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Social and Political Development

Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy
Henry Wissink *Editors*

Reflections on African Cities in Transition

Selected Continental Experiences



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Introduction

The African continent today continues to suffer from the inevitable consequences of rapid urban growth, urban poverty, and infrastructural and associated social problems. African countries and cities often rise to the occasion through great ideas and often innovations ranging from community-led or alternatively state-centred growth projects and models. Although these initiatives may be exemplary to other African cities, they are too often characterised by short-lived experiments, or projects that simply do not meet the expectations, promises, visions and desires of their initiators. This may be an indication that it may be linked to the trajectory and approaches followed by many African nations in the post-independence period that failed to deliver on these desires. Seeing the African continent rise as an independent and emergent economic powerhouse, through unique and parochially designed approaches to broad-based human development and concomitant economic growth strategies that will provide prosperity for all is ultimately, is what is hoped for.

Africa's economic performance is promising, with booming cities supporting growing middle classes and creating sizable consumer markets. But despite significant overall growth, not all of Africa performs well. (UN Habitat, 2018).

There is, however, an indication that the African continent is currently experiencing a number of changes and reconfigurations that are currently part of a unique transitioning towards the type of urban configuration that may be very different to traditional concepts inherited from the twentieth century dispensation and colonial influence and history. These ideas shaped cities as urban areas within clearly defined boundaries and often governed by a single municipal authority. These cities or major urban centres were connected by reasonably effective transportation systems and linked with reasonably well-dispersed rural communities living off the land with subsistence-based livelihoods.

Subsequently, during the years of post-colonial rule, cities were shaped by challenges imposed by increased and rapid urbanisation; subsequent uncontrolled growth of informal settlements (slums) within urban centres and on the fringes of cities; increased demands for energy and clean water; growing needs for urban transportation from peri-urban to city centres or industry locations; and poor living

conditions created by inequality, legacies of prejudice, discrimination, food insecurity and scarcity, and poverty. These contexts are sometimes exacerbated by hazards created by harsh environmental conditions and frequently occurring natural disasters and conflict as well as poor regional economic growth. In addition, local governments are often directly challenged and experience pressures to take responsibility for these poor living conditions. Often these dire conditions are created as a result of the lack of infrastructure, resulting in poor waste management and consequent poor health, living and sanitation issues. The State of African Cities Report by the UN (2010) cites the following reasons contributing to urban slum expansion (and this would continue unless vigorously tackled and dealt with):

- Inadequate urban governance, planning and policies
- Low urban institutional and skill capacities
- High levels of socio-economic inequality among different population strata
- Limited options for the poorer Africans to access urban land

African cities in transition need to consider that demographic, economic, technological, environmental, urban and socio-political changes need to be engineered to steer the continent towards a dispensation that could lead to the African continent becoming truly independent in the use its resources for the benefit of its citizens. This will require driving the strategy of economic leadership and growth to sustain its citizens, but also to become a continental economic powerhouse. These transformations invite complete rethinking of current developmental trajectories to facilitate and sustain Africa's strategic repositioning in the world.

This book focuses on key areas that should be addressed and, in particular, a few case studies looking into the challenges of African cities. It has been suggested that African cities of the future will need to look at the re-engineering and reconsideration of existing policies, approaches and models in guiding ongoing transitions towards cities and urban metropolitan areas, with a focus on greater sustainability. The book also endeavours to question what there is to learn from African cities in transition, in the face of overwhelming urban challenges in Africa, faced with the weaknesses and threats introduced by alarming urbanisation rates, demands for land, housing, basic services, employment, efficient and affordable transport, and ever-growing climate and environmental changes at a micro and macro scale.

This book is comprised of 14 chapters. The editors will summarise the content of the chapters, and will present concluding remarks in the final chapter – Chap. 14.

In Chap. 1, the political/administrative interface within African countries is analysed by Chris Thornhill. He reflects on the background and history of the independence of African states as well as the difficult and vexing tasks of shaping and crafting African democracies to serve their people and become instruments of African development. Thornhill focuses on the political/administrative interface as a problematic aspect in their constitutional efforts to provide stable and productive states with the appropriate capacity to satisfy their local or societal needs, arguing that this interface is diffused as a result of political involvement and interference of politicians in managerial or administrative matters, *inter alia*, through the use of

deployees (appointments on the basis of political affiliation) or through interference of higher levels of government in local government affairs.

In Chap. 2, Paul Kariuki critically examines the changing notion of local democracy and public participation in African cities and calls for an alternative paradigm. Public participation is a critical aspect in African local governance, given increasing urbanisation and persistent communal needs. Inclusive citizen participation is a regulatory mechanism for local government's facilitation and informing development in a multifaceted society, taking cognisance of competing socio-economic and political needs. Local democracy is being challenged by those experiencing poor basic services delivery and increasing taxes as the contestation is about who is benefiting and at whose expense. Most African cities wear the coat of a developmental state mired in corruption and patronage politics and at the same time are struggling to raise revenues sustainably. Deliberative democracy is proposed as an alternative for engagement, one which puts the citizenry at the centre of urban governance.

In Chap. 3 Gladys Klaas-Makolomakwe and Purshottama Reddy critique the dynamics between councillor and traditional leadership in South African Local Government with particular emphasis on the understanding, attitudes and perceptions. The country is culturally diverse, promoting the inclusion of all citizens, traditional leaders in government, and municipal councils facilitated in terms of Section 81 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures (Act 117 of 1998). A dearth of research or best practice models relative to Section 81 implementation prompted the provincial KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) to undertake a study examining the impact on municipalities and traditional leaders. Challenges highlighted include the fact that traditional leaders are limited by legislation on matters of voting and representation and consequently see no benefit for their communities. Municipalities were knowledgeable and understood Section 81 but had negative attitudes and perceptions to facilitate the process. COGTA has to facilitate information sharing and capacity building platforms for traditional leaders and councillors to enhance relationships. A provincial framework/policy for determining out of pocket expenses and tools of trades for traditional leaders was also recommended.

In Chap. 4, Henry Wissink addresses the governance and management of African cities and proposes alternative approaches and models towards transforming into successful cities of the future. He analyses the dilemma of African cities, and primarily the problems and inevitable squalor associated with rapid and unplanned urbanisation. He argues that this situation requires a new approach to the overall management and governance of these sprawling urban precincts, and will require future leaders to be skilled and directed towards innovative approaches and practices in order to achieve the overall UNDP goal for sustainable cities and communities. He also challenges readers that African cities of the future may have to consider and evaluate alternative forms of governance and management that may be found in the ideas surrounding the development of free private cities, start-up cities, charter cities or cities built within the arrangements for Special Economic Zones (SEZs), as

local governments continue to struggle with poor governance and management dilemmas.

In Chap. 5, Dimitry Pozhidaev analyses Uganda's economic growth and urbanisation from an international and national perspective amid growing concern about the quality of growth and rising inequality. The focus is on secondary cities and towns to evaluate their contributions to the quality of growth and their potential. Uganda's economic growth in the past three decades at 6% GDP annually has not resulted in a matching quality, with poverty and inequality increasing. Cities contribute over 70% of the national non-agricultural GDP, but Uganda's structural transformation (with labour moving from less productive activities in rural areas to marginally more productive activities in urban areas, mostly informal occupations) is neither sustainable nor truly transformative. Cities are yet to realise their full potential as engines of structural transformation and sustainable and inclusive growth. Secondary cities and towns, relatively neglected by government and investors, can become game changers. However, they face a challenge of becoming investment ready to incentivise business activities in higher productivity sectors and to achieve sustained transformation and growth.

In Chap. 6, John-Mary Kauzya analyses Africa's local governments and cities in their efforts and endeavours towards the implementation and achievement of the 2030 Agenda to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He argues that local governments and cities in Africa continue to play a critical role to achieve the SDGs not only because SDG 11, in particular, places an emphasis on cities and local governments, but ideally all SDGs have to be achieved in and by local communities in local governments and cities. He also strongly focuses on the role of local government and the notion of city polycentric governance and transformational leadership. He also argues in this chapter that these SDGs may be difficult to achieve if local governments and cities do not succeed in incorporating transformational leadership and personnel into coherent and integrated polycentric governance to create a collective impact through the role of resilience, creativity and innovation, effective delivery of services, future-oriented governance, partnerships, collaboration and all the values and principles enshrined in the 2030 Agenda for the achievement of SDGs.

In Chap. 7, Bongani Qwabe and Sakhile Zondi reflect on local economic development (LED) as an alternative development strategy in Southern African cities. They argue that the LED strategy has attracted global recognition as a response to local challenges such as imbalanced economic growth, intra-regional investment, lack of trade diversification, domestic infrastructure constraints, financial inclusion, labour shortage and political-economic constraints. They focus on the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–2020 to enhance economic collaboration in the region in order to address the existing socio-economic development imperatives; use cases such as the SADC, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) Free Trade Area, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, and African Development Bank (AfDB); and describe how these paradigmatic shifts in LED approaches at a regional level now plays a prominent role within African cities.

In Chap. 8, Linos Mapfumo and Sybert Mutereko critically review e-participation as an alternative governance mechanism for stakeholder engagement in the polarised Zimbabwean City of Harare. Cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are beginning to leverage the power of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) by incorporating e-participation as the key mechanism of public participation. Limited effectiveness and debilitating political and economic challenges have resulted in astronomical prices and diminishing disposable incomes, thereby reducing data resources for their active involvement in various ICT platforms for e-participation. Frequent power outages has also been a huge barrier to the application of alternative governance and innovative technologies for African cities in transition. Consequently, e-participation and its significance has to be understood in the heterogeneity of the context of its application.

In Chap. 9, Henry Wissink writes about the aerotropolis model for African cities and cites the case of the Durban Aerotropolis as an example of African innovation in the area of smart airport city development. Aerotropoli and their associated businesses usually flourish in the fields of innovation, high technology and high value-added sectors, mostly foreign in nature. An aerotropolis can become a fully integrated and modern smart city, and it can flourish by focusing on logistics and commercial facilities and services that emanate from and support aviation-linked businesses.

It is proposed that the Durban Aerotropolis will become the new gateway city to the South African and regional tourism industry, based on the growing desire among tourists to visit it being a major strategy to increase passenger flows, and investors desiring a high return on investment, In addition the Durban Aerotropolis is becoming a strategic production and export champion in the region, and an example to other African cities seeking to build smart cities around transportation hubs.

In Chap. 10, Nirmala Govender and Purshottama Reddy address the urban decay and regeneration challenges in the African city, arguing the fact that the large scale, and often unplanned, migration of the population into the urban environment tends to be disordered, leading to untidy spaces, scarcity of resources, air pollution, health concerns, increased traffic challenges, deteriorating and ageing infrastructure, and inadequate waste management systems. As a result of this uncontrolled urban growth, many cities have challenges with underused land or distressed and declining urban areas, which impact on the city's liveability, image and already-dwindling productivity. The chapter explores certain African cities' efforts in addressing urban regeneration and uses the City of Durban in South Africa as a case study, providing both successful and failed actions. It concludes by providing recommendations for successful urban regeneration programmes within African cities.

Thokozani Nzimakwe in Chap. 11 critically examines the challenges of water and sanitation in the broader context of urbanisation and future smart cities. An increasingly urbanised world implies substantial transformations in population distribution which are inevitable, perhaps not as rapid as often predicted. Local governments have to ensure inclusive urbanisation and its resultant benefits are shared. Yet, African cities lack access to adequate water and sanitation, increasing their vulnerability to both environmental and socio-economic hazards. Integrating broader

water resources management, water infrastructures design and water services operation into urban planning is critical in responding to key urban–rural water linkages. Innovative technical/non technical solutions (including new technologies and techniques, business models, stakeholder engagement, green infrastructure, regulatory arrangements) to respond to these challenges as well as ensuring water security is imperative. Infrastructure asset management (both physical and otherwise) is an integral part of service delivery. The municipalities whose solutions are resilient and scalable have the most opportunities to become smart cities.

Mthokozisi Duze and Purshottama Reddy in Chap. 12 critically review disaster risk management at the local level using eThekweni Municipality as a local case study. An assessment of disaster risk reduction practices was undertaken with a view to address disaster risk management gaps. eThekweni Disaster Management Centre has capacity constraints, evident in service shortcomings, notably incomplete plans/frameworks coupled with the absence of significant institutional arrangements, i.e. an operational Disaster Management Advisory Forum. The disaster management approach was reactive rather than proactive, evident from the lack of a disaster management blueprint informed by a disaster risk assessment. A practice framework was proposed to assist local government to improve/enhance disaster risk reduction mainstreaming in their core activities. Alignment between disaster risk reduction and integrated development planning is critical, thereby ensuring that initiatives taken are holistic and incorporated in the planning, legal and financial frameworks. Developing and strengthening municipal disaster management capacity and requisite institutional arrangements (interdepartmental committee and the advisory forum for stakeholder engagement) has to be prioritised.

Evan Mantzaris and Pregala Pillay's contribution in Chap. 13 focuses on corruption in two major South African cities (Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth) wherein they identify and dissect existing corruption challenges, namely the heightening of socio-economic inequality; shoddy economic and social service delivery; lack of systematic organisational systems able to support the collection, analysis, systematisation and dissemination of data on practices in urban governance; lack of accountability and violations of ethical and compliance issues; non-effectiveness of e-tools leading to the lack of the oversight and accountability regimes within which they operate; and the 'open doors' to 'mediators' and corrupt 'gatekeepers' that increase the vulnerability of the cities. Insights have been developed to inform emerging policy and practice in African cities and other developing regions in response to the varied forms of corruption. An evidence base for understanding the effectiveness of urban governance interventions in addressing corrupt practices is highlighted thereby determining which urban initiatives could benefit from an enhanced anti-corruption effectiveness lens.

Finally, in Chap. 14, Purshottama Reddy and Henry Wissink, as the editors, summarise the nature of local government of African cities, mostly characterised by social, political and economic failure, due to limited or non-provision of basic public services, rampant corruption and disregard for the rule of law. Cities in Africa are not only faced with the problems of uncontrolled and unplanned urbanisation, slums and squalor, but faced by the challenges of severe economic decline, and the failure

of many states due to the challenges and failure at the local government levels. It is believed that the road to recovery starts with a serious consideration of the nature of public leadership and the future investment in African leaders for future political and executive leadership. In conclusion, it is inferred that African developmental states will not succeed without strong, decisive and ethical leadership. African states and cities who show exemplary qualities from within their leadership cadre in serving their governments will probably be able to turn the tide and produce African cities that could be more resilient and innovative, and effective in facing the challenges for African cities of the future.

Contents

1	The Political/Administrative Interface in African Countries	1
	Chris Thornhill	
2	The Changing Notion of Democracy and Public Participation in Cities in Africa: A Time for an Alternative?	17
	Paul Kariuki	
3	The Dynamics of Councillor Versus Traditional Leadership in South African Local Government: A Study of Understanding, Attitudes and Perceptions	39
	Gladys Klaas-Makolomakwe and Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy	
4	The Governance and Management of African Cities: Alternative Approaches and Models Towards Transforming into Successful Cities of the Future	67
	Henry Wissink	
5	Urbanization and the Quality of Growth in Uganda: The Challenge of Structural Transformation and Sustainable and Inclusive Development	91
	Dmitry Pozhidaev	
6	African Local Governments and Cities in the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals.	119
	John-Mary Kauzya	
7	Local Economic Development as an Alternative Development Strategy in Southern African Cities	147
	Bongani Reginald Qwabe and Sakhile Isaac Zondi	
8	E-participation as a Mechanism of Stakeholder Engagement in the City of Harare	169
	Linos Mapfumo and Sybert Mutereko	

9 Evaluating the Aerotropolis Model for African Cities: The Case of the Durban Aerotropolis 183
Henry Wissink

10 Urban Decay and Regeneration in the African City 213
Nirmala Govender and Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy

11 Urbanisation and Future Smart Cities: Challenges of Water and Sanitation Services 231
Thokozani Ian Nzimakwe

12 Disaster Risk Management at the Local Level: The Case of Ethekewini City Council in South Africa 247
Mthokozisi Duze and Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy

13 South African Cities and Corruption: A Tale of Two Cities 273
Evangelos A. Mantzaris and Pregala Pillay

14 African Cities in Transition: Solutions and the Way Forward 291
Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy and Henry Wissink

Index 305

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Linos Mapfumo is a doctoral student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests are in local and internal relations. Other than his doctoral studies, Linos is a Zimbabwean diplomat in South Africa.

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Pregala Pillay holds a Doctor of Administration from University of KwaZulu-Natal and has enjoyed a versatile academic career for over two decades. She has published widely in *Public Administration* and is the co-editor of the Book entitled *A Multidimensional Perspective on Corruption in Africa: Wealth, Power, Religion and Democracy*. Pregala serves on the following associations and boards, namely, Chair of the Working Group on Corruption for the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (Belgium), Member of the Advisory Committee of the Africa Centre for HIV/AIDS Management (University of Stellenbosch) and Unit for Sustainable Urban Governance and Innovation (University of KwaZulu-Natal). She is currently the Vice Dean: Social Impact and Transformation (EMS), Professor in the School of Public Leadership and Director of the Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Pregala was a Visiting Professor at KU Leuven University (Belgium).

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Bongani Qwabe started his academic career in 2000, prior to the establishment of the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 2004, and holds a D Administration degree from this university. Qwabe teaches both at undergraduate and postgraduate levels and supervises postgraduate research in the Discipline of Public Governance. Moreover, he has presented papers at national and international conferences. His research interests include but not limited to teaching and learning (T&L) in higher education, project management and rural development. Bongani Qwabe is currently a member of the Association of Southern African Schools and Departments of Public Administration and Management (ASSADPAM), South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM), and International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA).

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Chris Thornhill obtained his DPhil from the University of Pretoria in 1973. He established and was the first head of the Department of Public Administration at the University of Port Elizabeth (1976–1982). He joined the public service in 1983 and

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Henry Wissink is a Professor and PhD graduate from the University of Stellenbosch. He is educated and broadly skilled in the fields of public sector governance, public policy analysis, development studies, organisation and leadership development. Prior to joining the UKZN, he was employed as an academic at the University of Stellenbosch and the PE Technikon, which later became the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in 2005. Prof Wissink has made many international study visits to universities and institutions in many parts of the world and lectured in public policy analysis and development management in Africa at two American universities in North Carolina and Ohio State. During his career, he produced more than 100+ academic and scholarly outputs, which includes authoring or co-authoring eight authoritative textbooks in his field. He has served as deans at two institutions, and recently as the dean of the School of Management, IT and Governance, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) since his appointment in November 2011, and completed his tenure at the end of 2016, where he remains to serve as a professor of Public Governance. Prof Wissink currently serves on the steering committee of the Aerotropolis Institute Africa (AIA) at the UKZN and is the director of the Unit for Sustainable Urban Governance and Innovation (USUGAI). He is also engaged in the #CoCreateMyCity project between the Dutch and South African government aimed at providing smarter and resilient African cities of the future.

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Chapter 1

The Political/Administrative Interface in African Countries



Chris Thornhill

Abstract African states have been in a state of transition since gaining independence from their colonial powers since the 1960s. Some of them commenced their independence with a little more experience in governing than others. However, they all inherited the governing culture of their former colonial powers with limited prior experience in the relationship between government and administration that is required to obtain an efficient and effective public sector. Since independence, each country had to craft its own system of “democracy” but often succeeded only in establishing a semblance of democracy. The newly created democracies were characterized by volatility in communities endeavouring to maintain their identities and appointed officials failing to implement policies due to political involvement/interference. This chapter attends to the political/administrative interface as a debilitating factor in constitutional efforts to provide a stable state with the capacity to satisfy societal needs.

Public sector institutions are characterised by the need for cooperation by two sets of role players. On the one side the elected political office bearers determine policy, set priorities according to their convictions and have to satisfy the electorate that their needs are being addressed. The other set of role players in the policy domain consists of appointed officials who have to give effect to policy (which may only contain vague guidelines) and ensure that the correct procedures are followed, that expenditure can be accounted for and that the promised services are delivered effectively and efficiently as viewed from society’s perspective. This results in an interface between politics and administration. However, there is no clearly delineated dividing line between the two functions, making the identification of the respective contributions by the two sets of participants complicated. The two functions may even be considered as complementary. This chapter discusses the interface from an African local government perspective. It is argued that the interface is diffused as a result of political involvement and interference of politicians in managerial matters, e.g. through the utilization of *deployees* (appointments based on political affiliation) or through the interference of higher levels of government in municipal matters. The arguments concerning the topic mainly use published and electronic sources.

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Keywords Administration · Cadres · Complementarity · Deployees · Interface · Level (The terminology of the different subordinate structures differs in countries. The terms used will be in accordance with the usage in each country, e.g. sphere, level or tier.) · Management · Politics · Policymaking

Introduction

The debate on the political/administrative interface has been on many agendas since officials were appointed to give effect to policies formulated by politically elected structures. In this chapter, the historical development of the debate concerning the interrelationship will not be described in detail. The justification for such a relationship will be referred to in an effort to explain the situation in selected African countries after gaining independence. Attention is also devoted to the implications of the interface and how it affects the relationship between politicians and managers but more specifically at the local level¹. As local government allows close proximity between politicians and officials, the interface is more pronounced than in the national sphere. The complex political, economic and social environments within which African political and administrative structures operate should be acknowledged to be able to comprehend the volatility of the relationship due to political instability in many African countries, still in a stage of transition to a fully democratic dispensation. This is the case despite one party being in power for long periods of time in numerous African “democracies”.

Electronic as well as published documents are consulted to support arguments. It will be argued that the relationship between politics and administration should be reconsidered as a result of current realities in African countries. The relationship could also be viewed as one of complementarity rather than administration being subordinate to or even in a dichotomous relationship with politics although the ultimate power vests in the political structures.

African States: A Political Dimension

All African countries did not inherit sound political and administrative systems at the time of gaining independence from the colonial powers. Some African countries even emerged with weakened governance structures (Commission for Africa 2005: 102) contributing to the challenges they had to face in the post-independence phase putting them in a transitional phase for decades. Even in the case of South Africa,

¹ In South Africa referred to as a sphere of government

with a different history as far as democratic independence is concerned, the newly elected democratic government inherited a deeply fragmented administrative system in 1994. Therefore, the newly established South African government was required to develop new systems to accommodate the 18 governmental and administrative systems (10 Bantustans,² 3 own affairs, 1 general affairs system³) and the former 4 provincial administrations into one non-racial administrative structure consisting of departments for the new national sphere and provincial departments for the provincial spheres of government. Furthermore, more or less 1100 racially divided municipalities, covering only some of the urban areas, had to be transformed into 284 non-racial transitional municipalities covering the total area of South Africa. These transitional structures had then been newly demarcated into the current 257 municipalities covering the total geographical area of South Africa.

Most African countries had to locate and craft a place for themselves in the ever-changing international arena. In the case of South Africa, this challenge was succinctly stated as follows in the National Planning Commission's report (2011: 95):

The 21st century presents humankind with exceptional opportunities and unprecedented risks. The linkages between risks can either amplify the impact of harmful events or modulate and disperse their effects. Interconnected risks are shown by the links among food, fuel and water in the context of climate change; among illicit trade, organised crime, corruption and terrorism in the context of fragile states and cybercrime; and among global macroeconomic imbalances, wide disparities in the growth paths of developed and emerging economies, and weak systems of global governance. It would be a mistake to believe that South Africa is a captive of irrational and irresistible extraneous forces. The decisions and actions it takes to create or modify linkages, regulate and incentivise behaviour and adopt policies on global issues are greatly important.

Other African countries such as Ghana and Uganda developed new local government systems after independence (Ghana Local Government Act 1993; Ayeko-Kümmeth 2014). Some of the systems are rather complex as in the case of Uganda with its three-tier system of government which makes a distinction between rural local government structures and urban local government structures creating complex relationships with higher authorities with commensurate intricate political/administrative relationships.

Local authorities in Kenya have a distinct structure established by the constituting Local Government Act. It provides immense powers to the Minister for Local Government to the extent that he has to approve virtually all matters resolved by local authorities, under the Local Government Act Cap 265, fusing together civic and administrative functions. It is significant to note that it has not been established as a separate sphere of government (Esidene 2013). The civic function is vested in

²“A *Bantustan* (also known as *Bantu homeland*, *black homeland*, *black state* or simply *homeland*; Afrikaans: *Bantoestan*) was a territory set aside for black inhabitants of South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia), as part of the policy of apartheid”. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bantustan>

³Parliament consisted of three legislative structures for the white, coloured and Indian population with each having its own administration. Matters concerning all population groups were dealt with by so-called “general affairs” departments such as Defence, Police and Home Affairs.

elected and nominated councillors. Municipal councils (for larger urban areas) are headed by mayors, while county councils (for rural areas) and town councils (for smaller municipalities) are headed by council chairpersons. The appointment of senior personnel is done by central government. Local authorities have no powers to hire and fire senior personnel. Central government through the Minister for Local Government has to approve the budgets of local authorities. This has a major setback on the reform process of Kenya's local administration to date. This policy allows a politically appointed office bearer to impose a politically motivated influence in the operation of local authorities. Kenya, just like any state system, has to grapple with a plethora of problems including, among others, undue political interference by the central government, lack of consistency of policy focus, corruption, nepotism, lack of political will, poor political culture, intergovernmental fracas and lack of funds and overall apathy among the grass root population (Esidene 2013: 14).

Similarly Tanzania had to establish a new system of local government after gaining independence. The local government system consists of urban councils and rural district councils. The local government authorities thus created were to be authorised to make policy and take operational decisions without undue interference by central government (Ngwilizi 2002). This proves that each country embarked on different approaches to establish local government systems to suit their political agendas. Ghana's Constitution (Article 146(1)) simply states that the purpose of local government authorities is to transfer authority to the *people*, implying citizen power, but no specific functions and powers are yet defined. However central government is required to facilitate local authorities to perform their duties, develop and manage national policy, monitor its accountability and provide adequate financial and human resources (Ngwilizi 2002).

The transformation in South Africa since the democratic elections of 1994 required a close liaison between the political and the administrative structures and officials to achieve the goal of an effective and efficient public sector that is required to improve service delivery to the formerly disadvantaged communities of the South African society. Thus the transformation was an endeavour not only to change the existing form of government but to rectify injustices of the past. Simultaneously, the restructured system has to ensure that existing administrative and managerial requirements are met, implying that legislation and new policies are honoured, prescribed procedures followed and accountability maintained. Thus the system crafted required extensive consideration of the contributions of the political structures and the administration to be developed to ensure continuous effective and efficient service delivery on an equitable basis.

Political Structures

Various definitions of the term *politics* are found in the literature concerning the public sector. The meanings relate to the context within which the user intends to make a particular statement. The *Oxford Dictionary* (2014) contains a rather simple

definition which could suffice for the purposes of this discussion, namely, that politics refers to “the principles relating to or inherent in a sphere or activity, especially when concerned with power and status”. Therefore, it could be argued that politics is one of the most significant phenomena in the public sector. In this regard, it does not imply only *party* politics, that is, the politics of a political party, but politics referring to the process of weighting priorities for the purposes of decision-making; who receives what, when, where and how; a conflict resolution process which determines the apportionment of resources; the process by which power is applied in order to determine whether and how government is to be exercised in any given area; or the allocation of values to identified needs (Fox and Meyer 1995: 98).

Politics has many faces or facets. It could be argued that the weighting of the available facts and related information is done within a particular value framework. This framework could be that of a political party, an interest group (Treatment Action Campaign, ratepayers’ association, agricultural union, religious group) or even a corporate body (e.g. in South Africa: Eskom, Telkom, South African Broadcasting Corporation). Therefore, it could be argued that politics concerns the attachment of values to the available facts, determining the relative importance of requests by society or a particular community for a specific service or the quantity of the services to be provided (e.g. in South Africa, 6 kilolitres of water or 20 kilowatt/hour of electricity free of charge to the indigent) and on the quality of the services to be delivered (e.g. 98% guaranteed water supply to within 200 metres of every household). Thus, the council as the political body governing (Section 151(3) of the South African Constitution 1996) in a particular municipality has the responsibility to identify the goals and to oversee the executive actions of the appointed officials acting on its behalf.

Members of society are elected by citizens to make decisions on behalf of that particular society or a particular community in a system of representative democracy. Even Aristotle identified the importance of the ruler in identifying the role of the “statesman (or women) in obtaining the good life for citizens” (Aristotle on line: 1). The role of the state in ensuring a safe environment, meeting the expectations of society, is becoming more complex. This phenomenon requires the political structures to review their roles in determining priorities and taking decisions concerning the well-being of society.

The representative body that is created as a result of an election in a democratic state normally consists of a large number of members. This composition makes it cumbersome and even impractical to *formulate* decisions or to develop complex policies requiring technical knowledge and factual information to ensure that policies are implementable. Therefore, a committee is usually elected/appointed to assist the larger assembly in formulating guidelines (policies) for operation, to oversee the performance of the appointed officials and to provide the representative body with information about the quantity and quality of results achieved.

Cabinet acts as a committee to assist Parliament in the national sphere (as defined in South Africa) of government in deciding on particular issues demanding the intervention of the state and to give guidance to the executive institutions, i.e. to perform the governing function. In fact, the origin of the term govern is the Greek

word *gubernare*, which means to steer, as in steering a boat. Thus, a government's primary responsibility is to provide guidance to the executive institutions concerning the policy directions in which they should aim their activities. Government is not supposed to row, i.e. to become involved in implementing a policy.

In the municipal sphere, the council as legislative body also performs the executive function (Section 151(2), South African Constitution 1996 and Section 11 (1) of the *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000*). Various possibilities exist regarding the structures available to assist council in performing the executive function. In the South African local sphere, a committee, such as the executive mayor and mayoral committee, has a different relationship with the council than the case is with Cabinet in the national sphere regarding their relationships with their respective legislatures.

With this simplified definition of a very complex phenomenon in mind, it is obvious that politics is a characteristic of all national states. African countries are no exception to this phenomenon. In the Commission for Africa's Report (2005, 119), *Our Common Interest*, it is stated that:

Every country has a mix of social and economic realities that differ from other countries and differ, often massively even within one state according to divisions of ethnicity, religion, gender, generation, geography and so on. Such diversity can be seen in everything from attitudes to standards of living, provision of infrastructure, access to health and education, economic opportunity, models of governance and political history.

The National Planning Commission (NPC) of South Africa identified the following challenges facing a capable state (2011: 408–09):

unevenness in capacity that leads to uneven performance in local, provincial and national government. This is caused by a complex set of factors, including tensions in the political-administrative interface, instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of accountability and authority, poor organisational design and low staff morale. This vision requires a capable and developmental state: capable in that it has the capacity to formulate and implement policies that serve the national interest; developmental in that those policies focus on overcoming the root causes of poverty and inequality, and building the state's capacity to fulfil this role.

From the view expressed by the NPC, it could be deduced that South Africa as an epitome of African states is confronted with a complex political/administrative dilemma. The state is required to be developmental, thus requiring a stable public service, unambiguous policies and a supportive society adhering to legal prescripts. Simultaneously, transformation also demands adaptability, implying policy and procedural changes which could affect administrative consistency. Meeting the demand for political certainty and accountable administration thus pose a challenge.

The complexity of governing a diverse population becomes obvious as South Africa actually represents a microcosm of the composition of African states. Madagascar, for example, has 18 ethnic groups, Kenya has 42 tribes and Democratic Republic of Congo boasts 200 tribes speaking 215 indigenous languages. Representatives in each of the legislative bodies in each of the three spheres of government in South Africa, as is the case in other African countries which implemented systems of local government, have to be able to judge, the often divergent,

values and requests of interest groups or political parties representing segments of society such as regions, population groups or language groups. The complexity of this function becomes clear if one considers the composition of the population of most African countries, e.g.:

- Different religious groups, different language and cultural groups, different economically active/inactive groups, different residentially situated groups with divergent developmental needs
- Different business and industrial concerns
- Different labour unions
- Different political parties with own agendas
- Different age groups with each its own needs and expectations

Within any large institution, such as a government (or a municipality), a variety of invisible networks exist (Commission for Africa 2005) These social networks influence the perception of a community or society at large regarding the acceptability of a political body's composition and decisions (consider the unrests in various parts of South Africa, the DRC and even Rwanda during the past few years) and the quality of the administration and management being practised under its guidance.

Government has to identify the priorities concerning the issues requiring attention at a particular stage, concerning its powers and functions entrusted to the three spheres of government individually and collectively. This identification of functions as part of the political process has to acknowledge the constitutional requirements contained, e.g. in the South African *Bill of Rights* (Constitution 1996) such as the right of access to healthcare, food, water and social security services within its available resources. These rights can only be realized if an administrative system exists to implement the relevant policies. Svava (2001: 176) argues that this is actually "at the heart of the relationship between public administration and political leaders and the public". He argues that administration cannot be viewed as only mechanically instrumental in the policy function; therefore, the Wilsonian dichotomy cannot be accepted. Administration has to cooperate with the legislature to assist the latter in being effective in its role as it will be better informed.

Politics as expressed in the governing function is largely "practised" by politicians, such as ministers of Cabinet or mayor assisted by a committee in the municipal level/sphere. However, it should also be considered that even in determining the relative importance of a proposed policy, the possible administrative implications have to be considered. This is one of the occasions where the politicians are required to liaise with the appointed officials and rely on their expertise. Government can only keep its promises made during election campaigns and in policy statements if they can trust the appointed officials to give effect to their policies. The latter has to translate political decisions into actions and must ensure that policies become a reality. Thus, a minister, mayor or executive committee in local government will be:

- Responsible for overall political supervision of the department or other public entity under his/her jurisdiction

- Accountable to the legislature for the way in which the department/entity gives effect to the policies as approved by the relevant legislature
- Responsible for other duties related to the particular position, e.g. the approval of regulations related to the laws/by-laws under his/her jurisdiction

Political office bearers have different governing styles. Some political office bearers such as mayors could, for example, be viewed as *interventionists*, implying that they may tend to be more involved in the detail of the actions of a municipality; thus, they tend to become involved in management instead of providing policy guidance. Some political leaders prefer to act as *policy initiators* and thus focus mainly on the development of new policies without regard for the administrative and managerial requirements to give effect to the initiatives. Some mayors/executive mayors tend to play an *ambassadorial role* and endeavour to promote the image of a municipality or a specific policy without providing policy certainty. Lastly some political office bearers could be viewed as *minimalists*, implying that they keep a low profile and avoid having to take controversial decisions that may compromise them. Consequently these governing styles would have a direct effect on the relationship between the political head and the administrative structures. Thus, the personality of the elected political office bearer will have a significant effect on the political administrative interface.

The managing style of the head of administration would also have an effect on the extent to which the political office bearer could play his/her political role in prioritizing and weighting the importance of the matters requiring executive action. The political ideologies of a government during a period of rapid change required after an election could also require stronger political involvement than in cases where political stability exists and new policy directions are not crucial requirements.

Although most African countries appear to be politically stable, it may only be due to the fact that no regular elections take place as is the case currently in the DRC and even in Zimbabwe under the former and the current President. However, in reality most countries suffer from political uncertainty resulting from internal strife within the ruling party (or alliance). Hurwitz (1973) argues that political stability is one crucial ingredient for effective government. Thus, in countries plagued by instability, viable and sustainable policies are unlikely. The effects of political instability will have the same effect in local government as in national government as is the case currently in various South African municipalities governed by unstable coalitions. In these municipalities, resolutions and by-laws can only be passed if the governing coalition could agree. This situation most often results in policies which could be coined as *satisficing*, not necessarily providing the optimum solution to a problem, but are merely the minimum that could be agreed upon by the different parties in the coalition.

Administration/Management

Administration and management could be defined as the enabling functions required to give effect to political decisions/policies. Public administration as a system primarily concerns the creation of an enabling framework for the performance of the functional activities assigned to public institutions. The framework could be divided into subsystems and processes by public institutions for:

- The formulation of policies
- The development of organisational structures
- The appointment and utilisation of human resources
- The acquisition and utilisation of financial resources
- The development of work methods to promote efficient and effective service delivery
- The establishment of effective control measures to obtain efficient and effective service delivery while maintaining public accountability

Management, put in a simplified form, may be viewed as the way in which the system operates. It *inter alia* concerns planning, budgeting, leading and monitoring and evaluation. The relationship between administration and politics is not one of a servant-master relationship (Cameron 2003: 55). The relationship is much more multifaceted and complex. The NPC (2011: 411) puts it concisely as follows:

All democratic regimes have to balance the need for public servants to be responsive to the priorities of the government of the day with the need for the public service to treat citizens equally and not discriminate on grounds of political allegiance. Where the public service is too insulated from political pressures, there are likely to be concerns that it is failing to serve the interests of the government of the day and therefore not fulfilling its democratic mandate. However, where the public service is insufficiently insulated, standards can be undermined as public servants are recruited on the basis of political connections rather than skills and expertise, or access to state resources and services become defined by political affiliation rather than citizenship.

The view expressed by the NPC clearly explains one of the core requirements for an effective and efficient public sector (national/regional/local), that is, the acknowledgement of the indispensable function of public administration in a complementary role in governing. Political leaders are accountable and perform an oversight function regarding operations of the appointed officials to ensure that their policies are implemented. This requirement does not create a paradox as a politician's role is constrained (Svara 2001) by the expertise of the appointed officials regarding the practice of administration and management. It could thus be argued that there should be a mutual recognition of the respective functions concerning the need for control over municipal administration and the need for authority by the appointed officials to administer and manage the affairs of a municipality.

Personnel Corps

Human resources are utilised on every level of the public sector to give effect to policies determined by the political executive and authorised by the legislature. It should be considered that political office bearers on every level of government rely on sound advice by the appointed officials. The senior officials who advise the political executive body, therefore, have to be fully aware of the political choices that have been made by the municipal council when it exercises its *governing* authority. The political choices have to be considered within the framework of its administrative, managerial and technical feasibility. This is the domain of particularly the senior managerial employees of the executive institutions. However, in some cases the governing political party sometimes intervenes in appointments as Ayko-Kümmeth found in the case of Uganda (2014: 70). This is particularly the case where specialists are required in areas such as economic matters, financial affairs, labour relations, legal matters and a plethora of other functions municipal institutions deal with. This is why it is a matter of concern that currently only about 40% of municipal managers and about 34% of the chief financial officers in the South African local government sphere meet the required minimum standards prescribed by the South African National Treasury.

The management echelon requires specialists in management and administration. These are areas requiring the same degree of expertise as is required in each functional area similar to the technical expertise required of engineers or accountants or lawyers. The municipal manager as head of administration has access to these specialists and does not need to be a specialist in those areas. The municipal manager as well as all managers should be experts in administration and management. The senior management officials, in particular, are involved in the political arena within which the political office bearer operates. Cameron (2003: 60) states it succinctly as follows:

The criteria for posts that require political suitability can be defined as any post

- Which involves the development of government policy at a strategic level ensuring alignment with party political objectives and programmes
- Which requires the incumbent to be trusted with sensitive and/or confidential party political information
- Which requires the incumbent to direct, at a political level, government communication

The managerial level is the actual area within which the political/administrative interface plays itself out as this space brings the two participating role players into direct contact with one another, requiring mutual acknowledgement of their respective roles.

A prime example of political interference in the appointment of a municipal manager in the Amathole District Municipality in South Africa serves as a case in point. In this instance, two candidates were nominated for the post: candidate A scored 16% higher in the interviews than candidate B during the selection process conducted by a panel consisting of the former Department of Provincial and Local

Government, councillors of the municipality and the local Chamber of Commerce. However, the Regional Executive Committee of the ruling party instructed the caucus of the party in council to appoint candidate B although he scored less than candidate A. Legal opinion obtained by the mayor also advised him not to appoint candidate B. Before the council meeting, the caucus decided to withhold this advice from council and proceeded in council to appoint candidate B without conducting a vote. Candidate A then approached the court which found the appointment procedurally invalid as no vote was taken. The court further found that the decision to appoint candidate B was an administrative action and the interference of the regional branch of the ruling party in the decision was thus unlawful. The court also ruled that the caucus acted improperly. The final outcome was that candidate A was appointed as municipal manager (De Vos 2008). This clearly illustrates the interference of politics in the appointment of a municipal manager as required in Annexure A of the South African Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000, which is an administrative action requiring a person with the required competencies to be appointed not merely because of a political connection or political predisposition.

The Interface

The debates on the interface can be explored from various possible perspectives. Demir argues that three schools of thought could be identified, viz. separation, political and interaction. The first and the second could be viewed as the two opposites with the interaction school in a more conciliatory approach. The approaches make it possible to conceptualize the complex phenomenon becoming even more relevant in the current political and economic environment of African states promoting political agendas without necessarily remaining committed to efficient and effective service delivery.

The United Nations identified the need for a reconsideration of the role of the public servant clearly by promoting the need for the depoliticisation of the public service and “promoting the ideal of a neutral and merit-based civil service. Evidence shows however that pure merit-based systems are the exception and that political appointments are common in most civil services” (United Nations on line 13). Although this required neutrality may be unachievable, it signifies the need to identify the role of the public servant as opposed to the role of a politician. The view also indicates that the relationship is in transition and that no final word has been said on the phenomenon.

The political/administrative interface is where the tyre hits the road. This is the grey area within which politics has to be distinguished from administration and management. In the case of a motor vehicle, the bonding between the tyre and the road determines to what extent the driver is in control of the vehicle. If the bonding is insufficient due to tyre failure or road inconsistency, the vehicle tends to move in an irregular manner. This situation applies to the executing authority and the management echelon as well. If there is lack of trust or lack of clarity regarding the

respective responsibilities, the executive departments cannot provide the services required. To be able to separate the political and administrative functions to some extent, one has to assume that sufficient educated and talented people are available to fill both offices (Cameron 2003). If this condition cannot be met, the municipal department cannot promote the policy objectives of the particular council performing its executive function, and political values may not be properly integrated into the administrative and managerial systems.

The interface in the municipal sphere is much more complex than in the other two spheres of government. This is mainly due to the fact that the issues involved in municipalities concern the direct and daily lives of communities in clearly demarcated areas. Lack of efficient service delivery is directly observable and often results in direct calls from citizens or even visits to the municipal councillor to solicit support for a particular service or favour. The councillor in turn tends to liaise directly with the manager concerned or, worse still, with the particular functional official involved. This practice tends to cloud the distinction between the two functions. It also contributes to communication failures within the managerial system and detrimentally affects lines of authority within the system. It is a requirement in Section 53(5) (a) of the South African Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000, that a municipality must determine the roles and areas of responsibility of political office bearers and of the municipal manager concerning lines of accountability and the interaction between the two. The need for clarity on the interface is, therefore, an urgent requirement to be attended to in an attempt to ensure that ethical guidelines are honoured although a need exists for the recognition of an intimate interface or complementarity of the two functions in developing an efficient and effective level/sphere of local government.

The political/administrative relationship is probably one of the most complex relationships to manage in any public institution. However, the different acts of Parliament governing municipal matters are quite clear regarding the respective functions and duties of the political role player (e.g. the mayor) on the one hand and the head of administration (the municipal manager) on the other hand. In fact, Section 76 of the South African *Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003*, determines that “Any action by a political office bearer against a municipal manager solely because of the accounting officer’s compliance with a provision of this Act is an unfair labour practice for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995”. This is a clear stipulation that allows the manager to act without political constraint. However, it does not protect him/her from political bullying techniques.

The head of administration (municipal manager), with the assistance of all the other managerial personnel, has to interpret the demands from politicians in terms of the administrative and managerial implications, e.g. the human resources, infrastructure, as well as the geographical conditions and demographic reality of the citizens of a municipality.

Ultimately the final decision-making power vests in council representing the community. The municipal manager and other managerial personnel are charged with the responsibility to ensure that the council, in its capacity as legislative body, is fully briefed on all administrative, managerial and executive activities. The

municipal manager will ultimately be held accountable by council if the policies or resolutions are not effected due to maladministration or poor managerial practices. Therefore, if an executing authority (mayor/executive committee) neglects its oversight and monitoring function, the electorate could take the responsible political office bearer to task. Indirectly the actions of officials are also scrutinised by members of society and may even be criticised in newspapers and the other news media. These actions or inactions, however, will ultimately have to be dealt with by council or one of its committees. In some cases, communities demonstrate their opposition physically to inefficiency and ineffectiveness due the lack of knowledge regarding functions of the different spheres of government, thus unable to identify the public institution involved. This could result in the destruction of municipal property although the problem could be related to a regional or national incompetency.

The need to distinguish between the functions of administration and of politics remains imperative to be able to establish accountability. However, the traditional notion of the “neutral” public servant will have to be revisited. This matter is particularly important as the South African Bill of Rights (Constitution 1996) allows every citizen to become a member of a political party and to participate in its activities. The Bill also prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee as a result of his/her political opinion or belief. Therefore, an employee is permitted to exercise his/her political rights, raising the question of being politically neutral in performing the administrative functions. It is unlikely that managerial officials could be politically neutral in developing countries. They need to reconcile their views with those of the executing authority regarding the functional area within which they have to perform their administrative and managerial responsibilities. The implication is that the interface or the complementarity of the two functions is becoming more complex. The respective role players must still continue in their endeavours to distinguish between political and administrative issues and promote the primary duties for which they are responsible.

The responsibilities of senior officials in a rapidly changing political environment have to be reviewed to obtain clarity regarding accountability due to unclear policy instructions from political office bearers. This requirement even demands the manager to assume a *Janus face* (after the Roman god who could look at the future and the past simultaneously) by considering the political and the administrative considerations simultaneously. This requires a new “breed” of public manager equally knowledgeable in the political domain as in the administrative/managerial competencies but still able to distinguish between the two.

One of the most serious threats facing public administration and management in South Africa is certainly the introduction of political deployees or party politically motivated appointments. This practice was introduced to eradicate the skew representation of the different population groups in the public sector. According to this practice, a minister or mayor can appoint a number of officials who may not normally qualify for appointment to assist him/her in exercising the political function. However, it has become common practice to even appoint other personnel in a municipality on the basis of their political affiliation and not according to their competencies. The result is that employees may not possess the required knowledge,

experience or commitment to manage. This could result in managerial decisions being taken purely to safeguard political ideals or personal preferences and not to promote efficient and effective service rendering. This practice is not unique to South Africa. Various other African countries experience a similar dilemma (Ayko-Kümmeth 2014; Gould and Amaro-Reyes 1983).

The practice of appointing political supporters as reward for their commitment to the party's ideals has far-reaching effects on the management of the public institutions. This is because the appointee may lack the required competency to perform the job assigned to the post in which he/she is appointed. These so-called cadres are often not even committed to the ethical guidelines or principles of public administration as enumerated in Section 195 of the South African Constitution, 1996. Such appointees, therefore, do not attempt to distinguish a political function from the managerial responsibility attached to the particular post (Siddle and Koeble 2012: 17). It could thus be argued that the appointment of unsuitably qualified personnel who only require loyalty to the party's cause negates the principle of a public service that must promote and maintain "a high standard of professional ethics" and can exhibit that they provide services "impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias" (South African Constitution 1996). The interface becomes totally obscured, and society loses trust in the ability of the public service to render services fairly and equitably to everyone.

This chapter has largely focused on the public sector, and it may appear as though the political/administrative interface only applies to this sector. However, it should be pointed out that in the corporate sector the interface is also present, although not necessarily a *party* political/administrative interface. In this regard specific reference should be made to the *King II Report* (Appointed by the South African Board of Directors 2002). This Report's recommendations are wide ranging and "apply to public sector enterprises and agencies that fall under the Public Finance Management Act and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 including any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government or any other functionary or institution exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution or exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but not including a court or a judicial official, unless otherwise prescribed by legislation".

The abovementioned clarification of its mandate implies that its recommendations are applicable to any organ of state (thus including a municipality) defined in Section 239 of the Constitution, 1996. Thus the King Report acknowledges the similarity between the public and the private sector as far as the proposed *Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct* is concerned. It could, therefore, also be argued that the *Business Judgment Rule* (King 2002: 73) is also applicable to the public sector and by implication to the municipal council in the municipal sphere.

The King Committee's *Business Judgment Rule* (King II) is defined as follows:

Essentially, the rule protects directors against being held accountable for business decisions, however unwise they subsequently turn out to have been, if they were made on an *informed basis, in good faith, and without conflict of interest, and the decision was rational at the time in all its circumstances* (my emphasis).

It should be clear that if the opposite situation occurs, i.e. a decision is biased, taken without proper information being considered, taken in bad faith (*mala fides*) and irrational, and when conflict of interest played a role in the decision, a board (council) could be held accountable. This illustrates that the political/administrative interface could to some extent be clarified as far as the accountability for decisions is concerned. The political body cannot be absolved for wrongful decisions which may result in unauthorised or wasteful expenditure due to council's failure to honour the ethical principles of natural justice. This is clearly demonstrated in Section 54A (3) of the South African *Municipal Systems Act 2000* (amended by Act 7 of 2011) which states that:

A decision to appoint a person as municipal manager and any contract concluded between the municipal council and that person in consequence of the decision are null and void if:

- (a) The person appointed does not have the prescribed skills, expertise, competencies or qualifications.
- (b) The appointment was otherwise done in contravention of this Act.

Section of Section 54A (8) states that:

If a person is appointed as municipal manager in contravention of this section the MEC for local government must...take appropriate steps to enforce compliance by the municipal council, which may include an application for a declaratory order on the validity of the appointment, or any other legal action against the *municipal council*. (author's emphasis)

The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000 provides in Section 54A (9) that if the Member of the Executive Council (of a province) fails to act, the Minister may take the steps contemplated in the relevant subsection. The municipal council may in terms of Section 54A (10) of the Act apply in writing, in special circumstances, to the minister to waive the requirements listed if it is unable to attract a suitable candidate. If this waiver is applied freely, it will defeat the object of the Act as far as the prescribed skills for the appointment of a municipal manager is concerned. Irrespective of the latter escape clause, the rule still applies that council has to acknowledge its duty to act responsibly in appointing the municipal manager to ensure a competent head of administration and accounting officer.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter was aimed at reviewing a complex topic. Its focus was mainly aimed at clarifying concepts and the legal requirements. More comprehensive research is required to establish the practical application in the current political fluidity in many African countries and with regard to the lack of expertise and experience in the senior managerial sector in various African countries. The political/administrative interface which has created tension since the appointment of "permanent" officials has not been resolved. It will probably remain a contentious issue for the foreseeable future while countries are still struggling to find an equilibrium in their public sector systems unless some agreement could be reached in which political office bearers will commit themselves to give effect to legal requirements regarding their

particular area of power and unless competent senior officials who meet the required competency requirements are appointed. This requirement is a prerequisite for efficient municipal services to local or urban communities.

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Chapter 2

The Changing Notion of Democracy and Public Participation in Cities in Africa: A Time for an Alternative?



Paul Kariuki

Abstract Participation has become an increasingly important aspect in local governance as African cities experience increasing urbanization and pressing social needs. In the interests of advancing democracy, inclusive participation of citizens has become a guiding notion of how local governments deliver development to all without excluding any section of the populace. The challenge for most African cities is determining how inclusive citizen participation should inform development in a complex society faced with competing socio-economic and political needs. In the same breath, the notion of democracy is being challenged by different sections of the populace. The contestation is about who is benefiting from democracy and at whose expense. In this case, most African cities wear the coat of a developmental state mired in corruption and patronage politics. From this standpoint, the notion of democracy is contested, mostly by citizens who are experiencing poor basic service delivery and increasing taxes as cities struggle to raise revenues sustainably. The task of this chapter is to interrogate these salient issues. Firstly, it examines the concepts of participation and democracy, exploring their convergence and divergence in the broader discourse of development and democracy. Secondly, the chapter seeks to explore the extent to which these concepts are being upheld by city governments in the context of equality and statutory provision, given the diversity of city populations. Thirdly, the chapter examines the notion of participation in enabling deliberations, allowing for divergent views without promoting consensus-based political outcomes excluding dissident voices. Fourthly, it interrogates the extent of decision-making processes, determining the extent the city dwellers influence policies. All together, these various issues are intended to enable critical reflection of the changing notions of participation and democracy in African cities. The chapter concludes with a suggestion of an alternative mechanism of participation in restoring the voice of citizens towards effective and inclusive governance.

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Introduction

The 21st century will not be dominated by America or China, Brazil or India, but by The City. In a world that increasingly appears ungovernable, cities — not states — are the islands of governance on which the future world order will be built. (Parag Khanna)

Cities in Africa are increasingly becoming centres of social, economic and political leadership. The effect of this trend is palpable as cities become more urbanized due to surging population growth, demographical changes and technological advancements. Even though the rates of urbanization are generally uneven across the continent, the effects of the trend are visible as cities in Africa grapple with opportunities and challenges imposed on them by this phenomenon. For instance, urban planning, socio-economic development, city management and governance are critical aspects attracting the attention of investors, academics and researchers among other key stakeholders, who are examining the effects of rapid urbanization on cities.

At the same time, population sizes of cities in Africa are increasing at a faster rate than cities themselves can cope with the growth. The resulting effect is enormous pressure being exerted on the already-stretched resources further limiting the delivery of basic services sustainably. Consequently, most cities continentally have also become centres of civil protests, as the swelling populations compete for the limited resources available to them. The protests in many cases are violent, characterized by damage to property, arson, intimidation and looting of business premises among other aspects.

The enormous responsibilities placed on cities due to rapid urbanization as well as internal migration have necessitated the city governments to reconsider their models of engaging the public towards lessening citizens' disaffection with the inability to provide basic services satisfactorily. In rethinking citizen engagement, cities are exploring models of facilitating meaningful citizen engagement in enabling inclusive city governance. This inclusivity is in line with democratic ideals, where ordinary citizens are expected to influence decisions of cities in so far as governance and development processes are concerned. As Mkhize (2015) contends, city dwellers must have a sense of belonging, spatially, socioculturally as well as economically, so they can fully participate without fear or a feeling of being not welcomed.

As cities morph into nodal spaces for good governance towards becoming democratic developmental localities, their levels of awareness in terms of strengthening institutional bureaucratic capabilities, political legitimacy as well as active citizenship have heightened in the last decade. However, this sense of awareness is not homogenous and context city specific. Some cities have made significant progress towards good governance, but they remain spatially untransformed. In such instances, cities are constantly exploring mechanisms of aligning their developmental goals with their processes such as intergovernmental relations to ensure effective coordination of governance.

In ensuring cities become effective and well governed, collective leadership is needed to ensure that cities are not only well governed but also are centres of transformation for democratic practices of inclusiveness, equality and participation. Cities of the future must embrace these democratic principles to ensure they are able to cope with the complex forms of change facing them.

Conceptual Definitions

(a) Democracy

Democracy is a form of government in which citizens have the authority and privilege to choose their leaders through voting, where each citizen has an equal political and legal right and enjoys a high degree of civil liberties (Doorenspleet 2019:238). Stated differently, democracy has its legitimacy in public participation in the governance affairs of the nation. It is a form of governance centred on its citizenry, by them and for them (Adegboye 2013:25). In countries where democracy exists, governments are guided by a constitution, which sets out its structures, powers and limits (Canache 2012:56). In this case, political power is vested in the constitution of the country (Kasfir 2013:45). In those instances where government does not follow its own constitution, it loses its legitimacy and violates individual rights of citizens, often with impunity (Riedl 2014:87).

(b) Citizen Participation

Citizen participation means public involvement of ordinary citizens in the activities of government or its agencies, to make contribution in various processes that lead to decisions affecting their lives (Park 2019:281). Interpreted differently, citizen participation also refers to active involvement in decision-making processes, either as individuals or organized communities, whilst holding their leaders accountable (Simonofski et al. 2019:48).

(c) Citizen Inclusion

Citizen inclusion refers to a government policy that allows all citizens an equal access to public services and democratic rights as well as the ability to participate in government representing others such as a representative of an organized community (Cardullo and Kitchin 2019:5). As citizens engage actively in public affairs, they gain a sense of belonging to a political community that represents their interests (Knox et al. 2019:40).

(d) Citizen Exclusion

Citizen inclusion refers to a government policy that excludes citizens from participation in various affairs of the state. Political exclusion may include lack of political rights and rights to organize and alienation from or lack of confidence in political processes including lack of freedom of expression and equality of

opportunity among other aspects (Watts and Hodgson 2019:140). Other forms of citizen exclusion include social, cultural and economic exclusion. Social exclusion occurs when members of certain societal groups are excluded from full participation in society for non-material things linked to discrimination, intolerance or legal status (Friedman 2019:285). Cultural exclusion is a form of marginalization among certain societal groups based on their cultural differences relative to a dominant cultural group, denying them access to public goods and privileges (Daenekindt 2019:180). Economic exclusion refers to a form of exclusion that prevents certain population groups from participating actively fully and equally in the economic life of their nation (Newman and Hayes 2019:15).

(e) Urbanization

Urbanization refers to a process by which large concentrations of people move from rural areas to urban cities and a particular locality is often characterized by a gradual increase of people (Rocco and van Ballegooijen 2019:55). It is closely linked to modernization and industrialization (Smith 2019:45).

(f) Governance

Governance refers to structures and processes designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, equity and inclusiveness in society (Dahiya and Das 2020:15). In a democracy, governance means effective and efficient structures that provide support to citizens optimally, enabling them to lead productive lives in the service of self, community and society as active citizens (Bergström et al. 2019:140).

(g) Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy refers to the broad participation of citizens in all affairs of state governance, especially in decision-making processes and continuous engagement with political parties to ensure representation (Laurence et al. 2016:226). Stated differently, participatory democracy also connotes citizen engagement in governance, from grassroots to national level (Paulse 2019:50).

Urbanization Trends in Africa: Forces at Work

Urbanization is a global phenomenon that cannot be ignored. It is sweeping across the nations of the world irrespective of their political and socio-economic status. It is a historical phenomenon driven primarily by population dynamics associated with skewed development, between geographical areas resulting in unprecedented movements of people from underserved areas to those perceived as developed or developing locations characterized by technological innovations and industries among other developments (Potts 2018). Given the anticipated population growth over the next three decades, this surge in population will most y likely outstrip the capacity of most cities to deliver basic services to their citizens adequately and

sustainably. The net effect of this inability to provide basic services sustainably is a rise in civil protests from low-income urban poor living in the fringes of cities, the majority of whom are living in deplorable conditions. Given this background, achieving sustainable city development will remain a formidable challenge across the continent.

In addition to population growth and its contribution to urbanization, the other aspect influencing urban trends on the continent is urban policies adopted by most city governments. In countries with historical urban spatial exclusion on the continent, urban reforms have not fully reversed uneven spatial development architecture (Turok 2018). In this case, city development is still unevenly delivered, with affluent areas still enjoying better public services than all other areas. This uneven spatial development continues to divide citizens along racial and socio-economic statuses, creating conditions for social unrests among citizens and impeding peaceful co-existence.

In other African countries, tribalism influences national and regional development trajectories. The dominant tribe normally forms the government given its dominant political representation in the ruling party. In this case, development is shaped by the political elite who in most cases hail from a particular tribe, situation that undermines patriotism and national development in general. Sadly, tribal politics shape city planning processes depending on who is at the helm of the region as a political leader. In such situations, city development is remaining a contested phenomenon and often precipitates into ongoing civil protests among city dwellers.

Moreover, urbanization in African cities is also being influenced by the influx of migrant labour. Migration has always had a cross-border phenomenon, people moving inter- and intracities, crossing also national boundaries into other countries. In the process, cross-border and interregional mobility has continued to accelerate, as people move from one place to the other for economic opportunities as result of high unemployment levels and uneven provision of basic services, bringing significant diversification of cities beyond geographical and linguistic considerations. This trend has been observed across all parts of the continent, more notable in the Southern and Eastern African region (Awumbila et al. 2016). Socio-economic opportunities are key drivers for this trend including other factors such as environmental degradation (Flahaux and De Haas 2016).

The Nexus: Democracy, Inclusive Citizen Participation and Development in Africa

Democracy must be lived to be treasured as a notion that seeks to elevate citizens' experience of enjoying freedoms that enhance their participation in shaping their interaction with their governments. One such freedom is political freedom that allows ordinary citizens' experience constitutionally endorsed privileges aimed at promoting equality before the law, regardless of their creed, religion, ethnicity, gender and social status to mention just a few. It is worth noting that these privileges are

internationally recognized and guaranteed, and no state can take them away (Heller 2012). Therefore, nation states are bound by their own constitutions to protect them and institute remedial actions any time they are violated. It is against this understanding that democracy is highly valued as it is sustained by rights enshrined in the constitution, which also describes the various checks and balances of the various arms of government. The separation of powers is critical in promoting national unity. In this case, the executive cannot have all power; it must be checked by the judiciary and the legislature to ensure that there are no abuses of power in any form. The judiciary must remain independent, so it can always determine accurately whether a law or a government action or policy is consistent with the constitution. On the other hand, parliament is tasked with the responsibility of enacting legislation, once it has received government policies including national budgets from the executive and has conducted due diligence on them to ensure that they are consistent with the constitution. This distribution of political power is critical in ensuring that state resources are allocated as per the national budget informed by government development priorities, eventually at bringing government services closer to the people.

In the interest of entrenching constitutional democracies on the continent, most African countries have adopted a decentralized system of governance. Political leaders in these countries are elected directly by citizens in every election cycle, in which case ordinary citizens have an opportunity to elect political representatives of their choice. In this sense, elective leaders are at both provincial and local levels, represent ordinary citizens and are expected to be responsive to their needs. As a system, democracy then functions in a shared political authority arrangement where the executive designs the policies, the parliament enacts legislation to support the policies and government programmes whilst the judiciary ensures everything done within the prescripts of the constitution and the rights of citizens are protected. In the end, this practice engenders national unity as it allows ordinary citizens at the community level to have some level of control in their own affairs.

What then is the role of citizen in a democracy? The main role of citizens in a democracy is participation (Doorenspleet 2019: 240). Participation takes many forms across countries around the world. It takes forms such as volunteering in community and societal projects, advocacy efforts, attending ward committee meetings, attending public dialogues and voting in elections to mention just a few (Gordon et al. 2019: 800). All these forms of participation empower citizens with information to facilitate their abilities to engage in public dialogues with confidence, voicing their views about matters close to them and demanding accountability from the political leaders and representatives. This enablement is a key element in any democracy.

In Africa, citizen participation in leadership processes at any level of governance is a contested phenomenon. This is mainly because citizens, once informed, gain confidence to engage their representatives and hold them accountable for their actions and decisions. They can monitor their actions closely and voice their opinions in the process (Van Noorloos et al. 2019:430). It is this inclusive participation in governance processes that deepens democracy in any country. Citizens have the

power to participate in both invited and invented spaces of expressing citizenship. This is critically important in entrenching participatory democracy. Invited spaces are those spaces that are legitimized by government and sometimes donors for civil society organizations to meet and engage with each other including donors and government on matters that are important to them and their work. Invented spaces are those opportunities that are not legitimized but are claimed by civil society organizations for their collective action about a societal issue important to them, to confront public authorities and challenge their position on an issue. They aim at forcing a larger societal change by confronting the dominant power holders that set the agenda.

In this neoliberal era, democracy finds expression in the efforts that citizenry employ in claiming their space, to voice their opinions and challenge the status quo, to ensure that they are considered or at least included in decision-making processes (Galuszka 2019:150). It is a critical aspect of participatory democracy that permits ordinary citizens to contribute towards inclusive nation building, where each voice matters and deserves to be heard.

City Governance and Inclusive Participation in Africa

In most African cities, inclusive participation is usually a battle. City governments are normally not open to constant dialogues with their citizens. As a result, citizens are forced to use both invited and invented spaces to challenge status quo and hold their leaders accountable. Invited spaces are the ones established and legitimized through legislation by government for grassroots and non-governmental organizations. Invented spaces are the ones established through activism claimed by civic organizations and other citizen interest groups to challenge status quo including confronting government on any issue of concern to society such as poor basic service delivery or failing infrastructure in a locality which is limiting enjoyment of constitutional rights and privileges.

Given this background, inclusive participation is a contested concept in most cities in Africa. This is primarily because of ever-growing demands on dwindling revenue resources available to city governments. Most of the cities are burdened with infrastructure and service delivery backlogs complicated by rapid urbanization and increasing unemployment as well as burgeoning social challenges such as crime and substance abuse to mention a few. Because of these challenges, attempts to improve local governance on the continent aimed at improving efficiency and accountability are failing because decision-making often does not include the interests and aspirations of the local citizenry. Weak citizen participation in most African cities has led to poor citizen participation in local development agenda, resulting in minimal uptake of citizens' interests in government development plans. The situation has been further exacerbated by high staff turnover rates where most cities are struggling to retain skilled and qualified officials. All these dimensions of governance challenges are juxtaposed with minimal revenue collection challenges due to a low

tax base. As a result, most city governments are struggling to implement development programmes effectively due to resource constraints emanating from low tax bases and dwindling financial allocations from both regional and national fiscuses.

The question then is how cities are navigating these different realities to ensure meaningful citizen participation in their processes in an inclusive manner. One of the many innovative and creative ways that cities are ensuring meaningful and inclusive citizen participation is increased decentralizing local government functions to localized governance structures such as ward committees, where ward committees have become the new “city operations” based for most cities on the continent (Galuszka 2019:144). Even though the structures are not optimally perfect in their operations, nevertheless, they have remained active engagement spaces where ordinary citizens interact with each other and their local leadership to deliberate on their development needs, aspirations and challenges among other aspects. One of the main challenges that most cities on the continent face as far as ward committees system of decentralized governance is concerned is to ensure ward committees do not become breeding grounds for political parties to advance their individual political party agenda at the expense of the rest of the other citizens in the locality. Sadly, this phenomenon has become a norm in most cities, and it is an impediment to effective inclusive citizen participation.

Another innovative way of ensuring inclusive citizen participation is by use of digital platforms for engagement. E-governance is gaining traction in most cities, majority of whom are adopting technology as a means of encouraging citizens’ voices in city development planning and decision-making processes (Ingwani et al. 2019:755). However, there have been notable challenges with digitalizing engagement, especially due to unevenness across cities on the continent in terms of access to the Internet, costs of data as well as varying digital literacy levels among citizens. These challenges impede effective engagement by citizens with their cities, thereby limiting the extent their opinions reach city authorities for consideration (Chirisa and Matamanda 2019). There is still a lot to be done to ensure cities become digitally inclusive for all.

Moreover, cities are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of developing relationships with the corporate sector operating in their localities. The drive to foster corporate citizenship is on the rise, and cities are becoming wiser in creating an investor-friendly environment for business community not only to ensure there are economic growth opportunities but also to ensure their involvement in local government affairs. Policies are being formulated to ensure partnerships and participation of the private sector reinforce good governance of cities by holding local government accountable for its actions and decisions. In fact, in most cities, civil society and private sector are joining hands in advocating for transparency and accountability where development planning and service delivery, among others, are concerned (Ekane et al. 2019). This symbiotic partnership among these three spheres of societal influence creates an inclusive space for engagement to ensure city authorities are held accountable and that these partnerships contribute towards a shared city vision where each partner has a role to play.

In conclusion, as cities grapple with the challenges of urbanization and increased intra- and intercity migration, the greater the need for inclusive public participation. There are notable challenges as noted, but there are creative ways for ensuring every voice is heard. It is critical for cities to ensure a conducive environment exists at all time to ensure both invented and invited spaces of engagement remain as inclusive as possible and receive recognition and support from city authorities (Anheier et al. 2019:20). This consciousness will continue to deepen democracy by expanding the public sphere to engage with cities, so that ultimately citizens' socio-economic rights are realized and social justice achieved. It is therefore imperative that cities pursue partnerships across the board inclusive of the private sector and citizen interest groups to ensure no one is left behind in making their cities a just city where each citizen matters. This way, the concept of citizenship in the city becomes a reality and contributes immensely towards reformulation of inclusive public participation in African cities.

Democracy Contested: Inclusive Citizen Participation in Decision-Making Processes in African Cities

As alluded to in the preceding section, public participation is a critical tool for deepening democracy in any country (Collins 2019:170). It is a mechanism that allows meaningful citizen engagement with the state at every level of governance to inform decision-making in development processes, policy formulation and their implementation among other aspects. It allows ordinary citizens to demand accountability from the state, thereby strengthening public service and minimizing corruption among other ills (Kübler et al. 2019:40). Moreover, it enhances citizens' knowledge about how government works as they engage continuously in government processes including its development programmes (Kanyane 2019). Additionally, it forces government to forge partnerships with civil society, private sector and labour and ordinary citizen interest groups to explore citizens' interests, collectively prioritizing urgent needs which require state action. Stated differently, citizens become the centre of governance where public participation is actively emphasized. In many ways, public participation often opposes centralized forms of governance, where citizens are seldom considered in any decision-making processes (Friedman 2019). Thus, it is an imperative that cannot be ignored in a dispensation where the notion of inclusivity is one of the hallmarks of democratic governance. In essence, the level and nature of public participation are key pointers of a healthy civic culture.

In most cities in Africa, public participation is a contested concept (Kanyane 2019). Most regimes on the continent are yet to open to public scrutiny in many areas of their operations. Transparency in the public sector is still fiercely contested, especially as regimes seek to stay in power beyond their constitutional terms. Citizens bear the brunt of this underhand practices where governments often use repressive measures to silence any form of activism seeking more openness and transparency (Matebesi and Botes 2011:15).

For instance, budgets for local development programmes are often hid from ordinary citizens. At best, public dialogues on budget allocations are often conducted for compliance purposes and do not necessarily seek to really engage citizens on them. In some cases, politicians often assume that they can make decisions on behalf of citizens because they are their representatives, at times taking advantage of citizens' budgetary illiteracy (Gilman and Wampler 2019:7). However, this practice of making decisions on behalf of people weakens public participation and creates imbalances in local governance, where politicians end up making decisions on behalf of their constituency, often fronting their personal interests and not of those they purport to be leading or representing.

As Reddy (2018:713–714) contends, effective decentralization impacts positively on local governance and is supported by the following critical pillars:

- (a) An effective legal framework that devolves power to ordinary citizens
- (b) An adequate capacity to execute governance functions
- (c) Enhanced accountability across governance spheres and citizenry
- (d) Enhanced civil society participation in local governance processes including collaboration with regional and national governments
- (e) Commitment by government to improve citizens' well-being

Arguably, a combination of the above in a coordinated manner is highly likely to improve local governance through effective and efficient basic service delivery, ultimately enhancing citizens' quality of life. It is critical that local government is responsive to citizens' development priorities to ensure that their welfare is adequately covered and aligned with national development plans. It is through ongoing interaction between the various levels of government that citizens' aspirations are shared and lobbied to be captured in development plans. Sometimes the lobbying requires pressure from citizens so that public authorities are responsive to their needs. This contestation for recognizing citizens' needs is a critical indicator of a thriving democracy, and public authorities must make space for it to ensure accountability is upheld.

In conclusion, modern democracy necessitates that those governing and the governed work together towards a shared vision. In this sense, their interaction must be underpinned by a genuine desire to collaborate in solving societal challenges. It thus requires high levels of transparency to facilitate accountability which in turn strengthens governance at the local government level. In this sense, public participation enables the local democracy ecosystem to function optimally, creating a meaningful linkage between leaders and the led. Decision-making becomes a collaborative effort, underpinned by a common understanding of challenges. Consequently, partnerships are forged, with an aim of developing achievable and realistic solutions to the challenges. This way, both the local authorities and the public become active actors in spurring local development towards a better life for all citizens.

Challenges of Participatory Democracy in Cities in Africa

Participatory democracy in Africa has been a contested concept since the dawn of independence of most countries on the continent (Titz and Chiotha 2019). This is primarily because the concept promotes co-governing arrangement between the state and its citizenry bounded by the dictates of a constitution. Most African countries are constitutional democracies, where the constitution is supreme and provides guidelines through which the state is governed (Sebola 2017:30). The constitution confers privileges to citizens that empower them to participate actively in deepening democracy in their countries. Over time, due to this constitutional empowerment, participatory democracy has taken root in most postcolonial governments, with an array of mechanisms emerging that entrench this democratic practice. For instance, mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, public forums, participatory planning forums and neighbourhood watches to mention a few are examples of participatory democracy in action.

However, although all these mechanisms have emerged over the last three decades, the concept of participatory democracy is becoming increasingly challenged as political regimes begin to consolidate their political power characterized by extension of the terms of office, a growing phenomenon on the African continent. This disturbing trend is closing down engagement spaces as it feels threatened by the growing advocacy activities by ordinary citizens and civil society to hold such regimes accountable (Khadzali and Zan 2018:40). The overall structure of political power remains largely untransformed, choosing rather to limit public participation in governance and decision-making processes. Moreover, in most African cities, local bureaucracies are becoming increasingly authoritarian, resisting vehemently any dissenting opinions, struggling to shift the traditional forms of engagement (Lima 2019:10). Consequently, citizen-state engagement relations are strained and often become adversarial resulting in ongoing civic protests.

Additionally, political and social activism has been weakened overtime in most cities as political interference becomes a norm, getting in the way of city governance. Political and administrative structures of most cities on the continent remain unstructured in a way that they can serve their constituents efficiently and effectively as far as delivering public goods and services is concerned.

Furthermore, politicization of socio-economic rights has also generated ongoing protests between the state and communities as these rights are accessed based on connection and allegiance to dominant political networks in control of a locality (Enaifoghe and Cotties 2019:100). Consequently, the struggle for these rights has led to the emergence of social movements rooted in communities in the cities. These social movements are becoming stronger in their advocacy efforts in their attempt to enforce accountability (Heller 2019:15). Meanwhile, the urban poor that make up the majority of the disenfranchised city dwellers are excluded from any decision-making processes of the city. So, their voice and aspirations are carried through by social movements and other citizen interest groups. Therefore, this socio-economic justice struggle is ongoing as public participation spaces become limited and most

city governments on the continent constantly oppose every attempt to include urban poor and their advocates in governance mechanisms (Refstie and Millstein 2019:250). In some instances, city governments claim public participation and pretend to be speaking on behalf of citizens. Civil society needs to reclaim its rightful place, use every available spaces of engagement (invited and invented spaces of public participation) and ensure that citizens can engage their local governance structures confidently without any fear (Naidu and Narsiah 2017:165).

In summary, participatory democracy is a highly challenged concept in most cities in Africa. Participatory democracy in most cities in Africa is principally limited to participating in elections. Top-down forms of engagement inform governance mechanisms in most cities on the continent. Governance structures remain largely untransformed, and there are limited public participation mechanisms that meaningfully engage citizens as partners in enabling democracy to flourish. In the absence of these mechanisms, social movements and other citizen interest groups result in insurgent strategies to expand spaces of participation, by creating alternative spaces of engagement to deepen political accountability of city governments. The next section discusses an alternative to participatory democracy, referred to as deliberative democracy.

An Overview of Selected Country Case Studies in Africa

- **Lagos, Nigeria**

Nigeria, like most countries in Africa, has a wide array of legislation governing public participation processes, especially as it relates to economic and social development as well as urban planning to mention a few. However, despite these pieces of legislation and the provisions they provide regarding public participation, citizen participation in the above-mentioned processes remains undesirable (Arowolo and Aluko 2012: 800). It is important to note that public participation in Nigeria is categorized broadly into two parts, firstly, the statutory participation, which is primarily participation in government processes as provided for by the constitution and, secondly, voluntary participation, which is a form of participation initiated by ordinary citizens outside of formalized and legislated spaces (Adegbite 2019:10). However, despite the existence of both forms of public participation, citizens continue to demand inclusion in the various government processes, in their quest to shift the balance of power and related dynamics, in order to expand participation opportunities. Government at all levels of governance is largely reluctant to allow meaningful participation of the public in the various processes (Abang and Solomon 2019:110). This reluctance is a result of its perception about being held accountable by the citizenry.

The government often contend that opposition political parties often incite ordinary citizens to exert political pressure on government to achieve political aims. Armed with that perception, the government continually controls the extent citizens

can participate in its various developmental and planning processes including economic growth processes (Murana and Bakare 2019: 80). As a result, it does not communicate its plans adequately so that citizens can engage with it constructively. In the end there is limited transparency about how government goes about doing its business, which provokes citizens to engage in other advocacy mechanisms to force it open (Odeyemi and Abioro 2019: 220). In those instances that public participation is held, government controls the program, determining the agenda and the content of the dialogue. In most cases, it is a monologue, government informing citizens about its plans without necessarily seeking citizens' inputs about the issues being discussed (Acey 2019:315). Government not only limits access to information that would enhance citizens' capacities to make informed decisions but also controls participation mechanisms that would empower citizens to hold it accountable. As a result, important processes such as budget monitoring and development planning are void of citizens' input. The limited public participation therefore delegitimizes government policies about inclusive governance and weakens the democratic political system of the nation. Citizens are therefore in most cases unable to malpractices such as corruption and misuse of public funds, and resources often go unchecked as it gets normalized in such an environment characterized by weak public scrutiny (Ikemefuna and Onah 2019:20). Furthermore, the government responsiveness to public interests and aspirations is also weakened due to lack of resources to meet those needs.

In summary, increased public participation in Lagos is important for strengthening democracy and democratic institutions in Nigeria in general. However, any democracy without meaningful public participation falls short of its ideals. So, in engendering democratic values, public participation in all matters of governance is a priority in any thriving democracy. This way, citizens' capabilities to engage with the state is enhanced, thereby increasing their political accountability capable to demand better governance from the government.

• **Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

Public participation in Dar es Salaam, like any other city on the continent, has varied levels of participation in local governance matters. Tanzania, like many African countries, is globalizing rapidly, at a rate of 4.7%, and 30% of the total population lives in urban areas, including Dar es Salaam (Nuhu 2019: 12). The challenge of engaging the public adequately in all matters of governance and development is prevalent in the city. The city political and administrative leadership continues to utilize top-down participation approaches for engaging the public, a phenomenon that has led to strained relationship between the city dwellers and the city government (Pasquini 2019:9).

Moreover, due to limited participation possibilities available to the public, there is a high rate of dissatisfaction among citizens with the city government. Citizens' aspirations seldom gain the attention of city policymakers, who remain aloof to their aspirations and interests (Poncian 2019: 80). Furthermore, poor communication between the city and her dwellers has exacerbated the situation. The public rarely knows when consultative meetings will be held and when they are conducted;

it does not get an opportunity to set the agenda. The poor communication often results in poor attendance by the public to these meetings.

In the end, democratic governance is weakened as ordinary citizens are excluded from all major processes that affect their lives politically and socio-economically. The high levels of disaffection between the city and her citizenry are often obscured by insufficient citizens' knowledge about public participation. This situation is partly as a result of political dynamics prevalent in the country not just in the cities, as freedom of speech is shrinking in the country (Nantongo et al. 2019:50). As a result, citizens and opposition politicians are fearful of repercussions should they challenge government on issues of national importance that they deem are not pro-democratic governance such as corruption and maladministration to mention a few (Mkunde 2019: 220). The other reason for insufficient citizens' knowledge is because government controls the scope to which civil society can intervene actively in the political space (Shayo 2019:220). The current government does not allow civil society to operate independently of its influence so it can raise political literacy of the citizenry. It is impossible for a large mass of politically educated citizenry to engage and hold government accountable for its decisions and actions (Chinyele and Lwoga 2019:190). Given the large population that the city of Dar es Salaam has, citizen civic and political education is a must if democratic governance is to be realized.

In summary, public participation in the city of Dar es Salaam is unsatisfactory. Public participation is conditional and top-down driven. Citizens rarely make meaningful input in many development and governance matters. As much as civil society would like to actively complement the efforts of city government, its operation is controlled, and therefore its ability to strengthen citizen-city government relations is limited. The current politico-economic environment does not fully support democratic participation of the public in governance matters without fear of retribution. The power struggles between city political government and local actors such as civil society continue to undermine democracy and limit public participation in the development of their own city. Public participation needs to be prioritized if the city dwellers would make meaningful contribution towards city governance.

- **Maseru, Lesotho**

Lesotho, largely a homogenous society, has over the last decade taken incredible steps towards entrenching a culture of democracy to enhance governance throughout the Kingdom. Understandably, the government has initiated multiple processes throughout its governance system, for instance, the introduction of the decentralization unit within the department of local government and chieftainship, with an intention to enhance citizen participation at all levels of governance (Mokotso 2019:14). As a result of this governance direction, citizens are enjoying rights to participate in national politics, across the entire nation. Moreover, it is encouraging to note that even the national legislature is actively engaging with citizens at the local level through innovative citizen participation mechanism such as the community parliament and community *pitsos* (Rakhare 2019:60) The platforms have significantly bridged the government citizen gap, allowing flow of information between

the government and the governed (Kariuki et al. 2016: 50). This is encouraging to note and provides an opportunity to further entrench democracy and its values in the country. Governance structures at different levels are making sustained efforts to reach out to citizens and involve them in their processes. Citizens observe such processes and interpret them as functional mechanisms in entrenching democracy in the country. There is a general view that governance structures are functional.

Whilst citizen participation in general seems satisfactory, it is severely hampered by limited civic education literacy about democratic governance and related processes. This deficit is especially noted around the roles and responsibilities of different democratic and traditional leadership institutions. Public participation is normally held at community council level, which operates under traditional authority leadership. Local councils ought to be engaging the public in the governance affairs of their locality. However, this is not the case, as most citizens remain unaware of the roles and responsibilities of the two governance institutions. Moreover, they do not even know the roles and responsibilities of the representatives.

Whilst the government has pronounced the intention to allow “more decision-making, resource allocation, local planning, development and public services physically closer to the people” (Ministry of Local government 2014), evidence shows that citizens at local level are still excluded from important decision-making processes. According to Kariuki et al. (2016:17), the main challenge to effective citizens’ participation emanates from the *Local Government Act* 1997 itself, which fails to articulate how people will participate in the development processes. Therefore, the *Act* fails to institutionalise participation. The absence of this provision therefore means that citizens’ participation is left at the discretion of government officials ((Ngozwana 2014:50). This anomaly in the policy limits the extent the public can effectively engage in governance and service delivery matters at the local level.

Moreover, political environment in the country, generally and in the city, is not conducive for effective and meaningful public participation due to high levels of uncertainty (Thakaso and Preece 2018:125). Elections in Lesotho are held fairly within very short cycles and therefore limiting the extent lasting interventions can be implemented with certainty of sustainability beyond one political administration (Rupiya and Teffo 2018:30). Given the fact that politicians are generally unwilling to listen to citizens, political uncertainty makes it unappealing for them to engage confidently in any governance matters.

In summary, in order to increase public participation in Maseru, ongoing civic education is critical in improving citizen participation in governance structures whilst at the same time deepening their understanding of the different governance systems in their country (political and traditional). At the same time, it is crucial that politicians are sensitized about engaging mechanisms with the electorate towards good governance and deepening political accountability in the city and the entire country. Without this sensitization, politicians will continue dominating public participation platforms, setting development agenda that is void of citizens’ input, ultimately weakening democratic governance in the country.

- **Cairo, Egypt**

Following the Arab spring in 2011, Egypt began a process of constitutional review in relation to public participation in governance. As politically challenging Egypt is, this process of constitutional review has created an active participation of the public in governance processes and broadened citizens' understanding of the role they play in holding government accountable and demanding transparency in all matters pertaining to governance and development among other aspects (Abdelghaffar and Hassan 2019:45).

The pre-constitutional review period was characterized by limited citizen participation in governance processes, a lack of transparency by government, low civic knowledge rates among Egyptians as well as limited outreach by civil society organizations among other socio-political aspects (Attia and Ibrahim 2018:320). However, the situation is changing rapidly now since the government has broadened participation processes through the constitution review process and the public, especially the youth, have taken participation actively using social media and the Internet (Tobbala 2019). Through social media and Internet, the public has used them as sources of information to make information easily accessible to masses who for decades remained uninformed of many aspects of governance including human rights (Hamdy and Gameel 2018:7).

The post revolution period has increased citizens' enthusiasm to participate confidently in public affairs including holding government accountable for its decisions and actions. Civil society and other citizen interest groups have been instrumental in expanding participation spaces, using both legislated and invented spaces (Abdalla 2018:50). As a result, the Egyptian parliament is now allowing citizens to make input into various pieces of legislation through civil society organizations that represent their interests. In this case, civil society has played a significant role in enabling access to information leading to enhance public civic education about their constitutional rights and their civic responsibility (Panetta 2019:930). The use of social media and the Internet has created an educated, active citizenry that is mobilized to engage with government confidently.

In summary, the current political environment is supportive of public participation in various governance-related processes. However, access to information remains controlled as well as freedom of expression and assembly, rights that are instrumental in enabling effective public participation. Even the use of social media and the Internet has acted as an instrumental mechanism for enabling public participation; the struggle to make these rights translated into specific laws governing public participation is ongoing. The challenge for the Egyptian government is to facilitate their inclusion in legislation related to public participation.

Deliberative Democracy: An Alternative to Participatory Democracy in Cities in Africa – A Model for Africa Political Processes

Given the constraints experienced through participatory democracy, cities in Africa need to be unburdened from the weight of disengagement. Deliberative democracy then becomes a supplementary mechanism to participatory democracy to ensure citizens' voice is meaningfully heard in city governance affairs. This is one of the principle tenets of deliberative democracy. Naidu and Narsiah (2017:170) define deliberative democracy as a form of democracy that makes citizens' voice more pronounced in governance processes, in which deliberation is central to decision-making towards co-governance. Stated differently, deliberative democracy facilitates consensus in decision-making whilst adopting the majority rule (Chirawurah et al. 2019). Thus, citizens' voice is at the centre of decision-making. In a participatory democracy, public participation has been politicized, shrinking both invited and invented spaces of engagement (Menon and Hartz-Karp 2019). Decisions are simply made on behalf of citizens, who only receive such decisions as information, with no room to make any inputs (Bohler-Muller and Pienaar 2019:20). This is the democratic deficit that deliberative democracy seeks to fill in its efforts of reconstructing the public sphere.

In this reconstructed space, citizens can engage freely and confidently with their leaders without any fear of intimidation or retribution (Bvuma and Joseph 2019:150). In the end, it is plausible to arrive at consensus-based decisions, where every citizen has an equal voice, and reach agreement on issues of city governance with their leaders. It is through such a mechanism as deliberative democracy where political accountability is enhanced and deepened for facilitating meaningful productive and realistic public participation (Lührmann et al. 2019:12). At the grassroots level, this is an important mechanism for enabling civil society and ordinary citizens to reclaim their space. However, there is no illusion that this way of doing politics and governance will always be fiercely contested against political leadership that is largely untransformed and is still stuck in top-down forms of public participation. The dominant rationale in this alternative democracy mechanism is to ensure city governance is a partnership between citizens, civil society and city governments (Enaifoghe 2019:15). In postcolonial era, in which most African countries are in, effective public participation is critical for deepening democracy so that local voices are meaningfully captured in the city governance affairs. This way, political structures of dominance found in most city governments on the continent are dismantled overtime as deliberative democracy becomes a norm.

Some of the benefits of deliberative democracy include the following (Enaifoghe 2019:17–20):

- It re-establishes confidence among citizens as city governments respond to their concerns and aspirations are captured in development plans, budgets allocated to implement them and execution of the plans.
- Democracy is strengthened as city governments pursue cooperative governance in meaningful ways.
- A politically dynamic citizenry is mobilized, educated and activated to engage confidently with government at all spheres of governance in holding their leaders accountable.
- Strengthened participatory planning processes where governments, civil society and citizens collaborate in conceptualizing and developing plans as well as in decision-making plans citizens' voice is reinforced.
- Accountability is boosted as governments become more transparent and open up to public scrutiny.
- Political administration and governance is improved as city governments become more accountable to its citizenry.

Against the above arguments, participatory democracy may be considered an outdated theoretical concept of enabling transformational public participation. The argument for deliberative democracy is geared towards restoration of citizens' voice in city governance decision-making as well as regenerating participatory mechanisms towards effective and inclusive governance. Deliberative democracy needs conducive political environment for it to flourish.

Conclusion

The concept of democracy and participation in cities in Africa remains ambiguous for most urban dwellers, given the diminishing desire by most regimes to embrace participatory mechanisms that facilitate citizens' voices in decision-making and governance processes of cities. The forms of participation are largely untransformed and still adopt top-down mechanisms of engagement. Therefore, in the absence of democratic consciousness, democracy processes in cities have been rendered ineffective as urban dwellers become more segregated spatially, politically and socio-economically. This has led to significant disaffection among citizens, primarily due to the low levels of urban governance which seldom prioritizes their interests and concerns. As a result, the concept of democracy has a vague meaning as access to basic services is still problematic, and where these services exist, they are not provided equitably and sustainably. Moreover, ongoing service delivery protests have become a permanent feature in most cities on the continent. Since the challenge attributed to ongoing service delivery protests is the limitations of adequate participatory mechanisms in facilitating meaningful engagement between citizens and city bureaucracy, the chapter argues for an alternative form of engagement, deliberative democracy, one which puts the citizen at the centre of urban governance. This alternative ensures that the aspirations of citizens and interests are prioritized and

factored into development processes by city governments as citizens participate more actively in relevant decision-making and planning processes. This way, democracy in this case becomes a lived experience based on lived values, where all relevant stakeholders work cooperatively as partners. The lived values then give rise to new norms and practices in society which support equality, power sharing, active citizenship and social justice.

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Chapter 3

The Dynamics of Councillor Versus Traditional Leadership in South African Local Government: A Study of Understanding, Attitudes and Perceptions



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Abstract South Africa is culturally diverse and strives to promote the inclusion of all citizenry in governance. The participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils is facilitated in terms of Section 81 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998). Since the promulgation of this national Act, there is a dearth of research and/or best practice models relative to implementation of Section 81. The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) undertook a study to explore the understanding, attitudes and perceptions in implementing Section 81 among traditional leaders and municipalities. Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches were utilised, and selected participants were municipal representatives and traditional leaders whose names were gazetted to participate in municipalities. The study revealed gaps and challenges in understanding the roles and responsibilities among traditional leaders. Traditional leaders felt limited by legislation on issues of voting and representation and saw no benefit for their communities due to not being given the opportunity to express views and being excluded from council decisions impacting on their communities. Municipalities had adequate knowledge and understanding of Section 81 but had negative attitudes and perceptions to facilitate the process. The study recommended for COGTA to coordinate and strengthen information sharing and capacity building platforms for traditional leaders and enhance relationships between the two parties. The development of a provincial framework for determin-

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ing out-of-pocket expenses as well as policies on the provision of tools of trades for traditional leaders was recommended.

Keywords Traditional leaders · Municipalities · Municipal Structures Act · Section 81 · Participation · COGTA

Introduction

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) introduced the participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils in terms of its Section 81 and Schedule 6. These are, respectively, intended to promote sound relationships between traditional leadership and municipalities where traditional leaders are identified to participate in municipal councils. The overarching statutory mandate is drawn from Chapter 12 of the Constitution, 1996, which provides for the recognition and role of traditional leaders.

COGTA is mandated in terms of Chapter 3 relating to cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations as well as Chapter 7 Sect. 154 of the Constitution, 1996, to facilitate cooperation among governmental spheres and provide support and strengthen municipal capacity. Within KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), COGTA has made critical efforts and initiatives introduced have to date directed the implementation of Section 81.

Problem Statement

Apart from the legislative imperatives to implement Section 81 of the Act, there is a dearth of research and/or best practice models to guide its implementation. COGTA ought to be informed and gain an understanding of what the experiences are with the implementation of Section 81.

Research Objectives

The objectives are (i) to explore the knowledge which determines the understanding of Section 81 by traditional leaders and municipalities; (ii) to explore the attitudes and perceptions of participants on the implementation of Section 81; (iii) to determine the relationship between the understanding of Section 81 and its implementation; (iv) to explore challenges faced by participants in implementing Section 81; and (v) to draw suggestions on solutions to the identified challenges.

Contextual Understanding of Participation

Participatory governance has been cited dating back to the 1970s, to have developed around views that “representative democracy is unable on its own, to improve the quality of state performance, educate and empower citizens and make reasonable use of scarce public resources” (Wampler and McNutly 2011). Unlike other forms of governance such as direct and deliberate democracy which allows limited expression and engagement of citizens, and which does not link the voting powers of citizens to bind government decision-making processes, respectively, participatory governance institutions give citizens the right to reshape policy outcomes (Wampler and McNutly 2011). South Africa has progressively adopted policies and programs including, inter alia, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP); Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy; Local Government Turn Around Strategy (LGTAS); and the Back-to-Basics (B2B) approach by local government which emphasised involvement and consultation with citizens to address service delivery challenges.

Legislative Prescripts for Participation of Traditional Leaders in Municipal Councils

The legislative mandates which govern participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils are as follows:

- Chapter 3 of the Constitution providing for principles of cooperative governance/ intergovernmental relations in all governmental spheres/organs.
- The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998), notably Section 81 which gives effect to the procedures for the participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils. Schedule 6 in particular makes provision for the identification of traditional leaders.
- The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000) which provides for the conduct of councillors and for municipalities to encourage and enable community participation through local capacity building.
- The White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance 2003, which places considerable emphasis on the transformation of traditional leadership to promote sound relationships between itself and other spheres of government. It also provides for traditional leadership to partner with municipalities in line with the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) which stipulates the participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils to enhance service delivery.
- Sections 4 and 20 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework (Act No. 41 of 2003) which provides guidelines for the allocation of roles and functions to traditional councils and traditional leaders.

- The KZN Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Act No. 5 of 2005) provides for the recognition/establishment of traditional councils as well the roles and functions of traditional leaders.
- The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act No. 13 of 2005) establishes a framework for all spheres of governments to promote and facilitate inter-governmental relations.

Details on Subsections of Section 81 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998)

- Section 81 (one) provides for the participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils.
- Section 81 (two) enables the province through the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for local government to identify traditional leaders who may participate in municipal affairs. It requires that a maximum of 20% of traditional leaders be identified in respect of the number of councillors. One traditional leader may participate where the number of councillors in a municipality is fewer than 10. It also enables the MEC to determine (Schedule 6 and by notice in the provincial gazette) a rotation system where the number of traditional leaders within a municipality exceeds 20%.
- Section 81 (three) requires that before a decision is taken by the municipal council, traditional leaders are allowed to express views on matters directly affecting their traditional authority.
- Section 81 (four) calls for the MEC, after consultation with the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders (PHTL), to regulate participation and the role of traditional leaders in municipal councils by notice in the provincial gazette.
- Section 81 (five) directs that the code of conduct for councillors be applicable to traditional leaders participating and also stipulates that the budget for paying out of pocket expenses must come from the municipality.

KZN Provincial Notices in Relation to Section 81 of Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998)

In September 2013, the KZN province passed a municipal and general notice on the draft regulations providing for participation and roles of traditional leaders in municipal councils. The purpose was to regulate the participation of traditional leaders in the proceedings of municipal councils and to prescribe the roles of traditional leaders in municipal affairs. The draft regulations made provision for participation, roles and responsibilities, relationship between the municipal council and the traditional leaders and the breach of code of conduct. However, the regulations

have a gap in that provision is not made for the payment of out-of-pocket expenses, provision of tools of trade as well as clarity from whom the budget must come from to facilitate participation of traditional leaders.

Issues of Participation in Terms of Section 81

Municipalities are mandated by various legislative prescripts to nurture and encourage community participation. While it is argued that some municipalities are ill-equipped to play a meaningful role in ensuring sustainability and reducing poverty (George and Binza, 2011), it would not be fair to conclude that effective community participation has not been mastered at local levels since the passing of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000). One resource at the disposal of municipalities to fast-track community participation in rural areas is the Institution of Traditional Leadership which plays a critical role and is mainly favoured in rural communities, warranting it is not to be left behind on community development initiatives. However, “since its fusion into the democratic local government system; the role and place of the institution of traditional leadership in municipalities has been fraught with tension, confusion and contradictory practices” (South African Local Government Association: (SALGA) 2013). Municipalities raised concerns around the legality of participation and voting rights, the entitlement of traditional leaders to salaries and lack of clarity on the roles of traditional leaders when participating (SALGA 2013).

George (2011) highlighted the difficulty faced by Mgwala Traditional Authority in the Nkonkobe local municipality of Eastern Cape province around performing socio-economic development within the municipality and harboured a view that customary and cultural activities are a concern for traditional leadership and governance and development were the role of the municipality. This research concluded that the implementation of the Traditional Leadership Governance Framework Act (2003) could foster good relations between the municipality and traditional leadership and also emphasised the need for the municipality to enhance its working relations with local stakeholders.

The implementation of Section 81 needs to be thoroughly understood by all parties involved in order to achieve effective and successful outcome. A court case delivered on this matter in the Eastern Cape between Mbhashe traditional leaders in the municipal council (as the applicant) and Mbhashe local municipality (as the respondent) in 2013 attests to the legal evidence on how critical it is to understand the implementation of Section 81. The case was brought to court after the respondent terminated the allowance/out-of-pocket expenses that were being paid to the applicant in terms of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998). The applicant applied for the court to declare the respondent’s actions unlawful, invalid, and of no force and effect and also that the respondent should be directed by court to reinstate the payments as well as backdating payments. In ruling on the case, the court issued an order of dismissal with costs to the applicant as

it concluded that, among others, the term “out-of-pocket expenses” could not be used and was distinct from remuneration, allowance and salary which the applicant understood to bear similar meaning (Mbhashe traditional leaders in municipal council and Mbhashe local municipality 2013).

In KZN, the PHTL refused to participate in municipal councils during the year 2005/2006 as it was not satisfied with the stipulations of Section 81 more particularly that of 20% representation (Chonco 2012). To remedy this situation, the KZN Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, 2005 (Act No. 5 of 2005), was applied to promote synergistic partnerships through Joint Coordinating Committees although they ineffectively failed to promote the implementation of Section 81 (Chonco 2012). To mitigate conflict, an agreement was reached during the Local Government and Traditional Leadership Summit in 2011 that continuous cooperation and clear understanding of the formal mandates of traditional leadership and elected local government structures need to be ensured (Chonco 2012).

Summary of the Provincial National Assessment Outcomes

In 2012, the national Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA) released an assessment report on the state of governance within traditional affairs (DTA 2012). The various provinces’ participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils revealed some interesting information (Table 3.1).

Research Design and Methodology

Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches were applied in this investigation. Data was collected through survey questionnaires which entailed close-ended and open-ended questions. The identified population were municipalities (represented by Mayors, Speakers and Municipal Managers) and the traditional leaders whose names have been gazetted to participate in municipal councils. The selection of traditional leaders preceded the selection of municipalities as municipality selection was dependent upon the gazetted names of traditional leaders.

It was assumed that the traditional leaders participating at district and municipal level would have experiences of participation and therefore provide insight on their experiences. The aggregate number of two traditional leaders participating at both district municipality (DM) and local municipality (LM) level was reached and therefore five DMs and two LMs under each satisfied the criteria and were selected. Only the Municipal Managers (MMs) were identified to participate at DM level, and Mayors, Speakers and MMs identified for selection participated within LMs. A total of 50 participants comprising 15 traditional leaders and 35 municipal officials were sampled. These participants came from Ugu DM (including Mzumbe and Hibiscus LMs), Umzinyathi DM (including Nquthu and Msinga LMs), Zululand DM

Table 3.1 The state of governance within Traditional Affairs (DTA 2012)

Province	Status
Eastern Cape	Participation differed from one municipality to the other and where there was participation was not regulated in terms of Section 81. Despite improvements in participation of traditional leaders in integrated development plan (IDP) processes, participation challenges were experienced in the development and review of IDPs as well as in the ward committees. Thus, the MEC was requested to define the roles and participation of traditional leaders as per the legislative requirements
Free State	It was found that there was a limited relationship between traditional leadership structures and local government which resulted in municipalities not consulting and involving traditional leaders during IDP processes
Gauteng	Gauteng was the first to publish a notice on participation in relation to Section 81. However, there was no clarity on the roles and nature of participation and consequently participation in the municipal council, and the development and review of IDPs and ward committees remained a challenge. Traditional leaders also viewed the absence of voting rights as a constraint to participation.
KwaZulu-Natal	There was a unique formula of fostering relationships and participation of traditional leaders in municipal processes and structures. The traditional councils were represented within ward councils and Joint Coordinating Committees and were established between municipalities and traditional councils. The challenge was that traditional leaders did not participate in these establishments.
Limpopo	A discontent with regard to Section 81 and the need to amend Chapter 7 and 12 of the Constitution to contain powers and functions of traditional leaders were recorded. It felt that the powers and functions of traditional leaders should be elevated within the constitution and not by Section 81. However, DTA opposed the view and suggested clarification of roles, compliance with the legislation and improvement of relations as a solution.
Mpumalanga	Participation and involvement of traditional leaders differed within municipalities resulting in inconsistencies. There was absence of MEC notice on participation, and traditional leaders also called for a review of Chapter 7 and 12 of the Constitution. Traditional leaders had different positions regarding the ex officio status and their exclusion in caucus meetings. Again, the DTA suggested the need to clarify roles, comply with legislation as well as improve relations as an alternative solution.
Northern Cape	Participation prevailed within municipalities, but in dissimilar patterns. A challenge faced was due to differences in understanding, interpretations and implementation of Section 81 which diminished participation of traditional leaders as adding no value to municipal processes. Although there was willingness of traditional leaders to participate, their roles were not prescribed.
North West	Strong partnership relations such as monthly meetings between ward councillors and traditional leaders which were not necessarily based in Section 81 but carried its implications were observed. Absence of uniform approach, policy or guidelines on the support provided by municipalities to participating traditional leaders gave effect to differing participation by municipalities. The disparities in the understanding and interpretation of ex officio status by traditional leaders and councillors influenced the views that attendance of traditional leaders added no values.

(including Abaqulusi and Nongoma LMs), Umkhanyakude DM (including uMhlabuyalingana and Jozini LMs) and Harry Gwala DM (including Ingwe and uMzimkhulu LMs).

Self-developed questionnaires (one for the municipalities and one for traditional leaders) were utilised. The questionnaire for traditional leaders was translated into isiZulu. The collected data was captured, and analysis for quantitative data was done through SPSS and the qualitative data analysed thematically.

Limitations

The following limitations were observed and recorded:

- The distribution of questionnaires took place during the month of November/December; hence, there were delays with return.
- The length of questionnaire might have posed challenges, and data verification was undertaken on questionnaires having gaps.
- The study failed to explore the political dynamics related to the implementation of Section 81.

Findings

The findings of the study are presented under the categories of knowledge and understanding of Section 81, attitudes and perceptions on implementing Section 81, the challenges faced by participants as well as the suggestions to addressing challenges. The study draws from a total of 35 questionnaires that were received.

Knowledge and Understanding

This section explored participants' opinions of what they know and understand about Section 81, its implementation and their roles and requirements in terms of the Act.

Opinions and Levels of Understanding

Knowledge about Section 81 and Its Implementation

Participants were asked what they know about Section 81 and its implementation. Figure 3.1 is combined to depict results for both traditional leaders on the left and municipalities on the right.



NB: The left graph represent traditional leaders while the graph on the right represents municipalities

Fig. 3.1 What is known about Section 81

Both traditional leaders and municipalities scored equally (100%) on agreeing that Section 81 promotes the participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils.

Variations are observed by a slight 6% on agreeing whether or not Section 81 requires traditional leaders to observe in municipal councils [traditional leaders, Yes (60%) and No (40%); municipalities, Yes (54%) and No (46%)]. By implication of Section 81 in which participation of traditional leaders is more than observing, this outcome suggests there is lack of understanding, and clarity needs to be given on what observation means.

How Did You Get to Know About Section 81 and Its Implementation?

Figure 3.2 above represents indications from both traditional leaders and municipalities on how they got to know about Section 81. The main source of obtaining knowledge about Section 81 among traditional leaders is COGTA (100%) followed by the municipal training or workshops (29%). Municipalities on the other hand draw their knowledge about Section 81 from COGTA (80%), municipal training or workshops (74%) and SALGA workshops (55%). Municipalities also indicated that they attended courses on an individual capacity to advance their knowledge of Section 81, while traditional leaders mentioned that other ways of obtaining knowledge are through attending meetings at COGTA. These results are indicative of municipalities being much more empowered as they draw knowledge from various sources. Results strongly suggest that capacity building platforms for traditional leaders need to be enhanced.




Fig. 3.2 How did you get to know about Section 81

How Well Would You Say You Understand Section 81 from the Knowledge You Received or Have?

Figure 3.3 indicates responses received from both participants when asked to rate their own level of understanding on Section 81. The graphs clearly reflect that traditional leaders rated themselves as having an average understanding (71%) as compared to 15% average rating by municipalities. On ratings of good understanding, traditional leaders rated their understanding at 29% compared to municipalities who rated their understanding at 85%.

In addition, traditional leaders indicated that the areas they needed more clarity on were:

- The role of traditional leaders in municipal councils as stipulated in the Act




Fig. 3.3 How well you understand Section 81?

- The full participation of traditional leaders and why traditional leaders are not included in the speaker list

The results above confirm the findings prior to this section relating to how knowledge is obtained by traditional leaders and municipalities. The less exposure to knowledge by traditional leaders poses a challenge because how knowledge is acquired contributes to how well one would understand the subject.

Do You Understand What Is Expected of You?

Both participants were asked whether they understand what is expected of them. Eighty-six per cent of traditional leader participants indicated yes (they understand what is expected from them) as opposed to 14% that indicated no. Among the municipality participants, 95% indicated yes (they understand what is expected from them) as opposed to 5% that said no.

When asked to state what is expected from them, the 86% of traditional leader participants that said yes indicated the following:

- Expected to advise the council and to participate in the committee I’m deployed to.
- Expected to participate in council meetings especially on issues pertaining to my area and the Institution of Traditional Leadership.
- It needs me to be part of certain decisions made for development in municipality and wards.
- Participation only.
- Working jointly with the municipality on matters of service delivery and also be involved in problem-solving more in particular the community services delivery protests.

When asked to state what is expected from them, the 95% of municipality participants that said yes indicated that it is to ensure that:

- Traditional leaders are invited and participate in council meetings and express their views especially on issues that affect their areas of traditional authority.
- Traditional leaders attend any meeting of the municipal council.
- Traditional leaders participate in council decisions.
- Information about IDP, budget and service delivery is shared.
- A conducive environment such as agenda and payments for attending meetings is created for traditional leaders to play their roles.
- The Municipal Manager, Mayor and Speaker must swear the traditional leaders gazetted by the MEC into council.
- Cooperation is enhanced from both traditional leaders and councillors.
- Amakhosi address and advise the council.
- Relationship between traditional leaders and councillors is promoted, and traditional leaders are aware of the services municipalities bring to the communities.

The views presented above in relation to knowledge of what is expected of the participants could imply that both traditional leaders and municipalities are clear on what is expected of them despite the levels of knowledge on Section 81.

Own Understanding of the Roles of Traditional Leaders

Participants were asked to present in their own understanding what the roles of traditional leaders in municipal councils were. The findings indicated that there is clarity needed among both traditional leaders' and municipality participants. This follows the observation that although participants seem to be aware of some roles, there are gaps however in how roles were understood. For instance, traditional leader participants indicated that their roles are:

- None besides being observers
- To look after the interest of the Institution of Traditional Leadership and that of their area of jurisdiction

Municipalities on the other hand indicated that the roles of traditional leaders are:

- To sit in council meetings and only observe
- To observe the municipality since traditional leaders are in the municipal boundaries

These kinds of understanding of roles need to be addressed as it may impact negatively on implementing the Act properly.

Opinions on the Importance of Traditional Leader Participation in Municipal Council

Participants were asked to share their opinions on a statement implying that traditional leaders could participate in multiple municipalities within the same district municipality. Both traditional leaders and municipalities indicated the statement was false. The scores for this question were 57% for traditional leaders and 45% for municipalities. There were however elements among municipalities who said it is true and those who said they are unsure that traditional leaders must reside and participate in the same municipality. Traditional leaders (100%) believed it is true that traditional leaders must reside and participate in the same municipality:

- Because it will make development initiatives easy and better for the benefit of the communities.
- Each traditional leader must know how and when service delivery will be done according to IDP.
- The municipality is located in areas of Amakhosi; therefore, it is important for the municipalities and traditional leaders to work cooperatively.
- To understand the business of the council and development happening in traditional communities.

The indications that it is not important for traditional leaders to participate in municipal councils were supported with the following reasons:

- Because traditional leaders are not given enough opportunity to express their views as per stipulations of the Act.
- Municipalities also have separate caucuses where they argue issues and they present to traditional leaders after decisions were made.

The reasons given by the municipalities in support of the importance of traditional leaders to participate in municipal councils were:

- Because most of the land where development is needed falls within the jurisdiction of Amakhosi and is also under the Ingonyama Trust Board.
- It is important for them to express their views on development issues of their traditional land.
- So that problems that may arise in the traditional councils can be resolved by municipal council.
- The people whom the local municipalities' service belongs to are subjects of Amakhosi; therefore, the Amakhosi should know what happens in their communities.
- They should form part of decisions taken by council which affect their areas of jurisdiction.
- This will assist the council to operate more effectively and efficiently in areas led by traditional leaders without interferences or limitations.

A deduction made from the results presented above is that even though there is 100% agreement by municipalities that it is important that traditional leaders participate in municipal councils, the reasons to support these opinions rather seem to be more in line with how municipalities can benefit in accessing the land, whereas traditional leaders' opinions seem to be more related to how participation may not happen to their satisfaction.

Out-of-Pocket Payments

Section 81 (5) (b) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act provides that a traditional leader who participates in the proceedings of the municipal council is entitled to out-of-pocket expenses and municipal participants were asked what their positions were in relation to the provision. Figure 3.4 depicts clearly that municipalities are strongly in support (75%) of paying out-of-pocket expenses and only 20% and 5% indicated support and not supporting, respectively.

When asked whether or not their municipalities pay out-of-pocket expenses, 75% of municipal participants indicated that their municipality pay out-of-pocket expenses to participating traditional leaders as opposed to 25%. Reasons given for not paying were mostly related to municipalities not having budgeted/allocated budget for out-of-pocket expense, the municipality can only pay on arrangement since the traditional leaders are paid from provincial and the traditional leaders have not yet started attending council meetings.




Fig. 3.4 Position regarding entitlement

How Out-of-Pocket Amounts Are Determined by Municipality

Municipalities indicated that the model for paying out of pocket is determined by:

- Applying councillors' policy on upper limit and agreeing on percentage
- Using same amount paid to councillors
- Holding district consultation
- Finance section
- Council resolution
- Mayors' forum
- Using petty cash or sitting allowance method

When municipalities were asked how much the standard figure is, they indicated:

- It depends on distance travelled.
- Per month: the minimum amount indicated was R500.
- Per meeting or sitting: amounts ranged from R600 to R857.

These findings have suggested that there is a need for common agreements in terms of how payments of out-of-pocket expenses are determined and the amounts to be paid within municipalities. Municipalities need to be supported in reaching these agreements and developing common standards among the districts.

Does the Municipality Pay Out-of-Pocket Expenses or Not?

While at 100%, traditional leader participants agreed that municipalities where they participate pay out-of-pocket expenses, 67% of traditional leaders reported that the municipalities had not explained to them how out-of-pocket payments are determined as opposed to 33% that said yes it was explained to them.

Is There a Standard Amount Given by the Municipality for Payment of Out-of-Pocket Expenses?

Traditional leaders were asked whether there were standard amounts given by municipalities, and 67% indicated yes while 33% indicated no. Among the 67% who said yes, it was observed from the indications of traditional leaders that the amounts paid for out-of-pocket expenses varied by municipality with some paying R600 and others paying R860. Often, the district municipality paid higher amounts of up to R1000 than the local municipalities. Traditional leaders participating at both DM and LM levels were paid both by the particular DM and LMs they participate in.

When asked whether they have claimed, 71% as opposed to 29% of traditional leaders had claimed the out-of-pocket expenses from the municipalities they participate in. Those who indicated having not claimed cited reasons for not claiming

being due to not understanding how the system works or not knowing that they should claim.

Both municipality and traditional leader participants indicated that there were no incidents where traditional leaders claimed more than what is set for claims.

What Does the Payment of Out-of-Pocket Expenses Cover?

When asked what the payment of out-of-pocket expenses covered, all traditional leader respondents cited travelling expenses as the reason for these payments. Municipalities gave the same response as traditional leaders but went on to mention the following:

- Sitting or meeting allowance
- Time spent in meetings
- Subsistence and travelling: meals, travelling, accommodation, parking and toll gate fees

Tools of Trade

Understanding of Tools of Trade

Traditional leaders were asked what they understood tools of trade to be. Laptops, cell phones and cars, respectively, accounted for 21%, 16% and 11% of what was regarded as tools of trade. The budget and offices accounted for 6%, while the rest (security, basic skills, equipment required to effectively execute duties, local government library, manual of the municipality, laws governing the functioning of the municipality, not being sure, stationery and communication) accounted an equal 5% each.

When asked whether the municipalities they participate in provide tools of trade, 71% of traditional leaders indicated that they were not given tools of trade, while 29% were given. The tools of trades that were given were said to be manuals, laptops and “access” to libraries.

Traditional leader participants that were not provided with tools of trade stated the reasons for this as either not known, not thinking the political head and head of administration saw a need for that or because they just started participating.

The general indication of how municipalities understood what tools of trade are was that it is material resources that enable officials to perform their duties. Among the examples given for this understanding were laptops/computers, cell phones, stationary, data cards and office furniture as well as the agenda, timetables for meetings, tea/lunch breaks and diaries.

When asked whether the municipalities provide the tools of trade, 28% of municipal participants stated yes while 72% said no. The reasons provided for providing

tools of trade were that all councillors are given, so that traditional leaders can work effectively and so that traditional leaders can plan and contribute in their participation. When asked what those tools of trades were, municipalities indicated agenda and meeting schedules, tea and lunch breaks, diaries, laptops and data cards, legislation booklets and other documents like stationary.

The reasons provided by municipalities for not providing tools of trade were because:

- Of financial constraints where budget was minimal or not available.
- It was simply not budgeted for.
- Tools of trade were provided for by COGTA
- Traditional leaders are not councillors.
- Traditional leaders don't do anything additional besides attending meetings.

What Participation in Municipal Council Is Understood to Mean

When traditional leaders were asked what participation in municipal councils meant to them, the following were said:

- At the moment, it is just a waste of time as the decisions are taken from caucuses and various portfolios.
- It means that one day we will have a seat in our traditional council exactly as it is in municipalities.
- It means traditional leaders are made to abide by the western laws governing the municipalities and forced to move away from their culture and tradition.
- Representing my community and the interest of the Institution of Traditional Leadership.

Similarly, when municipalities were asked what their understanding of participation of traditional leaders was, the following responses were provided:

- It is a collaborative initiative to encourage participation.
- To get involved in events and issues of council.
- To raise their suggestions, matters and the kind of development required in their communities.
- To ensure that there is harmony between traditional councils and municipalities.
- They are required to understand budgets of municipalities and how municipalities function.
- They have a right to attend meetings but have no right to vote.
- They are there to represent communities in all aspects of service delivery so that councillors can account.

Interpretation of the above results suggests that understanding traditional leader participation in municipal councils varies between the traditional leaders and municipalities. While there are positive indications within the understanding, there

seems to be silent underlying messages that suggest understanding of traditional leaders that contain negative perceptions especially with regard to how minimal it seems municipalities involve traditional leaders. Understanding of municipalities, however, seems to be more associated with the change (harmony, change in meeting environments as well as benefit to community development) that could be brought forth by participation.

Opinion on Responsibility of Identifying Traditional Leaders for Participation

Table 3.2 shows the opinions of both traditional leaders and municipalities regarding who is responsible for identifying traditional leaders for participation.

Results at 50% and above indicate that traditional leaders seem to believe that MEC (57%) is responsible for identifying traditional leaders to participate in municipal councils whereas municipalities at 50% believe it's the responsibility of traditional councils to identify participating traditional leaders. While the traditional leaders think it is a no-go area for municipal councils to identify traditional leaders for participation, they seem to believe that Municipal Managers can however be responsible, whereas municipalities' view it as a no-go area for Municipal Managers but for municipal councils to take this responsibility.

Opinions on the 20% Representation by Traditional Leaders in Municipal Councils

Figure 3.5 shows that while 71% of traditional leaders (left graph) believe 20% allocated for the number of traditional leaders who may participate in a municipality is not enough, 79% of municipality participants (right graph) think it is.

Traditional leaders indicated that the number is not enough because there are many traditional leaders in the province, and as a result, many traditional councils and communities are not represented. On the other hand, municipalities felt the 20% is enough because of the following:

Table 3.2 Who is responsible for identifying traditional leaders

Who is responsible for identifying	Traditional leaders		Municipalities	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
MEC	57%	43%	40%	60%
Mayor	14%	86%	10%	90%
Municipal council	0%	100%	15%	85%
Traditional council	43%	57%	50%	50%
Municipal Manager	14%	86%	0%	20%
Others: Local house of traditional leaders	14%	86%		




Fig. 3.5 Think 20% is enough

- Not all traditional leader can be accommodated.
- Considering there are expenses associated, there is insufficient space and allowances.
- Traditional leaders do not vote and the number should not exceed that of elected councillors.
- It is logistically manageable and council can only communicate with this percentage representation.
- More traditional leaders could cloud issues and turn council meetings into traditional affairs; therefore, council issues will not be addressed.

Opinions on the Role of Traditional Leaders in Municipal Council

When seeking participants to confirm the statements that:

- Only the MEC can prescribe the role of traditional leaders in municipal councils.
- The traditional leader must hold a supreme office.
- Traditional leaders can send someone to attend a council meeting on their behalf.

Traditional leaders were unsure whether or not they can send someone to attend on their behalf, thought it was false that they must hold a supreme office (71%) but said it is true (67%) that only the MEC can prescribe their role in municipal councils. It is interesting to observe that traditional leaders thought it is false for them to hold supreme office, while in the previous opinion, traditional leaders felt that all traditional leaders in the province should participate in municipal councils.

The responses from municipality participants were however spread between true (40%), false (45%) and unsure (15%) that only the MEC can prescribe the roles of traditional leaders participating in municipal council. These participants also had high percentage rate of false (60%) that traditional leaders can send someone to attend on their behalf and were unsure (22%) or rated false (78%) that traditional leaders participating must hold supreme office.

Opinions on Area of Residence and Participation

Participants were asked to share their opinions on a statement implying that traditional leaders could participate in multiple municipalities within the same district municipality. Both traditional leaders and municipalities indicated the statement was false. The scores for this question were 57% for traditional leaders and 45% for municipalities. There were however elements among municipalities who said it is true and those who said they are unsure that traditional leaders must reside and participate in the same municipality. Traditional leaders (100%) believed it is true that traditional leaders must reside and participate in the same municipality.

Opinions on the Budget for Paying Traditional Leaders

Interesting results were found when participants were asked where the budget for paying traditional leaders must come from. Among the traditional leader participants, 86% felt that the budget must come from municipal council, to a lesser extent from provincial budget, and 100% not from the traditional councils. Municipalities on the other hand seem to have thought that the budget should be spread across and come from the municipal (65%), provincial (50%) and traditional council (15%).

Attitudes and Perceptions on Implementation of Section 81

This section reports on the attitudes and perceptions of participants regarding the implementation of Section 81. It relates to participants' sharing of information and their own understanding of Section 81 with others, attitudes and perceptions when attending meetings and the implications of traditional leaders' participation at community levels.

Sharing of Information and Your Understanding with Others

When both the participants were asked whether they share information on their understanding of Section 81 with others, both agreed 100% that they do share information.

Attendance of Meetings

Traditional leaders were asked if they have been attending meetings since they were identified to participate, and 100% indicated that they have attended meetings with the municipal council since being identified. With regard to frequency of attendance, they were asked how many times they have attended, and 57% indicated all meetings so far and 43% indicated most meetings.

Municipalities were asked the same question, and 85% answered yes as opposed to 15% that answered no. For those that said no among municipalities, their reasons were that it is because traditional leaders have not attended.

Traditional leader participants were asked to indicate how they were treated when they attended the meeting with municipal councils. All traditional leader participants indicated that they were treated “very well”. The only concern raised was the attitudes of municipal councillors which was perceived to be bad and was thought to be due to their political influence. The results could be suggesting that traditional leaders perceive the attitudes of councillors to be influenced by the political environment rather than personal attributes.

Expectations When Attending Meetings

Both the traditional leader and municipality participants were asked what their expectations were when they attended council meetings with municipal council or traditional leaders, respectively. Traditional leader participants indicated that their expectations of attending municipal council meetings were to:

- See municipalities working hard to ensure delivery of services to their communities.
- Be given a chance to express views in respect of their communities.
- Be given an opportunity to be in portfolio meetings where decisions are taken.
- Be respected and given the right direction.
- Be provided with sufficient information to better understand things in municipality.
- Get an understanding of how the municipality delivers services.

Municipality participants indicated that when they attended municipal council meetings with traditional leaders, they expected:

- Traditional leaders understand what is expected from them.
- Traditional leaders will participate and cooperate with councillors.
- Information to be shared.
- Traditional leaders to observe protocol.
- Tension but there was none.
- Traditional leaders engage in debates and discussions of council.
- To hear traditional leader’s views on development in their communities.

Expectations Met

When asked whether their expectations were met, 67% of traditional leaders felt that their expectations were met as opposed to 33% whose expectations were not met.

Among the 67% that felt their expectations were met, these were the reasons:

- Cooperation between councillors and traditional leaders despite conflict
- Now having some understanding of the processes followed
- Traditional leaders being given the opportunity to express views and participated

For the 23% that felt their expectations were not met, results show that they felt political leaders confronted each other and forgot about the involvement of traditional leaders.

Among the municipality participants, 82% felt that their expectations were met as opposed to 18% that felt their expectations were not met. The reasons for expectations met were that:

- Councillors and traditional leaders were cooperating well.
- Traditional leaders contributed positively.
- Traditional leaders actively participated without fear or prejudice.
- Traditional leaders did what was expected of them, that is, expressing their views on development during discussions.

The reasons for the expectations not met were that:

- Although traditional leaders had little to say, all was well.
- Traditional leaders have not debated on issues on the agenda.

Encouraging Participation

Traditional leaders were asked whether they would encourage other traditional leaders to participate, and 71% said yes while 29% said no. Municipality participants were also asked whether they will encourage more traditional leaders be given opportunity to attend, and 80% said yes while 20% said no. The results suggest that both traditional leaders and municipality participants saw it beneficial for traditional leaders to participate.

Opinions on Whether Participation Will Benefit Communities

When asked whether they thought more participation by traditional leaders in municipal councils will benefit communities, 57% of traditional leader participants said yes while 43% said no. When responding to the same question, municipality participants (85%) indicated communities will benefit and 15% said no.

Challenges

Qualitative questions were asked to explore reasons preventing traditional leaders from participating and attending council meetings and the reasons contributing to conflicts between traditional leaders and municipal councils. The following themes emerged:

Communication and Information Sharing

With regard to the reasons why traditional leaders do not attend council meetings, the responses given reflect that there are levels of being discouraged especially with regard to non-communication. Logistical arrangements such as agendas were either circulated late or not circulated at all. There were instances where traditional leaders were not aware or not invited to council meetings, or there was continuous rescheduling of meetings. Municipal responses reflected similar concerns with regard to communication.

Council Proceedings and Meetings

According to traditional leaders, some were not attending meetings because they were not given the opportunity to participate fully and express their views and also because of the less meaningful participation of traditional leaders in portfolio meetings. Traditional leaders felt that they were not being paid the out-of-pocket expenses and lacked clarity on roles and there was lack of respect between traditional leaders and municipal councils. Responses from the municipalities indicated that traditional leaders were overwhelmed by the proceedings of the council meetings or traditional leaders commit to other things instead of attending meetings, were not informed on who is responsible for paying out-of-pocket expenses as well as they think that traditional leaders do not want to be bound by council decisions.

Level of Understanding

Both traditional leaders and municipalities stated that traditional leaders did not sit in council meetings because they lacked understanding of their roles in council meetings and did not see how their participation will benefit their communities.

Relations in Council Meetings

According to the traditional leaders, lack of respect for each other was among the reasons they did not attend council meetings. Municipalities stated that it was because traditional leaders refused to be bound by the council's decisions. The results suggest that there is a need for information sharing and communication but

also the need for commitment and change of mindsets and each party doing what is required of them.

Reasons for Conflict Between Traditional Leaders and Municipal Councils

Interesting findings suggested that municipalities are picking on issues that could be frustrating to traditional leaders such as not being informed about development in their areas.

Suggestions on Dealing with Challenges

Participants were also asked to give suggestions on how challenges should be dealt with. A question was asked in terms of what each of the three main role players (i.e. provincial government [COGTA], municipalities and traditional leaders) should do to harmonise relationships between traditional leaders and municipal councils. The following themes emerged:

Role of Provincial Government

Capacity building was suggested by both categories and seen as a tool to promote cooperation and understanding of roles. Traditional leaders felt that COGTA should provide tools of trade, allow traditional leaders to identify projects which municipalities will support and also amend the Act, especially on issues of right to vote, more opportunities than observing and participation of all traditional leaders.

Municipalities felt that COGTA should set standard rates for out-of-pocket payment or make payments of such as well as promote intergovernmental relations between traditional leaders and municipalities.

Role of Municipalities

In terms of capacity building, there seems to be a suggestion that municipalities need to ensure that both traditional leaders and municipalities understand the guiding rules and regulations of each. In terms of resource allocation, traditional leaders felt that municipalities should fully recognise traditional leaders and provide them with tools of trade. Municipalities on the other hand indicated that they should implement what the Act provides for. There was a mutual feeling that municipalities should work on fostering good relations, give more information and find alternatives and lasting solutions among the two parties in order to work as a team.

Role of Traditional Leaders

Traditional leaders pointed out that they should make efforts to involve municipalities in the programs and also cooperate with municipalities. Emphasis was also on traditional leaders gathering knowledge on the functioning of municipalities. The municipalities felt that traditional leaders should take the lead in gaining understanding by initiating workshops. It was also felt that in order to build relationships, councillors should be invited to traditional council's meeting and they should promote effective communication with councillors.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

The findings of the study show that to a certain extent, there are positive outcomes in the implementation of Section 81. For instance, there is adequate knowledge of what Section 81 is, both from traditional leaders and municipalities. However, there are identified gaps and challenges with regard to understanding. What gives effect to this is the understanding of traditional leaders' roles in what they should be doing in municipal councils and the legislative provisions. There is some level of subjectivity among the responses given by traditional leaders indicating that responses relative to knowledge and understanding were given because it is something happening within municipalities (observing) but not what has to happen (according to legislation). Evidence suggests that traditional leaders are clearly against "observing" in municipal councils, but they indicate it as their understanding. On rating their understanding, traditional leaders indicate high average understanding than good. The study could therefore not subject the levels of understanding and knowledge of traditional leaders to absolute lack but rather indications of the need to be capacitated and restoring confidence. Furthermore, more gaps were identified in the extent of their understanding of the Act and its implementation which can also be linked to the limited sources where they drew their knowledge of the Act from. There is also evidence that suggests that traditional leaders feel limited by legislation on issues of voting and representation. More exposure and understanding of the Act would suggest that traditional leaders would effectively participate in council meetings and thus impact on the successful implementation of the Act. This could imply that given its mandate, COGTA should strengthen information sharing platforms to build capacity of traditional leaders so as to be on the same level of understanding as municipalities.

Municipalities on the other hand seem to find themselves at liberty of being able to access alternative ways of gaining knowledge such as more training by other stakeholders. There are reasons to suggest that municipalities have adequate knowledge and understanding of Section 81. There are, however, attitudes and perceptions that are not positive enough to encourage and allow their full cooperation with the implementation of the Act. These reasons to support such premise are mainly observed when reasons such as "traditional leaders should just observe",

“traditional leaders are not doing anything except attending meetings” or “traditional leaders must follow the rules of council” are given.

There were also variations on how municipalities and traditional leaders felt about the significance of the participation of traditional leaders in municipal councils and the impact this will have on traditional leaders themselves as well as the benefit this will have on their communities. It remains an issue that some traditional leaders feel it is not important for traditional leaders to participate in council meetings and also see no benefit for their communities due to various reported factors, among which were not being given the opportunity to express views, not being included in decisions made in the council and also some of the decisions affecting their communities are taken outside council. Traditional leaders seem to be advocating for more than 20% participation of traditional leaders as they feel that not all traditional councils are represented. Reasons such as the extent of representation when participating need to be addressed adequately for traditional leaders to realise how effective they can utilise platforms to communicate issues that affect traditional leaders. The payment of out-of-pocket expenses to participating traditional leaders and who is responsible for the payment and the provision of tools of trade continued to be among the challenges hindering the implementation of the Act. It was found that perceptions among municipalities were that provisions of tools of trade for traditional leaders were not necessary as they only attend meetings and not working extra hours. Also, there were concerns that COGTA provides tools of trades to traditional leaders, hence perceived as unnecessary to provide such. This could mean that there are gaps in the Act that require being relooked at to ensure mutual understanding. There seems to be realisation that participation is important, but there are elements of bias among traditional leaders and municipalities which hinder implementation. These bias elements are more to do with what will be gained out of participation (municipalities wishing to access land for development) and traditional leaders (wishing to be compensated for their participation). Each of the two categories was able to identify sound and specific roles that can be played by all three stakeholders (municipalities, traditional leaders and COGTA) in making implementation of Section 81 a success.

Recommendations

The variations in the level of understanding and knowledge on the Act and its implementation between traditional leaders and municipalities pointed to the need for COGTA to coordinate and strengthen information sharing and capacity building platforms. Capacity building among traditional leaders will further raise the levels of confidence, and COGTA will need to provide more hands-on support on education about legislation. It is recommended that COGTA embark on further enhancing relationships through creating and facilitating more platforms such as workshops. Municipalities also need to be encouraged to organise own capacity building platforms. In the same breath, traditional leaders also need to realise the benefits of participation in municipal councils beyond their individual needs.

Municipalities seem to be realising and supporting payments of out-of-pocket expenses but reluctant in taking full responsibility of allocating budgets for it. It is recommended that COGTA should consider enforcing implementation of the legislative requirements to pay out-of-pocket expenses by municipalities without deviation. Developing a framework for determination of out-of-pocket expenses and encouraging municipalities to adapt it to their local situation and resources have to be considered. It is also recommended that COGTA develop its own internal policy on the provision of tools of trades to traditional leaders in order to stand clear and cut cost of issuing tools of trades at provincial and municipal levels. This policy needs to specifically address budget allocation in instances where traditional leaders stand to benefit for provision of tools of trade based on participation in municipal councils as well as from the support received from the Department. Further research to investigate the political dynamics and influences related to the implementation of Section 81 in municipalities is recommended.

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Chapter 4

The Governance and Management of African Cities: Alternative Approaches and Models Towards Transforming into Successful Cities of the Future



Henry Wissink

Abstract Modern and often largely overpopulated or dense cities are increasingly becoming problematic, in particular, in the developing world, and specifically in regions such as Africa. Cities are set to be the precincts where on average 66% of global citizens will live in 2050, and are currently faced with many challenges. This includes the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's) as set out in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report (2015), and the contents of a recently published United Nations (UN) Report on *The Weight of Cities* (2018), and the challenges that they face as summarised below. These challenges according to the report will force us to devise new strategies for twenty-first century urbanisation: how we use resources that are normally critical for the maintenance of cities, and how we devise new tools, technologies and information-based interconnected interventions that can assist in improved resource management. The report emphasises low-carbon, resource-efficient, and socially just cities. This includes the monitoring of the flow of resources entering and leaving cities and the development of resource-efficient strategies to address these urbanisation trends. In monitoring growth and new developments, the planning of cities has to consider to 'compact growth' in order to mitigate rapid and uncontrolled urban sprawl and resulting squalor. This includes in particular the energy and water wastage that result from such uncontrolled and unplanned urbanisation activities, and requires future leaders to be skilled and directed towards innovative approaches and practices in management and governance in order to achieve the overall UNDP goal for sustainable cities and communities (Goal 11). This chapter explores the challenges that these demands will make on the governance and management of future cities, and it also considers and evaluates alternative forms of governance and management that may be found in the ideas surrounding the development of free private cities, start-up cities, charter cities or cities built within the arrangements for the

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development of special economic zones (SEZs). Will these models be a consideration for twenty-first century African urban reconstruction and development?

Keywords Urbanisation · Free private cities · Start-up cities · Charter cities · Special economic zones · Hierarchical governance · Self-governance · Co-governance

Introduction

In 2050, between 68% and 70% of the world's population will reside in cities, and growing numbers of people move to cities and towns because they view rural areas as places with hardship and backward/primitive lifestyle (Fig. 4.1). As the world rapidly urbanises (1.5 million people are added to the urban population every week), it has become critical to consider how we shape and influence what cities of the future we would like to live in, work in and enjoy during their leisure. It is also where most of the citizens will cast their votes for both national and local governments. This does not mean that government needs to neglect rural development, but as a priority – if African cities are going to be neglected, the African urban future does not look very promising. Cities are unable to respond to the problems of this rapid urbanisation, important land management, distribution and reforms as a result of sprawling urban precincts (Akinola and Wissink 2019) and concomitant citizen needs and social services. Traditional democratic systems are failing citizens and cities, resulting from the scale and growth of 'untamed' cities and the inability of traditional local government to live up to expectations. Sloganised transformations




Fig. 4.1 Projected global rural and urban population change – 1950–2050. (Reproduced from World Bank 2018)

such as ‘Ubuntu’¹ and ‘Batho Pele’² as developed in South Africa, seemed to fail in inspiring public officials and local communities in meeting the challenges of twenty-first-century urban government. It would appear as if ‘slogans’ without ‘action’ may be an appropriate perspective when it comes to evaluating why these honourable plans and programmes fail.

Causes and Benefits of Rapid Urbanisation

Urbanisation, in general, is linked to industrialisation and commercialisation, and social benefits and services normally not provided in rural contexts, as well as improved employment opportunities. Modernisation and changes in the mode of living, and rural–urban transformation into lifestyles characterised by technological and infrastructural improvements, improved transportation, communication, educational and medical facilities, and generally improved standards of living (smart cities) become an attractive option for people who have been locked into rural poverty for many generations. Cities that have generated this level of economic and advanced development become natural attractions for people and immigrants who are seeking a better life.

Disadvantages of Urbanisation

Cities, even though their epicentres display the characteristics stated above, pose huge problems for housing, overcrowding, land ownership dilemmas and unemployment due to uncontrolled urbanisation from ‘new immigrants’, often resulting in slum development with consequent water and sanitation problems. Poor health and spreading of diseases, traffic congestion, growth of crime and increased protests by citizens due to poor service delivery have become the prevailing definition of the modern African city.

Governance and Management Solutions to Urbanisation – Building Cities for Good

Building sustainable and environmentally friendly cities, the provision of essential services and the creation of more employment opportunities, as well as population and immigration control, and creating smart and resilient cities (dealing with

¹The original Southern African (Nguni origin) idea of serving one another based on the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity.

²This initiative was first introduced by the [Mandela](#) Administration in 1997 to stand for the better delivery of goods and services to the public.

stresses and shocks), are all regarded as the common challenges in modern developing cities. Looking at the notion of governance as a strategic driving force to ensure that the above can be achieved. Cities and urban areas have become the major drivers of the economies of most countries, and the lion's share of dominant state politics and socio-economic struggles are evident within the boundaries of cities and sprawling urban conurbations. Beck et al. (2018) viewed this as follows:

Not only is it that cities may be more important units of analysis than nation states, but also that qualitative evidence (narratives, storylines, case studies, 'toad's eye science' and so on) may be more believable than quantitative evidence (the above-mentioned statistics) in guiding the way we make decisions. 'Fewer data, more anecdotes', you might say (not unlike that slogan among patisserie-enthusiasts: 'less sponge, more gunge'). So the qualitative and the quantitative need to be both re-balanced and better combined.

Cities are viewed by many scholars as complex systems in transition, often untamed, but with a distinct 'metabolism', with more than half of the global population living in cities, and more than 80% of global waste and carbon dioxide pollution stemming from cities. The strategic management and governance of cities require careful analysis and management of the critical aspects of such a systemic metabolism, which defines the life, future and sustainability of urban economic engines and livelihoods.

In their essay *Cities as Forces for Good in the Environment: A Systems Approach*, Beck et al. (2018) proposed that there are 'large' questions to be asked about cities of the future:

- How to restore the natural capital and ecosystems that were present before the city "arrived, in geological time"?
- How the city can "act as a force for good", to compensate for negative human impact?
- How the cities of the Global South can avoid making the same mistakes as the Global North and 'leap-frog' advances in areas like 'human-waste-into-the-water-cycle phase', and remaining aligned with global trends?
- How can the future design and engineering of city infrastructure be employed "so that those at the bottom of the pyramid of dignified human development may be brought to a level" where they participate and contribute to cities as 'forces for good' – beyond the ongoing struggles of day-to-day survival activities?

These major questions to my mind lie at the centre of considering African cities of the future, and perhaps, they should be systematically unpacked to reflect a more complete analysis of the situations that specific African cities find themselves in.

It is the contention of this chapter to argue that at the foundation of the pyramid of solutions lies the challenge of governance, management and leadership. Without good governance, management and leadership, the existing problems, such as pollution, urban congestion, and poor or lack of developing and maintaining infrastructure and provision of services, will lead to the increase of these dire conditions and the marginalisation of the poor and desperate jobseekers migrating to cities in hope of a better future. This contention is supported by Förster and Ammann (2018, 4):

African urbanism is a challenge for our scholarly understanding of social change, the status of such cities and what they are about to become, and of their role in national, regional and world development, and last but not least, contemporary African cities raise questions of how they can be governed and planned.

Hierarchy of Priorities in Ensuring Transforming African Cities of the Future

The future of cities will be determined by a structure that requires careful consideration of the following:

- Governance, management and leadership. This would be considered as an immediate goal and would require deliberate action.
- The transformation of systems that relate to the critical sub-systems, and provision of basic requirements of citizens living in cities or urban conurbations. This would be considered as a medium-term restoration goal.
- The refocusing for growth and development within the city (overall system). This ultimately happens if the critical first and second phases have been completed. During this phase, the city starts utilising its gains to ensure that it becomes this 'force for good' and has raised the level of functioning to ensure quality of life comparable to most modern cities in the world, who are aiming towards this goal. This would be considered as a 'long-term' goal.

Ultimately, how to raise the level of participation and involvement of citizens to improve the quality of life of all citizens is through the development of smart, agile, and resilient strategies to transform cities as 'forces' for good, as Beck et al. (2018) call them. Governance generally refers to the process of the overall political and strategic management structures that are representative of an urban population. These structures determine strategic priorities and public policy (often in the shape of local by-laws) and are ultimately personally and collectively (corporately) responsible for the nature and future of a city and the well-being of its citizens. Management generally refers to the executive, but in particular the professionals, and experts who will take responsibility for the implementation of public policy (collectively agreed on by the political and executive order), and who will ensure that sub-systems will function effectively (achieving outcomes) and efficiently (value for money). Leadership, in a sense, speaks to the 'spirit' of those entrusted with governance and management. Perhaps it is in this dimension that we really need to take a hard look at. From a leadership point of view, what stands out is the requirement for ethical leadership (doing what is regarded as right, or legitimate and legal), having incumbents of public office that are visionary leaders and have a desire to be innovative, responsible and accountable for such actions. In transforming societies, especially where there have been dramatic political transformation, such as in some of the post-colonial African states, there may be a deep sense that

‘fixing’ the governance, management and leadership dimensions of urban systems is the foundation of the pyramid for urban reconstruction and development (Fig. 4.2).

The second level of urban reconstruction and development focuses on basic infrastructure and services and transforming critical sub-systems in urban service delivery. It firstly needs to always start by ensuring a form of egalitarian provision of basic services. No city can project itself to the third level – becoming a ‘force for good’ without knowing that the majority or ideally all its citizens have access to clean water, energy, basic transportation, urban health, safety and security. Once city governments and citizens have these in place, the focus is on smart and improved services such as movement of urbanites through more efficient and smart and affordable public transport, such as light rail, modern designed bus and rapid transit systems, as more liveable urban designs will require more people to walk, use bicycles and share rides on a daily basis. This should be augmented by more resource-efficient and modern innovative and technologically advanced systems such as electric vehicles, serviced by charging points designed to strategically service transportation systems. More efficient water reticulation systems, waste management systems, smart grids to allow the generation of private and other forms of energy loaded onto these grids. The design of energy-efficient buildings, heating and cooling systems, lighting technology driven by sensors and intelligent monitoring systems is envisaged. Added to this, the UN Report (2018) extensively advises the development of infrastructure for cross-sector efficiency, such as the intelligent utilisation of waste and excess energy and heat generated from processes in industry.

These challenges all require that urban leadership needs to be considered as key, as well as establishing or at least considering new models for city governance and politics that supports imaginative business propositions and experimentation (Florida and Hathaway 2017).




Fig. 4.2 Pyramid perspective to restoring cities (Author)

Considering the Evolution of Urban Futures Within the Nexus of Systems, Models and Transformation Approaches to Urban Governance

The challenge to future cities, their leadership, management and governance would be to consider where certain countries, especially African countries, find themselves within the nexus of this three-dimensional challenge. The understanding is that there are many commonalities between cities all over the world, and the basic needs of people have been very similar for centuries. Unfortunately, cities have become large and complex, and now can be regarded as complex systems in transition. This requires a careful consideration of how we need to drive and approach the management and governance of cities of the future, keeping in mind that appropriate systems, models and forms or stages of change and transformation may be appropriate during certain stages of evolution of cities and their governance and management approaches (Fig. 4.3).

Systems of Governance in the Post-centralised State

In the early nineties, political scientists James Wunsch and Dele Olowu (1995) edited a masterful text, relating the reason why the notion of the centralised state has failed dismally in Africa and why we need to consider to return to a form of self-governance, where people can be educated, informed and empowered to take control of their own destiny. Regardless of what they refer to as the ‘vast reservoir of energy and potential untapped at Africa’s grassroots’ (Wunsch and Olowu 1995:3–4),




Fig. 4.3 Governance nexus of the dimensions or approaches to governance (Author)

it is clear from their analysis that this wealth of untapped opportunity has for decades been affected by domestic political processes, violence, ethnic conflict, political instability, administrative weaknesses and in many cases dismal economic performances. This in turn has led to increasing centralisation of the powers of the state, and consequential centralisation of resources, and failure to employ resources where they matter most – in ‘untamed’ cities and growing urban precincts. Africa, in particular, has a long history of adopting colonial and/or western systems of government, either by virtue of history, compliance to international norms and trends or enforced structural adjustment policies and systems.

Neither democracy, nor constitutional principles, nor separation of powers, nor sophisticated *checks and balances* have proven to be guarantees to protect states against abject poverty, inequality and corruption, as well as the abuse of the rights of individuals. Over time, groups or individuals seize power and abuse it at their own discretion, when there is a sense that the system will allow for such interventions (Ward 1989; Swilling 2017). Respective rulers do not bear any economic risk for wrong decisions, are immune to liability and have no enforceable obligations to the governed. Such *power without liability* ultimately corrupts everyone. (See the chapter on corruption in local government.) It is therefore important to consider the options for evolving into a more workable system of government that would not only work towards built in mechanisms to ensure better governance and improved delivery but also increase self-governance of precincts in order to ensure self-determination of the goals of communities. Bell (2018) agrees with this sentiment in his book *Your Next Government: From Nation States to Stateless Nations* and adds to the mix of proposing alternate systems of local or urban governance as explained below; for instance, the moving away from hierarchical (or centralised governance) to co-governance and self-governance and others are important to consider (Tenbenschel 2007; Tribe et al. 2007 and Kooiman 2003), among many concepts such as networks, professionalism, egalitarianism and communitarianism that need more conceptual clarification in this context.

For the purpose of this chapter, the classification, originally devised by Kooiman (2003), as consisting of three modes, hierarchical, co-governance and self-governance modes, will be used and proposed as alternative modes or systems of governance as described below.

Hierarchical Governance

The hierarchical approach to organisational structuring and management is regarded as the ‘classical approach’, and has been practiced for many years as a basic approach to govern state structures. The hierarchical approach is based on the classic centralised steering (command) and control model of Max Weber (1947). Translated into city governance, it is based on the long-standing system of local government, ruled by a majority council, an executive head (mayor) and an executive (city/town manager) chosen by virtue of political party and other allegiances to

the major power brokers in the urban system. Often these leaders are not skilled and experienced in city or urban government, but are awarded for their long-time support of the majority party. Invariably, states do legislate for the structural organisation, and at least for the professional qualifications and experiences of executives or city managers, but in many countries, the enforcement of these standards is subject to the political superiors and will play second fiddle to practices of cronyism and political favouritism in appointments. Due to the inherent potential of centralised control of power and decision-making and potential for corrupt practices, especially at the political level, this form of local governance has mostly failed local governments in Africa. It has also been instrumental in consolidating the structures of reporting and accountability into these structures, and consequently leaving these structures powerless to act against themselves.

Co-governance

Co-governance is “an approach where the interacting parties have something ‘in common’ to pursue, that in some way autonomy and identity are at stake. A good example of co-governance is the incorporation and coordination of networks in a system that collectively delivers on common needs and projects. Co-governance includes key forms of ‘horizontal’ governing; actors communicate, collaborate or co-operate without a central or dominating governing actor” (Kooiman 2003:96–97). In this co-governance model, a system of multiple levels or layers of stakeholders, and key role players from the citizenry, legacy³ and established organisations, as well as business, and the NGO/CBO sectors have an important vote and input to make in decision-making in the city. This system rejects the hierarchical governance model that originated from mostly colonial origins and argues that principles of liberal democracy are more important than populist democratic systems – in other words, the views of ‘business powerbrokers’ who drive the local economies, who employ people and who pay the lion’s share of taxes matter. The voices of non-governmental actors and community-based organisations who are connected and can produce material impact at a community level should also be heard. Co-governance requires this balance between political representatives, big business, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), knowledge leaders (universities/colleges), and community and non-governmental organisations. Co-governance strikes a balance between individual and organisation interests and cooperation, to produce this ‘force for good’. The proper interpretation of liberal democracy is the antidote to populist democracy, and where the interests of a ‘numbers’ majority quickly stifle and suffocate the ‘best interest’ of society, and ultimately disadvantage the majority. Here a practical measure needs to be employed, as is often achieved in national

³Legacy organisations build structures and business models that allow them to generate profits in a very efficient way and are performance engines that focus on well-defined customer problems.

political systems between the parliamentary majority (congress of the people/parliamentary members/House of Commons) and the Senate to safeguard minority or special interests and their opinions in a system of government (e.g. specific interests represented by the House of Lords/Senators). Perhaps it is time to consider what this approach to governance will look like at the local level. It is at this level of governance, where specific or ‘ground swell’ opinion really matters most, and where the direct contribution and participation of all the interest groups could be far more effective than the simple ‘majority’ or representative democratic systems applied in most African states combined with bureaucratic and ‘hierarchical’ rule-based systems of governance. These systems ultimately open up opportunities for appointing cronies and resultant poor leadership and management in representing communities, hiding behind rules and no direct consequences for poor performance, and opening up the system for corruption and maladministration of public resources in government (Wissink, 2015; Subban and Wissink 2015).

Self-Governance

According to Kooiman (2003:79) “self-governance refers to the capacity of social entities to govern themselves autonomously”. Internet communities are often set up in a more or less self-governing manner, where, during the process, values and norms may be defined on the way information is exchanged. Smaller communities and groups of people who have a common interest, values and ideals may be able to negotiate self-governance. This notion is not a foreign one anymore, as most modern governments that are considering economic growth and development as a priority have created special dispensations for industrial and economic zones. In some parts of the world, the ideas relating to independent, free private and charter cities are growing rapidly. The idea of self-governing urban contexts seems to be gaining in many parts of the world. Although independent cities are not new, or a new concept, there are examples like Singapore, Monaco and the Vatican that are fully independent city-states, whereas others such as Hong Kong, Macau and Dubai are part of larger nations but function independently.

Alternate Models for Urban or City Governments

Alongside the broader theoretical approaches of systems for governance, and the philosophies or schools of transformation, the literature now reflects the practical manifestation of a lot of this thinking that proposes different models for local governance of urban human settlements or new socio-economic precincts. In moving away from classical and hierarchical-based models of local governance, scholars and professionals have devised models of local governance that reflect embracing community based, and decentralised responsible and responsive institutions, who

are willing to experiment with new technologies through co-governance and self-governance approaches or open systems thinking. These models are reflected in literature as free private, charter and special economic zone-based cities.

Free Private Cities

One of the most ardent proponents of a Free Private City is Titus Gebel (2018a, b), who has created a movement known as Free Private Cities (FPCs), and is a manifestation of self-governance as a system, combined with the best of institutional and technological transformation thinking and change. In his recent book, *Free Private Cities: Making Governments Compete for You*, he states:

Imagine a system in which a private company offers you protection of life, liberty and property as a 'government service provider'. This service includes internal and external security, a legal and regulatory framework and independent dispute resolution. You pay a contractually fixed fee for these services per year. The government service provider, as the operator of the community, cannot unilaterally change this 'citizens' contract' with you later on...

He writes that FPCs can imaginatively provide a city run by a private company 'offers you the basic services of a state, the protection of life, and property, in a defined territory within a host nation'. The benefits are that your city will function autonomously, versus being subject to state control even though they have to comply with the constitutional and legal frameworks within a state. Free private cities are also profit and benefit orientated. They allow for maximum benefit of its citizens and stakeholders, and they allow for the maximised incomes to be used and applied for the benefit of the community and optimal provision of services. The traditional hierarchical approach is a distributive and socially driven dispensation, which invariably spreads the benefits of taxation very thinly, and ultimately without the advantages of professional and ethical governance, invariably, it depletes these resources for the overall improvement of urban precincts. From a service delivery point of view, Bell (2013) and Gebel (2018a, b) suggest governance by 'civic contract' driven by egalitarian governance theory versus the traditional approach to governance that is determined by political decision-making driven by political and social contract. In other words, in FPCs, 'tax-based income' to local government is used for the spreading of resources to benefit the majority without disadvantaging any other citizen, as opposed to failed efforts to benefit the majority and disadvantaging many others in the process. What distinguishes free private cities from traditional cities is the concept of stakeholder power – which services those persons or companies who invest in the concept, as opposed to voter power that proposes to service citizens based on 'inalienable human rights' and ensuring equitable services to all who live there, irrespective of whether they are contributing significantly to the tax base of the governing authority. From a governance perspective, it would appear that the dominant mode of public management would be a 'plug-and-play' management style, where most services will be online and using virtual and

e-government approaches versus the bureaucratic style of government, often disconnected to the realities and needs of citizens, and still operating in an outdated paper-based, queue-based system of management, where citizens are served by an operator behind a counter. Modern ‘plug-and-play’ forms of management would allow, for example, for all renewal of licences and privileges to be done via a smart ‘e-identity authentication’ system. In FPCs, the ‘territorial autonomy’ is determined and its consequent governance authority is owned by its investors and property owners. Owners and investors determine the nature and future state of their regional precinct and develop legacy cities based on such rational allocations of resources, minimising bureaucratic costs. This model is contrary to the territorial control by the state and citizens residing in the area, and who are allowed private ownership of industries, business and the properties, but regionally, these properties are taxed based on the broader needs and political priorities, bureaucratic employment needs, and the government or local authority as a job creator and economic or employment agent. FPCs are aimed at maximising self-determination in such a regional precinct or legal boundaries of ownership, as opposed to maximising public participation in an urban precinct in order to politically determine developmental priorities. Gebel (2018a, b) states that

...as a ‘contract citizen’, you have a legal claim to compliance and a claim for damages in the event the provider does not perform. You take care of everything else by yourself, but you can also do whatever you want, limited only by the rights of others and some limited rules of living together.

The FPCs are generally aimed at settling for greater legal certainty in disputes through electronic and legally tested procedures and predictability, based on case law, as opposed to traditional cities that have long and extended or retracted costly legal procedures that generally frustrate citizens. Generally, FPCs are structured to provide citizens more freedom of choice and ability to enhance decision-making in such contexts. What they also offer is higher security and focused local policing in providing such security, social peace and resultant sense of stability in general daily living.

For many citizens who are enabled to lead reasonably ‘middle-class’ lifestyles, this higher quality of life may be provided at a lower cost, if the cost–benefit analysis is based on a model where all the variables are included. According to Gebel (2018a, b), in FPCs, you pay for what you get, and get what you pay for. Obviously this model of governance will find it difficult to become the predominant model of governance in countries with high unemployment, high inequality and poverty levels, but could and will probably be employed as mechanisms to produce polycentric forms of government⁴ in future (Carlisle and Gruby 2017). They argue that the following attributes may be part of a polycentric governance system. Firstly, ‘multiple, overlapping decision-making centers with some degree of autonomy’, and secondly,

⁴Polycentricity is a concept created by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom. The term implies a ‘complex form of governance with multiple centers of decision making, each of which operates with some degree of autonomy’.

‘choosing to act in ways that take account of others through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolution’, and that this can produce what they refer to as ‘self-organising tendencies’ in municipalities and metropolitan areas (Carlisle and Gruby 2017:6).

Special Economic Zones

Tom Bell (2018) proposes a similar system and philosophy in his book and argues that:

Governments across the globe have begun evolving from lumbering bureaucracies into smaller, more agile special jurisdictions – common-interest developments, special economic zones, and proprietary cities. Private providers increasingly deliver services that political authorities formerly monopolized, inspiring greater competition and efficiency, to the satisfaction of citizens-qua-consumers. These trends suggest that new networks of special jurisdictions will soon surpass nation states in the same way that networked computers replaced mainframes.

In this book, he describes how a quiet revolution is taking place, and from the perspective of transforming governments, this revolution or evolution is from ‘the bottom up, inside-out’, and globally, and ultimately bringing peace and economic as well as social prosperity to people across the globe who are willing to embrace this system of transformation. Bell (2017) argues that ‘for the last several centuries, nation states have dominated the political landscape, and set all the rules for everyone inside them. But now two kinds of special jurisdictions – private communities and “special economic zones” – are quietly taking over functions and providing options that traditional polities cannot or will not. This gentle revolution has already brought comparative wealth and better living to millions of people – perhaps including you’.

Tom Bell (2018:45), in particular, favours the idea of local government in the form of special economic zones (SEZs), with the specific objective of bringing ‘Hong-Kong’ style growth and economic prosperity to regions. He uses examples of Central American states such as the Honduras who changed their constitutions to reconstruct ‘quasi sovereign’ special economic regions (SERs), referred to as ‘Regiones Especiales de Desarrollo’ developed to ‘attract foreign investors with low taxes, free trade, and transparent government’. This effort was eventually transformed into a new approach referred to as the Zone for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDE) aimed at generating employment in uninhabited regions, or in municipalities that agree to be converted into ZEDE zones.

Every zone will de facto be governed by a technical secretary, elected by a committee that will oversee the adoption of best practices. The committee is in its turn appointed by the president of Honduras, in accord with the organic laws that regulate these zones. The inhabitants will be able to interact with each other voluntarily. (Bell 2018)

These approaches may take some time to find applications in young democracies of the developing world, but are already seeing manifestations of this in large ‘relatively’ independent secure urban housing estates in South Africa, and special economic development zones (SEZs), such as the Dube Trade Port in Durban (see chapter on the Durban Aerotropolis), and a few others which can be regarded as a variant of the switch between hierarchical and co-governance models, as well as the proposed as an alternative in the development of new large-scale urban developments within such special- or charter-based urban and industrial development zones (Nyakabawo 2014).

Charter Cities

Charter cities are another variant of the co/self-governance model for future urban or local governments, depending on the extent and the nature of the rules that are devised for their governance in different political economies. A charter city is generally a city where the governing system is determined by the city’s own charter or constitution, as opposed to by ‘general law’ cities. In the United States, where states have city charters which are allowed by law, there are provisions where a city can create or amend its charter by a decision of its administration, and through the precepts as set out in its charter, resulting in the difference between general law cities and charter cities.⁵ It is also important to consider that in California State which contains 478 cities within its region, 121 are regarded and designated as charter cities. These include cities such as Norco, Oakland, Newport Beach, Palo Alto, Huntington Beach, Alameda, San Francisco, Irvine, Los Angeles, San Jose, Merced and the capital, Sacramento, as examples. However, charter cities that are subordinate to the rules of larger institutions (such as provinces or nations) have limited flexibility to adopt new governance structures and have to be structured to create and recreate systems and forms of governance as they evolve.

These cities may be administered predominantly by residents or through a third-party management structure, because a charter gives a city the flexibility to choose novel types of government structure. Charter cities often generally function within the confines and the legal requirements of a country’s constitution.

Nobel Prize winner and economist Paul Romer proposed that a new form of charter cities can be successful in transforming the dire socio-economic conditions in developing countries. Romer (2010) suggested that through the passing of special acts in developing countries, portions of undeveloped and ideally uninhabited land can be set aside for special charter cities.

⁵Cities that have not adopted a charter are general law cities. General law cities are bound by the state’s general law, even with respect to municipal affairs. A charter city’s law (constitution) concerning a municipal affair will override a state law governing the affair.

This charter city would be administered by a developed third-party guarantor government, and citizens from the host country (and maybe other countries) could move in and out as they please. The point of the charter cities idea is to give citizens the choice of where they want to live and to provide the basic rules and amenities required for economic growth. Ideally, by establishing a city with highly developed rules and governance in an underdeveloped region, living and working in a charter city may provide a closer and more attractive alternative to moving far away to more developed countries. (Romer 2010)

According to Romer (2010), there are three important factors to consider in the development of a charter city in the context of developing countries. Firstly, identifying the host country and the land designated for the development. Often this land is regarded as ‘a special reform zone’ and will be managed in accordance with an agreed set of rules between the agents and state authorities. Secondly, the idea of a charter city in a developing context is initiated when a ‘guarantor’ or sponsor comes in and takes up the responsibility to administer and govern the region or precinct in co-governance with a ‘*board of governors and an appointed chairman like the Federal Reserve System in the United States*’. Finally, the ‘source country’ will be the country that provides the majority of its residents, apart from some that may come from other source countries. Romer’s idea was considered, and in some cases with mixed reactions. Madagascar recently considered developing two charter cities, but the plan was cancelled following a change in political leadership that originally supported it. More recently, there was also the example in Honduras, when they considered such a special charter city, but without the control of a ‘third-party government’.

In 2011 Honduras made the necessary legal changes. Romer served as chair of a ‘transparency committee’ but resigned in September 2012 when the Honduran government agency responsible for the project signed agreements with international developers without knowledge of the committee.

In October 2012, the Honduran Supreme Court determined that these proposals and arrangements for special charter cities devised by Romer to be unconstitutional. It stated that the laws of Honduras would not be valid there, and the idea of a charter city or ‘Home Rule’ as commonly known in the United States may not be compatible with the Honduran Constitution and general laws. As in the state of California, cities which do not operate under a charter are governed by state law and referred to as a ‘General Law City’ (LCC 2007). Alternatively, cities created and governed by a charter may elect to employ different systems, such as a ‘strong mayor’ or ‘city manager’ as forms of government.

This example, and in particular the important principle of how centralised states, and their constitutions, as well as defined systems of government impact on the future of cities, is very important to consider. It remains to be seen if developing countries will take the bold step to devolve ‘special charter’ type of powers to cities and even allow free private cities and liberal and independent economic development zones to be created in the fashion of Hong Kong, and the most recent example of China’s special economic zones, and the impact that Hong Kong’s rules (rules-that-change-rules) had in creating one of the most vibrant and economically powerful cities of the World, Shenzhen. These SEZs were instrumental in unleashing the

most rapid reduction of poverty and growth of economic opportunities and employment on the globe (Romer 2010; Farole and Gokhan 2011). Perhaps, the example of city states like Hong Kong and Singapore will explain why their example and approach is a critical precursor for successful African cities of the future.

Having said that, perhaps there has to be sobriety about the fact that many, if not the majority, of African states are navigating their way through and struggling with post-colonial transformation challenges. Apart from that, the practicalities are there in dealing with corruption, inequalities, poverty and financing huge demands for infrastructural and other developmental priorities. Maybe the challenge is to consider that as African nations and countries, we do have some platforms to build on and to utilise the best of knowledge, approaches and models in our transitioning to locally developed and devised systems of governance and management to meet the special challenges and demands for the development of socially, culturally and technologically smart African cities of the future.

Change and Thinking About Transformation in Relation to the Future of Cities

Another dimension of looking at alternatives for the governance and management of cities is to consider the nature of transformation. Schneidewind and Augenstein (2016) propose that we could consider viewing transformation from the perspective of considering three schools (philosophies) of transformation (see Fig. 4.4). They are idealist, institutionalist and technology-driven schools of transformation. These approaches challenge us in our thinking about what we believe and trust in when we consider change and transformation within our socio-economic and political structures that determine what we will look like in the future.

Idealists Can Shape and Influence Public Opinion

An example of this school according to Schneidewind & Augenstein (2016) is “the economic and political theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that hold that human actions and institutions are economically determined and that a class struggle is needed to create historical change and that capitalism will ultimately be superseded by communism”. Leadership in this school of thought are usually idealists gaining power through political organisation, but often not very skilled, diligent and committed to the tactical side of implementing ideas. Political leaders are often not held accountable for poor implementation – often viewed as a question of ‘who guards the guardians’, when those entrusted with power fail us. A movement away from this school of transformation is the approach of institutionally driven transformation.

School of Transformation	Conception of Humanity	Drivers of Civilisation	Key Proposition	Associated Theories or Approaches
Idealist	They make sense, social and communicative	Ideas, and meaning	Ideas or ideologies rule the world. They shape institutions and technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constructivism • Social system theories • theology
Institutionalist	Utility maximising	Healthy institutions	Society is shaped by institutions. They facilitate the diffusion of new ideas, and shape processes and technological innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • institutional theories in political science and economics
Technological	Routine dependent, and deficient	Appropriate Technologies	Societal development is driven by constant expansion of scope for action driven by new technological innovations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Innovation studies and theory • Science and technology studies

Fig. 4.4 Schools of transformation. (Reproduced from Schneidewind and Augenstein 2016)

Transformation as a Result of Trust in Institutions

Institutions and organs of the state, such as religious, cultural, political, social, economic and functional or purpose driven, have historically attained high degrees of resilience, and generally reflect stability, but are often subject to change processes that are both incremental and discontinuous in nature. The advantage of trusting in institutions is that when they are focused on their purpose and utility and there is a sense of purpose and internal organisation and productivity towards their survival, they play an important role in successful transformations and change. They are usually driven by professionals and well-trained tacticians. Their disadvantages may be that institutions tend to change, evolve and lose their purpose, or become protected by the state and become ineffective and inefficient bureaucratic structures. When they evolve into captured institutions,⁶ they become slow to respond, and often corrupt, and divorced from the realities of their patrons, supporters or funders, and lose their value as trusted instruments of the state to produce agreed-on societal and economic futures.

⁶The notion of institutions being captured can extend beyond external “state capture of institutions”, but can also be defined by virtue of the extent to which they become instruments of internal interests and corrupt activities.

Technologically Driven Transformation

As human beings generally rely on processes, rules and procedures, new technologies, both hard and soft technologies (in particular information technologies), gradually removed the burden of arduous and routine-based work and time-consuming processes. It introduced industrialisation, productivity, efficiency and a world that has become far more organised, comfortable and easy to live in. Their advantages are not always directly evident, although they may be associated with the fast tracking of economic, social and industrial development, more efficiency and a more liveable and comfortable world, the technologies associated with such trends have the propensity to produce more inequality (benefits the top echelons of society) and the over-utilisation of scarce resources (overexploitation of fossil fuels through improved technologies). They are often not well checked by the role and inputs of idealists and institutions who fall short of applying globally agreed on principles of responsible, responsive and sustainable technological management (Wissink 2019).

Technologies are invariably highly specialised, and although they are often promoted to serve the interests of the majority of citizens, their inherent dangers and threats are often not explained and are only understood by the well-informed and associated professionals. For example, we still do not have a clear and convincing verdict on the impact of cellular devices on human physiology and biology. The advent of nuclear technology and the questions regarding potential large-scale destruction, unplanned disasters, long-term impact on the environment, sanctity of life and the sustainable use of resources are issues often checked by idealists (politicians/academics/religious leaders) and institutions (religious movements/universities/Green Peace/Green Party) focused on this role. Often driven by competing institutions who have opposing values and goals (military organisations and institutions versus environmental organisations such as Green Peace/Wise Campaigns). New and powerful technologies need to be carefully and responsibly managed from a policy management and governance perspective (Wissink 2019) to ensure that they are implemented with utmost care and maximised benefit and minimum negative consequences and impact to the broader society and the environment.

The challenge for governments around the globe will be to consider that it will progress along the lines of the proposed three dimensions (see Fig. 4.5). Generally, when societies are politically and socially idealist, you may have a preference for centralised, and hierarchical, bureaucratic systems of government, sticking to traditional structures for city government. When societies are willing to break out of the idealist and traditional moulds into co-governance systems, which will also spread power and responsibilities across sub-systems and institutions not generally regarded as formal or state chartered in origin, the theory is that you can initiate improved growth and steady developmental patterns. Alternatively, there are some proponents that believe that models of limited state control and self-governance provide the best solutions for high growth and development (Gebel 2018a, b).

Systems	Models	Change and Transformation	Impact
Hierarchical	Traditional	Idealist	Low growth and retarded development (if not stagnation)
Co-Governance	Charter/Special economic zones	Institutionalism	Improved growth and steady development
Self-Governance/limited state intervention.	Free/Private	Technological/Innovation	High growth and development

Fig. 4.5 Linking systems, models and change/transformation dimensions. (Author, and reproduced from Kooiman 2003, and Schneidewind and Augenstein 2016)

Typically post-colonial countries such as those in Africa would fall into the first category in Fig. 4.5, and the understanding is that such city governments should adopt approaches to move away from idealist and populist ideologies, re-evaluate hierarchical and bureaucratic and centralised systems of governance, and move towards systems where established institutions that have proven their value, and are steeped in communities and the (local legacy and commercial economy enterprises, CBOs and NGOs) are given more prominence, and where hierarchical and centralised government makes place for more decentralised, and systems of co-governance between societal sub-systems and economic hubs, and where communities and groups that exhibit important influence can become stakeholders in the political as well as executive governance of cities and/or urban precincts. Centralised, idealist and bureaucratic command and control systems are prone to maladministration and corruption as these systems are often unchecked and far removed from the realities of day-to-day management and governance. In South Africa, sloganised approaches such as Ubuntu, Batho Pele, ‘Back-to-Basics’ and the introduction of ward councillors⁷ to bring government closer to communities have been devised to try and overcome the deficiencies of the hierarchical, centralised system, with mixed results. It would appear that the ward councillor system is abused, and often suggestions that this arrangement meets the requirements of ensuring that ‘grassroots democracy’ is being practised cannot be supported; and real access to decision-making power cannot be guaranteed. Managing power and achieving political settlements within African urban systems is an important determinant of change and real access to decision-making according to Kelsall (2016:3). In this sociological analysis of power, aspects such as narrative, ritual and deal-making are proposed as nested dimensions of contemporary governance. Pieterse (2018:32) cites Petit (2013) and

⁷Ward councillors is a typical South African arrangement, and their primary role is to represent their ward or division and the people who live in it. They provide a bridge between the community and the council, represent their views at council meetings and lead local campaigns on their behalf.

suggests that in applied policy development literature, visible, invisible and hidden power plays important roles in ‘the complex flows and dynamics of power and counter-power in the heterotopic sense’. He also argues that the history of Africa has proven a long-term ‘anti-urban bias practiced by most African governments manifested in mired devolution efforts combined with futile anti-migration policies’, but he argues that there has been some change at various levels of formal governance and around the approaches to ‘rethink, remake and reinvest multi-level governance arrangements to improve the prospects of “structural economic transformation” and inclusive growth’. This implies departing from the governance paradigm of centralisation or concentrated power within executive management structures of councils (particularly in local government) to what could be a model for future new urban governance, with ‘polycentric’ features, governing, financing, shaping and growing such new urban precincts. This in no way implies a muddled or heterotopic⁸ sense that becomes disorganised, impractical, chaotic or dystopian. It implies perhaps a new discourse to enable social, economic, physical and organisational innovative perspectives that allow for society to utilise this space to move towards new and improved urban futures, where unlike the often wielded Afro-pessimistic perspective, African cities can in fact become models for global cities of the future. This kind of ‘dreaming’ also does not exclude the practicalities nested in territorial, spatial, architectural and infrastructure development and investments sorely needed for developing and growing smart urban precincts. According to Pieterse (2018, 8):

...embedded in this new policy discourse is an unmistakable recognition that unless a stronger territorial or spatial understanding begins to drive routine processes of infrastructure investment and economic development, most African countries will remain low-income and marginal in global value chains. Furthermore, it is recognised that the imperative to coordinate, sequence and calibrate disparate investments in highly complex and volatile systems requires a territorial proximity, for which the traditional model of national-centric planning and management is not well suited.

This position infers that African urban governance needs to be transformed, and to counter the forecasts for Afro-pessimistic doomsday scenarios and authors like Mike Davis (2006), who argue that the view of African cities are ‘bustling cities in the global South, and consist mainly of chaotic slums where poverty, frustration, corruption, crime and violence thrive due to a lack of housing and basic infrastructure and to the limited opportunities they offer their inhabitants’, and ‘depicts African cities primarily as violent and ungovernable and eventually as a mirror of the whole continent’.

So apart from focusing on what so-called good governance means in these contexts, one solution may therefore be seriously consider the departure from traditional governance systems to more effective institutional trust and collaboration between autonomous, but co-dependent centres of decentralised decision-making appear to be the approach to be followed if governments are going to face growing

⁸The philosopher Michel Foucault described cultural, institutional and discursive spaces that become ‘other worldly’, ‘different’, disturbing, intense, incompatible, contradictory or transforming, often challenging existing norms.

and complex urban systems, which are able to cope with this rapid change and transformation of African cities. There may be important lessons to learn from African cities such as Kigali in Rwanda and Cape Town and developments such as the new Durban Aerotropolis (separate chapter description in this book), and global success stories such as Hong Kong and Singapore (Alvares 2017; Doãn 2017) .

Summary and Conclusion

Our challenges in African cities of the future would be to ensure that we find governance and management models to ensure an effective and efficient framework to create and maintain critical infrastructure, greater and increasing inclusion of all the sectors of our society into the economy, and the opportunities that would allow for maximising economic empowerment. Furthermore, to ensure the fair and proper spatial integration of urban migrants into our burgeoning cities that will require alternative or different approaches in thinking about the problem of inclusive cities for people who are less able to bring wealth, urban skills and experiences to the urban context. In other words, when focusing on making local government as effective as possible, we will have to create sustainable, productive, resilient and agile African cities of the future. This will require new leadership attitudes, skills, determination and the innovative transformation of the governance approaches and systems of African cities. Perhaps the way forward is to request that the leading countries in Africa become examples to the rest of Africa. It is time to consider that new approaches and models of governance, management and leadership of urban precincts and conurbations may need to ‘leapfrog’ through existing and innovative approaches and models to address these vexing problems that Africa will be facing as rapid urbanisation continues. There is an expectation that Africa will become the new market place for many around the globe. The world is watching in anticipation. Focusing on governance, management and leadership to restore critical and basic sub-systems of cities, will be critical to propel African cities towards becoming ‘forces for good’ as described earlier in this chapter.

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Chapter 5

Urbanization and the Quality of Growth in Uganda: The Challenge of Structural Transformation and Sustainable and Inclusive Development



Dmitry Pozhidaev

Abstract This chapter analyzes Uganda's economic growth and urbanization from the perspective of the growing international and domestic concern about the quality of growth and rising inequality. It focuses in particular on secondary cities and towns to analyze their contributions to the quality of growth and their potential. Uganda has been growing impressively over the past three decades at about 6% of GDP annually and has one of the fastest rates of urbanization in the East Africa region. But this growth has not resulted in a matching quality. Average incomes have been lagging behind the GDP growth, whereas poverty and inequality has increased. Urbanization has welfare-improving effects, but these effects are distributed unevenly between urban areas, and cities are the main contributor to inequality nationwide. However, secondary cities and towns are characterized by less inequality than the primary cities, with a relatively higher share of higher productivity sectors, particularly manufacturing.

Cities' contribution to structural transformation is undoubtful, with over 70% of national nonagricultural GDP being produced in urban areas. But the kind of structural transformation taking place in Uganda, with labor moving from less productive activities in rural areas to marginally more productive activities in urban areas (most notably informality), is neither sustainable nor truly transformative. Cities are yet to realize their full potential as engines of structural transformation and sustainable and inclusive growth. Secondary cities and towns may become game changers. But they face a challenge of investment readiness to incentivize business activities in higher productivity sectors—an area of particular importance to secondary cities and towns, relatively neglected by both the central government and private investors. This challenge requires a comprehensive approach and substantive changes in the applicable regulatory framework to allow municipalities to expand their fiscal space. This chapter offers a number of practical recommendations in this respect.

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Most importantly, municipal authorities are yet to develop a business mentality, including the basic concepts of comparative advantage and risk-return tradeoff, to be able to manage their cities as businesses, not as government offices, and to effectively engage the private sector.

This takes political will and investment in the fundamentals, such as capacities and systems for urban governance and management at all levels. The manner in which urbanization is planned and managed today will play a critical role in the quality of growth in Uganda over the coming decades and in particular the achievement of structural transformation and its national development objectives.

Keywords Uganda · Urbanization · Quality of growth · Structural transformation · Secondary cities

Introduction

This chapter is driven by the growing international and domestic concern about the quality of growth and rising inequality in Africa (Kanbur et al. 2019; Milanovic 2016; UNDP 2017) and in Uganda in particular (Asiimwe 2018; Oxfam 2017). The rates of economic growth on the continent have picked up as the international pessimism about the “hopeless continent” (to use the title of a (in)famous *Economist* issue in 2000 lamenting the disastrous development outcomes in the continent in the 1990s) gave way to an upbeat narrative about the bright prospects of the African “lions on the move” (to borrow the title of a McKinsey’s 2010 study).

Unlike for many other countries on the continent (and despite a localized civil unrest in the north of the country), the decade of the 1990s was not lost for Uganda: its GDP between 1990 and 2000 was growing at a very impressive annual average rate of 6.5% doubling its GDP during this period. The time since 2000 was also quite bright marked by GDP annual average growth rates of 6.4%, with 3 years demonstrating an annual rate of about 10%.

However, the shortcomings of GDP as a measure of development are well-known and recognized giving rise to global “beyond GDP movement” to find alternative measures of social well-being (Mazzucato 2018; Stiglitz et al. 2019). Most problematically, GDP often fails to account for economically productive activities while reporting economic outputs that may be outright damaging to society. And of course, GDP (in all its variations, such as GNI or per capita measures) cannot indicate the quality of growth. To use the title of the Oxfam study (2017) on inequality in Uganda, GDP does not answer the question “Who is growing?”. With all its impressive growth in the past decade (even longer in the case of Uganda), Africa has become a continent of extremes: home to more than a half of the world’s extreme poor where “three richest billionaire men have more wealth than the bottom 50 percent of the population, approximately 650 million people” (Oxfam 2019).

The critical question is thus the quality of growth, which, as Kanbur et al. (2019) indicate, involves four key dimensions, such as (1) the distribution of the income gains from growth, (2) the translation of economic growth into nonincome dimensions of well-being, (3) the impact of growth on the structural transformation of the economy to improve its productivity and resilience, and (4) environmental sustainability. When economic growth does not adequately reflect in these dimensions, we are dealing with a growth without quality, a growth that does not translate in improved well-being of the population, which is the ultimate objective of development.

Considerations of the quality of growth underpin international and regional development agendas adopted by all countries, including Uganda. The most important among those are the Sustainable Development Goals that set global targets and indicators in 17 areas to be achieved by 2030, the New Urban Agenda that translates these development objectives into an urban context (UN-Habitat 2017), and the African Union's Agenda 2063 "The Africa We Want" presenting development aspirations for Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development (African Union 2015).

This chapter situates the concern about the quality of growth in Uganda in the context of the country's accelerating urbanization (which has been steadily increasing from 5.7% annually in 2000 to 6.2% in 2018), focusing on secondary and small cities below the primary level.¹ It analyzes the links between Uganda's impressive growth and its income and nonincome development outcomes. Why urbanization and why secondary cities? The historic association between urbanization and growth as well as between urbanization and structural transformation (with the resulting new quality of growth due to higher productivity achieved as a result of a transition from less productive to more productive economic activities) is well established (Dorosh and Thurlow 2012; Manuh and Yemeru 2019). This statement is historically true but needs some qualification to reflect the fact that there is no simple linear relationship between urbanization and economic growth and that "the potential of urbanisation to promote growth is likely to depend on how conducive the infrastructure and institutional settings are" (Turok and McGranahan 2013). Rodrik (2014) also emphasizes the role of fundamentals, such as human capital and the quality of policies, to ensure structural transformation and sustained long-run growth.

The cause for secondary and smaller cities is less well established, but there is a growing body of research and evidence of the secondary cities' positive contribution to poverty reduction in aggregate as compared to big cities (Christiaensen

¹This chapter uses the following population levels for different categories of urban settlements: above 250,000 for major cities, below 250,000 but above 50,000 for secondary cities, and below 50,000 for small cities (towns) (see, e.g., Roberts 2014). This classification cuts across the formal status designation in Uganda: some municipalities (such as Kira with a population of 434,200) are defined as major cities, some municipalities (e.g., Fort Portal with 59,600) as secondary cities, and yet others (Nebbi with 40,300 residents) as towns. However, some towns (Kyengera with 268,000) are defined as major cities.

et al. 2019). UNECA stresses strong association between secondary town development and inclusive growth and rapid poverty reduction through nonfarm employment for the poor and points to the criticality of investments, especially in secondary cities and smaller towns, that help create quality employment to “absorb rural migrants and urban populations expanding from natural demographic growth” (UNECA 2017: 80). A simple demographic fact is that in Africa the distribution of urban population is bimodal as it is split between cities larger than one million people and towns of less than a quarter million people (Dorosh and Thurlow 2013).

At the same time, secondary cities are not just “smaller” or “less developed” cities (although in practice they may be both). Roberts notes the important functions performed by secondary cities in the national and global system of cities functioning as “secondary hubs, spokes and centres in a complex network of production-distribution supply chain and waste-management recovery systems connecting different spatial levels of human settlement at both a national, but increasingly global, system of cities” (Roberts 2014: 21). As Roberts (2014) and UNECA (2017) argue, it is critical to distinguish between secondary cities and primary or capital cities. It is equally important to distinguish between major cities, secondary cities, and other types of urban settlements.

Effective analysis and informed policy making cannot be based on the aggregate rates of urbanization only but should take into account its composition, which is at least as important for the equitable distribution of its benefits. This granular analysis is necessary in the context of structural transformation. There are indications that in developing countries the positive effect of average city size on economic growth may not hold to the same degree as in developed countries and it may even be negative (Frick and Rodriguez-Pose 2016). Dorosh and Turlow (2012) suggest that whereas urbanization and agglomeration economies are “important sources of economic growth and might well be a driver of long-term structural transformation in Africa, over the short-term, investing in major cities does little to address national poverty.”

UNECA calls for an “aggressive” approach to addressing the issues of economic, environmental, and social sustainability in secondary cities to resolve the challenges developing countries presently face. In Robert’s opinion (2014: 21), “the failure of secondary cities to attract investment, provide and maintain efficient logistics and to generate sustainable employment is one of the principal factors creating distortions and disparities in the regional economic development and poverty.”

This chapter proceeds as follows: it describes key stylized facts about Uganda’s urbanization and its institutional setup, particularly in secondary cities and other towns. The next section analyzes the quality of urban growth in urban areas along the four dimensions identified by Kanbur et al. (2019), with a special focus on structural transformation. This chapter then focuses on the analysis of cities’ investment readiness as a key contributing factor to structural transformation and offers some policy recommendations.

This work benefitted from field research in two Ugandan municipalities, Gulu and Mbale, conducted in 2017–2018 with the financial support by the Cities Alliance

in the framework of the Joint Work Programme on Equitable Economic Growth in Cities.

Urbanization and Its Discontents

The year 2019 was marked by the decision of the Ugandan government to create nine cities by upgrading some municipalities to this status. This is the first ever creation of cities in Uganda's independent history. To be implemented in a phased manner, the process will see five cities (Arua, Gulu, Jinja, Fort Portal, and Mbarara) becoming effective on July 1, 2020, another two (Hoima and Mbale) on July 1, 2021, and two more (Lira and Entebbe) officially launched at a later date. This development is grounded in a government's long-term development blueprint called Vision 2040, which envisages establishment of four regional cities (Gulu, Mbale, Mbarara, and Arua) and five strategic cities—Hoima (oil), Nakasongola (industrial), Fort Portal (tourism), Moroto (mining), and Jinja (industrial)—identified as part of the urban corridor development. But this decision is also an important recognition of Uganda's progressive urbanization, its opportunities and challenges, as well as the urgent requirement for effective urban management, particularly at the level of secondary cities (all newly created cities have population below 250,000), to leverage those opportunities and deal with the challenges.

Uganda has been urbanizing at a high rate of about 6% annually starting from the 1990s. Back then only 11% of Ugandans lived in urban areas; the estimates for 2020 are 25%. By 2050, almost half of Uganda's population will be living in cities and towns (Fig. 5.1).

Uganda's urban landscape includes a variety of urban centers whose population is distributed in a bimodal fashion. About one-third is concentrated in the Kampala metropolitan area, and 37% live in towns populated by less than 50,000 residents (see Table 5.1). Although Uganda complies with the general pattern of its regional peers with a primary city (usually the capital) dominating the landscape, Kampala proper is relatively small accounting for about 1.4 million or 3.3% of the country's total population (Nairobi, for comparison, accounts for 9.2%).

This outcome is the result of the urbanization trends in the past 40 years. Starting from mid-1970s and particularly after mid-1980s, with political and economic stabilization setting in after the turmoil years of dictatorship and Civil War in the 1970s, secondary cities with population below 100,000 (in fact, no urban centers back then with the exception of Kampala were as big) have been growing faster than the capital metropolitan area ahead of the total urbanization rate (Fig. 5.2). Growth of secondary cities picked up between 1980 and 2000 to almost 10% slowing down in the following decade to about 7%. Although it has decelerated to 6.4% during the current decade, it still remains above the total urban growth and the growth in the Kampala metropolitan areas, which has remained pretty stable since 1990.

The results of these growth trends are presented in Table 5.2.




Fig. 5.1 Urban and rural population in Uganda, 1950–2050. (Source: Author’s calculations using data from UNDESA (2018))

Table 5.1 Distribution of urban centers by size (2014) and poverty estimates (2019)

Population of urban center	Number of urban centers	Total population	Share of the total	Poverty estimates (proportion of population under the national poverty line, 2019)	
				Average	Variation
More than 250,000	2	1,829,971	28.5	2.6	1.3
100,000–250,000	7	959,859	14.9	4.8	6.8
50,000–100,000	12	852,500	13.3	7.7	12.3
25,000–50,000	27	1,005,469	15.6	11.4	18.3
10,000–25,000	90	1,382,763	21.5	17.5	17.0
Less than 10,000	59	395,451	6.2	22.3	56.3
Total	197	6,426,013	100.0		

Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), <https://www.ubos.org/explore-statistics/20/>

The data in Table 5.2 for 2005 are reproduced from Dorosh and Turlow (2012). The data for 2017 are calculated using the same methodology based on the use of the 2013 social accounting matrix (SAM) for Uganda (Randriamamonjy and Thurlow 2016) complemented with data from the 2016/2017 Uganda National Household Survey and Bank of Uganda’s Private Sector Investment Report (for discussion of the methodology, see Dorosh and Turlow 2012).




Fig. 5.2 Decomposition of the urban growth, 1950–2020. (Source: Author’s calculations using data from UNDESA (2018) and PopulationStat, <https://populationstat.com/uganda/kampala>)

Table 5.2 Evolution of key characteristics of urban and rural areas, 2005–2017

	2005				2017			
	Rural	Towns	Cities	All	Rural	Towns	Cities	All
Population (mil)	23.0	2.5	1.7	27.2	32.9	7.1	2.8	42.9
Share (%)	84.7	9.3	6.1	100.0	76.8	16.6	6.6	100.0
Poor population	10.2	0.6	0.1	10.9	8.2	0.9	0.1	9.2
Share (%)	93.8	5.5	0.7	100.0	89.5	9.8	0.7	100.0
National GDP shares (%)	62.4	18.0	19.6	100.0	47.1	9.6	43.3	100.0
Regional GDP shares (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	37.2	5.3	0.1	24.2	26.7	4.1	0.1	26.7
Industry	18.0	30.5	36.2	23.8	19.4	35.3	33.2	22.1
Services	44.8	64.2	63.7	52.0	53.9	60.6	66.7	51.2

Source: Author’s calculations based on Dorosh and Turlow (2012), Rafa et al. (2017), and UBOS (2018a)

It shows the doubling of the share of secondary cities (towns) in 2005–2017 to 7.1 million inhabitants (from 9.3% to 16.6%). The growth of large cities in percentage points is not very impressive (0.5%), but it means an increase of over one million people. The table also indicates a trend of pauperization in secondary cities: the number of poor people there increased by 50%. In combination with a drop in rural poverty, this may imply an inflow of rural migrants to nearby urban areas. Unlike some other African countries where urbanization is driven increasingly less by rural-to-urban migration and more by natural population growth, rural migration remains a major driving factor in Uganda’s urbanization accounting for about 60% of the urban population growth. The data in this chapter refer to a period prior to the South Sudan refugee crisis that broke out in late 2017. Currently, Uganda is hosting

about 1.3 million refugees, most of them from South Sudan. Many of them end up in urban areas (rather than in refugee settlements), and some towns in Northern Uganda (e.g., Yumbe, Moyo, and Adjumani) have experienced a significant inflow of Sudanese refugees.

Yet another interesting observation is a dramatic change in the GDP share of cities, which jumped from 19.6% to 43.3%. This is however more a classification issue than a reality. Four urban areas (all of them in the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area, GKMA) have exceeded the threshold of 250,000 since 2005 and can be formally classified as cities. The peak in the GDP share of cities is an accounting transfer from secondary cities. The share of Kampala City is much more modest, 22.5%, a slight increase from 2005.

In addition, secondary cities are becoming somewhat more industrialized and less agriculture- and service-oriented. The government is actively promoting local economic development through industrialization, manufacturing, and agro-processing, and this may be an indication that these efforts are bearing fruit. Large cities, on the other hand, appear to be turning more toward services at the expense of the industrial sector. This may be a sign of future urban specialization where larger cities develop services while towns focus on industrial facilities.

Currently, about 70% of Ugandan urbanites live in secondary cities. At the present rate of growth (even taking into account some deceleration due to the demographic transition), the population of secondary cities is due to increase to about 35 million people by 2050, over 30% of the country's total population (Fig. 5.3).

This brings into focus the issue of secondary cities. An environment that defines the well-being of over one-third of the entire population is worth in-depth analysis and a serious policy consideration. The failure to achieve quality growth in




Fig. 5.3 Growth of Uganda rural and urban population by type of settlement until 2050. (Source: Author's calculations using data from UNDESA (2018) and PopulationStat, <https://populationstat.com/uganda/kampala>)

secondary cities and realize their potential for structural transformation would imply the failure of Uganda’s development project.

Figure 5.4 takes a closer look at Uganda’s urban centers by their size of population in six categories: more than 250,000, from 100,000 to 250,000, from 50,000 to 100,000, from 25,000 to 50,000, from 10,000 to 25,000, and less than 10,000. What is remarkable about Uganda’s urban areas is not only their variation in size but also poverty distribution. Not only secondary cities in general are poorer than the large ones, but poverty is concentrated in towns with less than 50,000 residents, most of them living in towns hosting from 10,000 to 25,000 residents.

A clear indication of the growing realization by the government and other partners of the importance of urbanization for the country’s development is a strong institutional framework for managing urbanization that emerged over the past two decades. In 2006, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MoLHUD) was established to be responsible for providing policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks as well as setting national standards and guidelines and coordinating all matters concerning urban development. The Urban Development Sector was created to coordinate the plans and activities of relevant government ministries, departments, and agencies as part of the Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government (IFCPPI) under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).

The National Vision 2040 stresses the importance of key strategies and policy reforms to ensure urbanization that will bring about better urban systems to enhance productivity, livability, and sustainability. The Second National Development Plan (2014/2015–2019/2020) unpacks this vision into a set of practical measures, such as comprehensive physical planning for urban development, improved urban




Fig. 5.4 Poverty distribution in urban areas by size (size of the bubbles represents poverty shares). (Source: Author’s calculations based on Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), <https://www.ubos.org/explore-statistics/20/>)

infrastructure services and utilities, an inclusive policy and regulatory framework for urban development, and availability of and access to land for urban expansion and investment. It commits the government to controlling urban sprawl through preparation and approval of integrated development plans which encourage increasing density of settlement by construction of high-rise buildings and sticking to development controls. The recent years have seen the adoption of some fundamental policy documents, such as the National Land Policy (2013), National Local Economic Development Policy (LED) (2014), National Housing Policy (2016), and National Urban Policy (2017).

Quality of Urban Growth

There is no doubt that Uganda has been urbanizing. But to what extent has Uganda's urbanization delivered on its developmental promise?

Distribution of the Income Gains of Growth

As indicated in the previous section, the income of growth is distributed unequally between urban centers of different size so that smaller urban centers are poorer than the larger ones (see Fig. 5.4). The smaller is the urban center, the closer it is to the urban poverty level, which is 30% in Uganda. And as the size of the urban areas decreases, not only the poverty level but also their poverty variance increases. Smaller towns have a wider range of poverty incidence (around 18%) as compared to large towns and the cities, which are much more homogenous (1–7%) as presented in Fig. 5.5.

In addition, Uganda is characterized by significant geographic inequalities so that incomes go down and poverty increases from the center towards the east and the north. Table 5.3 presents three indicators for poverty measurement: P0 for poverty headcount (number of people below the poverty line), P1 for poverty gap (showing how poor the poor are), and P2 for the squared poverty gap (an indicator of how severe poverty is). The table explains the data from Fig. 5.5 since geographic dispersion is closely correlated with the size of the urban center as smaller cities and towns are more geographically dispersed.

In addition to inequality between urban settlements of different size discussed above, income inequality within urban areas of the same size is a distinct feature of Uganda's urban development. Income inequality in urban areas has been on the rise between 2012/2013 and 2016/2017, largely driving total national inequality (0.42 Gini points compared to 0.38 in rural areas) (UBOS 2018a, b). Decomposition of this inequality through a series of Lorenz curves that correspond to income distribution in three zones (rural, urban, and cities) returns interesting results (Fig. 5.6). Income for each zone was calculated across nine professional groups (from




Fig. 5.5 Poverty variance (range) by size of urban areas. (Source: Author's calculations based on Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), <https://www.ubos.org/explore-statistics/20/>)

Table 5.3 Regional poverty estimates, 2016/2017

Region	Population share	Poverty estimates		
		P0	P1	P2
Kampala	4.2	2.6	0.5	0.2
Wakiso	6.6	2.7	0.4	0.1
Central	16.8	12.7	3.1	1.1
Eastern	26.2	35.7	8.7	3.1
Northern	20.8	32.5	8.6	3.3
Western	25.5	11.4	2.4	0.8

Source: Adapted by author from UBOS (2018a)

agricultural workers to professionals and managers) in accordance with their share (θ) and wage (w) adjusted for the zone differential (d).

$$\text{Income}_z = \sum_9^{i=1} \theta_i d_z w_i$$

Figure 5.6, in addition to illustrating the already mentioned fact that urban inequality in total is higher than in rural areas, also demonstrates that city inequality is the highest compared with inequality in towns and rural areas. Towns, on the other hand, are not much different from rural areas in total inequality (expressed by the Gini coefficient) but are different from rural areas in creating more inequality for low-income groups and high earners (above the seventh decile) while returning less inequality for the groups in the middle of the income distribution (approximately between the fourth and seventh decile). This is an indirect indication of the potential of the service sector which is much less developed in rural areas. The service industry is an equalizer in towns but a large inequality factor in cities where services




Fig. 5.6 Income distribution in rural and urban areas and cities. (Source: Author's calculations based on UBOS (2018a, b))

differ very significantly between low-paid elementary services, such as caretakers, guards, vendors, and similar (about 60% in the informal sector), and highly paid specialized services in government, banking, insurance, real estate, and such like. For example, the share of real estate and business services in Kampala is 11 times the average across districts (World Bank 2015).

On average, the cities have lived up to their promise of higher living standards. Despite being more equal, rural areas remain poorer. Whether by average monthly income or average expenditure per capita (UBOS 2018a), the Kampala area is ahead of towns and urban areas (UGX 163,000, UGX 122,000, and UGX 55,000 in per capita expenditure, respectively). But as the above discussion argues, the income benefits of growth in urban areas are disproportionately skewed toward the high-income population groups, leaving the poor even worse off than in rural areas.

The data presented in this section give credibility to conclusions that development of secondary cities may have a greater contribution to reducing national poverty than investments in large cities (Dorosh and Turlow 2012; Christiaensen et al. 2019). Slashing poverty in Ugandan secondary cities by half (targeting just about 2.5 million people, 5% of total population) will reduce total urban poverty by almost 50%, translating into a 3% decrease in national poverty.

Distribution of Nonincome Gains of Growth

Access to social and basic infrastructure services is much higher in urban areas than in rural areas. Figure 5.7 gives an idea about the distribution of education infrastructure by distance of primary and secondary schools in rural and urban areas as in Kampala.

As we trace the changes in the first column upwards from rural to urban areas and then to Kampala, the circles are becoming bigger and bigger indicating a higher availability of schools in the immediate vicinity of the students' residence, with the exception of the last section where the circles are getting smaller. In this case, rural areas have a larger number of schools located further from the residence. On average, the number of rural students who travel more than five kilometers to the nearest school is twice the number of their urban peers. Urban students also have a much better access to private schools that offer higher-quality education. The same is true with respect to another important social sector, healthcare. Availability of pharmacies in rural areas (within the lowest administrative unit of residence) is 1.6% compared to 21.6% in urban areas and 46.6% in Kampala.

This is yet another example of how urbanization contributes to inequality by relegating rural residents to second-class services and perpetuating inequality across generations. It is well known that investing in education brings a clear payoff in terms of higher wage potential. According to the national household survey of 2016/2017 (UBOS 2018a, b), Ugandans with a university degree and above earned a monthly median income of UGX 780,000, more than ten times the wages of paid employees with no formal schooling (UGX 75,000).

Public utilities are also more available to urban residents, particularly in larger cities. Nationally, only one-fifth of the population had access to grid electricity in 2016/2017. However, the disparity between rural areas (8.3%), urban areas (57.2%),




Fig. 5.7 School infrastructure by distance. (Source: Author's calculations based on UBOS (2018a, b))

and the Greater Kampala area (85.8%) is striking. Similarly, urbanites enjoy a 20% margin over rural residents in access to improved water sources. Access to communication, Internet, banking services, business counseling, and other service infrastructure that enables employment opportunities is also much better in urban areas. Sixty percent of rural communities do not have an Internet access point in their area compared to an almost 100% coverage in urban areas, raising concerns about a lasting urban-rural digital divide (Aine 2017).

During the household survey of 2016/2017 (UBOS 2018a), communities attributed improvements in their living conditions to the following main factors: better access roads (20%), provision of safe drinking water (18%), a peaceful environment and improvement/availability of social amenities (17%), and provision of electricity (10%). Within urban areas, higher incomes are associated with higher levels of access to these benefits, while as argued above, in rural areas access is almost uniformly poor, even for households that can afford the services.

This brief and sketchy overview of the distribution of monetary and nonmonetary benefits of growth would be incomplete without highlighting the gender dimension. Poverty and inequality in Uganda, in urban areas in particular, has a woman's face. Urban women outnumber men by 3% among the poor, there are 10% more illiterate adult women than men in urban areas (although this is a notable improvement over a 23% gap in rural areas), they are 14% less likely to be employed than men, and they are overrepresented in the informal sector where they make up about 60% of the workforce.

The benefits of growth, as we have seen, are distributed unevenly, both spatially (with the larger cities accruing most benefits) and gender-wise (with women relatively marginalized). Yet, these benefits represent a minor share of economic growth. If average income indicators are considered (e.g., measured by median income between 2012/2013 and 2016/2017), then the lukewarm growth of urban incomes of 1% lagged far behind the GDP growth of 43% over the same period. Ugandan urbanites are better off than their rural compatriots, yet even they do not enjoy the full benefit of economic growth.

Impact of Growth on the Structural Transformation of the Economy

The Introduction already noted the general consensus that exists among scholars and practitioners internationally about the historic association and even causal relationships between growth, structural transformation, and urbanization (e.g., Henderson 2000 found a correlation coefficient of 0.85 between the urbanization level and the logarithm of per capita GDP for a panel of 80–100 countries over a period of 35 years). But it is obvious in the context of our earlier discussion about Uganda's growing poverty and inequality, particularly in larger urban centers, that, as the World Bank poverty assessment in Uganda (World Bank 2015) argues,

sustained gains in poverty reduction require also a fundamental shift in the nature of production from low-investment, informal activities to higher-capital, more productive employment.

How is Uganda doing on its structural transformation and what is the role of urban areas in this process?

Uganda’s economy has been experiencing structural transformation for the past two decades. This transformation is characterized by three features: a declining share of agriculture in GDP (from 42% in 1998/1999 to 24.2% in 2017/2018), a sluggish growth of the industrial sector (from 17% in 1998/1999 to 19.9% in 2017/2018), and a modest growth of services (from 42% in 1998/1999 to 47.6% in 2017/2018). In contrast, the share of manufacturing in GDP remained stagnant at between 8% and 9%. This structural transformation, marked with a transition to the service sector without industrialization (and in some cases even accompanied with deindustrialization), is typical of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Rodrik 2014; Borat et al. 2019).

Of course, the changes in the relative shares of sectors in the GDP are important only to the extent that they contribute to growth by inducing labor force movement from low productivity to high productivity activities usually associated with the nonagricultural sectors of economy. An analysis of productivity by sector of economy is presented in Fig. 5.8.

Overall productivity between 2002/2003 and 2016/17 registered a very modest increase of 2.8% annually. The main contributors to this growth were the non-agricultural sectors: manufacturing (increasing by 4.2%) and services (4.6%). Productivity in agriculture essentially stagnated registering a decline of 1.5% year




Fig. 5.8 Labor productivity by sector of economy (constant 2009/2010 prices). (Source: Author’s calculations based on Dorosh and Turlow (2012), Rafa et al. (2017), and UBOS (2018a))

on year. What is also obvious from the statistics is high variation in manufacturing productivity (peaking in 2005/2006 to UGX5.6m, then declining to UGX2.9m in 2012/2013, and picking up again) and a relatively slow productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.

These growth changes came with changes in the employment shares across economic sectors. Whereas agriculture remains the largest employer, it lost 7% of its labor force between 2002/2003 and 2016/2017, and employment in industry and services increased by 1.9% and 5%, respectively.

Figure 5.9 presents the relationship between these two trends, sectoral productivity and employment changes (the changes for subsectors refer to the period 2011/2012–2016/2017).

The graph shows if shifts in employment across sectors have been toward productive or unproductive activities. A positively sloped fitting line indicates productivity-enhancing and hence growth-inducing, structural change. While the overall positive trend is clear, it is also clear that sectors with high productivity, such as manufacturing and construction, do not attract much employment due to their capital-intensive nature. And whereas the service sector in general has a high productivity and is the main beneficiary of the employment shift, some of the higher productivity activities and, in particular, telecommunications, finance, and real estate are not employment intensive and instead rely on a relatively small number of skilled workers.




Fig. 5.9 Sectoral productivity and employment changes, 2002/2003–2016/2017. *AGR* agriculture, *CON* construction, *HOT* accommodation and food, *MAN* manufacturing, *MIN* mining and quarrying, *SER* services, *TRA* transport, *TRD* trade. (Source: Author's calculations based on Dorosh and Turlow (2012) and UBOS (2018a, b))




Fig. 5.10 Structural composition of regional economies by share of employment

Most of the higher productivity sectors are concentrated in urban areas, and this concentration increases with the size of the urban center, that is, larger urban centers have more higher productivity activities (Fig. 5.10).

Over 90% of workers in cities and about 80% in secondary and small cities are employed in sectors with higher productivity, such as manufacturing, construction, services, and such like. As the World Bank (2015) argues, urbanization has played a major role in Uganda's transformation by virtue of the highest proportion of production and jobs in the formal sector. Urban areas accommodate more than 70% of manufacturing activities and are responsible for 65% of new jobs created over the past decade and 70% of Uganda's nonagricultural GDP (World Bank 2015).

This said, we should be aware of the kind of transformation driven by urbanization: predominantly informal, small-scale and resulting in greater inequality. Most of the increase in urban employment has been driven by micro-firms that on average employ 1.7 workers and have a low survival rate. It is impossible for these firms to benefit from economies of scale and new technologies. Seven hundred fifty of the nation's largest firms in manufacturing, finance and insurance, construction, and ICT with the highest productivity account for less than 1% of the total working population (Bank of Uganda 2018). As Brownbridge and Bwire (2016) point out, most of the shifts in the composition of the labor force in Uganda involve "workers moving from one low productivity sector to another, such as from self-employment in agriculture to self-employment in services or artisanal manufacturing or paid employment in informal microenterprises."

Our analysis of the business environment in two secondary cities, Gulu and Mbale (Mukuye and Pozhidaev 2020), provides a typical structure of their economies by business location. On average, 70% do their business in open markets, on




Fig. 5.11 Location of business in Gulu and Mbale municipalities. (Source: Mukuye and Pozhidaev (2020))

the streets, or from their homes, and that category is the most diversified to include manufacturing, transporting, trade, and production (Fig. 5.11).

Disputes continue about whether industrialization must be part of structural transformation in SSA or it can transition directly from agriculture to a modern service sector. Bhorat et al. (2019) are convinced that “manufacturing remains the best hope for SSA to generate a large number of good jobs and reduce prospects of political and social instability.” Page (2018) is optimistic that new technologies open in front of African countries a different transformation path based on a growing number of services, such as ICT-based services, tourism, and transport as well as agro-industries including horticulture.

Regardless, structural transformation requires productive capabilities that allow firms to move toward the productivity frontier by offering more diverse and complex products. One way to measure the productive capabilities is by economic complexity index (Hausmann et al. 2014). Presently, Uganda measures negatively on this index (Bhorat et al. 2019), and the kind of structural transformation taking place in Uganda is unlikely to upgrade its productive capability. The present modality of structural transformation has its natural limits defined by the limits of expansive growth based on micro-firms, and profit ceilings in the service sector dominated 80% by retail trade, personal services, and other low-tech activities. Uganda’s growth has not resulted in a structural transformation that can be considered self-sustained and capable of progressive evolution in terms of complexity. Uganda’s cities are yet to prove their ability to stand up to this challenge and sustain the country’s economic growth by raising productivity in sectors where the largest proportion of urban residents is employed or alternatively reducing the number of people in low productivity sectors.

Environmental Sustainability

Urbanization is known to produce a strain on environment while simultaneously increasing the vulnerability of urban populations to climate change, both because extreme weather events can be especially disruptive to complex urban systems, because climate change is expected to disproportionately impact cities, and because so much of the world's urban population live in areas vulnerable to climate change by virtue of their geographic location (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009).

The negative environmental effects of Uganda's urbanization are connected to its poorly planned and implemented development resulting in the proliferation of informal housing and sprawling slums, increasing congestion, chaotic conditions, and deteriorating physical and social environment (World Bank 2015).

Many cities, including Kampala, have expanded beyond their original spatial plans but without a matching increase in public utilities, services, and housing. The challenge is particularly acute for secondary cities where physical plans have not been updated for decades or did not exist at all. This situation is further exacerbated by the plans to incorporate neighboring rural subcounties devoid of any physical plans in some newly established cities, such as Gulu, where this measure will double its population overnight (Mukwaya et al. 2018).

Informal settlements (slums) are home to 60% of the urban population and are characterized by lack of basic services for the provision of water, storm drainage, sewage treatment, and solid waste collection; social conflicts; and crime. Forty percent of Kampala population is estimated to live in informal settlements and/or slums (World Bank 2015). Slum populations in secondary cities vary from 61% in Mbarara to 16% in Jinja and Kabale, with the median value about 45% (Mbale and Arua). In general, the percentage of slum dwellers decreases with the size of the urban center.

Urbanization in Uganda is also characterized by encroachment on greenspaces, wetlands, and conversion of agricultural land into built-up areas. It is a distressing reality of many cities across Uganda that their public spaces and land are shrinking and disappearing altogether. Our research in two secondary cities, Gulu and Mbale (Mukwaya et al. 2018), has recorded a precipitous loss of public land, green areas, forests, and wetlands within and on the periphery of these cities. Figure 5.12 shows the growing requirement for public spaces in the two municipalities under the population pressure until 2050 as well as the diminishing public space availability under the "business as usual" scenario against the minimum recommended public space of 1.2 hectares per resident. If no decisive action is taken, the cities will be at only 50% of the recommended minimum by 2030.

The urban sprawl and continuous loss of public land and green areas cause the degradation of greenspaces and ecosystem services. Most of the central forest reserves and public spaces in urban areas have been destroyed and degraded through encroachment and other illegal activities (Zake 2018). Encroachment on fragile ecosystems becomes rampant resulting in persistent flooding in urban areas and heat islands. Irresponsible dumping of waste including plastics causes stagnation of water and acts as a breeding site of the mosquitoes, leading to increasing incidences




Fig. 5.12 Public land situation forecast for Mbale and Gulu municipalities 2018–2050. (Source: Mukwaya et al. (2018))

of malaria (NEMA 2016). Most secondary towns lack lagoons for managing human waste, and cases of waterborne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea have been on the increase (Kiggundu 2014).

The quality of water and air in urban areas is a growing concern. The National Environment Management Authority is only able to collect air pollution data in Kampala. Recent studies carried out on air quality in Kampala indicated that the city has the second worst air quality in Africa and that concentrations of particulate matter (PM2.5) were three times higher than the WHO air quality guidelines for ambient air (25 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$). The air pollution problem is attributed to emissions from increased traffic and reconditioned motor vehicles and other anthropogenic activities (NEMA 2019).

Uganda and its cities are on the receiving end of the climate change, with a minor contribution to greenhouse emissions. However, the negative environmental effects of Uganda’s urbanization reinforce the climate change impact, making urban areas more vulnerable to weather extremes and degrading natural and economic ecosystems in peri-urban areas. Proper environment management is a challenge that is yet to be tackled by Ugandan cities.

Making Cities Investment Ready

In the words of the New Urban Agenda (2017: 3), “we are still far from adequately addressing... existing and emerging challenges, and there is a need to take advantage of the opportunities presented by urbanisation as an engine of sustained and

inclusive economic growth, social and cultural development, and environmental protection, and of its potential contributions to the achievement of transformative and sustainable development.” One cannot but agree with this statement in light of the achievements and failures of Uganda’s urbanization described in the previous sections.

The World Bank (2015) already provided a very comprehensive analysis of the key problematic areas of urbanization from the perspective of reshaping Uganda cities to become more competitive, produce more and better jobs, and be more livable. This analysis involves four dimensions where the major impediments to inclusive and sustainable urban development are concentrated: planning, institutional arrangements for urban governance, land markets, business environment, transport, and finance.

This chapter uses a very specific focus to look at the challenge of urbanization in Uganda. This focus is on urban infrastructure investment and, specifically, on making Ugandan cities investment ready. Identified as one of the priority areas in the World Bank analysis (2015), new investments, particularly in higher productivity activities, are critical to taking structural transformation out of the limited space of low productivity microenterprises to where it is largely confined now. This challenge figures prominently on the national agenda, and secondary cities and towns are particularly concerned feeling relatively neglected by the central government and not having as much financial muscle as the primary cities. It was the theme of the 2018 Jinja Urban Expo “Becoming investment ready: Unlocking the business and investment potential of secondary cities.” The challenge of investment readiness cuts across all dimensions or systems of secondary and smaller cities and provides a useful perspective of analyzing how these systems—governance, economics and finance, urban development and management, social development, and environment management (Roberts 2014)—should adapt and transform to crowd in investments in higher productivity sectors.

Investment readiness is defined as the “demonstrated capacity of a city to prime itself towards the needs of external investors, by providing a credible and efficient framework and process for external investment, coupled with a development pipeline of bankable propositions and opportunities that meet the specific process, asset, scale, and risk management requirements of the investors” (Clark 2014).²

Clark et al. (2016) point out that “investment-ready cities cultivate a reliable supply of opportunities for inbound capital,” including development of the opportunities and assets to meet investor funding demands and risk/reward appetites. There are four major obstacles to becoming an investment-ready city and fully realizing the business and investment potential of secondary cities:

²Greg Clark, *Business-Friendly and Investment-Ready Cities* (London, Urban Land Institute, 2014). Available from <http://europe.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/ULI-Documents/Business-Friendly-Report-final.pdf>




Fig. 5.13 Stages of investment readiness. (Source: Author's creation)

- Opportunity areas for business and investment are not properly identified.
- Business and investment opportunities are not proactively created and encouraged.
- Business and investment opportunities are not properly presented and communicated.
- Business and investment opportunities are not converted into bankable projects.

From the process perspective, investment readiness involves four stages, from identification of investment opportunities to their execution (Fig. 5.13). Unlocking their business and investment potential requires cities and towns to form broad-based coalitions with relevant local and national partner to implement action in each of these four stages. The arrow at the bottom indicates the type of support to be provided by municipal authorities. Although each stage will require a combination of support measures, each of them will be dominated by a particular type of support.

Identifying Business Opportunities

Whereas the recent years have seen a proliferation of various localized “visions,” “development, and business strategies” (normally supported by MoLHUD and other development partners), the quality of these blueprints is often unsatisfactory. Their analysis is perfunctory and extrapolates existing trends rather than anticipates the future; they tend to cover a very broad range of issues without a clear focus; they emphasize current needs rather than comparative advantages and opportunities and, more importantly, lack a proper understanding of what makes business opportunities at the local level.

Rarely, if ever, do municipalities use advanced analytical tools, such as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for local economies, application of local quotients, and input-output or cluster analyses. The gender dimension is not substantively mainstreamed in local plans, which do not properly consider business opportunities emerging from women’s economic empowerment and gainful employment.

The existing “visions” and “strategies” exist in a parallel reality with cities’ annual workplans and budgets. “Master plan” mentality still prevails among planners and municipal practitioners at the expense of integrated planning grounded in a thorough economic analysis and visioning that could uplift rural and peri-urban areas through a regional development approach. Leveraging the huge potential of urbanization for agricultural transformation is yet to be addressed by city planners (Gollin et al. 2016).

In general, municipal authorities are yet to develop a business mentality, including the basic concepts of comparative advantage and risk-return tradeoff, to be able to manage their cities as businesses, not as government offices, and to effectively engage the private sector.

Creating Business and Investment Opportunities

To identify the existing or emerging business opportunities is not enough. Municipal authorities need to work proactively on creating new business and investment opportunities, prodding businesses to consider, and engage in, such opportunities.

There is a need in mechanisms and systems that would allow municipal authorities to closely follow business trends and new developments nationally and even internationally, regularly share this information with local businesses, and reach out to relevant private sector entities outside the locality. This requires an improved capacity of municipal governments to collect, process, and share relevant information. Municipal officials should be on the watch out for new trends through regular engagement with regional, national, and possibly international platforms, such as national investment promotion agencies, chambers of commerce and trade, business associations, and such like.

Municipal long-, medium-, and short-term plans and budgets should be crafted in a way that creates additional space for private sector involvement and offers new business opportunities. Physical spatial plans, capital investment plans, municipal financing strategies (which are currently largely absent), and other planning instruments should actively encourage private investments in the areas believed to be most prospective through allocation of space for specific businesses and provision of complementary public infrastructure, such as roads and utilities. Of those planning instruments, a financing strategy is an important first step toward identifying the type of finance and financing sources for the projects prioritized in the capital investment plan.

Communicating Business and Investment Opportunities

Local business and investment opportunities need to be shared regularly with the right target groups to draw their attention to such opportunities. Lack of information about prospective business and investment opportunities and about available

investment support in specific areas is one of the key obstacles to unlocking private investments. Municipal authorities need to develop a capacity to present business opportunities by using the language of local comparative advantages, value chain addition, and risk-return tradeoff with the private sector. The Uganda Investment Authority has recently produced a number of district or municipal investment profiles to facilitate private investments. This is a step in the right direction, but these investment profiles and the local development strategies prepared by municipalities do not appear properly aligned.

Second, cities and towns need platforms and mechanisms to share such opportunities on a regular basis with business communities inside and outside the municipality. Secondary cities should endeavor to fully utilize and leverage the potential of existing institutions, such as local investment committees, Local Economic Development and Municipal Development forums, as well as the local chapters and national offices of the chambers of trade and commerce, business associations, and others. Secondary cities should also be encouraged and supported to mount targeted investment mobilization efforts and special events linked to specific sector or geographic projects through fairs, exhibitions, thematic investor round tables, etc. This requires a good capacity to identify when, how, and with whom the relevant investment information should be shared and assumes a profound acquaintance with the local and national business landscape as well as the business interests and opportunities of the key private sector players. Municipal administration's capacity to reach out far and wide to different business interests at different levels is particularly important because local investors are often too few, too poor, and technically unskilled for larger investments.

Preparing and Executing Investments

Once appropriate investment opportunities have been identified and qualified business entities confirmed their interest, actual investments have to be secured, prepared, and executed. Participation of private capital in municipal investments can take two forms. Private capital may be extended directly to municipalities in the form of debt as term loans or capital market instruments such as bonds. Alternatively, private businesses may invest in specific projects as a sole investor or in cooperation with municipalities. Tapping into private sources of capital requires secondary cities to develop four functional interconnected services or assure access to third parties who can extend such services:

- Project development support to establish projects' socioeconomic feasibility.
- Project structuring services to identify the best funding and implementation modalities.
- Investment facilitation services to ensure that the investment eventually materializes and does not fall through midway as is often the case. It may include many interventions that attract and secure private investments, such as provision of

supplementary public infrastructure (roads and utilities), land and/or space allocation, provision of technical assistance for project development and business development services, and relationship building with local communities and other stakeholders with critical interest in the project. Financial support includes grants, debt or equity finance, guarantees, and output-based subsidies.

- Financial services. Municipal corporations may issue loans, take equity in businesses, and make other financial investments. This however requires a strong financial position (possibly by pooling several urban jurisdictions together into one financial vehicle) and a conducive regulatory framework.

Neither of these conditions appear to be achievable in the near future. A regulation on municipal bonds or special purpose vehicles does not exist, whereas the statutory thresholds for municipal borrowing are capped at 20% of annual own source revenues. Most importantly, Ugandan cities suffer from financial dependency on central government, as their fiscal space remains extremely limited. The central government perpetuates this dependency by limiting the discretionary fiscal space of cities with conditional transfers, restrictive prudential requirements on borrowing, limited revenue-generating powers, and so on (UNCDF 2016). Tax revenues accounted for 6.7 of municipal budgets in 2017/2018, the rest coming in the form of central government grants (80% of them as conditional grants), donor support, and nontax revenues (UBOS 2019). To leverage additional private capital, secondary cities need an expanded fiscal space. Hence, transition to smart financial management that actively uses and promotes blended finance to maximize limited public resources and attract private capital is a critical challenge for secondary cities (UNCDF 2019).

Conclusion

Uganda has been growing impressively over the past three decades in terms of its GDP, but this growth has not resulted in a matching quality. Average incomes have been lagging behind the GDP growth, whereas poverty and inequality has increased. Urbanization has welfare-improving effects, but these effects are distributed unevenly between urban areas, and cities are the main contributor to inequality nationwide. However, secondary cities and towns are characterized by less inequality than the primary cities, with a relatively higher share of higher productivity sectors, particularly manufacturing.

Cities' contribution to structural transformation is doubtful, with over 70% of national nonagricultural GDP being produced in urban areas. But the kind of structural transformation taking place in Uganda, with labor moving from less productive activities in rural areas to marginally more productive activities in urban areas (most notably informality), is neither sustainable nor truly transformative.

Cities are yet to realize their full potential as engines of structural transformation and sustainable and inclusive growth. Secondary cities and towns may become

game changers. But they face a challenge of investment readiness to incentivize business activities in higher productivity sectors—an area of particular importance to secondary cities and towns, relatively neglected by both the central government and private investors. This challenge requires a comprehensive approach and substantive changes in the applicable regulatory framework to allow municipalities to expand their fiscal space. Most importantly, municipal authorities are yet to develop a business mentality, including the basic concepts of comparative advantage and risk-return tradeoff, to be able to manage their cities as businesses, not as government offices, and to effectively engage the private sector.

This takes political will and investment in the fundamentals, such as capacities and systems for urban governance and management at all levels. The manner in which urbanization is planned and managed today will play a critical role in the quality of growth in Uganda over the coming decades and in particular the achievement of structural transformation and its national development objectives.

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Chapter 6

African Local Governments and Cities in the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals



John-Mary Kauzya

Abstract In this chapter the author presents a synopsis of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which also commits to support the implementation of Africa's Agenda 2063. (The heads of state and governments of the African Union (AU) adopted Agenda 2063 in January 2015 as both a vision and action plan to build a prosperous and united Africa based on shared values and a common destiny. The seven Aspirations of Africa expressed in Agenda 2063 are (i) a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; (ii) an integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance; (iii) an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; (iv) a peaceful and secure Africa; (v) an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics; (vi) an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and (vii) Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner.) He argues that local governments and cities in Africa continue to play a critical role in implementing the 2030 Agenda to achieve the SDGs not only because SDG 11 puts emphasis on cities and local governments but mainly because all SDGs have to be achieved in and by local communities in local governments and cities. The focal point of the chapter is on local government and city polycentric governance and transformational leadership. The gist of the chapter is that SDGs will be difficult to achieve if local governments and cities do not succeed in galvanizing transformational leadership and people into coherent and integrated polycentric governance to create a collective impact through resilience, creativity and innovation, effective delivery of services, future-oriented governance, partnerships, collaboration, and all the values and principles enshrined in the 2030 Agenda including equity, transparency, accountability, inclusion, integration, and leaving no one behind in sustainable development.

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Therefore, it will be under the auspices of cities where we will succeed or fail in achieving our goals of poverty eradication, equality, climate change reduction, and ensuring healthy lives. It will be the cities that determine if we achieve inclusive economic growth or yield to greater inequality. It is in cities where people will seek opportunities for higher education and employment. And, it will be cities that determine if we will continue our steadily increasing usage of the world's resources or if we can realize a more sustainable path. This is why sustainable development goal (SDG) 11, "Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable", is so important. Success in achieving the targets under SDG 11 sets the stage for achieving targets in many of the other SDG goals.¹

Introduction

World leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) in September 2015 with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)² to be achieved by the end of the year 2030. With effect from 1 January 2016, the imple-

¹See Kristie Daniel: Goal 11 – Cities will play an important role in achieving SDGs. In UN Chronicle: The Magazine of the United Nations, vol. 42,014, April 2015: <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/goal-11-cities-will-play-important-role-achieving-sdgs>

²See United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1 adopted by the United Nations Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda on 25 September 2015. The 17 SDGs are Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere; Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries; Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development; Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

mentation of the 2030 Agenda to achieve the SDGs started building on the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)³ which had been under implementation between the year 2000 and 2015. Universal, ambitious, integrated, and indivisible, the 17 SDGs are built around, and balance, the three dimensions of sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental, and are people focused to ensure economic, social, and ecological equity. Achieving such an ambitious global agenda and goals is a daunting challenge for public administration especially in local governments and cities where people live.

In this chapter, the focus is on the role of local governments and cities in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achievement of the SDGs in Africa. “In addition to Sustainable Development Goal 11, which calls for sustainable cities and human settlements, the 2030 Agenda acknowledges the crucial role of sustainable urban development to the quality of life of people.”⁴ The problematic is focused on the role the governance, leadership, and communities of local governments and cities have to play in implementing the 2030 Agenda. The gist of the chapter is that the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs have put before the governance systems, leadership, people, and the communities in local governments and cities a big development challenge. At the same time, they have provided an opportunity for launching Africa on to a repositioned development path that is resilient and resolved to achieve people-centered sustainable development, leaving no one behind. Local governments and cities in Africa require unprecedented institutional, leadership, and human capacities as anchors and catalysts for other resources in order to succeed in meeting the SDG challenge.

The chapter addresses the following key questions: How much work has the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs put on local governments and cities in Africa? What are the transformational values and principles contained in the 2030 Agenda that the local governments and city governance and leadership must pay particular attention to in order to have a solid base for their strategies for transformation and achievement of SDGs? What is the role of the leadership in the local governments and cities in this critical work? What are the key capacities that the cities and local governments need to develop in order to successfully implement the 2030 Agenda and achieve SDGs? Are there examples from local governments and cities that illustrate how achieving SDGs is being approached?

³The Millennium Development Goals are to (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development.

⁴Sustainable Development Solutions Network: Getting Started with the SDGs in Cities: A Guide for Stakeholders (July 2016) page 99

The 2030 Agenda and SDGs vs Mandates and Responsibilities of Cities and Local Governments in Africa

How much work has the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and pursuit of achieving the SDGs put on cities and local governments? In pondering over this question, it needs to be born in mind first that the 2030 Agenda is more than the 17 SDGs. There are other intergovernmental agreements and documents that together with this one constitute the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. These include [Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development](#), the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Millennium Development Goals, and others. The Africa Agenda 2063 also is recognized as part of the 2030 Agenda. In paragraph 42 of the 2030 Agenda document, Member States of the UN “reaffirm the importance of supporting the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the programme of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, all of which are integral to the new Agenda.”⁵


An analysis of the SDGs shows that they will best be achieved when local governments and cities execute their mandates and responsibilities effectively. All development is local. The SDGs will need to be achieved at local level. The 2030 Agenda and the SDGs were designed for the prosperity of the people and the planet to live peacefully with freedom from poverty and other encumbrances. All of this can be achieved if Africa and the whole world work in partnership and collaboration. People, planet, peace in freedom, prosperity, partnerships, and poverty eradication are what, in this chapter, is termed as the six Ps of the 2030 Agenda. It is an agenda that actualizes “we the people” which is central to constitutions of many countries as well as the United Nations Charter. Whichever way one looks at it, people live at the local level, and it is at this very level that the action for the 2030 Agenda and SDGs must be solidified. Therefore, even before studying the legal mandates and responsibilities of each city or local government which spell out what functions and responsibilities and resources are devolved, delegated, or deconcentrated to a particular sub-national government in question, one can say that implementing the 2030 Agenda and achieving the 17 SDGs in a local government or a city is a big undertaking. Achieving SDGs is a heavy responsibility for local governments and cities especially since it has to be accomplished equitably leaving no one behind (Fig. 6.1).

It is projected that by 2030, half of Africa’s population will be living in urban areas. “In 2016, an estimated 54.5 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban settlements. By 2030, urban areas are projected to house 60 per cent of people globally and one in every three people will live in cities with at least half a million inhabitants.”⁶ Therefore, eradicating poverty to ensure prosperity, peace in freedom, and a sustainable livelihood on a safe planet will need that local governments and

⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/70/1 of 25 September 2015

⁶ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016). The World’s Cities in 2016 – Data Booklet (ST/ESA/SER.A/392) www.unpopulation.org

Fig. 6.1 The Ps of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (We have included P for poverty eradication to emphasize the challenge of eradicating poverty. Otherwise there are supposed to be 5 Ps of the 2030 Agenda). (Source: composed by the author)




cities in Africa pay attention to the three dimensions of sustainable development, namely, economic, social, and environmental sustainability, with particular emphasis on equity, including intergenerational equity (Fig. 6.2).

All the three dimensions of sustainable development are confronting the biggest challenge of poverty eradication, and at the core of this challenge is equity. Eradicating poverty becomes real, not only when there is a boost in economic growth, or enhanced delivery of social services or even improvement of environment. Local-level poverty eradication becomes real when there is visible social equity, economic equity, and ecological equity. The generation of today must contribute to the development of the generations of the future. Eradicating poverty today should not create poverty tomorrow. This not only applies to matters of the environment; it is also in decisions of borrowing, investment, and social services. For example, investing in education today creates human capital for tomorrow. Investing in health facilities contributes to a healthy population of tomorrow. Investing in infrastructure today provides assets for development for tomorrow. Leaders and people of local governments and cities today must realize that managing a city or a local government is a combination of managing to provide for today’s population’s needs and tomorrow’s population’s needs as well. The work for local governments and cities is full of challenges.

Core Challenges in Achieving Sustainable Development at the Local Level

Cities and local governments in all countries are confronted with addressing various challenges to implement the 2030 Agenda and achieve the SDGs. The challenges may be different depending on the socio-politico-economic situation of each coun-

Fig. 6.2 The three dimensions of equitable sustainable development at local level. (Source: composed by the author)



try and local communities. However, basic challenges are faced by all despite differences in situations. These challenges become acute the lower one goes from central government to cities and local governments and grassroots communities. They include:

- How to achieve economic equity and sustainability and eradicate poverty in all its forms
- How to achieve social equity
- How to achieve ecological equity
- How to integrate the three pillars of sustainable development and mainstream them into coherent local development policies and strategies

This brings out a critical question: What are the development policy and strategy imperatives in local governments and cities that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and pursuit of the SDGs has generated? The policy and strategy imperatives are related to the above challenges and will require transformed and strengthened collaborative governance as well as leadership competences and capacities at local government and city level.

Poverty eradication is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. In many countries where there is poverty, it most adversely affects populations at local level. In a number of

countries (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa), decentralization objectives include poverty eradication and local economic development. Poverty is also about inequality and suffering the indignity of being regarded as poor and hopeless. Poverty eradication can prove persistent especially where economic growth is accompanied by growth in inequalities. Where this happens, people who become less poor remain disgruntled because they turn their attention to the very rich. The problem turns into the issue of the gap between the rich and the poor rather than poverty itself. At local level and especially in cities, this gap is clearer when one looks at slums vs parts of cities where the wealthy live. Eradicating poverty and narrowing the gap between the poor and the rich is therefore a critical task local government and city leadership in Africa must effectively undertake to achieve SDGs. Without success in poverty eradication and reducing inequality, the challenge of achieving social sustainability becomes impossible.

Social sustainability covers all aspects of human life. To deal with ensuring social sustainability, one has to address issues related to equity and equality, social cohesion, social inclusion, shelter, education, health, youth engagement and employment, engaging and protecting the elderly, gender and advancement of women in social economic and political life, migration, population and demographic growth and dynamics, social diversity, social protection and social security, etc. This is one of the reasons why there is great need for transformational leadership in local governments and cities in Africa to address all these issues at local level where they are manifested most. The constant struggle by local populations to address these challenges using rudimental means easily jeopardizes the efforts for addressing the challenge of environmental sustainability (Fig. 6.3).

Achieving environmental sustainability is an imperative that requires creating awareness and capabilities in local societies to exploit the environment such that current generations do not create environmental conditions that will be untenable for the future generations. This touches not only on environment but also on issues of poverty eradication as well as on those related to social and economic sustainability. What local-level leaders need to be aware of is that poverty and the struggle to address social challenges can push communities to deploy ways that greatly harm the environment. Activities such as overgrazing, burning of forests, overfishing, and charcoal burning are normally associated with the struggle of local-level peasants for survival. However, these activities harm the environment and jeopardize the well-being of future generations. Environmental sustainability requires “building a future in which people live in harmony with nature.”⁷ There must be coherent and integrated policies, strategies, and bylaws that are based on local people agreement and shared understanding of the challenges and solutions that secure their future as well as poverty eradication and social equity.

Integrating the three pillars of sustainable development in local government and city development policies and strategies is a challenge for local governance because it is a departure from common practice of departmentalized policy making.

⁷See 2019 World Wide Fund For Nature “Environmental Problems in Uganda,” wwf.panda.org



Fig. 6.3 Core challenges for local governments' leadership and grassroots people. (Source: composed by the author)

Each pillar being treated alone is likely to be unsuccessful. Any shortfall in one pillar easily causes faults in the others. Addressing issues of the environment without addressing issues of poverty would not yield sustainable positive results. Or achieving the goal on education without addressing investment, job creation, and unemployment can easily result into large numbers of unemployed youth which in turn can cause social unrest and other problems. The challenges pointed out above, to be effectively addressed, will need effective city governance and a leadership that engages all people and all stakeholders within and without the community.

Local Governments and Cities Must Deliver on Each SDG

Looking at the 17 SDGs, each of them will require effectiveness in service delivery at local level to be achieved as illustrated bellow (Fig. 6.4).

Goal 1	End poverty in all its forms everywhere: Effectiveness in Local governance is about the delivery of services such as: health, education, infrastructure, information, law and order, justice, energy, water, sanitation etc, which services when effectively delivered contribute to fighting poverty in many of its forms. Local governments' leadership is also about local economic development.
Goal 2	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture: Local governments in rural areas promote agriculture, food banks, agricultural extension services, local land utilisation, agricultural research etc to ensure food security
Goal 3	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages: Effective local governments and cities governance includes providing basic health services in general, urban health policies, primary health care, immunization, hospitals, health clinics, pharmaceutical, maternal and child health and promoting healthy living habits among the local people tc.
Goal 4	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all: Many local governance systems are in charge of basic education services, infrastructure including school buildings etc, kindergarten centres, primary schools and other schools, adult learning centres, community centres, etc.
Goal 5	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls: local governments and cities governance includes interacting with local communities to discourage gender bias and discrimination practices, girl child education, maternal health care, women land and property sensitive laws, involving women in governance especially in policy decision making etc.
Goal 6	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all: Local governance includes provision of services such as, clean water, refuse collection, sanitation services, sewerage etc.
Goal 7	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all: Local governance includes ensuring lighting cities, heating and cooling, making choices between different sources of energy to deploy etc.

Fig. 6.4 Showing SDGs and services linked to them at local level. (Source: composed by the author)

Goal 8	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all: Local governance includes providing education services to develop a skilled employable population, local economic and employment policies, local investment environment, labour bye laws commercial and industrial centres, etc.
Goal 9	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation: Local governance includes, transport infrastructure eg road networks in urban areas, industrial parks, innovation incubation centres etc.
Goal 10	Reduce inequality within and among countries: Local governance makes bye laws governing equal opportunities for local contractors. They also make bye laws governing local wages and employment etc.
Goal 11	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable: This is a core Cities governance function which depends on all the other goals being achieved.
Goal 12	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns: Local governance includes making and enforcing bye laws governing protection of consumers and areas of investment for production.
Goal 13	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts: Local governance includes regulation of emissions in cities and other climate change related practices
Goal 14	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development: Local governments bordering Oceans and seas, regulate exploitation and pollution of the waters
Goal 15	Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss: Local governments make and enforce bye laws in this area.
Goal 16	Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels: local governments and cities are the public institutions that are closest to the people. They need to be effective, inclusive, responsive and accountable to people at that level
Goal 17	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development: local governments' cooperation, collaboration, and partnerships locally, nationally and internationally will contribute to this goal.

Fig. 6.4 (continued)

Local Governments and Cities as Institutions for Implementing the 2030 Agenda and Achieving the SDGs

Local governments and cities are critical players in the socio-politico-economic development including the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and SDGs in any country. There are many things local governments and cities in every country ought to do to implement or to facilitate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda to achieve the SDGs. The most critical ones are seven:

- Local socioeconomic and environmental policy and strategy planning
- Providing services to local communities
- Local-level infrastructure development
- Local community mobilization and empowerment
- Resource and investment mobilization for local economic development
- Monitoring and evaluation programs at local level
- Institutional and human resource capacity development (Fig. 6.5)

Local governments and cities are expected to provide the bedrock on which all operations of all actors are anchored which when not provided the whole effort of implementing the 2030 Agenda at local level is jeopardized. This bedrock is the respect for rule of law and justice in the governance of the local government/city, observance of human rights, law and order, security of person and property, leadership, professionalism, transparency, accountability, ethical conduct, and integrity (in short good governance). Sub-national governments are a lynchpin that connects development actors with local people. They cannot afford to be weak and ineffective or engage in bad governance. Therefore, their governance leaders are occupying a strategically vantage position in the whole process of implementing the 2030 Agenda and achieving SDGs. First, the leadership must leverage the potential of the local community and mobilize the will to implement the agenda and the resolve to achieve the SDGs by 2030. The most critical part of the job is to mobilize the will of the entire community to embrace the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs and to engage in implementing it.

With the above analysis of the role of local governments and cities in implementing the SDGs, it is clear that they have a big task to accomplish until 2030. “All SDGs are local” and “The achievement of all SDGs requires local action”⁸:

...the role of local administrations in the achievement of the Agenda goes far beyond Goal 11. All of the SDGs have targets that are directly or indirectly related to the daily work of local and regional governments. Local governments should not be seen as mere implementers of the agenda. Local governments are policy makers, catalysts of change and the level of government best-placed to link the global goals with local communities⁹ (Box 6.1).

⁸Statement delivered by representatives of local and regional government networks gathered around the global taskforce, New York, 27 September 2015

⁹UCLG: The Sustainable Development Goals: What Local Governments Need to Know.

Box 6.1: Addressing Challenges Related to Disparities in Access to Quality Education: The Success of the Extra School Support Programme (ESSP) of Gauteng Department of Education in South Africa

Faced with the problem of disparity in education, the Gauteng Department of Education in South Africa sought to improve quality of education and eliminate the disparities. Special attention had to be paid to ensuring that all learners reach their full potential in all aspects of their lives in all their schooling lives. This was necessary within the context of right to access to quality education. There had been research and reports in all sectors of the department which indicated a number of associated challenges including (i) lack/inadequate support for learners on homework and sports, arts, and culture due to multiplicity of factors such as socioeconomic conditions, parent's levels of literacy, child-headed families, lack of involvement of parents in their children's learning, etc; (ii) the vulnerability of learners who are orphans/child headed, emotional instability, poverty, lack of parental guidance, etc. and thus need a variety of support to help them overcome a number of challenges; (iii) access to schools not being controlled; (iv) a great need to extend the school time to allow learners to participate in a number of activities and remain safe; and (v) lack of sports, arts, and culture facilities for the learners in township areas. In order to address most of these issues, the Gauteng Department of Education came up with the Extra School Support Programme (ESSP) which provided support to learners in the targeted 1237 no-fee paying Schools which produced the following benefits: The Programme led to the initial employment of about 15,000 workers as homework assistants; sports, arts, and culture assistants; general supervisors; admin assistants; and patrollers. The employment of patrollers led to a drastic reduction of crime in schools, reduction in vandalism, and prevention of dangerous weapons entering in schools. More learners participated in sports and culture, academic results improved, and stress levels in educators reduced. (Extra School Program ESSP won the United Nations Public Service Awards in the category of improving the delivery of Public Services in 2014.) Source: United Nations Public Service Awards Database <https://publicadministration.un.org/en/Research/Case-Studies/unpsacases>

Part of the work local governments and cities have to accomplish is the work of transformation which is at the core of the 2030 Agenda. They will need to transform leadership mentalities, competences, mind-sets, organizational structures, institutions, and especially the communities themselves. Paying attention to transformation in this regard needs to start by identifying the underlying values and principles contained in the 2030 Agenda documents that underpin the necessity for transformation.




Fig. 6.5 The bulk of the work of local governments and cities in implementing the 2030 Agenda. (Source: composed by the author)

Underlying Transformation Drivers Contained in the 2030 Agenda

The 2030 Agenda and the SDGs contain critical underpinnings of the need for transformation in the governance of local governments and cities as well as in local economic development. These include the notion of integration; leaving no one behind; equity; resilience; innovation; partnerships and effective, inclusive, and accountable institutions; as well as transformation itself. Moreover, Goal 16 commits countries to building effective, inclusive, and accountable institutions. This includes institutions of local governance. Below we consider some of these underpinnings beginning with the notion of transformation itself (Fig. 6.6).



Fig. 6.6 Underlying drivers of local-level transformation contained in the 2030 Agenda
Source: composed by the author

The Notion of Transformation

The 2030 agenda is “the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world to a sustainable and resilient path.” Member States set “out a supremely ambitious and transformational vision” for the world, and so in implementing this vision, transformation needs to be one of the prime drivers. Those who are concerned with governance in local governments and cities, institutions, systems, structures, practices, as well as other capacities, need to be considering the kind of transformation that they need to undertake to enable the local governments and cities to achieve the SDGs.

However, it needs to be pointed out that African countries are not implementing transformation strategies because transformation figures prominently in the 2030 Agenda. Most of these transformation strategies in Africa (in Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Botswana, Nigeria, Liberia, Libya, to mention only these) were formulated well before the 2030 Agenda was adopted. Development strategies of the 25 African countries we have consulted out of the 54 have transformation as a major objective.¹⁰ This transformation needs to be cascaded in local governments and cities and integrated in local-level socioeconomic development strategies. That

¹⁰Kauzya John-Mary: “Developing Transformational Leadership Capacity in Africa’s Public-Sector Institutions to Implement the 2030 Agenda and Achieve the SDGs” (Presentation during 38th Roundtable Conference of the African Association for the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), El Jadida, Kingdom of Morocco, November 2017).

means that transformational leadership needs to be pervasive at all levels of governance including local governments and cities.

Integration

The emphasis the 2030 Agenda puts on “integration” necessitates transforming local governance in local governments and cities to enable them to pay particular attention to the need for integration. Integration must be understood in a wider, fuller, and deeper meaning to include:

- Integration of the three pillars of sustainable development (economic, social, and environment) into one coherent sustainable development policy or strategy for the local government or city in question.
- Integration in form of coordination and coherence of various institutional components, policies, strategies, and programs which the local government or city puts in place to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda.
- Integration of the various sectors and development activities to collaborate their inputs and outputs and create a mutually complementally collaborative impact.
- Integration in terms of current and future policies and strategies: Through a process of anticipatory governance, policy risk assessment, and disaster prevention, development strategies and policies of the current generation need to be integrating and collaborating in the way they will impact the needs of future generations.
- Vertical integration of the different levels of local governance and central government: Vertical integration also includes integration of national development strategies and policies with supranational levels. For a country to move in the same direction toward sustainable development, all levels of government need to be integrated and coordinated in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the 2030 Agenda.
- Integration of modern local governance institutions with informal institutions especially at community level so that the two join forces to cause sustainable development especially in grassroots communities.
- Integration of local government, private sector, and civil society in terms of all the three sectors working in the same direction of achieving sustainable development in the city.

The way integration is being taken in many countries needs to be reviewed to ensure that it takes a comprehensive meaning in all the above different terms (Box 6.2).

Box 6.2: Integrating Water, Sanitation, Agriculture Improvement: Employment and Participation

Improving water and sanitation in the municipality of Bangangté: The population living in the municipality of Bangangté in Cameroon had a problem of “shortage of potable water and inadequate sanitation”. A joint study by the National Participatory Development Program (NPDP) and technical services of the municipality of Bangangté in 2006 revealed a need for increasing access to water and sanitation facilities in 23 of the 25 units in the region. In 2010, only 15% of the rural population had access to drinking water, well below the national average which was 27.7% in 2008. This led to an increase in health spending in the region, largely due to the consumption of dirty water. Access to drinking water is a priority for 82% of the 600 heads of households interviewed in 2010 in the preparation of MODEAB project. This result confirms the priorities already identified in the local development plans. The initiative, named MODEAB, was initiated to rehabilitate and to establish new water points for the public. The water was provided on a cost recovery basis. Through this project, community-based water management structures were established. A Committee of Water Users (CUE) was set up for each group of users, composed of volunteers, who are spokespersons of the population. The operator of each group is paid from the water service revenues. This project is expected to increase the coverage of drinking water needs of 50% in the rural area by June 2014. To improve sanitation conditions, ten toilets were constructed in schools and in five markets. The initiative had a big impact. The sanitation level, the crops fertilized with urine, was probative: There was no doubt about the good quality and high yield. People saw that it is possible to have good crops, practically at no cost. This intervention has increased school attendance and has reduced illnesses caused by poor water quality. Many jobs were created for local people, mainly in the operation and maintenance of the facilities, and income-generating opportunities were created as the local communities sell water to the people who do not have access. A key highlight of this initiative is increased participation of citizens in decisions on policies and service delivery with respect to the two services, which was not done in this area previously. (The Water and Sanitation Initiative won second place of the United Nations Public Service Awards in 2014.) <https://publicadministration.un.org/en/Research/Case-Studies/unpsacases>

Leaving No One Behind

“Leaving no one behind” has strong local-level communities and local governments and cities value undertones. They include egalitarianism, equality, equity, involvement, inclusiveness, engagement, collaboration, social security, and socioeconomic welfare. Effectively implementing the 2030 Agenda and achieving its 17 SDGs with

their 169 targets, leaving no one behind necessitates a value system that emphasizes such values and principles. This brings to the foreground the role of the welfare state, local governments, and cities. The framers of the 2030 Agenda did not mention the ideological underpinnings that would ensure that Sustainable Development is achieved leaving no one behind. However, public administration being at the forefront of supporting the implementation of the agenda will have to engage this and unwrap its full meaning and implications. The values and norms that will ensure effective welfare will need development and transformation of local governance and administration institutions, systems, structures, and practices as well as ideological outlook in local governments and cities. The lower one moves to community level, the more prominent issues of welfare become because that is the level where the common men and women including the poor and vulnerable who need support and protection reside.

Over time in many countries, many people have been left behind especially in the consumption of critical services. In many instances, the institutions in local governments and cities have not been challenged to work and deliver services leaving no one behind. Consequently, in many local governments both rural and urban, but more so in cities, poverty and inequality is still a big problem with many left behind already. To pay particular attention to these values will require a sustained capacity development for effective, collaborative, and integrated local government. Local government as an institution ought to be very keen on figuring out how to address these challenges. And supporting capacity development of local governments and cities ought to start focusing on how local government and city leadership and local government public services/servants can transform competences, mind-set, behavior, conduct, practices, skills, and knowledge to align their capacities with the requirements of integrated local development, leaving no one behind, collaboration, and partnerships.

Resilience

In the UN General Assembly Resolution that adopted the 2030 Agenda, Member States affirmed: “We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path.” Thus, creating resilient societies has increasingly become a principle and value in sustainable development. Local governments and cities, through bylaws, rules, regulations, policies, strategies, and practices, can have a negative, positive, or neutral impact on whether the communities within them become resilient or not. Many face socio-politico-economic and environmental challenges and changes, some of which are or can be disastrous or even catastrophic while in the same breath they present opportunities to be harnessed for a better future. Therefore, it is important that local governments, working together with local-level communities in their societies, develop and institutionalize mechanisms that develop and sustain a resilient society. They need to aim at developing resilient societies which can absorb shocks and bounce

back to build better and more durable and thriving governance and public administration institutions. Most importantly, the resilient societies should be capable to innovate, foresee, and prevent any changes that would pose a threat to them.

One of the ways of understanding resilience is to regard it as the institutionalized capability, sustained over a relatively long period of time, to foresee and manage threats of any nature with own resources and to exploit threats and turn them into opportunities for making life better. The main characteristics of a resilient society include the following:

- Absorption of shocks
- Adaptation to new and better ways of life
- Anticipation of possible and potential problems and disasters
- Averting disasters or turning them into opportunities
- Communication among a wide spectrum of actors and stakeholders to respond to such disasters in time
- Coordination among institutions
- Integration, collaboration, partnerships, engagement of all segments of communities
- Incessant creativity and innovation to find new ways of confronting threats and challenges
- Inclusion of everyone in the development process
- Sustained scientific research to identify and prevent possible mishaps that can turn into irreversible human threatening hazards

In this regard there is need for local governments and cities to create and sustain conditions that enable their communities to be resilient. “In the traditional sense, resilience is a measure of how well a system—an organization or institution, an ecosystem, a city or region, or indeed a whole country—recovers from an unexpected shock or disaster. But it also has become invested with a larger and more important meaning of cultivating the assets, culture, and capabilities that render systems less vulnerable to risk, more agile and adaptable, and therefore better prepared for successive waves of change and disruption. It means not only bouncing back, but also bouncing forward”¹¹ (Fig. 6.7).

Resilience is about absorbing the shock such that disastrous strong changes do not destroy but alert the systems that they have to be stronger and better. Resilience is a mix of resistance, flexibility, creativity, innovation, and alertness to the needs of today as they relate to the solutions to future challenges. Local governments and city leaders need to put emphasis on resilience.

¹¹ Albert Cho, Simon Willis et al. “The Resilient Society: Innovation, Productivity, and the Art and Practice of Connectedness” (Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group (IBSG), August 2011). P 5




Fig. 6.7 Some characteristics of a resilient society. (Source: composed by the author)

Local Governance and Administration Reforms and Transformation That Would Contribute to Achieving the SDGs

Reform programs have been a feature of many local governments and cities for some time. However, they have tended to focus on bureaucratic efficiency, effectiveness, and to some extent economy (the three Es of management). There is need in local governance and administration to pay particular attention to issues of social equity as dictated by the requirement of inclusion and leaving no one behind in the achievement of the SDGs (Fig. 6.8).

Implementing at the Equilibrium Point of Effectiveness, Efficiency, Economy, and Social Equity

Therefore, the transformation that local governments and cities must undergo in light of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achievement of SDGs must be constituted by a combination of accomplishing the reforms that have been ongoing to have effectiveness, economy, and efficiency in performance with strong doses of social equity measures. This is in order to ensure that discriminatory practices and marginalization are eliminated and social and political inclusion are entrenched in the practice of local governments and cities. The pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy at the expense of social equity, the concern for results at the expense of outcomes and values, and the emphasis on money and individual wealth at the expense of the general well-being and community health may endanger achieve-




Fig. 6.8 Transformation in Local governments and cities for the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. (Source: composed by the author)

ment of SDGs by leaving many people behind. This is where value system orientation in local government and city local communities becomes a subject for transformation.

Optimization will not be enough. There has to be significant transformation included in the value system that drives it. The environment that has emerged to determine the transformation rather than optimization evolves not only around implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achievement of SDGs but also welfare, investment, and participatory society social security and social protection especially for the less able and vulnerable members of local communities.

Value System and Mind-Set Orientation

The very first transformation that local governance and administration in general and public service in particular needs to undergo concerns the ideological or value system orientation that channels the thinking and operations of the public service in local governments toward commitment to the welfare of the people leaving no one out or behind. The debate on ideology and delivery of public services has been

dominated by considerations of who delivers the service: private or public sector. This is not the correct debate because whether it is the private sector or public sector, the service can be effectively and even efficiently delivered. However, by putting a particular emphasis on “leaving no one behind,” the 2030 Agenda calls for a commitment to serving all which calls for social equity. That requires a pro-people/society ideology irrespective of the differences in their abilities to pay for the services.

Responding to, and Harnessing, the Emergency of a Participatory Society/Culture

One of the determinants of the differences in the way local governments and cities are structured and behave in different countries is the fact that societies are different and consequently they design local governments according to their needs. There is an emerging trend whereby societies are demanding enhanced participation and engagement of the citizens in decision-making and influence of the things that matter in their lives including public administration/government and the delivery of critical services. This is moreover reflected in the emphasis put on inclusion in the 2030 Agenda. The emergence of participatory societies means that local governments and cities should not be inward looking only but outward as well, if anything to respond to this demand for participation by the people. A local government or city administration that responds to the demands for efficiency alone is not suitable to serve a society that is demanding participation, engagement, and values such as equality, equity, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and others which when pursued to their extreme may go contrary to efficiency or at best redefine it.

Resource Mobilization and Local Governments’ Investment for Production and Delivery of Public Goods and Services

There has developed an observable swingback of the public enterprise after a strong and lengthy wave of privatization since the 1980s which had been built on the advocacy that the private sector enterprise is more efficient. However, the requirement to implement the 2030 Agenda and to achieve the SDGs leaving no one behind has rekindled the defense and satisfaction of the “public interest” and however defined and encouraged many cities and local governments to engage in more ownership or operation of public enterprises. The main point here is that local governments and cities, alone or in partnership with other public and private actors, will have to invest in what will ensure sustainable development especially when it comes to ensuring equitable delivery of essential public services including education, health, water,

electricity, information, transportation, judicial services, etc. Social equity itself will necessitate resource mobilization and investment from local governments and cities.

Integrating the Current with the Future Generation: Future-Oriented Local Governments and Cities

In many African countries, reforms in local governments and in cities were of the nature of optimization. This caused lack of integration with the needs of the future. The solutions optimization offered to local governments and cities applied to the problems of the day and sometimes created problems for the future. Optimization needs to be balanced with transformation to address the challenges of the current and future generations beginning with effective support to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achieving the SDGs. Most local government and cities governance and administration systems are predisposed to identify and solve temporal problems. However, achieving sustainable development requires looking far ahead to foresee the future challenges and problems and find solutions to them today. Local governments and cities must have data and information systems as well as qualified data and information analysts that will enable them to look at trends, predict future trajectories, and find solutions to challenges and problems before they become crises. Such public servants are what one would call scientific prophets. They foretell the future but based on data and information. Foresight among local leaders and public servants is critical in this. Transforming local governments and cities to make them achieve SDGs leaving no one behind should include making it future oriented, pro-active rather than reactive, more dynamic, and innovative. A future-oriented local government and city will promote the spirit of innovation and change-readiness, transform mind-sets, and create a different organizational culture, norms, and values that are aligned with the values of the 2030 Agenda. The major difference between optimization and transformation is that optimization is about making the most of existing resources of all sorts. Transformation is about innovation, creative thinking, and trying out new ideas and new ways of doing things. This in the short term may look inefficient in the use of resources, but in the long term, it could be the most useful in terms of cherished values such as inclusiveness, equity, responsiveness, and leaving no one behind in development.



Fig. 6.9 Total will in local governments for implementing the 2030 Agenda. (Source: composed by the author)

Mobilizing Total Will in Local Governments and Cities to Implement the 2030 Agenda

Since the 2030 Agenda with its 17 goals and 169 targets was adopted, one of the things that has been emphasized is that it will require strong political will to implement the agenda. In a general sense, the political will in any local government or city to implement the 2030 Agenda is required. However, political will alone will not achieve much. “We the people” should not be reduced to “we the political leaders.” The rhetoric around the need for political will has been ongoing since a long time, and it surrounds the arguments about why reforms and programs do not succeed much. Overemphasizing the “political will” underestimates the influence other actors in local governments and cities, besides political leaders, have on the success or otherwise of achieving SDGs in a given local government or city (Fig. 6.9).

Success is always driven by a composite of the will from various actors. In the case of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, in any local government or city there is need for:

- The political will from political leaders at central government, local government, and community levels
- Social/civic/community will (the people must be willing and committed to implement the Agenda)

- The administrative will (the bureaucracy, i.e., the public servants in the local government or city as well as those in central government, must be willing and committed to implementing the agenda)
- The will of development partners including donors especially in terms of financial and technical assistance if local governments heavily depend on funding from development partners

In many countries some reforms or development programs in local governments and cities have failed to achieve the desired results because public servants do not support them irrespective of strong political will. The power of the bureaucrats to resist, sabotage, and deliberately move slowly in implementation is well-known in classical public administration. Similarly, some reform or development programs have failed because communities refuse or resist them mainly because they were not consulted during the design of such programs. It is the same with the implementation of the 2030 Agenda to achieve SDGs. These need to be domesticated and adopted at local level to align them with the needs and expectation of the people. Finally, in poor countries, heavily dependent on development aid, the ambitious 2030 Agenda will be difficult to implement without official development assistance and other forms of support. The will of development partners both national and international is critical here.

All this goes to say that the concept of total will must replace the rhetoric of political will. It is in line with the 2030 Agenda's call for engagement, inclusiveness, partnerships, and collaboration as well as leaving no one behind. The most desired, and probably most effective, political will in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is the will to engage all actors in all sectors and at all levels. The work of implementing the 2030 Agenda and achieving the SDGs is too big, too complex, and too important to be left to the will of political leaders in local government alone. All actors must be willing to chip in whatever contribution they have to lead to success. That also is part of leaving no one behind.

Mobilizing for Collective Impact in Implementing the 2030 Agenda

One of the approaches that could lead to this total will to implement the 2030 Agenda and achievement of SDGs in local governments and cities is what is known as the collective impact.¹² “The Collective Impact approach is premised on the belief that no single policy, government department, organisation or program can tackle or solve the increasingly complex social problems we face as a society. The approach calls for multiple organisations or entities from different sectors to integrate their own agenda in favour of a common agenda, shared measurement and

¹² John Kania and Mark Kramer first wrote about collective impact in the *Stanford Social Innovation Review* in 2011.

alignment of effort. Unlike collaboration or partnership, Collective Impact initiatives have centralised infrastructure known as a backbone organisation with dedicated staff whose role is to help participating organisations shift from acting alone to acting in concert.” Collective impact rhymes with integration that is emphasized in the 2030 Agenda.

Capacity Development

Another aspect of the role of the local governments and cities that is highlighted here is capacity development. All the challenges and all the tasks, functions, and responsibilities that have been dictated by the need to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda and achieve the SDGs will need adequate comprehensive capacities, institutional, human, structural, material, policy, legal frameworks, governance environment, financial, information, modern technology (especially information and communication technologies), partnerships, and others, in order to be successful. Therefore, one of the most critical roles local governance plays is capacity development. Working with research institutions, management development institutions, university faculties, and other local government and city governance and leadership need to intensify the search for better ways of work to implement the agenda and achieve the SDGs at local level. This will further encourage creativity and innovation. However, most importantly, little will be achieved via any capacity development until there is a mind-set change in leadership, people, and public servants both in central government and local-level authorities. Therefore, local-level public administration and leadership competences for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to achieve SDGs in Africa is not only topical but also critical. As part of the efforts of developing local governments’ capacities for effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to achieve the SDGs, there needs to be clarity on what competences, what knowledge, what skills, what institutional arrangements, what structures, what systems, what information technologies, etc. are needed for public administration and leaders in local governments and cities.

Harnessing Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)

The importance of information and communication technologies in modern governance, public administration and management, service delivery, and sustainable development must be emphasized. If local governments and all their development partners, stakeholders, and actors can leverage technology, especially ICTs, the chances of enhancing transparency, accountability, service delivery, risk assess-

Box 6.3: Evidence-Based Planning: Map Kibera – Bringing Visibility to Marginalized Communities Through Community Engagement and Open Data

The slum of Kibera, located outside Nairobi, was once considered Africa's biggest informal urban settlement and was estimated by some to have a population of close to 1 million inhabitants. However, a complete lack of data (official census and household surveys are rarely carried out in such settlements) meant the true figure, as well as conditions within the settlement (what infrastructure and services existed), remained completely invisible. In 2009 a group of independent researchers set up the "Map Kibera project," which began by conducting door-to-door surveys of the settlement with the aim of mapping the physical and socio-demographic features of the slum. Mapping included not just the information on the people who lived in the slum, but on the infrastructure, such as schools, markets, pathways, clinics, water and electricity points, etc. The mapping estimated that the slum was home to some 235, 000 to 270, 000 inhabitants – far fewer than originally estimated. The disparity between the informal estimates and the figure produced through the project highlighted the fundamental role of frequent and reliable data to set and meet development objectives. Since then, Map Kibera has grown into an interactive community information project aimed at increasing the influence and representation of marginalized communities through the creative use of digital tools for action. Mappers, all young community members, collect data with GPS devices and edit and upload the map information. Not only are they providing a necessary service for the communities that make up the settlement and for local government, but also in the process they are learning valuable skills and training in cutting-edge technology usage. Using open data and software, such as OpenStreetMap, and open source GIS (geospatial information system), they aim to analyze and produce maps that document the location and hours of facilities and services, such as roads, shops, clinics, and schools. Using open technology has also ensured that the project is transferable to similar areas, and in Kenya alone, the project has expanded to map two further informal settlements. (<https://mapkibera.org>) Source: United Nations Public Service Forum Report 2019 Public ([Administration.un.org](https://www.un.org/public)).

ment, evidence-based policy making, targeting beneficiaries of government work, informing markets, assisting consumer choices, as well as management of natural resources will be greater (Box 6.3).

Therefore, among the capacities to be developed in local governments is the comprehensive capacity for digital government because a range of frontier digital technologies can be combined to make the work of local governments in developing their communities not only effective but also a lot easier and quicker. However, the following are some of the aspects of the digital ecosystem that public and private sector institutions are already utilizing to benefit from technology: satellites and

drones, cloud and edge computing, artificial intelligence, machine learning, the Internet, platforms and social media, blockchain technology, open source software and commercial software, mobile phone applications, and others. As the United Nations E-Government Survey of 2018 found out, “E-government improves public services, citizen engagement, and transparency and accountability of authorities at the local level. E-government also strengthens resilience and sustainability and better aligns local government operations with national digital strategies” (2018 UN Government Report).

Conclusion

The chapter has emphasized the view that SDGs need to be achieved at local level since they are targeting the people. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda needs to focus on local communities. Local governments and cities which are closest to local communities need to focus development efforts on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achievement of SDGs because mandates of local governments and cities concern the SDGs. The transformation of the 2030 Agenda needs to take place at local level in local governments and cities. At this level, transformational leadership capacities are required to engineer and sustain transformation in local governments and cities.

Transformational capacities need to be comprehensive including institutions, structures, human resources, changing mind-sets to align them with the principles and values of the 2030 Agenda, facilities, infrastructure, data and information, ICTs, policies, legal frameworks, logistics, financial resources, etc. The now classical mismatch of mandates and resources should be avoided in the context of implementing the 2030 Agenda and achievement of the SDGs. Matching mandates and resources should be part of transformation of governing local governments and cities.

It is important for local governments and cities to focus on achieving the 17 SDGs. There is need to always bear in mind that without inculcating the principles and values enshrined in the 2030 Agenda (integration, equity, leaving no one behind, inclusion, accountability, people focus, innovation, resilience, partnership, collaboration, rule of law, respect for human rights, and others), it is inconceivable that communities in local governments and cities or their leadership can work effectively to achieve SDGs. These principles and values are what make the 2030 Agenda a global strategy for creating good societies.

Many of the principles and values enshrined in the 2030 Agenda have not been priorities in the context of public sector reform programs. To the extent that they are a departure from what has been the norm for quite some time, they need to be entrenched in local government and city governance through intensified and sustained comprehensive capacity development programs targeted at all sectors and at all levels of governance.

Given the enormous benefits of the application of information and communication technologies (ICT) in government, local governments and cities provide fertile

ground for using ICT to render governance and service delivery effective and tap the potential of ICT for innovation and search for the most successful ways of serving the populations at that level. Therefore, capacity development should give priority to application of digital governments in local governments and cities.

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Chapter 7

Local Economic Development as an Alternative Development Strategy in Southern African Cities



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Abstract Local Economic Development (LED) has attracted global recognition as a response to local challenges such as imbalanced economic growth, intra-regional investment, lack of trade diversification, domestic infrastructure constraints, financial inclusion, labour shortage, and political-economic constraints. In light of the recent global development initiatives, including the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals, the need to stimulate economic growth in contemporary societies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region cannot be overestimated. As such, LED backing is constantly on the development agenda. The LED practice within the SADC is informed by the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–2020. This plan aims to enhance economic collaboration in the region in order to address the existing socio-economic development imperatives and has paved the way for several LED alternatives in order to promote socio-economic development within the African cities in the region. These initiatives include the SADC- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)-East African Community (EAC) Free Trade Area, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, and African Development Bank (AfDB). The paradigmatic shift in LED approaches at a regional level confer a prominent role within African cities.

Keywords Local economic development · Regional integration and African cities

Introduction

The developmental challenges posed by globalisation has triggered the rethinking of traditional economic development approaches and the intensification of developing local economies by adopting alternative strategies such as local economic

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development (Rodriguez-Pose 2001, 2008). Local economic development at the regional level stems from the Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–2020 (RISDP), which was adopted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC¹) Heads of States to communicate their developmental strategies which are pertinent to sustainable growth and economic development in the African region. This plan aims to enhance economic collaboration in the region in order to address the existing socio-economic development imperatives. In light of the recent global development initiatives, including the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals, this chapter undertakes an extensive review of the economic development activities and the development strategies that seek to stimulate economic growth within the SADC region. In this review, this chapter notes that the African region has experienced its slowest economic growth rate since the 1998 global economic challenges, thus resulting in socio-economic ills in the region. The authors therefore contend that several economic development strategies, notably regional trade agreements, infrastructure development for regional cooperation integration and human development, require a more comprehensive LED strategy in order to augment socio-economic development within the African cities in the region. This chapter is premised on the assertion that LED strategies should be regionally managed and promote inclusive economic growth and local dialogue in the African region. To facilitate strategic regional and economic cooperation, this chapter highlights several LED alternatives which have been adopted in the region. These initiatives include the SADC-COMESA-EAC Free Trade Area, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, African Development Bank (AfDB), and Tripartite Co-operation Framework.

Local Economic Development: Meaning, Context, and Practice

In contemporary societies, LED is perceived as an inclusive socio-economic strategy which governments in the transitional cities must adopt (Rodriguez-Pose and Viesti 2013; Rodriguez-Pose 2001). The LED concept is explained as an economic practice which is collaborative in nature. This definition encapsulates the role of the various stakeholders including the private and public stakeholders in designing and implementing joint socio-economic development strategies (Thornhill et al. 2014).

Local economic development is both obscure and has multiple delineations (Trah 2004; Pike et al. 2006). Box 7.1 provides additional definitions of LED.

¹All references to SADC in this paper will exclude the newly admitted 16th member, Comoros (admitted in 2017), since most data pertain to SADC's development over the last few years. The main objective of the SADC is to facilitate regional integration that is built on democratic principles, equity and sustainable development.

Box 7.1 Some Definitions of Local Economic Development

1. 'LED is a territorial concept and part of local development or regional management, specifically aiming to stimulate the local economy to grow, compete and create more jobs, in particular by making better use of locally available resources' (Trah 2004:1).
2. 'LED is a process in which partnerships between local governments, NGOs, community-based groups and the private sector are established to manage existing resources, to create jobs and stimulate the economy of a well-defined territory' (Helmsing and Egziabher 2005:1).
3. 'LED as a process by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation' (World Bank 2003:1).
4. 'LED is an ongoing process by which key stakeholders and institutions from all spheres of society, the public and private sector as well as civil society, work jointly to create a unique advantage for the locality and its firms, tackle market failures, remove bureaucratic obstacles for local businesses and strengthen the competitiveness of local firms' (Ruecker and Trah 2007:15).

The era between the 1960s and the 1980s marked the first phase of LED. The initial LED activities focused mainly on specifically marketing and investment promotion. This was often associated with incentive systems, such as endowments and tax credits or loans. The period beyond the 1980s to the mid-1990s was the second phase of LED. This period specifically concentrated mainly on developing local economies by encouraging, for instance, the culture of entrepreneurship. This paved the way to new policy initiatives by governments (World Bank 2003). For example, the introduction of the White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses in 1995 paved the way for the establishment of many small enterprises for local communities.

From the late 1990s, an all-inclusive LED practice, which sought to promote private entrepreneurship and sectoral development in the global North became a standard norm (Pike et al. 2006; Ruecker and Trah 2007). In this context, LED practice has necessitated an assortment of innumerable strategies. These include attracting more capital investment, engaging in economic development initiatives, creating a more conducive entrepreneurship environment, and promoting global competitiveness of the African cities (Christensen and Van der Ree 2008; Beer 2009).

In recent years, LED has attracted global recognition as a response to local challenges caused by the globalised world, decentralisation, and identified local prospects (Glasmeyer 2000). In this context, LED backing is constantly on the development agenda (World Bank 2001 2002; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2008). Globally, LED is expressed in numerous practices, such as the promotion of endogenous development, urban

business development with potential of competing in the global markets, and other local economic interventions to advance pro poor economic growth (Hambleton et al. 2002). The assertion of a local initiative has helped to create and reinforce the bi-polar logic of 'localism and globalism' as being hallmarks of contemporary society, economy, and politics. Within this context of LED practice, issues of local governance, social capital, and the significance of collaborations between various stakeholders have been advocated as key drivers for economic transformation (Rodriguez-Pose 2009).

Global Perspective of Local Economic Development

Local economic development approaches are becoming necessary and a sustainable mechanism to complement the formal or traditional economic activities, particularly in the international community. The global economic depression, which took place after the Second World War (WWII) in 1945, and the global economic failure of 2008 have made it necessary for the creation of alternative livelihood strategies across the world. Therefore, contemporary societies must adapt to the changing global economic environment which has affected local economic policies (ILO 2006). As such, globalisation has significantly impacted on regional and local economic development planning including the African cities from the underdeveloped world (Rodriguez-Pose 2008; Rodrigues-Pose and Sylvia 2009).

Rodrigues-Pose and Tijnstra (2009) remark that one of the most significant implications of the global new economic thinking is the restructuring of the locally based political and socio-economic landscape that is capable of responding to new human development challenges particularly among developing African cities in the SADC region. In this transformed trajectory coupled with the drive for decentralisation, LED strategies must respond to the economic challenges and aspirations of the regions and their local cities (World Bank 2003; Ndlovu and Makoni 2014).

Growing opportunities for LED in the international arena are accompanied by critical questions which are often attributed to the failure of this economic initiative. The following are some of the identified questions about the future developments of LED (International Labour Organisation (ILO) 2014).

- Do local economic strategies sync with broader national and regional policy frameworks?
- What is the state of local governments' preparedness to execute LED initiatives?
- How to secure diversified stakeholder interest?
- What should be the contribution of cosmopolitan enterprises towards local economies?

Answers to these pertinent questions require a comprehensive and an all-encompassing strategy which will ensure that the stakeholders who drive this initiative are capacitated to deal with challenges which have the potential to hinder their effectiveness.

Contrary to the practice of many developing nations in which the ‘*welfare state*’ is promoted in many forms (such as in the provision of social grants in South Africa), the ILO’s approach to LED aims to promote a culture of self-sufficiency among citizens, and the promotion of decent employment and income as a social protection strategy, and permit meaningful role of women and youth in economic development. This may be achieved by:

- Focusing on the specific territory development demands
- Identifying economically viable sectors
- Creating synergies between enterprise competitiveness and job quality
- Building capacity at citizenry level
- Prioritising strategies and tools to benefit the indigent (ILO 2006, 2014)

For ILO, LED means more than simply economic growth, but also the process of social empowerment, aiming to capacitate the citizens with quality work opportunities. Therefore, LED strategies should be people-centred and locally managed. This is imperative in promoting community participation and local dialogue (ILO 2014). From an economic point of view, a people-centred approach refers to the roles of the government, private sector, and other interested parties, in creating economic opportunities by capacitating citizens with, among other aspects, entrepreneurial skills and financial support, so that they may take control of their economic aspirations (ILO 2014).

The OECD (2008) outlines the following characteristics of people-centred development:

- Promoting inclusive citizenry participation in local economic matters
- More responsive leadership and good governance
- Building and sustaining community skills
- Coining community development agenda with sustainable growth

The degree to which communities successfully influence their economic opportunities depends mainly on their willingness to engage with their authorities at the community level. This may be problematic for the contemporary South African political and economic landscapes in which public discontent with community leadership has culminated in hostile relations owing to poor services and failure to deliver on promises (Venter 2014).

Local Economic Development in the SADC Region

The LED practice at the regional level is informed by the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP²) which was introduced in 1999 and formalised in 2003 by SADC Heads of States.

²The RISDP was adopted in 2005 to guide social and economic goals envisioned by the SADC.

The RISDP was adopted to review the operations of the SADC institutions in dealing with issues of poverty eradication and creating social and economic opportunities at a regional level. The RISDP initiative is driven by the participatory principles, through which all members of SADC member states, including, Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, communicate their developmental strategies which are pertinent to sustainable growth and economic development in the region. This requires progressive consultation with government agencies, *community-Based Organisations* (CBOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), academic and research institutions, and International Cooperating Partners (ICPs). In a broader context, the RISDP focuses on meeting the following objectives (SADC 2013):

Science and Technology

Science and technology is imperative for economic development and growing competitiveness within the SADC region. In this regard, the RISDP aims to develop and strengthen innovative national systems and infuse scientific and technological solutions in the quest for growth within African cities. For example, in the South African context, there has been an increase in the use of technology, particularly in the banking industry and government sectors. As such, the South African education sector has in the recent past introduced universities of technology with the purpose of enhancing development through technology. In the case of Lesotho, the Ministry of Technology, Communication and Innovation has a project underway for implementing e-Government programmes. Malawi has recently opened the Science and Technology University. Angola is facing a shortage of skilled personnel; and this is greatly detrimental in terms of the country's economic growth and development (Scheepers et al. 2002).

The use of modern technology to cascade information and communication is viewed by the SADC region as a critical mechanism indicator for successful regional cohesion (SADC 2013).

Environment and Sustainable Development

Environment and sustainable development are pivotal to ensuring equity in the distribution of natural and environmental resources. This principle stems from the 1992 Agenda 21st Sustainable Development Conference in Brazil in which the resolution to preserve the ecosystem for the 'benefit of present and future generation' was adopted (Scheepers et al. 2002). Within the regional context, the mission for environmental protection is crucial in forging the harmonisation of compliance with environmental policies.

Poverty Eradication

Poverty presents a threat to the lives of the majority of African communities, particularly in the SADC region. It is against this background that the RISDP accords attention to poverty eradication as its primary objective. This is achieved through the creation of various projects such as informal economic activities and rural livelihood activities, which promote self-sufficiency amongst the citizens in the region (World Bank 2003). The RISDP specifically makes provisions for poverty eradication (SADC 2013).

Private Sector Development

The priority of this objective is to amalgamate the private sector policies and processes into development programmes of the SADC in order to sustain growth within African cities (Scheerpers et al. 2002).

Economic Prosperity, Trade, and Development

This focus area aims to promote trade and economic prosperity across the entire SADC region by enhancing all the systems and mechanisms which are pertinent for the realisation of inclusive industrial development and the acceleration of financial security and competitiveness of the region. This practice will ensure that the SADC region applies standard norms in their quest for economic sustainability and industrialisation processes (SADC 2013).

Gender Equality, and Development

The vision for creating gender balances is to promote equal access to the economic opportunities between men and women by harmonising gender policies and programmes. Specific focus includes measures to accelerate the monopolisation of resources by women; particularly in impoverished or rural backgrounds. From an economic development perspective, women, who in most cases play a leading role in the agricultural productions and trade, should be empowered, as they are the engines for economic growth in the African region (SADC 2013).

The effort of the SADC region in promoting LED has had a major impact on stabilisation of its finances, industrialisation, equity, and innovation. Despite challenges which have been encountered in these economic liberalisation endeavours, the region is continually engaged in forging a progressive regional integration.

There has been significant improvement since the inception of SADC initiatives and its programmes to boost the economy, except for the period between 2008 and 2009 in which there were economic difficulties around the globe (SADC 2013).

Youth Empowerment

Youth employment is undoubtedly one of the critical challenges that require immediate solution towards ensuring economic prosperity. While concerted efforts have been accorded to youth unemployment in some African cities in the SADC region, in South Africa, for example, the South Africa (Stats SA) (2018) reported that the youth employment was still high at 38% when compared to 26.8% for adults. South African youth were unemployed in the first quarter of 2018. Beyond this period, youth unemployment continued to be a major socio-economic challenge in South Africa. In many instances, the poor participation of youth in economic affairs in the region is attributed to the shortage of their economic opportunities and empowerment programmes. To promote youth participation in economic activities and community development, developing capacity and incorporating youth into the economic mainstreams must be prioritised (eThekweni City Council 2017).

Local Economic Development in the SADC Region

From a comparative perspective, LED experiences in Africa demonstrate different characteristics. This section of the chapter draws on three selected countries to reflect such diversity: South Africa, Tanzania, and Angola. These countries have the GDP levels above other member states in the SADC region (SADC 2012). Case study one presents LED experiences in South Africa using eThekweni Municipality as a local case study.

Case Study 1: Local Economic Development in South Africa

The experience of the South African cities in poverty alleviation is regulated by various macro-economic policies and legislative framework that endorse LED initiatives as pro-poor economic development strategy. Municipalities are identified as critical institutions for poverty alleviation; and are required by the South African Constitution of 1996 to arrange their budgetary processes in a manner that prioritises socioeconomic endeavours for local communities. The unemployment levels in eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality in 2018 were estimated at 22.41% and another 33.3% of the citizens who were living under chronic poverty. In the presence of these harsh socio-economic conditions, South African municipalities over the years have introduced

various poverty alleviation programmes, including Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) that facilitate employment opportunities, SMMEs, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment, transportation and infrastructure development and many other initiatives. In the case of eThekweni City Council, the municipality has established a business development unity which promotes various forms of informal business activities in the city, including promotion of safe and healthy trading environment, provision of water, electricity, and ablution facilities. In addition, the municipality has adopted a comprehensive and innovative approach that focusses on improving informal economic activities for local communities. This approach can be considered innovative for inter alia, the following reasons:

Institutional Arrangements: the municipality launched the urban renewal programme in the 1990s in order to professionalise street vending and provide infrastructure requirements for emerging entrepreneurs in the city.

Holistic Approach: the Municipal Informal Trade Policy was formulated in 2002 to shape new mindsets around informal economy. In this approach, informal economy is not only a survivalist strategy, but a long-term development that contributes to self-employment and strong economic base for the city.

Shared Understanding and Communication: the formation of the eThekweni Municipal Informal Economy Forum (EMIEF) and South African National Economy Forum (SANIEF).

in 2006 were instrumental for the council's commitment towards the promotion of inclusive economic development for local communities.

Capacity Building: funding informal business activities in the city and capacity development programmes for local communities focusing on community entrepreneurship, health education, legal services, and other soft skills are prioritised by the municipality towards ensuring inclusive economic development.

Source: Minderman and Reddy (2016).

A plethora of legislations in South Africa was adopted following the ushering in of democracy. The Constitution of 1996, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, White Paper on Local Government of 1998, LED Guidelines to Institutional Arrangements of 2000, the National Framework for Local Economic Development in South Africa of 2006 to 2011, and the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) for municipalities have and continue to support LED initiatives in the country.

Case study 2 presents LED experiences in Tanzania.

Case Study 2: Local Economic Development in Tanzania

According to the Constitution of Tanzania, LED is part of the local government's strategic responsibilities. Furthermore, The Local Government Acts No 7 AND 8 of 1982 require Local Government Authorities to improve the social and economic well-being of people. Subsequently, Tanzania adopted several policy frameworks that promote LED. These included many policy initiatives such as the National Economic Empowerment Act (2004), which led to several national LED strategies and programmes. These included strategies and programmes that facilitate private sector development, land security system, a National council for the private sector, and the National Centre of Investment to promote LED (Platforma 2015). The decentralisation policy was augmented by the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) which gave local government fiscal autonomy of levying taxes.

The LED practice in Tanzania is also informed by the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 which guides Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) policy framework, which seeks to create an enabling environment for LED. The value of the SME sector is not fully recognised in Tanzania. This is despite the establishment of several institutions including Small Industrial Development Organisation (SIDO) and National Development Corporation (NDC) and the programme including Rural Development Strategy, Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) Programme to facilitate the SME sector. Coupled with these institutions, LED has significantly gained prominence in the decentralisation, economic growth and development engagements. Decentralisation efforts promote bottom-up planning and empowering local communities to get involved in resolving LED issues (UCLG 2016).

Similar to South Africa, Tanzania adopted several legislations, including the Decentralisation Policy and Local Government Act of 1982, the Local Government Reform Policy of 1999, the National Economic Empowerment Policy, and the National Economic Empowerment Act of 2004, all supporting LED initiatives in the country.

Case study [Study 3](#) presents the LED experience in Angola.

Case Study 3 Local Economic Development in Angola

The economic landscape of the Angolan cities is similar to many African countries that embarked on major socio-economic transformation after their independence from colonial governments since the 1950s. In the case of Angola, this transformation has embraced many community livelihood

strategies including the contributions of LED as an alternative strategy for the alleviation of poverty and the myriad of social ills. There are three main sectors that generate Angolan local economy, including oil, manufacturing, and urban–rural agricultural productions. Informal economy is the key economic driver of the Angolan economic base that is explored by many communities. The huge portion of participation is in the informal agricultural markets and is contributed to by female-headed households and the few who are the migrants in the cities (African Economic Outlook 2012). Despite many efforts to establish the multifaceted economic sectors, the economic potential of the local communities is still limited to agricultural productions. While the government encourages maximum participation into informal economy regardless of the citizens’ gender, race, and educational level, financial resources are the main barrier that limit participation of many local communities. It is only those individuals from elite backgrounds who are privileged to access bank funding for exploring business opportunities. In many instances, poor communities are secluded and compelled to resort to the financial support of the unauthorised financial institutions for short-term loans that further plunge them to chronic debts and poverty. For this reason, the microfinance scheme was launched in 1999 to encourage women’s participation in the fisheries industry. After the successful evaluation of the programme in 2010, a potential for a comprehensive community-wide development programme was identified to focus on small business financing. Hence, the Sustainable Livelihoods Project (SLP) was launched to target economically active men and women to pursue business ventures in the informal economic sector in both rural and urban communities. The creation of small business centres, encouragement of SMMEs, infrastructure development, and youth employment are also the government’s pipeline programmes for enhancing economic prosperities for the smaller cities in Angola. The key lesson that can be emulated from this is the inclusion and capacitation of local communities to drive their own community development initiatives without reliance on the government schemes.

Source: African Economic Outlook 2012

In the presence of harsh socio-economic challenges, the Angolan government has, since the proclamation of the country’s independence in 1975, introduced various legislative and policy frameworks that aim to boost the informal economy as a strong LED strategy for communities living in poverty. The revenues generated through the oil industries are currently the main economic activities that sustain economic growth for Angola (African Economic Outlook 2012).

SADC's Development Challenges and Realities

The formation of regional blocs such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have created a platform needed to mitigate human development challenges within the respective regions and their cities. From the inception of the SADC regional grouping in 1992, there have been numerous achievements. However, there has been notable challenges that outweigh the progress achieved. To date these challenges, include:

- **Imbalanced Economic Growth**

The SADC experienced an economic contraction from 2013 to 2016 with slight improvement in the gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 17% in 2017 compared to the previous year, and is it projected to grow at 4.7–5.5% annually until 2023 (ILO 2018). Although this economic outlook gives reason for optimism, the data show firm link with global commodity prices and renders continual regional overdependence on certain commodities. To sustain local economies, Governments in the regions have intensified their commitment to invest more on different economic sectors with potential to improve national economic growth. Despite these commitments, progress remains slow (Bronauer and Yoon 2018). In addition, intra-regional and continental trade in SADC countries is dwindling as shown in Table 7.1.

The GDP levels in SADC show vast disparities, hinting at significant structural differences among member states. As depicted in Fig. 7.1 of the region's insignificant GDP estimated at \$691 billion in 2017, South Africa had a share of 51%.

Table 7.1 Destination of SADC exports by exporting country (%), 2017

Exporting country	SADC (% of total)	Rest of Africa (% of total)	Rest of the world (% of total)
Angola	4	0	96
Botswana	9	0	91
DRC	24	1	76
Lesotho	30	0	70
Madagascar	6	1	92
Malawi	24	10	67
Mauritius	23	4	73
Mozambique	21	0	78
Namibia	29	1	70
Seychelles	4	1	95
South Africa	23	3	74
Swaziland	75	13	12
Tanzania	8	9	83
Zambia	17	2	81
Zimbabwe	14	2	85
Average	21	3	76

Source: ITC (International Trade Centre), Trade Map, <https://www.trademap.org/>




Fig. 7.1 SADC nominal GDP share per country (%), 2017. (Source: International Monetary Fund 2018)

Angola and Tanzania had the second and third highest GDP levels with 18% and 7%, respectively. While SADC has continued to demonstrate a positive economic outlook, its real, inflation-adjusted GDP growth has slumped significantly since 2010. In 2017, average real growth reached a mere 2.8%, which is 2% below the emerging economies (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

• **Intra-Regional Investment**

Southern Africa was hit particularly hard by the most recent decrease in global investment flows, as the region saw incoming investment decline by 66%. Since the sudden drop in global commodity prices in 2013, many investors have remained fearful of a repeated crisis and are therefore reluctant to invest in commodity extraction, an investment that tends to bind large stocks of capital for a relatively long period of time. As a result of this hesitancy, many SADC countries are deprived of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in their dominant extractive sectors. Since FDI makes up 39% of all incoming finance in developing countries more broadly, this volatility in investment has a substantial impact on their economic performance (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

• **Lack of Trade Diversification**

SADC faces the dual challenge of decreasing its reliance on primary commodities and diversifying its export network if the region wants to achieve stable growth in its domestic industries and regional value chain (RVC) networks. Constituting 62% of the region’s total primary commodities exports including mineral fuels and oils, precious metals and ores, and vehicles were the region’s top five exported commodities in 2017. In terms of trading partners, China is one of the most important export destinations for these commodities, with the US and the EU the other main destinations. These data suggest that the region not only relies on primary commodities but also trades predominantly with a few key partners. While commodity

dependence leaves SADC economies at the mercy of global commodity prices, the lack of diversification in trading partners increases the risk of global market turbulence's adversely affecting SADC countries, thereby undermining their economic development (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

Case Study 4 Mozambique's Sector Diversification

After a decade of civil war, reconstruction efforts in Mozambique took the form of megaprojects focused on rebuilding the country's infrastructure. The construction of the \$2.4 billion Mozal aluminium smelter from 1998 to 2003 was Mozambique's primary postcivil war megaproject, a joint venture led by the Australian BHP Billiton, the Japanese Mitsubishi, the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, and the government of Mozambique. This joint venture signalled Mozambique's openness to the foreign business sector. Owing to Mozambique's willingness to open up the country to FDI, it was able not only to strengthen its manufacturing infrastructure but also to diversify its export base from agricultural products, dominated by cashew nuts, to a range of minerals and metals, dominated by aluminium from the Mozal smelter.

Currently, the Mozal smelter is the largest industrial employer in the country. With more than 500,000 tonnes of aluminium produced every year, it has also started supplying.

Mozambique's first downstream aluminium business is forecast to boost the local economy. Such developments have attracted significant flows of FDI into Mozambique, contributing to impressive economic growth rates. Mozal, along with megaprojects Sosal and Moma, is estimated to have increased Mozambique's average annual growth by 1% between 1996 and 2006.

However, although Mozambique's megaprojects have boosted its economy in recent years, it has to be wary of overreliance on the development of mineral resources and instead widen its scope of investment. Megaprojects tend to have huge impacts on exports but limited linkages to the local economy. Owing to the intrinsic differences between the large-scale and export-oriented nature of megaprojects such as Mozal and local business, megaprojects may not create an equal share of benefits in the domestic arena.

Source: Bronauer and Yoon (2018)

• **Domestic Infrastructure Constraints**

According to the 2017–2018 World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index, the average ranking of SADC members' infrastructure is 101 out of 137 countries. Broken into subcategories, for example, this translates into 102 for electricity and telephone infrastructure and 95 for transport infrastructure (World Economic Forum 2011).

Estimates by the *African Development Bank*³ (AfDB) suggest that Africa's infrastructure needs \$140–\$170 billion per year, with an annual financing gap of between \$67.6 and \$107.5 billion. In order to address the region's share of this financing gap, SADC launched the Project Preparation and Development Facility (PPDF) in 2012 with the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) acting as its implementation agent. The institution aims to facilitate the implementation of the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan⁴ (RIDMP) by providing support for project preparation, including feasibility analyses and technical assistance. Most prominent among the areas for investment under the RIDMP are the energy and transport sectors, which account for more than 90% of the total initial investment costs (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

• Financial Inclusion

While microfinance institutions such as the *Southern Africa Micro-finance* and Enterprise Capacity Enhancement Facility (SAMCAF) have opened the credit market to smallholder farmers and entrepreneurs, the rates of such loans are often prohibitively high. For instance, in Malawi and Mozambique, microfinance interest rates for a loan of up to \$3145 are on average around 80% per year. By charging exorbitant rates, microfinance institutions fail to support inclusive finance for low income households and potential exporters. The issue of small, medium, and micro-sized enterprise (SMME) financing is one of the central considerations of the South Africa–Africa Trade and Investment Promotion Programme⁵ (SATIPP), which guarantees financial support for export-oriented companies (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

Case Study 5: Financial Inclusion in Malawi

The high cost of financing – owing to the lack of reliable information on borrowers – and the asymmetry of information regarding alternative sources of financing are primarily responsible for farmers' inability to upscale and insure their business operations. In 2014, 91% of Malawians were involved in agriculture while 86% depended on it as a major source of income. The lack of irrigation infrastructure and advanced technologies, as well as the country's volatile climate, thus jeopardise the livelihood of the majority of the population. Without access to affordable financing, farmers are unable to increase productivity by buying more advanced equipment or improved crop seeds, or

³The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is a [multilateral development finance institution](#), which was founded in 1964.

⁴The RIDMP was signed at the Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government in August 2012. It guides development in key infrastructure.

⁵The SATIPP is a joint programme launched by the African Export-Import Bank ('Afreximbank') and the Export Credit Insurance Corporation of South Africa SOC Limited ('ECIC'), which seeks to enhance trade and investment.

by installing irrigation. However, commercial banks and private lenders struggle to assess the default risk of their customers. Perceived risk must be included in the calculation of interest rates, and since many people living in rural Malawi lack any form of credit history or standardised documentation, banks are particularly cautious in extending credit to them. The disparity between the information lenders is expected to provide and the real information available to them demonstrates the different business cultures of the two stakeholder groups. Commercial banks tend to tailor their products to the needs of urban companies that they know much better than rural farmers, leading to a lack of suitable products for the rural population. This market discrepancy is amplified by the communication gap between rural communities and banks, most importantly caused by a difference in language as well as a lack of advertisement in rural areas. The result is that in 2014 a mere 8% of Malawians received their wages through a formal bank account. The rise of digital financial services (DFS) provides an opportunity to increase financial inclusion and allow rural residents to make financial transactions at a low cost. Since about 72% of Malawians had access to a mobile phone in 2014, there is a significant potential for DFS without the necessity of any physical infrastructure such as ATMs or branches (except for initial deposits). However, in the same year, only 4% of Malawians actually used mobile money services, indicating that much needs to be done before DFS can be considered a solution to financial exclusion.

As the main challenge identified in the study, the asymmetry of information between the formal banking sector and the informal agricultural sector must be overcome if access to finance is to be improved. Although unlikely, lenders could be urged to refine pricing methods to align more accurately with the financial conditions of potential customers. Alternatively, the creation of cooperatives and agricultural producers' organisations could help smallholder farmers engage more effectively with commercial banks and thereby secure better rates for loans. Risks can be spread by having a collective of farmers as a customer rather than individual farmers, who tend to pose a higher default risk for banks.

Source: Bronauer and Yoon 2018

• Labour Shortage

Shortages of skilled labour supplies in local labour markets continue to jeopardise the region's industrialisation agenda. As foreign firms often prefer to hire abroad, particularly for positions that require more technical or managerial expertise, this problem has not been resolved by the entrance of foreign businesses or investment in the region. This is especially concerning, as countries that need human capital performance requirements the most are often those that have the scarcest supply of skilled labour. Therefore, restrictive measures to encourage local labour sources tend to backfire (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

Case Study 6 Skilled Labour Shortage

Restrictive labour legislation often discourages foreign firms from entering SADC countries. For example, the control of foreign skills in Namibia, whereby foreign nationals working in Namibia are only granted temporary work permits, lowers the chance of companies' needing skilled workers settling and investing locally. Tanzania's Employment Promotion Service Act requires that when firms hire foreigners, they assign a Tanzanian understudy to that foreign national. Although a commendable policy, the need for excessive personnel training, owing to the low skills base of the Tanzanian workforce, could discourage foreign investors from operating in the country.

Source: Bronauer and Yoon 2018

• Political–Economic Constraints

Given that most barriers to trade and investment in SADC can be traced back to differences in national interests and the ensuing inconsistencies in economic policies among member states, the recent trend towards broader liberalisation seems counterintuitive. Theoretically, the failure to reach a regional consensus on sensitive trade issues suggests that broader economic integration is even more unfeasible. However, the high-level political momentum of the African Continental Free Trade Area⁶ (AfCFTA) indicates that there is substantial support for broader integration. This implies either that countries advocating increased liberalisation aim to circumvent non-participants in their regional economic community⁷ (REC) by expanding the free trade agreement (FTA) to include more willing participants, or that member states seek to pressure non-participants to comply by indirectly threatening them with economic exclusion. In the first case, it would not matter if countries failed to implement the agreement as long as those countries that were willing to participate opened their markets. The consequence would be a 'selective' FTA in which countries chose to which partners they granted preferred market access (Bronauer and Yoon 2018).

Strategic Partnership for Economic Integration in the SADC Region

The significance of the strategic partnerships that are discussed below stem from the realisation that the SADC region faces formidable socio-economic challenges and growing responsibility to work as a collective unit to address economic base and the

⁶ AfCFTA is a trade agreement between African Union member states which Rwanda ratified on 21 March 2018. Currently it has 54 member states.

⁷ REC is a 'building block' of the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which facilitates economic integration.

livelihoods of citizens who live in poverty. There is also a shared consensus among the SADC member states that confirms LED as an alternative strategy to traditional economic development approaches. These strategies include the following.

SADC-COMESA-EAC Free Trade Area

Africa is characterised by small economies and markets. Therefore, regional economic integration remains a sustainable economic strategy for the development of local cities in Africa (Kalenga 2012). To that effect, ‘the arrangement for instituting the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa was endorsed on 21 December 1981 and became effective on 30 September 1982’ (Kalenga 2012). The PTA was later replaced with the current Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which was signed on 5 November 1993 and ratified on 8 December 1994. The vision of COMESA is ‘to have a fully integrated internationally competitive regional economic community with high standards of living for its entire people, ready to merge into the African Economic Community’. Currently, COMESA is constituted of 21 member states including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Somalia, and Tunisia (Kalenga 2012).

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

On 31 October 2000, COMESA successfully established an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) among nine member states. These include Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros, and Libya. African Continental Free Trade Area facilitates regional integration obliterating intercontinental customs tariffs. African Continental Free Trade Area is a strategic partnership model within the African region seeking to support various country-specific economic development programmes. This model establishes a unified continental market for commodities for approximately 1.2 billion people in Africa and creates employment opportunities jobs and develops infrastructure in order to support emerging entrepreneurs. In addition, AfCFTA will provide and pave the way to new export opportunities for Southern African products and services (Sandrey 2005).

In 2009, COMESA unveiled its Customs Union as its first Regional Integration milestone and a foundation of the East African Community (EAC). The EAC was formulated through the recommendations of the Abuja and formally unveiled in 1994, as an instrument for the acceleration of the African regional economic integration. It is also conceptualised as one of the many initiatives that strives to advance

economic amalgamation within the African region. Its undertakings are administered jointly by the AU Commission (AUC) (AfDB and ADF 2004). The African Union (AU) currently acknowledges eight sub-regional economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks of the AEC, including Republic of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Moreover, COMESA envisages becoming a full Economic Community by 2025 (COMESA-EAC-SADC 2011).

SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap

The 39th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community took place on the 18th August 2019 in Tanzania. The theme of the SADC envisioned ‘A Conducive Business Environment for Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development’ covered a wide range of issues, including the implementation of the region’s operational plans and priority programmes such as industrialisation, trade, and infrastructure development. The resolutions of the Summit reflect an urgent need to harness the combined strength of the SADC in order to foster the following:

- Intra-Africa economic trade and market integration
- Cross-border infrastructure development
- Development of industrial policies that will enhance public and private sector investments
- Encourage private sector involvement in the implementation of the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap
- Skills development geared towards and to develop innovation-led, knowledge-based economies commonly known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) (Williams 2019)

African Development Bank (AfDB)

The vision of the AfDB outlines poverty reduction as the Bank’s fundamental goal and identifies sectoral priorities that should be accomplished towards the realisation of the sustainable economic agenda in the SADC region (AfDB 2014: i). Accordingly, the AfDB aims to alleviate poverty, promote access to credit, and reduce gaps of gender equalities and enhance livelihood strategies (Chibba 2014:214). The theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the AfDB has potential to reduce poverty levels and promote pro-poor economic development and address socio-economic imbalances in the African region (Ponte et al. 2007).

Conclusion

Since the inception of the SADC region in the early 1990s, there has been a huge focus on ameliorating the myriad of socio-economic challenges that continue to engulf the region, including the lack of bilateral trade and investment, skewed economic growth, financial exclusion, youth unemployment, and poor infrastructure development. This chapter argued that the upsurge of globalisation and its impacts in the SADC region have led to the reconceptualisation of its economic development strategies, including the promotion of LED as an alternative strategy to complement the traditional economic establishments. The formulation of the RISDP in 2005 and its renewal in 2015 has affirmed the vision and commitment of the region towards planning the implementation of the regional cooperation and integration in the quest for socio-economic development and liberalisation. This has in turn seen the formation of the SADC-COMESA-EAC Free Trade Area, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, African Development Bank (AfDB), and Tripartite Co-operation Framework as alternatives to forge strategic partnership for economic integration in the SADC Region.

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Chapter 8

E-participation as a Mechanism of Stakeholder Engagement in the City of Harare



Linos Mapfumo and Sybert Mutereko

Abstract Cities in emerging economies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, are beginning to leverage the power of information and communication technologies (ICTs) by incorporating e-participation as the key mechanism of public participation. However, there seems to be an overwhelming consensus among scholars on its lack of effectiveness. This chapter contributes to the growing body of literature on e-participation as an alternative governance mechanism and as an innovative technology for African cities in transition by providing insights into its application or lack thereof in politically polarised cities such as the City of Harare. In doing so, the chapter draws strongly on a case study of the City of Harare in Zimbabwe and on data gleaned through surveys and documentary analysis. The data for this chapter emerged from a broader project that used interviews with purposefully selected informal traders and their customer participants (N = 195) randomly chosen for the surveys. The chapter argues that the effects of political and debilitating economic challenges, which have resulted in skyrocketing prices and diminishing disposable incomes, have been to limit citizen's resources for data which could enable them to be actively involved in various ICT platforms for e-participation. This, together with frequent power outages, is a huge barrier to the application of alternative governance and innovative technologies for African cities in transition. This study not only highlights the importance of e-participation but underscores the need to understand the heterogeneity of the context of its application.

Keywords E-participation · Local government · Public participation · Social media · Stakeholder engagement

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Introduction

A growing corpus of literature demonstrates that electronic participation (e-participation), as a part of e-governance, has in recent decades proved to be an effective means through which government, at different levels, can engage the citizenry (Macintosh (2004); (Conroy and Evans-Cowley 2006). Proponents of e-participation argue that the adoption and application of innovative ICTs in the governance of cities allows a wider audience to engage in such governance and it deepens the level of democratic debate on issues that affect citizens (Macintosh 2004). Some studies have explored the impact of e-participation by examining the levels of satisfaction by citizens and government responsiveness to it. For instance, drawing on the rich and extensive data from a 2009 E-Participation Survey undertaken for the Seoul Metropolitan Government, Kim and Lee (2012) concluded that, among other things, the satisfaction of citizens with e-participation and government's responsiveness was high and to some extent reached Arnstein's (1969) higher levels of the degree of participation. The compelling theoretical and practical argument for the e-participation is plausible and its intuitive appeal has seen many governments, particularly at the local level, establishing infrastructure for it. For instance, the Ministry of Communication and Information of Singapore has an online site named *Reaching Everyone for Active Citizenry Participation @Home*, where citizens can participate in public policy matters (Government of Singapore 2019). Although this platform is bidirectional, and only reflects communication between government and citizens, to the exclusion of important debates between citizens themselves, it has proved to be an effective way of improving citizenry participation in policy issues that affect their lives. The Singaporean example is but one example of e-participation out of many such cases in North America and continental Europe.

Cities in the emerging economies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, are beginning to leverage harness the power of ICTs by incorporating e-participation as a key mechanism of public participation (Wakabi and Grönlund 2019; Mawela et al. 2017). However, there seems to be an overwhelming consensus among scholars on its lack of effectiveness. Among the reasons often cited for the lack of effectiveness of such participation are low Internet use, authoritarian contexts (Wakabi and Grönlund 2019), limited access to resources, poor leadership, inadequate ICT skills and lack of funding (Mawela et al. 2017). However, much of the research on e-participation in the emerging economies is largely descriptive and does not seem to take into account the views of the citizens, who are the major stakeholders in public participation in the cities. As a backdrop to this, this chapter contributes to the growing corpus of literature on e-participation by providing insights into its application or lack thereof in politically polarised cities such as the City of Harare (CoH). The chapter builds on and contributes to the discourse of e-governance in general and to its application in emerging economies where democratic consolidation is very low and the digital divide is wide. In doing so, the chapter draws strongly on a case study of the CoH in Zimbabwe and data gleaned through surveys and documentary analysis.

Following this introduction, the next two sections review literature on e-participation and outline the theoretical framework underpinning the chapter. The fourth section outlines the methods to glean the data for the Harare case study. The fifth and last section provides the case study and demonstrates how the implementation of e-participation is not as linear as its proponents claim it to be.

Conceptualising E-participation: A Review of Literature

E-participation Defined

Various scholars have come up with different definitions for the term e-participation (Ochara and Mawela 2015). Because of this, there has not been a single universally accepted definition to understand the concept of e-participation. Generally, the term 'e-participation' has been used to refer to the type of democratic governance that takes place in virtual space. Macintosh (2004) refers to e-participation as the use of ICT to support the democratic decision-making process. Some scholars conceptualise e-participation as 'e-voting'. However, this definition seems too simple and it must be noted that it fails to capture the pertinent elements of the term because voting is not the only process of decision-making that the citizens can participate in. Wirtz et al. (2018) conceptualised e-participation as the active process of fostering public engagement and open participatory governance through information and communication technologies (ICTs). Salamat et al. (2011: 56) argued that e-participation is the term used to describe 'ICT supported participation in the processes involved in government and governance'. These processes may involve areas of administration, service delivery, decision-making and policymaking. Owing to this character of e-participation, scholars believe that it is closely related to e-governance and e-governance participation.

Similarly, Royo and Yetano (2015: 323) decided to take a broad approach to e-participation and defined it as 'the use of information and communication technologies to broaden and deepen political participation by enabling citizens to connect with one another and with their representatives'. This definition is comprehensive in the sense that it includes all stakeholders in democratic decision-making processes and not only in citizen-related top-down government initiatives. Drawing on this definition, scholars argued that e-participation should be understood as an integral part of e-governance.

Promises of E-participation

Increasing evidence points to the fast growth of e-participation as a tool for engagement and strengthened partnership between governments and citizenry (Salamat et al. 2011). The foremost objective of e-participation is to advance access to information and to promote participation in policymaking, both for the empowerment of

individuals' citizens and the benefits of society as a whole. Ochara and Mawela (2015) stressed that central to the concept of e-participation and e-governance is that e-participation could reduce the gap between government and its citizens and allow the two to be constantly communicating with each other on issues that affect the government and the citizens. In a similar vein, Van Kempen (2014) argues that e-participation can be utilised as a way to reach out to the citizens when obtaining feedback is of great importance. These scholars stress that e-participation in this way can be a useful tool that works as a guideline for what type of government solutions could be accepted and therefore prove to be sustainable. Mergel (2013) argues that e-participation allows two-way communication between the government and the citizens on issues of policy. This scholar is of the view that participation 'needs to be used to provide information about the efficiency and sustainability of different projects and efforts, and it must be used to align the final solution design to the needs and views of the public to ensure acceptance and continued progress' (Mergel 2013: 327). Rexhepi et al. (2018) argued that e-participation is only possible when the government provides its citizens with ICT-based communication channels that help government to undertake deeper levels of engagement with its citizens.

Effectiveness of E-participation

E-participation has been seen to be very effective. Rexhepi et al. (2018) stressed that the most common type of e-participation channels used by the local government is social media. These scholars argued that this form of communication can only be effective if they allow the two-way communication that allows the government to send the message and allows the citizens to respond. According to these scholars asking citizens to submit their ideas and comments 'highlights the potential for bi-directional citizens participation and this content can be actively pulled in through crowdsourcing' (Rexhepi et al. 2018: 114). Similarly, Royo and Yetano (2015) argued that e-participation has been effective as a tool that governments and organisations use to solve wider problems. According to these scholars, the use of ICTs has allowed the government to open up the problems to the people and this allowed them to have different views of the problems. These scholars said e-participation has allowed, for citizens with expertise, experience, local knowledge and professional insights to contribute their perspectives as service users or interested participants. As a result this has been crucial in broadening the circle of information and know-how on which government agencies eventually decide what course of action to take (Royo and Yetano 2015).

Komito (2005) argued that contrary to the promises and expectations of many, ICTs might not promote public involvement rates in formal governments and so might not advance participation rates generally. However, according to Komito (2005), ICTs have the possibility of growing levels of casual communication and consequently of building social capital. When citizens monitor and influence local service provision, these exchanges create trust and a sense of influence, which, in

turn, encourages civic and political participation. To add to this, Ochara and Mawela (2015) stressed that despite the potential that e-participation brought, the sustainability of ICT for e-participation and e-governance projects in developing nations remains a huge challenge. These scholars stressed that claims that e-participation is good are not true. This is because the more the government moves communication to ICT, the more exclusion takes place.

Theoretical Perspectives: The Ladder of Participation

The Ladder of Participation

This study is underpinned by Arnstein's *ladder of participation*. The Arnstein (1969) theory, particularly her description of the ladder of public participation, has been adopted and applied by different scholars in different disciplines. For instance, Mapuva (2010) employed Arnstein's *Ladder of Citizen Participation* to examine the type a relationship that exists between citizens and the authorities in Zimbabwe. Wang (2001) applied the theory to evaluate the type of citizens' involvement in United States (US) cities. Similarly, Blair (2018) employs the ladder of public participation in dealing with challenges of policymaking and political accountability in India. Nonetheless, Arnstein's *ladder of participation* comprises eight 'stages' or progressions of participation. These stages are grouped under three different headings: Non-participation, Tokenism and Citizen Power (Radtke et al. 2018; Arnstein 1969; Reardon 1998).

Arnstein (1969: 263) asserts that 'participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless'. What this means is that the organisation of power in the process of participation and decision-making occupies a crucial role. Because of that, emphasis by Arnstein on power constructions within any given community and how they interrelate by displaying who possesses authority and dominion in situations where crucial decisions are being made is mostly suitable to this study as it allows one to reflect through the several phases in which local government authorities can involve the public meaningfully, by including them in policy preparation and implementation processes. Moreover, Arnstein's definition of public participation is useful in understanding how public involvement in issues of governance and the influence they have can occupy a vigorous, meaningful and purposeful role in the manner in which they are ruled by local government establishments. In this instance, the manner city councils oversee the flea markets to the communal advantage of the community and the councils themselves. To add, by considering all the gradations, that is, 'manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control' (Arnstein 1969: 217), Arnstein offers both scholars and experts a theoretical instrument to advance governance. More so, Arnstein's conceptualisation is of enormous value particularly in explaining the significance of cooperative governance and civic participation. Additionally, the public participation and involvement literature assists

us to understand relations that exist between ‘government, the governed and other sectors, either as potentially collaborative or adversarial’ (Blair 2018: 54). Accordingly, by giving careful consideration to Arnstein’s (1969) influential work, it assists us to contextualise Harare’s governance framework.

Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology

The *unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT)* has been used by a number of scholars (Dwivedi et al. 2019). For instance, Gupta et al. (2008) examined the UTAUT in the context of e-government adoption in a developing country. Koivumäki et al. (2008) applied the UTAUT to examine the perceptions of 243 people in northern Finland towards mobile services and technology. These scholars found that ‘the time an individual spent using the device had no impact on the consumer perception, instead, familiarity with the devices and user skills did have an impact’ (Koivumäki et al. 2008: 67). Curtis et al. (2010: 90) used the model to the adoption of social media by 409 USA non-profit organisations. These scholars found that ‘organizations with defined public relations departments are more likely to adopt social media technologies and use them to achieve organizational goals’ (Curtis et al. 2010: 90).

According to Venkatesh et al. (2003), the UTAUT model can be conceptualised as a technology acceptance model. The model explains the intention of the users when they use information systems and their subsequent usage behaviour. According to these scholars there are four main constructs upon which the model is grounded. These are performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence and facilitating conditions. To illustrate, performance expectancy is understood as the extent a person believes that using a particular communication system will assist them to accomplish their desired aims. Effort expectancy explains the degree of ease that is associated with the individual use of a particular IS/IT system. Social influence explains the extent to which an individual thinks that people in their circles believe that the use of a particular IS/IT communication system is important. Attitude will then refer to a person’s negative or positive feelings about performing the targeted behaviour using IS/IT communication systems.

Despite the fact that the model hypothesised some associations that may not be appropriate to all situations, this chapter draws on the work of Venkatesh et al. (2003) to argue that the government and citizens can both use the IS/IT communication system to enhance e-participation. UTAUT’s four constructs are especially useful for this study analysis as it allows one to think through how the adoption of IS/IT as a vehicle of communication can enhance e-participation in the governance of cities. The conceptualisation of Venkatesh et al. (2003) that the individual acceptance and use of technology is generative for grasping how the citizens adopt and uses different technologies that are provided to them by their government for purposes of public participation is important. It is here also that UTAUT’s attention to performance expectancy is of value for informing the extent to which the citizens

think that e-participation will help them to attain their right to participate in decision-making.

Methodological Issues

This chapter draws on data from a broader study that was undertaken using a mixed method approach in the CoH, an area that falls under the metropolitan province of Harare.

Participants

The data for this study emerged from a broader project that used interviews with purposefully selected participants and randomly chosen survey participants. Table 8.1 shows the profile of the respondents.

As shown in Table 8.1, in Harare Central, out of 65 respondents, 76.9% were flea market customers whilst 23.1% were flea market operators or vendors. In Mbare, 130 respondents were interviewed, out of which 61.5% were flea market customers whilst 38.5% were flea market operators or vendors. This indicates that the majority of respondents from both Harare Central and Mbare were flea market customers. This is attributable to the fact that, due to high competition and the nature of flea market trading, vendors were reluctant to be interviewed as it entailed losing revenue. Further to this, 12 participants from members, policymakers in the Harare City Council, flea market leaders and non-governmental organisation (NGO) leaders/lobbyists were purposely selected to participate in the study.

Instrumentation

In order to elicit the views of both the vendors and their customers, a survey questionnaire was designed. The questionnaire included four broad themes, namely, policy formulation, institutional design, facilitative leadership and collaborative process in order to gain perspectives on and perception of flea market governance and participation. The first theme sought to comprehend the respondents' opinions on their perceptions and experiences in policy formulations whilst the second theme sought to understand the framework in which the respondents participate in flea market governance and management. A five-step Likert scale was one of the data collection instruments that was used whereby respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement in terms of their perceptions of public participation in Harare's flea market sector (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). The questionnaire also contained open-ended questions where respondents could express their views.

Table 8.1 Profile of participants

Ward		Harare Central		Mbare		Total (N)
		(N = 65)		(N = 130)		
		Frequency	Per cent	Frequency	Per cent	
Age group	Between 18 and 25	12	18.5	25	19.2	37
	Between 26 and 35	20	30.8	44	33.8	64
	Between 36 and 45	18	27.7	39	30	57
	Between 46 and 55	11	16.9	17	13.1	28
	Above 55	4	6.2	5	3.8	9
Level of education	No formal education	2	3.1	2	3.1	4
	Primary	4	6.2	4	6.2	8
	Secondary	41	63.1	41	63.1	82
	Tertiary	12	18.5	12	18.5	24
	Postgraduate	6	9.2	6	9.2	12
Gender	Female	33	50.8	71	54.6	104
	Male	32	49.2	59	45.4	91
Respondent category	Customers	50	76.9	80	61.5	130
	Flea market operators	15	23.1	50	38.5	65
Total		65	100	130	100	195

Source: Field Survey (2018). Sample size = 195

Data Collection Procedures

Having been granted permission to conduct fieldwork by the Ministry of Local Government and permission from various vendor organisations and role players, the researcher engaged with vendors and their customers explaining to them the purposes of the study and that their participation was voluntary. In administering the questionnaire, this study used intercept interviews. Hornik and Ellis (1988) argue that intercept interviews have become the most popular method of data collection. Upon identification of a potential respondent, the researcher used the gaze and touch techniques as suggested by Mardanbegi and Pfeiffer and Dolinski (2015), to approach potential interviewees in the most densely populated flea markets in the districts of Mbare East and Harare Central. Upon contact, the target was greeted and advised of the broad aims and goals of the study and why their input was important in contextualising issues. The face-to-face interviews took a minimum of 40 min. Permission was also sought to audio record the interviewees.

Data Analysis

The researcher used both quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques. With regard to interviews, all interview transcripts were processed and analysed. Firstly, all the interviews were transcribed verbatim. The transcribed data generated approx-

imately 50 A4 printed pages. This study also utilised four (4) steps in thematic analysis. These are the identification of major themes, allocation of codes to main themes, thematic classification of responses and thematic integration of responses into texts. Quantitative data analysis was also utilised in focus group discussions and interviews in order to derive patterns and meanings. The chi-square was used to test the study's hypothesis on whether or not variables such as the vendors' and their customers' age, place of origin, gender and qualification determined their responses and whether or not their responses were influenced by such variables.

City of Harare: The Background

The City of Harare was established as a fort by the Pioneer Column in 1890. The Pioneer Column was a mercenary force that operated under Cecil Rhodes, who was the leader of the occupying Pioneer Column (Mackintosh et al. 2019). The city was initially dubbed Fort Salisbury and it was later declared a municipality in 1897 and it became a city in 1935. Salisbury was the capital of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963. The City of Harare is the administrative and economic capital and most populous in Zimbabwe. Harare is the leading commercial, financial and communication centre as well as a trade centre for manufacturing and mining. Its population is estimated at 1.6 million as of the last census. An estimate of two hundred thousand of its total population lives in the metropolitan area. The city which covers an area of 960.6 square kilometres is situated in the north-eastern parts of Zimbabwe in the country's Mashonaland region. Moreover, it is also a metropolitan province which includes the municipalities of Epworth and Chitungwiza. It is seen as the economic hub of Zimbabwe. Although the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), controls most the country, the City of Harare, like many other urban centres, is governed by the country's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change. This political polarisation complicates public participation particularly e-participation. This takes place in the context of fear and suspicion among the citizens.

City of Harare E-participation

Whilst the *2013 Zimbabwean Constitution* makes public participation a constitutional requirement, it does not prescribe the mechanisms for such. With the growth of ITC in the country and its intuitive appeal, e-participation is one option that the city explores and tries to apply. Online democratic participation is fast emerging as one of the leading contemporary public participation methods which provides the citizenry with an added opportunity to be informed and to be given the chance to shape their own futures. E-participation is described by the *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)* as an engagement tool that

fosters civic engagement and through information and communications technologies (ICTs) also opens up participatory governance. The sole objective in this regard is to improve access to information and public services and in the process to support the promotion of civic participation in policymaking for everyone and for society's benefit (UNDESA 2018). Zimbabwe has not been left out of these new global information technology trends. The country has, over the past nine years, been experiencing an exponential increase in Internet penetration as indicated in Table 6.11 (Fig. 8.1).

As indicated above, Zimbabwe has a mobile Internet penetration rate of about 50%. It also has an active mobile subscriber of 14 million out of a cumulative total population of 16,53 million across the country (Karombo 2018). This growth has also coincided with the exponential rise of social media platforms especially *Twitter*, *WhatsApp* and *Facebook* as major sources of communication. This growth in Internet penetration has also invigorated social consciousness as the public is becoming more aware of the immense participatory potential information technology has. This has therefore led to the advent of digital activism. For example, since the launch of the #ThisFlag¹ social media movement in July 2016, digital activism has been growing in momentum on a host of political and social issues. Online polls through *Twitter* as well as live *Facebook* forums are also growing in popularity in Harare as alternative participatory tools. The CoH has a website, a *Facebook* page and a *Twitter* account. However, the website, which was developed on June 2012 (Munkuli 2015), is more of a 'notice board' which does not allow citizens to express their views. Such a website is barely distinguishable from Arnstein's (1969) lower levels of participation which are manipulation, therapy and informing. The *Facebook* page and the *Twitter* can also be said to be at the lower level of Arnstein's ladder as they are used to inform the residents about the achievements and developments made by the CoH. However, these two allow citizens to express their views. Unfortunately, a study of both the CoH *Facebook* page and the *Twitter* account shows that, in most cases, the citizens use these platforms to complain about poor service delivery often with no response to such complaints. It is in this context that respondents were asked to choose the best participatory strategy among a host of tools that they thought would be ideal for Harare. Their responses are shown in Fig. 8.2.

Figure 8.2 reveals that most respondents at 93.8% in Mbare East and 96.9% in Harare Central chose public hearings as the best option. E-participation comes second with 6.2% in Mbare East and 3.1% in Harare Central. It is striking to note that despite an extensive mobile Internet penetration rate and exponential growth of ICT in Zimbabwe and Harare in particular, e-participation is yet to gain traction among residents as a critical node for the translation of the residents' aspirations and

¹The #ThisFlag protest movement was formed by Evan Mawarire, a pastor who gained both national and international prominence in April 2016, when his recorded mobile video went viral lamenting over the growing injustices and indignities of living under the government of then President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. Consequently, Mawarire found himself at the helm of a citizenry protest movement that threatened the status quo.




Fig. 8.1 Zimbabwe’s Internet penetration rate. (Source: POTRAZ 2018)




Fig. 8.2 The best option for participatory strategies to use in Harare

demands to the policymaking process in Harare. From the statistics above, it is obvious that e-participation is yet to be considered as a preferable participatory tool by respondents. This is probably because of the prohibitive data costs. According to the Research ICT Africa Mobile Pricing (RAMP) Index, Zimbabwe has the fourth most expensive data in Africa. Furthermore, the country is currently facing its worst economic crisis in a decade. Therefore, combined with debilitating economic challenges that have resulted in skyrocketing prices and diminishing disposable incomes, respondents have limited resources to spare and therefore cannot afford to buy data and be actively involved in various ICT platforms. E-participation has, therefore, become a victim of the economic challenges as respondents cannot choose this participatory tool that could reduce economic damage to their livelihoods.

E-participation is still a novelty in Harare but residents are becoming increasingly reliant on social media as a source of information. If harnessed it will be an important participatory tool, especially among the youth. It could also improve trust and relations between the governors and the governed. Therefore, e-participation has the potential to promote public inclusion in municipal policymaking processes and could help to address a myriad of urban planning problems such as the locations of flea markets and how their governance could be improved. The present findings confirm Rexhepi et al. (2018) hypothesis that through e-participation, the collaborative effort between citizens and experts has increased exponentially, resulting in participants becoming unobtrusively educated in sustainable urban design, and this has led to the joint expression of ideas. According to Smith and Dalakiouridou (2009: 50), e-participation has fostered accountability, good governance, transparency and legitimacy, thereby empowering people to co-govern and self-govern. New technologies as noted by Komito (2005) have, therefore, enabled the citizenry to, inter alia, have access to greater amounts of information, be able to participate in policy formation more effectively and even challenge the existing political establishment. It has therefore made it possible for the voice of citizens to be heard more, stimulating critical debate and generating dialogue.

Furthermore, one interesting finding is that this study confirms the findings made by Komito (2005) and Androutsopoulou et al. (2018) that e-participation has the potential to remove the traditional invisible wall between governments and citizens as it facilitates collaboration and information exchange among all stakeholders including citizens and decision-makers. Therefore, e-participation has the potential of steering, stimulating and leading constructive discussions for the betterment of society, thereby replacing technocracy with democratic participation of people. Thus, through e-participation, there is potential for a meaningful amalgamation of technocrats' expertise with public opinion which takes into account citizens' perceptions. However, the benefits of e-participation such as improved accountability and transparency and empowerment of citizens (Munkuli 2015) remain a pipedream for the citizens of Harare. This study established the common barriers for e-participation in Harare which are also consistent with what Munkuli's (2015) broader study on e-governance identified, namely, the digital divide, lack of skilled expertise and infrastructure, poor economic environment and an erratic power supply. All this is happening in a highly polarised political environment where the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), is governing a capital city where political posturing and grandstanding are common phenomena. At times, citizens are sceptical of the kind information they post on the *Facebook* page or *Twitter* due to a culture of fear.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was not on the impact or the efficacy of e-participation as measure of stakeholder management in the African cities in transition. Important as this may be, the primary focus was to illustrate how the political and socio-economic

imperatives may conspire to limit the application of ITCs in governance and by extension e-participation. This chapter has demonstrated that the pincer movement of economic challenges and political polarisation has, on the one hand, resulted in skyrocketing of prices and diminishing disposable incomes. This, in turn, limits citizens' financial resources which would allow them to be involved in various ICT platforms. On the other hand, the hostile and polarised nature of politics associated with draconian laws of censorship often acts as deterrents for meaningful e-participation. The chapter builds on and extends the discourse of e-governance in general and its application in African cities in transition and other emerging economies where democratic consolidation is very low. In general, therefore, this chapter not only highlights the importance of e-participation but underscored the need to understand the context of its application. The insights gained from this point to the need for public administrators to have a good understanding of the technological development and the nature of politics in the cities where they intend to use e-participation as a mechanism of stakeholder engagement. Even within one city, public policy practitioners should understand the heterogeneity of such variables to determine the suitability of e-participation as a mechanism of public participation. These insights have profound implications, not just for CoH but for other cities with similar political and economic outlook. For the scholar community, this chapter may act as a springboard for asking more precise questions at a broader level and the development of e-participation theory.

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Chapter 9

Evaluating the Aerotropolis Model for African Cities: The Case of the Durban Aerotropolis



Henry Wissink

Abstract A new approach to airport development and associated industrial and commercial land use in its immediate surroundings is gaining prominence around the world, which has become known as the Aerotropolis Model. An aerotropolis is a “smart city” precinct being developed in the surrounding area of an airport, and focusing on business developments in the so-called “first mile” and also in rapid and world-class logistics and connectivity to suppliers, customers, and partners locally and globally. Aerotropolis and their associated business usually flourish in the fields of innovative, high-technology and high value-added sectors, and with business links that are mostly foreign in nature. So, apart from the notion that an aerotropolis can become a fully integrated and modern smart city, they flourish and focus on logistics and commercial facilities and services that emanate from and support aviation-linked enterprise. The plan is that the Durban Aerotropolis will seek to become a unique entry point for the South African and regional tourism industry, and that tourists desiring to visit will be one of the major strategies to increase passenger flows, as well as investors desiring a high return on investment and becoming strategic production and export champions in the region. This chapter looks at evaluating the aerotropolis concept and also assesses the impact that aerotropolis developments could have on African cities of the future.

Keywords Aerotropolis · Large-scale urban developments (LSUDs) · Urban governance models · Innovation · Local economic development (LED) · Smart cities

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Introduction

The growth of a multitude of air travelers who use the airport and surrounding facilities as they traverse and move around the airport precinct is critical to the notion of aerotropolis development. These may include mostly warehouse and distribution facilities and services, accommodation and hotels focused on the business within the precinct, medical services and specialist centers, convention and recreational centers, and conferencing, exhibition and office facilities geared at promoting the immediate priorities and demands within the aerotropolis economic zone. Added to the area often known as a special economic zone (SEZ) are shopping malls, dining, and entertainment facilities and venues. Aerotropoli are known as developments of excellence both in business and in supporting and supplying excellent governance and management of public services associated with investment and doing business by foreign investors and businesspersons. Aerotropoli are also often associated with new, private, or charter-type city developments that are envisaged in the so-called green field contexts allowing for maximum new, innovative, and novel developments.

One of the case studies in this chapter also focuses on the vision of the Durban aerotropolis, which is closely linked to the Government's 2030 NDP Vision, and of developing the Province of KwaZulu-Natal into becoming a premier gateway to Africa. To contribute to this vision, the idea of the Durban aerotropolis was developed to ensure that citizens are globally and regionally connected, and also envisages that King Shaka International Airport (KSIA) grow its passenger and cargo movements with direct connectivity to major international hubs in Africa, Europe, Asia Pacific, South America, and North America. Furthermore, connectivity also implies that the aerotropolis must also be characterized by efficient ground connectivity. It is also envisioned that, by 2030, the airport city covering the area known as the Dube Trade Port will become a fully developed commercial zone. In this special economic zone (SEZ), the KSIA airport city will be connected to other major economic nodes in the Durban Aerotropolis through efficient roads and rail transport networks. The Durban Aerotropolis is set to become the most competitive metropolitan region in Africa. In the context of globalization, and increasing pressures on resources, growing urbanization and unemployment in developing cities, and some critical factors that affect economic growth and development, governments have moved some of their foci from trying to upgrade cities and create growth from within the core, to extending urban growth and development to the outer peripheries and into concentric geographic growth nodes. Globally, there are movements and debates about this growing concern, and in particular, to manage cities as the most important determinant of the quality of life on earth. According to the work done by the drafters of the Charter for the Ecosystemic Planning of Cities and Metropolises (2016):

...urban environments are currently the main factor behind the pressure being exerted on the earth's ecosystems, on every level. The extent of the impact is such that the current historical period has been classified as a new geological age, known as the Anthropocene era. The process behind these uncertainties has been described as unsustainable and, today, we can say that life on earth depends on a single species and, above all, on the urban systems created by it.

One new approach to refocusing growth and development within urban regions has been smart airport development, and associated industrial and commercial land use in its immediate surroundings is gaining prominence around the world. These developments are now known as the Aerotropolis Model.

By definition, an aerotropolis is a city built around an airport, focusing on business developments and sustainable socioeconomic development and growth. This is set to happen in the so-called first mile area and also in rapid and world-class logistics and connectivity to suppliers, its customers, and strategic partners locally and globally. An aerotropolis and its associated business usually flourish in the fields of innovative, and high-technology and high value-added sectors, and mostly linked to cities that are popular tourist destinations, and/or foreign direct investment destinations. Aerotropolis are also often associated with new, private-, or “special charter”–or “special zone”–type city developments that are envisaged, often ideally in the so-called green field contexts allowing for maximum utilization of land in the surrounding precinct and innovative and novel developments to attract potential foreign investment. These aerotropolis developments may be evaluated and considered in the light of some global trends and changes impacting on these possibilities.

Global Population Growth, Rapid Urbanization, and Economic Development

Cities in the global world are all affected by the growing trends in world population growth, but in particular, the alarming growth of urbanization, and the rate at which in particular countries in the developing world are urbanizing. It is projected with a high means of reliability that on average in 2050, 66–68% of all of the global population will reside in cities (WEF 2018). In Africa, it is projected that the urbanization may be in the upper 70s by then. By 2025, it is estimated that there will be 100 cities in Africa with one million plus inhabitants, double the amount of those in Latin America. Consequently, in this context, most young people do not have access to the formal economy or have job prospects. Already some 70% of Africans are under 30. They make up 40% of the workforce, but 60% of them are unemployed, resulting in poverty, and in some countries, high inequality resulting mostly from unemployment. In South Africa, approximately 27% of all the citizens are unemployed.

Changing Trends in Mobility and Growth of the Aviation Industry

Against the backdrop of the global world entering the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the twenty-first century, the fifth wave of transit-oriented development during this century is also an appropriate perspective for the purpose of this study. Globalization

and rapid urbanization created the need for rapid transportation systems and the requirement for an effective and efficient transportation. This wave of transit-oriented development started with the focus on seaports from the earliest times into the seventeenth century, river- and canal-based developments into the eighteenth century, railroads into the nineteenth century, modern and super vehicular highways into the twentieth century, and modern airports and aerotropolis into the twenty-first century. The drivers of such modern airports are “large jet aircraft (along with IT advances), globalization (producers & consumers), speed (time-based competition), agility (customization & flexible response), connectivity (worldwide enterprise networks), perishability (pharma, fish, flowers, fashions) and tourism (especially international)” (Kasarda and Lindsay 2011).

The air transportation industry has been one of the fastest growing industries from a local and international context, with an estimated annual growth increase of between 4% and 5% of global passenger and freight traffic mainly attributed to the increasing demand accounted to the economic prosperity among different economies (Senguttuvan 2006:3), and even expanding far beyond economic key continental corridors as portrayed in Table 9.1 and Fig. 9.1. What appears to be significant is the potential for Africa to grow economically in the aviation and related business sectors and become a future leader based on projections of African market futures. According to the German-African Legal Advisors Network (GALAN 2020), it was foreshadowed that:

...Africa will grow by 4.8 percent and in 2014 by a further 5.3 percent, according to a joint report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Economic Commission (ECA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Numbers of that the weakening European economy currently can only dream of. Between 2003 and 2012 non-African investors have also increased the overall value of their investments in Africa by 214% to 182 billion U.S. dollars.

In 2019, it would appear that Africa’s economic growth has stabilized at 3.4% in 2019, and the forecast is that it may reach 3.9% in 2020 and 4.1% in 2021. Growth trends are changing with departure from private consumption toward a trend of investment and exports according to the African Economic Outlook (ADBG 2020)

Globally, the trend is that in 2009, airports managed around 952 million passengers. In 2014, the IATA (2019) reported the growth to be around 3.3 billion passengers, who

Table 9.1 Passenger and freight traffic (percentage of total market). Produced by Author and IATA – World Air Transport Statistics, 2019

Market total = 8329.77 million revenue kilometers	Passenger and freight traffic (percentage of total market)
Asia-Pacific	34.3
Europe	26.3
Africa	2.2
Latin America	4.5
North America	22.4
Middle East	10.4
Total	100

Passenger and Freight Traffic by Major Continental Sectors




Fig. 9.1 Global air services – Passenger and air freight by key continental corridors. (Reproduced from Powell 2012: 2; IATA – World Air Transport Statistics, 2019). Reproduced by Author

in turn demanded increase in the demand for more effective and efficient airport facilities and services to manage rapidly growing needs for airline traffic and the concomitant growth of the tourism industry. It is estimated that global air transportation accounts for approximately 40% of the total international trade, mainly high-value and low-weight items (Kasarda 2016:3).

The Information Revolution and Changing Notions of Economic Growth

There are rapidly changing notions of what will create economic opportunities and wealth and how to achieve that. For ages and decades, the notion of land ownership and associated wealth generated from agricultural activities prevailed, but rapidly changed with the introduction of mechanization (1765–), introduced the First Industrial Revolution, with innovations in mining of coal and the development of the steam engine. The Second Industrial Revolution (1870–) introduced access to oil and gas, the internal combustion engine, growth of the steel industry, and the first phases of the telegraph and telecommunication technologies. During the end of this revolution, the development of motor vehicles and the first aeroplanes emerged. The Third Industrial Revolution (1969–) created another dramatic revolution in energy provision and saw the rise of nuclear energy, the rise of microelectronics (integrated

circuits), space research and biotechnology, and the emergence of robotics (high-level automation in production) through the introduction of programmable logic controllers (PLCs). These scientific and technological developments set the tone for what have recently become known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution at the start of the Third Millennium and associated with the unprecedented global explosion of information technology, Cloud Computing, Big Data, the Internet, electronic devices (Internet of Things, IOTs). These devices associated with the IOT's that are connected to the Internet have introduced new and novel approaches to business, industries, and enterprises to serve their clients. These devices and systems have introduced changes in the way we trade and use financial systems, such as online trading, electronic banking, and, recently, the use of crypto-currencies. The role of new industry skills, appropriate knowledge, and modern information technologies in modern educational systems using online technologies are becoming more evident and critical in this new environment.

Growing Threat of Energy Shortages and Environmental Pollution

Urbanization and high global demand have created natural resource scarcity (water, coal, and oil), global pollution, and species decline (pressures from overpopulation). The global and particularly urban-based pollution, creating CO₂ excesses and global warming at an alarming scale, is of great concern. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF 2018:1), "Africa's urban areas are likely to suffer disproportionately from climate change, as the region as a whole is warming up 1.5 times faster than the global average." Oceans absorb 30% of global CO₂, with ocean temperatures rising, and subsequent weather patterns and natural disasters threatening livelihoods and food security. Recent unprecedented floods in Mozambique serve as an example. Food insecurity due to pollution and the destruction of crops and droughts (new innovations in producing healthy food) is impacting on the survival of people in cities and growing urban conurbations. The impact of pollution by the growing aviation industry is also attracting attention.

Urban Transformation, Aerotropolis, and Alternative Governance Models

During the industrial eras as described above, the globe has experienced changes from dominant nation states to decentralized and liberal and techno-dependent regional and urban societies, and the growing wealth of middle classes. We have also experienced many sweeping changes in the way and manner in which governments and societies are transforming. Apart from growing populations, technologi-

cal advancements, urbanization, global economic changes, and trends in the way in which we will live in future, one of most significant trends in public governance was the ‘privatization’ of government in many states of the ‘free world’ through the New Public Management paradigm, and the deregulation of government roles and functions, and in particular, the manner in which the airline industry has transformed. According the Ahmed (2016), deregulation meant no or little “government control over fares, routes, and new entrants which increased competitiveness within the airline industry. This resulted in the need for airports to provide services to airlines that assisted with this growth and competitiveness. Due to this growth, airlines and destinations have become heavily dependent on airports as a key contributor to destination’s attractiveness and as an income generator.” Airports are now seen as critical infrastructure that assists cities to become catalysts for economic development and magnets for foreign and local direct investment (Conventz and Thierstein 2014). In order to achieve this, most airports are run by airport companies, or run by state-owned enterprises, and surrounded by trade zones, either privately or partly state-owned, and under the policy or frameworks of Special Industrial or Economic Zones that provide special incentives for investors, ‘one-stop-shop’ government services, and in particular companies to relocate to these zones. A lot of what we have experienced in and around airports or developing smart airport cities have been shaped by a sense that these developments should be directed and governed by structures and authorities that are free from deep layers of bureaucracy and unnecessary ‘red-tape’ to facilitate investment and commercial and industrial development in such zones.

The Importance of Large-Scale Economic and Urban Infrastructure Projects

According to the WEF (2018), urban infrastructure deficits will challenge Africans who will

need to spend between \$130-170 billion annually to meet the continent’s basic infrastructure needs...the region is already facing financing shortfalls of \$68-\$108 billion. Roughly two thirds of the investments in urban infrastructure needed by 2050 have yet to be made.

In different types of cities, different or alternative strategies may be necessary for economic development. According to Kennedy (2013:3), urban economic development strategies will increasingly be dependent on large-scale economic and infrastructure projects or the so-called megaprojects. According to her understanding, this notion implies the changing role of infrastructure from being a basic requirement for production and consumption to becoming the foundation and the critical requirement for growth and economic development. The challenge lies in the politics and governance of megaprojects (actors and institutions). The role of upstream and midstream thinking versus downstream delivery of plans and programs, are important concepts used in the business world to consider (Quain 2019), and here

implying the upstream conceptualization of LSUD projects by politicians and consultants, versus midstream translation of what may be required for implementation by bureaucrats and the project partners and ultimately the downstream delivery of the material or physical infrastructure and benefits.

The Effects of Growing Globalization

Globalization is generally defined as the growing interconnectedness of all aspects of the society and embodies values and cultures in defining connections (ASEF 2017). It also determines how businesses interact with their customers and competitors and the manner in which regions and their citizens conduct their daily activities in relation to the global markets and trends. It is therefore critical for modern urban development and regions to use such global markets and access for means of economic development and growth, and consequential gains in reducing poverty and unemployment, as well as inequalities. Airports and the emergence of the aerotropolis paradigm can be defined as the result of these infrastructural projects emanating from globalization. They are important in ensuring that a region is globally recognized and connected, emphasizing the three precepts of a modern aerotropolis, e.g., speed, agility, and connectivity by companies and organizations operating in these globally interconnected various regions (Kasarda 2016: 3). This in turn has placed more pressure on aviation-related infrastructure such as airports and other related aeronautical services (OECD 2016).

Aerotropolis: Their Role in Local Economic Development and Future Cities

Traditionally, airports have been viewed as necessary ‘evils,’ or a precinct, which provided a lot of uneasiness or stress for travelers and requires a lot of procedural efforts just to complete a journey from one city or destination to the other. In addition, the mindset in the past has been one of getting in and out of airports as soon as possible so that the final destination can be reached, with the least stress and unnecessary time loss and effort.

John Kasarda (2011), who has been a prominent academic and professional consultant to companies modern airport cities, has commented on this attitude in a seminal work on future airport cities; *Aerotropolis – The way we’ll live next*. He argues that

Airports have traditionally been viewed as places where aircraft operate and passengers and cargo transit. This traditional understanding is giving way to a broader, more encompassing model which recognizes the fact that along with their core aeronautical infrastructure and services, virtually all major airports have incorporated a wide variety of non-aeronautical facilities and services.

He also argues that airports and their surrounding precincts are more than a modernized transportation hub, with associated services and some commercial activities, it is a “new socio-economic and key urban development strategy” ... and he coined this new strategy an *aerotropolis*.

An aerotropolis is therefore viewed as a combination of physical, institutional, economic, and policy approaches introduced mostly through a strategy or master-plan, which is directed at improving local investments and assets, improving ground-based mobility and costs from strategic places or positions to the airport, expanding global connectivity in order to benefit from aviation-based trade, and beneficitation in goods and services. It also improves business competitiveness, employment opportunities, and the development of people at all the socioeconomic levels.

Retail mall concepts have been merged into passenger terminals. Airport property beyond the terminal is being developed with hotel and entertainment facilities, conference and exhibition complexes, shopping centers, office buildings, and logistics and free trade zones. Airports also frequently offer complementary sets of facilities for airport and airline employees (such as day care centers and health clinics), as well as commercially serve residents in the local market area (Kasarda 2011)

Apart from the normal aeronautical services that airports provide, standard internationally approved features integrate regions and allow them to compete internationally and grow what is generally accepted as smart airport cities (aerotropoli). These features include modern IT-driven logistics services, accommodation, business parks, trade centers, government ‘one-stop shops,’ entertainment, and shopping malls (Appold and Kasarda 2012:95).

For example, starting in the terminal, Hong Kong Airport has a number of designer clothing shops; Changi Airport in Singapore contains saunas, cinemas, and a swimming pool; McCarran Airport in Las Vegas is home to a museum and a large gaming facility; Amsterdam Schiphol Airport is home to the Dutch Masters Gallery; Frankfurt Airport has the largest resident clinic that treats over 30,000 patients annually; and Stockholm Arlanda Airport has a chapel that has hosted over 450 weddings since its introduction in 2010. Apart from servicing the airport processing and flight support experiences within the airport, aerotropolis are now becoming ‘regional ecosystems’ that are poised to serve to socioeconomic needs of their regional inhabitants and business stakeholders. In particular, the improvement of employment opportunities is created, and even more jobs as the movement of passengers and cargo increase through the airport precinct.

Most of this is highly dependent on airport infrastructure, which includes effective and efficient transport to and from the airport, communication systems, and advanced logistics and supply chain systems (Azzam 2017: 514). It is also clear that basic infrastructure as described above provides the basis of future growth, and therefore a systems approach to the successes of regional and large-scale urban will perhaps be prudent to approach the evaluation of the future to ensure the success of aerotropolis, as well as for the purposes of stable foreign direct investment (FD) and local direct investment (LDI).

On the output side, aerotropolis across the world are showing why they are successful, and in particular due to the fact that they are primarily growing in the passengers that are being carried to and from other destinations, the amount of cargo that is being processed, and the growth of employment opportunities provided within the general aerotropolis precinct, and through aerotropolis-related industries and activities.

Africa's air transport industry according to the World Bank (2008) increased at an average of 5.76% per annum between 2001 and 2007. This unprecedented growth in air traffic has meant that the emphasis moves toward focusing on improving the conditions of the air transportation, which has been playing a key role in regulating the movement of people and cargo.

Aerotropolis Strategy and Global Aerotropolis Developments

Many of the research studies conducted on the aerotropolis strategy are informed by Kasarda, who describes the concept as an extension of the metropolitan urban area whose infrastructure, land use, and economy are centered within the catchment of an airport (Kasarda and Appold 2014). From an architectural perspective, the concept is described as representing an urban plan in which the layout and infrastructure are centered around an airport (Revello 2014: 3). Other researchers have offered alternative opinions regarding the strategy but make references to concentric rings, distribution centers, manufacturing plants and logistics complexes in the vicinity of office precincts, parks, restaurants, and aeroplanes (Rodrigue 2017:44). Much of the existing literature research agrees that the following factors are critical to considering the basic requirements in aerotropolis master planning (Table 9.2).

Geographical Strategic Positioning

The aerotropolis strategy relates to its geographical positioning or dimensions. Kasarda (2016:1) defines it as comprising of an area in which the infrastructure, economic activities, land use, and buildings are influenced and centered around the geographical radius of an airport. The concept is mainly derived from using the airport as the core, which is surrounded by outlying of aviation-focused businesses and associated residential areas (Bowen and Rodrigue 2016:56). It becomes the hub of a cluster of related airport activities.

Due to the need for airports to improve their non-aeronautical and surrounding areas to revenue streams, regional governments and airports are collaborating and allowing for the idea of an aerotropolis or the airport city model in their master planning. This consideration requires that the following be considered:

Table 9.2 Comparison of aerotropolis case studies (Author)

Aerotropolis	Governance	Passengers P/A	Cargo	Businesses/feeder industries	Job opportunities
Schiphol International Airport (SIA), Holland	Managed by the provincial and local government	55 million	1.5 million tons	500 businesses +300 are listed publically	62,000
Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport (AHIA), USA	Atlanta Aerotropolis Alliance steering committee (ARC 2014)	80 million	Primarily domestic passenger transfer hub	Delta air lines, Porsche cars North America, Chick-fil-A, Georgia convention center, 5 MARTA stations, 3 community improvement districts, 3 film studios	+/- 70,000
Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA), China	Chinese government	62 million	4 million tons	Global companies, e.g., Cathay Pacific, HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank	+/- 65,000
Dubai World Central (DWC), United Arab Emirates	DWC is managed by Dubai Aviation City Corporation (DACC)	100 million +	12 million annual tons of cargo (Kasarda 2010)	Dubai World Central is the development currently under construction. Multiple companies will be established here.	+/- 400,000 estimated when completed.
Tancredo Neves International Airport (TNIA), Brazil	Government department economic development in partnership with the Brazilian airport operator Infraero	Handling capacity of 20 million passengers	Ability 150,000 tons	Area between Belo Horizonte city and TNIA is now a populated with high technology and agro processing zones	+16,000 people
Oliver Reginald Tambo International Airport (ORTIA), South Africa	Airports company of SA (ACSA)	19–20 million (half of South Africa's arrivals)	800,000–1.2 million tons	More than 100 large companies, e.g., Engen and PEPSI, airport hotels, conference centers	50,000 people

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

Aerotropolis	Governance	Passengers P/A	Cargo	Businesses/feeder industries	Job opportunities
King Shaka International Airport (KSIA), South Africa	ACSA and Dube Trade Port Corporation	2014–4.5 million 2018–5.9 million domestic and international	1.6 million tons in 28	Hotel, conference and business centers, manufacturing (Samsung) agricultural export zone packaging companies vegetable and flower grow houses	2010–12,000 people 2019–18,000 people

Spatial Design and Corridors

Spatial design and elements refer to the form and shape of development around the ‘airport belt’ specifically created for the purposes of connectivity between all the airport corridors. Airport corridors provide the primary link between the inland nodes to the major economic destinations or geographical regions. Redefined, it may be viewed as a system of infrastructure that facilitates the movement of people and goods between the ports (if available), railway stations, and all the regional airports. (Hanly 2015: 6; EDTEA 2015: 3).

Mobility Considerations

The importance of ‘transit time’ is a key in determining the success of an aerotropolis, as it influences “inventory carrying costs, inventory cycle time, and the costs of travelling.” For high-value and perishable cargo items, the fastest and shortest routes are critical. The importance of considering this element as one of the most critical in the long-term future of aerotropolis should not be underestimated (Kasarda 2016).

Economic Linkages

Apart from the increase in the world’s inter-regional airline capacity and inter-regional trade figures of Africa (7.1% per year), and based on an estimation that a third of the value of international trade is comprised of goods and services transported via air transport, it is clear to see huge potential economic advantages (Hancock 2011: 1). This is also estimated to triple over the next 20 years, therefore making the aerotropolis concept a sustainable solution to future economic growth.

Trends in the Growth of Non-aeronautical Revenues

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has produced information on airport financial statistics that show that in 1990, airport non-aeronautical revenues (NAR) have grown by $\pm 30\%$ of their total revenues. It increased to 46% in 1995, to 51% in 2000, and to 54% recently. Even for a relatively low cargo-driven aerotropolis such as Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, their NAR now exceed 60%. It is now a fact that airport commercial, retail, and in some instances some parking are major sources of NAR.

Key Issues and Challenges for Aerotropolis Success

Many of the older airports and airport cities were not well planned and developed in a relatively evolutionary and organic fashion, often creating logistical, systems, and environmental problems. Today, we realize that modern airports need to be well planned from a spatial and systems point of view. There are many agreed on factors or variables that contribute to the successful implementation of an aerotropolis. Unfortunately many of them are critical for the recognition of an airport precinct to be regarded or classified as a successful and smart airport city/aerotropolis. Many of these factors or variables provide some challenges for developing countries who are very eager to promote aerotropoli as economic generators in their regions. According to “Kasarda and Benesch (2013: 12–13), the success factors of aerotropoli can be improved by implementing the following critical aspects that will require dedicated and committed plans and programmes” through:

- *Dedicated airport expressway links (aerolanes) and airport express trains (aero-trains) that should efficiently connect airports to major regional business and residential concentrations.*
- *Special truck-only lanes should be added to airport expressways, as should improved interchanges to reduce congestion.*
- *Time-cost accessibility between key transportation nodes should be the primary aerotropolis planning metric rather than distance.*
- *Businesses should be steered to locate in proximity to the airport based on their frequency of use, further reducing traffic while improving time-cost access.*
- *Airport area goods-processing activities (manufacturing, warehousing, trucking) should be spatially segregated from white-collar service facilities and airport passenger flows.*
- *Noise and emission-sensitive commercial and residential developments should be sited outside high-intensity flight paths.*
- *Cluster rather than strip development should be encouraged along airport transportation corridors with sufficient green space between clusters.*
- *Form-based codes should establish general design standards for airport area buildings, walkways, travel lanes, landscaping, and public space.*

- *Placemaking and wayfinding enhanced by thematic architectural features, public art, and iconic structures should make aerotropolis developments interpretable, navigable, and welcoming.*
- *Mixed-use residential/commercial communities housing airport area workers and frequent air travelers should be developed with easy commutes and designed to human scale, providing local services and sense of neighborhood.”.*

In addition, strategic links between economic blocks and trade regions are also a critical consideration. The South African Development Community (SADC) is an example of the consideration to strategic economic alliance within a region. A strategic international think tank has also emerged and referred the African Airport Evolution Forum (AAEF) that focuses on “trade and cross-border collaboration between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg”. The objective is to attract global companies to these airports and also build world-class African airports. South Africa is regarded as the economic and institutional gateway into Africa (SANEC 2013). Three potentially viable possibilities of building such successful airport gateways are being considered, OR Thambo, Cape Town Airport, and King Shaka Airport in Durban.

It is not only time-sensitive goods-processing and distribution facilities that are being drawn to airport areas. As the world’s service economy likewise shifts into fast-forward, airports have become magnets for regional corporate headquarters, trade representative offices, professional associations and information-intensive firms such as consulting and auditing that require executives and staff to undertake frequent long-distance travel. Because major airports typically have excellent expressway links, the airport area needs to provide local metropolitan market accessibility Kasarda (2011).

Critique of the Aerotropolis Idea

Regardless of all the favorable comments and expectations of the aerotropolis idea, some commentators are skeptical about the concept as they have cited different views. Charles et al. (2007) argue that the “aerotropolis” has not sufficiently evaluated especially from a long-term policy and planning perspective, its long-term sustainability, and the security concerns of critical infrastructure and transportation hubs. This includes promoting international trade and long-distance traveling based on rapidly depleting fossil fuels. Hirsh (2016) in addition indicated doubts about all the advantages, which it is supposed to generate. Other concerns are centered around the aerotropolis strategy that generally promotes the privatization and commercialization of airports, which could result in a number of economic and social benefits, but may only benefit middle- or upper-class citizens’ “economic enclaves,” and not the majority of poor or marginalized people in developing countries, eroding the value of valuable farmland, forests, and wildlife habitats (May and Hill 2006; Crosby 2012; Bridger 2015).

The main critique is that Africa needs to free itself from Neo-Liberal philosophies and policies that promote elitist developments and ignores the realities of the developing world, with great existing inequalities.

Against this backdrop, it is important to understand the drivers and underlying core arguments of the aerotropolis strategy. The main factors to be considered are associated with the driving factors created as part of the strategy, the restraining factors acting as disrupters in ensuring that the objectives of the strategy are achieved. The socioeconomic factors as referred to below are probably the most important factors, in influencing regions in adopting this strategy. Misago (2016:13) suggests that due to the high levels of unemployment, poverty, and inequality, the aerotropolis has been considered a favorable strategy, as it is directly linked to the development of digital cities, urban regeneration, and supports the development of rural and township economies, and the revitalization of the production sector to drive the radical economic transformation agenda in South Africa. In addition to these factors, the growth and evolution of airport developments, the growing focus on air transportation, and the impact of globalization and accessing international markets have been important factors to consider. Airport cities are now regarded as critical new revenue streams for regions and regional development.

The Durban Integrated Aerotropolis Strategy (IAS)

In the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), South Africa, the provincial growth and development strategy (PGDS) is derived from the South African national policy frameworks such as the national development plan (NDP). The PGDS has developed catalytic programs that are focused on promoting economic development and employment. One particular driver and catalytic project is the Durban aerotropolis development, adopted by the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government as a catalytic project to improve industrialization and economic development in the region.

The commissioning of King Shaka International Airport (KSIA) and the establishment of the Dube Trade Port (DTP), in 2010, marked the progress toward this project. This multibillion Rand development has been the largest infrastructure investment project in the province during the past 20 years. The KSIA replaced the Durban International Airport (DIA) that became too small and outdated to manage the demand both from a passenger and cargo perspective. The KSIA provided the province with a world-class aviation facility and positioned the province to respond to the growing demands for economic development. There is marked evidence of the impact on the airport development on the northern area of Durban, the Umhlanga-Ballito strip and the region. This in turn has also attracted substantial private sector investment in property developments, industry, and commercial enterprise, which has recognized the benefits of proximity to an international airport which provides a gateway to the markets and tourism opportunities in the province and the country.

The Integrated Aerotropolis Strategy (IAS) is the plan of the KZN provincial government to embrace all the opportunities provided by KSIA, the Dube Trade

Port (DTP), the ports of Durban and Richards Bay, and other infrastructures such as the new roads, highways, and mobility arrangements are fully utilized to drive the suggested economic development.

“The strategy seeks to synergise operations in and around the airport by bringing together competing visions for the area, especially those of municipalities, government departments, state-owned entities, and other major private sector landowners to foster a truly strategically competitive airport-linked enterprise network that attracts new private investment.”(DIAS 2014).

As part of implementing the PGDS, the Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs (EDTEA) identified four critical programmatic interventions, namely, aerotropolis, maritime, tourism, and industrial economic hubs. The aerotropolis project is identified as one, which will promote the gateway status of the province while engendering economic growth and job creation. This is expected to turn the region into a bustling hive of economic activity and become a regional economic powerhouse.

The department is ardently pursuing the development of an aerotropolis that impacts the entire province through connecting KZN regional economies to South Africa, the Southern African region, and the entire global economy through King Shaka International Airport (KSIA). It is against this backdrop that the provincial Cabinet tasked the Economic Sectors and Infrastructure Development Cluster (ESID) to develop the Integrated Aerotropolis Strategy (IAS) with the aim of mapping the concept, bringing together all KZN stakeholders to a common purpose and harmonize their plans for implementation. The success of the aerotropolis project required the ‘triple helix approach’ and the collaboration of government, the respective municipalities, state owned entities (SOEs), and the private sector to work together in the implementation of the strategy. The IAS is therefore a forward-looking roadmap to implement the aerotropolis concept in the province. According to the IAS the viability of this aerotropolis is driven by several pillars, and strategic levers for every pillar are as follows (EDTEA 2015):

Pillar 1: Main Drivers

- ***Growing Air Services and Connectivity*** – This implies that the airport grows its annual traffic to beyond 10 million people as a general norm, as well as its international connectivity to other major hubs nationally and internationally.
- ***Integrated and Coordinated Spatial Planning*** – The spatial planning needs to be coordinated as part of the Spatial Development Frameworks (SDF’s) of public institutions as most of its influence spans across the boundaries of various national, provincial and municipal entities, as well as private properties.
- ***Equitable and Inclusive Growth*** – This lever includes planning economic growth to include all the socio-economic layers of society, and to provide equal opportunities to advance and resolve the challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment in developing regions such as the Durban Aerotropolis.

Pillar 2: Supportive Pillar

This second pillar supports and sustains economic growth in the aerotropolis. through the following levers:

- ***Business Growth and Development*** – This lever implies the strategic attraction of local and foreign direct investors in the aerotropolis, but starting within the so called ‘first mile’ or the recently created Special Economic Development Zone (SEZ).
- ***Knowledge Support and Human Capital*** – The attraction, training and continued development of sector and aerotropolis focused human resources and critical skills to grow and develop the region.
- ***Integrated Multimodal Transport Networks*** – Integrated multi-modal transportation networks imply that within the aerotropolis multiple transportation approaches and facilities for the ground transportation of people and goods from the point of departure or manufacture to the departure facility is maximised for effectiveness and efficiency.

Pillar 3: Strategic Support Pillar

The support pillar serves to strengthen the other pillars, mentioned above:

- ***Place Marketing*** – Ensuring that the Aerotropolis is effectively marketed to its key stakeholders and potential investors.
- ***Advanced Telecommunications Infrastructure*** – This implies the development of modern information technology architecture within the aerotropolis, especially access to free or open broadband Wifi and Internet services, and employing modern information technologies and services.
- ***Infrastructure and Engineering Services*** – Ensuring the basic infrastructure within the SEZ, or the ‘first mile’ and its immediate precincts is appropriately developed to maximise the application of the first two pillars.
- ***Environmental Sustainability*** – This includes the concern for, and care for the natural and physical environment, but also all the socio-economic drivers to maximise sustainability of employment and general conditions of living (quality of life) within the aerotropolis.

The Durban aerotropolis grants developers and investors the opportunity to work from a model that can be regarded as “global spatial development best practice” to enhance inter-nodal connectivity and efficiency in the movement of passengers and goods, as well as creating a new space that will have positive impact on historical and new emerging communities. It is implied that the aerotropolis will attract new investment and consequently grow the local economy. Existing statistics show the cargo outputs reaching a high of 1.6 million tons in 2017. The airport region is set to deliver 750,000 employment opportunities and 42 million square meters for the

purposes of enterprise growth and development. This will also allow for the future accommodation of approximately 1.5 million people in the precinct. The estimated investment potential is a set to be approximately R1 trillion. The Durban Aerotropolis Master Plan provides for 50-year growth scenario, currently estimated at around 3% GDP growth, but aiming at around 6% GDP growth per year. According to Dube Tradeport, “the precinct from which the airport operates from, the international numbers, together with strong domestic passenger growth of more than 6% for 2018, saw KSIA retaining its position as South Africa’s fastest growing major airport for a second year” (IOL 2019).

There are a number of challenges that are associated with the Durban aerotropolis strategy as described above. The Durban Aerotropolis development and plans have been associated with challenges such as the lack of collaboration between stakeholders and planners during its initiation, and during the planning and implementation stage, serious concerns were raised regarding the nature of the socioeconomic benefits emanating from the concept, the environmental impact in the existing “greenfield.” Concerns were also raised regarding the fact that there appeared to be a lack of synchronized efforts between the role players, different developers, private sector actors and consultants, different levels of government, and agencies in order to achieve the objectives of the concept.

Feasibility Studies of the Aerotropolis Idea in South Africa

In a study on comparing the potential of future aerotropolis, Menon (2014) created an evaluation tool for decision-makers. He developed a “Suitability Index” for evaluating aerotropolis in South Africa. The airports selected were OR Tambo International Airport (ORTIA), King Shaka International Airport (KSIA), Cape Town International Airport (CTIA), Bram Fischer International Airport (BFIA), and Upington International Airport (UIA). He started off analyzing the factors that contributed toward the success of established aerotropolis. He organized these into main factors and subfactors. The main factors identified were “airport characteristics, transportation network in and around the airport, regional economy, land-use around the airport, costs, role of the airport in the global supply chain, political will, and legislative policies. Within airport characteristics, sub-factors such as the size of the airport, number of runways, connectivity of the airport, and number of airlines serving the airport were found to affect the competitive advantage of the airport.” He argues that the location of the airport is one of the most important subfactors. The airport’s proximity to a substantial population and a healthy economy is critical (Menon 2014: 48–49). Menon (2014) also utilized an approach by Saaty (1987) referred to as the “Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) in order to solve a Multi Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) problem. The AHP method is a way to detect interactions between various decision-making factors, which include factors that may not be easily quantifiable”. Data was collected from a variety of sources, “weights of the factors and subfactors were calculated for each airport”. It was con-

cluded that three main criteria determining the continuing and future success of an aerotropolis are firstly, the airport infrastructure, secondly, transport infrastructure, and thirdly, strategic location.

Airport infrastructure includes the following factors:

- The number, quality and length of runways to comply with international aviation standards.
- Parking facilities to service the immediate area within the aerotropolis.
- Basic services such as water and electricity.
- Extent and appropriate fit of the infrastructure within the first mile.

Transport infrastructure includes the following:

- The effectiveness and efficiency of access arteries and the quality of the infrastructure.
- Availability of roads and highways that facilitate the movement goods to and from the airport.
- Access via a railway line.
- Provision of an “intermodal transfer facility”¹ was found to be advantageous.
- The proximity to seaports was found to be a factor but not critical.
- Population in the “catchment area” is seen as a critical factor. Compared to other major aerotropolis such as Dubai, Singapore, Schiphol, South Africa is disadvantaged due to its geographic position far south and at the far-end of Africa, and not surrounded by major regional economies.

He finally concluded that ORTIA is best positioned in terms of strategic location, and in the short to medium term, ORTIA and KSIA should be well positioned as hubs for southern Africa. Rather than competing with Dubai and Cairo airports that have these strong geographic advantages, as they can position themselves to become transit and logistics hubs between Asia and South America and establish new and unique markets in the southern hemisphere. Looking at some of the critical factors, ORTIA seems best positioned due to these critical factors, being close to businesses and the supply of skilled personnel in Gauteng, and connected to both metropolitan areas and business centers by highways and by rapid rail systems such as the Gautrain. As opposed to KSIA, which has the advantage of being in a greenfield, ORTIA is surrounded by brownfield, where the relocation of the businesses that may not directly benefit the aerotropolis or expropriation of land will have high cost and other unforeseen implications. KSIA has the advantage of developing value-added services and industries that produce high-value, and time-sensitive goods to be transported, as well as having the benefit of a lot of relatively low-cost land to develop value-adding industries and enterprises in a strategic manner. It will have to look strategically at its access issues, especially dedicated truck/heavy transportation lanes as it has one main artery that feeds the airport from the north and the

¹*Intermodal freight transport involves the transportation of freight in an intermodal container or vehicle, using multiple modes of transportation (e.g., rail, ship, and truck), without any handling of the freight itself when changing modes.*

south, and will need to seriously look into the possibility of high-speed rail mobility for passengers to augment access beyond vehicular transport.

Based on this study, Menon (2014:51–52) developed a suitability index (SI) to determine viability of South African aerotropolis, and the SI for OR Tambo and Cape Town International Airports was found to be 0.4190 and 0.2138, respectively. The suitability index of KSI, BFIA, and UIA was found to be 0.1859, 0.0954 and 0.0858, respectively. So based on the SI that inferred that CTIA is more suitable than KSIA, from a long-term perspective, KSIA has a higher potential to develop into an aerotropolis, as a higher index does not guarantee success. For instance, if accessibility to KSIA is improved by constructing another highway and high-capacity public transport, then the SI increases from 0.1859 to 0.2298, while SI decreases from 0.2138 to 0.2113.

Evaluation Tool for Aerotropolis Planning

The existing research and information on airport cities or centered development is focused on well-researched and published analyses of the global north, and the literature related to the global south more in the format of technically documented information and presents the global south as underdeveloped from an urban planning perspective. It is implied that to introduce the aerotropolis concept or paradigm as a documented and tested model for specialized large-scale urban developments into the global south, where most of the contexts may be defined by informality and underdevelopment, can lead to fragmented development and failure. This may also lead to the expenditure of valuable public resources into unsustainable structures and facilities, which could give rise to major conflict within the airport city (aerotropolis) precinct (Crosby 2012; Hanly 2015; Bridger 2015). It is of course also true that in some contexts in South Africa, the conditions may be amenable, and that the cities in South Africa, such as ORTIA, CTIA, and KSIA, all pass the minimum requirements for the introduction and development of successful aerotropolis or smart cities. The model developed according to Hanly (2015) implies that:

The functionality of each airport is historically and economically context specific with a dynamically negotiated outcome between multiples parties. Implied here is the demand for a greater understanding of how the different airport urban forms have played out in the Global North, South and South East cities.

It appears that the lessons from the case studies in his study, as well as experiences within selected aerotropolis on a global scale, imply that generally the success of an aerotropolis is based on the consideration of the following factors:

- The degree of political direction and buy-in to airport city-based development.
- The potential to negotiate new direct flights to and from other important destinations for the purpose of tourism, and additional cargo space is an important consideration (supply and demand models need to be carefully applied).
- The geographic positioning as a global destination and cargo hub and gateway.

- The institutional climate and environment in the local context, and in particular, the extent to which the institutions are able to collaborate in order to achieve strategic levers of the aerotropolis.
- Proximity and connection to rail or practical transport (mobility) facilities.
- Proximity to seaports in order to achieve the multiplier effect of a smart city.
- The scale and size of the supportive and existing broader metropolitan economy.
- Its territorial location in relation to its surroundings such as growing enterprises, SMMEs, and supportive infrastructure.
- The demand and availability of real estate in the precinct and close proximity to the aerotropolis.
- The extent and level of cooperation between the various airline companies, airport companies, and governmental agencies or spheres, the general business private sector, and NGOs and communities strategically surrounding the aerotropolis.

Summarizing the work of Menon (2014), Hanly (2015), as well as work of Kasarda (2014), it would appear that a more comprehensive model for assessing the possible success and impact of aerotropolis for local and regional economic development is required. Ultimately, the output factors will determine success, but in particular, the input factors and throughput factors are prerequisites for ensuring success and the required impact for socioeconomic development of regions (Fig. 9.3).

A cursory comparison between the major regions (Global North, South, and Southeast Asian) airport cities implies that their economic systems, market dynamics, and situational realities are quite different and emphasizes the notion of the divide that remains between these regions. Other developing nations such as China, countries in South East Asia, India, and Middle Eastern countries are pursuing what is referred to as the “21st century trade race against time” and have deliberately invested in smart airports as primary infrastructural investments to compete with the rest of the Global North, specifically planning for new smart cities to be built and naturally develop around thriving airport precincts. According to Kasarda and Lindsay (2011), “The aggressive scale at which these airports are developed leverages their competitive and comparative advantage in the future aviation freight market.” On the other hand, cities in the Global South have only recently embarked on developing the required infrastructure to compete with the rest of the world. Added to this have been growing demand trends, and global attractions such as Olympic Games, Soccer, and Rugby World Cup events in South Africa demanded that resources and budgets be earmarked and almost demanded regional collaboration amongst government, the private sector, and airport authorities such as ACSA at the time.

Greenfield airports such as KSIA are generally considered when capacity is being reached at existing airports such as the old DIA. Like any other new development, this approach is less prone to the concerns that are often major constraints such as space limitations and noise pollution and possible resistance or contestation

Input Factors (Basic Prerequisites)	Throughput Factors (Supportive Requirements)	Output Factors (Performance and Impact Measures)
Airport infrastructure	Political interest and buy in	Passenger movement growth
Primary transport infrastructure (aerolanes/RTS)	Attracting new direct flights	Cargo movement growth
Strategic location	Local institutional and sector collaboration	Capital Investment growth (FDI and LDI)
Advanced telecommunications infrastructure	Place marketing	Establishment of enterprises and growth of non-aeronautical revenues
Land availability	Integrated and coordinated spatial planning	Multimodal/Intermodal transport network growth
Special economic zoning and tax dispensation	Good governance	Equitable and Inclusive Growth for region
Competent and well skilled staff	Knowledge support and human capital development	Environmental sustainability

Fig. 9.3 Model for assessing aerotropolis systems. (Produced by author, and adapted from Hanly 2015; Menon 2014)

from already established surrounding communities. Greenfield airports also run the risk of not materializing the desired vision if the infrastructure costs or investments do not result in the desired outputs and resultant economic growth. A prime example is the case of the Tancredo Neves International Airport (TNIA) in Brazil, and the effect can be minimized from the point of view that single local authorities stand to be blamed for loss of estimated impact and benefits. Corrections and new developmental approaches are possible to resolve similar problems such as in the case of TNIA.

From an economic point of view, perhaps the most fundamental question to raise is, if countries in Africa, and especially South Africa, should be embracing a macro-economic policy that allows for these “free market” strategies and new urban projects to flourish, or whether we need to consider the value of Keynesian thinking,² where the power of the free market needs to be limited, controlled, and most of the available public resources need to be imaginatively reinvested, redirected, and affirmatively redistributed and applied in the investment of development and growth in previously disadvantaged communities and in employment creation to generate the

² **Keynesian theory** - or policy for fighting unemployment and inflation. Keynesian macroeconomics argues that the solution to a recession is expansionary fiscal policy, such as tax cuts to stimulate consumption and state investment in infrastructure, and programs that induce direct increases in government spending. This shifts the aggregate demand curve to the right.

Macro-Economic Policy	Policy instruments	Economic Strategy	Economic Effect
Limited Government (Free Enterprise)	Policy frameworks designed to regulate the “over heating” of the economy.	Allow for maximum growth, employment and competition, and economic growth.	High Economic Growth/High Employment (Supply meets demand)
Mixed Economy/Welfare Statism. Mixed governance models, and relationship between public and private sector. (Keynesian policy)	Policy frameworks designed to regulate and control the economy to optimally manage and correct the economy.	Strategies to fight unemployment, and recessionary effects of poor economic growth. Use and application of public, private partnerships (PPPs), and contracting of private enterprise.	Economic Growth/improved employment, only if good governance is applied, but generally inflation rises. (<i>Phillips Curve</i> = Stagflation when economy does not grow due to government fiscal and infrastructural interventions), <i>and inflation continues to rise.</i>
Centrally Planned/Government Controlled. Socialism	Policy frameworks designed to nationalise and control the economy, and employment (factors of production).	The state and its organs benefit from the economy in order to create and control the means of production, relatively low tax, high employment, low wages.	Slow economic growth (economic isolation), high employment, and stable inflation = no personal financial incentive, improvement and economic benefits commensurate with efforts.

Fig. 9.4 Macroeconomic considerations for aerotropolis development contexts (Authors’ construction)

growth and progress needed to address inequality and poverty. Off course, some theorists are clear that Keynesian theory cannot apply in all situations, and in some contexts, stagflation³ may be evident, where both inflation and slow economic growth apply, primarily due to poor governance issues in developing nations. The strategy of introducing alternative forms of governance, such as special charters, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), that may have a different charter and have the freedom of operating as enterprises, with additional benefits such as those found within the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policy charters, and in some instances industrial development zones (IDZs) (Fig. 9.4).

From a sustainability point of view, as concerns over the environment escalates, and technologies improve over time to manage many of these concerns, it has been observed that international airports tend to shift to what is known as “sustainable closed loop infrastructural systems and strategically acquiring and leasing land in addition to establishing CID’s is a noteworthy means of kick-starting inside the fence some non-aeronautical revenues to attract businesses and other functions”(Hanly 2015).

³ Stagflation - Stagflation is a condition of slow economic growth and relatively high unemployment, or economic stagnation, accompanied by rising prices, or inflation. It can also be defined as inflation and a decline in gross domestic product (GDP).

There is, according to Hanly (2015), a gap that exists in current literature and research regarding the need for developing “value added benefits outside the fence to surrounding communities in addition to formulating national policy mechanisms that ensure sustainability of manufacturers, exporters and importers in aviation linked industries.”

The existing literature and research points to a need to understand the local context and socioeconomic environments of international airports in South Africa, and it would appear that the new White Paper on improving the management of Civil Aviation in South Africa is also aiming to address this issue (RSA 2017).

Conclusion and Summary

Inasmuch as the idea of a large-scale urban developments (LSUDs) such as the aerotropolis is one that has shown great potential to serve as catalysts for economic development and growth, and theoretically one should be able to transfer the concept to other contexts that have some of the basic requirements (critical prerequisites) in place, it may not be a strategy that works or shows the kind of benefits or returns on investment (ROI) that may have been observed in the Global North or some of the emerging developing nations of the East and Middle East.

It is important to be critical of any concept or strategy that involves a great deal of resources and investments, and which may divert from other critical developmental variables such as infrastructure and services in communities far removed from these LSUDs.

The CECPM (2016) argues, “Without regenerating existing cities, this problem cannot be solved, and every day that passes sees uncertainties grow. The suggested solutions must, of course, deal with new urban developments, but it is even more important to find solutions for systems that are already built, and which are currently causing damage.”

Could it be that for these reasons the aspirations of consultants and progressive or liberal politicians will fail, and that LSUDs such as smart airport cities can simply not be transplanted from one context to another without a proper consideration of local socioeconomic realities, needs, and dynamics? This question requires a lot more research and analysis. For the moment, it may be possible to assess the success or failure of a “smart airport city” or aerotropolis by virtue of measuring the outputs as suggested above in Fig. 9.3. However, that may not be adequate to assess the broader impact of this enterprise, and if in particular the aerotropolis will be able to effectively impact on the local economic development, and the ideal corollary of such increased economic growth and development is much improved employment patterns among the youth in KZN and in this region. What will be required to ensure that this growth and employment strategy remains sustainable and can serve as an example to the rest of South Africa and the SADC region, as well as the rest of the continent?

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Chapter 10

Urban Decay and Regeneration in the African City



Nirmala Govender and Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy

Abstract Urban degeneration is a challenge that is experienced in many cities throughout the world. The massive and complex migration of the population into the urban environment tends to be disordered, leading to untidy spaces; scarcity of resources; air pollution; health concerns; increased traffic challenges; deteriorating and ageing infrastructure, and inadequate waste management (Chourabi et al. 2012:2289). This shift of the population from primarily rural areas to urban areas is projected to continue into the future, and has resulted in more than half the population now living in urban areas (Chourabi et al. 2012:2289). As a result of productivity patterns and urban growth, many cities have a challenge, with underused land or distressed and declining urban areas, which result in the city's livability, image and productivity dwindling (World Bank 2018).

Despite the various endeavours undertaken by many cities to address urban decline, numerous cities still grapple with streets full of litter, degenerated buildings and dumping. This chapter explores certain African cities' efforts in addressing urban regeneration. A detailed perspective of the City of Durban within South Africa is presented with the intention to providing an analysis of both successful and failing actions and providing recommendations for African cities to potentially implement to ensure traction in urban regeneration programmes within cities.

Keywords Urban decline · Urbanisation · Pollution · Disintegration · Infrastructure · Urban regeneration.

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Urban Decay or Degeneration

In order to provide context to the process of urban decay and regeneration processes, it is important to understand what has been identified as urban degeneration. The UN-Habitat (2014:7) states that ‘Ubiquitous urban poverty and urban slum proliferation, so characteristic of Africa’s large cities, is likely to become an even more widespread phenomenon under current urban development trajectories, especially given the continuing and significant shortfalls in urban institutional capacities’. Urban Decay is defined ‘as the steady deterioration of a previously functional city or town. Urban decay could be caused by deindustrialisation, economic breakdown, and failure of businesses, leading to increased crime rates, growing unemployment, and rising poverty. This is evidenced by abandoned buildings, refuse and rubble on the streets’ (Newsmax 2010). On the other hand, urban regeneration is ‘a process to address urban decay, especially in inner-city areas, in order to revitalise the whole physical, social and economic environment of this area’ (NASHO 2013:10). To support this process, urban regeneration is also identified as a way forward for cities. Urban regeneration refers to the ‘correction of urban decay in the urban areas, slum clearance and the rescuing of both the fabrics and functions of the Central Business District (CBD). The term ‘urban regeneration’ refers to the regeneration of the decayed parts of an urban centre on behalf of, and with the tacit cooperation of, the people who live and work there (Eni and Abua 2014:129).

Regeneration in African Cities

As observed by the United Nations, Africa will cease to be a rural continent, as traditional rural-based societies in sub-Saharan Africa start fading, ‘with more than half of its approximately 700 million people predicted to move to urban areas by 2030’ (Funsho et al. 2013:2). Based on the current rural–urban trends, urbanisation is not orderly or sustainable for African countries, as informal sector enterprises and informal settlements proliferate, despite the implementation of urban development plans by African cities (Funsho et al. 2013:2).

Bafana (2016a) reports that African cities have experienced a massive population growth, which has compelled African governments to deal with a range of development challenges. Africa has urbanised rapidly between 1995 and 2015, more than any other less developed part of the world (UN-Habitat 2016:7). Funsho et al. (2013:2) concur that the rapid frequency of urbanisation over the past century has created more slums in the major cities of developing countries, where there is a large contingent of rural–urban migration.

The influx of people into urban African cities creates many governance challenges and the capacity of African cities is compromised, which spares little time for their national governments to respond to the challenges (Kanhema 2016). The rapid urbanisation in Africa is driven by rural–urban migration, natural increase,

reclassification of rural areas, conflicts and disasters in some countries and spatial expansion of urban settlements (UN-Habitat 2016:14). Furthermore, as African cities are some of the poorest in the world, the resources available to construct and maintain adequate infrastructure, as well as provide public services, are not enough for the growing population (UN-Habitat 2016:14). The urbanisation of African Cities leads to overcrowding, crime and pollution amongst other challenges (Bafana 2016a). Rapid urbanisation, particularly in developing countries, causes challenges related to inefficient land-use patterns, and cities which grow horizontally, are stressed in dealing with the mass influx of population into cities. This leads to unsustainable living conditions, due to congestion and pollution (Bafana 2016a). Furthermore, rural–urban migration intensifies poverty and inequality, and causes a strain on water, transportation and garbage collection services (UN-Habitat 2016:13).

An analysis of various African cities is detailed, to provide context to the challenges experienced in responding to urban degeneration.

Urban Regeneration in Kigali, Rwanda

Rwanda, a country riddled with death and destruction in 1994, is now emerging as the cleanest country on the African Continent. It is difficult to imagine such a feat, but Rwanda, a landlocked country in Africa, has succeeded in doing this. As many as 800,000 people were murdered over a three-month period (History 2009), and the country was left devastated.

Rwanda's remarkable recovery, after the 1994 genocide, from absolute economic, political and social collapse, is seen to be one of the African Continent's most amazing and inspiring achievements (United States Agency International Development [USAID] 2015:5).

Since the aftermath of that genocide, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) has committed to confront its development challenges, by undertaking a broad-based economic and social transformation programme, which it is anticipated will ensure equitable and sustainable development for the entire country (USAID 2015:5). As a result of this commitment, there are noticeable outcomes, such as the extended political stability and peace in the country, along with social and economic progress, which has resulted in Rwanda having one of the highest annual economic growth rates in Africa (USAID 2015:5).

However, Rwanda is still one of the world's poorest and most densely inhabited countries (USAID 2015:5) and Kigali, the capital city, has approximately 70% of its area classified as rural (Ngabonziza 2018). This has resulted in rural–urban migration, and Evariste et al. (2017:575) point out that 'negative consequences of migration are the increase in crime'; congestion within the city; and the increase of slum areas, which consequently attracts pollution. Consequently, this has led to environmental degradation, as migrating people create settlement in areas by reclaiming swamps and cutting down trees (Evariste et al. 2017:575).

Furthermore, one of Rwanda's threats is its limited access to public infrastructure namely, roads, water and energy, which is an ongoing challenge for the country (Republic of Rwanda 2013:20). Bafana (2016b) states that the genocide of 1994 has deprived the country of years of development and demolished infrastructure and crippled essential services.

The transformation of the city of Kigali therefore, is due to the resolute efforts by the government to ensure national unity and realising a new vision for the country (Bafana 2016b). Rwanda's Vision is as follows:

Vision 2020 aspires for Rwanda to become a modern, strong and united nation, proud of its fundamental values, politically stable and without discrimination amongst its citizens (Republic of Rwanda 2013:9).

In order to achieve this vision, the country needs to develop suitable infrastructure to support Local Economic Development and community development (Republic of Rwanda 2013:9). Thus, despite approximately 70% of Kigali being rural, its population has grown to 1.2 million people, who are relatively young (Ngabonziza 2018).

Bafana (2016b) confirms that Kigali is one of the continent's rising cities, as it is organised and clean, and has become a progressive metropolitan city, achieving success in the social, environmental and economic areas. The government adopted a Development Master Plan in 2013, with the City of Kigali constructing new buildings, which are replacing the outdated ones (Bafana 2016b), thereby, successfully addressing urban degeneration. With its tarred and dual-carriage roads, access to Kigali has resulted in it attracting many international conferences. Furthermore, the UN-Habitat awarded its 2008 Scroll of Honour to Kigali for clearing out slums, upgrading of urban amenities, especially refuse collection, and providing water, sanitation and housing to its people (Bafana 2016b).

Various initiatives are currently visible in Kigali, which include that the young people of the City of Kigali are preserving its cleanliness and contractors are seen to be cleaning the streets around the clock, with night trucks sweeping the dust on the road and mopping up the mud (Ngabonziza 2018). Policies have been implemented and are enforced through fines issued for littering, spitting, urinating, damaging trees or infrastructure and walking on the grass (Ngabonziza 2018).

Aside from these environmental actions, the Kigali City government has banned non-biodegradable plastics from being imported (Bafana 2016b). In addition, one of the most notable actions taken by the government is the designation of a cleaning day, once a month, where residents clean the city streets and neat up the surroundings (Bafana 2016b).

Spencer and Rurungwa (2012:1007–1041) state that the impact of tourism has received a major boost for both the economy and the environment, but the employment benefits for its population is still to be experienced. Incoming international investment is also part of Rwanda's development plan, and this process is intended to improve modern infrastructure, and ensure basic service delivery to the residents of Kigali, including transportation, water and sanitation, and energy (Bafana 2016b).

Kigali was designated as one of six African cities to be part of the '100 Resilient City' initiative by the Rockefeller Foundation, which focuses on addressing

urbanisation, globalisation challenges and climate change, through addressing infrastructure development for water, sanitation and public health (Bafana 2016b). In addition, planning is critical to ensure sustainability of the cities in Rwanda, and Kigali being the main city, leads the way with the development master plan guiding growth and expansion every 5 years until 2014 (Bafana 2016b). The plan for 2013–2018 highlights rapid and effective urban development, with improvement in administrative structures and financial hubs (Bafana 2016b). The master plan also ensures preservation of the environment for future generations, by using natural cycles to provide adequate infrastructure for water, water purification, drainage, and biogas extraction from waste and recycling to all residents, including informal settlements (Bafana 2016b).

In implementing its Smart City initiative, approximately 487 buses, in the City of Kigali were connected to 4G Internet, allowing passengers free, full and high-speed access to the Internet (Bizimungu 2016). This initiative is meant to change the lifestyles of city dwellers and visitors and improves service delivery, business continuity, entertainment and staying connected (Bizimungu 2016).

With its focus on development, economically, socially and environmentally, and utilising the benefits of government leadership, international investment, information technology, communities working together and focusing on a new vision for Rwanda, the City of Kigali provides a very good example of how a city can transform itself, which is aligned to the World Bank Framework.

Urban Regeneration in Lagos, Nigeria

Lagos is the commercial and economic centre of Nigeria and is one of the most crowded cities in the world, with an estimated 15 million people living in the city. According to Funsho et al. (2013:2), it is estimated by the United Nations that the population in Lagos will by the year 2015 increase to 25 million, which will result in relentless gross squalor and degradation of the city. Many parts of the City of Lagos are fraught with informal human settlements which lack basic infrastructure, access to clean drinking water, waste disposal, electricity and have succumbed to harsh environmental and health hazards (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012).

Funsho et al. (2013:2) state that the urban decline in Lagos is triggered predominantly by urbanisation, but that environmental complications result mainly from unplanned land use, lack of open space, swampy built areas, poor control over flood plains, sub-standard housing and weak development control.

Overwhelmed by the growth in population, disintegrating infrastructure and growing slum areas, several schemes have been undertaken by Lagos authorities in order to revive the city and its facilities (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012 and Funsho et al. 2013:11). Funsho et al. (2013:9) state that the main concerns of the Lagos State government are the shortage of basic infrastructure and services; inferior housing, dirty and disorganised society and the high levels of crime. These security concerns prompted the demolishing of informal settlements, which unfortunately

resulted in communities becoming homeless and displaced (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012). However, Duthiers and Kermeliotis (2012) state that residents felt they were paying the price for an ambitious urban regeneration process. On the other hand, (Agbola and Jinadu 1997, as cited in Funsho et al. 2013:11) confirm that there was vast support for the destruction of the 'squatter settlement by environmentalists', with the proviso that those affected will be resettled by the government. Many also feel that for Lagos to be developed into a world class city and to become Nigeria's economic and commercial centre, informal settlements will have to be demolished (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012). Unfortunately, the resettlement was not properly organised, and the residents were forcibly moved into incomplete government housing, thereby exacerbating Lagos's challenges (Funsho et al. 2013:11).

In order to address these challenges of urbanisation and slum development, planning strategies and resources, as well as community participation are required (Funsho et al. 2013:11). As part of this process, Lagos sees the development of a groundbreaking business and residential development, located along the coastline, which will stimulate employment opportunities for 150,000 people, and accommodation for 250,000 people (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012).

The city has also launched a rapid transit system with buses, while work has started on developing a dependable, and inexpensive urban rail system (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012). Furthermore, new garbage trucks have been deployed to recover many tons of waste which was generated daily (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012). Lagos must develop quickly in order to accommodate its swiftly growing population and to provide education, jobs and suitable infrastructure or deal with the risk of social mayhem (Duthiers and Kermeliotis 2012).

Adeoti and Peter (2015:8) state that Lagos, the most populous city in Nigeria, is undertaking an effective and sanitary collection and disposal of solid waste, and ensuring that street furniture, open space landscape and beautification exercise are carried out in order to ensure that the city is and looks clean. Therefore, in order for Lagos to develop into an advanced city, the following elements must exist, viz., cooperative leadership of government at all levels, the inclusion of communities at the outset of the execution of programmes regarding environmental planning, the relocation of residents prior to clearing out slums, quality assessments to be implemented, and most importantly implementing an inclusive and cohesive regeneration strategy (Funsho et al. 2013:11–14). An example of how communities get involved cleaning up the city is provided by Hunt (2018) who writes of a Nigerian man, living in one of the world's most polluted cities in Nigeria, and who has been lauded as leading by example for cleaning up the community, due to the inaction by government. Furthermore, he is getting other youth to join him in his endeavour to clean up the city (Hunt 2018).

As stated by the Associated Press media, Lagos is immersed in waste, with piles of garbage on the streets, along the waterways and lagoons, and outside homes, generating rancid smells and creating an eyesore (Associated Press 2014). Furthermore, due to the electricity shortages in the city, the use of diesel generators creates a haze of black exhaust (Associated Press 2014). However, Lagos is transforming these challenges into an advantage by converting waste into methane gas

and then into electricity (Associated Press 2014). The waste management programme by the City of Lagos, includes recycling of waste in order to clean the biggest city in Nigeria, the country with a 'population of approximately 170 million people' (Associated Press 2014). Waste collected is taken to a dump site, where scavengers or 'resource providers' can take what they want and can be resold (Associated Press 2014). Approximately 45% of the waste generated is organic material, which is fermented, and the gas is turned into light, which does not produce a black exhaust (Associated Press 2014). The remaining waste is used as compost (Associated Press 2014).

Lago's example is not any different to other African cities, as comparisons of its implementation plans, to address urban degeneration is prevalent in all the frameworks which are used for this study. Implementation of the frameworks, however, may not be suitable for such a highly populated area.

Urban Regeneration in Johannesburg, South Africa

The City Improvement District concept was implemented post-1994, in the City of Johannesburg, in order to address the issues of regeneration in the inner-city regions (Peyroux 2012:183). Bethlehem (2013:17) states that the City of Johannesburg underwent massive degeneration within its inner city from the 1980s onwards. During the 10-year period, many jobs were lost, and companies declined (Bethlehem 2013:17). The area was left to disintegrate, even during the post-apartheid years (Duff 2014). Downtown Johannesburg used to be fraught with high-rise slums, streets filled with trash and violent crime, and the area degenerated and was neglected, due to the withdrawal of foreign investment in South Africa in the 1980s, when many businesses moved out of the CBD (Duff 2014). The devaluing of property afforded opportunities for the transformation of inner-city buildings to housing rental which was affordable (Bethlehem 2013:17).

From 1995 to the year 2000, the concept of the 'Unicity' emerged to overcome the acrimonious 'legacy of apartheid' (Peyroux 2012:185). During this period between 1995 and 2000, the Johannesburg inner city had an economic decline and was undergoing physical degradation, with increasing crime, poor public transport and a lack of parking facilities, resulting in major department stores, large companies and even the Johannesburg Stock Exchange relocating to suburbs (Tomlinson 1999 and Beavon 2004, as cited in Peyroux 2012:185). The former 'whites'-only areas became suburban economic nodes, depriving the inner city of economic growth, with office spaces in the inner city becoming vacant and rent, property values and municipal rates falling (Tomlinson 1999 and Beavon 2004, as cited in Peyroux 2012:185).

In 2001, the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) was created to deal with inner-city regeneration (Bethlehem 2013:19). CIDs were introduced, which allowed for levies to be collected 'to fund private sector management of the area' (Bethlehem

2013:19). Investment by large corporates, retail business and the increase in residential conversions aided the city to revive itself (Bethlehem 2013:20–24).

Urban Regeneration in Cape Town, South Africa

Various Central Business Districts, community nodes and central business areas were identified as declining, by the Cape Town Mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme (MURP), and in 2015 the Integrated Urban Management Plan was introduced in order to upgrade the areas which were increasingly regressing (City of Cape Town 2019). The focus of the area-based programme was to regenerate various areas in Cape Town, in order to improve the lives of communities which have been recognised as ‘neglected and dysfunctional and are seen to be degenerating rapidly’ (Jennings 2017: page). The programme includes improving the socio-economic conditions, the quality of life and to improve the safety conditions in specific areas and public spaces. The partnership with communities includes the public infrastructure and facilities maintenance programme which has created a facility for effective private and public investment (Jennings 2017).

Urban Regeneration in Durban (eThekweni Municipality) – South Africa

KwaZulu-Natal is estimated to have ‘19.6% of the total population of South Africa’ in 2017, which is 11 million people. This is the second highest percent of the population in a province, with Gauteng having 25.3%. (Statistics South Africa 2017:3). Out of the estimated 11 million of the population in KwaZulu-Natal, an estimate of 3.7 million people, reside in the eThekweni Municipality (eThekweni Municipality 2016d:3–4).

eThekweni Municipality is the ‘third largest city in South Africa, and the largest city within the Province of KwaZulu-Natal’ and it is also one of eight metropolitan municipalities within South Africa (eThekweni Municipality 2016d:3–4). ‘The vision of the City is that by 2030, eThekweni will be Africa’s most Caring and Liveable City’ (eThekweni Municipality 2016a).

eThekweni Municipality is located over an expanse of approximately 2297km² (Statistics South Africa 2016).

eThekweni is known as the home of Africa’s best-managed, busiest port and is also a major centre of tourism because of the city’s warm subtropical climate and extensive beaches (eThekweni Municipality 2016a)

The municipality has also had many challenges of addressing social, economic and material needs of employees and communities. Nair (2017:6) opines that the Durban Central Business District has deteriorated with dilapidated buildings dominating the

skyline. The buildings in the city have become derelict and they have been high-jacked by drug lords, prostitutes and street children (Nair 2017:6). Criminal activities and the state of buildings in the inner city of Durban, due to poor management and illegal squatters has been raised as a concern for investors (Ndaliso 2017:1).

Other issues experienced by the eThekweni Municipality relate to by-law enforcement and compliance, general cleanliness, verge maintenance, illegal land use, illegal businesses and potholes (eThekweni Municipality 2016b:3). One of the most crucial factors in moving towards a greener and more sustainable economy is the behaviour change of everyday South Africans, who should be driven by an increasing attentiveness towards sustainable development and social and environmental responsibility (Republic of South Africa 2012:200). However, as social cohesion, subsequent to democracy, has not been effectively addressed by the government, the behaviour patterns of the population have not altered since the era of apartheid.

For the purpose of this chapter, the names 'Durban' and 'eThekweni Municipality' were used interchangeably, as is common amongst citizens. Durban is the main central business district in the eThekweni Municipality. The inner-city area encompasses the eThekweni Municipal wards 26, 27 and 28 (eThekweni Municipality 2016c:2).

The inner-city area of Durban, which is the main Central Business District in the eThekweni Municipality, is a vibrant buzz of activity, consisting of business, educational institutions, one of the biggest ports in South Africa, a small craft harbour and many entertainment and restaurant establishments. It is also the seat of the eThekweni Municipal Council, which is housed in the Durban City Hall (eThekweni Municipality 2016c:30–35,214).

According to the eThekweni Inner-city Local Area Plan, the inner city is rich in opportunities and culture and is a complex and diverse zone of the city (eThekweni Municipality 2016c:30). The strategic location of the inner-city area is served by major transportation networks (eThekweni Municipality 2016c:30–35, 214). Tourism plays a critical role in the city and is supported by the Ushaka Marine World, which is located in the inner city (Durban Tourism 2018). The inner city of Durban also incorporates the iconic Moses Mabhida Stadium; The International Convention Centre; government offices and facilities; the Municipal Court, High Court and magistrate's courts; legal offices; social facilities; various retail stores and markets; the beach promenade and coastline; museums and libraries; parks and gardens, and various clinics and hospitals (eThekweni Municipality 2016c:30–35, 214). With the wide coverage of economic activities, tourism and social facilities, the inner city was the ideal study site for research related to these activities.

The implementation of the various strategies, programmes and projects of the municipality is supported by the legislative framework for South African local government, and the eThekweni Municipality has also introduced various policies and by-laws which are applicable within the municipal environment.

The City of Durban has initiated numerous programmes concerning the clean-up of city spaces, including the Clean and Maintain My City campaign (eThekweni Municipality 2016b:1), and has also attempted to enforce by-laws concerning

problem buildings and litter over the years. Nevertheless, these efforts seem to be unsustainable in the long term. Programmes which have been implemented previously by eThekweni Municipality, also includes the 'Keep Durban Beautiful' programme, verge garden competitions, and in 2017 the *Khuculul'iTheku* holistic clean-up project. However, these programmes and projects are also not seen to be sustainable, as there is continuous media feedback that the city is filthy and plagued by bad buildings and urban decay.

Given that the units involved in the cleaning and maintaining the city are in different clusters, it is apparent that this has led to a situation of silo mentality. Many of the projects related to urban regeneration are undertaken within the units, without involving other units, undertaking projects with the same ultimate aim.

By-laws have also been implemented by the eThekweni Municipality; however, the city has been faced with several challenges regarding the enforcement of these by-laws. Municipal records reveal that many of the fines for non-compliance to the by-laws was written off in subsequent years, for various reasons.

Another challenge as reported in February 2017 was that the City of Durban was filled with uncollected rubbish bags, which were not collected by Durban Solid Waste due to strike action by the Solid Waste staff (Uncollected rubbish 2017:2). Streets around tourist attractions were also filthy with heaps of refuse, and the rubbish bags were attracting rats and gave off a bad stench (Uncollected rubbish 2017:2). The spokesperson at the Cathedral in one of the streets, which was filled with rubbish bins, complained that cleanliness in the area was an ongoing problem, as once the streets are cleaned, it becomes dirty 'a few moments later' (Uncollected rubbish 2017:2).

According to the eThekweni Municipality 'Management is aware of the issues concerning crime, dirt and grime, that streets are filthy, that there are problem buildings, illegal activities and that there are contraventions of by-laws' (eThekweni Municipality 2017:1). The challenges confronted by the city include crime and grime, abandoned and invaded buildings, traffic congestion, informal traders, migration of businesses out of the central business district and road safety particularly for pedestrians (eThekweni Municipality 2015). It is apparent, therefore, that the eThekweni Municipality has implemented many initiatives to address the cleanliness of the city and urban decay, but these have not been successful in sustaining a clean, attractive and well-maintained city.

Numerous challenges were identified during the research study, which are as follows:

Challenges

- There was a lack of involvement by business and informal trade in cleaning up city spaces.
- Ineffective enforcement of regulations concerning informal and illegal traders.
- Public realm infrastructure was damaged increasing the problem of bad buildings.
- The city was filthy due to dumping and littering.
- There was a lack of leadership and governance.

- Social cohesion was not sufficiently dealt with resulting in homelessness and street children.
- There was a lack of education and lack of ownership by citizens.
- Inadequate and badly maintained infrastructure and public spaces.
- Inadequate and outdated service levels and a lack of monitoring.
- Lack of enforcement of by-laws and ineffective by-laws.
- Lack of educational initiatives for the public.
- Poor behaviour patterns of stakeholders.
- Lack of involvement of business in keeping the city clean.

The Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in South Africa has also identified several challenges experienced by the local government in its 20-year review. Although this review took place in the year 2014, the challenges identified were still highly relevant 4 years later. The governance challenges identified by DPME in 2014 reflect on the lack of political leadership and political oversight, as well as inefficient and ineffective administrations at the local government level (Republic of South Africa 2014:30). These were recognised by the National Government as key to the difficulties at municipalities. The issues regarding political and administrative leadership has resulted in another challenge identified, which was the declining trust in the local government, mostly due to service delivery failures and the incapacity to provide a response to intricate ‘policy demands’ (Republic of South Africa 2014:30).

Accountability is key to the success of any organisation. The challenges recognised by DPME in its review clearly reflected that the lack of communication and understanding of the community’s needs was central to the negative perception of Municipalities. This was revealed in the service delivery protests, which were discussed in the research study, and brought to fruition the findings of the 2014 review by DPME. Consequence management and performance management also contributed towards the lack of trust in the local government (Republic of South Africa 2014:33–34).

The Auditor-General of South Africa also identified that consequence management was key to accountability. If the actions of those officials who were responsible for service delivery were deficient, then consequence management needed to take place. The fact that the Auditor-General has identified that consequence management and internal control were lacking in many municipalities accounted for the poor performance of municipalities. The findings of the Auditor-General, as listed in the 2014 review by DPME were ‘A general lack of consequences for poor performance; Mayors and councillors are not responsive to the issues identified by the audits and do not take recommendations seriously; and municipalities are slow in taking up responsibilities and do not take ownership of implementing key controls. If this widespread root cause is not addressed, it will continue to weaken the pillars of governance’ (Auditor-General of South Africa 2012 as cited in Republic of South Africa 2014:34).

Capacity and skill shortages were identified by DPME in 2014. This was an ongoing issue for many years, and even though recognised by the National

Government as a challenge hindering service delivery, not much has been done since 2014 to address the challenge. Listed below are some of the challenges which DPME identified in the 2014 review, which was highly prevalent in many municipalities (Republic of South Africa 2014:35).

Financial constraints at municipalities was the foundation for many challenges experienced by the local government. Due to the inability to generate enough revenue from its customer base, as well as non-revenue service delivery, municipalities struggled to maintain high levels of performance. On many occasions, non-compliance to supply chain management policies took root in municipalities in order to fast track services, and these led to unauthorised, irregular and/or fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Many municipalities were therefore challenged with qualifications on the Annual Report and Annual Financial Statements due to non-compliance (Auditor-General of South Africa 2012 as cited in Republic of South Africa 2014:36).

Indeed, the most critical challenge experienced by the local government was that of service delivery constraints. Many of the service delivery constraints have had dire consequences over the years, with the increase in service delivery protests, as identified in the study. The list of challenges as identified by DPME in 2014 have gained momentum over the years and have created unmanageable municipalities to date. These included the 'Inability to deliver core services; Lack of infrastructure and appropriate service standards; Neglect of maintenance and repairs of municipal infrastructure; Increasing population growth, escalating urbanisation, increasing municipal services demand and infrastructure maintenance loads, and the predominance of slow budget growth and slow economic growth and high levels of backlogs' (Republic of South Africa 2014:39–40).

The list of challenges as identified in the 20-year review was not finite, and DPME had recognised that there was still much to be done to address the challenges (Republic of South Africa 2014:40). Many of the challenges directly resulted from cities not undertaking efficient service delivery. However, more important in the context of this study was that these challenges had hindered many cities from being clean, attractive and well-maintained.

One of the recommendations by the DPME was that participatory local governance needed to be revitalised and for the improvement of processes at the local government level there needs to be an integration of institutional, political and community faced interventions, which must be directed at the governance challenges (Republic of South Africa 2014:46). The underlying cause of many of the governance issues which plagued South African cities was the problem of the silo mentality within Municipal departments, which needed to be addressed in an integrated manner.

Therefore, the following recommendations are provided to holistically address the challenges identified.

Recommendations

Integrated Strategic Planning

An Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) is critical for a municipality to tackle urban degeneration and is the starting point for any initiative. It is important to determine what needs to be achieved, how it will be achieved, the resources required to achieve the goal, the stakeholders to partner with and the financial resources required for the ISP. The involvement of the public in its strategic plan will be of considerable advantage to the city, as there will be buy-in from the public. Integrated plans must consider all cross-cutting processes within the entire plan and ensure that sufficient consideration is given to inter-dependent tasks. All parallel processes must be aligned for implementation. Once an integrated plan has been formed, a timeline for implementation must be set and agreed on and must be communicated to all stakeholders. Monitoring and evaluation of such a plan is crucial to achieve success.

Proactive Policy Environment

To ensure that the municipality remains clean, attractive and well maintained, it is important to have proactive policies to address environmental issues. This will ensure sustainability of practices and processes and provides a model for all units. Such policies must be subject to regular annual reviews, as the environment is continuously changing, and policies need to be adapted accordingly. Policy frameworks lend support to the initiatives being undertaken for urban regeneration and allow the municipality to implement crucial changes within a legislated environment.

Increase Resources in Waste Management

As urbanisation occurs within cities, levels of pollution increase as more waste is generated. This in turn, contributes towards urban degeneration within the cities, as waste management is overburdened. Therefore, increased resources for waste management are required. Furthermore, a dedicated Cleaning Project Officer should be allocated per zone within the inner city, with a task team cleaning each zone daily. Shifts should be considered so that all 24 h can be covered by the cleaning team. Technological tools must be implemented to assist in the management of waste. Furthermore, recycling should be enforced, and better measures taken to ensure that there is minimum waste transported to landfill sites.

Enforcement and Consequence Management Strategies

Urbanisation also causes an increase in illegal occupation of buildings, illegal water, sanitation and electricity connections and increased waste within inner cities. This has consequentially resulted in deteriorating environmental conditions within inner cities. Landlords neglect to upgrade buildings due to the high costs involved, and many of these abandoned buildings have been hijacked and illegally occupied, resulting in massive deterioration of the buildings.

Another issue around enforcement is that the Waste Management Unit cannot cope with the increased waste generated in the city. There is continuous dumping and littering plaguing the city, which results in a very unattractive city. The attitude of the public is also a concern, as littering and dumping is not considered a wrongdoing by the public.

Although the municipality has by-laws in place to address litter, dumping and problem buildings, the city still needs to properly enforce them. However, critical to this process of enforcement is ensuring that there are enough staff to enforce the by-laws. The municipality's multi-unit task team dealing with the urban degeneration issues must be enhanced. Furthermore, consequence management strategies need to be identified and enforced. 'Naming and shaming' should be implemented, so that the public will know that the city is serious about its programmes and that those who are non-compliant will be found responsible and fined or imprisoned. This will send a strong message to those persons who ignore the by-laws.

Changing Behaviour Patterns Internally and Externally and Empowering Communities

The historical situation in South Africa plays a huge role in current behaviour patterns towards littering, dumping and problem buildings within cities, as advised by the respondents to the research study. This is an area which is lacking in research material, and assumptions will be made based on the feedback from several respondents. The belief is that the changeover from the apartheid era to democracy brought about several changes to the lifestyles of people, especially those moving to cities. However, the perception is that the government did not fully address the need for social cohesion in the new democracy. The unintended consequences of moving to a democracy, without addressing how people perceived the new living and urban circumstances, have resulted in rebellious behavioural patterns, which are still surfacing some 25 years after the dawn of democracy.

To change behavioural patterns, well-thought out plans need to be implemented, with an understanding that behavioural change does not happen overnight.

In order to address this underlying cause of urban degeneration, it is important that the municipality creates a comprehensive strategic plan which will integrate programmes and projects aimed at changing mindsets and behavioural patterns

internal to the organisation as well as to the public, with subtle messages of keeping the environment clean; raising awareness and perception of clean spaces; facilitating programmes which will enhance the sense of pride and ownership within the city; discouraging anti-social behaviour of dumping, littering, squatting, vandalism, graffiti and illegal connections, and inspiring community perception and participation in neighbourhood programmes and prevention programmes.

Critical to any city is the utilisation of the potential of its employees of the municipality in fostering the message of keeping the city clean, attractive and well maintained. The city's biggest asset in this venture is its employees, and by inspiring the employees to be ambassadors of the city, the city will not only be impacting on its employees, but also their families and friends with the message to keep the city clean.

Effective Communication and Technology

Effective communication is essential for any strategy to be achieved. All stakeholders need to be kept informed of all programmes and projects being implemented by the municipality, and the communication must encourage participation. Therefore, a proper communication plan must be created which will allow appropriate and regular communication with communities. Social media is a powerful tool, which can be used to communicate effectively the messages of keeping the city clean and attractive. Technology can also be used to provide the public with a tool to alert the municipality of areas that need to be cleaned, where there is dumping, if there are any illegal activities taking place in buildings and similar issues. By placing the responsibility in the hands of the public, the municipality will build pride and ownership over time.

Awareness and Education Sessions with Public and Business

One of the strongest recommendations arising from the results of the research is the issue of awareness and educating the public. To provide the public and businesses with the opportunity to understand the reasons why they should not litter, or dump, education and awareness sessions should be held within the city for different groups of people. Strategic communication messages which provide the public and businesses with ideas of how to keep the city clean, should be shared across all platforms. Education is critical to effectively curbing litter and dumping. If the staff, public and businesses are not properly educated on how to keep the city clean, the inner city will continuously be a dump site.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Performance Management

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), as well as Performance Management are critical elements of any programme or project. An adage of Performance Management is that 'what gets measured gets done'. By monitoring the targets set by the departments to clean up the city and evaluating the implementation or impact of the strategies, programmes or projects aimed at ensuring that the city is clean, attractive and well maintained, the city will have an appreciation of the strategies, programmes and projects, and whether the goals and targets set out have been achieved. Monitoring will also determine the reasons why any part of the strategies, programme or project are not working effectively. Evaluating the strategies, programmes or projects will provide an analysis of the value addition of the project, whether the project has impacted on beneficiaries; and whether the ultimate goals of the programmes or projects have been achieved. It will also highlight the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of programmes. Performance Management provides an avenue to manage the performance of all employees involved in the processes. This will allow the municipality to make decisions on how the programme is managed, how to change the programme and whether to continue with the programme or to terminate it.

Conclusion

The process followed in this chapter included how urban regeneration programmes are experienced by third world cities, within the African context. The experiences of the various cities profiled indicate that numerous challenges prevail in African cities and an integrated approach towards urban regeneration is recommended. The City of Durban was profiled as a case study with the main challenges identified, as well as potential recommendations for cities to implement and to address urban regeneration. The recommendations are cross-cutting in nature and help address various pockets of challenges, which may differ in each city. Therefore, each recommendation is self-sustaining and is not dependent on any other recommendation.

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Chapter 11

Urbanisation and Future Smart Cities: Challenges of Water and Sanitation Services



Thokozani Ian Nzimakwe

Abstract In an increasingly urbanised world, substantial transformations in population distribution seem inevitable, although perhaps not as rapid as often predicted. At the city level, local governments play perhaps the most important role in ensuring that urbanisation is inclusive and that its benefits are shared. Yet, a very large proportion of the population of many cities in Africa lacks access to adequate water and sanitation services. This increases their vulnerability to hazards, both environmental and socioeconomic. Integrating broader water resources management, the design of water infrastructures and the operation of water services into urban planning is becoming increasingly important and highlights the imperative of addressing the key urban-rural water linkages. Making the best use of innovative technical and non-technical solutions (including new technologies and techniques, business models, stakeholder engagement, green infrastructure, regulatory arrangements) to respond to the above challenges at least cost is key to ensuring adequate levels of water security and water services.

Cities are central nodes in the development of human geographies. They are spaces where the flows of goods, capital and people converge. They rely on the management and good governance of public infrastructure for sustainable growth and stability and to safeguard their populations against natural and man-made disasters. City governments need to nurture and expand their infrastructure ecosystems. Developing economies will struggle to provide housing, infrastructure, transportation, energy, employment and basic services. In Africa in particular, populations crammed into informal settlements and low-cost housing are most vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, conflict and climate change. City governments need a forward-looking systematic approach to urban growth in order to secure sustainable socio-economic development and ensure resilience in the face of disaster. This chapter argues that population growth, commercialisation and industrialisation place further pressures on authorities to meet growing demand in water-scarce

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regions. Smarter, more effective management of water in relation to the urban water cycle can contribute to more effective water services planning and water demand management. Municipalities are the custodians of community infrastructure. The maintenance and management of physical infrastructure assets, infrastructure asset management, are therefore the cornerstone of delivering public goods and services. The municipalities whose solutions are resilient and scalable have the most opportunities to become smart cities.

Keywords Urbanisation · Water · Sanitation · Smart cities · Future cities · Municipalities · Government

Introduction

Cities in developing economies must become sustainable, smart and resilient if they are going to manage future challenges associated with rapid urbanisation. The need for robust, intelligent and integrated infrastructure asset management practices has never been this dire. The availability and distribution of water resources is intrinsically linked to any city's operations in areas as diverse as housing, health, economic development, tourism, recreation, transport, waste management and energy. City governments need to nurture and expand their infrastructure ecosystems. Developing economies will struggle to provide housing, infrastructure, transportation, energy, employment and basic services. In Africa in particular, populations crammed into informal settlements and low-cost housing are most vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, conflict and climate change. City governments need a forward-looking systematic approach to urban growth in order to secure sustainable socio-economic development and ensure resilience in the face of disaster. With rapid urbanisation becoming an inevitable fact, cities are facing increasing challenges to secure financially sustainable water and sanitation services for its citizenry. Urban areas will also have the task of absorbing rural populations, as their growth continues to decline.

Integrating broader water resources management, the design of water supply infrastructure and the operation of water services into urban planning is becoming increasingly important and highlights the imperative of addressing the key urban-rural water linkages. Making the best use of innovative technical and non-technical solutions (including new technologies and techniques, business models, stakeholder engagement, green infrastructure, regulatory arrangements) to respond to the above challenges in an efficient manner is key to ensuring adequate levels of water security and water services. Factors such as population increase and especially urbanisation mean that the world is forecast to use about 30% more water in 2025 than it did in 2000, with further water shortages expected. This chapter describes the concept

of a smart city, the role of water management in the smart city revolution, issues to be known about the future of water and sanitation, urbanisation and [water in cities](#), [water-wise cities](#) *through integrated planning and design*, smart water management in cities and the leadership and governance required, as well as a conclusion.

Concept of a Smart City

Ecological and economic sustainable cities are a new initiative launched by the World Bank, as an integral part of the World Bank Urban and Local Government Strategy, to help cities in developing countries achieve greater ecological and economic sustainability (Yadav 2016). Urbanisation in developing countries may be the single greatest change in this century.

What Is a Smart City?

This is an increasingly urban world. There is an urgent need to ensure that local governments have the infrastructure in place to tackle the inevitable demographic challenges. There remains a great desire for change, and city management must act now to improve service delivery and streamline internal operations. To compete effectively at an international level, cities will need to become more intelligent, innovative and integrated. A smart city will increase efficiency, productivity and ecological awareness; it will reduce pollution and improve quality of life in a world of increasing urban complexity. The smart city concept is pragmatic and a balanced combination of ecological, economical and other sectors for perfect sustainable development. Ecological cities enhance the well-being of citizens and society through integrated urban planning and management that fully harnesses the benefits of ecological systems and protects and nurtures these assets for future generations. Economic cities create value and opportunities for citizens, businesses and society by efficiently using all tangible and intangible assets and enabling productive, inclusive and sustainable economic activity (Albino et al. 2015; New 2017).

The Role of Water Management in the Smart City Revolution

By the year 2050, the United Nations predicts that the global population will have risen to an astounding 9,8 billion people. While the population surges, a dramatic relocation is occurring, drawing individuals from rural areas to urban hubs. The drivers of this migration, economic opportunity and quality of life will bring an estimated 70% of the global population to cities by the time we reach 10 billion human beings, according to the Population Reference Bureau (United Nations

2019). This means literally millions more people inhabiting the same cities people live in today, where networks like energy, transportation and water treatment and distribution are already strained. The world can also expect the emergence of an expanded global middle class, set to deservedly become prosperous consumers. To support this kind of population density, cities around the globe are going to require major improvements to infrastructure and efficiencies (Taddune 2018).

‘Smart water’ is one of six components that define a smart city. The others include energy, mobility, buildings, public services and integration. The goal of these efforts is to make cities more sustainable and efficient, according to Water World Council (2017), and effectively improve quality of life. Smart water generally refers to a holistic approach to managing this priceless resource and the infrastructure systems surrounding its sourcing, treatment and delivery. As cities update and invest in their water infrastructure with more Internet-enabled tools, and a wealth of data becomes available, it is vital that these networks communicate with one another. This will allow for not only the measurement of important indexes such as reservoir and groundwater supply, and the triage of infrastructure updates, but will improve efficiencies across water-related disciplines. As an example, Water World cites predictive capabilities of flood mapping when looking at historical flood data paired with real-time and predicted weather and precipitation data (Taddune 2018).

By recognising anomalies in consumption patterns for both the utilities and end users, cities can optimise and eliminate water waste and cost in delivery (Taddune 2018). The high-energy demand of a city’s water treatment and delivery networks are often underestimated, meaning that improving operational efficiency through actionable data will reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cut costs simultaneously.

Effective ways of supplying water to afflicted cities include production of water by seawater desalination and use of recycled water, and there is a need to manage the overall circulation of water around the city efficiently. To provide smart cities with water infrastructure systems, some companies are promoting their intelligent water system concept for integrating water treatment systems with information and control systems for the efficient utilisation of recycled water. According to Mizuki et al. (2012), based on the technology and experience it has built up along with its customers and its activities over many years in manufacturing, technology development and ensuring product reliability, Hitachi intends to create smart cities by making effective use of water resources and providing an efficient water infrastructure.

It seems as though the impact these technologies could have for problem anticipation is boundless. As global water demand grows and climate change creates a question mark in the future of water’s security, Taddune (2018) contends that it is likely cities will not be able to afford resource losses at this scale. Perhaps a network of water treatment plants communicating in real time as a system of checks and balances could prevent or at least mitigate the damage done to communities. Some African cities are well placed to implement changes, and others will need to build capacity to work more effectively. Such cities include Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Dakar and Douala (Jacobsen and Closas 2013).

Implementing smart solutions comes with pivotal, and sometimes costly, challenges and limitations. To update the ageing water infrastructure with the most current technologies, vast resources will need to be spent through both public and private investment. In addition, smart sensors need power to take readings, creating a huge new source of energy demand. Small-scale solar can work in some areas, but is it likely that cloudy or winter cities will maintain enough light to power these tools? As these systems and sensors age or as technology improves, who will bear the rising maintenance costs of smart infrastructure? There are also significant issues of privacy to address and whether all the data and information should be available to the public. What sorts of security measures will need to be taken to ensure the safety of water resources from terrorism and cyberattack? These are all questions that will require input from public, private and non-governmental organisation (NGO) stakeholders to resolve (Taddune 2018).

Though the world does not have all the answers today, now is the time cities must start investing in this smart infrastructure. On a global scale, it is even more important as developing countries are some of the most densely populated places on the planet. Cities must ensure access to the most powerful and modern tools available as industrialisation sweeps the globe. According to Taddune (2018), to invest in anything but the most current technologies will be more costly in the long term and may risk human health and safety in dense urban areas.

Luckily, the cost of these technologies is set to rapidly decline in the coming years, making smart solutions more feasible and powerful than ever before. Frankly, if states do not steadily move in the direction of smarter and more efficient cities, they will not be able to handle the overload of people that is inevitably coming in the near future (Taddune 2018).

Ten Things to Know About the Future of Water and Sanitation

According to Mason et al. (2017), there are ten things to know about the future of water and sanitation, and they include the following.

5,2 Billion People Will Need Better Sanitation by 2030

In 2015, at the end of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a third of the world still defecated in the open or used unsafe or shared toilets. The new sustainable development goals (SDGs) are much more ambitious. For sanitation, everyone needs access not only to a toilet but also to a sanitation system that safely captures and manages waste. Over 60% of the world, 4,5 billion people, currently lack that. With population growth, the target is to reach at least 5,2 billion more people by 2030 (Roser 2019). Meanwhile, at least 2,5 billion more people will need a reliable water supply service that is available at home and free from contamination.

Poor People Will Need to Be Served First

In recent years, the gap in access to water and sanitation between the richest and poorest has widened in many countries. In most countries for which data is available, the richest fifth in rural areas gained access to sanitation faster than the poorest fifth. Leaving no one behind means actively putting poor people first, not just assuming they will eventually catch up.

Demand Will Increase and Supply Will Get More Variable

In the future, increasing demand from growing populations and economies will have more widespread effects on water availability than climate change. Climate change will reduce water availability in some regions, costing as much as 6–14% of growth, but the most consistent effect will be increasing variability. Countries often see infrastructure, especially large dams, as the best way to handle both variable rainfall and increasing demand. For example, the biggest dam in Ethiopia will hold more than 30 times the annual flow of the Thames in London. Yet dams are more of a problem than a solution if they are not accompanied by investments in people and policies for sharing water and its benefits equitably (Mason et al. 2017).

Quality Will Matter as Much as Quantity

Mention water scarcity to people and most will think of retreating lakes and rivers or falling water tables. Despite this, it is quality, not quantity, which will limit options in many areas. Poor quality affects not just surface water but also major groundwater reserves – a hidden problem that is difficult to treat. In South Asia, over half of the groundwater potentially available in the Indo-Gangetic basin is contaminated with salt or arsenic, down to a depth of 200 m. Across China, 10 of 37 deep aquifers analysed had unsafe levels of nitrate pollution (Mason et al. 2017).

Water, Conflict and Migration Will Be Increasingly Linked

Conflict will continue to drive population movements, putting pressure on water resources and services in countries that already struggle to cope. Of the ten major refugee-hosting countries, seven face water stress or water scarcity. A quarter of the total population across these countries do not have access to basic drinking water. To avoid water-related conflicts of their own, host countries will need assistance to meet the needs of refugees as well as their own people.

Water and Sanitation Will Secure Inclusive Growth

Water is a crucial input to economic activities across sectors and income levels – from smallholder farms to high-tech factories. Using water to drive inclusive growth means allocating it to firms and sectors that generate jobs and diversification, not just gross domestic product. While ministries of finance have tended to overlook the sector, sanitation offers much more than health benefits to the economy. In India, a latrine for everyone could free up 260 million hours every day, time that people could spend productively instead of trying to find a place to defecate in the open (Mason et al. 2017).

Small Cities Will Drive Innovation for Billions

It is often assumed that large cities and megacities present the greatest challenge for urban services. Yet, by 2030 it is estimated that 2,3 billion people, more than a quarter of the world's population, will live in towns and cities of fewer than 500,000 people (Roser 2019). Historically, cities in poorer regions have struggled to extend formal, centralised water and sewerage networks to growing populations living on their edges. In sub-Saharan Africa, the share of the urban population receiving a piped water supply has fallen from 67% to 56% since 1990. Yet small cities are less likely to be 'locked in' to centralised networks, giving them the chance to find innovative solutions.

Energy and the Internet Will Reshape Water Use

Water has powered societies for millennia. Now, a power revolution is set to change the rules for water. Mason et al. (2017) contend that solar photovoltaic cells provide energy that is 250 times cheaper now than it was 40 years ago and are now powerful enough to meet irrigation needs. Twelve million small farmers in Asia and Africa have historically used expensive diesel to pump water. Switching to solar systems will lower the cost of food production over time and could reduce poverty. Other smart solutions, including Internet-enabled technology, need to be used wisely to monitor pumping and keep it to sustainable levels (Mason et al. 2017).

Joined-Up Spending Will Meet the Needs of the Most Vulnerable

Joining up longer-term and emergency water and sanitation would help meet the needs of the most vulnerable people in the world. Over \$700 million was spent on long-term water and sanitation projects in fragile countries and territories in 2015. In the same countries, around \$400 million was spent on emergency water and

sanitation (World Bank 2017). Yet there is little joint planning, even where the money comes from the same source. This results in duplicated effort and contradictory approaches.

Companies with the Long View Will Prosper

Many companies understand that water risks affect their business, yet only a few are taking action. More than \$14 billion in water-related financial impacts were reported across about 600 companies in 2015, but there is little progress on addressing the risks (World Bank 2017). If anything, most companies are only trying to increase water efficiency in their own operations. To get the edge on competitors and win the confidence of investors, companies need to help their suppliers manage water risks and engage openly with others, public and private, who rely on the same water resources (World Water Council 2017).

Urbanisation and Water in Cities

Factors such as population increase and especially urbanisation mean that the world is forecast to use about 30% more water in 2025 than it did in 2000, with further water shortages expected (Mizuki et al. 2012). Cities around the world are continuously providing financial and specialised services for businesses, industry and manufacturing sectors, among others. The emergence of new markets has contributed to a sharp population increase, fostering urbanisation. The global urban population is estimated to be 3.5 billion of inhabitants and is expected to surpass 5 billion by 2030 (United Nations 2019).

According to the International Telecommunication Union (2014), the rate of urbanisation in some cities exceeds the capacities of governments (both local and national) to effectively plan and transition in an efficient and sustainable manner. Since the infrastructure design and capacity of water distribution and treatment plants are reliant on forecasted water demands and socio-economic data, unforeseen urban growth can lead to severe inequalities in service provision, thus constraining public access to water and sanitation.

Urban water management cannot be effective without the investment needed for a comprehensive, system-wide implementation. Increasing urbanisation poses the need for new infrastructure to satisfy the requirements of the present as well as the future (ITU 2014). The high cost and substantial investment requirements for the establishment and operation of such services have led to shifting responsibilities between governments and municipalities, between governments and industries/businesses as well as between governments and the public in order to generate the revenue and payment systems needed to finance urban water investments.

Accordingly, the financing of water and sanitation services constitutes a major issue. The fact that ageing infrastructure is crippling urban water distribution systems is a clear indicator that there is insufficient financing and investment within the urban water structure (Knight 2019). To ensure a sustainable development of water infrastructure in future and smart cities, appropriate investment levels are needed to support both short- and long-term decision-making and to address the uncertainty and emerging risks associated with urban water challenges.

Water-Wise Cities Through Integrated Planning and Design

According to the International Water Association (IWA) (2019), for the first time in history, over half of the world's population is living in cities. By 2050, roughly **6.4 billion people** will live in a city. These people will be living in an increasingly water-scarce world at a time when demand for water is projected to increase by 55 per cent by 2050. Rapid population growth, industrialisation, climate change, water pollution and maintaining, renewing and expanding urban water infrastructure are just some of the unprecedented challenges facing urban water management and systems.

Cities are the future for humanity, but the failure to manage higher population density or climate change can result in a threat to resources – water, energy, food – and have a profound impact on human health and well-being, the environment and the economy. Water-sensitive cities are great places to live, where innovation, social cohesion, creativity and culture flourish. To create sustainable water in cities, all stakeholders need to act to avoid the looming water crisis. People need to share experience and knowledge and track progress towards sustainable development goals. The cities of the future agenda harness the power of the IWA network to co-create solutions and join efforts to manage a city's many waters in a sustainable and resilient manner, an approach endorsed by the IWA Principles for Water-Wise Cities.

Local, national and international decision makers will need to focus on the following as part of managing urban water and systems in future and smart cities (IWA 2019).

Financing Urban Water

The focus should be on providing policy guidance on how governments can effectively meet the financial needs to sustainably manage urban water and maintain, renew and expand urban water infrastructure. Meeting such needs will require major reforms to improve the economic and institutional framework for water utilities and to enhance the enabling environment for attracting sources of finance and reducing investment needs. This work will help governments to better understand and address commercial, political and institutional issues associated with urban

water financing and the contribution of economic instruments and innovative financing mechanisms. Cities will need to identify the obstacles to the efficient use of available funding and the mobilisation of additional sources of finance, including from the private sector (OECD 2014).

Governing Urban Water

This will call for the provision of evidence on the relationship between governance structures for managing water in cities and the performance of water policy outcomes in terms of access, quality, reliability, equity and sustainability. Cities will have to be clustered according to future urban trends and governance features; map who does what within the water chain and beyond (spatial planning, energy and urban development); draw lessons from good practice in managing interdependencies across people, places and policies; and provide guidance on how to overcome territorial and institutional fragmentation. Specific attention will need to be devoted to pioneer cities with forward-looking adaptive governance strategies to cope with future climate, regional and demographic trends. The aim is to support policy coherence and effective water management beyond administrative boundaries and sectoral silos.

Regulating Urban Water

Countries and cities regulate the dimensions of urban water services (the network, quality, service delivery and pricing) in different ways. One recent trend is the development of dedicated regulatory bodies for drinking water and wastewater services. Building on a survey across dedicated water regulatory agencies and recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) work on the governance of economic regulators, this will shed light on the governance arrangements of these dedicated regulatory agencies in order to promote effective and efficient water service delivery and better responsiveness of service providers to urban population needs.

Eco-innovation and Urban Water

Government policy has a strong role to play in increasing the amount and pace of eco-innovation in urban water delivery that is critical to the improved management of urban water. Cities will need to focus on the economic and institutional aspects of water-efficient spatial design, smart water systems, distributed water systems and green infrastructure. This will address policy blockages to the uptake of innovations

and identify economic and regulatory policies that can encourage water innovations in cities.

Managing the Urban–Rural Water Interface

The interdependencies between cities and the broader river basin within which cities are located are critical in terms of the linkages with agriculture, the use of green infrastructure in the watershed, institutional arrangements for watersheds and cities, impacts on biodiversity and economic instruments for managing water allocations. Cities will have to explore existing bottlenecks as well as positive drivers for more integrated approaches, at the relevant territorial level and beyond administrative boundaries.

According to Mizuki et al. (2012), a company in Japan like Hitachi believes it is possible to improve the business efficiency of the water cycle across an entire region by collecting information such as water usage in the distribution system and operational data from water treatment plants in a single database where it can be managed centrally and used interactively. A feature of the intelligent water system is that it can improve the efficiency of water resources in a region by combining information technology with various different water treatment systems to make effective use of recycled water. The intelligent water system has an essential role in coping with water shortages throughout the world and the development of the ideal smart cities of the future. Hitachi intends to draw on its experience to make further improvements in regional water cycles.

Smart Water Management in Cities

If matched with appropriate and effective ICT solutions, in the form of smart water management (SWM), water issues within cities can be properly addressed and managed. Smart water management (SWM) in cities seeks to alleviate challenges in the urban water management and water sector through the integration of ICT products, solutions and systems in areas of water management and sanitation, as well as storm water management (International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2014). Such technologies are adapted to continuously monitor water resources and diagnose problems in the urban water sector, allowing to prioritise and to manage maintenance issues more effectively. This further assists to gather data needed to optimise all aspects of a city's water management system and feed information back to citizens, water operators and technical services of cities.

As illustrated in Fig. 11.1, the availability and distribution of water resources is intrinsically linked to the city's operations in areas as diverse as housing, health, economic development, tourism, recreation, transport, waste management and energy.



Fig. 11.1 Interconnectedness of water and cities. (Source: International Telecommunication Union 2014)

In terms of the International Telecommunication Union (2014), the increasing concentration of people, economic activities and assets in urban areas usually generates high amounts of waste and greenhouse gas pollution, heightening the city's susceptibility to the risks posed by disasters/hazards, as well as to the impacts of climate change. Thus, uncontrolled growth in urban areas poses socio-economic and environmental challenges to residents, businesses, industries, municipalities and governments alike.

These challenges include the stress placed on water resources by fast-paced urbanisation rates, which translates into a growing demand for clean water supplies and adequate sanitation, required to ensure human dignity. Rapid urban growth has also increased the competition for scarce water resources between sectors such as industry and agriculture. The urban water service must therefore ensure proper management of water supply and distribution, water and wastewater treatment and other municipal-related services.

Smart water is the solution **smart cities** must work on to control and prevent the waste of water. Water conservation is necessary for smart cities to exist and function efficiently. Smart water solutions are growing as they give consumers the ability to easily monitor their water consumption and provide useful information to the public. Water loss management is becoming increasingly important as supplies are stressed by population growth or water scarcity. Many regions are experiencing

record droughts. Countries in dry and semi-dry regions, where there is water scarcity and water stress, are among the dominant crucial problems, seriously affecting any type of development (GMSA 2017).

Many of those countries are exposed to both economic and physical water security. Institutional constraints, aging infrastructure, lack of investment, poor data and lack of quality services are just some key challenges that the water sector faces. Smart water management solutions seek to alleviate challenges in the water sector by promoting the development and management of information and communication technology products, solutions and systems to maximise economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of water as a resource of the environment.

Managing Water for Future Cities

More than half of the world's population currently resides in cities and urbanisation is projected to continue increasing. By 2050, 86% of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) population will be living in urban areas, with an increasing concentration in large cities of one million or more inhabitants. This will have inevitable consequences on the way water is managed across administrative and hydrological boundaries (OECD 2014).

Countries are already confronted with significant challenges to protect cities from water risks and to secure financially sustainable water and sanitation services to city dwellers. According to the OECD (2014) this situation requires a concerted effort, putting water supply and sanitation policies in the wider context of institutional arrangements and water resources management and strengthening the interface between cities and the surrounding rural environment. The significant urban water investments being made, or which need to be made, require OECD members to think carefully about how to manage urban water cost-effectively and to learn from the experience of others in addressing the demand and supply sides of the urban water management challenge.

Future demographic and economic trends have important implications for household and industry access to urban water and sanitation services (OECD 2014):

- Demand for water is projected to increase by 55% by 2050. As a result, city dwellers and urban industries are increasingly competing with other water users for access to water resources. If not properly managed, this competition can have undesirable social, environmental and economic consequences.
- Cities are increasingly at risk of floods and droughts, especially as a result of increasing climate variability. The value of assets at risk is particularly high in OECD cities, although the capacity to respond is also often high.
- In OECD countries, diffuse pollution is leading to increasingly inadequate water quality in a number of catchment areas, generating additional costs in ensuring access to safe water.
- While access to water services is usually good in OECD cities, renewal of existing infrastructure is lagging well behind with the result that networks are ageing,

with potential consequences for the economic costs of maintenance, and on health and the environment.

- Infrastructures conceived and built several decades ago may be maladapted to emerging challenges. Urban drainage is often not adapted to heavy rains: where rainwater is collected in sewerage systems, heavy rains can lead to sewer overflow and wastewater being released in the environment without treatment.
- The financial context in many OECD cities is dire as water investment needs are rising while the traditional sources of finance are under severe constraints. Revenues from water tariffs are affected by the decline of water consumption in many OECD city centres due to drives for higher levels of water efficiency and changes in industrial structures of cities. Taxes from central governments are increasingly scarce in many countries where fiscal consolidation is a priority. Transfers from the international community (such as official development assistance and European structural funds) are increasingly constrained.
- Retrofitting existing water infrastructure creates challenges in terms of how to adapt existing infrastructures with new technologies at least cost for the community in order to meet current and emerging demands. Such demands and self-help initiatives tend to be smaller in scope than formal utility-community partnerships. They often operate in small towns, with examples to be found in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia (Adams 2018).

Leadership and Governance

Sustainable policies, strategies and practices are necessary to respond to the challenges affecting urban water resources. However, weak regulatory water and sanitation frameworks, along with overlapping functions within governmental agencies and institutions, have led to an unclear division of responsibilities and to uncoordinated efforts in urban water management. This has caused the fragmentation of strategies, as well as redundancies, jurisdictional conflicts, wastage of resources and conflicts in financing, resulting in inefficient and unsustainable approaches to urban water management in many cities around the globe. Heavy subsidies and fixed rates implemented by governments have encouraged ineffective usage and high consumption rates of water resources, ultimately placing further stress on this fragile resource. Weak leadership and governance within the urban water structures has limited the sector's capacity to effectively address many of the existing and emerging challenges related to water resources (International Telecommunication Union 2014).

Conclusion

Cities can contribute to water resources management, ecosystems and biodiversity conservation, through their design and the infrastructures they rely upon (smart water systems, green roofs and more permeable surfaces). This chapter has argued

that the way in which water is managed in cities has consequences both for city dwellers and for the wider community. Water management in cities dictates water availability (in both quantity and quality) upstream and downstream for other users. It thus also influences the environmental, economic and social development of territories and countries.

Smart water management can play a key role in the transformation of cities of both developed and developing countries into smart and sustainable cities, if adequate policies, stern governance and broad stakeholder involvement are integrated into its planning and implementation. Through real-time monitoring, efficient operation, improved decision-making and enhanced performance and service delivery, smart water management can ensure that future cities' growth is not achieved at the expense of their water resources. Further advantages such as increased revenue in utilities, reduced operational costs and increased public involvement place smart water management as a viable, smart sustainable solution to address urban water challenges.

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Chapter 12

Disaster Risk Management at the Local Level: The Case of eThekweni City Council in South Africa



Mthokozisi Duze and Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy

Abstract There has been advanced development of progressive disaster management legislation/policies globally, which are intended primarily to ensure progress in disaster risk reduction (DRR). This chapter critiques the application of the disaster risk reduction policies/plans at the local sphere, using eThekweni Municipality in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa as a case study. More specifically, it presented a critical assessment of disaster risk reduction practices with a view to addressing disaster risk management gaps at the local level.

A qualitative case-study strategy was utilized as the primary paradigm, and participants were purposively selected from a multidiscipline source population, namely, municipal disaster management practitioners, councillors, and relevant departments. Analysis of emergent data was conducted through a combination of descriptive statistical and content analysis.

eThekweni Disaster Management Centre has noteworthy capacity constraints, both technical and nontechnical, evident in service shortcomings, notably incomplete plans/frameworks coupled with the absence of significant institutional arrangements, namely, an operational Disaster Management Advisory Forum. The approach to disaster management is reactive rather than proactive, evident from the lack of a disaster management blueprint informed by an assessment of disaster risk.

Apart from the theory development phase, a practice framework was proposed with recommendations to assist local government to improve/enhance disaster risk reduction mainstreaming in their core activities. There has to be alignment between disaster risk reduction and integrated development planning, thereby ensuring that disaster reduction initiatives are holistic and incorporated in the planning, legal, and financial frameworks. Developing and strengthening municipal disaster management capacity and requisite institutional arrangements (interdepartmental committee and the advisory forum for stakeholder engagement) has to be prioritised.

Information extracted from masters dissertation submitted in 2016.

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Keywords Case study · Disaster risk management · Disaster risk reduction · eThekweni City Council · Municipality and local government

Introduction

A comprehensive review of current literature confirms a stark and alarming fact which centers on the acknowledgement that over 4.7 million of all global deaths over a calendar year result from consequences related to disasters—man-made and natural (Kim et al. 2013; Noy 2009). When quantified, this assertion attributes significant loss of human life to disasters and in fact echoes the view expressed by the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon who is famously quoted as saying “vulnerability to disaster is growing faster than resilience. Disaster risk reduction should be an everyday concern for everybody. Let us all invest today for a safer tomorrow” (Ki-Moon 2014: 56).

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) exists as the cornerstone to supporting states and communities to lessen disaster threats and rests on building a worldwide culture of disaster prevention even within a wider acceptance that the natural hazards, which cause disasters, are most of the time outside human ability to control. Be that as it may, susceptibility is ordinarily a consequence of human activities (Reddy 2011: 14). It is therefore critical that institutions are given a responsibility of managing disasters to identify and advance approaches and scrutinize new ways of preventing and minimizing the impact of such disasters. For that reason, the concept of disaster risk reduction should proactively, as opposed to reactively, deal with disasters by promoting disaster prevention and mitigation and a state of preparedness. However, more work is required to entrench and make this practical, particularly in local government, given that it is at the lead in disaster risk management and invariably the closest point of contact and communication with the often-vulnerable communities it serves.

eThekweni Municipality was used as a case study, and specific questions and objectives were set to empirically assess the disaster risk reduction measures, particularly in terms of shortcomings and best practices. The research results were then critically reviewed to make recommendations on enhancing disaster risk reduction through greater coordination and integration.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): Historical and International Perspective

A resolution was passed in 1987 by the United Nations General Assembly whereby the 1990–1999 period was considered the worldwide era for natural disaster reduction (Carter et al. 2007: 51). In this era, collective worldwide efforts were aimed at mitigating property loss and life, as well as any social and economic disruptions occurring due to the disruptive effects of nature, in areas that are susceptible. The fundamental intention of this period was to move away from the reactive approach to disasters and toward a new approach that had prevention and proactive planning at the heart of it (Gaillard 2007: 27). The following are the five (5) major goals of this era:

- Enhancing state capability to lessen the effect of natural disasters, assisting developing countries in evaluating potentially harmful disasters by creating early warning systems/structures that would aid them in self-protection
- Developing appropriate plans/guiding principles for applying scientific/technical knowledge, taking cognizance of cultural/economic diversity internationally
- Supporting scientific/engineering efforts reducing the knowledge gaps to limit loss of property/life
- Collecting new/existing technical data connected to calculating the prediction/evaluation/reduction of natural disasters
- Creating assessment measures for the decreasing/forecasting of natural disasters through technical aid programs, technology transfer, sharing projects/customizing these to specific locations/disasters and evaluating the efficacy of these programs (United Nations (UN) 2002: 74).

The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) set some goals in line with the above objectives that needed to be reached by all countries by the conclusion of the twentieth century. The IDNDR vision was that all countries should have carried out the natural risks assessment, created local/national prevention measures, and implemented global readiness plans, in addition to local/regional and national warning systems (UNISDR 2009a, b: 17).

However, the increased international enthusiasm and focus on the socioeconomic impact of disasters demanded development of pragmatic methods of responding to hazards and vulnerabilities (UNISDR 2003: 34). This led to increasing awareness in aspects relating to hazard responsiveness and practices around risk management. Prominence was given to those vulnerable socioeconomically as a rapidly predisposing risk factor in the mainstream communities, which emphasized the necessity to support the greater participation of local communities in hazard and risk mitigation responsibilities. The IDNDR relied on other parts as well as financial assistance by members of government. The United Nations (UN) member states/governments had an obligation to develop/mainstream their respective disaster risk reduction strategies pertinent to a country's disaster/hazard risks. The 10-year period started off well (ISDR 2002: 28), and an overwhelming 130 countries attempted to create

local committees. The national committees in question varied in their capacities and effectiveness, and less than 25% of them attempted to implement their goals in continental Africa and more specifically Southern Africa. Continentally, the disaster reduction arena has yet to reach the same standing relative to policy or secured financial commitment levels as the continents of Latin America and Asia. As pointed out by Reid and Van Niekerk (2008: 17), this can to a large extent be connected to the Asian Disaster Centre of Preparedness' presence through US participation in Latin America.

The above has highlighted the global strategy impact on disaster reduction, but an added event which constituted the basis of disaster risk mitigation then was the "World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction", held on Yokohama, Japan, in May 1994. Here a strategy toward a disaster-free world was adopted and planned.

Yokohama Strategy and Action Plan for a Safer World: United Nations First International Conference

It was articulated in 1994 that the Yokohama Action Plan and Strategy for a disaster-free world might perhaps be even more pertinent in the twenty-first century (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2000: 105). These postulates provide the basis wherein a significant number of risk justification approaches of the new century are focused. The Yokohama Action Plan and Strategy for a safer world highlighted that all states are in charge and has the sovereignty to safeguard its populace from natural calamities and that developing countries—specifically the least developed ones—in particular as well as island states which are small and small landlocked countries need to be prioritized.

The plan also concentrated on the importance of solidification and increasing the skills in local government. Local laws must be developed wherever required for disaster reduction, awareness, and prevention, which also involved mobilizing local nongovernment organizations (NGOs). The plan also highlighted the significance of firming up and advocating collaboration subregionally, regionally, and internationally in the mitigation, decrease, and anticipation of disasters, both natural and otherwise.

This approach is based on the fact that disasters which are natural have negative economic effects. Although the occurrence is often beyond human control, the vulnerability of people is not. Therefore, communities need to develop strong methods for predicting and living with the risks of such hazards. Communities must be empowered to embark on activities aimed at averting and lessening the effects of catastrophes (Myers 2009: 18). The global conference on disaster risk reduction developed a firm ground for the establishment of the International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2000: 42).

The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) concentrated on safety against natural and man-made threats, by minimizing the susceptibility of communities by enhancing coping capacity (UNISDR 2002: 19). The most significant development which the UNISDR tried to achieve, in relation to the International Decade for IDNDR ideals and the Strategy and Action Plan for Yokohama for a Safer Globe, was humanizing disaster reduction within the framework of inclusive and sustainable development (UNISDR 2004a, b, c) through a multidisciplinary approach. The ISDR adopts a universal approach to disaster mitigation which embraces a risk avoidance ethos and behavioral attitudes that support public activities. The ISDR seeks to increase public awareness on vulnerability issues, risk and disaster reduction internationally. A key priority is to establish government commitment to disaster mitigation implementation and development. Ensuring interdisciplinary/inter-sectoral integration and the development of current communication networks is one of the most important parts of the ISDR.

The ISDR benefited from IDNDR and requested for significant research to be done, thereby developing scientific understanding around disaster reduction with a view to ensuring that ISDR ideals are achieved. The United Nations Interagency Secretariat was created as the pivotal point for the UN General Assembly (facilitated by Resolutions 561195 and 541219) (UN 2002: 15). UNISDR seeks to merge activities on mitigation of disasters and philanthropic/socioeconomic issues (UNISDR 2002: 19). A significant benefit arising is the capacity to combine an expansive array of participants from a variety of disciplines/fields, supported by the Task Force of Interagency Disaster Reduction. The World Conference on Reduction of Disasters placed emphasis on disaster risk reduction. A debate on contemporary activities was carried out in an attempt to shape the reduction of disaster risk globally.

The Second UN Global Conference on Disaster Reduction: The Hyogo Action Framework (HFA) 2005–2015

The Global Disaster Mitigation Conference took place in Hyogo, Japan, on January 18–22, 2005, and this is where the Action Framework for 2005–2015: Establishing the Country's Resilience to Disasters (thereafter referred to as the Action Framework) was presented. At this gathering, a unique way of fostering a methodical and tactical method to reduce exposure to risks and threats was demonstrated. The importance of establishing resilience in the face of disasters through the Hyogo Framework was emphasized. The Framework was presented to outline the details that are needed from all the role players and stakeholders.

It attempted to merge groups including global agencies, governments, and professionals on disasters and others into a collective synchronization structure

(Mohapatra et al. 2009: 111). The HAF outlined five (5) important activities for prioritization, which provided direction and a realistic way for enhanced defense against disasters. The key objective was to reduce significantly by the end of 2015 losses from disasters by working on disaster resilience. This basically intended to limit the economic, social, and environmental losses, as well as lives, when a disaster happens:

- Priority Action 1: establishing that disaster risk reduction should be prioritized locally and nationally and firm institutional implementation is a necessity
- Priority Action 2: disaster risks monitoring/assessing/determining to improve signs of early warning
- Priority Action 3: applying knowledge/education/innovation to build a caring attitude and likely resilience at all levels
- Priority Action 4: controlling the causes of basic risks
- Priority Action 5: revitalizing disaster preparedness for all-level responses which are effective (Duze 2016: 6)

UN Third Global Disaster Risk Reduction Conference: Sendai Framework 2015–2030

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was approved by UN member states/governments on March 18, 2015, at the Third International Conference of the UN on disaster risk reduction in Japan. This framework is the success of the HFA which ended in 2015, with defined aims and action priorities to further the disaster risk reduction agenda and take it forward.

Consultation with the required stakeholders and intergovernmental negotiations commenced in March 2012 and July 2014 to March 2015, respectively, assisted by the Disaster Risk Reduction Office of the United Nations and the General Assembly's Plenary which facilitated this process (Mercer et al. 2009: 13). The Sendai Framework was the predecessor and mechanism of the Hyogo Framework of 2005–2015 for Action: Establishing the Communities and Nations' Resilience to Disasters. According to Nakagawa and Shaw (2004: 16), the HFA provided the stimulus to the effort under the Global Action Mechanisms for the Strategy of Yokohama and Safer World Natural Disaster Situation for the Decade of 1989.

The Sendai Framework detailed aspects that determine the continuity of the work completed by governments and stakeholders based on consultations and negotiations. Many observers have pointed out that emphasis and resources have to be placed on vulnerability and disaster risk management as opposed to disaster response, because if this is done, then there will be limited damage and resilience and the preparedness level will be reasonably high. These are disaster risk declining as a predictable result, an objective eliminating new disaster risk, restricting the risk that exists, revitalizing flexibility, as well as developing guiding principles for disaster prevention and enhancing engagement with communities. Furthermore, the

disaster risk reduction choice of work has expanded to include man-made and natural hazards as well as environmental, biological, and technological risks and hazards. The Sendai Framework advocates for the sustained health and well-being of people and the environment.

A Brief Overview of the South African Context

The country that was one of the first to initiate and develop disaster risk legislation continentally was South Africa. The Disaster Management Act (DMA) 57 of 2002 has since been amended by the Disaster Management Act No. 16 of 2015. The purpose of the Act is to provide a disaster management policy that focuses on systematic coordination and integration of measures and practices that seek to prevent and mitigate the risk of disaster occurrence as well as the disaster impact. The Act also emphasizes the importance of disaster preparedness and efficient response to disasters. Efficient post-disaster recovery which includes long-term solutions to disasters is also an important objective of the Act. All governmental spheres are required to develop/capacitate disaster management centers (Republic of South Africa 2002: 3) and decentralize disaster management even to the relevant sectors (Komino 2008: 41).

The Disaster Management Act No. 57 of 2002 transfers powers to all governmental spheres, thereby rendering disaster management functions in a decentralized fashion. Decentralization has to take place across all domains of government. The DMA in Section 20, 33, and 47, respectively, highlights the need for creating a policy which is coordinated and integrated for disaster risk reduction in all governmental spheres, where the strategic focus is on prevention and mitigation jointly referred to as disaster risk reduction. The DMA necessitates a uniform policy for disaster management nationally; hence, the National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF) was developed and introduced in 2005. The NDMF is very specific in terms of what must be done to achieve uniformity and also on how disaster management issues must be tackled.

The South African Republic, as detailed in its Constitution (1996 Act 108), is legally obliged at the government level to ensure the safety (environmentally and in terms of health) of its populace. As detailed in Section 41, Part 1(b), all structures of government are necessary to “safeguard the welfare of the Republic’s people” (Republic of South Africa 2005: 29; 2015: 19). Local government must ensure “a healthy and safe environment” for the populace (see 1(d) of 152). This implies that the government has the overall responsibility for the major tasks relative to disaster management nationally (Republic of South Africa 2015: 23).

Disaster management is an imperative that has to be implemented at national, provincial, and local spheres of government as detailed by the Constitution (Schedule 4 of Part A). Section 156, Part 4, of the Constitution details the role of disaster management. It is most beneficial, moreover, that this be locally administered—rather than being the task of a national or provincial government. Much

emphasis has been placed on the capacity development of all municipalities to ensure improved services, as detailed in the Disaster Management Amendment Act 16 of 2015¹ (Republic of South Africa 2015: 45).

Extreme weather events which have been very severe in some instances and man-made disasters have amplified rapidly over recent years, with severe global consequences. Disaster risk management needs to keep developing an approach that is multidisciplinary and that is comprised of more collaboration between different companies and societal groups (Odendaal and Olivier 2008: 58). Relevant sectors of government ought to be more active and play a meaningful role in planning and developing capacity for rapid response and disaster risk reduction implementation measures. Disaster management is accepted internationally as a primary responsibility of the state. The challenge though is that in most cases the disaster management function is not appropriately or adequately delegated to local bodies further down in the government bureaucracy (Pelling and Wisner 2009: 24). Agencies of government have to play a more pivotal role during disasters. A ministry or disaster management authority handles disaster management affairs in many developing countries.

In many countries, the state is primarily responsible for coordinating disaster management issues, with consolidated resources and authority for making decisions. Governments of the developing countries tend to focus more on building response capacity instead of proactive measure. This is however mainly due to limited resources and competing priorities. The building of disaster management capacity locally is usually less of an urgency (Pouliotte et al. 2006: 81). Hence, when a major incident or disaster occurs, making of decisions is often a centralized process, mainly because of pressure from the media and the political sensitivity of such a situation for any government (Mercer et al. 2009: 45).

The success of disaster risk reduction strategies at the local government level is largely related to the capacity of the public sector to adopt relevant policies and plans as well as building implementation capacity. Therefore, for there to be an effective reduction in disaster risk, it is imperative to deal with the issues impacting on local government and provide it with the assistance and necessary resources, including proper funding and real authority around decision-making—and this requires a reformation of the structures around disaster risk reduction and response within government.

As alluded to above, disaster risk management remains fraught with difficulties, and there is wide agreement that a need exists to develop empirically supported models of practice to support proactive rather than reactive disaster reduction interventions.

¹ See Section 43.

Location of the Study

eThekweni Municipality, like many parts of the KwaZulu-Natal Province, is facing unprecedented and at times unseasonal disaster risks (KZN-COGTA 2014: 7). Due to the latest factors linked to global warming and consequently climate change and the associated negative impact, studies show that people not only in the Province but globally are increasingly exposed to more frequent and severe hazardous and dangerous weather conditions, and people are becoming vulnerable to the impact caused by disasters. These are not only accompanied with death-related risks and serious socioeconomic setbacks and disadvantages, but the phenomenon can also devastatingly damage the natural and physical resources that people largely depend on for survival (UNISDR 2004a: 109).

eThekweni Municipality is experiencing an unparalleled increase and varying levels of disaster risks, both natural and man-made as well. In addition to this, most of the disasters in the eThekweni Municipality seem to be worsened as a result of the fact that a major part of the populace is located in ecologically fragile areas, i.e., flood plains and informal settlements. In response to the challenge of disasters, the Constitution² stipulates that local government ought to prepare customized plans and regularly review these plans to ensure that they continuously and effectively deal with the matters related to disaster management, and these plans must pay more attention to the avoidance, alleviation, and readiness for disasters.

The International Symposium on Disaster Risk Reduction was held in 2005 in Japan where the most significant outcome was the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 which gave wide-ranging pointers toward actual disaster risk reduction (United Nations 2005: 6–27). Regrettably, South Africa's efforts in planning and implementing suitable disaster risk reduction measures in a systematic manner, particularly at a local sphere of government, have been fraught with difficulty (Duze 2016: 165–168). In response to this imperative, this chapter seeks to investigate the state of progress with respect to these issues as part of a greater focus on the development of a best-practice framework for effective preparation and execution of disaster risk reduction at a municipal level.

The development of an empirically sound disaster risk reduction mechanism is fundamentally important. Such a framework must offer succinct, adaptable, and comprehensive standards of operation for resulting procedures for integrated disaster risk reduction measures. Furthermore, it will serve to control and improve the alignment between disaster risk reduction programs and interventions to attain long-lasting solutions.

² See Section 53 (1) of the Disaster Management Act (2002: 61).

The Research Problem

As noted by Coppola (2015), the incidence of disasters continues to remain disproportionately high across the world, and the existence of comprehensive disaster management strategies within different countries acts as an important mediating factor that separates successful disaster management policy from that which is not. The absence of a credible and systematic model to implement disaster management proactive measures (disaster risk reduction) locally is a cause for concern in KwaZulu-Natal. Quite often, local government in the Province has been found wanting (lacking capacity, coordination, and resources) when it comes to proactive disaster management measures. Almost every year, the eThekweni Municipality experiences severe fires and flash flood-related disasters. For example, in November 2011, eight people were killed in Umlazi and Clermont south and west of the city due to floods (KZN-COGTA 2014: 45). According to Burkinshaw (2008: 14), the eThekweni municipal areas experience fire disasters almost every day. This is highlighted by the annual statistics of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Disaster Management Centre (KZN-PDMC 2016 in Duze 2016:12) in Fig. 12.1 and Table 12.1 whereby fires account for a bigger share of disasters that occur in the eThekweni area. As also shown in Table 12.1, the eThekweni region tends to be severely affected in terms of loss of assets and physical impact to life.

The municipalities tend to be more reactive than proactive. In keeping with the spirit and objectives of the South African legislation and policy relating to management of disasters, the focus must be on a proactive disaster management approach. However, there seem to be serious challenges in the planning/implementation of processes that reduce vulnerability and disaster risk in local government. Arguably, local government efforts are still largely premised on reactive rather than proactive




Fig. 12.1 Disaster/incident occurrences in eThekweni Municipality, 2010–2016 period (KZN-PDMC 2016 in Duze 2016:12)

Table 12.1 Impact of disasters in 2010–2016 period (KZN-PDMC 2016 in Duze 2016:12)

Districts	Households affected	People affected	Fatalities	Injuries
Umgungundlovu	3847	13,921	14	5
Umzinyathi	603	3402	11	16
Ugu	348	1580	10	9
eThekwini	4755	8927	30	50
Harry Gwala	391	1747	13	9
Umkhanyakude	751	3977	9	58
UThungulu	575	2468	13	5
Zululand	730	730	19	5
uThukela	1536	3934	6	36
Amajuba	383	2093	6	29
Ilembe	673	3513	18	52

tenets. The lack of an appropriate disaster risk reduction framework for local government may have a significant causal involvement in the lack of up-to-date methodologies and policies blamed for this phenomenon.

Political commitment and the allocation of resources by municipalities in the KwaZulu-Natal Province have been focused on temporary emergency eventualities (KZN-COGTA 2014: 24). Undoubtedly, the role of relief aid through serious periods of disasters will continue to be vital and should be improved. Nevertheless, a fundamental question is whether or not citizens can afford to rate their possessions (both material and social) solely once disasters have struck. This should not be the case. Hence, it is necessary to make certain that an integrated and sound framework is in place to respond to disasters more particularly at the local level.

Research Methodology

This study was premised or anchored on the overarching goal of emerging with a logical systematic model for appropriate and efficient disaster risk reduction mainstreaming. The model seeks to control and augment the disaster risk reduction procedures within local government. However, this sought to outline and clarify the notion of disaster risk reduction in eThekwini Municipality: to evaluate the efficiency of the existing disaster risk reduction policy/practices and assess the implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies and examine the impact of existing (if any) disaster management approaches on municipal integrated development plans.

In responding to the objectives, the critical questions that guided the research were how effective is disaster risk reduction strategy implementation in eThekwini Municipality; is there adequacy/appropriateness of the current disaster risk reduction policies/practices in dealing with disasters within the Municipality; and to what extent are disaster risk reduction plans incorporated into the Municipality's

integrated development plans? The research design methodology adopted was a case study as it is considered robust, reliable, and versatile. This study employed a mixed method approach to data gathering and analysis as it is used for collecting, examining, and integrating qualitative and quantitative data in one research study, mainly to dissect and comprehend a research problem comprehensively (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 13). The reason for using both techniques was to improve research quality in terms of thorough comprehension and examination of the research problem, such as the complex issue of planning and application of measures that seeks to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities and disaster risk at local government level. When employed together, numerical and qualitative approaches balance each other and permit for more comprehensive exploration (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 23).

A sequential explanatory mixed research design consists of two distinct stages. Firstly, the quantitative data was gathered using a structured questionnaire and the data subjected to quantitative examination. The quantitative method of inquiry was applied to classify possible critical and dominant variables impeding or enhancing suitable design and carrying out of mechanisms aimed at reducing vulnerability and disaster risk.

In the second stage, a qualitative method was utilized to elicit in-depth explanatory data through semi-structured interviews. The basis for this method of inquiry is that data gathered qualitatively and its findings provide a comprehensive outlook of the research conducted (Charles and Mertler 2002: 23). The qualitative data enhanced and enlightened the statistical results by understanding the respondents' opinions profoundly. The summative discussion of the study incorporated the results of the two stages which were integrated.

Local Government and Disaster Risk Reduction

It is imperative to contextualize disaster risk reduction in a national setting and also in the broader framework of global initiatives and drives that have been initiated to date.

Local Government and Disaster Risk Reduction: The Context Redefined

The nexus and responsibilities of the local sphere of government in South Africa in relation to disaster risk reduction are examined below.

Roles and Responsibilities Within Local Government

Constitutionally, the municipalities are mainly established for service delivery and local economic development. Municipalities must deliver independent and accountable administration, offer amenities to people in a workable method, encourage public and financial growth, stimulate a harmless environment, and boost the participation of populations and community organizations in the issues pertaining to development and governance. The Constitution clearly mandates local government to strive toward long-lasting orientated developmental solutions. Local governance nationally therefore has to be fundamentally comprehended in relation to delivery of services (Mogale 2003: 13).

Significance of Disaster Risk Reduction in Local Government

The Disaster Management Amendment Act 16 of 2015 specifies (Section 43) that each municipality ought to develop its management capacity to plan and implement disaster management functions. Section 44 further requires municipalities to focus on matters pertaining to disaster management. Additionally, municipalities must encourage and strive for a cohesive and synchronized *modus operandi* for disaster management, with distinctive prominence given to disaster risk reduction, by all relevant departments within the municipality.

In view of the above assertions by the Disaster Management Amendment Act 16 of 2015, local government ought to be instrumental in the planning and application of measures directed at reducing disaster risk and vulnerability. Local government is a sphere where a number of practical activities concerning disaster risk reduction are likely to occur (Republic of South Africa 1998a: 47). Hence, local government essentially needs to see to it that legitimate projects/programs in disaster risk reduction are effectively implemented at the local level.

Integrated Development Planning and Disaster Risk Management Plan

The integrated development plan (IDP) is the purposeful municipal blueprint which requires operationalization and deliberate implementation of progressive projects and programs responding to people's needs. The IDP must also assist with the incorporation of projects and programs intended to reduce susceptibility to hazards/disasters. The Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 and Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 necessitate that plans in disaster management be organically integrated into preparation processes of the IDP. The fundamental objective of that is to guarantee that all development initiatives are reducing disaster

risk and vulnerability. The IDP is a legally binding document that surpasses all other development plans in the municipality, although it may be complemented by other relevant initiatives.

Global Context: A Shift Toward Disaster Risk Reduction

Disaster risk reduction in its current form evolves mostly from developments in the area of civil defense and protection and more recently in disaster management (UNISDR 2004a: 7). In this respect, the old emphasis has been placed on the planning and better working competences for an efficient reaction to an imminent occurrence or the delivery of emergency relief to normalize the situation if a disaster has occurred (UNISDR 2004a: 8). The difference, of late and possibly inspired at least partly by the regularity and brutality of disasters recently, is that those linked with the victims of disasters, i.e., politicians, professional and commercial interests, community groups, institutions of higher learning, and community leaders, have increasingly recognized the importance of continued determinations to decrease the social, financial, and ecological expenses associated with natural dangers (UNISDR 2004c: 5). This has translated into the necessity for more attention to execution of protecting approaches that can result in elimination or minimization of disasters which will therefore lead to protection of lives, property, and the environment. A shift toward a proactive approach in dealing with disasters has resulted in coalescence and importance of the disaster risk reduction notion.

It is generally perceived that, in all probability, corrective actions for disaster-related issues can be best achieved via the successful accomplishment of development programs intended to reduce susceptibility to hazards and disaster risk (UNISDR 2003: 35–38; UN 1999: 23–29).

Disaster Risk Reduction: Legislative and Policy Aspects in South Africa

Similarly to the global context, advancement in disaster management as a specialist field in the country is highly influenced by past practices which were to a great extent concentrated on reaction rather than a proactive approach. Disaster risk reduction underlines a paradigm shift toward emphasis on mitigation, prevention, and preparedness.

South Africa, until the dawn of democracy in 1994, had not devised a mechanism to comprehensively deal with catastrophes and reduction of vulnerability (Van Niekerk 2015: 57). The view taken then saw disasters as coming about because of “nature” as uncommon, unavoidable occasions that could not be predicted or stayed away from.

The Constitution (1996) has made it obligatory legally for the state to see to it that disaster management services are appropriately rendered, and therefore “all levels of government are required to secure the well-being of people, protection of property and the environment. It is thus the duty of government to implement disaster risk reduction plans and also to plan for climate change adaptation and mitigation to reduce the vulnerability of people, infrastructure and other national assets to various hazards (also those relating to climatic change)” (Republic of South Africa 1996: 114; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005: 59). Disaster risk reduction is consequently a government obligation, and the country is acknowledged as being the first country continentally to widely enact disaster risk reduction law (Vermaak and Van Niekerk 2004: 57). Developing disaster management law commenced earnestly in June 1994 and continued with the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 (amended in 2015) and thereafter with the National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF 2005 in Duze 2016:18). Several authors (Reid and Van Niekerk 2008: 45; Van Niekerk 2005: 56; NDMF 2005 in Duze 2016:18) highlight the fact that the disaster management legislation/policy in South Africa propelled a move to a disaster risk reduction model. Disaster risk reduction necessitates the participation of a variety of stakeholders and role players given that it contains matters that are crosscutting (Van Niekerk 2015: 37). Hence, an integrated approach within the municipality is of utmost importance.

Disaster Risk Management in Local Government: Legal Requirements

The Constitution put an obligation on government to guarantee the well-being of people and the environment. Van Niekerk (2015: 205) reinforces this by pointing out that the principal responsibility and accountability for disaster management in the Republic of South Africa is mainly a government obligation. It is generally accepted that the development and execution of measures directed at reducing vulnerability to and risks of disasters effectively occur at the local government level (UNISDR 2003: 78–99). Van Niekerk (2015: 45) adds that the most critical government level for successful synchronization and execution of disaster risk and vulnerability reduction is the local level as this is the place where a significant number of the operating exercises pertaining to disaster risk reduction are implemented. The mainstreaming of disaster management into local government activities is paramount. Local government endures the worst disasters, and these spheres of government likewise are primary responders to disasters. It is consequently obvious that proactive management and prevention or mitigation of disasters must be given high priority and the attention it deserves particularly at the municipal level.

Disaster Risk Reduction Practice in Local Government

South Africa became a democratic state in 1994, and following this, a large number of legislative and policy enactments have been ushered in, many of which have been key to democratising and transforming local government (Reddy and de Vries 2015: 325). The post 1994 local government framework has been termed “futuristic” and “world class.” There has been progress made responding to development backlogs; however, there are still challenges that need to be urgently addressed (Reddy and de Vries 2015: 334–339). Among others, there is the absence of or limited orderly incorporation of disaster risk reduction actions into core local government development activities. Conceptually, disaster risk reduction cannot work in isolation, but it requires a coordinated methodology that local government ought to adopt as a service delivery imperative. This approach must focus on fundamental human rights service delivery issues that are concerned with reduction of disaster risk and vulnerability (Van Niekerk 2015: 21).

The weaknesses at local government in terms of inadequate technical capacity result in inappropriate or limited planning and execution of measures meant to reduce disaster risk and vulnerability; such deficiencies are one of the main elements responsible for escalated susceptibility to natural and man-made hazards in less developed countries (Anderson 1995: 48; Smith 2001: 30). Hence, the United Nations recommended the urgency to decentralize and institutionalize planning and provision of incorporated disaster risk reduction actions particularly at the local spheres of governance (UNISDR 2004a:8). The responsibility of municipalities in the reduction of vulnerability and disasters is vital in building strong societies mainly because local government structures and communities are at the coalface of disaster management (UNISDR 2004a:8). Although local government should lead disaster risk reduction initiatives, it encounters a number of major difficulties.

The inadequacy of human resources with desirable expertise, as well as financial resources, and the absence of a proactive disaster management approach tend to affect effective planning and implementation (Manyena 2006: 810; Pearce 2003: 211).

Ahrens and Rudolph (2006: 45) point out that investing in local government following proper guidance is beneficial in terms of arranging and executing disaster risk reduction measures. It has been recommended that disaster risk reduction should be combined with other developmental initiatives for disaster risk reduction solutions which are sustainable, thereby enhancing responses to disasters (Department for International Development (DFID) 2005: 7).

There has since been a worldwide transformation to a proactive disaster management approach and sustainable model of managing disaster risk (disaster risk reduction). There has been progress in South Africa toward the disaster risk reduction model, as depicted from the reformist disaster management legislation and policies that have been developed which recognize that reducing vulnerability and disaster

risk is an obligation of every relevant sector and a duty of all governmental spheres. A number of publications point out that the local government sphere, particularly in developing countries, has not made significant strides with regard to the effective planning and implementation of disaster risk reduction. Many municipalities, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, have over the years not taken disaster management responsibility seriously, pointing out that it is an unfunded mandate. Disaster reduction measures were not planned or implemented, and people panicked when they experienced serious community disruptions. Consequently, they failed to respond and normalize the situation that they may have been confronted with as they were not prepared. The responsibilities of local government, particularly the local municipalities, have been reinforced with the new Disaster Management Amendment Act 16 of 2015. There is thus a need to develop a framework for proactive disaster management which will largely entail the introduction of disaster risk reduction measures. This chapter has attempted to contribute to the development and practice of the disaster risk reduction framework in the Province.

Description of eThekweni Municipality

The study was undertaken at the eThekweni Municipality in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Province, South Africa. The municipal jurisdiction is approximately 2297 km² with 103 wards and has a population of approximately 3,442,361 million people (eThekweni Municipality 2015: 24). The Municipality is made up of different groups confronted by numerous social, economic, environmental, and governance issues (eThekweni Municipality 2015/2016: 25). The most prevalent kinds of disasters that the Municipality encounters are floods, structural fires, strong winds, and lightning due to extreme coastal storm surges (KZN-COGTA 2014: 24).

The selected study area was convenient since it resembles characteristics of the majority of the country's municipalities relative to its urban and rural settings and assortment of hazards experienced in its area of jurisdiction. The fact that it has long established its disaster management center was also acknowledged relative to evaluating its disaster risk reduction programs. The newly refurbished and technologically advanced Disaster Management Centre of eThekweni Municipality was officially opened on April 1, 2011.

eThekweni Municipality facilitates municipal services and infrastructure provision and support to the populace in Durban. There is an elected Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Speaker, executive committee, and councilors to facilitate the implementation and oversight process. The Municipality has 219 council members, which select the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and Speaker (IEC in Duze, 2016:24). The eThekweni Municipality is quite vast as depicted below (Fig. 12.2).



Fig. 12.2 Map showing the eThekweni Municipality. (eThekweni IDP 2015/2016: 26) (adapted)

Key Findings and Discussion

The research has highlighted certain key issues which will constitute the basis of the discussion below.

Disaster Management Practitioner’s Perspective

The Disaster Management Act and Policy Framework in South Africa and its provisions and directives constitute the fundamental basis of the research into the status quo and disaster risk reduction approach at eThekweni Municipality as represented by the selected sectors and key informants.

The data from the eThekweni DM practitioners and management was collected through questionnaires and interviews. The disaster management practitioners and respective managements are responsible for strategic and practical development and application of disaster management operations of the municipality. They are well versed with disaster management issues involved in the disaster management continuum, i.e., pre, during, and post-disaster activities.

This section presented the analysis of eThekweni DRR situation and was subdivided into six (6) thematic areas, viz., Respondents' Demographics, Integrated Institutional Capacity for Disaster Risk Management, Disaster Risk Assessment, Disaster Risk Reduction, Public Awareness, and Research. However, a summary of some of the thematic areas are highlighted in this chapter.

The respondent's demographics are essential to the validity, integrity, and dependability of the information gathered, mainly the work experience, education level, and level of responsibility.

Work Experience in the Current Institution

The years of experience are important in any field of work as they signify the level of competence and comprehension of the job and its responsibilities including the institutional mandate and culture. Therefore, the respondent's years of experience in the current institution were recorded. As indicated in Table 12.2, the years of experience ranged from 2 to above 10 years. Senior management staff had each 9 to above 10 years of experience working at the MDMC. This is indeed a sign of valid and quality data as a high number of years in a particular institution reflect solid institutional memory.

Level of Employment

As shown in Table 12.2, the work experience of the respondents ranged from 2 years to above 10 years.

Table 12.2 Years of experience in current position

Years of experience		
Respondents	% count of respondents	
1–2 years	1	11%
3–4 years	3	33%
5–6 years	1	11%
9–10 years	1	11%
Above 10 years	3	33%
Grand total	9	100%

Table 12.3 eThekweni Disaster Management Centre's respondents level of employment

Current position	Count of position	% position
Officer	3	33%
Assistant Manager	3	33%
Manager	1	11%
Senior Manager	1	11%
General Manager	1	11%
Grand total	9	100%

The level of employment plays a significant role in terms of data richness and quality. The level of responsibility at a work place also reflects the understanding of the institutional mandate and processes. The current positions of the respondents were therefore recorded, as shown in Table 12.3.

The respondent's current positions ranged from Disaster Management Officer to the Head of Department. The researcher was very pleased with the diverse respondents' level of employment as the data was collected from Operational Staff, Middle and Senior Management of the MDMC.

Respondents' Level of Education

The level of education of the participants was also recorded. The results are shown in Table 12.4. Notably, all respondents have been exposed to a certain level of formal education. The respondent's level of education ranges from high school to post-graduate level. The level of education is a significant indicator of competence.

The level of education ranged from high school to postgraduate qualification (Table 12.4). Investigation of the disaster management integrated institutional capacity at the eThekweni Municipality focused on structures such as Interdepartmental Disaster Management Committee and Disaster Management Advisory Forum and Ward structures. These institutional arrangement structures are essential in ensuring integrated and coordinated DRR.

These structures were identified but the major concern was their effectiveness to perform the expected responsibilities. The Disaster Management Act No. 57 of 2002 makes provision for a Disaster Management Advisory Forum, but it has yet to be established.

The study investigated the mainstreaming of DRR programs informed by DRA into municipal departmental plans. Since the Municipality does not have a comprehensive DRA, it is difficult to identify and mainstream DRR programs into municipal departmental plans.

The public awareness campaigns and research are important components of the DRR. The assessment revealed that there was no formal or documented disaster management integrated public awareness strategy as well as no research agenda.

Table 12.4 Level of education

Level of education	Count of level education	% level of education
High school	1	11%
Diploma	5	56%
Degree	1	11%
Post graduate	2	22%
Grand total	9	100%

Councillor's Perspective

The councillor's basic demographics were recorded. That was basically done to understand the depth and richness of the data solicited. The demographic indicators in terms of gender, level of education, job experience, and political party representation were recorded. The gender representation of the respondents was proportional, which is great from a balanced gender perspective. The level of education was also plausible as all respondents had been exposed to a particular level of formal education ranging from high school to postgraduate. An issue of inclusiveness in terms of variety of political party representation was also factored in to ensure balanced views. The respondent's experience in local government ranged from 5 to 15 years; with this level of experience, the assumption is that the respondents are well versed with local governance.

The assessment then moved on to core issues related to study objectives and questions. The assessment revealed that the DRA awareness of the interviewed councillors is limited, and unfortunately has negative implications on the role of politicians particularly in terms of DRR incorporation into IDP planning and implementation processes and most importantly on the oversight role. The unavailability of a comprehensive municipal disaster management plan informed by DRA is a major factor that could result in the lack of deliberate and pragmatic awareness of the municipal disaster risk profile.

A clear-cut proactive disaster management political leadership is imperative if the ideals of DRR are to be achieved. The engagement with the councillors reveals that reactive measures 'tend to dominate the politicians' approach to disaster management. This is evident from the fact that humanitarian activities are still popular among the most interviewed councillors and the interest on disaster management is generally quite high in the aftermath of the disasters.

There is a strong view among the interviewed councillors that DRR must become a political priority to deal with fundamental service delivery issues, well-being, and safety of communities. The respondents highlighted the lack of DRR awareness and focus on other pressing service delivery and developmental issues as one of the factors that undermine the foremost attention to DRR. Disaster management workshops for councillors and strengthening of MDMC capacity and authority were recommended by the respondents.

Municipal Departments

There seems to be a general lack of awareness of the plans and frameworks that departments are expected to comply. Even though some departments claimed to have developed specific disaster management plans, the evidence was not available as these plans were not submitted to the MDMC.

Since the Municipality does not have a comprehensive disaster risk assessment, it is difficult to ascertain conclusively that disaster risk profiles are considered in the planning and execution of programs and service delivery. The unavailability of a deliberate disaster risk reduction strategy has a potential to undermine the process and entrench a reactive disaster management culture.

All the assessed departments confirmed the existence and their participation in the municipal disaster management interdepartmental committee. However, the lack of disaster management plans informed by comprehensive disaster risk assessment raises several issues and casts doubts on the deliberate efforts to implement and adopt a proactive disaster management paradigm aimed at reducing disaster risk and vulnerability and ensuring an enhancement of living standards for the local populace and households deemed to be at risk.

The unavailability of an ideal municipal disaster management advisory forum also deprives the municipal departments of an opportunity to interact and plan with external stakeholders the progressive disaster risk reduction programs.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to explore and understand challenges facing disaster risk reduction practice at the local government sphere. A comprehensive framework for ensuring a systematic incorporation of disaster risk reduction plans by municipalities was proposed. It was emphasized that local government has to move away from a reactive disaster management paradigm to a more proactive paradigm. If this does not happen, the fight against disaster risks will take a very long time, and the poor will continue to be vulnerable to such disasters.

Data collected from several sources pointed to the fact that there is firm progress in disaster management implementation at eThekweni Municipality. However, the approach seems to be more reactive than proactive. The deliberate planning and implementation of disaster risk reduction seems to be inadequate and fragmented, demonstrated by disaster management policy frameworks/plans which are lacking or incomplete, coupled with the absence of coordinating arrangements such as the disaster management advisory forum to engage with relevant internal and external stakeholders.

The chapter sought to significantly contribute to the expansion of knowledge relative to disaster risk reduction application locally. It will provide empirically guided mechanisms for incorporating measures in disaster risk reduction as a key

aspect of the broader objective of facilitating sustainable growth and long-term solutions to the challenges of vulnerability and disaster risk, particularly at the local government level. Planning systematically and the integration of disaster risk mitigation activities locally will be enhanced.

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Chapter 13

South African Cities and Corruption: A Tale of Two Cities



Evangelos A. Mantzaris and Pregala Pillay

Abstract The present chapter is based on research combined with an enhanced focus on corruption in two major South African cities (Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth) and is based on the utilisation of secondary and primary sources, original state documents and an array of interviews with senior municipal and provincial politicians and administrators.

It attempts to identify and dissect existing corruption challenges in urban governance, such as the enhancement of socio-economic inequality; shoddy economic and social service delivery; the lack of systematic organisational systems able to support the collection, analysis, systematisation and dissemination of data on practices in urban governance; lack of accountability and violations of ethical and compliance issues; non-effectiveness of e-tools leading to the lack of the oversight and accountability regimes within which they operate; and the ‘open doors’ to ‘mediators’ and corrupt ‘gatekeepers’ that increase the vulnerability of the cities.

The research aspires to enrich the national, continental and international city-focused corruption research agenda in complementing, reflecting and informing emerging policy and practice initiatives within the terrain of a comparative urban studies’ approach to forms of corruption in developing country cities. It could also help build an evidence base for understanding the effectiveness of urban governance interventions in addressing corrupt practices. In the interim, interested donors should look critically at their portfolios to consider which urban initiatives could benefit from an enhanced anti-corruption effectiveness lens.

Keywords Corruption · City-focused research · City of Johannesburg · Mandela Bay Municipality

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Introduction

South Africa has followed in the steps of world's realities as large numbers of the young, the poorest of the poor and the socially marginalised do immigrate to the country's urban areas. They become an integral part of more than a half of the world's population who live in urban areas, hoping for a better life, which in most cases eludes them.

South African municipalities whose strategies, plans and activities are fundamental in determining the fate of the sustainable development goals have been perpetually involved in maintaining good governance and fight against the rampant corruption that undermines such efforts. Cities across the world are introducing urban governance initiatives intended to reduce corruption. Indeed, city-focused corruption research is a necessity in widening concrete information, policy planning and actions as the realities of this phenomenon unfold.

One of the major challenges facing South Africa in its efforts to move in the direction of sustainable development is to face head-on the immeasurable challenges of a relentless expansion of urbanisation at all levels. The vast majority of the new city inhabitants belong to two main categories: foreigners and young, poor, economically and socially marginalised South Africans aspiring for a better life.

Given the structural and functional problems facing South African municipalities, the relocation of millions to urban centres is instrumental in multiplying their problems and challenges at all levels. This is because their population increases and the service delivery demands become a serious impediment to development and upliftment of the majority.

The lack of good governance and perpetual corruption have been a serious obstacle to the realisation of transparent, ethical and efficient service delivery in most municipalities, including those situated in the country's urban centres. This has been an international phenomenon (Bhuiyan 2009: 127; Ambraseys and Bilham 2011: 153; Zaiderman 2017). This is despite the efforts to plan, design and implement a wide variety of strategies and tactics aiming at fighting corruption.

The present comparative study attempts to research, analyse, dissect and share key information on a number of realities facing corrupt city leadership and the people of Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. It is believed that such research findings, when utilised properly by the relevant state instruments and departments, will not only lead to different approaches, strategies and tactics but also to the introduction of policy and practice of new initiatives that can open up innovative ways of taking action at all societal levels.

This research is based on identifying and dissecting existing corruption challenges in urban governance, such as the enhancement of socio-economic inequality; shoddy economic and social service delivery; the lack of systematic organisational systems able to support the collection, analysis, systematisation and dissemination of data on practices in urban governance; the lack of accountability and violations of ethical and compliance issues; the non-effectiveness of e-tools leading to the lack of the existing oversight and accountability regimes within which they operate; and

the ‘open doors’ to ‘mediators’ and corrupt ‘gatekeepers’ that increase the vulnerability of the cities. The research is of a qualitative nature, rooted in the interpretative approach, and has utilised secondary and primary sources, original state documents and an array of interviews with senior municipal and provincial politicians and administrators in both municipalities. It was also deemed important to dissect the significance of existing anti-corruption and good governance initiatives in the municipalities and their effectiveness as urban governance interventions in addressing corrupt practices.

On Corruption and the Cities: An Overview

Over half of the world’s population lives in big cities, which makes municipal governance a key determinant of the material and social conditions of billions of people. Corruption, avarice and poor governance are, equally, key elements of deterioration and social upheavals. This means that city leadership is obligated to introduce, plan and implement anti-corruption initiatives that will guide them to the road of success (Johnsøn et al. 2012). Such initiatives cannot be undertaken without innovative research initiatives, transparency, popular and direct participation and access to information at all levels.

In this context, Goal 11 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015), to make ‘cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’, can be described as a major challenge. Scientific calculations have indicated that the urban population will increase by 70% by 2050 (Zinnbauer 2017). Another calculation has indicated that population growth and urbanisation are likely to add over 2.5 billion people by 2050, with over 90% of them in Africa and Asia (Myers and Murray 2007; Angel et al. 2011; UNDESA 2014).

International research has indicated that corruption in big cities enhances social and economic inequality, lack of public participation and weak urban development (Schenker 2016), as well as their repercussions (weak service delivery in terms of basic needs such as housing, water, electricity, sanitation, etc.) (Wissink 2013; Uraia 2017) and undermines citizens’ safety in urban environments (Leggett 2002; Jackson et al. 2014).

All these figures and statistics point to the fact that cities can concretely be classified as a fundamental element in the efforts to realise the UN Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 11 (UN 2015). This is a reality recognised throughout the world, although there is an understanding that there is a paucity of serious and multipronged empirical research on the effects of corruption in urban development and the organs responsible for its realisation.

There is no doubt that politicians, administrators, civil society and funding agencies throughout the world have over the years recognised the problems and challenges facing urban governance (Schenker 2016) that are multiplied by the lack of trust that leads to political inclusiveness and active citizen participation. Other key issues related to fraud and corruption of politicians and administrators in respect of

spatial priorities are associated directly or indirectly with the social and economic priorities of urban landscapes, land law rules and regulations and their effects on housing, as well as the relationships between the public and the private sectors in land affairs and disputes (Cai et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2013; Wissink 2013).

There has been empirical evidence that big cities' vulnerability to natural disasters is boosted by corruption that undermines their development (Pierre 2005; Zaiderman 2017). It has been concretely shown that corruption is directly and indirectly linked to poor regulation and planning, leading to fraud and corruption that is exacerbated by inadequate municipal organisational management (Robinson 2006; Malalgoda et al. 2014).

A variety of international platforms of municipal politicians and administrators have dealt closely with the problems of corruption and their repercussions for the welfare of citizens. Over the years, there has been wide agreement amongst them that corruption has been a major problem for local government practitioners. This realisation has led to the emergence of serious dialogues with regard to the structuring, planning and implementation of anti-corruption initiatives and agendas for cities that were adopted in a variety of forms in Medellin's World Urban Forum (WUF) in 2014 and the Kuala Lumpur International Anti-Corruption Conference (IAC) (Zinnbauer 2016).

In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the anti-corruption declaration of the Quito Habitat III Summit and in 2017, a workshop of the UN Habitat and the Global Fund for Cities Development (FMDV) expanded the existing resolutions by focussing on a wide range of anti-corruption measures and solutions that were to be spearheaded by active citizen participation against corruption (Uraia 2017).

In South Africa, it is widely acknowledged that the country's metropolitan entities' financial cul-de-sac is primarily, but not exclusively, due to rampant corruption that is rooted on a wide variety of reasons. These have been variously referred to as the 'political/administrative conundrum, organisational gaps, lack of capacity', all mediators and weaknesses in a wide variety of key operational imperatives such as supply chain management and procurement as well as financial and risk management (Mantzaris and Pillay 2014; Mantzaris 2014a, b, 2015).

As the country's Minister of Finance declared in his Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) (Mboweni 2018), the poorly performed municipalities with flooded roads, broken city lights and electricity challenges are a daily pain for inhabitants. These realities, he explained, exist because of 'serious capacity constraints', leading to enormous pressure on finances and resulting in high costs for the service delivery of public services, lack of financial controls and poor management, which in turn mean insufficient maintenance of infrastructure. The Minister underlined the fact that corrupt and fraudulent acts have been 'at the root' of the local administration financial conundrum.

It was stated that municipalities owed more than R23 billion to a wide variety of creditors, including water boards and ESKOM, with corruption a major impediment and challenge that made the call for good governance as urgent as ever (Phakathi 2018). It was calculated that 113 municipalities adopted 'unfunded budgets' for the

2018–2019 (as opposed to 83 in the previous financial year, unless sustainable financial recovery takes place through continuous efforts for improved, good governance). In case such efforts do not produce the expected results, there will be direct intervention from the provincial and national governments within the affected municipalities (Phakathi 2018).

Above-inflation increases were announced in lieu of the medium-term expenditure framework period because of the continuous increase of households, especially in the metros, as well as the resultant and higher bulk water, electricity and infrastructure costs. These will be supplemented by continuous efforts on the part of the government to strengthen the municipal capacity for better service delivery at all levels. These initiatives would be accompanied and supplemented by the clarification of the role and support of development finance institutions in respect of the entities' municipal borrowing patterns, as well as the regulation of municipal development charges. It is stated that these are prerequisites for the broadening of municipal access to private capital markets (Mboweni 2018).

It was more that evident in the South African President's State of the Nation Address that the new view of the future sustainable development strongly considers serious investment initiatives in social and community infrastructure projects in municipalities (Ramaphosa 2019). Given the predominance of urbanism in the last decade, it becomes evident that cities are investment priorities aiming at transparent and effective implementation of a wide variety of infrastructure projects with the support of the private sector and their communities. Inevitably, it is envisaged that the priorities lie most likely in private/public partnerships with financing arrangements organised through consensus-based agreement between the parties. In these agreements the private sector and 'multilateral development institutions' play a key role in assisting the government through technical and financial assistance in terms of conceptualisation, planning, designing, implementing and assessing/evaluating the projects (Ramaphosa 2019).

The Municipal Realities: A Description

The City of Johannesburg is home to almost five million people, representing 36% of Gauteng's and almost 9% of the country's population. Its population's average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is R117 2251, which has been described as 'upper middle income'. Unemployment has been calculated at 28 per cent and the municipality has been described as a city with one of the highest inequality levels in the world (City of Johannesburg 2018: 20).

The youth unemployment level, however, is (perhaps conservatively) calculated at 40% (City of Johannesburg 2018: 22) and is a major challenge for the municipality, province and country, as Gauteng is the 'economic powerhouse' of South Africa. It is a major concern as unemployment is a major ingredient of poverty and its major social consequences such as waste of human capital, increase in alcohol and drug abuse, crime and societal instability. The latest statistics have shown that more than

37% of the municipality's population live below the poverty line. This means that there are more than 650,000 households whose monthly expenditure is below R 2500 per month (Statistics SA 2018). Such levels of poverty and similar social and economic conditions have led to the region having the highest level of inequality in the country, with a 0.66 Gini coefficient.

Despite the evident rise of an ever-increasing middle class, the realities of unemployment, poverty and inequality are serious social challenges as they are the material foundations of popular agitation, political and social instability and civil unrest that effect negatively the whole population of the municipality. These developments are negative for social and economic development and cause an increase in crime in the sense that when demands are not met, social unrest occurs and may lead to increases in crime and, subsequently, more deprivation, loss of jobs and lower economic growth, with devastating consequences for the city and the country's economy. Poverty and inequality at all levels need to be addressed urgently.

Well before the 2016 municipal elections that brought the Democratic Alliance/Economic Freedom Front alliance to power, the leadership of the City of Johannesburg had identified very vividly the key challenges facing the municipality. These included poverty and unemployment especially amongst the youth, low economic growth, service delivery breakdowns, lack of infrastructure maintenance, lack of coordination and planning for the short to medium term on the part of various municipal departments, environmental decay, continuous climate risks because of climate change, continuous problems associated with water and electricity demands, scarcity of natural resources, water shortages and major pollution risks emanating from acid mine drainage (City of Johannesburg 2018: 25–26).

Corruption has been declared by the municipality as a threat that continues to rob the poor. The provincial organ of communication of the province, the *Gauteng City-Region Observatory*, in its 2018 citizens' research, indicated that 89% of the respondents felt that corruption within government institutions is a negation of democracy, while 78% believed that public servants do not follow the principles of *Batho Pele* (People First).¹

Other weaknesses identified were citizens' uncertainty because of the lack of visible policing, the role of the metro police and emergency services, 'social disconnect' and lack of social cohesion and the lack of engagement with the informal economy (City of Johannesburg 2018: 26–27).

In order to rectify the existing problems, a well-structured and ambitious strategic planning document was produced that dealt directly with the steps, strategies and tactics for the revitalisation of the growth and development of 'Johannesburg 2040'. It set out priorities, a vision and mission with alignment of priorities, development needs and existing and future capacities. Continuity was prioritised in the exercise, as existing processes were taking place in a diversified pattern that in some ways had not followed evaluation and assessment criteria, gaps and weaknesses and

¹ Batho Pele Principles – People First – White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997.

past and present trends and dynamics in the social and economic/financial terrain (City of Johannesburg 2018: 28).

This admission of short-term achievements was the foundation of the projected way forward that looked directly into complex challenges tackled by long-term strategic choices and the formulation of medium-term operational plans that lead to 'long-term development'.

The fundamental four outcomes of the plan were 'economic growth and job creation', 'improvement of all citizens' way of life', 'environmentally friendly service delivery' and 'responsive government' (ref). These fundamentals were rooted on the adoption of the SDGs (the sustainable development goals), a roadmap for the achievement of the SDGs through a new urban agenda, the adoption of a 2063 African Agenda of regional economic integration accountability and state capacity leading to sustainable development, the implementation of the dictates of South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) and the implementation of a Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation programme (TMR) (City of Johannesburg 2018: 28–29).

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality covers an area of 1959,02 km² and is the larger municipality in the Eastern Cape Province. It covers the cities of Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Despatch, as well as the semi-rural areas surrounding them, and houses a flourishing automobile sector and is an important seaport with two harbours, the Port Elizabeth Harbour and Ngqura. It is the home of the Coega Industrial Development Zone (IDZ), an industrial development with huge potential in the maritime and trade sectors.

According to the latest statistics, Nelson Mandela Bay is the home of 1,271,776 people, consisting of 365,973 households, 21,668 of which are classified as informal. This is the lowest number of informal households amongst the country's metropolitan municipalities (South African Cities Network 2016). It has the smallest population growth amongst the existing similar municipal entities (1.36%), with the young population (5–14 years of age) dominating: the life expectancy amongst Nelson Mandela Bay residents is 59,3 years for females and 53,7 for males. These are very low when compared to those in the City of Cape Town at 70,1 and 64,2 years, respectively (South African Cities Network 2016).

The latest available statistics indicate that 19,7% of the municipality's population were matriculants while 6,8% had a higher education. Three per cent (3%) had no schooling and 13% had passed grade 7 or less (South African Cities Network 2016). Furthermore, 29% of the municipality's inhabitants live below the poverty datum line (South African Cities Network 2016). Despite these statistics and the efforts of the entity to provide assistance to the poor through a scheme that covers the costs of free basic services, indigent households increased from 71,551 to 115,934 between 2013 and 2017 (31% of formal households).

The city has been blessed with the presence of the automobile industry manufacturing which is the dominant employment sector, followed by community services, finance and transport and trade. The automotive sector has been calculated as accounting for more than 50% of the metro's manufacturing sector (Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2018). As the driver of the Eastern Cape Economy, NMB contributes close to 42% of the province's gross geographic product (GGP) and the latest figures show unemployment standing at 37,4% in 2011 (South African Cities Network 2016).

In comparison with other metros, it has been acknowledged that despite its existing and past problems, the municipality has achieved significant advances in terms of service delivery of basic community services. It has been reported that all formal houses in residential areas that are demarcated have access to electricity, while most informal settlements in the city have electricity generated through solar panels. A number of informal settlement houses have no electricity connections, but for a number of years there has been a municipal plan for the provision of a 20-amp supply that will ensure basic electricity provision to inhabitants (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 2018: 31).

It has been reported that erf connections provide access to all formal households throughout the years, while 100% of households of informal settlements within the urban edge have permanent water provision through the services of communal standpipes located in a 200 m radius of each and erf. Water tanks located throughout the settlements also provide water to the inhabitants. However, community members who are considered illegal occupiers of pieces of private land are not guaranteed access to water. In real estate, an erf is the legal term used in Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland to describe a piece of land registered in a deeds registry as an erf, lot, plot or stand. The term is of Afrikaans origin.

It has been estimated that 85% of the municipality's inhabitants live in formal housing, of which 57% is privately owned, while 12% of the population live in backyard shacks and informal settlements (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality IDP 2018: 34). Official statistics show that every household is connected to waterborne sanitation, while all informal settlements are serviced by the bucket system (calculated at 16,317 buckets).

In the last few years, the municipality has devised and implements a strategy aimed at eliminating the bucket system completely, replaced by ablation block facilities at communal level (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality IDP 2018: 42).

In a *Doing Business in South Africa Survey* (SNDB) (Doing Business in South Africa 2018) wide-ranging research was undertaken in 2018 amongst all South African metropolitan municipalities. In this 'citizens' survey' undertaken by a service provider through a scientific sample and investigating key indicators related to living conditions, rules and regulations of private sector entities/business key answers were sought on a number of important issues such as property registration, electricity requests, business registration process, construction permits and contract enforcement. The key indicators underlying the project were the financial cost, time length and efficiencies in the municipality responsible for the final outcomes. Such

initiatives undertaken nationally take place for year by year comparative results aiming at short- and medium-term improvement in performance.

In terms of the findings, Nelson Mandela was second best performer in dealing with all permits related to construction work, with Cape Town leading. The research showed that there was a feeling that the municipality should refine the processes related to building evaluation and re-evaluation (Doing Business in South Africa 2018).

In terms of property registration processes, the municipality was rated in the top five in the country (no. 5), a position described as 'above average'. It was reported that there was a need to upgrade the performance of the Deeds Office and ensure the speeding up of the rates clearance certificates at all levels.

The municipality was the worst of all metropolitan municipalities in electricity provision in terms of cost and time. It was recorded that the five procedures associated with the process are completed in 333 days, more than 100% longer when compared to the average of other cities. The cost has also been considered high especially for the poor and most vulnerable sections of the population (Doing Business in South Africa 2018).

Following these findings, the leadership of the municipality has debated and agreed to activate the action plan that is continuously monitored and assessed by a committee of the municipal council in relation to these key indicators, as well as the relevant departments of the National Treasury (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 2018: 12).

The Findings

The latest report of the country's Auditor General (2018) and research produced by the civil society organisation Corruption Watch (Nicholson 2017), utilising official statistics, have indicated that although corruption in municipalities had dropped in comparison with the previous financial year, the City of Johannesburg, the most populated urban metropolis, has witnessed corruption rising. This is despite the fact that the new alliance regime that replaced the ANC is on record as identifying the fight against corruption as its key priority at all levels.

The Corruption Watch report (2017) shows that the Gauteng Province is responsible for 39.8% of recorded corrupt activities and irregularities, and the City of Johannesburg has 20.1% in the municipal terrain (Daniel 2018). This finding is in spite of a series of anti-corruption successes of the City of Johannesburg's ruling regime and a series of arrests of a number of corrupt municipal employees in a number of licensing centres facing immediate suspensions and disciplinary hearings. It was reported that there were investigations of 106 suspects in these centres by the city's Internal Investigation Unit, a mayoral 'anti-corruption innovation'. The unit's research had indicated that during the period starting in January 2008 and February 2016, there were records of 972 fraudulent transactions at the city's licensing centres.

These were based on the collaboration of criminal syndicates with hundreds of licencing officials throughout the metropolis conducting hundreds of illegal acts by reproducing fake and fraudulent drivers' licenses, vehicle registrations and disc licences, amongst other things (Nicholson 2017).

The majority party in the City of Johannesburg alliance of the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters have claimed on occasion that the city's coalition government has been instrumental in 'saving citizens R18 billion in less than two years'. This occurred because of the public exposure of corruption and fraud in the city.

The mere fact that a budget of R38 million was used to fight corruption and fraud as well as the internal anti-corruption unit during the 2016/2017 financial year led to the investigation of over 3500 corruption cases across all operational levels. Over 700 people were arrested for alleged corruption, 28 city employees were fired, 18 were immediately suspended, over 30 employees faced court cases and 25 'hijacked' properties were returned to their rightful owners. The Democratic Alliance's official audit calculations showed conclusively that under the previous ANC municipal government, 19% of the city's budget was 'lost to corruption' (Citizen 2018).

Amongst the corrupt cases described in the findings of the newly established anti-corruption investigation unit was the purchase of 500 computers valued at R6 million, items that were never delivered. This was a case of massive bribery of city officials involved in a revenue refund scam of over R28 million in revenue refunds and R80 million worth of city power equipment involving municipal employees and subcontractors (Citizen 2018).

The Auditor General's report (2018) of existing material findings on key issues related to integrity, reliance and corruption presents a slightly different picture of the municipality. The identified contravention of section 62(1)(d) of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (56 of 2003) (RSA 2003), which means that appropriate steps were not introduced and maintained in order to prevent unauthorised expenditure, revealed a figure of R435 476,000. Non-compliance with the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations (MSCMR) (an SCM regulation) was the main reason behind the figure and it became evident that appropriate steps were not undertaken to prevent it.

Corruption in the supply chain and procurement processes took a variety of forms, the most repetitive being that goods and services whose transaction was valued below R200 000 were procured without seeking price quotes as dictated legally by Supply Chain Regulation 17a and 17b. An examination of previous years indicates that the same irregular practice was evident throughout (Auditor General 2018: 277).

Interestingly, similar trends were detected in relation to goods and services whose value exceeded R200 000 which were procured with no competitive bids, a violation of the Supply Chain Regulation 19a. It was the municipality's Accounting Officer: Deviations, who approved the act despite the fact that the invitation to competitive bid was not impractical. Such an act is a direct contravention of SCM Supply Chain Regulation 36.1. The same process and outcomes were witnessed in previous years and the majority of cases were recorded in relation to IT services.

A number of quotations and the contracts awarded were to bidders based on 'preference points' that were in direct contravention of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (PPPPFA) (5 of 2000) (RSA 2000), as these points were not calculated according to the Act's clear dictates. Lack of compliance of this nature was also evident in previous years. The Auditor General staff discovered that a number of members of the adjudication committees did not meet the criteria of Supply Chain Regulation 29.2.

It was confirmed that the requirements of section 116(2)(b) of the MFMA (RSA 2003), stating that the performance of service providers and contractors should be monitored monthly, were not met. This means that the assessment of performance and monitoring of specific contracts were of little use in ensuring effective contract management. Such non-compliance was evident in previous years. Similar non-compliance was also reported in the prior year.

There was strong evidence that a number of close family members of a substantial number of municipal employees who had private business interests had contracts awarded to them by the municipality. Both sides failed to disclose these facts to the relevant organs, thus violating the 'Employees' Code of Conduct' and the Supply Chain Regulation 46.2e. Such non-compliance tendencies were evident in the previous years as well (Auditor General 2018: 278).

What makes these realities more interesting in terms of understanding the connection between the lack of compliance and corruption is the non-application of sections 32(2)(a) and (b) of the MFMA (RSA 2003) that demand a thorough investigation aiming at determining the liability of person or persons for all types of expenditure (fruitless, wasteful or irregular).

There are organisational weaknesses, gaps and challenges responsible for such a wide array of actions of non-compliance that are directly and indirectly related to fraud and corruption permeating the whole spectrum of the entity's structure.

The first fundamental weakness identified was the lack of oversight responsibility undertaken by the entity's Accounting Officer that led to serious gaps in the process of planning, structuring, finalising and implementing the entity's compliance with existing legislation, rules and regulations, as well as the financial and performance reporting. The evident lack of appropriate and updated reviewing, assessing and monitoring controls meant that all performance and financial and performance reports that were submitted for audit were weak in terms of accuracy and substance (Auditor General 2018: 278).

The lack of necessary control on performance and financial reporting on the part of senior management of the entity led to a situation of serious lack of appropriated and completed reports, inadequate year-end financial reconciliation and non-existent control implementation. The evident weaknesses identified in the management system of records associated with the annual performance and financial statement records led to omissions and material errors.

There were severe weaknesses detected in the process of internal audit processes leading to deficiencies in the internal control mechanisms, meaning that appropriate corrective action became impossible. The results of such weaknesses were

perpetual control deficiencies that led to serious problems in structuring and finalising the annual financial and performance reports (Auditor General 2018: 279).

It was reported that 869 cases of alleged fraudulent irregularities relating to non-compliance, theft and financial misconduct were investigated during year 2018, mainly by the City of Johannesburg's Department of Forensics (Auditor General 2018: 279).

It is important to note none of the irregularities or alleged corrupt and fraudulent acts that took place in the previous financial year were investigated.

Nelson Mandela Bay

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality has for many years been the centre of perpetual structural corruption at all organisational levels. The continuous changes of municipal managers, mayors, chief financial officers and other senior managers have resulted in a chaotic state of affairs rooted in instability; political, factional, personal and group in-fighting; fraud perpetration; and widespread corruption. It has been reported that four mayors have led the city in the last eight years and over ten municipal managers.

Olver's well-researched exposé of rampant corruption (Olver 2016) has encapsulated the true picture of unbridled corruption in the municipality with special emphasis on the looting of the Department of Human Settlements and ITS repercussions, including assassinations, gangsterism of the worst kind masquerading as political struggles and the desperate attempts of the national government to control the situation through the appointment of Danny Jordaan as mayor of the city. The national government's attempt to use political control in order to rectify the situation led nowhere.

So bad has been the situation in the municipality since 1994 that the National Treasury initiated two key interventions based on a number of forensic investigations that were associated with 'strategic reviews' deemed instrumental in 'escaping the crisis'. These were supplemented by a 'thoroughly thought-out, planned and easily implementable' support programme dictating the way forward (Olver 2016).

The responsible ministry, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), was also active in the efforts to solve the problems and it was thought that the best way out was the appointment of forensic firms to provide answers to the myriad questions emanating from the foundations of rotten governance. Even the expertise of Advocate V. Pikoli and some of his business partners were employed to discover the foundations and perpetration of corruption and fraud and provide immediate solutions through 'consolidated forensic and legal opinion' that would solve the existing 'problems' through 'support packages' and 'action plans', as the municipal elections were approaching.

There was direct and indirect collaboration between Treasury and COGTA while the former was on a mission to utilise its members' skills in an effort to increase the skills capacity of a number of key municipal sections, such as the Internal Audit

Division and supply chain management and procurement in attempting to spread knowledge and experience on corruption in the housing terrain, the lack of risk management initiatives, the complexities of revolving funds and trust accounts (Olver 2016).

All these initiatives came to nothing following the expose of the municipality's corrupt behaviour during the events around the time of the late President Nelson Mandela's funeral. The 2017 Public Protector's report following a long investigation process exposed the fact that millions of funds meant for badly needed service delivery and development projects in the whole of the Eastern Cape were used for catering, t-shirts and transport to the funeral (Whittles 2017). Amongst such service delivery priorities, sanitation, electricity, water, hospital refurbishment and replacement of dilapidated schools were mentioned.

The report recommended a thorough investigation by the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) on the hundreds of millions of irregular, wasteful negligent and unlawful expenditure, as a wide variety of politicians and administrators from the provincial government, the Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay metros, the Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) and the King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality were involved (Whittles 2017).

The exposed blatant Public Finance Management Act (FMA) (1 of 1999) (RSA 1999) and MFMA (RSA 2003) violations mentioned were directly and indirectly unauthorised supply chain and procurement to service providers who overpriced commodities and services, were not on the municipal database or provided false and fraudulent information. There were cases where t-shirts were sold for R350 after instructions from ANC leaders. There were cases where invoices were produced on an ANC letterhead (Whittles 2017).

Such realities have been the story of the municipality for many years as the fraudulent and corrupt practices of administrators and politicians have been boosted by organisational weaknesses such as the lack of adequate systems in identifying and stopping irregular expenditure.

This is a clear violation of section 125(2)(d)(i) of the MFMA (RSA 2003), as is the complete lack of sufficient appropriate audit evidence for all payments. Such realities are instrumental in the failure to determine the real values of irregular and wasteful expenditure.

In the period 2016–2017, the municipality's irregular expenditure was R3.37 billion (and in 2015 R2.1 billion). Interestingly, the municipality did not record its irregular expenditure in its separate and consolidated financial statements, a direct violation of MFMA's section 125(2)(d) (RSA 2003). This is because the municipality had made a plethora of payments violating the SCM requirements all these years (Auditor General 2018).

The 2016 municipal election results that brought a Democratic Alliance-led coalition showed evidence of the majority population's mistrust of the ruling party. Despite the efforts of the coalition with smaller parties to survive, new alliances led to an ANC/UDM/EFF coalition that overthrew the DA-led regime (Nicholson 2018a, b; Umraw 2018).

In August 2016, the municipality had a debt of R2 billion. The books have shown that in 2018, this was turned into a R615 million surplus. Official documents have shown that there was a successful termination of corrupt and fraudulent contracts worth more than R650 million and major advances were made towards the eradication of bucket toilets, while steps forward were achieved in attracting private investment.

Following the coalition's rise to power, there have been a number of alleged irregularities linked to key politicians including the mayor, who has been hit with charges for money laundering, corruption and fraud in relation to the Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS) (R News 2019).

The mayor's 'un-budgeted' R21 million contracts during the Christmas period in 2018 to 945 and 600 SMMEs, respectively, for drain cleaning also raised a number of serious questions. This is because there was no clear evidence of the work performed and there was a discrepancy in terms of payments as many of the contractors were remunerated while others were not. These realities led a series of community and SMM owners to protest outside the city hall, while two of the key players in the debacle were assassinated in execution-style shootings (Daily Maverick 2019).

Conclusion and the Way Forward

Given the problems, challenges and difficulties facing South African metropolitan municipalities, there are a number of fundamental ideals that need to be elevated to concrete realities in order to salvage the situation and move towards a more progressive path.

The first is a concrete adaptation of its strategic planning's priorities of the peoples' developmental needs (briefly presented earlier). Careful strategic planning can only become successful when the urban leadership at all levels understands the dynamics and repercussions of continuous unpredictability of social, political and economic conjunctures.

There cannot be strategic planning with the identification and alignment with the key role players and drivers of change and transformation. It is this alignment that, united, can ensure collective planning, contextual continuity, the marriage of structures, organisational goals and processes as well as assessment and evaluation of achievements and failures, successes and weaknesses.

There have been initiatives internationally from municipalities and local government entities in the efforts to reduce or eliminate corruption (Uraia 2017). The question arises, however, whether efforts devoid of systematic research that is serious in understanding existing and future weaknesses and challenges of anti-corruption plans, initiatives and implementation can be successful. Such research deals with reasons for the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption plans in a comparative perspective

and examines forms, types and frequency of corrupt acts in a systematic and evidence-based methodology and the relationship(s) amongst the different layers of government.

In such an exercise, the scrutiny of existing policy, rules and regulations is a key issue, as are comparisons with similar entities and their respective interventions. When such focus-based research exists and is done in a systematic way, new ways of attacking corruption emerge as do policies, rules and regulations that lead to organisation and performance management practices.

Increased public engagement is rooted on wide and well-planned efforts and implemented access to information in all respects of municipal realities, including direct communication on aspects of financial management such as price increases in terms of rates and water and on present and future infrastructural undertakings.

Given the wide influence of social and electronic media, all existing and future packages of changes and reforms undertaken can increase not only the visibility of the municipality but also its levels of transparency and accountability.

Publicly shared information and direct communication, even in regard to simple actions such as garbage collection, rate fluctuations and car licences, strengthens the existing knowledge of citizens at all levels and the entity's functions, processes and reforms become common knowledge (Johnsøn et al. 2012).

Such action can open new paths of understanding and support amongst the citizens and widen citizen engagement with municipal and city management. Inevitably, an introspective analysis of strengths, weaknesses and challenges in all aspects of the political and administrative terrains is a key element of success.

This means a thorough study and evaluation of existing resources (revenue base strengths and weaknesses, budget allocation and prioritisation of key service delivery challenges, human resources realities, skills and gaps, assets, financial realities and strategic partnerships), leading to competitive advantage.

Given today's realities, transparency can improve substantially through the utilisation of existing mass communication media to spread and disseminate information messages to all citizens (Baniamin 2015).

This can be combined occasionally through the spreading of research questionnaires through social media or community meetings that can make communities feel that they are an integral part of the solution.

On a more positive note, the finance minister's announcement of the grant reforms that would allow metropolitan and other municipalities to increase their borrowing potential in order to fund infrastructure could prove to be instrumental in strengthening good governance, make municipalities more creditworthy and develop a stronger organisationally sound financial management. The blending of grant funds with municipal revenues (including the new public transport network grant) can play a key role in new exciting developments.

Time will be the final judge.

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Chapter 14

African Cities in Transition: Solutions and the Way Forward



Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy and Henry Wissink

Abstract The quality and sustainability of future African urban living, apart from other important considerations, will be determined by the vision, capacity, commitment and tenacity of its leaders, both in the public and the private sector, to produce such futures. Good leaders guide governments to perform effectively in the interests of their citizenry, and they produce results in terms of enhanced standards of living, abundant personal and development opportunities, quality basic education, skilled medical care, reduced crime and basic infrastructure. In contrast, benevolent or even malevolent leadership results in roads falling into disrepair, currencies depreciating, inflation, declining health, increasing poverty and crime and overall security becoming tenuous. Consequently, the notion of good or bad leadership will impact either very positively or negatively on the African city and the local communities as alluded to above. Failure to achieve this collaborative governance between the key role players and stakeholders clearly predicts a dystopian future, as the slum population of Africa has increased to approximately 200 million people and is predicted to grow rapidly if smart interventions are not devised.

Keywords Good governance · Leadership · Management · Triple helix · Ethics · Accountability · Meritocracy · Developmental state

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The African Future

African city growth is predicted to be the highest over the next 15 years, as cities like Luanda, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg and Cape Town are set to become the economic giants in Africa.¹ In developing countries or developmental states², one has to ensure that states have effective national policies, priorities and macroeconomic strategies and support in place, but it is generally accepted that if one neglects general good governance and management, local governance and the management of cities and states will fail. This effort will require a healthy cooperation between the government, commerce and industry and academia (triple helix) to foster quality and sustainable urban futures. The aim is to bring government, industry and academics together in considering the key challenges towards creating such futures on the African continent and learning from experiences and examples on the continent and intercontinentally. Again, the focus needs to be to improve leadership and good governance in the critical areas of need, to ensure that the nexus of good governance and the challenge of innovation in creating sustainable and smart city futures (economic growth, employment, prosperity and quality of life) are achieved as African cities and urban precincts grow at an alarming rate and to counteract or avoid dystopian futures. In particular, where indicators show that one also has to focus and make this investment and enhancement of good governance in African cities of the future, it is proposed in alignment with the strategic goals of the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) as set out by the South African government (COGTA 2016).

Dealing with Governance and Management Problems in the African Context

In order to build a stable foundation for the transformation of local government, and the changes required in critical subsystems of urban service delivery, this final chapter reviews the inherent challenges that need to be addressed. South Africa, for instance, has recently been immersed in debates, commissions of enquiry and the quandary of managing the scourge of corruption and state capture³ that is a growing

¹Africa Renewal <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2016/africa%E2%80%99s-cities-future>

²A developmental state was originally related to East Asian economic renovation during the late twentieth century and is usually associated with strong state intervention and centrally driven regulation and planning. The term is also used within African or developing countries outside East Asia as developmental states employing principles of directed economic development strategies, especially from a good governance perspective, and using local government as the primary instruments of economic recovery.

³State Capture. Type of systemic [political corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/political_corruption) in which private interests significantly influence a [state's](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/state) decision-making processes to their own advantage. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/state_capture

global endemic phenomenon, which has become entrenched nationally during the last decade. It has threatened to destabilise the political, social and economic order and substance of one of the most prosperous countries on the African continent. Numerous sources can be quoted on this gloomy state of affairs in South Africa (including the poor standing in the global corruption index⁴) and its consequent potentially disastrous consequences (Schwella 2017c:234–240 and De Vries 2015: 21–23). The hollowing out of the state in general and in particular the capture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been the target of such state capture schemes by many in state leadership positions. The nature of their relative independence and poor observation and enforcement of compliance to laws and policies in existence and important guidelines such as the King Reports as well as other policy, regulatory and ethical frameworks, designed to ensure effective and efficient governance, have made them easy targets. However, of late especially in the past decade, there has been increasing abuse of public funds, nepotism, maladministration and corruption on a massive scale. These dysfunctional practices and poor governance acts have also found their way into the private sector (Carter 2018). As Makgae (2019:1) points out, this unethical behaviour was not only confined to the public sector, but also spread to the private sector and more specifically to companies like Steinhoff, KPMG and Old Mutual. This corrupt syphoning-off of state resources into private pockets reduces available resources for legitimate state developmental programmes and this is exacerbated by poor financial management at the municipal level. Unfortunately, many local government public leaders are connected centrally and consequently emulate their examples set by the national leadership and the party powerful.

In addition, the general history of the senior political and administrative leadership at all governmental levels in South Africa to take optimal decisions about strategic developmental priorities is dismal. Inappropriate decisions about what to do and how to do it frequently lead to poor policy implementation, resulting in policy failure (Schwella 2017d:321). The combined impact of these problems in South Africa has now brought this country to the brink of international financial junk status and to an impending International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout for the first time in its history, with the debt crisis approaching the rating agencies' red line of 60% of economic output.⁵ This ultimately erodes governments' ability to effectively support and fund urban governments, through strategic policy frameworks like the IUDF (COGTA 2016). According to Tshwane (2018), municipalities "already owe R23.4-billion to service providers, and of the 257 municipalities, 113 local governments adopted unfunded budgets in 2018–2019".

State_capture. See also Swilling, M. 2017. Betrayal of the promise: how South Africa is being stolen. Centre for Complex Systems in Transition, May 2017. State Capacity Research Project. Convenor: Mark Swilling.

⁴<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>

⁵Debt crisis and downgrading in countries are often a result of debt reaching close to 60% of the GNP of a nation. <https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/15/south-africa-s-debt-becoming-unsustainable-imf/>

Both at the level of political leadership and senior executive leadership, control over compliance and sound governance principles have so far been seriously neglected by persons who were elected to be the guardians of the state in general, as well as of the key enterprises of the state. The political and administrative leadership is mandated to pursue sustainable developmental outcomes for all in Africa, but unfortunately they seem to have largely failed so far to accomplish many of these goals. The main reasons for this unfortunate situation include one or more of the following: inexperience; ignorance of what should be done and how; a lack of professionalism and commitment; personal greed; inappropriate value systems; the absence of effective political, financial and managerial control systems; or the lack of implementation of such systems.

Many of these problems can therefore be attributed to serious defects in the nature and quality of leadership and professionalism at the top echelons of African governmental structures, including critical, strategic and operational, political and administrative leadership in the presidency, cabinet and the provincial and local government executive and legislative structures (Wissink 2015). Fundamentally, it would appear that the nature of poor leadership and consequential poor governance, corruption and malfeasance originates from *inter alia*, the following:

- Politicisation of the bureaucracy and appointment or deployment of personnel with poor leadership skills and experience, but with “good political credentials”.
- Inadequately or inappropriately qualified executive municipal functionaries in leadership position in municipalities, more specifically municipal managers/ chief financial officers and departmental heads. Politically motivated appointments result in staff being unable to manage municipal financial affairs and resultant fiscal challenges.
- The deliberate and calculated misuse of public office for personal gain and political agendas results in outcomes harmful to the society and the state in general.
- The flouting of the rule of law, requirements for public accountability and responsibility, in public expenditure and corrupt activities.
- A considerable amount of money has been invested in skills and capacity development post 1994 with no formal evaluation of the training. Consequently, the situation on the ground cannot be accurately assessed and the required action taken.
- The lack of long-term planning for future incumbents (shaping, schooling and training of leaders) for the purposes of public leadership positions and visionary and innovative management.
- The lack of a vision for a combined “competition and developmental state”⁶ focus as opposed to a narrow social and developmental focus, driven by ideologi-

⁶The competition state concept is an analytical construct used to assess the ways in which industrially developed states began to restructure themselves during the 1990s in response to the opportunities and constraints resulting from globalising economic forces. Originally coined the competition state concept to describe how economic policies and institutions of the state, it prioritises the pur-

cal agendas only (Ajam, National Planning Commission, Mle; Ndwa, Financial and Fiscal Commission and Thornhill in Reddy 2015).

Investment in Public Leadership for the Future

There is a moral, social and political necessity to address basic needs in countries such as South Africa, given that it is a constitutional democratic developmental state (Reddy 2015:340). Much has been written about the importance of a developmental state in the South Africa case, but without the commitment of political and executive public leadership to both development, and to contribute to a healthy “competition”- based paradigm to recalibrate the South African political economy (Thompson and Wissink 2018). From this approach it is clear that structural and socio-political factors as those mentioned above will dictate the future of successful African cities. Only through sound governance and management principles, procedures and compliance to the policies, rules and procedures, as well as commitment to accountability and responsibility, will the notion of a developmental state succeed. It would appear that current leadership education and training programmes are largely ineffectual and have no lasting impact on the development of strategic leadership skills to turn around the above negative public leadership trends (Reddy 2015:335). Public leadership education and training content, facilitation and management should be significantly transformed to be more effective. It should not only transfer more relevant and appropriate strategic professional leadership competencies, but also inherently inculcate stronger perceptions of the importance of commitment and dedication to public sector values like honesty, accountability, responsibility, morality, ethics as well as the importance of legal compliance and high level competencies in policy analysis for good governance (Cloete et al. 2018).

This necessitates significant changes in public leadership education and training curricula, facilitation and management. Examples of such curriculum changes include the need to adopt more globally proven public value and behavioural insights (BI) theory and good practice approaches as well as more holistic network approaches to policymaking and implementation in complex contexts. This also implies a stronger focus on integrated carrot, stick and sermon policy approaches. Countries in Africa as well as many other countries linked to UN projects for improved governance and programmes and other forms of structural adjustment programmes,⁷ such as those offered by the World Bank, and the IMF has tried to heed to many ideas about what needs to be fixed and what should be done. There is a growing consensus that the big holes in the dyke of most African states are

suit of global competitiveness on behalf of its national territory and to conform to the anti-inflationary norms of the international financial markets (Thompson and Wissink 2018:34).

⁷Structural adjustment programmes were popular in Africa during the post-WWII era through application of fiscal discipline and good governance. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_adjustment#End_of_the_Structuralist_model_of_development

unemployment, corruption, quality of basic education, inadequate infrastructure, public service performance, inequality, crime, poor governance, poor law enforcement, low economic growth and lack of investment confidence; and the list has become extensive (Goldman Sachs and National Planning Commission in Schwella 2017c). The essence of dealing with the poverty, inequality and unemployment (PIU) dilemma is to start at the level of local governance and where basic services and improved conditions of living make it possible to address the PIU dilemma (Chibba and Luiz 2011). Generally, though much has changed in South Africa since 1994 (post-Apartheid era) and in many rural areas, where life has taken on new meaning due to some infrastructure and improved services and developments (Makale 2015), the inequality that persists and the uneven provision and enhancement of the quality of services provided by the government in South Africa do not match the expectations of many of the citizens (HSRC 2016). This again applies to the majority of African states.

For example, in 2009, a significant number of municipalities were still in distress and municipal service delivery was in a crisis. Nationally 46% (5.7 million) of households did not have universal access to water, sanitation, refuse removal and electricity in 2009 (i.e. access to basic and higher levels of service in respect of all four services combined. (HSRC 2016:3–4)

During the most recent State of the Nation Address (RSA 2019), the South African President highlighted several priorities to address: reliable quality basic services; education, skills and health, economic transformation, job creation, spatial integration, human settlements and local government; social cohesion and safe communities and a capable, ethical and developmental state, a better continent and World.

It is now an established fact that poor management, governance and corruption are the root cause of much of the failure of African governments to deliver infrastructure and services to its citizens and in particular in cities (Corruption Watch 2019). In the African context, corruption tends to divert resources, whether human and financial, from local development which implies basic service like water/sanitation, housing and electricity to benefitting individuals, who are generally the political elite (Reddy 2015:336).

In the African case generally, it is to confront the insidious nature and effects of malfeasance within the public sector. This requires leaders to do introspection and honest evaluation which will result in a great deal of discomfort in many quarters. Although the South African president mentioned a capable, ethical and developmental state in his address, this needs to be unpacked. There is also no single panacea for states who have allowed their governments to slide into this dire and concerning state of affairs. This is evident from observing what has occurred in similar countries of the developing world that have been declared failed states (Rotberg 2003). Failed states are characterised by social, political and economic failure which includes a weak national government so ineffectual and dysfunctional, that it has limited everyday control over much of its jurisdiction: limited or nonprovision of basic public services, rampant corruption and no law and order,

severe economic decline/failure and free movement of the population and refugees (Schwella 2017a: 40).

The most pertinent warnings, if not heeded, generally lead to the erosion of the institutions of democracy and the systematic erosion of any society and its economy. If left unaddressed, it could rapidly tilt states onto the inevitable path of no return, as is the case in many African and other states, which have now been declared failed states with little or no hope for the future of its citizens – life in unbearable circumstances often characterised by conflict and poverty.

Scholars and practitioners should also not be fooled by the idea that “democracy”, the often used “silver bullet”, provides the safety net for these dystopian futures. It is firmly believed that the upholding of liberal democracy and sustaining its precepts will provide a reasonable normative framework for hope. Liberal democracies worldwide are experiencing internal opposition from critics and populist leaders, and these movements seem to be increasingly gaining support. Critics of liberal democracy are gaining ground, and these “populists” may want to argue that the will of the majority is the “bedrock” of real democracy, and public decisions are justified by virtue of this mandate. Many of these actions often justify and lead to deeply corrupt, ‘illiberal’ actions and violations of fundamental human rights (Zakaria 1997).

Zakaria (2016) argues that “many countries had adopted fine constitutions, put in place elaborate checks and balances, and followed best practices from the advanced world. But in the end, liberal democracy has eroded anyway. It turns out that what sustains democracy is not simply legal safeguards and rules, but norms and practices — democratic behavior. This culture of liberal democracy is waning in the United States today” (Zakaria 2016).

Perhaps a common misguided view, that power gained through representing the majority in populist and even liberal democratic systems, can be wielded without the limits and of checks and balances, and the deep sense that progress and real development is driven by agreed on community norms, responsible practices and globally agreed on behaviour. So populist demagogues ultimately posing as democrats often ultimately become terrifying dictators, with no other motive other than their own economic interests and power. Africa and the developing world have historically come through processes of painful postcolonial transformation and challenges. Perhaps the answer to many questions is closely aligned with the view that the ideas of “co-governance” or “self-governance” of their urban precincts should be given serious consideration and may be something that needs to be considered by states who want to ensure good governance and who can rely on systems of co-governance to ensure the necessary checks and balances to keep leaders responsible and accountable. This may be necessary as a reasonable “trade-off” to secure a ‘true’ liberal democratic future but also as an option towards transition to future “smaller” and independent city states, such as in the case of Honduras and other countries that are experimenting with alternative forms of local or city governments.

Conversely, the assumption is that “liberals” preserve the values associated with progress, reform and the protection of civil liberties that have been carved from a

long history of intellectual endeavours and experience, aimed at preserving the hard-fought gains of human rights and progress in preserving the sanctity of life. The evolution of political thought and philosophy has also produced excellent normative frameworks and guidelines for good governance augmented by the precepts of democracy, the continual evolution of government, the emergence of liberal democracies that produce the most sustainable governments, the assurance of inalienable human rights and the protection of the sanctity of the state and its institutions that protect core constitutional values in increasingly complex societies.

It is now quite common that populist leaders “hijack” states and through subtle erosion of liberal democratic values and its institutions and the sand under the “pyramid foundation” start shifting or start eroding the solid foundation. Good governance in a liberal democracy is based on the “two sides of the coin” principle. On the one side is the constitution, with all the precepts and principles to protect this liberal democracy, and on the other hand are “institutions” of the state charged with the responsibility of protecting and growing the state. When considering the two sides of a coin, it is good to know and understand that South Africa and many modern developing democracies already have one aspect of that solid foundation which is a strong and healthy constitution. However, considering the opposite side of the coin; what is disconcerting is that what is now being experienced are actions and efforts to erode or wash away solid constitutional substance, the very institutions of the state and Constitution.

This misuse of power and hollowing-out of the state (or state capture – if one wishes) or of the institutions of the hard-fought democracy, through poor or ideologically misguided or dissenting public leadership, may ultimately lead to a failed state, as experienced throughout the world over the past decade. Apart from most African countries that are listed on high alert, South Africa has recently been listed on the warning list for fragile states in the Fragile States Index (FSI 2019).

When a foundation is built, long-term stability is needed to ensure that it can support the weight of the walls and several layers of development. Particularly during tough times, the integrity of the foundation needs to be maintained. Commentators and theorists use words such as sustainable, responsible, transparent, effective, efficient, productive, fair, responsive and accountable government to describe good governance. Undoubtedly, such adjectives describe important characteristics of good government if one wishes to add them into the mortar mix to set and cure a strong foundation.

The question arises on how to proceed once the foundation has been laid. Inasmuch as one would like to build solid walls (economic growth, employment, equality) and provide a protective covering (safety and security), such developments hinge on the impact of good leadership (managers), in particular political and bureaucratic leadership as one of the most important factors in ensuring that important state goals, strategic plans and objectives are achieved. In addition, there are legal requirements to be accountable and to hold public managers accountable for complying with the rule of law and good government practice (governance). Much of the accountability that is required arises from both an inherent and an acquired

sense of responsibility in addition to an inculcated disposition to act in the interest of citizens.

The Singapore Example

A very well-known figure, former Prime Minister Mr. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, is credited with reversing the fortunes of a fledgling and troubled island state when he took office in 1959. He maintained that good governance can be achieved by virtue of applying the MPH in full principle: firstly, appointing people on the basis of merit (meritocracy); secondly, being pragmatic about what works and employing the best of what one has to his/her avail to achieve important outcomes (pragmatism); and thirdly, always being truthful in all one's actions (honesty) and in what one says, do and how one applies the resources entrusted to oneself, in a legal and ethical manner. He stressed that those holding higher office are required to be exemplary in their responsibilities. Higher office bearers should be measured by the strictest rules and laws to ensure integrity, honesty and the highest level of ethical behaviour.

Of course many may not have liked his benevolent autocratic leadership style, and one may have challenges in interpreting what this may mean in a liberal and democratic society like South Africa; but the question remains how can one determine and fearlessly ensure that the transformation of public leadership drives the building of a developmental state in South Africa? Maybe closer to South Africa, Rwandan President Paul Kagame's efforts serve as an example. Restoring the rule of law through strong and determined ethical leadership seems to be a recurring theme in most if not all societies that are serious about reconstruction and development (Doãn 2017).

Breaking with Cronyism and Nepotism

In essence, the Singaporean example reminds one to consider how important appointed government leaders need to be (notably cabinet ministers, members of parliament, members of provincial executive committees and provincial parliament, executive mayors and councillors), as opposed to current practices. On the other hand, the greatest challenge is to not blur the lines between political office spoils and how administration and professional public servants are appointed. Again, often new governments misuse the opportunity to appoint their top administrators or director generals that are loyal to the ruling political party and their policies, which does make sense from a policy implementation point of view. Keeping in mind that South Africa needed to make an effort to correct past racial and other gross imbalances in the structure of public sector employment and in the economy, it still remains a critical requirement that public servants should be held to the highest

level of professional and functional standards, based on impartial commitment to public service delivery. Ideally, both political office bearers and bureaucrats need to be listed and appointed on merit and be held to strict codes of professionalism and ethics (Wissink 2015). This may not have always been immediately achievable when required to implement the transformative and corrective agenda and actions that were needed to embark on in South Africa in the post 1994 era. Added to this, even though many political office bearers may not have had all the experience and skills required to ensure merit-based appointments, it remains critical that the rule of law be upheld, and public leaders should be held accountable to be responsible and honest in all their dealings. Though it is quite possible for all public servants to be educated in the field of public management, be trained to be innovative, be oriented to address the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and become developmentally minded and well aligned to become leaders of the future, there could still be a missing, yet critical ingredient. Perhaps the understanding that public service and leadership is a “calling” has been lost. The sense of creating a better future for all, one that provides quality living and sustainability in the way one shapes such futures, is absent. Public servants need to know and be reminded that the core of public service is first and foremost about serving and thereafter being part of the writing of history and the public investment into the future. In this context, Reddy (2015:33) points out that executive municipal functionaries who are committed and passionate about local governance and with demonstrated visionary leadership skills in addressing basic service delivery needs and enhancing the standard of living of local communities should be appointed. Strategic capacity to manage and lead in a developmental context should be prioritised, and the relationship between municipal functionaries, both from the ruling or opposition party should be productive and more cooperative so that local communities benefit from qualitative decision-making and implementation. Candidates put forward as executive/senior municipal functionaries by political parties should be passionate and committed to local governance obligations that need to be discharged.

When public servants are themselves guilty of squandering public resources, misusing their office and pursuing ill-gained benefits, without the legal consequences being enforced, the investment into a better future for all is slowly eroded. The effect is tantamount to the result of drawing more from your pension savings than you should and ultimately finding yourself financially stranded. In all fairness, public servants are generally paid market – related salaries, and that self-enrichment through malfeasance should be condemned in the strongest of terms.

Rekindling Ethics and the Ethos of Public Service

It is critically important that this ethos is recreated in government. However, the question remains: what keeps even well-educated and trained personnel honest and committed to public service? Perhaps the current efforts within the state to keep the

highest offices accountable and to ensure that when that happens, it will have a “trickle-down” effect within all ranks of government are a good start. There are no easy answers to these challenges, but it all starts with a determined and committed leadership at the helm. Investing in and growing such public leadership (governance) will make an important contribution to changing the current nature of corruption that currently reigns in the country. It may simply start by systematically keeping all public servants accountable for every action taken in their own interest, rather than the interest of the public, and ensuring that there are real consequences for actions that erode endeavours to build a successful developmental state. The United Kingdom has introduced a broad code of behaviour for public functionaries involved in public life, namely, selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership (Pope in Schwella 2017a:29).

In the light of some of the previous comments, it requires that the ruling party and all political parties commit themselves to a programme of leadership development within their own ranks and to be ruthless in dealing with leaders who are found guilty of malfeasance and wilful actions that contradict the law and their codes of ethics. The fact is that this is not a uniquely South African or African problem, but is now a challenge all over the world where leaders fail their people, and where democratic institutions are eroded, and the fabric of society is consequently slowly destroyed. The road to recovery is tough and requires a lot of hard work.

Even though the restoration of good governance could be achieved through costly investigations, endless commissions and pursuing extensive parliamentary checks and balances, it may be worthwhile. Firm and decisive leadership and action is imperative to respond to crucial issues impacting negatively on local governance, notably rampant corruption, poor performance, non-payment for services, non-implementation/poor implementation of by-laws and finally basic services provision (Reddy 2015:338). In addition to the abovementioned issues, in striving to build a better future for all, the strengthening and sustained support of the roles of other important institutions such as the Chapter 9 Institutions in South Africa, the Criminal Justice system, the National Prosecuting Authority and an independent media culture in general is imperative. These are critical contributing factors to restore faith in public institutions and its leaders, resulting in the majority of public servants who are honest and hardworking, being commended for excellent work; and when from a service delivery perspective citizens rally together and are singularly focused on creating a better society.

Continued building of bridges between government, business and academia also needs to be strengthened and utilised to add impetus to this process. It is also noted that in terms of Section 15 of the *Public Administration Management Act* promulgated in 2014, the new Minister of Public Service and Administration recently initiated the introduction of the important Ethics Unit as required by this law. This Unit proposes norms and standards on integrity, ethics, conduct and discipline in the public sector. It will also build capacity within all state institutions to manage disciplinary proceedings and to strengthen government oversight over the matters raised in this chapter. Again, it is proposed that it all starts with good leadership.

African Smart Cities and Innovations in Service Delivery and Governance

A little optimism about the desire to turn things around goes a far way, and even some ideas and dreams about grand future “smart” cities can conjure up some excitement about a better future. Smart cities do provide conditions and circumstances for quality living, but this is regarded as a level 3 tier in the pyramid model. The provision of quality leadership in governance and basic infrastructure and services is required as a prerequisite. Regardless of the negativity about these dreams from many quarters, some of these dreams are already materialising. In Durban, South Africa, and the surrounding precincts of the King Shaka Airport and the approximate “first mile” around the airport, the new smart airport city or aerotropolis is starting to take shape due to the introduction of a special economic zone (Dube Tradeport), good management and governance and infrastructure development (see chapter on the Durban Aerotropolis). The KZN provincial government, in collaboration with the metropolitan government (eThekweni Municipality), academia and business, has shaped a master plan for a new smart airport city. The Durban Aerotropolis has the potential to become the grand lady of African cities of the future. It is poised to become even more popular and prominent as a gateway to Africa, than Johannesburg and Cape Town. One has to take note of critics, some raising neoliberalist concerns and even though some of these dreams will only materialise as a result of a steadfast determination to change things at the foundational level. The creation of investment confidence, leadership excellence, restoring societal order (safety and security), the respect for the law, and the ability to respond to national and local crisis situations, will ensure the success envisaged for all African cities of the future.

Conclusion

African states are characterised by social, political and economic failure which includes weak local government systems that are so ineffectual, dysfunctional and limited that everyday control over much of its jurisdiction is required. In many respects, they are plagued by limited or nonprovision of basic public services, rampant corruption and little respect for law and order (the rule of law). Consequently, the results often are severe economic decline and failure of states, due to failure at the local government levels. It is believed that the road to recovery starts with a serious consideration of the nature of public leadership and the investment into African leaders for the future, both political and executive leadership. African developmental states will not succeed without strong, decisive, innovative and ethical leadership, who show exemplary qualities in serving their governments and in this context their local governments and cities of the future.

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Index

A

- Accountability, 223
- Active citizenship, 18, 35
- Administration, 7
- Administration/management, 9
 - democratic regimes, 9
 - framework, 9
 - NPC, 9
- Aeronautical services, 191
- Aerotropolis case studies, 193–194
- Aerotropolis master planning, 192
- Aerotropolis model
 - academic and professional consultant, 190
 - Africa's economic growth, 186
 - airline traffic, 187
 - airport companies, 189
 - airport infrastructure, 201
 - bureaucracy, 189
 - comments and expectations, 196
 - decision-makers, 200
 - definition, 185
 - developing nations, 203
 - developments, 185
 - employment opportunities, 192
 - evaluation tool, 202
 - facilities and services, 184
 - governments and societies, 188
 - KSIA, 201
 - land ownership, 187
 - local and regional economic development, 203
 - LSUDs, 206
 - macroeconomic considerations, 205
 - material infrastructure, 190
 - new industry skills, 188
 - ORTIA, 201
 - pollution, 188
 - socioeconomic development, 203
 - socioeconomic factors, 197
 - transport infrastructure, 201
 - urban economic development, 189
 - urban infrastructure, 189
 - urbanization, 185
 - value-added sectors, 185
- Aerotropolis paradigm, 190
- African
 - creating futures, 292
 - developmental states, 302
 - effective national policies, 292
 - good governance, 292
 - rampant corruption, 302
- Africa's air transport industry, 192
- African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 163, 164
- African Development Bank (AfDB), 165
- African Economic Outlook, 186
- Air transportation industry, 186
- Ambassadorial role, 8
- Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, 191
- ANC/UDM/EFF coalition, 285
- Attendance of meetings
 - benefit communities, 60
 - encouraging participation, 60
 - expectations met, 60
 - municipal councils, 59
 - municipality participants, 59
 - political environment, 59
 - traditional leader and municipality participants, 59
 - traditional leaders, 59

Attention, 2

Auditor General's report, 282

B

Behaviour patterns, 226

Business and investment opportunities
 communication, 115
 creation, 115, 117
 preparation/execution, 116

C

Cadres, 14

Capacity building, 64

Capacity development, 143

Cape Town Mayoral Urban Regeneration
 Programme (MURP), 220

Central Business District (CBD), 214

Charter cities, 80

Christmas period, 286

Citizen exclusion, 20

Citizen inclusion, 19

Citizen participation, 19, 24

Citizens' budgetary illiteracy, 26

Citizenship, 25

City governance
 citizens, 23
 non-governmental organizations, 23

City governments, 232

City of Harare, 177

City of Johannesburg, 278

City's Internal Investigation Unit, 281

Civil society, 32

Collective leadership, 19

Committee of Water Users (CUE), 134

Communication and information sharing, 61

Computable general equilibrium (CGE), 114

Constitutional democracies, 22

Cooperative Governance and Traditional
 Affairs (COGTA), 284

Corruption, 282

Corruption Watch report, 281

Council proceedings and meetings, 61

Council's decisions, 61

Councillor vs. traditional leadership
 COGTA, 40

legislative mandates, 41

objectives, 40

policy outcomes, 41

Councilor's perspective, 267

Cultural exclusion, 20

D

Data Collection Procedures, 176

Deliberate democracy, 41

Deliberative democracy, 33, 34
 benefits, 33
 public participation, 33
 rationale, 33

Democracy, 19, 21

budgets, 26
 citizens, 26
 decision-making, 26
 democratic governance, 25
 forces government, 25
 modern democracy, 26
 policy formulation, 25
 role, citizen, 22

Democratic Alliance's official audit, 282

Democratic developmental localities, 18

Democratic governance, 30

Demographic and economic trends, 243

Department of Planning, Monitoring and
 Evaluation (DPME), 223

Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA), 44

Deployees, 13

Disaster Management Act (DMA), 253

approach, 254
 capacity of public sector, 254
 challenge, 254
 constitution, 253
 effective reduction, 254
 governmental spheres, 253
 healthy and safe environment, 253
 purpose, 253

Disaster risk management

concept, 248
 consequences, 248
 DRR (*see* Disaster risk reduction (DRR))
 vulnerability, 248

Disaster risk reduction (DRR)

case study, 258
 eThekweni Municipality, 255, 268
 global context, 260
 global strategy impact, 250
 goals, 249
 HFA, 251
 IDNDR, 249
 incorporating measures, 268
 ISDR, 251
 legislative/policy aspects (*see* Legislative/
 policy aspects)
 level of education, 266, 267
 level of employment, 265, 266

- local government, 268 (*see* Local government)
 - logical systematic model, 257
 - practitioners perspective, 264, 265
 - research methodology
 - logical systematic model, 258
 - quantitative method, 258
 - research problem, 258
 - Sendai framework, 252
 - years of experience, 265
 - Yokohama plan and strategy, 250
 - District municipality (DM), 44
 - Dube Trade Port (DTP), 184, 197–198
 - Durban aerotropolis, 184
 - Durban Integrated Aerotropolis Strategy (IAS)
 - challenges, 200
 - developers and investors, 199
 - economic growth, 199
 - KSIA, 197
 - PGDS, 197, 198
- E**
- East African Community (EAC), 158, 164
 - Eco-innovation and Urban water, 240
 - Ecological and economic sustainable cities, 233
 - Economic exclusion, 20
 - Economic powerhouse, 277
 - Effective communication, 227
 - e-governance, 170
 - Egypt, 32
 - political environment, 32
 - social media and internet, 32
 - Enforcement/consequence management strategies, 226
 - Environment and sustainable development, 152
 - Environmental sustainability, 125
 - effects, 111
 - fragile ecosystems, 111
 - greenhouse emissions, 112
 - informal settlements, 111
 - public land situation, 112
 - public spaces, 111
 - quality of water/air, 112
 - urban populations, 111
 - E-participation, 180
 - barriers, 180
 - City of Harare, 177
 - communication, 172
 - concept, 171
 - definitions, 171
 - democratic participation, 177
 - effectiveness, 172
 - emerging economies, 170
 - government, 172
 - growth, 171
 - ICTs, 171
 - Internet penetration, 178
 - literature, 171
 - objective, 171
 - policy preparation and implementation, 173
 - policymaking, 171
 - public involvement rates, 172
 - research, 170
 - scholars stress, 172
 - UTAUT, 174
 - eThekweni Municipality, 220, 248
 - annual statistics, 256
 - credible and systematic model, 256
 - disaster impact, 257
 - political commitment, 257
 - proactive disaster management approach, 256
 - E-voting, 171
 - Extra School Support Programme (ESSP), 130
- F**
- Finance Management Act (FMA), 285
 - Financial constraints, 224
 - Financial inclusion, 161
 - Financing Urban Water, 239
 - First Industrial Revolution, 187
 - Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 159
 - Fourth Industrial Revolution, 185, 188
 - Fragile states index, 298
 - Free Private City, 77
 - Free trade agreement (FTA), 163
 - Fund for Development of Cities (FMDV), 276
 - Future cities, 243, 245
- G**
- Gauteng City-Region Observatory, 278
 - Geographical strategic positioning
 - economic linkages, 194
 - evolutionary and organic fashion, 195
 - mobility, 194
 - non-aeronautical, 192
 - residential areas, 192
 - spatial design and elements, 194
 - Global air services, 187
 - Globalization, 185, 190

- Governance, 20
- Governance and management problems
- administrative leadership, 293
 - competition/developmental state, 294
 - global endemic phenomenon, 293
 - inherent challenges, 292
 - leadership, 294
 - political leadership, 294
 - professionalism, 294
 - state resources, 293
 - unfortunate situation, 294
- Governance/management
- approaches/models, 87
 - backward/primitive lifestyle, 68
 - building cities, 69–71
 - effective and efficient framework, 87
 - future of cities, 71–72
 - local government, 87
 - post-centralised state (*see* Post-centralised state)
 - rapid urbanisation, 68
 - rural/urban population change, 68
 - transformation (*see* Nature of transformation)
 - untamed cities, 68
 - urban/city government (*see* Urban/city governments)
 - urbanisation (*see* Urbanisation)
- Governing Urban Water, 240
- Government of Rwanda (GOR), 215
- Greenfield airports, 203, 204
- Greenhouse gas emissions, 234
- Gross domestic product (GDP), 158, 277
- Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), 41
- H**
- Hong Kong Airport, 191
- Hyogo Action Framework (HFA), 251, 252
- I**
- i2030 Agenda
- integration, 133
- Identifying business opportunities, 114
- Inclusive citizen participation, 24
- Inclusive participation, 23
- Income gains of growth
- income estimation, 104
 - indicators, 102
 - inequality, 102
 - poverty variance, 102
 - regional poverty estimates, 103
 - service sector, 103
 - slashing poverty, 104
- Industrial Development Zone (IDZ), 279
- Information and communications technologies (ICTs), 143, 178
- Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government (IFCPPI), 101
- Instrumentation, 175
- Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP), 225
- Internal anti-corruption, 282
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 195
- International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), 249
- International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), 251
- International Telecommunication Union, 238, 242
- International Water Association (IWA), 239
- Interventionists, 8
- Investment readiness
- challenge, 118
 - definition, 113
 - dimensions, 113
 - identification, 114
 - key problematic areas, 113
 - potential of secondary cities, 113
 - risk/reward appetites, 113
 - stages, 114
 - transformative/sustainable development, 113
 - urban infrastructure, 113
- Investor-friendly environment, 24
- IS/IT communication system, 174
- J**
- Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), 219
- K**
- King Shaka International Airport (KSIA), 184, 197, 198
- KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), 40
- KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Disaster Management Centre (KZN-PDMC), 256
- KZN Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, 42

L

- Large-scale urban development (LSUDs), 206
- Legislative/policy aspects
 - eThekweni Municipality, 263, 264
 - legal requirements, 261
 - local government, 262
 - service, 261
 - stakeholders, 261
 - vulnerability, 260
- Lesotho, 30
 - citizen participation, 31
 - government, 31
 - national legislature, 30
 - political environment, 31
- Level of understanding, 61
- Local economic development, 190
 - in Africa, 154
 - in Angola, 156
 - definitions, 148
 - economic environment, 150
 - economic policies and legislative framework, 154
 - environment and sustainable development, 152
 - FTA, 163
 - future developments, 150
 - gender balances, 153
 - global recognition, 149
 - ILO's approach, 151
 - labour shortage, 163
 - liberalisation, 163
 - modern technology, 152
 - people-centred approach, 151
 - phases, 149
 - poverty, 153
 - private sector policies, 153
 - regional and economic cooperation, 148
 - RISDP, 152
 - SADC, 151
 - SADC exports, 158
 - SADC region, 148, 153
 - science and technology, 152
 - socio-economic challenges, 157
 - socio-economic strategy, 148
 - in South Africa, 154, 155
 - stakeholders, 150
 - sustainable mechanism, 150
 - in Tanzania, 156
 - traditional, 147
 - youth unemployment, 154
- Local governance and administration reforms
 - bureaucratic efficiency, 137
 - development programs, 142

- local governance and administration, 138
 - optimization, 138, 140
 - public administration/government, 139
 - public and private actors, 139
 - public enterprise, 139
 - transformation, 137, 140
 - 2030 Agenda, 137, 142
 - Local government, 172
 - context redefined, 258
 - roles/responsibilities, 259
 - significance, 259
 - Local Government Act 1997, 31
 - Local Government Act Cap 265, 3
 - Local Government Structures Act, 52
 - Local governments and cities, 129
 - Local-level communities, 134
 - Logistical arrangements, 61
- M**
- Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), 276
 - Medium-term expenditure framework, 277
 - Member of the Executive Committee (MEC), 42
 - Metabolism, 70
 - Metropolitan urban area, 192
 - Microfinance institutions, 161
 - Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 121, 122, 235
 - Minimalists, 8
 - Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MoLHUD), 101
 - Mixed method approach, 175
 - Modern local governance institutions, 133
 - Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), 228
 - Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 180
 - Mozambique's sector diversification, 160
 - MPH principle, 299
 - Multi Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) problem, 200
 - Municipal departments, 268
 - Municipal Informal Trade Policy, 155
 - Municipal Managers (MMs), 44
 - Municipal policymaking processes, 180
 - Municipal realities
 - fundamentals, 279
 - metro police and emergency services, 278
 - municipal elections, 278
 - municipality, 278
 - poverty and inequality, 278
 - unemployment, 277

Municipal Structures Act, 40, 41, 43
 Municipal Supply Chain Management
 Regulations (MSCMR), 282
 Municipal Systems Act, 41
 Municipalities pay out-of-pocket expenses, 52
 Municipalities role, 62

N

National Disaster Management Framework
 (NDMF), 253
 National Participatory Development Program
 (NPDP), 134
 National Vision 2040, 101
 Nature of transformation
 institutions, 83
 public opinion, 82
 school, 83
 technology (*see* Technologically driven
 transformation)
 technology driven, 84
 Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 279
 automobile industry manufacturing, 280
 automobile sector, 279
 COGTA, 284
 community and SMM owners, 286
 forensic investigations, 284
 informal settlement houses, 280
 leadership, 281
 metros, 280
 municipal election, 285
 municipality, 280
 national government, 284
 official documents, 286
 property registration processes, 281
 statistics, 279
 structural corruption, 284
 water provision, 280
 Neo-Liberal philosophies and policies, 197
 Nigeria
 government responsiveness, 29
 legislation, 28
 mechanisms, 29
 public participation, 29
 Non-aeronautical revenues (NAR), 195
 Nongovernment organizations (NGOs), 175,
 235, 250
 Nonincome gains of growth
 higher-quality education, 105
 income indicators, 106
 living conditions, 106
 monetary/nonmonetary benefits, 106
 national household survey, 105

public utilities, 105
 school infrastructure, 105
 Ugandan urbanites, 106

O

Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), 101
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
 Development (OECD), 149, 243
 Out-of-pocket payments
 and municipal participants, 52
 municipalities, 53
 traditional leaders, 54

P

Participants profile, 176
 Participatory democracy, 20, 27, 28, 34
 civil society, 28
 mechanisms, 27
 political and social activism, 27
 socio-economic rights, 27
 Participatory governance, 41
 Participatory strategies, 179
 Payment of Out-of-Pocket, 53
 People-centred development, 151
 Performance management, 228
 Personnel corps
 degree of expertise, 10
 governing authority, 10
 human resources, 10
 political interference, 10
 political suitability, 10
 Policy demands, 223
 Policy initiators, 8
 Political/administrative interface
 accountability, 15
 administration, 7, 8
 ambassadorial role, 8
 attention, 2
 business judgement rule, 14
 cabinet, 5
 civic function, 3
 clarity, 12
 complementarity, 2, 12
 composition, population, 7
 debate, 2
 democracies, 2
 depoliticisation, 11
 develop/manage national policy, 4
 dichotomous relationship, 2
 dimension, 2–4
 diversity, 6

- electronic, 2
 - implication, 13
 - interventionists, 8
 - managerial personnel, 12
 - municipal council, 4, 15
 - municipal sphere, 12
 - NPC, 6
 - permanent official, 15
 - perspectives, 11
 - policy statements, 7
 - public institutions, 14
 - senior officials, 13
 - three-tier system, 3
 - Political exclusion, 19
 - Political office, 8
 - Politics, 4, 5
 - Pollution, 225
 - Post-centralised state
 - checks/balances, 74
 - co-governance, 75, 76
 - concepts, 74
 - hierarchical approach, 74
 - self-governance, 76
 - Post revolution period, 32
 - Poverty eradication, 124, 125, 153
 - Poverty, inequality and unemployment (PIU), 296
 - Pre-constitutional review period, 32
 - Preferential Trade Area (PTA), 164
 - Privatization, 189
 - Proactive policy environment, 225
 - Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), 188
 - Provincial government, 62
 - Provincial House of Traditional Leaders (PHTL), 42
 - Public leadership
 - accountability, 298
 - civil liberties, 297
 - co-governance, 297
 - core constitutional values, 298
 - corruption, 296
 - democratic developmental state, 295
 - economic failure, 296
 - education/training content, 295
 - fragile states index, 298
 - growing consensus, 295
 - honest evaluation, 296
 - infrastructure/services, 296
 - liberal democracy, 297
 - long-term stability, 298
 - misuse of power, 298
 - municipal service delivery, 296
 - PIU, 296
 - political/bureaucratic, 298
 - progress and real development, 297
 - pyramid foundation, 298
 - self-governance, 297
 - significant changes, 295
 - silver bullet, 297
 - systematic erosion, 297
 - Public participation, 30, 170, 173
 - inclusivity, 18
 - resulting effect, 18
 - urbanization, 18
- Q**
- Quantitative and qualitative data analysis
 - techniques, 176
 - Quantitative and qualitative research
 - approaches, 44
- R**
- Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), 41
 - Reform programs, 137
 - Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 151, 161
 - Regional integration and African cities, 164
 - Regulating Urban Water, 240
 - Rekindling ethics/ethos of public service, 300–301
 - Research ICT Africa Mobile Pricing (RAMP) Index, 179
 - Resilience, 136
 - characteristics, 136
 - local governments and cities, 135
 - Resilient society, 137
 - Rethinking citizen engagement, 18
 - Returns on investment (ROI), 206
- S**
- SADC member states, 164
 - SADC-COMESA-EAC Free Trade Area, 164
 - Second World War (WWII), 150
 - Section 81, local government
 - community participation, 43
 - draft regulations, 42
 - implementation, 43
 - knowledge, 46, 47, 50
 - KZN, 42, 44
 - MEC, 42
 - understanding, 48
 - Sendai Framework, 252

- Service delivery/governance, 302
 - Service rendering, 14
 - Singapore
 - cronyism/nepotism, 299, 300
 - ethical behaviour, 299
 - meritocracy, 299
 - Skilled labour shortage, 163
 - Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 75
 - Smart cities, 203
 - ageing water infrastructure, 235
 - anomalies, 234
 - concept, 233
 - definition, 233
 - ecological cities, 233
 - global scale, 235
 - global water demand, 234
 - networks communicate, 234
 - population surges, 233
 - smart water, 234
 - water and sanitation, 235
 - water infrastructure systems, 234
 - Smart infrastructure, 235
 - Smart water, 234, 242
 - Smart water management (SWM), 241
 - Social accounting matrix (SAM), 98
 - Social media, 172
 - Social sustainability, 125
 - Socio-politico-economic situation, 123
 - South African cities and corruption
 - administrators, 275
 - dissemination of data on practices, 274
 - ESKOM, 276
 - governance and perpetual, 274
 - international research, 275
 - municipal governance, 275
 - municipalities, 274, 275
 - natural disasters, 276
 - politicians, 275
 - structural and functional problems, 274
 - sustainable development, 274
 - urban governance, 274
 - South African Development Community (SADC), 148, 165, 196
 - South African metropolitan municipalities, 280
 - Special economic regions (SERs), 79
 - Special economic zone (SEZ), 184, 205
 - Special Investigation Unit (SIU), 285
 - Stakeholder engagement, 181
 - Structural transformation
 - business environment, 109
 - correlation coefficient, 106
 - economic growth, 110
 - employment changes, 108
 - features, 107
 - GDP, 107
 - governance/management, 118
 - industrialization, 110
 - labor productivity, 107
 - main contributors, 107
 - productive activities, 117
 - productive capabilities, 110
 - productive/unproductive activities, 108
 - share of employment, 109
 - urban areas, 107
 - urbanization, 109
 - working population, 109
 - Sustainable development goals (SDGs), 95, 125, 235
- T**
- Tancredo Neves International Airport (TNIA), 204
 - Tanzania, 29
 - citizen-city government, 30
 - citizens and opposition politicians, 30
 - communication, 29
 - consultative meetings, 29
 - political and administrative leadership, 29
 - Technologically driven transformation
 - challenge, 84
 - dreaming, 86
 - good governance, 86
 - grassroots democracy, 85
 - growth/steady developmental patterns, 84
 - maladministration/corruption, 85
 - nuclear, 84
 - scarce resources, 84
 - structural economic transformation, 86
 - Third Industrial Revolution, 187
 - Tools of trade
 - budget and offices, 54
 - MEC, 58
 - municipal councils, 55
 - municipal managers, 56
 - municipalities, 54, 55
 - paying traditional leaders, 58
 - traditional leaders, 54–57
 - traditional leaders and municipalities, 56
 - Trade diversification, 159
 - Traditional leader participation
 - municipal councils, 51
 - out-of-pocket expenses and municipal participants, 52
 - Traditional leaders
 - and municipality participants, 50
 - Traditional leaders and municipal councils, 62

- Traditional leaders and municipalities, 47
- Traditional leaders role, 63
- Traditional Leadership Governance Framework Act, 43
- Transparency, 25
- Tribalism, 21
- Trickle-down effect, 301
- Triple helix, 292
- 2030 Agenda, 123, 131, 141, 142
 - achievement, 142
 - implementation, 122
 - implementing, 134
 - legal mandates and responsibilities, 122
 - local governments and cities, 121–123, 133
 - local level, 126
 - notion of integration, 131
 - people-centered sustainable development, 121
 - poverty eradication, 123
 - public administration, 135
 - SDGs, 121, 122, 129
 - sustainable development, 121, 122
 - transformation strategies, 132
 - world leaders, 120
- U**
- Uganda
 - GDP, 94
 - GDP growth, 117
 - global target, 95
 - hopeless continent, 94
 - quality of growth, 94, 95, 102
 - urbanization (*see* Urbanization)
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 103
- UN General Assembly Resolution, 135
- UN Sustainable Development Goals, 275
- Unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT), 174
- United Nations General Assembly, 276
- United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), 248
- Urban/city governments
 - charter cities, 80, 81
 - classical/hierarchical-based models, 76
 - free private city, 77, 78
 - special economic zones, 79, 80
- Urban decay/regeneration
 - African cities, 214
 - awareness/education session, 227
 - behaviour patterns, 226
 - Cape Town, South Africa, 220
 - CBD, 214
 - characteristic, 214
 - Durban, South Africa, 220
 - challenges, 222–224
 - clusters, 222
 - tourism, 221
 - effective communication, 227
 - enforcement/consequence management strategies, 226
 - infrastructure, 216
 - ISP, 225
 - Johannesburg, South Africa, 219, 220
 - Kigali, Rwanda, 215, 216
 - Lagos, Nigeria, 217–219
 - M&E/performance management, 228
 - migration, 214
 - proactive policy environment, 225
 - strategies, 221
 - waste management, 225
- Urban decline, 217
- Urban Development Sector, 101
- Urban infrastructure, 189
- Urbanisation, 225
 - causes/benefits, 69
 - cost and substantial investment, 238
 - developing economies, 232
 - disadvantages, 69
 - future and smart cities, 239
 - humanity, 239
 - smart city revolution, 233
 - systems, models and transformation approaches, 73
 - urban water and systems, 239
 - water management, 238
 - water management and systems, 239
 - water resources management, 232
 - water shortages, 238
- Urbanism, 71
- Urbanization, 20, 25, 188
 - in African cities, 21
 - agglomeration economies, 96
 - aggressive approach, 96
 - decomposition, 99
 - distribution of urban centers, 98
 - effective analysis/policy making, 96
 - environment, 100
 - global system, 96
 - landscape, 97
 - local economic development, 100
 - phased manner, 97
 - political and socio-economic status, 20
 - population growth, 21
 - promote growth, 95
 - rural migrants, 99
 - structural transformation, 95
 - Vision 2040, 97

Urban reforms, 21
 Urban–rural water interface, 241
 Urban water management, 244

V

Vertical integration, 133

W

Waste management, 225
 Water and sanitation, 236
 growing populations, 237
 longer-term and emergency, 237
 population movements, 236
 populations and economies, 236
 power revolution, 237
 quality, 236
 sectors and income levels, 237
 water-related financial, 238
 Water and sanitation frameworks, 244

Water scarcity, 236
 Water-sensitive cities, 239
 Water World cities, 234
 Water-Wise Cities, 239
 Weak leadership, 244
 Work local governments and cities, 130
 World Bank, 233

Y

Yokohama Action Plan and Strategy, 250
 Youth employment, 154

Z

Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic
 Front (ZANU–PF), 177
 Zimbabwe’s Internet penetration
 rate, 179
 Zone for Employment and Economic
 Development (ZEDE), 79