Chapter 9
The Migration-Development Nexus in Selected African States: Is the Implementation of EU Migration Policies Development-Friendly?

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9.1 Introduction

In response to increasing numbers of asylum applications and a perceived 'migration crisis', the EU introduced a new concept of a 'Migration Partnership Framework' in 2016. The EU's key objective has been to support and reinforce migration management in countries of migrants' origin and transit. This new emphasis on externalizing migration policies to countries in the Global South has caused controversy. NGOs and pro-migrant activists have criticized the Migration Partnership Framework. It was seen to reorient EU development policies towards security and control-oriented objectives (Global Health Advocates 2017). As the framework is largely financed by development budgets, development aid may be (re-)directed at migration control instead of fighting poverty. In practice, this may run counter to wider development objectives the EU has been pursuing in partner countries.

This chapter has two main objectives. First, it will assess the aims and strategies of the EU within the new Partnership Framework by means of an analysis of the implementation of the Framework. The analysis is realized through a policy frame analysis (Schön and Rein 1994; Verloo 2005) and builds upon the migration policy frames proposed by Knoll and de Weijer (2016). The first section shows that the Migration Partnership Framework is largely focused on three strategies, namely (1) strengthening border control and fighting migrant smuggling, (2) protecting refugees and providing them with humanitarian assistance, and (3) addressing the

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root causes of migration via development aid. A fourth objective, facilitating regular migration, is also mentioned in policy documents because of its potential to enhance development in countries of migrants' origin. However, policy measures to create more channels for regular migration or maximize its benefits for development can hardly be identified in the framework. Because of this observation, the second objective of the chapter is to evaluate to what extent security priorities may override the EU's development agenda. Therefore, the second section will look at how the 'development-migration' nexus is translated into the concrete implementation of the European Migration Partnership Framework and examine whether the EU external migration policy is development-friendly.

The chapter analyses the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework in five priority countries of origin and transit, namely Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia. The analysis is based on primary and secondary documents (notably progress reports and other EU documents, see reference list) and eight interviews with migration and development experts and officials from the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as with a project researcher working on root causes of migration governance in West Africa. As the respondents preferred to remain anonymous, their names and precise function will not be quoted.

9.2 Understanding the Implementation of the EU's Migration Partnership Framework

The EU's Migration Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration was launched in June 2016. Within this framework, the EU seeks to better manage migration by cooperating with migrant-sending countries and the transit countries through which migrants travel. Initially, the Migration Partnership Framework targeted five priority countries of origin and transit in Africa, namely Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Ethiopia. However, as the framework adapted to the evolving migration crisis, the geographical scope was extended and now includes other countries in Africa and also Asia. In West Africa, the neighboring states of the priority countries were approached given that a regional strategy may be more effective to regulate migration flows. Therefore, cooperation with Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia and Ghana was also fostered under the framework. As migration on the Central Mediterranean Route increased, it became more pressing to cooperate with countries in Northern Africa too. Indeed, the situation in Libya became a concern of growing importance. Also, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco have been involved in the Migration Partnership Framework. Because of the rising number of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, cooperation with these host countries became part of the framework too. Finally, dialogues with Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been established as increasing numbers

of Asian migrants were using the Central Mediterranean Route (European Commission 2017b).

Besides the partnerships with countries of origin and transit, the EU initiated a closer cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN migration agency, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN refugee agency. The EU's official objective is to protect and support people on the move, promote resettlement programs for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) and assist voluntary returns to countries of origin (European Commission 2017b). For example, there is an ongoing tripartite agreement between the EU, the IOM and the African Union (AU) on Assisted Voluntary Return. On the one hand, this entails organizing identification missions and providing transportation. On the other hand, it includes advancing sustainable reintegration opportunities once migrants have returned. The reintegration programs seek to minimize the social stigma of the returnee as having failed in a migration process. Reintegration measures cover social counselling, access to vocational training and a certain budget for economic reintegration. Projects also aim to work with the communities that are receiving returnees in order to enhance resilience.[1]

The main instrument that finances the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework is the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa) (European Commission 2017b). The Fund was founded at the Valletta Summit in November 2015 to develop effective migration cooperation with 26 countries across three regions in Africa: the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. The projects financed by the EUTF for Africa are said to come in addition to traditional development assistance (European Commission 2017b). However, the largest part (approximately 80%) of the EUTF comes from reserves of the European Development Fund (EDF). The EUTF allows the use of budgets in a faster and more flexible way to be able to respond quickly to emergency situations (European Commission 2017a, b).[2] Other EU financing instruments (DCI, ENI, DG HOME, DG ECHO, etc.) have contributed around 15% and the contributions of Member States[3] provide only 5% of the fund (European Commission 2018a). Next to the EUTF for Africa, the EU has set up an External Investment Plan (EIP) to provide more resources to tackle the root causes of irregular migration by boosting private investments in partner countries where investments are usually low due to an unfavorable risk analysis.[4]

The Migration Partnership Framework adopts a comprehensive approach and involves a number of diverse strategies. Objectives range from strengthening border control, fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking, creating agreements on return and readmission, improving international protection and asylum policies to

[1] Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018 and interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018.

[2] Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018.

[3] Switzerland and Norway also participated.

[4] Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018.

creating more economic opportunities in partner countries, building capacity of national governments and increasing the resilience of local communities (European Commission 2017a). The variance in objectives translate the mutual interests of EU and African partners (Adam and Trauner 2019; Van Criekinge 2010).

9.2.1 Narratives and Strategies

To analyze the large number of initiatives under the Migration Partnership Framework, the study uses the typology of Knoll and De Weijer (2016). These scholars identify four different narratives in the European debate about how to deal with migration pressures. These narratives can be understood as policy frames (Schön and Rein 1994; Verloo 2005) as they express a specific understanding of the problem and identify certain guidelines for action (Knoll and De Weijer 2016; Lavenex and Kunz 2008). With the help of this categorization, it is possible to distinguish four strategies in the Migration Partnership Framework.

In a first narrative identified by Knoll and de Weijer migration is regarded as a 'threat'. In the 'threat frame', the focus is on irregular migration, which would pose a risk to the security, welfare and culture of migrant-receiving states. That is why, in this frame, the primary objective is to reduce irregular migration (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). Our analysis of the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework shows that this narrative has been a cornerstone of the current initiatives. The EU centrally focusses on the enforcement of border control, the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and on the increase of returns of irregular migrants. For the EU, an agreement on return and readmission is one of the most important goals as this would reduce the number of migrants in Europe and could function as a disincentive for more irregular migration. To close a deal on returns with partner countries, the EU is planning to use all relevant measures as leverage, including development aid, trade and visa measures (European Commission 2017d, p. 15). For example, stricter regulations for obtaining visas can be used as a negative incentive for partner countries who do not cooperate on return and readmission of irregular migrants in Europe. Likewise, EU visa policy can be turned into a powerful positive incentive as many partner countries desire more legal migration opportunities and visa-free travel (European Commission 2018b). Furthermore, efforts to counter smuggling have been increased and improved in cooperation with Frontex and Europol (European Commission 2017c, pp. 2, 13).

Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, tasked to ensure security at and beyond the European external borders. The agency is mandated to fight cross-border crime, monitor migration pressures and conduct return operations of migrants illegally residing in Europe (Frontex n.d.). Europol, the EU's Law Enforcement Agency, aims to fight terrorism and other forms of organized crime by strengthening states' investigative capabilities and supporting them in the exchange of information (Europol n.d.). To fight organized crime in West Africa, the EU has also started to give financial and technical assistance to joint task forces

in the Sahel to implement more regional projects. These projects will tackle trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons. Regionalization is a new focus of the EU as fighting cross-border crime at country-level is believed to bear little fruits. The problem is said to simply move to neighboring countries.[5]

In the second narrative proposed by Knoll and de Weijer (2016), migration is seen as a humanitarian issue. The EU calls for the protection of migrants, especially refugees, in accordance with the international human rights obligations of states (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). The main strategies that are used are humanitarian aid and rescue missions in the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean Sea. Analysis of European policy documents indeed shows that projects are trying to increase the resilience of communities by enhancing basic services including food, shelter, education, health care and social protection services. These projects mainly work to the benefit of vulnerable groups such as refugees, IDPs and victims of human trafficking (European Commission 2017a).

The third narrative proposed by Knoll and de Weijer (2016) considers migration as a consequence of poverty, bad governance and conflict. Advocates of this narrative aim to fight these root causes via development cooperation (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). They argue that investing in employment opportunities and education, building democracy and strengthening the rule of law in migrant-sending countries would reduce migration because it makes migration less necessary (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). Projects under the Migration Partnership Framework that pursue better governance and provide more economic opportunities can be categorized under this narrative. We observe that the EU objectives fitting this narrative are twofold. A first type of projects emphasizes on law enforcement, peace building and conflict prevention, countering radicalization and extremism and addressing human rights abuses. A second type of initiatives focuses on building new enterprises, promoting trade and investment and providing vocational training (European Commission 2017a).

In the fourth and last policy narrative identified by Knoll and de Weijer (2016), migration is viewed as an opportunity to enhance development in countries of origin. This fourth narrative is different from the others as it does not call for less migration. The goal is to facilitate regular migration and manage it in a way that maximizes the benefits for development (Knoll and de Weijer 2016, p. 7). The EU does argue that migration, if managed well, can foster development in developing countries (European Commission 2015, pp. 73–84). However, our analysis shows that under the Migration Partnership Framework, no serious efforts have been undertaken and no robust strategy is in place to facilitate a freer flow of people, neither regionally nor to Europe. Awareness raising campaigns are informing (potential) migrants about the legal migration channels to keep them from crossing borders irregularly. Nevertheless, this is hard to achieve given that legal migration channels to Europe are rare and that intra-African migration is very informal.[6]

[5]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018 and interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018.

[6]Interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018

To a certain extent, all four narratives proposed by Knoll and De Weijer (2016) can be identified in the Migration Partnership Framework. However, the emphasis strongly differs. Our analysis shows that some narratives have a stronger influence on actual policy making than others. The first three narratives (securitarian, humanitarian and 'root causes') are substantially present in the projects implemented in the five priority partner countries. Policy measures that can be situated in the fourth narrative—which sees migration as an opportunity for development and promotes legal migration channels—have hardly been implemented. This absence of implementation of projects relating an objective which is mainly in the interest of African actors (Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Chou and Gibert 2012) demonstrates the unequal power relations (Holland 2002) in EU-Africa migration cooperation. Table 9.1 presents the four narratives and their role in the EU's Migration Partnership Framework.

9.3 Is the Implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework Development-Friendly?

While the Migration Partnership Framework does not actively seek to use migration for the benefit of development in partner countries, the EU has committed to ensure Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; a commitment that was reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (European Commission n.d.). Pursuing Policy Coherence for Development implies that all EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries have to comply with the development agenda. Mutually reinforcing policies are needed to avoid contradictions and create synergies to maximize effectiveness. PCD works with five broad themes, namely trade and finance, climate change, food and nutrition, security and migration. When applied to the specific policy area of migration, the EU recognizes the way in which migration policies coincide with different aspects of the development agenda (European Commission 2015, pp. 73–84). EU documents consider that well-managed and legal migration can contribute to development in both countries of origin and destination, but they also acknowledge the challenges that irregular migration may bring about. The policy documents state that migration and development policies can be interlinked to achieve common goals and create mutual benefits. Accordingly, migration policies need to counter smuggling and trafficking networks and improve border management as well as create options for legal migration and maximize the benefits for development. Development policies, in turn, can be used to address the root causes of irregular migration and support the resilience of displaced persons and returnees by ensuring that they have sustainable (re)integration opportunities (European Commission 2015, pp. 73–84).

As incoherencies result in inefficiencies and financial costs and may make the EU less credible, it is crucial to balance the security and development objectives. For this, it is important to understand how migration and development relate to one another. In this section, we evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the

Table 9.1 The four narratives, as identified by Knoll and De Weijer (2016), and their role in the migration partnership framework

	Conception	Strategies	Implementation in the Migration Partnership Framework
First narrative	Migration is a threat to security in receiving countries	Containment strategies and return operations	• Enforcing border control • Actions to dispose of smuggling and trafficking networks • Training of police and security personnel • Joint investigation operations • Forced return operations and assistance for voluntary returnees
Second narrative	Migration is a humanitarian issue	Humanitarian aid and rescue missions	• Provision of basic services, including food and shelter • Strengthening the rights of migrants • Rescue missions in the Sahara desert and Mediterranean Sea
Third narrative	Migration is a result of underdevelopment	Development assistance and cooperation	• Creating employment opportunities • Providing vocational training • Strengthening governance and administration • Promoting democracy • Conflict prevention • Anti-radicalization projects
Fourth narrative	Migration is an opportunity for development in countries of origin	Facilitation of regular migration and improved migration management to maximize the benefits for development	• Awareness raising campaigns to inform on the existing legal alternatives to irregular migration • Lack of initiatives to maximize the developmental impact of existing migration flows and no progress on a freer and safer flow of people

Migration Partnership Framework is development-friendly. Before doing so, we briefly review the academic debate on the migration-development nexus.

9.3.1 The Migration-Development Nexus: A Brief Literature Review

Migration is often seen to be triggered by underdevelopment. Consequently, EU development aid is used to address this root cause. However, evidence suggests that development processes do not reduce migration in the short-term. Instead, they can generate an increase in migration for the first 10–20 years, a phenomenon known as the 'migration hump' (De Haas 2010). While there may not be immediate results in

terms of fewer numbers of irregular migrants, development aid can help partner countries that experience large emigration to better distribute the positive effects and compensate for the negative effects of migration (Concord 2018). For example, better transport and communication infrastructure will facilitate regional migration and allow people to fill labor shortages in other parts of the country. Development projects can also, for instance, compensate for the brain drain in health and education sectors by providing training and enhancing services in these sectors. Furthermore, development aid can support the integration of intra-African migrants or help the successful reintegration of returnees (OECD 2007; European Commission 2015).

The debate on the effects of migration on development is ongoing. Some see migration as beneficial for development while others argue that migration can be harmful for developing countries (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). The most established knowledge of the migration-development nexus is in the economic sphere. Firstly, 'brain drain' refers to the loss of human capital and labor force in developing countries as the productive and educated part of the population is most likely to emigrate (Vullnetari 2012). On the other hand, in countries where unemployment levels are high, people are 'pushed' to emigrate and search for employment opportunities abroad. In this way, emigration can reduce unemployment rates in the countries of origin (Wets 2007). A second element with considerable economic impact on developing countries are the remittances that migrants transfer to their families at home (Collier 2015; Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015). These funds can help to protect people living in poor countries from economic hardship and a lack of social security (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015). When recipients use remittances to invest in productive activities, it has a direct effect on national economic development and on better standards of living (Vullnetari 2012; Wets 2007). Thirdly, diasporas can stimulate the home economy by facilitating trade and creating new business ties between the receiving and the sending country (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015; OECD 2007). A fourth economic aspect is that the migration industry has become an important driver of economic growth in some of the towns along migration routes and near important borders. Given that these informal economies have created a large number of jobs, the smuggling industry included, it is presumable that reducing migration could hinder economic growth and endanger stability (Knoll and de Weijer 2016; Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen 2017).

While these economic factors have profound consequences for development, development is more than only economic growth. There are several non-economic aspects that equally contribute to the development of a country such as respect for human rights, democracy, sustainability and social cohesion (Wets 2007). Migrants transfer these social remittances to their communities of origin when they return, but also through visits and technological communication (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015; OECD 2007). Therefore, diaspora networks do not only lead to more financial resources and investments, but also to cultural exchange and political advocacy which can play an important role in boosting development in the countries of origin (Misceac 2015).

9.3.2 *Policy Coherence for Development? An Assessment*

The literature discussed above shows that the positive and negative effects of the migration-development nexus vary spatially and temporally; they interact with each other and form a complex relationship (Vullnetari 2012). Additionally, these effects are mediated by policies in both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (Cortina and Ochoa-Reza 2015). NGOs and activists have strongly expressed their disapproval of current EU policies. They suspect the Migration Partnership Framework to have a negative impact on the quantity and quality of European development assistance in partner countries (Global Health Advocates 2017). A concern is that these new developments in the external dimension of EU migration policy might hinder partner countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (11.11.11 2017). Below, an assessment is made to evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework is development-friendly.

NGOs accuse the EU of using development budgets, intended for poverty eradication, to obtain domestic security goals (Global Health Advocates 2017). Available budgets of the EUTF for Africa are indeed coming from the EDF reserve. This reserve contains funds which are currently not used and have not previously been allocated for any other purpose. There is also a part of the EDF reserve that is kept for DG ECHO in case of emergencies and to top up other programs.[7] Next to this, working on security in developing countries can also be part of development cooperation.[8] Strengthening security and the rule of law will benefit countries that suffer from terrorism and other forms of organized crime as violent groups will keep governments from creating any form of stability and inhibit development. EU officials argue that border controls need to be established with the primary aim of disrupting the smuggling and trafficking networks. This may not necessarily lead to a curb of migration, but to an end of the crime relating to it since that is what puts people in danger.[9] As long as security measures have a development component, it does not oppose the Policy Coherence for Development. For example, enhanced border control can be part of a policy that aims to organize migration in a safe and legal way to maximize the benefits for development. The Migration Partnership Framework uses a holistic approach that interlinks security and development objectives. In doing so, it brings together development and non-development officials to discuss how security measures affect development in the partner countries. In theory, this can only be beneficial for PCD.[10] However, the EU must avoid spending development budgets on pure security operations mainly aiming at curbing migration to Europe. While there is sometimes a problematic 'grey area', it must be

[7]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

[8]Interview 5, Brussels, 4 April 2018.

[9]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

[10]Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018 and interview 3, Brussels, 27 March 2018.

possible to posit a number of criteria that can be used to determine which security operations contribute to development.[11]

Making aid conditional on migration cooperation is another concern. Conditionality refers to the use of different EU policies including development aid, trade, and visa as leverage for cooperation on migration issues. The use of conditionality in the Migration Partnership Framework implies that partner countries that cooperate well on migration control can expect to get additional development funding. Those that do not agree with the containment strategies used by the EU risk to receive less European support for development (Concord 2018). However, the existing partnerships with the five priority countries of origin and transit are based on a positive leverage approach. In principle, the Migration Partnership Framework includes negative conditionality but it has not yet been applied in practice. According to our respondents, there is no evidence that less budgets are going to traditional development commitments, only that additional funding has been allocated to countries that agree to cooperate on migration issues. Therefore, according to one of our respondents,[12] additionality, rather than conditionality, is applicable to describe the current situation. As long as the EU says 'more for more', its policy does not go against PCD. This may change however. Some Member States are pressuring the EU to implement negative conditionality.[13] With the current 'crisis' rhetoric in the EU, it is possible that negative incentives will be increasingly used. This would be opposed to PCD. Only humanitarian aid provided by DG ECHO is certain to remain as it is, even if negative conditionality will be more often used in the future.[14]

Under the Migration Partnership Framework, many development projects are set up to tackle the root causes of irregular migration. While these projects are supported by advocates of the third narrative, which describes under-development as a 'root cause' of migration, the rhetoric has been criticized heavily for diverting focus away from traditional development purposes (11.11.11 2017; Concord 2018; Global Health Advocates 2017). However, EU officials argue that the rhetoric of addressing root causes has not changed development assistance. It is about creating stability, boosting economic growth, promoting social inclusion and enhancing resilience. This is what development projects have been doing for many years. While the migration label is relatively new and the goal of addressing root causes has come to dominate the rhetoric, this does not necessarily change the existing practices. What is new—and can be seen as the added value of the EUTF—is that the flexibility has been strengthened to provide fast results. Indeed, the fund can operate with simplified procedures to an emergency situation.[15]

[11]Interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[12]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

[13]Interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[14]Interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018 and interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[15]Interview 2, Brussels, 19 March 2018.

Then again, budgets under the EUTF for Africa are mainly targeted at potential migrants and areas where migrants depart from or transit through. A valid concern is that this is becoming the main criterion for allocating aid. This can undermine the leading principle in EU development policy stating that it targets the most vulnerable. As long as budgets for least-developed countries and poverty eradication do not reduce, it might not counter PCD. Nonetheless, according to one of our respondents, donor countries should be encouraged to give broader development aid in the countries of origin so that it does not just benefit those that are on our doorstep, but also other parts of the population.[16]

Another question is if fighting root causes will reduce the number of irregular entries in Europe. Firstly, fighting root causes is a narrative which provides the countries in the Global South with an incentive to cooperate with the EU on migration issues (Cassarino 2009; Van Criekinge 2010). According to one of our respondents, it is also used to top up budgets for development assistance and to counter hardline Member States proclaiming that the issue is solved simply by closing borders.[17] However, as shown by literature on the migration hump (De Haas 2010), increased development aid will not automatically decrease migration as previously mentioned. There is sufficient evidence that more wealth actually increases migration in the short term. EU officials recognize this and acknowledge that development projects will only generate results over longer time periods. It is argued that, even though the public asks for immediate measures, it is essential to invest in these durable solutions.[18] However, solutions need to be broader than just development aid. For instance, development aid may have little effect while trade policies keep undermining sustainable development in partner countries. As the EU acknowledges, fostering PCD is crucial across all EU policies affecting developing countries to achieve both development and migration goals (European Commission 2015).

Finally, policies addressing migration need to consider how migration can be a driver for development in developing countries to effectively balance security and development goals. It is important to mention in this context that most people migration within regions—and not necessarily from the Global South to the Global North. For instance, an estimated 84% of migration takes place within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (ICMPD 2015). In West Africa, south-south migration is therefore in quantitative terms more important than migration to Europe or other parts in the world. The Migration Partnership Framework does not prioritize this regional dimension of migration dynamics, which plays out importantly for the development of some countries (see Chap. 10).

To actively advance the migration-development nexus, the Migration Partnership Framework would need to facilitate regular migration and manage it in a way that maximizes the benefits for development. While the EU policy documents mainly

[16]Interview 8, Brussels, 16 April 2018.

[17]Interview 7, Brussels, 10 April 2018.

[18]Interview 1, Brussels, 15 March 2018.

cover measures to reduce irregular migration, promoting regular migration, which is very much a demand of the African partners, is also a stated objective. The difficulty is that, within the EU, legal migration is part of a domestic debate about skills and labor market needs, not a development debate. The European Commission or other EU institutions can voice the request for legal migration—and they do so. However, EU officials do argue that regular migration is still an exclusive competence of Member States and the current climate is not immigration-friendly.[19] Whilst there is no doubt about the second argument (on the anti-migration climate), the first argument can be countered. The EU does have competence on legal migration (art 79 Lisbon Treaty), and did develop several legal migration policy tools. It is only prevented from determining volumes of admission for third country nationals for work related migration (art 79§5). Another reason why progress on legal migration appears to lag behind is that well-managed migration is seen as a long-term goal. It is not something to be easily achieved. In the meantime, tackling the crime related to irregular migration is understood as something delivering more immediate results (European Commission 2016).

9.4 A Way to Move Forward

Our close look at the Migration Partnership Framework has shown that many means are attributed to reducing irregular migration. Besides border control, anti-smuggling practices and return operations, also development cooperation and humanitarian aid are used as tools for migration management. The evaluation of the implementation of the Migration Partnerships demonstrates that there is an awareness of the potential of migration for development but that this has hardly guided policy choices. It is fair to state that the Migration Partnership Framework is not particularly directed at development. Despite this, development-orientated migration policies do not have to be juxtaposed to migration policies aiming to increase security—they can be interlinked (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). The migration-development nexus can guide policy-making as follows: on the one hand, well-managed migration can be used as a means to advance development in the countries of origin by facilitating the transfer of remittances, skills and knowledge. In addition, the existence of safe and legal migration channels will also stem the influx of irregular migrants in Europe. On the other hand, development can be used as a tool for migration management as it will support countries of origin and transit to better deal with the complex effects of migration. It might even remove the necessity of migration in the long term.

A way for the EU to move forward may be to explore partnerships based on legal migration. In the following, three measures are discussed as to how EU migration policies can contribute to development in migrant-sending countries.

[19]Interview 4, Brussels, 28 March 2018.

A first policy measure would be to create more channels for regular migration to Europe. Organized recruitment gives people the opportunity to take up employment abroad in the form of seasonal or temporary work schemes, based on the employers' demand for workers. Temporary work contracts can specify return and future re-entry. This allows migrants to move back and forth between destination countries and countries of origin. This kind of circular migration is expected to reduce irregular migration by creating safe and legal migration channels, while maximizing the positive impact on development. However, recruitment from European countries mostly targets high-skilled foreigners. This can cause brain drain, mainly in public sectors like education and health care. To compensate for this negative effect, it is important to target development aid at building adequate working conditions and providing vocational training in these sectors so that skilled workers are more inclined to stay in their home country. In addition, there should be guidelines for the recruitment of highly-educated migrants from developing countries and more incentives to target the less educated. Migration of low-skilled workers usually has more positive effects on development as remittances are sent to poorer families and unemployment among the poor is reduced (OECD 2007). Alongside this, attention should be given to protect the rights of circular migrants. They are more vulnerable to exploitation due to their lack of permanent status. Migrants who suffer from exploitation and discrimination will earn less and gain less knowledge and skills. As such, they will not contribute as much to development in their countries of origin compared to migrants who managed to integrate and work in a regular way in their host country. In this way, policies and structures of European countries can be adjusted to maximize the positive and minimize the negative effects of migration (Hong and Knoll 2016).

A second policy measure of the EU should be to support a better regulation of intra-African migration. For this, it is crucial to invest in regional economic opportunities, to harmonize regulations and to advance an 'orderly and freer flow of people' (Knoll and De Weijer 2016, p. 7). An estimated 20% of the migrants that travel on the trans-Saharan route intend to migrate to Europe. The large majority stays in Africa. For them migration is an important strategy to cope with demographic and climate pressures. It is necessary to ensure the maintenance of intra-African migration as these flows contribute to stability in the region (Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen 2017).

The third policy recommendation is to reduce the costs of financial transfers through formal channels. Currently, the costs of sending remittances are relatively high with an average of 7.5% of the transferred amount. Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, transfer costs are extraordinarily high, at an average of 9.5% (IOM 2016). A reduction of transfer costs will lead to a higher amount of remittances. A greater use of formal channels would also be positive as banks are able to encourage recipients to save more and use their savings for productive investment. However, formal channels will not be used as long as the costs of transferring money is too high (OECD 2007).

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