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Measuring Hierarchy in the European Union and Eastern Partnership Countries

Yuval Weber

1 Introduction

After nearly two decades of relative absence from European and international headlines, Russia has returned to the top tier of European concerns. Since long-time leader Vladimir Putin's striking denunciation of the US-led international order at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 (Putin 2007), Russian policymakers have demonstrated repeatedly that they are dissatisfied with their place in international affairs and are willing to revise that order to bring about an increase in their power and status (Weber 2016; Krickovic and Weber 2017, 2018). To bolster its claim that, as a great power, it should be entitled to prerogatives such as a sphere of influence, consultation on continental and international security issues, and the cessation of external pressure on internal affairs such as the state of its democracy and the openness of its economy (Karaganov 2015;

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Suslov 2016), Russia has directly and indirectly challenged the post-Cold War distribution of power internationally, in Europe, and, most forcefully, in the states of the former Soviet Union that have pursued alternative security, political, and economic institutional partners, primarily with the European Union, NATO, and the United States.

This chapter sets out to theoretically define and empirically measure Russia's purpose and success in re-establishing hierarchy in areas it previously governed directly or controlled indirectly as the Soviet Union during the period following the end of World War II through the dissolution of the Soviet state in 1991 with particular reference to the European Union's Eastern Partnership programme. While I do not adjudicate the moral appropriateness or legitimacy of Russia's claims to hierarchical control or influence over former Soviet or communist states, I do take Russia's pursuit of a sphere of influence seriously, especially regarding the six states of the Eastern Partnership that Russian leaders have often referred to as their "redline": Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine (Zagorski 2011; Cadier 2014; Keil and Michelot 2017). In turn, this chapter evaluates whether Russian leaders have succeeded in their self-appointed task of returning Russia to great power status in Europe via a hierarchical bloc of states, more commonly referred to as a sphere of influence, both generally and in their immediate neighbourhood.

No scholar or observer would seriously claim that Russia is as weak today in terms of power projection as it was in the 1990s during the years of post-Soviet poverty and disorganisation. Any analysis of Russian power today could point to any number of actions that have reshaped international security, including, but not limited to, intervening on behalf of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the war against Georgia, granting asylum to wanted American contractor Edward Snowden, supporting Bashar Assad in Syria's violent civil war, annexing Crimea from Ukraine, overseeing a civil insurrection in Ukraine against the Kiev central government, and involvement in electoral interference and assassinations in the United States and Europe.

However, the data show that the Russian campaign under Putin to reshape the political, diplomatic, security, and economic decision-making of previously Soviet and communist states into a coherent and consistent bloc has largely failed. There are two important considerations that

temper the definitiveness of this claim. First, this is not to claim that Russia is weak or alone in the world, but, instead, that its set of allies in 2019 remains approximately the same, or even smaller, compared to when Putin came to power in late 1999. Second, the clarity and consistency of Russian foreign policy means that the chief danger to states seeking to move away from Russian hierarchical claims is declining political, diplomatic, security, and economic leadership from the United States and the European Union. When formerly Soviet and formerly communist states wish to reorient themselves towards the Euro-Atlantic bloc, insufficient direction and support from the Euro-Atlantic bloc leave these states in a dangerous position—having left one house, but unable to enter another.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I articulate Russian foreign policy as a concerted effort to reconstruct a sphere of influence amongst formerly Soviet and communist states. Defining this more explicitly as a hierarchical bloc, in which a dominant state (Russia) provides a political or economic order of value to subordinate states (post-communist and post-Soviet countries) who then grant legitimacy and comply with the behavioural restraints necessary for the production of that order, the threat to Russia from Euro-Atlantic states and multilateral institutions becomes exceedingly clear: they provide a competing hierarchical order for states to join and keep Russia in a subordinate international position relative to the United States.

Second, I provide a novel quantitative index of hierarchy and resilience along Russia's borders, featuring an original data set of security, diplomatic, economic, and informational indicators. As hierarchy is the existence of unequal political relations between states contra to the common theoretical assumption of anarchy, it should be observed through the deliberate process of shaping the economic, political, social, and security decisions of other states to bring them into one state's alliance and unavailable for others. Instead of focusing solely on dramatic but infrequent superpower confrontation, this index focuses on the alliance maintenance that comprises most of international politics. The Hierarchy and Resilience Index (HRI) measures the extent to which states in Europe and Eurasia are resilient to the hierarchical orders of Russia, China, and the United States in four categories: security, diplomacy, economy, and

information. The HRI shows that in Central Asia, Chinese economic domination has shifted the region, in the Caucasus, Russia has few tools outside of security domination to shape political realities on the ground, and in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia's influence is limited to the pressure it exerts on Belarus.

Finally, I evaluate the shape of international politics with a focus on the Eastern Partnership. If great power competition was solely great power confrontation, Putin's skilful diplomacy has raised Russia back into the highest realms of international politics. Bringing in alliance expansion and management, however, shows that Putin's diplomacy has won the battle, but lost the war when it comes to the Eastern Partnership. The European Union's plans to extend itself across the rest of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus has been successfully blocked by splitting Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. However, the last three states have exited Russian hierarchy so dramatically, they are effectively European and American outposts. The main challenges to European stability and the Eastern Partnership countries have less to do with Russian pressure, as that is now a structural feature in regional politics, but more to do with (1) Chinese economic power limiting the sovereignty of states in and around the European Union and (2) disinterest from an inconsistent United States.

2 Theorising Hierarchy and Russian Dissatisfaction

The hierarchical battle between Russia, the United States, and China for influence and allies in Europe and Eurasia encompasses much of contemporary international politics, and specifically on the formerly Soviet states in the Eastern Partnership. Although this chapter focuses on Russia, the presence and ambitions of China and the United States, alongside the sovereign aspirations of states in Russia's purported sphere of influence, limit and reduce Russia's own presence and ambitions. For China, one of the chief components of its grand strategy is its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Eder and Mardell (2018) pithily summarised just how far the project has come along:

> When China's party and state leader Xi Jinping first announced his plan for a "Silk Road Economic Belt" and "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" in the fall of 2013, the concept sounded vague and its content was difficult to interpret. While Western observers are still trying to make sense of the initiative, which is now called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is creating new realities on the ground. Five years down the road, China has invested more than 70 billion USD into BRI-related infrastructure projects, not counting projects still under construction or in the planning phase, which involve much larger investment volumes. It is clear by now that BRI is about much more than securing China's trade routes and energy supplies as well as exporting its industrial overcapacities to far-away construction projects. The initiative is a key part of Xi Jinping's grand foreign policy design to increase China's influence in its regional neighborhood and beyond.

As Fig. 9.1 demonstrates, the BRI is a long-term, global development, tying China to Europe over land and sea, and which will incorporate security components as China will look to secure and defend its forward operating bases and projects.

The experience of the World Wars and the Cold War has defined the United States' security needs over the past seven decades. The alliance network it has built since 1945 has resulted in the largest economic space and the strongest military alliance in modern history. Figure 9.2 depicts the reach of the US military in Europe.

For the United States and China, the creation of international power and regional hierarchy alongside what appears to be the blueprint for future build-up of international power and regional hierarchy over the next several decades has suggested that international politics will return to bipolarity instead of multipolarity (Burgess 2016; Maher 2018; Mearsheimer 2019).[1] Where does all of this leave Russia, a state dissatisfied with the existing international order? I argue here that even as Russia cannot match the economic capabilities of its rivals, it has followed a logic of hierarchy. First, to ameliorate its sense of dissatisfaction with the current distribution of power in the world and, second, to try and regain

[1] For a strong counterargument that the world is moving towards multipolarity with a weak Russia bandwagoning alternately between the United States or China, see Mearsheimer (2019).



Fig. 9.1 Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure network, 2018 (Source: Eder 2018)



Fig. 9.2 U.S. European Command military installations (Source: Heritage Foundation Report *Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital* (Coffey 2012))

great power status as acknowledged and respected by the United States and China, the two most powerful single states in the international system.

The rest of this section oversees the origins and consequences of the gap in power and status that defines contemporary Russian strategic-political

culture (Larson and Shevchenko 2010), and the subsequent "revisionist" challenge to the Western international order. It begins with theoretical examination of the origins and consequences of international political order and hierarchy to define who is a great power and why Russia has not been universally recognised as such. Employing international hierarchy as a theoretical concept to guide inquiry is to identify structural sources of Russian dissatisfaction. While this may miss specific complaints or tactics, which might be more easily identified through paradigmatic or levels-of-analysis interpretations of Russian foreign policy, hierarchy as a concept captures the whole thrust of a country's grand strategy. Additionally, considering Russia's foreign policy in light of hierarchy concerns illuminates the political path that any Russian leader would need to follow to gain the informal power necessary to build and sustain a power vertical (Keenan 1986). The policies pursued by Putin over his nearly two decades in office is not about any particular political genius, but identification of a clear, broad goal—make Russia into a recognised great power able, and permitted by other great powers, to set the rules of international political and economic interaction—and recognition that limiting political competition at home and in the region was probably the only way to get a chance to achieve it (Hill 2016; Gunitsky 2018).

This chapter elides Russia's direct confrontation and coordination with the United States and China, as well as the general course of Russian domestic politics in the past two decades. Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe the numerous levers pursued by Russia during Putin's time in office to rebuild a sphere of influence, such as natural gas diplomacy (Nygren 2008; Barkanov 2018; Holland 2017), the Russian Orthodox Church (Davis 2018), bilateral outreach across Europe (Forsberg and Haukkala 2018; Smith 2018), East Asia (Kuhrt 2018; Lukin 2018), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Freire 2018), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Deyermond 2018), the Eurasian Economic Union (Molchanov 2018), and others. However, what Russia did during Putin's time in office was a concerted effort to rebuild a hierarchical order through rules, opportunities, and institutions to bind neighbouring states to Russia so that it could compete at the great power level with states it considered its peer competitors, chiefly the United States, China, and Europe more broadly. The following section evaluates that broader effort.

2.1 International Hierarchy

Recent scholarship on the American-led international order has set out to identify when an international order begins, who comprises its leading (or great) powers, what the rules by which the order operates are, and how leading and non-leading states relate to each other.[2] The enduring work in this field, John Ikenberry's *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, argues that the origin of any particular international order begins from the conclusion of the previous great power war, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War (Ikenberry 2019). The settlement of that war commences the next cycle of international politics by defining the great powers of the international system, their power relative to each other, and the rules that govern their interactions. Great powers are identified as those states that are able to impose foreign policy decisions upon others and to resist the impositions of others; they are "makers" of the international order with other states being "takers" of international order (Mastanduno 2009).

What distinguishes international *order* from mere power politics in Ikenberry's and others' conceptions is the thicket of security, political, and economic institutions put in place by the winners of the previous conflict that incorporate the losing states of that conflict into the international order. When winners generate institutions that restrain themselves, they reduce the consequences of defeat and ensure buy-in from the losers. Conversely, when winners generate institutions that do not constrain themselves, they increase the consequences of defeat and incentivise resistance from the losers.

The notion that war settlement extends into peacetime to determine how winners and losers, the strong and the weak, relate to each other in durable ways challenges one of the core elements of modern International Relations research since Kenneth Waltz's watershed contribution in *Theory of International Politics*: the assumption of anarchy defining the international structure (Lake 2007, 2009). Waltz (1979) distinguished the anarchical ordering principle of the international structure from the

[2] For very broad review articles, see Nye (2017) and Ikenberry (2018).

hierarchical ordering principle of domestic polities through a stylised reinterpretation of state sovereignty in a post-Treaty of Westphalia universe. He argued that all polities have some sort of domestic government, a hierarchical ordering principle that eventually culminates in a leader. In contrast, the international sphere has no such world government, and, without one, all states face the same imperative of survival and reproduction, with only varying power capabilities determining how to provide the security necessary to achieve those goals. The fear of war emerging from the lack of a single overarching power can generate numerous strategies for mitigating the effects of anarchy.

Waltz explicitly distinguished between international and domestic spheres, but a relatively underappreciated strategy, now coming into sharper focus, is for most states simply to accept hierarchical orders (beyond crisis-driven choices of balancing or bandwagoning) and leaving anarchy to the great powers. For those states that are willing to take foreign policy orders from others, choosing subordination instead of isolation is the acceptance of hierarchy in the international sphere. The existence of "hierarchy" does not imply a pejorative relationship between states, but, instead, acknowledges that juridically equal states do not exercise sovereignty equally. They instead form, as David Lake has argued, "hierarchical relations between the hegemon/hierarch and subordinate that] are best seen as bargained relationships in which the dominant state provides 'services'"—such as order, security, and governance—to subordinate states in return for compliance. What distinguishes the various forms of hierarchy, from colonialism to modern alliances, is the amount of sovereignty ceded to the leading state. Thus, Lake relies on two premises to challenge international anarchy and identify the basis of hierarchy: first, that hierarch and subordinate develop a relational social contract and, second, that rights, obligations, and even sovereignty itself are manifold, distinguishable, and divisible (Lake 2009).

The ambiguous distinction between the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the end of the Soviet state in 1991 has upset Russian policymakers to the present day, and motivated its attempt to reconstitute a sphere of influence as a hierarchical bloc. The end of the Cold War allowed the post-Communist states to adopt the thicket of Euro-Atlantic security, political, and economic institutions previously denied to them vis-à-vis membership in the Warsaw Pact and Council of Mutual Economic

Assistance. The end of the Soviet state afforded Russia the same choice, in effect: the opportunity to choose hierarchical subordination within the Euro-Atlantic bloc, or isolation as a former superpower. By denying Russia the great power condominium its leaders sought with the United States to jointly govern international relations, and by offering Russia the same deal as the states the Soviet Union used to dominate, the Euro-Atlantic bloc reduced the consequences to hierarchy from all states *but* Russia, and increased the resistance *from* Russia.

The source of Russian dissatisfaction with the international order, and the motivation to regain a sphere of influence, is that American-led unipolarity defined the international system and the US-led liberal international order grew even stronger with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In his June 18, 1992, speech to the US Congress, Boris Yeltsin (1992) pleaded with the representatives:

> Now that the period of global confrontation is behind us, I call upon you to take a fresh look at the current policy of the United States towards Russia and also to take a fresh look at the longer-term prospects of our relations. Russia is a different country today… Let us together, therefore, master the art of reconciling differences on the basis of partnership which is the most efficient and democratic way. This would come naturally both for the Russians and the Americans. If this is done, many of the problems which are now impeding mutual, advantageous cooperation between Russia and the United States would become irrelevant.

Yeltsin, and his predecessor Mikhail Gorbachev, wanted the United States to treat Russia as a special ally so they could leverage that revision of the international order (after 1989 and after 1991) to compensate for the sudden lack of allies abroad (having given up on the external empire in Eastern Europe and elsewhere) and the internal tumult over the late 1980s and early 1990s. They both wanted American help to alleviate the pressures exerted upon them from changes to internal affairs, regional hierarchies, and the international order. Gorbachev and Yeltsin did not want merely money or status from the United States, for which Realist or Constructivist frameworks would be sufficient, but American assistance in redefining how Russia would be run and how Russia would interact with its neighbours and in the international system broadly. They wanted

to revise the international order to be a partner of the United States, not a subordinate, while simultaneously receiving distributional gains to smooth reforms and alleviate internal privation.

This combination of seeking money *and* status makes other frameworks insufficient for understanding the origins of Russian dissatisfaction because Russia considered itself different from other European states who were willing to trade off money for status. The post-*Soviet* political, economic, and security institutions allowed Russia a pathway to the West so long as it abdicated everything it held dear as a perennial great power and recent superpower, an unacceptable trade-off. As the memorable phrase by Stephen Sestanovich (2000) put it, the Russians were "lousy joiners" who were insufficiently attracted to membership in institutions they had not designed:

> Participation (by Russia) was expected to give them a stake in a more regularised, consensual, rules-based international order. The prestige of membership would confirm that they had not been permanently relegated to second-class status by decades of communism. For Russia, it would show that defeat in the Cold War was not a setback but a new opportunity. Most important, the practical benefits of drawing steadily closer to Western institutions would create continuing incentives for governments and societies to reshape themselves—their economies, their military establishments, their international conduct, their way of thinking.

It is not a stretch to consider how this offer left both sides disappointed and worse off—Russians were unenthusiastic to be treated the same as those they used to rule or control, and Americans were disappointed by Russian lack of enthusiasm for prestige by proxy. For Yeltsin and any subsequent leader, to accept Western terms would be acceptance of indefinite second-tier status, a disappointing structural result, only two-plus years out from the promises of great power cooperation at Malta (Goldgeier and McFaul 1992; Trenin 2006; Mead 2014). Moreover, acceptance of those terms would violate the basic sense that Russians themselves had ended both the Cold War and the communist system of governance, for which they were unjustly receiving no reward (English 2000).[3]

[3] Suslov (2016: pp. 2–3) describes Russian political culture's position about 1989 in a tone balanced between wistful and sarcastic: "The paradigm of Russian policy in late 1980s, early 1990s was that we contribute to unification of Germany, allow for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, withdraw the Soviet

Newly independent states in Europe sought security through joining pre-existing institutional arrangements such as the European Union and NATO, or through mirroring successful practices of the leading states (Marten 2018). Russia neither was a good "joiner" nor could it revise the international order, so it existed awkwardly on the sides of international politics, joining in on specific issues but not defining the security agenda of Europe or the world. It lost previously subordinate states to the Euro-Atlantic hierarchy and made few new allies, while the lack of world government and anarchy permitted the creation of a much bigger rival hierarchy. Nearly all post-socialist states willingly gave up autonomy and took on significant restrictions to legal-formal sovereignty, but Russia neither accepted the invitation nor could do much about it. The result for Russia was that if it did not want to turn into just another member of the Euro-Atlantic hierarchy and give up all great power pretensions, nor challenge the distribution of power internationally in an era of American unipolarity, it would have to create (or recreate) a sphere of influence of its own subordinate states as the only way to "enjoy" the state of anarchy as an undisputed great power.

3 Measuring Hierarchy and Resilience

The origins of Russia's dissatisfaction have shaped its motivations to construct a hierarchical bloc of states, commonly known as a sphere of influence. After more than a decade of open revision of the international and regional orders from Russia, countless scholarly, popular, and think tank publications have been released in the past decade on the subject, but none provide a holistic and thorough measurement. Although measures of aggregate material power exist, such as the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities from the Correlates of War project,[4] International Futures from RAND Corporation (Treverton and Jones 2005), Geometric

3 troops from the CEE not because we do it in order to obtain more—leading seat at the decision-making table, position of country No. 2 after the US, vice-president in the Global Earth Corporation. We dismantle the former Soviet empire, in order to rule the world together with the US."

[4] See Correlates of War Project. 2017. National Material Capabilities V5.0. (available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/).

Indicator of National Capabilities (Kadera and Sorokin 2004), these say little about *political* relationships between states on a dyadic basis and, in particular, ignore the ability or agency of subordinate states to shape the hierarchical relationship. While other measures capture notions of soft power, such as the Soft Power 30 from the University of Southern California's School of Public Diplomacy (McClory 2018) and Irene Wu's Soft Power Rubric (Wu 2018), those rely heavily on perceptions and aspirations worldwide towards specific countries without clarifying how soft power could limit or expand the dyadic relationship between any two specific states.

To bridge this gap between the measurement of hard and soft power, and specifically its application to the measurement of hierarchical relationships between specific countries, I develop a novel Hierarchy and Resilience Index (HRI) that is based on an original data set. An index such as the HRI can illuminate both trends as well as the state of hierarchy, influence, and resilience in a single dyadic relationship in a single year. The importance of providing objective data is to have a sense of how great powers try to shape the decisions of others and where influence actually lies, instead of drawing upon anecdotes or outlying data points.

The HRI measures, on a dyadic basis, the hierarchical relationships of Russia, China, and the United States to nearly all of the states of Europe and Eurasia across several indicators grouped into four categories, namely (1) security, (2) economics, (3) diplomacy, and (4) information and weighted equally within the categories.[5] The four categories were selected because they represent the basic levers of power and influence associated with international interactions.[6] Policymakers, therefore, can evaluate which of the four categories drive the relationship between Russia, China, the United States, and any one of the states of Europe and Eurasia, while scholars can analyse the effect of specific policy decisions or significant events. In the Annexes (in the Methodology for the hierarchy and resilience index section), I provide a country-year example to demonstrate

[5] Several states are missing data, primarily Andorra, Switzerland, and Kosovo.

[6] Further research will include more, and more nuanced, indicators of hierarchical relations, but the existing data set provides a suitable first cut at exploring the patterns of hierarchy between states in Europe and Eurasia.

how the HRI is calculated, and I explain later the rationale and data sources for these categories and indicators.

The HRI evaluates how Russia, China, and the United States compete against each other in collecting allies and shaping their decisions by focusing, counterintuitively, on how able subordinate states are to resist hierarchical power and influence. China and the United States are included because "sphere of influence" implies competition by great powers for smaller states to enter into clear hierarch-subordinate relationships, and Russia is primarily concerned with increasing its influence and power in Europe and Eurasia in competition with China and the United States.[7]

By identifying when and how smaller states lack resilience to the security, diplomatic, economic, and informational pressure of a larger power, the HRI identifies the presence of hierarchy by the absence of resilience. The spectrum from full resilience to full hierarchy comports with the difference between the "makers" of international affairs and the "takers": great powers with independent foreign policies make decisions independent of others and are resilient to the actions of others, but subordinate states take the decisions of others. What the HRI measures, therefore, is where any dyadic relationship falls along that spectrum.

The data of the HRI are collected into five distinct pathways by which hierarchy between a great power and a subordinate state can be constructed. Those five pathways include an "All Is Equal" model in which each of the four categories are weighted equally to account for a possibility that security, diplomacy, economics, and information are equally important to the establishment and sustainability of hierarchy. The other four pathways weight one of the categories (security, diplomacy, economics, and information) as half of the total model, weighting the other three as one-sixth of the total model. This generates a realist-inspired security model of hierarchy and resilience; a diplomatic model that stresses international political interaction; an informational model that stresses resilience (or not) to disinformation; and an economic model inspired by

[7] Russia's interventions in Venezuela and Syria indicate desire to become a global player, and future iterations of this research project will evaluate Russia as a hierarchical player in Latin America and the Middle East.

Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State during World War II. Hull noted that, "[it] is a fact that war did not break out between the United States and any country with which we had been able to negotiate a trade agreement. It is also a fact that, with very few exceptions, the countries with which we signed trade agreements joined together in resisting the Axis. The political line-up followed the economic line-up" (Frieden 1988).

Figures 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 present the results for the "All is Equal" model for Russia, China, and the United States over the time period 2003–2017. Figures 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10 show the Security and Economic models. The data are reported in the Annexes (in the "All is important" model data and Eastern Partnership data sections—Tables 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, and 9.11). The HRI broadly shows that China's "rise" is to the detriment of Russia, the consolidation of the post-Communist states in the Euro-Atlantic alliance, and Russia's diminishing sphere of influence compared to the beginning years of Putin's tenure. (The following section on the Eastern Partnership demonstrates the last point very well: Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have left Russia's sphere of influence, while Belarus has maintained balance between several great powers, and Armenia and Azerbaijan are even more firmly in Russia's orbit.)

The balance of the results demonstrates that the period between 2008 and 2014 defines the extent of Russia's regional sphere of influence.



Fig. 9.3 Russian hierarchy, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)



Fig. 9.4 American hierarchy, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)



Fig. 9.5 Chinese hierarchy, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)

The 2008 financial crisis served as a critical juncture transitioning Central Asia from "post-Soviet" to "pre-China," and that process roughly concluded in the aftermath of the 2014 recession and global isolation of Russia when Russian policymakers concentrated their financial resources on stabilising the Russian economy ahead of subordinate partners. The Eurasian Economic Union, the vehicle by which Russia wished to use as the vehicle to expand its great power hierarchy, likely peaked during this time as it failed to incorporate Ukraine, and the financial consequences of sanctions greatly limited Russia's ability to export capital to its intended



Fig. 9.6 American hierarchy, "Security" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)



Fig. 9.7 Russia hierarchy, "Security" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)

sphere of influence. Russia's success in extending hierarchy into Europe also failed to get much traction, but the informational pressure from Russia into Central and Eastern Europe from information operations shows that the challenge for European states, particularly the newer post-Communist members, is the inconsistency of great power leadership from the United States. This inability of the United States to convince others of its leadership manifests in the weakening ability to enforce voting discipline in the United Nations General Assembly. In general, the HRI also demonstrates that social media will continue to challenge infor-



Fig. 9.8 American hierarchy, "Economic" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)



Fig. 9.9 Russian hierarchy, "Economic" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)

mational hierarchy as more people across the world shift away from television, newspapers, and radio as sources of information towards social media, a largely unregulated space where people choose their own information from like-minded individuals instead of legally accountable sources of authority and expertise. Additionally, although rarer, security and diplomatic changes are bigger and more dramatic, and the shifts of Ukraine, Georgia, and new entrants into NATO exclusively limit Russia's security hierarchy.



Fig. 9.10 Chinese hierarchy, "Economic" model, 2003–2017 (Source: Author's representation)

3.1 Composition of the Hierarchy and Resilience Index

The HRI comprises various indicators grouped into four categories that individually measure an aspect of hierarchy and resilience (i.e. security, diplomacy, economics, and informational). Table 9.1 identifies the categories, their indicators and the types of variables they are, how they are bounded, and their sources. Each of the indicators forms an equal weight within the category itself. A full example of how a score is produced is provided in the Annexes (in the Methodology for the hierarchy and resilience index section).

4 Evaluation of the Hierarchy and Resilience Index

The data used to comprise each of the categories reflect different potential pathways towards hierarchy and resilience and are reflected in the following differently weighted models, displayed in Table 9.2.

As described above, the first model assumes that international military, political, economic, and (dis)information are equally important in comprising hierarchical relations between two states. This means that to

Table 9.1 Categories and indicators of the hierarchy and resilience index

Category	Indicator	Explanation	Source
Security		Military alliances prohibit members from taking membership in other alliances, leading to path dependence of military planning and training, arms sales and transfers, and acceptance of foreign military installations on one's own territory	
	Arms sales	Concentration of arms suppliers (none from the United States, Russia, or China; multiple; or one of the hierarchs); potential scores are 0, 0.5, and 1	SIPRI[a]
	Defence pacts	Binary indicator of formal defence treaty between hierarch and subordinate; potential score is 0 or 1	NATO[b]; CSTO[c]
	Military bases	Binary indicator of subordinate's acceptance of hierarch's military base on own territory; potential score is 0 or 1	Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies[d]; US Department of Defence[e]
Economic		Deep economic relations lead states which trade with each other to be more fearful of losing that trade through conflict or rivalry. This is measured through how much a hierarch provides of a subordinate state's imports and foreign direct investment and consumes of a subordinate state's exports, as a percentage of all of the subordinate's imports, foreign direct investment, and exports	

(*continued*)

Table 9.1 (continued)

Category	Indicator	Explanation	Source
	Export dependence	Concentration of exports from subordinate to hierarch within all of the subordinate's exports. Inspired by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and normalised to a score between 0 (the subordinate exports nothing to the hierarch) and 1 (the subordinate exports only to the hierarch)	Eurostat[f]; Observatory of Economic Complexity[g]
	Import dependence	Concentration of imports from hierarch to subordinate within all of the subordinate's imports. Inspired by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and normalised to a score between 0 (the subordinate imports nothing from the hierarch) and 1 (subordinate imports only from the hierarch).	Eurostat; Observatory of Economic Complexity
	Foreign direct investment dependence	Concentration of foreign direct investment (FDI) in subordinate's economy from hierarch within the subordinate's total FDI. Inspired by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and normalised to a score between 0 (the subordinate receives no FDI from the hierarch) and 1 (the subordinate receives FDI only from the hierarch)	IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey[h]
Informational		Two aspects of "information wars" between states are its general digital resilience capabilities and the state of its press freedom. The former evaluates the resilience of a country's online environment regarding its digital media freedom, state Internet regulation capacity and approach, and online media polarisation. The latter is used to assess how far apart two states are in their press freedom rankings	

	Press freedom index score	Difference in places in the annual Press Freedom Index ranking divided by total number of countries. Compiled and published by Reporters Without Borders based upon the organisation's "own assessment of the countries' *press freedom* records in the previous year." Similar scores indicate similar environments for press freedom, while significant divergence indicate freer or less free press environments. Scores range from 0 (complete divergence) to 1 (same score)	Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index[i]
	Digital society project scores	Expert assessments on digital resilience from the Digital Society Project, an imprint of the Varieties of Democracy project. Scores range from 0 (complete lack of digital resilience) to 4 (complete resilience)	Digital Society Project[j]
Diplomatic		This category captures two of the most critical aspects of international hierarchy, voting at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and meetings between heads of state. UNGA voting is a critical measure of hierarchy because the non-binding nature of the votes means that states are free to express sincere foreign policy preferences, including signalling adherence to the foreign policy positions of the hierarch. Additionally, this category captures head of state meetings, a key mechanism by which states reward or punish others by granting audiences.	

(*continued*)

Table 9.1 (continued)

Category	Indicator	Explanation	Source
	United Nations General Assembly voting	Percentage of agreement between a subordinate state and a hierarch in voting at the United Nations General Assembly. Scores range from 0 (no convergence between votes, meaning that subordinate state votes the opposite of the hierarch on every single vote) to 1 (complete convergence between votes, meaning that subordinate state votes with the hierarch on every single vote)	Voeten, Erik; Strezhnev, Anton; Bailey, Michael, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data"[k]
	Head of state meetings	Measurement of meetings between subordinate and hierarch heads of state on an annual basis; potential scores are 0 (no meetings), 1 (single meeting), and 2 (multiple meetings)	US Office of the Historian[l]; Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, News[m]; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—China Vitae[n]

Source: author's representation

[a]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI arms transfers database (available at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers)

[b]North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. "Member Countries." (available at https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_52044.htm)

[c]Organizacija Dogovora o kollektivnoj bezopasnosti [Collective Security Treaty Organisation. "Sovet Kollektivnoj Bezopasnosti" [Collective Security Council] (available at https://odkb-csto.org/authorized_organs/collective_security_council/)

[d]Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies—"Russian Military Forces: Interactive Map" (available at https://www.gfsis.org/maps/russian-military-forces)

[e]United States Department of Defence—"Military Installations." (available at https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/view-all)

[f]Statistical Office of the European Commission—"Eurostat Database" (available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database)

[g]Simoes, A. J. G., & Hidalgo, C. A. (2011, August)—The economic complexity observatory: An analytical tool for understanding the dynamics of economic development. In Workshops at the twenty-fifth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence (available at https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/)

[h]International Monetary Fund—"Coordinated Direct Investment Survey Database" (available at https://data.imf.org/cdis)

[i]Reporters Without Borders—"2019 Press Freedom Index" (available at https://rsf.org/en/ranking)

[j]Mechkova, V., Pemsetin, D., Seim, B., & Wilson, S. (2019) "DSP Dataset v9" Digital Society Project (DSP, available at http://digitalsocietyproject.org/data/). See also Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., Teorell, J., Marquardt, K.L., Medzihorsky, J., Pemstein, D., Pernes, J., von Römer, J., Stepanova, N., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y., & Wilson, S. (2019). "V-Dem Methodology v9" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-9-apr-2019/)

[k]See Bailey et al. (2017) and Voeten et al. (2015)

[l]United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian.—"Travels Abroad of the President" and "Visits by Foreign Leaders" (available at https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president and https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits)

[m]President of Russia—"Events" (available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/trips)

[n]Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—"China Vitae" (available at http://www.chinavitae.com/)

Table 9.2 Weighted models

Model name	Security	Diplomacy	Economic	Information
"All Is Important"	25%	25%	25%	25%
Realist Security model	50%	16.67%	16.67%	16.67%
International Diplomacy model	16.67%	50%	16.67%	16.67%
Cordell Hull Economic model	16.67%	16.67%	50%	16.67%
Information model	16.67%	16.67%	16.67%	50%

Source: author's representation

induct and maintain a subordinate state in one's own sphere of influence, a hierarch employs various tools of statecraft, such as arms sales, defence pacts, military bases, buying imports, selling exports, providing foreign direct investment, ensuring similar press freedom and digital resilience environments, arranging similar votes in the United Nations General Assembly, and granting head of state visits, without any particular emphasis on any particular tool. The other models assume that security, diplomacy, economics, and information play leading roles in the establishment of hierarchical relations between two states. Although reference is made to the other models, space restrictions preclude full breakdown of the results, and the HRI results for the "All Is Important" model are the only general ones reported. The following section, on the Eastern Partnership, provides a more detailed exploration of results by examining the security and economic models, which show that the resilience of the Eastern Partnership is under greatest threat from US-Russia security competition from the West and China-Russia economic competition from the east.

4.1 Results for Russian, Chinese, and American Hierarchical Orders in Europe and Eurasia, 2003–2017[8]

For ease of interpretation, Europe and Eurasia are roughly divided by geographical or historical congruence into three categories: post-communist countries of Central and Southeastern Europe plus the three Baltic countries, Georgia, and Ukraine; the rest of the post-Soviet states;

[8] Due to incomplete data, results for Andorra, Macedonia, and Switzerland are not reported.

and the rest of the European continent. The choice to include Georgia and Ukraine in the post-Communist category instead of in the post-Soviet category reflects the extreme political shift towards the Euro-Atlantic order as a result of rivalry and war with Russia. Although this decision would appear to be prejudicial to the results, or "selecting on the dependent variable," (King et al. 1994) the intent of the HRI is to evaluate resilience of subordinate states to specific hierarchs, which should be reflected in how subordinate states themselves choose to resist or accept specific hierarchical orders.[9]

4.2 "All Is Important"

For the equally weighted "All Is Important" model, Figs. 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 display graphically the shifts in hierarchical orders across the European and Eurasian continental space. European states traditionally part of the Euro-Atlantic alliance demonstrate an appreciable decline in Russian hierarchy from 2003 to 2017, driven largely by the deterioration in economic relations with Russia in the post-Crimea sanctions era and the accompanying diplomatic isolation of Russia. The expulsion of Russia from the G-8 has limited the number of international meetings with leading European states Putin is able to attend, in addition to bilateral head of state meetings with European counterparts, except for Germany and France, who play a mediating role between the European Union and Russia. For the United States, the increase in NATO membership has consolidated Europe's security relationships within the Euro-Atlantic hierarchy, but overall hierarchy has increased only modestly. This is driven primarily by general European divergence in United Nations General Assembly voting from the United States and the decline of the military activities of America's strongest supporters in light of the Iraq War winding down. Chinese hierarchy in Europe also demonstrates decline, driven primarily by differences in diplomatic interactions, and informational openness between Europe and China.

[9] In fact, should Ukraine and Georgia be included in the post-Soviet states, the data show that Russia has even less control over its purported sphere of influence. The Russian bloc without Ukraine and Georgia is smaller, but purer.

In Figs. 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, red indicates an increase in hierarchical relations and blue indicates a decrease in hierarchy, or, alternatively, an increase in resilience. The results are the differences in hierarchy scores between 2003 and 2017, which captures the height of American hierarchy as the Iraq War began, the aftermath of the Ukraine war and annexation of Crimea for Russia, and the beginning stages of the Belt and Road Initiative reaching Central Asia and Chinese investment reaching Europe. They broadly show that the United States continues to maintain strong hierarchical relations across Europe, Russia holds some sway in the former Soviet Union, and that China is increasing its presence from east to west. The underlying data are presented in the Annexes (in the "All is important" model data section).

The following section focuses on the resilience of the European Union and the Eastern Partnership to external powers, showing that security competition between Russia and the United States defines the borderlands of Europe, and economic competition from China is bringing the borders of Eurasia closer to Europe.

Figure 9.3 depicts the greatest declines in Russian hierarchy to be in Ukraine, Georgia, the UK, and Kyrgyz Republic. The first two states engaged in armed conflict against Russia, the UK experienced several poisonings on its territory, and Kyrgyz Republic studiously pursued multi-vector diplomacy, following the Tulip Revolution of 2003. Russia increased its hierarchical presence in four groups of states: Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, where imposed security considerations from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) have grown; Greece and Turkey, which have sought alternative partners due to economic and political troubles with the Euro-Atlantic alliance; Iceland and Finland, which have acted as diplomatic go-betweens for the Euro-Atlantic alliance and Russia outside of the major visits by the leaders of France and Germany; and Cyprus, Malta, and Czech Republic, which provide numerous, and often dubious, financial services for Russian individuals and firms (Ledyaeva et al. 2013; Cooley et al. 2018).

Whereas Russia experienced declines across much of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, the opposite can be said for the United States. Figure 9.4 depicts declines concentrated largely in Western Europe, driven primarily by the diplomatic divergence caused by the Iraq War.

The rest of Europe reflects the expansion of NATO and the importance of the United States as an offshore balancer to Russia.

Figure 9.5 shows the beginning stages of Chinese entry into Europe and Eurasia on the basis of economic expansion. While the strongest increases of Chinese hierarchy are in Central Asia, where the Belt and Road Initiative has already started to reshape the trade and infrastructure patterns of the region, other increases follow no fixed geographical pattern, showing instead the general increase of Chinese investment and trade.

5 Eastern Partnership and the Shape of International Relations

The states of the Eastern Partnership are hemmed in between US-Russia security competition from the West, and China-Russia economic competition from the east. Figures 9.6–9.10 showing the Security and Economic models for the broader region illustrate the challenges for the European Union and the Eastern Partnership very clearly: (1) Western Europe losing enthusiasm for American leadership causes debate within the United States over the value of NATO as a defensive security alliance, posing a looming threat for abandonment of the newer European Union states and Eastern Partnership states, which itself would impose likely unattainable security requirements for the European Union; (2) the economic absence of the United States from Central Asia alongside Russia's declining clout in the region is shifting the region towards China, which will inhibit European Union efforts to export and establish its more transparent and sustainable rules of engagement and investment. The HRI shows that the resilience of the Eastern Partnership, not least the European Union itself, is dependent on the European Union, recognising the competitive nature of contemporary international politics and actively bolstering its regional foreign policy efforts, either towards supporting the United States more aggressively or generating independent security capabilities. Russia has been able to stop the development of the Eastern

Partnership through security means, and China has been able to provide a plausible alternative to it through economic means.

The following graphical representations of the Security and Economic models show the result of Russia's ability to impose security outcomes in Ukraine (war and annexation), Georgia (war and secessionist territories), and Moldova (frozen conflict), and China's economic might. They show that both the European Union's attempts to create a new wave of expansion and Russia's attempt to recreate a previously existing sphere of influence have failed. The data for Figs. 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10 are included in the Annexes (in the Eastern Partnership data section).

Figures 9.6 and 9.7 present the security competition between the United States and Russia in Europe and Eurasia. Figure 9.6, depicting American security hierarchy, is the story of NATO expansion into Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, as well as influence in those states seeking alternative security outcomes in the Caucasus (Georgia) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan). Figure 9.7, depicting Russian hierarchy, shows more declines generally and deepening mostly in Belarus and Armenia.

The key lesson for the European Union in general and particularly with regard to the Eastern Partnership is that Russian security policy is based around being recognised as a great power, especially by the United States. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 show the challenge for Russia to succeed on its own terms; the Eastern Partnership thus serves as metaphor for Russia's place in the world. The zero-sum view of great power competition that pushes Russian policymakers to view states as won or lost by how subordinate they are to Russian leadership has resulted in more American security presence in its region than ever before.

The second key lesson for what international politics poses for the European Union and its Eastern Partnership programme is that Chinese economic power is making its way closer. Figures 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10 present the American, Russian, and Chinese economic hierarchy models, and the visual results confirm anecdotal observations: Russia is receding as an economic power, the United States has little presence in Central Asia, and China is advancing westwards. Failure to redouble efforts in the Eastern Partnership will leave those states balancing between China and

Russia as economic versus security powers with relatively less European influence.

In an economically competitive international arena, China's economic strategy has been to go slowly but surely, perhaps in line with Cordell Hull's admonition to develop economic relationships as a prelude to political, and then security, ties. For the economically less developed states along the Belt and Road Initiative, it would appear that the easy foreign direct investment and attractive sovereign debt purchases have led to reshaping of import and export trade ties (Hurley et al. 2018). The studious "sustainability" approach of the European Union and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development may not appear as attractive in practice.[10]

6 Conclusions

This chapter evaluated the existence and development of hierarchy in Europe and Eurasia and found that of the three basic regions—the post-Soviet states that have hewn closely to Russia, the post-communist states that have migrated into the Euro-Atlantic hierarchy, and the traditional allies of the United States—Russia's efforts to bolster its hierarchical bloc through new subordinate allies have largely failed to get traction. In Central Asia, China has turned that region into a Western outpost of its powerful economy, while in Eastern and Central Europe, most states have sought closer and deeper relations with the United States and the European Union.

The Eastern Partnership, however, was the move that prompted Russia to push back as stridently as possible against foreign power and influence in its neighbouring states (Bechev 2015). Russia distinguished the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the six states of the Eastern Partnership—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,

[10] see European Commission—"EU Approach to Sustainable Development" (available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/international-strategies/sustainable-development-goals/eu-approach-sustainable-development_en) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—"Our Sustainability Approach" (available at https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership_en?page=1).

and Ukraine—because of different historical relationships (Larson and Shevchenko 2014; Nielsen and Vilson 2014). If Russia were to remake a sphere of influence in its direct bordering lands to compete as a great power in international affairs, it would have had to be through the states the Euro-Atlantic alliance was also interested in shaping. In the competition for the states of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus over the period from 2003 to 2017, Russia lost Georgia and Ukraine completely as potential subordinate allies, has effectively lost Moldova, yet has increased its control over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. The existence of territorial disputes, ongoing conflict, and frozen conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are the mechanisms by which Russia continues to extend influence into those states, so resolution of those conflicts would likely see Russian influence diminish even further and thus unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Finally, the chief lesson for policymakers in the European Union is that competition has returned to define international politics of Europe and its borderlands. The ability, and success, of the European Union to maintain its own institutions and collective sovereignty will depend upon buttressing the political, economic, security, and informational hierarchies of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and offering material support and leadership to those states that show an interest in joining or allying with the European Union. Failure to do so will be considered in those states, and by external powers, that the European Union is not willing to backup lofty rhetoric with concrete substance.

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Annex 1: Methodology for the Hierarchy and Resilience Index

To explain how the Hierarchy and Resilience Index is generated between all of the states of Europe and Eurasia and the three external powers, Russia, China, and the United States, this section of the Annexes explains the scoring for Georgia in 2003 and 2017.

The categories, indicators, and data sources for a country's HRI score relative to an external power are explained in great detail in Table 9.1. Each indicator is weighted equally within the category.

For the security category, the three indicators are arms sales, defence pacts, and military bases of the external power.

Arms sales are coded 0 (none from the three hierarchs), 0.5 (multiple suppliers), or 1 (one of the hierarchs). Georgia in 2003 had no arms imports from Russia, China, or the United States and is coded as zero. Georgia in 2017 had arms imports from the United States only and is coded as 1 (Table 9.3).

Defence pacts are a binary indicator of formal defence treaty between hierarch and subordinate, and although Georgia had been a member of the CSTO from 1994–1999; in both 2003 and 2017, the country was a member of no pact and is coded as zero for both.

Military bases are a binary indicator of subordinate's acceptance of hierarch's military base on own territory. In 2003, Georgia is coded as 1 for Russia in 2003 because Russian military bases were in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Following the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, Georgia lost sovereignty over those territories and is coded as zero for Russia in 2017.

For the economy category, the three indicators are export, import, and foreign direct investment dependence between a state and a hierarch, which is normalised to a score between 0 and 1 for each indicator to denote complete resilience to complete subordination to a hierarch.

Table 9.3 Hierarchy and Resilience Index, Georgia 2003 and 2017

	Russia		China		United States	
	2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017
Arms sales	0	0	0	0	0	1
Defense pacts	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military bases	1	0	0	0	0	0
Security hierarchy score	**0.33**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0.33**
Export dependence	0.09	0.1257	0.01	0.066	0.0438	0.0449
Import dependence	0.1	0.0974	0.02	0.0937	0.0883	0.0263
FDI dependence	n/a	0.0311	n/a	0.0583	n/a	0.0199
Economic hierarchy score	**0.1**	**0.0848**	**0.01**	**0.0724**	**0.0661**	**0.0304**
PFI score	0.58	0.5307	0.51	0.3743	0.7654	0.8827
Digital-informational score	0.35	0.3215	0.35	0.3215	0.3466	0.3215
Informational hierarchy score	**0.46**	**0.4757**	**0.43**	**0.3479**	**0.5560**	**0.6021**
UNGA voting	0.64	0.4434	0.51	0.4690	0.3095	0.3739
Head of State meetings	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
Diplomacy hierarchy score	**0.57**	**0.2217**	**0.26**	**0.2345**	**0.1548**	**0.1870**
All Is Equal Score	**0.37**	**0.1956**	**0.17**	**0.1637**	**0.1711**	**0.2566**

Source: author's representation

For the informational category, the two indicators are (1) difference in places in the annual Press Freedom Index (PFI) ranking divided by total number of countries and (2) expert evaluations of a country's general digital-informational resilience. Scores for media freedom range from 0 (complete divergence) to 1 (same score) for a state relative to a hierarch. Scores for digital-informational resilience is not relative to a hierarch but is dynamic over time, and resilience is scored from 0 (complete lack of digital resilience) to 4 (complete resilience).

For the diplomatic category, the two indicators are how often a subordinate vote with or against the hierarch in the United Nations General Assembly and how often the head of state (or government if the head of state is ceremonial) from the subordinate meets with his or her counterpart from the hierarch. Scores for the United Nations General Assembly

range from 0 (no convergence between votes, meaning that subordinate state votes the opposite of the hierarch on every single vote) to 1 (complete convergence between votes, meaning that subordinate state votes with the hierarch on every single vote). Scores for the head of state meetings are 0 (no meetings), 1 (single meeting), and 2 (multiple meetings).

"All Is Important" Model Data

Although the Figures in the chapter graphically portrayed shifts in the international affairs over the previous 15 years, Tables 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6 provide the granular data. For ease of interpretation, Europe and Eurasia are divided into three geographical and historically rooted regions: Continental Europe, Post-Communist Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia.

In Table 9.4, the data show, with relatively few exceptions, the most significant declines occurred in Russian hierarchy, weaker declines in Chinese hierarchy, and modest increases in American hierarchy.

Table 9.5 provides the data for the post-Communist countries of Central and Southeastern Europe plus the three Baltic states, Ukraine, and Georgia. They show a much heavier decline in Russian hierarchy, a weak increase in Chinese hierarchy, and a dramatic increase in American hierarchy. As noted above, including Georgia and Ukraine in the post-Communist category instead of in the post-Soviet category reflects the extreme political shift of these states towards the Euro-Atlantic order as a result of rivalry and war with Russia. Ukraine and Georgia, perhaps followed by Moldova in the near future, have replicated the experience of other states in the region, and demonstrate that states can leave the Russian sphere of influence, albeit at great cost.

Table 9.6 provides the data for the remaining post-Soviet states. They show decline in American hierarchy; weak increase Russian hierarchy; and, critically for the future, stronger increase in Chinese hierarchy. Russia is concerned about its great power confrontation with the United States and has acted to reinforce its prerogatives in the states that have not

Table 9.4 Continental Europe, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003	RUS 2017	RUS, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	USA 2003	USA 2017	USA, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	CHI 2003	CHI 2017	CHI, % Diff, 2003 to 2017
Austria	0.1482	0.1278	**−16.02%**	0.1118	0.1106	**−1.09%**	0.1285	0.1028	**−24.97%**
Belgium	0.1355	0.1254	**−8.07%**	0.2764	0.3556	**22.28%**	0.1113	0.1069	**−4.05%**
Cyprus	0.2051	0.2262	**9.36%**	0.1686	0.1274	**−32.29%**	0.1862	0.1231	**−51.27%**
Denmark	0.1266	0.1129	**−12.14%**	0.3210	0.2589	**−24.00%**	0.1032	0.1589	**35.03%**
Finland	0.1361	0.2394	**43.12%**	0.1047	0.1701	**38.42%**	0.1722	0.1576	**−9.25%**
France	0.2912	0.2844	**−2.38%**	0.4277	0.3731	**−14.62%**	0.1224	0.1282	**4.59%**
Germany	0.2623	0.1943	**−35.00%**	0.3558	0.4385	**18.86%**	0.1775	0.1167	**−52.16%**
Greece	0.1600	0.2479	**35.44%**	0.4390	0.5541	**20.77%**	0.1336	0.2277	**41.32%**
Iceland	0.1398	0.1848	**24.38%**	0.2903	0.3527	**17.69%**	0.1135	0.1049	**−8.19%**
Ireland	0.1608	0.1270	**−26.60%**	0.2147	0.2338	**8.20%**	0.1396	0.1144	**−22.02%**
Italy	0.3030	0.2232	**−35.73%**	0.5247	0.4575	**−14.69%**	0.1561	0.1475	**−5.79%**
Luxembourg	0.1204	0.1199	**−0.47%**	0.1741	0.2831	**38.50%**	0.1174	0.1009	**−16.35%**
Malta	0.1581	0.1537	**−2.84%**	0.1399	0.1449	**3.50%**	0.2102	0.1389	**−51.29%**
Netherlands	0.1339	0.1211	**−10.56%**	0.4204	0.3667	**−14.63%**	0.1135	0.1753	**35.24%**
Norway	0.1353	0.1176	**−14.98%**	0.4206	0.3673	**−14.52%**	0.1114	0.0970	**−14.81%**
Portugal	0.1551	0.1282	**−20.98%**	0.4057	0.3505	**−15.75%**	0.1218	0.1701	**28.36%**
Spain	0.1605	0.1334	**−20.30%**	0.4156	0.4219	**1.48%**	0.1296	0.1151	**−12.57%**
Sweden	0.1449	0.1078	**−34.44%**	0.1007	0.1021	**1.41%**	0.1166	0.0972	**−19.91%**
Turkey	0.3069	0.3872	**20.74%**	0.4522	0.5596	**19.18%**	0.2279	0.2508	**9.12%**
U.K.	0.2803	0.1535	**−82.66%**	0.5375	0.4845	**−10.92%**	0.1862	0.1968	**5.40%**
Average	0.1832	0.1758	**−9.51%**	0.3151	0.3257	**2.39%**	0.1439	0.1415	**−6.68%**
Median	0.1566	0.1434	**−11.35%**	0.3384	0.3542	**1.44%**	0.1290	0.1257	**−8.72%**

Source: Author's representation

Table 9.5 Post-Communist Europe, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003	RUS 2017	RUS, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	USA 2003	USA 2017	USA, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	CHI 2003	CHI 2017	CHI, % Diff, 2003 to 2017
Albania	0.1727	0.1874	**7.89%**	0.1389	0.4088	**66.02%**	0.1458	0.1641	**11.14%**
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.1749	0.1857	**5.80%**	0.1307	0.1634	**20.01%**	0.1509	0.1561	**3.35%**
Bulgaria	0.3006	0.2215	**–35.71%**	0.1907	0.4295	**55.60%**	0.1396	0.1895	**26.33%**
Croatia	0.2883	0.2477	**–16.38%**	0.1863	0.3210	**41.96%**	0.1925	0.1613	**–19.29%**
Czech Rep.	0.2073	0.2918	**28.98%**	0.2608	0.3949	**33.96%**	0.1207	0.1835	**34.23%**
Estonia	0.2067	0.1617	**–27.80%**	0.0997	0.2892	**65.54%**	0.1098	0.0993	**–10.51%**
Georgia	0.3660	0.1956	**–87.18%**	0.1711	0.2566	**33.30%**	0.1741	0.1637	**–6.34%**
Hungary	0.3033	0.3226	**5.97%**	0.2009	0.3346	**39.97%**	0.1937	0.1635	**–18.49%**
Latvia	0.2389	0.2009	**–18.91%**	0.1729	0.3203	**46.02%**	0.1208	0.1238	**2.40%**
Lithuania	0.1849	0.1869	**1.09%**	0.1792	0.3037	**40.99%**	0.1230	0.1234	**0.36%**
Poland	0.2258	0.1832	**–23.22%**	0.4188	0.3855	**–8.66%**	0.1359	0.2096	**35.18%**
Romania	0.2453	0.1736	**–41.34%**	0.2062	0.3785	**45.51%**	0.1593	0.1395	**–14.19%**
Slovakia	0.1577	0.1757	**10.25%**	0.1834	0.3141	**41.60%**	0.1233	0.1224	**–0.73%**
Slovenia	0.2425	0.2197	**–10.36%**	0.1171	0.2904	**59.69%**	0.1310	0.1329	**1.42%**
Ukraine	0.4345	0.2389	**–81.87%**	0.1894	0.2805	**32.47%**	0.2388	0.2654	**10.03%**
Average	0.2499	0.2129	**–18.85%**	0.1898	0.3247	**40.93%**	0.1506	0.1599	**3.66%**
Median	0.2389	0.1956	**–16.38%**	0.1834	0.3203	**41.60%**	0.1396	0.1613	**1.42%**

Source: Author's representation

Table 9.6 Post-Soviet Europe, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003	RUS 2017	RUS, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	USA 2003	USA 2017	USA, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	CHI 2003	CHI 2017	CHI, % Diff, 2003 to 2017
Armenia	0.5542	0.6465	**14.28%**	0.1761	0.1624	**–8.41%**	0.2129	0.1919	**–10.96%**
Azerbaijan	0.3777	0.4791	**21.17%**	0.2617	0.2089	**–25.29%**	0.2794	0.2953	**5.37%**
Belarus	0.6854	0.7602	**9.85%**	0.1854	0.1945	**4.65%**	0.2635	0.2540	**–3.71%**
Kazakhstan	0.6912	0.6505	**–6.25%**	0.2569	0.2336	**–9.96%**	0.2987	0.2978	**–0.29%**
Kyrgyzstan	0.6821	0.5550	**–22.90%**	0.2637	0.1641	**–60.72%**	0.2764	0.2903	**4.79%**
Moldova	0.3908	0.3513	**–11.25%**	0.1657	0.1896	**12.60%**	0.1905	0.1627	**–17.08%**
Tajikistan	0.6244	0.6578	**5.07%**	0.2114	0.2362	**10.48%**	0.2747	0.4273	**35.72%**
Turkmenistan	0.3710	0.3964	**6.40%**	0.2103	0.2047	**–2.72%**	0.3179	0.4768	**33.33%**
Uzbekistan	0.4500	0.4311	**–4.37%**	0.2338	0.2953	**20.83%**	0.2752	0.3375	**18.44%**
Average	0.5363	0.5475	**1.33%**	0.2183	0.2099	**–6.50%**	0.2655	0.3037	**7.29%**
Median	0.5542	0.5550	**5.07%**	0.2114	0.2047	**–2.72%**	0.2752	0.2953	**4.79%**

Source: author's representation

explicitly abandoned it, but the future trend in the post-Soviet region is Russia failing to compete economically with China. The future of Russia in its own self-declared sphere of influence is deciding which of Chinese economic competition and American security competition is the more proximate political threat.

Annex 2: Eastern Partnership Data

Every single model shows that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus have deepened subordination to Russia, while Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have increased resilience to Russia. Only Belarus' studious attempts at multi-vector foreign policy prevents the same set of states taking the opposite position on American hierarchy (Leshchenko 2008; Gnedina 2015).

Table 9.7 Eastern partnership, "All Is Important" model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003	RUS 2017	RUS, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	USA 2003	USA 2017	USA, % Diff, 2003 to 2017	CHI 2003	CHI 2017	CHI, % Diff, 2003 to 2017
Armenia	0.5542	0.6465	14.28%	0.1761	0.1624	−8.41%	0.2129	0.1919	−10.96%
Azerbaijan	0.3777	0.4791	21.17%	0.2617	0.2089	−25.29%	0.2794	0.2953	5.37%
Belarus	0.6854	0.7602	9.85%	0.1854	0.1945	4.65%	0.2635	0.2540	−3.71%
Georgia	0.3660	0.1956	−87.18%	0.1711	0.2566	33.30%	0.1741	0.1637	−6.34%
Moldova	0.3908	0.3513	−11.25%	0.1657	0.1896	12.60%	0.1905	0.1627	−17.08%
Ukraine	0.4345	0.2389	−81.87%	0.1894	0.2805	32.47%	0.2388	0.2654	10.03%
Average	0.4681	0.4453	−22.50%	0.1916	0.2154	8.22%	0.2265	0.2222	−3.78%
Median	0.4127	0.4152	−0.70%	0.1807	0.2017	8.63%	0.2258	0.2230	−5.03%

Source: Author's representation

Table 9.8 Eastern partnership, security model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003 Sec'y	RUS 2017 Sec'y	RUS, % Diff, 2003–2017	USA 2003 Sec'y	USA 2017 Sec'y	USA, % Diff, 2003–2017	CHI 2003 Sec'y	CHI 2017 Sec'y	CHI, % Diff, 2003 to 2017
Armenia	0.5917	0.7644	**22.59%**	0.1174	0.1083	**−8.41%**	0.1419	0.1279	**−10.96%**
Azerbaijan	0.3629	0.4305	**15.71%**	0.1745	0.1393	**−25.29%**	0.1863	0.1969	**5.37%**
Belarus	0.6791	0.8402	**19.17%**	0.1236	0.1296	**4.65%**	0.1757	0.1694	**−3.71%**
Georgia	0.3551	0.1304	**−172.40%**	0.1141	0.2822	**59.57%**	0.1160	0.1091	**−6.34%**
Moldova	0.2605	0.2342	**−11.25%**	0.1105	0.1264	**12.60%**	0.1270	0.1085	**−17.08%**
Ukraine	0.2897	0.1593	**−81.87%**	0.1263	0.1870	**32.47%**	0.1592	0.1769	**10.03%**
Average	0.4232	0.4265	**−34.68%**	0.1277	0.1621	**12.60%**	0.1510	0.1481	**−3.78%**
Median	0.3590	0.3323	**2.23%**	0.1205	0.1345	**8.63%**	0.1505	0.1486	**−5.03%**

Source: Author's representation

Table 9.9 Eastern partnership, economic model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003 Econ	RUS 2017 Econ	RUS, % Diff, 2003–2017	US 2003 Econ	US 2017 Econ	USA, % Diff, 2003–2017	CHI 2003 Econ	CHI 2017 Econ	CHI, % Diff, 2003–2017
Armenia	0.4158	0.5286	**21.35%**	0.1491	0.1183	**−26.07%**	0.1442	0.1468	**1.74%**
Azerbaijan	0.2821	0.3433	**17.81%**	0.1873	0.1485	**−26.08%**	0.1979	0.2123	**6.78%**
Belarus	0.6279	0.6789	**7.51%**	0.1304	0.1328	**1.76%**	0.1801	0.1818	**0.91%**
Georgia	0.2759	0.1586	**−73.93%**	0.1361	0.1812	**24.88%**	0.1203	0.1332	**9.73%**
Moldova	0.3323	0.2783	**−19.42%**	0.1209	0.1313	**7.90%**	0.1306	0.1210	**−7.99%**
Ukraine	0.3736	0.1969	**−89.68%**	0.1343	0.1969	**31.77%**	0.1710	0.1939	**11.80%**
Average	0.3846	0.3641	**−22.73%**	0.1430	0.1515	**2.36%**	0.1574	0.1648	**3.83%**
Median	0.3529	0.3108	**−5.95%**	0.1352	0.1406	**4.83%**	0.1576	0.1643	**4.26%**

Source: Author's representation

Table 9.10 Eastern partnership, diplomacy model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003 Diplo'y	RUS 2017 Diplo'y	RUS, % Diff, 2003–2017	US 2003 Diplo'y	US 2017 Diplo'y	USA, % Diff, 2003–2017	CHI 2003 Diplo'y	CHI 2017 Diplo'y	CHI, % Diff, 2003–2017
Armenia	0.6698	0.6966	**3.84%**	0.1503	0.1492	**−0.75%**	0.2655	0.2342	**−13.36%**
Azerbaijan	0.3859	0.5923	**34.85%**	0.2827	0.1776	**−59.18%**	0.3314	0.3260	**−1.65%**
Belarus	0.7628	0.7917	**3.66%**	0.1493	0.1624	**8.10%**	0.3142	0.2940	**−6.88%**
Georgia	0.4345	0.2043	**−112.69%**	0.1657	0.2334	**29.01%**	0.2014	0.1873	**−7.54%**
Moldova	0.5420	0.4765	**−13.75%**	0.1530	0.1922	**20.38%**	0.2217	0.1883	**−17.77%**
Ukraine	0.5782	0.2426	**−138.33%**	0.1639	0.3537	**53.65%**	0.2709	0.3450	**21.47%**
Average	0.5622	0.5007	**−37.07%**	0.1775	0.2114	**8.53%**	0.2675	0.2625	**−4.29%**
Median	0.5601	0.5344	**−5.05%**	0.1585	0.1849	**14.24%**	0.2682	0.2641	**−7.21%**

Source: Author's representation

Table 9.11 Eastern partnership, informational model, 2003–2017

	RUS 2003 Info	RUS 2017 Info	RUS, % Diff, 2003–2017	US 2003 Info	US 2017 Info	USA, % Diff, 2003–2017	CHI 2003 Info	CHI 2017 Info	CHI, % Diff, 2003–2017
Armenia	0.5395	0.5966	**9.56%**	0.2874	0.2738	**−4.97%**	0.2999	0.2585	**−16.00%**
Azerbaijan	0.4797	0.5503	**12.82%**	0.4025	0.3702	**−8.72%**	0.4022	0.4460	**9.84%**
Belarus	0.6717	0.7302	**8.02%**	0.3384	0.3531	**4.15%**	0.3839	0.3710	**−3.47%**
Georgia	0.3986	0.2889	**−37.95%**	0.2687	0.3296	**18.49%**	0.2585	0.2251	**−14.86%**
Moldova	0.4284	0.4162	**−2.93%**	0.2783	0.3084	**9.76%**	0.2828	0.2332	**−21.24%**
Ukraine	0.4966	0.3568	**−39.17%**	0.3332	0.3845	**13.36%**	0.3540	0.3457	**−2.38%**
Average	0.5024	0.4898	**−8.27%**	0.3181	0.3366	**5.35%**	0.3302	0.3133	**−8.02%**
Median	0.4881	0.4833	**2.55%**	0.3103	0.3413	**6.95%**	0.3269	0.3021	**−9.16%**

Source: Author's representation

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