Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks

Identity, the Curriculum and Educational Media

Edited by
Gorana Ognjenović
Jasna Jozelić

palgrave
macmillan

Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks

"Since the 19th century history textbooks have been used as powerful tools of the nationalist socialisation of young people. The ministries of education of most European states were eager to use the teaching of national history as a device of social control aimed at inculcating a nationalist ethos among the generations of young people. In this context, history textbooks were dominated by one-sided and stereotypical narratives where one's own nation was regularly depicted in terms of heroic victimhood and moral superiority while other nations assumed the role of passive bystanders or immoral aggressors. After WWII many European historians in the West led initiatives to change these stereotypical depictions and to decouple the teaching of history from politics. At the same time much of Cold War Eastern Europe retained traditional heroic narratives where nationalism was now amalgamated with the state socialist ideology. With the collapse of Soviet bloc countries and Yugoslavia, the writing and use of history textbooks became even more politicised as the new regimes were keen to establish their legitimacy through nation-centric interpretations of the past and present. The onset of war in former Yugoslavia strengthened the hegemony of ethno-nationalist understandings of history. This book offers a comprehensive and thoroughly researched analysis of politicisation of history in school textbooks in South-Eastern Europe. It successfully combines primary empirical research with valuable theoretical insights and in this way provides a unique comparative look at all new states that have emerged after the break-up of Yugoslav federation."

—Siniša Malešević, *University College Dublin, Ireland*

"This book is not only necessary reading for students of South East Europe after the break-up of Yugoslav federation, it also offers important insights about the rise of populism and nationalism in various parts of the world. Anyone who is interested in countries that are perpetually in a state of 'frozen conflict' can learn much about cultural and social mechanisms behind conflicts and develop proactive methods of protecting human rights by reading this insightful and thoroughly researched book."

—Idil Eser, *Former General Secretary of AI Turkey*

"The book offers an original contribution to the field. To my knowledge there is no other study of this kind concerning history textbooks in ex-Yugoslav successor states, considering not only the current situation, but also the tensions in constructing a common past based on the former common nation (Yugoslavia) vs. current intentions to construct different nationalities… The book deal with various controversial topics related to the tensions between different national and ethnic groups, but they are presented very carefully and professionally throughout the book."

—Alicia Barreiro, *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Argentina*

"This book makes a valuable contribution to scholarship on the way history has been presented in the school textbooks in the successor states of post-Yugoslavia. It would carry forward the careful studies done in previous volumes published by Palgrave with these two editors on how religion has been treated in those states. Given these successor states' desire to be received into the European Union and the directives given regarding how history should be presented (among many other directives) as required for that accession, the chapters lay out well how far short of the intended directives the history textbooks have fallen… All the chapters manifest careful research and assessment of what their investigations have found. This volume definitely carries forward the study of how history is presented by the various successor states of the former Yugoslavia… The volume will likely have a significant shelf-life: as the chapters indicate, the patterns described have taken root in the history textbooks and are not likely to be changed any time soon. If they were to change, the volume would continue to be a solid assessment of what was the case; if they do not, the volume will offer a careful assessment of what has developed (and is likely to continue to be the pattern)."

—James R. Payton Jr., *Emeritus Professor of History, Redeemer University College, Canada*

Gorana Ognjenović · Jasna Jozelić
Editors

Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks

Identity, the Curriculum and Educational Media

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Gorana Ognjenović
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway

Jasna Jozelić
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
Oslo, Norway

ISBN 978-3-030-38120-2 ISBN 978-3-030-38121-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To the new generations in Southeast Europe who deserve better…

Contents

Contributors

Nebojša Čagorović Department of Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, Montenegro

Sead S. Fetahagić Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Shkëlzen Gashi University of Prishtina, Prishtina, Kosovo

Jasna Jozelić Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Saša Knežević Department of Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, Montenegro

Snježana Koren University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia

Anne Madelain Centre d'études des mondes russes, caucasiens et centre-européen, École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, France

Gorana Ognjenović University in Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Ana Radaković Department of History, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Mateja Režek Science and Research Centre of Koper, Koper, Slovenia

Slobodan Rudić Department of History, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Sabine Rutar Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast, European Studies, Regensburg, Germany

Goran Šimić Faculty of Law, International University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Zrinka Štimac Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Brunswick, Germany

Darko Stojanov Institute of National History, University of Saint Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, North Macedonia

Marko Šuica Department of History, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Petar Todorov Institute of National History, University of Saint Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, North Macedonia

1

Foreword: Sarajevo in the Twentieth Century, or, the Manufacture of European History

Anne Madelain

To introduce a book about the politicization of history in the former Yugoslavia, it can be useful to shift vantage points and examine how Yugoslav history, including the pre- and post-Yugoslavia periods, is presented in schools in another European country. In the "old democracy" of France, history teaching has been made one of the foundations of national and civic sentiment.

Yugoslavia's Collapse in the New French History Curricula

In France, history curricula are applied on a nationwide basis and are subject to frequent reforms and passionate, even virulent, public debate.

A. Madelain (✉)
Centre d'études des mondes russes, caucasiens et centre-européen, École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, France
e-mail: anne.madelain@inalco.fr

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_1

Debate does not focus on the textbooks—numerous and never compulsory, these are chosen by teachers freely—but on the curricula themselves. The curricula are thus ultimately the product of negotiations involving an ever-growing number of stakeholders: teachers' associations, academics, pedagogical specialists, experts, the Ministry of Education, politicians, and interest groups. History has been taught in France using a thematic and issues-based approach for several decades. Curricula and textbooks emphasize students' need to acquire tools and methods, and to increase their critical thinking skills, more than simply acquiring factual knowledge.

The most recent reform of the history-geography curricula for French high schools, in 2011, brought about a mini-revolution by ending the previous breakdown of the twentieth century into two periods, pre-1945 and post-1945. Now, students in the last two years of secondary school (*première* and *terminale*) learn about the entire twentieth century (and even a portion of the nineteenth) through three to five major themes that aim to shed light on "questions for understanding the twentieth century" and provide "a historical perspective on today's world," as indicated in the titles of the official programs.[1] In *première* (the next-to-last year of high school), the curriculum comprises these five themes:

- Theme 1: Economic Growth, Globalization, and Changes in Society since the Mid Twentieth Century
- Theme 2: War in the Twentieth Century
- Theme 3: The Century of Totalitarianisms
- Theme 4: Colonization and Decolonization
- Theme 5: The French and the Republic

In French history curricula and textbooks, communism has traditionally been dealt with by looking at the Soviet experience. The new curricula, by sweeping away an overarching view of the twentieth century in favor of a thematic approach, assorting and comparing Nazism, Fascism, and

[1]For the program for *première*, see: *Bulletin officiel* (BO) special issue no. 9, 30 September 2010: http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid53319/mene1019675a.html. For the program for *terminale* for the ES (economics and social) and L (literature) sections, see: BO no. 42, 14 November 2013: http://www.education.gouv.fr/pid25535/bulletin_officiel.html?cid_bo=74738.

Communism, has strengthened this focus.[2] The multiple forms of socialism existing in actuality are thus largely ignored. As colonization and decolonization are handled separately (in theme 4 in *première*), based primarily on French examples, the Non-Aligned Movement is not addressed either. A unit about the "workers' movement and socialism" is included, but only for *terminale* students and only as part of a theme about German history; as a result it comes after the unit on "totalitarianisms," which all students in *première* must cover.

The main Yugoslav topic in new French history curricula is Sarajevo. It appears twice—both times within the theme "War in the Twentieth Century." The city is first mentioned as the site of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, on 28 June 1914. This event is noted for having triggered a diplomatic crisis, but its analysis rarely goes any further than that. The reformed curricula give decreased importance to the settlements that ended the two world wars, with the formation of new states in Europe in 1919 (and the birth of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed "Kingdom of Yugoslavia" in 1929) and the partition of Europe after the 1945 Yalta Conference (with the birth of people's democracies and the reshaping of Central Europe and the Balkans). This is because these curricula de-emphasize chronology and instead highlight the "combative experience" of the wars.

Sarajevo is mentioned a second time with regard to the city's siege in the 1990s—the only time Yugoslavia appears in the new French history curricula. This is towards the end, as part of three "case studies" of the post-Cold War "new conflictuality." These case studies respectively cast light on a "place" (the Siege of Sarajevo, 1992–1995), an "armed conflict" (the First Gulf War, 1990–1991), and a "terrorist act" (the attacks of 11 September 2001).

No mention is made of other phases or aspects of the Yugoslav Wars. Nothing is said about the war in Croatia or Kosovo, and almost nothing about what happened elsewhere in Bosnia. The Srebrenica Genocide is mentioned in only one of five textbooks. The victim count is often

[2] In *première*, communism is taught as part of theme 2, "War in the Twentieth Century" (which includes the Cold War) and as part of theme 3, "The Century of Totalitarianisms."

ambiguous and sometimes even wrong; some textbooks indicate that 10,000 people were killed, without specifying that this is the toll for the siege of Sarajevo victims alone, excluding the many others killed. The political actors are also absent: Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegović, and Radovan Karadžić, for example, are rarely mentioned. One teacher's manual, listing "traps to avoid" for teachers dealing with the subtheme "From the Cold War to New Conflictuality," warns against giving a lecture "on the history of Germany and not that of Berlin, [or] on the history of the former Yugoslavia instead of Sarajevo." It also specifies the question that should act as a "guideline": "How is the Siege of Sarajevo a typical example of intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War era?" (Mellina 2011, 47). The textbooks generally present the role of the "international community" during the Bosnian War (1992–1995) in a positive light, noting its backing of the Bosniaks against the Serbs.

By comparison, the pre-2011 curriculum for *terminale* classes gave greater importance to post-1989 Europe, including the Yugoslav conflict and issues related to enlargement of the European Union. What's more, this unit was taught in the year that students took their *baccalauréat* exam. Starting in the 1990s, Central and Eastern Europe, which had traditionally been side-lined in French history curricula, received renewed attention due to political will to unite Europe and the need to shape a European citizenship. The collapse of the Yugoslav Federation was covered—not just one event—in a similar format (two or four textbook pages). However, the main cause of Yugoslavia's breakup was already presented as intercommunity dissension.

This idea has remained dominant. The teacher's manual mentioned above, published by the Ministry of Education, indicates the "phases" teachers should emphasize. First, the "multicultural character" of the "Balkan capital" (i.e. Sarajevo) before the war. Second, the siege itself, when "the Serbs organized 'ethnic cleansing' of the districts they occupied by force," it explains, continuing: "The city was divided into homogeneous ethnic districts, and the populations were torn apart based on their ethnic and confessional belonging. Interventions by the European Union, which supported Bosnia, then by the UN, were initially in vain. NATO intervention against Serb forces shifted the balance of powers." The third phase, according to the manual, began in 1995 and was that of

the "Bosnized" capital: "The war had ruined the city. The Dayton Agreement freed the districts occupied by Serb forces, which withdrew to Pale, while the Serb and Croat populations left the reunified Sarajevo, which was populated by peasants and refugees or displaced Bosniaks" (Mellina 2011, 49).

Indeed, analyzing the Siege of Sarajevo through the angle of conceptual, thematic history, with more a focus on the *kinds* of conflicts than on their causes, clearly results in a more ethnicized view of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. It also tends to extract these conflicts from the chronological and spatial contexts that link them to wider Europe. Many of the European issues that had been introduced or developed in the 1990s and 2000s were removed during the 2011 curriculum reform, and those that remained were scaled back and handled superficially. Unlike issues related to historical memory—such as remembrance of the Algerian War, colonialism, or the Holocaust—these themes did not give rise to any particular public debate.

New Conflictuality, the Nation, and Citizenship

What *has* been debated, openly and at length, with regards to French school curricula is the way in which the nation is taught and the role the subject (history-geography) plays in educating the citizenry. In fact, this debate appears to have been exacerbated in recent years, fuelling calls for a return to the great historical narratives, or even prompting ministers to demand that schools promote "the values of the Republic and the defence of secularism [*laïcité*]." The French conception of history teaching in connected to the Republic: It is education about political citizenship.

A concern that this form of civic education is increasingly disconnected from students' experiences and how they understand the world has recently gathered strength. Controversies involving the place given to the nation, or to chronology and "major milestones," have erupted repeatedly. Another stumbling block is the pedagogical vs. scientific dimension in school curricula, and therefore the connection between

research and teaching, between a school subject and an academic discipline. These various issues are interconnected, because there appears to be a consensus, within the school system and outside it, that the aim of history in the schools is to produce a "shared history" that enables people to "form a society."

The notion of "new conflictuality"—that is, intrastate wars involving a wide range of participants, waged within the civilian population—in recent historiography, as well as a new focus on the experiences of combatants and the memory of conflicts, illustrates how research innovations quickly impact how history is taught in schools.

Yet reducing the Yugoslav Wars to the Siege of Sarajevo replicates the breaks in intelligibility that characterized French school curricula and media conversations about the conflict in the 1990s. This lack of intelligibility was clear in the focus given to ethnicity as the source of violence, and "ethnic cleansing" as the only way to describe the conflict—in the French conception of a civic nation, the very term "ethnicity" is ambiguous, and therefore does not clearly explain these events to a French audience. Indeed, the concept of a civic nation—the idea of voluntary adhesion to the political nation—precludes giving any political value (and often by extension any value at all) to forms of belonging based on birth, a group's unique history, or any language other than a national language. If claims are ever made involving these other forms of belonging, they are considered to apply to "others" and often seen as illusive.

The way French history curricula have treated the collapse of Yugoslavia since 2011 clearly reflects the specific problems in understanding this event in France at the time. The breakup of Yugoslavia is seen as an entirely new event, despite the importance of references to the past, and no connection is made between this collapse and its context: the end of socialist regimes and the end of Yugoslavia's socialist regime specifically. The curricula's approach to this event is reminiscent of the media discourse of the 1990s, including abundant historical clichés, pervasive nationalist explanations, and a focus on the city of Sarajevo, which had become an ambiguous symbol—both of the guilty conscience of Europeans, who had allowed "nationalist demons" to be unleashed, and of civic resistance in a "multicultural" or even "multi-ethnic" society, although the meaning of these terms was quite vague.

An Orphaned History

Examining communism through the prism of totalitarianism and the Yugoslav Wars—through "new conflictuality"—reflects the disappearance of an entire mode of thought, including a system of beliefs dominated by certain religious and political references, namely socialism, emancipation, utopianism, and ultimately the very idea of progress. As François Furet noted back in 1995, in his famous book about the concept of communism and the end of the people's democracies in Eastern Europe (Furet 2000), the rapid pace at which these ideas disappeared has actually threatened our capacity to understand twentieth-century history. The absence of references to the particular forms of Yugoslav self-managed socialism and to the Non-Aligned Movement in French history curricula reflects the way that the experience of the *deuxième gauche*—France's "second left," which sought to break with the Soviet "totalitarian" left—has been overshadowed in France's collective memory.

We must recognize that the changes in perspective on and interpretation of communism, as well as the post-1989 events and the recent transformations of Europe, are very important in history teaching. When I sat the French *baccalauréat* in 1987, the USSR was more a subject of geography than of history. We studied "Soviet power" just as students today study "Chinese power." We learned to draw the Iron Curtain on a map of Europe. Yugoslavia did not fit into any category. It was rarely discussed. Yet in my family memory, as in a wide spectrum of French society, from the Catholic left to libertarians, Yugoslavia was regarded as a country that had successfully reconciled socialism and democracy by inventing a unique system that could serve as a model elsewhere.

Likewise, the fact that Europe is not a major focus of history curricula today is worth noting. If educating future citizens is a major preoccupation in history teaching in France, viewing Yugoslavia and even "the Balkans" solely through the lens of the Siege of Sarajevo may be intended as a counterexample for an abstract form of citizenship still seen as the only solution in a national context. "Communitarianism" has become a very powerful explanatory principle for describing "the other" and the threats hanging over the Republic and its unity.

While the intention is clearly to improve students' understanding of the twentieth century, what are the causes of the methodological impasses that have resulted? For example, what else could have replaced the analysis of the "causes and consequences of conflicts" that prevailed in 1990s textbooks, under the methodological influence of Marxism? A partial conclusion could be that the "horizons of expectation" and the "spaces of experience" (Koselleck 2004) of people in the twentieth century become hard to understand if we do not analyze beliefs: political beliefs—especially communism—and religious ones—in the case of France and many other European countries, the weight of Catholicism, its secularization process, and its partial disappearance from the public sphere.

Before getting to the heart of the subject and exploring the various facets of history's politicization in schools across former Yugoslavia, this brief detour through history teaching in France has shown that similar difficulties and tensions with regard to national sentiment in a democratic (or so-called democratic) society, and the role history teaching should play, are shared among European countries. The fact that this is what we have "in common" as Europeans may not be not very satisfactory, but the observation may enable us to focus on these issues with greater awareness of what is at stake.

References

Furet, François. 2000. *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Koselleck, Reinhart. 2004. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Mellina, Annick. 2011. *Clés pour l'enseignement de l'histoire et de la géographie en 1ere. Aide à la mise en œuvre des programmes.* Editions du CRDP de l'académie de Versailles.

2

Nationhood and the Politicization of History in School Textbooks

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

The continuous process of including the former Yugoslav republics into the European Union slowly goes ahead, based on numerous institutional reforms including educational reform on all levels. Education is seen as instrumental to the integration of young generations into the European nation based on the values on which modern Europe is built. It is generally believed that in order to gain EU membership there is no alternative but to reform education according to the European model, which is meant to ensure increased respect for human, civil and political rights. The message from the European council on the importance of teaching history in school for a unified European nation is clear, presented through numerous institutional channels in the form of obligations, recommendations, and advisory directions. All advice is more or less also

G. Ognjenović (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

J. Jozelić
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: jasna.jozelic@nchr.uio.no

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_2

built on practice, on other countries' previous experience, since every European state has to deal with its own difficult heritage.

The problem in Southeast Europe is that education is still instrumentalized by nationalist powers as a means to fight local political battles, determined by shifts within micropolitical horizons. Education thus serves as a political instrument for domination, and a powerful tool for the exclusion of others, rather than as a bridge to better integration into European heritage. The twenty-first-century idea of nationhood in the Southeastern nations is different from that of the 1990s: Yugoslav successor states have shifted from the bold aggressive nationalism of that period into a more peaceful modus operandi, but is still nevertheless a nationalistic one. The nationalism currently dominant in the Balkans has evolved to resemble the "grounded nationalisms" of other European nations. As Siniša Malešević has written, this type of nationalism has a much better societal grip than its predecessors due to its grounding in the everyday life of ordinary people. It is a more sophisticated form of nationalism that has slowly evolved through structural changes, including numerous institutional developments such as educational reform, that are organizationally deeply grounded and ideologically rooted within state structure and civil society networks. These in turn provide organizational channels for the society-wide nationalization of the population (Malešević 2019, 227–230).

By *politicization of history in history textbooks* we mean ethno-national interpretations of historical narratives in schoolbooks for the purpose of further developing ethnic conflicts long after the wars of the 1990s had ended. Such interpretations are characteristically derogatory or belittling toward certain ethnic minorities.

In order to test the contents of educational materials in Southeast Europe and reveal how deeply this detected issue undercuts general European education policy, for this volume we have chosen to focus on a single subject, namely history as it is taught in school textbooks. We have examined the contents of history textbooks in each Yugoslav successor state with a focus on the educational instrumentalization of history for the purpose of continuing the politics of "divide and rule," thus retaining and promoting hostility among groups across ex-Yugoslavia.

In developing our analyses we took a further step back, beyond the "banal nationalism" of the 1990s, to recognize the role that education had in Tito's Yugoslavia (1945–1991) in embedding what can perhaps be considered the pilot project of "Yugo nationalism." To this end we include a study of examples from what we call "pre-succession nationalism," which can also be labeled Yugoslav or socialist federal nationalism—as demonstrated in the history textbooks of that time. This decision was based on our wish to acknowledge the role that education had in creating the modern Socialist Yugoslavia (Ognjenović et al. 2016), and the mechanisms used for promoting its particular kind of nationalism—mechanisms that are frequently identical to those employed by the "post-succession nationalism" of the 1990s and today's grounded nationalism, which have the same goal despite today's softened rhetoric. That is: rewriting history according to political ethno-national barometers and forcing politicized historical images onto pupils' minds from the early age to gain consent for nationalistic goals.

Like its monarchic predecessor, the socialist federation was, as Malešević also writes, officially committed to developing unifying society-wide narratives intended to surpass narrow ethno-nationalist discourses. Yet the main obstacle to that commitment came from this very same system. On the one hand it promoted a supranational doctrine of "brotherhood and unity," a pilot program for Yugo nationalism, as we illustrate in this book. On the other hand, it recognized and constitutionally enshrined the rights of its six constituent nations—Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, and Serbs—and thus institutionalized the ethno-national differences which today can be seen as the fundamental elements of what would come in the 1990s (Malešević 2019, 222–223). This was nothing short of a double moral, and the project was doomed to fail before it began.

The phenomenon of *pre-succession nationalism* is clearly demonstrated in three categorically different perspectives within this book. The chapter analyzing textbooks in Slovenia during Tito's rule shows how Communist authorities dealt with the problem of inventing history.[1] Unlike

[1]Mateja Režek, "The Ideologization of History Education and Textbooks in Slovenia (Yugoslavia) during Socialism, 1945–1990."

nationalists, who invent historical narratives for the purpose of distinguishing themselves from each other, Yugoslav nationalists were forced to invent a common Yugoslav history, upon which the new collective identity could be built. These textbooks also promoted hatred toward those who thought differently, in this case those who did not recognize themselves in the common national liberation struggle and subsequent class liberation, which was said to resolve the question of nationality once and for all. In Yugoslavia, the struggle between nations on the federal level was settled by allowing each republic to publish their own textbooks. Yet while the crimes of occupiers or collaborators were described in detail, the Partisans were depicted as their polar opposite, being idealized as expressing the highest form of courage and humanity. Thus books across Yugoslavia reflected Tito's unbalanced and selective historical memory.

There was one exception to the rule that each republic publish their own textbooks.[2] In Montenegro, the contents of history school textbooks changed as the political situation changed in Yugoslavia. The perspective on change was that of Belgrade rather than that of Podgorica, since almost all textbooks were produced in Belgrade until 2001. Needless to say, this ensured a long-term compliance of content with Belgrade's centralized power, while other republics organized their history textbooks according to their own perspectives. Even though Montenegro was the only former Yugoslav republic to keep a state link to Serbia, the share of Montenegrin history in the history textbooks was no greater than that of any other Yugoslav republic. Political history was predominant topic in the textbooks, while social and cultural history were neglected, following the trend set by Belgrade.

The historical events in Kosovo as presented in history textbooks in primary and high schools in Kosovo and Serbia (1945–1999) takes the discussion of pre-succession nationalism to a new level, since these textbooks were approved for use in schools by the respective ministries of education in each country.[3] Based on a comparative study of their contents, the study presented here uncovers the mechanisms behind and the

[2] Saša Knežević and Nebojša Čagorović, "Ideological Changes in the History Textbooks of Montenegro."

[3] Shkëlzen Gashi, "Kosovo Under Yugoslavia (1945–1999) in the History Textbooks of Kosovo and Serbia."

basis for the contradictory allegations between the two nations in conflict in Kosovo. By explaining the implicit lines of argument the textbooks contain, the study shows what the two governments suggested to younger generations. Accordingly, it reveals the bases for often the contradictory allegations made by the two groups, who are engaged in what is now often presented as an "unsolvable conflict."

Once we move into the studies of cases from *post-succession nationalism*, the nature of the subject becomes more peculiar. Croatia, for example, has already entered the EU but still has difficulties embedding proposals for a new history curriculum, which is a part of a larger unsuccessful attempt to carry out comprehensive education reform since the 1990s.[4] This study indicates ongoing political and ideological confrontation concerning the content and goals of education since 1990, alongside efforts to re-define contemporary Croatian identity through education. These efforts started by introducing nationalist themes and values at the beginning of the 1990s, and include more recent attempts to inject socially conservative views. Together, they seek to change the paradigm of history teaching. This approach goes as far as rewriting the histories of entire ethnic groups to manipulate generations of pupils, for the many methods employed include generalizing ethnicity across abstract religious and territorial boundaries, and oversimplifying ethnicity by making it synonymous with religion—resulting in an image of ethnic homogeneity which has no root in territorial reality.[5] Nationalist and conservative forces do this even if it means giving helping hands to future nationalist manipulations of their counterparts across the succession borders.

The situation regarding school textbooks in Serbia shows equally little hope.[6] Even today, prejudice plagues pupils' understanding of the wars of the 1990s, since the main source of information about recent history comes almost exclusively from their social milieu. Most history textbooks in Serbia still contain closed narratives, which have a direct influence

[4]Snježana Koren, "History, Identity, and Curricula: Public Debates and Controversies over the Proposal for a New History Curriculum in Croatia."

[5]Gorana Ognjenović, "Phantoms of Neverland: The Tale of Three+ History Textbooks."

[6]Marko Šuica, Ana Radaković, and Slobodan Rudić, "Where and How Do Pupils in Serbia Learn about the 1990s Yugoslav Wars?"

on how young Serbians' identities develop. Serbians' tendency to self-victimize and to glorify the victimhood of the Serbian people has a large presence and contributes to a generally one-sided idea of the war and its consequences. Historic contexts where the Serbian state or Serbian people could be shown in a negative context, such as the suffering of other ethnic groups under Serbian violence, are omitted.

The complexity of the issue climaxes once we reach the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[7] Due to the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the country has long endured a power struggle between the three ruling political elites, and each have a set of textbooks that glorifies their own people, nation, and state, and undermines minorities and neighboring states—thus producing a new generation of dominated by hatred. It is worth noting that, of three main group identities, the Bosniaks' school textbooks still contain the least inadequate interpretations of political options.

This multiply complex situation has resulted in a measure for objectivity, the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in BiH, which defines the principle that education should be the foundation for life in a multicultural society. Contrary to all hopes, the law's introduction was not immediately able to deal with the problems.[8] The analysis of secondary-school history textbooks in BiH shows that they continue to provide instruction of an ethnically exclusive character, based on different curricula and textbooks for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—ethnicities recognized by the country's constitution as its "constituent peoples." International pressure on the authorities in BiH has steadily declined over the past decade, and grassroots demands for a more inclusive education are only occasional and largely dependent on pressure from external actors. The medieval history of Bosnia in the secondary-school textbooks serves to empower both Bosnian civic nationalism (patriotism) and Bosniak ethnic nationalism. This study focuses on the problem of distinctions and overlaps between Bosniak nationalism, which is ethnic, exclusive,

[7] Goran Šimić, "To Believe or Not to Believe: Current History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

[8] Sead Fetahagić, "The Most Golden Age: A Discourse Analysis of Representations of Medieval Bosnia in Secondary-School History Textbooks in the Federation of BiH."

and sometimes (but not always) state-denying, and Bosnian patriotism, which is civic, inclusive, and state-affirming.

The battle for depoliticized history textbooks in Bosnia is a battle to build a common national ethos through education, historical awareness, and more considered identity politics. It is not just that history has become a blossoming "academic" topic in Western Balkans, but that it has become a prism through which other topical aspects of contemporary life are spotted, grasped, and examined.[9]

Lastly, it should come as no great surprise that after centuries in which Northern Macedonia yearned for independence, now that it has finally been achieved the country's history schoolbooks explore historical narratives of suffering.[10] These narratives have turned into a political myth of victimization which closely follows and intertwines with the myth of political continuity. As in many other cases across the Balkans, political and symbolic frustrations from the twentieth century are thus anachronistically superimposed on the early Middle Ages. Indeed, textbook contents are solely used to create the narrative of national suffering, and questions and analyses are dominated by the expectation of both direct memorizing and empathizing. Instead of dealing with society's symbolic frustrations, textbooks authors and education authorities chose only to repeat and reinforce them—in other words, to participate in creating a culture of mistrust and insecurity vis-à-vis the Other, and in reinforcing prejudices and stereotypes.

At the very end of this volume, we see that the idea here is not just to condemn the current state of school textbooks in Southeast Europe. We believe that value of this study lies in unfolding the mechanisms of political nationalist manipulation in such books. It is clear that these mechanisms are to be found in other textbooks around Europe, but that the mechanisms are a bit easier to detect in the case of Southeast Europe due

[9]Jasna Jozelić, "Teaching History with an Ethno-Nationalistic Approach: History Textbooks in the Education System of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

[10]Darko Leitner Stojanov and Petar Stojanov, "The Myth of Victimization in Macedonian History Textbooks (1991–2019)."

to their less refined embeddedness compared to other European counterparts. The study of this, of course, always depends on "which epistemological interests dominate the analyses."[11]

References

Malešević, Siniša. 2019. *Grounded Nationalisms: A Sociological Analyses*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ognjenović, Gorana, Nataša Mataušić, and Jasna Jozelić. 2016. "Yugoslavia's Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of 'Absolute Modernity'." In *Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism and Cultural Memory, Volume 2: Tito's Yugoslavia, Stories Untold*, edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić. London: Palgrave.

[11] Zrinka Štimac, "Southeast Europe in History Textbooks: A Variety of Selective Perceptions."

3

The Ideologization of History Education and Textbooks in Slovenia (Yugoslavia) During Socialism, 1945–1990

Mateja Režek

Collective historical memory results from the construction of a common past, a construction in which history textbooks play an extremely important role. They represent one of the first contacts with history for anyone who has ever attended school, and although an individual's perspective on the past may later change, traces of them remain. "Our image of other peoples, or of ourselves for that matter, reflects the history we are taught as children," noted French historian Marc Ferro. "This history marks us for life. Its representation, which is for each one of us a discovery of the world, of the past of societies, embraces all our passing or permanent opinions, so that the traces of our first questioning, our first emotions, remain indelible" (Ferro 2003).

In evaluating the content of history textbooks, it must not be overlooked that, more than other types of historical writing, textbooks are powerfully subject to influences from the time and environment in which they emerge. They must therefore be interpreted not only in light of what

M. Režek (✉)
Science and Research Centre of Koper, Koper, Slovenia
e-mail: Mateja.Rezek@zrs-kp.si

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_3

is written in them, but also what is not; what is absent is often more telling than what is present. In his renowned Cambridge lecture *Society and the Individual*, Edward H. Carr pointed out the depth of the interaction between past and present: "There is no more significant pointer to the character of a society than the kind of history it writes or fails to write." For this reason, he advised students: "Before you study the history, study the historian… Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment. The historian, being an individual, is also a product of history and of society; and it is in this twofold light that the student of history must learn to regard him" (Carr 1961). The same applies to history textbooks and curricula, which are not only the product of their authors, but above all a reflection of the dominant system of values, beliefs, and ideology of a given society. Great political upheavals cause changes in perceptions of the past, or rather constructions of new collective memories that secure the legitimacy and historical identity of the new order. In this sense, the past finds itself in the Orwellian function of mastering the present and the future: "Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past" (Orwell 1983, 28).

History was certainly one of the main tools of legitimation of the Yugoslav communist authorities.[1] Key legitimation points were the *national liberation struggle* during World War II and the *people's revolution*. Another important legitimizing tenet of the communist authorities was their concept of resolving the *national question*, that is, the principle of *brotherhood and unity* which was eventually accompanied by that of *Yugoslav socialist patriotism*. After the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948, resistance to Stalinism, *self-management*, and *non-alignment* also entered the historical canon as specific qualities of Yugoslav socialism.

In post-World War II Yugoslavia, two tasks were prioritized for historiography: the search for a tradition of progressive movements in the past, and the definition of a linear historical development as ceaseless progress from lower to higher forms of social arrangements, from a class-based to

[1]For more on the relationship of communist authorities to historiography, see: Koren (2012), Najbar Agičić (2013), Režek (2014, 971–992).

a classless society. Historians were supposed to support their arguments with dialectical and historical materialism, and to be oriented toward a Marxist interpretation of the history of the masses. At the same time, they were required to expand their research toward contemporary history, in particular toward the interwar period and World War II. One of the first tasks that the new Yugoslav authorities assigned to historians was the drafting of new textbooks, which turned out to be a challenge; the first history textbooks by domestic authors were published only in the mid 1950s.

The most important interpretative guidelines in the field of contemporary history were defined by the highest Communist Party leaders, especially Josip Broz Tito, with the significance of his speeches and political reports for Yugoslav historiography comparable only to that of *The History of the VKP(b)* ("the Short Course") for Soviet historiography. In Slovenia, Boris Ziherl, at the time minister of science and culture, played the most important role in defining the ideological direction of historical writing. In 1947, on the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Communist Party of Slovenia, Ziherl wrote that the party's establishment had not only been "a turning point in the development of the Slovenian workers' movement" but also "a turning point in the history of the Slovenian people in general… It was a historical necessity that the Slovenian people acquired new political leadership: a new, truly national and people's party that would be capable of forging the way through difficult ordeals toward victory. This could only be the Communist Party of Slovenia."[2] In 1951, at the congress of Slovenian historians in Ljubljana, Ziherl presented specific guidelines. In his report "On Certain Theoretical and Practical Problems of Slovenian Historiography," he emphasized that, like all revolutions, "ours also, conceived in the liberation struggle, marked what we call the re-evaluation of all values." He characterized older Slovenian historiography as a reflection of its German counterpart, and reproached it for conservatism and for wallowing in earlier historical periods—"an escape from the damned present"—in its neglect of

[2]ARS – Arhiv Republike Slovenije [Archives of the Republic of Slovenia], AS 1589, Box 212, Boris Ziherl, "Mesto Komunistične partije Slovenije v zgodovini slovenskega naroda" [The Place of the Communist Party of Slovenia in the History of the Slovenian People]. Ziherl's speech was first published in *Ljudska pravica*, April 18, 1947.

Marxism and privileging of positivism. Ziherl was of the opinion that Slovenian historiography erred by being "conditioned by class" and that a class society clouded the gaze and prevented objective evaluation of the past. He advised historians to dedicate research to recent history, particularly the interwar period, and to follow "the dialectical methods of historical materialism" (Ziherl 1989, 56–70).

The Communist Party's interest in education was deeply rooted in its political program, which anticipated not only the building of a new state, but also the formation of a new socialist society and a new socialist man. A society that broke with tradition, exchanging previous values for new ones, required new schools and a new education system to assist in building a new society-wide identity. But multi-ethnic societies, such as Yugoslavia was, find it harder than ethnically homogeneous societies to create a common identity. It was even more difficult for socialist Yugoslavia, where the modest common past that existed was burdened by prewar ethnic antagonisms and a bloody settling of accounts during World War II. Because of this, the communist authorities were forced to invent a common Yugoslav history (Höpken 1996, 100). The common *national liberation struggle* of the Yugoslav peoples during World War II offered a solution that could be connected with the idea of *brotherhood and unity* and the *people's revolution*. The *national liberation struggle* was therefore not only a means to legitimize the communist government, but also a means with which to build a common Yugoslav identity.

In 1945, prewar history textbooks were removed from schools because they were not in tune with the new Yugoslav reality and the Communist Party's concept of history; they did not promote a dialectical-materialist perspective of the world. As no domestic textbooks adhered to the new ideological concepts during the first postwar years, translations of Soviet history textbooks—mostly in the Stalinist style—were used in schools, although they contained no national history and ended chronologically with the October Revolution, thus not reflecting the Yugoslav curricula.

Preparation of new national history textbooks was a priority for the communist authorities, but serious divisions soon appeared at the top of the federal political structure over whether there should be unified textbooks of national history for the whole of Yugoslavia, or each Yugoslav republic should have their own. As early as 1945, two currents had

emerged in the federal Ministry of Education: Slovenians, Croatians, and a few Serbian representatives supported individual textbooks for each republic, while the majority of representatives from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia lobbied for unified textbooks. The latter approach prevailed, and the educational authorities prescribed unified history textbooks while also granting republics "provisional" permission to publish their own textbooks (Lilly 2001, 62), eventually making this a permanent right. Thus tension between common Yugoslav identity and the individuality of the respective Yugoslav nationalities was already discernible during this early period of extreme centralism. It would become even more apparent in later decades.

The starting point of school history teaching is the curriculum that dictates textbooks' content. A first curriculum was articulated before the war ended: As early as September 1944, a provisional curriculum for primary schools was issued in Slovenia that was valid in territories under Partisan control. In terms of history, that curriculum explicitly prescribes lessons about World War II in which teachers were required to present the causes of the collapse of prewar Yugoslavia, the development of the *national liberation struggle*, the personality of Marshal Tito, and the establishment of *people's power* (SŠM 1944). The first postwar curriculum for primary schools, drafted in 1946, is similar (SŠM 1946a). Given the period in which they emerged, the diction of these first two curricula is surprisingly moderate, which is not the case for the primary school curriculum for the year 1948. In addition to acquainting pupils with historical events "from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism" and promoting the development of "conscious and active love toward everything that is progressive and humane," the 1948 curriculum demands that pupils develop "hatred toward everything reactionary and inhumane" (SŠM 1948a, 91). Both prewar traditions and political dissent were considered manifestations of conservatism; the curriculum thus combines patriotism and love toward humanity with hatred toward those who thought differently. It enumerates detailed themes and subjects through which pupils should learn during history lessons. Chapter outlines dealing with the interwar period emphasize the role of the Communist Party, although it had been a marginal political party then. The curriculum also provides detailed prescriptions

regarding material dealing with World War II, with an emphasis on the Yugoslav peoples' common struggle against occupiers and collaborators, and on the role of the Communist Party. Primary school pupils were to learn about "the betrayal perpetrated by the leadership of the previous political parties" and about "domestic traitors." Several hours of lessons were also dedicated to the formation of *people's power* during World War II and the introduction of socialism after it (SŠM 1948a, 94–95).

Gymnasiums, secondary schools offering an academic course in preparation for university entrance, received their first provisional curriculum in 1945. The first postwar generation of gymnasium students would learn, among other history lessons, about the history of prewar Yugoslavia, its collapse, the Partisan movement, the victory of the *national liberation struggle*, the formation of *people's power*, and the new Yugoslav state (SŠM 1945, 10–14). The 1946 curriculum has slightly more detailed content prescriptions. Since textbooks for recent history did not exist, gymnasium teachers and students were required to read the works of leading politicians: Tito, Edvard Kardelj, and Ziherl (SŠM 1946b).

Extreme detail characterizes the 1948 gymnasiums curriculum. During history lessons, like their primary-school counterparts, students should develop "love toward everything that is progressive and humane in history, and hatred toward everything reactionary and inhumane." History lessons should also engender "conscious and self-sacrificing builders and defenders of our people's homeland." In addition, students should be given "the correct orientation toward history and contemporary political life, and the correct understanding of the laws of the historical path that brought our country to the victory of socialism, as well as the laws of the historical path upon which humanity moves toward its final purpose—communism, a society of limitless progress and humanity" (SŠM 1948b, 70). Categorization of historical periods remain traditional—from antiquity to the modern era—with emphases in content and terminology adapted for the new ideology. Antiquity is defined as a period characterized by slave ownership, the Middle Ages as one of feudalism, great social inequality, and peasant rebellions. The emphasis in modern and contemporary history is on the establishment of capitalist relationships and the emergence of the workers' movement. World War I

is presented as a precursor to the October Revolution, and great significance is given to the history of the Soviet Union. National history, or the history of the Yugoslav nation, was presented during the final gymnasium year. The main topics addressed for the interwar period are the workers' movement and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, with the most detailed lessons addressing the history of the *national liberation struggle*, capturing both the military and political aspects of World War II war through Partisan battles and the organization of new government organs (SŠM 1948b, 70–114).

After the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia began to open to the West and the most extreme forms of control and repression were abandoned. The most rigid ideological elements then disappear from the history curricula, as did eventually the cultivation of "hatred toward everything reactionary," but the fundamental ideological postulates and emphases remain more or less unchanged. What's more, during the period immediately after the Cominform Dispute, Yugoslav political leaders increased the pressure on historiography. The Cominform Resolution had reproached Yugoslav leaders for excessive boasting and immodesty in praising the merits of Yugoslav communists and Tito's Partisans during the war, and these accusations demanded a quick and efficient response. The framework in which the history of the Communist Party and the *national liberation struggle* should be written was inserted into Tito's political report at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in July 1948, during which the general secretary laid out a detailed overview of party history, and, on this basis, justified its policy as righteous (Tito 1948, 7–148). A resolution was passed at the Fifth Congress to organize research into the history of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the workers' movement, the *national liberation struggle*, and the postwar building of socialism. Soon afterwards, a department of history was founded within the party's Central Committee, and similar departments were established in the parties of each republic. These departments gathered and published material about party history and supervised historians' work.

Exactly what the government needed from new history textbooks is most explicitly expressed in an article by Milovan Djilas titled "On National History as a School Subject." Published in January 1949 in

Komunist, the gazette of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it lays out the ideological framework for writing Yugoslav textbooks of national history. Djilas appeals to historians to rid themselves of traditional belief systems and old perspectives on national history, and to read the Marxist classics. Historians should reinvent the laws of historical development on the basis of dialectical materialism, which he viewed as "the only true scientific method," and decide in what manner and in which circumstances these laws were expressed in the history of the Yugoslav peoples. At the same time, they should develop criticism in their work and discover not only the power that drives development but also that which prevents development. Finally, historians should not be guided by nationalism in the evaluation of events and personalities from the national past. Djilas believed that the most urgent task in the field of historiography was the creation of national history textbooks, which would serve as an ideological weapon for the party, and be "a constituent part of the struggle for the rapid ideological elevation and re-education of our working people and our youth." He tasked historians with supporting "the struggle of the Party to properly illuminate the past of our people" (Đilas 1949, 52–77).

A political thaw followed the "Yugo-Stalinism" period of 1948 and 1949. In 1952, amid the liberalization of the political system after the retreat from Soviet patterns, the Commissions for Agitation and Propaganda with the federal and republican parties, better known as Agitprop, responsible for culture and education, were dissolved. But the thaw did not last long. In 1956, the Communist Party again extended its reach into "sensitive" areas, historiography among them. When party leaders realized that relaxing the ideological work previously performed by Agitprop had weakened party influence, Central Committees on both federal and republican levels established Ideological Commissions, and soon afterwards History Commissions, which had wide powers in directing and controlling historiography. Meanwhile the idea of creating special institutes exclusively engaged in modern and contemporary history from a Marxist standpoint, thus serving the needs of the Communist Party, gained strength. As a result, institutes dealing with the history of the workers' movement emerged in nearly all Yugoslav republics in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The mid 1950s saw the first textbooks by domestic authors published in Slovenia. The first Slovenian textbook dealing with modern and contemporary history came out in 1956, written by Ferdo Gestrin, Jože Hainz, and Metod Mikuž. It was intended for students in the fourth year of lower gymnasiums and, following the school reform of 1958 and the introduction of a unified eight-year primary school program, in the eighth year of primary school.[3] The book begins with the March Revolution of 1848 and ends with the beginning of the 1950s, with most attention given to the *national liberation struggle*. Its extensiveness and high number historical facts gives the impression that its authors were not following a curriculum for primary schools (SŠM 1954), but for gymnasiums (SŠM 1955).

Metod Mikuž, professor of history at the University of Ljubljana, founder of the first department for contemporary history in Yugoslavia, and before that a priest and Partisan, wrote the chapters about the twentieth century. He was a respectable and respected figure, but not accepted—still less so his perspective on historiography—as entirely loyal to the communist authorities (Režek 2010, 225). Textbook writing was probably entrusted to him because there was no one else as knowledgeable about world and national contemporary history, or as Bogo Grafenauer, another University of Ljubljana history professor, later concluded: "Only with our knowledge was it possible to compose all possible publications… and to realize a series of important academic projects… The nomenclature's hands were tied; but on the other hand, the only safe way to work was self-censorship" (Grafenauer 1993, 123).

The extent to which Mikuž's writing was dictated by self-censorship cannot be determined from the book, but he evidently performed the task in accordance with the ideological canon and official curriculum. In the chapters about the interwar period he emphasizes, more than the facts warranted, the significance of the Communist Party, while the *national liberation struggle* occupies a central place in the textbook. The positivistic description of events is frequently interrupted by authoritative conclusions, usually connected to the party's role. The description of the *national liberation struggle* is written in the context of ideological

[3]For more on the 1958 school reform, see: Gabrič (2006a).

postulates, and connected to the *people's revolution* (Gestrin et al. 1958, 180–181):

> The NOB [*national liberation struggle*] was not a battle to merely rid the homeland of the occupiers and then continue with the old social and political life that had been disrupted by the occupation, so that after the liberation, the king and old government would return to power, and the Great Serbian *čaršija* and the rest of the Yugoslav bourgeoisie would once again sit on the neck of the working people. NOB was much more than that. It was both a liberation war and a people's revolution. Under the leadership of the KPJ [Communist Party of Yugoslavia], the working class along with the masses of farmers and workers' intelligentsia, settled accounts with both the occupier and the bourgeoisie that had suppressed the working class and the freedom-loving masses during the times of old Yugoslavia, and, as soon as the occupation had begun, collaborated with the occupier and perpetrated the greatest possible betrayal of their own people. Because the masses fought against the traitorous bourgeoisie and persisted in enforcing the people's power, the country was liberated not only from the foreign occupiers, but also from the traitorous bourgeoisie and its authorities. The revolution was a complete success.

In contrast with the Croatian history textbook of the time, in which there was no special chapter on the *national liberation struggle* in Croatia (Koren 2012, 354), the first Slovenian textbook of contemporary history dedicates even more space to the *national liberation struggle* in Slovenia than to the common struggle of the Yugoslav peoples. Notable, but still in keeping with the Slovenian curriculum, is the emphasis on the operations of the Liberation Front [Osvobodilna fronta, or OF], the specifics of the Slovenian resistance. Leaders of other Yugoslav republics did not always want to hear about this, because the establishment of the Liberation Front in April 1941 came much earlier than the resistance that developed in other parts of Yugoslavia. Similarly, it is unusual that the slogan *brotherhood and unity* does not appear anywhere in this textbook. The phrases "our republics" or "our peoples" appear, but nothing more. Mikuž was quite skeptical about "Yugoslavianism," as revealed in some of his later statements, for example from May 1966. In a conversation with Mitja Ribičič, the president of the History Commission of the League of

Communists of Slovenia, about an academic conference dealing with the Liberation Front that had taken place in Ljubljana shortly before, Mikuž remarked that it was important that "guests from the southern republics" attended to learn about the Slovenian Liberation Front and specifics of the Slovenian resistance. They also discussed the current Yugoslav project of writing a collective history of the workers' movements of the Yugoslav territories. Mikuž believed the project was unrealistic and did not want to participate. "Each of the Yugoslav peoples should write their own history and then we will see what we have in common," he concluded.[4]

From the mid 1960s inter-republic relations became an increasingly serious problem in Yugoslavia. A worsening of both the economic and political situations prompted the *national question* to raise its head again. This question was crucial for the existence of Yugoslavia but the communist authorities had long underestimated it, in part because they believed that the revolution and the formation of the Yugoslav federation had solved it once and for all, and in part from the fear of prodding a sensitive nerve in the multinational state. Furthermore, they believed in proletarian internationalism. Revolution or class liberation was supposed to be the precondition for the formation of the federation, which in turn was the solution to the *national question*. In an attempt to calm inter-republic tensions, the Yugoslav authorities clung even more tightly to *brotherhood and unity*. In the mid 1950s they began to promote *Yugoslav socialist patriotism*, or rather the creation of a Yugoslav supranational consciousness (Režek 2007, 195–208). They attempted to include these principles in school textbooks and in the all-Yugoslav projects of writing the common history of the Yugoslav territories and the Yugoslav workers' movement into academic historiography, but the success of these efforts was quite limited.[5]

In the first half of the 1960s, Slovenia reformed its curricula for both primary schools and gymnasiums. The 1962 curriculum for primary schools emphasized the *national liberation struggle* even more than the previous curricula: pupils should learn about all historical eras, "but especially the most recent era of our history and the national liberation

[4]ARS, AS 1589, Box 189, Notes, May 13, 1966.

[5]For more on the Yugoslav history projects, see: Najbar Agičić (2013), Režek (2014).

struggle" (SŠM 1962, 77). In 1964, gymnasiums received their new curriculum. In addition to the usual material pertaining to historical events and the development of national consciousness, patriotism, and humanism, a distinct emphasis was introduced in order that students should "be trained to recognize the laws of the development of human society… that an awareness should be developed in the historical necessity and justice of revolutionary concepts at specific levels of society" and that "students should be shaped into conscious fighters and builders of socialism" (SŠM 1964, 17). Like previous curricula, the failures of prewar Yugoslavia, the heroism of the *national liberation struggle*, and the success and international reputation of postwar Yugoslavia were highlighted in lessons on contemporary history. The historical material for fourth-year gymnasium students carries the telling title "The Disintegration of Capitalism and the Growth of Socialist Power" (SŠM 1964, 26), which suggests that socialism's final victory over capitalism was a historical necessity and only a question of time.

In the fall of 1965, the History Commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia issued a report on the problems of teaching contemporary history. It identified the greatest weaknesses as the lack of appropriate history textbooks, the limited professional capabilities of teachers, and the frequent failure to complete the curriculum. The new curriculum allotted a greater number of lessons to recent history because of "its important educational role." The report noted: "The older teaching staff is only slowly adapting to these changes because they do not want to reduce lessons on the earlier historical periods. Systematic supervision over the implementation of the curriculum does not exist. Individual oversight reveals that teaching staff do not adhere to the curriculum; for example, in Ljubljana at the Gymnasium on Šubičeva Street and at Poljane Gymnasium, and also at the Gymnasium in Stična, only six hours were dedicated to the national liberation struggle and the postwar period. Despite this, it must be emphasized that younger teachers find it easier to get accustomed to the demands of the new curriculum, and therefore we can expect that recent history will receive the emphasis it deserves in the future…We cannot say that teachers decline to teach the national liberation struggle and its revolutionary

characteristics, but at the same time we cannot ignore the fact that many teachers shortchange recent history in favor of older periods."[6]

It would be necessary to wait until 1966 for the first gymnasium history textbook dedicated to twentieth-century events. Also written by Mikuž, it covers the period from World War I to the 1960s (Mikuž 1966). This textbook is less dogmatic than the one for primary schools Mikuž had written ten years earlier, and it is interesting that only a quarter is dedicated to World War II. This section provides a chronological overview of the war's events in Europe, followed by a description of the *national liberation struggle* in Yugoslavia and Slovenia. The Slovenian *national liberation struggle* again receives more space than that of the other Yugoslav peoples and, like its predecessor, this textbook makes no mention of the *brotherhood and unity* slogan. Here and there Mikuž uses of the first person plural ("our national liberation struggle," "our homeland," "we created," "we founded," and, last but not least, "we elected Tito as president of the republic"), but in general the tone is much more restrained than the previous textbook. On the other hand, Mikuž shows very little sense of history pedagogics: the text is dry, tends toward political history, and is accompanied by only a few photographs and maps—there is no other supplementary educational material.

At the same time Mikuž's textbook came out, a new textbook of twentieth-century history for the eighth year of primary school was released. It was written by France Škerl, a historian at the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement. Škerl was a former Christian socialist, and, like Mikuž, was not considered a "party historian." What's more, in the 1960s his academic work had been criticized by the party's History Commission, which reported that he "gives a misleading representation of the national liberation struggle." Because of this, certain members of the History Commission believed that Škerl should be redirected into the publication of bibliographies, "because he is very precise," and "we have to discourage him from other work."[7] It is not known why the writing of a primary-school textbook was entrusted to him, but it

[6]ARS, AS 1589, Box 167, Report on the Problems of Teaching Contemporary History, October 23, 1965, pp. 5–6, 15.

[7]ARS, AS 1589, Box 166, Session of the History Commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia, February 8, 1962, pp. 9–10.

was probably for similar reasons to those behind the choice of Mikuž. The textbook, in accordance with the curriculum, covers the period from World War I to the then present time, with approximately 40 percent of the content dedicated to World War II. Most of the section on World War II is related to the *national liberation struggle*, although Škerl, unlike Mikuž, does not distinguish chapters on the Slovenian *national liberation struggle* from the common Yugoslav struggle. Škerl gives even more space than Mikuž to the Liberation Front and its key role in developing Slovenia's resistance movement, and somewhat boldly titles one chapter "The Liberation Front Led Slovenians in Battle" (Škerl 1966, 95). The text is extensive and contains a considerable amount of historical data, but Škerl shows a better sense of how to deal with supplementary educational material. There are more pictures than in Mikuž's textbook, and summaries, lists of new concepts, and exercise questions at the end of each chapter. Given the time when the textbook was published, Škerl's writing is not excessively charged with emotion, but rather dry and boring.

It is possible that this book did not meet with the authorities' approval. Documents of the party's History Commission contain almost nothing about it, except that it was "clearly too difficult" for pupils in primary schools, and that there should be more emphasis on "formative potential in the history lessons,"[8] as Branko Božič, dean of the Pedagogical Academy in Ljubljana, noted in 1972. By then Božič and Tomaž Weber, a professor of methodology in history teaching, were already preparing a new history textbook for the eighth primary year.

This new book by Božič and Weber was published in 1973 and reprinted many times, the last edition revised and updated in 1990. Because it was used in Slovenian primary schools for almost two decades, I will take a closer look at its content. The textbook covers the time from the October Revolution, defined as "the beginning of a new era in the development of human society" (Božič and Weber 1976, 10) to the early 1970s. It paints a black-and-white picture of history, has a single perspective, and an emotional charge is present in almost every sentence. The Communist Party occupies the center of national history during the

[8]ARS, AS 1589, Box 195, Consultation of historians – communists, June 23, 1972, p. 2.

interwar period; the workers' movement is emphasized and the bourgeoisie, "which temporarily united and fortified its authority in order to mercilessly suppress the revolutionary avant-garde of the working class and later compete among itself for power" (Božič and Weber 1976, 24), is characterized as on its last legs. This outline of interwar history is followed by an overview of World War II, and then a chapter on the *national liberation struggle* takes up half the book. Tito and the Communist Party play the key roles, not only as leaders of the Partisan movement but as the far-sighted planners of the resistance. They were prepared for war, unlike the prewar Yugoslav government, which immediately succumbed to the aggressor (Božič and Weber 1976, 62–63):

> The Yugoslav peoples under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia prevented Yugoslavia from crossing into the Fascist camp and forced the bourgeoisie to resist Hitler. But a poorly armed military, betrayal, inability of the general command, insufficient plans for defense, lack of preparedness for war, total confusion, and internal weakness resulted in the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The King and his government fled and left the people to the mercy of the occupier… In the fateful days of April 1941, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the only organized power in the country that realized what destiny awaited the Yugoslav people.

The discussion of the war maintains a very clear delineation between good and evil: Partisans on one side, occupiers and "domestic traitors" on the other. In their ruthless violence against the people, the occupiers "were surpassed only by the domestic traitors, Četnici, Ustaše and others" (Božič and Weber 1976, 66). The text is accompanied by photographs, some featuring extreme images of torture, hanging, and shooting, which are very suggestive and certain to affect children's sensibilities. The crimes of the occupiers and their collaborators are sometimes described in detail, such as the Ustaša crimes in the Jasenovac concentration camp (Božič and Weber 1976, 72):

> Almost every day drunk Ustaša butchers brutally tortured their victims, beating them to death with clubs, cutting off their heads, incinerating them in the "brickyard," shooting them in ditches that were dug by

> Gypsies, throwing them in the Sava River which swallowed up some ten thousand people.

The Partisans are depicted as the complete opposite. Their struggle is idealized to the extreme and Partisan morale described as an expression of the highest form of courage and humanity (Božič and Weber 1976, 69):

> An extraordinary comradeship developed among the Partisan fighters. Between battles, the new Partisan morale grew, fortifying the fighters' conviction and trust that they would not leave each other in danger, that if there was no exit strategy for all of them, they would fight the enemy together until the last man. This Partisan comradeship was particularly evident in the care for wounded comrades. Wounded fighters were carried countless kilometers to health facilities and hospitals. During these voyages, the Partisans often encountered enemies and impassable natural obstacles. They were often assisted by noncombatants, patriots from the surrounding villages, who would share their last bit of food and clothing with the fighters. It was precisely the knowledge that they would never be abandoned when powerless, and the help of ordinary people, that gave the Partisans the fighting power to overcome the most terrible hardships.

There are detailed descriptions of several battles, for example the Battle of Neretva, known as the Battle for the Wounded, at the beginning of 1943. Both the moral and military victories of the Partisans are emphasized (Božič and Weber 1976, 90):

> The Battle for the Wounded was successfully won. It was one of the greatest and most renowned battles… in which the tactics of the Partisan High Command and Comrade Tito defeated the well-conceived battle plan of the German and Italian commands. Eighty thousand enemy soldiers (that is how many they had in Northern Africa at that time) with the most modern arms could not defeat National Liberation Army and the people.

As in previous Slovenian history textbooks, the Liberation Front finds its place in this book (Božič and Weber 1976, 77):

> The communists played a leading role in the OF, but this was not emphasized in 1941. They respected the principle that it was necessary to avoid anything that would limit the expansion of the liberation struggle. Only in the spring of 1943 did the CK KPS [Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia] emphasize their leadership in the establishment and development of OF, when it became clear even to the Slovenian Catholic masses that the liberation struggle would not have existed without the communists.

On the other hand, "the White Guard… only sowed hatred among the people" and "in the fall of 1942, it was unmasked as the servant of the occupiers. Its propaganda that it fought for faith and for the Slovenian people was in vain… But it was difficult to settle accounts with fanatical members of the White Guard, the organizers of the gangs that were hunting down OF activists and frightening the population" (Božič and Weber 1976, 87). A special subchapter titled "The Significance of the National Liberation Struggle as an All-People War and People's Revolution" interprets this struggle (Božič and Weber 1976, 110–111):

> This was a magnificent struggle of the Yugoslav peoples, which under the leadership of the KPJ took fate in their hands and consciously went toward a common and more beautiful future… The war for national liberation was a well-organized all-people's struggle led by the High Command of the National Liberation Army under Marshal Tito, the High Commander and General Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

Tito's thoughts are included in the text, for example about the "inhuman heroism of young people who sacrificed lives that they had hardly entered so that future generations would be happy" (Božič and Weber 1976, 111). Thus, a pattern and model was offered to coming generations for identification.

In the spirit of the times, *brotherhood and unity* is also strongly emphasized and the Yugoslav peoples' common *national liberation struggle* presented as "the forge of brotherhood and unity" (Božič and Weber 1976, 111–112):

> The brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav peoples were forged in the NOB. They gave them the power to thwart the attacks of the occupiers and domestic traitors. "The gesture of brotherhood and unity made it possible wherever we went to gain the support of our tormented and impoverished people," Tito said in the first period of the NOB. The Partisans vanquished all traitors with the ideas of the common struggle of the Yugoslav peoples, who could only defeat their enemies if they were united. In the NOB, the Yugoslav peoples forged a unity that no one was ever or would ever be able to break again.

In the chapters on postwar history, the textbook resumes an overview of world history through the early 1970s, with the most space given to the liberation movements in the Third World and the expansion of socialism globally. The chapter on building socialist Yugoslavia includes an overview of Yugoslav postwar history. The solution for the western Yugoslav borders, the formation of the new state, and the establishment of its government are described in detail, but the imitation of the Soviet model in internal politics is not mentioned. Another theme is postwar reconstruction and in this context "the exceptional determination and diligence of the Yugoslav people" (Božič and Weber 1976, 134). The conflict with the Cominform is described as a struggle to find a different path to socialism in which the people "supported Tito and the party with a united spirit and would not allow anyone to sully his heroic battle against Fascism" (Božič and Weber 1976, 137). A description of the introduction of self-management socialism follows, along with countless details from Yugoslav laws, constitutions, constitutional amendments, and other documents. The textbook's concluding paragraphs are dedicated to the role of Yugoslavia on the international scene, with an emphasis on the Non-Aligned Movement. At the center is Tito, and Yugoslavia headed by him is presented as the epicenter of global peace efforts.

The 1975 curriculum for primary schools is even more explicit in intention than previous curricula. History is divided into five periods: prehistoric communities, slave ownership, feudalism, capitalism, and the growth of socialist power—the last era beginning in 1917 with the October Revolution. The division of historical periods by social order fits with dialectical materialism, demonstrating the internal laws

of the development of human society and its ongoing, linear progress from lower to higher forms of social order—a fundamental purpose of historical education. The curriculum includes an explicit description of the characteristics of the history teacher, "especially one that teaches the history of the NOB and the postwar period… He must be a proficient expert—a historian whose teaching methods derive from Marxist foundations. In addition, he must have a versatile pedagogical and political background. He should regularly monitor historical, theoretical-Marxist, and political literature, and follow the news of the public and mass media. He should also have the skills of a social worker who educates pupils by example in accordance with the ideology of Yugoslav socialist self-managed society" (SŠM 1975, 28–29). It prescribes synchronized treatment of the *national liberation struggle* in Slovenia and other parts of Yugoslavia, and the search for mutual characteristics. For lessons on World War II, it is pointed out that the teacher should arrange the material throughout the school year so that he or she will not run out of time for postwar history, which is "due to its extraordinary topicality inadmissible" (SŠM 1975, 33). The instructions for teaching the curriculum include many themes from twentieth-century history that the teacher should work on during lessons, as well as instructions for how to give lessons on recent history. The instructions conclude as follows: "Above all, we must explain to pupils that our peoples live happily and that Yugoslavia is strong because it is led by the Communist Party, which is capable of resisting internal reactionary forces from the petit-bourgeois and nationalistic to the bureaucratic and dogmatic, and provides, with the implementation of social reforms, a self-management system and the power of the working class" (SŠM 1975, 34).

The 1975 curriculum reflects the atmosphere of the "leaden 1970s." After the settling of accounts with "party liberalism" at the beginning of the decade, the Yugoslav authorities strongly reined in freedom of expression. In fact, the 1970s and early 1980s saw the political authorities, more than ever before, reshape school history education into a tool of ideological and political indoctrination; the gap between school history and academic historiography was at its widest then since World War II.

At the end of the 1970s, Bogo Grafenauer, a respected Slovenian historian, proposed a secondary-school curriculum conceived as a chronological and content-driven overview of key historical processes, concepts, and institutions through all periods of human history—a framework within which the historical experiences of Slovenians and other Yugoslav nationalities would be approached. His appeal to shift the focus from exclusively political history to the cultural and social-historical was not acceptable to the political authorities, which persisted in the view that the most important task of teaching history was the transfer of revolutionary, patriotic, and "progressive" values to new generations, and shaping young people in the Marxist spirit. Grafenauer's draft was rejected with the controversial explanation that it was not sufficiently Marxist or "national" (Vodopivec 2009, 46–47).[9]

The authorities extended their reach farthest into the school system with the introduction of vocationally oriented education in secondary schools at the end of the 1970s. In 1975, the tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia prescribed new school directives, indicating that the party was returning to patterns that had seemed obsolete in the 1960s. They reintroduced the cult of physical work and vocational education, and general education slid down the ladder of cultural values (Gabrič 2006b, 1146). This meant more hours in professional subjects and a reduction of programs in general subjects. The final examination for gymnasium students (the *matura*) was also deemed unnecessary. In Slovenia, the law on vocational education was passed in 1980. Gymnasiums were eliminated, although several general programs still existed in some secondary schools: social sciences and languages, natural sciences, pedagogy and culture, in which students were prepared not for a specific vocation, but a more general professional field. These schools retained a flavor of the abolished gymnasiums, meaning more hours for general subjects, among them history. In the other secondary schools only two years of history were offered.

The first textbook of modern and contemporary history intended for students in the second year of the vocational secondary schools was written by Božič, Weber, and Janko Prunk, and published in 1978. The

[9] See also: Grafenauer (1979, 2–7).

Communist Party and Tito continued to occupy a central place, being depicted in great detail during the interwar period and even more so during World War II, in such a way that their rise to power after the war seems self-evident. World War II and the *national liberation struggle* took up roughly a third of the book, with ideologized and dogmatized explanations and the material, in accordance with the curriculum, presented in such a way that "students would learn about the leading role of the Communist Party. They should understand that our national liberation struggle was also a socialist revolution that put a new people's government into power. They should learn that our revolution also signified a struggle for the equality of the Yugoslav peoples… In the treatment of the military course of the National Liberation Army, teachers should not get lost in the details, but should above all convey the people's role in the struggle and the connection between the military and the hinterland, the moral values of the fighters, the reciprocal human relationships, the importance of the struggle in the international context, and the connection between the Yugoslav peoples" (SŠM 1977, 7–8). The postwar assumption of power is shown from the perspective of "party historiography," without any mention of its darker sides. The development of postwar Yugoslavia is presented as "an exceptional success," Tito as "the most prominent political personality in the contemporary world, a symbol of an independent socialist Yugoslavia, and of all the progressive forces that struggle for the equality of all nations, peoples, and countries in the world, for peace, for an end to the arms race between the great powers, and for the development of all humanity" (Božič et al. 1978, 121). The descriptions of internal political development of Yugoslavia are overloaded with the resolutions of party congresses and the content of the postwar Yugoslav constitutions. They conclude: "The new delegate system presents great possibilities for the further growth and strengthening of the socialist democracy and the strengthening of independence and self-management" (Božič et al. 1978, 132).

Another textbook, for modern and contemporary history, was used in the new educational system, this for social science and pedagogical secondary schools, in which history was taught throughout the four years. This book, written for fourth-year students by Marija Kremenšek and

Štefan Trojar, and published in 1984. It is the last textbook of recent history to be released during socialism. In accordance with the curriculum, it emphasizes similar themes as that for the vocational secondary schools written by Božič, Weber, and Prunk; in general, especially the chapters about the development of socialist Yugoslavia, it has more detail and is laden with the barely comprehensible terminology used by politicians and media in the 1970s and 1980s. This textbook did introduce some innovations. For example, it was the first to mention the capture of collaborators at the end of World War II: "After the German capitulation, the traitorous Četnici, Ustaše, Croatian, and Slovenian Home Guard and others lost their masters and perspectives. Most of them were desperate to flee to British military forces and thus evade the responsibility for their traitorous acts. Many members of the Slovenian Home Guard managed to get to Carinthia [in Austria] but the British forces sent them back to Yugoslavia" (Kremenšek and Trojar 1984, 139). Of course, there is nothing on the fate of the collaborators in this book, but it can be sensed. Previous textbooks hold no hint of this historical chapter, which is still a subject of political manipulation and cause of deep divisions today.

In the last secondary school textbook of modern and contemporary history from the socialist period, the *national question* and ethnic nationalism are, for the first time, presented as a problem of socialist Yugoslavia and not just of prewar Yugoslavia. Although the *national question* was crucial to the existence of multinational Yugoslavia, textbooks from the era dedicate a surprisingly limited amount of space to it. Whenever they touch on conflicts among the Yugoslav nationalities, they are presented as an expression of bourgeois class conflict, a problem solved in postwar socialist Yugoslavia. In this way, any discussion of inter-republic relations in socialist Yugoslavia became taboo, as did differences in economic development among the republics, which was the most salient trigger of both inter-republic and inter-ethnic antagonisms. It is thus even more significant that the textbook by Kremenšek and Trojar cites imbalance in the economic development of the Yugoslav republics as one of the main reasons for inter-republic tensions (Kremenšek and Trojar 1984, 194). The textbook ends with a description of the economic difficulties experienced by Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1980s—but we look in vain for the fact that Tito had died in 1980.

Conclusion

A stroll through the curricula and textbooks offers us a relatively good overview of history teaching in Slovenian schools during socialist era. Through textbook narratives we can easily discern the values mediated to young generations: patriotism, collectivism, and socialism. As Wolfgang Höpken has noted, historical education was directed toward the formation of the ideological and not the civic-social identity of young people, and in this sense, Yugoslav textbooks did not differ significantly from textbooks and educational goals in other socialist countries. "Such an education," wrote Höpken, "simply produced a set of codes, necessary for behaving in conformity with the existing political system and avoiding conflicts, but nothing like an identification with the system" (Höpken 1996, 104). Vast amounts of political facts, generalizations, one-sided, often dogmatic explanations, and political and ideological messages intended to secure the legitimacy of the Communist Party prevail in the history textbooks produced during socialism. The textbooks present socialism as a historical necessity. The leading role of the Communist Party is emphasized even in descriptions of the interwar period, although at that time it was marginal. Glorification of the *national liberation struggle* is placed at the center of the books as a method of creating a collective identity for the multi-ethnic Yugoslav state and legitimizing communist rule. Another important educational goal of school history was the strengthening of the Yugoslav peoples' *brotherhood and unity*—a slogan that emptied of meaning through endless repetition. A consequence of these ideologized textbook representations was unbalanced and selective historical memory. Decades-long one-sided historical education had long-term consequences; for example, in a 1995 public opinion poll in Slovenia, more than 35 percent of respondents reported that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the strongest and most influential political party in prewar Yugoslavia (Toš et al. 1996). During the socialist period history teaching was already criticized by academic historians on occasion, but their critiques did not have any significant consequences for educational practice. In Slovenia, criticism of history education grew louder in the second half of the 1980s, but history curricula and textbooks began changing only in the 1990s.

References

Božič, Branko, and Tomaž Weber, 1976. *Zgodovina za osmi razred* [History for the Eighth Year of Primary Schools]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

Božič, Branko, Tomaž Weber, and Janko Prunk. 1978. *Zgodovina 2* [History 2]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

Carr, Edward Hallet. 1961. *What Is History? The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge January–March 1961*. New York: Vintage Books.

Đilas, Milovan. 1949. "O nacionalni zgodovini kot učnem predmetu" [On National History as a School Subject]. *Komunist* 3 (1): 52–77.

Ferro, Marc. 2003. *The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is Taught to Children*. London and New York: Routledge. First published in French in 1981.

Gabrič, Aleš. 2006a. *Šolska reforma 1953–1963* [School Reform, 1953–1963]. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.

Gabrič, Aleš. 2006b. "Šolstvo od reforme do reforme" [Education from Reform to Reform]. In *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992* [Slovenian Modern History 1848–1992]. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga – Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.

Gestrin, Ferdo, Jože Hainz, and Metod Mikuž. *Zgodovina za VIII. razred osnovne šole* [History for the Eighth Year of Primary School]. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1958.

Grafenauer, Bogo. 1979. "Problematika izrade programa istorije kao obaveznog predmeta zajedničke programske osnove usmerenog obrazovanja u reformiranoj školi" [Some Problems with the Shaping of History Curriculum in the Framework of the Common Program in the Reformed, Vocationally Oriented Secondary School]. *Pouk zgodovine – Nastava povijesti* (1).

Grafenauer, Bogo. 1993. "Ob pisanju o slovenskem zgodovinopisju" [On the Writing about Slovenian Historiography]. *Zgodovinski časopis* 47 (1).

Höpken, Wolfgang. 1996. "History Education and Yugoslav (Dis-)Integration." In *Öl ins Feuer? – Oil on Fire?: Schulbücher, ethnische Stereotypen und Gewalt in Südosteuropa – Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in Southeastern Europe*, edited by Wolfgang Höpken. Hannover: Verlag Hansche Buchhandlung Braunschweig.

Koren, Snježana. 2012. *Politika povijesti u Jugoslaviji, 1945–1960: Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, nastava povijesti, historiografija* [Politics of History in Yugoslavia: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, History Teaching, Historiography: 1945–1960]. Zagreb: Srednja Europa.

Kremenšek, Marija, and Štefan Trojar. 1984. *Zgodovina 4* [History 4]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

Lilly, Carol S. 2001. *Power and Persuasion: Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944–1953*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Mikuž, Metod. 1966. *Zgodovina za četrti razred gimnazij* [History for the Fourth Year of Gymnasiums]. Ljubljana: Zavod za šolstvo SRS.

Najbar Agičić, Magdalena. 2013. *U skladu s marksizmom ili činjenicama?: hrvatska historiografija 1945–1960* [In Accordance with Marxism or Facts? Croatian Historiography, 1945–1960]. Zagreb: Ibis.

Orwell, George. 1983. *1984*. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga. First published in English in 1949.

Režek, Mateja. 2007. "Political Changes and the National Question in Yugoslavia in the Decade Following the Dispute with the Cominform, 1948–1958." In *Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende*, edited by Wolfgang Mueller and Michael Portmann. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Režek, Mateja. 2010. "Nevidna cenzura zgodovinopisja v socializmu" [Invisible Censorship of Historiography in the Period of Socialism]. In *Cenzurirano: zgodovina cenzure na Slovenskem od 19. stoletja do danes* [Censored: History of Censorship in Slovenia from the 19th Century to the Present Day], edited by Mateja Režek. Ljubljana: Nova revija.

Režek, Mateja. 2014. "Usmerjena preteklost: mehanizmi ideološke in politične 'kontaminacije' zgodovinopisja v socialistični Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji, 1945–1966" [Directed Past: The Mechanisms of Ideological and Political 'Contamination' of Historiography in Slovenia and Yugoslavia, 1945–1966]. *Acta Histriae* 22 (4): 971–992.

Škerl, France. 1966. *Zgodovina za 8. razred osnovnih šol* [History for the Eighth Year of Primary Schools]. Ljubljana: Zavod za napredek šolstva SRS.

SŠM – Slovenski šolski muzej [Slovenian School Museum]. 1944. *Začasni učni načrt za osnovne šole* [Provisional Curriculum for Primary Schools], September.

SŠM. 1945. *Začasni učni načrt na gimnazijah in klasičnih gimnazijah za šolsko leto 1945–1946* [Provisional Curriculum for Gymnasiums and Classical Gymnasiums for the School Year 1945–1946]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1946a. *Začasni učni načrt za višje osnovne šole* [Provisional Curriculum for Higher Primary Schools]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1946b. *Spremembe k učnemu načrtu za gimnazijo za šolsko leto 1946/47* [Changes to the Curriculum for Gymnasiums for the School Year 1946/47]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1948a. *Učni načrt za osnovne šole, nižje razrede sedemletk in višje osnovne šole* [Curriculum for Primary Schools]. Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za prosveto LRS.

SŠM. 1948b. *Učni načrt za gimnazije, nižje gimnazije in višje razrede sedemletk* [Curriculum for Gymnasiums, Lower Gymnasiums and Senior Years of the Seven-Year Schools]. Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za prosveto LRS, 1948.

SŠM. 1954. *Učni načrt za nižje razrede gimnazij in višje razrede osnovnih šol* [Curriculum for Lower Years of Gymnasiums and Higher Years of Primary Schools]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1955. *Učni načrt za višje razrede gimnazij in klasičnih gimnazij* [Curriculum for Higher Years of Gymnasiums and Classical Gymnasiums]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1962. *Predmetnik in učni načrt za osnovne šole* [Curriculum and Syllabus for Primary Schools]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1964. *Gimnazija: gradivo za sestavo predmetnika in učnega načrta* [Gymnasium: Materials for the Composition of the Curriculum and Syllabus]. Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije.

SŠM. 1975. *Osnovna šola: vsebina vzgojno-izobraževalnega dela* [Primary School: The Content of Educational Work]. Ljubljana: Zavod SRS za šolstvo.

SŠM. 1977. *Predmetnik in učni načrti (delovni osnutek): skupna programska osnova v usmerjenem izobraževanju* [The Curriculum and Syllabus (Working Draft): Common Program Basis in Vocationally Oriented Education]. Ljubljana: Zavod SRS za šolstvo.

Tito, Josip Broz. 1948. "Politično poročilo" [Political Report]. In *V. kongres Komunistične partije Jugoslavije* [Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia]. Ljubljana: Ljudska pravica.

Toš, Niko, et al., eds. 1996. *Razumevanje preteklosti: podatkovna knjiga, prvi del* [Understanding the Past: Research Data, Part 1]. Ljubljana: FDV.

Vodopivec, Peter. 2009. "Politics of History Education in Slovenia and Slovene History Textbooks since 1990." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeastern Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Ziherl, Boris. 1989. "O nekaterih praktičnih in teoretičnih problemih slovenskega zgodovinopisja" [On Certain Theoretical and Practical Problems of Slovenian Historiography]. In *Zbrana dela: peta knjiga* [Collected Works 5], edited by Boris Ziherl, 56–70. Ljubljana: SAZU.

4

Ideological Changes in the History Textbooks of Montenegro

Saša Knežević and Nebojša Čagorović

Under the socialist republic of Yugoslavia, from 1945 to 1991, Montenegrin history textbooks were adapted to the suit the political mould of its socialist society. There was a Marxist levelling and symmetrizing of its constituent nations' history, even though each nation had had its own specific historical development. During the most recent Yugoslav crisis, in the 1990s, ideologies of ruling political elites were founded on co-opting historical memory. History was hijacked for nationalistic purposes. In 2001, Montenegro commenced the development of its own historical textbooks utilizing Council of Europe recommendations and contemporary models of historical interpretation of the past. Analyzing these textbooks, we can conclude that Montenegrin textbook authors have made significant strides in the presentation of national and general history.

S. Knežević (✉) · N. Čagorović
Department of Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, Montenegro
e-mail: sasak@ucg.ac.me

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_4

Each generation analyzes its history with its own eyes and interpretations, posing different questions about the past. Each generation of researchers examines the historical record, interprets established facts, and may find new sources with which to augment the historical record and paint a revised picture. A society's historical consciousness and consequent spiritual health depends on the content presented during individuals' early education. A modern society needs to create a rational historical consciousness because in the zone of memory and oblivion exists the border beyond which the past endangers the present.

Changes inside school history textbooks are rooted in current ideology. Any change to the framework of the state, and consequent search for national and political identity, necessitate changes to school curricula and history textbooks. That is why history textbooks are a reliable indicator of societal changes and of the ideology of the political elites. If there is no educational policy beyond the state and, conversely, there is no state beyond ideology, then logically there is no school history beyond the ideological discourse of a society's main matrixes (Rastoder 2001, 22–23).

Official ideology in the era of communist Yugoslavia denied the findings of previous non-socialist, bourgeois historiography. It requested that history be the history of all nations of Yugoslavia, and that school history curricula neither single out nor neglect one nation at the expense of another. This Marxist levelling and symmetrizing of history denied the fact that each Yugoslav nation's societal development had its own specifics. In addition, the revolutionary winners replaced their predecessors in a way that led them to believe that history came with their ascension to power. They changed cities' names (Podgorica to Titograd, Bečkerek to Zrenjanin, Ploče to Kardeljevo, Strnišće to Kidričevo) and street names, destroyed monuments, and simply erased from textbooks those personalities whose clout could reduce their control of power.

As the ruling party, for decades the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had a monopoly over all political decision making. It defined the concept of education in line with its vision and goals in order to create citizens of a self-management socialist society.

At the first conference of the Council of Europe—founded in 1949 to uphold the rule of law, democracy and human rights on the continent—in Calw, Germany, in 1953 identified a need for member countries to

pay greater attention to European and world history.[1] Yugoslavia almost became a member state, and if it had done it would have been obliged to revise its existing world history textbooks in accordance with these recommendations. However, the political and ideology reality of Yugoslavia made that difficult. After political changes in 1990s, the new republics from former Yugoslavia prioritized the revision of their history books to reflect the rise of nationalism and to ensure their respective histories reflected their specific national stories; revision of European and world history along the lines suggested by the Council of Europe were left to another day (Vuković 2015, 12–13).

The history books of Yugoslavia reflected the views and values of the Communist Party. The party portrayed itself as vanguard of the working class with the historical mission to create a new, better society in which equality of men would be achieved. Education, specifically with respect to history and historiography, was a potent tool in the creation of a common memory to safeguard societal cohesion. Primary goals of the education system including shaping and "correcting" students' opinions, attitudes, and viewpoints to ensure that they acquired the values of a socialist society. Priorities in the history curriculum from 1945 to 1949 included: developing and strengthening brotherhood and unity; introducing students to the history of Yugoslav peoples; developing resistance and animosity towards enemies of the homeland and opponents of the legacy of the peoples' liberation struggle; and nurturing love and loyalty towards the homeland. In short: the "introduction of students to the glorious past of our peoples and our homeland Yugoslavia in order to form correct attitudes towards the new political reality" (Vuković 2015, 20).

Immediately after World War II, Yugoslav schools primarily relied on Soviet history textbooks. More intensive work on its own history textbooks commenced after 1949, following Tito's break with Stalin. This change in policy necessitated the establishment of commissions tasked with revising the curricula. This new approach maintained Marxism as the ideological starting point, however. The Cold War was presented as a bitter class struggle between the ruling and exploited classes. The 1950s

[1]Conference on "The European Idea in History Teaching," Calw, Germany, August 4–12, 1953, see: http://www.didactics.eu/fileadmin/pdf/1622.pdf.

saw various panegyrics to Stalin erased from Yugoslav history textbooks. Passages in Soviet textbooks which credited achievements to Lenin and Stalin were edited in Lenin's favour (Vuković 2015, 46).

During this period, Montenegro produced few required textbooks; the majority were published in Belgrade. From 1948 through 1960 the main domestic publisher was Narodna knjiga from Cetinje. The first textbook authors were Dragomir Petrić, Đ. Mrvaljević, Vukašin. Radonjić, S. Milošević, and Jagoš Jovanović. Montenegrin production of history textbooks in the 1960s and 1970s continued to be slow and stagnant, primarily due to lack of funds and competent authors, although from 1963 Montenegro prepared several textbooks in cooperation with the Serbian State Office for Textbooks and Educational Tools. Radonjic, one of their Montenegrin authors, wrote an analysis of Yugoslav textbooks, specifically the equal distribution of national history and requirement of joint Yugoslav conception. He argued that the key element of a good history textbook was unobtrusively integrating an idea and presenting it to students. Examples from the histories of Yugoslav nations illustrating patriotism and the struggle for freedom were, therefore, "precious material for realization of concept design in teaching history" (Radonjić 1963, 243).

The Montenegrin educational program continued to aim at introducing students to the "most important events from the past of our peoples and Yugoslavia." This knowledge of history aimed at developing pride, love and loyalty toward the national homeland; strengthening brotherhood and unity and the legacy of the people's anti-fascist struggle; creating hatred towards enemies of the homeland and all others who work against the legacy of the people's liberation struggle (Ministarstvo prosvjete NR Crne Gore 1948, 105).

History readers, as auxiliary reference books, were developed according to the curriculum and included selected texts and historical sources. In the history reader for the seventh grade of elementary school, published in Belgrade and used in Montenegro, a large number of chosen texts relate to class struggle in the nineteenth century and early twentieth. For example the topic "The life of workers in the nineteenth century" is covered with three texts: "The Position of the Working Class in England," "Karl Marx," and excerpts from "The Communist

Manifesto." The unit entitled "Working Class in the Second Part of the Nineteenth Century" is covered with texts mostly dedicated to the Paris Commune: "Proclamation of the Commune," "Long Live the Commune," "Hot Night," "The Death of Delescluze," "The Massacre of the Communards," "What is the Heroism of the Communards' Endeavour," "First of May: International Labour Day," and "Decisions of the First Congress of the Second International." The unit on the same topic within national history is dominated by similar ideologically based documents, for example: "Excerpts from the Program of Social Democratic Party," "The Speech of Dimitrije Tucovic on the Annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina," "The First Celebration of The May Day," and "Lenin on the Importance of the First Balkan War" (Grubač and Sečanski 1964).

The 1974 Constitution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brought profound changes to the country's social system and institutional framework. Amendments to the constitution enlarged each republic's jurisdiction and independence. History textbooks from the mid 1970s followed suit, but maintained the same ideological discourse. Montenegro's history education plans and programs continued to stress that a basic goal of teaching history was to introduce students to the history of Montenegrin and other Yugoslav nations and their struggle for freedom. This accent on national history was in the accordance with a similar trend in other Yugoslav republics. In general those curricula shared many common or similar characteristics, as can be seen in the program guidelines for the eighth grade of elementary school, which prescribe that students needed to understand that capitalism as a system was weakening while socialism as world process was winning, and that our socialist revolution demonstrated how to fight for freedom, brotherhood, unity, and international relations based on equality (Republički zavod za unapređenje školstva SRCG 1973, 140). In this period we can see a tendency to increase the share of national history in republican history education.

The 1975 history textbook for the seventh grade of elementary school, in a unit titled "Liberation Struggle and National Movements among South Slavs," presents the history of all Yugoslav nations individually. In a separate unit, it also presents the topic "South Slavs and their Neighbors in the Second Part of the Nineteenth Century and at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Units on Montenegro contain

very detailed maps of Montenegrin state development (Grubač 1975). Most of the 1975 history textbook for the eighth grade of elementary school is dedicated to the anti-fascist struggle, which takes up eighty pages (from page 60 to page 140) of a total of 180. Montenegrin anti-fascist struggle gets a special focus, with particular emphasis on the uprising of July 13, 1941 and other events of the war that happened in Montenegro. In general, the ideological matrix is impregnated with the successes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. One unit is dedicated to the "development of self-management socialist democracy in our country" (Radonjić and Petrić 1975).

The chapter "The World after World War II" discusses five educational topics: (1) The development of socialism after Word War I; (2) Relations between superpowers and the creation of blocs; (3) Non-aligned countries and their role in the world; (4) Development of science and technology; and (5) The activities of UN organizations. World affairs are explained through the dominant antagonism between socialism and capitalism. The textbook offers ready conclusions on the aggressive tendencies of capitalist countries lead by the United States, arguing that imperialist countries permanently endanger world peace and create instability and crisis. While the West is blamed for forming military-political blocs, the textbook authors advocate for non-alignment, as underlining cooperation among states based on equality and as a major force for fair international relations (Radonjić and Petrić 1975).

The end of the twentieth century was marked by the collapse of socialist regimes and the end of a single ideology. In Yugoslavia, it was followed by deep political crisis, the country's disintegration, and armed conflict, with the eruption of nationalism and nationalistic outbursts. In general, nations whose national identity and political freedoms are denied turn to nationalism. It is therefore not surprising that some of the most striking examples of nationalisms occurred in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union, where overall development was late and national identities were long suppressed under Communist ideology. British historian Elie Kedourie spoke about two ideological

obsessions: Communism and nationalism (Kedourie 2000).[2] The disintegration of the Soviet Union and fall of Communism arguably revived and fanned nationalism.

Prior to the birth of nationalism, history played a specific role. While in Europe's age of romanticism, from 1800 to 1850, folk stories and legends were fashionable, history now became popular. Before the national intelligentsia in post-Communist countries gave themselves the task of regaining the memory of the nation, and the cult of nationhood endangered respect for personal freedoms.

Historical consciousness has accurate and false standpoints on history, depending on a given political context (Deletić 2006, 42), and "histories are not only warehouses of exemplary behaviour" (Heler 1984, 267) but also inspire through shining role models and bad examples (Petranović 1984, 144). Through past prototypes, valuable and less valuable examples are constructed: the good and the bad, the heroic and the cowardly—conceptions which stir personal and collective aspirations. German historian Jürgen Kocka refers to a "narrative possession of history as a part of our own" (Kocka 1994, 12). A society chained by its own traditions cannot resist the burden of a consciousness full of accurate and false facts, the overblown importance of historical personalities or events which glow and grow in the public imagination. Rational consciousness has little chance in a society burdened by oral tradition and legends (Petranović 1984, 229).

In the 1980s, with the decline of Communism and disappearance of divided blocs, the Yugoslav political crisis reached its peak. Nationalism developed with public discourse around the realization of "historical dreams" based on so-called historical rights that had given birth to "historical territories." Such a pattern is typical of nationalism, as pointed out by the most prominent analysts of the topic, Ernest Gellner (1997), Kedourie, and Eric Hobsbawm (1996). But so-called natural boundaries intended to safeguard each nation in their own territory can neither

[2]The notion of ideology is frequently used in a political sense, as a political doctrine that inspires individual and particularly group behaviors and defines basic standpoints. Also see: Đorđević (1972), Manhajm (1968).

provide peace nor resolve problems in mixed areas where nationalistic passions are strongest. The universal importance of history or historical consciousness in shaping and experiencing national identity is crucial in the Balkans as a cohesive factor for identity and for choosing the nation's political goals.

Several academic works deal with the influence of historicism on Balkan national and state-making movements (Đorđević 1989; Bataković 1997). It can be argued that history and historical consciousness consist of consciousness of both present and past. Serbian historian Andrej Mitrovic wrote that historical notions have a specific place in the identification and legitimization of groups, movements, and nations (Mitrović 1991, 66). However the largest and the most important part of collective consciousness is created by non-scientific sources (Mitrović 1991, 251). US historian Hayden White has argued that history is inevitably formed on various meta-historical assumptions which create the interpretations used in historiographical analysis (White 2011, 26). As in all the humanities, historical views can present as though they are mutually exclusive, although different interpretations of the same historical events or processes can be equally legitimate (White 2011, 409).

Analyzing historical thought at the end of the twentieth century, German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler wrote that the particularity of national historical conditions was so strong that it created, in time, limited dominant currents that are very difficult to find counterparts to in another country. In addition, people were unwilling to face the crimes of the past (Wehler 2010, 53). Sometimes the past serves to justify the present, but sometimes there is a need to blame it. Rational historical awareness is not a prevailing attitude in any society, but a goal which can provide us with a healthy perception of the past, necessary for shaping a nation's consciousness. As part of social consciousness, history is subject to various manipulations. The best antidote to prevent its abuse and politicization is respect for methodology and the historian's heuristic guidelines. Working on a rational basis, the emotions and imagination are constantly sidelined. Historians should advocate for the necessity of using rational awareness to understand and interpret the past, in order

to create a healthy society liberated from hatred, political monopolies, propagandistic stereotypes, and nationalist cults (Petranović 1984, 8).

The role of myth is unavoidable in one's experience of one's own history, and history is full of idealistic pictures. The conflict with history that follows the destruction of myth is essentially conflict with one's identity and community (Protić 1986, 264). Historical memory is an essential part of social integrative thought as it not only serves daily politics but also fosters the construction of ideas in the immediate term and far into the future (Kuljić 1985, 24). Finally, increased political struggles multiply unscientific irrational notions because they are easier to instrumentalize (Mitrović 1991, 250).

Given the particular importance of history on consciousness, the ruling political elites in former Yugoslavia at the end of 1990s adopted ideologies wholly based on co-opting historical consciousness. This meant forming a positive self-image and a "picture of the enemy," both of which very quickly rose to incredible heights. For example, Serb nationalists pointed to Croatian separatism as the main culprit for triggering the Yugoslav crisis, claiming that Croats failed to appreciate the losses Serbia suffered for Yugoslavia, and that Croatia committed genocide against Serbs during World War II. Croats were portrayed as the greatest enemy of the Serb people, as a fascist, genocide-prone nation with a historical inferiority complex. This discourse drew parallels between the Croatian fascist Ustashe government of 1940 and Croatia's new leadership, and the memory of the Ustashe Jasenovac concentration camp was abused in the process (Andrijašević 1999, 49–51). Such ideas were taken from the repertoire of past ideologies.[3] Conversely, in Croatia the notion of a savage and primitive Serbia was revived: Serbs as schemers, born nationalists, and saboteurs of peace and tolerance who emerged from a bloody Byzantine legacy.

It is illusion to believe that those who analyze reality through a historically inaccurate prism and find their source of strength in nationalism will think rationally. Nationalists excuse their uncivilized behaviour as traditional, and describe the rational behaviour of others as unhistorical.

[3]Concepts and arguments for unifying all Serb lands were revived from before and during World War II.

In such a discourse, tolerance is considered betrayal of the national cause and violence promoted as the most exemplary tool for achieving political goals (Andrijašević 1999, 370).

Under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, some historians dropped their Marxist, Communist Party ideology to adopt opposing ideological viewpoints and subjugate their historiography to politics. Nationalism assisted in a search for scapegoats to blame for all societal problems. National pathos boiled over and links were uncovered to a glorious past and heroic ancestors to justify and fuel the rising nationalism. The media flooded with articles and entertainment with historical motives. Their authors largely had no academic credentials. Those publishers who were not marginalized followed the mainstream to establish analogies between the current situation and the past, supporting the homogenization of the nation and raising its war spirit. In the media and academia alike, issues of ethnic origin and the genesis of nationhood were opened. This overture to the far past aimed to stress the uniqueness of each nation and their respective differences towards neighbors. Small differences among neighboring nations influenced the creation of invented differences and emphasized trivial characteristics. The South Slavic nationalism of the 1990s followed the long-observed phenomenon of narcissism of small differences—political propaganda does not worry about the accuracy and rationality of ideas, rather it is designed with a view to control the public (Šušnjić 1997, 176). National heroes from the past were rediscovered and glorified in order to mobilize political masses. Revisionism of recent history was a particular trend, and politically opportune events, processes, and personalities from the recent past were re-examined.[4] During the 1990s, concluded British historian Kenneth Morrison, the unique national identity of individual Balkan states became a tool for the political elite and served pragmatic goals. Morrison also found that in the Balkans there were "aspects of political culture that hardly fits in a European line."[5]

[4]If certain nations are burdened with a "surplus of history," Montenegro is one of them. See: Niče (2001).

[5]From a BBC interview on the publication of his book *Montenegro: A Modern History*, London, 2009.

Relatively homogeneous political and intellectual elites faced a choice between modernity and maintaining the status quo. They opted for the latter because it strengthened their position: Nationalistic ideology created strong barriers against developing democratic procedures. These new elites were a mix of old Communists, dissidents, and nationalist elites. The energy of nationalism helped eliminate rivals and secure their ascension to power. Their interests were served by fear, xenophobia, homogenizing behind a party and charismatic leaders, and the absolute prioritization of the nation, its programs and values (Janjić 2009, 183). Although not a decisive factor, the intellectual elite contributed significantly to creating nationalistic conflicts, insisting on certain ideas even if they contradicted professional, scientific knowledge. The majority of intellectuals understood nationalism as a starting point for analyzing post-Communism (Janjić 2009, 139).

The new programs and textbooks of the early 1990s were a product of the Yugoslav Wars and the political need to situate them within a historical context. The consequence was a reduction in focus on a joint Yugoslav past. During this period, he history that Montenegrin textbooks told was adapted to the political needs of the day: They essentially presented the ideological mix on which the current order was based. This could be called "communism with a national image"; it was predicated on an illogical but politically successful synthesis of nationalism and communism (Stojanović, n.d.). Nazi collaborators were rehabilitated and a new historiography disregarded scientific findings and cherry-picked facts according political views and elevated them to a divine status that served nationalistic ends (Kovačević 1998, 558). Montenegrin history textbooks continued to be produced in Belgrade; they were identical to those used in Serbia. They interpreted Montenegro's past as Serbian and presented Montenegro as a Serb state. For example, the history textbook for the third grade of secondary school regards Montenegro as a state within the Serb nation and at the same time uses socialist remnant term "our peoples" to distinguish them. The textbook forcibly combines Marxist views with the latest nationalistic theory, itself excavated from the past. This odd assortment of ideological remnants from previous systems and nationalistic derivatives is employed in every unit in the book

to construct a history that encompasses both Montenegro and the Serb nation (Andrijašević 2001, 104).

In 2000 Matica Crnogorska, a Montenegrin cultural NGO, organized a debate on existing textbooks in the country's school system. The goal was to analyze the textbooks' shortcomings and contribute to the reform of the education system. In addition to finding ideological and other deficiencies, they found that there was an inadequate representation of Montenegrin history in textbooks. Although Montenegro was the only former Yugoslav republic to keep a state link to Serbia—during the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 2003—the share of Montenegrin history in textbooks was no larger than that of any other Yugoslav republic. Political and military history were the dominant topics, while social and cultural history was neglected. Textbook authors followed the outdated trends of Yugoslav school textbooks (Folić 2001, 124).[6]

Analysis of a 1997 textbook for the eighth grade of elementary school concluded that it presents a narrow picture of the twentieth century, reduced to a terrifying portrait of killings, destruction, and ideological power struggle. The book offers no role models beyond politics and war. It teaches how people killed each other, but not how they lived. No mention is made of the information and communication revolution underway, or about space exploration (Burzanović 2001, 144). It articulates differences among former Yugoslav republics through the principle of "us against them": "We" are Serbia and Montenegro, "they" are the others. Yet not one of the book's twenty-seven units is dedicated to Montenegro. Analyzing the breakup of Yugoslavia, the authors find reasons for others' animosity: insincere Europe, war-mongering US, and an already established separatist scenario of secessionist forces (Burzanović 2001, 148).

The seventh-grade textbook, as in previous years, continued to analyze capitalism, the First International and Second International workers' movements in Yugoslav countries, and similar topics.

[6]Analyzing the history textbook for the fourth grade of secondary school, Folić found that history is analyzed through value systems and standards of older times. For March 27, 1941, for example, the authors emphatically write that Yugoslavia broke the chain of Hitler's easy subjugation of European states and prompted the admiration of the Serbian people. They omit to mention that Yugoslavia capitulated just eleven days later. Folić also reports that the textbook describes the July 13 uprising in Montenegro in an excessive way and gives all credit to the Communists, underestimating the other factors behind the event.

The unit on national movements among South Slavs presents each national movements individually. This is also the case in the chapter on South Slavs and their neighbors during the nineteenth century and early twentieth, where each Yugoslav nation is covered individually. Relations between Serbia and Montenegro were given special attention, while King Nicholas's absolutism was blamed for certain disruptions (Strugar and Perović 1993).

In 1998, politician Milo Đukanović won the Montenegrin presidency against forces supportive of then-president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević. Under Đukanović's leadership, Montenegro started to distance itself from Serbian politics. It was only after 2000 that plans for history education promoted content from national history with the idea of developing a distinct national identity and consciousness of belonging to the Montenegrin state. Students were introduced to a variety of historical sources and informed of the necessity of applying critical analysis to them. It was also stressed of the need for students to introduce themselves to other cultures to help the formation of their personalities free from xenophobia, prejudices and nationalistic ideals. Care for democratic political behaviour, religious and national tolerance was emphasized (Ministarstvo prosvjete i nauke 2005). It was obvious that those changes were as a consequence of the democratic changes underway in Montenegro as well as in Serbia after Milošević's fall in 2000.

Up until 2001, Montenegrin history textbooks had been produced in Belgrade, and Montenegro provided only between 7 and 11 percent of content to history textbooks (Vuković 2015, 138). The first generation of textbooks developed solely in Montenegro arrived in 2001. In the abovementioned third-grade secondary-school book, the part related to Montenegro's relationship with the superpowers over two centuries consisted of six sentences. The first generation of reformed history textbooks, from 2001 to 2005, represented a transitional model between traditional and modern. They brought significant advances in interpretation of history of Montenegro, the region, and the world.

Through democratic processes, Montenegro had embarked on its independence path and as such, it was expected that it would adopt Council of Europe recommendations and initiatives in all areas including

education. In 2001 the Council of Europe issued a series of recommendations for countries in transition in Southeast Europe; those related to history textbooks and education were presented and discussed at several conferences in Montenegro.[7] They included a request to reduce factual material and select information in such way to distinguish important from less important; to develop students' critical faculties through use of multi-perspective materials; and to promote values of tolerance, respect towards diversity, and impartiality. It was advised that textbooks develop students' competences so that they acquire knowledge, skills, and manners practical for life in democratic society, and that heroes of the history should be citizens, both male and female. Thus ordinary people in various historical periods should be portrayed to highlight cultural and social history in relation to political history; this view of the past should be presented through a general European perspective, meaning dedicated attention to the role of woman in society. Finally, they recommended that textbooks be written by teams of experts composed of university professors, long-time practitioners, pedagogues, and psychologists (Vuković 2015, 138).

As a consequence, the share of Montenegrin history relative to textbooks' general content increased. In 2003, it made up eleven education units out of twenty-seven in the history textbook for the third grade of secondary school, and the ratio between national, regional, and general history was balanced. The textbooks are not composed only of authored text but also excerpts from historical sources and historiography, with abundant illustrative source material. In the introduction and final chapter of each educational unit is a "Check what you learned" section. The introductory note is illustrated with a timeline that visually and graphically puts certain events in chronological order, alongside descriptions of certain historical persons. The textbook includes places that can be found on historical maps as well as other information important for understanding historical processes (Borozan et al. 2003).

[7]For example: "development of students' critical faculties, ability to think for themselves, objectivity and resistance to being manipulated." Council of Europe Committee of Ministers: Recommendation Rec (2001) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on history teaching in twenty-first-century Europe: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805e2c31.

The 2003 twentieth-century history textbook for the fourth grade of secondary school is a marked departure from previous editions, which were dominated by political and military history. Now there are several units dedicated to social and economic changes, scientific and technological developments, and art and culture. Special units are devoted to achievements of parliamentary democracy, authoritarian nationalism between the two world wars, and Soviet totalitarianism. The last unit, titled "World as a Village," examines globalization, ecological problems, demographic changes, and technical progress (Rastoder et al. 2003).

In general, Montenegrin school textbooks have changed based on the European recommendations. Montenegro received technical assistance and an exchange of experience with developed countries to support this process. The Ministry of Education evaluation of educational reform in 2015 showed that the curricula are to certain degrees too loaded (large in size) and do not provide sufficient space for students to develop their own arguments and actively learn (Vuković 2015, 138).

In 2016, the Montenegrin NGO Centre for Civic Education examined how recent Montenegrin history is represented in elementary, middle, and secondary education curricula. Its report points out a number of deficiencies. While a majority of student respondents (54.2 percent) answered that Montenegro participated in the war from 1991 to 1995, almost one third (30.8 percent) responded that it had not. Almost two thirds of polled students selected the wrong multiple-choice answer on the question of when Montenegrin forces attacked Dubrovnik. The polled students had no idea what caused the war in former Yugoslavia. Asked to say what they knew about Srebrenica Genocide, the Battle of Vukovar, or the Siege of Sarajevo, only 55.8 percent answered, and very briefly. Only 40 percent knew of Srđan Radov Aleksić, the young Serb hero who lost the life protecting his Muslim neighbor in Trebinje, although a street in Podgorica bears his name. Although the NATO bombing is very present in Montenegrin political discourse, only 27.5 percent of polled students knew that seven people lost their lives in Montenegro during the NATO intervention. The researchers concluded

that in elementary and secondary-school textbooks, Montenegro's contemporary history and its role in the Yugoslav Wars are inadequately represented.[8]

Conclusion

Clearly, the complex process of producing new educational plans and textbooks together with ongoing evaluation requires continuous attention. Montenegro has only relatively recently entered into this educational reform process and the experience of developed democracies demonstrates that adequate education requires long-term stability as a precondition for establishing values on which a free and democratic society is based. Facing negative pages from own past is part of democratic transformation. Empty spots in history education leaves the possibility that they are filled with unhistorical education.

References

Andrijašević, Živko. 1999. *Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti*. Bar: Conteco, 1999.
Andrijašević, Živko. 2001. "Bez saglasnosti o vrijednostima nema dobrih udžbenika." In *Matica*, br.4/5, zima 2000/proljeće. Podgorica.
Bataković, Dušan. 1997. "Balkanski imaginarijum: Istorija i istoricizam." *Nova srpska politička misao*, 3–4. Belgrade.
Borozan, Đorđe, Saša Knežević, and Sait Šabotić. 2003. *Istorija za III razred gimnazije*. Podgorica: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.
Burzanović, Slavko. 2001. "Suviše ratova i vladara, a malo društva i kulture." In *Matica*, br.4/5, zima 2000/proljeće 2001. Podgorica.
Deletić, Zdravko. 2006. *Nauka o istoriji*. Niš: Centar Za Balkanske Studije.
Đorđević, Dimitrije. 1989. *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije*. Belgrade: Izdanje SKZ.
Đorđević, Jovan. 1972. *Ideje i institucije*. Belgrade: Radnička štampa.

[8] http://cgo-cce.org/, što skrivaju i otkrivaju crnogorski udžbenici o savremenoj istoriji crne gore; „Vijesti", June 23, 2016.

Folić, Zvezdan. 2001. "Standardi iz minulih vremena." In *Matica*, br.4/5, zima 2000/proljeće. Podgorica.
Gellner, Ernest. 1997. *Nacije i nacionalizam*. Novi Sad: Matica Srpska.
Grubač, Đorđe. 1975. *Istorija za VII razred osnovne škole*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.
Grubač, Đorđe, and Živan Sečanski. 1964. *Istorijska čitanka za VII razred osnovne škole*. Belgrade: Zavod.
Heler, Agnes. 1984. *Teorija istorije*. Belgrade: Rad.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1996. *Nacije i nacionalizam od 1780*. Beograd: Filip Višnjić.
Janjić, Dušan. 2009. *Ideologija, politika i nasilje*. Kriza nacionalnog identiteta i etnički sukobi. Belgrade: Hesperiaedu.
Kedourie, Elie. 2000. *Nacionalizam*. Podgorica: CID.
Kocka, Jürgen. 1994. *O istorijskoj nauci*. Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga.
Kovačević, Branislav. 1998. *O racionalnoj istorijskoj svijesti i nastavi istorije, Zbornik radova, Deseti kongres istoričara Jugoslavije*. Belgrade: Savez istoričara Jugoslavije/Zavod za udžbenike.
Kuljić, Todor. 1985. "Savremenost i istorijska svijest." *Marksistička misao*, 2.
Manhajm, Karl. 1968. *Ideologija i utopija*. Belgrade: Nolit.
Ministarstvo prosvjete NR Crne Gore. 1948. *Nastavni plan i program za osnovne škole*. Cetinje.
Ministarstvo prosvjete i nauke. 2005. Podgorica: Nastavni plan i program za opšte gimnazije u Replublici Crnoj Gori.
Mitrović, Andrej. 1991. *Raspravljanja sa Klio*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
Niče, F. 2001. *O koristi i šteti istorije za život*. Novi Sad: Svetovi.
Petranović, Branko. 1984. *Istoričar i savremena epoha*. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga.
Protić, Predrag. 1986. *Sumnje i nadanja*. Belgrad: Prosveta.
Radonjić, Vukašin. 1963. "Jugoslovenska koncepcija u udžbenicima istorije." *Istorijski pregled*, br 4. Zagreb.
Radonjić, Vukašin, and Dragomir Petrić. 1975. *Istorija za VIII razred osnovne škole*. Titograd.
Rastoder, Šerbo. 2001. "Kako do udžbenika istorije? Evropsko i crnogorsko iskustvo." In *Matica*, br.4/5, zima 2000/proljeće 2001. Podgorica.
Rastoder, Šerbo, Radoje Pajović, and Zvezdan Folić. 2003. *Istorija za IV razred gimnazije*. Podgorica.
Republički zavod za unapređenje školstva SRCG. 1973. *Nastavni plan i program za osnovnu školu*. Titograd.
Stojanović, Dubravka. n.d. *Konstrukcija prošlosti, slučaj srpskih udžbenika istorije*. www.seeol.com.

Strugar, Milo, and Milutin Perović. 1993. *Istorija za VII razred osnovne škole*. Podgorica.
Šušnjić, Đuro. 1997. *Ribari ljudskih duša*. Belgrade: Imprint.
Vuković, Vanja. 2015. *Evropa u crnogorskim udžbenicima istorije 1945–2012*. Podgorica: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna strdstva.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 2010. *Istorijsko mišljenje na kraju XX veka*. Podgorica: CID.
White, Hayden. 2011. *Metaistorija*. Podgorica: CID.

5

Kosova Under Yugoslavia (1945–1999) in the History Textbooks of Kosova and Serbia

Shkëlzen Gashi

This chapter focuses on the approach taken by primary and secondary-school textbooks of Kosova and Serbia to events in Kosova from 1945 to 1999. The Kosovar textbooks in question are published by the Libri Shkollor publishing house, those of Serbia by Zavod za udžbenike. The history textbooks of the two countries, approved by their respective ministries of education, are a key source for this chapter. It compares the descriptions given in them, drawing out the similarities and differences. It likewise sets against them findings of international authors about the events in Kosova in the same period. This chapter deals with some of the most important periods of the history of Kosova under the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), pointing out where the history books do not agree with one another and where they falsify the account. In an indirect way, the chapter draws out what the governments of Kosova and Serbia are suggesting, to the younger generations they are educating through these books, are the relations between them as neighboring states. I also aim,

S. Gashi (✉)
University of Prishtina, Prishtina, Kosovo

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_5

within the framework of this chapter, to reveal in the clearest possible way, based on facts, the basis of the often contradictory allegations made between the two peoples who come up against one another in Kosova.

Kosova Under Italian/German/Bulgarian Rule

In the summer of 1941, the Italians occupied most of Kosova and united it with Albania, which they had occupied in the spring of 1939. The rest of the territory of Kosova was occupied by the Germans and Bulgarians. The situation of the Kosovar Albanians under Italian and German rule was noticeably better than that under Yugoslavia. Under Bulgarian rule, it was practically the same as the experience of the Albanians under Bulgarian rule during World War I (Malcolm 2002, 289–313).

Some Kosovar textbooks say that the Albanians opposed the Fascist occupation of Kosova (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 154) while others claim that, although the Albanians were opposed to fascism in principle, they welcomed it as a liberation from domination by the Serbs (Rexhepi 2010, 110). In general, the Kosovar textbooks say that the union of the majority of Kosova's territory with Albania, even though it was caused by the Italian occupiers, had a positive effect for Albanians. The Serbian textbooks, on the other hand, just say that Kosova and Metohija were included within Italian Albania (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 137).

When Kosova was under Fascist/Nazi occupation, armed Albanians attacked villages inhabited by Serbs to remove settlers and retake property confiscated between the two world wars (Malcolm 2002, 293). Foreign authors' accounts of the number of Serbs and Montenegrins evicted from Kosova in this period vary from 30,000 to 100,000, and they say that the victims of killings, destruction, and theft, while found on both sides, were mainly Serbs and Montenegrins (Malcolm 2002, 293–294, 313).

Serbian textbooks say that "the Albanians of Kosova and Metohija committed terrible acts against the Serbs" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 137) or "there are no data on the number of civilians killed during this period" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 208). Kosovar textbooks, on the other hand, say that the Albanians, despite their sufferings under

Yugoslav rule, took care of Serbian and Montenegrin minorities and "in many cases they even took them under their protection" (Rexhepi 2010, 118).

The Liberation and Reoccupation of Kosova

After the capitulation of the Italian Fascists in Kosova and the establishment of German Nazis on Kosova's political scene, two critical elements crystallized: the nationalist faction, supported by the Nazis and organized in the Second League of Prizren, which announced that it was working to keep Kosova united with Albania (Malcolm 2002, 305), and the communist faction, mainly supported by Yugoslav communists and organized into the National Liberation Council for Kosova and Metohija, which, at the 1943 Bujan Conference, announced its desire for Kosova's unification with Albania, suggesting the right to self-determination.

The Serbian textbooks do not deal with this at all. Although these two elements are superficially present in the textbooks of Kosova, in no textbook is there a description of the armed clashes between them, nor of the fact that one had support from Nazi Germany and the other from the Yugoslav communists. Nor do the Kosovar textbooks mention the independent nationalist groups who opposed the occupation, such as that of the Kryeziu brothers in Gjakova.

After the withdrawal of German troops from Kosova, the Albanian Partisan forces established themselves in the cities of western Kosova, while the Bulgarian Partisans arrived in eastern Kosova, together with the Yugoslav Partisans. Leaving Kosova along with the German troops were most of the armed groups created by the Second League of Prizren, and including members of the Scanderbeg division which, before it left, took part in the rounding up and expelling communists, including a number of Jews, from Kosova (Malcolm 2002, 310–311). This is not presented in Kosavar textbooks.

In some Kosovar textbooks, the withdrawal of the German troops is presented as a liberation of Kosova by the Partisan units of Kosova and Albania (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 156). In others, it is presented rather as

liberation by Serbian and Bulgarian units (Rexhepi 2010, 115). However, according to these textbooks, the Albanians of Kosova and other areas were attempting, alongside the battle for liberation from German troops, to also liberate themselves from the Yugoslav occupiers whom, after the Germans capitulated, established "power which was steely and discriminatory towards the Albanians" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 156; Rexhepi 2010, 115). These textbooks invent an organization named "the National Liberation Army of Kosova (UNÇK)" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 156) although it is well known that Kosova's communists were part of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.

The textbooks of Kosova do not mention that the Kosovar Partisans were divided: On the one hand those led by Shaban Polluzha, who refused orders to fight German troops in the north of Yugoslavia and decided to stay in Kosova to protect the Albanian population from Yugoslav Partisans; and on the other hand, those led by Fadil Hoxha, who accepted a position as deputy to Sava Drlević, commander of the Yugoslav military forces in Kosova. Nor is there mention of the fact that Shaban Polluzha's partisans, concentrated mainly in Drenica, were swiftly annihilated by those of Fadil Hoxha and Yugoslavia, helped by divisions of partisans from Albania.[1]

According to the Kosovar textbooks, after the German troops left, "Serbian/Montenegrin and Macedonian partisan units" came to Kosova and other Albanian areas and "used violence and terror on the Albanian population"; as a consequence of "this terror and Serbian/Montenegrin and Macedonian genocide in Kosova, around 45,000 Albanians were killed" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 157). The Serbian textbooks make no mention of these crimes. British historian Noel Malcolm, who analyzes data from a range of authors, comes to the conclusion that the figure of approximately 45,000 killed is exaggerated (Malcolm 2002, 293–294).

The hope expressed at the Bujan Conference was thus ignored. Kosavar textbooks blame the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPY) and

[1]The textbook by Isa Bicaj and Isuf Ahmeti (Bicaj and Ahmeti 2005, 124–125) is, to some extent, an exception to this. For the clashes between the forces of Shaban Polluzha and those led by Fadil Hoxha.

the Communist Party of Albania (PKSh) (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 156; Rexhepi 2010, 115). Those who had taken part in the Bujan Conference became a target for the Yugoslav authorities, according to these textbooks; some were killed, some deported to Albania, and some imprisoned (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 193–194). However, they do not mention that in July 1945 some participants of the conference took part in the so-called Prizren Assembly, where a resolution for Kosova's annexation by federal Serbia was approved by acclamation (Malcolm 2002, 315). Serbian textbooks claim that this resolution was approved after the withdrawal of military rule and at a time of ever greater cooperation with Albania (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 235). But they do not say that in this assembly only thirty-three out of 142 members were Albanian, nor that assembly members were purposely reminded of the fact that there were 50,000 troops in Kosova to defend the fruits of the war (Malcolm 2002, 315).

From 1945 until the middle of the 1960s, a range of organized political groups of Albanians in Kosova resisted Yugoslav rule. Of these, the most significant were the illegal Albanian National Democratic Committee and the Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unification (LRBSh), which, like other groups, swiftly disintegrated. The textbooks of Kosova do not mention these. At this time, the Yugoslav authorities forced tens of thousands of Albanians in Yugoslavia to move to Turkey, using a range of forms of pressure, such as the weapons-gathering campaign. There is no mention in the Serbian textbooks of the families who were moved, while the textbooks of Kosova give the inflated figure of some 250,000 Albanians (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 194).

The 1974 Constitution

During the 1960s, amendments were approved almost every year to the Constitution of Serbia and that of Yugoslavia in favor of Kosova. In July 1966 at the Brioni Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, a decision was taken that the person second only to Tito in the Yugoslav hierarchy, Minister for Internal Affairs Aleksandar Ranković, would be removed from power. After Ranković's

fall the atmosphere became less controlled and there were no more actions like the mass weapons search, widely seen as iniquitous. On 27 November 1968, an illegal group dubbed the 68 Group, many of whose members had been part of the LRBSh, organized demonstrations in a number of cities in Kosova to demand a "Kosova Republic."

Kosovar textbooks speak superficially of these demonstrations and make no mention either of their organizers or of the fact that Kosova's legal political officials described them as enemy nationalists (Çeku 2009, 30–214). They attribute the progress in Kosova's constitutional position within Serbia and Yugoslavia exclusively to the demonstrations, ignoring the fact that the re-establishment of Albanian-Yugoslav relations had had an impact on constitutional progress for Kosova's legal politicians (Malcolm 2002, 325). Serbian textbooks represent the demonstrations as being of a separatist nature, after which a harsh discussion typically unfolds on the subsequent alteration of the federation's character, with greater independence for the regions which "could take part in the decision-making of the republic, while the republic did not have the right to be involved in their activities" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 235).

This independence for the regions was formalized in 1974 with the approval of the Constitution of SFRY, ensuring for the two autonomous regions, Kosova and Vojvodina, which were part of the Republic of Serbia, a status in many ways similar to that of the six Yugoslav republics, particularly in economic decision-making and some fields of foreign policy. Kosovar textbooks only mention the approval of the Kosovar Constitution for 1974, and this as an effect of the 1968 demonstrations. They do not make any mention of the rights guaranteed to Kosova.

On the basis of this constitution, the territory of the SFRY was made up of the territory of the republics, and the territory could not be changed without their agreement. The Assembly of the SFRY was made up of the Federal Chamber, to which each republic had the right to send thirty delegates, and each of the regions to send twenty delegates, and the Chamber of the Republics and Regions, where the republics had the right to send twelve delegates each and the regions to send eight each.[2]

[2]For the rights set out in the 1974 Constitution for Kosova see: Krieger (2001, 2–8).

The Serbian textbooks focus mainly on the strengthening of the independence of the regions which, they state, gained wide authorization in legislative and executive powers and equal status in the federation, with decision-making rights equal to the republics for federal matters (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 245). However, although they say that Serbia gained elements of confederation, they do not specify that, while the SFRY Constitution and the Constitution of Serbia mention the rights of each nation for self-determination including secession, these do not figure in the constitution of the autonomous region of Kosova. Furthermore, on the basis of these 1974 constitutions, Albanians were considered a nationality but not a nation, a legal distinction in socialist Yugoslavia between those entitled to have their own constituent republic (*narodi* or "nations") and those not so entitled (*narodnosti* or "nationalities").

The textbooks of the two countries mention the demonstrations that erupted in March and April 1981, initially organized by students of the University of Prishtina (UP) for better conditions, and later by a range of political and illegal groups of Kosovar Albanians, with the demand for a Republic of Kosova. As with the demonstrations of 1968, Kosovar textbooks do not mention the names of the organizers of these demonstrations, nor the allegations made by senior Albanian political officials in Kosova of nationalism, separatism, hooligan crowds, and counter-revolutionary Albanian organizations (Malcolm 2002, 335–336).[3] Kosovar textbooks do not state that, after these demonstrations, thousands of demonstrators were imprisoned and hundreds fined; some do not even mention the demands demonstrators made (Rexhepi 2010, 160–161). The imprisonments and fines are equally absent from Serbian textbooks, which only say that the first signs of Yugoslavia's destabilization were seen in Kosova, where "the eruption of Albanian nationalism and separatism in the spring of 1981 showed the awakening of a fatal dormant nationalism" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 248).

[3]See also: Hajrizi (2008, 196–216).

Civil Resistance in Kosova

Relations between Albanians and Serbs deteriorated further after the 1981 demonstrations, when Serbia began plans to withdraw Kosova's autonomy, starting media propaganda campaigns against what Serbian textbooks describe as "pressure against Serbs, rapes, destruction of property, and even killings, from national hatred" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 248). This is despite the fact that the study of an independent committee of Serbian jurists, published in 1990, concluded that the rape rate in Kosova was the lowest in all Yugoslavia and that in the vast majority of cases both rapist and victim were Albanian (Malcolm 2002, 339). Serbian textbooks mention Serbs moving out, reducing the Serbian population to 13.2 percent of the total, but they do not stress that one of the main reasons for this was the mismanagement of the economy in Kosova and the highest unemployment rate in Yugoslavia.

At the end of 1988, hundreds of thousands of Albanians protested in Kosova against the withdrawal of its autonomy by Slobodan Milošević's Serbia. Kosovar textbooks do not clarify that the protesters were opposing changes to the communist leadership in Kosova, leaders presented as "instruments in the hands of Serb policy… who realized too late in the game for the suspension of autonomy" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 199; Rexhepi 2010, 162). Likewise, the strikes of miners in Kosova, who in February 1989 holed up for ten days in mineshafts to protest the demise of Kosova's autonomy, are presented in these textbooks without their demands for "brotherhood and unity and Tito's road ahead."[4] These protests and strikes are not presented at all in the Serbian textbooks. A state of emergency was subsequently declared in Kosova and hundreds of intellectuals, professors, and leaders of social enterprises were arrested. These arrests are mentioned only in the Kosovar textbooks, but they make no reference to the arrest and trial of the Kosovar Albanians' former political leader Azem Vllasi, who was imprisoned for nearly a year.

Despite the protests and strikes by Albanians in Kosova, Serbia completed the process of suspending Kosova's autonomy when it was

[4]For the miners' ten demands, see: Maliqi (1990, 254).

approved on 23 March 1989 by the Kosovar Assembly with an Albanian majority. While the Serbian textbooks do not mention this at all, their Kosovar counterparts say that the Kosova Assembly building was surrounded by Serb police and military. None of the textbooks say that, despite this, ten Albanian deputies to the Kosovar Assembly voted against the withdrawal of the 1974 autonomy.

Some months after the suspension of Kosova's autonomy, the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) was formed, and, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, quickly became clearly the largest political party in Kosova. Its manifesto, although it was initially for autonomy, is presented in Kosovar textbooks as a program for "resolving the issue of Kosova and the Albanians in other regions of the former Yugoslavia on the basis of the principle of self-determination" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 200; Rexhepi 2010, 163). Serbian textbooks make no mention at all of the LDK and its program.

In March and April 1990, schools sent thousands of Kosovar pupils to hospital due to stomach aches, headaches, and vomiting as a result, it was said at the time, of a mass poisoning of Albanian children. A toxicology expert from the United Nations later found, in blood and urine samples, evidence of sarin and tabun agents. In 1995, it was made public that the Yugoslav Army had produced sarin. The incident is not mentioned in Serbian textbooks. Kosovar textbooks say that one of the harshest forms of police repression was "the poisoning of more than 7000 pupils and students with a chemical weapon" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 200). None of the textbooks state that in some parts of Kosova there were dozens of attacks against local Serbs by Albanians who believed their children had been poisoned by the Serbian occupiers of Kosova (Malcolm 2002, 345; Clark 2000, 58).

On 2 July 1990, the deputies of the Kosova Assembly, supported by the LDK, and in front of the Assembly, declared Kosova a republic *within Yugoslavia.* After this, Serbia suspended all legislative, executive, and judicial organs in Kosova; the vast majority of Albanians in employment were sent home from work; the television, radio, newspapers, hospitals, and factories were closed, and Albanian students and teachers were barred from the University of Prishtina campus. After two months, on 7 September 1990, the Kosova Assembly declared the Constitution of the

Republic of Kosova *within Yugoslavia* (Ismajli et al. 2005, 7–8, 9–41), and from 26 to 30 September 1991 a referendum was organized for the recognition of Kosova as a sovereign and independent state *with the right to link with Yugoslavia* (Ismajli et al. 2005, 98–101).

Serbian textbooks do not depict these developments at all. Kosovar textbooks describe the declaration of Kosova as a republic within Yugoslavia more accurately, but do not mention that the Kosovar Constitution was a constitution for Kosova as a republic within Yugoslavia. Nor is it mentioned that immediately after the act of declaring the constitution, the majority of Assembly deputies fled Kosova. The textbooks of Kosova present the referendum as a referendum for a sovereign and independent state of Kosova, removing the right to link with Yugoslavia. On 19 October 1991 the Republic of Kosova Assembly changed the Republic of Kosova Constitution and cut this link with the state of Yugoslavia (Ismajli et al. 2005, 119, 141–142). This is not mentioned in the Serbian or Kosovar textbooks.

During this period Kosova, under the leadership of the LDK, a parallel system was created in various fields—education, health, finance, media, culture, and sport—and presidential and parliamentary elections were organized. Diplomatic lobbying took place for the internationalization of the Kosova issue. These developments are not mentioned in the Serbian textbooks; they are in the Kosovar textbooks, but with the addition of the field of "defence and self-defence, thus creating a challenge for the occupying Serb powers" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 204).

The Peaceful and Military Factions

Until the mid 1990s, the passive peaceful resistance led by the LDK under Rugova was unrivalled. At this time, Adem Demaçi, who had spent twenty-eight years in the prisons of Tito's Yugoslavia because of his work for unifying Albanian lands under Yugoslavia with Albania, was included in the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PPK) to start active peaceful resistance. This was because, he said, a generation of people was being born in Kosova who were dissatisfied with the policy of passive peaceful resistance and were seeking a military solution (Gashi 2010,

118–140). This division in Kosova's politics is not presented in the textbooks of Serbia, nor in those of Kosova itself.

Demaçi did not achieve his aim of active peaceful resistance. In September 1996, with the mediation of the Shën Exhidio Association, Rugova signed an agreement with Milošević on the return of Albanian pupils and students to school and university premises taken over by organs of the Serbian state. This does not feature in the textbooks of either of the two countries. When the Serbian/Yugoslav side did not observe the agreement, on 1 October 1997 the students of the University of Prishtina (UP) organized a protest calling for a return to lectures at the UP campus. These protests are only mentioned in Kosovar textbooks, and only with this sentence: "Serbian repression meant that on 1 October 1997 protests by UP students and the general population erupted against the occupying powers" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 205).[5]

The repression by the Serbian regime is thus called "Serbian repression"; the student protests, in which a number of Albanian citizens became involved, are called "protests by students and the general population," but the stated aim of the student protests, return to the university campus, is mentioned nowhere. This could create the impression that these protests were organized for the liberation and independence of Kosova from Serbia.

Human rights abuses by the Serbian regime against Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s (Malcolm 2002, 349–356; Clark 2000, 70–157) are presented in Kosovar textbooks as massacres across Kosova, which "inspired the emergence of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) to protect the people of Kosova" (Rexhepi and Demaj 2009, 104). The Serbian textbooks do not give any evidence of these abuses, and they present the deterioration in the situation in Kosova as a consequence of the "robbery and confrontations of Albanian terrorist groups, declared as the Kosova Liberation Army, with associated forces, who increasingly impacted on civilians" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 251).[6] They do not provide data on the ethnicity of these civilians.

[5] See also: Rexhepi (2010, 168).

[6] See also: Đurić and Pavlović (2010a, 186).

The Serbian textbooks do not mention the division between the peaceful and military factions in Kosovar politics. This is also missing in the Kosovar textbooks, as is reference to the three political and military conceptualizations of war in Kosova: (a) that of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova (FARK), established by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kosova government, which was in favor of war, led by professional officers; (b) that of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova (LKÇK), created mainly by former political prisoners, which envisaged the creation of a wide political and military front for the organization of general armed uprising, whereby all political and military groups aiming for the liberation of Kosova from Serbia would be included; and (c) that of the KLA, created by the Kosova People's Movement (LPK), who favored guerrilla war with the aim of provoking a NATO intervention against Serb forces. The lack of these three strands means lack of information on the friction and clashes between them.

War Crimes

The textbooks of both countries present only the crimes of the "other side." For example, Serbian textbooks mention not a single Albanian killed by Serbian/Yugoslav forces during the armed conflict in Kosova, while Kosovar textbooks make no mention of a single Serb killed by the KLA and NATO forces during or after the armed conflict. The textbooks of Kosova and Serbia also exaggerate the crimes of the "other side" and create room for misunderstanding.

Serbian textbooks refer to a letter the FRY sent to the UN Security Council in February 2000, which said that since NATO forces entered Kosova "899 had been killed and 834 had been kidnapped" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 251),[7] but they do not give the ethnicity of these people nor the fate of those kidnapped. The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC),[8] headquartered in Belgrade, notes that 1123 Serb civilians were killed

[7] See also: Đurić and Pavlović (2010a, 187).

[8] There is more on this organisation at: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/.

between January 1998 and December 1999, 786 of whom following the entry of NATO forces (12 June 1999–December 1999).[9]

On the other hand, Kosovar textbooks say that during the armed conflict in Kosova, between January and December 1998 alone "more than 2,000 Albanians were killed, not counting here a very large number of missing persons" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 206). For the same period, however, the HLC's multi-volume *Kosova Memory Book 1998–2000*[10] registers 1660 Albanians killed (including 678 KLA soldiers) and 296 Serbs (including 167 members of the Yugoslav Army or the Ministry for Internal Affairs) (Kandić 2011, 457). According to Kosovar textbooks, during the NATO bombings (24 March–10 June 1999) "the Serbian army killed approximately 15,000 Albanians" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 207).[11] The *Kosova Memory Book 1998–2000* gives the numbers of Albanian civilians killed between January 1998 and December 2000, including the seventy-eight-day NATO bombing, as 7864 in total. The number of those killed is thus doubled in the Kosovar textbooks, with the sources for the data not given.

More or less the same issue as with the presentation of those killed occurs in relation to deportations and displacements. Kosovar textbooks do not note the figures for Serb and non-Albanian displacements after the NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR) took control, while in the Serbian textbooks this figure is given as more than 220,000 (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 251), and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) puts it at 210,000.[12] Similarly, Serbian textbooks do not report the deportations of Albanians from Kosova during the NATO

[9]Interview with Sandra Orlovic, deputy executive director of the Human Rights Fund, conducted by email, 16 December 2011. For the killings of Serbs following the war in Kosova, see also: Kandic (2001, 3).

[10]The Kosova Memory Book (1998–2000) is an HLC publication in several volumes which gives the relevant data for every person killed or missing from the last war in Kosova: Albanian, Serbian, Roma, Bosniak and other civilians; members of the Serbian/ Yugoslav military and police forces and of Kosova Albanian armed groups, but also members of political groups of various ethnicities. The sources for the information in this publication are taken from witness or family statements, court proceedings, the notes from autopsies, newspaper articles, data from ICRC, UNMIK, KFOR, KLA and Serbian institutions.

[11]See also: Bicaj and Ahmeti (2005, 202).

[12]For more information, see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d9f6.html.

bombing which, according to the UNHCR, included 862,979 people.[13] Kosovar textbooks state that more than 1 million Albanians were deported (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 206).

Kosovar textbooks describe the crimes of Serb forces against Albanians during the war in Kosova as genocide (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 207).[14] Instead of giving the definition of the UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, or any arguments supporting the idea that genocide occurred, the books offer phrases such as "the horrible scenes of barbarism of the bloody squadrons" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 205) targeting children of fifteen to sixteen years old. By describing the crimes of the Serbian forces in Kosova as genocide, the authors of Kosovar textbooks ignore the opinion given by the Supreme Court of Kosova, according to which the actions of the Serbian regime under Milošević can be considered crimes against humanity rather than genocide.[15]

Serbian textbooks, as explained above, do not mention the crimes of the Serbian forces against Kosova's Albanians; they do state that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted major political and military leaders of the FRY and Serbia (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 253),[16] but do not mention the allegations. On the other hand, Kosovar textbooks do not present the crimes committed by the KLA against Serbs and non-Albanians during and after the armed conflict in Kosova, and also do not mention the ICTY indictments for war crimes and crimes against humanity for the two main leaders of the KLA.

[13]UNHCR Country Updates—Former Yugoslavia, UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Situation Report: Kosova, pp. 65–70.

[14]Some of the Kosovar textbooks even say that the Reçak massacre was described as genocide by William Walker, the head of the OSCE mission in Kosova. See: Bicaj and Ahmeti (2005, 202). Walker actually described it as a crime against humanity in the speech he gave at the burial of those massacred. For the speech of Ambassador William Walker and more on the Reçak massacre, see: Petritsch and Pichler (2002, 154–162).

[15]William Schabas, "Gjenocidi në të Drejtën Ndërkombëtare", Prishtina: FINNISH-UNHCR Human Rights Support Programme—Kosova, 2003, 467.

[16]See also: Đurić and Pavlović (2010a, 187).

The crimes committed by the KLA against Serbs and non-Albanians during the armed conflict in Kosova are not presented at all in the Serbian textbooks. Regarding the KLA, these books give data only for the crimes committed after the armed conflict and the arrival of KFOR troops in Kosova. One obtains the impression, from these textbooks, that during the armed conflict in Kosova only NATO committed crimes.

During the seventy-eight days of the NATO bombing of the FRY, according to the Serbian textbooks, "between 1,200 and 2,500 civilians were killed" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 251).[17] In the table they provide for the suffering of civilians from the NATO bombardment, however, data are provided for only 347 civilians killed. In this table, Albanian ethnicity is mentioned only for the seventy civilians killed by NATO forces near Gjakova, while for the fifty civilians killed in the village of Luzhan near Podujevo, twenty near Peja, and eighty-seven in the village of Korisha near Prizren, there is no mention of their Albanian ethnicity. Likewise, there is no mention in the table of the attack of NATO forces on the Dubrava Prison where, according to the HLC, 112 Albanian prisoners were killed. It may be that this attack is not included because only twenty-nine of the prisoners were killed by the NATO bombs on 19 and 20 May 1999, while the others, again according to HLC, were executed by Serbian forces on 21 and 23 May 1999.[18]

On the killing of civilians by NATO, the report of Human Rights Watch, based on field research, says that during the bombing of the territory of the FRY, NATO killed a minimum of 489 and a maximum of 528 innocent civilians. According to New York-based NGO Human Rights Watch, the majority of these innocent civilians were killed in the territory of Kosova, giving numbers of between 279 and 318 people (Human Rights Watch 2000). The number of civilians killed by NATO is therefore at least doubled in the Serbian textbooks while not being recorded at all in the textbooks of Kosova.

[17] See also: Đurić and Pavlović (2010a, 187).

[18] On 28 May 2010 HLC made a formal accusation at the Serbian War Crimes Court against the thirty-four people responsible for the killing of more than ninety and the injuring of more than 150 Albanian prisoners in the Dubrava Prison on 21 and 23 May 1999 after the NATO attacks on the prison of 19 and 20 May 1999. The charges can be found at: http://hlc-rdc.org/index.php/en/public-informationoutreach/pressreleases/208-krivina-prijava-za-ratni-zloin-protiv-ratnih-funkcionera-republike-srbije.

The Rambouillet Conference

Before the Rambouillet Conference, one of the most important events on the political scene was the meeting of the Kosovar delegation, represented by Rugova, with Milošević in May 1998, when the parties agreed on a peaceful solution to the Kosova issue. This is not presented in any textbook from either country. Without a doubt, one of the most important events leading up to the escalation of armed conflict in Kosova was the conference organized at Rambouillet in France, an event presented in the Kosovar and Serbian textbooks in brief and different ways. The Kosovar textbooks say only that the failure of talks there marked "a new phase for the KLA war" (Bajraktari et al. 2010).[19] They do not give the reasons for that failure, nor the key points of the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo document, signed in Paris on 18 March 1999 by the Albanian representatives from Kosova at the conference and by mediator Christopher Hill (US) and Wolfgang Petritsch (EU), but rejected by Serbia/FRY and mediator Boris Majorski (Russia).

The authors of the Kosovar textbooks offer nothing of the content of this document—the implementation of which was guaranteed by 28,000 NATO troops in Kosova—because it envisaged substantive autonomy for Kosova within the FRY.[20] The information they do give creates the idea that the KLA had not given up on their political position. As well as not mentioning the signing up by KLA representatives to substantive autonomy for Kosova, for the Kosovar textbooks the political platform of the KLA's war was Kosova's freedom and independence (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 205). It is nowhere made clear that initially this platform was, as is stated in the oath sworn by the KLA soldiers, "for the liberation and union of the occupied lands of Albania."[21]

In contrast, for Serbian textbooks "the NATO aggression occurred because the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet and Paris refused to sign the ultimatum for the withdrawal of the army and police from Kosova"

[19] See also: Bicaj and Ahmeti (2005, 202).

[20] The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-government, Paris, 18 March 1999, can be found at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm.

[21] The text of the oath of the KLA soldier can be found on the webpage dedicated to Adem Jashari: http://www.ademjashari.com/uck.aspx?View=1&SMID=68&CID=19.

(Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 251).[22] It is also not mentioned that the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government envisaged 2500 FRY police and 1500 soldiers in Kosovar territory, and substantive autonomy within FRY sovereign territory. For Serbian pupils the impression is thus created that "the Western states who got involved, giving open support to the Albanians" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 251),[23] aimed to remove Serbia from Kosova.

Kosovar textbooks do not mention the substantive autonomy Kosova would enjoy within the FRY on the basis of the Interim Agreement. The agreement said that: "after three years an international meeting will be called to determine a mechanism for a final solution for Kosova, on the basis of the will of the people, the opinions of relevant authorities, the efforts made by each side in relation to the implementation of this agreement and the Final Act of Helsinki…".[24] It did not specify anywhere exactly which people's will was being referred to. Besides the phrase "the will of the people," it cited the Final Act of Helsinki, according to which international borders could only be changed by agreement of the two sides.

The NATO Intervention

After Rambouillet, the most important period of the war in Kosova was undoubtedly that of the NATO bombing of Serbian/Yugoslav military and police targets which was, according to Serbian textbooks, aggression on the part of NATO. As mentioned above, the international community did not demand the withdrawal of all Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces from Kosova, so Serbian textbooks account seems to present Serbia as "a victim of the Western states who openly sided with the Albanians."

[22] See also: Đurić and Pavlović (2010a, 186).

[23] See also: Đurić and Pavlović (2010a, 186).

[24] Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-government, Paris, 18 March 1999, at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm.

For Kosovar textbooks, the NATO military interventions were "to stop the wave of crimes committed by Serbia against Albanians" (Rexhepi and Demaj 2009, 105). According to them, Kosova was liberated from Serbia "after the successful liberation struggle of the KLA and the entry of the NATO troops in June 1999" (Rexhepi and Demaj 2009, 106). Yet if the KLA was not in a position to end the Serbian crime wave against Albanians, and NATO had to intervene militarily, it is difficult to understand how Kosova was liberated after a successful KLA struggle and the entry of NATO troops. Equally, the Kosovar textbooks say that "as well as the battle units of the KLA, NATO forces, with the name KFOR, also entered Kosova" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 207). It is thus left to be understood that the KLA troops had not been in Kosova, but had entered like the NATO troops, but the textbooks do not say from where or when they entered.

Some Kosovar textbooks say that the Serbian/Yugoslav side withdrew from the territory of Kosova as a consequence of "the NATO bombing and the ongoing campaigns of the KLA" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 207).[25] The Military Technical Agreement on the withdrawal of Serbian/Yugoslav forces from Kosova, signed on 9 June 1999 in Kumanovo, was agreed only by NATO and the FRY—specifically Serbia. The authors of the Kosovar textbooks do not specify that the KLA was not part of this important agreement to end the armed conflict in Kosova. Besides compelling the Serbian/Yugoslav forces to withdraw, this agreement guaranteed that a number—limited to hundreds, not thousands—of them would be allowed to return to Kosova.[26] This too is not mentioned in the Kosovar textbooks. Perhaps surprisingly, this guarantee does not figure in the Serbian textbooks either.

Likewise, none of the historiographies say that NATO did not initially aim to cause all Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces to withdraw from Kosova, but that this aim emerged as such on 3 June 1999, a few days after the end of the bombings, when the president of the FRY,

[25] See also: Bicaj and Ahmeti (2005, 202).

[26] The Technical-Military Agreement document between the International Security Forces (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, Kumanovo, 9 June 1999, can be found at: http://www.nato.int/Kosova/docu/a990609a.htm.

Milošević, accepted a document drafted by Strobe Talbott (USA), Martti Ahtisaari (EU), and Victor Chernomyrdin (Russia), which demanded the withdrawal from Kosova of all police, military, and paramilitary forces of FRY/Serbia.[27] The document included this demand because it was only way refugees would feel safe returning to their homes, and NATO soldiers would establish a safe environment without the chance of conflict with those from FRY/Serbia, or between the latter and the returning population.

The demilitarization and transformation of the KLA is also presented in the Kosovar textbooks simply as its metamorphosis into the Kosova Protection Corps (KPC) "on the basis of an agreement signed in September 1999 between General Agim Çeku, the Commander of the KLA, and General Michael Jackson, Commander of KFOR" (Bajraktari et al. 2010, 207).[28] The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the KLA document, which the KLA political director, Hashim Thaçi, offered Commander Jackson on 21 June 1999, does not feature anywhere. In this document, Thaçi pledged that KLA soldiers would disarm and integrate into civil society as a civilian organization for emergency intervention—the KPC. According to this document, the KLA agreed not to interfere with FRY staff returning to Kosova (in the hundreds, not thousands) to complete specific tasks under the authorization and instructions of the KFOR commander.[29] In the Serbian textbooks, the disarming of the KLA is not mentioned at all.

On the civilian rule in Kosova established by the UN, and on military control established by NATO, Kosovar textbooks offer only the dates and the numbers of troops. There is no statement anywhere on the aim of the NATO mission in Kosova to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Equally, there are no data relevant to the UN mission in Kosova, UNMIK, which—in accordance with Resolution 1244—guaranteed Kosova a temporary international administration under

[27]The document drafted by Strobe Talbott (USA), Martti Ahtisaari (EU) and Victor Chernomyrdin (Russia) and accepted by the Serbian Parliament on 3 June 1999, can be found at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/peace.htm#plan.

[28]See also: Bicaj and Ahmeti (2005, 202).

[29]The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation of the KLA can be found at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/peace.htm.

which its people enjoyed substantive autonomy within the FRY. In the Serbian textbooks there is a reference to the guarantee of territorial integrity for the FRY according to Resolution 1244.[30]

Conclusion

Many clear differences are revealed in the approach of school history books in Serbia and in Kosova towards the events in the territory of Kosova. These differences can be grouped as follows:

Possession of the Territory

The penetration of the Serbian army into Kosova at the end of 1912 is presented in opposite ways in the Serbian textbooks and those of Kosova. This is because both sides claim sovereignty over the territory of Kosova. The way that the liberation, or occupation, of Kosova is presented not only in 1912, but also in 1918 and 1945, reflects an offensive nationalism in the Serbian textbooks, and a defensive nationalism in those of Kosova.

- In the Serbian textbooks the penetration of the Serbian army is presented as a liberation of the cradle of the Serbian nation, and the attainment of the Adriatic Sea as achieving one of the aims of the war.
- In the Kosovar textbooks, Serbian troops' encampment in Kosova is presented as occupation, which is said to have come as a consequence of the Albanians' difficult position.

The Crimes Committed by the Other Side

The most important element of Kosova's history consists of the crimes committed by the Serbs, organized into regular army and police, against

[30]Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Countil can be found at: http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm.

Albanians, and the crimes of the Albanians, mainly not organized, against the Serbs. The school textbooks of the two sides present only the crimes of the other side, presenting themselves as victims, and the other as the aggressor.

- The Kosovar textbooks present only the crimes of the Serbs against Albanians. In these books, such crimes are described as "bloody terrorist acts," "nationalist violence and terror," "national terror and genocide," and "the horrible scenes of the barbarism of the bloody squadrons." It is rare that they offer information to quantify the Serbian crimes, and when it is offered, it is in an exaggerated form.
- The Serbian textbooks present only the crimes of the Albanians against the Serbs, describing them as "the attacks of local gangs of Albanians," "Albanian terror against Serbs," and "robberies and the confrontations of terrorist groups with the forces of order." These textbooks generally do not give data for these crimes.

Silent Collaboration

Although the penetration of the Serbian army into Kosova and the crimes of the two sides are presented in a variety of ways, no textbooks from either country mentions the meetings, agreements, and collaborations of the political and military representatives of the Albanians with their Serb counterparts. There is no mention anywhere of:

- the close collaboration between the Albanian communists of Kosova (during and following World War II) with the Serbian/Yugoslav communists; or their participation and acclaim in the parliament where it was decided that Kosova should be part of federal Serbia;
- the agreement of the leader of peaceful resistance among the Albanians of Kosova (in 1996) with the Serbian president to open up school and university buildings to Albanians in Kosova; or the meetings between them aimed at finding a peaceful solution for the Kosova issue (in 1998).

Distortion of Aims

A characteristic of the Kosovar textbooks is exaggeration of the aims of Albanian political and military organizations. These are even sometimes given invented names.

- An organization named "the Kosova National Liberation Army" (UNÇK) is invented, but in fact the communists of Kosova were part of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.
- The initial manifesto of the LDK for autonomy is presented as a manifesto for self-determination, while the referendum held in September 1991 for Kosova to be a sovereign and independent state with the right to link with Yugoslavia, features only as a referendum for Kosova as a sovereign and independent state.
- The signing up to substantive autonomy for Kosova in the Rambouillet Conference by the political representatives of the KLA is not mentioned anywhere; furthermore, it is said that the KLA's aim was independence, while the actual text of the oath of KLA soldiers speaks of the liberation and union of the occupied lands of Albania.

Merging of Different Strands of Thought

Kosovar textbooks generally do not describe the various political elements present in Kosova until the end of the 1980s, describing them only under the umbrella "Albanian national movement." This umbrella is called "the democratic movement in Kosova" until the end of the 1990s. The elements of the most recent war in Kosova are just grouped together as the KLA. Serbian textbooks make no reference to these different strands.

- The textbooks of Kosova do not state that during World War II there was on the one hand a nationalist element, supported by the German Nazis, which declared commitment to maintaining a united Kosova and Albania, and on the other hand the communist element, supported by the Yugoslav Communists, which also declared Kosova's

desire to unite with Albania, suggesting the right to self-determination, even to secession. In no Kosovar textbook is it mentioned that the communist element was internally riven.

- The textbooks of Kosova do not mention that after World War II in Kosova there was both the work of the legal element, as part of the Yugoslav institutions and system, and the work of illegal organizations which opposed Yugoslav occupation.
- In none of Kosovar textbooks is there reference to the division of the peaceful policy into a faction for passive resistance and a faction for active resistance. There is also no reference to the division between the peaceful and the military arms of Kosovar politics.
- Also missing in the textbooks of Kosova are the three conceptualizations of military policy regarding war in Kosova: those of the FARK, LKÇK, and KLA respectively. Omitting mention of the three approaches means also a lack of information on the friction and clashes between them.

The aspiration for ownership of the territory of Kosova, the presentation only of the crimes committed by the other side, portrayal oneself as the victim and the other as the aggressor, and the silence on Albanian-Serbian collaborations, meetings, and agreements, shows that the countries are not sowing the seeds of reconciliation in the next generation. The distortion of aims and the merging of political elements among the Albanians of Kosova, in the Kosovar textbooks, leaves it to be understood that Albanians have always been united around one ideal. From the Kosovar textbooks it emerges that approximately until the 1980s this *ideal* was national unity, and later the independence of Kosova. In the end, taking into account the abovementioned considerations, it could be said that through these history schoolbooks Serbia and Kosova do not promote civic values because they promote inter-ethnic hatred, not only between the citizens of Kosova and Serbia, but also between the citizens of Kosova itself—Albanians and Serbs—since the history books published by the Ministry of Education in Kosovo are used by the Albanian pupils in Kosova, while the history schoolbooks published by the Ministry of Education in Serbia are used, not only in Serbia, but by Serbian pupils in Kosova as well.

References

Bajraktari, Jusuf, Fehmi Rexhepi, and Frashër Demaj. 2010. *Historia 10*. Prishtina: Libri Shkollor.

Bicaj, Isa, and Isuf Ahmeti. 2005. *Historia 12*. Prishtina: Libri Shkollor.

Çeku, Ethem. 2009. *Demonstratat e vitit 1968 në Arkivin e Kosovës*, 30–214. Prishtinë: Brezi 81.

Clark, Howard. 2000. *Civil Resistance in Kosova*. London: Pluto Press.

Đurić, Đorđe, and Momčilo Pavlović. 2010a. *Istorija 8*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike.

Đurić, Đorđe, and Momčilo Pavlović. 2010b. *Istorija 3*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike.

Fischer, Bernd. 2005. *Shqipëria gjatë Luftës, 1939–1945*. Tirana: Çabej.

Gashi, Shkëlzen. 2010. *Adem Demaçi: Unauthorised Biography*. Prishtina: Rrokullia.

Hajrizi, Mehmet. 2008. *Histori e një organizate politike dhe demonstratat e vitit 1981*. Tiranë: Toena.

Human Rights Watch. 2000. "Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign." Accessed at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/.

Ismajli, Rexhep, Hivzi Islami, Esat Stavileci, and Ilaz Ramajli. 2005. *Akte të Kuvendit të Republikës së Kosovës – 2 korrik 1990-2 maj 1992*. Prishtina: Akademia e Shkencave dhe Arteve të Kosovës.

Kandic, Nataša. 2001. *Abductions and Disappearances of Non-Albanians in Kosova*. Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre.

Kandić, Nataša. 2011. *Libër Kujtimi i Kosovës 1998–2000*. Prishtina: Fondi për të Drejtën Humanitare.

Krieger, Heike, ed. 2001. *The Kosova Conflict and International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malcolm, Noel. 2002. *Kosovo: A Short History*. London: Pan Macmillan.

Maliqi, Shkëlzen. 1990. *Nyja e Kosovës – as Vllasi as Millosheviqi*. Ljubljana: Knjizna zbirka KRT.

Petritsch, Wolfgang, and Robert Pichler. 2002. *Rruga e gjatë në luftë – Kosova dhe bashkësia ndërkombëtare 1989–1999*. Prishtina: KOHA.

Rexhepi, Fehmi. 2010. *Historia 9*. Prishtina: Libri Shkollor.

Rexhepi, Fehmi, and Demaj. 2009. *Historia 5*. Prishtina: Libri Shkollor.

Schabas, William. 2003. *Gjenocidi në të Drejtën Ndërkombëtare*. Prishtina: FINNISH-UNHCR Human Rights Support Programme—Kosova.
UNHCR Country Updates—Former Yugoslavia. 1999. UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Situation Report: Kosova.

6

History, Identity, and Curricula: Public Debates and Controversies Over the Proposal for a New History Curriculum in Croatia

Snježana Koren

On 1 July 2016, tens of thousands of people gathered in the main square in Zagreb, Croatia's capital, to protest against the stalling of curricular reform. The demonstration was initiated by a civic initiative called *Croatia Can Do Better—Support the Comprehensive Curricular Reform*. It followed twenty-five years of unsuccessful attempts to carry out comprehensive education reform in Croatia. This failure was mostly due to political and ideological divisions in Croatian society and the inability of key political actors to reach a common ground on education. One particularity that is relevant for understanding the developments in education is the predominance of politics over other areas of the societal life, including issues that require professional judgments (Koren and Baranović 2009, 91–95). Education is never among political parties' key priorities, but it continues to be (mis-)used as a means of fighting political battles. Decision-making in the field thus tends to be subjected to short-term political interests and prone to change with every shift in the political arena. In the last quarter of a century, consensus among

S. Koren (✉)
University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_6

main political actors has been absent even on certain basic issues, such as the duration of compulsory education. This has left Croatia as one of very few European countries with only eight years of compulsory education (ages six to fourteen or fifteen).

Croatia declared independence in 1991, during the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. Right from the start, people made demands to change the education system inherited from the socialist period, but without a clear development strategy. As a result, changes in education during the 1990s were incoherent and often arbitrary. The first interventions in 1991–1992 focused on the textbooks and curricula narratives,[1] but there was no reform of the organizational structure of compulsory education system. Bigger changes occurred in non-compulsory secondary education at that point. The unified and vocationally directed system of secondary schools inherited from socialism was diversified: the elite four-year grammar schools—gymnasiums—were reinstated (they had been abolished in a mid-1970s reform), as well as the various types of four and three-year vocational schools (Koren and Baranović 2009, 95–96). According to some education experts, the system at the beginning of the 1990s thus switched back to the organizational structure set by a 1958 education reform, whereby compulsory education was extended to eight grades and secondary education remained split between gymnasiums and vocational schools (Pastuović 1996; Žiljak 2013).

Attempts to reform education in the 1990s were additionally marked by the Croatian leadership's efforts to create an independent and ethnically homogeneous state. During that decade the ruling party was the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which has in fact been in power for most of the period since 1990 (1990–2000, 2003–2011, 2016–today). A conservative right-wing party, its political attitudes vary from center-right to radical right and are strongly influenced by the ideology of ethnic nationalism. In early 1990s, the political leadership used education

[1]For example, history textbooks inherited from the socialist period were modified in 1991 (mostly to remove Marxist terminology). In 1992 they were replaced with new ones, now strongly colored by the ideology of the Croatian statehood and nationalist perspective. New history curricula for primary and secondary schools were introduced in 1995, but they were pieced together from the titles and subtitles of textbooks published in 1992. For details, see: Koren and Baranović (2009, 96–105).

as one of the tools to redefine identity, mainly through curricula and textbooks of the so-called national subjects such as Croatian language, history, geography, and music. History teaching in particular was heavily politicized and subjected to alterations motivated by the interests of the ruling political elites in promoting ethno-national identity and conveying official interpretations of the past (Koren and Baranović 2009, 96–99). Catholic religious studies was introduced in Croatian schools at the very beginning of the decade—alongside Orthodox and Islamic religious studies, but these had significantly smaller shares of students.[2] Formally, Catholic religious studies is an elective subject; in reality, it has a special status because it is regulated by international agreements with the Vatican and opted for by a huge majority of students. Because Catholicism is considered a key feature of Croatian ethnic and national identity, Catholic religious studies is also sometimes considered one of the *national subjects*. Although the constitution defines Croatia as a secular state, the Catholic Church has exerted a very strong influence on its social and political life, including education since the beginning of the 1990s.

After unsuccessful attempts at reform in the 1990s, the Social Democrat (SDP)[3] government proposed a set of educational changes in 2002–2003 based on new strategic documents. The intention was to adapt Croatian education to European standards because European Union (EU) membership was proclaimed one of the most important national goals. That proposal included an extension of compulsory education from eight to nine years (with six-year primary education and three-year lower secondary), substantial curricular changes, a shift towards more student-centered teaching methods, and the introduction of the idea that learning outcomes should serve as a basis for defining teaching and learning requirements (Ministarstvo prosvjete i športa 2002). These ideas, however, met strong opposition from the conservative political parties

[2]According to the last census in 2011, there were 4.28 million inhabitants, 90.42 percent Croats. According to religious affiliation, 86.28 percent were Catholic, 4.44 percent Orthodox Christian, and 1.47 percent Muslim. See: Croatian Bureau of Statistics (2011).

[3]The Social Democratic Party (SDP) has been one of the two most influential political parties in Croatia since 1990. It evolved from the former League of Communists of Croatia and it is the largest party of the Croatian center-left. It led the coalition governments from 2000–2003 and 2011–2016.

in the Parliament, as well as some groups from the academic community and the Croatian Academy of Science and Arts (HAZU), and they were eventually abandoned.[4] The new government, led by the HDZ (2003–2011),[5] rejected the 2002 reform proposal; another view prevailed, according to which the existing eight-year system of compulsory education need not be changed but "improved" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 106–107, 113–114). The government could not give up changes to education altogether because Croatia had gained the status of a candidate country for EU membership and needed to make institutional adjustments to EU standards and requirements to fulfill the accession criteria. New curricula were thus introduced in compulsory (primary) education in 2006 that included a modest shift towards defining of learning outcomes and some modifications in curricular content (Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i športa 2006). There were no changes, however, to curricula for secondary schools (gymnasiums and vocational schools) which originated from the mid 1990s and were heavily teacher and content-centered. The only major change to secondary education in that period was the introduction of the state graduation exam (*matura*) in 2009. A National Framework Curriculum, put forward by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport in 2010, envisaged ten-year compulsory education (eight years of primary and two years of secondary), but it was never implemented (Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i športa 2010). Education policy and practice has remained fragmented and incoherent; key education documents such as primary and secondary school curricula differ significantly in methodology, and some subject curricula differ even in their definition of the goals and purpose of education.

Debate over the content of history curricula and textbooks has been another feature of these developments. Due to sharply divergent views of key events in twentieth-century Croatian history (such as World War II, communist rule in Yugoslavia, and the wars of the 1990s), history curricula and textbooks are constantly scrutinized and discussed in the

[4]See, for example: Kustura (2002).

[5]In that period there were actually three conservative governments in a row led by the Croatian Democratic Union: the first from December 2003 to January 2008, the second from January 2008 to July 2009, and the third from July 2009 to December 2011. Retrieved from https://vlada.gov.hr/prethodne-vlade-11348/11348.

media, politics, and historiography. Curricula and textbooks published during the last twenty-five years reflect the clashing interpretations and divided memory that exists in Croatian society. This has made teaching these events a difficult task for history teachers (Koren 2015). The paradigm of history teaching, however, has been gradually changing in the last 20 years. Due to the influence of international trends and the activities of some history teachers and historians, the purpose of school history lessons has increasingly been perceived as a critical engagement with the past. This orientation has met resistance among those who perceive school history as a body of carefully selected facts and "proper" interpretations whose main purpose is the formation of a particular identity. Ethno-national ideology still strongly permeates the curricula and textbook narratives, as well as political and public expectations of history education's aims and content.

Another shift in educational politics occurred under the second coalition government led by the SDP (2011–2015). After taking office in December 2011, the left-liberal governing coalition evidently had no coherent plan of its own for the education. Only in the third year of its mandate, after a proposal from some individuals and groups from academic circles, did the government develop a Strategy for Education, Science and Technology (hereafter called the Strategy), adopted by the Parliament in October 2014.[6] Prior to the Strategy, however, the Ministry of Education unsuccessfully attempted to introduce programs of civic and health education in schools. This led to ideological confrontations over the content of these programs as part of a broader culture war between conservative and liberal forces in society, battling over issues like same-sex marriage, reproductive rights, gender equality, and the introduction of sex education. A noticeable growth in conservative civil society organizations occurred in that period, mostly among conservative Catholic groups and organizations for veterans of the 1990s war. These groups advocate conservative, anti-liberal, and sometimes even anti-democratic values and ideas, and they seek to exercise influence over important political decisions, including those on education.

[6]For the text of the Strategy, see: *Narodne novine* 124/2014. Also available online: https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2014_10_124_2364.html.

As part of the Strategy, primary and secondary education reform was launched in 2015. Officially called the Comprehensive Curricular Reform (CKR), it was envisaged as a first major step towards changes in education and science. It aimed to transform and modernize the outdated education system by extending compulsory education from eight to nine grades, replacing existing curricula with new outcome-based ones, allowing students to choose among different modules in the final grades of gymnasium, and introducing new courses such as computer science, civic education, and sex and health education. It aimed at changing the philosophy and methodology of learning and teaching by promoting a student-centered approach and teacher autonomy, as well as more balance between gaining factual knowledge and developing skills (as opposed to rote learning and memorizing huge quantities of facts, which still dominate in Croatian schools). An Expert Work Group was formed to manage the reform process, in contrast to prior attempts which were managed directly by the Ministry of Education, as well as groups made up of 450 teachers and education experts that were given tasks to develop new curricula.[7] The output was a total of fifty-seven curricular documents, including a new National Framework Curriculum as the central document and others necessary to conduct comprehensive reform—such as various subject curricula, three methodological manuals, frameworks for evaluation, frameworks for promoting the learning experiences of students with special needs, and so on.[8]

This curricular reform attracted a lot of public attention, not only among experts but among parents, students, and many other citizens who wanted some positive changes in a country then devastated by economic crisis, divided over ideological issues, and drowned in apathy and cynicism. The attention was also due to public appearances of a young scientist, psychologist Boris Jokic, the non-party member who led the Expert Work Group, whose optimistic messages focused on the wellbeing of children were welcomed by many.

[7]Documents are available online: https://mzo.hr/hr/rubrike/odluke-o-imenovanju.

[8]See: the proposal for the National Framework Curriculum, as well as the framework curricula for elementary school, gymnasium, and vocational education. All documents are available online: http://www.kurikulum.hr/dokumenti-nacionalnih-kurikuluma/.

Under the SDP-led coalition government a parallel process aimed to develop new curricula for vocational schools. This was initiated by Croatia's Agency for Vocational Education[9] in 2011 and was financed by the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds. It resulted in the creation of new vocational curricula for twenty-four professions that were experimentally introduced in certain schools in the 2013–2014 school year. In 2015–2016 an external evaluation of the experimental implementation took place (Nacionalni centar za vanjsko vrednovanje obrazovanja 2017). Meanwhile the Strategy envisaged a comprehensive reform of education, which included not only compulsory education and high schools, but also vocational education, meaning two endeavors to reform vocational education proceeded in parallel. However, the new curricula for vocational schools developed by the Agency for Vocational Education were not approved before the school year 2017–2018—the moment when it seemed that the CKR had been brought to a halt for an indefinite period of time.[10]

Once again, shifts in the political scene proved decisive for the future of education reform. Less than three months after the groups began their work under the Strategy, in November 2015 general elections were held that eventually resulted in a change of government. A conservative coalition of parties and groups (ranging from moderate, center-right groups to far-right groups that based their program on rigid nationalism and social conservatism), led by the HDZ, formed a government in January 2016. Some groups in the governing coalition immediately declared that they wanted to halt the CKR.[11] The government officially announced that it would continue, but very quickly made decisions that

[9]The full name is the Agency for Vocational Education and Training and Adult Education. It is a public institution founded in 2010, which takes care of the development of vocational education system and curricula, as well as adult education. Retrieved from http://www.asoo.hr/default.aspx?id=100.

[10]Altogether nineteen new vocational curricula were approved by ministerial decision between June 16 and August 28, 2017. See: *Narodne novine: službeni list RH*, no. 58/2017, 68/2017, 71/2017, 74/2017, 77/2017, 78/2017, 79/2017, 82/2017, 83/2017, 84/2017, 85/2017. Also available online: https://www.nn.hr/.

[11]Only a few days after its establishment, the new government announced guidelines for its future actions on the Parliament website. These included demands to stop the curricular reform and to revise the Strategy. The government quickly denied this and offered the explanation that the wrong document was mistakenly published on the website. See, for example: *24 sata* (2016).

effectively stopped its implementation. Most of the financial and material support for the reform process was discontinued. Education was then left to the influence of marginal right-wing parties in the ruling coalition, as well as to groups and individuals associated with the Catholic Church, ultraconservative non-government associations and some war veterans' organizations.[12] These groups wanted to add new members to the Expert Work Group and the other groups, to ensure that their views would be reflected in the curriculum documents. In May 2016, when the parliamentary committee on education, controlled by the ruling coalition, proposed adding ten new members to the seven-person Expert Work Group, all seven members resigned.[13] The resignation of the Expert Work Group triggered the mass protests all over Croatia on July 1, 2016. The protestors voiced opposition to political meddling in education reform.[14]

In an attempt to reach a national consensus on curricular documents, the Expert Work Group had originally planned a large consultation process consisting of an expert discussion and a general public consultation. Almost 3000 experts (teachers, education experts, scientists, and so on), either individually or as members of institutions, participated in the expert discussion that began in March 2016. Without going into details on individual subjects, general remarks and questions often referred to the orientation of curricular documents on outcomes and student achievements, instead of to the detailed description of content which is a common characteristic of the existing curricula. The proposal to extend compulsory education from eight to nine years won wide support among the experts, but reactions to the proposal that students in the final grades of gymnasium could choose between subjects according to their interests were divided. There were also many comments about the role of STEM subjects, the role of the humanities and arts, the content

[12] See, for example: *Poslovni.hr* (2016). For articles in English, see: Milekic (2016).

[13] See: the webpage of the Croatian Parliament, Parliamentary Committee for education, science and culture, conclusions from the meeting held on May 19, 2016: http://www.sabor.hr/radna-tijela/odbori-i-povjerenstva/zakljucci-odbora-za-obrazovanje-znanost-i-kulturu-s-tematske.

[14] The resignation of the Expert Working Group was extensively covered in the Croatian media, but also discussed internationally. For articles published in English, see: *Reuters* (2016), Milekic (2016), *The Economist* (2016), Kovačić (2016), Marini (2016), Šošić (2016).

of civic and health education, and so on. Teachers' comments showed general concern about how the planned changes would affect their jobs and their everyday work.[15]

Based on comments from the expert discussions, work groups developed new versions of documents (almost without any official support, as explained in the previous paragraph). The online general public consultation[16] about these new versions of documents launched in June 2016 and lasted until November 2016, but the response was much weaker. This might be due to the fact that the consultation process was used by political opponents of the CKR to launch orchestrated attacks against it. The political backlash against the reform proposal, and some members of the Expert Work Group and other work groups, cast a shadow over the consultation process and hindered constructive debate about the curricular documents. Specific criticisms of the curriculum proposals for the "national subjects," such as history and Croatian language, as well as civic education, were used politically to stir up public sentiments and undermine the reform as a whole. Some members of the HAZU, university professors, and researchers from scientific institutes were also directly involved in these political attempts to stop the reform, with ideological, personal, or institutional motives.

The 2016 debate on the curricular reform in general, and the curricula of "national subjects" in particular, happened in the period when, after the completion of the EU accession process, a renewed trend of nationalism emerged. This was evident in the 2014–2015 presidential and parliamentary elections and in the months following the parliamentary elections. Among other things, derogatory terms were used by right-wing parties to label their political opponents to the left as people who,

[15] For the contributions to the expert discussion, as well as answers from the work groups, see: the official web page of the CKR: http://www.kurikulum.hr/?s=odgovor+stru%C4%8Dne+radne+skupine&fbclid=IwAR33m_y-MMnkG5vMviN-TziKdoq8Vafk6DnlBoJ6ZpKqF0vy1Jodgzjx9Zc.

[16] "Consultation with the interested public" is part of the process of adopting new laws and other regulations. There are various methods to conduct a public consultation (e.g., organizing public discussions, conducting surveys), but the method of online public consultation is mostly used. Public authorities are required to publish draft laws and other acts on the e-Counseling website, usually for a period of thirty days, and citizens can write their comments and suggestions.

they claimed, never wanted an independent Croatia—such as "Yugonostalgics," "Yugophiles," "Yugoslavs," "reds," and "communists." Fostering national identity and socially conservative views and values has again become the central political goal of right-wing parties in culture and education (Koren 2015, 13–16). In this political context, the authors of the Croatian language curriculum were accused of attempting to undermine Croatian national identity because of their effort to modernize the reading list, while the documents dealing with civic and health education were disqualified for allegedly promoting "gender ideology," *pro-choice* views, and same-sex marriage.[17] The proposed history curriculum was labeled, directly or indirectly, as "ideologized," "anti-Croat," "pro-Yugoslav," and "Titoist." It was also criticized because, according to the critics, it did not provide enough national history (the curriculum proposed an equal ratio of Croatian and world history—at least 40 percent of each—and 20 percent of content was left for teachers to decide). Here are some examples of this kind of criticism.

An excerpt from a newspaper column written by a historian (Banac 2016):

> Only one question remains, who planted this on Tomislav Karamarko [a leader of the HDZ at the time]… It could be concluded that the necessary interpretative changes, in fact decommunization, do not accompany the methodological innovations of the proposal for history teaching. This equally applies to the interpretation of the history of Croatian identity and the national question in all modern states in this territory. Perhaps this proposal will currently succeed in defending the continuity of apology for and ideologemes of Titoism, but the historians' guild will sooner or later need to explain why it is so. Can the methodology replace the necessary content of the reform?[18]

From a historian's contribution to the expert debate:

[17] For examples, see: Jerković (2016), Starešina (2016), Cvrtila (2016a), *Kamenjar.com* (2017), *Direktno.hr* (2016), *Hrvatsko katoličko društvo prosvjetnih djelatnika* (2017), *Vjera i djela* (2016).

[18] See also: the answer: Koren (2016).

> Considering that the third topic, *World War II on the territory of Yugoslavia*, deals with "exploring the multiple causes and course of World War II on the territory of Yugoslavia with the focus on the situation in Croatia […]," I see no reason to mention in the title of that topic the state that disappeared in the whirlwind of World War II, and even more because 90 percent of this topic is dedicated to the situation in Croatia.[19]

The commentary of a historian and a director of the Croatian Memorial-Documentation Centre of the Homeland War, during the discussion about the history curriculum proposal at the Croatian Institute of History:

> For me, it is unacceptable that the share of national history has been reduced from 60 percent in the current curriculum to 40 percent in the new curriculum, equally as world history. One cannot prescribe national history below 50 percent. Although the topic of the Homeland War [the 1991–1995 war] is mandatory and the number of lessons is increased, what does it mean that 20 percent of the content is left for the teachers to decide? I'm afraid that the problematic topics, such as World War II and the Homeland War, will be avoided. Are we supposed to let teachers to use sources themselves and consequently to have a history based on newspapers, fiction, web portals? Or shall we, finally, fully present transcripts from the Office of the President and questions related to Croatia's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina?[20]

An excerpt from the commentary of a historian during the discussion about the history curriculum proposal at the Croatian Institute of History:

---

[19]The commentary of Ante Birin in *Odgovori na pristigle priloge stručnoj raspravi o prijedlogu Nacionalnog kurikuluma nastavnog predmeta Povijest*, p. 224. Available online: http://www.kurikulum.hr/page/3/?s=odgovor+stru%C4%8Dne+radne+skupine.

[20]This commentary of Ante Nazor is quoted in: Cvrtila (2016b). The last sentence of the commentary refers to the transcripts of talks led by Croatian President Franjo Tuđman with his associates, partners, and other political actors from Croatia and abroad between 1990 and 1999. These talks were taped and their transcripts appeared in public after Tudjman's death. They contain sensitive political material usually not available for public usage. Some excerpts and even whole transcripts were published in newspapers and books (see, for example: Lucić 2005). Some excerpts were used as evidence during the some ICTY trials, specifically those of Bosnian Croats.

> Ideologies are an integral part of our professional and social reality, but they must not be one-sided ideologies. That is one thing. And here you have pronouncedly one-sided ideology. I'll just tell you one thing. In your document, Yugoslavia is mentioned thirteen times … it's easy, search the document by search engine … and Hungary four times. Croatia was, or some forms of Croatia, in union with Hungary for 816 years, while the Yugoslav state lasted sixty-nine years. What are we talking about?[21]

Teaching the "Homeland War"—this is how the 1991–1995 war is officially referred to in Croatia, for example in the Croatian Constitution—was another important point in these debates. In the years following the end of the conflict, it has acquired an important place in official memory and has increasingly been portrayed as a key event in Croatian history. In 2000, the Croatian Parliament issued a Declaration on the Homeland War, which provides an official interpretation: Croatia "led a just and legitimate, defensive and liberating war and not a war of conquest and aggression against anyone; it defended its territory from the Great Serbian aggression, within its internationally recognized borders."[22] A similar sentence was added to the Croatian Constitution in 2010 (in "Part I: Historical foundations"). Narratives about this war entered the history textbooks almost immediately, in 1992, and were very much in tune with the official memory of it. Only after 2000 did some textbooks begin to offer more complex narratives (for example, by mentioning crimes committed by Croats during the war). At the same time, some veterans' associations and political groups have increasingly demanded that more time and space in curricula, textbooks, and teaching be dedicated to this topic. It is now usually taught for between three and five class hours, and textbooks usually dedicate between twenty and thirty pages to post-1980s Croatian history. But critics continually insist that existing curricula and textbooks do not pay enough attention to teaching the

[21]The commentary of Mladen Ančić during the discussion about the proposed history curriculum in the Croatian Institute for History took place on April 22, 2016. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4ZvQtLDdgY, 2:02:40–2.04.09.

[22]For the text of the Declaration, see: *Narodne novine* 102/2000: https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2000_10_102_1987.html.

1991–1995 war and that mandatory terminology and the official interpretations of it must be used.

Regarding the proposed new history curriculum, the critics insisted that the curriculum did not pay enough attention to the war, even though it provided at least twice as many school hours than before for teaching the topic. They also maintained that it would be necessary to strictly and thoroughly prescribe the content and "proper" interpretations of topics related to the war. One paragraph of the curriculum—one word in one paragraph, to be more precise—was strongly criticized by some historians, conservative civil society organizations, and even by some members of the Croatian Parliament:

> The student explores the processes of forming the independent Croatian state after 1990, including the democratic, political, and economic transformation of the Croatian state and society, the Homeland War, armed conflicts in *(post)Yugoslav space* [emphasis added], and Croatia's inclusion in international integration. The emphasis is on the period from the beginning of the Homeland War to the peaceful reintegration of the Danube basin region: on the causes of the war, key military operations, peace initiatives, different experiences of people during the war, and military and civilian war victims. The student explores the causes and consequences of these events and analyzes sources, including personal testimonies of contemporaries.[23]

Here are some examples of how the critics explained why they consider this term problematic.

An excerpt from the commentary of a historian and a director of the Croatian Memorial-Documentation Centre of the Homeland War on public television:

> Let me be clear, if we today, in 2016, are talking about armed conflicts in the post-Yugoslav space, then I do not know who made it. If the framework curriculum looks more like the Yugoslav curriculum rather than the

[23] *Nacionalni kurikulum nastavnoga predmeta Povijest: prijedlog*, February 2016, 51. Available as pdf document on: http://www.kurikulum.hr/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Povijest.pdf.

> Croatian curriculum, then I do not know who the expert is and what is politics.[24]

An excerpt from a comment on the general public consultation:

> But why do we mention and how much longer will we mention the (post)Yugoslav space? Both [King] Alexander's and Tito's Yugoslavia lasted together only for seventy years. If we stubbornly insist on the post-spaces, why wouldn't we in the case of the war in Slovenia, and even in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, talk about the (post)Austro-Hungarian space, or in the case of Kosovo about the (post)Ottoman space? Are we finally going to get away from that wretched Yugoslavia?[25]

An excerpt from a teacher's comment during the expert debate:

> rename the topic on page 51—replace the title *World War II on the territory of Yugoslavia* with *World War II on Croatian territory* (also p. 52 post-Yugoslav space); try to avoid propagating different ideologies through the content of the curriculum.[26]

The history curriculum was also criticized because, according to critics, it allowed too much autonomy for teachers to choose content and topics. There were also complaints that content was missing from the curriculum, as well as demands to elaborate each particular topic in detail.[27] The proposed curriculum defined students' progression in history not

[24]This claim by Ante Nazor was made during the political TV show *Otvoreno* on Croatian Television on May 25, 2016. For the footage, see: https://vijesti.hrt.hr/336501/otvoreno-zasto-je-boris-jokic-dao-ostavku (accessed January 6, 2019). See also: the polemics between Ante Nazor and Jurica Pavičić regarding the proposal of the history curriculum: Pavičić (2016a, b), Nazor (2016). Also: Pavičić (2017).

[25]This is a commentary from the contribution to the general public consultation from a conservative civil society association, In the Name of the Family. See: https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/MainScreen?entityId=3745 (accessed January 6, 2019).

[26]See: *Odgovori na pristigle priloge stručnoj raspravi o prijedlogu Nacionalnog kurikuluma nastavnog predmeta Povijest*, p. 38. Available online: http://www.kurikulum.hr/page/3/?s=odgovor+stru%C4%8Dne+radne+skupine.

[27]A 2007 study showed that the Croatian curricula were among the most prescriptive in Europe. See: Koren and Najbar-Agičić (2007). In the Croatian context, such a detailed prescription of contents always increases the risk of obligatory interpretations and official versions of history.

only in terms of detailed factual knowledge, but also in terms of students gradually developing generic skills and deeper understanding of concepts of historical thinking that applied to each topic provided, such as time and space, causes and consequences, continuity and change, historical sources and historical enquiry, and interpretations and perspectives. It is interesting to note that some professional historians were strongly against the inclusion of "sources and enquiry" and "interpretations and perspectives" among the organizing concepts of the history curriculum. Lacking knowledge of the constructivist learning theories that underlined the curriculum, they mistakenly equated enquiry-based learning strategies with scientific research, leading them to conclude that the concepts, as well as curriculum objectives using phrases such as "students investigate the past," were unrealistic and too difficult for primary and secondary school students' cognitive abilities. Analyzing historical sources and comparing different interpretations and perspectives of the past were not only deemed "too difficult," however, but also as a "relativization of history," an idea which stems from perceiving the main purpose of (school) history as transferring "proper" interpretations of the past.[28]

After only 146 days, however, the HDZ-led government lost support in the Parliament. Its deep unpopularity came not only from the stalled curricular reform. It was inefficient and incapable of implementing any important decision; at the same time, it deepened ideological rifts in society through the radical rhetoric of some of its prominent members, threatened freedom of expression, and put political pressure on state-funded public media. Snap elections ensued and a more moderate, center-right government (still led by the HDZ, but with a new president) took office. This government initially continued the policy of its predecessor towards the CKR. It officially resumed the reform, but tried to do it with different people who rejected certain key ideas in the original reform proposal. An attempt to select a new Expert Work

[28] See: *Odgovori na pristigle priloge stručnoj raspravi o prijedlogu Nacionalnog kurikuluma nastavnog predmeta Povijest*: http://www.kurikulum.hr/page/3/?s=odgovor+stru%C4%8Dne+radne+skupine, contributions to the general public consultation: https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/MainScreen?entityId=3745 and the discussion about the proposal of the history curriculum in the Croatian Institute for History, April 22, 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4ZvQtLDdgY.

Group in April 2017 failed because of procedural irregularities.[29] This led to another massive protest exactly a year after the first, on 1 July 2017. Demonstrators demanded the dismissal of the minister of education, who had been compromised by numerous scandals, along with some of those appointed to run the reform process.[30] When the government was reconstructed in June 2017, the minister was replaced by a non-party academic who was charged with the task of pushing the reform forward. During the government reconstruction, the HDZ made a coalition deal with the liberal Croatian People's Party (HNS), representatives of national minorities and a few smaller parties to remain in power and avoid a second snap election in less than a year. As a junior partner in the government, the HNS got two ministries, one being the Ministry of Education. The HNS endorsed the new non-party minister of education and the party leadership said the principal reason its entered the ruling coalition was to secure continuation of the CKR. The Ministry of Education took control of the reform process and started to prepare an experimental implementation to test the curriculum proposals in some schools.

Because of controversies over the reform, the Ministry of Education announced it would ask for international reviews for most of the subject curricula,[31] except history and Croatian language, which, as "national subjects," were supposed to be reviewed primarily by Croatian experts. The Croatian language curriculum was ultimately reviewed by the HAZU, and the history curriculum by both the HAZU and the Bavarian Ministry of Education. The history curriculum received a positive review from the Bavarian ministry, with a couple of suggested improvements—among them a suggestion that "the cross-community and cross-regional focus of the curriculum" as well as "the role of women

[29] For the appointments, see: the web page of the Ministry of Education: https://mzo.hr/hr/rubrike/odluke-o-imenovanju.

[30] The second protest was also well covered in the Croatian media. For articles in English, see: Milekic (2017).

[31] So far, the curricula have been sent for review to the British Council (English Language), France (French Language), Slovenia (Mathematics, Geography, Physical Education), Estonia (Nature and Society, Biology, Computer Science), Finland (Technical Culture, Music), Austria (Computer Science), UK (Computer Science), and Italy (Latin Language). For reviews, see: the website of the Ministry of Education: https://mzo.hr/hr/rubrike/.

and minorities" could be made much stronger.[32] It received barely a passing review from the HAZU, however, which essentially asked that a new draft of the proposal be prepared.[33] In the end, the Ministry of Education accepted both curricula with some minor changes, and both are included in the pilot project, called the "School for Life," for the school year 2018/2019. According to the ministry's plans, after a year of experimental implementation, new curricula should be implemented in all primary and secondary schools for the school year 2019/2020.

Still, there are many obstacles and a lot of criticism about the whole reform process, from various points of view. On one side, there are those who warn that many of the ideas from the original reform proposal have not been implemented.[34] The extension of compulsory education from eight to nine grades is no longer mentioned in legislative documents that support the reform process, and nor is the National Framework Curriculum as a key document. During the experimental phase, the focus is on implementing subject curricula and not comprehensive curricular reform. On the other side, those to the right of the political and ideological spectrum wanted to stop the liberal reform of education from the beginning, or at least take control of the process.

Much still remains uncertain because of the inter-party dynamics in the ruling coalition. Tensions already surfaced between the coalition partners during the election of the members of the new Expert Work Group. It was finally formed in April 2018, but due to disagreements on who would lead the group, the prime minister appointed a special advisor to coordinate its work (a high-ranking HDZ member who had been

[32]For the review, see: the website of the Ministry of Education: https://mzo.hr/hr/rubrike/.

[33]The HAZU was included in the review process as the most important scientific institution in the country, although among its 160 academics who are experts in their respective fields of study none are specialists in educational sciences. A group of historians from HAZU signed the review of the history curriculum. According to the response of the History Work Group, there were several misplaced and flawed comments and conclusions in the HAZU review. For both the review and the response, see: https://mzo.hr/hr/rubrike/. For other comments on the reviews, see: http://www.historiografija.hr/?p=9314.

[34]See, for example: Kršul (2018), *Jutarnji list* (2018).

minister of education in 2009–2011).[35] A majority of the group's members was made up of those who wanted to ensure substantial review of the existing documents. Recent developments also point to negotiations and compromises over the reform within the ruling coalition. From mid-November to mid-December 2018, the Ministry of Education opened another general public consultation, this time about the decision to implement the new subject curricula in the school year 2019/2020. In comparison, curricula for vocational schools were approved in summer 2017 and implemented in schools without any public consultation.

The majority of the roughly fifty comments received[36] about the history curriculum proposal during the new general public consultation were positive. Most teachers, including those from experimental schools, positively evaluated the new student-centered approach, active learning methods, development of critical thinking and teachers' autonomy, as well as the reduction of prescribed content and number of topics. There were some questions and concerns among teachers on how the proposed teacher autonomy and possibility to choose among the proposed topics would affect textbook production and state exams. Most indicated the need for further education.[37]

The reactions of the academic community, however, were strongly divided on issues such as teachers' autonomy and, most of all, the purpose of school history. Some academic historians strongly advocated limiting teachers' autonomy and demonstrated mistrust in teachers as educated professionals. For some, the main purpose of learning and teaching history is to instill patriotism and shape students' national identity (for example, Ante Nazor, a historian and director of the Croatian Memorial Documentation Center of the Homeland War, specified "the importance of nurturing national identity, and strengthening the feeling and awareness of belonging to the Croatian people and towards

[35] See: the decision on the appointment of twelve members of the Expert Working Group for the implementation of curriculum reform on the website of the Ministry of Education, April 17, 2018: https://mzo.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/2018/OBRAZOVANJE/Nacionalni-kurikulumi/odluka_o_imenovanju_clanova_ers-a_17.4.2018.pdf.

[36] For the comments, see: https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/MainScreen?entityId=9427.

[37] Contributions to the general public consultation are available on the government website *esavjetovanja.com*, from which the following excerpts are taken: https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/MainScreen?entityId=9427. For media reactions, see: Ponoš (2018).

the political and ethnic territory of the Croats"). Others supported the views of the authors of the history curriculum proposal who define learning history as the critical pursuit of knowledge about the past. Here are some examples of these different views.

From the statement of a group of teachers from the History Department of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science in Zagreb:

> As teachers of the History Department of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science in Zagreb—the oldest and largest Croatian scientific-educational institution that educates future history teachers—we emphasize that, in accordance with the democratic foundations of the European Union, education should be free and critical, and it should encourage constant questioning of national narratives, societies, and the world we live in.

An excerpt from the statement of the History Department of University of Zadar:

> The proposed history curriculum for high school is opposed to the idea of creating a coherent national narrative, and thus opposed to the fundamental values of the Republic of Croatia as a national state […]

An excerpt from the commentary of historian Mario Kevo from the History Department of the Croatian Catholic University in Zagreb:

> history as a school subject must be seen as crucial in preserving the "mental health" of future generations focused on expression of the longevity of the identity of a nation. It requires a meta-narrative about the past, which is formed through professional consensus and properly and timely mediated in teaching. Only this understanding of the past is meaningful to the school population, future stakeholders and bearers of Croatian social reality. Only a small part of that population, who will opt to study history at the university, will be fully acquainted with the concepts of shaping images of the past reality.

An excerpt from the statement of the Croatian History Teachers' Organization:

> More thorough work on individual topics will enable more efficient development of critical thinking skills, which has declaratively been one of the goals of history teaching in Croatia for a long time.

From the commentary of Nazor, director of the Croatian Memorial-Documentation Centre for the Homeland War:

> Although this review of the history curriculum does not deal with civic education, I think that the name "homeland education" would be much more appropriate for this subject. Along with the topics that are now anticipated, its curriculum should also include topics important for understanding issues of national security. These issues are completely neglected in the proposed curricula in Croatian schools, although they are very important, especially because there is no compulsory military service in Croatia.

The Ministry of Education also announced a call for new work groups to revise the subject curricula and improve the documents according to the comments received during the public consultation. The education minister was able to appoint one member of each of the former work groups who drafted the original proposal in the new groups, while the new Expert Work Group chose the other members. The majority of the history work group was made up of those who had previously strongly criticized the curriculum proposal.[38] Instead of improving the existing document, the group developed—in less than one month—a completely new proposal. This new document was endorsed by the Expert Work Group, but the minister of education initially refused to accept it, declaring as a reason for this decision a dissatisfaction with the huge quantity of content and the "relativization of the Holocaust."[39] In February 2019, the document was sent to a new public consultation; it received more than 300 comments and extensive media coverage.[40] It provoked many negative reactions, especially among teachers, because of its prescriptive

[38] For the members of the new history work group, see: Ministry of Science and Education (2018). For media reactions, see: Šimićević (2018). For the reaction of the Ministry of Education to the article, see: *Novosti* (2018).

[39] See, for example: *Jutarnji list* (2019).

[40] For the comments, see: https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/MainScreen?entityId=10217.

and normative character, a huge increase in the overall number of topics, and its disregard for the plurality of interpretative perspectives (particularly with regard to the presentation of the 1990s war). Among academic historians, however, opinions were again divided, especially on the role of history teaching in shaping national identity. Extensive contributions from several history departments and institutes point not only at academic historians' diverging views of the purpose of school history, but also of the nature of history as an academic discipline.

After the completion of the public consultation, the minister added another three historians to the existing work group and charged the group with finalizing the document in a two-week period, on the basis of the second proposal. During the government session on 15 March 2019, the prime minister announced that the history curriculum was completed and that the history work group had achieved "a quality consensus." He emphasized that all members of the government, regardless of their political philosophy, could support this document, which is "its real value." Two sentences from his speech were posted on the government's official Twitter account (@VladaRH, March 15, 2019):

> Sensitive topics from 20th century history, like the Holocaust, are appropriately represented in the new curriculum in undoubtedly democratic and unbiased manner towards any totalitarian and authoritarian system.
>
> Similarly, the topic of the Homeland War, which is the starting point of sovereign Croatia, is in this curriculum covered appropriately and comprehensively, in accordance with the parliamentary Declaration on the Homeland War.

Although the prime minister emphasized the professional, not political, character of the document, his words, and the whole process, show otherwise: a deep and thorough politicization of history teaching in Croatia, especially topics from twentieth-century history.

Conclusion

The impact of this document on history teaching remains to be seen, as well as the impact of other curricular documents on the reform process as a whole. Taking into account the political back-and-forth on the education reform so far and the evident lack of broad political support for implementing the more substantial changes, we still cannot be sure what kind of reform will be implemented in the school-year 2019/20, and whether it will be just another missed opportunity for Croatia.

References

24 sata. 2016. "Objavili da stopiraju reform školstva, a onda: 'To je greška'," January 22. Retrieved from https://www.24sata.hr/news/objavili-da-stopiraju-reformu-skolstva-a-onda-to-je-greska-457762.

Banac, Ivo. 2016. "Kurikulum političkog kontinuiteta ili tko je podmetnuo Karamarku?" *Jutarnji list*, March 11. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/arhiva/ivo-banac-kurikulum-politickog-kontinuiteta-ili-tko-je-podmetnuo-karamarku/30757/.

Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2011. *Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011*. https://www.dzs.hr/eng/censuses/census2011/censuslogo.htm.

Cvrtila, Marijana. 2016a. "Mate Maras: Tvorci kurikuluma poigravaju se sa sudbinom naroda." *Slobodna Dalmacija*, March 12. Retrieved from https://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/scena/kultura/clanak/id/305412/mate-maras-tvorci-kurikuluma-poigravaju-se-sa-sudbinom-naroda.

Cvrtila, Marijana. 2016b. "Novi kurikulum povijesti: puno Jugoslavije i ideologije, malo o Hrvatima u BiH." *Slobodna Dalmacija*, April 3. Retrieved from https://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/hrvatska/clanak/id/310308/novi-kurikulum-povijesti-puno-jugoslavije-i-ideologije-malo-o-hrvatima-u-bih.

Direktno.hr. 2016. "Kristina Pavlović: GROZD upozorava na nove zamke u obrazovnoj reformi," November 7. Retrieved from https://direktno.hr/direkt/grozd-upozorava-na-nove-zamke-u-obrazovnoj-reformi-66532/.

Hrvatsko katoličko društvo prosvjetnih djelatnika. 2017. "'Cjelovita kurikularna reforma' je velika nestručna, ideološka i nacionalna prevara," February 10. Retrieved from http://hkdpd.blogspot.com/2017/02/kurikularna-reforma.html.

Jerković, Darko. 2016. "Slobodan Prosperov Novak: Jokićev je kurikulum šuvarovska tempirana bomba!" *Glas Slavonije*, April 30. Retrieved from http://www.glas-slavonije.hr/300267/11/Jokicev-je-kurikulum-suvarovska-tempirana-bomba.

Jutarnji list. 2018. "Boris Jokić: Cjelovita kurikularna reforma je projekt koji je umro. To je možda i dobro…," September 18. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/boris-jokic-cjelovita-kurikularna-reforma-je-projekt-koji-je-umro-to-je-mozda-i-dobro/7840545/.

Jutarnji list. 2019. "Javna rasprava većinom negativno ocjenjuje ponuđeni kurikulum povijesti," February 19. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/obrazovanje/javna-rasprava-vecinom-negativno-ocjenjuje-ponudeni-kurikulum-povijesti/8397914/.

Kamenjar.com. 2017. "Prof.dr.sc. Marko Marušić: Rodna ideologija i njezine posljedice," October 12. Retrieved from https://kamenjar.com/prof-dr-sc-matko-marusic-rodna-ideologija-njezine-posljedice/.

Koren, Snježana. 2015. "Twentieth-Century Wars in History Teaching and Public Memory of Present-Day Croatia." *Studi Sulla Formazione* 2: 11–32. Accessed January 8, 2019. Also available online: http://www.fupress.net/index.php/sf/article/view/18013.

Koren, Snježana. 2016. "Ivo Banac parcijalno, površno i pogrešno napada kurikulum povijesti." *Jutarnji list*, March 21. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/arhiva/snjezana-koren-ivo-banac-parcijalno-povrsno-i-pogresno-napada-kurikulum-povijesti/34723/.

Koren, Snježana, and Branislava Baranović. 2009. "What Kind of History Education Do We Have after Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia? Transition, Intervention, and History Education Politics (1990–2008)." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeastern Europe*, edited by A. Dimou, 91–95. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Koren, Snježana, and Magdalena Najbar-Agičić. 2007. "European Experience and the History Curriculum in Compulsory Education." *Metodika: časopis za teoriju i praksu metodika u predškolskom odgoju, školskoj i visokoškolskoj izobrazbi* 8 (15): 344–372. Also available online: https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=38746.

Kovačić, Marko. 2016. "Croatia Rallies in Support of Education Reform." *Open Society Foundations*, June 7. Retrieved from https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/croatia-rallies-support-education-reform.

Kršul, Dora. 2018. "Propast Cjelovite kurikularne reforme. Komentar: Kako je za jefitne političke poene slomljena ideja CKR." *Srednja.hr*, March 14. Retrieved from https://srednja.hr/novosti/hrvatska/propast-cjelovite-kurikularne-reforme-komentar-jeftine-politicke-poene-slomljena-ideja-ckr/.

Kustura, Irena. 2002. "Akademici protiv Strugarove reforme." *Večernji list*, December 11. Retrieved from https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/akademici-protiv-strugarove-reforme-727700.

Lucić, Predrag, ed. 2005. *Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne*. Split: Feral Tribune; Sarajevo: Dani.

Marini, Adela. 2016. "Croatia Is Fighting the Conservative Revolution." *euinside*, June 2. Retrieved from http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/croatia-struggles-for-a-radical-change.

Milekic, Sven. 2016. "Croatian Education Reform Protest Gains Global Support." *BalkanInsight*, June 1. Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatian-education-reform-protest-gains-global-support-05-31-2016.

Milekic, Sven. 2017. "Croatia Teachers Protest over Stalled Education Reforms." *BalkanInsight*, June 1. Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/pupils-need-to-develop-skills-croatia-professors-claim-05-31-2017.

Ministarstvo prosvjete i športa. 2002. *Projekt hrvatskog odgojno-obrazovnog sustava za 21. Stoljeće*. Zagreb.

Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i športa. 2006. *Nastavni plan i program za osnovnu školu*. Zagreb.

Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i športa. 2010. *Nacionalni okvirni kurikulum za predškolski odgoj i obrazovanje te opće obvezno i srednjoškolsko obrazovanje*. Zagreb.

Ministry of Science and Education. 2018. *Odluka o imenovanju članova radnih skupina za izradu prijedloga predmetnih kurikuluma*, December 12. Retrieved from https://mzo.hr/hr/imenovani-clanovi-radnih-skupina-za-izradu-prijedloga-predmetnih-kurikuluma-kurikuluma.

Nacionalni centar za vanjsko vrednovanje obrazovanja. 2017. *Novi horizonti strukovnoga obrazovanja. Izvještaj vanjskoga vrednovanja eksperimentalne provedbe novih strukovnih kurikuluma*. Zagreb.

Nazor, Ante. 2016. "Vodite boj protiv 'revizionista' koji ugrožavaju vaš monopol nad 'istinom'." *Magazin Jutarnjeg lista*, October 10. Also available on: https://tsnitko.wordpress.com/2016/10/18/vodite-boj-protiv-revizionista-koji-ugrozavaju-vas-monopol-nad-istinom/.

Novosti. 2018. "Reagiranje: Ministrica ne bira članove radnih skupina," January 3. Retrieved from https://www.portalnovosti.com/reagiranje-ministrica-ne-bira-clanove-radnih-skupina.

Pastuović, Nikola. 1996. „Upravljanje i reformiranje obrazovnih sustava: osvrt na reforme u postkomunističkim zemljama." *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja* 5 (1, 21): 39–58.

Pavičić, Jurica. 2016a. "Viktor Orban, najveći sin naroda i narodnosi." *Jutarnji list*, September 9. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/komentari/viktor-orban-najveci-sin-naroda-i-narodnosti/4682300/.

Pavičić, Jurica. 2016b. "Dok misli da iznosi činjenice, Nazor nam nudi ideologiju." *Jutarnji list*, October 22. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/komentari/dok-misli-da-iznosi-cinjenice-nazor-nam-nudi-ideologiju/5169336/.

Pavičić, Jurica. 2017. "Najvažnija hrvatska tema 2016: Čemu, zapravo, služi škola?" *Jutarnji list*, January 1. Retrieved from https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/najvaznija-hrvatska-tema-2016.-cemu-zapravo-sluzi-skola/5452355/.

Ponoš, Tihomir. 2018. "'Je li Domovinski rat dovoljno zastupljen?' Kurikulum povijesti najveće je mjesto 'sukoba'." *Novi list*, December 24. Retrieved from http://novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Je-li-Domovinski-rat-dovoljno-zastupljen-Kurikulum-povijesti-najvece-je-mjesto-sukoba.

Poslovni.hr. 2016. "Jokić i njegov tim dali ostavke zbog političkih pritisaka," May 25. Retrieved from http://www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/jokic-i-njegov-tim-dali-ostavke-zbog-politickih-pritisaka-313350.

Reuters. 2016. "Thousands of Croatians Protest for Education Free of Politics," June 1, Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-croatia-protests-education/thousands-of-croatians-protest-for-education-free-of-politics-idUKKCN0YN5OO.

Šimićević, Hrvoje. 2018. "Deforma povijesti." *Novosti*, December. Retrieved from https://www.portalnovosti.com/deforma-povijesti.

Šošić, Lovorka. 2016. "50000 Croatians Tell Government Not to Meddle in Education Reform." *Liberties*, June 14. Retrieved from https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/croatia-can-do-better/8937.

Starešina, Višnja. 2016. "Projekt Jokić na partijskom zadatku." *Slobodna Dalmacija*, May 29. Retrieved from https://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/misljenja/vijesti-i-konteksti/clanak/id/313886/projekt-jokic-na-partijskom-zadatku.

The Economist. 2016. "Mass Protests in Support of Curriculum Reform," June 7. Retrieved from http://country.eiu.com/(F(YLE1RNtDcPyDUkSK2xcbPTpi5ZVfsESiEA5EH233wGw84tf4MsgONGvhpPwHJWlDJNe500ZyDmcSujcijcIxVecUqT0PgdFJtsQoPbG6nRrleTz8D_2ZFVYjwS4_ubbB7UNPitjMi6bBhCrofHQ2XYPDo-U1))/article.aspx?articleid=914289675&Country=Croatia&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Political+stability&u=1&pid=697455053&oid=697455053&uid=1.

Vjera i djela: portal katoličkih teologa. 2016. "Petar Marija Radelj (s.a.), Kurikularna reforma ni letitimna ni legalna." *Vjera i djela: portal katoličkih teologa*, 01/05/2016. Retrieved from http://www.vjeraidjela.com/kurikulna-reforma-ni-legitimna-ni-legalna/.

Žiljak, Tihomir. 2013. "Dvije faze obrazovne politike u Hrvatskoj nakon 1990. godine." *Andragoški glasnik* 17 (1): 7–25.

7

Phantoms of Neverland: The Tale of Three+ History Textbooks in Croatia

Gorana Ognjenović

How does the identity of Croatia's Orthodox population appear in history textbooks?

This analysis of primary school textbooks as a reflection of state politics in the Republic of Croatia uses as its starting point a study by Domagoj Švigir completed in 2012 (Švigir 2012). Titled "The image of the other"—a reference, in this case, to Serbs—this study focused on textbooks used in state-run primary school between 1990 and 2012. Švigir's study in particular was chosen because it represents a standard, increasingly frequent approach to critiquing schoolbooks.

This chapter then provides a summarized history of the group known as "Vlachs," before offering a comparative discussion of three "parallel" history textbooks, each published by a different state-authorized private publishing house, that are currently used in Croatian primary schools. Specifically, it focuses on these books' presentation of Vlachs, the first people of Eastern Orthodox faith to arrive on the territory of present-day Croatia, before they fused with the Serbian Church Orthodox (SPC)

G. Ognjenović (✉)
University in Oslo, Oslo, Norway

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_7

through a political process. It will examine the presentation of Vlachs through these three textbooks in order to see how far it resonates with the content focused on by Švigir's study. Finally, it will attempt to identify some deeper reasons for why today's history textbooks in primary schools, as part of daily politics of the state, present the identity of Croatia's Orthodox population as they do, showing that it is no accident that even critics such as Švigir, by default, classify the country's entire Orthodox population as Serbs. Hopefully, this short reflection will help readers better understand why Vlachs' transgressive identity history continues to challenge such stereotypes, and may be a time bomb under the beds of Southeast Europe's contemporary nation states.

Švigir's Serbs as the Other

According to Švigir, history textbooks in Croatia between 1992 and 1995, so-called "war-period" textbooks, were an important part of the project of national identity building (Švigir 2012, 108). They were targeted by nationalist streams in the Parliament who hurriedly deleted all pro-Yugoslav content, which they did not see as serving the Croatian state.[1] This pulled Croatia out of the Yugoslav context, and instead analyses delved deeper into interpretations of Croatian history, thus augmenting ethnocentricity. The story of Croatia became the story of a nation fighting its way forward against all of its neighbors throughout history, until independence and the creation of a nation state in 1992 (Koren and Najbar-Agičić 2007; Koren 2007, 265). The story of Serbs, meanwhile, became that of Serbs from Serbia coming over and continuously attempting to sabotage, in one way or another, this great battle that was the Croatian nation's project of independence from everyone around them. The textbooks' portrayal of Serbs was ugly and derogatory. Historical figures who happen to have been Serbs were always presented as "antiheroes" (Švigir 2012, 110), as if all Serbs, independent of historical context, were exponents and promoters of greater Serbian politics on Croatian territory, from early Croatian history to the present day.

[1] See also: Koren (2007, 263), as quoted in Švigir (2012).

For example, Švigir shows that the books blamed Serbs for all Croatian deaths during World War I (Švigir 2012, 110). Serbian history is narrated using false information, presenting personal views as fact, and relativizing crimes. No historically positive connections or relationships between Serbs and Croats were mentioned (Švigir 2012, 111), and almost all negative encounters in the history of the Croatian nation had "Serbian" as a prefix. Individuals' doings were identified with group actions, "Serb" was synonymized with "Greater Serbian" to erase the difference between the two, and Chetnik war crimes against Croatian and Muslim populations were used to legitimize the Ustashe genocide of Serb, Roma, and Jewish civilians during World War II, implying that it was the victims' fault (Švigir 2012, 112). In addition, it is implicitly suggested that Serbs were better positioned as a nation than Croats in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Švigir 2012, 113).

In 1997 the so-called parallel textbooks were introduced with the aim of decreasing the amount of material pushed upon pupils in regular courses. Changes were subsequently made to course design, language was made milder, and descriptions of historical events became more complex, although the ethnocentric overtones remained strong (Švigir 2012, 115). After the social democrats come into power in 2000, textbooks changed for the better thanks to a commission tasked with evaluating them. Negative descriptions of both Serbs and Muslims dropped in volume and intensity, and descriptions of Serbian history were drastically reduced (Švigir 2012, 118). While the entire history of this part of Europe was still primarily seen through the conflict between Croats and Serbs, as if no one else was ever really out there (Švigir 2012, 120), in post-2000 textbooks historical Serbs could finally be discussed as antifascists—although only those from Croatia—and even some non-Croatian Serbs were mentioned as victims. This was a great change, as previously the only victims mentioned were strictly those of crimes committed by Serbs (Švigir 2012, 121). With the "parallel textbooks" project, a space opened up for those who did not want to continue to teach strongly ethnocentric political interpretations of history, for softening of the language and images of "others." Yet almost all textbooks from between 2000 and 2006 still held Serbs as collectively guilty for the wars of the 1990s. In the

same textbooks, Croats were the only victims; other ethnic groups' suffering was non-existent. It was only in one textbook published in 2000 that the authors, Snjezana Koren and Maja Brkljacic, mentioned large numbers of Serbs who fled Croatia during the Flash and Storm military operations of the 1990s, through which Croatia regained its territory after years of occupation by Serbian forces (Švigir 2012, 123). After 2006, Serbs finally described are in some places, by Koren for example, as taking part in the antifascist struggle in Serbia (Švigir 2012, 127).

In order to avoid misleading the reader any further with the idea that only Serbian part of Orthodox population in Croatia who came over from Serbia are described in ugly, derogative ways, let us take a look at the history of the Vlachs, the first people of Eastern Orthodox faith on the territory of Croatia, and then at how they are presented in more recent primary school textbooks. We will find that despite very little text about them on these pages, a very clear message comes in the form of the whole list of attributes which the authors use to describe them.

Becoming Serbs

As an ethnic group, Vlachs represent perhaps the earliest victims of Southeast Europe's religious nationalism, which draws its roots from the founding of the Serbian autocephalous church by St. Sava in 1219. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) melded nation and church together, gaining in power despite paying the price of being totally dependent on the state. As time passed, with the arrival of Serbian Archbishop Arsenije Čarnojević[2] to Croatia towards end of the seventeenth century, the SPC's territorial aspirations surpassed Serbia's borders. With backing from Constantinople, Čarnojević managed to obtain total autonomy for the SPC on the territory of Croatia, at the time a Habsburg colony. In everyday practice, this meant absorbing all Orthodox believers, whether ethnic Serbians or not, into the SPC. In the long run, as religion became politicized, it also slowly resulted in synonymizing ethnic Serbism and

[2]Arsenije III Čarnojević was the archbishop of Pec and Patriarch of Serbs from 1674 to 1691 and Metropolit of Sentandreja from 1691 until his death in 1706.

Orthodoxy, an equivalence which is one of the cornerstones of modern Serbian nationalism. In 1695 Čarnojević reorganized the hierarchy of the SPC in Croatia, which involved the formal assimilation of Vlachs—a title covering several modern Latin peoples descending from the Latinized population in the present-day territory of Romania and Moldova, as well as the southern part of Balkan Peninsula and south and west of the Danube River[3]—or Byzantine Orthodox. This was a profitable affair for both the SPC and Vlachs, since it meant an expansion of SPC territory under Habsburg rule and the possibility of increased political influence for Vlachs. The essential problem, which became more obvious for Vlachs with time, was that from then on the SPC on Habsburg Croatian soil no longer recognized Orthodox Vlachs as a separate ethnic group (Mirdita 2004, 12). This outcome can be seen as surprising, since the church was well aware that in the mother land, Serbia, Vlachs were constantly reminded by Serbians that they were not Serbians, and treated as lowly due to their nomadic origins. The Vlachs had been present in Serbia and other southern parts of Southeast Europe for a long time; much longer than the normative ethnic distinctions between Vlachs and Serbians that were established in Dušan's Code, which ruled the Serbian Empire since 1349.

On the other hand, Vlachs represented a problem for the SPC on foreign territory because they came to the area of today's Croatia long before Čarnojević and SPC did. Their identity was not solidly connected to the SPC or to Serbia, because they came with Turks, and mostly via today's territory of Montenegro. Eventually, a lot of them changed sides in the conflict and fought for the Habsburgs. A lot of promises had to be made and fulfilled by the Habsburgs to persuade the Vlachs to settle in the war-torn deserted areas of the *Vojna Krajina* (military border zones) between Habsburg and Ottoman empires, as a defense line. The promise of a possibility of a lasting settlement was proven irresistible. Rather than anything to do with religion, since as nomads they were not particularly religious, one precondition for their settlement in the area was the 1630 *Statuta Valachorum* or "Vlachs' rights," which were characteristic of the patriarchal military society (Roksandić 1991, 35, 47–50;

[3]See the chapter on Vlachs in Malcom (1996).

Mirdita 2004, 146–147; Valentić 1992, 1–21). The statute was accepted by Habsburgs as a very beneficial organizational tool that was effectively already in place, so that this form for army was able to function as a defense zone immediately. In these areas one can still see Eastern Orthodox Churches (*Vlaške Crkve*) that the Habsburgs built as an expression of their gratitude to the Vlachs for defending them against the Turks. These original Vlach's churches look nothing like other SPC churches across Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Upon their arrival with Turks on the other side of the frontier (today's territory of Bosnia), Vlachs settled along Drina river and in the southern areas (Donia and Fine 1994, 37–45). As a result, they were also more oriented towards the West, and their alphabet was Latin. It was not before middle of the nineteenth century that almost the entire Orthodox population in Croatia and Bosnia started using the nomenclature "Serbs" in reference to their ethnicity, brought about by Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy, which came up with the idea of declaring oneself through ethnic belonging rather than religious affiliation. The problem was that the SPC, essentially the Serbian national church, opportunistically took advantage of this by widely preaching the in the spirit of all SPC members being Serbs. That particular SPC project of politicizing history through politicizing religion as ethnic denominator made sure that the erroneous image of Vlachs national identity as Serbs is very much still in use today.

The problem of the image of Vlachs is thus an old historiographical issue. It started as soon as their ancestors arrived in Croatian territory, a long time before Čarnojević and refugees from Serbia came as part of a great migration under the wings of the SPC. One can always downplay the role of religion in creating identity, as Malešević does, by claiming that institutional Serbian Orthodoxy was too weak to reshape people's sense of the identity and instill in them a sense of nationalism (Malešević 2019, 181). Yet in the absence of other alternatives, once the first census was orchestrated, on paper and thus ever since, all Orthodox individuals turned out to be ethnic Serbs regardless of what their ethnicity was until that point or might be today after centuries of residing outside of Serbia. That early project of making ethnicity and religion one and the same is at the core of ethnic conflicts in Southeastern Europe—more than many Serbian academics, such as Radmila Radić and Siniša Malešević, would

like to admit. Demanding and achieving an autocephalous SPC on Habsburg territory and absorbing the whole Orthodox population under its national church can hardly be a sign of a weak institution, especially since their very same project still continues today, in a modernized manner.

Vlachs as Other

The textbook *Tragom prošlosti* (Brdal et al. 2018) ventures more deeply into analyses of the historical context around the origins of the Orthodox population on the territory of today's Republic of Croatia. It correctly explains how the first arrival of those of Orthodox faith was connected to the establishment of the *Vojna Krajina* (military border zones). It describes how, in the mid-sixteenth century, Ferdinand I von Habsburg started organizing military forces in Croatia and Slavonia (Brdal et al. 2018, 167). These forces were deployed through interconnected *Krajina* (border zones), as an Austro-Hungarian defense line against the Ottoman Empire. The book lists the three *Krajina*: Croatian, with its administrative center Karlovac; Slavonic, administered by Varaždin; and Banska Krajina, under control of a *ban* (or viceroy) and the Parliament, with its central administration in Petrinja. The Croatian and Slavonic *Krajina* were under direct control of the main military command in Graz. The book describes how the Croatian ban and Parliament made several demands for total control over the *Krajina* from the Habsburgs, but only succeeded in getting Banska Krajina. In addition, the authors admit how in order to defend Croatian territory, at that time part of the Habsburg Empire, people known as Vlachs/Vlasi, who came from Ottoman territory, knew the Ottoman way of war well, and could therefore defend the territory against them and act as spies, were settled in the *Krajina*. Yet the textbook quickly implies that Vlachs, who were also Uskoci, were despicable plunderers, since they had belonged to military forces who went into wanted territories first to plunder and destroy before the Ottoman forces moved in. The fact that the Uskoci or *hajduks* were small opportunistic groups determined to survive in the *Krajina* wastelands, having no concept of nation of any kind and needing to take from any side in order to survive (Malešević 2019, 179), is something that is

not considered as a possible explanation. The scarce resources in these war-torn wastelands were to be taken by those who got to them first.

The authors also describe Vlachs as "grand opportunists" because they attempted to keep up their benefits from the Ottoman Empire after changing sides. They were freed from feudal taxes on both sides and apparently saw themselves as warriors who, except as soldiers reporting to kings, did not have any obligations towards the state. Yet in reality it is hard to determine what would have been taxed anyway, since vast swathes of the population had fled the area, the wastelands only offered the resources for basic survival, and, furthermore, the Vlachs were not exactly very high on the anyone's payroll, instead receiving the possibility of settlement as reimbursement for their willingness to fight for the Habsburgs against the Turks. The authors even go as far as acknowledging that not all Vlachs were of Eastern Orthodox confession. Yet instead of describing their settlements as occurring in places where no one wanted to live due to ongoing conflict, the authors describe "Vlachs" as those who came "temporarily" as guests and stayed forever as occupiers refusing to submit to the rule of the Croatian Ban or Parliament (Brdal et al. 2018, 168). Equally, there is no trace of reflection over the fact that they were brought about by a third party—the Turks when invading the Balkans—as soldiers for the colonial power, placed directly under colonialist powers administration just as Croats were.

The description of the arrival of the Orthodox population in the textbook *Povijest 6* (Birin and Šarlija 2007) is very short, yet it still manages to downplay the role that Vlachs initially had, and does not mention that not all Vlachs were Orthodox. What the two authors do say is that *Vojna Krajina* was established in order to effectively defend the Habsburg Empire from Ottoman Empire's persistent attempts at conquest. They write that at the beginning there were only two *Krajina*, the Croatian and Slavonic, and that neither were under control of the Croatian ban or Parliament. According to them, it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that the Habsburgs ceded control over a piece of *Krajina*, as compensation, to the Croatian ban and Parliament by proclaiming a third area titled *Banska Krajina*. They emphasize the fact that even then the majority of Vlachs residing within *Krajina* did not come

under the rule of the Croatian ban and the Parliament (Birin and Šarlija 2007, 120).

The material in the textbook *Vremeplov 6* (Labor et al. 2016) corresponds to that in the above two books, but it focuses much more on describing *Vojna Krajina* and the circumstances around its emergence (Labor et al. 2016, 121). It informs students that Vlachs had lived on raising cattle and off the land, but that due to continuous war cattle took over as their primary source of survival (Labor et al. 2016, 192). However the story changes yet again according to this textbook: Because Vlachs were losing their benefits as the Ottoman Empire weakened, they did not hesitate to accept the Habsburg invitation to switch sides. The authors do admit, however, that not all Vlachs were Orthodox (Labor et al. 2016, 193). They also correctly point out that with the Vlach Statutes, signed by the Habsburg emperor in 1630, they became autonomous in relation to the Croatian ban and Parliament, and admit that the statutes were rules for everyone who resided in *Krajina*, including Croatian peasants. Living under the Vlach Statutes was a territorial, not an ethnic or religious, matter (Labor et al. 2016, 194).

Past Becomes Present

Even though the language descriptions have softened up over time, certain questions linger after reading through the three abovementioned textbooks, written since a partial *moratorium* for studying contemporary history in Croatian schools was lifted in 2005.[4] Are images of a distant past, a past not connected to the events of the 1990s, still resonating in the post-trauma of the wars of the 1990s? Or are negative images of Serbs being superimposed onto Vlachs due to their Orthodox origins? As if the images of Vlachs in the textbooks from the 1990s were not already bad

[4]As part of the Erdut Agreement between the Croatian Republic and the temporary UN administration for Eastern Slavonia, Barnja, and Western Srijem (4 August 1997), through which those three areas by the Danube were reintegrated into Croatia, the Croatian government recognized educational rights for minorities in those three areas. A subsequent declaration stipulated a five-year moratorium on studying the history of the period from 1988 to 1997 in all schools in the Danube area.

enough (Tomljenović 2012)? And why is there no recognition, in any of studies of textbooks, of the fact that the story of Vlachs and the story of Serbs are two distinctive parts of what after a certain point becomes one religiously historic narrative?

From the perspective of this analyses, the split between the two narratives seems clearly made for the purpose of not wanting to see the entire Orthodox population in any way but through the prism of the 1990s. Teaching pupils that all Serbs came from Serbia as an extended hand of centuries-old Serbian nationalism with hereditary aspirations to Croatian and other territories is a clear goal of the project within which these textbooks are organized. Ethnocentric perspectives reflecting the conflict between Vienna and Croatian feudal families who demanded of Vienna submit Vlachs to a tax regime once they settled on the Croatian side of the defense war frontier against Turks (deeply focused on in each of the three textbooks analysed) can carry only so much weight, since it is well reflected fact throughout Croatian school textbooks that also other ethnic groups are always in one way or the other, evil invaders who are there only to cause conflicts and problems (Najbar-Agičić and Agičić 2006).

Yet none of this still explains why and how these phantoms remain identity-less Vlachs in *Krajina* in these textbooks. The authors do not make the mistake of assigning them national identity per se. In textbook after textbook, the phantoms of the Neverland (*Krajina*) remain throughout descriptions both of a nationless and stateless group which still carries the potential of indulging the grounded statelessness. None of the authors or critics seem willing to delve into this abyss of uncertainties on which these form of transgressive identities are.

There is no doubt that Švigir's study and other related studies analyze and correctly describe the state of textbooks in Croatia concerning the presentation of Serbs. Undoubtedly, what these images effectively attempt to demonstrate, again and again, is a vital, continuous line of Serbia's ingrained desire to conquer and occupy Croatian lands, making them irrevocably part of a Greater Serbia. It is seen purely as an eternal conspiracy between Serbs living in Croatia and Serbians from Serbia, and thus in the 1990s Croatia won independence as the logical final step in this sequence of attacks on the integrity of Croatia and is people. Operations Flash and Storm, launched by the armies of Croatia and

Bosnian and Herzegovina in 1995, are therefore envisioned as the climax or grand finale of the long historical epic of Croatia's independence, especially when thousands of Orthodox people left Croatia on the back of old tractors after the military victory.

Yet the problem is even bigger than Švigir and others show: In school history textbooks in both Croatia and in Serbia, these nationalist ideas are presented as facts while in reality they are nothing but another set of nationalist projections launched from each end of the spectrum Serbian and Croatian nationalism (Tomljenović 2012). In this way, Malešević's grounded nationalism is a "doubled up" nationalism from both ends, which is equally far from any reality of the historic facts in question.

Examples of these double projections are many, but nothing beats that used by Siniša Malešević to illustrate the point—the historical context of the competitive relationship between the two nineteenth-century Serbian royal houses of Djordje Petrović ("Karađorđe") and Miloš Obrenović. They supposedly led the uprisings against the Ottoman occupier, and later came to be used in symbolically loaded historical narratives composed during the build-up of national awakening—as they still are now (Švigir 2012, 109, 116). But none of the competition between the two, or the first uprising led by Karađorđe, who was later assassinated by Obrenović, actually had anything to do with Serbian national awakening. Both houses were wealthy pork traders on the Austro-Hungarian market and competed for a monopoly on exporting meat to the Habsburgs. They were illiterate individuals who instrumentalized local populations' frustrations with the occupying Ottomans for personal gain. Obrenović very clearly stated that he worked not against the Ottoman Empire but to restore order on behalf of the sultan (Malešević 2019, 194). Another classic example is the orally conveyed Kosovo battle epic in which the fourteenth-century Serbian king Kraljević Marko is celebrated as the hero, when he in fact was a Turkish vassal.

But of course not all modern-day Serbs, such as Vlachs for example, came from Serbia, and therefore they do not represent Serbia's extended hand of conspiracy against the sovereignty of Croatia. This is why references to Serbia's medieval history to point at identity-related reasons for later Serbian nationalism have little or no use when considering the

ethnic identities of Orthodox people who have resided for centuries on Croatian soil.

As stated above, the arrival of those of Orthodox faith, Vlachs, in *Krajina* was connected to Habsburg battles against Turkish incursions, resulting in the settlement of Vlachs as a military force at the border area in the sixteenth century, long before the arrival of Čarnojević and Serbian refugees to Croatia as part of the great migration.

As a part of the grounded nationalist project in history textbooks, the story of ethnic Vlachs and the story of ethnic Serbs remain strictly separated from each other, as if the majority of ethnic Vlachs were not ancestors of contemporary Orthodox population on Croatian soil. Vlachs are were the first ethnic group to fall victim to the religious nationalism of the twentieth century in Southeast Europe—to equating "religion" and "ethnicity" at both ends of the spectrum. They are punished by Croatian historiography for coming to help out against the Ottoman Empire when desperately needed but not leaving after that war of civilizations was over. They have simultaneously been punished by the Serbian historiography and SPC through forceful religious assimilation—religious institutions are never good at dealing with the transgressive ethnic identities, which are much more fluid that the strict rules of religion.

Presenting the two parts of the same narrative as two different, unconnected stories is a key moment in misleading students with the idea that all Serbs are originally ethnic Serbians from Serbia in order to legitimate the project of Croatia's long-lasting battle against its greedy neighbor. In this way, history school textbook authors in Croatia paradoxically play into the hands of Serbian nationalists, who likewise continue to synonymize ethnicity with religion in an attempt to legitimize their argument that Krajina is and will always be Serbian land. Were the books to correctly present Vlachs and Serbs as two parts of the same narrative, they would also automatically challenge their own narrative structured around a conspiracy theory of eternal Serbian pretensions towards Croatian land.

Vlachs are described in an ugly and derogatory way before they become Serbs in these textbook descriptions, because they are victims of the religious nationalism of the Croatian Catholic Church, grounded as it gets, which envisions as hostile and threatening anything that does

not resemble itself. To crown it all, not even the critical studies of textbooks, let alone the textbooks themselves, mention the fact that a large number of people of Orthodox faith voluntarily chose to defend Croatia against Serbian aggression during the 1990s.

Conclusion

As Malešević shows in *Grounded Nationalisms*, nationalism didn't exist in the Balkans before industrialization or modernity. Most of the population was oblivious to nationalist ideology—they did not even have a concept of a nation, let alone conspire to be part of someone or something else. Yet this analyses shows that nomadic Vlachs, having a transgressive local identity, still work to keep the grounding of nationalism at bay because the standardized nationalisms of the newborn nation states do not know what to do with them. Since for Malešević the entire Orthodox population are Serbs, this challenges his presentation of the historical facts in his sociological study of nationalism. His swift conclusion is that national religious institutions in Southeast Europe did not and do not have much to say about the ongoing evolution of "grounded nationalism" as a more refined form of nationalistic terror. But as also this analyses shows religious nationalism is far from being just a convenient shadow on the wall, free from institutional power, as we have seen in the recent decades and we will even more so come to see in the coming time.

References

Birin, Ante, and Tomislav Šarlija. 2007. *Povijest 6, Udžbenik za šesti razred osnovne škole*. Zagreb: Alfa.

Brdal, Zeljko, Margita Madunić, and Tragom Proslosti. 2018. *Udžbenik povijesti u šestom razredu*. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga.

Donia, Robert J., and John V. A. Fine, Jr. 1994. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Koren, Snježana. 2007. "Slike nacionalne povijesti u Hrvatskim udžbenicima uoči i nakon raspada Jugoslavije." *Historijski zbornik* 60: 247–294.

Koren, Snježana, and Magdalena Najbar-Agičić. 2007. "Slika naroda s prostora prijašnje Jugoslavije u hrvatskim udžbenicima povijesti." Accessed at http://www.cpi.hr/download/links/hr/7125.pdf.

Labor, Šime, Manuela Kujundžić, Tin Pongrac, Jelena Šilje Capor, and Snježana Vinarić. 2016. *Vremeplov 6, Profil Klet, 3 izdanje*.

Malcom, Noel. 1996. *Bosnia: A Short History.* London: Papermac.

Malešević, Siniša. 2019. *Grounded Nationalisms*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mirdita, Zef. 2004. *Vlasi u historigrafiji*. Zagreb: Hrvatski Institut za povijest.

Najbar-Agičić, Magdalena, and Damir Agičić. 2006. "Nastava povijesti u Republici Hrvatskoj i njezina zlouporaba." In *U Demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj: transformacije vrijednosti, obrazovanje, mediji*, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić, 169–191. Zagreb: Alinea.

Roksandić, Drago. 1991. *Srbi u Hrvatskoj od 15 stoljeća do današnjih dana.* Zagreb: Vjesnik.

Švigir, Domagoj. 2012. *Slika «drugoga»: predodžbe o Srbima u hrvatskim udžbenicima povijesti za osnovnu školu od 1990. do 2012. godine*. UDK.

Tomljenović, Ana. 2012. *Slika Hrvata u srpskim i Srba u hrvatskim udžbenicima povijesti za osnovu školu*. UDK.

Valentić, Mirko. 1992. "Oetničkom korijenu hrvatskih i bosanskih Srba." *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 24 (3): 1–21.

8

Where and How Do Pupils in Serbia Learn About the 1990s Yugoslav Wars?

Marko Šuica, Ana Radaković and Slobodan Rudić

Decisions about what will be celebrated in the public domain and what will be suppressed in collective memory shape the identity of each nation.[1] Important and defining moments from the past are often marked as watersheds in a nation's self-determination and positioning on the historical timeline. Through the conceptualization and structure of history education, state education policy can create historical consciousness and therefore plays a pivotal role.[2] History teaching is the vehicle

[1]This has been elaborated in detail through various studies, such as Anderson (1990), Kuljić (2006).

[2]Societies all over the world wrestle with the question of compulsory history education in schools. In most of these "history wars," there is a political battle between the functions of history education. Put simply, on one side of the debate is the opinion that history must uphold a united sense of national identity through the retelling of a single national history that upholds one truth as the legitimate narrative. On the other side is the viewpoint that history education has the possibility to support the emancipation of minority groups as well as the recognition of a variety of historical narratives and viewpoints. These issues are addressed in Carretero and Bermudez (2012).

M. Šuica (✉) · A. Radaković · S. Rudić
Department of History, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_8

for transferring certain knowledge, messages, and attitudes defined by the state curricula to new generations, and can serve to intentionally or unintentionally manipulate identity.[3]

Among the controversial topics taught in the countries that emerged from the remnants of Socialist Yugoslavia is the break-up of the once common state. Differing roles in the wars and in the dissolution of Yugoslavia created various, often polar opposite, perspectives on interpreting and perceiving past violence, which are left to the successor states to deal with in their own ways (Bešlin and Milošević 2017a, 17–18).

Serbian Society and Historical Knowledge at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century

Identity creation is closely related to the perception and construction of the image of the "other." It also serves as the tool for establishing the legitimacy of the "glorious" past of the group (Kuljić 2006, 161–214). Whether learnt in school through the state-governed system, or involuntarily in the wider social setting, these constituents of collective identity emerge as equally influential. In 2010 the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights published a study titled *Novosti iz prošlosti* [News from the past], derived from a survey of more than a thousand people of various cultural, social, and educational backgrounds. It aimed at getting closer picture of the perceptions of the wider adult population in Serbia, as the post-conflict state, about sensitive issues at the core of national identity. Topics covered included general and national history, Serbs and the others, identity, religion, fascism and antifascism, Communism, and the Yugoslav Wars (1991–1995). The study showed that the established set of attitudes and knowledge held by a majority of inhabitants of the Republic of Serbia at the beginning of the twenty-first century were quite ethnocentric and selective. Despite a great leap forward in the fields

[3]The purpose and goals of history education in Serbia are defined by Article 8 Paragraph 16 of the basic educational law *Zakon o osnovama sistema obrazovanja i vaspitanja* (Belgrade, Serbia: The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 88/2017 and No. 27/2018) [The law on the foundations of the education system] and in the educational programs for both primary and secondary education, which are currently undergoing changes.

of historiography and education, certain myths and misconceptions that had been demystified by the academic community almost a century and a half ago were still dominant in the mindsets of a majority of respondents. For example, 58 percent of examinees thought the Cyrillic script was invented by the Serbs, 40 percent thought Serbs to be indigenous to the Balkans, and 29 percent answered that Serbs came before Croats. Although historiography had come to sharply divergent conclusions and such distorted facts cannot be found in any history textbook or school, belief in them is still widespread (Stojanović et al. 2010, 136–139).

Responses given within the topic "Yugoslav Wars (1991–1995)" were full of contradictory opinions. On one side 70 percent answered "Yes" to "Was Serbia fighting just wars for liberation?" and 52 percent of all spontaneously given answers[4] cited "the Croats" when asked "Which people has the greatest responsibility for starting the war?" On the other side, 22 percent of examinees knew the correct answer to the question "Who bombed the [Croatian] City of Dubrovnik in 1991?"—the Yugoslav People's Army. Along the same lines, the largest number of respondents—21 percent—identified the greatest crime committed during the wars as the Srebrenica Massacre (Stojanović et al. 2010, 151–154). The question of whether these answers reveal deliberate choices about what is remembered and what is forgotten, or simply a lack of information, still occupies historians and sociologists. The survey's results have huge importance because they show how easily people's memory can be manipulated and altered, particularly when it comes to such a sensitive topic as the wars of the 1990s. Although they might not be representative enough, especially as the research was conducted just a decade after the wars ended, they give a picture of the framework on which general opinion in Serbia is based. Having in mind the influences of family and social surroundings on youngsters, these results are essential in understanding what pupils in Serbia know about the most recent past.

[4]Examinees were free to give whatever response they thought was correct, rather than multiple choice.

The Wars of the 1990s in the Education System of the Republic of Serbia

Teaching units discussing the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the wars conducted on the territories of the former Yugoslav republics, and the consequences of these wars have been included in Serbia's curricula and textbooks since 2000. Nevertheless curricula designers and textbook authors have taken a very cautious approach to these topics. At the beginning, certain significant events and people of recent history were simply omitted, being too politically controversial or differently perceived within the public. As one elementary school history teacher argued almost two decades ago, after the end of the Yugoslavia Wars: "The problem with leaving the latest chapter of Yugoslav history practically blank is that many of my less responsible colleagues may fill the gap as they see fit" (Crawford 2003, 49–51). The trend has continued, and today the gap is also filled via informal ways of obtaining information and interpretations of the recent past, such as social networks, the media, and family surroundings (so-called street history), which provide fertile soil for myth-making and stereotypes.

Clear prospects for accession to membership of the European Union (EU) for all the Balkan countries opened up during the EU Summit in Salonika in 2003. Certain political, legislative, economic, and value-based criteria were imposed as a result, and one of the first was admission to the Council of Europe, aimed at ensuring stronger respect for human, civil, and political rights (Bešlin and Milošević 2017b). Education reforms system went alongside this. The Council of Europe recognizes the importance of history as a basis for educating European citizens and its role in bridging differences and bringing peoples together by establishing mutual understanding and confidence between them. As a member state, Serbia is obliged to implement the strategies adopted by the Council, some of which specifically target history education as a medium for overcoming conflicts and building a society based on democratic culture and respect for diversity. First and foremost, this applies to the Council's recommendations on *History and the learning of history in Europe* (Recommendation 1283 [1996]), *History teaching in twenty-first-century Europe* (Recommendation Rec [2001] 15), *History teaching in*

conflict and post-conflict areas (Recommendation CM/Rec. [2009] 1880), and *Intercultural dialogue and the image of the other in history teaching* (Recommendation CM/Rec. [2011] 6). The history-teaching unit of the Council of Europe has developed multiple projects with these goals and published various documents, the latest being *Quality History Education in the 21st Century: Principles and Guidelines* addressed primarily to those politicians, officials, and others in each member state who are responsible for the development of the school history curriculum; but they are also for those teachers and teacher trainers whose role it is to deliver the curriculum to students (Council of Europe 2018).

Compulsory education in Serbia lasts for eight years (ages seven to fifteen) in a "basic" or "elementary" school. Those pupils continuing after the age of fifteen attend secondary school—grammar, vocational, or art schools—for four years (ages fifteen to nineteen). The structure of the education system in Serbia is created in such a way as to enable pupils to develop subject, cross-curricular, and lifelong learning competences and achieve certain educational standards at the end of each learning cycle (primary and secondary). Education standards are measurable, strictly defined, and fixed descriptions of knowledge, skills, and abilities that pupils need to achieve at the end of each cycle. They are systematically developed throughout the entire education cycle according to school plans, so that they can eventually be used as a measure of achievement outcomes, that is, pupils' achievements. The standards for history are structured through domains (specific areas or matters) within the subject. Each domain consists of numerous descriptors, which represent concrete knowledge, skills, or abilities that pupils should perform or show at the end of the educational cycle. Standards are formulated on three levels (basic, medium, and advanced). The basic level should be achieved by, at least 80 percent of pupils, medium by 50 percent, and advanced by 20 percent. Educational standards for history as a school subject are divided into three domains: knowledge, research and interpretation, and historical foundations of modern society. This structure of standards, which is oriented not around content but around skills and values, leaves space, nominally at least, for the development of critical thinking.

Considering the topic of our research, it is important to stress that lessons about the dissolution of Yugoslavia are provided for by Serbian state curricula. They feature in the curricula for the eighth grade of primary and third and fourth grade of secondary schools. In order to enable teachers to structure history lessons and teach more successfully, in 2008 the Institute for Education Quality and Evaluation in Serbia—state-appointed to develop educational standards—created a team of experts to define key terms to fit and fill the structure of standards. As the outcome, the Institute published a teacher's manual, *Ključni pojmovi za kraj obaveznog osnovnog obrazovanja za nastavni predmet Istorija. Priručnik za nastavnike* [Key terms for the end of compulsory education for history: Teacher's manual]. Based on an extensive survey carried out by history teachers, the authors created a catalogue of key terms for history as a subject. The manual key specifies terms for the final grade as: *Yugoslav Wars (1991–1995); break-up of Yugoslavia; war in Slovenia; war in Croatia; war in Bosnia and Herzegovina; armed conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija and the NATO intervention of 1999; peace talks; genocide; ethnic cleansing; Dayton Agreement;* and *International Criminal Court in the Hague* (Ferjančić et al. 2008, 46–66). Without precise and detailed instructions, however, loopholes exist and chances for data manipulation are huge.

Teaching the Wars of the 1990s in Practice

In theory, then, the education system supports quality history teaching that includes lessons about the break-up of Socialist Yugoslavia. In practice, though, it is a completely different matter. A survey conducted in 2016 and 2017 by European Association of History Educators (EUROCLIO) experts within the Epact project[5] confronted history teachers and creators of educational policies with various issues regarding history

[5]ePACT: Education Partnership for Advocacy, Capacity-Building and Transformation project developed by EUROCLIO in cooperation with CDRSEE and with the support of Austrian Development Cooperation had the overall objective to contribute to sustaining the democratization process and enhancing conflict sensitivity in the Western Balkans through reforms and implementation of changes in the formal schooling system that will intensify democratic education. The project strived to achieve that education authorities and civil society jointly reform education and schools in the region to enhance critical thinking and active citizenship. These

teaching in general, but specifically teaching controversial and sensitive topics, such as the wars of the 1990s. History teachers from the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) gave their own assessments of the current state on listed topics in their countries. Teachers mostly reflected on dominant national discourses that support narratives about victims and victimhood, which are "observed and discussed through collective, ethnic glasses." History teachers from the region emphasized the necessity for better inclusion of minority groups and their perspectives of certain events, specifically the wars of 1990s and dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia (Marić and Jovanović 2016, 33–34).

The upshot of another recent EUROCLIO project[6] is a set of recommendations for responsible teaching of the wars in Yugoslavia and its successor states, "Making sense of the past that refuses to pass" (EUROCLIO 2017). The purpose of this is to offer teachers and educators as well as education policymakers and educational institutions practical tips how to overcome difficulties such as teaching a traumatic and controversial past to still vulnerable generations. These recommendations and materials are also made for pupils, in order to ease them through processes of learning. Apart from formulas for how to teach and learn topics like these, they reiterate the desired goals of history teaching—such as development of critical thinking, mutual understanding, and compassion.

Besides examining attitudes of experienced history educators and practitioners, this study was the most significant survey conducted among

two competencies are key drivers of all forms of development, but particularly of the development of a vibrant civil society that is ready to protect and defend democratic values, gender mainstreaming, environmental protection and a culture of non-violent conflict resolution.

More information on the project can be accessed at: https://euroclio.eu/projects/epact-education-partnership-advocacy-capacity-building-transformation/.

[6] *Learning a History that is 'not yet History'* is a project developed by EUROCLIO and its members seeking the answer to the question of how to teach the history of recent wars, which is often considered not yet to be history but is remembered in many different ways and has been investigated in great detail in the context of transitional justice, by investing in a unique partnership among teachers and their associations from former Yugoslavia, in which transnational teams will collaboratively create a free ready-to-use learning resource about the Yugoslav Wars.

postgraduate students of history at the end of their M.A. studies, taking a course on history didactics as part of initial teacher training. It is important to sensitize students for teaching sensitive and controversial topics, especially related to the recent past and in a post-conflict social and political setting. The survey was designed to examine the knowledge and attitudes of future teachers on highly emotive and sensitive teaching units about the turbulent dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia and violent conflict. The results showed that M.A. students, who have already learned about dealing with sensitive and controversial issues in history teaching on the B.A. level, are inclined to nationalistic perceptions of the wars of the 1990s. They constructed their notions about the wars through the polarized, black-and-white lens of perpetrators and victims. Their perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague were strongly biased and based either on prejudices or images created by the media and in public space. Nevertheless a tendency towards seeking reconciliation in the region through history teaching was dominant. Out of twenty-five examinees, nineteen answered that they believed reconciliation would be possible if there was more teaching about responsibility and the perspective of the other, and if it did not depend on the opinion of the teacher.

Now comes the tantalizing question: What is actually happening in the classroom? In 2016 another study was carried out by two MA students entitled *Yugoslav wars in Serbian schools*. They visited seven secondary schools (both grammar and vocational) in Belgrade and Vrbas,[7] and they interviewed more than 500 pupils.[8] The goal was to examine what Serbian youngsters actually know about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, its causes and consequences, after the second education cycle. The results were disappointing. Although the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia is provided for by year plan and program, a majority of

[7]Vrbas is a town and municipality located in the South Bačka District of the autonomous province of Vojvodina, Serbia.

[8]In total 532 pupils were examined from seven secondary schools: the IX Grammar School "Mihailo Petrović-Alas" (Belgrade, 110 examinees), the Sportive High School (Belgrade, 80 examinees), the Grammar School "Žarko Zrenjanin" (Vrbas, 59 examinees), the XIV Grammar School (Belgrade, 79 examinees), the VII Grammar School (Belgrade, 61), the Zemun Gymnasium (Belgrade, 86 examinees), and the Technical Secondary School "Branko Žeželj" (Belgrade, 57).

pupils answered that they had not done anything on it in school. Afterwards, pupils were asked to name their main source of information for this topic. The most frequent response was "family," which implies that new generations' opinions and knowledge of Yugoslavia's dissolution are inherited from older generations' recollections. Answering this questionnaire, adolescents' associations for the last decade of the twentieth century showed a certain ignorance and obliviousness, but also a strongly self-centered perspective. This self-centeredness is mostly noticeable among the answers to the question "What are your associations on the Yugoslav wars?" where the most frequent response was "NATO bombardment." A plausible explanation is that the majority of examined pupils came from Belgrade, where the traces of destruction are still ubiquitous, but also because that was probably the most dramatic experience that their parents had ever had.

The Wars of the 1990s in History Textbooks

In the eighteen years since downfall of Slobodan Milošević's[9] regime, just one thorough analysis about the 1990s in Serbian history textbooks has been made in Serbia. In 2015, the Humanitarian Law Center organized an international conference on history textbooks and their role in processes of dealing with the past under the title "History textbooks in post-conflict societies: Education for reconciliation?" International and regional experts were invited to discuss how confronting narratives in successor states about the Yugoslav Wars can be redefined and eventually used as a potential substance in the process of reconciliation. As the outcome of the conference, the Humanitarian Law Centre published the volume *Analizu sadržaja udžbenika istorije u Srbiji o ratovima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, u svetlu utvrđenih činjenica pred Međunarodnim krivičnim*

[9]Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) was a Yugoslav and Serbian politician and the president of Serbia (originally the Socialist Republic of Serbia, a constituent republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) from 1989 to 1997 and president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. In the midst of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, Milošević was charged by the ICTY with war crimes in connection to the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.

sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju [Analysis of the content of history textbooks in Serbia relating to the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the light of the facts established before the ICTY]. This showed how facts about war crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia are represented in history textbooks in Serbia. It also included a comparative analysis of the official narrative in the textbooks' teaching units with the facts about these events as established by the ICTY. The analysis covered books for primary and grammar schools used in history teaching in Serbia from 2000 to the present.[10]

The Humanitarian Law Center experts noticed several tendencies when analyzing the textbooks. Units about the wars in former Yugoslavia are presented in a relatively distant and dispassionate manner. There is no meticulous elaboration of the events as in the thematic units used for the period preceding the dissolution of Yugoslavia. These lessons also lack objectivity, particularly in the presentation of the war crimes committed and their victims. An effort to portray the Serbs as the only or greatest victims is visible, while facts and events that could show the role of the Serbian people and Serbia as a state in a negative context (such as the sufferings of other ethnic groups) are either omitted or neglected (Humanitarian Law Center 2015, 100).

The authors concluded that lesson titled "Social crisis and the Defeat of Yugoslavia" contain already-noted tendencies—selectiveness, briefness, and bias—that negatively influence pupils' attitudes and perspectives. Different authors give priority to diverse events as major causes leading to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, but certain phenomena are common, such as: the death of Josip Broz, divisions inside the Communist Party, rising national issues, political and economic crisis, separatisms,

[10]The textbooks in question were:

- Gaćeša et al. (2010)
- Ljušić and Dimić (2010)
- Vajagić and Stošić (2011)
- Đurić and Pavlović (2010a)
- Pavlović and Bosnić (2010)
- Svilar Dujković and Dujković (2013)
- Radojević (2014)
- Nikolić et al. (2003).

and the accession of Slobodan Milošević to power. Peculiarly, there is little mention of external factors. Yugoslavia is not placed in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism across Eastern Europe. The resulting impression imposed, of the historically unique and unjust destiny of an ex-state, particularly the Serbian nation, can produce a self-victimization among pupils that could be constructed as the principal narrative and representation of the war (Dimou et al. 2015, 100–103).

The armed conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are present in history textbooks, although the mode of the storytelling can be described as distanced and undetailed. For more attention is paid to the war in Croatia than to the conflicts in Slovenia or even Bosnia. Yet history books in Serbia contain reduced and selective information about the war in Croatia. The military operations "Flash" (Bljesak) and "Storm" (Oluja) launched by the Croatian government and army in 1995, resulting in "the planned ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population in the region of western Slavonia and from the region of Lika, Kordun, and Dalmatia" (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 239). Create the informative narrative of the teaching unit. There are no other details about major and controversial military operations, such as the Siege of Vukovar launched by the Yugoslav People's Army and Serb paramilitary forces. The destruction of Vukovar and crimes against Croatian civilians and prisoners of war are absent. Sporadic and superficial references to victims from the stage of war in Croatia leaves no educational space for understanding the perspective of the "other" or for developing empathy. The textbooks do not offer consensus on the number of victims or their ethnicities. Yet no exaggeration is to be found in references to the number of Serbs who fled Croatia during Operation Storm—the information corresponds to the factual count established by ICTY (Dimou et al. 2015, 104–106).

The approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on general information. Authors stress that "at the beginning it was a conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims, and in 1993 it grew into a larger-scale conflict that also led to heavy fighting between former allies, Bosnian Croats and Muslims" (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 240; Nikolić et al. 2003, 145; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 195; Radojević 2014, 377). It is said that the Republic of Srpska "suffered heavy losses and lost a

huge part of the territory, which forced it to agree to peace negotiations in 1995." The outcome was the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 197). The textbooks fail to elaborate on the cause of the war, and there is no mention of the large-scale territory-conquering military operations that most often resulted in massive persecutions of civilian inhabitants and crimes committed against them.

The majority of war crimes committed during the Yugoslav Wars took place on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there is remarkably little mention of them in Serbian history textbooks. Two textbooks quote the United Nations assessment that 102,622 individuals lost their lives in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Radojević 2014, 379; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 197), while the third states that the "total number of casualties in Bosnia and Herzegovina was approximately 100,000 and in Croatia around 20,000" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 185). In the eighth-grade history textbook published by Freska, the chapter dedicated to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina explains that "the military operations of all sides were marked […] by massive war crimes, the most prominent one being the crime in Srebrenica […]" (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 240). To discuss war crimes, the books use general terms, such as "a large number of civilians lost their lives, property was destroyed, and forced displacement of civilians took place (ethnic cleansing)" without specifying the causes or naming the perpetrators (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 240). Other books include examples of ethnic cleansing, but do not establish the responsibility for crimes committed or simply avoid naming the victimized ethnic group if it does not fit the master narrative. The nature of the criminal and violent acts during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been "widely debated both domestically and internationally, and also before domestic and international courts, and there is a lot of disagreement about whether some of those crimes can be considered war crimes," as stated in the textbook written by Mira Radojević (2014, 379). Nonetheless, in one textbook for the eighth grade of elementary school published by state-run Zavod za udžbenike, the Srebrenica Massacre is discussed separately. The authors address the sensitive issue: "massacre in Srebrenica was a war crime and a crime against humanity committed by the Army of the Republic of Srpska and paramilitary formations against Bosniak soldiers and civilians" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 185).

Similarly, it is stated that Ratko Mladić, the former commander-in-chief of the Army of the Republic of Srpska (ARS) who led the Srebrenica take-over operation, "and other Serbian military commanders, have been charged with committing war crimes, including the crime of genocide, by the ICTY" (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 185).

The most space in history textbooks in Serbia is dedicated to the conflict in Kosovo and the NATO bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of two former SFRY republics, Serbia and Montenegro). Information about this conflict is selectively presented, however, creating a one-sided, biased narrative. As a prevailing reason for the war in Kosovo, textbooks list "the provocations of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA], which escalated into armed conflict in which the international community interfered." The authors say the main reason for the military guerrilla mobilization of the Albanian population was that "the Albanians requested separation from Serbia" (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 240). The stress is put on information about KLA military actions against Serbian official police forces with "the political support of the United States and a number of member states of the European Union" (Radojević 2014, 379). In almost all reviewed textbooks the Kosovo conflict is treated through the events that transpired between March and June 1999. The consequences for the predominantly non-Albanian population after the withdrawal of Serbian armed forces in June 1999 are highlighted, omitting the perspective of the "other," the opposite side. When addressing war crimes and victims, the authors only discuss the suffering of the Kosovo Serbs and the residents of Serbia during the NATO bombardment, which is seen as an "aggression" (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 240; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 199; Radojević 2014, 383; Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 187; Nikolić et al. 2003, 229; Dimou et al. 2015, 110–111). In other words, the conflict is treated only through the sufferings of Serbian people. A narrowed perspective and filtered information thus prevents an approach based on multiple perspectives, which could enable better understanding of the vicious events that resulted in a massive loss of human lives.

The Wars of the 1990s and Visual Sources in History Textbooks

In their thorough analysis, Humanitarian Law Centre experts only partially considered visual sources from the textbooks as a source of valuable information about the war or as a didactic support for the narrative parts of teaching units.

It is commonly claimed that primary sources are the building blocks of history. For a historian they represent the precious pieces of the puzzle needed to create a bigger picture of the past, and for a pupil they make history tangible and alive. The use of primary sources in history teaching is a delicate process which requires adequate preparation and can lead into a number of traps,[11] but it can bring immense educational potential in developing specific analytical skills and multiple other competences. Using the authentic relics of the past in the classroom is also inspiring. Illustrative sources provide pupils with more personal insight into the abstract construct of past events, phenomena, processes, and especially individual stories of people. This makes pupils more likely to investigate the past, gives them a more active role, and develops critical thinking, deductive reasoning, and problem-solving skills (Barton 2005, 751–753; Doty et al., n.d., 3–5).

Today, pupils receive a continual stream of visual information from social media, advertising, film, art, computer games, and so on (Lundy and Stephens 2015, 1057–1058; Sturken and Cartwright 2001, 10–12). They are constantly exposed to a rapid and changing flow of information that includes instantaneous images of their friends, pop culture news, and new viral videos. Pupils capture images of their daily lives and upload them too (Nix and Bohan 2014, 14). In these semi-real, semi-digital surroundings, visual materials become an especially desirable teaching tool, especially in classrooms with internet access. But exposure to visual materials does not automatically make pupils able to use them in a productive manner, nor does it make them visually literate. Pupils often demonstrate flaws in reading such materials, mostly by giving simplistic explanations

[11] Some of these traps and myths related to the usage of primary sources in history teaching have been elaborated in Barton (2005).

solely based on the visuals, without the necessary context or additional evidence to help grasp a bigger picture. It is long process to the point when they will be able to fully interpret visual evidence, evaluate it, and use it accordingly (Lundy and Stephens 2015, 1058; Jaffee 2006, 1378).

The significance of using visual sources in history teaching and enabling pupils to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to read them is recognized by the education system in the Republic of Serbia. According its standards for history teaching, pupils in compulsory education are expected to develop the skills for analyzing primary written and visual sources. In secondary education the expectations are higher, and pupils are expected to further develop their analytical skills—to read and interpret sources and use them for conducting various types of research. For instance, they are expected to identify and analyze prejudice, stereotypes, propaganda, and other biases in primary sources and deduce their consequences (Tomić 2015, 28). These stipulations are of great significance for use of visual sources illustrating controversial and sensitive issues, such as dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia.

A comparison of fourteen textbooks for the eighth grade of elementary school and the third and fourth grades of grammar school[12] conducted within the EUROCLIO study showed that visual sources, as the most noticeable and highlighted parts of teaching units, consist of vivid and "eloquent" visual images that construct or support certain explicated

[12]The textbooks in question are:

- Kovačević et al. (2001)
- Rajić et al. (2005)
- Đurić and Pavlović (2010a)
- Bondžić and Nikolić (2015)
- Nikolić et al. (2003)
- Đurić and Pavlović (2010b)
- Pavlović and Bosnić (2010)
- Simić and Petrović (2016)
- Vajagić and Stošić (2011)
- Radojević (2014)
- Ljušić and Dimić (2010)
- Ljušić and Dimić (2013)
- Svilar Dujković and Dujković (2013)
- Omrčen and Grbović (2014).

textual narratives. In order to make the analysis systematic, the visual sources were divided into three separate themes:

1. The crisis in Socialist Yugoslavia
2. The wars in former Yugoslavia
3. The aftermath of the conflicts

The analysis of visual images includes differentiation, correlation with the text, didactic inputs, and contextualization.

The Crisis in Socialist Yugoslavia

All reviewed textbooks include teaching units on the crises which eventually lead to the end of Socialist Yugoslavia with the awakening of national sentiments, especially after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980. More or less directly, Tito as the ultimate political figure from Socialist Yugoslavia is identified with the state itself. His death is seen as the beginning of the decline of the federal state, and authors mainly address this matter by oversimplifying the complexity of the historical period. In six out of fourteen textbooks, this is underlined by visual representations of Tito, whether his portrait (Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 193) or photographs depicting his funeral or tomb (Omrčen and Grbović 2014, 248; Svilar Dujković and Dujković 2013, 186; Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 237; Simić and Petrović 2016, 24). Although the visual sources in the teaching unit correlate with the text of the textbooks' master narrative, they are not properly didactically contextualized. The images lack didactic support and are left without any deeper explanation that could provoke further interrogation of visual sources. Images selected to visually back the text represent Tito either as a mighty leader or create a post-mortem "supernatural" image of his uniquely grandiose funeral. The selected images could suggest unreal notions about Socialist Yugoslavia as a flourishing country that expired on the day of death of its unquestionable lifelong president.

The discourse on nationalism's rise is also visually represented through many picturesque images. One of the issues mentioned is the reopening of the political status of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo within the boundaries of Socialist Yugoslavia. In some of the reviewed textbooks images illustrate Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo are used to signal Albanian separatist actions. The authors do not provide any additional information on the visual sources, such as when the pictures were taken, who took them, for what purpose, official or private, and when and where they were published (Rajić et al. 2005, 189; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 235). This lack of didactic contextualization prevents taking a pedagogical approach necessary for the proper analysis of sources as envisaged by the educational standards.

The most represented person in this discourse is the former president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. His ascent to the position of the most influential Serbian politician, and his use of political power to construct an authoritarian regime within the framework of "controlled democracy," is closely intertwined with the changing constitutional status of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Several examined textbooks depict his political rise through iconic images of his June 1989 "Gazimestan speech," given during a massive public commemoration of the famous Battle of Kosovo (which occurred in the year 1389) on its 600th anniversary at the site of battlefield (Radojević 2014, 374; Simić and Petrović 2016, 226; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 236). Among the analyzed visual sources one is incorrectly attributed to the speech, a mistake that indicates an irresponsible approach to selecting reliable visual sources. The conclusion drawn is that authors are driven more by images' visual impact than their provision of accurate information (Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 248). A majority of the textbooks contain Milošević's portrait, often a close-up photo, usually followed by his biographical data. He is usually presented with gloomy, unpleasant, and almost angry face (Rajić et al. 2005, 190; Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 187; 2010b, 252; Nikolić et al. 2003, 227; Simić and Petrović 2016, 225; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 199; Radojević 2014, 375; Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 237; Pavlović and Bosnić 2010, 144). The exception is a textbook issued by Freska in which Milošević is represented smiling during his ICTY

trial at The Hague (Ljušić and Dimić 2013, 284). Leaders of other ex-Yugoslav republics who led independence movements and became the political leaders of states that emerged from the conflict, such as Franjo Tuđman, president of Republic of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegović, president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have significantly smaller presence in Serbian textbooks.[13] Images of these persons are usually followed by summarized biographical notes. In both textbooks for the eighth grade of primary school, published by Freska the image of Tuđman is also accompanied with an excerpt from his 1992 speech (as a written source) stating that the war in Yugoslavia could have been prevented, but that was not in the best interest of the Croats and their goal of separating from Yugoslavia (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 240). The same textbook includes an image of Milošević, but without any written sources on his political statements or decisions that could be used to compare the two leaders or their approaches to nationalist ideology or politics.

A third group of visual materials relates to the political authorities from federal Yugoslav government, who failed, due to lack of interest or power, to prevent the dissolution of the federal state. The image of the last prime minister of Socialist Yugoslavia, Ante Marković, as a symbol of a brave but feeble attempt to save the concept of Yugoslavia, is present in one textbook (Simić and Petrović 2016, 225). The photographs represent him in quite an optimistic light, perhaps due to nostalgia for the last period of the existence of a common state. Turbulent and difficult times on the eve of the war are illustrated through images from the last, unsuccessful 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in textbooks published by Klett (Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 193; Radojević 2014, 375). In the those published by Novi Logos a photograph of the Presidency, the collective body that ruled Socialist Yugoslavia after Tito's death, is signed "Failed negotiations on Yugoslavia's future" opens the way for the difficult narrative about the cruel Yugoslav Wars (Simić and

[13] Franjo Tuđman is visually represented as an individual in Ljušić and Dimić (2010, 239; 2013, 287), Radojević (2014, 377), Vajagić and Stošić (2011, 194), Alija Izetbegović pictures can be found in Ljušić and Dimić (2010, 240; 2013, 288), Radojević (2014, 377), Vajagić and Stošić (2011, 195), Simić and Petrović (2016, 229).

Petrović 2016, 226). Although worried faces in selected images symbolically announce upcoming tragedy, pupils again lack adequate didactic instruments to use and analyze these visuals' informative aspect.

The focus in Serbian history textbooks is mainly on Milošević as an autocratic leader and the position of Serbia in the break-up of the state. Political opposition to Milošević's regime in Serbia is depicted through several images of the rally on 9 March 1991 in Belgrade (Pavlović and Bosnić 2010, 145; Simić and Petrović 2016, 228; Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 248; Rajić et al. 2005, 190; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 236).

The main problem with the visual materials included in Serbian history textbooks on the deconstruction of Socialist Yugoslavia is lack of didactic support or proper contextualization. The images function to illustrate the main narrative at the core of teaching units. In some cases they create contextual homogeneous entity with textual sources, but without tasks that engage pupils in critical analysis. Even when images are on the same page with questions and tasks for students, they do not relate to each other. If teachers want to use them in any other way—analyze or compare them—they must design the activities by themselves.

The Wars in Former Yugoslavia

The wars of the 1990s and images from that period are categorized as sensitive teaching topics. Visual sources in textbooks should reflect the challenges of the historical phenomena but should also be appropriate for the age of pupils. The images should not represent extreme atrocities or explicit content that could shock, consternate, or emotionally traumatize them. Pupils should be able to see and understand the reality—the destructive and tragic side of the war and its horrors—from analytical and emotionally acceptable perspectives.

Teaching units which deal with the break-up of Socialist Yugoslavia contain visual images of various individuals, predominantly from the political milieu, for example Milošević, Tuđman, and Izetbegović. Textbook authors also included the images of other political figures as well, such as famous Serbian writer and architect of "national awakening" Dobrica Ćosić, the first president of the new Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (consisting of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro) (Simić and Petrović 2016, 229; Rajić et al. 2005, 192; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 238; Nikolić et al. 2003, 229; Radojević 2014, 382). One textbook includes a portrait of Ibrahim Rugova, political leader of the Kosovo Albanians (Simić and Petrović 2016, 231). In one case Milošević is represented in an affable meeting with then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, implying the close and friendly nature of Russian-Serbian relations (Simić and Petrović 2016, 230). Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, is visually represented in the textbook for the third and fourth grade of secondary education, with the statement that he opposed Yugoslavia's dissolution and fought to keep the Bosnian Serbs part of the same state as Serbia, a goal which he did not achieve but was crucial for the formation of Republic of Srpska. It is also stated that he was indicted by the ICTY and arrested in 2008, with the court process still ongoing (Ljušić and Dimić 2013, 288).

The only visual material depicting direct violence in the prewar period is a dramatic scene from the Dalmatian town of Split, when Croatian extremists, as they are labeled, attacked a soldier of the Yugoslav People's Army. This scene can be seen in multiple textbooks (Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 238; Nikolić et al. 2003, 228; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 236; Rajić et al. 2005, 191; Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 184; Simić and Petrović 2016, 229). Otherwise, visual sources mostly show the tragic consequences of the war or scenes without direct violence. They are either neutral, for example showing ruined buildings (Radojević 2014, 380; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 197; Nikolić et al. 2003, 228; Kovačević et al. 2001, 204; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 237), or they show the suffering of the civilians—almost exclusively Serbs. The most common representation of civilian suffering are images of Serbian refugees from Croatia after Operation Storm (Oluja) in 1995 (Pavlović and Bosnić 2010, 145; Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 242; Radojević 2014, 380; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 196; Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 250; Simić and Petrović 2016, 230; Rajić et al. 2005, 191; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 237). Other images show the ruined Orthodox Church in Pakrac in Croatia, or people attending a sermon in an Orthodox church, but also without questions or tasks for source analysis (Nikolić et al. 2003, 228). None

of reviewed textbooks implement the didactic concept of multiperspectivity, which could bring in different inputs and open up sensitive issues for further analysis or debate. In most textbooks Serbs are presented as the sole victim of the conflict, paving the way for the self-victimization that dominates today's public discourse, as discussed above.

The conflict in Slovenia, which marked the onset of the conflict in Socialist Yugoslavia, is presented visually in textbooks published by Klett (Radojević 2014, 376; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 194). In contrast, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are depicted more extensively and dramatically. The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement is shown in a number of textbooks (Pavlović and Bosnić 2010, 145; Omrčen and Grbović 2014, 250; Radojević 2014, 379; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 197; Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 250). Unlike civilians, who are represented as homeless refuges and direct victims of the conflict, political leaders are pictured as reckless masters of war who either achieved or failed to achieve their goals. The most common content in Serbian history textbooks regarding the war of the 1990s is the NATO bombing of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. All reviewed textbooks contain images of the bombardment and its consequences (Pavlović and Bosnić 2010, 146; Omrčen and Grbović 2014, 250; Svilar Dujković and Dujković 2013, 188; Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 241; Radojević 2014, 383; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 200; Simić and Petrović 2016, 231; Nikolić et al. 2003, 229; Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 186–187; 2010b, 251; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 238–239; Rajić et al. 2005, 192; Kovačević et al. 2001, 205). For Serbian-Albanian relations and the Kosovo conflict itself, besides the abovementioned Albanian political leader Rugova, textbooks use images of Serbian refugees fleeing the Autonomous Province of Kosovo in the conflict's aftermath (Rajić et al. 2005, 192; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 238; Ljušić and Dimić 2010, 243; Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 186; Simić and Petrović 2016, 231; Nikolić et al. 2003, 229). In three textbooks published by Zavod za udžbenike, an image of Serbian refugees is accompanied with the rhetorical question "Where to?"—pupils are not expected to answer it (Rajić et al. 2005, 192; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 238; Simić and Petrović 2016, 231; Nikolić et al. 2003, 229). Without any didactic significance, the question underlines the notion of self-victimization.

As in previous cases the images represent only one side in the conflict, excluding the other's perspective. Although not a visual source, one chart is very revealing of the textbook authors' attitude to the war of the 1990s—it contains data, that is, the death toll of the bombing's casualties, including Albanian civilians, but no mention of whether these civilians were killed in conflicts with the Serbian army and police, or by the NATO bombardment (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 187).

The visual materials published in Serbian history textbooks related to the wars of 1990s are mainly appropriate for pupils' ages. But although they include no scenes that could be considered overly violent, they do not show the perspectives of other sides engaged in the conflicts. The analyzed images correlate with the main narrative of the teaching units, but without didactic tasks or instructions.

The Aftermath of the Conflicts

Like the visual materials analyzed above, the photographs presented in the final chapters provide basic, mainly neutral information without didactic inputs. Iconic imagery that is present in every Serbian history textbook depicts the mass protest in front of the Yugoslav Parliament in Belgrade on 5 October 2000, which led to the fall of Milošević's regime. Captions vary from textbook to textbook. Some describe the images as "Demonstrations in Belgrade on October 5, 2000," while others state "Protesters enter the National Assembly on October 5, 2000," or "The overthrow of Slobodan Milošević" (Pavlović and Bosnić 2010, 147; Omrčen and Grbović 2014, 251; Svilar Dujković and Dujković 2013, 188; Ljušić and Dimić 2013, 67; Radojević 2014, 383; Vajagić and Stošić 2011, 200; Simić and Petrović 2016, 231; Nikolić et al. 2003, 230; Đurić and Pavlović 2010b, 253; Bondžić and Nikolić 2015, 239; Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 188; Rajić et al. 2005, 193; Kovačević et al. 2001, 206). This major event is widely perceived as the turning point in recent Serbian history and the photograph corresponds precisely to the main texts of the teaching unit.

Zoran Đinđić, Democratic Party leader and the first prime minister after the democratic changes of 2000, who was assassinated in 2003,

is considered the most influential political figure of the post-Milošević period. For that reason the tragic images related to his death can be found in nine out of fourteen examined history textbooks. His biography and political career are clearly described and, in later textbooks, his death is too. Some photographs show him with a smiley, optimistic expression (Đurić and Pavlović 2010a, 188), giving the feeling of a new and promising leap into the future. There is no sign in these photographs, however, of potential reconciliation in the region.

Finally, images are used to discuss the issue of the independence of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, or more precisely the reactions and outcomes of that event. The grammar school textbook published by Klett contains a photograph of mass protests in front of the Serbian Parliament after the proclamation of Kosovo's independence in 2008 (Radojević 2014, 384). The textbook for the eighth grade of elementary school published by Novi Logos includes a photograph of an Orthodox Church in flames, burnt by the Albanian protestors in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo (Simić and Petrović 2016, 233). Because the devastation of Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo is present in the media and as a seemingly permanent element of everyday public discourse, this topic counts as a highly sensitive and emotive teaching unit. Such an image can therefore easily provoke disturbing reactions outside of the teacher's control. Illustrated in this way, the issue appears even more treacherous than it is, losing any ability to help calm an already extremely heated atmosphere.

Conclusion

The studies discussed in this text reveal that the mindset of the adult population in Serbia is mostly constructed on biases, myths, and ethnocentrism. Collective memory, particularly of recent conflicts, is still manipulated by people currently in power whose intentions are transferred to public space through the media and social networks.

In the light of the results of the latest research done by M.A. history students, history teaching practice has finally become clearer. Although it is provided for by the official state curriculum, the wars of the 1990s are not taught to the majority of pupils in Serbia, leaving wider space for

manipulation. As stated in the study, the prime source of information on this topic is family, followed by television and the internet.

Those who do have the opportunity to learn about the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia find narratives written in a quite distant and neutral manner with selective choice of data in history textbooks. Tendencies of self-victimization and of glorifying Serbian victims are highly present and contribute to general one-sided notions about the wars and their consequences.

The psychological impact of the visual materials accompanying the core narrative has already been determined. However, the authors' or editors' selection of images for illustrating teaching units about Socialist Yugoslavia and its dissolution does not improve the general conclusion about one-sidedness and self-victimization. The photographs can be described as appropriate for students' ages and correlate with the text, but they are accompanied by little or no didactic instruction that could enhance and foster the learning process, prompt analysis of sources, or develop critical thinking skills. Thus they are purely illustrative. Multiperspectivity is completely neglected in written parts of the textbooks as well as in the selection of visual materials. In other words, without careful use they can be very deceptive.

Despite all this, the future of teaching the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia and the conflicts among successor republics might not be hopeless after all. Organizations such as the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) and EUROCLIO have prepared additional materials (original sources, maps, documents, and photographs) followed by carefully planned instructions, and these are becoming increasingly enticing for both teachers and pupils. Furthermore, learning outside the classroom can sometimes be even more productive. The exhibition "Lessons from '91," which ran for a month in early 2017 at the Museum of Yugoslavia, was just one of several projects

trying to explain this issue through the eyes of photographers who documented the Yugoslavia Wars. All these materials and sources are accessible to history teachers and could be used in history teaching not only in Serbia but in the wider region.[14]

It is no coincidence that visual materials are considered the most influential tool in the teaching process. They have the power to bring history alive. For that reason, with a little creativity and caution, they can become the most impactful didactic tool in learning about the sensitive conflicts in Yugoslavia.

References

Anderson, Benedict. 1990. *Nacija: zamišljena zajednica*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. [Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1983].

Barton, Keith C. 2005. "Sources in History: Breaking Through the Myths." *The Phi Delta Kappa* 86 (10): 745–750.

Bešlin, Milivoj, and Srđan Milošević. 2017a. „Multiperspektivnost (post)jugoslovenskih istorija." In *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi*, edited by Latinka Perović, Drago Roksandić, Mitija Velikonja, Wolfgang Hoepken, and Florian Bieber, 17–18. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

Bešlin, Milivoj, and Srđan Milošević. 2017b. "Problemi društvene transformacije." In *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi*, 517–520. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

Bondžić, Dragomir, and Kosta Nikolić. 2015. *Istorija za osmi razred osnovne škole*. Belgrade, Serbia: Zavod za udžbenike.

Carretero, Mario, and Angela Bermudez. 2012. *Constructing Histories*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Council of Europe. 2018. *Quality History Education in the 21st Century: Principles and Guidelines*. Strasbourg. The document can be accessed at:

[14]Sandra Vitaljić, author and the curator of the exhibition, also published her Ph.D. thesis titled *Rat slikama; suvremena ratna fotografija* emphasizing especially the use and misuse of war photography during the wars of 1990s in Yugoslavia: Vitaljić (2013).

https://rm.coe.int/prems-108118-gbr-2507-quality-history-education-web-21x21/16808eace7.

Crawford, Keith. 2003. "Culture Wars: Serbian History Textbooks and the Construction of National Identity." In *International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and Research* 3 (2, July): 43–52.

Dimou, Augusta, Peter Gauči, Ivan Jovanović, Vera Kac, Snježana Koren, and Dubravka Stojanović. 2015. "Analysis of the Content of History Textbooks in Serbia Relating to the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia in the Light of the Facts Established before the ICTY." In *V Forum za tranzicionu pravdu: Udžbenici istorije u post-konfliktnim društvima: Obrazovanje za pomirenje*, edited by Marijana Toma. Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center.

Doty, Richard, et al. n.d. *Engaging Students with Primary Sources*. Smithsonian, National Museum of American History, Kenneth E. Behring Center.

Đurić, Đorđe, and Momčilo Pavlović. 2010a. *Istorija za osmi razred osnovne škole*. Serbia: Zavod za udžbenike.

Đurić, Đorđe, and Momčilo Pavlović. 2010b. *Istorija za treći razred gimnazije prirodno-matematičkog smera i četvrti razred opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike.

EUROCLIO. 2017. *Making Sense of the Past That Refuses to Pass: Recommendations for Responsible Teaching of the Wars in Yugoslavia and Its Successor States*. The Hague. Accessible at: https://euroclio.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Making-sense-of-the-past-that-refuses-to-pass_final-English.pdf.

Ferjančić, Snežana, Marko Šuica, Suzana Rajić, Ljubodrag Dimić, Dragica Koljanin, and Vidosava Grahovac. 2008. *Ključni pojmovi za kraj obaveznog osnovnog obrazovanja za nastavni predmet Istorija. Priručnik za nastavnike*, edited by Arsen Đurović, 46–66. Belgrade: Institute for Education Quality and Evaluation.

Gaćeša, Nikola, Ljiljana Mladenović-Maksimović, and Dušan Živković. 2010. *Istorija za osmi razred osnovne škole*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavni sredstva.

Jaffee, David. 2006. "Thinking Visually as Historians: Incorporating Visual Methods." *Journal of American History* 92 (4, March), 1382.

Kovačević, Duško, Dejan Mikavica, Branko Bešlin, and Biljana Šimunović-Bešlin. 2001. *Istorija 8 za osmi razred osnovne škole*. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.

Kuljić, Todor. 2006. *Kultura sećanja: teorijska objašnjenja upotrebe prošlosti*. Belgrade: Čigoja.

Ljušić, Radoš, and Ljubodrag Dimić. 2010. *Istorija za osmi razred osnovne škole sa istorijskom čitankom i radnom sveskom*. Belgrade: Freska.

Ljušić, Radoš, and Ljubodrag Dimić. 2013. *Istorija za treći razred gimnazije prirodno-matematičkog smera i četvrti razred opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera.* Belgrade: Freska.

Lundy, April D., and Alice E. Stephens. 2015. "Beyond the Literal: Teaching Visual Literacy in the 21st Century Classroom." *Procedia: Social and Behavioral Sciences* 174: 1057–1060.

Marić, Dea, and Rodoljub Jovanović. 2016. *Teachers on Teaching: How Practitioners See the Current State and Future Developments in History Education Across the Western Balkans (Rep.).* The Hague: EUROCLIO and CDRSEE, 2017. Accessible at: https://euroclio.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Annexe-5-Teachers-On-Teaching-ePACT-Report.pdf.

Nikolić, Kosta, Nikola Žutić, Momčilo Pavlović, and Zorica Špadijer. 2003. *Istorija za treći razred gimnazije prirodno-matematičkog smera i četvrti razred gimnazije opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera.* Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavni sredstva.

Nix, Jearl, and Chara H. Bohan. 2014. "Looking at the Past for Help in the Present: The Role of Historical Photos in Middle and Secondary History Classes." *Ohio Social Studies Review* 51 (2): 13–22.

Omrčen, Milica, and Nevena Grbović. 2014. *Istorija 8 za osmi razred osnovne škole.* Belgrade: Eduka.

Pavlović, Zoran, and Jovo Bosnić. 2010. *Mozaik prošlosti; Udžbenik istorije za osmi razred osnovne škole.* Belgrade: BIGZ.

Radojević, Mira. 2014. *Istorija; Udžbenik za treći razred gimnazije prirodno-matematičkog smera, četvrti razred gimnazije društveno-jezičkog smera i opšteg tipa i četvrti razred srednjeg stručne škole za obrazovne profile pravni tehničar i birotehničar.* Belgrade: Klett.

Rajić, Suzana, Kosta Nikolić, and Nebojša Jovanović. 2005. *Istorija 8 za osmi razred osnovne škole.* Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.

Simić, Predrag, and Ivana Petrović. 2016. *Istorija 8.* Belgrade: Novi Logos.

Stojanović, Dubravka, Radina Vučetić, Sanja Petrović Todosijević, Olga Manojlović Pintar, and Radmila Radić. 2010. *Novosti iz prošlosti. Znanje, neznanje, upotreba i zloupotreba istorije*, 136–139. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.

Sturken, Marita, and Lisa Cartwright. 2001. *Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Svilar Dujković, Dunja, and Goran Dujković. 2013. *Istorija 8. Udžbenik istorije za osmi razred osnovne škole* [History 8: Textbook for the Eighth Grade of Primary School]. Belgrade, Serbia: Eduka.

Tomić, Jelena Najdanović, ed. 2015. *Opšti standardi postignuća za kraj opšteg i srednjeg stručnog obrazovanja za predmet Istorija*. Institute for Education Quality and Evaluation.

Vajagić, Predrag M., and Nenad Stošić. 2011. *Istorija za osmi razred osnovne škole* [History for the Eighth Grade of Primary School]. Belgrade: Klett.

Vitaljić, Sandra. 2013. *Rat slikama; suvremena ratna fotografija* [War of Images; Contemporary War Photography]. Zagreb: Algoritam.

9

To Believe or Not to Believe: Current History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Goran Šimić

Today's Bosnia and Herzegovina is internally organized in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995. At that time the international community, determined to end a bloody war between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs on this territory, made significant concessions to the nationalist claims of the warring parties and subordinated individual human rights to those collective rights. According to that "settlement," the educational system was left outside of state-level authority and divided among three autonomous sectors, governed separately, in a feat of complicated administrative organization, by three ruling nationalist groups, whose interests are incorporated in relevant laws and elaborated in school plans and programs. Nenad Veličković argues that nationalism "naturally" concerns itself with language, history, geography, and religion courses since they promote "desirable" values and create a voter base inclined to the values and goals of "its own" nation.

G. Šimić (✉)
Faculty of Law, International University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_9

Many authors argue that the fighting in BiH ended in 1995 not due to an internal peace settlement and consensus but because of an intervention and pressure from "outside." Precisely because of this, instead of establishing justice for victims and for society—reconciliation and addressing common suffering and destruction of lives and property—the nationalist leaders of BiH continued the war by other means. In that sense, one can say that today's BiH is not living in peace, but rather in a state of "frozen conflict" or absence of armed conflict. The last twenty years have passed in ethnic struggles that have reinforced divisions through various methods, including politics, media, and education.

According to the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial, and religious groups, and shall further UN activities for the maintenance of peace. In post-conflict societies, this role is especially important. As one recent study suggests, the most influential means of shaping public opinion in post-conflict societies are schools, media, and family (Leonard et al. 2016). Schools have a qualified characteristic other two do not: As a state-sponsored means of promoting perceptions of the past, attendance is obligatory in most countries. (In BiH primary and secondary school are compulsory.) This means students don't have a choice but to be exposed to certain interpretations of facts and values, and history is one of the classes in which this happens.

Apart from knowledge of the students' own modernity, history classes share knowledge of other peoples and states, recognizing the national, cultural, and denominational norms of certain regimes. Ideally, history textbooks convey a global understanding of history and the norms of co-existence, preserve tradition, and contribute to the development of every individual's self-respect. They try to explain the roots of societies, mentalities, and traditions, as well as to explain where and why people live and who they are.

Perhaps the most important thing in such a study is to determine for whom textbooks are intended and what their purpose is. If the objective

is to develop the ability to pass judgment on, comprehend, and accept knowledge with critical reasoning related to social norms of one's own past and of modernity, then the path to the "other" should be open and welcome. However, ever since the emergence of national states in the past century in the Balkans (and earlier elsewhere in Europe), history textbooks have contained a large amount of text that glorifies the target students' own people, nation, and state, and undermines minorities and neighboring states. Since history textbooks, more than any other textbooks, communicate facts that spread ideologies, follow political trends, and justify historical legitimacies, the need to revise them was and is an obligation of essential value for every society. History textbooks should offer open-minded and diverse views on certain experiences, developments, events, and processes stemming from national and general history that carry messages corresponding to content based on science and established facts. Since the demanding task of writing history textbooks, regardless of institutional guidance, almost always leaves room for numerous controversies when it comes to national interests, the strongest outcomes can be expected from a team of investigators, teachers, authors, and civil servants working together. The road from facts to interpretations has always been long and complex. If the objective is to meet at least some of the requirements without which every textbook must be subject to revision—in terms of supplementation, completeness, and suitability of the content—it is rarely achieved. Errors in information, interpretation, and intolerance in textbooks of national history require immediate verification and redefinition. Unfortunately, in the countries created in the territory of former Yugoslavia the best current examples were the textbooks written following Yugoslavia's dissolution, during the last decade of the twentieth and first decade of the twenty-first century. Since the European political idea is becoming increasingly important, the issue of history textbooks, their creation and educational usage, remains urgent. History had and will have an essential role in forming and preserving all identities. Thus, the recent history curricula require constant harmonization of the sense for everything that can be mutual in the field of culture, political, religious, and social traditions. This is the path toward meeting the objective by defining a set of very controversial and sensitive issues left by previous centuries: wars, imposed political regimes, ethnic

cleansing, religious conflict, war crimes, persecution, civil wars, forced deportations, refugees, human rights and treaty violations etc. As there is no pattern for a good class nor standards for textbook writing, these and other controversies depend on the specificity of the classroom and the textbook authors, and their sensibility and respect for mutually overcoming the past as an ever hard question.

So what happens when all school history textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina are collected? What can be found in them? Most important: Are they to be trusted?

History as a Science and as a School Subject

Due to prominent controversy, confusion, and media interpretations around history textbooks in recent years, it is necessary to critically discuss and shed light on the essential ongoing questions for the research, interpretation, and writing of history as a science and history as a school subject. History as a science is an important discipline in every citizen's education, and as such it should strengthen mutual understanding, respect, and cooperation. History as a school subject should provide clear support for the peace and stability of each country, region, Europe, and the world. During history class, problems should be tackled critically, asking questions that facilitate exchange of opposing views through contemplation and discussion, organizing debates for collective learning and cooperation based on tolerance and mutual respect. Teaching history is essential for general knowledge, and it is increasingly expected that students must adopt a critical view of historical facts and evidence, and develop thought processes necessary for historical awareness and interpretation. History teachers are expected to help their students understand the present, awaken their interest in the past, contribute to the development of their awareness of national identity and prepare them to be citizens and all of this during two classes a week and sometimes only for four school years (Kovačević 2012).

The balance between teaching contemporary history and older history has shifted: Recent history curricula include contemporary Europe and implications for the entire Europe and the world. A previous reluctance

to include recent history in classrooms was caused by an idea that the interpretation of contemporary events must be temporary as proper historical perspective was still lacking. It was also claimed that the evidence was not systematized and that teachers faced difficulties tackling certain recent events. Today's history teachers are faced with challenges resulting from the circumstances they cannot control. Every curriculum that covers twentieth-century national and European history will probably touch upon topics and questions that are still delicate and controversial. Teachers must therefore help students develop a coherent overview of the century through discussion, not only to know the chronology but also to realize that seemingly separate political, social, economic, cultural, and intellectual events are in fact interdependent. Emphasis should be placed on the criteria for selecting the topics and teaching methods to be included in the curricula. These are fundamental questions for the creators of curricula, textbook editors and authors, history teachers and professors, and others responsible for students' education. Moreover, it is important to emphasize history classes' objectives, which can be ambiguous in curricula.

It can be useful to ask what, out of everything taught in history classes, society would like students to remember five to ten years after finishing school. Historians and other experts have frequently asked themselves this question in recent years, especially after research showed that former students remember fewer and fewer historical facts as they get older.

The ultimate objective for the selection process lies in what is believed students must learn and what is reasonable to expect they will learn, as well as the gap between the two. School history is public property. Lately, the selection criteria for the content of curricula have been vigorously debated at history workshops, seminars, and conferences. Some history curricula for secondary schools are organized into themes, but the crucial question is how much knowledge and understanding of history society wants students to remember. Controversial and delicate issues cannot be avoided. The previous century produced a wide scale of such issues, from genocide to war crimes, from treaty violations to abuse of Romani people, labor migrants, and refugees, from military occupations to sectarian violence and colonialism. Every European country has its own, and these can be used as a useful way to help students understand the fundamental

nature of history as a discipline: that almost every event or development can be interpreted differently. Multiple perspectives must be an integral part of history classes.

The role of teachers is essential, especially those who have a talent for narration, who can spark interest among students and motivate them to continue learning. There is no template for a good class. For most teachers, the most important question is how to establish a good balance between a teacher-focused approach and student-focused approach.

History should be treated as a critical and constructive science that deals with the human past by reconstructing it using historical sources that are critically analyzed and interpreted. Historical events don't parade before historians; historians must revive them in their minds in order to understand the experiences of those who were part of them. Thus role of history as a science is to objectively connect and interprets available facts, without claiming what cannot be proven.

History is not just a collection of facts students must learn in order to get a pass or diploma; it is an essential intellectual discipline for life. By learning history, students develop general principles of scientific work as well as a new dimension of thought and deduction. History teaches them to be open-minded, to distinguish facts from assumptions, opinions, and attitudes, and to develop critical thinking. Critical thinking, independent from authorities and sources, is an indispensable and necessary prerequisite for knowledge of history. History lessons should create the basic idea of history as a scientific discipline, its subject and methods, as well as the facts it has obtained. It should spark interest, motivate students to learn, and give them the foundation to study history at a higher educational level.

When students are first being introduced to history, it should be a descriptive story about the past, but a story that is accurate, clear, and that will gradually emphasize the temporal and spatial dimension of all historic events and their mutual causality and order of appearance. Through this descriptive approach, students can learn about what history is, what historians are doing, and their findings. An efficient history class requires that the teacher prepares a review of all basic terms; that the students first learn definitions and mutual relations between important terms used in the study materials; that the teachers locate these terms in

everyday usage and precisely define them; and that exercises are provided that require interpretation and reflection, such as: to project themselves to another time period, to create dialogue between people of different perspectives, and to use additional teaching materials like films, images, maps, diagrams, textbooks, exercises, and role play (Kovačević 2012).

A textbook is a guideline for a history class and should be a systematic, organized, and methodical form of learning about the world. History classes should use textbooks as well as non-mandatory books whose materials are elaborated in an interesting way.

Politics and History Teaching

In 1923 Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev said: "Unfortunate is the destiny of the people that don't love their history and wish to start from scratch" (Berđaiev 1990). In the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in the last 100 years, history started almost from scratch many times, mostly for political reasons.

A case in point is the period of World War II. When it comes to the participation of the peoples of former Yugoslavia, it is mostly about liberators and traitors. The Communist Party long took all the credit for organizing the liberating military operations in Yugoslavia, although the majority of fighters joined the war with noble intentions, confident in defending the liberty and dignity of its people. Other ideals were irrelevant to the majority of these fighters, and arguably if they had been guided by the political ideals of the Communist Party, as countrymen many of them would not have joined the war. Following World War II, the new government of Yugoslavia denied all the achievements of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia then belonged to the so-called Eastern Bloc, but the 1948 Cominform Resolution caused new deaths, this time of so-called Cominformists or those suspected of Cominformism. Then came the period of self-governance, during which schools wasted time discussing the self-governance legislation, arguably at the expense of schooling.

At the beginning of the 1990s, an excessive bureaucratization took place in education; pre-school and primary school institutions were no

longer under the jurisdiction of municipalities and local self-governance units. In the economy, the process of leaving behind socialist self-governance relations began. These changes mostly focused on criticizing the previous period rather than on explaining the positive effects of certain changes. Again, positive effects from the previous period were neglected. Instead of building on the past in order to progress, in the former Yugoslavia a nihilistic approach to the previous system has been common. Thus, after January 1989, the ideological as well as the historical pendulum that had been swung on one side suddenly became loose and through the force of inertia swung to the opposite side (Starovlah 2012). In this context, Paul de Man described modernity as characterized by an urge for radical renewal and an obsession with a *tabula rasa*, or even with a systematic forgetting. According to him, modernity could be described as a desire to destroy whatever came earlier, in the hope of reaching at last a point called a true present, a point of origin that marks a new departure (Stradling 2001).

Recently, major changes have taken place in history writing in the territory of former Yugoslavia. An experienced historian can choose a topic to make a judgment on the basis of his own analyses and convictions. But the options for textbook authors are limited in at least two ways: the author must cover the entire period planned in the curriculum, and the textbook must be adapted to students' physical and mental development. Moreover, apart from their own subjectivism, textbook authors are burdened with the subjectivism of historians whose works they use, compounded by the fact that some historians revise their original scientific assertions and that many recent events have not been sufficiently empirically verified. Textbooks, especially those for primary schools, must only contain indisputable facts, but when it comes to our own recent history and that of the world, many events are not indisputably corroborated. Many accounts depend not only on the historical facts but on the political, national, and other affiliations of the historian. Some history writing is political and, worse, colored by hatred. It is a misuse of science for political and ideological purposes.

After the end of World War II, the People's Liberation War and the leader of the Partisans became very popular. The entire social mechanism, including the education system and some historians, tried to prove that

the Partisans were flawless. All other participants in the events in former Yugoslavia were considered traitors, although in war light and truth are never only on one side, with the evil and darkness on the other (Berđaiev 1990). By the end of the 1980s, the post-war period was being relentlessly criticized frequently by those who used to glorify it. The problem with such criticism was not that so-called political conformity was replaced by "nonconformity," but that in an under-developed state and national awareness, the critics often stopped at nothing, even choosing enemies of the state as allies in order to strengthen their own individual positions. Apart from the present divisions, old divisions were revived. Support in the past was sought for everything that is being done, at all costs. When such support was lacking, as it commonly was, rage was expressed toward history classes, curricula, and textbooks (Strugar 1994).

The process of writing history textbooks is hampered by the fact that many documents about this period was published indiscriminately, alongside low-quality historical writings in the form of memoirs or in feuilletons that reflect the views of individuals and political parties. A question arises: Who misuses history—textbook authors, or those prepared to forge it for their own, often political purposes? These latter disregard anything they don't like about the past. Instead of examining how something happened, they dictate how it should have happened so they can refer to it when justifying their policies. When their "interpretations" are not supported, they blame it on history textbooks. Many politicians have forgotten the words of Winston Churchill when he addressed the British in 1940: "If we open a quarrel between past and present, we shall find that we have lost the future." The people in the territory of the former Yugoslavia have been doing that unmercifully for almost a century (Starovlah 2003).

The people who live in the territory of former Yugoslavia are so burdened with politics that they have forgotten their daily problems, even in the villages. People talk about politics at every gathering and encounter. Political events are featured on all newspapers' front pages, not only those that are directly related to one community. On the other hand, education is only rarely featured in newspapers, and even then it is to serve the purpose of politics rather than education. Politics has been in the limelight in BiH for a long time because politics is profitable, given the

standard of living of the majority of citizens and since many "guardians" of the nation's position are politically involved. If BiH was a stable and democratic country, everyone would be better off regardless of ethnic and political affiliation, but otherwise there is an ever increasing number of "protectors" who, for the sake of their position, constantly speak of the vulnerability of the group they belong to. BiH is such a divided country that Mihailo Lalić has said that "subtraction can be proclaimed as the national mathematical operation" (Lalić 1982). Lalić argues: "When our politicians divide among themselves and start to outsmart one another about who will be better at slandering, I'm afraid that this hatred will get passed on the children." Indeed, hatred is already being transferred, creating "new generations of haters" (Šimić 2016). With constant struggle in BiH over the constitution and redefinition of political and social authority, it is not unexpected that "the form of political authority that the nation represents is intimately tied up with, and made possible by, the way in which it invokes its memories, and with what it remembers and why" (Edkins 2006).

In order not to pass on hatred on to children, schools should be free of daily politics, which is so often infused with dangerous conflict. This should be a priority when selecting teaching content. History curricula should require content about recent history, which still has many things unexplained, but is misused by many for current political aims. Accurate facts that could produce wrong messages should not be included. In order to avoid this, particular attention should be given to interpretation of recent history. Because authors can be biased depending on political and ethnic affiliation, detailed analyses should be made of recent events, especially those of the last century. Undisputed facts should be relied on, such as the final court judgments in the war crime cases in BiH for the period of 1992–1995.

Clearly both history textbooks and curricula have been burdened with politics ever since 1945. For example, a history curriculum from 1948 states that one objective of history classes is to develop irreconcilable hatred toward state enemies and those who work against the heritage of the People's Liberation War, even though it is well known that hatred and school should not mix (Starovlah 2003).

In the school legislation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, teaching staff were not allowed to get actively involved in politics: "A teacher was obliged to be an example of civil, religious, political and cultural tolerance and must avoid private and public actions, especially those of purely political character that could lead to intolerance. This is the reason why teachers cannot be members of organizations that are in any way detrimental to the objectives of teaching schools or have an interest in affairs that are contrary to the teaching profession."[1] Today in BiH, when students enroll in the first grade of primary school, they must declare their ethnic affiliation, although the terms are not well clarified—whether it means affiliation in terms of people, nation, national minority, ethnic group, religious affiliation.

The extremes that are common today in society and in history as a science should be avoided in the classroom. The overall situation in which history, especially recent history, is being taught today is oddly complex. History teachers face many challenges that scholars can avoid. Running from one's own history is unnecessary. It is what it is, but its course can be explained in a truthful way, avoiding generalized qualifications, especially those negative ones that lead to unacceptable generalizations. As suggested by Pilvi Torsti, the two most problematic obstacles for building sustainable peace as far as education is concerned are the overall national (ethnical) segregation that divides children into separate groups and the teaching of national subjects that are different for each group, in particular history, which fosters enemy images and stereotypes of the other national (ethnical) groups (Torsti 2009).

Political Content in History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina

According to the a 2007 study by the NGO Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a single positive example of presenting political content was identified in the country's history textbooks, but a significant number of negative examples of presenting political structures,

[1] Zakon o učiteljskim školama [Law on Teacher Schools] (Prosvetni glasnik, no. 9, 1929).

options, or political changes did exist (Trbić 2007). Biased presentations of political alternatives, as well as the integration of politics and religious institutions within the concept of civil policy were most commonly found in textbooks for Serbian curriculum. Textbooks for the Croatian curriculum also contained inadequate interpretations of political options, whereas the textbooks for Bosniak curricula contained the least amount of such content. Negative interpretations of politics and political options appeared mostly in lessons about the Ottoman period, the Austro-Hungarian period, and twentieth-century events (the world wars, the socialist period, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and later). Political options and processes were presented as still supporting conventional opinions about what had happened in the past, as well as the stereotypes about student's own ethnicity and other ethnicities and their role in those processes (Trbić 2007).

Some examples are:

- Even the restoration of a plural-party system did not contribute to the improvement of the actual situation because the "Greater Serbia" project was completed and it was just a matter of time when its implementation would begin (Ganibegović 2004).
- As the Italians tried to suppress the Ustashe government in their occupational area in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and prevent the activities of the Croatian army, they generously supported and cooperated with the Chetniks. The Chetniks committed great crimes in many parts of the NDH, often under Italian protection. They burned down houses, plundered, destroyed property, and killed innocent civilians. The Partisan movement was focused against the NDH with a goal to come to power and restore Yugoslavia. In the regions where the NDH soldiers were recruited, the Partisans terrorized, killed, and plundered. They destroyed numerous Croatian villages and killed Croatian patriots. They heavily pounced on the Catholic Church and killed hundreds of priests. The thing they had in common with the Chetniks was the attempt to overthrow NDH. The correlation and mutual objectives became prominent during the war, when many representatives of the Chetnik movement gradually

switched over to the Partisans and within a new organization continued their anti-Croatian policy (Matković et al. 2005).

- The period of Ottoman rule was the period of religious tolerance. The difference between Muslims and others reflected in certain rights and obligations, but they were equally protected by the state. The main difference was in the law of war and tax-paying duty. Due to conscription, the Muslims were the only political people that gave them the opportunity to advance in state and military services. However, at the same time, they were more exposed to suffering and death. On the other hand, non-Muslims were not exposed to such dangers, but they were unable to pursue a political and military career (Hadžiabdić and Dervišagić 2014).

The following examples show not only biased interpretation of the political events, but also the presentation of diversity as a problem:

- Upon the arrival of Benjamin Kallay to the position of the supreme administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina [in 1882], the Austro-Hungarian government attempted to create a Bosnian nation and Bosnian language in order to repress the political requests of Croatians and Serbians, who had already formed national awareness and to prevent raising awareness of Muslims. Thus, the attempt was made to form a Bosnian nation on the foundation of the formed Serbian and Croatian nation together with the Muslims. Certainly, such unnatural political action was destined to fail (Jurković et al. 2005).
- Under the Austro-Hungarian administration, the local population in BiH did not have much use from the development of industry. It was only ten years after the occupation that the local population started to get by through the new economic opportunities. This was first done by the Serbs. The Croats remained working as small traders and craftsmen. The Muslims remained as passive observers of events in the country (Jurković et al. 2005).

The following examples are from two textbooks—the book for the first grade of vocational school and that for the ninth grade of primary school, both by Ranko Pejić—that deal with the same text. They describe the

movements in Yugoslavia from 1945 to the end of the 1990s through reliance on stereotypes about the ongoing vulnerability of the Serbian people. Non-Serbs are portrayed as nationalists, unreliable, and cruel.

- Reprisals against supporters of Cominform: Many Yugoslavs, particularly the Serbians who have a deeply rooted awareness of religious and national affiliation with the Russians, had trouble accepting the conflict with the USSR. The Communist regime settled accounts with all who refused to publicly condemn the Resolution and the stances of Cominform. Those who supported or were suspected of supporting Cominform were arrested without the possibility of defense and were sentenced to years in prison. Camps were opened to place the disobedient members of the Communist Party and supporters of Cominform: Goli otok [Barren Island] near Senj, Stara Gradiška, Sveti Grgur, and Rab.
- The Serbian people consider the 1974 Constitution to be detrimental to the unity of Serbia and the cause of the breakup of the Yugoslavian federation. The peoples from the republics that seceded from Yugoslavia believe that this Constitution was a democratic one (Matković et al. 2005).
- In 1991 the Slovenian Territorial Defense started attacking members of the Yugoslav People's Army. Many innocent young men on military service who resisted the secessionist attacks unarmed died in the attacks by the Slovenian Territorial Defense. The Slovenian government carried out a plebiscite. Slovenia forcefully seceded and soon was an internationally recognized state. Soon other countries followed—Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia—and were immediately internationally recognized. Since the Western states were quick to recognize the seceded republics, it became evident that they planned and assisted the breakup of Yugoslavia.
- The disintegration of Serbia. Serbia suffered a great deal of damage as the result of the 1974 Constitution. The provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were separated and they became states within a state. They had their own presidency, executive council, constitutional court, and other state institutions. Apart from the Department of National Defense, Serbia had no authority over these provinces. The

Serbian Assembly could not pass decisions without provincial consent. However, the provinces were not required to ask the consent of Serbia. Provinces had their own representatives in all Serbian authorities and they could affect the policy making. On the other hand, Serbia did not have its representatives in the authorities of the provinces. The provincial leadership took advantage of these circumstances to achieve their own goals. The statehood of republics and provinces blocked the functionality of federal institutions, encouraging the breakup of the Yugoslavian Federation (Matković et al. 2005).

- The Croatian leadership, favored by the international community, initiated the armed operations "Bljesak" [Flash] and "Oluja" [Storm] in the territory of Srpska Krajina in May and August 1995 respectively. Apart from soldiers, thousands of Serbian women, children, and elderly were killed during these operations. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs were banished from their homes where they had been living for ages. A convoy of refugees bombarded by Croatian airplanes relocated to Serbia. The NATO Alliance did not condemn these violent operations but supported and assisted them. The western part of the Republic of Srpska Krajina was occupied by the Croatian Army in 1995, whereas the eastern part remained under the protection of the United Nations until 1998, after which, contrary to the wishes of the Serbian people, it became part of Croatia. The international community did not show understanding for the Serbian people who only wanted freedom and the preservation of national and political rights. The Serbian people in the Republic of Srpska Krajina lived a good, liberal, and democratic life, but unfortunately only briefly.
- Three national armies fought in the four years of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian armies.
- NATO and EU member states supported the US demand from Rambouillet, which meant the end of independence and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to accept the Rambouillet Agreement as in the case of Austro-Hungarian ultimatum from 1914. On 24 March 1999, NATO began bombing Yugoslavia. The aggressors cynically named the attack on Yugoslavia "Milosrdni anđeo" [Merciful Angel] (the stronger is always right). The attack was executed without the decision of the United Nations, thus violating

its Charter, but the aggressors ignored this. NATO deliberately created this precedent for future conquering ventures. Indeed, some countries, including the members of the Security Council, Russia and China, raised their voices against the bombing (Matković et al. 2005).

The interpretation of the events from last war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) has particular importance. According to Andrea Soldo, these are most salient examples of misinterpretations in history books in BiH regarding that period (Soldo 2017):

- Authors always blaming one side for eruption of violence and war (never its own).
- The events from the last war are shown only from one perspective, disabling the possibility of discussing the responsibility of all sides for committing crimes.
- Victims of the crimes are always "our own," while "war criminals" are always "others."
- History book used in the Bosniak school programs promote the idea that Bosnians are Muslims, that all inhabitants of BiH are Bosniks, and that all Bosniaks are Muslims.
- History book used in the Croat school program represents reconstruction of political history from the perspective of Croatian state, nation and Croatian national interest, where Bosnia and Herzegovina is just mentioned.
- History book used according Serb school program dominantly presents perspective of Serbian state, nation and collectivity, presented thru ignorance, reduction, mystification and imputation.

The Quality of History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As elsewhere, textbooks still have a central role in the process of learning and teaching in schools in BiH. They represent both the main corpus of knowledge the students needs to learn and the tool for achieving educational goals as described in school plans. They function to develop the

system of values, attitudes, and convictions derived from society's ideological framework. They explicitly materialize the goals and visions of education, but also of society as whole (Soldo 2017).

The educational quality of history textbooks is a matter in a wider context of teaching history in all societies where there is a difference of opinion about past events. How to teach students about Jewish victims in the Baltic countries or in Germany in World War II? How do Turkish history textbooks explain the relationship between Turkey and the Kurds? Due to the number of controversial topics in world history, teaching history is no easy task—let alone preparing a textbook for it (Trbić 2007).

There is an entire array of approaches to this problem, from ignoring such topics in textbooks, to an exclusive emphasis on the interpretation predominant in one social group. Yet history teaching is found on the agenda of intellectual debates in almost all countries, because it is clear that interpretations of historic events directly contributes to the openness of a society by critically perceiving its historical role and using the learned lessons to define a critical and open relationship towards one's own society and others. Therefore history teaching in BiH must be a topic of constructive dialogue not only among historians but also among other intellectuals and social analysts.

Like any other social science, when interpreting social processes and changes, history relies on intersubjectivity—that is, the harmonization of diverse opinions about what happened in a certain historical period. Intersubjectivity, as the criterion of objectivity, is a scientific basis for humanistic and social sciences. It carries the possibility of a larger number of theories or interpretations of the same event or phenomenon, that open scientific communities consider as a contribution to interpreting and approaching issues in an open, active and critical manner. They are aware of the fact that no interpretation is "perfect," in that it is absolutely true, and that makes them prepared for dialogue.

History textbooks hold facts and interpretations of certain events that more or less comply with the 2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in BiH, the country's law on education and school plans. The level of history textbooks' positive compliance with the Framework Law—with the principles defined by this document—is very limited. The majority of positive examples is found for the criteria of

equal treatment (equal representation) and diversity observed as an asset, which is in accordance with the principle that education should prepare students to live in a multicultural society. These are the examples that present the culture, language, and tradition of all the peoples of BiH, that mention the and other places from its entirety, and when describing a social situation of a certain period, the diversity of peoples and their characteristics is presented as an advantage emphasizing the merits of everyone, not just one people. To a certain extent, critical reviews of certain events could be found. Students are offered multiple interpretations of a certain event so they realize that there can be different opinions as well as compromises. When it comes to the criterion "critical reviews," history textbooks contain examples that encourage students to think critically, i.e. examples where students take an active part in considering different options and making their own judgments based on rational consideration of the offered facts (Trbić 2007). Yet most past events are presented in a one-sided manner, preventing students from grasping a full picture. Other perspectives and personal responsibility are neglected, so violence and war are always blamed on "others" (often of whole nations) while "our own" crimes are always seen as isolated incidents (Soldo 2017).

A negligible number of examples affirm the principle and practice of respecting human rights: "School has the responsibility to contribute to the creation of a culture, which respects human rights and fundamental liberties of all citizens." They usually come in the last lesson in the textbook, and involve a theoretical framework for understanding various declarations and conventions, with no examples of their implementation in everyday life. Instead of making young people sensitive to the importance of respecting and promoting human rights and their active role in the process, the books merely list documents followed by statements such as: "International organizations aspire to consistent implementation of the documents on human rights and freedom protection and raise awareness of the citizens of the entire world of the need for mutual respect in order to contribute to the equal use of rights and freedom by everyone" (Pejić 2006). It is easy then for students to gain the impression that human rights are a project for international organizations, not for everyone.

Many more examples are not in accordance with the Framework Law. These are most common in Croat curricula, most likely because textbooks from Croatia were used as a basis for the textbooks in BiH. The Framework Law are largely violated when it comes to the criterion of "not encouraging the feeling of belonging." The content of these textbooks are focused on encouraging the feeling of belonging to the state of Croatia and not to the state of BiH. The following are the examples for the criterion of *emphasizing* where these textbooks speak about Croatia, Croatian people, and Croatian historical figures (Trbić 2007).

The majority of examples of non-compliance with the Framework Law in history textbooks for the Serb curricula refer to the focus on one people and its roles throughout the history. There are also frequent stereotypical images of Serbian and other peoples.

The least amount of such examples has been identified in the history textbooks for the Bosniak curricula. These are most commonly examples of emphasizing Bosniak people and its history, as well as stereotypical images of Bosniak and other peoples (Trbić 2007).

All textbooks show that emphasizing the role of their own people means students learn the history of their own people, while other peoples are represented disproportionately. There are many different ways to affirm one people. In some cases, numerous pages of a textbook are devoted to the history of one people, while others are just mentioned occasionally. In other cases, only the names of persons from one people are mentioned when describing an important event. Students can easily get an impression that there are no meritorious persons among other peoples. This contributes to biased opinions about the contribution of certain peoples to the history of BiH, and directly violates the principle defined by the Framework Law, i.e. that education should be the foundation for a life in a multicultural society.

The next commonly violated principle in the history textbooks is developing awareness of commitment to the State of BiH based on common heritage. Instead, there are attempts to promote the attitude that every people has its own history, each developed "in vacuum" without a mutual relationship (Pejić 2006).

Encouraging a destructive educational practice, textbooks offer stereotypical images of one's own and other peoples. The position of certain peoples throughout history are portrayed through these stereotypes among peoples, events, and figures. Thus, the Bosniaks see themselves as the baseline for constructing the BiH nation-state, while others work on its destruction; they are peaceful and hold no aggressive pretensions towards other peoples, while others are militant and aggressive. Throughout history and today, they are the victims of their naivety. The Serbs also see themselves as eternal victims who always wanted only peace, while others are cruel, hostile, and unreliable. The Croats emphasize themselves as native to this region, while others have an adverse effect and discriminate against them as a constitutional people (Šuica 2002).

Furthermore, a significant number of political interpretations contrary to the Framework Law have been identified in history textbooks. These largely support the auto- and hetero-stereotypes, and present the diversity in multiethnic communities and states as a problem that leads to the breakup of these communities. The tendencies of the people for whom the textbook was primarily prepared are presented as the only right option. The interpretation of one historic event is very different across three curricula and none offer other perceptions of the same event. Such interpretations not only keep such stereotypes alive, but prevent students from thinking critically about the common history and understanding the position of other peoples. This directly violates the principle defined by the Framework Law, according to which education should serve the life in a multicultural society.

In the opening of his analysis of history textbooks, Marko Šuica poses a fundamental question: "What do we really want to offer our students in the content of school textbooks and what do we expect from them?" Without going into the pedagogical aspect, history textbooks should be in accordance with the Framework Law, meaning that they should develop the sense of belonging to the state of BiH, they should actively promote the idea and attitude that everything that happened and existed in BiH is a common heritage, to prepare students for a life in a multicultural society, to challenge established stereotypes about one's own and other peoples and to be free from any form of discrimination (Šuica 2002).

The ideological instrumentalization of the modern education system is a deeply rooted social phenomenon. Its origins are related to the very appearance of that system in the process of building political communities on new foundations during the nineteenth century, in the original European wave of nationalization. This issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be seen outside the context of the wider South Slavic cultural space, which has not been circumvented by these ephemeral social changes (Kapo 2012).

Is history so vitally important in post-conflict societies, or is that idea exaggerated? Is it problematic when children are segregated—"two schools under one roof"—and taught different "truths," "facts," and "values"? When they are taught that diversity is a major problem in multicultural societies? That the "others" are always the perpetrators of the crimes? That there cannot be reconciliation with "them"?

Twenty years after the end of last war, BiH is deeply divided country. Divisions are deeper and more substantial than the merely territorial. With time, they seem to widen instead of shrink. They are partly built on events (including crimes) from the country's recent and further past, and their interpretations. Teaching history, along with its instrumentalization in the media, is thus essential to such divisions. While a long tradition conjoins historiography with nation-building, most often such histories invoke a glorious past which articulates a mythic unity or common origin. The pasts of the post-conflict societies, however, are replete with atrocities that are shameful and divisive (Bevernage 2010). According to Tommaso Diegoli, the use and misuse of the history by the state through ideology and education has serious structural implications that influence future violence or stabilization in post-conflict societies (Diegoli 2007).

Because BiH never established official truths about the events of the past war, space for manipulation is wide open. Ironically, even if writers of history textbooks in BiH wished to include established facts, that would be not possible, since there is no such thing. The only facts that could be accepted in that way—established as "beyond reasonable doubt" according to legal standards—would be the final decisions of the international and domestic courts dealing with war crimes committed in BiH between 1992 and 1995.

A set of recommendations for improving the quality of school textbooks in BiH and their preparation in line with contemporary law and educational principles could be made. This could ultimately be more or less applicable in other post-conflict societies going through similar difficulties when rebuilding a democratic society.

The recommendations may primarily refer to the revision of textbook content for the ethnic (national) group of subjects, since they are used as a mechanism of segregation. Revisions should reconsider the common content of curricula, especially subjects such as language, history, and geography, and find efficient, inclusive, and multi-perspective ways to present heterogeneous content. There are no simple solutions and that model where students would learn about their origin should be found, but interpretations should not be offered as the only truth. Content that causes controversies should be presented as it is, and students encouraged to think about them. This would in time enable students to understand the position of others and overcome the barriers that exist between the peoples in BiH. Experts such as pedagogues, psychologists, and human rights professionals should be included in assessing the quality of textbooks, before they are approved, to ensure their educational role.

Creating textbooks should be a team activity that includes professionals specialized in the discipline that the textbook is about, methodologists, pedagogues, teachers, graphic designers, and proofreaders. Teachers are most familiar with the ways students acquire certain content and what has their attention; their comments are an invaluable asset when creating a good textbook because, in the end, they are the ones who will use it. After years of working in education and in communication with students, teachers represent the best source of information about what a textbook should look like and how it should deal with certain units. Teachers should, therefore, be actively included in the work of publishers when preparing books, as well as in the work of ministries and other relevant commissions when assessing quality.

Guidelines for preparing textbooks should be used. Guidelines for geography and history textbooks contain very clear criteria. The educational role of textbooks never should be disregarded.

The basic principles of knowledge acquisition should be met. Students don't need knowledge for the sake of knowledge, especially in today's

constantly changing world. Textbooks should therefore support all levels of building knowledge: acquiring facts, explaining, applying them in the real world, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.

Textbooks should also include information about other peoples and minorities living in BiH. Teachers should raise awareness about the social importance of what they are teaching for students' later lives and for society as a whole—education is a public good. Teachers should actively promote what they are teaching. If a society wants students to learn something to use in the future, teachers must think about the social importance of what is being taught. One history lesson can be a turning point when students are making decisions about their future lives, and teachers should raise awareness about the teaching process.

Unfortunately, most of this is still not happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would help to provide an objective accounting of the past that could be used as the basis for developing a common shared history and for reconciliation. This would lead to closing the book of the painful past and stop history's use as a point of contention between former adversaries (Goldstone 1996). Reducing the number of permissible lies in public discourse (Huyse 2003) would also mean demagogues and ethnic entrepreneurs would have less success in inciting violence by appealing to historical distortion (Ignatieff 1996).

In this way the education system would be able to educate students about past events. Learning from the past would prevent the resumption of violence and prevent similar events in the future (Hayner, 46).

Conclusion

It is still to be seen whether this will this happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Probably like any post-conflict society, what is obvious is that education system needs to promote and create new peace builders or peace fighters, not new haters. If the opposite is happening, and there is no doubt that it is, there is no reason to be surprised that Bosnia and Herzegovina is still at war.

References

Berđaiev, Nikolaj. 1990. *Filozofija nejednakosti*. Mediteran: Oktoih.

Bevernage, Berber. 2010. "Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice." *History Workshop Journal* 69: 111–131.

Diegoli, Tommaso. 2007. "Kolektivno pamćenje i obnova društva u poslijeratnoj Bosni i Hercegovini" [Collective Memory and the Renewal of Society in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina]. Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.

Edkins, Jenny. 2006. "Remembering Relationality: Trauma, Time and Politics." In *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Past and Present*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ganibegović, Muhamed. 2004. *Historija za 8. razred osnovne škole*. Svjetlost.

Goldstone, Richard J. 1996. "Justice as a Tool for Peacemaking: Truth Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals." *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 28: 485.

Hadžiabdić, Hadžija, and Edis Dervišagić. 2014. *Historija, udžbenik za 3. razred gimnazije*. Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing.

Hayner, Priscilla B. 1994. "Fifteen Truth Commissions, 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Perspective." *Human Rights Quarterly* 16: 597.

Huyse, Luc. 2003. "The Process of Reconciliation." In *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Ignatieff, Michael. 1996. "Articles of Faith." *Index on Censorship* 25 (5): 110–122.

Jurković, Stipe, Anđelko Mijatović, Franko Mirošević, and Trpimir Macan. 2005. *Povijest za III razred gimnazije*. Školska naklada Mostar i Školska knjiga Zagreb.

Kapo, Midhat. 2012. *Nacionalizam i obrazovanje: Studija slučaja Bosna i Hercegovina* [Nationalism and Education: Case Study Bosnia and Herzegovina]. Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.

Kovačević, Predrag. 2012. "Istorija kao nauka i istorija kao predmet" [Historical Sciences, Programs and History Teaching]. In *Istorijska nauka, programi i nastava istorije*. CANU.

Lalić, Mihailo. 1982. *Dokle gora zazeleni*. BIGZ.

Leonard, Melinda A., Branka Damjanovic, Goran Šimić, and Gul Aldikacti Marshall. 2016. "Peace Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Effects of

Ingroup Identification, Outgroup Trust and Intergroup Forgiveness on Intergroup Contact." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 23 (1): 29.

Matković, Hrvoje, Božo Goluža, and Ivica Šarac. 2005. *Povijest za 8. razred osnovne škole*. Školska naklada Mostar i Školska knjiga Zagreb.

Pejić, Ranko. 2006. *Istorija za 9. razred osnovne škole*. Zavod za udžbenike.

Šimić, Goran. 2016. *The Disintegration of the Soul*. Amazon: Kindle and Paperback Edition.

Soldo, Andrea, ed. 2017. *Obrazovanje u BiH: čemu (ne)učimo djecu?* Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.

Starovlah, Miloš. 2003. *Napad na udžbenike ili nasilje nad istorijom*. Knjiga o knjigama.

Starovlah, Miloš. 2012. "Istorija kao nauka i istorija kao predmet" [Historical Sciences, Programs and History Teaching]. In *Istorijska nauka, programi i nastava istorije*. CANU.

Stradling, Robert. 2001. *Kako predavati historiju 20. Vijeka* (Vijeće za kulturnu suradnju, Izdavaštvo Vijeća Evrope, 2004) [Teaching 20th Century European History, Council of Europe].

Strugar, Vlado. 1994. *Snalaženje istoričara u višestranačkom društvu* (Istorijska nauka i nasTava istorije u savremenim uslovima).

Šuica, Marko. 2002. *Analiza školskih udžbenika iz predmeta Istorija koji obrađuju period srednjeg veka* [Analysis of School Textbooks from the Subject of History Dealing with the Period of the Middle Ages]. Serbia: South-East Europe Textbook Network. Available at: http://www.ffzg.hr/seetn/states/serbia/index.html.

Torsti, Pilvi. 2009. "Segregated Education and Texts: A Challenge to Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Journal on World Peace* XXVI (2): 65–82.

Trbić, Dženana, ed. 2007. *Obrazovanje u Bosni i Hercegovini: Čemu učimo djecu?: Analiza sadržaja udžbenika nacionalne grupe predmeta*. Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.

10

The Most Golden Age: A Discourse Analysis of Representations of Medieval Bosnia in Secondary-School History Textbooks in the Federation of BiH

Sead S. Fetahagić

Since the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), many international and local actors have had education reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on their agenda. Despite some noteworthy improvements, the country is still burdened with an inadequate system. According to policy analyst Valery Perry, the education system in BiH is a "logical consequence of both the lack of meaningful and systemic political reconciliation over the past two decades, and the practical public policy implications of the power-sharing state structure agreed at Dayton" (Perry 2015, 26). The apparent outcome of this predicament is that the schools in BiH continue to teach following the ethnically based curricula for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—the ethnicities recognized by the DPA's constitutional arrangements as "constituent peoples"—which leads to "ongoing cultivation of different and often mutually incompatible worldviews" (Perry 2015, 26). Perry also points out the troubling fact that the schools in BiH are unlikely to become more broadly inclusive without either strong international pressure or grassroots demands (Perry 2015, 27).

S. S. Fetahagić (✉)
Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_10

Given that international pressure to the authorities in BiH has steadily decline over the past decade and that grassroots demands for a more inclusive education manifest only occasionally, we cannot easily dismiss grim prospects for the country.

To talk about the politicization of education means also reviewing the purpose of "depoliticized" schooling—schooling expected to be free of unjustified political interventions into its organization, content, or practice. What would then be education's ideological, intellectual, or moral basis? Although modern mass education clearly stems from eighteenth-century European enlightenment philosophy, there seems an inherent conflict between two ideas or principles guiding educational organization.

In his study of the education system in BiH, Midhat Kapo reminds us that the standard of general education for all was developed and affirmed by the political construct of the nineteenth-century nation-state (Kapo 2012, 31). From the onset, the modern education system sought to achieve two different and often contradictory goals. The first, idealistically conceived, was to transfer and produce knowledge for future generations; the second, politically conceived, was to assimilate and indoctrinate the masses in order to build a culturally and politically homogenous society (Kapo 2012, 14). This indoctrination is, according to Ernest Gellner, performed mainly through attaining universal literacy so every member of society can become a citizen, and "only a nation-size educational system can produce such full citizens" (Gellner 1994, 56). Thus, for example, during the French Third Republic (1870–1940), "the school, notably the village school, compulsory and free, has been credited with the ultimate acculturation process that made the French people French" (Weber 1976, 303).

If this is true, then anyone discussing the problems of education should be aware of its correlation with this nationalist paradigm and of the fact that mass, compulsory, and free schooling was and still is financed and controlled by a nation-state (Kapo 2012, 54). It thus involves diminished learning about the world outside the nation-state. For this reason, we should come to terms with the fact that (Said 1994, xxvi):

> Defensive, reactive, and even paranoid nationalism is, alas, frequently woven into the very fabric of education, where children … are taught to venerate and celebrate the uniqueness of *their* tradition (usually and invidiously at the expense of others).

Education is an integral part of the political subsystem of every modern society. Having been identified as an ideological state apparatus (Althusser 2014, 79), that subsystem is headed by a governmental department to administer educational processes in all their segments: hierarchy, structure, finance, content, personnel, and values. Without this symbiosis between politics and science, nationalism as ideology may not have become so embedded into contemporary states' everyday societal practices. Moreover, should we take nationalism broadly, as Michael Billig does, to encompass its banal forms in everyday communication (Billig 1995), we can conclude that it is still widespread as a discourse and as a practice.

In the context of international affairs and communication, where the concept of the "nation" is congruous with that of the "state," BiH figures prominently as an anomaly. Although not constituted as a nation-state but as a kind of imperfect consociation,[1] it is internationally treated as a single nation-state by virtue of its membership in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. This has a profound influence on the way we treat the many challenges that post-conflict BiH society faces in its everyday struggle to become a functioning democracy and a member-state of the EU. A discourse analysis of history textbooks must therefore proceed with awareness that in the Bosnian context the politicization of education can largely be attributed to a certain type of nationalist manipulation.

Without delving deeper into theories of nationalism, for my analytical purpose it suffices to distinguish between two types that roughly follow the dichotomy between "Western" and "Eastern" nationalisms as proposed by Hans Kohn. In the Western world, "the rise of nationalism was

[1] BiH has been variously described "as an example of multinational federalism, as a consociational federal state, an ethnic democracy, an ethnocracy or as some other hybrid that embeds and proritizes ethnicity" (Perry 2015, 11).

… preceded by the formation of the future national state, or … coincided with it" (Kohn 1994, 164). Outside this area, and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, "the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern" (Kohn 1994, 164). Although his thesis, written in the aftermath of the Allies' victory against Nazism, was biased—he ascribed higher value to the "civilized" Western nationalism in contrast to its "primitive" Eastern counterpart—one of the main elements of the distinction, namely nationalism's position *vis-à-vis* the existing state, can be useful as an analytical tool to examine educational policies in contemporary BiH. For this purpose I rely on Michael Hechter's typology,[2] and distinguish between:

(a) state-denying nationalism and (b) state-affirming nationalism, where "state" signifies contemporary BiH.

(a) State-denying nationalism combines elements of Hechter's peripheral[3] and irredentist[4] types. However, due to its strong ethno-religious component, its main tenet is opposition to the secular institutions of BiH and to various Bosnian-wide affairs, rather than in openly calling for secession or change to existing state borders. Some authors thus prefer to label such ideology "populism" (Kuzmanič 2004, 89), (*narodnjaštvo*), akin to the "narodism" (*New World Encyclopedia*, n.d.) of nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia, or "ethnicism" (Vlaisavljević 195, 302–204) not "nationalism." The fact that many top-down Bosnian-wide policies and reforms (especially in the judicial and education systems) are marked by a strong international flavor supports the arguments of state-denying nationalists that a foreign-imposed agenda to build BiH as a nation-state runs against the will, tradition, identity, or even biological survival of "our people." State-denying nationalism in BiH comes in three principal forms: Bosniak, Croat, and Serb. They each differ, sometimes to a large

[2]Hechter recognizes four principal types of nationalism: state-building nationalism, peripheral nationalism, irredentist nationalism, and unification nationalism (Hechter 2000, 15–17).

[3]"Peripheral nationalism occurs when a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government" (Hechter 2000, 17).

[4]"Irredentist nationalism occurs with the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals" (Hechter 2000, 17).

extent, in their relation to the state, depending on the political context of their time and place. Still, they share common traits of an exclusive ethnic nationalism based on religious culture.[5]

(b) State-affirming nationalism in BiH is less prominent in the sphere of politics (despite its rhetorical usage by mostly Bosniak politicians and some "leftist" political parties), but is seen in some strata of civil society, economy, and sports.[6] Although it roughly corresponds to Hechter's state-building nationalism,[7] it is doubtful in this case whether central political authorities consciously working to spread it actually exist. Furthermore, one may claim that manifestations of this type of nationalism in BiH are conspicuously multiculturalist rather than assimilationist as in Hechter's model. State-affirming nationalism is often equated with Bosnian patriotism, and this link in particular will be explored when analyzing the history textbooks. While both Serb and Croat state-denying ethnic nationalists are easily detectable in daily public discourse, Bosniak state-denying ethnic nationalism often manifests in the form of state-affirming Bosnian patriotism—a phenomenon that many, particularly international, observers tend to overlook.

This work focuses on the problem of distinctions and similarities between *Bosniak* nationalism, which is ethnic, exclusive, and often (but not always) state-denying, and *Bosnian* nationalism, which is civic, inclusive, and state-affirming. Since history textbooks present a prime example of how nationalist indoctrination manipulates the past in order to produce a historical narrative suitable for contemporary power elites, two

[5]The 2013 empirical study of the dynamics between religion and politics in BiH confirms almost perfect correlation between religion and ethnicity, so that Bosniaks are equated with Islam, Croats with Roman Catholicism, and Serbs with Orthodoxy (Fetahagić 2015, 48, 58).

[6]An example worth mentioning is public broadcast of a relatively successful participation of the Bosnian national soccer team at the World Cup 2014 held in Brazil. As monitored by this author, during live TV broadcast of several games involving BiH team in June 2014, the national TV channel BHT1 was saturated with linguistic phrases resembling Billig's descriptions of "deixis of homeland" such as: "national anthem is a symbol of nationhood," "our national team," "we all Bosnians," "BiH is a soccer nation," "our heroes," "national pride," "our homeland," "all Bosnians want a victory," "we need unity," "national flags of our country." See: Billig (1995, 118–125).

[7]"State-building nationalism … is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state. It is the result of the conscious efforts of central rulers to make a multicultural population culturally homogenous" (Hechter 2000, 15).

history textbooks currently used in secondary schools of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) will be scrutinized. The hypothesis to be tested using discourse analysis is that the medieval history of Bosnia, as presented in these textbooks, serves to empower both Bosnian and Bosniak nationalisms.

To create a framework for the discourse analysis of history textbooks, I will first provide general background on the post-conflict society in BiH and on the problems of its education system. I also refer to previous research that has specifically targeted history teaching in public schools.

Education System(s) in Post-conflict BIH

The title of this sub-chapter indicates an uncertainty around whether we can talk about a single system or several systems of education in BiH. Like in many other sectors (such as justice, policing, public health, welfare, science, and culture) there is no single legal and institutional framework nor a single policy in education. Twelve autonomous regional governments (the Republika Srpska entity, ten cantons of the FBiH entity, and the Brčko District) possess "full and undivided jurisdiction in the field of education" (Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH, n.d.a). Under such a highly decentralized system, BiH as a state has no sovereign power in this field. Despite this, there are several state-level "framework laws" in the field of education (Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH, n.d.a), whose purpose is merely to establish central agencies intended to tackle various aspects of education necessary to coordinate between regional systems. The Department of Education within the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH has limited powers. It can merely coordinate and harmonize activities between regional bodies and act as a central body for the purpose of international communication (Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH, n.d.b).

Besides the legal-administrative fragmentation of jurisdiction related to education, another problematic aspect is more ideological-political. It concerns further division of public education into three ethnically-based school curricula. Given that the recent history of BiH, following the collapse of Yugoslavia, has been shaped primarily by the ideology

of ethnic nationalism (an essentialist view of ethnicity behind the concept of a "constituent people"), the dominant practice in the sphere of public affairs takes the form of ethnopolitics. By pervading and shaping the structure, content, and function of education, this keeps the current social and political relations in status quo, thus preventing any attempt at meaningful social reforms (Kapo 2012, 24, 193). The politicization of education thus manifests primarily in ethno-politicization. This makes positioning outside of the established ethno-political discourse extremely difficult. Even if such a discourse were to be found, it would immediately, and with all available means, be targeted, rejected, denigrated, and excommunicated from the public sphere as something treacherous, subversive, or immoral (Kapo 2012, 192).

Ethnopolitical strife manifests in the field of education through the existence of the so-called "national group of subjects" (NGS). Since the FBiH and Republika Srpska constitutions define education as one of the sectors protecting "vital national interests of constituent peoples,"[8] the NGS includes language and literature, history, geography, and religious education. This group of syllabi serves as a core around which three ethnically based curricula have been built. The most visible difference between them is the name of the "mother tongue," which is called either "Bosnian,"[9] "Croatian," or "Serbian." In everyday practice these curricula are thus referred to by the names of these languages (Husremović et al. 2007, 15).

[8]Both the Constitution of FBiH (Article IV.A.17a, Amendment XXXVII) and the Constitution of the *Republika Srpska* (Article 70, Amendment LXXVII) equally define, inter alia, "identity of one constituent people" and "education, religion, language, promotion of culture, tradition and cultural heritage" as "vital national interests of constituent peoples." Text of these constitutions in English version can be obtained from the official website of the Office of the High Representative: www.ohr.int (accessed April 27, 2016).

[9]The Bosnian curriculum is itself incoherent regarding the question of which and how many "official languages" it incorporates. The title of a mother-tongue course may read either "Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian," or "Bosnian and Croatian," or just "Bosnian" depending on a particular canton (Kapo 2012, 153–154).

History Teaching in Public Schools

Of all the NGS, history epitomizes the way in which a desirable collective we-identity is presented, through historical narrative and myth-making, as a timeless and fixed category. Prior to its inclusion in the school curricula, however, history as an academic discipline had to be nationalized.

Scholars of nationalism have already exposed history as a key discipline, producing "national histories" based on myth rather than historical fact. As early as the late nineteenth century, Ernest Renan famously observed: "Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation" (Renan 1996, 45). A century later, John Breuilly wrote, "history is the only way to understand a society, [whereby history itself is understood] only in terms of the achievements and frustrations of the nation" (Breuilly 1994, 104–111). If history writing is deeply rooted in the nationalist paradigm, then, professional historians are to blame for this manipulation. Many historians are aware of the problem, of course, and since this article looks at how history textbooks deal with the Middle Ages, it is instructive to cite the views of two such medievalists.

In his study of medieval origins of the European myths of nations, Patrick Geary points out that modern research methods and history writing were developed specifically in order to promote these nationalist goals (Geary 2003, 157):

> We historians are necessarily to blame for the creation of enduring myths about peoples, myths that are both tenacious and dangerous. By constructing a continuous, linear story of the peoples of Europe, we validate the attempts of military commanders and political leaders to claim that they did indeed incorporate ancient traditions of peoples.

Another historian's mea culpa is that of John V. A. Fine, introducing his work on ethnic identity in the medieval and early modern Balkans. Aside from nationalist historians, Fine points out that even non-nationalist historians often unconsciously use ethnic labels (ethnonyms) uncritically, as

if the content signified by these labels from the medieval sources somehow corresponds to the substance of modern national identities. Following such a practice (Fine 2006, 10):

> Too many modern people, seeing the national/ethnic labels, began to read things into them and came to assume that one labelled a Croat or Serb in a discussion of the Middle Ages had all the qualities and ethnic consciousness that a modern one does. And when that happens, history becomes anachronistic and skewed.

Once academic history had paved the way for smooth nationalist propaganda, "educational institutions became the locus for the creation of the nation-state, both through the inculcation of nationalist ideology and, more subtly, through the dissemination of a national language in which this ideology was incarnate" (Geary 2003, 157).

Turning back to the present context, in the following paragraphs I provide a brief review of several history textbook analyses with a focus on BiH.

Bosnian History Textbooks

One analysis of twenty-four history textbooks in BiH conducted from 1997 to 1999, shortly after the Bosnian War ended, found that in all of them "one's own nation was predominantly portrayed in a positive manner, e.g. as a nation that has always fought defensive wars, has been the victim of aggression by other nations, as having suffered throughout history, etc." (Baranovicé 2001, 22). All these textbooks were heavily ethnocentric and thus functioning "more as a disintegrative than integrative factor in the post-war reconstruction" (Baranovicé 2001, 22–24).

A new generation of history textbooks in BiH, published in 2002–2005, was analyzed by a research team of the Education Reform Program of the Open Society Fund in BiH. The purpose was to find out "whether and to what extent the textbooks promote social cohesion and positive attitude towards their own state" (Husremović et al. 2007, 11). This study concluded that the number of cases that could be outlined

as a positive model of history teaching was very limited. Concerning identification with BiH, negative examples dominated and textbooks did not encourage the development of a common Bosnian identity (Husremović et al. 2007, 111–113). Taking each of the three curricula separately, it confirmed a pattern recognized in the previous study, whereby "the Croatian textbooks were the most ethnically colored, followed by the Serbian textbooks. The Bosniac textbooks contained the least number of the units that mentioned the ethnic aspects of national history" (Baranovicé 2001, 24). This time, negative examples were again more frequent in Croatian curriculum textbooks, whose content encouraged a sense of belonging to the Republic of Croatia and not to BiH as a state (Husremović et al. 2007, 111, 182). In the Serbian curriculum, a majority of negative examples concerned singling out Serb people, with frequent use of auto- and hetero-stereotypes. Bosnian curriculum textbooks contained the least number of negative cases, and these mostly concerned singling out and stereotyping Bosniak ethnicity (Husremović et al. 2007, 112, 182).

Following the adoption of the "Guidelines for Writing and Evaluation of History Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools in BiH,"[10] some slight progress in textbooks' quality was detected. One analysis of seven primary school textbooks for the school year 2007/08 found that two were outstanding in their proximity to European standards, one was very close to them, and the others did not comply with the guidelines (Karge 2008, 8). Yet another study, besides confirming slight improvements in didactic quality and in introducing multiperspective approaches, again demonstrated that the main problem regarding content lay in the conceptualization of "national history." As long as authors of all Croatian curriculum textbooks treat this as the "history of Croats," authors of all Serbian curriculum textbooks treat it as the "history of Serbs," and authors of some (but not all) Bosnian curriculum textbooks treat it as the "history of Bosniaks," "then any class dealing with periods of shared history will continue to be exceedingly difficult, both for teachers and for students." Only some Bosnian curriculum textbooks

[10]The Guidelines were published in the "Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina," No. 05/07 in January 2007.

"have a clear focus on BiH history when dealing with national history," but even here an ambivalence "between Bosniac and Bosnian history" was detected. This equivocation is specifically examined in the analytical section of this article.

In the following sections, I analyze a discourse on the medieval Bosnian state, Bosnian church, and Bosnian people as presented in two Bosnian curriculum history textbooks. The first is co-authored by Hadžija Hadžiabdić, Edis Dervišagić, Alen Mulić, and Vahidin Mehić (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, hereinafter HDMM). The second is co-authored by Esad Kurtović and Samir Hajrulahović (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, hereinafter KH). I pay attention to the use of language expressing the identities of the above three concepts and how they relate to the contemporary context of BiH as elaborated in the preceding sections.

For this purpose I rely on critical discourse analysis as a type of research "that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context" (van Dijk 2001, 352). Given the explicit awareness that scholarly discourse is "inherently part of and influenced by social structure" (van Dijk 2001, 352), this analysis attempts to expose the way in which parts of the text are subject to politicization for nationalist manipulation aiming to affirm inequality between social groups. The end result offers an explanation, as suggested by Teun A. van Dijk (2001, 354), bridging the gap between a micro approach to language use in the textbooks and the macro level setting of ethnically divided society in BiH.

Given that the cultivation of positive attitudes to BiH is legal requirement,[11] I expect to find instances of patriotic discourse in the textbooks. Yet this sort of state-affirming nationalism is not unconditional. The law

[11]The Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in BiH stipulates that one of general objectives of education is "development of consciousness of belonging to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Art. 3.d) and that the common core curricula "ensure development of a positive attitude and a sense of belonging to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Art. 43.a), see: "Official Gazette of BiH," 18/2003.

(Article 3) also provides that objectives of education stem from "the systems of value based on the specificities of national, historical, cultural and religious tradition of the peoples and national minorities living in Bosnia and Herzegovina." This can be interpreted as a provision for an ethnocentric type of education. Thus the very legal framework creates antinomy about priorities ("state" or "people"), further intensifying political controversies, and I anticipate these textbooks to reflect that. Since I have selected for this analysis two textbooks used in the parts of FBiH that are largely shaped by Bosniak ethnopolitics, I expect to find examples of both "pro-Bosnian" and "pro-Bosniak" discourse in their content. The former may take shape of mythicizing the "golden age" of the Bosnian Kingdom in the context of today's fragile state.[12] The latter may utilize the formula "Bogomils-Islam-Bosnia" (Kapo 2012, 134) for the purpose of bridging the Christian tradition of medieval Bosnia with the subsequent tradition of Islam, thus merging the Bogomil myth with the "Muslim myth of antiquitas" (Kamberović 2003, 71).

The corpus I work with consists of two history textbooks for the second grade of secondary school that are used in FBiH. Despite being published back in 2007, these books are still approved by the Federal Ministry of Education for the school year 2018/19.[13] To my knowledge, neither has previously been analyzed. I analyze Bosnian curriculum textbooks, consciously excluding the textbooks of both the Croatian and Serbian curricula. As explained in the preceding sections, the latter two have already been exposed as propagating state-denying nationalism, while this type of discourse in Bosnian curriculum textbooks, on the other hand, has not been sufficiently studied.

[12]According to the US non-profit Fund For Peace's Fragile State Index 2018, BiH is ranked 95th out of 178 states, with FSI score of 71,3 (max 120), being the most fragile state of Europe excluding Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey, see: "Fragile States Index" Fund For Peace: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ (Web access February 28, 2019).

[13]"Spisak odobrenih radnih udžbenika, udžbenika, priručnika, radnih listova i zbirki zadataka za osnovne škole, gimnazije i srednje tehničke i stručne škole u školskoj 2018/2019. Godini." Vlada Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, Federalno ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke: http://www.fmon.gov.ba/Upload/Ostalo/e258f190-6d63-4e57-8960-ad6b571ca9e3_Spisak%20odobrenih%20udzbenika%2003082018.pdf (accessed February 28, 2019).

Regarding the portions of text taken for analysis, I choose only the most representative samples of language. These are typically the instances where the noun "Bosnia" and the adjective "Bosnian" are used, especially when they relate to the state, the church, or the people of the medieval Bosnia. I also look for possible cases of a "deixis of homeland" that may invoke the "national we" in a subtle way so the nation in question need not be named (Billig 1995), keeping in mind van Dijk's assertion that a "typical feature of manipulation is to communicate beliefs implicitly, that is, without actually asserting them, and with less chance that they will be challenged" (van Dijk 2001, 358).

The hypothesis that will be tested using critical discourse analysis is that the medieval history of Bosnia, as presented in these textbooks, serves to communicate the idea of both Bosnian "civic" state-affirming nationalism, as well as of Bosniak "ethnic" state-denying nationalism, whereby the former is overpowered by the latter in the process.

Last but not least, a personal ethical issue ought to be stressed when talking about analytical methods. Most of the social sciences continue to rely on methodological nationalism, which treats "society" as "national society" and takes nation-states as basic units of scientific research and social analysis (Kapo 2012, 60; Billig 1995, 53). This means that this very article runs a risk of succumbing to methodological nationalism. Being attentive about that, I have chosen only one region (FBiH) and within it only a Bosniak-dominated area, as a unit of analysis instead of BiH. Still, I am aware that the overall tone of my text may be interpreted as being written from a Bosnian "nation-statist" methodological (if not ideological) standpoint. What is more, in the preceding chapters I do treat BiH as a unit of social analysis and as a given political reality against which various destabilizing ideologies, policies, processes, or forces should be measured. I think this can hardly be avoided, however, in a world still shaped by discursive practices such as a dichotomy between "national" and "international." Perhaps methodological nationalism is still a valid starting point for a research aiming to criticize the very concept of it.

Finally, due to the fact that the analyzed corpus will be translated into English, any interpretation of the original language and conclusion about its discourse is the sole responsibility of this author.

One immediately observable difference between the two textbooks lies in their introductory remarks. KH do not mention BiH, explaining instead that the purpose of the textbook is to "acquire knowledge of the Middle Ages by reviewing political, social, religious, and cultural history" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 5). In contrast, HDMM immediately stress that in this textbook "we explain also the history of the Bosnian state, which first appeared as a small country, then as a banate and finally as a powerful kingdom" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 5). The latter authors also express hope that students will "successfully learn a part of the history of our country Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the world" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 5).

There are further invocations of the "national we" in HDMM. One of the questions posed for students, positioned below an image of the 1189 Charter of Ban Kulin, reads: "When and who signed the so-called 'Charter of Ban Kulin', what does it represent for our country?" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 100). Additionally, a part of the abstract below the chapter title "Bosnia During the High Middle Ages" reads (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 92):

> It was the place of cultural, religious, and ethnic contacts … from which … the medieval Bosnian state appeared, with its independence, ruling dynasty, and culture, social and religious distinctiveness. All of this delivered to us a rich cultural heritage, identity, and inheritance for all those living in BiH today.

Expressions conveying the idea of a bond between "us" of today and "them" of the past are largely absent from KH. As we progress through the findings, this slight but important difference between the textbooks becomes more obvious.

Science of History vs. Reading the Present into the Past

In KH the authors accentuate the importance of science when studying history on several occasions. They remind students: "The modern age is

characterized by the formation of nation-states. The situation was different in the Middle Ages. Then, there was no congruence between the state and the people" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 25). More generally, they mention the historical concept of *longue durée* when talking about the Ottoman conquest: "Even in the Ottoman period there were evolutionary (developmental) processes. Those were the long-term events … If Bosnia indeed fell suddenly, that sudden impact lasted over seventy years, since 1386" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 191).

More specifically, KH stress the importance of science when writing about the location of the earliest known towns in Bosnia: "It was long believed that Desnik matched the location of latter-day Tešanj, while Katera was identified as Kotorac in the vicinity of Sarajevo. Yet archaeological research has not confirmed these hypotheses" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 146). In contrast to a widespread belief that the famous tombstones (*stećci*) belonged exclusively to the Bogomils in Bosnia, KH explain: "Besides Bosnia and Herzegovina the tombstones have been found also in parts of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. It is unclear to whom they might be ascribed. The most widely held opinion is that they belong to all believers in medieval Bosnia" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 180).

But even here (HDMM contains virtually no related science-based references) methodological nationalism is ubiquitous. The territory of present BiH is taken as a unit of study, so that each particular historical region that territorially fits into present state borders is considered part of the history of BiH. Additionally, any present region not belonging to BiH, but which was part of medieval Bosnia in the past, is also considered part of BiH history. Thus, for instance, historical events surrounding the Ottoman conquest of the city of Novi in 1482 (present-day Herceg Novi in Montenegro) is treated as belonging to the medieval history of BiH (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 9). In line with this approach, concepts such as "citizenry," "political scene," "religious tolerance," and "international agreement" as well as the proper names of languages, churches, states, nations, and ethnicities that are frequently used in modern discourse are easily projected into the past, when they either did not exist, were spelled differently, or had different meaning. Specific

topics will be analyzed in detail further on, but here several examples are worth mentioning.

A language used in medieval Bosnian documents is referred to by the modern term "Bosnian" (*bosanski*) rather than by a linguistically and historically more accurate designation, such as "Serbo-Croat vernacular" (*narodni srpskohrvatski*) or "Old Church Slavonic" (*crkvenoslavenski*) (Kuna 2008, 64): "Preserved written records indicate the presence of Glagolitic, Bosnian Cyrillic, and Latin alphabets, as well as of Bosnian and Latin languages in public and everyday communication" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 54). The Eastern Orthodox Patriarchate of Peć is equated with the modern Serbian Orthodox Church established in 1920: "Organizationally, the leader of Eastern Orthodox believers in Bosnia was the Metropolitan Bishop with his see in Mileševa. He was subordinate to the Serbian Orthodox Church, i.e. the Patriarchate of Peć" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 173). HDMM refer to the Charter of Ban Kulin as "the first known international agreement of Bosnia and [it] is considered the birth certificate of the Bosnian state" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 98–99). They routinely transpose modern ethnonyms, such as "Slovenes," into a distant past when in fact different ethnonyms (such as "Slavs" or "Wends") were used by contemporary writers to identify the same population: "Slovenes were the first among the South Slavs to establish the state of Carantania in the seventh century" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 50).

The Bosnian State: Greater Bosnia

The identity of the medieval Bosnian state has a prominent place in the textbooks. These political history narratives describe the periods when the most powerful rulers, such as Ban Kulin, Ban Stephen II Kotromanić, and Ban/King Tvrtko I Kotromanić, expanded their realms, enlarged the state's territory, proclaimed political sovereignty, and stabilized institutions and the economy. Bosnia is often depicted as a powerful state actively influencing regional affairs in the Balkans, and as a highly developed country in the same league as the Western European societies of the High and Late Middle Ages.

Thus, during the reign of Ban Kulin, KH reads: "Bosnia was fully recognized as a medieval feudal state. It expanded its territory to the neighboring areas. Ban Kulin has been remembered for his famous charter issued to the Ragusans in 1189 and for the stability of the state" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 147).

HDMM Describes This Situation in a Similar Manner (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 98):

> Having consolidated feudal social relations, the foundations for Bosnian statehood were made. Bosnia was freed from the Byzantine rule around 1180. In the same year Bosnia got a new ruler known by the name of Kulin … [who] ranks among the greatest and most important Bosnian rulers.

Bosnian greatness is stressed even further when HDMM describe the actions of Ban Stephen II: "Whether through his good diplomatic skills or through warfare, he expanded the territory of Bosnia and fortified the Bosnian state" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 107). At this point HDMM cite a historical source depicting the country stretching "from the Sava river to the seacoast, from the Cetina river to the Drina river" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 107). Another variant of this "Greater Bosnian" slogan, mentioning the Una river as the western marker instead of Cetina, could often be heard and read in the Bosnian patriotic discourse during and after the Bosnian War of the 1990s. We also read that Ban Stephen II "laid the foundations of Bosnian statehood and independence and, by marrying his daughter Elisabeth to the King of Hungary in 1353, aligned Bosnia with the world of high European politics" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 108).

The textbook often utilizes the adjective "Bosnian" (*bosanski*) to emphasize the identity of political or social symbols and institutions, even though some of these were not exclusively Bosnian (such as titling Tvrtko I "the King of the Serbs, Bosnia, Pomorje, and the Western Areas") and some were primarily identification markers of the Kotromanić dynasty (such as the coat of arms or coins) rather than of Bosnia as a state in modern sense. Thus we read modern-sounding expressions such as "Bosnian state," "Bosnian economy," "Bosnian

currency," "Bosnian throne," "Bosnian King," "Bosnian fleet," "Bosnian coat of arms," "Bosnian products," "Bosnian rulers and nobility," and "Bosnian statehood" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 107–111; Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 158, 168).

The Most Golden Age: Bosnia of the Western Civilization

Besides the abovementioned examples, the textbooks further accentuate the political power of medieval Bosnia. Its most important institution during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, attesting to its sovereignty, was the assembly of the nobility (*Stanak*) (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 159):

> The ruler attended the assembly with his courtiers and the nobility. Priests and churchmen did not attend sessions. The assembly dealt with key issues regarding overall state policies, war and peace, questions of disloyalty, and also the election of the ruler. Since the assembly protected the ruling system of fiefs, the nobility protected the institution of the assembly even during crises. The assembly prevented the collapse of the Bosnian state and promoted Bosnian statehood during the Middle Ages.

The historical period in which Bosnia was proclaimed a kingdom is the most admired (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 149):

> Medieval Bosnia experienced the greatest expansion of its territory during the reign of Ban and the first King Stephen Tvrtko Kotromanić (1353–1391) … He expanded Bosnia to include the territories of upper Podrinje, Polimlje, and the eastern part of Zachlumia, then the region extending up to Prijepolje and Mileševa, Trebinje, Konavle, and Dračevica, leading to the Bay of Kotor. Ban Tvrtko was crowned king in 1377—Bosnia became kingdom. That act signified the elevation of Bosnia to the ranks of the most important states of the Southeastern Europe.

While KH cite the slogan "from the Sava river to the seacoast, and from the Una river to the Drina river" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 149)

to picture this territorial expansion, HDMM add a few more geographic details: "Tvrtko's state stretched from the Sava river to the Adriatic sea, including the Dalmatian islands, and from the Velebit mountain to the Bay of Kotor, from the Una river to the Drina river and to the midstream of the Lim river" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 111). Geographical maps of Bosnia depicting the country at its territorial maximum accompanies these passages in both books.

In this period Bosnia was not only politically powerful, but a highly civilized society as well. At the end of the High Middle Ages (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 152):

> Bosnia emerges as a stable state among the neighboring countries, which recognized its achieved status … Within such a milieu, through conflicts but also through various positive interactions and cooperation a recognizable Bosnian feudal state, social and cultural progress was developed, which was respected as a part of the contemporary medieval world.

Urbanization and prosperity were on the way (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 116):

> A Bosnian town, not unlike contemporary European towns, had a market square as a center of business and public life, surrounded with shops and houses of merchants and craftsmen. There was also a church, inns, pubs, customs houses, and leprosariums as shelters for lepers situated at Franciscan monasteries … In the first half of the fifteenth century there were around seventy market squares in Bosnia, which by size were identical to other Balkan and European towns.

In this context HDMM see an early formation of the middle class (*građanska klasa*) in Bosnia, ascribing to medieval town-dwellers a quality of modern *bourgeoisie*. Moreover, they link the political meaning of "civic" (*građansko*) in present BiH—an idea allegedly opposed to post-Dayton ethno-nationalism—with the distant "golden age," as in the idea of "that period, or moment, of pristine glory when the creative energies of the nation were at their most vigorous and their virtues most apparent" (Smith 2009, 96).

Finally, discussions of the type of land tenure and the culture of chivalry firmly situate medieval Bosnia in the civilizational area of Western Europe during the High Middle Ages. In contrast to the West where the central element of feudalism was a heritable property—a fief—in the Byzantine East the feudal system was based on temporary, usually lifetime, grants called *pronoia*. Medieval Bosnia's subscription to the system of heritable property akin to fiefdoms, called *plemenita baština* (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 17–18), is presented as aligning the country with the West. The courts of rulers and nobility in medieval Bosnia were centers of chivalric culture; an event mentioned in both textbooks is the grand meeting of European nobility at Budim in 1412. Sandalj Hranić and Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić are acclaimed as skilled participants in a tournament (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 122): "Bosnian lords were not far behind their Western peers" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 181). Therefore, "the Fall of Bosnia in 1463 marked the end of an era, of certain structures and of particular ways of behaving and understanding. In the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina this represents its most golden age" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 54).

The only element setting Bosnian feudalism apart from that of its Western European contemporaries was the position of the church. As suggested by a sub-chapter title in KH, Bosnia was a country of its own authentic development, but at the same time on the boundary between civilizations (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 154).

Bosnian Church: Neither West Nor East

Although seemingly following Western European feudalist conventions, the anomalous position of the Church made Bosnia exceptional among the Western models and vulnerable to the competing influences of Western and Eastern powers. Speaking of the Church of Bosnia (hereinafter COB), HDMM claim: "The Church was not a powerful 'noble' as in other countries of Europe" (Husremović et al. 2007, 96), while KH add: "A lack of recognition, within wider contexts of the development of Christianity, prevented the organization of a single church in Bosnia, or formation of an established church in medieval Bosnia" (Kurtović and

Hajrulahović 2007, 172). The main reason for this religious exceptionalism is that COB was considered heretical by the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. The controversial nature of its heresy, a phenomenon well-known in historiography, is also evident in the textbooks.

A Secular Medieval Country of Religious Tolerance

In general terms, KH explain: "The members of the Church of Bosnia called themselves Christians.[14] They were also referred to as Patarenes and Bogomils in the historical sources. They were ascribed to hold dualist beliefs on the origin of the world." The clergy are described as modest people unconcerned about worldly possessions: "Representatives of the Church of Bosnia do not erect religious buildings like those found in Catholicism and the Eastern Orthodoxy. They hold neither possessions, nor fiefs … their rituals (liturgy) are simpler than those of other Christians." Yet they had strong moral standing: "They appear in public life as guarantors of certain deeds and agreements and they take part in diplomatic missions. The presence of their guarantee in secular documents issued by Bosnian rulers and nobles was held in high esteem by the Ragusans." Since churchmen could not attend assembly sessions and the rulers were more concerned with secular activities than the confessional identity of their courts and subjects, medieval Bosnia is pictured as a precursor of the modern secular state and of the idea of religious tolerance, unprecedented in contemporary European feudal society (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 174–175):

> In contrast to many other countries both in the East and West, the relation between secular and spiritual power in medieval Bosnia was different. The spiritual power in Bosnia did not participate in the work of *Stanak* [the assembly]. Nor did the churchmen enjoy a status in the feudal estate or hold public office in the country. Bosnian rulers favored secular activities … Religious faith had a role in the ruler's life and provided him

[14]The local archaic expression *krstjani*—meaning simply "Christians"—is used.

> with a moral support, … but religion did not … restrict him in ruling his land. In his domain the ruler was tolerant towards the faith of his subjects.

In a similar manner, according to HDMM, medieval Bosnia was "in the Balkans, and even in Europe, a rare country of religious tolerance and a country permeated by diverse cultures and civilizations—Mediterranean, Balkan, and Central European" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 110). Even the legendary Queen Catharine, mythicized in folklore as "the Last Bosnian Queen," is presented as a powerful symbol of multicultural sensibility and religious tolerance (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 193):

> During Catherine's youth, the courts of the Kosačas … were places where different cultural and religious traditions intermingled, a situation that must have influenced her growing up. Through her grandmother and mother as well as her relatives she learned about Eastern Orthodoxy and Byzantine heritage influencing the Balšićs of Zeta. At the courts of the Kosačas she acquainted herself with Bosnian and Western European cultural traditions, as well as with the Church of Bosnia and Catholicism.

Incidentally, by adding to the above the heritage of her children, who converted to Islam, a recent opinion from writer and cultural historian Ivan Lovrenović holds that their multi-religious symbolic potential may become a transethnic symbol of the present, ethnically shattered, BiH (Lovrenović 2014).

Bosnian Heretics: Bogomils or Just Dualists?

The question of the nature of the heresy ascribed to COB adherents has long been debated among scholars, producing various and often contradictory theories (Šanjek 2005). This uncertainty is also reflected in these textbooks.

KH claim, less categorically, that some historical sources use the names "Patarenes" or "Bogomils" in the attempt to ascribe dualist views to the Bosnian *krstjani*. However, when elaborating on the hierarchy of the COB, KH describe its members as "believers, who could be perfect and

imperfect, i.e. those abiding by all requirements and those who are not yet ready for it" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 174). This division between two ranks of adherents is typical for other dualist heresies of medieval Europe, and KH clearly identify Bosnian *krstjani* with dualism, albeit not with Bogomilism, in another paragraph: "Dualists believed that the world was based on two principles: the good and the evil … Notable among them are Paulicians, Manicheans, Bogomils, Albigenses, Patarenes, Cathars, Waldensians, and Bosnian Christians" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 120).

HDMM on the other hand firmly stick to the Bogomil thesis (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 101):

> The Church of Bosnia formed under the influence of Bogomil teaching … Members of the Church of Bosnia called themselves Christians. They were also called Patarenes and Bogomils … They interpreted the beginning of the world in a dualist way, through the conflict between the good and the evil.

These mutual differences notwithstanding, both textbooks neglect the possibility that COB was not shaped by dualism, but that it might have represented an unreformed remnant of the early "rustic" Slav Christianity, which predated the tenth- and eleventh-century Cluniac and the Gregorian reforms within the Western Church and the Great Schism—a theory frequently argued in scholarly works (Malcolm 2002, 27–42). A narrative has thus been created that, despite its exceptionally civilized and tolerant society, Bosnia was, due to its anomalous religious identity, a frequent target of hostile neighboring powers. Insistence on Bosnian exceptionalism in the Middle Ages serves to establish a connection between present post-Dayton challenges to the political identity of BiH and a mythicized past. These challenges mainly concern the residents of FBiH whose children's schooling is based on Bosnian curriculum, which attempts to spread Bosnian patriotism or state-affirming nationalism among younger generations.

Bosnian People: *Bošnjani*, *Bosanci*, *Bošnjaci*

One of the most problematic aspects of history writing is the selection of a proper noun to designate a group of humans in a particular historical period. No writer of such a text is truly independent from his surroundings and from social powers controlling the discourse about what can be said or written under the circumstances (Foucault 1972). Hence, a writer unmindful of such powers easily succumbs to using the socio-politically imposed vocabulary of the day, no matter how limited or inappropriate it might be, in order to elaborate on complex subject matter—a medieval society in this case. A lexical form used as a proper noun for a group in the present-day context is then routinely transposed onto the past (Fine 2006, 10). In this way we neglect the fact that modern social reality rarely matches a historical reality of the past. A peculiar feature of language is at work here: As Ferdinand de Saussure showed, the bond between the signifier (the sound-image or the word used) and the signified (the concept meant) is arbitrary, meaning there is no natural connection between the two (de Saussure 1959, 67–69). Keeping this in mind, we can see how modern signifiers are used in these two textbooks to ascribe the meaning to the signified concept from several centuries back in time. We are talking about the name of the inhabitants of medieval Bosnia, but also about present-day linguistic quandaries in BiH.

Playing with Signifiers

Both HDMM and KH briefly mention the archaic word *Bošnjani* as a demonym for the inhabitants of Bosnia. Yet both textbooks make it clear that this name corresponds to the modern demonym *Bosanci*: "The inhabitants of that country, medieval Bosnia, were named after the state they lived in as Bosnians" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 92). An almost identical sentence is found in KH, but here it is qualified by a critical observation: "This is a name that has a different meaning in the modern age" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 54)—although it is not explained what that difference is. In fact, what is above translated into English as "Bosnians" is written in the original language using two morphological

variants—the archaic *Bošnjani* and the modern *Bosanci*—seemingly to suggest a continuation between pre-modern and modern concepts of a "people." The signified labelled with the signifier *Bošnjani* and the signified labelled with the signifier *Bosanci* are thus equated without suggesting that the signifier used in the medieval sources might well have meant a different thing—namely only a segment of the population, the nobles, and not all inhabitants. After all, even the name of the country was occasionally used in the medieval sources in a narrower sense to name the assembly of nobility as "all of Bosnia" or simply "Bosnia" (Kurtović and Hajrulahović 2007, 159). Thus, a hard-to-prove meaning of a word in historical writings is merged with the modern meaning of national identity as the identity of citizens of the state.

Both textbooks quite consistently use the modern proper noun *Bosanci* to name the population of medieval Bosnia (along with the adjective *bosanski* to refer to all things of or from Bosnia). This manner of nationalizing the past in some ways reflects the legal requirement that students adopt a positive attitude towards BiH, including historical Bosnia. But, in respect to my hypothesis that the content of the textbooks may serve to strengthen both Bosnian "civic" and Bosniak "ethnic" nationalism, a question arises: Are there instances of the text stressing a particular Bosniak ethno-religious identity? In this respect the two textbooks slightly differ.

Before addressing that question, it is useful to offer a minor linguistic-historical remark about the proper noun "Bosniaks." The early modern expression *Bošnjaci*, an archaism borrowed from the Turkish language (Riđanović 2013, 144), was used as a country-level demonym signifying the identity of all inhabitants of Bosnia until the late nineteenth century (Radušić 2011, 131–156), when the word gradually shifted meaning under Austro-Hungarian rule to an ethnonym signifying Bosnian Muslims only. As an archaism, however, the word became out-dated during the twentieth century. In its place, the modern word *Bosanci* came to be commonly used in all South Slav languages as a demonym. The archaism *Bošnjaci* was reinstated in public discourse around the time of the first multi-party elections in BiH, in 1990, when some secular-minded ideologues of the otherwise conservative Islamist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) advocated its use. Having briefly flirted with the possibility of

restoring it as a demonym, the name *Bošnjaci* was finally decided, at the war-time "Bosniak Congress" in 1993, to signify only Muslims. Having been officially accepted in the constitutional texts of both the FBiH entity in 1994 and the DPA in 1995, signifying one of three "constituent peoples," the signifier *Bošnjaci* acquired its present-day ethnonymous meaning.

Given that the word *Bošnjaci* is clearly a linguistic construct of the modern era, the textbooks dealing with the Middle Ages do not use it explicitly. There is only one exception to that, in HDMM, when the actual term is mentioned when talking about the Old Church Slavonic language: "It was a common language of literature spoken and used by Bulgarians, Serbs, Russians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Bosniaks, and to a great extent Croats, especially in Istria and Dalmatia" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 49). This sentence almost epitomizes the method of history writing whereby modern national or ethnic labels are translocated to a past in which neither the signified concept nor the actual signifiers were the same as modern ones. Yet two sentences that follow suggest an ideological power is at work in the current Bosniakization of medieval Bosnian statehood, reflecting certain Bosniak state-building agendas: "It fostered a growing awareness among the Slavs of their distinctiveness and of their historical identity. This identity among the South Slavs was manifested above all in the building of their early feudal sovereign states" (Hadžiabdić et al. 2007, 49).

Following on from the micro approach to language use in the textbooks, I conclude this analysis by linking the above to the macro level of socio-political context in the Sarajevo Canton of FBiH. Randomly chosen daily press articles published in the Sarajevo Canton demonstrate a persistent urge among the Bosniak ethnopolitical elite to continue problematizing the identity of both the Bosnian state (Abadžija 2016) and the Bosniak people (Trako 2016). This unveils their power to control the discourse around what can be said in public, and how, when, and by whom (Foucault 1972, 216–224), in a way that makes their assertions hard to challenge, because of their seemingly state-affirming attitude. In such a setting, the ideology of the ruling ethno-political class can practice mind control unhindered, especially in the education sector where

less powerful groups, such as students and parents, are unable to question the authority behind educational discourse and policies.

The Implications of Ethno-Politicized Education and Its Discourse

Elements of language emphasizing Bosniak identity are implicit rather than explicit in the analyzed textbooks. They are more prominent in HDMM, where the word *Bošnjaci* is actually mentioned in the context of statehood building and where the identity of the COB is firmly Bogomilized. Although more successful in avoiding present ethno-politicizing traps, KH also teach that the COB members were dualists. Taking these elements together, it is possible to see how Bosnian medieval history is interpreted to serve present Bosniak state-denying nationalism. By ascribing to the COB a dualist (that is, not truly Christian) religious character, it can be treated as a "proto-Islam" present in Bosnia from time immemorial. Through amalgamation of Ottoman Sunni Islam and South Slav ethno-religious nationalism, this "proto-Islam" serves to imagine Bosniaks as the core *ethnie*, possessing sole power to build the state[15]—which would encompass either the whole of present BiH or only a part of its FBiH entity (often dismissively called *Bošnjakistan*). This process could result in carving up BiH into an ethnocentric political entity that would, through a complex system of social and political exclusion, segregate those people who do not identify themselves with either the Bosniak ethnic label or Islam, making them second-class citizens at best.

However, this is only one possible implication of the textbook discourse. For the most part, and KH in particular, they produce a narrative that may be understood in exactly the opposite terms—namely as a set of demonyms and associated adjectives (*Bosanci*, *bosanski*) that clearly try to cultivate Bosnian trans-ethnic identity to be shared by the general citizenry of BiH. This instance of state-affirming nationalism is however

[15]For a historiographic study of transition from the Bogomil myth to the Bosniak myth, see: Lovrenović (2009).

marred by the position of the Bosnian curriculum, the use of which is restricted to only those parts of FBiH where Bosniak ethnopolitics control public discourse.

Therefore the proposed hypothesis can be partially confirmed. Both textbooks explicitly employ state-affirming nationalist discourse in order to propagate the idea of inclusive Bosnian identity, KH being more consistent in this approach and adding important science-based instruction. Yet the discourse of both books, and particularly of HDMM, also contains elements that implicitly support exclusive Bosniak identity politics, having state-denying characteristics. As for the question of whether Bosnian civic nationalism is overpowered by Bosniak ethnic nationalism in this process, I can only say that the results of these on-going developments are uncertain, but state-denying elements of ethnic nationalism are surely evident and possibly growing in the analysed discourse.

Conclusion: A Way Out—Myth-Based or Science-Based History?

Despite increasing awareness among scholars and public intellectuals that historical myths should be debunked scientifically, the problem seems to be much more complex. Socially and politically destructive powers of historical myth-making are not universally recognized, even among esteemed scholars. Some of them use a functionalist approach to maintain that myths may have the positive effect of enhancing social cohesion and that demythologizing history may undermine such a sense of community (Kolstø 2003, 35). Although it is true that not every myth has potential for negative social outcomes, the enlightenment approach insists on exposing them as factually incorrect. For example, having accepted that the functionalist approach to the study of myths is valid, Pål Kolstø nevertheless argues that the relativistic aspects of functionalism—claiming that the objective truth is unattainable—must be rejected, and that certain types of boundary myths (such as *antemurale*, sui generis, and *antiquitas*) possess qualities that make them particularly liable to harmful use (Kolstø 2003, 36–37).

As of 2015, according to a report by the European Stability Initiative (European Stability Initiative 2015), history textbooks in Croatia had changed drastically in comparison to the one-sided nationalist outlook of the 1990s. While praising Croatia's progress in coming to terms with its recent history, on page 27 the report warns that some

> Balkan countries still use textbooks similar to those used in Croatian schools in the 1990s, telling children stories of a nation surrounded by enemies, with national heroes and foreign villains, periods of suffering and victimhood alternating with military triumph: nursery histories of the worst kind.

The report advocates an alternative approach whereby young people learn "adult history" free of myths. In other words, "[a] society that is able to treat its homespun identity myths with some degree of irony and detachment is less likely to be mobilized by political and ethnic entrepreneurs for aggressive purposes" (Kolstø 2003, 35).

It is not hard to recognize elements of "nursery history" and boundary myths in parts of the analyzed history textbooks. However, even if the standards of science-based "adult history" were to be reached, it remains to be seen what would happen to the ubiquity of methodological nationalism, as long as the nation-state remains the container, organizer, regulator, and financer of the science and education systems. One way to look at this problem is to accept a radical shift from the modernist-nationalist paradigm to a postmodernist-postnationalist one, as Midhat Kapo did in his 2012 study (Kapo 2012, 189)—but this is a topic to be addressed elsewhere.

References

Abadžija, Maja. 2016. "Himna BiH bit će prvo školsko zvono." *Oslobođenje*, August 26.

Althusser, Louis. 2014. *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. London and New York: Verso.

Baranovicé, Branislava. 2001. "History Textbooks in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Intercultural Education* 12 (1): 22.

Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Breuilly, John. 1994. "The Sources of Nationalist Ideology." In *Nationalism*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 104–111. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

de Saussure, Ferdinand. 1959. *Course in General Linguistics*. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. New York: Philosophical Library.

European Stability Initiative. 2015. "Teaching War: How Croatian Schoolbooks Changed and Why It Matters." Textbook Series-Part One. ESI Report Berlin-Zagreb-Vienna, September 16.

Fetahagić, Sead S. 2015. *Between Cooperation and Antagonism: The Dynamics Between Religion and Politics in Sensitive Political Contexts, Case: Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Sarajevo and Oslo: Nansen Dialogue Centre and Scanteam.

Fine, John V. A., Jr. 2006. *When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans: A Study of Identity in Pre-Nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern Periods*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Geary, Patrick. 2003. *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1994. "Nationalism and Modernization." In *Nationalism*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Hadžiabdić, Hadžija, Edis Dervišagić, Alen Mulić, and Vahidin Mehić. 2007. *Historija: Udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije*. Tuzla: Bosanska knjiga.

Hechter, Michael. 2000. *Containing Nationalism.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Husremović, Dženana, Steve Powell, Ajla Šišić, and Aida Dolić. 2007. *Obrazovanje u Bosni i Hercegovini: Čemu učimo djecu? Analiza sadržaja udžbenika nacionalne grupe predmeta*. Edited by Dženana Trbić. Sarajevo: Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.

Kamberović, Husnija. 2003. "'Turci' i 'kmetovi' - Mit o vlasnicima bosanske zemlje." In *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu, Zbornik radova*, edited by Husnija Kamberović. Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu.

Kapo, Midhat. 2012. *Nacionalizam i obrazovanje: Studija slučaja Bosna i Hercegovina.* Sarajevo: Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.

Karge, Heike. 2008. "20th Century History in the Textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of Books Used for the Final Grades of Primary School." Braunschweig: The Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. Accessed May 29, 2016. http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/abteilungen/schulbuch_und_gesellschaft/Suedosteuropa/BiH_Schulbuchanalyse_Englisch.pdf.

Kohn, Hans. 1994. "Western and Eastern Nationalisms." In *Nationalism*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Kolstø, Pål. 2003. "Procjena uloge historijskih mitova u modernim društvima." In *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu: Zbornik radova*, edited by Husnija Kamberović. Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju.

Kuna, Herta. 2008. "Srednjovjekovna bosanska književnost." *Forum Bosnae*, 45/08.

Kurtović, Esad, and Samir Hajrulahović. 2007. *Historija istorija povijest: Udžbenik sa čitankom za drugi razred gimnazije*. Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing.

Kuzmanič, Tonči. 2004. "Disintegration of the SFR Yugoslavia and Its Legacy: Populism—Not Nationalism." In *The Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Causes, Dynamics and Effects*, edited by Miroslav Hadžić. Belgrade: Center for Civil-Military Relations.

Lovrenović, Dubravko. 2009. *Povijest est magistra vitae*. Sarajevo: Rabic.

Lovrenović, Ivan. 2014. "Čija je kraljica Katarina." *Svjetlo riječi*, October 25. Accessed September 30, 2016. http://www.svjetlorijeci.ba/clanak/1975/drustvo/cija-je-kraljica-katarina.

Malcolm, Noel. 2002. *Bosnia: A Short History*. London: Pan Books.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Department of Education. n.d.a. "Osnovne informacije o obrazovanju u BiH." Accessed January 13, 2016. http://www.mcp.gov.ba/org_jedinice/sektor_obrazovanje/default.aspx?langTag=en-US&template_id=108&pageIndex=1.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Department of Education. n.d.b. "Responsabilities." Accessed April 25, 2016. http://mcp.gov.ba/org_jedinice/sektor_obrazovanje/nadleznosti/default.aspx?id=1997&langTag=en-US.

New World Encyclopedia. n.d. "Narodnik." Accessed April 9, 2019. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Narodnik&oldid=1015745.

Perry, Valery. 2015. "Wartime Division in Peacetime Schools." In *Forced Migration Review* 50. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

Radušić, Edin. 2011. "Ko su Bošnjaci 19. stoljeća? Bosna, Hercegovina i Bošnjaci u britanskoj konzularno-diplomatskoj korespondenciji od 1857. do 1878. Godine." In *Identitet Bosne i Hercegovine kroz historiju: Zbornik radova*, edited by Husnija Kamberović, 131–156. Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju.

Renan, Ernest. 1996. "What Is a Nation?" In *Becoming National: A Reader*, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Riđanović, Midhat. 2013. *Riđanović o jeziku i još nekim stvarima iz Tamnog Vilajeta.* Sarajevo: Author.

Said, Edward W. 1994. *Culture and Imperialism.* New York: Vintage Books.

Šanjek, Franjo, ed. 2005. *Fenomen "krstjani" u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu: Zbornik radova.* Sarajevo and Zagreb: Institut za istoriju and Hrvatski institut za povijest.

Smith, Anthony D. 2009. *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach.* London and New York: Routledge.

Trako, E. 2016. "Grupa štetočina radi na razbošnjavanju Bosne!" *Dnevni avaz*, September 30.

van Dijk, Teun A. 2001. "Critical Discourse Analysis." In *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Weber, Eugene. 1976. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

11

Teaching History with an Ethno-Nationalistic Approach: History Textbooks in the Education System of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Jasna Jozelić

In recent years we have witnessed a real discursive explosion around teaching history in schools and the textbooks used for the purpose. It is not just that history is a blossoming academic topic in the Western Balkans, but that history has increasingly become a prism through which other topics of contemporary life are seen, grasped, and examined.

After the wars of the 1990s, a new social order in Western Balkan countries formed through inter-societal relations predominantly based on an ethno-nationalistic approach. The construction of a narrative based on patriotic ethno-nationalistic politics is increasingly evident, and this narrative has become a guiding force in creating a social reality around artificially created diversity rather than discernable cultural similarities between national groups.

The new ethno-nationalist social order is most evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This is not only because of the country's constitutional structure, based on the principle of constituent peoples as created

J. Jozelić (✉)
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: jasna.jozelic@nchr.uio.no

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_11

by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, but also the increasing interference of surrounding states—namely, Serbia and Croatia. As well as many other aspects of BiH's internal order, those countries' interference has impacted education politics, including traditional history teaching. The discriminatory and dysfunctional institutional framework resulting from this political environment centered around ethno-nationalistic discourse has negatively effected the education system in two main ways. First, by introducing three separate educational programs based on ethnicity. Second, by using what Adila Pašalić Kreso has called subjects of "huge national importance," such as history, language, and religion, to reinforce ethnic division and rebuild national identity. There is almost no unified education policy, nor any common education system, curriculum, textbooks, goals, or values to speak of (Pašalić-Kreso 2008).

In the divided education system of BiH, history textbooks and teaching play a central role in maintaining the status quo—if not in actually reinforcing further division in society. As we will see, history textbooks in BiH transmit new, politically influenced social and cultural values to new generations, conveying negative stereotypes and encouraging attitudes that explicitly or implicitly generate conflict between groups. History education serves as a platform for promoting different versions of history—there are, at the very least, three versions of history in BiH, depending on textbooks authors' ethnicity. They attempt to revise historical events and, perhaps most worryingly, fail to confront the past in a critical way (Höpken 2003). This tendency is in perfect opposition to the Council of Europe's current vision for history education (Council of Europe 2018).

The Role of History in the Education System

In all countries of the territory of former Yugoslavia history textbooks and teaching take an ethnocentric approach. The mono-perspective that prevails largely excludes learning about neighbors' societies and cultural values. The members of the "group" for which a given textbook is produced are largely portrayed as victims and heroes, while the wrongdoers are always "others."

Generally, it is accepted in historiography that a historian must start—however far from it they may end—with the fundamental distinction between establishable fact and fiction: between historical statements based on evidence, and those which are not (Hobsbawm 1997, viii). In ethno-nationalist programming, a failure to accept reality and the truth about oneself, and a resulting obsessive tendency to cultivate past misconceptions and myths, are central. Counterfeit pasts carry the germ of antagonistic feeling and preoccupation with "our own distinct" history, imaginary boundaries, and group differentiation. An ethnocentric approach glorifies one society and its sacrifices, placing one group at the center and making it a measure of social and cultural difference, meaning others become incomplete and inferior reflections of that group. Using history as a filter to indicate that "others" are enemies makes it a part of politicized system that contributes in further division among citizens.

Manipulating history and increasing the role of history education in self-understanding, especially in identity quests, is a political strategy aimed at legitimizing segregation firstly in schools and then in society in general. In this context, history teaching based on textbooks plagued by lack of objective facts takes on a political dimension, whereby schools become a playground for nation-building and teaching is arranged according to national logics.

Today, history education in all the former Yugoslav countries is predominantly constructed around instilling in young people a positive story about the national past, a loyalty to the state, a convincing and positive sense of identity and belonging, and a social solidarity limited to their own group. The fact that the main focus of history curricula is a celebratory and heroic story of the national past undoubtedly leads to segregation between ethno-national groups living in a common area. Indeed, the political project of segregation is most evident in the education system and schools, where topics of major national importance, such as history, language, and religion, are divided according to students' ethnicity.

In BiH, the project of segregation is ethnically divided between the three major ethno-religious groups, or "constituent peoples." The paradox of the BiH school system is that it is based on triple ethno-nationalist politics, so three separate curricula are taught. The curriculum in schools

teaching in the Croatian language is based on Croatia's curriculum, the Serbian-language curriculum relies on the Serbian curriculum, and Bosnian-language schools follow the BiH curriculum. This fragmentation of curricula is nothing other than a mirror of institutional fragmentation and weak public education institutions which allow parallel education policies to be integrated into the country's education system.

Against the background of an intrusive ethno-nationalist educational policy, descriptions of events—especially from recent history—in the curricula and history textbooks used in BiH contain subjective views and non-factual interpretations that clearly encourage segregation among students. One example of such subjective views and non-factual interpretations of history is the current textbook for ninth grade (Vasić 2018). Its reconstructions of history are clearly produced through ethno-nationalistic and state attempts at persuading students that divisions among groups are necessary.

In such a context it is evident that political education policy directly causes how the past has been represented, interpreted, and accorded significance for different reasons and purposes. One goal of history as a school subject should be to develop students' ability to ask relevant questions about the past and critically explore them using several different sources while taking their historical context into account. Each student should recognize that historical knowledge, comprehension, and associated skills help understand the present and provide a basis for further academic and social development. It is crucial that students can appreciate and understand significant individuals, events, and social developments in a broad historical context, as well as how these have affected various groups in society. The ability to interpret historical knowledge is fundamental for insight into and awareness of the past, which shapes each student's individuality and connection to their social surroundings.

How to Construct National History in Light of New Social Structures?

In Australia, education researchers Tony Taylor and Sue Collins have shown that: "History education in modern, mass education systems is

commonly regarded by politicians, media commentators and educators alike as a major factor in the construction of particular forms of historical consciousness that provide the basis for social disposition and social action" (Taylor and Collins 2012).

Politicizing history requires inventing or dressing up past events, or appropriating historical figures to suit current needs. The ongoing politicization of history education in all former Yugoslav republics and especially in BiH has led to a decline in the quality of history as a discipline. According to historian Husnija Kamberović, a strong stream of intellectuals who publicly and aggressively promote history for political purposes has damaged history as a science in BiH in recent years. This affects social consciousness and historical thinking. Legitimizing a present ethno-national status through the past relies on this science, because it allows groups to construct their pasts and shape their identities through a collective biography (Kamberović 2012). Policymakers and historians who support ethno-nationalist approaches to history education as an element in building a nation's new order increasingly obscure the facts on which truth about the past is built. This phenomenon is widespread on a global level. Researching the politicization of the 1938 Nanjing Massacre, for example, US historian C.X. George Wei writes: "The professionalism of historians in the field has never been so seriously challenged and threatened. Can historical writing be objectively the craft of history professionals or is it inevitably the subjective product of historians who have been more or less influenced by moral, political, or ideological elements?" (Wei 2008).

In *The Killing of History* (2000), conservative Australian historian Keith Windschuttle narrates a series of case histories in an attempt to argue that literary and social theorists such as Michel Foucault and Edward Said have tried to replace the learning of "traditional history" with left-wing political agendas (Windschuttle 2000). The hyper-politicized debate on education in BiH, in contrast, has fomented a dramatic shift in power away from educators and into the hands of a few state officials who have been influenced by political or ideological elements. Schools appear to be under complete political and administrative control: Textbooks themselves are governed by several laws enacted

by state ministries. These laws regulate the preparation, approval, selection, issuance, withdrawal and monitoring of textbooks and textbook kits, manuals and additional teaching aids for primary and secondary schools.[1] Because the ministries are divided according to ethnic and territorial principles, and thus there is no unified Ministry of Education, the laws on textbooks are shaped by the same ethnic principles of regulation.

Nationalist and religious indoctrination goes far beyond the level of school textbooks, of course, as political representatives push forward a narrative in which identity politics is defined by enclosure in relation to others rather than similarities. The challenges around presenting unified standards of history education in BiH are symptomatic of a nationwide trend of anti-democratic and anti-historical forces stifling well-established historical understandings, and shifting power away from teachers and relevant experts, to move it into the hands of a few politically connected individuals who want to change expectations around history content to suit their own agendas. German historian Fritz Fischer identified such people as anti-historians, that is, as "politically motivated activist[s] seeking to teach the past as political ideology rather than following well-established rules for seeking to understand the past" (Fischer 2017). An enduring method in textbook-writing is to glorify both the national heroes of the past and the politicians of today while offering stereotypical representations of "others," especially when it comes to the (early) Middle Ages and the formation of social identities and religious groups. In the Croatian-language history textbook for the seventh grade, for example, descriptions of the difficult position of Croats in the Ottoman Empire dominate (Bekavac et al. 2012). In the Bosnian-language seventh-grade book, religion, ethnicity and nationality are presented as equivalents, and any attack on the church means an attack on a people, whose sacrifice is then glorified, magnifying their grouphood (Dervišagić et al. 2010). A ninth-grade book focuses on the violent recession and the breakup of Yugoslavia (Pejić et al. 2014).

A countrywide public debate was sparked in 2018 when the history textbook by Dragisa D. Vasic was introduced for the ninth grade of

[1]In BiH at least four different laws regulate the preparation and approval of textbooks. See: Federalno ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke (2009).

elementary school in Republika Srpska, one of three entities of BiH (Vasić 2018). The main criticism was directed at the section on recent history, especially the part on World War II and the period between 1992 and 1995—namely, the origins of Republika Srpska and the causes and results of the 1992 war. The content was seen as potentially having implications for the reconciliation process. Its narrative of national history relies on partially and arbitrarily interpreted facts, and facts that are unspecified or unfounded. In terms of World War II, the Serbian nationalist Chetnik movement led by Draža Mihailović, which collaborated with the occupying Axis forces, is presented as an anti-fascist, civil, and national movement. No reference is made to the many atrocities they committed during the occupation. Persons convicted of grave crimes against humanity are just presented as key figures in national struggle against foreign occupation. As for more recent events, the book presents a history of all Serbs living in the former Yugoslavia, while denying the state, continuity, and borders of BiH as the homeland of the Serb people living in it. As Dragan Bursać points out, the statistics it offers are one-sided and incomplete, again referring only to the Serbian population and no other groups living there (Bursać 2019). As solid historical sources are stored in many archives around the world, and are easily accessible to a wider circle of researchers—especially now that we have the internet—the inevitable question was how it was possible that the educational institutions of BiH ignored the book's patchy, biased take on history.

The task of modern education is no longer just to provide information to the student, but to develop the ability to analyze and process information. The teacher plays a key role in this, as they must direct students to relevant sources of knowledge while protecting them from the harmful influence of the political distortions of history that are ubiquitous in the media. Is such approach possible in BiH schools? The bulk of the contemporary history curriculum in BiH suffers from a phenomenon whereby the opinions of laypeople and experts are intertwined, distinguishing direct participants in events from those who see themselves as apart. In this sense many textbook authors put aside the essential rule that history can only be written on the basis of historical sources, and historians show their skill and knowledge precisely through their critique of those sources. Many textbooks used in BiH interpret events related to

contemporary history with prejudice and without basic factual knowledge.

Indeed, the authors of current BiH history textbooks seem to lack sufficient sensitivity to cover sensitive and controversial topics. This is why lessons on the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s contain only the most basic information. A superficial approach to such a sensitive issue results in students developing stereotypical views and prejudices, rooted in the generally accepted narrative that dominates the Western Balkans. Working to develop the skill of critical thinking in students through the analysis of different historical sources is just one way how we can influence the change.

An analysis of the textbook content of a group of main school subjects (history, language, and geography) in primary schools conducted by a group of researchers in 2017 showed that the history textbooks are an instrument of political reckoning and a means of propaganda. For instance, the textbooks for the Bosnian-language curriculum often present content from only one perspective, using reduction and innuendo (Soldo et al. 2017). They present the war without pointing out the crimes of members of the HVO (the Croatian Defense Council, or Bosnian Croat army) or the Armed Forces of BiH, which makes it impossible to discuss the responsibility of all those who participated in the war. The same approach is evident in the textbooks for the Croatian- and Serbian-language curricula. For each representative group, curriculum content focuses on that group's importance, suffering, and innocence during the war and in the postwar period.

The presentation of content in each of three curricula was shown to often use relativization, ignorance, reduction, and imputation. The attention of the student is diverted from the essential to the irrelevant. Vague attitudes are expressed. Phenomena are not viewed in their entirety, and misinterpretations and incomplete interpretations appear intended to exclude others from the field of group values. Violence, war, and denial of rights are blamed on others, and no account is taken of the personal responsibility of the individuals or peoples whose accounts are given. History textbooks dominated by one-nation, often nationalistic perspectives diminish possibilities for interaction and mutual understanding, the study pointed out. They corrupt historical understanding, consciousness,

and literacy, which are considered necessary tools to understand social developments past and present.

The conclusion of the 2017 analysis addressed several problematic areas (Soldo et al. 2017):

- Textbook authors often present content from only one perspective.
- Conclusions are drawn from small, selected samples; all or multiple aspects of a particular event are not examined.
- The student's attention is diverted from essential to irrelevant; vague attitudes are expressed; events and phenomena are misinterpreted or only partly interpreted.
- Other perspectives as well as personal and collective responsibility are completely ignored, leading to incomplete understanding, uncritical reflection, and non-affirmation of universal values.
- We emphasize the vulnerability of one people, and emphasizing the role of the victim reproduces victimization, encouraging stereotypes about that people as the eternal victim of others' hegemony and repression.
- Attitudes and values that exclude others are imputed, based on existing stereotypes, which incite hostility.

What does this analysis tell us? The way groups are represented, underrepresented, or misrepresented reveals the policy enforced in the education system and identity construction in BiH more widely. By allowing such one-dimensional approaches and textbooks containing newly constructed histories, the state indirectly maintains an awareness of an ethno-national identity. Policymakers and politicians together with historians use these textbooks, and to some extent history teaching, to consolidate and sharpen citizens' ethnic differences.

The legacy of a complex political history, combined with the pattern of exclusion implemented by successive conflicting governments basing their policies on ethnic diversity, prevents Bosnians in particular from interacting and identifying themselves, and has resulted in deep polarization along ethnic, religious, and regional lines. In turn, such polarization deeply affects and is duplicated in schools and the education system

at large. History education became a terrain of inclusion and exclusion. According to Sarah Graham-Brown, state policies tend to define national history in favor of the dominant groups by constructing "a version of history, particularly of the recent past, which heightens the role of that group at the expense of the others" (Graham-Brown 1994, 28).

It is evident that the responsibility lies with historians as well, however: they must deal more fully with broader historical events, not just political or military events, which has so far been the prevalent approach in BiH. History teaching which includes only story-telling and wars must be replaced by a social and cultural history approach in order to establishment historical consciousness and cultural identity. Rather than contradictory statements, there must also be harmony and continuity in the historical knowledge given to students in schools in order to establish historical consciousness. Incompatibilities between that knowledge and the knowledge students may acquire in their social environments should be acknowledged (Akinoglu 2005). In political and public space historical knowledge, which is in many ways already distorted, is used to shape actions and thoughts in a way that aims to determine the future in the desired way—towards a society divided along ethno-nationalist lines. Using biased interpretation in history textbooks, the political elites legitimize a dysfunctional, ethnicified political system. By conceptualizing a new narrative on origin of nation, identity, and society, they articulate historical consciousness and the social paradigms defining individual and collective interpretations of the past. The politics of the past in BiH is divided into three competing interpretations of history and three different approaches to narrating history, all of which oppose a common historical narrative.

This chapter shows that ethno-nationalistic politics influence history education in BiH by reinforcing patriotic narratives in history textbooks and implementing three different history curricula, depending on student ethnicity. Historical knowledge is based on dominant ideological ethno-nationalist principles, and controlling it is considered an important tool for domination. Because the past of all Western Balkans countries, BiH especially, is closely bound up with current challenges, much attention is given to history and history education. History's political

instrumentalization gives new policymakers an opportunity to construct the past in order to legitimize the present policy of disentangling and negating common history, cultural heritage, and identity. Societal division are increasing rapidly under ethno-nationalistic elites using all means necessary, including education. The politicization of history that we are witnessing is the result of one group's push for blind domination through presenting an irrational fear of the unknown, achieved by demonizing others and suppressing any possible rapprochement, coexistence, or commonness. This constructed exclusive singular collective identity denies calls for national unity in a multi-religious country.

Conclusion

In such an environment, how we can liberate students from ignorance and help them build critical facilities so that they can create a world where nobody can get away with swallowing extreme ideologies or denying genocide? Critical thinkers can demand the social changes that are necessary for developing individuals and society at large. BiH must depoliticize its education system. It is time for a broader critical analysis of the history curricula, which will provide a better understanding of the relationship between education, social divisions, and conflict in the long run (Tawil and Harley 2004). This will give us more insight into how to develop a tolerant, unified, and balanced curriculum, which is fundamental to healing and reconciling a country ravaged by war. Indeed, there is an urgent need for radical curriculum and educational reform not just in BiH but in all Western Balkan countries. The ethno-nationalistic ideology that guides history education and curricula must be re-examined to counter the actions of policymakers who favor the interests of single groups.

References

Akinoglu, Orhan. 2005. "History Education and Identity." *History Education Research Journal* 5 (1, January): 71–81.

Bekavac, Stjepan, Siniša Kljajić, and Miroslav Rozić. 2012. *Povijest 7*. Zagreb: ALFA.

Bursać, Dragan. 2019. "Kako su četnici postali dobri momci u pola BiH 31." Al Jazeera Balkans, August. Accessed at: http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/kako-su-cetnici-postali-dobri-momci-u-pola-bih.

Council of Europe. 2018. *Quality History Education in the 21st Century: Principles and Guidelines.* Accessed at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/history-teaching/developing-a-culture-of-co-operation-when-teaching-and-learning-history.

Dervišagić, Edis, Hadžija Hadžiabdić, Alen Mulić, and Vahidin Mehić. 2010. *Historija 7, "Bosanska knjiga"*. Sarajevo.

Federalno ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke. 2009. *Pravilnik o postupku pripremanja i odobravanja udžbenika, radnih udžbenika, priručnika i drugih nastavnih sredstava za osnovne i srednje škole.*

Fischer, Fritz. 2017. "Teaching Revolution, Reform, and Rebellion (and Those Who Would Seek to Prevent It." In *The Role of Agency and Memory in Historical Understanding: Revolution, Reform, and Rebellion*, edited by G. P. Andrews and Y. D. Wangdi. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Graham-Brown, Sarah. 1994. *The Role of the Curriculum: Education Rights and Minorities.* London: Minority Rights Group.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1997. *On History*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Höpken, Wolfgang. 2003. "Textbooks and Conflicts. Experiences from the Work of the Georg-Eckert-Institute for International Textbook Research." Washington, DC: World Bank Symposium.

Kamberović, Husnija. 2012. *Historiografija u Bosni i Hercegovini u službi politike*. Zagreb: Srednja Evropa.

Pašalić-Kreso, Adila. 2008. "The War and Post-War Impact on the Educational System of Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Review of Education* 54 (3/4), "Living Together: Education and Intercultural Dialogue" (May–July): 353–374.

Pejić, Ranko, Simo Tešić, and Stevo Gavrić. 2014. *Istorija 9, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva*. Istočno Sarajevo.

Soldo, Andrea, Dženana Trbić, Dženana Husremović, Nenad Veličković, Ivona Čelebičić i Namir Ibrahimović. 2017. *Obrazovanje U Bih: Čemu (Ne) Učimo Djecu?* Sarajevo: Mas Media Sarajevo and Fond otvoreno društvo BiH. Accessed at: http://www.promente.org/downloads/cemuucimodjecu.pdf.

Tawil, Sobhi, and Alexandra Harley, eds. 2004. *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*. Paris: UNESCO.

Taylor, Tony, and Sue Collins. 2012. "Behind the Battle Lines of History as Politics: An International and Intergenerational Methodology for Testing the Social Identity Thesis of History Education." *Education Sciences* 2: 208–217.

Vasić, Dragiša. 2018. JP "Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva." Sarajevo: Istočno Novo. Accessed at: http://www.unibl.org/sr-lat/fis/zaposlen/3592-dragisa-vasic.

Wei, C. X. George. 2008. "Politicization and De-politicization of History: The Evolution of International Studies of the Nanjing Massacre." *The Chinese Historical Review* 15 (2): 242–295.

Windschuttle, Keith. 2000. *The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past*. New York: Encounter Books.

12

The Myth of Victimization in Macedonian History Textbooks (1991–2018)

Darko Stojanov and Petar Todorov

A discussion on the phenomenon of perceiving one's group as a permanent victim throughout history cannot avoid the topics of violence, historical (in)justice, moral authority, and how the past is dealt with. It also poses complicated questions about the creation of historical narratives, collective memory, politics of remembrance, and, especially, history education and educational policies.

Self-portrayals as victims of aggressive neighbors can be found in almost all of the countries in Southeastern Europe. In Serbia, for example, as Dubravka Stojanović has argued, the image of the nation-victim was especially accentuated during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, "for it strengthened the image of a people who should be excused at any price, after having suffering so much throughout history" (Stojanović 2009, 145). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Falk Pingel, the recent wars left a mark on public discourse and history textbooks by

D. Stojanov (✉) · P. Todorov
Institute of National History, University of Saint Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, North Macedonia

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_12

creating a clear distinction between victim and perpetrator, with a significant historical dimension (Pingel 2010, 294). In Kosovo, as Durim Abdullahu shows, a selective treatment of sources intentionally bolsters "an image of an innocent people that has been the victim of other peoples" (Abdullahu 2018, 45). In Bulgaria, some textbooks still present the Bulgarian people as a victim of what is even today occasionally termed as Turkish slavery (Nikolov et al. 2017, 132). It is evident that throughout the wider region narratives of self-victimization were and still are considered relevant for use in the classroom. But it often remains unclear to what extent this phenomenon is caused by political needs and circumstances, by authors' personal mindsets and perceptions of history, or both.

Whether inspired by true tragic events or not, and whether related to contemporary political developments or not, what these narratives have in common, besides the fact that the perpetrator is always the Other, is a tendency to project an image back in time. Historians and other textbook authors often add an element of continuity to the process of suffering, and this can go back to the Middle Ages, where a primordialist view locates the origin of the respective nation. The phenomenon of suffering thus gets a purpose, and a "nation" is indeed destined to be a "victim." In the Macedonian case, as we shall see, this image has been projected back to the seventh century and continues in the present day.

A Case Study: Macedonian History Textbooks

A brief survey of current history textbooks in use in the Republic of Macedonia would suggest that, in general, the perception of history is not burdened with explicit scenes of suffering. A large portion of textbook material is dedicated to European and Balkan history. Violence and suffering seem to be reserved for unavoidable and important topics such as the two world wars, including the Holocaust. What's more, since the proclamation of independence in 1991, the educational authorities have tried through several reforms to ameliorate textbook quality and outlook, and make history, as a teaching subject, less of a burden. As a result one rarely finds graphic images of torture or execution, for instance, in books

produced after 1991. Yet narratives of suffering, especially national suffering, can be created in many ways. As well as visual and textual content, attention must be paid to hidden discourses, the interplay between a textbook's structural elements, use of language, emphasized statements, exercises (didactic sections), and so on.

For the study of victimization, it is important to point out that Macedonian history textbooks are quite ethnocentric (Höpken 2007, 180). That is, histories of Macedonia focus on ethnic Macedonians (in the 1990s) or on Macedonians and Albanians (after the armed conflict and the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement), albeit in two separate, unrelated nationalized historical narratives.[1] The textbooks ignore the complexity of the region in their interpretations of Macedonia's socio-political development and its geographical understandings throughout history. Even when the term "Macedonian population" is used, it refers to ethnic Macedonians and not to the variety of religious and cultural groups that have existed on the territory of what we describe today as geographical Macedonia.[2] Moreover, textbooks from the fifth elementary grade to the fourth year of high school present Macedonia as an unchangeable category of political geography, a region well defined by its political and economic activities and a specific ethnic group. They completely ignore the complex regional developments regarding demography, that is, the territory's religious or ethnic composition. For example, we often read about Macedonia as an Ottoman province administratively divided into three vilayets, or about a "Macedonian ethnic space" (*makedonski etnički prostor*) or simply Macedonian territory (*makedonska teritorija*), followed by maps reflecting the contemporary geographical understanding of the region of Macedonia. Moreover, the accounts of the main political events in the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could lead the reader arrive at the conclusion that Macedonia was a legal entity, as the following example suggests: "on 30.VII (10.VIII) 1913 by the decision of the Bucharest treaty Macedonia was partitioned into four parts, between

[1] On this last point, see: Todorov (2016, 111–124).

[2] For a discussion on ethnocentrism versus multiculturalism in Macedonian history textbooks, see: Petroska-Beshka and Kenig (2018, 237–247).

the belligerent parties Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, while a smaller part was given to the newly created state of Albania".

Although "national" victimhood in Macedonian history textbooks is yet to be extensively researched, some steps have been taken in relation to academic historiographical production. Ulf Brunnbauer, for example, has identified victimization as one of the three most important mythical narratives in historiography in Northern Macedonia (Brunnbauer 2004, 176). Pal Kolstø, furthermore, has described victimization (*martirium*) as one of the four most important groups of myths that serve as "boundary-defining mechanisms" in the Balkans and elsewhere (Kolstø 2005, 4). In this paper, we propose a content and discourse analysis of narratives of suffering in Macedonian history textbooks published since 1991. We pay special attention to the forms in which suffering is ethnicized or "nationalized," to its diachronical aspect, and to its relation to other mythical narratives found in textbooks.

From Slavic *Settlement* to Ottoman *Conquest*

Explicit narratives of "national" suffering generally have no place in textbook sections on ancient Macedonia. To some extent this is to be expected, for two basic reasons. First, in Macedonian history textbooks national identity tends to be related to the Middle Ages and later, rather than to antiquity. Second, the presence of the famous figures of Philip and Alexander the Great in the narrative creates a story of military success and political power. It is only with the Roman conquest of the ancient Macedonian kingdom in 168 BC, after the battle of Pydna, that Macedonians' sorrowful destiny can be hinted at. The kingdom was conquered, and its territory divided into four parts. After an unsuccessful rebellion, the land was turned into a Roman province twenty years later. The expression usually found in textbooks is that Macedonia "fell under Roman rule," which is not particularly problematic. A textbook from 2002, however, makes a considerable stretch: "They [the Romans] divided the territory of enslaved Macedonia into four areas (*мерuдu*), and that was the first dismemberment of the ethnic whole of Macedonia." At least five notions in this phrase bear a closer look. First,

Macedonia was not "enslaved" (*поробена*) in 168 BC. As was customary in ancient warfare, the Romans took a number of civilian and military captives to bring back to Rome, but they did not reduce the entire population or land to slavery. Second, the term "Macedonia" is imprecise in this instance, because the kingdom of Macedon under the last Antigonid kings was not contained in the geographical area of Macedonia. Third, proposing that this was the "first" partition of Macedonia is manipulative, as it alludes to events much later in time and particularly to the 1913 partition of geographical Macedonia, by the Treaty of Bucharest, among the victors of the Balkan wars (namely Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, who fought over the remaining Ottoman territories in the Balkans). Fourth, the precise word used, "dismemberment" (*распарчување*), is charged with meanings and emotion: The land was not simply partitioned but torn, bodily, into pieces. Finally, the expression "the ethnic whole" (*етничкото цело*) is both disingenuous and loaded with allusions. It taken from nineteenth-century nationalist vocabulary and anachronistically used in a twenty-first century schoolbook to describe events taking place in the second century BC. It contains the essentialist idea of the nation as a (sort of) "organic tissue" both primordial and monolithic. As such, it cannot have a meaningful purpose in history research or teaching. Be that as it may, this episode stands isolated in the larger narrative of the period. It is not directly linked to other narratives of victimization, but it does hint at the millennial national drama that will begin eight centuries later.

At the end of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century we follow the Slavic migrations to, or invasions of, the southern Balkans. It is the time of the well-known Slavic and Avaro-Slavic sieges of Thessalonica. Although they cannot conquer the important Byzantine city on the Aegean coast, many Slavic groups settle in the region. Throughout the seventh century they occasionally form tribal alliances known as *sclaviniae*. In some textbooks, these loose political formations are anachronistically interpreted as early efforts to create a (Slavic) Macedonia. Thus, in a section entitled "Attempts at creating a Macedonian Slavic state in the seventh century," one book states that the goal of the Macedonian Slavic tribes united in a great alliance by Prebond was the creation of a Slavic state for themselves. Since Prebond was captured and later

killed by the Byzantines (in 674), the author laments: "Thus failed the attempts of the Macedonian *sclaviniae* to unite under Prebond's rule and to create their own Macedonian-Slavic Kingdom as early as the seventh century." This presentation is repeated using almost the same phrases to describe several later events, in 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, and 2002.[3] In the last case, a secondary school textbook from 2002, produced as a part of the wave of textbook reforms at the time, the same author continues to claim that local Slavic leaders in the seventh century, such as Hatzon and Prebond, wanted to create a "Slavic state in Macedonia," or a "unique Slavic state in Macedonia," but their plans were unjustly crushed by Byzantium. In the exercise section, pupils are basically asked to repeat the proposed information about the efforts of the Macedonian *sclaviniae* to create their own state in the seventh century (Panov and Mladenovski 2002, 116–117, 119). Other textbooks also hint at the possibility of creating a Slavic entity, albeit using more neutral words and focused instead on the idea of capturing Thessalonica (Boškoski, Lilčić et al. 2002, 165–166). Most revealing, however, is this question posed in a 1996 textbook: "How did Byzantium impede the Slavs' efforts to create their own state in Macedonia in the second half of the seventh century?" (Panov 1996, 37). The tone of these narratives often contains a level of moral bias. Careful use of words turns the Slavic/Macedonian side into the righteous side, living in a Slavic or Slavicized territory in Macedonia and trying rightfully to create its own state, but its effort mercilessly, and at times treacherously, crushed by Byzantium, which is seen as an external force with but one base in Macedonia. The textbook authors neglect two factors here: (a) The Slavic tribes were still relatively recent intruders into the area that the Byzantine Empire had controlled for centuries, and countermeasures by Byzantium were to be expected; and (b) the written sources do not support theories of efforts to create one unique Slavic Macedonian state in the seventh century.

In the next century Macedonia seems to be threatened by a new enemy. The Bulgarians, who under Khan Asparuh created their state in the Lower Danube area in c. 680, were expanding their state through

[3] See: Panov (1996, 37; 1997, 37; 1998, 61–62), Panov et al. (2001, 48).

military conquest. The textbooks mention this, and again the use of language is revealing. Of the multitude of words the books use to depict the regional powers' military actions throughout history ("attacking," "conquering," "plundering," and so on), it seems that one is used only in relation to Bulgarians: They were "endangering" (Macedonia).[4] Of course, the Bulgarian army did take expansive military action in the region in the eighth and ninth centuries. The questions that arise are: (1) who or what did they endanger, and (2) why is this term only used in this case? First—as we will continue to find later on—in history textbooks and often in broader historiography in Northern Macedonia, the term "Macedonia" is treated as a fixed notion never subjected to conceptual or geographical change throughout history. Pupils receive the image of a one and only Macedonia, the same region with fixed borders in antiquity as today. Thus it becomes possible to create the image that "Macedonia" always suffered and "we" were always the victims, that is to say, any case of suffering anywhere in the region of Macedonia can be rendered as "national" victimization. As for the term "endangering," which appears only in relation to Bulgaria, it can be suggested that perhaps it resonates with the more recent image of Bulgaria that appeared during and after the Second World War. In the same sense, in several textbooks one picture is used in the chapter on the Bulgarian medieval state—Bulgarian soldiers killing Christians.[5]

The more influential mythological narratives come with the period of Tsar Samuil, however, and what was often anachronistically portrayed as a medieval Macedonian state. The focus is on the destruction of his army at the Battle of Kleidion/Belasica in the summer of 1014 by a Byzantine army led by Emperor Basil II. After four decades of Samuil's rule and his campaigning across the Balkans, the two armies met at a gorge beneath Mount Belasica, where, using a military ruse, the Byzantines defeated the rival army and forced Samuil to flee the battlefield. Then, as the

[4]See: Panov (1996, 30) ("After these military successes the Bulgarians started to endanger the north-eastern Macedonian areas, as well"), Panov and Mladenovski (2002, 111). The term can be found in some older history textbooks from socialist times; see: Kuševski et al. (1973, 124).

[5]In some textbooks, the image is large, taking half a page and involving a multitude of people, as in Panov and Mladenovski (2002, 111). In others, it is only a fragment of the larger image, as in Panov et al. (2001, 35).

story goes, and as it is accentuated: "in revenge, Basil II ordered all 14–15,000 of Samuil's soldiers to be blinded. Each one hundredth soldier was spared one eye so that they could lead the blind soldiers to their tsar in Prilep" (Panov and Mladenovski 2002, 137). The fact that authors choose to highlight these phrases testifies to the importance of drama and victimization. Days or weeks later, confronted with the sight of his once mighty army now permanently mutilated, Samuil died. This event, or rather two events combined (the disastrous defeat and the subsequent mutilation of soldiers) is indeed a mental image of national suffering for many Macedonians today. The most important reason for this, we believe, is the educational system—specifically history textbooks. While folklore might help retain a blurry echo of these distant events, they have no real place in collective memory; one cannot find a community today that has a trauma or direct memory transmitted by a witness or victim, or by a descendant of a witness or victim. Instead, the story is poured into the collective memory, and mostly though history textbooks.

The narrative, both in the sources and in the textbooks, has several flaws, and we should mention at least the most pertinent here. The account in the textbooks is both anachronistic and uncritical. By representing Samuil's state and the local Slavic population as Macedonian,[6] in terms that resonate with today's Macedonian national identity, the authors give the suffering a sense of continuity and of community. It is "we," the Macedonian people, who suffered, just as "we" *always* suffered at the hands of our neighbors. Furthermore, while traumatic, emotional, or other sensitive events usually require special treatment, in this case the exercise section only serves to confirm the proposed knowledge rather than prompt critical questioning. This becomes even more inadequate if we know that the account of the mass mutilation of Samuil's soldiers has been reexamined and identified as twelfth-century Byzantine propaganda related to the revolt that would to lead to the Second Bulgarian Empire (Stephenson 2003). That is to say, pupils in Northern Macedonia were and are still learning—and getting emotionally involved with—something that probably did not take place, or at least not in the

[6]See: Panov (1996, 59–60; 1997, 59–60; 1998, 88–90), Panov et al. (2001, 66–68), Boškoski, Lilčić et al. (2002, 195–197).

way described. It is therefore certainly more crucial for pupils, but also for textbook authors, to critically question the proposed narrative. In some textbooks, the story of the Battle of Kleidion and the mutilation of Samuil's soldiers is accompanied by visual content. A 1996 textbook for twelve-year-olds presents two paintings containing dramatic scenes (Panov 1996, 60). The first, a miniature from a medieval manuscript, depicts (on two levels) the defeated army fleeing and Samuil's death. The visual expression is not particularly clear and detailed, so its relevance comes rather from the events it depicts and the written explanation given by the textbook author, which says "Emperor Basil II defeats Tsar Samuil at the battle of Belasica on July 29, 1014 (above); the blinded Macedonian soldiers come to their Tsar Samuil (below), miniature from the Chronicle of Manasios." The second picture depicts a group of suffering, half-naked men. The caption reads: "Martyrs, a fresco painting from the church of Saint Leontius near Strumica (11th c.)." The drama here comes from the way in which people are painted. Their bodies are almost naked and take various twisted poses, their faces show pain, the position of their hands suggest despair and an entreaty for help. However, this highly emotional image actually represents the forty Christian martyrs from Sebasteia in Asia Minor, targeted in the religious persecution ordered by Licinius in 320. Its use suggests that the textbook author intended to build up emotional tension and visualize a message of suffering.

The heavy defeat at Kleidion and the death of Samuil heralded the fall of the state four years later, following another Byzantine military campaign. After a series of victories, the same textbook explains, "Towards the end of 1018, with Basil II's entry in Ohrid, the Macedonian state came to an end. Thus began the period of long-term Byzantine mastery over the Macedonian people" (Panov 1996, 61). Here, the author laments the fall of an alleged national state and a people destined not to have their own state until the twentieth century; it seems the word "mastery" (*господство*) is just a euphemism for slavery, the latter long reserved for the Ottoman period. The Byzantine emperor then returned to Constantinople, taking with him the members of Samuil's dynasty. The book continues: "After a short stay in Carigrad [Constantinople], they were all interned in the far eastern dominions of

Byzantium. Thus the Macedonian people was decapitated, since their real leaders were removed from Macedonia" (Panov 1996, 61). Yet the sources show that Samuil's relatives and noblemen were not interned. Indeed, many of them obtained high administrative posts and titles and were integrated into the empire. Further, the use of the word "interned" (*интернирани*) is not only dramatic, but hints at events and processes from twentieth-century political and military history. It suggests, among other things, internment camps. The illustration for this part of the story also pertains to the theme of victimization. The caption reads: "Emperor Basil II, victor over Tsar Samuil, in front of whom kneel the subdued noblemen of the Macedonian Empire, a miniature from the Madrid manuscript of John Skylitzes" (Panov 1996, 62). Thus, the *decapitated* "Macedonian people had representatives only in the face of the priests of lowest rank. With their help, they successfully resisted the reinforced Hellenization that Byzantium implemented in Macedonia through the Ohrid archbishops and their helpers" (Panov 1996, 58). At the same time, it is pointed out that "For an easier rule over Macedonia, its entire territory was divided into bigger or smaller military-administrative units (areas) called themes" (Panov and Mladenovski 2002, 139). Seen as part of a chain of partitions, from the partition of Macedonia by the Romans in 168 BC to the partition of Macedonia at the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, this statement, when left without critical examination or discussion, can give the impression that it is Macedonia's destiny to be divided and dismembered by neighbors and conquerors, reinforcing the feeling of self-victimization.

Episodes of self-victimization continue in the eleventh century. The difficult economic and social situation in the Byzantine Empire is presented as national suffering. The use of language and the selection of source quotations are revealing. One textbook from 2002 states: "Both the vassals and the free peasants and citizens were burdened by the Byzantine government with heavy taxes and obligations. The main state taxes were paid in money, something that Macedonians had difficulties getting. It was—as contemporaries said—bloody money, covered in 'tears and pain'. Those subjects who couldn't earn enough money to pay state taxes had their children reduced to slavery by the state's fiscal institutions,

'as livestock, one from every five or ten'" (Panov 1996, 63).[7] Accordingly the important revolts against the empire in 1040 and 1072 are anachronistically presented as "massive people-liberating uprisings" or as expressions of "the resistance of the Macedonian people" (Panov 1996, 64). Both revolts' failure are presented as national tragedies. For the latter it is stated: "Although the uprising of the Macedonian people in 1072–1073 led to the liberation of a large territory in Macedonia, it was quickly and bloodily destroyed. This attempt by the Macedonians to renew Samuil's Macedonian Empire therefore also ended without success" (Panov 1996, 66). Such presentation of the eleventh-century revolts clearly alludes to the revolts and uprisings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with their national ideas and programs, although the situation in the Middle Ages was, needless to say, very different.

In the next three hundred years, from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, before the arrival of the Ottoman Turks prompts the victimization narratives to pick up in intensity, Macedonia is depicted as a sort of a in-between area where the interests and ambitions of neighboring powers collided. Numerous foreign states imposed their rule, one after the other—Byzantium, the Bulgarian Empire, the Despotate of Epirus, the Empire of Nicaea, the Serbian kingdom, and so on. In a lesson entitled "The conquest of Macedonia by the neighboring states," a 2002 textbook gives a chronological overview of these invasions. It reads like a military report, with expressions such as: "part of the southeastern regions were seized by the Epirots," "the biggest part of Macedonia was subsumed in the Bulgarian state," "the Empire of Nicaea used that to enter Macedonia," "they conquered the territory of north-eastern Macedonia to…", "from the South, the despot of Epirus annexed the territory of Macedonia to…", "the next year Macedonia again fell temporarily under Bulgarian rule," "the whole of Macedonia to Šar Planina and Osogovo was ceded to the Nicaeans," "the entire territory of Macedonia fell under the rule of the Nicaeans," "Macedonia was the first in the way of the strengthened Serbian state," "Macedonia was divided under Serbian (in the North) and Byzantine rule (in the South)." The pupils are finally

[7] Also see: Panov and Mladenovski (2002, 143).

asked: "Which conquerors had conquered Macedonia by the end of the thirteenth century?" (Ristovski et al. 2002, 45).

At the end of the medieval period, a series of important events marks the history of Macedonia's victimization: the defeat of the regional Serbian rulers, the brothers King Vukašin and despot Uglješa Mrnjavčević (in some textbooks presented as Macedonian rulers), in the Battle of Maritsa in 1371, which opened the way for further Ottoman conquests in the Balkans; the defeat of King Marko, Vukašin's son, in the Battle of Rovine as an Ottoman vassal in 1395; and the fall of Thessalonica (often presented as an ethnic Macedonian city) in 1430. While the first event is seen as Macedonia succumbing to Ottoman rule, for some textbook authors it is the last event that meant that "for the whole Macedonian people began the long period of Ottoman rule" (Panov 1996, 86). At this turning point, an additional text box (entitled "Also of interest" or "Documented material") is offered—an extract from a contemporary written source: "The monk Isaiah, who at that time lived on the Holy Mountain [Mount Athos], left us a dramatic account of the Turkish destruction and killings in Macedonia during this period: '… And such trouble and misery flooded all the western towns and regions, as neither the ears have ever heard, nor the eyes ever seen. After the brave Despot Ugleša was killed, the Turks spread out and flew over the entire land like birds in the air, and some Christians they slaughtered by the sword, while others they took away as slaves. And those who stayed were annihilated too early by death. Those who saved themselves from death became victims of famine… Oh, so sad was the spectacle. The land was left barren, without people or animals or any fruit at all, because there was neither prince nor leader to save the people. Everything trembled in fear from the Turks…'" (Panov 1996, 86).[8] The vivid description of suffering, the nationalization of the experience, and the uncritical source selection and treatment all enhance the victimization narrative and introduce a period that was until recently presented as "Turkish slavery" or "the Turkish yoke" both in historiography and in textbooks in Macedonia.

[8]Also see: Ristovski et al. (2002, 51–52), Panov et al. (2001, 116). Boškoski, Sidorovska-Čupovska et al. (2002, 58), gives several variations such as "Ishmaelits" instead of "Turks," and continues the quotation with: "Everything trembled in fear from the Ishmaelits, so that the brave hearts of virtuous men turned into weakest women's hearts… and then, indeed the living envied the dead."

From the Ottoman Empire to the Macedonian State, via the Balkan Wars

The period from the establishment of the Ottoman authority in the Balkans up to the twentieth century is regularly presented as the period of the Macedonian people's struggle for liberation and for the creation of their own independent state. The start of the Ottoman control is often seen as a loss of freedom—that is, as the start of a long period of subjugation. This allows for a narrative of victimization and constant struggle against foreign rule and the enemies of the idea of a Macedonian state and a distinct Macedonian ethno-national identity. The Ottoman period and the history of the first half of the twentieth century thus play a central role in the victimization of the Macedonians. As for the twentieth century, it seems that the Balkan wars (1912 and 1913), and more precisely the partition of the geographical region of Macedonia through the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, comprise an important point at which several other myths intertwine. The textbooks insist on Macedonians' difficult position, the "sufferings of the Macedonian people," due to the crimes, killings, political oppression, assimilation, and terror perpetrated by the Ottoman state, or Ottoman Turks, as well by neighboring states. The struggle and resistance of the Macedonian people are also an important part of the victim narrative. The suppressions of revolts are regularly defined through the prism of victimhood. Moreover, certain failures of the Macedonians or the Macedonian national movement are attributed to the politics and activities of neighboring countries, creating a picture of the nation as a victim of its neighbors, bolstering a siege mentality.

The overall image of the Ottoman Empire in Macedonian history textbooks is biased to the point of error, and completely ignores current scholarship. They still use the term *feudal state* to define the empire's socio-political development and economic activities and relations. They ignore the complex relations between religious and cultural groups, as well the integration of non-Muslims in the state of Osman. Many aspects of the complex institutional system and the way in which the Ottoman Empire managed its territories are completely absent.

The establishment of the Ottoman authority in Macedonia and the Balkans more generally is defined as a tragic moment. The textbooks

define the beginning of the Ottoman period as the end of the "Macedonian kingdoms"—namely the territories ruled by King Marko, Despot Uglješa, and King Vukašin—followed by looting, violence, and other crimes perpetuated by the "Ottoman-Turks" against the Christians and the Balkan peoples (*балканските народи*) (Boškoski et al. 2016a, 92; 2016b, 52). As a 2009 textbook puts it: "thus [with the Battle of Maritsa] the roads for Ottoman incursions into the Balkans were open, which had tragic consequences in the fate awaiting the medieval Balkans states and peoples" (Ristovski et al. 2002, 46). Although the Ottoman period is no longer described as a period of "Turkish slavery" (*турско ропство*), as it was in textbooks from the 1970s, the term "enslaved Christian masses" (*поробените христијански маси*) attracts attention (Ristovski et al. 2002, 53). It shows that textbook authors still need to define the position of Christians vis-à-vis Muslims and the Ottoman state, as well to outline the demographic changes and the Ottoman heritage in Macedonia.

Indeed, the position of Christians is presented as one of constant economic exploitation. In the center of this interpretation is the Ottoman tax system, which is always presented as very harsh. When speaking about the population subjugated to it, textbooks ignore the Muslims who were also paying taxes. Thus, the term *reaya* (members of the flock), which referred to all lower-class subjects of the Ottoman Empire, is used only for Christians in the textbooks. Central to the discussion of taxes is the practice of recruiting young Christian boys for the Ottoman army—*devşirme*. Although it was not part of the Ottoman taxation system, *devşirme* is often defined here as the harshest "tax" (Ristovski et al. 2002, 53; Boškoski et al. 2016b, 58). The textbooks also tell pupils that people always resisted boys' conscription, ignoring the fact that some Christian families saw the recruitment of their children in the Ottoman army as a way out of their economic misery (Ristovski et al. 2002, 52–53). Moreover, some textbooks use the term *devşirme* for periods when this practice no longer existed. In the sections dedicated to the nineteenth century, for example, it can be used to present the situation of the Macedonian population as very difficult (Ristovski et al. 2002, 140; 2016, 94).

The role of economic exploitation in the narratives of victimization can be further followed in discussion of the causes of revolts and uprisings against the Ottoman authorities, from the sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. Here the taxation system is among the most important reasons for the troubles of the Macedonian population. Regular references are made to "harsh taxes," "tax increases," and "new taxes introduced" in the sections on the Ottoman state in all history textbooks. Thus: "The population could barely endure the tax increase…" (Boškoski et al. 2016b, 61); "the position of Christians in the Ottoman Empire was unbearable… besides, they had heavy tax obligations…" (Ristovski et al. 2009, 55); or "Due to reduced income as result of a loss of territories, the Ottoman authorities increased taxes and introduced new ones" (Ristovski et al. 2016, 102). Although economic issues are considered to be the main motive for resistance against Ottoman state, all revolts are seen through an ethno-religious prism as revolts of ethnic Macedonians/Christians, and as part of their century-long struggle to create their own independent state. For example a 2016 textbook reads: "The cause of the uprising of Razlog [*Разловечко востание*, in 1876] was the reduced circumstances of the population as a result of tax increases…" (Ačkoska et al. 2016, 85). These arguments appear biased, however, because they remind us that they are not used in earlier cases, for medieval states presented as Macedonian or Christian whose taxation systems were not always significantly different from the Ottoman system. They imply that the Macedonian people only encounter economic difficulties under foreign taxation systems.

Alongside economic exploitation, part of the narrative that puts the Macedonian population, and Christians in general, in the position of victims, is discussion of "colonization" and "Islamization." Increases in the number of Muslims is seen as negative: "In parallel to the processes of emigration of the Macedonian population, we note the immigration of non-Macedonian population to the Macedonian ethnic area," or "…this led to changes in the composition of the population, but the colonization never endangered the existence of the native Macedonian population…" (Ristovski et al. 2009, 53; Boškoski et al. 2016b, 59). Regarding Islamization, textbook narratives often use the idea to explain current

political and demographical situations. Specifically, some textbooks propose that the process of Islamization was most intense in the western parts of contemporary Republic of Macedonia (Boškoski et al. 2016b, 60). Today, a significant number of ethnic Albanians, Turks, and Macedonian Muslims lives in that area. Islamization was equally important in the central part of the Republic of Macedonia, but it is ignored where there are no significant Albanian or Turkish communities today. This story of non-Macedonians' settlement becomes more problematic for explanations of the later period of Ottoman history in the Balkans.

Apart from devastations of localities and massacres of civilians as a main consequence of uprisings and other political developments from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, also discussed are the flight and resettlement of the Macedonian population on the one hand, and the settlement of the Albanian population (as well as Turks and Romas) on the other (Boškoski et al. 2016b, 83). The victimhood of the Macedonian people is underlined in sections describing the suppression of uprisings or any kind of resistance against occupiers. Thus: "The consequences of the uprising [of Karpoš, in 1689] were harsh. Many cities and villages in northeastern and western Macedonia were deserted." Later on, meanwhile: "The consequences of the uprising [of Negush, in 1822] were harsh for the people in this [southern] part of Macedonia. To escape the terror, many residents became refugees." And finally: "After the failure of the Razlog uprising [in 1876], the population was exposed to terror and reprisals" (Boškoski et al. 2016b, 83, 154; Ristovski et al. 2016, 102).

In the same period, Macedonians are presented as victims of Albanians, who are given a specific role in the negative image of the Ottoman period and in the victimization of Macedonians. Based on the ethnic background, some brigand groups (*арамиски банди*) are seen as dangerous (Albanian), while others are friendly (Macedonian). The armed brigands in the *ajdutstvo*/*haydukluk* movement are portrayed as freedom fighters and protectors of the Macedonian population. "At the same time, *brigand groups* (mainly Albanians) were looting all across Macedonia…," while "The Haydut were loved by the people and had *supporters* [*јатаци*] everywhere."

In narrations of the Ottoman period, language is used to stir up emotions. For instance: "Cruelty and terror were frequent. They reached for the honor and dignity of the people, girls and women were abducted, kids were taken to fulfill the needs of the Ottoman army, and there was pressure to accept Islam" and "Macedonians who refused to accept Islam were killed" (Boškoski et al. 2016b, 61). Terms such as "terror," "looting," and "difficult situation" abound in these discussions. On some occasions—albeit rare—history textbooks also contain explicit depictions of acts of violence that not only reinforce the victimization narrative but are also inappropriate in relation to pupils' age. An iconic example, as familiar as the mutilation of the 14,000 soldiers in 1014, is the punishment and execution of Karpoš, the leader of a local revolt against the Ottoman state in 1689, supported by the Habsburg army, during the Austrian–Turkish War of 1683–1699. Pupils read that: "At the Stone Bridge in Skopje, Karpoš was brutally killed by being impaled on a stake"; "At the Stone Bridge in Skopje, the leader of the uprising, Karpoš, was impaled on a stake and brutally killed"; or, "A captured *haydut* would be hanged, impaled on a stake or hook, skinned alive, condemned to permanent imprisonment in a fortress, or sent on a galley as an oarsman" (Boškoski et al. 2016a, 117; 2016b, 83; Ristovski et al. 2009, 66).[9]

Some of these terrible acts are presented visually too. A black-and-white picture in a 2002 (reformed) textbook, entitled "Punishing hayduts (gravura)" and occupying half a page, shows three explicit scenes of public mutilation: (a) One person is pressed to the ground by four people, as an executioner either beats him or cuts him with an unidentifiable object; (b) one person, held by three other persons on a platform, is being impaled on a stake; and (c) one person is strapped onto a long plank and is being beaten. In each scene the tortured person is naked and has an agonized expression, Muslim dignitaries watch the act, and mosques can be seen in the background. The same textbook contains images titled "Collecting blood tax," "Prisoners go to work," and "An Ottoman dungeon" (Ristovski et al. 2009, 64–67).

[9]Also see: Ristovski et al. (2009, 56), where the authors omit the expression "skinned alive" but leave in other horrific descriptions of torture.

The image of Macedonians' victimization during the Ottoman period is complex, and involves other nations and ethnic groups. As in the abovementioned case of Albanians, part of the narrative of victimhood is related to Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs, who are often portrayed as enemies of the Macedonians in their struggle for liberation and an independent state. This is especially the case for events of the late nineteenth century, during the so-called propaganda period: "In all respects foreign propaganda played a negative role in Macedonia. It impeded the process of national consciousness of the Macedonian people and their struggle for the creation of Macedonian state" (Ačkoska et al. 2016, 92). Pupils are required to learn that: "Apart from economic and political oppression, the people [Macedonians] were subjected to strong spiritual subordination. The bishops and clergy of the Constantinople Patriarchy exploited and denationalized the Macedonian population," or "they" [the neighboring countries] all had particular influence in destroying the ethnic and religious identity of the Macedonian people. They fought for control of Macedonia against Macedonian national interests and against the unity of the "Macedonian liberation movement" (Ristovski et al. 2009, 141, 154). These interpretations of the role of the Balkan states in the history of the Macedonian people, and the Balkans in general, are crucial when it comes to the two most exploited events in the Macedonian victimhood narrative—the 1912–1913 Balkan wars and the subsequent partition of the geographical region of Macedonia, in 1913.

The text dealing with these events is usually not extensive, but it plays an important part in the national imagination. Pupils learn that their neighbors (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania) partitioned Macedonia. The long-lasting consequences are accentuated, and the descriptions are dramatic: "This treaty [of Bucharest in 1913], with its territorial, ethnic, and economic consequences, interrupted the unique [*единственият*] historical development of the Macedonian people"; "Thus, finally *the integrity* of Macedonia *was destroyed*…"; "The Bucharest treaty had heavy *political, ethnical, and economic* consequences for the Macedonian people. With this treaty, the *territorial* and *ethnical* integrity of Macedonia was destroyed, and *a process of ethnic cleansing of the Macedonian population* and of colonization of non-Macedonian population, aiming to change the traditional historical ethnical character

of Macedonia, began" (Boškoski et al. 2016b, 198; Ristovski et al. 2009, 178; 2016, 131). The importance of Macedonia's partition, and the image of Macedonians as victims, can be further seen in sections on the interwar period, in which pupils are regularly reminded that: "On the political map of Europe following the First World War, Macedonia remained divided between its four neighboring states, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania"; "The Second World War caught the Macedonian people divided, holding no rights, among the three states of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece"; "Macedonia became easy prey and was divided by the allies—Germany, Italy and Bulgaria"; "The Macedonian people experienced new partitioning [1941] followed by political oppression, assimilation, and economic exploitation" (Ristovski et al. 2009, 66; Veljanovski et al. 2006, 142, 143). Regarding the Balkan Wars, another important interpretation in the victimization of the Macedonians is recruitment in foreign armies. Some textbooks even describe the Macedonians as a naïve ethnic group who took part in the war in hope that neighboring Christian states would allow them the liberty they had awaited for centuries, and to whom it never occurred that the Balkan wars were wars for the division of Macedonia (Ristovski et al. 2009, 176; 2016, 130; Boškoski et al. 2016b, 197; Ačkoska et al. 2016, 115).

It is thus clear that according to the textbooks, in all sections and for all historical periods in which foreign rule in Macedonia is described, the Macedonian people was always subjugated to political oppression, economic exploitation, enforced cultural and spiritual assimilation, denationalization, terror, killings, and more. An abundance of terms describes the "difficult predicament" of the Macedonian people under foreign rule. No section forgets to offer interpretation of this plight, and the need to underline it is also reflected in the titles of multiple chapters and subchapters. Among others, we note: "The predicament of the population in Macedonia" or "The situation in Macedonia after the [Ilinden] uprising" used for the Ottoman period; "The situation of the Macedonian people behind the front line"; or "The position of the Macedonians after the Bucharest peace treaty" used for the period of the Balkan wars and First World War; "The position of Macedonians in Greece" or "The position of Macedonians in Bulgaria" used for the period between the two world wars. Moreover, we do not read such interpretations in sections

dedicated to other nations. For example, when we read about the First World War, we read how Macedonians were politically oppressed and economically exploited, with their goods confiscated, but no such explanations are found in sections on Serbia, Albania, or Bulgaria during the same event. The only exception, which confirms the rule, is the establishment of the Ottoman state in the Balkans, where the focus is sometimes on the Christians, rather than Macedonians.

Accentuation of the victim role is often achieved though the use and abuse of numbers. Two examples come from the recent history of the twentieth century. In parts about the 1903 Ilinden Uprising against the Ottoman authorities in western Macedonia, some textbooks claim that 200,000 Ottoman soldiers were sent to fight 20,000 insurgents (Ristovski et al. 2016, 119). This does not correspond with the actual number of soldiers who took part. Meanwhile some textbooks claim that 25,000 people were killed in what is today the Republic of Macedonia during the Second World War (Ristovski et al. 2009, 127; 2016, 96; Veljanovski et al. 2006, 159). Several studies have challenged these numbers, estimating the number killed to no more than 15,000, including the Jews deported to Treblinka (Žerjavić 1992, 14, 57).

If we compare the victimization theme in recent textbooks with that in with older textbooks from the 1990s and especially from the socialist period, we notice few, but important differences. Some result from the fall of Socialism, while others from changing inter-ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians. Textbooks from the 1970s and 1980s reflect a Marxist paradigm as well as a larger Yugoslav perspective, where Macedonian history is a part of the history of Yugoslav lands. Many events were interpreted through the class paradigm. Thus, the socio-political changes in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth century were defined as a deepening of the class struggle (Dinev et al. 1971, 235). Aggressive politics of neighboring countries, including Serbia, towards Macedonians was defined as politics of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois governments of those countries (Kuzmanovski and Mickovski 1972, 239–240). Textbooks from the 1970s avoided ethnic designations. An exception was made for the Turks and the role of the Ottoman Empire, however—they did use the term "Turkish slavery" (Kuzmanovski and Mickovski

1972, 239). Although textbook authors in the 1990s, mostly academic historians, claimed that they were implementing a "de-ideologization" of historical narratives, on the one hand aspects of both interpretation and terminology remained in place, while on the other hand, after 1991 ethnic attributes in negative sense were used more often. Textbooks from the 1970s and 1980s do not mention Albania in the 1913 partition of geographical Macedonia (Kuzmanovski and Mickovski 1972, 275; Dinev et al. 1973, 218), but after the rise of nationalism in all Yugoslav republics, and especially after the violent breakup of socialist Yugoslavia, in light of the new socio-political circumstances and increased tensions between Macedonians and Albanians the minimal role of Albania in the partition was not to be forgotten.

From Narrative to Myth

To be sure, not every (historical) narrative is a myth. It happens often in contemporary historiography that the notion of myth is applied to any narrative that either contradicts established historical "facts" (and is thus false), or to any narrative based on "facts" but interpreted in a manipulative way. Yet while we may speak of abuse of history, this is not necessarily what constitutes a myth. Interpretations and uses of the notion of myth are various,[10] but not all of them have a particular application. Without entering into a detailed debate, we just point out that treating any false or exaggerated tale as a myth only voids the concept of meaning.

In this analysis we follow Chiara Bottici's theory on (historical) political myth, according to which "a political myth can be defined as the work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group (or society) provide significance to their political experience and deeds. Thus, what makes a political myth out of a simple narrative is not its content or claim to truth, but first, the fact that this narrative coagulates and produces significance, second, that it is shared by a group, and third, that

[10]For an overview of definitions of myths and their functioning in Southeastern Europe, see: in particular, Ifversen (2010, 452–479), Schöpflin (2002, 26–30), Bošković et al. (2011, 13–20), Kolstø (2005, 1–34), Lichnofsky et al. (2018).

it can come to address the specifically political conditions in which this group operates" (Bottici 2007, 14). Indeed, as in ancient times, myths are used as orientation points or to "control" the unknown, but they also "provide narratives, which, by inserting events into a plot, can produce and reproduce significance" (Bottici 2007, 13). It is this notion of significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*), introduced into the debate by Hans Blumenberg (1979) and developed by Bottici, which is at the core of the notion of political myth. Furthermore, just as historical narratives about the past are unavoidably produced from the standpoint of the present, so does myth address an ongoing need for significance in a specific socio-political context.

For (many) ethnic Macedonians today, as throughout the twentieth century, the "late" establishment of the Macedonian state and identity in comparison to neighboring states, most of which were established in the nineteenth century, provides a specific political context to which the need for significance is related. The crucial element in this situation is the negation of identity and statehood, and a constant need to prove them to the Other that results. Thus, when it comes to the myth of victimization, a contemporary, twentieth-century symbolic pain is anachronistically transmitted back to the Middle Ages, and inserted into a dramatic narrative of continuous suffering at the hands of neighbors. Even after the Macedonian state's creation in 1945, its basic identity markers were negated or unrecognized by the political and intellectual elites of certain neighboring countries: in Bulgaria: the Macedonian nation and language, in Greece; the right to use the name Macedonia, in Serbia; the autonomy of the church. In such an atmosphere many people need tales that will not only make sense of what they are experiencing, but will also give significance to their specific position.

The history of the Macedonian people presented in history textbooks, with all its selectiveness and anachronism, is thus reduced to a history of suffering with clear moral positioning. "We" settled here (in the sixth–seventh century), "they" invaded; "we" had the right to create our state (in the seventh century), but "they" treacherously stopped our efforts; when "we" created our state (tenth century), "they" crushed it mercilessly and left us without leadership; since "we" were left stateless (twelfth–fourteenth century), "they" treated our territory as being up for grabs,

and so on. Furthermore, during this entire period (from the seventh to the twentieth century), it appears as if Macedonia was a fixed ethnical, cultural, and geographical entity—almost a living person. "She" (*maa*) suffered the injustices of the neighbors, along with the Macedonian people. This nationalized suffering regularly follows attempts to create an independent Macedonian state, in the seventh as in the nineteenth century. In fact, one of the specifics of the Macedonian case is that the myth of victimization is closely interrelated with that of political continuity. The overall message is that the group had to suffer constantly, because the neighbors crushed (almost) all its efforts to establish its state. This narrative "freezes" the past to recreate it today, with all the eternal enemies still inhabiting the social imaginary. Recent or ongoing symbolic conflicts with neighbors—such as the name dispute with Greece—seem clear and understandable.

Conclusion

Historical narratives in Macedonian history textbooks in the period 1991–2018 foster the myth of self-victimization. While this myth is present in textbooks throughout the region, its specificity in the Macedonian case lies in its interrelation with the myth of political continuity, and thus with the question of identity. Political and symbolical frustrations from the twentieth century are anachronistically transferred back to the early Middle Ages. Textual and visual content are both used to create the narrative of national suffering, with the accent on the former. The selection and uncritical use of sources, the manipulative use of language, the (academically and pedagogically) inadequate terminology, the allusions to unrelated traumatic events, the ethnocentric view on history, and the tense and dramatic images all invite pupils into an emotional involvement with the tale of a people/nation destined to suffer. The exercise sections entirely lack a critical function, and are reduced solely to requiring recitations of the proposed knowledge. Pupils are not asked to question or analyze, but rather to memorize and empathize. Instead of treating and dealing with the society's symbolic frustrations, textbooks

authors and educational authorities chose simply to repeat and reinforce them.

The myth of victimization has created and still creates a culture of mistrust and insecurity vis-à-vis the Other, and reinforces prejudices and stereotypes. It develops a feeling of moral superiority and has the potential to justify, in the eyes of the self-perceived victim, the need for payback on old historical dues. Last but not least, a society that sees itself as a constant victim of historical injustices becomes a fertile ground for the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism.

References

Abdullahu, Durim. 2018. "Myths in Kosovar Textbooks: History in the Service of Identity Construction." In *Myths and Mythical Spaces: Conditions and Challenges for History Textbooks in Albania and South-Eastern Europe*, edited by Claudia Lichnofsky, Enriketa Pandelejmoni, and Darko Stojanov, 45. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Ačkoska, Violeta, et al. 2016. *Istorija za sedmo oddelenie*. Skopje: Tabernakul.

Blumenberg, Hans. 1979. *Arbeit am Mythos*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Boškoski, Milan, Silvana Sidorovska-Čupovska, and Jordan Ilioski. 2002. *Istorija za vtora godina gimnazija*. Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija.

Boškoski, Milan, Viktor Lilčić, and Jordan Ilioski. 2002. *Istorija za prva godina gimnazija*. Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija.

Boškoski, Milan, et al. 2016a. *Istorija za VII oddelenie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Boškoski, Milan, et al. 2016b. *Istorija za II godina (gimnazisko obrazovanie)*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Bošković, Aleksandar, Darko Gavrilović, and Vjekoslav Perica. 2011. "Myths, Political Mythologies and Nationalism." In *Political Myths in the Former Yugoslavia and Successor States: A Shared Narrative*, edited by D. Gavrilović and V. Perica. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters.

Bottici, Chiara. 2007. *A Philosophy of Political Myth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brunnbauer, Ulf. 2004. "Historiography, Myths and the Nation in the Republic of Macedonia." In *(Re)Writing History: Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism*, edited by U. Brunnbauer. Münster: LIT.

Dinev, Risto, Gjorgji Dimovski-Colev, Jovan Kočankovski, and Gjorgji Tankovski. 1971. *Istorija za II klas gimnazija, opštestveno-jazična nasoka*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Dinev, Risto, Gjorgji Dimovski-Colev, Jovan Kočankovski, and Gjorgji Tankovski. 1973. *Istorija za VII oddelenie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Höpken, Wolfgang. 2007. "Between Civic Identity and Nationalism: History Textbooks in East-Central and Southeastern Europe." In *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education and Media*, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet and D. Matić. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

Ifversen, Jan. 2010. "Myth in the Writing of European History." In *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*, edited by S. Berger and C. Lorenz. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kolstø, Pal. 2005. "Introduction: Assessing the Role of Historical Myths in Modern Society." In *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, edited by P. Kolstø. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Kuševski, Vojo, Jordan Dimevski, Trpko Pangovski, and Cvetan Beličanski. 1973. *Istorija za prv klas gimnazija*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Kuzmanovski, Ilija, and Dimitar Mickovski. 1972. *Istorija za III klas gimnazija, opštestveno-jazična nasoka*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Lichnofsky, Claudia, Enriketa Pandelejmoni, and Darko Stojanov, eds. 2018. *Myths and Mythical Spaces: Conditions and Challenges for History Textbooks in Albania and South-Eastern Europe.* Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Nikolov, Georgi N., et al. 2017. *Istorija i civilizacii za 6 klas*. Sofia: Arhimed & Diogen.

Panov, Branko. 1996. *Istorija za šesto oddelenie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Panov, Branko. 1997. *Istorija za šesto oddelenie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Panov, Branko. 1998. *Istorija za vtora godina gimnazija*, 3rd ed. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Panov, Branko, Andon Gjorčevski, and Miroslav Bošković. 2001. *Istorija za šesto oddelenie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Panov, Branko, and Simo Mladenovski. 2002. *Istorija za prva godina reformirano gimnazisko obrazovanie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Petroska-Beshka, Violeta, and Nikolina Kenig. 2018. "Ethnocentric History Textbooks in a Multiethnic Society: The Case of the Republic of Macedonia." In *Myths and Mythical Spaces: Conditions and Challenges for History Textbooks in Albania and South-Eastern Europe*, edited by Claudia Lichnofsky, Enriketa Pandelejmoni, and Darko Stojanov, 237–247. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Pingel, Falk. 2010. *UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision*, 2nd ed., 37. Paris and Braunschweig: UNESCO and GEI.

Ristovski, Blaze, Simo Mladenovski, and Stojan Kiselinovski. 2002. *Istorija za vtora godina reformirano gimnazisko obrazovanie*. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Ristovski, Blaze, Šukri Rahimi, Simo Mladenovski, Todor Čepreganov, and Stojan Kiselinovski. 2009. *Istorija za vtora gimnazisko obrazovanie*. Skopje: Albi.

Ristovski, Blaže, et al. 2016. *Istorija za VIII oddelenie*. Skopje: Albi.

Schöpflin, George. 2002. "The Nature of Myth: Some Theoretical Aspects." In *Albanian Identities: Myth and History*, edited by S. Shwandner-Sievers and B. J. Bischer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Stephenson, Paul. 2003. *The Legend of Basil the Bulgar-Slayer*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stojanović, Dubravka. 2009. "Slow Burning: History Textbook in Serbia, 1993–2008." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeastern Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou, 145. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Todorov, Petar. 2016. "Teaching History in Macedonia after 2001: Representations of Armed Conflict between Ethnic Macedonians and Ethnic Albanians." In *History Can Bite: History Education in Divided and Postwar Societies*, edited by D. Bentrovato, K. V. Korostelina, and M. Schulze, 111–124. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Veljanovski, Novica, Gordana Pletvarska, Sonja Cvetkovska, and Dzaferi Siceri. 2006. *Istorija za treta godina gimnazisko obrazovanie* [History for Third Class of High School Education]. Skopje: Prosvetno Delo.

Žerjavić, Vladimir. 1992. *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga: Gubici stanovništva u Drugom svjetskom ratu*. Zagreb: Globus.

13

Southeast Europe in History Textbooks: A Variety of Selective Perceptions

Zrinka Štimac

This chapter addresses the findings of diverse textbook analyses resulting from a Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI) project on Southeast Europe (2000–2009) and its related preliminary studies. It explores two perspectives: first, how Southeast Europe is portrayed in school textbooks from Western, Central, and Southern Europe, and, second, the narratives contained within history textbooks from Southeast Europe. It also attempts to ascertain which epistemological interests dominate the analyses.

The Project for the Coordination of Textbook Research, Development and Comparison in South-East Europe was funded by the German Foreign Office under the banner of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. The project homepage states that: "It strived to lend support to the diverse processes of local educational reforms in primary and secondary education, as well as to promote the incorporation and integration of

Z. Štimac (✉)
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Brunswick, Germany
e-mail: stimac@gei.de

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_13

South-East Europe into the wider European educational agenda. In addition, it worked towards strengthening and facilitating cross-border communication and exchange between the various countries and regions of South-East Europe. Finally, it aimed at enhancing the transfer of new didactical and pedagogical know-how and skills in the fields of history, geography and civics."[1] Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia were the countries included. The project worked with a variety of cooperative partners from the field of education, such as ministries and pedagogical institutes, textbook authors, researchers and scholars, teachers, curriculum planners, and publishing houses. It cooperated closely with a series of international and regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, Euroclio, the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, and the Allianz Cultural Foundation. It "tried to ensure that recent development in textbook research has an impact on pedagogical practice." Conferences, workshops, and summer schools dedicated to various themes of historical and didactic interest were organized, as well as several scholarships for researchers from Southeast Europe. A principal aim was to mediate between various educational agencies and stakeholders in an effort to more effectively link academic expertise with teaching practice. The project resulted in a wide range of publications addressing education, particularly history teaching, in post-conflict situations.

Theoretical Perspectives

Before examining a selection of the works that resulted from the project, I would first like to briefly consider the topic's theoretical positioning. In most cases, processes of post-conflict development are viewed from an academic standpoint as processes of modernization. But as the majority

[1]The Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research webpage for the Project for the Co-ordination of Textbook Research, Development and Comparison in South-East Europe can be accessed at: http://www.gei.de/en/projects/completed-projects/project-for-the-co-ordination-of-textbook-research-development-and-comparison-in-south-east-europe.html.

of Southeast European countries are seeking membership of the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe, processes of Europeanization are also taking place. Despite the fact that the classic models of modernization theory have been heavily criticized for their notions of instrumental rationality as a totalizing utopian moralistic vision, their Eurocentrism in the form of Western theorists' ethnocentrism, and their presumption of incompatibility between traditional and modern, it is impossible to completely dispense with them. In this text, approaches to modernization theory emanating from "multiple modernities" will be employed, rather than those using "evolution theory."

Overlaps of the ethnic and the religious, the international and the national—despite the difficulties of definitively delineating the term "nation" in this context—and the local and the global mean that modernization is a process we can only conceive of "in the plural" (Giordano 2004, 226f.). This idea, first developed by Georges Balandier, is intended to encapsulate the fact that processes of a society's modernization encompass both exogenous capacities for change, often imported from the West, and endogenous potential within the society itself. This theory essentially holds that tradition and modernity are constantly engaged in an "inexhaustible, indissoluble interaction" (Giordano 2004, 223ff.). Balandier perceived a relationship of reciprocal action between the modernization of tradition and the retraditionalization of modernity, an interplay he terms "oscillating balance"—a balance which is highly explosive. This critique of classical theories of modernization was later extended by Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000, 10ff.), who added a critique of ideas of instrumental rationality, showing that the Eurocentrism of Western theoreticians was ethnocentrism, and criticized the assumption that tradition and modernity were fundamentally irreconcilable (Degene and Dries 2005, 19). It is also vital for us to emphasize that these conventional theories go hand in hand with Western models of the nation-state (Beck 2008, 63)—the very models which were at the center of the most recent conflict in former Yugoslavia. As Holm Sundhaussen has demonstrated, the first idea of a nation-state to emerge in Southeast Europe originated from eighteenth-century German philosopher

Johann Gottfried Herder's concept of culture, which entailed homology between a people and its territory (Sundhaussen 1973, 181). Klaus-Detlev Grothusen's study of modernization and nation-building in Southeast Europe finds that the nineteenth-century theory of modernization received unconditional acceptance in the region in that period, with the term "nation-building" being used as a positively connoted synonym of "Europeanization" (Grothusen 1984, 141). Nation-building was then understood as relating to the national emancipation of the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman Empire. The interpretation of modernization as a positively connoted phenomenon continues to dominate across present-day Southeast Europe, with BiH no exception.

Researchers have turned to investigating processes of political transformation in Southeast Europe as a variation on more general processes of modernization.[2] Southeast Europe finds itself in a process of transformation which, in contrast to "open-ended modernization processes" has pre-set and pre-known aims (Zapf 1994, 124, 138).[3] These aims include "the establishment of democratic political institutions, the emergence of a market economy, institutional changes in the regulations around private property, institutional reforms for establishing the democratic rule of law, and the pluralization of cultural institutions" (Sterbling 2005, 51). We might at this point raise questions as to how these processes can be completed without the region falling into the trap created by ideas of instrumental rationality, of Eurocentrism as ethnocentrism, and of the assumption that tradition and modernity are irreconcilable.[4] The current idea of "Europeanization" possesses particularly acute relevance in

[2]See: von Beyme (1994), Offe (1994), Lienemann (2006, 35).

[3]The theory conceives of "open-ended" processes of modernization, not as processes of "catching up" with a known and set goal, but rather as a drive towards change within the new system, linked to the (re)invention of a systemic self and genuine innovation.

[4]A discussion of critiques of political transformation is in Giordano (2004, 9ff.). The points raised critically here are that (a) processes of societal change are characterized and themselves undergo shifts not only through the transformation itself, but also through the collective spaces of memory which have characterized the past; (b) the term "transformation," in a similar manner to classical theories of modernization, is based on the fundamental idea of progress; and (c) East and Southeast Europe are viewed as if they were essentially deficient in terms of civilization.

our times, but its primary associations are currently with "democratization" and "European integration" and its meaning largely determined by the international community, specifically the EU.

Turning to the concept of "modernity," we need to acknowledge at least two different theoretical conceptions of the term. One encompasses ideas held by authorities within the EU and the international community, which assume it is related to economic and political development having taken place. The other is a Southeast European definition, which Karl Kaser views as having been established at a different time and under different conditions, as not having a teleologically defined endpoint and as revolving essentially around the issue of political and cultural hegemony (Kaser 2002, 107). Wolfgang Geier describes this concept of modernization as involving "subjective and objective necessities for the continued development and 'completion' of culturally based national identities and the sovereign autonomy of states." Such necessities, in Geier's view, cannot simply be labelled as "catching up on nation-building and emergent statehood" or dismissed with the remark that, "as processes of nation-building have long since been completed over here, they must be relapses into anachronism, nationalism and tribalism over there. Instead, they are […] essentially attempts to 'resume' interrupted historical developments and to create historical continuities and legitimation for current cultural, political and national identities" (Geier 1999, 42). We can create a theoretical link between these two perspectives and Shalini Randeria's notion of "entangled modernities," which signifies a view of history as asymmetrical but shared. The interactionist and relational perspective opened up by shared history overcomes the dichotomy between tradition and modernity (Randeria and Eckert 2000).

What role does education play in post-conflict processes shaped by modernization? What can education and textbooks achieve in a post-conflict situation? While there can be no straightforward answer to either question, the literature on education during armed conflict and in processes of post-conflict reconciliation indicates a general tendency. My ideas in this respect are based on the following approaches. Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley have developed a phase model of intervention for the UNHCR, according to which BiH, for example, finds itself in a post-conflict condition in which the primary focus is placed on

the reconstruction and establishment of social and civil life (Tawil and Harley 2004, 11). A state-of-the-art examination of the present situation of education in emergencies and processes of reconstruction was conducted by Margaret Sinclair, who also provided guidelines for planning education in reconstruction environments, in 2002 (Sinclair 2002). The problems surrounding education in pluralist societies are the focus of Lynne Davies' work, which is based on the assumption that schools can merely reflect the situation within a state. She also finds that education under difficult and/or distressing conditions usually follows top-down models.[5] These, however, are revealed to be entirely unsuitable for the task of appropriately addressing the needs of children and young people (Davies 2004). Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli "show how educational systems can be manipulated to drive a wedge between people, rather than drawing them closer together. In short, education reflects the society around it. The attitudes that flourish beyond the school walls will, inevitably, filter into the classroom" (Bush and Saltarelli 2004, vii). They argue that no inter-ethnic conflict that is based on patterns of identity can be solved by education alone, but only when all state-based and non-state entities are involved together (Bush and Saltarelli 2004, 8). Bush and Saltarelli conclude that merely ensuring a "good education" is not good adequate for post-conflict countries: "In many conflicts around the world, education is part of the problem, not the solution" (Bush and Saltarelli 2004, 32).

Western European History Textbooks

Several publications resulted from the Project for the Coordination of Textbook Research, Development and Comparison in South-East Europe, some of which examine history books and the political dynamics that have brought about changes to education in Southeast Europe over the past few decades. Others investigate history books in Central and Western Europe in order to more effectively locate stereotypes surrounding Southeast Europe. These publications address many recurring

[5]See also: Štimac (2018).

themes: processes of political transformation (with the intervention of international stakeholders), nation-building, comprehension of history, and textbooks and history teaching.

I will now turn to analyses of history textbooks in selected Central and Western Europe countries, specifically their portrayals of Southeast Europe. A range of data and events will be scrutinized, and ideological content, bias, and judgments in particular will be questioned. This will show that although the textbooks touch upon a wide range of historical periods, these are presented in a stereotypical manner, which, in most cases, develops a single (negative) narrative. Analyses of history books from Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Hungary, and Slovakia reveal that Southeast Europe is seen as a region of perpetual conflict. They have been found to consistently describe the region as a "powder keg" and an eternal flashpoint.

The distinctions lie in the details. German, British, French, and Italian textbooks, for example, do not include separate histories of Southeast Europe; in many cases they instead use the region's history to address topics and viewpoints of relevance to their own countries (Mahner 2007, 66; Rutar 2007, 169; Cajani 2007, 180). None of these examples present an inner perspective or even attempt to deconstruct myths about Southeast Europe that hold firm in Western Europe (Helmedach 2007, 112). Even a brief reference to the writings (diaries or travel notes) of Western travellers who recorded their impressions of Southeast Europe in the nineteenth century, for example, would facilitate discussion of stereotypical opinions and attitudes. Yet such elements were absent from all examined textbooks.

A particular narration strategy has been developed in these books to trace the controversies of this region, central to which are political and military relationships (Helmedach 2007, 82) but also local conflicts (Helmedach 2007, 114). German textbooks sketch the "Turkish conquests" and the Communist era as threats to the West (Mahner 2007, 41–72) and regard the region not only as itself ridden by conflict but as posing a constant, latent threat for all other European countries. This is also the case when Southeast Europe is referenced parenthetically, as revealed in examples from British and French history books (Ihrig 2007, 135).

The analyses illustrate that the majority of textbooks concentrate predominantly on geopolitical events. Both Hungarian and Slovakian textbooks largely discuss Southeast European history from the viewpoint of the Great Powers, and mainly discuss political issues (Fischer-Dardei and M.-Csczar 2007, 212; Kratochvíl 2007, 227). British textbooks present Southeast Europe as being on Europe's periphery, "suffering" under the political movements of the center and only worthy of mention when reflecting them (Ihrig 2007, 138). Analyses of German, French, and Italian textbooks also show that the countries of Southeast Europe are, in most cases, construed as figures in a chess game between the Great Powers.[6] In all the textbooks examined, the portrayal of Greece is a prime example: it fought "heroically" against the "Turkish yoke," yet it only succeeded with the help of the Great Powers and ultimately remains a weak state (Cajani 2007, 178).[7]

The textbooks name two key reasons for the conflicts within Southeast Europe: ethnic (and occasionally religious) diversity, and nationalism. These phenomena are linked on occasion, and on others addressed separately. Slovakian textbooks discuss the advantages of this ethnic diversity as well as its disadvantages (Kratochvíl 2007, 226). Analyses of Hungarian textbooks reveal that they describe the ethnic diversity in local societies as a source of conflict, but also present a nuanced vision of the subject using maps and tables (Fischer-Dardei and M.-Csczar 2007, 211). All other textbook analyses reveal a "fundamental scepticism displayed with regards to multi-national state structures" (Helmedach 2007, 105). Notably, the conflict in former Yugoslavia is introduced as an example of "the alienation of nations" (Fischer-Dardei and M.-Csczar 2007, 211), pro-Serbian interethnic tensions (Cajani 2007, 194), the nationalist endeavours of individual groups (Mahner 2007, 57), and of "hostile" and "militant nationalism" (Helmedach 2007, 108).[8]

Even in individual cases where wars are explained as having economic roots (Rutar 2007, 194), it is ethnic diversity, when paired with national ambition, that is depicted as the problem. An analysis of French

[6] See, for example: Mahner (2007, 66).

[7] See also: Rutar (2007, 156).

[8] See also: Kratochvíl, op.cit., 224.

textbooks showed a "teleological presentation of the aspirations of the nation-state […] based on the model of the Western European or French nation-state, which was used as an uncontested and desirable model for the East" (Rutar 2007, 169). From this perspective the former empires, such as the Hapsburg and the Ottoman, are portrayed as backward in French textbooks. Maps depict diverse "minorities" and ethnic rivalries (Rutar 2007, 156). Paradoxically, the wars to establish nation-states after the collapse of Yugoslavia are not identified as being due to "honorable nation-state agendas," but explained—briefly—as an eruption of "earlier interethnic hatred" (Rutar 2007, 170).

This brief overview illustrates how the region is portrayed as fragmented and incoherent historically, and as unsophisticated and impoverished due to continued conflict.[9] As well as a "powder keg," Southeast Europe is construed in European textbooks as a "cauldron" and a "European hot spot." It is almost impossible to refute such arguments if no positive information is provided about the historical region, and if individual self-aggrandising histories are perpetuated. "Nationalism" in one form or other remains, therefore, the dominant explanatory concept.

Andreas Helmedach provides possible solutions in his recommendations for more appropriate portrayals Southeast Europe in German history textbooks (Helmedach 2007, 307ff.). He recommends several historical interfaces between the histories of East and particularly Southeast Europe, which would improve presentations in textbooks and ignite discussion of aforementioned "multiple modernities," empires, national education processes, and migration (Helmedach 2007, 312ff.). In the context of portrayals of various European histories and regions, he argues that "Europe" too must be "Europeanized" (Helmedach 2007, 311). An examination of several empires would avoid reducing the Ottoman Empire to simply the "Turkish threat" but addressing it instead in parallel with other non-European civilizations, thus also addressing issues of diversity. He criticizes the shortage of profound and detailed examinations of the creation of nation-states and of specific approaches to the phenomenon, such as the thinking of Benedict Anderson. Systematically examining diverse models of nation-states would enable comparisons of

[9] See also: Fischer-Dardei and M.-Csczar (2007, 213).

the Southeast European models with imported and exported models, rather than simply viewing them as examples of political impotence on the chessboard of history (Helmedach 2007, 313). Yet despite the significant role played by the German national model in Southeast Europe, Helmedach only refers to British and French models. He sees the third interface as being migration between the Ottoman Empire and the "European environment; between individual populations and regions within the great empires, as well as the product of the founding of national states" (Helmedach 2007, 314). This would also enable the recognition of mutual conditionality, which would quickly bring the view of the Southeast European region as exotic or other into perspective.

One trend found in the textbooks corresponds with analyses by Maria Todorova (1997). In her 1997 book *Imagining the Balkans*, she demonstrates how the term "Balkan" developed throughout the nineteenth century "alongside romanticised perceptions by Western and Central European scholars or frequently, a widespread lack of knowledge." The term "powder keg" was subsequently used to refer to the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, as well as the most recent wars related to the breakup of Yugoslavia. We will now see whether this paradigm of recurring war and displacement can also be found in history textbooks from Southeast Europe.

Southeast Europe: Shared Past, Separate Histories

What epistemological agenda can be found in an analysis of Southeast European history textbooks?[10] What narratives can be found in history books written since the conflicts? Within the framework of the GEI project on Southeast Europe, textbooks from many countries were analyzed, including Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. Here, however, I focus on analyses of history textbooks from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. Textbooks written since the most

[10]It is important to note that multifaceted analyses of international interventions in the education sector have also been made within the GEI project on Southeast Europe. See: Dimou (2009a).

recent war were analyzed, as well as the processes that led to a range of textbook revisions in the framework of political transformation. In individual countries those revisions were closely connected with the activities of international organizations, whose role has been pronounced in the field of history teaching and religious education (Štimac 2010, 26–45).[11] Analyses of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and Slovenian textbooks, and of the educational reform processes in these modern states, revealed many similarities—the most striking being that all assumed an ethno-nationalistic ideology when selecting their theoretical approaches.

In the analyses of the present-day Republic of Serbia, which has experienced four national configurations over the past twenty-five years, socio-political changes were scrutinized (Dimou 2009b, 159–200) in conjunction with history books published between 1993 and 2008 (Stojanović 2009, 141–158). Dubravka Stojanović describes Serbian history teaching, over which the Education Ministry holds a monopoly, as fundamentally a form of military priming (Stojanović 2009, 141). In the period investigated, history textbooks were redesigned for the first time during the Slobodan Milošević era, in such a way that they disseminated collectivism, populism, and nationalism. A second round of modifications came during the 1990s when anti-Communist sentiments were added to existing nationalistic positions (Stojanović 2009, 143). The narrative presented a "history of conflict" between the peoples of the western Balkans (Stojanović 2009, 152), suppressing any kind of interethnic coexistence (Stojanović 2009, 148). The books portray Serbian people as "unique beings" victimized by "all neighbouring peoples" and who consequently developed a reasonable "scorn for death" (Stojanović 2009, 144–145). The notion of "greater Serbia" provides a matrix openly propagated in history books released after 2000 (Stojanović 2009, 150). Although the books begin their history of conflict in the sixteenth century, the author found the description of post-World War II history the most challenging. Reinterpretations include an "amalgamation" of the Chetniks with the Partisans in order to mask the country's fascist past (Stojanović 2009, 151), and then a shifting of responsibility to the

[11] See also: Štimac (2017a, 33–59; 2017b, 99–127).

Allies for forcing the Chetniks to collaborate with the fascists (Stojanović 2009, 155). None of the history textbooks examine their country's own crimes, despite considerable efforts during the period of education reform.[12] On the contrary, the Chetniks are valorized as having been the only party during the World War II to have represented the "Serbian national interest" (Stojanović 2009, 154). In textbooks released after 2000, the Partisans are portrayed as having "imprisoned, tortured, and put before firing squads, not only those suspected of having collaborated with the occupiers but also those whom they thought of as a potential class enemies" (Stojanović 2009, 154). Unfortunately Stojanović does not provide analysis of the most recent war, although subsequent textbook studies, that were not part of this project, indicate that here too books contained several problematic statements that follow the controversial model of national identification (Stojanović 2009, 158).

Analyses of Snježana Koran and Branislava Baranović on Croatia illustrate how different ideological processes were developed in the years before, during, and after the Yugoslav Wars: the "de–ideologization" of the socialist past, nation-building ideology, the radicalization of the narrative in the 1991–1995 "Homeland War," and the differentiation of memories after 2000 (Koren and Baranović 2009, 91–140). Revisions to curricula and textbooks corresponded with these patterns. As in Serbia, analyses of history textbooks used between 1995 and 2009 showed changes in depictions of World War II and the Homeland War to be particularly significant. Older textbooks, written before the textbook revision of 1999, deliver an ambivalent image of the Ustashe movement, "whose atrocities were not neglected, but they were marginalized and glossed over, while those committed by Chetniks and partisans against Croats were given greater focus" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 119). After many debates and critiques by historians both within and outside Croatia, textbooks published after 1999 adopted an unambiguously critical position towards the Ustashe state (Koren and Baranović 2009, 120), which was referred to as a "fascist dictatorship and totalitarian state" in textbooks written after 2007. These books also paid "more attention to

[12]See also: Dimou (2009b, 165ff.).

political aspects of the war and the sufferings of civilians than to military operations" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 121). Textbooks have portrayed the Homeland War "as one of the key events in Croatian history," accompanied by the decisive statement that people who are defending themselves cannot be considered to be committing war crimes (Koren and Baranović 2009, 123). After 2000 some cautiously offered narratives "that went beyond the simplified, black-and-white depictions of war" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 124). Koran and Baranović show that in the last eighteen years it is not just the question of textbook content that has come under increasing scrutiny but also the question of the meaning and function of history teaching, which has undergone a process of modernization, particularly after 2000. They also argue, however, that "educational authorities still prefer educational models that seek cohesion rather than those that stress diversity" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 131), in a time when "the old paradigm is partly abandoned but the new one is not yet entirely formed" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 133).[13]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where education is ethnically divided between three constitutive peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), it is likewise clear that history teaching represents a "strategy of nation building" (Pingel 2009, 257). Various researchers have examined history education in the country from differing perspectives. For example Falk Pingel has analyzed political and social contexts as well as education reform (Pingel 2009, 251–305), Katarina Batarilo has investigated the curricula, and Heike Karge's study includes the textbooks themselves.

In analysis of history curricula in BiH, Batarilo demonstrates that the Bosniak curricula focused heavily on the victim role. The Croatian curricula paid scant attention to BiH, and the Serbian curricula focused strongly on neighboring Serbia. In addition, the Serbian curricula presented Islam in an exclusively negative light. The study argues that the relevant textbooks demonstrated mono-perspectives and ethnonationalistic perspectives. Multi-perspectivity was completely lacking, as was a perspective that strengthened mutual heritage *and* individual ethnic identity (Batarilo 2004, 120).

[13]In this context the discourse surrounding history books for the Serbian minority in the Republic of Croatia is particularly significant.

Karge investigated stereotypes and perceptions of others in history textbooks published between 1994 and 1998 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Karge 1999).[14] To achieve this she analyzed depictions of a range of eras: the early Middle Ages, the early modern age, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the two world wars and the period following the most recent war. She focused on problems "arising from the portrayal of historical 'facts' on subjects such as national education processes, concepts of identity and experiences of violence" (Karge 1999, 316). In her examination of how different eras were addressed, Karge finds similar trends to those dominating descriptions of recent events. This was manifest in a tendency to write history from the perspective of one's own national collective (Karge 1999, 330). This almost entirely negates the opportunity to perceive a mutual space for historical experience. The study elaborates that an exclusive focus on instances of conflict also provides a skewed perspective (Karge 2000a, 77). It finds most fault with Croatian history textbooks, which dedicated the largest amount of space to conflict. They also presented war as a fount of identity-building, which has a homogenizing effect on a nation that has experienced violence. Karge also criticizes the Croatian history textbooks for constructing an "enemy" (quotation marks in original), when discussing the most recent war in Croatia, but not addressing their own wrongdoings (Karge 1999, 333). The positive examples selected in the study are striking. The idea of inclusive identity combined with "good neighborship" is only found by Karge in the former Bosniak history textbooks in Sarajevo, when discussing the Ottoman Empire for example (Karge 2000b, 40). It is qualified, however, and could be seen as selective.

Wolfgang Höpken establishes a comparative perspective and demonstrates that textbooks in Southeast Europe are similar to German textbooks of the same period, for example. He suggests that the idea of the national state was adopted from Central Europe together with its educational approach and textbooks (Höpken 1999, 71). On the other hand, Pingel criticizes the optimistic perception found in Bosniak history textbooks as an exclusively "Muslim perspective" (Pingel 2009, 259).

[14] See also: Karge (2000a, b).

Two subjects acquire a particular explosiveness in textbooks from BiH that is not in evidence in those from Serbia and Croatia: the way in which "problematic text passages" are dealt with—those containing terms such as "aggression" and "crime," for example—and how ethnic diversity is dealt with in the sense of multi-perspectivity. The first topic has become particularly sensitive since the "Council of Europe stipulated that potentially offensive material should be withdrawn from textbooks before the start of the 1999/2000 school year" (Pingel 2009, 271). This was especially significant as it was a precondition of accession to the Council of Europe. Batarilo reports that the international community recommended selected passages be rendered unreadable or modified, as otherwise there would have been no textbooks available (Batarilo 2004, 117). The aim was to minimize pupils' negative attitudes towards other nationalities in BiH (Batarilo 2004). According to Karge this was viewed, however, particularly from the Bosniak perspective, as an attempt to "redefine, retouch or distort the tragedy that had taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Karge 2000a, 73). After rendering passages unreadable proved an unsuitable strategy, an OSCE report from 2003 to 2004 recommended openly addressing problematic topics and competing interpretations of the war. Guidelines were subsequently developed for textbook authors. According to Pingel "the guidelines stipulate that tolerance and multi-perspectivity should be prevalent in those parts of textbooks which deal with mutual relations among peoples in BiH, as well as their relation to neighbouring countries" (Pingel 2009, 285). In his opinion multi-perspectivity "is not a form of truth, but a method designed to provide insight into processes by which judgments are reached" (Pingel 2009, 286). Nevertheless local education experts in BiH, as well as representatives of international organizations, doubted that such a didactic approach could function in this instance. The reason was simple: "Multi-perspectivity can only be effective if there already exists common ground on the basis of which different judgments can be compared" (Pingel 2009, 286).

A perspective that initially appears quite different can be found in Slovenian history textbooks. The principal focus of Peter Vodopivec's study is not nationalism, but changes to the curricula; relevant education policy debates revealed, however, that the most recent textbooks clearly

placed increasing focus on their own nation. He differentiates between several phases in his analysis of history books in Slovenia. The first covers the 1990s, the second runs from the end of the 1990s to 2007, and the third begins in 2007, a year that saw widespread education reform in the country (Vodopivec 2009, 45–69). Textbooks from the first period are described as overloaded with political content despite attempts to include more socio-historic and cultural material. During this time the books maintained their "so-called Marxist terminology and stereotypes" (Vodopivec 2009, 55). Books published during the second period attempted to expand the narration of history beyond political events to include cultural, social, and economic developments. The history of the Slovenians is then given a specific relevance for each era (see for example "Slovenian Lands" in the Roman Empire) (Vodopivec 2009, 56). However, the textbooks "do not pay any particular attention to the formation process of the modern nation" and therefore have "considerable difficulty adopting more modern concepts" (Vodopivec 2009, 57). Stereotypes of national identity, national resistance, and the union of all Slovenian "populated regions in a single administrative unit" emerge in depictions of the nineteenth century and the Habsburg monarchy (Vodopivec 2009, 59). Generally other "southern Slavs from the Balkans" such as Serbians, Croats, and Macedonians, are not afforded much space. The two kingdoms of Yugoslavia as well as socialist Yugoslavia are presented in the context of antagonism between centralists (predominantly Serbia) and federalists (Slovenians, Croats, and Macedonians). Depictions of the World War II caused dispute in Slovenia too. The one-sided apologetics of the Communist past were abandoned, and Communist radicalism was criticized (Vodopivec 2009, 61). Interestingly, debates concerning national identity and "national pride" largely emerged after 2004—the year of the country's accession to the EU (Vodopivec 2009, 65). The new democratic coalition, led by the Democratic Party, claimed they "would pay substantially more attention to Slovene national interests" (Vodopivec 2009, 64), which was certainly discernible in the curricula reform of 2007–2008 and the subsequent new textbook content. Discourse surrounding "patriotic content" and the history of Slovenian independence became the focus of debate in 1991, when textbook content discussing the history of the Southern Slavs and the two Yugoslavias

was dramatically reduced and Communism came to be portrayed as a totalitarian system. The analysis covers the years up to 2008 and concludes that a re-nationalization, even a mythologization, of history teaching had taken place in the country (Vodopivec 2009, 65).

In the end it is possible to draw several conclusions from these studies, and from the textbooks themselves. All analyses of the selected history textbooks are borne of similar epistemological interests: an examination of stereotypes and prejudice in history teaching.

If we accept Jochen Huhn's position that history textbooks represent societal communication about the past, then the results of the textbook analyses are unsurprising. The textbooks mentioned above were produced during significantly varied political constellations. Some in Southeast Europe came into being under the post-conflict conditions of nation-building and political transformation. The books from selected Western and Central European countries were created during peacetime, when the authors had recourse to the latest academic findings. Significant problems were noted in all the selected textbooks, but on different levels. Textbooks from Western and Central Europe consistently used negative stereotypes of the "powder keg" and depicted a political inability in Southeast European states to determine their own history. The countries of Southeast Europe are portrayed as playthings tossed between the Great Powers, barely capable of acting independently. Nationalism is constantly portrayed as a continuous negative force. From today's perspective, where diversity is one of the EU's top education policies, it is interesting to note that the Western European textbooks in particular depict diversity in Southeast Europe as one of the region's biggest problems. The analyses of textbooks from selected Southeast European countries reveal that in this context, and following the most recent war, the epistemological interest naturally serves purposes closely associated with nation-building and ostensibly nationalistic explanatory models. Although other examples were found in the course of the textbook analyses, they were applied in such a way as to perpetuate the narrative of nationalism. Several desiderata were revealed in these textbooks: the perspective of the victim, the costs of war, and non-military solutions were omitted entirely (Karge 2000a, 76).

Common to all analyzed books was the absence of an examination of nationalism through modern theoretical approaches. On the one hand this is illustrated by Helmedach's recommendations for German history books, which establish that one-sided perspectives are detrimental. On the other hand, they were not used in Southeast European textbooks as they contradicted the post-conflict paradigm and discourse. The concept of history evident in the selected textbooks from Southeast Europe was that of a "finished historical painting, not open for critical dispute" (Karge 2000b, 36–41). Moments of "fragmented memory" (Höpken 1999)[15] are also evident throughout. This suggests that the perspective of "shared history" is irreconcilable with both nation-building in the post-conflict period and a historiography of (predominantly) national history. In Southeast Europe not only common history but common cultural heritage is ignored in all examined texts. In terms of the theoretical approaches mentioned above, ideas of interconnected history or entangled modernities are absent throughout.

What is significant for the textbook analyses? The analyses of textbooks from Southeast Europe are characterized by an ideological criticism of the fact that national identity is placed at the forefront of history teaching.[16] In this sense the analyses adhere to the logic of the textbooks by also concentrating on national identity. Höpken refutes this approach by stating that the results of textbook analyses should be contextualized within a larger historical framework. It then becomes clear that a focus on national identity is not specific only to Southeast Europe. "As much as in Western or Central Europe … textbooks in the Balkans were instruments for developing and fostering national identity and legitimizing the territorial claims and foreign policy objectives of individual countries" (Höpken 1999, 71). It is not then the focus on one's own national history that is the problem with the textbooks, but that it is to the detriment of a common past. This contention overlaps with the theoretical positions of Kaser and Geier discussed above.

Although nationalism emerges as the primary narrative in the majority of the history textbook analyses, and despite the selective perceptions

[15] See also: Karge (2000b).

[16] See also: Höpken (1999, 76).

of some of those analyses, sweeping generalizations of the "nationalistic" and "conflict-ridden Balkans" are not supported. The local textbook analyses carried out in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia illustrate this convincingly, when they reconstruct the dependence of the history books on different social and political context. Through these studies it is clear that there is no linear process leading to unbounded nationalism. On the contrary, the analyses reveal that over the last twenty years individuals and organizations have continually criticized the ethno-nationalistic discourse prevalent in education, making their own recommendations for changes to textbook content and delivering a significant discursive contribution, independent of their own social positions within the field of education. An in-depth study of such contributors, who do not generally have leading positions in ministries or political parties, and of their work (draft curricula, brochures, and so on) remains a significant desideratum in the field of education and educational media research.

Conclusion

We can conclude that Southeast European history textbooks cannot be held responsible if the idea of the "violent Balkans" is consolidated in the perceptions of textbooks authors and textbooks from other parts of Europe (Karge 2000b, 36). There is still much work to be done both in relation to educational media research and mutual perceptions of and within Southeast Europe. And, based on Geier's theoretical implications (see footnote 16), the political processes of nation-building in Southeast Europe cannot be labelled as anachronistic and nationalistic only because processes of nation-building have long been completed in some other part of Europe. It is, additionally, important to question the extent to which textbook analyses and political and journalistic reports on education, relying on a single argument or theoretical approach, must also carry a degree of responsibility for the image of the "violent Balkans" being continuously reproduced.

Discussing the findings produced within the framework of the GEI Project for the Coordination of Textbook Research, Development and Comparison in Southeast Europe, which investigated history education,

provides an opportunity to look back at the project but also to look forward to upcoming challenges in this thematic area. If, as discussed at the start, official textbooks are part of the problem, then it seems likely to assume that complementary educational materials, new media, and new projects might offer some new solutions. Alternatively a textbook commission for Southeast Europe might be helpful within the context of EU expansion. This might provide a forum for discussing and testing educational materials that address not only history education but also civics and religious education in Southeast Europe.

References

Batarilo, Katarina. 2004. "Pädagogischer Umgang mit bewaffneten Konflikten am Beispiel friedensbauender Geschichtscurriculumrevision in Bosnien-Herzegowina." In *Konflikt und pädagogische Intervention*, edited by Özkan Ergen and Volker Lenhart. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Beck, Ulrich. 2008. *Der eigene Gott. Friedensfähigkeit und Gewaltpotential der Religionen*. Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Verlag der Weltreligionen.

Bush, Kenneth, and Diana Saltarelli. 2004. *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuildung Education for Children*. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Center.

Cajani, Luigi. 2007. "Von Lepanto bis zum Zusammenbruch Jugoslawiens: eine Reise durch die italienischen Geschichtsschulbücher für die Oberstufe." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Davies, Lynn. 2004. *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos*. London: Routledge.

Degene, Nina, and Christian Dries. 2005. *Modernisierungstheorie*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Dimou. Augusta, ed. 2009a. *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Dimou. Augusta. 2009b. "Politics or Policy? The Short Life and Adventures of Educational Reform in Serbia (2001–2003)." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou, 159–200. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 2000. *Die Vielfalt der Moderne.* Weilerswist: Velbrück Verlag.

Fischer-Dardei, Agnes, and Zsuzsanna M.-Csczar. 2007. "Das Balkanbild in ungarischen Schulbüchern für Geschichte und Geographie." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Geier, Wolfgang. 1999. "Multiethnische und multikulturelle Konfliktlagen im östlichen und südöstlichen Europa." In *Multikulturalität und Multiethnizität in Mittel-, Ost und Südosteuropa*, edited by Ernst Peter Brezowsky, Arnold Suppan, and Elisabeth Vyslonzil. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag.

Giordano, Christian. 2004. "Jenseits von Emile Durkheims Erbschaft: Georges Balandier." In *Französische Soziologie der Gegenwart*, edited by Stephan Moebius und Peter Lother. Stuttgart: UTB.

Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev. 1984. "Modernisierung und Nationsbildung. Modelltheoretische Überlegungen und ihre Anwendung auf Serbien und die Türkei." *Südost-Forschungen* 43: 135–180.

Helmedach, Andreas. 2007. "Südosteuropa in deutschen Geschichts- und Gemeinschaftskundeschulbuch der Gegenwart." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Höpken, Wolfgang. 1999. "Textbooks and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe." In *Culture and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe*, 67–84. Thessaloniki.

Ihrig, Stefan. 2007. "No More Eastern Questions Asked—South Eastern Europe as Just Another European Periphery in British History Textbooks." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Karge, Heike. 1999. "Geschichtsbilder im postjugoslawischen Raum: Konzeptionen in Geschichtslehrbüchern am Beispiel von Selbst- und Nachbarschaftswahrnehmung." *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 21: 315–337.

Karge, Heike. 2000a. "'Bestimme Genitiv und Akkusativ: Seid ihr euch eures Verbrechens bewußt? Die Drina flußabwärts trieben ermordete unschuldige Menschen' - Eine Studie zu post-jugoslawischen Schulbüchern." In *Südosteuropa von der Krise zur Transformation*, edited by Cvetana Todorova und Edgar Hösch, vol. 12, 73–78. München: Aus der Südosteuropa Forschung.

Karge, Heike. 2000b. "History after the War: Examples of How Controversial Issues Are Dealt with in History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Textbook Research Network—Newsletter* 9: 36–41.

Kaser, Karl. 2002. *Südosteuropäische Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft*. Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag.

Koren, Snježana, and Branislava Baranović. 2009. "What Kind of History Education Do We Have after Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia?" In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou, 91–140. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Kratochvíl, Viliam. 2007. "Die Darstellung des Balkanraumes in den aktuellen slowakischen Geschichtsschulbüchern." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Lienemann, Wolfgang. 2006. *Kirche und Öffentlichkeit in Transformationsgesellschaften*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Mahner, Christian. 2007. "Zwischen Andersartigkeit und Fremdbestimmung. Südosteuropäische Sequenzen in bundesdeutschen Geschichtsschulbüchern (1945–1989)." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Offe, Claus. 1994. *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundungen der politischen Transformation im neuen Osten*. Frankfurt am Main and New York. Campus Verlag.

Pingel, Falk. 2009. "From Ownership to Intervention—Or Vice Versa? Textbook Revision in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Randeria, Shalini, and Andreas Eckert. 2000. *Vom Imperialismus zum Empire. Nicht-westliche Perspektiven auf Globalisierung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Rutar, Sabine. 2007. "En passant: Südosteuropa im französischen Schulbuch 2007." In *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsbuch; South Eastern Europe in European History Textbooks*, edited by Andreas Helmedach. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Sinclair, Margaret. 2002. *Planning Education in and after Emergencies*. Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning.

Sterbling, Anton. 2005. "Gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Vergleich." In *Transformation als Typ sozialen Wandels*, edited by Raj Kollmorgen. Münster: LIT Verlag.

Štimac, Zrinka. 2010. "Auseinandersetzungen um den Religionsunterricht und die Bildungsreformen in Bosnien und Herzegowina." *Land-Bericht. Sozialwissenschaftliches Journal* 2: 26–45.

Štimac, Zrinka. 2017a. "Islamic Religious Instruction in the Context of EU Integration and Education Reform." In *Education on Post-Conflict Transition: Politicization of Religion in School Textbooks*, edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, 33–59. London: Palgrave.

Štimac, Zrinka. 2017b. "From *Vrhbosna* to Brussels: Catholic Religious Education Between Local and European Perspectives." In *Education on Post-Conflict Transition: Politicization of Religion in School Textbooks*, edited by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, 99–127. London: Palgrave.

Štimac, Zrinka. 2018. *Kampf um Deutungsmacht. Religion und Bildung in Bosnien und Herzegowina 1994–2008*. Münster: LIT Verlag.

Stojanović, Dubravka. 2009. "Slow Burning: History Textbooks in Serbia 1993–2008." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou, 141–158. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

Sundhaussen, Holm. 1973. *Der Einfluß der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchie*. Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag.

Tawil, Sobhi, and Alexandra Harley. 2004. *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*. Geneva: UNESCO, IBE.

Todorova, Maria. 1997. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vodopivec, Peter. 2009. "Politics of History Education in Slovenia and Slovene History Textbooks since 1990." In *'Transition' and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou. Göttingen: V&R unipress.

von Beyme, Klaus. 1994. *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Zapf, Wolfgang. 1994. *Modernisierung und Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und Transformation. Soziologische Aufsätze 1987–1994*. Berlin: edition sigma.

14

Conclusion

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

As mentioned above, this study is intended to reveal the mechanisms of nationalism practiced in the context of education, which be found in other European contexts as well as in Southeast Europe.

Although in principal we agree with Malešević's argument that "grounded nationalism" is a consequence of the modernization of Southeast European nations, this does not explain why statistics, specifically annual ombudsmen's reports on violations of civil rights, reflect an intense increase of hate speech and hate crimes against a background of ethno nationalism, as extreme far right parties and populism in general win votes in a wider, "better evolved" Europe.

We should not forget Ulrich Beck's brilliant explanation of why only so many variables can be factored into our future predictions, and thus

G. Ognjenović (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

J. Jozelić
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: jasna.jozelic@nchr.uio.no

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_14

there will always be an "x factor" of unpredictability in the consequences of our consciously chosen actions for further modernizing our societies, as another expression of "reflexive modernity" (Beck 1992). The resurfacing of ethno-nationalist violence in a form of terrorist attacks on the streets of modern Europe is another exposé to be.

Reference

Beck, Urlich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

15

Afterword

Sabine Rutar

Tony Judt concluded his monumental book *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (2005) with a lucid essay on European memoryscapes and the significance of the professional ethics of the historians and engineers of public history who helped craft them (Judt 2005, 831):

> The new Europe, bound together by the signs and symbols of its terrible past, is a remarkable accomplishment; but it remains forever mortgaged to that past. If Europeans are to maintain this vital link—if Europe's past is to continue to furnish Europe's present with admonitory meaning and moral purpose—then it will have to be *taught* afresh with each passing generation.

S. Rutar (✉)
Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast, European Studies, Regensburg, Germany
e-mail: rutar@ios-regensburg.de

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9_15

It is this notion of having "to be *taught* afresh" that I wish to take up in my afterword to this collection of essays on the politicization of history textbooks and teaching in the states that, during most of the twentieth century, made up one country—Yugoslavia. This is a book about how controversial, and how much a part of power politics, history has remained. It is about how difficult it is to counteract ahistorical myths invented because somebody perceives them as instrumental to their political goals. It is about the worthiness of struggling against history's usurpation by monolithic and abusive interpretative tendencies.

Professional historians and the ways in which they gather and communicate knowledge about the past, Judt was convinced, can contribute to the sobering of the world in each generation anew (Judt 2005, 830). What makes Judt ideal to herald this book is the way in which he wrote in response to the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s. His writings from that period uncomfortably prove today how matters have gone from bad to worse: Dissensual and divisive history politics are now observable far beyond those territories in which war returned to Europe for the first time since 1945. This book is timely not only because it reflects on how younger generations in the successor states to Yugoslavia have been, or need to be, taught their most recent and painful histories. It is timely also because crises have spread since the Yugoslav wars, and so have symptoms of secessionism. Britain and Spain are merely those cases that have recently hailed most media attention.

Judt's writing from 1992 has acquired intensified meaning in the course of the past decade (Judt 1992, 84):

> [T]he ways in which the official versions of the war and postwar era have unraveled in recent years are indicative of unresolved problems which lie at the center of the present continental crisis—an observation true of both Western and Eastern Europe, though in distinctive ways.[1]

This was about the Second World War. Two years later, in 1994, *vis-à-vis* the wars in Yugoslavia, Judt continued his reflections with a cogent

[1] Several years later, Judt re-published this essay as the epilogue to a volume whose chapters presented both western (this included a lucid essay on Greece by Mark Mazower) and east central European case studies that clearly illustrated what was at stake. See: Deák et al. (2000).

description of the pieces that were to be reassembled from postwar foundational European myths after they had "burst" with the end of the Cold War and the demise of state socialism (Judt 1994, 4). Among the illusions shattered, he cited an economic miracle "built in part on the importation of cheap, non-European (or at any rate non-European Economic Community) labor" (Judt 1994, 6). Being no longer required, the "guest workers" had become "immigrants," who, at the time of Judt's writing, received a new face with the wave of refugees from Yugoslavia. More importantly, the new wars did away with "two other treasured postwar illusions" (Judt 1994, 6–7):

> That Europeans might come to blows over such traditional matters as borders, nationality, or ethnic territorial claims [had] seemed unthinkable; that they might do so in ways uncannily redolent of earlier conflicts hitherto assigned to history books would have seemed horrific and absurd just five years ago.

For Judt, the Yugoslav wars were the ultimate defeat of the European idea and the myths conditioned by the Cold War. The ideological and statal architecture of Tito's Yugoslavia, and thus its existence, had depended on the Cold War setting. "Undigested" issues concerning the Second World War were heavily instrumentalized by various parties in the process of ethnicization and mobilization towards hate and violence. Judt extended this Cold War-conditioned quality to the idea and practice of "Europe" as it had been constructed in its western half since 1945. He would prove more correct than he could have anticipated: Today, we can study ethnicization and divisive mobilization movements, and even instances of violence, in many European countries.

After the demise of state socialism, the Council of Europe and other EU institutions had seen restoring "historical truth" in Eastern Europe as an urgent matter: Building democracy demanded a departure from the previous "uses" and "misuses" of the past. It was the violent and protracted collapse of Yugoslavia which then prompted fears that re-emerging nationalisms might threaten peace in all of Europe. Offering a many-voiced version of divisive events was expected to facilitate national reconciliation and guarantee space for pluralistic memories, albeit based

on common European core values (Rousso 2009). Today, however, the long decade between 1989 and 2001, during which Judt wrote his two essays, has been blocked from view by the events of 11 September 2001. It has even been declared outright insignificant. Charles King, professor of international affairs and government at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, who is specialized in eastern European matters, has described it as a "dreamlike era from 11/9 to 9/11," a "historical hiatus between the Cold War and the war on terror" (King 2010, 4–5). If one follows through on this definition, the Yugoslav wars of 1991–1999 thus took place in a gap between two eras. In such a way, the decade that saw the longest siege of a European city in the twentieth century (Sarajevo, 1992–1995), genocide (Srebrenica, 1995), deaths in the tens of thousands, and people made refugees in the millions, has been assigned to oblivion. Its memory has been drowned in the war on terror and in the crises of the last decade (Busek 2016; Breuilly 2016; Despot et al. 2016).

Lately, previously simmering (or largely academic) controversies over historical interpretation have evolved and contributed to rattling the very foundations of "Europe," several of its constituent states, and the wider Euro-Atlantic region. The chapters in this volume vividly illustrate just how difficult it is to move forward towards a teaching of the past that helps *build* democracy. More than ever, history seems to be at the service of political goals. Alas, in this sense what has happened in "the Balkans" is now part of a wider norm. Alongside this utilization of history, another factor that has contributed significantly to the newly virulent political instabilities in Europe is the lack of sustained and entangled conversation, since the Cold War ended, on what the twentieth century meant for *all* of Europe, and how it needs to be read to provide for future democratic stability. Forgetfulness of the wars in Yugoslavia on European and global levels is but one serious symptom of this process of neglect.

Attempts to contrive or engineer a common European memoryscape, a renewed regime of historicity of the twentieth century, have thus fallen victim to the law of unintended consequences.[2] One factor that was underestimated the depth of the void of meaning left by the demise of

[2]The term "regimes of historicity" comes from Hartog (2003).

state socialism, especially when accompanied by war and violence. A second overlooked factor was just how much Western societies had profited from their "negative other" in the East. Post-1989, identities were in flux, insecure and vulnerable, which in turn rendered societies susceptible to the seeming simplicity of politically motivated economies of truth.

In 2011, the European Council issued an invitation to member states to "raise or support initiatives aiming at informing and educating the public about Europe's totalitarian past, as well as to conduct research projects, including those with an international dimension." It insisted that there could be "no reconciliation without truth and remembrance" (Council of the European Union 2011). As it turned out, the Council's initiative gave politicians and state actors encouragement to advocate for a single historical truth, one which should be remembered in a particular, decorous way. Indeed, most European and international recommendations rest upon the belief that conflicted memories can and should be reconciled, however difficult the task. The chapters in this volume make a strong case that the real challenge in fact lies elsewhere: in recovering the many voices that have been lost, so that there can be a thorough exploration of the diversity of sources available, and necessary conversations can be carried out free of prescriptions for where they should lead.

Put positively, the flourishing of public controversies on who holds the historical "truth" in recent years, in the successor states of Yugoslavia as much as elsewhere, might be seen as a necessary precondition for strengthening public interest in what makes the past divisive, and for creating a generation of scholars who will provide innovative, if not integrating, pieces of research *and* communicate their results into wider sociopolitical debates, beyond academic dialogues. School textbooks represent a core medium here.

The case studies in this volume show how, over the last quarter century, the narrowing of historiographical agendas to the needs of the nation state—which has had to make up for much of what has been left blank by the disappearance of the state socialist ideological superstructure—has impacted history teaching. This in turn has caused difficulties for the evolution of a history writing that thinks inclusively, relationally, and in terms of process. The process may be even more pronounced in the Yugoslav region than elsewhere, given that coming to terms with the

recent past has meant coming to terms with the consequences of war and conflict, too.

Yet what also emerges clearly from this book is that, despite all the drawbacks, history teaching in the service of peace and democracy has made a strong point in the successor states of Yugoslavia, albeit more often than not beyond the mainstream or official. Initiators are not only international agencies—such as the European Association of History Educators (Euroclio), UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, and the Georg-Eckert-Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig—but also agencies like the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) in Salonica, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade, the United World College in Mostar, and many others. Many of the authors gathered in this volume have long and substantial track records of working towards this common goal.

At the center of this goal is a mediation of history which insists on being complex, but is simultaneously informed about its communicative, collective, and, not least, educational dimensions. It requires being very conscious of the fact that history teaching by definition includes selection and simplification. The sensitive question that remains is how history teaching can crystallize the past into meaningful digests that talk *to* rather than *against* each other. In the face of a Europe (and beyond) in which the focus, lately, seems to be precisely on divisive rhetoric and politics, reflections such as those gathered in this book are much needed—on a comprehensively European level.

References

Breuilly, John. 2016. "Brexit and Europe: A Commentary." *Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society*, "Europe(an) Matters," 64 (3): 372–380.

Busek, Erhard. 2016. "Europe on the Move: A Commentary." *Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society*, "Europe(an) Matters," 64 (3): 365–371.

Council of the European Union. 2011. *Draft Council Conclusions on the Memory of the Crimes Committed by the Totalitarian Regimes in Europe*. Brussels, June 8. Accessed at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011268%202011%20INIT.

Deák, István, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt, eds. 2000. *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Despot, Andrea, Hannes Grandits, Wolfgang Höpken, Dušan Reljić, Gabriella Schubert, and Sevasti Trubeta. 2016. "Beyond the 'Balkan Route', or Why Southeastern Europe Remains a Core Issue for Europe: A Discussion among Andrea Despot, Hannes Grandits, Wolfgang Höpken, Dušan Reljić, Gabriella Schubert, and Sevasti Trubeta." *Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society*, "Europe(an) Matters," 64 (3): 381–395.

Hartog, François. 2003. *Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expérience du temps.* Paris: Le Seuil.

Judt, Tony. 1992. "The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe." *Daedalus* 121 (4, Fall): 83–118.

Judt, Tony. 1994. "Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of Which European Era?" *Daedalus* 123 (3, Summer): 1–19.

Judt, Tony. 2005. "From the House of the Dead: An Essay in Modern European Memory." In *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, edited by Tony Judt, 801–834. New York: Penguin.

King, Charles. 2010. *Extreme Politics: Nationalism, Violence, and the End of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rousso, Henry. 2009. "Les dilemmes d'une mémoire européenne." In *Historicités*, edited by François Dosse, Christian Delacroix, and Patrick Garcia, 203–221. Paris: La Découverte.

Index

G. Ognjenović and J. Jozelić (eds.), *Nationhood and Politicization of History in School Textbooks*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38121-9