Chapter 6
The Ethical Value of Motivation as an Operative Desire

Esther Jiménez-Hijes López

Abstract Ritchar Boyatzis defined competencies as a set of behaviors organized around an underlying construct called intention (Boyatzis. Vision: The Journal of Business Perspective 15(2):91–100, 2011). This intention, this desire, significantly and consistently influences behavior (Hogan and Shelton. Human Performance 11 (2):129–144, 1998).

As Gagné (High Ability Studies 21(2):81–99, 2010) points out, the goals that people set themselves indicate what they want to achieve. Most of the research in this field has followed this author along with the objectives and has focused on the motives, the intention, conscious or not, that justifies the choice of a certain goal.

Human motives are associated with interests, desires, passions, needs, values, willpower, determination, perseverance, intrinsic, extrinsic, or prosocial motivation, among many others. Juan Antonio Pérez López (Pérez López) distinguishes between motives—intention and motivation—the impulse required to achieve the motives—and the influence that each of the motives exerts in the formation of that impulse.

Faced with an isolated and static conception, Pérez López provides a dynamic explanation between the motives and the conditions necessary for their transformation into an "internal force" that leads to decision making. This chapter aims to show the interrelation and dynamism of the motives in people's behavior and the value of training in order to learn to evaluate "a priori" the consequences of the actions themselves.

Keywords Desire · Competencies · Motives · Motivation · Learning

E. Jiménez-Hijes López (✉)
Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: ejimene@uic.es

M. Bosch (ed.), *Desire and Human Flourishing*, Positive Education,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47001-2_6

6.1 Introduction

Nowadays, the institution that has the greatest impact on people's lives today is the company they work for. A company is an organization in which its members work together to achieve certain results (Pérez López 1993). Over time, people acquire skills and abilities. Furthermore, they can develop a culture, social networks, and an organizational structure difficult to imitate by their competitors (Barney 1995).

As a result, some researchers assert the need to develop a decision science, which takes into account what affects people in particular, which other disciplines such as marketing or finance have already done (Boudreau and Ramstad 2005). These authors state that considering only efficiency and effectiveness, regardless of the impact of the actions, can lead to incomplete decisions. They also point out a series of values necessary for the company's long-term sustainability. These include contribution to the community, diversity, environmental protection, ethics, governance, human rights, social responsibility, and transparency, through which they integrate people into strategic decisions.

In line with this, Pérez López also posits that the aim of management function is to design strategies which produce economic, psychological, and ethical value. Thus, Pérez López helps us to understand that any business decision (obtaining resources, production, consumption, and so forth) implies an ethical aspect, since "each and every one of the acts of the individual is subject to ethical assessment as far as that affect other people and affect us ourselves" (Pérez López 1998). His interests lay in developing human thought as an instrument to solve real problems. Problems that require thinking, analyzing, and taking into account the context of the situation thus open an immense panorama of business ethics.

The study of ethics focuses on what we should do and how we should act as human beings (Ciulla 2004). Ethical behavior requires theoretical and practical training to help make the right decisions. The correct decision is one that leaves no value out of its consideration. Analytical anthropology represents the components that must necessarily occur in a free agent to explain its dynamic processes and shows the internal process by which moral virtue[1] is forged, considering the dynamism of the action.[2]

Pérez López's anthropological theory analyzes the internal consequences that actions have for the person who acts, as well as the interaction between human powers (cognitive, volitional, and affective) in the motives or desires (values, goods) that are present when taking a decision that generates a certain behavior.

[1]Discussing ethics without mentioning moral virtues is like discussing mechanics without mentioning gravitation. A poetic discourse will be made, but nothing resembling a rigorous analysis. In the specific case of ethics, that omission is especially serious and has dire consequences. It implies a discourse—a way of reasoning—that not only ignores ethical realities, but supplants them using pseudo-ethical, pseudo-humanist categories, which are the opposite of true humanism.

[2]A more detailed development of this issue can be found at: López-Jurado, M. and K. Sowon, "Moral learning and the good life," Spanish Journal of Pedagogy, LXXI (255) (May-August 2013), pp. 327–341.

The pressures of everyday life can lead us to react rather than act. We usually spend time trying to guess the reasons why other people act, instead of stopping to think about why we do things. Understanding what moves us when making a decision is vital for our own knowledge and learning. Pérez López's anthropological model aims to guide the practical action of people in the field of work and is appropriate for the education of desire, since it starts from the consequences that our actions have for the people with whom we interact. Therefore, this chapter follows his anthropological theory of action, proposed in his first major work, *Theory of Human Action in Organizations* (1991), which his second book *Fundamentals of Business Administration* (1993) describes in practical application.

6.2 Consequences of Actions

The education and evaluation of competencies have been introduced with great weighting in training nowadays, to which different meanings have been granted. Following Boyatzis (2011), we consider competencies as a set of behaviors organized around an underlying construct called intention. This definition distinguishes both the behavior of the person acting and the desire that moves them to perform a certain action.

The term desire is used from various perspectives. In general sphere, desires are often differentiated from the intentions of action (Malle and Knobe 2001). In the academic field, Davis (1984) distinguishes between two types of desire: volitive and appetitive. According to Davis, the appetitive desire lacks a rational basis, it is practical, whereas the volitive desire implies reasons for acting that affect the intention to do so. Taking this into account, Perugini and Bagozzi (2004) define desire as a state of mind by which an agent has a personal motivation to perform an action or reach a goal. In this chapter, we will use desire in its volitional meaning, considering it as the reason behind a person's actions.

As mentioned previously in the introduction, theoretical education is not enough in order to learn ethical behavior. Reflection that analyzes the object and the consequences that our actions will have is required. To analyze forming the right intention process and of the right desire, we will start from the results that we directly seek, desire, as well as those that occur independently of that specific interest. To achieve this will use the impact that some business decisions have had on society.

During recent years, we have verified how greed to maximize profits has brought thousands of companies to bankruptcy and, with it, personal, professional, family and social ruin of hundreds of thousands of people around the world. Companies that have caused this effect evaluated their members in terms of effectiveness and only rewarded the achievement of economic objectives.

Examples of companies, such as Enron or Lehman Brothers, show how their directors managed to raise them to international acclaim and prestige, only to then sink them as a result of the distrust they generated in investors, clients, and employees when making public the methods that were used to achieve results

(Ariño 2005). This distrust occurs when, among different "scales of values," efficiency becomes the sole purpose of the company.

Members of the organization are evaluated by their effectiveness in achieving economic goals and objectives—a necessary, but insufficient, criterion for the company's long-term sustainability. Along with effectiveness, efficiency also needs to be evaluated, that being the satisfaction of individual needs and social objectives (Locke and Latham 1990). Experience has repeatedly shown us how a company limited to seeking economic benefit often does so at the expense and harm of people and society.

Regarding Enron, in August 2001 the stock price began to fall. The Vice President of Corporate Development sent a letter to the Executive President warning him of accounting irregularities that could endanger the company. With the aim of presenting a good image of the company, instead of solving the problem, the decision was made to fabricate the financial statements. From then on, the repeated irregularities committed were the result of "learning" about the activities that would be "useful to deceive" shareholders, customers, and employees.

There was a "negative learning" whereby hiding the company's real situation was creating the habit of manipulating others. If Enron executives had stopped for a moment and not thought only of their own benefit, but had assessed the impact of their action, the results would have been different. In hindsight, it is easy to identify the need for immediate intervention. However, the executive president and a team of committed managers would have had to recognize the seriousness of the situation and the people affected, and then decide to act accordingly.

Obviously, the choices made were not the only possible alternatives. What caused them to make those decisions? What reasons led Enron executives to opt for that alternative against other possible types of action? Would the managers' learning have been different if they had taken into account the people affected by their decisions?

6.3 Results of Decisions

Every action produces results according to one or more of the following three categories:

- *Extrinsic results*. These results are caused by the reaction to the environment. They depend on the response given by one or several people to a given action. Hence the name "extrinsic result," since it does not depend directly on the person acting. If we continue with the Enron example, it would be the reaction of the employees to achieve the objectives proposed by the managers in order to obtain greater recognition and a notable increase in their economic compensation.
- *Internal results.* These occur inside the person who acts, the result of the decision she or he makes. This is what the decision maker learns and will condition, in one way or another, his or her future decisions. The essential difference with respect

to the extrinsic result is that the decision maker does not depend on the response given by the person or people with whom she or he interacts. In the case of Enron, it would be the internal impact, the imprint, that the action of deceiving is left to the managers who made the decision. If they believed their actions were appropriate, if they only thought of their own benefit, if they sensed they were shirking their responsibilities by cheating customers, shareholders, and employees, etc.

- *External results*. These are the internal results for the person affected by the decision. It is the learning that the action produces in the person and the people with whom he or she interacts. It is an external result for the decision maker and different from the action taken.

Enron had an internal audit and, led by Arthur Andersen, an external audit. Enron's executives' decision affected the people in charge of the audit and produced changes in their future behavior. Whether they were satisfied or not, and whether the profits obtained were adapted to their wishes and expectations, determined their level of willingness to continue modifying the financial statements.

These three types of results occur regardless of the desire, intention, or motive of the person acting, even if she or he is not aware of it. The criteria by which we choose a certain action over another are based on:

- *Effectiveness*. The need the person wants to cover. This is evaluated through extrinsic results (the benefits obtained).
- *Efficiency*. The learning the action provides the decision maker with, in order to meet that same need in future decisions. This is evaluated through internal results.
- *Consistency.* The impact that the decision has on the people it affects, in order to facilitate future interactions. This is evaluated through external results.

When considering the learning of the right intention, of the right desire, this triple dynamic must be assessed. If only one type of result is evaluated, the decision will be wrong, because the reality will have been only partially analyzed. If a decision is made only based on obtaining extrinsic results, the efficiency and consistency of the decision will be ignored. As we have seen, any action implies a process in which three elements necessarily intervene:

- The *interaction* (action-reaction) between the person who performs an action and the one who is affected by the decision.
- The *person performing the action*. A positive or negative learning, depending on the consistency of the action, will take place.
- The *person affected by the decision* in which, as in the previous case, positive or negative learning will occur.

The dynamism of the action that entails the interrelationship of the aforementioned elements shows that the decision itself generates consequences on the person whom the action is directed at, as well as on the person who takes it. This impact on people who interact produces learning that alters the way they face their future decisions, both personally and professionally, depending on the experience they both acquire when they interact.

Through her or his performance, a person can alter his or her relationship with another or others. If, to satisfy their material needs, they steal from someone, it will worsen their ability to maintain good relationships in terms of emotional needs.

6.4 Actions and Their Desires or Motives

There are various theories about motivation which explain people's needs. Many authors have focused on the content of these needs (Maslow 1954; McGregor and Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1960; McClelland 1971; Herzberg 1966; Alderfer 1972). Academic research on motivation describes the different material and knowledge needs. We also need to add the affective ones, to the list, with a broader sense than that granted to social or esteem needs, since the latter are often linked to psychological aspects of the person. For a better understanding of the distinction we intend to make, below we synthesize three types of basic needs:

- *Material needs*. These are satisfied through the interaction between the senses and the physical world that surrounds a person. They are linked to feelings of pleasure or pain. Ultimately, they involve the possession of things, or the possibility of establishing sensitive relationships with them.
- *Knowledge needs*. These are satisfied to the extent that a person is able to control the reality around him or her. They are linked to the ability to do things in order to get what you want. The sense of power, of security, corresponds to psychological states of satisfying these needs.
- *Affective needs*. These are satisfied through the assurance that other people are also affected the same as us. They are linked to the achievement of adequate relationships with other people, with the certainty that people care and are not indifferent to us. It is also the ability to internalize what happens to other people, to love and be loved, to satisfy emotional needs.

Unlike other approaches (e.g., Maslow 1954), these three types of needs do not constitute a hierarchy, but are all present simultaneously in a person. Meeting these needs means that the person moves with his environment on three different levels: the world of sensitive realities, the world of personal realities, and his own inner world. According to Cox and Klinger (2004, p. 124), the reasons are the value assigned to what people want to achieve, what motivates them, and the energy and effort that drives them to behave in a certain way. Desire, the reason why they choose to act in a certain way to meet those needs, can be:

- *Extrinsic desire or motive.* Those that seek a benefit from the external environment. The verb for excellence is to have or achieve (incentives, retribution, awards, status, recognition, or prestige).
- *Intrinsic desire or motive*. Those who seek to learn or acquire operational knowledge (skills, knowledge, abilities, satisfaction, and so forth). The verb for excellence is to know, learn, enjoy, appreciate, or overcome a certain challenge.

- *Desire or transcendent motive*. Those who seek the use or benefit that the action will have for others. The verb for excellence is to serve, meet the real needs of people, whether material, knowledge, and their human development.

All decision theories include the first type of motives. The second one appears frequently under the name of intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci 2000). The third type of motives are usually referred to as prosocial motivation (Grant 2008) even though this has a different content than that which we call transcendent (Pérez López 1993).

Avolio and Locke (2002) point out the love a person has for their spouse or children propels him or her to help them (transcendent reasons); in the case of a coworker it might be the interest of finishing a project (extrinsic motives), or to a driver in distress, it could be for benevolence or goodwill (intrinsic motives). These are all factors associated with a prosocial or altruistic motivation. These examples claim a distinction between motive and motivation, since one could be talking about three types of motives under a single denomination of prosocial motivation.

Faced with an isolated and static conception, Pérez López provides a dynamic explanation between the three types of motives and the conditions necessary for their transformation into an "internal force" that leads to decision making.

6.5 Learning and Motivation

Knowing the structure of human motives is fundamental to understanding motivation (Carver and Scheier 1998; Kruglanski et al. 2002). As we have seen earlier, the three types of motives, extrinsic, intrinsic, and transcendent, can be simultaneously present in any decision. However, some may have a greater weight than others. Our motivational construct will be determined by the weight we give to each of these reasons. Our reasons for working can be extrinsic, if our desire is to earn money, obtain notable prestige, or have our value recognized by others. If we focus our work on intrinsic motives, we will be propelled by the satisfaction of learning, for enjoying what we do, or for the challenge that professional development brings us. If we move for transcendent reasons, our intention will prioritize attending to the needs of other people: feeding our families, providing good customer service and/or that our employees can develop personally and professionally.

At first glance, money may appear less valuable. Nevertheless, like power, it is an instrumental factor whose goodness or evil depends on what we want it for. If it constitutes an end in itself (wealth, show off, etc.), we would be faced with purely extrinsic motives that will never be completely satisfied. If, on the contrary, we want it to continue training and improve at work, or to be able to help our children and/or others through an NGO, it would become a means of serving other intrinsic or transcendent reasons.

We see ourselves and interpret reality based on our motive structure. If extrinsic motives have a great weight in that structure, we become a puppet of our surroundings and a sounding board of what is happening around us.

If the weight falls on the intrinsic motives, we can spend our lives studying degrees, or climbing professional ladders, with no concern other than our own learning or overcoming challenges that do not positively affect anyone other than ourselves.

The transcendent motives help the deeper development of the person, making it life's four-by-four SUV. It does not exclude our expectation for some recognition, or feeling good about ourselves. We are not pure spirits to whom only the good of the other moves us; we also need affection.

The three types of motives entail three types of gratification: external, from the people who thank us (extrinsic); from performing a certain (intrinsic) task; and those that come from our own conscience, which in the end is the one that produces a deeper (transcendent) satisfaction.

In order to advance in the education of desire it is necessary to distinguish between the motives which we have been discussing and the motivation, or the impulse, necessary to achieve those motives. Motives and motivation are interrelated, since the motives influence the learning of motivation. They act as a force of attraction, driving a person to perform a certain action in order to fulfill a desire or need. How do we generate that motivation which leads us to achieve our desires? For this we will distinguish between:

- *Spontaneous motivation*. The impulse that automatically leads us to act based on what we already know through experience.
- *Rational motivation*. This leads us to adapt spontaneous motivation to convenience—or not—of an action.

We have ample evidence of how different it is to act, or move, when we only have abstract knowledge of something (which we acquire through rationalizing) or when we have experimental knowledge (which we acquire through experience). Fazio (1995) determined attitude to spontaneous motivation and attributed it to the same learning characteristics that are unconsciously and automatically activated toward a certain type of behavior or action. Fazio (1995) also sets out the possibility of slowing that momentum by deliberating and considering the desirability of doing so. In the following section, we will present an example to demonstrate this.

Imagine a director who has never delegated. You no doubt will have read, or been told about, the many advantages of delegation: it increases efficiency, creates more time, empowers employees, encourages motivation, etc. Thinking about this abstract knowledge, about the benefits of delegating, can encourage you to do so (rational motivation), but you can also debate the force that exerts the inertia of your lack of habit (spontaneous motivation).

If you finally overcome your resistance and delegate, you will begin to have experimental knowledge about what delegation entails. If the "experiment" went well, you will be more predisposed to do so in the following dilemma, since you know the benefits that delegation produces—both theoretically and in practice. The

more you delegate now, the easier it will be to delegate in the future. A habit that will finally make spontaneous motivation converge with rational motivation: what you rationally see as good will be easier now.

Our manager can overcome his or her initial spontaneous motivation not to delegate for different reasons: because he or she will have more time to do other jobs that will bring more benefits, or take a few vacation days. Moreover, he or she will learn to delegate and overcome the challenge of developing that competence, as well as enhancing and contributing to the professional development of the collaborator. Again, you may have one or more of these reasons, with a greater or lesser weight on your decision to delegate.

How we solve the dilemma between rational motivation and spontaneous motivation reveals whether we act through reason, or if get carried away with passion and emotions. In order to be in control of ourselves, we must be able to avoid visceral reactions and think about the right decision. Delegating is not easy if you are a perfectionist, narcissist, or simply if we find it expensive to do so. Falling systematically into unsuitable habits or actions, or that are harmful to others, drags us into a vicious circle, preventing us from growing on a personal, work, family, and social level. The immediate satisfaction we feel when carried away by spontaneous motivation gives us a negative learning, through which we achieve our goal at the cost of sacrificing a greater good. Leaving that negative circle sometimes requires putting off instant gratification in order to tune in to solid values. In contrast, generating a positive circle provides us with the strength and temperament that confer the necessary moral authority to be able to lead and lead others as well.

Let's look at the circles of positive and negative learning with another example. The director of a bank branch receives the order to sell a financial product from his or her superiors. Due to its complexity, in the past it had always been offered to professional investors who could understand the risks, costs, and expected return. However, the proposed objectives imply having to sell the product to the entire client portfolio. If he or she manages to meet these objectives, you will ensure your promotion to good position in the central offices.

The entity for which he or she works is not going through its best moment, and most of its clients are pensioners and people with a low level of education. In these circumstances, the manager could get carried away by the impulse to make an easy and profitable sale, however inappropriate it may be.

Although he or she senses that the client wishes to have enough money to cover his or her old age and leave as much as possible to his or her children, the director recommends a product with no expiration date (he should sell it to recover the invested capital), without a guaranteed return and without coverage of the Deposit Guarantee Fund in case the bank fails. In this way, it would enter a circle of negative learning by obtaining a profit based on selling and not reporting on the possible risks. From there, repeated sales will create the habit of manipulating others in order to obtain his or her desires. In this way trust is destroyed, we become unable to see the needs of others, and the range of future alternatives is also reduced.

If, on the other hand, he or she decides to inform customers about the advantages and disadvantages of choosing such products, he or she will show rational

motivation, even at the risk of losing the possible promotion. The governing reason on the initial spontaneous impulse will produce a positive learning circle, which will in turn allow you to choose the right option freely in the future. This process allows us to anticipate the consequences, discern reality more clearly, and increase our capacity for service.

6.6 Evaluative Intelligence

An authentic human motivation theory cannot be limited to recognizing the three types of motives, which need to be present in human interactions. It must also explain how each of these reasons influences the impulse formation, the motivation of the decision maker. As we have seen above, motivation is the application of the generic impulse which we all have to achieve satisfaction, with the realization of a specific action which we estimate will reach the desire. We have called spontaneous motivation the impulse that a person feels to act on something that he or she knows through experience and rational motivation to the force that controls the spontaneous impulse and adapts the action to abstract knowledge. This "internal force" is generated when choosing, among different options, the most suitable option or the most attractive and desirable.

Spontaneous motivations are automatic impulses and therefore operate directly. Rational motivations, however, will have varying influence on the action taken, depending on the degree of virtuality (ability to control spontaneous motivation and implement the most suitable alternative) that the person possesses.

In the dynamism we have been discussing, having to choose an action from several that are more—or less—attractive, inter-motivational conflicts can arise. An option may appear attractive for one type of motive versus alternatives that present more interest to others: the child who hesitates between not giving his or her mother a distaste that he or she wants to study (transcendent motive) and continue playing (intrinsic motive), or an employee who doubts whether or not to close an operation that benefits him or her (extrinsic motive), knowing that doing so will be deceiving the client. If the doubt is debated between not deceiving the client—transcendent reasons—and charging more variable—extrinsic reasons—we are facing an inter-motivational conflict, as it is a matter of choosing between different types of motives. If the doubt is due to other causes, such as the fear of loss of reputation if the act were discovered—extrinsic motivation—the conflict would be intra-motivational, since it is the same type of motives—extrinsic. The motivational quality will depend on the sensitivity that the person has toward one type of motive or another. It is often said that a person is "very human" when she or he takes into account what happens to other people and is always willing to help them. This is an attitude which implies in her or his motivation: the transcendent motives weigh heavily. Conversely, we say that a person is selfish—"inhuman"—when she or he acts with the sole purpose of seeking her or his own satisfaction, without taking into account the damage or

difficulties that this could cause to others. The degree of motivational quality will change depending on how inter-motivational conflicts are resolved.

Grant (2007) calls a perceived impact on the degree of awareness that the actions themselves affect others and, therefore, the consequences that the actions themselves have on others. This impact requires evaluating different alternatives that, in addition to extrinsic results, also take into account the transcendent results that an action will have on others.

This evaluation requires a rational motivation for transcendent reasons (Pérez López 1993), which I refer to as evaluative intelligence. I define this as the ability to anticipate, evaluate, and choose the one that includes a greater transcendent result from different alternatives. In front of this evaluative intelligence, I refer to the ability to anticipate, assess, and choose the alternative that achieves a certain extrinsic result as executive intelligence.

Affective needs are met through evaluative intelligence, through which we discover and feel the affection of others. Developing this intelligence allows us to discover which plane other people move in and to design an action plan that facilitates that others also take into account the transcendent results of their decisions. Thereby, evaluative intelligence facilitates the development of moral virtues, and executive intelligence that of operational virtues. Both intelligences, evaluative and executive, are necessary. Executive intelligence facilitates the achievement of objectives, but if it is exercised regardless of how decisions affect others, it is highly unlikely that unity will be achieved.

6.7 Evaluative Intelligence Development

Those who only use executive intelligence do so for their own benefit. Therefore, the people they interact with collaborate for obligation, or the results they obtain, or because they have no other option. Conversely, involving others in the resolution of problems and their voluntary collaboration, that is, unity of purpose, will only arise if others are considered along with developing an understanding of the impact of their actions in them. The key to evaluative intelligence development is to overcome the cost of one type of behavior or another. With regard to extrinsic or intrinsic motives, the spontaneous impulse is much stronger, because they start from a previous experience which arouses spontaneous motivation.

McClelland (1985) discovered that we can predict the different types of responses related to desire based on the preference for a certain type of incentive. The spontaneous actions people take compared with actions decided on after reflexive deliberation. Having the ability to do something—power—is a required condition, but without the determination—will—and sacrifice you are unlikely to achieve a result that brings value.

Figure 6.1 reflects the potential of the combination of these three factors for the development of evaluative intelligence. If the action is based on rational motivation for transcendent reasons, the spontaneous motivation toward these types of motives



Fig. 6.1 Evaluative intelligence development

grows, as does enhanced readiness and ease toward wishing for the greater good. For this, the real need of another person must be perceived, and an action plan must be designed that includes the transcendent value of the decision (1). While other alternatives are more appealing and less expensive to do, in deciding you will use your virtuality (2) to implement the action. This will increase your ability to do things for other people (3) and will also increase spontaneous motivation for outside needs (4), facilitating action in future decisions (5):

The transcendent motives require combining reason and emotion, since the different alternatives normally involve a cost of opportunity, a sacrifice with respect to the achievement of extrinsic and intrinsic motives. This sacrifice does not mean a lose-win, using the terminology of Covey (1992), which does occur in the dynamics of extrinsic and intrinsic motives. Only through the transcendent motives is it possible for both people who interact to win, although in that interaction they must give up something. The child in the previous example, who gives up playing with the ball, gains in his ability to move for his mother's affection (transcendent motivation) and in the learning that the study will give him.

As we will see later, the extrinsic and intrinsic motives focus on the person's own interest and the result is manifested in the benefits obtained. Therefore, we usually think in terms of dichotomies: win-lose, success-failure, strong-weak. Transcendent motives are based on the paradigm that one person's gains are not achieved at the expense or exclusion of others. People with altruistic values care more about benefiting other people than those who move through selfish values (McNeely and Meglino 1994; Penner et al. 1997; Rioux and Penner 2001; Meglino and Korsgaard 2004).

The scientific debate on motivation to help others revolves around whether help is given for selfish or selfless reasons (Batson 1990; Cialdini et al. 1987; Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Haidt 2007). As Loewenstein and Small (2007) state, there are many reasons for a person to provide others with help. Pérez López distinguishes between blind altruism and selfishness, and intelligent altruism and selfishness. Extrinsic motivation corresponds to a blind selfishness, which often opposes a transcendent motivation that does not consider the real needs of people—blind altruism. Neither case values which is the most suitable action to take. Both motivations start from an instrumental intelligence based on costs and benefits. Reducing rationality to calculations leads to creating purely instrumental relationships with people and the world around us. However, evaluative intelligence would correspond to an intelligent altruism, which requires valuing the most suitable action from the point of view of the development of virtues. Grant (2007) notes that there is little research that addresses the role of the work context in the formation of prosocial motivation.

Someone who desires and acts exclusively for the money he or she will get from the sale of a product, for the challenge of closing a sale, and / or for what he or she can learn, regardless of the real needs of the client, does not move beyond his or her own interests. Whether he or she is aware of it, this way of acting will influence his or her decisions and the relationships he or she may or may not have with that client and other people in the future.

As Boyatzis (2011) highlights, behaviors are manifestations of intention, of what we want to achieve. The three-dimensional analysis that we have carried out is based on the fact that people have dynamic "structures." This being that they change their ways of operating as they learn from their experiences. It is an internal process through which moral virtue is configured. In order to achieve this, it is essential to educate desire by developing an evaluative intelligence that facilitates:

- Action based on *transcendent reasons*. That is, for the real value that people have, respecting their dignity.
- That the *motivation is rational*. That is to say, generate different alternatives that contemplate the extrinsic, intrinsic, and transcendent consequences that are expected to occur with the action, without being carried away by the one you most want.

Evaluative intelligence allows the person to get out of herself or himself and be interested in others: by asking them, by finding out their real needs, with the aim of responding appropriately to them. This will allow you to discover in each case what is most suitable action to take.

The "internal force" that generates the consequences of the decision / action in the person facilitates the correct decision making. Thus, when in the future you face a decision that is very appealing but unfair, you will be able to reject it because your rational motivation will have acquired the ease of spontaneous motivation. You will be attracted to the most suitable action to take, the good, and will have the strength to carry out that action. In this way, motivation, operational desire, will act as an ethical value in action.

References

Alderfer, C. P. (1972). Existence, relatedness, and growth: Human needs in organizational settings. Conflict, and strain. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 4*(1), 72–77.

Ariño, M. Á. (2005). *Toma de decisiones y gobierno de organizaciones*. Bilbao: Ediciones Deusto.

Avolio, B., & Locke, E. (2002). Contrasting different philosophies of leader motivation. *The Leadership Quarterly, 13*(2), 169–191.

Barney, J. (1995). Looking inside for competitive advantage. *Academy of Management Perspectives, 9*(4), 49–61.

Batson, C. (1990). How social an animal? The human capacity for caring. *American Psychologist, 45*(3), 336–346.

Boudreau, J., & Ramstad, P. (2005). Talentship, talent segmentation, and sustainability: A new HR decision science paradigm for a new strategy definition. *Human Resource Management, 44*(2), 129–136.

Boyatzis, R. (2011). Managerial and leadership competencies. *Vision: The Journal of Business Perspective, 15*(2), 91–100.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). *On the self-regulation of behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cialdini, R., Schaller, M., Houlihan, D., Arps, K., Fultz, J., & Beaman, A. (1987). Empathy-based helping: Is it selflessly or selfishly motivated? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*(4), 749–758.

Ciulla, J. (2004). Ethics and leadership effectiveness. In J. Antonakis, A. T. Cianciolo, & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), *The nature of leadership* (pp. 302–327). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Covey, S. (1992). *The 7 habits of highly effective people*. London: Simon & Schuster.

Cox, W. M., & Klinger, E. (Eds.). (2004). *Handbook of motivational counseling: Concepts, approaches, and assessment*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Davis, W. A. (1984). The two senses of desire. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 45*(2), 181–195.

Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related behaviors. *Psychological Bulletin, 101*(1), 91–119.

Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, and correlates of attitude accessibility. *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences, 4*, 247–282.

Grant, A. M. (2007). Relational job design and the motivation to make a prosocial difference. *Academy of Management Review, 32*(2), 393–417.

Grant, A. (2008). Does intrinsic motivation fuel the prosocial fire? Motivational synergy in predicting persistence, performance, and productivity. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 93*(1), 48–58.

Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. *Science, 316*(5827), 998–1002.

Herzberg, F. I. (1966). *Work and nature of man*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & SleethKeppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal systems. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 34, pp. 331–378). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). *A theory of goal setting and task performance*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Loewenstein, G., & Small, D. (2007). The scarecrow and the tin man: The vicissitudes of human sympathy and caring. *Review of General Psychology, 11*(2), 112–126.

Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (2001). The distinction between desire and intention: A folk-conceptual analysis. *Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition, 45*, 67.

Maslow, A. (1954). *Motivation and personality*. New York: Harper & Row.

McClelland, D. C. (1971). *Assessing human motivation*. New York: General Learning Press.

McClelland, D. C. (1985). How motives, skills, and values determine what people do. *American Psychologist, 40*(7), 812–825.

McGregor, D., & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J. (1960). *The human side of enterprise* (Vol. 21, pp. 166–171). New York: McGraw-Hill.

McNeely, B., & Meglino, B. (1994). The role of dispositional and situational antecedents in prosocial organizational behavior: An examination of the intended beneficiaries of prosocial behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 79*(6), 836–844.

Meglino, B., & Korsgaard, A. (2004). Considering rational self-interest as a disposition: Organizational implications of other orientation. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 89*(6), 946–959.

Penner, L. A., Midili, A. R., & Kegelmeyer, J. (1997). Beyond job attitudes: A personality and social psychology perspective on the causes of organizational citizenship behavior. *Human Performance, 10*(2), 111–131.

Pérez López, J. A. (1993). *Fundamentos de la dirección de empresas*. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp.

Pérez López, J. A. (1998). *Liderazgo y ética en la dirección de empresas*. Bilbao: Deusto.

Perugini, M., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2004). The distinction between desires and intentions. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 34*(1), 69–84.

Rioux, S., & Penner, L. (2001). The causes of organizational citizenship behavior: A motivational analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 86*(6), 1306–1314.

Ryan, R., & Deci, E. (2000). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and new directions. *Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25*(1), 54–67.