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Organisations and Resilience: What Relevance for the Eastern Partnership?

Gilles Rouet and Thierry Côme

1 Introduction

The concept of "resilience" is now very popular and is generally used to highlight some individual or collective characteristics. This concept or paradigm is both explanatory and prospective in nature and is used in various fields, from political science or management, to policymaking. As such, this concept is of high importance for companies and governments alike, both of which seek to build or use a "culture of resilience", so that institutions/organisations could better implement strategies, as quickly as possible, as well as to ensure continuity and to avoid those ruptures leading to chaos, or even to a system's disappearance. A resilient system implies

G. Rouet (✉)
LAREQUOI, ISM-IAE of Versailles-St-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Paris-Saclay University, Guyancourt, France
e-mail: gilles.rouet@uvsq.fr

T. Côme
Laboratoire de Recherche en Management, LAREQUOI, IUT, Mantes-la-Jolie, France
e-mail: thierry.come@uvsq.fr

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that those dysfunctions induced mainly by external factors, but also by internal ones, could often be avoided, the risks controlled, and, even in case of major stressors, the organisations could still find their equilibrium, thus returning to an efficient and effective structure once more.

In *The End of History and the Last Man* published in 1992, Fukuyama stresses the ideological victory of liberal democracy and its undeniable supremacy over all other political or economic ideologies. He does not exclude the possibility of conflicts, but he affirms the capacity of liberal democracy to always being able to recover from crises and to maintain its ideological domination. This idea, even if it has been contested, notably by historians (Jeanneney 2001), has largely influenced the minds of American or European policymakers. Thus, spreading liberal democracy became a standard practice for the US and EU in developing their international relations, particularly with respect to the countries of the Eastern Bloc. The current understanding of the concept of resilience and its assertion as a goal of European policy comes from the internalisation of this norm by Brussels decision makers. However, the certainty of a world that is automatically overcoming shocks and crises of external or internal origin and always straightening like a roly-poly by the sole force of the principles of the market economy and liberal democracy has been undermined by the volatility of financial markets, the emergence of new ideologies (radical Islamism) and the migratory tensions.

This certainty also suffers from a recent wave of questioning the very foundations of an economic model of development that is no longer ideological, but ecological in nature. Climate change, the decline in biodiversity and the greenhouse effects call for other approaches than implementing the principles of liberalism alone. As such, European policymakers have now realised that resilience is not self-evident. Resilience must be maintained, supported and developed whether it is preventive (ex ante) or curative (ex post). Consequently, it became a matter of further examining the role of organisations, institutions, conventions, standards and culture in order to contribute to building resilience of this new system put in place by Europeans in their relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

Within this context, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was revised in November 2015, in order to bring into line the cooperation practices with the context of increased fragility of most EU partners. In particular, crises appear to be more sustainable, be they economic, political, social or ecological, the democracies seem to have a less solid foundation, and the mass media seems less and less independent, whereas civil society and non-governmental organisations appear more and more controlled, through new high-tech tools (Schumacher 2015; Blockmans 2017). The previous ENP was based on the idea that it was possible, in Eastern Europe, to promote through structural reforms, the creation of proper conditions to foster a functioning democracy that could allow the establishment of an open market economy, in line with the rules of major global institutions (IMF, WTO, World Bank). These institutions often advocated the opposite, respectively the necessity to establish a market economy prior to ensuring a functioning democracy. The meaning given by the European Commission and the aforementioned institutions to the notion of "good governance" particularly illustrates this major difference in their approaches. While for the European Commission, good governance is rather political, as it is allowing stakeholders to express themselves and to be taken into account in all sorts of organisations, for financial institutions, "good governance" is primarily economic, allowing private players and generally the business sector to control the way in which their input and contributions are being used within the system.

In the frame of the ENP, the political and social democratisation is being articulated at the same pace with economic development. In reality, the two processes are not unfolding at the same pace; democracy is being turned into hybrid systems where the only resilience that remains is that of the authoritarian practices of the Soviet bloc, or, in some extreme cases, into rising nationalism and xenophobia. Moreover, the envisioned economic development of the EaP partners, in a context of the financial crisis and international tensions, has not occurred. Within this context, the European Commission has clearly understood the limits of the EaP. The fragility of these young democracies, their insufficient rooting within their tenuous societies and organisations, does not allow them to be resilient. Moreover, the European *inertia*, particularly in the framework of Brexit or the necessary rescheduling of debts (the case of Greece), no longer allows the EU to propose, in response to shocks and crises appropriate global actions, but measures that would only be temporarily curative, and financially too expensive to be effective *ex-post*. The EU has therefore embarked on a new partnership policy advocating a differentiated approach, taking into account the specificities of each state but with a proposal of a win-win strategy. Subsequently, EU's actions in the eastern neighbourhood take into account the aspirations of the EaP countries, the needs of the partners and the interests of the EU. While the objectives of the new ENP remain largely identical and rather political in nature—good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights—the novelty is the promotion of sustainable economic development, a path favoured by the EU to strengthen the resilience of its partners. As such, the focus is on structural reforms, in order to improve the business environment, to boost trade and to increase competitiveness; even the adaptation of education to the needs of the real economy, which remains a strong point of this policy, shows that the support for the resilience of the EaP countries fits well into a liberal perspective. Consequently, the EU's Global Strategy now focuses on the strategic concept of resilience, understood as "a capacity to resist and regenerate", so as to be able to become "crisis-proof" (European Council 2017).

The current EU Global Strategy builds on the resilience of member states and neighbouring states that includes the ability to defend against attacks, as well as to repair the damage done. This resilience also makes it possible to set up preventive structures against these attacks. The concept of resilience in this strategy relates to internal and external security and concerns all individuals and the whole society, and therefore all organisations as well. Thus, a resilient society is supposed to operate democratically, based on institutional trust and sustainable development. It is therefore necessary to promote an integrated approach that includes all stakeholders. For some, this strategic evolution based on the concept of resilience devotes a conservative foreign and security policy that can reduce the possibilities of transformation (Biscop 2017). However, it is important for the EU to promote both stability and democracy through its external actions in neighbouring countries, which may seem contradictory, at times (Bendiek 2017, p. 14), by developing or strengthening its capacity to avoid external hazards and stabilise neighbouring states. For this, it becomes important to try to transform the environment of the EU, but how? In this regard, it is needed to define the involved actors. It is therefore necessary to go further and try to define who should be resilient, and in what context and with what resources. A sound EU strategy of enhancing its resilience and that of its neighbours should focus on both the external dimensions (strengthening security, resistance to attacks or external crises) and the internal one (mainly to ensure that organisations are able to develop their capacities for resilience as part of their strategies but also their participation in society as a whole). As such, resilience of organisations should be regarded as an important quality, or even a considerable advantage of the overall "culture of resilience"; however, fostering it could also limit resistance to more or less radical changes and thus contribute to the legitimisation of those actors who induced them, and ultimately could avoid disruptions within the system. Consequently, resilience is an overall objective for organisations which could, by improving themselves and becoming "resilient", put in place appropriate mechanisms, capabilities and special skills, thus leading to managerial innovations (Côme and Rouet 2015).

This chapter outlines the specificities of organisations' resilience in relation to their management through an analytical approach. In this regard, it is useful to link this concept to specific approaches, by taking into consideration, generally, the overall context of social and economic changes of institutions and societies, within or outside the EU, and particularly, the framework of the EaP with its political, societal and democratic developments.

2 Organisations and Resilience

Individually, an organisation, an institution, a convention or even a legal or social norm cannot play a decisive role in cushioning shocks and supporting resilience on their own. Similarly, none of the constituent agents of an organisation is capable of it either. Additionally, entrepreneurial culture and creativity, which are not concepts of resilience but individual attitudes necessary to overcome shocks, are required, so that organisations could express themselves, and foster collective adhesion, shared values, social recognition and political support.

2.1 From the Individual to the Group and from State to Project

At the psychological level, resilience is an individual capacity, whereas at the level of society, it could be a collective competence. As such, resilience capacity is based on the ability of individuals to define collective goals and to give themselves the means to act coherently; this idea is best captured by Amartya Sen's concept of "agency" (1982). A policy of support for resilience must spread this "agency" and transform it into a "collective agency". Subsequently, all these social forms that Arrow calls "invisible institutions" (1974, p. 28), such as conventions, norms, rules, ethical principles, relationships of trust or loyalty between individuals, have, like organisations or institutions, an essential role in establishing and maintaining a *market economy* and a *society of trust* (Peyrefitte 1995). Whereas the former contributes to raising the awareness of agents regarding the limits of societies and the risks they incur, the second concept, *society of trust*, refers to envisioning society as an essential place for confronting different points of view, as well as learning and promoting democracy. Such a model of society is also a place to create team spirit, develop common values and build a collective approach. Subsequently, an active EU policy of strengthening the resilience of Central and Eastern European (CEE) societies, therefore, emphasises the need for European decision makers, to have the support of these social forms. This should lead to the development of a collective project, leading to a general partnership with CEE countries, but with the specific objective of establishing a favourable environment for organisations. Clauses promoting good institutional governance (respect for democracy, minorities, the prevalence of rule of law, the fight against corruption) or rules that are supposed to guarantee a minimal respect of social and environmental standards are then adapted to the specific conditions of each country, of its organisations and of its national culture.

As it has been previously mentioned, resilience is a concept used in many scientific fields, from physics to psychology but also in sociology or in management sciences. Although the objects of study are different, the overall approach is based on close understanding and, sometimes, on similar approaches. Overall, "resistance" is an essential characteristic of "resilience" for which time is a critical variable, for individuals, for organisations and for the inert matter. Moreover, a system's resilience is also dependent on the magnitude of the disturbance, which is usually directly proportional to the recovery time. In psychology and in psychopathology, the concept of resilience emerged when the relevant studies in the field highlighted the importance of "coping", apprehension, emotion and adaptation mechanisms to stressors by individuals; at the same time, it has also become popular the concept of "invulnerability", as that specific characteristic that allows individuals to resist external aggression (Koupernik and Anthony 1970). However, this approach is at the opposite spectrum of resilience, which, according to Cyrulnik (2001) is acquired and therefore is not in itself an innate or genetic characteristic.

However, no matter the approach or the field of study, for both individuals and for groups, resilience is never absolute/definitive, but it varies depending on the environment and shock duration (Fonagy et al. 1994; Cowen et al. 1996; Masten and Coatsworth 1998). According to Cyrulnik, resilience is the *ability to successfully live and develop in an acceptable manner in spite of stress or adversity that normally has the serious risk of a negative outcome*[1] (Cyrulnik 2002, p. 10). Later, this definition evolved into the *ability of a person or group to project into the future despite destabilizing events, difficult living conditions, sometimes severe trauma*[2] (Manciaux et al. 2001, p. 17). Thus, resilience could be considered that specific capacity of a group, an organisation, an institution or a company to join and maintain a project's logic—which is a core characteristic of organisations at large—despite the emergence of disruptive events. By adopting a collective approach, passing from individuals to groups, the paradigm is now focused on the project and not on a condition, a state or a situation. In this regard, resilience can be seen as a process, a set of

[1] "Capacité à réussir à vivre et à se développer de manière acceptable en dépit du stress ou d'une adversité qui comporte normalement le risque grave d'une issue négative".

[2] "Capacité d'une personne ou d'un groupe à se projeter dans l'avenir en dépit d'événements déstabilisants, de conditions de vie difficiles, de traumatismes parfois sévères".

provisions, of mechanisms, made possible by skills and that needs special conditions to be set up.

As such, a resilient organisation should have the ability to anticipate the disruptions in order to be able to resist them and to further adapt its structures and mechanisms so that it can ultimately find a state closer to the initial one and to continue its project. Moreover, continuity, as a main quality or characteristic of an organisation, is closely linked to resilience, a multifaceted concept that could be divided into corporate or enterprise resilience, business resilience, organisational resilience, technical resilience and individual resilience, as follows:

- Corporate resilience ensures the sustainability of the organisation; the stakeholders can find the meaning of the organisation, as part of a trans-generational logic and accept the evolution of the organisation with major changes, in various situations and environments (i.e. the markets for companies); the changes and the evolution in management methods do not affect durability.
- Business resilience concerns the business activity, its maintenance and its development in difficult conditions, sometimes, at all levels. Obviously, the Business Resilience helps Corporate Resilience, but in a strategic logic, which induces competencies and skills related to analysis and strategic planning, business transfers, etc.
- Organisational resilience is related to different aspects of the organisation and enables teams and stakeholders to overcome crises; thus, it is necessary to master different approaches and specialties to be able to consider fostering and enhancing this type of resilience, as it is needed to analyse and evaluate various aspects of an organisation.
- Technical resilience is the ability of technical systems (including what the stakeholders create, implement, support and give up) to overcome the incidents to a certain level of seriousness.
- Individual resilience, as defined earlier, is the ability of each individual to cope with and overcome critical incidents/events affecting the course of their lives. Individual resilience also refers to professional lives of individuals, as they can indeed be affected by special circumstances when incidents occur within an organisation. Furthermore, we can define pre-incident resilience as the ability to prevent incidents

whenever possible, and after-incident resilience (usually a phase of post-traumatic stress) as the ability to recover from the incident and to rebuild a positive development of an individual's life. As critical incidents can be traumatic events (related to a natural or legal death), they can be experienced as episodes of high-intensity stress. The level of corporate and organisational resilience, in particular, can be crucial for the acquisition by the concerned individuals of an individual resilient capacity.

To sum up, resilience of organisations is a highly complex and multidimensional concept comprising various elements and whose logic and intensity depend solely on the organisations' structures and their contexts. We must note that resilience is not necessarily a positive concept, should the organisation display resistance to positive changes or to adapting to a better environment.

2.2 Environment and Organisations

The concept of resilience of organisations establishes a central link between the environment (context) and the specific organisation (Centre Risques et Performance 2009) and is part of a paradigm integrating concepts of: the system, the disturbance (or failure) and the adaptive capacity, and ultimately the management methods that must be changed or transformed (Côme and Rouet 2015). Internally, it is important to take into account the processes, technologies, functions, structures and stakeholders with their strategies, not only individually but also in interaction with each other. The dynamic and the relationships between these internal components and the environment can cause blockages or endogenous shocks, such as changes of strategy, redundancies after market developments and so on. The analysis of incidents that result in significant breaks in organisations allows us to better understand the negative elements, as well as to try to establish processes necessary to increase organisational resilience (Perrow 1984). However, it is important to combine external and internal nature of shocks, since the crises can, of course, have as main cause an external disruptive element but also be the consequence of the system's malfunction due to an internal problem, hence the importance of considering all the various forms of resilience outlined above.

Overall, the organisation tries to prevent any disruptions and seeks to prepare itself for it, mainly by strengthening its resistance and adaptation capabilities, which can help prevent crises; however, this does not prevent the implementation of a crisis management system. In this regard, an analogy with democratic transitions could be particularly relevant, especially in relation to EU's aid and support programmes offered to public administration structures in the EaP countries that are aimed, precisely, to increase the "administrative capacity". The main question that arises from this analogy would be whether among the involved capacities, is it usual to consider resilience? Obviously, in the case of transitions, the political project is more global, and the "transition" concerns the entire country with its institutions and organisations; however, the general logic is similar and, more importantly, the programmes directly concern some administration bodies and institutions. Furthermore, these programmes must be supported by an active policy, and be legitimised within and outside of organisations. Moreover, it is essential to take into account all the systems, processes and structures of organisations, and, from an analysis in terms of resilience capability, to analyse in detail the operations to assess the risks of dysfunctions.

Within this framework, a "resilience plan" can be proposed through an approach that mixes proactivity and reactivity, as follows:

- *Proactive*, because it is important to highlight the proactive elements against the possible risks, assumed or anticipated; it is therefore necessary to change the processes and the control procedures in order to limit the risk sensitivity. The security policies but also the evaluation systems are core elements of this development.
- *Reactive*, to be able to implement also a forward-looking management of the impacts of disturbances. Some external threats cannot be controlled by the organisation, while some crises are difficult to avoid, making it necessary to anticipate their treatment and an appropriate action plan.



Fig. 10.1 The diagram of resilience (Source: Authors, based on Gibson and Tarrant 2010, p. 8)

The diagram in Fig. 10.1 could be applicable to any organisation of any size or to any company, country or administration. A combination of knowledge, capabilities of the implementation of process, skills, capacity to use resources and infrastructure, is part of a general context, which in part is articulated and determined by employable, flexible, tenacious stakeholders that have certain skills (a priori in relation to the collective project).

Consequently, it is not a matter of seeking to organise a collective survival or to assimilate the resilience only to a level of resistance to a turbulent and unstable environment, but to contribute to the evolution of organisations, with the awareness of all the actors. For them, continuity is necessary and is articulated with the changes or disruptions, through interactions with the environment. As such, continuity is essential for organisations to recognise and highlight a “shape memory”, determined by their cultures, memories and stories. However, it is not a question, after a crisis, to regain the previous form, but rather to recompose the organisation based on this memory, in an identitary continuity in particular.

The continuity, as objective or as characteristic of an organisation, comes with resilience. It is necessary to reconsider the issues of reorganising the system and to discuss future developments, often essential, that are no longer radical disruptions with dramatic effects for the stakeholders, but are part of a logic of continuity. The resilience is then mobilised to manage the crisis because it is then possible to adapt structures and systems in case of major disruptions.

2.3 Resilience and Identity

The stakeholders and the organisations may be subject to disturbances, which challenge their identities, to the point of an "identity crisis"; such crises are manifested particularly in periods of rapid evolution in a context difficult to understand or during a "transition" period. Under such circumstances, it can become difficult for everyone to keep a sense (feeling) of belonging, of reference. This identity problem obviously relates to each stakeholder (particularly physical) but also to the organisation itself. The organisational identity, which may be in crisis, is also an element of a personal identity process of each actor involved. The withdrawal, the mystification of an event, for example, are reactions to major disturbances. However, it is also possible to rely on the collective resilience to face these crises.

Engagement in a project links the individual to the organisation and has been analysed, particularly in the context of studies on "motivation". The identity is built, more or less steady, gradually, in relation to perceptions of time, space and continuity; for the case of organisations, identity could be understood as a set of perceptions belonging to the members of the organisation. The structure of the organisation but also the management methods, project (strategy), rituals, symbols or stories are all identification elements, leading to a sense of belonging. Subsequently, the identity of an organisation could be defined as those stables, specific, fundamental characteristics (Albert and Whetten 1985; Whetten 2006), constituted by individuals in interaction, their goals, their scopes and their explicit and implicit rules.

The organisational crises in the case of sustained, rapid and successive reforms (i.e. the loss of "meaning" for the actors of the French University, for example, the integration of competitive elements in the case of public services, the rapid and not legitimised application of the New Public Management tools in some administrations, the change of structure after a merger/acquisition process, etc.) can both lead to a deconstruction of meaning and a questioning about identity: the changes are then experienced as ruptures because an element is considered as destroyed, sometimes irreversibly. Indeed, the organisational identity produces meaning, induced by the links between the members of the organisation and the structure, management methods and strategy. The organisation is a form of socialisation so that the individual identity crises, consisting of the loss of landmarks, or of the feelings of belonging are both causes and consequences, in a circular interaction, of certain problems within the organisations. In particular, inflexible organisations have difficulties to withstand identity crises that can lead to organisational conflicts (Weick 1995).

The restructuring of organisations can also provoke certain radical calling into question in relation to professional identities, compared to "professions" in reconstruction because it is necessary to integrate the logic of the network, the role of customers/users and the evolution of occupations within the service relationships. Under these circumstances, the references to professions remain, but in an evolutionary logic, in the context of different social relations and according to individual and collective levels of resilience.

3 The "After 1989" and the Resilience of Organisations

The concept of "resilience of organisations" can be called upon for an exploration of societal situations related to the European integration process (rapprochement process, pre-accession and accession of countries, evolution of administrative and regulations systems) and to the setting up of partnerships in particular in the framework of the ENP, respectively, the EaP.

3.1 An Outlook within the Changes and the Political and Social Crises

Research dedicated to organisations can connect the above-mentioned macro-processes to the daily working relationships, paying specific attention to the identitary aspects, such as the developments of functions, jobs and relationships. It is interesting to comprehend how political, economic and systemic developments are relayed and finally legitimised inside organisations (companies, NGOs, administrative bodies, etc.); moreover, these organisations build a collective political project of which is necessary to assess the relevance to the overall development, on the one hand, and the role, precisely in societal evolution, on the other.

In this regard, a possible way to link the analysis with the main dynamics and interactions in organisations, could be the model proposed by Hackman and Oldham (1980) (respectively, relating to the roles and to the structuration of work), and the characteristics of institutional and social developments (ruptures) induced by the mechanisms of European integration or by the development of partnerships with the EU. However, one should not consider that organisations are only subject to additional constraints, without taking into account the evolution of their projects (policies) and their ability to evolve, and enhance their resilience. Miner's model is easy to be employed as it considers those specific characteristics of the environment in analysing the roles of individuals and organisational structures. The model allows analysing the distance between desired role and the role requested by the organisation in the context of changes and evolution. The individual motivation, related to situations, is at the centre of the model, particularly with respect to representations of professional roles of everyone within organisations. In the case of political integration processes or partnerships, the motivation of actors can contribute to increasing the resilience of organisations and thus to avoiding organisational failures.

The model of Hackman and Oldham (1980) is also based, partly, on work motivation, which can be analysed with their main characteristics that allow building a sense of action: the variety of tasks and skills, the identification of results and the social value of work. The model allows assessing the implications for the stakeholders of a changing pattern of work. As such, this model is useful to analyse the contexts of work, taking into account the levels of autonomy, of information about work, of empowerment and of knowledge of the results but also of commitment and satisfaction. The various characteristics may have different influences, depending on the stakeholders, the organisations and the circumstances, thus making it particularly interesting, to test these differences, by researching inside the organisations, those processes specific to the economic, social and policy evolution related to European integration of the EaP. Such research direction could focus on the sources and factors that have helped shape the meaning of work for the involved stakeholders and could link this construction to the eventual approximation, as well as to legitimising political projects, especially by considering the levels of individual and collective resilience inside organisations.

Of course, it is not possible to base an analysis solely on these developments/evolution/ruptures, so as to consider only the motivation at work, but these models could be used to connect the concerns of citizens/stakeholders with the peculiarities of the culture of organisations in particular contexts. Furthermore, organisations are faced with constant changes and to achieve their evolution, they should engage more pragmatism; these rapid and successive transformations in the case of societies that are integrated in a high-paced and global process of evolution must be legitimised by those actors who need references to individual and group projects, organisational cultures, shared values, etc. Regarding motivation, it is appropriate not to favour its contents to its process: in particular, the work motivation is both a source of resilience and a result of organisational changes. The mentioned models (among others) can contribute to an analysis of organisations through the lenses of resilience, providing important information on the specific elements that are more likely to help the organisations to mobilise actors in the case of rapid changes or crisis.

3.2 Crisis and Organisations

The etymological meaning of the word "crisis" (from Greek "κρίσις") is "judgement" and "decision"; in Latin, the word "crisis" means a phase of a disease when a rapid change happens. As such, etymologically speaking, we could define the crisis as a "crucial moment where the disease reaches completion, to its end, for better or for worse"[3] (Bolzinger 1982, p. 475). Furthermore, starting with the nineteenth century, crisis took on a negative connotation and is generally related to different spheres: political, economic, social, spiritual and so on. It is more recently that crises have become objects of study within organisations (Herman 1963), although with different uses of the term: indeed, the crisis may also designate a set of characteristics, certain causes for a difficult situation or consequences of a rupture or an unusual event. The crises, or rather the "situations of crisis" can be chronic or occasional, particular or general, even global, for a given organisation.

Generally speaking, a crisis can be considered as the origin of particular individual behaviours, of questioning of "values" or of deviation from the desired goals (Lagadec and Guilhou 2002). Thus, from 1972, Milburn described the "crisis" both in defining and in delimiting the effects, especially the causes or the consequences of threats to fundamental values identified by those responsible. Similarly, emergencies that require short reaction times or that are not within the known frames, may, by themselves, constitute crises or cause crisis. Some organisations may face them, others may not; some can innovate to solve unanticipated problems in the existing processes or/and structures, some may not (Côme and Rouet 2015); some react to information overload, others cannot. In the same approach, internal conflicts can also cause the crisis, but can also help overcome it.

The crisis is difficult to predict, precisely because organisations do not necessarily have the same options to react to rapid and radical changes in their environment or within their structures. The crises, as the "crucial moment", are frequent and often beneficial for some organisations, but

[3] "Instant crucial où la maladie touche à son terme, à sa résolution, pour le meilleur ou pour le pire".

destructive for others. The study of such situations, consecutive, a priori, to a rapid and radical change within the political or economic environment (as in the case of democratic "transitions"), allows to assess the level of resilience of organisations, particularly in relation to flexibility, but not only, as well as the level of resilience of the key actors.

In an unstable and turbulent environment, organisations are trying to maintain integrity for teams to "cope" and to perform new tasks, sometimes to learn together, in order to change the vertical organisations (bureaucratic hierarchies), inherited (otherwise legitimised) and to integrate the markets horizontality. In this regard, it is possible to consider a change within a network organisation, capable of both transversal and intense collaboration. However, this theoretical option needs to be verified in practice. Indeed, the political, economic and social "crises" of the post-1989 era have induced a significant destabilisation of organisations, and thus emerged the stringent need for emergency measures for a wide palette of challenges and multiple difficulties, having disorderly functioning structures, opposing organisational choices and considerable differences in values. In some countries, the "crisis" has been both sudden and violent, whereas in others, more progressive. It is interesting to consider the level of understanding and of explanation of these situations by the actors themselves, and particularly in relation to their activities and choices inside organisations.

The crises after 1989 were not generally considered as fortuitous events, or as a set of circumstances which resulted in a rupture de facto, but as a major event. The collapse of the USSR and of the satellite countries was certainly a surprise for many actors involved, having an unprecedented high speed and magnitude of changes, both at individual and at collective levels; it was not about an expected and more or less measured risk, but about an unprecedented shock, that came along with a loss of all references. In terms of uncertainty, the analysis is not highly relevant in this case, particularly for organisations. Although the end of the regime was "expected", it was not the case for the shock wave and the element of surprise was very important, with consequences difficult to predict, in all cases and for all actors and organisations concerned.

However, if some "crisis" is aggravated by the loss of meaning, in the case of post-1989 period, on the contrary, the workers have often rebuilt a common meaning, be it in the framework of a national renaissance (in Russia), by participating in the European integration process (especially during 2004 and 2007 for some CEE countries) or in the logic of strengthening partnerships with the EU. The "return to Europe" (Chevallier 1999, p. 334), legitimised by an important part of the population in the recently integrated countries (from 2004 and 2007 enlargement waves), has certainly prevented an escalation of the crises to insurmountable lengths. The situation in Ukraine, for example, is certainly different. Indeed, the crises and the induced loss of meaning that came along disrupted the local actors from seeking to understand and to better consider their future. If an end to the crisis can be brought to light, then the shock can stimulate actors to react, if not, the loss of meaning can result into identity disturbance (Russia for years 1990–1993), ruptures and loss of references.

In such destabilising situations, organisations can adopt specific behaviours or can radically change in order to avoid collapse. For example, a "resistance" of actors can manifest in a multiplication of processes which can only make sense in relation to a recognised past, compared to a present without legitimacy, or as part of an attempt to maintain a professional identity. In the first case, it is possible that this collectivised resistance to result into a collective collapse, whereas in the second scenario, it is important to avoid destabilisation and to better try to rebuild than to maintain professional identities so that organisations can regain their foothold in the altered context.

Organisations can also try to adjust their resources in order to try to maintain an operating balance (principle of homoeostasis, see Bateson 1984). This process is similar to the type 1 of change (Le Moigne 1994, p. 213), while a type 2 change would consist of finding a balance point, different than the initial situation (Table 10.1).

It is common in literature when analysing resilience of organisations (in particular of organisational resilience) to make references or analogies to this typology of changes. Thus, a type 1 resilience would make a change of type 1 but not of type 2, whereas a type 2 resilience would make a change of type 1 as of type 2 (Koninckx and Teneau 2010, p. 98).

Table 10.1 Changes of type I and II

Equilibration methods		Change described by the process	
		Accommodation (Reaction to the context) (Retention of structure)	Assimilation (Action on the context)
Change described by the result	Type I change (synchronic perspective)	*Homoeostasis* Ability of an organisation to maintain a constant level of some internal characteristics (regulation)	*Homeogenesis* Adaptation of the organisation by re-encoding. The equilibration by structurally invariant reproduction without affecting projects
	Type II change (diachronic perspective)	*Homeorhesis* Trend of organisations that develop or change, to continue this development or changes to a given state, even if it interferes with the development	*Morphogenesis* Development process of structures of an organisation during its evolution (structural changes)

Source: Authors, based on Le Moigne 1994, p. 214

3.3 Trajectories of Resilience of Organisations

Organisations in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, in the context of the post-1989 period, have been disrupted by ruptures, turbulence, imbalances, crises and shocks, loss of sense and references which have deeply affected the society, as well as the economic and the political systems.

Bankruptcies, restructurings, mergers, redeployment, relocations and closures have severely tested the professional identities, and workers have developed resistance scenarios and/or adaptation scenarios which proved to be more or less effective. Overall, uncertainties have taken the place of guarantees on the market; furthermore, the paradigm of change is obviously radical and questions the values, beliefs and even the meaning of organisations. One may wonder whether in the context of an organisation, the individuals-stakeholders change faster than the ensemble, and whether an organisation can continue to maintain its strategy/structure dyad even if the meaning, the sense has been destroyed.

Within this context, the main uncertainty revolves around identifying the step when the organisation could realise the necessary changes; in this regard, the assumption of a two-step process could be tested. At first, the first step could consist of a reorganisation, a change in leadership, a downsizing, with the maintenance of the old structures and even of previous strategies. In some contexts, this first level of change is enough to restore the performance.

Yet, when the external context is more difficult and/or the loss of meaning is deeper, then these changes are not enough, and we must review the structure and the strategy of the organisation. Thus, it becomes necessary to rebuild the professional identities and the overall identity of the organisation itself in the new context, in order to achieve the reconstruction of a new organisational identity, which concerns all stakeholders, especially managers, employees and shareholders, and also customers or users. In the context of ruptures and crises, the actors have indeed rebuilt their scope, with new representations, and new references. In some cases, a charismatic legitimised person, can be taken as a model and can gain the support of stakeholders for building a new structure/strategy. The reconstruction of meaning can also operate collectively.

The model Shock-Resilience-Change proposed by Koninckx and Teneau (2010) puts into perspective the shocks and the induced ruptures, the organisation and the actors. In the diagram (Fig. 10.2), the crisis does not necessarily have the same peak at the level of the organisation than it can have for stakeholders. For the authors, there is a time delay between the observation made by the organisation and that made by the stakeholders. Consequently, strong signals are sent when the curve is at its maximum and low signal when it is at its minimum.

When the organisational curve is falling, then a new identity emerges and settles down (change), provided that the actors do not settle into a negative dynamic, in which case the organisation may not survive. It is therefore necessary, so that the organisation does not disappear, for the resilience conditions to allow a “rebound” (Type 1) or a change (Type 2).



Fig. 10.2 Model Shock-Resilience-Change (Source: Authors, based on Koninckx and Teneau 2010, p. 112)

3.4 Establishing Appropriate Conditions for Resilience

If the levels of resilience can enable organisations to bounce back and avoid destruction, the question of how to implement these levels remains open and is apparently circular. Indeed, it is conceivable that the establishment of resilience requirements can be done by setting up a new type of management, new strategies, by changing structures and processes. However, for this to be possible, we need a certain level of resilience, at least initially. Moreover, this type of transformation leads to an evolution of the identity of the organisation. Therefore, it is before the crisis that it is necessary for an organisation to have a sufficient level of resilience in order to be able to face the crisis and the post-crisis situation. In this regard, it should try to continuously improve its structures, work on the logic of motivation, commitment and involvement of stakeholders at all times, ensure, in times of crisis, a sufficient level of resilience to face its various consequences. Consequently, it is necessary to articulate clearly, within organisations, the core values, meaning, professional identities and shares in a collective, recognised and legitimised logic.

One of the interesting questions that remains for the organisations that have suffered the consecutive crises after 1989 is precisely whether their level of resilience was due to the level of individual resilience of actors, which formed in the preceding period, with an obvious relativisation depending on local contexts. From these developments, it seems worthwhile the assessment of resilience of organisations in the context of European integration and of EaP partners after 1989 (for example, using the methodology of Robert et al. 2010). As such, further research is needed, country by country, and perhaps also inside each country, in order to be able to consider, capture and better explain the positive or negative consequences (developments but also rigidities and barriers to change). Currently, no inventory of how organisations were impacted by European integration or by the EaP in these different countries seems to be available. The main question that remains is which organisations have disappeared, which have not and why? Nevertheless, even if it is possible to link the analysis of the resilience of organisations, to the individual level, as well as to each EaP country, individually, to their cultural, economic, historical and political contexts, the challenging issue that remains is to include the human factor in the decision-making process.

4 Conclusions

It is quite rare in the academic literature to find links between the resilience of organisations and the resilience assessed at societal or state level. However, organisational resilience can only be understood in an inter-organisational framework, and therefore within networks that are constituents of societies. It is therefore possible to put organisational resilience in perspective with societal resilience, which could lead to a clarification of the concept that is not always specified in current studies and analyses, particularly at EU level. By employing the term "resilience" within the definition of its global strategy in relation to its neighbourhood (even if it is contested at times from a conceptual point of view), the EU may seem to underline and put into perspective a proactive approach of participating in the democratisation of societies in this background, and an intention to prioritise the internal security and the external stability. However, deepening resilience at the level of the organisations in particular, induces a direct involvement of the stakeholders, of the citizens themselves, with their formal and informal relationships, as well as encourages a process of self-evaluation by each group about their ability to react; subsequently, the participation of everyone is therefore essential in this project, which is ultimately societal. It remains to be seen whether this may or may not be an essential determinant of the democratisation of the concerned EaP states.

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