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Introduction: Resilience and the Eastern Partnership—What Relevance for Policies?

Gabriela Carmen Pascariu and Gilles Rouet

The year 2019 is an auspicious one, considering that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) celebrates its 15th anniversary, whereas the Eastern Partnership, the multilateral dimension of the ENP towards the European Union (EU's) Eastern Neighbourhood, is approaching its 10th anniversary. With this in mind, it is high time for EU decision-makers to ponder the region's future prospects and to reflect on the key questions and answers regarding some of the most worrying concerns about Europe's security and stability, concerns that also have global significance and impact.

G. C. Pascariu (✉)
Centre for Research in International Economic Relations and European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Iasi, Romania
e-mail: gcpas@uaic.ro

G. Rouet
LAREQUOI, ISM-IAE of Versailles-St-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Paris-Saclay University, Guyancourt, France

1   European Union's Eastern Neighbourhood: Geopolitical Context and the Normative Agenda

Launched in 2004, only one year after the European Commission's Communication "Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" (European Commission 2003), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP's) main goal was to develop "a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood— a 'ring of friends'—with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations" (European Commission 2003, p. 4). In this regard, through its new foreign policy, the European Union (EU) has assumed the role of a regional power, aiming to promote stability and prosperity at its external borders by strengthening cooperation with its closest neighbours and by supporting them in adopting the necessary reforms for establishing democracy and consolidating free market institutions. Moreover, the Commission's Communication even includes the "promise" of a deeper integration through the neighbours' participation in the European Single market, "in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis" (European Commission 2003, p. 4), following the model of the European Economic Space.

Initially designed to include Russia, the ENP has also outlined the prospect of a broader pan-European economic integration, following the model of concentric circles, with the Union as the tough nucleus, that promotes at its external borders "shared" values, which were in fact European values, norms, institutions, and development patterns. A simple analysis of this document, which represented the basis of the ENP, leads to three key conclusions, which played a significant role in the evolution of this policy in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU:

1. The ENP was mainly the result of external pressures, of a certain constraint, present on the regional geopolitical environment that has been restructured as a result of the EU's own dynamics; as such, through

successive expansions to the South and East (see also Howorth 2016), the EU aimed "to avoid new dividing lines in Europe", by reducing the gaps between the regions inside the EU and those situated outside its immediate borders; furthermore, the EU's Eastern neighbourhood was perceived as a threat to the Union's security, as these countries (Russia included) did not clearly express a willingness to adopt a clear democratic path and a sustainable development model. Subsequently, the ENP has thus emerged as a reactive policy, its tools and methods being "imported" from its enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. Association Agreements, Action Plans, Financing, Market Liberalisation, Positive Conditionality). In this case, the Union sought to encourage and support, at the same time, the new neighbours to adopt the Western model of society and economy, but without offering institutional integration, thus "sharing everything with the Union, but institutions" (Prodi 2002). However, such a limitation has generated two opposite reactions in the neighbourhood: frustration in those countries that had European aspirations (such as Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine), respectively, the perception of the EU as an oppressive power, with its specific conditionality; this view was particularly expressed by those countries with a more balanced approach towards the EU, that were rather oriented towards Russia (such as Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan).

2. When the ENP was launched, the EU was deemed strong and attractive enough for neighbouring countries so that it assumed a clearer external dimension. Moreover, the EU was also inclined to believe that its mechanism of positive conditionality, that had worked so well in the enlargement process, would be just as effective, despite lacking the promise of the EU's accession itself. At the same time, the lack of a clear integration perspective, of limiting the neighbours' access to the European common market highlighted the emerging of a certain "fatigue", following the eastern enlargement of 2004–2007, which also partially indicated that the EU might have reached its geographical limit. In practice, these translated into a raising awareness of the existing vulnerabilities which have compelled the EU not to consider future enlargements, even in the case of those countries that would have opted for such a perspective.

3. By giving its own model a universal value, the EU has built its ENP around the idea that all neighbouring countries, including Russia, will automatically aspire and strive for the European model, so that the Union could assume the role of a transformative power in the region, without facing notable challenges in transferring to these countries its own rules, values, and institutions, in line with the acquis communautaire. In return for adopting the required reforms and policies that these countries have agreed to, thus promoting the "Europeanisation" phenomenon, the EU has offered financial support, strengthened cooperation and access to European programmes, security guarantees, as well as it has, overall, facilitated people's mobility and access to European markets. However, in literature, the EU's approach is being perceived as "Eurocentric" (Lehne 2014; Howorth 2016), "missionary" (Simionov and Tiganasu 2018, p. 137), or as an "intoxication with its own model" (Krastev and Leonard 2014).

Apart from the specific ENP aspects mentioned earlier, the lack of a common EU foreign and security policy has played a major role in the policy's implementation dynamics and the results obtained in the region. The resulting limits have been very clearly highlighted in the context of the crisis in Ukraine, when the discordant preferences of the member states towards the neighbours and Russia have led to different positions that have weakened the effects of sanctions against Russia along with the EU's overall ability to provide security and stability in the region. Moreover, the ENP is rather a common European platform that is not entirely assumed by the individual member states. Furthermore, border states, which should play a key role in implementing the ENP, are not necessarily accountable in this process, thus displaying a very low self-awareness. At individual level, connecting countries to the ENP is mainly achieved through cross-border cooperation within the framework of European Cohesion Policy, without assuming, from a political standpoint, an active role in the region, given that in the EU's external policy, the key players are the member states, not the Union.

Over the past 15 years, all these limitations have determined the EU to constantly revise the ENP and, thus, to undergo a permanent process of strategic and methodical reconsideration of its relations and approach

towards its neighbours. The first important steps were the adoption of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009, which have added a multilateral dimension to the existing bilateral platform. This major revision was followed by the reforms of 2011 (following the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the Arab uprisings in 2011), the 2015 reforms as a direct result of the EaP Summit in Riga (following Ukraine crisis, the annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbass in 2014) and, more recently, in 2017, with the 20 Deliverables for the revised 2020 (European Commission 2017c). Each of these reforms has strengthened the EU's commitment to its Eastern and Southern neighbours in supporting the processes of democratic transformation, promoting free markets and sustainable development, in accordance to ENP's initial goal: that of creating a "ring of friends" with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful, and cooperative relations (European Commission 2003, p. 4). As such, the EU's actions in the region led to consolidating a more differentiated and tailor-made approach designated at reaching the common objectives of the EaP.

The ENP design in the Eastern neighbourhood is therefore defined now by a revised EaP. Considered a joint initiative of the EU and the six post-Soviet neighbouring countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), the EaP has set itself major goals after 2015 through constant negotiations between the EU and the post-Soviet countries, focusing on a list of priorities related to democratic transformation and economic and social development: (1) economic development and market opportunities (by stimulating economic diversification, attracting investment, creating new jobs, sustaining macroeconomic stability); (2) strengthening institutions and good governance (by fighting against corruption, supporting the reform of justice and strengthening public administration); (3) connectivity, energy efficiency, environmental and climate change (by facilitating transportation and regional economic integration and people's mobility, reducing external exposure to the risks and increasing the resilience of the EaP countries) and (4) mobility and people-to-people contacts. The four priorities, based on the negotiations which took place at the Riga Summit (2015) have materialised in 20 deliverables agreed through a joint agreement at the EaP Brussels Summit in November 2017 (Council of the European Union 2017). These

deliverables are aimed at providing tangible results to the citizens from the EaP states by 2020, at rebuilding confidence in the EU's capacity to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and at reinforcing the EU's commitment to support the aspirations of these countries in order to have closer relations with the EU.

As it appears, the EaP is based on the assumption that the six Eastern neighbours assume European integration as a strategic political objective, since strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, as well as principles and norms of international law are at the heart of the EaP (European Commission 2017b). Likewise, on behalf of the EU, the assumption is that the Union is sufficiently strong and genuinely interested in supporting the efforts of the EaP states to seek closer integration with the EU. In earnest, the only possible integration available is a partial one, since the EU has not altered its initial offer, which only entails the prospect of participating in the EU's internal market (European Commission 2003, p. 10). The subsequent EaP summits reaffirmed this political option, which, over time, constituted itself as the bedrock of the EU-EaP relationship.

However, after casting a glance at the EU's latest developments over the past years, at Union's present challenges and limits and at the complex geopolitical context from the wider post-Soviet space, it is fair to observe that the ENP perspectives are currently called into question.

Firstly, although the EU is a major global economic actor (with over 20% of global GDP and 15.6% of global exports in 2017), it experiences now a very problematic period of systemic challenges. The Union has still not managed to recover from the economic crisis and reach the pre-crisis economic levels. As such, economic and social disparities remain high, posing important risks to the functioning of the internal market and the economic and monetary union. Concurrently, the subsequent economic downturn registered after the financial crisis affected people's confidence in the EU and undermined social cohesion and solidarity across the continent. Moreover, Brexit has negatively impacted the economic outlook on the continent and constrained the EU budget. The decision of the UK to leave the EU has also generated political risks and may weaken the EU's position as a global and regional actor. Last but not least, the immigration crisis (with over 1.8 million refugees who have arrived in Europe

since 2014) has led to increased tensions between member states and brought about serious discussions vis-à-vis the real meaning of the principle of subsidiarity, namely what the Union is allowed (or not) to impose on the member states. Against this backdrop, the EU still remains popular across Europe, according to the latest Eurobarometer, although the past years have seen a surge in the Eurosceptic sentiments in many member states.

Secondly, ever since the end of the Cold War, the EU has addressed the challenges existing in the neighbourhood by spreading the European values, norms, and principles with the final aim of strengthening stability, security, and prosperity in the region. Whereas the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have eventually managed to "return to Europe" after becoming members of both the EU and NATO, for the EaP countries the EU sought to reactivate the same rationale. However, unlike the CEECs, the "full-fledged" membership prospect has never been offered to the EaP countries, which questioned the effectiveness of the EaP partnership framework. Considering the limited attractiveness of the EU's offer to the post-Soviet neighbouring states, the ENP produced modest results in almost all spheres (including economic, social, institutional development).

Last but not least, Russia's implications in the "shared neighbourhood" have raised additional challenges for the EU's transformative power. The EU was unable to deploy more effective responses to the regional turmoil sparked by the Ukrainian crisis. For the first time since the EU has actively involved itself in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the Union has faced an entirely different context marked by the revival of realistic concerns and Cold War geopolitical-type competitions.

Problematic here, it has also been the inefficient communication of the Union's policies and plans vis-à-vis these countries. For example, only in 2015 has the EU adopted a communication strategy, more than a decade after the launch of the ENP. This has been chiefly sparked off in response to Russia's disinformation campaign during the Ukrainian crisis, which pushed the Union to establish an internal structure (namely, East StratCom Task) commissioned to debunk and counter Russia's disinformation practices in the Eastern neighbourhood. As far as Russia is concerned, while in the 2003 Commission communication document Russia

was seen as a partner in the regional cooperation process, just after the crisis in Ukraine, Russia became "the other", the enemy and a constant threat to the stability of the EaP countries. Little is mentioned about the fact that Russia's actions can also be seen as a reactive strategy against the gradual rise of the EU's economic and political influence in the so-called "shared neighbourhood". Nevertheless, the future of the EaP is obviously linked to the quality of relations between Russia and the EU, which must be rethought in terms of cooperation, mutual respect, and not rivalry and conflict.

In addition, the clear divisions in the EaP countries' societies, between the pro-European groups and actors, on the one hand, and the pro-Russians, on the other hand—generated by the increased presence of the two major actors in the region—represented a major source of increased internal tensions and political instability. Specifically, the interference of EU and Russian interests and actions in the region can be viewed as the source/cause of instability and "frozen conflicts", leading to a decline in the EU's attractiveness for the EaP population, coupled with a decreased confidence in the EU's ability to be a real provider of security and prosperity in the region. Within this context, it is not by chance that according to the latest survey conducted in 2017, in Georgia (the country with the strongest European orientation), only 59% of the respondents mentioned having a positive image of the EU, whereas in Belarus (the country most strongly oriented towards Russia), the percentage declined to just 35% (Eurobarometer 2019).

Moreover, taking into account that the economic and political situation of the EaP countries (see the General Annexes) and, subsequently, their relations and stages of integration with the EU vary greatly, the EaP proposed and included into its strategy and agenda various multi-speed and multi-level integration elements. As such, the three partner countries that are more advanced in their relations with the EU (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) have signed the Association Agreements (including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas) in 2014. With Armenia, the EU has signed in 2017 the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, as a result of the EaP Summit in Brussels, in November 2017, while Armenia is also a member of the Eurasian Customs Union with Russia, just as Belarus. With Belarus, there was no bilateral

agreement, although relations with the EU have considerably strengthened over the past years. With regard to Azerbaijan, the bilateral relation with the EU is based on the 1999 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. At the 2017 EaP Summit, the two partners only began negotiating a new updated agreement. Overall, the most advanced countries in terms of EU integration are Georgia and Moldova, whereas the least integrated remain Azerbaijan and Belarus, according to the index of linkage dimension developed by the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum 2014–2017).

An analysis of the literature in the field easily reflects that all these limits of the EU's actions in the region, in the framework of its neighbourhood policy, have shown their effects since the early years of implementation. Starting with 2010, academics and experts in international relations but also other connected disciplines have pertinently claimed the need for a radical overhaul of the neighbourhood strategy, in general, and of the EaP, in particular, in order to advance the transformative processes in the neighbouring countries by adapting their economies and societies to European standards (Bechev and Nicolaidis 2010; Börzel 2011; Whitman and Wolff 2010; Korosteleva et al. 2013; Howorth 2016; Lehne 2014; Korosteleva 2017). The same key priority has also been highlighted by European institutions (Council of the European Union 2015; European Commission 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). In effect, the EU's main challenge regarding its Eastern Neighbourhood was to find new approaches and action tools in the region, better suited to the geopolitical context (defined by instability and multiple shocks) and to the specificities of each country (structural fragilities, economic, social, and institutional risks). Nevertheless, since the values, models of governance, or reforms cannot be imposed from the outside, merely searching for optimal formulas at EU level was clearly not enough. The perspective of development in the region is directly dependent on the capacity of EaP countries to assume and implement reforms "in moments of abrupt change and rupture of political and social stability" (European Commission 2014b). This means that in the various stages of ENP's dynamics, the priority was to find common solutions, outside and inside, and to advance better understanding of the EU's partners and of the region as a whole, by integrating a systemic analysis of the internal and external shocks and vulnerabilities.

One of the most recent approaches in literature, which can offer such an understanding, refers to the concept of resilience and its specific theoretical and methodological developments. Representative studies in the field (Shaw and Maythorne 2013; Martin and Sunley 2014; Boschma 2014) explain that resilience can reflect the capacity of a socio-economic system (city, region, country) to be placed on a long-term development path, incorporating a large set of internal and external conditionalities. Consequently, the resilience analysis could outline the vulnerabilities within a system in relation to various types of shocks, which may further explain its capacity to resist, to recover, and to transform by adopting a new growth and development pattern, making it a very appropriate approach for the specific case of the EaP countries. Not by chance, the concept of resilience has increasingly become present in the European Foreign Policy, especially when it comes to the EU's neighbours. Thus, if in the Commission's Communication of 2003 on the "Wider Europe" project, resilience is never mentioned, within the Joint Declaration of Riga (2015) it appears twice, in the Commission's Communication "Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework the Concept of Resilience for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" (2017a) seven times, whereas in the "A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (EUGS) (European Commission 2016), the word "resilience" appears 41 times. Consequently, in the EUGS, resilience of states and societies becomes a "strategic priority across EU's East and South both, in countries that want stronger ties with the EU, addressing the different paths of resilience" (p. 26). The EUGS and the revised ENP (European Commission 2015, 2017a) call for a focus on achieving the overall goal of increasing the stability and resilience of the neighbours.

2   Why Does Resilience Matter?

One of the defining features of worldwide economic dynamics over the past decade has been the accelerated pace of changes that produced asymmetric shocks at international, national, regional, and local levels. In the attempt to understand how economies respond more efficiently

to exogenous systemic impulses and in order to identify measures/solutions for taking advantage of endogenous developments and mitigating opportunities, scholarly literature has developed a new analytical framework, crystallised in the concept of resilience, which is defined as "the ability to resist, recover from, or adapt to the effects of a shock or a change" (Mitchell and Harris 2012, p. 2). The interest in the study of resilience dates back to the 1960s but, only recently, has it reached a critical mass of academic research (Folke et al. 2002; Cutter et al. 2008; Boorman et al. 2013; Martin and Sunley 2014). As a result, the concept of resilience is still a matter of scholarly debate and remains to be fully integrated into models of growth and development.

The global crisis of 2007–2009 and its internationalisation have strengthened the academic interest in examining resilience and its interdependency with economic development. This focus is further underscored by the protracted economic slowdown in Europe and increasing regional and global geopolitical instability. International organisations also increasingly pay a central attention to resilience in their visions of development (see, e.g., The World Bank 2014; UNDP 2014), suggesting that resilience gradually tends to replace sustainability as the ultimate goal of development (Folke et al. 2002). To European economies, especially those belonging to the EaP, resilience gains special importance given the complex dynamics of change brought about by internal structural reforms (economic, social, institutional), by the Europeanisation process triggered by the adoption of EU standards, and by the international and regional dynamics defined by the EU's and Russia's roles in the region.

Academic literature proposes two approaches to resilience and its relation to long-term development (regional, local, urban). The first approach (used in environmental and engineering sciences) offers a static vision of resilience: it refers to the economy's capacity to resist shocks (resistance), thus integrating the changes induced by these shocks within its system and consequently returning to equilibrium. In turn, the equilibrium can either be the initial one or a new one with maintaining the functions, structures, and growth model (adaptability and recoverability). According to this approach, the system may resist, adapt, and return to a functional balance while keeping the pre-shock development model (Davoudi et al. 2013).

The second approach, developed by social sciences over the past ten years, suggests a dynamic vision of resilience: the economies affected by the shock do not just return to the initial balance or move to a new equilibrium but also transform (in terms of structure and functions), affecting the operation of a new growth and development model (Martin and Sunley 2014, p. 4; Bene et al. 2014, p. 602).

In fact, the two approaches reflect the evolution of the resilience concept in parallel to new approaches such as "positive adaptability" or "evolutionary resilience". These approaches have a high explanatory potential in terms of social systems' functioning and transformation, as when employed by Martin and Sunley (2014, p. 3) for defining regional economic resilience as "the capacity […] to withstand or recover from […] shocks to its developmental growth path, if necessary by undergoing adaptive changes to its economic structures and its social and institutional arrangements, so as to maintain or restore its previous development path, or transit to a new sustainable path".

Consequently, resilience can be examined as an economy's adaptation and/or transformation process triggered by exogenous shocks. Based on this premise, the analytical model for the study of resilience comprises the following dimensions: the capacity to resist (the shock does not alter its equilibrium), the capacity to absorb (the shock alters its equilibrium, but the economy can adapt, recovering the initial equilibrium or a new one, by maintaining its model and functions), the capacity to adapt (the shock alters the equilibrium, and the system recovers by adapting, although without any major change in functions and characteristics), and the transformation capacity (the capacity to generate new structures, new functions, new models).

Various organisations, agencies, research institutes (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Centennial International Group, Network on Building Resilient Regions), and experts in various areas are considering resilience analyses as being the most appropriate alternative to replace other key concepts in designing macroeconomic policies, due to its capacity to accommodate the multitude of factors and conditions that influence long-term growth and development in a systemic approach.

Lately, on the European agenda, the concept of resilience has started to be mentioned more frequently as a key concept in relation to specific areas and fields of strategic importance, such as economic governance; growth and sustainable development; energy, environment and climate action; education and labour market; and foreign affairs. Moreover, faced with the current multiple crisis and challenges (economic crisis, Brexit referendum, the refugees crisis, the terrorist attacks, the Ukrainian episode, etc.), and considering the pitfalls of the overall integration process, the EU itself needs to become not only more intelligent, more inclusive, and more sustainable (EU2020 agenda; EUGS 2016) but also more resilient, more capable of reacting to different internal, and external shocks.

As an analytical concept, resilience can help us understand a region's capacity and ability to generate a shared development model, thus reflecting the specific characteristics and weaknesses of a socio-economic system (fragilities) and the way in which shocks can divert development directions from the established objectives (risks). The way in which the potential for the system's capacity to react, adapt, and transform, both as a whole or by its individual components (developmental potential), can be realised.

Consequently, an analysis framework based on the resilience concept in relation to the EaP dynamics can enable a better understanding and assessment of the opportunity cost of "non-resilience"; it can help identify vulnerabilities in relation to internal and external shocks (typology, level, duration, intensity) and to propose adequate measures in order to increase resilience capacity and speed up EaP economies' convergence process to EU standards. In particular, a resilience-based approach can capture the weaknesses of the systems characterised by instability, insecurity, institutional weaknesses, and structural fragilities, as well as inefficient governance. It can thus offer a scientific basis for the design of public policies.

3 The Book Content

This volume consolidates the understanding of the recent geopolitical challenges in Europe, providing, first, an extensive analysis of the EaP countries from a multi-disciplinary and multi-level policies perspective

and, second, by revisiting the Eastern Partnership agenda, based on the resilience approach, as a new paradigm in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. The resilience analysis framework encompassed in the current book seeks to outline the vulnerabilities but also the strengths of both the EU and EaP countries, in relation to various types of shocks and stressors, which characterised the international environment and the regional context over the past decade. In this respect, the volume proposes: (a) a critical approach of the ENP and its implications for the EU as a regional actor, starting with the current trends, which focus on using the concept of resilience, almost excessively and lacking a rigorous scientific substantiation; (b) an update of the current state of the art regarding resilience theories, focusing on the four main aspects of resilience (the abilities to resist, absorb, adapt, and transform) in relation to specificities and challenges for the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood; (c) case studies that will provide and foster a better understanding of the new realities at the EU's Eastern borders; and (d) opinions and proposals of a new framework for the resilience capacity analysis and for using the concept of resilience in policy-making development in the EaP Countries, as well as in increasing the efficiency of the ENP. Considering all of the above-mentioned arguments, the book can be considered as the first of its kind to provide an in-depth understanding of the EaP region, based on resilience approach analyses, from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Furthermore, resilience analysis of a system can provide highly normative conclusions for the policy-making process, for both national governments and European structures in the region.

In Chap. 2, Cristian Nitoiu analyses the geopolitical context in Eastern Europe, based on the dynamics of the status-seeking efforts of Russia and the EU over the past two decades. The chapter contends that the Ukraine crisis has moved the relations between the EU and Russia from geopolitical competition to geopolitical conflict, and that this movement has been primarily caused by a breakdown in the post-Cold War pattern of mutual recognition of the status-seeking efforts of Russia and the EU. The chapter also contends that the increased focus in geopolitics has prompted the EU to build its resilience towards external development in the eastern neighbourhood. In the opinion of the author, it is in the EU's interest to increase its sensitivity towards Russia's status claims and efforts and to

resume the dialogue with Russia (possibly by also including the views of the post-Soviet states), as well as to develop clearer strategies and prevention measures for dealing with Kremlin's assertive foreign policy.

Mihaela Onofrei and Florin Oprea propose in Chap. 3 a comparative study of the administrative systems and governance practices in EaP countries, along with their implications for ENP's effectiveness. Considering that, the strongest reform triggers are internal rather than external, and the sustainability of the measures and their effects depend mostly on internal factors, the authors also put forward new guidelines in the ENP implementation, with an emphasis on human capital, institutional and governance performance, as well as civil society involvement.

Chapter 4 focuses on the economic issues of the EaP countries, in order to identify the main vulnerabilities but also the drivers of economic development, which are relevant for enhancing the resilience capacity of those countries. A wide palette of indicators and indexes are used by the authors—Oana-Ramona Socoliuc and Liviu-George Maha, in order to offer an in-depth analysis of the economic dynamics of the EaP countries in relation to the various shocks and crisis that have affected the region over recent years. In this framework, the authors propose specific measures for each analysed county on how to enhance the overall impact of the ENP and to accelerate their economic integration.

Drawing on (in)securitisation theory as developed by the PARIS school, Chap. 5 addresses the central normative dilemma of the EU's EaP—resilience versus principled pragmatism—and offers an alternative conceptual framework. The author—Grzegorz Pożarlik discusses the "neighbourhood fatigue" undermining the EU's international actorness and identity, the necessity to focus the ENP on the societal resilience dimension and the "return to political".

In Chap. 6, the authors (Teodor-Lucian Moga and Lucian-Dumitru Dîrdală) revisit the concept of the EU's actorness, and explain the factors limiting the EU's actions in its Eastern neighbourhood, pondering on the risk of less commitment and capabilities directed towards EaP countries in the near future. However, the author of Chap. 7—Michael Bolle—demonstrates that the EU has a strong resilience, but it needs to improve its decision-making, in order to build its reputation as a moderator of international conflicts and to engage more in a real construction and

consolidation of European identity. Along the same lines of the analysis of the EU's interest and capacity to act as a provider of security and stability beyond its borders, the authors of Chap. 8 (Ivana Slobodnikova, Peter Terem, and Radovan Gura) explore the EU's involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. Based on a qualitative analysis, the authors provide strong arguments for a deepening integration of the EU so as to increase its resilience capacity and to strengthen its position in the international system.

Yuval Weber's Chap. 9 proposes a new tool of analysis in international relations—Hierarchy and Resilience Index. The author evaluates the hierarchical relations of Russia, the United States, and China along security, economic, diplomatic, and informational categories, and finds that Russia's efforts to bolster its hierarchical bloc in Eastern Europe through new subordinate allies has largely failed to get traction. As regards the EU, its role in the region will depend on buttressing the political, economic, security, and informational hierarchies of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and offer material support and leadership to those states that show an interest in joining or allying with the EU.

Chapter 10 turns to yet another relatively new concept in the theories of resilience: the organisations. The authors, Gilles Rouet and Thierry Côme, bring about an important contribution to the in-depth analysis of resilience, by explaining the role that agents play in the proper functioning of associations, companies, administrations, and people, as well as the way that networks are formed between these agents, respectively, the role and meaning of societal-social resilience. The authors highlight the necessity to involve the societal actors in building resilience; the normative relevance for the ENP being the stringent need to focus more on societies and individual organisations in the EaP countries.

The last section of the volume consists of a wide spectrum of case studies. In Chap. 11, the authors Carmen Pintilescu and Daniela Viorică develop a new framework of the economic resilience analysis and evaluate the resilience capacity of the EaP countries. The chapter contributes to a better understanding of the economic systems of those countries and identifies the main drivers of resilience capacity, thus having a high relevance for policy-makers.

Adrian Healy and Gillian Bristow develop in Chap.12 an analysis of economic resilience, integrating the role of the geographical positioning of a region. The results indicate that regions with external borders tend to be less resilient to economic crisis than regions with no national borders, or where these borders were internal to the EU. For policies, this means that the EU needs to focus more on the connection between external and internal conditionalities of resilience; the findings suggest that reducing the peripheral nature of internal border regions needs to become a strengthened priority of the EU's cohesion policy, whereas the member states situated at the Union's external borders must assume more important and consistent political objectives in relation to their neighbours by going beyond the European common actions.

In Chap. 13, Ramona Ţigănaşu and Loredana Maria Simionov focus on another key driver of resilience: the institutions. The authors conduct a cross-country comparison between the Baltic States—Ukraine and Republic of Moldova—aiming to highlight the subtle mechanisms by which resilience and development can be correlated and through which the synergic relationships between the institutional elements included in the current research can be intensified. The results put, first, in evidence that institutions matter for resilience and, second, that there are important differences between countries. The conclusions reinforce the idea of focusing on EaP's actors and society, in order to reduce the Eastern neighbours' vulnerabilities to the uncertainties and instabilities of external environments.

Chapters 14 and 15 turn back to political approaches. In Chap. 14, Sergiy Gerasymchuk focuses on investigating the specific coordinates of the Europeanisation process and its adaptation capacity to the new realities, threats, and challenges that the EaP countries are currently facing; the main findings conclude that in order to regain the support of civil society and population, to be able to counteract Russian influence in the region and to increase the level of resilience, the EU has a home task, which is rethinking the idea of Europeanisation in its initial terms for winning the hearts and minds of the ordinary citizens. In what concerns conditionality as a strategy, the author argues that it can only be effective and efficient with a credible membership perspective as the main reward offered by the EU. In Chap. 15, Eske Van Gils examine the challenges posed to resilience-building in states

with authoritarian regimes, due to the inevitable contradictions between elite interests and interests of society as a whole. Using the case study of Azerbaijan, the chapter argues that the EU will have to be cautious to avoid strengthening the resilience of this regime rather than getting the intended inclusive resilience of the broader society.

The social and cultural dimensions of resilience represent the main subject of analysis in the last two chapters of the book. Subsequently, in Chap. 16, Cristian Incaltarau and Gabriela Carmen Pascariu focus on analysing the role of migration and remittances in supporting resilience in the transition countries. The authors estimate that the effect of natural disasters disappears for remittances ratios above 10% of GDP. While remittances also mitigate the impact of political conflicts, their impact is stronger in countries with less freedom. Policy-makers should design friendlier remittance policies in order to help population cope with shocks and boost recovery. Chapter 17 presents how multiculturalism is used in the local policies of resilience in three towns located at the Polish-Ukrainian borderland. Dariusz Wojciech Wojakowski highlights that in both Poland and Ukraine there is a possibility of maintaining and developing the past multiculturalism as a resource for resilience. In the ENP, multiculturalism should be further supported by specific policies, as an important factor which strengthens societal resilience.

The ENP has evolved significantly since its initial action framework launched in 2004. As such, it became increasingly suited to the current political, economic, institutional, and security context in the region. However, the various strategic interests displayed by the big players in this particular region, correlated with its own vulnerabilities, but especially with the complex and often selfish and conflicting interests of the EaP countries, have considerably limited the effects of the EU's support offered to these countries. Moreover, complementary to the recent lines of action proposed by the European Commission (2017c), which reinforce a more pragmatic approach towards the region, the current volume offers additional major strategic directions as follows: developing a stronger connection between the EU's external action and its internal policies, correlated with enhancing the coherence of the EU and its member states' actions, along with enhancing the role played by border countries; changing the overall perspective from convergence and alignment with EU

norms, to the mutual recognition of diversity in values, norms, and expectations; advancing from hostility and rivalry to cooperation in the relations with Russia, from self-projection on others, to fostering integration that is inclusive and encompasses the vision and interests of others; and from having as main objectives the Europeanisation and integration of the EaP countries (approximation and linkage dimensions), to focusing solely on cooperation, in order to increase stability in the region by strengthening the resilience capacity of both the EU and the EaP countries. Last but not least, where intergovernmentalism fails, markets and individuals can be successful. Thus, the EU needs to invest more in its relation with the agents in the EaP countries, focusing on the people and societal resilience, building an identity and a feeling of belonging to a "shared" system of values and institutions, including the enhancing of the multilateral instruments and a stronger communication strategy.

The book first targets academia's interest: scholars across the social sciences, researchers, educators, and graduate students in the fields of International Economics, European Economy, Economic Integration, Economic Growth, and Regional Development, as well as International Relations, Political Science, and European Policies. Nevertheless, considering its highly normative nature, the book will also be of great interest for policy-makers, from both the EU and EaP countries, as it tackles specific issues of the region, while it offers solutions and concrete recommendations. Moreover, the book will also be of interest for practitioners and professionals working in EaP and EU regional and local institutions, since these institutions are the main actors in the design and/or implementation of regional policies (i.e. regional development agencies, ministries, NGOs, or public administrations).

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