Education in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Issues, Concerns and Prospects 54

Zhidong Hao
Peter Zabielskis *Editors*

Academic Freedom Under Siege

Higher Education in East Asia, the U.S. and Australia

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When that project was finished, we thought that we should include more jurisdictions and publish an edited volume. So we invited professors who studied Japan, South Korea, and Australia to join us. They gracefully accepted our invitation and now we have a chapter from each of those jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong team expanded, and we have also included another chapter on China. We want to thank all the authors in this book for their collective effort in making this book possible.

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We hope our readers like it and will find it relevant to their own endeavors and concerns.

Zhidong Hao
Peter Zabielskis

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Chapter 1
Academic Freedom Under Siege: What, Why, and What Is to Be Done

Zhidong Hao

Academic freedom is under siege everywhere in the world, and it cannot be taken for granted. Core academic values such as academic freedom, institutional autonomy, social responsibility, equity, integrity, etc. "need to be nurtured, actively pursued and defended" (Stølen and Gornitzka 2019; see also Myklebust 2019). This is true not only under authoritarianism and dictatorships but also in democracies (Scholars at Risk 2018a; Teichler et al. 2013; Tierney and Lanford 2014: 11–14). Some argue that academic freedom should be recognized as a transnational right "anchored in the political and intellectual history of different cultures and regions across the world" (Hoodfar 2017). Most recently, members of the European Parliament adopted a report that recommended making academic freedom a human rights consideration in EU's foreign policies (Scholars at Risk 2018b). A declaration from 1988 of the core values of the university, called Magna Charta Universitatum and signed since then by 906 universities worldwide, is now being updated and will be finalized by 2020 in light of the current situation (Stølen and Gornitzka 2019).

The examination of universities in some Asia-Pacific countries and regions in this book demonstrates how and why academic freedom is under siege and needs to be actively nurtured, pursued, and defended. The jurisdictions this book covers range from democracies such as the USA, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, through semi-democracies such as Hong Kong and Macau, to authoritarianism/dictatorship like mainland China. Although the problem manifests itself to different degrees in different political systems and cultures, commonalities abound (see also Tierney and Lanford 2014). For example, each jurisdiction has a different set of historical and political contexts and contemporary symptoms. Nationalism plays a more important role in East Asia in impeding academic freedom than in the USA. And in general the more democratic a country or region is, the more academic

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freedom there will be and vice versa. But the erosion or lack of academic freedom is found across all jurisdictions despite all these differences. And the nature of constraints and restraints of academic freedom is the same.

The pursuit of academic freedom is a historical as well as contemporary struggle. As Tierney and Lanford (2014: 8–9) point out, European universities in the Middle Ages were partly self-governing, but their charters of government could always be amended or taken away by the Pope or the Emperor. When the modern conception of academic freedom (i.e., *Lehrfreiheit*, "the right of the university professor to freedom of inquiry and to freedom of teaching, the right to study and to report on his findings in an atmosphere of consent") was developed in Europe, especially in Germany, in the late nineteenth century, and the European academy was vastly expanded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "the president and board of trustees of an institution retained power over daily activities." Scholars in various disciplines then "created groups, unions, professional associations, and/or national associations to advance the rights of faculty and the notion of academic freedom." Since then a seesaw battle has been engaged between the profession and the powers that be. In the contemporary era, the academic profession is again facing an uphill battle in promoting and protecting academic freedom. We need to better understand how and why academic freedom is under siege and what can be done so that higher education can function as a common good searching for truth and its exposition, thereby benefiting the entire society politically, economically, socially, and culturally (see also Tierney and Lanford 2014: 7).

In this introductory chapter, I discuss what is academic freedom; why it is a universal value; how academic freedom is under siege, including shared governance and tenure, the pursuit of international rankings, student evaluations of teaching, extramural speech, etc.; why it is under siege, i.e., the ideological and political factors underlying the erosion of academic freedom; and what can be done to promote and protect academic freedom. In doing so, I cite the chapters in the book as well as other relevant literature. I am hoping that the reader will have a better idea of what the current status of the profession is like regarding academic freedom and what the stakeholders of higher education need to do in enhancing this public good.

1.1 Defining Academic Freedom

Academic freedom is a cultural construct composed of a belief, a value, and a set of norms. The American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments" is still arguably the most authoritative explanation of the concept. As a belief, academic freedom assumes that institutions of higher learning are "conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition" (AAUP 2001: 3; see also Scott 2019). This would also include free pursuit of extramural activities, e.g., writing and speaking

as citizens free from institutional censorship or discipline, although when they write and speak they should emphasize accuracy, exercise appropriate restraint, and show respect for the opinions of others (AAUP 2001: 4). We can see how this conception is related to the early European notion of the term, but it is more nuanced and developed.

Derived from this belief is the value of the essential freedom of research, teaching, and service in advancing truth. This value of freedom is more likely promoted in democracies than under authoritarianism, but it manifests itself across all the political spectrums we discuss in this book. We will further discuss this issue in the next section.

Academic freedom also refers to a set of norms, including shared governance (or faculty governance) and tenure, which are means to achieve the end of free research, teaching, and service for the common good. Shared governance means "appropriately shared responsibility and cooperative action among the components of the academic institution" (AAUP 2001: 217), especially between faculty and administration, over matters of the selection of a new president, academic deans, and other chief academic officers (AAUP 2001: 219), while the faculty has "primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process" (AAUP 2001: 221). Tenure means the permanent or continuous employment of teachers after a probationary period except in the cases of moral turpitude, retirement for age, or extraordinary circumstances of financial exigencies (p. 4). Tenure is a precondition of shared governance and thus of academic freedom (see also Tierney and Lanford 2014 and Chap. 2 for more on the genesis of academic freedom and tenure).

1.2 Academic Freedom as a Universal Value

In October 1998, UNESCO convened its first-ever World Conference on Higher Education in Paris, with 4,000 representatives from 182 states, including teachers, researchers, students, and members of parliament, of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and of the world of work and business, financial institutions, publishing houses, etc. (UNESCO 1998). The Conference adopted the "World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-first Century: Vision and Action." In Article 2 of the Declaration, the Conference states that higher education institutions (HEIs) and their personnel and students should "enjoy full academic autonomy and freedom, conceived as a set of rights and duties, while being fully responsible and accountable to society" (p. 22). This definition of academic freedom, at least the belief and value of it, corresponds to the AAUP definition above.

That academic freedom is a universal value, or what Tierney and Lanford (2014) also call "transcendent value," is demonstrated not only by the fact that the above Declaration was signed by representatives of almost all the nation-states in the world but that it is a demonstrated value in China's modern history of higher

education as well. Although the concept of academic freedom has evolved and been interpreted and practiced or constrained differently in different political, cultural, and historical contexts (Marginson 2014), it is increasingly becoming a universally recognized one due to globalization.

In Japan, the institutions and practices of faculty self-governance were established during the Meiji era (1868–1912, see Chap. 9). In China, the Imperial University, the predecessor of Peking University, was established in 1898 under the influence of progressive intellectuals from the Hundred Day Reform Movement. "It was patterned after the University of Tokyo, which in turn had been influenced by both French and German academic patterns" (Hayhoe 1996: 18; also cited in Rhoads et al. 2014: 65). It was renamed the National Beijing University after the 1911 revolution and became the first modern university in China. It is true that the concepts of institutional autonomy and academic freedom did not exist in traditional China (Hayhoe 1996: 9, 2011: 17); rather, self-mastery and intellectual freedom with Chinese characteristics were more likely their substitutes (Chapman et al. 2010: 14; Hayhoe 1996; Jun Li 2016: 23). But these ideas did develop further toward the Western interpretation in modern times.

When Cai Yuanpei became the president of Peking University in 1916, he adopted the principle of *sixiang ziyou, jianrong bingbao* (freedom of thinking and accommodation of different viewpoints). The university was going to be a place "where different ideas and values of Orient and Occident, antiquity and modernity, could be studied objectively, debated freely, and selected discriminately" (Israel 1998: 119, cited in Rhoads et al. 2014: 67; see also Weiling Deng 2016: 126 on this same point). Indeed, on one hand, he hired radical revolutionaries like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, who later founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); on the other hand, he hired skeptical historian Gu Jiegang and Qing Dynasty loyalist Gu Hongming. Academic freedom was apparently on his mind. Soon Peking University played a key role in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 which was characterized by science and democracy. This tradition of faculty governance (*jiaoshou zhixiao*) and academic freedom, inherited mostly from a Western tradition, was solidified by Xinan Lianda (Southwest Associated University, composed of Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Nankai University) in Yunnan during the war against Japan in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Du Shengyan 2017: 520–21).

Even in contemporary authoritarian China, Peking University still officially claims on its website that academic freedom is one of its major principles. Hao Ping (2018), the CCP Party Secretary of Peking University and Chair of the University Council at the time, states in his message in the latter capacity: "Peking University is also renowned for its respected educational leaders and faculties, distinguished scholars, active student body, and an [sic] spirit of 'academic freedom and inclusiveness.'" This spirit is what Cai Yuanpei advocated as *sixiang ziyou, jianrong bingbao*. Lin Jianhua (2018), the then president of Peking University, also relays the same message: "With our democratic administration laying great emphasis on academic freedom and scientific research, we have proudly produced a great number of scholars in various areas of concentration and specialty." Lin even claims that his is a "democratic administration." The insistence on academic freedom and critical

thinking by the authorities is also clear in the official documents and declarations of the elite university in one of our case studies in Chap. 5.

This spirit of democracy and academic freedom is echoed by faculty members as well although their response is mostly about the lack of them. In their investigation on research universities in China, Rhoads et al. (2014) studied four elite universities in Beijing: Tsinghua University, Peking University, Renmin University, and Minzu (Chinese nationalities) University. At Tsinghua University, professors were concerned about the degree to which they can pursue a full range of scholarly interests (Rhoads et al. 2014: 39). One professor reported his failure to find a publisher in China to accept his manuscript on oral histories of farmers (p. 40), apparently for political reasons. Peking University was to screen students with "radical thoughts" or "independent lifestyles" (p. 88). One of the consistent themes that arose from their discussion with faculty members at Renmin University was academic freedom, or more accurately the lack of it (pp. 101, 103). Zhang Ming, a political scientist, was removed from his post as department chair because of his criticism of the university administration (p. 121). As also mentioned in Chap. 4 of this book, a professor of Uyghur nationality from Minzu University has been sentenced to life in prison for his criticism of China's nationality policies.

It is true that the Higher Education Law of the People's Republic of China does not mention the phrase "academic freedom." But in Article 10 of the law, it does stipulate: "The State, in accordance with law, ensures the freedoms of scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activities conducted in higher education institutions" (Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China 2009). All jurisdictions in this book, democratic or not, view academic freedom as crucial in their institutions of higher education. In light of the declaration of the World Conference on Higher Education and both the Chinese official and grassroots level discourses on the concept, it is fair to conclude that academic freedom is a universal value. Along with it there is a belief and a set of norms. Norms can be different but the belief and value are the same.

As I mentioned above, Hoodfar (2017) goes even further. She says that "academic freedom is the right to think outside the box and reflect on issues critically." And more importantly, it is a transnational right, echoing the view above that it is a universal value. It should not be that one has critical thinking and academic freedom in Canada or the USA, and then once one has entered into the air space of Iran or China, he or she will lose that right.

1.3 Academic Freedom Under Siege

The belief, value, and norms of academic freedom mentioned above are the ideal, a goal for academics to achieve. In reality, few have fully achieved that goal no matter the political inclination of the state they are in. As I said at the beginning of the chapter, academic freedom is fractured or otherwise threatened in almost all the jurisdictions we examine, not only in the usual suspect jurisdictions like

authoritarian mainland China but also in semi-democracies like Hong Kong and Macau and democracies like the USA and Australia which have a fairly strong tradition of academic freedom (see Chap. 11 for more on the institutional and cultural commitments to academic freedom in Australia).

Here are more examples in some other parts of the world. Yale-NUS (National University of Singapore) canceled a course on dissent, apparently because universities cannot be used "to sow dissent against the government" as Singapore's Education Minister Ong Ye Kung charged in a speech to parliament (Sharma 2019). In the UK, the Government's anti-extremism agenda has been used to create an expansive surveillance of the public, including students and professors, and to police dissent, while the institutional and legal mechanisms for protecting academic freedom are either weak or absent (Allen 2019). Audit frameworks of research and teaching and administrative exercises that follow strict market logic also place restrictions on faculty's academic pursuit there. In Italy, the far-right governing party, the League, is now beginning to attack universities as leftist bastions, and a local branch party representative argued that academics have a duty of loyalty to the state (Matthews 2019a). In Holland, the Forum for Democracy, a right-wing populist party, is seeking reports of "left indoctrination" at schools and universities, which has brought condemnation from university presidents and rectors (Morgan 2019).

In Russia, like in China, efforts are made to prevent "extremism" and "a color revolution"; as a result, books are removed from library bookshelves and people accused of such "crimes" are imprisoned (Dubrovskiy 2019). As China is resuming some Mao-era control mechanisms, Russia is undergoing what some call "structural Sovietization" (Dubrovskiy 2019). Likewise in Turkey, after co-opting the judiciary and the media, the government has launched an attack on universities by, for example, punishing and threatening to punish with investigations, arrests, interrogations, suspensions, and termination of positions about 2,000 academics for signing a petition denouncing deliberate massacre of Kurds and calling for peace negotiations (Redden 2016). In Hungary, the government has gained "control over the network of research institutes that formerly belonged to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences," arousing concerns within the European Union (Bothwell 2019a).

In India, any discussion about Kashmir is prohibited except to praise the government (Lau 2019). At the University of Delhi, curricula cannot contain controversial or provocative content, and the faculty of sociology, political science, history, and English had to revise their syllabi by, for example, removing some books from students' reading lists. In Brazil, the government tried but failed to eliminate university programs in philosophy and sociology after national and international pushbacks. But an order has been issued to "eliminate the use of the term *gender* in all educational activities supported by the state," and students are "encouraged to make video recordings of teachers or professors if they discuss gender in the classroom and to denounce them to the school administration and the Ministry of Education" (Green 2019).

But people everywhere still strive for the goal of academic freedom as demonstrated in this book. Each chapter here has a different focus on one or more aspects

of this struggle. For example, Chap. 2 is a comparative study on how commercialization and corporatization (C&C) affect faculty's political (organic, professional, and critical) and academic (research, teaching, and service) roles in both the USA and Greater China (including mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan); Chap. 3 is about how C&C affect shared governance in the USA; Chap. 4 is about how professors play their political roles in teaching, research, and service in a provincial university under the circumstances in mainland China; Chap. 5 is on the dual functions of faculty in mainland China, also related to professorial roles but in an elite university; Chap. 6 is about how Hong Kong's academic capitalism affects faculty's education sovereignty; Chap. 7 is on Macau faculty's struggle for professional identity; Chaps. 8, 9, 10 and 11 are discussing C&C and academic freedom in democracies like Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, respectively. Chapter 12 offers some concluding thoughts on the issue. In my discussion in this introductory chapter on the what, why, and how of academic freedom, I will frequently cite these other chapters as well.

I now introduce the major indicators of academic freedom under threat, such as shared governance, tenure, and extramural speech, and some stressors like the rankings game and student evaluations of teaching (SETs). These specific indicators demonstrate the extent to which academic freedom is under siege.

1.3.1 Erosion or a Lack of Shared Governance

One of the major factors leading to the erosion of shared governance is corporatization, and this is a major argument of this book. Universities are increasingly treating themselves as businesses and managing themselves as corporations, which is antithetical to shared governance as we defined it above. A study entitled The Changing Academic Profession (CAP) involving 18 countries and one region found that, across the jurisdictions under study, the power of the university management has increased while faculty role in governance is mixed (Teichler et al. 2013: 114, 171. According to the CAP survey, fewer than two out of every five respondents say that there is collegiality in decision-making, and 73% of the Hong Kong academics felt most frequently a top-down management style, following Australia's 74% (Chap. 2).

It is true that in democracies and even in a semi-democracy like Hong Kong, most academics felt they had some influence in faculty status like choosing new faculty, promotion, and tenure and approving new academic programs. In Japan, academics feel that the faculty committees have much power in "the selecting of key administrators, choosing new faculty, making faculty promotions and tenure decisions, determining budget priorities, determining the overall teaching load of faculty, setting admission standards for undergraduate students, approving new academic programmes, and evaluating teaching" (Morozumi 2015: 325). Indeed there is more shared governance in democracies than in authoritarianism. But no matter where, the power of university management has been strengthened. Autocratic

leaders are on the rise despite the fact that shared governance is still the dominant mode in democracies.

All this directly affects faculty morale. As a recent large survey funded by the TIAA (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America) Institute found out, 42% of the academics identified their leaders as having a negative impact on job satisfaction, while 30% noted a positive impact and 28% were neutral (Webber 2018: 15). We now discuss the eroded and lack of shared governance in democracies, authoritarianism, and semi-democracies respectively, and the importance of faculty organizations.

1.3.1.1 Eroded Shared Governance in Democracies

Chapters 3 and 11 look at an American university and Australian HEIs, respectively, and find that faculty are losing influence in decision-making over a number of issues due to commercialization and corporatization: commercialized research, the development of applied programs for practical purposes, increased use of casualized faculty, budgeting, student-teacher relationship, grade inflation, the dramatic growth of international students mainly for tuition purposes and its ensuing problems, online teaching, teaching load, and the administration's unilateral decision to merge regional campuses—with no consultation with the faculty before the decision was made.

In South Korea as well as Japan to some extent, the government makes the most important decisions on higher educational policies and monitors their implementations (Chaps. 9 and 10). In the American case, neither the AAUP chapter nor the Faculty Senate is truly functioning (Chap. 3). That seems to be a typical problem. As one interviewee in the TIAA Institute funded survey says (Webber 2018: 15):

> University senate and that sort of thing are just sort of sham operations—they don't do anything productive as far as changing real policies of importance.

Another interviewee, apparently an administrator, says:

> I feel that my voice counts for decision making mainly because I make a lot of the decisions [in my role]. But when it comes to the university senate, I believe we have a very, very weak senate.

The first interviewee's words may sound harsh and the reality in most universities may not be that dire, but the erosion of shared governance is real. The National Tertiary Education Union in Australia also lacks clout to influence both enterprise bargaining agreements and individual cases to protect better academic work conditions (Chap. 11).

There are more examples of eroded faculty governance in the USA. At the time of this writing, the University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point announced a plan to cut 13 majors, all liberal arts oriented, "American studies, art (excluding graphic design), English (excluding English for teacher certification), French, geography, geoscience, German, history (excluding social science for teacher certification),

music, literature, philosophy, political science, sociology and Spanish," and to grow more job-oriented fields such as aquaculture, captive wildlife, ecosystem design and remediation, environmental engineering, geographic information science, master of business administration, master of natural resources, and doctor of physical therapy. More importantly, faculty members were not involved in this plan except participation in an earlier survey on what criteria to use for eliminating programs (Flaherty 2018b).

On the other hand, shared governance sometimes can go wrong even when the faculty have it. But it does not mean that it is not needed. It simply means that it should be carefully exercised. On July 6, 2018, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered Marquette University to reinstate and pay damages to John McAdams, a political science professor whose service was discontinued because he criticized a graduate student instructor by name on his own personal blog for the way she handled a classroom discussion (Flaherty 2018a). The majority opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling is that the university violated McAdams' academic freedom by censuring the latter's speech on social media. The minority opinion sided with the university, arguing that McAdams was terminated not because of his writing about the student but because of his using her name and making her vulnerable to harassment. Furthermore, this decision of termination was made after McAdams refused to accept a seven-professor panel's recommendation in 2016 that he be suspended without pay for two semesters.

Procedurally Marquette University followed the principle of shared governance, a normal practice of academic freedom. The conflict is between one aspect of academic freedom, i.e., the protection of extramural speech, which we will further discuss below, and the other aspect of academic freedom, i.e., shared governance and institutional decision-making power. In fact, AAUP earlier had already made an amicus brief on the matter, stating that "a college or university administration cannot discipline a faculty member unless it proves that extramural speech 'clearly demonstrates the faculty member's unfitness to serve,' taking into account the faculty member's entire record as a teacher and a scholar" (Flaherty 2018a). Apparently, Marquette erred in failing to look at the case holistically. The professor should be disciplined but not by being fired. Shared governance can go wrong even if it is an ideal normal practice. But the way to solve the problem is to correct it, not to reduce shared governance.

Overall, however, in democracies faculty are usually intimately involved in the recruitment of new faculty members, tenure, and promotion, and curricular design, although they have little say in many other issues as we discussed above including the selection of academic officers, budgetary decisions, etc. But shared governance in democracies cannot be taken for granted; in fact, it has been seriously eroded. It is still better, though, than in semi-democracies and superior to the practices under authoritarianism.

1.3.1.2 Lack of Shared Governance in Authoritarianism and Semi-democracies

If there are some mechanisms in the USA and other democracies for shared governance, there are few if any in mainland China and Macau. Hong Kong and Taiwan are doing much better in shared governance, but they are also facing challenges (Chaps. 6 and 8).

In China's authoritarianism, with the central government making all the policies in higher education, "institutions and scholars have few opportunities to participate in the process of making academic policy" (Jia Song 2018). As we discuss in Chap. 2 what arises in China is called "administrationization," characterized by centralized policymaking by the Party-state, implemented by its branches at all levels of government. The Party secretary and president of each university function like the CEOs of a company, making all institutional hiring, firing, and budgetary decisions. Academic committees, unions, and professors' conferences are largely window dressing.

Chapters 2, 4, and 5 describe how specifically research and teaching are controlled tightly in mainland China by the Party-state. There is limited room for faculty members to pursue their own interest in research and to teach the contents they want to teach in humanities and social sciences. For more examples, before Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, there was much research on the land reform movement at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, but after that one could find hardly any published papers on that issue. In fact, Tan Song was fired from Chongqing Normal University just because he did research on land reform and talked about it in and outside class (Luo Siling 2017). Other issues they cannot do research on now in China include the Cultural Revolution, civil society, political reform, etc. (see more on this issue below and in Chap. 4). Sun Yat-sen University (2017) in Guangzhou issued a notice to faculty members about ten things they cannot do in class. The top three are criticisms of the Chinese Constitution, criticism of the CCP's leadership in China, and spreading religious superstition (meaning any religion). It is an order from the administration, and faculty members can only follow or there will be consequences. Shared governance is the best practice, but there is almost nothing like that in mainland China.

Faculty members in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (Chaps. 2, 6, 7, and 8) enjoy much more academic freedom in research, teaching, and service than in mainland China. But the picture of shared governance is mixed. Professors can largely decide what to research and teach, but in Macau there are already signs of restriction. For example, faculty members are asked by the administration to report their academic exchanges with scholars from Taiwan, which sends a signal to the faculty that they should refrain from activities related to Taiwan. Nonetheless, academic freedom is largely intact in teaching and research. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, some professors participate in the selection of academic officers, but in Macau the opportunity is close to none. The role of faculty in Macau in the hiring and firing of professors is also very limited. Academic councils and faculty senate play the role of consultation and information sharing rather than collective decision-making in their relationship

with the administration. Faculty associations are rare in Macau, and even if there is one, it is not functioning as an advocacy or bargaining organization.

Chapter 7 mentions the cases of two professors fired in 2014 for extramural political activities or criticism of government officials. In one case, the faculty association was not even consulted on the issue. And the faculty hearing committee was organized by the administration and was biased to begin with. In the recruitment of new faculty members, promotion (there is no tenure in Macau's HEIs), program planning, and the selection of academic officers, faculty have only token involvement. In fact in the selection of the rector at the case university in 2017, no faculty members were on the selection committee. There is no shared governance in Macau's HEIs, and the administration makes almost all the major decisions. It corresponds to the mainland China practices.

Hong Kong is facing a lot of pressure from the Party-state to be more like Macau since it is also governed by the "one country, two systems" principle. In the earlier years after the return of Hong Kong to mainland China, there were already concerns about the future of academic freedom, but faculty were still largely optimistic (Currie et al. 2006). Twenty years later, however, those concerns have been gradually realized: two professors along with seven other social and political activists were tried in court for initiating a peaceful protest movement in favor of democracy and sentenced to prison terms. The academic community largely remained silent (Tierney 2018a). Chapter 6 gives more examples. Taiwan is doing much better, but they have also experienced political interference in the appointment of the president at National Taiwan University (Chap. 8). Still, Taiwan and Hong Kong are doing much better than Macau, which is more and more like mainland China now in the lack of shared governance and academic freedom.

1.3.1.3 The Importance of Faculty Organizations

In democracies, semi-democracies, and even in authoritarianism, faculty organizations are supposed to play an important role in shared governance, but their role is mixed (see Chap. 2). As we have discussed in this chapter, faculty senates and academic councils in the USA often find themselves marginalized and losing power. Most faculty members do not belong to a union or an advocacy organization like the AAUP. There are no independent faculty organizations in mainland China, and those in other parts of Greater China have mixed successes. Hong Kong's faculty associations are fairly strong, but Hong Kong Baptist University's president of the faculty union has just been fired, likely for political reasons (Chap. 6).

This lack of shared governance alienates faculty members and mitigates their institutional loyalty. The level of the feeling of affiliation to one's institution fell from 80% to 63% between 1997 and 2012, according to the CAP survey (Teichler et al. 2013). It is detrimental to the mission of higher education.

1.3.2 Erosion or Lack of Tenure and Job Security

One of the major threats to academic freedom is the increasing use of contingent or casual faculty such as in the USA and Australia and the decreasing number of tenured and tenure-track faculty members. The statistics cited in Chap. 2 are illuminating: in 2009, out of the nearly 1.8 million faculty members and instructors in HEIs in the USA, more than 1.3 million (75%) were in contingent positions off the tenure track (The Coalition of the Academic Workforce 2012: 1, citing 2009 data from the United States Department of Education). There might be some ups and downs over the years, but the general tendency is an erosion of tenure. According to AAUP's (2016: 14) report on the academic profession, for example, in 1975, 45.15% of instructors in the USA were either full-time tenured or tenure-track faculty, while in 2014, that number dwindled to 29.50%. Chapter 3 also discusses the increasing use of part-time faculty members in the case university in the USA. Chapter 11 further discusses how the use of casually employed staff undermines academic freedom in Australia. "The adjunctification of teaching in the United Kingdom passed a tipping point in 2015, when the numbers of academic staff on fixed-term or casual contracts exceeded those in permanent positions" (Allen 2019).

Some states in the USA are moving to restrict or eliminate tenure. In 2015, Wisconsin Governor, Scott Walker, a Republican, "signed into law a budget bill that removes provisions on tenure and shared governance from state law" (Jaschik 2015). It is under such circumstances that the University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point was contemplating closing 13 liberal arts programs and laying off tenured faculty members. In 2018, the legislators in Kentucky were contemplating allowing universities to dismiss tenured faculty members due to program changes or eliminations. Meanwhile the University of Tennessee System was "considering changes in post-tenure review that faculty leaders say will essentially gut tenure" (Jaschik 2018a).

In addition to Wisconsin, Kentucky, and Tennessee, Arkansas has also made explicit policy moves to weaken tenure. Legislators in Iowa and Missouri had introduced proposals which would effectively end tenure. They "didn't get far but it would've been unthinkable a generation ago" (Warner 2018).

Inevitably the threat to the tenure system has to do with budget cuts initiated by the legislative bodies at the state level. Public universities in Kentucky were already talking about deep cuts, and Eastern Kentucky University was considering the elimination of 200 jobs along with program cuts (Jaschik 2018a).

Warner (2018) argues that tenure is already dead, and for many it was never alive, but "the values tenure is meant to promote can and must endure." He believes that "tenure will survive as a kind of status marker for elite institutions," but "it will become increasingly rare, particularly at public colleges and universities. It is already nearly extinct in community colleges." Similarly in Australia, the term "tenure" is now replaced with the word "tenurial," capturing the change that faculty employment is no longer permanent (Chap. 11).

The lack of tenure and job security has dire consequences. It exacerbates faculty reticence to speak out for fear of reprisals in front of increasing workloads and

declining work conditions. Faculty are already silenced, "either implicitly or explicitly, fearing reprisal if they speak freely" (Warner 2018 citing another professor on the loss of tenure or "the soul of higher education," ditto below). Academia is already "less attractive as compared to private industry, resulting in a brain drain out of the academy." Faculty "loyalty and level of engagement in the institutional mission" are already diminished, "affecting governance, advising, and mentoring."

In most universities in Japan, there is no tenure system for determining permanent appointments (Chap. 9). There is no tenure system in mainland China and Macau, either. But there is relative job security although it is based on the condition that faculty members are careful about not running into conflict with their superiors, especially in China and Macau (see the chapters on China and Macau and Scholars at Risk 2019). Hong Kong and Taiwan are doing better, and it is less easy to fire people for political reasons, but it is difficult to say if this will continue in the future as C&C accelerate there.

On the whole, democracies are still doing much better on tenure and job security notwithstanding all the problems they still face. No matter where we are, the lack of job security and fear of reprisal for speaking out are detrimental to the health of not only higher education but the general society as well. And it will lead to more social inequalities and injustices. We will discuss this further in the section on extramural speech.

1.3.3 The University Rankings Game Versus Research and Teaching

As discussed in Chap. 2 the university rankings game is not a serious issue in the USA, since major colleges and universities are well-established historically and do not need to make improving international rankings a mission. Some colleges and universities do provide misinformation to the *US News & World Report* to boost their rankings in the USA—eight of them did so in 2018 (Jaschik 2018d), but it is not a widespread problem and not usually done by world-renowned and well-established universities.

But in what are called "striving" institutions of higher education (Gonzales et al. 2014), such as the major universities in mainland China, the University of Macau, most universities in Hong Kong, and some in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, improving one's position in international rankings is an obsession. For mainland China and other former colonies, this may be a result of colonial psyche and complexes (Chap. 10). Universities will emphasize research more than teaching, and faculty members will have to publish their research in international journals since such publications are counted heavily in the rankings game. As a result, teaching is often relegated to a secondary position, and research neglects local issues. And with the emphasis on research, more teaching is allocated to staff as a punishment for less research (Chaps. 7 and 11).

Some undergraduate students in the Hong Kong case study (Chap. 6) indicate that at least some faculty members and students do not care much about teaching and learning. Some graduate students are complaining that they do not get much help from their supervisors. It seems that much of the student-teacher relationship is very business-like.

Even in Australia rankings are important since they determine whether universities can attract foreign students who will bring in tuition dollars in a time of budget cuts for higher education (Chap. 11). In Taiwan it is done in the name of internationalization, and higher education is viewed as an industry that is full of competition and successes and failures (Chap. 8).

Since local research has fewer chances to get into international journals, scholars are reluctant to do it. Indigenous knowledge is often marginalized. Research is for the sake of improving rankings rather than creating new and locally relevant knowledge. HEIs are not conducted for the common good but mainly serve as a tool of the state for its control as in mainland China and as a mechanism of the striving institutions and individuals for their own reputation. A community of scholars has become an enterprise producing papers to serve the purpose of the Party-state or improve university rankings. Professors' sense of calling in research, teaching, and service is getting lost, and their professional identity eroded.

1.3.4 Student Evaluations of Teaching (SET) and Other Mechanisms of Faculty Control

In democracies and semi-democracies, professors are largely free to decide what and how to teach in their classrooms. But as we discuss in Chap. 2 adjunct professors, especially in for-profit institutions, are much less free to decide on such matters. Furthermore, because SETs are usually the primary indicator of faculty performance when making tenure and/or promotion decisions, professors are often forced to grade their students more leniently to make them happy. This results in grade inflation and lowers the quality of education, which is true across all jurisdictions (see also Lewis 2007; Tong and Liu 2014). Treating students as consumers and seeking to improve customer satisfaction level is part of C&C.

In addition, there is mounting evidence of bias in SETs against female and minority instructors in the USA which negatively affects female and minority faculty members' chances of tenure and promotion. Research also finds that difficult topics one teaches, like statistics, tend to disadvantage the instructor in student evaluations (Flaherty 2017a, b; Grove 2014). In other words, professors are not able to exercise academic freedom in terms of what and how to teach. SETs are doing more harm than good for higher education, and steps need to be taken to reform them and the way they are used.

Indeed SETs have so many problems that the University of Southern California (USC) has decided to stop using them in promotion decisions in favor of

peer-review models (Flaherty 2018c). The University of Oregon is also thinking about replacing traditional SETs and adopting a new tool of non-numerical feedback to evaluate teaching. In fact, the AAUP has urged "chairs, deans, provosts and institutions to end the practice of allowing numerical rankings from student evaluations to serve as the only or the primary indicator of teaching quality, or to be interpreted as expressing the quality of the faculty member's job performance" (cited in Flaherty 2018c).

Under authoritarianism and in semi-democracies, however, there are even more serious and flawed mechanisms of faculty control. In mainland China, there are specific rules as to what to say and what not to say in the classroom. We have already mentioned some in the discussion of shared governance above. Here are the well-known "Seven No's" in both research and teaching, i.e., seven things faculty members are not supposed to do research on or discuss in class: civil society, civil rights, universal values, legal independence, press freedom, the bourgeois class with money and power, and the historical wrongs of the Party (Chaps. 2 and 4). That is why the interviewees in Rhoads and his colleagues' (2014) study all expressed the hope for academic freedom.

There are ubiquitous student informers and surveillance cameras in the classroom that will make sure these rules are followed. Student informers will report to the authorities any violations of the Seven No's in the classroom. It is reported that some informers are directly recruited by the national security and supervision agencies since they do not always trust the university administrators to do the "right" thing and are afraid that they may excuse their professors for their "wrong" doing (Huang Yuxin 2018; Anonymous 2018; see also Xiaojun Yan 2014 on the control and domination of students).

In censorship and self-censorship, Macau is catching up with the mainland, and Hong Kong is catching up with Macau. The Macau government has just established a branch in the government specializing in national security. It is understood that the Central Liaison Office is watching closely what the professors say and do in Macau (see Chap. 7). And there are reports that they asked student informers to tape-record professors' teaching. Hong Kong is fast catching up in censorship and self-censorship with the imposition of a national security law in 2020. One could only hope that Taiwan and other democracies discussed in this book will keep more of their academic freedom in a time of C&C and will stand up to various political pressures which we will discuss later in this chapter.

At any rate, SETs make faculty members self-censor themselves in the classroom to avoid sensitive topics for fear of antagonizing students. They water down the quality of teaching and seriously endanger academic freedom. In democracies, reforms are needed as they have done in the USC and the University of Oregon. Under authoritarianism, faculty members need to keep fighting political censorship and find ways to counter political and ideological control in the classroom as we discuss in Chaps. 4 and 5. In semi-democracies, faculty members need to protect however much academic freedom they have and fend off as much political interference as possible.

1.3.5 Extramural Speech Penalized

Too many times, shared governance fails to protect faculty members for their extramural speech let alone when there is no shared governance. Kenneth Storey lost his job as an adjunct sociology professor at the University of Tampa, Florida, over a 145 word insensitive tweet mocking Republicans over Hurricane Harvey in 2017. At the time of this writing, he was working two part-time jobs, which paid less than a third of what he used to earn, and his rent, car payments and electric bills were all past due (Peters 2018). There was no clear policy and procedure on protections for speech like Storey's at the University of Tampa even though the university's Faculty Handbook uses the AAUP guidelines regarding extramural speech (McNeill 2017). But Storey's example is not an isolated one. As McNeill (2017) points out:

> In recent months, professors from California to New Jersey have been fired for social media posts and speaking appearances. At Fresno State, a lecturer tweeted that President Trump "must hang" to "save American democracy." A professor at Brigham Young University-Idaho wrote a private Facebook post supporting LGBT equality. Both lost their jobs.

In these cases academic freedom is at risk. As one University of Tampa faculty member commented, "I can feel a slight chill in the air over this" (McNeill 2017). Indeed, as Ari Cohn, an attorney with the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education comments, "Other faculty members are going to think twice before speaking publicly, and that's to the detriment of everybody" (McNeill 2017).

University administrations tend to respond to pressure expressed on social media. Kenneth Storey caused a stir online with his tweet. "A #FireKenStorey hashtag spread far beyond the university. Angry Facebook comments piled up" (McNeill 2017). They include angry tweets like this:

> "Don't think this is a school we will be looking at for my daughter anymore," one commenter said. An alumnus wrote, "Good thing I already paid you, because I'll never send the school another dime again."

As McNeill (2017) reports, Storey's name had been:

> added to a website called Professor Watchlist, a project to "expose and document college professors who discriminate against conservative students and advance leftist propaganda in the classroom."

The professor was then fired. Other faculty members felt a chill, as we mentioned above. A group that fights for civil liberties in academe was "disappointed that UT 'caved' to the pressure of 'outrage mobs' online" (McNeill 2017).

Increasingly, social media has become a double-edged sword for academics: They can use it for off-duty speech, or extramural speech, called for by their academic freedom, and they can be hurt by online outrage, justified or not. This is true especially when the administration "caves" in or succumbs to what McNeill (2017) calls "internet crusaders" who "hold serious sway" in this era. The AAUP is calling on "college and university leaders to denounce the targeted online harassment of their faculty members and to more forthrightly defend academic freedom" (cited in McNeill 2017), but it is not clear whether the leaders are listening.

At the time of writing, a professor from Rutgers University, James Livingston, was facing disciplinary action up to and including discharge because of his online speech of what is termed as racist remarks against whites. Right-wing media like *The Daily Caller, The Blaze, The College Fix,* Fox News, and Professor Watchlist all participated in the condemnation of the professor along with online harassment and death threats. The administration felt the pressure and was contemplating disciplinary actions, arguing that "a reasonable [white] student may have concerns that he or she would be stigmatized in his classes because of his or her race. As such, Professor James Livingston's comments violated university policy" (Whitford 2018).

The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) was concerned that "this is part of a trend, and if would-be internet trolls see that flooding universities with hate mail and being loud online is a successful way to silence faculty members whose views they disagree with, that will be repeated" (Whitford 2018). FIRE and Livingston were considering their options for legal action while awaiting university disciplinary decisions. Following the AAUP principles, however, the university would need to prove that white students would be stigmatized in his classes. Otherwise, discharging would not be justified although less serious disciplinary action might be possible since his comments were not very appropriate after all.

The Marquette case we cited earlier originated from an undergraduate's secret recording of his conversation with the graduate student instructor (Flaherty 2018a). The undergraduate student shared the recording with McAdams who

> then wrote about it in a post called "Marquette Philosophy Instructor: 'Gay Rights' Can't Be Discussed in Class Since Any Disagreement Would Offend Gay Students" on his blog, *Marquette Warrior*, which has a wide following in conservative circles.

McAdams was apparently inciting emotions although that was within his rights except that he mentioned the graduate student instructor's name which caused her to face online attack and threats.

Social media is a double-edged sword in other jurisdictions as well although it holds more sway in a democratic country than in a semi-democratic or authoritarian state. In mainland China, social media is the only venue where liberal intellectuals can express their political views since it is less controlled or more difficult to censure by the government than traditional media. But even here, their criticism can be quickly taken off and could still cause them serious consequences. Some of the cases of professors fired because of their online and/or in-class speech criticizing the CCP and its state include Yang Shaozheng of Guizhou University (Ling Yun 2018), Shi Jiepeng of Beijing Normal University (Shi Tao 2017), Wang Gang of Hebei Engineering University and You Shengdong of Xiamen University (Mingpo 2018), Deng Xiangchao of Shangdong Jianzhu University (Lin Ping 2017), Tan Song of Chongqing Normal University (Luo Siling) 2017, etc. This is only a short list of professors sacked for online critical speech (see more examples in Scholars at Risk 2019). Many more got sacked and even more got warnings from their respective universities. Most professors therefore have got the cue and kept silent.

In Hong Kong, 100,000 people placed their signatures online requesting the University of Hong Kong to fire one of its faculty members, Benny Tai, for his

alleged promotion of Hong Kong independence. Tai, a professor of law, was one of the two professors sentenced to prison terms for his role in the Occupy Central movement in 2014 (Zao Bao 2018). The other professor was Chan Kin-man, a sociologist. Tai was fired in 2020, and Chan retired before he went to prison in 2019.

Online attacks on professors and the punishment of academics for their extramural speech and activities severely erode their academic freedom. If there may be some recourse for faculty in democracies, such as faculty organizations and the courts, those in authoritarian regimes have to largely fend for themselves.

1.4 Why Academic Freedom Is Under Siege: Ideologies and Politics

The problems discussed above are arguably a result of both ideologies and politics. By ideologies, I mean academic capitalism derived from neoliberalism mostly in democracies and semi-democracies, and authoritarianism in mostly mainland China but also in Hong Kong and Macau. Ideologies are a major factor influencing academic freedom. Politics refers to the coordination of different stakeholders in higher education, including politicians, judges (especially in democracies), higher education administrators, students, and faculty members. The extent to which there is academic freedom is determined by the struggles among these stakeholders. We will now discuss these two factors respectively although they are related to one another.

1.4.1 Ideological Factors and the Consequences of Eroding Academic Freedom

In democracies and semi-democracies, the major ideology is academic capitalism, which results in commercialization and corporatization that erode academic freedom (see also Tierney and Lanford 2014 on commercialization). Academic capitalism is derived from neoliberalism characterized by managerialism, competition, efficiency, productivity, and accountability (see also Chap. 2; Jung Cheol Shin 2015: 16–17). Rhoades and Slaughter (2004) also discuss how government funding cuts for public higher education are related to the ascendance of neo-liberal and neo-conservative politics and policies.

Academic capitalism is related to economic capitalism (Chap. 6) not only in the democracies we cover in this book but also for semi-democracies and even in Chinese authoritarianism which is arguably capitalism with Chinese characteristics. The entrepreneurial mode of neoliberalism and economic managerialism that emphasizes excellence, cost-effectiveness, and public accountability is now transferred to the governance of higher education (see also Chap. 11). As a result, faculty

is losing power, and austerity has become a *casus belli* for the powers that be to materialize their social and political agenda (Chaps. 9 and 10).

Academic capitalism leads to universities' striving to produce world-class research and attaining institutional prestige in global rankings. Performativity derives from accountability, i.e., universities have to answer for public and private money spent on higher education. Performativity is used in evaluating a professor's research and teaching, both of which have to be quantified and calculable (Chap. 6) as in research production and SETs. Universities have become economic organizations and have created academic dystopia, i.e., the academy is now less of a community that seeks truth and pursues justice.

As is the case in democracies, the Hong Kong government has also cut funding to universities, 4% in 2000, and a further 10% in 2003 (Chap. 6). This leads to the marketization of HEIs that result in massive expansion of self-financed postgraduate programs and of applied research, increased quota for non-local students, the hiring of staff on contract terms and adaptive salaries, and university-industry partnerships which invite conflicts of interest and self-censorship. This is also true in Australia (Chap. 11) where international students account for about one quarter of all HE enrolments nationally and are important in offsetting budget cuts with their tuitions and fees.

As a result of the above, educational sovereignty is eroded. Education is conducted as an economic activity for personal or even partisan political gains rather than for public good. The board of trustees or regents is often predominantly composed of businessmen and women who make sure that HEIs are run as a business just for those purposes.

Furthermore, in the cases of Hong Kong and Macau, "mainlandization" or "intra-nationalization" in city governance further erodes educational sovereignty. After all, the system in Hong Kong and Macau is semi-democratic, as mentioned earlier, which also means that it is semi-authoritarian. The problem is that now it is leaning toward authoritarianism rather than democracy. That does not bode well for academic freedom since academic capitalism is now combined with authoritarianism.

If in democracies and semi-democracies, it is neoliberalism, then in mainland China it is mainly authoritarianism that is restricting academic freedom. The main ideology that governs the management of universities there is Chinese Marxism, which emphasizes that the role of the university is to promote socialism (or capitalism) with Chinese characteristics. Professors are supposed to instill in students' minds the correctness of the CCP and therefore the support of the CCP leadership. Yuan Guiren, the former Minister of Education, directed that Western values not be taught in the Chinese classrooms (see Chap. 5). Only one ideology of Chinese Marxism and one leadership of the CCP are allowed, and they have become the guiding principles of Chinese higher education. Therefore HEIs in mainland China are more likely a tool for ideological control than a place to seek truth. It is therefore understandable why there are Seven No's and other restrictions in place in China's colleges and universities and why professors are fired for violations of them in teaching and research and extramural speech.

As discussed in Chaps. 9 and 10 ideological constraints play a role in faculty research on politically sensitive issues in Japan and South Korea, too, and faculty members are afraid to touch on certain issues like that of the "comfort women" in WWII. Social sciences and humanities are required to fulfill the job needs of society or face consequences. But at least the government does not have as many constraints as there are in mainland China, and academic freedom is still viewed as sacred.

In a nutshell, academic capitalism is one of the underlying factors that dictate C&C which affect shared governance, tenure, the university rankings game, and SETs in democracies, semi-democracies, and authoritarianism (see also Johnson 2019 for the same point). But in the latter two systems, academic capitalism combines with authoritarianism to make the situation even worse. Indeed there is a strong feeling for academic freedom in all these jurisdictions, but it is under siege although at different degrees in different places. It may be a perennial struggle between academic freedom and academic capitalism and authoritarianism.

1.4.2 Political Factors and the Consequences of Eroding Academic Freedom

Politics is another underlying factor that influences academic freedom. We will discuss how politics in democracies, authoritarianism and semi-democracies have eroded academic freedom first. And then we will move on to how Chinese authoritarianism is affecting academic freedom worldwide.

1.4.2.1 Politics in Democracies Eroding Academic Freedom

Academic capitalism is realized through political operations by politicians, legislators, judges, boards of trustees, faculty organizations, etc. As Warner (2018) points out, legislators and boards of trustees "are likely motivated by problems of cost and efficiency, rather than values like freedom and curiosity." Politicians and trustees are less likely to see "tenure as an essential protection, a tenet of democracy, the foundation of academic freedom" or "what allows professors to teach, write, or do research that challenges the status quo without fearing reprisal" (Warner 2018, citing the University of Tennessee professor Monica Black arguing before its board of trustees). Politicians, often with submissive trustees and presidents of universities, tend to make an effort to "alter or curtail expression, research, teaching, or publication, or to impose a regime of orthodoxy" upon the faculty, which threatens "the integrity of strong universities and of vibrant constitutional democracies" (Nichol 2019). In fact, the same happens even more often in semi-democracies and under authoritarianism, which we will discuss in the next section.

We have already given many examples above about how politicians influence tenure and shared governance in universities in democracies. In Taiwan, as we

mentioned earlier, politicians generally do not intervene in academic affairs, but in 2017 the government refused to accept Taiwan University's selection of its president, in disregard of the traditional principles of shared governance (it relented at the end of 2018). In Japan, the government has required national universities to abolish or reorganize social sciences and humanities to make them useful, by their definition, for society and to raise the national flag and sing the national anthem at entrance and graduation ceremonies (Chap. 9), just as they have begun to do at the University of Macau.

In South Korea and Australia, government austerity measures seem to dictate program, faculty, and university mergers. Chapter 10 describes in detail how politicians in South Korea have directly involved themselves in the various reforms of HEIs, both private and public, in the direction of neoliberalism and managerialism resulting in the erosion of academic freedom. The most recent government effort in 2016 was to drastically cut humanities and social sciences enrolments and increase the number of students majoring in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) so that they can raise the graduate employment rate. The heads of state-run research institutes and universities even have to resign in the middle of their terms because of regime change, often interrupting long-term development and research plans of the university (Bothwell 2019b). Similar things have happened in Australia (Chap. 11), where budget cuts and political interference by the Minister of Education vetoed 11 successful peer-reviewed projects in the 2017 Australian Research Council grants worth over AUD$4 million without telling the applicants why they were rejected. Government officials may pay lip service to academic freedom while instituting policies of C&C that hurt it.

In democracies, judges can also play a major role. Judges are supposed to be neutral politically and will adjudicate only according to the law. But judges can also be appointed by political parties or otherwise heavily influenced by politics. Some can be more conservative and others more liberal, but as is in the case of the USA, more and more very conservative and free market-oriented judges have been appointed to the federal judiciary.

It is true that judges, even if conservative judges, can protect academic freedom, as in the case of the Marquette suit. It was the American Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter who, in 1957, asserted "four essential freedoms" of a university: the freedom to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it should be taught, and who may be admitted to study (cited in Thelin 2004, see Chap. 2).

But judges can also hinder academic freedom as in the following cases. Three professors in Texas sued the state for its campus gun carry law. As AAUP states, the campus carry law directly affects academic freedom (cited in Jaschik 2018b):

> It predictably affects not only the choice of course materials, but how a particular professor can and should interact with her students – how far she should press a student or a class to wrestle with unsettling ideas, how trenchantly and forthrightly she can evaluate student work. Permitting handguns in the classroom also affects the extent to which faculty can or should prompt students to challenge each other. The law and policy thus implicate concerns at the very core of academic freedom: They compel faculty to alter their pedagogical

> choices, deprive them of the decision to exclude guns from their classrooms, and censor their protected speech.

A federal appeals court rejected the challenge to the law by these three professors on the ground that there is not enough evidence to show that academic freedom would be impaired (Jaschik 2018b). In South Korea, the Seoul High Court overturned a lower court decision and fined a scholar "for her writings challenging conventional wisdom on the euphemistically termed 'comfort women,' women who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese" during WWII. She was suggesting that not all of the women were coerced (Redden 2017a). Other professors who hold similar views on the same issue are also facing serious backlashes from the administration and civil society groups (Chung 2019). Apparently even judges, who are the last line of defense for academic freedom, may not stand with professors or at least may not always agree with how the latter interpret and use the term.

When the US Supreme Court's conservative majority rules to cut off unions' fair share fees for collective bargaining, the justices are also hurting academic freedom. As Wilson (2018) argues:

> Unions are a leading force protecting faculty rights, and starving them of money will make professors more vulnerable and violate their First Amendment right of association. In particular, the American Association of University Professors, where I work, is the leading defender of academic freedom, and it depends on money from collective bargaining units to sustain the entire organization.

Indeed, faculty organizations are the first line of defense of academic freedom. Any weakening of them is weakening academic freedom. With the conservative judges in the US Supreme Court having a solid majority, faculty organizations will have a difficult time advancing and protecting academic freedom, and universities are less likely to see funding increase for their operation.

1.4.2.2 Politics in Authoritarianism and Semi-democracies Harming Academic Freedom

If there are still some checks and balances in the USA, it is a very different story in mainland China, where the Party, the state, the legislature, the court, and the university administration are one and the same. No independent faculty organizations are allowed so there is no recourse for faculty academic freedom violations. Examples of faculty firing because of sensitive online speech abound as we discussed above. It is reported that almost all the classrooms in colleges and universities throughout China have installed surveillance cameras (Huang Yuxin 2018). National security agencies are directly involved in policing professors' classroom behavior and discourse, as we mentioned earlier, and they are monitoring what is posted on the university's LAN (local area network) regarding their teaching materials. The violators of the Party ideology would be invited to "have tea" or "coffee" with their agents and required to write confession papers (Chap. 5) if not directly fired as in the many cases we have cited above. Academics are "caught between serving

governmental agendas and pursuing their own goals as an academic community" (Zha and Hayhoe 2014: 42).

Scholars based in the West who do academic investigations in China are also subject to various restrictions. A recent survey found that "Roughly 9% of China scholars report having been 'taken for tea' by authorities within the past ten years; 26% of scholars who conduct archival research report being denied access; and 5% of researchers report some difficulty obtaining a visa" (Greitens and Truex 2018; Redden 2018a). In addition, about two dozen of the 500 scholars who responded either had their computer or other materials confiscated or experienced temporary detention by police or physical intimidation during field research, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The academic presses in the West are also feeling the pressure. The Cambridge University press removed from its websites in China 300 *The China Quarterly* articles related to the three Ts (Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan) and Xinjiang only to reverse its decision later upon protests by scholars all over the world (Buckley 2018). Allen and Unwin canceled its publication of *Silent Invasion*, "a book by the Australian academic Clive Hamilton that claimed the Chinese government was eroding Australian sovereignty by controlling Chinese businessmen and students in the country, as well as manipulating Australian politicians into taking pro-China stances" (Siu 2018; see also Chap. 11). "Springer Nature has blocked access to more than 1,000 journal articles in China to comply with government censors," and some journals have received "requests from Chinese censors to block access to certain journal articles" (Redden 2017b).

Greitens and Truex (2018) found that Western-based scholars cope with the situation by adjusting their research strategies: 48.9% of them use a different language to describe a project, while in China, 23.7% of them shift a project's focus away from the most sensitive aspects, and 15.5% simply abandoned a project entirely (cited in Redden 2018a). As Chaps. 4 and 5 discuss, Chinese faculty members in China can still talk about politically sensitive issues in class, but this is increasingly difficult. Professorial violators of Party ideology are rarely fired in elite universities, but it is not clear how long this will last. At the time of writing, Xiamen University has just fired a professor (Zhou Yunzhong) and expelled a student (Tian Jialiang) for online speech (*Xiamen Daily* 2018).

Hong Kong's and Macau's higher education fares a bit better, but mainlandization, meaning doing things the way they are done in mainland China, is becoming more and more serious (Chaps. 6 and 7). The Central Liaison Office (CLO), the representative of the Chinese Party-state in each place, is playing a dominant role. As we mentioned earlier, recently the faculty association head of Hong Kong Baptist University, Benson Wong, was denied promotion and fired on grounds of teaching but actually for political reasons as reported in Chap. 6. Indeed in Hong Kong, the Chief Executive of the government functions as the Chancellor of all public universities. The Chief Executive of Macau is also the Chancellor of the University of Macau. They tend to appoint pro-government members and businessmen and women to the University Council (in both Hong Kong and Macau) and to the University Assembly (in Macau, a higher organ where the Chief Executive is the

Chancellor, or Chair). Structurally and under the instructions of the CLO, they make sure that the direction of HEIs will be politically aligned with the mainland Chinese government and serve its interests.

One of the reasons why the former Vice Chancellor and President of the University of Hong Kong (HKU) resigned 2 years before the expiration of his contract is pressure from the government. The University Council rejected Johannes Chan as Vice President of HKU because he was pro-democracy even though he was recommended unanimously by the selection committee (Chap. 6). These are in addition to Benson Wong's example. More professors in Hong Kong were let go in 2020 because of political reasons. They are all part of the mainlandization trend in Hong Kong and Macau.

Similar to the social media attacks on professors for their extramural speech in the USA, in both Hong Kong and Macau, there is a strong presence of traditional pro-government media. They often launch campaigns to call on the universities to fire professors who are engaged in political activism, like Benny Tai of HKU (Chap. 6). Dr. Horace Chin Wan-kan was removed from his university post at Lingnan University in 2015 with the university president's letter saying that his activism "severely hurt the reputation of Lingnan." One piece of evidence against the professor at the University of Macau in his firing in 2014 was a newspaper article criticizing him for his comments on the political processes there. In all these instances, one can see an invisible government hand.

1.4.2.3 The Politics of Chinese Authoritarianism in the World

In fact, Chinese mainlandization has been flexing its muscles and spreading to other parts of the world, both economically and politically. We have already discussed the Chinese government's interference in academic research and publications in or about China by non-Chinese organizations and individuals. With China's emergence as a global superpower and its "ability to direct Chinese students to cash-strapped universities—or take them away" (Fish 2018), the situation of censorship and self-censorship is going to get worse even outside China. The Chinese government has already vastly reduced the number of tourists to Taiwan as a punishment of the pro-independence government in the past few years and strongly affected its economy. It can do something similar with the students going to other parts of the world. Indeed, the University of California (UC)-San Diego invited the Dalai Lama to speak at its commencement in 2017, and the Chinese government then "froze funding to Chinese scholars wishing to attend the school" (Fish 2018). Roughly 14% of UC-San Diego's student body are Chinese, and one can see how much effect there would be to its finances if Chinese students stopped coming. And they are paying more than twice what local students pay.

In Australia, 26% of university students are international, the bulk of whom are Chinese. Higher education in Australia is an export industry, third in line after coal and iron ore or "the cultural equivalent of iron ore." In 2013 overseas students paid $4.3 billion in tuition and fees to Australian universities, out of a total of $6 billion,

and international student tuition and fee income constituted 18% of university funding nationally in 2015, much of which came from Chinese students (Chap. 11). One can imagine the financial effect if China were to reduce the number of its students to Australia.

For fear of economic and political retaliation, in what Fish (2018) calls "a sophisticated global censorship regime," Columbia University in New York canceled several talks for fear of upsetting Chinese officials in 2015; North Carolina State University canceled a visit from the Dalai Lama in 2009; The provost of New York's Alfred University personally ejected a researcher from campus for investigating Chinese government influence at the school. Indeed, many professors (including Perry Link, Andrew Nathan, and the professors who wrote a book on Xinjiang) are denied visas to China for their research on sensitive topics such as the three T's and Xinjiang. Chinese students and scholars face even more pressure to self-censor: Yang Shuping gave a commencement speech at the University of Maryland praising the USA in May 2017 and experienced an Internet mob attack and threat to her family members in China.

The PRC representatives in Western countries and the large number of Chinese students there are already changing their academic atmosphere. A recent study may sound alarmist, but some facts remain (Lloyd-Damnjanovic 2018 cited in Redden 2018c):

> The study, authored by Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, a Schwarzman Associate at the Wilson Center for 2017–18, concludes that "over the past two decades, PRC diplomats stationed in the United States have infringed on the academic freedom of American university faculty, students, administrators, and staff by: complaining to universities about invited speakers and events; pressuring and/or offering inducements to faculty whose work involves content deemed sensitive by the PRC authorities … and retaliating against American universities' cooperative initiatives with PRC partner institutions."
>
> Individual Chinese students, meanwhile, have – according to the report – in various cases infringed on academic freedom by "demanding the removal of research, promotional and decorative materials involving sensitive content from university spaces"; "demanding faculty alter their language or teaching materials involving sensitive content on political rather than evidence-based grounds"; "interrupting and heckling other members of the university community who engage in critical discussion of China"; and "pressuring universities to cancel academic activities involving sensitive content."
>
> In addition, the report documents cases in which Chinese students have "acted in ways that concerned or intimidated faculty, staff, and other students at American universities," such as by "monitoring people and activities on campus involving sensitive content"; "probing faculty for information in a suspicious manner"; and "engaging in intimidation, abusive conduct, or harassment of other members of the university community."

Granted that these activities may involve only a tiny number of the 350,000 PRC nationals currently studying in the USA, and one should not stereotype them especially in a time of renewed American xenophobia (see also Lee 2019 for the same point), it remains a challenge especially for academics related to China studies to deal with censorship and self-censorship as they do in Greater China.

More examples of censorship and self-censorship from other parts of the world are below. Two academics from European universities decided to withdraw their papers from a special edition of *The China Quarterly* because they did not want their papers to be published together with another paper, authored by an Australian academic, James Leibold, which argued that state surveillance in Xinjiang is at odds with Beijing's Belt and Roald Initiative (Siu 2018). These happened alongside the Chinese government's request to 44 foreign airlines in 2018 that they indicate in their public-facing content that Taiwan is part of China, or they would be punished. These airlines have caved, one way or the other.

A threatening letter from the Chinese Embassy in Spain to the University of Salamanca exhorting it to cancel its program to celebrate Taiwanese culture is also a good case in point (Sociopolitica de Asia Pacifico 2018):

> We demand your University adheres [sic] to the "One china [sic] Principle" and takes [sic] measures to avoid and eliminate the adverse effects….we demand you cancel the remaining ["Taiwan Cultural Days"] scheduled events. We reserve the right to contact you again as the case may be [sic], we hope that the University of Salamanca acts with caution on this subject and avoids a similar unpleasant incident.

The university was scared of angering Beijing and its retaliation against it so it cancelled the event (Redden 2018b). This threat is similar to those issued to other universities, whether directly or indirectly. Other examples include Chinese embassies or consulates interfering in US university events on Taiwan or speech invitations to the Dalai Lama deemed sensitive to China's interests (see Lloyd-Damnjanovic 2018: 51–55; for more examples, see also Scholars at Risk 2019).

In Australia, pro-PRC course content is demanded by Chinese students. Questions arise as to whether Chinese students are being monitored in Australia and whether they report each other to Chinese authorities. Most recently, Zihan Liu, a Chinese student at the University of Adelaide, claimed on social media that he reported to the university authorities and the local Chinese consulate about his fellow students' anti-socialism statement in a student organization election campaign (Radio Free Asia 2018). In 2016 an assistant professor of Chinese origin named Wu Wei was forced to resign because of his online speech critical of China after online attacks of him by Chinese students in Australia and elsewhere. People are afraid whether universities can "remain true" to their values in front of attempts at untoward influence and interference that silences dissent (Chap. 11; for more examples of China's influence on Australia, see Lloyd-Damnjanovic 2018: 28–30). That seems to be a question for other Western universities, too.

China's influence in the world is also seen in its Confucius Institutes. There are 525 of them in 146 countries and regions around the world, including over 100 in the USA and 29 in the UK, enrolling over 9 million students. They are housed in universities and are generously funded by the Chinese government. They offer instruction in Chinese language and culture but avoid issues considered taboo. They are "an important part of China's overseas propaganda apparatus," in the words of Li Changchun in 2009, then a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP, serving the Chinese government's interests with implicit codes of speech

considered proper (Fish 2018). Several US universities have discontinued their contracts with the Chinese government on the institute, but one doubts many are going to follow for fear of losing the funding for teaching Chinese language and culture and hurting their relationship with their counterparts in China. The result is reduced academic freedom on the part of the faculty (see also Chap. 11 on the Confucius Institutes in Australia).

In a nutshell, politics is a formidable and instrumental factor eroding academic freedom across all jurisdictions. It is probably the most challenging force to deal with if academics everywhere want to protect and promote academic freedom.

1.5 Facing the Challenges

To deal with the problem of eroding or lack of academic freedom, one has to first recognize it is a problem. It seems that in democracies, semi-democracies, and authoritarianism, grassroots faculty members are beginning to understand that there is a problem. But most seem to go along to get along as the restrictions become gradually normalized (Allen 2019). Most faculty members themselves do not feel the importance of academic freedom until they lose it (see Hoodfar 2017). People in power tend not to recognize the problem at all. In response to the Lloyd-Damnjanovic (2018) report, the Chinese Embassy in Washington says, "This allegation of the report you mentioned is totally groundless, full of prejudice, discrimination and hostility" (cited in Redden 2018c), in spite of the countless concrete examples cited in the report. Can academics across jurisdictions convince the authorities that there is a problem? Do they themselves know that there is a problem? Much still needs to be done in consciousness raising, as discussed in Chap. 9 about the situation in Japan.

In the USA, one of the major tools for faculty members who feel that their academic freedom is violated is to sue in court. Sometimes they win, as in the Marquette case, and other times they lose, as in the campus carry law suit in Texas. With the US Supreme Court ruling we mentioned earlier, unionization is also difficult. But they keep trying.

In Canada, courts are playing a minimalist role; rather, academic freedom disputes are resolved through labor arbitrators (Robinson 2019). For example, the faculty association of Ryerson University in Canada recently won an ongoing dispute with the administration over the use of SETs. An arbitrator ordered the administration to stop using SETs to measure teaching effectiveness for promotion or tenure. The order says that "the best way to assess teaching effectiveness is through the careful assessment of the teaching dossier and in-class peer evaluations" (Flaherty 2018d). SETs cannot be used to reach conclusions about teaching effectiveness.

Sometimes the disputes are resolved within the university albeit with outside support. Purdue Global, an online branch campus of Purdue University, decided to discontinue its use of nondisclosure agreement (NDA) which would restrict the right of faculty members to own their own course materials. It happened only after

a national protest. As an AAUP email indicates (personal document, September 7, 2018; see also Toppo 2018):

> Purdue Global's announcement comes in response to a public outcry that followed upon the work by the Indiana Conference of the AAUP and the national AAUP to expose its use of NDAs; thousands of AAUP members and supporters signed our petition demanding the end of the practice. The victory demonstrates that when faculty join together they have a powerful voice to protect academic freedom, shared governance, and higher education for the common good.

The national AAUP was also involved along with the local AAUP chapter in rebuilding shared governance and turning sanction to collaboration at the University of Iowa and with the state board of regents (Daack-Hirsch et al. 2019).

Unionization is apparently one important tool to resolve disputes and defend academic freedom. "Academic and student unions can be a powerful force for fighting back against the ideologies and policies stifling academic freedom today" (Allen 2019). Academic faculty in Canada seems to be in a better position since about 90% of them are covered by collective bargaining agreements including legal protections for academic freedom (Robinson 2019), and they seem to be doing exceptionally well.

Although few faculty members are unionized in the USA, most HEIs have some kind of senate, chaired mostly by an elected professor. But faculty senates need to participate in collaborative decision-making, rather than simple consultation or information sharing with the administration (see Gerber 2014: 160 on the status quo of the faculty senates). The latter is also the case in Macau as Chap. 7 explores.

Faculty can exert pressure in other ways as well. The president of Edinboro University of Pennsylvania "was quoted in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* as saying that he needed to bypass the faculty in order to make necessary changes" and that he "knew [he] would never be able to reason with the faculty" (Jaschik 2018c). He resigned under faculty pressure. At Bethune-Cookman University, about 30 faculty members went to the president's office to deliver a letter in August 2018, complaining that the university faculty were "blatantly disregarded, the Faculty Senate mocked, and the work of the Faculty Senate discounted" (Seltzer 2018). They wanted the administration to share with the faculty information about the financial and accreditation status of the university. Apparently such information was not shared before: the university was in crisis and the faculty had been in the dark. Faculty members themselves have to strive for shared governance; it is not, has not been and will never be, a given.

Apparently the lack of shared governance hurts administrators as well. Tierney (2018b) examined the recent string of presidential resignations and found that a key problem is a lack of shared governance. This may cause what Lovett (2018) calls a mismatch or misalignment resulting in the declining median tenure of presidents at 4-year HEIs in the USA.

Indeed, much more can be done in terms of shared governance in democracies and semi-democracies. In Japan, some senior public intellectuals wrote forcefully in defense of humanities and social sciences (Chap. 9). Faculty have also resisted the government regulation of a president/dean responsibility system: faculty

committees are making important decisions which the president/dean will then sign and implement (Dong Hongqing 2017). In South Korea, faculty and public resistance substantially slowed down the privatization and incorporation of public universities under two regimes (Chap. 10). In Germany, the University of Göttingen has had to rerun the search for a president after faculty protests of a "clandestine" selection process (Matthews 2019b).

In semi-democratic Hong Kong, faculty members can also join together for academic freedom. In 2015, more than one thousand people in higher education signed a petition entitled "Staunchly Defend Freedom and Civility in the Academia—Public Statement of Faculty, Administrative Staff and Students" calling on the protection of academic freedom (Denyer 2015). How much success they have achieved is hard to say but things could be worse if there had been no protests. We have not heard much about what the academic staff associations do in Hong Kong HEIs, but considering what the AAUP has done in the USA, there is certainly a lot they can do.

Even under authoritarianism, faculty engage in "obedient autonomy" and creative dissent, as we can see in Chaps. 4 and 5. Things are bad, but they can get worse if faculty do nothing. This, in fact, is true everywhere in the world (for more on organizational and individual responses, see Tierney and Lanford 2014: 18–20).

Meanwhile, some international advocacy groups have been set up for academic freedom. In Europe, the Magna Charta Observatory (MCO), the guardian of fundamental university values expressed in the Magna Charta Universitatum (MCU), is planning to obtain 1000 or more worldwide signatories of the MCU by 2020 and to become the leading global organization that supports fundamental values for higher education. This is in addition to their other activities like holding and participating in conferences and workshops, creating a vibrant website, launching publications, etc. (Myklebust 2019). Scholars at Risk (SAR), founded 20 years ago and based at New York University, has built a network of over 500 institutions in 39 countries that assists scholars under some of the severest of attacks for seeking truth and asking questions, including dismissal, arrest, imprisonment, and even execution. It has also built student advocacy, clinical programs, regional partnerships, courses, and workshops aiming to document violations of academic freedom and train more defenders. Indeed, academic freedom should be a core part of professional training for PhD students, many of whom may enter the ranks of the faculty in the future (Whittington 2020). SAR, also a member of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, currently has a caseload of over 800 scholars, but in 2018 alone they documented nearly 300 attacks in 47 countries involving thousands of scholars and students (Quinn 2019). More organizations like MCO and SAR are needed.

One of the major campaigns these organizations should engage themselves in, however, is to put academic freedom on university ranking metrics (Dutta et al. 2019). As they stand now, university rankings are based mostly on research output, teaching, internationalization, etc. But without academic freedom, what will be the point of those evaluations? How can a university with little or no academic freedom, like those in China, be placed among the top universities in the world? Because universities are concerned about their rankings, to add a measurement of the state of

academic freedom at HEIs would go a long way toward its protection and promotion. The Global Public Policy Institute based in Germany has already constructed an index on academic freedom (Hoffmann and Kinzelbach 2019), and there is no reason why it cannot be refined and used by the university ranking regimes.

Apparently, faced with all these challenges, faculty are not totally powerless. While in democracies there are courts, arbitrators, unions, and faculty senates, in semi-democracies and autocratic countries and regions, faculty have to find other means to protect academic freedom. But most importantly, all need to raise their consciousness to see that there is a problem, and they have to confront it. They need to communicate the importance of the university as a public good and the integrity of their profession as the means of delivery of that good to other stakeholders—the state, the board of trustees, staff, students, parents, and the general public—rather than hiding in an ivory tower and pretending that attacks on academic freedom will eventually go away (see also Hoodfar 2017 and Quinn 2019 on this point). Academic freedom needs to be systematically nurtured, conscientiously and determinately pursued, and strongly and effectively defended.

1.6 Conclusion

Academic freedom is a universal value. From the heads of Peking University to the judges in Wisconsin's Supreme Court, let alone university administrators and professors, all will probably believe in academic freedom and the thinking behind it. But they diverge significantly in how to implement that value. Shared governance is a mechanism, but it is being eroded in democracies, and there is little of it under authoritarianism. Faculty in semi-democracies have a difficult time striving for shared governance. Tenure or job security is another mechanism to guarantee academic freedom, but as discussed in this chapter and throughout the book, most university professors do not have tenure. There are fewer and fewer tenured positions. In addition, the university rankings game, SETs, and the attack on professors' extramural speech have all harmed academic freedom.

Nevertheless, "the country benefits when faculty are able to search for truth without external hindrance and when they are able to report their findings regardless of what those findings may be" (Tierney and Lechuga 2005: 7). Because higher education is a public good, and university professors need the freedom to teach, research, and serve in order to provide that good, academic freedom has to be protected and promoted. It is difficult for faculty members and their organizations, if and where they exist, to stand up for academic freedom. But in protecting and promoting academic freedom, it is possible to ally themselves with any in the government and the board of trustees who truly believe in the concept. All the stakeholders in higher education need to work together to defend academic freedom for the betterment of society.

Academic freedom is better protected and practiced in democracies, or even in a semi-democracy like Hong Kong, because of their existing mechanisms, despite all

the challenges professors still face there. Even in mainland China, there is the possibility of "obedient autonomy" or creative dissent (Chaps. 4 and 5) in exercising some academic freedom. In Australia, as one Australian academic claims, academia as a whole has not succumbed to the pressure of Chinese mainlandization (Siu 2018). The same is true elsewhere.

Nonetheless, protecting academic freedom will be an uphill battle everywhere for all the reasons discussed in this book. As in the situation in Japan (Chap. 9), academics in the USA have already had a long and arduous struggle over academic freedom, and they are still fighting (AAUP 2009; Tierney and Lechuga 2005). The fight is just beginning in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and it is hard to build the academy into a "bulwark against conventional thought and received opinion not just for the benefits of its members but for society at large" (Robinson 2019). But it is a battle or a war worth fighting and a struggle that faculty cannot afford to lose.

"[F]ree inquiry is indispensable to the good life," "universities exist for the sake of such inquiry," and without academic freedom, universities "cease to be universities" (Tierney and Lechuga 2005: 20, citing Robert Hutchins). University professors have a calling to foster critical and creative thinkers and produce research that has long-term intellectual value for society. A docile and alienated faculty with little academic freedom is detrimental to such a calling. Rather than adapting to authoritarianism, as the American professor interviewed in Macau comments on what he was doing (Chap. 7), faculty members need to step up to strive for shared governance and academic freedom and to "develop campus cultures that nurture and expand basic freedoms" (Tierney and Lechuga 2005: 20)—or they will be stepped down and the entire society will suffer.

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Chapter 2
Commercialization and Corporatization vs. Professorial Roles and Academic Freedom in the USA and Greater China

Zhidong Hao

A study of 18 countries and one region found that "45% of university professors on average across the advanced countries consider their job as a source of considerable personal strain" (Teichler et al. 2013: 107). That is a large percentage. And personal strain increased in the majority of the countries in 2007 as compared with 1992 when the Carnegie Survey was conducted. The pressure on research, teaching, and service is probably causing the strain, but underlying the pressure may be the forces of academic capitalism or, to be more specific, commercialization and corporatization (C&C), which have eroded academic freedom.

In this chapter I explore how C&C strain professors' academic freedom and thus their work. I first discuss some theoretical perspectives in the sociology of higher education, which can help us understand the roles of professors in research, teaching, and service but especially their political roles as organic, professional, and critical intellectuals. Then I explain the data and methods of analysis. Thirdly, I examine how C&C of higher education institutions (HEI) in the USA and greater China constrain the role of professors. Fourthly, I explain why this is in essence an issue of academic freedom. And finally in conclusion, I will call on further comparative studies of higher education.

My argument is that C&C have adversely affected the role the professoriate plays. The main contribution of this chapter is the application of the sociology of intellectuals and professionals in the analysis of the role of professors and their

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academic freedom under the influence of C&C, using existing data. It enriches the contents of the sociology of higher education.

Professors are faced with the danger of becoming what Weber (1958) calls "specialists without spirit," "sensualists without heart," or simply "academic workers who are merely doing routine jobs and who are no longer strongly committed to the traditional norms and values of the profession" (Teichler et al. 2013: 6–7, citing Enders 2001). They could become Marx's alienated workers engaged in what Durkheim calls a "forced division of labour" (Giddens 1971) in the "knowledge factory" (Aronowitz 2000). Whatever and however the professoriate does will affect the direction in which a society goes, since after all the university is not only a primary engine of the economy but often the driver of social and political change, for better or for worse, and the professoriate plays a crucial role at any university. A study of the role of the professoriate is therefore of extreme importance. This chapter hopes to shed light on how professors might respond more effectively to the trend of C&C and as a result be better able to play their academic and political roles and protect academic freedom and the university as a public good.

2.1 Sociology of Higher Education and the Political Role of Professors

In the early 1970s, Burton R. Clark (2007a, b), the renowned professor of the sociology of higher education, commented that the field is relatively young and unformed. Now about 40 years have passed. In addition to traditional sociological theories such as those of Durkheim and Weber, the field has drawn theories from various studies, such as the sociologies of education, organization, institutions, professions, stratification, work, etc. But as Gumport (2007: 347) points out, "if it lacks conceptual development and systematic inquiry, it would be far from what we would consider sociology of higher education." Granted that this is a hybrid field, a coherent theory is still needed. And this would include not only higher education as an institution but also the evolving role of professors, their academic freedom, and how these are affected by changing circumstances, especially C&C.

What are the main theoretical perspectives concerning the role of the professoriate or the university itself, then? From the traditional sociological theories, we have the Durkheimian perspective of higher education "as a means of cultural transmission, socialization, social control, or social processes" (Clark 2007a: 5). This would speak to the mission of the university, which in Kant's terms "was to serve two primary functions: first, to provide educated bureaucrats for the state, and second, to conduct research whose goal was the production of new knowledge" (cited in Taylor 2010: 18). Professors would be the educators of the future bureaucrats and producers of new knowledge. This is essentially the European model of the relationship between the profession and the state, which emphasizes the university's "tasks of

stocking government with top-grade officials and preparing able individuals to staff the best secondary schools" (Clark 2007b [1987]: 297).

A Marxist perspective would ask, however, "Whose state is the university serving?" Is it the bourgeois state, or the working people's state, if there is one? For Gramsci, those who serve the bourgeois state would be organic intellectuals (see Hao 2003a). So for whom are the professors at a university working? Whom are they spokespersons of? What kind of knowledge are professors producing? For whom are they producing it, if they are actually producing new knowledge? In Clark's (2007b [1987]: 297) American model, the academic profession is "trying to do everything for everybody." But "employment in government was never the first resort for graduates: it was far more prestigious to become a captain of industry or commerce." They could also engage in "forestry, social work, librarianship, and nursing, as well as law and medicine."

Weber (1973: 20) would ask similar questions like Marx would do. He says that the state may require those in the university to follow this principle: "I sing the tune of him whose bread I eat." In other words, the university is the tool of the state if the latter is the major funding source of the former. Indeed the state often controls the university, one way or the other, and in this case the professoriate is its servant. Political obedience is required. Likewise, if a business corporation is funding the research, then the researcher may have to serve the bottom line of the corporation.

Clark (2007b [1987]: 298–99) comments that in contrast to the American model of "closeness to the general economy and to a plethora of societal institutions and groups" and of "relatively considerable distance from government," the European model's closeness to government and embeddedness in its civil service make the university and the profession "vulnerable to changes in the dominant political ideologies of government." This is because the government monopolizes the financing of the estate, allocates salary subsidy "according to civil service rank and privilege, with all the bureaucratic classifying and rule-making that is a normal part of modern governmental procedure. Academics are then a national profession, an estate situated within the state." In the US model, the professoriate has "little sense that one has joined the organized ranks of state public employees, and of course no sense of embeddedness in any national corps" even if they may be on the public payroll as is the case of public institutions.

The Chinese model is the European model in its extreme with close-to-totalitarian control of the university and the professoriate, as we discuss in this chapter and in this book. It is interesting to note, though, that the European selecting of intellectual talents into civil service through examinations in the medieval ages may be influenced by the age-old Chinese tradition (Webber 1989: 36)! It is no surprise then that there is so much commonality in the Chinese and European models.

But Weber (1973: 20) would say that "such a castration of the freedom and disinterestedness of university education [or research, especially in the Chinese model], which prevents the development of persons of genuine character, cannot be compensated by the finest institutes, the largest lecture halls, or by ever so many dissertations, prize-winning works and examination successes." Weber raises the question of the relationship between state and university and market and university

by implication. Likewise, this is also a question of the relationship between state and professoriate. As we will explain below, this is not an easy relationship to sort out. In addition, Weber also points out the mission of HEIs, which is to develop persons of genuine character. This certainly has to do with the role of professors.

In my work on professionals and intellectuals (Hao 2003a), I have developed a typology: organic, professional, and critical intellectuals based on their political roles. The word "intellectual" here refers to a knowledge worker with a political connotation. Derived from Gramsci, *organic* intellectuals can be viewed as those who serve an interest, whether this is the state, business, a social movement, or even the HEI itself, as we will find out later. In research, they may be singing the tune of those whose bread they eat, and political obedience is a must, as Weber would say. In teaching, they are socializing young people to become future bureaucrats of the state, as Durkheim and Kant would say.

Professional intellectuals pursue their work for the sake of science and technology or of humanities and social sciences, and they are here to solve an intellectual puzzle. In Durkheim and Kant's words, they are producing new knowledge and transmitting culture. In spite of its apparent neutrality and distance from politics, it is a political stance or a political role.

Critical intellectuals are the conscience of society and are particularly interested in equality, human rights, democracy, and the plight of the little people. This is a Marxist tradition of a concern for social and class inequalities. For example, are professors aware of social inequalities and alienation in and outside the academy? Are they active in combating inequality in and outside academe? Are they focused on developing persons of character?

The organic intellectuals here correspond to Burawoy's (2007) policy sociologists, and professional intellectuals correspond to his professional sociologists, while critical intellectuals correspond to his critical and public sociologists. The typology applies to non-sociologists as well. One must note, however, that these are ideal types, and in reality, different roles may be played by the same person at different times although at any given time, one characteristic is probably more salient than another. It is a dynamic role-playing (for more on this point, see Chap. 4).

2.2 The Data and Methods of Analysis

Two sorts of data are used in this paper. One is statistics and findings from various studies. One major study is entitled *The Changing Academic Profession* (CAP), conducted between 2004 and 2012 by more than 100 scholars from 18 countries and one region, which we have cited above. It was the second major comparative survey of the academic profession in the history of higher education, the first being the Carnegie Survey of the Academic Profession in the early 1990s involving 14 countries and one region (Teichler et al. 2013), covering similar themes. Statistics and findings from a similar survey on Asian higher education, derived from the CAP survey (Arimoto 2011), are also cited.

The major themes of the CAP survey(s) are relevance of the academy's work; internationalization of the academy; increasing power of the managers of higher education; and commitment of the academy (Teichler et al. 2013). Commercialization is directly related to the relevance of professorial work, and corporatization means the increasing power of managers and decreasing attachment of academics to the institution. I will touch on internationalization of universities and will treat C&C as globalized trends. Statistics from the CAP survey(s) help us understand C&C and their effects in the world. And they will be complemented by other statistical studies.

The second sort of data is from qualitative studies of the current status of higher education both in the USA and in greater China (i.e., mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan). The qualitative data will flesh out what seem to be dry statistics of the questionnaire surveys. The cases I cite in the paper will help us understand how specifically C&C have adversely influenced the professorial roles. And together with the quantitative data, they will highlight the directions in which the academic response should take in balancing the roles of professors in the face of the advancement of C&C.

A word about the method of analysis is in order. To talk about international trends is necessarily comparative. Indeed, the academic profession everywhere is under similar pressures of C&C as we discussed in Chap. 1. But the jurisdictions under analysis are not homogenous as an administrative set: The USA is a democracy; mainland China, or the People's Republic of China, is an authoritarian state; Hong Kong, a former British colony returned to China in 1997, is a semi-democracy; Macau, a former Portuguese colony returned to China in 1999, is less democratic than Hong Kong; and Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is a full democracy. So C&C in different jurisdictions may embody very different degrees, and even nature, of influence in the professorial roles despite their similarities. In my analysis, I will highlight these similarities and differences.

But this is not a full-fledged comparison among jurisdictions. I will focus only on certain issues related to C&C and academic freedom. It is a comparative analysis at any rate, and as I say in the conclusion, such comparative studies are needed for the development of the sociology of higher education.

2.3 Commercialization and Corporatization and Their Constraints on Professorial Roles

Commercialization and corporatization are two aspects of academic capitalism. Following Hanley (2005), Hurt (2012), Kauppinen (2012), Park (2011), and Slaughter and Rhoades (2009), we can define academic capitalism as market and market-like ideologies and practices in academe. These ideologies include neoliberalism, managerialism, competition, efficiency, productivity, and accountability (see also Chap. 1). The practices of academic capitalism include both commercialization and corporatization efforts. The former include patenting, spin-off companies,

university-industry partnerships, increasing student tuition fees, student consumerism, privatization of higher education, and the increasing use of part-time faculty to save money. And the latter include top-down management styles, assessment and rankings, and the erosion of faculty power in shared governance. We will now discuss commercialization and corporatization separately for the sake of clarity, although they are often related to one another. One feeds into the other.

2.3.1 Commercialization and the Transformation of Professors into Organic Intellectuals

As defined above, there is a range of commercialization practices. But because of space and because the main point of this chapter is to illustrate how commercialization influences the role of professors and their academic freedom, I am going to discuss only industry-university collaboration, the development of for-profit educational institutions, and the increasing use of contingent faculty, especially in the USA, as examples of commercialization.

The CAP survey mentioned the commercialization of knowledge (Arimoto 2011), but it did not have much data on industry-university collaboration. A representative survey of the university research centers (URCs) in the USA, however, finds evidence to counter the academic capitalism argument. Bozeman and Boardman (2013: 115–16) find that "academic researchers are not necessarily beholden to market demands at the expense of universities' traditional research and educational missions," and "most URCs and the faculty performing research in URCs are oriented to traditional, public domain, research publications."

Indeed, academic capitalism in industry-university collaboration in the USA may affect mainly research universities, and extreme cases may be few. But it still merits our attention since it is part of a larger commercialization movement and needs to be grappled with. In addition, it is emulated by universities in greater China where there is not a strong tradition of treating university education as a public good. Furthermore, our focus is on how professors might be transformed into organic intellectuals to business enterprises. Hence the study of industry-university collaboration is still important.

In 1996, when the University of California (UC) began to actively encourage faculty collaboration with industry, the marketing slogan to solicit industry investors in the area of biotechnology was "When it comes to biotechnology, UC means business" (Washburn 2005:19). Indeed, not only UC but Harvard, Yale, and other well-known research universities also mean business when it comes to university-industry collaborations especially in the areas of science and technology (see also Aronowitz 2000). In fact, they mean business so much so that they may ignore the role of the university to protect public interests, their professional and critical role. They become organic to business enterprises.

In her book on the corruption of the university, Washburn (2005) cites quite a few examples of how universities get into contracts with industry for the money and then suppress research findings that would have an adverse influence on the corporate sponsor's bottom line, but which could save people's money and even their lives. In 1990, Betty Dong, a clinical researcher at UC-San Francisco, found that a widely prescribed thyroid medication, taken by eight million Americans each day, was no more effective than three other cheaper competing drugs. She was able to publish her findings only 9 years later, following the corporate sponsor's various failed efforts to discredit her research. Her academic freedom was apparently harmed. And in all those years, people suffering from hypothyroidism and other conditions could have saved $365 million annually (Washburn 2005).

If knowledge produced in universities does not become the property of the knowledge commons but is exploited for profits by universities and the industry, university-industry collaborations serve the interests of businesses. Another example of the commercialization movement is the 112% increase of for-profit, degree-granting college and university campuses, from about 350 to 750, in the USA in the 1990s (Ruch 2001). In a for-profit institution, "faculty serve 'at the will' of their employer" and are viewed as being "delivery people," as in delivery of a centrally managed curriculum (Ruch 2001: 112, 118). In both cases, professors are forced to become organic intellectuals to businesses.

Yet another example of commercialization is the use of contingent faculty to save money. At Queen's College of the City University of New York in the 2010s, a full professor was paid US$116,000 for six classes taught per academic year, or $17,000 per course, while an adjunct was paid a flat fee of $4600, or about a fourth of what a tenured full professor made. That was already far above the median pay per course of $2700 in the USA, where the bulk of the undergraduate teaching is done by adjuncts, or part-timers. And 70% of college teachers was classified as such contingents (Hacker and Dreifus 2010; The Editorial Board 2014). As one survey report states:

> According to data from the United States Department of Education's 2009 Fall Staff Survey, of the nearly 1.8 million faculty members and instructors who made up the 2009 instructional workforce in degree-granting two- and four-year institutions of higher education in the United States, more than 1.3 million (75.5%) were employed in contingent positions off the tenure track, either as part-time or adjunct faculty members, full-time non-tenure-track faculty members, or graduate student teaching assistants. (The Coalition of the Academic Workforce 2012: 1)

They often teach over 50% of the college classes. At one time at New York University (NYU), 3,277 part-timers taught roughly 50–60% of the university classes, and they outnumbered the 3,083 full-time faculty (Washburn 2005). According to some surveys of adjuncts, while about half of them (55%) hold some other job than teaching, more than 75% of them "sought, are now seeking or will be seeking a full-time tenure-track position" (Flaherty 2017; The Coalition of the Academic Workforce 2012: 2). More university professors are becoming organic to the for-profit as well as non-profit institutions as knowledge workers, with diminished roles as professional and critical intellectuals (see also Hanley 2005).

Such commercialization of the university has continued so much so that even Clark Kerr, once against the evaluative role of the university, later warned against the commercial threat to academic life. He was afraid that the "money-seeking group on the inside" would collude with the "for-profit group on the outside" to undermine the mission of the university as "a neutral agency devoted to the public welfare, not to private welfare" (Washburn 2005: 1–2).

If commercialization in the USA has been largely a slow and steady process, it came to mainland China with a vengeance, though in somewhat different forms (see Hao 2011a; Mok 2005). Disillusioned by the June 4 crackdown of the 1989 democracy movement and inspired by the fast development of a market economy in the early 1990s, many university professors either disserted the university and became businessmen and women or did business and teaching and research at the same time (Hao 2003a). The keyword is the integration of businesses/industry, teaching, and research, but the underlying principle is to ask teaching and research to serve businesses, to make money. This would mean that universities will build their own business enterprises or become shareholders of collaborating enterprises, among other such models (Lei 2012). In the early 1990s, for example, Chen Zhangliang, the then president of the College of Biological Engineering at Peking University, was also president of the Biological Engineering Company he founded (Hao 2003a). Universities and academics were encouraged to engage in business and market-like activities to generate more revenue on top of higher tuitions. According to one report, around 1,000 higher education institutions in China had more than 5,000 university-run enterprises (Mok 2005).

Marketization and privatization also led to a flurry of HEIs affiliated to well-established universities but financed by student tuition fees or other non-state sources. There has also been a rise in the number of private universities, corresponding to the development of for-profit universities in the USA. In 2001, there were already 1,727 *minban* or private institutions of higher learning in China, and in 2000, nearly one million students had already been enrolled in such institutions (Mok 2005; see also Law 1995; Yang 2004). Marketization has also affected faculty in humanities and social sciences. Their disciplines are underfunded, just like in the USA. They are encouraged to do businesses to increase their income as well (Hao 2003a).

In Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, the use of contingent faculty to save money is not a serious issue as it is in the USA, but the recruitment of international students, especially mainland China students, has often been seen as a major way to increase revenue since they are charged higher tuition fees despite the few scholarships some students may obtain. And academic programs are increasingly asked to self-finance themselves through collaboration with business and industry sectors and acquire private donations (see Chen and Lo 2013; Mok and Cheung 2011). In the USA, all the Confucius Institutes (over 100 of them now) are funded by the Chinese government, with compromised academic freedom (Redden 2012). In Taiwan, the university ranking indexes measure levels of financial assistance from corporations. In Macau, one often hears administrators mention higher education as an industry and students as consumers. Professors are in a way treated as knowledge

workers making products to satisfy their employers who can sell their products with a good price.

Commercialization in many ways is transforming professors into alienated workers, entrepreneurs, and organic intellectuals to businesses and HEIs or the state while changing the contents and the ways they research and teach, diminishing and straining their roles as professional and critical intellectuals as well as their academic freedom. It is true that not all industry-university partnerships will lead to the loss of autonomy on the part of the professor, and some such efforts toward serving industry may indeed be part of the university mission. But if the efforts described above serve only the interests of businesses and the state and run counter to the mission of the university, which in Shils's words is "the methodical discovery and the teaching of truths about serious and important things" (Quoted in Yang 2004: 486), then professors should be wary. A business- and market-oriented university cannot be serious about uncovering truths of the world in an unbiased way and will likely affect the role of professors adversely.

2.3.2 Corporatization and Its Effect on the Professorial Roles

Related to commercialization is corporatization of higher education, i.e., the adoption of business principles and practices in administration in academic capitalism (see also Mok 2005). I will discuss two specific practices: top-down management styles vs. shared governance and the management-initiated competition for world-class universities through the university rankings game, both of which lead to what Durkheim calls "forced division of labor" and diminish the role of professors as professional and critical intellectuals while enhancing their role as organic intellectuals to the interest of the state, businesses, and even to the HEI itself.

2.3.2.1 Top-Down Management Styles vs. Shared Governance

Top-down management style is increasingly a worldwide phenomenon. The CAP project found that in many countries, "the power of the university management has been strengthened…" and "the faculty role in governance is mixed" (Teichler et al. 2013: 114, 171). On the one hand, "academics in nearly all of the countries included in the survey report are powerless" in some areas such as the selection of top officers, although on the other hand "academics in a majority of the systems believe that they and their colleagues have influence" in some core academic areas like choosing new faculty, making faculty promotion and tenure decisions, and approving new academic programs (Teichler et al. 2013: 171). Such participation actually falls in line with the American model of "shared governance."

But shared governance is often threatened by autocratic leaders. In the USA, perhaps the best example is Lawrence Summers, president of Harvard University from 2001 to 2006, who followed a business model in managing the university.

Summers' leadership style can be summarized in the following ways (Bradley 2005). First, he would force out a dean or professor if he did not like him or her, even if the person was well liked by students and other professors, as in the case of Cornell West, a renowned expert on African-American studies. Second, he might set up a mechanism for faculty and student participation in choosing a dean, but people knew that it was all window dressing and he would not care what others thought and would have his way anyway. Third, he made people afraid of speaking out on campus issues. And finally he did not like those who taught well but did not have enough scholarship. He wanted scholars at Harvard, not teachers. Summers was not alone in the USA. A survey found that 69% of the nation's faculty rated the administration of their universities in 1989 as either "very autocratic" or "somewhat autocratic" (Chait 2002). Summers was forced to leave his job, but most autocratic presidents are not. Under an autocratic leadership, being professional and critical and exercising academic freedom is a struggle.

Nonetheless, shared governance is still a strong tradition in the USA, and the faculty plays a much stronger role in the abovementioned core academic areas than in most of greater China. If the faculty had some kind of autonomy during the nationalist era in mainland China, they have lost almost all of it since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) takeover in 1949. The CCP has controlled virtually everything. It is "corporatization" in its extremist form, and the Chinese call it "administrationization." There are at least two major characteristics (Chen et al. 2013; Hao 2011b; Xie et al. 2013; Yang 2010): (1) The management of the university is centralized. At every level of government, there is a CCP-led government branch that deals with higher education. University presidents are appointed by the CCP. The government branch decides whether a university can enroll MA or PhD students and how many, and it decides how many professors a university can have and at what level. Even new programs have to be approved by the government. The accreditation of universities is also managed by the government. (2) The Party secretary and the president behave like the CEOs of a company, having the power to decide on things big or small. They decide who may be hired, how money is used, etc. There are academic committees, unions, and professors' conferences, but they are largely window dressing. Of course, academic freedom is not totally impossible, as the two chapters on mainland China in this book illustrate. But it is largely diminished.

Between 2012 and 2015, HEIs in mainland China were supposed to finish revising their charters following regulations issued by the Ministry of Education (MoE) at the end of 2011, which would give universities more autonomy. By November 2013, six universities had finished their charter revision and had them approved by the MoE (Lei 2013). According to Renmin University's charter, the academic council of the university, which deals with academic regulations, will normally be headed by a senior professor who is not an administrator. But the CCP secretary and the president are still the final decision-makers. There seems to be some improvement over administrationization, but progress is minimal.

In fact, the tendency is to strengthen the Party leadership in universities, and there is little to share with the faculty. According to a recent Party document, the so-called president responsibility system under the leadership of the Party

committee reemphasizes that the Party has the full responsibility of policymaking on teaching, research, and administrative issues (Zhong Gong Zhongyang Bangongting 2014). And it will make sure that both students and teachers arm themselves with the theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Peking University Party Committee called on teachers and students to "take a firm stand and be unequivocal, and fight against [negative] speech and actions that touch upon the party's and country's principles and bottom lines in a timely, efficient and resolute manner" (Wee and Hui 2014; see also Piao 2014). The university has a 24-h monitoring system and takes early measures to control and reduce the effects of what the Party terms as negative speech on the Internet and other social media.

One would think that the levels of shared governance in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan would be similar to that of the USA, since the power there is not monopolized by one party and the level of internationalization is high. But the picture is mixed. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, faculty in some universities do participate in the selection of presidents, deans, and department chairpersons, sometimes even by ballots, and thereby have more academic autonomy, despite faculty criticism of governance by numbers and formulas (Lee et al. 2013).

But in Macau, as Chap. 7 will further illustrate, the selection committee is usually composed of administrators, occasionally with one or two representatives of other professors. In 2017 when a new rector (president) was selected, not one faculty member was on the selection committee. And department chairs are appointed by deans and approved by rectors. Public institutions of higher education are characterized by a heavy hand of government control, followed by the decisive powers of academic managers. The faculty is largely powerless in the core academic areas of choosing new faculty, making faculty promotion decisions, and approving new academic programs, in contrast to Hong Kong and Taiwan and to most other universities in the CAP survey (Hao 2011a). Academic councils in one university, for example, used to be headed by an elected professor who was not an administrator, but now it is headed by the dean of each faculty, a backward move compared with even Renmin University in mainland China. In such cases, professors' roles as professional and critical intellectuals are being diminished, and they are losing their professional autonomy.

2.3.2.2 The University Rankings Game

Shared governance is further eroded when managements initiate competitions to become world-class universities. This is an issue in the USA, though less serious than elsewhere, resulting in some cases of falsification of institutional data, among other things (Jaschik 2014). But in greater China, it is an obsession. Such global ranking regimes as Times Higher Education, Times QS ranking, Leiden University ranking, Webometrics, Shanghai Jiaotong University ranking, etc. are therefore affecting the way university professors are recruited and evaluated. Since publication is one of the major criteria for university rankings, star professors are enticed with big money since they have good publication records. Those who publish more

papers in SCI, SSCI, and A&HCI journals are also rewarded with more money. Money has become the measure of success, and as Marx would say, human relations are reduced to operations of the market, resulting in alienated labor (Giddens 1971). As found in the CAP survey, the community of scholars in a knowledge community has become a community of workers in a knowledge enterprise producing papers aimed at improving university rankings (see Arimoto 2011).

Since English is the lingua franca of the academic world, those papers have to be published in English and appeal to an international audience, especially American and European, since they are the regions that are more likely to host SCI, SSCI, and A&HCI indexed journals. Indeed, the introduction of the rankings has produced "an internationally unified pecking order of universities and colleges" (Arimoto 2011: 21) or what Mok and Cheung (2011: 238) call a "common world education culture." Academic managers are obsessed with rankings and equate quality with rank, and they value universal knowledge more than particular knowledge in local studies, especially in local languages by discouraging local publications that have little or no ranking clout. This ignores the needs and relevance of the local and marginalizes indigenous knowledge (Chen and Chang 2010; Chou et al. 2013; Tai and Chen 2011; see Arimoto 2011 for more on particularism and universalism).

It is true that aiming to publish in international journals does not necessarily contradict academics' professional interests, and it may actually enhance scholarship and cosmopolitanism across national borders. But the pressure to follow one model is more likely to goad professors into performing certain tasks for a certain purpose usually organic to a certain institution rather than public interest. They have to change the nature of their work: to emphasize universal knowledge rather than local knowledge, and as a result, they are forced to become organic to a new capitalism and to the educational institution itself.

Although the university rankings game will not necessarily contradict academics' professional interests, when carried to the extreme, one cannot help but wonder who benefits (those whom professors are organic to) and what is lost (public interest which professors are supposed to serve and their academic freedom), as Marx and Weber would ask. On the one hand, international trends seem to emphasize the relevance of research and teaching, according to the CAP survey (Finkelstein and Cummings 2008; Teichler et al. 2013), but on the other hand, in their striving to be "world-class" universities, higher education institutions in greater China are more likely to serve the interest of the state and the reputation of the president. They are relevant to private rather than public interest, contrary to what a university is supposed to do. As we will discuss below, the creation of the Yenching Academy at Peking University seems to be part of their internationalization efforts, but it mostly serves the interest of the Party-state. It is not clear how much of that is public interest.

Granted that the political contexts in which C&C occur are very different in the USA and greater China areas, C&C function the same in transforming academics into organic intellectuals to political and bureaucratic institutions and elites, including businesses and the university itself, rather than into professional and critical

intellectuals working for academic and public interests. The difference in these areas might only be a difference of degree.

2.4 How C&C Erode Academic Freedom in the USA and Greater China

I have shown that C&C have put strains on research, teaching, and service and adversely influenced the academic and political roles of the professoriate. The essence of the problem, however, is academic freedom. So in this section, I focus on how C&C erode academic freedom, the core value of the academic profession, in relation to professors' academic and political roles. I give more examples of C&C to illustrate the problem.

2.4.1 Academic Freedom and Roles of the Professoriate and Their Political Roles

As I discuss in Chap. 1 the most authoritative definition of academic freedom is probably that of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in its 1940 statement, i.e., the freedom to do research and publish the results; the freedom to discuss subject matter in the classroom; and the freedom to write and speak as citizens without institutional censorship or unwanted sanction (AAUP 2001; O'Neil 2005; Ruch 2001; Teichler et al. 2013). It covers research, teaching, and service to the public. And freedom is the key word. While playing these roles, professors can be organic, professional, and/or critical (see also Hao 2011a, b, c). In regard to teaching specifically, American Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1957 asserted "four essential freedoms" of a university: the freedom to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it should be taught, and who may be admitted to study (cited in Thelin 2004). Normally these matters are reserved for the direct control of the faculty, not for either the president or the trustees (Birnbaum and Eckel 2005). These are indeed the core academic areas of professorial work.

The rationale for academic freedom, according to AAUP (2001:3), is that "institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition." Academic freedom thus is legitimized. It is on the ideology of academic freedom that the three roles of the professoriate are based. We now examine how professors' academic freedom is eroded by C&C when they play their academic and political roles in the USA and greater China.

2.4.2 *Academic Freedom, C&C, Research, and the Advancement of the Organic Role*

Are professors free to do research and publish the results? In the USA, this is largely true. But in cases of corporate sponsorship, for example, they are not often free, as in the examples of Betty Dong and others we discussed earlier, even if they are not necessarily beholden to market demands at the expense of the university mission. The ratings and rankings game, especially in greater China, also dictates what professors should publish (e.g., only articles that can be counted as academic publications), where (like in an SSCI journal or by a prestigious book publisher), and even in what form (articles rather than books). This often results in "trivial research and publication" (Schrecker 2010: 187), having little relevance to reality and the concerns of humanity itself and being read only by a few of their own colleagues. But that is what they must produce for school ratings and rankings purposes. Professors end up becoming organic to businesses and the educational institution.

In the mainland Chinese model of corporatization, professors have to serve the state in addition to businesses and the university. Government sponsorship of research is the order of the day, and universities, especially research universities, are considered as think-tanks of the state and local governments (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 2014). But these think-tanks are not independent; most of their funding comes from the state and local governments, and they serve their purposes. They are very different from the independent think-tanks in the West, or what Burawoy (2007) calls policy sociologists. Rather they take directives from the above and research on state and local government policies where political and ideological correctness is of paramount importance. As vividly described in words attributed to Xi Jinping, the paramount leader of the CCP and the state, you cannot eat the Party's food while smashing the Party's cooking pot (i.e., undermining the CCP) (Wei 2014), or in Weber's words, you have to sing the tune of those whose bread you eat. Indeed, the CCP committees of three representative and prestigious universities, Peking University (Beijing), Fudan University (Shanghai), and Sun Yat-sen University (Guangzhou), have written articles in the CCP journal *Qiushi* (meaning "seeking truth") pledging to uphold the CCP ideologies in their research and teaching and ideological controls over students and faculty (Piao 2014). After the 19th Party Congress, dozens of universities and colleges in China rushed to establish centers to study Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The ideological limitations imposed on research and publication topics include studies on Party history related to the anti-Rightist movement, the Cultural Revolution, national minority issues in Xinjiang and Tibet, or issues like Taiwan independence. Since early 2013, the government has expanded its restrictions on research and teaching to include civil society, civil rights, universal values, legal independence, press freedom, the bourgeois class with money and power, and the historical wrongs of the Party, i.e., the so-called Seven No's. Professors can only say and do what the Party wants them to, i.e., to play an organic role and sing the tune of the CCP. If they want to play a professional role, it will be limited in certain areas,

i.e., outside the Seven No's, like in natural sciences. If they want to play a critical role and do critical research, they have to face consequences. Some outspoken critics of the Party have either left or been forced to leave their universities, and one such critic, Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur scholar from the Minzu (nationalities) University of China (Beijing), is currently serving a life sentence in prison because of his political activism on the website he created (Jacobs 2014). Academic freedom in China is very much limited (see also Rhoads et al. 2014). This CCP central domination is, of course, much more severe than what we mean by C&C in a democracy like the USA. But any limitation of academic freedom in research is limitation nonetheless.

The controversy over the Yenching Academy at Peking University is another good example of how the CCP tries to control the direction of research and teaching in universities. This was planned to be a one-year MA program on China studies taught in English and enrolling 100 best Chinese and international students each year. The plan would help internationalize the university, but the school authorities made it clear that the program was to serve the state's strategic purpose of enhancing its soft power (Altbach 2014; Qian 2014). It might also mean that China wants to set trends in China studies in the world. And it may be a version of the Confucius Institutes the Chinese state has established throughout the world, which aims to spread Chinese culture and language. Now they want to spread their ideologies as well. The organic role of the new international endeavor is fairly clear, which is why it makes people like Professor Qian Liqun (2014) feel uneasy. Qian is a renowned professor who retired from Peking University a decade ago. He thinks that to make humanities and social sciences serve the state in its policies and ideological control is to sabotage the long-cherished tradition of Peking University's independent spirit and free thinking, or the ideal of the university.

2.4.3 Academic Freedom, C&C, Teaching, and the Erosion of Professionalism

Are professors free to decide what to teach and how to teach it? (Because of space, I will not discuss the issue of who may teach and who may be admitted to study, although I have mentioned before the issue of contingent faculty.) As we discussed earlier, the answers are mixed in the CAP project findings.

In terms of what to teach, there is considerable freedom for the full-time faculty, especially in public institutions in the USA, but it is a different story for the part-timers. Research consistently finds that adjuncts perceive a lack of respect. One survey finds about one-third of adjuncts felt "disrespected or less valued than full-time faculty," with inadequate compensation, "irregular assignments, limited opportunities to select class times or to expand their roles, and lack of adequate communications and support from colleagues" (Flaherty 2017). Another survey finds that only 18% of part-time faculty said they had an office of their own, while

45% said they shared an office with others, and the remainder had no space (Flaherty 2015). And those who feel that they are underemployed (three-fourths of adjuncts) "tend to have weaker outcomes (absenteeism, poor work, turnover, etc.) for the organization," which would mean that students are shortchanged as a result (Flaherty 2015). There is not much academic freedom for adjuncts to speak of either in research or teaching or service since they are alienated from the institution.

Professors in mainland China feel disrespect and underappreciation as well but of a different kind. They do not have much say since the curriculum is set by the administration. With the Seven No's in mind, just like in research, the professoriate in general is not free to teach whatever they think should be taught, especially in social sciences. An equally serious threat in both the USA and greater China, however, is utilitarianism or vocationalism of students, part of the commercialization trend, that dictates that universities offer more courses like business administration and social work than other humanities and sciences courses (see Altbach 2005). Increasingly students think that they go to college to obtain a set of credentials to help them find a job in the labor market rather than to develop a meaningful philosophy of life (Brint 2002; Ruch 2001). This explains why more students now than ever before are interested in practical disciplines like business administration, public administration, social work, communications, education, engineering, psychology, biology, etc. But this is not all that a university is about. Yet, universities, operating under a business model, responded to the commercialization trend by expanding certain fields and cutting unpopular offerings in order to meet students' vocational needs, thereby making academics organic to narrowly defined vocational interests rather than the larger public good.

But teaching, especially the teaching of humanities and social sciences, which fosters a critical mind, is crucial in fulfilling the basic mission of the university: "to challenge the minds and the imaginations of…young people, to expand their understanding of the world, and thus of themselves" (Hacker and Dreifus 2010: 8–9), in addition to advancing the frontiers of knowledge and serving as the conscience of society (Washburn 2005). When politics, money, and other utilitarian goals advance, the teaching of humanities and social sciences and the fostering of critical thinking abilities retreat. Disciplines that broaden people's minds rather than job opportunities, such as literature, history, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology, are marginalized (Mok and Cheung 2011). It is also against the traditional Chinese missions of teaching: *chuan dao, shou ye, jie huo* (students' moral development, knowledge acquisition, and clearing up doubts). Academics are encouraged to become organic rather than critical intellectuals. And their professional role is also eroded since they cannot often decide what to teach.

They are not free to teach the way they want to teach it, either. Because of the need for tuition fees, university administration is increasingly keen on the retention rate. They want students to be happy. Professors, especially junior and part-time professors, have to make their students happy, because the latter's negative evaluations of their teaching can lead to negative decisions about the faculty members' future (Lewis 2007). So one result is grade inflation: "Favorable evaluations and higher grades have been shown to go hand in hand" (Lewis 2007: 117). This is true

both in the USA and greater China. After all, teaching has not been emphasized as much as research, except in traditional teaching colleges, again because of the need to serve the institution's pursuit of rankings. But by not emphasizing teaching and by emphasizing its utilitarian goals, the university is failing one of its major professional missions and hurting the professional role of the professoriate. Thus regarding what to teach and how to teach it, professors' academic freedom and their professional and political roles are eroded by C&C, as is the ideal of the university.

2.4.4 Academic Freedom, C&C, Service, and the Lack of Critical Involvement

We have already discussed some of the problems of top-down management styles and its impact on shared governance. Service is often narrowly defined as faculty's sitting on various internal or external committees in shared governance. A broader definition, however, would include faculty's involvement in larger political and social contexts, which is part of academic freedom.

Internally on faculty committees, professors could play more active roles, but they often do not, or they cannot, in the USA or in greater China, because of corporatization. As we discussed earlier, oftentimes university presidents have the power of appointing vice presidents and deans to solidify their power, and they have the final say on candidates for tenure, resulting in "direct control over the makeup of a department and the intellectual direction of the university" (Bradley 2005: 102–3). Faculty members do not usually make the final decisions on these matters, even if they may have been involved in one way or another in the process. On internal committees, faculty members may be doing perfunctory duties and may not be interested in active engagement. Faculty senates or academic councils may not be dealing with important issues and making decisions on them. Rather they may spend weeks debating the minutest details of a newly proposed program, which has already been approved by the administration (Damrosch 1995; see also Chap. 7 on Macau).

Indeed professors in the USA have a much higher degree of participation in faculty governance than in much of greater China. And not all presidents are Lawrence Summers, who governed "by rational choice and power, not by belief and commitment," and used that power with "impatience, harshness, thoughtlessness, and lack of candor" (Lewis 2007: 258–9). Nonetheless, a lack of democracy or the potency of corporatization, in HEIs in both the USA and greater China, still merits one's concern. Should academe be a democracy? Is it a pseudodemocracy in the context of C&C?

Academics are not happy with the lack of democracy or shared governance. As the CAP survey notes (Teichler et al. 2013: 177–78): "Fewer than two out of every five respondents in the CAP survey say there is 'collegiality in decision-making.' Over half describe the management style at their institution as top-down. Overall the academics in the CAP countries believe current decision-making is far more top-down than is appropriate and far less collegial than is desirable."

The CAP survey found Hong Kong to be one of the two places where academics feel most frequently a top-down management style (73%), following Australia (74%), as we also mentioned in Chap. 1. Indeed, only 25% of academics in Hong Kong reported good communication between management and academic staff (Postiglione and Tang 2008). Hong Kong is already a place with more academic freedom than elsewhere in China, with some universities even allowing teachers to select their deans and department heads through ballot sheets (Law 1997), as it is in Taiwan. Had there been a survey in Macau, one would find an even higher percentage of academics reporting top-down management styles (see Chap. 7). This managerialism does not mean efficiency. In fact, the CAP project finds that "competent leadership is not prevalent in the view of the academics" (Teichler et al. 2013: 184).

Nonetheless, by not getting actively engaged in university affairs, by choice or by coercion, faculty members relinquish or are forced to relinquish their powers to the administration in exchange for research and sabbatical leaves and other benefits the administration can hand out. This top-down management style is apparently directly contributing to the significant decline of the level of the feeling of affiliation to one's institution in the 15 years between the Carnegie survey and the CAP survey, from 80% to 63% (Teichler et al. 2013). Not being informed about or being discouraged from getting involved in what is going on at the institution, academics become alienated and demoralized, and the system under such circumstances is losing valuable academic energy (Teichler et al. 2013). Without academic freedom, professors are losing activism and critical edge in university affairs.

There are indeed faculty unions, and some of them may occasionally be successful in opposing budget cuts (Aronowitz 2000). But only a small number of faculty members have ever belonged to such organizations, and the administration seldom supports unionization. The unions' influence in combating discrimination and other injustices is still minimal since they do not have the final say (see also Hao 2003b; Krause 1996). In mainland China, there are no independent faculty unions. In Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, professors are free to criticize and organize, but faculty unions are few and far between, and they are much less effective than in the USA.

As I mentioned above, a broader definition of service also includes faculty's involvement in political and social affairs outside the university. Many in the USA and greater China expect professors to take a stand as public intellectuals on issues of public import (Bradley 2005; Kristof 2014). The university is often thought of as a place of "education for democracy, for social justice, for the whole person, for the perpetuation of civilization" (Birnbaum and Eckel 2005: 352). Professors have a role to transform society (Damrosch 1995). Although this has not been a strong tradition in the USA, intellectuals are expected to be the conscience of society in China (Hao 2003a). That is both a professional role and a critical one. Indeed, the third aspect of academic freedom is that the faculty is free to write and speak as citizens without institutional censorship or unwanted sanction.

In the USA, Kristof (2014) criticizes academics there for writing gobbledygook for obscure journals and not actively engaging the public, as Burawoy (2007) would like them to do in his call for a public sociology (see also Hao 2007 for a discussion of the debate on public sociology vs. other sociologies). Others, however, believe that academics are doing a fairly good job already: they do translate academic

knowledge for the reading public through blogs, op-eds, magazine articles, media appearances, and books (Neem 2014). Above all, teaching is public engagement and professors teach students democratic ideas (Logan and Ferrer 2014).

But that is not always possible in greater China, especially in mainland China. And freedom of speech in Macau and Hong Kong is also being threatened. It is not easy to be a critical or public intellectual under the C&C with Chinese characteristics although that is a role that academics cannot escape from. Otherwise, they would lose their professional and intellectual identity.

Indeed, many are trying to behave like critical and public intellectuals. Peking University professors like He Weifang and Zhang Qianfan (law) and Tsinghua University professors like Qin Hui (history), Guo Yuhua (sociology), and Sun Liping (sociology) are some of them. Some professors in Hong Kong have been directly involved in the social movement for universal suffrage, such as Chan Kin Man (sociology), Tai Yiu-ting (law), Cheng Yu-shek (political science). But these are the minority. As we discussed in the section on research and academic freedom, there are consequences they have to face as in the case of Ilham Tohti. Zhang Xuezhong (East China University of Political Science and Law) was dismissed at least partly because of politics. In Macau, two professors were dismissed for alleged political reasons (see Chap. 7). In Hong Kong, Chan Kin Man and Tai Yiu-ting were sentenced to prison terms for their roles in the civil disobedience movement, known as the Umbrella Movement for democracy, in 2014.

Again in faculty governance and in their civic and political participation, professors' academic freedom is eroded by C&C, especially corporatization. In the USA or in greater China, while some professors are active in civic and political life in or outside the university, most tend not to be, out of considerations of pragmatism and individual interests. But that may not be what a university is meant to be.

To sum up, in this section on academic freedom and professorial roles, we observe that although there are differences in different jurisdictions, academics are by and large constrained by all kinds of social forces, especially C&C. But academic freedom is their raison d'etre, without which they are no different from an alienated industrial worker doing forced division of labor. It may be their perennial plight to constantly struggle for academic freedom and weigh and balance their roles as being organic (to the Party-state or businesses or the institution), professional (in research or teaching), and critical (in internal and external political and social affairs). In the process they find their true identity.

2.5 Conclusions

This chapter argues that professors' academic freedom and roles are strained and eroded. It is true that the C&C we have discussed so far affect professorial role-playing at various degrees at different universities in different countries and regions and all universities are not the same (see also Bentley and Kyvik 2012). Shared governance is in much better shape in the USA than in greater China. Although there are some variations, the professoriate in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan

enjoy much more academic freedom than they do in mainland China. But the tendency of C&C to affect adversely professors' roles as organic, professional, and critical intellectuals and in essence their academic freedom, in all these jurisdictions, is prevalent.

What would be a balanced approach to the role of the professoriate facing the challenges of C&C, then? Can higher education follow the Mertonian norms of science (communalism, universality, the free flow of knowledge, and organized skepticism) and survive the movement of C&C (Hurt 2012; Park 2011)? That may be what future research should further explore (see Chou et al. 2013). We hope that such research will contribute to the sociology of higher education in terms of the academic and political roles of professors as well as their ethical dilemmas. It could contribute to the methods of the sociology of higher education through cross-cultural and cross-national comparative studies. As Clark (2007a, b:11) points out, a more comparative analysis is needed "in line with the general drift of sociology toward comparative study, a development that should help correct the myopia that comes from too many days spent on scale reliability or on vignettes of the American college." Indeed, a comparative analysis, like the CAP project we have cited and our efforts in this chapter, will correct the myopia that comes from studying one's own local universities as well. That is also the goal of this book.

Finally, to strike an optimistic note, Clark (2002: 340) observes that the university is not driven by "globalization," "economic forces," "demographic trends," or even by "state policy." It is "mainly driven by the responses it makes, responses that are the sum of reactions in its many parts." Likewise, it is fair to assume that it is neither C&C nor faculty power or student consumerism alone that determines what roles professors play and how they can play them. Rather, it is the interaction among all those forces that shapes the academic and political roles of professors and the extent to which they can exercise academic freedom. In other words, the fate of the academic profession, more strain and alienation, or more academic freedom and belief in and commitment to higher education, is partly in the professoriate's own hands. It takes the effort of *both* the administration and the faculty to balance the top-down management style and the commercialization trend and to make possible a communication-oriented administration and a public interest-oriented university. Only through a high degree of "shared governance" can we mitigate faculty alienation and forced division of labor, enhance institutional loyalty, and turn a "knowledge enterprise" or "factory" back into a "knowledge community."

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Chapter 3
The Role of Commercialization and Corporatization in University Shared Governance: An American Case Study

Zhaohui Hong

3.1 Introduction

Low faculty morale and shrinking faculty governance have sounded serious alarms in higher education. A global survey revealed that 45% of university professors felt personal strain due to various reasons (Teichler et al. 2013:107). These findings were supported by another 2014 faculty survey at an American university (see UAR Survey II). In the open-ended comment section of the survey, one faculty member complained, "Morale is very low. We work very hard without much support or acknowledgement of the work we do. The expectation seems to be to do more with less." Another faculty member summarized the changing patterns of faculty morale: "Decline in faculty morale, increase in faculty dissatisfaction, less congeniality, more tension among faculty members, increase in faculty politics and group formation."

Obviously, there are various reasons for the lower faculty morale and declining faculty governance. But this chapter focuses on the roles of commercialization and corporation (C&C) as one of the key factors in shaping and reshaping American faculty governance in the past 30 years. After discussing the key concepts supported by a literature review, data, and research methods, this chapter presents empirical evidence in faculty research, teaching, and service through a variety of quantitative and qualitative indicators.

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This is a case study of an American university (hereafter referred to as UA), a public university with three regional campuses in the USA. The study is designed to enhance awareness of important issues, including shared governance, faculty morale, and academic freedom. Generally speaking, faculty shared governance in the USA essentially is an issue of academic freedom which includes faculty authority over curriculum development, faculty employment, faculty promotion, and, to some extent, university budget. Although faculty governance in the USA is arguably better than that in mainland China and other countries, C&C in American higher education since the 1980s have gradually muted professors' voices and marginalized their power in university governance which eventually damage academic freedom. Through comparisons and contrasts with higher education institutions in East Asia, the study further illustrates what may constitute the best practices in higher education governance and academic freedom. It is hoped that in doing so, a positively productive light will be shed on higher education, especially in terms of shared governance and academic freedom.

3.2 Defining Concepts and Data

There are various definitions of "shared governance" or "faculty governance," but no one has a more authoritative definition than the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). In 1967, AAUP's Joint Statement addressed the two principles of shared governance or faculty governance. The first is that "important areas of action involve…the initiating capacity and decision-making participation of all the institutional components." The second is that "difference in the weight of each voice...should be determined by the reference to the responsibility of each component…." (AAUP 2001: 218).

AAUP's definition has empowered faculty to fulfill their responsibilities for all educational matters, including not only instruction, curriculum, and research but also educational policy, planning, budgeting, and the selection of administrators (Birnbaum 2004: 6). Specifically, in Dreyfuss' view (2014), shared governance must be demonstrated by roles for faculty in university budgeting, administrative search, evaluation of administration, and program review. According to Birnbaum (2004), the key for shared governance is not about its degree of effectiveness or level of quality, but rather, it "is a matter of ideology" (p. 20) because the bottom line is that higher education is an "academic institution" instead of a "market institution" (p. 8). In addition, some scholars address the important role of trust in shared governance (Kezar 2004: 35–40; Pope 2004:75–84), maintaining that it is essential because it can either sustain or destroy faculty governance. After all, "Governance is a means to an end" (Birnbaum 2004:19).

In addition, the commercialization and marketization of higher education can be defined as "an effort to build up a market-like resource allocation system and develop competition between and within higher education institutions" (Enders 2001: 20). As a result, university commercialization contributes to academic capitalism, which is characterized by "competitiveness, a strong emphasis on

productivity, the search for ever-expanding and new income streams, drastic cost cutting, and the academics' growing insecurity" (Enders 2001: 20). Various scholars have also provided similar interpretations of academic commercialization (Breznitz et al. 2008: 129; Hong and Walsh 2009: 145; Kumar 2010: 324–351; Mirowski and Van Horn 2005: 503; Molesworth et al. 2009: 277; Peters and Etzkowitz 1990: 427). As for the definition of the corporatization of higher education, it can be characterized by "processes, decisional criteria, expectations, organizational culture, and operating practices that are taken from, and have their origins in, the modern business corporation" (Steck 2003: 74). Other scholars also shared their understanding of the corporatization of higher education (Giroux 2002: 103; Jain et al. 2009: 922; Parker 2011: 434). As Henry Steck (2003) states, higher education managers were driven to use "the tools and techniques of corporate management, including increased pressure to replace public support with revenues raised by increasing student costs or by competing more aggressively in the market" (p. 69). The president of the University of Florida claimed in 1997 that "we have taken the great leap forward and said: 'Let's pretend we're a corporation.'" Someone even directly declared that the university is not "like" a business corporation; it *is* a "corporation" (Steck 2003: 70, 67). More and more, American universities are "aggressively and coherently" embracing the ideology of the new university, that is, "a modern university must behave like a modern corporation" (Steck 2003: 72). There are many telling indications that "consistent with the centralized managerial decision-making structure and the university's corporatisation and commercialisation has come a reduction in academics' autonomy and freedom of speech" (Parker 2011: 445).

C&C are closely connected in affecting university governance. According to Steck (2003), under the influence of commercialization, university culture is "colored by values appropriate to the modern business corporation" as well as "by corporate economy, culture, and practices" (pp. 76, 75). Meanwhile, "selection and evaluation of top administrators – perhaps even mid-level academic managers – by criteria and expectations is more appropriate to a CEO of a corporation than of a dean or provost or president" (Steck 2003: 77). Consequently, in support of university commercialization, university administrators now encourage "faculty members to obtain corporate funding for their work. That quest produced ambiguous results, since such entrepreneurial ventures could violate academic freedom" (Schrecker 2010: 43).

Meanwhile, as faculty by nature are teachers and scholars who may be unwilling or unable to run a university as a corporation or a business firm, university administrators have found more opportunities to expand their share and power in governance. Operating a university as a corporation can be a practical approach in making a university competitive and cost-effective. Accordingly, the principles and practices of shared governance – such as fair representation, transparent process, inclusive discussion, consensus building, and mutual accountability – are ignored, discouraged, and even abandoned. Condemning such a trend, Schrecker states, "academic freedom is under attack – both in its traditional form as the protection of the faculty's freedom of expression in and outside of class, as well as in its equally important, though less obvious, role in preserving the faculty's autonomy and ability to carry out its academic responsibilities" (2010: 38–39). Schrecker (2010)

further declared that the most serious consequence of the lack of academic freedom and arbitrary leadership is the "casualization of faculty labor" (p. 39) and that "without academic freedom, the quality of higher education will almost certainly decline" (p. 40). According to Shrecker (2010), "by casualizing the faculty, the academy is eating its seed corn. Eventually, even the most dedicated scholars and teachers will abandon the dream of an academic career" (p. 45).

Needless to say, university commercialization will lead to corporatization, and the fusion of C&C will adversely affect the faculty's academic role. In today's American higher education, C&C acts as a hybrid. Therefore, it is necessary to address the two phenomena together while discussing their effects on academic freedom and professors' roles in university governance.

To examine the role of professors in university shared governance, a UA's regional campus Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) conducted its first campus-wide survey (hereafter referred to as "UAR survey I") in October 2013, focusing on administrative responsiveness and shared governance. It received 93 responses, including 67 faculty (28 AAUP members), 4 staff, 7 administrators, 2 others, and 13 non-classified. Meanwhile, to investigate the impact of commercialization and budget pressures on shared governance and morale, UA's regional campus Chapter of AAUP completed its second survey in January 2014. There were 70 faculty respondents and 55 completed the surveys (hereafter refers to "UAR survey II"). In addition, in light of the unification of UA's two regional campuses, a special survey was completed by UAR's AAUP from May 22 to June 27, 2014. There were 83 respondents, including 72 faculty members (hereafter referred to as "UAR survey III"). Approved by the UA's Institutional Review Board (IRB), these UAR surveys are cited in this article as important references.

With regard to the basic information and data about UA, all data after 2000 is available to the public at the UA website, and the data before 2000 is also available upon request. The project collected and selected information on 13 relevant topics from 1982 to 2013, including the university's mission statement, vision, strategic plans, institutional history, student enrollment information, degree award data, faculty and administrative staff information, revenue, sponsored funding, technology transfer and commercialization, and UA's nationwide and worldwide rankings. In order to protect the confidentiality of UA, no base data cited from its website is revealed.

3.3 Shared Governance and Faculty Research

Faculty research is the first area affected by C&C and the consequential decrease in shared governance. Today's American universities are witnessing "changes in academic attitudes and structure related to economic development," which "could set the stage for as great a transformation as was precipitated by the assumption of a research function by universities at the beginning of this century" (Peters and Etzkowitz 1990: 427). To be sure, the Uniform Patent Act of 1981 has changed

university behavior with respect to intellectual property rights. For faculty and administrators, this law "has heightened their interest in commercialization of the results of university research" (Peters and Etzkowitz 1990: 432). The companies established by MIT faculty and students in 1990, for instance, had combined annual sales of $39 billion – about one-third of the gross annual product of Massachusetts State (Peters and Etzkowitz 1990:433).

It is vital to use measurable indicators when evaluating academic research under the influence of C&C. First, technology transfer and commercialization have clearly represented some notable commercial efforts at American universities. Following the national trend since the beginning of the twenty-first century, UA, for instance, created a position of Vice President for Research, replacing the previous Vice Provost for Research. One of UA's regional campuses also created a new position of Associate Vice Chancellor for Research and Professional Development in 2005. After reallocating financial resources and human capital, UA achieved a 666% growth in the number of patent applications from 2001 to 2006 and another 940% growth from 2006 to 2011. Its royalty income has also increased by 158% in 2006 and 139% in 2011 (see Table 3.1).

Therefore, in light of technology transfer and commercialization, professors began to focus on "patenting and licensing in order to garner market-based rewards for selling privatized knowledge" (Hong and Walsh 2009: 15). Interestingly, in some scholars' view (Reingand and Osten 2010: 1), "it is too late to complain about the university research commercialization, since it is an existing reality and plays a growing role for ranking and reputation." Also, money really matters because "when it comes to commercialization of the technology or material or process or device disclosed in the patent, then the inventor has a right to request a monetary reward for using the patented invention" (Reingand and Osten 2010: 2). Now, "academic entrepreneurs are encouraged to secure formal rights on their intellectual property as a key step towards the successful commercialization of their research" (Etzkowitz 2000: 360).

Furthermore, the factor of external grants and contracts also reflects the effects of C&C in academic research, with serious impact on faculty morale and shared governance. To develop university-industrial relations and secure more external funding in support of the university research enterprise, more and more American universities have to go the extra mile in expanding sponsored research programs. Demonstrated by Table 3.2, UA's sponsored funding increased by 220.44% from 2000 to 2012.

Noticeably, focusing on external grant and university-industrial collaboration has devaluated the research, mainly in the areas of humanities and social sciences.

Table 3.1 UA technology transfer and commercialization (2000–2013) (Unit: $million)

Year	Patent applications worldwide	Royalty income
2000–01	35	1.63
2012–13	344	5.8
Percent change	+882.86%	+255.83%

Table 3.2 UA sponsored funding awarded (2000–2013)

Year	Amount (million)
2000–01	190.3
2011–12	345
Percent change	+81.29%

While emphasizing practicality and economic development, many humanities and social sciences faculty members have found their morale diminished and their voice marginalized when it comes to university governance. Meanwhile, academic commercialization has revised the definition of faculty research. It now focuses on applied research that can display measurable outcomes on the university's revenue sheet. Besides, the university has to emphasize the measurable quantity of publications instead of the quality of scholarship. In reality, a faculty member may be tenured with books and articles published by some commercial publishers and non-refereed journals.

3.4 Shared Governance and Faculty Teaching

In light of powerful C&C, a decrease in shared governance in teaching is demonstrated in five situations. First, more professional degrees were awarded by UA. While UA's student enrollment increased by 20.96% from 1982 to 2012 (see Table 3.3), the Baccalaureate, Master's, and Doctorate degrees it conferred increased by 22.44%, 15.73%, and 44.82%, respectively, from 2000 to 2012 (see Table 3.4). By contrast, the professional degrees that UA (a main campus) awarded increased dramatically by 178.65% during the same period, although its total number of degrees (248) in 2013 was not significant (see Table 3.4). Such an increase is indicative of the impact of commercialization on the academic expectations and outcomes, as holders of professional degrees presumably have a better chance of finding employment.

Driven largely by commercialization, the focus on professional degree programs has affected the university's curriculum, which "serves to further ensure that industry-relevant skills, rather than critical reflections, are the focus of delivery" (Molesworth et al. 2009: 283). The decisions on experiential education and professional degree programs are made in a top-down fashion without intensive or extensive faculty involvement. UA's President in his open letter of January 18, 2013, emphasized that UA's faculty must focus on "useful" research and teaching because "too many professors are spending too much time 'writing articles for each other,' researching abstruse topics of no real utility and no real incremental contribution to human knowledge or understanding". Therefore, UA has placed its curricular priority on its students' vocational needs, experiential education, and professional career development. As a result, UA is becoming more of a professional school at the expense of humanities, social sciences, and competence training. As Zhidong Hao mentions, "When politics, money, and other utilitarian goals advance, the teaching

Table 3.3 UA student enrollment (1982–2012)

Year	Student numbers
1982–1983	32,455
2011–2012	39,256
Percent change	+20.96%

Table 3.4 UA student degree awarded (2000–2012)

Year	Baccalaureate degrees	Master's degrees	Doctorate degrees	Professional degrees
2000–2001	5579	1284	464	89
2012–2013	6831	1486	672	248
Percent change	+22.44%	+15.73%	+44.82%	+178.65%

Table 3.5 UA faculty and staff (2000–2013)

Year	Full-time faculty and lecturers	Adjunct faculty	Administrative and professional staff
2000–2001	2302	234	2938
2012–2013	2682	362	3975
Percent change	+16.5%	+54.7%	+35.3%

of humanities and social sciences and the fostering of critical thinking abilities retreat" (Hao 2015: 118). Similarly, one faculty member pointed out during the UAR Survey II in January 2014 that there is "decline in academically challenging courses offered. Department has a preference for skill and job preparation courses. There is decline in liberal arts education and a move to job preparation to maximize enrollment and justify programs. It is dumbing down higher education."

The dramatic growth of the number of adjunct professors has reduced the instructional cost but affected the morale and generated strain for part-time faculty because it has created a "caste system" in higher education institutions. For instance, while the positions of full-time faculty and lecturers increased by 16.5% from 2000 to 2013 at UA, the number of adjunct faculty increased by 54.7% during the same period (see Table 3.5).[1]

The large income gap between full-time and adjunct professors is what creates a faculty caste system. To some part-time professors, full-time faculty is boss and part-time professor is slave, and full-time faculty is teaching with respect, but part-time faculty has no dignity. On the other hand, tenured professors have also complained about the lower morale of adjunct faculty because some adjunct professors have "checked out" and rely on things such as old, outdated syllabi and videos. "Similarly, some adjunct faculty may use more multiple-choice questions in exams,

[1] Given that there are no data about adjunct faculty from 1982 to 2000, Table 3.5 has to focus on the period from 2000 to 2013 for the comparison between the adjunct and full-time faculty.

as their commitment to the students is less. UAR Survey II supports the findings drawn from the interviews in January 2014. One faculty member added, "I think the overall faculty morale in my department is not high given the number of adjuncts we hired to replace faculty who have left the institution. I have never in my experience seen more student turmoil due to low faculty morale and incompetence."

Lower faculty morale is also related to the drastic tuition increase, which is a general trend in American higher education. Currently, students are becoming "cash cows" and customers, faculty are treated as salesmen, and the university is being transformed into a commercialized vendor. As a public university, UA is not a tuition-driven institution, compared to most private universities. Traditionally, the more students enrolled in public universities, the more revenue allocations these universities would receive from the state government. However, the budget crisis in recent years has reduced the percentages of state revenues for the public universities. As indicated in Table 3.6, the state revenue allocation in dollar amount increased by 5.5% from 2000 to 2013, yet UA's percentage of the state revenue allocation was reduced from 28.6% to 14.6% in the past 13 years. Arguably, UA is no longer treated as a state university. Consequently, UA has been forced to increase student tuition and fees by 219.81% in the past 13 years, and its percentage of the total revenue increased from 20.89% to 33.3%.

To render effective service to these "customers" whose tuition makes up one-third of the university's revenue, the relationship between faculty and students is directly impacted. Professors act as salesmen, while students perform as conscious customers who are always right. They want good grades for the dollars they pay. Given that student evaluations play an important role in the tenure and promotion processes, and students' opinions are often influenced by their satisfaction of the grades they received, some professors are discouraged to experiment with new pedagogical methods and strategies for fear that they will not be able to give students good grades and thus not get good student evaluations. Furthermore, most students do not really use evaluations to judge how a professor performs. Some faculty would buy students pizzas to boost the evaluation scores. Similarly, some of the students who cannot get their expected grades would lower the rating for their professors. The results of student evaluations highly depend on the toughness of his/her professor.

As a result, grade inflation has become a troubling trend. At present, the "university administration is increasingly keen on the retention rate. They want students to

Table 3.6 UA budgeted revenue (2000–2013) (Unit: $million)

Year	Student fees	State appropriation	Federal appropriation	Total
2000–2001 (percentage of total revenue)	$197.9 (20.89%)	$271 (28.6%)	$15 (1.58%)	$947.1
2012–2013 (percentage of total revenue)	$632.9 (33.3%)	$285.9 (14.6%)	$17.1 (0.87%)	$1957.7
Percentage change of revenue in dollar amount	+219.81%	+5.5%	+14%	

Table 3.7 UAR Survey II: changing teaching rigor

Item: During the Fall 2013 semester, please rate how (if at all) you changed your behavior in each of the following areas:	Easier (%)	No change (%)	Harder (%)
The rigor of my exams	13	84	3
The rigor of my homework assignments	32	66	2

be happy" (Hao 2015: 12). In doing so, grade inflation is inevitable. The administration realizes that it is a problem. As UA's president stated in his open letter dated January 18, 2013, "Rigor has weakened. Grade inflation has drained the meaning from grade point averages and left the diploma in many cases as merely a surrogate marker for the intelligence required to gain admission in the first place." But the administration does not realize that they are part of the problem. Weakened academic rigor was reported in the second survey conducted by UA's regional campus AAUP in January 2014. It indicated that 13% of faculty had made their exams easier while 32% made their homework assignments easier in Fall 2013, as compared to the previous semester (see Table 3.7).

In this regard, several faculty members expressed concerns in their open-ended comments during the UAR Survey II. "I made them [assignments/assessments] easier to grade for my benefit. Because of this, I had to change the format, so I feel I was not able to reach the depth of learning I think is necessary for a graduate degree." Others shared similar opinions and experiences: (1) "The increased class size has really put a strain on me in terms of grading. I included fewer written assignments and more exams, which I believe diminished the class experience;" (2) "I provided fewer assignments to grade;" and (3) "Since my classes were so large, I gave fewer tests." Similarly, since students are customers, once conflicts occur, professors have to adjust course workload so that students do not feel burdened.

Freedom of speech in the classroom has also been affected by this customer-centered environment and student consumerism. To adhere to the idea of political correctness, some faculty members try to avoid any sensitive topics in the classroom. The commercialization of higher education has directly or indirectly given rise to high tuition, influenced student evaluations, caused grade inflation, and weakened faculty's freedom of speech in the classroom, all of which have in turn contributed to decreased faculty morale, increased faculty strain, and, ultimately, eroded faculty governance.

The dramatic growth of international students is another index of the commercialization of higher education and another source of strain and stress for faculty members. Given that international students typically pay out-of-state tuition, the university has a strong incentive to recruit them, and they may be not as academically competent as other American students. For instance, as of 2013, UA had 9509 international students, which is the second-largest international student population among US public universities (Institute of International Education 2013). By contrast, there were only 1500 international students at UA in 1982. While the total number of students at UA increased by only 20.96% from 1982 to 2013, the international student population rose dramatically by 533.93%, and its percentage of the

Table 3.8 UA International students and total students, 1982–2013

Year	Number of International students	Number of total students
1982–1983 (percentage of the total students)	1500 (4.62%)	32,455
2012–2013 (percentage of the total students)	9509 (24.22%)	39,256
Percentage change	533.93%	20.96%

total student population increased from 4.62% to 24.22% during the same period (see Table 3.8). In addition to charging out-of-state tuition, UA charges an additional $1000 for each international student as processing and orientation fees.

Given the lack of English language capabilities on the part of many international students, faculty members have to serve as language instructors to help them improve their English, in addition to classroom instruction on the specific subject and any other advising duties. It has added burden and responsibility to faculty members' workloads because many international students have problems writing papers and delivering presentations. Sometimes, professors have to compromise the quality of English essays in order to let some international students pass the class. One regional campus at UA offers provisional admissions to those international students who did not pass their TOEFL. In such cases, the university can charge extra tuition for them to take the English training program on campus. As one faculty member pointed out, in reality, it was nearly impossible for some international students to improve their language ability to a satisfactory level that would enable them to engage in meaningful academic studies. Some international students had to withdraw from the university and go back to their home countries after paying the expensive English learning tuition for one or more years.

It needs to be pointed out that the decision to waive the requirement for TOEFL in order to increase the enrollment of international students did not get approval by the faculty senate. Instead, the decision was made by university administration. The faculty never knew about the decision-making process concerning the aggressive recruitment of international students until they witnessed a massive number of foreign students talking in their native languages on campus.

Shrinking shared governance, low faculty morale, and serious faculty strain are also attributable to the growth of online teaching, another product of the commercialization of higher education. As Table 3.9 shows, the number of UA distance learning courses increased by 633.33% from 2000 to 2013.

At present, professors are in no position to stop or even slow the trend of online teaching – one of the outcomes of academic commercialization and a change that is generally supported by university administrations. Many professors have serious reservations regarding online teaching but budgetary factors will continue this drive in the future. Thus, students are also limited in their learning efforts. As one faculty stated during the UAR Survey II, the university has "become an educational enterprise that is focused on the production of billable hours, establishing a student as customer model, and diminishing and marginalizing the faculty." Some senior

Table 3.9 UA distance learning courses (2000–2013)

Year	Number of distance learning courses
2000–2001	132
2012–2013	968
Percentage change	+633.33%

Table 3.10 UAR Survey II: increasing teaching loads

Item	Fewer/ Smaller (%)	About the same (%)	More/ Larger (%)
Compared to previous semesters, how many course (i.e., preps) did you have for Fall 2013?	5	56	39
Compared to previous semesters, how large were your class sizes in Fall 2013?	3	40	56

faculty lamented that the steep learning curve made it very difficult for him/her to teach online courses, though there was little choice but to learn to use Blackboard in order to survive in a commercialized academic environment.

Similarly, UA's faculty body never had a chance to discuss and approve the distance-learning course curricula. The fact is that, given the current administrative policy, once one faculty member develops a regular on-site course approved by the faculty senate, he or she is free to make it into an online version, thus raising the issue about its quality and accreditation. Therefore, the key issue is shared governance regarding developing distance education because nobody can ensure the quality of online courses without faculty's input and professional program review.

Finally, another reason for faculty's strain and low morale is the fact that full-time faculty are compelled to increase their teaching loads, which involves more course preparations and larger class sizes. As demonstrated by UAR Survey II in January 2014, 39% of the faculty now teach more courses and 56% taught larger class sizes (more than 40 students) in Fall 2013 compared to the previous semesters (see Table 3.10). As one faculty member commented in the survey, "The class sizes are increasing substantially. As an example, the size of our freshman experience sections has increased more than 50%, making the student/faulty interaction less personal and this is not helpful in terms of retention efforts." Another faculty member also made it clear that "I think my students are feeling the strain from larger classes because I don't have enough time to be responsive to students."

Due to the increased teaching loads, more than 75% of the faculty has reduced time devoted to scholarly activities (see Table 3.11). Accordingly, a significant percentage of the faculty members is dissatisfied with the quality of their teaching, research, service, and professional development (see Table 3.12).

Hence, faculty morale has decreased significantly. In the open-ended comment section in the UAR Survey II, one faculty member admitted that he/she had changed "in belief system about what education means." Naturally, heavier teaching loads have led to increased stress for faculty. Several faculty members voiced the following concerns: (1) "I found myself being more irritable than usual with my students when they were off-task;" (2) "I was less patient with my students than usual;" (3)

Table 3.11 UAR Survey II: changing faculty's time allocation

During the Fall 2013 semester, when compared to the previous semesters, please rate how (if at all) you changed the amount of time you spent on each of the following activities:	Less time (%)	No change (%)	More time (%)
Teaching all my classes	5	49	46
Work on scholarly activities	79	15	7
Starting new scholarly projects	80	13	7
Reading and reviewing scholarly journals	75	20	5

Table 3.12 UAR Survey II: changing faculty's job satisfactions

Item: During the Fall 2013 semester, when compared to previous semesters, please rate how (if at all) you felt about each of the following activities:	Declined (%)	Same (%)	Improved (%)
The overall quality of my teaching	33	60	7
The overall quality of my research work	63	33	3
The overall quality of my service activities	40	43	17
My personal growth	65	27	8
My professional growth	70	24	7
My overall job satisfaction	77	15	8

"Pressure, stress, and anxiety;" and (4) "I had to seek medical help and was prescribed medications to help me cope with the situation. Needless to say, this added to the pressure and burden."

Apparently, increased teaching loads and class sizes have resulted in the decline of scholarship, the rigor and effectiveness of teaching, and instructional quality as well as increased faculty dissatisfaction with their job and their personal and professional growth. Consequently, faculty morale is low, stress is high, and burnout symptoms are reported frequently. Overworked and under-appreciated faculty members have reacted by exerting less effort in teaching, research, and scholarship, including less interest in seeking research grants. Faculty members have expressed little or no confidence in the aims and actions of the administration, whether in the past or the future.

3.5 Shared Governance on Professorial Services

The rights and responsibilities of professorial service are mainly reflected in faculty governance in conducting university affairs. Several factors have contributed to the erosion of the faculty's role in university service and governance.

First, the different growth rates of the number of university administrators and that of faculty reveal the changing role of faculty in university service. Naturally, both administrators and faculty want to see a respective increase in personnel. However, the control of political power and financial resources in the hands of the administrators has led to disproportionate increase in the number of administrators.

A national survey conducted by AAUP in 2014 shows that the explosive growth in administrative positions became evident because the number of full-time, non-faculty professional employees more than quadrupled between 1976 and 2011, and employment in non-tenure-track faculty positions more than tripled. The number of full-time senior administrators also more than doubled during the same period while tenured and tenure-track faculty employment grew only 23%. According to John Curtis, director of Research and Public Policy of AAUP, "while faculty and staff members were told there was no money for raises or continued benefits, presidents were scooping up double-digit percentage increases in salary. Suffering from a decades-old case of 'administrative bloat,' higher education is losing its focus" (Curtis and Thornton 2014: 4–5).

The findings of this national survey are strongly supported by UA's situation, where administrative and professional staff members increased by 140.04% from 1982 to 2013, while full-time faculty increased by only 51.72% during the same period. This disparity clearly demonstrates the personnel growth of administrative power at the expense of faculty interests. Indicated by Table 3.13, the size of the faculty was 7.2% (1775 vs. 1656) more than administrators in 1982, but 30 years later the number of administrators was 42.43% more than faculty members (2693 vs. 3975) in 2013 (see Table 3.13).

One faculty member complained, "We have a large and growing administrative sector at UA. It is my sense that the administration does not have a great deal of faith in the faculty – as a whole – to contribute to the running of the University, which is why administrators have been hired. We do not have a union and the Faculty Senate seems to be a plodding bureaucratic organization that does not focus on important issues."

Specifically, once the university hires more administrators, the limited budget restricts the hiring of tenure-track faculty members. In the past 5 years, UAR has almost frozen all unfilled positions for tenure-track faculty when others retired or left the university. However, it has kept hiring various administrative staff and even created many new positions for the senior administration. Meanwhile, UAR hasn't had any salary increases for its faculty in the past 3 years.

The second indicator of the impact of commercialization and corporatization on shared governance is the arbitrary leadership of the university administration. Various interviews with UA faculty and administrators clearly demonstrate that the university administration has dominated all decision-making processes except for curriculum development. Given that UA is not a unionized campus, the role of faculty governance, such as the faculty senate, is significantly limited. For instance, facing a $1 million shortfall due to lower enrollment, a UA's regional campus

Table 3.13 AU Faculty and administration (1982–2013)

Year	Faculty and lecturers	Administrative and professional staff
1982–1983	1775	1656
2012–2013	2693	3975
Percentage change	+51.72%	+140.04%

decided to terminate six tenure-track faculty positions on August 9, 2013 while still hiring and expanding administrative positions. This decision had no meaningful faculty involvement and generated serious complaints. Based on its AAUP chapter's survey (URA Survey I) in September 2013, 80% of the faculty either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the administrative decision to terminate faculty positions using budgetary reasons (see item 1, Table 3.11). It is worth noting that the American system of higher learning is widely perceived in the rest of the world as rather liberal, but 30% of faculty respondents in the survey either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the "university adheres to the principles of academic freedom" (see item 4, Table 3.14).

Another case also illustrates the shrinking of shared governance at UAR. Currently, it has been proposed that two UA's regional campuses merge into one entity. One UA senior administrator stated, "After the consolidation has been worked out, faculty input will be sought and given great weight." The UAR AAUP chapter president mounted a strong opposition: "Consulting with faculty after decisions are made is not shared governance" because "unilateral administration decisions do not include faculty or student participation and do not serve the public interest. Shared governance is essential to a quality university" (Staff 2014). Consequently, AAUP at UAR conducted its third survey in June 2014, gathering the opinions of faculty and staff on the process and decision of campus merger (Tables 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17).

Survey III above concludes that UAR's merger process, presumed to be instigated by the president of UA and Board of Trustees, has not been handled well. The information on the process was scant and not well-received. Furthermore, the merger is believed to benefit administrators, rather than faculty, staff, students, or alumni. The majority of the respondents believe that the decision-making process, rather than being deliberative and persuasive, was centralized and restrictive, with minimum input from the rest of the campus population. To put this event in a broader context, it reflects the crisis of confidence in shared governance as a result of the corporatization and commercialization of higher education.

Table 3.14 URA Survey I: University governance A

Item	Number of respondents	Strongly agree and agree (%)	Undecided (%)	Strongly disagree and disagree (%)
1. University budget cuts resulted in termination letters to faculty in Summer, 2013	78	8	13	80
2. University faculty and staff can expect equitable treatment regardless of gender, sexual orientation, disability, religious, and racial/ethnic differences	78	45	10	45
3. University has a strong due process system in place for faculty and staff	78	28	18	54
4. University adheres to the principles of academic freedom	86	54	16	30

Table 3.15 UAR Survey III: competence and input on the unification (83 respondents)

Item	% Strongly agree/agree	Mean
The unification process has been handled competently	26	1.95
The reasons for the unification have been adequately explained	20	1.93
The naming process for the new, combined institution has been handled competently	16	1.58
Sufficient input was sought before the unification process was begun	5	1.36
Selection of faculty representatives on the unification committee was through an open and transparent process	26	1.88

Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree

Table 3.16 UAR Survey III: representation for the unification (83 respondents)

Item: The unification committee adequately represents the interests of…	% Strongly Agree/ Agree	Mean
Administrators	88	3.36
Faculty	21	1.84
Staff	36	2.14
Students	21	1.82
Alumni	15	1.83

Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree

Table 3.17 UAR Survey III: campus atmosphere on the unification

Item (negative option of two statements presented)	% Chosen
Solutions are pre-determined by the ruling elite	77
Authority is used to induce acceptance of a predetermined solution	81
Leader behavior is not constrained by rules or other group members	86
There is a single source or colluding sources of information on campus	69
Communication structures on campus are centralized	60
There are rigid group boundaries and roles that limit discussion and options	79
Minority opinion is censored via neglect, ridicule, social pressure, or persecution	74
Feedback is discouraged on campus	54
The agenda, objectives, and work tasks are set by a small, select group	86
Rewards are used to maintain group structure and leaders' status and power	82
Persuasion on campus is based on simple images, prejudices, and the playing on emotions	75
Scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.92)	

Commenting on the trend of university corporatization, one faculty interviewee conceded, "Immediate future of this university will involve increased focus on revenue generation, customer satisfaction and cost cutting measures. I suppose this could be considered increased commercialization and/or corporatization. Faculty governance will not be on the increase – at least not on this campus." Additional URA survey results also strongly reflect the scholars' concerns and the

Table 3.18 URA Survey I: University governance B

Item	Number of respondents	Strongly agree and agree (%)	Undecided (%)	Strongly disagree and disagree (%)
1. University conducts university business in a transparent manner	87	16	14	60
2. University openly shares budget information with faculty, staff, and administrators	84	25	8	67
3. University is responsive to the needs of its student body	85	32	28	40
4. University is responsive to the needs of the local community	76	32	32	37

Table 3.19 URA Survey I: University governance C

Item	Number of respondents	Strongly agree and agree (%)	Undecided (%)	Strongly disagree and disagree (%)
1. I believe that my input is considered and acted upon at the university level	78	20	9	70
2. I have many opportunities for input about important matters at the college level	82	43	20	38
3. I believe that my input is considered and acted upon at the college level	83	34	16	51
4. I have many opportunities for input about important matters at the department level	78	73	8	19
5. I believe that my input is considered and acted upon at the department level	78	62	13	26
6. University has a strong faculty governance system	80	18	14	69

interviewees' opinions related to the lack of administrative transparency and shared governance (see Tables 3.18 and 3.19). In particular, 69% of faculty respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that "university has a strong faculty governance system" (Item 6, Table 3.19).

As a result, the commercialization and corporatization of the academia have changed the roles of faculty in university service. The growth of the university corporation has taken place at the expense of shared governance, hence the reduced power and influence of faculty in the institution's decision-making process. One UA faculty opined that "faculty are intimately involved in determining tenure and promotion, and selecting new faculty. Faculty have little say in governance issues concerning funding." Not surprisingly, many faculty interviewees repeatedly brought up this issue, expressing their dissatisfaction with the fact that "top-down direction precludes faculty participation," i.e., except in faculty recruitment and tenure at the

initial stages. Some pointed out that in terms of faculty recruitment, "the final hiring decision is made by the administrator. Normally, the administrator follows the recommendations from the search committee." Recently, the positions of provost, vice chancellor, associate vice chancellors, and department heads have been directly appointed without nationwide searches. Others believed that "faculty has contributed to the university governance, but not necessarily the selections of administrators." According to established practice, the selection of senior university administrators has to result from a nationwide search, and the search committee must have more than 50% of faculty representation. However, this conventional rule and practice have not been followed at UA and/or UAR.

Other similar complaints were voiced: "promotion and tenure is a peer review process, and while faculty have strong advisory powers, the final promotion decisions are made by administrative offices." Therefore, "faculty governance is tolerated in purely advisory roles (except in curricular and calendar matters). The administration pays lip service to involving the faculty senate in all decision-making processes, but in reality the faculty have very little influence."

As for the role of faculty senate, as a key body for shared governance, it is functional but UA is not unionized. Therefore, relatively, their power is not strong. It is worth noting that chapters of AAUP can be divided into two types: one is the advocacy chapter, which doesn't give faculty collective bargaining power in negotiating annual contracts with the administration. Another one is the collective bargaining congress (CBC), which is similar to the faculty union. Since UA has the former, its faculty members don't have the power to negotiate their contracts in order to protect their interests. One faculty member mentioned that it is "useless in my opinion–mostly figureheads for faculty senate. They do not have power over real, substantial issues," such as the selection and evaluation of the administrators, the design and implementation of educational policy, and university budgeting. "Many [faculty senators] are useless," in one faculty member's view, because "in many cases, the university administration will decide the direction of the university, and all faculty's inputs are ignored," such as timely filling faculty positions when vacancies are available and restricting the number of adjunct instructors.

The faculty interviewees' individual opinions are supported by the following URA survey (see Table 3.20). Interestingly, while 52% of faculty felt negative about the role of the faculty senate in effectively advancing faculty interests, only 18% of them entered negative evaluations on the AAUP which is a totally independent organization (see Item 3, Table 3.20).

All in all, UA's regional campus surveys have yielded several key findings: One is the pervasive sense of deep mistrust, unhappiness, and lack of pride. Another is the lack of administrative transparency and responsiveness, especially above the departmental level. Finally, AAUP is seen as a better advocate of faculty interests than the Faculty Senate.

Interestingly, the widespread faculty discontent is contrasted with the administration's expectations of increased faculty service in promoting university marketization through the recruitment efforts. One university administrator argued, "From my perspective, annual faculty reviews should include a section on service. If

Table 3.20 URA Survey I: University governance D

Item	Number of respondents	Strongly agree and agree (%)	Undecided (%)	Strongly disagree and disagree (%)
1. The university faculty senate effectively advances faculty interests	73	20	27	52
2. The university senior leadership team effectively advances staff and faculty interests	79	8	22	71
3. The university AAUP chapter effectively advances faculty interests	45	42	40	18

faculty performs next-to-no service, their annual raises should be impacted." He stressed, "Faculty need to understand that the academic world has changed. We need to do more to sell our product to perspective students and families." This administrator also addressed that "this service should be praised and acknowledged, but, at this time of budget crisis and low enrollments, service to UA should be prioritized." Furthermore, he stated, "UA, like many universities, is encountering serious financial issues and falling enrollment. Most faculty do not view these issues as matters for direct personal concern and involvement. They are wrong." Therefore, in his view, "Faculty must now be required to play an active role in the fundamental survival of their universities. In my opinion, UA needs to adopt a formal post-tenure review system. Such a system would reward the faculty who are significant contributors to the university's mission. It would also assist faculty who are underperforming and facilitate the retirement or termination of faculty who are hindering the university's mission." In addition, some administrators felt it was particularly inappropriate for some faculty to "serve for too many paid positions, such as external advisors, consultants, and executive positions" because "there are some conflicts of time and financial interests" affecting their service obligations on campus which are their priority. These concerns are helpful in understanding the administrators' viewpoints regarding shared governance.

3.6 Conclusion

Based on extensive empirical studies, this chapter discusses the wide-ranging impact of commercialization and corporatization on shared governance, academic freedom, faculty morale, and faculty strain related to the three pillars of American higher education, including university professors' research, teaching, and service. While C&C have adversely affected the quality of faculty work in all three areas, they have concurrently increased faculty strain, reduced their morale, weakened their instructional rigor, and decreased their job satisfaction. In particular, marginalized faculty voice and power in university governance have significantly limited their academic freedom in sponsored research, classroom teaching, and community

service. Indeed, C&C have threatened the collective academic freedom in addition to individual rights. As Nancy Thomas asserts, "we need to shift the conversation from academic freedom as an individual right to academic freedom as a collective duty, a responsibility implicit in the social contract between American higher education and democracy" (Thomas 2010:85).

Arguably, crises are invariably accompanied with opportunities. The unprecedented development of C&C in the past 30 years calls for fundamental reforms and reconstruction of higher education. A "university renaissance" that aims to accentuate the traditional values of respecting teachers and teaching is in order. The crucial issue, as Steck (2003) has pointed out, is to reclaim the traditional roles of academic institutions. "The core values and mission of the university must be sustained if the university is to fulfill its traditional role of learning, scholarship, and service." A corporatized university, in Steck's view, "is only the shell of a university, and the task facing the academic community is to ensure that the inner core as well as the outer shell are preserved" (p. 81). To protect the "inner core," it is vital to heed the concerns and interests of professors. As indispensable human capital in the noble undertaking of higher education, professors deserve their rights to shared governance, societal respect, economic rewards, and, more importantly, academic freedom.

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Chapter 4
Professors as Intellectuals in China: Political Roles and Academic Freedom in a Provincial University

Zhidong Hao and Zhengyang Guo

On 13 November 2014, the *Liaoning Daily* (*Liaoning ribao* 辽宁日报) published an open letter to university professors of philosophy and the social sciences. The letter criticized some professors for not identifying with the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) theories on socialism and socialist politics and for lacking "feeling" for the Party-state. It also claimed that some professors compared Mao Zedong 毛泽东 to ancient emperors, cast doubt on important policies of the Party-state and want China to follow the Western road of political development. The article caused a sensation and was nominated for an award in the 25th China News Annual Awards in 2015. Although it failed to win a prize, the article nonetheless raises the issue of the role of professors as intellectuals and how they engage with that role (Phoenix News 2015), a role derived from academic freedom.

We know that professors have multiple academic identities, for example, scholar and professional in general or sociologist and engineer in particular, and they have academic roles in research, teaching and service (see also Chaps. 2 and 7). We hypothesize that in their relationship with the state, they play multiple political roles as well which we categorize as establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical (see also Chaps. 2 and 7 on academic roles, but the typology here is more refined regarding the political roles of intellectuals).

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The term before the slash in these designations refers to physical and/or political distance from the establishment; the term after the slash refers to political position or attitude. Political roles, like academic ones, are multifaceted and synchronous: a professor may play one or more such roles at the same time, or different roles at different times (see also Goldman 1996 and 1999 for intellectuals' political engagement and Cheek 2007 for the role of historians). If one of these roles assumes a dominant function, it becomes a person's dominant political identity. Political identities and roles may be combined. For example, the main role of Hu Angang 胡鞍钢 (Tsinghua University) is to advise and advocate for the Party-state, even though he may sometimes dissent (see Goldman 1981 and Goldman and Cheek 1987 about these and other roles). His political identity and predominant role is therefore establishment/organic. We call this his "status role" among a plurality of roles associated with identity or status (Parsons 1964: 388–89). The status role of most professors in China is generally either establishment/organic or non-establishment/professional. We also hypothesize that it is in these various kinds of role playing that professors find room for creative dissent or academic freedom even if that room is very much restricted.

In the following pages, we first examine what China scholars say about the political identities and roles of intellectuals and how intellectuals take on those roles. We explain how our study may contribute to what Timothy Cheek (2014) calls "a long-standing cottage industry" of the study of China's intellectuals. We also hope to contribute to the sociology of higher education in terms of how academic freedom is practised. We then explain our methods of inquiry and show how our case study of a provincial university may provide the answer to our research questions and test our hypotheses. Finally, we demonstrate professors' multifaceted identities and roles and academic freedom as we find them in our research. Our conclusions should help to provide a better understanding of intellectuals' intricate relationship with the state and however much academic freedom they may have.

4.1 The Idezntities and Roles of China's Intellectuals and How They Play These Roles and Exercise Academic Freedom

It is difficult to provide a precise definition of an intellectual since the meaning of the term is forever evolving and different people see it differently. Although some argue that the term should refer only to those who serve as the conscience of society by being dissident or otherwise critical (as in Xu Jilin quoted in Cheek 2006: 412), a broader definition of "intellectual" traditionally used in the Chinese world includes those who have received a certain degree of education and who are doing professional/cultural work, whether as experts or as critics (for more on the definition of intellectuals, see Edward Gu 2004: 23; Gu and Goldman 2004: 2–5; Zhidong Hao 2003: 377–395; Baogang He 2004: 263–68; Eddy U 2007: 977; Jilin Xu 2003a, b). We adopt the broader definition here and examine intellectuals' identities, their roles and how they perform these roles.

4.1.1 The Identities and Roles of Intellectuals and the Academic Freedom They Exercise

We may identify intellectuals and their roles according to the intrinsic characteristics of their intellectual activity, giving them professional identities, such as scientists, philosophers and artists, who tend to create knowledge, and engineers, doctors, lawyers and journalists, who tend to use knowledge (Gouldner 1979; Lipset and Basu 1976). Professors (identity) both create and divulge knowledge, i.e. engage in research, teaching and service (academic roles). On the other hand, intellectuals can, for analytical and expository purposes, be distinguished more finely according to their social relations, as advocated by Gramsci (1971: 8).[1]

Indeed, studying such relationships has shown that intellectuals play a number of political roles. For example, Merle Goldman (1981), in her aptly titled book *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent*, describes how the intellectuals who worked for the government throughout 1959–1976, and in particular liberal intellectuals such as Ba Jin 巴金, Deng Tuo 邓拓, Mao Dun 茅盾, Liao Mosha 廖沫沙, Sun Yefang 孙冶芳, Wu Han 吴晗, Xia Yan 夏衍 and Zhou Peiyuan 周培源, both advised and dissented (see also Cheek 1997 on Deng Tuo and Mazur 1996 on Wu Han). These are the eponymous "establishment intellectuals" of Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek's (1986) edited book dealing with Yang Xianzhen 杨献珍, Deng Tuo, Sun Yefang, Wu Han and Bai Hua 白桦. The title of Cheek and Hamrin's (1984) introductory chapter, "Collaboration and conflict in the search for a new order," illustrates the dual roles these intellectuals take on in their relationship with the Party-state, the same roles Goldman (1981) identifies, and the political roles of both "conservative ideologues and reformist theorists" (Gu and Goldman 2004:8; see also Chap. 5). The words "conflict" and "dissent" indicate some form of academic freedom however limited that may be.

Goldman (1981) categorized the Cultural Revolution-era intellectuals Wang Li 王力, Guan Feng 关锋, Qi Benyu 戚本禹, Zhang Chunqiao 张春桥 and Yao Wenyuan 姚文元 as radical intellectuals. In Zhidong Hao's (2003) typology, however, these intellectuals, along with Goldman's liberal intellectuals and Hamrin and Cheek's establishment intellectuals, would be termed organic intellectuals, since they all served as advisers, administrators, spokespersons and theorists for the Party-state. It is true that some of them sometimes dissented and that establishment intellectuals also play the role of scholar, but they are predominantly classifiable as organic, and their academic freedom is very much limited. In this chapter, we would term them establishment/organic intellectuals while treating separately other roles such as the critical and professional roles discussed below (Zhidong Hao 2003). The term "establishment/organic" indicates their priority status role as organic to the state while acknowledging their occasional synchronic role of dissent derived from

[1] He distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals. See also Hao 2003:2–7 for a comparison of Gramsci and other scholars on the classification of intellectuals.

limited academic freedom. Intellectuals do not have to be in the establishment to be organic, although they usually are.

As noted above, to be an intellectual assumes that one is a professional or a scholar with associated roles. Since the Deng Xiaoping era, it has been possible for intellectuals to detach themselves from politics and focus on their professional identities and roles. Commercialization and professionalization has also reduced the incentive to be critical. This does not prevent intellectuals from dissenting and advising; however, their criticism of the government may be cloaked in abstract and opaque academic language, and the advice they offer the government may be based on their technical knowledge (Cheek 2006: 407–08, 417; Fewsmith 2001: 15; Gu and Goldman 2004: 11–13; Zhidong Hao 2003: 205–260; Baogang He 2004: 270–73; Yuezhi Zhao 2004: 48–51). We adopt and adapt Edward Gu and Merle Goldman's (2004: 8) concept of non-establishment (non-official, non-governmental) intellectuals and term these intellectuals as "non-establishment/professional" intellectuals because of their distance from politics, their focus on professional and academic work and their occasional organic and critical roles. Here, the prefix "non" does not necessarily mean that they are not in the establishment but rather that they are largely indifferent to the ideology and politics of the establishment, that is, they may be in it but are not of it. They thus have more academic freedom than establishment-organic intellectuals.

The two intellectual roles described above are very different from those of the contra-establishment/critical intellectuals, who primarily play a critical role and exercise their academic freedom to the fullest extent possible. Cheek (2014: 921), citing Goldman (1999), uses the term "dis-established" to refer to all those who fell from the establishment. We use the term "contra-establishment/critical intellectuals" to include not only the fallen heroes but also those who were never part of the establishment, or who are in the establishment but are vocally critical of it. This category includes Cultural Revolution-era intellectuals Gu Zhun 顾准 and Yu Luoke 遇罗克; Democracy Wall Movement intellectuals such as Chen Ziming 陈子明, Wang Juntao 王军涛, Hu Ping 胡平 and Fu Shenqi 傅申奇; reform and opening-era intellectuals Liu Binyan 刘宾雁, Wang Ruowang 王若望 and Fang Lizhi 方励之; and 1989 democracy movement scholars and students, as well as the intellectuals who organize the China Democracy Party and the overseas democracy movements (Goldman 1994; Hao 2003: 87–99, 118–204; Wright 2004). This term would also refer to those who are viewed as social activists and NGO intellectuals, for example, Xu Zhiyong 许志永 (lawyer, in prison for 4 years and released in 2017) and Wang Gongquan 王功权 (businessman, detained but later released) from the civic organization Gongmeng 公盟, Guo Yushan 郭玉闪 (released in September 2015) from the civic organization Chuan Zhi Xing 传知行, Lu Jun 陆军 from Yi Ren Ping 益仁平 (a civic organization), activist lawyers Teng Biao 腾彪 and Pu Zhiqiang 浦志强 (sentenced to 3 years in prison, with a 3-year reprieve) (Zhao Sile 2015), journalists such as Gao Yu 高瑜 (imprisoned but now on probation), public intellectuals such as Zi Zhongjun 资中筠 (retired from the Chinese Academy of Social Science), Bao Tong 鲍彤 (the former Party secretary Zhao Ziyang's 赵紫阳 political secretary), He Weifang 贺卫方 (Peking University), Qin Hui 秦晖 (Tsinghua University),

Zhang Weiying 张维迎 (Peking University), Sun Liping 孙立平 (Tsinghua University), Zhang Qianfan 张千帆 (Peking University), Zhang Ming 张鸣 (Renmin University), Ilham Tohti 伊力哈木·土赫提 (Minzu University of China, imprisoned for life), Chen Danqing 陈丹青 (resigned from Tsinghua University), Zhang Xuezhong 张雪忠 (forced out from East China University of Political Science and Law), Chen Hongguo 谌洪果 (resigned from Northwest University of Politics and Law), as well as those who clustered around the journal *Yanhuang Chunqiu* 炎黄春秋 (formerly the foremost liberal magazine in China but which has now been taken over by newly appointed Party cadres).[2] These intellectuals can also be viewed as what some term as "public intellectuals" in that they serve as the conscience of society and openly air their concerns about social justice in China (Cheek 2006: 401; and Kelly 2006: 185, 201). Compared with other intellectuals, they strive to exercise their academic freedom as much as possible.

Contra-establishment/critics do not rule out the possibility of cooperating with the establishment. In the words of Chen Ziming, they would "contend but not clash, and cooperate but remain independent of each other" in their relationship with the government (Goldman 1994: 48). For example, there are occasions when dissident Ai Weiwei 艾未未 works closely with the state (Callahan 2014: 909, 911–12),[3] and Hu Shuli 胡舒立, the most influential journalist in China, conducts investigative reports while cooperating with the government in its anti-corruption campaign (Caixin News 2014; Zhao Yuezhi 2004: 60–62).[4] We call these intellectuals contra-establishment/critical intellectuals to indicate their critical stance towards the state; however, this does not preclude them from sometimes playing multiple and synchronic roles and cooperating with the state.

When William Callahan (2013, 2014) describes both Ai Weiwei, on the one hand, and Hu Angang, Pan Wei 潘维 and Zhang Weiwei 张维为 on the other as "citizen intellectuals," he is mixing two very different status roles or political identities. Ai Weiwei's political identity is contra-establishment/critical, and one of his major roles is as critic and dissident, although he may occasionally cooperate with the government. Hu, Pan and Zhang's political identity is establishment/organic. They may sometimes dissent, but because dissent is not their major role, their political identity is very different (see Callahan 2013: 13, 36–39; 2014: 916; Fewsmith

[2] These intellectuals' works could often be found on websites such as Gongshi (consensus) at http://www.21ccom.net/plus/list.php?tid=11 (closed by the government on 1 October 2016), Ai Sixiang (like to think) at http://www.aisixiang.com/, or the New Citizens Movement website at http://xgmyd.com/.

[3] During a trip to Germany in 2015, Ai might have gone too far when he defended the state for arresting rights lawyers. See Tatlow 2015. This may be what Callahan calls an "ironic tension". Still, it is unlikely that he will transform into an establishment/organic intellectual.

[4] In October 2016, Caixin News was punished with a 2-month suspension as a news outlet, which means that it has temporarily lost the right for its news to be carried by other social media. The reason stated for the suspension was that it had reported on a lawyers' petition campaign against a new government regulation stipulating that lawyers cannot engage in protest activities such as sit-ins, shouting slogans, spreading banners, lending support to one another (shengyuan) in protests, etc.

2001: 139–140). Eddy U (2007, 2009, 2013) has forcefully argued against the reification of intellectuals in China into progressive/revolutionary and bourgeois/reactionary intellectuals. In the same vein, the multifaceted identities and roles of intellectuals and their academic freedom under discussion in this paper are building blocks rather than straitjackets (Zhidong Hao 2003: xvii–xviii, 70–72).

Callahan's classification does raise another interesting question: how do these different "citizen intellectuals" engage with their multifaceted and often ambiguous critical roles or demonstrate "creative dissent?" Are they simply living in truth, rejecting lies and engaging in small-scale work in order to build parallel cultures, as advocated by Havel (Callahan 2014: 914, 916)? In fact, they may all play a critical role which might qualify them as "citizen intellectuals" and practise some kind of academic freedom. The question is only one of degree, as indicated by our categories (see also Davies 2001, 2007; Frenkiel 2015; Hao 2003, Chap. 3, for more examples of critical discourses).

4.1.2 How Intellectuals Play Their Roles and Exercise Academic Freedom

When discussing the political role of intellectuals, scholars invariably mention the political and ideological conditions under which intellectuals operate or the extent of academic freedom. Since Xi Jinping 习近平 assumed power in 2012, the "Seven No's" have been implemented in universities as well as in the media, banning discussion of civil society, civil rights, universal values, legal independence, press freedom, the privileged capitalistic class and the historical wrongdoings of the Party (Chen Xi 2013; see also Chap. 2). A 24-hour system to monitor public opinion on the Internet has been established over the past few years, helping the government take early measures to control and reduce the effects of negative speech (Xiaojun Yan 2014). There is little manoeuvre room for contra-establishment/critics. Non-establishment/professionals have a hard time maintaining a professional stance in their research and teaching. Establishment/organic intellectuals dominate the official discourse, but their critical role is even more limited. For example, as an advocate of Party policies, Li Shenming 李慎明 (2013a, b), the former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that Western-style democracy is not universal; he is against criticizing the past wrongs of the Party and Mao Zedong. Yang Xiaoqing 杨晓青 (2013), a professor from Renmin University, argues that China must practise socialist democracy and not bourgeois constitutionalism. Hu Angang (2013a, b) maintains that "people's society" (*renmin shehui* 人民社会) is better than "civil society" (*gongmin shehui*公民社会) and proclaims the great advantages of the Chinese CCP collective leadership as opposed to the American division of power. In Weber's (1973: 20) words, they sing the tune of those whose bread they eat.

Can intellectuals still play a critical role and exercise some academic freedom under the circumstances? Yes, to some extent. Here, Erika Evasdottir's (2004) concept of "obedient autonomy" may help. Logically, if obedience is involved, there is no autonomy and freedom. An individual is "always immersed in a web of social rules, hierarchies, structures, stereotypes, and norms" which he or she has to obey (Evasdottir 2004: ix). Nonetheless, increased social restrictions come along with "practical opportunities to combine and reinterpret such restrictions," providing a certain degree of fluidity, individuality and change, even if the systems and hierarchies may appear fixed and unchanging. Thus, obedient autonomy is "a self-directed control over change that takes effect only through the concerted effort to achieve and maintain a discourse of order and immutability" (Evasdottir 2004: x). The individual effects change and exercises some academic freedom by participation in the system and not in its destruction (Evasdottir 2004: xi).

That is also the strategy of the intellectuals we study. Mass media, especially the Internet, has provided opportunities for intellectual/cultural contention and (transnational) online activism (Guobin Yang 2009). It is true that many controls have been in place for some years and that the government has intensified its crackdown on the mass media under the Xi regime. The Southern Media Group (*Nanfang baoye chuanmei jituan* 南方报业传媒集团), one of the few liberal news groups in China in the 1990s and 2000s, has been finally brought into the orbit of the Party-state's propaganda machine (Ji Chen 2015). Internet control measures have been reinforced (Guobin Yang 2014). Yu Jianrong 于建嵘 (2015) posted online how the Party secretary in his work unit at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences repeatedly called him in to warn him about his online and offline social activism and criticism.

But activists and critics still find a way to make their voices heard. Establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals can all play a critical role. Establishment/organic intellectuals can still serve within the Party-state yet act as critics. *Focus Interviews*, an investigative reporting programme broadcast by Central Television, is still able to continue with some of its critical reports. While these intellectuals function as mouthpieces of the Party-state, in their own way, they also perform the role of social critic (Ogden 2004: 116–19; Wu 2015; Yuezhi Zhao 2004: 54–59).[5] The Southern Media Group's newspapers still try to assume a watchdog role, even though they are on tighter Party leashes, an apt metaphor used by Yuezhi Zhao (2004: 54, 62–63).

The Unirule Institute of Economics (*Tianze* 天则), an independent think tank whose intellectuals could be characterized as non-establishment/professionals, complained about its invited guest speakers being blocked by higher authorities and was able to make its complaints online, albeit via the *Financial Times* Chinese website based overseas (Shuguang Zhang 2015). (The Institute was closed by the government in July 2019.) Zhang Yimou 张艺谋, Chen Kaige 陈凯歌 and Jia Zhangke 贾樟柯 make films that can serve the Party-state by promoting nationalism, but they

[5] Wu discusses how she was able to do a lot of socially critical reporting in her more than a dozen years at Central Television, but she finally decided to quit because there was still so much that she wanted to do but could not.

also advance their own interpretation of social justice in China (Callahan 2014: 902, 909; Ogden 2004: 115–16, 125–26). Or they can couch their intellectual thought, as Xu Jilin 许纪霖 does, in abstract academic language and pragmatic terms, veiling criticism of the Party-state in professional and technical forms (Cheek 2006: 417; Davies 2001: 35; Baogang He 2004: 273).

One of the founders of *Yanhuang Chunqiu*, where contra-establishment/critics clustered, was able to complain about the Party's censorship of the journal through a Hong Kong publication (Xun Jiang 2015). Despite great pressure from the state (Yang Jisheng 杨继绳, the previous editor in chief, was forced to retire from the position), the journal continued to be published from 1991 onwards as a liberal platform until it was taken over by Party conservatives under government orders in 2016. The risks are high for contra-establishment/critics; they face having their works banned, losing their jobs and even imprisonment, but they carry on. He Weifang, Yu Jianrong, Zhang Qianfan and Zhang Ming persisted as active bloggers with hundreds of thousands of followers, and their articles could be seen on such websites as *Gongshi wang* 共识网 (closed by the government in 2016) and *Ai sixiang wang* 爱思想网.[6] Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, it seems there is less and less room for intellectual freedom. Yu Jianrong has largely stopped writing critical blogs. But most have persisted in one way or the other. The Internet and globalization have accorded intellectuals some academic freedom and opportunities to fulfil their organic, professional and critical roles by practising "obedient autonomy" (see also Barmé and Davies 2004; He 2004: 274–75).

Xiaojun Yan (2014) has studied the control and domination of university students. As we will see in our case analysis below, similar methods have been used with university teachers, but the resultant order is not maintained "seamlessly". Intellectuals are able to play the synchronic roles of non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critic in addition to the establishment/organic intellectual in their teaching and research and practise some academic freedom.

4.2 A Note on Our Research Methods

Our case university has a history of more than 100 years and is situated in a province in the northern part of China. It has over 2,000 full-time faculty members and 28,000 undergraduate and graduate students. It is typical of provincial public universities. This case study does not aim for representation; it aims for understanding the operating mechanisms and processes that may have widespread applications. However, because Party-state control of higher education in China creates homogeneity in Chinese universities, the mechanisms and processes of how professors play their establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/

[6] For example, Yu Jianrong has 1.5 million followers from various walks of life. See Svensson 2014, 176.

critical roles and practise academic freedom can be viewed as typical of professors in mainland China (see also Chaps. 2 and 5 of this book; Xiaojun Yan 2014; Shengyan Du 2017).

In our case study, we interviewed 5 professors, 13 associate professors, 5 assistant professors (called lecturers), 3 administrators and 10 students, altogether 36 people from departments in the natural sciences, humanities and social sciences. Faculty interviews lasted between one and two hours; student interviews lasted about half an hour. The questions we asked focused on their academic roles of teaching, research and service, and the way they dealt with political issues associated with those roles.

Two more methodological issues related to case studies are worth explaining here. One is the matter of ideal types, and the other is the nature of case studies. When Weber (1946: 78–79, 295–99) discusses traditional, charismatic and legal authorities, he is using ideal types, abstractions of reality and a "combination of an indefinite number of elements which, although found in reality, are rarely or never discovered in this specific form" (Giddens 1971: 141). Our analysis of establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals and their academic freedom assumes that intellectuals have multifaceted identities and roles. These constructs are ideal types. Even when one may play a distinct dominant status role, like Hu Angang as an establishment/organic intellectual, he or she rarely or never plays it in its pure form. This is what multifacetedness and synchronicity mean. The utility of the ideal typical construct is to "facilitate the analysis of empirical questions" (Giddens 1971: 142), which in our case would concern the political roles of professors as intellectuals and their exercise of academic freedom.

On the other hand, case analysis helps us to understand the mechanisms and processes of role playing among professors. It is in line with the extended case method, "by which researchers analyze a particular social situation [in our case, the role of professors and their academic freedom] in relation to the broader social forces shaping it," and also with the principle of sequential interviewing where each case, or each interviewee, "provides an increasingly accurate understanding of the question at hand" (Small 2009: 19, 24–25). The purpose is saturation, where through semi-structured interviews concerning the roles professors play in teaching, research and service, we obtain the information needed to describe the political role and academic freedom of professors as intellectuals.

4.3 Findings and Discussion

Our findings are focused on how establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals each play their ideal typical roles and how they exercise or do not exercise their academic freedom. Again, by categorizing their ideal typical roles, we emphasize that professors usually play multifaceted roles even if one role may be more dominant than others.

4.3.1 *Professors as Establishment/Organic Intellectuals and Their Academic Freedom*

In our case study, we found that most professors clearly play the role of establishment/organic intellectuals to the Party-state in their teaching and research. In speeches and declarations, the university leadership has repeatedly pointed out that a key function of the university is to train students to be firm believers in and successors to socialism. It is proud of the "strategic cooperation" it has established with local and state-owned enterprises to promote the socialist economy and of its think-tank role in promoting social development (Authors' research notes 1; interview with Admin1, March 3, 2013). Indeed, that determines the establishment/organic role professors play both consciously and under coercion. As one professor commented (Interview with Assoc9, April 23, 2014):

> We live in a real society, which is ruled by the CCP. They have an ideology backed up by political power and a political structure. This is the foundation of the [socialist] identity. If we sabotage this identity, there may be more serious social problems. As university professors, we should respect this reality.

According to this professor, education itself is political in nature, and one of its roles is to foster the Party-state ideology in order to promote order and stability and to avoid social problems. It is therefore appropriate to ask professors to spread what he defines as "positive energy" (*zheng nengliang* 正能量).

If this professor seems to be consciously doing what the Party-state expects him to do in what to teach and how to teach it, others seem to follow the Party directives only because they feel there is no alternative. The common rule professors follow is that "there is no restriction in academic studies but there is discipline in the classroom" (*xueshu wu jinqu, ketang you jilu* 学术无禁区, 课堂有纪律). But anything that is "anti-Party and anti-state" is not allowed in the classroom. As one interviewee put it (Interview with Assoc8, April 21, 2014):

> There is, of course, no academic freedom. We in political science can't write and speak freely. This I understand. We can't be totally free. We must be the spokespersons (*chui gu shou* 吹鼓手) of the dominant ideology… It's better if we don't touch on sensitive issues in class or in writing. For example, it's better not to discuss or write about civil society. [If you did that,] you might go out of bounds. You cannot publish it anyway.

But some still try to do as much as possible: "I really dare not say [anything that's controversial]. I may touch on it a little bit, and that's as much as I can do. I can't afford to do more (*zhende shang bu qi* 真的伤不起)" (Interview with Assoc7, May 4, 2014).

If there is no way to go around some topics, professors tell students that class discussion on controversial topics must not be spread outside the class (Interview with Assist5, May 10, 2014 – that is not possible now in 2019 because of a widespread system of student informants). Our student interviewees told us that professors avoid discussing sensitive topics (Interviews with Student 2, April 2, 2013; Student 3, April 1, 2013; Student 6, March 19, 2013). These professors have some

autonomy, or academic freedom, although based on general obedience, and they practise careful self-censorship. Some may test the boundaries, but the establishment/organic ones do not go as far as the non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals, whom we will discuss below.

If teaching is restricted to what is allowed for the establishment/organic roles, research is usually restricted to approved government topics, which are decided by existing state and provincial grant structures. We examined the grant topics for the year 2014 that were sponsored by the state (192 topics), by the Ministry of Education (52 topics) and by the provincial Party and government (183 topics) (Ministry of Education 2014; Hefei University of Technology 2014; X University of Technology 2014). They concentrate on the study of the Sinicization of Marxism – that is, socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese dream and the study of Xi Jinping's talks (especially in provincial grant topics); historical, cultural and environmental studies; and various political, social and economic policy studies. Research universities in particular are considered to be think tanks for the state and local governments and serve the strategic purposes of the state (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Think Tank Research Center 2014). Because they serve a purpose of the Party-state, their academic freedom in what to research will be restricted by that purpose.

For example, none of the 2014 grant topics dealt with matters such as civil society, controversial issues in CCP history, contemporary ethnic relations in Tibet and Xinjiang or constitutionalism. There are topics on political reform, but they do not deviate from the Party line. For example, one can study consultative democracy, but not electoral democracy; administrative reform, but not political reform; and how to train minority professionals, but not contemporary ethnic conflicts. The list of permitted topics guides researchers in their establishment/organic roles for the Party-state. As some professors commented (Interviews with Assoc6, December 11, 2012; Assoc13, December 13, 2012):

> Our country does not promote a critical spirit. All they want you to do is to work for the government. If you don't work for the government, your research won't be recognized. This is how the state designs social science grant topics.

> This is termed "administrationization" (*xingzheng hua* 行政化). All research must serve the state. Not what academic studies require, but what state policy requires determines the research.

Professors are kept busy with such research projects because papers are necessary for promotion. One professor commented that whether intended or not, the Party's requirements help to create a lot of academic garbage (*xueshu laji* 学术垃圾). This may be an unintended (or intended?) consequence on the Party's side (Interview with Full1, September 6, 2013):

> Research is a matter of interest. If you make me do what I don't like, I will only produce garbage. When you apply for a state research grant, they give you guiding principles. You won't be able to get approved if your research doesn't fall within their guidelines. But true research needs freedom of choice.

Indeed, such academic study often results in something that is so useless that neither the sponsoring organizations nor other academics are interested in reading it (Interview with Assoc11, April 22, 2014). Another latent dysfunction, but maybe a manifest function for the Party, to reference Robert Merton (1968: 104–138), is to keep academics busy so that they will not be able to play more professional and critical roles. As one professor put it, "The state might not really be interested in what you do in research. Its true interest is that you are not being critical. They will give you some research money so that you will shut up" (Interview with Assoc7, May 4, 2014). So the deprivation of academic freedom may be intentional.

That professor might be too cynical, but other professors also commented that academic promotion drives the generally instrumental and pragmatic approach to such research. One must serve the state and be recognized by it, or face a difficult time (Interviews with Assoc13, Assoc7, May 4, 2014). Professors have mortgages to pay and children to support, so they cannot afford to rock the boat and lose their jobs; they become assembly workers, simply doing a job to serve the state and make a living. One professor explained (Interview with Assoc7, May 4, 2014):

> Because of the influence of the Party-state ideology on research, I'm not independent. I don't have an independent academic personality. In such a reality, I must [make] sacrifices in order to make a good living (*shenghuo shang de yinshi* 生活上的殷实).

One becomes a cog in the machine (Interviews with Assoc6, December 11, 2012; Assoc8, April 21, 2014). There is no academic freedom, no free spirit, no creativity, no new thinking, no respect for oneself (Interview with Assoc6, December 11, 2012).

Similar to Li Shenming or Hu Angang, as discussed above, some establishment/organic intellectuals enlist the media to advocate Party policies and ideology. A good example of synchronic role playing is provided by Professor YW of our case university, who posted an article on China Net (*Zhongguo wang* 中国网) and CharharNet (*Charhaer xuehui wang* 察哈尔学会网) discussing the importance of NGOs but advocating Party control over NGOs that spread Western values and endanger the safety of the Party-state (Research notes, 26 September 2015). He also supports the state's version of Chinese dreams and China's foreign policies. Another professor publishes articles on People Net (*Renmin wang* 人民网) and Chinese Communist Party News Net (*Zhongguo gongchan dang xinwen wang* 中国共产党新闻网) promoting socialist values and the spirit of Lei Feng 雷锋 (Research notes, September 26, 2015).

These professors play the ideal typical establishment/organic role, serving as the think tanks and spokespersons of the Party-state in their teaching and research. They may maintain some obedient autonomy or academic freedom as non-establishment/professionals and even contra-established/critics, but that is not their status role, and their academic freedom is very much limited.

4.3.2 *Professors as Non-establishment/Professional Intellectuals and Their Academic Freedom*

Both establishment/organic and contra-establishment/critical roles presume that intellectuals must be professional, that is, they must possess some cultural capital, as Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 186–87) would say, in order to play any of their roles well. The non-establishment/professional role is therefore one for all professors. If the reluctantly obedient establishment/organic role is not always exciting and the contra-establishment/critical role is too risky, the autonomous non-establishment/professional role may be more enticing. Professors playing this role may enjoy more academic freedom in their teaching and research.

Professors in the natural sciences especially tend to enjoy this status role in its purest form, since they usually do not have to deal with politically sensitive issues; neither do they have to advise and dissent. As one professor admitted (Interview with Full5, September 9, 2013):

> I truly love my subject, chemistry. I may be exaggerating, but it is more important than my life. I wonder why some students don't often go to the laboratory. If I were them, I'd go there every day… When you have a breakthrough, you're happier than if you have a baby.

Another professor told us that the professors in his faculty of physics and electronics all enjoy research and teaching (Interview with Assoc1, December 12, 2012). They focus on training undergraduate students in basic knowledge, and graduate students in creative abilities. There is no censorship; professors teach whatever they need to teach, and the university encourages them to tackle the cutting-edge issues in their field (Interview with Assoc2, April 18, 2014).

However, part of being a professional, in the natural sciences as well as in the humanities and social sciences, is to teach students to be independent, critical thinkers. Indeed, all non-establishment/professionals and contra-establishment/critics have this role also. As another professor observed (Interview with Full1, September 6, 2013):

> To teach well, one needs to know how to foster students' academic ability step by step. We will need to teach them how to discover problems, to have a sense of the problem (*wenti yishi* 问题意识)… Graduate students need to learn to study on their own. If they find that they cannot solve a problem, then they should come to me and see whether I can provide a different angle, different method to look at the problem.

Independence and critical thinking are more difficult to maintain in the humanities and social sciences, except through obedient autonomy as with the establishment/organic intellectuals. For example, one professor explained that the required uniform textbooks were only references; she/he could use some of the materials and viewpoints but still develop her own views (Interview with Full2, September 5, 2013 – that is also becoming increasingly more difficult now under the Xi Jinping regime).

To say the least, as Weber (1946: 147) comments, a professional teacher needs to acquaint students with "inconvenient" facts:

> The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize "inconvenient" facts. I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every party opinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less than for others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if he compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. I would be so immodest as even to apply the expression "moral achievement", though perhaps this may sound too grandiose for something that should go without saying.

It is important to provide students with different perspectives and viewpoints. It is the chief mission of the university to get students to think, and think critically. Professors should create an atmosphere of free thought, openness, independence and critical inquiry (Interviews with Assoc3, August 30, 2013; Assoc6, December 11, 2012). One professor suggested that one way to do this is to put on the table both the arguments and counter-arguments and ask students to judge for themselves (Interview with Full4, March 24, 2014), as Weber advises. This interviewee believed that it is not necessary to tell students what the professor thinks. Students know how to judge.

One professor told us that if a topic was deemed too sensitive to tackle, he would touch on it and ask students to think further about it. It is unnecessary to challenge (*jiaoban* 叫板) the system; as long as one gets students to think, that is good enough (Interview, Assoc11, April 22, 2014). This is typical of a non-establishment/professional attitude: in the establishment but not agreeing with its ideology; not openly challenging the ideology but approaching it, obediently autonomous, somewhat free academically, from a professional point of view. Another professor provided more examples (Interview with Assoc8, April 21, 2014):

> You can always find a different angle from which to tackle sensitive issues. For example, you are teaching or researching civil rights. You can study peasant workers, urbanization, and you will have to deal with rights issues. Or if you are teaching the three equalities (*sange pingdeng* 三个平等) advocated by the Party's 18th congress, i.e. equality in rights, opportunities and rule enforcement, you can always give examples. And you don't have to talk about it as if you're subverting the government, but do it in a way that you hope the state can solve these developmental problems in achieving social progress. There is a lot you can talk about within the limits of the ideological controls.

This is obedient autonomy or limited academic freedom. Students do complain that, on the one hand, professors encourage them to think independently, but on the other hand, they themselves are not really doing so (Interviews with Student 3 and Student 4, April 1, 2013). These professors, however, are already doing as much as they can under current conditions.

Professors' research reflects the same dilemma. In Table 4.1, we summarize the recent research topics of five faculties and departments: history, economics and business administration, philosophy and sociology, politics and public administration and law (Author research notes 12–14). This is not a complete list, since not all professors' research topics are available online, but what we find is probably typical of what people do. Judging from the titles of their projects, most of their research is organic and professional (34% and 56%, respectively). Research topics that are sponsored by the local government examine the industrial structures of the province

Table 4.1 The nature of professors' research topics

Faculty/department	Professor	Total no. of grants	Organic	Professional	Critical
History	Z1	7	6	1	0
	L1	13	5	8	0
	K1	16	13	3	0
	L2	9	5	4	0
	L3	10	0	10	0
	Z2	7	2	5	0
Economics and business administration	L4	11	2	9	0
	Y1	5	5	0	0
	S1	12	2	10	0
	Y2	14	1	12	1
Philosophy and sociology	Z3	7	4	3	0
	B1	8	3	5	0
	Z4	4	1	3	0
	W1	24	9	15	0
	S2	7	2	4	1
Politics and public administration	D1	16	9	4	3
	Z5	11	2	3	6
	D2	37	6	19	12
	L5	29	8	17	4
	W2	14	7	7	0
	C1	5	1	4	0
	D3	20	7	12	1
Law	S3	12	0	7	5
	W3	25	9	15	1
Total		323	109	180	34
Percentage		100%	33.7%	55.7%	10.5%

Source: Data taken from the departmental/faculty websites

or population change; corporations sponsor research on building a management team in an enterprise, or developing tourism; the Ministry of Education sponsors studies concerning the transformation of commercial systems in the Qing dynasty. Thus, the professors serve the role of establishment/organic and non-establishment/professional intellectuals. Topics on critical and politically sensitive issues are few (11%).

In fact, even topics which appear to be critical, like democratization or the life of children of peasant workers left behind with their grandparents or accompanying their migrant parents to the cities, can be researched in a variety of ways, ranging from largely organic, helping the Party-state to solve practical problems; largely professional, analysing mechanisms; to mildly critical, pointing out problems or offering alternative solutions. In obedience one can find some autonomy and freedom. Faculty can play establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional, or even contra-establishment/critical roles to varying extents.

But the status role of the professors we discuss in this section is non-establishment/professional. Their typical priority role is not organic or critical, but professional. And their academic freedom is also limited, but they exercise more of it than establishment/organic intellectuals.

4.3.3 Professors as Contra-Establishment/Critical Intellectuals and Their Academic Freedom

As we have seen above, all may play the contra-establishment/critical role, but few can play it in its purest form. Two examples illustrate the extent to which the professors in our case university can go in their teaching and research. We will call them Professor L and Professor W.

Professor L makes a point of teaching students to think logically and scientifically. He explores sensitive topics such as the land reform movement from a critical perspective. He also speaks on the media about issues such as the relationship between the government and the masses, from the perspective of the latter (Authors' research notes 24). He published his critical ideas on the recently closed *Gongshi wang*.

Professor W also emphasizes independent thinking (Authors' research notes 25):

> It's a shame if a professor only uses Party jargon (*dang bagu* 党八股) when he or she teaches and writes. It's a pity if he or she only repeats empty talk and lies, and if he or she does not relate theory to reality and tackle politically sensitive issues. One has to teach and write only sincere and new things that can endure the test of history.

He teaches students to read textbooks critically and apply what they read to the analysis of the difficult, important and hot issues of contemporary China. His research touches on very sensitive issues that people tend to avoid. He promotes the use of "citizen" when the term "civil society" becomes sensitive. He claims that to deny universal values, as the dominant ideology does, is to deny Marxism. He calls on the Party-state to practise constitutionalism, saying that the constitution does not give state power to the governing party. In his own blog, he has published over 100 articles calling for democratization. Because of the sensitivity of the topics he deals with, he has had to use his own money to publish a book of his essays on democratization.

These two examples tell us that indeed intellectuals can go further in their criticism and exercise more academic freedom than establishment/organic and non-establishment/professional intellectuals, both in teaching and research. Despite stricter ideological controls, mass media, especially the social media, has become an important platform for critical discourse for critics such as Qin Hui, Zhang Qianfan and Zhang Ming. Proportionally, however, their number is still small, and few would go so far as to risk arrest and imprisonment like Xu Zhiyong for his new citizen movement and Ilham Tohti for advocating national minority rights in his classroom and on his website. Most contra-establishment/critical intellectuals'

efforts on the mainland maintain a kind of obedient autonomy, although they behave more autonomously and freely than the establishment/organic and non-establishment/professional intellectuals described above.

Equally important, contra-establishment/critics, as professionals, may even want to be an organic part of the Party-state. Professor L believes that he is, above all, a professional, and just like every other intellectual, he would like to play the role of adviser to the state (Email exchange 1, December 3, 2014). Professor W believes that he is a critical intellectual but also that he is a professional and plays an organic role in what he believes to be the true Party course (Email exchange 2, December 3, 2014). Thus, he plays multifaceted and synchronic roles although one identity or status role may dominate at any time. That is the contra-establishment critical role. We must, therefore, treat the establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical roles of intellectuals and their ways of practising academic freedom only as ideal types.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the multifaceted and synchronic identities and roles of professors as intellectuals and the ways they practise or do not practise academic freedom. Their academic identities may be as scholars and professionals, sociologists and engineers, but they may play political roles as establishment/organic, non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals and exercise some academic freedom. If one of these roles assumes a dominant function or status role, it becomes the person's political identity. That political identity is associated with the amount of academic freedom he or she can exercise. Thus, while playing different roles, Hu Angang is primarily an establishment/organic intellectual, and Ai Weiwei is primarily a contra-establishment/critical intellectual. The former exercises less academic freedom than the latter.

We found that at least partly owing to tight ideological controls in China, most professors play an establishment/organic and/or non-establishment/professional role and assume such political identities as intellectuals. They follow the Party line in teaching and research and serve the Party-state as think tanks, informing the government in its public policymaking. But that does not exclude them from also playing the less obvious role of contra-establishment/critical intellectuals and practising a form of obedient autonomy. But compared with professors assuming other roles and identities, they exercise the least academic freedom.

On the other hand, both non-establishment/professional and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals may sometimes play the role of the establishment/organic intellectual by cooperating with the government in advising or advocating its policies. (Understandably, the contra-establishment/critical intellectuals are very small in number.) But that is not their status role. Their own status roles afford them more academic freedom. Professors as intellectuals thus have multifaceted and synchronic identities and roles, although one of these roles is their status role. Professors

assuming different political roles and identities exercise different amounts of academic freedom.

In addition, our case study of a university in provincial China shows that conditions and intellectual responses that obtain in smaller cities are similar to those found in larger ones, as is often seen in the studies on metropolitan intellectuals in Beijing, Shanghai or other megacities. As Chap. 5 indicates, professors in an elite university in a big metropolitan city in the south do face similar conditions and have similar responses, although they seem to be bolder in exercising academic freedom and the number of their contra-establishment/critical intellectuals is larger. We hope we have contributed to the empirical range of such studies, as well as offering our own contributions to the model of the status role of intellectuals. We hope also that our study will contribute to the sociology of higher education, in which the faculty role, both academic and political, is an especially important issue to study, and different roles and identities correlate with different amounts of academic freedom exercised.

Professors as intellectuals shape the university and the nation's political discourse while being shaped by the university and the Party-state. Future studies should explore the political identity and role of professors in their academic services. Future studies could also analyse similar political roles played by lawyers, doctors, engineers and journalists. Within the limits of this chapter, we have not been able to examine how personalities, family background, political ambitions, environmental factors, career positions and educational background affect professors' choice of roles and practice of academic freedom, but we hope that future research will.

The Party-state is very conscious of what professors do and how much academic freedom they can have. If professors and other intellectuals are also conscious of what they do and how much academic freedom they can have, they might be able to engage with their roles better and exert more influence on the direction of the Party-state. As we have demonstrated, they can at least practise obedient autonomy and build parallel cultures by engaging in small-scale work, creative dissent, living in truth and rejecting lies. At least some academic freedom is allowed, although it may be limited to varying degrees. And as we discussed in Chap. 1, although it is a difficult task, professors need to struggle for more academic freedom. Otherwise, they lose their raison d'être.

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Chapter 5
Academic Staff's Dual Role in China: Academic Freedom in a Prestigious University

Xiaoxin Du

5.1 Introduction

Discussions of academic freedom in countries such as China are inevitably linked to the concepts of political intervention in and state plans for the development of higher education. China's higher education system fulfills both an academic task and a political task, the balance between which is worth exploring as an alternative to conventional perspectives on the impact of political control on academic freedom. While Chinese universities have been pushed by the state to become world-class universities, achieving academic innovation and a prestigious reputation requires the promotion of critical thinking, which could largely contradict the political indoctrination role imposed on China's higher education system by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). The complexity of China's higher education system makes it different from the Western model and thus worth exploring.

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5.2 Academic Freedom vs. Political Socialization

While there is a conceptual and functional consensus around academic freedom in the studies of higher education, the concept also faces recognized threats. Academic freedom is considered the fundamental means by which higher education has guarded its pursuit of knowledge creation, innovation, and truth and is a necessary condition for creating knowledge and fostering critical thinking. Conceptually, academic freedom in universities entails not only freedom of thought and expression in teaching and research but also freedom to speak and write to civil society (Enders 2007; Moor 1993; Turk 2014). Academic freedom ensures teaching and researching quality and that individuals continue to contribute knowledge to the world (Akerlind and Kayrooz 2003). According to Yang, Vidovich, and Currie (2007), both institutional and individual autonomy should be crucial elements of higher education, with "the former referring to a university's autonomy in its context of multiple external relationships, especially with governments, and the latter referring to the autonomy of individual academics which is akin to the notion of academic freedom." Functionally, academic freedom is supposed to ensure the creation and production of knowledge, without fear of sanction by academic or external authorities (Altbach 2004). As a threat, political and ideological pressures affect research directions and the selection of faculty and students, resulting in academics losing both the right to make judgments based on intellectual virtue and the ability to act as social critics (Pan 2009). Professors can be influenced by sociopolitical intervention to make adjustments to curricula, syllabi, research topics, and publications, thus threatening the collective rights of academic staff (Turk 2014).

The situation of academic freedom can vary according to different contexts, and the threat of sociopolitical intervention is seen as more severe in some countries than others. Extant studies question the degree of academic freedom enjoyed by Chinese universities, maintaining that Chinese higher education has been an instrument for political education, serving the needs of the state or various political regimes. The emperors of ancient China, for example, consolidated their power over the educated elites by enforcing Confucian orthodoxy through national examinations that defined individuals' opportunities for upward mobility (Lo 1991). Though this value system had been questioned and transformed since 1911, the function of higher education for socializing educated people with certain values has persisted. While, in Western traditions, universities are traditionally institutions of knowledge creation that promote academic autonomy for both staff and students and encourage critical thinking (Barnett 1990), the focus of higher education in the Chinese context has long been on ensuring political socialization (Hayhoe 2011; Jun Li 2012; Zha 2011). Though state-led political indoctrination can also happen in other countries and both political and economic forces can threaten academic freedom (Ballantine and Spade 2011; Enders et al. 2013), China's case exemplifies the dilemma of having to fulfill both academic and political tasks assigned by the state.

Extant theoretical studies (Jennings 2007; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Torney-Purta 2004) explain political socialization in a Western context, with a focus on how students become social members of a given polity by gradually becoming attached

to a political party, learning morality, and providing support to the political system. In China, political socialization has long been an important task of higher education. Confucianism has traditionally been an important content for political socialization throughout the very long history of China. The major functions of Confucian sociopolitical values aimed at rationalizing the emperor's dominance, reinforcing state-society relations, and maintaining social and political stability (Law 2011). Political participation was seldom a commoner's right or responsibility in China (Yu 2002); rather, the responsibility of citizens in traditional Chinese society was to respect and obey the established authorities.

Citizenship in Chinese society is different from Western conceptions. It denotes less of a contractual relationship between the individual and society and more of an inheritance of an identity bound to nationality and loyalty (Lo and Man 1996) that reflects mechanisms for political socialization. The Practice of Rites (Cai 1987) and the recognition of a common identity composed the contents of political socialization as support for the governor, rather than the governed. This traditional political culture has impacted political socialization in modern China, particularly its function in consolidating a specific regime's rule through a unified political ideology, though the CCP initially replaced Confucianism with socialism at the beginning of its rule. The state tightly controls educational institutions at all levels, using them as instruments of political socialization to foster students' socialist values and produce graduates who are *Red and Expert* (Dreyer 2004; Saich 2004; Spring 2012) through ideological and political education mechanisms (Fairbrother 2003). This strong control over politics has jeopardized academic freedom in modern universities in China (Yang 2015), especially in elite institutions.

However, extant studies do not fully portray the situation in which universities now find themselves – i.e., having to satisfy a political task while simultaneously facing challenges to it. Marginson (2014) argued that Chinese higher education has ambiguous potential for academic freedom, as the leadership system limits the direct role of the Party state and secures partial autonomy. Pan's (2009) work discussed how the semi-independent status of Chinese universities ensured their academic freedom, while Hu's (2005) work showed the dual impact of both politics and academics on university teachers (see also Chap. 4 of this book). These studies provide a sense of the unique achievements Chinese higher education has made despite its mechanisms of political socialization; however, the interplay between the pursuit of academic freedom and the implementation of political socialization among university staff and students is still under-researched, and it informs the research problem of this chapter, which uses academic staff's role as a window on the strategies they use to fulfill both their academic and political tasks.

5.3 Methodological Considerations

This chapter is based on fieldwork done in 2014 by the author, using mixed data collection methods, including document reviews, questionnaire surveys, observation, and interviews. This study chose a prestigious university in a large city in

China (hereafter the University) as a case to investigate the real-life context of Chinese higher education and provide an intensive, holistic description and analysis thereof (Merriam 1998; Yin 2008).

The University is a leading university in China located in a large city with a long history of pursuing academic excellence and striving for academic freedom. Due to its aim of becoming a world-class university (Xi'an Jiaotong University 2009), both political stability and academic freedom have become core developmental values – the former to guarantee state support and the latter to spur the innovation in research and teaching needed to enhance its international reputation. It was also chosen because its students have historically been active in politics. It was a university that struggled to rid itself of religious control in its founding years and that bore different ideologies on campus during the Republic of China era. Due to its students' activism in politics during the 1989 democracy movement, its students were required to undergo a long period of military training (Dreyer 2004; Rosen 1993; Zhao 1998) as part of a re-education process to build trust between students and the CCP (Rosen 1992). These events made the University's efforts at balancing its academic and political tasks an interesting case for study.

Mixed methods were used to collect data. Reviewing documents helped establish the state's requirements and expectations of the University and how teachers implemented these requirements. Questionnaires helped uncover students' perspectives on political education programs on campus and in courses and also students' views on academic freedom. Observing classes provided information on how policies were implemented, how teachers reacted to requirements from the university, how students participated, how the actual practice of political socialization was carried out, and, most important, the atmosphere of academic freedom on campus. Semi-structured interviews revealed participants' understanding of political education and their views on the university's tasks in general, in relation to academic freedom issues.

5.4 The State, the University, and the Students: Differentiated Expectations

5.4.1 The State's Control of Universities in China

Being academically outstanding worldwide is one of the expectations the CCP-led state has for universities in China, while being politically reliable to continuously serve the country's developmental needs is another. In a 2015 State Council document about *Double First-class* construction (State Council 2015), the state outlined plans for Chinese higher education to have first-class universities and first-class disciplines, with 42 institutions expected to become first-class universities by 2050. Accordingly, it encouraged innovation by students and staff and a global vision for the university while at the same time insisting that universities remain politically loyal to the CCP. The nature of Chinese universities as socialist entities could not be changed.

As such, the 1950s slogan for university students' education goals – *Red and Expert* – has been continuously used to identify the state's expectations of Chinese

universities, especially given the CCP's tight grasp on ideological issues in universities in recent years. In the contemporary era, the *Red* no longer narrowly represents a commitment to Communism, and it mainly means a loyalty to the political regime and the ideologies of the CCP. In 2013, CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping, in a speech to the National Conference on Propaganda Work, reaffirmed Marxist ideology's important position in universities (Xi 2013), while the vice director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CCP confirmed teachers' role in providing ideological and political education the creation of qualified constructors of and reliable successors for Chinese socialism (The Paper 2013). Regarding the Western infiltration of university classrooms that the CCP has always feared, then-Education Minister Yuan Guiren, in a January 2015 meeting with university administrators, implied that the CCP would by no means allow material propagating Western values or defaming the CCP (Xinhua Net 2015). In a later speech, Xi (2016) emphasized the importance of ideological and political education in universities and made it official that students' sticking to Marxist values, teachers' political reliability, and the CCP's absolute leadership on campus were central to Chinese higher education. For the CCP, university teachers are inevitably important figures in political control, despite their being the group that should most actively seek academic freedom.

5.4.2 The University's Mixed Conduct on Academic Staff

The University passed the state's expectations on to its staff, especially its academic staff. In 2014, the three top universities in China stated they had their own ways of improving their ideological work in reaction to Xi's 2014 speech (Cai 2014). In a similar vein, the University responded by focusing on preventing teachers' use of possible politically incorrect contents in class (particularly for teachers under 45 years of age), strengthening teacher training, and reforming the teacher evaluation system (Jing Li 2014). Like the three top universities, the University wanted to improve its political standing and ensure its teaching staff would not have or voice an "incorrect understanding" about the state and the CCP. Thus, political loyalty to the CCP and an ability to implement political correctness according to CCP standards was also deemed important in academic staff recruiting by the University.

In practice, political supervision by the state was implemented in the University by China's surprisingly ubiquitous national security apparatus in two ways. Externally, the National Security Department and its related local organs oversee teaching contents through participatory or indirect in-class observation; when problems occur, they refer the matter to either the University Security Department or other relevant university departments to talk with the people involved. When a teacher is reported on an issue, he or she might be "invited for coffee" by the security department, a euphemism for an informal interrogation and lecture to reinforce clarity on what cannot be said in class (Interview02); however, teachers are rarely dismissed or given serious penalties (Interview01). For example, one political education course (PEC) teacher (Interview02) recounted his experience in the 2000s

regarding his teaching contents on the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. He talked about the event in class and uploaded some related video clips to his FTP (file transfer protocol) site for students to download. However, the University's on-campus LAN (local area network) is monitored by the National Security Department; officers went to this PEC teacher's department head, who later ordered him to remove the clips from the site and to write a report confessing that his actions were inappropriate. The University helps the National Security Department implement their supervision on all teachers, but only through a system of checking and warning.

Internally, academic staff are under the supervision of university security departments. Academic lecture topics are censored, with the first barrier being at the faculty level. One social science professor (Interview04) implied that all international scholars are expected to "report their lecture topics to the university [based on] a regulation issued by the MoE," while Chinese scholars' topics are examined by the university and the relevant faculty. The Department of Publicity (the CCP's propaganda department) at the University is also involved in the censorship of academic staff's classes (Interview01), and it pays special attention to social science and humanities faculties, particularly mass media comments by faculty members that could "influence the University's reputation and image" (Interview05). Guest speakers invited by students' associations also need department approval. In this sense, academic freedom seems to be constrained to a great extent.

On the other hand, however, the University's official documents and declarations display its contradictory perspective on academic independence – specifically, its responsibility for seeking the truth, remaining academically independent, and preserving its staff's freedom of thought. For example, Prof. Y, a former president of the University, often talked in his commencement ceremony speeches about making students into critical thinkers and giving staff space for unhindered academic research. In a speech he delivered at a freshmen convocation ceremony, Prof. Y exhorted teachers to encourage students' critical thinking in class (Document01) and reminded students to reflect on the things they learned and to continue to innovate (Document02). This echoed the University's Charter, which declares that staff should "love students and stick to academic research ethics" (Document03). Prof. Y also emphasized teachers' moral obligation to be good examples to students by pursuing academic truth and stimulating students' critical thinking ability. Mentioning one young teacher, he said:

> This young teacher said in the commencement ceremony in a faculty, "We [the University name] teachers are afraid of nothing – not the authorities, not political leaders, not the mass media – but our students." Could all of our teachers be like him and take students' evaluation of us as the standard for always pursuing excellence in research and work? (Document04)

Prof. Y used examples to encourage all teachers in the University to seek truth in their academic activities through critical thinking, so as not to fail the students. From a number of other documents, one can see that the University really regarded pursuing academic truth and influencing students to be important academic staff responsibilities, but attempting to fulfill both types of tasks could cause tensions for academic staff. Thus, in this sense, the University encouraged academic freedom

despite political control. (In December 2019, however, it was revealed that the new University charter has removed the wording of institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and freedom of thought and strengthened the wording of Party control.) Its conduct regarding its staff's academic freedom is ambiguous to say the least.

5.4.3 *Students' Expectations of Academic Staff*

Regarding academic freedom and university autonomy, students had high expectation of their university education and the University's academic staff. According to the questionnaire data, students generally agreed on the link between university autonomy and the university's role in knowledge production and innovation, but were slightly conservative regarding university autonomy, as seen in Table 5.1. When asked about academic freedom issues at the University, students gave positive responses, based on their own experiences, and confirmed their overall satisfaction in later interviews; however, their attitudes revealed some dissatisfaction regarding political education.

Students had mixed feelings about the political control exerted on them. Some accepted the existence of political education programs because they had received education about CCP ideas since elementary school, and they saw it as a natural part of education. In the interviews, some students identified PECs as essential to their university study; one Year 6 medical student (Interview06) reported, "I think PECs are necessary for university students, though I had little interest in them." A Year 4 social science student (Interview07) thought PECs established students' basic values, and they were "important for university students [because] they serve to set up students' world outlook, views on life and values." Though they had reservations about the quality of political education, these students saw the necessity of including PECs in the curriculum and accepted PECs as a component of their education. Most of the students interviewed never questioned the existence of PECs or they felt useless to challenge them.

Regarding PEC quality, although some PEC teachers (Interview09 and Interview10) tried to encourage critical thinking, students did not see that as sufficient, when compared with the practices of teachers in most other courses at the University. Student interviewees (Interview09) confirmed that their PEC teacher

Table 5.1 To what extent do you agree with the following statements?[a]

	N	Mean	Standard deviation
Universities should promote autonomy	694	1.70	0.63
University should produce knowledge and encourage innovation	695	1.38	0.54
The University always sticks to academic freedom as its priority	694	1.64	0.69

[a]1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Disagree; 4 = Strongly Disagree

Table 5.2 How much do students think these courses have influenced them in attaining political knowledge, forming political attitude, and learning political participation[a]

	N	Mean	Standard deviation
Marxist Basic Theories	683	2.23	0.74
Mao's Thoughts and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics	676	2.21	0.77
Moral Education and Law Basics	686	2.01	0.79
Outline of Chinese Modern and Contemporary History	694	1.91	0.79
Group B Selective Courses	652	2.11	0.75
Courses based on disciplines	679	1.79	0.86
Classics in Literature and History and Heritage of Culture	669	1.86	0.79
Philosophy and Critical Thinking	665	1.86	0.79
Intercultural Conversation and Global Vision	676	1.75	0.77
Scientific Progress and Spirit	684	1.98	0.79
Ecological Environment and Care for Life	681	2.01	0.79
Artistic Creation and Appreciation Experience	679	1.79	0.86

[a]1 = Very positive help; 2 = Not much; 3 = Not at all; 4 = Very negative influence

encouraged discussion and debate, but they pointed out that not every PEC teacher at the University was like him. Based on the survey questionnaires collected, students showed a lack of interest in most PECs, except for *Outline of Chinese Modern and Contemporary History* (hereafter *History*). As to whether these courses helped their political learning, students gave higher scores to General Education Core Courses (GECC) than PECs, as shown in Table 5.2.

One student wrote an article in a non-official student publication that explained students' dissatisfaction with PECs, suggesting they saw PECs as an obstacle to academic freedom:

> PECs are mostly boring…I do not think they include critical thinking. But training in critical thinking and freedom of expression through discussion should be the major educational function of universities. And this is what PECs lack. (Yinbing 2011)

5.5 To Be "Red and Expert": Academic Staff's Dual Roles

5.5.1 Academic Staff's General Perception of Academic Freedom at the University

The academic staff generally thought the atmosphere at the University was free, compared to other universities in China. They did not feel restricted in the topics they could talk about in class, but they did not deny the possibility of intervention from external departments or the University itself. All interviewees were asked whether they had been informed of the "Seven No's" – seven major topics that many online media sources claimed could not be talked about in class. They all responded

that the University had neither distributed documents nor held meetings to discuss such regulations. Most felt free to talk in class, as one interviewee noted:

> The happiest thing about staying at the University is that no one has any control over what kind of articles I should write, what kind of research I should do, and how should I give my lectures. (Interview04)

Though not officially told what they should not say in class, academic staff still had a mental list of topics they could not touch upon without crossing the CCP's bottom line. One young overseas returnee staff member in the economics department commented:

> I was never officially told that there might be some contents I could not talk about in class. But I happen to know the boundary. Criticisms about the government should be separated into two parts: those directed towards the bureaucracy are fine, but comprehensive attacks on the whole system or the regime are problematic. For example, if you criticized the Party Secretary in the University, that might cause a problem. (Interview12)

They took students' responses as a motivation to pursue excellence and truth in academics. The University's academic staff had great confidence in their students and regarded the academic language as the best medium to communicate with them:

> I do not think there is anything I cannot talk about in the class. One has to have confidence in knowing the theories well so as to scientifically answer students' questions, even if the questions are harsh. (Interview11)

However, the academic staff still felt their academic affairs could sometimes be subjected to political intervention, which caused them to proceed cautiously most of the time. Those who were willing to challenge the bottom line had comparatively more troubles than others, as one interviewed PEC teacher reported:

> There certainly were people coming over and telling me there were inappropriate contents in my class. (Interview10)

Similar comments were also made by his colleague:

> My head came and talked to me saying that I used some words inappropriately; for example, one should not say 'Party State' (as it sounds negative and is different from the officially adopted term, like the Central Committee of the CCP) in class, or the 'Beijing government' (which is a term Western media love to use). But of course, if I did use them, it would not be a big deal, either. (Interview02)

Other academic staff also shared that they did not see violating the bottom line slightly as too big a deal, as there were never serious consequences for doing so at the University. Though all PEC teachers had also to be CCP members, their political beliefs were not a factor affecting their faculty position. As a staff member commented:

> The University is comparatively tolerant. As far as I know, one's political position is not a selection criterion for academic staff recruitment. (Interveiw09)

However, since only few interviewees commented on the recruiting issue, other examples could reveal a different reality. In addition, there may have been changes in academic staff recruitment in recent years due to the state's tightened control over

ideological issues in higher education. Some academic staff believed that the University and their students focused more on academic criteria or teachers' professional level than their political affiliation like Party membership. Although the latter had some influence, teachers tended to have their own strategies for dealing with it, as will be discussed in the next section. In addition, academic staff were afraid of failing students, academically. Several teacher interviewees (Interview04, Interview09, Interview12, Interview15) said their students were no less talented than Ivy League students, and they wanted to provide them with the best education and good academic standards, which encouraged them to place "academic values over political correctness" in their minds.

5.5.2 Academic Staff's First Role: Helping the Party-State with Political Control by Practicing Self-Censorship

Despite the different expectations of the state, the University, and its students, and the academic staff's general understanding of academic freedom issues at the University, the faculty's first responsibility is to create *Red* graduates. This is the CCP's political bottom line that cannot be violated. The result is self-censorship on the part of the faculty. The political socialization mechanisms on campus remind academic staff of what the political bottom line is, which sensitive topics and historical events they are not to discuss in class, and what self-censorship protocol they should use.

The primary component of the political bottom line is the recognition of the CCP's leadership in China; the legitimacy of the CCP generally cannot be challenged, no matter what topic academic staff are discussing. As one PEC teacher (Interview17) said, the contents delivered cannot contradict the CCP's *Four Cardinal Principles* (upholding the socialist path; the people's democratic dictatorship; the leadership of CCP; and Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse Tung Thought), with recognition of the CCP's leadership being foremost among them. When talking about the bottom-line issue in teaching, one social science professor (Interview04) – who had earned his PhD in the United States and had learned of Chinese universities' restrictions on teaching materials before he started teaching – commented:

> When I first came to the University to teach in a social science department, I asked the senior professor timidly about whether there were things that I could not talk about in class here in mainland China; the professor told me: "As long as you do not say 'Bring down the CCP,' you will be perfectly fine." And then I went to sit in his class; he was way bolder than I would be (Interview04).

The second area of the political bottom line concerns specific historical events and incidents that might challenge the CCP's leadership. These topics are politically sensitive in the Chinese context, and the state does not want students to know anything more about them than has been reported in the mainstream media. Some interviewees (Interview11, Interview04, Interview02) mentioned topics they felt they

could not talk about in class, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the *Falun gong* (a religious organization banned by the government as an anti-CCP political movement), and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo (who was accused of "inciting subversion of state power" (Zang 2011), as the CCP sees them as challenging the legitimacy of its rule. In addition to these obvious forbidden zones, others – such as so-called Western values, democracy values, and ignoble histories – could be played as edge balls (see also Chap. 4).

With this understanding of the bottom line in mind, the University's academic staff have developed self-censorship strategies based on their experiences, taking responsibility for checking their own teaching contents by filtering some political sensitive ones or manipulating their methods of delivering teaching contents in various ways.

The first such strategy is the plentiful use of metaphors in class to avoid sensitive words, especially those that criticize the CCP or the government. For instance, in one political science class I observed on nation-building and democracy (Observation05), when the teacher mentioned "a minority in a country [that] would like to be independent," he drew a map on the blackboard that made it clear he was talking about the Uygur ethnic group in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. However, the teacher spoke as if he were commenting on the Ukraine issue. Xinjiang ethnic issues and the Uygur's conflict with the majority Han are politically sensitive in mainland China, especially since the July 2009 riots in the region. Thus, academic staff talked around such issues and took different tracks to play it safe. Academic staff were cautious about the words they used in class and were reluctant to speak out publicly on politically sensitive issues. As one PEC teacher said:

> When I 'fake' my point of view, I give them signals on that. I mean, when I am ironically echoing the mainstream political view, I give students a facial expression as a hint to let them know I do not actually agree with the CCP on this specific issue. I also substitute cases from history for current situations to make an analogy, when I feel like criticizing the government and the Party. (Interview10)

Teachers' wariness about explicitly criticizing the government and the Party is a form of self-censorship, but one that is used to keep their teaching contents within tolerance while still striving for academic freedom, as will be illustrated below.

The University academic staff's second self-censorship strategy is to avoid talking about or commenting on Chinese politics in class. They generally focused on academic analysis rather than political positions or filtered out overtly political contents. One teacher of economics reported that he only talked about academic research and was not keen to comment on current political or social issues in class:

> I would discuss facts about the Party-state political system, the CCP cadres' promotion system, the government's internal administrative organization and structure, and the relationship between the Party and the government, all of which are academic research results supported by evidence and data, instead of providing students with my own values. (Interview12)

Some teachers eliminate sensitive elements about Chinese politics when preparing their syllabi and use their own systems to choose "politically correct" teaching

contents. One history department teacher (Interview13), for example, focused mainly on European rather than Chinese issues, to be "academically safe." Even PEC teachers would use this strategy. In PEC classes, teachers are supposed to indoctrinate students with socialist values; however, PEC teachers seldom made it clear that the values they presented were socialist ones, nor did they often use the words "socialist core values" in the observed PEC classes. From the researcher's observation of classes and online course videos (Shanghai Course Center 2015), one can see that most *Moral Education and Law Basics* teachers dealt with topics related to university life, such as relationship problems and time management, and offered nothing related to politics. If one never talks about something, one can never say something wrong about it.

The third self-censorship strategy is for teachers to compromise their personal political views, mainly in their research and publications. They compromise their ideas to avoid offending the CCP to ensure that they get published. One teacher said, in an observed class, that his research on the relationship between the CCP and the KMT (Nationalist Party in China) covered only from 1927 to 1937, instead of from 1927 to 1949, since he knew a lot of what had occurred between 1937 and 1949 was "unprintable" (Observation06). A young scholar who had just returned from the United States to join the social science faculty told the researcher, in an informal conversation, that she would use different titles in English and Chinese on posters announcing a talk she was going to give if she deemed a word in the title was a bit sensitive, as a self-censorship strategy to avoid trouble.

There are differences in censorship levels between academic disciplines, with science and engineering teachers experiencing less censorship of their research and teaching than humanity and social science teachers (Interview21; see also Chap. 4). As one teacher commented:

> There is almost no restriction on what I teach and research as a science teacher. Freedom for science and engineering is different from that for humanity and social sciences. When you read the research program title on the list of national grants, those in science and engineering look reasonable and some in humanity and social sciences are disgustingly a** kissing. (Interview05).

What irritated this interviewee, as he literally cursed in the interview, were those topics that too obviously focused on praising the CCP, rather than doing serious research. However, science and engineering staff also knew not to talk about topics like the 1989 Tiananmen Incident in class (Interview21), suggesting the political bottom line and related censorship issues were generally clear to all University teachers.

5.5.3 *Academic Staff's Second Role: Pursuing Academic Freedom*

Despite their acting to fulfill their political tasks, teachers also had strategies to pursue academic freedom within the boundaries of the political bottom lines by using their University-granted freedom to encourage critical thinking in class so as to produce "Expert" graduates. They were generally free to talk about Western values, criticize the CCP in class, and reject official textbooks, based on their academic judgment. However, as mentioned above, these were edge balls; one got space to play them but had to explain it if caught doing so.

First, it is impossible for academic staff not to discuss Western values in class at the University. Western values, as defined by the CCP (Theory Bureau of Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee 2009), include ideas about constitutional democracy, liberty, human rights, capitalism, liberalism, civil society, freedom of the press, and so on. The CCP opposes the spread of such ideas, fearing they may unify people's thoughts around the "wrong values" (Theory Bureau of Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee 2009). All interviewed teachers at the University said they had not been told officially what could not be discussed in class and did not think it right to avoid Western political concepts related to their courses if balanced values were provided, in accordance with the University's academic standards (Interview11, Interview15, Interview13). Even after Yuan Guiren's (Xinhua Net 2015) talk on preventing the infiltration of Western ideas into Chinese universities, the University's academic staff did not change their teaching contents or style (Interview03). Based on the fieldwork, there were two main types of Western values discussed in the University's classrooms.

The first concerned the advantages of Western political systems. Teachers in observed classes spoke freely about such concepts as democracy (Observation06), civil society (Observation03), and constitutionalism (Observation08 and Observation02) and the advantages thereof. For example, in one class (Interview15) on *Ancient Greek and Roman Classics*, the origins of politics and political systems were discussed with references to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The teacher implied, in an interview, that it was impossible to avoid talking about the idea of Athenian democracy in his class, as it was central to the historical period and writings on which it focused; thus, CCP restraints on Western ideas in university classroom were not fully implemented at the University. The second type of Western values concerned social and political issues and especially their advantages. In an observed philosophy class (Observation07), the teacher focused on Max Weber's book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He also talked about religion, social welfare in Western countries, and other Western values in an introductory and explanatory way, and he made comparisons between social welfare systems in China and Germany, indicating that their differences in rationality were based on religion. The teaching of these Western academic values was indicative of the University academic staff's autonomy in terms of content selection and course delivery.

Going one step further, the University's academic staff sometimes – or frequently, according to some students – used their academic judgment to introduce contents that challenged the legitimacy of the CCP in class while remaining cognizant of the political bottom line and using metaphors or other technical strategies to avoid crossing it. In an interview, one Year 2 social science student (Interview08) reported that he was initially surprised that the University's classes were open to discussion and different opinions, since his teachers were "criticizing the CCP's political censorship pretty hard in some classes." In non-PEC classes (Observation08, Observation09), teachers presented criticisms of the People's Commune and Three Years of Natural Disasters, indicating they had led to the deaths of over ten million people in China but had never been studied or admitted as a mistake by the Chinese government. PEC teachers, despite being mandated to spread pro-CCP values, also presented criticisms on occasion. One teacher reported:

> This is a country constructed on lies and violence. This regime does not want its citizens to know that they are actual taxpayers. I told my students not to be too grateful to the country. (Interview10)

This teacher regarded his *History* class as a reversed form of brainwashing to counter orthodox indoctrination and to help students break down their knowledge about the CCP and construct a new system of values and beliefs. He did not show support for the CCP in his classes, indicating academic staff critical of CCP could still serve as PEC teachers in the University and showing the level of freedom teachers enjoyed when teaching. Another academic staff member, who also taught *History*, believed that only praising the CCP in class would not really set up a "great, glorious, and correct" image of the CCP, and so did not avoid criticism in her class, either. A political science teacher (Interview11) even asked his students to collect negative comments about the CCP online and discussed them one by one with the students to see whether the comments were reasonable or one-sided. Exercising academic freedom did not mean these teachers were cynical about the CCP all the time, merely that they had the space to talk about issues and provide students with multiple resources without fear of losing their jobs.

The University's academic staff could also exercise professional and academic judgment in selecting teaching materials, such as rejecting officially approved textbooks. Generally, PEC teachers are expected to follow the official textbook; at the University, however, they had more latitude in teaching content selection. For example, two *History* class teachers selected ten lecture topics they considered most important in modern and contemporary Chinese history, without using the official textbooks (Interview09, Interview10), based on their academic evaluation of the books and their understanding of PEC's political task. A PEC teacher reported:

> Those books have too strong a sense of preaching, emphasizing again and again the legitimacy of the Party and how great it is. But the truth is, the Party made mistakes too. I have never denied that in my class. My students would know from my teaching that the Party struggled all the way to realize better governance, with its ups and downs, with all tests and experiments. (Interview08)

This teacher regarded the officially approved textbooks as too doctrinal and one-sided, as well as being not sufficiently well-organized in terms of pedagogy to attract students. Similarly, another PEC teacher (Interview10) believed the contents in the *History* class official textbooks were written to prove the CCP's greatness at the expense of historical accuracy and that letting students believe everything the textbooks presented was "Universal Truth" would be ridiculous. Students in his class were encouraged to criticize the arguments and historical facts in the official textbooks in an academic way. "I teach them real history," this PEC teacher said proudly. Taking the *Boxer Rebellion* (an event mentioned both in the official textbook and in this teacher's lecture) as an example, he argued:

> The official textbook said this movement was encouraged by missionaries and stimulated by foreigners' invasion. But the missionary force was far more active in Guangdong than in Shandong. Why was it not happening in Guangdong? This reason doesn't make sense at all. This movement was always captioned as anti-imperialist patriotic movement. I think it was total nationalist terrorism (Interview10).

This PEC teacher did not agree with the officially approved textbook, so he decided to deliver the class in his own way, providing students with his own interpretation of historical events and telling them where they could find books providing more balanced views. The teachers exercised their academic judgment in teaching content selection in their own courses, even if those contents did not align with the official political orthodoxy. Since there were no official textbooks for non-PEC classes, academic staff in these courses enjoyed even more freedom.

Critical thinking was encouraged in all types of courses, even PEC courses, though not in each and every class, as variation could happen from teacher to teacher. The University academic staff encouraged students to look for different information sources to enable them to approach academic discussions with a more open mind. One PEC *History* class, for instance, demonstrated the ways in which the academic staff encouraged critical thinking. In this observed PEC teacher's (Interview09) class, several students made oral presentations on *The Treaty of Nanking* in 1842, most of which regarded the opening up of the five seaports to trade as a passive move that shamed China. The academic staff pointed out that most of the historical materials students cited had strong ideological orientations and were mainly drawn from senior high school textbooks that presented only one side of argument; students were using such terms as *yangren* (Qing Dynasty expression for *foreigners*) and *lieqiang* (negative expression for *foreign powers*), which she characterized as "CCTV-style" discourse, which students claimed to hate but still used. Most students had presented similar arguments, while she thought they should have shown more independent thinking. In this way, the teacher deconstructed the knowledge system of history her students had attained in high school. The next step this teacher took was to construct a way of doing research using diverse resources and to encourage students to find multiple sources of historical data to support their arguments. From this class observation, it can be seen that what she actually instilled in her students was a healthy skepticism of official textbooks and historical accounts. This was common in the University, based on observations in the field.

Discussion and debate were also encouraged in class by academic staff to stimulate critical thinking. In addition to lecturing on alternative interpretations of China's problems, the academic staff involved students in inquiring into China's current problems (Observation06, Observation10), such as netizens' criticisms of the CCP (Interview11) and the government's firewall blocking of the Internet (Interview04). One social science teacher's (Interview04) class used several high-tech touchscreens and intranet to demonstrate students' immediate discussion of his lecture and other students' presentations. A PEC teacher (Interview02) reported, "I value students' depth of thinking. If a student really reads and thinks, you can tell from his essay." None of the interviewees said students' answers and discussions in exams or essays had to stick to CCP ideology. From the University's official website, it can be seen that discussion and debate is encouraged by the University as well; as such, a lot of observed classes involved interactions between teachers and students with open questions.

The academic staff also encouraged students to question and even disagree with the teacher. In several observed classes (Observation10, Observation04), students had heated interactions with their teacher, whom they questioned about concepts and about whose answers they seemed skeptical; they were not afraid of posing questions. The teacher also gave them encouraging words when they pose questions, such as "You've got a very good point," "I haven't even thought about that," "Would anyone else like to comment on this?", and so on. Other teachers also stated that they welcomed questions and comments from students whose opinions differed from theirs (Interview11, Interview09).

In these ways, the University's academic staff searched for academic freedom within the boundaries of a political bottom line, by providing students with balanced views from multiple academic resources.

5.6 Discussion: The Role Duality of Academic Staff in the University

As shown above, the University's academic staff had two different roles to cope with and different tasks assigned to them within the mechanisms of political socialization and the framework of academic development. They used their own strategies to cope with the conflicting expectations of the state, the university, and the students in fulfilling their dualistic role – i.e., the simultaneous fulfillment of both the academic task and the political task assigned to them. Through these strategies, they were able to pursue academic freedom, within the boundaries of the CCP's political bottom line.

As the data has shown, academic staff's role duality arose from the competing – even contradictory – expectations of the state, the University, and students. The state's expectation that the University would create socialist conformists to serve the state's construction, the University's expectation that focusing on

academic independence would stimulate innovation and facilitate its development agenda, and the students' expectation that their university education would be academic oriented together reflect the complexity of academic and political tasks that co-exist in Chinese higher education. While this complexity could create tensions between political control and academic freedom, by accepting the duality of their role rather than choosing to satisfy only one task, the teachers in this study were able to pursue academic freedom to some extent.

Within the field of Chinese higher education, and especially as illustrated in this case study, different players interacted to make academic staff adopt different strategies on different occasions to cope with their academic and political tasks. To cope with political socialization, they used self-censorship to deliver academic opinions without crossing the political bottom line, to remain politically correct, to follow university instructions, and to avoid trouble. They also had their own tackling strategies for academic freedom that increased their space for flexible conduct while still teaching within established bounds. The academic staff took advantage of the freedom they had been granted and found loopholes in the implementation of political socialization that enabled them to preserve their academic freedom and to encourage debate, discussion, questions, skepticism, and openness to different ideas in class. These strategies helped staff members balance their academic and political responsibilities.

The University did not have a strong mechanism for supervising and punishing staff members who violated political correctness and crossed the political bottom line; as reported in the findings, the academic staff did not face dismissal for such transgressions, but only a talking-to by their supervisor or a self-reflection report on the issue. Although academic staff were aware of the political bottom line, they made use of the autonomous space within its boundaries to challenge political orthodoxy at times and used tactics to avoid overt political incorrectness while still delivering balanced views to their students. To promote critical thinking, the academic staff used strategies to increase discussion and questions, access multiple resources, and learn in alternative environments. Academic staff encouraged students not only to learn the CCP perspective but (more importantly) also to use diverse sources to support their argument, even in PECs. Based on the data presented herein, political control versus academic freedom is not a simple either-or issue in Chinese higher education, but a complex interaction and negotiation involving academic staff's dual roles.

Revisiting related studies, "Red and Expert" is still Chinese higher education's aim in cultivating its graduates, though the meaning of "Red" has evolved since the 1950s. The political task has still been the core of Chinese higher education since 1949, with the CCP overseeing the indoctrination of university students into its political orthodoxy and their socialization into the "norms, values and ideologies deemed acceptable to and prescribed by the CCP-led state" (Law 2013). This has always been seen as an obstacle for academic freedom in China. Though realizing China has its own mode of autonomy and freedom in teaching, most studies in this area have focused on state-granted university autonomy (Du 1992; Pritchard 1994; Ren and Li 2013; Wang 2010; Zhong 1997) or individual staff autonomy (Yang

et al. 2007), rather than seeing teachers as having an active role in fighting for academic freedom. In the extant literature, much has been said of the higher education reforms of the 1980s and how decentralization and decreased funding turned higher education in China from a state-controlled model to a state-supervised model with more institutional autonomy over knowledge structures, teacher salaries, admissions, and university administration (Postiglione 2004; Yang et al. 2007), tempered by the imposition of new measures of restraint (Law 1995). There have also been comments about the de-politicizing trend in Chinese higher education (Yan 2014). On the other hand, the image of Chinese scholars as self-mastering and enjoying a high degree of intellectual authority (Jun Li 2011; Zha 2011) emerging from Chinese cultural tradition (Zha 2012) has been emphasized by scholars as a unique form of autonomy in Chinese higher education. This continues to be a mode of scholarly behavior, according to the findings, one which echoes Hu's (2005) assertion that professors in Chinese higher education are both political and academic figures who must always balance their dual roles. This chapter suggests that the strategy of role duality could render political control boundaries flexible, resolve the supposedly unresolvable tension between political control and academic freedom, and offer a new simultaneous existence model for understanding academic freedom from a non-stereotypical and non-Western perspective.

This chapter has pointed out that, contrary to the perceptions of some scholars, there is not always a constant tug-of-war between political control and the pursuit of academic freedom in a socialist country. China's higher education provides a case study of political intervention in university affairs and exemplifies what Altbach (2004) called a country that "permits unfettered academic freedom in the nonpolitical hard sciences but places restrictions on it in the more sensitive social sciences and humanities." Though this is partly represented in the data, the real situation is more complex, as, in addition to restriction, flexibility also exists.

5.7 Conclusion: Academic Freedom, Duality, and Chinese Higher Education

Role duality is a strategy for preserving academic freedom in the face of political restriction in the Chinese system of higher education. Readers might find the arguments presented here somewhat contradictory – for example, how can staff simultaneously feel free but also be subject to possible supervisory intervention? The answer might lie in their thoughts on and expectations of academic freedom in Chinese higher education. Chinese academics have a relatively low expectation of universities' openness and are used to being cautious politically as Chinese citizens. Role duality was a tactic most could adopt while growing up; as a result, when presented with a real situation that was freer than they had anticipated, they regarded it as free; and, in fact, it *is* freer than many people understand, especially those who view academic freedom issues from Western perspectives. While a lot of cases did

happen that put Chinese scholars at risk (Scholars at Risk 2019), this chapter attempted to provide a daily picture on the broader issues regarding academic freedom rather than specific ad hoc cases. Thus, this chapter reminds scholars studying Chinese higher education of the need to understand academic freedom issues in China from a more balanced perspective and to have greater understanding of its complexity and dynamics through a cultural and historical understanding of the context (see Chap. 4 on obedient autonomy).

Recent years have witnessed an increased tightening of political and social control in China, as echoed in then Vice-Minister of Education Du Yubo's (2016) comments on student counselors' ideological influence on students and in CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's emphasis – at the National Conference on Ideological and Political work in Colleges and Universities held in Beijing in December 2016 – on the importance of ideological and political education in universities, especially the role of teacher. Xi said that it is alright to do research as long as the topic is academic. However, the use of the result of the research and to what extent faculty could use these results in classes should be regulated (Xi 2016). How such an increase in control might affect the interaction between political task and academic task fulfillment could be the subject of future studies. Readers might find that some of the scenarios have now changed when compared to the findings in this chapter. Such cases may well be signs of the tightening of practices that warrant further notice and research attention.

Additionally, the rapid emergence of so-called think tanks (based in existing higher education institutions) to serve the country's needs could be a threat to the research freedom of academic staff in Chinese universities as scholars increasingly recognize their roles of assisting the government; this development has not been discussed here but deserves further research. Methodologically, the qualitative data presented here provides a vivid picture of the issue and should aid understanding of the atmosphere present in this case university in a holistic and deep way. Future quantitative studies could use this chapter as a part of their framework to provide interested audiences with statistical analysis of the general situation in Chinese higher education as a whole, which would also be relevant to understanding the issue of academic freedom in China. This case university was a prestigious one in China; the complex reality of academic freedom in other types of universities could be different, as discussed in Chap. 4 of this book.

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Chapter 6
Freedom to Excel: Performativity, Accountability, and Educational Sovereignty in Hong Kong's Academic Capitalism

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6.1 Introduction

Historically, professors were persecuted when they expressed views or "uncomfortable truths" that religious authorities, states, or other powerful status groups disliked. Therefore, academic freedom is an issue which should be safeguarded and defended. The definition of modern academic freedom was established when the first research university began operating in Berlin, Germany, in 1810. According to Altbach (2015), academic freedom, in the first instance, referred to the understanding that professors had freedom to decide what they could teach in classrooms and how to do research in direct areas of expertise. The protection of such academic freedom did not, however, cover expression of opinions outside of a professor's own academic expertise. In nineteenth-century Germany, academics who expressed political views in opposition to the ruling elite, who were socialists, or who dissented in other ways were often punished and deprived of academic appointments.

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A more comprehensive version of academic freedom was developed when the American Association of University Professors broadened its definition to include expressing opinions on topics outside direct academic areas. In terms of academic freedom in Germany and America, it not only protected professors as members of the academic community but also defended democratic governance in the academy. As professors were protected from being dismissed through a tenure system, they neither needed to worry about their dismissal for their disagreement with the ruling class in their research, teaching, or other views, nor worry about punishment due to dissenting university leadership on issues concerning academic governance or policy. The broadened view of academic freedom, stemming from German and American academic professions, has been adopted by many higher education communities worldwide which commit to the ideal of academic freedom in their scholarly traditions (see also Chap. 1 on this point). During its long history, academic freedom has been contested through debates and tensions outside of the academic profession rather than within professorial communities (Altbach 2015).

In the case of Hong Kong, when the issue of academic freedom is broached, educational sovereignty is a notion which is debated in the discourse. The debates have become increasingly uneasy and confrontational in this entrepreneurial city governed under the "One Country, Two Systems" political arrangement. Educational sovereignty stands for the authority of a jurisdiction to govern independently the domestic issues of education by exercising the highest executive power on legislation, administration, as well as enforcement of education-related laws (Pan 2009). More importantly, sovereignty of a jurisdiction is embodied in educational sovereignty. It refers to the final right of decision-making on specific education issues. Once academic freedom is being threatened, some activist citizens usually come to its defense to safeguard freedom of speech as a core value of Hong Kong. Some groups of professorial activists like Scholars' Alliance for Academic Freedom in Hong Kong express concerns that they gain more support from members outside the academic profession than members from the inside. At times, when academic freedom is endangered, it is the student activist groups that come to its defense, often facilitated and supported by the mass media and social media (Tang 2015).

Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are changing socio-political constructions shaped and interpreted by various stakeholders in Hong Kong's political development, especially in the context of greater integration of Hong Kong and mainland China and the increasing oversight of university management by the government (Law 2019). Government interference of academic affairs and university institutional management is not incidental but offers clues about a tendency toward a restrictive regime of control over higher education governance in Hong Kong (Chan and Kerr 2016).

At the micro level of politics, democracy, and education, people usually broaden the definition of academic freedom, while governments or administrators usually narrow the scope of the notion. For instance, some people believe academic freedom basically includes everything essential to democratic ideals, while governments define academic freedom within limits to what can and cannot be taught, researched, and published (Altbach 2015; Chan and Kerr 2016).

In fact, since Hong Kong's sovereignty was returned to China in 1997, there has been widespread concern over the preservation of university institutional autonomy and academic freedom in this Chinese city. Apart from a number of significant incidents prompting controversies over government interference in academic work, there has been the rise of managerialism, where collegial decision-making processes are taken over by managerial processes based on a corporate rationality (Lee 2011; Schugurensky 2003). However, Lee (2011) claims that there is a good merge in Hong Kong universities of managerial values, highlighted by institutional mission and competent leadership, and academic values, which include emphases on academic freedom and collegiality. What underpins the debates and discourses within and without the academic profession is the question of whether academic freedom is essential for the making of excellent, world-class universities.

Based on the context introduced above, this chapter examines key issues surrounding changes in the academic profession of Hong Kong, including academic excellence, accountability, and educational sovereignty against the backdrop of academic capitalism. Analyses and discussion are based on in-depth interviews with academic professionals and postgraduate students in a leading university in this Asian entrepreneurial city which has inherited a predominantly Western academic culture. We also use newspaper reports to supplement our analysis of the latest trends in Hong Kong's rapidly changing academic profession. We focus on the way academic freedom is understood, expected, and practiced when pressure for performance dominates the everyday tasks of academic life which is increasingly commercialized. The chapter takes universities in Hong Kong as a case study and argues that academic freedom is under siege by performativity as a means to a political end, escalating intrusions from diversified stakeholders, and "mainlandization."

6.2 Conceptual Framework

This chapter borrows the conceptual framework of Tang (2014a) on academic capitalism in Greater China. In particular, it discusses a performance-driven academic profession and the ways in which performativity and accountability erode educational sovereignty. Academic capitalism refers to the forces that restructure the higher education sector into the "academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime" (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) through neoliberal governance, institutional policies and practices, funding mechanisms, regulation of the academic profession, and new/entrepreneurial organizations which integrate the university into the state and market systems. Apart from the institutional aspect, academic capitalism is also concerned about the changing behavior of academic professionals in this capitalist knowledge/learning regime, and the market and market-like actions by other stakeholders in the higher education sector. The creation of new circuits of knowledge that link higher education to political economy may undermine self-governance of the academic profession and endanger academic freedom (Slaughter 2011).

6.2.1 *Performativity and Pro-competition Higher Education Policies*

As an example of East Asian capitalist modernity, Hong Kong's economic success lies in the way in which economic freedom is accentuated. In a quest for freedom to compete and excel, migrants are attracted to this land of opportunity where performativity is the lifeblood of the city's ethos. Its value system is predominantly shaped by the capitalist logic which features a free-market, open competitiveness, efficiency, and capital accumulation (Hamilton 1999; Lee 2008; Lung 2006).

Hong Kong's economic development preceded the development of its higher education sector. In higher education, the concern for research performativity – and the research tradition at large – emerged in Hong Kong academia in the 1990s when the universities started to respond to the globalization of higher education. Before that, the colonial city usually relied on overseas countries, especially the colonizer, the United Kingdom, for research and knowledge on government and industrial needs. Until the massification trend in the 1990s (Lo and Tang 2017; Tang 2015), Hong Kong's higher education was elitist, with only two universities offering higher education for bright high school graduates. When the higher education sector began expanding, the entrepreneurial mode of governance in alignment with the operational logic of capitalism (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012) was adopted in university management. Global competitivenss, cost-effectiveness and public accountability are central to institutional agendasetting and pursuit of excellence (UGC 1996). Managerialism was generally embraced by Hong Kong academics (Lee 2011) who shared a culture of consensus (Postiglione 2002).

Theoretically and legally, Hong Kong universities are entitled to institutional autonomy according to their own institutional ordinances. The Hong Kong government does not directly implement higher education policies in a top-down manner; rather, it is done through a buffer organization called the University Grants Committee of Hong Kong (UGC). However, this chapter argues that institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and educational sovereignty are affected, infringed, and redefined in some subtle and problematic ways, against the backdrop of globalization of academic capitalism and performance-driven policies.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, neoliberalism has been penetrating many aspects of academic life in Hong Kong. With the freedom to compete, excel, and perform, academic professionals are tasked with producing world-class research and attaining institutional prestige in global rankings. Only a select few are recognized through the awarding of competitive research grants, promotion of academic rank, or professorial endowment. In addition to financing higher education bodies, a more significant duty of the government is to formulate and regulate pro-competition policies. The narrative of "value for money" (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012) is instigated, circulated, and reproduced in government and institutional policies, resulting in the indoctrinating of neoliberal ideology into the funding mechanisms of research and academic programs, as well as into the everyday life of Hong Kong's academic profession.

The logic of performativity as an attribute of capitalism means attaining "the best possible input/output equation" (Lyotard 1984: 46). Its extension into education brings a mode of thinking whereby tertiary institutions build optimal operation, performance orientation and commit to competition in the higher education system (Locke 2015; Lyotard 1984; Roberts 2013). The idea of optimizing performance in tertiary education teaching and research – which needs "means of proof" – assumes outcomes are "always calculable" (Lyotard 1984). When the emphasis on performativity influences evaluating a professor's research and teaching, there is a set of criteria for publication assessment, funding measurement, and teaching evaluation. In essence, the setup of calculable performance criterion urging efficiency and competition creates an "academic dystopia" in institutional procedures and priorities (Roberts 2013). Academic dystopia is commonly understood as the circumstances in which the academy becomes no longer a community that desires truth-seeking and the pursuit of justice.

Within the academic capitalist framework, individual intellectuals and academic units attain resources based on their own performance rather than on their membership in the academic system. Insomuch that it is essential for a capitalist economy, competition makes global higher education work. Not unlike other higher education jurisdictions which are profoundly affected by the globalization of academic capitalism, Hong Kong universities function more and more as economic organizations. Economizing academic life (Bok 2003) is the entrepreneurial response of Hong Kong universities and the academic profession to the rise of global academic capitalism.

6.2.2 Accountability

All first-tier universities in Hong Kong are public-funded institutions under the auspices of the University Grants Committee. Apart from excellence and cost-effectiveness, public accountability is viewed as vital in how the UGC steers higher education in Hong Kong (UGC 1996). Hong Kong universities are not only obligated with accountability to the general public; they are also expected to be accountable to sponsoring bodies and donors. Accountability justifiably makes sense, especially in a crisis of austerity and amid a risk society. Embedded within Confucian managerial culture which values reciprocity, Hong Kong's higher education governance ensures that accountability has a unique function.

In the face of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, austerity imposed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government further justified and intensified its elevation of entrepreneurial governance in the higher education sector. The public-funded universities, as first-tier institutions, were directed by the government to pursue international excellence (Postiglione and Tang 2008), proving their competitive edge and demonstrating accountability for the public money spent on higher education (Tung 1997). In those times of austerity, Hong Kong employers and the local community questioned the quality of university graduates and the

cost-effectiveness of the educational returns of massified higher education (Postiglione and Mak 1997, cited by Tang 2014a).

When the twenty-first century arrived with a global call for developing knowledge economies, Hong Kong's universities were facing the challenge of serious funding cuts from the Hong Kong government. The Hong Kong funding of the higher education sector experienced a 4% cut when education reform was launched in 2000. It was followed by a further 10% budget cut for all public-funded institutions in 2003/04 (when the SARS epidemic seriously affected Hong Kong's society and economy). In the policy narrative, the government, via the UGC, stated that focused support was to serve as an incentive for Hong Kong universities in their strategic quest for excellence at the highest international levels (Sutherland 2002, 6–7; cited by Tang 2014a). Marketization was introduced into the operation of academic programs, with a massive expansion of self-financed postgraduate programs. Non-local students began to be enrolled in self-financed postgraduate programs, and those enrolled in government-funded undergraduate programs and postgraduate programs now comprised only 4% of the total student population. Market ideology was also applied to human resources management by delinking the salary scale of public-funded higher education institutions from the civil service. This delinking offered higher education administrations the flexibility of hiring staff on contract terms.

Instead of widespread resistance, Hong Kong universities applied the culture of consensus (Postiglione 2002), embraced this "new reality" (Clark 2000; Tang 2013), and entrepreneurially adapted to the changes and challenges. The president of a first-tier research university recommended that Hong Kong public universities should diversify funding from external sources by focusing more on applied research and enhance networks with business corporations and industries (Mok 2001; Tang 2014a). Paradoxically, although one aspect of the policy agenda was aimed at strengthening public accountability, knowledge, and education in Hong Kong, universities became more "capitalized" (Etzkowitz et al. 1998) and less devoted to the public good (Marginson 2011; Tang 2014a). Having entered the globalization of academic capitalism, Hong Kong's higher education institutions are positioned in an increasingly open-market framework, with ever-quickening competition and intensifying cross-border capitalist academic activities.

6.2.3 Academic Capitalism and Educational Sovereignty Eroded

Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are the cornerstone ideals of a vibrant, prolific, and healthy higher learning institution. Both of these ideals include the concept of educational sovereignty which guarantees academics their right to decide what they research and teach; how knowledge is created, disseminated, and applied; who can be members of the departmental/disciplinary colleges; as well as what kind of students can be admitted. Free from the demands of laymen and the control and censorship of administrators, academics should be entitled to

professional autonomy in its own right to a great extent. An academic appointment is not merely an occupation but a calling, and the calling of scholars should transform and transcend self-interest into ideal-regarding interests and public good (Clark 2008, cited by Hao 2015). A university should be a community with shared governance which safeguards academic autonomy, enables knowledge advancement and reinforces academic identity, and, from time to time, refreshes the academic calling (Hao 2015).

Protection of academic freedom is enshrined in Article 137 of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's Basic Law (Currie et al. 2006; Postiglione 2006; Tang 2014a). On the basis of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, Hong Kong's higher education institutions enjoy the capacity to use recurrent grants at their discretion.

However, managerial practices are enforcing efficiency and effectiveness and legitimatizing the imperative of university managerialism. The ideology of academic capitalism leads to a redefinition and new understanding about the meaning and practice of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. What constitutes the "superstructure" of an academic enterprise is the very ideology of academic capitalism (Tang 2014a). Through the "social technologies" of policy narrative and many a "scientific" measurement of performativity (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012), the academic capitalist ideology redefines academic excellence as a global academic game of excelling in the accumulation of productivity, prestige, and profits. In everyday circumstances of academic life, academic freedom is more often practiced as the freedom to perform, compete and excel in a liberal academic system, than fulfilling the higher calling of scholars to speak truth to power. Tang (2014a: 210) argues:

> Since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, competitiveness discourses gained currency – through wide circulation – among policymakers, elite circles of business leaders, university administrators, the mass media, and the general public. According to Slaughter and Cantwell (2012), human capital and competitiveness discourses justify and normalize neoliberal changes in higher education, which utilize education as an investment for economic returns rather than for social good and social justice. The concerned narratives and discourses further elaborate and articulate the ideology of academic capitalism through "social technologies" of various ranking methods of "world-class universities," citation indices of journal publications, and audit exercises for quality assurance. The circuits of production and reproduction of such narratives and discourses reveal that the prevalent economic culture forms, transpires, and reinforces the rudiments of academic capitalist ideology, in line with the existing political agenda and ideology. Corporate leaders, in capitalist economies in particular, are the key players in the initiation, articulation, and advocacy in the above-mentioned competitiveness narratives. The corporate elites, despite being external to the academic profession, are commonly on the board of trustees or regents, and they phase in corporate-like governance of higher education to universities' "executive management" (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012). . . . The ideology of academic capitalism blinds the members of academia to the contradictions in capitalist society, and to their mission to pursue social justice for the people.

Apart from the symbiotic relationship of global academic capitalism, entrepreneurial universities, and local governing and corporate elites, one variable that affects the educational sovereignty of Hong Kong's higher education institutions is

the powerful trend of "mainlandization" or "intranationalization" in the governance of this city. According to Hao (2015), authoritarianism is prevalent as "the order of the day" in mainland China (see also Chaps. 4 and 5). Increasingly the ethos and practices in the Hong Kong SAR government and political arena are affected by the mainland's authoritarianism, and Hong Kong's political practices are starting to resemble that of the mainland. Structurally speaking, the Chief Executive is the Chancellor of all public universities in Hong Kong, and all university presidents are presumably under the management of the Chief Executive. In the past, the Chief Executive (and Governor in colonial Hong Kong) only performed their duties in a symbolic manner, but the third Chief Executive (2012 to 2017) exercised his authority by intervening in the governance of individual universities, including appointing pro-government members onto the University Council. The executive-led practices, which are also supported by the Basic Law, enable the Chief Executive to intervene in educational affairs for the sake of strengthening the national sovereignty. Although more time is needed to confirm the observation, the current Chief Executive and her governance team seem to follow suit in this trend of executive-led practices. In the name of "public accountability," the government can intervene in educational sovereignty in favor of the national government's agenda which impedes the development of academic professionalism.

On the one hand, the mainland's ever-prospering innovative industries demand new knowledge, which incentivizes cross-border knowledge transfers from Hong Kong, for instance, via the neighboring city of Shenzhen (Sharif and Tang 2014). Yet on the other hand, mainland China's and Hong Kong's higher education systems are made up of different academic structures, systems of credentials, academic cultures, ideological foundations, and local cultures (Tang 2014a). In particular, their basic understanding about educational sovereignty and institutional/academic authority differs. This leads us to the question: Who is afraid of academic freedom (Bilgrami and Cole 2015)? Interactions may lead to enhanced multiculturalism. They may also create clashes of core values. Yet the issue is not as simple as represented by the media. Rather, it is the result of dynamic processes involving tensions and collaboration between the state, market, and academic profession in response to the trans-border spread of academic capitalism – and a possible dominance of Chinese academic capitalism.

6.3 Research Focus and Methodology

In Hong Kong's higher education sector, there are currently eight government-funded public universities. During Hong Kong's colonial period of 150 years, from 1842 to 1997, higher education was absent during the first 70 years. The first higher education institute, the University of Hong Kong (HKU), was founded in 1912. HKU was the one and only university in Hong Kong for half a century. The university became the hub to train colonial bureaucrats and professionals (Tang 2015).

After World War II, the need for college education increased as a result of the population boom in the post-war period (Rong 2002). The second university in Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), was established in 1963. CUHK was originally amalgamated from three colleges: New Asia College (founded in 1949), Chung Chi College (founded in 1951), and United College (founded in 1956).

The 1990s was an era of massification of higher education. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), the third university in Hong Kong, was founded in 1991. Before the end of the century, four publicly funded universities, one private university, and one higher education institute were upgraded or combined with existing institutions to become universities (see Table 6.1). The expansion was due to the influence of demographic change, employment demand, talent retention purpose before hand-over, and knowledge advancement outside Hong Kong (Morris and Yeung 1994).

The expansion of government subsidized higher education institutes and degrees effectively shifted higher education from elite supply to massification of education during the decolonization period (Morris and Yeung 1994; Tang 2015). What this means, however, is still unclear, including the massive increase in sub-degree programs (Tang 2015; Wan 2011).

The legacy of the colonial period is the adoption of the United Kingdom's model of the chancellor governance system and University Grants Committee (UGC) funding scheme (Rong 2002). As we mentioned earlier, the chancellor of all public universities in Hong Kong was the Governor under the British colonial period, and after 1997 it has become the Chief Executive. UGC was established in 1965 and is now the major funding body of the whole public higher education sector. The percentage of UGC funding in terms of local GDP has been decreasing since the government's tightening fiscal policy of 2003.[1]

The data for this chapter was collected in two main ways: qualitative research using snowball sampling and newspaper reports on university-related issues. Between 2012 and 2013, we conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with nine academic professionals, five graduate students, and two administrative staff members across the Faculty of Social Sciences, Faculty of Art, Faculty of Sciences, and Faculty of Architecture in the case university. The majority of interview respondents were found through personal contacts and referrals from interviewees. Most of the interviews were recorded and then transcribed, and the interview data was subjected to thematic analysis.

For the newspaper reports, we collected more than 500 university-related news reports, magazine articles, and press releases from the Hong Kong government covering the period from July 2012 to July 2017 (the Chief Executive appointment

[1] University Grants Committee. (2019). Grants for UGC-funded Institutions as a whole, 2003/04 to 2018/19. Retrieved from http://cdcf.ugc.edu.hk/cdcf/searchStatSiteReport.do (accessed on 2019-11-19)

Table 6.1 Major universities in Hong Kong as of 2019

	Name[a]	Year of establishment	Number of degree program students as of 2019 (UGC funded programs)[b]	Number of staff as of 2019 (both academic and non-academic staff)[c]
1.	The University of Hong Kong (HKU)	1912	19,579	5,982
2.	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU)	1937 (founded as Government Trade School) 1994 (granted full university title)	16,685	4,436
3.	Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU)	1956 (founded as Hong Kong Baptist College) 1994 (granted full university title)	7,478	2,019
4.	The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK)	1963 (assumed full university status from three separate colleges)	20,122	5,633
5.	Lingnan University (LingnanU)	1967 (founded as Lingnan College) 1999 (granted full university title)	2,619	606
6.	City University of Hong Kong (CityU)	1984 (founded as City Polytechnic of Hong Kong) 1994 (granted full university title)	14,637	3,332
7.	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST)	1991	11,205	2,888
8.	The Education University of Hong Kong (EdUHK)	1994 (founded as The Hong Kong Institute of Education from five separate colleges) 2016 (granted full university title)	8,391	1,463

[a]Joint University Programmes Admissions System. (2015). University Grants Committee funded Programmes. Retrieved from http://www.jupas.edu.hk/en/about-jupas/introduction/ (accessed on 2016-05-21)

[b]University Grants Committee. (2019). Student Enrolment (Headcount) of UGC-funded Programmes by Institution, Level of Study, Mode of Study and Academic Programme Category, 2018/19. Retrieved from http://cdcf.ugc.edu.hk/cdcf/searchStatSiteReport.do (accessed on 2019-11-19)

[c]University Grants Committee. (2019). Staff Number (Headcount) in Academic Departments of UGC-funded Institutions by Source of Salary Funding, Institution, Staff Grade and Mode of Employment, 2018/19. Retrieved from http://cdcf.ugc.edu.hk/cdcf/searchStatSiteReport.do (accessed on 2019-11-19)

period of Mr. C.Y. Leung). The news reports and magazine articles were researched via printed and online channels from the Wisenews search engine.[2]

6.4 Findings and Discussion

6.4.1 Performativity Calculation Harms Teaching and Corrodes Academic Freedom

The rationale for academic freedom, according to the American Association of University Professors (2001:3), is that "institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of the individual teacher or the institution as a whole" (cited in Hao 2015: 115). But academic capitalism, "the market and market-like ideologies and practices in academe" (Hao 2015: 107), is forcing the case-study university to exhaust itself in pursuit of a better market ranking which is of benefit to the university itself rather than the common good.

An international survey on the changing academic professions around the world found that Hong Kong had the third highest percentage (64%) of academics who admitted that there was a strong performance orientation (Lee 2011). In this era of academic capitalism, a university's market ranking is closely associated with the calculation of the performativity of the university's academic staff – the total number of journal articles published in English-dominated internationally recognized journals such as journals on the list of Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Science Citation Index (SCI), and Arts and Humanity Citation Index (A&HCI). One of our interviewees, an associate professor from the university, stated:

> Since Antony Leung chaired [the University Grant Council], the university has started telling you that you need to publish a certain number of articles. The articles published are classified into 5 ranks. 1st to 3rd ranks refer to academic journals of international level hosted by famous, foreign universities. The 4th to 5th ranks are assigned to local academic journals and some local ones are not even classified…. Universities compete with one another. They brag about themselves to each other. They scramble to be number one. They fight for ranking. They fight because every university is fighting. The traditional university mission is to train our students so our society will have talent in teaching, research, developing [sic] and other fields. But now, some professors scarcely teach. They put less weight on their teaching job. I know some professors who claim themselves as research professors. They reduce their teaching. They don't teach in a serious manner. They got a promotion because they got research projects even though they got poor teaching evaluations from students. For those who have excellent teaching records but only have "ordinary" grades for their research activities, they are often neglected and even despised. Their Department Heads make things difficult for them and create a lot of obstacles to their promotion (associate professor, Faculty of Arts).

[2] The newspaper clipping covers articles from Am 730, Apple Daily (蘋果日報), etnet.com.hk (經濟通), Mingpao (明報), Wenweipo (文匯報), Oriental Daily (東方日報), hk.on.cc (東網), Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報), Hong Kong Commercial Daily (香港商報), Hong Kong Daily News (新報) (which stopped publishing in 2015), Hong Kong Economic Times (香港經濟日報), Singpao (成報), Takungpao (大公報), The Sun (太陽報) (which stopped publishing in 2016), YazhouZhoukan (亞洲週刊), and Next Media (壹週刊).

As a consequence, many academic staff set their first priority as publishing and obtaining more project funding so that they can collect more data and write more papers for publication. Teaching duties have been put aside, and the quality of teaching has been adversely affected as the reward mechanism is publication in so-called "first-tier" journals, not for good teaching. A student we interviewed said:

> At the very first class the professor just tends to say 'OK, I don't want to be here, you don't want to be here, let's just get this over with and hopefully all of you will pass.' So I feel like…if the department doesn't care about us and throws us all in this situation, then why should I care? Why should I bother to put in the effort to do well in this course? (postgraduate student, Faculty of Social Sciences).

This not only occurs in the classroom. Many professors take publication as their first priority and neglect the supervision of postgraduate students' thesis writing. Another student stated:

> We (my supervisor and I) don't socialize or talk about stuff outside of "work," though, and I guess I wish that things were different sometimes, but it's really a formal, business-like relationship that works out for everybody, because nobody asks for more than that. . . . I know friends who have finished their master's and only got to see their supervisor twice throughout the entire thesis! It's kind of like their supervisor gave them two brief meetings, they came to some sort of an understanding as to what the thesis was about, then the supervisor told them, "OK, you're on your own now, I can't see you anymore because I don't have the time" (postgraduate student, Faculty of Social Sciences).

The professor's mentality, illustrated by the comments such as "let's just get this [teaching] over with and hopefully all of you will pass" and "you're on your own now, I can't see you anymore because I don't have the time," indicates an alienation within the academic community, an unintended consequence of the ranking game. Many professors are exhausted by the strong competition of getting papers published in top journals. Some take the strategy of "focusing on publication but devalue teaching." With this mindset of competition, efficiency, productivity, and accountability, many professors are becoming what Weber (1958) calls "specialists without spirit" and "sensualists without heart" (cited in Hao 2015: 104). Professors are alienated from their students since they know a good teaching record does not play much of a role in academic promotion. Students have their own very clear mindset about their professors' mentality. Students "fight back" against this lack of accountability to them by intentionally "not put[ting] in the effort to do well in [their] course." Thus, these students are alienated from their classes and their professors. They begin to doubt what university leaders say in public. A postgraduate student points out that:

> Nominally, the university says all this stuff about holistic education and research that makes a contribution to humanity or whatever, but really we know that that's what they're obligated to say, that we want to be recognized as one of the best universities in the world, and the way to score points against other schools and climb up the rankings is to get a lot of money and spend it on getting people to do stuff that is generally recognized to be important (postgraduate student, Faculty of Social Sciences).

On the one hand, the university president, the faculty dean, and the department head make statements in public saying that they have students' best interests at

heart. They stress that students are the future of the university and the future of Hong Kong. On the other hand, they do not establish any practical mechanism to account for teaching performance as a key criterion for academic staff's career mobility. They are chasing after the wind of capitalism in the name of striving to become "world-class" institutes for the sake of a better future for the university.

The university is not supposed to be an institution that only produces graduates who simply bear its brand, a stamp of validation that verifies his or her fitness for work, with the fitter certified for higher-paid work; rather, they are supposed to be institutions which look for new knowledge and new ways of thinking. Professors should, ideally, combat the prevalent situation and rekindle their students' desire for knowledge. Embracing calculable and quantitative merit as a centric requirement for an individual's career development encourages the neglecting of classroom teaching and student supervising. In the name of enforcing university competitiveness, the university deprives students of the opportunity to develop. Professors' adaptation to the situation by succumbing to the pressure of capitalist competition results in their loss of academic freedom.

6.4.2 How Politics Affects Higher Education Governance and Hence Academic Freedom

A further threat to academic freedom comes from the politicization of higher education governance. There have been many new appointments of university council chairpersons and university presidents across Hong Kong's public universities since 2012. Professor Peter Mathieson, former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, resigned from the leadership position before the completion of his tenure. Through the press, he revealed that in the last days of his presidency, he received "pressure from everybody," including academic staff, student bodies, graduates, legislators, and politicians across the spectrum and the media. On a couple of occasions, local government leaders and the liaison office of Beijing also provided advice to the president as education in Hong Kong becomes an important issue in the national affairs of mainland China. Professor Mathieson commented that his premature departure was triggered, to a certain extent, by the lack of trust and cooperation with the newly appointed university council chairman who is a pro-establishment politician. In view of new practices in the Hong Kong political and educational arenas, it appears that there is no such thing as education sovereignty at the institutional level but, largely at a national level, as an imperative dimension of national sovereignty.

In Hong Kong's university governance, political loyalty to the Central government can be used as an effective management tool to bar controversial academics from taking up leadership positions in institutions. The appointment of Mr. Johannes Chan, a renowned law scholar of human rights, as a vice president of HKU was rejected by the Council in 2015, although the selection committee (led by the HKU

President) unanimously recommended it. After a process of deliberation and dispute lasting nearly 10 months, the pro-democracy academic was barred from the leadership position at HKU. His liberal stance on Hong Kong's electoral reform aroused a Hong Kong pro-Beijing newspaper to publish more than 300 articles accusing him of sympathizing and supporting his departmental colleague Mr. Benny Tai, who was a co-founder of the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. A justification for the rejection of the appointment is that Mr. Johannes Chan was not a doctoral holder. However, a doctoral degree is not a necessary condition for this post in legal studies.

Hong Kong Baptist University decided not to renew the contract of Dr. Benson Wong Wai-kwok in 2018. The reasons given were the lack of course development and teaching excellence, though in his performance evaluation "very good" was given. Others suspect the real reason was his support of students' democratic activism and his presidency of the university's staff union. As a result of the Central government's political influence, there have been increasing tensions and lack of trust not only between faculty and administration but between students and university management and within the student body.

6.4.3 Academic Capitalism and Educational Sovereignty

As discussed above, academic freedom and institutional autonomy entail educational sovereignty which guarantees academics the freedom to decide what to research and teach, as well as how knowledge is created, disseminated, and applied. Educational sovereignty refers to the academics' freedom from the demands of laymen and the control and censorship of administrators. Academics should be entitled to professional autonomy to a substantial extent. Of course, educational sovereignty is inherently limited by performativity since academic freedom is earned through academic performance. However, our interview findings reveal that the educational sovereignty of Hong Kong academics is diminished in subtle ways, particularly under the ever-intensifying pressure of neoliberalism and managerialism. In an international survey on the changing academic professions, 72% of Hong Kong academics revealed that the management style is top-down. The figure is the second highest among the 18 systems surveyed in that international study (Lee 2011).

An associate professor from the Faculty of Arts, who recently retired, explained that before the neoliberal reform of the Hong Kong academic profession, he enjoyed more professional autonomy and a spirit of freedom:

> In the past we enjoyed much freedom in research. But now we need to go through many levels of assessment. Amid them there is also much auditing [sic]. Now research has been denatured. Moreover, universities are in the status of mutual competition, glorifying themselves over one another. All are ambitious to be number one. They are simply competing for the sake of competition (associate professor, Faculty of Arts).

This audit culture affects educational sovereignty. A part-time teaching consultant in our research interview commented that there is too much jargon in official

documents for communicating learning outcomes, assessment criteria, and marking rubrics. An associate professor of the Faculty of Arts criticized the practice of students evaluating teaching because it confuses cause and effect. This practice produces a vicious cycle whereby professors lower standards and expectations because they worry about students' negative evaluation due to demanding coursework. In turn, the quality of university education – what students should have learned – is adversely affected. Offering a diagnostic point of view, an interviewee said:

> I think teaching evaluations (TEs) can help sort out some extreme cases. But indeed for those extreme cases, be they very bad or very good teachers, we can see them and know them even without TEs. Therefore, I think it is unnecessary to conduct TEs if it is only very structural and mechanical in nature (associate professor who previously served as department head, Faculty of Architecture).

In terms of how research is conducted and disseminated to interdisciplinary colleagues, some academics in Hong Kong enjoy less educational sovereignty than others. An interviewee explained:

> Take the case of the Chinese language, the targeted audience is Chinese societies. But if you aim at publishing in the international journals overseas, it is "impossible." The readership of those international journals is not mainly from the Chinese world [sic], therefore they are less likely to accept your manuscripts, or feel interested in your research. In cases where your research is on Chinese language, but you use English to convey your research findings, that creates a barrier of communication. And when you teach them [your findings], you need to translate them back into Chinese. … It is not effective at all! Isn't it better to use the same language to communicate research findings for research on languages and literature? (former associate professor, Faculty of Arts).

Another factor which has recently emerged which affects the educational sovereignty of Hong Kong's higher education institutions is the powerful trend of "mainlandization" on Hong Kong campuses. A former associate professor from a Faculty of Architecture revealed that in the context of post-colonial Hong Kong, objective advice and professional judgment can be politicized and distorted. Although there is no official evidence for the following particular issue, many professors worry about a controversial issue which arose in a local university. One of our interviewees explained this anxiety as follows:

> Because the university president is a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, he found a person of the "same color" [meaning same political orientation] to join the center of China Studies. At that time, a lot of people had already explained that the national education [system] could not be implemented [in Hong Kong], yet he insisted on doing so. It was because he wanted to please the officials in the authorities [sic]. If you are a genuine scholar, and if you truly hold no biased view, how could you use the mainland ways of interpretation and mindset to make sense of Hong Kong's education and pedagogy? If he was true to academic research, the issue would not have been messed up so severely (former associate professor and department head, Faculty of Architecture).

Educational sovereignty also safeguards academics by allowing them to decide what kind of students to admit to higher education institutions. Yet given the huge market of mainland Chinese students who seek further studies in Hong Kong as a prestigious education hub in the region, Hong Kong universities may admit more

mainland students than the optimal number, especially for self-financed programs (usually at the master's level). A full-time native Hong Kong student who was studying at a self-financed master's program commented that in actuality internationalization at his university is played out as de-localization or, more specifically, mainlandization. In his class of about 25 students, more than half of the students are from mainland China, with a few foreign students (one Greek, one South African, one British, one American). Apparently, the expansion of self-financed programs and the quest for internationalization has brought a paradoxical result, that is, mainlandization of Hong Kong. It occurs partly as a result of academic capitalism, and academics do not have a say on this issue.

Educational sovereignty and academic freedom are increasingly under siege, especially since the Umbrella/Occupy Movement of 2014. This movement was organized and supported by many university academics and students (although a majority of Hong Kong academics were not active in expressing their opinions and taking part in the Movement). Since then, some top-down control measures, including termination of contract renewal or refusal of promotion to key leadership positions, were imposed on a number of politically active and outspoken academics, with a view to limiting academic freedom in Hong Kong (Carrico 2018). State-connected community leaders were appointed to important leadership roles, for instance, the chairperson of the university council who governs university management (Lo 2018). One of the most disputable examples was the appointment of Dr. Arthur Li Kwok Cheung as the Council Chairman of the University of Hong Kong and the subsequent decision on the appointment of Vice-President and Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Academic Staffing and Resources) in 2015. The accusation was that this case resulted in the increasing control of Hong Kong university councils regarding staff appointment with a view toward political censorship. Further research is called for to examine whether there has been an ethos of self-censorship among Hong Kong academics with regard to researching and/or teaching politically sensitive topics.

Despite the endangerment of educational sovereignty of Hong Kong's academic profession, university academics are not keen on participating in university governance through unionization. A former department head from the Faculty of Architecture admitted that he himself was not enthusiastic and was fully aware of this matter; and he thought that there were sufficient channels for academics to voice their opinions. Explaining his lukewarm participation in unionization, he said:

> I think the reason is relatively complex. For some academics like me, we are already very busy with the service work for other professional communities outside the university. If the University approaches us and expects us to participate in some committees, we try our best to cooperate. But talking about involving [ourselves] further in the university committee services, I myself will not do so…. This is perhaps because we are a professional department…. I already engage in service for the government and other organizational boards, I cannot manage to extend my involvement (associate professor and former department head Faculty of Architecture).

Therefore, who is afraid of educational sovereignty and thus academic freedom (Bilgrami and Cole 2015) and who should be concerned about it more? Surveying

the history and contemporary realities of higher education worldwide, Altbach (2015) argues that academic freedom has always been contested by discourses and debates outside the academic profession, instead of forces from within. When professionals inside the higher education sector are less interested, less enthusiastic, or even afraid of articulating the definition and core principles of academic freedom amidst the increasing external demand of academic capitalism accountability, it becomes more challenging for it to be protected.

6.4.4 Conflicts Between Academic Roles and Public Intellectual Roles

Hao and Guo's (2016) study on professors in China (see Chap. 4) argues that professors as intellectuals have multifaceted identities and engage in synchronic political roles as established/organic, non-establishment/professional, and contra-establishment/critical intellectuals, although most take on the first two roles. The established/organic intellectuals take their priority status role as organic to the state while acknowledging their occasional synchronic role of dissent. The non-establishment/professional intellectuals keep their distance from politics. They focus on their professional and academic work and perform their organic and critical role occasionally. The contra-establishment/critical intellectuals are viewed as public intellectuals that serve as the conscience of society and openly air their concerns about social justice in China.

Indeed, the critical role is the most difficult to perform, even in Hong Kong. Professors in Hong Kong are severely criticized by pro-government forces if they make public comments deviating from the Central government's statements on Hong Kong social and political issues. For example, in April 2018, Benny Tai, Associate Professor of Law from the University of Hong Kong, received a barrage of criticism for his discussion on the possible formats of independence for Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party-owned newspaper, *The People's Daily,* called on the Hong Kong government to take legal action against Tai under Hong Kong's existing criminal law. A Hong Kong government spokesperson said that the Hong Kong government "strongly condemns" Tai's remark. Forty-one pro-establishment Hong Kong legislators made public statements calling for Tai's dismissal from his university post (Leung and Sharma 2018, April 6). Professors who are politically active (especially those who participated in the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement) receive serious condemnation from pro-China media. Some of them have even been removed from their university positions. For example, in March 2015, Dr. Horace Chin Wan-kan, Assistant Professor of Chinese at Hong Kong's Lingnan University, received a letter from the president of his university saying that his activism "severely hurt the reputation of Lingnan." Dr. Chin was subsequently removed from his university post (Sharma 2018, January 26).

Apparently, what professors can teach in the classroom and what they can do in public are severely restricted. Professors, as intellectuals, encourage their students to develop independent and critical thinking in their teaching subjects. The antithesis of this is that if they practice what they have been teaching regarding sensitive social or political issues, they are ridiculed for doing so. They even receive punishment for their critical comments and actions. The two incidents mentioned in the previous paragraph, and many other cases, happened to Hong Kong academic staff who felt a strong force from pro-government groups that urged professors to stay strictly within their academic roles. Pro-government groups prefer professors in Hong Kong to focus on their duty of creating and divulging knowledge by engaging in research and teaching within the academic framework. If professors engage themselves in the role of a public intellectual, they will be discredited, and they may be disqualified from their professional role. This is most likely associated with pressure from the authorities in Beijing to try to limit academic freedom and bring academia under their control.

6.5 Conclusion

The Hong Kong case indicates that performativity is calculated with overemphasized quantifiable measurements. The university evaluation system is predominantly shaped by global rankings, cost-effective evaluation criteria, and a goal-oriented and administrative-led managerial mentality. Market rationality, managerialism, and an entrepreneurial mode of governance have brought deep and negative effects to the autonomy of professorial roles and hence educational sovereignty and academic freedom. The majority of academics in our study have experienced unrelenting pressure to publish material in western-dominated, English-language journals. Their teaching duties were put aside because good performance in classrooms does not contribute much to career mobility within the current reward system. Within this context, our research found that the lack of whole-hearted commitment to students is a common problem across departments and faculties. This is a result of the negative influence of academic capitalism on academic freedom in terms of what to teach and how to teach.

A “new normal” appears to be emerging in terms of the professional practices of Hong Kong’s academics. Problematically, participation in civic and social movements, especially those not in line with the government’s nationalist agenda, are judged as unprofessional and decried as going beyond the professional duties of research and teaching. In the two decades after the founding of the Hong Kong SAR, when academic freedom and institutional autonomy were threatened, various stakeholders in Hong Kong society, including activist students (Tang 2014b), would come together to collectively defend both freedom and autonomy. Independent institutional or judicial reviews would be engaged. Now, as Hong Kong SAR continues into its third decade, new governing practices seem to be normalized, resisting any social and political reform. Hong Kong’s academics are starting to adapt to

the new normal without much protest, seeing and believing that protests against the powerful might be futile. As society is being polarized into pro-democracy versus pro-establishment/national camps, universities fail to function as a place where the truth is pursued, deliberated, and defended and academics fail in their role as public intellectuals.

Who does a university represent? What are the mission and vision of a university? Why is educational sovereignty essential for a university to fulfill its mission and vision? There is an urgent call in international academic communities to rethink these fundamental and important questions in this era when universities fall under the influence of globalized academic capitalism and the commercialization and corporatization discussed in this book. This chapter takes universities in Hong Kong as a case study and argues that academic freedom is under siege in this energetic, entrepreneurial city as elsewhere. Our case study in Hong Kong highlights the escalating pressures on intellectual work and the increasing alienation among both professionals and students.

Our research found that varying degrees of anxiety, resentment, disgruntlement, and discontent among university communities have been simmering. In this current era, academic "freedom" appears to be in danger of being largely confined only to the freedom to excel performatively within the strict limits of a corporatized and commercialized capitalist system. When structural forces intertwine with and compound each other to produce deep and far-reaching effects that are often beyond the control of the individual actors, including university leaders, what is next for the future of educational sovereignty and the international academic profession?

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Chapter 7
In Search of a Professional Identity and Academic Freedom: Higher Education in Macau and the Academic Role of Faculty

Zhidong Hao

Situated at the west of the Pearl River estuary opposite Hong Kong, Macau has a population of over 650,000. Semi-colonized by Portugal in 1553, Macau was returned to China in 1999 and since then has been under the "One country, Two systems" arrangement with mainland China, operating on a capitalist system rather than the current socialism-based one of mainland China. Macau has inherited from the Portuguese a political system that is semi-democratic and predominantly authoritarian, which meshes well with Chinese authoritarianism. Such a political system will inevitably have an impact on its colleges and universities and consequently on a faculty's professional identity and their academic freedom.[1]

With a relatively short history of higher education, faculty professionalization has never developed in Macau as it has in the West. Macau's first higher educational institution (HEI), the College of St. Paul, established by missionaries in 1594, was closed in 1762, and attempts to build colleges did not succeed until 1981 when Macau's major university, the University of East Asia, was built. At present there are ten post-secondary schools of different orientations and sizes, most of them focused on vocational training.

What is the Macau faculty's professional identity, what is their academic freedom like, and how do they experience decision-making and thus control? What are

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[1] For an introduction to Macau and its brief history of higher education in the following pages, see also Zhidong Hao (2017).

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the political, cultural, and individual obstacles to the development of academic professionalism and freedom? In the following pages, I will (1) briefly introduce the key features of higher education in Macau, especially as related to issues of faculty professionalization; (2) define the professional identity of faculty; (3) introduce the method of my qualitative research, i.e., a case study of faculty at a university in Macau; (4) report the findings, illustrating how faculty experience decision-making, and discuss the structural, cultural, and individual factors influencing the formation of faculty's professional identity; (5) conclude, emphasizing the role of individual faculty members in enhancing their professional identity and academic freedom.

In-depth studies on higher education in Macau are rare, and rarer is the study of faculty's professional identity and academic freedom. This study fills a gap in this intellectual pursuit and has some important implications for both policymakers and practitioners in Macau and elsewhere regarding the status of the academic profession.

7.1 Some Key Features of Higher Education in Macau

The short history of higher education in Macau has not allowed much time for faculty professionalization. The College of St. Paul (sometimes called the St. Paul University College), financed by the Portuguese king and the city senate and supplemented by donations from other Catholics and lay people, has left little legacy. The college was small, with fewer than 100 students and 10 teachers and taught languages, including Latin, Japanese, and Chinese, theology, philosophy, ethics, and arts. Later physics, astronomy and medicine were added (Li 2001: 79–87, 109, 137–39). The college was closed in 1762 as a result of the Rites Controversy when Jesuits were arrested and transported to Portugal.

For over 200 years, the Portuguese Macau government did not establish another HEI. In 1900–1904, Gezhi College moved to Macau but did not last long. Chinese scholars then established Huaqiao (overseas) University (1950), Huanan (south China) University (1950), Yuehai Wen Shang (humanities and business) College (1949), and Zhongshan College of Education (Zhongshan Jiaoyu Xueyuan) (1950), but they soon closed for lack of both social and political support. Students had to go elsewhere for their college education (Lau 2002; Ma 2010). In 1981, some Hong Kong businessmen were able to convince the Macau government to allow them to establish the University of East Asia (UEA), mainly a market-oriented and commercialized business school (Ma 2010: 33).

Things changed in 1988 when the government purchased UEA and changed its name to the University of Macau (UM). Humanities, science, technology, and the social sciences were gradually introduced. Meanwhile, other colleges and universities were established. Table 7.1 is a summary of the colleges and universities currently in Macau, including the date of their establishment and the number of students and faculty as of 2012/2013.

From the names of the HEIs in Macau in Table 7.1, one can see that most of them, MPI, IFT, KWNCM, MSFSS, MIM, and MMC, are focused on vocational training. That raises the question of the mission of higher education, but most

Table 7.1 HEIs in Macau as of 2012/2013

	Year established	Number of students as of 2013 (full- time unless specified)	Number of faculty members as of 2013 (both part time and full time)	Ownership of the school
University of Macau (UM)	1981 (UEA) 1991 (UM)	8,481	598	Public
Macau Polytechnic Institute (MPI)	1991	2,961	351	Public
Institute for Tourism Studies (IFT)	1995	1,573	109	Public
Macau Security Force Superior School (MSFSS)	1988	73	42	Public
City University of Macau (CityU)	1992 (AIOU)[a] 2011 (CityU)	1,296 + 482 (part-time)=1778	109	Private
University of St. Joseph (USJ)	1996 (IIUM)[b] 2009 (USJ)	1,684	145	Private
Kiang Wu Nursing College of Macau (KWNCM)	1999	246+59 (part-time)=305	32	Private
Macau University of Science and Technology (MUST)	2000	10,365	466	Private
Macau Institute of Management (MIM)	1984	362 (part-time)	38	Private
Macau Millennium College (MMC)[c]	2001	194	26	Private

Sources of data: Mark Bray et al., with Roy Butler, Philip Hui, Ora Kwo & Emily Mang (2002), *Higher Education in Macau*, pp. 19–26; Tertiary Education Services Office of Macau government (2013), *Tertiary Education Services Office Annual Book 2012*

[a]AIOU: The Asia International Open University (Macau), the previous name of CityU

[b]IIUM: The Inter-University Institute of Macau, a joint initiative by the Catholic University of Portugal and the Diocese of Macau now called USJ

[c]The Macau Millennium College's Chinese name is Zhong Xi Chuangxin Xueyuan (Sino-Western Innovation College), under the auspices of SJM (Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, S.A.), a corporation whose main business is gambling

importantly the identity and calling of the faculty. If vocational training is the main goal of higher education, one might not expect much academic training of the faculty. Thus we see in Table 7.2 that a large percentage of faculty in Macau's HEIs work on a part-time basis and do not have a PhD.

More than a third of college and university faculty in Macau have little job security as part-timers and about half, as indicated by the lack of a PhD, are not fully

Table 7.2 The number of full-time and part-time faculty and those without a PhD degree 2012/2013

	Full-time	Part-time	% of part-time faculty	% of faculty members without a PhD
University of Macau (UM)	524	74	12%	30%
Macau Polytechnic Institute (MPI)	232	119	34%	60%
Institute for Tourism Studies (IFT)	73	36	33%	71%
Macau Security Force Superior School	2	40	95%	70%
City University of Macau (CityU)	48	61	56%	41%
University of St. Joseph (USJ)	68	77	53%	69%
Kiang Wu Nursing College of Macau	21	11	34%	66%
Macau University of Science and Technology (MUST)	275	191	41%	52%
Macau Institute of Management	5	33	87%	85%
Macau Millennium College	5	21	81%	35%
Total			35%	49%

Source of data: Tertiary Education Services Office of Macau government (2013), *Tertiary Education Services Office Annual Book 2012*, pp. 119

professionalized. They therefore do not enjoy the kind of professional autonomy and academic freedom faculty are assumed under Western traditions to enjoy. Moreover, there is no tenure system in Macau, so one can argue that even full-time faculty have no job security and consequently do not enjoy much academic freedom. Dismissals rarely happen, but in 2014 two full-time professors were sacked partly because of their political views (Hao 2014). If full-time faculty with PhDs can be dismissed for political reasons, part-time faculty are especially vulnerable.

But what is academic freedom and how is it linked to academic professional identity?

7.2 Academic Freedom and Professionalism: An Academic Identity

In China, professionalism did not come into being until after the self-strengthening movement in the 1860s when technical intellectuals began to grow. Peking University, a modern HEI, was established only in 1898. Faculty governance (or shared governance) and academic freedom, both indicators of academic professionalism and identity, were introduced at Peking University in the early twentieth century by Cai Yuanpei, the university president (1912–1927). A faculty senate (教授会) and faculty governance committee (行政会) were established. The faculty senate's job was to design academic policies and assess academic qualities, and the faculty governance committee would serve like a board of trustees, assessing and making policies both academic and beyond (Du 2017). However, since then the

faculty governance role has been markedly diminished under the authoritarianism of the Nationalist Party, Mao Zedong's dictatorship, and authoritarianism since the Deng Xiaoping era. Presently, authoritarianism is the order of the day in both mainland China and Macau, severely limiting a tradition of professionalism and academic freedom, the major guarantee of quality in higher education.

What is professionalism anyway? In this paper I assume professionalism as a universal value and will use the development of professionalism in the USA as a comparison point. The sociology of professions has long considered the meaning of professionalism and professionalization (Abbott 1988; Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994; Brint 1994; Clark 2008; Collins 1990; Freidson 1970; Hao 2003; Larson 1977). The professionalism of college teaching, i.e., the creation and transmission of knowledge (see also the discussion of Kant and Durkheim in Chap. 2), may be what Clark (2008: 319) regards as the logic or identity of the profession. It is the social function discharged by the professional scholar, according to the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) (Gerber 2014: 52), and a calling, as Clark (2008: 325–26) observes, that "transmutes narrow self-interest into other-regarding and ideal-regarding interests: one is linked to fellow workers and to a version of a larger common good. It has moral content, contributing to civic virtue." Here the professor finds "the fascinations of research and the enchantments of teaching," or "the demon who holds the very fibers" of his or her very life, and "the rewards of personal fulfillment and a sense of societal service."

To fulfill this academic calling, i.e., the creation of scientific knowledge and education as "the cornerstone of the structure of society," whose progress is "essential to civilization," "the professorial office should be one both of dignity and of independence" (AAUP 2001, 294; see also Weber 1973). This means that faculty needs to have academic freedom and the means to exercise that freedom. In 1915, when the AAUP was established, its first job was to define academic freedom. Its 1940 statement on academic freedom is a classic: (1) the freedom to do research and publish the results; (2) the freedom to discuss subject matter in the classroom; and (3) the freedom to write and speak as citizens without institutional censorship or unwanted sanction (AAUP 2001; Gerber 2014; Ruch 2001; Teichler et al. 2013).

As is also discussed in Chap. 2 in a 1957 statement, American Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter defined the "four essential freedoms" of a university as: the freedom to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it should be taught, and who may be admitted to study (cited in Thelin 2004). More importantly, these matters are reserved for the direct control of the faculty, not for either the president or the trustees (Birnbaum and Eckel 2005).

To guarantee academic freedom in the terms outlined above, shared governance has developed, where faculty play an important role in core academic areas like recruitment of new faculty, tenure and promotion, and academic programing. Faculty should enjoy "a large degree of autonomy from lay control and normal organizational control" (Clark 2008: 123) in relation to the trustees of the governing board and the administrators of colleges and universities (see also Pennock et al. 2015). "The governing board and president should, on questions of faculty status [the recruitment of new faculty, promotion, and dismissal], as in other matters where

the faculty has primary responsibility [educational policies], concur with the faculty judgment except in rare instances and for compelling reasons which should be stated in detail" (AAUP 2001: 221). Although the selection of academic deans and other chief academic officers is the responsibility of the president, it should be done "with the advice of, and in consultation with, the appropriate faculty" (AAUP 2001: 219).

The process of achieving shared governance is the process of professionalization, i.e., establishing mechanisms that will foster the identity and calling of the profession and guarantee its autonomy "in selecting the economic terms of work, the location and social organization of work, and the technical content of the work" (Freidson 1970: 44). This negotiation of professional autonomy or academic freedom is usually done between professional associations and other stakeholders in higher education. AAUP, for example, "has been engaged in developing standards for sound academic practice and in working for the acceptance of these standards by the community of higher education" and by the society in general, including the state (AAUP 2001: ix).

Academic professionalization is thus a process of constantly defining the boundaries of academic freedom and defending faculty autonomy. In the USA, for example, one survey found that between 1970 and 2001 those who reported either faculty determination or joint control with administrators in the recruitment of new faculty members rose from 31% to 73%, and those who reported substantial faculty control over tenure and promotion decisions rose from 36% to 71% (for the statistics in this and the following paragraph, see Gerber 2014: 159–160). Those who reported substantial faculty control over the curriculum and degree requirements rose from 80% to 90%.

Faculty determination or joint authority in the selection of department chairs rose from 22% in 1970 to 54% in 2001. Only 4% said that faculty had no role at all. However, the faculty influence in the selection of deans and vice presidents and presidents was small, 32% in 2001, although still an increase from 14% in 1970, with only 5% saying that faculty played no role at all. Moreover, more than 90% of the institutions surveyed had some kind of senate, chaired mostly by an elected faculty member. This could mean "fully collaborative decision making" or "simple consultation" or "information sharing" (Gerber 2014: 160).

Granted that faculty power in the USA has been eroded to some extent in the last decade (see Chap. 2), university teaching in the USA is still a very strong profession, and it is fair to assume that in general professors in the USA enjoy more academic freedom than in most other parts of the world. Thus, to use faculty governance as developed in the USA as an indicator of professional identity development in Macau would help us see more clearly the status of the academic profession and identity of the professor. That is what I will do below.

7.3 A Note on Our Research Methods

The university studied, hereafter called the University, has both undergraduate and graduate programs and a fairly large faculty. Most of the faculty members are recruited internationally. A majority have a Chinese cultural background, but they tend to be returned students from the West, who were professionalized in the West before they came to Macau. The University can be characterized as a "striving" institution (Gonzales et al. 2014): it places great emphasis on improving its position in international university rankings, has made great investment in recruiting productive researchers, and has distributed a huge amount of money for research. Research support and most faculty benefits are in general superior to many in the UK or the USA.

The research team interviewed faculty members, administrators, and students, altogether 44 from the University: 9 assistant professors, 8 associate professors, 10 full professors, 6 administrators, and 11 students, both undergraduate and graduate. Most interviews lasted from one to one and a half hours, but several lasted for 2 h, and a couple of interviews were through emails. We also interviewed three professors from three other institutions of higher education to give us a sense of conditions elsewhere in the region. The interviews were done in professors' offices or cafes between 2013 and 2014.

I have not set out to look for deviant cases to refine or reconstruct the theory of university governance, neither in analyzing the case University nor in reporting individual faculty members' points of view (see Small 2009 about such methodological issues). The ultimate purpose of the paper is to examine the mechanisms and processes of professionalization or the lack thereof in a striving university. This method is in line with Clyde Mitchell's and Michael Burawoy's extended case method, which seeks to uncover social mechanisms, to trace processes, and to understand the larger forces shaping those mechanisms and processes, whether in unique or in deviant cases (see Small 2009).

The research methods used here are also in line with Robert Yin's (1989) principle of sequential interviewing in that each case in our study (i.e., each interviewee) "provides an increasingly accurate understanding of the question at hand" (Small 2009, 24–25). I have used a similar set of questions with different stakeholders, but they have all focused on the role of faculty in research, teaching, and service, from the perspective of various professors as well as students. Interviews were conducted more like discussions, explorations, and explanations than questions and answers. The objective is saturation, i.e., team members are fairly confident that the cases we have studied have provided us with most if not all the necessary information regarding the status of professionalism in the region.

7.4 Findings and Discussion

7.4.1 The Role of Faculty in Personnel Matters

As discussed above, professionalization in the form of shared governance means that the faculty play a crucial role in the recruitment of new faculty members and in promotion. Normally, the dean and the president are not involved directly in the processes and will go along with committee decisions. For the dean or the president to disapprove of a candidate without compelling reasons would be a serious violation of shared governance and an encroachment on professional autonomy and academic freedom. However, in our case University, while faculty members may be involved in the selection of job candidates, the rectors (presidents) can, and sometimes do, reject job candidates approved by the faculty level committees usually headed either by a dean or a vice president. (Since all the academic deans, vice presidents and the president were men at the time of research, I will use "he" to refer to any one of them.) This has caused discomfort among faculty, as one professor comments (Interview Notes, Full5):

> The rector is too micro-managing. When we hire a faculty member, even if this is only an assistant professor, he would use his veto power. But are you qualified to make such decisions? What are your fields of study? You cannot possibly know every field, right?

Usually the reasons given are either that the candidate does not come from a prestigious university or he or she does not have enough publications. Whatever the reason, the faculty role is diminished.

Deans also have much more power than in the USA and Europe in general. They decide the composition of the recruitment and promotion committees; the identities of the members and how they are selected are not public. At the meetings, the administrator directs where the discussion goes (Interview Notes, Full10). Faculty's, especially junior faculty's, voices are seldom heard, if ever (Interview Notes, Assis1, Assoc1). The dean, in consultation with the rector, decides which department can have new hires and what kind. Sometimes the rector or vice rector makes that decision directly with the department chair with little consultation with the dean. The dean decides whether one's promotion application can even be processed, his power expanding especially when the criteria are not clear (Interview Notes, Assoc2). Professors thus do not have real autonomy in choosing their own colleagues as academic professionalization and freedom would require. Rather the dean is often the person who decides the composition of the department, and sometimes it is the rector who makes that decision.

Rather than faculty determination or joint authority in the selection of department chairs (see also Interview Notes, Admin2, Assoc5), in our case University, these are appointed by the dean and the rector with no consultation with the faculty. Because of the lack of faculty participation in selecting department chairs, people feel less of an attachment to the department, and the department chairs feel they have more responsibility to the management than to the faculty and students. The

same problem applies to the higher management positions. The appointment of deans, vice rectors, and the rector may go through an open international search. Faculty members may be invited to presentations and give their opinions, but it is not clear how much their comments count (Interview Notes, Assoc4, Assoc5, Full2). Many believe that participation is only a formality (Interview Notes, Assoc2, Full5).

With the mainlandization of Macau, it is not even clear whether the selections of higher-level managers will go through an international search and involve faculty participation, let alone lower-level managers. In its most recent selection of the rector position, for example, no faculty member was invited to be part of the selection committee. It was not clear if even more than one candidate was invited to a campus interview. Even though the committee held meetings to ask for faculty opinion, it was not at all clear whether any faculty opinions mattered. As a result of such selection methods, the managers are obligated to serve the will of the higher authorities rather than the need of faculty and students. We will discuss further the problem of mainlandization later in the chapter.

7.4.2 The Role of Faculty in Research and Teaching Policies

Professors at the University are required to publish in SCI, SSCI, and A&HCI journals so that they can increase the University's citation indexes in its pursuit of world rankings. These requirements are not usually negotiated with the faculty and furthermore are driven very much by a science-based model (Interview Notes, Full1) not fully applicable to humanities and social sciences. As one professor says (Interview Notes, Full1),

> I don't write many journal articles. I write books, I write chapters of books, occasionally, unlike journal articles. And for me it's not very interesting to write journal articles. It has limited impact. But if a book is well received, it can have considerable impact. But in the science field books are of second grade.

He complains that his books and book chapters are not worth as much as a journal article. Others point out that although books are representations of one's system of knowledge (Interview Notes, Assoc2, Assis2, Assoc2), they are not valued, since they do not count in international rankings.

The University not only emphasizes journal articles but requires that they be in English and published by international publishers, especially for junior and middle-level faculty members. Most international journals are not very interested in publishing research on Macau. But that's not the university's concern. The editor of one of the top journals in China studies once told me that he is not interested in publishing Macau studies since it will not help his citation indexes. One professor tells us that even scholarly research on Chinese literature must be written in English in order to be recognized as important. This is like requiring an American university paper on Shakespeare to be written in Chinese to be considered valuable research.

Local studies must be published internationally, too, or they are not given much credit (Interview Notes, Assoc6). Works published locally in Chinese are not counted by international rating regimes and are therefore rarely valued by the administrators (see also Interview Notes, Full2) who make their decisions top-down. Faculty protests are usually futile. In a word, faculty may be free to do whatever research they want to do, but they feel less free to publish their findings in whatever venues they choose.

The pursuit of rankings has not only forced the faculty to change the way they do their work but has also resulted in a change of values and professional identity. In order to increase the production of indexed journal articles, faculty members are assigned to research, balanced, or teaching tracks. Each track carries an indexed journal paper production quota. Faculty unable to fulfill the quota are bumped down to a lower track to teach more courses, which is often viewed as a punishment, thus eroding the core values of education, rendering teaching more or less meaningless and depriving teachers of their sense of calling and professional identity. As a result, traditional teachers "feel very very depressed, demoralized." "The university ranking might have risen, but the idea of the university is lost. Humanism is lost. People's respect for you is lost" (Interview Notes, Full3). Furthermore, dividing professors against their own desires into three classes—researchers, researchers/teachers, and teachers—makes it harder to build an academic community. It goes against "von Humboldt's concept of the university, where teaching and research are integrally linked—the Humboldtian model has been the guiding principle of the American research university since the beginning" (Altbach and Finkelstein 2014).

Finally, program changes and creations are basically decided by administrators, rather than being bottom-up proposals based on what faculty believe to be educational needs (Interview Notes, Full10). An academic program is initiated or approved because the managers believe it is useful to their own purposes, such as university rankings or government needs, rather than what faculty believe to be educational or social needs.

As Chaps. 2, 4, and 5 point out, ideological control in China is very much strengthened. That has a ripple effect in Macau. For example, the faculty have to get approval from the management when they invite guest speakers from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Professors who lean toward Taiwan independence or Hong Kong autonomy are often denied entry into Macau at the customs. Faculty members on research trips to Taiwan are required to report to the university authorities whom they have met and what they have done. In both research and teaching policies, the faculty are deprived of participation in much of the decision-making processes, and their professional status and academic freedom are very much strained.

7.4.3 Faculty Involvement in University Governance Organizations

The senate (at the university level) and the academic council (AC, at the faculty/college level) at our case University are only advisory bodies, according to the University's organizational charter published in 2013. The issues involving ACs are strictly about curricular changes (abolition and creation of programs, program revision) and student education (qualifications of graduate and postgraduate students). Again decisions are made top-down, and only rubber-stamp approvals are sought at the AC meeting. Even if an initiative is raised bottom-up, the dean can refuse to take it to the AC meeting, since he is the chair of the AC and decides what will be on the agenda. "Resolutions" passed at the AC may go nowhere unless they involve minor decisions about things like course descriptions. As one administrator comments (Interview Notes, Admin5),

> Things started at the top and often it is just a gesture of giving the endorsement by the people, by the staff below without them having any real input in the decision. By the time to discuss them, it is already decided, you know, so the input of the staff doesn't mean a lot… This generates a lot of bad morale from people, because they feel like nobody really listens to them.

As a result, except in rare cases when the dean is more democratic, people seldom speak out at their AC meetings because they think that whatever they say is not going to be heeded anyway. One professor calls it "learned helplessness." The AC, faculty members say, is just like the National People's Congress on the mainland at which people's job is to raise their hands to endorse the Party decisions (Interview Notes, Full5; Interview Notes full6 for the same point).

There is a faculty association, but its role is limited to organizing year-end parties. It has made proposals to the University management regarding faculty welfare, but they have gone nowhere. It has not been able to influence personnel and educational policies at the University. The weakness of the faculty association mirrors the weakness of the student associations (Interview Notes, PhD1, UG3, UG4). There are faculty and university-level student associations. But even if they may participate in senate and AC meetings, they seldom speak. This inactivity on the part of both faculty and student organizations affects not only the professional identity of the professors but the identity of the university as well.

7.4.4 The Creation of a Docile Faculty and Study Body: The Opposite of a Professional Identity

The lack of shared governance described above has resulted in the creation of a docile and alienated faculty whose interests are constantly threatened as a result of their loss of autonomy and academic freedom. As one professor points out (Interview Notes, Full8):

> Because there is no tenure system, if you speak out, you may have your job in jeopardy, or various interests affected, just like in China. Who dares to speak? Younger faculty feel that they are too junior to speak out. Senior faculty want to protect the benefits they have already obtained. But of course, not speaking out is against everyone's interest.

Several other faculty members also say that the lack of tenure plays a key role in such docility (Interview Notes, Assoc3, Full6, Full8). This lack of professional protection leads to much discontent, mistreatment of faculty, low faculty morale, and alienation on the part of the faculty. And there is almost no recourse. A professor comments (Interview Notes, Full9):

> It's almost like they're being hit by a big truck or smashed on the ground because a dean or a department head does not like that individual and then that individual is crushed and the individual either seems to not know his rights or cannot find out what his rights are… There is no staff faculty association worth its mettle that could at least intervene on behalf of faculty and could say that we must have an appeals process, that we must have it clearly written what the rights and what the duties and what the obligations are of people, of faculty member, of staff, and of deans and department heads and all that…

Those who choose to speak out will do so at selected moments (Interview Notes, Assoc2). But in general, the faculty are docile, withdrawn, alienated, and demoralized despite being well-paid, with good benefits and conference and research grants (Interview Notes, Full9, Assoc2, Assoc3).

A docile and obedient faculty leads to a docile student body, as we have also mentioned above, and together they create a passive learning environment. There are no faculty or student forums on politically controversial issues. In 2008, the Macau government was going to legislate Article 23 of the Basic Law, a bill on state subversion. This was controversial because people were concerned about freedom of speech. Once the law was passed, what was allowed before might be considered as illegal. So some faculty members decided to organize a forum to discuss this matter, and they invited scholars from Hong Kong. Then just before the forum, they cancelled the event because the University said that the space that had been assigned to the forum was now unavailable. There has never been a forum on the true nature of the "One country, Two systems" formula, or the Hong Kong democracy movement. In the 2014 Hong Kong movement on universal suffrage, there was almost no voice coming from Macau colleges and universities. Students of communications at our case University did design a very professional flier and it was posted in several places on campus, voicing their support of the movement in Hong Kong. Some yellow ribbons were tied on the handrails of a bridge on campus. But such activities never became a movement – people did not even know who the leaders of these activities were. So their effect was very limited.

Two professors comment that students at the University do not have the ability to talk about politics (Interview Notes, Assis3). If protests are part of college life and education in the USA (Rivard 2014), that is not happening at our case University. One student's comment is apt here: the ethos of the university is harmony, not vitality (Interview Notes, MA1). The mission of the university is to train obedient workers rather than thinkers (see Interview Notes, Assis1, Assoc2, MA1, UG1). Increasingly the university generally approves only professors who follow the Party

line or who present on non-political topics to come to speak on campus. The lower-level managers quickly follow the cue. In 2017 a professor was inviting a controversial mainland scholar to speak on their academic forum. He asked the department chair to write an invitation letter, but the latter refused. Even if a meeting on a controversial topic such as the Cultural Revolution or national minority issues was held, the organizers would make sure that it was as low-key as possible. Academic freedom is eroded, the faculty is losing its identity and calling, and students are losing opportunities to learn to be critical thinkers.

7.4.5 Factors Affecting an Academic Professional Identity Formation

Given the issues of vocationalization, part-time employment and corporatized governance discussed above, what might be some of the political/structural, cultural, and individual factors that make it difficult for the faculty to form a professional identity and exercise academic freedom?

Chief among the political and structural factors is the influence of mainland China. Under the "One country, Two systems" principle, Macau is supposed to be a largely free society. Politically, however, it resembles China in its authoritarianism, although there are some limited democratic practices in the election of legislators and the Chief Executive (CE). In the so-called "executive-led" system, the CE has the power to make all the important decisions of the land. The legislature does not have the power to make laws but can only improve and approve bills submitted by the government. The CE is responsible to those who elect him, i.e., a 400-member committee, most of whom are pro-government representatives of social organizations, and to the Central government that appoints him. Increasingly the CE is required to answer to the Central government rather than to the people of Macau. This corresponds to the university system where the rectors are the decision makers and faculty have little or no role to play regarding university policies. The rectors answer to the Chief Executive, even to the Central government, and need not consult the faculty to make decisions.

If the mainland Chinese system does not allow for much academic freedom (see Chaps. 2, 4, and 5), professors in Macau feel the effect. For example, the Central government has an office in Macau, called the Central Liaison Office (CLO), which coordinates the relationship between Macau and the Central government. One interviewee reports that when they invited the Consul of the American Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macau to give a talk at the University, both the CLO and the Macau government were upset and told them next time to report such invitations beforehand (Interview Notes, Admin1). One faculty member reports that he heard that a student was paid by the CLO to record his class. Another faculty member reports that his relationship with Hong Kong and Macau democracy activists was

being investigated. A third faculty member reports that she and others were told by the government to stay quiet on controversial issues in Macau.

A student organization used to hold exhibitions in June of each year to commemorate the 1989 student democracy movement in China, but they stopped the practice several years ago when student organizers were called to meet officials from the CLO to talk about it (Interview Notes, Full10). They were also asked about what professors discussed in class. Some student organizers were from mainland China and had family members who were civil servants there. They were afraid that their activities in Macau would harm the opportunities of their family members back home.

Apparently there is a concerted effort in controlling what happens on campus. The mainland government is increasingly concerned about the political inclinations and activities of faculty and students in Macau for fear that Macau would become Hong Kong. As a result, self-censorship is now on the rise, and faculty and students are becoming more docile.

Increasing political control in Macau culminated in the dismissal of two professors from two different universities in 2014, apparently for political reasons (Hao 2014). The reason for no contract renewal regarding one of them was ostensibly violating professional ethics to ask students to attend his political activities for extra credit. But the actual reasons were his political activities: the evidence the university presented included a letter of complaint about him passing out election fliers outside a high school and a newspaper article complaining that he should not comment on how the legislators should be elected. There were also reports on their investigation of his class assignments. It turned out that what he required was for students to attend 2 or 3 out of 12 political gatherings in Macau and to write a report for extra credit. And this was a political science class.

Another professor was fired because he commented that the CE did not have charisma. The rector said openly that the professor could not criticize the CE and comment on politics in Macau. That he was invited to go to a meeting in Portugal about Macau politics was also a reason for firing him. The lack of a tenure system only better serves that control. If the University is treated as a government department (Interview Notes, Admin1) as on the mainland, professional autonomy, identity, and academic freedom are likely to suffer. Professors are supposed to be free to teach the way they think appropriate and to participate in political activities off campus as long as such activities follow professional ethics.

Culturally, Macau is basically Chinese. If American culture supports faculty governance, the Chinese hierarchical culture does not. To conform to Confucianism, faculty obey the deans, deans obey the rector, the rector obeys the University Council (UC, or the board of trustees) chair, the UC chair obeys the CE of Macau, and the CE obeys the chief of China. They all have to say yes to their superiors (Interview Notes, Admin2).

One professor interviewed believes that this is in fact a mixture of Western management style and Eastern culture (Interview Notes, Assis6; see also Full6, Admin5). Indeed corporatization, part of academic capitalism (Gonzales et al. 2014; see also Chap. 2 and other chapters in the book), is on the rise in American higher education

and perhaps Macau university leaders have learned the Western corporate management style. In one professor's words, the management and faculty have combined the problematic elements of two cultures when they should be combining the best elements of both (Interview Notes, Full8).

That is a very interesting observation. So why have both administrators and faculty members chosen a system that largely goes against traditions of academic freedom and professionalism? That brings us to the last issue of analysis: individual factors.

One interviewee observes that those Chinese who have been bathed in American culture cannot wash their Chinese cultural traces away. Once they are back in China, their Chinese culture comes alive again, and the American culture fades (Interview Notes, Assoc6). Another interviewee comments that anyone [foreign teachers] who jumps into Chinese culture will be tainted (Interview Notes, Assis1).

Nevertheless, despite structural and cultural influences, it is individual managers who choose top-down management style and individual faculty members who choose whether and how to speak out. As one interviewee further explains (Interview Notes, Admin5):

> I am an American, I am an outsider, and I came here recognizing this is not America… That there are certain ways people censure themselves, given the realities the central government probably discourages parades or whatever, it is never… no one ever told me I don't do something, or I did something wrong, but on the other hand, I am not saying anything controversial. I just, maybe it is just stereotype or generalization that I just presumed it wasn't going to be the way when I was coming in… So different cultural tradition and different kind of political system, there is a different rule whether it is official or not official. And I am not saying that is good or I think it should be like that, there ought to be freedom of speech or of doing things, but I know that, you know, it is not… I am a visitor, it is not my country… I figure there are some tradeoffs, benefits and costs.

Indeed, if one is an American or Australian or Brit one learns to adapt to an authoritarian culture. This adaptation is easier for the faculty members who are trained abroad but have a Chinese background. Very few can escape from the political and cultural constraints.

When asked whether the faculty association should be more active in protecting faculty interests like class scheduling or track assignments, some association leaders' response is that after seeing what happened in the Cultural Revolution, etc., they hate politics and do not want to be troublemakers. Others, however, want to be more involved and more active (Interview Notes, Assis9). These are apparently individual choices. Most faculty members choose not to speak out at AC meetings, as we discussed above. But there are some people who do speak out, even though selectively. Some are afraid of joining the faculty association for fear of being viewed as troublemakers, potential enemies, the opposition (Interview Notes, Full9). But others do join. One dean or president is more democratic than another. These are individual choices.

It is true that structural/political and cultural factors greatly influence individual behavior, but ultimately it is individuals who make the choice to practice and obey top-down management style or to resist. And resistance need not be confrontational.

But given the general political atmosphere in China and Macau, academic freedom and professionalism on the part of faculty are going to be an uphill battle if some want to fight it.

7.5 Conclusions

To sum up, higher education in Macau has a relatively short history and is very much characterized by academic capitalism such as vocationalization, casualization of faculty, and political and commercial corporatization that reflect the nature of the government system in Macau and China. These are not conducive to the development of an academic professional identity. Our case study of one university illustrates how weak or no faculty shared governance erodes academic freedom and professional identity formation in terms of who to teach, what to teach, and how to teach. Such weakness can be the result of structural factors related to the hegemony of mainland China and to the executive-led political system of Macau, as well as to cultural factors related to a Confucian ethos. But both the political system and cultural constraints are made by individuals. So they can also be results of individual choices. The formation of a professional identity, or professionalization, and the extent to which academic freedom can be exercised are the aggregate outcome of individual decisions made by both the management and faculty.

What is the implication of this study, then? While it is difficult to change the structural factors, faculty themselves may have some room to maneuver in their own reactions and responses. Following Clark's (2008: 131) remark:

> When the faculty member feels that this sensitive right [pursuit of one's scholarly interests] is infringed, he will run up the banners of academic freedom and inquiry, or he will fret and become a festering sore in the body politic of the campus, or he will retreat to apathy and his country house, or he will make it known in other and greener pastures that he will listen to the siren call of a good offer.

That is a range of responses. In the face of political and cultural obstacles that hinder the formation of a professional identity and practice of academic freedom, some faculty members indeed choose to rediscover their purpose and assert themselves (see also Irvine 2012: 391) under the banner of professionalism, a professional identity, an academic calling, academic freedom, autonomy, and scientific pursuits. They organize and strive to build an academic community and shared governance. In Macau, though, such individuals are few and far between. Others choose passive resistance, symbolic compliance, professional pragmatism, various cunning maneuvers, and games-playing (Mok and Cheung 2011; Teelken 2012). Still others retreat to "learned helplessness," "just collect your pay and say nothing" (Interview Notes, Full6). A majority of the faculty members in Macau adopt these last two attitudes and behavior. An increasing number of professors at our case University have left the university or are actively looking for another job.

Whatever faculty members choose to do, it is a choice. It is true that faculty members can easily succumb to powerful structural and cultural forces, but as Gerber (2014: 168) points out, "faculty members themselves must bear some of the responsibility for the retreat from higher education's democratic purposes that has already occurred in American colleges and universities." The same is true of the faculty in Macau who are involved in building a "contemporary" university.

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Chapter 8
How Commercialization and Corporatization Affect Academic Freedom in Higher Education: A Case Analysis of a University in Taiwan

Emily Jin-Jy Shieh and Sheng-Ju Chan

8.1 Introduction

Academic freedom is the cornerstone of a university (Chang 2000). The fulfillment of a university's mission relies on academic freedom because the "institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good" and "the common good depends on the free search for truth and its free exposition" (American Association of University Professors, AAUP 2001, 3). According to AAUP in its 1940 statement, academic freedom should include "the freedom to do research and publish the results," "the freedom to discuss subject matter in the classroom," as well as "the freedom to write and speak as citizens without institutional censorship or unwanted sanction" (quoted in Hao 2015: 115). This means that university teachers should have full freedom to perform in research, teaching, and service for the common good.

But academic freedom can be affected when the government influences universities' independence through government budgets (Chang 2000). This might be the situation that Rhoades and Slaughter (2004: 38) describe as "the ascendance of neoliberal and neo-conservative politics and policies that shift government investment in higher education to emphasize education's economic role and cost efficiency. This shift has led governmental agencies to cut funding for public higher

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education…The combination of these cutbacks, along with competition among institutions, leads academic managers to play the leading role in advancing academic capitalism on campus...The salient factors in this shift are directly connected to the increasingly corporatized, top-down style of decision making and management in higher education."

In addition to the corporatization of higher education, Rhoades and Slaughter (2004: 37) also point out that "colleges and universities – particularly public colleges and universities faced with a major loss in state support – now develop, market and sell a wide range of products commercially in the private sector as a basic source of income." In other words, "higher education institutions are seeking to generate revenue from their core educational, research and service functions, ranging from the production of knowledge (such as research leading to patents) created by the faculty to the faculty's curriculum and instruction." This is commercialization of higher education. Thus commercialization and corporatization (C&C) are forces that influence universities' independence and eventually affect teachers' academic freedom in doing research, teaching and service.

However, the breadth and depth of this impact on different universities varies (Rhoades and Slaughter 2004). This chapter presents a case study of University T in Taiwan that was conducted to examine how C&C affect teachers' academic freedom and addresses the following questions: Are there any practices of C&C appearing in University T? If the answer is yes, what factors are present that have facilitated their occurrence? Does C&C affect teachers' academic freedom? Here, commercialization refers to efforts such as "patenting, spin-off companies, university-industry partnerships, increasing student tuition fees, student consumerism, privatization of higher education, and the increasing use of part-time faculty to save money"; and corporatization refers to the efforts such as "top-down management styles, assessment and rankings, and the erosion of faculty power in shared governance" (Hao 2015: 107). These definitions of the two terms are adopted in this case study in order to examine the actual situations present in University T.

8.2 Methodology

This research adopts a case-study approach making use of documentary analysis and interviews. Information was collected on the institution's mission, history, and evolution since the founding of the university, including enrollments, faculty profiles, funding sources, degrees awarded, and personnel practices. In order to preserve anonymity, some information that might disclose the institution's identity is not presented here.

We located faculty members to interview by searching university websites, including its online open class website and via recommendations from professors who were interviewed. Ten professors were identified via the websites, while 16 professors were recommended by others. In all, 26 professors, including 6 professors who also held positions of leadership in administrative sectors, were interviewed. We also invited students to participate in interviews through the Student

Table 8.1 Features of interviewees

Faculty			Students		
Category		Number	Category		Number
Position	Full professor	12	Position	Leader	3
	Associate	7			
	Assistant	6		Non-leader	14
	Instructor	1			
	Full-time	21	Region	Taiwan	14
	Part-time	5		Hong Kong	1
	With a leader role	6		Macau	1
	Without a leader role	20		Mainland China	1
Gender	M	19	Gender	M	9
	F	7		F	8
Length of teaching in the present university	1–3 years	5	Length of study in the present university	1 year	3
	4–10	5		2	5
	11–20	8		3	5
	21 or more	8		4 or more	4
Area	Science	10	Area	Science	8
	Social science	6		Social science	8
	Humanities	10		Humanities	1
Channel	Website	10	Level of Study	Undergraduate	10
				Master's	4
	Recommend	16		Ph. D	3

Union and other students or teachers. In all, 17 students were interviewed. Each interview lasted one to two hours, and the interviews were conducted from 20 December 2012 to 25 June 2013. Table 8.1 shows the features of interviewees according to gender, length of teaching/study, etc. Although the number of interviewees seems to be small when compared with the university's large population, we are confident about the sampling as it is quite representative of the various types of staff and students at the university.

The interview questions were comprised of five parts, namely, general information about the university, and questions on current research, teaching, service, and the future plans. The interview data was analyzed according to a framework that included the case's related background information, the causes and manifestation of C&C, and the impact of C&C on academic freedom. An 8-digit coding system for interview data was adopted – the first letter F stands for faculty and S for students. The number indicates the order of the interview. Two letters that follow refer to the ranks of faculty members – "fu" for full professor, "as" for assistant professor, and "ao" for associate professor; for students, "ug" refers to undergraduate, "ma" for Master's, and "ph" for Ph.D. students. The fifth and sixth letters indicate the fields – "sc" for science, "ss" for social science, and "hu" for humanities. The last two letters indicate the interviewees' position either leader (ld) or non-leader (nl). For example, F1fu.sc.ld represents the first interview data from a full professor in a

science field with a leader's role; F2as.ss.nl represents the second interview data from an assistant professor in social science field without a leader role; S1ug.ss.ld represents the first interview data from an undergraduate student in a social science field with a leader role.

8.3 Findings and Discussion

The major findings on the influence of C&C on academic freedom at University T are presented and discussed in this section. The context of University T, including basic information and its ethos in general, is presented first; we then describe the main forces of C&C at University T and the impact of C&C on academic freedom in teaching, research, and service.

8.3.1 An Overall View of Higher Education in Taiwan and University T

Taiwan is "located off the southeastern coast of China, at the western edge of the Pacific Ocean" (Ministry of Education [MOE] 2015a). It has a population of 23.40 million people and occupies an area of 36,193 square kilometers (Executive Yuan 2014). People in Taiwan enjoy a free, democratic, and safe society and pride themselves on their hospitality (MOE 2015a). Taiwan offers a variety of educational opportunities to its people that include formal education as well as continuing education (MOE 2015b). Taiwan has a large number of institutions of higher education so that almost every student can enroll in a university program nowadays. Table 8.2 shows the general information on higher education in Taiwan.

Table 8.2 General information on higher education in Taiwan

Feature		Description		
Type of institution	Universities	Public (45)	Private (82)	127
	Independent colleges	Public (1)	Private (13)	14
	Junior colleges	Public (2)	Private (10)	12
Study period of programs	Undergraduate	4 years		
	Master	1–4 years		
	Doctoral	2–7 years		
Population	Teachers	46,794		
	Students	1,244,822		
Annual expenditures	US$ 400 million			
Tuition fees per student per year	Public	NT$58,726 (US$1,817)		
	Private	NT$109,944(US$3,402)		

Source: From "Education in Taiwan"(Ministry of Education 2018, 26; 2019, 27) and "Data for the School Year 2018" (Department of Statistics 2019)

Taiwan's higher education, following a global trend, is encountering a large number of challenges. According to some scholars, the challenges mainly result from the following: (1) globalization; (2) increasing international competition; (3) marketization; (4) heavy financial costs due to the expansion of higher education; (5) the demands of quality higher education and accountability; (6) the increasing degree of freedom in university management; and (7) low birth rate (Chen 2012; Chou 2011; Gai 2004; MOE 2013; Tai 2015; Yung 2009).

According to Tai (2015), higher education in Taiwan is facing a crisis because of marketization, bureaucratization, and low birth rate. Quite a few institutions of higher education are facing the challenges of budget shortages and low student enrollment and might need to close. University mergers and closings are hot issues that have been discussed by higher education authorities. Many programs have already been closed due to low student enrollment. Many institutions now have to find their own ways to adapt and survive.

University T is a public research university in Taiwan. According to 2018 statistics, University T consists of 11 colleges, 54 departments, 126 graduate schools, 56 undergraduate programs, 120 master programs, and 103 doctoral programs, and it has 2,050 full-time and 2,095 part-time teachers. There are 31,747 students in total, including 16,604 undergraduate students, 11,682 graduate students, and 3,459 doctoral students. Most teachers are Taiwanese while 141 of the full-time teachers are from foreign countries. University T has a long history and traditions of academic freedom and university autonomy which were established by a previous president, Fu Sinian. It is one of the well-known public universities in Taiwan and boasts many alumni who hold important positions in Taiwanese society. Its students and faculty members are very competitive in comparison with other universities. The total annual research funding is about 5–6 billion Taiwanese dollars (30 NTBs equals one US dollar). Of this, in 2012, 85–90% was from the Ministry of Science and Technology [MOST] and other government sections, while 10–15% was from corporate bodies and industries (F1fu.sc.ld).

Students of University T were aware of their teachers' research areas. Some students learned about them from the university's websites (S16ph.ss.nl); others knew them because their teachers presented their research outcomes in class (S2ug.ss.nl, S3ug.sc.nl) or offered courses based on their research interests and outcomes (S1ug.ss.nl, S9ug.hu.nl). Some other students knew of them from the references in their teachers' course outlines or teaching materials (S7ug.sc.nl, S11ma.sc.ld). Both faculty members and students perceived a very open and free climate of teaching, learning, research, service, and social participation (e.g., F17ao.ss.nl, F18as.hu.nl, F21as.hu.nl, F23as.sc.nl, S1ug.ss.nl, S7ug.sc.nl, S17ph.ss.nl). University T does not define what and how its teachers need to do teaching, research, and service which it leaves to be decided by the teachers themselves (F1fu.sc.ld, F17ao.ss.nl, F18as.hu.nl, F21as.hu.nl, F23as.sc.nl). All faculty members and students who were interviewed perceived a high degree of freedom.

Generally speaking, relationships between teachers and students are very positive. Most teachers said they had good relationships with students and that conflicts between teachers and students rarely happen (F17ao.ss.nl, F21as.hu.nl, F23as.

sc.nl). Some faculty members mentioned that the Chinese culture of mutual respect might be the key to maintaining such positive relationships (F1fu.sc.ld, F4fu.ss.ld, F18as.hu.nl). Adding to that is the positive influence of a free atmosphere of teaching and learning (S16ph.sc.nl). University T also adopts a type of faculty governance with different levels of committees, such as the Academic Affairs Meeting (F1fu.sc.ld, F21as.hu.nl).

Overall, University T has a very strong tradition of faculty governance (autonomy) and academic freedom that was established by Fu Sinian in 1949. Ideas and practices derived from Fu have been upheld and maintained until today, according to interviewees.

The strong tradition of faculty governance results in setting up many different committees and a lot of meetings in practice. Any policies in relation to the university have to be discussed and then decided by the representatives from different faculties and departments (F7fu.hu.nl). Professors are also given the right to select their president and deans by way of forming different selection committees with representatives from different departments. When selecting a president, the university forms a selection committee with 15–21 representatives that includes two fifths of members from the university itself and other representatives from alumni, social justice people, and the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education 2012). For the selection of deans, a selection committee is required. For example, the selection committee of the College of Biological Resources and Agriculture for selecting its new dean should comprise 17 members that include 11 professors from its own college, 3 alumni, and 3 from other colleges. This system is to ensure that professors have the primary right to select the best candidate as their future leader at different management levels through a fair procedure.

8.3.2 Main Force of Commercialization

Since University T is a public university its management must be in accordance with policies and laws established by the government. The findings of this research show that the National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act has triggered processes of commercialization at University T that have also influenced academic freedom to some extent.

The expansion of higher education caused the reduction of the government's funding to universities (Lin 2011). To cope with this challenge, the Taiwanese government passed the National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act in 2001 to grant universities the right to establish their own endowment funds (National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act 2001). This Act, in fact, encourages universities to strive to generate their own funds.

Under the Act, it is legal to do income-generating business to some extent, including revenues from continuing education, education cooperation, renting onsite equipment to outside users, donation, and other activities (National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act 2001). University T makes good use of its

reputation and its human resources as well as its facilities and equipment to increase its income without increasing tuition fees. Some faculty members described the following phenomena on the campus:

> There are more fund-raising activities focusing on the university alumni and corporations, sometimes reciprocated by naming new buildings with the donor's names. For example, there are more tall buildings appearing on campus; the donations from alumni are increasing. There are more restaurants on campus and some site equipment is rented to outside users (F17ao.ss.nl).
>
> You can see many 7–11s (convenience stores) and coffee shops on campus. Our university adopts commercialized ways to increase income including car park renting. If you want to park your car, you need to pay for it (F18as.hu.nl).
>
> Nowadays, collaborations between the university and industries are increasing. University T also encourages teachers to establish new businesses (F19ao.sc.nl).
>
> In order to increase revenue more and more continuing education programs have been set up. For example, the college of management set up MBA courses for people with high social statuses (F3fu.sc.ld).

One physical education teacher even pointed out that he had a new role of businessperson due to commercialization. He said:

> In addition to teaching and research, I have administrative work that is related to doing business. Our university does not have the budget for the stadium we are using. I need to make money and to demonstrate to the university that we can keep our budget balanced. To be honest, I think teaching should be the first priority for teachers. You shouldn't see a teacher being required to teach and do business at the same time, with so many monetary calculations to take care of; I feel that I am managing a private company (F17ao.ss.nl).

Thus the National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act triggered University T to be commercialized with more fund-raising activities, more continuing education courses offered by the university, more university-industry cooperative projects, and more facilities and equipment that are rented out, such as car parks and spaces leased for shops and restaurants. However, this phenomenon of commercialization seems to result in mostly positive effects, such as making students' university life more convenient (F17ao.ss.nl) and transforming academic theories into practice through university-industry cooperative projects (F21as.hu.nl). This close collaboration with corporations could conceivably clash with the academic community's tradition of valuing research as a top priority and in turn affect academic freedom for the common good, such as the situation of researchers agreeing to "keep their findings secret in order to protect their sponsors' commercial interests" (Schrecker 2010, 170). Interestingly, even though University T has a number of university-industry projects, teachers' academic freedom in research did not appear to be affected by commercialization because University T has a long history of such collaborations, and its assessment system of university-industry cooperative projects is relatively sound in all aspects. University faculties have the right to decide whether they will take the proposals from industries or not (F5fu.sc.ld, F22as.ss.nl). Yet, to create more continuing education programs such as MBA courses (F3fu.sc.ld), as well as asking teachers to do income generation tasks, seems to have some impact on academic freedom in teaching and service, as will be discussed below.

8.3.3 Impact of Commercialization on Academic Freedom

The findings show that the impact of commercialization on academic freedom appeared mainly in teaching and service, but not in research.

8.3.3.1 Freedom to Decide What and How to Teach Is Affected

According to Bok (2013), Schrecker (2010), and Doiz et al. (2013), the commercialization of higher education is making university teaching seem like a tool for making money because the university provides "programs and courses that would bring in more tuition revenue" (Schrecker 2010: 163). To meet a variety of the learners' needs, teachers need to adjust their curriculum content and teaching methods to become less difficult for students and more practical. Moreover, students are seen as consumers because they contribute to tuition fees. Therefore, teachers tend to be more sensitive to students' requests.

To increase incomes, more continuing education courses in the university have been offered (F3fu.sc.ld). As a result, teachers need to accept more diversification of students (F4fu.ss.ld). Teachers need to adjust curriculum content and teaching methods according to students' needs. This type of adjustment often reduces the level of difficulty of curriculum content.

Consumerism also makes teachers more aware of students' demands (F4fu.ss.ld, F22as.ss.nl). For example, some interviewees pointed out that students welcome more humorous classes and lecturers are encouraged to teach like a talk show host (F9fu.ss.nl). Students preferred easy and practical content as opposed to abstract and basic theories. Even when theories are important, students might not pay attention when teachers talked about them. Therefore, teachers often adjust how and what to teach and simplify the content to meet students' demands (F9fu.ss.nl). In other words, teachers are indirectly forced to adjust their way of teaching and the content even though the university gives them the freedom to decide what and how to teach based on professional standards.

To compare the situation of University T with what Bok (2013), Shrecker (2010) and Doiz et al. (2013) have pointed out above, it seems that University T faces a similar situation. However, teachers at University T see students as customers not because students are playing the important role of contributing tuition fees but because teachers are aware of the atmosphere of consumerism (F22as.ss.nl). As we know, universities in Taiwan cannot increase the tuition fees freely; this is controlled by the MOE (National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act 2001). To look at the practice of teaching, it seems that University T grants a very high degree of freedom to teach (F1fu.sc.ld, F17ao.ss.nl, F18as.hu.nl, F21as.hu.nl, F23as.sc.nl), but the commercialization resulting from the National University Endowment Fund Establishment Act seems to affect academic freedom in terms of what and how to teach.

8.3.3.2 Freedom to Select the Role of Service Is Affected

University T does not have any specific service regulations for faculty members (F1fu.sc.ld, F23as.sc.nl). Service counts for only 10% in the teacher evaluation and promotion system (F4fu.ss.ld, F18as.hu.nl). It is not very difficult to meet the criteria. Teachers are free to provide services as an academic to whatever they think important, such as being a member in the selection panel or a representative in the school management board, or as a journal editor (F22as.ss.nl). Yet, service is still affected with more staff engaging in commercial activities such as fund-raising and doing income generation (F17ao.ss.nl, F19ao.sc.nl) that specifically benefits the university financially rather than for a common good. This inevitably affects teachers' academic freedom.

The mixture of academic and commercial roles might make professors feel uncomfortable about having to juggle two roles if they were trained solely for academic purposes and not business. Professors may feel unable to escape from this additional business role which, in turn, can compromise their freedom to provide service for a common good since the profits generated are not shared in common, even though they may contribute to the running of a public institution.

8.3.4 Main Forces of Corporatization

8.3.4.1 Globalization and Internationalization

The pressure to be global and conform to global standards can limit freedom. Globalization refers to "the economic, political, and societal forces pushing 21st century higher education toward greater international involvement" (Altbach and Knight 2007, 290), while "internationalization includes the policies and practices undertaken by academic systems and institutions – and even individuals – to cope with the global academic environment" (290). According to Altbach and Knight (2007), commercial advantage, knowledge and language acquisition, as well as enhancing the curriculum with international content are often the motivations for internationalization. Internationalization usually includes "branch campuses, cross-border collaborative arrangements, programs for international students and English-medium programs and degrees" (290).

According to some Taiwanese scholars, globalization, international competition, the knowledge economy, technological advance and innovation, as well as marketization have posed challenges to Taiwan higher education (Chen 2012; Chou 2011; Gai 2004; Ministry of Education 2013; Yung 2009). However, among them, the tendency toward globalization and internationalization seems to be the main force that pushes higher education in Taiwan to be corporatized. The message was clearly conveyed in the annual report of Taiwan's education: "everywhere around the world competition is getting fiercer and more talent is migrating across borders. How can

Taiwan's higher education industry face up to these challenges… strengthening Taiwan's international competitiveness?" (Ministry of Education 2013: 26).

This message conveyed by the government turned into a goal that University T set out to achieve. Faculty members of University T are aware of the development of globalization and internationalization and have been ready to join the global competition. An administrative leader mentioned that:

> Because of the wave of globalization, we need to step outside of Taiwan. Taiwan is an island country with limited hinterland, and knowledge economy is very important, Taiwanese society needs to head for that direction; and so do universities. We continue to improve research, teaching and service. However, the direction of improvement of these three is heading towards internationalization. We expect to adopt international criteria, international values and the international practice for our campus to make it an international academic organization. Our research topics, teaching methods and service are all heading towards internationalization. Regarding research, we expect that we could be in a leading position in some fields (F1fu.sc.ld).

Because of the trend toward internationalization, there are more international projects, competitions, exchange activities, collaborations, conferences, services, students, courses with English as the teaching medium, and publications in international journals at University T:

> I think the management of the university and probably the government of Taiwan are trying to make University T more international. And every year that I walk around the campus, I see more and more foreigners. Some of them are doing six-month exchange programs, some of them are doing one-year exchange programs, some of them are studying Chinese at the International Chinese Language Program (ICLP) over here, and some of them are here to do a four-year degree from University T. The university is trying to make more material available in English, which is also good for me; more and more things on the university's website are in English (F24as.sc.nl).
>
> Our number of published research papers, if we only count Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), will be in the ninth place in Asia, but 121st in the world.... Some professors have been chairpersons of international academic organizations, or editors of an international journal…. According to my estimation, about 30% of our professors hold positions in international associations, such as editors, chief directors (F1fu.sc.ld).

The goals of globalization and internationalization have resulted in the inclination to international values, standards, and practice at the University T, such as joining the global competition between universities and publishing papers in indexed journals (F1fu.sc.ld). This goal of internationalization was enhanced by the Taiwan government through the Projects of Developing World-class Universities and Leading Research Centers and Heading toward Top Universities, and these policies are affecting academic freedom as will be demonstrated below.

8.3.4.2 Projects of Developing World-Class Universities and Leading Research Centers and Heading Toward Top Universities

To cope with the challenges of economic crisis and international competition, the Taiwanese government has changed its philosophy of budget allocation from equalitarianism to competition (MOE 2013). It means that if the universities want to get funds from the government, they need to demonstrate their unique accountability and competitiveness through an assessment system. Among the policies, the most significant one should be the plan of Developing World-class Universities and Leading Research Centers (from 2006 to 2011) and Heading toward Top Universities (from 2011 to 2016). In fact, these two plans are the same in nature, but with different names. However, this assessment system pushes professors to do research that follows global trends, and this limitation of subject matter affects their academic freedom in doing research.

University T has been granted about NT 3 billion, or US$ 100 million, per year since 2006 from the plan of Developing World-class Universities and Leading Research Centers and Heading toward Top Universities. This is a very large grant with a clear mission that University T needs to get into the top one hundred universities in the *UK's Times Higher Education and Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) rankings*. This, of course, is related to research and publications listed in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), the Science Citation Index (SCI), and other well-known indices. In accordance with the regulations of the University Act that universities shall regularly carry out self-evaluation and establish the teacher review system (University Act 2011), University T set up its evaluation measures on teaching (20%), research (60%), and service (10%) (F3fu.sc.ld, F23as.sc.nl). In addition, these evaluation results are linked to teachers' promotion. It is not surprising that research is at the heart of the faculty's work; to publish research outcomes in indexed journals as much as they can becomes a key target for them. It also becomes a major criterion for a teacher to succeed in getting promoted (F21as.ss.nl, F23as.sc.nl). As such, this assessment system pushes professors to do research along the lines of favored global trends which constitute a limitation on their academic freedom in doing research.

8.3.5 Impact of Corporatization on Academic Freedom

The upshot resulting from the goals of joining the global competition and an assessment system that focuses on the number of published indexed journal articles has created the situation of corporatization at University T and has affected teachers' academic freedom of research. We briefly mentioned this above but will discuss more below. In addition, academic freedom of teaching is also affected by the restrictions on research.

8.3.5.1 Freedom to Decide Why, What, and How to Do Research Is Affected

In order to meet the target of joining the top 100 universities in the world, University T had no choice but to strive to achieve. One of the most competitive indicators for recognition in the top universities in the world is the number of papers published in international indexed journals (F13ao.hu.ld). To publish as many papers as possible is now a top priority for University T and its academic staff, and the number of such papers is a very important aspect of teacher evaluation and promotion. At the same time, University T also set up a research reward system to reinforce its policy that requires that faculty publish papers in indexed journals. Faculty members are given different bonuses according to the rank of the published journal articles (F13ao.hu.ld, F21as.hu.nl). All of these practices gradually contribute to the professors' decision of why, what, and how to do research. Slowly but surely, professors try to adjust their research topics to align with the research mainstream (F9fu.ss.nl), the popularity, and above all, the preference of specific journal editors (F15ao.ss.nd). Moreover, to increase the paper acceptance rate, professors have shifted their research methodology to the quantitative and empirical approach to make it easier to get papers published (F24as.sc.nl).

The overemphasis on research, especially the publication in international indexed journals, has caused problems. Most SSCI and SCI journals are in English and focus on issues that are in favor with international readers. Even TSSCI journals played a role as well in faculty evaluation, but for the purpose of international competition, SSCI and SCI journals are the most recognized. They do not attract many domestic readers in Taiwan because of the topics and the language (F9fu.ss.nl). As a result domestic issues and local journals are often ignored. As such, the academic freedom for searching for the common good is restricted.

Leathwood and Read (2013: 1162) point out that "research is now a high-stakes activity for universities, with their positionality in national and global league tables largely dependent upon research achievements and reputations as reflected in citations, grant and awards." In such a context, everyone is engaging in the arena of research competition. Faculty members might be inclined to do certain kinds of research projects and sometimes overlook those projects that might be beneficial to the common good (Phoenix 2009). Phoenix (2009) also notices that the form of research has been changing from individual to global research networks. Leathwood and Read (2013: 1163), however, think that research is getting "colonized in its material and ideological demands for accounting, efficiency, austerity, utility, and measured effectiveness" and eventually becomes a tool of income generation.

To compare the situation of University T with the international trend, it seems that University T has a similar situation in terms of research. At University T, research has been placed as a first priority and is often seen as an indicator of effectiveness (F13ao.hu.ld, F21as.hu.nl). The research topics are tailored according to the editors' interests, while the research methodology has shifted to the empirical approach. For example, a teacher points out that:

> The university asks us to publish papers in indexed journals. Many of my colleagues are trying hard to publish SSCI papers, I have no choice but to do the same. However, in my field, I find some social issues that I can do something through writing to provide ideas. This kind of topic does not often fall into the social mainstream and it is hard to become an SSCI paper. This makes me struggle with the selection of topics. If I want to focus on publishing SSCI papers, I need to consider the topic I am going to explore (F9fu.ss.nl).

Among other points this teacher said that "in the past few years, we explored the topic of Zhongyong, a doctrine of Confucianism, but it is difficult for such articles to be published in the SCI journals. The mainstream researchers do not necessarily understand these concepts" (F15ao.ss.nl).

However, although teachers at University T can do any kind of research in terms of topics and methodology, the assessment system that focuses on the number of the published indexed journal papers has driven teachers to favor certain topics and methodologies. As such, the academic freedom for searching for common good is indirectly restricted. As a result, teachers' freedom of doing research, to some extent, has been limited.

8.3.5.2 Freedom of Teaching Is Affected by the Restrictions on Research

Many teachers expressed a struggle between teaching and research in their interviews (F14ao.hu.nl, F16ao.ss.nl, F18as.hu.nl, F21as.hu.nl, F22as.ss.nl). In theory, they think teaching is very important because one of the most important missions of the university is to cultivate students through teaching. But in practice, the university values research and has set up a high weight of 60% for research in the evaluation and promotion criteria. Teachers feel that their time is limited so if they invest more time in research, the time, and energy for teaching would be less. However, in practice, research is the most important element that affects teachers' survival; teachers need to care more about their research than their teaching. It is difficult to find a good balance between teaching and research.

The regular evaluations carried out by the MOE and the project of "Heading toward Top Universities" have played the role of supervision and have led professors at University T to the direction of focusing on the accountability, outcomes, quantity, corporatization, and internationalization. The tendency of outcome-based consideration gradually restricts professors' research in a specific way such as selecting research topics in accordance with the mainstream and getting involved in international service. In addition, in order to keep track of their performance, professors have to report their progress on a quarterly or yearly basis. This is a way similar to the management of corporations.

However, there is the other force to fight back the influence of corporatization, that is, the academic freedom and autonomy guaranteed by laws. The Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the University Act clearly state that "the people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication" and "Universities shall be guaranteed academic freedom and shall enjoy autonomy within the range of laws and regulations." In addition, the tradition of academic

freedom advocated by president Fu of University T in 1949 also plays a vital role to fight back the influence of corporatization. Therefore, in practice, professors at University T normally enjoy a high degree of academic freedom such as freedom to decide what, when, whom, where, and how to teach, research, and give services. As a result, the degree of corporatization at University T did not seem to be significant as a factor that compromises academic freedom due to the practicalities of funding, promotion, and the assessment system.

8.4 Conclusion

The findings reveal that commercialization and corporatization have created changes in higher education in Taiwan that could very narrowly compromise continuity with a tradition that has long valued academic freedom. University T has no specific requirements about what and how to do teaching, research, and service. Faculty members are free to decide what to teach and how to teach. They are also free to choose any research topics according to their interests and professional training. Service, most of the time, is a personal choice, and what to do and how to do it are usually up to teachers' personal decisions. However, the tendency of C&C of higher education does affect professors' academic freedom in terms of how and what they do in terms of a series of strong, although indirect pressures that arise with C&C.

As Rhoades and Slaughter (2004: 38) say, "The difference [between different universities] is a matter of breadth and depth." University T, like many well-known universities in the United States, cannot be spared from the influence of C&C, but the extent of its influence is not overly challenging to academic freedom. The influence of C&C does affect academic freedom, but the University Act and the restriction of increasing tuition fees pose two strong countering forces. The university cannot increase its tuition fees freely; students still pay relatively low tuition and enjoy good facilities and resources at University T. Moreover, the university's traditions of the high degree of academic freedom and faculty governance encourage University T to maintain considerable freedom in teaching, research, and service. Furthermore, Taiwan's democratic atmosphere and Chinese culture encourage people to respect one another, so the administration functions more as a supportive sector rather than a controlling one.

This is a case study whose primary method was the use of interviews. Although the people who were interviewed were not many, only 43 in all, there is enough confidence to claim that the findings can be trusted because the respondents were taken from a representative range of the social actors at work in this institution. From the interviewees' responses, we found that their opinions appeared to be very consistent. If there is room for improvement in this case study, it would be good to additionally include interviews with people in charge of policy-making both at University T and at the Ministry of Education in order to access the contributions of their influence on the system of higher education in Taiwan.

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Chapter 9
Turtles or Dragons? Academic Freedom in Japanese Universities

Edward Vickers

Is academic freedom Japanese? Given the widespread currency of claims for Japan's "uniqueness" on the one hand and for Western exceptionalism on the other (Goody 2006), this seems a pertinent question to ask, perhaps especially so when the analysis is offered, as here, by a Westerner (albeit Japan-based) whose notions of "freedom" might be seen as at odds with a Japanese emphasis on the collectivity. Is it appropriate for someone socialized into what has been dubbed the "Western" ethos of "dominant independent selfhood" to judge academic practice in a society purportedly oriented toward interdependence (Silova et al. 2018)? To what extent are meanings attached to academic freedom in such a context likely to be compatible with those current in the West?

In fact, as this chapter will demonstrate, there is no single, incommensurable, essentially "Japanese" idea of "academic freedom" – just as there is no universally agreed "Western" understanding of this concept. Culturally essentialist assertions of national uniqueness have been deployed with special enthusiasm, in Japan as elsewhere, by those eager to foreclose open debate and deny pluralism (in Japan the term 日本人論/*Nihonjinron*, or "Theory of the Japanese people," has been coined to describe such discourse). But such attempts have been vigorously contested by more liberal Japanese scholars. To cast doubt on the relevance to Japan (or to "Asia" more generally) of the concept of academic freedom would thus, apart from anything else, be a betrayal of those Japanese liberals. And although many in Japan itself, whether chauvinist or liberal (e.g., Yoshimi 2011), see modern higher education as an originally European creation, Goody argues that "universities [along with related notions of higher learning and its animating ideals] were only European from a very narrow point of view, strongly tinged by teleology" (2006: 229).

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Whatever the historical origins of universities as institutions, the struggle for and against academic freedom today cuts across cultural divisions.

This is not to deny the distinctiveness of the Japanese debate over the purpose of universities or the role of the scholar. However, the distinctive features of the Japanese case need to be understood as products not of some ageless cultural essence, but of particular historical conditions. The tension between calls to prioritize learning for its own sake and to produce knowledge deemed socially "useful" is far from unique to Japan. As noted in the introduction to this volume, such tensions are increasingly acute worldwide, as governments seek to control the rising costs of a burgeoning higher education sector while redirecting universities toward the promotion of "innovation" and enhanced economic growth. But the tension is arguably especially severe in societies, such as those of East Asia, where modern universities were founded as part of state-directed projects of self-strengthening" and the pursuit of "catch-up" growth (Kariya 2019).

I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of some of the key themes or issues relating to a consideration of academic freedom in modern and contemporary Japan. This is followed by an attempt to trace the salience of these issues in the history of Japanese universities up to the early twenty-first century. That account provides necessary context for a more in-depth analysis of academic freedom in Japanese universities under the premiership of Abe Shinzo since 2012 – a period that coincides with my own tenure as a professor in one of Japan's leading national universities (国立大学). Here I consider the implications of various policies pursued by the Abe regime in relation not just to universities but also to education, the media, and public culture more broadly. A particular focus of this section is the position of social science and humanities fields within Japanese academia – a subject around which controversy has swirled during the Abe years. Finally, I home in on a particular area – research on the wartime "comfort women" system – that starkly illustrates some of the challenges to academic freedom that confront scholars in Japan today.

The focus throughout falls primarily on the research function of universities, their governance, and public debate over their purpose as institutions. Teaching is of course central to the mission of a university and certainly relevant to any discussion of academic freedom. Moreover, there is ample evidence of dire problems in the quality of the education that Japanese universities provide (for a forceful and still sadly apposite diatribe, see McVeigh 2002). But since a full consideration of pedagogical issues would take us beyond the specific focus of this volume, I refer to problems with teaching only insofar as they impinge upon, or reflect, problems with freedom to pursue research and to debate and disseminate its findings. It is safe to assume that if, as researchers, scholars are constrained in their exercise of academic freedom, then this will be reflected in interactions with their students.

9.1 Academic Freedom and the Japanese University: Some Key Themes

Nationalism Versus Universalism Assertions of national uniqueness are of course far from uniquely Japanese. Nor are they new, having formed a running theme of intellectual debate since well before the Meiji revolution of the late nineteenth century, when advocates of "national learning" (国学) sought more clearly to delineate Japanese tradition from that of China. But the Meiji period, when Japan experienced a revolutionary transformation inspired by Western models, witnessed new tensions between nationalist and universalist standpoints. Since this was also the period that saw the establishment of modern universities along Western lines, those arguments helped shape the institutional cultures and curricula of the country's most prestigious institutions of higher learning. Crystalizing these tensions were slogans associated with what some have loosely termed the "Meiji ideology" (Gluck 1987). "Civilization and enlightenment" (文明開化) was favored by Fukuzawa Yukichi, generally seen as a liberal luminary of the early Meiji era, and a fervent advocate of Western-inspired modernization. But even Fukuzawa argued that the strengthening of the Japanese state should take priority over its political liberalization; repelling the real threat of Western colonization was the prime imperative (Craig 2009). This emphasis was encapsulated in another prominent slogan of the time: "a prosperous country with a strong army" (富国強兵). The prioritization of national self-strengthening was something on which many liberals and conservatives could agree. For the latter, however, the ultimate prize was not the freedom to embrace a liberal vision of modernity, but the power emphatically to reject it. In the ascendency by the 1890s, conservatives promoted the principle of "Japanese spirit" as the core, Western learning for practical use (和魂洋才). Appeals to notions of a unique Japanese "spirit" have remained popular to the present day.

STEM, Technocracy, and a Statist Agenda A heavy focus on the practical uses of Western learning was evident in the emphasis in Japan's imperial universities on science, technology, and engineering and – in faculties of law and economics – on the training of technocratic administrative elites for service in the state bureaucracy and large commercial concerns. Nevertheless, in the early years after their establishment, scholars at Tokyo Imperial University in particular (and, to a lesser degree, Kyoto) also played important roles in setting the agenda for modernization, rather than simply supplying technical advice on the implementation of pre-determined state goals. As Marshall notes, during the early twentieth century, the state became steadily less reliant on universities for expertise in fields of "modern" knowledge (1992). But technocratic assumptions about the function of higher education have remained prevalent into the twenty-first century, and universities have struggled to recalibrate their relationship with the state.

The Status and Public Role of the Scholar The autonomy and status of Japanese academics is nonetheless buttressed by significant cultural and institutional supports.

Full-time, permanent faculty in national universities enjoy tenure – making it difficult to fire outspoken scholars. And the public status of professors in Japan is high. Marshall, citing Dore, attributes this partly to the "high prestige of the Confucian tradition" with its linking of the roles of "scholar-educator, adviser-official, and moral-cultural arbiter" (1992: 78–79). Though he was writing of the pre-1945 period, the relatively high social prestige academics still enjoy is apparent to anyone moving, like the present author, from British to Japanese academia. Professors feature prominently as media commentators on various issues, and there is a substantial market for cross-over publications authored by high-profile scholars. Examples of the latter include highly critical essays on the role of universities and of the social sciences and humanities within them; some of them cited below. But media freedom in Japan operates within a political climate and institutional-legal context that restricts open discussion of certain controversial issues. And while scholarly prestige affords high-profile individuals the opportunity to offer independent critique, for many more closeness to officialdom is double-edged, conferring a sense of dependency on government that curbs the exercise of autonomy.

The Diversity Deficit Reluctance among scholars to raise their heads above the proverbial parapet tends to be reinforced when the academic community is uniform, closed, and immobile. Uniformity in terms of ethnicity, gender, and educational background is especially pronounced in Japanese academia. Western academics were recruited in the Meiji period to help establish some of the earliest modern universities, but thereafter the sector was rapidly and comprehensively indigenized. While recent decades have witnessed a significant influx of overseas students and a rise in the proportion of female postgraduates, the composition of faculties has remained overwhelmingly Japanese and male (especially at senior levels). In a world dominated by Anglophone universities, and where resort to crude metrics of research performance accentuates pressure to publish in English, the preservation of a Japanese scholarly community operating primarily in Japanese is a crucial precondition for meaningful academic freedom. However, widespread inability or unwillingness to operate in foreign languages, or in non-Japanese contexts, reflects a "closed-shop" mentality associated with chronic reluctance to challenge established norms or procedures. And lack of transnational mobility among Japanese scholars reduces the capacity or willingness to confront authority: those who have nowhere else to go are more likely to keep their heads down.

Governance and the Uses of Freedom Such factors help explain why Japanese academics faced with threats to their autonomy tend to be overwhelmingly defensive. In the words of Tokyo University's Yoshimi Shunya, social science and humanities faculties are like creatures with "shells," conditioned to react to external threats not by going on the attack, but by retreating behind prepared fortifications (2016: 152–162). As we shall see, the social sciences and humanities, already severely under-resourced and marginalized, have been subject to intensified attack in recent years. The dominant response to such threats has been to quietly shore up established barricades to outside interference, often under the banner of faculty autonomy,

rather than aggressively to challenge the terms of public debate over higher education. The likelihood of humanities and social science faculties evolving, as Yoshimi puts it, into creatures with "backbones" is constrained by numerous factors which it is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter to analyze.

9.2 Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University

Defensiveness in response to external threats is a long-established pattern in Japan; as Marshall shows (1992), it typified reaction to the severe official assault on university autonomy in the pre-war period. Marshall depicts the Meiji period as one of considerable autonomy for the new imperial universities (especially Tokyo and Kyoto), but attributes this to a fundamental consensus then between the bureaucratic and academic elites. In the early years of modern higher education, academics enjoyed ready access to political decision-makers, with a virtual revolving door between Tokyo Imperial University (Todai) and the Ministry of Education. What tension there was (after 1905) involved attempts by professors to ensure their "independence from the partisan politics of cabinet governments" (187) while retaining their identity as academic civil servants. In 1905, this was successfully achieved through a threat to close the Todai Law Faculty rather than submit to the dismissal of a single professor in the face of demands from politicians. However, the earlier consensus proved highly fragile in inter-war Japan, in ways that "cannot simply be attributed to flaws in the formal structure of universities as originally instituted in the Meiji period" (79).

According to Marshall, the key to the inability of faculties to repel attacks on academic freedom in the 1930s lies in historical developments inside and outside academia during the period after World War I. This was a time when "a substantial minority of a new generation of faculty now accepted political partisanship as a legitimate means of taking part in the struggles of their times" (187). However, a majority of academics remained concerned above all to protect the institutions and practices of faculty self-governance as established during the Meiji era.

The 1920s witnessed increasing clashes between radical scholars and activist students (often inspired by Marxism) and anti-Marxists within and beyond academia. The academic freedom of the Marxists was championed by liberal figures such as Todai Economics professor Kawai Eijiro, an admirer of John Stuart Mill who subsequently became a more outspoken opponent of fascism (138–9). But even Kawai was ambivalent as to how far scholarly political critique might extend to political activism beyond the university gates – arguing that "academics should not play political roles in the larger society" (141). (It was illegal for schoolteachers or students to belong to political organizations.) "The conflation of university autonomy and academic freedom" was, Marshall writes, a dangerous and naïve attitude embraced by many liberal academics in the inter-war period, linked to an "attempt to justify academic freedom at the expense of freedom for the wider populace" (143). When faced with the threat of ministerial interference in the internal

management of universities (to secure the dismissal of critical scholars), this naivety led academics to sacrifice individual dissenters in order to maintain the formal trappings of self-governance. "Although the 'ideal university' might have need of academic dissenters, 'in the actual university' their presence was too much of a 'disturbance'" (180).

Marshall argues that the drive to an increasingly activist political role among some academics and students in the 1920s was partly related to a decline in the importance of "the technocratic functions of the academic elite at the imperial universities" (188). As the civil service became more professionalized, those academics "who sought to influence political affairs as 'public men'" found that they had to do so outside the informal bureaucratic channels that had existed in the Meiji period. And as the higher education system expanded in the 1920s and 1930s, the Ministry also found that old methods of bureaucratic coordination with academia no longer worked (particularly given the decentralized governance structure of universities). What did work, in the late 1930s, was the threat of direct government intervention – ironically leading academics at imperial universities to defend institutional "autonomy" by doing the government's bidding. One key factor here was that the authorities no longer saw the universities' expertise as so crucial to the ongoing pursuit of modernization and state power: "the valued knowledge and required techniques had become the common property not only of numerous other universities but also of rival elites outside of academe" (190). As Marshall tells it, then, the story of academic freedom in the Japanese Imperial University is one of scholars under external political pressure surrendering the substance of autonomy to preserve its shadow.

9.3 Japanese Universities in the Era of Postwar Liberal Democracy

The collapse of the militaristic wartime regime brought a rapid relaxation of the academic climate (and the release of a number of imprisoned scholars), but it did not usher in an era of unfettered free speech. The American Occupation authorities instituted an extensive system of censorship, initially with the aim of purging public discourse of vestiges of militarism, fascism, and emperor-worship (as well as suppressing criticism of their own governance), but, with the onset of the Cold War, extending increasingly to suppression of pro-Communist sentiment, as well (Dower 1999). Nevertheless, Marxist scholars quickly gained a strong foothold in university humanities and social sciences faculties.

In a largely symbolic move, "imperial universities" were re-designated "national universities" by the Occupation authorities. However, moves to introduce boards of governors, on the model of American state universities, met strong opposition on the grounds that they threatened faculty self-governance. As a result, these reforms were eventually abandoned, leaving the governance structure of national universities largely unchanged – with a contradiction between the "ultimate

decision-making power" of faculty senates (or "meetings of professors") and the authority of the Ministry in Tokyo (which held the purse strings) (Kaneko 2013: 174).

What had changed was the political climate within which ministerial authority was exercised. Following the end of the American occupation, the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, dominated by conservatives of pre-1945 vintage, attempted to claw back control over the ideological content of education in the name of ensuring political "neutrality." In 1954, laws were enacted to prohibit political activity by university and high school instructors and political advocacy by teachers in the compulsory grades (Ienaga 2001). The 1950s also witnessed the stealthy reintroduction of bureaucratic procedures for censoring school textbooks. But while the conservatives maintained a strong grip over the levers of central power, they now had to contend with lively opposition from leftist political activists (including academics) and the main schoolteachers' union, who challenged these measures on the ground that they contravened the liberal precepts of the 1946 Fundamental Law of Education.

Meanwhile, the internal faculty structure of the most prestigious national (formerly imperial) universities experienced some alteration. These institutions now acquired distinct Education Departments, newly elevating the status of research into educational (and related social and psychological) issues. Previously, education had been the province of "normal schools" tasked simply with training teachers to government-mandated specifications. But the democratizing postwar reforms to schooling envisaged teachers as autonomous professionals rather than obedient state functionaries. The new recognition of the importance of educational research was a corollary of efforts to raise the status and entrench the autonomy of teaching as a profession. Tokyo University's Faculty of Education was established in 1949, and those of other former imperial universities at around the same time. Meanwhile, Tokyo's old Higher Normal School became the Tokyo University of Education.

Nevertheless, the extent of change should not be overstated. Within national universities, the status of social science and humanities departments (including the new departments of education) remained low. The established bias in enrolments and research funding toward science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine remained, as did the dominance of these fields in internal governance. A roll-call of national university presidents and vice-presidents reveals a vanishingly small presence of scholars from the social sciences and humanities; Kyushu University, for example, has never had a president from a non-science background and as of 2019 features not a single non-scientist among its eight vice-presidents (see also the National University presidents featured in the February 2016 issue of *Chuo Koron* / 中央公論, cited below). The overwhelming dominance of "hard" scientists has both reflected official visions of the purpose of higher education and conditioned how universities as institutions respond to challenges to the role and status of social science and humanities fields.

One such challenge came in the 1970s when Tokyo University of Education (TUE) was moved to a remote new site at Tsukuba and simultaneously renamed and restructured as a comprehensive university with stronger science and engineering faculties. TUE had been a hotbed of youthful rebellion in the late 1960s and early

1970s, when Japan – like many Western countries – experienced an upsurge of student radicalism. At TUE, much activism and opposition to the Tsukuba move was centered in the Faculty of Letters. In 1973, a law was rammed through the Diet (Japan's parliament) mandating the establishment of the new, relocated university. This law neatly sidestepped the issue of faculty self-governance by simply abolishing the Faculty of Letters. Ienaga Saburō (家永三郎), a historian in that faculty and leading critic of the government's procedures for censoring school textbooks, characterized the Tsukuba move as aiming to "make the production of human talent its main goal, responding in this way to the desires of the financial world; to focus authority in the hands of the president and vice-president; to abolish faculty councils…; [and] to set up in their place an organ whereby outsiders could take part in running the university" (2001: 189).

Ienaga's fears were not immediately fulfilled as far as the wider university system was concerned. The dominant mood on campuses remained anti-establishment, but the open confrontation of the late 1960s subsided into a tacit truce. The mid-1970s to the mid-1990s were the fat years: the era of "Japan as Number One." University budgets expanded, and in the public sphere, critical voices were tolerated amidst a mood of vaulting national self-confidence. Conservatives attributed economic success to Japan's innate cultural superiority, and bookstore shelves groaned under the weight of *Nihonjinron* screeds. At the same time, Ienaga and his leftist supporters pursued their campaign against the Education Ministry's textbook censorship practices through the courts, and critical debate over the country's wartime past attracted significant public attention. As East Asia's Cold War thawed, with first the Sino-Japanese rapprochement of the 1970s–1980s and then the liberalization and dissolution of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, external threats to Japan's security and prosperity appeared to evaporate – and with them much of the drive to suppress oppositional voices.

This climate of relative tolerance and openness was not destined to last. Since the rise of the nationalist right from the mid-1990s, systemic weaknesses have hampered the capacity of liberals within academia and beyond to mount a robust defense of academic freedom. These frailties have included not only the persistently low status of humanities and social sciences but also weak unionization in the academic profession – a factor of the general weakness of sectoral unions in Japan. Also weak is the collective voice of students: while Japanese academics have sought to preserve faculty self-governance, this involves no role for student representatives. The low priority given to teaching and the lack of effective systems for monitoring its quality, though not the focus of the present paper, arguably further handicap beleaguered social science faculties as they seek to assert their relevance. Most fundamentally, perhaps, the chronic lack of pluralism in Japanese politics complicates the task of mounting a sustained and forceful defense of academic freedom.

9.4 Stagnation, Austerity, and Attempts at Reform Since the 1990s

The rapid expansion of the higher education system from the 1970s was accompanied by a significant splurge of state largesse. The major national universities retained their position at the system's commanding heights, providing a steady supply of scientists and technocrats to staff the laboratories and boardrooms of "Japan Inc." Much of the growing demand for tertiary credentials was met by private universities, where courses in the social sciences and humanities (cheaper to deliver) account for a large proportion of enrolments. Increased government subsidies for private institutions meanwhile brought enhanced public oversight of their operations (Kaneko 2013: 175). But even before the era of rapid growth came to a juddering halt in the early 1990s, calls both to curb spending on higher education and to gear it more effectively toward the needs of the economy were becoming increasingly voluble.

At this point, some comparative perspective on Japanese higher education spending is important. UNESCO's 2010 *World Social Science Report* found that, whereas Germany, America, and Australia devoted between 5.3% and 8.3% of gross research and development spending to the social sciences and humanities, the figure for Japan was 4.6%. Proportionately fewer Japanese students studied social sciences, business, or law than in almost any other OECD country. About 6% of the country's doctoral graduates were conducting research in these fields, compared to 13% in Australia and 18% in Germany, France, Britain, and America. And all this in the context of a level of public spending on higher education which, at 0.5% of GDP, was less than half the OECD average. Even in the natural sciences, then, public spending on research was low by international standards; in Japan, the best talent in these fields has tended to be "snatched up by corporate research centers" with companies taking it upon themselves to both train their own technical staff and provide much of the funding for research with potential industrial applications (Amano and Poole 2005: 695).

Growing calls for austerity in higher education spending from the 1990s thus came in the context of what was already, by international standards, an anemic level of public support for research in general and for social science and humanities work in particular. A sense that the Japanese university was "in crisis" had been building since the 1970s. Academics faced growing criticism from politicians and business leaders impatient to see universities take up more of the responsibility for maintaining the country's competitiveness. These calls intensified from the late 1980s, as economic growth began to slow. At the same time, with the end of the Cold War "universities started to experience a new freedom from previous ideological divisions and changed their, until now, disapproving stance toward industry" (Amano and Poole 2005, 695). But while these changes lent increasing impetus to calls for reform to both teaching and research, especially as economic growth stagnated through the 1990s, opposition to change simultaneously intensified, coalescing around defense of the privileges of faculty self-governance confirmed by the

postwar settlement. "The stronger the pressure for reform and the higher the 'innovation' banner is flown," wrote Amano and Poole in the early 2000s, "the deeper the university crisis will become" (701).

The main thrust of university reform has been to enhance institutional autonomy from direct government regulation on the one hand while on the other deploying mechanisms of accountability to retain or even enhance ministerial control. This approach was epitomized by the "corporatization" (法人化) of national universities, enacted in 2004. Effectively transforming these institutions from wholly owned offshoots of the ministry into independent entities, this legislation was ostensibly liberalizing. However, universities were still required to seek permission from the central bureaucracy to establish new departments or programs, to vary their student quotas, or to increase their fees. From 2004 onward, the core budget allocated to universities by the government was also subjected to an annual cut of 1%, compelling institutions to compete for a greater proportion of their funding – either from industry or from government. In practice, the ministry itself remained overwhelmingly the biggest source of funding, with a steadily growing slice of its budget disbursed through grants awarded on a competitive basis. Corporatization thus meant devolving responsibility, but very little power – and forced universities into ever more intense competition for funding, the vast bulk of it still disbursed by government.

Much of this will sound very familiar to academics who have worked in contemporary Western universities. In some respects, Japan went even further than, say, Britain in implementing the precepts of "New Public Management." Contract evaluation systems inspired by British practice in the 1990s (where many functions of government were outsourced to "quasi-non-governmental organizations" or QUANGOs) were introduced to institutionalize government oversight, but in Japan these extended to "*every* aspect of university activities" (Kaneko 2013: 193, emphasis in original). Initially, the fiscal consequences of a poor evaluation were relatively slight, which Kaneko interprets as a strategy for minimizing opposition while entrenching the precedent of detailed and intrusive bureaucratic oversight (179–80). Meanwhile, within institutions, the authority of the president and the central administration has been steadily enhanced, in the face of often dogged resistance from faculty councils (Morozumi 2015).

The advance of New Public Management has implied a search for criteria – or metrics – for evaluating university performance. The supreme metrics onto which politicians, bureaucrats, and administrators have latched since the early 2000s are international university rankings, which rate Japanese universities poorly. This has prompted the adoption of targets that are wholly unrealistic or, if taken seriously, would involve a wholesale de-Japanization of academia. For example, several top universities (including Tokyo and Kyushu Universities) have recently begun using the Scopus database to rate the research performance of their academics. However, since this only rates publications in English, its strict application would disincentivize the publication of work in Japanese while skewing the focus of social or historical research toward topics of interest to predominantly Western-based journal editors. (For a discussion of the deleterious effects of such metrics on academic

research in Taiwan, see Chou and Ching 2012. See also Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 in this book.)

Both the pursuit of rankings and the attempt to enhance the supply of highly skilled talent in a context of demographic shrinkage have meanwhile prompted increasingly ambitious attempts to internationalize universities. However, coming in the context of a top-down drive to impose reforms that many scholars perceive as threatening, these have tended to be resisted or implemented in a tokenistic fashion. Many universities have established international centers or programs that cater to non-Japanese students and employ some non-Japanese faculty, but these are often quarantined from the rest of the institution. Japanese and non-Japanese students in such programs (especially undergraduates) seldom interact, and most non-Japanese faculty are employed at junior levels on non-permanent contracts. Considerable care is thus taken to ensure that centrally imposed, quantitative targets for recruitment of foreign students and faculty, or for overseas exchanges, are met in ways that have a minimal impact on business-as-usual within the wider university (Ishikawa 2011).

Ministry statistics show that the proportion of foreign staff in national universities stood at 3.3% in 2013, up from 2% in 2000, with the vast majority concentrated at junior levels (primarily as non-tenured assistant professors) (MEXT 2013). Fewer than 20% of foreign faculty were full professors (the figure for Japanese staff is over 40%), and while there were two foreign vice-presidents, no foreigner held the presidency of a national university. There is strong resistance among many Japanese faculty to recruiting substantial numbers of foreigners, not all of it due to crude xenophobia. In the absence of meaningful internationalization of university administrations, foreign faculty require considerable fluency in Japanese (very difficult to attain for those not educated in Japan) in order to share fully in the large bureaucratic burden that academics must bear. One reasonable fear is therefore that more foreign faculty mean increased administrative work for their Japanese colleagues. There is also a suspicion that Japanese universities will end up providing "temporary employment for researchers who cannot find jobs in English-speaking countries," drafted in merely so that their publications and citations will boost the institutional score (Ogawa 2014: 56). Such faculty may leave as soon as an opportunity arises, contributing little to the long-term development of the institution. Nevertheless, in a world where Japanese is not a major language of international scholarly discourse, the chronic lack of diversity on Japanese campuses significantly impairs the meaningful exercise of academic freedom.

The Top Global University (TGU) Program, introduced in 2014, made increasing the recruitment of international faculty one of its prime objectives, especially at the 13 institutions selected by the ministry as the vanguard of the internationalization of higher education. But the factors outlined in the previous paragraph, combined with the unreliability of TGU funding itself (the ministry arbitrarily reduced funding from the levels originally promised), precluded any step change in hiring practices. Figures provided by Kyushu University, for example, show the number of overseas faculty increasing from 109 in 2013 to 149 in 2016 (against a total of about 2040 permanent faculty), before falling back slightly to 142 in 2019. But even some

of that increase is accounted for by very short-term appointments (effectively, visiting professors rebranded as "home" faculty).

The low presence and status of foreigners on campus is not even the most serious aspect of the diversity deficit. In 2013, the proportion of female researchers stood at 14.4% – the lowest proportion in the OECD (the figure for South Korea was 17.3%) (Kyoto University 2014). The proportion of women employed in social science and humanities faculties was relatively high – at 23.4% and 33.9%, respectively. However, most women are concentrated in junior positions, often on precarious contracts. As of 2012, women accounted for only 20.8% of full professors in the humanities and 13.3% in the social sciences, while well over half of junior assistants in both fields were female.

A revealing indicator of the inward-looking culture of universities is the pattern of international exchange. Ministry figures for the 2016 academic year show that 170,000 Japanese researchers went on overseas trips, but only just over 4000 of those visits lasted more than 1 month (MEXT 2018). The figures do not offer a more detailed breakdown, but it is likely that the vast majority of the shorter trips were very short indeed, lasting around one week or less. The rules relating to use of research funding make it very hard for academics to extend trips to attend overseas conferences, for example, beyond the actual dates of the conference itself. Meanwhile, the dominant culture of collective decision-making within universities and individual faculties, with frequent meetings at which attendance is expected or required (as well as collective duties such as entrance examinations), also complicates efforts to arrange extended overseas visits. A telling contrast in the official figures for overseas exchanges is between those for outgoing and incoming researchers, with fully one third of the latter (13,000 out of 39,000) visiting Japan for longer than 1 month. But while the presence of these foreign researchers on campus helps universities meet their targets for internationalization, many do not engage extensively with Japanese academics or students. The overwhelmingly male and Japanese "core" of the university has thus been largely insulated from meaningful change, in the context of what remains a superficial and tokenistic approach to internationalization or the broader pursuit of diversity (see Vickers and Rappleye 2015; Brotherhood et al. 2020 likewise portray "junior international faculty" at Japanese universities as "tokenized symbols of internationalization" (497)).

9.5 The Abe Government and the Social Sciences: A Frontal Assault on Academic Freedom?

Despite various attempts at reform since the 1990s, through the first decade of the twenty-first century, Japan's universities remained relatively static and insulated from competition. Part of the reason for this related to political instability. The relative stability of the Koizumi premiership (2002–2006) and the first Abe administration (2006–2007) witnessed the corporatization of national universities and the

passage, in 2006, of a revision to the Fundamental Law of Education mandating the teaching of patriotism in schools. But the implications of these significant changes did not immediately become apparent, as political instability between 2007 and 2012 hampered the pursuit of a consistent agenda by government.

However, writing soon after the start of Abe Shinzo's second premiership in 2012, Kaneko noted that "the days of this curious lethargy may… be numbered" (2013: 195). Universities were indeed a key target of the reform agenda projected by the new Abe administration. The intention, wrote another academic observer, was to make universities more responsive to the demands of industry, government and, ultimately, of "global capital," with the effect of transforming them into "factories for the production of human resources" (Ogawa 2014: 48).

Another component of Abe's agenda with profound implications for education and academic freedom is the revision of Japan's postwar "Peace Constitution," a project intertwined with revisionism in public discourse over Japanese identity and history. Abe himself has long been prominently involved in campaigns to excise from history textbooks all acknowledgement of atrocities perpetrated by Japan during the Asia-Pacific War. A prominent slogan of his first premiership was "Japan, the Beautiful Country" (美しい国、日本), while his second period in office has witnessed an officially sponsored "Japan is Great Boom" (Yamaguchi 2017). Most of the current cabinet are members of the Nippon Kaigi (日本会議), a body that lobbies not only for historical revisionism but also for a reversion to features of the pre-1947 imperial constitution, including enhanced status for the emperor himself.

Academic freedom cannot be considered in isolation from the broader political climate, and here there have been significant developments since 2012. A draconian new State Secrets Law enacted in 2013 was calculated, in the words of Jeff Kingston of Tokyo's Temple University, to have "a chilling effect on investigative journalism in a country not known for much investigative zeal" (quoted in Pollmann 2015). According to the head of the Asia-Pacific desk of the organization Reporters Without Borders, Japanese journalists even before the introduction of this law reported "unusually severe self-censorship, corporate and peer pressure (to cover or not to cover certain kinds of stories), and restricted access to information" (Pollmann 2015). In 2014, the government appointed as head of the state broadcaster, NHK, Momii Katsuto, an Abe associate who warned that "We cannot say left when the government says right" – and went on to sack a number of critical reporters. Reforms to the school curriculum and revisions to textbooks have meanwhile reflected the neo-nationalist agenda of the governing LDP's dominant conservative faction (see below). And these shifts have been facilitated by the absence of effective and coherent political opposition – an absence which the lack of media openness has helped to ensure.

The resurgence of nationalism that helped propel Abe back into office in 2012 was largely fueled by fears of Japan's declining competitiveness vis-à-vis an apparently hostile China. Popular resentment and incomprehension of Chinese and Korean anti-Japanese sentiment was fused with anxiety about growing threats to Japan's security. In the LDP narrative, just as restoration of national pride requires educators to tell a "beautiful" story about Japan, national security and prosperity

demands that they devote their energies above all to fostering "innovation." At an OECD meeting in March 2014, Abe cited research claiming that whereas in America, "15% of patent applications from universities were related to [the establishment of] new businesses, in Japan the figure was only 0.5%." His reforms to higher education, he went on, would therefore seek "not to deepen academic research but to ensure greater responsiveness to social needs" (quoted in Ogawa 2014: 51). In other words, writes Ogawa, he was explicitly seeking to place universities "at the convenience of economic interests." The anticipated results would include a reduction or abolition of academic fields "seen [by government or industry] as of little practical use" (52).

To give the government tools to enact this strategy, revisions to the National University Corporation Law were introduced to strengthen non-academic (ministerial and business) representation on university councils, enhance the authority of university presidents, and weaken that of faculty councils (Ogawa 2014: 50). These measures included no steps to represent other stakeholders – students, parents, and local citizens – in bodies tasked with the oversight of public universities. According to Ogawa, the financiers who have been influential in shaping higher education policy under Abe have in mind solely the model of a "private business."

9.6 The Position of Social Sciences and Humanities

Two official declarations in June 2015 crystallized for many the threat posed by the Abe administration's agenda on academic autonomy. That month, Education Minister Shimomura Hakubun sent a letter to all presidents of national universities demanding that they "take active steps to abolish [social science and humanities] organizations or convert them to areas that better serve society's needs" (Grove 2015). He separately issued a statement urging national universities to raise the national flag and sing the national anthem ("Kimigayo") at entrance and graduation ceremonies (Japan Times 2015). The latter request did not have legal force, but coming as it did from the body with ultimate power over university budgets, it carried considerable weight.

This attack on the role of social science and humanities departments did not come out of a clear blue sky, nor is pressure on these fields from governments and funding agencies peculiar to Japan. Recent developments in Britain, for example, supply ample precedent for politicians elsewhere seeking legitimacy for attempts to curb state support in these areas. However, as demonstrated above, Japan starts from a far lower base in terms of overall state support for higher education and especially for the social sciences and humanities.

A discourse of skepticism regarding the social relevance of these fields had long been building in Japanese society. Nishiyama attributes this partly to developments in neuroscience and the life sciences that have been portrayed as displacing or rendering redundant the traditional mission of the humanities to provide "humanistic enlightenment" (2013: 7). Policymakers and much of the media tend to discuss

education as a technical process, so that issues such as bullying or dropping out from school are portrayed predominantly as problems of individual maladjustment rather than societal dysfunction (Arai 2016; Vickers 2017a). Arai shows how psychologists have gained influence in Japanese education policymaking since the 1990s, in tandem with the growing influence of conservative nationalists. The attraction of psychology to conservatives lies in its aura of scientific objectivity and its abstention from social critique. The more that social problems can be blamed on individual pathologies and then medicalized or micro-managed, the more effectively criticism of the established political and social order is deflected.

At the same time, some Japanese social scientists have reflected critically on very real problems with the current state of teaching and research in their fields. Some of these issues involve shifts in Japanese society to which universities must respond, such as declining student numbers and limited opportunities for new social science and humanities graduates. Demographic shrinkage implies a more challenging environment for those taking higher degrees in these fields, with Minatsuki observing that graduate schools are increasingly churning out "highly qualified working poor" (2009: 265).

But the problems in bringing youngsters and especially those from more diverse backgrounds into the academic profession are exacerbated by factors internal to universities. Among these is the lack of a structured, transparent system for recruitment or promotion – crucial factors in the continued discrimination against women and foreigners. As Yonezawa et al. put it, "the strong decision-making power of the professoriate in recruiting new faculty members has continuously worked more or less in favor of inbreeding and colonization" (2018: 142). In Kyushu University, where inbreeding is perhaps especially severe, around 60–70% of permanent faculty graduated from the institution itself. Regarding what they term "colonization," a study cited by Yonezawa et al. (op. cit.) found that in 1961, the alumni of 6 out of 250 universities dominated around a half of all full-time university positions in Japan; by 2001, the figures were 12 out of 669. This reflects how "old boys'" networks among the professoriate help skew recruitment across the board in favor of graduates of a narrow range of institutions. Such problems are exacerbated by the almost complete lack of any tenure track or habilitation procedure for determining permanent appointments and by the entrenched practice of promotion-by-seniority. Most faculties display an "inverted pyramid" structure, dominated by often unproductive senior professors (Nishiyama 2013: 27). There is some recognition that scholars do need to do more to engage with wider society and prepare their students to do so (Minatsuki 2009: 265), but this has so far spurred little reform.

These self-critical points are amplified by Yoshimi (2016), who portrays social science and humanities departments as inward-looking and barricaded against each other and the outside world by a network of "walls." These include "interdepartmental walls," which often serve to actively discourage collaboration with colleagues in other faculties, or make it difficult for students to take courses in other departments. As a result, as Yoshimi puts it, Japanese tertiary institutions resemble loosely federated "united colleges" rather than genuine universities (153). Another crucial barrier is that of language, with academics in social science and humanities

fields typically unwilling or unable to operate in foreign languages; this contributes to what Yoshimi, using a metaphor frequently deployed in Japan, terms the "Galapagos-ization" of Japanese academia. Further "walls" that he identifies relate to entrance examinations (with departments running independent, elaborate, and typically highly labor-intensive systems over which control is fiercely defended); study years (i.e., dividing students strictly by year of entry or seniority); and the enormously time-consuming "job-seeking activities" (就職活動), which consume most of the final year of the 4-year undergraduate degrees. Taken together, these "walls" embody an overwhelmingly defensive academic culture, with "tradition" habitually invoked to repel all forms of outside interference (many similar points are made by Vickers and Rappleye 2015).

The academic response to the attack on the status of the social sciences and humanities has been varied. Tokyo and Kyoto Universities, the country's most prestigious, rebuffed calls for any major review of their offering in these fields. A number of senior public intellectuals (Yoshimi among them) forcefully defended the value of the social sciences and humanities while also engaging in thoughtful self-criticism (see also Vickers 2016a). Among the most forceful was the President of Shiga University, Sawa Takamitsu, who penned a blistering critique of a country that ever since the pre-war period "has consistently favored the sciences and engineering" (2016: 68). Alluding to Japan's fascist past, he wrote that it was a "law of history" that "totalitarian countries dismiss (排斥) knowledge in the social sciences and humanities, and countries that dismiss knowledge in the humanities and social sciences will inevitably become totalitarian" (2016: 71). He went on to stress that neglect of these fields was not only wrong, but self-defeating in terms of the Ministry's own self-declared goals – namely, the pursuit of enhanced international rankings for Japanese institutions.

Elsewhere, however, the response was far less forceful. The journal *Chuo Koron* invited national university presidents to respond to a questionnaire designed to gauge their reaction to the ministry statement on social science and humanities departments. All avowed their support for these fields, but often in rather vague terms. Quizzed on their own expertise, the vast majority turned out to be scientists, engineers, or medics. Meanwhile, at many national universities below the very top tier of Tokyo and Kyoto, senior management has been eager or anxious to demonstrate compliance with the spirit of the ministerial edict. One former imperial university established an interdisciplinary Asian Studies Institute dominated by medics, engineers, architects, and information scientists, marginalizing the study of Asian politics, societies, and cultures. The same institution seriously considered, though eventually abandoned, a proposal to abolish its Department of Education and enfold it within a new "Department of Psychological Science and Education"; many humbler institutions have followed through with similar proposals to merge or abolish their education departments.

A key structural factor inclining institutions to toe the ministerial line is extremely heavy reliance on public funding disbursed by MEXT via the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). Such reliance is especially heavy in the social sciences and humanities, where prospects of attracting funding from business and

industry are comparatively slim. Institutions typically place intense pressure on staff to secure funding through this route, which also pays "overheads" to the university administration. At some institutions, faculties are penalized if in any single year fewer than 90% of their members apply for (or are receiving) JSPS funding. The application process is elaborate, fiendishly bureaucratic, and extremely time-consuming. Since there are no strong incentives for institutions to pre-screen applications, the committees of senior academics tasked with assessing proposals are invariably swamped. But the criteria for assessment are vague and opaque, and – perhaps inevitably, given the volume of proposals – feedback is nugatory, consisting of numerical scores and generic comments. Evidence of concerted discrimination against applications in particular fields is hard to pin down, but confronted with this official "black box," many institutions and individuals prefer to play safe.

9.7 Controversial Research in a Hostile Climate: The Case of "Comfort Women"

At this point it is pertinent to invoke my own experience of the research environment in Japan, particularly in relation to work on the representation of the wartime past. From 2010 to 2013, I was involved in coordinating an international research network on "East Asian Images of Japan," funded by the Leverhulme Trust (a private British foundation), and from 2014 was a core member of a related Leverhulme International Network, this time on "War Memoryscapes in Asia" (WARMAP). For the latter project, I conducted research into the commemoration of "comfort women" in museums around East Asia, particularly in China, as well as recent efforts by Chinese, Koreans, and others to gain recognition for an archive of related materials – "Voices of the Comfort Women" – through UNESCO's Memory of the World Register.

Comfort women were those tricked or coerced into working as prostitutes serving the Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War, in a system overseen and coordinated by the military itself (in a wider context in which prostitution was legal throughout Japan and its dominions and trafficking in women for sex was thus effectively state sanctioned – see Mamiya 2015). Since the 1980s, this issue has been a significant source of controversy within Japan itself and has bedeviled relations with the country's neighbors, especially Korea. It is particularly neuralgic for Japanese nationalists, who typically refuse to accept either that Japan ever in fact instituted such a system, or that any of the women were coerced, or that their prostitution was in any way coordinated by the military, or that, if it was, there was anything wrong or unusual about this. The current prime minister, Abe Shinzo, has been particularly prominent among such "denialists." (See Chap. 1 for a discussion on the research on comfort women in South Korea, which faces the opposite challenge.)

Since Abe's return to the premiership in 2012, his administration has coordinated a worldwide campaign to counter or suppress attempts to draw attention to comfort women. As a leading (now Japanese-owned) British newspaper reported, the Japanese government "insists there is no evidence that the women were 'forcefully taken away' and tries to police discussion, making a formal complaint whenever the *Financial Times* uses the term 'sex slaves'" (Harris and Harding 2018). UNESCO itself has been intimidated by Japan (until recently the organization's largest donor) into changing its own rules in order to block the inscription of a "Voices of the 'Comfort Women'" archive on its Memory of the World Register (Vickers 2017b). Meanwhile, discussion of the comfort women has been almost entirely eliminated from Japanese secondary school history textbooks. Whereas, in the mid-1990s, most texts mentioned the issue, by 2016 it had been expunged from all but one text approved for use in schools.[1] The *Asahi Shimbun*, which played a prominent role in publicizing the comfort women phenomenon in the early 1990s, was in 2014 forced to retract a slew of articles that turned out to have been based on false testimony – thus lending a spurious legitimacy to rightist claims that the entire issue was bogus (for a review of the Japanese-Korean controversy on this matter, see Mamiya 2015).

These developments were among those that prompted around 400 scholars of Japan, mostly based in America, to sign an "Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan," voicing concerns about the intimidation of critical scholars and erosion of media freedom. The letter's publication was timed to coincide with an official visit by Abe to the United States in May 2015. I subsequently added my signature to the letter. Almost immediately, I received an email from several individuals associated with a revisionist group calling itself "The Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact." The mail repeated standard rightist claims regarding the supposed lack of evidence for Japan's wartime atrocities and accused signatories to the open letter of hate speech and racial discrimination.[2] Some days later, I was contacted by an NHK reporter keen to discuss my reasons for signing the letter – something very few Japan-based academics had done. We subsequently had a lengthy phone conversation, during which she admitted that she was doubtful whether senior editors at NHK would permit dissemination of the story she was compiling. And indeed, her report was never broadcast or published.

One significant Japanese media outlet that then still featured highly critical reporting on the "history wars" and other controversial issues was the English-language *Japan Times.* In late 2016, an essay of mine on the Japanese government's UNESCO diplomacy in the online magazine, *The Diplomat*, was instantly republished in the *Japan Times* as an op-ed (Vickers 2016b). But when I followed this a

[1] The Women's Active Museum (WAM) in Tokyo has tracked coverage of the comfort women issue in school textbooks since the 1990s, and the results are displayed in their exhibition.

[2] This sort of insult is mild by comparison with the sort of harassment some Japanese researchers and campaigners on this issue have experienced. WAM (referenced in the previous footnote) has received bomb threats. Two international conferences on comfort women recently convened in Tokyo (in April 2017 and November 2018) were held in the windowless underground hall of the Korean YMCA in order to prevent rightists with their sound trucks from disrupting proceedings.

year later with another *Diplomat* essay commenting on Japan's successful blocking of the inscription of the Voice of the "Comfort Women" archive (Vickers 2017b), the *Japan Times* did not republish. In the interim, the newspaper had undergone a change in ownership, discontinuing a regular column by the outspoken Tokyo-based American scholar, Jeff Kingston (cited above). Later, in November 2018, it announced a shift in editorial policy whereby the term "forced labor" would no longer be used to describe Koreans and Chinese compelled to work for the Japanese war machine during the Asia-Pacific War, and descriptions of comfort women as "forced" sex workers would also be dropped (McCurry 2018).

How, though, does this political and media environment relate to the state of academic freedom in Japan? On the one hand, as my own experience testifies, no one can prevent a tenured academic in a national university from conducting politically sensitive research. But when the mainstream media ignore findings critical of the government's stance, and when officially approved school history textbooks ignore the scholarly consensus, the significance of the freedom to conduct research is diminished. Attempts by scholars to publicize critical views provoke harassment from the political right that many Japanese academics find intimidating. The response of colleagues with whom I discuss my research has been: maybe you can get away with it because you are not Japanese, but this is an issue we don't dare touch. And the risks incurred by non-tenured, junior scholars who venture into this area are especially acute. I know of one such individual who had her attachment to a research center abruptly terminated when she revealed that she was conducting comfort women-related research. "We don't do that kind of work," she was told.

Nevertheless, even if many scholars assume that applications for official research funding on issues such as the comfort women will be rejected, there is as yet no clear evidence of such systemic bias on the part of the JSPS. In fact, rightists have made the opposite claim. In 2018, a conservative LDP legislator, Sugita Mio, attacked the use of public research funding (*kakenhi* 科研費) for research into "anti-Japanese" topics such as "comfort women", wartime forced labor, and Okinawan Independence (Sankei Shimbun 2018). Her demands that the ministry explain the criteria for its decisions were met with the response that discussing individual cases in this way would be to countenance "political interference in academic freedom."

This seems to indicate a robust defense of the principles of academic freedom on the part of officialdom. However, given the broader political climate, and with financial stringency rendering universities and academics ever more desperate to curry official favor, courting criticism from the nationalist right has come to seem increasingly risky. When senior officials exhort scholars in embattled social science and humanities faculties to demonstrate a commitment to responding to "social needs," many are inclined to second-guess official definitions of what those "needs" might be. In the context of the Abe administration's broader higher education strategy and attempts to police discussion of controversial issues, attacks on researchers

by LDP rightists feed scholarly anxiety in ways that bureaucratic rebuttals cannot easily assuage.[3]

9.8 Conclusion

Many of the challenges to academic freedom in contemporary Japan are comparable, and indeed related to, those confronting universities in many other societies. The march of New Public Management, with its associated "tyranny of metrics" (Muller 2018); demands from politicians, media, and business for spending on mass higher education to demonstrate a clearer economic return; and growing skepticism concerning the value of funding for the social sciences and humanities – all of these are features of recent debate over the role of universities across the Anglophone world and elsewhere. Moreover, as Lukianoff and Haidt argue (2018), a lack of political diversity on campus and the attendant dangers of groupthink and harassment of dissenting voices have recently posed growing threats to academic freedom in many Western universities.

However, the situation in Japan displays several distinctive features. Here there is a lack of political pluralism not simply on campus, but across society more widely. Added to the weakness of civil society institutions such as trades unions, and the herd-like modus operandi of the mainstream media, this undermines the capacity of academics and of universities as institutions to resist the government's agenda or shape alternatives. The perception that universities exist not so much to pursue the truth as to serve national ends, defined primarily as enhancing economic competitiveness and fostering "human capital," is more strongly entrenched and less contested here than in many other societies. Humanities and social sciences may be under attack in the West as well, but in Japan they start from a far weaker position.

For these reasons, the predominantly defensive reaction of Japanese faculty to various reforming initiatives over the past 20 or 30 years is understandable. Lack of capacity to operate in English and other foreign languages certainly contributes to the "Galapagos-izing" tendency that Yoshimi criticizes. However, at the same time, a distinctive Japanese space for academic discourse needs to be preserved in the face of the homogenizing force of Anglophone and Western-centric scholarship and the rankings and metrics that increasingly underpin it. If such distinctiveness were

[3] In a special issue of *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, my fellow contributors and I further reflect on the politics of comfort women-related heritage in Japan and East Asia. This includes a discussion with the Japanese-American filmmaker Miki Dezaki, whose documentary *Shusenjo: The Real Battleground of the "Comfort Women" Issue* featured interviews with Sugita Mio and other prominent rightists. These figures subsequently sued him, forcing him into a lengthy and potentially expensive process of litigation that is still ongoing. The summer of 2019 also featured an uproar over official censorship when a threat to withdraw official funding led to the removal of a comfort women display from the Aichi Triennale Art Festival in Nagoya (the display was later reinstated, but visitor access was restricted).

lost, that would be to the detriment not just of Japan but of the world in general (Rappleye 2018).

But what sort of academic space is actually being defended today in the name of "faculty autonomy"? University faculties, even in the humanities and social sciences, remain overwhelmingly male and ethnically homogenous. In addition to the chronic lack of diversity among tenured academics, students lack any voice in faculty governance. Rather than actively seeking ways to collaborate across faculty or departmental boundaries, let alone engage more actively with civil society or the political world, academic energies tend to be concentrated on shoring up the defensive "walls" that Yoshimi describes. And behind those barricades, what is often being preserved, among other things, is the freedom to exploit or marginalize – or just ignore and exclude – women and foreigners. If faculty autonomy gives scholars the freedom to embrace diversity and challenge themselves and their students to see the world from different perspectives, they have so far largely failed to use it for such purposes.

This is unfortunate, since now more than ever what Japan needs is scholars committed to pursuing critical research on history, politics, sociology, and culture and to engaging forcefully with those outside the university who are skeptical of the value of such work. The Abe administration's aspiration to reinstate certain constitutional features of the pre-war period cannot be compared in scope or severity with that era's fascist assault on academic freedom. But the narrow and largely negative focus of many academics on resisting reforms to their own institutions, in the name of faculty autonomy, echoes the response of their 1930s predecessors to official interference. What Marshall termed "the conflation of university autonomy and academic freedom" led scholars during the fascist era to sacrifice the meaningful exercise of their autonomy (along with the careers of their more outspoken colleagues) in order to preserve its empty shell.

Academics in Abe's Japan face a difficult choice: Do we repeat that pre-war pattern – shoring up our external defenses, seeking to maintain professional self-governance within the narrow bounds of the faculty while retreating from confrontation with the social and political forces that fundamentally threaten academic freedom? Or do we adopt a more positive, activist stance, seeking not just to resist objectionable reforms, but to articulate and exemplify a vision of the university as a microcosm of a more open, tolerant, and plural society? Not just in Japan, but especially here, the times call for dragons, not turtles.

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Chapter 10
South Korea: Managerial Wisdom in Higher Education for a Selective Academic Repression

Jae Park

10.1 Introduction

The modern Korean peninsula has been a geopolitically hot location with a continuous identity-seeking tension between cultural-political survival efforts and a no less compelling urge to modernize itself while coming to terms with surrounding imperial powers and the world in globalizing world.

The first modern higher education (HE) institution in Korea, the Legal Training School,[1] which would be a part of the 1946 foundation of the Seoul National University, was established by a royal charter in 1895. The final years of the Chosŏn dynasty were marked by intense hegemonic struggles among the surrounding empires: militaristic Meiji Japan in a colonial expansion geopolitics via Korea, Czarist Russia's interest of securing a Far East Russia with an eye on the Korean peninsula, and the fast-declining Qing China. The higher education system in South Korea has been subject to the vicissitudes of time, every so often a victim of colonial politics, and in some other instances, a source of intellectual energy to build up a nation. Korea's early relationship with Western academia during the Japanese colonial period was far from an intellectually liberating and fruitful experience as was the case of Yale University academic George Trumbull Ladd and his service to the Japanese colonial authorities in Korea as their eulogy-loaded spokesperson to the West (Schmid 2002: 163–164).

In 2011, South Korea had "376 official HE institutions that support 3.7 million students and 60,000+ academic staff. This includes 179 private four-year

[1] Noninstitutional high learning system existed in the form of a school of thought by mentor and mentees. See Kim and Kim (2013).

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universities, 43 national universities, polytechnics, cyber-universities and other types. Two-year and three-year Junior (Community) colleges number 149, with a student population of 770,000 and 12,500 faculty. In 1970, there were 160 HE institutions serving about 200,000 students" (Parry 2011). During the decade 2009–2018, the number of universities remained stable at about 200, while Junior (Community) colleges decreased by 7% (So 2019). The student enrolment rate in tertiary education is today stable at about 95% (OECD-Data 2019) with the visible presence of universities with strong business and engineering/technology faculties in global HE-ranking tables (THE 2019). Almost all the top-ten Korean universities in the *Times Higher Education* ranking have their main forte in business, science, and technology programs (Table 10.1).

Within this already science-dominant context, this chapter looks into the processes whereby South Korea further eroded social sciences and humanities programs during the 2015–2016 higher education reform based on the so-called academic capitalism with descriptors such as managerialism, commercialization, and corporatization of universities. A first layer of analysis discusses how the South Korean higher education system has succumbed to the imperatives of an ideal and perfectly functioning workforce, according to Weber's concept of what is necessary for social cohesion, which is the primary consideration in managerial reasoning. In this reasoning, the foremost mission and vision of universities and academics should be that of graduates' job placement, paired with an imperative that, to be effective and sustainable (a buzzword we seldom hear being questioned), universities must attain maximum efficacy with minimum expenditure through bureaucratic management:

> The university's organizational and institutional interests are not well served by the expanded role of its management cadre. Indeed, the growing power of management and the decline of the faculty's role in governance has exposed the university to such classic bureaucratic pathologies as shirking, squandering, and stealing (Ginsberg 2011: 66).

Managerialism in higher education (Lynch 2015) has caused significant changes in Western universities (Altbach 2004: 2012), among which austerity measures have arguably been the handiest and strongest justification of recent higher education

Table 10.1 University rankings in South Korea 2020, *Times Higher Education*

Rank	World rank	University
1	64	Seoul National University
2	89	Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
3	=110	Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
4	=146	Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH)
5	=179	Korea University
6	197	Yonsei University (Seoul campus)
7	201–250	Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST)
8	301–350	Kyung Hee University
9	351–400	Hanyang University
10	401–500	Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology
10	401–500	Sejong University

policies across the world (Nixon 2017). East Asia is no exception; at approximately the same time, both Japan and South Korea came up with higher education reforms with austerity *qua* managerial wisdom as a core rationalization. Their policies had minimal or no public consultation except for brief professional consultancy and pilot implementation. In the name of austerity, governments dictate university programs or faculties to be merged or shut down; the kind of students to be recruited; and the specialties of the professors to be hired. But what is the origin of austerity? Are all austerity measures in higher education clean, plain, and without veiled agendas? Can austerity be instrumentalized to achieve goals other than financial? These are the questions to be answered in this chapter by showcasing the HE reform saga in South Korean academia.

10.2 Accountability Discourses

Before discussing the South Korean case, we should take a look at the discourse of austerity both in the West and East. This is because austerity by itself could be the subject of both positive and negative interpretations across different political and cultural traditions.

In English, a 500-year semantic distance separates austerity as a virtue and austerity as reduction in public spending. The latter was first used only in 1937 by John Maynard Keynes in *The Times* of London (OED 2012) at the outset of what will be known later as Keynesian economics, which rippled out from the British Isles to the world. Although Keynesian economics kept afloat a desperately troubled Europe of the time, it sounds to the sensitivities of today like a choice that is a necessary evil and rather uncomfortable.

Austerity had long been a deep-seated value in Europe since Plato's conceptualization of "temperance" (Gk. *egkrateia* – ἐγκράτεια) in his philosophically narrated drinking party or *Symposium* (196c). The next great discourse related to austerity was Aristotle's identification of temperance as an essential virtue (Gk. *arete* – ἀρετή) of ruler-citizens who ought to manage their city-state not only by obeying the law but also acting rationally (*Politics*: 1277b9-10, 1260a5-8). This pioneering discursive amalgamation of politics, excellence, and moderation was also preached and practiced by the Stoics and eventually enshrined by Christian Europe (Pieper 1966).

This millennial *aretaic* discourse of temperance as self-control, moderation, and self-restraint from squandering resources and other excesses was never totally forgotten or dismissed by modern Europe. In fact, the utter rejection of the system of hierarchical honor, *préférence* and opulence, led the downfall of the *Ancien Régime* (Taylor 1991). Therefore, there has never been any major reason for the West to reproach austerity except perhaps a subjective discrepancy between the way people tend to value it as a virtue and how they experience it, that is, a dialectics of axiology versus phenomenology and taste versus feel.

In arguing here that the South Korean conservative government has compromised higher education's academic freedom, with austerity as its main justification,

we cannot discard the possibility that South Korea's austerity measures on higher education have been greatly influenced by the West. Nevertheless, it is also possible that such measures are defensible with Eastern values. The Buddhist discourse of detachment from the material world; Daoist metaphysics of supremacy of immaterial *chi* (氣); and Confucian moral philosophy all generally commend austerity. For example, in praising his favorite disciple Yen Hui, Confucius is cited as follows:

> The Master said, "Incomparable indeed was Hui! A handful of rice to eat, a gourdful of water to drink, living in a mean street – others would have found it unendurably depressing, but to Hui's cheerfulness it made no difference at all. Incomparable indeed was Hui!" (Analects 6–9 in Waley and Confucius 1938).

A reading of the passage could be that austerity itself is not a virtue. Virtue is instead taking up austerity and frugality with resilience and in good spirit as a *junzi* (君子 superior person) with *ren* (仁 altruism/humanness), when it is only natural for ordinary people to be upset and feel miserable. Indeed, for agrarian China and Asia, seasonal abundance was linked to heaven's blessings to be celebrated with festivals, whereas austerity was more of a misfortune if not a curse, signalling a lack of heavenly assistance and blessing.

10.3 Austerity as *Causa Belli*

Western institutions of higher education have recently been under austerity measures, but these have not been uniform either in modality or in scale of their repercussions (Nixon 2017). Unlike Asia, where austerity measures were handed down during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the European ones seem to come in cycles and are better consulted and politically negotiated, self-imposed, and uneven across countries and institutions.

We have also seen that among global social institutions, it is time-honored higher education that has become a common target of state-imposed austerity measures (Nixon 2017). An initial analysis could run as follows. First, for more than a decade, there has been a very rapid growth in student enrolment in higher education concomitant with growth in infrastructure and increased numbers of academic staff (Altbach 2012). Second, this phenomenal growth rate has resulted in a huge expansion of infrastructure and bureaucracy. Third, administration and management in higher education have become increasingly dependent on subsidies and corresponding regulations by state- and public-private partnerships under the banner of "global practices" such as marketization, privatization, and decentralization.

Governments across the globe have rapidly changed their identities in higher education from that of being a public agent into a market-based pragmatic/utilitarian agent. Can this alone be considered the definition of "academic capitalism"? Perhaps, but the capital involved here is no longer driven by a liberalism of old. We are witnessing the ascent and triumph of neoliberal ideologies which are no longer preoccupied with an ideological commitment to laissez-faire. They openly endorse

interventionist states that propel a system of competition for internal markets and quasi-markets in which students and teachers are simply commodities and commodifying agents.

Today, managerialism in higher education is globally rampant (Lynch 2015). Authorities are subject to market principles that encourage competition among higher education institutions while not minding at all that the state is funding the private sector. Neoliberal political and economic discourses in Asia have further eroded traditional public safety-net systems provided by weaker and less competitive higher education institutions. Now, highly regarded public institutions in East Asia are held responsible for their own success or failure and are proportionally funded based on research performance with a new nomenclature of excellence hierarchy.

Both reflecting and affected by this global phenomenon, neoliberal discourses of competitiveness, efficiency, and political currencies of accountability are rather visible in South Korea, and they are on the rise. But a deeper layer of analysis may reveal a more intriguing and interesting interplay among self-imposed ideological paradigms and HE policies and how these values are being forwarded regardless of unequal political creeds of different governments or of conservative or progressive principles.

This is why there is a need to look at HE austerity measures more critically, that is, austerity not as a social virtue or salvific Keynesian remedy for financial catastrophes but as a vice of instrumentalization and posing it as a *causa belli* for an incumbent power structure to materialize its social and political agenda. As we will discuss in the following sections, the main and ultimate victim of 2015–2016 HE reform in South Korea was academic freedom, but it was a selective repression on humanities and social sciences.

10.4 South Korean Higher Education in Context

In analyzing the general context of the 2015–2016 reform of higher education in South Korea, a number of paradoxes in basic indicators are glaringly noticeable. For instance, South Korea is now the world's 15th largest economy, with a gross domestic product per capita, at nominal values, of US$27,222, which ranks it number 28 in the world (World Bank 2015); but on the other hand, its economy heavily relies on manufacturing production and export. About 80% of South Korean higher education institutions are private, and it was the private sector that led the bulk of the sector's expansion after the Korean War (Shin 2018). Unlike other Asian countries such as Japan and China, private higher education institutions in South Korea are no less prestigious than public ones (Kim 2008). Most South Korean higher education students are therefore rather content in private universities in a country that continues to mesmerize the world with its oversupply of universities and the highest student enrolment rate in the world, paired with a falling employment rate of their graduates.

Democratization of South Korean politics in the late 1980s brought about positive changes in academic freedom, university autonomy, and governance. From then

onward, participation of faculty constituency and other stakeholders of the university in the selection of presidents has been crucial, especially in public universities (Shin 2018). Generally, faculties' role in selecting middle administrators such as deans is highly significant. Regarding the freedom for research and personal opinion, Korean political democratization also allowed faculties to do research in domains and topics of their interest with corresponding publicizing. Nevertheless, faculties are not without scrutiny by the general public and the Korean judiciary power as shown in the cases of the internationally disgraced Korean stem cell researcher Woo Suk Hwang in 2006 as well as a recent high court sentence of a researcher investigating comfort women (Redden 2017).

It would be a bit too simplistic to describe South Korean academia's current state of academic freedom as the result of global neoliberal trends that result in a particular type of capitalism which, in turn, brings harm to academic freedom. A more longitudinal and situated analysis is appropriate.

South Korean academia has a unique legal background which must be taken into consideration to understand the situation it is in today. The government has direct control over both public and private higher education regardless of different funding schemes (Kim 2008; Ministry of Education Science and Technology 2009). By law (the Private School Law) even private universities are under state control instead of the greater autonomy that is common among global private universities. Such a situation is similar to or even mimics Japanese regulations (Park 2017). South Korean government funding of private higher education institutions dates back to the 1990s, and such subsidy has had clear potentials to compromise administrative freedom of private institutions in the name of public accountability and to eventually erode academic freedom. Thus, politically imposed structural changes in South Korean institutions by a succession of ruling regimes were only a matter of time.

Policies on higher education during the presidencies of Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) and Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) were, respectively, (1) post-dictatorship, sociopolitical euphoria, and enthusiastic welcoming of globalization that was quickly muted by the Asian financial crisis and (2) a quest for internationalization with an emphasis on English language instruction and a quest to achieve "world-class" status. These two stages of the reform of higher education in South Korea – what I call "Early Korean academic capitalism" – were a result of recently reclaimed basic liberties and a celebrative mood that characterized the post-military period, which coincided with the collapse of Cold War political tensions in the region. The Cold War was a major obstacle for South Korean international relations, and the higher education sector was a key state apparatus (Althusser 2006) that played an ambivalent role in the production of knowledge that either sustained and further fueled Cold War political tensions or reacted against them.[2]

[2] Recent reverberation of Cold War dynamics due to Vladimir Putin's doctrine of nationalistic assertiveness is unlikely to bring back a comparable level of tensions to institutions of higher education. For a discussion of knowledge production and its role in colonized Korea and during the Cold War, see related works (Chen 2010; Park 2016).

This political honeymoon and adaptation period brought about deep changes to South Korean society. The film industry, K-pop cultural products, and other social institutions were all busy and flourished in their adjustment to liberal democracy. Politically freed, South Korean academia and the society as a whole were now in an intense quest to become global somebodies. When the social democrat Roh Moo-hyun ascended to the presidency (2003–2008), he felt the need to materialize the restructuring of the South Korean society. Roh Moo-hyun was known as a socialist leader with a workers union advocacy background, but in terms of his higher education policies, he was rather "liberal right." His policy on higher education was unpopular only at par with his attempt to change the South Korean capital from Seoul to a newly developed Southern City. His 2004–2005 reform of higher education was far more explicitly and strategically liberal than the two previous regimes. It primarily focused on

> (i) enrolment cuts, and merger and acquisition policies; (ii) specialization of the existing private higher educational institutions; (iii) incorporation of the national universities; (iv) forming new university-industry links for regional economic development; and (v) the liberation of the domestic education market (Ministry of Education 2005 as cited in Kim 2008: 562).

The policy package as a whole can be considered as a prototypical measure of academic capitalism with justifications such as administrative efficiency, mergers, and the corporatization of universities. It is not clear, however, why this particular academic capitalism should be regarded as being the direct and main culprit responsible for damage to South Korean academic freedom. This needs further analysis at deeper layers.

10.5 From Labor Union Leader to Businessman

The 2004–2005 reform of higher education during the government of Roh Moo-hyun was paradoxical in several accounts. Its principles were far from anything one would expect from a socialist president known for his defense of workers and people in the "peripheries" of South Korean society. Indeed, from its formulation, the reform was at odds with the traditional public safety net provided by non-elite and often less than competitive higher education institutions. Instead, the reform seemed to aim at sharpening the competitive edge of South Korean universities: "elitization." For example, during and around the 2004–2005 reform, about 46% of the government research funding was offered to the top-ten institutions – regardless of the public-private sector division (Kim 2008: 561).

Noteworthy aspects of the 2004–2005 reform were induced mergers and acquisitions with different combinations involving universities, industrial colleges, and junior colleges; trimming down the higher education sector, such as annual undergraduate intake; and reduction in the total number of private universities (Kim 2008). Further policy maneuvers included financial measures such as funding withdrawal; increasing specialization and competition among top universities; reprofiling and specializing private universities; restructuring higher education

administration in general, such as the incorporation of national/public universities in which university presidents became managers or CEOs; and emphasis on university-industry-regional government alliances in order to obtain higher graduate employment rates. In addition, since December 2005 and under the framework of the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Trade in Services and trade agreement with the USA, the government allowed establishment of foreign universities in free economic zones (Kim 2008). Meanwhile, a few notorious cases of unfair student selection processes were exemplarily punished by the government in 2006 (Kim 2008: 562).

The next government, led by "businessman" President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013), put emphasis on auditing the management of higher education to enhance public accountability (Kim 2008). Byeon and Nam, both professors at South Korean University, report that President Lee strongly pushed forward the university restructuration policy initiated by previous governments (2012). Higher education reform implementation reached its heights in 2012 with the following: (1) incorporation of public universities; (2) area specialization of public universities; and (3) quality audit of private universities with the possibility of closing down operations of the lowest performer. Although Lee's higher education policies could best be described as a sequel of the 2004–2005 higher education reform, their intent was far more result-oriented. In 2012, the government listed 43 universities as not worthy of government subsidy; out of 17 universities monitored, student loans were banned for 12 universities; and two universities that were investigated for corruption were shut down (Byeon and Nam 2012).

Neither the "labor union leader" nor the "businessman" president was successful in fully implementing their higher education policies. For example, the incorporation of public universities met strong opposition from the general public who perceived that incorporation is just a stepping stone for privatization, which is a betrayal to the social cause of public education. Initially only two universities, namely, Seoul National University and Incheon National University, have been incorporated and through an irregular approval by lawmakers (Park 2011).

10.6 Selective Repression of Academic Freedom

During the next conservative government, led by Park Geun-hye (2013–2017 March), a hybrid alliance of pragmatism-conservatism delivered a blow against the higher education sector.

In 2015, after a professional consultation but no public one, the South Korean Ministry of Education announced its official and final decisions on PRIME, the Program for Industrial Needs-Matched Education (Lee 2015). Its main rationale was conspicuously Weberian in its main concern to sustain modern bureaucracy:

> Universities…are dominated and influenced by the need for the kind of 'education' that produces a system of special examinations and the trained expertness that is increasingly indispensable for modern bureaucracy (Weber 1946/2011: 4).

The policy was piloted in 21 universities in May 2016; these represented about 10% of all South Korean universities. The condition for this pilot scheme was that every university commits itself to reduce humanities students intake by 2500 while increasing intakes of students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) by 4500, creating a discrepancy of 7000 students between humanities and science (An 2016). The main goal of this policy is barely different from other higher education policies of the previous decade. The goal is to raise the average employment rate of graduates by 7.7% between 2015 and 2023 (An 2016).

This policy has been criticized for its manipulation of choice of school and/or major (Kim 2016). The conservative government under the leadership of Park Geun-hye was adamant about implementing it even as other more pressing problems arose, such as the impeachment of the president herself. The chief controversy at hand was whether a democratically elected government can forcefully scale-down humanities in higher education institutions and its consequential limits upon academic and intellectual freedom. It should be noted, however, that the downgrading of social science and humanities in higher education and their decline in popularity is indeed a global phenomenon (Eagleton 2015). For decades, humanities and social sciences have received reduced funding, student enrollments have been given a ceiling capacity, and related majors and programs have been silently depopulated worldwide. The only notable difference of the South Korean case is the swiftness and authoritarian character of the implementation of this move, unlike many global comprehensive universities (Ginsberg 2011) where social sciences and humanities have been subtly and gradually reduced over the years.

In the eyes of the government, the main mission of South Korean universities seems to be applied research and regional/global recognition in the international university ranking system, by which their governance would be assessed. In this battle for "face" and international recognition, university teaching is no longer a priority, and it is hypocritically delinked from knowledge transfer and meaningful service to the community. STEM-centered education policies (Curriculum Development Council 2015) dictate a course of action that includes redistribution of budget allocation, preferential selection of programs, and related staff hiring. On the surface, it aims at immediate effects including enhancing job placement rates, salary levels upon graduation, and the essentially flawed idea that all skill-demanding jobs are performed only by engineers and mathematicians.

Higher education and other education policies by democratically elected South Korean governments have traditionally been implemented in a top-down manner. The fact that there was no public consultation but only professional consultation is most telling about a political system that has never given up its wartime command-line hierarchical approach.

South Korean ministries, including education, have their own policy formulation units and research centers, such as the Korean Educational Development Institute devoted to research and development for general educational policy formulation, the Higher Education Policy Research Institute, and the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training (under the Prime Minister's Office) for technical and vocational education. These state-backed think tanks are composed of

technocrats in civil service careers and/or intellectual opportunists looking for an academic position or a better job in related industries. These advisory bodies have been feeding successive South Korean governments with higher education policy proposals and provide a public justification for imposing policies without having much multilateral public consultation or third-party consultancy.

The March 2017 impeachment of President Park was principally due to a public controversy over a "private" political advisor's interference in the governance with no public accountability or consultation. The difference between this behavior and the practice of pushing forward the conclusions of official think tanks seems only a matter of formality, but this is not how ordinary Korean citizens see the problem. In their view, perhaps, neoliberalism is not necessarily the main cause; there is instead a solid historical fact that political ideologies of every regime are not fully reflected in their governance, which also holds true for higher education policies.

10.7 Bedrocks of Korean Higher Education Reforms

With its "W" shape course, the Han River divides Seoul into the North River and South River halves. The southern half ("Gangnam" in Korean) is known for a lifestyle of the *nouveau riche* that was satirized in a globally acclaimed Korean popular song and choreography. The bedrock under this river, with water flowing above, provides a fitting image with which to depict the ephemeral and the permanent sources of Korean education policies. In this metaphor, the flowing water depicts the coming and going of politically appointed ministers and senior ministerial-level politicians, whereas the bedrocks represent civil servants, technocrats, and bureaucrats who are in the ministry to stay regardless of the ups and downs of Korean political tides.

When a new minister of education takes the position, logic tells us that it might take her/him about a year to grasp and take full control of the situation of her/his portfolio. The list of ministers of education since February 1993 (the first democratically elected government[3]) displays 25 ministers in 23 years, with an average of less than a year per person (MOE 2016). Korean ministers of education often step down before reasonably getting used to the post and without fully comprehending the basics of the ministerial portfolio. It is common knowledge that the job of minister of education is a post that is one of the most closely scrutinized by the general public and is thus the most volatile ministerial-level political position in Korea. By contrast, the mid-junior-level staff in the bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of Education are stable, and they are the actual brains and arms that run the Korean education system. They are also those who actually formulate policies on higher education institutions and monitor their implementation.

[3] Oh Moon-myeong was the 33rd minister of education since the foundation of the Korean Republic and first of the post-military democratic era. His term in office ran from 26 February to 21 of December of 1993.

New regimes in South Korea tend to discontinue and dismantle policies and funds allocated by past governments. This is a common practice to secure and reallocate funds for the new regime's policies, thereby swiftly self-defining their stance before their voters. As a result, South Korean education policies in general are short-lived, but higher education polices are relatively more stable compared with those for elementary and secondary education.

However there are a few exceptions to this usual educational policy "purge." The first is a policy that has been sustained across political regimes. This is an audit-based funding mechanism called the *Brain Korea 21* program aimed at achieving "world-class" postgraduate level education and research that emerged after the military junta period, and it has been in place during the entire democratic era. In its first stage (1999–2006), the South Korean government awarded a total of US$1.3 billion to 120 institutions and 440 projects (Kim 2008). The second stage was between 2006 and 2013, and it is currently in its third stage with the value-added name of *Brain Korea 21 plus* (2013–2020).

A second type of lasting higher education policy relies on a partial policy purge. A showcase would be the student admission system. While keeping the general idea of selecting the best secondary school graduates for university studies, the admission system has undergone significant changes in its requirements and *modus operandi*. There have been to-and-fro swings from an academic performance assessment-based system (also known as "relative evaluation") to a meritocratic/academic portfolio-based system ("absolute evaluation"). The secondary school assessment grade scale has changed from five to nine points, which has caused much anxiety among students and parents. Furthermore, there were also swings in the weight given to main items of assessments, namely, ability test, secondary school exam grades, and essay writing. Currently, there are two parallel assessment systems, namely, "Jeong-si" with (1) initial screening exam, (2) essay for second screening, and (3) personal interview that is different for every university and "Soo-si" with (1) secondary school exam marks and (2) portfolio based on merits in experiential learning, external activities, leadership experience, and awards. Currently far more weight is given to "Soo-si," which has been blamed for worsening social inequality with a vantage point that favors political and financial elites.

Longer-lasting higher education policies are proposed by state-sponsored think tanks and endorsed at the convenience and in different degrees by the regime in power, even though ministers of education in actuality have limited time to exercise their power.

10.8 Conclusion

At the peak of political control by South Korean president Park Geun-hye and prior to her impeachment in March 2017, South Korean higher education underwent a remarkable reform characterized by an explicit attack on faculties and programs of social sciences and humanities. This chapter is a critical analysis of what was an

overt repression in the name of managerial wisdom, austerity, and public accountability. The sort of erosion in academic freedom reported here does not only and necessarily derive from the capitalist dynamics of commodification, commercialization, and privatization. Instead, it also stems from a selective suppression of intellectual freedom of students and faculties to pursue their own intellectual interests and endeavors.

The 2015–2016 South Korean higher education reform proposed by technocrats and think tanks was endorsed by a political machinery. Arguably, a widespread assumption in the South Korean political mindset is that the government must play a proactive and energetic role (far from the liberal ideal of laissez-faire) in social engineering in order to face the challenges of knowledge-based economic globalization. This in turn would be indicative of some of the following long-standing South Korean geopolitical issues:

(1) A deeply engraved self-imagery of South Korean high-income economic standing on the one hand and, on the other, a collective memory of a nation lagging behind in modernity;
(2) a demographic crunch with a dwindling young population; and,
(3) an imagined crevasse between an economy still based on manufacturing and export (while most manufacturing now occurs in China and South East Asia) and a brave new world of a knowledge-based service economy.

It is possible to argue that a culprit of the 2015–2016 South Korean higher education repression is an astonishingly unyielding colonial subjectivity and its resulting complexes, which reverberate repeatedly. It runs like this: Korea needs to catch up with the West, so imitating, importing, and internalizing foreign knowledge are an existential imperative, in which the Korean language is a "low language." It appears to be the only consistent theme common across all South Korean higher education reforms in the democratic era.

The 2015–2016 South Korean reform of higher education was an odd blend of repressive and conservative politics (i.e., dismissal of careful public consultation and top-down execution) with justifications such as managerial efficacy, smart expenditure, and austerity. With the Weberian discourse of universities as productive of an ideal bureaucratic workforce as the chief rationale, the West-born discourse of STEM education was uncritically embraced with ensuing direct repression of non-STEM disciplines and fields in higher education.

It could be argued that the usual suspect of "academic capitalism," with cognates such as the commercialization and corporatization of universities and their concomitant austerity measures, is but a veneer under which a democratically elected government exerts power. Regardless of how much or how little policies are connected to the political ideology of the ruling party, they seem to be articulated and driven by the rather alien epistemologies of neoliberal globalization and the supremacy of a science stream workforce.

The interpretation that academic capitalism is detrimental to academic freedom is plausible but rather limited in its lineal thinking of cause and effect. In the South Korean case, the link between academic capitalism and academic freedom seems more complex than what meets the eye. A "triple helix" model with the following variables could be suggested – law, freedom, and autonomy. As Immanuel Kant

pointed out in the footnote to the preface in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788/1997), law exists to regulate freedom, and freedom is perceived (recognized) in accordance to the law. Policies enforced with law by nature ultimately delimit academic freedom in different degrees. Since freedom is the condition sine qua non for all truly human actions, both in academia and in ordinary life, its existence is, therefore, a ground for the acting agents (e.g., professoriates, students, and university as a whole) to be self-determining and autonomous. The formulation and implementation of the 2015–2016 South Korean higher education reform were clearly detrimental to academic freedom because they curtailed individual and collective autonomy and intellectual liberty.

To conclude with a greater picture, the crucial task of postcolonial and post-Cold War recovery of South Korean subjectivity is an unfinished task (Park 2016), to which social sciences and humanities have much to contribute. The selective repression of social sciences and humanities in universities can only regress the processes of development and decolonization that South Korea faces as a modern nation.

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Chapter 11
Commercialization and Corporatization: Academic Freedom and Autonomy under Constraints in Australian Universities

Linda Hancock

11.1 Introduction

Australia is a democratic nation where academic freedom has been enshrined and defended by vice chancellors,[1] academics, public servants, and politicians. While constraints on academic freedom of expression may therefore seem less than other countries included in this volume, they may just take a different form. With deregulation of previous caps on the number of students enrolled and subsequent "massification" (Coates et al. 2009) of higher education (HE) enrolments in Australia, the "enterprise university" of the early 2000s has morphed into "Higher Ed. Inc." under hardened, budget-driven neoliberal reforms. Neoliberalism is taken to encompass an ideological agenda where "all goods and services can and should be treated as if they have an exchange value" (Gonzales and Nunez 2014). Articulated under commercialization and corporatization (C&C), neoliberal reforms have impacted Australian HE resulting in degraded academic work conditions, deprofessionalization and increased job insecurity, and an entrenched small core and larger casualized-peripheral academic workforce. At the same time, HE enrollments have increased under deregulation. While there has been robust defense of

[1] As outlined by Universities Australia which publicly represents universities, vice chancellors in Australian universities have a dual role as "academic officer and chief executive officer for a university." Chancellors are appointed as chair of the university council which is the governing body of the university. They "confer the academic awards of the university and represent the university at meetings, functions, and ceremonies" (Universities Australia 2018a, b).

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the academic right to speak out publicly, political, systemic sectoral, and internal institutional pressures are structurally shifting the capacity for academic freedom and autonomy.

This chapter sketches Australian sectoral and cultural commitments to freedom of speech and more specifically academic freedom in Australia and depleted capacity for the exercise of academic freedom and autonomy within the academy. It then outlines the constraints accompanying the combined impacts of HE C&C and how these bear upon the complexities of academic freedom and autonomy: commercialization of research; the impact of cuts to HE government funding; shifts from education as a public to a private good; the impact of C&C on academic workloads and on professional autonomy; and impacts of increased reliance on international student fee income. This is linked to the last shift, the defense of academic freedom from foreign influence. Recent events have resulted in the defense of academic freedom of speech in the context of national debates on foreign influence in HE but amidst weakened academic capacity for academic autonomy and the clash of academic freedom against institutional commercial imperatives.

11.2 Legal, Cultural, and Sectoral Commitments to Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom in Australia

While universities in Australia are formally legally constituted under state and territory laws, providers are otherwise regulated nationally. In terms of governance, universities are self-governing bodies, overseen by councils or senates (to which vice chancellors report) and their academic boards (which oversee internal governance, teaching, learning, and research standards). Universities have autonomy to approve courses under self-accreditation, hire staff, and select students, seen today as a central hallmark of academic (institutional) freedom. Australian universities have autonomy or self-governance over staff recruitment, promotion and tenure processes; curricular design; and the appointment of department chairs, deans, and presidents (or vice chancellors in the Australian context).

Australian academics have enjoyed professional autonomy and academic freedom assumed under Western traditions as identified by Hao in this volume under the 1940 American Association of University Professors (AAUP) statement. While universities are self-accrediting, national oversight of quality standards is newly regulated by the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA), aimed at achieving regulatory uniformity,[2] which commenced in 2012 in response to varying institutions' standards and practices. National government regulation has recently set parameters under the Australian Quality Framework (AQF) and its regulator,

[2] While higher education includes levels 6–10 in the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) (with some overlap between universities and other HE providers in terms of awards approved), discussion here uses the term HE to refer only to university-based education rather than post-secondary education in general.

TESQA, resulting in a shift from professional autonomy as a collectively shared practice (e.g., within disciplines), to externally evaluated accountabilities through generic teaching and learning standards and nationally regulated, specified teaching and learning outcomes.

The over-arching concepts of freedom of speech and expression have a degree of high-level protection in Australia via government endorsement of international rights covenants and treaties. As a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), freedom of information, opinion, and expression are respected in Australia. Article 19 of the ICCPR states that "Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference" and the "right to freedom of expression (orally, in writing or in print), while also respecting "the rights or reputations of others" and with some restrictions for "the protection of national security or of public order (*ordre public*), or of public health or morals" (Article 19, ICCPR, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1998; United Nations 2011).

Drawing on General Comment No. 34 Article 19 of the ICCPR, the Australian Human Rights Commission (2017) "emphasizes that freedom of expression and opinion are the foundation stone for a free and democratic society and a necessary condition for the promotion and protection of human rights." This includes freedom of opinion and expression "essential for any society" (Australian Human Rights Commission 2017).

Bearing upon translation of freedoms of opinion and expression into the HE sector, these freedoms are linked to good governance and protection of human rights in Australia under Article 19, which states:

> Freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of the principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn, essential for the promotion and protection of human rights (Article 19, para 3).
>
> States parties are required to ensure that the rights contained in article 19 of the Covenant are given effect to in the domestic law of the State…. (Article 19, para 3) (Australian Human Rights Commission 2017 citing UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) 2011).

Australia is party to seven core international human rights treaties (Attorney-General's Department 2017). Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws "together with the *Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986* (Cth), prohibit breaches of human rights and discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction, social origin, age, medical record, criminal record, marital status, impairment, disability, nationality, sexual preference and trade union activity. The conduct prohibited may include speech or other forms of expression" (Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 2015, 3.103).

Despite these ostensibly robust rights frameworks, a potential sticking point for enforcement of individual human rights complaints is that the Australian Constitution refers only to a handful of "rights-type provisions" (such as religious freedom of expression) and a few other rights implied from the text or structure of the Constitution (Saunders 2010: 120). They are referred to as implied rights "because these provisions tend to be expressed as limits on Commonwealth power, rather than as positive rights" (Saunders 2010: 120). Australia does not have a bill or charter of rights and responsibilities that would formally incorporate human rights

(Zifcak and King 2013) and relies on the parliaments of the Commonwealth and States and the independent judiciary interpreting the common law (Saunders 2010). There is thus robust defense of the current protection of rights by both statutes and under the common law (Croucher 2016; Heydon 2013) as fundamental to democratic parliamentary governance, but no charter or bill positively asserting rights. Several parliamentary committees consider whether proposed bills are compatible with rights and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, established in 2011, has a more specific brief to assess compatibility with international human rights instruments ratified by the Australian Government (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 2017).

Australia has a strong track record of involvement in international recognition of human rights and was centrally involved in the 1960s establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But the former President of the Human Rights Commission 2012 to 2017 Gillian Triggs (2018) argues that Australia's commitment to human rights has regressed from those principles. She cites as illustrations increased Aboriginal deaths in custody today (showing worse outcomes than found by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 25 years ago), laws in relation to secrecy regarding off-shore detention centers (now withdrawn), refugees being held indefinitely and without charge or trial, and new laws on foreign interference and espionage (Australian Government 2018). With this selective whittling away of rights, ratification of UN Protocols and Conventions is not sufficient protection for direct translation of rights into action and redress mechanisms or access to justice via the courts, and some argue that rights-related covenants need to be "expressly incorporated into Australian legislation" (Wright 2013).

Several recent inquiries into freedom of speech have highlighted some of the limitations of Australia's approach to rights, including freedom of speech and expression, which bear particularly upon academic freedom and the exercise of the harm principle. Attorney-General Brandis initiated a "Freedoms Inquiry" by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), and in 2015 the Commission undertook a review of the common law protection of rights and freedoms in Australia. The inquiry focused on those laws that may be seen to interfere with common law rights and freedoms "to ensure that laws that limit traditional rights and freedoms are thoroughly scrutinised and encroachments justified" (Croucher 2016). The Commission's definition of freedom of speech "includes, but is not limited to, freedom of public discussion, freedom of conscience, academic freedom, artistic freedom, freedom of religious worship and freedom of the press" (ALRC 2015). Freedom of speech is described as "the freedom par excellence," since without it, no other freedom would survive (ALRC 2016: 14).

Recent controversies over freedom of speech are a topic in themselves but have involved complex issues, particularly in relation to anti-terrorism, national security laws, anti-discrimination laws, and race-related debates, especially the scope of Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the public interest, for example, in relation to journalists, academics, and whistleblowers speaking out publicly. Exceptions have involved specific application and definition of exemptions to freedom of speech in the criminal laws, secrecy laws, contempt laws,

anti-discrimination laws, media broadcasting and communication laws, information laws, and intellectual property laws (ALRC 2015). Submissions to the 2015 ALRC inquiry criticized the lack of safeguards to protect public interest disclosure and the encroachment of limitations on rights (see, e.g., Castan Human Rights Centre (Fletcher and Joseph 2015); Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC 2015)).

Constitutional lawyer Professor George Williams identified "350 instances of laws that infringe upon freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement, the right to protest and basic legal rights and the rule of law," with 209 enacted since 2001 (Williams 2015: 10). He cautions:

> since September 2001, enacting laws or regulations that infringe democratic freedoms has become a routine part of the legislative process. Basic values such as freedom of speech are not only being impugned in the name of national security or counter-terrorism, but for a range of mundane purposes. Speech offences now apply to a range of public places and occupations, and legislatures have greatly expanded the capacity of state agencies to detain people without charge or arrest. Such offences have become so normal and accepted that they can be turned into law without eliciting a community or media response (Williams 2015: 9).

Unlike countries such as South Africa, where "academic freedom and freedom of scientific research" is encompassed under the right to freedom of expression under article 16 of the South African Constitution, Australia is the only "democratic nation of the world that does not expressly protect freedom of speech in its national Constitution or an enforceable national human rights instrument" (Williams 2018). So, although Australia has a tradition of common law and statutory protection of basic freedoms including freedom of speech or expression, critics argue the fact that Australia does not protect freedom of speech in its Constitution and the lack of a charter of bill or rights or explicit legal instrument results in weak legal/institutional protections and a whittling away of rights by exceptionalism (Saunders 2010; Williams 2015: 2018). Importantly, under the Higher Education Support Act, every university is obliged "to have a policy that upholds free intellectual inquiry in teaching, learning and research" (Universities Australia 2018a).

11.3 Depleted Capacity for the Exercise of Academic Freedom and Autonomy Within the Academy

Australia is a self-professed democratic nation where freedom of expression is supported and actively defended and promoted. Academic freedom is encompassed both publicly and within universities, as self-managing autonomous entities with control over teaching and learning, personnel employment choices, research, and enterprise, within broader laws. Academic freedom of expression has been tested and upheld in cases of unpopular views being expressed publicly. In one such example, Professor Mirko Bagaric, head of Deakin University's Law School, in a joint 2005 article with Dr. Julie Clarke, argued that torture is defensible in extreme circumstances, for example, where interrogation of a terrorism suspect could avert

harm to many (Bagaric and Clarke 2005). In the midst of wide-ranging national and international criticism from academics, torture survivor groups, and civil libertarians, the university defended academic freedom of expression, and the authors were not sacked or sanctioned by their university. In light of these events, the then Minister for Immigration Amanda Vanstone said that Bagaric would be removed as a member of the Refugee Review Tribunal and reiterated that Australia is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture. But at the same time, she defended academic freedom as "a cherished part of Australian cultural life" (AAP 2005).

Vice chancellors have publicly defended freedom of academic expression (Universities Australia 2018a). Responding to public reactions to a report on the 2012 independent inquiry into the Australian media, conducted with former Federal Court Judge Ray Finkelstein and University of Canberra (UC) Professor Matthew Ricketson, UC Vice Chancellor Professor Stephen Parker stated:

> The University of Canberra is committed to academic freedom. We staunchly defend the right of our academics to write, speak and debate ideas in their area of expertise. Just last year we stood up to legal threats by a large, influential media organisation against a lone UC academic. We will no doubt be called upon to defend academic freedom again (Parker 2012).

Despite formal public defense of freedom of speech within the academy, the exercise of power over freedom of opinion and expression takes different forms, and the subtle workings of self-censorship need to be addressed within the marketized competitive sector discussed below under the interacting themes of corporatization and commercialization. Drawing on Lukes's (2005) three dimensions of power, the impact of neoliberal managerialism on academic autonomy is multilayered. Strong or direct use of power (Lukes's first dimension) may be exercised through hierarchical exercise of top-down managerialism by, for example, sackings and forced redundancies. Controlling the agenda through agenda setting (e.g., course restructuring as a means of forced staffing redundancies) illustrates Lukes's second dimension. The third more subtle form of power is embodied in discourses, practices, and implied understandings that set the parameters of acceptable deviation from pro-organizational norms and control over staff behavior.

In the book *The Establishment and How They Get Away with It*, British journalist and broadcaster Owen Jones (2015: xvii) pointed out the subtleties of power embedded in routine practices and argued it is "the system" – the Establishment – that is the problem, not the individuals who comprise it. New forms of academic command and control operate through Foucauldian capillaries of power, disabling the academic capacity to exercise academic freedom and rewarding performativity that accords with institutional political correctness. This may occur as discussed below, when commercial imperatives trump academic autonomy and, for example, staff are told to alter course content that may be offensive to fee-paying international students because of their government's policies. Bourdieu spoke of "academic capitalism" as a form of cultural capital. Taking this notion, Fraser and Taylor (2016: 3) argue that academic capitalism is "a term that can be used uncritically to champion free-market capitalism and the commodification of knowledge, labor, and everyday life; where specific forms of knowledge and professional expertise become the

'hard currency' of an entrepreneurial university." C&C encapsulate the mechanisms used in trends articulated internationally, to transform HE from educational knowledge production into markets.

11.4 Corporatization and Commercialization of HE Policy Reforms Under Neoliberal Reforms and the Impact on Academics

Against the backdrop of Australian and international legal and governance mechanisms related to protection of human rights, freedom of speech and expression, and ways of theorizing depleted capacity for the exercise of academic freedom and autonomy within the academy, C&C are central over-arching interpretive concepts. The policy reform agendas under corporatization and commercialization of government and HE institutional policies, underpinned by neoliberal ideologies, are highly relevant to structural constraints on the sector (in particular, reduced government investment in HE funding) and diminished work conditions for academics, alongside management cultures silencing dissent and stymying autonomy.

Corporatization encompasses the emphasis on managerialism, efficiency, and productivity characteristic of New Public Management reforms that swept across governments with reforms going back and forth between Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and the USA from the 1980s. This was predicated on assumptions that the public sector needed to learn to adopt more efficient private sector models of management and administration. The 1980s heralded an era where managerialism and efficiency in Australian HE mirrored federal and state governments' focus on public sector efficiency and performance-based appraisal, modeled on applying private sector models to public sector entities. Senior executive staff in universities adopted similar practices to senior public sector managers employed on contracts for undisclosed salaries and with backgrounds not necessarily in academia, engaged to steer universities as commercial enterprises.

The focus on efficiency has brought increasing metrification and performativity to the academy, impacting on intensification of academic workloads, where individuals' workload percentages on research, teaching, and service are determined in workload formulae on quantity (not quality) of measured outputs. These include numbers of students, hours of teaching, quantum of research grants from external sources, and publications in A-listed journals and books with top-ranked international publishers. Low-productivity academics are put onto teaching-intensive workloads that preclude time for grant applications and publications, resulting in a dual track system of teaching-intensive and research-intensive staff (see also Chap. 7 for similar practices in Macau). Courses and units within courses have been streamlined for mass delivery, with cloud learning previously used for off-campus delivery brought to on-campus and substituted for (more costly) face-to-face teaching. Staff performance appraisal based on constantly changing metrics has increased the

intensity of work, resulting in self-interested competitive individualism and gaming the system. As discussed earlier, this kind of competitive work environment alongside institutional pressures of commercialization breeds distrust and a reticence to speak out about conditions for fear of reprisal. This also acts as an internal silencing constraint on academic freedom of speech and professional autonomy in relation to their own work conditions that also act as constraints on research capacity. Fraser and Taylor (2016: 2) refer to the use of metrics in narrow determinations of academic value as a central plank in the marginalization of critical knowledge production.

Commercialization was entrenched in the Dawkins reforms from the 1987 White Paper under the Hawke Labor Government, which sought to link HE to the global economy and as an incubator for new-economy jobs. Foreshadowing the expansion of HE, introduction of student fees (transforming HE from a public to a private good) went alongside reduced public funding and the need for HE providers to develop more diversified funding sources. From the 1980s commodification of HE, economic productivity was no longer seen as deriving from government investment in education but like a product to be bought and sold in a globalized market (Davies et al. 2006: 311). The transition from elite HE from the 1980s to mass education (massification) under deregulation in the 2010s has been paired with restraints on government funding investment and continued government commitment to positioning Australia for global economic competition and promoting HE as an export product. Reduced public investment in Australian education and training has spurred the marketization of the Australian HE sector, as universities have increasingly relied on alternative sources of domestic and international student fee and private corporate funding.

In the context of these central over-arching interpretive concepts of C&C, key shifts within Australian HE impacting on academic freedom and autonomy are discussed below: commercialization of research; the impact of cuts to HE government funding; shifts from education as a public to a private good; the impact of C&C on academic workloads and on professional autonomy; and impacts of increased reliance on international student fee income. This is linked to the last shift: defense of academic freedom from foreign influence.

11.4.1 Commercialization of Research

The links between research and commercialization are reflected in the increased emphasis on Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage industry partnership funding and increased national government focus on rewarding universities for both ARC and non-ARC industry-/community-funded research, with the smallest amount of research funding allocated to the humanities (Universities Australia 2018a). The language of return on investment (ROI) permeates HE institutional strategic goals and management practices. In 2015, a report commissioned from Deloitte Access Economics by University of New South Wales (UNSW) estimated

the return on investment in university research was between $5 and $10 for each dollar invested, equating to an annualized return rate of 60–100%. In defense of government investment in research and training, UNSW Vice Chancellor Ian Jacobs called for the federal government to fully fund university research rather than force universities to increase costs to students. He argued, "universities are left out of pocket by about 27 cents for each competitive research dollar awarded and funding for research training has declined by approximately 30% on a per student basis since 2000." He said research funding should not be viewed as a government donation to universities but as seed funding, yielding an economic return (Jacobs 2015). He later estimated at a $10 return to the economy for every $1 of funding spent on Group of Eight universities,[3] worth $24.5 billion per annum for Australia (Jacobs 2018). While Jacobs acknowledges research rankings are deficient in recognizing other priorities, like "nurturing and rewarding those who make major contributions in areas such as teaching and learning, knowledge transfer, thought leadership, global development and promoting equality, diversity and inclusion," he nonetheless defends these "imperfect rankings" as critical to a "virtuous cycle" for national and societal benefit (Jacobs 2018).

> Investing more in research will improve outputs; better outputs will improve our rankings; better rankings ensure we remain attractive to international students, industry partners and philanthropic supporters; and all of this funds more high-quality research and the benefits that brings, both economically and for our society (Jacobs 2018).

While universities are struggling to adequately fund research, such arguments point to the broader problem, where discourses emphasizing commercializing research can lead to undervaluing the contribution of the humanities and social sciences, which are less explicitly linked to commercial outcomes than medicine and applied sciences (discussed below in terms of lower research funding). The ARC and the medical/sciences funding body, the NHMRC (National Health and Medical Research Council), fund research based on expert peer-reviewed academic applications. However, political interference was recently exposed during Senate Estimates hearings on the 2017 ARC Discovery grants process requiring reportage on whether ministerial veto had been exercised. It came to light that the former Education Minister Simon Birmingham had canceled 11 ARC Discovery projects worth AUD$4.2 million – all in the humanities – that had been short-listed in the top 10% under expert peer review (ARC Discoveries are intensely competitive with only an 18% success rate). Extensive public outcry highlighted criticism of the past use and exercise of ministerial veto on final approval of ARC research endorsed by expert peer review, the lack of transparency (the refused applicants were only informed they had not received funding, not the circumstances of the veto), and negative reaction to the current minister's additional requirement that future grants address the impact on national interest to be assessed by the minister, not peer referees (grants

[3] The Group of Eight comprises the Australian National University, University of Adelaide, University of Melbourne, Monash University, University of Queensland, University of Sydney, University of New South Wales, and University of Western Australia.

are currently already judged on their arguments on significance of the research) (Piccini and Moses 2018; Universities Australia 2018a).

Universities Australia came out strongly critical of the minister's veto on grounds it "erodes global confidence in Australia's research program and our reputation for research excellence" and "also undermines academic freedom, by opening the door to any Minister deciding they don't like a research topic – irrespective of its merits – that could transform knowledge in a field" (2018a). At their plenary meeting in October 2018, Universities Australia vice chancellors restated their commitment to academic freedom and intellectual inquiry.

Within universities, commercialization (driven also by national competitive funding) has led to adoption of aggressive approaches to patenting, commercialization of research product innovations, spin-off companies, and university-industry partnerships. Many universities now have private commercial entities sitting alongside public system teaching and research. As discussed later, these priorities are not in themselves detrimental and are part of a global trend in other developed countries that promotes universities as incubators of innovation. However, in a fiscally constrained environment of budget cuts, such priorities result in cost-cutting to HE faculties and disciplines seen as competitively low performing (notably, the humanities and social sciences) and a shift to investment where monetary profit is to be made, such as business schools and IT (Barrigos 2013) and the sciences.

Private corporate benefaction can bring conflicts of interest. One such example is the controversy over the A$13 million donation by US corporation missile maker Lockheed Martin for the STELaR Laboratory at the University of Melbourne in a three-way partnership with the Defence Science Institute (Cook 2016). Australian universities have blocked research funding from tobacco corporations, and some are divesting their investments in coal; but divestment and research funding decisions are institution-specific, rather than sectoral or values-driven by peak bodies like Universities Australia (2018b), established in 2007 as the national body for the university sector, represented by university vice chancellors. Once corporate sponsors are accepted, open criticism by academics within a university can cause tensions and invite conflicts of interest and self-censorship within universities, limiting legitimate public interest criticism of ethical issues raised by research partnerships or the ethics of partners' broader business activities.

11.4.2 The Impact of Funding Cuts to HE Government Funding

The decline in public investment in Australian HE has been influential on the increasing vulnerability of academics within an increasingly marketized system. In the 1970s, the Australian government provided approximately 90% of universities' incomes. Upon coming to power in 1975, the Whitlam government made tertiary education free. However, this was short-lived, and core Commonwealth funding to HE was substantially reduced by the early 2000s. HE in Australia changed dramatically between 1975 and 1989, from the short-lived Whitlam Government-initiated

free tertiary education reforms to the 1980–1990s Hawke Government's (Dawkins era) reforms.

In a series of tertiary education reforms between 1987 and 1991, Labor Education Minister John Dawkins introduced student fees under the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) (a scheme later copied by Britain) and amalgamated 19 universities and 46 Colleges of Advanced Education into 36 public universities (Bexley 2017). Under what have become increasingly ramped-up neoliberal reforms, universities were redefined as competitive enterprises subject to public sector management efficiency reviews, leading to the collective term "the enterprise university" coined by Marginson and Considine (2000) and elaborated later (Marginson 2002). The 2002 collection, *Scholars and Entrepreneurs: The University in Crisis* (Cooper 2002), highlighted the post 9/11 laments of the decline in universities' capacity to undertake their traditional role in societal cultural transformation and the changes brought by "the fusion of intellectual practices and market forces" between "the academy and the market." Commenting on the privileging of instrumental over intellectual "cultural-interpretive" practice, Cooper argued at the turn of the century:

> At first it seems ironic that the further we progress towards a "knowledge society" the harder it is for universities to sustain themselves…. the semi-autonomous status of the university is collapsing as the institution increasingly merges or competes with private capital for education and research funding (Cooper 2002: 2).

The marketization of HE is well illustrated with universities engaged in "market-like behaviours at unprecedented levels and from an offensive rather than a defensive position" (Gonzales and Nunez 2014). In Australian HE, the neoliberal reform agenda is exemplified by Commonwealth Government cuts to HE funding (and decline in government support paid per student), the deregulation of student enrolments in a competitive HE market, increased student fee contributions from the initial flat fee, the introduction of demand-driven university student funding in 2012 (with price caps only for what universities could charge for undergraduate courses in medicine), and increased reliance on international student fee income. This was played out across the Australian HE sector by increased emphasis on applied sciences and vocational disciplines and job cuts in the humanities, which were seen as less proficient in income generation (Macintyre 2002).

In the 2000s, public Commonwealth government funding for HE continued to shrink. Despite the 2008 Bradley Review of Higher Education Funding recommendation for a 10% increase in Commonwealth funding to student places (Bradley et al. 2008), Australian government funding fell to 42% in 2010 and, for some universities, to as little as 20% in 2015 (Mc Phee 2014). This was followed by a raft of reforms in the 2010s pressing for mass tertiary education ("massification") as a national goal linked to up-skilling the workforce of the future but within a dominant narrative of individual benefit (and cost). In 2012, the cap on university undergraduate enrollment numbers was lifted, with degrees mainly funded by a combination of national government Commonwealth grants and student loans paid to universities. Student loans under the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) are later

repaid by students when they earn over a certain threshold after graduation. This has led to situations where universities award student places below advertised marks cutoffs resulting in accusations of treating students as "cash cows" for Commonwealth government funding through HECS student debts (Bagshaw and Ting 2016).

Universities' funding has been stripped by successive national budget cuts by both sides of politics. The Labor government's 3.5% cut in 2013 resulted in an effective reduction of A$3.2 billion (Davis 2015), and A$2.8 billion was cut to university funding in 2017 under the Liberal Coalition Government (Universities Australia 2017a). Further national budget cuts to HE in 2017 included a 2.5% "efficiency dividend" (to the government)[4] applied to government Commonwealth Grant Scheme payments to *universities* for *2018* and 2019 and a tightening of the HECS-HELP student loans program. In practice, the 2.5% cut has meant reductions of over A$50 million for some universities (Monash, Western Sydney, Queensland, Sydney and Deakin) and marginally less for other universities. Representing university vice chancellors, Universities Australia opposed the cuts, which government had justified citing vice chancellors' salaries, university reserves, and university administrations' advertising and marketing expenditures, as evidence of university budget surpluses.

Students are also paying a higher percentage of the costs of their degrees with payments commencing at a lower threshold. The 2017–2018 budget announced a 1.82% annual increase in student contributions to the *High Education* Loan Program from *January 1, 2018* (a 7.5% increase over the forward estimates), while lowering the income threshold of payment from the 2017 level of about $55,000 a year to a new, much lower level of $42,000 a year (Bexley 2017). Under the Higher Education Reform Bill 2017, Commonwealth-supported students are paying more than 50% of the cost, and nearly one fifth will be paying more than 90% (Universities Australia 2017a).

> Students will pay 46% instead of 42% of the cost of their degree on average. So for a four year course, this is an increase in total student fees of between $2,000 and $3,600. The government claims the maximum any student will pay is $50,000 for a four year course, and $75,000 for a six year medical course (Croucher 2017).[5]

The Department of Education and Training commissioned analysis by Deloitte, based on conceptions of "reasonable costs," hinges "on a defined construct of quality and the efficient cost at which this can be achieved and which, in turn, differ across fields of education and depend on staff-student ratios, proportion of casual

[4] The National Tertiary Education union states that "Universities have already had a very significant efficiency dividend imposed upon them by a change in the indexation arrangements for university grants moving from the Higher Education Grants Index (HEGI) to the consumer price index which the PBO estimates will save the government in the order of $3.7 billion over 10 years" (Hare 2017).

[5] In the past, the government has claimed to subsidize on average around 60% of the actual cost of higher education to students, with the student paying the remaining amount (student contribution amount) to the approved provider (Department of Education and Training, 2015, p. 8). This is now no longer the case.

teaching staff and relative levels of efficiency applied" (Deloitte Access Economics 2016: iii). Despite Deloitte's caveats on the validity of comparisons over time due to different methodologies, the government used Deloitte's estimates of trends in teaching costs to argue that HE is overfunded (Bexley 2017). Universities Australia counterargued in relation to university funding that the number of students in Commonwealth-supported places – 469,588 in 2009 – grew to 606,691 (an increase of 29%), but "in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, funding under the Commonwealth Grants Scheme per university place grew by less than one per cent each year between 2009 and 2015" and from 2018 "funding will no longer increase in real terms." Public investment in university infrastructure decreased from almost $1.4 billion in 2009–2010 to around $170 million in 2016–2017 (Universities Australia 2017b, 6). As Professor Peter McPhee, former Provost of University of Melbourne observed, "universities may still be 'public spirited,' but they are no longer publicly funded." Ironically, he says, "the generation that is running the country" were the recipients of publicly funded university education (McPhee 2014). These structural changes have shifted the place of HE in Australia from public education/research and knowledge investment to a system dominated by economic imperatives based on income generation and cost cutting that form the environment within which academics work.

11.4.3 Shifts from Education as a Public to a Private Good

These budget and policy shifts confirm the shift from HE as a public good to increasingly being a private individual responsibility, notwithstanding government rhetoric of its continued support. Cutting HE funding (equivalent to a A$380 million reduction in 2019 (Bexley 2017)) to pay for promised support for disadvantaged school reforms recommended by the Gonski Report pitched one sector of education against the other, rather than government prioritizing education across the board. Irrespective of caveats on comparisons over time in the Deloitte report used to justify the HE budget cuts, the government argued that cuts to universities are merited in light of large HE expenditures on infrastructure projects, government criticism of high vice chancellor salaries, and university surpluses or invested savings discussed earlier. Universities have been extolled to become careful financial managers but are then punished for it. For the first time since the 1980s Dawkins era, the reforms point to a decoupling of teaching and research and a dedicated proportion (7.5%) of Commonwealth Grants Scheme funding contingent on each university's performance against benchmarks, for example, on newly introduced graduate employment outcomes and satisfaction (Croucher 2017).

Controversially, and illustrative of segmentation within the HE sector between older well-endowed "sandstone" universities (Group of Eight) and the more recent teaching-intensive universities, the Group of Eight universities have called for deregulation of student fees to address the funding gap between government income and teaching costs. That this is supported by the Group of Eight elite privately endowed but also publicly funded universities that garner 67% of national

competitive research funding (Ferguson 2019) and top the research rankings illustrates the competitively based bifurcation of the Australian university sector. A two-tiered status system is driven by the capacity of the Group of Eight to garner corporate, industry, and philanthropic alternative sources of funding added to their historical benefactions, land holdings, and government and industry research grant performance. But whether this system is delivering quality education as a national public good is debatable.

Despite education being the number one export in states like Victoria and the third-ranked export nationally behind coal and iron ore, students will be paying more and getting less, because after these neoliberal budget-driven reforms, universities will have to do more with less in a competitive environment dominated by Commonwealth budget cuts. As part of a globalized trend where rankings are reshaping HE (Hazelkorn 2016), performance on international HE rankings based on research performance are linked by university managements to international student choice of university and hence to income. As outlined by Andrews et al. (2016: 1), "research performance is perceived as critical to student recruitment, with institutional research performance and world rankings being used as a measure of institutional status."

Domestically, research performance defined by Research Quality Framework (RQF) and the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) rankings has resulted in universities using teaching funding to subsidize research (Hamilton 2018). In 2008, 40% of research expenditure (A$2.7 million) was reportedly cross-subsidized to research from the Commonwealth Grant Scheme and Student Fee Income (Larkins 2011). This is not to derogate the role of research but to point out that declines in government investment in research and teaching have had perverse outcomes and that such practices risk intrinsically linking research to income generation rather than pursuit of knowledge and broader national benefit.

11.4.4 The Impact of C&C on Academic Workloads and on Professional Autonomy

Commercialization along with budget cuts, a volatile international student market, and a deregulated domestic student market has impacted the composition of the academic workforce and academic workloads. A core and periphery staffing model has evolved to most efficiently deliver HE, which involves concentrating core teaching loads on permanent academic staff (some of whom are deemed teaching-intensive) and about two thirds of delivery (marking, tutorial teaching, and sometimes whole unit responsibility) on casual and limited term (contract) staff, who are usually teaching-intensive with little research-teaching and a limited research academic career trajectory. As confirmed by Bexley, James, and Arkoudis (2011: 1) and Lama and Joullié (2015), casuals constitute around 60% of HE teaching staff.

Table 11.1 Increase in academic precarious work 2005–2015 in the Australian University workforce

	Casual	Limited term	Tenurial	Total
2005	13,529	24,446	55,826	93,801
2015	21,363	12,829	65,523	99,715
% increase 2005–2015	58%	−52%	17%	

Source: Table constructed from Changes in Australian University Workforce Gender and Contract FTE 2005–2015 based on Department of Education and Training data (Kniest 2017, 25)

As shown in Table 11.1, the higher education academic workforce has expanded (which would be expected due to rising student enrollments). But "tenurial" jobs only grew 17%, while there was a contraction of limited term academic appointments and a 58% increase in casual employees. Many of the jobs created are precarious – casual or sessional. (Adjunct academics, usually retired academics, perform various tasks in exchange for access to facilities, including postgraduate thesis supervision and research.) Industrial regulation restricting flexibility via fixed-term appointments has also created incentives for universities to favor casual and sessional teaching appointments, alongside the devolution of employment appointments to schools and faculties (Andrews et al. 2016: 1). As shown in Table 11.1, there was a 58% increase in casualized university staff in Australia between 2005–2015. Division of the Australian University workforces into core and a casualized periphery with inferior work conditions results in an army of casuals. This props up some conditions for core staff (who may gain from the conditions of full-time employment like holiday pay, long-service leave, and superannuation, but who must also oversee a reserve army of casuals) but consigns casualized academic staff to the precarious secondary labor market.

Status as a casually employed worker undermines academic freedom. Casually employed staff are not formal members of identified institutional staff, and some work in a variety of HE workplaces with no real institutional "home." This means they have little say over work conditions and rates of pay beyond strict legal requirements, and they constitute a highly vulnerable reserve army of HE labor (Barrigos 2013). Others employed on contracts are also highly vulnerable, leading to hesitancy to rock the boat in terms of complaining about excessive workloads or speaking out on issues potentially controversial for their employer (e.g., publicly criticizing the questionable ethical behavior of a major donor corporation). Tenurial staff can also be subjected to insider power plays where senior managers close ranks on staff speaking out about funding allocations or engage in unfair behavior on matters within their discretion such as workloads, denial of leave, or internal conference/research funding. Gendered hierarchies within the academy remain despite equal opportunity legislation (Sawer 2018). This is accentuated in the sciences where over half PhD graduates are female, but women are less than 20% of senior academics in Australian universities and research institutes (Academy of Science 2018).

Curiously, the substitution of "tenure" with the term "tenurial" is itself a shift away from academic jobs having ongoing permanence. Whereas tenure refers to "the right to permanent employment until retirement, esp (sic) for teachers, lecturers," "tenurial" refers to "the fact, manner, or condition of holding something in one's possession, as real estate or an office; occupation" (The Free Dictionary 2017). As borne out by successive sackings and forced redundancies at Australian universities, where staff have had no choice, "tenurial" captures the idea that tenure meaning permanence is a thing of the past. HE academics are increasingly vulnerable in environments where they have no comeback over increasing workloads and changes undermining work conditions, considered later in relation to how vulnerability interconnects with reticence to speak out for fear of reprisals.

These structural shifts have impacted upon academics in Australian universities resulting in loss of autonomy and declining work conditions under union-brokered enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs). Financial stringency is driving declining workplace standards, with increases in contract appointments based on individually negotiated agreements; decline of tenure protection of job security; and forced redundancies driven by funding shortfalls (often localized in particular schools and courses and lacking in transparency). There is a loss of autonomy over teaching, as enrollments drive curricula with large units dependent on cloud-delivered learning and large class sizes where there is face-to-face teaching. Courses or units with low enrollments and deemed uneconomical to offer result in redundancies or forced teaching transfers. The union (National Tertiary Education Union), focused on institutional EBAs, lacks clout to influence weakened outcomes in both EBA and individual cases.

The impact of C&C in Australia on academic and public-political roles of academic staff (taken to encompass academics of ranks level A lecturer to professor level E), and excluding adjunct, casual/sessional, and honorary roles, was captured in the 2007 Changing Academic Profession (CAP) survey with 1370 responses from academics from 20 Australian universities (and replicated in 20 countries) (Coates et al. 2009). The survey found that academic satisfaction was declining and that Australian academics were less satisfied with their work than their international colleagues. These authors summed up the demands placed on academics in Australia over a decade ago: "There has been considerable pressure placed on Australian academic staff to be more competitive, productive and accountable, while simultaneously being more entrepreneurial and innovative" (Coates et al. 2008: 183; see also Chap. 8 for a similar point). These results concur with other commentaries. Bexley's research on Australian academics across 20 universities with 5525 responses (including limited term contract and sessional staff) found that "around half believe that their workload is not manageable, or that they experience high levels of stress related to their work" and that work design, workloads, and working conditions will be central to future renewal of quality teaching (Bexley et al. 2011: xiii). While academics listed the intellectual and scholarly aspects of their work as positives, they strongly expressed negatives including "excessive administrative duties, overbearing bureaucracy and lack of job security" (Bexley et al. 2011: 14).

Probert has noted how academic performance and workloads are being managed more invasively with some punitive outcomes. She cites a policy from one university's Academic Workloads guidelines: "Staff who are not 'research active' as defined by the Division/School/Institute workload allocation model and following a reasonable opportunity to undertake research may be allocated additional teaching or other academic duties"; "teaching is being defined here as a sort of punishment for failure to meet personal research performance targets" (Probert 2015: 47; see also Chap. 7 for a similar point).

While academic freedom is nominally supported, it is being chipped away by worsening work conditions, increased academic work loads, and a divide-and-rule culture, as academics are scared of reprisals (e.g., imposition of heavier workloads) if they speak out or complain about work conditions. In terms of Lukes's third dimension of power, the capacity for system-questioning criticism and the time for research are whittled away, in particular for teaching-intensive academics and casuals.

11.4.5 Impacts of Increased Reliance on International Student Fees

Marking the transition from elite to mass university education, enrollments in Australian public universities have increased from 956,515 in 2006 (Department of Education and Training 2007) to over 1.4 million Australian and international students in 2015 (Department of Education and Training 2015). Approximately 74% of students in 2015 were domestic and 26% were international (Robinson 2017: 29). Education is Australia's highest service export and was worth A$20.3 billion to the Australian economy in 2015–16 (Robinson 2017: 29). Research from the Grattan Institute found that in 2013, overseas students paid $4.3 billion in fees to Australian universities, the bulk of the $6 billion total paid in fees. The institute warns that this leaves Australian universities vulnerable to any economic downturn in source countries like China (Norton and Cherastidtham 2015).

Government cuts to HE funding have propelled Australian universities into competition for international fee-paying students, predominantly from Asia and China in particular. The shift to a deregulated HE market has meant overall increases in funding in support of expanded enrollments but a decline in the proportion contributed by government funding and increased pressure on international student fee income (18% of university funding nationally in 2015), industry, and other funding sources (Robinson 2017: 35). Commenting on the government focus on HE as an export industry, "the cultural equivalent of iron ore," Connell signals another shift where monetizing high fees for overseas students replaces "an earlier regime where Australian universities offered modest development aid to Southeast Asia for free" (Connell 2013: 1). Some HE leaders argue that opening up Australian HE to Asian students goes beyond revenue. Marginson, the vice chancellor of the University of

Melbourne, noted the high value put on self-funded education in Post-Confucian societies and the potential for ongoing culturally sensitive research partnerships and collaborations (Marginson 2015). This, however, is mainly interpreted across the HE sector as a steady flow of customers and a revenue flow upon which the sector is increasingly dependent.

Such dependence also exposes the sector to income-stream risks, illustrated by media reports of attacks on Indian students in 2008–2010 which resulted in reputational damage affecting enrollments (Bennett 2017). Meanwhile, there is scant discussion of the displacement effects of funds spent marketing for international students and the diversion of teaching funds to research (Hamilton 2018), or the favoring of disciplines or programs with greater appeal to international student markets, so as to maximize performance on international rankings linked to attracting students in a competitive commercialized international HE market. Risks of conflicts of interest increase as the academy is more beholden to commercial or government vested interests, for example, through sponsorships, donations, partnerships, benefactions, dedicated chairs, and institutes with corporations, which may also have foreign government links (Hamilton 2018).

11.4.6 Defense of Academic Freedom from Foreign Influence

Reliance on international student fee income has in the past focused on questions around shifting academic standards linked to accusations of dumbing down entry scores and English requirements, soft marking, and lowered student work standards linked to non-English-speaking fee-paying students. At the University of Newcastle (in New South Wales), a plagiarism scandal involving 15 international students studying offshore was covered up by senior management staff, and at another university an academic whistleblower was sacked and then reinstated after disclosing that he was instructed to upgrade international students' honors marks (Corvini 2003). Other issues included controversies over TESL cutoffs (English competency test for university admission and assessment conditions/standards) for coursework postgraduate courses such as MBAs. International students have been implicated in cheating, plagiarism, and soft institutional responses to exam and essay cheating. A Fairfax report exposed use of the MyMaster service, marketed in both English and Chinese, by over one thousand New South Wales HE students to write essays and sit online tests (Visentin 2015). A report by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC 2015), *Learning the Hard Way*, warned universities against creating conditions "conducive to corruption" and eroding academic standards. The report referred to "'a widespread public perception that academic standards are lowered to accommodate a cohort of students who struggle to pass" (ICAC 2015: 4).

Following public safety concerns and assaults on international students, reductions in HE international student enrollments, "most particularly from India but also Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other Asian nations," were troubling to the

HE sector. Universities Australia (2012: 2) named factors that "combined to create the crisis including student safety concerns, private college closures, a strong Australian dollar and changed migration policy settings." Vice chancellors noted the historic engagement with Asian education, with over one thousand Australian institutional programs in Asia. Prospects for deeper cultural engagement and research partnerships with Asia in a "third wave of internationalization" have been embraced by Universities Australia's input to the Australian Government White Paper on *The Asian Century* (Universities Australia 2012). However, engaging with the Asian Century raises other intercultural issues. As Simon Marginson notes, "the post-Confucian states see higher education and research as essential to economic growth and global effectiveness," but he argues, "concepts like state responsibility, civil society, public interest and academic freedom are practiced differently in much of East Asia" (Marginson 2015, 204, 207). As he explains, this requires culturally sensitive understanding, and "in the Chinese tradition, scholars have a responsibility to serve the state" (Marginson 2015: 208).

From the earlier discussion of C&C, it follows that the commercialization of exchange relationships between academic staff and tertiary education students (now high-paying consumers) results in qualitatively changed relationships, expectations, and accountabilities. Students (both domestic and international) have become consumers, and HE is a service mediated by commercial and implied contract relationships. Students are consumers invoking value-for-money claims against academic lecturers, including expectations that HE qualifications (even for undergraduate degrees) will result in jobs and enhanced incomes as illustrated by return-on-investment discourses. But layered upon this, pro-PRC course content is also becoming part of these claims by Chinese students (Hamilton 2018).

There are newly emerging concerns about Chinese government monitoring of international students on Australian campuses (Varrall 2017). An ABC Four Corners program on *The Chinese Communist Party's Power and Influence in Australia* alleged the Chinese government has been monitoring students studying in Australia (McKenzie et al. 2017). The program reported that Swinburne University's Professor Fitzgerald "has warned Communist Party influence operations in Australia not only risk dividing the Chinese community but sparking hostility between it and other Australians" (ABC News 2017). Former-DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) Chief Mr. Varghese argued that Australia should require more accountability and transparency around the way the Communist Party and its proxies are operating in the media and on university campuses. (ABC News 2017). In September–October 2017, this took a new turn, with Chinese students studying in Australia posting on Chinese websites videos critical of content used by some Australian university lecturers (e.g., citing Taiwan as a country and territory claimed by China as part of India) claimed to be insulting to China or incorrect (Ho 2017).

A proposal from the think tank "China Matters" argued that Australian universities should formally adopt a new code of conduct to resist what it sees as pressure from Chinese government officials to alter academic content (Gill and Jakobson 2017). Following these high-profile media discussions of untoward Chinese influence, Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia's

highest-ranking diplomat, Frances Adamson, gained wide media attention for her strident defense of Australian HE freedom of speech. In an address to the University of Adelaide Confucius Institute in October 2017, she said universities should be prepared to "remain true" to their values and to "remain secure and resilient." She urged students to speak up. "We have seen attempts at untoward influence and interference." "When confronted with awkward choices, it is up to us to choose our response, whether to make an uncomfortable compromise or decide instead to remain true to our values, 'immune from intolerance or external influence' as Adelaide University's founders envisaged" (Adamson 2017).

With 525 Confucius Institutes and 1113 Confucius Classrooms across 146 countries and regions, Australia ranks third behind the number in the USA and UK. Confucius Institutes have become controversial in Australia because of their potential to "compromise academic freedom, spread propaganda, encourage self-censorship on sensitive issues and exert undue influence on schools, universities and governments" and because some overseas universities have closed their institutes or refused such offers (Gill 2018). There are concerns in New South Wales that the Confucius Institute is located within the government bureaucracy, with positions and operating budget funded by the government Department of Education and that Hanban (the Chinese government Office of Chinese Language Council International) "provided establishment funds of A$150,000 for the Confucius Institute, as well as A$10,000 for every Confucius Classroom" (Gill 2018).

As argued earlier, Australia has a legal/institutional framework supportive of freedom of expression and opinion. As Secretary to DFAT, Frances Adamson, stated in late 2017:

> Australia is a pluralistic society: a place where open debate, individual rights and freedoms are the foundation upon which we have built our political and economic systems. We are a society that thrives on the competition of ideas.
>
> Australia's university campuses have a proud history of supporting free debate – of enabling the robust exchange of viewpoints. Universities don't just give students qualifications, but prepare citizens capable of participating fully in political, social and economic life. The silencing of anyone in our society – from students to lecturers to politicians – is an affront to our values. Enforced silence runs counter to academic freedom. It is only by discussion, and of course discussion which is courteous, that falsehoods can be corrected.
>
> Respectful and patient discourse with those with whom you disagree is a fundamental skill for our ever-more-connected contemporary world (Adamson 2017).

These issues stretch beyond Australia. Cambridge University Press censored more than 300 online access articles in its journal *The China Quarterly* (Pringle 2018) and later relented following fierce protest internationally. Springer Nature "blocked access on its Chinese website to more than 1,000 academic articles containing key terms such as 'Tibet,' 'Taiwan,' or 'Hong Kong,' which China deems politically sensitive" (Zhang 2018). In November 2017, Allen & Unwin suspended publication of Australian academic Clive Hamilton's book, *Silent Invasion: How China is Turning Australia into a Puppet State*, after "extensive legal advice" over the possibility of defamation action (Hamilton 2018). The book was subsequently published by another publisher.

There are claims by the Director of the East Asia Program at the Lowy Institute, Merriden Varrall:

> Universities have not adequately addressed this threat to debate and openness. Officials may be reluctant to take action because overseas students bring a lot of money to underfunded Australian universities (Varrall 2017).

Problems have also been raised when funding bodies seek to interfere in governance where universities have traditionally been autonomous. A proposal from the philanthropic Ramsay Institute for an AUD$3 billion bequest to Australian National University for a Centre of Western Civilization sparked controversy when Ramsay Center board member, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott, wrote in the conservative periodical *Quadrant* in May 2018 that the Ramsay charity would wield some control over staffing and curriculum decisions in the new center.

Subsequently, ANU withdrew from the proposal, citing "no prospect of us reaching agreement," and the Vice Chancellor Brian Schmidt reiterated the principles of "integrity, autonomy and freedom" underlying this decision (Schmidt 2018). Commenting on the ensuing hub-bub in the Australian newspaper, Robert Manne commented, "no university worthy of the name could accept a gift from a benefactor who did not trust the beneficiary, who wanted therefore to micromanage its implementation, and who had shown during discussions that it respected neither the autonomy of the university nor the idea of academic freedom" (Manne 2018). Subsequently the Ramsay Centre found a home at the University of Wollongong, also controversial, as the decision by-passed the university Senate, and two other universities are considering the funding.

11.5 Conclusion

Under increasing financial stress, vice chancellors, likened to CEOs of large private firms and with equivalent budgets, seek to augment decreased national government funding from more diversified sources: principally from international student fees, research income, and corporate sponsorships, along with their profit-making entities that commercialize patented inventions. Academics are expected to do more with less funding.

This chapter has argued that the academic workforce in Australia is concentrated into a core of precarious "continuing" (rather than protected tenured) staff, as increasingly, tenure recedes and two-thirds of the university workforce comprises increasingly marginalized, casualized staff. With the new forms of self-censorship or just the sheer load of balancing work, life, teaching and publications, grants, and metrics' performativity, the net effect is disabling academic capacity to exercise academic freedom of expression and work-based autonomy. Under the C&C neoliberal reform agenda, "hard liberalism" has impacted on the academy, depleting capacity for the exercise of academic freedom and autonomy and the pursuit of "free intellectual inquiry" (Norton and Cakitaki 2016, 10). This may play out

unequally. Research-funded institutes can continue to support academic freedom and work conditions conducive to intellectually driven research. But universities less successful in winning competitive national research funding and funding biases against the humanities and social sciences may stunt research, and academic research may become increasingly tailored to donor needs or to government political agendas.

Declining teaching and assessment standards become a vexed issue for underachieving domestic students (admitted with low high school HE-enter scores) and for international students from non-English-speaking countries admitted to courses without the required language skills and background to cope with knowledge-based critical pedagogy. For academic staff, increased insecurity of academic tenure under institutional governance by highly paid contracted senior executive staff with far-reaching powers to impact day-to-day academic work conditions contributes to lowered morale, heightened perceptions of insecurity, and self-censorship among the academic rank and file (Coates et al. 2009; Connell 2016; Fraser and Taylor 2016). As Fraser and Taylor (2016: 1) note, "the power/knowledge paradigm of neoliberalism has begun to dismantle the idea of a public intellectual." This takes place in the context of frequent budget-driven redundancies within the sector over the last decade, as a shadow hanging over those who underperform or step out of line.

Although some government officials seem to understand the risks to academic freedom, government policies in general are not helping. The commercialization and commodification post-1980s Australian HE reforms under neoliberal reform agendas have transferred priority from HE as a public good coupled to individual benefit to individualized social capital (Savage 2011), resulting in some of the highest degree fees in developed countries. As the Australian economy opened to the global market from the 1990s, HE has been framed as a private good (and responsibility) and secondarily for national benefit. This shift has been central to the retreat of government from funding HE and the rise in consumer/user (student) payments, linked to other shifts in governance and a whittling away of academic freedom and autonomy including, taking Lukes's third dimension of power, the will and capacity to exert it.

Cross-cutting themes on HE C&C and the neoliberal reform agenda have rendered Australian HE an individual investment, accompanied by increased individualization of risk, cost, and benefit. Far from investing in youth, Australian graduates enter the workforce with growing fee-related personal debt. These are hallmarks of a neoliberal reform agenda, linked to C&C across the Australian economy from the 1980s but worsened by massification of higher education at the same time as funding cuts per student.

Australia is linked to Asian contributions in this volume not only geographically as regional neighbors but through Australian HE dependence on Asian international students (the largest group from China). As Clive Hamilton argued:

> Although they deny it, the money that pours into Australian universities from China has an insidious silencing effect (Hamilton 2018).

Income from international students has now surpassed tourism in terms of percentage of Australia's GDP and is third in line behind coal and iron ore in terms of exports (Thirlwell 2018). C&C coupled with ongoing budget cuts to HE have rendered the sector increasingly dependent on nongovernment funding, principally from international students, alongside patented inventions and corporate sponsorships. These can enmesh universities in complex conflicts of interest that undermine academic freedom to speak out critically against political regimes, funding partners, or whole industrial sectors enmeshed in university-funded research (e.g., banks, the coal industry, mining, tobacco, gambling, or the pharmaceutical industry). The impacts are both diverse and far-reaching.

Controversially, new forms of commodification, funding diversion, and priority shifting come with this increased reliance on external nongovernment income. The over-reliance on international student fee income in the Australian HE sector partly as a means of replacing cuts to national government funding, became brutally evident in early 2020, as COVID-19 travel restrictions exposed the vulnerability of the sector to this dramatic loss of income. Perversely, there is the added complexity that reliance on international fee-paying student income has resulted in cost-shifting to research rather than teaching, since international university leagues tables are based on research performance (Hamilton 2018). Such reliance is also coupled to public debates on foreign influence and freedom of the academy but with affirmation of academic freedom by Australian vice chancellors and high-ranking government officials.

In 2018 the government commissioned an independent review into freedom of speech in higher education by former High Court of Australia Chief Judge the Hon. Robert French. It has recommended universities adopt their own versions of a voluntary code of practice outlined in the report, with umbrella principles embedded to promote and protect freedom of expression and intellectual inquiry. The review concludes that "existing legislative and statutory standards are pitched at a level of generality which allows for choice in how their requirements are met. Allowing universities to institute their own versions they argue is in itself respectful of institutional autonomy 'which is a dimension of academic freedom'" (French 2019). Transposed upon these changing relationships within the academy are newly emerging pressures from foreign influences pressing their political agendas. The challenge for the Australian university sector (especially faculty and management), publishers, and political leaders will be to draw a line defending academic autonomy and freedom of speech.

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Chapter 12
Afterword

Peter Zabielskis

Facing charges of impiety and the corruption of youth, Socrates is famously said to have declared that "The unexamined life is not worth living." According to Plato, the charge of impiety included "failing to acknowledge the gods that the city acknowledges" and "introducing new deities" or, in other words, corrupting youth by nurturing in them both critical and creative thought. In yet other, more modern words, his crime amounted to challenging the official party line of his polity with an insistence that a certain standard of practice – academic freedom – is universal. All citizens should be free to think and disseminate ideas because that is what researchers and teachers do: they examine life. Students, in turn and by example, should feel free to do likewise, continuing on into each new generation. Continuing this freedom in the pursuit of examined lives and truths, something long and firmly established, at least in the Western tradition and younger in the East, is now under siege in every part of the world. There is a new god in town who demands obeisance, and it is a bully. It assumes various guises, pervades terrains previously considered sacred, and attempts to cover them with a blanket stamped with its own colors: political censorship and, above all, academic capitalism. These threats to academic freedom – widespread and seemingly dominant in our age – can perhaps be seen as the end bracket to the current transformation of the Socratic tradition into something itself now subject once again to accusations of impiety and the corruption of youth. The war is on. Much ground has been lost, but its final outcome remains uncertain.

Framed in words and images that may be less dramatic and emotional but no less large than war and siege, life and death, the authors of this book all examine their own academic lives within the nests that they and others find themselves: the institutions of higher education with which they are most familiar. They make real for readers details of the threat that constitute, in one way or another, a call to action.

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The life structures examined are those that have been socially and culturally constructed. These are the structures that shape their lives as professors and that color, impact, enable, or prohibit, everything they do but which, in turn and ideally, they can, or do, or should also help shape. They are the nests in which they have made their beds, that have provided the bread they eat, and that provide the base that enables them to grow, help others do likewise, and from which, in a best-case scenario, equipped with imagination and skills, all parties involved – teachers, students, and the institutions of schools and nation states – can hope to fly off against and soar.

Idealism and ideals – and not just knowledge and ideas – are definitely part of the picture they frame, but these are precisely what are challenged at every layer of the structural nest that is higher education. This institutional structure is highly complex and layered, somewhat differently so in each case, but it is a nest that, for many, does or could or should make life worth living. Since the values it has long sheltered – academic freedom – are now imperiled, the structure itself must be examined. Through empirical case studies, both qualitative and quantitative in method, the chapters here all examine how and why this siege is happening. Each author gives a long hard look at his or her own home nest together with its own particular historic, geographic, economic, political, and ideological contexts and implications. Certain patterns emerge. Each case is specific, but each also shows how very similar dynamics operate and in some cases connect and influence on a global level. With an eye on both region and time, a common critical edge emerges in which regions and times are compared, resulting in a shared realization that, in some ways, the past may have been better than the present, the present is definitely something to worry about, and the future is headed in some questionable directions. But there are still reasons to hope.

The authors are themselves exemplars of what Bourdieu calls *Homo academicus*; they examine their own lives as such but at a structural, institutional level that spans every level of scale, from the plight of particular, and sometimes named, individuals, all the way up to national ideological goals and placements and positions within a global world order. In the interest of personal safety and security within this system, it should be underscored that the universities they examine may not be their "home" universities but are those within the larger category of those which are most familiar to them. These are real, not hypothetical cases, although the discussion of them is often set against an imagined ideal. Following ethical social science field research practice, names of both individual respondents and universities have been anonymized to protect them. Actual quotes of individuals interviewed are identified only by their institutional role; the universities in question include "university T," "the university," "UA," and the "case university." The need for such nomenclature already indicates something about the precarious state of academic freedom in today's world of education in that the professor-authors need to protect themselves and others from anonymously named institutions as part and parcel of their ideals to speak the truth frankly, if not openly, within their institutionally defined roles.

Included in the definition of "academic" as both a social type and a qualifier of "freedom" are such concepts as "well-established," "exemplary," "standard,"

"common," "widespread," and even "slow to change." As each of these chapters emphasize in one way or another, academic standards established through long-standing traditions – including the freedoms to research, speak, teach, and organize – are now challenged most often in today's global city by the new and globalizing god of academic capitalism. Homage or obeisance to this currently dominant power is not always easy for such idealists to accept, given the emphases that many hallowed institutions of higher education have traditionally placed on other ideals. In some structural jurisdictions, this relatively new god in town has changed "academic," once immediately also an indicator of "conservative," into an identifier also currently flagged as a likely location of potentially dangerous materials now possibly tagged as radical and deviant, or perhaps just inefficient, in a new normal.

12.1 Summary and Scope

In the introductory Chap. 1, Zhidong Hao defines academic freedom and asserts how and why it should be a universal value, even an ideal and clearly, of course, a goal. His own and subsequent chapters articulate multiple examples and structural reasons why, unfortunately, this may all too easily look like a distant impossible dream. Yet the ideal remains. The authors here and academics from around the world still keep their eyes on this prize. Without advocating in each case very many specific or explicit details of what to do next, each chapter does articulate or direct attention to various ways out – either real ways in which existing practices are indeed able to more less successfully and productively fly between traps or straight into the face of policy, or by imagining different possible futures of academic life by pointing out that many of the current restraints and trajectories, and their limiting consequences, are ultimately unsustainable. Many of the narratives here depict gloom but not necessarily doom. The siege scenario presented as the frame here also inspires ways and imagined means to get the tough going toward better policy and practice.

In the Chap. 2, Hao goes on to outline and enumerate some of the "stressors and indicators" of academic freedom and how "academic capitalism" seems to be the largest category that covers most of the stressors. Indicators can chalk up on either the plus or minus sides of whether or not academic freedom exists or is strong or is shaky, but the stressors more often than not count up as minuses. Each chapter articulates in its own ways how capitalism and market relations now pervade all aspects of education and academic life and in seemingly ever deeper ways, as seen in the details of how those lives are structured today. Even the universal and the sacred now confront the taint of this bully. Like it or not, academic capitalism provides an overall structural constraint that everywhere forces change, generates stress, and ends up challenging freedoms of different kinds and at every level of organization.

Each succeeding chapter has more than a few tales to tell in which the freedom to research, publish, speak, and organize – both inside and outside the classroom – has been explicitly constrained, denied, and punished or prosecuted in the name of the austerity-and-efficiency-index attributes that accompany the idol that is academic capitalism. The gist of each story – if it is not self-censorship due to the flavor of the age – is that some specific educational domain or subject matter is proscribed as threatening by some official or official narrative with some real power behind it. The status quo that gets its dander up may react for reasons of policy that are political or economic but in practice combine elements of both. Much harder to pull apart are the hows and whys of the many small cuts, the wheels within wheels, and the frames within frames that confront the vitality of academic freedom both officially, in some explicitly stated goals of policy, and unofficially in the back alleys of practice. The result may not always be the total death of academic freedom but its slow suffocation by stress and the distraction of academic attention under duress. Every chapter articulates and sometimes enumerates such stressors and at a range of organizational levels through specific empirical examples and analytical discussion of the structures that shape them. The strands of the culture, social organization, and political ideology and practice of academic capitalism that are woven into the nests of academic life are tightly knit and intricately woven. Each author or team may unravel them for examination with slightly different emphases, but their common goal is to reveal the power of their complex whole.

Stressors mark harmful influences on academic freedom; indicators can point in either direction, plus or minus. Hao in the first chapter also summarizes some public declarations in both China and the West that assert its universal value, but there are other indicators that point to its degree of health that need to be variously considered under democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian political systems. Indicators that may or may not work variously as stressors include the degree of shared governance, tenure, the pursuit of international ranking, the significance and use of student evaluations of teaching, mechanisms of control of faculty in research, teaching, and extramural speech, as well as an overall resultant institutional culture in which political caution or academic capitalism impacts or forces the hand of almost every decision or act. His discussion includes analysis of some of the specific and also common consequences of academic capitalism under different milieux of political and ideological organization and administrative styles in the USA, China, and other places in East Asia. But he does not leave us simply in the deficit column of stressors. Setting the tone for all other chapters to include at least some lighter notes of hope, he insists on the continued importance of faculty organizations and the need to face challenges in an ongoing search for best practices and what it takes to make them happen. Each succeeding author or team then proceeds to include some similarly aspirational considerations in reporting on their own case studies. The overall conceptual progression of the book as a whole features discussion of the effects of the top upon the bottom – including the plight of some named individuals in specific cases – to evaluations of the specific cases of the universities studied. The concluding chapters offer insight into policies and practices – and the historical and

socioeconomic contexts which have produced and enable them – at more general national levels within a larger world stage.

12.2 The Siege Is in the Details

The landscape of the current siege on academic freedom is littered with the names of the fallen whose cases are a matter of public record openly, if not always widely, reported by popular media. A number of authors here name their names as a kind of honor badge for various reasons: to pinpoint the consequences of the current reality on actual lives, to provide empirical historical background, and to elicit indignation as well as further investigation, debate, and discussion of possible solutions. These named and dated cases perhaps more memorably serve these causes than the analysis of each anonymous "case university" and individual interviewee that need the protection of pseudonyms. Each author who names names moves quickly to the larger structural issues that have produced their cases, but it is worthwhile to assist readers looking to pursue specifics by mentioning some of them here as a kind of roll-call index of fact.

Zhidong Hao cites more than a dozen specific cases of academic freedom under siege and their unfortunate consequences. Professors at Tsinghua University in China have reported concerns that they are unable to pursue freely the full range of their scholarly interests, including one who said he could not find a publisher in China for his work on oral histories of farmers; Peking University routinely screens students with "radical thoughts" or "independent lifestyles"; Zhang Ming, a political scientist, was removed as department chair for his criticism of the university administration; and a professor of Uyghur nationality at Minzu University was sentenced to life in prison for his criticism of China's nationality policies. Tan Song was fired from Chongqing Normal University because he researched land reform and talked about it both inside and outside class. Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou has issued a notice to faculty about the things they cannot do in class, including criticism of the Chinese Constitution, Communist Party leadership, and the spreading of "religious superstition." Hao also cites, as "only a short list," cases of professors fired because of online or in-class criticism of the Chinese state: Yang Shaozheng of Guizhou University; Shi Jiepeng of Beijing Normal University; Wang Gang of Hebei Engineering University; You Shengdong of Xiamen University; and Deng Xiangchao of Shangdong Jianzhu University. Most recently, Xiamen University fired Professor Zhou Yunzhong and expelled student Tian Jialiang for online speech.

For the USA, Hao notes how not all crackdowns and dismissals are directly job related: Kenneth Story lost his job as an adjunct professor of sociology at the University of Tampa over a 145-word tweet mocking republican response to Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Other firings include a lecturer at Fresno State University who tweeted that Trump "must hang" to "save American democracy" and a professor at Brigham Young University-Idaho who wrote a statement in a private Facebook

post that supported LGBT equality. A website called "Professor Watchlist" was set up to "expose and document college professors who discriminate against conservative students and advance leftist propaganda in the classroom," and at Rutgers University, James Livingston faced dismissal and death threats because of online speech that was deemed racist against whites. Three professors in Texas sued the state over a law that permits guns on campus, citing its compromising effect on protecting the free exchange of ideas and viewpoints. Bringing both East and West together into the citation of a siege setting with global reach, included in the list are the Chinese government's attempts to discourage or outright quash certain events on USA campuses, such as the Dalai Lama's invitations to speak at the University of California, San Diego and North Carolina University; the ejection of a researcher at Alfred University in New York for investigating Chinese government influence at the school; and the cancellation of a program celebrating Taiwanese culture at the University of Salamanca under pressure from the Chinese Embassy in Spain. Scholars wishing to pursue details of any of these cases should refer to Hao's citations of his sources.

Dipping elsewhere into the book, in the Chap. 7 Hao continues his testimony of professor dismissals for activism outside the classroom in Macau. In the Chap. 6, Wai-wan Chan, Hei-hang Hayes Tang, and Lap-kin Ross Cheung relate several infamous cases in Hong Kong well-known to area residents: vice-chancellor of the University of Hong Kong (HKU) Peter Mathieson resigned from his position before the end of his term citing "pro-establishment" (i.e., "pro-Beijing") pressure and a lack of trust from multiple directions; pro-democracy advocate Johannes Chan, a renowned law scholar of human rights, was unanimously recommended by the selection committee as a vice president of HKU but was rejected by the University Council. Professors Chan Kin-man and Benny Tai were prosecuted for their involvement in the pro-democracy Umbrella Movement, and at Hong Kong Baptist University, Benson Wong Wai-Kwok was denied contract renewal for his support of students' democratic activism and his presidency of the university's staff union. In the Chap. 9, Edward Vickers details his own confrontation with the "denialist" stance of the Japanese government in its effort to counter or suppress attention to his and others' research on "comfort women" in China, Korea, and elsewhere who were conscripted to sexually service Japanese soldiers during World War II. Such efforts include strong attacks on academics' use of language itself: the definitions and terms scholars use to describe the phenomenon that various authorities deem too critical and harsh.

Is there a pattern here? Yes. If it is not about attempting to deflect what is perceived as a clear and direct attack on a political status quo, it is about the defense of a morally and/or intellectually indefensible ideology. What is to be done? Plenty. First step is to move beyond the specifics of any particular individual case to a more general structural case study of a single university or national education policy or, to use Mills' terms, understand the sociological fruitfulness of the distinction between "the personal troubles of milieu" and "the public issues of social structure." Every chapter in this book shares this approach. The power elite at work and in question here may or may not be named individuals or specific institutions, but the

terms are everywhere both political and economic, and the implications are publicly shared. As academics, we may be the individuals personally in trouble and under siege, but our achieved status as exemplars of *Homo academicus* also means we have equipped ourselves with the consciousness and tools necessary to resist such powerful forces and dig ourselves out of any defensive fortification – and in the name of concerns larger than our own self-interest.

12.3 Academic Capitalism

This is perhaps the largest structural net under which academic freedom finds itself and within which it is easily cornered and trapped. More than ever before in history capitalism is the flavor of our age and pervades much of what everyone everywhere sees, thinks, feels, and does, either by commission or by alternative, contrasting, and now glaringly deviant, omission. As a phenomenon and a superstructure, it needs to be broken down because it has become a kind of entropic default mode of low energy or lowest common denominator that can severely limit the kinds of critical and creative energies and imaginations that have long been fostered by higher education in many traditions. It often feels that there is no alternative. Does anything different – such as socialism – exist? Has idealism itself been thrown out in the bathos of the bathwater?

In her study of a "prestigious" university in China, Xiaoxin Du deconstructs the clever 1950s phrase *Red and Expert* that has been continuously used to identify the state's expectations of universities in China. She shows how each term has come to encapsulate two, sometimes conflicting, identities and goals that every academic in China must attempt to enact and balance. But is anyone or anything today, even China, really red? Is this the color of a lingering nostalgia rather than a current power? In ways similar to Edward Vickers's explication of *Nihonjinron* (the "theory of the Japanese people") in the chapter on Japan, China as socialist or red remains a historically significant tagline of national identity on a playing field of international cultural politics that is now subject to an even bigger bulldozer – the culture of global capitalism – that currently flags "expert" as the more powerful identifier and goal.

Every chapter articulates certain cultural specifics at work in a series of difficult and sometimes fraught tensions between policies and practice and goals and realities, wrought in the whole-cloth cultures within which individuals and institutions find themselves today. The bottom line is that in most cases, the modernity that is still sought as a national goal in many regions of the world, especially in Asia, is understood to foster, perhaps above all, the "expert" which in turn is also and automatically understood to embrace ideas as "technical," "vocational," "professional," "innovative," and "moneymaking" as the hot but standard colors thought necessary by the complex nests of nationalism in order to compete for attention on the stage of global capitalist competition. As Jae Park in the Chap. 10 and Linda Hancock in the Chap. 11 emphasize and all other authors here underscore, what usually falls by

the wayside in all of this are the humanities and social sciences, sidelined offstage as inefficient and unnecessary incidentals in favor of more clearly capitalist tropes such as the tech side of absolutely anything and everything, practicality, jobs training, budget cuts, austerity, cost-benefit analyses, and bang-for-buck calculations. These are now the primary concerns of higher education in many parts of the world. Their emphasis comes at the expense of the freedom to research, teach, and study other topics of human enterprise that may have different but also beneficial outcomes for society and humanity that may be unexpected and unforeseen but are nevertheless officially unwelcome in the current structure of today's systems of higher education.

There is nothing inherently wrong with pursuits such as efficiency, practicality, pragmatism, and even profit-making that now characterize much of the current academic capitalist world order. Throughout history, great expressions of both art and science and even the sacred have commonly not been too far away from some serious money. But emphasis on such peripheral concerns is at a lower level than the ideals themselves that universities and professors and students have long had in their sights. They may be the practical and ubiquitous necessities that underlie all human action, but they are not themselves universal values, and we already have in hand a clearly imagined alternative. The frames that structure bigger scopes are necessary to imagine wider potential outcomes of human creativity and thought. As every chapter in this book makes clear, this frame is academic freedom. The currently global order of academic capitalism is not ideal for this purpose; we can, and do, and should fight to protect academic freedom as its better and higher twin. Today, only economies can be dragons; cultures and societies are something else, such as a turtle with the ability to retreat into a defensive shell upon onslaught, which Vickers presents as a metaphor for academics in Japan who continue to pursue such things as social sciences and the humanities in the face of the more pervasive and politically powerful juggernaut of academic capitalism.

12.4 Unravelling the Nests of Academic Life

As previously mentioned, the nest of *Homo academicus* is complexly and tightly interwoven with many strands. Within it, the individual may feel personally and professionally trapped and may feel or be complicit in creating it. This is indeed a self-examination and not just a complaint. As Zhidong Hao and Zhengyang Guo outline in the Chap. 4, professors find challenges in every role they enact – in research, teaching, and service – within the three major, distinct yet often overlapping roles that they identify as different types of intellectuals. Organic individuals serve an interest, such as the state, a business, a social movement, or even higher education itself; professional intellectuals work for the sake of their academic field within science, technology, social sciences, and arts and humanities and solve intellectual puzzles; and critical intellectuals are the conscience of society and are "particularly interested in equality, human rights, democracy, and the

plight of the little people." Each type may be stressed in different ways, but each is also a political stance. Types of political systems are themselves indicators of the health (or not) of academic freedom. Isolating only this measurement, democracies tend to have the most academic freedom, authoritarian regimes the least, and semi-democracies enjoy something in-between. The cases described in this book represent the entire range: Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the USA are democracies; Hong Kong and Macau are semi-democracies; and China is authoritarian. Academic freedom in all locations is stressed.

Under the blanket of academic capitalism and even within what could generously be called the academic socialism of China as a smaller subset of the larger blanket of capitalism, major stressors across the board are found: the pursuit of both international university ranking and the primacy of the English language as assumed gold standards; mechanisms of political and/or economic control of faculty in all that they do (research, teaching, service, and extramural speech and activism), as impelled by forces such as managerialism, administrationization, and emphasis on performativity (which together mean excessively bureaucratic, evaluative, and input-output top-down management efficiency concerns), budget austerity, and, perhaps, above all, the commercialization and corporatization of higher education, here given a kind of brand recognition with the abbreviation "C&C." The latter is not always or necessarily a stressor but can sometimes be a largely neutral indictor. Vickers notes in his case that the corporatization of universities in Japan – which detached them from a complex government finance bureaucracy and allowed their autonomy as independently income-generating institutions – actually increased their degree of academic freedom. And in the case of Taiwan, Jin-Jy Shieh, Emily, and Sheng-Ju Chan present many positive benefits of C&C in that "more funds and resources can be generated through these processes to improve facilities and equipment" and "partnerships between university and industry provide opportunities to combine theory and practice and are conducive to social progress" (Shieh and Chan in the Chap. 8). In Taiwan, teaching may be de-emphasized as professors engage in combat to compete for resources and publications in international journals, but there is no siege mentality; the authors conclude that the overall negative effect of C&C on academic freedom in Taiwan "does not seem to be very significant."

Other major indicators discussed throughout the book are the presence or absence (and in some cases, again, something in-between) of self-governance by academic staff in administrative and policy decisions and in decisions on tenure which provides not only job security but ensures the freedom to speak out about policy and practice both inside and outside the academy. Many of the chapters emphasize self-governance as the battleground for the siege. Who controls the field, the department, the institution, and the nation itself? Powerful political, business, or industrial interests? Powerful, but nameless ideologically based administrative structures that limit criticism and critical thinking, foster alienation, and work to stifle creativity and progress? In the case of Hong Kong, Wai-wan (Vivian) Chan, Hei-hang Hayes Tang, and Ross Lap-kin Cheung frame their discussion largely in terms of what they call "educational sovereignty," as if their case study of "a leading university in this Asian

entrepreneurial city" marked a social significance and clout as serious and deep as the sovereignty of a nation-state. In the case of the USA, Zhaohui Hong also highlights shared governance as a framing indicator and finds that every stressor found in every other chapter also occurs in the USA, with the possible exception of the emphasis on publications in the English language as a potential limitation on and oppressor of academic freedom.

12.5 Passion, Prison, and Freedom

Passions can run high when academic freedom is under siege. So much is at stake – personally and professionally at an individual level but also socially, politically, economically, and symbolically all the way up and down the ladder of hierarchy and at every scale – even extending to humanity itself. Passion can be an effective fuel that keeps everything going, and it is something to be cherished, depended upon, and sustained as a powerful yet delicate resource all too easily subject to damage by forces of externally generated compromise. Freedom of its pursuit and respect for the diverse sources where different academics find it should also be considered in any proposed best-practice formula. One of this book's most memorable vignettes is an interview quote collected and reported by Zhidong Hao and Zhengyang Guo in their study of academic freedom in a provincial university in China (in the Chap. 4). Their interpretation of it is that, in order to nurture such productive passion, professors should be free to choose what to concentrate on, which may not be anything commercially viable, politically sensitive, or relevant to issues of governance, budget, participatory advice, or consent. One professor said the following:

> I truly love my subject, chemistry. I may be exaggerating, but it is more important than my life. I wonder why some students don't often go to the laboratory. If I were them, I'd go there every day… When you have a breakthrough, you're happier than if you have a baby.

Further detail of Hao and Guo's frame for this is, of course, discussion that the natural sciences are easily more neutral, exact, and cleaner politically than the social sciences, arts, and humanities, which tend to be messier, more dangerous, and therefore subject to more regulation and control. Such differences across fields of endeavor as targets for constraint are explored in every chapter.

One of the preconditions of any kind of freedom is some kind of base from which it can emerge, a home base if you will, a nest of often complex parts, and a necessary constraint which can help define and facilitate the freedom that is its opposite. Structure is necessary. A future trajectory and upshot to be imagined for future endeavors inspired by this volume would be an additional, perhaps book-length discussion of best practices that have been, could be, or should be considered to make for better structures that would ensure more freedom with greater productive potential. The current reports here only touch at such possibilities.

To continue with the nest idea, I have to mention the following: I love birds but was always reluctant to keep any because I saw the cage they would need to inhabit as a kind of superstructural, ironclad form of unnatural oppression, symbolic of subjugation to human will. When a friend gave me a pair of birds along with their cage, I threw open its door to let them fly free – only to find that they always preferred to return to the security of their own gated home after only a few rounds in free air. Academics and others who are now behind bars of self-censorship or jailed for acting on their belief that they could or should freely express certain things enjoy no similar at-will or temporary liberty. Whether the bars of their cage are physical or are the mental constraints of self-imposed caution, their ability to return to the safe haven of a more amenable situation is uncertain; but the wings of the human spirit will not be stopped by the structures that humans themselves create and inhabit.

I am reminded here of the provocative and social-structurally thought-provoking title that African-American poet Maya Angelou gave to her book *I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings*. Freed perhaps from the political machinations, the ideological agendas, and the thousands of trivial details of everyday life "outside" in order to concentrate on the heart's desire, the following great books are among those written by their authors in whole or in part while in prison, where they found themselves against their will but nevertheless did not languish, despite the strength of the bars: *Letters from Birmingham Jail* by Martin Luther King Jr.; *Pisan Cantos* by Ezra Pound; *The Travels of Marco Polo* by Rustichello da Pisa; *Don Quixote* by Miguel de Cervantes; *Conversations with Myself* by Nelson Mandela; *Le Morte d'Arthur* by Sir Thomas Malory; *History of the World, Volume 1* (no time before execution for his planned volumes 2, 3, 4, and 5) by Sir Walter Raleigh; *Justine* by the Marquis de Sade; *Our Lady of Flowers* by Jean Genet; and *Prison Notebooks* by Antonio Gramsci. Not to leave out natural science, Galileo Galilei was sentenced to prison (commuted to house arrest) by the Inquisition, who found his heliocentric views and writings "foolish, absurd, and heretical." Under house arrest he wrote *Two New Sciences*, in which he summarized some of his major findings.

Not by any means an entirely innocent, pure, or even unjustly convicted lot, the crimes for which these major figures in world history and culture were imprisoned include nonviolent protest; debt; broadcasting support for Mussolini; opposition to Mussolini; being on the wrong side of a victorious regime; conspiracy against the queen of England; and theft. Whatever the status of their crimes, their morality or immorality, their innocence or guilt, their works and ideas remain. We all would be poorer without them.

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Correction to: Freedom to Excel: Performativity, Accountability, and Educational Sovereignty in Hong Kong's Academic Capitalism

Wai-wan Vivien Chan, Hei-hang Hayes Tang, and Ross Lap-kin Cheung

Correction to:
Chapter 6 in: Z. Hao, P. Zabielskis (eds.),
***Academic Freedom Under Siege*, Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 54,**
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49119-2_6

The original version of the book was inadvertently published with errors in the affiliation of the chapter author in the chapter opening page of the sixth chapter. The affiliation of Wai-wan Vivien Chan has now been corrected to "Research Professor, Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology".

The updated version of the chapter can be found at
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49119-2_6

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