



Optimal Bounded-Collusion Secure Functional Encryption

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Abstract. We construct private-key and public-key functional encryption schemes in the bounded-key setting; that is, secure against adversaries that obtain an a-priori bounded number of functional keys (also known as the collusion bound).

An important metric considered in the literature on bounded-key functional encryption schemes is the dependence of the running time of the encryption algorithm on the collusion bound $Q = Q(\lambda)$ (where λ is the security parameter). It is known that bounded-key functional encryption schemes with encryption complexity growing with $Q^{1-\varepsilon}$, for any constant $\varepsilon > 0$, implies indistinguishability obfuscation. On the other hand, in the public-key setting, it was previously unknown whether we could achieve encryption complexity growing linear with Q , also known as *optimal* bounded-key FE, based on well-studied assumptions.

In this work, we give the *first* construction of an optimal bounded-key public-key functional encryption scheme under the minimal assumption of the existence of any public-key encryption scheme. Moreover, our scheme supports the class of all polynomial-size circuits.

Our techniques also extend to the private-key setting. We achieve a construction of an optimal bounded-key functional encryption in the private-key setting based on the minimal assumption of one-way functions, instead of learning with errors as achieved in prior works.

1 Introduction

Functional Encryption [SW05,BSW11] (FE) is a powerful type of encryption where the owner of a secret key sk can generate special-purpose functional secret keys sk_F which allow anyone to compute $F(x)$ given an encryption of x . The standard and demanding security notion for functional encryption is *collusion-resistance* which, informally stated, requires that an adversary who holds functional secret keys for an *arbitrary polynomial* number of boolean functions F_1, F_2, \dots, F_m of her choice should learn no more than $F_1(x), F_2(x), \dots, F_m(x)$ given an encryption of x . Collusion-resistant functional encryption schemes are extremely powerful: [AJ15,BV15,AJS15] show that such FE schemes can be used to construct indistinguishability obfuscators and therefore, can be used to

instantiate a vast majority of cryptographic primitives (see [SW14] and a large number of followup works.) It is no surprise then that collusion-resistant FE schemes are very hard to construct and indeed, to this date, we do not know constructions from well-established cryptographic assumptions.

In many uses of functional encryption, however, the weaker notion of *bounded-key setting* might suffice. Bounded-key setting permits the secret-key owner to release an a priori bounded number $Q = Q(\lambda)$ of functional keys. (Here and henceforth, λ denotes the security parameter.) Thus, bounded-key setting is appropriate in scenarios where functional keys are tied to users, and a large colluding set of users is hard to form. Historically, bounded-collusion resistance has been well-studied with the goals of improving efficiency, reducing computational assumptions, and supporting a larger class of functions; see [DKXY02, HK04, CHH+07, GLW12, SS10, GVW12a, ISV+17, AR17, Agr17] and the references therein.

Encryption Complexity. An important complexity measure considered in the FE literature is encryption complexity (defined to be the size of the encryption circuit). Of particular interest in the setting of bounded-collusion resistance (referred as bounded-key FE) is the growth of the encryption complexity with the collusion bound Q . The importance of this measure stems from the recent results [BV15, AJ15, AJS15, GS16, LM16, BNPW16, KNT18], which tell us that, for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, bounded-key FE with encryption complexity $Q^{1-\epsilon} \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$, where s is the maximum size of the functions queried, is as powerful as collusion-resistant FE. Thus, achieving encryption complexity $Q^{1-\epsilon} \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ in bounded-key FE schemes from well-studied assumptions would be a breakthrough in cryptography.

On the other hand, we could still hope to base bounded-key FE schemes, in the public-key setting, with encryption complexity $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ (henceforth, referred to as *optimal bounded-key FE*) on well-studied assumptions. Unfortunately, this question has remained unanswered so far. The best known result, by Agrawal and Rosen [AR17], managed to reduce the encryption complexity to $Q^2 + \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$.

We ask the following question:

Can we construct optimal bounded-key public-key FE for all functions in P/poly based on well-studied assumptions?

1.1 Our Results

In this work, we answer the above question in the affirmative and in fact, our construction can be based on minimal assumptions alone, i.e., existence of any public-key encryption scheme.

Specifically, we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 1 (Informal). *Assuming the existence of public-key encryption, there exists a bounded-key public-key FE scheme for P/Poly with encryption*

complexity $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$, where Q is the collusion bound and s is the maximum size of the functions queried.

Additionally our scheme has many advantages. It satisfies simulation security and adaptive security, which is the best possible security notion that we can achieve in this setting. Moreover, our scheme makes only black box use of the underlying public-key encryption scheme. We note that even constructing optimal public-key attribute-based encryption, a weaker form of FE, based on minimal assumptions was unknown prior to our work.

Private-Key Setting. In the private-key setting, a recent work of Chen, Vaikuntanathan, Waters, Wee and Wichs [CVW+18] showed how to achieve optimal bounded-key FE based on the assumption of learning with errors. Moreover, their scheme was only selectively secure. Thus, constructing optimal bounded-key FE in the private-key setting based on the minimal assumption of one-way functions was open.

We show,

Theorem 2 (Informal). *Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a bounded-key private-key FE scheme for P/Poly with encryption complexity $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$, where Q is the collusion bound and s is the maximum size of the functions queried.*

Our private-key scheme has the same attractive features as our public-key scheme, that is, our private-key scheme satisfies simulation security, adaptive security and only makes black-box use of the underlying cryptographic primitive.

Dichotomy in Bounded-Key Functional Encryption. We see our work as establishing a dichotomy in bounded-key functional encryption (in both public-key and private-key settings): (i) for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, any bounded-key FE scheme with encryption complexity $Q^{1-\epsilon} \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ implies indistinguishability obfuscation and, (ii) the existence of bounded-key FE with encryption complexity $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ can be based solely on minimal assumptions.

1.2 Prior Works on Bounded-Collusion FE

Dichotomy in Bounded-Key IBE. Early work by Dodis, Katz, Xu and Yung [DKXY02] showed how to construct a Q -bounded identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, another special case of FE, where the public parameters had size $O(Q^2\lambda)$, and the ciphertexts and secret keys had size $O(Q\lambda)$, starting from any public-key encryption scheme. Goldwasser, Lewko and Wilson [GLW12] later showed a construction with public parameters of size $O(Q\lambda)$, and ciphertexts and secret keys of size $O(\lambda)$, albeit under more structured algebraic assumptions.

More recently, Döttling and Garg [DG17b] and followup works [BLSV18, DG17a] showed how to bootstrap any bounded collusion IBE with public parameters of size $Q^{1-\epsilon} \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, irrespective of ciphertext and secret-key length, into a full-fledged (i.e., fully collusion-resistant) IBE scheme.

This gives us a dichotomy for IBE: Q -bounded IBE with public parameters of size $\Omega(Q)$ exists under the minimal assumption of public-key encryption; and doing any better in terms of the size of public parameters is as hard as achieving unbounded-collusion IBE.

Bounded-Key FE. In the other extreme, the situation with general functional encryption (FE) is less clear-cut. The first construction of bounded-key FE for *Boolean functions*¹ in NC^1 was demonstrated by Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee [GVW12a], who built on the work of Sahai and Seyalioglu [SS10]; the encryption complexity in their scheme was $Q^4 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$. They also showed how to extend this to support all poly-time computable functions, but at the expense of an additional assumption, namely pseudorandom functions that can be computed in NC^1 , an object that we currently know how to construct based only on algebraic assumptions such as factoring, DDH and LWE. (see Fig. 1 for a detailed comparison.) Agrawal and Rosen [AR17] showed how to reduce the ciphertext size to $Q^2 + \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ under the LWE assumption. Chen, Vaikuntanathan, Waters, Wee and Wichs [CVW+18] very recently showed how to reduce the dependence even further to $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$ under the LWE assumption, except they could only achieve private-key FE. The ciphertext size dependence on Q in this last result is the best possible (without constructing IO) except that (a) they rely on LWE; and (b) they only achieve private-key FE. Even in the much weaker setting of public-key *attribute-based* encryption (ABE), the best known ciphertext size is $Q^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ in constructions that rely only on public-key encryption [ISV+17].

Dependence on the Circuit Size. We do caution the reader that our focus will be on the dependence of the ciphertext size on the collusion-bound Q . Ciphertexts in our scheme grow with the circuit-size of the functions that the scheme supports (denoted s in Fig. 1). On the one hand, for constructions that rely only on the minimal assumption of public-key encryption, this dependence seems hard to remove; indeed, even the best 1-bounded FE with ciphertext size sub-linear in the circuit-size of the (Boolean) functions assumes (subexponential) LWE [GKP+13]. On the other hand, we show how to translate any improvement in this state of affairs for 1-bounded FE into a corresponding improvement in Q -bounded FE with ciphertexts that grow *linearly* in the collusion bound Q . Concretely, applying our techniques to the 1-bounded FE of [GKP+13] gives us a Q -bounded FE from subexponential LWE where ciphertexts grow as $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$ where d is the circuit-depth, improving on [AR17] (who achieve a quadratic dependence in Q) and on [CVW+18] (who construct a private-key FE scheme with a linear dependence in Q).

¹ Handling functions with output size ℓ is morally the same as increasing the collusion bound and handling ℓ functions with Boolean output. Indeed, this is made precise in the results of [BV15, AJS15, GS16, LM16].

	Ciphertext Size	Circuit Class	Assumptions	Remarks
[GVW12a]	$Q^4 \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	NC^1	PKE	Public-Key, Adaptive
	$Q^4 \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	NC^1	OWFs	Private-Key, Adaptive
	$Q^4 \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	P/Poly	DDH/LWE	Public-Key, Adaptive
[AR17]	$Q^2 + \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	P/Poly	LWE/Ring-LWE	Public-Key, Selective
[CVW ⁺ 18]	$Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	P/Poly	LWE	Private-Key, Selective
Our Work	$Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	P/Poly	PKE	Public-Key, Adaptive
	$Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$	P/Poly	OWFs	Private-Key, Adaptive

Fig. 1. State of the art for bounded key functional encryption schemes in terms of query dependence. Q denotes the number of circuit queries allowed in the security experiment and s denotes the size of the circuits for which functional keys are issued.

1.3 Technical Overview

We give an overview of the techniques. For the current discussion, our focus will be on the public-key setting; the techniques carry over *mutatis mutandis* to the private-key setting as well. We show our result in two steps. In the first step, we construct a public-key bounded-key FE for P/Poly starting from any public-key encryption scheme. We will not worry about optimizing the ciphertext size; indeed, it will be a large polynomial in the collusion bound Q . In the second step, we show a general way to reduce the ciphertext size: we show how to transform an FE scheme, where the ciphertext complexity grows polynomial in the collusion bound, into a FE scheme with *linear complexity*.

We now describe an overview of the techniques involved in the two steps, in order. In the technical sections, we invert the order of presentation since the second step (see Sect. 4) is simpler than the first (see Sect. 5).

First Step: Bounded-Key FE for p/poly. Our starting point is the observation from [SS10, GVW12a] that secure multiparty computation protocols with certain properties can be used to construct FE schemes; for [SS10], it was Yao’s two-party computation protocol [Yao86] and for [GVW12a], it was a non-interactive version of the BGW multi-party protocol [BOGW88]. Broadly speaking, our goal in this paper is to identify *the right* notion of MPC that can be turned into *optimal* bounded-collusion FE.

Towards this end, we define secure multiparty computation protocols in a client-server framework where there is a single client who wishes to delegate an a-priori bounded number Q of computations to N servers. We first describe the syntax of such protocols and then the security we require of them. A protocol in the client-server framework proceeds in two phases:

- An *offline phase* where the client encodes a private input x into N encodings, and the i^{th} server gets the i^{th} encoding.
- An *online phase* which is executed Q times, once for every function that the client wishes to delegate. In the j^{th} session, the client encodes a circuit C_j into N encodings, and sends each server an encoding. At this stage, only n of the N servers come online, perform some local computation on their encodings,

and output a single message each. (We call the local computation function *Local*.) A public decoding algorithm can then reconstruct the value $C_j(x)$ from these server messages. (We call the reconstruction function *Decode*.) Crucially, we require that the client does not keep any shared state between the online and offline phases.

As for security, we consider an adversary that corrupts an arbitrary size- t subset of the servers (for some pre-determined t) and learns (a) the offline phase messages received by these t servers and (b) the messages of *all the servers* in the online phase; that is, the adversary gets to see the entire communication between the client and the servers in the online phase. We require that such an adversary does not learn anything more about the client input x other than $\{C_j(x)\}_{j \in [Q]}$. This requirement is captured through a simulation-based definition. Two aspects make it challenging to construct such protocols:

- *Reusability*: the input encodings generated by the client should be reusable across different computations; and
- *Dynamic Recovery*: the ability for only a subset of servers to come together in the online phase to recover the output.

For the current discussion, we call secure protocols that satisfy both the above properties as *reusable dynamic MPC* protocols. In the technical sections, we will not explicitly use the terminology of reusable dynamic MPC protocols and just refer to them as client-server protocols.

Implicit in [GVW12a] is a construction of a reusable dynamic MPC protocol, where the circuits delegated by the client are in NC^1 . There is a fundamental barrier in extending their approach to handle circuits in P/Poly as they crucially use a two-round MPC protocol (derived from BGW) that securely computes polynomials. Circuits in P/Poly are believed to not have efficient polynomial representations. While several recent works [BL18, GS18, ACGJ18, GIS18, ABT18] demonstrate two-round MPC protocols that securely compute P/Poly , they fail to simultaneously satisfy reusability *and* dynamic recovery. Nonetheless, we will crucially use the construction of reusable dynamic MPC protocol for NC^1 [GVW12a], denoted by Π_{NC^1} , to build a protocol for P/Poly .

From Client-Server Protocol for P/Poly to Bounded-Key FE for P/Poly. Before we construct reusable dynamic MPC protocols for P/Poly , we first show how such protocols are useful in obtaining bounded-collusion FE for P/Poly . As an intermediate tool, we use a single-key FE scheme for P/Poly . This is a well studied object and can be based solely on the existence of public-key encryption [SS10]. We call such a scheme 1fe and we denote the bounded-collusion FE scheme that we wish to construct to be BFE . The construction of BFE , which follows along the lines of [GVW12a], proceeds as follows:

- The setup of BFE invokes $N = \text{poly}(Q)$ instantiations of 1fe . The N public keys of 1fe form the master public key of BFE and similarly the N secret keys of 1fe form the master secret key of BFE .

- To encrypt an input x in BFE, run the offline phase of the client-server framework. Denote the output to be $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^N)$. Encrypt \hat{x}^u under the u^{th} instantiation of 1fe. Output all the N ciphertexts of 1fe.
- The key generation for a circuit C in BFE is done as follows: run the client delegation procedure CktEnc on C to obtain $(\hat{C}^1, \dots, \hat{C}^N)$. Pick a random n -sized subset $\mathbf{S} \subseteq [N]$ and generate 1fe functional keys for $\text{Local}(\hat{C}^u, \cdot)$ (recall that Local is part of the online phase in client-server framework) for every u in the set \mathbf{S} . Output all the n functional keys of 1fe.
Note that here we crucially use the fact that the client does not share state between the offline and online phases.
- The decryption proceeds by first decrypting the u^{th} ciphertext of 1fe using the u^{th} functional key to obtain the encoding \hat{y}^u . Then run Decode to recover the answer.

The correctness of BFE follows from the correctness guarantees of 1fe and the reusable dynamic MPC framework. To argue security, as in [GVW12a], a simple combinatorial argument is first invoked to prove that the size of pairwise intersections of the sets chosen during the key-generation procedures of all the Q functional keys is at most t . For this argument to work, we need to set N to be a sufficiently large polynomial in Q . Using this observation, we can deduce that at most t instantiations of 1fe can be rendered insecure. An 1fe instantiation being rendered insecure means that the corresponding server is corrupted in the client-server framework; note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the number of instantiations of 1fe and the number of servers in the client-server framework. We can then use the property that the client-server protocol is secure even if at most t servers are corrupted, to argue that the scheme BFE is secure.

Moreover, since 1fe can be based on public-key encryption (resp., one-way functions), we obtain a public-key (resp., secret-key) BFE for P/Poly from reusable dynamic MPC for P/Poly assuming only public-key encryption (resp., one-way functions).

Reusable Dynamic MPC Protocol for P/Poly. Now that we have shown that reusable dynamic MPC is useful for constructing bounded-key FE, we shift our focus to building this object.

Towards this, we first define the abstraction of *correlated garbling*. This abstraction allows for generating multiple garbled circuits from a shared random string. More specifically, it comprises of two algorithms: CorrGarb and CorrEval . The correlated garbling algorithm CorrGarb takes as input circuit C , input x , a random string R (not necessarily uniformly generated) and outputs a garbled circuit GC and appropriate wire labels \mathbf{K}_x . The evaluation algorithm CorrEval takes as input $(\text{GC}, \mathbf{K}_x)$ and outputs $C(x)$. We require that all the different correlated garbled circuits $\{\text{GC}_i \leftarrow \text{CorrGarb}(C_i, x, R)\}$ produced using the *same string* R do not reveal any information about x beyond $\{(C_i, C_i(x))\}$.

We use this abstraction to transform Π_{NC^1} (recall, Π_{NC^1} is a reusable dynamic protocol for NC^1) into a reusable dynamic for P/Poly as follows:

- Offline Phase: to encode an input x , generate a random string R (as dictated by correlated garbling) and then encode (x, R) using the offline phase of Π_{NC^1} to obtain N input encodings.
- Online Phase: in the i^{th} session, let C_i be the circuit delegated by the client. The client generates the online phase of Π_{NC^1} on the circuit $\text{CorrGarb}(C_i, \cdot, \cdot)$ to obtain N circuit encodings and sends one encoding to each of the servers. A subset of the servers perform local computation of Π_{NC^1} and each of them output a single message. The value $C_i(x)$ can be recovered from the outputs of the servers in two steps: (i) run the decoding procedure of Π_{NC^1} to obtain the correlated garbled circuit-wire keys pair $(\text{GC}_i, \mathbf{K}_x^i)$ of (C_i, x) and then, (ii) run CorrEval on the correlated garbled circuit to recover the answer.

In order to implement the above construction, it is required that CorrGarb is representable by an NC^1 circuit: this is because Π_{NC^1} only allows for delegating computations in NC^1 . The security of the above construction follows from the fact that the different correlated garbled circuits along with wire keys $\{(\text{GC}_i, \mathbf{K}_x^i)\}$ can be simulated using $\{(C_i, C_i(x))\}$: note that all the correlated garbled circuits are computed as a function of the same random string R . In Sect. 5, we give a direct construction of client-server protocol from correlated garbling; in particular we do not assume that a client-server protocol for NC^1 as implicitly proposed in [GVW12a].

All that remains is to construct a correlated garbling scheme with the garbling function in NC^1 . We introduce novel techniques in this construction and this is the main technical contribution of the paper.

Construction of Correlated Garbling. The main hurdle in constructing a correlated garbling scheme is to ensure the security of different correlated garbled circuits computed using the same randomness. As a first attempt, we use the classical garbling scheme of Yao [Yao86]:

- Let s be the number of wires in the circuit to be garbled. For every wire w in the circuit, generate a large (i.e., $\text{poly}(\lambda, Q)$) number of uniformly random keys, denoted by the vector $\overrightarrow{\mathbf{K}}_w^0$, associated with bit 0 and λ number of keys $\overrightarrow{\mathbf{K}}_w^1$ for bit 1. Similarly, for every gate G in the circuit, generate a large (i.e., $\text{poly}(\lambda, Q)$) number of random strings, denoted by $\overrightarrow{\mathbf{R}}_G$. The collection of all the strings form the random string R that will be input to CorrGarb .
- To garble a circuit C , CorrGarb performs the following steps:
 - **Generation of wire keys and randomness for encryption:** It chooses a *random* λ -sized subset S ; for every wire w , it generates the wire key K_w^0 (resp., K_w^1) for w by XOR-ing the subset S of keys in $\overrightarrow{\mathbf{K}}_w^0$ (resp., $\overrightarrow{\mathbf{K}}_w^1$). Similarly, generate R_G by XOR-ing the subset S of random strings in $\overrightarrow{\mathbf{R}}_G$.
 - **Generating the garbled gates:** Using the wire keys and the random strings generated using the above process, we generate the garbled gates for every gate in the circuit. The generation process will be performed as

described in [Yao86]. In particular, this process will employ a private-key encryption scheme to generate four ciphertexts associated with every gate in the circuit.

- **CorrEval** is the same as the evaluation algorithm of the garbling scheme by [Yao86].

In addition to security, we need to argue that **CorrGarb** can be implemented in NC^1 ; recall that the latter property was crucially used to construct reusable dynamic MPC for P/Poly . Let us first give intuition as to why the above template satisfies security.

Suppose the string R (input to **CorrGarb**) is reused Q times to generate Q different collections of wire keys and random strings, with each such collection generated using a different random set S . Then each collection in turn is used to generate a single garbled circuit. First we invoke a combinatorial argument to prove that the joint distribution of the Q collections of wire keys and the random strings, generated as above, is identical to the product uniform distribution. Once this is proven, this proof can then be leveraged, using arguments standard in the garbling literature, to argue the security of the above correlated garbling candidate.

All is left is to show that **CorrGarb** can be implemented in NC^1 . Since the procedure **CorrGarb** involves running the encryption algorithm of a private-key scheme, at the very least we need to start with a private-key scheme with encryption algorithm computable in NC^1 . Unfortunately such schemes are known to exist only based on algebraic assumptions, in particular, assuming PRGs in NC^1 . Thus, the above candidate does not work for us.

To overcome this barrier, we make the following observation: notice that the generation of the random string R fed into **CorrGarb** is “lightweight”, meaning that no cryptographic primitives are used. On the other hand, the algorithm **CorrGarb** is “crypto-heavy”, meaning that it makes many invocations of a cryptographic primitive and specifically, a private-key encryption scheme. We design a *flipped* correlated garbling scheme, where the generation of R is “crypto-heavy” while **CorrGarb** is “lightweight”.

Specifically, we make the following changes to the above candidate.

- Instead of invoking the PRG during the execution of **CorrGarb**, we instead invoke this during the generation of R . While doing so, we observe that it is no longer necessary that PRG needs to be computable in NC^1 , since there is no such restriction when generating R . As a result, we will end up generating all the keys in $\{\vec{\mathbf{K}}_w^0, \vec{\mathbf{K}}_w^1\}$ using *any* pseudorandom generator.
- To maintain correctness, we need to encrypt a subset of the seeds of the PRG as part of the garbled table. Arguing security is more challenging now. We need to argue that the joint distribution of the Q collections of the wire keys and the random strings computed using R , is identical to the product uniform distribution, *even if some of the PRG seeds generating the wire keys are leaked* and this step is crucial to the proof of the correlated garbling lemma.

The above template is an over-simplified presentation of correlated garbling and we refer the reader to the technical sections for a precise description.

Summarizing the First Step. We summarize the steps to construct a bounded-key functional encryption for P/Poly.

1. We construct correlated garbling for P/Poly from one-way functions.
2. Combining correlated garbling with techniques from [GVW12a], we construct a protocol in the client-server framework (satisfying both reusability and dynamic recovery) that handles P/Poly computations.
3. Finally, we construct bounded-key FE for P/Poly from a client-server protocol and single-key functional encryption for P/Poly [SS10, GVW12a].

The ciphertext complexity in the resulting FE scheme, however, grows polynomially in Q .

Second Step: Linear Dependence in Query Complexity. In the second step, we give a generic transformation to turn the FE scheme resulting from the first step into one that satisfies linear complexity property. This transformation is remarkably simple and draws connections to the classical load balancing problem. Recall in the load balancing problem, there are Q reviewers and there are Q papers to review, with each reviewer having bandwidth to review at most q papers. Assigning papers at random to the reviewers ensures that each reviewer has to review one paper on average. By a simple Chernoff argument coupled with union bound argument, it follows that, as long as q is large enough, the probability that any reviewer has to review more than q papers is small. We propose our transformation along these lines: let **bfe** be the FE scheme obtained from the first step and let **BFE** be the FE scheme with linear complexity that we wish to construct. To tolerate a query bound Q , we consider Q instantiations of **bfe** in parallel, where the collusion bound (read as “load”) in **bfe** is set to be q .

- To encrypt a message x in **BFE**, encrypt x in all the instantiations of **bfe**.
- To generate a functional key for a circuit C , pick an index i in $[Q]$ at random and generate a **bfe** functional key corresponding to the i^{th} instantiation. This is akin to assigning a paper to a reviewer at random.

If we set q to be security parameter, we can prove (using Chernoff and union bounds) that it is highly unlikely that the number of **bfe** functional keys issued for any given index is greater than q . This allows us to invoke the security of **bfe** scheme to prove the security of **BFE**. Moreover, the ciphertext complexity of **BFE** is linear in Q , as desired! (each **bfe** ciphertext is of size fixed polynomial in the security parameter and in particular, independent of Q).

2 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by λ . Suppose x and y be two strings. Then, we denote $x \circ y$ to be the concatenation of x and y .

Let D be a distribution with an efficient sampler. We denote the process of sampling v from D to be $v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} D$. The statistical distance between two distributions D_0 and D_1 is ε if $\sum_{v \in V} |\Pr[v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} D_0] - \Pr[v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} D_1]| \leq 2\varepsilon$, where V is the support of both D_0 and D_1 . Two distributions D_0 and D_1 are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} , the following holds: $\left| \Pr_{v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} D_0} [0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(v)] - \Pr_{v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} D_1} [0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(v)] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$, for some negligible function negl .

We assume that without loss of generality, every polynomial-sized circuit considered in this work contain only boolean gates (over any universal basis) with at most two output wires. Note that if every gate in a polynomial-sized circuit has at most one output wire then this circuit is representable as a polynomial-sized formula and thus, is in NC^1 . The class of all polynomial-sized circuits is denoted by P/Poly .

2.1 Bounded-Key Functional Encryption

A public-key functional encryption scheme bfe associated with a class of boolean circuits \mathcal{C} is defined by the following algorithms.

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$: On input security parameter λ , query bound Q , maximum size of the circuits s for which functional keys are issued, output the master secret key msk and the master public key mpk .
- **Key Generation**, $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$: On input master secret key msk and a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}$, output the functional key sk_C .
- **Encryption**, $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, x)$: On input master public key mpk , input x , output the ciphertext ct .
- **Decryption**, $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct})$: On input functional key sk_C , ciphertext ct , output the value y .

Remark 1. A private-key functional encryption scheme is defined similarly, except that $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$ outputs only the master secret key msk and the encryption algorithm Enc takes as input the master secret key msk and the message x .

Remark 2. Henceforth, Setup will only take as input $(1^\lambda, 1^s)$ in the case when $Q = 1$.

A functional encryption scheme satisfies the following properties.

Correctness. Consider an input x and a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}$ of size s . We require the following to hold for every $Q \geq 1$:

$$\Pr \left[C(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct}) : \begin{array}{l} (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s); \\ \text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C); \\ \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, x) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl .

Efficiency. Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec run in time polynomial in their respective inputs.

We define a measure of efficiency that captures the dependance of the ciphertext complexity on the query bound. We define this formally below.

Definition 1 (Linear Complexity). *A functional encryption scheme $\text{bfe} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is said to have linear complexity if the following holds:*

- The time to compute $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, x)$ is $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$.
- The time to compute $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$ for a circuit of size s is $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$.

where $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$.

Security. To define the security of a bounded-key functional encryption scheme bfe , we define two experiments Expt_0 and Expt_1 . Experiment Expt_0 , also referred to as *real* experiment, is parameterized by PPT stateful adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger Ch . Experiment Expt_1 , also referred to as *simulated* experiment, is parameterized by PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and PPT stateful simulator Sim .

$\text{Expt}_0^{\text{bfe}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Ch}}(1^\lambda)$:

- \mathcal{A} outputs the query bound Q and the maximum circuit size s .
- Ch executes $\text{bfe.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$ to obtain the master public key-master secret key pair (mpk, msk) .
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} , with oracle access to $\text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$, outputs the challenge message x .
- **Challenge Message Query:** Ch outputs the challenge ciphertext ct .
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} , with oracle access to $\text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$, outputs the bit b .
- If the total number of oracle calls made by \mathcal{A} is greater than Q , output \perp . Otherwise, output b .

$\text{Expt}_1^{\text{bfe}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}(1^\lambda)$:

- \mathcal{A} outputs the query bound Q and the maximum circuit size s .
- Sim , on input $(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$, outputs the master public key mpk .
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} , with oracle access to Sim (generating simulated functional keys), outputs the challenge message x .
 - Let QSet be the set of circuit queries made by \mathcal{A} to Sim .
 - Construct the set \mathcal{V} as follows: for every $C \in \text{QSet}$, include $(C, C(x))$ in \mathcal{V} .
- **Challenge Message Query:** $\text{Sim}(1^{|x|}, \mathcal{V})$ outputs the challenge ciphertext ct .
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} , with oracle access to Sim (generating simulated functional keys), outputs bit b .
- If the total number of circuit queries made by \mathcal{A} is greater than Q , output \perp . Otherwise, output b .

A public-key functional encryption scheme is adaptively secure if the output distributions of the above two experiments are computationally indistinguishable. More formally,

Definition 2 (Adaptive Security). *A public-key functional encryption scheme bfe is **adaptively secure** if for every large enough security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that the following holds:*

$$\left| \Pr \left[0 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_0^{\text{bfe}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Ch}}(1^\lambda) \right] - \Pr \left[0 \leftarrow \text{Exp}_1^{\text{bfe}, \mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}}(1^\lambda) \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl .

Remark 3. The selective security notion can be defined by similarly formulating the real and the simulated experiments. The only difference between selective security and adaptive security notions is that in the selective security notion, the adversary is supposed to output the challenge message even before it receives the master public key or makes any circuit query.

In the private-key setting, selective and adaptive security notions can be defined similarly.

3 Result Statements

We prove our result in two steps. In the first step, we present a transformation that converts a bounded-key functional encryption scheme, that doesn't have linear complexity property, into one that satisfies linear complexity.

Generic Transformation to Achieve Linear Complexity. We prove the following theorem in Sect. 4.

Theorem 3. *Consider a class \mathcal{C} of polynomial-sized circuits. If there exists a public-key (resp., private-key) bounded-key FE scheme for \mathcal{C} then there exists a public-key (resp., private-key) bounded-key FE scheme for \mathcal{C} that additionally satisfies linear complexity property (Definition 1).*

Remark 4. Our transformation does not place any restrictions on \mathcal{C} . In particular, our transformation works for identity-based encryption schemes, attribute-based encryption schemes, and so on.

The above theorem is restated as Theorem 6 in Sect. 4.

Bounded key FE for P/Poly. We prove the following theorem in Sect. 5.

Theorem 4. *Assuming the existence of public-key encryption (resp., one-way functions), there exists a public-key (resp., private-key) bounded-key functional encryption scheme for P/Poly.*

We prove the above theorem by first defining a client-server framework and then we construct a bounded-key FE from a client-server protocol. Finally, we instantiate client-server protocols from one-way functions.

The above theorem is restated as Theorem 7 in Sect. 5.

Bounded Key FE for P/Poly satisfying Linear Complexity. By combining the above two theorems, we achieve our main result.

Theorem 5 (Main Theorem). *Assuming the existence of public-key encryption (resp., one-way functions), there exists a public-key (resp., private-key) bounded-key functional encryption scheme satisfying linear complexity property for P/Poly.*

Our construction of functional encryption scheme in the above theorem makes only black box use of public-key encryption (or one-way functions).

4 Achieving Linear Complexity Generically

We show how to generically achieve linear complexity for any bounded-key FE scheme. In particular, we prove the following:

Theorem 6. *If there exists a bounded-key FE scheme, denoted by bfe, for \mathcal{C} then there exists a bounded-key FE scheme, denoted by BFE, for \mathcal{C} that additionally satisfies linear complexity property (Definition 1). Moreover, the following holds:*

- *If bfe is adaptively secure (resp., selectively secure) then BFE is adaptively secure (resp., selectively secure).*
- *If bfe is a public-key (resp., private key) scheme then BFE is a public-key (resp., private key) scheme.*
- *If bfe is simulation secure (resp., IND-secure) then BFE is simulation secure (resp., IND-secure).*

Proof. We focus on the case when bfe is adaptively secure, public-key and simulation secure. Our construction easily extends to the other cases as well.

We describe BFE below.

- Setup($1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s$): On input security parameter λ , query bound Q , maximum circuit size s for which functional keys are issued, generate $(\text{mpk}_i, \text{msk}_i) \leftarrow \text{bfe.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^q, 1^s)$ for every $i \in [Q]$, where $q = \lambda$ (in fact, q can even be set to be poly-logarithmic in the security parameter). Output the following:

$$\text{MSK} = (\text{msk}_1, \dots, \text{msk}_Q), \text{MPK} = (\text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_Q)$$

- KeyGen(msk, \mathcal{C}): On input master secret key msk , circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}$,
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$.
 - Generate $\text{sk}_C \xleftarrow{\$} \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{bfe.msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$.
 Output $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$.

- $\text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x)$: On input master public key MPK , input x , generate $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{bfe.Enc}(\text{mpk}_i, x)$ for every $i \in [Q]$. Output $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_Q)$.
- $\text{Dec}(\text{SK}_C, \text{CT})$: On input functional key $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$, ciphertext $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_Q)$, compute $\text{bfe.Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct}_u)$. Output the result.

The correctness of BFE follows directly from the correctness of bfe . We analyze the efficiency of the above scheme next.

Suppose the time taken to generate a bfe ciphertext of message x is $\text{poly}(\lambda, s)$ then the time taken to generate a BFE ciphertext of message x is $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$. Similarly, if the time taken to generate a bfe functional key of C is $\text{poly}(\lambda, s)$, where s is the size of C , then the time taken to generate a BFE functional key of f is $Q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, s)$. Thus, the resulting scheme BFE satisfies linear complexity property.

The only property left to be proved is the security property, which we prove next.

Security. Let sim be the stateful simulator of the bfe scheme. Since we invoke bfe scheme Q times in the scheme, we consider Q instantiations of the stateful simulator, denoted by $\text{sim}_1, \dots, \text{sim}_Q$. We construct a simulator SIM associated with the BFE scheme. We denote the PPT adversary to be \mathcal{A} .

The simulator SIM proceeds as follows:

1. It receives the query bound Q and the maximum circuit size s from \mathcal{A} .
2. For every $i \in [Q]$, execute $\text{sim}_i(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$ to obtain the i^{th} master public key mpk_i . Set $\text{MPK} = (\text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_Q)$. Send MPK to \mathcal{A} .
3. Initialize the sets $\text{qset}_i = \emptyset$, for every $i \in [Q]$. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , do the following:
 Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{sim}_u(C)$. Add C to qset_u . If $|\text{qset}_u| > q$ then output \perp . Otherwise, send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$.
 \mathcal{A} finally outputs the challenge message x .
4. For every $i \in [Q]$, construct the set \mathcal{V}_i as follows: for every $C \in \text{qset}_i$, include $(C, C(x))$ in \mathcal{V}_i . For every $i \in [Q]$, compute $\text{sim}_i(1^{|x|}, \mathcal{V}_i)$ to obtain ct_i . Set $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_Q)$. Send CT to \mathcal{A} .
5. In the next phase, \mathcal{A} makes circuit queries. For every circuit query C made by the adversary, do the following:
 Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{sim}_u(C, C(x))$. Add C to qset_u . If $|\text{qset}_u| > q$ then output \perp . Otherwise, send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$.

Consider the following hybrids. The changes are marked in **red**.

Hyb₁: This corresponds to the real experiment. For completeness, we describe the real experiment here.

1. The challenger Ch receives the query bound Q and the maximum circuit size s from \mathcal{A} .
2. Execute $\text{bfe.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$ for Q times to obtain $\{(\text{msk}_i, \text{mpk}_i)\}_{i \in [Q]}$. Set $\text{MPK} = (\text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_Q)$. Send MPK to \mathcal{A} .

3. Initialize the sets $\text{qset}_i = \emptyset$, for every $i \in [Q]$. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , Ch does the following:
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$. Add C to $\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}$. Send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} finally outputs the challenge message x .
4. For every $i \in [Q]$, generate $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{bfe.Enc}(\text{mpk}_i, x)$. Set $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_Q)$. Send CT to \mathcal{A} .
5. In the next phase, \mathcal{A} makes circuit queries. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , do the following:
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$. Add C to $\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}$. Send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$ to \mathcal{A} .
6. Let b be the output of \mathcal{A} . If $\left| \bigcup_{i=1}^Q \text{qset}_i \right| > Q$, output \perp . Otherwise, output b .

Remark 5. Note that the experiment described above is phrased differently from the real experiment of the bounded-key FE scheme. In the real experiment, the challenger only keeps track of the total number of BFE circuit queries made by the adversary but in \mathbf{Hyb}_1 , the challenger keeps track of the set of bfe functional keys issued per index. Since ultimately the challenger only aborts if the size of the union of all these sets exceeds Q , the output distribution of \mathbf{Hyb}_1 is the same as the output distribution of the real experiment.

\mathbf{Hyb}_2 : This hybrid is the same as the previous hybrid except that the real experiment outputs \perp if there exists an index $\mathbf{u} \in [Q]$ such that $|\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}| > q$.

In particular, we make the following changes to bullets 3 and 5 in the experiment described in \mathbf{Hyb}_1 .

3. Initialize the sets $\text{qset}_i = \emptyset$, for every $i \in [Q]$. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , Ch does the following:
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$. Add C to $\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}$. **If $|\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}| > q$ then output \perp .** Otherwise, send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} finally outputs the challenge message x .
5. In the next phase, \mathcal{A} makes circuit queries. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , do the following:
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$. Add C to $\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}$. **If $|\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}| > q$ then output \perp .** Otherwise, send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$ to \mathcal{A} .

Claim. The statistical distance between the output distributions of \mathbf{Hyb}_1 and \mathbf{Hyb}_2 is at most $Q \cdot e^{-\frac{(q-1)^2}{1+q}}$ and thus, negligible in λ .

Proof. Define $\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u},j}$, for every $\mathbf{u} \in [Q]$, $j \in [Q]$, to be a random variable such that $\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u},j} = 1$ if in the j^{th} circuit query C made by the adversary, the challenger responds with $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$; that is, the challenger responds with the functional key corresponding to the \mathbf{u}^{th} instantiation of bfe. Let $\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u}} = \sum_{j=1}^Q \mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u},j}$.

Note that $\Pr[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u},j} = 1] = \frac{1}{Q}$. By linearity of expectation, $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u}}] = 1$.

By Chernoff bound, we have the following: for every $\mathbf{u} \in Q$,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u}} > q] &= \Pr[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u}} > q \cdot \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u}}]] \\ &\leq \frac{1}{e^{\frac{(q-1)^2}{2+(q-1)} \cdot \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{u}}]}} \end{aligned}$$

Thus for any fixed $\mathbf{u} \in [Q]$, the probability that the number of bfe functional keys per index \mathbf{u} issued by the challenger is greater than q is at most $e^{-\frac{(q-1)^2}{1+q}}$. By union bound, the probability that there exists an index \mathbf{u} such that the challenger issues more than q functional keys with respect to \mathbf{u} is at most $Q \cdot e^{-\frac{(q-1)^2}{1+q}}$.

Next, we consider a sequence of intermediate hybrids.

Hyb_{3,j}, for all $\mathbf{j} \in [Q]$: In this intermediate hybrid, the first \mathbf{u} instantiations, with $\mathbf{u} < \mathbf{j}$ are simulated. The rest of the instantiations are honestly computed.

We consider \mathbf{j} instantiations of the stateful simulator, denoted by $\text{sim}_1, \dots, \text{sim}_{\mathbf{j}}$. We describe the hybrid experiment below.

1. The challenger Ch receives the query bound Q and the maximum circuit size s from \mathcal{A} .
2. For $i < \mathbf{j}$, execute $\text{sim}_i(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$ to obtain the i^{th} master public key mpk_i . For $i \geq \mathbf{j}$, execute $\text{bfe.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s)$ to obtain $(\text{msk}_i, \text{mpk}_i)$. Set $\text{MPK} = (\text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_Q)$. Send MPK to \mathcal{A} .
3. Initialize the sets $\text{qset}_i = \emptyset$, for every $i \in [Q]$. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , Ch does the following:
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate sk_C as follows:
 - If $\mathbf{u} < \mathbf{j}$, generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{sim}_{\mathbf{u}}(C)$.
 - If $\mathbf{u} \geq \mathbf{j}$, generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$.
 - Add C to $\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}$. If $|\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}| > q$ then output \perp . Otherwise, send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$ to \mathcal{A} .
 - \mathcal{A} finally outputs the challenge message x .
4. For every $i \in [Q]$, construct the set \mathcal{V}_i as follows: for every $C \in \text{qset}_i$, include $(C, C(x))$ in \mathcal{V}_i . Compute CT as follows:
 - If $i < \mathbf{j}$, compute $\text{sim}_i(1^{|x|}, \mathcal{V}_i)$ to obtain ct_i .
 - If $i \geq \mathbf{j}$, compute $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{bfe.Enc}(\text{mpk}_i, x)$.
 Set $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_Q)$. Send CT to \mathcal{A} .
5. In the next phase, \mathcal{A} makes circuit queries. For every circuit query C made by \mathcal{A} , do the following:
 - Sample $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} [Q]$ and then generate sk_C as follows:
 - If $\mathbf{u} < \mathbf{j}$, generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{sim}_{\mathbf{u}}(C, C(x))$.
 - If $\mathbf{u} \geq \mathbf{j}$, generate $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{bfe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_{\mathbf{u}}, C)$.
 - Add C to $\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}$. If $|\text{qset}_{\mathbf{u}}| > q$ then output \perp . Otherwise, send $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{u}, \text{sk}_C)$ to \mathcal{A} .
6. Let b be the output of \mathcal{A} . If $|\bigcup_{i=1}^Q \text{qset}_i| > Q$, output \perp . Otherwise, output b .

The following two claims are immediate.

Claim. The output distributions of \mathbf{Hyb}_2 and $\mathbf{Hyb}_{3,1}$ are identically distributed.

Claim. For every $\mathbf{j} \in [Q - 1]$, the security of \mathbf{bfe} implies that the output distributions of $\mathbf{Hyb}_{3,\mathbf{j}}$ and $\mathbf{Hyb}_{3,\mathbf{j}+1}$ are computationally indistinguishable.

\mathbf{Hyb}_4 : This corresponds to the simulated experiment.
 The proof of the following claim is immediate.

Claim. The security of \mathbf{bfe} implies that the output distributions of $\mathbf{Hyb}_{3,Q}$ and \mathbf{Hyb}_4 are computationally indistinguishable.

5 Construction of Bounded-Key FE for P/Poly

We construct a bounded-key FE scheme for P/Poly as follows:

- First we define a client-server framework and show how to construct a bounded-key FE for P/Poly from a protocol in this client-server framework.
- We then show, in the full version [AV19], how to construct a protocol in the client-server framework from one-way functions.

We begin by describing the client-server framework.

5.1 Client-Server Framework

The client-server framework consists of a single client and $N = N(\lambda, Q)$ servers, where λ is the security parameter. It is additionally parameterized by $n = n(\lambda, Q)$ and $t = t(\lambda, Q)$. The framework consists of the following two phases:

- **Offline Phase:** In this phase, the client takes as input the number of sessions Q , size of the circuit delegated s , input x and executes a PPT algorithm \mathbf{InpEnc} that outputs correlated input encodings $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^N)$. It sends the encoding \hat{x}^u to the \mathbf{u}^{th} server.
- **Online Phase:** This phase is executed for Q sessions. In each session, the client delegates the computation of a circuit C on x to the servers. This is done in the following steps:
 - **Client Delegation:** This is performed by the client computing a PPT algorithm \mathbf{CktEnc} on input $(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, C)$ to obtain $(\hat{C}^1, \dots, \hat{C}^N)$. It sends the circuit encoding \hat{C}^u to the \mathbf{u}^{th} server. Note that \mathbf{CktEnc} is executed independently of the offline phase and in particular, does not depend on the randomness used in the offline phase².
 - **Local Computation by Servers:** Upon receiving the circuit encodings from the client, a subset \mathbf{S} of servers come online and the \mathbf{u}^{th} server in this set \mathbf{S} computes $\mathbf{Local}(\hat{C}^u, \hat{x}^u)$ to obtain the \mathbf{u}^{th} output encoding \hat{y}^u .
 - **Decoding:** Finally, the output is recovered by computing a PPT algorithm \mathbf{Decode} on $(\{\hat{y}^u\}_{u \in \mathbf{S}}, \mathbf{S})$.

We describe the properties below. We start with correctness.

² We could define a notion where \mathbf{CktEnc} takes as input the randomness of the offline phase. It is however not clear how to build FE from such a notion.

Correctness. A protocol Π in the client-server framework is said to be correct if the following holds:

- Suppose the client computes encodings of input x by computing $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^N) \leftarrow \text{InpEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, x)$.
- In the online phase, let C be the circuit that the client wants to delegate. The client computes $(\hat{C}^1, \dots, \hat{C}^N) \leftarrow \text{CktEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, C)$ and distributes the circuit encodings to all the servers. A subset of servers $\mathbf{S} \subseteq [N]$, of size n , then locally compute on the circuit encodings. That is, for every $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbf{S}$, the \mathbf{u}^{th} server computes $\hat{y}^{\mathbf{u}} = \text{Local}(\text{gc}, \hat{x}^{\mathbf{u}})$. Finally, the output can be recovered by computing $\text{Decode}(\{\hat{y}^{\mathbf{u}}\}_{\mathbf{u} \in \mathbf{S}}, \mathbf{S})$ to obtain y .

We require that $y = C(x)$.

Security. We allow the adversary to be able to corrupt a subset of servers. Once the server is corrupted, the entire state of the server is leaked to the adversary. The adversary, however, is not allowed to corrupt the client. In every session, since n servers can recover the output, the number of servers that can be corrupted has to be less than n^3 .

Informally, we require the following guarantee: even if the adversary can corrupt a subset of servers, he cannot learn anything beyond the outputs of the computation $(C_1(x), \dots, C_Q(x))$ in every session, where C_1, \dots, C_Q are the circuits delegated by the client. However, the circuits (C_1, \dots, C_Q) are not hidden from the adversary. Since our end goal is to build FE for P/Poly, we need to suitably define the security property that would enable us to prove the security of FE. Towards this, we incorporate the following in the security definition of the client-server framework:

- We not only allow the adversary to choose the servers to corrupt but also allow it to decide the subsets of servers $\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_Q$ participating in the Q sessions.
- In every session, the adversary is provided all the N circuit encodings. Moreover, the outputs of the local computation of all the servers, including the honest servers, are visible to the adversary.

To define the security notion formally, we first state the following experiments. The first experiment Expt_0 is parameterized by a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and PPT challenger Ch and the second experiment Expt_1 is parameterized by \mathcal{A} and PPT stateful simulator Sim_{csf} .

$\text{Expt}_0^{\mathcal{A}, \text{Ch}}(1^\lambda)$:

³ If n or more servers can be corrupted then the corrupted set can recover $C(x)$ for any circuit C : this is because the corrupted servers can execute CktEnc on input C , run the local computation procedure and then decode their outputs. Thus, such a notion would imply program obfuscation.

- \mathcal{A} outputs the query bound Q , maximum circuit size s , total number of parties N , number of parties n participating in any session, threshold t , corruption set $\mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}} \subseteq [N]$ and the input x . If $|\mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}}| > t$ then the experiment aborts. It also outputs the sets $\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_Q \subseteq [N]$ such that $|\mathbf{S}_i| = n$, where \mathbf{S}_i is the set of parties participating in the i^{th} session.
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} is allowed to make a total of Q circuit queries. First, it makes $Q_1 \leq Q$ adaptive⁴ circuit queries C_1, \dots, C_{Q_1} .
For the i^{th} circuit query C_i , Ch computes $(\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N) \leftarrow \text{CktEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, C_i)$ and sends $(\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N)$.
- **Challenge Input Query:** \mathcal{A} submits the input x . Ch generates $\text{InpEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, x)$ to obtain $(\widehat{x}^1, \dots, \widehat{x}^N)$.
Ch sends $\left(\{\widehat{x}^u\}_{u \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}}}, \left\{ \text{Local}(\widehat{C}_i^u, \widehat{x}^u) \right\}_{i \in [Q_1], u \in \mathbf{S}_i} \right)$. That is, the challenger sends the input encodings of the corrupted set of servers along with the outputs of Local on the circuit encodings received so far.
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} then makes $Q_2 = Q - Q_1$ adaptive circuit queries C_{Q_1+1}, \dots, C_Q .
Ch computes $(\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N) \leftarrow \text{CktEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, C_i)$ and sends $\left\{ \left\{ (\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N), \text{Local}(\widehat{C}_i^u, \widehat{x}^u) \right\}_{i \in \{Q_1+1, \dots, Q\}, u \in \mathbf{S}_i} \right\}$.
- \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b . The output of the experiment is b .

$\text{Expt}_1^{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}_{\text{csf}}}(1^\lambda)$:

- \mathcal{A} outputs the query bound Q , maximum circuit size s , total number of parties N , number of parties n participating in any session, threshold t , corruption set $\mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}} \subseteq [N]$ and the input x . If $|\mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}}| > t$ then the experiment aborts. It also outputs the sets $\mathbf{S}_1, \dots, \mathbf{S}_Q \subseteq [N]$ such that $|\mathbf{S}_i| = n$, where \mathbf{S}_i is the set of parties participating in the i^{th} session.
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} makes a total of Q adaptive queries. First it makes $Q_1 \leq Q$ adaptive circuit queries. For the i^{th} circuit query C_i , the simulator computes $(\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{csf}}(C_i)$ and sends $(\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N)$.
- **Challenge Input Query:** \mathcal{A} submits the input x . Construct \mathcal{V} as follows: $\mathcal{V} = \{C_i, C_i(x) : i \in [Q_1]\}$.
 Sim_{csf} on input $(1^{|x|}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}}, \mathcal{V})$ (and in particular, it does not get x as input) outputs the simulated encodings $(\{\widehat{x}^u\}_{u \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}}})$ and the encodings of outputs $\{\widehat{y}_i^u\}_{i \in [Q_1], u \in \mathbf{S}_i}$ such that $\widehat{y}_i^u = \text{Local}(\widehat{C}_i^u, \widehat{x}^u)$ for every $u \in \mathbf{S}_i \cap \mathcal{S}_{\text{corr}}$.
- **Circuit Queries:** \mathcal{A} then makes $Q_2 = Q - Q_1$ adaptive circuit queries C_{Q_1+1}, \dots, C_Q . The simulator Sim_{csf} on input $(i, C_i, C_i(x))$, for $i \in \{Q_1 + 1, \dots, Q\}$, sends $\left((\widehat{C}_i^1, \dots, \widehat{C}_i^N), \widehat{y}_i^u \right)$.
- \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b . The output of the experiment is b .

⁴ By adaptive, we mean that the adversary can decide each circuit query as a function of all the previous circuit queries.

We formally define the security property below.

Definition 3 (Security). *A protocol Π is secure if for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT simulator Sim_{csf} such that the following holds:*

$$\left| \Pr[0 \leftarrow \text{Expt}_0^{\mathcal{A}, \text{Ch}}(1^\lambda)] - \Pr[0 \leftarrow \text{Expt}_1^{\mathcal{A}, \text{Sim}_{\text{csf}}}(1^\lambda)] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl .

5.2 Bounded-Key FE for P/Poly from Client-Server Framework

We now present a construction of a bounded-key functional encryption for all polynomial-sized circuits from a protocol in the client-server framework.

Theorem 7. *There exists a public-key (resp., private-key) adaptively secure bounded-key functional encryption scheme BFE for P/Poly assuming,*

- *A public-key (resp., private-key) adaptively secure single-key functional encryption scheme 1fe for P/Poly and,*
- *A protocol for P/Poly in the client-server framework, denoted by $\Pi = (\text{InpEnc}, \text{CktEnc}, \text{Local}, \text{Decode})$.*

Proof. We focus on the public-key setting; the construction and the analysis for the private-key setting is identical. We describe the algorithms of BFE below. Let the protocol in the client-server framework be parameterized by $t = \Theta(Q\lambda)$, $N = \Theta(Q^2t^2)$ and $n = \Theta(t)$, where Q is the query bound defined as part of the scheme.

- Setup($1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s$): On input security parameter λ , query bound Q , circuit size s , generate $(\text{msk}_i, \text{mpk}_i) \leftarrow 1\text{fe.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^s)$ for $i \in [N]$. Output the following:

$$\text{MSK} = (\text{msk}_1, \dots, \text{msk}_N), \quad \text{MPK} = (Q, \text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_N)$$

- KeyGen(MSK, C): On input master secret key MSK , circuit C ,
 - Sample a set $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{\$} [N]$, of size n , uniformly at random.
 - Compute $(\widehat{C}^1, \dots, \widehat{C}^N) \leftarrow \text{CktEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, C)$.
 - Let $\text{E}^u(\cdot) = \text{Local}(\widehat{C}^u, \cdot)$. Generate a functional key for E^u ; that is, compute $\text{sk}_{\text{E}^u} \leftarrow 1\text{fe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}_u, \text{E}^u)$ for every $u \in \mathbf{S}$.

Output $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{S}, \{\text{sk}_{\text{E}^u}\}_{u \in \mathbf{S}})$.

- Enc(MPK, x): On input master public key MPK ,
 - Compute $(\widehat{x}^1, \dots, \widehat{x}^N) \leftarrow \text{InpEnc}(1^\lambda, 1^Q, 1^s, x)$.
 - For every $i \in [N]$, compute $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{mpk}_i, \widehat{x}^i)$.

Output $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_N)$.

- Dec(SK_C, CT): On input functional key $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{S}, \{\text{sk}_{\text{E}^u}\}_{u \in \mathbf{S}})$, ciphertext $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_N)$,
 - For every $u \in \mathbf{S}$, compute $\widehat{y}^u \leftarrow 1\text{fe.Dec}(\text{sk}_{\text{E}^u}, \text{ct}_u)$.
 - Compute $\text{Decode}(\{\widehat{y}^u\}_{u \in \mathbf{S}}, \mathbf{S})$ to obtain y .

Output y .

Correctness. Consider a circuit C and an input x . Suppose $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MPK}, x)$ and $\text{SK}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$. Let $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_N)$ and $\text{SK}_C = (\mathbf{S}, \{\text{sk}_{E^u}\}_{u \in \mathbf{S}})$. By the correctness of 1fe , $\text{1fe.Dec}(\text{sk}_{E^u}, \text{ct}^u) = \text{Local}(\widehat{C}^u, \widehat{x}^u)$ for every $u \in \mathbf{S}$. From the correctness of Π , it follows that $\text{Decode}\left(\left\{\text{Local}(\widehat{C}^u, \widehat{x}^u)\right\}_{u \in \mathbf{S}}, \mathbf{S}\right) = C(x)$.

We present the proof of security in the full version [AV19].

Instantiation. The bounded-key functional encryption scheme described above makes black box usage of $\text{InpEnc}(\cdot)$ algorithm of Π . Moreover, in the construction of Π (described in the full version [AV19]), pseudorandom generators are only used in $\text{InpEnc}(\cdot)$. Furthermore, $\text{InpEnc}(\cdot)$ only makes black box calls to the pseudorandom generator. Thus, assuming that 1fe makes black box usage of public-key encryption, the bounded-key functional encryption scheme described above, when instantiated with Π , yields a bounded-key scheme that makes only oracle calls to cryptographic primitives (public-key encryption and pseudorandom generators). All that is left is to demonstrate the feasibility of a single-key adaptively-secure public-key functional encryption that makes black box usage of public-key encryption.

To show this, we first present an informal description of single-key public-key FE 1fe for P/Poly from [SS10].

- $\text{1fe.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^s)$: Sample $2s$ public keys $pk_{i,b}$ ($i \in [s], b \in \{0, 1\}$) and secret keys $sk_{i,b}$ ($i \in [s], b \in \{0, 1\}$) corresponding to a public-key encryption scheme. Call the master public key $\text{mpk} = (pk_{i,b})_{i \in [s], b \in \{0, 1\}}$ and the master secret key $\text{msk} = (sk_{i,b})_{i \in [s], b \in \{0, 1\}}$.
- $\text{1fe.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$: Output $\text{sk}_C = (sk_{i,C_i})$, where C_i denotes the i^{th} bit in the description of C . Output sk_C .
- $\text{1fe.Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$: Generate a garbling of $U_x(\cdot)$, where $U_x(\cdot)$ is a universal circuit that takes as input a circuit C of size s and outputs $C(x)$. Call the resulting garbled circuit to be GC . Encrypt the $(i, b)^{\text{th}}$ wire label, for $i \in [s], b \in \{0, 1\}$, using $pk_{i,b}$; call this ciphertext $ct_{i,b}$. Output $\text{ct} = (\text{GC}, (ct_{i,b})_{i \in [s], b \in \{0, 1\}})$.
- $\text{1fe.Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct})$: Decrypt ct_{i,C_i} using sk_{i,C_i} to obtain the $(i, C_i)^{\text{th}}$ wire label. Using all the wire labels recovered, evaluate the garbled circuit to obtain $C(x)$.

The above construction only guarantees selective security; this construction was upgraded to adaptive security by [GVW12a]. This construction is described in Sect. 4.3 (page 14) of the ePrint version of [GVW12a] ([GVW12b], version posted on 06-Sep-2012 17:57:14 UTC). The ONEQFE scheme (that allows a single function query and adaptive simulation security) described in Sect. 4.3 is constructed from randomized encodings for P/poly (which can be based on one-way functions) along with BFFE scheme described in Sect. 4.2. Moreover, the BFFE scheme described in Sect. 4.2 can be based on any PKE scheme (see the first para of Sect. 4.2).

BFFE scheme makes black box usage of PKE. Also, the ONEQFE scheme makes black-box usage of the one-way function (used for randomized encoding) and the underlying procedures of the BFFE scheme.

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