Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
Inocent Moyo *Editors*

Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development

Issues, Dynamics and Perspectives in West, Eastern and Southern Africa

Springer

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

Series Editors

Diery Seck, CREPOL—Center for Research on Political Economy, Dakar, Senegal
Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA
Yaw Nyarko, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political development. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to provide fresh answers to Africa's development challenges. All the socio-political dimensions of today's Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceedings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade, regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues, political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11885

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi • Inocent Moyo
Editors

Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development

Issues, Dynamics and Perspectives in West, Eastern and Southern Africa

Springer

Editors
Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), Faculty of Humanities
University of Pretoria
Hatfield, Pretoria, South Africa

Inocent Moyo
Geography & Environmental Studies
University of Zululand
KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

ISSN 2198-7262 ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic)
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development
ISBN 978-3-030-42889-1 ISBN 978-3-030-42890-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To all the conspicuous but unheard, who continue to suffer the impact of African borders

Foreword

This book provides valuable information to researchers, policymakers, practitioners and students on the essentials of borders, mobility and regional integration. It is a precious collection of core chapters on various aspects and issues of human mobility, dynamics and perspectives in West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. It provides compelling evidence with important contributions in the field.

The framework, specific case studies and actual examples of successful practice in this book also offer a shared vision and understanding of a major predicament of the African Continent. In this regard, authors provide an increasingly critical and compelling evidence-based reflection on emerging trends and geopolitical, economic and cultural space in Africa.

The book focuses on the historical context of migration, social predicament, economic and political issues, human rights, mediatised phenomena and more contemporary issues of Africa. It also commands critical attention and sparks debate on mix of mobility and border studies and highlights the groundbreaking aspects of human agency in Africa, in all societies of the African Continent. The book encourages each reader to think through human mobility, regional integration and development. This is a collection that has genuine continental appeal and relevance.

In Africa in general, and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular, there is an increasing interest on evidence-based policymaking to develop more effective policies that should lead to improved implementation and outcomes. I believe that this book provides thoughtful ideas to policymakers to make well-informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects, by placing the best available evidence from research in West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The book also provides valuable literature on borders, migration, regional integration and development in Africa that will help scholars and practitioners understand the complexity of these African realities.

Institute for Social Development (ISD)
Faculty of Economic and Management Science
University of the Western Cape
Cape Town, South Africa

Mulugeta F. Dinbabo

Acknowledgements

This book arose from two workshops: in Pretoria, South Africa, and Uppsala, Sweden. The Pretoria workshop was part of the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation's (GovInn) flagship biennial conference, the Governance Innovation Week, held from 27 November 2017 to 1 December 2017. The Uppsala workshop was part of the Nordic Africa Days (NAD), the leading academic conference on Africa in the Nordics organised by the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI). It was held from 19 to 21 September 2019. Our thanks go to all the participants in and those who attended the workshops. We also thank those who funded the workshop in Pretoria, in particular the National Research Foundation (NRF), South Africa. We also wish to thank the many anonymous reviewers of the manuscript and individual chapters of this volume, for their collegiality and commitment to scholarship. We are equally grateful to all the contributors to the volume, who worked under pressure to meet deadlines as well as the minutest suggestions of reviewers.

We are also very grateful to Mrs Kirsty Agnew Nepomuceno, Project Coordinator in GovInn, University of Pretoria, for her tireless work and support.

We are greatly indebted to our families. Running workshops, editing and writing book chapters towards this volume meant a great deal of time had to be spent away from them. We are very thankful to them for their patient support and understanding and ongoing tolerance of the heavy demands of our respective careers.

16 December 2019

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi
Inocent Moyo

A Synopsis of the Book

More than a century since the principles and framework of delimitations for the occupation and conceding of African territories were negotiated by colonialists in the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, the postcolonial leaders of contemporary African nation-states chose to maintain what scholars have called the bondage of boundaries. Even when they were forming the continental integration organisation—the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in 1963, African leaders chose to re-enforce the boundaries delimitated on the basis of the Berlin Conference. This is seen in the OAU founding fathers' opting to institutionalise the principle of the inviolability of borders (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013), national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of respective member states (OAU Charter, Article III.2). The OAU Charter of 1963 was specifically purposed to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence (OAU Charter, Article II.1(c).). Even with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) and adoption and enforcement of the 2000 Constitutive Act of the AU, the continent seems to have not done much to revise these principles. Article 3 (b) of the Constitutive Act still maintains the objective of defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states. Moreover, this newer piece of legislation of the continent goes on to articulate a principle that prescribes the respect of African nation-states borders that existed on achievement of independence (Constitutive Act, Article 4(b).), essentially colonial borders. This reservation not only runs through the continental but also the various regional integration schemes on the continent today. The expression of this principle is manifested in the fact that only 13 out of the 55 AU countries offered visa-free access to citizens of other African countries in 2018. This makes Africa the most restrictive continent to Africans in the world. Trade wise, intracontinental trade and trade within the respective key regions of Africa are low—at approximately 11–15%. This is due to, among others, the maintenance of rigid artificial borders, exclusivist, populist and securitised nationalism and the continuity of restrictive and draconian colonial policies of migration, which all work against a continental governance mechanism to facilitate the maximisation of Africa's human and natural resources for continental wellbeing.

Therefore, despite attempts to overcome the limitations imposed by these borders or to foster development across Africa through regional integration, most African countries remain inaccessible to citizens of other African countries. In fact, African countries are more integrated with countries outside the continent than with each other. Add to this transboundary natural resources such as water, which, by nature and given their spatial location on Africa's common territories, make collaboration between the countries sharing the resources imperative. Alternatively, the common resources potentially precipitate interstate conflict over them. Paradoxically, African leaders are unanimously pushing for continental economic integration. This is evident in negotiations for the establishment of the continental free trade area (CFTA), which should eventually lead to the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 2028. With the AEC, it is envisaged that capital, labour, goods and services will move freely across Africa.

On the transboundary natural resource front, the situation across the continent is mixed. On the one hand, some regions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have crafted instruments to guide cooperation in the management of such resources. On the other hand, riparian states of regions such as the Nile Basin apparently face challenges in overcoming the discord between them over the basin's resources. The result is the failure to adopt cooperative agreements, as happened in 2010, when only five upstream countries of the Nile river—Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda—signed a cooperative framework agreement, to the exclusion of Egypt and Sudan. Clearly, cooperation in the management of transboundary resources is beneficial, and non-cooperation is costly. Similarly, managing human mobility within and across state borders raises prospects of reaping benefits from the phenomenon. Inaction or nationalistic attitudes towards migration could lead to, among others, negative social repercussions, social instability and negative impacts on regional and continental development. Against this background, this book interrogates themes regarding the mobility of economically active human resources and ordinary people within and across the borders of Africa's disparate states. It also explores the dynamics of cooperation and the governance of transboundary natural resources. This is in quest of examining the relationship between the spatial mobility of borders and development, as well as the migration regimes within which states that share contiguous borders in given geographic territories are embedded.

The book interrogates social, economic and political issues and phenomena from a different perspective than the usual and frustrating 'one-size-fits-all' effort to cast ideas and realities in Western and Eurocentric thought and frameworks, which dismisses African phenomena and realities. In pursuit of this logic, it interrogates and presents issues, experiences and perspectives on human mobility involving economically active human resources and ordinary people within and across the borders of Africa's disparate nation-states, because such realities do not presumably fit into ideational models and theories that explain Western realities and experiences. Given that Africa is vast and constitutes many nation-states, the book mainly focuses on West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The three regions provide a large enough geopolitical, economic and cultural space from which to draw experiences and perspectives which are African and representative of its inhabitants. This book, therefore, uniquely distinguishes itself as one that goes beyond the description and analysis of human mobility, borders and regional integration in Africa. Rather, it engages in a serious consideration and mix of mobility and border studies and asks hard questions designed to highlight the innovative aspects of human agency in Africa. It simultaneously emphasises gender, from an African worldview/context through and empirical issues relating to social, economic and political realities in West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa.

The book also explores the dynamics of cooperation between African nation-states, including the governance of transboundary natural resources. Thereby, it highlights complex historical interconnections on the continent. This is in quest of examining the relationship between the spatial mobility of borders and development and the migration regimes within which nation-states which share contiguous borders in given geographic territories are embedded. The volume specifically asks questions meant to provoke a rethink in ideas and the understanding of African realities regarding human mobility, borders and regional integration. The topics or themes that are interrogated include but are not limited to linkages between *inter alia* the coloniality of borders, conflict and sociocultural and ethnic relations in Africa; the role which the porous borders of African states play in hampering or promoting, sustaining and perpetuating human mobility and wellbeing; the impact of physical nation-state borders on human mobility; inclusive development in Africa and of the continent; and whether the porosity of border in Africa and its migration patterns provide foundations for inclusive development too.

These topics translate into specific questions that the thirteen chapters in this volume attempt to answer: Do any linkages exist between, among others, the coloniality of borders, conflict and sociocultural and ethnic relations in Africa? What role could the porosity of borders in Africa play in promoting, sustaining and perpetuating wellbeing? What impact do the physical borders have on the inclusive development of Africa? Could the porosity of African borders and the migration patterns on the continent also provide foundations for inclusive development? Is a borderless Africa in which the citizens of the continent would harness freedom of movement to engage in productive activities in the interest of Africa possible? How could a borderless Africa promote inclusive development? Could a borderless Africa strengthen the migration–development nexus? If so, how? What could be the projected trajectories in this respect? Is the synchronisation of governance institutions at regional and continental level and harmonisation of socioeconomic policies possible? What are the challenges and opportunities? What are the prospects? In what ways is the construction of a Pan-African identity, on which continental integration and a borderless Africa is predicated, possible, vis-à-vis the decolonisation of knowledge, the reformulation of social, cultural, economic and political expressions and interactions that existed across Africa in precolonial times? Is this Pan-African identity in relationship to continental integration a necessary precondition for Africa to unleash its development potential?

Reference

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Mhlanga, B. (2013). *Bondage of boundaries and identity politics inpostcolonial Africa: The 'Northern Problem' and ethno-futures*. Pretoria: AISA.

Contents

About the Authors

Mike Chipere-Ngazimbi is Financial Technology Development Consultant turned researcher with expertise in designing and developing Digital Payment Systems, particularly mobile money and web-based proximity and Remote Payment Systems. He is currently Associate Researcher in the Human Economy Research Program at the University of Pretoria where he draws on anthropological approaches to examine monetary practices of the unbanked poor in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Mike's academic background is in finance (University of Greenwich), financial information systems (Queens University Belfast), science and technology studies and international development (University of Edinburgh). His publications engage with the discourse on the future of money in developing countries.

Lanre Olusegun Ikuteyijo is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria. He obtained his PhD degree in sociology and anthropology from the same university. His research interests include migration, urbanisation and community policing. He has published in reputable journals and contributed to a number of books and encyclopaedia entries. He was a visiting researcher to the Department of History, McMaster University, Canada, between 2011 and 2012 under the auspices of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Canada. Ikuteyijo has received a number of academic grants including the Qualitative Research Network Africa Grant for PhD thesis, Council for Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) research grant and Nigerian Urban Reproductive Health Initiative (NURHI) research grant, among others. He was a fellow of the Brown International Advanced Research Institutes (BIARI) and African Doctoral Academy, Stellenbosch University.

Esther Makhetha is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of South Africa (UNISA). She holds the following qualifications: Baccalaureus degree in Consumer Science (University of Pretoria, South Africa), MSc Research in Agricultural and Food Economics (University of Reading, UK) and PhD (University of Pretoria, South Africa). Her research interests include mining, artisanal and small-scale mining, commercial mining, gender, land needs and land use.

Inocent Moyo is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand (South Africa). His research interests include migration and development, migration and immigration politics, cross-border trade, regional integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), transnationalism, borders and borderlands, and urban informality and governance.

Prudence Nkomo is Emerging Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn) at the University of Pretoria where she is also a graduate student in International Relations. She holds a Bachelor's and Honours degrees in Political Sciences and in International Relations. Prudence's research interests include the impact of borders and the challenges and opportunities that arise from their existence for nation-states. She also has strong interest in Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), particularly the local communities within and around TFCAs. Prudence is an Andrew W Mellon Grant recipient.

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi is Director and DST/NRF (Department of Science and Technology/National Research Foundation, South Africa) Research Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn) at the University of Pretoria. He researches migration, borders, regional integration, the informal economy and water. Chris teaches regional integration, African and regional politics and African state and governance in the Department of Political Sciences of the University of Pretoria. He sits on regional, continental and international technical working groups on labour migration, the integrated water sector, social protection and wellbeing.

Peter Olayiwola is a Doctoral Candidate at the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, UK, where he is a recipient of the Vice-Chancellor's Research Excellence Scholarship (International) of the University. His project explores how popular child protection and child-saving rhetoric compares with the realities of child domestic work in Southwest Nigeria. He has a BSc in Sociology and Anthropology (First Class) from Obafemi Awolowo University and was previously a Commonwealth Shared Scholar at SOAS, University of London, where he completed his MSc in development studies with distinction. His research interests include migration, trafficking, inequalities and poverty.

Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba is an NRF (National Research Foundation, South Africa) rated Researcher, Senior Lecturer and the Coordinator of the Research cluster on Innovation and Developmental Regionalism at the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. Oloruntoba is the author *of Regionalism and Integration in Africa: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Euro-Nigeria Relations (2016)* and co-editor of *Palgrave Handbook on African Politics, Governance and Development*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, USA.

Nedson Pophiwa is a Research Manager at the Human Sciences Research Council's Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) Programme. For the past 14 years, he has been involved in numerous academic and policy-focused research projects within South Africa and the region. Nedson has published several peer-reviewed publications and read papers at international and national conferences. His main research interests are in good governance, local government, cross-border trade, migration, sustainable development and informal economies.

Firehiwot Sintayehu is Lecturer and PhD Candidate of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. Her dissertation is on the Baro-Akobo/Sobat river basin, which is a sub-basin to the Nile. Previously, she worked with Save the Children UK from March 2009 until February 2011. She has produced conference papers, research reports and book chapters in the areas of gender, migration, food security, climate change and hydropolitics. She was a visiting researcher at the University of Groningen (1 and 30 November 2014) through a fellowship of the Coimbra Group Scholarship for Sub-Saharan Africa and the University of University of Bergen, Telemark University College the and Norwegian University of Life Sciences (20 June–17 July 2015) through the funding of Water and Society Project at Addis Ababa University.

Daniel Tevera is a Professor in the Department of Geography, Environmental Studies and Tourism at the University of the Western Cape. He has extensive research experience in southern Africa (especially Zimbabwe and Swaziland) and has published many influential articles on issues relating to Zimbabwean migration, urban food security and urban spatialities, but it is the domain of food and the city that his recent work has focused on. He has co-edited several books including *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration and Survival* (2010) and *Harare: The Growth and Problems of the City* (1993). He has participated in the Southern African Migration Programme (a consortium of Canadian and African researchers) and has presented papers at Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) conferences. Daniel Tevera has been visiting scholar at several universities, including Oxford University (UK), Dartmouth College (USA), Gothenburg University (Sweden), Friedrich-Schiller University (Germany), Keele University (UK) and the University of Botswana.

Germain Ngoie Tshibambe is Acting Head of the Cabinet of the Rector of the University of Lubumbashi. He is Professor in the university's Department of International Relations Studies, Faculty of Social, Political and Administrative Sciences. He is former Chief of the Department of International Relations Studies and former Dean of the Faculty of Social, Political and Administrative Sciences. Professor Tshibambe is widely published (including in Spanish) in various journals and part of various research networks worldwide. His areas of research interest include migration, curriculum development in higher education, foreign policy of African states and geopolitics of knowledge.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC	All Basotho Convention
AEC	African Economic Community
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Agreement
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
ANAC	National Administration of Conservation Areas
ANC	African National Congress
ASM	Artisanal and small-scale mining
AU	African Union
BCM	Billion cubic metres
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CAR	Central African Republic
CBL	Central Bank of Lesotho
CCNR	Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine
CEGAA	Centre for Economic Governance and Accountability in Africa
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CET	Common External Tariff
CFA	Cooperative Framework Agreement
CHR	International Commission for the Hydrology in the Rhine Basin
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
CPA	Communal Property Association
CU	Customs Union
DA	Democratic Alliance
DMR	Department of Mineral Resources
DoP	Declaration of Principles
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community

ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECGLC	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ELMS	Environment and Land Management Sector
EMCCA	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ESAP	Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FAL	Final Act of Lagos
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FLS	Frontline States
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross domestic product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GLTFCA	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area
GLTP	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
GNP	Gonarezhou National Park
HI	Historical Institutionalism
ICBT	Informal cross-border trade
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICPR	International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine
ICTs	Information and communications technologies
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPOE	International Panel of Experts
IPZ	Intensive Protection Zone
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JMB	Joint Management Body
JMP	Joint Master Plan
KNP	Kruger National Park
KP	Kimberley Process
LNP	Limpopo National Park
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MICE	Meeting, Incentive, Conference and Exhibition
MP	Member of Parliament
MW	Megawatt
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NRA	New Regionalism Approach
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

OERS	Organisation des États Riverains du Sénégal
OMVS	Organisation Pour la Mise En Valeru du Fleuve Sénégal
PPF	Peace Parks Foundation
RBO	River basin organisations
REC	Regional economic communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC RISDP	SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SANParks	South African National Parks
SAP	Structural adjustment programs
SWCLU	Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation
TBPA	Transboundary Protected Area
TCC	Transnational capitalist class
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area
TFP	Transfrontier Park
UMA	Union du Maghreb Arabe
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USA	United States of America
WFD	Water Framework Directive
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
ZACPLAN	Zambezi Action Plan
ZAMCOM	Zambezi Water Commission
ZANACO	Zambia National Commercial Bank
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Army
ZIMRA	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNP	Zimbabwe National Parks
ZPWMA	Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority
ZRB	Zambezi River Basin

Part I
Borders, Mobility and Integration in Africa: Concepts and Issues

Chapter 1
Borders, Human Mobility, Integration and Development in Africa: An Introduction

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi and Inocent Moyo

One-Size-Fits-All and Unjust Epistemologies of African Borders and Mobility: Why This Book?

Among other things, the twentieth century witnessed a massive and deep turn among some scholars to an unfinished project, studies and debates that were sceptical and expressed attitudes that critiqued epistemic injustices inherent in Eurocentrism (Grosfoguel, 2007; Maldonado-Torres, 2006, 2011; Mignolo, 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). That is, the idea that the Eurocentric viewpoint alone explained reality and the world system. Yet, more than 100 years since the principles and framework of delimitations for the occupation and conceding of African territories were negotiated by colonialists in the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference (Nshimbi, 2019a), the postcolonial leaders of contemporary African nation-states chose to maintain what scholars have called the bondage of boundaries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013). Even when forming the continental integration organisation—the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)—in 1963, African leaders chose to re-enforce the boundaries delimitated on the basis of the Berlin Conference. This is seen in the OAU founders' opting to institutionalise the principle of the inviolability of borders (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013), national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of respective member states (OAU Charter, Article III.2).

C. C. Nshimbi (✉)
Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: christopher.nshimbi@up.ac.za

I. Moyo
Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_1

The OAU Charter of 1963 specifically purposed to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence (OAU Charter, Article II.1(c).). Oloruntoba (Chap. 3) finds this curious and argues that it has had two consequences. First, that singular decision has led to wars and conflicts, especially in Africa's border communities. Second, that singular decision has contribruted to the stifling of economic and social development on the continent. Even with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) and adoption and enforcement of the 2000 Constitutive Act of the AU, the continent seems to have done little to revise the principle of inviolability. Article 3 (b) of the Constitutive Act still maintains the objective of defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states. Moreover, this newer continental legislation goes on to articulate a principle that prescribes the respect of African nation-states' borders that existed at independence (Constitutive Act, Article 4(b))—essentially, colonial borders. This reservation not only runs through the continental integration scheme today, but also those of the various African regional economic communities (RECs).

The expression of this principle is manifested in the fact that only 13 out of the 55 AU countries offered visa-free entry to citizens of other African countries in 2018. This makes Africa the most restrictive continent to Africans in the world. Trade wise, formal intra-continental trade and trade within the respective RECs of Africa are low—at approximately 11–16%. This is due to, among others, the maintenance of rigid artificial borders, exclusivist, populist and securitised nationalism, the continuity of restrictive and draconian colonial policies of migration, which all work against a continental governance mechanism to facilitate the maximisation of Africa's human and natural resources for continental wellbeing. Therefore, despite attempts to overcome the limitations imposed by these borders or to foster development across Africa through regional integration, most African countries remain inaccessible to citizens of other African countries. In fact, African countries are more integrated with countries outside the continent than with each other. Add to this, transboundary natural resources such as water which, by nature and given their spatial location on Africa's common territories, make collaboration between the countries sharing the resources imperative. Alternatively, the common resources potentially precipitate interstate conflict over them. Paradoxically, African leaders are unanimously pushing for continental economic integration. This is evident in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement signed in Kigali, Rwanda, in 2018, which should eventually lead to the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 2028. With the AEC, it is envisaged that capital, labour, goods and services will move freely across Africa.

On the transboundary natural resource front, the situation across Africa is mixed. On the one hand, some regions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have crafted instruments to guide cooperation in the management of such resources. On the other hand, riparian states of regions such as the Nile Basin apparently face challenges in overcoming the discord between them over the basin's resources. The result is the failure to adopt cooperative agreements, as happened in 2010, when only five upstream countries of the Nile river—Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda—signed a cooperative framework agreement without Egypt and Sudan. Clearly, cooperation in the management of transboundary resources is beneficial, and non-cooperation is costly (Nshimbi, 2019b). Similarly, managing human mobility within and across state borders raises prospects of reaping benefits from the phenomenon. Inaction or nationalistic attitudes towards migration could lead to, among others, negative social repercussions, social instability and negative impacts on regional and continental development.

Against this background, this book interrogates social, economic and political issues and phenomena from a perspective that differs from the usual and frustrating 'one-size-fits-all' tendency to cast ideas and realities in Western and Eurocentric thought and frameworks. Perspectives which emanate from those tendencies usually dismiss African phenomena and realities as mythical, at best (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). In pursuit of the different logic, however, the book interrogates and presents issues, experiences and perspectives on human mobility involving economically active human resources and ordinary people within and across the borders of Africa's disparate nation-states as important realities. This is because such realities do not presumably fit into ideational models and theories that explain Western realities and experiences. Given that Africa is vast and constitutes many nation-states, the book focuses on West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The four geographical regions provide a large enough geopolitical, economic and cultural space from which to draw experiences and perspectives which are truly African and representative of its inhabitants. Between these regions, all except one of the eight regional economic communities (RECs) recognised as building blocks of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by the African Union (AU) are represented,[1] including at least 40 of the 55 states of the AU.

This book uniquely distinguishes itself as one that goes beyond the description and analysis of human mobility, borders and regional integration in Africa. Instead, it engages in a serious consideration and mix of mobility and border studies, and asks hard questions designed to highlight the innovative aspects of human agency in Africa. Simultaneously, it emphasises gender, from an African worldview/context through and empirical issues relating to social, economic and political realities in Eastern, Southern and West Africa.

The book also explores the dynamics of cooperation between respective African nation-states or members of the AU, including social, economic, political as well as the governance of transboundary natural resources. Thereby, it, in unbiased ways but from African perspectives, highlights complex historical interconnections on the continent. This is in a quest to examine the relationship between the spatial mobility of borders and development, and the migration regimes within which nation-states

[1]The only exception being the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The other seven RECs include at least one country that falls in the geographical space that make West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. They include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).

which share contiguous borders in given geographic territories are embedded. The book specifically asks questions meant to provoke a rethink in ideas and the understanding of African realities regarding human mobility, borders and regional integration. The themes that are interrogated include but are not limited to linkages between inter alia the coloniality of borders, conflict and sociocultural and ethnic relations in Africa and the role which the porous and politically and socially constructed borders of African states play in hampering or promoting, sustaining and perpetuating human mobility and wellbeing. Also examined is the impact of physical nation-state borders on human mobility, inclusive development in Africa and of the continent and whether the porosity of borders in Africa and its migration patterns provide foundations for inclusive development too.

These themes translate into specific questions which the 13 chapters in this volume attempt to answer: Do any linkages exist between, among others, the coloniality of borders, conflict and sociocultural and ethnic relations in Africa? What role could the porosity of borders in Africa play in promoting, sustaining and perpetuating wellbeing? What impact do the physical borders have on the inclusive development of Africa? Could the porosity of African borders and the migration patterns on the continent also provide foundations for inclusive development? Is a borderless Africa in which the citizens of the continent would harness freedom of movement to engage in productive activities in the interest of Africa possible? How could a borderless Africa promote inclusive development? Could a borderless Africa strengthen the migration–development nexus? If so, how? What could be the projected trajectories in this respect? Is the synchronisation of governance institutions at regional and continental level and harmonisation of socioeconomic policies possible? What are the challenges and opportunities? What are the prospects? In what ways is the construction of a Pan-African identity, on which continental integration and a borderless Africa is predicated possible, vis-à-vis the decolonisation of knowledge, the reformulation of social, cultural, economic and political expressions and interactions that existed across Africa in precolonial times? Is this Pan-African identity, in relationship to continental integration, a necessary precondition for Africa to unleash its development potential?

Borders, Mobility and Regional Integration: Some Issues and Perspectives

The notion of a border or borders does not only refer to the physical lines at the margins of nation-states, but also social, political and other processes, which translate into everyday practices (Berg & Van Houtum, 2003; Johnson et al., 2011; Laine, 2015, 2016; Moyo, 2016; Newman, 2006; Novak, 2011). The implication is that borders serve and perform both a material and symbolic function (Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). As a result, the concept is deployed in this book to refer to both the material and symbolic manifestations, performance and functions of borders.

And this is the context within which the materiality and symbolism of African borders comes through in all chapters in this book volume, in both implicit and explicit ways. It is in this context that Oloruntoba (Chap. 3) clearly refers to nation-state borders, but Ikuteyijo and Olayiwola (Chap. 7) seem to also use the notion to imply the broad distinction based on language between former colonies and colonisers. That is, they distinguish between Anglophone and Francophone Africa. In this, they see a separation or demarcation of one set of African countries from another, and that this has consequences for the continent's integration. For Oloruntoba (Chap. 3), the insistence by African countries on respecting the borders drawn by colonisers, or the bondage of boundaries as Gatsheni-Ndlovu and Mhlanga (2013) would say, contributes to war and conflict in Africa. Moreover, Moyo (Chap. 9) takes this argument down to the level of the REC in Africa, where he pinpoints its effect between neighbouring countries. When considered thus, the securitisation effect of the border shifts further to the micro level and the individual, and might carry negative connotations. This is because the border there might promote inhumane practices such as human smuggling.

At that level, the meaning of the border transitions beyond being a social construct to the symbolic. This is because it becomes spatially mobile, as some actors or entities attempt to contain and monitor the person (or migrant, as far as concerns this book) who crosses the physical nation-state border at the outer limits of its territory to the interior. The motive here would be to create difference, between 'inside' and 'outside' or 'us' and 'them'. A substantial body of literature exists that, in relation to Africa, engages with issues that relate to this interpretation of borders. An example is the us/them binary that sets indigenous in opposition to non-South African Africans, in which the latter are derogatorily called *makwerekwere* and are, in extreme cases, subjected to violence and murder for being foreign and different (Landau, 2012; Neocosmos, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Worby, Hassim, & Kupe, 2008).

Therefore, those who migrate are confronted with either physical or symbolic borders or both. Migration in this sense, or as concerns this book, is the movement of people from one country, across nation-state borders, into another. The purposes for which people engage in this form of mobility are diverse. For most of the contributions in this volume, however, people migrate for work and trade. Thus, Adeniran (2018) presents the case of mostly Ejigbo-Yoruba cross-border transporters along the Nigeria-Ivorian migratory corridor. According to Adeniran, they represent the most visible facilitator of cross-border inter-community development. Their bond across, between and linking Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire is so strong that they form what Adeniran calls an informal practice of 'transnational subsistence dualism'. Unlike the negative binary manifestation of borders which we just highlighted above, Adeniran shows the Ejigbo-Yoruba to seem to operate across a border which seems to bridge rather than separate two countries and the people therein—a border which seems to not only be in line with but also enhance the AU's goal of integrating Africa into a single economic space. It uniquely does this from the bottom up. (Regional) Integration in this respect would be viewed in the context of globalisation, and its characteristic ability to erase nation-state borders, as the borders give way to market forces and the power of flows. The flows in question are capital, labour, goods and services. Again, this paints a picture of what the AU ultimately seeks to achieve in establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).

As Sintayehu (Chap. 10), Nkomo (Chap. 11) and Nshimbi (Chap. 12) show from their respective contributions in this volume, Africa has generally managed to harness natural geographical boundaries and barriers including rivers or river basins and wildlife areas. The way that the continent's countries relate with each other around such resources, however, seems classifiable into two categories. Nkomo (Chap. 11) and Nshimbi (Chap. 12) each present a case in which potential for and actual cooperation around the resources helps avert conflict while contributing to integration and development. Nkomo, though, highlights a form of conflict that borders on issues of social justice, in which the proceeds of cooperation between countries in a transfrontier game reserve seem to accrue to only one group of beneficiaries and the neglect or disadvantaging of people who dwell in communities around or would have been relocated from the natural resource to pave way for game management. But (potential) conflict emanating from natural geographical boundaries could escalate and be between nation-states, an example of which is the case of Egypt and Ethiopia presented by Sintayehu (Chap. 10).

This notwithstanding, ordinary citizens who straddle natural geographical boundaries sometimes seem to ignore macro level politics and the contestations at that level over borders. Instead, these actors deploy cross-border initiatives that even defy natural barriers such as unnavigable rivers, to take advantage of market differentials between neighbouring countries. Such is the case of the Tonga people of the Zambezi/Gwembe Valley between Zambia and Zimbabwe among which Chipere-Ngazimbi (Chap. 8) conducted an ethnographic study to understand the monetary activities of people that have no access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) that define modern banking. This chapter further demonstrates that for the fishermen on either side of the Zambezi River between Zimbabwe and Zambia, the border is non-existent, because the people do not recognise it. In other words, there is integration from below based on the principles of supply and demand which is met by non-state actors like the fishermen, for example. Within the framework of this book, therefore, borders are not only constructions that result from social, economic and political processes that seek to fix 'difference' on a physical map, but also assume a spatial level and are seen differently by different categories of people such as the state and non-state actors.

Structure of the Book

The contributions in this book are intertwined. In the context of the theoretical framework briefly outlined in this chapter, and further in Chap. 2, as well as some of the empirical issues, perspectives and dynamics outlaid above, we categorise the contributions into three main parts. The main argument of the book revolves around these parts. Part I introduces the major theme and, indeed, conceptual issues, with a focus on borders, mobility and regional integration (Chaps. 1, 2, and 3). It provides an overview of borders, migration and regional integration in Africa, and the way in which these notions apply to and across four of the continent's major geographical areas including, West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa (Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). West Africa is home to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Chap. 7), which has the most advanced and dynamic migration governance regime in Africa (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2016). Central Africa too is characterised by very dynamic voluntary and involuntary mobilities (Chap. 4). But the cross-border issues of mobility and trans-border cooperation in the region are the most challenging. Southern Africa itself is characterised by intra-regional movements, which historically consist of labour migration to South Africa (Chap. 9) and, indeed, Botswana and Zambia, among others (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017).

Part II is anchored on borders and integration. The contributions in this part examine the various ways and actors involved in the governance of the borders, people and socioeconomic systems and, thus, how they ultimately contribute to integration (Chaps. 6, 7, 8, and 9). In all this, security or the tendency to securitise borders is not to be ignored (Chap. 9), especially if Africa is really going to become a borderless continent (Chap. 7). This part highlights the variety, poly-perspective and dynamic range of actors and governance mechanisms that are all significant to integration and development in Africa. Part III focuses on transboundary natural resources, how they are governed and/or disputes over them and between countries or communities that share these resources (Chaps. 10, 11, and 12). It simultaneously considers how this all contributes to or inhibits integration. Part III also concludes the volume by recapping the key themes, perspectives and dynamics highlighted in and which thread all the contributions to the book together (Chap. 13).

In Part I, **Nshimbi and Moyo** (Chap. 1) outline the scope and focus of the book, laying out the key themes, issues and experiences it explores and examines. They briefly discuss and run down the key conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches to the understanding of borders, mobility and integration in the African context. Concurrently, they question the understanding of postcolonial borders and their validity, especially seeing that Africa aims and is engaged in concerted efforts to integrate its respective nation-states, RECs and the continent as a whole.

Tevera (Chap. 2) continues with the conceptual foundation of the volume, from Nshimbi and Moyo in Chap. 1. He draws on conceptual debates and empirical work on bordering processes, mobility and regional integration to address tensions between two options. One is the opening of borders to allow for increased mobility and the other is intensifying border control in order to increase border securitisation. Tevera argues for a kind of border studies that should address mobility and cross-border trade issues in ways that provide meaning to invisible aspects of border spaces. He does this by presenting a case where he considers national borders to be vital sites in the construction of social geographies in Africa. These should focus on mobility, informality and regional integration.

Oloruntoba (Chap. 3) examines the relationship between borders, regional integration and socioeconomic development in Africa, but does so in a way that departs from previous scholarly interventions. This is because he interrogates the underlying philosophies of borders and does this from the perspectives of local and transnational elites. Further, he transcends purely economic considerations, which pre-occupy most analyses of regional integration, to engage with non-economic issues such as cultural integration and social interaction among people in border communities.

Tshibambe (Chap. 4) grapples with the drivers of and dynamics sustaining migration trends in Central Africa, which has a complex human landscape. Human mobility across the borders of the nation-states of this region creates and recreates political, social and cultural configurations which present challenges. He, in this respect, for instance, cites the example of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where political instability raises the challenge of refugees. Besides nation-states, he also analyses the actions and reactions of the RECs in tackling migration and argues that the era of states managing migration on their own is long gone and has been replaced by a regional approach.

Makhetha (Chap. 5) explores the relationship between *zama-zama* or illegal mining, conflict, mobility, turf wars and violence in the disused gold mines of Gauteng Province in South Africa. Her conceptual work draws from extant literature, observations and experience in studying unlicensed artisanal diamond mining in the highlands of Lesotho. Her chapter is premised on the industrial configuration of Southern Africa, where countries in the region served as the labour reserve economy for South African mines and industries. The declining trend in employment opportunities in these sectors from the 1990s onwards saw many miners retrenched. This was followed by shifts towards informal income activities, including *zama-zama*. She focuses on Basotho illegal miners and goes on to demonstrate the conflicts between different groups of Basotho in underground, disused mines in a foreign country, South Africa. The point she clearly brings out of this is that, with *zama-zama* groups coming together to work in disused mines, their interactions are often marred with conflicts, violence and killings in some cases.

Pophiwa (Chap. 6), in Part II, examines the spatial practices of cross-border shoppers at the Beitbridge border between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The author argues that the cross-border shoppers from Zimbabwe have triggered other spatial and border practices as states and their delegated agents attempt to control and benefit for the cross-border shopping business. This has implications on promoting or hindering cross-border mobility, informal trade, development and by extension regional integration.

Ikuteyijo and Olayiwola (Chap. 7) examine Africa's readiness for a borderless continent and inherent constraints to the objective. They echo Oloruntoba's assertion in Chap. 3 that the colonial heritage has had lasting effects on many realities in Africa. Unlike Oloruntoba, however, Ikuteyijo and Olayiwola approach their study from the viewpoint of a continent divided along Anglophone and Francophone lines, and that the consequences are accordingly aligned. They mainly rely on data sources for the critical analysis of relevant policies and the literature in line with the aims of the chapter. Using this, the current security issues facing Africa and the challenge it faces in achieving its potentials of continental integration and development are analysed.

Chipere-Ngazimbi (Chap. 8) engages in an ethnographic exercise to examine the monetary practices of the unbanked poor in Binga District, Matabeleland North Province of Zimbabwe, which stretches along the Zambezi valley and shares borders with Zambia's Southern Province district of Sinazongwe. He focuses on the way that the unbanked innovate to deal with the challenges of the cash shortage experienced in Zimbabwe and how this can inform future monetary innovations. He shows how border citizens from both Zimbabwe and Zambia have been left to their own devices to confront a harsh agro-ecological environment and sparse private and public infrastructure. Further, he clarifies how this neglect translates into lost opportunity to incorporate the agency of the unbanked into policy coordination in relation to ICT monetary innovations, foreign exchange control and environmental conservation.

Moyo (Chap. 9) argues that the securitisation and the spatial mobility of borders beyond their physical definition, in order to monitor and 'border' migrants between neighbours and members of the same regional organisation (SADC), is a call for border management strategies. The strategies should reduce the impact of the border, whether actual or symbolic. The aim in this should be to create decent conditions for migrants to live and earn livelihoods as citizens of the region encompassed in the organisation. He specifically examines migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa which has long occurred and continues even after South African borders were strengthened after the latter was liberated from apartheid in 1994. His focus is on human smuggling as a form of undocumented migration, which, he argues, is execrated by the strengthening of the border. He goes on to argue that smuggling makes the undocumented Zimbabwean exist in a state of liminality, besides the observation that they are placed and constructed as the precariat.

Sintayehu (Chap. 10) takes the case, in Part III, of the transboundary natural resources contained in the Nile Basin. She acknowledges that the basin presents a complex case of hydro-politics because of the numerous riparian states and the diversity of interests they represent. She argues that despite the absence of a legal framework that binds all riparian states, prospects for cooperation in the Nile are evident because of economic, ecological, political and legal justifications. But international law is progressively equipping riparian states with possibilities of utilising the Nile waters in a win-win manner.

Nkomo (Chap. 11) engages in a critical and comprehensive review of literature to examine the livelihood strategies of people in local communities located in a transnationally managed game park area known as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP). Broadly, she examines how the GLTP is managed under a Joint Management Board (JMB) and its interaction with 'economic governance' in order to help the local communities benefit from the park economically. She premises her examination on the idea that Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) provide the most suitable strategy to pursue conservation and alleviate poverty, mostly through ecotourism. To achieve this, a critical and comprehensive review of literature on this subject was done.

Nshimbi (Chap. 12) explores the possibilities of peaceful cross-border coexistence amidst sustainable development and environmental security issues in Africa's common territories. He examines the path-dependent evolution of regionalisation in Eastern and Southern Africa and highlights the dynamics operating at two opposite levels included the state and grassroots in that evolutionary process. He shows that the former seeks to consolidate power and assert national independence while the latter, by virtue of existing realities, suggests that people at the grassroots should collaborate in cross-border interactions. They encounter various obstacles to the activities in which they engage and their interactions seem constant and promise to foster integration.

Moyo and Nshimbi (Chap. 13) conclude the volume, noting that debates on borders, mobility and integration in Africa are ongoing and raise important issues. They also note that the prominent ones in this book include migration, regional integration and development. They argue that migration has developmental impacts especially in an African context although it presents a paradoxical tendency where African states project negative perceptions of migration. Non-state actors are criminalised and placed on the margins of migration governance. Because of this, they argue, regional integration schemes should be active in developing regional migration management regimes to enhance human mobility, in readiness for a more or less borderless Africa as immortalised in the Agenda 2063 project. According to the authors, the way African states understand borders (i.e. based on the demarcation at the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference) turns the borders into a limitation. This must be confronted for regional integration to succeed and promote different types of cross-border cooperation in Africa.

References

Adeniran, A. I. (2018). Migration, integration and inter-community development in West Africa. *Africa Insight, 48*(1), 86–93.

Anderson, J., & O'Dowd, L. (1999). Borders, border regions and territoriality: Contradictory meanings, changing significance. *Regional Studies, 33*(7), 593–604.

Berg, E., & Van Houtum, H. (2003). *Routing borders between territories: Discourses and practices*. Burlington, VA: Ashgate.

Grosfoguel, R. (2007). The epistemic decolonial turn. *Cultural Studies, 21*(2–3), 211–223.

Johnson, C., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M., et al. (2011). Interventions on rethinking the border in border studies. *Political Geography, 30*, 61–69.

Laine, J. (2015). A historical view on the study of borders. In S. Sevastianov, J. Laine, & A. Kireev (Eds.), *Introduction to border studies* (pp. 15–32). Vladivostok: Far Eastern Federal University.

Laine, J. (2016). The multiscalar production of borders: An introduction. *Geopolitics, 21*(3), 465–482. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1195132.

Landau, L. (Ed.). (2012). *Exorcising the demons within: Xenophobia, violence and statecraft in contemporary South Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Maldonado-Torres, N. (2006). Césaire's gift and the decolonial turn. *Radical Philosophy Review, 9*(2), 111–137.

Maldonado-Torres, N. (2011). Enrique Dussel's liberation thought in the decolonial turn. *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1* (1), 1–30.

Mignolo, W. (2000). *Local histories/global designs: Essays on the coloniality of power, subaltern knowledges and border thinking*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moyo, I. (2016). The Beitbridge–Mussina interface: Towards flexible citizenship, sovereignty and territoriality at the border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31*(4), 427–440.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2013). Why decoloniality in the 21st century? *The Thinker: For Thought Leaders, 48*, 10–16.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2015). Decoloniality as the future of Africa. *History Compass, 13*(10), 485–496.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Mhlanga, B. (Eds.). (2013). *Bondage of boundaries and identity politics in postcolonial Africa: The 'northern problem' and ethno-futures*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Neocosmos, M. (2010). *From 'foreign natives' to 'native foreigners' explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, citizenship and nationalism, identity and politics*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Newman, D. (2006). The lines that continue to separate us: Borders in a borderless world. *Progress in Human Geography, 30*(2), 1–19.

Novak, P. (2011). The flexible territoriality of borders. *Geopolitics, 16*, 741–767.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2019a). Life in the fringes: Economic and sociocultural practices in the Zambia Malawi-Mozambique borderlands in comparative perspective. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 34*(1), 47–70.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2019b). SDGs and decentralizing water management for transformation: Normative policy coherence for water security in SADC river basin organizations. *Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 111*, 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2019.02.010.

Nshimbi, C. C., & Fioramonti, L. (2016). *Regional migration governance in the African continent. Current state of Affairs and the way forward*. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (sef:)/ development and peace foundation.

Nshimbi, C. C., & Moyo, I. (Eds.). (2017). *Migration, cross-border trade and development in Africa: Exploring the role of non-state actors in the SADC region*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2006). *Insiders and outsiders: Citizenship and xenophobia in contemporary southern Africa*. New York: Zed Books.

Worby, E., Hassim, S., & Kupe, T. (Eds.). (2008). *Go home or die here: Violence, xenophobia and the reinvention of difference in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Chapter 2
Imagining Borders, Borderlands, Migration and Integration in Africa: The Search for Connections and Disjunctures

Daniel Tevera

Introduction

Recent literature on border studies has highlighted the potential that borders have as hubs of connectivity between countries. This literature talks to the open tension between the so-called open globalization era borders on the one hand and on the other the higher exclusionary and securocratized borders that have been shaped by the geopolitics of homeland 'security' and typically are characterized by extensive human controls and electronic surveillance. In Africa, increasingly securitized borders are producing various forms of inclusion and exclusion. As Cooper and Rumford (2013: 108) argue, 'we need to view borders not simply as markers of division but also as a mechanism of connection and encounter'. This chapter argues that African borders need to be imagined not only as markers of division but also as socially constructed spaces of human transit and connection. This chapter addresses a three-pronged problematic, namely the need (a) to engage conceptual approaches that explain how and why many African borders have remained divisionary 'channels' that hinder cross-border connection, despite increased mobility, fluidity and connectivity patterns that characterize the globalization process; (b) to engage new lenses to unravel the borders-mobility question by offering grounded reflections on the disjuncture between regional integration and increased national border securitization that is producing multiple forms of exclusion; and (c) to analyse the different contexts regarding how African borders are impacting on human mobility, transborder natural resources and borderlands. The following questions are explored in this chapter: How are African national borders affecting human mobility and flow of

D. Tevera (✉)
Department of Geography, Environmental Studies and Tourism, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, Cape Town, South Africa
e-mail: dtevera@uwc.ac.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_2

goods across the continent? How do informal cross-border traders (ICBTs) construct their experiences of mobility across increasingly fortified and unfriendly borders? What do the overlapping processes of mobility/immobility and belonging/not belonging mean to informal cross-border traders? How are the everyday cross-border activities by local people who reside in national borderlands disrupted or enhanced by the intensification of control measures aimed at increased border securitization? The aim of such an engagement is to broaden our understanding of how contemporary African borders are influencing the geographies of human mobility and borderlands at a time when the African Union (AU) is championing increased intra-regional interaction and trade.

Studies on Borders and Informal Cross-Border Traders

The conceptual shift or the bordering perspective which occurred in border studies during the 1990s shifted attention from a conception of borders as geographical and political peripheries (Brambilla, 2015; Coplan, 2010). On the African continent, the shift has led to a reconsideration of borders as social constructs and processes rather than spatial entities and that borders are susceptible to transformation and erasure. The twenty-first-century national borders have become increasingly complex and multidimensional spatial entities with shifting symbolic importance and functions (Andreas, 2003; Balibar, 2002; Brambilla, 2015) and are selectively porous for some and difficult to navigate for other groups (Asiwaju, 1993, 2010; Dobler, 2016; Jawando, 2012). Border studies provide a useful framework for investigating both the dynamics and impacts of shifting patterns of informal cross-border trade and regional integration initiatives within and across Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the continent. These initiatives are taking place at a time of increased debate on the benefits of imagining national borders as the vital architecture of mobility whose main function is to manage and facilitate rather than impede human mobility. Some of these debates resonate well with the policy initiatives that are being driven by the African Union.

Since the new millennium the African Union (AU) has promoted regional integration as a key vehicle for driving economic development programmes through the systematic softening of physical and psychological barriers to human mobility, flow of consumer goods and capital across the continent. To this end, the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the continent, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have introduced programmes aimed at facilitating free movement of persons within their regions by pursuing market-led regional integration initiatives that are informed by the Abuja Treaty. For example, the African Union's protocol on free movement of persons was adopted in 2018 with the primary goal of achieving African economic integration mainly through the facilitation of human mobility across the continent and its numerous national boundaries. Empirical evidence shows that SADC's regional initiative to facilitate free movement of persons across Southern Africa has contributed to a substantial increase in intra-SADC migration (Crush & Tevera, 2010). Between 2005 and 2015, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia emerged as the main regional destinations largely because of their comparatively strong economies and political stability during a decade that witnessed a rise in refugee flows into the region from within and outside the region. In particular, South Africa has become home to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia. Not much has been written about how these African refugees negotiate the various borders from their countries of origin to the destination countries.

Also, the literature that specifically focuses on the experiences of informal cross-border traders at the border is generally patchy and very often is based on micro-scale case studies. Informal cross-border traders generally get very little support from national governments because they are largely perceived by policymakers as a blight on the landscape that needs to be contained rather than a legitimate economic activity that is keeping many households afloat when faced with economic hardships. A detailed study by Peberdy (2000) of small entrepreneurs and informal sector cross-border trade between South Africa and Mozambique revealed that cross-border traders face numerous obstacles that include unrealistic registration requirements, lack of access to finance and credit, widespread corruption and harassment by border officials and 'helpers' who extort money and goods from these traders. A more recent study by Chikanda and Raimundo (2017) confirms some of the findings reported in earlier studies by Duri (2012), Muzvidziwa (2015) and Vigneswaran (2008). Other studies have revealed that despite determined continental policy initiatives to promote intra-regional trade through the SADC protocol on free movement of persons, informal cross-border traders continue to encounter considerable challenges at national border posts (Duri, 2012; Moyo, 2016; Peberdy et al., 2015; Thebe, 2010). For example, at Beitbridge/Musina border post (along the Zimbabwe–South Africa border) everyday mobility practices are disrupted on either side of the border or informal cross-border traders experience delays of as long as 8–14 hours at the border post. This makes borders like the Beitbridge/Musina border an unwelcoming space of 'waithood' for some groups of travellers such as informal cross-border traders. The travel disruptions reveal the disjuncture between the SADC's goal of free movement of persons and goods and the corresponding reality of increased border securitization and general border management approaches. Also, there is a trend towards fortifying political borders with fences, including electric fences, as is the case along sections of the border between Botswana and Zimbabwe. Other borders are being hardened through the deployment of new security practices and systems, ranging from increased patrols to electronic surveillance systems.

According to Peberdy et al. (2015) control of informal cross-border traders is largely viewed in terms of management of their micro-entrepreneurship and less as control of illegal entry. The majority of informal cross-border traders cross the border on a visitor's visa, instead of business visas, because they do not qualify to get business visas due to stringent requirements such as proof of a business bank account and an official trading licence. The experiences of informal cross-border traders that have been highlighted by scholars, such as Peberdy et al. (2015), reveal how national borders in Africa disrupt mobility despite the intentions of the protocols that aim to facilitate mobility and integration. Clearly, the anti-informal cross-border trade mentality at border posts ignores the fact that informal trade contributes considerably to national income and international trade. Also quite evident is the fact that border management in many parts of Africa continues to be characterized by features such as anti-mobility controls that are rooted in delays at borders and are inconsistent with the realities presented by African Union (AU) and RECs protocols on free movement of persons. This situation alludes to the elusive pursuit of regional and continental citizenship and identity that Williams (2006) wrote about more than a decade ago.

The paradox, however, is that globalization is characterized by mobility fluidity and high levels of connectivity across countries with borders functioning as welcoming spaces of connection and transit. However, the literature reveals that in many parts of the African continent cross-border traders encounter delays. How can we account for this apparent contradiction? Cooper and Rumford (2013) provide a revealing take on the issue when they argue that in the current era of high human mobility, political borders are increasingly functioning as divisionary devices. In the same vein, Paasi (2009) argues that borders create 'channels' or 'conduits' of passage that facilitate connection, for some and not for other groups of people, such as those embedded in informality. This is so because cross-border mobility is in many ways about the material dynamics of the politics of mobility as mediated through legislative regulations and the local politics of power, identity and difference. Critical studies of border spaces reveal a significant 'spatial blindness' in border studies that has largely ignored analysis of how border spatialities can help to explain how borders hinder or facilitate human mobility depending on whether their main function is (re)boarding or connectivity. The fluid and permeable African borders remind us of the fact that the political boundary in Africa is a European construct that was superimposed on traditional social formations and they reinforce the point that post-colonial Africa still struggles to transform national borders so that they become less of divisive instruments and more of connectivity devices.

According to Ama, Mangadi and Ama (2014) and Andersson (2006) informal cross-border trade in Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes a significant component of regional cross-border trade and has a considerable impact in the economies of some countries such as Zimbabwe, where there has been a phenomenal growth of informality following the contraction of the local economy due to political and economic challenges. The national economic meltdown that began at the dawn of the new millennium heavily eroded household incomes and this compelled Zimbabweans, across socio-economic, gender and age categories, to construct livelihood strategies anchored on informality and an exodus of skills to other countries on the continent and abroad (Crush & Tevera, 2010). A recent study by Chikanda and Tawodzera (2017) on informal entrepreneurship and informal cross-border trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa is quite illuminating with respect to the operations and viability of the activity.

Across Africa, the degree of border permeability varies considerably. This is demonstrated by both theoretical and empirical literature on informal cross-border trade that reveals how contemporary political borders still function largely as barriers rather than bridges that facilitate regional integration (Bauder, 2011; Doevenspeck, 2011; Gibb, 2009; Jawando, 2012; Mbembe, 2002; Vigneswaran, 2008). The argument by Mbembe (2002) on boundaries, territoriality and sovereignty is a good example of the nuanced approaches to a rethink of borders and the state in Africa. This makes African border posts not a welcoming space of transition but unfriendly spaces that are characterized by waithood that often consists of unintended breaks in mobility for several hours or days. These challenges are experienced on a daily basis by cross-border traders. Clearly, there is a need to reflect on the disjuncture between the notion of free movement of persons and the reality of increased border securitization across the continent that generally criminalizes migrants by governments that are determined to regulate inflows of migrants, especially from other African countries.

Clearly, there is tension between wider openness of the borders resulting from waiver of visas and increased securitization at the border posts that is manifested by visible reinforcement of controls and inspections of goods coming into the country. This calls for studies that focus on the intersection of ‘power’ and ‘vulnerability’ within the border zones and how the process is undermining regional efforts to promote regional integration. Also, despite the crucial role of borders in informal cross-border trade (ICBT), few studies have looked at borders in relation to trade and general mobility. Border policies and practices are still restrictive, and traders face other trade barriers such as visa control. Clearly border management retains old approaches, such as anti-mobility controls, which are based on security considerations that are inconsistent with realities presented by SADC and its aspirations for free movement of persons across the region. Quite evidently, the trend towards the expansion of fortress architecture in the region is transforming national border posts into spaces of waithood rather than spaces of flows and mobility. However, despite the fact that informal cross-border trading has become a way of life for many people in the region, limited official support has been granted to the traders by various structures of the state, including local and municipal authorities.

As a result, what emerges are borders as fields in which processes of traversing and crossing meet those of reinforcement and blocking and in which borders are produced by social institutions and migration as a social force. As institutions, borders are perceived as territorial markers that identify the limit of national sovereignty from a perspective of state construction. However, from a process perspective, borders may ‘produce distinctions between social groups and are at the same time produced by them’ (Brambilla, 2007: 35). As Brambilla (2007) further argues, this in turn gives rise to a paradoxical relationship in which borders separate communities while concurrently fostering and mediating interaction between the communities. Clearly, this is one aspect of African borderland studies that requires more intense academic investigation than has been provided so far. Such studies would not only engage with the issue of borderland peripherality but would also open up new strands of enquiry around issues such as the invisibilization of borders in remote parts of Africa, whereby local daily practices tend to carry on quite oblivious to national laws that control cross-border mobility and livelihood strategies. As a result, the question can be asked: are African border management practices missing a good opportunity to grab the moment and open up the mobility blockade?

Spaces of the Border and Borderlands

Border studies have generated empirical and theoretical works on border control and border landscapes. The spaces of the border model can be used as a prism through which to find meaning and analysis of social practices in cross-border contexts. By 2005 when the South African government had abolished visa requirements for SADC residents, two perspectives of cross-border mobility in the region were already evident: (re)bordering and connectivity. In Southern Africa, cross-border activities by local people on either side of the border between countries suggest the existence of strong cross-border relations. A recent study by Moyo (2016) on mobility patterns across the Beitbridge–Musina border between Zimbabwe and South Africa addresses how cross-border traders have become adept at handling the tricky issue of flexible citizenship in order to avoid situations of harassment and xenophobia in various settings.

Clearly, informal cross-border trade highlights the intersection of ‘power’ and ‘vulnerability’ within the border zones, and how traders have to engage in multiple socio-spatial strategies when engaging with various officials and helpers at the border. According to Castells (1998), a common characteristic of borderlands is their peripheral location and disconnection resulting from the ‘border effect’ or how the border shapes the territorial development of a borderland. Three types of border effects have been documented in Southern Africa and these are the (a) rapid growth and transformation of a border town, (b) growth and decline of a border town, and (c) widespread underdevelopment of predominantly rural borderland.

First, there is the urban growth effect in the borderland whereby small urban centres are transformed into growth centres with strong developmental growth impulses in the border area, as is the case of the small town of Musina, near the Beitbridge border with Zimbabwe. A key physical impact of the informal border economy on Musina is the building of commercial centres and shopping malls. The economic, demographic and urban landscapes of Musina have been shaped by the high volume of trade activities between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Also, Musina has benefitted from shopping tourism by the thousands of Zimbabweans who cross the border daily from Beitbridge on holiday visa permits but whose main purpose of travel to Musina is to purchase goods or to service their cars.

Second, there is the mixed situation of rapid economic and spatial growth and subsequent decline of the small border town of Oshikango in Namibia. The town experienced considerable growth after 2001 due to the then thriving cross-border economic activities with Angola (Dobler, 2009). However, in recent years the number of cross-border traders from Angola has dropped significantly. Third, there is the situation of widespread rural underdevelopment in the borderland as is the case of south-western Zimbabwe near Beitbridge border post. Thebe (2010) provides an interesting account of how the region has suffered from depopulation since the early 1980s due to multiple waves of out-migration from the area and across the border to South Africa. Nshimbi (2017) provides a different scenario based on his study of living conditions in the fringes in the borderlands of Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. The three examples highlight that proximity to a border can have mixed developmental effects in borderlands and, unlike the case of Musina in South Africa, is not always a source of economic stimulation.

Conclusion

This chapter has made a case for considering national borders as vital sites in the construction of social geographies in Africa that focus on mobility, informality and borderlands. Drawing on conceptual debates and empirical work on bordering processes, mobility and regional integration, this chapter has addressed the tension between opening borders up for increased mobility and intensification of border control measures aimed at increased border securitization. This chapter argued for a more nuanced understanding of borders that probes beyond the physical barriers put in place to check the movements of people from one place to another and to consider the social construction of boundaries as they occur in various contexts. In Southern Africa, the trend towards the expansion of fortress architecture is transforming national border posts into spaces of waithood rather than spaces of flows and mobility. This calls for studies that focus on the intersection of 'power' and 'vulnerability' within the border zones and how the process is undermining regional efforts to promote regional integration. Border policies and practices are still restrictive, and traders face other trade barriers such as visa control. Clearly, border management still retains old approaches which are based on security considerations that are inconsistent with realities presented by the African Union and its aspirations for free movement of persons across the continent.

References

Ama, N., Mangadi, K., & Ama, H. (2014). Characterization of informal cross-border traders across selected Botswana borders. *International Journal of Management and Marketing Research, 7*(1), 85–102.

Andersson, J. A. (2006). Informal moves, informal markets: International migrants and traders from Mzimba District, Malawi. *African Affairs, 105*(420), 375–397.

Andreas, P. (2003). Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century. *International Security, 28*(2), 78–111.

Asiwaju, A. (1993). Borderlands in Africa: A comparative research perspective with particular reference to Western Europe. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 8*(2), 1–12.

Asiwaju, A. I. (2010). Centring the margins: Fifty years of African border studies. *Africa Review of Books, 7*(2), 4–6.
Balibar, E. (2002). *"What is border?" Politics and the other scene*. London: Verso.
Bauder, H. (2011). Toward a critical geography of the border: Engaging the dialectic of practice and meaning. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 101*(5), 1126–1139.
Brambilla, C. (2007). Borders and identities/border identities: The Angolan-Namibian border and the plurivocality of the Kwanyama identity. *Journal of Borderland Studies, 22*(2), 21–38.
Brambilla, C. (2015). Exploring the critical potential of the borderscapes concept. *Geopolitics, 20*(1), 14–34.
Castells, M. (1998). *The rise of the network society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
Chikanda, A., & Raimundo, I. (2017). Informal entrepreneurship and cross-border trade between Mozambique and South Africa. *AHMR, 3*(2), 943–974.
Chikanda, A., & Tawodzera, G. (2017). *Informal entrepreneurship and informal cross-border trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa* (SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 74). Cape Town and Waterloo.
Cooper, A., & Rumford, C. (2013). Monumentalising the border: Bordering through connectivity. *Mobilities, 8*(1), 107–124.
Coplan, D. (2010). Introduction: From empiricism to theory in African border studies. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 25*(2), 1–5.
Crush, J., & Tevera, D. (Eds.). (2010). *Zimbabwe's exodus: Crisis, migration and survival*. Cape Town/Ottawa: Idasa Publishing/IDRC.
Dobler, G. (2009). Oshikango: The dynamics of growth and regulation in a Namibian boom town. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 35*(1), 115–131.
Dobler, G. (2016). The green, the grey and the blue: A typology of cross-border trade in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54*, 145–169. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X15000993.
Doevenspeck, M. (2011). Constructing the border from below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan state boundary. *Political Geography, 30*, 129–142.
Duri, F. (2012). Negotiating the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border: The pursuit of survival by Mutare's poor, 2000–2008. In S. Chiumbu & M. Musemwa (Eds.), *Crisis! What crisis? The multiple dimensions of the Zimbabwean crisis* (pp. 122–139). Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Gibb, R. (2009). Regional integration and Africa's development trajectory: Meta-theories, expectations and reality. *Third World Quarterly, 30*(4), 701–721.
Jawando, J. O. (2012). Survival strategies of women in informal cross border trade along Lagos-Seme border axis. *Global Journal of Human and Social Science, Sociology, Economics and Political Science, 12*(9), 29–37.
Mbembe, A. (2002). At the edge of the world: Boundaries, territoriality and sovereignty in Africa. In M. R. Bessinger & C. Young (Eds.), *Beyond state crisis? Postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Moyo, I. (2016). The Beitbridge-Musina interface: Towards flexible citizenship, sovereignty and territoriality at the border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31*(4), 427–440.
Muzvidziwa, V. (2015). Gendered nature of informal cross border trade in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Social Development in Africa, 30*, 131–146.
Nshimbi, C. (2017). Life in the fringes: Economic and sociocultural practices in the Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique borderlands in comparative perspective. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 34*(1), 47–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1300780.
Paasi, A. (2009). Bounded spaces in a "borderless world": Border studies, power and the anatomy of territory. *Journal of Power, 2*(2), 213–234.
Peberdy, S. (2000). Border crossings: Small entrepreneurs and informal sector cross border trade between South Africa and Mozambique. *Tjidschrift voor Economischeen Sociale Geographie, 91*, 361–378.

Peberdy, S., Crush, J., Tevera, D., Campbell, E., Zindela, N., Raimondo, I., et al. (2015). Transnational entrepreneurship and informal cross border trade with South Africa. In J. Crush, A. Chikanda, & C. Skinner (Eds.), *Mean streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa* (pp. 207–228). Cape Town: International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

Thebe, V. (2010). From South Africa with love: The “Malayisha” system and households’ quest for livelihood reconstruction in south-western Zimbabwe. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 49*, 647–670.

Vigneswaran, D. (2008). Making mobility a problem: How South African officials criminalize migration. *Political Geography, 27*, 783–801.

Williams, V. (2006). In pursuit of regional citizenship and identity: The free movement of persons in the Southern African development community. *Policy, Issues and Actors, 19*(2), 1–15.

Chapter 3
Regional Integration, Borders and Development in Africa

Samuel O. Oloruntoba

Introduction

Post-independent Africa has witnessed several border-related wars and conflicts. In many instances, these wars arose out of disputes over the arbitrary borders that the colonialists designed in areas occupied by people who had existed together as one ethnic group for centuries. At the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, the imperial forces of Europe divided African countries among themselves. This was done to make it easy for the European powers to exploit, control and subjugate the African societies (Rodney, 1981). Besides, the division was also done as part of the peace process in war-torn Europe. Apart from wars and conflicts, scholars have established a causal link between underdevelopment in Africa and the rigidity of colonially deigned borders (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017). The contradictions inherent in colonial borders have ensured that intra-Africa trade remains one of the least in the world today (Gibb, 2009). Zeleza (1993) argues, pre-colonial African societies achieved high levels of economic growth, built empires and were relatively well off on the back of free movement of people across the length and breadth of the continent. However, colonially designed borders have ensured that what is considered as informal cross-border trade receive little or no support from governments as the traders are criminalised. While post-colonial African leaders have made regional integration one of the identified paths towards achieving socio-economic development, it has not succeeded as expected due to several factors, not least the mimicry of European integration, lack of political will among the ruling elites to relinquish their national base of power, external influences and application of wrong theoretical

S. O. Oloruntoba (✉)
Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: oloruso@unisa.ac.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_3

models (Adedeji, 2012; Draper, 2013; Oloruntoba, 2018a). The inability of the state to respond or cope with both internal and external forces that are competing against its development has perpetuated the peripherisation, underdevelopment, poverty and general dependence of African countries on the rest of the world for ideas and assistance. While there have been narratives about Africa rising and a growing economy, the continent is host to the largest concentration of people living in poverty.

This chapter weaves the triple issues of regional integration, borders and development in Africa. After this introduction, the second section explicates on the origin and complexities of borders in Africa, while the third section attempts both historical and contemporary sketches of regional integration in its various forms and dimensions. Section four explicates on the challenges of borders, regional integration and development, while section five concludes.

African Borders: Origins, Forms and Politics

As indicated above, contemporary African borders were formed from the arbitrary decision of the imperial powers of Europe to bifurcate Africa and divide it among themselves (Adebajo, 2010). Before the epochal event of 1884–1885, African kingdoms had exited for centuries with fluid but traceable borders, usually determined by natural markers such as rivers, mountains, roads, etc. Asiwaju (1993) shows that people of the same language, history or linguistic similarities banded together in their search for development. Although scholars like Nugent would argue that the borders created by the colonialists are not arbitrary and indeed followed on the pre-colonial patterns of boundary formation (personal communication, 2016), the evidence of history and the real-life experiences of people contradict this revisionist argument. In their bid to avoid competition from locals over exploitation of African resources, the colonialists adopted various tactics, including divide and rule, lies, bribery and violence to apportion African land to themselves. The borders were delineated in Berlin without the knowledge of the cultures and ethnic composition of people who inhabited these lands. Gashaw (2017: 2) puts this into balanced perspective when he notes that

> Artificial borders split many closely related ethnic groups into different colonial regions. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, they split Somalis into French Somaliland, British Somalia, Italian Somalia, Ethiopian Somalia, and the Somali region of northern Kenya. Such colonial borders have massive effects on Somali people who share a common culture, a similar way of life, and the same religion, but live as separate citizens of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Similarly, the Afar people of Ethiopia were split amongst Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and the Anyuaa and Nuer were split between Ethiopia and South Sudan.

These patterns of forced splitting and forced marriage are found in different parts of Africa, including in Angola where the Portuguese forced people of disparate nationalities from three countries into Angola. As Fisher (2012) argues, "had pre-industrial-era Portuguese colonists not pressed so far up along Africa's western coast so quickly, for example, then Africa's seven million Kikongo-speakers might today have their own country. Instead, they are split among three different countries, including Angola, as minorities." Yoruba people are divided among British-ruled Nigeria and French-ruled Benin Republic. Until the controversial decision of the International Court of Justice to hand over Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, the people living in that region were part of Nigeria. Beyond the accident of geography that these artificial borders represent are the more destructive and long-term mistrust, distrust and mutual hatred that they have created in the minds of Africans. The mental boundaries that are constructed in the minds of Africans have done significant damage to the socio-economic and political development of Africa before and after independence. Apart from the borderland areas that have been marginalised and subjected to several attacks, Africans are distant from each another through the construction of psychological otherness. Oblivious of the extent to which neo-imperial designs which manifest in the form of global capitalism and the war on terror in contemporary times have conditioned them to a subordinate position in the global hierarchy of power, Africans have been conditioned along mental boundaries to think that the other African, from across the border, is the one taking jobs and engaged in criminal behaviour. The decision of African leaders to keep the colonial boundaries at the Cairo Conference of 1964 has contributed to the perpetuation of what scholars have called bondage of boundaries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2012). Although the leaders decided to keep the colonially designed boundaries to avoid conflicts, that decision did not help to stem the tide of conflicts. Rather there are over 200 separatist groups that are campaigning for independence from the countries where they were forced to be by external powers. The Biafra War of Independence from 1967 to 1970 in Nigeria is a classic case.

Cases of Xenophobia have become rampant on the continent as locals who see other Africans as the *other* have risen up in arms and other forms of discriminations against fellow Africans (Neocosmos, 2010; Oloruntoba, 2018b). While the economically disadvantaged have been the face of such attacks, they usually have political foundations as political elites find it more convenient to blame others, especially African immigrants, for their lack of imagination, vision, discipline and commitment to socio-economic transformations in the lives of their people.

Nyamjoh (2006) chronicles the sense of insiders and outsiders in Southern Africa, especially South Africa and Botswana. Locals, who are excluded from economic opportunities, have felt threatened by the influx of other Africans. Rather than seeing their experiences of oppression and exploitation as similar in the global capitalist system, they engage in oppressing and exploiting these other Africans through different forms. As Prah (2010, 1999) argues, Africans also denigrate themselves by calling other Africans. For example, people from relatively developed economies in Southern Africa are fond of calling other Africans *makwerekwere* (people with unintelligible language). In South Africa, it has become politically correct to criminalise other Africans as being the brain behind everything that is wrong and illegal. While some part of the leadership of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) may be measured in making such xenophobic comments, that cannot be said of the nationalist oriented Democratic Alliance (DA). The Mayors of Tshwane and

Johannesburg, Solly Msimanga and Herman Mashaba, leading members of this party, especially the latter, have incessantly made xenophobic statements against other Africans living in South Africa. While there could be merit to the accusations that other Africans are involved in criminality, crimes have no boundary. Such statements smack of generalisation and a demonstration of crisis of identity, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the fact that non-Africans in the country are generally spared of such categorisations, when indeed they may not be innocent.

It is precisely in the manner in which African leaders and some professional elite appropriate nation space for political ends that borders continue to constitute a serious hindrance to achieving African unity. Even though Anderson (1983) argues that the nation-state is an imagined community, it provides the basis of power, accumulation and influence. Thus, despite the glaring reality that the balkanisation of Africa into micro and dependent states had origin in the desire of the imperialists to keep Africans weak, divided and susceptible to further manipulation and exploitation, these leaders prefer to rule over debt-ridden, beggarly and dependent states than to genuinely commit themselves to the project of Pan-African unity. As scholars have argued, with very few exceptions, the neo-colonial state has become authoritarian, exploitative and distant from the people (Wariboko, 2002). The state is also used for patronage, to settle political scores and project personal aspirations at the expense of societal development.

The ruling elites in Africa and some intellectuals, professionals and bureaucrats are often united in the politics of narrow nationalism, exclusion and feelings of superiority over others. Whereas it might be convenient to express belief in the unity of the black race, Pan-Africanism and African solidarity, these feelings become secondary when issues of positions, appointments and opportunities in places of work are involved. In such instances, territoriality becomes a key factor: Africans from other parts of the continent are reminded of where they come from, either overtly or covertly. This tendency to express belief in one thing is not limited to Africans. As Fanon (1965) argues in relation to French Liberals, who claim to support democracy, these groups of people did little or nothing when the French forces were killing millions of Algerians and other Africans who were demanding for decolonisation in the 1950s–1960s. On the other hand, borders matter little for African elites when they need to get their companies to go to other countries on the continent. Whereas human mobility is usually constrained due to various phony excuses and hysteria feelings, capital is usually welcome with open arms.

Visa regimes for political and other professional elites who are considered less dangerous and less of a burden to the state are also relatively relaxed. The target of border restrictions and securitisation are the subaltern classes, who because of exclusions in their countries of origin are seeking for ways of improving their livelihood in other African countries. Gumede, Oloruntoba, and Kamga-Djoyou (2019) found out in a study of migration and regional integration in Africa that the mass of Africans in the lower classes want borders dismantled so that people can move freely across the continent.

To summarise, the politics of borders and its effects on regional integration and development in Africa cannot be divorced from the crisis of identity that the continent is facing today. In the absence of self-knowing, self-appraisal and self-critique, Africans continue to perpetuate the politics of difference, divide and rule, define and conquer that underpinned the imperial logic of partition of Africans in the nineteenth century. Today, as it was then, various countries in the developed and emerging economies are negotiating agreements on the basis of unequal relationship with small and incapable African states. From China to the European Union (EU), African countries are negotiating agreements that could further under-develop rather than develop them (Oloruntoba, 2018a; Soludo, 2012). While there is merit in the fact that Africa is made up of various disparate ethnic identities, different cultures and languages, this does not detract from the possibilities that an African identity can be born based on the consciousness of being African first before identifying with other markers of identity. What late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Paul Kagame did in post-independent Tanzania and post-Genocide Rwanda, respectively, attest to the possibility of building a state out of the multi-ethnic sub-nationalities. The reality of geopolitical configurations and considerations for geo-strategic interests that underpin the global capitalist system necessitate rethinking the current externally contrived borders in Africa. But to make this acceptable and meaningful, it must be based on the idea or philosophy of socio-economic and political freedom in which the dignity of Africans is restored. The next section provides an analysis of regional integration and its link to development in Africa.

African Experiences with Regional Integration: From the Past to the Present

Regional integration, broadly conceived as the voluntary surrender of some aspects of a state's sovereignty to achieve larger political and economic objectives, has been at the core of development strategies in Africa since colonialism. Post-colonial leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Julius Nyerere believed that a Pan-African integration agenda is a sine qua non for positioning African countries to achieve development (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Nkrumah, 1963). Although these leaders could not agree on the sequence of integration, they had the understanding that given the structural composition of the global capitalist economies, the experiences of Africans under slave trade and colonialism, Africa had little or no chance to develop outside a cooperative arrangement. The ideas of regional integration and how it might lead to industrialisation occupied centre stage in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL). Subsections 1–3 of the Preamble to the text of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos state as follows:

1. We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to promote the economic and social development and integration of our economies with a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-sufficiency and self-sustainment.
2. We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to promote the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse.
3. We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to establish national, sub-regional and regional institutions which will facilitate the attainment of objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment (Organisation of African Unity, 1980).

An analysis of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos shows that although the programme was very ambitious and indeed held great potential for the socio-economic transformation of the continent, it failed to achieve its objectives due to a combination of both domestic and external factors. At the domestic level, lack of national capacity for resource mobilisation made it impossible to fund the huge infrastructure needs that is required to achieve the integration objectives. At the external level, the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted at the same time that African countries began to experience economic crisis. The crisis provided opportunity for the International Financial Institutions to intervene in African economies. Rather than supporting the vision of African leaders as encapsulated under the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, the World Bank came up with the Berg Report, which laid the basis for the introduction of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Whereas the LPA had forged out clear roles for the State in terms of fostering industrialisation, providing social services and enhancing redistribution, the Berg Report sees the State as a hindrance to socio-economic development and made the case for the market to take the centre stage in allocation of resources (Adebajo, 2014; Adedeji, 2012).

The adoption of the SAPs marked the neoliberal turn in African economies. Thus, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) that followed conceived regional integration basically from the perspective of market integration (Gibb, 2009). And as Draper (2013) would argue, African's attempt at regional integration has tended to follow the European integration model.

Theoretically, Ballasa (1961) provides four stages through which regional integration can be achieved, namely (a) Free Trade Area, (b) Customs Union, (c) Monetary Union and (d) Political Union. Whereas the EU appears to have reached the final stage of integration, through the creation of various supranational institutions such as the European Parliament, European Court of Justice, European Investment Bank, single currency (except for four countries) and so on, each of the member states still have their own sovereignty. The rise of populist regimes in Europe has spurred right-wing movements that are now calling for the dismantling of the EU. The Brexit vote represents a classic case of the existential threat of that the EU is currently faced with. The contradictions between the market integration ideas that informed EU integration call for reflections on the path that African integration efforts have taken post-1980. The fracturing that the EU is faced with is largely informed by the fears that regional integration (free movement of people) is responsible for the threat to jobs that people from countries that are relatively developed are faced with due to what they call influx of migrants from less developed countries, even with the EU. As scholars have argued, the globalisation processes have excluded many people and nations that are not fully prepared for it. Trade and investment regimes and the overall liberalisation of the global markets have ensured that capital have more value than human beings. Thus, the reaction of people to regional integration efforts in developed countries is borne out of this sense of exclusion.

As noted above, the feeling of exclusion and the fears that migrants will take over available opportunities have underpinned the increased territorial thinking in different parts of Africa. It might be necessary to rethink regional integration away from its neoliberal foundation. In the case of Africa, this is of utmost importance in the light of the need to pool resources and build synergy while relating with negotiating trade and investment agreements with other parts of the world.

Following the Abuja Treaty of 1991, the African Union (AU) recognised eight regional economic communities through which the continent will arrive at a full economic and political integration. These include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (ECA), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD. These organisations are to serve as building blocks to the realisation of African integration. They are also part of the AU Agenda 2063. Perhaps due to the relatively stronger economic capacity of two regional hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa, in West and Southern Africa, ECOWAS and SADC have been the most active of the regional economic organisations. From the intervention of ECOWAS, through its military arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), this regional organisation has played important roles in fostering peace and security and promoting the norms of democracy in the sub-region (Adebajo, 2002; Olonisakin, 2008). SADC has also played significant roles in resolving political logjams in countries such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe. In the wake of the escalation of terrorist attacks from Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and its environs, regional approach has also been taken to tackling the challenges of insurgency in West Africa. The formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force is a regional approach to solving this challenge.

Despite the relative success that has been achieved by regional economic communities (RECs) in the promotion of peace and security in the sub-region, economic integration among and between the RECs has been below the expected volume. As the figure below shows, intra-Africa trade in general is much lower than other regions.



Source: UNCTAD, 2018

The new African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which was signed and ratified by the required number of member states of the AU in April 2019, is a crystallisation of various processes geared towards the actualisation of regional integration and creation of African Economic Community (African Union, 2018). AfCFTA goes beyond the promotion of intra-African trade in commodities to exports of processed goods, services as well as ensuring free movement of people across the continent. The overall aim is to ensure structural transformation through the creation of regional value chains and preparation of African countries to participate in the global value chains (ECA, 2018). With an estimated population of 1.2 billion and a projected population of 2.5 billion people by 2050, a well-integrated African market with strong industrial capacity can enhance growth and prosperity of the continent. However, for this to be done, there is a need to overcome the perennial challenges that have adversely affected regional integration in Africa. To this we now turn.

Challenges to Regional Integration

The nature and the character of the state in Africa makes regional integration a compelling force for structural transformation and the repositioning of Africa in the global capitalist economy. Despite the rhetoric around this subject matter, there are challenges that have continued to hamper its realisation. First is the model of integration that has been adopted in Africa. As noted above, African countries have tried to mimic the EU model of regional integration by advocating creation of market access for goods and services to the detriment of cultural exchanges, mutual understanding of our shared identity as Africans and the expected benefits of integration. Because regional integration is located within the neoliberal capitalist system, which care little for the welfare of the people, political elites in Africa eill continue to adopt a top-down approach. As noted above, African political and bureaucratic elites work in tandem with other members of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) to accumulate profits and rents under the current regime of primitive capitalist accumulation. Thus, their overall agenda is to function within this regime through the nation-space. Consequently, there is no incentive for these elites to concede parts of the powers and privileges that they enjoy at the national level. Regardless of the weakness of this state and the resultant inability to exercise sovereign functions, the elites are satisfied with the rhetoric of regional integration, especially within the confines of market ideas.

The absence of incentives to surrender part of the sovereignty is linked to the next challenge: lack of political will on regional integration is evident in the treaties and protocols that have been signed but are not implemented, both at the regional and continental levels. In ECOWAS, for instance, whereas the Protocol on Free Movement of People and Rights of Establishment works relatively well, there have been cases of other Africans being attacked or their businesses seized in some countries that are signatories to such Protocols. The recent cases in which Ghana clamped down on Nigerian businesses raised start-up capital for foreigners to about three hundred thousand dollars and deport other Africans attest to this breach in Protocol. As mentioned above, in the case of South Africa, attacks on other African nationals, especially those who live in the township, have become commonplace (Shireen, Tawana, Eric, & Alon, 2008).

Linked to the absence of political will as one of the challenges of regional integration in Africa is crisis of identity (Oloruntoba, 2018c). Crisis of identity manifests in lack of self-knowledge of Africans. It is also a demonstration of the lack of appreciation of their collective fortune in the global hierarchy of power. It is not uncommon to find one state in Africa competing with other states and actually feeling that they are better than the others, sometimes on account of the level of acceptance that they have with the others. Even at international fora, it is not uncommon to find African countries take sides with former colonisers against fellow Africans. The crisis of identity shows how difficult it is for Africa to unite and take common positions in critical matters that affect the development and the survival of the continent in an intensely competitive global environment. This crisis also shows in the ease with which non-Africans are able to enter other African countries either for leisure or for business. It would appear that there is a psychological conditioning of Africans to have self-hate and aversion for themselves. This conditioning has a long historical trajectory starting from the period of slave trade, in which slave merchants incentivised Africans to hunt after one another. The commoditisation of life and the destruction of sense of community and bonding that had defined African value system had its foundation in slave trade but have now become accentuated through market-induced neoliberal individualism, and, what Chomsky calls, consumerism and exhibitionism (Chomsky & Barsama, 2017). The preoccupation with self and the ideational pursuit of accumulation without regard to how the society is affected have undermined the commitment of African elites to the project of integration.

Apart from the economic and cultural challenges narrated above, there are economic factors, such as inadequate infrastructure, landlocked countries, insufficient domestic technical and analytical capacity, dependence on external financing, narrow production base, overlapping membership of regional integration arrangements and external interferences as well as lack of synergy of national policies with the objectives of African Economic Community (ECA, 2004; Qobo, 2007).

In terms of infrastructures, travelling within Africa remains a big challenge as rail lines and road networks are poorly connected. Air travels might have been improving, but it is still difficult to connect from smaller countries in West Africa to East as well as Southern Africa. In cases where the road networks are relatively good, such as in Sothern Africa, road blocks and delays at the borders hinder free flow of goods and services (Jerome & Nabena, 2016). Due to lack of well-developed seaports and shores, importation of goods through the sea continues to be a disincentive to intra-African trade. Goods imported from one part of the continent to the other might have to be re-exported through other countries, which makes it cheaper to import outside Africa than within the continent.

The inability to connect cultural exchanges and connections to the project of regional integration at the policy level also affects the practicality of integration in Africa. Although there are currently such exchanges among Nollywood actors, Musicians, Sports and so on, these have not been deliberately incorporated into the regional integration agenda. Yet, people-to-people integration could be a fundamental requirement for integration over and above market-induced integration in Africa.

Lastly, the exclusion of the informal sector from integration agenda remains another challenge to the realisation of huge potentials that are inherent in this process for economic development in Africa. In a special issue of *Africa Insight on borders, informality and regional integration* edited by the trio of Nshimbi, Moyo, and Oloruntoba (2018), the importance of the informal economy and its link to regional integration was brought into focus. The informal sector constitutes a considerable part of the African economy, contributing over 40% of job creation in a country like Zimbabwe (Chirisa, 2015). In this context, informal cross-border trade contributes to livelihood for women in different parts of the continent (Nshimbi & Moyo, 2017). Rather than focusing all attention to how companies can export goods and services from one part of Africa to the other, it is imperative to conduct more research on the contributions of the informal sector to regional integration. Additionally, rather than criminalising informal-cross border traders, substantial support should be provided at both national and regional levels. If development is defined in terms of improved welfare, capability and voice (Sen, 2001), then, by providing employment for millions of Africans, both educated and uneducated, the informal sector is helping to achieve development outcomes. A deliberate linkage between the regional integration agenda and this sector will provide a different outcome in terms of the volume of intra-African trade as well as the potentials for achieving socio-economic development (World Bank, 2012).

Conclusion: Linking Borders, Regional Integration and Development in Africa

This chapter departs from the existing literature on borders and regional integration by reframing the debate to include the historical, identity and non-formal part of the discourse. I argue that given the location of Africa in the global capitalist order, none of the states on the continent can exist meaningfully and achieve development without integrating in one way or another with other states. Even though post-independence African leaders are aware of this reality and have indeed taken some steps towards this end, the combination of historical forces and events which altered the mode of social relations among Africans, the entrapment within the global imperial design which is ensconced under neoliberal market ideology, preoccupation with self-survival and accumulation have rendered the project of regional integration ineffective. Thus, it becomes imperative to restructure the epistemological and ontological basis of relationships among Africans, in ways that reshape and redefine the current predisposition to both mental and physical boundaries. Beyond the pursuit of market integration through formal business enterprises, a conscious effort should be made to incorporate culture and the informal sector into the regional integration agenda on the continent. In this connection, solving the problem of identity and the associated crisis will foster new thinking about the ways in which Africans can relate among themselves. Achieving economic integration without conscious effort at achieving social and political integration will produce a sub-optimal outcome as it has been over the past five decades of gaining political independence.

References

Adebajo, A. (2002). *Building peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Adebajo, A. (2010). *The curse of the Berlin: Africa after the Cold War*. London: Hurst.

Adebajo, A. (2014). Chapter 19: Two prophets of regional integration: Prebisch and Adedeji. In B. Currie-Alder, R. Kanbur, D. M. Malone, & R. Medhora (Eds.), *International development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adedeji, A. (2012). The travails of regional integration in Africa. In A. Adebajo & K. Whiteman (Eds.), *The EU and Africa-from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (pp. 83–104). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

African Union. (2018). *African continental free trade agreement*. Addis Ababa: African Union.

Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verson: London.

Asiwaju, A. (1993). Borderlands in Africa: A comparative research perspective with particular reference to Western Europe. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 8*(2), 1–12.

Ballasa, B. (1961). *The theory of economic integration*. London: Allen & Urwin.

Chirisa, I. (2015). The role of the informal sector in African regional integration: Scope and limits. *Insight on Africa, 6*(2), 131–144.

Chomsky, N., & Barsamia, D. (2017). *Global discontents: Conversations on the rising threats to democracy*. Boston, MA: Metropolitan Books.

Draper, P. (2013). Breaking free from Europe: Why Africa needs another model of integration. In L. Fioramonti (Ed.), *Regionalism in a changing world: Comparative perspectives in the new global order*. New York: Routledge.

Economic Commission for Africa. (2004). *ECA (Economic Commission on Africa) 2004. Assessing regional integration in Africa* (ECA Policy Research Report). Addis Ababa: ECA.

Economic Commission for Africa. (2018). *African continental free trade agreement*. Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa.

Fanon, F. (1965). *A dying colonialism*. New York: Grove Press.

Fisher, M. (2012). The dividing of a continent: Africa's separatist problem. *The Atlantic*. Accessed May 11, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-dividing-of-a-continent-africas-separatist-problem/262171/

Gashaw, T. (2017, November 17). *Colonial borders in Africa: Improper design and its impact on African borderland communities, southern voices*. Accessed May 11, 2019, from https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/colonial-borders-in-africa-improper-design-and-its-impact-on-african-borderland-communities/

Gibb, R. (2009). Regional integration and development trajectory: Meta-theories, expectations and reality. *Third World Quarterly, 30*(4), 701–721.

Gumede, V., Oloruntoba, S., & Kamga-Djoyou, S. (2019). *Migration and regional integration in Africa: West and southern Africa in comparative perspectives*. London: CODESRIA and Brills.

Jerome, A. A., & Nabena, D. (2016). Infrastructure and regional integration in Africa. In D. H. Levine & D. Nagar (Eds.), *Region-building in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2013). Decolonial epistemic perspective and pan-African Unity in the 21st century. In M. Munchie, P. Lukhele-Olorunju, & O. Akpor (Eds.), *The African Union ten years after* (pp. 385–409). Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S., & Mhlanga, B. (Eds.). (2012). *The bondage of boundaries and identity politics in post-colonial Africa*. Pretoria: African Institute of South African Press.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S., & Mhlanga, B. (2013). Introduction. In S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & B. Mhlanga (Eds.), *Bondage of boundaries and identity politics in post-colonial Africa: The 'northern problem' and ethno-futures* (pp. 1–23). Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa.

Neocosmos, M. (2008). *From 'foreign natives' to 'native foreigners': Explaining xenophobia inpost-apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and nationalism, identity and politics*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Neocosmos, M. (2010). *From 'foreign natives' to 'native foreigners': Explaining xenophobia inpost-apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and nationalism, identity and politics*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Nkrumah, K. (1963). *Africa must unite*. London: Panaf Books.

Nshimbi, C., & Moyo, I. (2017). *Migration, Crossborder trade and development in Africa: Exploring the role of non-state actors in the SADC region*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nshimbi, C., Moyo, I., & Oloruntoba, S. (2018). Borders, informal cross-border economies and regional integration in Africa: An introduction. *Africa Insight, 48*(1), 1–11.

Nyamjoh, F. (2006). *Insiders and outsiders: Citizenship and xenophobia in contemporary southern Africa*. CODESRIA: Dakar.

Olonisakin, F. (2008). *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The story of Unamsil by Funmi Olonisakin*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Oloruntoba, S. (2018a). Crisis of identity and xenophobia in Africa: The imperative of a pan-African thought liberation. In A. Adeoye (Ed.), *The political economy of xenophobia in Africa* (pp. 9–22). New York: Springer.

Oloruntoba, S. O. (2018b). In whose interest? Liberal democracy, inequality and the imperatives of alternative politics: Nigeria and South Africa in comparative perspectives. *New South African Review, 6*, 102–114.

Oloruntoba, S. (2018c). Opportunism or partnership for development: Trends and patterns in Sino-Nigerian relations. In K. Prah & V. Gumede (Eds.), *Perspectives in China and Africa relations*. Cape Town: Africa World Press.

Organisation of African Unity. (1980). *Lagos plan of action and the final act of Lagos, 1980*. Addis Ababa: Organisation of African Unity.

Prah, K. (1999). African renaissance or Warlordism? In M. Malegapuru & W. Makgoba (Eds.), *African renaissance* (pp. 37–61). Cape Town: Mafube.

Prah, K. (2010). *Soundings, studies on African transformation* (CASAS Book Series, No, 79). Cape Town: Centre for Advanced Study of African Society.

Qobo, M. (2007, June). *The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalisation and the prospects for a United States of Africa* (ISS Paper 145).

Rodney, W. (1981). *How Europe underdeveloped Africa* (2nd ed.). London: L'Ouverture.

Sen, A. (2001). *Development as freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shireen, H., Tawana, K., Eric, W., & Alon, S. (Eds.). (2008). *Go home or die here: Violence, xenophobia and the reinvention of difference in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.

Soludo, C. (2012, April). Will Europe underdevelop Africa again? *News African Magazine*.

Wariboko, N. (2002). State-corporation relationship: Impact on management practice. In A. Oyebade (Ed.), *The transformation of Nigeria: Essays in honor of Toyin Falola* (pp. 289–327).

World Bank. (2012). *Defragmenting Africa. Deepening regional integration in goods and services*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Zeleza, P. (1993). *A modern history of Africa* (The nineteenth century) (Vol. 1). Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Limited in association with Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa.

Chapter 4
Perspectives on Contemporary Migration and Regional Integration in Central Africa

Germain Ngoie Tshibambe

Introduction

The Central African region is characterized by a mixture of peace and conflicts. Based on Johan Galtung's distinction (1964) between positive and negative peace, this region is characterized by negative peace. This distinctive reference to negative versus positive peace aims at understanding the social complexity of violence and conflicts within any society: a negative peace is 'the absence of violence, the absence of war' (Galtung, 1964: 2); it is indeed a peace without justice, whereas positive peace is the absence of indirect violence enabling persons to be integrated. Positive peace indicates the simultaneous presence of many desirable states of mind and society, such as harmony, justice, equity and so on. The lack of positive peace within this area stems from the political instability which opens doors to conflicts and plundering of natural resources (Omeje & Ngoie, 2008).

The quest to render this region 'a space of peace, prosperity, solidarity and an unified economic and political space' was emphasized by Heads of State at the 13th Summit Conference of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) held in Brazzaville on October 2007 (Ngoie, 2014: 38). To make such an ideal possible depends upon softening the weight of borders between the member states. Instead of being deemed barriers, borders should be footbridges which assist in building foundations of uniting this space. Countries of the region have many natural resources such as oil in Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea; copper and coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and diamond in the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR). The resource-abundant countries are close to

G. N. Tshibambe (✉)
Department of International Relations, University of Lubumbashi, Haut Katanga, Democratic Republic of the Congo
e-mail: tshibamben@unilu.ac.cd

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_4

others which are poor in resources. Economic performance also shows a spatial picture in which asymmetries display a scale with four rich countries (Angola, DRC, Cameroon and Gabon) whose high GDP (gross domestic product) makes them more attractive than the others with low GDP. Political instability hits more than 60% of the countries of the region due to uneasy bargaining at the expense of democratic demand.

Poverty is rampant, because more than 60% of the population is said to live on less than $2 per day (Omeje & Ngoie, 2008). Out of the 25 poorest countries located in Africa the poorest three are from the Central Africa region. That is the case of CAR, Burundi and the DRC. Because of this, making a living through the informal sector is paramount in the region. The report on Zambia, which shares borders with the DRC, is worth being cited concerning the trend of the importance of the informal sector in the region: 'formal sector employment has remained almost stagnant since 1998 and most employment growth has been recorded in the informal sector of the economy' (Gondwe & Pamu, 2014: 6). In the DRC, informal sector activities are deemed to be 'the real economy', according to MacGaffey (1991). This is not so different in Congo-Brazzaville, the Central Africa Republic, Cameroon and Gabon. As people are bound to fend for themselves, they tend to expand and to broaden their 'space for living'. Beyond diverse economic activities, across borders there is the dynamic of migration (or mobility), the first effect of which is the creation of a vast 'migratory territory' (Tarrius, 2005). That mobility is not a new phenomenon in this region. What is still common in the migration dynamic is the commercial plinth essential to it.

However, what is new concerning mobility, and in view of the picture painted above, relates to two features in the Central African region: the first feature concerns mobility induced by violence, which results in refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The second aspect is about the involvement of transnational actors in managing and framing issues of migration. Those transnational actors are the international organizations like the African Union (AU) or ECCAS.[1]

The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. It, first, seeks to make sense of the sustained migration dynamics and trends in the Central African region, in an attempt to understand the drivers of migration. Additionally, it analyses the actions and reactions undertaken in and through regional economic communities (RECs) to tackle migration issues in the region. Furthermore, it takes particular interest in analysing the apparent transition in migration management and governance from the nation-state to the transnational level. Finally, this chapter critically analyses the scope and limits of integrating migration issues within RECs.

[1]ECCAS includes the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea Equatorial, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Sao Tome Principe.

Methods

The methodology employed in this chapter is based on a review of the literature and some fieldwork research. Fieldwork research was conducted between 2012 and 2013 in selected cities across four countries including Burundi, the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Zambia. Semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observation were conducted in these locations in order to get insightful understanding of 'ways of doing things' in migration, in ways similar to de Certeau (quoted by Bayart, 1980: 21). This chapter adopts an approach that is based on migrant's agency. Using this approach, it classifies practices relating to migration, and migration drivers and systems. This approach helps draw up a two-dimensional interpretation of migration in Central Africa: the first pits macroscopic against microscopic migration and the second structural against microscopic and helps make sense of the main drivers of migration. The first dimension paves the way for analysing the typology of migration at the microscopic level, which helps identify and make sense of the new actors on move.

Migration in Central Africa: Form and Drivers

Central Africa is characterized by strong migration dynamics. These shape the landscape in respective African countries of the region. At the same time, these dynamics straddle other migration systems, namely migration from or towards Africa in general and other world regions. Taking into account the fact that nowadays multiple places are migration destinations, Central Africa hosts about 1.7 million African migrants, accounting for approximately 8.7% of all migrants. Immigrants in some Central African countries like Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and Sao Tome make up about 19%, 3.5%, 3.4% and 3.2% of the total population, respectively. Without attempting to map out migrant destinations in the region, two features are worth considering here concerning this issue. First, trends in multiple destinations and, second, individual trajectories which depend on individual choices and networks. A map of destinations is not easy to draw, but we can subsume the evidence of variety of destinations of migration to Africa and the worldwide.

Due to the porosity of the borders and scarcity of updated statistical data, the number of immigrants to the member states of the ECCAS is not easy to record. In this stance, what is better recorded concerns refugees fleeing conflicts tearing the region apart. Worldwide, the highest number of refugees comes from Central Africa, the percentage of which is about 78%. The top refugee generating countries are the DRC (68%) and CAR (23%). The destination of these refugees is the bordering countries. For instance, refugees from the DRC go to Tanzania, Uganda, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and Zambia. Some go further, to South Africa, Europe or

Canada. To this dimension we can add dynamics of internal migration from rural to urban milieus and the fact that the current rate of urbanization of the region, which stands at 40.4%, is high and above the average of sub-Saharan Africa's rate of urbanization (37.2%) as per 2010's record. Bearing this statistical evidence in mind, three issues deserve commentary. First, all the facets of migration are prevalent in the region, for example, internal as well as international migration, forced and voluntary migration—all characterize the migration of this region. Second, the region's political instability gives prominence to forced migration through its two dimensions of refugee movement and the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Third, international (and voluntary) migration is of a complex and diverse nature. The main challenge is that the exact numbers are difficult to determine.

In analysing the forms of migration in Central Africa, we go beyond the classical description such as the ethereal differentiation giving light on forced versus voluntary migration or internal versus international migration. We look at those who are migrating bearing in mind that in our analysis, internal migration is excluded. Internal migration is left out in this reflection as the final aim is about assessing migration governance which is not intrastate, but instead interstate with the involvement of international organizations. What are the features of migration and the migrants who are on the move within this region? Before unfolding the forms and features of migration and migrants, our approach is structural and microscopic. The structural lens looks at the social and economic forces driving motivations to migrate; it helps classifying migration within broad categories. The microscopic approach gets interest in portraying the actors, let us say the actors on move. In combining this double approach, we are about to know who is migrating and, accordingly, migration governance should be implemented to meet people's needs and expectations. Table 4.1 shows the forms of migration with the mixed approach—structural and micro.

It needs to be noted that one should avoid the binary perspective of thinking there is a translation/shift alongside the combination of parameters and the structural lens through which the continuum is reversible. Depending upon the conditions which determine movement, a migrant can decide to undertake steps for migrating for labour whereas in situ he/she finds opportunities to conduct business. Therefore, this migrant will start being mobile in search of benefiting the differentials of spatial price variation (Ngoie, 2014). As this region is stricken by conflicts, political instability leads many people to run away from pockets of violence and, as said above, this region has a high percent of refugees. The distinction between regular and irregular/clandestine migration needs to be clear: indeed, two factors account for the tenuous straddling. First according to Luc Sindjoun's 'ethnic communautarism' thesis (Sindjoun, 2002) nation-states in Africa's international relations are framed upon ethnic melting pots that have put together diverse ethnic groups spread within neighbouring countries. Those co-ethnic members can move easily from one country to another with the reflex of 'my parents' home' is in this country A, and my uncles' houses are there after crossing this neighbouring border. Second, statistical scarcity

Table 4.1 Structural and microscopic picture of migration

Lens / **Parameters**	**Structural** ⟷ **Microscopic**		
Economic motivation	Labour migration ↕ Trading migration		Men Women Children Persons with disabilities Family reunion
Juridical status	Regular migration ↕ Irregular migration	refugee Asylum seeker	
Time scale	Long span of life migration ↕ Short stay migration	⟷ Circular migration	
Strategic	Transit migration	⟶ to multiple destinations	

Source: The author (2019)

is stemming from the 'intractability' (Mbembe, 1992) of state institutions, whose officers tend not to support collecting data and to update them accordingly.[2]

The Drivers of Migration

Finding out the reasons why people are moving is a challenging task. To grasp this task starts by agreeing with three levels of debates. The first level is about the definition of migration; the second level concerns the changing nature of the functionality of spaces being part of 'the migratory territory' (Tarrius, 2005); and in the third level, there is the issue of the scale through which migration is featured. Concerning the definition of migration, it involves a threefold change: change of the place of residence, change of the employment and change of social relationships (Piché, 2012: 153–178). The varying functionality of spaces within the globalized migratory territory is the complex dimension worth being considered, as the binary distinction between the sending country and the receiving country is no more adequate. Instead of two, there are three countries, the third being the transit country to insert within the spatiality of mobility. The third level raises the methodological

[2]'Intractability' as used by Achille Mbembe refers also to 'simulacre regime' being the way of doing things in Africa. If discourse on scarcity of migration data is so predominant in Africa this is a partial representation of things. Indeed, statistical data are not well kept due to bribery and smuggling practices undertaken by state officers willing to cheat in pocketing the migrants. See Mbembe (1992)

lens through which we need to grasp the actor involved in migration. Lenses can be 'micro', 'meso' or 'macro'. In combining surreptitious implications induced from all the above debates it suffices to note the super-complexity of thinking on one-sided approach to grasping drivers of migration issue.

Without reminding the debatable theories of this issue, let us put emphasis on the 'push–pull' factor model that has been promoted to account for the explanatory variable in the decision-making relating to mobility. At the core of this model, we analyse the conditions being found within the sending country and the destination country. Not only objective conditions within the two countries should be assessed but also the subjective perceptions as they are understood by the subjects being in mobility (Piché, 2012: 156). Having said that, the following factors are deemed the most important in supporting the dynamic of migration: poverty, climate change, urbanization, education, conflict, population growth, access to information, smuggling and trafficking. We can also summarize them into three categories within which we cite, the search of work, economic and trade opportunities and security and safety.

Migration Systems and Consequences

It needs to be known that the dynamics of migration have led to a spatial configuration through which it is possible to draw a continuum of the migratory territory where there is a dialectical positioning of sending, transit and destination countries (Ngoie, 2013). At this level, Central Africa is linked to any other region or area within Africa and elsewhere in the world. The cartography of migration from and to the Central African region has complex lines and arrows. Within the region, intra-regional migration although an important phenomenon tends to be hidden because of lack of data. Countries having abundant natural resources are exercising the pull function whereas conflict-torn and less endowed in resources countries are likely to be push areas. Indeed, this partition of migration movement is not so automatic and linear. Depending upon 'intermediary opportunities' this simplistic description of the role and function of countries may vary, based on the ability of one country to be inverted to be either a sending or receiving, or transit country, depending upon the internal and regional environment. It has been ascertained that intra-regional migration is intense meanwhile intra-African migration is also important. According to UNICEF/UNO/5325/DRAGAJ, 'each year, an estimated 12 million people cross borders in West and Central Africa. In fact, the vast majority of those people are not trying to get to Europe. More than 75% of them move within sub-Saharan Africa, going from one country to another, either for economic opportunities or fleeing from conflict'.

Research undertaken on the migration systems within the Central Africa region points to multipolarity of migration systems. According to Mvuezelo Bazonzi (2014): 18),

> with an estimated people of more than 146 million the central Africa region is one among the regions having the high degree of outmigration at the continental and worldwide scale. It has three migration sub-systems: the Portuguese-speaking countries system (Angola, Sao Tome and Principe), the second concerns countries of the African Great Lakes (DRC, Burundi and Ruanda) and the third one is turned to the Benin Gulf (Chad, Central Africa Republic, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea).

From Ngoie's (2014: 34) standpoint,

> besides this first configuration of migration areas other representations of systems unfold many spaces with different speed. Therefore, there exists the segmented space of the Economic and Monetary Community of the Central Africa within which four countries, namely Congo, Cameroon, CAR and Chad have incentive practices supporting the free movement of people. Another space is the one constituted of member states of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC), namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ruanda which have signed free movement of people agreements. The third space stems from practices implemented by those states that adopt restrictive measures consisting in requiring entry and sojourn visas from nationals belonging to other member states of the ECCAS. Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Angola are the main concerned in this case.

Therefore, in considering this reality it is worth raising two aspects: the first aspect relates to the critical mass of intra-African migration and as it regards the Central African region. Intra-regional migration here is coupled with cross-regional migration in two directions: to the East and to the Southern regions. The second aspect concerns the characteristics of those people who are on the move. As shown in Table 4.1, the time of masculine migration is over; within the migration field there are more and more women. These women are independent while migrating with dynamic networks and business niches (Ngoie, 2014). Besides women, we find also children and persons with disabilities. The children are not accompanied; that gives cautious attention to such emerging categories of actors involved in migration. These new forms and characteristics of migrants now characterize the political economy of migration from and in the Central African region (see Table 4.1). On this basis, the question can be asked: are there policies aimed at managing this nature of migration? However, countries in this region have considered making policies relating to regulating migration, in the context of regional integration.

Transnational Migration Governance

This phase stems from the dynamics and the high demand of the institutionalism in Africa. In the 1980s, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held its first economic summit, which adopted the Final Act of Lagos and the Lagos Plan of Action, in Lagos. According to the Lagos Plan of Action, African states were committed to implementing integration as a way for sustaining economic growth and political stability. Implementing integration throughout the continent induces the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC) aimed at creating the common market by

2028. Africa was subdivided into five regions[3]; each region was bound to get its integration organization(s). The Central African Region created the ECCAS as a regional economic community with ten member states. Besides the ECCAS, there are also the economic organization implemented by the neighbouring countries of the African Great Lakes which are three (Burundi, DRC and Rwanda) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) with six member countries. While looking at the constitutive acts of both economic organizations, it should be noted that they aim at promoting peace and stability among member states, and at the economic levels, the member states try to get involved into the process of integration as propounded by Balassa.

Migration issues were incorporated within juridical frameworks of these institutions implicitly at their inception, but moreover they became the new agenda implemented through added juridical instruments. For instance, at the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, it was in 1980 that a specific agreement between the three governments of Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda relating to free movement of people within this area was sealed and amended on 26 July 2011. At the level of CEMAC, which is composed of mainly the former French colonized territories, the free movement of people was implemented and got grassroots support due to the colonial heritage backing by the Afrique Equatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa).

Post-National Migration Governance

In the history of migration management in Africa it is worth recalling that, after the first phase of nationalistic perspective of managing migration, there is a second step consisting in seeing different international organizations created in Africa get involved in encouraging free movement of people. After creating regional economic communities with discursive claims on free movement of people and of services and goods, there was a new security impetus steered upon this issue after the 11th September 2002 terror attacks in the USA (Biyoya Makutu, 2014). In fact, terrorist attacks against the USA opened up a new era through which the migration issue became the new challenge in the global politics (Badie quoted by Biyoya Makutu, 2014: 52–53).

At the same time, debates are alive which attempt to show the correlation between migration and development through remittances. This shift from negative to positive

[3]The five regions are the North of Africa with the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the West of Africa with the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Economic Community of the Western African States (ECOWAS); the East of Africa with the East Africa Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Centre of Africa has its Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Southern part of Africa has its Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). But concrete politics is very complex; things are not going so well.

perspective on migration introduced a new wage of migration policies from the Western powers. There was a mobilization of the scholarship worldwide around the migration–development nexus as new gold reef, which has mobilized non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academicians and research centres. States were mobilized to implement new policies integrating the nexus between migration and development. That is the same situation for the international organizations which were called to get more consciousness in implementing proactive policies dealing with migration in all its facets. From 2012 to 2014, the ECCAS embarked upon inserting and raising consciousness on framing the culture of considering migration issues and their nexus with development. All the pertinent issues of remittances and migration, free movement of people within the region, gender issues in migration, human rights and migrants, management of statistics related to migration services, health and migration, environmental risks and migration were the core issues raised during this activity for which the European Union spent more than 20 million Euro (Bakewell, 2009; Ndione, 2014).

Integrating Migration into the RECs' Agenda

Economic asymmetries worldwide induced turbulences at the periphery. The threat of poor people knocking at the doors of the rich countries with the stereotypes of 'the fortress Europe' or the 'invasion of Europe' led to drastic measures taken by many countries against migration movement (Smith, 2018). After the creation of Frontex as a mechanism implemented by the European Union so as to 'tame' the influxes of migrants to Europe, the will of controlling and patrolling borders of European countries against the unwanted guests led the European Union's states to let the African states get in a multilateral summit with the aim to help the latter states be able to contain the propensity of African youth to migrate to Europe.

All the initiatives undertaken towards African international organizations with regard to migration issues have a foundational axis upon security sensitiveness. Thanks to the diffusionist approach, African states and international organizations are called upon to revitalize the commitment towards the content of the first steps in the march to integration as expounded by Balassa's theory of integration. The free trade agreement and the customs union are but valid unless they are supported by free mobility of factors of production among which is the importance of free movement of people. Therefore, there is a renewal of the necessity to give more importance to create a spirit of a governance of migration within the regional economic communities. This migration governance is sustained and should get support at the level of transnational organizations working with a double dynamic, a top-down logic and a bottom-up dimension. The top-down logic steers migration governance when we consider all the agency and the work undertaken at the institutional level of any regional economic community committed to implementing various measures to facilitate the management of migration within the member States of the community. That is the task unfolded by the ECCAS, the EMCAC or the ECGLC or any other REC in Africa. The case of the ECOWAS is telling upon the agency and the force of all sorts of measures taken from the bottom in order to back the free movement of people. The bottom-up logic consists in considering all the rules, measures and legislation adopted by each nation-state at the national level so as to harmonize them with others of other States. The second feature of the bottom-up logic consists of reinforcing internal capacities of the national bureaucracies in charge of migration in order to get officers attuned with the specific cases while dealing with migrants. These specific cases concern questions of human rights of migrants, rights of women rights of disabled persons and rights of children.

Conclusion

The challenge is immense as what is decided within states institutions can be ignored or bypassed by practices at grassroots. For instance, even if in airports the nationals of the same REC are required to be guided to a special desk for speedy processing, rules are evidently not applied. The way the RECs try to cope with migration issues is based on formal Western rationale through which many aspects of African migrants are neglected. In view of Table 4.1 presented in this chapter, there are categories of migrants for which African states should take care in adopting specific rules and legislation. Examples include children, persons with disabilities and women. Moreover, African migrants are not all moving in order to look for jobs. Some are in the quest of business opportunities. They try to create a 'migratory territory' through which they should be able to move easily and frequently without becoming permanent residents. A paradigm shift from migration to mobility is worth being valued, and therefore migration governance needs to consider the true motivations of the African mobile actors. The institutional governance of migration in Central Africa is still rhetorical. The true work should involve creating the African way of tackling issues of migration, which combine both the top-down and the bottom-up logics in migration governance.

References

Bakewell, O. (2009). Introduction to the workshop on migration in the DR Congo. Notes of research for the workshop, Lubumbashi and Kampala.

Bayart, J.-F. (1980). *L'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre*. Paris: Fayard.

Biyoya Makutu, P. (2014). L'Afrique, le terrorisme et la transformation du système international, Conference delivered at the Faculty of the Social Sciences Faculty, University of Lubumbashi.

Galtung, J. (1964). *Positive and negative peace: Conceptual frameworks*. Draft of a lecture: Oslo.

Gondwe, M., & Pamu, E. M. (2014). Growth strategies for Zambia: Harnessing natural resource wealth for sustainable growth. In C. Adam, P. Collier, & M. Gondwe (Eds.), *Zambia. Building prosperity from resource wealth* (pp. 3–14). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacGaffey, J. (1991). *The real economy of Zaire. The contribution of smuggling & other unofficial activities to national wealth*. London: James Currey.

Mbembe, A. (1992). Provisional notes on the postcolony. *Africa, 62*(1), 3–37.

Mvuezelo Bazonzi, J. (2014). Diaspora et développement. In B. Ndione (Ed.), *L'Afrique centrale face aux défis migratoires* (pp. 13–31). Bruxelles: Observatoire des migrations.

Ndione, B. (2014). *L'Afrique centrale face aux défis migratoires*. Bruxelles: Observatoire des migrations.

Ngoie T. G. (2013). Las migraciones en Africa Central: permanencias y discontinuidades en la region de los grandes lagos africanos. In K. B. Mbuyi (Coord.), *Africa en moviemento. Migraciones internas y externas* (pp. 71–91). Madrid: Catarata-Casa Africa.

Ngoie, T. G. (2014). Libre circulation des personnes et défis de l'intégration. In B. Ndione (Ed.), *L'Afrique centrale face aux défis migratoires* (pp. 32–42). Bruxelles: Observatoire des migrations.

Omeje, K., & Ngoie, T. G. (2008). Rentier politics and low intensity conflicts in the DRC: The case of Kasai and Katanga Provinces Congo (Chapter 8). In K. Omeje (Ed.), *The rentierism and conflicts in the global south*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Piché, V. (2012). Les théories migratoires contemporaines au prisme des textes fondateurs. *Population-F, 68*(1), 153–178.

Sindjoun, L. (2002). *Sociologie des relations internationales africaines*. Paris: Karthala.

Smith, S. (2018). *La ruée vers l'Europe: la jeune Afrique en route pour le vieux continent*. Paris: Editions Grasset.

Tarrius, A. (2005). Au-delà des Etats-Nations: des sociétés des migrants. *Revue Européenne des migrations internationales, 17*(2), 37–61.

Chapter 5
Basotho Mineworkers and *zama zama* in Disused Commercial Gold Mines in Gauteng Province, South Africa

Esther Makhetha

Introduction

Despite restrictions and security imposed on the disused commercial mines by the South African government, illegal mineworkers make a livelihood by taking part in *zama zama* (illegal mining). This practice is carried out informally and according to the state illegally. The illegal mineworkers have adapted and adjusted to the constraints that emerged in the wake of the retrenchment of former mineworkers from South African mines (Makhetha, 2017b) and high unemployment within the country (Makhetha, 2017a; Munakamwe, 2016; Thornton, 2014). Over 5–10% of mining production in South Africa is produced through illegal mining, such that in 2013, the value of gold and platinum produced through these means was over R72 billion and under R63 billion, respectively (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 2013).

Until recently, many countries in southern Africa served as the labour reserve economy for the South African mining industry. However, the changing socio-economic conditions in South Africa were manifested in the fact that the services of migrant labour (largely men) from neighbouring countries were less desirable, leading to retrenchment on an unprecedented scale (Crush, Dodson, Gay, Green, & Leduka, 2010; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). Upon returning to their homes, most ex-migrant mineworkers were faced with the stark reality of unemployment and lack

Parts of this chapter are taken from my dissertation, Makhetha, E. 2017. *Small-scale artisanal diamond mining and rural livelihood diversification inLesotho*. PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria. Available online: https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/62649/Makhetha_Small_2017.pdf

E. Makhetha (✉)
Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of South Africa, Midrand, Republic of South Africa
e-mail: makhee@unisa.ac.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_5

of sources of livelihood. With the skills acquired while working abroad in South Africa, and with practically no other sources of livelihood at their disposal, ex-migrant mineworkers migrate back to South Africa to scavenge gold at abandoned, disused gold mines (Makhetha, 2017a; Munakamwe, 2016; Nhlengetwa & Hein, 2015; Thornton, 2014). On the other hand, unemployed South Africans are also involved in this activity, which is prohibited by the state. Looking at the case of Basotho illegal migrant mineworkers working in abandoned, disused gold mines in Gauteng Province, South Africa, this chapter explores *zama zama* (illegal mining) and its relationship with conflict, mobility, turf wars and violence in the disused gold mines in Gauteng province. The chapter further demonstrates the conflicts and turf wars between different groups of Basotho illegal migrant mineworkers in these mines in a foreign country, South Africa.

Basotho migrant mineworkers' teams are forged based on two dominant and rival groups of the *famo*[1] music from Lesotho, Mafeteng district. Mafeteng district is the hometown of most of these music artists, and it is in the southern part of the country. These groups are *Terene* and *Seakhi*. Their conflicts elevated to, and became even more controversial as they reached, the national level. This was because these same groups came to align themselves with political parties. The *Seakhi* group was/is aligned to the opposition parties, Lesotho Congress for Democracy and Movement for Economic Change, while *Terene* group is aligned to the All-Basotho Convention (ABC),[2] which is the main party in the coalition government.

In the period from 2008 to 2012, the rivalry between *Terene* and *Seakhi* escalated, with deadly consequences (Monaheng, 2014). These *famo* music artists were/are still killing each other, family members, fans and friends. Within a period of 2 years from 2008, more than 100 people died as a result of the conflicts between these rival groups in Lesotho.[3] These conflicts spilled over from Lesotho to the mining sites in South Africa, hence the interest in them, in this chapter. This is around the same time that *zama zama* activities also increased in South Africa. More on this will be discussed in the section on conflicts and turf wars between different groups.

Basotho mineworkers cross their nation border into South Africa to work as migrant mineworkers; first, officially and legally as workers in the commercial mining sector and then as illegal migrant mineworkers after they are retrenched

[1] A popular form of accordion music that blends storytelling, spoken word and rapid-fire rap styles to reflect the lives of Basotho (Monaheng 2014). Lesotho's traditional music is referred to as famo (from ho re famo, meaning to flare one's nostrils) or 'mino oa koriana (accordion music) (Monaheng 2014). The story of Lesotho's traditional music has its roots in a community dating back to the late 1800s, which spawned the songs of *li tsamaea-naha*—the migrant labourers who journeyed for days on foot to work in the mines in South Africa. The men would compose songs during their migration about everything from love interests to the hardships of life. The freestyle traditions of that era are still closely guarded by contemporary musicians in Lesotho (Monaheng 2014). https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Accordion-cowboys-20150430 (accessed 26 September 2018).

[2] http://sundaypress.co.ls/?p=7499#sthash.e1pI5wQB.dpuf (accessed 13 May 2014).

[3] http://sundaypress.co.ls/?p=7499#sthash.e1pI5wQB.dpuf (accessed 13 May 2014).

from the South African commercial mines. Basotho are not the only southern African nationals who cross into South Africa to provide migrant labour or work illegally in *zama zama*. Zimbabweans and Mozambicans are also active in the sector.

This chapter draws from the author's thesis (Makhetha, 2017a), extant literature and researcher's observations and experience in the study of unlicensed diamond artisanal mining in Lesotho. A thorough review of the literature on mining (artisanal and commercial), migrant labour and violence (conflicts and turf wars) was carried out. Literature on migrant labour provided the regional context of mobility in countries in southern Africa that include Lesotho, Mozambique and Eswatini (former Swaziland) to South African mines. This chapter is organised into four major sections. The first section explores the history of Lesotho in the regional mining economy as a labour reserve. The second section reviews literature on the consequences of the collapse of the regional mining complex. The third section discusses the relationship between *zama zama*, conflict, mobility, turf wars and violence in the mining activities of Basotho migrant mineworkers. The last section deals with the recommendations and concluding remarks of the chapter.

Zama zama: Notion and Activity

Zama zama is a Zulu word which means 'try and try again' or 'try try'. It is used for artisanal mineworkers but with the connotation of illegality rather than legislative right to access. They operate outside of the existing South African mining laws, including those related to surface-owners' rights, prospecting and mining rights, permitting, direct payment of royalties to the state, trespassing on the permitted land, occupational health and safety, environmental impacts and other reforms incorporated in the Mineral Minerals Petroleum Resource Development Act of 2002. These mineworkers generally operate illegally in abandoned or disused mine shafts in search of residual mineral resources that could not be accessed using machinery or proved unprofitable for major mining companies (Ledwaba, 2017; Nhlengetwa & Hein, 2015; Olalde, 2016, 2017; Wilson, 2018). The term *zama zama* in this chapter is used interchangeably for the activity and mineworkers.

History of Lesotho Within the Regional Mining Economy

In the nineteenth century, Lesotho became a labour reserve for South African mines and emergent industries by colonial design (Amin, 1973). This came about as a result of the discovery of diamond and gold in South Africa. After these discoveries, there was a high demand for food and labour in the mining areas and neighbouring towns. Lesotho became a supplier for grain and later for labour (Makhetha, 2017a; Murray, 1980) and ended up depending on wages from the South African mines. Feinstein (2005: 47) puts it as follows:

> [African economies were] totally transformed by the discovery of diamonds and gold in the late nineteenth century. From that point forward, the economic history of [southern Africa] becomes, in essence, a story of how this unique combination of indigenous populations, European settlers, and mineral resources was brought together in a process of conquest, dispossession, discrimination, and development to promote rapid economic progress. . . It is this history of the incorporation of the African people that paved the indispensable labour for a modern economy. . . Africans progressively lost the possibility of continuing to farm independently . . .

Basotho participated in wage labour around the 1860s. Their main purpose was to get cattle, ox-drawn ploughs and guns back home in Lesotho (Makhetha, 2017b). Basotho's economic prosperity and labour competition within the South African industry enabled them to put their own terms of employment. The terms of employment included who to work for, for how much and for how long. Thabane (2002: 108) names this 'discretionary labour migration'. It is because whatever Basotho earned from South Africa then was not necessarily essential for their households. However, such flexible labour proved incompatible with the need for capital for a more stable, predictable and controllable labour supply, particularly at a time when commercial farming was beginning to compete with mining for cheap labour (Makhetha, 2017b). As a result, the colonial state in South Africa used various methods to ensure Basotho labour was forced off the land and made available to the colonial state's construction projects and to individuals who needed labour for the mines and farms (Thabane, 2002). Increasingly, Basotho men migrant workers were forced into long-term contracts that required them to stay in mine compounds for stretches of time (Makhetha, 2017b).

European imperialists freed up labour by dismantling Basotho's precolonial socio-economic, political and trading activities, which had supported their relative autonomy in relation to the global economy (Makhetha, 2017b). Colonial laws, Thabane (2002) argues, effectively undermined the precolonial socio-economic structures of the Basotho by ensuring that monetary rather than other forms of exchange became the primary means for securing basic necessities. The process of freeing up labour for the emerging regional labour market was also achieved by forcing Basotho off their rural lands through the introduction of a Hut Tax in 1870. The tax could only be paid in cash, which in turn forced Basotho to abandon their lands and agricultural production and work for wages in the mines (Boehm, 2003; Makhetha, 2017b; Maleleka, 2007; Theal, 2002).

Colonial efforts to turn Lesotho into a labour reserve money economy were buttressed by other political economic and environmental factors. This is important because they led to Basotho being forced to depend on wages from South Africa. These include drought and animal diseases, notably rinderpest (Boehm, 2003; Makhetha, 2017a; Murray, 1980). The regional colonial context and changes in transport infrastructure also had an impact on Basotho participation in the regional market for food. The neighbouring Free State Republic imposed tariffs on Basotho produce in the 1890s forcing Basotho to sell at higher prices (Makhetha, 2017a). Completion of the railways into the interior of the Free State Republic meant Basotho struggled to compete with cheaper grain imported from overseas.

Moreover, loss of arable land to the Boers in the 1850s left Lesotho (Basutoland) with mostly mountainous areas unsuitable for agricultural production (Makhetha, 2017a). The agricultural potential of the remaining available land was further reduced by soil erosion, further undermining Basotho's relative economic independence (Boehm, 2003; Maleleka, 2007; Murray, 1980).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, a higher number of Basotho men than ever before were working in the mines to support their families (Makhetha, 2017b). For example, in 1904, there were 86,000 working in the mines out of the total population of approximately 349,500 (Stevens, 1967). In 1906, a railway line that connected Lesotho's capital, Maseru, with South Africa was completed. It facilitated the increased mobility of migrant workers; as a result, the number of Basotho men working in the mines increased further (Stevens, 1967). By the 1920s, Basutoland's (Lesotho's) position as the main supplier of labour to South African mines was cemented. In this regard, Murray (1980) argued, Basotho could no longer be described as an agricultural society. Small-scale agricultural production that survived this process was maintained through wages from the mines (Pule & Thabane, 2004). Similarly, as Ferguson (1990) has argued, it was remittances from wage work that supported the bovine mystique in livestock production. Meanwhile, remittances became a mainstay of rural households. Murray (1980) argued that it became imperative for men to support the family unit by moving away for wage-work resulting in his thesis on 'families divided' (Makhetha, 2017b).

The regional mining system thus created an economic system in which a regional market for labour was a striking feature. The freeing up of labour for this regional market transformed relations all over the region (Makhetha, 2017b). It also created new forms of dependency within households, and between households and the wider money economy. Lesotho's rural economy was significantly impacted by the migrant labour system (Ferguson, 1990; Murray, 1980). As Lesotho became more interlinked to the regional economy, it not only lost aspects of its economic autonomy, but it also became more and more difficult to conceive of a national economy (Makhetha, 2017a).

Over a period of roughly the last 20 years, the status of South African mining has shifted from being the backbone of Basotho livelihoods to being what it is currently a minority occupation for a fortunate few (Makhetha, 2017b). Turner (2005) argues that many Basotho young men are unable to seek employment in South African mines, as it was the case with the previous generation. As a result, these young men find it difficult to amass the resources needed to start an independent household (Makhetha, 2017b). Young people see little prospect of employment or significant income generation prospects unless they are 'lucky' enough to get work for long hours and minimal wages in a Maseru factory (Turner, 2005). It is now clear that households must build livelihoods within Lesotho, as there are no new employment opportunities in South African mines (Makhetha, 2017b).

For those already employed in the South African mining sector retrenchments are common. The number of Basotho employed in South African mines has dropped from 130,000 in the 1970s to around 50,000 in the 1980s (Boehm, 2003) and then to 40,600 at the beginning of 2011. By December 2013, these numbers had declined further to 33,500 (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2011; Crush et al., 2010; Love, 1996; Makhetha, 2017b). This decline in labour migration or the collapse of the regional mining complex has resulted, amongst other things, in a drastic decline in the amount of remittances flowing from South Africa to rural Lesotho. Former mineworkers have therefore had to explore other forms of income generation to support their households (Makhetha, 2017a).

Since 2002, women were legislatively incorporated into the South African mining sector. Prior to that, women were excluded from working underground through the following legislation: the 1911 Mines and Works Act No. 12 and the South African Minerals Act of 1991 (Benya, 2016). This means that Basotho women also were not allowed to work underground just like South African women. However, these laws were later repealed and replaced by more 'inclusive' legislation which promoted the inclusion of women in mining. With the inclusion of women in mining in the legislation, women can now work underground (Benya, 2016).

Basotho Miners' Retrenchment and Life Thereafter

After the collapse of the regional mining complex, many Basotho men returned to Lesotho. In Lesotho, most of them got involved in agriculture, mining and other activities (Ambrose, 2004: 7; Thebe & Rakotje, 2013: 408). An example of the other activities includes making a living by building residential houses (*malaene*), which they then rent out (Thebe & Rakotje, 2013: 408). They use *malaene* as their investment and means of livelihood besides farming. *Malaene* have proved to be an important way of making money by the land-holding households in the peri-urban and urban areas and villages close to diamond mining areas (Ambrose, 2004: 7; Thebe & Rakotje, 2013: 408). Former mineworkers move to the towns that include Maseru and Maputsoe in search of formal jobs. Their wives work in textile factories in the mentioned towns. Some of these women go to South Africa to work as domestic workers. With this, there is an internal and external mobility of retrenched mineworkers and women searching for livelihood to sustain their households in the midst of the collapsed regional mining complex.

The importance of unlicensed mining in the highlands of Lesotho increased as a result of the retrenchment of Basotho men from South African mines. As observed in the fieldwork conducted in the Butha-Buthe District, Lesotho, communities of Kao and Liqhobong villages relied on unlicensed artisanal diamond mining for decades. Since the 1930s, artisanal diamond mining has been one of the main livelihoods like livestock production and other farming activities (Thabane, 1995, 2000. In addition, despite the long history and significance of artisanal diamond mining to rural communities in Kao and Liqhobong, successive postindependence governments in Lesotho have persistently marginalised, trivialised and criminalised artisanal diamond mining. Scholars such as Chefa and Maleleka have observed that mining policies support commercial mining over artisanal mining (Chefa, 2014; Maleleka, 2007). The marginalisation of artisanal diamond mining in Lesotho is evident from the fact that artisanal diamond mining remains illegal. According to the Lesotho government (Makhetha, 2017a):

> The artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sub-sector is especially challenging for Lesotho. Currently, ASM activities are not legally permitted in the country . . . For fear of creating loopholes for illegal exportation of conflict diamonds, the Government has not legalised mining of industrial minerals and semi-precious stones by ASM sub-sector (2014).[4]

The state comparison of the large-scale mining companies and artisanal diamond mining shows that the government believes that the illegal export of diamonds can be done by the artisanal diamond miners, not the large-scale mining companies, because of the provisions of the Kimberley Process (KP). As it has been stated above, some of the Basotho retrenched migrant mineworkers joined unlicensed artisanal diamond mining in the highlands of Lesotho (see Makhetha, 2017a), whereas some returned to South Africa, and got involved in *zama zama* in the abandoned, disused gold mines. These ex-migrant mineworkers, however, have adapted the skills acquired during their formal working careers abroad in South Africa. With practically no other sources of livelihood at their disposal, their available option is artisanal mining in Lesotho and South Africa.

South Africa's Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) holds a list of 6000 'derelict and ownerless' mines, which became the government's problem over the years when the former owners 'disappeared'. While the DMR slowly rehabilitates those mines at a rate of about 10 per year, companies continue to walk away from operations, and both mining companies and the government are slow to accept responsibility (Olalde, 2016, 2017). As a result, *zama zamas* occupy these disused, abandoned gold mines to scavenge gold ore.

In South Africa, the past few years have witnessed an increasingly critical debate about the treatment by authorities of *zama zama* mining as simply illegal, and even criminal. News media have tended to focus on problems of illegality in this sector (Nhlengetwa & Hein, 2015; Thornton, 2014) and less on the relationship between conflict, mobility and violence in the disused gold mines, which is growing amongst migrant mineworkers, especially those from Lesotho. This chapter, therefore, explores the relationship between *zama zama* and conflict, mobility, turf wars and violence in the disused gold mines, using the case of Lesotho *zama zama* mineworkers.

[4]Lesotho Mining and Minerals Policy Green Paper, www.ls.undp.org (2014, December 16).

Mobility, Conflict and Turf Wars Amongst Basotho *zama zama* Mineworkers in South Africa's Disused, Abandoned Gold Mines

Many of the Basotho men have tried to overcome the difficulties associated with the collapse of the regional mining complex in South Africa by becoming involved in unlicensed artisanal diamond mining and *zama zama* in South Africa. *Zama zama* operations have continued unabated since 2008, the year in which investigations into the illegal mining activities began (Ledwaba, 2017). Wilson (2018) argues that South Africa's socioeconomic context appears to be driving illegal mining activity more than it ever did in the past. This is as a result of high unemployment rates and levels of poverty, an influx of migrant mineworkers from the southern Africa region and difficulty in accessing the formal mining sector for both South Africans and migrants who used to work in formal mining (Ledwaba, 2017; Wilson, 2018). The gold mining sector is the primary target of most of *zama zama*, because gold mining companies normally shut down unprofitable shafts in response to the financial stresses of diminishing gold prices and increased labour costs. This paves the way for *zama zamas* to begin scavenging the residual gold ore that industrial methods could not extract (Wilson, 2018). *Zama zamas* normally insert themselves into the economy by working on the mines deserted by large commercial mining firms. *Zama zamas* also occupy a shaft operated by the commercial mining companies, competing with the commercial mine for gold (Hart, 2013). The focus of this chapter, however, is the abandoned, disused gold mines concentrating on Basotho mineworkers' involvement.

Literature suggests that *zama zama* mineworkers organise themselves in ethnic teams and work closely with South Africans of many backgrounds. In addition, many of the mineworkers are from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho (Nyoni, 2017; Thornton, 2014). This chapter, however, argues that Basotho mineworkers have their own teams; hence, they are not homogenous as the literature suggests. Their most popular teams are *Seakhi* and *Terene* as mentioned in the introduction.

In South Africa, these same groups compete amongst other things for gold shaft in abandoned, disused mines and this has caused deaths for many of their members. For instance, in September 2015, 15 Basotho *zama zama* mineworkers were killed when they clashed at the Grootvlei Aurora mine in springs, Gauteng province (Molosankwe, 2019).[5] In September 2016, three *zama zama* mineworkers died in Langlaate abandoned shaft, and 11 were rescued. In 2011, 40 mineworkers died at an illegal mining shaft in the old mining town of Springs, east of Johannesburg. In February of 2014, 25 illegal mineworkers died at Mag shaft in Roodeport, west of Johannesburg. Seven illegal mineworkers murdered in May/June in 2018, and few

[5] https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/zama-zama-turf-war-fears-after-7-bodies-found-in-veld-12727076 (accessed 18 September 2018).

https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/six-foreigners-arrested-for-zama-zama-murders-in-ekurhuleni-18753902, (accessed 16 March 2019).

days later, four Basotho women were murdered near an informal settlement in Daveyton on the East Rand. This is linked to a possible turf war between illegal mineworkers (Pitt, 2018). This conflict has taken forms that include ideological clashes and disputes as well as armed conflicts that have resulted in life being lost as well as disruption of livelihood and the environment (Nyoni, 2017).

The economic crisis in southern African countries such as Lesotho has given rise to the migration of illegal mineworkers to South Africa. In most cases, these illegal migrant mineworkers are undocumented, and the border is invisible to them. The challenge with this is that it is difficult to trace them when they have committed crime in South Africa, especially conflicts in abandoned, disused gold mines and in the informal settlements. In the same way, with the cases happening in Lesotho, offenders normally cross to South Africa and just disappear from the law enforcement officials from Lesotho.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Artisanal miners are vulnerable to violence, death, permanent injuries in their everyday lives. However, if the laws and policies related to this sector (e.g. criminalisation), in both countries, Lesotho and South Africa, are positively transformed, many lives will be saved as a safe and conducive working environment will be created (Munakamwe, 2016). This could be done by developing meaningful regulatory frameworks and infrastructure (Makhetha, 2017a). Both countries could draw inspiration from countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia and set up legislation that would allow artisanal mining. This could be done through legalising artisanal mining and encourage cooperatives (microlevels) to work hand in glove with commercial diamond mining (macro level) as is the case in Botswana and Zambia (Makhetha, 2017a). Competition over the gold shaft will be reduced, and more lives will be saved in the mining sector.

The illegal, artisanal miners or *zama zama* provide significant levels of economic activity (Thornton, 2014), support considerable numbers of people in communities who receive almost no support from elsewhere and embody skills and knowledge that is found nowhere else in South Africa (Thornton, 2014). With this class of illegal mineworkers, both the government of Lesotho and South Africa could support them by formalising illegal mining activities. In South Africa, the government could support them by formalising areas not used by the industry and providing support such as safety advice (Thelwell, 2014). For instance, Ghana is one of the countries that legalised ASM in 1989 (Hilson & Potter, 2003), but it remains difficult for miners to acquire licences as prospective applicants have to navigate through endless layers of bureaucratic red tape (Makhetha, 2017b). These processes include a lot of paperwork, high fees to obtain documents and limited availability of land where legal miners can work (Banchirigah, 2008; Geenen, 2012). Any process of meaningful formalisation will have to avoid providing bureaucrats with the power to control, stymie and extract rent from those who do the actual work of mining, as happened in Ghana (Makhetha, 2017b).

The chapter suggests that given adequate attention by the government through policy, land and funding, ASM could become a viable economic activity that will invigorate some rural livelihoods and improve the economic status of both countries (Makhetha, 2017a). The chapter concurs with Hentschel, Hruschka, and Priester (2002) who argue for the encouragement and support for the formation of cooperatives, associations or enterprises to support communication, cooperation and coordination between mineworkers, villagers and the state. In the case of Lesotho, this could be done by formalising artisanal mining around areas such as the riverbanks, and dumping sites of the commercial mining companies (Makhetha, 2017b).

However, the primary threat to their lives and livelihoods is the competition for gold shaft, which normally leads to conflict, violence, turf wars, deaths and killings. To prevent this from happening, states must harmonise their laws to ensure that there are no safe havens for criminals. They must also generally cooperate with one another in sharing information and intelligence on crime and criminals as well as their efforts to combat them. States must also ensure that criminals do not reap the fruits of their crimes by concealing the proceeds of such crimes in any country (Nsereko, 1997). This has political implications for Lesotho and South Africa. *Zama-zama* is a valuable part of the regional economy, and a part of the southern African cultural and national heritage (Thornton, 2014).

This is not to fall into the trap of romanticising Basotho artisanal mineworkers but to see in their existing practices and institutions elements that could potentially be scaled up and formalised in a manner that would increase their access to markets and wealth, and reduce conflicts (Makhetha, 2017a). In this, Lesotho and South Africa are not alone. Many countries in Africa and South America are debating the relationship between inclusive economy and the extractive resources industries (Canel, Idemudia, & North, 2010; Makhetha, 2017b).

References

Ambrose, D. (2004). *Lesotho annotated bibliography section 16: Mining, Kimberlite and diamonds*. House 9 Publications: National University of Lesotho.

Amin, S. (1973). *Neo-colonialism in West Africa*. Middlesex: Penguin.

Banchirigah, S. M. (2008). Challenges with eradicating illegal mining in Ghana: A perspective from the grassroots. *Resource Policy, 33*, 29–38.

Benya, A. (2016). *Women in mining: Occupational culture and gendered identities in the making*. PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand.

Boehm, C. (2003). The social life of fields: Labour markets and agrarian change in Lesotho. *Journal for Interdisciplinary and Cross-Cultural Studies, 3*, 1–20.

Canel, E., Idemudia, U., & North, L. L. (2010). Rethinking extractive industry: Regulation, dispossession, and emerging claims. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 30*(1–2), 5–25.

Central Bank of Lesotho (2011). *March quarterly review* (Vol. XXXI, Issue 1). Maseru: Central Bank of Lesotho.

Chamber of Mines of South Africa. (2013). Annual report 2013/2014.

Chefa, L. (2014). Ownership of mineral rights in Lesotho. http://www.academia.edu/11032659/Ownership_of_Extractive_Operations_in_Lesot-ho. Accessed 15 May 2015.

Crush, J., Dodson, B., Gay, J., Green, T., & Leduka, C. (2010). Migration, remittances, and development in Lesotho. Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP).

Feinstein, C. H. (2005). *An economic history of South Africa: Conquest, discrimination, and development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferguson, J. (1990). *The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geenen, S. (2012). A dangerous bet: The challenge of formalizing artisanal mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Resources Policy, 37*(3), 322–330.

Hart, M. 2013. *Gold: The race for the world's most seductive metal*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hentschel, T., Hruschka, F., & Priester, M. (2002). Global report on artisanal & small-scale mining. Mining, minerals and sustainable development (MMSD). Project 70.

Hilson, G., & Potter, C. (2003). Why is illegal mining activity so ubiquitous in rural Ghana? *African Development Review, 15*(2–3), 237–270.

Ledwaba, P. F. (2017). The status of artisanal and small-scale mining sector in South Africa: Tracking progress. *The Journal of Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 117*, 33–40.

Love, R. (1996). Lesotho: Inner to outer periphery? *Review of African Political Economy, 23*(6), 75–80.

Makhetha, E. (2017a). *Small-scale artisanal diamond mining and rural livelihood diversification in Lesotho*. PhD thesis, University of Pretoria.

Makhetha, E. (2017b). The rise and fall of Liqhobong Diamond Mine Cooperative in Lesotho. *Journal Anthropology Southern Africa, 40*(3), 185–196.

Maleleka, D. (2007). The evolution of diamond mining in Lesotho. *Southern Africa Resource Watch.*

Molosankwe, B. (2019). Six foreigners arrested for zama zama murders in Ekurhuleni. https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/six-foreigners-arrested-for-zama-zama-murders-in-ekurhuleni-18753902. Accessed 16 Mar 2019.

Monaheng, T. (2014). Accordion cowboys. https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Accordion-cowboys-20150430. Accessed 26 Sept 2018.

Munakamwe, J. (2016). The informalisation of work: Illegal and informal mining from a gender perspective. African Centre for Migration and Society. University of Witwatersrand.

Murray, C. (1980). *Families divided. The impact of migrant labour in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nhlengetwa, K., & Hein, K. A. A. (2015). Zama-Zama mining in the Durban Deep/Roodepoort area of Johannesburg, South Africa: An invasive or alternative livelihood? *The Extractive Industries and Society, 2*, 1–3.

Nsereko, D. D. N. (1997). When crime crosses borders: A Southern African perspective. *Journal of African Law, 41*, 192–200.

Nshimbi, C. C., & Fioramonti, L. (2014). The will to integrate: South Africa's responses to regional migration from the SADC region. *African Development Review, 26*(S1), 52–63.

Nyoni, P. (2017). Unsung heroes? An anthropological approach into the experiences of zama zamas' in Johannesburg, South Africa. In A. Nhemachena & V. W. Tapiwa (Eds.), *Mining Africa: Law, environment, society and politics in historical and multidisciplinary perspectives*. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG.

Olalde, M. (2016). SA's failed system of mine closure. https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/sas-failed-system-of-mine-closure-7117963. Accessed 1 Nov 2018.

Olalde, M. (2017). South Africa: A minefield of hope....and violence. https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/south-africa-minefield-hopeand-violence. Accessed 1 Nov 2018.

Pitt, C. (2018). 4 women killed in suspected East Rand zama zama turf war. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/4-women-killed-in-suspected-east-rand-zama-zama-turf-war-20180119. Accessed 26 Sept 2018.

Pule, N. W., & Thabane, M. (2004). Lesotho's land tenure regimes: Experiences of rural communities and the calls for land reform. *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 42*(2), 283–303.

Stevens, R. P. (1967). *Lesotho, Botswana, & Swaziland: The former high commission territories in southern Africa*. London: Pall Mall Press.

Thabane, M. (1995). *Individual diamond digging in Lesotho, 1995–1970: A study of an aspect of the social and economic history of Lesotho*. Ph.D. thesis, University of Trondheim.

Thabane, M. (2000). Liphokojoe of Kao: A study of a diamond digger rebel group in the Lesotho highlands. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 26*(01), 105–121.

Thabane, M. (2002). Aspects of colonial economy and society, 1868-1966. In N.W. Pule & M. Thabane (Eds.), *Essays on aspects of the political economy of Lesotho 1500-2000* (pp. 1–14). Department of History: National University of Lesotho.

Theal, G. M. (2002). *Basutoland records: Volume VI, 1871-1872*. Roma: Institute of Southern African Studies.

Thebe, V., & Rakotje, M. F. (2013). Land strategies and livelihood dynamics in peri-urban communities: Challenges of land and agricultural policy in Lesotho. *African Studies, 72*(3), 400–415.

Thelwell, E. (2014). Six things to know about the illegal mining boom. https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Six-things-to-know-about-the-illegal-mining-boom-20140626. Accessed 27 Sept 2018.

Thornton, R. (2014). Zama Zama, "illegal" artisanal miners, misrepresented by the South African Press and Government. *The Extractive Industries and Society, 1*, 127–129.

Turner, S. D. (2005). Livelihoods and sharing: Trends in a Lesotho village, 1976-2004. Programme for land and agrarian studies. School of Government. University of the Western Cape, Cape Town.

Wilson, L. (2018). *Unshackling South African artisanal miners: Considering Burkina Faso's legislative provisions as a guideline for legalisation and regulation*. Master's thesis, University of Cape Town.

Part II
Borders, the Governance Question and Integration

Chapter 6
Shopping-Oriented Mobility Across the Zimbabwe-South Africa Border: Modalities and Encounters

Nedson Pophiwa

Introduction

Cross-border shopping is a global phenomenon. There are cities which have gained worldwide popularity as shopping destinations. New York, Berlin, Los Angeles, London, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Singapore, Istanbul, Paris and Madrid constitute the "World's 10 Best Shopping Destinations" (The Huffington Post, 2016). These cities are rated highly on the basis of their value for money, number of visitors and their friendliness, among other indicators. Dubai is another popular destination for shopping which has a strategic advantage in that it serves as an aviation hub in the Middle East, thus rendering it easily accessible from different countries in the world. This emirate city hosts popular events like Dubai Shopping Festival and is actively promoted as a "Meeting, Incentive, Conference and Exhibition (MICE)" destination. Although no South African city is rated among the "World's 10 Best Shopping Destinations", the city of Cape Town is number 23 in the Top 25 list published by travel blogging site Expedia.[1] At regional level, Johannesburg is a popular destination for shoppers from neighbouring countries in Southern Africa and other parts of the continent. In the past decade, South African border towns such as Musina have grown exponentially in retail services and become subregional "hubs" for cross-borders shopping. The existing literature on cross-border shopping has paid little attention to understanding the nature and extent of this phenomenon in less popular shopping destinations.

[1] http://www.expediablog.co.uk/shopping-guide/cities/capetown.php

N. Pophiwa (✉)
Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR-AA), University of the Witwatersrand, Parktown, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa
e-mail: n.pophiwa@thencc.org.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_6

This chapter discusses the spatial practices of shoppers, especially how different categories of shoppers experienced mobility across the Zimbabwe-South Africa depending on whether they travelled by car, bus or other forms of public transport. It examines the modalities and practices associated with cross-border shopping by Zimbabweans in South Africa's border town of Musina. The focus is on long-distance shoppers, those that are referred by Timothy and Butler (1995) as coming from the distal zones of the border (over 200 km). Their shopping trips require more organising, planning and financial resources while their journeys take anything from 3 to 8 h to get to the border post. The majority of them were day trippers who arrived in mornings and spent a day shopping, and turned around the same day. I zoom in on these shoppers because Zimbabwean long-distance shoppers in Musina seem to be from towns and cities such as Bulawayo, Mutare and Harare the capital city, which are larger than Musina. This brings a fascinating twist to common norms in the study of cross-border shopping where scholars have paid attention to shopping and trade among borderland populations. I concur with Mechlinski (2010: 99) who argues that "the literature's pointed focus on borderlanders obscures the way in which borders in Africa affect and are affected by migrants and travellers covering longer distances".

Mobilities and Shopping Across Nation-State Borders: A Brief Conceptual Overview

Mobility studies (Büscher, Urry, & Witchger, 2011; Cohen & Cohen, 2015; Cresswell, 2012; Faulconbridge & Hui, 2016; Sheller & Urry, 2006) have in the last decade advocated for studying and theorising the way people and things move in space and time. The term mobilities is used in the plural, because "the aim is to understand not only how people, but also how images, communications, and objects are on the move, and how actual and potential movements organise and structure social life" (Urry, 2004 cited by Kloppenburg, 2013: 19). Cresswell (2010: 160) conceptualises mobility as a form of movement that involves three distinct but complementing aspects, namely: "the fact of physical movement: getting from one place to another; the representations of movement that give it shared meaning; and, finally, the experienced and embodied practice of movement" (Cresswell, 2010: 160). Studying cross-border shopping from a mobilities approach helps us to move beyond describing why such forms of mobility occurred in the wake of economic crisis in Zimbabwe to explaining how such mobilities are practised and experienced. Hannam, Sheller, and Ury (2006: 1) argue that the concept of mobilities also encompasses "the more local processes of daily transportation, movement through public space and the travel of material things within everyday life".

Study Methods and Approach: Following People and Goods Across Nation-State Borders

Research on which this chapter is based is part of a multi-sited study of cross-border shopping by Zimbabweans in South Africa's border town of Musina since the post-2000 political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Fieldwork research was conducted between August 2015 and July 2016. Primary data collection involved conducting oral history interviews with cross-border shoppers. The oral histories enabled me to understand meanings, practices and social experiences of cross-border shopping which Zimbabweans encountered in Musina. This method of data collection proved very insightful especially considering that one barely stumbled upon written accounts of cross-border shoppers in the literature except in a few journalistic accounts available in online newspapers. Information gathered through oral histories may also focus on "events of interest to the historian or on the subject's perhaps idiosyncratic memories of a family, neighbourhood, community, or movement" (Henige, 1982: 2).

Interviews with cross-border shoppers were conducted in multiple places considering their mobile nature. I was able to conduct in-depth interviews following a life history approach. In total, 43 cross-border shoppers were interviewed. Interviewing people about their early livelihood strategies and how they eventually turned to cross-border shopping in the post-2000 period enabled me to understand the trajectory through which most of them exercised agency in times of precarity. Older respondents were able to reflect the changes which occurred in their lives from times when they shopped for leisure to a point where they crossed the border to shop for basics as a result of scarcity. Such information would not have been possible without an interview process that was based on a historical approach—something which oral history does. In line with ethics of research, the verbatim quotes from interviews are cited using pseudonyms but indicate the age, occupation and place where they come from.

The mobilities approach used in this study is effective in understanding how the experiences of cross-border shoppers influence other mobilities which may either be in support or in opposition to them. Through their mobility patterns, Zimbabwean cross-border shoppers stimulate mobilities of other actors whose aims are to control or benefit from their movements, say for example, state agents (immigration or customs), brokers who facilitate the movement of goods and people across the border and retailers, who have invested in the border town in recent years. Musina thus became a convergence zone for political and economic interests of multiple actors. I therefore assess how trips were organised, whether it was by households, extended families, go-betweens, or representatives, in view of the costs of transport and transportability of goods. For most respondents, shopping was itself an expedition not just merely about needs, prices and variety but about encountering difference and learning about new ideas to "show off" when they returned home. In analysing mobilities of these cross-border shoppers, I heed the call by Mavhunga, Cuvelier, and Pyper (2016: 46) for research that seeks to understand the mobility of

Africans on the continent not as ‘victims’, ‘users’ or ‘tinkerers’, but also as initiators, makers and thinkers who imbue self-made and incoming tools with their own meaning, purposes and value systems.

Proximal, Medial and Distal Shoppers: Geographic Spread of South Africa-Zimbabwe Cross-Border Shoppers

In terms of geographic spread, shoppers come from different regions of Zimbabwe and display varying shopping intentions (see Fig. 6.1). Timothy and Butler (1995)’s classification of cross-border shoppers according to their distance from the border posts is helpful in unpacking the geographic spread of Zimbabweans who shop in Musina border town. They argue that there are three zones, namely: (1) the residents of the proximal shopping zone generally cross the border frequently and are willing to go shopping every day usually to buy small ticket items such as fuel, groceries,



Fig. 6.1 Zimbabwean towns from where shoppers come to Musina. Source: Map supplied by Elize van As (Cartographer, Africa Institute of South Africa)

beer, tobacco products and restaurant meals[2]; (2) residents coming from the medial shopping zone cross the border less often and tend to buy higher-value goods; and (3) the distal shopping zone residents seldom cross the border but when they do so tend to buy big-ticket items like clothes, appliances and electronic products.

Cross-border shoppers from the proximal shopping zone at the South Africa-Zimbabwe border are mostly from the neighbouring town of Beitbridge, in Zimbabwe. One can observe a man or woman carrying a bag on their head and walking on foot instead of using the taxis or long-distance buses. In conversations with such shoppers, it emerged that they only began to frequent the opposite side of the border at the height of the shortage of goods and commodities in Zimbabwe, around the year 2006. A few of them had been to the other side, in South Africa, mostly for social events such as church and drinks at taverns in Nancefield Township. Although mostly adults travel for daily shopping, some parents send their children to shop for household goods at retail outlets Shoprite and Spar, across the border.

Usually on Saturday mornings, border residents can be identified around midday as they make way back to the border post usually crossing on foot or hitchhiking for transport back to their homes in Beitbridge. In terms of modes of transport, the majority use public transport to the border post, disembark and then walk across the border post. When going to Musina, they board Musina-bound taxis, and upon return just outside the Zimbabwean border gate, there are local taxis waiting to ferry them to the township of Dulibadzimu. Beitbridge residents who own tuck shops and flea markets also buy in bulk for resale. Instead of stocking up their tuck shops with goods from Zimbabwean wholesalers, much of what they sell is sourced cheaply from Musina. Among the most common purchases are alcoholic beverages especially ciders, whisky and lager brands that are not produced locally in Zimbabwe such as Heineken. These beverages find their way to the *shebeens* and taverns in Beitbridge through the illegal crossing points along the Limpopo River.

Shoppers from the medial zone travel from towns and rural areas within a radius of 200 km from the border, namely parts of Masvingo province and Matabeleland South. The rural parts of these southernmost provinces of Zimbabwe have all become connected with the border town of Musina over the years. Shoppers travelled from towns and villages located south western such as Tuli, Collen Bawn, West Nicholson and Gwanda while from the South Eastern direction, they travelled from Mwenezi, Bubi, Rutenga and far afield as Triangle and Chiredzi (see Fig. 6.1). Shoppers can in most cases board minibuses which ferry them from their villages to Beitbridge and even crossing into Musina and back. Depending on the volumes of their purchases, these shoppers would sometimes hire a three-tonne truck to transport their stock straight to their door step. Others use their own private vehicles to travel to and from Musina. They are mostly into bulk shopping of groceries and alcohol for resale in their tuck shops and shebeens, respectively.

[2]According to Timothy and Butler (1995), the proximal zone is the area extending approximately 50 km from the border. The medial shopping zone ranges from 50 to 200 km from the border while the distal shopping zone includes the rest of Canada.

Cross-border shoppers from the rest of country come from distal zones located more than 300 km away from the border, among them Bulawayo, Mutare, Gwanda, Gweru, Gokwe, Kwekwe, Chegutu, Kadoma and the capital city Harare (see Fig. 6.1). Shoppers who travelled the furthest include those from Karoi (786 km), Victoria Falls (759 km), Chinhoyi (698 km) and Bindura (670 km). Considering the conditions of the roads in Zimbabwe, journeys by bus from some of these areas to the border post may last up to 10 h. For those who use public transport, long-distance buses and coaches are the most viable forms of transport. Their shopping trips require more organising, planning and their journeys take anything from 3 to 8 h. In interviews with these shoppers, it was revealed that contrary to predictions of most cross-border shopping models, long distance did not always influence the nature of goods that they purchased. It was not uncommon to see a Harare-bound shopper purchasing grocery only. These shoppers buy consumer goods in bulk including huge appliances and furniture either for household use or resell.

The fact that some of these long-distance shoppers travelled from Harare the capital city of Zimbabwe, which is larger than Musina, is testimony to the shift in economic nodes in the Southern African region. For over a decade and half, Musina has shifted as an economic hub supplying informal cross-border traders with goods for resale as opposed to travelling further south in South Africa to Johannesburg as they used to in the 1980s and 1990s. The interruption of commodity distribution networks in Zimbabwe during the period of shortages led to the shifting of nodes to the border towns neighbouring the country. Owing to its wide range of goods and growing retail community, Musina has become an important shopping destination. Residents of Zimbabwean border towns like Victoria Falls, Plumtree and Mutare travel long distances to Musina apart from crossing into Zambia, Botswana or Mozambique, respectively. Buses from all these towns arrive every morning with shoppers who then spend half their day purchasing goods and then return the same day. The observable presence of long-distance cross-border shoppers in Musina shows a rather different picture to the norm that only people who live in borderlands shop there. Some local residents of Beitbridge and Musina eke out their living from facilitating mobility of long-distance shoppers.

Organisation of Shopping Trips

Shopping was often organised in groups or individual trips. In my analysis of their mobile practices related to cross-border shopping, I take note of Creswell who argues that mobility is experienced differently by travellers.

> Human mobility, like place, surely has the notion of experience at its centre. Moving is an energy-consuming business. It can be hard work. It can also be a moment of luxury and pampering. The arrangement of seats on a trans-Atlantic flight is an almost perfect metaphor for an experiential politics of mobility. Upper, first, or connoisseur class provides you with more space, nicer food, more oxygen and more toilets per person, among other perks. Those at the back are cramped, uncomfortable, oxygen starved and standing in line for the toilet (Creswell, 2010: 166).

In like manner, shoppers who travelled by private car or public transport experienced mobility differently in terms of comfort or luxury, speed, travel time and convenience especially during border crossings. The trips could further be divided by their places of origin within Zimbabwe namely those who resided near the border in Beitbridge as well as its outlying areas and those who came from further distances in the hinterland of Zimbabwe. Hinterland shoppers comprised those who hailed from distant parts of the country of up to about 8 hours' drive. Among the modes of travel for hinterland shoppers are private cars (especially those travelling as family members), long-distance coaches for those coming from the hinterland (e.g., a coach plying the Harare/Beitbridge route daily back and forth). Some shoppers found it more convenient to hitch rides from private motor vehicles and long-haul trucks heading to the border and back to their town within the hinterland. Long-haul trucks were preferred not only for their flexibility with regard to travel fares but also they could help their passengers to pass with their goods undeclared. Travel patterns for most shoppers were determined by the time it took to cross the border and the opening hours of the shops in Musina. On bad days, the shoppers had no choice but to sleep over on the paving of shops and service stations while the better off would at least sleep in the local bed and breakfast lodges.

Mufaro and his wife Odelia who live in Harare shared some interesting experiences with me about their shopping trips between 2007 and 2008 when there were severe shortages. Mufaro earned his salary in American dollars at the time and would often prefer to drive with his wife and some close family members to stock up their household needs. In an ordinary year, they would do this four times. He mentioned that the frequency of their trips increased when shops began to run dry. The mid-sized Toyota sedan that he often used with his wife was becoming too small for the purchases that were becoming bulkier each trip. He had to resort to borrowing his employer's truck (a one-tonne truck) which he would fill up with various groceries and supplies for his workmates. At the time, because he was among the few people at his workplace who had a visa, most of his workmates would also give him their orders to buy goodies for them in Musina. Mufaro narrated the journeys to Musina. In terms of driving, they would leave in the evening usually at 7:00 pm so that they would arrive around 1:00 am in Beitbridge. The distance between Harare and Beitbridge is about 580 km, but because of the poor state of the road, it can take more than 8 h of driving. They would then cross to the South African side of the border and then sleep at the nearby N1 service station waiting for shops to open. Once they started shopping, the couple would forget all about the arduous journey ahead of them. By about 2:00 pm they would be getting ready to return to the border post and cross into Zimbabwe (Mufaro, 38, Harare, NGO employee).

The downside to travelling between South Africa and Zimbabwe was always the encounters with traffic police who would stop them to find a fault on their car so that they could solicit a bribe from him. He says their faces always showed sadness and hunger as they envied him and other shoppers who were driving past their roadblocks. It touched his heart so much that in some cases he would leave them refreshments from his cooler box full of drinks and bottled water to cope with the heat. Sometimes the police officers would become hostile if they realised they could not get anything from motorists and Mufaro expressed that he could see the desperation of the situation that these fellow countrymen were going through. They would utter statements like "just because you can afford to go for shopping doesn't mean you can evade the law". He did sympathise with their situation and mentioned that indeed the cross-border shopping had an "economy" of its own which benefited different actors across the Harare/Beitbridge highway that came in contact with shoppers. These trips were not always easy especially if cars broke down at night because there were high risks of being mugged by criminals lurking in the bushes along the highway (Ibid).

Despite such experiences, shoppers who travelled by car expressed that they enjoyed their trips and they were happier than when using a bus or other public transport. They said it brought families closer together and it was a better form of recreation than going to some of the country's tourist destinations when the country was undergoing harsh economic turmoil. Respondents who travelled by car as families also spent some of their money on dining at local restaurants in Musina such as the Spur Steak Ranches and KFC. Having a meal at KFC during those times of shortages was something very special especially if they travelled with their children. Travelling in car groups was also meant to make sure that having more family members would mean more people to declare the excise duty on purchases. Everyone in the car would be given something to declare since they each had a duty free rebate of US$300.

Bus trips always began with a prayer. Zimbabwean roads have claimed so many lives and so shoppers always prayed for God's hand to look after them. A member of the bus crew would ask anyone aboard the bus to pray for a safe journey. Nevertheless, riding the bus always came with its own perks. Rebecca narrated how a bus ride always gave her ideas on what to buy in order to resale back home.

> Every time I was on the bus I always spoke to other women on the bus who were also going to Musina. Because people are usually uncomfortable sharing business information I would ask in a subtle manner what they were going to buy and where the lowest prices could be found. On one occasion I actually learned that the ZIMRA officials were now confiscating frozen chickens from shoppers crossing into Zimbabwe. I was very grateful for that information because I had plans to import as many chickens to supply my brother for his wedding. Although I had to change my plans unexpectedly I was happy about that information. That's why I always liked riding on the bus it was my source of information as well as networking sometimes (Rebecca, 26 trader, Mazowe).

Apart from getting information and intelligence on goods to purchase, travelling by bus was also organised in such a way that travellers would collectively help each other to cross the border with their heavy loads. Most respondents mentioned that shopping trips brought out humanity in people to such an extent that they have been helped before by a fellow shopper from the same bus group as them to declare goods when crossing the border. One went as far as explaining that a fellow shopper who was a complete stranger helped them with money to pay their excise duty and reimbursed them when they arrived at their destination in Mutare. Shoppers preferred buses because they offered door-to-door delivery services for their passengers on return from South Africa.

In other cases, a bus ride was a big inconvenience especially if it broke down and no recovery truck was sent on time. Melissa remembers how they slept two nights by the roadside without decent water supply and taking a bath.

> It was bad, we heard a loud burst as the bus was in motion. I don't know exactly what it was but one of the rear tyres was badly damaged. What irked me the most was that the bus did not have a spare wheel and the mechanics only came the next morning about eight hours later to fix the bus. It took forever and even when you complain to the owners of the bus it doesn't help. As a result of that experience my friends and I always know which buses not to ride when travelling to do our shopping (Melissa, 43, trader Harare).

The unreliability of the buses is something that most of the respondents experienced in their shopping trips. However, their biggest fear was always accidents because most of the highways in Zimbabwe have become pot hole-ridden and dangerous especially at night. Stray animals are also part of the problem as they cause fatal accidents to vehicles on the road. Shoppers who travelled by bus could only "leave it in the hands of God" as most would say. Certain buses were notorious for charging exorbitant prices for any luggage that a shopper had on them. The price to carry big items like beds, four plate stoves, sofas and refrigerators was often prohibitive. One could pay as much as R800 for a refrigerator or R1500 for a set of sofas to be loaded onto the bus from Musina to Harare. However, the shoppers argue that even after factoring in the costs of transporting their appliances, they were still cheaper than in Zimbabwean shops.

For Beitbridge borderland residents, mobility was a less demanding exercise as they could easily catch a taxi ride to the border and then cross on foot to the other side. At the South African side of the border, they would board another taxi to Musina city centre. It was only in cases where they wanted to shop for big ticket items like household electrical appliances that border residents hired trucks to transport the goods for them instead of the usual carrying by head and that is only when they had to declare at the border. Many of the respondents I spoke to carried small quantities of goods. In one of my field trips, I interviewed a woman who had purchased a packet of laundry soap because she could not find the things she wanted to buy at a reasonable price.

For those who grew up in the borderland, most respondents confirmed that the border has grown in prominence since the early 2000s and their home town Beitbridge shows visible signs of expansion, linked to the increased volume of traffic traversing the border. Prior to the 2000s, residents of both sides of the border could occasionally cross to either side for social visits to relatives or for drinks. But since then, Beitbridge residents have increased their consumption of South African products, as their local shops are full of products from the other side. Even in terms of mobile communications services, these residents have a choice to use either South African mobile phone carriers, namely, Vodacom, Cell C, Telkom and MTN, or Zimbabwean mobile carriers like Econet, Net One and Telecel. Most of the young Beitbridge residents whom I came across in Musina's shopping areas were engaged as transporters. They would ferry their passengers from the Zimbabwean side of the border to Musina and wait for them to carry out their shopping, then return with them to the border post. At the border, the transporters would facilitate the passage of goods with ease especially negotiating duty of smuggling altogether.

These residents are transnational as they are well-versed with languages spoken in the area and border officials are lenient with them sometimes allowing them to cross the border undetected.[3]

The buying power of these cross-border shoppers earns them “special treatment” from retailers in the town. Bulk shoppers receive discounts and additional benefits such as free transport to the border post or the long-distance bus terminus where they board buses to ferry them home. Although all groups of retailers find ways to woo bulk shoppers, no other group of retailers in Musina goes out of their way to lure Zimbabwean consumers than Asian and East African shop owners in the town. These shop owners tried by all means to make sure that their customers bought in bulk by lowering prices and offering transport to their consumers back to the border post. A few of them have gone as far as waiting for customers at the bus terminus when passengers disembarked early in the morning from Zimbabwe. They then negotiate with drivers for customers whom they provide transport to their shops and negotiate purchases and return them to the buses after a few hours’ shopping.

It is a widespread practice in these shops for customers to negotiate the price of goods. One can observe that the merchandise displayed in the shops do not have price tags signifying that it is a matter of negotiating. In some cases, shop owners offer lay-buy terms for their customers especially for expensive electrical goods, which makes their products attractive Because these shop owners employ Shona-speaking shop assistants, some shop owners have learned basic Shona phrases relating to buying and selling. What was interesting is that most of the shops sell similar merchandise so shoppers use their discretion to shop based on previous experiences of customer services, price discounts, etc. but products are almost similar from one shop to another. One Bangladeshi shop owner asked me “*une marii?*” (how much do you have?), after I asked the price of a gasoline water pump. He knew that by speaking Shona to me, he would be able to reach common ground and convince me to buy from him. The use of Shona-speaking shop assistants also shows that the bulk of customers for these bazaars come from Zimbabwe and not local Musina residents. Zimbabwean music can be heard playing loudly in the shops and one of the assistants announcing that day’s specials through a microphone/loudspeaker. It must be acknowledged though that these shop assistants are cheap labour for the shop owners since their stay in the country is illegal.

Crossing the Border

The Zimbabwe-South Africa border is a site of congestion, where shoppers and other travellers experience temporary “immobility” as they wait their turn to cross the border. Even though it operates 24 h daily, travellers crossing this border post can

[3]Some of these residents stay for some parts of the year in Musina’s residential areas so that they engage in informal activities in the city centre most of which are targeting fellow Zimbabweans as their clients.

experience delays of up to half a day or even more during peak seasons like Christmas holidays. When crossing into South Africa, the shoppers are subjected to different forms of structural violence including standing in long queues for hours in scorching heat without explanations for the delays, frisk searches without consent sometimes by officers of the opposite sex and other forms of dehumanising treatment.[4] Similarly on their return trips to Zimbabwe, the shoppers have the revenue officials waiting to tax them on every item that they have purchased if it falls under the lists of restricted goods. Because of its role as a space where travellers are subjected to control and come into contact with the state, the border presents itself as "a symbolic obstacle and consumption as reward" (Ulusoy, 2011: 893) for cross-border shoppers. One would agree with her when she says:

> Local people encounter numerous difficulties while crossing the border. They wait in lengthy lines every day, sometimes under excruciating conditions. But once they are done crossing the border, they often indulge themselves in consumption experiences available on "the other" side. Therefore, the border is a symbolic obstacle in the way of alluring consumption time, and the act of crossing it generates a mysterious and thrilling experience. It is apparent from the narratives that such sensational swings would not be possible or the same if the border was to be removed (Ibid).

This is indeed true of most Zimbabwean shoppers who after waiting in long and winding queues to enter South Africa indulged in bulk buying of all sorts of merchandise. Depending on their personal circumstances, the shoppers had to return on time to their respective places of work or to their families especially for mothers who were nursing babies left behind.

Entering South Africa from Zimbabwe always gives travellers anxiety especially when it comes to delays in crossing into Musina which meant they could end up crossing late when shops have closed. In such cases, shoppers would be forced to sleep on the pavements of shops in the town to avoid incurring accommodation costs in nearby lodges. South African Department of Home Affairs officials were notorious for their slow pace in processing travellers. When one asks the travellers why they think the officials are taking time, the typical response is "I don't know, but these guys are just slow"; some believed that the officials were always on strike.

---

[4]Structural violence distinguishes itself from physical violence in that it refers to systemic ways in which social structures disadvantage individuals. Structural violence is often ascribed to John Galtung who applied it to his study of peace and conflict and defined it as indirect violence built into repressive social orders which creates enormous differences between potential and actual human self-realisation. Farmer defines structural violence as "violence exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order". Furthermore he argues that "structural violence is one way of describing social arrangements that put individuals and populations in harm's way" in the sense that "the arrangements are structural because they are embedded in the political and economic organization of our social world" and "they are violent because they cause injury to people". In the context of this study, I argue that present-day violence against Zimbabwean shoppers must be understood within a deeper historical context of structural forms of violence that precipitate mobility, namely economic and social uncertainty in Zimbabwe. Their journeys between South Africa and Zimbabwe and their experiences in the host community in South Africa are all sites of structural violence which they have to negotiate.

Apart from time, the other fear for most people travelling was that they would be turned away if an irregularity was picked up on their passport. Procedures for immigration and customs changed every now and then especially the designated counters and in some cases buildings. Interviewees noted that in 1 month they would be directed to a specific counter for immigration clearance and the same counter next month would have been moved to a temporary shelter outside the main building. On numerous occasions, they lamented that time would be lost between trying to figure out all those changes and long queues which they had to patiently wait in. Any travellers who had agricultural products on them destined for South Africa were subject to customs searches and were bound by law to declare them. Usually those traders who carried cane furniture, wooden ornaments and brooms made from dry grass in Zimbabwe would be expected to declare, and if they did not for any reason do that, they could be fined or have their goods confiscated. Anyone travelling with milk products or any cooked food would have them confiscated as part of disease control. First-time travellers would usually be the transgressors of this law. "I cried in disbelief as I saw them take away yoghurt and when I asked why they were taking it away, they just said you want to bring diseases here" (Maria, 35, Harare). It was only when she joined her colleagues in the bus that she understood that confiscations happen a lot at the border entering South Africa.

Because of hyper-mobility, some people's passports deteriorated especially the photograph page—something which could deny them entry into South Africa. South African immigration authorities scanned a passport through their computer system. If it recorded an error because of the poor quality of the image, the traveller was turned away. It was heartbreaking for many who experienced such unfortunate incidents. But they always found ways of proceeding with the journey. If they were travelling on a bus, they would then ask the bus driver to help them pass through the immigration checkpoint "smoothly".

Exiting South Africa and entering Zimbabwe subjects the shoppers to the unpredictable border. Right from the time of packing their goods and loading them onto the respective transport, shoppers have the border in mind as they think of innovative ways to evade payments of duty which would make their trade in goods unprofitable. The South African side of the border was usually a pain when it came to delays in procedures for exiting the country, usually the queues for stamping passports are long and staff are usually to blame because of their "go-slow" tactics as Zimbabweans refer to it. While shoppers have had their lucky days when waiting time in a queue is less than an hour, the most common waiting time is over an hour to 12 h before they can leave the country. The same process can repeat itself on the Zimbabwean side of the border especially during peak times. The Zimbabwean revenue officials are the dreaded of them all. They are ready to tax every other thing they consider to be expensive or on the list of taxable items. Bribery is not done openly with these officers unless they solicit for it; usually middlemen or runners help shoppers with bribing officials. One may ask how problems with regard to customs and excise duties and transportability of goods were handled. Below I explain some of the clandestine ways in which goods cross the border.

The Clandestine Movements of Goods and People

Cross-border shoppers and traders try by all means to evade paying excise duties because they would render their goods unprofitable. From the extant literature on informal cross-border trade in Africa, it is clear that the smuggling of legal and illegal goods across borders is a widespread economic phenomenon (Bruns, Miggelbrink, & Müller, 2011; Doevenspeck, 2011; Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002; Flynn, 1997; MacGaffey, 1991; Raeymaekers, 2009; Schomerus & Titeca, 2012; Van Schendel & Abraham, 2005; Vlassenroot & Büscher, 2013; Wiegand, 1993). Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002: 398) argue that illegality exists in three basic forms: firstly, the trading of goods or services that are normally forbidden by law (e.g. narcotic drugs, prostitution, certain categories of arms, rare wildlife); secondly, the trading of legal goods and services made illegal by avoiding the payment of duties or taxes; and thirdly, using illegal unfair practices to attain a competitive advantage (insider trading, organising clandestine cartels and monopolies, tax evasion, black market currency exchange). What lubricates these practices in many countries are bribery and corruption, which are ancient methods of avoiding law enforcement and judicial sanctions in that they essentially reduce the risk of what would otherwise be extremely hazardous activities (Ibid 398).

On their way from South Africa into Zimbabwe, cross-border shoppers were expected to declare all the goods that they had purchased on their trips. Even if they were travelling by bus, all passengers on board were subjected to physical searches on their luggage to check if any of them were trying to cross with prohibited or restricted goods. The role of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) as an arm of the state mandated to collecting revenue places officials to create ludicrous laws in order to meet unrealistic financial targets. Cross-border shoppers therefore smuggle for the following reasons:

(a) Some goods have been banned or prohibited such that they attract 40% duty. Food stuffs such as eggs, chicken, potatoes and the like. In some cases, where travellers have failed to pay the tax, they have been confiscated.
(b) New regulations by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Zimbabwe which came into effect in July 2016 ban the importation of goods such as building materials, groceries and a whole list of other products in the name of protecting local industries.
(c) Alcohol is regulated in terms of quantities that can be imported, and because there is a high demand for imported beers, ciders and whiskies, they are smuggled through the border post for consumption in Zimbabwe.
(d) Shoppers smuggle so that they can exceed their maximum tax rebate allowance of US$300 per month without paying an extra amount.
(e) Sometimes shoppers without passports have no choice but to smuggle because they cannot legally declare and pay for goods; they have to cross the border through clandestine means.

While there was a general unwillingness to pay on the part of the cross-border shoppers, the reality was that the profitability of their businesses would not be realised if they paid customs duty. Shoppers felt that evading paying hefty customs duty was a way of realising “social justice” (Wiegand, 1993) to them, because the Zimbabwean state regulated specific commodities and placed high taxes on goods that are not even made locally in the country. Apart from customs duties, shoppers have to meet other expenses which make cross-border shopping unprofitable, namely, toll gate fees and what are commonly known as “spot fines” for violation of traffic laws en route to or from the border post. In Zimbabwe, motorists are required to pay their fines upon admission of guilt in cash to the officer who has issued the fine.

To avoid paying customs duty, shoppers could smuggle their purchases on their own or they could enlist the services of a smuggler. Usually before boarding public transport from Musina to the border post, shoppers took their time removing items such as shoes or clothes from their original packaging especially boxes and price tags. They would then pack these in unmarked plastic bags and then pack them neatly into suitcases or bags. Preparations for smuggling began at the point of purchase in Musina, where shoppers begin to pack their goods in ways that conceal them, boxes of goods which are restricted are opened and the goods repackaged, even frozen goods like chicken are packed like dry goods. Some would simply wear the new clothes they had purchased and pack the old ones in their luggage.

Under-declaring prices of what their total expenditure in Musina was also a method of ensuring that their goods were not taxed. Because ZIMRA officials demand to see receipts of goods which shoppers have purchased the shoppers would ask retailers to issue them with receipts reflecting lower amounts. One shopper explained thus:

> Shop owners in Musina, especially the Indians [including other Asian-origin retailers] even ask you if you would like them to issue a receipt that shows a lesser price. This they know will make you purchase the goods from them. Furniture items are the most important ones because ZIMRA officials always want to overprice and tax you. They are so clever you have to stick by the price on your receipts even if it seems too cheaper than the price they expect it to be (Melissa, 43, trader Harare).

Officials from ZIMRA conduct their own price checking through websites of leading South African retailers just to make sure that importers do not underprice their purchases to avoid paying the correct amount of customs duty.

ZIMRA officers behaved in ways that promote smuggling especially when they cause unnecessary delays on travellers travelling by bus. Frustrated travellers resorted to bribing them so that they “release” their bus and let them cross the border without any delays. The whole process of crossing the border into Zimbabwe involves a number of checkpoints which are time-consuming. Upon arrival by bus from the South African side of the border, passengers entering Zimbabwe have to disembark and rush to the immigration counter for clearance, then they have to fill in a declaration form stating how much they have shopped for and an itemised list of all the goods. No matter how many buses are queuing to cross into the country, customs officials require all passengers to offload their luggage from the bus and stand by it while officials conduct physical searches for prohibited goods and checking the declaration form against the passenger's luggage. Usually such a process could be conducted using a scanner, but ZIMRA officials prefer physical searches. This really frustrates travellers. In the end, customs officials and bus crew members usually agree on a fee for them to turn a blind eye to their luggage and let them go.

Sometimes the customs officers at the border also made shoppers' lives difficult when they charged exorbitant duties on their goods and confiscated them. Most private car users stated that it was not always easy to negotiate with officials because officials would be afraid of being busted by what could be "undercover cops". On one occasion, a small-business operator I spoke to said he had experienced the worst punishment for smuggling his computers across the border. He had been used to giving the customs officers a little something but on that particular day he lost all that he had on him:

> I had a lot of computer components especially motherboards, hard drives and other parts to build computers at my workshop in Bulawayo. My clearing agent was unreachable and I only had one option to speak to the ZIMRA officials directly. There was a junior rank official who accepted to help me for a fee but he did not give me an official receipt to show that I had paid the required customs duty. I was busted at the last checkpoint that leads to Beitbridge and the customs officials asked for proof that I had paid the required duty on the computer items. When I failed to produce the receipts they confiscated my car on condition that I paid a fine and the duty in full. I failed to raise the money and the computer components plus my car were confiscated. After 2 months it was auctioned as I watched helplessly because I could not afford to buy back my car. All my investment was gone in a flash (Kevin, 35, Bulawayo).

Stories like the one above are very common especially when the Zimbabwean government changes its customs duty requirements and shoppers are left with no choice but to leave their goods at the border.

Sometimes cross-border shoppers hired other people to smuggle on their behalf. Middlemen such as runners/porters, bicycle riders, truck drivers, bus drivers are usually there to help with the smuggling of goods especially crossing into Zimbabwe without detection by authorities or they broker between shoppers and officials from ZIMRA. The experiences of Zimbabwean cross-border shoppers with smuggling of goods across the border resonate with findings of studies in other parts of the world. Svab (2002) explains the relationship between import regulations imposed by the state and the rise in smuggling as a grievance by shoppers in socialist Yugoslavia. She demonstrates how Yugoslavs practised a sort of "soft smuggling" which involved only small quantities and amounts of goods usually hidden in their cars. Petty smuggling would involve hiding money in long hair, in underwear and in shoes among other places (Ibid).

Challenges of Mobility for Cross-Border Shoppers

One of the biggest challenges that shoppers and traders face is physical and structural violence (Raeymaekers, 2009; Schomerus & Titeca, 2012; Vlassenroot & Büscher, 2013). Studies have shown that corruption and insecurity at borders affects many traders as corrupt law-enforcement agencies take advantage of the traders' lack of knowledge on customs procedures to take bribes while those who carry money run risks of having it seized (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012). Certain regions on the continent have recorded high incidences of rape (Ibid). As a result of lack of committed and effective policing at border points and market ports, there have been increases in crimes against traders. Therefore as a coping strategy, most traders, mostly women, travel together for safety (Peberdy, 2002). Others resort to crossing at informal border crossings to avoid abuses and paying hefty taxes.

Research conducted by organisations such as the Strategic Business Partnerships (2006) shows that cross-border shoppers and traders are faced with a number of challenges which negatively impact on the expansion of their businesses and total spend. Among them, crime especially theft of their money or goods was ranked first, followed by lack of accommodation that is affordable, safe, strategically located and clean, and thirdly xenophobia as well as harassment by police, especially in Johannesburg (Strategic Business Partnerships, 2006). Africans from the rest of the continent who come to South Africa as tourists find themselves in a difficult situation as they are subjected to what Mathers and Landau (2007; 523) describe as "a schizophrenic response to Africans from elsewhere on the continent who are at once a critical component of South Africa's Africanness, mighty consumers, widely touted as criminals, seen as burdens on the state, and deported by the tens of thousands". They argue that the shopping tourist is "in a very immediate sense at the mercy of the confusion that comes from being a black visitor in South Africa" (Ibid).

A newspaper report established that upon visiting Musina one night, their news crew saw "scores of women and men were like abandoned bags of maize, fast asleep on the pavements as they waited for the next day for shops to open". The newspaper cites a woman who explained some of the structural violence involved in cross-border shopping, "We are harassed while in other countries especially in South Africa by its customs and police officials who are very hostile and have negative attitude towards us. . .We are subjected to humiliating body searches in the hands of South African police and this lowers our dignity as human beings" (Ibid). Some of the shoppers expressed dismay at what they termed "excessive customs duty charges" as well as confiscation of their goods by border officials because they were misconstrued as smugglers and drug traffickers (Ibid).

Conclusion

The discussion has shown how shopping trips were organised and experienced by shoppers of different categories. Musina receives shoppers who display a wide range of characteristics, among them those who shop for personal consumption and live in close proximity to the border, or bulk shoppers that live hundreds of kilometres away in an urban or rural area within Zimbabwe's hinterland. These shoppers come from different regions of the country and display varying shopping intentions. A distinguishing characteristic among the cross-border shoppers is related to their organisation, whether they travel as individuals or as families. Family shoppers travel as family members of the same household or closely related and may have a friend or two among them. Normally they travel in a car and buy enough for their family members as well as extras in the form of gifts. Their counterparts are the trader-shoppers whose main reason for cross-border shopping is to purchase goods to resale in Zimbabwe. These bulk shoppers receive discounts and additional benefits such as free transport to the border post or the long-distance bus terminus where they board buses to ferry them home.

Most of the shoppers narrated how their trips were never rosy even for those who travelled in their own private cars. When crossing into South Africa, the shoppers are subjected to different forms of structural violence including standing in long queues for hours in scorching heat without explanations for the delays, frisk searches without consent sometimes by officers of the opposite sex and other forms of dehumanising treatment. The rent-seeking Zimbabwean state adds to the burden of travel too. As a response, cross-border shoppers and traders try by all means to evade paying excise duties because they would render their goods unprofitable.

Commentators and scholars wrongly assume that cross-border mobility by Zimbabweans is a problem which needs to be curbed by implementing measures and policies which stop them from crossing the border. Such a perspective misses the point in that there is a need to measure and understand the developmental outcomes for both Zimbabwe the sending country and South Africa which hosts shoppers. Whereas economic decline (which manifested itself in shortages of consumer goods) had been a major driver of mobility, Zimbabweans continue to traverse the border into South Africa to access and consume goods and services in times of economic abundance. They continue to boost local economies (especially retail sectors) of small towns such as Musina through regular cross-border shopping trips. Below are some of the recommendations.

(i) In order to avert resistance through smuggling and covert protests against protectionism, it will be more inclusive on the part of the Zimbabwean government to formulate policies which strike a balance between state-centred interests and citizens' survival needs or wants and their consumption desires. The Ministry of Trade and Industry thus needs to conduct robust economic studies which provide evidence on ways in which local Zimbabwean industries can benefit from protectionist policies from foreign imports without creating further shortages in the economy. The ban on imports has only brought in new challenges, namely smuggling but are yet to lead to the revival of local manufacturing industries.

(ii) It will be more enabling for the South African government, particularly the Department of Home Affairs if it adopts strategies to cater for informal cross-border traders and shoppers so that they are not clumped together with migrants. There can be special express counters for shoppers which can reduce the amount of time that is spent on border crossing. Such counters can also include the services of South African Revenue Services such as a facility for refund of value-added tax rebates. At the moment, shoppers who travel by bus cannot claim their tax rebates because the process takes long and buses leave them.

(iii) The local municipality of Musina also needs to recognise cross-border shopping as a form of tourism and include it in its Local Economic Development Plan. Rather than just policing the compliance of Zimbabwean shoppers with parking and road use by-laws, the municipality can also reconfigure certain spaces in the town to have infrastructure which caters for cross-border shoppers. Such infrastructure can include low cost but functional bus terminuses with ablution facilities and safe waiting areas for the cross-border shoppers. Shoppers also expressed concerns of accommodation which is often expensive and very limited. This is also an aspect which the local municipality can address by inviting investors to provide low-cost boarding facilities for shoppers.

Cross-border shoppers need a voice in order for governments to listen to their concerns. In order for this to be achieved, there is a need for civil society groups which capacitate the existing cross-border trade associations and where possible they need to be depoliticised so that they focus on lobbying the state for better conditions of travel and taxation, among other issues. Non-partisan cross-border trade associations are likely to focus more on the mandate of delivering better conditions for their members.

References

Afrika, J., & Ajumbo, G. (2012). Informal cross border trade in Africa: Implications and policy recommendations. *African Development Bank: Africa Economic Brief, 3* (10).

Bruns, B., Miggelbrink, J., & Müller, K. (2011). Smuggling and small-scale trade as part of informal economic practices: Empirical findings from the eastern external EU border. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 31*(11/12), 664–680.

Büscher, M., Urry, J., & Witchger, K. (2011). *Mobile methods*. London: Routledge.

Cohen, E., & Cohen, S. A. (2015). Beyond Eurocentrism in tourism: A paradigm shift to mobilities. *Tourism Recreation Research, 40*(2), 157–168.

Cresswell, T. (2010). Towards a politics of mobility. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 28*, 17–31.

Cresswell, T. (2012). Mobilities II: Still. *Progress in Human Geography, 36*, 645–653.

Doevenspeck, M. (2011). Constructing the border from below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan state boundary. *Political Geography, 30*(3), 129–142.

Fadahunsi, A., & Rosa, P. (2002). Entrepreneurship and illegality: Insights from the Nigerian cross-border trade. *Journal of Business Venturing, 17*(5), 397–429.

Faulconbridge, J., & Hui, A. (2016). Traces of a mobile field: Ten years of mobilities research. *Mobilities, 11*(1), 1–14.

Flynn, D. K. (1997). "We are the border": Identity, Exchange and the state along the Benin-Nigeria Border. *American Ethnologist, 24*(2), 311–330.

Hannam, K., Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2006). Editorial: Mobilities, immobilities and moorings. *Mobilities, 1*(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/17450100500489189.

Henige, D. (1982). *Oral historiography*. New York: Longman.

Huffington Post. (2016). The world's 10 best shopping destinations may surprise you. 12/01/2016. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/entry/top-places-to-shop-worldwide_us_5695184be4b086bc1cd52de4

Kloppenburg, S. (2013). *Tracing mobilities regimes: The regulation of drug smuggling and labour migration at two airports in the Netherlands and Indonesia*. PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam.

MacGaffey, J. (Ed.) (1991). *The real economy of Zaire; The contribution of smuggling and other unofficial activities to national wealth*. London/Philadelphia, PA: James Currey/University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mathers, K. & Landau, L. (2007). Natives, tourists, and makwerekwere: Ethical concerns with 'Proudly South African' tourism. *Development Southern Africa, 24*(3), 523–537.

Mavhunga, C., Cuvelier, J., & Pype, K. (2016). "Containers, carriers, vehicles" three views of mobility from Africa. *Transfers, 6*(2), 43–53.

Mechlinski, T. (2010). Towards an approach to borders and mobility in Africa. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 25*(2), 94–106.

Peberdy, S. (2002, April 23). *Hurdles to trade? South Africa's immigration policy and informal sector cross-border traders in a SADC*. Presented at SAMP/LHR/HSRC workshop on regional integration, poverty and South Africa's proposed migration policy, Pretoria.

Raeymaekers, T. (2009). The silent encroachment of the frontier: A politics of transborder trade in the Semliki Valley (Congo-Uganda). *Political Geography, 28*(1), 55–65.

Schomerus, M., & Titeca, K. (2012). Deals and dealings: Inconclusive peace and treacherous trade along the South Sudan–Uganda border. *Africa Spectrum, 47*(2–3), 5–31.

Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2006). The new mobilities paradigm. *Environment and Planning, A38*, 207–226.

Strategic Business Partnerships (SBP). (2006, January). Cross-border African shoppers and traders in South Africa: Findings from an SBP survey. SME Alert. Retrieved from http://www.sbp.org.za/uploads/media/SME_Alert_Cross_Border_Shopping_final_8-12-06.pdf

Svab, A. (2002). Consuming Western image of well-being: Shopping tourism in socialist Slovenia. *Cultural Studies, 16*(1), 63–79.

Timothy, D. J., & Butler, R. W. (1995). Cross-border shopping: A North American perspective. *Annals of Tourism Research, 22*(1), 16–34.

Ulusoy, E. (2011). The meaning of border and its effects on cross-border consumption. In R. Ahluwalia, T. L. Chartrand, & R. K. Ratner (Eds.), *NA—Advances in consumer research* (Vol. 39, pp. 892–893). Duluth, MN: Association for Consumer Research.

Van Schendel, W., & Abraham, I. (2005). *Illicit flows and criminal things: States, borders, and the other side of globalization*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Vlassenroot, K., & Büscher, K. (2013). Borderlands, identity and urban development: The case of Goma (Democratic Republic of the Congo). *Urban Studies Journal, 50*(15), 3168–3184.

Wiegand, B. (1993). Petty smuggling as "social justice": Research findings from the Belize-Mexico border. *Social and Economic Studies, 42*(1), 171–193.

Chapter 7
The Security Challenges of a Borderless Africa: Issues and Perspectives

Lanre Ikuteyijo and Peter Olayiwola

Introduction

The idea of a borderless Africa is a reflection of globalisation with emphasis on related outcomes such as free movement of people, goods and services, interdependence, free market policies and liberal migration norms. One of the key objectives of a borderless Africa is the maximisation of Africa's human and natural resources, and this is undoubtedly a laudable goal. Moreover, a borderless Africa is an attempt to reflect developmental feats in other parts of the globe as is the case in Europe with the Schengen Accord for example. However, the accomplishment of this goal seems threatened by many challenges facing the continent which make the realisation to look like a smokescreen. These challenges could be broadly categorised as political, economic and social. The political challenges stem from the colonial heritage which has divided the continent mainly along the anglophone and francophone gulf with attendant consequences. The economic challenges also stem from the former and manifest in the difficulty to achieve a single currency after several attempts over the years. However, the social aspects include issues of security which present in the form of terrorism, insurgency, human trafficking, xenophobia and other forms of security threats involving transboundary crimes. This also includes the issue of ethnicity, which colonialists exploited to divide and rule. The readiness of the continent in achieving the much-anticipated borderless Africa as well as inherent constraints is discussed.

This chapter is mainly based on secondary data involving critical analysis of relevant policies and literature. The chapter is organised as follows: first, it discusses

L. Ikuteyijo (✉)
Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria
e-mail: likuteyijo@oauife.edu.ng

P. Olayiwola
School of Sociology & Social Policy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_7

the concepts of a borderless Africa and regional integration in Africa, and why they have become significant in modern-day Africa. Next, it relates the current patterns and experiences of mobility and development in Africa to the colonial heritage. Afterwards, there is an overview of existing regional bodies in Africa and their current operations. Next, the security challenges of a borderless Africa are outlined, and the last section proposes some solutions to the challenges.

Conceptual Clarification: Security and Regional Integration

Security has been defined in several ways but the common denominator is the emphasis on the freedom from fear and absence of threat of any kind. In Africa, the concept of security entails the absence of internal and external threats, safety of lives and property as well as the presence of general conditions which will guarantee fundamental human rights. The current state of security in Africa is, however, very precarious with several countries facing with one form of conflict or the other. These range from the use of child soldiers to wage wars to the use of child suicide bombers which has become the trademark of the Boko Haram sect in West Africa. Lives of people, especially migrants, are equally threatened with the rising rates of ethnic clashes and xenophobic attacks sweeping across the continent. In Jos, Nigeria, there are consistent reports of crises between settlers and migrants on the one hand and farmers and herdsmen on the other hand. In Cameroon, there are agitations by the minority English-speaking region for self-determination which is resisted by the dominant French-speaking region. In South Africa, there are disturbing reports of various episodes of xenophobic attacks and proliferation of hate speeches. All these coupled with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons make Africa's security climate more than worrisome.

Lastly, the concept of regional integration "covers the full range of public sector activities that involve permanent collaborative ventures, including economic policy, regional security, human rights, education, health, research and technology, and natural resource management. Regional integration is generally characterized by the establishment of joint institutional mechanisms and a degree of shared sovereignty" (Aryeetey, 1998: 395). Integration is therefore hinged on the achievements of the goals of borderless Africa as well as promotion of factors that will enhance human security and respect of human rights of all irrespective of social, political and economic background. However, the current security issues facing the continent no doubt pose a formidable challenge to the achievement of the potentials of continental integration and development.

Regional integration in Africa is informed by neoclassical theories like that of Balassa (1961), who assert that integration should be achieved through institutions, hence the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community of 1991 and its drive towards the formation of an African Economic Community along the following stages: formation of a Free Trade Area, formation of Customs Union, formation of an Economic and Monetary Union, formation of supranational institutions to govern the region modelled along the lines of the EU, etc.

Africa and the Colonial Baggage

Kwame Nkrumah, the former Ghanaian leader, was among the first to envision the integration of Africa to enhance sociocultural, economic and political development on the continent. His idea was driven by the quest for political unity and economic integration (Kumalo, 2011:15). The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was the first major step in this direction, but several factors such as the effects of the Cold War and the alliance of many African states to their colonial masters—even after independence—have limited the achievement of the goals of the founding fathers of the organisation (ibid).

In general, most of the former colonies were divided to suit the economic and political interests of the colonial administrators and had little regard for the economic sustenance of the countries (Greenwood, 2009). This colonial legacy is generally responsible for the small size and fragmentation of many countries and economies in Africa (Tuluy, 2016). One major avenue that African countries have sought to overcome the constraints of fragmentation and small size is by forming regional integration arrangements (ibid). In principle, these regional arrangements target at harnessing the potentials of economic gains. Thus, there are several regional economic communities (RECs)/regional blocks (often with overlapping objectives and memberships) in different parts of the continent for this purpose, and as such, the topic of regional integration in Africa is complex (Thonke & Spliid, 2012). The next section briefly looks at some of these regional blocks.

Regional Economic Communities

In order to achieve the main objective of this chapter, this section will briefly consider the existing regional organisations and the peculiar security challenges confronting each one, with the overall aim being to explore how these translate to a continent faced with many security challenges of a borderless Africa.

The following are the major RECs in Africa: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA).

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) is an African economic and integration organisation that seeks to promote economic union and trade of the member countries. Its objectives are to establish a global economic union by fostering cooperation and a sustained development plan that covers agriculture, industry, energy, education, etc. among its member states; removing all restrictions hampering free movement of persons, goods and services; and the promotion of external trade.

Since its establishment in 1998 (4th February) by the Leader of Great El-Fateh Revolution in Libya and the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan, other countries have joined CEN-SAD to increase its members to twenty-nine countries. These include Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia.

Political instability in some member states as well as hostage taking, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons, extremism and terrorism are security challenges that member states continue to grapple with (Iratni, 2017; OECD/SWAC, 2014).

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

COMESA was established in 1994 as a regional integration grouping of 19 eastern and southern African countries which 'agreed to promote regional integration through trade development and to develop their natural and human resources for the mutual benefit of all their peoples' (Ngwenya, 2013:1). The Member States are Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The COMESA Treaty covers a wide range of activities and sectors, but the overarching aim is to enhance economic prosperity of the region through regional integration (ibid).

Political instability and internal crises, armed conflicts and terrorism are major security challenges for COMESA some countries (Burgess, 2015; Lins de Albuquerque & Wiklund, 2015; Ramdeen, 2017).

The East African Community (EAC)

Headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, the organisation was founded in 1976 with six Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan and Tanzania with four integration pillars: customs union, common market, monetary union and political federation.[1] Through these four pillars, the organisation aims to "construct a powerful and sustainable East African economic and political bloc."[2]

In recent times, disagreements between leaders, intrastate conflicts, conflicts over resources such as land and water, armed attacks, drug trafficking and smuggling (around Lake Victoria), small arms and light weapons, political instability and terrorism threats in neighbouring eastern African states including Somalia and Uganda are some of the security challenges confronting the community (Africa News, 2019; Chikwanha, 2007; The Independent, 2017).

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) comprises 11 member states: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe and Chad.[3] The organisation was created in 1983 to 'promote and strengthen harmonious co-operation and balanced and self-sustaining development in all areas of economic and social activity; and harmonize national policies with a view to promoting Community activities, particularly in the fields of industry, transport and communications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, trade, currency and finance, human resources, tourism, education and culture, science and technology' (Chapter II, Article 4).

Sociopolitical unrests and armed conflicts led to a period of inactivity for the organisation in times past, and these are yet to be fully resolved in the region. In recent years, these include political instability including conflicts in the Central African Republic, terrorism in particular perpetrated by the Boko Haram, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and illicit trafficking in arms (Azah, 2014; Meyer, 2011).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) came into existence following the Treaty of Lagos in May, 1975. According to the organisation, its mandate is to promote economic integration in all fields of activity of member states. The 15 member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d' Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. The major vision is to create "a borderless region where the

[1] https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac

[2] ibid.

[3] http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/index.php/fr/

population has access to its abundant resources and is able to exploit same through the creation of opportunities under a sustainable environment".[4]

Some of the major achievements of ECOWAS include the free movement of persons without visas within the subregion, the use of the ECOWAS travellers' cheques and the introduction of an ECOWAS passport as a symbol of unity within the subregion (Adepoju, 2003). These and other attempts to eliminate rigid border formalities were designed to facilitate the movement of persons within the subregion, and the ultimate goal is to have a borderless West Africa (Adepoju, 2002).

Despite these innovations, the volatility of most countries within the subregion means that during periods of political and economic uncertainties, immigrants (including those from ECOWAS member states) have been targeted by national governments in the subregion (Adepoju, 2003). Thus, reports and cases of xenophobic attacks against foreigners including expulsion, payment of residence fees, etc. are not uncommon in different countries within the subregion (Adepoju, 2003; Ikuteyijo, 2015; Ikuteyijo and Olayiwola, 2018). Also, political instability and threats of terrorism and violent extremism especially by the Boko Haram are real security challenges for the Community.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Formed in 1996 with a focus on development and environmental control, IGAD replaces the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) formed in 1986, to mitigate the effects of the recurring severe droughts and other natural disasters that resulted in widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship around the Horn of Africa and the Nile Valley. IGAD comprises eight member states, namely, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.[5]

Political instability, violent extremism and terrorism remain serious security challenges for some of the member states (Burgess, 2015; Ramdeen, 2017).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) became a regional organisation in 1992. It has 14 member states, namely, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The major objective of the organisation is to coordinate, harmonise and review national policies

[4] www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/

[5] https://igad.int/about-us/what-we-do

and strategies for sustainable development—including measures to remove all barriers and obstacles to free movement of persons, goods and capital (Bourenane, 2002:21).

Although the region is arguably the most stable in Africa, political instability and internal crises in member states, such as Madagascar, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Lins de Albuquerque & Wiklund, 2015) are threats to the full realisation of SADC objectives as well as the development of the region. Xenophobic attacks on foreign African nationals in South Africa also threaten human security and regional cohesion.

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)/Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

The Maghreb Union was established in 1989 (17 February) in Marrakech, Morocco. The Union consists of the five Maghreb states—Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Among others, the Union was established to promote the free movement of persons in services, goods and capital between the Member States. However, the realisation of its objectives has remained a mirage as the Union has been in crisis—due to multiple technical and socio-political factors—since the mid-1990s (Albareda & Barba, 2011; Biad, 2013). At present, security challenges, especially political instability and terrorism (Albareda & Barba, 2011), are real threats to any form of integration between the region and other parts of the continent.

A Borderless Africa: What Are the Security Challenges?

From the foregoing, it is clear that all regions within the continent are faced with real security challenges that have implications for a borderless continent. Today, most of the countries and regions in Africa are faced with internal and external security challenges. For example, these security breaches are spread across the subregion ranging from the crises in Cote d'Ivoire to the uprisings in Sierra Leone, from the insurgencies and threats to secession in Nigeria to the infightings in Cameroon. Promoting peace and stability within and between countries in any region is essential to any prospect of economic integration, and one major factor in achieving this is the effective management of trans-border activities in the subregion (Ikuteyijo, 2015). However, this is currently a herculean task because of factors such as dilapidation of border control points, low level of technology and poorly remunerated security personnel, among others (Fall, 2005; Ikuteyijo, 2013). These have resulted in multiple security challenges such as political instability, the spread of insurgency and terrorism, proliferation of small arms, human trafficking and xenophobia—all of which are threats to regional integration and development of the subregions and the continent at large.

Although some challenges are common in almost all regions of Africa, e.g. political instability, this section will focus mainly on a few for space constraints.

Political Instability and Threats of Terrorism

Perhaps, the biggest challenge to the potentials of regional integration and development in the West African subregion is political instability. Sit-tight administrations, financial misappropriation and widespread corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, ethno-religious crises and civil wars among others have become breeding grounds for insurgency and terrorism. In fact, it has been rightly observed that armed conflict has become a burgeoning economy in itself on the continent (Bourenane, 2002). The ongoing militant activities and the Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria are poignant examples in this regard. With the poor border management system in the subregion and on the continent as a whole, firearms trafficking between countries is rife, and security challenges in one country often spill over to other neighbouring countries. For instance, Boko Haram has grown as a problem beyond Nigeria, as the Tuareg insurgency in Mali had alleged connections with Boko Haram in Nigeria and Late Gaddafi's Islamic Legion in Libya (Ikuteyijo, 2015). Also, at some point, the threat of Boko Haram has transcended the borders of Nigeria as there were reported incidences of sporadic but calculated attacks in neighbouring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon. This had prompted the establishment of the joint task force which comprised a combination of military and paramilitary forces from some of these countries. However, the joint efforts did pay off as no sooner had the nations come together than the eclipse of the once dreaded group began to set in. The feat achieved by the joint efforts of the affected countries is a clear testimony of what could be obtained if African countries learn to harness their inherent potentials. Undoubtedly, a well-implemented borderless arrangement will be another archetypical manifestation of the power of unity.

Also, in Central Africa, only a few of the ten ECCAS member states have been free from internal conflicts and crises during the last three decades (Meyer, 2011). Porous borders mean that combatants and armed groups move across different areas in the subregion with this resulting in other security challenges such as proliferation of arms and conflicts spreading easily to neighbouring countries. Rebel movements in the CAR, Chad, Sudan and Uganda represent a good example here (see Debos, 2008).

Irregular Migration and Borderless Africa

Over the years, the migration configurations in Africa have evolved into a myriad of dynamic patterns and dimensions. Most African countries have evolved through the diverse forms of being countries of origin, transit and destinations at various epochs. For example, in the oil boom era of Nigeria during the late 1970s, the country was a major destination hub for most migrants from Africa and other parts of the world (Adepoju, 2006). During this time, young Nigerians who went abroad to study gladly returned home to choose careers and life courses. However, in the twilight of the oil boom which has been described as concomitant of years of unbridled corruption, the country became a major source for migrants across the globe. Another example of this dynamic migration trend is that of Senegalese migrants. Shortly after her independence, Senegal was a major destination country for most West African migrants, but the increasing population and declining gross domestic product (GDP) have pushed Senegal from a net immigration to a net emigration country (Gerdes, 2007; Ikuteyijo, 2014). Recently, Senegalese have increasingly migrated to other countries in West Africa. Consequently, some of the stock of migrants from Nigeria and Senegal are irregular migrants who have moved and are still moving out of the countries in defiance of migration norms of both origin and destination countries. These include the rising number of African youths trapped in their quest to cross the Mediterranean Sea (De Haas, 2006, 2008). The borderless policy has, however, been identified as one of the major stimuli of this irregular migration stream, and there are myriads of security challenges—including proliferation of arms, human rights violations, etc.—that come with irregular migration itself (see Ikuteyijo, 2015).

Xenophobia

Closely related to changes in migration configurations and patterns is the threat of intolerance of foreigners within the African continent at large. While xenophobia has a long history, it would not be considered a serious security threat to harnessing the benefits of regional integration until recently when attacks on foreigners and increase in hate speeches have assumed new dimensions. Cases of xenophobia have been recorded in the past in many West African countries—especially during the periods of economic recession and political uprisings (Ikuteyijo & Olayiwola, 2018), and as evidenced during the last major xenophobic incidence in South Africa, such cases can lead to 'a diplomatic tit-for-tat' (The Quartz, 2015), and undermine any regional or subregional arrangement. The resultant effects definitely will run counter to the spirit or core of regional integration.

Human Trafficking

The problem of forced labour and human trafficking in Africa needs urgent innovative solutions as most African countries constitute one or more of source, transit and destination countries for trafficked victims (ILO, 2003). This untoward development has raised concerns for policy-makers and migration scholars as Africa's involvement in the global human trafficking network is increasing. The human trafficking network is spread across the African continent. Uganda and Kenya dominate the human trafficking network in the Eastern part of Africa and serve as source and transit countries for women working as prostitutes in the Gulf States (Adepoju, 2005). In the Horn of Africa, human trafficking is exacerbated by the natural and human-induced catastrophes that have threatened peace and stability in the region (Manian, 2010). It is, however, more worrisome that victims of human trafficking in the region often undergo dual victimisation arising from the conflict in the environment as well as the exploitation of their bodies in violation of their human rights. There are established syndicates run by foreign businessmen who specialise in trafficking young girls to Europe (Manian, 2010).

Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal are the leading countries in the West African subregion. These countries have been identified as source, transit and destination countries for trafficked women and children (Adepoju, 2005). There is also an infamous network of traffickers who run the business around these countries. Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Togo constitute the major source countries for child labour while the major countries of origin for prostitution are Nigeria and Togo (Adepoju, 2005; Anarfi, 2001). Apart from the routes and networks within the subregion, traffickers also 'export' children and young women to some countries in Europe and the Gulf states (De Haas, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2003; ILO, 2003; Taylor, 2002). De Haas (2006) noted that out of the 27,000 migrants apprehended by Moroccan police in 2004, over half were of West African origin, with most migrants coming from the Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Senegal, respectively, while over 90% of migrants apprehended by Algerian authorities between 2002 and 2003 migrated from West Africa (De Haas, 2006; Simon, 2006). In 2016, over 20,000 youths involved in the Mediterranean Sea crossing were reported to be from West Africa (Nwalutu, 2016; Ojeme, 2016)

In the southern part of Africa, human trafficking is rampant in three main countries, namely, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Human trafficking is thriving in South Africa as a result of the following factors: poverty, child and female oppression, limited border security and sexual myths (The National Prosecution Authority of South Africa, 2010). In Southern Africa, human trafficking takes various forms including sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery and domestic servitude (World Bank, 2009). The National Prosecution Authority of South Africa (2010) has also identified four major streams of human trafficking flows in South Africa: trafficking to South Africa from outside of Africa; trafficking to South Africa from within Africa; trafficking within the national borders of South Africa; and trafficking that uses South Africa as a transit point to other countries. However, the widespread human trafficking in South Africa has been disputed as some scholars have risen to debunk the allegations that the practice is rife in South Africa (see Gould, 2010; Wilkinson & Chiumia, 2013)

In all, for the borderless policy to be beneficial to all concerned, the precipitating factors of human trafficking and forced labour must be identified and tackled. For instance, the problem of unemployment, fall in educational enrolment and standard, conflict and other predisposing factors in most source countries must be addressed. Failure to address these concerns will lead to the principles of borderless Africa aggravating the already bad image of the continent in terms of involvement in the global scourge of human trafficking.

Forward-looking Strategies

There is a symbiotic relationship between peace and stability and economic development. There can be no real economic development without peace and stability, but at the same time, peace and stability are practically impossible without economic development. What these two have in common, however, is a focus on the people. This is why promoting good governance is essential to the success of any regional pact. The forward-looking strategies recommended by this paper will therefore take the following dimensions:

Individual Countries

Each African country has a role to play if the idea of a borderless Africa will be a success. From the smallest country in the region to large economies like Nigeria and South Africa, the idea of good governance should not be reduced to a mere rhetoric. Citizens' discontentment with the quality of life in their countries of origin and the perceived neglect and misadministration by their governments are issues that African leaders cannot shy away from. Preaching tolerance or economic cooperation to citizens where there is palpable dissonance within and between groups is an illusion. Addressing marginalisation, widening inequalities between the rich and the poor, pursuing pro-poor economic plans, better accountability and management in governments are essential for addressing agitations and cracks within each economy. When individual economies are relatively stable, it becomes easier to harness the benefits of cooperation with other countries. However, when conflicting issues are not being addressed at 'home', any pact with 'outsiders' is bound to be problematic. A contemporary example in this regard is Brexit in the United Kingdom. There is a consensus among many scholars and public analysts that the government's persistent neglect and failure to address issues of marginalisation, declining infrastructure, growing inequalities, etc. were significant considerations for the citizens of the country to vote in favour of leaving the European Union (CNN, 2016; The Guardian, 2016). Similarly, xenophobic attacks in various parts of Africa, especially South Africa, have been linked to citizens' grievances with their level of deprivation, exclusion and perceived corruption in government (Ikuteyijo & Olayiwola, 2018).

Regional Organisations

The dearth of physical infrastructures is not only a major impediment to regional integration but also contributes to some of the security challenges between African subregion. Coupled with differences in immigration policies in different countries, it is not difficult to understand why a borderless region is like a mirage. There is a need for huge development in physical infrastructures and better connectivity of different parts of the continent. With better infrastructure, migration management becomes easier, and some of the security challenges earlier highlighted can be addressed. In this regard, the bigger economies have a role to play as some of them are currently doing (see Tuluy, 2016 for a brief overview of this).

It will also be significant for the objectives of the existing subregional organisations to be harmonised. At present, the objectives of many of these organisations are not necessarily complementary, and this makes regional cooperation—whether for economic or security reasons complex. It is also in relation to this that African countries need to be wary of any potential negative implications of their colonial affiliations—especially when this impedes effective cooperation with other countries within the region.

Conclusion

The desire of African countries at creating an enabling environment for faster and more efficient passage of humans and transfer of goods and services has led to the proposal for the removal of barriers to regional integration. The chapter has therefore examined the readiness of the continent in achieving the much-anticipated borderless 'entity' as well as examining the inherent constraints to this laudable idea. One of the major findings of the study is the current security issues in Africa which are inseparable from the socioeconomic and political challenges that the continent is facing. These will inevitably pose a formidable challenge to the achievement of the potentials of continental integration and development. Another barrier identified is the colonial baggage which has also constituted an albatross over the years with telling consequences on regional integration moves. The non-alignment of the aims and objectives of the various regional blocks in the continent is also a significant barrier which must be well researched and resolved before the ideals of regional integration could see the light of the day. The chapter therefore concludes that as long as these identified barriers are not addressed, the realisation of the objectives of regional integration will continue to be threatened and the much-anticipated regional integration will continue to be a smokescreen. In order for there to be any optimism about the potential benefits that regional integration holds for Africa as a continent therefore, there must be more intensive cooperation across the various regions at nipping the causes of the many identified security issues in the bud. It is also very significant to realise that Africa is not Europe and while some cues could be taken from the regional integration process in other parts of the world, efforts should be made to ensure that practical and localised ideas are considered at achieving Africa's regional integration.

References

Adepoju, A. (2002). Fostering free movements of persons in West Africa: Achievements, constraints, and prospects for international migration. *International Migration, 40*(2), 3–28.

Adepoju, A. (2003). Migration in West Africa. *Development, 46*(3), 37–41.

Adepoju, A. (2005). Review of research and data on human trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa. *International Migration, 43*(1/2), 75–93.

Adepoju, A. (2006). Leading issues in international migration in sub-Saharan Africa. In *Views on migration in sub-Saharan Africa.* HRSC Press, Proceedings of an African Migration Workshop.

Africa News. (2019). Is the East African community cracking? https://www.africanews.com/2019/01/02/is-the-east-african-community-eac-cracking//. Accessed 4 Apr 2019.

Albareda, A., & Barba, O. (2011). *Sub-regionalism in North Africa and the Middle East: Lessons learned and new opportunities*. Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània (IEMed).

Anarfi, J. K. (2001). Ghanaian women and prostitution in Cote d'Ivoire. In K. Kempadoo & J. Doezema (Eds.), *Global sex workers: Rights, resistance and redefinition*. New York: Routledge.

Aryeetey, E. (1998). Sub-Saharan African experiences with regional integration. In I. Zubair & K. Mohsin (Eds.), *Trade reform and regional integration in Africa* (pp. 395–431). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Azah, A. L. (2014). The Central African region and sub-regional security, African Leadership Centre. https://africanleadershipcentre.org/index.php/2014-10-22-15-44-06/alc-newsletters/feb-2015-issue/282-the-central-african-region-and-sub-regional-security. Accessed 03 Apr 2019.

Balassa, B. (1961). Towards a theory of economic integration. *International Review of Social Science, 14*(1), 1–17.

Biad, A. (2013). The construction of the Maghreb in the challenge of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership of the European Union. *The Year of the Maghreb* [Online], IX, pp. 103–124.

Bourenane, N. (2002). *Regional integration in Africa: Situation and prospects, in regional integration in Africa*. Paris: OECD Development Centre Seminars.

Burgess, S. F. (2015). Comparative challenges in securing the horn of Africa and Sahara. *Comparative Strategy, 34*(2), 202–217.

Chikwanha, A. B. (2007). The anatomy of conflicts in the East African Community (EAC): Linking security with development. Keynote speech to Development Policy Review Network-African Studies Institute. Leiden: Leiden University.

CNN. (2016, June 24). A look at Brexit: Why are the Brits thumbing their noses at Europe? http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/24/europe/brexit-aftermath-robertson/index.html. Accessed 01 Nov 2017.

Debos, M. (2008). Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian "ex-liberators" in the Central African Republic. *African Affairs, 427*, 225–241.

De Haas, H. (2006). *Trans-Saharan migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical roots and current trends*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Available at www.migrationinformation.org.
De Haas, H. (2008). *Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An overview of recent trends* (Vol. 32). Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
Fall, H. (2005). Border controls and cross-border crimes in West Africa. In A. Aissi & I. Sall (Eds.), *Combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the training of armed and security forces*. Geneva: United Nations' Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR).
Gerdes, F. (2007). *Focus migration: Senegal country profile*. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
Gould, C. (2010). Moral panic, human trafficking and the 2010 Soccer World Cup. *Agenda, 24*(85), 31–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2010.9676321.
Greenwood, L. (2009, August 21). Q&A: Free trade zones in Africa. BBC Africa Business Report. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8208254.stm
Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2003). *Borderline slavery: Child Trafficking in Togo* (Vol. 15, Issue 8A). New York: Human Rights Watch.
International Labour Organization (ILO). (2003, March 24). The trafficking of women and children in Southern African region, presentation of research findings, ILO, Geneva.
Ikuteyijo, L. (2013). The impact of European Union migration policies on irregular migration in sub-Saharan Africa. In M. Walton-Roberts & J. Hennebry (Eds.), *Territoriality and migration in the EU neighbourhood: Spilling over the wall*. Springer International Immigration Series 5. Dordrecht: Springer.
Ikuteyijo, L. (2014). EU migration policies and the criminalisation of the Senegalese irregular migration flows. In M. Gonneli (Ed.), *Between migrations to Europe and returns. International commentary* (Vol. 10, no. 35). Pisa, Italy: Scuola Superiore Sant Anna.
Ikuteyijo, L. (2015). Policing irregular migration in the West African sub-region: Implications for regional integration. In A. O. Olutayo & A. I. Adeniran (Eds.), *Regional economic communities: Exploring the process of socio-economic integration in Africa* (p. 123). Dakar: CODESRIA.
Ikuteyijo, L., & Olayiwola, P. (2018). Migration and Xenophobia in Africa. In: S. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of African politics, governance and development* (pp. 307–319). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Iratni, B. (2017). *Security challenges and issues in the Sahelo-Saharan region: The Algerian perspective*. Dakar: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).
Kumalo, D.S. (2011). International and continental social cohesion: The missing link in regional integration. In C. Moore (Ed.), *Regional integration and social cohesion: Perspectives from the developing world* (pp. 13–26). Brussels: Peter Lang.
Lins de Albuquerque, A., & Wiklund, C. H. (2015). *Challenges to peace and security in Southern Africa: The role of SADC', Studies in African security*. Stockholm: FOI (Swedish Defence Research Agency).
Manian, S. (2010). Sex trafficking in the horn of Africa. In M. C. Kimberly & M. Sabita (Eds.), *Sex trafficking: A global perspective* (pp. 13–24). Plymouth: Lexington Books.
Meyer, A. (2011). Peace and security cooperation in Central Africa: Developments, challenges and prospects. Discussion paper no 56. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Ngwenya, S. (2013). Overview of the common market for Eastern and Southern Africa in 2013. In A. Mugunga (Ed.), *Key issues in regional integration* (Vol. 2, pp. 1–5). COMESA.
Nwalutu, M. O. (2016). *From Africa to Europe, youth and transnational migration: Examining the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant youth in Malta.* University of Toronto.
OECD/SWAC. (2014). *An atlas of the Sahara-Sahel: Geography, economics and security, West African studies*. Paris: OECD.
Ojeme, V. (2016). 22,500 Nigerians cross Mediterranean Sea, in 2016 says EU. Available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/10/22500-nigerians-cross-mediterranean-sea-2016-says-eu-2/

Ramdeen, M. (2017, July 21). Countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. http://www.accord.org.za/conflicttrends/countering-terrorism-violent-extremism-africa/. Accessed 04 Apr 2019.

Simon, J. (2006). Irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean: Facts, figures and insights. In N. Nyberg-Sorensen (Ed.), *Mediterranean transit migration*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Taylor, E. (2002, November 18–22). *Trafficking in women and girls*. Paper presented for group meeting on trafficking in women and girls, Glen Cove, New York.

The Guardian. (2016, June 24). How did UK end up voting to leave the European Union? https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-did-uk-end-up-voting-leave-european-union. Accessed 01 Nov 2017.

The Independent. (2017, November 23). Gen Muhoozi warns of complex set of security challenges in East Africa. https://www.independent.co.ug/gen-muhoozi-warns-complex-set-security-challenges-east-africa/. Accessed 02 Apr 2019.

The National Prosecution Authority of South Africa. (2010). *Tsireleddzani: Understanding the dimensions of human trafficking in Southern Africa*. A Research Report.

The Quartz. (2015). Total recall: South Africa and Nigeria's row over the xenophobic attacks is now a diplomatic tit-for-tat, April 27. https://qz.com/391805/south-africa-and-nigerias-row-over-the-xenophobic-attacks-is-now-a-diplomatic-tit-for-tat/. Accessed 01 Nov 2017.

Thonke, O., & Spliid, A. (2012). What to expect from regional integration in Africa. *African Security Review, 21*(1), 42–66.

Tuluy, H. (2016). Regional economic integration in Africa. *Global Journal of Emerging Markets Economies, 8*(3), 334–354.

Wilkinson, K., & Chiumia, S. (2013). Are 30,000 children really 'trafficked' in South Africa every year? The claim exaggerates the problem. *Africa Check*. Available at https://africacheck.org/reports/are-30000-kids-trafficked-into-south-africas-sex-trade-every-year-the-claim-exaggerates-the-problem/. Assessed 6 Apr 2019.

World Bank. (2009). Social development notes: Conflict, crime and violence. No 122/ December. www.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/RESOURCES?244362/HumanTrafficking_pdf/. Accessed 01 Nov 2017.

Chapter 8
Invisible–Visible Borders Between Zambia and Zimbabwe Along the Zambezi Valley: Tonga Fishermen, Cross-Border Livelihoods and Monetary Practices

Mike Chipere-Ngazimbi

Introduction

This chapter discusses a rich ethnographic account of the monetary practices which I encountered during my fieldwork between August 2017 and October 2018 on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe along the Zambezi valley (formally known as the Gwambe Valley during the mid- to late-nineteenth-century Ndebele reign), and what this may mean for future monetary innovations and border studies rather than an exhaustive analytical account.

This study contributes towards the wider debate about the future of money and or its convergence with information and communication technology (ICT). Currently, this debate is dominated by a techno-centric narrative driven by international financial institutions (IFIs) and their affiliates who have reduced the financial needs of the unbanked poor to their supposed need for "bank money" and eradication of notes and coins through an inevitable shift to digitization/mobile money (Donner, 2006; Donovan, 2012a, 2012b; Jack & Suri, 2011; Smith, Project, & Anderson, 2012). This lack of recognition of such actors, non-state actors, is documented in similar contexts, such as that of border citizens who are not recognized by or are invisible to the state and its proxies. For instance, Moyo (2016) conducted a research at the Beitbridge border post where he studied how Zimbabwean and South African Vendas, whom he calls border citizens, refused to allow the restrictive border between the two countries to decimate their sociocultural ties which predate the border and the political regimes that set them up. He states that the

M. Chipere-Ngazimbi (✉)
Human Economy Programme, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Hatfield, Pretoria, South Africa

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_8

two communities refused to be separated, but their battle to maintain social ties remains invisible to their respective governments. On the contrary, the Zimbabwe and Zambia governments deliberately created an enabling trade and immigration regulatory framework, which has enabled border citizens residing in Binga (Zimbabwe) and Sinazongwe (Zambia) to maintain strong sociocultural ties which have rendered the border which separates them invisible. This chapter is an attempt to develop ways of seeing, by revealing how in spaces of poor to non-existent infrastructure people draw on their agency to become the missing infrastructure (for more on people as infrastructure, see Simone, 2004) or appropriate the existing sparse infrastructure in creative ways, some of which may be beneficial to policy and future innovations.

In a study which she carried out in the 1950s, Elizabeth Colson noted that Binga had no universally accepted medium of exchange; they dealt in equivalence rather than prices (Colson, 1960; Ncube, 2004). She commented that "…much of the exchange is obligatory, consequent upon institutionalised relationships existing between the parties to the transaction: one has the right to receive and the other obligation to give" (Colson, 1960: 21). Today, the same kinship-based exchanges (reciprocity), barter exchange and cattle money still persist, but running along with that is the increased use of fiat currency, bank money and mobile money.

In this study, monetary practices relate to the role of money or lack thereof in the act of making a living or livelihood activities of border citizens. The term monetary practices is closely influenced by Guyer's (2004) concept of money ecologies and repertoires. In brief, money ecologies relate to the multiple monies that people use, while repertoires are about the functions and purposes of these different monies. But it is important to note that the functions are not limited to textbook functions of money, i.e. medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value, standard of deferred payment, etc. but includes unintended purposes that people may decide to use money for and value scales that shape conversions that they make between the different monies available to them. International financial institutions have managed to position financial inclusion (provision of suitable formal financial products and services) as a top priority in the international development agenda. In brief, they are promoting the idea that digital or electronic forms of money, i.e. bank money plus mobile money, have a positive impact on poverty alleviation. However, in this study, the border citizens of Binga and Sinazongwe do not have access to banks. Neither do they prefer mobile money to cattle money, barter exchange, fiat money or commodity (sugar) currency that they use.

The rest of the paper is about their agency in relation to the multiple monies available to them and how some of their practices could inform policy and future monetary innovations. A study of money would be incomplete if it excludes the economy (livelihood activities) in which the money mediates. It is within this realm that some of the border economy complexities emerge, particularly in relation to equitable access to common resources.

Displacement of the Great River People

Zimbabwe and Zambia were separate British colonies of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, and they were both established around the late-nineteenth century under the administration of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) (Brownlie & Burns, 1979; Hyam, 1987). After several decades, they were both consolidated into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) in 1953; however, the unstable white minority-run federation was subsequently dissolved in 1963 (Hyam, 1987). Thereafter, Zambia gained its independence from the British government in 1964; its border, which was fluid before and during the federation, became separate from Ian Smith's white minority-run Southern Rhodesia. Several influential studies of Tonga culture and livelihoods conducted predominantly by Colson (1958, 1960, 1971) and Scudder (1962) suggest that before the colonial era, right up to the construction of the Kariba dam in 1956, the relationship between the Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia Tonga people was much stronger across the Zambezi River borderline than along; thus, the Zambezi River which now marks the border between Zimbabwe and Zambia was never a dividing line that it now is, but one that bound them. These relationships were cultivated through, trade, intermarriages, shared religious practices, attending funerals and joint cultural activities between villages on either side of the river. According to Colson and Scudder, households engaged in subsistence agriculture, their fields, riverbed and riverbank gardens were randomly distributed across the Zambezi River, and their position was not defined by citizenship. In fact, the Tonga or *Basilwizi* (great river people) as they were referred to never had to make the choice on whether to settle on the Zambian or Zimbabwe side, and this only happened when the Zambezi River widened after the construction of the Kariba Dam the largest hydroelectric power station in Zimbabwe, built between 1956 and 1959.

The expansion of the Zambezi River was anticipated by the Southern Rhodesia-dominated Federation; thus just before its construction, households on both sides of the Zambezi River were forcibly relocated uplands further away from the river where it is drier and drought-prone. According to my elderly respondents from Chief Saba area, prior to the construction of the Kariba dam, Zambezi River was so narrow that when they were young they used to ride on floating logs to cross over to the Zambian side (Interview with Thembi 82, Binga District—Mangani Village, 8 July 2018). Based on their description, I estimate that the river was less than 50 m, today the area which they described (Saba, Mlibizi and Sebungwe) is about 1 km wide going up to 4 km around Binga Centre and 40 km at Kariba Dam. According to the 2010 Zambian Census, Sinazongwe district is 4800 m^2 and has a population of 101,617 people (Zamstats, 2010), while Binga has a population of 146,606 people (WFP, 2016). The region is situated in Zambia's agro-ecological zone 1 (Zimbabwe classifies it as region 5) both of which are not only drought-prone, but the landscape and soils are unsuitable for agricultural production. Thus, the region has a high prevalence of food insecurity.

Physical and Soft Infrastructure

The sparsely populated Sinanzongwe district has very poor public and private infrastructure (Zambia Red Cross Society, 2003), measured from the area adjacent to Mlibizi in Zimbabwe; their nearest clinic is 3 h walk while the nearest hospital on the Zambian side is in Mamba (160 km) away. On the other hand, healthcare provisions in Binga are poor but relatively better than their Zambian counterparts. In fact, Sinazongwe residents receive free treatment in Zimbabwe at the nearby Sianzyundu clinic and Binga provincial Hospital where several Zambian children are born every year (Interview with Nurse in Charge, Sianzyundu Clinic, Binga Sianzyundu, 10th October 2017). I spoke to the Nurse in Charge at Sianzyundu clinic and the Nurse Superintendent at Binga provincial hospital who both explained to me that Zambian visitors receive the same standard of treatment as their Zimbabwean counterparts. Although officials at both health centres could not tell me the specific Zimbabwe government guidelines or the Ministry of Health policy guideline under which this arrangement falls, they reiterated that Zimbabwe upholds health as a universal human right. When individuals attend both the clinic and provincial hospital for treatment, they did not ask for a passport or national ID. They also enlightened me about the Zim-Zam agreement which is a more specific bilateral agreement between the Zimbabwe and Zambia ministry of health specifically set up to harmonize malaria treatment, policies and activities aimed at eradicating malaria in the region (The Herald, 2013).

Educational provisions in both Binga and Sinazongwe are very poor (Zambia Red Cross Society, 2003). Sinazongwe primary school children who reside in the areas adjacent to Binga Mlibizi Resort walk for up to 3 h to get to the nearest school in Kafambila (Interview with a Zambian Fisherman, Mlibizi Fish Harbour, 20th of October 2017). Other provisions such as banks (One Bank, Zambia National Commercial Bank, ZANACO), secondary schools and the nearest police station are in Mamba, which is 160–170 km away and has a very poor road network. Similarly, in Binga, Zimbabwe, most primary and secondary school students walk for up to 2–3 h one way, to attend school. I have had several interviews with Zimbabwean school heads who informed me that they do not have Zambian school children in their schools, because the majority of Zambians who reside in Sinazongwe are fishermen who stay by themselves at fishing camps along the Zambezi River while the rest of their families remain at their permanent villages, upland nearer to public services. The other means through which both communities cope with poor schools and educational facilities are by sending their children to live with their kinsmen in urban areas or other well-resourced localities. The most prominent and influential post-independence Binga member of Parliament (MP) Andrew SikajayaMuntanga attended primary school in Binga but temporarily relocated to Mazabuka in the then Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) to complete his secondary education (Herald, 2014). Today the educational systems in the two countries are separate, but they maintain sociocultural ties through literature books. Some Binga secondary schools include Zambian Tonga language novels as part of their curriculum. The reason why there are limited sharing opportunities in the educational sector is possibly due to the health and safety risk of school children crossing the dangerous Zambezi River every day but also educational provisions in both Binga and Sinanzongwe districts are equally poor.

Telecommunication infrastructure in both Binga and Sinazongwe is not only sparse but very expensive, and Sinanzongwe district is served by several mobile networks comprised of Airtel, MTN and Zamtel. Despite such a wide range of mobile operators, Zambians also access Zimbabwe mobile network signals from Telecel, Econet and NetOne, which they say have better reception in some areas and enable them to make cheaper calls to fellow Zambians including Zimbabwean relatives and friends (Interview with Zambian Fishermen, Mlibizi Resort, 30th of October 2017). One of the incentives is comparatively favourable pricing by some Zimbabwean networks particularly NetOne which is said to have an international call package which costs $1 for 5 min of call to any Zambian network (Ibid.). To deal with all these multiple providers, many people I spoke to said they resort to several cost-minimizing strategies which include use of double SIM card phones, buying multiple mobile phone handsets and purchasing numerous SIM cards which they switch depending on incentives on offer and the network that they would like to call because cross-network calls tend to be more expensive. The users of the mobile phone technology are the ones who bear the cost of price differentiation between different providers; however, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia are reported to have run a low roaming charge pilot scheme in 2015 (Herald, 2015), but none of my informants from both countries have ever heard of it.

A close examination of how the two countries share some of their infrastructure seems to suggest that the distance to and consequent difficulty in accessing services inland in one's own country makes the alternative in the neighbouring country more convenient and desirable. Malaria treatment is certainly an initiative that seems to have originated from the respective country's governments while other health services appear to have evolved from pressure from the high demand for such services from Zambians who are far from their own health facilities. Discussion in the ensuing sections will also reveal that Zambian fish traders in Sinazongwe prefer to sell their wares at Zimbabwe's Mlibizi Fish Harbour, which is nearest to them than alternative markets in Zambia.

Livelihood Strategies

Hunting game was once a source of livelihood for Tonga people, but this is now heavily regulated (on the Zimbabwe side) that it has become a privilege enjoyed only by the rich local and foreign tourists and licensed professional hunters. Locals only get leftover carcasses discarded by hunters after they have harvested valuables such as crocodile skin, elephant tusks or hippo hides. However, there are reported cases of poor wildlife conservation practices on the Zambian side of the Zambezi River, and this is partially due to historical events related to Zimbabwe's liberation war. Both sides of the river were once battlegrounds between Rhodesian soldiers and black African liberation forces dominated by Zimbabwe African National Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces who used to cross over and set up military bases in Zambia from which they launched military operations. When the Zimbabwe liberation war ended in 1979, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces returned to Zimbabwe where they surrendered their weapons at several demobilization zones, but a large quantity of ammunition and guns most of which were machine guns, AK47 and other heavy weaponry were reportedly left behind and the local Zambian residents took them into possession. This information was based on several interviews with many Mlibizi domestic workers, assistant hunters, villagers and an elderly headman who has lived in and around Mlibizi all his life. Even today 39 years after the war, there are reported cases of landmines along the borderline which separates Sinanzongwe and Binga (Zambia Red Cross Society, 2003). The downside of these illegal firearms is that whenever wild animals (including protected species) from the Zimbabwean side cross over to Zambia, a bullet, through poaching, reportedly decides their fate. But I also found out that these activities predate the liberation war. They go back to the mid-twentieth century, before and after the construction of the Kariba Dam. At the time, poachers (a word used by Clements, 1959) used traditional snares and primitive guns acquired during trade with the Portuguese; included in these activities were White settler hunters who killed several wild animals and elephants for their tusks but at times for adventure and sport (Clements, 1959: 163). Respondents from Binga informed me that there are no known cases of illegal possession of firearms on the Zimbabwean side. The absence of illegal guns in Zimbabwe is probably explained by the large police presence in and around Binga district and a strong communication network with security centres in urban areas while in Sinazongwe the nearest police station is in Mamba. The adverse agricultural conditions together with the above twenty-first-century liberation war legacies made the area less hospitable.

Many Tonga people whom I spoke to on both sides of the Zambezi River reported that their seasonal subsistence crop production of draught resistant millet (*Nzembwe*) only lasts for about 6 months. Therefore, they supplement their food supplies by cultivating in the fields around and inside the Zambezi River during the dry season. Tonga people refer to this system of riverbed cultivation as *nchelela* (Interview with Dumisani, Sebungwe Mouth, August 2018). These riverbank gardens are not dependent on rainwater because riverbeds retain moisture throughout the dry season. They intercrop a variety of crops such as maize (*kaile*), pumpkin leaves, cowpeas, cucumbers and Turkish tobacco soon after the peak floods in March and April. The Zambians seem to rely on this much more than the Zimbabweans; this is based on my numerous visits to the Mlibizi market where all the fresh maize and vegetables sold during the dry season are sold by Zambians. Despite these strategies, many people remain vulnerable particularly the elderly, single-family households and orphaned children. The Zimbabwe government put in place safeguards in the form of monthly cash grants of USD$25 payable to the elderly (over 65) and people looking after orphans. In addition to that they also provide them with food (50 kg of maize) from the beginning of summer until close to harvesting time. Unfortunately, since 2013, there has not been any new social grant disbursement because of the financial crisis in Zimbabwe. These government schemes remain inadequate but despite that people share the little they have and depend on each other. I am yet to investigate social welfare provisions in Zambia.

As stated previously, historical social ties between Zambians and Zimbabweans included marriages, funerals, worshipping ancestral spirits and celebrations (Colson, 1960). Up to this day, intermarriages and trade between the two communities are still very common. Zambian traders and fishermen are allowed to cross over to the Zimbabwean side twice per week (Mondays and Fridays) to sell their fish in Zimbabwe for cash, which is denominated in US dollars and Zimbabwe Bond notes (ZWB$). During my fieldwork from 2015 to 2018, seasonal fish prices at Mlibizi Fish Harbour were as follows: rainy season US$1.00–1.50 kg; in summer prices go up to US$1.80–2.50 kg. However, Zambian traders sell fish at slightly lower prices than their Zimbabwean counterparts, usually 15–17% less. The main reason for doing so is that lower prices will speed up the sales process and thus enable them to sell all their stock before returning home to Zambia in small petrol-powered engine boats at the end of each trade day. Many of my Zambian informants told me that they always ensure that they spend a significant portion of their cash takings (predominantly, Zimbabwe B$ notes) at Zimbabwean supermarkets because on the Zambian side, large retail stores and supermarkets are far away, but besides that they do not widely accept the Zimbabwe currency as a means of payment.

Cash mediates exchange of fresh fish, but dried fish attracts highly negotiable means of payments that include barter trading with small value food items but predominantly sugar. The attractiveness of sugar as a currency is due to its high demand and use value in Zambia where large retailers are far from the Zambezi valley. Zimbabwean dried fish traders who sell their fish in several locations in and around Binga accept mobile money as payment but because of the liquidity problems which Zimbabwe is experiencing at present (2019), traders face difficulties converting the mobile money into cash. So, when they want to replenish their stock, they purchase sugar in bulk at stores in and around Mlibizi Fish Harbour. With cartons of sugar in hand, they then approach Zambian dried fish traders and negotiate exchange with fish. At the harbour fish is sold in heaps, for example, 3–4 dried palm-size fish is priced at US$1.00, larger sizes will cost more US$1.50–5, etc. In 2018, a bag of 2 kg sugar cost between $2.00 and $2.20 in Zimbabwe. As part of the exchange process, both parties convert the price of sugar to its cash equivalent. But because the Zambians in turn sell the sugar in Sinazongwe at much higher prices (K30 equivalent to US$3.75), they tend to be generous with their heaps. I would describe the exchanges to be fair and highly flexible, and it allows Zimbabweans to negotiate better deals than they would with cash. In addition to barter trading and cash, Zambians also accept Zimbabwe mobile money which they in turn use to purchase groceries on the Zimbabwean side, but they temporarily store the remainder on their phones so they can use it to sell airtime to fellow Zambians who use Zimbabwe mobile networks since Sinazongwe does not have Zimbabwe mobile phone airtime seller.

Policy Gaps and Money

Fishing is one of the main sources of livelihood for Tonga people in Sinanzongwe and Binga. Both countries fish in the Zambezi River, where they judge by eyesight the position of the middle of the river so that they can ensure that they fish on the correct side. On the 30th of November 2017, I attended a fishing cooperative meeting in which I first became aware of the complexities involved in managing shared resources, especially ones situated at national borders. In attendance were the Binga District Administrator, Police Chief and the Binga District head of the Zimbabwe National Parks (ZNP). Zimbabwean fishermen complained that Zambians are encroaching onto the Zimbabwean side of the river to poach fish. Secondly, for conservation purposes, use of glass fishing nets is illegal in Zimbabwe because they harvest far too much fish due to their invisibility. As a means to conserve fish, the ZNP restricts Zimbabwean fishermen's use of the more visible cotton fishnet, which harvests less fish. However, the Zambians do not have such restrictions and this has led to complaints of unfairness by Zimbabwean fishermen (Nshimbi, 2019). Their argument is that while they conserve fish, their Zambian counterparts are busy depleting the very same stock and, in the process, enriching themselves at their expense. The glass net issue was put to the head of the ZNP, but he was unhelpful, stating that they cannot enforce Zimbabwe conservation policies on Zambians; this seems reasonable but surprisingly he did not even offer to liaise with the relevant authorities in Zambia for possible policy coordination. Because of this lack of awareness of the need for policy harmonization, to this day Zambians sell more fish at much lower prices than the Zimbabweans at their own fish harbour where by law they are restricted to sell a maximum of 5 kg of fish per person twice per week, but in practice they routinely exceed this limit. Again, when the Zimbabwe fishermen complained about the disregard of fishing quotas and underpricing, they were advised that responding to market demand was a much better approach than their suggestion of some sort of price control. The Police Chief added that stringently enforcing the fishing quotas will result in increased health and safety risks, especially drowning because the Zambians will most likely respond to tight restrictions by ferrying additional family members and friends to cross over to Zimbabwe on trade days so they can beat the 5 kg per person limit.

Previous studies (see Colson, 1958, 1960; Scudder, 1962) never cited shared fisheries as a source of conflict, and this suggests that historically, local communities had effective means to manage and fairly distribute resources particularly before colonization. This seems to concur with Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) and Ostrom's (2011) arguments against claims that people over-harvest and deplete shared resources because they are inherently self-interested. The risk of escalated conflict and depleting resources seems to stem from the failure by both governments to acknowledge the complexity of the border economy and the need for it to be seen.

Border Currency Dealers

The nearest bank on the Zimbabwe side is at Binga Centre about 100 km away, while the nearest one in Sinazongwe, Zambia, is in Mamba 160–170 km away. Bureau De Changes where people can trade foreign currency are even much further away in Victoria Falls and Livingstone; average transport costs from Binga to Victoria Falls were about US$20–30 return (2017). Therefore, people do not bother with the banks to manage their banking or foreign exchange requirements to make conversions between Zambian Kwacha, US dollar or Zimbabwean bond notes. In October 2017, I spoke to a Zambian fisherman who sells over 100 kg of fish in Zimbabwe every week, at a selling price of US$$1.80 kg. He gets paid in US$ and Zimbabwe bond notes, which the Zimbabwe government claims to be at par with the US dollar but on the black market Zimbabweans are trading them at a discount (of around 80% in November 2017) in urban areas. My informant stores all his cash takings at his house at the Zambian fishing camps, which are adjacent to Mlibizi Fish market. But before that he has to convert all the bond notes to US dollars at a rate of ZWB$1.00 to US $1.00 (no discounting in rural areas). After a few months, he then travels to Lusaka where the US dollar is selling at 10–11 Kwacha (at the fishing harbour it is trading at US$1–8 Kwacha). Thus, in 26 weeks (half a year), he makes about K14 040 profit from arbitrage foreign currency trade. He finds this more lucrative than transporting and selling fish in Lusaka, but most importantly, had he used a formal financial institution as advocated by international financial institutions, the K14 040 profit would have been accrued by a Bank or Bureau De Change not him. Certainly, managing money in this manner presents risk of theft or loss but if that risk was too high, he would not have found this monetary practice to be lucrative for the decades that he has been engaged in this type of trade.

Conclusion

Zimbabwean and Zambian authorities implemented deliberate immigration provisions that effectively rendered the glaringly visible Zambezi River borderline invisible. It was a commendable attempt to redress what the respective colonial governments put in place to divide Zambian and Zimbabwean Tonga people whose unity and sociocultural ties predated the national boundaries. Although these efforts enabled the divided people to maintain relations and trade, the newly created identities of two different Tongas bring with them complexities which require acknowledgement by the respective states. This acknowledgement is to some extent demonstrated in the collaborative approach in Malaria treatment and provision of free health care to Zambians in the nearby Sinazongwe district. However, failure to coordinate conservation policy could be a potential source of conflict and division between two communities who despite the externally imposed strain on their social ties have managed to hang on to their kinship ties. Lack of policy monitoring and evaluation means that border citizens' agency in a harsh agro-ecological environment and an equally inadequate public and private infrastructure has reduced capacity to translate into policy and scaled innovations. For example, although there was a challenge in relation to currency conversion between the Zambian Kwacha and Zimbabwe US$, there was no effort by banks to open satellite banks which are nearer to customers, or in the case of mobile money users and providers to develop a mobile payment functionality which could facilitate currency conversions. Findings from this study cast a dark shadow on supply-driven innovations that have reduced the financial needs of the unbanked poor to their supposed need for bank money and eradication of cash through digitization. Clearly, access to bank money is impossible where banking infrastructure is almost non-existent. Preferences for commodity money such as the sugar currency described in this chapter suggest that digitization of money may be peripheral to the financial needs of the low-income group in both regions. Findings about impoverished people being forced to incur additional expenditure purchasing multiple SIM cards and buying double SIM mobile phones suggest that we also throw caution at optimistic bottom-up innovation systems (see Christensen, 2013; Kaplinsky et al., 2009; Urban & von Hippel, 1989; von Hippel, 2007) which positions technology users as innovators capable of developing technologies which can challenge dominant ones; buying double SIM card phones and multiple SIMs could be described by some as innovation or agency but clearly displayed before us are unfair relations in which poor users are being dispossessed.

References

Brownlie, I., & Burns, I. R. (1979). *African boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia*. London: C. Hurst.

Christensen, C. (2013). *The innovator's dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms to fail*. Retrieved from https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3JnBAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR4&dq=Innovators+dilemma&ots=G3B11ShoYW&sig=LZ1iCiwZt2yIHzqqaCjDEWDaKF0

Clements, F. (1959). *Kariba: The struggle with the river god*. London: Northunberland Press.

Colson, E. (1958). *Marriage and the family among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia*. Retrieved from https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=umq7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA66&dq=Marriage+and+family+among+the+Plateau+Tonga+of+Southern+Rhodesia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjd8-zqhtXgAhXjrHEKHSsCDJMQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=Marriage%2520and%2520family%2520among%2520the%2520Plateau%252

Colson, E. (1960). *Human problems of Kariba* (Vol 1: Social organistion of the Gwembe Tonga). Manchester: University of Manchester.

Colson, E. (1971). *Kariba studies: The social consequences of resettlement;the impact of the Kariba resettlement upon the Gwembe Tonga*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons. *Science, 302*, 1907–1912. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1091015.

Donner, J. (2006). The use of mobile phones by microentrepreneurs in Kigali, Rwanda: Changes to social and business networks. *Information Technologies and International Development, 3*(2), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1162/itid.2007.3.2.3.

Donovan, K. (2012a). Mobile money for financial inclusion. In *Information and Communications for* .... Retrieved from http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/08/30/000386194_20120830022053/additional/585559324_201406191042051.pdf

Donovan, K. P. (2012b). Mobile money, more freedom? The impact of M-PESA's network power on development as freedom. *International Journal of Communication, 6*, 23.

Guyer, J. I. (2004). *Marginal gains* (Vol. 53). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.

Herald. (2014). Muntanga: The lion of binga. Retrieved from https://www.herald.co.zw/muntanga-the-lion-of-binga/

Herald. (2015). Southern Africa countries to reduce roaming charges. *Newspaper*.

Hyam, R. (1987). The geopolitical origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948–1953. *The History Journal, 30*(1), 145–172. University of Pretoria.

Jack, W., & Suri, T. (2011). *Mobile money: The economics of M-PESA*. 16721. Massachusetts.

Kaplinsky, R., Chataway, J., Clark, N., Hanlin, R., Kale, D., & Robbins, P. (2009). *Below the radar: What does innovation in the Asian driver economies have to offer other low income economies*. Policy.

Moyo, I. (2016). The Beitbridge–Mussina interface: Towards flexible citizenship, sovereignty and territoriality at the border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31*(4), 427–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2016.1188666.

Ncube, G. T. (2004). *A history of Northwestern Zimbabwe 1850–1960*. Kadoma: Mambo Press.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2019). Taking sustainable development to the limits: State policy—Grassroots actor activities interface in borderlands. In I. Moyo & C. C. Nshimbi (Eds.), *African borders, conflict, regional and continental integration*. London: Routledge.

Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. *Policy Studies Journal, 39*(1), 7–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00394.x.

Scudder, T. (1962). *Kariba studies* (Vol 2: The ecology of the Gwembe Tonga). Manchester: University of Manchester.

Simone, A. M. (2004). People as infrastructure: Intersecting fragments in Johannesburg. *Public Culture, 16*(3), 407–429. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-16-3-407.

Smith, A., American Life Project, & Anderson, J. Q. (2012). The future of money: Smartphone swiping in the Mobile age. *Pew Research Center's Internet & American Life Project*.

The Herald. (2013). Zimbabwe, Zambia in joint malaria reduction programme. *The Herald*. Retrieved from https://www.herald.co.zw/zimbabwe-zambia-in-joint-malaria-reduction-programme/

Urban, G., & von Hippel, E. (1989). Lead user analyses for the development of new industrial products. *Journal of Chemical Information and Modeling, 53*(5), 160. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.

von Hippel, E. (2007). Horizontal innovation networks—By and for users. *Industrial and Corporate Change, 16*(2), 293–315. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtm005.

WFP. (2016). *Binga district profile 2016*. World Food Program. Retrieved from http://www1.wfp.org/countries/zimbabwe

Zambia Red Cross Society. (2003). *Vulnerability capacity assessment: Sinazongwe District*. Society.

Zamstats. (2010). *2010 Census of population and housing southern province*. Lusaka. Retrieved from https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/phocadownload/2010_Census/2010_Census_Analytical_Reports/Southern Province Analytical Report-2010 Census.pdf

Chapter 9
Migration and the Spatial Mobility of Borders in the Southern African Region

Inocent Moyo

Introduction

The Southern African region is characterised by a long and complex history of migration in which countries have been both senders and recipients of migrants (Crush, Williams, & Peberdy, 2005; Wentzel, 2003). For example, in the late 1800s, Mozambicans seasonally migrated to work on the farms in the then Cape Province (Crush et al., 2005; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2016). In addition, in the nineteenth century, countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zambia also attracted migrant workers from countries in the region, because of lucrative mining activities (Crush et al., 2005; Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006). In the 1860s and 1880s, the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold in the Witwatersrand, respectively, precipitated an exodus of people to these destinations, particularly from countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Crush et al., 2005). For this reason, Crush et al. (2005) correctly observed that it is not surprising that South Africa continues to attract migrants from the Southern African region.

Perhaps one of the countries which has experienced outmigration in the recent past is Zimbabwe. Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observe that two phases of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa can be identified in the period since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. In the early 1980s, a number of white skilled and semi-skilled workers migrated to various countries including South Africa. Recently, the negative economic and political situation has driven many people out of Zimbabwe (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Tevera & Zinyama, 2002). A comment on the recent wave of migration of Zimbabweans to many countries in the Southern African region and

I. Moyo (✉)
Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa
e-mail: moyoi@unizulu.ac.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_9

beyond is needful. As a result of the economic decline in the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government introduced the Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Tevera & Zinyama, 2002). The ESAP was characterised by liberalisation of trade, monetary, fiscal and public enterprise reforms, budget deficit reductions and government non-interference in investment, labour and pricing mechanisms (Sachikonye, 1999). But the prescriptions of ESAP failed to resuscitate the Zimbabwean economy, such that there was reduced economic and industrial growth leading to the closure of industries, retrenchments and unemployment (Brett, 2005; Dhemba, 1999; Sachikonye, 1999).

In addition, Raftopoulos (2006) states that the more recent decline in the Zimbabwean economy can be linked to the land reform programme. This is because the land reform led to economic collapse, because agro-industries declined leading to a negative investment climate, unemployment and general economic depression (Fontein, 2009) which led to many people leaving the country to South Africa, among other countries (Crush & Tevera, 2010). Some of these Zimbabwean migrants to countries like South Africa have been undocumented (Araia, 2009; IOM, 2010; Mdlongwa & Moyo, 2014; Ndlovu, 2013), which has forced them to engage in human smuggling so as to cross the border to South Africa (Araia, 2009).

As a result, borders between South Africa and Zimbabwe like that at Beitbridge are characterised by cross-border human smuggling, in which many players and processes feature. These processes include crossing the Limpopo River[1] and scaling the border fence. The players include taxi operators (*omalayitsha*), government officials and other migrants (Araia, 2009). The role played by *omalayitsha* is that they transport individuals from different parts of Zimbabwe to selected points in Beitbridge town.[2] When migrants who are transported by different taxi operators are a substantial number (30–40 people), they go to specific crossing points from where they are taken across the border by guides (*impisi*[3]) who are familiar with the area and are hired by the taxi operators (Interview with a taxi operator/*malayitsha*, Beitbridge, 4 January 2015). After crossing the border, undocumented migrants meet *omalayitsha* at designated points along the freeway from Beitbridge to Musina from where they are collected and transported to many parts in South Africa (Araia, 2009). With this in mind, this chapter explores migration into South Africa from the Southern African region and how the securitised border manifests, mutates and also moves in different scales and locales. The aim in this respect is to demonstrate that a border or borders are not only lines which are fixed at the margins of nation states but

[1]The Limpopo River forms a natural boundary between Limpopo Province, in Northern South Africa and Southern Zimbabwe.

[2]Beitbridge is a town in Zimbabwe, situated at the border with South Africa.

[3]*Impisi* is a hyena, which is "a carnivorous dog-like species of animal, native to parts of both Africa and Asia. There are four known species of hyena: the spotted hyena, the striped hyena, the brown hyena and the aardwolf. Hyenas are scavenger mammals meaning that the hyena tends to eat another animal's kill, rather than the hyena actually catching its own food. Retrieved from: https://a-z-animals.com/animals/hyena/. Perhaps like and true to the nature of hyenas, the *impisi* are opportunistic criminals who capitalise on defenseless migrants.

can also move and manifest and materialise in socioeconomic and political processes at different levels and places and spaces.

Borders, Securitisation and Mobility

A securitised border is one with features such as stringent immigration requirements and physical barriers like fences and walls (Walker, 2015), whose objective is protecting a nation state against threats, like that of migrants (Mabee, 2007). Perhaps an apt example is that of the US–Mexico border as championed by US President Donald Trump. When he was campaigning for election as the president of the United States of America (USA), in 2016, he declared that he would build a great wall on the Southern border between Mexico and the USA and that he would make Mexico pay for the wall. And at the beginning of 2019, the US government was in partial shutdown over the need to raise money to build the wall (Valverde, 2019). In February 2019, Donald Trump declared a national state of emergency which would allow him to access the money to build the border wall between Mexico and the USA (Baker, 2019). Towards the end of March 2019, Donald Trump further threatened to close a large section of the Southern border between Mexico and the USA, if the former failed to stop illegal migration to the latter. The US president accused Mexico of failing to stop the illegal migration of not only Mexican citizens to the USA but also of other migrants from Central America. However, the Mexican Minister of foreign affairs responded to the US threats by declaring that Mexico did not recognise or operate on the basis of threats (Jacobs, 2019). On 2 April 2018, Donald Trump reiterated the threat to close the US–Mexico border, declaring that the negative economic impacts that this may cause were lesser than the security of the USA, which will be achieved if the border was closed off. Differently stated, Donald Trump suggested that the security of the USA was more important than negative impacts on trade and the economy (Higgins, 2019). With this in mind, the question of how borders are securitised in the Southern African region and in South Africa and its neighbouring countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe specifically arises and is explored in this chapter in terms of its impacts on migrants.

Beyond securitising the border as demonstrated by the extreme and yet determined resolve by Donald Trump, this chapter also examines the notion of the spatial mobility of borders. The idea of mobility suggests that borders are not marginal lines at the periphery of a nation state but can be "'displaced' to the 'centers' in different ways" (Cons & Sanyal, 2013: 6). The spatial mobility of borders is demonstrated by the case of the US–Mexico border, in which "there has been a marked increase in immigration policing operations away from the borders in the interior", to the extent that "these new spaces of immigration geopolitics suggest that the border—and border enforcement—is increasingly everywhere" (Coleman, 2007: 64). As such, the spatial mobility of borders illustrates that "borders are everywhere" (Balibar, 1998, cited in Johnson et al., 2011: 61) and they "never to be found *only*[4] in border areas but are also located in wider social practice/discourse all around societies" (Johnson et al. 2011: 63). For these reasons, "borders are enacted, materialized and performed in a variety of ways" and that these "performative aspects of borders" can be operationalised by "state and non-state actors" (Johnson et al. 2011: 62). This chapter explores how the spatial mobility of borders materialises in the Southern African region, that is in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe specifically. The chapter is based on a qualitative study of Zimbabwean migrants between December 2014 and March 2015, who were interviewed at the Beitbridge border (South Africa-Zimbabwe), Ramokgwebana border post (Botswana-Zimbabwe), Musina and Johannesburg. The interviewees were purposively sampled such that they provided evidence which demonstrates the focus of this chapter. What is important to emphasise is that respondents provided cases who, on the basis of "orientation towards the in-depth multi-aspect and holistic investigation of one or a small number of instances" (Iosifides, 2011: 202) and "a holistic description through an iterative process" (Easton, 2010: 119), yielded information which achieved the purpose of this chapter.

Regional Integration in the SADC

The SADC is one of the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) which have been identified by the African Union (AU) as the building blocks for the continental community in the form of the African Economic Community (AEC), set for establishment in 2028 (Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 1991). The other RECs are Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The SADC is made up of 16 member states which are Angola, Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The origins of SADC can be traced when the Front Line States (FLS) movement established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to be self-reliant and reduce members' dependence on apartheid South Africa. The FLS were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which joined in 1980. The FLS movement can be traced to the 1970s based on the need to resist apartheid South Africa. For instance, the FLS through the formation of SADCC was able to thwart the efforts by apartheid South Africa to create the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), which was essentially an attempt to increase apartheid influence (Evans, 1984) and

[4]Italics in original.

so the meetings of the FLS in Botswana in May 1979 and Tanzania in July 1979 culminated in the formation of SADCC in 1980 (Southern African Development Community, 2012). The Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992) transformed SADCC into SADC. The SADC aims to, among others, remove obstacles to the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992). This regional integration is to be achieved through the establishment of formal institutions as postulated by neoclassical economic theory advanced by scholars like Balassa (1961).

In the Balassian logic, the first stage involves the removal of trade restrictions and the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA). This occurs through the removal of trade restrictions among the integrating countries. However, the integrating countries still maintain trade tariffs with third countries. The second stage is the formation of a Customs Union. This is done on the basis of the adoption of a common external tariff (CET), which is applied against third countries. In the third stage, integrating countries form a Common Market. This is characterised by the removal of all restrictions on the movement of capital, labour, goods and services within the regional economic community. The fourth stage involves the setting up of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in which supranational institutions govern policies in the integrated countries, such as the adoption of a common economic policy and a single currency by the integrating countries as well as the setting up of a central bank and unified fiscal system (Balassa, 1961). For this reason, in 2001, the SADC put in place a comprehensive 15-year regional integration roadmap as follows: formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008, a Customs Union (CU) by 2010, a Common Market by 2015, an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2016 and an economic union by 2018 (SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 2003).

The objective in briefly discussing regional integration in the SADC was to demonstrate that the member states are committed to the development of a regional community and citizenry in terms of strengthening and consolidating "the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region" (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992: 5). Hence the commitment by SADC to developing "policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the Region generally, among Member States" (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992: 8). Against this background, it is then possible to discuss the issue of securitised borders in terms of how they materialise or dematerialise and the implication of this on the ideal of free human mobility within the logic of regional integration.

On Securitised Borders and Their Spatial Mobility

It was the opinion of the respondents that the securitised border was manifest in that "in some cases it was nearly impossible, to obtain a work permit as a result of stringent requirements" (Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, March 2015).

And this resulted in the migrants crossing the border illegally at unofficial crossing points. Such people crossed the border because the 90-day per year visitors' permit applicable to SADC citizens to enter into South Africa was not enough. The Zimbabwean respondent argued that:

> the 90-day visitor's visa is not useful at all and this is why many people overstay and rely on using human smugglers to travel to and back from South Africa to Zimbabwe. In addition, some of those who decide to overstay in South Africa, send their passports back to Zimbabwe through bus drivers and omalayitsha for an "exit stamp", when in fact they are in South Africa. Due to their failure to get work permits, they prefer to stay undocumented (Interview with Zimbabwean worker, March 2015).

In addition to stringent immigration regulations was the deployment of the army and police on the border such as that of Beitbridge. The deployment of such a state security apparatus was to monitor and enforce the border. However, the securitised border in all its manifestations at Beitbridge was not enough to stop people from crossing the border. This is precisely because migrants such as those from Zimbabwe had devised dynamic and agentive ways which assisted them to cross the border. These included swimming across the crocodile-infested Limpopo River and scaling the border fence as well as using the services of human smugglers so as to cross into South Africa (Moyo, 2016a, 2016b, 2018).

For such people who illegally crossed the border, it followed them everywhere. A case in point is that such migrants often secured employment on the farms and other businesses in the province of Limpopo and beyond. In such jobs, these migrants faced an intractable dilemma in that the lack of immigration papers made them to be easily exploitable. This is because employers such as farm owners paid workers low salaries and if the migrants showed any unhappiness, such farmers threatened to call the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) officials (Interview with Zimbabwean migrant farmworkers, January 2015). In this, one can see the spatial mobility of the border. Not only were the farmers using the undocumented status of migrants to exploit them, but they were also performing a bordering function in the form of threatening to call the DHA at the border. In this sense, the farmers were also policing the border several kilometres into the interior of the country. And this shows that the Beitbridge border is not fixed and/or marginal but can and does in fact migrate and manifest in the wider social and economic spaces. For instance, paying the undocumented Zimbabwean workers low salaries could be seen as an act of bordering. This is based on the assumption that those who were not undocumented migrants were paid decent salaries, which means that for the undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, not only did the border follow them but it mutated into several other borders such as exploitation, which created inequality and marginality or precarity (Moyo, 2020). The result was that, in the interior of South Africa, on the farms, it was easy to identify (on the basis of socioeconomic and other borders) the migrants and especially those who were undocumented from citizens.

Moyo and Nshimbi (2019) showed other contexts in the spatial mobility of borders in South Africa. One example is that there were several road inspections along the Beitbridge-Musina-Polokwane-Johannesburg freeway. Migrants were subjected to several passport inspection stops, which resulted in some migrants being detailed pending further verification of the travel documents. Similarly, in Johannesburg, which was over 600 km from the Beitbridge border, there were several and random passport inspection stops in which several migrants were arrested and/or detained (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2017, 2019). Conversations with the respondents also suggested that, in Zimbabwe as well, the borders were also spatially mobile away from the Beitbridge border into the interior. For example, one respondent who lives in Bulawayo, the second largest city in the country, explained that soon after crossing the Beitbridge border, there was another border about two kilometres into Zimbabwe along the Beitbridge-Bulawayo road, in which they were asked for passports by the police and army and not immigration officials. After, this, there were several (about three) similar borders, the last of which was about 40 km from Bulawayo (Interview with Zimbabwean worker, January 2015). Again the people who patrolled these borders were the army and police. Similar borders were also experienced along the Beitbridge Masvingo road in the interior of Zimbabwe (Interview with Zimbabwean worker, January 2015).

Furthermore, on the freeway to Francistown from the border between Botswana and Zimbabwe at Ramokgwebana Border post, the Botswana police randomly stopped people and requested for their passports. Likewise, from the same border post, the Zimbabwean army and police mounted “border” controls on the freeway to Bulawayo (Interview with Zimbabwean worker, December 2014). The insights from these interviews seem to suggest that it may be simplistic to assume that in the Southern African region, it was only in South Africa in which borders were spatially mobile into the interior of the country. The interview material seems to suggest that even in a country like Zimbabwe which experienced significant numbers of people who migrated out of the country in the recent past, actors who were not immigration officials actually performed various aspects of borders and bordering, far away from the borders into the interior of the country.

This is a potential area of research, so as to uncover, for instance, the similarities and differences in the spatio-mobility of borders among the Southern African countries. It is known for example that in South Africa, immigration policing by people who are not immigration officials, such as the army and police, was done so as to flush out undocumented migrants, actual or perceived (Moyo, 2020; Moyo & Nshimbi, 2019). But in a country like Zimbabwe, which experiences more outmigration by its citizens (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Moyo, 2018; Tevera & Zinyama, 2002), it would be interesting to investigate the motivation of the erection of several borders into the interior of the country. Questions relating to whether this was based on immigration anxieties or the so-called security imperatives would need to be answered in such research.

The impacts of securitised and spatially mobile borders on migrants are many. They include the fact that some migrants whether documented or not felt victimised. While it is understood that some of the migrants were undocumented, the question of whether or not they deserved victimisation arises. But the treatment of undocumented migrants in receiving countries is a bone of contention. For example, some argue that because undocumented migrants illegally enter a country, there should be no discussion about their rights or issues of morality but swift arrest and deportation, but other scholars assert that what may be illegal is not exactly immoral, such that "'illegal' does not mean the same thing as 'immoral' and so the judgment of illegality, even if indisputable, cannot decisively bring moral deliberation on the matter to a halt" (Taylor, 2008: 31). It is in this context that this argument has been taken further:

> *If* citizenship in rich and safe states ceased to be a privilege, exclusion would be less a prima facie moral wrong. This if has two aspects. The first is *temporal*: As long as measures to fight poverty are not taken or as long as they are not really effective, 'we' (individuals, organizations, states in affluent societies) have no moral right to close borders. The second is *gradational*: to the degree that affluent states do not live up to their international moral obligations, they have no moral right to close borders. This double *if* makes all other arguments *conditional* upon the prior fulfilment of our moral obligations with regard to safety and subsistence (Bader, 2005: 341–342).

Further, Bader (2005) argues that this kind of thinking on and approach to issues of international migration requires a more universalist and less sovereign frame of reference and migration management. And this is where the issue of regional integration in the SADC and the whole of Africa (Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), 1991) and the ultimate united and prosperous Africa by 2063 (Agenda 2063, 2015) become points of reference. This is precisely because free human mobility is one of the targets and thus discussing such matters directly responds to what the SADC and Africa as a whole hope to achieve. Notwithstanding, the subject around the moral treatment or otherwise of undocumented migrants in the context, like that of the SADC, deserves a chapter of its own and will not be attempted beyond this point. Similarly, the question of whether undocumented migrants, like the case of Zimbabwean farmworkers in South Africa, who were exploited also arises as well and whether or not it was justifiable to exploit them, will not be pursued further than this, given the scope and limits of this contribution. However, there were documented migrants who suffered more or less the same borders as those who were documented. For instance, a documented migrant felt that the several borders on the freeway from Musina to Johannesburg asking for a stamped passport were tantamount to harassment and this made them feel unwanted in South Africa (Interview with Zimbabwean worker, January 2015). Further, even the spatially mobile borders in countries like Botswana and Zimbabwe created anxieties on migrants, because it also amounted to harassment and they made the migrants feel as if they were under surveillance (Interview with Zimbabwean worker, December 2014).

Conclusion

The notion of the spatio-mobility of borders adequately demonstrates that borders are not the simple and marginal lines at the periphery of nation states (Cons & Sanyal, 2013). This has been demonstrated by that in the case of the Southern African region, borders between states like Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe are not fixed at the margins of these states, but such borders "migrate" inland into the interior of these nation states. For example, the South African border at Beitbridge is not only securitised, in the form of stringent immigration controls as well as the deployment of the army and police so as to monitor the border, but it also followed migrants. This materialised in many ways, such as stops by the police, who demanded to see the passports of migrants who were travelling along the freeway from Beitbridge to Johannesburg. Similar patterns were also revealed by interview data in that along the freeway from the Botswana border with Zimbabwe at Ramokgwebana, the Botswana police also stopped migrants and demanded to see their passports. The respondents also stated that this was the same exact practice which obtained along the Zimbabwean freeways from Botswana and South Africa borders. Cases in point relate to the "borders" which were erected and manned by the Zimbabwean army on the freeway from Ramokgwebana to Bulawayo as well as from Beitbridge to Bulawayo and from Beitbridge Masvingo.

Furthermore, and in the case of South Africa, the spatially mobile borders were also performed by ordinary people such as employers in Musina and the surrounding farmers in the South African province of Limpopo. In particular, undocumented migrants were exploited and threatened to be reported to the Department of Home Affairs, if they complained against ill treatment (Moyo, 2020). Those migrants who managed to reach Johannesburg also faced similar borders as well as patrols by the police, who demanded to see passports (Moyo, 2020; Moyo & Nshimbi, 2019; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018). But, in the case of South Africa, the securitised and spatially mobile borders failed to stop the migration of people from Zimbabwe to South Africa, for example. For instance, in order to contest the physical and securitised border at Beitbridge, migrants illegally crossed the border through unofficial points and also engaged human smugglers so as to cross the border to South Africa (Moyo, 2016a; Moyo & Nshimbi, 2019), thus suggesting that migration in the Southern African region has an enduring presence, but at the same time countries erect and attempt to sustain securitised borders, without any success (Moyo, 2016a, 2018).

In the light of this and in a region like the SADC, which is in pursuit of regional integration and indeed the promotion of human mobility, such securitised and spatially mobile borders do not articulate into a borderless Africa as aspired by the African Union and immortalised in the Agenda 2063 project (Agenda 2063, 2015). For this reason, there is a need for reimaging borders (in all their manifestation) in the Southern African region. This could reduce cross-border migration and human smuggling. It is arguable that if the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe was not securitised, people would not have to swim across a crocodile-infested river and that the farmers will have no business threatening such migrants with informing the DHA (Moyo, 2020). The reduction in the impact of securitised borders is being progressively done in other parts of Africa. In East Africa through the East African Community (EAC), Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda accept national identity documents for their citizens, to move across the borders of these countries without passports (Oucho, 2013). This actually achieves free human mobility in such a region. But the relevance of the East African development is that it is a reminder of what SADC targets at, which is implementing "policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the region generally, among Member States" (SADC Declaration of Treaty, 1992: 5). And this is amplified in the SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons which should "progressively eliminate obstacles to human mobility into and within SADC Members" (Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC, 2005: 3). If SADC countries remain true to this ideal, it means that the development of an effective migration management regime needs to be seriously considered.

References

Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). (1991). Accessed March 19, 2017, from https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/243/

Agenda 2063. (2015). *The Africa we want*. Accessed July 19, 2018, from https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf

Araia, T. (2009). *Report on human smuggling across the South Africa/Beitbridge border*. MRMP occasional paper. Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of Witwatersrand.

Bader, V. (2005). The ethics of immigration. *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, 12*(3), 341–342.

Baker, P. (2019). Trump declares a national emergency, and provokes a constitutional clash. *The New York Times*. Accessed February 26, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html

Balassa, B. (1961). *The theory of economic integration*. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

Brett, E. A. (2005). From corporatism to liberalisation in Zimbabwe: Economic policy regimes and political crisis, 1980-97. *Journal of International Political Science Review, 26*(1), 91–106.

Coleman, M. (2007). Immigration geopolitics beyond the Mexico-US border. *Antipode, 39*, 54–76.

Cons, J., & Sanyal, R. (2013). Geographies at the margins: Borders in South Asia-an introduction. *Political Geography, 35*, 5–13.

Crush, J., & Tevera, D. (2010). Exiting Zimbabwe. In J. Crush & D. Tevera (Eds.), *Zimbabwe's exodus: Crisis, migration, survival* (pp. 1–49). Kinston: Southern African Migration Programme.

Crush, J., Williams, V., & Peberdy, S. (2005). *Migration in Southern Africa*. Paper prepared for Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration. September 2005. Retrieved from https://womin.org.za/images/impact-of-extractive-industries/migrancy-and-extractivism/Crush%20%20Williams%20and%20Peberdy%20-%20Migration%20in%20Southern%20Africa.pdf

Declaration and Treaty of SADC. (1992). Accessed March 2, 2019, from https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf

Dhemba, J. (1999). Informal sector development: A strategy for alleviating urban poverty in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Social Development in Africa, 14*(2), 5–19.

Easton, G. (2010). Critical realism in case study research. *Industrial Marketing Management, 39*, 118–128.

Evans, M. (1984). The front-line states, South Africa and southern African security: Military prospects and perspectives. *Zambezia, XII*, 1–19. Accessed March 2, 2019, from https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Fronline%20States.pdf

Fontein, J. (2009). Anticipating the Tsunami: Rumours, planning and the arbitrary state in Zimbabwe. *Africa, 79*(3), 370–398.

Higgins, T. (2019). Trump on closing the US-Mexico border: 'Security is more important to me than trade'. *CNBC*. Accessed April 3, 2019, from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/trump-on-closing-border-security-is-more-important-to-me-than-trade.html

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2010). *Wolves in sheep's skin: A rapid assessment of human trafficking at Musina, Limpopo Province of South Africa*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Iosifides, T. (2011). *Qualitative methods in migration studies: A critical realist perspective*. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate.

Jacobs, B. (2019). Trump threatens to close border with Mexico. *The Guardian*. Accessed April 3, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/29/donald-trump-threatens-close-mexico-border

Johnson, C., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M., et al. (2011). Interventions on rethinking "the border" in border studies. *Political Geography, 30*, 61–69.

Mabee, B. (2007). Re-imagining the borders of US security after 9/11: Securitization, risk and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. *Globalizations, 4*(3), 385–397.

Mdlongwa, T., & Moyo, T. (2014). Representations of xenophobic otherisation in Jinga's one foreigner's ordeal and Mpe's welcome to our Hillbrow. *Elite Research Journal of Education and Review, 2*(4), 88–94.

Moyo, I. (2016a). Changing migration status and shifting vulnerabilities: A research note on Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. *Journal of Trafficking, Organised Crime and Security, 2*(2), 108–112. Special Issue.

Moyo, I. (2016b). The Beitbridge-Mussina interface: Towards flexible citizenship, sovereignty and territoriality at the border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31*, 427. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2016.1188666.

Moyo, I. (2018). Zimbabwean dispensation, special and exemption permits in South Africa: On humanitarian logic, depoliticisation and invisibilisation of migrants. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618776413

Moyo, I. (2020). On borders and the liminality of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 18*(1), 60–74.

Moyo, I., & Nshimbi, C. C. (2017). Of borders and fortresses: Attitudes towards cross-border movement in South Africa as a critical factor in SADC's integration project. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 35*, 131. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1402198.

Moyo, I., & Nshimbi, C. C. (2019). Border practices at Beitbridge border and Johannesburg inner city: Implications for the SADC regional integration project. *Journal of Asian and African Studies, 54*, 309. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618822123.

Ndlovu, L. (2013). They are everywhere like cockroaches: Unpacking the experiences of the Zimbabweans in the diaspora through the short essay. *European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 22*(1), 1143–1158.

Nshimbi, C. C., Fioramonti, L. (2016). Regional migration governance in the African continent: Current state of affairs and the way forward. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden. Accessed June 10, 2019, from https://www.sef-bonn.org/fileadmin/SEF-Dateiliste/04_Publikationen/Weitere_Publikationen/Sonderpublikationen/sb_studie-2016_en.pdf

Nshimbi, C. C., & Moyo, I. (2018). Informal immigrant traders in Johannesburg: The scorned cornerstone in the Southern African development community integration project. In A. Adeniran & L. Ikuteyijo (Eds.), *Africa now! Emerging issues and alternative perspectives* (pp. 387–413). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oucho, J. O. (2013). Prospects for free movement in the East African community. *Regions and Cohesion, 3*(3), 103–122.

Raftopoulos, B. (2006). The Zimbabwean crisis and the challenges for the left. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 32*(2), 203–209.

Sachikonye, L. (1999). *Restructuring or deindustrializing: Zimbabwe's textile and metal industries under adjustment*. Research report no. 110. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

SADCRegional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). (2003). Accessed July 19, 2018, from https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/

Southern African Development Community. (2012). Retrieved March 2, 2019, from https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/

Southern African Development Community (SADC). (2005). *Draft protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons*. Retrieved from http://www.sadc.int/english/keydocuments/protocols/protocol-on-the-facilitation-of-movement-of-persons

Taylor, M. R. (2008). Illegal immigration and moral obligation. *Public Affairs Quarterly, 22*(1), 29–41.

Tevera, D., & Zinyama, L. (2002). *Zimbabweans who migrate: Perspectives on international migration in Zimbabwe*. Migration policy series no 2. Cape Town: IDASA.

Valverde, M. (2019). *Donald Trump stalls on promise to build a wall, have Mexico pay for it*. Retrieved February 26, 2019, from https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/promise/1397/build-wall-and-make-mexico-pay-it/

Walker, A. (2015). *5 European countries have built border fences to keep out refugees*. Retrieved from https://gizmodo.com/5-european-countries-have-built-border-fences-to-keep-o-1731065879

Wentzel, M. (2003, March 17–20). *Historical and contemporary dimensions of migration between South Africa and its neighbouring countries*. Unpublished paper delivered at HSRC migration workshop, Pretoria.

Wentzel, M., & Tlabela, K. (2006). Historical background to South African migration. In P. Kok, D. Gelderblom, J. Oucho, & J. Van Zyl (Eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa, dynamics and determinants* (pp. 71–96). Cape Town: HRSC Press.

Part III
Borders, the Transboundary Natural Resources Question and Integration

Chapter 10
Prospects for Cooperation in the Nile Basin

Firehiwot Sintayehu

Introduction

The Nile is a complex river basin system situated in North East Africa. It is the world's longest river draining over 3.2 million km^2 (NBI, 2016). The river is shared by 11 riparian countries.[1] The use of the Nile water resources has generated debate, in that, downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt assert that, they are the main users of the Nile Basin water resources and that upstream countries utilization is negligible. As Egypt and Sudan defend the status quo of downstream dominant use, upstream countries have rejected the claim, arguing that they too would like to utilize the Nile waters for their own development. This has raised political debate around the use of the basin's water resources. Such a debate has been going on for long without any agreeable culmination (Cascao & Nicol, 2016; Yacob, 2007).

Following upstream and downstream debates, authors like Starr (1991) argued that there will be water wars in the Nile Basin referring to the speeches of Egyptian leaders like Anwar Sadat who once said "the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water" in 1979 and the former Foreign Minister of Egypt Boutros Ghali mentioning that the "national security of Egypt is. . .a question of water" (Starr, 1991: 19). Nevertheless, it is also evident to look into various negotiation platforms established in order to achieve cooperation in the Nile which outweigh such threatening statements cited as evidence for the prospect of water wars in the Nile.

[1]These include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.

F. Sintayehu (✉)
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_10

This chapter looks into ecological, economic, political and legal justifications that emphasize the prospects of cooperation rather than conflict in the Nile Basin. The chapter is structured as follows. The first part offers an introduction, which is followed by a theoretical discussion presenting existing debates in hydropolitics. The third part describes the geography and hydrology of the Nile Basin. This is followed by the predicaments of cooperation in the Nile Basin which is an acknowledgement that harmony is not yet achieved. Then, the main analysis of prospects for cooperation follows, before winding up with some concluding remarks.

River Basin Cooperation: A Theoretical Discussion

There are arguments and counter-arguments about the prospects for cooperation on transboundary river basins. One set of arguments propagate that when states share transboundary resources conflict is a possiblity while they differ on the way they put the conditions which lead to such a scenario. The second set of arguments favour basin-wide cooperation, taking up various socio-economic, environmental and political reasoning. The present section engages with both arguments and concludes by framing the theoretical direction adopted for analysis.

The water wars thesis upholds the argument that, when sovereign states share river basins, it is likely that they clash over its usage. For Gleick (1993: 84–85), the possibility of conflicts driven by scarcity of water depends on some conditions which determine the prospect of water conflicts namely: "(1) the degree of scarcity, (2) the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one region or state, (3) the relative power of the basin states, and (4) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources". For him, the Middle East satisfies these criteria. It is so, since the area is extremely dry and in turn very much reliant on river basins like the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates.

All of these rivers traverse international borders and are degraded from time to time as a result of population pressure. Here, the 1967 Arab-Israel war is put forward as a case linked with the intention of the Arab League to divert headwater of the Jordan River in the 1960s and Israel later on occupied most part of the headwater to avoid such a threat in 1967. Furthermore, he cites instances whereby water infrastructures were used as a tool and targets of wars. The German dams of the Mohne, the Sorpe and the Eder were bombed during the Second World War. The Yalu River serving North Korea and China was also attacked during the Korean War. However, some scholars say that referring to the 1967 Arab-Israel war as a water war is unacceptable and cannot serve as evidence. They say that the ambition of Zionism to build a Jewish state in the region which was opposed by the Arabs in a historical context serves as a root cause for the 1967 war rather than water scarcity (Dolatyar & Gray, 2000; Libiszewski, 1995; Wolf, 1998).

Nonetheless, the divergence of demands of upstream versus downstream countries' interests in international river basins has been cited as a cause for conflict among riparian states. In cases such as the Nile and Euphrates–Tigris river basins, the upstream countries claim for the doctrine of "Territorial Sovereignty" or

"Harmon Doctrine". The doctrine argues for the right of countries to fully utilize sources of water within their boundaries. On the other hand, downstream countries subscribe to the doctrine of "territorial integrity". These upstream–downstream interests appear to be incompatible in many cases such as the Nile and Euphrates–Tigris river basins. This is supplemented by the level of power distribution among the basin countries and the level of ease of access to alternative freshwater sources determining the likelihood of water dispute (Gleick, 1993).

Starr (1991) and Shiva (2002) are proponents of the water wars thesis in the Middle East and North Africa. They base their claim on the existing tension over water scarcity among countries of the region. The tension in the region is here elaborated taking the case of the Nile and Euphrates which have been points of discussion and at times quarrel among riparian countries. In 2013, Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi was heard saying "If our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative" (El-Behairy, 2013). Egypt has also maintained its historical rights over the Nile in its new constitution approved in 2014. This basically means continuation of its dominant usage. However, these are expressions of national interest, not a sign of water wars. The thesis remains flawed as threats have been directed by Egyptian leaders at different times and the country insists on its historical rights. Nevertheless, no military action has so far been taken on upstream countries for making use of the Nile waters. Even a mega project such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has served as a catalyst for resuming talks on the use of the waters (Salman, 2016).

The theoretical underpinning of the study at hand is that, despite the existing water shortage and poverty in the Nile Basin region, cooperation provides a more plausible scenario. The argument supporting cooperation in the Nile Basin is driven from earlier theoretical discussions. The scarcity of freshwater sources leads to interdependence among riparian states. This situation makes the choice of war too risky and unrealistic. Dolatyar and Gray (2000) put it as "a mutual hostage situation" whereby the decision of each riparian country has multifaceted implications. They argue that water is a resource which is too vital to choose war and loss for riparian states. As a result, riparian countries prefer to cooperate and negotiate over how best to handle dissatisfactions. That explains the existence of numerous agreements on the utilization and management of river basins. Allan (2002) argues that water wars will not happen in regions where water is scarce like the Middle East. Though water is scarce in the Middle East, it is available in the global market in its virtual[2] form. "By the year 2000, the Middle East and North Africa were importing fifty million tons of grain annually" (Allan, 2002: 255). Nachmani (1997) relies on technology advancements such as desalination as a way out of dealing with water scarcity rather than conflicts.

For Wolf (1998), the water wars thesis should seriously be challenged despite the fact that water is a crucial resource and very much scarce around the world. Even in

[2]States with water scarcity may resolve their problem by importing agricultural produce and thereby eliminating the need for the irrigation of domestic agricultural production.

the existing international context which is without a set of principles to govern freshwater resources across borders, the thesis will not work. Wolf gives five major justifications to support his argument: historic, strategic, shared interest, institutional resilience and economic argument.

Previous writings about water wars lack evidence that contradictions caused by water have turned violent. In addition, the history of cooperation is viewed as more impressive than the history of conflict over international water resources. This is expressed in terms of the number of treaties concluded concerning the usage of international water resources. The second justification Wolf puts forward is that waging water wars is not strategically sound for sovereign states as there are numerous conditions which would enable riparian countries to wage water wars the fulfilment of which is very much unrealistic. Some of the conditionalities involve the existence of a riparian state which is downstream and powerful. When an upstream state launches a project that threatens the quality and quantity of water heading downstream, the downstream state needs to destroy the facility which is built upstream, which may mean flooding to the former. In addition, the upstream country should also be in a position to easily pollute the water source. Wolf, therefore, concludes that, claiming the fulfilment of conditions will be unrealistic.

The third justification given by Wolf is shared interest among the upstream and downstream states. In most instances, upstream countries are well situated for dam construction and production of hydroelectric power while the downstream riparian states have immense potential for irrigation. Having dams upstream can also be highly advantageous for downstream states in terms of evening out the amount of water going downstream. In a situation where these riparian states can benefit a lot through cooperation, the water wars thesis does not hold water. Wolf also states that institutional arrangements in place to manage the distribution of water resources among riparian states are resilient to rough relations. He gives examples of the Mekong Committee which existed since 1957 and exchanged data throughout the Vietnam War, and the Indus River Commission, which survived two India–Pakistan wars. The last justification he puts forward is the economic argument that war is much more expensive than what water would generally cost.

International Norms and Principles on Shared Transboundary River Basins

Members of the international community set up various mechanisms to have a set of norms and principles that riparian countries sharing transboundary river basins may gear their relations towards cooperation. The United Nations (UN) adopted the convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse on 21 May 1997 which is regarded as a major breakthrough when the International Law for Transboundary Rivers is discussed. The convention intends to serve as a general framework for countries sharing international rivers and consists of seven parts. Article 5 and Article 7 under the second part of the convention state general principles which are essential to the discussion on hydropolitics. Article 5 discusses "equitable and reasonable utilization and participation" as a general principle. In this article, it is stated that watercourse states should make use of international water sources in an equitable and reasonable manner:

> In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse (UN, 1997).

Article 5 of the convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses further mentions that riparian states do have the right to participate in terms of deciding how water is used and protected. Here, the convention clearly says riparian states do not only have the right to make use of the water in equitable and reasonable manner but also have the duty to cooperate when protection of the watercourses is being conducted.

The other important provision of the UN convention is in Article 7 which puts forward the principle of "Obligation not to cause significant harm". It states that when riparian states make use of international water resources, they should apply all measures to prevent significant harm to others. If any significant harm is committed, the states should discuss and try to mitigate the harm and, where appropriate, to discuss compensation (UN, 1997: 5). The convention is committed to cooperation among riparian states in transboundary water resources. This is also explicitly expressed in Article 8 which is about "General obligation to cooperate". The convention officially came into force with the accession of the 35th state, Vietnam, on May 21, 2014.

Trying to resolve two major points of conflict among many upstream and downstream states has been a success of the UN convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. However, this by itself is far from resolving issues around water sharing of transboundary river basins since the states tend to emphasize the principle which best suits their own national interests. In this regard, many upstream countries such as Turkey in the Euphrates river basin find it difficult to pay enough attention to the principle of "Obligation not to cause significant harm" because their national interest is best served through the utilization of water resources within their territory and as a result they focus on construction of water development projects such as Ataturk dam without due emphasis on their impacts on downstream riparian states. Downstream countries like Egypt, which has been making use of the Nile for centuries, do not want to acknowledge the "equitable and reasonable utilization" of upstream countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda.

The UN convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses has been criticized by Wolf (1998) for not providing enough guidelines in terms of allocation of these resources. But Wolf's expectation for the convention to provide specific guidelines is not realistic because conventions are to be adapted to each specific case. That is why regional arrangements are in place in cases such as the Mekong, Senegal and Rhine river basins. Here, the Liberal Institutionalism's argument that distinct issue area enables states to cooperate is applicable. This is because it is difficult to establish international regimes to govern the behaviour of states at the global level. It is more operational to establish them specially at the river basin level. The other criticism by Wolf (1998) is that the convention is entirely concerned about sovereign states leaving out the interest of other actors such as the Palestinians along the Jordan or the Kurds along the Euphrates. The tendency of states not taking their cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is also mentioned as a challenge to facilitate better relations over transboundary water sources as part of a downfall of the international political system at large.

Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) argue that the mere existence of agreements among riparian states does not ensure cooperation. If agreements are going to achieve positive relations they should aim for win-win arrangements for all parties. These agreements should ideally be inclusive of every riparian state to international river basins. One instance of an agreement which has been highly contested is the 1959 agreement which was concluded between Egypt and Sudan over usage of the Nile waters. This agreement has been a source of confrontation among the upstream and downstream riparian countries rather than a source of cooperation. This is because it does not fulfil the abovementioned criteria.

Parallel to the UN convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which is a general international framework, there have been a number of instances whereby transboundary river basins shared by two or more sovereign states have been a source of cooperation. One major move in terms of managing water issues that are pertinent to collectives is the European Water Framework Directive (WFD). The Directive came into force in the year 2000 in reaction to the problem of water pollution being acknowledged in a poll conducted among the citizens of the EU countries.

A major justification for having the WFD is multiplication of actors involved in water management, their role, power relations and conflicts over occasional complexities in water management. Such complexities demanded competent institutions to oversee water management at the international level (Kaika, 2004). The major achievements of the WFD in Europe are opting for the involvement of all stakeholders to a particular river basin in decision-making over its usage. In this regard, the Rhine has been cited as a very good example in Europe. The EU thus calls for similar moves by its member states.

One of the best practices that facilitates interstate collaboration in the use and management of specific river basins can be seen in the Rhine river basin.[3] It serves functions of navigation, recreation, irrigation, energy generation, municipal wastewater disposal and drinking water. River basin organizations (RBOs) including the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR), International Commission for the Hydrology in the Rhine Basin (CHR) and International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) provide collective mechanisms for managing the

[3]The Rhine is shared by Switzerland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg and Belgium.

river basins collectively (Frijters & Leentvaar, 2003). The CCNR was established in the nineteenth century to ensure freedom of navigation on the Rhine and its tributaries, and to maintain a uniform legal regime governing navigation on the river.[4] They make decisions unanimously and the chairmanship revolves around state representatives every 2 years (Frijters & Leentvaar, 2003).

The CHR was established in 1970 at the recommendation of UNESCO to promote closer cooperation.[5] Scientific institutions of riparian states of CHR develop joint hydrological measures to be applied on the Rhine for sustainable development. Scientific research on the river basin is conducted and published within the context of the CHR. Furthermore, the organization intends to contribute to basin-wide solution by the formulation, management and provision of information systems and models (Frijters & Leentvaar, 2003).

The ICPR is concerned with pollution in the Rhine river basin. According to the Berne convention of 1963, which marked the legal foundation of the organization, the ICPR is responsible for investigations into the type, source and extent of Rhine pollution, recommending appropriate measures to reduce pollution and prepare agreements between the participating countries (Huisman, Jong, & Wieriks, 2000). The ICPR is also an important aspect to the WFD as its operation goes in line with the specific objective of WFD which is reduced pollution over European watercourses at large. As a result, the Rhine river basin riparian countries have managed to commonly handle issues which should ideally be managed by institutions that coordinate all riparian states' interests. They have formed specialized institutions for different water management aspects, such as navigation, develop joint hydrological measures and pollution reduction. The water management strategy adopted by the Rhine riparian states is exemplary to struggling riparian states desiring to achieve legal and institutional frameworks. In this regard, the learning point for the Nile Basin countries is that it is essential to conduct joint scientific research which clearly stipulates shared water management challenges from the river basin and strictly adhere to outcomes of such studies. Furthermore, it is essential to solicit legal and institutional frameworks to ensure that the concerns of all riparian countries are entertained and potential conflicts are abated.

In Africa, the Senegal river basin provides a good point of reference for cooperation in river basin management.[6] It is the second most important in West Africa next to the Niger. According to Godana (1985), it covers 1600–1800 km depending on the period and author. The four basin countries are poor and the Senegal River offers, for the moment, the only hope for alleviating some of their problems. Hence, starting independence different legal and institutional structures and modalities for the joint development of the basin's water resources evolved. The first one was the Inter-State Committee which came into effect in 1963. At the time, the river basin

[4]Member states of the CCNR include the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium and France.

[5]Member states include Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

[6]The Senegal river basin is shared among the four basin states of Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania.

was internationalized so that no single state may exclusively utilize it and a committee was given the responsibility of approving studies and works for harnessing it. The committee faced political challenges, including disintegration of the federation of Mali and Senegal which left some distrust between them as well as Mauritania's decision to have an economy independent of its neighbours for some time (Godana, 1985). But the states were encouraged by the results brought about by the interstate committee and formed the Organisation des ÉtatsRiverains du Sénégal (OERS) or the Organization of the Senegal River States. OERS was meant to be a stepping stone towards unity of the four states for economic, social, cultural and even military activities. However, the creation of this organization did not lead to the resolution of all political crises among the riparian countries. Senegal and Mauritania had some frictions concerning the partitioning of the waters of the Senegal River which forms the border between them. There was also political difference between Senegal and Guinea. The organization also faced financial challenges which paralysed its operationalization in 1972 (Godana, 1985).

But the riparian countries did not stop at that. Instead, they founded Organisation Pour la Mise En Valeru du FleuveSénégal (OMVS) or the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (Godana, 1985).[7] The fundamental principles and institutional frameworks created by the organization were applauded for being very progressive and advanced approach of international water management arrangement. With the signing of 1972 Statute, the 1972 OMVS Convention and the 1978 Works Convention, the basin countries gave the authority to plan and implement projects on water sources of the Senegal river basin for the OMVS. Vick (2006) says after 10 years of its formulation, the OMVS conducted studies, gathered and analysed data, obtained financing and began construction of two dams called Manantali and Diama. Though the OMVS is in place as an institutional framework to manage water resources of the Senegal river basin, there exist operational challenges which have to do with financial obstacles, problem of effective implementation and not conducting environmental impact assessments properly.

The perseverance of the Senegal river basin riparian countries to establish different legal and institutional frameworks despite political and economic challenges, which emanate from poverty and political upheavals, is worth appreciating. Despite such challenges, the Senegal river basin countries have managed to form and maintain a RBO which plans and implements water development projects on behalf of riparian countries. This can be used as learning for the management of river basins in the Nile, which has poor and politically unstable countries as riparians.

Efforts to commonly manage the waters of the Eastern Nile river basin, which is the focus of this chapter, are also present though not sufficient. There have been numerous processes to conclude a win-win basin-wide agreement which is yet to materialize. In this regard, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in 1999 by Nile riparian countries as a transitional institution until the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) comes to force. NBI has a shared vision to achieve sustainable

[7] OMVS was initially formed by Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.

socioeconomic development through equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin water resources. Its primary objectives are to develop the water resources of the Nile Basin in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples, to ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources, to ensure cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win gains, to target poverty eradication and promote economic integration and to ensure that the programme results in a move from planning to action.

Situating the Nile Basin

The Nile is a complex river basin system situated in North East Africa. Over 257 million people (54% of the total population of the 11 Nile riparian states) inhabit the basin area (NBI, 2016). The Nile consists of two major subsystems, namely, the Eastern Nile and the Equatorial Nile. The Eastern Nile subsystem is a contribution of tributaries in the highlands of Ethiopia from Abbay/Blue Nile, Tekeze/Atbara and the Baro/Akobo/Sobat subbasins. The Equatorial subsystem is where the White Nile originates and flows into Lake Victoria. Most of the water source of the Nile Basin, which is said to be about 86% of the total Nile flow at Aswan, comes from the Ethiopian Highlands. The Blue Nile is the largest contributor to the Nile flow supplying about 50 billion cubic metre (BCM). Another subbasin contributing to the Nile waters in Ethiopia is the Tekeze-Atbara with an annual flow of 11.4 BCM. Though the most unmonitored, the Baro-Akobo/Sobat is also the source of the Nile waters from Ethiopia with a contribution of 12.56 BCM (NBI, 2016). The discharge coming from tributaries is highly dependent on the rainfall and climate patterns. In this regard, the White Nile contributes little but more consistent year-round flow.

The waters of the Nile Basin are vulnerable to decline from climate change (Paisley & Henshaw, 2013). This poses a serious threat to existing water management. There has been variability in water discharge of the Nile as measured at Aswan. In 1916, the measurement of the Nile was a peak of 120 BCM. In 1984, this amount declined to 42 BCM as a result of drought in the Ethiopian Highlands. Currently, the average basin discharge is 84 BCM which may fluctuate as a result of variability in climate (Mwandosya, 2017). The operation of current dams and their release strategy may not be sufficient for present and future demands (NBI, 2016).

There are a number of water development projects installed by the Nile Basin riparian countries for various purposes. Egypt and Sudan account for the largest withdrawal from the Nile which is 10–15 times more than the other riparian countries (FAO Aquastat, 2005). NBI (2016) data show that there are 14 dams throughout the basin as of 2014. The total storage capacity of these dams is about 203 BCM. In Egypt, Lake Nasser was formed after the construction of the High Aswan Dam in 1970 with a capacity of 162 BCM. Upstream, in the Ethiopian Highlands Tekeze dam with a storage capacity of 9.29 BCM was built in 2009. In Sudan, the Merowe dam with a storage capacity of 12.39 BCM and Roseires heightening with 5.9 BCM were completed in 2009 and 2012, respectively. Bujagali dam of Uganda has the capacity to store 0.75 BCM. In 2010, Ethiopia started constructing the GERD, which is expected to store 74 BCM and plans to produce hydroelectric power with an estimated installed capacity of 6000 MW (NBI, 2016: 174). Both upstream and downstream countries are planning and executing numerous water development projects in order to ensure respective national economic growth, which at times creates confrontation among riparian countries.

In addition to large-scale projects run by national governments, the Nile provides livelihood to many communities in the 11 riparian countries. Principal economic activities among inhabitants of the Nile Basin are agriculture, pastoralism and agropastoralism (Elias, 2009). The socioeconomic situation in riparian countries of the Nile is, however, unpleasant. For instance, in eight of these countries over 50% of the urban population lacks access to sanitation (NBI, 2016). The fact that the amount of water in the Nile Basin is limited while the needs are rising, because of population increase and urbanization, for example, complicates relations among riparian countries. For long, Egypt makes use of the largest proportion of the Nile waters followed by Sudan. Egypt and Sudan concluded the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, which proclaims "the acquired rights" of the two countries to be 55½ and 18½ BCM respectively. The two uphold this division of the Nile resources against the interest of upstream countries that are denied any share from the existing 84 BCM Nile waters. In response, upstream countries say they do not acknowledge agreements such as the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, as they did not take part in its conclusion. This led to more recent negotiations spearheaded by the Nile Basin Initiative, which is a temporarily inter-riparian regional institution. The following sections look into the challenges and prospects for cooperation in the Nile Basin.

Cooperation in the Nile Basin: Some Challenges and Prospects

Egypt signed agreements and constructed the High Aswan Dam to establish what is now referred to as acquired rights over the Nile Waters. In 1929, an agreement was concluded between Egypt and the United Kingdom (representing Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). The 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is also cited as the basis of current reference to acquired rights. The 1929 Nile agreement states that no works will be undertaken on the Nile, tributaries and lakes which would reduce the volume of the Nile water reaching Egypt; Egypt has the right of inspecting the implementation of projects; all agree on Egypt's ancient right of the Nile water; and Egypt has the right of investing along the whole length of the Nile, to the remote sources of Nile tributaries in these territories (Kieyah, 2007). The 1959 Nile water agreement distributes Nile waters between Egypt (55.5) and Sudan (18.5). Egypt also gave its consent for the construction of Roseires reservoir in Sudan by being part of the 1959 Nile water agreement. In the agreement, projects to minimize losses in Gbal and Zaraf lakes, Ghazal lake and its branches, Sobat river and its branches and the White Nile Basin are planned while the Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC) of the Nile waters is established to oversee implementation. Such statements ignore that these agreements are challenged by upstream countries and are sources of disagreement among upstream and downstream countries, instead of cooperation.

The “acquired right” claims of Sudan and Egypt are disputed by upstream countries. In particular, Ethiopia has resisted those claims because they seriously impact its national interest. As a result, the country argued for “unlimited territorial sovereignty” rights. Within this framework, Ethiopia and other upstream countries, which are the sources of Nile waters, declare their rights to make use of resources which are within their own boundaries. Following such claims, the Ethiopian government designed and implemented dam projects to expand its water use from the Nile. The Ethiopian government came up with the Lake Tana project intending to construct an outlet to the main Abbay River and sell water to the British colonial power for its cotton plantation in Sudan and other basin countries. In 1929, the Tana venture was awarded to J.W. White which was a US construction and contracting firm. The project faced implementation challenges because of the 1929 and 1930 world economic depression, which forced Ethiopia to seek commercial loans to finance the Tana project. This did not work as the timing and creditworthiness of the country was a challenge. In 1935, the Italian occupation came, further deferring the Ethiopian use of its water resources for mega investments (Waterbury, 2002). In more recent years, Ethiopia has constructed a number of hydroelectric power production dams on the Nile. These include the Finchaa Power project (134 MW production capacity), the Tana Beles scheme (460 MW production capacity) and the Tekeze Power project (900 MW production capacity).

These projects are considered a threat to downstream countries because they compromise their “acquired rights”. Tensions, therefore, arise because Egyptian leaders speak of reaffirming their “acquired rights” by any means, including war. Egypt has even included a “historical right” provision to its new constitution, adopted in 2014, which was found to be offensive to upstream countries. Article 44 of the constitution reads as follows:

> The state commits to protecting the Nile River, maintaining Egypt’s historic rights thereto, rationalizing and maximizing its benefits, not wasting its water or polluting it. The state commits to protecting its mineral water, to adopting methods appropriate to achieve water safety, and to supporting scientific research in this field. Every citizen has the right to enjoy the Nile River. It is prohibited to encroach upon it or to harm the river environment. The state guarantees to remove encroachments thereon. The foregoing is regulated by law (Constitution of Egypt Article 44: 19).

Nevertheless, an extreme situation of water wars has never happened in the past; rather the riparian countries are trying out negotiations in order to bring about common water management mechanisms on the Nile. The cooperation process which started in the 1990s on the Nile Basin was a new one in its approach. It has two parallel tracks: one being a technical track through the NBI as a transitional cooperative arrangement and the second, a political track of gearing towards a basin-wide framework for legal and institutional arrangement by negotiating for a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The idea was that once the CFA comes into force, the NBI would be replaced by a permanent basin commission. However, when the CFA was being negotiated the upstream–downstream debates on the use of the Nile waters stood on the way.

The negotiation process under the CFA started in 1999, right after the establishment of the NBI. The process of concluding an agreement between the Nile riparian countries continued for over 10 years. However, in 2010, upstream countries decided to proceed with the signing of CFA despite major disagreements with downstream countries. This led to the freezing of NBI membership of Egypt and Sudan. Later in November 2012, Sudan returned to the NBI though it remained excluded from the CFA. The CFA is signed by Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya while ratified by the first three. It is yet to come into force as it requires ratification by six Nile riparian states. Sudan and Egypt raised a number of issues concerning the CFA. The first had to do with the "water rights" provision of the agreement. All Nile riparian countries including Sudan and Egypt agreed on 45 legal articles except Article 14 which states:

> Having due regard for the provision of Article 4 and 5, Nile Basin states recognize the vital importance of water security to each of them. The States also recognize that cooperative management and development of the waters of the Nile River System will facilitate achievement of water security and other benefits. Nile Basin states therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: a) to work together to ensure that all States achieve and sustain water security; b) not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.

Sudan and Egypt saw Article 14b threatening their "historical and acquired rights" as stated in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. Hence, they requested to include the phrase "not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State", which triggers the historical debate and in turn a deadlock with upstream countries. In 2007, the case was referred to the heads of state and no agreement could be reached until May 2009. In May 2009 during a Nile Council of Ministers meeting in Kinshasa, upstream states decided not to wait any longer annexing the controversy on Article 14b to be dealt by the Nile River Basin Commission within 6 months after its establishment and proceeded signing the remaining parts. Water rights was not part of the UN Watercourses agreement of 1997, but it was included in the CFA in order to resolve the debates between the two provisions of "the obligation not to cause significant harm", which was supported by downstream countries and "the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization" which was in line with the interests of upstream countries (Salman, 2012).

In addition to the issue of water security, Egypt and Sudan requested to include a provision which explicitly states the notification of other riparian countries of planned projects which may cause a significant effect on other riparian states. However, the CFA had a provision about the exchange of information on planned measures through the Nile River Basin Commission to be established once the CFA comes to force. The demand from downstream countries was opposed by Ethiopia as it is viewed to compromise its sovereignty and indirectly reinforce Egypt's claim to control projects implemented on the Nile (Salman, 2012). The third point of divergence between upstream and downstream Nile riparian countries was the approach of the CFA amendment. Sudan and Egypt requested that the CFA should be amendable by consensus or a majority which consists of both Egypt and Sudan while upstream countries were of the opinion that the agreement should be amendable by simple majority, with no veto power to any riparian country (Salman, 2012).

Upstream and downstream claims and counterclaims led to a vicious circle without any agreement being reached. This highly affects prospects for cooperation in the Nile as agreeing on the terms and approaches of use are mandatory to implement projects in the river basin. Indeed, such disagreements are increasing the number of lost opportunities to implement a joint project on the river basin. They also lead to the emergence of more unilateral water development projects in riparian countries. In this regard, Ethiopia has embarked upon the construction of the GERD which attracted the attention of many while discussing relations among the Nile basin riparian countries. The GERD was launched on 2 April 2011 and according to Meles Zenawi—the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia—the project commenced with the plan to produce 5250 MW of hydroelectric power. The dam was expected to hold 67 BCM of water at completion. According to interviews made with officials of the Ethiopian government in June 2015, the major reason which brought the GERD as a unilateral dam project on the Nile was Ethiopia's frustration with joint projects with downstream countries.

The Nile Basin: Prospects and Possibilities of Cooperation

Despite the lack of common understanding on modalities of utilizing the waters in the Nile Basin among riparian countries, cooperation is more strategic because benefits outweigh possible harms. The theoretical discussion of this chapter presented several justifications that reinforce the argument that cooperation in the use and management of transboundary river basins is not just a matter of choice but survival for riparian states. The argument emanates from the interdependence created by sharing freshwater resources, which in many instances is delicate.

Environmental degradation, for example, could be exploited for cooperation in the river basin. Population increase in the basin is, for instance, among the factors that exacerbate deforestation. Between 1960 and 2010, the aggregate population of all riparian countries had grown more than fourfold and had reached approximately 480 million by 2012. A consequence of this is the replacement of forests with farm and land for pasture, increasing temperature and decreasing rainfall (Wani, 2011). Agricultural expansion, which replaces forest land with agricultural land, is practised in the upstream. The wood is then used to generate additional income earned from the sale of firewood or for other uses such as furniture and construction of houses (ENTRO, 2016).

Egypt's interest in ensuring access sufficient to freshwater from the Nile is dependent on the availability of rain in upstream countries. Hence, wetland rehabilitation work in Ethiopia and South Sudan and afforestation in upstream countries have a positive impact on the amount of water in the Aswan High dam. Though at the moment Egypt is not interested in upstream environmental rehabilitation work, this is possibly a concern for the future as the impact of environmental degradation on the quality and quantity of water harms water use trends in downstream countries which always plead that the Nile is their only source of freshwater. Indeed, interbasin networks to resolve environmental challenges have been suggested. However, national policies which have to do with the environment and management of freshwater resources are done by national governments which fail to consider basin-wide concerns by only concentrating on their own needs (Yacob, 2007).

The second set of justifications for cooperation in the Nile Basin is economic. Thus, though freshwater is scarce in its blue form in the Middle East and North East Africa, it is available in "virtual" form in the world market. Hence, countries like Egypt which highly depend on one river may reduce such reliance by importing food and energy resources which they produce using the river basin. Allan (2002: 255) mentions that as of the year 2000, the Middle East and North Africa were importing 50 million tons of grain annually. Scholars who promote virtual water as a market solution to tension over river basin uses say transporting food is an efficient technique of reducing water shortage. It takes about 1000 L of water to produce 1 kg of bread, and 15000 L to produce 1 kg of beef (Allan, 1997; Yang & Zehnder, 2002). Moreover, compared to the economic cost of war, the virtual option is more efficient and politically strategic as emphasized by Wolf (1998).

The virtual water argument is further reinforced by the notion of benefit sharing among the Nile river basin riparian countries. Many scholars argue that discussing a wide array of benefits from the river rather than discussing water allocations is an efficient way of achieving cooperation among riparian countries (Dombrowsky et al., 2014; Sadoff & Grey, 2002, 2005). In this regard, Sadoff and Grey (2002) talk about four types of advantages of the water sharing approach. The first is benefit to the river—this is about possibilities of enhancing water quality and flow, improving watershed management, reducing sediments transport and protecting biodiversity. The second is the possibility of developments like dams. The third is the reduction of cost. This relates to containing tensions from conflict over water resources. The fourth relates to benefits beyond the river. That is, using the ties created as a result of the river to affect relations beyond it. Examples include augmented trade relations, investments and hydropower interconnections among riparian countries.

There were opportunities for upstream and downstream countries to maximize common economic goals by using the Nile. The Joint Master Plan (JMP), for example, was a large-scale, long-term and multipurpose investment project. Its objective was to identify ideal outcomes of water resource management for all the three Eastern Nile subbasins of Blue Nile, Atbara/Tekeze and Baro-Akobo/Sobat. The Eastern Nile Council of Ministers commissioned an independent study on "Opportunities for cooperative water resources development on the Eastern Nile: Risks and rewards" in 2008. The JMP scoping study concluded that the Blue Nile provides the best opportunity for investment. These investments included water storage facilities with the capacity to produce a large amount of hydropower, flood control structures, sediment management works, irrigation and navigation. But no further action was taken after the study because Egyptian authorities contested its findings despite Ethiopian and Sudanese efforts to bring Egypt on board. Cascao and Nicol (2016) argue that the JMP is a lost opportunity for a jointly implemented large-scale project on the Nile. Even if the implementation of a joint integrated water development programme like the JMP failed because of stalled negotiations, the riparian countries prefer to cooperate even when a "unilateral" project like the GERD, which Egypt considers a threat, is implemented. This is happening because conflict is costly and cooperation is beneficial, not only in economic terms but also in political terms.

There are some political hurdles between upstream and downstream countries which are associated with the Nile waters. The main one has been intimidating speeches from Egyptian leaders and responses by leaders of upstream countries. Nevertheless, in substantial terms both downstream and upstream countries know the political cost of manifest conflict. Egypt is aware of the diplomatic disaster resulting from verbal threats. Ethiopia is also conscious of the possible sanctions it will face by souring political relations with downstream countries. This argument is indicated in the relation between Ethiopia and downstream countries including Sudan and Egypt following the commencement of the construction of GERD. Many expected that this project may lead into a water war but the outcome was a diplomatic compromise.

Initially, both Egypt and Sudan opposed the GERD out of concern that water would decline and for dam safety issues. Sudan's position gradually changed as professionals explained the multifaceted benefits of GERD, such as reducing sediments to its dams, regulation of flow of the waters of the river and ending frequent flooding. The regulation of flow is said to assist Sudan in augmenting its crop rotation to two or three per year. Furthermore, both Egypt and Sudan will benefit from electricity trade with Ethiopia, which could be provided for them cheaper than their own production cost. Sudan became a supporter of an Ethiopian mega project sooner than thought. Egypt tried to stop construction of the GERD demanding official notifications which Ethiopia did not take into consideration as both Egypt and Sudan were also constructing dams without notifying Ethiopia (Salman, 2016). However, since Ethiopia appeared to be pro basin-wide cooperation, it suggested the formation of an International Panel of Experts (IPOE) consisting of ten members including two from each country and four from outside the Nile Basin. A task of the IPOE has been to identify the negative effects of the dam on Sudan and Egypt and recommend ways of mitigating it.

The IPOE report was released on 31 May 2013 recommending further in-depth studies to be undertaken. Egypt demanded for suspension of GERD construction until the studies were complete while Ethiopia disagreed and continued construction. On 4 December, Sudan publicly expressed its support to the GERD, representing a breakthrough. Later the Agreement on Declaration of Principles (DoP) was signed by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on 23 March 2015, after a lengthy process of negotiations among them. The signing of the DoP is a major shift from Egypt and Sudan's positions that any riparian country should ask for their permission for any share of the Nile waters as agreed in 1959. By being part of the DoP, they acknowledged the rights of other riparian states to utilize the waters of the Nile.

From the above discussion, one can observe that the benefits of cooperation outweigh those of conflict in the Nile Basin. That is why riparian states gear towards cooperation. The path to cooperation is however riddled with challenges. The main one remains the ongoing upstream–downstream debate on their rights to make use of the Nile waters. The former claiming that their "existing historical rights" should be respected, which the latter view as a total loss since such arrangements allocate 100% of current freshwater available in the basin. Nevertheless, economic, political, ecological and legal justifications make riparian countries prefer cooperation.

Conclusion

Being shared by 11 riparian countries and with non-reconciled national interests between upstream and downstream countries, many expected the Nile hydropolitics to take the turn of conflict or water war. However, events from both upstream and downstream countries rather suggest an inclination towards increased cooperation. This does not only emanate from the urge of riparian states to exist in harmony but much more from substantial economic, ecologic, political and legal realities.

The chapter attempted to argue that cooperation is strategic and plausible through the case of the Nile hydropolitics. The quality and quantity of the Nile waters is degrading, creating concern for both upstream and downstream riparian countries. The solution lies in watershed management and soliciting efficient population control mechanisms which can best be done through cooperation. There are also economic justifications which reinforce cooperation among the Nile riparian countries. War is more expensive. Furthermore, there are economic solutions to water scarcity. Here, the concept of virtual water may fill the freshwater gaps in Egypt.

Indeed, war is also costly in political terms. Once in war, the relations between states are significantly wounded. In the Nile Basin, this is unaffordable for both upstream and downstream countries as they are linked through unbreakable ties which are here to stay. It is particularly costly for Egypt, whose leaders are known to threaten to declare war against Ethiopia if their access to the Nile waters is threatened. But the latter being a upstream country, it is the source of 86% of the Nile and should instead be persuaded and not threatened. In reality, the interdependence of the two countries is reflected through legal and institutional arrangements, such as the NBI, the CFA as well as the most recent DoP.

References

Allan, J. (1997). Virtual Water: A long term solution for water short Middle Eastern economies?, Occasional Paper 3. In *Water issues study group, school of oreintal and African studies*. London: University of London.

Allan, J. A. (2002). Hydro-peace in the Middle East: Why no water wars? A case study of the Jordan River Basin. *SAIS Review, 22*(2), 255–272.

Cascao, A. E., & Nicol, A. (2016). GERD: New norms of cooperation in the Nile Basin? *Water International, 41*(4), 550–573.

Dolatyar, M., & Gray, T. S. (2000). The politics of water scarcity in the Middle East. *Environmental Politics, 9*(3), 65–88.

Dombrowsky, I., Hagemann, N., & Houdret, A. (2014). The river basin as a new scale for water governance in transition countries? A comparative study of Mongolia and Ukraine. *Environmental Earth Sciences, 72*(12), 4705–4726.

El-Behairy, N. (2013). Morsi: If our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative. Retrieved September 20, 2016, from www.dailynewsegypt.com

Elias, A. (2009). *The politics of the Nile Basin*. MA thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining master of arts degree in hydropolitics studies. University of Witwatersrand.

ENTRO. (2016). *Baro-Akobo-Sobat multipurpose water resources development project study: Baseline, development potentials, key issues and objectives report*.

FAO. (2005). *FAO aquastat*. Retrieved October 10, 2016, from www.fao.org

Frijters, I. D., & Leentvaar, J. (2003). *Rhine case study*. New York: UNESCO-IHP.

Gleick, P. H. (1993). Water and conflict: Fresh water resources and international security. *International Security, 18*(1), 79–112.

Godana, B. A. (1985). *Africa's shared water resources: Legal and institutional aspects of the Nile Niger and Senegal River systems*. London: Frances.

Huisman, P., Jong, J., & Wieriks, K. (2000). Transboundary cooperation in shared river basins: Experiences from the Rhine, Meuse and North Sea. *Water Policy, 2*(1), 83–97.

Kaika, M. (2004). Water for Europe: The creation of European water framework directive. In J. Trottier & P. Slack (Eds.), *Managing water resources, past and present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kieyah, J. (2007). *The 1929 Nile waters agreement: Legal and economic analysis*. Retrieved November 25, 2016, from www.works.bepress.com/joseph_kieyah/1/

Libiszewski, S. (1995, August). Water disputes in the Jordan basin region and their role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Zurich: Center for security studies and conflict research, Occasional Paper 13. Retrieved December 20, 2016, from http://www.mideastweb.org/Mew_water95.pdf.

Mwandosya, M. (2017). *Bridge across the River Nile*. Dar es Salaam: E & D Vision.

Nachmani, A. (1997). Water jitters in the Middle East. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20*(1), 67–93.

Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). (2016). *Nile Basin water resource atlas*. Entebbe: Author.

Paisley, R. K., & Henshaw, T. W. (2013). Transboundary governance of the Nile River Basin: Past, present and future. *Environmental Development, 7*, 59–71.

Sadoff, C., & Grey, D. (2002). Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international rivers. *Water Science and Technology, 47*(6), 91–96.

Sadoff, C. W., & Grey, D. (2005). Cooperation on international rivers. *Water International, 30*(4), 420–427.

Salman, M. A. S. (2012). The Nile Basin cooperative framework agreement: A peacefully unfolding African spring. *Water International, 38*(1), 17–29.

Salman, M. A. S. (2016). The grand ethiopian renaissance dam: The road to the declaration of principles and the Khartoum document. *Water International, 24*(4), 512–527.

Shiva, V. (2002). *Water wars: Privatization, pollution and profit*. New York: South End Press.

Starr, J. (1991). Water wars. *Foreign Policy, 82*, 117–36.

United Nations (UN). (1997). *Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international water courses*. Retrieved 20 November, 2016, from https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf.

Vick, M. J. (2006). The Senegal River basin: A retrospective and prospective look at the legal regime. *Natural Resources Journal, 46*(1), 211–243.

Wani, A. Z. (2011). *Climate change in the Baro-Akobo-Sobat project area field work consultancy report submitted to ENTRO*.

Waterbury, J. (2002). *The Nile Basin: National determinants of collective action*. New Have: Yale University Press.

Wolf, A. T. (1998). Conflict and cooperation along international waterways. *Water Policy, 1*(2), 251–265.

Yacob, A. (2007). *Ethiopia and the Nile: Dilemmas of national and regional hydropolitics*. Zurich: Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.

Yang, H., & Zehnder, A. J. B. (2002). Water scarcity and food import—A case study for southern Mediterranean countries. *World Development, 30*(8), 1413–1430.

Zeitoun, M., & Mirumachi, N. (2008). Transboundary water interaction I: Reconsidering conflict and cooperation. *International Environmental Agreements, 8*, 297–316.

Chapter 11
Community-Based Conservation in Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park: On Livelihoods and Economic Governance

Prudence Nkomo

Introduction

Transboundary conservation initiatives were pioneered in Europe and North America from as early as the eighteenth century when a Treaty of Alliance was formed between Louis XVI, the then King of France and Frederic of Wangen, Prince-Bishop of Basel (IUCN, 2004). The first transboundary protected area (TBPA) was implemented in 1932 in Europe. The origins of transboundary conservation in Africa have been traced back to the Albert National Park that was created by the Belgian colonial power (IUCN, 2004). The park was created in 1925 and its primary purpose was to protect mountain gorilla populations on the boundary between colonies of Ruanda-Urundi and the Congo (IUCN, 2004). Ramutsindela (2007, p. 3) states that the "pioneers of TFCAs in Africa were involved with conservation projects in Southern Africa from as early as 1968". Although the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park was only officially implemented in 2000 as the first transboundary park in Southern Africa, it can be assumed that its inception occurred many years ago.

This chapter utilises the example of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) to explore the concept of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) and their impact on local communities' livelihood strategies. The GLTP was the second transboundary park to be implemented in Southern Africa. The GLTP is a 15-year-old park that has developed a formidable relationship with international organisations, where conservation is concerned. The use of the GLTP as a specific case study will demonstrate how partnerships between the states, non-state actors the private sector and local communities are navigated. The GLTP is analysed in terms of its

P. Nkomo (✉)
Department of Political Sciences, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: u14015936@tuks.co.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_11

profile as a TFCA in Southern Africa. In addition, the chapter examines more widely how the GLTP is managed under the Joint Management Board (JMB) and its interaction with "economic governance" in order to help the local communities benefit economically.

In its establishment, the GLTP displaced some communities and awakened an entrepreneurial spirit for other communities within the three national parks, which constitute it. Since its establishment, there has been an increase in the number of TFCAs in Southern Africa. Subsequently, the GLTP is very important for this analysis, as it was the first stage of a bigger TFCA namely the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA). The success or failure of the GLTP will predict the chances of survival for the GLTFCA. Consequently, the impacts of the park on local communities deserve scholarly research, of which this chapter is a humble attempt.

The establishment of the GLTP is fundamentally supposed to benefit both the wildlife and the local communities. Since the establishment of this park, most of the communities have been resettled to new locations far from it. The communities that have remained in the park are constantly struggling to protect themselves from the increasing incidents of human-wildlife conflict. Therefore, this chapter investigates community-based resources management and economic governance in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in an attempt to understand if and how the local communities benefit from the park. With the increasing incidents of human-wildlife conflict, the number of resettlements is expected to rise in this area. The prioritisation of ecological boundaries that allow for the revival of the wildlife ecosystems in the GLTP seems to be alienating the local communities and removing them from their homes. Furthermore, the economic activities (which are supposed to benefit the communities) of this park are not accessible to the local communities and this means that one of the fundamental principles of economic governance is lacking. Against this background, the overarching question which this chapter addresses is: How and to what extent does the GLTP meet the livelihoods of the local communities?

The chapter is structured as follows: this introduction is followed by background information on the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and places this in the context of regional legislation on Transfrontier parks. The next section provides the theoretical framework for the chapter. This is followed by an analysis of the GLTP and interactions with both the local communities and the Joint Management Board (JMB). The last section is the conclusion, which also provides recommendations.

The GLTP: Background to the Birth of an African Transfrontier Park

The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) was established in 2002 when the Presidents of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively, signed an international treaty in Xai-Xai, Mozambique (GLTP, 2014). Two years prior to this international treaty, ministers representing the same countries signed the Skukuza Agreement in Skukuza, South Africa (GLTP, 2014, p. 2). The agreement finalised the three states' intent to establish and develop a Transfrontier Park (TFP) (GLTP, 2014, p. 2). The Great Limpopo is a TFP that is made up of the Limpopo National Park (LNP) of Mozambique, Kruger National Park (KNP) of South Africa inclusive of the Makuleke Contractual Park and Gonarezhou National Park (GNP) of Zimbabwe (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4). The GLTP also includes Manjinji Pan Sanctuary, the Malipati Safari Area and the Sengwe/Tshipise Wilderness Corridor in Zimbabwe (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4; PPF, 2004). The Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA) covers a wider range of the Transfrontier Park, including rural, peri-urban and urban areas in which communities of Mozambicans, South Africans and Zimbabweans live (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4; PPF, 2004).

Transfrontier Parks (TFPs) and TFCAs are created after the authorities who are responsible for the conservation areas (GLTP, 2014) that straddle across "international boundaries agree to manage these areas as one integrated unit" (GLTP, 2014, p. 1). The aim of these areas is to get rid of all "human barriers" within the TFP or TFCA to enable animals to move freely within the local ecosystem (GLTP, 2014, p. 1). One of the primary aims of the transboundary conservation projects is to reconnect ecological systems that were broken up by the creation of political borders that came with colonisation in Southern Africa.

Chief to the establishment of the transboundary conservation projects is the concept of local communities' benefitting from these parks. The GLTP's International Treaty and Southern African Development Committee (SADC) Programme for TFCAs explicitly emphasises the importance of the local communities benefitting from conservation projects such as the GLTP. These local communities should ideally benefit from these projects through the launching of "cross border tourism and socio-economic development programs" (GLTP, 2014, p. 1).

The SADC TFCA (2013) programme has seven key components and each carries specific objectives, activities and outputs carried at different levels (regional, national and sub-regional). Component five focuses on the "enhancement of local livelihoods" because "millions of people... [who]... live in and around the TFCAs are intricately linked to it" (SADC, 2013). Subsequently, there is a consensus that member states acknowledge that the rural communities should be the primary beneficiaries of the TFCAs (SADC, 2013, p. 5). The international treaty that was signed in 2002 provided a set of strategic objectives for the GLTP that included encouraging "alliances in the supervision of the natural resources by encouraging partnerships that also involved local communities" (GLTP, 2014, p. 3), "striving to eliminate artificial boundaries that interrupt the organic movement of wildlife" (GLTP, 2014, p. 3) and developing "trans-border ecotourism that will foster regional economic development" (GLTP, 2014, p. 3). Both these documents emphasise how devoted the TFCAS should be towards the involvement of the local communities and the prioritisation of ecological borders.

Whilst the creation of the GLTP and the elimination of political boundaries (these were presented as fences that were erected and used to demarcate the beginning and end of one country) might be permitting for animals to roam freely between the KNP and the LNP, the lives of the communities residing within or surrounding these parks are negatively impacted. The communities have been considered or better yet, treated as a secondary factor or habitant after the wildlife. According to Lunstrum (2010), the way in which certain spaces can be transformed and reinvented matters only for those who could reap some benefits from the transformations, and in that same space, someone or some people ought to make sacrifices to enable these transformations and reinventions (2010, p. 132). In the case of the GLTP, the wildlife stands to reap the most benefits from this transformation. The transformation from enclosed national parks to transboundary conservation areas gives them infinite space to roam and live. Ironically, there were already existing communities that resided within these parks. Therefore, the communities would have to be the ones who sacrifice through relocations and other related problems to make room for the animals and their free movement whilst principally avoiding human-wildlife conflict (Lunstrum, 2010).

Mavhunga and Spierenburg (2009) provide a necessary historical account from 1925 to 1940 and the events that occurred then, which led to the successful creation of the GLTP. The authors cite human-animal conflict as one of the many hindrances to the park's early aspirations. The local communities within the national parks that were going to be incorporated in the GLTP were unsure of the human-wildlife conflict incidents and how these would affect them. In this context, the "ecological and economic necessities for creating the 'super park' are less controversial than the political factors that have slowed down implementation" (Mavhunga & Spierenburg, 2009, p. 716). This suggests that political factors play a prominent role within the GLTP. Evidently, the human-wildlife conflict has been in existence before the park's establishment, and this is one of the main reasons why communities are being relocated within the GLTP.

The map below shows the GLTP and the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA). As illustrated by the map, the size of the GLTP is evidently smaller than the GLTFCA. The Kruger clearly makes up a big part of the park.

Understanding the GLTP: Clarification of Key Concepts

Two concepts need clarification and contextualisation in this chapter, and these are economic governance and transboundary protected areas.

A transboundary protected area is defined by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as (Fig. 11.1):

> an area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed cooperatively through legal or other effective means (IUCN, 2004, p. 6).

A transboundary protected area is a generic term that covers several types of transfrontier areas that are set aside for conservation. The GLTP is considered one of

Fig. 11.1 Map of the GLTP. Source: Map produced by the SANParks, www.sanparks.org

the areas set aside for conservation. It straddles the boundaries of three states and its primary establishment was for the transboundary management of natural resources and free movement of wildlife. The GLTP is described as a Category "A" TFCA because it was established by a treaty as already mentioned in the background and this treaty is recognised by all three states.

Fukuyama (2013, p. 1) defines governance as "a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services regardless of whether that government is democratic or not". According to the Centre for Economic Governance and AIDS in Africa (CEGAA), there are four features that are crucial to the effective design and execution of economic governance (CEGAA, 2017). These features are transparency, accountability, the rule of law and participation (CEGAA, 2017).

Transparency promotes the free availability and direct accessibility of required information by those who will be affected by the decisions and their enforcement (CEGAA, 2017). Accountability is said to reflect “the responsibility and liability of an organisation or institution for its decisions and actions to those who will be affected” (CEGAA, 2017). The rule of law feature refers “to a fair legal framework and impartial enforcement of this system that protects human rights and constitutes a strong policy base for prudent policy-making” (CEGAA, 2017). The last feature, participation, ensures that the communities within the system have a voice in the decision-making process one way or another (CEGAA, 2017). The African Union’s (AU) Charter on elections, democracy and governance has 13 points that are prescribed as guidelines which states ought to institutionalise good economic and corporate governance. These 13 points are contained in Article 33 of the Charter. The points address the same features that were suggested by the CEGAA and these include the transparency of public finance management, the legislative and regulatory framework and poverty alleviation and preventing or combating corruption (AUC, 2012, pp. 12–13).

The definition and features of economic governance given above will be used as guidelines on which the economic activities taking place within the GLTP will be scrutinised. Using the four features as guidelines, it will be easier to break down the umbrella term that is economic governance to small features like transparency that will be useful in analysing the relationship between the JMB and the local communities whose primary imperative is to benefit economically from this park. If the JMB is truly doing its work then, it will fulfil most of the economic governance features and the local communities would be effortlessly receiving their benefits from the park and attaining economic governance within this space.

Understanding the GLTP: The Theoretical Framework

The New Regionalism Approach (NRA) is the theoretical lens which will be used to view the issues arising within the GLTP. NRA emphasises the idea that regions are social constructs “that do not arise in a vacuum but are made in a broader social practise” (Paasi, 2009, p. 133; Ramutsindela, 2013). In the NRA, the state ceases to be the only actor, it should often either “compete or collaborate with other forces in shaping a regional space” (Ramutsindela, 2013, p. 45). According to Jones (2009, p. 499), “regions are framed by the balance between different geopolitical, socio-economic, and cultural institutionalizing forces”. Paasi emphasises the notion that because regions are social constructs, it will then appear to be the “meeting point of various concepts of space . . . that may become crucial instruments of power that manifest themselves in shaping the spaces of governance, economy and culture” (2001, p. 16). Considering the definitions given, NRA is the best suited lens on which to view the GLTP which consists of a balance of “. . .geopolitical, socio-economic, and cultural institutionalising forces. . .” (Paasi, 2001, p. 499).

This balance or lack thereof is seen between the interdependence being forged between the geographic, political, social and economic spaces within this park. The concerned states are not the sole actors within this space, and there is evident collaboration between the states themselves, the wildlife and the local communities surrounding the park(s). The GLTP is therefore a regional space because of the ongoing social interactions and the power that it has amassed since its inception. This power has allowed for it to have an impact on the different strands of governance sought after in this space, especially economic governance.

Understanding the NRA detects a huge appreciation of constructivism as a theory because they both believe in the role of people creating their own comprehension and knowledge of the world through experience and reflection (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000; Paasi, 2009). Because of this, institutions are therefore subject to some change and they cease to be rigid entities. The constant exposure to the people could influence the institutions in more directions, and with better knowledge communities are empowered to demand land ownership and co-exist with the wildlife (Lunstrum, 2010).

Methodological Approach to Understanding Livelihoods Strategies in the GLTP

This study employed the qualitative research method in the form of a critical literature review around the issues of TFCAs, their governance and benefits to the local communities. This literature review allowed for an explanation of the phenomenon of the TFCAs with regard to economic governance, as well as looking for gaps in the existing literature with regard to the GLTP and the local communities' efforts to co-exist with the ongoing wildlife conservation efforts and attaining economic governance. In addition, the literature review provided information on two concepts namely: economic governance and transboundary conservation. The analysis contributed invaluable insights on which this chapter is based.

The JMB, the Community and the Integrated Livelihoods Diversification Strategy

The JMB was established to ensure that the matters that were of mutual concern to the parks would be handled in a more appropriate manner. Furthermore, it was for the "harmonisation" of procedures and policies. The SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement of 1999 (SADC, 2013) and the international treaty that was signed by the three governments in 2002 provided the frameworks within which the JMB must function. The JMB is made up of 12 members as follows:

(a) Two from each of the National Implementing Agencies of the Parties.
(b) One from the national institutions responsible for borderline control of the Parties.
(c) One appointed as deemed fit by each of the Parties.

Their responsibilities include periodic revision and implementation of the Joint Management Plan for the Transfrontier Park, determining mechanisms for administering funds received specifically for the Transfrontier Park, identifying financial needs and sourcing such funds as are required to achieve the effective implementation of the Joint Management Park, and to establish committees as may be necessary (GLTFCA, 2016; GLTP, 2014).

The JMB was given a mandate by the Ministerial Committee to take a supporting role for the livelihoods of communities by focusing on objectives of the 2002 Treaty, such as facilitating the establishment and maintenance of a sustainable sub-regional economic base through appropriate development frameworks, strategies and work plans and the development of trans-border ecotourism as a means of fostering regional socio-economic development (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4).

As a result, the role of the JMB is to be the convener or facilitator, by bringing together a diversity of institutions, people, views and experiences thereby promoting the integrated regional development of a shared vision and understanding of opportunities and ideas (PPF, 2005). In addition, it should encourage information sharing and coordination of efforts (PPF, 2005). Another role is to actively empower actors in their efforts (PPF, 2005).

As shown above, the roles that JMB assumes are very supportive. It is only involved at the crux of the facilitating, convening and supporting aspects of the strategy. The above roles paint a good picture of the JMB as the board that creates a platform for different actors to interact, which supports this interaction whilst also making sure that if in any way this strategy fails, it is not solely on the JMB. The strategy is meant for the communities in the broader TFCA and not just the GLTP. This is aptly captured in the vision crafted by the stakeholders in February 2016, which is "flourishing together in harmony with nature" (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 9). This vision is informed by the belief that the GLTFCA achieves inclusive growth and prosperity for families, communities, villages, institutions, countries and households. The second part of the vision is informed by two viewpoints. The first one suggests that "protecting and restoring natural capital and resources while avoiding conflict with the need to protect and restore communities" and the second one implies that "conservation goals should contribute to protecting and restoring human wellbeing" (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 8).

In 2015, an Integrated Livelihoods Diversification Strategy was initiated by the JMB and its partners. The strategy is made up of 5 objectives that exist as its pillars. Objectives 2 and 5 are of interest for purposes of this chapter. Objective 2 reads "to enhance the ability of local communities to capture the benefits of existing (and new) livelihood opportunities" whilst objective 5 reads "to strengthen governance and capacity at all levels, including the community level". Objective 2 is essential because it focuses on the benefits the communities could reap from the livelihood opportunities whereas objective 5 focuses on strengthening governance which is the primary focus of this chapter.

Part of the strategy aims to "develop a collective vision and integrated approach to enhancing livelihood options in the project area" (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4) and to "identify appropriate, viable and strategic livelihood initiatives ..." (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4). The aims of the strategy will be partly achieved by "empowering communities to actively participate in resource management decisions" and "promoting a regular review cycle to ensure plans are adjusted to changing contexts and new learnings" (GLTFCA, 2016, p. 4). The strategy is meant to be implemented within a 15-year period starting from 2016 to 2030. The implementing agencies that will help the JMB bring all the strategic objectives to life are the National Administration of Conservation Areas (ANAC), in Mozambique, South African National Parks (SANParks) and the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (ZPWMA) (GLTFCA, 2016). The strategy stresses the need for the communities to be involved to ensure the greatest chance of success and that the assets owned by the communities ought to be strengthened and recognised (GLTFCA, 2016).

The Relationship Between the GLTP and Local Communities

A wave of TFCAs hit Southern Africa and numerous scholars have had different viewpoints on this trend of conservation and its implications on the region. King (2009) explores the political dynamics of community conservation and peace parks. He suggests that colonialism and the awakening of sustainable development gave birth to national parks around the world. These are the same national parks that would be used to reinforce the "separation of human populations from nature while being justified as a means of generating economic development" (King, 2009, p. 2). Part of his primary inquiries are on the maintenance of these TFCAs "through the language of economic development" and "how control and access to land and natural resources is determined by particular stake holders at the expense of others" (2009, p. 3). The author further reiterates the concerns that have been raised about the multiple ways in which these parks seemingly disenfranchise communities from natural resources and territories that they have had traditional access to (King, 2009, p. 2).

King (2009) clearly demonstrates the role colonialism played in the creation of the national parks (that are serving as a foundation for the TFCAs) and how part of their telos was not to have nature or wildlife co-existing with human activity. Running with this logic, the concept of TFCAs therefore ought to be a part of the decolonising era, where there are evident efforts being put in place to try and challenge the underpinnings of certain institutions created during the colonial era like national parks.

TFCAs are created in the hope of serving multiple purposes and one of these is the co-existence between wildlife and local communities, with local communities reaping the major benefits from the economic activities within the GLTP. The GLTP is very transparent on its ecological benefits; it is also very active on its economic plans yet its establishment and maintenance remains highly political (King, 2009, p. 10). The removal of part of the fence between the KNP and LNP illustrated the ecological benefits as the animals would be motivated to move freely, the economic aspirations of the GLTP are well articulated in its GLTFCA Integrated Livelihoods Diversification Strategy (2016–2030) and yet the workings of the JMB are still politically influenced from the election of the members of the JMB, and their rotations and motives are still heavily influenced by the three governments.

In the GLTP, numerous communities have been displaced whilst trying to avoid the increasing incidences of human-wildlife conflict within the park. The Makuleke community, which is situated on the KNP, was one of the first communities to be removed from the KNP (Lunstrum, 2010, p. 131) to make way for the GLTP. On the LNP side, the human-wildlife conflict has been increasing since the park's creation in 2001 and residents are not permitted to defend themselves (Witter, 2013, p. 407). In 2008, the first resettlement incident involved the Nanguene residents from the LNP. As written by Mombeshora and Le Bel (2009, p. 2602), "The GNP has plans to develop an Intensive Protection Zone (IPZ) for Black Rhinoceros in an area particularly occupied by the Chitsa people" and this will evidently result in the possible resettlement of the Chitsa people who are located on the GNP.

In the case of the Makuleke community, the TFCA came with some unfathomable conditions. The initial premise of the GLTP being a joint venture between the state and the local communities did not work well from the beginning. The notion of local community engagement is used as a façade that hides the neoliberal mission being pursued within the park. The minimised role of the state allowed for the neoliberal "New Policy Agenda" to render service delivery paramount (Spierenburg, Steenkamp, & Wels, 2008). In so doing, an entrepreneurial spirit was fostered amongst the local communities and exploitation of the economic values of the conservation resources that would allow for sustainable livelihoods and conservation (Spierenburg et al., 2008).

Mozambique and South Africa were still new democracies when the promotion of the GLTP was initiated. Being new democracies, it meant that they had numerous financial demands, and their governments were pressured to correct historically unequal distributions of resources and finances. To try and address the poverty alleviation and economic growth, the states agreed to pursue ways in which the conservation area(s) could ideally pay for themselves (Spierenburg et al., 2008, pp. 146–147). The communities were the first targets, which they could start with. They would use these communities as the first groups through which they could correct past injustices. This meant that the suggested involvement of communities in the GLTP might have been sheer coincidence as there was pressure to correct injustices (Bhatasara, Nyamwanza, & Kujinga, 2013, p. 633). The Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) has been the most vocal organisation on the involvement and development of the local communities within TFCAs and ironically it is also the biggest proponent of the GLTP. The Makuleke community is often cited as one of the successful cases where TFCAs and communities are concerned; however, when one carefully examines the activities that have occurred within the Makuleke community, the success is questioned.

The partnership pattern is not a new phenomenon, and the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe was one of the first of these partnerships that were to include communities, local authorities and the Ministry of Environment (Bhatasara et al., 2013, p. 632). This partnership focused on hunting, where communities were urged to partner with hunting operators to help get hunting started in the country's marginal areas. Even with the support of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), CAMPFIRE was not a success. CAMPFIRE has often been criticised as a trend that could possibly marginalise communities even more. The argument accompanying this criticism is that such a partnership could fail to deliver the benefits to the communities, and they may limit long-standing rights to the land and natural resources belonging to the indigenous communities.

Whilst the communities might try and fight to recover these rights, the odds are not in their favour. The partnership is viewed as expensive because the small-scale farmers give up their land in exchange for small shares of benefits from ecotourism that do not eventually add up to their previous income from the farming. In South Africa, the communities are tirelessly trying to reclaim their land within conservation areas. Post-independence, communities that had been displaced because of a discriminating legislation such as the Group Acts of 1950 could file for a land claim. These claims were believed to place the communities in a more favourable standpoint as opposed to the conservation authorities, where extracting benefits from the parks is concerned.

Some communities were forcefully removed from their locations; hence in 1996, the South African Minister for Land Affairs announced that "land claims were one of the strongest mechanisms for correcting the balance of power between communities and conservation authorities". The land claims were facilitated by the Communal Property Association Act of 1996 that allowed communities to set up a Communal Property Association which they could use to "acquire, hold and manage property communally".

After 18 months of tumultuous bargaining, the Makuleke and South African National Parks (SANParks) announced reaching a settlement in 1998 because the community proved that it had been occupying the area until 1969 when it was removed by the then Department of Native Affairs. Whilst the land claim was successful, the lease was accompanied by conditions. The land could only be used for conservation purposes for a duration of 99 years and all developments had to undergo an environmental impact assessment before implementation. SANParks kept its right of first refusal and this meant that if the land had to be sold, it would be offered to SANParks first and only after SANParks refuses it can it be sold to another interested party. They signed a 25-year agreement that was overseen by a JMB which was made up of three SANParks representatives and three community representatives. The SANParks would be responsible for the cost of the Makuleke part of the park for the first 5 years; thereafter, the Makuleke CPA would need to cover 50% of the costs.

Most of these conditions were seemingly ridiculous and the reasoning behind the CPA accepting them was the fact that they had been given the right to make use of the land's resources and this was inclusive of hunting. They also gained exclusive commercial rights which they could exercise without SANParks. The Makuleke community later got into a 45-year agreement with another safari operator, Wilderness Safaris. Although this agreement is supposed to bring in a lot of profit, it has no clear exit clause that would allow the community to withdraw if the agreement became unprofitable. It also contains a clause that prevents the community from hunting. This agreement cements the notion of unfair dealings between the communities and other interested parties other than the state. In this case, the private party had a lot more experience in such dealings so that they evidently got the better end of the deal.

Livelihood Strategies in the GLTP: The Findings

According to the strategy, the existing livelihood initiatives focused on both high-end and low-end tourism which includes photographic and consumptive tourism; hence, the new strategy ought to focus on the locals reaping more benefits through employment, ownership and accessing supply chains. In Mozambique, there will be local economic developments councils that will be used as a structure that focuses on accountability and governance. There is a legislated community levy of 20% of the tourism revenue directed at communities in the LNP and a 1% community levy on all reservation in the KNP that was decided by SANParks with effect from 1 June 2012.

In the KNP, predators leave the park to find easy prey and this means that the communities living in the surrounding areas lose a lot of livestock. Elephants often leave the park to eat the marula fruit and crops grown by the local communities. Although the loss in livestock and crops is one of the big problems that the local communities are facing, there are also diseases that can be transferred to the livestock by the wildlife and there was a prominent case of these in Mpumalanga Province in the KNP from 1995 to 2009. In the LNP, one of the main donors, the German Development Bank, was insisting on making the resettlements seem voluntary yet all they do is urge park authorities to dangle carrots and incentives that will create an illusion of inclusiveness and participation for the local communities that would be relocating. The creation of the park has led to increased incidents of human-wildlife conflicts and it has made migration to South Africa for the communities residing in the park much more difficult because of the increased anti-poaching watches and the growing predator populations within the two parks, which make travelling a nightmare. The growing lion and elephant population means that the local communities fear more for their lives and losing livestock. The local communities cannot defend themselves against wildlife and are not compensated for any losses they may incur because agriculture and livestock keeping were declared illegal when the LNP was proclaimed. In the south-east Lowveld of Zimbabwe, around the GNP there was a case of wild buffalos with Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) being transferred to livestock. This led to the prices of meat in this area being lower than those from free-FMD zones, and to combat this, fences were erected as a measure to keep the buffalos away from the livestock, and in as much as this worked for the primary problem, it meant that local communities had restricted access to resources. The residents are still not employed by the park and this has caused resentment and hostility towards the park authorities.

Two of the four features of economic governance which will be analysed below are participation and accountability. Most of the Sabi Sabi Reserve (part of the KNP) employees live in the local communities and this is because of the efforts to develop the local communities. The project that is run in this community is motivated by the idea of teaching local communities how to fish as opposed to merely handing them the fish. The Lillydale Environmental Education Centre is also an initiative supported by the Sabi Sabi Reserve yet it is run by the community. According to Loon, Harper, and Shorten, "the centre serves as a multi-functional environmental centre, promotes Shangaan knowledge and rural development tourism to the area and encourages local environmental conservation practises through training workshops" (2007, p. 274). The Pafuri triangle is another reserve within the KNP that is co-managed by the Makuleke community and the KNP administration. This joint venture is called the Makuleke Kruger Contractual Park. The contractual park initially made money from trophy hunting for tourists but has since moved to pursue ecotourism. Ecotourism has resulted in two luxury lodges being built and a trail guide training camp. Although the ecotourism pursuits sound good, Venter, Naiman, Biiggs, and Pienaar (2008) are of the opinion that trophy hunting was a more viable income generating activity because it required less infrastructure compared to ecotourism. Ecotourism requires infrastructure like roads, restaurants, sewerage and electricity whilst trophy hunting requires none of these. On an environmental impact scale, ecotourism has a higher impact; however, hunting is not favourable from an animal rights perspective (Venter et al., 2008).The local communities did get temporary jobs to fence the park and build accommodation for the rangers.

The GNP receives about 10,000 tourists annually and because this is a relatively small number in comparison to the KNP, the GNP has managed to maintain the wilderness atmosphere as it has not been under extreme pressure to develop its infrastructure in an effort to accommodate the tourists (Wolmer, 2007, p. 161). This wilderness atmosphere has led to the continued restrictions on the local communities such as no watering of livestock that is in close proximity to the lodges because this will disrupt the wildlife experience (Wolmer, 2007, p. 178). The Shangaan, however, fit this atmosphere perfectly because they have held true to their culture and relatively traditional ways so they would be very attractive to the tourists. The Malipati Development Trust in the GNP applied for permission to a site to establish a tourism lodge from the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (Chirozva, 2015, p. 193). The permission was granted, but the annual lease fees amounted to US $25000 (Chirozva, 2015, p. 193). The fees were considered as prohibitive by the MDT and only deemed to be feasible if they secure financial assistance from the private sector (Chirozva, 2015, p. 193).

Considering the strategies laid out in the Integrated Livelihoods Diversification Strategy (2016–2030) and the roles of the JMB as explained earlier, the four features of economic governance are not fulfilled. From the encounters cited in the discussion, the local communities do not seem to have a functional relationship with the JMB. There is no explicit accessibility and availability of information to the local communities. There is no record of the JMB stating that, if need be, the local communities will be given the relevant information if the decisions made will affect them. There is no record of the local communities, for example, having access to the ministerial committee meetings and it is in these very meetings that the bulk of the decisions are made. This shows the lack of transparency and participation of locals in managing the park. The JMB's roles are articulated in such a way that they cannot be held accountable for any actions or decisions that will affect the communities. Its role is to support and be a convenor. The participation of the local communities is very selective in the GLTP. Theoretically, the communities ought to play a very active part in the GLTP, but the practical aspect of this leaves a lot to be desired. The communities only participate where they can benefit the tourism element of the park. A case in point is that the Shangaan people in the GNP are part of the tourism offerings of the park because their cultural activities make for good entertainment for the tourists. In the same park, the local communities are prohibited from watering their livestock and allowing their animals to roam around the lodges because the sight of domesticated livestock will not fit into the wilderness atmosphere in the park. Lastly, the rule of law featured in economic governance is not a prominent activity in the GLTP. The strategic objectives that were set out in the Treaty when the park was established are partially not enforced. The wildlife objectives are enforced more eagerly than the communities' objectives.

The GLTP, Human Livelihoods and Wildlife: Some Concluding Remarks

From the above-mentioned findings, it is very clear that although the GLTP is faithfully fulfilling its wildlife objectives, the communities' objectives are almost always neglected. The increasing human-wildlife conflict incidences have only catapulted the JMB and the relevant donors to sell the relocation idea to the communities as the only solution. The park's economic benefits are not primarily given to the local communities as stated in the SADC TFCA Programme and the Integrated Livelihoods Diversification Strategy. The legislated community levies of 1% in the KNP and 20% in the LNP have not been beneficial to the local communities as the processes that surround the levy have their shortcomings. Proclaiming agriculture and livestock keeping as illegal in the LNP is another way of forcing the local communities to relocate because they will be attacked by wildlife and will require compensation, yet this compensation cannot be given because the very things they lost are illegal in the park. The slow response time from the Rangers when local communities report human-wildlife conflict incidents seems like a passively aggressive method in dealing with the local communities. This passive aggression is fuelled by the notion that the local communities are not supposed to be living within the park, but when they do get attacked, they cannot defend themselves so they are left there to reap the benefits of opting to keep staying in the park.

According to Loon et al. (2007) and Venter et al. (2008), there has been community-based success in the Makuleke Kruger Contractual Park and this illustrates the possibility of communities benefitting from the GLTP. The Makuleke community is evidently forging partnerships with the park's administration and gaining financial support from the private sector too. This case is one of the few successes that have come from the GLTP, and the majority of the literature captures the ills that have resulted from the establishment of the GLTP. The handling of the economic activities within the park in comparison to the communities' reinforces the arguments presented by Mavhunga and Spierenburg on the controversial political factors that slow down the implementation of the GLTP's objectives (2009, p. 716). The political factors are seen in cases where the Ministerial Committee elects the JMB and gives it its mandate. The Ministerial Committee will only articulate their national interests and protection of these, and it is unexpected that the Ministerial Committee would consider accommodating the local communities at the expense of the wildlife or the interest of their commercial entities. The wildlife generates economic benefits that they could highly benefit from and their reputation can get a boost from the benefits so their national interests would likely prioritise wildlife.

Cognizant of all the arguments that have been presented in this paper, the workings of the JMB and other actors in the GLTP have crippled the aspiration to position the local communities as the primary beneficiaries of the economic benefits generated by the park. The economic governance features are not fulfilled, and evidently so, the creation of the GLTP hinders the local community's attainment of economic governance.

The strategies contained in the Integrated Livelihoods Diversification Strategy and the SADC TFCA Programme are well-thought-out yet the implementation is lacking. The JMB needs to be more active in their relationship with the communities, the GLTP's objectives need to be enforced equally and the local communities ought to be also considered a priority. The wildlife and local communities unfortunately share this space and there needs to be some level of co-existence between the two. The only way to forge the co-existence is through the governments involved, non-state actors and the JMB. Their decisions and policies ought to prioritise co-existence and develop infrastructure for this to be feasible.

References

AUC. (2012, February 15). *African Union*. Retrieved August 15, 2017, from https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance

Bhatasara, S., Nyamwanza, A. M., & Kujinga, K. (2013). Transfrontier parks and development: The case of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. *Development Southern Africa, 30*(4–5), 629–639.

CEGAA. (2017). *Economic governance: Centre for Economic Governance and AIDS in Africa*. Retrieved August 15, 2017, from http://www.cegaa.org/knowledge_center/economic_governance.htm

Chirozva, C. (2015). Community agency and entrepreneurship in ecotourism planning and development in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area. *Journal of Ecotourism, 14*(2–3), 185–203.

Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? *Governance, 26*(3), 1–22.

GLTFCA. (2016). *Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area: Integrated livelihoods diversification strategy 2016–2030*. South Africa: USAID Southern Africa & Peace Parks Foundation.

GLTP. (2014). *Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park*. Retrieved August 11, 2017, from http://www.greatlimpopo.org/about-gltp/

Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (2000). Theorising the rise of regionness. *New Political Economy, 5* (3), 457–473.

IUCN. (2004). *International Union for the Conservation of Nature*. Retrieved August 11, 2017, from https://www.iucn.org/resources/publications

Jones, M. (2009). Phase space: Geography, relational thinking and beyond. *Progress in Human Geography, 33*(4), 487–506.

King, B. (2009). Conservation geographies in sub-Saharn Africa: The politics of national parks, community conservation and peace parks. *Geography Compass, 3*(1), 1–14.

Loon, R., Harper, I., & Shorten, P. (2007). Sabi Sabi: A model for effective ecotourism, conservation and community involvement. In R. Bushell & P. Eagles (Eds.), *Tourism and protected areas : Benefits beyond boundaries* (pp. 264–276). Oxfordshire: CABI.

Lunstrum, E. (2010). Reconstructing history, grounding claims to space: History, memory, and displacement in the great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. *South African Geographical Journal, 92* (2), 129–143.

Mavhunga, C., & Spierenburg, M. (2009). Transfrontier talk, cordon politics: The early history of the great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in Southern Africa, 1925–1940. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 35*, 715–735.

Mombeshora, S., & Le Bel, S. (2009). Parks-people conflicts: The case of the Gonarezhou National Park and the Chitsa community in South-East Zimbabwe. *Biodiversity and Conservation, 18*, 2601–2623.

Paasi, A. (2001). Europe as a social process and discourse: Considerations of place, boundaries and identity. *European Urban and Regional Studies, 8*(1), 7–28.

Paasi, A. (2009). The resurgence of the 'region' and 'regional identity': Theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe. *Review of International Studies, 35* (S1), 121–146.

PPF. (2004). *Peace Parks Foundation*. Retrieved August 22, 2017, from http://www.peaceparks.co.za/news.php?pid=1091&mid=426

PPF. (2005). *Peace Parks Foundation*. Retrieved August 22, 2017, from http://www.peaceparks.co.za/news.php?pid=1092&mid=553

Ramutsindela, M. (2007). *Transfrontier conservation in Africa: At the confluence of capital, politics and nature* (1st ed.). Wallingford: CABI.

Ramutsindela, M. (2013). Experienced regions and Borders: The challenge for transactional approaches. *Regional Studies, 47*(1), 43–54.

SADC. (2013, October). *Southern African Development Community.* Retrieved August 11, 2017, from http://www.sadc.int/files/4614/2122/3338/SADC_TFCA_Programme_FINAL_doc_Oct_2013.pdf

Spierenburg, M., Steenkamp, C., & Wels, H. (2008). Promises of the economic development in the great Limpopo, Southern Africa: Networks and partnerships in transfrontier conservation. In M. Rutten, A. Leliveld, & D. Foeken (Eds.), *Inside poverty and development in Africa: Critical reflections on pro-poor policies* (pp. 144–168). Boston: Brill Leiden.

Venter, F. J., Naiman, R. J., Biiggs, H. C., & Pienaar, D. J. (2008). The evolution of conservation management philosophy: Science, environmental change and social adjustments in Kruger National Park. *Ecosystems, 11*(2), 173–192.

Witter, R. (2013). Elephant-induced displacement and the power of choice: Moral narratives about resettlement in Mozambique's Limpopo National Park. *Conservation and Society, 11*(4), 406–416.

Wolmer, W. (2007). *From wilderness vision to farm invasions: Conservation and development in Zimbabwe's South-East Lowveld* (1st ed.). Oxford: James Currey.

Chapter 12
Bordered Environment: Redefining Transboundary Water Resources into Environmentally Sound Governance Frameworks in Southern Africa

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Introduction

Much is said about Africa's nation-state borders—their coloniality, that they are political and social constructions and the emphasis on (re)enforcing, in contradistinction to eliminating them, in view of Pan-African goals of continental integration. Larémont (2005: 2), for instance, says European colonialists fixed the African nation-state borders during the narrow period between 1878 and 1914. The borders are in this sense a European sociopolitical construction. Not only did Europeans draw and manage the African borders in the same way they managed European borders back home, but the same imperialist legal instruments they established between themselves in the late 1800s to early 1900s for governing the African borders including "Treaties", "Protocols", "Agreements" and "Notes" also continue to define and govern the African borders (Asiwaju, 1993). African states have, in this way, maintained what they inherited from colonisers. Larémont (2005) attests to this in saying that immediately after political independence in the early 1960s, African leaders reified the colonial borders.

That is why scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga (2013) argue that Africa is under a spell of the bondage of borders. For Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga, it is in fact ironic that, when postcolonial African leaders formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, they embraced the nation-state boundaries that had been arbitrarily drawn by the European colonialists. Moreover, the African leaders went on to institutionalise the principle that stipulated the inviolability of "bondage

C. C. Nshimbi (✉)
Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: christopher.nshimbi@up.ac.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_12

of boundaries". Scholars who hold this view believe that the decolonisation process in Africa is incomplete because it has failed to, among other things, adequately address or break up colonial boundaries. The borders that mark up independent African states are thus the last things to be dismantled, if Africa is to free itself from the bondage of boundaries and for it to fully achieve decolonisation (Mazrui, 1993).

The converse, however, aligns with Larémont's (2005) argument that African urban political elites are the most avid supporters of those borders. This, according to Larémont, is because the elites gain the most from maintaining the borders. Understandably, this reflection paves the way to the argument that modern African nation-state borders are artificial. Firstly, colonisers arbitrarily drew the borders, without considering the cultural, socio-economic and political configurations and realities of peoples they found on the continent. And they did not even consult the people whose spaces they demarcated. The borders are, secondly, therefore, effectively nothing more than socio-economic and political constructions that serve(d) the interests of colonisers in Africa. For elites to thus embrace the view previously held by former colonisers on Africa's borders makes the case of the oppressed becoming the oppressor. Only this time around the "oppressor" holds their fellow citizens, especially those operating at the margins and grassroots in borderlands, under the bondage of boundaries. Considered thus, the borders are however irrelevant. They "do not exist" to the majority of Africans who dwell in borderlands.

Other discourses on African borders relate them with conflict, for example, over natural resources. The resources in question span across nation-state borders, threatening to rouse conflict between the nation-states separated by the borders. Okumu (2010), for instance, speaks of heightened tensions, potential interstate conflicts and border disputes in Eastern [and Southern] Africa arising from the discovery of natural resources such as oil in the borderlands of the countries of that region. He singles out the "Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the Eritrea-Djibouti border, the Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya borders, the Sudan-Kenya border, the Uganda-DRC border, the Sudan-Chad-CAR-DRC-Uganda borders, and the Kenya-Uganda border" as Eastern Africa's hottest border spots, and "the Tanzania-Mozambique, Tanzania-Malawi, Tanzania-Uganda, Uganda-Rwanda and the Kenya-Ethiopia borders" as second-tier dispute spots (Okumu, 2010: 280). Okumu contends that the interstate disputes in the Eastern [and Southern African] African contested spaces are, in the main, over territorial claims vis-à-vis border security and transboundary resources, among other issues. According to him, though, the causes of the escalating transboundary resource disputes in that region boil down to colonial boundary-marking errors, as well as poor governance of those spaces by current African leaders. Thus, Okumu observes that disputes are escalating in borderlands over water, fisheries, minerals and, even, access to the sea for landlocked countries. Considerable literature on African borders or borderlands similarly paints them thus – spaces of contest, conflict and violence, all of which are largely precipitated by poverty, disputes over land, natural resources and extremism, among other factors (see, e.g. de Vries, Englebert, & Schomerus, 2019; Korf & Raeymaekers, 2013; Walther & Miles, 2017).

This chapter deviates from such skewed generalised interpretations of the nature of, life at and realities of African borders and borderlands. It, of course, acknowledges that disputes, conflict and violence, or the potential thereof, exist at some African borders and borderlands (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2019). However, it takes the less pursued line of inquiry into the nature, realities as well as lives of people in some of those spaces. It looks into the prospects of continued peaceful coexistence in such spaces, the ways in which the borders might be governed and how the natural resources that straddle neighbouring countries' contiguous borders might be utilised. Thus, the chapter engages in an exercise whose objective is to understand the possible and, perhaps, existing ways in which peaceful coexistence around common natural resources that transverse nation-state borders in Africa is achieved. The context in which this endeavour is pursued is sustainable development and environmental security, with a focus on transboundary water resources.

Focus

The specific physical location of the exercise is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, encompassing 16 member states including Angola, Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eswatini (formerly, Swaziland), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. As it is contextualised in sustainable development and environmental security, with a focus on transboundary natural resources, the chapter zooms in on continental member states of the SADC that share the Zambezi River Basin (ZRB) and the water resources of the Zambezi River. There are eight of these including Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Together, they constitute a water management or river basin organisation (RBO) called the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM). In line with the approach adopted in this exercise and explained shortly below, on the one hand, the chapter examines (especially the political) activities in the formation of ZAMCOM. On the other hand, it examines the (largely) socio-economic activities of grassroots actors located in the margins or borderlands of at least two riparian states of the ZRB on which it zooms in.

Argument

In view of the stated objectives and proceeding discussion, this chapter argues that some seemingly unrelated dynamics that are evident at the state and grassroots levels of respective SADC member states affect regionalisation. The dynamics involve issues and activities that are related to transboundary natural resources. Although this argument is based on observations and evidence drawn from some and not all eight riparian states of the ZRB (and indeed not all 16 SADC member states), some of the anecdotal evidence presented in the chapter and the broader literature on

African regionalism seem to corroborate the argument. Regarding these dynamics, therefore, the chapter argues that first are states and rulers seeking to consolidate power over respective SADC member state territories. The rulers seek to assert their countries' national independence too. Second, a geographical logic at the grassroots suggests that people there should collaborate in cross-border interactions. This logic is based on the geography of Southern Africa. Many authors say African nation-state borders are porous (see e.g. Crush, 1999; Dodson, 2000; Park, 2010; Ramutsindela, 2004). However, those markers of state territory or lines that separate one country from another are generally not easily visible to the human eye in most of Africa. Besides this, most of the borders could, generally, most appropriately be described as open expanses that span tens, hundreds and thousands of kilometres. Because of this, relevant state authorities in Africa generally find it almost impossible to control and patrol, let alone fence them. It is in and across these spaces that dynamic grassroots actor activities occur. Again, the literature on African borders generally tends to focus on negative aspects of these realities, as indicated earlier. But peaceful and economically gainful activities do also occur in those spaces. And such interactions have long histories that are motivated by socio-economic, cultural and political factors. This chapter focuses on such activities, for the promise they hold to promote peaceful coexistence in African borderlands as well as regionalisation. Such an approach and argument (which this chapter projects) are only logical, given the dilemma in which African states find themselves on matters concerning nation-state borders. The dilemma is that, while African states harbour ambitions to eliminate the colonially imposed borders, they equally desire to reclaim Africa's past political institutions while seeking to engage anew in state-building (Ramutsindela, 1998: 194).

The next section briefly describes the methods, outlines the approach and reflects on the key concepts used in the chapter. The chapter then presents and discusses the dynamics that occur at state level and the grassroots vis-à-vis transboundary water resources and cross-border socio-economic and cultural interactions, respectively, in two parts. The first, in the "Peaceful coexistence is largely necessary/important" section, briefly relates to three levels at which interactions between actors in the ZRB occur in relation to borders, including state–grassroots interactions, state–state interaction and grassroots–grassroots interactions. The second part, in the "Coexistence becomes critical/ is tested in times of adverse weather conditions" section, briefly touches on the way in which riparian states of the ZRB and various actors therein respond and relate to each other when faced with adverse natural conditions such as floods or droughts as well as domestic political and economic challenges. The chapter concludes with a general call to making African borders functional, in an integrative manner for commercial activities, and developmental, in view of long-term aspirations of transforming Africa.

Path Dependency and Southern African Integration: Methods, Approach and Conceptual Lenses

The data for the analysis contained in this chapter came from secondary sources. These included the literature on regional integration, regional legislations of SADC, reports, press articles as well as official ZAMCOM documents and the ZAMCOM website. The chapter executes the proposed exercise by highlighting the path-dependent evolution of regionalisation in Southern Africa. It, on the one hand, follows the political process and events eventually leading to the establishment of ZAMCOM in 2014. On the other hand, it underscores long-standing processes of regionalisation at the grassroots, in the contiguous borderlands of ZRB riparian states.

Thus, the paper demonstrates that two logics, which simultaneously unfold at the level of the state and at grassroots level, impact on regionalisation. Regionalisation here refers to sustained and institutionalised cross-border processes involving state as well as non-state actors. The processes specifically define dynamic international or cross-border movements of labour, capital, goods and services and other forms of interaction including security, political and cultural. The drivers of such movements and interactions vary across time in as much as they are long term. For example, in the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s cross-border movements across the Zimbabwe–Botswana border were extensive. As a result of this, tension occurred between the then presidents of Botswana and Zimbabwe (Campbell & Crush, 2012; Dzirutwe, 2008; Ndebele, 2016). At the grassroots, the result was the rapid increase in cross-border mobilities, especially of Zimbabwean migrants and people engaged in informal trade between Zimbabwe and Botswana, as well as Zimbabwe and Zambia (personal observations; interviews, Kazungula border: 2010–2015). The driver of the grassroots mobility was the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe.

A careful application of historical institutionalism (HI) and the concept and analytical approach called *path dependency* and *critical junctures* help gain insight into these temporal political processes that generated outcomes between the ZRB riparian states as well as the socio-economic processes in their contiguous borderlands, along their common border on the Zambezi River. The *border*, as hinted earlier and for purposes of this chapter, is used to mean the line of demarcation or separation across land or water between any two proximate sovereign nation-states. The term *borderlands* refers to the zones or immediate areas stretching from the border into the hinterland, on either side of the nation-states concerned.

HI as a broader research method not only focuses on decision-making processes, but it also examines the ways in which institutions are created, persist and change over time. The institutions in question include formal and informal policy structures, rules, regulations, norms or humanly devised constraints (North, 1990: 3) as well as informal aspects of social interaction that are designed to regulate human behaviour. Institutions are embedded in the political economy or polity of organisations and society. Except for studies focusing on Europe (e.g. Pierson, 1996), HI has surprisingly not been used in the literature on African regionalisation. Yet, political science uses the approach to explain the tendency for institutions and policies to persist, and the difficulty in reforming them (Pierson, 1996). As hinted, *path dependence* is central to HI, which provides robust theoretical or conceptual frameworks and tools for analysing changes and continuity in public policy and institutional structures. This chapter adapts HI, and specifically path dependence and critical junctures, to (sub-)regional governance and the establishment of ZAMCOM as a regional organisation within the broader SADC. To the best of the author's knowledge, no systematic effort has been made to apply the approach to the understanding of regionalisation or cross-border interactions in Southern, let alone, Africa. This is despite its ability to help unpack the political dynamics of institutional change in a regional and cross-border context.

The idea in path dependence is that it is harder to change some institutions as time progresses. This is because the institutions generate "positive feedback" or effects that are self-reinforcing. In other words, path dependence "characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties" (Mahoney, 2000: 507). Because of this, it increasingly becomes difficult to change some institutions over time. This also implies that small choices that are made early on can generate significant long-term impacts. At those moments, the particular institutional choices or critical junctures that are taken lead to the establishment of new paths. But as time progresses, it increasingly becomes difficult to leave the new paths in order to return to those which had previously been available, or to join other paths.

Critical Junctures and Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission

This empirical section uses HI to explain the key stages and outcomes of Southern African regionalisation processes through, particularly, the eventual creation and establishment of ZAMCOM. As institutions evolve, some events may disrupt the status quo and lead to the formation of new ones based on a different set of preferences and a change in structures of opportunities available to and between actors. Path dependence is a product of these "*relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest",[1] or critical junctures (Capoccia & Daniel Kelemen, 2007: 348). The critical junctures constitute "brief phases of institutional flux [. . .] during which more dramatic change is possible" (Capoccia & Daniel Kelemen, 2007: 341). According to Capoccia and Kelemen, the choices that are made during critical junctures have a lasting impact, as they close off alternative options. Hence, they establish institutions which generate processes that are self-reinforcing and

[1]Italics in original.

path-dependent. Put another way, critical junctures constitute moments in which a constellation of opportunities and interests change and lead to new institutions or the modification of old ones, opening up new pathways. In the proceeding section, the chapter explains the sequence and patterns of events in the development of ZAMCOM by focusing on four critical junctures.

Critical Juncture One: Aspirations to Internationally Manage a Transboundary Watercourse

The first critical juncture from the perspective of this chapter occurred between the early and mid-1980s. It involved a series of discussions between three riparian states of the ZRB including Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Executive Director (Salewicz, 2003). Pioneered as the first enterprise of UNEP, the discussions included environmental aspects of the Zambezi River system as an international waterbody. UNEP sought to help riparian states integrate environmental matters into the development and management of freshwater resources (Salewicz, 2003). Ultimately, these parties wanted to promote the implementation of environmentally sound watercourse management and regional development in the Zambezi River system, while reconciling conflicting interests among riparian states. Between 1984 and 1987, therefore, the riparian states asked UNEP to assist with and guide the development of a plan to establish mechanisms for them to jointly manage the ZRB (Nakayama, 2003; Shela, 2000: 75). They started the plan drawing process by constituting a team of representatives and stakeholders from the riparian states and various local and international experts. They tasked the team with conducting a Diagnostic Study to examine the status of water management and environmental problems in the ZRB. They gave the team four specific objectives to fulfil in the study: to define current and future environmental problems and impacts in the ZRB, to help riparian states design activities that incorporated environmental issue in water resources management, to raise awareness of potential developmental impacts of environmental issues among development-oriented institutions in the ZRB and to solicit for funding from potential donors for project implementation (David, Golubev, & Nakayama, 1988 cited in Salewicz, 2003: 116). Out of this process, UNEP and riparian states—through the working group—also produced the *Draft Zambezi Action Plan for the Environmental Management of the Common Zambezi River System* in 1986, besides the Diagnostic Study document. The following year, Mozambique and Tanzania joined the three states that had initiated discussions with UNEP, at a conference in Harare, Zimbabwe. They conferred to sign the International Agreement on the Action Plan for Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System, which was based on the draft Zambezi Action Plan.

Critical Juncture Two: ZACPLAN

The second critical juncture, therefore, when riparian states had agreed on developing regional legislation and an integrated plan for managing transboundary water resources, was the adoption of a plan to carry out the decision. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Environmental Management of the Common Zambezi River System UNEP convened by UNEP in 1987, in Harare, Zimbabwe, thus approved and signed the Zambezi Action Plan (ZACPLAN) for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System. Five of the eight ZRB riparian states endorsed this international cooperative agreement. Then followed almost a decade of meetings, discussions and implementation of an agreement whose parties had varying concerns. The concerns led to difficulties in implementing ZACPLAN. This not only slowed but also rendered the plan ineffective in meeting intended goals (Nakayama, 1997).

Nakayama (1997) actually refers to the implementation problems and long delays that ensued as an impasse. For one, the project lacked financial support for implementation from potential donors. Only a few participated in the meetings for potential donors that UNEP organised, and those few did not even make any substantial pledges to fund the project (Nakayama, 2003: 107). The donors, according to Nakayama (ibid), were not interested in ZACPLAN because it was, among other reasons, considered an "anti-South Africa" campaign by border countries that happened at the height of apartheid, when the latter group cooperated under the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) umbrella, to counter South Africa's efforts to annex Southern Africa. There were also political and project management (in)capacity challenges that hampered the implementation of ZACPLAN. In the course of negotiating ZACPLAN almost a decade earlier, relevant stakeholders on the continent had held an African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), to formulate practical proposals of cooperation for environmental management and conservation in Africa. As its pioneering enterprise in international water management, UNEP thus hoped to showcase a signed ZACPLAN at the second AMCEN billed for 1987 (Nakayama, 1997). AMCEN itself, according to Nakayama (ibid), had also prioritised ZACPLAN as a sub-regional activity it would also display among its successes at the 1987 conference. "This political nature of ZACPLAN within the framework of AMCEN cast a shadow on the course of its further development and implementation" (Nakayama, 1997: 375). Further, political conditions at the time made it difficult for riparian states to embark on large-scale development projects in the ZRB because of apartheid South Africa's policy to destabilise Southern Africa (Patel, 1987; Salewicz, 2003). Among them, ZRB riparian states held opposing views on the need for an independent secretariat to oversee the implementation of ZACPLAN and its possible location in the basin. This, together with proposed alternative view for ZACPLAN to be implemented through the framework provided by SADCC, to avoid duplicating regional institutional mechanisms, is what led to what Nakayama called an impasse regarding ZACPLAN.

However, the region eventually decided that SADCC implement ZACPLAN as a programme in one of its units. This was pronounced at a regional conference in Lesotho: that ZACPLAN would be implemented with UNEP's assistance but under the regional organisation's Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation (SWCLU) Sector Coordination Unit (now SADC Environment and Land Management Sector (ELMS)) in Lesotho (Botswana–Mozambique–Tanzania–Zambia–Zimbabwe, 1988; Nakayama, 1998). Despite this, SADCC had limited institutional capacity to implement the project. Therefore, international, regional and local politics and financial and institutional (in)capacities affected the implementation of ZACPLAN.

Critical Juncture Three: Formulation of the Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC

The third critical juncture, offset by the political, financial and institutional challenges that hampered the implementation of ZACPLAN, was the formulation in 1995 of the Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC (revised 2000) or SADC Water Protocol. That is, among the three "only visible outcomes" of the 10-year implementation of ZACPLAN (which at some point saw an "impasse") was the development of the draft "Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in SADC Region" (Nakayama, 1997: 374). Nakayama (2003) partly attributes the impasse to the fact that during the preparation of the ZACPLAN, decision-makers from the ZRB riparian states did not cultivate a culture of meeting with each other to deliberate on ZRB issues. On their part, scientific and technical experts regularly met during that period and subsequently continued with the practice beyond the formulation of ZACPLAN. Therefore, Nakayama (2003) argues that the indecisiveness of ZRB riparian states on important basin issues points to the lack of mutual trust and understanding, which could have been nurtured had they regularly interacted in the past. It also explains the protracted negotiations that offset the fourth critical juncture explained shortly in the text below. But protracted negotiations characterised the third critical juncture too. This is partly because of the path-dependent history of sector-specific bilateral, and not multilateral, approach to transboundary water resource and the management of water-related issues in the ZRB. Citable examples of bilateral cross-border interactions include engagements between the DRC (then Zaire) and Zambia dating back to the 1950s and Zambia and Zimbabwe dating back to colonial times on issues of hydroelectricity production and the transfer or trade in hydroelectric power between them (Nshimbi, 2019a, 2019b). ZACPLAN was, therefore, not only a successful pioneering project but also a model for the promotion of sustainable development in national and international water systems in Africa (UNEP, 1988 cited in Nakayama, 1998). And because no basin-wide legislative mechanism for managing transboundary water resources existed, ZACPLAN paved the way for that legislation in the SADC. The ZACPLAN had its own shortcomings, despite representing an African milestone in international collaboration on sustainable management of shared or transboundary natural resources (Nakayama 1998). A couple of the shortcomings included the politicking and inadequate financing mentioned earlier, which generated protracted negotiations that stalled the project. Out of the 19 projects that made up ZACPLAN and earmarked for completion by 1996, only four got financed and implemented (Nakayama, 1998; Shela, 2000; UNEP, 1986). One of them sought to establish a treaty for ZRB riparian states to commonly manage the Zambezi River and Basin. While riparian states were developing the ZRB treaty, however, SADC, having assumed ownership of ZACPLAN and placed it under SWCLU, decided instead to formulate a regional protocol on shared watercourse systems in the context of the SADC Treaty and policy (Shela, 2000; Zambezi Watercourse Commission, 2015). Member states therefore signed the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in 1995. The protocol was subsequently revised and ratified in 2000, after SADC members such as Mozambique expressed reservations over some of its provisions. The water protocol notwithstanding, ZRB riparian states still felt the need for a basin-specific agreement to jointly manage the Zambezi River. This process was, however, hampered by the unavailability of and disagreement over appropriate institutional arrangements to effectively manage the preparation of the basin-wide agreement.

In sum, politicking, inadequate financial resources and weak institutional capabilities, among other factors, in constellation with the SADC assuming the ownership of ZACPLAN led Southern Africa on a path that proceeded from ZACPLAN to a regional legal framework for the management of transboundary water resources or the SADC Water Protocol. But because the need for a basin-specific mechanism for the environmentally sound management of the Zambezi watercourse system persisted, the continued protracted negotiations at basin level influenced by the path-dependent history of bilateral (and not regional) approach to water resource governance led to the next critical juncture in the evolution of Southern African regionalisation.

Critical Juncture Four: Creation of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission

The fourth critical juncture was the signing, in 2004, of the agreement to create ZAMCOM and the eventual operationalisation of this river basin organisation (RBO) in 2014. Despite the persistent desire for a basin-specific framework, protracted negotiations and disagreements in the ZRB continued to define the path towards ZAMCOM. Frictions, delays and setbacks characterised the negotiations for the formation of the RBO (Böge, 2006: 29–30). According to Böge, a large number of riparian states and contentions over the way in which ZAMCOM should be structured, the country in which it should be located, how it was going to be financed and its human resources all compounded the situation. Further, respective riparian states had concerns that ZAMCOM would encroach on their sovereignty (Van der Zaag, 2009), adding to the challenges they faced in the process of creating ZAMCOM. This is why it took a decade for ZAMCOM to become fully operational in 2014, from the time ZRB riparian states signed the ZAMCOM agreement in 2004. Still, consistent with the persistent desire of ZRB riparian states, ZAMCOM aims to encourage effective participation and management of the water resources of the ZRB. In view of developments in the water sector at regional level, ZAMCOM is subservient to and operates in line with the provisions of the SADC Water Protocol. The eight riparian states of the ZRB pledge "to promote the equitable and reasonable utilization of the water resources of the Zambezi Watercourse as well as the efficient management and sustainable development thereof" (Zambezi Watercourse Commission, 2004: Article 5). This objective is consistent with the SADC Water Protocol. After operationalising the institutional framework of ZAMCOM, ZRB riparian states established the permanent secretariat of ZAMCOM in Harare, in January 2015. The framework comprises the Policy Organ, Council of Ministers and the ZAMCOM Technical Committee.

In sum, the negotiations that eventually led to the establishment of ZAMCOM and secretariat in Harare in 2014 were initiated in the early 1980s. The aim and concern of the three riparian states that initiated the idea of an RBO and UNEP then was to achieve environmentally sound integrated governance and development of an international watercourse between and by the riparian states. The regional sociopolitical and economic environment in which they pursued this, however, also demanded that they cooperate and seek common economic development to liberate countries still under colonial domination or minority rule. This would lessen dependence on apartheid South Africa and counter its constellation of Southern African states plans. So, the process to establish an environmentally sound basin-wide framework for governing transboundary watercourse resources in the ZRB that had started in the early 1980s would occur through the ZACPLAN. That is, the process did not directly lead to the establishment of the desired framework, as initially intended. Instead, it first resulted in ZACPLAN and, later, in the formulation of the 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC (revised 2000). This Water Protocol was, therefore, a spinoff of ZACPLAN, as Shela (2000) indicates. And, as Nakayama (1997, 1998) argues, difficulties experienced in implementing ZACPLAN led Southern Africa to a more comprehensive regional water protocol.

The Geographic Logic

Briefly, the geographical logic presents long-standing water governance mechanisms at the grassroots, by actors who use water resources across contiguous border areas on transboundary watercourses of the riparian states of the ZRB. Historically, people in Southern Africa managed "transboundary" water resources even before the SADC drew up and revised the regional framework for water governance in 1995 and 2000, respectively. Going back further, pre- and colonial traditional societies in the region established institutions or the rules through which they developed, maintained, managed and controlled common water resources. This included resources in watercourses that would today be considered “transboundary”, seeing that nation-state borders had not yet been politically constructed, particularly in precolonial times. But even after the borders were imposed, they would remain irrelevant to traditional grassroots actors to whom they “do not exist”, as this chapter has argued earlier. Therefore, traditional water regimes regulated interactions around water resources, and thus established socially acceptable and predictable forms of organisation for the collective use of the common resources.

It is worth noting, though, that Southern Africa is historically culturally diverse. The water governance regimes or frameworks that define(d) the region should, therefore, not be thought of as (having been) uniform across the region. But Van der Zaag (2009) insists on the evolution of grassroots water-sharing frameworks in most of Southern Africa that reflected core community values and the appreciation, understanding and knowledge of the physical environment. Most of all, these frameworks were firmly embedded in the local culture. According to Van der Zaag, the water management practices in these localities were not only consistent with but also formed a constituent component of customary principles. And this history has shaped present-day arrangements for regulating water use and access in the region.

To date, customary water institutions in the SADC region persist, despite colonisation and the institutional reforms in the water sector that accompanied the neoliberal economic reforms in post-independence riparian states of the ZRB, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Carlsson, 2003; McDonald & Ruiters, 2005). Customary or informal institutions thus continue to regulate the activities of grassroots actors in local and cross-border water governance systems in the ZRB. The activities of grassroots actors that define these institutions at this level have remained somewhat constant. Those involving formal actors at the level of the state, however, have, during the same period, been characterised by lack of mutual trust and understanding between actors, leading to protracted negotiations in the search for a functional basin-wide water governance system.

Conclusion

This chapter contributes to the understanding of borders and regionalisation in Southern Africa from a transboundary water resources perspective. Unlike other studies, it used the notion of path dependency to shed light on how actors at the level of the state and those at the grassroots engage in parallel interactions that influence the development of cross-border or regional mechanisms for managing common water resources in a manner that is environmentally sound. Though exhibiting an apparent lack of trust and understanding, and faced with inadequate finances, institutional weaknesses and political contestations, Southern Africa has actually pioneered the development of international frameworks and institutions for the cooperative governance of shared transboundary water resources on the African continent. The 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourses (Revised 2000) and its template, the 1987 ZACPLAN, make Southern Africa a leader on the continent in the development of international instruments for the sustainable governance of transboundary watercourses (Bruch, 2003: 66–67).

By highlighting the path-dependent evolution of regionalism focusing on a river basin that includes eight of Southern Africa's 16 member states of the SADC, and the dynamics operating at two levels in that evolutionary process, the chapter has demonstrated that Southern Africa has increasingly initiated and adopted legal and institutional mechanisms to manage transboundary water resources. By using critical junctures, it was able to exploit an analytical framework that augmented the understanding of regionalisation by examining the dynamics manifested between countries whose contiguous borders include a transboundary water resource. It has shown that regionalisation in Southern Africa evolves in a path-dependent manner, involving dynamics operating at two levels. States and actors at that level have actively sought to establish environmentally sound frameworks for governing common transboundary water resources. In the process, they are confronted with challenges that include financial, political and weak structural capabilities. The end result is the creation and establishment of organisations that differ from those that had been initially desired. Meanwhile, long-standing institutions embedded in local cultures and consisted with local values establish a grassroots logic based on the geography of the region that suggests that there should be collaboration in the cross-border use of the transboundary water resources.

Rather than insist on reifying nation-state borders, leaders in the ZRB and the broader Southern African region would benefit it and its inhabitants by focusing on making the borders functional. Colonisers had constructed them to divide the region, while asymmetrically linking it to the outside world. Regional leaders should use them in an integrative manner, as bridges for developmental activities including the joint exploitation of the common natural resources that straddle them, such as water. People at the grassroots show the ways in which the ZRB and Southern Africa could transcend the limitations that nation-state borders impose on positively functional and dynamic transboundary use of natural resources like water that could benefit Southern Africa and its population. Accommodating the traditional water-sharing and water use arrangements embedded in local cultures and based on shared values could compliment regionalism. They could transform the boundaries into zones of integration characterised by dynamic activities that are consistent with long-standing aspirations of Africa's past and current leaders of transforming the continent through self-reliance and inbred initiatives of developing the continent. (Southern) African leaders should redefine borders into schemes that work for the good of people, the region and the environment.

References

Asiwaju, A. I. (1993). Borders and borderlands as linchpins for regional integration in Africa: Lessons of the European experience. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 8*(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.1993.9695431.

Böge, V. (2006). Water governance in Southern Africa—Cooperation and conflict prevention in transboundary river basins. *BICC—Brief 33*. Bonn.

Botswana–Mozambique–Tanzania–Zambia–Zimbabwe. (1988). Agreement on the action plan for the environmentally sound management of the common Zambezi River system. *International Legal Materials, 27*(5 (September 1998)), 1109–1143.

Bruch, C. (2003). Role of public participation and access to information in the management of transboundary watercourses. In M. Nakayama (Ed.), *International waters in Southern Africa* (pp. 38–70). Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Campbell, E., & Crush, J. (2012). In J. Crush (Ed.), *Unfriendly neighbours: Contemporary migration from Zimbabwe to Botswana*. Cape Town: Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP).

Capoccia, G., & Daniel Kelemen, R. (2007). The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. *World Politics, 59*(3), 341–369. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100020852.

Carlsson, E. (2003). *To have and to hold: Continuity and change in property rights institutions governing water resources among the Meru of Tanzania and the BaKgatla in Botswana, 1925–2000* (Vol. 28). Lund: Almqvist & Wiksell International.

Crush, J. (1999). Fortress South Africa and the deconstruction of Apartheid's migration regime. *Geoforum, 30*(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0016-7185(98)00029-3.

David, L. J., Golubev, G., & Nakayama, M. (1988). The environmental management of large international basins. *International Journal of Water Resources Development, 4*(2), 103–107.

de Vries, L., Englebert, P., & Schomerus, M. (Eds.). (2019). *Secessionism in African politics: Aspiration, grievance, performance, disenchantment*. Cham: Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7.

Dodson, B. (2000). Porous borders: Gender and migration in Southern Africa. *South African Geographical Journal, 82*(1), 40–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2000.9713683.

Dzirutwe, M. (2008, December 15). Zimbabwe accuses Botswana of training insurgents. *Reuters, World News.*

Korf, B., & Raeymaekers, T. (Eds.). (2013). *Violence on the margins: States, conflict, and borderlands*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137333995.

Larémont, R. R. (2005). Borders, states, and nationalism. In *Borders, nationalism, and the African state* (pp. 1–32). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependence in historical sociology. *Theory and Society, 29*(4), 507–548. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007113830879.

Mazrui, A. A. (1993, September 24). The bondage of boundaries. *Economist*.

McDonald, D. A., & Ruiters, G. (Eds.). (2005). *The age of commodity: Water privatization in Southern Africa*. London: Earthscan.

Moyo, I., & Nshimbi, C. C. (2019). In I. Moyo & C. C. Nshimbi (Eds.), *African borders, conflict, regional and continental integration* (1st ed.). Abingdon: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429057014.

Nakayama, M. (1997). Successes and failures of international organizations in dealing with international waters. *International Journal of Water Resources Development, 13*(3), 367–382. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900629749737.

Nakayama, M. (1998). Politics behind Zambezi action plan. *Water Policy, 1*(4), 397–409. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1366-7017(99)00004-5.

Nakayama, M. (2003). Institutional aspects of international water-system management. In M. Nakayama (Ed.), *International waters in Southern Africa* (pp. 101–113). Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Ndebele, H. (2016, September 23). Mugabe, Khama Battle intensifies. *The Zimbabwe Independent*. https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/09/23/mugabe-khama-battle-intensifies/

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J., & Mhlanga, B. (2013). *Bondage of boundaries and identity politics in postcolonial Africa*. Africa Institute of South Africa. https://books.google.co.za/books?id=At0WAgAAQBAJ

North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2019a). SDGs and decentralizing water Management for Transformation: Normative policy coherence for water security in SADC river basin organizations. *Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 111*, 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2019.02.010.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2019b). Taking sustainable development to the limits. In I. Moyo & C. C. Nshimbi (Eds.), *African borders, conflict, regional and continental integration* (Border regions series) (pp. 136–159). New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429057014-7.

Okumu, W. (2010). Resources and border disputes in eastern Africa. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 4*(2), 279–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2010.487338.

Park, Y. J. (2010). Boundaries, borders and borderland constructions: Chinese in contemporary South Africa and the region. *African Studies, 69*(3), 457–479. https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2010.528862.

Patel, H. H. (1987). South Africa's destabilization policy. *The Round Table, 76*(303), 302–310. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358538708453820.

Pierson, P. (1996). The path to European integration. *Comparative Political Studies, 29*(2), 123–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414096029002001.

Ramutsindela, M. F. (1998). The changing meanings of South Africa's internal boundaries. *Area, 30*(4), 291–299. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.1998.tb00074.x.

Ramutsindela, M. (2004). Glocalisation and nature conservation strategies in 21st-century Southern Africa. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 95*(1), 61–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0040-747X.2004.00293.x.

Salewicz, K. A. (2003). Building the bridge between decision-support tools and decision-making. In M. Nakayama (Ed.), *International waters in Southern Africa* (pp. 114–135). Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Shela, O. N. (2000). Management of shared river basins: The case of the Zambezi River. *Water Policy, 2*(May 1997), 65–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1366-7017(99)00022-7.

UNEP. (1986). *Draft action plan for the environmental management of the common Zambezi River system*. Nairobi: UNEP.

Van der Zaag, P. (2009). Southern Africa: Evolving regional water law and politics. In J. W. Dellapenna & J. Gupta (Eds.), *The evolution of the law and politics of water* (pp. 245–261). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9867-3_15.

Walther, O. J., & Miles, W. F. S. (Eds.). (2017). *African border disorders* (Routledge studies in African politics and international relations). New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315166483.

Zambezi Watercourse Commission. (2004). *Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission*. http://www.zambezicommission.org/publication/zamcom-agreement. Accessed 29 Mar 2019.

Zambezi Watercourse Commission. (2015). *About ZAMCOM*. http://www.zambezicommission.org/index.php/index.php?option=com_content&view%0A=article&id=l&catid=8&Itemid=102

Chapter 13
Borders, Mobility and Integration in Africa Revisited: Towards a New Understanding of African Realities

Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Borders, Migration and the Nation-State in Africa

The map of Africa, which defines the nation-states on the continent, is essentially a by-product of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1985, in which the continent was divided into European colonies (Bach, 1997; Miles, 2014). After independence, African states have maintained and rigidly enforced these colonial boundaries, which has had negative impacts on various sociocultural and economic cross-border activities (Moyo, 2016). But most importantly, the erection, securitisation and enforcement of borders by African states against other Africans from neighbouring or other countries brings to the fore the coloniality of borders. This should be viewed in the context that, in Africa, where people have "experienced the violence of history", consequent upon colonial conquest, borders against and/or especially closing out migrants from African countries endorse "anti-humanist and nihilistic impulses" (Mbembe, 2017: 5). This also systematically assaults the "long held traditions of flexible, networked sovereignty, mutual security, integration through incorporation and universal right to temporary sojourn (ethics of hospitality)" (Mbembe, 2017: 5), which people in Africa have always had. Added to this, any African border that is inward-looking against migrants from other African countries is fundamentally "anti-African and anti-black" (Mbembe, 2017: 3).

I. Moyo (✉)
Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

C. C. Nshimbi
Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: christopher.nshimbi@up.ac.za

C. C. Nshimbi, I. Moyo (eds.), *Borders, Mobility, Regional Integration and Development*, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7_13

And if it is the case that African borders are anti-African and also anti-black, the question of who freely crosses these borders also comes to the fore. For instance, Europeans can easily migrate to many African countries, but it is difficult for people from the African continent to migrate from one country to another. This translates to only 22% of other African countries allowing Africans to migrate/travel without visas (Madowo, 2018). For example, in the case of South Africa, "citizens of only 15 African nations can travel to South Africa without a visa, yet holders of 28 different European passports can enter the country freely", which implies that "many European nationals, meanwhile, waltz into most Africans countries visa-free" (Madowo, 2018: 1). In this context, borders in Africa both in their material and symbolic forms have a significant impact on human mobility, development and regional and continental integration. These are themes which have been successfully tackled in this volume by several authors. For example, Oloruntoba (Chap. 3) has convincingly argued that the insistence on enforcing the colonial borders by African countries has engendered a trajectory of conflict, which also negatively impacted on development and integration in Africa. Likewise, Tevera (Chap. 2) has amplified this argument by demonstrating that African borders continue to be divisionary and also promote different levels of inclusion and exclusion. The full meaning of this is that some actors, like the formal entities, are free to cross the border, but others, like informal cross-border traders, are not free to do so, as they face a plethora of regulatory regimes. The result of this is that the full social and economic development potential of the classes of people who are excluded by the border continues to be disrupted.

Consequently, concerning the border, the state and migration in Africa, it seems as though the major problem pertains to the manner in which borders are governed. There is the unmitigated observance of the Berlin borders and the Westphalian state and border governance regimes to the total exclusion of African cross-border realities. This has resulted in conflict, war and practices which lock rather than unlocking the transformative potential of African borders. For this reason, the main argument in this volume on these issues is that, in the management of borders, African states must "de-emphasize the statist and sovereignty-referenced frameworks" and exert efforts towards "the integrative rather than conflictual processes . . .[of borders]; the problems of border peoples, instead of those of the national states; and finally concern for border, regional and local authorities rather than for the national governments" (Asiwaju, 1993: 9). Thinking of borders and dealing with borders in this way would demonstrate an understanding of African cross-border realities and processes and in this way accommodate the integration, development and unity. For instance, departing from a statist propensity in the management of African borders would entail desecuritising borders such that Africans can easily migrate from one country to the other on the African continent (an element of social and cultural integration and development). This would also mean that cross-border communities and non-state actors like informal cross-border traders could freely cross borders in their transactions. These activities have a social and economic development as well as integrative function and effect.

Regional and Continental Integration: The Question of the Border

The formation of the OAU in 1963 actually put in motion plans for the African continental integration, and after the transformation of the OAU to the AU, this has been further consolidated. In fact, the AU through the Abuja Treaty targets continental integration to be established through an African Economic Community (AEC) (Treaty Establishing African Economic Community, 1991). This should be built on regional economic communities (RECs), which are the building blocks of the continental economic community (Treaty Establishing African Economic Community, 1991). At the moment, eight RECs are in different stages of formation across Africa. These are the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA).

A brief overview of these RECs is necessary so as to contextualise the issue of migration and regional integration in Africa. CEN-SAD was established in 1998 and includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Togo and Tunisia (African Union Capacity Development Support Programme to RECs (M-CDP), 2015). This REC suffers from a lack of free human mobility because of the lack of a regional mechanism that manages migration (African Union Capacity Development Support Programme to RECs (M-CDP), 2015).

COMESA is made up of the following countries: Angola, Burundi Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 1994).

The EAC is made up of six member states, which are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Uganda. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community was ratified in 2000 (Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community, 1999). This REC has achieved significant progress on the matter of human mobility, in that some countries, for example, allow citizens of the region to migrate across borders, using their identity cards in place of passports (Kanyesigye, 2013).

ECCAS was established in 1983 and is composed of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe. In this REC, some of the countries require visas for citizens of member states (African Development Bank, 2005; African Union, 2014; International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2018), which suggests that there are obstacles to the goal of free human mobility.

ECOWAS is composed of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (left 2002), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Burkina Faso, and it was established in 1975, as a result of the Treaty of ECOWAS (1975), which was revised in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993 (Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Revised Treaty, 1993). A significant achievement of ECOWAS is the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. It addresses the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, which has generally led to free human mobility in the REC (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016).

IGAD, which was formed in 1986, is made up of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda (Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 1996). However, the REC does not have a protocol on free human mobility, such that bilateral agreements between member states govern migration in the REC (African Union, 2013).

SADC is made up of Angola, Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The REC established the SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (Southern African Development Community (SADC), 2012), but there are still challenges around free human mobility, because only 6 out of the 16 member states have ratified the protocol on free human mobility in the REC (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2013).

UMA was established in 1989 as a result of the Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union (Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union, 1989). It is composed of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union, 1989), but the REC still faces challenges on the issue of human mobility in that only Tunisia allows citizens of member states to migrate into the country freely but the other three member states do not (African Union, 2013).

The intention of this descriptive outline of the RECs is to highlight two issues. The first is that the border in Africa continues to restrict movement and the second concerns the logic which drives these RECs and how this implicates on migration, regional integration and development. Concerning the issue of the border, it was discussed in detail in the preceding section, but suffice to say that, while the AU declares moves towards integration, predicated on the RECs, the same building blocks erect restrictions against people from fellow member states. A good example of this is that of ECCAS. On the second issue, what needs emphasis is that the logic behind regional and continental integration or the template which African countries (or RECs) follow is neoclassical economic integration theory as propounded by scholars like Balassa (1961), for example.

This template prioritises formal actors, like registered businesses at the expense of the informal and unregistered businesses such as the informal cross-border traders (Moyo, 2017; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2019). Yet, these informal actors play a significant role in the movement, import and export of goods as well as poverty reduction and other development impacts (Afrika & Ajumbo, 2012; Makombe, 2011; Moyo, 2017, 2018; Nshimbi, 2017, 2018; Nshimbi & Moyo, 2018; Peberdy, 2013). In the final analysis, the border is closed for these actors, and most disappointingly, the AfCFTA was signed in 2018, and these actors do not feature at the level of both trade and cross-border movement.

Regarding this issue, the several chapters in this book have made the argument that this calls for a serious revision of the way that African borders are managed or governed and for whom. The call is for a people-centred approach in the management of African borders, so that the development potential and capacity of all classes of people and especially the informal cross-border actors is unlocked and unleashed. This is precisely because "Africa cannot achieve regional integration without having to directly confront the question of the obstructionist boundaries of the national states, which have given rise to the need for regional integration in the first instance" (Asiwaju, 1993: 8). This necessarily involves changing the "prevailing postures ... [of African borders] as ramparts into a new veritable function as bridges between limitrophe national states" (Asiwaju, 1993: 8). Achieving this must of necessity and design "de-emphasize the statist and sovereignty-referenced frameworks" and emphasise among others "the integrative rather than conflictual processes ... [of borders]; the problems of border peoples, instead of those of the national states; and finally concern for border, regional and local authorities rather than for the national governments" (Asiwaju, 1993: 9). In this context, the African states themselves as well as the RECs have an important role to play, because the people on the ground are actually involved in integrative activities which passively and actively operate in spite and in defiance of the border, respectively. This has been fully discussed in the contributions to this book.

Towards a New Understanding of African Cross-Border Realities: Some Concluding Remarks

The book interrogated social, economic, political and national resource issues and phenomena in West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. The contributions to the book adopted some perspectives that differ from the usual and frustrating "one-size-fits-all" effort that casts ideas and realities in Western thought and Eurocentric frameworks. They interrogated and presented issues, experiences and perspectives on human mobility, borders and transboundary natural resources in the three geographical regions of Africa covered in the book. Underlying the issues and realities obtaining in these regions of Africa is how they are governed. There is also the relationship between the spatial mobility of borders and development. The borders in Africa should be imagined as markers of division as well as socially constructed spaces where human transit and connection occur.

In this respect, Tevera (Chap. 2) eloquently made the case for considering nation-state borders as vital sites in the construction of social geographies that focus on mobility, informality and regional integration. Of course, Tevera, Oloruntoba (Chap. 3) and Moyo (Chap. 9) clearly argue that border management in Africa continues to uphold old approaches based on security considerations. These approaches are inconsistent with not only the aspirations of the AU for free movement of people across Africa, but more so the real life experiences of people on the ground. Effectively, these grassroots actors reflect the historical, identity and non-formal part of the discourse on integration with which Oloruntoba (Chap. 3) engages. And some of these actors seem ahead of the AU and the regional economic communities in effecting/implementing what policymakers in those spaces only dream of. Cross-border shoppers from different walks of life, for example, organise shopping trips (as Pophiwa shows in Chap. 6), which in and of themselves not only provide the shopper with wonderful experiences but also contribute to their livelihoods and local economies.

Not only so, Chipere-Ngazimbi (Chap. 8) shows how similar cross-border actors engage in monetary practices that could richly advance scholarship on the future of money and/or its convergence with information and communication technology (ICT). Relationships between people of neighbouring countries across contiguous borders involve complexities that, indeed, require recognition by the states involved. But Chipere-Ngazimbi shows that acknowledgement is to some extent demonstrated in the collaborative approach in malaria treatment and provision of free health care in the health centres of one country to citizens of another. Like the cross-border actors discussed in this book, some countries seem ahead of AU visionaries, at least locally, in applying what the continental body aspires to achieve across Africa.

This is significant because African states cannot afford to live in isolation occasioned by hardened borders and expect to achieve development. Unfortunately, they, in one way or the other, allow this to happen. For example, Tshibambe (Chap. 4) shows how mobility in the Central African region is not only induced by violence, resulting in refugees and internally displaced persons, but also that transnational actors are actually actively involved in managing and framing migration issues affecting that part of, if not the whole continent. The Southern African region, and South Africa in particular, provides a localised example of cases in which mobility induces competition over resources, which in turn induces conflict, as Makhetha's (Chap. 5) examination of Sotho ex-migrant mineworkers in disused South African mines shows. The experiences of the ex-migrant mineworkers with which Makhetha engages are revealing of some of the negative consequences of migration and point most often used to oppose the opening up of borders and restrict free movement of people on the continent. Migration sometimes generates social aspects such as those related to security, as Ikuteyijo and Olayiwola (Chap. 7) attempt to show. This may take the form of terrorism, insurgency, human trafficking and xenophobia.

Besides the impact of borders on and their interaction with human beings, the book also engaged with the fact that natural resources have a bearing on people-to-people as well as interstate relations around those resources in Africa. Natural resources could produce one of two outcomes between countries that share them: conflict or the potential thereof (Sintayehu, Chap. 10) or peaceful coexistence (Nshimbi, Chap. 12). In fact, there is a third aspect to relations around natural resources. Nkomo (Chap. 11) brings out the social and economic consequences on communities that live in areas whose natural resources are harnessed by states (in a cross-border cooperation manner) in collaboration with private companies. While the argument that is generally forwarded in such instances is that there is a need to protect the environment and nature, great potential exists to push the people in those areas into poverty and foster inequality in their communities. The form of governance that the cooperating states and the companies adopt for managing the shared natural resources, therefore, significantly matters.

In the final analysis, the main contribution of this book volume has been to bring to the fore debates on borders, mobility and integration in Africa. It has demonstrated that these notions and realities are ongoing on the African continent. They also raise important issues, such as the observation that many African states continue to securitise the border, especially against fellow Africans. This suggests that African countries have negative perceptions of migration. However, evidence on the ground, and as some contributions in this book have demonstrated, suggests that migration has development impacts. The case of informal cross-border traders in various parts of Africa particularly merits and needs the attention of scholars and, especially, policymakers. The securitisation of borders against Africans in Africa has direct negative consequences on classes of migrants such as the informal cross-border traders. This, in turn, impacts on migration and, by extension, regional and continental integration. The restriction of free movement of people is antithetical to the formation of an integrated Africa, which the continent, through the AU, aspires to achieve. The regional integration organisations on the continent that are designated as the means through which Africa should achieve continental integration need to, respectively, establish regional migration regimes that enhance human mobility, in readiness for a more or less borderless Africa as planned in the AU's Agenda 2063.

References

African Development Bank. (2005). *ECCAS regional integration assistance strategy for Central Africa 2005–2009.*

African Union. (2013). *Status of integration in Africa*. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.au.int/ar/sites/default/files/SIA%202013(latest)_En.pdf

African Union. (2014). *Highlights—Status of integration in Africa (SIA V)*. Retrieved October 12, 2018, from https://au.int/sites/default/files/.../32854-doc-status-of-integration-in-afriva-v.pdf

African Union Capacity Development Support Programme to RECs (M-CDP). (2015). Retrieved 26 July, 2018, from https://www.nepad.org › file-download › download › public.

Afrika, J. K., & Ajumbo, G. (2012). *Informal cross border trade in Africa: Implications and policy recommendations*. Africa Economic Brief: African Development Bank.

Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). (1996). Retrieved October 12, 2018, From https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei475/rei475.01tt.pdf

Asiwaju, A. I. (1993). Borderlands in Africa: A comparative research perspective with particular reference to Western Europe. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 8*(2), 1–12.

Bach, D. (1997). Frontiers versus boundary lines: Changing patterns of state society interactions. *WeltTrends, 14*, 97–111.

Balassa, B. (1961). *The theory of economic integration*. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) Revised Treaty. (1993). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-treaty.pdf

ECOWAS. (1975). Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). Retrieved 20 March, 2019, from https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/treaties/.

Fioramonti, L., & Nshimbi, C. (2016). *Regional migration governance in the African continent*. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF).

International Organisation for Migration (IOM). (2018). *IOM, African Union and Partners Commit to enhancing labour mobility in Africa with USD 9 million Swedish grant*. Retrieved October 19, 2018, from https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/iom-african-union-and-partners-commit-enhancing-labour-mobility-africa-usd-9-million-swedish

Kanyesigye, F. (2013). *Rwanda: Tripartite ministers endorse single tourist visa*. Travel by Identity Card. Retrieved 10 June, 2019, from https://allafrica.com/stories/201309161820.html.

Madowo, L. (2018). Why is it so hard for Africans to visit other African countries? *BBC*. Retrieved April 15, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45677447

Makombe, P. F. (2011). *Informal cross border trade and SADC: The search for greater recognition*. Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. Retrieved from www.trademarksa.org/.../informal-cross-border-trade-and-sadc-search-gr

Mbembe, A. (2017). Africa needs free movement. *Mail and Guardian*. Retrieved from https://mg.co.za/article/2017-03-24-00-africa-needs-free-movement

Miles, W. F. S. (2014). *Scars of partition: Postcolonial legacies in French and British borderlands*. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Moyo, I. (2016). The Beitbridge–Mussina interface: Towards flexible citizenship, sovereignty and territoriality at the border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31*(4), 427–440.

Moyo, I. (2017). Zimbabwean cross-border traders in Botswana and South Africa: Perspectives on SADC regional integration. In C. C. Nshimbi & I. Moyo (Eds.), *Migration, cross-border trade and development in Africa: Exploring the role of non-state actors in the SADC region* (pp. 43–62). London: Palgrave.

Moyo, I. (2018, December 17–21). *Polyperspectivity in regional and continental integration in Africa: On the informal cross border trade-regional integration nexus in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region*. Paper presented at the 15th CODESRIA General Assembly, Dakar.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2017). Life in the fringes: Economic and sociocultural practices in the Zambia–Malawi–Mozambique borderlands in comparative perspective. *Journal of Borderlands Studies, 32*(2), 1–24.

Nshimbi, C. C. (2018). Rethinking regional integration for development and eradication of poverty in Africa: The missing link. In S. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of African politics, governance and development* (pp. 645–660). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nshimbi, C. C., & Fioramonti, L. (2013). A region without borders? Policy frameworks for regional labour migration towards South Africa. In *African centre for migration and society*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.

Nshimbi, C. C., & Moyo, I. (2018). Informal immigrant traders in Johannesburg: The scorned cornerstone in the Southern African development community integration project. In A. Adeniran & L. Ikuteyijo (Eds.), *Africa now! Emerging issues and alternative perspectives* (pp. 387–413). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nshimbi, C. C., & Moyo, I. (2019). In I. Moyo & C. C. Nshimbi (Eds.), *African borders, conflict, regional and continental integration*. London: Routledge.

Peberdy, S. (2013). *Social protection for informal cross border traders*. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from www.saspen.org/.../Peberdy_PPT_FES-SASPEN-INT-CONF_Social-Prot...

Southern African Development Community (SADC). (2012). *Draft protocol on the facilitation of movement of persons*. Retrieved July 26, 2012, from: http://www.sadc.int/english/key-documents/protocols/protocol-on-the-facilitation-of-movement-of-persons/

The Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community. (1999). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from www.eala.org/.../the-treaty-for-the-establishment-of-the-east-africa-community-1999-

Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. (1991). Retrieved August 13, 2017, from http://www.au.int/en/treaties/treaty-establishing-african-economic-community#sthash.gaX4N06U.dpuf

Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. (1994). Retrieved October 12, 2018, from www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/COMESA-Treaty.pdf

Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union. (1989). Retrieved October, 12 2018, from www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/amu/trt_amu.pdf