), \lambda/100 \right)$ .

*Proof.* Recall that  $\delta^* \geq \delta_{\text{avg}}$  and that  $\delta^* \geq \min(\lambda/3 - 3\varepsilon, \delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)} - \delta^{(0)} \cdot \delta^{(1)} - 2\varepsilon)$  (see Eq. (7)). The proof of the proposition is based on a (somewhat tedious) case analysis.

Suppose first that  $\delta^* \geq \delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)} - \delta^{(0)} \cdot \delta^{(1)} - 2\varepsilon$ . In this case the proposition follows from the following claim:

**Claim 6.3.**  $\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)} - \delta^{(0)} \cdot \delta^{(1)} - 2\varepsilon \geq 2\delta \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{2}{m_0} \right)$ .

*Proof.* By the AM-GM inequality it holds that:

$$\delta^{(0)} + \delta^{(1)} - \delta^{(0)} \cdot \delta^{(1)} \geq 2\delta_{\text{avg}} - \delta_{\text{avg}}^2.$$

We consider two cases. Suppose first that  $\delta_{\text{avg}} \leq 2/m_0$ . Then,

$$2\delta_{\text{avg}} - \delta_{\text{avg}}^2 - 2\varepsilon = 2\delta_{\text{avg}} - \delta_{\text{avg}}^2 - 2\delta_{\text{avg}}/m_0 \geq 2\delta \cdot (1 - 2/m_0),$$

where the inequality is based on Claim 6.2 and our presumed upper bound on  $\delta_{\text{avg}}$ . Thus, we may assume that  $\delta_{\text{avg}} \geq 2/m_0$ . Then,

$$2\delta_{\text{avg}} - \delta_{\text{avg}}^2 - 2\varepsilon \geq \delta_{\text{avg}}/2 \geq 1/m_0 \geq 2\delta \cdot (1 - 2/m_0),$$

where the first inequality holds for sufficiently large  $m_0$  and using the fact that  $\delta_{\text{avg}} \leq 1$  and the last inequality from the fact that  $\delta < \frac{1}{100m_0}$ .

Thus, we may assume that  $\delta^* \geq \lambda/3 - 3\varepsilon$ .

Suppose now that  $\varepsilon < \lambda/300$ . Then, we have that  $\delta \geq \lambda/3 - 3\varepsilon \geq \lambda/100$  and we are done. Thus, we may assume that  $\lambda/300 \leq \varepsilon = \delta_{\text{avg}}/m_0$ . On the other hand, we have that  $\delta^* \geq \delta_{\text{avg}} \geq \frac{m_0}{300} \cdot \lambda \geq \lambda/100$ , for sufficiently large  $m_0$ .

This concludes the proof of Proposition 6.1.

Fix  $\pi^{(0)}$  and  $\pi^{(1)}$  such that the event specified in Eq. (8) does not hold. That is, for every  $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w} \in S_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}}$  it holds that

$$\Pr_{c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}} [\delta_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w}} < \delta^*] \leq \frac{1}{100m_0}.$$

Let  $\mathbf{u} = (\tilde{g}^{(0)}(\lambda_1^{(1)}), \dots, \tilde{g}^{(0)}(\lambda_t^{(1)}))$  and  $\mathbf{w} = (\tilde{g}^{(1)}(\lambda_1^{(0)}), \dots, \tilde{g}^{(1)}(\lambda_t^{(0)}))$ . Suppose that  $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w} \notin S_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}}$  then  $\text{PVAL}(2t, \{\lambda^{(b)}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}, i \in [t]}, \{\tilde{g}^{(b')}(\lambda_i^{(b)})\}_{b \in \{0,1\}, i \in [t]}) = \emptyset$ , for either  $b' = 0$  or  $b' = 1$ . In Step 9 the verifier and prover run an interactive proof to check that this is not the case and so the verifier rejects in this case with probability at least  $1 - \frac{1}{100m_0}$ . Thus, we may assume that  $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{w} \in S_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}}$ .

In particular, this means that for all but  $\frac{1}{100m_0}$  fraction of  $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}$ , it holds that  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}}$  is at distance at least  $\delta^*$  from

$$\text{PVAL}\left(2t, \left((\pi^{(0)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'), (\pi^{(1)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'), (\omega_k)_{k \in [2t]}\right), \right),$$

where  $\omega_{b \cdot t + i} = c^{(0)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(0)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(1)}(\lambda_i^{(b)})$ .

Let us fix  $c^{(0)}$  and  $c^{(1)}$  such that the foregoing statement holds. Let

$$\delta' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \min\left(2\delta \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right), (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}\right) \quad (9)$$

and observe that by Proposition 6.1 (and the invariant lower bound on  $\lambda$ ), it holds that  $\delta' \leq \delta^*$ .



**Claim 6.4.** *With all but  $\frac{1}{100m_0}$  probability over the choice of  $\xi_1, \dots, \xi_t \in \mathbb{F}$  it holds that the function  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}}$  is at distance at least  $\delta'$  from the set*

$$\text{PVAL} \left( t, (\mathcal{C}(\xi_i))_{i \in [t]}, \left( c^{(0)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(0)}(\xi_i) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}^{(1)}(\xi_i) \right)_{i \in [t]} \right).$$

*Proof.* Fix some  $h : \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  at relative distance  $\leq \delta' \leq \delta^*$  from  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}}$ . By our assumption on  $c^{(0)}$  and  $c^{(1)}$  we have  $h \notin \text{PVAL} \left( 2t, ((\pi^{(0)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}'), (\pi^{(1)})^{-1}(\mathbf{j}')), (\omega_k)_{k \in [2t]} \right)$ , where  $\omega_{b \cdot t + i} = c^{(0)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(0)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(1)}(\lambda_i^{(b)})$ . In particular, this means that there exists some  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and  $i \in [t]$  such that:

$$\hat{h} \left( \mathcal{C}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) \right) \neq c^{(0)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(0)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(1)}(\lambda_i^{(b)}).$$

The functions  $\hat{h} \circ \mathcal{C}$  and  $c^{(0)} \cdot \tilde{g}^{(0)}(\cdot) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}^{(1)}(\cdot)$  are therefore *different* polynomials of degree  $O(m \cdot t)$ . Thus, the probability over a random  $\xi \in \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$  that  $\hat{h}(\mathcal{C}(\xi)) = \tilde{g}^{(0)}(\xi) + c \cdot \tilde{g}^{(1)}(\xi)$  is at most  $O(m \cdot t / |\mathbb{F}|) \leq 1/2$ . Therefore, the probability that  $h \in \text{PVAL} \left( t, (\mathcal{C}(\xi_i))_{i \in [t]}, \left( \tilde{g}_i^{(0)}(\xi_i) + c \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(1)}(\xi_i) \right)_{i \in [t]} \right)$  is at most  $2^{-t}$ .

The number of functions  $h : \{0, 1\}^{m-1} \rightarrow |\mathbb{F}|$  that are  $\delta'$ -close to  $f'_{\pi, c}$  is upper bounded by  $(2^{m-1} \cdot |\mathbb{F}|)^{\delta' \cdot 2^{m-1}} \leq 2^{\delta' \cdot 2^m \cdot m \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|)}$ . Therefore, by a union bound, we have that  $f'_{\pi, c}$  is  $\delta'$ -far from  $\text{PVAL} \left( t, (\mathcal{C}(\xi_i))_{i \in [t]}, c^{(0)} \cdot \left( \tilde{g}_i^{(0)}(\xi_i) + c^{(1)} \cdot \tilde{g}_i^{(1)}(\xi_i) \right)_{i \in [t]} \right)$ , with all but  $2^{\delta' \cdot 2^m \cdot m \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|) - t}$  probability. Since  $\delta' \leq (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}$ , we have that this probability is upper bounded by  $\frac{1}{100m_0}$ .

Assuming that the event stated in Claim 6.4 holds, the protocol is run recursively on input  $f'_{\pi^{(0)}, \pi^{(1)}, c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}}$  that is at least  $\delta'$ -far from the relevant PVAL instance. At this point we would like to argue that by the inductive hypothesis, the verifier rejects with high probability. However, to do so, we still need to argue that the recursive invocation satisfies all the prescribed invariants.

**Claim 6.5.**  $\delta' \geq \frac{200m_0^3}{2^{m-1}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{m_0 - (m-1)}$ .

*Proof.* We consider two cases. If  $\delta' = 2\delta \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)$  then:

$$\delta' \geq 2 \left( \frac{200m_0^3}{2^m} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{m_0 - m} \right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right) = \frac{200m_0^3}{2^{m-1}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{m_0 - (m-1)},$$

as required. Otherwise,

$$\delta' = (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2} \geq \frac{200m_0^3}{2^{m-1}} \geq \frac{200m_0^3}{2^{m-1}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{m_0 - (m-1)},$$

where the first inequality follows from the fact that  $m_0 \leq t^{1/5}/14$ .

**Claim 6.6.** *With all but  $\frac{1}{100m_0}$  probability over the choice of  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t$  and  $\xi_1, \dots, \xi_t$ , it holds that  $\lambda' \geq (t/2^{m-1}) \cdot \frac{1}{14m_0^2}$ , where  $\lambda' = \Delta(\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{0}))$ .*

*Proof.* Observe that  $\xi_1, \dots, \xi_t \notin \{\lambda_i^{(b)}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}, i \in [t]}$  with probability  $1 - \frac{2t^2}{|\mathbb{F}|} \geq 1 - \frac{1}{200m_0}$ .

Since the curve  $\mathcal{C}$  passes through  $t$  random points (i.e.,  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t$ ), the distribution over points through which the curve  $\mathcal{C}$  passes is  $t$ -wise independent, other than at the fixed points  $\{\lambda_i^{(b)}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}, i \in [t]}$ . Putting the above two facts together, we obtain that with all but  $\frac{1}{200m_0}$  probability, the set of points  $\mathbf{j}' = (\mathcal{C}(\xi_1), \dots, \mathcal{C}(\xi_t))$  is uniformly distributed in  $(\mathbb{F}^{m-1})^t$ .

Recall that  $\lambda' = \Delta(\text{PVAL}(t, \mathbf{j}', \mathbf{0}))$ . By Proposition 5.1, since  $t \geq \frac{t}{14m_0^2} \cdot \log(2^m \cdot |\mathbb{F}|) + \log(200m_0)$ ,

$$\Pr \left[ \lambda' \leq (t/2^{m-1}) \cdot \frac{1}{14m_0^2} \right] < \frac{1}{200m_0},$$

and the claim follows.

Thus, the invariants for the recursive step are satisfied and so the verifier accepts in the recursion with probability at most  $\frac{m-1}{10m_0} + 1/100$ . Overall, by accounting for all of the bad events in the analysis above, we get that the verifier accepts with probability at most:

$$\frac{m-1}{10m_0} + 1/100 + 5 \cdot \frac{1}{100m_0} \leq \frac{m}{10m_0} + 1/100$$

as required.

### 6.3 Complexity

*Communication Complexity.* We first analyze the complexity of a single iteration (i.e., excluding the recursion). The verifier only sends to the prover a specification of the permutations  $\pi^{(0)}$  and  $\pi^{(1)}$  (which take  $2m$  bits each), the values  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_t, \xi_1, \dots, \xi_t \in \mathbb{F}$  and  $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)} \in \mathbb{F}$ . Overall the verifier-to-prover communication is  $2m + (2t + 1) \cdot \log_2(|\mathbb{F}|)$ . The prover in turn sends  $(c_i^{(b)})_{i \in [t], b \in \{0,1\}}$  and the polynomials  $\tilde{g}^{(0)}$  and  $\tilde{g}^{(1)}$  (of degree  $O(t \cdot m)$ ). Thus, the total prover to verifier communication is  $O(t \cdot m \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$ .

Thus, the overall communication complexity is given by  $cc(m)$  where  $cc(m) = O(t \cdot m \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|)) + cc(m-1)$  if  $m > \log(t)$  and  $cc(m) = 2^m \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|)$  otherwise. Overall we have  $cc(m) \leq O(m^2 \cdot t \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$ .

*Query Complexity.* Denote the query complexity by  $q(m, \delta)$ . Note that if  $m \leq \log(t)$  then  $q(m, \delta) = O(1/\delta)$  and otherwise  $q(m, \delta) = 2 \cdot q(m-1, \delta') = 2q\left(m-1, \min\left(2\delta \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right), (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}\right)\right)$ . The stated query complexity follows from the following claim.

**Claim 6.7.** *There exists a fixed constant  $c$  such that for every  $m$  and  $\delta$  it holds that  $q(m, \delta) \leq c \cdot (1 - \frac{2}{m_0})^{-m} \cdot \max\left(\frac{1}{\delta}, \frac{2800 \cdot 2^m \cdot m_0^2}{t}\right)$ .*

*Proof.* We prove by induction on  $m$ . The base case  $m = \log(t)$  is immediate. Suppose that the claim holds for  $m - 1$ . Then:

$$q(m, \delta) = 2q\left(m - 1, \min\left(2\delta \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right), (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}\right)\right)$$

Suppose first that  $2\delta \cdot (1 - \frac{2}{m_0}) < (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} q(m, \delta) &= 2q\left(m - 1, 2\delta \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)\right) \\ &\leq 2c \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{-(m-1)} \cdot \max\left(\frac{1}{2\delta \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)}, \frac{2^{m-1} \cdot m_0^2}{t}\right) \\ &= c \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{-m} \cdot \max\left(\frac{1}{\delta}, \frac{2^m \cdot m_0^2}{t}\right) \end{aligned}$$

as required. Otherwise,  $2\delta \cdot (1 - \frac{2}{m_0}) \geq (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}$  and we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} q(m, \delta) &= 2q\left(m - 1, (t/2^m) \cdot \frac{1}{1400m_0^2}\right) \\ &\leq 2c \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{-(m-1)} \cdot \max\left(\frac{1400 \cdot 2^m \cdot m_0^2}{t}, \frac{2800 \cdot 2^{m-1} \cdot m_0^2}{t}\right) \\ &\leq c \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{-m} \cdot \frac{2800 \cdot 2^m \cdot m_0^2}{t} \\ &\leq c \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{m_0}\right)^{-m} \cdot \max\left(\frac{1}{\delta}, \frac{2800 \cdot 2^m \cdot m_0^2}{t}\right). \end{aligned}$$

*Prover Runtime.* In every iteration, the prover only does elementary manipulations of the truth table of  $f$  (and never needs to fully materialize the truth table of  $\hat{f}$ ). It also runs the prover of Lemma 5.2. Overall its running time is  $\text{poly}(2^m, m_0, \log(|\mathbb{F}|), t) = \text{poly}(2^{m_0})$ .

*Verifier Runtime and Succinct Description.* The queries made by the verifier can be succinctly specified by the permutations  $\pi^{(0)}$  and  $\pi^{(1)}$  used through the recursion as well as the random locations that it queries in the base case. The total number of bits needed to describe the permutations is at most  $2(m_0)^2$ . The number of bits needed in the base case is equal to the total number of queries divided by  $2^{m_0}/t$  (since in each of the  $m_0 - \log(t)$  iterations the number of queries doubled) and multiplied by  $\log(2^m) = m$  (to specify the location). By the above analysis this quantity is therefore upper bounded by  $O\left(\frac{t \cdot m_0}{2^{m_0}} \cdot \max\left(1/\delta, \frac{2^{m_0}}{t} \cdot \text{poly}(m)\right)\right) = O(\text{poly}(m) + \frac{t \cdot m_0}{2^{m_0}} \cdot (1/\delta))$ . If  $\delta > (t/2^{m_0}) \cdot \frac{1}{\text{poly}(m)}$  this string has  $\text{poly}(m)$  length as required.

Given the set of base points we can generate the list of  $q$  queries by repeatedly applying the two permutations that we have for each level of the recursion. Since the permutations can be computed in  $\text{poly}(m)$  time (see Proposition 3.1), we obtain that a logspace Turing machine can generate a  $\text{poly}(m)$  depth circuit that outputs the entire set of  $q$  query locations.

As for the succinct description of the verification predicate, observe that all of the verifier’s checks that do not involve the input can be implemented in time  $\text{poly}(t, m_0, \log(|\mathbb{F}|)) = \text{poly}(t)$ . The testing of the actual input only happens in the case in which the prover sends over the alleged actual input  $\tilde{f}_\perp$  (which at the end of the recursion has length  $t \cdot \log(|\mathbb{F}|)$ ). This string  $\tilde{f}_\perp$  is part of the description of the verification predicate, together also with all of the  $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}$  values generated in the recursion. Using these values it is possible to construct a  $q \cdot \text{poly}(m_0, \log(|\mathbb{F}|))$  size depth  $\text{poly}(m_0)$  circuit that given the query answers checks their consistency with  $\tilde{f}_\perp$ .

## 7 Proving Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2

Theorem 4.1 follows immediately by combining [RVW13, Theorem 1.3] with Theorem 6.1, while setting  $t = \delta \cdot n \cdot \text{polylog}(n)$ .

In order to prove Theorem 4.2 we utilize an idea from the work of Reingold *et al.* [RRR18] who used known IPP protocols to achieve batch verification for UP languages. We restate a more general form of their reduction below. In the interest of directness, we avoid defining or using Interactive Witness Verification protocols, as they did. Instead, we use IPPs for pair languages:

**Theorem 7.1 (From IPPs to UP batch verification (generalization of [RRR18, Theorem 3.3])).** *Suppose that for every query parameter  $q = q(n) \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ , and for every pair languages  $\mathcal{L}$  that can be computed by log-space uniform polynomial-size circuits with fan-in 2 and depth  $D = D(n)$ , there exists an interactive proof of proximity where the verifier is public-coin and, on input  $(x, y)$ , at the end of the interaction either the verifier rejects, or it outputs a succinct description  $\langle Q \rangle$  of a set  $Q \subseteq [|y|]$  of size  $q$  and succinct description  $\langle \phi \rangle$  of a predicate  $\phi : \{0, 1\}^q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and for every input pair  $(x, y)$ :*

- **Completeness:** *If  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{L}$  then*

$$\Pr [\mathcal{V} \text{ does not reject and } \phi(y_Q) = 1] = 1.$$

- **Soundness:** *If  $\mathcal{L}(x) = \emptyset$  (there is no  $y'$  s.t.  $(x, y') \in \mathcal{L}$ ), then for every prover  $\mathcal{P}^*$ :*

$$\Pr [\mathcal{V} \text{ does not reject and } \phi(y_Q) = 1] \leq 1/2.$$

Let  $\text{cc} = \text{cc}(q, D, n, m)$  be the communication complexity,  $r = r(q, D, n, m)$  the number of rounds,  $\mathcal{V}\text{time}(q, D, n, m)$  the verifier’s runtime, and assume that the honest prover runs in polynomial time.

Then, for every UP language  $\mathcal{L}$  with witness length  $m = m(n)$ , whose witness relation can be computed in NC, there exists a public-coin interactive proof (with

perfect completeness) for verifying that  $k$  instances  $x_1, \dots, x_k$ , each of length  $n$ , are all in  $\mathcal{L}$ . Taking  $D' = \text{polylog}(n, k)$  and  $m' = k \cdot m$ , the complexity of the protocol is as follows:

- Communication complexity:  $O\left(m + \sum_{i=1}^{\log k} \text{cc}\left(\frac{k}{2^i}, D', \frac{n'}{2^i}, \frac{m'}{2^i}\right)\right)$ .
- Number of rounds:  $O\left(\sum_{i=1}^{\log k} r\left(\frac{k}{2^i}, D', \frac{n'}{2^i}, \frac{m'}{2^i}\right)\right)$ .
- Verifier runtime:  $O\left(m \log n + \sum_{i=1}^{\log k} \mathcal{V}\text{time}\left(\frac{k}{2^i}, D', \frac{n'}{2^i}, \frac{m'}{2^i}\right)\right)$ .
- The honest prover, given the  $k$  unique witnesses, runs in polynomial time.

Theorem 4.2 now follows from Theorem 7.1 by utilizing the efficient IPPs for NC given in Theorem 4.1.

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