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A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II

Markets, Trade and Regulation of Quality

Edited by
Silvia A. Conca Messina · Stéphane Le Bras
Paolo Tedeschi · Manuel Vaquero Piñeiro

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Paolo Tedeschi · Manuel Vaquero Piñeiro
Editors

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Palgrave Studies in Economic History
ISBN 978-3-030-27793-2 ISBN 978-3-030-27794-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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Terroir, Institutions and Improvements in European Wine History: An Introduction

Silvia A. Conca Messina, Stéphane Le Bras, Paolo Tedeschi and Manuel Vaquero Piñeiro

The Research Project and the Relevance of the Topic

The project of a book collecting papers about different European wine regions was developed during Spring 2017 by Paolo Tedeschi and Manuel Vaquero Piñeiro, scholars in economic history and members of the informal group of research about the Italian Oeno-History.

Considering that, from food and agricultural history points of view, the wine sector is at the core of the present scientific debate and the social, economic and legislative relevance of the products of the terroir

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_1

are receiving ever more attention in the field of scientific literature,[1] this research project and the consequent two volumes which were realized aim to show that the wine history has to start by the analysis of the evolution of the single wine regions. This evidently does not imply that the State was not important for the improvement of the quality and quantity of the European wine production: the mainstream idea is that local winegrowers and winemakers' choices were fundamental to develop a successful wine conquering the world wine market or, in the opposite, to explain the decadence or the limited diffusion of a wine. The State and, more in general, public institutions (local or European) guaranteed a support (minimum or relevant) and established rules to follow during the winemaking, but they were not able to create homogeneous wines. Face the changes of laws and other relevant exogenous factors (as the arrival of diseases and new technological innovations) each wine region gave a different answer and so chose a different way of development allowing (or not) the winemakers to improve the quality of their production and to extent their market. So, only for the mass media and the statistics, it exists a French (or an Italian or a Spanish, etc.) wine: in the real oenologic world there only exist the wine regions of Barolo, Bordeaux, Champagne, Chianti, La Rioja, Tokaj etc.

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[1] For the increasing interest and relevance of the "wine history and wine economics" and the rapid rise of its social and economic relevance throughout the world, it is important to remember the launch in 2006 of the "Journal of Wine Economics" (Cambridge UP) edited by the American Association of Wine Economists: it joined the "International Journal of Wine Business Research", the official outlet of the Academy of Wine Business Research, which was launched in 1989 (under the name of "International Journal of Wine Business Marketing"). Concerning in particular the wine history see, among others, the following publications which also include relevant studies on legislation in the wine sector: Unwin (1996, 236–321), Bisson et al. (2002, 696–699), Campbell and Guibert (2007), Simpson (2011), Lukacs (2012), Harvey et al. (2014), Harvey and Waye (2014), Tattersall and De Salle (2015), Meloni and Swinnen (2016), Anderson et al. (2017), Anderson and Pinilla (2018), and Alonso et al. (2019).

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As the proposal was considered original and interesting and met the favourable answer of lots of colleagues working in European universities, it was possible, thanks to the precious collaboration of Silvia A. Conca Messina and Stéphane Le Bras, to produce two volumes analysing the wine history of lots of different European wine regions and, at the same time, illustrate the role of national and European institutions in the development of the wine sector.

The two volumes show how the wine market was made and shaped by three actors, that is producers, sellers and public authorities (municipalities, countries and European Union) and that there existed (and continue to exist) different wine markets depending on price and quality of the product (the wine for old taverns and modern supermarkets is very different from the wine for three stars restaurants or niche luxury market) and consumers' regional customs and tastes (German wines always have a few market in France and Italy, rose wines are only for young people and they were often created by producers who want to diversify their products and create a new wine market, etc.). It is important to note that all wine producers had to constantly achieve compromises with their consumers, including those making high-quality wines: the example of the best production in the Champagne region is evident (Perron 2010). Besides it was important, in particular from the last decades of the twentieth century, the historical relevance of the concept of terroir, the wine producers' appropriation and invention of the tradition and the related marketing based of the (clearly false) concept that in the past the wine was more organic and good (Marache and Meyzie 2015; Reckinger 2012; Demoissier 2010; Charters 2006). Again the French market (or the Italian and Spanish ones) and the related average prices exist only in the statistics: they did not really explain what has happened in the wine history (and also in the present wine world) with the important, but rare, exception represented by local analyses which are able to use long term prices concerning one defined product (Chevet et al. 2011). Furthermore, these volumes aim at underlining that the history of wine should be based on data and information from both archives and official statistics. The combination would make it possible to better highlight the actual decisions taken by winemakers about wine production in a defined wine area (Le Bras 2019).

In these two volumes most of the contributions concern Italian and French wine regions: this is obviously linked to the origin of the project and the editors, but it is also related to the evolution of the European wine history. The modern viticulture was born in France and the first producers in the world are (and had been for the last two centuries) France and Italy. The others European countries simply copied the innovations coming from France thanks to the network of the agrarian reviews and congresses which started in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century (Locatelli and Tedeschi 2015): this network allowed the international diffusion of the know-how concerning winegrowing and winemaking. This transfer of knowledge was implemented by migrants coming from Italy, France and Spain who progressively developed a local viticulture in Chile, Argentina, USA, New Zealand, Australia etc.: new wines progressively entered in the world wine market and this last became more competitive (Anderson 2004; Lukacs 2005; Anderson and Pinilla 2018). The French wine sector (the most modern in the world) obviously represented the most important reference for all people who wanted to invest in the wine industry, but the diffusion of the ampelographic know-how allowed to better imitate the French productive system and so some wine producers started to make products whose quality was not so inferior to the French wines. In particular, during the second half of the twentieth century, the Italian wine production progressively increased in quality and quantity: in the new Millennium the Italian wine sector became the first in the world for the total production (about the primacy concerning quality authors of these volumes obviously do not enter in the debate). All this clearly explain why the studies about the history of the French and Italian vines, wines and winemakers are so numerous and it is very difficult to indicate all of them.[2]

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[2] It is impossible to quote every recent article and book about French and Italian wines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Only considering the volume and papers published by academic historians and agronomies in the new Millennium it is possible to see, among others: for France see Lachiver (1988), Sagnes (1993), Paul (1996), Stengel (2013), Bodinier et al. (2014), Le Bras (2017, 2019). For Italy, Pedrocco (2000), Failla and Scienza (2001), Agnoletti (2002), Gangemi and Ritrovato (2002), Tedeschi (2003, 2017), Zoia (2004), Leonardi (2006), Ciuffoletti (2009), Dandolo (2010), Maffi (2010, 2012), Ottolino (2011), Mainardi and Berta

These volumes also include some contributions that allows readers to discover the evolution of the viticulture and winemaking in other European regions (or small countries) as the Mosel (Germany), the Slovenia, the Catalonia, the Luxembourg and Porto (Portugal). There are unfortunately some relevant absences, e.g. some Spanish or German regions (as La Rioja, Castilla-La Mancha, Franconia, Palatinate, Rheinland, etc.) or the Hungarian Tokay[3]: this simply depends on the fact that no other colleagues accepted to write because they had no time.

Even these lacks, these volumes allow scholars the opportunity to make interesting comparisons between different European winemaking regions. They, in particular, put in evidence that the "road to success" followed by lots of European wines can share the same characteristics, in particular when terroirs are located under the same public authority and legislation, but it is also possible that there exist very different trajectories depending on the different wine producers' decisions and their ability in lobbying with the public authorities. For example the choice to create cooperatives was very important to overcome the negative effects of the crises linked to the fungal and insect attacks and to improve the ratio quality/price of the wine production and moreover the distribution of the wine, before in the local market and then in the national and international ones.[4]

The European wine regions had in fact to face the following events arriving from the last decades of the nineteenth century and the end

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(2013), Mocarelli (2013), Gasparini (2014), Carassale (2014), and Zanotti (2015). In Italy the substantial interest in this topic is also demonstrated in particular by the eight volume collection concerning the regional history of vines and wine (*Storia regionale della vite e del vino in Italia*) and by the other numerous books edited by important experts in oenology as well as professional *sommelliers*.

[3] Among the major limits of this collection, the lack of contributions on Castilla-La Mancha, the Spanish region that currently covers 46% of the Spanish vineyard area and 13.6% of that of the EU, and on other relevant French and Italian wine regions. However, it is evident that it was not possible to consider all European wine regions. About the Spanish wine sector see Muñoz Moreno (2009). Besides about the German wine sector, other the contribution of Thomas Schuetz in these volumes, see Bird (2005) and Brook (2006). Finally, about the Hungarian wine sector see Rohály et al. (2003).

[4] The relevance of the cooperative wineries for the European wine sector is put in evidence in lots of contributions of these volumes. See also, among others, Planas (2016) and Simpson (2000).

of the twentieth one: the reduction of the land set aside for vineyards, a careful selection of vine varieties, the growth in investments for the improvement of manufacturing techniques and of the quality of the cellars, a progressive differentiation of wines according to the geographical origin of vines and an increased attention towards the retailing sector and to consumer tastes. Even if some events were similar, e.g. the strong increase of the productive costs following the arrival of the fungal diseases (*oidium* and *peronospora*) and insect (*phylloxera*) attacking the European vineyards, it is possible to note different evolution in France, the country where lots of wines showed a high-quality level during the nineteenth century, when in other European areas the high-quality wines represented some exceptions in a context presenting a low quality for most of the production arriving from the terroirs. In this case it became very relevant the considerable differences in the social and economic position of viticulturists and winemakers: French winemakers, for example, were able to organize mass protests against the government policy on wine (in particular in the early twentieth century) and set up a number of powerful regional associations (like the *Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi* or the *Fédération des Syndicats de la Champagne*). They were able to influence the legislation: they laid down a set of guidelines for winegrowers during the 1930s and the related birth of the Controlled Designation of Origin (in French language Appellation d'Origine Controlée, AOC) (Wolikow and Humbert 2015). They acted on behalf of their members and, in an attempt to reduce distribution costs, they held negotiations with wine retailers and bottle maker's associations (particularly in the case of *Champagne*).[5] In other European countries this did not happen or it arrived later or it had small dimensions, that is it was limited to a discrete lobbying action to obtain some tariff protection or subsides and, moreover, the discussions about the CDO finished without guidelines and some winemakers who underlining that CDO protected the worst producers and that the best wineries had in their name and history all the necessary to conquest the wine market.[6]

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[5] On French viticulturists and winemakers and their relations with the State and with wine retailers see, among others, Sagnes (2008), Bagnol (2010), Lucand (2011), Palaude (2012), Le Bras (2013), and Planas (2015).

It is evident that where the legislation regulated the winegrowing and winemaking it was very important the ability of local producers to obtain rules which were favourable to the characteristics of their wines. Where the public authorities were absent, the winegrowers and winemakers associations assumed the role of the main player and, by the definition of the guidelines and orienting the investments to modernize the productive system, decided the future of the local viticulture. The role of investments was fundamental because, although viticulture naturally remained a rural activity, it gradually became industrialized. In particular during the last few decades of the twentieth century, winemakers who wished to remain competitive in the new worldwide wine market had to modernize their interactions with consumers and retailers and become fully integrated into the industrial sector: this arrived both in the European terroirs and in non-European wine regions (Doloreux and Lord-Tarte 2013). This has been accompanied over the last 25 years by the rapid rise of wine tourism, which has had the effect of increasing the social and economic impact of the wine sector (and justifying new academic studies).[7]

Notes About the Terroir, Technology, Public Institutions and Related Improvements in European Wine History

Over the past 150 years, the total world volume of wineproduction has grown from 10 to 27 billion litres per year (Anderson et al. 2017). In the 1860s, almost all of it was produced in Europe; after a century and a half—despite the emergence of new competitors and the globalization process—the volume of wines produced in European countries is still around six-tenths globally, while exports exceed two-thirds of the wine traded throughout the world. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, exports from the old continent represented, in monetary value, more than 90% at the global level; while they fell to slightly above 70% in the first 16 years of the twenty-first century alone. In 2016, out of the $32 billion of wine exported throughout the world, France held the record with $9.13 billion, Italy (which had reached first place in volume of production) followed it with $6.22 billion, ahead of Spain ($2.96 billion).

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[6] About the relevance of rules established by the European institutions for the European wine secter see, other the contributes in these volumes, Gaeta and Corsinovi (2014).

[7] For recent studies on the wine industry see also *The Journal of Wine Economics*, *The International Journal of Wine Business Research*, as well as the *Conference proceedings of the Academy of Wine Business Research* from 2003 to 2014 (http://academyofwinebusiness.com). For wine tourism see, among others, Hall et al. (2000), Carlsen and Charters (2006), Asero and Patti (2009), Boatto and Gennari (2011), Cavicchi and Santini (2014), and Vaquero Piñeiro (2015b).

Therefore, Europe has been able to maintain clear leadership both in the volume of production and in monetary value, despite the process of globalization. This process of "slowed down" and "delayed" globalization in the wine sector has undergone a change in very recent times, beginning in the last three decades, with the strengthening of important competitors (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and the United States) and, in last few years, with the development of new markets such as China, which in turn is fostering the growth of the sector. Nevertheless, outcomes are not easily predictable, mainly because wine is not like other "agro-industrial" products. Producing good wine requires certain skills and factors which are not so easy to relocate: they are complex, variable, difficult to reproduce. Probably, the main feature of wine is the variety of its products and the complexity of all the factors that make it possible to achieve a certain quality and a diversified, typical and unique offer.

The history of wine is inextricably linked with the history of Europe, its agrarian systems, its territories, its institutions and its local traditions. Its success in the world in the last two centuries should not be taken for granted. The essays collected in this volume try to offer a picture of the wine industry's production and retailing systems in various European regions over the last two centuries. In order to better understand its economic significance, the authors have tried to set the production and sale of wine in their historical context, namely the European rural society and its institutions as well as the wine merchants. Thus, the essays allow us to trace the transformation of production, marketing and distribution, the evolution of trading and consumption markets. They also highlight the advancements in science and techniques, the issues of cultural representations, the role of agricultural and educational institutions, the influence of economic policies, as well as the emergence on the scene of economic actors and entrepreneurial initiatives of various dimensions and social origins: from the small–medium enterprise to the large multinational, from the family business to the consortium, from producers belonging to the aristocratic classes to merchants or peasants.

As it emerges from this collection of contributions, Europe now reaps the benefits of a slow and contrasting evolution that began in the first half of the nineteenth century, when France started to establish the modern global wine industry. The search for wine quality—the key element of its economic success—required a series of cultural, institutional, political and entrepreneurial components strongly linked to the wine producers and terroirs. During the nineteenth century, some radical changes were introduced regarding the two main production systems into which the sector was divided: on the one hand, the production for self-consumption or local sales; on the other hand, specialized production aimed at satisfying external, interregional or international demand. Although in several European regions—including Italy and France—the mixed system remained largely predominant for a long time, from then onwards, the growth of markets, the refinement of production methods, cultural values, scientific knowledge applied to cultivation and winemaking processes underwent sweeping changes. In terms of quantity, the volume of wines destined for sale during the year continued to be prevalent for a long time as this kind of production was within the reach of small winemakers. However, at the same time, the experimentation and refinement of vintage wines increased and required much greater investments (e.g. in cellars, barrels for preservation) in view of a considerably higher profit.

The aristocratic and bourgeois classes that emerged from the Napoleonic wars were the first to embrace this tendency towards the qualitative improvement of wines, often emphasized in this volume. They considered the production of wine and the consolidation of oenological science as an effective factor for social identity and investment. In the beginning, these improvements were undertaken with the liqueur wines (Porto, Marsala, sherry) launched by the British on the national and international colonial market. Then—also in the wake of the reputation and appeal created by Champagne—came the turn of the most widely consumed table wines, which also became the subject of vigorous modernization. While liqueur wines were intended to satisfy the narrow demand of the élites, in the case of the much more widespread red and white wines, it was a matter of introducing changes into a fully consolidated sector, rather behind in its ways but based on centuries-old knowledge handed down from generation to generation. Therefore, the innovations did not always find a fertile ground on which to develop. There was much resistance and the wine had to be suitable for certain tastes: changing it also meant bringing changes to everyday life and, in the long run, social practices. Moreover, for many farmers and owners it was a question of continuing to have wine for domestic consumption, completely leaving aside the unknown world of the market and commercial trade.

Nevertheless, as several of these essays highlight, a common trend was underway throughout Europe: the transition from an oenology aimed at the production of large quantities of wine for local or national consumption to one which was more attentive to quality, safety and the promotion of a precise image. The research and development of bouquet and taste, which are typical of good wine, involved a growing number of operators throughout Europe. They accumulated more precise knowledge about vines, the condition of grapes at harvest time and winemaking methods. All of the most intricate aspects of wine handling (types of barrels, periodic decanting, contact with oxygen, control of temperatures and environmental conditions) were investigated and studied by local institutions and the most advanced operators (generally those in contact with international markets).

Vine diseases, which affected crops all through the nineteenth century (*oidium*, *phylloxera*, *peronospora* or downy mildew, black rot), led to a dramatic reduction in harvests in France, the major European producer, but represented an opportunity for viticulture expansion in Italy and Spain, which were hit only later. Each country reacted with its own systems, but generally, the diseases increased the attention that was paid to the vineyards and stimulated the qualitative improvement of production. Although only a few producers decided to specialize in high-quality production, the characteristics of European wines improved everywhere, at least regarding the way wines were produced and sold. In southern Spain and Italy, the great variety of traditional vines required extensive experimentation in order to identify the most suitable rootstocks, while other areas focused on growing better quality grapes and abandoned marginal vineyards. In Slovenia, after the outbreak of *phylloxera*, viticulture and winemaking were re-established in line with the rules and methods applied in the Habsburg monarchy.

The variable influence of the diseases from region to region and the temporal differentiation of their effects are recurrent themes in the essays of this volume, which capture the turning points and the transformation from a variety of local oenological traditions to a larger agronomical and technical landscape on a continental scale. Around 1850, the birth of European oenology was underway, later to spread worldwide. The fight against these plagues had long-term effects on European viniculture and was the driving force in bringing producers and scientists together and creating local institutions, schools and producers' associations. Some general consequences of *phylloxera* and *peronospora* are easily recognizable: a decrease in the number of small producers due to the growing costs of new grafts and of monitoring and looking after the crops; the increase of the capital required both to combat the diseases of the vine and to expand the production of vintage wines; the growing recourse to science; the development—or at least the planning—of legislation aimed at guaranteeing the origin of wines, both to fight against the increasing chemical sophistication of wine as well as to support exports; the growing urban demand for popular wines improved transport systems, the increasing power of commercial houses; beginning in the nineteenth century, the expansion of viticulture in the colonies by Europeans.

The recurrent crises of overproduction (and therefore of prices) were among the most difficult economic problems for European winemakers. The crises depended on variable productivity from year to year and on the fact that investments encountered difficulties in following such unpredictable market trends (also considering that newly planted vines required a certain number of years before they started to produce grapes). Fraud was as well an important issue and a market-confusing variable, leading to regional uprising in France and legislative response. Many of the changes in the wine industry introduced during the twentieth century were aimed precisely at reducing this variability as much as possible, e.g. the vertical integration of production, technical progress aimed at creating wines with the most constant characteristics, the growing importance of, first, major producers and then large multinationals which were able to provide the vast capital necessary to invest in new technologies and marketing.

Everywhere in Europe, regardless of the agricultural structure and the characteristics of wines, public institutions played a decisive role, with the creation of schools, cooperation systems, industrial exhibitions, experimentation centres and the application of scientific knowledge. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the creation of new agricultural schools and public institutions for the improvement of rural activities helped winemakers in various ways: lectures, conferences, bulletins, newspapers, the dissemination of news concerning innovations in viticulture (wine production and preservation, the prevention of and cures for diseases, etc.). Various competitions and exhibitions for scholars and producers were organized with the specific aim of increasing the productivity of the vines, while for others it was to improve the resilience of the wine during transport. Moreover, other means such as agricultural almanacs and calendars contributed to the dissemination of knowledge concerning ampelography and oenological practices. The regional studies collected here help to better define the tangible systems of transferring know-how and its impact on production practices. France was—and has remained—the country of reference for wine producers and consumers, a leadership based on an enduring institutional tradition in supporting French products and on maintaining the quality of a product whose roots lie in the early-modern age. The creation of institutions to support the sector was decisive even in areas such as Bordeaux, which had long enjoyed international prestige. In this area too, it was the institutions which led initiatives in promoting local wines, marketing and various other actions aimed at improving every aspect of production and trade: vineyards, commercial networks and logistics facilities, brokerage houses, brand promotion and enhancement and state-endorsed ranking (1855). Besides, the economy—and the reputation—of the area included not only the most prestigious brands and names, but also small producers, wine growers and wines of average quality. At every stage of this story, cohesion—which does not necessarily mean solidarity—was at stake, to preserve or rebuild the brands and the overall reputation of the region.

A further important aspect which emerges from reading the essays is the close relationship between the wine and its terroir—i.e. the land, the region where the vineyard is cultivated. Even if "terroir" is a highly debated concept—especially because it fosters a strong geological determinism that excludes or underestimate the role of other factors (e.g. human interventions)—it is a practical one, allowing territorial and cultural comparisons. Wine is a typical product of European civilization and culture, has shaped the agricultural landscape and, more recently, has assumed increasing importance in the tourism industry. It is no coincidence that wine is one of the main strengths for territorial brands and for the creation of tourist destinations whose appeal lies in "authentic" food or wine and short supply chains.

Last but not least, the volume also tries to consider the differentiated impact of legislation concerning indications of the product's origin. Although several price-dependent markets persisted, the average quality of European wines progressively improved after the establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy. In Italy, the new CAP rules made an important contribution to the improvement and qualitative diversification of wine, a differentiation which involved both the production processes as well as the logistics and supply chains. In France, campaigns of uprooting from the 1970s to the 1990s changed the face of mass-production vineyards: thanks to the bonuses granted by the CAP, new qualitative vine stocks were planted, improving the general level of the French wine sector, especially the ordinary wines.

As a whole, the process of transformation of the European oenological industry appears as variegated as its wines. It has been a journey of modernization that every country, every region and every territory has interpreted in an original way and at its own pace. Nevertheless, its common ground lies in its transition from an oenology aimed at producing large quantities of wine, to one which places greater value on the product's quality, safety, promotion and reputation.

The editors thank a lot the anonymous referees (all papers were in fact subject to double-blind refereeing) for their precious suggestions and advice which contributed to further improve the quality and historical interest of the contributions included in these two volumes.

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Bordeaux Wine Challenging Cycles and Competition (From the 1820s to Present times)

Hubert Bonin

A New Take-Off and the Emergence of the Chartrons System

The years of the French Revolution and of following wars had shaken the basis of aristocratic and even bourgeois landownership of vineyards, and undermined those of internationalized trade houses—even a few houses had resisted the successive wars and crisis—Balguerie-Stuttenberg (Lambercy 1910; Valette 1986), Gradis, Johnston, Schyler, Guestier, Bethmann, Wustenberg, Delbos, Faure or Blanchy, whose houses had been set up between 1724 and 1795. But the syndrome of "*le Père Grandet*" could have played some leverage force, that is, as described in Honoré de Balzac's novel *Eugénie Grandet* (1834) about the Loire valley, the opportunity seized by some petty bourgeois to purchase vineyards which had fallen on the market because of the difficulties of their owners: transfers of ownership could have injected some

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_2

Table 1 A few family wine trade houses created in the first half of the nineteenth century

Gaden	1803
Exshaw	1805
Mestrezat	1814
Hanappier	1817
Lestapis	1818
Cruse	1819
Calvet	1825
De Luze (first attempt)	1826
Seignouret	1830
Eschenauer joined a house created in 1821	1831
Lalande	1840
Quancard	1844
Édouard Kressmann	1871

Source Bonin (1999)

"oil" in the rebirth of land transactions. But the key event was the wave of entrepreneurship that carried the *bordeaux* wine economy: ambitious people rushed to Gironde to insert themselves into the rebuilding of market circuits. A few of them came from the British Islands and thus joined a few family trade houses founded in the eighteenth century by British people. Some others came from Switzerland, like Cruse (Butel and Domblides 1996; Butel 1997, 1998) and De Luze. Several ones came from French regions (Calvet from the Rhône valley), as they felt a promising perspective to combine their ambition, their talents, their desire for profits and fortune, and the rebirth of the wine markets, national and European. Another stratum chose at the same time to invest funds and energy in the colonial empire and to build trade houses active in several French port-cities, of which Bordeaux itself: wine outlets and colonial outlets structured therefore expansion (Table 1).

So many family tales and historians' stories (Bonin 1999, 2003) converge to prove that the 1820s–1860s welcomed a bunch of creations, developments, and Europeanization. It epitomized there the wave of entrepreneurship that drove forward French capitalism (Cameron 1971; Landes 1949; Vérin 1982; AFHE 1983; Verley 1994) at that stage of the first industrial revolution and, to cling to our topics, to the weaving of renewed commercial networks. They benefited from several chances:

the growth of wine production thanks to the extension of vineyards in every part of Gironde—at its maximum, because every small peasant introduced wine as far as possible into its system of mixed farming (Roudié P., *Vignobles et vignerons du Bordelais, 1850–1980,* Pessac, Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 1994; Bordeaux, Féret, 2014); the opening of broad markets among popular industrial and services layers for low-cost wines and among new bourgeoisies for high-end ones, all the more because urbanization extended outlets; the renewal and expansion of European markets, spurred by the networks set up by foreign merchants established in Bordeaux. The case study of Alfred de Luze (1797–1880) (Pacteau-De Luze 2016) exemplified such a turnaround: coming from Switzerland, after some failures and a new endeavour from 1838, he ended leading a big trade house which could emulate that of Johnston, from which came his wife Georgina Johnston, and which he could transmit to two sons, Charles (1837–1910) and Maurice (1844–1919).

Such a multipurpose boom couldn't but pave the way to the rebuilding of a commercial identity of favour of Bordeaux wine, whatever its quality and price, and to a strong offensive on the several circuits of the market, adapted to the various layers. Monarchies and high bourgeoisies, middle bourgeoisies, city popular layers: this large array of customers proved as bonanzas for *bordeaux* wine producers, traders, logisticians and suppliers. This upward move stimulated a wide economy of small and medium-sized trade houses, as quoted in various archives funds and repertories: such "anonymous" actors of wine history could not sure be forgotten, as "invisible" powers of the (petty) wine economy. Meanwhile Bordeaux lived a formidable sociological and economic revolution during these decades as the "dynasties" (Butel 1991, 2008) were built up; year after year, they contributed to the drawing of a new city map; the heart of high capitalist bourgeoisies moved from upstream "*quartier de La Rousselle*" (the area between the new railway station and the historical centre) to "*quartier des Chartrons*", the area north-west of this centre and the huge *place des Quinconces*.

There emerged a commercial system, composed with downstream quays (to transfer barrels onboard of ships), wine storehouses to end "breeding" wine, commonplace warehouses for transit and customs processes, wine brokerage houses (like Tastet & Lawton) as intermediaries between winegrowers and traders, trade houses oriented towards the regional, French and/or foreign markets, not to speak of insurance companies, bankers, financing seasonal credits, warrants, foreign exchanges and maritime operations (Bonin 1993a). There too an architectural hold on the city map gathered momentum between the quays and a few large avenues, rich with wine storehouses, headquarters of trade houses, and good-looking buildings housing these new, then second-generation, bourgeoisies: a city of wine and trade capitalism (Bonin 2010) dug its roots, surrounded by popular areas and low-staged houses for the workers of the warehouses, the port and logistics. *L'aristocratie du bouchon* (the aristocracy of the cork) brought to Bordeaux its brand image, its institutional networks (bourgeois clubs, music associations, religious connections, the Chamber of commerce (Butel 1988), politician commitments, etc.).

The rebirth of *bordeaux* wine stimulated the capitalist attractiveness of Gironde. On one side, high bourgeois commenced investing in vineyards which were already reputed ones or around which they built reputation thanks to investment in technics and quality. Bankers rushed to Bordeaux (two Rothschild families, Pereire, etc.); dynasties of wine trade houses climbed upstream through the purchase of wine-lands; and overall traders jumped to landownership too (Prom, etc.). An actual "fad" was to put ahead ones' own wine brand to enhance entrepreneurial and capitalist success, along some aristocratic mindsets as owning a reputed vineyards and producing a high-range wine became signs of this new French *grande bourgeoisie*—in parallel with the ownership of huge forests or luxury houses in sea resorts (Arcachon or else).

A second step was the campaign lead by bigwigs to identify as *grands crus* these high-end wines: a lobby led by the chairman of the Chamber of commerce Lodi-Martin Duffour-Dubergier (owner of *Smith Haut-Laffite*) succeeded in injecting an uncontested supremacy for 58 brands, among which four first class ones (*Château Lafite*, *Château Margaux*, *Château Latour* and *Haut-Brion*, till the addition of the *Mouton Rothschild* in 1973); wines were classified in 1855 from the first to the fifth *grands crus*, all of these red wines from the *Médoc* except *Haut-Brion* in the Graves. These "winners" belonged to the classical rural aristocracy (like *baron de Pichon Longueville*), to trade houses (Barton 1991, Guestier, Blanchy, etc.), or commonplace *grands bourgeois* (Markham 1997; Enjalbert 1953).

Crises Before a Second Renewal (1870s–1920s)

All at sudden, this economic balance was swept off, intense concerns stoked the Bordeaux wine bourgeoisie and peasantry. The two European wars (1870–1871, 1914–1918) for a while put a halt to the peaceful life of trade, because Germany had become an important consumer of Bordeaux wine: its orders fell down, and durably during WWI—when also the assets of German houses in Bordeaux were confiscated. The further Russian market disappeared too from the 1920s. But beyond these dramatic events, the key explanation of a harsh crisis was the offensive of phylloxera, from 1874–1875, like everywhere in France, and several attacks of cryptogamic diseases (oïdium, mildiou, etc.). The very bases of the Bordeaux wine industry were weakened: many areas of Gironde stopped cultivating vineyards; commercial flows dwindled; profits were curtailed, etc.[1]

A renewal trend helped the *bordeaux* wine economy to recover its momentum. Investments had to be assumed to replant the vineyards, which demanded money, technical knowledge, and public help. The main breakthrough was achieved by chemicals, to help fighting the diseases and moreover preventing them. Technician advisers, agricultural associations, the Chamber of agriculture were mobilized. Big landowners served as pioneering forces to remodel the vineyards. Last but not least, a new institution was set up (all over France), *Crédit agricole mutuel* (cooperative agricultural bank), in Bordeaux (Bonin 1991, 2002) in 1901 and in Libourne in 1907. It was used to finance the seasonal needs for credit, for instance to purchase chemicals or else, either for petty peasants or for big landowners, and it discounted the bills emitted by these latter pending their payment by trade houses.

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[1] About the history of the *bordeaux* wine economy as a whole, the main pioneering historian war a professor in geography, Philippe Roudié. See Roudié (1994, Bordeaux, Féret 2014). Velasco-Graciet et al. (2008).

A quadruple path was followed by the *bordeaux* wine economy. First, on the upper layer, trade houses reinforced their grip on the various markets to promote the wines benefiting from a strong identity, that is the *grands crus* and a bunch of reputed *châteaux*. Second, in the meanwhile, either these layers or the layer constituted with the petty or average wines (*petits vins*) took profit from the new legislation which fixed in 1905 strict rules to qualify the belonging to a *bordeaux* qualification or designation: quality was at stake against bad practices and fraud (Stanziani 2003; 2004a, b; 2006). They forbade mixing *bordeaux* wines and those produced in neighbouring areas (Dordogne, Lot-et-Garonne, etc.)—even if the wine-croppers of north-west areas (Bourgeais, Blayais) suffered from losing their outlets in the cognac area. The *bordeaux* wine brand image did progress on the middle-long term from such constraints, despite frequent fraud practices.

Third, a vast commercial strategy was achieved on the four main fields. On one side, trade houses (or directly for a few *grands crus*) targeted the high-end consuming groups, that is aristocratic layers, where it resisted social and political decline, and mostly bourgeois layers, in every country and city where economic growth and revolution expanded them forcefully. Day to day habits or festive ones allowed *bordeaux* wines to extend their reach; Bordeaux wine and luxury extended their scope altogether (Marseille 1999). Another field was prospected methodically, that of hotel trade: numerous hotels opened their doors in national or regional capitals, in mountain or sea resorts. As it has been studied about Paris *Grand Hôtel* (Tessier 2012), each one was equipped with a large cellar full with *bordeaux* wines (and else, sure, like *champagne* or *bourgogne*). The third path largely opened to them was the large extension of *cafés:* middle-ranges wines conquered these new outlets; but the revolution caused by the intense use of wine among industrial labourers (see Émile Zola' novel *L'Assommoir*) developed massive sales of petty wines (in parallel with petty alcohols). A fourth innovation was to found among the orders offices of the new companies of retail distribution through networks of branches: either cooperative or capitalist, they opened thousands of shops all over France and especially in Paris (*Félix Potin* [Camborde 1997], *Nicolas*, etc.), which paved the way for global orders to trade houses about petty and middle-range wines.

All in all, conversely with the Languedoc wines, the *bordeaux* succeeded in finding out several types of purchasers. Sure, the growth of Algerian wines could have robbed off a few low-key markets on the low-key; but the upsurge of sales in the colonial empire (armies, hotels, settlers or civil servants) could have compensated largely this competition.

Fourth, trade houses, solid *châteaux* and even middle-sized wine-croppers were more and more inserted into a various credit system. Bankers financed seasonal needs (through *crédits de campagne*), granted warrant credits guaranteed by wine barracks stocked in storage facilities on the harbour, and developed their support to trading and also foreign exchange. Agencies were opened in the key areas in Bordeaux and also in the countryside, supplemented by the local entities of *Crédit agricole*, as it got more and more embedded thanks to leftist or social-catholic militancy (Bonin 1993b). Bordeaux grew as a marketplace: national banks rushed there (*Crédit lyonnais*, *Société générale*) (Bonin 1999, 1996), and the *Comptoir national d'escompte de Paris* purchased the strong local bank Lafargue in 1891. Sometimes, the crisis of some trade houses led to bank falls, as was the case for leading Piganeau in the 1890s and even to its competitor Samazeuilh in 1913—which ended into *Banque nationale de crédit*'s hands. The whole bourgeoisie of *châteaux* and trading mainly attended the growing local banks *Société bordelaise de crédit* (founded in 1881) (Bonin 2010) or Soula-De Trincaud Latour; a sign of the osmosis between the *bordeaux* wine economy and banking was the choice of Théodore Tastet, from the brokerage house Tastet & Lawton, as the chairman of *Société bordelaise de* CIC in 1898–1914. All in all, this wine system resulted into a mix of deep rural roots, an overall entrepreneurship, an efficient services system and an array of banking solutions (Bonin 2002).

In the meanwhile it fostered an articulated cluster of activities because the wine productive system needed upstream and downstream industries to prop up each stage of production, transformation, and logistics, either on land or on the harbour quays pending the boarding of barrels on cargo ships for foreign ports (Bonin and Marnot 2007). Sure this was not original, but the very broad dimension of the *bordeaux* wine economy lay upon several thousand wine-croppers, a bunch of other thousand people upstream and downstream. Its contribution to the Gironde

Table 2 The Bordeaux wine cluster in the 1900–1920s

The wine chain	The support activities
Vineyards and wine structures	Construction companies to develop renewed and extended buildings
Grands crus and *crus bourgeois*	Equipment goods suppliers: machinery, wine presses, wine storehouses, wine cisterns
	The horse sector for agricultural tasks, transportation; then trucks too
	Barracks and cooperage
Châteaux	Bottle industrialists
Petty peasant for *petits vins*	Corks specialists (France, Portugal, etc.)
The first cooperatives	Printing workshops in Bordeaux to deliver brand sticks
Production of industrial alcohols, consuming large amounts of petty wines	
Intermediary and downstream services	Firms delivering chemical goods (sulphites, etc.)
Brokerage houses	Sugar to reinforce the degree of some wines
Trade houses	Crates industrialists for the wine logistics
Closely involved services	Logisticians (railway, harbour, road or river transportation)
Administration offices to register quantities, brands, turnover, etc.; and for controls and taxes	Banks
Customs administration	Exhibitions, *salons*, etc.

Source Author

workforce and to gross regional product was a heavy one, at the apex of the end of the 1920s—even if figures are missing (Table 2).

From a Dire Crisis to a Wave of Expansion (1920s–1970s)

The overall effects of the depression of the 1930s were terrible for the Bordeaux wine economy, because of the drop of prices and the constriction of exports. A direct stroke hurt wine-croppers, as they could no longer finance their seasonal expenses (Mora 1970). But the wine families suffered in parallel: their revenues dwindled; a number of them endured a serious crisis of over-indebtedness, as they were unable to repay bank credits, for instance to *Crédit agricole*, constrained to renegotiate them or to extend their term. The whole trade sector curtailed its activity, and a few houses even collapsed as they could not recover their loans (Bonin 2009). That was the case of the well-known Barton & Guestier house, which caused the downturn of the Guestier family.

Last, because of the depression, then of the war, several trade houses and wine-producers endured an almost stagnation, throughout the 1930s–1950s. WWII's consequences were mixed: sure German outlets (close to 40% of exports in the 1930s) could somewhat be preserved, thanks to the purchases of the Nazi army and administration in France, and to several of Collaboration with their chiefs (like the Eschenauer trade house) (Durand 2017), but at low prices, and the other destinations fell down. The hyper-inflation in 1944–1952 weakened the values of goods, but it contributed to alleviate the real cost of middle-term debts. The *bordeaux* wine economy was at a crossroad in the 1950s (Roudié 1997). Generally speaking, lack of investments by landowners and uncertainties about prices and sales converged to explain gaps and lags in the rhythm of the modernization of equipments and methods, and also a relative stagnation of the real estate value of family *châteaux*, as was the case at *Château Margaux*, of which the *Crédit agricole* imposed the sale to the indebted Ginestet family in 1977 at only 60 millions francs.

Another trend of renewal happily brought upwards the Bordeaux wine economy. A common conscience took shape in the 1930s–1950s in favour of better qualities and fights against frauds or tricky assemblages (with even Algerian wines). This started by 14 November 1936 which officialized the *appellations d'origine contrôlée* (*AOC*) (designation of origin) (Lucand 2019) *pauillac* and *bordeaux*: strict rules were more and more accepted and respected by the whole community of the *bordeaux* wine economy, but it required two decades to be achieved.

One might pretend that a wave of entrepreneurship helped revolutionize it. Its first constituent laid among colonial expatriates who flew back to France at the turn of the 1960s: among these "*pieds-noirs*" (repatriates from Maghreb) were dozens of well-eased families that lost their estate assets overseas but that kept treasury assets; they reinvested them in the purchase of *châteaux*, and moreover started a strong move of investments in equipments and technics. *Château Carbonnieux* (Graves) (Brun-Puginier et al. 1999) and *Château Fonréaud* (Médoc) encapsulated this evolution. In parallel a new generation climbed among traditional rural families, often sharing values of solidarity forged by social-christian basis: they launched the *Centre départemental des jeunes agriculteurs* (CDJA), then took over the charges of *Fédération départementale des exploitants agricoles* (FDSEA), as national organizations of dynamic peasants were set up from 1946. They learnt there to share new values of investment, entrepreneurship, coopetition for modernization and competitiveness.

They invested energy into the local desks and Gironde funds of *Crédit agricole*, presiding over them from the 1960s–1970s, as was the case for Pierre Perromat at *Crédit agricole de la Gironde* in 1973–1997. Emulation resulted from this yearning for revenues, brand image for the *appellations*, social positions, all the more than each branch was rich with about half-a-dozen children. They also took over the young CIBV-*Comité interprofessionnel des vins de Bordeaux*, the organization that, from 1948, struggled to dispatch the novelties among the stakeholders from the whole front of wine economy (Guyon 1956).

These families (like Lurton or Perromat) benefited from a young generation that deeply renewed the vineyards, and thus awakened the *bordeaux* economy throughout the 1960s–1970s, often pushing aside in fortune and consideration the old families dating back from the previous century. And they ended challenging old-style rivals, who had to react and to commit themselves in this revolution of techniques, qualities and brand image. So did well-known families like Kressmann (Graves), Cazes (*Lynch-Bages* at Pauillac) or Boüard (Saint-Émilion) (Candau 1991). Moreover, several of them, sometimes rich with half-a-dozen children, betted on a rapid ascension in two generations, so that, thanks to enough purchases of vineyards owing to profits raised by the renewed estates, each son and daughter could inherit from his/her own vineyard…

Two turnarounds were a reorientation from white to red wines in several areas to enhance the capabilities of the earth and vineyards, and a commitment to better qualities, from *grands crus* (being thus reconstructed) to middle vines. Syndicates and associations contributed highly to such evolutions, as they served as collective "schools" to promote good practices. Entrepreneurial moods touched also medium wines: as soon as the 1930s, the Rothschild "invented" *Mouton Cadet* generic trademark and then a range of *bordeaux* (managed by the company Baron Philippe de Rothschild SA) resulting from an assemblage of wines from several areas of Gironde and oriented towards a hard-working commercial strategy, with a huge success from the 1960s among middle bourgeoisies. This philosophy contributed to a better identification of *bordeaux* wine by consumers and mass-distribution firms, a fruit of hard and diplomatic discussions among the stakeholders to reach protocols to be respected (Querre 1968). Such common policies couldn't but raise the standards, as was the case in the whole Médoc (Pijassou 1980; Roudié 1973).

On another level, cooperatives gathered thousands of petty wine-croppers from the 1930s to the 1950s to safeguard somewhat their revenues and standard of life (Roudié and Hinnewinkel 2001). Then they invested in equipment and moreover convinced their members to orient themselves towards more quality and less production for each hectare. But the move relied on long-term changes of mindsets and practices.

The Wine Families Challenged (From the Mid-1970s Till Today)

Volatility prevailed at the turn of the century: the uncertainties seizing on markets, the complexities of strategies to be reinvented, and the ambiguity reigning over quality, led to classical matrix assessing the key comparative advantages to be enhanced about the positioning of the Bordeaux wine economy and its stakeholders within the harsh competition taking force on a world scale (Pitte 2009; Spahni 2000).

Shocks on the Bordeaux Wine Economy

Frailties came back nonetheless in the 1970s–1990s. Some exceptional events confirmed the historical habit of some stakeholders to the wine *bordeaux* economy to exert speculative practices: a few trade houses and wine estates were involved in speculation on prices and qualities at the start of the 1970s, and they were submitted to dire losses in 1972–1975, first because the world-wide recession cause by oil-hikes, then because of some kinds of "corners" on some *millésimes*, mainly the 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975, the quality of which was questioned, last as a little scandal ("Winegate", along the *Watergate*…) burst out about frauds achieved by some traders (notably Cruse) mixing *languedoc* wines and Bordeaux, for an amount of 3 million bottles (against 60 million being shipped each year). As a consequence, US demand for Bordeaux wine dropped back to 1969 levels and only really recovered from 1982 onwards.[2] A bunch of well-known houses collapsed; if their brands were kept on life, they were now onwards inserted in groups (like Calvet), even if the families generally conserved their estates—like the Cruse at *Château d'Issan* (Margaux), owned since 1945.

Strategy and Competition: The Issue of Competitiveness

In fact the key issue became harsh competition: other French areas climbed the steps of quality and international reputation, even in Provence, Mâcon or Languedoc, while the high-end ones launched international offensives (Côtes-du-Rhône, Burgundy [Pitte 2005], Alsace), all the more because the concept of *terroir* was being magnified (Hinnewinkel 2004, 2009). In the meanwhile average wines faced emerging competitors, from Spain, Australia, Central Europe and Latin America (Hinnewinkel and Velasco-Graciet 2005), thus robbing off some market-shares in the United States or everywhere in hotels and restaurants. All in all the Bordeaux wine economy became involved in the œno-globalization trend (Deroudille 2003–2008; Hinnewinkel 2004), even if French firms contributed themselves to such a move, through investments in Australia (Pernod-Ricard with Orlando Wines-*Jacob's*), the USA (LVMH) or even now China. Once more, it had to reinvent itself to preserve its brand image (Roudié 1996) and redesign its position in the harshly competitive wine world (Collombet 2016), for example to redefine the collective rules and business model of the AOC (*appellations d'origine contrôlée*) which encapsulate the processes of differentiation among high-end wines (Hinnewinkel 2009; Célérier and Schirmer 2015; Giraud-Héraud et al. 2002; Hinnewinkel 2004). Strategies were at stake: to explicit a strategic diagnostic along the managerial practices (Johnson et al. 2014), a *SWOT* matrix is proposed to help seizing at a glance the challenges to be faced by the *bordeaux* wine economy.

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[2] See website http://invisiblebordeaux.blogspot.ch/2015/05/winegate-scandal-which-shook-bordeaux.html.

A *SWOT* matrix applied to the wine Bordeaux economy

Strengths

- Large range of quality wines
- Struggle to respect rules and standards: designations, *cépages* (varieties of grapes), production by hectare, etc.
- World image of *grands crus*
- Deep-rooted entrepreneurship among wine-croppers, trade houses, brokers, etc.
- Solid trade houses' networks
- Structuring of strong purchase offices and wine selling departments by mass distribution companies
- Recent mindsets of solidarity about quality, prestige, institutional communication and events (and sometimes history…)
- Construction of efficient oenology science and practices

Weaknesses

- Fragility of a few cooperatives
- Volatility of markets
- Large number of petty wines
- Upstream dependence on chemicals
- Uncertainties in some areas about very petty wines (Bourgeais, Blayais, Entre-deux-Mers, Bas-Médoc)
- Recurrent difficulties of treasuries among large segments of petty wine-croppers
- Inequalities in the wineproduction equipment and cellars, and therefore in qualities of maturation and tastes, introducing uncertainties among customers

A *SWOT* matrix applied to the wine Bordeaux economy

Opportunities	*Threats*
• Large offer of financing by competing banks • Arguments about the commercial position of Beaujolais and Languedoc wines for petty wines • Rapid enlargement of the US and China markets for high-end and medium wines • Booming outlets among hotels and restaurants • Booming initiatives from groups amalgamating well-known trade houses or/and vineyards • Fads among well-eased managerial layers in favour of wineconsumption • Fashionable trends among the press in favour of Bordeaux wines • Emergence of œnotourism	• Climate issues • Speculative habits among a few big wine-croppers and some traders • Fragility of Chinese consumption • Intense competition from Burgundy (*Chablis*, etc.) • Growing competition from the Loire areas about average wines • Upsurge of emerging wine-economies (Australia, Latin America, California, Central Europe, etc.) • Offensives from Chinese investors Evolution of the policy of the European Community in favour of harsh competition and the liberalization of productive ceilings (Ledent and Burny 2002)

Source Author

Social-Marxian and Commercial Issues

Should this text follow a troubling path in recalling with Marxian issues about classes struggle? The evolution of the *bordeaux* wine economy did in fact uncork such arguments! The under-layer of petty and average wines have been more and more questioned, under the competition mainframe by regional or foreign average ones: the issue of differentiation is at stake. Popular outlets dwindled sharply because of the disappearance of popular *cafés*, of the fall of industrial classes, of the reduction of physical tasks: petty wines (*vins de table*) lost their basic markets—all the more because junior popular classes favour "strong alcohols" and wine declined as a product of daily life. Several *bordeaux* areas were put aside from the main commercial flows, especially *petits blancs* or *rouges*; among 6700 wine-croppers of Gironde, 500–1500 suffer from low revenues, debt-burden (by *Crédit agricole* mainly, often having to renegotiate its loans), and that trade houses and cooperatives send them only with low margins. About one-tenth of *bordeaux* production is being actually transformed into industrial alcohols, thanks to French and European grants and because of the needs of industries—with therefore Gironde company Bernard as a French leader on that niche.

Conversely, the powerful purchase departments of mass-consumption firms (Carrefour, Auchan, Leclerc, the three leaders) buy about two-tenths or even a quarter of *bordeaux*; and they were joined by internet websites dedicated to winery (*Millésima*, *Vente privée*, etc.) and managing one-tenth of French wine sales. Average wines are thus targeted for middle classes, from *petits bourgeois* to *moyens bourgeois supérieurs* (from low middle class to upper middle class), which imposed a relative homogeneity in quality and reputation (Chauvin 2010; Landon and Smith 1997). The development of wine merchants (*Nicolas* chain, etc.) and of the hypermarket's wine shelves (with "wine fairs" every year in the fall) contributed to promote such average wines (from 10/30 to 100/200 euros).

A few signs exemplified the drastic move imposed to stick to the market. First, one notable effect of the scandal of the 1970s was the implementation of tighter regulations and the extra importance given to the phrase "*mis en bouteille au château*", suggesting minimal intermediary involvement. The concept of *château* blossomed (Réjalot 2007) thanks to these rules, but also because commercial fads demanded a climb in quality and reputation to average "medium" wines, those above mere petty wines. In each area and designation, there was a scramble by cooperatives, clever wine-croppers and trade houses to push upwards this layer of wines to answer the needs of mass distribution and even exports. And commercial campaigns were launched to promote *bordeaux supérieur* wines target the low-middle classes as the promoters of this designation (800 wine-croppers on 2000 hectares) that intend to balance a relevant quality and modest prices (from 5 to 20 euros), with 73 million bottles a year, that is 13% of the 537 million sold by the members of the *Syndicat des appellations bordeaux & bordeaux supérieurs*. Standard brands even regained momentum, with the leader *Mouton Cadet* and the brand *Malesan*, created by trader Bernard Magrez in 1979. And the *second vin* concept was developed, to propose middle-quality wines issued from the same estates that *grands crus*, but resulting from different assemblages—the first *second vin* having appeared in 1948 thanks to Thierry de Manoncourt at *Château Figeac*.

But challenges were ever rekindled indeed! First the average wine layer ever lacks homogeneity in quality, which could have disappointed consumers. Second, nature sometimes imposed its rhythm, with "bad years", that is wines missing high-standards of maturation which explains for instance the crisis of sales for the 2011, 2012 and 2013 years. Third, some wine-croppers, all at sudden fond of "*vins de garage*", that is average wines sold outside the process of trading and thus at home itself, did not reach the standards of quality, contributing to a small crisis of reputation at the turn of the century. Fourth, an argument loomed about the very concept of *bordeaux* wines, that is assemblages of grape varieties because the fad in favour of one-single component emerged recently (*pinot noir*, in Burgundy and Alsace; *merlot*) in France or elsewhere (Swiss Valais, etc.). Fifth, arguments were raised about the massive use of chemicals (sulphites) throughout the vineyards—against bio-agriculture. Last, climatic events stroke the Bordeaux wine economy as elsewhere, with fell in sales, for example in 2001–2004, 2007–2009 (Auby 2007; Mothe 1992), or even recently in 2013–2014 and 2018–2019.

The Revolution of Wines for Upper Classes

Marxian-type concepts prevailed too when globalization ended delivering millions rich people, in the United States or Asia, mainly, far beyond European wealthy bourgeois. The *bordeaux* wine economy became more and more committed to the upper-crust layers of the world bourgeoisies: luxury (Beverland 2004) (that is above 300/500 euros a bottle) and high-end (from 100 to 300/500 euros) wines have raised at the core of a new commercial system, connecting *grands crus* or such high-end wines, trade houses and brokers (Tastet & Lawton, Lévêque, etc.), Paris *grands magasins* (*Galeries Lafayette* or *Bon Marché*, as main actors), big specialized stores (*Lavinia*, since 1999), *grands restaurants* and hotels cellars, all over France and the world. Even asset management got involved, because high fortunes were advised to invest into *grands crus*, then kept at globalized cellars (in UK atomic shelters or else).

This inspired the reaction from *crus bourgeois* to climb up in reputation and seduce middle classes. That group was set up in 1932 by the *Médoc* wine-croppers committed to higher quality: only 444 *châteaux* belonged to this upper-middle range club (Dovaz 1992). But the *Médoc* wine community had to foster the reputation of this group, through a new classification in 2003, which had to be replaced by that of 2010, limited to 243 wine estates), to re-cement the capital of reputation and provide efficient commercial leverage. The *Saint-Émilion* community completed its own classification (since 1956) in 1996 and last in 2012, to assert its positioning against its *Médoc* rivals. Entrepreneurial Jean Kressmann and André Lurton succeeded in creating the *Pessac-Léognan* designation in 1986 to replace woods by vineyards or extend their estates in this area, to design high-quality wines. In each area a few leaders practised entrepreneurship and played the role of locomotives to rejuvenate practices—as did Thierry de Manoncourt à *Château Figeac* in 1947–2010.

Well-targeted institutional communication gathered momentum to stir attractiveness and differentiation along cognitive methods. Beyond advertisement campaigns (by trademarks or the CIVB), the *bordeaux* brand and its premium brands have to be promoted to resist competitors and keep their image among high-end consumers. *Grands crus* and *châteaux* mobilized œnology stars (Denis Dubourdieu, Michel Rolland, Jean-Claude Berrouet) (Chevet 2015). Managers and œnologists attended specialized institutions of research and academic training (*Institut des sciences de la vigne & du vin*, in Villenave-d'Ornon, masters in wine management, etc.) to be able to reach the new worldwide requirements. Events spread out, those organized by wine communities, like the *Commanderie du Bontemps de Médoc et des Graves Sauternes et Barsac*, or the 82 *commanderies* entertained in 31 countries by the *Grand Conseil des vins de Bordeaux*; or those set up by lobbies (*Vino Bravo)*, or by CIVB, etc.) (Smith et al. 2007), while the "taster" Robert Parker contributed to enhance quality wines in the United States in 1978–2012 through his magazine sold to well-off wine amateurs (Hadj Ali et al. 2008).

While forms of œnotourism grew rapidly in favour of average consumers (Mitchell et al. 2000) (those from cruise ships or commonplace visits to Bordeaux, and those paying a visit to the recent *Cité du vin* on the strands of the Garonne[3]), the main trend of œnotourism has been oriented towards wealthy: luxurious hotels in Bordeaux or in the countryside, events with movie or song stars, tasting of *grands crus* at events in the renowned châteaux, press books, etc. Such institutional communication is being crowned by the *Vinexpo* fairs (every two years), opened to the whole layers of wines, sure to be accompanied by magnificent parties all over Gironde.

Some aspects of financiarization took shape at the turn of the century. Individual investors (with the Chinese rushing to join the club for the sake of distinction and profits) joined auctions and yearly sales to set up costly cellars (Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh 1996; Jones and Storchmann 2001). Wine became thus part of this economy of connected luxury (Heine et al. 2016) and finance (Cardebat 2017).

Capitalist Issues

To face such "class struggle" about wine consumption and reputation, the *bordeaux* wine economy had to rebuild itself. Amalgamations prevailed firstly, in the wake of the building of big French groups oriented towards alcohols (Pernod-Ricard, Rémy-Cointreau) or luxury (LVMH, several champagne firms), even if sometimes nostalgia emerged to remind of the ancient *bourgeoisie des Chartrons* (Saporta 2014). A continuous flow of acquisitions gathered momentum from the end of the twentieth century (Corade et al. 2008, 2010).

Three capitalist trends were followed. Businessmen having piled up fortunes retired from their historical field and invested their assets in big wine estates, before mobilizing their art of management to rejuvenate these latter—like ex-heads of mass-distribution groups Cathiard at *Smith-Haut-Laffite* (Berdin 2010; Méric 2016),[4] Mentzelopoulos at *Château Margaux* and Perse in the Saint-Émilion area,[5] or the Dassault (aerospace), Wertheimer, Pinault and Arnault (luxury) bigwigs, etc. They have been imitated recently by Chinese investors, who took over one hundred *châteaux* in that century (generally third-rank ones). Second, little groups aggregated reputed wine estates, thus able to entertain vast commercial campaigns and communication events. The generation that injected entrepreneurship in the vineyards ended grouping some bunches of estates, like the Kressmann, Perromat (*Vignobles M & J Perromat*[6]), Cazes (*Domaines Jean-Michel Cazes*[7]), Lurton (*Les Vignobles André Lurton*, with 27 châteaux on 1300 hectares, transmitted by André Lurton to his ten children in 1995), etc. Bernard Magrez sold his trade house to focus from the 1980s on *grands crus* and set up a little high-end group, rich with luxury brands added to *Château Pape Clément* (*grand cru classé de Graves*), *Château Fombrauge* (Saint-Émilion), *Château La Tour Carnet* (Médoc) and several others to reach about 40 estates on one thousand hectares. The ancient Moueix family which established in Gironde in 1931 (*Château Fonroque*) built a dualist group, with a trade house, launched in 1937 (*Établissements Jean-Pierre Moueix-Duclot*) and a portfolio of two dozens wine estates in the Saint-Émilion and Pomerol (*Petrus*, etc.).[8]

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[3] See website http://www.laciteduvin.com/fr.

External investors rushed to Gironde too: institutional investors diversified their assets into vineyards; the insurer Axa since 1987, with *Axa Millésimes*, the national banker *Crédit agricole*, since 2004 with *CA grands crus*,[9] or mutualist insurer Maif (*Château Dauzac*), etc (till 2019). They bet that the value of their estates will keep on progressing, as stable assets, thanks to the commitment to higher quality wines and modern equipments and methods.

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[4] See website http://www.smith-haut-lafitte.com/.

[5] See website http://www.vignoblesperse.com/fr/.

[6] See website www.mjperromat.com.

[7] See website http://www.jmcazes.com/fr/domaines.

[8] See website http://www.dico-du-vin.com/moueix-famille-pomerol-saint-emilion-bordeaux-californie/.

[9] See website http://www.cagrandscrus.com/.

The second capitalist trend animated the commercial structures. A few trade houses merged—like Kressmann and Dourthe into CVBG-*Compagnie des vins de Bordeaux & de Gironde* in 1967, mixing trading with Delor and Dourthe, and wine estates—or poles of amalgamation purchased federated houses, like Castel: the Castel brothers had created their group in 1949 for beers and petty wines on Africa markets then in France (*Société des vins de France* in 1992), and reinvested their profits into wine estates (about which 17 *bordeaux châteaux*), trade houses (Barton & Guestier in 2010) the retail chain *Nicolas*, and brands in Gironde (*Malesan* in 2003) or in several French regions, to become the third world wine group, behind two American ones (Constellation Brands and Gallo).[10]

Second, investors who structured groups on a national level seized the opportunity offered by weakened or hesitating local companies to purchase them. One key actor became the Merlaut family which, from the Languedoc region, established a powerful Taillan group, and took over the Ginestet trade house (Bonin 2002) and several vineyards. The family group Louis Rœderer mixes trade (champagne) and estates in Champagne, in Provence and in Gironde (with several ones since the 1990s, rehabilitated and managed for long by Anne Cazes-Regimbeau, from the Cazes family, till 2012, crowned by grand cru *Château Pichon Longueville-Comtesse de Lalande* in Pauillac in 2007). The old trade house Calvet (since 1823) lost its family roots (Patrice and Hubert Calvet in the 1960s–1970s) and was taken over by a company joining then Allied Domecq, integrated itself in 2005 into Pernod Ricard before joining the second leader of French wines, *GCF* (*Grands Chais de France*), the company of Alsatian family Helfrich. Third, cooperatives joined the fray recently; on one side, several of them started a process of merging to resist competition and mobilize enough cash to invest in equipment, and the aim is to reduce their number from about 40 to a dozen, tackling one-fourth of *bordeaux* production; and because some regional ones are building diversified agro-business groups all over France, south-western InVivo launched the move when InVino Wines structured a federation of cooperatives around Vinadeis while it purchased the historical trade house Cordier-Mestrezat.[11]

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[10] See website http://www.groupe-castel.com/groupe/.

Conclusion

The intent was to follow the history of the *bordeaux* wine economy through the commonplace of economic and business history, avoiding the romanticized writings about wines. It doesn't comprise only family and estates reputed names, but also petty labourers, wine-croppers and average wines. It structured a chain of upstream and downstream activities as an actual cluster. It faced cycles in economics, entrepreneurship, regulation, trade, qualities and practices (good or bad). At every stage of this history, cohesion was at stake, to preserve or rebuild trademarks and global reputation; a few historical bigwigs and also fresh waves of entrepreneurs and investors embodied the successive evolutions which allowed the *bordeaux* wine to recover from each crisis and to renew its forms of competitiveness. And the turn of the present century epitomized such challenges once more.

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Quantity Is Not Quality: Expansion and Limits of Wine-Producing in Sicily

Francesco Dandolo

The Initial Increasing After the Italian Unification Process

When the Italian Kingdom was formed in March 1861, the Sicilian farming activities were already set. The island was at the centre of massive trade exchanges among centuries, resulting in an important mutation of exported agricultural products. The corn was the main product, but it was progressively followed by other cultivations, with particular regard to that taken by specialized tree crops, that are typical of the Mediterranean vegetable garden (Aymard 1987, p. 7). Viticulture became important after the finishing of the Italian unification process, it allowed to increase profits of both the landowner aristocracy and the smallholders. In fact, the political closeness with French empire strengthened the economic relations among the two countries, as it could be clearly shown by the bilateral commercial agreement signed

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_3

in January 1863. The Italian wine-producing, with particular regard to the Sicilian ones, was already famous for special types of wines, but it became much more relevant in this context because of the phylloxera infection that in a short time destroyed a significant quantity of French vineyard starting from the 1860s. Moreover, Sicily was helped by the Mediterranean routes that permit to reach French harbours in an easy and safe way.

Specifically, the Marsala harbour became the island's most important one for the Sicilian wine export abroad. Marsala became a headquarter of important wine plants starting from the nineteenth century, operating by the English managers John Woodhouse and Benjamin Ingham, and also by Florio starting to the 1830s (Iachiello 2003, p. 45). Vincenzo Florio built a shipping company together with Ingham in 1840 dedicated to winemoving from the island (Cancila 2008).

France was obliged to massively import grape or wine at rough state; the Italian wine export doubled respect to the prior years starting from the end of 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, with 80% of the product absorbed by the French market (Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio 1896, pp. 844–845). The export continued to stay at high levels until 1887, when a quick shrink of export related to France occurred due to the French commercial treaty condemnation (Montoneri 1933, p. 125).

The quick and massive export increasing led to a significant production rising; it is noticeable how it emerges from the rough statistics of these decades that the Palermo's province was at the first place of the national wine-producing level, followed by Trapani at the fourth place, while the Trapani and Girgenti areas were among the first places due to the maximum production obtained by every hectare (Ottavi 1885, p. 47). The grapevine covered land increasing encompassed all the island and it was progressively intensified starting from the Italian unification process, according to the general events exposed at the beginning of this study. The passage was from 120.000 to 130.000 hectares in the 1850s to 200.000 hectares at the beginning of the 1870s, overcoming the 300.000 hectares during the 1880s. Focusing to the 1870–1874 and 1879–1883 period of five years, the increasing of wine-producing in the island was about 80%, becoming the most relevant respect to other Italian regions and crowning Sicily to the first place for this type of product (Cerletti 1887a, p. 217). So an important agricultural landscape change occurred, encouraged by the agricultural crisis that hit Sicily starting from the 1870s.

So the grapevine cultivation became one of the most productive inside an agriculture-oriented economy as it was the Sicilian one (Giarrizzo 1976, p. 18). The proverb *Cu avivigna, avipani, vinu e ligna* sums up the advantages of this cultivation: the grapevine was the most valid alternative to the extensive and self-consuming agriculture, assuring a good labour absorption and a profitable occasion for the island to assume an important role inside the international trade (Barone 1987, p. 217). The vineyards, even the small ones, were a wealth source guaranteeing an acceptable economic stability and introducing dynamic elements that modified the traditional social hierarchy in the Sicilian rural areas (Cancila 1992, pp. 206–207). But the vineyards were not able to modify the contractual relationships between the landholders and leaseholders of grapevine dedicated lands. So, the grapevine strong expansion continued to be functional to an old type economy (Renda 1977, p. 98 ss.).

The Expansion Structural Limits and Attempts to Modernize the Production

The progress was abundant on a quantitative basis, but qualitatively there were lots of production problems. It was an old issue: even in the past phases of expansion, nothing changed about land organization, contractual conditions regulating the relationship between landholders and leaseholders and possibilities to realize a good-quality product. Only in the dessert and fortified wines target, like Marsala, Siracusa's Moscato, Eolie's Malvasia and some others Palermo's province wine, the Sicilian production was appreciated for its quality (Cancila 1992, p. 220). The wine-producing majority part came out from a special international conjuncture. The foreign demand modified only superficially the agricultural structures and productive paradigms, that remained abundantly speculative.

This condition was clearly underlined during the “Italian wine-producing Agreement” sponsored by the General Association of Italian Winemakers. Based on a regional analysis, it came out that the big wine-producing agglomeration was basically concentrated among the Trapani and Palermo provinces’ countries, different areas of Messina’s province, Etnea and Terreforti area and Catania’s province. In some cases a highly specialized productions were made, like Marsala, Moscato and Albanello: anyway, there were just a few cases with respect to the general production trend largely dedicated to the must-wine exported in France. This trend was typical from small landholders or leaseholders, that were able to realize an easily tradable and low cost rough product thanks to favourable climate conditions. It was obvious that the rough way of grapevine cultivation and wine preparation with absence of basic industrial planning would be come out when the favourable international trade conditions shrank (Cerletti 1887b, pp. 566–567).

The institution of viticulture and winemaking schools was conceived to tackle with this risky situation of an expansion sustained by fragile basis. These schools were part of a wide agricultural education project promoted by the Agriculture Ministry aiming at modernizing the primary sector, even if it was hard to realize because of the chronicle financing lack (Bidolli and Soldani 2001; Ivone 2004). The Catania’s viticulture and winemaking school was inaugurated in 1884 because it was one of territorial areas most grapevine intensive of the island. The school location was fair because the Catania’s province recently experienced a huge change in the agricultural landscape and it needed that farmers knew the most updated grapevine cultivation techniques. The school realization law was approved three years before, during November 1881, but the delay of the course starting was due to the hard research related to the field where the school practice could take place. At the beginning only basic courses were delivered, while the starting of theoretical courses was delayed. The paradox was that the school was mainly attended by the high class sons, while the poorer ones did not attend even if the basic courses were conceived for them. So there were no progresses in the education delivering because only people coming from an already skilled family had a real access to these schools, while the ones coming from a poorer and under-skilled one continued to stay away from the education process.

During the summer of 1894 the school board tried to tackle with this hurdle and decided to transform the basic courses into very short special courses dedicated to all aged and all level skilled farmers, with the aim of spreading among farmers the basic teachings of modern viticulture. Moreover, itinerant conferences were promoted into the main viticulture-oriented areas by the itinerant professors; the teaching approach was closely related to the users by the using of Sicilian dialect and by delivering lessons during days and hours when the winemakers were free from their work. Related to this approach, there were the Riposto and Noto experimental wine bars experience, respectively in the Catania's province and in the Siracusa's province. These wine bars were conceived as a meeting point for the rural society because people could stay there during the free time; moreover, they were very useful for spreading the wine culture among people that were not directly involved in the production, because they could go there and taste the wines produced by the wine bars organizers. They could be considered as a turning point that changes the relation between producers and users; they anticipated what nowadays are considered cool places to socialize and taste good wines.

The main idea of these proceedings was to revolutionize the teaching with a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down one, in order to be more closely related to the population.

These teaching experiences came out with better results if related to that of Catania's school. The winemakers appreciated this change in the winemaking teaching experience because they claimed it was closer to their needs and especially it was more ductile about times and techniques with which the modern viticulture essential principles were transmitted (Dandolo 2010, pp. 60–67). The contents transmission became urgent due to the rapid phylloxera infection diffusion in the Sicilian countries, this event rose a hard debate between the winemaking issues experts and the grapevines landholders.

The Phylloxera Discovering in Sicily

A lot of Italian regions, especially Sicily, took advantage when the phylloxera infections spread in France destroying a significant part of its grapevines. But when the first infections were discovered in the island countries, a big contrast clearly arose between the Agriculture Ministry experts and winemakers. In fact, a lot of interests other than the productive ones were implied, as it was already underlined above. Among the main issues there was the forthcoming decline of local credit banks because of the winemaking difficulties to entirely finance the agricultural reconversions and the buying of tools needed to transform grape into must-wine.

The discovering of huge phylloxera infections in the island starting from 2 March 1880 created a big fear, while smaller phylloxera infections hit the Messina's province. The area which the infections were founded was an internal one, in the Caltanissetta's country, the most marginal province among the abundant Sicilian viticulture. But the fear was related to the possibility that the infection could quickly extend to important close viticulture areas destroying the entire island economy. The Sicilian deputies understood this fear and stimulated the government to rapidly conceive a systematic destroying plan of infected viticulture fields. The landholders and winemakers of the infected areas sharply opposed to that and claimed their opposition to the field destructions. It was a clear interest conflict, even if both parties were bounded by sharp criticism towards the area's government delegates. More specifically, the Ministry experts were criticized because of the criteria they used to define an area to be destroyed. In the Sicilian grapevines the phylloxera hit very deep into the roots (Ministero di Agricoltura, Industria, Commercio 1880, p. 61). So it was necessary to destroy grapevines that apparently were productive, but instead were already hit by infections. Nevertheless, the winemakers did not give up and claimed their opposition to destructions of grapevines they thought were sane and very productive. Protests were organized and thousands of winemakers and their families took part, the security forces hardly tackled with them (Maccagno 1881, pp. 470–476). Considering these protests, divergent opinions emerged among experts about the indiscriminate destruction system, even on the basis of experiences matured in other countries, like France. This way of acting expanded a confused and uncertain situation. Nobody knew who was right between government and protesters. Anyway, nobody knew if the government way of acting was too exaggerated even if it was right in the principle of tackling the phylloxera expansion.

The Phylloxera Infections Inside Principal Sicilian Viticulture Areas

The destruction system was abandoned during the 1884 spring. It was a compulsory choice because of the massive phylloxera infections extension and because other European countries adopted similar decisions ("Atti del congresso fillosserico internazionale" 1885, p. 54). New important phylloxera infections were discovered around one year ago in the Catania's province, one of the most important viticulture areas in Sicily. The grapevine cultivation in this province took advantage of the volcanic soil fertility and of the favourable climate conditions. The situation collapsed when phylloxera infections were discovered in the Noto's plain, inside the Siracusa's province. This area turned recently into a massive viticulture one because of the agricultural mutation guided by the international trade demand. Small leaseholders bore the new grapevine implantation in the Catania's province and Siracusa's province, relying on private and popular banks credits (Reale Cantina di Noto 1894, p. 25). So the winemakers of these areas strongly opposed against the destruction system abandon because they were frightened to be left alone without any State protection. It was much better to destroy grapevines and justify this way the impossibility to repay their bank debt rather than continue producing without a real possibility to repay debt in the State aids absence. The difficulty to repay debt came from both sides: there was a problem related to the production, as it was the phylloxera infection one, and another related to the lack of demand.

In fact, this feeling rose more after the French commercial treaty condemnation in 1887. It occurred that not only someone needed to bear costs for grapevine reconstructions, but also that incomes were no longer easy as in the recent past. The problem was not only to restart the production, but also to produce quality wines able to compete in order to catch new commercial opportunities in the international markets. The most famous Sicilian grapevine areas—Noto, Vittoria, Pachino, Ragusa—were totally abandoned at the beginning of 1890s. In some areas there were autonomous and spontaneous reconstructions operating with American rootstocks, but it resulted in a total failure ("Tristissima condizione della Sicilia di fronte alla fillossera" 1893, p. 772). A Ministry of Agriculture survey in 1893 certified that infected grapevines in Sicily occupied a 63.000 hectares surface, compared to the 96.000 hectares definitely destroyed. Around 14 million working days were lost in the 96.000 destroyed hectares, with a total loss amount of about 22 million liras. The grain cultivations that were replacing grapevines cost 3.368.715 working days, with a total salary of about 17 million liras ("Relazione sui provvedimenti contro la fillossera attuati nel 1893" 1894, pp. 7–8). The crisis became stronger and led to a sensitive wine-producing shrink during the 1890s and the beginning of the twentieth century. Related to that there were a sensitive farmers economic conditions worsening, the people that took more advantage of wine rising foreign export before (Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni dei contadini nelle provincie meridionali e nella Sicilia 1910, pp. 73–74).

The Grapevine Reconstruction

The grapevine reconstruction with phylloxera-resistant American rootstock was complicated. The Sicilian winemakers were reluctant because they thought that distinctive peculiarity of local production was damaged. As it is typical to development of economics processes, the society demonstrated a certain degree of resistance to the introduction of new techniques.

The rootstock could be subject to infections not only when winemakers tried to do it themselves without experts, but also when the Ministry of Agriculture directly implanted grapevines (Precile 1891). In July 1885 the Palermo's "Reale Vivaio di Viti Americane" was created, but the grapevine reconstruction struggled. Marsala was the Trapani's province that produced the most quality Sicilian wines and that was massively hit by the phylloxera; only in that location there was a new impulse to grapevine reconstruction in the nineteenth century ending years (Dell'Orto and Vajarello 1914). But the reconstruction process was slowed by a newly discovered grapevine disease spread in the Trapani's countries, Siracusa's countries and Girgenti's countries that hit the new grapevines built with American rootstocks. These events shocked the Sicilian winemakers, that doubted about the American grapevines phylloxera resistance. An enquiry commission of the Agricultural Ministry affirmed that the main cause was the climate adaptation hurdle, because the climate, the soil composition, the implant system, the agricultural techniques, the fertilizers and the high variety of local grapevines was very different in Sicily from the conditions the rootstocks came first. To sum up, the idea to transplant an American production technique in Sicily without taking into account the different local conditions was wrong; it was necessary that this new acquired technique adapted into the new environment: it needed time and patience.

The Sicilian grapevines partial reconstruction extended to all the 1920s having tackled these hurdles, especially with the using of "Rupestris du Lot" that was easily adaptable to dry island climate. Taking into account the hard times of the phylloxera infection and the subsequent difficult reconstruction, the winemakers continued to give more importance to the specialized grapevine, that was not associated with any other cultivation, so the typical wines that were produced before the infections continued to be made, as *Marsala, Moscato* and *Malvasia* (Paulsen 1933, pp. 181–198).

The Hard Times During Fascism

The fascism found the viticulture and the national wine-producing industry in a bad state because of the lack of production organization and because of the diminishing export on the foreign markets. Italy continued suffering of overproduction crisis even if the phylloxera infection was ended, because of the intensive Mediterranean countries competition—especially Spain and Tunisia—that led to a rising of grapevine cultivation (Carpentieri 1924, p. 705). So a lot of difficulties appeared for the Sicilian viticulture and they would be even more intensive for the coming years. The total of grapevine cultivated soil in Sicily was about 178.900 hectares in 1927, of which only 1300 hectares dedicated to mixed cultivation, achieving a 2.448.000 hectolitre wine production.

The foreign export amounted to 44.341 hectolitre in barrels during the same year, diminishing respect to the 99.441 in 1924; so the wine export represented the 5,03% over the total Reign export, while the exported wine bottles were 17.000. Referring to Marsala, it resulted that in 1927 were exported 7517 hectolitres in barrels and 285.461 in bottles (of which 163.864 in the United States). To sum up, the Sicilian wine export reached a low level, especially regarding the bottled ones (Buttitta 1977, p. 82). During these years the Sicilian countries became poorer. The situation turned into a more dramatic one when Mussolini adopted the "quota 90" resolution, that permitted to rapidly revaluate the lira causing new hurdles in the wine foreign export. Even stronger were the 1929 crisis effects, also because the Sicilian wine production was abundant the prior year, as it was at the national level (Montoneri 1933, p. 135; Buttitta 1977, p. 82). At the same time, the most quality island production was threatened by others phylloxera infections that hit massively the Pantelleria island starting from 1930; Pantelleria produced high alcoholic white wines together with Marsala, that were highly sought by the wine industries in Trapani's province (Scarponi 1939, pp. 294–332). So the production was abundant but with low-quality standards. The fascist regime did not pay attention to the increasing hurdles related to viticulture and winemaking: the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Giacomo Acerbo understood the situation and invited substituting the grapevines with other cultivations in a newsletter dated March 1930, with special regard to the corn and grass plot; this was in line with the "corn battle" ("Il problema della vite e del vino" 1930, p. 139). During the 1930s the situation did not seem to come to a solution. Sicily suffered a lot for the backward conditions of its production even if it was at the first place national level for specialized cultivation before Puglia and Piemonte and even if it was a reference to the woody crops in the estate colonization elaboration process (Tassinari, pp. 8–16). An important treaty published at the beginning of the 1940s observed that the production was low quality in all the island, except from the Trapani's province. This situation emphasized among small landholders and sharecroppers in the Agrigento, Noto and Vittoria countries, because they well cured the grapevine but did not do the same for the winemaking process, especially for the lack of proper tools and wine cellars (Garoglio 1941, pp. 204–205). This way, one of the main products able to grasp foreign currency was sacrificed due to the regime agrarian political choices that anticipated the autarky turning point (Marescalchi 1938, pp. 111–113).

Rebirthing Processes After the Second World War

The national trade intensified during the Second World War. There was a high demand coming to the foreign troops allocated on the Italian soil. Sicily was implied with an increasing wine export. This augmentation stayed at high levels even in the post-war years. Anyway, the demand enforcement did not provoke production changes: the Sicilian winemakers continued to furnish raw grapes or blending wines to other Italian regions that were able to transform them in other Italian wines (Buttitta 1977, p. 83). The backwardness was showed by the production per grapevine hectare, one of the lowest at national level, and by the high production costs, limiting the local consumption among the poorest people. Moreover, if the product was exported the high transport costs had to be added; they rose during the war and they did not diminish the years after, affecting Sicily very much because they were distance-based. So it was impossible not to lower profits in order to continue exporting increasing wine quantities. All these correlated problems constituted the basis of the winemaking Sicilian crisis (Rossi 1955, p. 12).

The issue was at the top of the Southern-oriented politics during the post-war ages, in the perspective of a wide primary sector modernization. The first credits issued by the Banco di Sicilia went in this direction because about one-third of them was dedicated to the winemaking sector ("I finanziamenti deliberati per l' industrializzazione del Mezzogiorno sul D.L. n. 1598" 1951, p. 275). The "Associazione per lo Sviluppo Industriale del Mezzogiorno" (Svimez) seemed to show a lot of attention in the winemaking empowerment sector; it was born at the end of the 1946 and it was the main reference for politics oriented to tackle Southern Italy underdevelopment. The Svimez promoted a series of regional studies and from the Sicilian survey emerged an irregular condition: in the Trapani's province the wine was made in medium–large factories, but in the Messina's province and Catania's province the wine-related tools were primitive and limited the winemaking production, even if some years the grape crop was larger than the Trapani one. Anyway, the general overview was optimistic: the hypothesis was to create big wine model factories with the State financing, because the private sector was not able to finance all the project; they would be created in limited areas—Vittoria, Riposto and Barcelona, respectively in the Ragusa's province, Catania's province and Messina's province—corresponding to the main viticulture oriented island areas ("Indagine sulla industria enologica in Sicilia" 1948, pp. 478–480).

The idea was to rethink the production environment in order to improve quality wine other than quantity export. In fact, the Sicilian winemaking was not top quality because related tools and factories were very primitive and roughly managed, resulting in a low-quality production or in a raw wine ones. At the same time strategies applied aiming at rebuilding a link with European countries in order to facilitate wine export ("La crisi vinicola" 1948, p. 404). The Sicilian region issued some actions for the island winemaking valorization; the region had significant freedom of political action thanks to the Italian Constitution that applied from the 1 January 1948. The most important one was the institution of the "Istituto regionale della vite e del vino" in July 1950, aiming at important goals: the fungal disease defence, the empowerment of the professional viticulture and winemaking education, the promotion of new wine bars, the foreign countries commercial agreement proposals and related sector-specific laws (Legge 18 luglio 1950, n. 64, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Regione Sicilia, n. 27 1950).

It continued to present an irregular distribution of the wine quality among the island, even if the above-mentioned ambitious proposals were formulated. Marsala was confirmed as the most dynamic area and a wine-protecting committee born, it bounded the 85% of local winemakers; moreover an experimental centre for wine industry was founded there. But the general issue was already unsolved: there were a low incidence of quality wines over the total regional production, amounting about the 25% of the total according to evaluations done at the beginning of the 1950s ("La produzione dei vini pregiati nel

Mezzogiorno" 1951, p. 560). An attempt was done with the agricultural reform applied in Sicily starting from 1950, that tried to introduce the viticulture in dispossessed areas according to a government top-down approach; but generally the effects were weak because of the public financing decision to finance olive groves rather than grapevines according to the extra-production ("Lo sviluppo agricolo nel Mezzogiorno" 1953, p. 556; "Direttive del Consiglio superiore dell'agricoltura in materia di bonifica" 1959, p. 132).

The Sicilian grapevine production amounted to about six million hectolitres on annual basis at the mid-1950s, that represented about the 12% over the total national production. The Trapani's province assured the 50–52% of total Sicilian produced wines. After that province, there were the Catania's province with a 9%, Messina and Palermo had lower percentages. The Sicilian wines were the first exported in Switzerland, Malta and Austria, while a lower quantity was exported in Sweden, Germany and England. A stimulating input came from Venezuela, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, even if the total quantity was low ("La produzione vinicola siciliana" 1955, p. 1103). The issue stayed unsolved: the quality production was not satisfying even if it was on a quantity point of view.

The European Integration Impact

The wine-producing restructuring opportunity came from the Roman Treaty signature the 25 March 1957, that created the European Economic Community. The interest was clear: grapevine and wine continued to represent the biggest working opportunity for Sicilian areas farmers. It was calculated that for a grapevine hectare 150 working days on annual basis were necessary, so the entire Sicilian viticulture needed 32.400.000 working days on annual basis, corresponding to 130.000 fully employed workers in the Sicilian grapevines. Moreover, it was also necessary to consider the workers for industrial winemaking and for others directly related activities (transports, wine tanks factories and winemaking machines, chemical laboratories needed for wine-related products, winemaking industries) (Rossi 1955, p. 174).

The winemaking increasing production became massive during the mid-1950s, when an amount of 6832 thousands hectolitres on annual basis was achieved, compared to 4377 thousands obtained during the 1936–1939 years. Given that, Sicily was at the second place for wine national production, with a percentage of 12%. It was preceded by Puglia, that assured a 15,9% total amount; but it came first Piemonte, that achieved 11,9% of total national production ("L'economia agricola della Sicilia", p. 811).

The European integration process launched again the Sicilian production restructuring issue: in fact, the European Economic Community requests for Italy were about meal-consuming wines rather than blending wines. So a strong competition with Northern Italy regions took place, because they promptly activated significant changes for wine quality increasing. Moreover, the Sicilian winemakers were worried about the Italian law elaboration that permitted an artificial alcohol-realization that favoured the Northern regions and damaged themselves because they obtained the alcohol-realization on natural basis (Buttitta 1977, p. 92). Nevertheless, viticulture and winemaking remained as main Sicilian economy pillars during the 1960s, even if there were not significant production changes; these activities assured an average total income of 66 billion of lira, that was lower respect to that assured by citruses but higher respect to that assured by potatoes, vegetables and grains. A significant production differentiation became clearer during these years respect to the past years: the white wines dominated in the Western Sicily, corresponding to the Trapani's province, Palermo's province and Caltanissetta's province. That production was about 8 million grape quintals, corresponding to the two third of regional production; it took place on a grapevine surface amounted to the 70% of the regional one, the 46% of that referring to the Trapani area, the most Italian grapevine cultivated area. The red grapes dominated in the Eastern Sicily, corresponding to the Messina's province, Catania's province, Siracusa's province, Ragusa's province and Enna's province, with a total production of about 4 million quintals. The meal-consuming grape was increasing quantity: in 1965 about 1.345.800 quintals were produced, mostly exported abroad. That production was limited to small and prestigious Sicilian areas until the mid-twentieth century (Regione Siciliana, Istituto Regionale della vite e del vino 1966, p. 5).

The wine-related European law was issued only in the April 1970, when the European Economic Community Ministry Board approved the rules related to "produced quality wines in specific areas". The followed criteria were the geographic origins one and it was permitted the sugaring only in areas where this practice was already done in the past. The wine foreign export rapidly increased during this phase: the amount was 587.000 hectolitre over the Italian total of 5.846.000 in 1970, it increased to 1.681.000 over 13.384.000 in 1971, achieving the amount of 3.258.000 over 8.338.200 in 1972. At the same time the Sicilian wine national trade towards Northern Italy increased, passing from one million/one million and six hundred thousand hectolitre in 1952–1953 to over 3200 thousand in 1972–1973. These results were linked to a push towards the production modernization process and to a way of working reorganization. Related to that, some data could be shown: there were only 39 wine bars in the island during 1968–1969 years, while they reached 77 unities in 1973–1974 years, with a total amount of 30.868 partners. The wine bars spreading together with the progressive reduction of blending wines and an increasing of meal-consuming and certified wines (Buttitta 1977, p. 92).

The progresses that occurred in the 1970s came out from deep changes in the Sicilian countries during the past decades, like: the diminishing working availability and the related possibility to start a partial process of conglomerating production, the wine price that did not increase too much in Sicily, the augmenting hurdles in trading blending wines due to national and European law, the easing in trading Sicilian meal-consuming wines due to the trade liberalization in the EEC area (Pastena 1976, pp. 24–25). The viticulture and winemaking contest was rapidly evolving, but the type-related industries were already the same as in the past. In fact, 78% of 160.000 winemaking industries were directly directed by the same owner (Pastena 1976, p. 7). So the relevant changes acted in a complex scenario that did not cause transformations in industry paradigms, it was based upon the ancient idea that viticulture guaranteed a better wealth compared to other cultivations. Related to this idea, there was the winemakers way of acting: they did not carry the effort to change and improve production because they were aware that winemaking guaranteed better economic results compared to that of other cultivations in any way it was done. So there was the problem of changing this way of thinking and related acting to face with the issue of improving quality wines. As it is common to development economics dynamics, the people way of thinking and related working approach analysis is crucial in understanding why an area is still underdeveloped even the attempted reform efforts.

This idea was never criticized even during the frequent overproduction crisis that characterized the Sicilian winemaking for a long time.

Conclusions

It is clear how a series of strong shocks impacted the Sicilian viticulture and winemaking in the above considered years. First of all the phylloxera, that assumed a positive role when infected the French grapevines and stimulated new grapevine implants; but it became negative when the infection transmitted over the majority part of Sicilian viticulture. Other negative shocks were the two world wars that determined and involution and the fascism, that hit massively the viticulture and winemaking interests due to its agrarian politics. The issue approached in this paper could be summed up analysing the foreign demand. The Sicilian wine production was exuberant and easily overcame the Sicilian market among centuries, also because of its geographical position. It is also interesting analysing how Sicily entered the international trade. This is the tricky issue: Sicily exported almost only blending wines, that raw material would be transformed into the final product by the foreign demander; the only exception was represented by Marsala. The relevant quantitative expansion was primitive and it did not take into account the quality production. The market conditions were passively accepted by Sicily, these imposed to the Sicilian winemaking a massive subordination compared to the strong area interests. Substantial changes were introduced in the Sicilian countries after the EEC definition, specifically when it was issued an European regulation about the trade among member states at the beginning of 1960s, taking into account an increasing meal-consuming demand rather than blending wine one. These dynamics linked to a more general issue. Sicily has all conditions for a typical and good-quality wine production. But this type of production was not realized for a long time, except for some limited areas. So there was a huge quantitative expansion but a low-quality realization. The causes could be identified in the lack of capital investments for bigger projects, but also in the hurdles related to the human capital creation. The grapevine is identified as the opportunity to improve the personal economic condition, but at the same time it did not receive a focusing effort. The viticulture and winemaking could be a way to affirm quality brands competing with massive concurrence of other Italian regions and other foreign winemakers countries. This lack of focus did not permit the relevant Sicilian viticulture and winemaking to become an extraordinary resource. Recent data shows how quality wines production is spreading in Sicily. The above described quantitatively based situation is important but it needs necessarily to come to an end: this is the whisper for the coming years. This way, the international community could appreciate even more the Sicilian typical and quality wine.

The Sicilian winemaking potentialities are higher than the present situation, so it is necessary to improve efforts in order to align these potentialities to the effective market realization. It is not a matter of improving marketing or sponsorship, it is a matter of improving production conditions that permit to a potential real high-quality wine to be appreciated around the world.

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The Development and Promotion of Controlled Designations of Origin (Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées) in Burgundy: The Recognition of Terroir Wines (1884–1970)

Olivier Jacquet

Introduction

The subject of this chapter raises several methodological issues. Current approaches tend to promote what characterizes the terroir instead of attempting to understand how and why it is defined as such. Yet this approach fails to consider the temporal aspect of the terroir, a terroir subject to different regimes of historicity (Hartog 2003) as well as numerous interpretations, definitions, and representations depending on the societies and contexts that engage in and with it. Through the example of Burgundy as a hierarchical and fragmented production space, especially the Burgundy of the crus of the Côte-d'Or, I attempt to trace the development of part of our current legal (Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées, AOC), economic, and mental representations of wine terroirs from the late nineteenth century to 1970. This entails a multiple-perspective analysis of the strategies used by the various actors implicated in

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© The Author(s) 2019
S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_4

the network (Boyer et al. 2007; Jacquet and Laferté 2006), who were able to overturn the production and marketing standards of terroir wines and anchor the AOC concept among wine professionals and consumers. This research draws from both the corpus of sources and works published during the period under study as well as local (union archives and newspapers, vineyard archives, public data), national (Institut National des Appellations d'Origine [INAO] archives), and international (International Organization of Vine and Wine archives) documentation. These sources allow us to take a more comprehensive look at the regulatory, political and economic circumstances that favoured this unprecedented process of standardization. Finally, the study of our Burgundy example, because of its proximity to the relevant stakeholders, supposes a "ground-level" perspective suitable to grasp the essential role played by wine unions in this twentieth-century evolution.

In the first instance, this study examines the phase of economic, regulatory, and structural metamorphoses that affected the world of wine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries before turning to the manner in which the vineyard owners in Burgundy were able to exploit this new legislation to defend their collective interests. In particular, this involves understanding the ways in which the law of 6 May 1919 relating to the AOC was appropriated and interpreted in Burgundy. How were the geographical delimitations decided in the interwar period? How did the vineyard owners organized in wine unions develop this specific model of the AOC Burgundy with its emphasis on micro-terroirs given the conflictual context? Finally, this study focuses on the different methods used to promote the new norms, which initially lacked commercial success. The AOC producers thus had to strive for the recognition of these "new products" and instil among professionals and later consumers the idea that a delimited terroir gives specificities and qualities to the wine produced there. This publicity began in the 1920s, but adopted a different scale with the support of the INAO from the 1950s, thus permitting the economic development of the AOC and its appropriation by consumers and eventually the European legislator in the 1970s.[1]

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[1] See 28 April 1970 (regulations n°816/70 and 817/70), "Community Regulation with Additional Provisions on the Common Organization of the Wine Sector." This regulation was heavily influenced by the French AOC model in which Burgundy played a relatively important role from the early twentieth century.

Regulatory Change in the Twentieth Century: A Favourable Context for Winegrowers

In Burgundy in the nineteenth century, wine merchants were entirely in charge of the vinification, ageing, and sale of wine, imposing their own norms of production and marketing on consumers (Lucand 2010). For the most part, winegrowers were the simple suppliers of grapes and must, and it was rather unheard for them to sell bottles of wine directly from their property. Thus, the label of every bottle could include two mentions: first, the name of the distributor who guaranteed the know-how and traditions of blending and maturation, and second, the geographical name of the "village", vintage, or winegrowing region. Note that these "geographical brands" were much less numerous in the wake of the first AOC laws than they are today. At the end of the nineteenth century, for example, the order catalogues for the department of the Côte-d'Or included the names of no more than 40 cru vineyards and 15 "villages".

These names are indeed geographical brands and not strictly defined designations. By using a method known at the time as the "system of equivalences", the merchants played on the reputation of certain "villages" that were recognized by purchasers and used as quality norms. Thus, a Gevrey-Chambertin wine was not necessarily the product of grapes harvested in Gevrey-Chambertin, but rather a wine with the quality of a Gevrey-Chambertin that resulted from the skillful blending of grapes from the neighbouring communes. We may thus speak of geographical brands that guarantee the typical character of wine. This typicity is conferred by the merchants and their vinification methods. Broadly speaking, each cru is distinguished by a unique taste created by the blending. The merchant, as the guarantor of know-how and blending and ageing traditions, thus adds his own mark to these geographical names. As he produces and commercializes the wine, he alone can give his name to it, thus playing on his own reputation in the case of the upgraded classification of the product.

Following the deregulation of the market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several Burgundy merchants adopted opportunistic strategies by diluting the practices of blending and the equivalence of the crus (or "climates" in Burgundy) and putting even further pressure on Burgundy viticulture. Some Burgundy crus thus had more Languedoc, Italian, or even Algerian grapes than local must. The winegrowers henceforth had to compete against competitors situated ever further afield from the Burgundy crus. Some of the merchants consequently found themselves challenged by the winegrowers in crisis.

The conflict that began in the early years of the twentieth century thus opposed the trade sector, overwhelmed by anti-fraud legislation that it had nevertheless contributed to implement, and the vineyard owners, wanting to go even further to guarantee and protect the origin of wine. For the vineyard owners, this was the only way to break the stranglehold of trade by favouring norms to enhance and protect their territories of culture. Yet this also involved engaging in a policy of economic Malthusianism to ensure volumes and decent sale prices in the face of external competition.

To impose this norm that prioritized origin over brand, the winegrowers organized in unions took advantage of the extremely favourable context in terms of the development of unions[2] and the republicanization of campaigns. The republic, hoping to become established in rural milieus, in turn favoured small and medium landowners over "large landowners" and "industrialists" (Jacquet and Laferté 2006). In the Côte-d'Or, this translated, in the majority of cases, into a struggle between landowning winegrowers and non-landowning merchants.

From 1908, the professional unionism of winegrowers became structured on the regional level through the formation of Confederation of Winegrowing Associations of Burgundy. Its objective was to defend the local interests of Burgundy on the national level. Relying on a series of legislative texts (including the law of 1 August 1905) as well as local parliamentarians, the winegrowers participated in the elaboration of the designations of origin law of 6 May 1919. By putting pressure on their elected representatives and convincing winegrowers from other regions in France, they succeeded in removing the notion of "substantial quality" from the text; if it had remained, based on the fears of the time, it would have allowed the wine trade to continue to make blends with prestigious appellations. With the exclusion of this phrase thanks to the tenacity of the Burgundy vineyard owners, this law now provided all the necessary conditions to uphold the standards and protect Burgundy's wine terroirs.

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[2] Agricultural unionism was authorized following the law of 21 March 1884, leading to the creation of dozens of professional wine organizations in Burgundy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Jacquet (2009).

In essence, this text authorized the courts to resolve any dispute of whether a product had the right to use the designation under which it was sold. In their assessment, the courts only considered "the origin, nature, and composition of the product sold" in virtue of local, loyal, and constant usages.[3]

The vineyard owners of Burgundy quickly seized on this text, and from 1921 with the geographical delimitation of Montrachet until 1936, a series of 17 judgements was enacted.[4] Burgundy alone had around 45% of all delimitation judgements in France. This part of the interwar period proved all the more important, as it contributed to shaping the matrix of the Burgundy model. The geographical delimitations based on the law of 6 May 1919 were not contested by the subsequent decree-law of 30 July 1935, which established the Appellations d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) and proposed a new delimitation model "controlled" by INAO, that is to say, the public authorities.

Thus, given the region's numerous judgements on the geographical delimitations of winegrowing areas and the high stakes of such actions, Burgundy became a territory marked by numerous conflicts within the wine sphere. As a consequence, intense debates took place during the interwar period with each interest group aiming to impose its own vision of the AOC relative to wine terroirs.

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[3] On the debates around the notions of local, loyal, and constant usages and the involvement of Burgundians in the regulatory discussions on the issue of designations, see Wolikow (2017).

[4] I have calculated to date a total of 37 delimitation procedures linked to the law of 6 May 1919 for the entire French territory between 1921 and 1938. This figure does not include the referral of these judgements to appeal or cassation, referrals that were likewise numerous during this period.

What Types of Terroirs and Classifications for the Vineyards of Burgundy?

In the delimitation judgements, the diversity of actors involved (small owners of vins ordinaires, owners of prestigious crus, landowning/non-landowning merchants, cooperatives, etc.) resulted in the introduction of a multitude of territorial identifications and appropriations before the judges. In these cases, it had to be proven that such and such a usage was the most local, loyal or constant. These inter-union debates before the courts thus played out in multiple arenas: political (appeal to the republican register for defence of small landholders), social (small versus large landholders), and economic (denominations traditionally used in the wine trade).

Appeal to Historical and Cadastral Usages of the Nineteenth Century

In judgements, in order to prove constant usage in the definition of Côte-d'Or vineyards, the unions had to partially rely on old records with commercial and cultural legitimacy.

The map drawn by the Committee for Agriculture and Viticulture of Beaune in 1860, based on the writings of Morelot, Jullien and Lavalle[5] as well as a survey conducted in each of the affected communes, became the necessary proof for any delimitation request in judgements.[6] By classifying each "climate" of grapevine into four distinct values (tête de cuvée, first, second and third cuvées), the plan hierarchized wines by attributing a distinct commercial value to each plot. Used in numerous judgements, it accorded a structure to the Côte-d'Or vineyards and influenced the vision of Burgundy's winegrowing territory with hierarchical and "over-delimited" terroirs.

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[5] See Lavalle (1972), Morelot (1925), and Jullien (1832).

[6] See Municipal Archives of Beaune (AMB), Collection of the Committee for Agriculture and Viticulture of the Arrondissement of Beaune, Investigations by Commune 56W75 (1859) and Minutes of the Commission of Viticulture 56W22 (1858–1960).

The grounds of judgement on delimitation in Burgundy dated 29 April 1930 make reference to this representation: “Finally, the wine plan of the Côte-d’Or made in 1860 indicates only the grapevines planted in Pinot and Chardonnay as the producer of fine wines and expressly mentions the locations where non-fine seedlings are cultivated as the region of vins ordinaires or grands Ordinaires.”[7] For the delimitation of each commune and cru in the Côte-d’Or, the plan acted as a benchmark. As an example, the geographical delimitation of a cru as Pommard shows the utilization of this map on the scale of a commune.[8]

Despite the widespread use of the plan, its usage was still thrown into question. As a result, other documents proving the age of cultural and commercial practices associated with a given terroir and thus providing alternative visions were called upon.

In the conflict over the geographical delimitation of Corton that opposed the winegrowers of Ladoix and Pernand against the owners of Aloxe, only the latter evoked the map. By excluding certain vineyards in Pernand and Ladoix from the right to use the Corton AOC, exclusively reserved for the area of Aloxe, the map imposed a historical hierarchy of terroirs. Yet this was rejected by the small winegrowers of Ladoix. In reference to older sources as well as the map, the president of the Ladoix-Corton union affirmed that “because of their age, it is possible that they do not precisely translate the state of affairs that predated the law of 1919”, and further on, “in short, the plan has an informative value but no more. Often, it is a useful reference but it is not a proof in itself”.[9] Against the large landowners of Aloxe and the 1860 categorization, the small winegrowers of Ladoix used recent commercial proofs to demonstrate the wine merchant’s purchase of their grapes under the name of Corton.[10] In this case, terroir adopts a commercial dimension and expands spatially.

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[7] See the Page 8 of the grounds of the trial, INAO Archives, Dijon.

[8] See the letter from the mayor of Pommard to the director of the Oenological Plant of Beaune, dated 13 April 1937.

[9] Notice written by M. Capitain, president of the Ladoix-Corton Union, following the same union’s appeal to the court of cassation on 23 November 1937, INAO Archives, Dijon.

[10] For the history of the conflict linked to the Corton AOC, see Laferté and Jacquet (2003).

The 1860 categorization, initially developed by doctors and local scholars, proposed a cultural and geographical approach to the Côte. Yet the usage of this map before the courts and the disputes regarding its validity highlighted the transformation of what had been a mere cultural representation into an object that legitimated the commercial practices and legal norms for the AOC.

The Beaune Committee refuted the more homogenous vision of vineyards provided by certain owners of Côte de Nuits crus. Thus, after the completion of the plan in 1859, people in Vosne-Romanée and Clos Vougeot worried about the tendency of the Beaune elites to determine hierarchies even within the crus, while the vineyard owners in Richebourg, Tâche, Romanée Saint-Vivant, and Clos Vougeot refused for their land to be split into categories of quality.[11] The Committee's response to these grievances shows that the terroir, even with the owners of cru vineyards, could have a different signification depending on how it was defined:

> The Committee believed that it should proceed in a totally different manner. It dealt with the product of the grapevines not by considering them according to their current conglomeration in the hands of the same owner or the very often arbitrary boundaries given by the cadastral plan for each climate, but rather by assessing the real merit of the product. Thus, when the same climate or parcel of grapevine had quite dissimilar sections in terms of the merit of the products, the Committee did not hesitate to organize them into different classes.[12]

Through the example of the 1860 plan and especially in the disputes associated with its creation, we are able to appreciate the complexity involved in defining the reality of the AOC, with the classification of terroirs being variously based on their geography, cadastral data, notoriety of the crus, and even the relationship to the vineyard, perceived as the cohesive element of a cru.

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[11] See AMB—Series 56W—Response of the communes of Vougeot and Vosne-Romanée to the investigation of the Committee of Agriculture and Viticulture of Beaune.

[12] See AMB—Series 56W22—Minutes of the Commission of Viticulture.

Furthermore, this plan, used between 1920 and 1930 (and even still today with the INAO), may leave room for interpretation or even become less relevant in light of certain grievances. The legal contribution made by other documents such as harvest declarations and written sales agreements highlights another problem linked to commercial practices that the unions would also have to face, notably that of equivalences and brands.

The Actions of Excluded Villages: The Proof of Divisions Among Wine Unions

The 1860 plan can be read in two ways: vertically and horizontally. Vertically, it allows the winegrowing areas to be hierarchized according to climate with strict delimitations between villages. Viewed horizontally, the colours used to define the quality of the crus cross the communes in wide strips and define large intercommunal areas with equivalent wine qualities. Thus, a white wine from the area of Monthélie where plots are classed as second cuvée could adopt the more prestigious name of Meursault, as the border between the two villages matters less than the coloured classification. This usage is known as the practice of equivalences.

Certain winegrowing communes represented by their mayors and unions expressed their desire not to lose the added commercial value offered by this system. Being relatively unknown, they wanted their wines to adopt the name of the “flagship” communes of the Côte. Union alliances were thus created between these so-called “excluded” villages and other communes dissatisfied with the geographical delimitations.

In 1931, during the visit of the Beverage Commission of the National Assembly to the Côte-d’Or, the winegrowers took advantage of the presence Edouard Barthe, president of the Commission, deputy, and founder of the International Office of Vine and Wine in 1924, to delegitimize the 1919 law and denounce its adverse consequences on geographical delimitations.[13] They stigmatized “their rich and powerful colleagues (winegrowers of crus)” who, according to M. Naudin, secretary of the union of the Haûte Côte de Nuits and Beaune, “had the impertinence to act against the destitute, against the derelict, against the workers of Burgundy viticulture, against us, using the local, loyal, and constant usages” (*Investigation* 1930, 245). These remarks prove that the union’s action to promote the legal entity of the vineyard and a certain conception of terroirs did not only contribute to the validation of a cultural or commercial patrimony, but also to debate of social issues.

In this context, the union structures and their leaders had to join networks of local or national influence in order to weigh in on parliamentary and ministerial decisions and carry economic and social significance.[14] This then creates an interesting paradox. How can national legal norms be appropriated through local issues? How can an area’s own collective rules of delimitation and its own conception of terroirs be defined in a winegrowing nation full of fragmented practices? These issues express the concern of every union stakeholder on the necessity to be in the best position in his sphere of interest in order to maximize his influence and legitimacy.

Structuring the Territory and Legitimating Collective Action

The use of past evidence should not override the current action of unions and their leaders. Behind any grounds of judgement, there exists an array of pressure groups, networks, actions and ideas at work.

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[13] These entities who had witnessed their ambitions progressively lost during the different delimitation judgements attempted to hold on to an idea born in Saône-et-Loire with the executives of the Confederation of Winegrowing Associations of Burgundy. Their objective was to circumvent the judgements by creating a Burgundy wine status that would be debated in the National Assembly. See *Investigation* (1930).

[14] The proponents of the new social economy show the importance of the individual joining permanent networks of personal relationships in order to facilitate and reinforce economic action. On the basis of this principle, let us suppose that the same may apply to cultural and political actions in the wine sector driven by economic principles prima facie.

The first AOCs in Burgundy—not to mention throughout the entire wine sector in France—derive from the conflicts of the relevant stakeholders in relation to contemporary issues. Let us take the example of the Union for the Defense of the Producers of Great Fine Wines of the Côte-d'Or founded by the Marquis d'Angerville in 1928.

Save for the importance of the private sources on this wine union, it was chosen on account of its decisive role in the development of the AOC Burgundy. The union gained its legitimacy from the prestige of its members, as the vast majority of fine wine unions and cooperatives of the Côte-d'Or were affiliated with it.[15] Thus, despite its relative economic strength (Laferté 2002), the union represented prestigious vineyards, as emblematic images of France similarly to the castles of Bordeaux.

The Marquis d'Angerville acted for these vineyards through a vast network the comprised unions, politicians, winegrowing associations and public authorities. He first succeeded by integrating a French network of influential unionists within the Federation of Winegrowing Associations of France and Algeria. In a more restricted way, the representatives of the winegrowing regions of the crus were grouped in the Federation's highly influential "Section of Grand Crus". As part of this "club", he rubbed shoulders with Edouard Barthe as well as Baron Le Roy who is considered with Joseph Capus to be the creator of the AOC and "savior of French vineyards". Finally, to ensure his legitimacy and impose his views at the national level, from 1921, d'Angerville participated in the all-new Advisory Commission on Viticulture, where he worked with 17 parliamentary representatives, including Camuzet, deputy of the Côte-d'Or, and Joseph Capus as well as numerous union leaders and representatives of the different ministries.[16]

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[15] See AMA. III-A-8, Associations Affiliated with the Union for the Defense of the Producers of Great Fine Wines of the Côte-d'Or.

[16] See Official Journal of 10 March 1921. Decree Establishing an Inter-ministerial Advisory Commission on Viticulture and Fixing its Composition. Note also the presence of d'Angerville from 1922 in the Advisory Commission on Crus presided by the minister of agriculture in the Official Journal of 23 October 1922, p. 10640.

The call of politics has been a standard feature of union struggles in the vineyards of France. The political weight of agricultural regions was indeed a matter of course in the Third Republic (Barral 1968, 368). With the growing economic weight of the wine sector in the interwar period, winegrowing areas were able to exert constant pressure via their unions on the decisions and acts of their elected representatives in the National Assembly.[17]

D'Angerville thus maintained numerous links with local politicians. Many letters attest to the existence of a real dialogue and exclude any idea of political preference. With the exception of politicians from the far right and left wing, all of the regional political actors from both sides of the political divide were involved. We may draw attention to the particular support of the socialist Jardillier (Autran 1994). "He shares our ideas", affirmed Baron Le Roy to the Marquis.[18] As a minister in the Popular Front government, mayor of Dijon, and rival of Gaston Gérard who was closely linked to the merchants, not to mention a musician and man of culture, Jardillier adhered to the notions of micro-delimitations and the specific ranking of crus as advocated by d'Angerville.

In all evidence, d'Angerville participated in multiple power networks from the early 1920s until the creation of the CNAO, of which he would be one of the executives. The wine union of d'Angerville relied on the precedence and value of legal judgements following the laws of 6 May 1919 and 29 June 1927 and strengthened its legitimacy through social networks of friendship and power in numerous forums.

Other winegrowing organizations, however, called for a less specific delimitation of Burgundy, more in line with the former system of equivalences. Such was the case with the General Confederation of Winegrowing Associations of Burgundy whose members included the excluded villages of the Dijon region and Hautes Côtes. The Confederation also attempted to establish its legitimacy and support its claims with the backing of influential, knowledgeable and determined politicians (Henri Boulay, president of the Federation of Wine Cooperatives of France and socialist deputy of Saône-et-Loire; the radical Henri Maupoil; and Etienne Camuzet, the influential centre-right member of the Beverage Commission). Last but not least, this organization relied on the numerical weight of its members who came from all over Burgundy.

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[17] We can only note the union and political influence of the Confederation of Winegrowing Associations of Burgundy during the discussions of the future law of 1919 at the National Assembly between 1911 and 1913. See Jacquet (2005).

[18] See AMA-IX, Letter of the Baron Le Roy, 31 May 1936.

Another stakeholder of the wine sector—the merchants—was likewise divided on the delimitation issue. Some hoped to defend the system of equivalences, while a less numerous group of owners of reputed crus supported the Malthusian grievances of the d'Angerville union.

We thus find ourselves amidst a complexity of engagements and power relations, which led to the final victory of the principles expressed by the advocates of strict delimitations. Beyond the political and social issues at stake, the cultural legitimacy of these associations allowed them to advance their views and make the AOCs in Burgundy what they are today.

The use of these networks with their strong cultural ramifications[19] contributed to the victory of the advocates for strict delimitations in Burgundy. Yet this "regulatory" success did not entail direct economic benefits. The markets and standards previously developed through trade were strongly anchored in the markets, with the AOC label being seen as a commercial novelty.

The arrival of AOC wines on the French and global markets profoundly altered the consumer's relationship to the product that he drank. What should he think of these wines that were systematically linked to a delimited territory, of these new geographical brands being added to the names of wine merchants, and even of the few winegrowers or consortiums of winegrowers who sold wine directly in concurrence with the trading families of long-standing reputation? In this new world of the AOC, the consumer had to find his own way. Thereafter on labels, even if some already did so, the names of crus supplanted those of trading houses. The location replaced the private brand, and as a consequence, new production and marketing standards were introduced to the drinker who would sometimes discover completely new names.

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[19] The links of the Union of the Vineyard-Owners of Crus with the cultural, university and archival milieus of Burgundy gave them a decisive intellectual weight in the delimitation judgements during which they could produce numerous old documents to justify their vision of designations. These documents were sourced by these networks.

In order to establish the new AOC norms among consumers, producers were obliged to develop an intense publicity campaign aimed at a whole series of professionals: oenologists, sommeliers, restaurateurs, gastronomes and journalists. At the same time, with the support of the National Committee of Designations of Origin from 1935 (and then INAO from 1947), this networking and promotional activity also allowed these new norms to emerge in the market and eventually become established among these influential professionals and consumers.

AOC Publicity Prior to 1939: The Role of Burgundy

Diverse Forms of Regional Publicity

The promotion of the AOC was not initially conducted in an autonomous manner by the wine unions. Despite their certain encouragement of it, the National Committee of Propaganda in Favor of Wine, created in 1931 and administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, was responsible for this trend. The aim was to "develop and boost the consumption of our national drink", declared the Committee's president, Edouard Barthe, at its creation,[20] with the idea to draw from modern marketing techniques to increase the consumption of wine. The Committee used its publicity in a pluralistic approach and took action on multiple fronts in terms of consumption.

Nevertheless, despite the considerable promotional efforts, the Committee could not ensure the real commercial development of the

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[20] See NP, F10/5383, Ministry of Agriculture, Record 2, Report of the Meeting of 24 February 1932.

AOC, as it was poorly adapted to the territorial fragmentation associated with the delimitation processes underway. The development of regional publicity axed around the AOCs and identity therefore endeavoured to remedy these shortcomings.

Founded in 1933, the Committee of Propaganda in Favor of Burgundy Wines, presided by pro-designation unionists, had the aim to "promote, in France and abroad, the wines of Burgundy in general and the wines of crus in particular".[21] Turning its words into actions, the Committee thus proposed to organize "touristic and gastronomical tours to Burgundy via travel agencies, a wine day from Burgundy to Brussels, the production of a film, and talks on the TSF radio station".[22] By adopting certain initiatives of the National Committee, its efforts maintained a focus on Burgundy and its characteristics. The organization of visits to the region aimed to make novices, potential buyers and journalists discover the charm and originality of Burgundy wines. This promotional campaign also facilitated the recognition of the terroir as a commercial object.

Aside from this committee, other initiatives arose, particularly with the producers of the crus of the Côte-d'Or and Yonne. As fierce defenders of the delimitation system through the Union for the Defense of Burgundy Wines, these winegrowers hoped to promote the AOC. As president of the Union, Sem d'Angerville along with 13 other wine scholars and professionals founded the famous Academy of French Wines. This initiative was the result of both a cultural approach and a commercial concept that built on the content and symbolic potential of the product.[23] These local promotional initiatives also owe much to the support of politicians such as Gaston Gérard who was mayor (1919–1935) and radical deputy of Dijon (1924–1932), undersecretary of state for tourism and public works (1930–1932), and eminent member of the Tourism Council (1932–1935). The research of Gilles Laferté particularly well describes and re-contextualizes the promotional activity of this politician who rapidly became the "defender of the new regional economic order in the industrial age by introducing commercial methods into the political sphere".[24] It would be useless to detail here all of his achievements in the promotion of gastronomy and wine—let us nevertheless mention the creation of the Gastronomic Fair of Dijon in 1921—, but we should point to the 600 lectures that he presented on wine, Burgundy, and Dijon in 32 countries in the early 1920s.

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[21] See ADCO – U – VII – A – 47, Jurisdiction, Court of First Instance of Beaune, General Affairs, Unions.

[22] See *The Winegrower of Burgundy*, Minutes of the Executive Board of the CGAVB of 17 January 1933, February 1933, n°231, 1–2.

[23] *The Winegrower of Burgundy*, Publication the Executive Board of the CGAVB, Avril 1934, n°245, 3.

The strategies used in the promotion of wine were thus not uniform. For the producers of crus influenced by the publicity connected to the identity of their terroirs, the legitimacy of the AOC concept was promoted by targeting carefully chosen consumers to convey the idea that they should consume good-quality, healthy products, or in other words, AOC wines. Hence, Parisian and foreign elites were the primary beneficiaries of this AOC discourse.

The Promotion of AOCs Among the Elite of Gastronomy

Two situations unrelated to any publicity efforts led to the increased knowledge and appreciation of geographically named wines: on the one hand, the fight against fraud in restaurants with the ensuing publicity for AOCs, and on the other, the development of strong ties with sommeliers as a new professional category in the wine sector.

During the 20 years spanning the world wars (1920–1940), the Union for the Defense of Viticulture was involved in 187 fraud trials.[25] Headed by the owners of crus, this union mainly concentrated its efforts on fraud cases concerning deceptive designations. While wine merchants were incriminated for fraud in 99 out of 187 cases (or 52.9% of all judgements), 6.9% implicated restaurants and hotels. The fraud trials initiated by the union allowed its president, d'Angerville, to have the judgement proceedings published in different local and national newspapers. The condemnations thus appeared in the *Journal de Beaune* and *Bien Public*, while the Parisian press also published summaries in *La Croix*, *Travail*, *Petit Bleu*, *Soir Marocain*, and *A Paris*. Finally, the *Revue du Vin de France* allowed d'Angerville and his friends to affirm their concepts and notably publish in full the numerous judgements that proved detrimental to the fraudsters.[26] This provided winegrowers with a national "audience" to raise awareness, especially among the burgeoning population of Parisian oenophiles (Fernandez 2004). As a result, pro-AOC publicity was able to reach the clients of certain renowned Parisian restaurants. This in turn enhanced the value of the geographically named wines proposed by several unionized vineyard owners, some of whom already sold bottles directly on their property.

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[24] *The Winegrower of Burgundy*, Publication the Executive Board of the CGAVB, Avril 1934, n°245, 168–174.

[25] See the examples in "Appendix IV—3: General Assembly of the SDVB of 12 February 1922," and "Appendix IV—9: Summary Insertions of the Fraud Trials on the AOC in Burgundy," *Revue du wine de France*, January 1932.

Yet d'Angerville even went on to develop this publicity on the international level, especially in the United States after the end of prohibition in 1934. For example, he had the names of fraudsters published in relevant forerunning oenophile works (Schoonmaker and Marvel 1934; Street 1933). As a result, the commercial brands were discredited, while the AOCs endorsed by the winegrowers of his union were advocated.

Beyond this promotional strategy that had a direct effect on the oenophile public, winegrowers and even some landowning merchants who had begun to promote the AOC system worked to create strong links with a new profession that was gaining institutional recognition: the sommelier. With their connections to winegrowers' unions, gastronomes, and the specialized press (*Revue du vin de France* and *Le Moniteur viticole*), the sommeliers espoused a discourse through the Union of Sommeliers that was increasingly in favour of AOCs. The contents of the union's review, entitled *Le Sommelier*, illustrate this very trend. For example, in 1929, the review republished an article from the

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[26] See the article of the Marquis d'Angerville, *Revue du Vin de France*, n°70, May 1933, pp. 17–18.

Parisian newspaper, *Le Vosgien*, which recommended the new AOCs to consumers instead of brands and “standardized” “monopolies”.[27]

Let us draw attention to the elaboration of an ever stronger discourse linking regional food and AOC wines through the union’s review, *Le Sommelier*, and its various actions. The sommeliers tended to promote the harmonious marriage between the wine and gastronomy of a particular region. *Le Sommelier* published, for example, the menus of meals organized by the *Revue du Vin de France*. The crus of local producers were also showcased and savoured in the company of a panel of journalists and fashionable artists.[28]

The increasingly strong links between the winegrowers of crus and sommeliers clearly express what John-Luc Fernandez calls the process of product qualification.[29] With their increasing legitimacy from a scholarly and institutional point of view, the sommeliers were able to establish a more direct mechanism to nurture the confidence of consumers. Thus emerged a new type of recommendation advocating “good taste”, which would go on to become highly influential.

Yet such initiatives still remained a minority in the sector, and it continued to prove difficult to give visibility to the AOCs, which were drowned out by the mainstream publicity for ordinary table wines. However, the creation of the CNAO in 1935 and the simultaneous adhesion of part of the trade sector to the principles of delimited wines had a positive impact on the distribution of AOC wines to the consumer.

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[27] See “Consumer Advice”, Article by Félix Chevrier, director of *Le Vosgien* of Paris, republished in *Revue le Sommelier*, n°71, 15 August 1929, p. 1220.

[28] See “4ème déjeuner de la Revue du Vin de France,” *Le Sommelier*, n°86, 15 November 1930.

[29] This usually denotes the mechanisms of identity construction of goods. See Fernandez (2004) and Eymard-Duvernay (1986).

Defining the Taste of Location: Typicity as a Gauge of Quality of AOC Wines for the Consumer

The creation of the CNAO had the direct consequence of establishing or, more precisely, reinforcing the official and institutionalized channel of communication around the AOCs. In this framework, the AOC publicity relied on the association of the CNAO and National Committee for the Propaganda of Wine, which became a constant force in the late 1930s. The promotion of the AOCs under the auspices of these two committees truly took form after 1937. Their publicity approach generally adopted the above-mentioned methods, being a synthesis of the initiatives undertaken since the turn of the century.

Despite these initiatives, not until the 1960s did AOC wines finally become established among buyers and consumers who began to perceive typicity as synonymous with quality in these products originating from a specific terroir. This trend is attested in the following statistics: from 1960, the consumption of AOC wines grew at a rate of 5–10% over the next two years to reach 12% in 1963.[30] This tendency continued until the entry of new competitors on the market from abroad. The increasing strength of the AOC cannot be separated from the role of the INAO after the war, as this organization was able to introduce AOC wines to buyers and consumers on account of its close ties to the wine sector.

From 1943, the leadership of the CNAO aimed to verify the quality of AOC wines by means of tasting. On October 20 of the same year, during a session of the Steering Committee of the CNAO, its president, Joseph Capus, proposed the addition of a new condition to the designation right formulated in article 21 of the decree-law of 31 July 1935. Requests would thereafter need to consider "the substantial qualities characteristic of AOC wines".[31] In an unprecedented move, this request aimed to introduce wine tasting into the quality control of AOC wines.

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[30] See Figure of the Official Journal, 2 April 1964, cited in *Bulletin de l'INAO*, n°89, April 1964, p. 118.

[31] See "Role of Tasting in the Control of Wines of Designation of Origin," Report of the Session of the National Committee of 21 October 1943 in Paris, p. 520.

Following these principles, numerous unions became involved in tasting for the quality control of wine during the post-war period from 1945 to 1974. This type of expertise was also used in a pioneering way in problematic delimitation cases such as Chablis in 1947 (Jacquet and Vincent 2015) Saint-Emilion in 1955–1958,[32] Graves in 1959, and especially Beaujolais in 1949. In the latter case, this entailed verifying the Burgundian character of the Beaujolais villages in order to decide on their inclusion in the AOC Burgundy.

During the tasting sessions to verify the substantial qualities of the AOC wines or lend support to a particular geographical delimitation, the tasting commentaries were succinct and lacked precision. Indeed, tasters, unionists, gastronomes and INAO agents alike were incapable of defining the typicity of wines.

In reality, the elements of analysis at the disposal of these experts were highly influenced by the pre-war tasting trends initiated in the nineteenth century. The wine-tasting terms found in the different scholarly works published at the time clearly reveal the lack of vocabulary to distinguish the crus from one other. The most important aspects were the colour of the robe, its clarity, and the structure of the wine in the mouth as the chief expression of its greater or lesser value. At the time, what counted for a wine to be commercialized was not the specificity conferred by its geographical origin or terroir, but rather its loyal and commercial character with the taste being adapted to the clientele. This quality was "felt", hence the multitude of descriptions on the feel of the wine in the mouth.

The terms used for tasting in the aftermath of the Second World War only allow for a very poor characterization of typicities through a comparative assessment. Therefore, after the failed tasting of the "Beaujolais-villages" in 1949, several INAO agents from the Rhône and

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[32] See the Report of the committee director of INAO of 7 June 1948: "Internal Regulations of the Tasting Commissions of the "Saint-Emilion", "Saint-Emilion grand cru" and "Saint-Emilion grand cru classé" Designations," p. 9.

Burgundy in conjunction with the professionals of the region pleaded for a revision of tasting practices. Experts and technical agents had to be able to rely on an "objective" tasting method to determine the geographical delimitations and certifications. At a lecture given in 1966 in Brussels, Pierre Charnay, regional inspector of the INAO in the Rhône, openly spoke in favour of this. He questioned, among others, the subjective degustation system of experts who did not take into account "the variability of aromas found in the wine" as these aromas were essential for this "identification work" (Charnay 1967).

The INAO thus showed a willingness to identify and distinguish the crus by tasting, and even to create the necessary tools to define, wine by wine, what this institution would later call "the link to the terroir". Based on the studies of Jules Chauvet,[33] local scientific organizations, and several union leaders of Beaujolais, the INAO agents developed a new framework for wine tasting. Giving precedence to the bouquet and aromas, the principles thereafter called on collective sensorial referents to distinguish the wines. As a more customized tool, this new vocabulary could allow the crus of very similar designations to be distinguished.

In 1972, this research led to the INAO's publication of "Essay on Wine Tasting" (Vedel et al. 1972) which was based on the studies of Jules Chauvet, and the almost simultaneous creation of the INAO tasting glass, the first glass adapted to olfactory tasting. These new ways of approaching wine, adopted by all influential professionals (oenologists, sommeliers, critics, etc.) from the late 1970s, allowed the product's relation to its terroir of origin to be defined. This meant describing the character of each designation and envisaging, even if the word only appeared much later, the typicity of each wine, with typicity being perceived as a gauge of quality and not only as a gauge that respected a geographical delimitation. Terroir wine thus became a product deemed to be qualitative by consumers who were increasingly numerous to choose such wines during the 1980s.

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[33] Jules Chauvet, a small trader from Chapelle-de-Guinchay in Saône-et-Loire and a former student of the School of Chemistry in Lyon, gradually became an authority for scientific experiments on wine. Yet his studies on tasting would overturn the contemporary approach to wines. See Jacquet (2014).

Conclusion

This study on terroirs and their modern construction, that is to say, their legal, economic, and cultural as well as political and social construction, adopted an original approach by focusing on the contribution of unions. The unions of winegrowers and producers emerge as vital entities in the perception of the introduction of production and marketing norms and in the implementation of the AOC values. This major initiative undertaken by groups of professionals was rooted in periods of economic upheaval, but it thrived on the struggles opposing the different stakeholders in the sector, especially the wine merchants. We thus witness the emergence of diverse perceptions of terroir: a brand-driven terroir, a vast terroir (equivalences) and a geographically delimited micro-terroir. Yet the latter terroir finally prevailed on account of its new legal status and its promotion by vineyard owners operating in increasingly dense and efficient networks. The issue of geographical delimitations in Burgundy thus allows us to compare the complexity of the notion of terroirs and the multiplicity of viewpoints expressed within the professional organizations tasked with defending their respective winegrowing areas.

By tracing the process of developing the norm of a terroir in Burgundy during the early twentieth century, this article should be viewed as a contribution to the history of the definition of terroirs. Today, the terroir is akin to an object with geological, climatic, and ampelographical significations. As a marketing object, a culture, a social setting and sometimes a politicized space, the terroir also emerges as a place of authenticity. Collective representations also impart the terroir with an eternal status. While terroir wines are good, as asserted by all wine marketing, this is because of the immanence of a production space with an almost-divine essence. Yet the implementation of the AOCs and especially their later promotion show us that these images not only relate to the construction and integration of a representation but also to the voluntary acculturation of practices. This was certainly the case during the 1950s and 1960s, a key moment in the administrative and scientific development of "objective" tasting tools that were perceived as being able to associate tastes with terroirs as frameworks of wine typicity.

Admittedly, other elements such as folklore and the creation of regional identities actively contributed to the elaboration of our current representations of terroir (Laferté 2002). Yet the legal, commercial and cultural notion of origin, as a phenomenon used to fix the specific usages associated with soils, is an integral part of these representations.

The terroir (at least in Burgundy, as a paradigmatic vineyard of this notion) is not a phenomenon with a natural basis that has been enriched by ongoing and ever-improving human action. The terroir is an historical construction, an object that is continuously redefined by history and its contextual ruptures, economic crises, political conflicts and cultural debates. The terroir is finally—and in the case of our example—the result of the necessary construction of norms without which any market would be unable to function (Stanziani 2002; Bruegel and Stanziani 2004; Bourdieu et al. 2004).

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No More Credit: Languedoc Wines Facing Their Reputation (1850s–1970)

Stephane Le Bras

Introduction

In recent years, various publications have praised the quality of wines from the Languedoc (Daum 2007; Gasparotto and Jullien 2016), marking an acknowledgement of new behaviours in the sector (Genieys 1998; Jes 2015). This trend is quite a novelty since, for decades, Languedocian wines were despised or mocked, regularly regarded as "*piquettes*"[1] ("plonk"), products of low-quality. Even the French Minister of Agriculture from 1974 to 1977, Christian Bonnet, shared this point of view, calling Languedoc wines "*bibines*" ("cheap plonk") in 1976 and condemning Southern winegrowers to their demise: "When I'm asked to help out awful cheap plonk production, producing

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[1] "Piquette" is used as a reference to the Languedocian wines by Michel Rocard, French Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991.

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_5

200 hl per hectares in widely-irrigated plains, I decline. If some of those producers are going to die off, let them die…[2]"

Behind this harsh statement lies the dreadful reputation of the Languedoc wines, produced in a region comprising three of the most important departments in terms of wine output: Aude, Gard and Hérault.[3] Yet, reputation is a key factor in the food and drink markets, linked to the fundamental—but fickle—notion of quality (Stanziani 2005). And even if the Languedocian vineyard is admirably old (AD Aude 2008), perhaps the oldest in terms of a coherent and organized regional structure in France (Garrier 1998), with a good reputation built between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries (Lachiver 1988), this long held reputation was wiped out in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a period of recurring diseases (Garrier 1989), fierce crises (Pech 1975) and new market evolutions (Gavignaud-Fontaine 2000).

The aim of this paper is to focus on the factors that led to the deterioration of the reputation of wines from the Languedoc as well as the consequences of this poor and unpleasant image in the industry, especially in terms of positioning the product in a highly competitive market. In addition, we will question and try to measure the reality of this credit through the logics of production and consumption, as well as inquiring the existence of products of quality in the region. Based on official reports, testimonies and the wine trade press, this piece will examine the nature and representations of the Languedocian wine industry from the emergence of a mass production in the 1850s to the birth of the European wine community in 1970.

Becoming France's Wine Cellar (1860s–1910s)

A Turning Point: Mass Production and Phylloxera

In the early 1860s, vine growing in Languedoc experienced a noticeable revival. Indeed, the 1850s allowed the development of plentiful and profitable vine growing for a large number of its inhabitants, colonizing new territories in the region. Little by little, the hills of the *garrigue* along with many fallow lands were exploited by numerous new owners, eager to take advantage of a new economy, ever more profitable since it was connected to Paris by rail. This was completed in 1856 and opened new perspectives to wines from the Languedoc: thanks to reduced costs and faster shipping-times, the urban markets of the North and the East of France were now easily accessible. As consumption increased (from 51 litres per capita in 1848 to 60 litres in 1859[4]), so too did the area under vine and, indeed, the yields. In the department of Hérault, the area grew by about 60% between the beginning of 1850s and the 1860s, whereas yields progressed by about 110% over the same period (Lachiver 1988, pp. 596–606). Despite a new disease, powdery mildew (*oïdium*), which struck in the middle of 1850s, this positive dynamics was not slowed down. The regional economy specialized more and more in wine, to the detriment of cereal and wool production which, up to then, had attracted the investments of the urban capitalist bourgeoisie. From that point, those families—such as the Bazille from Montpellier[5]—turned to the acquisition of vast properties and\or merchants' companies which carried out the shipping of almost all wine production (in the Hérault, only 5% of the production was reserved for local consumption in the 1860s). Clearly, the period of the "Second Empire and the first years of the III^th^ Republic were marked by the triumph of the vineyard" in the region (Galtier 1958, p. 125). As a good example, in Aude, workers left the cloth industry as they preferred to work in the vineyards where salaries were higher, creating a situation that worried the prefect of the department at the beginning of the 1860s (Plandé 1944, p. 212). This report was confirmed by Jules Guyot, as expressed in a study of the vineyards of France commissioned by the government of Napoleon III. "The culture of the vineyard [being] of the easiest, of the simplest" and especially "of the most lucrative",[6] he remarks that in Aude, "the vineyard maintains more than two thirds of the population".[7] Although Languedoc is not the only region to benefit from this "era of prosperity" on a national scale (Lachiver 1988, p. 404), it is indisputable that the domination of the vineyard became more and more hegemonic in the region: from the beginning of the 1850s to the early 1870s, the regional vineyard grew by about 50%. Moreover, the share of the regional production in the national market rose from 15 to 27%, emphasizing the place of Languedoc as the most productive wine region, and reinforcing its place as the wine-cellar of France.

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[2] Matouk (1977).

[3] For detailed figures on a specific decade or on the long run, please report to the appendix.

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[4] Statistique générale de la France, *Annuaire statistique*, Résumé rétrospectif, 1935, p. 177. Here is only notified the "taxed consumption", the real figures (taxed and familial) being more important.

[5] Mainly Gaston Bazille, lawyer, banker and famous landlord, which one of the cousins, Louis, is leading a national-renowned merchant company during *Belle Époque*.

In this expansionist situation, the phylloxera crisis had a doubly serious effect.[8] In the first instance, the impact of the aphid was devastating, but in varying degrees. Discovered for the first time in Gard in 1863, its effects were deeply felt from the first half of the 1870s. From 1873 till 1876, the vineyard of Gard was ravaged, literally burned; in 1876, it reached the area of Montpellier, then Aude in 1878. The region was then affected by a phenomenon of remarkable internal competition, aroused by the delayed expansion of its area under vine. Taking advantage of the destruction of the eastern territories (Gard and Eastern Hérault), later affected areas in the West (Béziers, Narbonne, Carcassonne) profited from their unique ability to keep answering the national demand, which itself remained strong (Galtier 1958, pp. 128–129). Furthermore, as remedies had already been developed by the time when western vineyards were struck, their recovery was faster and more efficient than in Gard, for example, where the experimentations of the years 1873–1876 were disastrous for numerous families and the local economy. Secondly, the methods used to fight the disease permanently transformed the regional wine making landscape. At first, flooding was used as a technique to drown the aphid: as a consequence, vineyards moved overwhelmingly towards the plains of Bas-Languedoc where it was easier to flood lands, as well as towards the coast where sands prevented the development of the insect. Additionally, specialists looked for new species of vines able to resist the disease. This option led to two types of technique: (1) the direct producing hybrids, associating two plants (an American—which resisted the disease—and a European one), which generally produced plentifully but with an unsatisfactory flavour; (2) the rootstock technique which allowed French plants to prosper on American roots. The problem here was that the two main varieties typically used on rootstock were carignan and aramon, two high-productivity plants with generous yields of 100–150 hl/ha and sometimes up to 200 hl/ha in the plains.

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[6] Guyot (1868, p. II).

[7] Guyot (1868, p. 257).

[8] On the topic, see Garrier (1989).

After this stage, contemporary observers noted a new direction: a new era of the "ideal of quantity".[9]

Poor Reputation, Criticism and Slump Sales Crisis: Languedoc in Turmoil

This transformation towards a "*vignoble de masse*[10]" was not without negative consequences, and these alarmed some observers as early as the 1880s–1890s. Specialist of the Languedoc vine growing industry, Henri Marès (1820–1901) warned of the bad direction taken in the region. He spoke against "this exaggeration of the plantations which is neither in harmony with the real interests of the farming industry, nor with the resources of the regular outlets".[11] On his side and in the same sense, Paul Coste-Floret tried to highlight, in his numerous essays, the necessity of keeping the region's productive capacity with the capacity of the market to absorb it (Coste-Floret 1902). Indeed, he regularly recommended a turn towards quality vine growing, a wish already uttered by Jules Guyot during his investigations on the national vine growing in 1868 (Guyot 1868, p. 218). Yet, this was definitely not the path that was taken. The region turned very clearly to a rapid specialization on low-quality wines, whereas in the rest of France, under the grip of phylloxera and undergoing a shift towards other more profitable agricultural products (beets, cereal for example), the vineyards surfaces decreased. Meanwhile, in Languedoc, “industrial vine growing activity” (Augé-Laribé 1907) took off, aiming to satisfy the ever increasing demand (in the 1900s, the annual consumption per capita exceeded 100 litres[12]). The region turned to monoculture and profitable production, with prices remaining high. At least until 1893.

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[9] Bertall (1878, p. 473.)

[10] Galtier (1958). Literally it means a "mass cultivation of the vine" but it implies as well "a vineyard made for a mass consumption".

[11] Quoted by Gavignaud-Fontaine (2000, p. 53).

This year marked a decisive break in the dynamics of the languedocian economy. The market collapsed under the combined effects of fraud and overproduction. The first was due to continuously growing demand in the 1870s–1880s while supply remained insufficient: facing high demands and subsequently high prices, producers and merchants lacking products to sell rushed headlong towards the production of “artificial” wines: wines of sugar, wines of raisins, third press wines, sometimes even wines produced without grapes. In 1902, as the market was struck by yet another crisis, a syndicate of wine growers in Aude, answering a questionnaire sent by a commission set up by the Chamber of Deputies to investigate into the causes of the crisis, explained that the reason for the crisis is “the increasing fraud”, “developed by the lure of gain”, producing “considerable quantities of artificial wines”.[13] The second cause was the result of hybrid productions and, more especially, the plantation of high-yields species: in Hérault, production followed a wild pattern in the 1890s, exceeding 10 million hl on average in the 1900s (18% of the national production). These wines are often of mediocre quality, however, and would previously have been intended for the distillery. But now, under pressure from the demand for wine, they found their way to market and, as the Agricultural trade association of Lézignan (Aude) described in 1902, they set the market reeling.[14]

The crisis, seen in the depreciation of the prices, was limited at first (1893, 1900, 1902), though became permanent from 1904, leading to the major demonstrations of 1907 and to the insurrectionary state of the region during the spring of the same year (Maurin and Pech 2007). Most importantly, this commercial and social instability was coupled with a profound degradation of the image of wines from the Languedoc. If they still enjoyed a positive reputation until the 1870s, articulated around the quality production of white (muscatel wines, piquepouls) and red (Saint-Georges-d'Orques, Limoux, Faugères) wines or of quality alcohols ("three-six"), this time was over by the beginning of the twentieth century. The overwhelming shift towards mass production condemned wines from the Languedoc to watch their fame deteriorate, as local actors worried at the time. In 1902, the Central Syndicate of the wine growers from Aude warned of the risks of this excessive production: from now on, "the wine was going to be dishonored in the eyes of foreigners". In France, the stigmatization of wines from the Languedoc was widespread: beyond the mediocre quality of produced wines, the inhabitants of Languedoc were accused, on a regular basis, of cheating, either by watering,[15] or by mislabelling the wine's provenance.[16]

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[12] *Annuaire statistique*, 1935, p. 178.

[13] Archives nationales: C//5655, Assemblées nationales, Chambre des députes, Enquête sur la crise viticole, Aude, “Syndicat central des viticulteurs de l’Aude pour la vente du vin”, February 1902.

[14] Archives nationales: C//5655, “Syndicat professionnel agricole de Lézignan”, 1902.

In concrete terms, if the Languedoc producers chose the path of quantity, it was an easy decision, drawn by dazzling potential profits to be had from unfussy clientele in traditional areas of consumption (Massif Central, Paris region, Lyonnais, etc.). Indeed, the period is clearly marked by a new increase in the consumption of alcoholic drinks, wines in particular. This grew ceaselessly between the 1880s and 1900s: 73 litres per capita on average in the 1880s; 85 in the 1890s; 115 in the 1900s. This increase logically accompanied the growth of bars and cafés: from approximately 356,000 *débits* at the beginning of the 1880s to around 400,000 in the middle of this decade, and about 480,000 at the end of the 1900s.[17] The market of alcoholic drinks grew exponentially, which made it all the more attractive. In 1913, a survey led by the Ministry of Employment revealed large portions of people's average income dedicated to the purchase of alcoholic drinks (wine, cider, beer): 12.4% for working families, 13.8% for employees', 16.8% for independent workers and 11% for farm labourers (Dugé de Bernonville 1919). The report exposed that in the regions where wine was the drink of choice, these figures were even higher, reaching 24% in the Massif Central, the main destination for wines from the Languedoc. In Allier, a questionnaire related to this survey enables us to specify further: on a weekly basis, a sharecroppers' family, composed of 7 individuals (among which 3 women and a domestic) consumed 42 litres of wine (that is 6 litres a day). It represented the second food expense item (behind the cheese and the butter) and approximately 21% of weekly spending.[18]

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[15] Archives de la Banque de France, Inspection de la succursale de Béziers, 1902.

[16] In Bordeaux, one suspects fraudsters to sell wine from Languedoc under the name "Bordeaux". Cf. Chambre consultative d'agriculture de Bordeaux, 1902.

[17] *Annuaire statistique*, 1935, pp. 176–177.

From then on, while the area of vines was dropping elsewhere in France, it is not surprising to witness this specialization of vine growing in Languedoc, which responded to increasing demands. Undoubtedly, the market—combined with the lack of ardour and maybe ambition of the inhabitants in Languedoc—drove off regional wines and diminished their reputation: now seen as mainly of mediocre, and sometimes even dubious quality. Abandoning quality in favour of quantity created a reputation which degraded the image of wines—and of the whole wine-based ecosystem—in Languedoc for decades. A trend that was only confirmed further during the 1920–1930s.

The Interwar Period: Invisibility on the Markets

A Promising but Ultra-Competitive National Market

At the end of World War I, wine enjoyed an unprecedented popularity in France.[19] In numerous homes, soldiers come back from the front with the idea that "*pinard* helped to win the war". This refrain, which echoes until today, was supported by doctors[20] and by the top brass.[21] Raised to the rank of the national and patriotic drink, in spite of the misconduct it caused on battlefront and Homefront during the conflict, wine strengthened its image as a major constituent element of French identity. Yet, *pinard*, supplied massively to the soldiers during the conflict,[22] mainly came from Languedoc: for instance, as of the 1917–1918 campaign, 6 M hl of requisitioned wines (among which 3 M from Hérault alone) came from the region, that is approximately 60% of the total.[23] As hoped by the local authorities as well as the commercial organizations during the conflict, wines from the Languedoc played a dominant part in the provisioning of the troops and, de facto, their support. It is thus logical that in 1918–1919, Languedocians expected to take advantage of this situation and hoped that the value of wines from Languedoc might be set as high as their role in the conflict implied. The stakes were significant since, as of 1919–1920, the consumption of ordinary wines resumed a steady, progressive rhythm, only to accelerate from the 1920s.

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[18] Archives départementales de l'Allier: 6 M 2344, Population, économie, "Enquête sur les conditions de la vie ourvière et de la vie rurale", Commune du Donjon, 1913.

[19] On that matter, see Ridel (2016).

[20] See, for example, Huot and Voivenel (Drs.) (1918, p. 66).

Indeed, from 1919, the average consumption per capita got back to pre-war Figs. (102 litres in 1920 vs. 104 in 1912; 115 and 113 in 1920–1921 vs. 117 in 1910). The average taxed consumption of the 1920s was appreciably the same as that of the 1900s (117.5 litres vs. 112.7 litres per capita), whereas the total consumption increased notably (167 litres vs. 150.7 litres per capita). National production also experienced similar fluctuations: 56 million hl/year on average in the 1900s vs. 59.8 million hl/year in the 1920s, the main difference resulting from the disappearance in the 1920s of mediocre harvests (as the one of 1903, 35.7 million hl only) and, on the contrary, the presence of very plentiful years (76.8 million hl in 1922). In this context, the Languedoc's share of national production—which had already increased during the previous period—became even stronger: it now represented about 39% of national production (more than 21% of which was for the Hérault alone).[24]

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[21] Maréchal Pétain for example in Derys and Dufy (1935).

[22] A study led by a doctor estimates the average consumption around 1.5 litre/day, mainly composed by daily supplies offered by the army (0.25 litre in 1914; 0.5 litre in 1916; 0.75 litre in 1917) and extra purchase.

[23] *Journal official de la République française*, 12 November 1918, p. 9820.

However, the Languedoc was no longer alone and faced competition from a new type of product: Algerian wines. These new competitors underwent a quantitative and qualitative transformation during the period. After first expanding during the phylloxera crisis (230,000 hl/year in the 1870s vs. about 4 million in the 1890s), Algerian production stepped up in the 1920s to reach 9.5 million hl/year on average (vs. 6.8 million hl/year in the 1900s). Besides, from this point, Algerian wines were of much better quality, offering richly coloured products of a high degree which were ideal for blending to create popular wines in direct competition with the wines of Midi. This new tension for Languedoc wines only increased by the 1930s: whereas Languedoc produced on average 21.7 million hl/year, Algerian production soared to 17.1 million hl (+80% in regards to the 1920s); the Languedoc still constituted nearly 37% of national production, but their relative share of national consumption was under pressure from these North African wines. This was a head-on challenge which greatly troubled the merchant organizations of the Languedoc by the 1930s, who sought to promote Languedocian wines amidst a climate of acute crisis.[25]

Promotional Attempts in a Context of Difficulties

In February 1925, *L'Action méridionale*, the official organ of the Syndicate of wine merchants from Languedoc (the "*Fédération méridionale*") perceptively addressed the question of outlets for Languedocian wines. In an article drawing a parallel between production and consumption, the semimonthly journal judged the market to have reached "a strained level which it will be difficult to overcome". Growing a customer base, and particularly an international one was seen to be difficult, especially as consumers repeatedly rejected wines from the Languedoc which had "the reputation to be of very mediocre quality".

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[24] *Annuaire statistique*, 1935, p. 177.

[25] *L'Action méridionale* (*AM* hereafter), March 1935.

The author, André Granaud, recognized that "a lot of wines of our plains" were of a very passable quality, and that "there are in the hillsides of Corbières, Minervois, Cébazan, red wines which, selected and well taken care of, may make very honorable competition with good vineyards".[26] A few weeks later, a delegation of Southern merchants went to Brussels to organize a tasting-exhibition. While outlining the planning and objectives for the trip, Jules Nougarède-Bermond, the new president of the *Fédération méridionale*, underlined how crucial it was "to deliver only beautiful and good wines as those who made in the past the deserved reputation and the glory of our beloved Languedoc".[27] Thus, the quality imperative was stressed—as it would be throughout the 1920s and 1930s—amidst an ever more challenging climate.

Indeed, during the interwar period the market was subject to a double phenomenon. The first was the legislative structuring led by the State around the principles of quality, visibility and legitimacy. In keeping with the law of 1911 on demarcations, the legislator established the demarcation of Controlled label zones in 1919. From that point, certain territories would be, very clearly associated with a label which insured their identity, under the authority of the administrative courts. It was a first step towards the establishment of collective territorial standards and the institution of labels that, subsequently, imposed a hierarchical organization of wine making territories. From this point forward, the value of winemaking areas was recognized by the law which, as a consequence, legitimized the qualitative dimension of these territories. For a Southern wine industry which had based a large part of its wealth and its fame on the production of a generic wine intended for popular consumption, but also as a "wine-doctor", capable of treating and enhancing "little" wines from other regions, it was a fatal decision. And, apart from the protests of the merchants' syndicates which dreaded new complications when creating their blends, little effort was made to try to benefit from this law, unlike the Bordeaux or Burgundian regions.[28]

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[26] "Comment faire connaître nos vins", in *AM*, 1 February 1925.

[27] "Un effort pour l'exportation de nos vins", in *AM*, 1 April 1925.

[28] Only few territories in Languedoc took advantage of this law, such as the Corbières in 1923.

Besides, the situation was complicated even further by the contraction of the market: in addition to competition from Algeria, wines from Languedoc had also to deal with the outbreak of small private vineyards, only intended for family consumption. In the 1920s, untaxed familial consumption was increasing sharply (+30% between the 1900s and the 1920s), whereas taxed commercial consumption was stagnating (+5% during the same time period). Only the high prices (117 F/hl in 1927–1928) ensured relative prosperity for the Languedocians, even if the period was not without its lingering concerns.

Amidst this troubled context, the Propaganda association for wine ("*Association de propagande pour le vin*") was created for promotion in 1927.[29] Situated in Béziers and state-approved by decree in 1930, its ambition was "to develop the consumption of wine by propaganda" in the country, but also abroad, by numerous means: pamphlets, postcards, brochures, posters, cinema, radio, conferences, exhibitions, etc. Its statutes specified that this propaganda was undertaken in "all its forms in France and abroad, for the wine generally, without any specification of regions, vineyards or firm", yet its location, as well as its kingpin (André Nougaret, vineyard owner in Bessan—Hérault) indicated that this propaganda mainly served the marketing of popular wines, and thus wines from the Languedoc.

The Anonymity

Despite these initiatives and their successes,[30] wines "from Languedoc" remained shrouded in anonymity. This anonymity, firmly resisted by the patronal organizations, was the product of several factors. The first one is naturally the bad reputation of wines from Languedoc. In his 1925 *pro domo* arguments, André Granaud highlighted it perfectly. Astutely, he claimed that the bad image of wines from the Midi held back their development. He evoked wines that, in France as abroad, had "the reputation to be of very mediocre quality and by this very fact do not appear on the tables of the jet-set, even on simple bourgeois tables".[31] For Granaud, the main problem was the identification of the wines. So, besides improving the processes of wine making—as wished by all the Southern patronal organizations, from the local syndicates up to the chambers of commerce—Granaud tied the emergence of a new reputation with the creation of a new identity, articulated around the name "Languedoc", as one can find "Bordeaux" or "Bourgogne". He considers that the adoption of a unique name, coupled with a reasoned and rigorous choice of better quality vines would reduce the risks of crisis, by limiting the quantity, while continuing to insure the prosperity of the winemaking region. He agreed that changing the name would not solve the problem "with a wave of a magic wand", and insisted on the necessity of changing mentalities and habits to amend the reputation and realize commercial success. This would allow, according to him, the consumer "to fairly appreciate the products" from Languedoc. The analysis of Granaud is particularly relevant, both in term of targeting the causes of the difficulties and the type of answer proposed. Firstly, because the period was a turning point for the wine market: the law of 1919 which established the Controlled label zones, created de facto a two-speed market, legitimized and institutionalized by public authorities. It is in this very context of market rationalization, around the issue of the identity of wine production, that Granaud wrote this text and developed his arguments. He understood that, in an industry where "the magic of words" had long allowed "numerous products to live on the reputation of a name itself", it was now fundamental to think more globally, ensuring the well-being and the fortune of Southern wine growers and merchants.

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[29] Archives nationales: F/10/5384, Agriculture, Comité national de propaganda en faveur du vin, Rapport à M. le directeur de l'Agriculture, 1932.

[30] Like the " Repas à prix fixe, vin compris", a principle including wine for every meal.

When Granaud diagnosed the consequences that this lack of credit for Southern wines had, he is absolutely right. Menus and books offer little space—and at times no space at all—to wines from the Languedoc. The wine menus of the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* are a good example of this during the interwar period.[32] They targeted a wealthy clientele (the one evoked by Granaud) and proposed a particularly wide-ranging and diverse choice of alcoholic drinks: wines of champagne, sparkling wines, wines of Bordeaux, Bourgogne, Côtes-du-Rhône, Algeria, Alsace, Anjou, Vouvray, Italy, Moselle, the Rhine, dessert, liqueur, cognac and brandies. Among these hundreds of references, wines from Languedoc are almost absent. Only Blanquette de Limoux and Tavel rosé make the list from the region, though they are marked as côtes-du-rhône.

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[31] "Comment faire connaître nos vins", in *AM*, 1 February 1925.

[32] *Carte des vins de la Compagnie générale transatlantique*, 1930s.

Even chain stores, which extended their range of wines during this period, ignored wines from Languedoc. In *Monseigneur le Vin* or "The art of drinking", edited and published by the wine retailer *Nicolas*[33] in the 1920s, one can find numerous suggestions for how to purchase wine, organize and manage one's cellar, pair wine and food, and master the vocabulary. Although many examples are given with wines from various regions, the Languedoc is excluded from them. Neither does it appear in the multiple cases which accompany the suggestions, nor in the examples of menus that explain how to match wine and food (Montorgueil 1924). A few years later, in *Comment boire nos bons vins de France*, published this time by *Les Caves Félix Potin*,[34] wines from the Languedoc are represented among tens of references accompanying the dishes (Piquepouls with the cold hors-d'oeuvres; Lirac and Tavel with fish soups; Minervois and Corbières with sauerkrauts; Frontignan with sweets or desserts). But when the main regions of production are outlined, only wines Burgundy, Champagne and Bordeaux merit individual descriptions and multiple entries (De Croze 1934). The most productive region was thus excluded from the advertising promotion undertaken by one of its major customers.[35]

From then on, it is thus not surprising that in 1935, when the law on AOC was established, only a single Languedoc wine obtained the label. And what is truly remarkable is that it concerns a wine from an ultra-minority production in the region: the muscat wine of Frontignan, followed a few years later by Blanquette of Limoux, another original

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[33] *Nicolas* is a chain store company, owning 138 stores in 1919.

[34] Félix Potin is one of the main chain store in France.

[35] Felix Potin buys directly the wines from Languedoc through a shared company in Languedoc: *La Compagnie générale des vins du Midi et d'Algérie*.

Midi wine. After the Second World War, the region faced a tortuous path in crafting an identity based on its core production of red wines.

1950–1970: At the Crossroads

In the Name of Quality… But Which Quality?

In his recent and complete study on *terroirs*, the geographer Éric Rouvellac recalls the choice made, during the post-war years, in French agriculture: "feeding the people, at all costs, after periods of shortage which left marks on the collective memory". According to him, "this situation emphasized [the importance of] the soil, to the detriment of other criteria involved in the value of a production" (Rouvellac 2013). This is why in the South of France, the notion of quality has a particular resonance, as shown by a poster of the Propaganda association for the wine in the 1950s. Entitled "For wine, Justice and the Truth", this poster recommends drinking wines from *Le Midi* which "are exclusively from the fermentation of the fresh grape". Here, the notion of quality is exclusively correlated with the origin of wines, not the winemaking process, the nature of its vines or even the taste. É. Rouvellac considers that this restrictive conception dates from "the middle of the XXth century", yet in fact it emerged much earlier in Languedoc. Indeed, already in 1904, the Merchants Union from Sète disagreed with other local syndicates, in particular that of Béziers, in its wish to establish prices based on tasting (whereas Béziers merchants required for only standard the alcoholic degree). It is this latter conception which prevailed, already in use for several decades and used for several decades to come also. As a matter of fact, when in 1907, the Languedocians demonstrated to defend the quality of their wines, the issue was not the "gustative" quality, but the "natural" quality, which meant at this time "fraudless" (Le Bras 2018). The cultural influence of this idea lingered for a long time in the Languedoc wine sector, especially among the producers for whom it is easier and, frankly, more remunerative, to produce large quantities. And, in this context, as long as the natural character of the product was respected, any quality concerns—as understood by the vast majority of Languedoc wine producers—were satisfied. Unquestionably, merchants' organizations, despite propaganda papers such as the one by Granaud in 1925, were not followed by the producers, nor by the majority of merchants engaged in various dubious operations to meet their clientele's demands. Even the Wine Statutes of the 1930s approved this vision by linking the quality of ordinary wines to the definition of standards of blending, with no consideration for taste, plants or soil origins (Bagnol 2011).

In the 1950s, the problem remained the same. Once again, merchants' syndicates encouraged "the exclusive promotion of products of quality[36]" and, this time, were backed by the State with the creation of the *Institut des vins de consommation courante* in 1953. But once again, practices remained far from the rhetoric. The rigid system set up by the State favoured the disposal of poor quality wines, whereas those of good quality were stored to escape the regulation orchestrated and planned by the Administration. Nonetheless, a few years later, merchants' organizations welcomed the measures taken by the State to compel a part of the poor quality production to be distilled, decongesting the market.[37] Clearly, this was a victory for the supporters of these ideals and the promoters of quality vine growing in Languedoc.

But this victory was only window dressing. Even as the 1958 "Agriculture Week" in Strasbourg celebrated the quality of Hérault wines,[38] and posters of the National Propaganda Committee in Favour of the Wine ("*Comité national de propagande en faveur du vin*") promoted the extreme diversity of vineyards in the region, the situation remained alarming. This was because the sector, as admitted by some members of the *Fédération Méridionale* in the early 1960s, was unable to adapt to the qualitative requirement of its consumers. It was also, in part, because another commercial direction was chosen.

This was largely driven by a new agent in the market: wine-growers' cooperatives. Founded mainly in the first half of the twentieth century, cooperatives were at first generally limited to winemaking (except in rare cases), leaving all commercial activities to the merchants.[39] In the 1930s, they nevertheless began to interfere in sales networks, then decidedly became commercial agents in the 1950s, short-circuiting the activity of the merchants and getting involved in direct relations with customers. Yet, except in certain territories where the reputation of local wines granted them recognition and credit on the national market,[40] the cooperative system reinforced the invisibility in which Languedocian wines were shrouded. Indeed, the wine sold by the cooperative members is a basic one, a mixture of several producers whose main concern is not the satisfaction of the clientele, but the disposal of their production. There was no incentive for cooperative members in the 1950s or 1960 to invest into practices which would improve their own individual production, as it would simply be drowned in the communal tanks of the cooperative (Touzard and Chiffoleau, 2008, pp. 392–393). Under the weight of a powerful, collective and deleterious inertia, wine-growers' cooperatives (which dominated in terms of representativeness and production) continued to reinforce the poor image of wines from the Languedoc, undermining any efforts to increase its visibility and legitimacy put forward by the merchants' representatives. In the 1950s and 1960s, cooperatives in Languedoc were mainly focused on producing ordinary generic wines as shown in the awards list during the la "*Foire internationale de la vigne et du vin*" in 1966: except in the "VCC" category, the wine-growing cooperatives are almost absent from the prize list.[41] This can be explained by the new circumstances of the wine market in France.

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[36] "Congrès 1953", in *Midi Vinicole (MV* hereafter*)*, 9 May 1953.

[37] "Motion générale, Congrès 1960", in *MV*, 18 May 1960.

[38] *La Journée Vinicole (LJN* hereafter), 18 November 1958.

[39] On the topic, see Gavignaud-Fontaine (2010).

A New Configuration of the Market

This situation was reinforced by the distortive effect on the market caused by the introduction of a new product. From the 1950s, a new type of wine began to be promoted widely in France: *les vins de marque*. These products were ordinary wines, made from branding between merchant houses from diverse territories, mainly Languedoc and Algeria. These wines, which had made a tentative appearance in the 1930s, colonized the market for popular wines in the 1950s and 1960s. Manufactured by national as well as local companies (*Société des vins de France*, *Préfontaines*, *Margnat*), chain stores (*Nicolas*, *Félix Potin*) then supermarkets (*Leclerc*, *Casino*), these wines grew their market share greatly and became the main outlet of the Languedoc wine sector. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the 1960s, the merchant which generated the biggest turnover in Hérault, a company named *Guibal* from Clermont-l'Hérault, sold the larger part of its stocks to *Nicolas,* whereas in Lodève, the major company *Beaumes Frères* worked directly with the nationally well-known *vins de-marque* company *Les vins du Rocher*.[42] In spite of calls for greater quality production, producers and merchants favoured the ease and the large monetary returns from these commercial arrangements, despite the fact they erased the identity of wines from Languedoc.

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[40] Red wines from Saint-Georges-d'Orques, cotes-d'agly (red and white) from Villeneuve-les-Corbières, muscat from Frontignan for example.

[41] "Les médailles d'or héraultaises à la Foire international de la vigne et du vin (FIVV)", in *MV*, 29 October 1966.

However, other modes of development existed. In an effort to develop the labelling process in territories that couldn't (or didn't want to) claim the AOC label, the State, after several years of lobbying by technocrat Philippe Lamour,[43] set up a sub-label in 1949: the *Vins délimités de qualité supérieure* (VDQS). This intermediate recognition could be applied to a lot of wines from Languedoc, in order to serve a clientele attracted to new products that were economical but also good quality. On the one hand, the Languedoc was among several wine making territories to enrol in this process (along with Provence) in which this new mid-labelling was hugely important (Humbert 2011, p. 690); Saint-Chinian, Minervois, Quatourze, Corbières Supérieure (1951), Picpoul de Pinet (1954), Faugères, Pic-Saint-Loup (1955), and Coteaux du Languedoc (1960) were the most eminent representatives of the new label with some success, although the reputation for their local wines remained low. On the other hand, the production of AOC was increasing in the region: 168,000 hl of AOC produced in average in the 1950s, up to 285,000 hl in the 1960s.[44] But it continued to represent only a very limited portion of total production (1.24% in the 1960s). With regard to its image, the situation in Languedoc did not really evolve despite the effort of Lamour in the 1940s and the 1950s. In 1966, Gilbert Senes, General Secretary of the *Fédération Méridionale*, in charge of the VDQS sector, used the same argument as Granaud had, 40 years earlier: “We think that it is necessary to better advertise the wine produced by our pleasant department because far too many consumers do not know that Hérault can offer a highly varied and very high quality range of wines”.[45] The stakes were high at this point in time, as a new threat was lurking on the horizon: the establishment of a European wine market.

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[42] Archives de la Banque de France, Inspection succursale de Montpellier, 1961.

[43] Winegrower in Gard and senior civil official ("*haut fonctionnaire*"), Lamour founded in 1944 the *Fédération des syndicats des vins de qualité de la région Languedoc-Roussillon*, then in 1945 the *Fédération nationale des vins de qualité supérieure*.

The wine trade press is a good instrument to measure the concerns which grew with the approach of its constitution. At first, Jean Fraisse, president of the *Fédération Méridionale*, was satisfied with the opening of a large-scale market, offering new possibilities of market shares for wines from Languedoc, but quickly, concerns became overwhelming. The first, as early as 1958, concerned the import of Italian wines (about 2 million hl) and “the orientation to be given to the production of wines in the countries of the community, the harmonization of the diverse legislations concerning these products or the most appropriate organization to assure the balance of the market”.[46] This “*Europe du vin*”—as it was called in France—became a constant concern among merchants’ representatives and was articulated, logically, alongside the question of the quality of Languedocian wines, a major imperative for the conquest of new markets. As a consequence, these markets were assessed through a quantitative angle (how much such or such nationality drinks), but also a qualitative one. In 1962, an article investigated “what the Italians drink”.[47] Wine was presented as their national drink and its market depicted as rich with the potential for Languedocian wine to become “known” and “liked”.

While this European wine market was delayed (it was first invoked as early as 1957 and was a priority of the CAP agreements (Common

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[44] With the first red AOC label in Languedoc, the Fitou (Aude) in 1948.

[45] “Les VDQS de l’Hérault”, in *l’Officiel de la FIVV*, 1966, p. 3.

[46] “À l’ouverture du Marché commun Européen”, in *l’Officiel de la FIVV*, 1958, p. 2.

[47] “Que boivent les Italiens”, in *LJN*, 1–2 January 1962.

Agricultural Policy) signed in 1962), it became clear that the urgent necessity for the region was to move towards better quality production. Once again, wine-growers were targetted, accused of producing a basic product that lacked identity,[48] and of compromising the reputation of wines from Languedoc, in a future which promised only greater and more intense competition. Moreover, in 1964, the link between quality production and the penetration of the European market was highlighted by an economist from Montpellier whose theories gained traction in the wine trade press.[49] European integration through the wine market was thus viewed cautiously. On one hand, the potential benefits of new markets were made clear as they were explored and debated in the press and in syndicalist speeches. On the other hand, the sharp increase of competition and worries about missing a chance to evolve—as they had after the 1900s, the 1920–1930s and the 1950s—provoked a high level of fear and concern in the Languedoc wine sector.

These were without a doubt connected to the issue of identity in a European-wide context. With a new and serious challenge ahead, the ability to take advantage of these new opportunities relied on enhancing the image of Languedocien wines. This was possible if the sector could rely more readily on quality production, meaning AOC wines in part (as a shop window), but the VDQS more specifically, as many reports from the 1970s suggested.[50]

Conclusion

In a clear manner, the contemporary period saw the image and the reputation of wines from Languedoc degrade quickly in an ever more competitive market which was increasingly defined hierarchically. When the first classifications of the 1850s established a new wine order on the national market, products from the Languedoc occupied a functional but poorly valued position: that of the blended and popular wine. As demand evolved and the sector became more and more rigid, winegrowers and merchants from Languedoc in their vast majority chose the easy route of quantity to the detriment of quality. Nonetheless, quality is not absent in the region, but, despite the ceaseless activity of certain actors such as Philippe Lamour, it remained drowned out amidst a stream of "gros rouge" which runs to millions of hectolitres each year, and makes regional production invisible at a national and international level as it lacks exposure or a brand as "Champagne", "Bordeaux" or "Bourgogne".

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[48] "Sélection? Valorisation de la qualité? Parlons-en", in *LJN*, 10 February 1968.

[49] "Du salaire de la concession à la qualité des vins dans le marché commun", in *l'Officiel de la FIVV*, 1964, p. 4.

[50] See, for example, Bentegeac (1976).

In 1970, while *L'Europe du vin* was emerging, wine making Languedoc faced a tremendous challenge: how to square the socioeconomic imperatives of a region completely dependent on winegrowing with the reconfigurations of a wine market now dictated by a logic stretching beyond national borders. Incidentally, in 1971, Michel Flanzy, member of the Academy of Agriculture, made no mistake about it. Evoking "the future of the vineyard from Languedoc", he considered the near future of the market of popular wines. In his opinion, the salvation for the region was necessarily bound to a new step towards a qualitative transformation. Unlike in previous periods, this new stage was not merely linked to the care given to vines and to vineyards, but to wine making and to oenology, in particular in the cooperative cellars.[51]

This was the major challenge which awaited Languedoc, an adventure that would take several decades before its realization, a long period made of severe crises,[52] numerous hopes and yet more new issues (such as the imports).

Acknowledgements I'd like to thank Dr. Andrew W. M. Smith, from the University College London, Secretary of the Society for the Study of French History, regarding his help in the translating process of this piece.

Appendix

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[51] "L'avenir du vignoble languedocien", in *L'officiel de la FIVV*, 1971, p. 5.

[52] Especially during the 1976 crisis but not only. See Smith (2016).

Wine production in the Languedoc
(ten years averages, in Million hectolitres)

	1852	*1862*	*1870s*	*1880s*	*1890s*	*1900*	*1910s*	*1920s*	*1930s*	*1940s*	*1950s*	*1960s*
Aude	1.46	1.19	2.86	3.51	6.63	5.63	4.64	6.29	6.41	3.65	5.83	7.02
Gard	1.51	1.43	1.12	0.68	2.01	3.27	2.64	4.11	4.37	3.54	5.01	5.47
Hérault	4.29	6.59	9.95	3.52	7.52	10.6	10.67	12.67	11	7.54	9.46	10.61
Languedoc	7.26	7.78	13.93	7.03	16.16	16.23	17.95	23.07	21.78	14.73	20.3	23.1
France	28.9	37.4	52.1	33.3	36.2	56.1	43.4	59.8	58.7	41.7	52.9	60.3
Part of L. (%)	25.1	20.8	26.7	21.1	44.6	28.9	41.4	38.6	37.1	35.3	38.4	38.3

Source Official sources from the national statistics that author rearranged himself

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The Wines of Apulia: The Creation of a Regional Brand

Ezio Ritrovato

The Origins of Great Wine Production

In recent decades, Apulian viticulture and winemaking underwent a true "revolution", which stemmed from the enhancement of autochthonous vines aimed at the production of quality wines. After over a century of production of large quantities of second-rate wines which were particularly suited to blend with other wines, to which they conferred body and alcohol contents, Apulian producers began to enhance local characteristics and to understand the need for high winemaking skills at the service of modern winemaking processes. It should be borne in mind, however, that over most of the last century, the characters of the great nineteenth-century viticulture development still painted the

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_6

tableau of the Apulian wine industry a red-oriented chromatic table,[1] the colour of wine obtained from those local grapes that still represented the core of the production of blending wines.

As a matter of fact, crossing wine-producing Apulia from North to South nowadays means coming across extended vineyards of *Nero di Troia*, *Primitivo* and *Negroamaro*, which are the legacy of the years of consolidation of a production capacity which made Apulia rank on top national level in terms of vine-cultivated areas and wine production.[2] This record, though, required the long-lasting delay in the adoption of innovative crop practices and winemaking techniques which aimed at freeing Apulian viticulture and winemaking from the constraints of the production of complementary wines.

The historical foundation of the widespread of vineyards was laid during the first decades following the unification of the Kingdom of Italy, when the agricultural structure of the Apulian economy underwent deep changes, following a series of measures taken by the government as far as customs legislation and, more in general, economic policy were concerned.

Both the 1861 adoption of a liberal tariff regime—which was followed by the 1863 commercial Treaty with France—and the introduction of the lira forced currency in May 1866—which brought about a currency devaluation—gave remarkable impulse to the Apulian agricultural production and, in particular, to wine exports. Also the subsequent 1888 crisis, which was followed by the interruption of trade relations with France, was a consequence of new international policy strategies, as well as of the sudden protectionist turn imposed by the Crispi Government in 1887 (De Rosa 1971, pp. 1.471–1.475; 2004, pp. 9–31; Stringher 1911, pp. 8–10; Sombart 1896, pp. 253–257; Pedone 1969, pp. 242–243). In the 1870s, the clear impulse to the development of Apulian viticulture came from the massive demand for blending wines by France, whose vineyards had been devastated by phylloxera. A true plague for vineyards, this parasite of American origin, which spread in Southern France between 1863 and 1890, had such destructive effects as to curtail wine production from 83,836,000 hectolitres in 1874 to 25,770,000 in 1889 (MAIC 1892, pp. 3–7).[3] In order to meet the massive demand by the French winemaking industry, in those years Apulia increased its vine cultivation, attaining the highest concentration in the province of Bari where, particularly along the coastal areas of Bari and Barletta and in the neighbourhood of Gioia del Colle and Altamura, the process of agricultural conversion brought about an extraordinary specialization in viticulture and the winemaking sector (MAIC 1892, pp. XXXII–XXXIII).[4] Also, the increase must not be neglected in the home demand for blending wines by the regions in Northern Italy, although it was still marginal compared with the amount exported abroad and, up to 1887, mostly to France.

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[1] At the end of the nineteenth century, statistics for Apulia reported an incidence of red wine close to 90% of the whole wine production, with a component for blending wines averaging 60%. See Ministero Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio (MAIC) (1896, p. 842) and Circolo Enofilo Italiano (1893, p. 101).

[2] In 1913, special-crop, vineyard-devoted land (ha. 282,400), made Apulia rank sixth after Emilia (ha. 852,200), Veneto (ha. 697,600), Tuscany (ha. 618,000), Marche (ha. 382,200) and Piedmont (ha. 291,200). In wine production, though (hl. 6,425,000) it ranked third after Piedmont (hl. 7,265,000) and Campania (hl. 6,718,000); see MAIC (1914, pp. 2, 29). In the 1929–1931 period, wine mean production (hl. 3,537,000), on a smaller surface (ha. 191,000), made Apulia rank fifth after Piedmont (hl. 4,403,000), Campania (hl. 4,099,000), Emilia (hl. 4,015,000) and Tuscany (hl. 3,961,000); see Marescalchi (1934, p. 280) and Regio Ispettorato Agrario Compartimentale Bari (1934, p. 5). In the year 2000, the Apulian vineyard surface (ha. 156,254) was second only to Sicily (ha. 159,559), although where wine production was concerned (hl. 7,199,041), despite the widespread of vineyards for table grapes (ha. 47,066), Apulia still ranked second in Italy, after Veneto (hl. 8,483,430); see Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) (2003, pp. 95–97). In 2010, ISTAT data certified a wine production in Apulia averaging 7,169,000 hl., exceeded only by Veneto with 8,351,000 hl.

The market beyond the Alps became paramount for the Italian wine export, passing from 34,589 hectolitres sold in 1871 to 2,787,875 sold in 1887,[5] but it became even more irreplaceable for the Apulian winemaking industry, to the point of representing almost the sole commercial outlet of a product which had quickly turned into the most important item in the region's foreign trade. The dependence increased between the Apulian agricultural production and the French winemaking needs, which affected greatly viticulture and wine production in the South, from the choice of vines to winemaking techniques, passing through the quality of the wine produced.

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[3] The virulence of the phylloxera invasion was such that, despite the retrieval of vineyards started in the mid-Sixties, the vineyard-cultivated surface passed from 2,321,000 ha. in 1862 to 1,600,000 in 1910 (see Lesourd and Gérard 1973, p. 234).

[4] Moreover, for the province of Bari, see De Felice (1971, p. 152).

[5] On a general total of 3,603,084 hectolitres of wine exported worldwide in 1887 (see MAIC 1892, p. LIX).

The French market demands focused exclusively on red wines, which could be blended with the French lighter wines to increase their alcohol contents. That is why red-grape vines were planted, tilling uncultivated land first, and replacing arable land later: it was an unprecedented process of crop transformation in the history of Italian agriculture. Over twenty years, Apulian farmers made their region rank second in Italy, after Sicily, as to quantity of wine produced,[6] achieving a production specialization which gave origin to an almost uniform vineyard landscape in the whole region.

To obtain blending red wines, vines such as *Nero di Troia, Montepulciano, Primitivo, Negroamaro, Malvasia and Aleatico* were mostly used, with gobelet-trained, low-set vines (MAIC 1896, pp. CXLVIII–CLI). By the end of the nineteenth century, Apulia produced essentially only one type of wine, with a single possibility of utilization (blending with other wines) mainly on a single market: the French one.[7] Thus, though, Apulian viticulture and winemaking had deliberately got stuck into the monopsonic market impasse, where the presence of a single buyer obliged producers to accept the quantities and prices established by that only buyer. Only a small quantity of the huge production of Apulian wine, therefore, achieved the so-called "honour of the bottle". Thus, the strength of *Nero di Troia*, the colour of *Primitivo*, the bouquet of *Negroamaro* were diluted into wines from other regions, where they lost also their name, origin, typicality.

After the 1887 protectionist turn and the consequent Italian-French customs war, the tightening of differential duties put in place by the French Government in response to the new Italian Tariff affected most of the goods exported to France: raw and wrought silk, fruit, olive oil and wine foremost. Its entry duty to France was increased tenfold, from two to twenty liras per hectolitre, and the flow of Apulian export collapsed. Consequences were devastating for all those—farmers, landholders, landowners, merchants and bankers—who had linked their fate to unchanging marketing channels for blending wines and, in general, to the *terms of trade* for primary products (La Sorsa 1915, p. 290).

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[6] In 1890, Sicily produced 7,692,191 hectolitres on 304,701 hectares of vineyards, against 3,569,258 hectolitres on 213,462 hectares in Apulia (see MAIC 1892, p. XXXVII).

[7] Red wine production in the three Apulian provinces in the 1890–1894 period still accounted for 85% of all the wine produced (see MAIC 1896, p. 842).

The only chance to revive the fortunes of the Apulian wine industry was to recover export flows towards the French market or to open new commercial outlets which might replace it, somehow. Every path of commercial rapprochement with France barred, the obvious choice, also on the level of economic relations, was to reinforce the political ties of the Triple Alliance. In 1891, astride summer and autumn, negotiations with Austria and Germany were initiated, which led to the new Italy–Austria and Italy–Germany Treaties, which were signed in Rome on 6 December 1891. The end of negotiations and the enforcement of the above-mentioned Treaties revived the hopes of Southern producers, that had been ruined by the closure of the French market. With these new commercial agreements, starting in 1892, Austria-Hungary became the major customer of the Italian and Apulian wine industry, although it never revived the glory of the extraordinary season which had ended in 1887. In fact, resumed export towards the Central Empires increased the Apulian wine producers' illusion that the productive "vocation" of raw, cheap blending wines could not change and that it could still allow remarkable economic returns for a long time to come (Boggiano 1893, pp. VII–VIII).

The first form of diversification in production occurred after the phylloxera invasion at the turn of the twentieth century, which dramatically reduced the extension of vineyards and the production of wine in Apulia and encouraged the production of table grapes.[8] Actually, in the second half of the last century, this type of grapes spread so fast, that Apulia ranked first in terms of cultivated surface and quantity produced,[9] showing an ability to penetrate foreign markets, as well as profitability per hectare, thus far unprecedented in the regional viticulture and wine producing tradition. This first crop diversification was accompanied by a heightened operators' attention to the production improvements that would allow bringing healthy, harmonious, tasty wines onto the market (Starita 1916, p. 15). It was still too little, though, to ensure the thorough separation between viticulture and oenology in the Apulian countryside and, therefore, to relinquish old-fashioned winemaking processes in favour of a modern, industrial production. All through the first half of the twentieth century, blending wines still accounted for the major source of income for Apulian viticulturists. This explains why the Apulian wine output has been founded for many decades on the exclusive characteristics of its three typical red-graped vines—*Nero di Troia*, *Primitivo* and *Negroamaro*—which, also in their distribution over the territory, cover all the production areas of major blending wines.

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[8] From 1899, the year when phylloxera first appeared in Apulia, to 1932, vineyard-cultivated surface decreased from 319,000 to about 191,000 hectares (see Regio Ispettorato Agrario Compartimentale Bari 1934, p. 5; Starita 1916, pp. 1–3; Gramazio 1913, pp. 141–145).

The First Qualitative Improvements

As a confirmation of the long-standing anonymity of Apulian red wines, it must be remembered that the first, important acknowledgement of quality and typicality of the Apulian wine industry was awarded to *San Severo bianco*, a wine based on *Bombino bianco* grapes added with *Trebbiano* or *Montepulciano.* Actually, a Consortium for the Safeguard of *San Severo bianco* was established by a 1932 Ministerial Decree, which implemented the July 1930 law also aimed at the safeguard of production of Alto Adige, Soave, Barolo and Barbaresco, Moscato d'Asti and Asti Spumante, Chianti and Marsala (Marescalchi 1934, p. 290). In the years after the Second World War, though, the first timid hints at diversifying production in favour of quality and safeguard of typicality were recorded. The Apulian origin of wines needed to be proudly claimed as a quality indicator, and not only as a guarantee of alcohol contents and definite colour (Mattia 1946, p. 7).

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[9] The Apulian record appears even clearer when considering that in the year 2000, in the face of a surface of 47,066 hectares which produced 11,848,260 hundredweights of table grapes, Sicily ranked second with a vineyard-cultivated surface of 17,299 hectares and a production of 3,215,714 hundredweights (see ISTAT 2003, p. 95).

This concept spread very slowly among Apulian operators also in 1963, when the new regulations on the safeguard of wines' Designation of Origin provided the legal protection and the necessary support to quality wine productions. After all, the first Apulian wines to obtain a Designation of Origin were *San Severo bianco* in 1968, *Locorotondo* and *Martina* in 1969, all white-grape varieties; it was only in 1971 that, through DOC *Matino*, the attempt was made to qualify the production of one *Negroamaro*-derived red wine, which had always been used for improving blending. After a few years, in 1974, the first DOC designation was also granted to the wines produced with two other red-grape local vines: *Primitivo di Manduria*, from the vine with the same name, and *Rosso di Cerignola*, obtained from *Nero di Troia*.

In those years, the idea burgeoned in Italy that enhancing production in the areas renowned for their wines was indispensable; Apulian viticulture and wine production, though, were still indifferent to production qualification programmes, which could be achieved only through the modernization and enrichment of the oenological culture.

Unfortunately, in order to keep high unitary yields of vineyards, high-yielding vines per hectare were still planted, uprooting old, less-yielding but better quality grapevines, reducing the ampelographic base to almost a single variety, particularly in typical vines such as *Nero di Troia*, *Primitivo* and *Negroamaro*. As a consequence, for most of the second half of the twentieth century, the image of viticultural and winemaking Apulia remained associated with complementary, low-cost wines, sold in large containers and meant for foreign wine industry or for Community-favoured distillation.

Starting in the 70s, though, a progressive spreading of a new "wine culture" began. The success of the new Apulian DOC labels on the international markets was founded on the recovery and enhancement of the three typical red-grape vines. Thanks to the modernization of crushing methods, time of fermentation, storage premises and of all the operations of ageing and stabilization of must, many wineries in Apulia

(Rivera, Spagnoletti-Zeuli, De Castris, Zecca, Taurino and others) have quickly climbed the charts of the best Italian producers.

It is a tiring and often opposed change, as shown by the production data on DOC and DOCG wines as related to the total product of individual regions in 1990. Although as many as 23 Apulian DOC labels were already acknowledged and active at that time, qualified wine production amounted to only 2.2% of the region total production (6,823,800 hl.). On the other hand, the incidence of fine wines in other regions is very different: excluding Sicily, which with its 2.4% (on a total of 7,715,400 hl.) showed the same qualitative gap as Apulia, such incidence ranged from 23% in Veneto to 34% in Tuscany, 40% in Piedmont and up to 64% in Trentino Aldo Adige.[10]

In 1990, moreover, the contribution of white and rose wines meant for high-quality production in Apulia attained 65% of the scanty DOC production (Chamber of Commerce of Alessandria 1993, pp. 362–365), as to reaffirm a crop and wine approach which confined red wines to the blending market, which was dominated by the "large quantity—low cost—low quality" production scheme.

Starting in 1987, a new incentive to the qualification of wine production derived from a clear-cut change in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). New criteria and provisions were set (Common Organization of the viticulture and wine market, CMO wine, EEC Regulation 822/87), aimed at decreasing production potential and at converting part of all vineyards (Antonacci 2010, p. 595). In Apulia, the merit of the great turn of the two last decades is to be fairly shared among producers, oenologists and territorial Institutions. The former have the merit of understanding, although with some delay, the weakness of a productive structure where wine was considered as raw material meant for wholesale. Oenologists and institutions must be credited for claiming the importance of quality and differentiation, also based on the affirmation of a regional *brand*, preferably associated to a particular local vine (Visentin 2007, p. 4).

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[10] *Source* FederDoc.

The strategy adopted, which proved to be a successful one, aimed at the improvement and stabilization of the organoleptic characteristics of traditional wines through process innovations that ranged from planting vineyards to winemaking, storage and ageing methods. The true success factor in such renewing, though, were the three oldest and most widely spread local vines, on which the most advanced Apulian wine industry focused its energy and resources. A traditional production component, the use of *Nero di Troia*, *Primitivo* and *Negroamaro*, either vinified in single variety or along with other varieties, became the pillar of the many Apulian DOC grapes which have been granted major acknowledgments in all the Italian and international oenological events.

Nero di Troia is testified by all the wineries utilizing DOC varieties such as *Castel del Monte*, *Rosso Barletta* and *Rosso Canosa*; whereas *Primitivo* is the major component of *Gioia del Colle* and *Manduria* DOC varieties. A mention apart goes to *Negroamaro* which, after expressing its best qualities in DOC. *Salice Salentino, Leverano, Nardò, Squinzano* and *Alezio*, achieved a growing success as a distinguished product of the best-known Salento, ranking first in the 2009 Italian classification of bottled wines with the highest sales' growth rate (Vizzari 2010).

The Success of Apulian Wines

Over the last twenty-five years, further changes have occurred in the process of improvement of the Apulian viticulture and winemaking, all of which can be traced in the data on vine-planted surface, total wine production and percentage of high-quality wines. The regional extension of wine-devoted vineyards decreased by over 50% in twenty years, passing from 200,000 hectares in 1990 to 96,750 hectares, as recorded in the 2010 ISTAT agricultural survey, whereas the total production has been hovering between 5 and 6 million hectolitres, depending on the harvest, not to mention the peaks of 10–11 millions in the early 1990s of the last century. The most outstanding element, though, is the increase in high-quality winemaking (DOC, DOCG, IGT), which in 2013 amounted to 50% of the total Apulian production (see Table 1).

Table 1 Wine production in Apulia, divided by quality (hl/m) (2005–2013)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Grape must	279	281	282	409	384	539	435	1241	943
Table wine	5647	5110	3499	4379	3602	3649	2345	1295	1991
IGT	1478	1143	1059	1322	1201	1972	2090	1925	1984
DOC/DOCG	946	862	828	838	733	1010	907	877	990
Total	8350	7397	5668	6949	5920	7169	5777	5338	5908

Source Elaborated data from www.inumeridelvino.it

Most recently, the progress of the regional wine industry has been further accentuated by initiatives of diversification and specialization, focused on the rediscovery and enhancement of rose wines. The latter, which were once considered as wines of little value, have been recently experiencing a progressive widespread on markets worldwide, also due to the contribution of the French and Spanish wine industry. Also in the case of rose wines, the Apulian wine industry had neglected its own development to take up a supporting role to foreign production. Actually, since the early twentieth century, the pressing of grapes such as *Bombino bianco*, *Bombino nero* and *Montepulciano* gave origin to musts that, after being left in contact with the pomace for a few hours, resulted in good, light-red wines. Once sent abroad, these became *rosé* in France or *schiller* in Germany, or were used in the production of *vermouth*, aromatic wines and wine-based liqueurs (Regio Ispettorato Agrario Compartimentale Bari 1934, p. 11).[11]

It is in the very sector of rose wines that Apulia sports an undisputed record in Italy: the first bottling of a rose wine, in 1943, by the "Leone De Castris" wineries at Salice Salentino (LE). It is the so-called "*Five Roses*", a wine whose history is worth telling, as it shows how even the most deeply rooted tradition may become a strength, if coupled with creativity and entrepreneurial dynamism.

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[11] Particularly in the 1920–1930 decade, the vermouth Italian industry acquired massive supplies of white wines from the Itria Valley, bought starting in 1919 by Cinzano, followed by Fratelli Cora, Gancia, Riccadonna and, in 1929, Martini e Rossi (see Vitagliano 1985, pp. 233–234).

The October 1943 harvest in the Leone De Castris vineyards—an important family of landowners and wine producers in the province of Lecce—was particularly good, but national and foreign buyers were scanty because of the war. Storing thousands of hectolitres of unsold Negroamaro, Primitivo and Malvasia was an appalling prospect, but after the 8th September 1943 armistice, the new American allies reached Apulia and headquartered in Lecce. Having given up all hopes of selling his wines for their traditional blending use, don Pierino Leone De Castris decided to devote all that year's harvest to rose wine, which he normally produced in very little quantities for family use only, as his wife, Donna Lisetta, was particularly fond of it. In fact, in the 1943 autumn, the Leone De Castris wineries produced rose wine in large quantities to sell on the local market as table wine.

The ruse of don Pierino was to bottle part of the production and to serve it to the officers of the American army in the course of a reception in his Lecce palace. The unanimous approval obtained encouraged him to persevere and, to make up for the shortage of empty bottles, he used bottles of *Brewing Richmond* beer, which Americans used to drink. And it was from the very American headquarters in Lecce that the first order was placed for over 35,000 bottles of that rose wine made from *Malvasia nera* and *Negroamaro* in the Salice Salentino "Cinque Rose" vineyards. On the label, "Cinque Rose" became *Five Roses*, as a tribute to American customers, although that proved to be another successful choice in terms of international marketing. The American and world markets opened up and, after the first 1944 delivery, the export of *Five Roses* went on uninterruptedly.[12]

Success grew over the years, till the absolute triumph of the Apulian rose wine over the last decade, which was achieved through the commitment and investments of many producers in the region. The worldwide consumption growth of rose wines was a paramount encouragement for major producing Countries to modify their winemaking plans to humour new trends. France, Italy, Spain and the United States are the core of this "taste revolution", both on the side of offer and demand

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[12] The fiction-like story of *Five Roses* can be found in Massara (2007).

Table 2 World distribution of rose wine production by country (hl/m) (2002–2014)

	France	Italy	Spain	USA	Others	Total
2002	5.0	3.5	5.0	3.0	4.4	20.9
2003	5.3	3.3	5.1	3.1	4.9	21.7
2004	6.0	4.1	5.5	3.1	5.2	23.9
2005	5.8	4.0	4.7	3.3	4.4	22.2
2006	6.1	4.3	4.5	3.9	5.1	23.9
2007	6.0	4.9	4.0	4.1	5.3	24.3
2008	6.0	5.1	3.8	4.0	5.1	24.0
2009	6.9	5.0	3.5	3.2	5.3	23.9
2010	6.6	5.1	3.5	3.0	5.8	24.0
2011	6.5	4.2	3.5	2.9	5.6	22.7
2012	6.3	3.2	4.3	3.0	5.9	22.7
2013	6.6	2.5	4.0	3.1	5.8	22.0
2014	7.6	2.5	5.5	3.5	5.1	24.2

Source Elaborated data from www.inumeridelvino.it

(see Table 2), which in 2006 got to make up for about 9% of the world wine consumption.[13]

From 2003 to 2007, consumption of rose wines in Italy increased by 20.59%, much more than worldwide (+12.96%),[14] because rose wines have always been more popular in the rest of the world than in Italy. In recent years, though, compared with a slight decrease in the Italian consumption of high-quality white and red wines, rose wines (DOC and IGP) have kept a steady national share, which in 2014 attained 6% of all firm wines.[15] In the wake of such an international success, which was even more significant for sparkling wines, "rose" winemaking—a tradition of Apulia, Abruzzo, Veneto and the Lombard shore of the lake of Garda—showed an alternated trend. The Apulian wine industry, on the other hand, has been ranking first in Italy in terms of marketed labels, with over 40% of the national rose wine production.[16]

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[13] Data supplied by Federico Castellucci, then General Director of OIV (Organizzazione Internazionale della Vigna e del Vino- International Organization of Vineyards and Wine), in his presentation at the International Conference on rose wines, which took place in Otranto (LE) on 6 March 2010.

[14] Data Vinexpo/Iwsr 2009.

[15] About 150,000 hectolitres of bottled rose wine, averaging 47 million euros (see http://www.uiv.it/giornale/corriere-vinicolo-n-1-2016-vino-in-cifre/).

With particular reference to rose wines, Apulian wineries have diversified product lines and improved marketing, with a focus also on sparkling and semi-sparkling wines. Also in this case, though, the Apulian tradition in viticulture and winemaking has played a major role by using native, red-graped vines such as *Negroamaro*, *Primitivo*, but also *Bombino nero*, *Malvasia* and *Nero di Troia*. The strength and bouquet of the regional typical mixes have been coupled with innovative making and refinement techniques for still and semi-sparkling rose wines, achieving excellent levels that made rose wines a distinctive regional *brand*. This way, wine-producing Apulia has tackled the changes in young consumers' choices, compared with the middle-aged consumers'. This change favours light and semi-sparkling wines, which are fit as an aperitif or to drink between meals, at the expenses of wines with higher alcohol contents, which are traditionally drunk during meals.

Meanwhile, the production of high-quality wines has slowly but steadily increased, significantly contributing to the success of regional wine exports, which in 2015 exceeded 100 million euros (see Table 3). A significant contribution has come from the many cooperative wineries that are the traditional backbone of the Apulian wine industry and which now also play an important, qualifying role. Actually, in

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[16] In wine consumption worldwide, rose wines overcome the 10% threshold: a growth that, despite the general decrease in consumption, attained 22.7 million hectolitres in 2014. Always in 2014, with 5% of world consumption, Italy ranked fifth in the list of consumer countries, after the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and France. In Italy, two-thirds of produced rose wines are exported, although in worldwide trade, the main exporter of rose wines is Spain, with 46.3% of exported products, followed by Italy, the United States of America and France, with similar exports (comprised between 1.1 and 1.5 million hectolitres exported in 2014). These four countries export a volume of over 80% of the world's rose wines. The world four major importers account for 65% of total import of rose wines: France leads with 28%, followed by the United Kingdom and Germany, with about 15% of the total each, then the United States with 8%. Over 80% of the world's import of rose wines is from European non-producer countries, with the exception of France, which is a great producer and exporter, but also a major importer. A curiosity: in Tunisia and Uruguay, rose wines account for about half of total consumption of still wines. See Focus 2015 of OIV, *Il mercato dei vini Rosati*, a sector study on rose wines carried out by the International Organization of Vineyards and Wine (OIV) and by the Provence Interprofessional Council of Wines (CIVP). http://www.oiv.int/public/medias/3105/focus-2015-les-vins-roses-it.pdf.

Table 3 2015 wine export from Italian regions and percentage variation compared with 2010

Region	Wine export (€ × 1000)	2015/2010 (%)
Abruzzo	140,295	39.5
Basilicata	2607	68.2
Calabria	4730	9.1
Campania	42,871	60.0
Emilia Romagna	275,018	3.7
Friuli Venezia Giulia	100,729	53.7
Lazio	49,132	42.3
Liguria	10,239	6.0
Lombardia	255,290	20.1
Marche	47,465	14.8
Molise	2835	−28.8
Piemonte	964,794	24.6
Puglia	101,508	14.7
Sardegna	22,389	15.7
Sicilia	101,331	9.7
Toscana	902,419	53.7
Trentino Alto Adige	500,355	22.9
Umbria	29,951	29.9
Valle d'Aosta	1178	−8.3
Veneto	1,834,474	58.4
Italy	5,389,610	37.6

Source Elaborated data from Wine Monitor

2009, wine producers destined about 50% of grapes meant for DOC and DOCG wine production to cooperative wineries; an additional 28% was destined to own production and 22% was sold to other customers.[17]

Much of the credit for this increase is up to the improvement and wider use of the three native varieties—*Nero di Troia, Primitivo* and *Negroamaro*—which in the last decade have achieved a significant record in the Apulian most qualified wine industry. Actually, in 2015, all the 28 DOC, 4 DOCG and 6 IGT Apulian labels, with the exception of *Castel del Monte Bombino nero* DOCG, listed the use of at least one of those three varieties among their specifications with regard to the production of red and rose wines—either in single variety or mixed with others.[18] In doing so, Apulian producers guaranteed the success of the improvement policy for the wine sector, which had been caged in the role of low-cost raw material supplier for too long.

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[17] *Source* Assessorato alle Risorse Agroalimentari della Regione Puglia (Department for Agricultural Resources of the Apulia Region).

Such change in the regional wine industry is not the result of a one-way, isolated development project, but must be considered within a broader programme of recovery and revitalization of local values, in which food industry—mainly with regard to olive oil and wine—played a major role in the process of full recovery in which "physical space, anthropic space and production technological culture [interact] as the expression of a particular form of economy" (Pastore 2002, pp. 99–102). Spreading the idea of territorial promotion, founded on the concept of mutual compatibility among agriculture, environment and tourism, favoured the establishment of an integrated sustainability framework, strengthened by many tourist promotion initiatives and by institutional communication campaigns. On this assumption, a number of events related to the best regional wine productions were promoted, focusing on the attractiveness of the region, as a perfect combination with the eco-friendly growth principles.

In short, we have tried to highlight the importance of combining the regional wine industry success with improved environmental conditions and with the implementation of ambitious projects, such as the recovery of ancient skills, the promotion of agricultural activities and a fair income distribution (Arcuri and Tartaglia 2007, p. 141). However, the regional production scheme retains a basic contradiction represented by the excessive fragmentation of quality winemaking; actually, even boasting over 28 DOC, 4 DOCG and 6 IGT labels, the 2012 top 5 DOC labels accounted for more than 80% of total production (see Table 4).

Salice Salentino ranks first, followed by Primitivo di Manduria, Castel del Monte, Cacc'e Mmitt and San Severo. If these labels are added to those whose production exceeded 10,000 hectolitres (Brindisi and Squinzano), 90% of regional production is accounted for. As a consequence, the production capacity of most Apulian DOC labels has

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[18] *Source* FederDoc.

Table 4 Production of Apulian DOC labels (hl) (2008–2012)

Name	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Aleatico di Puglia	56	132	217	226	116
Alezio Rosso Barletta	864	591	585	831	751
Brindisi	26,934	1750	20,767	22,350	16,794
Cacc'e Mmitte di Lucera	2720	1758	2378		30,600
Castel Del Monte	66,231	55,739	43,129	41,998	35,226
Castel Del Monte Bombino Nero				745	2392
Castel Del Monte Nero di Troia				1762	2951
Castel Del Monte Rosso Riserva				1201	3561
Colline Joniche Tarantine	866	1412	1851	306	75
Gioia Del Colle	4828	4464	4126	3636	3355
Gravina	1207	988	1149	851	603
Lizzano	3845	3829	3455	1420	3763
Locorotondo	10,407	10,838	7217	1370	5203
Martina (or Martina Franca)	4230	4089	2073	1133	1399
Moscato di Trani	885	710	460	256	279
Orta Nova	272	141	118		105
Ostuni	31	33	32	34	36
Primitivo Manduria	107,529	67,163	99,942	87,818	87,171
Primitivo di Manduria Dolce Naturale				1350	1580
Rosso Canosa	956	527	361		
Rosso di Cerignola	242	501	417		115
Salice Salentino	42,972	27,856	122,220	139,653	140,797
San Severo	42,089	40,127	46,715		30,600
Squinzano	10,341	6459	9030	12,910	12,903
Tavoliere Delle Puglie					2739
Total of Apulian DOC labels	327,505	229,107	366,242	319,850	383,114

Source Elaborated data from FederDoc

decreased, with an obvious negative impact on the possibility to start qualified business activities (marketing, research etc.) at the service of effective strategies aimed at the expansion on domestic and international markets.

From this point of view, Apulian wineries must keep production above a minimum threshold, in line with domestic and foreign competitors, in order to tackle the decade-long downward trend in wine consumption and the new configuration of sales channels. On the one hand, while it is clear that mass distribution is acquiring a leading position in the domestic market, on the other hand the growing role played by the "on line" sales cannot be disregarded, especially as a raw indicator of the change in consumers' likings and in the level of appreciation of each winery's products.

Progress in recent years has guaranteed the success of Apulian wines and, more generally, of the wines from Southern Italy, also due to the opportunities created by the "drink a little but well" attitude, that favoured the consumption of good-quality wines at accessible prices. Such attitude did not escape the Italian historical wine producers—the big wineries from Tuscany, Veneto and Piedmont—which invested in Apulian vineyards and production plants to benefit from the distinctive features of native vines and their rich ampelographical variety. Among other things, the sunny land of Apulia has always been fit to accommodate international varieties, to mix them with local robust red wines and to obtain new high-quality wines, able to satisfy consumers' changing preferences and choices.

Conclusions

It is now beyond doubt that the path taken by the Apulian wine industry towards international markets and recognition cannot do without the recovery and enhancement of native vines, which started in recent decades and is destined to support the affirmation of the typicality and safeguard of the Apulian wines' origin for a long time to come. What raises hopes for the future of the regional wine sector is its ability to attract young people, particularly women, endowed with good agronomic and oenological skills and motivated by a passion for viticulture and high-quality wine production. Their contribution has been essential in introducing modern production technologies, aimed at increasing and diversifying the offer, which can already boast a solid record in "rose" winemaking. Thanks to the support of specialized marketing strategies, the Apulian origin has become a guarantee of quality, to the benefit of the volume of exports and of the market shares attained in Italy and the world. In conclusion, the possibility of "drinking well" at acceptable prices, which is offered by Apulian wines, proved to be a formidable competitive advantage to face the challenges posed by the competition with alternative drinks and by a persisting general decrease in wine consumption.

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The Evolution of Catalan Winemaking in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Without Wine Merchants There Is No Viticulture

Llorenç Ferrer-Alòs

Introduction[1]

As early as the eighteenth century, Catalonia was a major centre of wine production. A portion of the territory produced wine to be made into brandy, while another portion produced wine for domestic consumption and for export. Each of these areas saw the development of distinct structures of production and forms of marketing. The present paper argues that it was in those places where marketing was in the hands of large-scale wine merchants and stockists that vineyards survived the changes introduced in the twentieth century. Also, the paper analyses the evolution of viticulture in the region up to the present day.

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[1] This paper was written as part of the project entitled *Mundos del trabajo en transición (1750–1930): Cualificación, movilidad y desigualdades* (HAR2017-84030-P).

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_7

The paper is divided into three parts. The first section analyses the evolution of vineyards in Catalonia since the nineteenth century. The second section turns to the respective characteristics of the areas producing wine to distill and wine to drink, and the third section addresses the causes that allowed the vineyards in the area dominated by major merchants and stockists to survive until they could transform into quality vineyards.

Changes to the Winegrowing Map of Catalonia from the Nineteenth Century to the Twenty-First Century

The massive spread of vineyards in Catalonia is an eighteenth-century phenomenon, which gained speed in the first half of the nineteenth century and reached its height before the arrival of phylloxera (Colomé Ferrer and Valls 1995; Valls Junyent 2004). Table 1 shows the increase in land planted in vineyard between 1858 and 1889, when it reached its greatest extent thanks to the surge in demand for wine caused by the phylloxera outbreak in France. In Barcelona province, the amount of land grew 16% over the period, while the figure was 15% in Tarragona province and 91% in Lleida province, the most rapid growth in the territory. In Girona province, by contrast, less land was dedicated to winegrowing because phylloxera had arrived from France in 1878 and spread through every vineyard in the province (García de los Salmones 1892). What is significant is the accelerated growth that occurred in Lleida. While little is known of this expansion, all indications are that it was one of the areas in which the demand for wine triggered rapid, volatile growth to take advantage of high wine prices.[2]

Table 1 also shows the decline in the amount of land planted in vineyard after phylloxera. The low point was reached at varying times. In

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[2] This phenomenon resembles the expansion of vineyard land in La Mancha as a result of the demand for wine from the French market. See (Figeac and Lachaud 2015).

Table 1 Growth in land devoted to vineyards before phylloxera outbreak (in hectares)

	1858 (in hectares)	1889 (in hectares)	1858 = 100	Minimum extension	1889 = 100[a]	Maximum extension	1889 = 100[a]
Barcelona	113.508	132.155	116,4	35.675 (1898)	27,0	120.777 (1934)	91,4
Tarragona	96.538	111.028	115,0	65.522 (1909)	59,0	103.755 (1951)	93,5
Lleida	62.337	119.077	191,0	15.161 (1909)	12,7	29.334 (1934)	24,6
Girona	38.855	5.184	13,3	5.184 (1889)	13,3	15.506 (1928)	39,9
Catalunya	311.238	367.444	118,1	184.766 (1900)	50,3	268.672 (1934)	73,1

[a] Girona data refer to 1858

Source Pujol Andreu (1988) and own elaboration from data in the Anuario de Estadística

Girona, it came in 1889 (13.3% of the 1858 figure), while Barcelona province did not hit bottom until 1898 (27% of the 1889 figure), with Lleida following suit in 1909 (12.7%) along with Tarragona (59.0%), where the decline in winegrowing land was much less severe, most likely because it was understood by then how to respond to the phylloxera infestation and the replanting was much quicker.

In addition, Table 1 shows the high point achieved after phylloxera to determine the extent to which the vineyards recovered. Everything seems to indicate that the land dedicated to winegrowing in Catalonia reached its greatest extent in 1934, but at different rates. Barcelona province reached 91.4% of its pre-phylloxera level in that year and it exceeded its 1858 level, while Tarragona province reached 93.5% in 1951 and also exceeded its 1858 level. By contrast, Girona province only reached 39.9% of its 1858 high mark in 1928 and even more importantly, Lleida reached its high in 1928, but this was only 24.6% of the maximum surface area of 1889. The amount of land planted in vineyard was volatile and needs to be analysed accordingly.

The Maps 1 and 2 shows the relative weight of vineyard land over total land under cultivation by judicial district[3] Winegrowing land was concentrated in the administrative districts, or comarcas, of Barcelona and Tarragona, where vineyards exceeded 65% of cultivated land. It also extended into Lleida as noted earlier, but with lower intensity. By 1920, with phylloxera overcome, winegrowing land generally shrank in size, but the greatest extent and intensity continued to be in the comarcas of Barcelona (Penedès, Garraf, Baix Llobregat, Anoia, Bages and Vallès Occidental) and Tarragona (Alt and Baix Camp, Tarragonès and Baix Penedès). Girona had seen recovery in Alt Empordà where there had always existed a number of vineyards of some importance, while the intensity of cultivation in Lleida was much lower than the level that had been attained in 1889. In short, the comarcas of Tarragona and Barcelona had the greatest share of vineyards in Catalonia, while

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[3] We do not have data broken down by municipality. To compare 1920 data with data for 1889, we have taken the view that the land under cultivation was the same in 1920 as in 1889, a year in which we do have data on the total area under cultivation by judicial districts.


Proportion vineyard on cultivated land
0.00 to 5.00
5.00 to 15.00
15.00 to 25.00
25.00 to 35.00
35.00 to 45.00
45.00 to 55.00
55.00 to 65.00
65.00 to 75.00
75.00 to 90.00

Map 1 Proportion of all cultivated land devoted to vineyards by district (1889)

Alt Empordà and some comarcas in Lleida saw a lower intensity of cultivation.

Tables 1 and 2 and Fig. 1 set out the rate of evolution in the amount of land devoted to winemaking. The year 1934 marked the high point in the recovery that followed the declines caused by the outbreak of


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25.00 to 35.00
35.00 to 45.00
45.00 to 55.00
55.00 to 65.00
65.00 to 75.00
75.00 to 90.00

Map 2 Proportion of all cultivated land devoted to vineyards by district (1920)

phylloxera. In that year, vineyards covered 73.1% of the total in 1889.[4] We can differentiate distinct stages in this development: (a) high surface area planted in the mid-nineteenth century (300,000 ha) and high

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[4] Comprehensive statistics on winegrowing surface area begin in 1858, when tax assessments on land were carried out. Later, we have estimations that do not always coincide and it is not possible to generate a continuous series with official data until 1898. Prior to 1898, the data have

Table 2 Evolution of land devoted to winemaking in Catalonia (1858–2015). 1934 = 100

	1858	1889	1900	1934	1943	1963	1983	2003	2015
Barcelona	94	109	30	100	59	51	24	20	18
Tarragona	104	120	104	100	101	111	64	36	29
Lleida	214	409	145	100	103	53	23	17	16
Girona	287	38	71	100	74	78	49	19	16
Catalunya	121	143	72	100	80	75	40	26	22

Source Own elaboration from data in the Anuario de Estadística Agraria

Table 3 Comarcas with the highest extension of vineyards (2009)

	Hectares vineyard	% of total vineyards in Catalonia	% of cultivated land devoted to winegrowing
Terra Alta	6983	11.4	28.7
Priorat	3522	5.7	40.3
Conca de Barberà	4498	7.3	18.2
Baix Penedes	3895	6.3	63.0
Anoia	3510	5.7	12.0
Alt Penedès	18,723	30.5	81.3
Alt Camp	7637	12.4	38.9
Otras	12,623	20.6	2.7
Total	61,391		7.7

Source IDESCAT. Generalitat de Cataluña

intensity of cultivation in the comarcas of Barcelona and Tarragona; (b) a significant and rapid spread of vineyards particularly in Lleida province because of the phylloxera outbreak in France; (c) a decline in land planted in vineyards, reaching a low point in 1900 (184,000 ha) but falling at a varying rate by province due to the arrival of phylloxera; (d) a slow recovery of the surface area planted in Barcelona and Tarragona, a sharp decline in Lleida and a smaller drop in Girona, resulting overall in a new high mark of 268,000 ha in 1934; (e) the provinces of Barcelona and Tarragona reach the same level of planting that had existed in the mid-nineteenth century; (f) the start of a rapid decline during and after the Spanish Civil War, especially in Barcelona province, where the winegrowing area was cut almost in half; (g) a stabilization of land planted in vineyard up to 1963 thanks to Tarragona province holding steady; and (h) a new period of widespread cuts up to 1983, when Catalan vineyards

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been estimated using the information available in continuous years, while official data have been used from 1898 onwards. We have made estimations only during the Spanish Civil War, when no information was published. While official records do exist, they must be treated with a degree of caution because they usually come from local declarations that are not always reliable. Despite these limitations, we believe that available data do show a trend in the amount of land planted in vineyard in Catalonia. The primary sources of information are: an annual report on agricultural statistics called *Anuario de Estadística Agraria*, which has appeared in various formats and continues to the present day, and reports on agricultural and fishing statistics called *Estadístiques agràries i pesqueres*, which are published by the government of Catalonia.



Source: the data in Table 1

Fig. 1 Evolution of land devoted to winemaking Catalonia (1858–2015) (*Source* The data in Table 1)

occupied only 40% of the surface area in 1934. In fact, in this final period, the reduction continued right up to 2003, by which time the amount of land planted in vineyard was reduced to a quarter, with the decline being particularly sharp across much of Tarragona province. In 2015, the winegrowing area stabilized at low levels, covering 22% of the total in 1934 and 15% of the total in 1889.

A closer look at the nineteenth-century maps shows that the winegrowing areas were concentrated in Barcelona province and much of Tarragona province. In subsequent decades, vineyards practically disappeared from Lleida and Girona (where they were reduced modestly to traditional wine-producing areas such as Pallars Jussà and a portion of La Noguera in Lleida and Alt Empordà in Girona). This was accompanied by a steady decline in Barcelona and Tarragona, especially in the vicinity of the city of Barcelona. Ultimately, modern vineyards became concentrated in only a few comarcas. Table 3 sets out the comarcas where winegrowing is concentrated at present (2009). It also indicates the intensity of winegrowing as a proportion of total land under cultivation, while Map 3 depicts the intensity by municipality.

The geography of vineyards in Catalonia today bears only a modest relationship to the vineyards of the nineteenth century (there are vineyards and protected areas where there used to be vineyards, such as Costers del Segre in Lleida or Empordà in Girona or Pla de Bages in Bages). However,


% On cultivated land. Catalonia, 2009
0.0 to 0.2
0.2 to 10.0
10.0 to 20.0
20.0 to 30.0
30.0 to 40.0
40.0 to 50.0
50.0 to 60.0
60.0 to 70.0
70.0 to 80.0
80.0 to 90.0
90.0 to 100.0

Map 3 Area of vineyard cultivated by municipalities Catalonia, 2009

the areas that have maintained an almost absolute specialization and a very high level of intensity are the comarcas of Alt Penedès (30.5% of total winegrowing land), Alt Camp, Baix Penedès, Terra Alta and Priorat. These coincide with the areas of greatest intensity in the mid-nineteenth century. The blue on the map above identifies those municipalities that have vineyards on 50% of their land under cultivation and they are the ones that coincide with the comarcas listed above. Why has this geography persisted and not a different one? Why did the comarcas in Barcelona province that had such intensive winegrowing in the nineteenth century lose nearly all of it, whereas it has continued in the comarcas of Tarragona and in Alt Penedès (which is in Barcelona province but shares the production characteristics of Tarragona)?

The argument of this paper is that different types of viticulture coexisted in Catalonia in the nineteenth century and that the type that adapted best to the changes occurring in the twentieth century was the one that had developed in the comarcas of Tarragona in the eighteenth century, characterized by a highly active network of merchants and stockists who were basically devoted in that century to the production and marketing of brandy and later to the marketing of wine. These structures were to become the driving force behind the modernization of Catalan viticulture. First, we analyse the differences between these types of viticulture and then we move onto the evolution of Catalan viticulture to the present day.

Viticulture in the Comarcas of Barcelona[5]

The characteristics of this type of viticulture, which we have analysed in previous papers, are summarized below (Ferrer Alòs 2015a, b):

(a) Planting vines requires a great deal of effort, so landowners sought different formulas to get a return on labour. In many areas, the "rabassa morta" contract was adopted. This meant that the cost of planting was recouped through a long-term contract that lasted as long as the vines survived. In exchange, payment was made in the form of a portion of the harvest (normally a quarter of the grapes). In the comarcas near Barcelona, this gave rise to a network of small winegrowers, or "rabassaires", who focused exclusively on wineproduction and would, at most, supplement their household economies with proto-industrial activities (notably, spinning carried out by women). In addition to these small winegrowers, there appeared landowners who produced wine from their own vines and from the crop shares delivered by the rabassaires under their contracts (Colomé Ferrer 1990; Ferrer Alòs 2014; Moreno Claverías 1995; Valls Junyent 1997).

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[5] in Catalonia, there have been at least two other types of viticulture. Little is known about them. One corresponds to the comarcas of Lleida, particularly in the vicinity of Tremp, and the other corresponds to Alt Empordà in Girona. Exporting through Mediterranean ports was important to the latter type.

(b) This wine was used to supply the domestic market. Wines from the Manresa area went to grain-growing comarcas and comarcas in the mountainous interior, while wines from the coast and around Barcelona supplied the city of Barcelona and the network of medium-sized cities. The amount turned into brandy was relatively small, typically corresponding to residual, surplus or poor-quality wine. This brandy was sold domestically and also added to the product's substantial exports (Ferrer Alòs 1981).

(c) The marketing was carried out through tavern leases that were offered by municipalities, which regulated wine distribution and brandy sales. In practice, this was a monopoly under municipal control. Mule drivers played a key role in the distribution network. They purchased wine on behalf of the tavern keepers or on their own account and then hauled it to places where it was not produced. The small winegrowers, or rabassaires, were not very active in this commerce. Typically, they would hang a pine branch on their balcony to signal to mule drivers that they had wine to sell. In Barcelona, the sale of wine was free, but taxes did have to be paid on the wine trade and landowners and tavern keepers often worked together to supply the city (Sánchez Martínez 2001; Oliva Ricos 2009). This complex network gave rise to few merchants or agents in control of production as occurred in the comarcas of Tarragona.

Viticulture in the Comarcas of Tarragona

The characteristics of this type of viticulture are less well known, but a number of aspects are worth noting:

(a) In the second half of the seventeenth century, peasants in the comarcas of Tarragona saw a rise in the demand for wine to produce brandy. The demand originated from Baltic merchants. The wars between France and Holland had weakened the traditional commerce in French brandy and the Dutch found a substitute in Tarragona that became well-established in subsequent decades. This territory specialized in producing wine to distill (burn) and not wine to drink or for local consumption as the comarcas of Barcelona did (Torras Elías 1995; Valls Junyent 2004).

(b) In contrast to what occurred in the comarcas of Barcelona, vines were planted by means of a contract known as "*concessió a plantar*". This was a kind of lease that permitted a planter to plant vines and take advantage of the harvest for a number of years before the land devolved back to the owner (Moreno Claverías 1995). Subsequently, the planted vineyards, when returned to the landowner, were leased to short term sharecropping and generated a much less stable harvest than in the areas governed by the "*rabassa morta*" contract. From the little information that we have, this appears not to have given rise to small winegrowers, but rather encouraged the concentration of crops by medium-scale growers from many localities who would take care of the initial processing and subsequent distillation into brandy. In reality, the vineyards were not a monoculture, but were supplemented by crops of hazelnuts, almonds, carob beans and olives, to name but a few. Grapes were simply another cash crop for sale to others.

A description of Pinell de Brai shows what took place when the peasants went to sell their grape harvest: "*… the winegrowers of Pinell de Brai would haul their grapes to Gandesa to sell them, because it was the nearest trading centre. At daybreak, the peasants of Pinell took their loaded wagons as far as the banderole (…) they would arrive at the storehouse of the presumed purchaser, where the bodega keeper would tell them that the owner was not presently in, but was out picking his own plot of grapes, and so therefore no price could be given. Come back later. This business was repeated until the owner appeared and after negotiation or enticement a peasant could do only one of two things: leave the grapes at the price offered or return to Pinell with the grapes in his cart*" (Ber Sabaté 1997). It follows, therefore, that winegrowing and winemaking were not one and the same.

The cultivation contracts in this area show that the short term sharecropers hauled the harvested grapes to the home of the landowner, where the winemaking would be done.[6] The wine was stored separately in the landowner's storehouse, but he had first preference in its purchase.

(c) Another characteristic of this type of viticulture was its marketing process. Increased production of brandy cannot be understood without the emergence of extremely powerful merchants in Reus, Valls, Altafulla, etc. to channel, organize and give direction to all production (Rovira Gómez 1987, 1994, 2012). All of these merchants had a background in skilled crafts in the eighteenth century and, as occurred in other areas, they took advantage of the opportunities emerging at the time. Their businesses were based on speculation in the leasing of manor rights, which gave them access to a large amount of agricultural products, the transport of cereal crops from Aragón to Catalonia and trade in the area's products, such as almonds, hazelnuts, olive oil, the import of salted fish and, above all, the export of brandy and, to a lesser extent, of wine. Years later, they would take part in the overseas trade with the Americas and some would go on to become shareholders in factories producing printed calicos, rising into the nobility over the course of the eighteenth century. Creating companies was the most common form of organization.

The rural world in the comarcas of Tarragona was organized by these companies. Among the merchants and peasants, there were agents. These were individuals who went from village to village to understand the markets, purchase from the peasants and resell to the merchants from Reus. Hundreds of loads of brandy were purchased by brokers and agents and taken for distillation to the major export centres. Another option was to purchase the harvest from producers in advance to ensure production. Between 1758 and 1759, we know that 598 formal money advances were signed for a total value of 78,731 Spanish libras and drew on the participation of 40 merchants (Rovira Gómez 1995).

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[6] Arxiu Giralt, Vinseum, Vilafranca del Penedès.

When the first distillation brandy reached the home of a merchant, he would proceed to purify it in successive distillations in preparation for export (Segarra Blasco 1994). The March family had 8 stills for this purpose in 1780. All of this dynamic activity was channelled through the ports of Salou, Vilanova and Tarragona. The brandy business in Catalonia flowed through these ports at the close of the eighteenth century (Lipp 1793).

In summary, there were clearly two distinct types of viticulture. While one produced for the local and urban market, the other produced wine to distill and was driven by a powerful network of merchants who engaged in large-scale export of the brandy they produced.

Changes in the Nineteenth Century Prior to the Phylloxera Outbreak

Little is known about the evolution of viticulture in the first half of the nineteenth century. While no sound statistics exist, the collected samples do show a sharp increase in the amount of land planted in vineyard although the causes remain unclear. From the series of "*rabassa morta*" contracts taken from Bages and the notary's offices in Piera, Valls, Baix Penedès, Sentmenat and Palau-solità, and Alt Penedès (Parés 1944; Plans Maestra 2010; Valls Junyent 1996; Querol 2001; Garrabou and Tello 2004; Moreno Claverias 1995; Colomé Ferrer 1990), the tremendous growth in the nineteenth century centred on two decades: 1820–1829 and 1840–1849. This is also the case in Vallès Occidental (Roca Fabregat 2015). And the same timing has been identified in Girona and Alt Empordà (Congost Colomé and Saguer 2013).

Fewer data exist for the comarcas of Tarragona because no series has yet been produced from contracts. What were the causes of expansion? The colonial and North Atlantic markets, which had absorbed thousands of hectolitres of wine turned into brandy, were in the midst of a crisis and in the process of restructuring, while the domestic market was also undergoing restructuring and Andalusian producers of fortified wines were unable to absorb the surplus of alcohol. Did the growth in population push demand higher? Had consumption habits changed, with more wine now being consumed? Josep Colomé and Francesc Valls

(1995) have sought to explain the expansion by demonstrating that planting grapevines was more profitable than cultivating cereal crops because the prices of grapes were more advantageous. But planting vineyards for what market? The answer is not at all clear and research is needed to clarify the point.

Another element of this debate is the thesis of Francesc Valls (2004), who shows how the model based on the distillation of wine and the export of brandy was plunged into crisis in the first half of the nineteenth century when it started to be replaced by another model based on the export of wine and the import of cotton from the Americas in return. The data that have been provided are clear in this respect, but they raise new questions. Was there really a crisis in the production of brandy? If so, why was it still viewed as good business to set up distilleries in the Penedès region in the first half of the nineteenth century? Were the vineyards of Tarragona massively converted to produce wine to drink instead of wine to burn? Valls' thesis is consistent with the overseas market, but it fails to account for the growth in land planted in vineyard or for the existence of other alternatives like the domestic market, about which we know absolutely nothing.

The description of what occurred in the Penedès region is highly significant for an understanding of what was to happen later. Winegrowing was not the major crop in the eighteenth century and the "rabassa morta" system expanded in the nineteenth century. In 1838, the Frenchman Andreu Frances set up a distilling apparatus in Vilafranca at the request of Pau Boada, producing 25° Cartier and revolutionizing the business of wine distilling. Other distilleries followed, suggesting that business was still going well even though the overseas market was less dynamic (Martorell Pañella 2010). According to Frances, the good fortune of the Penedès region came with the outbreak in Vilanova of oidium, which destroyed the coastal vineyards. Merchants turned to the interior for their wines "giving rise to the major wine trade that has contributed to the prosperity of the Penedès and the aggrandizement of its capital". This set of circumstances led to the creation of commercial enterprises like Via and Raurell, which were dedicated to the export of wines to Cuba, and other companies soon followed in their footsteps. The beginning of rail transport meant that wines could reach the port of Barcelona and travel to France. The most important symbolic event came when Jaume Torres i Vendrell—of the future Torres y Cía—built a number of warehouses on the same premises in 1874 with a total capacity of 120,000 hectolitres as well as a winery of 6000 hectolitres. In 1878 J. B. Berger, a native of the Alsace, set up shop in Vilafranca to purchase the wines of the area and sell them abroad, just as did other Frenchmen and Swiss seeking to capitalize on the phylloxera outbreak in France by purchasing Catalan wines to supply the French market. As in the eighteenth century, agents and brokers controlled the wine market. The viticulture of the Penedès region was developed through these enterprises, which were dedicated to the marketing of wine.

In the comarcas of Tarragona, a large network of agents, brokers and merchants continued to operate throughout the entire nineteenth century. August Muller (who hailed from Reims) set up in Tarragona in 1851 because of the good prospects of Tarragona wines (Olivé Serret 1991). His enterprise bought the wine of entire villages by means of credit and cash advances (Nagel 2000), that is, the same technique used by the merchants of Reus and Valls in the eighteenth century when advancing money to safeguard brandy production. The list of foreign companies resident prior to the phylloxera outbreak is uncertain, but it begins to offer some idea of the importance of the process: Braedlin, Muller y Bonsoms, Carey Hnos, Clement Groupille, P. Pages et Cie, C Peyroud y Cía, Violet Frères (Alió Ferrer 2010).

One of the other nodes in this powerful commercial network was set up in Sant Martí de Provençals to take advantage of the benefits of the port of Barcelona. Merchants set up companies there to blend and fortify wine basically for export to the Americas. In 1861, there were two companies, but the number had risen to 27 in 1877 and 47 in 1886 (Nadal and Tafunell 1992). Three major names stand out: Gironella, founded in 1873; Maristany, which had been dedicated to this business since 1846; and Magí Pladellorens, who came from a family of rabassaires and wine dealers in Bages, in the Catalan interior (Ferrer Alòs 2004).

In the nineteenth century, the marketing model that we have described for the eighteenth century was reinforced, although we cannot currently establish continuities and breaks. The system of supply remained the same in Catalonia's interior and in the comarcas near

Barcelona after the municipal monopolies were ended and the free taverns established. The merchants continued to be modest in size and the “measurers” who levied the municipal tax whenever there was a transaction played a fundamental role in the movement of local wine.

Some data on the comarcas of Barcelona. Did this model of agents and merchants extend across all of Catalonia? We can see what happened in the comarca of Bages in the interior. Traditionally, the wine that was produced there went to supply the non-producing comarcas in the interior. The available statistics show that land planted in vineyard grew by 5000 ha between 1860 and 1889 and the produced wine had to be channelled into exports to France, which was the leading market for wines of all kinds.

It is worth noting that the industrial registry of Manresa in 1860 did not feature a single wine stockist. It only had taverns that sold at retail, brandy factories and liquor and wine stores. By contrast, the registry in 1889–1890 not only had cafes, wine cellars and wine retailers, but it also had wine stockists for the first time. Four, in fact, were located on the same street. By 1914, the number had risen to seven.

This was a fragile network that had little to do with the network of merchants in Tarragona or the Penedès region. Villages and cities continued to have small winemakers who sold to the local population and to the people of the comarca by means of informal networks. In the comarca of Bages, cooperative wineries appeared in 1926 in Santpedor and Salellas and again in 1935 in Artés (Ferrer Alòs 1998). They are late in comparison to the cooperative wineries in the Camp de Tarragona or the Penedès region. When vineyards began to decline in these areas, the cooperatives were the recipients of the grapes still being produced and they distributed the wine through local networks in the same way that small and medium-sized producers had previously done so.

Nor in the judicial district of Igualada did the cooperative wineries proliferate. The local wine producers group, Sindicat de Vinyaters d’Igualada, made wine for direct sale and, when it sold to more powerful merchants, the latter were from the same area.[7] This behaviour does not differ from what occurred in the judicial district of Manresa.

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[7] Only two cooperative wineries were created to make wine: the Sindicat de Vinyaters of Tous (1924) and the Sindicat de Vinyaters of Igualada (1921). See Planas Maresme (2013).

More research must be done to understand how the market operated in these areas of Catalonia. Roig Armengol, in his publication of 1890, provided numerous advertisements of winemakers from all the judicial districts in Barcelona province that produced more than 100 hectolitres (Roig Armengol 1890). Some of the winemakers indicate in their ads that the wine is suitable for export, while a smaller number indicate that they are wine agents or brokers. These are not, however, the major merchants of Tarragona, who were capable of producing any product by blending wines of varied origins.

The Creation of Wine Brands

Wine prices were related not only to supply and demand, but also to the creation of brands and designations of origin, which might help winegrowers to compete with merchants. Wines were often known by their place of origin and this could potentially add value or permit the entry of wine by small producers. The descriptions in this respect, however, are scanty. In 1600, Pere Gil noted: “In Mataró excellent claret wines are made; in Sitges and Vilanova, excellent malvasia; in the Camp de Tarragona, all kinds of wines” (Iglesies 2002). This is the first mention of the malvasia of Sitges, which was the only place to undertake such a delicate production process to yield a wine that attracted a good price.

In the early nineteenth century, the wines that were known by their place of origin once again included the malvasia of Sitges as well as the white and red wines of Priorat and Camp de Tarragona, the wines of Maresme (which appeared under the name of Alella) and the wines of the Empordà coast (which specialized in fortified wines made from Grenache grapes, or Garnatxa in Catalan) (Alonso de Herrera 1818; Iglesias Xifra, s.d.).

The daily newspaper *Diario de Barcelona* provides a sample of wine advertisements from between 1850 and 1870.[8] Though it is not intended to be an exhaustive sample, the adverts do suggest that the most prestigious wines included malvasia and other wines from Sitges and the vicinity, the wines of Priorat and some of the comarcas of Tarragona, and the Alella wine. These were the wines on sale in private homes and in confectionery shops in the city for people with a certain purchasing power. Everyone else consumed low-quality cask wine from all places of origin, distributed through channels that resembled the ones in use in the eighteenth century.

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[8] Collection of Emili Giralt i Raventós, Vinseum, Vilafranca del Penedès.

In Catalonia, therefore, very little wine was classified by a designation of origin. The reputation of some wines was related to comarcas, localities or individuals who sought to raise the prestige of their product, above all in Barcelona. Such wines, however, did not abound. Nor did phylloxera help to improve the level of quality: the wines supplied an undemanding popular consumption or were blended for export to France or the Americas. The real art of adding value to the wines was through coupage and fortification, which were carried out by prominent merchants and stockists.

Some Attempts at Own Brand and Product Creation

One of the paths to modernization—the French experience was well known—was to create own brands and products and commit to quality. To do this, the grape harvest had to be separated from winemaking. The increasing number of small winemakers led to the production of many different wines of low quality and merchants would gather these wines and blend them to increase their value. Brands offered another approach. We know of a few experiences of wine producers who strove to create their own brand and product in the nineteenth century.

For example, Codorniu in Sant Sadurní d'Anoia had 107.1 ha. In 1860, most of the land was vineyard (83.6 ha), but what interests us at present is that 59.8 ha were cultivated directly and only 23.8 ha were leased to 18 rabassaires. This was a major vineyard, which began to specialize between 1875 and 1880 in the production of sparkling wine in the style of champagne and focused on the creation of its own brand (Valls Junyent 2007). Then, in the twentieth century, the Raventós Codorniu family purchased the estate of Raïmat in the comarcas of Lleida (a wine-growing area overwhelmingly abandoned during the phylloxera outbreak), where it undertook a major planting of vines. The aim was to emulate the French chateaus and to create wines known by their brand.

The Marqués de Monistrol, a large estate in the municipality of Sant Sadurní d'Anoia—in reality, a property in the aggregate village of Monistrol d'Anoia—began production of sparkling wine in 1882 using its own grapes to create its own brand (Segura 1993). The owners modernized their winery and began to buy grapes from small winegrowers in the vicinity, ultimately affecting what grapes the latter would have to plant. Winemaking was to become a matter for the brand to decide.

Another experience of brand creation is offered by the Girona family on their estate of Castell del Remei in the comarca of Urgell in Lleida province. The estate had been purchased during the disentailment period, but it was not until the arrival of Ignasi Girona in 1880 that they decided to turn it into a model vineyard, with very careful planning of which varieties to plant (Pedro Ximénes from Andalusia, Macabeo from Catalonia, Sémillon and Cabernet from France) and the incorporation of French winemaking techniques. The brand Castell del Remei was launched and the winery became one of the first to sell wines under its own brand (Mateu Giral 2012). Are these cases isolated or were there more? All indications are that the process of creating brands linked to the production of own wines was really limited, perhaps influenced by large-scale exports of wine to France (Nagel 2000). At the end of the nineteenth century, the merchants/stockists were still the dominant figures in the wine business.

Wine Exports and Wine-Producing Crises in the First Third of the Twentieth Century

A number of factors account for the fact that the network of wine merchants and stockists in Barcelona, Vilafranca del Penedès, Tarragona and other cities in the area exported between 40% and 50% of Catalan wine production. These include the long tradition of wine exports dating back to the eighteenth century; the phylloxera outbreak and the destruction of French vineyards, which stimulated Catalan production; and a rail network that aided in overland export (Pascual Doménech 2015).

Wine production series in Catalonia began in 1889, when expansion was reaching its high point before the outbreak of phylloxera. At the time, production ranged between 6 and 7 million hectolitres and exports accounted for between 40 and 50%[9] (Fig. 2). The traditional market for Catalan wine was the Americas. Between 1868 and 1877, exports to the Americas accounted for 85–90% of exports and the remainder supplied European and African markets. With the outbreak of phylloxera in France, exports to that country increased. However, while the French market was fundamental for Spain, this was not so in the Catalan case, for which the Americas continued being an important market (Pujol Andreu 1984).

The golden age of Catalan vineyards, therefore, mixed a strong foreign demand, a growing domestic market, high wine prices and a structure of merchant exporters who had become stronger with the outbreak of phylloxera.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, the model was plunged into crisis. Wine production had risen worldwide because of France's recovery and the entry of new producers into the market to take advantage of high wine prices. Industrial alcohol was competing against wine alcohol and artificial wines were making their appearance in the marketplace. Exports to France practically disappeared from 1891 onwards and the American market declined sharply with the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Wine prices cratered in the early years of the twentieth century. Then came the "*crisis de mévente*" or crises of overproduction. The momentary reduction in vineyards caused by the gradual spread of phylloxera in Catalonia mitigated the effects, but the wine market was subjected to a sharp contraction. Production cuts, low prices and replanting costs initiated a number of lean years.

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[9] These export figures must be treated with caution. We do not have official data on Catalonia. Often, only maritime departures are considered and overland customs are not taken into account. Also, departures from these ports may not necessarily carry Catalan wine, but may haul wine from other places of origin.



Source: the data from Table 1.

Fig. 2 Evolution of wine production in Catalonia (1889–2015) (*Source* The data in Table 1)

Phylloxera changed cultivation techniques. Winegrowers had to learn how to grow American varieties and how to do grafting. Also, their vines needed to be treated with sulphur and copper sulphate to tackle oidium and mildew. As a result, the costs of cultivation rose. In addition, the "*rabassa morta*" contracts that had generated property rights for the winegrower were changed into long-term sharecropping If there had been no major contractual problems in the nineteenth century, now with the new type of contract and falling prices, demands for a different sharing out of agricultural income would become one of the issues to plague the Catalan countryside (Pujol Andreu 1984; Ferrer Alòs et al. 1992; Colomé Ferrer 2015).

However, phylloxera was no impediment to replanting in nearly the entirety of Barcelona and Tarragona provinces, though not in Lleida, where the growth in vineyards had been superficial and specific. The changes also led to an increase in productivity, which was compounded by good harvests during the First World War, when production finally surpassed the pre-phylloxera period, thanks to the growth in exports brought about by global conflict. Foreign demand, however, continued to fall because it basically depended on French demand and France was the destination of the largest share of exports (Pujol Andreu 1984).

The most severe crises of overproduction took place after the First World War. The conflict had thrown markets into chaos. The return to normality, however, saw more productive vineyards, more land under



Fig. 3 Proportion of Catalan wine production destined for export (1889–2015) (*Source* Pujol Andreu (1988); *Datos de los vinos de calidad…* [various years])

cultivation and a blocked foreign market. As can be seen in Fig. 3, prices slumped and the 1920s was one of the hardest decades, marked by a widespread intensification of social unrest (Pujol Andreu 1984, 1986; Soler Becerro 2014).

Cooperative Associations and Wineries

In response to falling prices, rising costs, adulterated wines and industrial alcohols, farmers formed associations as a solution. With the decree of 1906, hundreds of cooperative unions were founded all across Catalonia, particularly in the winegrowing areas. The main aim was to collaborate in driving down production costs. To achieve this, the associations focused on the joint purchasing of rootstocks, sulphur and copper sulphate, as well as other services. They also disseminated new winegrowing practices through lectures, the publication of journals and informational leaflets. In some cases, they even installed distilling apparatuses to take advantage of the pomace and sour wines and to reduce the surplus (Ferrer Alòs 2008). These activities did not entail any strategic shift: small farmers continued to make their own wine as they had always done and, at best, strove to improve the product by applying some of the techniques learnt in the association.

One of the issues, however, was that winemaking was fragmented. This reduced the farmers' bargaining power and resulted in rather uneven quality. The only people to benefit from the situation were the agents and brokers who were already blending wine in coupages that set the prices on offer. Why was no effort made to produce wine jointly in order to enhance the quality, improve bargaining power and push sales prices higher? Cooperative wineries were the answer. Map 4 shows the geography of the cooperative wineries founded in Catalonia between 1900 and 1936. A closer look reveals the following: (a) that the first cooperative wineries founded between 1900 and 1915 were located within the type of viticulture found in the comarcas of Tarragona; (b) that the growth occurring across the rest of the territory took place between 1915 and 1935 largely in the area of Tarragona and the Penedès region; and (c) that a nucleus emerged between 1925 and 1936 in Priorat, Bages and Alt Empordà.

Why did winemaking cooperatives emerge basically within the type of viticulture that has been linked above with the comarcas of Tarragona, where merchants and stockists were predominant? The answer can be found in the distinct kinds of winemaking that occurred in each area. The tenant farmers in the comarcas of Tarragona (who were not rabassaires) did not make wine, because winegrowing was only one part of a combination of crops, such as almonds, hazelnuts and carob beans. They sold their harvested grapes to the highest bidder, but the landowner was entitled to buy the grapes and set the price. This was the context in which tenant farmers growing grapes decided to create cooperative associations through which they could do what they had not done before: turn their grapes into wine. It was a way for them to increase the value of their harvest. This would explain the first geography of cooperative wineries (Planas Maresma 2015; Gavaldà and Sntesmases Ollé 1993; Fuguet and Mayayo 1994).[10]

By contrast, in the rabassaire areas, the small winegrower made his own wine and improvements were achieved through joint purchasing or through the cooperative production of alcohol by distilling the pomace

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[10] The cooperative winery of Alella, which was set up in 1906, was one of the first. It was the only one to create its own brand (with a wine that was already well-known) and to sell its own wines, and it was one of the first to bottle. As had always been the case, it supplied the domestic market, where the Alella brand was very prestigious (La comarca de Alella 1909; Barnadas Ribas 2013).



Map 4 Wine cooperatives founded in Catalonia (1900–1936) (*Source* Own elaboration from various sources)

and sour wines, or through a better sharing out of agricultural income, as can be seen from the large amount of social conflicts in these areas (Pomés 1998). The tradition of individual production by rabassaires and by landowners and the specific networks for marketing delayed the appearance of cooperative wineries.

With the worsening crises of overproduction in the 1920s, social unrest and demands over agricultural income intensified. However, this was also the period in which the most cooperative wineries were created in the rabassaire area. Individual winemaking brought quality problems and a risk of sour wines. It did not allow for investing in the improvements to winemaking that were then required. Against this backdrop, the rabassaire areas were driven to concentrate winemaking in cooperative wineries or in individual wineries that performed a similar function. In the medium term, it would be the cooperatives that ensured the continuation of vineyards (Ferrer Alòs 1998) and even the creation of a certain distribution network. The problem would come when the cultivation of grapes no longer turned a profit.

However, the cooperative wineries in the Tarragona area never competed against the merchants and stockists. They acted as a guarantee of the best price for the winegrower, but despite some attempts, they produced wine only to sell it to stockists through auctions or other procedures (Saumell Soler 2002, 2003). In reality, the winemaking had improved, but the commercial structures remained intact.

The Evolution of the Catalan Wine Sector in the Post-war Period

With the Spanish Civil War, the land planted in vineyard fell by 25% from 1934 to 1963. The decline was accelerated in Barcelona province, the area in which rabassaire viticulture was predominant. Production also fell and eventually levelled out at 3 million hectolitres, where it remains today. This was achieved with constant growth in yields, if we consider that the amount of vineyard land has continued to decline. Figure 4 shows the constant increase in yields since 1960, rising from less than 20 hl/ha to 60 hl/ha at present.

Prices collapsed in the early years of the Franco dictatorship. Between 1947 and 1953, they fell by 58.6% and between 1958 and 1963, by 29.6% (Medina Albadalejo 2014). The foreign market, about which we have little data, hardly existed for wine. When we do have data, from 1965 onwards, we know that exports barely reached 10% of total production (Fig. 3). In some areas such as Barcelona province, economic growth provided higher paying jobs than winegrowing offered. The vines were pulled up. Some authors argue that the post-war crisis explains the development of the cooperative movement in Spain. Winegrowers faced a choice. As had occurred in Catalonia in the crisis of the 1920s, they had to quit or join together in winemaking



Fig. 4 Evolution of yield per hectare in vineyards in Catalonia and Spain (1889–2015) (*Source* Own elaboration using the sources from Table 1)

cooperatives. In Catalonia, the number of cooperative wineries climbed from 39 in 1920 to 69 in 1940, 75 in 1946–1947 and 171 in 1980 (Medina Albadalejo 2015). In some areas, wine production came to be limited solely to these cooperatives.

In the Penedès region, despite the existence of winemaking cooperatives, the sector was controlled by wine merchants/stockists who had their facilities in Vilafranca del Penedès, Vilanova and Vendrell. They limited their activity to purchasing wine from cooperatives and individuals and then making various blends and selling to the domestic market or abroad, by bulk in large casks. They were new enterprises, some of which came into existence in the nineteenth century or in the first third of the twentieth century, and they had control of wine production (Soler Becerro 2003).

Mention must also be made of the appearance of cava in Catalonia. Above, we have noted how Manuel Raventós began making champagne in the late nineteenth century after the decline in the production of Mistelle wine. Raventós was not the only one to attempt this at the time; others tried in Reus (Giralt Raventós 1990; Valls Junyent 2003). To this end, he undertook to develop a new model of viticulture based on direct cultivation of much of his vineyards in order to ensure a certain quality in the wine. He also created his own brand with the sale of bottled champagne.

Throughout the first third of the twentieth century, the production of champagne rose through the substitution of French imports, with the help of protectionist measures and an increase in consumption. In

1935, there were 62 companies producing champagne in Spain, 52 of them being located in Barcelona province, particularly in Sant Sadurní d'Anoia in the Penedès region. Typically, cava makers not only made wines, but also purchased white wine from cooperatives and wineries specializing in the production of base wines from which to make cava (Valls Junyent 2003, 2007). The production of base wine mitigated the problems of failing prices and lower consumption. Later, cava would play a fundamental role.

What happened to wineconsumption? Data for the late nineteenth century are sparse. In 1887, the rate of consumption was 53 litres per person in Lleida and 113 in Tarragona (Mayayo Artal 1991). Various sources put the number at between 70 and 90 litres for Barcelona (Pascual Doménech 2015). In 1970, more reliable data put consumption at 62 litres per person, but from that point consumption began to fall dramatically, dropping to 44 litres by 1985 and 34 litres by 2004 (Soler Becerro 2007). Recent data put annual consumption at 17.25 litres per person. The reduction in consumption has necessarily had an effect on the model of wine production.

Cava, Designations of Origin, Quality Wine and the Recovery of the Foreign Market

The wine sector had to adapt to changes in consumption and this could only be done by moving towards quality production. The first major change to affect the modern evolution of the wine sector in Catalonia occurred in the sector that produced sparkling wine. The work of import substitution had been carried out in the first third of the twentieth century and this is how the situation remained until the 1960s, when demand began to grow because of a rising standard of living and a successful sales campaign for the product. The product also started to be discovered by the foreign market. Cava was excellent value for money and foreign sales began to grow. The dispute with champagne prohibited the use of this designation and it was then that the word *cava* was adopted to identify the product.

From that point onwards, cava production did not stop expanding. This can be seen in Fig. 5. At the initial stage, cava properly speaking (where the second fermentation takes place in the bottle) was supplemented by cava produced by the Charmat method (where the second fermentation takes place in stainless steel tanks) and by lower-quality carbonated wine. Gradually, however, these production methods disappeared and practically all cava has been fermented after bottling since the 1990s. The wine used in cava has continued to increase so much so that, in recent years, it stands at between 50 and 55% of all wine produced in Catalonia. This has spurred winegrowers to plant Macabeo, Xarel·lo and Parellada varieties, which produce the grapes for cava, and they have created a complex network of cooperatives and small wineries to produce the base wine used by cava makers.

The viticulture of Catalonia, particularly in the Penedès region and adjacent comarcas, cannot be understood without the spectacular development in cava production, which, at the same time, has aided in the sector's modernization, helping it to learn the mechanisms by which foreign markets operate as well as production techniques like bottling.

Falling wineconsumption led to production focused on quality and greater added value and it raised the need to adapt to new consumption habits. In the 1960s, bulk wine started being replaced by bottled wine and stainless steel tanks were introduced to control fermentation. Major stockists who had controlled the market and made their wines on the basis of blends that allowed them to make any product now began to disappear, elbowed aside by winemakers who made and sold their own wines and created brands. Initially, the prominent stockists themselves were the enterprises to make this transformation. This was accompanied by lower costs in winegrowing, thanks to mechanization processes that enabled winemakers to have their own vineyards and achieve better quality control. These major enterprises, which were the heirs of the old structures, were joined by small wineries that made and sold wine.

The new winemakers opted for quality and for the introduction of new varieties that were uncommon in the area (e.g., Merlot, Cabernet Sauvignon, Syrah, Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc) in imitation of the French model. They were convinced that this was one of the ways to improve the quality of the musts. Nowadays, a need has been identified



Fig. 5 Hl devoted to cava production in Catalonia, and cava production as a proportion of the total (1943–2014) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from the *Anuario de Estadística Agraria* in its various formats)

to be distinct from the classic tastes of varieties of French origin, and autochthonous varieties are being introduced and recovered in various designations of origin (e.g. Piquepoul and Mandó in Pla de Bages and Trepat in Conca de Barberá) (Soler Becerro 2003).

The next step towards the recovery of quality, in response to the gradual reduction in hectares and the abandonment of vineyards, was the creation of designations of origin, or Designations of Origin (D.O.). The aim was to guarantee the quality of output produced under a given seal. In Catalonia, the effort has focused on bringing practically the entire territory under some D.O. classification. By 1932, four areas had been recognized (Alella, Priorat, Penedès and Tarragona). However, the practical effects were slim. It was not until the 1970s and later, with Spain's entry into the European Union, that the various winegrowing areas were organized and took on distinct personalities. The D.O. Ampurda-Costa Brava was created in 1975 and then became D.O. Empordà in 2005. In 1976, the D.O. Tarragona was restructured and, in 2002, the D.O. Montsant was separated out. In 1985 the D.O. Conca de Barberà was created. In 1986, the D.O. Costers del Segre was divided into 7 sub-areas. In 1995, the D.O. Pla de Bages was created and the D.O. Terra Alta followed in 2005. Separate mention must also be made of the D.O. Catalunya, created in 1999 In reality, the D.O. Catalunya is a strategy to build value for all wines in the territory and



Fig. 6 Wines with Designation of Origin in Catalonia (1943–2014) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from the *Anuario de Estadística Agraria* and *Datos de los vinos de calidad…* [various years]. Prior to 1973, the sources refer to fine wines)

enable the creation of blends and composite products using wines produced in different areas. This explains why very few wines in Catalonia are not included under some classification for quality wines. It is also necessary to add D.O. Cava, which groups together all parcels of land that produce for this designation.

Although the official data are very imprecise and sometimes do not calculate the same concepts, it is apparent from Fig. 6 that wines classified under a designation of origin have been increasing in number.[11] From 1990, the proportion climbed to 70% and since 2000 it has approached 90%. Cava accounts for a very important share of this classification (between 55 and 60% of all classified wine).

Lastly, the commitment to quality has been complemented by foreign sales. A look back at Fig. 3 shows the evolution of Catalan wine exports since the end of the nineteenth century. In the wake of the Spanish Civil War, wine sales abroad barely exceeded 10% of total production. From the 1980s, however, cava started being exported on a mass scale. This was the first major instance of internationalization, though some

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[11] Changes in legislation make it very difficult to determine the amount of wine produced under Designations of Origin. Prior to 1963, wines were classified as table wines or fine wines. Subsequently, the Designations of Origin appeared, but in the official statistics, they disappear between 1982 and 1992. In Fig. 6, only the evolution of cava is shown in those years.

Table 4 Percentage of wine exported for each D.O. in Catalonia

	1989/1990	1996/1997	2000/2001	2005/2006	2009/2010	2014/2015
Alella	7.5	11.4	15.0	16.1	45.6	sd
Catalunya			52.0	52.4	50.3	50.3
Conca de Barberà	0.6	28.4	30.5	46.0	29.2	24.7
Costers del Segre	0	15.8	20.5	34.3	37.5	28.9
Empordà	1	4.5	4.2	6.6	12.2	11.8
Montsant				34.3	44.5	31.2
Penedès	31.4	39.6	35.0	35.7	41.9	30.6
Pla de Bages		11.1	14.6	15.1	13.7	20.0
Priorat	7.3	28.7	40.3	42.6	48.7	53.3
Tarragona	21.9	7.9	8.3	25.5	31.5	23.8
Terra Alta	2.1	1.8	12.4	38.1	77.5	41.2
Total Cataluña	19.8	19.5	26.6	39.2	46.7	41.8

Source Own elaboration based on data from Datos de los vinos de calidad wine stockists did have export experience prior to the Spanish Civil War. In 1987, cava exports stood at 10.2% of Catalan wine production. By 2012, however, the figure had reached 40%.

The D.O. have followed the same path and are exporting a significant portion of their output. Table 4 shows how the percentage of exports has evolved in each of Catalonia's D. O. While the creation of the D.O. Catalunya (Miquel Torres markets its wines with this classification) plays an important role by volume and export percentage, the percentage of total classified wine exported can be seen to have risen from 19.8% in 1989 to 46.7% in 2009 and 41.8% in 2014. This export success is clear, but it is much less than the success of cava by volume.

In recent years, efforts have been made to deepen our understanding of quality and originality based on the introduction of autochthonous varieties as a response to the early trend of introducing French varieties. Research is also delving into original forms of winemaking, the introduction of varietal wines to give greater value to simple wines, the investment in wineculture to increase consumption of quality wines, the promotion of enotourism (or wine tourism) as an additional activity of wineries and a way to encourage wine culture, the introduction of habits of wine consumption in bars and wine shops to build value for bulk wines, and more.

Now in the twenty-first century, Catalan viticulture has been modernized. Very little remains of what it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The current geography, however, must be explained in part by the features that once characterized it.

Statisticals

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Wine Production, Markets and Institutions in Italy Between Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: A Historical Survey

Silvia A. Conca Messina

Introduction

Italy is currently the world's largest producer of wine in terms of volume and, together with France and Spain—the two other main wine-producing countries—makes up about 80% of total EU production, which in turn amounts to 60% of the global offer. In the last fifteen years, the wine sector has gained increasing importance in the Italian agro-food industry and in international markets, testified by the fact that exports have more than doubled (Ismea 2017).[1] However, compared to the other two leading countries, there are important differences in terms of the composition and value of production and exports,

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[1] For a broad economic analysis of the wine sector in Italy see Castriota (2015). For a long-term history—but in which Italy is only marginally considered—see Unwin (1991).

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_8

which are the result of different historical evolutions in the wine industry. In particular, since the nineteenth century, a gap—which has still not fully closed—opened up between Italy and France in the international markets, in terms of quality and reputation. It should be pointed out that this disparity is the result of a different centuries-old tradition: since the early-modern age France has accumulated experience, developed commercial networks, created institutions and paid special attention to quality—while all these improvements have been lacking in the Italian peninsula (partly due to delayed national unification).

Continuing that tradition, in the nineteenth century France increased its production of fine-quality wines and released more highly priced products onto European and world markets, used a better production structure and a more effective commercial organization. It also benefited from supportive policies, local and government agencies, which were very attentive to market trends, and technical and scientific progress. Italy, on the other hand, suffered from long delays in various fields: production organization, marketing, quality management and regulation of the sector. The shift to quality production intensified in the nineteenth century, but this came to a halt at the outbreak of World War I, recovered at a very slow pace during the era of Fascism, accelerated after World War II and again, more decisively, in recent times. Even today, the development of Italian wines still has considerable room for improvement. Indeed, between 2006 and 2016, the average value was significantly lower than that of France, although the peninsula ranked first in the world in terms of production quantities. The 45 million hl of the latter amounted to a total value of 23 billion euros, while Italy produced an average of 47.6 million hl for a value of 10.5 billion euros. In 2014–2016, French production accounted for 35% of total world value, Italy 17%, the United States 10%, Spain 6%[2] (Ismea 2017; OIV 2017).

In 2016, despite Italy's attempts to close the quality gap, France was still leading the ranking in export value (28.5% of the global value, with more than 8.2 billion euros corresponding to 14.1 million hectolitres), followed by Italy (19.5% of the world value, with 5.5 billion euros corresponding to 20.6 million hectolitres) and then by Spain, which is also the largest exporter in terms of quantity (but with 2.6 billion euros corresponding to about 23 million hectolitres). Exports account for 56.7% of Spanish production, 40% of Italian and only 31% of French production. The Iberian state continues to export a high percentage of bulk wine at low prices (55% in 2016) and charges lower average prices. Italy and France export mainly wines for direct consumption (74 and 85%, respectively), but in the French case these are fine wines like Champagne, Bordeaux and Burgundy, sold at very high prices (23% of exports in volume, 47% in value) (OIV 2017). In short, at present, the gap in reputation, quality, distinction between French and Italian wines—which was apparent in the nineteenth century—seems to have narrowed, but not closed.

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[2] On the differences between Italy and France, see Loubére (1978).

This paper will focus on the century before the First World War, a period in which there were clear differences between the two countries, but at the same time, Italian initiatives were multiplying in order to closely follow the France model. In this first phase of "apprenticeship", the operators were strongly interested in understanding and imitating the key ingredients of transalpine commercial success, from qualitative improvement to sales organization. We will focus on the areas affected by the innovations, the creation of institutions for the promotion of the national industry, the trend of the markets which, at different times, sustained or slowed down the process. The intensification of the economic and cultural exchanges which characterize the century runs parallel to the spread of vine diseases (oidium, peronospora, phylloxera) which led to growing collaboration between viticulturists and scientists in chemistry and microbiology. Also for this reason, since the mid-nineteenth century, the new applications offered by science and technology took on particular importance; oenological science is born and institutions were founded to improve production processes and ageing. These opportunities for the renovation of the winemaking industry represent a keystone and appear to be well known by the élites of the peninsula and by individual producers and companies. Nevertheless, establishing them as common practices would meet with considerable resistance.

The main incentive for the expansion of crops and the improvement of oenological practices probably originated from international demand (Marescalchi 1919, pp. 60 and ff.), which offered a double stimulus: on the one hand, it drove the expansion of vineyards and the increase in the production of blending wines, required, above all, by France and central Europe. On the other hand, it highlighted the dependency and the vulnerability of growth, given that the amount of wine sold to French producers as a raw material to be blended would drop when they, as expected, rebuilt their vineyards. Quantitative expansion, however, also drove the improvement of product quality to gain a commercial advantage in the face of fierce competition from other producers from both traditional and emerging countries. Compared to the overall volume of domestic production, the export share may appear to be quite limited, considering that from 1 to 2% in the period before 1878, it reached 10% in 1887, remained at around 6% between 1892 and 1903, and then decreased. However, exports represent, in the history of Italian oenological development, an element of great significance, both because they allow commercial networks to be expanded and experience to be accumulated, and because the peninsula exports a quantity of wine which is certainly not insignificant. Limited to 250–500 thousand hectolitres up to 1878, Italian exports grew to a level between one and 3.5 million hectolitres between 1879 and 1887, most of which was exported to France; then, as a result of the preferential customs treaty, between 1892 and 1903 Austria-Hungary became Italy's main foreign market, to which the peninsula exported on average two million hectolitres. Later, in the years before the First World War, the economic context was to be characterized by strong fluctuations in production and recurrent crises of overproduction, volatility and price depression, and recurring public initiatives to support the sector. However, as we will see, Italy would still be able to export over a million and a half hectolitres per year, mainly to Switzerland and the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, United States and Uruguay).

Before Unification: Projects, Initiatives and Innovations

During the nineteenth century, markets and the international wine trade are definitely expanding, led by demographic growth and migration, urbanization and the demand for workers in the industrial and tertiary sectors. New means of transport, becoming gradually faster and more efficient, allowed shipping to take place over longer distances; in the meantime, developments in agronomy, oenology and production methods create new processing techniques and more effective methods of preservation and ageing for wine producers.

The reference model for Italian wine producers was France, the country which dominated world production and the international market until the 1870s (when phylloxera appeared). France seemed to be able to seize the opportunities offered by the transformations which were underway: the country exported over 3 million hectolitres of wines in the 1860s, providing a considerable contribution to its trade balance and, in general, to the national economy. France inherited a centuries-old tradition of supporting the country's industries, and local governments, institutions and municipalities had been promoting winemaking lessons and teaching for a long time. Even the emperor, Napoleon III, was attentive to the development of the French wine industry, creating, in 1863, a commission chaired by the young—but already renowned—scientist Louis Pasteur, to study the diseases affecting vines, improve quality and encourage marketing.

Revolutionary movements, the wars of independence, economic and political fragmentation affected Italy's condition. The country completed its political unification in the years 1860–1870; however, it was still somewhat behind, as a whole, in terms of industrial development and commercial organization. Until 1860, Italy's wine imports exceeded its exports and its share of foreign trade was very small compared to domestic production: most of the national production was made up of common wines for local consumption or regional commercial networks. Improvements in the wine-growing quality remained very limited. Processing followed an empirical method, only aimed at obtaining products suitable for domestic tastes. In general, winemaking was largely left to the farmers, thus leading to early harvests, a lack of selection of the grapes, inconsistency in the types of wine and small quantities for each type. As for trade, the Italian merchants did not want any delays in payments; the vines were often not ripe nor did they correspond to the samples, and they could not usually rely on proper advertising. Generally, in the 1860s, most of the wine was sold a few months after its production, without going through any ageing processes, in an attempt to gain the maximum profit as quickly as possible. The small amount which was exported was Sicilian Marsala, a southern blended wine. At the time of the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy, in 1861, only 255 thousand hectolitres were exported, which represented 1.3% of an estimated production of about 19 million and 200 thousand hectolitres (ISTAT 2011, Tables 13.14 and 16.9).

However, although the general situation was not so favourable, since the first few decades of the century, close contact and comparison with the French experience stimulated the most enterprising producers towards innovation, especially in the central-northern regions. Not unlike what was happening in the rest of Europe, this was part of a broader cultural process which attracted wide interest in agrarian improvements among the Italian élite. The wine sector was involved in this phenomenon, which had started in the previous century, when the Georgofili Academy was founded in Florence, in 1753, and the Agricultural Society was established in Turin (1785). At the end of the eighteenth century, these institutions promoted the first attempts to introduce more advanced methods in wine production and preservation.[3] In the nineteenth century, this interest became stronger and more extensive. The noble and bourgeois élite—who were more numerous—promoted science and knowledge about techniques and products, participated in conferences held by Italian scientists (which took place annually between 1839 and 1847, then resumed in 1861), discussed topics in the press, experimented with new vines and methods and founded companies, tried to open up new markets for selling national products. The result of these activities was the growing awareness that the local varieties of good wines were not lacking, even before Unification: they were the result of vine selection, and investments in cellars, barrels, machinery for pressing and fermenting grapes, or clarifying the wine. An embryonic geography of the different Italian qualities of wines was already emerging and would influence subsequent developments (Kovatz 2013).

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[3] See the chapter by Luciano Maffi in volume 1.

Although these were exceptional cases, some pioneering entrepreneurs promoted innovations and experiments aimed at producing a better quality wine. They also created special and characteristic wines, such as Marsala and Vermouth, which would enjoy wide and growing success on international markets. The Sicilian Marsala is the result of the initiatives of English merchants such as John Woodhouse (who invented the new wine in 1773) and Benjamin Ingham who, since 1812, had been renovating its production techniques and expanded its exports outside Europe. Beginning in 1832, Vincenzo Florio entered the field by establishing (jointly with Ingham) a new shipping company which also exported wine from the island (Iachiello 2003, p. 45). The production of Vermouth began in Turin in the eighteenth century, but owes its success to the brothers Cora, two Piedmontese entrepreneurs who started exporting it in 1838, and then saw the business grow considerably (Marescalchi 1919, pp. 53 and ff.). As in France, local wealthy owners of noble origin often introduced enotechnical innovations. Counts, barons, marquises and princes were pioneers who kept themselves up-to-date by reading copious specialist publications. These men developed relationships with French agronomists and farmers, from whom they imported vines and methods of production and ageing. The aim was to increase their agricultural income by improving the quality of local wines and making them comparable to those of Burgundy, Gironde and Champagne.

The promotion of companies, wine fairs and congresses, itinerant professorships, lectures and publications proliferated—above all, though not exclusively—in Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli and Tuscany.[4] Merchants and owners founded wine companies to promote the sale of luxury wines and to introduce the necessary production improvements, although they often found it difficult to succeed. The examples are plentiful. Between 1837 and 1838 some landowners and producers founded the "Tuscan enological company" and the "Enologica Lombarda company" operating in Milan for the improvement of the Kingdom's wines (Società Enologica 1839),[5] with the participation of the Sicilian baron Corvaja. The Baron was involved in the production of the classic Falerno wine on his farms in Naples, where he established the first winemaking company since 1833 (*Lettera agli Italiani del barone Giuseppe Corvaia* 1841). In just a few years, the Milanese winery became a model of wine refining and seemed to experience rapid development, attracting investments from Italian owners and capitalists (Ditta Enologica 1839). However, this attempt in Milan—as well as others in Piedmont, Tuscany, Venice, Padua and Genoa—ended after a few years, probably due to the very high costs of setting up the business compared to the time it took for the first profits to be seen (Cagnoli 1847). The "Milanese Depot" seems to have had more luck: opened in April 1844 in order to make Italian wines recognized by the upcoming congress of scientists in Milan, it represented an opportunity to encourage their sales and production in the various provinces of the Italian states and on the islands.[6] The Depot was under the control of a Central Commission in Milan, and relied on the collaboration of local delegates in various Italian states. In 1844 it had already received wines from different regions: Piedmont (Barolo), Valtellina (where the "Valtellina wine company"[7] was already active in promoting wines such as Sassella, Grumello, Inferno), Tuscany (Aleatico, Chianti, Vino Santo), Veronese (Costa-Calda by count Luigi Morando de Rizzoni, Valpolicella, Castagné), Gorizia (Campolonghese). In addition, there were Dalmatian wines

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[4] See the chapters by Cafarelli and Mocarelli and Vaquero Piñero in volume 1.

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[5] The "società in accomandita per azioni *Barone Corvaja e Compagni*" with storage in Porta Nuova, was founded in Milan on 17 July 1838, see the deed by Antonio Franzini from Milan.

[6] The National Commission of Enology promoted the warehouse. The Commission participated in the fourth Scientists Congress in Lucca during the same year, see Commissione enologica italiana (1844, p. 139).

[7] See the chapter by C. Besana and A. M. Locatelli in volume 1.

(Prosecco, Trivian, Vigava, Caritule, Neviane and Moscato), wines from Sardinia (Amarone, Malvagia, Cannonau, Moscato, Remongiau, Vernaccia, Girod, Nascu and Del Tirso) and Sicily. Marsala was the only wine to represent Sicily, although many local varieties are renowned, such as white wines, including liqueur wines from Syracuse, Pantelleria and Lipari (Enologia 1844; Marescalchi 1919, p. 39). At the following meeting of scientists—held in Naples in 1845—several operators wanted to set up a similar deposit in Genoa, where the wines could easily arrive by sea, including those from Tuscany (Atti della settima adunanza 1846, pp. 510–511). Shortly afterwards, between 1847 and 1851, another wine company was set up in Verona, whose example would be followed by many others. In the case of Verona, once again, a nobleman, Baron Luigi Morando De Rizzoni, played a key role: he provided warehouses, systems and techniques (Mamiani Della Rovere 1844, pp. 184 and ff.; Atti della settima adunanza 1846, p. 510). Of course, most of the winemaking companies in this period would have a short life, perhaps partly due to the Risorgimento events and the concomitant arrival of oidium, a plant disease which hit Italy hard between 1848 and 1866. However, the geography of wines and their variety begin to illustrate the enormous potential of the peninsula.

Further initiatives were emerging at this time, such as projects to develop exports, particularly to the Americas. Sometimes these were due to individual ventures, such as that of the Tuscan Marquis Mazzarosa, who began sending his wines to New York in 1831. In other cases, groups of entrepreneurs took the initiative, such as the members of the "Enological Society of Naples", who in 1833 started to ship wines from Naples, Sicily and Calabria to Latin America. The previous year, another company shipped a certain quantity of wine from the same regions to Rio de Janeiro. In 1836, several American ports received shipments of Piedmontese wines (Serristori 1834; Mamiani Della Rovere 1844, pp. 184 and ff.). Nevertheless, exporting overseas was still difficult, either because the networks and the commercial organizations were not yet consolidated, or due to the high costs of transport together with the uncertainties surrounding the methods of wine preservation suitable for long journeys.

A second stimulus to innovation came, in the middle of the century, after a series of diseases carried by fungi and insects required the community to find technical-scientific solutions to deal with the infections. Oidium, observed for the first time in England in 1845 and which spread to France in 1848, reached the peninsula in 1851, causing significant production difficulties in different areas between the middle of the century and 1866 (particularly in Valtellina, Bologna, Catanzaro) (Pedrocco 1994, pp. 317 and ff.). However, thanks to the use of sulphuration, oidium was contained relatively quickly, though it remained endemic. Even French production, which plunged from 54 million hectolitres in 1847 to 11 million in 1854, recovered fairly quickly, returning to the level it had reached in 1858 (Meloni and Swinnen 2014, p. 9, n. 11.). A close collaboration between producers in the wine industry and scientists of chemistry and microbiology began throughout Europe to address these attacks,[8] and became consolidated in the following decades, especially after the arrival of peronospora and then of phylloxera. The former, reported for the first time in France in 1878, rapidly spread to Italy, Spain and throughout the Mediterranean basin, but the winemakers were able to fight it with a mixture of copper sulphate and lime; phylloxera, on the other hand, struck in a more serious, persistent and extended way, so much so as to be considered a true turning point in the history of European viticulture. In Italy the disease spread more slowly and the most serious effects occurred later here than elsewhere. As we will see, this delay had specific causes and unexpected effects, as it would give a strong boost to exports and therefore to the expansion of the Italian vineyard and wine industry, which further mobilized to supply the French market which was in difficulty.

The First 20 Years After Unification: A Slow Transformation

During the first twenty years of the Kingdom's life, unification brought limited innovations in the wine sector and its structure substantially remained largely unchanged: localized production and consumption, heterogeneous cultivation, ageing practices, unexploited quality and limited exports. The growers, who actually managed production, lacked the necessary knowledge to carry out the delicate operations of winemaking with expertise, nor did they have the premises, the cellars and the essential tools to develop a potentially high-quality raw material. The peninsula offered a wide variety of wines, although it lacked the necessary institutional support structures for research, infrastructural networks and the ability to promote Italian products abroad. Italy could not compete with a country, like France, which had been exporting its wines for centuries and had the benefit of institutional structures, information channels and incomparable experience. Governments were engaged in the construction of the internal market and infrastructure networks, but there was no organic action plan in place capable of accelerating the development of the sector.

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[8] See the chapter by Cafarelli in volume 1.

Changes began to come about, albeit slowly, with the founding of institutions which supported the sector. In 1863, the government established a commission to study the conditions of viticulture and oenology and to promote growth of the industry, but was only in 1872 that the provincial ampelographic commissions and a central ampelographic committee began their activities, selecting the most suitable vines for the different regions. The local agencies, whose history is interesting in terms of the mentality and techniques of those who managed them, did not seem to achieve significant tangible results. Even the foundation of the oenological schools,—starting from that in Conegliano in 1877 and then in Avellino in 1880 and in Alba in 1881—despite their importance, were probably not supported by sufficient financial commitment to guarantee their full development.

As we said above, Italy offered a unique variety of wines, able to compete with France in terms of production potential and assortment. In 1872 the *Moniteur vinicole* of Paris mentioned for the first time, the "entry on the scene of Italian wines, which arrive in notable quantities on the Parisian market" and which could compete with French wines in the near future (Corbino 1931, p. 151). Imports tended to decline in the 1870s, due to the increase in cheaper domestic supplies and the first improvements introduced into the wine industry. By contrast, exports begin to rise, but only towards the end of the decade, mainly due to the damage caused by phylloxera in France, where one million hectolitres were exported in 1879, and more than 1.8 million the following year (Corbino 1931, p. 150). Although five-sixths reached the French market, there was also demand for Italian wines in England, Switzerland, Germany and South America, while exports to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had gained a certain importance, was decreasing at the end of the 1870s. Italy's export market share in Europe thus significantly improved: in volume it reached 17% in 1879–1880, but the value accounted for 9.3% (Corbino 1931, p. 151).

In the 1870s, average annual production was around 27 million hl (Corbino 1931, p. 72; Chart 1 in Appendix), with some increase from the southern provinces. The strengths and weaknesses of the domestic production can be better analysed in direct comparison with other European experiences, such as at industrial exhibitions. The Milan exhibition in 1881 and that of Bordeaux in the following year show that the Italian wine industry could boast of only partial excellence, concentrated mainly in Piedmont and Tuscany. In these areas, the cultivation methods and the choice of the vines, the grape harvesting methods and the winemaking techniques seemed to have improved: the winemakers made use of fermentation with open pots, improved presses, used good pumps for decanting, performed sulphurations and looked after the casks which were to contain the wine (Sempé 1882, pp. 75, 78). But, in general, both in the north and in the south and on islands, the Italian wine industry displayed only a weak ability to create wines that could satisfy the requirements of quality, consistency and reputation demanded by international markets (Cerletti 1883; Sempé 1882, pp. 75 and ff.). Italy also lacked large trading companies which could promote the sale of Italian wines abroad. The observers of the time reported various cases of relocation, in particular of transferring the vineyards from the plains to the high plains and hilly areas, a phenomenon which also affected the valleys of the Alps and the Apennines (Corbino 1931, p. 72). In the South, vine cultivation expanded and intensified, while in the centre-north mixed use and non-specialized cultivation was still dominant.

Together with Marsala and Vermouth, Chianti was one of the first Italian products to be promoted as quality wine. The "legend" of

Chianti was created by Baron Bettino Ricasoli, Prime Minister of the Kingdom in 1861–1862 after Cavour and then in 1866–1867. Ricasoli studied French winegrowing—both the vines and the methods of production—asked scientists for help in trying to correct the flaws and especially the acidity of his Brolio red wines. He compared and studied the wines entered into competitions and presented at industrial exhibitions, concentrating his production on three specific vines. Eventually, in 1872, he selected a successful composition and produced Chianti from Brolio. Ricasoli's practices were copied in Tuscany by—among others—Vittorio degli Albizi and the Marquis of the Antinori, and they also spread to Umbria, where most notably the Roman prince Ugo Boncompagni Ludovisi became well known for his substantial investments and his exports to America, Africa and Asia.[9]

Following the French example, Ricasoli also devoted a great deal of attention to the commercialization of the product. Chianti was bottled in a characteristic flask and sold to restaurants, hotels and thermal baths. Ricasoli also stipulated agreements with shipping companies such as Florio to export wine to world markets (England, India, Egypt, North America). Other Tuscan producers opened shops and sales outlets in the main Italian cities to increase their sales. Ricasoli's innovation was not the result of chance but of a multi-year commitment. It showed Italian producers how important it was to study and understand the chemistry of wine, constantly introduce new developments in the vineyard and in the cellar, but also the need to handle and perfect marketing, if they wanted to be known for and sell the best quality wines, especially in the most advanced foreign markets.

In general, beginning in the 1870s, it was now clear to industry specialists—as well as to economists and publicists—that Italians needed to focus on well-selected quality wines and have them accepted by international markets in order to compete with other producers. French wines dominated the market, but Italian wines also had to face competition from Spain, Germany and Austria-Hungary, which had developed a remarkable wine industry over a short period of time. Adapting to international markets required a modification of the product, first of all in taste, which had to be adapted to the market in question and had to abide by the rules of that country governing imports. Furthermore, Italian exporters learned to comply with chemical composition and hygiene requirements, the rules on tares and packaging, the demand for greater transparency on alcohol content and the type of wine which had to be indicated on the label.

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[9] See the chapter by Mocarelli and Vaquero Piñero in volume 1.

The Boom in Production Capacity: Phylloxera and the Role of French Demand

Until the second half of the 1870s, France held the record for world production (with a 43–45% share) and exports, which in 1875 accounted for almost 50% of the market. Between 1871 and 1875, it exported more than 3 million hectolitres per year, mostly quality wines (but there was no lack of common table wines) which on average accounted for almost 7% of production. The radical change in the sector's trade relations was caused by the spread of phylloxera. The epidemic forced the world's main winemaking power, especially in the 1880s, to start importing substantial amounts, mainly from Italy and Spain. The combined effect of the French collapse and the growth of Italian viticulture meant that Italy's production almost caught up with that of France, in terms of volume, in the last two decades of the century.[10]

Phylloxera first appeared in 1863 in the Gard, in France, but its effects were felt dramatically in the 1870s, when it spread to the area of Montpellier and the Aude (1876–1878), then to the Midi, where it affected about 367 thousand hectares. Some areas were particularly badly damaged: in Aquitaine 30 thousand hectares of vineyards disappeared and in the Charente another 80 thousand. In 1880 the disease reached Burgundy until, in 1890, all of France's viticulture appears to have been affected by the scourge (Pedrocco 1994, pp. 323 and ff.).

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[10] See Chart 3 in the Appendix.

In the 1870s and 1880s, the country's production collapsed and fell to just over a third of the previous averages: according to some estimates it dropped from its peak of 84 million hl in 1875 to 30 million in the period 1886–1890, with a contraction of the total cultivated area going from 3.2 million hectares in 1880 to 1.8 million in 1890 (MAIC 1892, p. 1; Marescalchi 1919, p. 16).

Over time, the most effective remedy proved to be the grafting of local vines onto American plant roots. In 1873, the viticulturists of Montpellier imported the first American plants which proved resistant to attack from the insect. But this solution was expensive, brought about controversy and only became operational in 1887, when the government granted tax relief to operators who bore the cost of replanting (Pedrocco 1994, p. 324). Unsustainable expenses for the small producers and the general price depression associated with the agrarian crisis proved to be a real test for the agrarian companies. The Italian Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce estimated that, in 1891 alone, the costs incurred for the introduction of American vines resistant to the disease reached one and a half billion lire (MAIC 1892, p. 1).

The consequences for international trade were far-reaching. Within a decade, France went from being a major exporter of high quality and table wines to a major importer of table and blending wines. French imports rose from 1.2 million hectolitres in 1875–1879 to 10.6 million in 1886–1890, most of which came from Italy and Spain. In the second half of the 1880s, France absorbed about four-fifths of the exports of these two Mediterranean countries (Pinilla and Serrano 2008). Italy's exports, in turn, increased from 240 thousand hectolitres in 1870 to 3 million 603 thousand hectolitres in 1887, which in that year represented more than 10% of its production (over 34 million hectolitres) (ISTAT 2011, Tables 13.14 and 16.9). In 1887, the value of wine exports (113 million lire) would be second only to silk exports (255 million) and higher than the other two most important goods of the agricultural sector, olive oil (80 million) and citrus fruits (41 million).[11]

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[11] See the Table *Valore delle esportazioni del vino e di altri prodotti dell'industria agraria italiana nel quinquennio 1886–1890*, in MAIC (1892, pp. LXIV–LXV).

However, it should be noted that French supremacy in the international markets was not affected by Italy, since in the period of greatest growth, from 1879 to 1889, its exports accounted for between 11.5 and 25.1% of the total. In value, they ranged from between 3.4 and 7.6% up to 1878; from between 6.3 and 18% (with a peak in 1887) for the following period which went up to 1889.[12]

Under pressure from growing French demand, cultivation of vines was intensified in Puglia and in Sicily, where vines quickly replaced arable land. In Sicily, vineyard "fever" increased the area of vine cultivation from 120 to 130 thousand hectares in the 1850s, to 200 thousand at the beginning of the 1870s, reaching over 300 thousand hectares in the 1880s. Between 1871 and 1886, the island produced on average over 8 million hectolitres of wine a year, and managed to stay in first place among the Italian regions at least until 1897, despite the arrival, even in Italy, of phylloxera and the consequent contraction of production and export volumes[13]. In the five years 1870–1874 and between 1879 and 1883, Sicilian production increased by about 80% (Cerletti 1887, p. 217). In turn, Puglia, which after unification had extended its vineyards (initially located around Bari and Barletta) to meet the demand of the domestic market and in particular of Naples—expanded its specialized vineyards and made the French market almost the sole recipient of its blending wine.[14]

This favourable period for the Italian peninsula came to a halt in 1887, after the introduction of international trade tariffs which gave rise to a trade war with France. In reality, the problem of getting the large Italian production to market was due to the fact that the significant expansion of viticulture did not go hand in hand with the development of the oenological industry and its commercial outlets. In the peninsula, from 1874 to 1883, the area devoted to vineyards rose from just less than 2 million to 3.1 million hectares and production rose from 27.5 to 36.8 million hectolitres (Corbino 1933, p. 101). After 1883, the area covered by vineyards continued to expand, while the previously cultivated land increased its production volumes even further. Therefore, as soon as the French market consolidated the recovery of its vineyards (thanks to the solution of grafting onto the American roots) and, moreover, once it began exploiting its large vine plantations in Algeria, the "announced" crisis took shape.

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[12] See the Table (with no name) on percentages of exports from France, Spain and Italy during the years 1871–1891 in MAIC (1892, p. XXII).

[13] See the two Tables on Production and Regional Exportation (volume) between 1893 and 1897 in Cantamessa (1899, pp. 382, 384).

[14] See the chapter by Ritrovato in this volume.

With the customs war which started in 1887, import duties for wines from Italy rose from 5 to 50%. Beginning in 1892, customs tariffs on Spanish imports increased, reaching 40%. Further tightening of tariffs in 1899 was clearly aimed at definitively excluding both Italy and Spain from the French market. Meanwhile, the French winegrowers began to recover reaching about 65 million hectolitres of production in 1900; moreover, imports from Algeria increased (2.8 million hl produced in 1892), after substantial capital investments by French companies.[15]

In the meantime, phylloxera also reached the rest of Europe and caused serious difficulties for production. In Italy, the disease lasted a long time, until the middle of the twentieth century. However, before providing some figures on the sequence of the regional wine crises which ensued, it should be noted that, as a whole, Italian viticulture was able to limit the damage and dilute it over time. Indeed, the diseases helped to mitigate the recurrent crises of overproduction, as we will see. The delayed propagation of phylloxera was due to various reasons. First of all, four-fifths of Italian vineyards used mixed cultivation (with tall vines, in well-spaced rows separated by areas where herbaceous plants grew) and this probably limited the damage, or at least slowed down its emergence. Indeed, the regions with specialized vineyards suffered more damage (Sicily, Apulia, Sardinia, Calabria, some areas of Piedmont), than those with mixed cultivation (MAIC 1914,

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[15] In the 1930s, Algeria would come to produce 22 million hectolitres of wine and in 1950 it dominated world exports with a percentage of 50%, until when, with its independence in 1962 and the creation of the European common market, its production collapsed. For more information on Algeria, see Meloni and Swinnen (2014).

p. VII, n. 1). Moreover, the orography, the peninsula's remarkable variety of soil and climate, probably slowed down contagion, allowing Italy, as a whole, to put up a certain resistance to its effects, thus protecting it from real generalized disaster (Marescalchi 1919, pp. 15–16). Human intervention also contributed to containing the disease. It was possible to limit or at least delay its spread, by destroying the infected vines using various methods, such as in Broglio, Pitigliano, Perugia, Imola, Viterbo, where phylloxera was contained or overcome, or in the district of Milazzo, where it was possible to delay the spread of the disease and protect the vines for 12 years (Cantamessa 1899, pp. 136 and ff.). Overall, the main safety valve of Italian viticulture was its variety. Phylloxera usually advances rapidly and destroys crops in warm climates, in dry lands and in low and intensive vine systems; by contrast, it spreads slowly in northern climates, in cool lands and in mixed use cultivation areas, allowing defences to be prepared and for overall wine production to be maintained and increased at national level (Marescalchi 1919, p. 16).

However, at the regional level, losses were huge. First appearing in 1879 in three municipalities in Lombardy, phylloxera advanced to affect, in 1897, 350 thousand hectares and 672 municipalities. The losses amounted to one billion lire, a value higher than the value of the country's total annual wine production, which in 1898 was estimated to be around 823 million lire.[16] In 1914, the total area affected reached 600 thousand hectares, while the reconstituted area is estimated to be about 200 thousand hectares. Sicily was first affected in 1880; in 1898 four-fifths of all phylloxeral infections were concentrated in the region, including 82 municipalities in the province of Messina, 53 in Catania, 45 in Palermo, 32 in Syracuse, 26 in Girgenti, 24 in Caltanissetta and 13 Trapani. To continue producing Marsala, the Sicilians were forced to import Greek wines (from 104 to 205 thousand hectolitres per year between 1885 and 1896) (Marescalchi 1919, p. 59). The rebuilding of the vineyards began to pay off only in the 1920s. At the end of the nineteenth century, the provinces of Sassari in Sardinia, Como and Bergamo in Lombardy, Novara and Alessandria in Piedmont were also particularly affected (Cantamessa 1899, pp. 135–136). In Puglia, where phylloxera made its appearance in 1899, the crisis was very long-lasting: in 1932, the 319 thousand hectares of vine area which had existed more than 30 years earlier was reduced to 191 thousand hectares.[17] Even Tuscany was not spared and, as elsewhere, the replanting of vineyards using American roots proceeded slowly.

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[16] On December 31, 1898, the affected Municipalities had already risen to 814, see the *Elenco dei Comuni fillosserati o sospetti di infezione* compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture, published in Appendix B, in Cantamessa 1899, pp. 532–542. See also the table with estimates of production and wine value in the years 1879–1898, ivi, pp. 135 and ff., p. 381. See also Zaninelli (1977).

While the devastation caused by phylloxeric continued in some places, other areas, such as Campania, actually increased production. Contemporary observers and historical data attest to resilience and, indeed, a growth in production in the last few years of the century, which increased even further in the fifteen years preceding the war, raising—as we shall see—strong concern about overproduction which significantly depressed prices. Indeed, while the average production in the 1880s was 31.27 million hectolitres, in the following decade—despite the emergence of the diseases—it reached 31.95 million (despite a decrease from 1894 to 1897), and then grew substantially to an average production of 46 million hl between 1901 and 1914 (ISTAT 2011, Ch. 13, Table 13.14, p. 639). While the statistics of the time should be considered with caution, the general trends are clear, as are the foreseeable consequences: lower prices due to the excess of supply compared to the demand, the search for new outlets abroad, a strong incentive to improve production and preservation techniques.

The Search for New Markets and the Support of Institutions

In seeking new markets to replace the French market, Italian production found its main outlet, between 1892 and 1904, in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the spread of phylloxera in its territories persuaded the Austro-Hungarian Empire to stipulate a trade agreement with the

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[17] See the Chapter by Ritrovato, note 8, in this volume.

Italian government, which led to a rise in exports. Within a short time, the peninsula was exporting over one million hectolitres to the empire (and this allowed Puglia to recover, before the arrival of phylloxera). In addition, there was a certain growth in shipments to Switzerland (from 165 thousand hectolitres in 1887 to 553 thousand in 1892) and to the Americas, to a large extent driven by the demand from emigrants. In particular, exports to Argentina followed an upward trend (rising from 62 thousand to 216 thousand hectolitres), as did those to Brazil and the United States (despite competition from California) (Einaudi 1894).[18] Overall, in the 12 years between 1892 and 1903, Italy exported about 6% of its production: over 2 million hectolitres a year with an average annual production of over 34 million hectolitres (ISTAT 2011, Ch. 16, Table 16.10, p. 740, and Ch. 13, Table 13.14, p. 639).

The export of wines, despite constituting a relatively limited share compared to the overall production of the country, was however significant and should not be underestimated. Above all, exports provided an incentive to establish Italian products in foreign markets and drove improvements in the wine industry. During these years, a growing awareness emerged about the need for more dynamic institutional intervention in the field of vocational education, in commercial organization and in public policies supporting the sector. Indeed, the lack of associative, educational and experimental structures was probably the country's main historical weakness, especially in comparison with France. The intensification of international competition highlighted the need to progress in the fields of training and experimentation with innovations. Many agencies, schools and agrarian committees were active, as were some associations including the "Subalpine oenophile association of Turin", the "Italian oenophile association of Rome" and the "General society of Italian winegrowers of Rome", which were particularly active and influential in the vicissitudes of viticulture and oenology during the decade 1886–1895 (Mondini 1916, pp. 8–10).[19]

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[18] For more information on Italian agrarian exports, see Federico (1992).

[19] In 1897, the society merged with the Italian farmers' society.

Some of the most significant contributions in this area include the school in Conegliano in Veneto and those in Catania and Alba, set up in the 1880s, and followed by several others. Sometimes, these initiatives were given a warm reception in the local areas, as in the cases of Conegliano and Alba, which become points of reference for wine producers; elsewhere, however, the impact was more limited, also due to the limited availability of suitable resources and venues. Nevertheless, meetings, conferences and experiments were held, prompted by the arrival of peronospora or for the purposes of sharing the most functional practices in viticulture and oenology, such as filtration, distillation and anti-parasitic treatments (MAIC 1897, pp. 171–173; 1914, pp. 61–62). All aspects of production, technology and marketing were addressed: the growing use of American vines, the introduction of new agricultural and oenological machinery, the improvement of winery practices (thanks to the advice of teachers and school pupils) and the creation of commercial networks (MAIC 1897, pp. 164, 167).

In the years around the turn of the century, experimental cellars were founded in Barletta (1886), Riposto and Noto (1889), Velletri (1892), Milazzo (1903), and Arezzo (1908). To support the fight against phylloxera, the government set up numerous vine nurseries, which provided the operators with the most suitable American vines for restoring damaged crops. In addition, public institutions tried to promote the wine trade abroad with the creation of "enotechnical stations" (in Lucerne, Munich, Zurich, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Vienna, Budapest, Trieste, Rijeka, New York, Buenos Aires, S. Paolo do Brasil), where Italian wine depots operated under state control. The Italian government also launched competitions for the production of certain types of table wines; it also offered its patronage to congresses and wine exhibitions, and financed missions abroad whose aim it was to study the markets.

The concrete effects of these measures are difficult to evaluate. It seems that the schools provided excellent training for dozens of enotechnologists each year, but that the social and economic environment was not yet suitable for their skills to be put to use. The country suffered from a lack of widespread and freely available vocational education, which could contribute to improving the general quality of wine production. For a long time, quality suffered every year as millions of hectolitres of wine went bad or its quality was severely damaged due to ignorance and technical negligence (Marescalchi 1919). Ultimately, it seems that Italy created useful and necessary institutions, but that the effects remained rather limited (Mondini 1916, pp. 8–10). Further efforts in this direction came in the first decade of the twentieth century, when the closure of the Austro-Hungarian market was combined with the increase in production and the price crisis.

The restoration of vineyards in Hungary and overcoming phylloxera determined the end of the trade agreement with the empire, and therefore of the clause which favoured Italy, maintained by Austria-Hungary from 1892 to 1904. A difficult period began for Italian exports, with a partial recovery only starting in 1907: over the next eight years, Italy sold about 1.5 million hectolitres per year to foreign countries (ISTAT 2011, Ch. 16, Table 16.10, pp. 740–741). In addition to customs duties, several other factors contributed to the contraction of commercial opportunities for wines from the peninsula. These include: the special schemes which favoured other countries (for example Algerian wines were exempt from customs duties in France); the rules which limited the importation of certain types of wine and which were applied inconsistently; the competitive advantage of Spanish and French products in important consumer markets such as Switzerland, Germany, the United States, Argentina and Great Britain; the preference for Portuguese wines in the United Kingdom and Brazil; the low potential of wine consumption in countries which favoured other beverages, such as Germany, Great Britain, Russia, the United States; the emergence of new competitors in the world wine market (Germany, Austria-Hungary, California) (MAIC 1914, p. 43).

Traders in the peninsula tried to address these challenges by exporting bottled wines, in particular, liqueur wines such as Marsala and Vermouth, which along with Chianti and Spumante, were products which had gained a certain reputation in the national wines sold abroad. In addition to penetrating the United States market, these wines were also able to conquer much of the Argentine market, previously dominated by the French with their Bordeaux (MAIC 1892, p. 2). Export prices, however, which remained high between 1879 and 1888, remained relatively stable, then underwent considerable fluctuations, remaining at a lower than average level, and experienced stronger fluctuations in the period 1905–1912, when the two main markets, France and Austria-Hungary no longer existed (MAIC 1914, pp. 61–62).

In summary, the Italian producers, having overcome an initial phase of confusion caused by the loss of the French market, tried to tackle the situation by launching new export flows or intensifying old ones, to countries which imported wine for immediate consumption and not to manipulate their wine, as France did. Unfortunately, these efforts were hampered by the fact that progress in the Italian wine industry did not go hand in hand with the development of viticulture. In general, the winemaking methods were always deficient, even though the number of national producers who introduced some improvements into the preparation of table wines was increasing and outnumbered those who had reached a high degree of perfection in the preparation of fine wines. These advances contributed to reducing the causes of suffering caused by overproduction and low prices, as many producers were now able to release a considerable amount of wine onto the market, which had previously been done just after the harvest.

The Framework at the Beginning of the Century: Potential and Problems

The events in the Italian viticulture industry in the first 15 years of the twentieth century appear to be rather complex. Considering its importance in the national economy, the Italian state intervened with greater incisiveness, trying above all to combat phylloxera, which at that time in Puglia, threatened to spread rapidly. A series of laws established "defence consortia", which regulated the export of vines from the islands, granted tax concessions, authorized a series of subsidies for loans taken out for planting American vines (Corbino 1938, p. 88). It is difficult to evaluate the weight of these interventions, but the spread of the disease certainly subsided, although it was not completely eradicated. Indeed, in the years preceding the Great War, Italy held the world record in production volume. In the five-year period 1909–1913, it was able to supply, on average, 46 million hectolitres per year. In the same period, France produced an average of 44.4 million hl a year and Spain 11.7 million.[20]

The production of wine, favoured by exceptional agricultural events, became so abundant as to determine an overproduction which brought down prices to such an extent—especially after 1907—that the producers could not sell their products even at ridiculously low prices. The crisis became so worrying that it threatened the economy of entire regions, especially in the south and on the islands. The government intervened with a series of measures which lasted throughout the first decade of the century and can be summarized as follows: reduction of railway tariffs; allocation of substantial sums for the purchase and distribution of wine vessels and for the installation of shared cellars; laws to combat fraud; tax exemption for the production of alcohol derived from wine and marc (which actually increases its production); a reward of 2 liras for every hectolitre of wine exported; subsidies for municipalities and associations to encourage the building of structures suitable for the preservation of wines. Other measures aimed to support the export of fine wines (Corbino 1938, pp. 88–91).

Starting in 1907, it becomes clear that the problem of the Italian wine industry was that of overproduction. With overabundant harvests, like those of 1907–1909, putting barrels—the main product—on the wine markets became difficult, since consumption had reached levels that were already very high and difficult to increase even further; on the other hand, using the product as distillation material could not exceed certain limits. Although there were some wines of "excellence" in the country, the majority of production was still made up of wines for immediate consumption, which did not remain in the producers' wineries beyond the first year. They were sold and drank just after production, before the summer heat arrived, or at most before the next harvest. The point is that full industrialization of the sector had not yet been achieved and production appears to be fragmented into thousands of small production units which do not have the means or the skills to introduce technical improvements. As a result, very often the buildings and facilities available for wine production were equipped to quickly process grapes and wine, but in most cases they seemed unable to provide prolonged storage and to age the product (Mondini 1916, p. 56). There were also too many different wines, and the variety did not only depend on the wine cellar, but may also be different from barrel to barrel, and from man to man, depending on who supervised the winemaking.

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[20] For these and further data see MAIC (1914, pp. 24–27). As we have seen above, 46 million hl is the average production for 1901–1914 according to the data provided by ISTAT (2011, Ch. 13, Table 13.14, p. 639).

However, the overall picture of the wine sector shows some progress in winemaking. In several regions, manufacturers introduced machines which replaced the work of men and built structures which were more suitable for the preservation of the product, while the production of medium-quality wines began to move beyond the regional limits and established itself throughout the national market. In addition, the areas of specialized cultivation increased, large companies emerged and the production of quality wines grew. In the first fifteen years of the twentieth century, in the new industrialized Italy, progress in winemaking and marketing procedures was reported in various parts of the peninsula. Supply was already extremely varied at that time. Tuscany had Chianti as its flagship product. It was by then already well-established and counterfeit versions appeared both in Italy and abroad. But the region also had a considerable variety of good-quality red and white wines. Piedmont had been excelling for decades with a variety of well-known products, including "selected red wines" like Barbera or "superiore" such as Barolo, sparkling white wines (Moscato di Canelli, Moscato sparkling wine, Asti sparkling wine) and Vermouth, which enjoyed great international success. The region by then had real wine industries, with large specialized companies such as Gancia (with a production facility in Canelli), F. Cinzano and C. (production facility in S. Vittoria d'Alba), the Cora brothers (factory in Costigliola d'Asti) which had a large international sales organization (Marescalchi 1919, pp. 30 and ff.; Marescalchi 1924, pp. 46–58).[21]

In the peninsula, regional concentration was very strong, given that almost two-thirds of production came from six regions, which together produced over 30 million hectolitres: Piedmont (6.1), Emilia (5.4),

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[21] See also the Gancia and Cinzano winery production facilities in Cantamessa (1899).

Puglia (5.2), Campania (4.7), Sicily (4.6), and Tuscany (4.1). In the local area, in the years 1909–1913, primacy belonged to the province of Alessandria, with an average of 4 million 302 thousand hectolitres, followed by Lecce (2 million 543 thousand), Bari (1 million 856 thousand), Catania (1 million 700 thousand). Reggio Emilia, Florence, Avellino and Naples produced over one million hectolitres. The strong red wines of the south and islands and those with the lowest alcohol content from Emilia and Mantovano were used to create, through careful blending, the most widely consumed wine. In Piedmont, Tuscany, Oltrepò Pavese and the Veronese area, wine was produced in flasks or bottles for the most demanding customers.

In the period from 1904 to 1910, Italian wine production concentrated on red wines with relatively high alcohol content. The so-called "special" wines (i.e. vin santo, marsala, vermouth, sparkling wines) accounted for only 2% of total production. The rest consisted of 73.2% of red wines and 24.8% of whites; 63.7% of the wines were above 10 degrees and on average the whites contained less alcohol than others (Cova 1988, pp. 319–337; MAIC 1914, pp. 29 and ff.). Four-fifths came from vineyards located in mixed use areas, only 20% came from specialized cultivation areas (Cova 1988; Valenti 1911, p. 73). An important new development in this period was the emergence of Emilia as a major regional producer. Until 1899, the region produced relatively little, from one to two and a half million hectolitres of wine, but this increased to 5.4 million hectolitres during the years 1909–1913.[22] Production was well organized especially in the provinces of Reggio Emilia, Modena and Ravenna. In the first two areas, when widely consumed red wines were most popular, customers were increasingly attracted to a special type of bottled wine, Lambrusco, destined to become a "sparkling red wine and popular in Italy". Popular at first only in Emilia and Romagna, demand increasingly spread to Lombardy. Lambrusco was also meet increasingly in demand in the Americas, mainly due to demand from emigrants (MAIC 1914).

In the centre-south, while the oenological industry in Marche, Abruzzi and Molise continued to lag behind (despite some limited progress) (Marescalchi 1919, pp. 30 and ff,), Campania gained significant winemaking prominence. Despite deficiencies at the production and commercial level, Campania's production exploited the phylloxera crisis in Puglia, taking its place and satisfying demand from the northern regions which were becoming industrialized such as Lombardy, Piedmont and Tuscany. Furthermore, Lombardy, Liguria and Veneto did not produce enough wine to satisfy demand in the industrial centres and they obtained basic wines for blending from the south.

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[22] See the table on *Produzione del vino delle diverse provincie del Regno* in MAIC (1914, p. 25).

Oenological improvement was strongly driven by the need to compete in international markets, where quality, compliance with certain standards and product reputation were of decisive importance. The potential of Italian viticulture was poorly valued abroad and exports did not increase significantly. However, in the five years preceding the war, Italy exports totalled more than a million and a half hectolitres of wine on average, mainly to Switzerland, France and the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, United States, Uruguay). Three-fifths of the value were made up of wine in barrels, but shipments of wines such as vermouth increased (33 thousand hl in barrels and 12.3 million bottles in 1912–1913), while shipments of marsala remained stable (Corbino 1938, pp. 195–196). As with other sectors in the food industry, Italian migrants, especially in the Americas, created "a new consumer home market" which attracted a lot of interest (Cerletti 1876, p. 262). Observers increasingly emphasized that winning over foreign customers "can come from *advertising*", especially for fine and quality wines. It is easy to see how a hotelier or a private customer, in making the decision to purchase a wine, "there is also the illusion of the name and trust in the person who offers it" (Plotti 1896, p. 95).[23] But it was necessary to create "uniform, constant, recognisable types", to focus on the reputation of the brand. Suggestions for increasing competitiveness and sales abroad were plentiful in the press of the time and guides for shopkeepers were also printed.[24] A manual for merchants in the late nineteenth century noted that Italian trade "needs more and more to establish its name abroad, because (and it is vain to deny it), it did not have one a decade ago".

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[23] See Vaquero Piñeiro (2016).

[24] See for example: Trentin (1895), Plotti (1896), and Ottavi and Marescalchi (1897).

And he adds: “This name and this credit can only be created by keeping to fixed conditions, from which the serious trader cannot deviate, whatever his line of business. The quality of the goods, sufficient quantity to meet future demand, consistent quality, moderation and firmness in prices are the cornerstones for making progress in oenology. The exporter’s flag should read ‘exactness and probity’, not pure and momentary speculation” (Plotti 1896, pp. 19–20).

In international markets, the share of fine and special wines and wines to accompany fine dining appeared to be evolving. In 1902, Arnaldo Strucchi pointed out a clear tendency, i.e. a reduction in the percentage of ordinary blended and simple table wines, in favour of higher quality wines.[25] For example, in exports to Switzerland, which increased with the opening of the Gotthard railway in 1883, one of the first Italian wines to prevail was red wine. Red wine, produced in Sicily and Puglia, represented almost two-thirds of Italian exports, and at least half of it was consumed just as it was. Then, however, within a decade, its share decreased to only two-fifths of exports and it was used only for blends. Although Italian wine did not have a similar reputation to that of French (or German) wine, with the exception of Chianti, the consumption of white wines from Piedmont and Puglia was spreading in Switzerland, as it had been completely modified, prepared in order to make its colour pleasing to the eye and adapted to the taste of consumers.

This process of qualitative change in the sector, however, was interrupted with the outbreak of the First World War and was certainly not helped by the fascist economic policies centred on support for cereal farming, the Great Depression and the Second World War.[26] Italy had to wait until the second half of the twentieth century, and in particular until the most recent decades, to witness a new, much deeper renewal of wine, heavily influenced by European Community policies and norms.[27]

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[25] Quoted in Cova (1988, p. 323, n. 10).

[26] Even the process of approval of the first law to protect typical Italian wines, almost completed in 1923, stopped before the political upheavals of the time, see the Introduction in Marescalchi (1924).

[27] See the chapter by Stranieri and Tedeschi in this volume.

Appendix: Wine Production and Exports—Italy, France, Spain (1860–2016)

See Charts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.



Chart 1 Volume of wine production (thousand of hl). Italy (1878–1915) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from ISTAT [2011, Table 13.14])



Chart 2 Volume of wine exports (thousand of hl). Italy (1878–1915) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from ISTAT [2011, Table 16.9])



Chart 3 Volume of wine production and exports (thousand of hl). Italy (1861–2016) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from ISTAT [2011, Tables 13.14 and 16.9]; Data Istat 2016)



Chart 4 Volume of wine production (ML). Italy, France, Spain (1860–1919) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from Anderson et al. [2017, Table 132])



Chart 5 Volume of wine production (ML). Italy, France, Spain (1860–2016) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from Anderson et al. [2017, Table 132])



Chart 6 Share of world wine exports volume (%). France, Italy, Spain (1860–2016) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from Anderson et al. [2017, Table 169])



Chart 7 Share of world wine exports value (%). France, Italy, Spain (1900–2016) (*Source* Own elaboration based on data from Anderson et al. [2017, Table 179])

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Converging Terroir Typicity for Political Usage and Didactic Normativity. The Metonymical Institutionalization of Wine in Luxembourg

Rachel Reckinger

Introduction

The current sensory aestheticization and hyper-differentiation of wines in terms of their region of origin (itself defined as something both natural and human) is part of a broader historical process of rationalization.[1] In the case of wine—prototype of the current profusion of ‘regional products’—three vectors (see Nora 1997 [1984]) have since the nineteenth century played a key role in the forming of oenophilia: these are regulation by the state, scientific consolidation and dissemination via the media, whose convergent effects have contributed in *constructing* an object with particular characteristics—but with different emphases

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[1] This text is an extended version of a conference presentation, published in the corresponding conference proceedings (Reckinger 2011), itself based on empirical research carried out within the framework of my PhD dissertation (Reckinger 2008, 2012).

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_9

according to the perspective of the different actors. Thus, for the political system, wine is above all national (agricultural, commercial and symbolic), while for its producers it is more something local—by investing the same attributes, 'agricultural', 'commercial' and 'symbolic', but used on a different scale and towards a different goal. Following the same principle, for the oenologists giving introductory wine-tasting courses, wine reflects above all a micro-origin, i.e. a region, a terroir. Yet this capacity for polysemic integration permits an enrichment of the category of 'origin of wines' which, as a slogan, erases internal contrarieties and differences, making it even more persuasive.

This means that this seemingly homogenous object—whose plural and even conflictual construction is hardly visible—requires specific consideration also in terms of its consumption: the oenophile gesture, i.e. a reflective, contemplative and comparative attitude, mixing aesthetic and analytical registers, in order to *rationalize the pleasure of wine*. This cultural figure that has only been on the upswing since the 1980s (Fernandez 2004)—but institutionalized to such a degree that it is taught in public courses for adult education in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg—draws precisely on the normativity of these three vectors, all of which have underscored the importance of the geographical provenance of wine in order to use it depending on their respective positions.

Political, Practical and Symbolic Usage

Let us first turn to the public vector which has the power to integrate aspects of the other two[2]: the involvement of the Luxembourgish state in wine growing. This state control (in Luxembourg and elsewhere) contains an economic-juridical and a political-symbolic element (Kertzer 1988) that variously complement each other, one taking precedence over the other depending on the period, while each having had datable developments. Thus, "since Greco-Roman antiquity until the monastic Middle Ages and the princely Renaissance, passing through Christianity, the conspicuous consumption of wine has contributed in solemnizing social events (Tchernia & Brun 1999; Garrier 1998 [1995])—frequently marking central authority. However, the Moselle wine became Luxembourgish only after political independence in 1839—and it is with the consolidation of the Luxembourgish nation state that winegrowing was both consolidated and used as a symbol of national specificity" (Reckinger 2007a: 299).

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[2] For instance by organizing public tasting courses based on the precepts of oenological science or by accompanying professional multiplicators who are in a dialogue with journalists, such as the Commission de Promotion des Vins et Crémants Luxembourgeois.

While this was the general development, it is important to emphasize, with regard to the economic-juridical component, that political independence did in no way also signify economic independence: Luxembourg was then a poor, agricultural and pre-industrial country so that it was obliged to enter a customs union with Prussia in 1842. The Empire offered a market for the export of Luxembourgish white wines which constituted a part of the raw material for the German sparkling wines (*Sekt*), owing to the Luxembourgish production being geared towards quantity, producing low-alcohol-content and acidulous wines (incidentally, the image of the Elbling variety today still carries this stigma, although it is a typical, traditional variety which is almost non-existent elsewhere).

Despite intiatives, since 1901, by Prime Minister Paul Eyschen to take control of national wine growing, it is only since 1921, at the time of the agreement of the Belgian-Luxembourgish Economic Union, that the state took a proactive role in the management of national winegrowing. At the time the wine-growing region found itself in a twofold transitional phase: on the one hand it was necessary to organize the comprehensive replanting on stocks resistant to the vine fretter (*phylloxera vastatrix*). On the other hand, it became necessary to make changes in the quality of the production, notably by expanding the so-called noble varieties (Riesling, Auxerrois, Pinots blanc and gris, Gewürztraminer, Chardonnay), since the still wine was henceforth destined for the Belgian market—as a finished product whose name explicitly revealed the Luxembourgish provenance.

In order to achieve this, governmental measures were implemented for the promotion of wine growing, increasingly declared as national: they included the establishment of the Institut Viti-Vinicole in Remich (IVV, in 1925) for educating winegrowers, the introduction of government premiums for the uprooting of sub-quality vines (from 1928 onwards), the allocation of government subsidies for the establishment of cooperative wine cellars (principally in the 1920s), intended to mitigate financial difficulties of individual winegrowers (see Reckinger 2007a; Krier 1997). In 1935—i.e. simultaneously with the French law of the *Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées*—an authority of evaluation and hierarchization of wine quality was created, called *Marque nationale*. This system favours an annual organoleptic testing (by a jury of experts) and a chemical examination (by a laboratory of the Ivv) in order to award distinctions of quality,[3] as opposed to the strictly geographic determination of the French system, where it is the parcel that indicates the category of quality. Thus in the French system it is the geomorphological part of the notion of terroir that plays a major role, with somewhat less focus on "local, trustworthy and established practice",[4] while in Luxembourg it is more the human component (the expertise and the technical choices) of this notion which is re-evaluated every year. The bias that can come into play here are the composition and the sensory preferences of the evaluation panel as well as a reduced sensibility for the geomorphological and micro-local influences, but the advantage is a constant update of quality control.

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[3] The entire wine growing region has one single designation (*Marque Nationale – Appellation Contrôlée Moselle Luxembourgeoise*) to which can be added the following supplementary mentions of quality: 'vin classé', 'premier cru' or 'grand premier cru'. In the first two cases the locality of the parcel is also mentioned. Needless to say this system is practicable only due to the very small size of the wine-growing region (currently 1300 ha).

[4] Incidentally, the current definition of the Institut National des Appellations d'Origine (INAO) no longer includes this clause, defining 'terroir' as follows: "A terroir is (1) a demarcated geographical space, (2) in which a human community (4) builds in the course of its history a collective expertise of production (4) based on a system of interactions between the physical and biological environment and a set of human factors. (5) The itineraries thus brought into play (6) reveal an originality, (7) confer a typicity (8) and achieve a reputation (9) for a good that originates from this geographical space" (*Source* www.inao.gouv.fr, accessed 10 January 2007).

It is therefore at the cost of restructurings, considerable subsidies and public investments[5] as well as the establishment of a specific system of quality evaluation that wine has been able to become—progressively and almost a hundred years after the establishment of national sovereignty—the showcase product of the Grand Duchy with which today it seems linked in such a natural and timeless way.

On the political-symbolic level one can emphasize the fact (unique in the European Union) that the political system attaches so much importance to Luxembourg's wine-growing sector that it is since 1896 included in the name of the ministry under whose purview it falls, which is currently the Ministry of Agriculture, Viticulture and Rural Development. Despite the decline of agriculture's economic importance during the country's industrialization, and even more so in the current service economy, the state has always maintained a considerable commitment in the wine-growing sector, which is also reflected in the fact that the pertinent legislation of the *Annuaire Officiel d'Administration et de Législation* for the financial year 2005 included no less than 24 grand-ducal regulations, four laws, seven ministerial regulations and 13 European Council regulations (EC). This high involvement by the state is variously received by the current professional wine-growing and winemaking circles (the European reforms of the sector and the reglementation of the blood-alcohol levels on the roads receiving most of the criticism). Nonetheless, it constitutes a stark contrast to the low level of political intervention with the other emblematic drink produced on the national territory, beer[6]: the state of Luxembourg has neither worked towards establishing an arsenal of legislation on beer-brewing nor towards a symbolic-political co-option; the beer-brewing activity is classified under the industrial sector of the Ministry of Economics and it is essentially regulated by one grand-ducal regulation[7] defining the product 'beer'.

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[5] But also in more recent times, when wine growing was more solidly established, the involvement of the state has remained a constant one through a permanent legislative institutionalisation that includes organizing the regrouping of wine making (since the 1960s), financial support for the creation of the Fonds de Solidarité Viti-Vinicole (1965), introduction of the official term *Appellation contrôlée* as a complement to the *Marque nationale* (in 1988), the designation *Crémant de Luxembourg* (in 1991)—the only non-French sparkling wine allowed to carry the designation *Crémant de…*—as well as the current reforms of the wine-growing and wine-making sector on the European level and beyond.

[6] The Gallic beer is also far older than the national entity: the first brewery with a permanent location attested in the old duchy of Luxembourg dates back to 1300—not to mention the itinerant brewers, farmers and monks who brewed beer during the winter season. The history of beer production in Luxembourg can be read as a history of industrial concentration—with, on the fringe, some niche phenomena (Reckinger 2007b).

In a general way, and closer to the region, the state shows its presence in the seasonal wine festivals by its public support of these events and addresses (oral, at opening ceremonies, and in writing, in brochures published at jubilees) on the part of the mayors and regional deputies, or even the responsible minister. Here, emphasis is on idealistic visions of the cohesion of the micro-local wine-growing culture as well as the "*bonhomie* and *joie de vivre*"[8]—"which confers an official legitimacy to the festivities, thereby revealing a political instrumentalization of popular merriment with symbolic value" (Reckinger 2007a: 302); this symbolic added value comes precisely from the folkloric character of the festivities, constructing a collective sense of identity. By contrast, the local organizers of these traditional village festivals that go back only to the beginning of the thirty-year post-war boom (1945–1975) had conceived them as celebrations of the plant cycle (with the grape harvest in mind) and of the effort of the winegrowers. In the course of the years, these festivals have become an integral part of the Moselle cultural heritage.[9]

At the same time, the state was active in more formal initiatives of heritage-building, such as the project of a Wine Museum, inaugurated in 1979 and created by the Confrérie Saint Cunibert, a local group of wine amateurs with official bylaws, whose goal is "the defence, the protection and the improvement of the viticultural, cultural and touristic wealth of Luxembourg Moselle […]" (Gehlen 1967: 116; see Contact

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[7] This is the grand-ducal regulation of 27 January 1994 (note, incidentally, the recent date). The other regulations in force treat associated subjects, such as commercialisation and the pubs via concessions.

[8] Personal translation of: "Freed a […] Liewensloscht" (Gerges 1961: 9).

[9] They are also established festive gatherings. For the (supra-regional and even national) public that frequents them these celebrations and customs represent, again, an assumed attractive originality of the Moselle locals compared to inhabitants of other regions in Luxembourg.

1969). The Confrérie thus devotes itself to organizing "public events of a cultural and folkloric nature, publishing brochures aimed at making the Moselle region, its wine and its vineyards known in the country and abroad".[10] Again, this regional project has received a favourable echo at the political level in the form of a collaboration with the Ministry of Tourism and the municipality concerned. The museum is "dedicated to the regional viticulture, history, folklore and art and to the tourism of the Moselle valley",[11] it explains the workings of the vine and the wine, the auxiliary trades, and has in its possession plants of vine of every locally cultivated variety—as do the majority of the (numerous) wine museums that exist in other regions. But it being housed in a prestigious eighteenth century residence acquired by the state in 1974 (considerably distinct from the historical reality of the small wine-growers' houses) emphasizes the political validation, as well as the fact that it was used for official receptions for state visits in the 1980s.

Another source revealing the formalization of cultural legitimacies for political use, and, by extension, the self-representation of the state, is the emission of Luxembourgish stamps. It is only since 1921[12] that elements of landscape and particularly Luxembourgish architectural heritage began to appear. In this iconographic series the references to historicity perceived as prestigious predominate and mix with the symbols of urbanization of the time.

Ever since 1911 the Service de la Viticulture has demanded that postage stamps highlight this agricultural sector, but it is not until 1948 that a stamp was issued featuring the Moselle region: it is a picturesque view of the village of Ehnen and its orbicular church unique in the diocese (built in 1826), couched against the border river and the vineyard. One had to wait until 1958 to see a second stamp appear that evokes the theme of wine growing: it would until today remain the only one that shows this activity itself—in its emblematic form of physical labour during the wine harvest. In 1963–1964 as well as in 1967 postal stamps were issued highlighting the large projects of regional civil engineering such as the canalization of the Moselle and the modernization of the river port of Mertert. It is however notable that emission of 1967 offsets the industrial side of the preceding representation with a new image of bucolic landscape, with the synthetic title "The vineyard". On the one hand, this collection of thematic stamps shows images of the Moselle region, generally lumped together with its vineyards and with the river marking the border with Germany. On the other, it is the most represented rural region of the Grand Duchy, in terms of distinct landscape. In this way, this region, small and marginal as it is, is at the centre of the spotlights and represents by an effect of conflation Luxembourgish rurality as a whole. In addition, winegrowing is condensed in it *solo*, cleansed of the connecting domestic economy (after all commonplace up to the 1950s), situated in a peaceful and timeless landscape—without any emphasis on the quality or the particularities of the wine produced.

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[10] Mémorial n° 87 of 29 June 1967.

[11] Mémorial n° 87 of 12 May 1975.

[12] The stamps, used since 1852, initially carried the portrait of the sovereign—which gave them the Luxembourgish nickname *Käppercher* (a diminutive of 'heads').

Similarly, in the primary school syllabuses it is the cultural heritage of wine growing that is taught: the emphasis is particularly on the geomorphological characteristics of the vineyard (dealt with in *Etude du Milieu Local*[13]) and on the arts and popular traditions (topicalized in languages or in singing lessons). The song collection *Mir sangen, Lidderbuch fier d'Lëtzebuerger Schoulen*,[14] incorporated in primary school programmes since 1974, includes in the section "Autumn", the season when the work around the grapevine and wine is particularly visible, traditional Luxembourgish songs—but only those that are not too explicitly drinking songs—as well as popular French songs describing the family ambiance of work on the slopes or the ripening process of the grapes to the finished wine (MEN 1978, 1981). In the French textbook introduced in the primary schools in 1966[15] the same subject is treated via the adaptation of the text of a French author. This is an indication that it is the wine-growing activity which is validated in a *generic* way as an essential ingredient of Luxembourgish heritage to the point where its mention is self-evident, stripped of its social context—which can even not be 'authentic', as in the case of the use of foreign songs.

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[13] This term is the official substitution of the previous name which is meanwhile considered as politically incorrect: *Heimatkunde* (which translates as "knowledge of our homeland").

[14] My translation: *We're singing. Song collection for the Luxembourgish schools.*

[15] *Nous parlons français. Manuel de français pour la cinquième année d'études*, Luxembourg, Ministry of National Education.

All these examples of state investment (both economic-juridical and political-symbolic) point in the same direction: it is about sublimating the regional embeddedness, representing Luxembourgish rootedness and authenticity—and for this, the specific modalities (for instance those regulating the link between the terroir and the quality of wines or ethnological specification of local sources, studied at school) are dismissed as secondary. In this way, wine is constructed, politically, through the method of metonymy—the part that represents the whole—in terms of agricultural technique issued from a particular '*terre*', whose value rubs off onto that of national entity. So, in less elliptic reasoning, it is in fact about an agricultural product coming from parcelled agricultural units of Luxembourgish countryside that produce ranges of wine that are individually commercialized (so which hampers a unified corporate culture, such as one finds in the case of beer). Consequently, the symbolic use of wine identifies with a validated 'make', but in actual fact brought about by a small fraction of the Luxembourg population, but the state lifts this regional characteristic and local affectivity to the level of a national symbol. What is therefore important, in the political use of wine symbolics, is to communicate a 2000-year-old 'rootedness' of a particularly validated aspect of human culture (in a twofold, agricultural and social sense). Nevertheless, the emphasis is not put on the quality or the characteristics of the wine produced, but rather on the producing region in its metonymic sublimation. In an emblematic way, Jean-Pierre Buchler, minister of Agriculture and Viticulture, wrote in 1964: wine "personifies, in a way, its producers in particular, and the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy in general" (Krier 1967 [1964]: 25).

Ultimately, these different elements presented here reinforce each other mutually, resulting in a metonymic usage of an inalienable 'native region' that lends itself to collective topophile memorization and identification.

Moreover, the political dimension—national as well as supranational—is very present on the labels and the guarantee of origin labels, so much so that consumers see themselves confronted by an abundance and possibly confusion of government regulations—which are not only national but reflect the diversity of the countries of origin of the consumed wines. Thus the juridical forms reflected in the specific relationships of nations with their territories via the resulting wine productions are incorporated in the discursive oenophile practices in today's Luxembourg, without necessarily existing in this form on the national juridical level. It is basically about the 'terroir' and the various mentions of origin, as much as about juridical seals inspired by the French model—that are increasingly and partially incorporated in EU regulations. With the current profusion of choices and norms, this 're-identification' of foods (and wines) necessarily goes through tutelary authorities (Fischler 2001 [1990]) and this correlation continues to grow—especially through the presence of the state via the increasing number of nutrition or taste education programmes. Among the latter the education of taste (which the courses for wine tasting latch on to) is with regard to the regionality of products also based on this kind of reasoning, putting local provenance and different qualities of products (gustatory, moral, authentic, etc., see Römhild et al. 2008) on a par. Let us now turn to the mediators, involved in these institutions—lecturers, in the case of wine—and their way of interpreting and presenting the discourse on the localization of wines.

Didactic Normativity, Scientific Knowledge and Propagation in the Media

The notion of terroir is in several ways central to the oenophile approach as it is taught in the public courses for adult education in Luxembourg. In a general way, the oenologists conducting the courses draw on it in order to deduce the sensory characteristics of the samples, but equally, in a political extrapolation, on the anti-industrial approach of the producers of these wines. It is worth noting that 45% of the tasting samples carefully selected by the Luxembourgish oenologists—observed during the empirical survey on which this article is based (Reckinger 2008, 2012)—come from France,[16] one of the wine growing countries where the notion of terroir is most firmly rooted, while German wines were conspicuously absent. In addition, despite methodological differences for teaching wine tasting, the course lecturers, who were not in communication with each other, base their approach on the same three didactic pillars: perceiving wine as a cultural good, promoting the autonomy of judgement of the people enrolled and promoting the so-called 'terroir' wines.

The individuals conducting the courses (called 'oenology courses', "*out of snobbery*", according to one of them, while they are actually introductory tasting courses) have occupations that are only indirectly connected to their qualification as oenologists (national education, chamber of agriculture) while devoting free time to a generally family-based wine-growing activity. Although their qualification and their occasional wine-growing activity are the attributes of professional identification that are most in tune with the courses they conduct, it is only their qualification as oenologists that figures in the documentation handed out in the course. On the one hand, this mention reinforces their wine expertise grounded in scientific training. On the other, by putting the emphasis more on the theoretical-chemical knowledge than on the more manual and practical wine-growing experience, the conveyed qualification as oenologists sets the tone for a course that claims to be firmly epistemic. The affinity to winegrowing shows through in the explanations and judgements given orally during the lessons—and particularly in the validation of the traditional production—but it is not emphasized a priori.

By contrast, what *is* posited a priori in the courses is the analysability of wine. While it is validated by considering wine to be a good of a cultural order—which for a general cultural identity is considered good to know about, or better still, practice—the method of analysis applied is clearly scientific. Used in oenology and in sensory analysis, regardless whether the tasting is conducted non-blind or blind, the tasting method consists in registering molecular odorous stimuli present in the wine, and described by association with a familiar smell (and not by their chemical formula) (Le Magnen 1962; Mac Léod 1993). Wine drinkers are thus encouraged to go beyond the idiosyncratic judgement ("I like it/I don't like it", totally legitimate, and even considered the norm until the interwar years [see Fernandez 2000, 2004]), in favour of an interpretation more furnished—and thus more aestheticized—with personal sensations. The reason for this is scientific explainability: the pleasure becomes, in a way, rationalizable by individual detection and interpretation of the volatilized odorous molecules (chemically and physically present and thus scientifically quantifiable). This interpretation is of course biased by the varying individual physiological levels of sensibility, the formatting in pertinent categories,[17] practice, as well as, above all, the social distinctions in the access to this type of experience and in the language appropriated to put it into words. But the fact that this method is scientifically validated (including subjective variations) and accessible by explanatory textbooks confers on it a positivistic valency and an apparent universality: you merely feel and reveal, 'register' what is present—and this then provides aesthetic pleasure. In this way, it is the detour via science which establishes today the difference between a simple 'drinker' of wine and a wine 'connoisseur'.

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[16] 35% of the wines are of Luxembourgish provenance, while the other countries are significantly less represented (Portugal with 8%, Spain with 5%, Italy with 4%, etc.) and the German wines are entirely absent in the selections of the oenologists in question.

Having said this, the scientific interest in wine—the growing of vines, the vinification, the maturation—is by no means something recent. Since time immemorial winegrowers have been confronted with parasites attacking the vines and with grape diseases that occurred at different stages of the production. Agronomic, biological and chemical research intensified and was systematized during the second half of the nineteenth century, on the one hand, following the works of Louis Pasteur, published in 1866 on the role of yeast in the fermentation process and the control of bacteria harmful to wine by a process of flash-heating (pasteurization) and, on the other hand, following the progressive contamination, beginning in Sète in 1865, of all vineyards in Western Europe (and subsequently around the world) by the phylloxera which punctures and sucks the roots of the grapevines, causing them to rot—ultimately leading to the death of the stock and not only the loss of a harvest. This research—on the vine stocks and on vineyards, respectively on the vinification and stabilization of the wine—brought forth the applied sciences of ampelography (vegetal biology and systematic botany of grapevines) and oenology (chemical management of vinification). Almost simultaneously with the publication of Pasteur's revolutionary work, Jules Guyot published his *Etudes sur les vignobles de France pour servir à l'enseignement mutuel de la viticulture et de la vinification françaises* (1868), initiating the scientific teaching of viticulture. The order of things was however very rapidly overturned by the volume and the speed of contagion of the phylloxera crisis. The victory over the scourge that enabled the vineyards to slowly recover came from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure Agronomique de Montpellier, established in 1848. In 1873 a teacher of this establishment returning from a mission to the United States brought home American vine stocks that were resistant to the insect's attacks (Garrier 1998 [1995]). They were first planted directly (producing a mediocre wine) and subsequently grafted. It is therefore the acceleration of research in the urgency of the phylloxera crisis that contributed to institutionalizing the new oenological science.

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[17] This means that in order to achieve this analytical and rationalised result, i.e. for the canon to become normative, it is imperative to know that wine tasting is composed of seeing, smelling and tasting, together with what particular information these three stages are likely to convey to the person who is doing the tasting.

But phylloxera continued to affect the vineyards in the rest of Europe: it was reported in Luxembourg from 1907 onwards (Institut Viti-Vinicole 2000; Reuland 1989; Ley 1988). The replanting of the Luxembourg vineyards was decided in 1922. The scale of the task required the creation of a viticultural station: it was established in 1925, with the task of training wine growers in the face of environmental challenges, the solution to which were however already known—distinguishing it from other oenological stations which were also active in research by their association with universities or viticultural schools.

However, the most canonized and professionalized recourse to wine tasting turned out to be a French initiative. It was the oenologist Emile

Peynaud who started to bring wine tasting to another level. It is precisely the transformation of wine tasting into a rigorous and reproducible “rational art” which had advanced it to the status of a “diagnostic tool” (Fernandez 2000: 311), indispensable to current oenology and perpetuating the indissoluble union between oenology and wine tasting (see Vedel 1972; Peynaud and Blouin 2006 [1983]) so characteristic of discursive practices since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century.

This scientific rationalization of wine tasting—not only as an empirical mode of oenological knowledge, but also as an aesthetic justification and honing—has seen a massive dissemination via education and training of executives and other professionals of the grapevine and of wine. Since the 1980s–1990s this has created, in wine-related professions as diverse as winegrower, oenologist, wine critic, sommelier and dealer, a very broad consensus in the adherence to the same norms of degustatory rigour and understanding of the products.[18] Certain individuals among them, who are in direct contact with the wine drinkers, contribute in propagating this new aestheticized and scientificated oenophilia.

Thus the method in question, observed in the introductory tasting courses in Luxembourg is analytic, comparative, capitalizable and encyclopedic, based on the materiality of the tasted sample, bringing into play measurable criteria and thresholds, as well as specific categories and vocabulary. The circumstances of the tasting, although responsible for changes in judgement, are not taken into account in the observed courses, nor are social factors (such as conviviality, but also inebriation and affectivity), as well as the fact that this competence—and even the desire to comprehend wine in this way—is socially specific. This social specificity can escape the attention of the course lecturers (who have only very little contextual information on the people enrolled) by the fact that the public that frequents their courses is composed in a significant way of individuals that are more educated than the national average and are members of the privileged social categories, in their majority from the services industry and/or intellectuals (see Reckinger 2008, 2012): their motivations, noticeable by the course lecturers, therefore do not necessarily correspond to those of the general population.

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[18] In addition, a climate of mutual control has established itself, based on the fact that actors involved in different areas and with different objectives share the same categories of judgement (Fernandez 2000, 2004).

The aestheticization of wine is central to the approach taken by the course lecturers, which is motivated by pleasure—"*people come here to have an enjoyable time*"—but neither aestheticization nor pleasure is an end in themselves: it is more a question of tracking the quality of the wines by their sensory, perceptible qualities, i.e. that meet defined criteria of tasting—and pleasure would result naturally from there. Thus, besides a set of tools for raising the sensibility and aesthetic pleasure of the apprentice tasters, it is about sharpening their judgement in this field not only in a sensory but in a moral way. Actually the objective—implicit or explicit, according to the course lecturers—is to teach people to distinguish and ideally to love 'good' wines—i.e. wines that are a 'must', the wines that are in keeping with a holistic philosophy of production, showing the attempt to express a region of origin, meant to reveal the natural and human resources rather than disguise them.

Nevertheless, the reasoning of the course lecturers clearly specifies that highlighting the provenance of the wines is not in itself a guarantee of quality and that it does not necessarily correspond to official systems of quality hierarchization (Aoc in France, crus in Luxembourg, for example)—which increases the difficulty in identifying them. Simply put, it is a *potentiality of sensory surprises and subtleties*, renewed annually and presented as distinct from the uniformity of industrially produced wines. The oenologists in this way promote a notion of quality in two turns: it is not sufficient that a wine is 'clean', that is without a perceivable flaw on the technical and organoleptic level (which in their view constitutes more a point of departure), but it must have an additional attribute that indicates the authenticity and uniqueness of its provenance. I describe this attribute as 'moral', because it comes from the domaine of consciously taking a stance for a specific ideal (here the type of viticulture), geopolitical in a wider sense, motivated by the resistance against the global tendency of conveyor-belt industrialization.

This ideal does not express itself through uniquely institutional signs (the official mentions do not in themselves provide a trustworthy evaluation) nor through unequivocal sensory characteristics (for example in blind tasting it is possible to confuse a wine of industrial production with a terroir wine). Taking a stance in its favour instead requires a tasting sensibility that is oriented towards the discovery of a terroir (relying on social occasions for tasting wine of such extraction), matched with a dose of active information on the modalities of production of the wine in question, that is to say a targeted cognitive investment. This investment implies an ease with the third vector of the propagation of analytical oenophilia: the (relatively recent) abundance of expertise and advice offered in the media. This not only requires reading the specialized press, handbooks and guides (those which are geared towards highlighting regional wines) but also expanding one's personal contacts with local and trustworthy advisers or producers. In short, the course lecturers convey a normativity that combines registers of action characterized by knowledge (analytical skill, technical comprehension of causal links) and by cultural capital (active information collecting, drawing on informed resources, varied curiosity, capacities of sensory evaluation, reflexivity, the desire and capacity to memorize coupled with verbalization). This 'cultural' tone claimed by the course lecturers, with its values of individual self-realization and free expression is, again, quite typical for superior intellectual milieus.

Ultimately, the course lecturers emphasize a *demarcated relativism* in matters of wine: according to them it is among terroir wines where stamps of authenticity—experienced as pleasant and validated as signs of real quality—are most easily found. Nevertheless, since one can't take anything for granted, "*one can only recommend people to taste*". Thus, once the amateurs have learnt to demarcate the field of potentially interesting wines, the course lecturers believe that only direct and personal tasting practice can provide a response to relativism—thereby reinforcing, in a loop, the epistemic orientation of the pleasure of tasting. It furnishes the individual consumers with self-understanding ("*rapports à soi*", see Foucault 1988) that aims to make them more autonomous, while they at the same time channel their sensory and moral judgements in favour of terroir wines.

Conclusion

What political usage and didactic normativity regarding the subject of wine therefore have in common—sometimes understood as an agricultural product and sometimes as an oenophile object—is the reference to its 'origin'. In the economic-juridical and political-symbolic manifestations of the vector of state regulation, this 'origin' refers to a cultural region of national sovereignty which is constructed in a metonymic way as the native region of national specificity. In the didactic realizations of oenophile normativity, emerging from the vector of scientific consolidation, this 'origin' refers in an epistemic way to parcellated vineyard regions which are constructed as terroirs by the interaction of traditional, man-made viticultural techniques and the given, natural conditions, holding sensory potentials whose sub-text is of a moral order.

Incidentally, as always, the choice of words—above all if they are consecrated in rhetorical or legal formulas—inform the underlying collective attitudes, which are not very conscious and function via connotations. Thus preferring the 'origin' to the 'provenance' of wines suggests an absolute territorial embeddedness. Indeed, the Latin *origo* conveys the notion of birth, of ancestry ("father of a race"), of source, of principle—in the sense of a cause that determines. 'Provenance' derives from the Latin *provenire* and emphasizes simply the place where something or someone comes from (Gaffiot 2000 [1934]): 1092 et 1266; Cnrtl/Trésor). If the notion of birth also appears in this semantic field, then in a less affective and certainly less shaping sense. It is more of a neutral progressive project: to grow, but equally in an objectifiable way, to emerge, take place.

In order to qualify the agricultural and economic activity that constitutes wine production, the usage of 'provenance'—reglemented, defined, codified—would have sufficed. Yet 'origin' confers the addition of a soul (for the oenophiles in search of sensory emotions, linked to the micro-varieties of the terroirs), respectively, the symbolic catchline (for the governmental vector)—necessary for *constructing* the irreplaceable and inimitable, in a word consubstantial *uniqueness* of that which the actor who uses them aims for. This mechanism erases precisely the internal negotiations and contradictions to convey the impression of absoluteness of that what is referred to: in the case of politics it is the symbolic uniqueness of the nationality in question, in the case of oenophile normativity, what is aimed for is the sensory and moral uniqueness of every wine whose intention of production was an "*expression of the terroir*".

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Foundations for a Comparative Research Programme Between Wine Markets in the Twentieth Century

Romain Blancaneaux

Introduction: Comparing Wine Markets in the Twentieth Century

Wine has served as a useful object to highlight the process of construction and organization of the markets in France, in particular from the perspective of the role of collective and economic strategies at stake. Indeed, a number of works approach the issue of the methods and repertoires of collective action developed by unions among public authorities with the aim of defining or modifying the sectoral standards they depend

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The original version of this chapter was revised: The chapter has been updated with the correct forename and surname of the author. The correction to this chapter is available at
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_12

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_10

on, and to asserting legally their economic model on their competitors (Tilly 1984; Offerlé 2008; Garcia-Parpet 2009, p. 20; Fligstein 1990, p. 10). Public policies are far from being neutral for them, since they frame, allow and constrain their activities. To make it short, unions and authorities maintain a structural relationship giving rise to stable market standards. Thus for example in France, the first half of the twentieth century has constituted a privileged period to study their role and means of action in the institutionalization of two different visions, paving the way to two distinct markets: one based on a restricted and elitist economic strategy (the Controlled Designation of Origin—*Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée*—AOC), facing another one emerging from an abundant, productivist economic strategy (giving thereafter way to the category of the wines known as "common wines" or "table wines") (Garcia-Parpet 2009, p. 69; Jacquet 2009; Jacquet and Laferté 2006; Laferté 2006). This sectoral division was soon confirmed by the creation in 1947 of the National Institute for Designations of Origin (*Institut National des Appellations d'Origine Contrôlée*—INAO), and in 1953 of the Institute for Common Wines (*Institut des Vins de Consommation Courante*—IVCC).

By doing so, the State consecrated union's views in "two modes of organization, which institutionalize[d] the dualism of the wine sector" (Bartoli and Boulet 1989, p. 227): "[O]n the one hand, an organization by the State of the wine mass market, prone to structural imbalances, subject to scrutiny of its growth, and constraining organization resting on supply control, with the obligation of storage and distillation […]; on the other hand, the creation of the AOC, which benefitted from revenues attached to the designation of origin in renowned vineyards, a form of corporatism in which the professionals manage[d] to control the access conditions to the label, without the State intervening directly in the market organisation" (Garcia-Parpet 2009, pp. 68–69). The analysis of the role of the trade unions in the partitioning, and framing of the French wine sector is central, but yet, however, not addressed through a unique analytical framework.

With one noticeable exception up to now, there has been no attempt to embrace the role of collective and economic action under one, unified grid of analysis. Indeed, Pierre Bartoli and Daniel Boulet's have conducted their research on the conditions of the French wine sectorization, providing—the necessary tools for a comparison—despite they did not clearly intend at carrying one out. The same theoretical framework allows to distinguish two different movements, yet similar from a structural perspective, giving birth to the peculiar, dual organization of the French wine sector endorsed by the State.[1] The demonstration brings light on the common logics, leading to delineate the national sectoral public policies. Since then, the framing of the sector has constituted an "indispensable unthought" allowing, but also restricting researchers' attention.[2] Monographic studies on each segment of the sector have led to look away, and to give academic backup to its institutional partitioning: by dealing with noble vineyards, later producing AOC wines, on the one hand, and with other excluded from this denomination, on the other, research has contributed to reproduce and accredit—in the academic field—institutionalized segmentation proceeding from historical conflicts.

However separate, research has shaded light on the collective and economic strategies attached to the construction of renowned—and unrenowned—regions and wines till the sectoral dualization. Such as in Burgundy, on one side and for instance, by studying the genesis of wine producers' standards (Jacquet 2009; Laferté 2006; Laferté and Jacquet 2005). Their institutionalization through the French Parliament, and their international diffusion (Jacquet and Laferté 2006; Jacquet 2004). Reversely, on the other hand, regard has been paid to regions of lesser renowned wines, especially Languedoc-Roussillon, where collective and economic strategies were translated via elected representatives in the Parliament (Dedieu 2003; Nicolas 2007; Bagnol 2010).

The sectoral and analytical division was then reinforced in the advent of the European Community legislation. During negotiations, two Common Market Organizations (CMO) were created, inspired by previous nationals regulations (Smith et al. 2007, p. 82). They introduced a distinction "[…] between two categories of wines being the object of political forms of very contrasted regulations: tables wines, on the one hand, 'Quality Wines Produced in Specified Regions' (QWPSR) on the other […], stemming from a general consensus to think of table wines as a European public problem, while the QWPSR remain[ed] primarily national public problems, for which the Member States conserv[ed] a great legislative and regulatory room for maneuver".[3] This "partial europeanisation" of policies, while displacing the scales of regulations affecting economic and collective action, has been partially dealt with academically. On the one side, decade-long transformations of table wines—placed under Brussels' scrutiny—have focused attention on collective, as well as innovative economic action facing the decline in their consumption.[4] On the other, research on renowned regions—independent from Brussels' intervention—have mostly dealt with their successful economic and symbolic strategies, price valuation, though letting unions' activities aside (Réjalot 2007; Garcia-Parpet 2005; Chauvin 2010).

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[1] They have underlined how the French wine sector has gradually combined two sets of economic regulations and institutions, which have been delineated by professional conflicts, and the determining contribution of the State. In line with the "Regulation school", they adhere to its concepts, and the idea according to which the national institutional regulations (set by public policies) arise from the local confrontations between unions. See Bartoli and Boulet (1989, 1990).

[2] By this expression, Pierre Muller underlines that scientists' thinking is bound to, and bounded by sectoral structuring preceding them. See Muller (2010).

For a few years, both sides of the sector have met. Indeed, a growing part of AOC wines, originally rare and considered higher in the hierarchy, has merged in value and reputation with table and local wines, supposedly lower in the hierarchy (ONIVINS 2003, p. 16). How can we explain that the—national, then European—division between wines that everything seemed to differentiate, has evolved to such a confused situation? This question provides us with an opportunity to turn to the aforementioned comparative approach combining the collective and economic activities of the organization of markets.

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[3] At that time, tables wines represented 95% of the Community production (Smith et al. 2007, pp. 80–81).

[4] The special issue of the *Pôle Sud* journal published in 1998, under the direction of William Genieys, includes works conducted by economists, historians and political scientists with expertise in tables wines and European regulations (Genieys 1998). For more recent development, see Garcia-Parpet (2004, 2007).

Elements for a Comparative Research Approach Between Wine Markets

We propose to take steps in this direction. To this end, theoretical and methodological precisions are necessary. Contributions and limits of the literature related to the regulations of economic conduits have to be dealt with. Three dimensions carried by economic sociology, political science and economy are to be taken into account, and combined to analyse the evolution, which hold our attention.

First in sociology of economy, while scholars' research agree on the structuring part played by collective and economic activities in the institutionalization of—wine—markets, they also underline *the role of the State—then of the European union—in the regulation of the economic and collective conduits*. Indeed, the State acts as a coercive third-party, which possess the power to direct economic conduits through public policies. They lay the institutional requirements for articulating actors' divergent interests, who thrive to define the rules which will serve their status and position the best (François 2008, p. 179). Thus, the State is "not only the regulator charged to maintain order and confidence […] it contributes, in a completely decisive way, with the construction of demand and supply" (Bourdieu 2000, p. 251). This State-centred standpoint can be amended by a European dimension. Indeed, European sectoral policies, as well as national, can impact national economic organization, by upsetting traditional and pre-existing economic, as well as professional, configurations.[5] This last point requires tackling, in another step, with collective action.

Second, political science deals more thoroughly on this point, by underlining the *coordination between collective action—through*

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[5] This is what Antoine Bernard de Raymond shows regarding the introduction of the Common Market Organization of the fruit and vegetable markets, by pointing out the change in regional offer: the varieties of apple produced in the orchards are homogenized (in particular through the creation of an official catalogue), while the producers‘ organizations take part into making them more competitive, by channelling their production and marketing, with a disappearance of the traditional circuits and trade unions. See Bernard de Raymond (2013, pp. 203–221).

professional bodies—and—national of European—authorities.[6] Indeed, collective action and public policies are interlocked and mutually constraining: while collective action is only possible within a framework defined by sectoral policies, the definition of the later is closely linked with interest groups acting in order to formulate, to abide and enforce the most favourable to them. Yet constraining, policies allow groups of actors depending on them to exist; therefore, interest groups take part to set, and watch over the regulations most favourable to them (Muller 1982, 1984). Again, this national-centred standpoint can be amended by a European dimension. The transfer to Brussels of the formulation of public policies has displaced the representation of collective interests, by disorganizing it at the national level. As the formulation of policies opens to new partners, and concurrent authorities, the influence of national interest groups diminishes. However, addressing the evolution of wines only in terms of public policy would neglect the economic dimension, and more particularly the orientation of demand, of which profit, or suffer unions.

Third, giving importance to the evolution of demand and its beneficiaries necessitates to recourse to economy, which brings light on *the constraining role of the commercial economic situation and consumption on the course of actor's economic activity*. Indeed, the application to the wine sector of the regulation theory has stressed its historical codification under power struggles relative to a certain consumption level, that the State contributed to orient in a determining way (Bartoli and Boulet 1989, 1990; Boyer 2004). Therefore, an inversion of consumption can call into question its mere organization, which structurally depends on a given level of demand (Bartoli and Boulet 1990, pp. 30–31).

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[6] Indeed, the study of the role of interest groups on public policies has become classical in political science. Three specialized currents have modelled it differently: "pluralists", for whom the definition of public policies results from a free and fair competition between interest groups, the State being reduced to a mere rubber-stamping party; "corporatists", underlining the uneven character of the competition between interest groups, the State recognizing only those in conformity with its interests; "neo-corporatists" (or "sectoral corporatists"), focusing on the formulation and the application of specific, sectoral policies. See Hayward (1996), Jobert and Muller (1987), Hassenteufel (1995), and Berger (1981).

In a nutshell, three general principles can be drawn from these readings in economic sociology, political science and economy, that allow for establishing an analytical grid. First, *public policies play a determining role in the regulation of economic and collective conduits*. They pose the necessary conditions that articulate collective and economic strategies. Second, *groups thrive to defend, and to apply policies they have had participated to define, to their benefit*. For this reason, attempts to reform policies by overriding the group's interests threatens its mere existence, and bring about its upheaval. Third, *the organization of sectors are correlative to historically consumption tendencies, whose reversal upsets economic and collective strategies*. When demand inverts, the economic organization of the sector is confronted with a modification of one of the terms, which had supported its past institutionalization, and regulation.

While bearing in mind these features, we can propose to revive the goal pursued before us to treat of the two wine main markets in a transverse, comparative way, by applying the same key readings to each of them. To this end, two privileged fields of observation will be retained, although dissimilar administratively, yet structurally equivalent: the Gironde department, and the Languedoc-Roussillon region. Both have been historically dominant nationally—therefore structurally homological—in one and other market by the weight of their economic model, wine production, and the role of their unions in the institutionalization of the sectoral public policies in the first half of the twentieth century.[7] As regards the time period, the aftermath of the "partial europeanisation" of the sectoral policy in 1970, while displacing the scales of regulations affecting economic and collective action, has been partially dealt with academically. It then seems relevant to question its effects on collective action and strategies. We will thus be dealing with a sectoral and organizational comparison, which will relate to the variety of the collective and economic strategies in regulatory asymmetrical situations. While generating clearly separated effect on both markets between 1970 and 1985 (A), it created contradictory effect after European regulations underwent a radical change (B).

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[7] Respectively, the Languedoc-Roussillon region for table wine, and the Gironde department for AOC wines. See Smith et al. (2007, pp. 64–78).

A French Wine Facing "Partially Europeanized" Sectoral Policies: Disturbed vs. Undisturbed Markets (1970–1985)

Before the creation of the European Community, the dualization of the French wine sector had constituted the matrix of its organization, and of the collective and economic strategies of its members. As of 1970, the European regulations came into effect. Here, the aforementioned grid of analysis comes in handy: *state of consumption* and *public policies*, while differing altogether in their forms, differ in their effects on *collective and economic strategies*. In Languedoc-Roussillon, both the disequilibrium in demand, and the transfer of public policy to Brussels gave way to collective and economic conduits reinforcing market imbalance (A1). In Gironde, the rise in demand, and the way left open by public policy—which remained national—let free reign to the affirmation of collective action, and expansion of the AOC economic strategy and success (A2).

A1 Table Wine in Languedoc-Roussillon: A Market Thrown off Balance by Surpluses, and Europeanised Public Policies

Prior to the European integration, the table wines of Languedoc-Roussillon had to cope with an inversion of the trends in consumption increasing the structural imbalance of the market, and the cessation of imports of Algerian wines, which were used to blend, and make table wines.[8] The post-war period faced a modification of lifestyles, the demographic and economic structures, which upset the demand for table wine, and provoked an upheaval of the sector, which was partly dependent of them (Boulet et al. 1976, pp. 41 and 50; Boyer 2004, p. 11). Their share in the drink consumption felt from 52.7 to 40.9% between 1960 and 1970 (Berger and Maurel 1980, p. 89). The decrease in demand, which is a deeply destabilizing phenomenon within markets (Fligstein 2001, p. 84). There was also the loss of Algerian wines—along the Algerian independence—which were necessary to blend with wines produced in Languedoc-Roussillon.[9]

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[8] Indeed, since the end of the twentieth century, an interdependence was established between the two shores of the Mediterranean, for blending wines.

The challenge posed by the change in demand and supply, and the anticipation of the integration in the European market, led representatives of the cooperation and the government to work at shaping new policies, and economic orientation for table wines. Since 1954, already, the States had been exerting through the IVCC an increased bureaucratic supervision aiming at "a reversal of trend on the level of production", so that it would not require blending anymore.[10] To this end, new representatives of the cooperation co-constructed with authorities an unprecedented agricultural modernization law to provide incentives as of 1960–1962 (Muller 2000, p. 34; Jobert and Muller 1987, p. 88). Its measures, and new local leaders such as Antoine Verdale in the Aude department, or Jean Rémond in Hérault, encouraged cooperatives to consolidate their land, restructure their wineries, improve their techniques and wines—so as to escape from the market of blended wines, and therefore of the merchant's grip—and distribution channels by allowing the emergence of—producer groups such as Val d'Orbieu (1967) or l'Union des Caves Coopératives de l'Ouest Audois et du Razes (UCCOAR) (1971)—"pioneers in sales of selected wines without intermediaries"[11] (Gavignaud-Fontaine 2006, p. 263). As the overall wine quality improved, the State and the representatives of the cooperation created a new category for the best table wines (Local wines) supposedly more able to face the free market.[12] On the dawn of the European integration, cooperation "had never been so powerful".[13] However, the Community legislation was about to contradict, and modify the regional collective and economic strategy.

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[9] From 1964 to 1970, however, the "system of supply inherited from the colonial time continues to function": the French and Algerian governments get along on an annual, limited delivery fixed at 8,760,000 hl in 1965 (Berger and Maurel 1980, p. 90).

[10] That is to say, to a certain extent, to even replace the Algerian wines (Bardissa 1976, p. 454; IVCC 1973, p. 33).

[11] The cooperatives, thanks to their qualitative growth and competences (technology innovations, reorganization of their workshops, selection of the harvests) empower vis-à-vis wine merchants' control, and capture added value.

[12] In 1968, the majority of the wines with an alcoholic strength of 9 °5–11 °4, and more than 11 °4, is produced in the South of France (CRPEE 1970, p. 70).

As of 1970, the transfer of public policy to Brussels led to an unexpected upheaval of the collective and economic strategies, and their increasing dependence to the European Community. Indeed, Community regulations set up sectoral rules noticeably different from those which framed it hitherto nationally. While in France, efforts had been carried out to promote qualitative, unblended wines—Local wines—, the European regulation classified table wines according to their alcoholic strength—the cheapest being both the strongest and weakest, traditionally used for blendings. In the European, frontier-free market, merchants could thus buy for cheap strong alcoholic wines in Italy, weak ones in France, and blend them to obtain wines competing with French Local wines, depriving them of market shares. Additionally, the European regulations displaced the scale of sectoral regulation, the State being no more able to fix guaranteed prices.[14] Thus, the first wine CMO deprived winegrowers from commercial outlets, obviated unions' traditional methods of action, and prevented them from obtaining state support. The corporatist unionism held sway, and blamed the maladjustment of the European regulations. Facing laissez-faire, a period known as "wine war" engaged, during which illegal actions aimed—at least symbolically, but without success—at regulating the market, by suppressing wine imports. As unsold stocks and market imbalance peaked, a deadly riot resulted in a reform of the CMO in 1976, that subordinated even more table wines. As it aimed at resorbing the surpluses, Brussels contributed to aggravate them: it set up various policy instruments being constantly diverted from their initial objective.[15]

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[13] Nationally in 1972, it controlled 54% of production volumes (against 31% in 1954), 60% in Languedoc-Roussillon (Boulet et al. 1976, p. 26). There were, in 1972, 552 cooperative wines caves producting 20 million hl in Languedoc-Roussillon (Gavignaud-Fontaine 2006, p. 201).

[14] From this moment on, they were set by "quotation regional commissions" (Bardissa 1976, pp. 55–56).

[15] The grubbing up premium, for instance, supported the retreat of the vineyard, but the wine growers slowed down its impact by gaining in productivity. The reduction of the production was slower than that of consumption, resulting in an increase in surpluses, and an increased recourse to the mechanisms of storage and distillation (Bartoli and Boulet 1989, p. 314).

While the Community provided outlets to productions, which would not find any other commercially, cooperatives and their unions fed the market at the expense of the Community.[16]

Such an evolution contrasted clearly with that of the Gironde department. There, the high demand for AOC wines, and the corresponding public policy, had let free reign to affirm, and defend the collective and economic strategy developed in the first half of the twentieth century.

A2—AOC Wines in Gironde: An Expanding Market Owing to National Policy

Before the European integration, and contrarily to table wines of Languedoc-Roussillon, AOC wines in Gironde faced a steadily growing demand, and new outlets through retail shops. Indeed, whereas the consumption of table wines decreased as of 1957–1959, it grew by 54% until 1972 for AOC wines (Bousiges 1994, p. 89; Anonymous 1973, p. 38). As quotations rose from between 1959 and 1968, mainly to the benefit of grands crus, the share of AOC wines increased in the total household expenditures (Pijassou 1980, p. 1032). By the middle of the 70s, the AOC wines from Bordeaux met an increasing demand as regards fine wines in large retails stores, where they achieved "remarkable commercial breakthrough" (Réjalot 2007, p. 45). In Gironde, this situation led economic and collective action to develop concomitantly in deprived territories, thanks to the incentives set up by the State.

The opportunity posed by the increase in demand, and agricultural public policy, inclined the departmental expansion of the collective and economic strategy that had made the AOC successful. As profits made from the belonging to the appellation Bordeaux differed greatly, between zones of the most famous Grands Cru, and other "less noble appellations", the later get through unprecedented development. While in the South of France, the professional and economic competition was dependent on the policy instruments for table wines, the situation differed significantly in the Bordeaux area. Indeed, the early 60s provided the opportunity of "major changes, imposing new conditions of productions" from zones of "less noble appellations" than the vineyard of the Grand Crus (Hinnewinkel 2000, p. 91; Roudié 2014, p. 412). As of 1956, young winegrowers and their union of less renowned appellations ambitioned, in reaction to their decline, to better their wines and remunerations through new cultivating techniques breaking with the traditional ones (Hinnewinkel 2011, pp. 37–42; Moser 1960, p. 328). This was noticeable in the Entre-deux-Mers area, strongly impacted by the decline in prices in white wines. Owing to the new agricultural modernization law in 1960–1962 and new local leaders in cooperatives, lands get regrouped, techniques improved, the dissemination of oenology progressed.[17] In order to perpetuate the ongoing reorganization, threatened by the inflationary spiral of white wines in AOC, collective action organized.[18] The *Syndicat Régional des AOC Bordeaux et Bordeaux Supérieur* was restructured, under the supervision of new leaders originating from less noble appellations.

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[16] Langedoc-Roussillon collected 75% of the European subsidies in France (Bernard 1989, p. 64).

As of 1970, France obtained that the AOC wines remained a national concern regulated by professionals, bringing a new warranty to the autonomy of the market of the AOC, in return for what Brussels refused any support to them (Clavel and Baillaud 1985, p. 93). Indeed, Brussels ratified the market organization, consolidating its strong autonomy. Unlike table wines, whose regulation was transferred to Brussels, which generated a substantial modification in their organization and upset the collective and economic strategies at stake, the AOC wine were exempt from such evolution. While letting AOC wines immune to regulatory disruptive effects, the increase in prices induced wine producers to break the hold of wine merchants. Thanks to the resumption of quotations since the years 1950s, profitability and investments increased in the vineyards. The wines conditioned and put on sale in bottles benefited from a new vogue. That allowed grand crus, as of 1970, to break free from wine merchants, who traditionally bought wines in bulk, and bottled them to their profit. As the Grand crus collected benefits, increasing with prices, wine merchants rushed to speculate on wines to preserve their margins, at their own expense. The soaring prices laid the ground for frauds: tables wines from Languedoc-Roussillon were bought, and passed off as Bordeaux wines. This symbolically destabilizing event was the first interference of the table wine market with the one of AOC. As of the mid' 70s, wine merchants gradually stopped embottling wines, and started buying and selling bottles in order to cut costs. The use of bottle spread among winegrowers, whose economic situation soared.

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[17] In 1968, about fifty communes regrouped their lands, approximately 70 in 1970, that is to say 20% of the winegrowing area in Gironde (Roudié 2014, pp. 415–416). The mechanization of the vineyard jointly accompanied the diffusion of "high vines" developped in Cadillac, which covered as soon as 1964 one-third of the vineyard in Gironde (Roudié 2014, pp. 406–407). On the diffusion of oenology, see Anonymous (1965, p. 9).

[18] For years, the production of white wines under the generic name "Bordeaux", in particular, had developed in an overabundant fashion, as it had become "practically a refuge" for wines of lesser quality. Less rewarding, it was also the less organized. See Vincent (1966, p. 5).

In general terms, this first part was the occasion to observe the evolution of distinct markets, under the effect of evolution of demand, which changed owing to AOC, and during the first years of coming into effect of the OCM Wine. The distinction in demand, and institutional supervisions established between them, maintained them apart. After 1985, a change occurred, when Brussels achieved a radical change in the management of table wines.

B—When "Partially Europeanised" Policies and Market Interfere (1985–2000)

By the middle of the 80s, the dependence of tables wine of Languedoc-Roussillon to Brussels, on the one hand, and the strong autonomy of the AOC from it, on the other, have constituted the sectoral framework from which two evolutions have occurred. In 1985, however, the Dublin agreement represented a "turning point" in the European *public policy* (Arnaud 1991, p. 7). While affecting *collective and economic strategies* in Languedoc-Roussillon, along the emergence of a demand for a new kind of—varietal—wines (B1), it had indirect consequences on the AOC wine market. Indeed in Gironde, the change in the European regulations hastened the full conversion of the vineyard to AOC wines, and their plethoric offer (B2).

B1—From Imbalanced to Balanced Table Wine Market, Through Varietal Wines

The decline in demand for table wines led wine merchants “to search outlets through “a new way in France, but already used elsewhere, in particular in the USA”, offering economic and symbolic success there: varietal wines (Clavel 1987, p. 37). Indeed, the classification according to the terroir lost ground to the benefit of that according to varietals (Roudié 2001, p. 295). New practices in viticultures benefited from this economic situation, and of a favourable turn in the European public policy.

By the mid 80s, the European Community changed its wine policy, due to the pernicious use of it. Indeed, the expected equilibrium of the table wine market never occurred and, worse, every policy instrument set up since 1976 had been diverted from its primary goals. Expenditure and surpluses were on the rise. Fearing their increase, along the upcoming integration of Spain, and Portugal, European ministers of Agriculture agreed on putting a halt to it, by making the use of distillation financially disadvantageous, and increasing benefits for curbing production potential. Since the winegrowers produced more wine than they did grub up, because of better remuneration for distillation, it was decided to reverse this trend by restricting the access to distillation. This turn “spelt the end” of mass wine (Gavignaud-Fontaine 2006, 387). The Languedoc-Roussillon region was the first concerned region, especially by the grubbing up in zones with strong outputs (Seniuk and Strohl 1996, p. 37; Gavignaud-Fontaine 2006, p. 400). The land and genetic structure of the southernmost vineyard was modified in an unprecedented way. The reduction in the subsidies for distillation, on the one hand, lowered the profitability of the productivist practices, while the aids for qualitative restructuring encouraged and increased more qualitative ones. By accelerating the extinction of the vineyard of mass production, it promoted its substitution by less productive and more qualitative viticulture, paving the way for the development of new economic and collective strategies. New techniques developed for cultivating, pruning and vinify the grapes. This reversal went hand in hand with that of unionism. The devalorization of the former practices, and of their advocates within the cooperation, allowed the valorization of new conduits. Among them was the case of the varietal wines called the “Vins de Pays d’Oc”. The increasing international demand for such types of wines led winegrowers and wine merchants to develop them. In this context, they managed to takeover against the cooperative unionism, with the creation of the *Syndicat des Vins de Pays d’Oc*. In the favourable commercial context of the years 1995–1999, the cooperatives, which had invested in the strategy of the varietal wines met with success. This evolution modified the hierarchy between wines. Gradually, a growing part of the southernmost productions, formerly undervalued, reached in price and reputation some AOC wines, which had long been considered superior (ONIVINS 2003, p. 16). Many were then winegrowers “to produce a simple local wine, […] applying better prices than those of AOC” (De Cantenac 2005, p. 65).

These observations lead us to tackle with the indirect effects of the Dublin agreements on the AOC wine the market, an increasing and substantial part of which declined in terms of economic and symbolic value.

B2—From a Restricted to a Restriction of the Market of AOC Wines

The years 1980 saw the rise in consumption of the AOC wines sold through large retail stores (Gille 1991). The decade, indeed, went hand in hand with an increase of its consumers, at the same time the production grew, and the average price of AOC wines dropped: between 1969 and 1992, their share in the national total production went from 15 to 52% (Anonymous 1993).

Facing high demand in wholesale distribution, the development of AOC wines in Gironde went through a buoyant period between 1985 and 1999. Whereas by the half of the 80s, the wine table market was constrained by the Dublin agreements to initiate a qualitative change, the market of AOC wines, and for what concerns us, the Gironde department, was let unrestrained to expand. The anticipation of new outlets, and rising costs nourished the replacement of the vineyard of table wine of Gironde, from now on subjected to reorganization by the European Commission and the Dublin agreements. The years following the turn in the European regulations saw an acceleration of the expansion of the surfaces and volumes of AOC instead table wines, to the detriment of quality, prices and reputations.[19] Indeed the vineyard of table wine in Gironde, even less valued with the decline in subsidies for distillation, was quickly and entirely converted to AOC. This conversion from table wines to AOC, vineyards, producers and productions was conducted under the aegis of the *Syndicat des vins de Bordeaux, Bordeaux Supérieur*, in front of which the Minister of Agriculture himself, François Guillaume, announced the authorization to convert the rights of plantations of wine table into AOC (Anonymous 1986). This opened to conversion a potential of several thousands of hectares, while Brussels hindered the table wine market. As an additional incentive for conversion, the State authorized the entry into production of converted vineyards from four to three years. Volumes of table wine of Gironde declined more quickly than before: while they had halved in 17 years (1970–1987), they lost 4/5th of their volumes the 6 following years (1987–1993) (Aubril 1987; Anonymous 1994). Additionally, rights of plantations could be bought in other regions: Bordeaux was the area purchasing the highest amount of them nationally (ONIVINS 1998, p. 146). Consequently, while the AOC vineyard had grown only by 13.3% between 1979 and 1985, it grew by 25% between 1986 and 1992 (Aubril 1988; ONIVINS 1993, p. 25).

This accelerated conversion was accompanied by a new intensification of cultural methods, outputs, and a devalorization of a growing proportion of the AOC wine from the department. The mechanization, which accompanied the reorganization of viticulture in the South of France in the years 1970s, developed in vineyards of AOC wines in the years 1980s, in particular in the Bordeaux regional appellation (Lacombe 1983, pp. 454–456). Techniques developed in wineries as well. This development of the viticulture of appellation, as the sales increased in large retail stores, was carried out together with an increase in investments and productivity. In particular for the regional appellation of “Bordeaux”, for which the least restrictive and gratified practices inclined the most productivists practices, which gradually demonetized the value of the label and the remunerations withdrawn by its members. As the AOC label did not provide the expected remunerations any more, an increasing number of winegrowers, by an irony of history, gave it up to convert to table wine, a category against which the AOC had been historically made up (Garcia-Parpet 2009, p. 11).

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[19] It felt from 30 to 15% of total departmental volumes between 1970 and 1987 (Aubril 1987, p. 47).

Conclusions

This article started with an interrogation regarding the recent reconsideration of the hierarchy of the French wines. In about fifty years, the AOC label ceased to provide the most favourable economic positions, contrary to certain table wines. How different categories of wines, that the professional and the State contributed to segment in two market in the first half of the twentieth century, could have evolved until calling into question the AOC wine, former institutionalized model of excellence? Gironde and Languedoc-Roussillon constituted two convenient cases to answer. The—undesired—incidence of the European instruments of public action on the sectoral evolution was clear.

By analysing the effects of the installation of Community legislation, we appreciated the way in which the policy change had been accompanied by a significant evolution in the political regulation and the emergence of new wine economic strategies. Then, from a description of the substantial modification of the Community sectoral policy in 1985, we understood how the wine hierarchies instituted in the first half of the twentieth century were destabilized: the public action, by setting up the structural necessary conditions, gave way to the agents and the economic strategies drawn on table wines, which gave them the possibility of improving their economic positions. At the same time, the remaining self-management of AOC wines evolved in the opposite direction, by leaving room to a productivist economic strategy, which devalued symbolically and economically the label.

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The Role of Quality in Wine Production and Market: European Rules, CAP and New Technology

Stefanella Stranieri and Paolo Tedeschi

Introduction: New Rules and Technologies for a Constantly Evolving Wine Market

The aim of this contribution is to show how, from the 60s to the new Millennium, the quality in the European wineproduction and market was influenced by new technologies and European rules.[1] The Treaties of Rome in 1957 and the related creation of the Common market modified the rules concerning the distribution of all European products, the wine

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[1] Please note that the word “European” is used here with the meaning of “belonged to European Economic Community (since 1992, to European Union)”, that is “regulated by the CAP”. A wide bibliography exists about this last. See, in particular, references quoted in: Cunha and Swinbank (2011), Tedeschi (2011), Kay and Ackrill (2010), and Spoerer (2010).

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_11

included. Moreover, in 1962 the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was born: since 1964, it has regulated the methods of winemaking and the characteristics of the European wines. So, European institutions progressively decided the evolution of the European wine sector and in particular the role of the quality in the production and market. They in fact established all rules concerning: the elimination of tariffs protecting national products and the actual level of competition in the European wine market, the chemical products which it was possible to use during the winegrowing against fungal diseases and insects, the minimum alcohol content and the percentage of preservatives as sulphites, the contents of labels which wine producers had to put on their bottles, etc.

These European rules also concerned the recourse of new technologies which, from the 60s, allowed a relevant improvement of the yields in grapes and, moreover, of the quality of the wine (e.g. thanks to new fermentation process and modern types of casks favouring a better conservation of the wine).[2] Besides, the evolution of the rules about the origins of the products and the related labelling strongly influenced the wine producers' decisions concerning the characteristics of the wine they wanted to make and sell. Face to the new world globalization of the wine market, a real European wine quality policy was shaped with the aim to improve the average quality and to promote a quality differentiation, that is to create more types of wine and encounter all target consumers. The CAP progressively enlarged to all European countries the best rules existing in France and Italy, that is the best world wine producers and, moreover, the countries where the wine sector has a great relevance for both the national agri-food system and the preservation of the territory. So, new labels as CDO (Controlled Designation of the Origin, sometimes Guaranteed too), PDO (Protected Designation of Origin), PGI (Protected Geographical Indication) and, more recently, "organic", were written on the bottles of European wines to indicate to consumers how and where the wines they drunk were made. The respect of new labels, which progressively became more severe, obliged European winemakers to improve the quality of their products to maintain their niches of market: the final result was (and it continues to be) positive and the flavours of new quality wines were able to encounter the consumers' tastes and enlarge the wine market.

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[2] A wide bibliography exists about technological innovations concerning the winegrowing and winemaking in European countries: see, in particular, the Volume 1 and references it quoted.

New European rules also concerned organizational innovations, in particular the wine supply chain. Relevant changes in fact regarded the implementation of sustainability aspects within the supply chain and the role of wine producers and retailers: the aim was to improve the quality of the European wines and the respect of the environment. While in the past the CAP and national public authorities justified their subsidies to the viticulturists with the need to avoid that young people left the European countryside, since the 90s and in particular in the new Millennium the aid to the winegrowers has depended on the positive effects, for the environment and also for the tourism, of the planting and cultivation of vines in the European countryside.

European rules influenced the wine producers, retailers and consumers' decisions: however, also the evolution of the wine market obliged European institutions to adapt rules to changes provoked by those decisions. World wine consumption has been greatly reduced from mid-90s. Since then, the degree of concentration of wine demand worldwide has increased. In the first decade of the new Millennium the highest levels of individual consumption remained concentrated in European countries with a strong wine tradition, such as France, Italy and Spain (which produced 80% of European wine and 50% of the world one). Other European countries, for example Germany and Greece, continued to consume limited quantities of wine. However, northern European countries without tradition on wine production revealed quite positive trends. Outside Europe, the consumption also grew up and some countries registered a considerable increase in the demand of wine: this in particular happened in USA, Russia, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, Canada, Brazil, Chile and Japan.[3]

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[3] A wide bibliography exists about changes in the wine market: besides chapters in this volume (and references they quoted), see Anderson and Pinilla (2018), Anderson et al. (2017), and Dougherty (2012). See also Eurostat reports and, in particular, as well as the reform of the EU wine market in the EU Commission portal (https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/wine/reforms_en).

So, the negative trend in the wine demand depended on the main wine markets and was mainly related to the changes in consumers' lifestyles and related diets. In the past, the consumption of wine in the main European winemaking countries was part of the everyday diet because it was an important part of the caloric intake necessary to perform work activities. From the 80s, the wine has become a matter of occasional consumption. The growing attention to health-related aspects, the increasing number of sedentary lifestyles and the growth of alternative (alcoholic or not) drinks in fact led to a decrease in the demand of wine (Hertzberg and Malorgio 2008). Moreover, the negative trend concerned the low-quality wines: consumers progressively reduced their consumption, but they drink better wine. This provoked an increasing competition in the wine market and stimulated winemakers to further improve the quality of their products and to better analyse the consumers' preferences towards quality attributes of wine. Face to these changes, the relevance of labelling increased and European institutions had to modify some rules: for example, sanctions against wine producers' false statements had to increase.

The Main European Policies for the Wine Sector

The European wine sector is deeply regulated: almost half of the world's vineyards are in fact located in the European countryside: vines strongly shape it because their surface in 2015 is 3,362,000 hectares (more than the dimension of Belgium). Moreover, the European wine producers are also the main importer and exporter in worldwide wine markets: in 2015 they produced the equivalent of 23 billions of bottles, that is 63% of the world wine production (Eurostat 2015). Due to the great importance of wine sector for the European agricultural economy, since the 60s the public regulation has provided a wide range of rules to protect and differentiate the production of wine: this happened in European countries and also in all countries were the wine market progressively assumed a social and economic relevance (Gaeta and Corsinovi 2014; Harvey and Waye 2014). Besides, the main changes characterizing the wine sector were mainly related to the product quality differentiation: the changes concerning this last included both processes, logistic along the supply chain and the market recognition of quality attributes of wines through labelling (Banterle and Stranieri 2013).

To protect wine sector, the European wine sector has been strictly regulated by the Common Market rules and in particular by legal framework related to the CAP. The European market for the wine sector was created in order to enable a gradual convergence of prices and the elimination of customs barriers, with the goal of establishing a single market for products with one common tariff for the rest of the world. Another important intervention for the regulation of European wine market was the Reform of 1999 which had the aim to align European supply and demand through the restructuration of large areas of vineyards, to eliminate the use of intervention as exits for surplus production, to arrange regional diversity, to recognize the role of producers and give them the possibility to guarantee a production that is in line with a market that demands higher quality products. To achieve these objectives, new rules in particular concerned: production potential, market mechanisms, oenological practices and processes, designations, presentation and protection of products and trade with third countries. In addition to these provisions, the regulation included the establishment of classification of authorized wine grape varieties, of a wine inventory and vineyard register. However, this reform was insufficient in reducing wine surpluses and EU still had to pay more money for wine sector. For this reason a new reform of the wine market was needed. In 2008 the European institutions reorganized the European wine market starting from the 2003 CAP reform introduced by Regulation (EC) 1782/2003. The reform adopted in 2008 followed the Regulations (EC) 509 and 510 of 2006 which established new severe procedures to obtain new European labels. It had different aims. Among these, the normative framework recognized the importance of the following: the abolition of the ineffective public intervention in European wine market; the convergence between European wine production and demand; the increase of European wine producers competitiveness; the reinforcement of European wines reputation; the improvement of market share both in the internal market and worldwide; the importance to protect the traditions of European wine cultivation and encourage the social and environmental role of winegrowing in rural areas.

In 2013 the European institutions adopted a further reform built with the aim of harmonizing and simplifying the outlines of the CAP. This reform was part of the wider reform of the CAP for the period from 2014 to 2020. The main topics discussed under the 2013 reform related to the national support programmes and the scheme of authorizations for vines plantings. European institutions had to consider the relevance for the environment as well as for the economy: in 2015 the European wine sector granted 3 million direct full-time jobs and the market value of European wine overcame 100 billion of euros (Eurostat 2015).

The first approach was linked to the one adopted in the framework of the 2008 reform. Thus, it regulated measures already existing in that reform. Such actions were: the restructuring and conversion of vineyards; the green harvesting; the mutual funds; the harvest insurance; investments; by-product distillation; promotion in third countries. The purpose of this normative framework was to foster new products and processes development, especially related to the introduction of advanced systems of sustainable wine production. In addition, it promoted the spread of information communicating with consumers about the responsible consumption of wine and about the system of the designations of origin and geographical indications.

With regard to authorizations, the planting rights approach was abolished by December 2015. New personal authorizations were granted without charge and were not transferable to the market. For this reason in 2016 a new system for the management of vine plantings was set up as the "Scheme of authorisations for vine plantings" in which EU Member States made available each year authorizations for new plantings corresponding to "1 per cent of the total area actually planted with vines in their territory, as measured on 31 July of the previous year". This plan was based on the outcome of the High Level Group on Vine Planting Rights organized in 2012 and its fully realization is foreseen for 2030.

Besides these rules which were promulgated to protect and regulate the European wine sector, different regulatory interventions succeeded in order to strengthen also the quality of wine. Such rules refereed mostly to three main issues: the market recognition of wine quality through the introduction of new labels; the introduction of rules for planting restrictions; the regulation of intrinsic quality wine attributes and their production methods.

The most relevant rule of the past was the Regulation (EC) No. 817/70 which introduced a specific regulation for the provisions relating to quality wines produced in specified regions (QWPSR). A quality wine produced in specified regions (PSR) could be sold under the name of the region granted it by the producer Member State. Examples of recognized quality schemes were the following expressions: “Naturwein”, “Originalabfullung”, “Spatlese”, “Auslese”, “Beerenauslese”, and “Trockenbeerenauslese” for German wine; “Champagne” for French wine. Moreover, these names could be followed by recognized expressions of quality, like “Qualitatswein” in Germany, “Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée” (AOC) and “Vin délimité de qualité supérieure” in France, “Denominazione di origine controllata” and “Denominazione di origine controllata e garantita” in Italy.

The AOC was the first quality label to be recognized at European level: it was in fact introduced in France for the wine industry since 1935. So European institutions used and improved the existing rules: such quality scheme regulated the geographical name of a country, province or terroir and it designed a product whose origins and characteristics were due exclusively or mainly to the geographical place of origin. Among the distinctive features of these products were also included the characteristics of human capital and natural resources and this became for consumers a guarantee of the quality of the wine. In addition to quality recognition policy, Regulations introduced also boundaries on the replanting of vines for European countries.

The Regulation 1161/76 introduced new rules on the definition of intrinsic quality parameters for wine. In specific, such normative framework aimed at introducing and changing rules on different aspects. Firstly, each European countries had to fix a minimum natural alcoholic strength for each of the quality wines produced within its territory. Secondly, winemaking and processing methods adopted for quality wines had to be defined. Third, the regulation also suggested that permission for the sweetening of a quality wine had to be asked to a Member State. The same authorization was referred also for the enrichment, acidification and de-acidification methods. With regard to planting restrictions, in these years a complete ban on all new plantings for table wines was introduced in Europe. Such intervention aimed at limiting the production of wine and incentivizing the production of quality differentiated products.

The Regulation (CEE) 823/1987 introduced the first system of European wine quality recognition. Such normative framework aimed at homogenizing the wine quality policy of each Member State and it regulated conditions of production and characteristics for quality wines PSR. With this Regulation new quality schemes were introduced: Quality wines produced in specified regions; Liqueur wine quality produced in specified region; Sparkling wines produced in specified regions; Semi-sparkling wine quality produced in specified regions. On the basis of such integration winemakers adopted a disciplinary of production, where the following information was provided: the determination of the production area; types of grape; cultivation methods; winemaking methods; title minimum blood alcohol; yield per hectare; analysis and assessment of organoleptic characteristics.

Italy in particular implemented such rules with the national law 164/92. Different quality labels were introduced within the Italian territory to diversify the quality characteristics of wines. They were: DOCG (Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita), DOC (Denominazione di Origine Controllata) and IGT (Indicazione Geografica Tipica). They became the main quality labels introduced for wine quality differentiation. More recently the label "biologico" ('organic wine') was introduced and it was referred to wines made from grapes grown in accordance with principles of organic farming which typically excludes the use of artificial chemical fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides and herbicides. As this last recognition was not cited in the law 164/92, a specific legislation about the "organic wine" did not exist and so producers had to follow the Regulation 2092/91, which fixed rules in a general way for all organic products.

The label DOC was attributed to wines produced in limited geographical areas (usually small/medium sized) and made following strict rules, which included: the use of some defined types of grapes and some established winemaking techniques; the existence of predetermined wine characteristics; the consumption only after accurate chemical and sensory analysis. For these wines was also permitted: the designation "Classico" coming from the ancient wine home areas; the designation "reserve", if the wine was exposed to a period of ageing (two years or more). At the same time, some restrictive product specification obliged the producers to the following requirements: the DOC designation on the label; the boundaries of the production area territory; the maximum yield of grapes per hectare; a minimum alcohol volume; the specification of chemical, physical and organoleptic characteristics of the wine; the production conditions (climate, soil, altitude, soil exposure); the authorized vine types; the density of the installations, pruning systems, etc.; chemical and organoleptic examination mode; any minimum period of ageing in wood and bottle ageing; any indication of the areas authorized bottling.

The DOCG was a particularly prestigious certification reserved for certain DOC wines of high quality or with a high international recognition. Producers had to follow rules more severe than those concerning DOC wines. These wines had to be marketed in containers of less than five litres and carry a label detailing the State, the guarantee of origin, quality and also the number of bottles produced. The market benefits granted by this designation increased producers' costs and so only the best wines received it (Belletti and Marescotti 2007).

Finally, IGT was quality awarded to table wines, which had generally a quite large production area and usually a quality inferior to DOC and DOCG wines. IGT wines corresponded to the French "Vin de Pays" and the German "Landwein". For these kinds of wines the production was regulated by simple and flexible rules. The following information was required: the indication on the label of the origin and the names of grape varieties; the boundaries of the production area territory; the list of grape varieties used in the production; the colour and wine type; the maximum yield of grapes per hectare; the alcoholic volume; the grape-wine yield; the authorized corrective practices.

With Regulation (EC) No. 479/2008 the oenological practices and the policy for wine quality were changed in order to harmonize the EU quality policy for food products with that of wine products. More precisely, such Regulation linked the PSR labelling normative with PDO and PGI rules. The new normative framework distinguished between wines of quality produced in a specific area and wines without a geographical indication. Within the first group there were PDO and PGI wines. PDO referred to wine which was entirely produced and transformed in a given geographical area. PGI referred to wine products where at least one production step within the supply chain was based in a specific geographical area. In specific, for PDO, the requirement was that "the production must take place in the geographical area [and] cover all the operations involved, from the harvesting of the grapes to the completion of the wine- making processes, with the exception of any post-production processes". For PGI wines, "the maximum 15 per cent share of grapes could arrive from outside the demarcated area" but it had to originate from the Member State or third country in which the demarcated area was situated". The consequence of this new regulation was that many IGT wines (or equivalent in other EU countries) became PGI ones. The result was a quality upgrade for many wine products.

However, the homogenization of the quality requirement for wine products with other foodstuffs led to a risk of consumer confusion towards new labels. Besides, the protection of wine products within international market was at the core of political debate in main European wine producers' countries and in particular in Italy (Chiodo 2008). PDO and PGI wines in fact represented (and they continue to represent now) a strategic element of Italian agri-food system: a great part of the Italian countryside (arriving at almost 50%) was in 2013 dedicated to the viticulture and from 50 to 80% of the wine production had the label PDO: this demonstrated the specialization of Italian wine production towards quality.[4]

Even if it is possible to realize an excellent wine without following the rules for the PDO wines (the excellent flavour of some wines depends on the mixing of grapes and must arriving from different terroirs) the relevance of European labels for consumers led all European wine producers to improve the vines dedicated to the production of PDO wines. So, the improvement of the quality concerned most of European wines and this increased the competition in the wine market and, consequently, obliged European institutions to intensify the controls concerning the respect of rules.

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[4] In 2013 Italian wine export represented 15% of national agri-food export. Among the first twenty food products exported, PDO and PGI wines played a very important role. Moreover, the 48% of cultivated land was used for PDO and PGI wines. In the northern Italy there existed the higher concentration of PDO wines: in most of terroirs more than 70% of wine production was used for PDO wines and this percentage increased up 80 in Lombardy. In Italy some exceptions were represented by Toscana and Sardinia only. In a context highlighting a negative trend concerning the cultivated land, the wine production had a positive trend together with the price of PDO and PGI wines. See Inea (2014), Ismea (2007, 2014), and Sardone (2013).

In 2013 a new reform was adopted with the aim of harmonizing and simplifying the outlines of the CAP. The regulatory frame of the 2008 reform was preserved but, for the wine sector, some changes were introduced and in particular concerned designations of origin and geographical indications. As labelling progressively assumed great relevance in the wine market, the labels became more severe and, at the same time, were more related to the respect of the guidelines established by consortia producing PDO and IGP wines.

European institutions increased controls on wine producers' statements influencing wine consumers' choices. Studies in fact revealed different determinants affecting consumers' attitudes towards wine consumption: in particular, consumer involvement and product knowledge affected consumer's preferences (Barber et al. 2009). So, not correct information about some wine attributes was able to modify the market in favour of not honest wine producers.

Wine producers and European institutions also concentrated their attention on the effects of different product quality attributes on wine consumer's preferences. There are extrinsic attributes which can be modified without changing the product itself (for example, the price, packaging, labelling and brand name) and intrinsic attributes which are directly connected to the product, to the processing method and to the perception of it (for example, the alcohol content and product sensory characteristics). It is evident that the first ones concern marketing only, while the second ones are also strictly related to the protection of consumers' health.

Besides, European institutions had to consider that wine preferences are affected by objective traits, sensorial variables and reputational attributes of wine producers. Objective traits are the price, origin, denomination of origin, grape variety, name of producer: the price of wine influences consumers' choice in particular when the other characteristics of the product are not known by consumers, or when it is difficult for these latter to evaluate the quality of the product; the others become relevant when consumers have a major knowledge of the characteristics of the terroirs and related wines. The sensorial variables includes product characteristics which are not known by consumers before the purchase: it is in fact possible to discover them only after the product tasting (for example, wine's aroma, body, finish and harmony of components). Reputational attributes are represented by all expectations about wine quality, built up through past experiences with the producer, the brand and the designation of origin: as their relevance progressively increased, European rules had to avoid that false statements deceive consumers and also create problem to honest producers of the same terroir (Landon and Smith 1997; Benfratello et al. 2009; Frick and Simmons 2013; Harvey et al. 2014).

Finally, the recent European rules also consider the problem of the sustainable development: consumers in fact show more interest about sustainable products and, in the wine sector, sustainability has become one of the primary concerns. Sustainability attributes attract consumer's attention as the other attributes: so, wine producers modify their strategies concerning the quality differentiation of their wine trying to underline the respect for the environment during the winegrowing and winemaking. This evidently implies that European rules have to regulate and control wine producers' statements and, moreover, verify that information is clear and does not confuse consumers in their purchasing decisions: studies in fact show that the risk of information overload exists and that labelling only the most important information helps wine producers to effectively differentiate their products from competitors.[5]

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[5] A wide bibliography exists about the problem to have a correct labelling which, respecting rules, really attracts consumers and, at the same time, allows producers to realize a quality differentiation. See, among other, Golan et al. (2001), Drichoutis et al. (2006), Kapsak et al. (2008), and Grunert et al. (2010). About wine producers' decisions, see also: Carpenter and Humphreys (2019).

The Main Technological and Organizational Innovations in the Wine Sector

The influence of European rules on the wine sector was relevant, but the novelties which, from the 60s to the new Millennium, mainly improved the quality of wine were related to technological, and organizational innovations.

With regard to technological innovations, from the 60s new packaging techniques were among the main drivers of novelties within the wine sector. During the 60s, the reduction of the dimension of the barrels (the *barriques* in wood oak) giving more oxygen during the fermentation or the recourse to new giant tanks (in stainless steel or fiberglass) to better conserve the product allowed producers to create new different types of wine having a better average quality and also a more competitive price. Moreover, the introduction of new technology for bulk wine transport also affected the quality of wine sold at international level. In specific, the introduction of new packaging technique "Flexitank" (big bag-in-box with a capacity of 16,000 to 24,000 litres) progressively substituted steel containers. From 2007, it has contributed to change bottled wine with bulk wine exports for the main wine exporting countries as Australia, USA and South Africa.

Thanks to this innovation, the quality attributes of wine were no more deteriorated because of reduced oxidation: a better preservation of organoleptic characteristics was guaranteed. By Flexitank it was possible to transfer wine from the areas of production to all areas of consumption. This provided a minimization of freight costs and the possibility to sell wine with a brand of origin at reasonable prices. The implication of such innovations related to an increased competition on the world wine markets because more quality wines were available within the same market.

The introduction of this new technology had both positive and negative effects. With regard to positive effects, a cost reduction, a minimization of environmental costs due to lower wine transports certainly played an important role. With regard to negative effects, the augmentation of unemployment and the economic consequences on the glass industry were acknowledged.

In addition to packaging advances, different innovations related to the wine traceability also characterized the evolution of the quality characteristics of wine products. Among these, the Quick Response (QR) code, was recently adopted within the food industry as a two-dimensional barcode (Tarjan et al. 2015). The QR collected a higher quantity of information than the one-dimensional code, and it could be incorporated into users' smartphone applications: these latter allowed consumers to scan and decipher product information (Kim and Woo 2016). The introduction of QR technology led to an increase of product knowledge and to a reduction of market failure associated to the information asymmetry between producers and consumers: this is important for experiential products, like wine (Wilson and Quinton 2012).

With regard to organizational innovations of the wine sector, different elements of novelty were introduced. They were mainly related to changes in the organization of wine supply chain. Among these, the major variations depended on: the implementation of sustainability aspects within the supply chain; the adoption of voluntary safety and quality standards; the role of producers and retailers in the management of vertical relationships.

As sustainability of wine production progressively increased its relevance in the wine market and played a strategic role at international level (Klohr et al. 2013), different initiatives were developed to promote the sustainability of wine supply chain. The first was launched in California in 1992 (Integrated Pest Management Programme). Later, many countries started to support sustainability, especially countries belonging to the "New world of wine", such as "California Sustainable Winegrowing Program" (California, USA), "Entwine" (Australia) and "Sustainable Winegrowing" (New Zealand). These initiatives brought to the implementation of voluntary standards for environmental, social and economic sustainability of the wine production. Some initiatives related to sustainable-related wine supply chains also concerned the European terroirs. For example the "Vignerons en Développement Durable" programme, a French collective brand for the sustainable viticulture based on the subscription of regulations composed by responsibilities with the aim of reaching goals connected to the sustainability. Another example was "VIVA Sustainable Wine" which was developed by the Italian Ministry of the Environment with the collaboration of several Italian Universities and research centres. The aim of this programme is the evaluation of the company's performance from the environmental, social and economic perspective and of the communication tools used to reach the final consumer using the QR code which allows identifying the company results with respect to four indicators: Air, Water, Vineyard and Territory.

With regard to the adoption of safety and quality schemes, it was important the adoption of voluntary schemes which were referred both to public and private standards. Public standards related to the recognition of wine origin through the PDO and PGI certifications and environmental-friendly wine attributes through Organic standard. Private standards were linked to holistic approaches to renewable agriculture through biodynamic procedures (Demeter) or to the adoption of standards which aimed for the reduction of unfair practices among wine operators. Such rules referred to traceability schemes entailing a higher complexity compared to the mandatory scheme introduced by Regulation 178/2002. In specific, these standards, like for example ISO 22005, referred to traceability standards, whose system had a high level of depth, breadth and precision.[6] Traceability depth referred to the sectors of the wine supply chain which were involved by the system. The breadth of the system referred to the amount of information traced. The precision of the traceability referred to the probability to reconstruct the complete history of a certain product and to the dimension of the tracking unit used to trace products. The higher the breadth, depth and precision of traceability, the higher its complexity, and the higher the probability to efficiently manage unfair practices and exogenous shocks within the wine supply chain (Wu et al. 2012; Manning and Soon 2014; Tähkäpää et al. 2015).

In terms of variations in the organization of supply chain driven by these voluntary systems, an increase in transaction transparency and in the bilateral dependency of economic agents was revealed (Banterle and

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[6] About the relevance and usefulness of the traceability in the food industry, a wide bibliography exists. See, among others: Golan et al. (2004), Trienekens and Zuurbier (2008), Aung and Chang (2014), and Charlebois et al. (2014).

Stranieri 2008). Indeed, the introduction of these voluntary standards increased the supply chain efficiency due to a strengthening of vertical relationships and the reduction of transaction information asymmetry. However, the adoption of complex traceability faced some difficulties, which were associated to the costs for its adoption, the type of product considered, and to the complexity of the supply chains (Canavari et al. 2010). Moreover, the increase of transparency offered by complex traceability caused opposing effects within the supply chain, because of the presence of different interests among food firms and their tendency to behave opportunistically during transactions (Ringsberg 2014). The decision on the voluntary traceability for wine producers in fact depended on the firms' strategy, i.e. from their strategic incentives towards the implementation of traceability (Karlsen et al. 2013).

With regard to the role of producers in the organizational innovation of the supply chain, it was possible to note an increasing role of the producers associations within the wine sector. Such forms of supply chain organization implied an increase in supply chain coordination due to the integration of the production and processing phase. Moreover, a strengthening of vertical relationships was due to the introduction of supply chain agreements implying new severe production rules to be respected by all members of the association.

Retailers also played an important role in the reorganization of wine supply chains. The strategic role of food retailers within the supply chain depended on different aspects: their strategic position at the end of the supply chain and their big dimensions compared to wine producers. With regard to the first aspect, the direct connection with consumers allowed them to quickly perceive their preferences and needs. This also allowed to reach information about market changes more quickly than the other actors of wine supply chain and to have more available information during negotiations.

Moreover, the food retailing was characterized by some big firms which concentrated a high percentage of food supply. On the opposite, most of wine producers had small dimensions. For example, in Italy the system of wine production was based on about 55,000 operators subdivided into producers-winemakers, winemakers and winegrowers' associations. The first and the last category of firms were examples of supply chain integration, whereas the second type of firms was part of supply chains mainly organized through hybrid forms of transacting, such as contracts and similar agreements. More than 90% of Italian wine firms was represented by winemakers even if they produced only a quarter of total national wine production. This entailed a power asymmetry between retailers and most of the agent of the wine supply chain and a progressive affirmation of retailers power: these later were the leader of the wine supply chain, coordinating the activities of the other agents.

Currently, retailers centralized information and production flows of the supply chain in order to better monitor activities and to guarantee a higher degree of food safety and quality. To reach this goal they introduced private standards with the aim to standardize quality procedures within the food supply chains. BRC (British Retailers Consortium) and IFS (International Food Standard) represented two relevant retailer standards for the efficient management of the supply chain. In specific, BRC was introduced by retailers in order to standardize the rules for suppliers with regard to food safety, food quality and other parameters (Contato 2007). This standard also introduced rules related to environmental and social sustainability. The environmental aspects related to a reduced use of chemicals in production processes, and to an efficient waste and water management within the food supply chain. The social aspect of this certification was based on the respect of work conditions with regard to labour rights and work safety issues.

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Correction to: Foundations for a Comparative Research Programme Between Wine Markets in the Twentieth Century

Romain Blancaneaux

Correction to:
Chapter "Foundations for a Comparative Research Programme Between Wine Markets in the Twentieth Century" in:
S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_10

The original version of this chapter was inadvertently published with author's forename and surname interchanged. The interchanged name Blancaneaux Romain has now been corrected to Romain Blancaneaux. The chapter has been updated with the corrections.

The updated version of this chapter can be found at
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_10

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27794-9_12

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S. A. Conca Messina et al. (eds.), *A History of Wine in Europe, 19th to 20th Centuries, Volume II*, Palgrave Studies in Economic History,
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