Babak Akhgar · Douglas Wells
José María Blanco   *Editors*

Investigating Radicalization Trends

Case Studies in Europe and Asia

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Security Informatics and Law Enforcement

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In loving memory of Aryan. H. Akhgar. You are always here.

PREFACE

It is a real privilege to write this preface for this edited volume of works from leading academics and practitioners concerned with the field of countering violent radicalisation. This book addresses the concepts, value and practical application of contemporary radicalisation, counterterrorism and public resilience strategies deployed across Europe.

Following the September 11 attacks, much of the Western democratic world has consistently been engaged in discussions around the detection, prevention and punishment of extremist ideologies and actors. Concerns have recently been further exacerbated by the increasing frequency and ferocity of far-right attacks, often accompanied by provocative rhetoric that justifies or legitimises the atrocity due to the actions of the opposition. Facilitated by the universal access to Internet-enabled devices and the permeation of social media through society, the belligerent polarisation of far-right, left-wing, extreme ideologically-driven narratives and all other avenues of extremism has led to a virtual arms race of inflammatory propaganda and indoctrination campaigns. As if in accompaniment to Moore's law, recent years have seen an exponential global growth in nationalist and populist movements, as well as in protest parties and anti-establishmentarian demonstrations.

The driving catalyst of the increasing social tension and dissonance is reflected in the increasing popularity of radical movements, many of which may be associated with encouraging anti-democratic or violent behaviours.

The ability to monitor and limit the hateful discourse problematic in terms of operational feasibility is also an extremely sensitive and controversial topic at the political state level. Nationally led programs set

up to counter online hate speech and terrorist propaganda, for example, have often been branded as institutionally racist or to hold a particular bias or focus towards a specific strand of the political or religious spectrum. From a European perspective, this problem is further compounded by the diversity of different policing regulations and policies, and considerations such as the right to political expression and the freedom of speech, as well as the capacity to be charged for holding, viewing or sharing 'extremist material' vary greatly on a country-specific basis.

These challenges represent the very 'tip of the iceberg' for the complex and ambiguous field of radicalisation research. It is our hope that this book will provide an expert, evidence-based overview of these critical domains, which in the current climate have become increasingly stressed from repeated extremist attacks and murders from both sides of the political spectrum. These topics are examined from a holistic, practitioner-focused perspective, considering the issues from the national security level through to the regional, local and civilian levels. The authors of the 12 chapters seek to provide a comprehensive, evidence-based view into the latest tactical and strategic approaches for both expert and amateur analyses, through clear visualisations, real-life case studies and realistic applications and examples of a wide variety of challenges and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is also important to consider guidance on legal and ethical considerations. We intend this book as a useful reading for public safety practitioners, as well as academics, students and security stakeholders. It is our hope that this collection of chapters will lead to a comprehensive awareness and understanding of the interconnectivities and trends behind emerging pan-European radicalisation patterns.

Sheffield, UK   Babak Akhgar

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People

CONTENTS

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Introduction

Babak Akhgar and Douglas Wells

1.1 Contextual Challenges of Modern Radicalisation

Ever since the 2015 Islamic extremist attacks in Paris and Brussels, few topics have divided European international and domestic debate like the topics of countering violent extremism (CVE). The term 'radicalisation' itself has been a social and political buzzword for over a decade (Crone 2016). Indeed, considerations of how to fight contemporary terrorism and violent extremism have played a significant role in the recent growth of nationalism, isolationism and social discord. In turn this has manifested itself in an increasingly fractured and volatile world wherein extremist atrocity begets extremist atrocity, the tragedies of the March 2019 Christchurch shooting and the subsequent Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka were both claimed to be revenge attacks by their polar ideological opposites, with the former far-right attack being the specific causation for the latter Islamic extremist attack (Groll 2019).

Despite almost unilateral international condemnation of such attacks, the policies, programmes, methodologies and practices of countering violent extremism are anything but consistent and coherent. Theoretical

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1

stereotypes, archetypes and profiles for violent extremists are often largely unhelpful and attackers continually break the expected vulnerability or concerning trait matrices set for them. The Paris and Brussels attacks of late 2015 and early 2016 highlighted the increasingly complex makeup and motives of the attackers that contradicted initial suppositions of ardent and committed fundamental Muslims: The Abdeslam brothers regularly drunk alcohol, visited gay and heterosexual bars and nightclubs, smoked cannabis and enjoyed other activities associated with more liberal Western juvenile behaviours (Cottee 2016). The reality of case studies such as this proved at the time to be problematic for some CVE programmes that assumed that the radicalisation process is a movement of negative behavioural correlation, with varying degrees of observable phenomena, that ultimately ends in: 'an extremist worldview that legitimises violence' (Cottee 2016).

Furthermore, recent years have seen Western countries continually revaluate the dangers of far-right terrorism and domestic extremism on a par to the likes of more traditional jihadist terrorism; despite this many of those same Western countries have held mixed success in reforming or broadening the scope of government-backed CVE policies and programmes (Osborne 2018). In cases such as the UK's Prevent initiative, this has led to opposition and criticism of the programme as a 'toxic brand' that struggles to hide a biased focus on specifically Islamic extremist concerns (Halliday and Dodd 2015).

The increasing awareness in far-right groups' presence has largely been through a series of high-profile attacks and murders such as by Brenton Tarrant of Christchurch, New Zealand; Darren Osborne in London, UK; and James Fields in Charlottesville, USA. Whilst some circumstances, such as the New Zealand Mosque attacks, have led to increased gun prohibition laws, prohibiting the ownership and sale of all military-style assault rifles (both semi-automatic and automatic) (Menon 2019), far less has been done on the global stage to properly acknowledge and suggest methods to curtail the far-right use of the Internet, which plays a fundamental role in the radicalisation, communication and networking of dangerous individuals. The existence of extreme-right online forums, social media accounts, groups and mobile chat rooms highlights a complex problem of monitoring and policing far-right online extremism in that much of the propaganda and hate speech used is not uniformly illegal. Indeed, in Europe alone, there are significant differences between the free speech laws of various countries; online posts that deny the holocaust and claim it to be

a Jewish conspiracy, for example, are illegal in Germany but not necessarily in the UK (Charlemagne 2007). Whilst holocaust denial and support for Nazi ideology may be technically lawful in some countries, furthermore much of this propaganda is often not classified as being terrorist or even extremist. The problem of the Internet as a facilitator and exacerbator of all generic extremist content is an even greater and more prevalent issue that is yet to be resolved. However, over the past 5 years some observable steps have been made to curtail these dangers; European governments have increasingly applied pressure towards Internet service providers and social media giants responsible for the hosting or facilitating the spread of extremist content.

Extremist and terror-affiliated groups are increasingly using the ubiquitous potential of the Internet to communicate with supporters, to indoctrinate, recruit and spread propaganda, sewing abroad the seeds of violence and radicalisation. Younger generations are often both the target of online indoctrination and the vehicle for tactical violence. The abundance and ease of access to online radical material often have long-lasting and far-reaching consequences; seeding sustained campaigns of social division and upping the ante between belligerent radical groups. Online extremist material also holds the significant potential to permeate politics, whether it is through governmental discussions on the brutality of Daesh execution videos (Khawaja et al. 2018) or through the sharing of factually incorrect propaganda from far-right groups by Donald Trump (Dearden 2017). Online extremist material holds the unprecedented ability to 'go viral' at any moment, potentially casting a significant influence over global, national and regional policy, legal and ethical discourse, as well as societal debate and perspectives.

On the topic of political, legal, ethical and societal debates, further compounding this complex field is the collapse and scorched earth policy of the Islamic State. The breakdown and exodus of the caliphate in the Levant now means that radicalisation is not only a forefront security concern but also a humanitarian, economic and legal concern. As highlighted by cases such as Shamima Begum—a former British supporter of the Islamic State whom travelled to Syria and married two Daesh soldiers (the former of which was killed), upon stating her desire to return to the country, the UK Home Secretary Sajid Javid stripped her of her UK citizenship, a controversial move which has attracted a significant amount of debate (Addley 2019). The Begum case has revealed the growing issue of sensationalism that has become intertwined with the discussion and reporting

of radicalisation. Such cases potentially run the risk of fanning the flames of extremism and adding legitimacy or martyrdom to former fighters, supporters and sympathisers; additionally they make reasonable discussion over the treatment of 'former radicals' into a politically and socially divisive issue. The potential division of societal opinions for treating individuals associated with extremist and terrorist can make the implementation, support for and legitimacy of 'softer stance' CVE programmes and initiatives a more challenging affair, and one that politicians choose to side away from.

1.2   Contributions to Overcoming CVE Challenges

These contextual challenges reveal the importance of avoiding sensationalist and reactive measures; instead it is critical that CVE policies and programmes are deployed as part of evidence-based methodology. Here it is imperative that counter-radicalisation initiatives are built on a solid epistemic foundation and are regularly and sufficiently reviewed, assessed and monitored against performance indicators. Therefore, this book has selected a series of leading case studies from European initiatives that seek to implement such practices.

Alongside the nuance and sensitivity of contemporary societal reactions to CVE approaches is the reality that such complexities contribute to the significant challenge that 'no one solution fits all'. As stated, prior, many EU nations are slowly moving to add the same credible weightings to the severity of far-right extremism, whilst programmes such as the UK's Prevent have been identified as a 'toxic brand' by critics that prioritises monitoring the Islamist ideology above other threats. These potential hindrances and barriers to the perceived reliability and efficacy of CVE programmes suggests that in reality it is highly unlikely for one uniform brand or initiative to successfully deal with the spectrum of CVE concerns spread across a nation; instead there may be greater strength in a decentralised, case-by-case approach towards tackling radicalisation. This suggested approach is reflected through the variety of case study chapters in the book, covering a variety of credible voices from the CVE domain in implementing a multitude of novel approaches.

An additional significant challenge that all national and regional actors face in implementing CVE is often from the lack of audible voices that represent positive community-based as well as personal psychological changes.

Whilst it is not unusual to hear about catastrophic failings of governments, law enforcement and intelligence eservices in the monitoring of known or suspected individuals who go on to be involved in violent extremist actions, there are far fewer reports on the successful counter-radicalisation case studies. This book also appreciates the importance of detailing credible and accountable instances, of positive implementation, statistical improvements and individual cases wherein CVE targets where achieved. The chapters of this book have been compiled in a manner that meets the modern challenges and nuanced complexities of various EU CVE initiatives; they are detailed below with a summary of their respective aims and objectives.

1.3   Chapter Summary

1.3.1   Chapter 2: Security and European Polarisation

This chapter focuses on the complex used case of the impact of Brexit upon the European Union and how it is impacting the structure of values and prioritisation of security concerns including terrorism, domestic hate crimes and the refugee influx crises. The authors utilise an analytical phenomenological approach to explore how these nuanced threats are affecting the stability of Europe's framework.

1.3.2   Chapter 3: The Radicalisation-Factor Model (RFM): Proposing a Framework for the Systematic Investigation and Modelling of Online Radicalisation

This chapter provides a model (the radicalisation-factor model) to evaluate the impact that online platforms play in the radicalisation process of individuals. The framework presented in this chapter aims to contribute to the development of detailed models, guiding policies and identification of gaps in existing research surrounding online radicalisation.

1.3.3   Chapter 4: The So-Called 'Lone Wolf' Phenomenon

This chapter discusses several different national approaches to the reporting and documentation of 'lone wolf' terrorist attacks in Europe. By looking at case studies in Germany, Canada, the USA, Norway, Russia and Algeria, the authors evaluate the different ideological standings for attempting to understand the phenomena.

1.3.4   Chapter 5: Cyber Intelligence Against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

This chapter provides a critical literature review and analysis of current models linked to cyber CVE in order to highlight current gaps for development. The results from this analysis highlight that cyber security methods should be used to detect new online trends, which is fundamental to understanding the dynamic methods used by counter-violent extremists.

1.3.5   Chapter 6: Testing for Reliability of the TARGET Threat Analysis Instrument (TTAI): An Interdisciplinary Instrument for the Analysis of School Shooting Threats

This chapter describes a German research programme into developing a research tool to help analyse characteristics of radicalised school shooter threats systematically. The chapter describes how The TARGET Threat Analysis Instrument (TTAI) is a reliable tool for testing current approaches and developing elaborated criteria to distinguish between school shooting threats, which are meant to be serious, and threats which are situational in that specific moment of threatening.

1.3.6   Chapter 7: Counter-Radicalisation Strategies: An Analysis of German and French Approaches and Implementations

This chapter provides a detailed analysis and comparison of the German and French approaches towards 'homegrown' Jihadist security. The chapter aims to contribute to the epistemic gap of systematic knowledge regarding political policies and preventive measures implemented to counter it exists. By examining Germany and France, two countries with significant Muslim populations, the authors seek to review and compare the theoretical underpinnings of both countries' approaches to CVE, particularly considering the legitimacy of state authority.

1.3.7   Chapter 8: Radicalisation: No Prevention Without 'Juridicalisation'

Amongst the backdrop of contemporary Western societies, this chapter provides a nuanced prevention/deradicalisation model alongside its methods, projects and tools which is comparatively discussed in how it is used by

European countries specifically for far-right threats. It also studies debates within academia which assesses their effectiveness both intrinsically and extrinsically for criminal and intelligence analysts, societal members and the overall European society. The analysis highlights the modern intertwining of police and judicial methods of prevention, thus creating a multi-agency approach.

1.3.8   Chapter 9: Countering Radicalisation in the United Kingdom: A Community-Based Approach

This chapter offers a polemical insight and discussion to the need for a critical review of key concepts in security studies, appertaining to the current contexts in the United Kingdom in relation to radicalisation and more specifically counter-radicalisation. In particular, the author focuses on exploring the potential for community resilience as a capacity to counter radicalisation.

1.3.9   Chapter 10: Enhancing Community Resilience: Assessing the Role That Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Law Enforcement (LEA) Staff Associations and Networks Can Play in the Fight Against Radicalisation

This chapter discusses the concept of community resilience and explains it in the context of the fight against radicalisation and CVE. The authors suggest that idea of community resilience is a valuable resource when empowered to negotiate and work in partnership with CVE initiatives; this empowerment must respect cultural competency standards as acknowledged through an examination of UK community policing alongside the British Black, Asian and Minority police officer staff associations and networks.

1.3.10   Chapter 11: The 'Choice to Challenge' Extreme Views in the Classroom? Counter-Radicalisation and the Prevent Agenda in the University Context

This chapter provides an insight into the roles of CVE programmes in the context of the UK Prevent agenda and its implementation in universities and higher education establishments. The author's research explores the relationship between higher educational and policing bodies. The chapter

conducts an in-depth analysis of the findings within a large quantitative survey disseminated using purposive sampling, given to students and staff at a law school within a UK university.

1.3.11   Chapter 12: Mothers' Agency as an Alternative to the War on Terror

This final chapter of this book provides an insight into the importance of motherhood as a critical bond that is able to detect and understand radical changes in their children. The author examines the potential for mother's agency as an effective component of the 'War on Terror' efforts, by drawing on empirical evidence generated in contexts where the major causes of radicalisation traditionally find ground. If approached appropriately, this capacity has the potential to work alongside tools and methodologies to provide a key intelligence resource for security concerns of violent extremism and terrorism.

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Security and European Polarisation

Jéssica Cohen and José María Blanco

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Europe is at a crossroads, affected by a severe political, economic and social crisis. Several analysts question the future of the European Union (EU). Two phenomena have arisen during 2015 and 2016 as major challenges for Europe. On the one hand, there is the jihadist terrorism, which has particularly hit France, Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK). On the other hand, there is the refugee crisis, a massive outflow of citizens from countries at war, who seek to reach Europe in search of a better life. In a recent report of the Congressional Research Service, Archick (2016) states that the European Union is a history of success, but faces many political and social pressures, the Greek debt crisis (the most prominent among the others taking place in Europe), the so-called "Brexit" (the referendum in which British citizens decided to leave the EU), a resurgent Russia, a heightened terrorism threat and the previously mentioned refugee crisis. Archick also points out the lack of strong leadership and strategic vision.

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Europe must address the effects of a polarisation that is being caused by the economic crisis; the refugee crisis; the terrorist attacks in Europe; the lack of confidence at institutions and political parties; the lack of engagement between the EU, as an international organisation, and the citizens belonging to the member states; the lack of leadership in Europe; inequalities and unemployment; and the growing power of right-wing parties, populist parties and nationalist ideologies. Several of these causes are, at the same time, effects of this polarised climate. But Europe also needs to deal with the effects of its own laws exacerbating the problem. These factors and actors that are most often depicted in a negative portrayal contribute to create anti-EU and "Eurosceptic" sentiments. Millions of voters are dissatisfied with classical parties and are giving opportunities to those that propose more radical points of view. Part of this analysis could be also applied to the case of the United States.

These impacts are affecting other associated phenomena with less media attention. Countries such as France, Germany, Spain and the UK—particularly after the Brexit and terrorist attacks—have experienced a sharp increase in the rates of hate crimes. Social media, but also traditional media channels, are being used as amplifiers of hate speech against minorities and communities, due to its ease of use and a degree of anonymity. Political parties have used this crisis to disseminate an anti-immigration rhetoric and far-right positions have advanced in many countries. The available information has lost its ability to inform. This chapter aims to discuss the current European climate, which has arisen from a number of indicators that have had an influential role in facilitating a polarised societal structure. It then aims to apply this knowledge to understanding polarisation dissemination into the political, social, economic and technological spheres through explanatory examples. From this analysis the chapter will discuss how these social imbalances caused by the polarised climate have had consequential effects on the stability of Europe, leading to a number of by-products such as hate crime and radicalisation, and incorporate this knowledge into a "social polarisation cycle". The knowledge gained through critical literature reviews, case study analysis and the development of the cycle will be incorporated into a number of recommendations that aim to help improve the security and structure of Europe as contemporary threats emerge.

2.2   Ways in Which Polarisation Takes Place

2.2.1   Political Polarisation

Populist parties (in the sense of those political parties that seek to represent the interests of ordinary people), from one or another ideology, have become a new player able to deal with the most traditional political structures of the EU. Today, on the date this chapter is being written, these new parties already hold 1329 seats in 25 countries. The support that political polarisation has is fed from the news, shared grievances and fears, drawing on the need for change. In this context, we forget that the construction of collective identities arises from the passions but also from the most irrational fears. Populisms are nourished by the total absence of political debate in our societies. The evolution of democracy and possible alternatives are a taboo issue from one to the other side of the continent. This political stagnation is being exploited by populist formations to gather more support, visible from the extreme left to the extreme right, which state that their intention is to return "power to the people". These populist demands can be observed in a high percentage of the protests that have shaken the international scene in recent years whose main complaints have been about corruption, injustice and lack of democracy (Youngs 2017). A clear example of political action that generates polarisation is the current management of the influx of refugees to the European continent, the largest exodus since the Second World War. Within this humanitarian crisis, many voices are rising, evoking the risk of having a high percentage of foreign population within national borders, warning about the possible infiltration of terrorists into these human floods and with growing complaints after recent attacks in Germany and France. The problem increases when this view is projected by authorities of one level or another, when politicians have the ability to implement policies that are born without a clear objective, aiming to contribute to a rhetorical discourse or simply to provide arguments of doubtful validity to the most reactionary sectors of society or social masses who have no prior information of the phenomenon.

The US 11th of September 2001 attack (four coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda) showed the biases that a terrorist act can have on social consciousness and their treatment to refugees. Governments of both sides of the Atlantic altered the international protection regime in their antiterrorist career. As mentioned by Ruud Lubbers, United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (quoted in Refugees 2011: 30): "as emotions run high and while Americans and the rest of the word grieve, we should refrain from pointing fingers and inciting hatred against innocent groups such as refugees". In this sense many EU countries have already raised the equivalent of 1200 km of fences or "anti-immigrant" walls. Initiative is followed even by countries like Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, where, according to Eurostat data, the immigrant population does not exceed four and a half percent. Thus, it is not trivial that the cardinal narrative of these populist parties is centred on immigration, identity or cultural issues, but also on security sphere, promising certainty in times of enormous uncertainty like the present and promoting the "us and them" narrative. Hence it is not difficult to identify same security agendas between political parties of different ideologies. These movements appeal to the need to return to traditional values, the use of symbols and flags and other collective references that had already given way to a more homogeneous continent. This has led to a fortified, fragmented and fearful Europe, of which society is facing a political pulse that is setting the Europe of the future. Nationalism, traditionally on the rise in periods of economic crises (Piketty 2014), is another cause of social inequality and therefore of polarisation, especially when it is observed that in its narrative the position of some communities over others is exalted. While the political and institutional causes that explain the growing nationalisms are many, and each territory is very different, the disaffection with the ruling political class stands as a common variable in its uprising (Heller 2017; Lopez 2013).

2.2.2   Social Polarisation

Polarisation can also be born from the social sphere fuelled by behaviour, actions and omissions, voluntarily and involuntarily, which tend to position some social sectors against others (Oxford dictionary of Human Geography 2013). It is very complex to identify social polarisation and separate it from the rest of polarisations as an independent phenomenon; moreover the intensification of these directly affects the population. However, there are very clear current examples that can be mentioned. One clear example comes from the current activity of the extreme right in Europe. Closely related to the political and social climate affecting the region, the far-right maintains high reactivity, being able to mobilise supporters taking advantage of any event, news or traumatic event, with a narrative and messages based on hate or intolerance. The economic crisis

and especially the jihadist attacks offer arguments for this hate speech, strengthening national identities against third parties and foreigners (Blanco and Cohen 2015).

Terrorist attacks, as it happens with major disasters, wars or crisis, also shape the social psyche. Every one of these changes affects the inner image (mental picture) about other societies and communities, particularly of those that are at the origin of terrorism, configuring negative and hostile beliefs and attitudes towards them (Cohen 2015; Bar-Tal and Labin 2001). Providing a face to a shared threat strengthens the identity of individuals in the community that encircles them, but also produces a self-generation cycle of mistrust that helps to maintain unjustified levels of unconscious fear, which in itself generates inter-group hatred and intra-group loyalties. In such contexts easily arises the phenomenon of "group think", a process in which a group of initially rational people ends up making irrational decisions. The rise of disparity identities is greater during processes enhanced in contexts of social inequality.

2.2.3   *Economic Polarisation*

Any of the contexts explained so far is linked to an economic recession or an increasing arrival of immigrants or minorities, creating a splendid breeding ground for populism. While the existence of the middle class and its growth represents steps towards greater equality and less polarisation, the economic crisis is deepening inequality. According to Credit Suisse in its report Global Wealth Databook (2015), the financial crisis has had a clear impact on the size of the middle class, where in the period of 1 year, between 2007 and 2008 in the first year of the crisis, its worldwide size declined by more than 102 million. Since then, mainly in Europe, middle-class rates have continued to fall until today due to a powerful inequality which, as reflected in the report, is increasing poverty.

The globalisation of the economy has also boosted inequality because it has been necessary to adapt a multitude of diverse territories to the neo-liberal economic model of a few states. This situation with clear effects in the labour market is also enhancing social polarisation. There is a growing divergence between the jobs for which a high qualification is required and those where only intermediate training is required. This disparity is leading directly to a reduction of the middle class, in both developed and developing countries. This situation has led in the specific sectors, such as the consumer sector, to an increasing polarisation by two extreme target

audiences: either low cost or high luxury. Multiple studies are published each year, as the one published by Oxfam Intermon (2016) or Capegemini (2017), which revealed that the world's wealth is going to be in fewer and fewer hands. In this scenario it is very difficult to justify the adoption of austerity policies against which there is a growing rejection.

From the socioeconomic perspective it is also necessary to mention the spatial polarisation. There are cities where there are developing increasingly wealthy economic sectors. The problem arises when only a few citizens participate in them and therefore cannot afford to live in the centre. In this situation there are increasingly extreme cities like London, Tokyo, New York, Lagos or Cape Town. An unequal distribution, in terms of space and wealth, means that a small number of people are growing richer and the poor are getting poorer.

2.2.4   *Technological and Information Polarisation*

Technology, in terms of access, use and possession, is another variable that generates social inequality and therefore polarisation. It is not only influenced by factors such as literacy, the level of resources or the ability to use new technologies but also by the skills of some users compared to the rest, which helps to access higher value knowledge. According to the report, all European countries except Albania enjoy a status of technology development above the average, a situation that is favoured by their greater economic development and GDP per capita.

Social networks must also be analysed despite an unquestioned work of the dissemination of information and opinion that is built bottom-up within society, which allows citizens to give information at the same level as it is produced by the media or political authorities, among others. But it also serves as a catalyst for social polarisation. Wael Ghonim, a computer engineer of Google, was a key player in the mobilisation of thousands of citizens in the so-called Egyptian "Arab Spring", in early 2011. Under the slogan "a revolution against corruption, injustice and dictatorship", he created a Facebook event with the intention of taking people to the streets in protest. In just 10 days the call reached more than one million people and 100,000 agreed to attend. The problem arose when the claims turned into a "with me or against me" scenario. Social networks quickly became broadcast channels with highly polarised political opinions, contributing to the spread of conflicting opinions providing rumours

and false information without any barriers and promoting hate speech. As it was revealed by a Pew Research on demographic trends, that influences US policy (June 2014) when our awareness line shifts up, so does our ideological consistency.

Wael has highlighted five characteristics of the media that contribute to greater social polarisation. We have added to these variables notes provided by the professor of Harvard University, Cass Sustain (2015), on how groups think and act in the new social dynamics:

1. The existence and rapid spread of rumours, especially when these are able to confirm the prejudices of some social sectors.
2. The echo effect powered by our habit to communicate only with people with whom we agree. We hear the same thoughts repeatedly.
3. The ease with which confrontation is generated: Online discussions have to acquire high hostility in short periods of time, leaving aside that after the vast majority of the profiles there are people.
4. The difficulty to change the mind. The increasing speed of communication incites the generation of conclusions instead of debates. Conclusions also are exposed simplistically if you look at the extent of post as permitted in Twitter and whose withdrawal becomes complex, even before with new evidence against the previous information.
5. Dissemination objective: Social media facilitates comments through multiple methods, provides an opinion and makes a perception. To communicate is not relevant; we try to communicate with others, not to others.
6. Group thinking: Phenomenon that makes slightly extremist individuals entrench their beliefs and radicalise even more.

Addressing these effects is very complex when, as users, we are not open to thoughtful and argued messages. Our experience in social networks is orchestrated around the headlines. Our identity is shaped in proportion to the degree of controversy that contains the information, a controversy that generates confrontation and that becomes a facilitator of polarisation. In short, variables such as the previous strength that each person holds about their beliefs; the nature, extent and context of the attack; or the dimension that acquires its dissemination by the media will determine the possible change of social public opinion. In this regard, it is

interesting to note the impact after the attacks of the 11th of September (2001) in the United States and the 11th of March attacks in Madrid (four train bombings coordinated by Basque and al-Qaeda), where political management was essential to structure elements in the subsequent public opinion in both countries. "Post-truth" was chosen as the word of the year by Oxford Dictionaries in 2016. It means the "deliberate distortion of a reality, which manipulates beliefs and emotions in order to influence public opinion and social attitudes. The demagogues are masters of the post-truth" (tech2, 2017: 1). Ultimately, with post-truth we refer to the invocation of emotions over facts with the aim of influencing or manipulating. The generalisation of the use of new information technologies, the development of the Internet and social networks and the proliferation of alternative media have turned out to be the great facilitators for its dissemination. Marwick and Lewis (2016) point out that media manipulation always has the desire to increase the audience on the message to be broadcast. The different actors that act in this environment may have very different objectives, but they can be classified simply as ideological, economic and desire for attention and ego.

But post-truth can claim objectives that are not entirely ideological or economic (Blanco and Cohen 2018):

1. Polarise a society, and generate instability and disruption. Situations that weaken democratic systems and that can affect the social and economic environment. It generates distrust, affecting the social and democratic values of a state.
2. Influence in any way in the decision-making, individual or collective. The electoral contexts are a classic paradigm of this type of scenarios. Or it affects decision-making of international actors, for example, trying to achieve a position or an action in a conflict. A compendium of manipulation and lies in search of different revenues.
3. Hide the truth, under different layers of misinformation, so that doubts arise about what is true and what is not. For this, misinformation tries to introduce, even if it is minimal, some element of truth or plausibility.
4. Distract public opinion from certain debates and entertain the media, to focus attention on irrelevant issues.

2.3   Security and European Polarisation

The climate of social polarisation that affects our European societies produces clear and direct effects in the security field, fuelling phenomena such as violent extremism, hate crimes, hate speech, confrontations between minorities and attacks against refugees or aggressions. A cycle of hate can be described (see Fig. 2.1). Although there is not a clear consensus about what causes terrorist actions, or indeed violent extremism, it is possible to point out possible facilitators, facilitators that, if we go deeper on some terrorist records, we can identify as trigger factors. Alleged grievances lead to terrorist attacks. After them, our European countries suffer an increase in hate crimes and social media act as propagandist of many messages that could be considered as hate speech. This situation, like actions against Islam or Muslims, can feed new grievances, accelerating radicalisation processes, which finally could end up in a terrorist attack.

The so-called "post-truth" is a clear current document that contributes to this cycle of hate, through the dissemination of lies or disinformation.


Fig. 2.1   The social polarisation cycle and security

In order to understand the previous cycle, we need a consensus about the terms used. In the recent weeks we are attending to a series of attacks, which are difficult to define. A mix of extreme ideologies, grievances and modus operandi will expand in the future. A grievance is the feeling of a real or imagined cause for complaint over something believed to be wrong or unfair. President Obama stated in 2015, at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (The White House, 19 February, 2015) that "we have to address grievances that terrorists exploit".

The core elements of the definition are:

1. A feeling, an emotional state or reaction.
2. A real or imagined cause. The cause can be an injury, an offence, an outrage, an atrocity, a damage, a mistake, a wrong decision or an injustice.
3. A complaint. The complaint could be manifested through a protest, an indignation, a charge, a criticism, a resistance, an objection or though other direct actions.

There is not academic and professional consensus about the definition of radicalisation. In this cycle we understand it as a process, which would lead to violent extremism and, as one of its possible manifestations, to terrorism.

Looking at the perpetrators, in Europe we could apply the concepts that federal law enforcement agencies use, in the United States, to categorise these key types of criminals partly ideologically motivated, pointing out the differences between domestic terrorism, homegrown violent extremism and hate crimes (Bjelopera 2016). The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines domestic terrorism as:

Acts of violence…committed by individuals or groups without any foreign direction, and appear to be intended to intimate or coerce a civilian population, or influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States

Crimes are committed in the name of animal rights, environmental rights, white supremacy, anarchism, antiglobalisation, anti-government or anti-abortion. A homegrown violent extremist (HVE) is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in or is preparing to

engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organisation, but acting independently of direction by it (FBI 2019). Hate crimes include any crime against either persons or properties in which the offender intentionally selects the victim because of its race, colour, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability and religion. They are acts of personal malice, missing the broader motivations driving acts of terrorism, although there is a broad grey zone that needs interpretations. For example, attacks against policemen are considered terrorism, but not others with the same motivation. Hate crimes could be terrorist attacks when the criminal articulates an ideology that belongs to a terrorist group of follow or is inspired by a radical extremist group. This could be the case, for example, of different attacks against refugee centres in Europe, inspired by extreme right groups with a clear organisational structure and objectives, aiming to terrorise this population an influence immigration policies.

A literature review shows a disagreement over the relationship between hate crime and terrorism (Deloughery et al. 2012), but those studies that have researched empirically this relationship show that it exists, calling them "close cousins" (Mills et al. 2015). Looking at the current situation in Europe, and taking into consideration quantitative data and qualitative information, we agree with that opinion, given that there is an existing relationship with clear paths from one phenomenon to the other. If it is difficult to establish similarities and differences between terrorism and hate crimes, Mills et al. (2015) try to analyse them. The most important similarities are the language used to tackle their interests and express their grievances, the biases linked to sociopolitical and religious ideologies and the objective of instilling psychological harms and fear. The main differences are that hate crimes are usually committed on the spur of the moment, requiring less planning and resources. Hate crimes are personal malicious acts sometimes without a clear link to a group or an ideology, can be downward (a powerful group attacking a minority or a concrete community) and not aiming at achieving general publicity. With these premises, some incidents could be conceptualised as terrorism, as hate crimes or perhaps as both of them. This has happened with the mass shooting in a gay nightclub in Orlando (June, 2016), in which a man murdered 49 people. President Obama declared it "an act of terrorism and an act of hate". Early reports indicate that the deceased shooter, Omar Mateen, had expressed his solidarity with ISIS. But his father also revealed

that his son was angry at the sight of two men kissing in Miami (Wing 2016). As it has been represented in the graphic, there are situations in which hate crimes can escalate to terrorism, and situations in which hate crimes appear as a response to terrorism. Michael (2003: 95), from looking to Hewitt's (2000) data, evidences an escalation from violence against the "outsiders" (individuals targeted based on their perceived group membership) to the state, because of the perceived alliance of it and the "outsiders". This research shows how the far-right in the United States moved from hate crimes (1950–1970) to anti-government attacks (from 1970).

Several researches have shown how hate crimes increase after a terror attack. Hanes and Machin (2014) offer empirical evidence on the effects of the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September (United States 2001) and the seventh of July (United Kingdom 2005). They found significant increases in hate crime against Asians and Arabs in the wake of both terrorist attacks, and something that should be a question of concern: a year later, these hate crimes decayed but remained at higher rates than before the attacks. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) have defined group or political grievance as a mechanism for radicalisation. Black (1983) stated a theory of crime as social control. In his opinion individuals use crime as "self-help" to express their group's grievance against a particular subgroup in order to maintain social control and to seek revenge, because they perceive them as a representation of a larger enemy.

In their research, Deloughery et al. (2012) concluded that hate crimes do not necessarily lead to future right-wing terrorism and that hate crimes are more often a response to terrorism. Current data from the United Kingdom show these kinds of crimes have grown after the attacks in London, the refugee crisis or, indeed, after "Brexit". Official statistics from the Interior Ministry in Germany (2015) shows how violence by right- and left-wing extremism was increasing to unprecedented rates in 2015, a record since 2001, with a 44% increase in violent crime by right-wing and a 35% by left-wing. In France, hate crimes against Muslims tripled in 2015 (400 attacks compared to 133 reported in 2014) (Chazan 2015). In the UK more than 3000 hate crimes and incidents were reported to police from 16 to 30 June, after the "Brexit" referendum, a 42% increase on the same period in the previous year. Hate crimes against Muslims in London have gone up from 557 in 2013 to 878 by November 24, 2015 (Burrows 2015).

Finally, a consequence of this social and political polarisation could be other manifestations of violent extremism: confrontations between hooligans, between religious communities, between nationalist sectors inside a country, activism in conflict zones (as it happens in Ukraine and Syria or Iraq), violent demonstrations, riots or black bloc-style unrest.

2.4   Addressing the Polarisation in Europe

The current situation in Europe needs urgent strategies, plans and actions, which we have recommended in Fig. 2.2. These strategies should begin with a rigorous analysis of the situation. Although many people could view a future marked by the dissolution of the Union, or certain paralysis, crisis is always an opportunity to produce reforms, encourage further integration (especially on security) and reinforce European values. Tackling the severe effects of this polarised situation demands a strong engagement of our societies at a national and European level. The previous graphic showed the key elements of the impacts of the current European social and political climate. Our focus should be put over (we should focus on) these subjects (polarisation, hate, radicalisation and violent extremism and terrorism) from a holistic point of view (Cohen and Blanco 2016), facing all of them at the same time and involving a broad set of stakeholders (law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, university, think tanks, private security, private sector, NGOs, communities and minorities or citizens). There is a need to improve the knowledge about these phenomena in order to support the decision-making process. There currently exists a lot of knowledge, but it is absolutely fragmented which limits the capacity to understand the "big picture" (Cohen and Blanco 2016). Usually, after a terrorist attack, governments and international institutions adopt new measures. Sometimes these new measures can act as a facilitator to new radicalisation processes, because of the focus put over concrete communities, the exceptional measures that allow the detention of persons without a judicial control, the technologies used to spy on citizens as if all of them were criminals. To avoid this situation there is an urgent need to improve the decision-making process with evaluation systems based on evidence-based policing (Cohen and Blanco 2015).

Objective	Measures
Tackling the roots of the current social and political polarisation	Good governance in order to recover the confidence of the European citizens. Transparency. Anti-corruption measures Democratic rules and more participatory government models. Inclusive societies with greater participation in policy -making. Fight against in equalities. Culture and education about risks and values.
Facing terrorism	A European model of security. Strengthen the intelligence capabilities and intelligence sharing. An agile response to the evolution of the phenomenon. Common measures with common responsibilities and sanctions if these measures are not developed inside the EU. Common operations led by EUROPOL, as it does against organised crime. Border controls. Early warning systems. Addressing the causes, drivers, facilitators and inhibitors in or igin and in Europe.
Facing radicalisation and violent extremism	Holistic and integral policies with the implication of all the society, especially municipalities, social services, and educative sector. Culture, education, information, communication. De -radicalisation programmes. Counter -narratives. Alternatives for young people. Disabling "inspirers", jihadist communications and narratives. Fighting general and common grievance perceptions.
Facing hate crimes and hate speech	Avoid considering it a minor question. Conscious of its importance and effects. Culture and education. A common legal framework. Improved statistics. Fight against hate speech. Engagement with media and social media.
Building the future of Europe	Strengthen a common European identity. Leadership. Foresight. Strategic vision. A common Security and Defence. Further integration. Reinforce European values

Fig. 2.2   Measures against polarisation in Europe

2.5   Conclusions

The European Union is in a crucial crossroad, facing its future, with the need of a strategic vision, exerted from a strong leadership, establishing clearly its role in the world. "Brexit" is a situation that will have great effects and will need to be managed with strength and intelligence. Europe also faces its past: how to maintain their own values, defending, as it has done during the last decades, democracy, freedom and individual rights and the Schengen system. Europe should build trust with citizens to generate engagement and continue believing that the European Union is a success story. With these objectives Europe must strengthen its unity, advance in a common security and defence system, improve its intelligence processes and intelligence sharing and be firm in their values. These are difficult goals to achieve if cession of national powers does not occur for the sake of a common interest. It has been shown that weakness in any point of the Union, in a globalised environment and with total freedom of movements of people, goods and capitals, is a threat to the rest of its neighbours. Moreover security will remain politically used to polarise voters and to press in pursuit of specific policies based on the ideology of political parties, lobbies and other groups of interest. In this context, managing the refuge crisis, addressing the economic crisis, deepening the democratic structures and democratic principles and tackling hate speech result from different spheres (political, citizens through social media and general media), and hate crimes are configured as necessary steps in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

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The Radicalisation-Factor Model (RFM): Proposing a Framework for the Systematic Investigation and Modelling of Online Radicalisation

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary terrorism has introduced new levels of threats involving a variety of individuals, networks and groups driven by extremist beliefs (Chapman et al. 2018). The observed increase in the reach and sophistication of terrorism has resulted in serious security challenges for infrastructures, economies and societies globally. In fact, it has been suggested that "no country, community or citizen should consider themselves immune from the global reach of international terrorists who believe they can advance their political, religious or ideological aims through acts of violence" (Bayerl et al. 2014: 540). In our age of technology, in which terrorism and its ideologists develop increasingly decentralised and globalised capabilities, preventing and combatting online radicalisation has become a security priority for many governments across the world. Equally, there is

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a need to better understand the processes and consequences of online radicalisation in all its complexity.

The Internet has changed—and continues to change—the very nature of terrorism (see Cohen and Blanco 2019—Chap. 5 in this volume), as "since its inception and subsequent widespread use, the possible utility of the Internet for extremist groups' expansion and recruitment has not been lost on their leading figures and strategists" (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017: 9). Past cases of radicalisation into violent extremism highlight that the Internet has become a co-constitutive part in all phases of the radicalisation process (Levin 2015: 960) and provides an effective platform to draw in sympathisers (Brachman and Levine 2011).

Terrorists have been apt at employing the Internet for propagating their ideologies, motives and grievances (Al-Suri 2004: 857) using narratives and images of a "holy and heroic warrior" (Bayerl et al. 2014: 540; Davies 2008). A special focus in this context is often placed on social media which by their very nature seem to create an environment that can be conducive to radicalisation (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017).

The radicalisation of Safaa Boular, a British teenager's journey to terror, illustrates how terrorist networks utilise the Internet's capability to gain easy access to targets, escape regulations and censorship and abuse the fast flow of information. Online, Boular had made contact with a female recruiter in Raqqa who was among the first and most prolific English language propagandists for Islamic State (IS). Partly through her, Boular met hundreds of new people online. "It was special; it was exciting", she told in her trial. Also, Boular communicated regularly with Naweed Hussain, a Coventry man twice her age who had left for Syria with a friend in June 2015 and played a critical role in radicalising Boular. The teenager was determined to carry out attacks on the public, and the primary *modus operandi* was the use of a kitchen knife, suicide belt and explosive device. However, online terrorist activities can be mitigated, if not completely stopped, with the application of appropriate investigation toolkits. Boular's case demonstrates how technological tools helped MI5 detect the planned attacks, by deploying a team of undercover officers posing online as British extremists. The undercover operation ultimately led to the arrest of all perpetrators.

The rise in online radicalisation requires new and innovative ways to identify, expose and counter radicalisation narratives and to isolate the spaces in which these actors are operating. In consequence, identifying and countermanding the indoctrination of individuals by online radicalisers

and recruiters has become a linchpin in counter-radicalisation efforts. Yet, if measures to equip law enforcement agencies with the necessary tools to address at least the most prolific forms of online radicalisation are to be successful, they must be informed by an inclusive definition of online radicalisation and a systematic modelling of its causal mechanisms. In the first part of this chapter we discuss definitions of radicalisation, thus laying the conceptual groundwork for understanding the phenomenon of online radicalisation. In the second part, we describe our radicalisation-factor model (RFM) which aims to provide intelligence and law enforcement agencies with a structured framework to guide systematic investigations into the processes and expressions of online radicalisation. The model is purposefully created as an atheoretical framework, instead focusing on the disparate factors that shape radicalisation processes. With this we aim to encourage a stronger acknowledgement of contextual variations in expressions and behaviours shaped by the specific individuals and their technological, cultural and ideological environment.

3.2   Defining Radicalisation

There is ample evidence that explains how grievances and ideas are developed by terrorist groups or individuals and how these materials are operationalised by recruiters to impact upon a gradual, individual-level process towards embracing violent extremism (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017). There are several models that aim to understand the radicalisation process. The most frequently cited models include:

- Borum's (2003) **four-stage model of the terrorist mindset**, which assumes four steps in the radicalisation process: (1) grievance, (2) injustice, (3) target attribution and (4) distancing/devaluation.
- Moghaddam's (2005) **staircase to terrorism:** This model assumes six steps which are (1) psychological interpretation of material conditions, (2) perceived options to fight unfair treatment, (3) displacement of aggression, (4) moral engagement, (5) solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organisation and (6) side-stepping inhibitory mechanism and the terrorist act.
- Precht's (2007) **model of a "typical" radicalisation pattern** assumes four steps from (1) pre-radicalisation, (2) conversion and

identification with radical Islam to (3) indoctrination and increased group bonding and (4) actual acts of terrorism or planned plots.

As is evident from the above, a consensus about the exact nature of the radicalisation process is still missing (McCullough and Schomerus 2017; for a detailed discussion see Sahar, 2019—Chap. 9 in this volume). Della Porta and LaFree (2012) in their work attempted to consolidate common characteristics of what constitutes the radicalisation process. They propose the following three features as shared aspects across existing conceptualisations (cp. Della Porta and LaFree 2012: 4–10):

- An escalation process leading towards the increased use of political violence
- The strategic use of physical force to influence several audiences
- Increased preparation for, and commitment to, intergroup conflict

Generally, ideo-political radicalisation can be understood as a change in beliefs, behaviours and feelings that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the own group (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). In contrast, the idea that extremists adhere to a specific psychological profile is disputed, as is the view that there may be clear profiles to predict who will follow the entire trajectory of radicalisation (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017; McCullough and Schomerus 2017).

However, empirical work has highlighted numerous push-and-pull factors for the process towards violent radicalisation. This starts with feelings of discontent and perceived adversity (framed as perceived deprivation) which form the initial foundation for the path to terrorism (Moghaddam 2005). Moghaddam (2005) further suggests that individuals develop a desire to alleviate adversity and redress their grievances. If these attempts fail, they may culminate in frustrations and feelings of aggression, which are often projected into an external agent—who is then regarded as an enemy (Borum 2011). The nature of injustice perceptions varies with respect to the underlying motivations for violence; the effects, however, tend to be highly similar (Silke 2006). With the accumulation of anger towards a (perceived or real) enemy, "some become increasingly sympathetic towards violent, extremist ideology and to the terrorist groups that act against them" (Borum 2011: 39; Moghaddam 2005). Particularly

young people and those who share a widely held sense of injustice seem to be drawn to actively violent expressions (Dudenhoefer 2018).

Terrorist groups have shown that they are highly capable of manipulating this sense of frustration in vulnerable individuals and in offering alternative narratives that develop "a clear sense of identity, a strong sense of belonging to a group, the belief that the person is doing something important and meaningful, and also a sense of danger and excitement" (Bayerl et al. 2014: 541; Silke 2006). In essence, people are socialised into radical ideals leading to a gradual deepening of their involvement in radical activities over a sustained period of time (Silke 2006). As such, some of the key factors in the radicalisation process are related to the social network of the individual (e.g. who is the person spending time with or who are his or her friends?; Silke 2006). Radicalisation is thus a social process which should be viewed not as "the product of a single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time" (Borum 2011: 15).

Generally, terrorism is a minority phenomenon in the sense that only a small group of disaffected people will turn to terrorism-related violence (Bayerl et al. 2014). What determines whether an individual is attracted to violent ideologies and the expression this takes is affected by many factors, as the brief discussion above shows. As we stated earlier, "the process of radicalisation begins when […] enabling environments intersect with personal 'trajectories' allowing the causes of radicalism to resonate with the individual's personal experience" (Bayerl et al. 2014: 542). The process of online radicalisation is thus an intersection of influences starting with the individuals and their personal circumstances, their social environment, the specifics of the ideology they encounter and feel attracted to as well as the means by which a person comes into contact with and can express extremist ideas. Yet, in our view it is important to take not only these individual factors into consideration but also their intersections and interactions. With this aim in mind, we developed our radicalisation-factor model presented in the following section.

3.3   The Radicalisation-Factor Model

The radicalisation-factor model (RFM) is a theory-independent approach with the aim to integrate major (causal) factors involved in the online radicalisation process into a common framework. RFM considers four interlinked factors:

1. **Features of the individual:** This dimension addresses the individual and their characteristics associated with a weaker or stronger vulnerability to radicalisation or affinity with certain ideologies and specific patterns of online and radical behaviours. These can be demographic factors (e.g. age, gender, socioeconomic status), norms and values, personal experiences, etc. (Bakker 2011). Some individual features can increase propensities towards adopting extremist ideas and behaviours (e.g. experiences of hardships or perceived social unfairness; see discussion above). Individual factors may further shape the way radicalisation is expressed online (e.g. the type of postings or the communities chosen to engage with).

2. **Features of the environment:** This aspect refers to the broader context(s) in which not only (radicalising) individuals but also the ideological and extremist groups operate. Environmental features are of special interest as radicalisation is broadly accepted as a socially situated process (Ongering 2007). Social network approaches in particular have posited that radical ideas and behaviours are transmitted and amplified through links with actors in a broader environment (Sageman 2004). These environments will be defined by a cross-section of national and subgroup cultures; features of the economic, legal and political system; the diffusion of technologies and media; societal stratifications; etc.

3. **Features of the radical groups/ideologies:** Extremist ideologies come in many forms. Motivating factors may thus be based on everything from religious fundamentalism, nationalist separatism, social revolutionary views, specific issues such as animal rights to racism or extreme right- or left-wing ideologies (Hudson 1999). Additionally, typologies of terror include state-sponsored terrorism and single-issue terrorism; the latter is often linked to lone actors or "lone wolf" terrorists (Awan and Blakemore 2012). Identifying the specific genre of terrorism, the actors perpetrating it and its modus operandi is an important factor in identifying radicalisation trajectories, but also in determining the most effective countermeasures to deploy.

4. **Features of the technologies:** Technologies differ greatly in the extent to which they may lend themselves for online radicalisation or for terroristic endeavours. Relevant aspects include the degree of anonymity for users, the speed with which information can be sent/accessed or the number of users to be reached at the same time

(Bayerl et al. 2014). Social media platforms, for instance, offer terrorist organisations valuable assets for disseminating propaganda, operational planning, information sharing and target selection as well as a medium to identify and engage potential recruits (Mahmood 2012). Considering features of technologies should thus address both the functions of specific digital applications and the ways in which they can be employed.

These four factors do not stand by themselves but overlap and interact. Still, there seems to be a tendency to model online radicalisation around singular facets. Investigators require an in-depth understanding of the multitude of factors which interact online and within the minds of would-be radicals (Victoroff et al. 2012). RFM explicitly focuses on the interactions and intersections of the four factors within a common framework. In addressing the core facets affecting expressions of online radicalisation and their intersections and interactions, we aim to provide a systematic basis with which to investigate causal and influencing mechanisms of online radicalisation, and an approach for the empirically derived identification of radicalised individuals. The full radicalisation-factor model (RFM) is presented in Fig. 3.1.


Fig. 3.1 The radicalisation-factor model (RFM; extended from Bayerl et al. 2014)

3.4   APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

With our RFM framework we hope to support investigations into online radicalisation in multiple ways.

Firstly, our framework has the capability to help relevant agencies develop more nuanced insights into online radicalisation processes and pathways and as well as facilitate the identification of radicalised individuals and the prevention of terrorism along the various stages of the processes. The framework is an interactive medium and as such links the main causal factors including the context, means, individual(s), ideology and the features of technologies used by terrorist groups. By so doing, the framework leads to an understanding and detection of behavioural change (expressions of online radicalisation) and the trajectory of online radicalisation. With this, RFM has the potential to safeguard a consistent approach to the identification of online radicalisation behaviours and bring to light the (causal) variables that too often remain elusive in online radicalisation processes and investigations. This framework thus offers guidance for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to gather, contrast and compare data for further analysis in a systematic and comprehensive way to identify emergent behaviours, trends and patterns of those being recruited and radicalised online (Bayerl et al. 2014). Based on the availability and accuracy of this data, new evidenced-based policies and strategies may be developed to increase the effectiveness and versatility of investigations into online radicalisation processes and mechanisms.

In this process, RFM can inform investigations and modelling approaches by suggesting a comprehensive matrix of the aspects impacting on the expressions and progress of individuals' online radicalisation trajectories. Similar matrices are already supporting the work of analysts responsible for providing strategic leadership to make clear and effective decisions (Ferrara et al. 2016). RFM may support law enforcement agencies in similar ways in devising strategies to detect and prevent online radicalisation through structured guidance.

The framework identifies a clear and concise system of relevant pathways and thus helps avoid the temptation to include "all-and-every possible variable just in case" (Bayerl et al. 2014: 546). It can thus also help evaluate the set of modelling factors, including their intersection and interactions. Such an evaluation is vital as the concrete choice of concepts determines the quality of modelling approaches used in online investigation.

Lastly, we hope that our framework may spark a review of our current knowledge specifically about the online aspect in the radicalisation process. Existing models of the radicalisation process (e.g. Borum 2003; Moghaddam 2005; Precht 2007) tend to be largely agnostic to the context in which the radicalisation takes place (offline, online or a combination of both) and the impact of these contexts on individuals' progression into extremist ideologies. Their focus is moreover on the psychological/attitudinal changes within individuals that lead them to adopt extremist views. They are less—or often not at all—concerned about factors that lead to inter-individual variations in how increasing online radicalisation is expressed or traversed. We see a clear need—as well as a chance—to systematically outline current empirical evidence on online radicalisation. RFM can be a useful framework to guide efforts in mapping out existing evidence as well as identifying which areas still require further (research) attention.

3.5   Conclusions

In the current endeavours of countering terrorism and radicalisation, the primary operational challenge to tackle online radicalisation is setting a tight and focused strategy (Bayerl et al. 2014). Moreover, given the dynamic and incremental nature of (online) radicalisation, law enforcement agencies need a dynamic and inclusive perspective that takes into account all elements shaping online radicalisation processes. RFM hopes to provide an analytical framework and parameters within which investigations into online radicalisation and its patterns and processes can be explored more systematically. The multifaceted, yet atheoretical make-up of our model enables users to adopt relevant concepts and frameworks without reliance on specific theoretical assumptions about radicalisation processes (Fernandez, Asif and Alani 2018). The framework thus ensures a holistic approach that enables practitioners to identify behavioural indicators of extremism/radicalisation while giving due consideration to variations in these indicators caused by the interplay of individual, contextual, technological and ideological features. In this way, the framework may also inform best practice guidance for online radicalisation instigative techniques and support the development of a new doctrine for contemporary counterterrorism practice as well as systematise further research efforts into the important field of online radicalisation.

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The So-Called 'Lone Wolf' Phenomenon

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4.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years several terrorist attacks have occurred in Italy, the USA, France, Germany and other countries that were commonly perpetrated by one individual and have led to the adoption of the phrase 'lone wolf' among the media and academic circles alike. The main point to consider is whether these are merely single incidents or if a new threat is arising in contemporary society. A key question is the motivation of this new type of attack; are they carried out alone or is there a strategy behind it? Will we see a rise of attacks in local communities and will local security services be prepared to handle such an attack? Social media plays a growing role in the radicalisation process and the material posted online is constantly rising. In many cases, *lone wolves* have not been under previous observations and were living undetected within society labelled as 'regular' citizens.

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These threats raised have for some time been topics of discussion among local communities with most people believing that the quantity of threats is increasing; meanwhile the feelings of safety among citizens are decreasing (Kury 2002: 343).

The number of offenders acting alone has continuously risen and the reasons are diverse. In the past these attacks were not largely recognised by the public as they are now, because the damage was not to the same extent and often they were not seen as newsworthy, but it is not a new phenomenon. The reasons for the rise are many. Globalisation is a strong driver, because ideas and ideologies are no longer limited to a specific region which consequently means terrorist activity is spread easier among borders and nations. Technical innovation makes communication global and cheap, allowing many offenders to communicate with their leaders for instructions shortly before or during the attacks. In addition, mass media is a strong driver allowing information to be shared globally almost instantaneously and multiplied in all channels, leaving citizens with the impression that the threat is bigger than before and their life is more at risk. This is related to the amplification of the mass media which has produced a wider amount of different information channels alongside the fact that social media as a source for information has increased its role tremendously in the recent years. More than half of the world's population has access and is using the Internet (Internet World Stats 2016), which allows users to retrieve information from different forums and websites, so that the traditional way of gathering information loses more and more its importance. One of the effects is also that the omnipresence of information about a terrorist incident lowers the feeling of safety among citizens consequently leading to the impression that the situation is more serious than the reality.

The promotion of terrorist acts throughout the world is a side effect of all these above aspects of globalisation used by terrorist organisations to promote their ideas. Many 'lone wolf' terrorists do have contact with others, communicate and hold the belief that they are part of a bigger group or at least of a certain ideology.

For law enforcement agencies it is crucial to look at previous cases to find a way to intervene at the earliest possible stage to prevent these types of attacks. Intervention stages may be very early, if an individual shows a certain behaviour or in the pre-attack phase. The third possibility of intervention is during the attack. The following six case studies of so-called 'lone wolf' attacks are reviewed from different countries and also with a different ideological background.

4.2   CASE STUDIES

4.2.1   German Case Study: Anis Amri

On the 16th of December 2016, Anis Amri killed a Polish lorry driver and stole his van where he drove into a Berlin Christmas market at the Breitscheidplatz (close to the Gedächtniskirche) killing 11 people. He was fleeing through several countries in Europe and was killed by Italian policeman on the 23rd of December 2016 in Milano, Italy.

Amri was born in 1992 in a small village called Farhat Achet in the North of Tunisia; his father worked as a temporary farm worker and had four sons and five daughters. In the 1990s Tunisia was a dictatorship which held low standards and hope for young people for a better life with more wealth. His father states that Anis Amri completed his A levels, but one of his brothers denies the claim and states that Anis left school after the eighth class. There are no hints that religion played a role in his early years as Amri was seen in bars drinking, smoking and consuming drugs that brought him into his first contact with the police. Following the altercation he had to pay 2000 Dinar and was imprisoned for 1 year (Biermann et al. 2016).

His criminal record increased and among other crimes he stole a van in the city of Kairouan. After the so-called Arab Spring, the uprising of citizens against their government in the Arab World, which started in Tunisia, in 2011 Amri travelled by boat to Italy and reached the island Lampedusa, where he said that he was young enough to get into a camp for unaccompanied minors. There are some differences in various sources of what happened next, but it is clear that Amri pillaged a public building in Italy and was sentenced to 4 years in Sicily. He was released in 2015 after the whole sentence, because he was aggressive whilst carrying out his sentence. It is unclear if Amri had his first contact to the Salafi scene in prison, but this might have been his first contact with radical Islam (Sydow 2016).

The Italian Government tried to return him to Tunisia, but the Tunisian authorities did not cooperate and denied his return. As a result he was brought into another camp, where he decided to go via Switzerland to Germany (Biermann et al. 2016).

In Germany he claimed asylum as an Egyptian, which was rejected as the officials did not believe his claims. Furthermore he was travelling through the country with different identities and was arrested with forged Italian documents. Again the German authorities argued he should be

sent back to his home country, but the Tunisian government continued to deny that he was a citizen of the country. He made contact with the German Salafists where he met Abu Waala among others, who are known to be responsible for sending individuals to Syria to fight for the so-called 'Islamic State' (Sydow 2016). Amri was in the focus of the German law enforcement agencies already at a very early stage, but he managed to move freely. He was looking for the company of Salafists, but was also involved in various violent crimes and continued to use drugs. In total he was using 14 different identities during his time in Germany (Zeit online 2017).

Amri communicated with jihadists with his HTC smartphone and visited the Christmas market twice before. On one occasion, he made a video to prepare his attack which was undetected, as the observation of his smartphone stopped in September due to officials believing that he was now a drug dealer and not a threat in a terrorist context. On the first of November 2016, he swore his oath to the head of the 'Islamic State'. The attack was not planned as a suicide attack, so he aimed to leave the country where maybe there were plans of further attacks in Europe (Junginger 2017). Also, refer to Chap. 12 on how a British teenager was mentored and radicalised by the Islamic State's recruiters/jihadis online.

4.2.2   Canadian Case Study: Marc Lépine

On the sixth of December 1989 a 25-year-old Marc Lépine brandished a firearm and burst into a college classroom at the École Polytechnique in Montreal, Canada, killing 14 female students within 20 min. By the time Lépine turned the gun on himself, another ten were injured. He was armed with a legally obtained Mini-14 rifle and a hunting knife. Lépine had previously been denied admission to the École Polytechnique and had been upset; it later transpired, about women working in positions traditionally occupied by men (Bindel 2012) and in particular the women who were accepted at the École Polytechnique. He held a strong hatred against feminists and women in general and pointed out 19 women he hated most in his claimed 'fight against feminism'. Lépine, whose original name was Gamil Rodrigue Liass Gharbi, was the son of a Canadian nurse and an Algerian investment banker and he was known to be a normal teenager (Bejsment 2014). He had a stable job for several years until 1988, which in between he was unemployed for a couple of months in 1986 where he applied for a job at the Polytechnique. After his unemployment in March

1988, he took courses on data management, but abandoned them later. In 1989 he completed a chemistry course and asked the Sûreté of Quebec for a firearms permission which he was granted. One day before the attack he rented a car, which was found after the attack close by the Université de Montréal. Lépine was very familiar with the scene, because he has visited the campus several times (Report of the Coroner's Investigation 1991:17f). He planned his attack carefully—he attacked the university he dreamed to study at, in a local community that was unprepared for any activity of that kind. The Canadian government annually commemorates the National Day of Remembrance and Action on Violence Against Women, also known informally as White Ribbon Day, on the sixth of December (Wyborcza 2012). The coroner's investigation report (1991: 18f) states that Lépine did show signs of suicidal tendencies and he wrote two documents that prove his hatred towards women.

4.2.3   US Case Study: Ted Kaczynski

A US example of the 'lone wolf' activity as we may name it today was the story of Ted Kaczynski, also known as *the Unabomber* (for the UNiversity and Airline BOMbing targets involved). Kaczynski came to world attention in 1978 with the explosion of his first, primitive homemade bomb at a Chicago university. 'Over the next 17 years, he mailed or hand delivered a series of increasingly sophisticated bombs that killed three Americans and injured 24 more' (FBI 2008: 1). At the age of 16, Kaczynski was accepted to Harvard University where he then enrolled into the University of Michigan, earning a PhD in mathematics, and taught undergraduate courses in geometry and calculus at the University of California at Berkeley for a short time. After sending his last letter bomb in 1995, he was not caught by FBI for a long duration. In the USA he was considered as a serious terrorist until the 11th of September 2001. The criminal activity of Ted Kaczynski was strongly related to his manifesto published in 1995. He claimed:

> *The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in advanced countries, but they have destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and have inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology will worsen the situation.* (UPI 1995: 1)

Kaczynski did his studies in university in a very short time. His ideology can be seen as very unique, as he is gravely against the modern industrial society especially universities and airlines. Therefore, his first attacks were against these targets. The Unabomber is a good example that a 'lone wolf' terrorist with a certain grade of intelligence is hard to find, because he was talking about his ideology to his brother, who went in the end to the FBI, but overall he was living particularly clandestine. After he was sentenced to four life sentences, Kaczynski wrote an article for an anarchistic paper in Berkeley, which was published in 1999 (Spiegel Online 1999). His figure was brought to world's mind by Anders Breivik—another example of a contemporary 'lone wolf' criminal. For a detailed discussion on processes in and through which individuals are radicalised into acts of terrorism, see Chap. 12.

4.2.4   Norwegian Case Study: Anders Behring Breivik

Anders Behring Breivik was a terrorist that conducted two sequential attacks against the government, civilian population and the Workers' Youth League (AUF) in Norway on the 22nd of July 2011. Breivik, aged 32 and a far-right fanatic, killed eight people at Oslo's government quarters with a car bomb, before murdering 69 Norwegian Labour Party youth members on the island of Utoya, and seriously injured 33 people (Biography 2014). It was described that in court 'Breivik was standing with his hands held above his head in passive surrender when police has finally caught up with him at the end of his gun rampage' (Rayner 2011: 1), saying he is ready to fight even from the jail (Walat et al. 2011: 8ff). He was sentenced to 21 years in prison, as it was verified that he was acting on his own and used simple measures such as firearms and bombs in planning the attack for over 3 years. Two main motives are political and religious ones. Before the Norwegian massacre Breivik published '*2083 A European Declaration of Independence'*, writing that he wanted to stop 'the Islamic colonisation' in Europe as well as the rise of cultural Marxism and multiculturalism, mainly Islam (Berwick 2011: 2). This ideology led him to commit the terrorist act, which with his work he legitimised his attack. He believed that Muslims are conquering Norway and that the Norwegian Social Democratic Party is responsible for this. Therefore, he thought that killing the future of the party will help to solve the 'problem'.

Breivik always wanted to be economically successful, and in his early years he was tagging walls in Oslo, but friends described him as anxious.

Then he joined a right-wing party and after working for 10 years he left, because the party did not hold the same extreme ideology and he did not get the position in the party that he wanted. Despite the fact that he was unemployed since 2006, his wealth was constantly growing. At the age of 27 he had to move back to his mother, because he couldn't afford an apartment by himself. He tried to join forums and blogs on the extreme right, but because of his different views he was rejected there as well (Seierstad 2016). In the years before the attack he persisted to try and communicate his ideology with different groups, but he did not succeed. The preparation of the attack took him at least 3 years.

4.2.5   Russian Case Study: Dmitry Vinogradov

In Russia few years ago there was a terrorist act conducted by a 'lone wolf', a 30-year-old named Dmitry Vinogradov. On the seventh of November 2012, Vinogradov, a lawyer for a pharmaceutical company in Moscow, shot dead six people and severely wounded another two. Later, he claimed his motive was a broken heart, as he split up with the girl working in the same company several months before. His claim is hard to believe as few hours before his attack, Vinogradov posted a 'manifesto of hate' on the Internet comparing mankind to a 'giant cancer tumour', which drew immediate comparisons with Norwegian mass killer Anders Breivik. In his manifesto, Vinogradov said (quoted in Berwick 2011: 2):

> *I hate human society and I am disgusted to be a part of it! I hate the senseless-ness of human life! I hate this very life! I see only one way to justify it to destroy as many parts of the human compost as possible. This is the only right thing which everyone can do in his life, it is the only way to justify it, the only way to make this world better.*

According to the content he informed himself via the Internet and tried to communicate there as well. Vinogradov, just like Marc Lépine, attacked in his very local community, shooting his work colleagues.

4.2.6   Tunisian Case Study: Seifeddine Rezgui Yacoubi

In June 2015 there was the deadliest terrorist attack in the history of modern Tunisia. About 10 km north of the city Sousse, a 23-year-old Seifeddine

Rezgui Yacoubi shot down 39 people, mostly tourists from Great Britain, Germany and Belgium (Newsweek Polska 2015). He was a student of electric engineering, who had links with the Islamic State. He came from the city of Kairouan, which is a centre of Salafists in Tunisia. His fighting alias name leads to that as well: Abu Jahja al-Kairuani (SZ online 2015). The attack was suspected to be supported by two other people and was a protest expressing Muslims' dissatisfaction with the actions performed by Western leaders. As in 2015 there was a massive amount of material in the Internet and social media and Yacoubi was a technical student; it was apparent that Yacoubi communicated via social media and the Internet. It should also be noted that in the small French village of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier a 35-year-old Yassine Salhi tried to blow up a local gas-fired plant which supplied gas in the local community in the same month that he was associated with. In the crime scene there was a headless body found (most likely his boss) and flags with Arabic inscriptions that indicate links with the Islamic State (Newsweek Polska 2015). Both attacks can be recognised as a 'lone wolf' activity.

4.3   FINDINGS

The presented case studies show that in the recent years the terrorist activity of a single person or a small group of individuals has intensified and become a serious threat to any state and its citizens. Particular groups such as the Islamic State try to push individuals forward to commit attacks, as it was published in their own e-zines and videos. The perpetrators were acting in different public places like universities, beaches or offices. Very often this is happening in local communities like the cases of the Unabomber, but also the cases of the attacks in Ansbach and Würzburg in Germany 2016. After 2011 the numbers of 'lone wolf' attacks have rapidly increased on a global scale. There were incidents in Germany, the USA, Canada, France and Russia. This shows that the phenomenon is not typical for a country or a region, but has become an international phenomenon.

The 'lone wolf' term was popularised by the extreme right American in the nineties which the leaders encouraged single individuals or small groups to attack the government (Łachacz 2013: 74). Before 2011 the phenomenon and school shootings were quite rare, along with the attention that they produce. After the intensifying of the phenomenon security experts and academics had a problem in defining it.

In academic literature there are various definitions on a 'lone wolf' attacker. Recently, the most common definition is that a 'lone wolf' is an individual, usually not openly involved with any terrorist organisation, who conducts a terrorist attack (Kaplan et al. 2014). This perspective emphasises the self-determination of the attacker, despite any methods that were used. According to Weimann (2012), a 'lone wolf' is an individualist or a small group of people who use typical terrorist tactics, including attacks on civilians, in order to achieve political or ideological goals. They mostly act without any membership, internal cooperation or any support from a particular terrorist organisation, either official or unofficial acting self-reliant and having a goal that should be achieved. Furthermore, Spaaij (2012) indicates that a 'lone wolf' is a dangerous leader, antisocial outsider and unpredictable individual. Some cases might question the leader position of Spaaij, as neither Breivik nor the first Islamist terrorist in Germany Arid Uka who killed American soldiers in a bus at Frankfurt airport was the leader.

Generally the experts in the field of security agree that a 'lone wolf' is a 'self-determined individual, acting alone by attacking civilians' (Łachacz 2013: 74). However, there are several differences that can be described as well.

Undoubtedly, a 'lone wolf' terrorist is a person acting independently, formally not belonging to any organised terrorist group or network. Their attacks are usually well thought out and planned. A perfect example here is Anders Breivik, who planned the massacre for over 3 years. According to Spaaij (2012) any attack begins and is controlled by the individual, the 'lone wolf' himself; there is no executive or hierarchy.

The nature of the phenomenon includes that the individual does not exchange information on the attack with anyone, but that does not mean that the perpetrator does not communicate about his ideas and ideology. In most of the cases the offenders did not have contact to others.

The identification of an offender is extremely difficult as they have limited communication to the outside world and no exchange of information about the attack. They are influenced by a radical ideology on an independent level, but they are not supported by other parties or organisations and the terrorist act is committed by the individual without any support (Becker 2014:970). Providing sympathy towards individuals with radical ideologies is used by extremist groups like the Islamic State to persuade them to commit violent acts, such as the case in Tunisia, Germany 2016 or the case of Arid Uka. Most of the offenders had a political or religious

ideology as a legitimisation of their attack; Breivik hated Muslims and communists, Kaczynski rejected the technological progress, Lépine hated women and Vinogradov hated the human race in general. Not all, but most of the offenders try to publish any kind of manifesto or other forms of publication.

New technologies like social media play an important role for getting information about carrying out the attack such as the building of a bomb or to gain support of the ideology like Breivik tried to. Also Kaczynski wanted to have his manifesto published in two transnational papers in order to gain followers. Simon (2013) draws the attention to the importance of technology, especially the Internet, as a source of accessing practical tips and instructions for any potential 'lone wolf'.

In addition, it is worth noting that a 'lone wolf' is often a young male, well educated, with some having well-paid jobs. For example, Kaczynski, having his doctoral degree, had worked as a mathematician at the university, Vinogradov was a lawyer and Breivik had a good education as his father was a diplomat. They all were in some sense *extraordinary individuals*, conscious of both undertaken actions and its consequences. But this does not necessarily have to be the case as the attacks in London where Amri probably did not even finish his school education or in Berlin show that higher education is not essential. The attackers were all timid and unsociable individuals showing that behavioural factors are also crucial in the detection. The age of 'lone wolfs' should be also emphasised as whilst conducting the attack most of the attackers were between 20 and 30 years old.

The final characteristic for the 'lone wolf' terrorism is the location of where the attack takes place. Very often it is a local community where the individual lives, studies or works in. All of the attacks described in this article took place in a public space. In a long-term perspective the attacks may result in the cohesion of local communities, as the 'lone wolf' might be an individual's neighbour, work colleague or friend from the university.

4.4   Discussion

In summing up the number of 'lone wolf' attacks, individual attacks have significantly increased in the recent years, happening regularly in various countries across the world. Law enforcement agencies face the problem of detecting the threat and intervening before the attack takes place. These incidents threaten the functioning of the state and their societies. The

'lone wolf' phenomenon is an individual activity where the detection is difficult because of the communication techniques and that the perpetrators are acting alone. All of the offenders are trying to kill as many innocent citizens as possible.

Comparing the case studies this article shows that the attackers' intelligence and methodology (e.g. not being a suicide bomber) makes the detection of the offender very difficult, as seen in the Ted Kaczynski case. His cause was also very different to others, so it is harder to detect and the emotion is there, but not spontaneous.

As most of the offenders are young individuals, introvert and self-determinate, a certain behaviour should be observed. Obviously not all introvert individuals are most likely a 'lone wolf'. This is certainly not enough, but there is research necessary to find methods to identify persons at risk without stigmatising the identity of attackers. For security agencies it is crucial and important to detect possible terrorist attacks as soon as possible. Behaviour is one of the key factors. There are factors which can be structured in a way that individuals can be dealt with without stigmatising them in a way that will help to prevent further violent extremism. Most of the past offenders had next to their individual behaviour linked to political or religious beliefs. It can be observed that many terrorists are linked to a greater group like the so-called 'Islamic State'. In addition it is noteworthy that there are also individuals whose attacks and motives remain unknown, which mental problems should not be taken as the only motive for the attack. Somehow, their activity has increased in the past years, just the same as the number of *typical* 'lone wolf' attacks. Most of the 'lone wolves' were usually described as an ordinary citizen, work colleague or a friend from the university.

Another important aspect is the use of social media by these offenders, which they use to try and gain or provide ideological information as well as information about how to carry out an attack. This might also be a key element in fighting this phenomenon, if the research on this field is successful.

Furthermore, the law enforcement agencies might have a chance to react appropriately, according to the before mentioned point, in the pre-attack phase. The information is dealt with correctly and the behavioural aspects are taken into consideration showing similarities between different actors despite the fact that they have completely different ideologies, eras and countries. Also the role of social media and the Internet should not be underestimated, as often information can be obtained here.

Lastly, in the response to the attacks the understanding of the 'lone wolf' helps to understand their modus operandi, by understanding their ideological background to gain knowledge about their communication to counter the attack with the lowest risk for citizens and security forces possible.

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CHAPTER 5

Cyber Intelligence Against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

José María Blanco, Jéssica Cohen, and Holger Nitsch

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to offer a framework in which cyber intelligence would be a tool to fight radicalisation and violent extremism. Fighting radicalisation is not exclusively a task for LEAs. There is a need of integral policies to tackle this threat, engaging civil society, communities and minorities, governments, institutions, private sector and NGOs.

Online terrorist content has been inspiring radicalisation and violent attacks in recent years. Islamic State's (IS) media network has been used to

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call on its supporters in the Muslim and Western countries around the globe to carry out terrorist attacks. Online terrorism has proven itself effective. IS has developed a media apparatus, which has been disseminating high-quality videos, magazines, statements, images, infographics and posters. They know perfectly the power of images and videos in Western societies and their impact, for example, on young people. They have also amplified the use of languages other than Arabic or English. Although IS has lost its two big fiefdoms, Mosul and Raqqa, it cannot be said that it is losing the battle in cyberspace. Now, blogs, chat rooms and encrypted chat apps can serve as ways for terrorist groups to radicalise and recruit new members. Tech companies have improved their efforts to detect and eliminate violent content, trying to keep radical groups from running social media accounts or from sharing videos involving executions, beheadings, terrorist attacks and calls for violent actions. In addition, governments are involved in trying to develop counter-narratives. We are not fighting against a jihadi group or several groups, but we are fighting against a global movement (Neumann 2016) that has been spread using Internet, social media, mobile applications and other technological tools.

This chapter aims to propose a framework for new policies that aids in the tackling and preventing of cyber CVE methods. The chapter begins with a detailed literature review surrounding the current understandings of cyber CVE and cyber intelligence, and how the Internet has become a facilitator for extremist organisations to disseminate terrorist content. It will then review the current academic debates surrounding cyber intelligence as a cybersecurity method, highlighting its importance in detecting new trends. These methods are then evaluated separately for their effectiveness in tackling cyber CVE, and any common gaps are highlighted. To conclude the chapter proposes a holistic model that aims to fill the gaps identified, to produce a framework that will guide the relevant stakeholders to maintain and develop a well-structured set of measures and policies to tackling cyber CVE.

5.2   Concepts

5.2.1   Radicalisation Online

We live in a digital era. The Internet offers terrorists and extremists the 'capability to communicate, disseminate propaganda, indoctrinate, radicalise, recruit, and collaborate in different ways' (RAND 2013). The

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2012: 3), regarding the possible classification of how the Internet is often utilised to support acts of terrorism, has identified six overlapping categories: 'propaganda (including recruitment, radicalisation and incitement to terrorism); financing; training; planning (including through secret communication and open-source information); execution; and cyberattacks'. According to Conway and Courtney (2018), IS's online content production began to degrade in 2016 and 2017, at the same time they lost a great part of their territorial control, showing a possible connection between the real world and the cyberspace. But this fact does not mean that IS had lost this cyber battle. There is a massive production of videos, magazines and images that can be accessed online, and, although they are being removed, they can be reloaded again in other platforms. Conway and Courtney (2018: 3) state that in 2015 'the dominant themes within these images were identified as mercy, belonging, brutality, victimhood, war, and utopia', but in 2017 the dominant one was the war theme, a logical evolution connected, again, with the real world. The ideal Caliphate fell, and the image of success that it was reporting finished. The BBC Monitoring (2017) team has pointed out how the access to IS content is being done primarily through its Telegram channels. Whereas Twitter was once the most obvious gateway 'there is little doubt that Telegram is now the hub of IS activity'. Telegram enables its users to have one-to-one and group conversations that are encrypted end-to-end. Although the information is not clear about the number of groups and channels (there are a lot of them created by fanboys, but not directly related to the group), IS themselves claimed to be operating more than 300 groups and channels in summer 2017.

However, the way in which IS communicates is adaptive and evolutionary, depending on the technological context and counterterrorism actions. They go on using Twitter as a helpful way to disseminate their messages and to establish contacts; social media focuses on images (the account in Tumblr was taken down last summer following inquiries by a Newsweek journalist, JustPaste.It or Pastebin.com). Rand Corporation (2013), in a research focussed not only on contents online but in the way the Internet is used by individuals, analysed five hypotheses, with the following conclusions: The Internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised, it acts as an 'echo chamber', and the ideas are supported and disseminated by other individuals. But, on the other hand, the Internet does not accelerate the process of radicalisation, does not allow, completely, radicalisation

to occur without physical contact and does not increase opportunities for self-radicalisation.

Following Bermingham et al. (2009), online radicalisation would be defined as 'a process whereby individuals, through their online interactions and exposures to various types of internet context, come to view violence as a legitimate method of solving social and political conflicts'. In terms of the evidence base, a review of literature shows divided opinions about the influence of online radicalisation on terrorism. Whilst many studies have emphasised the Internet's significance (e.g. Gray and Head 2009), others have concluded that the Internet does not appear to play a significant role in Al-Qaeda-influenced radicalisation (Bouhana and Wikström 2011). But the online activity from Al-Qaeda differs from that developed by Daesh (IS). At the same time, the study of terrorist groups' use of the Internet has become an increasingly popular area, especially from 2013, providing continuously new research and data. Reinares and García-Calvo (2017), as an example, have stated that a large majority of the detainees in Spain between 2013 and 2016 for activities related to jihadist terrorism were radicalised in the company of other individuals. This was true for almost nine out of ten of them (86.9% of cases). No more than 13.1% of the detainees—that is, around one in ten—were radicalised on their own, with no other interaction than their exposure to jihadist propaganda.

On the other hand, 40.3% of detainees were radicalised in a mixed environment, both online and offline. Only 35.3% of them were radicalised in a basically online environment. Up to 24.4% of detainees were radicalised in a basically offline environment.

5.2.2   Cyber Intelligence

There is not a clear consensus about the concept of cyber intelligence. Without a broad debate on the issue, not even a significant volume of publications, there are great difficulties in defining this term. Javier Candau (2017), Head of Cybersecurity at the National Cryptological Center (A Spanish Intelligence Service), has highlighted how it is a recurring concept, which is linked to the offer of cybersecurity services, but which is used ambiguously. The absence of a general accepted concept has important consequences: it prevents determining the elements that shape the possible discipline, the contents of the function to be developed and the design of training plans (knowledge and skills), as well as the development

of a professional career. Attending to its etymological origin, we tackle a concept composed by two words: cyber (which refers to cyberspace) and intelligence. This simple approach clearly provides a clue to follow, cyber intelligence as the confluence of two possible different disciplines.

The RSA (Fraud Intelligence Services) (2012) defines cyber intelligence as 'knowledge about cyber-adversaries and their methods combined with knowledge about an organisation's security posture against those adversaries and their methods'. Based on this knowledge, organisations develop actionable intelligence: 'knowledge that enables an organisation to make decisions and take action'. The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) (2015) defines it, in a more accurate and complete way, as 'the products and processes across the intelligence cycle of assessing the capabilities, intentions and activities—technical or otherwise—of potential adversaries and competitors in cyber domain'. INSA considers cyber counterintelligence a sub-discipline. In any case, these approaches based solely on adversaries seem to be limiting, obviating the fact that their action takes place in an environment, a political, social, economic, legal and technological context that should be analysed. Even the nature of cyberspace, the detection of new trends, the new threats and opportunities that arise at every moment are vital knowledge to be managed.

The Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (Carnegie Mellon University 2013) defines cyber intelligence as 'the acquisition and analysis of information to identify, track and predict cyber-capabilities, intentions and activities that offer courses of action to enhance decision-making'. This concept is much closer to the classical conceptualisation of intelligence. The US National Intelligence Strategy 2014 (p. 2) identifies cyber intelligence as one of the four missions of the Intelligence Community. The Department of Homeland Security, in a 2012 report:

> 'DHS Task Force of Cyber Skills', also approaches the content of the cyber intelligence function: 'deep and current knowledge of the attack surface, its most vulnerable and high value targets, and how its technical vulnerabilities may be exploited; maintain up to the minute situational awareness on what malicious actors are using and targeting; and develop techniques and program custom tools to detect local changes, identify suspect interactions, and watch for and respond to what the malicious actors are doing. More advanced teams also are able to understand the attackers' motivation, language, organization, and social behaviours, as well as group the threat actors logically to create effective cyber profiles of groups, actors and campaigns, thereby helping organizations become more proactive in their security posture and defence'.

Javier Candau (CCN-CERT) (2017) shows his agreement with the definition of cyber intelligence proposed by Manuel Torres Soriano: 'analytical activity whose purpose is to provide relevant information to support decision-making in matters related to cyberspace'. We believe that, when adopting a definition that combines the highest degree of consensus, it is necessary to address both the root of the concept, with its two components 'cyber' and 'intelligence', and the intelligence doctrine that clearly shows the CCN-CERT, proposing the following concept: 'process (and final product) of obtaining and analysing data and information in/about cyberspace, carried out by specialists, and oriented to decision-making, in time, place and form'. Cyber intelligence is limited to analysing not only the capabilities of adversaries but also the environment in which said competitors make strategic decisions. The analysis of the environment configures the (in) security and the cyber (in) security, and at least it must be tried to understand in the strategic dimension of the cyber intelligence. Cyber intelligence is finalist, and its purpose is to produce action, to support decision-making: identifying risks and threats; analysing the variables involved and the intervening actors; determining opportunities; answering to the classic 5W + H (what, when, where, why, who and how); identifying future implications: what will be next, what do we do now?; taking into consideration that decision-making is not limited to cyberspace, but also covers the physical world (everything that happens in cyberspace can have impacts on the day-to-day life of people and organisations, And hybridisation between the physical world and the cyber world tends to be absolute); intelligence should strive to be timely accurate, actionable and relevant.

5.3   A Cyber Intelligence Process to Tackle Radicalisation Online

5.3.1   Cybersecurity Models Applied

The development of cyber intelligence or cyber threat intelligence is based on a cycle, which partially combines the classic cybersecurity models with the well-known intelligence cycle. Applying this model against online radicalisation, it becomes clear, in its first stage (identify), the need to identify contents, identify and analyse risks and develop a risk management strategy. The second step, protect, would have as an objective, to reduce the

Fig. 5.1   Cyber intelligence cycle. (Adapted from NIST model)

offer and the demand of radical contents online, eliminating them and building a counter-narrative. The third step would have as a principal aim to detect advanced situations of radicalisation that could lead to violence, with a continuous monitoring system, analysing anomalies and events. Radical online activities that could lead to violence need to be tackled, with a response and recovery plan, based on communication tools, in order to mitigate their impacts and respond proportionally. Media and information literacy especially oriented to youth, communities and minorities would be an important tool, while applying measures to block contents and to develop a counter-narrative to delegitimise radical speeches, statements and messages (ideology of violence) (see Fig. 5.1).

5.3.1.1   The Cyber Kill Chain

The kill chain, a term with military origin, describes the process of an attack. In cybersecurity, the kill chain is a method of defence, which tries to disrupt the attack. Lockheed Martin adapted this concept, as a method to limit the impact of intrusions on computer networks. Martin and Rice (2011) identified several phases in a cyberattack: reconnaissance (selection of a target, identifying vulnerabilities), weaponisation (creation of a remote access, malware, worn), delivery (transmission of the weapon to target),

exploitation (malware acts on target), installation (malware installs a back-door), command and control (intruder controls the target network) and actions (data exfiltration, data destruction or ransomware). For the purpose of this chapter, cyber intelligence against radicalisation, the most interesting application of this model, comes from the categorisation of defensible actions, because of its completeness: detect (identify process of radicalisation), deny (prevent access to this kind of information), disrupt (stop or limit the online traffic), degrade (counter communication), deceive (interfere) and contain (minimise its effects) (see Fig. 5.2).

5.3.1.2 *The Diamond Model*
This model (Caltagirone et al. 2013), presents the four basic aspects of cyber intelligence (see Fig. 5.3):

1. Identification of the victim, its current vulnerabilities, its capabilities to resist. In a radicalisation process, different people, exposed to the same level of propaganda and violent materials, react in different way, because of environmental factors, social and engagement or psychological conditions.

Fig. 5.3 The diamond model

2. Adversary. Knowledge about the attacker. Online contents are pro-
   duced and disseminated by groups and individuals. From a cyber
   intelligence point of view, it is a key objective to identify these actors,
   their technical capabilities, the vectors of their actions and the tools
   used to develop their actions.
3. Infrastructures. Protocols used for communication, encryption of
   information, use of Deep Web or mobile applications.
4. Capability. Motivation, ability to select targets for the radicalisa-
   tion process.

In this analysis with the diamond model, the vertical (socioeconomic)
relationship between victim and attacker allows reaching strategic conclu-
sions (and arriving at the identification of the actor); while the horizontal
(technical) relationship allows the improvement of the detection and
response capacity of the defensive part. The diamond model allows two
analyses/two relationships: the socio-individual (victim-attacker) and the
technical (infrastructure capability). The socio-individual relationship can
provide conclusions about the actors involved in online radicalisation pro-
cesses, answering the classical: what, who, why, where and when. The
technical relationship answers how this process is developed.

5.3.2   *Countering Violent Extremism Models*

The definitions that have been given about radicalisation and violent extremism are quite poor. Therefore, it is very difficult to talk about policies against a phenomenon that we have not been able to define well or at least reach a certain consensus on its definition. The concept of 'radicalisation' has been widely used in terrorism studies, especially during the last decade, and in counter-terrorism policy-making (Kundnani 2012). Nowadays, 'radicalisation' and 'extremism' are the main international topics concerning terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policies (Blanco and Cohen 2014, 2016). The objective of counter-violent extremism (CVE) policies should be to decrease the number of supporters and followers of violent groups through non-coercive means, taking into consideration that being radical or extremist is a legal option, a part of ideological freedom in democratic societies.

The fight against radicalisation and violent extremism appears on many occasions as a category within a framework much greater, the fight against terrorism. But it is important to highlight the existing differences:

1. Objectives: Countering violent extremism pursuits includes preventing and anticipating radicalisation that could lead to violence. Countering terrorism has different objectives: to detect, avoid, persecute and bring criminals to justice.
2. Actors involved: In the case of terrorism, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. But, in the fight against radicalisation and extremism, the number of actors multiplies exponentially.
3. Policies against radicalisation, in general, must be comprehensive, in a participatory system, with a leading role of the municipal and welfare institutions.
4. Temporal framework: Working against violent extremism supposes an anticipation of actions. The action against terrorism, although it has a preventive approach, is especially produced after an attack has happened or during the process of preparation of the attack (detect and disrupt).
5. Exercise of power: Perhaps it is the most important of the differences. Hard power against terrorism, with the use of all possible coercive means of State, based on a basic principle: The State has a monopoly of the use of violence, within the democratic system and with all the compliance with legal guarantees. Soft power would be

Fig. 5.4 Does CVE
work?

used against radicalisation, non-coercive measures (education, infor-
mation, social support, etc.). There are authors who speak of smart
power, which would be the combination of both ends of performance.
6. Orientation of the policies that must be developed: Top-down
against terrorism, and bottom-up against radicalisation, with the
engagement of citizens, teachers, social services, communities and
minorities, NGOs, etc.

Specific models have been developed for CVE. We point out the one by
Romaniuk (2015), applying a classic intelligence cycle to the fight against
radicalisation (see Fig. 5.4).

The first stage is 'assessment'. Romaniuk (2015: 11) points out that
'you can't fight what you don't understand'. The list of 'unknowns' about
terrorism, radicalisation and extremism is long (Schmid 2013; De la Corte
2015). The existing knowledge has two characteristics: on the one hand,
we find knowledge focused on matters in style because of their media
impact, with proliferation of studies that deal with the same matters; on
the other hand, there exists a wide, but really divided, knowledge depend-
ing on the field of specialisation of the authors. Nevertheless, there are
no models for the integration of a knowledge which contributes to

Fig. 5.5 Holistic process for CT decision-making

understand the '*big picture*' (Blanco and Cohen 2016). Knowledge is the key point to design public policies and their implementation. There is a lack of evidence-based policing practices and evaluation of public policies, as we point out at the end of this paper.

5.3.3   Model Proposed

Blanco and Cohen (2014, 2016), tackling terrorism, proposed an intelligence process that tried to avoid the limits of the classical intelligence cycle (see Fig. 5.5).

This model is based on several principles, making it possible to adapt it for countering violent extremism. The pillars of this holistic approach are:

1. Need to focus on intelligence surveys, analyses and actions on answering the question 'what for?' Decision-making is the major goal, at strategic, tactical and operational levels.
2. The intelligence process must satisfy, as a main objective, the need to 'connect the dots', answering the requirements established to inform the decision-making process. The sources of those different 'dots' are data, information, imagination and creative thinking, and

homeland security observations (i.e. previous knowledge or intuition based on experience).

3. There are multiple stakeholders that could help to create the best knowledge and intelligence to take actions, design strategies or make plans. Think tanks, universities, experts and citizens should be an important part of that process. It would be useful to integrate the synergies among academic studies about intelligence, radicalisation and terrorism.

4. A new intelligence process, with the support of modern information technologies, modifying and eliminating the classical cycle of intelligence. This process is not based on a lineal and continuous cycle, but on the use of different tools like scanning, monitoring, information classification and evaluation, integration, analysis, dissemination or visualisation of information, which are not sequential stages.

5. Time perspective. We shape the future through the decisions we make in every moment. Expectations about the future introduce causal factors in it, and they also condition our decisions at present. But our past (experiences, education) creates our present too. Consequently, we can state that these three moments overlap. The model introduces considerations about non-linearity of time, path dependency and multi-causality.

6. The integration of every applicable methodology, from a holistic time-based perspective. From a methodological point of view, it would start from the scientific method and social sciences, incorporating the structured techniques of intelligence analysis, and even including big data or the futures studies.

7. Finally, the model incorporates the theory of evidence-based policing, evaluating different processes: the requirements or needs of intelligence, the intelligence process developed by analysts and their managers, the decision-making process and the effects of the CT strategies (efficiency, costs, impacts in citizens and other non-desired effects).

It is possible to present this model in a different way, as a combination of the models presented previously, merging cybersecurity approaches and classical intelligence analysis cycles of processes (Blanco and Cohen 2014, 2016) (see Fig. 5.6):

Fig. 5.6 An integrated intelligence and cybersecurity process

In the stage of analysis, the kill chain and cybersecurity models (NIST) would be approaches that could contribute in the needed assessment. In the stage of response, the defensive kill chain could have a clear use.

5.4   Designing Cyber CVE Evidence-Based Policies

In our opinion evidence-based policing faces three needs in CVE:

- The absence of a framework. Freese (2014) makes an interesting approach in her 'Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Framework', pointing out two stages: the first one is the scientific research, trying to answer questions (what, how and why); the second stage entails evaluative research, with the focus on resources, processes and outcomes. But evidence-based policing could have a broader framework.
- The lack of applied research. Lum et al. (2006) concluded that only seven studies were scientific evaluations of a counter-terrorism pro-

gramme, after selecting 354 studies that seemed to evaluate counter-terrorism programmes or interventions (after locating 20,000 written pieces about terrorism books, articles, reports, dissertations and policy briefs). This situation is worst in cyber CVE programmes.

- The development of methodologies to do it. It is not easy to apply a methodology and to know the effectiveness of a measure. Usually, several measures are implemented at the same time, being difficult to individualise the effects of each one.

Evaluating public policies on cyber countering violent radicalisation is a continuous process that offers, at least, three key moments (the existence of the previous knowledge and necessary intelligence, the failures in decision-making and the measure of the effects and impacts that the developed policies have had), a process led by different actors (university, think tanks, intelligence analysts, government civil servants, lobbies, citizens' desires and needs, etc.) and a process that aims not only to know the effectiveness of the policies but also to improve the future policymaking. The core of our proposal is based on the strategic action of radicalisation actors (states, groups or individuals) and CVE actors, expressed in two horizontal lines in Fig. 5.7. All actors have goals, develop actions and produce impacts. The two lines allow to make comparisons between each of these elements and to design CVE policies that act on them.

Fig. 5.7 CVE decision-making evaluation (Blanco and Cohen 2014, 2016)

CVE policies should face violent radicalisation root causes. There is not a clear consensus about the existing root causes; in the same way, there is no consensus about what is radicalisation and violent extremism. Macro (political, economic, social and technological factors), meso (society and groups) and micro (individual and psychology) theories are developed by researchers, but there is no common pattern. Perhaps it would be more interesting to talk about facilitators and inhibitors to tackle these threats. CVE policies must take into consideration the characteristics of violent groups and violent individuals. A clear analysis of them allows us to have key knowledge about their ideology, leadership, hierarchies, membership, financing, area of action, recruitment strategies, relations with other criminal groups or states, modus operandi, financing, supporters, sympathisers, communities, gateway organisations and ties with other types of crime.

Violent groups and individuals have a clear set of final objectives: terror, fear, political change, social polarisation and overreaction of Western countries. Fighting against these objectives should be part of CVE efforts, and there is a lack of measures facing these questions. The purpose of the horrific images and videos is to incite violence, recruit people to their cause and attempt to spread fear. States and international organisations have their own objectives. They must guarantee safety and security, to allow the exercise of civil rights. Following the content of several CVE strategies, states and international organisations must detect, prevent, deter and reduce. For these purposes, they develop CVE strategies, plans and actions that sometimes could produce severe impacts too. There is a clear asymmetry if we compare these objectives. Violent actors do not have to obey a legal framework, they have direct incomes, they do not pay taxes, they do not have ethical considerations, and they are not pressed and controlled by mass media and citizens. They try to get these objectives through different actions: communication, propaganda, diffusion of attacks, diffusion of videos and images, dissemination of violent narratives based on real or imagined grievances, recruitment, financing and the radicalisation of communities or individuals.

As it is happening in Europe since 2015, sometimes radicalisation processes finish with a terrorist attack or the support of violent actions. But the impacts of violent extremism and terrorism are not only the number of attacks, deaths or injuries, arrested or condemned. There are other effects that are not usually considered: social and economic outcomes, the level of social terror (the main objective of terrorist actions), the way that attacks affect government actions or the way they make us modify our

PHYSICAL/ MATERIAL	POLITICAL/LEGAL	SOCIAL /PSYCHOLOGY	ECONOMIC	SECURITY
Attacks	Scheduling changes	Migrants	Value of damage	More controls
Deaths	Political decisions (i.e. participation in international missions)	Hate crime	Insurance	More restrictions
Injuries		Xenophobia Islamophobia	Companies' decisions on internationalization or leaving countries	**CT POLICIES**
Kidnappings	Policies for victims	Social polarisation		
Damage (buildings, infrastructure, etc.)	Political polarisation	Social fear	Commercial routes	
	Debates about security and liberties	Mass media communication impact	Tourism	
	Debates about secrets and transparency	Change in way of life	Financial instability	
	Limits to rights and liberties	Values	Stock market instability	
	Overreaction of Western states		Consume	
			Kidnappings for ransom	
			Cost of security systems	

Fig. 5.8 Terrorism impacts (Blanco and Cohen 2014, 2016)

system, values and way of living. Although it is not a comprehensive classification, the following figure shows the impacts of terrorism on the society that suffers it (see Fig. 5.8).

We define cyber CVE as 'policies, operations and programmes that governments implement to combat cyber radicalisation processes' (Spencer 2006: 180). In a similar way, evaluating cyber CVE needs a clear definition, knowledge about different western models and the factors that condition them (sometimes as limiting factors); a classification of CVE measures, methodologies and technics to evaluate policies, and research about the impacts of these policies that sometimes could be ineffective or have non-desired effects or act as a fuel.

There are several, but not comprehensive, lists of different cyber CVE measures and specific studies about individual measures. They could be classified this way:

1. Deterring the producers of extremist materials.

It would be based on the selective use of takedowns in conjunction with prosecutions. It must be highlighted the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, an effort led by Facebook, Google,

Microsoft and Twitter that was announced in June, is a key factor in removing terrorist recruitment content from their sites. Terrorist attacks, especially in Western Europe, have forced the engagement of these companies.

Looking at the present and future, new technologies like machine learning will be instrumental in finding and removing online recruitment content. One example could be the UK is partnering with machine learning company ASI Data Science for just this purpose. This tool can automatically detect terrorist content online and block it from being viewed. ASI Data Science points out that the new technology can detect 94% of ISIS's online propaganda with 99.995% accuracy (iHLS 2018). But, according to ICSR (2009), although most governments are focusing on technical tools to remove or block materials on the Internet, fighting radicalisation online needs additional approaches and 'cannot be dealt with simply by pulling the plug'.

A second important problem is the acquisition of evidence in cases in which the Internet could have been used for terrorist purposes, preserving the integrity of the data and the chain of custody, previous conditions for its admissibility in court proceedings.

2. Education, training and awareness.

The presence of online radical materials can be addressed by reducing their supply and limiting their demand. From this last point of view, different possibilities open, with education being a key element. 'Any strategy that hopes to counter online radicalisation must aim to create an environment in which the production and consumption of such materials become not just more difficult in a technical sense but unacceptable as well as less desirable' (ICSR, 2009).

The Radicalisation Awareness Networks (RAN) (2016) is one of the most active organisations researching on CVE and identifying the best practices: 'schools are key institutions to strengthen resilience and prevent youngsters from being attracted to radical ideologies and organisations' (2016).

3. Engagement, support and empowerment.

The final aim would be empowering online communities to self-regulate. According to ICSR (2009), the 'creation of an Internet Users Panel in order to strengthen reporting mechanisms and complaints procedures would allow users to make their voices heard'.

Media and Information Literacy (MIL) (Cohen and Blanco 2016) would be the key tool to improve the use of the Internet for

several purposes: apply critical thinking contrasting different sources, detect contents against communities and minorities, identify hate speech and counter radical contents and materials. Following an intelligence process, it would be possible to establish an MIL process to address violent extremism online, with the following phases, not always cyclic or successive: planning the task, managing information, analysing information, disseminating information (new canals and new information that contributes to the diversity of cultural expression and social cohesion) in an ethical way and evaluating the impacts of the new disseminated contents. This model is compatible, for example, with the models proposed by Boekhorst (2013), the British SCONUL (2011) seven pillars of information literacy (1999) or the critical components proposed by the panel convened by the International ICT Literacy Panel (2002) (see Table 5.1).

4. Research on cyber violent radicalisation and cyber CVE.

   Possibly, at present, there are more questions that we do not know about online radicalisation. It is necessary to maintain research efforts to better understand its causes, processes, facilitators and inhibitors, as well as to determine the best practices for its containment or elimination. Finally, knowledge is the final way to tackle radicalisation and violent extremism.

5. Counter-narratives and hate speech.

   It is necessary to develop an action at two levels. The first, consisting of discrediting radical and violent messages, focusing on the possible lack of coherence, on the impacts they produce (death and desolation, imprisonment, harm to the innocent, etc.). The second one is promoting positive messages. Here, again, relying on government alone is not sufficient. NGOs, Internet companies, communities and minorities, and Internet users are key actors for this purpose.

6. Disengagement, de-radicalisation.

   Cyberspace can play a role in de-radicalisation processes, merging all the previous elements of a CVE policy, although it would be easy to conclude that perhaps it is easier to be get own radicalised online, but it would be very difficult to get own de-radicalised online.

   For this evidence-based framework, the most important issue is not to have a classification of CVE measures but to point out several key questions. Lee Jarvis (2014) proposes a framework named 'The Three W's of Counterterrorism'. This framework can be adapted for

Table 5.1 Media and information literacy in an intelligence analysis process (Blanco and Cohen 2014, 2016)

Process	MIL
Planning	• Establish objectives, time available and resources allocated • Understanding of the role and functions of information providers and media, as well as the conditions under which these functions can be performed • Recognition of an information need
Manage of information	Access to information • Selection of sources of information: press, audiovisual materials, forums, blogs, social media, libraries, etc. • Selection of tools to collect information: crawlers, alerts, content curation, Internet, etc. Collecting information • Monitoring and scanning
Analysis of information	Evaluate information • Reliability of sources and credibility of information. Making judgements about the quality, relevance, usefulness or efficiency of information Integrate information • Integration of the information found: summarising, comparing Analysis of information • Understanding of the information • Applying methodologies of analysis: quantitative, qualitative, structured techniques of analysis
Dissemination	Create new channels • Engage with information providers and media for self-expression and democratic participation • Promote the use of libraries with new technological services Create information • Creation of contents adapted to different channels • Create cases, stories, discussions and ideas
Evaluation	• Measuring the impact of new contents • Selecting indicators that measure the achievements • Contrasting these impacts with the impacts of hate crimes and hate speech

cyber CVE. The first one (is it warranted) involves the consideration of whether there is a real need for any new CVE policy, because perhaps there are enough mechanisms in place. The second one (will it work) manages our ability to identify the purpose of a cyber CVE tool, to predict the future functioning of it, to link cause and

Firstly

Who → What → Why → Where → When → How → For what

Secondly

	Measure	Desired outcomes	Indicators	Effects/Results
Politic				
LEAs				
Military				
Legal				
Social				

Fig. 5.9 Cyber CVE decision-making evaluation (Blanco and Cohen 2014, 2016)

effect and to know the impact on its targets. The third one (is it worth the consequences) tries to measure the consequences, intended or not, of cyber CVE policies.

The model we propose integrates two levels (see Fig. 5.9):

– For each measure we must answer several questions: for what, who, what, why, where, when and how. Each measure must have a clear context. Measures are not effective every time or everywhere. Cyber CVE needs strategic decision-making: strategies, programmes, actions, resources and a temporal and geographic framework.
– Each measure that we could establish must consider the desired outcomes, possible indicators to measure and results to evaluate the policy.

Cyber CVE policies produce a broad set of impacts that should be measured. In this way, we could compare CVE impacts and terrorist impacts and evaluate if these measures are facing root causes, groups, objectives and actions. It would allow us to evaluate if the impacts are against our own objectives and values too, if there are non-desired effects, and if they are the way or if there is a way to generate feedback to improve the system. Sometimes CVE policies can generate new grievances (discrimination of

communities or minorities, or strengthening hate speech and hate crimes) and new processes of radicalisation.

It is impossible to measure arithmetically all these impacts (De Graaf 2010), but there are several methodologies and models that could be applied. It supposes a multidisciplinary effort (criminology, law, psychology, sociology, economy, philosophy, anthropology, education…). It is not possible to evaluate cyber CVE only with rationalist approaches (less objective than the case of CT: number of attacks, number of arrested people). They must be completed with constructivism (Spencer 2006). We need to apply quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Or 'laypersons discourse', analysing in different mass media, blogs, forums, twits, web the use of adverbs, adjectives, verbs that are building our vision of this world (Milliken 1999). Or the 'performativity' model from Beatrice De Graaf (2010). Or Introducing foresight in the model: each measure must be analysed with prospective methodology before its implementation, with the objectives pointed by Jarvis (2014), and with methodologies like factor analysis, game of actors, cross impact matrix, what if, trend analysis, wild cards or scenarios (Blanco and Cohen 2014).

Following this model, and Fig. 5.2, we propose a 'Six Step-by-Step Evaluation Process', with the following stages:

1. Make sure that cyber CVE policies are facing terrorist actors (groups, states or individuals), terrorist objectives, terrorist actions (including financing and communication) and terrorist impacts, but especially, although it is not usually taken into consideration, the root causes of terrorism, and the effects of previous CT policies. Sometimes CT policies are only oriented towards one of these factors, especially terrorist groups or individuals as a reaction to previous actions and attacks.
2. Establish criteria, methodologies and indicators to evaluate cyber CVE impacts.
3. Compare the impacts of terrorist actions with the impact of cyber CVE policies.
4. Carry out a critical analysis of each cyber CVE measure, or, at least, packs of them, testing their need, effectiveness, efficiency and possible unwanted effects.
5. Confirm that the policies do not generate opposite effects to our goals or collide with our values.

6. Redefine cyber CVE policies, eliminating or changing former policies and introducing a long-term vision before implementing new ones. Avoid overreaction and bad decisions of the past.

5.5 Conclusions

According to the BBC Monitoring Team (2017):

> *'for a group whose effectiveness is often measured by its media operation, upholding that reputation is crucial for its brand and survival. So, while its output is unlikely to return to previous levels any time soon, IS's loss of its 'caliphate' on the ground makes it ever more important that it has a strong online presence. This is not only to compensate for territorial losses and to keep supporters onboard, but to ensure that IS keeps its high international news profile and that its brand is not forgotten'.*

Other authors point out that online activities are linked to 'real world' issues and that in this moment Daesh (IS) capabilities are under pressure. Current facts are not showing this evolution. After losing Raqqa and Mosul, the presence of the cyber Caliphate was reduced, but it is slowly recovering its level of activity in the last months (reference source).

Governments and international organisations are adopting new legislative measures and pressing Internet companies to disrupt radical activities online. Nevertheless, without an integral process and the involvement of all the possible stakeholders, it will be impossible to fight violent extremism online. New technologies, new widgets and new networks appear, facilitating their activities. There will be, in the future, more platforms receptive to extreme postings are nonetheless foreseen, especially on jihad and right-wing ideology.

A cyber CVE policy should try, at the same time, to reduce supply of radical content on the Internet, reduce demand for radical contents to the people, promote awareness, and adopt a constructive messaging strategy (Rashid 2016).

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Testing for Reliability of the TARGET Threat Analysis Instrument (TTAI): An Interdisciplinary Instrument for the Analysis of School Shooting Threats

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6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of Columbine (1999, USA) and Erfurt (2002, Germany), mass killings on school grounds, also referred to as school shootings, caused serious public concerns and were prompted by the brutality and

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unpredictability of the violent act (Madfis 2016; Muschert 2013; Reddy et al. 2001). These highly salient incidents affected not only schools or families but also communities, leading to post-traumatic stress, long-lasting feelings of insecurity and the pressure to assure safe and secure schools (Cornell et al. 2009; Reddy et al. 2001; Twemlow et al. 2002; Ahlig et al. 2016). However, school shootings are statistically rare events contrary to school shooting *threats* (Bondü and Scheithauer 2014). The reported frequencies of threats vary between 1.3 in the USA and 0.3 threats per 1000 students in Germany (Leuschner et al. 2016; Cornell et al. 2004; Leuschner et al. 2011; Ryan-Arredondo et al. 2001). In retrospective studies on school shootings, researchers like Bondü and Scheithauer (2014) and Hoffmann et al. (2009) emphasise that almost all school shooters communicated their intentions repeatedly or made them visible to their peers (e.g. showing a gun) before committing the violent act, thereby highlighting the importance of threats prior to a school shooting (for an overview, see Ahlig et al. under review). Moreover, authorities were able to prevent a series of potential shootings due to peer reports of a threat (O'Toole 1999). Accordingly, O'Toole (1999) and Bondü and Scheithauer (2014) consider the expression of threats to be a specific and valuable sign for signalling an attack. Moreover, those signs involve behavioural processes, which in turn offer an opportunity for the development of prevention and intervention approaches.

Not all threats made by students are necessarily indicative for a planned and prepared attack. Nekvasil and Cornell (2012) stated that only 1% of student threats of violence (not necessarily threats to kill) were attempted presuming that relatively few students have the motivation and capacity to carry out a violent act. Research by Strong and Cornell (2008), who examined 209 student's threats of violence (including hitting, stabbing and shooting someone) referred for assessment, showed that most threats (70%) "were made in jest or in a fleeting moment of anger" (Strong and Cornell 2008: 44). Based on these findings, several approaches have been developed to determine the seriousness of a threat and the danger posed by the students to carry out an act of violence. Any information that aids distinguishing a potentially violent act from a non-serious threat (situational in that specific moment of threatening) provides helpful guidance in developing prevention approaches and avert violent acts.

Systematic analyses and case comparisons have revealed no specific types or profiles of school shooters (O'Toole 1999; Vossekuil et al. 2002). Instead, FBI and the US Secret Service have recommended a threat

assessment approach, which underlines the collection of information about a student's warning behaviour (Borum 2000; Cornell and Allen 2011; Meloy and O'Toole 2011). Retrospective analyses have revealed a developmental path, progressing from fantasies about violence towards planning and preparing an attack which also included warning behaviours like spreading information about the motive of the later perpetrator, fascinations, or even plans (Scheithauer and Bondü 2011; Meloy and O'Toole 2011). An assumption underlying threat assessment is that severe targeted violent acts are the endpoint of a process including observable signs for signalling an attack, which open the avenue for preventive interventions. This perspective asserts the important distinction between making a threat and posing a threat. While making a threat refers to the expression of an individual to intent to harm the target, posing a threat involves the individual to engage in planning behaviours to harm the target (Reddy et al. 2001).

6.2 CURRENT APPROACHES FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF A THREAT

Research by O'Toole (1999) differentiates between low, medium and high level of risk to further help assess the seriousness of a threat. The level of risk increases with the specificity and plausibility of details contained by a threat (e.g. place, time and maps) suggesting planning thoughts and behaviour.

Furthermore, Cornell and Sheras (2006) developed the Virginia Model for Student Threat Assessment, which postulates a distinction between *transient* and *substantive threats* and is extensively used by the US Secret Service. Transient threats do not have a sustained intention to harm someone; they are understood as expressions of anger, frustration or inappropriate attempts at humour, dependent on the circumstance or context in which the threat was made. In most cases, an appropriate apology or explanation is offered by the student (Cornell et al. 2004). On the other hand, substantive threats express an enduring intention to harm somebody by including plausible details about the victim, time, place and method. A substantive threat can be defined by one or more of the following characteristics: (1) it is repeated or communicated to multiple persons, (2) it involves planning behaviour, (3) the person has attempted to recruit others or has invited an audience and (4) the presence of weapons, bomb material and maps (Cornell et al. 2004; Meloy et al. 2012). Testing these guidelines, Cornell et al. (2004) found 70% of their investigated cases to

be transient threats, whereas 30% of the cases required a more extensive evaluation and intervention.

The concept of warning behaviours was introduced by Meloy et al. (2012: 260) with the purpose of providing a more reliable and valid method to predict offenses and 'indicate factors which constitute change, and which are evidence of increasing or accelerating risk'. Their typology delineates eight factors:

- Pathway (any behaviour displaying research, planning, preparation or implementation of an attack)
- Fixation (any behaviour indicating an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a person or a cause)
- Identification (any behaviour indicating a psychological desire to be a 'pseudo commando' or 'warrior mentality')
- Novel aggression (any act of violence appearing for the first time and being unrelated to pathway warning)
- Energy burst (increasing frequency or variety of any noted activities related to the target, usually shortly prior to the attack)
- Last resort warning behaviour (evidence of words or deeds forcing the individual into a position of last resort)
- A differentiation between directly communicated threats, and leakage is proposed by which the communication is either directly or to a third party, respectively.

Meloy et al. (2014) tested the eight warning behaviours for targeted violence by comparing a German school shooter sample ($N = 9$) with students of concern (e.g. students with a low-risk to commit a school shooting) ($N = 31$). The results showed five warning behaviours to occur with a significantly greater frequency in the school shooters compared to students of concern: pathway, fixation, identification, novel aggression and last resort. However, no significant difference was found between school shooters and students of concern for leakage and direct threats, implicating the need to screen the existence of postulated warning behaviours after a student has verbalised a direct threat or leakage.

Furthermore, Bondü and Scheithauer (2014) found differences between school shooters ($N = 7$) and threateners (i.e. students making a threat only) ($N = 2$): Only school shooters repeated a direct threat and leakage—which is in line with findings from Cornell and Sheras (2006). Additionally, they found only for school shooters more than five direct

threats or leakages, a certain motive and direct threats by showing weapons. Concerning forms of expression, they found that school shooters expressed direct threats and leakage significantly more often in a nonverbal way (e.g. by a gesture or in a painting) than threateners.

However, despite a widespread usage of all these approaches, a sufficient empirical foundation is lacking, and it remains unclear if any of these criteria can be used to distinguish successfully between school shooting threats which are meant to be serious and threats which are situational in that specific moment of threatening. Furthermore, a systematic review of the literature reveals extensive inconsistencies and a vast heterogeneity of classification systems used by practitioners and researchers (Ahlig et al. under review).

However, reliable and specific criteria to distinguish between transient and substantive threats cannot be developed as long as this research field suffers from several shortcomings: (1) no uniform definition of the term 'threat' (Ahlig et al. under review); (2) the use of non-random, convenience samples and (3) no standardised tool to assess and analyse different characteristics of a threat systematically (Meloy and O'Toole 2011). There are empirically based instruments differentiating between low-, moderate- and high-risk threats, for example the HCR-20 (Webster et al. 1997). However, the HCR-20 does not focus on communicated threats. Hence, the lack of threat analysis instruments still remains unheeded (e.g. Meloy et al. 2012).

The present chapter addresses this methodological limitation by introducing an interdisciplinary instrument for the analysis of characteristics of school shooting threats.

6.3   THE TARGET THREAT ANALYSIS INSTRUMENT (TTAI)

The instrument was developed within the framework of the interdisciplinary research consortium TARGET (English: 'Incident and case analysis of highly expressive targeted violence' funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research [BMBF]). The project aimed at describing and analysing the developmental processes leading to a rampage or shooting and the social framing of such incidents. Additionally, cases of shootings or rampage were compared with other incidents of severe violence (i.e. rampages of adults, terrorist attacks, homicides of adolescents and threateners). The TARGET Codebook

(TARGET Research Group 2015) is an interdisciplinary instrument assessing crime record-related data coupled predominantly with specific information on risk and resilience factors (Göbel et al. 2016).The development of the instrument was solely based on homicide scenarios.

Within the TARGET consortium, a second codebook, the Threat Analysis Instrument (TTAI), was developed to code specific details from case file materials such as wording of threat, warning behaviour and other characteristics of threats and threateners. The aim of this instrument is to evaluate the seriousness of a threat and to support the investigation of elaborated criteria for distinguishing between substantive and transient school shooting threats. Such an instrument would allow specific analyses regarding details and contents of threats as well as comparing threats between several incidents of violence. The TTAI was developed according to results from Ahlig et al.'s (under review) systematic review, highlighting the extensive inconsistency of terminology used in research for the concept of 'threat'.

The TTAI should meet certain design requirements: (1) it needs to convey an interdisciplinary focus and should meet the needs of multiple users; (2) it has to ensure and retain the variability among cases; (3) it should take into account restricted crime record material; (4) it has to be time-efficient and (5) psychometrically valid (see Göbel et al. 2016; Kurasaki 2000).

As shown in Fig. 6.1, the development of the TTAI comprised three stages. In the first stage, staff members of the TARGET Research Group reviewed relevant literature to identify existing instruments and procedures. In the second stage, items were generated and a preliminary version of the TTAI was designed and tested over a series of two interrater testing phases. A high interrater reliability or agreement is necessary for the validation of any conclusions made according to the data analysis (Kurasaki 2000). Finally, the TTAI was finalised by making necessary amendments to the items and ensuring an acceptable level of interrater reliability.

6.3.1   Structure of the TTAI

The TTAI contains three thematic sections including ten subsections addressing threats and warning behaviour (see Table 6.1). In the following, these sections are introduced.

Fig. 6.1   Essential stages towards the development of the TTAI

Table 6.1   Thematic sections of the TTAI

	Sections
1.	*Offence*
1.1	Legal consequences
1.2	Criminal offence
2.	*Unit A—Information about recent threat*
2.1	Content of threat
2.2	Criminal charge
2.3	General information
3.	*Unit B—Information about previous threats*
3.1	General information
3.2	Content of previous threats
3.3	Warning behaviour
3.4	Familiarity of previous threats
3.5	Authority's reaction

6.3.1.1 Offence

1.1 *Legal Consequences.* In general, this section contains items on information about prosecution and conviction, including if the perpetrator was convicted or if the proceedings were dropped. Another item assesses the reasons for a dropped charge or case. According to the German Criminal Code (StGB) and German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), the following reasons may apply: (1) refraining from initiating a prosecution if educational provisions are fulfilled (§§45, 47 JGG); (2) exemption from criminal responsibility due to age (§19 StGB); (3) petty offence (§153 StPO); (4) withdrawal (§153b StPO); (5) active repentance (§153e StPO); (6) false suspicion (§154e StPO); (7) no criminal offence (§170 Abs.2 StPO) or (8) other reasons. Other items include questions about the criminal liability, juvenile criminal law, degree of penalty and disciplinary measures.

1.2 *Criminal Offence.* This section assesses the criminal offence for which the perpetrator was convicted according to the German Criminal Code (StGB), for example disturbance of public peace (§126 StGB), causing the danger of fire (§§306ff. StGB), causing explosion (§308 StGB), or threatening the commission of a felony (§241 StGB).

6.3.1.2 Unit A: Information About Recent Threat

2.1. *Content of Threat*. In this section, the threat is assessed by questioning specific details, for example communication channels used by the threatener (i.e. verbal, written or symbolic) and the explicit wording of the threat. According to Cornell et al. (2004) or O'Toole (1999) the seriousness of a threat is determined by the degree of plausibility and specificity classifying the threat as transient or substantive. Thus, low-risk or transient threats convey ambiguous, inconsistent and implausible information with a lack of detail while high-risk or substantive threats are direct, specific and plausible, signalling towards concrete planning behaviour to commit an act of violence (Cornell 2003; O'Toole 1999; Twemlow et al. 2002). Consequently, the TTAI introduces items regarding the content of threat by which the threatener communicated the specificity of location, targets, motive, execution and time of violent act. Other questions regarding the content of threat include the use of the word 'amok' by the threatener, suicidal ideation and reference to other school shootings (e.g. Meloy et al. 2012). Moreover, information about claims of terms or demands regarding the threatening statement is included as an item to determine a conditional threat as proposed by O'Toole (1999). Additionally, an increasing level of risk is postulated if the threatener reveals his/her name (De Becker 1999), and an item about the disclosure of own identity is introduced to evaluate the level of threat.

2.2. *Criminal Charge*. In this section, information regarding the threat incident is gathered from perceiving person and those who reported the threatening statement to the authorities. In the school context, threats are mostly perceived by peers and then reported to other friends, teachers and/or parents who will eventually inform officials (Meloy et al. 2012; Newman and Fox 2009; Pollack et al. 2008). Items to assess such information (i.e. number of persons, relationship to the person: parents, brother/sister, peers, officials, Internet contact, acquaintance and unknown adult) are included. Moreover, the motive of reporting a threat incident to authorities is needed because usually witnesses tend to rationalise, minimise or deny perceived threatening statements (as shown by the Good Samaritan or bystander effect) (Meloy and O'Toole 2011).

2.3. *General Information*. This section includes items on the use of drugs or medication and the threatener's involvement regarding the threat statement. According to Kaplan and Cornell (2005), students in special education (i.e. emotionally disturbed, learning disabled, and other health impaired) make more threats than students in general education systems, as they are particularly more at risk for showing aggressive behaviour (Wright and Dusek 1998). Hence, one item asking for the school type attended by the threatener to explore differences in the amount of threat statements among schools is added.

6.3.1.3   Unit B: Information About Previous Threats

3.1. *General Information*. This section provides information about the number/amount of threat incidents communicated by the threatener. In addition, it assesses the knowledge about former retracted threats and the involvement of others regarding the threats (within the meaning of complicity).

3.2. *Content of Previous Threats.* Analog to 'Unit A—Information about Recent Threat (2.1. Content of Threat)', this section deals with specific details regarding all previous threats and not only the specific threat of being prosecuted and analysed.

3.3. *Warning Behaviour*. In this section, the warning behaviour typology by Meloy et al. (2012) is in purview. To ensure content validity, some warning behaviours are measured using two items, e.g. fixation which is assessed by the preoccupation of the threatener with a person (i.e. stalking behaviour) or with a cause (i.e. conflict or perceived injustice). Additionally, some items based on the research results by Bondü and Scheithauer (2014) are included as risk factors for severe targeted school violence: having thoughts of suicide, composing violence-related lyrics, writing or comics and affinity to weapons.

3.4. *Familiarity of Previous Threats.* Code of silence, the phenomenon that students do not report threats to authorities or other persons is not unusual (Nekvasil and Cornell 2012). It is of particular importance because when students report on threats posed by their classmates, the majority of intended targeted attacks could be averted (O'Toole 1999). The results of a systematic review by Ahlig et al. (under review) demonstrate that at least one person

knew about the intentions of the threatener in 81–100% of all analysed school shooting cases. Predominantly, threateners leak their intention about a planned attack to peers (75–100%). In this section, items are used to rate information regarding the number of persons who were familiar with at least one of the previous threats and their belonging to a social group (i.e. parents, brother/sister, peers, officials, Internet contact, acquaintance, unknown adult). Furthermore, items are included regarding persons who were familiar with warning behaviours displayed by the threatener.

3.5. *Authority's Reaction*. The final section includes items addressing typical responses to reported threats by school authorities or other representatives of the institution responsible for the student at the time of the threatening behaviour. All items are based on the results of the project 'Networks against School Shootings' (NETWASS), relying on structured case report data (Leuschner et al. 2017; Sommer et al. 2016). Possible responses include (1) regulatory or educational measures, (2) face-to-face conversation with the threatener, (3) communication with parents, (4) inclusion of peers, (5) school internal measures (e.g. class representative), (6) internal exchange with colleagues and (7) support by the external professional network.

6.3.2   *Interrater Reliability (IRR)*

Testing the interrater reliability was especially necessary, as most of the items were newly developed and never used and/or tested before. Consequently, the instrument had to be monitored with regard to the quality criteria of objectivity, reliability and validity. In the following section, we describe how the interrater reliability of the TTAI was tested for.

6.4   Method

6.4.1   *Raters*

In total, 13 raters (seven in the first testing phase and six in the second testing phase) participated in the study. The raters met the following criteria: (1) German native-speaker, (2) obtained a university degree in psychology (e.g. Diploma, Master) and (3) were extensively trained in administering the TTAI by the authors of this manuscript and staff members of the TARGET Research group.

6.4.2   Materials

In the context of testing interrater reliability, 15 court records of school shooting threats were provided to the study participants (ten in the first IRR testing phase and five different in the second IRR testing phase). Those records were randomly chosen from a pool of 124 case records collected and requested from prosecutor's offices in Germany between 1999 and 2004. Court records included a police report, statements made by threatener, victim and witness and other evidence regarding the case. All court records were selected randomly based on the following criteria: (1) the police report containing a threat complaint, (2) case involved the school context or aimed at the school or school staff, (3) threateners were identified (no unresolved cases) and (4) threateners were not over 25 years of age. All records were previously unknown to the raters. Selected cases showed an average age of 15.87 years, 93% were male.

6.4.3   Procedure

Participants were trained in administering TTAI and supervised by the authors of this manuscript and staff members of the TARGET research group. All raters reviewed important original literature about school shootings, threats and threat assessment and possessed good knowledge on the structure of a court record and received a 2-h step-by-step training session on the administration of the TTAI. During this training, one randomly chosen court record served as an example for going through the entire codebook. The TTAI employs only objective questions by dealing with concrete facts (e.g. 'Threat included suicide announcement'). Moreover, a more detailed description of each section, explanation per question and definition of the response set are provided in the TTAI. Following the training, all raters were provided with the selected court records and were asked to be as thorough as possible when reading the court records and completing the TTAI independent of the other raters. The study was divided into two testing phases to determine interrater reliability. Following the IRR calculation, all items below a certain threshold were either modified by changing the wording of the item or adjusted for its response set, or the item was deleted. According to Landis and Koch (1977), the AC1 coefficient can be interpreted as moderate between 0.40 and 0.59; a coefficient above 0.60 indicates a substantial agreement and is used as benchmark in this study. The IRR procedure was repeated in a second IRR testing phase.

6.4.4 Statistical Analyses

The reliability of the data was calculated using the statistics software R integrating specific scripts provided by Gwet (2010). The statistics used to calculate the agreement between raters was Gwet's AC1. The decision to use Gwet's AC1 as opposed to other reliability measures (e.g. Cohen's Kappa) was made because AC1 provides a more stable result, is less affected by prevalence and marginal probability and consequently, remains more suitable for the given format of dataset (Wongpakaran et al. 2013; Gwet 2010). The TTAI employs closed question format with different sets of response options ranging from categorical (e.g. 'yes', 'no', and 'not assessable due to record quality') to ordinal and interval (i.e. number of threats). Also, see Chap. 3.

6.5   RESULTS

The IRR was calculated for 100 items in the first and 98 items in the testing phase. Table 6.2 displays the number of items below the threshold of 0.60 for both testing phases, and the final number of items in the TTAI and the average AC1 statistics for each section.

Table 6.2 IRR results

Code	Section	Number of items with AC1 < 0.60/no. of items		Average AC1
		IRR testing phase 1	IRR testing phase 2	
1.	*Offence*			
1.1	Legal consequences	5/12	0/11	0.93
1.2	Criminal offence	0/13	–	0.86[a]
2.	*Unit A—Information about recent threat*			
2.1	Content of threat	4/16	2/17	0.77
2.2	Criminal charge	3/8	1/10	0.78
2.3	General information	1/4	0/5	0.91
3.	*Unit B—Information about previous threats*			
3.1.	General information	2/4	0/3	0.81
3.2.	Content of previous threats	6/15	6/15	0.71
3.3.	Warning behaviour	7/13	0/13	0.87
3.4.	Familiarity of previous threats	9/20	1/16	0.71
3.5.	Authority's reaction	8/8	0/8	0.78

[a]No second IRR testing phase as all items showed an AC1 > 0.6

6.5.1   *IRR Testing Phase 1*

The AC1 values of the first IRR testing phase varied substantially between 0.16 and 1.00, with 45 out of 100 items below the given threshold (e.g. AC1 < 0.60). The section '*3.5. Authority's Reaction*' contained no items with an AC1 coefficient above 0.40. The sections '*Unit A—Information about Recent Threat (2.1. Content of Threat)*', and '*Unit B—Information about Previous Threats (3.1 General Information)*' showed reliability results with substantial agreement for 75% of the items. An IRR interpreted as poor (i.e. below 0.40) was found for 15 items in the TTAI.

6.5.2   *IRR Testing Phase 2*

Final refinement of the TTAI occurred before the second IRR testing phase. The modifications included a revision of the description of each item or/and the definition of response options. Furthermore, six items were deleted and four new items were added to the TTAI. The IRR results showed a considerable improvement of the AC1 coefficients compared to the first IRR phase. The AC1 values of 88 out of 98 items did reach the cut-off point (AC1 > 0.60), as a result five out of nine sections showed a substantial agreement (all items AC1 > 0.60). No improvements were found for the section '*Unit B—Information about Previous Threats* (3.2. Content of Previous threats)' with a moderate AC1 coefficient for six items. In addition, two items (i.e. '2.2. Criminal Charge' and '3.4. Familiarity of Previous Threats' show an AC1 coefficient defined as weak [e.g. AC1 < 0.40]).

6.6   Discussion

The aim of this paper was to introduce an interdisciplinary and standardised tool to collect different characteristics of school shooting threats and to present results from an interrater reliability analysis.

School shootings cannot be predicted, but in many cases they can be prevented. With this standardised tool, it is possible to collect characteristics of threats which are meant to be serious in that actual moment and to compare with characteristics of those threats which are situational in that specific moment of threatening. These indicators can help to determine whether the threat is transient or substantial.

Respective institutions like schools, police and forensic psychiatric units are in the need of reliable and specific criteria to evaluate the seriousness

of a school shooting threat and take measures to either avert a possible school shooting or—in the case of more harmless threats—offer student support and counselling if needed. Moreover, there is an urgent need to establish proper collaboration between those institutions (see Oksanen et al. 2015). Although a variety of theoretically funded criteria for evaluating the seriousness of school shooting threats exist (Cornell and Sheras 2006; Meloy et al. 2012; O'Toole 1999), a majority of those approaches have not been empirically tested for their sufficiency in distinguishing between school shooting threats that are meant to be serious and threats which are situational in that specific moment of threatening.

Consequently, those approaches cannot be used to assess the seriousness of a school shooting threat yet reliably and can only be used with caution to decide whether a direct threat or leakage has to be judged as serious or not. By developing a standardised and reliable tool to collect different characteristics of school shooting threats, we want to close this gap by offering an instrument for testing those approaches and detecting further specific criteria.

Several shortcomings within the threat assessment literature are necessary to be considered. First, no uniform definition of the term 'threat' was found. Ahlig et al. (under review) strongly suggest the use of a consistent terminology, offering the possibility to integrate and systematically compare research results in future. As the differentiation between the communication to a potential target and a third person is essential, we recommend the use of Meloy et al.'s (2012) terminology as a starting point.

Second, non-random convenience samples have been used so far for the analysis of school shooting threats; therefore, the results cannot be generalised. As such, this shortcoming needs to be worked on and is discussed further in the subsequent directions section. Third, no standardised tool to collect different characteristics of a threat was found (Meloy and O'Toole 2011).

A state-of-the-art developed instrument with proper interrater reliability to analyse school shooting threats is needed as introduced in this paper. The development of the TTAI was initiated to collect information predominantly on specific characteristics involving threats and warning behaviour and completed within two IRR testing phases. The first IRR testing phase showed 45 items below the given threshold which were modified or deleted, and tested again in the second IRR testing phases. Finally, a considerable improvement of the reliability was reached with only ten items below the threshold. The average AC1 of all sections was

satisfying. Further results include the necessity to test the instrument's ecological validity and diagnostic criteria. The instrument meets these methodological criteria and therefore can be used by personal trained staff with a degree in psychology. Currently, the TTAI is not a threat assessment instrument for evaluating the risk of severe targeted violence in schools, but a standardised code book to collect the characteristics of threats systematically.

Consequently, the TTAI offers the opportunity to test the current approaches of evaluating the seriousness of a threat or to develop elaborated criteria for distinguishing successfully between threats, which are meant to be serious and threats which are situational in that specific moment of threatening—an essential issue for prevention and intervention.

6.7   LIMITATIONS

In our analyses (see 3.1 General Information), the theoretical differentiation between direct threats and leakage as proposed by Meloy et al. (2011) lacked reliability. As a consequence, the total amount of direct threats and leakage was collected with one item only.

One reason for some items scoring with AC1 value below the given threshold might be due to missing information. Whereas some raters tend to rate 'no' when specific information was lacking, other raters preferred to rate 'not assessable due to record quality', which leads to statistical biases. The awareness of this problem led to the inclusion of a rule of thumb by which raters take the quality of the record as foundation while rating a case. Moreover, contradictory information in the case records also causes disagreement between raters. As a consequence, raters have to be specifically trained concerning those issues.

6.8   IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Existing approaches of evaluating the seriousness of a threat and distinguishing between transient and substantial school shooting threats have to be empirically tested. Most importantly, a translation of the TTAI into English language is required.

Moreover, a most promising assignment would be to analyse all national and international school shooting threats within the last years by using the TTAI. There is still a huge gap between unrecorded cases and the real scope regarding school shooting threats based on a lack of reporting the

criminal activity to authorities in many cases. As a consequence, police statistics may only constitute a small proportion of 'the full picture', and particularly, when it comes to criminal offences which are not sufficiently scientifically investigated and require our knowledge of the available data to be adequately expanded.

Analysing all registered school shooting threats (police and schools) would be a great benefit for receiving a more representative sample of school shooting threats and for more reliable statements about frequency, seriousness and general characteristics of threats. It would also help to develop elaborated criteria for distinguishing between threats which are meant to be serious and threats which are situational in that specific moment of threatening.

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Counter-Radicalisation Strategies: An Analysis of German and French Approaches and Implementations

Anina Schwarzenbach

7.1 Introduction

Radicalisation and counter-radicalisation are more than mere socio-psychological concepts, they are politically conceived constructs and as such resonate in both academic and public debates on Islamist extremism (see also Schmid 2013). Little consensus exists, however, on the notion of radicalisation and consequently also on the ones of de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. Experts admit that 'the concept of "radicalization" […] remains ill-defined, complex and controversial' (Coolsaet 2016a: 3). Scholars use the term *radicalisation* to question the influence of ideology and narratives within violent Islamist movements, but also to assess to what extent local contexts and personal conditions and motivations put individuals and groups at risk to turn to violent extremism. Despite the plurality of definitions and the conceptual difficulties surrounding the

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101

notion of radicalisation, the concept is 'firmly entrenched at the heart of European and global counterterrorism' (Coolsaet 2016a: 3).

In line with Alex P. Schmid, a renowned expert in the field of research on terrorism, this chapter assumes that radicalisation is 'an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging' (Schmid 2013: 18). Of particular interest for the analysis of counter-radicalisation strategies is the fact that 'affected' individuals or groups tend to prefer 'more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world' over 'mainstream or status quo-oriented positions' and question the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing political order (Schmid 2013: 18).

Following Schmid's definition, Islamist radicalisation might be understood as a process, whereby individual or groups increasingly adhere to those visions of Islam 'that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the sharia' (Mandaville 2010: 57). The role Islamic ideology plays in radicalism has been a widely discussed in Europe. Whilst some scholars, e.g. Gilles Kepel (2015), refer to the cognitive radicalisation within Islam, others, e.g. Olivier Roy (2003), think that structural inequalities are major root cause of Islamist extremism.

Efforts to counter (Islamist) radicalisation include all policies and programmes that state and non-state actors pursue to prevent radicalisation among individuals 'at risk' to fall for Islamist ideology, to deter disaffected individuals from committing terrorist acts and to reintegrate 'radicalised' individuals into society. The programmes can be of social, political, legal, educational and economic nature (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2008).

Germany and France have been heavily affected by the 'home-grown terrorism' and 'foreign fighters' phenomena and have consequently implemented strategies to counter terrorism and radicalisation (Hellmuth 2013, 2015). Both countries are home of a high share of Muslim population, although they originate from different countries: prevalently from North Africa in France and from Turkey in Germany (Halm and Sauer 2017).

Yet, different political systems are in place: a federal-state, decentralised in Germany and central state system in France. Another major, distinguishing factor is the strength of division between state and religious institutions: the strict impartiality and neutrality of the French state in front religion—also known under the concept of French 'laïcité'—contrasts to some extent the German integration of plurality of religion (Almeida 2016; Kandil 1988).

Although Germany has been late in addressing the issue of violent Islamist extremism, from the early 1970s it has extensively dealt with both left-wing and right-wing terrorist and racist groups (Butt and Tuck 2014). Since 2010, domestic intelligence assessments have recurrently raised concerns over the spread of violent Salafism in Germany. At the same time, the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) has pointed out an increased risk of terrorist attacks in Germany perpetrated by violent Salafists and defined the threat posed by Jihadist extremism as being among one of Germany's biggest challenges (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2016; Butt and Tuck 2014; Hellmuth 2013).

Contrary to Germany, France has been a target of international Islamist terrorism since the 1980s. One decade later, in the 1990s, the operation of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in France forced the French government to address Islamist extremism at the national level and marked the starting point of French initiatives to counter Islamist extremism and radicalisation (Adraoui 2014; Conesa 2014). Since 2001, France has repeatedly faced terrorist attacks linked to international jihadist movements. At the same time, France is among the countries in Europe that has experienced the largest exodus of foreign fighters to Syria. Yet, it was the events of the year 2015—the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo and kosher supermarket attacks and the November 2015 ISIS attacks in Paris—that primarily led the French government to implement a variety of pre-emptive and reactive measures to counter Islamist radicalisation (see Hellmuth 2015).

The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the legitimacy of country-specific strategies to counter radicalisation and reveal whether those strategies are shaped by the different political systems, stand of religion in society and histories of fight against violent extremism.

7.2   INSIGHTS FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Research dealing with Islamist radicalisation in Western Europe has highlighted the loss of identity, the lack of integration and the deficient representation of Muslim minorities in public discourse as prime factors triggering radicalisation at the macro-level (Murshed and Pavan 2011). While the 9/11 attacks made terrorism 'once more a leading threat to the West' (Coolsaet 2016b: 7), studies analysing strategies to counter radicalisation found that some countries were more reluctant than others to tackle the issue at a national level and to implement local programmes (see LaFree and Freilich 2017; Bouchard 2015). One reason might be that, initially, violent Islamist extremism was considered by many states an 'external threat' (Coolsaet 2016b: 7).

Previous research has pointed out that a variety of strategies can be applied to counter the phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation; these can include both tough security-oriented measures, such as surveillance, repression and prosecution, and 'softer' measures. Religious and civic education at school, phone hotlines, dialogues and workshops with Muslim communities, vocational training, educational and counselling programmes as well as exit, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are all part of the array of 'softer' measures (see Köhler 2017; Finlan 2016; Wellman 2013).

Modern programmes in Europe that focus on Islamist radicalisation build upon techniques that aim to reintegrate individuals into society. Such programmes were first established in the 1970s. Consequently, 'Western state-run programmes are mostly designed as classical reintegration programmes leaving aside ideology' (Köhler 2015: 127). Current research on radicalisation has often times failed to address the role of religion and has seldom critically assessed de-radicalisation progress, not least because the evaluation of models to counter radicalisation is difficult to achieve (see Schmid 2016; Feddes and Gallucci 2015; Lum et al. 2006). Moreover, several scholars (e.g. Schmid 2016; Sedgwick 2010) have urged to take the contextual element into account when analysing Islamist radicalisation, as well as when exploring the strategies set in place to counter the phenomenon, noting that until 'the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals' declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will often appear as a "rebel without a cause" ' (Sedgwick 2010: 481). See Chap. 9 for a detailed discussion on factors that drive individuals into radicalisation and the conceptual confusion associated with these discussions.

From a theoretical point of view, strategies (and associated measures) to counter terror and radicalisation might best be analysed through the 'legitimacy lens', then '[t]he power of terrorism is through political legitimacy, winning acceptance in the eyes of a significant population and discrediting the government's legitimacy' (Crenshaw 1983: 25). The concept of state legitimacy builds on Max Weber's (1956) theoretical work on the *legitime Herrschaft*, or legitimate rule. In his famous essay, Weber pointed out that citizens are more likely to voluntarily submit to state's authority if they feel that the state power is legitimate. Citizen's compliance with the state authority is achieved primarily through the internationalisation of social norms, whereas incentives and sanctions are of subordinate importance.

In more recent times, the concept of legitimacy has been widely applied for the study of relationships between state institutions, e.g. the police, and citizens, allowing to identify factors that enhance state legitimacy. According to Tom R. Tyler (2004), who has carried out leading work in this field of research, state agents and institutions are more likely to be perceived as legitimate when they act in accordance to the standards of a just procedure. Procedural justice builds on a neutral and transparent decision-making and on a fair and respectful treatment. Through the elements of neutrality, transparency, respectfulness and fairness, state agents and institutions gain the trust of citizens—which is the key element to citizen's legitimisation of the state authority. According to this line of thought, citizens who question the trustworthiness of the states and its actions are likely to doubt about the state's legitimacy.

Other authors have referred to the concept of legitimacy in relation to terrorism and elaborated on the relationship between the citizen and the state. For instance, Martha Crenshaw (1987) argues in her theoretical considerations that the legitimacy of state strategies is a precondition for the success in countering terrorism. LaFree and Ackermann agree that '[l]egitimacy explanations of terrorism emphasise the fact that counterterrorist policy makers are involved in a battle with opponents over the fairness of governments and their policies"' (LaFree and Ackerman 2009: 361).

Following this line of thought, one may assume that through a legitimate strategy, states minimise structural and cultural inequalities and empower marginalised individual or groups, and thus address macro-level grievances assessed to have a role in the prevention of terrorism and radicalisation (Coolsaet 2016a; LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Conversely, starting from the supposition that terrorism is an act deliberately chosen by a political actor (see Crenshaw 1983), government policies that fail to meet

the requirements of legitimacy may induce radicalisation and animate political violence.

This chapter discusses whether the counter-radicalisation strategies in Germany and France are designed in accordance to the standards of a legitimate state rule outlined above and conform to requirements of neutrality, transparency, fairness and respectfulness. The legitimacy of counter-radicalisation strategies is questioned following a two-step approach that sheds light on distinct dimensions of analysis: (1) socio-legal and policy discourses and developments in each country and (2) implementation on the ground. This approach allows identifying whether programmes and initiatives implemented on the ground mirror the country-specific approach taken in the fight against Islamist radicalisation.

7.3   Data and Methods

The findings from this chapter are based on a comparative analysis of policy and prevention programmes to counter radicalisation implemented in Germany and France. The chapter discusses all major recent political and judicial decisions and implementations concerned with the issue of Islamist radicalisation drawing on an analysis of 20 government publications (eight government documentations for Germany and 12 government documentations for France). The analysis of the counter-radicalisation strategies is based on government documentation accessible through the websites of the Parliament and the Ministry of the Interior of Germany and France respectively. In addition, for Germany only, official documents on the topic of Islamist radicalisation issued by other government organisations (such as the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth) have been taken into consideration, too.

The relevant documents were selected on the basis of two criteria: firstly, they discuss policies and government initiatives issued since 2014 (the year France implemented its first National Action Plan against radicalisation); secondly, they contain a substantial focus on the issue of Islamist radicalisation. A total of 70 programmes and initiatives (60 programmes in Germany and 10 programmes in France) to counter extremism and radicalisation have been selected for the analysis presented in this chapter.

The study of programmes that deal specifically with Islamist radicalisation in Germany relies on Internet searches on state-based programmes or programmes that are part of umbrella projects co-funded by the German

government. Information about landscape of prevention and de-radicalisation programmes in France is fairly inaccessible; therefore, the German programmes subject to analysis outnumber the French ones. The investigation of the landscape of prevention programmes in France relies on case studies and information from official sources (e.g., from the Inter-Ministerial Committee of the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation).

The differentiation of the programmes is undertaken following the systematisation adopted by Trautmann and Zick (2016). The authors combine the schemata proposed by Caplan (1964), Gordon (1983) and Hafen (2001) and categorise initiatives and programmes implemented to counter Islamist radicalisation in areas of prevention (primary, secondary and tertiary) as well as dimensions of intervention (direct and indirect).

Generally speaking, current programmes and initiatives implemented to counter radicalisation may be differentiated according to the area of prevention they tackle, that is whether they focus on a 'primary', 'secondary' or a 'tertiary' prevention of radicalisation. Under the category 'primary prevention' are subsumed all programmes that aim to strengthen the resilience of children and young people through empowerment, building of competencies and transferal of knowledge in an effort to impede radicalisation from occurring. Programmes of 'secondary prevention' include all initiatives that intend to tackle radicalisation at its very early stage and focus on groups deemed to be exposed to a high risk of radicalisation. Contrary to primary and secondary measures, 'tertiary preventive measures' target single individuals who already had experienced radicalisation. Tertiary prevention embraces all methods that aim to prevent further escalations of an advanced radicalisation process through dissociation and demobilisation of radical or extremist youth (see Gordon 1983; Caplan 1964). See Chap. 8 on how judicial systems might help bolster counter-radicalisation efforts and processes.

The programmes and initiatives in place to counter Islamist radicalisation may also be categorised depending on whether they address 'affected' persons directly or indirectly. Whereas a direct intervention foresees an active involvement of persons—or group of persons—'at risk' to undergo a radicalisation process, or who have already been radicalised, the indirect intervention addresses their social environment (see Hafen 2001).

Within the distinction in areas of prevention (primary and secondary versus tertiary prevention), the programmes can be clustered according to other lines of differentiation (see Trautmann and Zick 2016). These concern the characteristic of the target group (age, ethnicity and gender of

'affected' persons) and the applied measures and methods (e.g. workshops, continued formation, publications and soft skill training). Furthermore, the programmes might be distinguished depending on whether they are affiliated with, or are funded by, a government organisation or belong to a private association, and whether or not ideology plays a central role for the programmes. Finally, the programmes differ in their resources and cooperation and networking capabilities.

7.4   FINDINGS

7.4.1   Germany

7.4.1.1 Socio-Legal and Policy Discourses and Developments
The German strategy embraces both repressive and preventive measures. In Germany, law enforcement and general criminal prosecutions are used to the same extent as softer approaches to counter terrorism and radicalisation (see also Vermeulen and Bovenkerk 2012). The softer approaches include, for instance, civic education to reinforce fundamental liberal democratic values and to promote interfaith and religious-political dialogue, as well as 'broader policies aimed at improving integration and social cohesion within German society' (Butt and Tuck 2014: 20).

Currently, Germany does not officially implement a national counter-radicalisation strategy, meaning that at the national level no 'specific stand-alone plan or strategy for countering radicalization' (Butt and Tuck 2014: 20) exists. The issue of Islamist radicalisation is nevertheless addressed within the wider counter-extremism and counter-terrorism strategy of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the strategy to prevent extremism and promote democracy set up by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (see Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ) 2016).

The recently issued national prevention programme against Islamist extremism defines the core areas of the German government's strategy to fight against the Islamist threat at both the national and regional levels and is the closest to a national action plan that Germany has (see Bundesministerium des Inneren 2017).

Although Germany lacks a national action plan to counter radicalisation, many German federal states, e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, have their

own strategies to refute extremist ideologies. Consequently, a colourful array of programmes and policies for countering Islamist violent extremism are in place at the level of the federal states and the local levels that cover both prevention of radicalisation and de-radicalisation (see also Ceylan and Kiefer 2017). Germany has refined some of the programmes and initiatives previously implemented to fight extremist right-wing ideas to tackle Islamist extremism (see Banerjee 2014).

7.4.1.2 Implementations on the Ground

The German model builds on a strong public–private partnership that is both hosted and financed by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs (Bundesamtfür Migration und Flüchtlinge BAMF) as part of the Ministry of the Interior. Germany pursues innovative approaches to tackle 'home-grown' radicalisation through a nationwide telephone hotline for families and concerned persons (teachers, employers and social workers) that provides a first line advice before referring the case to a local non-governmental partner within its own network. The non-governmental organisations, which carry out the actual counselling work, can also be contacted directly by the families and concerned persons (see Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung 2017).

Only a few programmes are entirely sponsored by universities, federal ministries, legal enforcement institutions and other state organs. The vast majority of programmes in Germany are run by non-governmental organisations, mostly associations and private institutions. Yet, for the most part, these initiatives are embedded in a national or federal state programme and thus co-funded by the state (see Trautmann and Zick 2016). An example of such a national umbrella programme is the initiative *Demokratie Leben!* of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth that by end of 2017 includes 44 'model projects' in place to prevent radical Islamist attitudes and actions (see Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ) 2017).

According to the findings, the majority of the state-based or state co-funded national and federal programmes focuses on the provision of education and advice and is therefore directed towards primary and secondary prevention. Among the educational programmes, those that offer workshops and provide further educational training are particularly common. Prominent among the programmes that provide advisory service are those specialised on targeted intervention and exit strategies.

Fewer initiatives address tertiary prevention and offer rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. The vast majority of the state-based or state co-funded counter-radicalisation programmes in Germany are concerned with young people and young adults 'at risk', and they target, among others, students, young Muslims and refugees. The programmes build on the assumption that these are the groups of people within a society who are most receptive to Islamist propaganda and therefore at particular risk of being radicalised. Fewer programmes deal with persons who stand at both the initial and more advanced stages of radicalisation. The minority of programmes are concerned with people who have already committed a criminal offence.

Next to targeting different persons, the programmes contrast in their way of addressing people. The majority of programmes follow a 'indirect approach', that is, they reach out to the individual at risk of being radicalised through counselling hotlines or by training parents to identify signs of Islamist radicalisation among their children. Under the category of programmes that purse a 'direct approach' fall those initiatives that directly involve the individuals who are exposed to the threat of Islamist extremism.

In an attempt to prevent terror acts and the spread of extremist ideologies, in 2009 the federal government of Germany has established, under the authority of the domestic intelligence, a Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ). Within the framework of the programme, federal and state counter-radicalisation initiatives are reviewed, experiences and best practices shared, and new policies developed (see Gemeinsames Terrorabwehrzentrum 2017).

Germany has been keen in involving its Muslim community in the fight against Islamist terror. In 2011, following an initiative of the German federal state, the German Islam Conference (DIK) was created; a formal, institutionalised dialogue through annual summits and partnership projects, between representatives of the Muslim community and the security service (see Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2017).

The findings from this study reflect evaluations by the Federal Criminal Police Office that explore the landscape of state prevention programmes run by the government tackling religious radicalisation in Germany (Gruber et al. 2016).

7.4.2 France

7.4.2.1 Socio-Legal and Policy Discourses and Developments
In line with France's centralised tradition, the French government follows a 'whole-of-government approach' (Quivooij 2016: 84), that is, a top-down management system, supervised by the Interior Ministry, to counter terrorism and radicalisation. The judiciary, prosecution and execution of sentences for terrorist affairs are all concentrated in Paris. As a result of this centralisation of powers, knowledge and expertise for terrorist affairs has been enhanced, allowing, among others, the specialisation of the competent judges and prosecutors.

Until 2014, France countered radicalisation by focusing on the prosecution of persons guilty of committing terrorism offenses and, at the same time, by rejecting any 'soft' counter-radicalisation measures (see also Pietrasanta 2015; Conesa 2014; Gerecht and Schmitt 2007).

For a long time, the French government viewed terrorism solely as a crime that ought to be punished by law, and not as a culmination of the radicalisation process (see e.g. Marret 2009).

As a result of this strategy, France has a large number of Islamist prisoners, which, according to some experts (e.g. Hellmuth 2015; Marret 2009), facilitates radicalisation 'behind bars'. Following the example of other European countries, e.g. Germany and the United Kingdom, in more recent times, the French government has increasingly financed 'softer' counter-radicalisation measures, such as vocational training and counselling work.

In the year 2014, in response to the mass exodus of foreign fighters' dilemma, the first government effort to voluntary counter radicalisation led to the formulation of a national action plan to fight radicalisation and terrorism (several updates of the plan have followed, see Ministère de l'Intérieur 2018). This systematic model of countering radicalisation covers the areas of detection, prevention and de-radicalisation. The plan includes a wide variety of measures, such as a national centre for assistance and prevention, a telephone alert hotline that centralises reports issued from police and gendarmerie forces as well as those from the network of people suspected to go through a process of radicalisation, and an Internet website for endangered individuals, their parents and other relatives, who seek advice and help or who would like to alert authorities to potential cases. Those measures have been juxtaposed against various other ones, including an operation to mobilise the schools for the secular, republican

values, the efforts to strengthen the *Islam of France* and an extensive prison reform that have altogether strengthened the French counter-radicalisation campaign (see Benbassa and Troendlé 2017; Hellmuth 2015).

The last update of the National Action Plan was released on 23 February 2018 under the name *preventing for protecting* (Prévenir Pour Protéger) and had seen involved 20 ministerial departments. The plan encloses 60 measures and aims at reorienting the politics of prevention along five axes: (1) sensitising the citizen for the issue of radicalisation, (2) strengthening the cooperation between detection and prevention, (3) understanding and preventing the evolution of radicalisation, (4) professionalising the local actors and (5) evaluating the measures and redesigning the disengagement (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2018).

Critics have pointed out that the plan enacted to prevent radicalisation is, as the previous ones, 'too ambitious', including measures that are difficult to put into practice and lack of coherency with the previous drafts. Moreover, experts regret that the current action plan to prevent radicalisation fails to appropriately address the evaluation of measures implemented by the previous ones. Most importantly, the plan is silent about the role of religion in countering Islamist extremism and radicalisation (Hénin 2018).

Today, the fight against domestic extremism and radicalisation ranks highest on France's political agenda (Sèze 2018; Ragazzi 2017). Along the debate about the efficiency of the French government's policies to counter radicalisation, questions arose about the role of Islam in French society, the integration and the threat of stigmatisation of Muslim minorities. Since few years, policy makers have been concerned with strengthening the *Islam de France*, an Islam that aligns neatly with the values of the French République (Sèze 2018).

7.4.2.2   Implementations on the Ground

At the national level, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation (SG-CIPDR) leads the French counter-radicalisation strategy. The SG-CIPDR has elaborated measures, established good practices and trained civil servants in the issue of radicalisation. The centre delivers training sessions to professionals (including association leaders and public servants from various administrative units), implements communication and information campaigns and provides assistance to the prefectures that monitor young people exposed to the risk of undergoing a radicalisation process and their families. At the local level, the SG-CIPDR advises the different actors who are confronted with the issue of radicalisation, coordinates the work of the partner associations and evaluates the

actions and measures implemented to prevent delinquency and radicalisation. Although the SG-CIPDR primarily funds secondary and tertiary initiatives to prevent radicalisation, exceptionally, programmes that focus on the primary prevention are sponsored, too (see Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance et de la Radicalization 2015).

According to information from the SG-CIPDR provided to the author, on the whole, more than 100 initiatives and programmes under the authority of the SG-CIPDR are involved in the effort to counter radicalisation. For the most part, the French programmes are lay and apolitical and are not specifically designed to counter Islamist radicalisation. In line with the French Republican model which strictly confines religion to the private sphere, most of the programmes follow an integrative approach and target all French citizens. An example of such a programme is the Centre of Action and Prevention against the Radicalisation of Individuals (CAPRI). The CAPRI is a lay and apolitical association, which is financed by the state and local communities. The centre is committed to informing and counselling families and social workers and offering counter narratives to radical arguments in order to promote religious understanding (see Centre d'Action et de Prévention Contre la Radicalisation des Individus 2017).

Another hallmark of the French counter-radicalisation strategy is the establishment of centres for de-radicalisation. In 2016, as part of a government programme in response to the 'home-grown' Islamist threat and the wave of terrorist attacks on French soil, France opened its first de-radicalisation centre, or Centre for Prevention, Integration and Citizenship (CIPC) as it has been officially called, in Pontourny (Indre-et-Loire) in central France. The centre was meant to host young people convinced of jihadist ideology and who were referred by the justice system with the intention to veer them away from the jihadist networks and support them in their reintegration into French society. In 2017, a parliamentary fact-finding commission on de-radicalisation declared the flagship programme of the French government to de-radicalise jihadists a major failure and urged the government to re-conceptualise its counter-radicalisation strategy (Benbassa and Troendlé 2017).

On 2015, following an initiative of the French government, the 'Instance de dialogue avec l'Islam de France' has been established, a formal dialogue between representatives of the French government and its citizen of Muslim denomination. The second edition was entirely devoted to the phenomenon of radicalisation. This intercultural dialogue is exceptional; not only because it lists among the few French religious initiatives supported by the government, but also because it allows for a formalised

discussed between the French government and religious actors on the issue of counter radicalisation (Instance de dialogue avec l'Islam de France 2016).

Another exemplary religious initiative is the 'The Institute of Islamic Cultures (ICI)', a direct cooperation between the city of Paris and representatives of the Muslim community. The ICI was established in 2006, following an initiative of the city of Paris that intended to create a centre that would symbolically represent the Muslim population (see Institut des Cultures de l'Islam 2017).

Finally, the judicial programme in Mulhouse is an example of a successful partnership established to fight against Islamist radicalisation between local associations and state institutions in France. The chief of the Court of Appeal of Colmar established a programme to combat violent radicalisation within the district of Mulhouse in collaboration with the local association for the help of victims and the hospital group of the Mulhouse region. This programme deals only with persons referred by the judicial system and aims to detect acts linked to violent radicalisation (Benbassa and Troendlé 2017).

Two reports, one issued by the Paris Region Planning and Development Agency (IAU Île-de-France) and one from a delegation of the French government, have recently reviewed the public policies in place to prevent radicalisation in France (Bockel and Carvounas 2017; Pellon 2016). The reports conclude that despite the institutionalisation of the fight against radicalisation in France, and the vast array of measures that have been implemented in the course of the last 2 years, little effort to unify and formalise the instruments to counter radicalisation has been undertaken. As a result, the French government lacks a network of competent associations that could support the national and territorial authorities in their fight against violent Islamist extremism.

7.5   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The findings presented in this chapter reveal that the approaches adopted to fight the threat of Islamist radicalisation by Germany and France are rather different. The radicalisation prevention landscape of the two countries is shaped by the peculiarities of their political systems, but also by the country-specific understanding of integration of religious minorities and past experiences with violent extremism. As a result, strategies and programmes adopted to counter radicalisation serve other purposes, target

different groups within the population and achieve distinct levels of cooperation between state institutions and private associations. Major variation in the visibility and specificity of the measures exists, too.

The German counter-radicalisation strategy is characterised by a decentralised system and a strong private–public partnership and thus, other than France, involves the institution of the civil society to a large extent. As a result of the federal system, Germany features a unique array of measures to counter radicalisation at the local level which are decided and implemented autonomously by the individual states, yet in accordance with the state's interior ministries and domestic intelligence services. Critics are, however, concerned whether experiences and outcomes of the programmes are sufficiently shared beyond the regional jurisdictions (see e.g. Hellmuth 2013). Contrary to France, the German state refers primarily to private associations to fight terrorism and radicalisation; the independence of these institutions from the national authorities is, however, questionable. Although the private initiatives to counter radicalisation declare themselves autonomous, an important number of those programmes are part of umbrella projects and receive conspicuous public funding. In addition, standardisation is difficult as the non-governmental organisations use different approaches and methods. Summing up, 'the German model relies on a constant case-by-case negotiation of necessary approaches, the role of government authorities and the correct methods' (Köhler 2017: 133).

France's counter-radicalisation strategy is shaped, among other things, by the peculiarity of its centralised political system, the past experiences with terrorist violence and the relegation of religion to the private sphere. Furthermore, for some (see e.g. Burgat 2016) the occurrence of Islamist radicalisation is strongly intertwined with the country's colonialist past. In an increased effort to counter the 'interior enemy' (Sèze 2018), in the past years France has implemented a wide variety of measures and securitised its social politics (Hénin 2018). Following the French tradition, the counter-radicalisation strategy pursued by the French government builds on a centralised state approach. Other than Germany, France has implemented a national strategy to counter radicalisation and centralised the judiciary, prosecution and execution of sentences for terrorist affairs in Paris. As discussed in the previous section, French government programmes to counter radicalisation are often under the direct authority of the SG-CIPDR. Due to the administrative proximities of the SG-CIPDR and the prefectural administration to the Interior Ministry and as such to the law enforcement

institutions (the National Police and National Gendarmerie), people may be reluctant to participate in the programmes or to report their relatives for fear of the legal consequences. Moreover, France lacks private and public capabilities to counter radicalisation. On the one hand, public services demand an increase in human resources specialised in the issue. On the other hand, a limited number of non-profit organisations and private associations offer competent assistance to radicalised individuals and contribute to preventing radicalisation in the French context. In particular, civil society structures that provide professional psychological support to people at risk of radicalised are missing (Bockel and Carvounas 2017). Whereas Germany disposes over an array of prevention initiatives to counter violent Islamist extremism that have a high visibility on the Internet, in France there is no similar network of specialised prevention initiatives and little official information about them is available. Thus, as opposed to the situation in Germany, France lacks programme that are specifically or explicitly designed for countering violent Islamist extremism. The counter-radicalisation measures currently implemented in France are 'relatively experimental' (Quivooij 2016: 69).

Finally, a major distinction between Germany and France lays in the role religion plays within the strategies to counter Islamist radicalisation of the respective countries. Germany follows a pluralistic approach and welcomes religious diversities within its society, a fact that is also reflected in the strategies to prevent Islamist radicalisation. In France, the strict separation between state and religion cultivated by the French Republic, also known under the concept of *laïcité*, has 'made any official links between public counter radicalisation initiatives and religious approaches a sensitive issue' (Quivooij 2016: 68). As a result of this particular version of secularism that relegates religion to the private sphere, France has either neglected the role of religion in the field of de-radicalisation or understood religious deradicalisation as a 'neutralisation' of religion (see also Almeida 2016). Whilst German programmes aim to better integrate minorities in German society by promoting mutual understanding of each other's culture, the main purpose of the French programmes is to counter the threat of radicalisation by enhancing awareness for the core values linked to the concept of *laïcité* among its citizens, independently from their religious and cultural background. As a result, whereas in Germany a good share of the initiatives focuses on young people of the Muslim minority background, in France the initiatives are mostly directed towards the general population.

Summing up, as pointed out by various experts (e.g. Bockel and Carvounas 2017; Pellon 2016; Quivooij 2016; Marret 2009), the French approach exhibits some serious deficiencies. Particularly the 'comprehensive role of state institutions' (Quivooij 2016: 72), which leads to a concentration of powers in the hands of a few, is problematic.

Germany's endeavour to counter radicalisation is, for a large part, explicitly targeting specific groups within the population, e.g. members of the Muslim community, and thus the neutrality of the measures is questionable. Yet, major efforts are undertaken to provide a platform and enhance the dialogue between the majority and Muslim minority population, indicating the government's intent to seek for advice and support in its strategy to counter radicalisation among members of the population deemed 'at risk' and to promote mutual respect for different cultures and religions. The multitude of programmes and initiatives in place in the various federal states, and the well-balanced involvement of private and public institutions in the prevention of radicalisation and rehabilitation and reintegration of 'affected' individuals, are certainly constitutive elements of a fair strategy. German government has opted for a transparent approach to countering religious extremism and radicalisation, by rendering public and accessible rich documentations on the various policies and programmes and, thereby, providing information on which to assess the legitimacy of the overall counter-radicalisation strategy.

Contrarily, the French government is more cautious about publicising information on the various measures implemented on the ground to minimise the threat of Islamist radicalisation. As a result, making a cogent argument on the legitimacy of these measures is more difficult. The government's overall strategy to counter radicalisation is, however, well documented in the French national action plan to counter radicalisation and various other official documentations. Those sources highlight the fact that, other than in Germany, French counter-radicalisation strategy is designed to conform to, and strengthen, the values and norms of the French *laïcité* and thus thoughtful to avoid being partial and proposing any measures that disproportionately target religious minorities. Whether the French approach to counter Islamist radicalisation that addresses all citizens equally is fairer and more respectful toward the Muslim community and favours the integration and political recognition of Muslim minorities to a larger extent than in Germany is open to debate.

In the light of these findings, one may conclude that, compared to France, the currently implemented counter-radicalisation policy in

Germany presents more elements of a legitimate strategy, not least because of the rich variety, and well-documented, measures implemented in Germany at both the regional and national level.

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Radicalisation: No Prevention Without 'Juridicalisation'

Sergio Bianchi, Maria Ladu, and Serena Bianchi

8.1 CORRECTIONALISM, MONITORING AND DERADICALISATION

We cannot run the criminal justice system…unless there is real trust. Once that breaks down, it becomes a real problem. It is almost like making a pre-emptive strike: "If they're going to see me like this, this is how I'm going to be." That undermines trust and does not allow things to work as smoothly as they might.

(Baroness Young, Justice Committee, Oral evidence: Young adult offenders, HC 397, 12 January 2016)

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123

The debate surrounding the theme of so-called radicalisation has accelerated a process of transformation of prevention systems that, in Europe and the United States, has already been underway at least since the 1970s. Today, through the prism of radicalisation, we begin to see the effects of this new 'liquid' security culture[1] which started over 40 years ago, in a more marked form (Bauman and Lyon 2013).

David Garland (2001) identifies this transformation in the contrast between 'correctionalist welfare models' addressing the prevention of deviance via sociological or psychological methods, as opposed to emerging 'methods of surveillance' focused on the rational responsibility and control of criminals.[2] According to Garland and large sections of criminology, the result of this comparison is the prevalence throughout the West of 'theories of criminal opportunity' (Wortley and Mazerolle 2009),[3] commonly known as the situational crime prevention (SCP) based on the triad of routine ideological activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke 1986) and crime pattern theory (Brantingham 1993). According to this analysis, the 'postmodern' doctrines of security including their political nuances and strong moral condemnations would not consider the socio-psychological factors at the root of the criminal phenomena, and therefore the possibility of

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[1] Garland D. describes this process in his *The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*, Chicago, University Press, 2001: 'As recently as 1979, those involved in the business of crime control shared a common set of assumptions about the framework that shaped criminal justice and penal practices. There was a relatively settled, self-conscious, institutional field and the debates and disagreements that occurred operated within well-established boundaries. (…) Today, for better or for worse, we lack any such agreement, any settled culture, or any clear sense of the big picture. Policy development appears highly volatile, with an unprecedented amount of legislative activity, much dissension in the rank of practitioner groups, and a good deal of conflict between experts and politicians' (Garland 2001: 4).

[2] 'It would be going too far to say that criminal justice suffered a "collapse" or a "breakdown" in the period after the mid-1970s, but there is no doubt that the institutional arrangements of penal-welfarism and, more generally, of modern criminal justice, were undermined and unsettled in these years' (Garland 2001: 104).

[3] 'SCP is based upon the idea that crime is a rational decision (SCP theorists will then advance the concept of "rationality of irrationality" or "bounded rationality"), designed to weigh the risks and benefits for the offender, and how in the absence of effective controls, offenders will focus on suitable targets. Routine activity theory relies on the occurrence of three key characteristics: a motivated offender, a suitable victim, and a lack of control. Crime Pattern Theory, as developed by Pat and Paul Brantingham, is a complex way of explaining why crimes are committed in certain areas' (Bianchi 2018: 14).

rehabilitating criminals, once called 'correctionalism', and would be aimed solely at guaranteeing order through control, to the benefit of the wealthy.[4]

The dichotomy of welfarism versus security (or correctionalism versus surveillance) also characterises the current debate on radicalisation, especially where we discuss, with a degree of banality, whether more psychosocial 'deradicalisation' interventions or firmer monitoring practices for the prevention of terrorism and violence are needed. In short, it is the eternal debate on the roots of crime: a debate that has always been sterile especially in the case of radicalisation, where there is no crime at least until now. It is therefore difficult to imagine a punishment since there is neither a crime nor any conviction. In many European states today there are exercises in the re-education, the 'deradicalisation', of the other with a lot of good will but little memory of the historical precedents of past 're-education' efforts by regimes of every colour. Above all, they do not fully understand the legal, institutional, operational and political implications of these models of prevention.

Rather than 'welfarism' versus surveillance the phenomenon of radicalisation clearly brings out another latent trend in the evolution of security systems today, the scope of which the criminological debate has not grasped: the prevalence of administrative prevention measures with respect to the *juridicalisation* of processes, i.e. a latent conflict of elites between police and judicial structures within states and supranational organisations. We address this in the following paragraphs, first from a historical perspective and then from the technical-operational perspective.

8.2   The Historical Perspective

The debate on radicalisation is flawed due to a fundamental confusion about its relationship with terrorism and therefore also between prevention and punishment in a broader sense of preventive and afflictive measures. This depends in large part on how the security systems have evolved over the last four decades of judicial and police cooperation. This is why we first consider it necessary to frame the phenomenon of the prevention of radicalisation in a historical dimension.

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[4] 'The events of the late 1980s may have consigned Marx and Engels to the scrapheap of failed ideologies, but their description of capitalist modernity in the Communist Manifesto remains as true today as it ever was' (Garland 2001: 79).

Seen from a historical/evolutionary perspective and with an eye to operational practices, the alleged dichotomy between 'welfarists' and 'situationists' is only apparent, although authoritatively supported and politically appealing. On the one hand, Garland clearly grasps the stages of the evolution and transformation of prevention policies.[5] On the other hand, he does not recognise how some of the models and practices underlying the great judicial and security transformation processes are common to both the welfarists and the SCP schools of thought. More than a dichotomy, there seems to be a fundamental continuity on some great themes between the two great models of prevention of the twentieth century, such as predictive profiling strategies or public-private collaboration. What emerges least of all is the struggle between institutional elites and between states under the new world governance, which are both essential elements in prevention policies and practices today.

8.2.1   The Common Passion for Profiling

If it is true that the framework of ideological and moral justification differs between welfarists and SCP theorists, common to all these models are prevention doctrines and practices based on the presumed early identification of potential criminals from a multidisciplinary perspective before they can commit a crime in order to implement multi-agency protective actions. For the welfarists the purpose of early identification of potential criminals has always been to correct the alleged socio-psychological 'roots' of deviance. These include great historical projects such as 'The Early Childhood Nurse Home Visitation Program', started by David Olds in the USA, and 'The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study', commissioned in 1936 by Richard Cabot, or Shaw's 'Chicago Area Project', to mention only a few examples. The SCP has always criticised these socio-psychological approaches[6] but from the 2000s onwards suspect profiling also became the central theme of SCP prevention practices. In fact, since its dawn,

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[5] 'Private prisons, victim impact statements, community notification laws, sentencing guidelines, electronic monitoring, punishment in the community, "quality of life" policing, restorative justice—these and dozens of other developments lead us into unfamiliar territory where the ideological lines are far from clear and where the old assumptions are an unreliable guide' (Garland 2001: 4).

[6] 'Criminological theory is of little help in dealing with crime in the real world because it finds causes in distant factors, such as child rearing practices, genetic makeup, and psychological or social processes. These are mostly beyond the reach of everyday practice, and their combination is extremely complicated for those who want to understand crime, and do something about it' (Clarke and Eck 2008).

Brantingham and Faust (1976) had advanced a tripartite security model (triage)[7] which integrated the socio-psychological approaches of primary prevention with those aimed at secondary and tertiary prevention. This evolutionary path towards the identification of high-risk offenders through population screening continued with the motivational analysis of crime by Richard Wortley (2011), which puts 'perpetrators' and their ideologies back at the centre of criminal analysis where, ultimately, these peaked with the 'situationist' practices and policies on antiterrorism. The exact date when the SCP turned into SPT—i.e. situational prevention of terrorism— was in 2007 when Joseph Clare and Frank Morgan (2009) presented their theses at the Perth conference, thus anticipating the 'situationist' work on antiterrorism presented at the 17th Annual Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis of July 2008 by a year. From that moment on, the traditional situationist doctrines not inclined to researching the 'roots of crime' instead merged with Rose's (1992, 2001) methodologies of epidemiological analysis and above all with one of the major theorists of the conflict with radicalisation: Moghaddam (2005). The integration of the 'staircase of terrorism' theory based on the 'multi-casual approach', with the soft terror prevention techniques used by the situationists, marked a crucial step both for policies to combat radicalisation and for the transition from SCP to SPT.

On a practical level this long, complex process which we have condensed here will bring new psychological manipulation, profiling and technological surveillance practices to the heart of crime prevention analysis giving reference to the guidelines of *Policing Terrorism: An Executive's Guide* by Newman and Clarke (2008) and all the other works of the situationist school as well as the practices of combatting radicalisation via counter-insurgency and 'deradicalisation' tools. These prevention theories will mainly have relevance for the areas of radicalisation seen as soft terror prevention techniques leading to new policies, operating practices and analytical tools that will change the entire European judicial and security landscape (NYPD 2007: 21) based upon simple linear or scale-based

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[7] 'Primary crime prevention identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for precipitate criminal acts. Here the objective of intervention is to alter those conditions so that crimes cannot occur. Secondary crime prevention engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene in their lives in such a way that they never commit criminal violations. Tertiary crime prevention deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in their lives in such a fashion that they will not commit further offences' (Brantingham and Faust 1976: 290).

predictive models.[8] As in the film *Minority Report*, at the centre of all the new preventive security practices, there are strategies aimed at identifying suspects, ideas and behaviours during the pre-crime phase, i.e. in the absence of any crime, and at implementing a myriad of preventive, personal and patrimonial actions whether mandatory or voluntary, administrative or judicial, before any crime is committed. These include the conquest of the hearts and minds of the adversary as an established counterinsurgency technique.

The implementation of these pre-crime identification policies is based today on a series of risk management tools that are well funded by the Commission. On a regional scale the best known of these are 'the Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale', 'VERA2R', 'ERG22+' and the 'Violent Radicalisation—Recognition of and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups Concerned' project checklists; various tools made available by the European agencies (such as the FRONTEX Common Risk Indicators Booklet and Europol's FTF Risk Indicators Guide, also

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[8] The New York Police Department (NYPD), *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (NYPD 2007: 21), was the first linear predictive model aimed at detecting the emergence of radicalisation phenomena. We used this method in our Bianchi S., Jihadist Radicalisation in European Prisons: Experimental Project for the Identification of Jihadist Radicalisation in European Prisons, European Commission—Directorate General Justice Freedom and Security, CRYME JLS/2007/ISEC/551-2010; M. Sageman proposed a non-linear predictive model in 2007 in Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists, United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, which was then adjusted in 2008 in his article 'A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618 (1), pp. 223–231. Taarnby developed a model in eight steps, analysing recruitment pre- and post-11/9 (Taarnby, M. (2003) Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists, a research report for the Danish Ministry of Justice. Danish Ministry of Justice, and (2005) Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives. Danish Ministry of Justice). In its study on al-Muhagirun Q. Wiktorowicz (2004), 'Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam', The Roots of Radical Islam, Department of International Studies, Rhodes College identifies four sequential processes. McCauley C. and Moskalenko S. (2008) 'Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism', Terrorism and Political Violence, 20 (3), pp. 415–433 have identified 12 'mechanisms' of political radicalisation which operate across three levels: that of the individual, the group and the mass level. A pathway of suicide bombers, articulated in four steps, is offered by P. Gills (2007) 'A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing', International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 1 (2), pp. 142–159, and 2008, 'Suicide Bomber Pathways Among Islamic Militants', Policing, 4 (2), pp. 412–422.

used by national police forces such as the Greek police); as well as other products on a local scale such as the 'Arrel' system used by the regional prison administration in Catalonia to supplement the 'RisCanvi' model.

8.3   The Contradictions in Current Prevention

The result of this historical process which sees the separation of criminology from jurisprudence is the current model of radicalisation prevention based on surveillance, the predictive profiling of suspects and a broad use of administrative practices and of new models of multi-agency public-private partnerships with a strong reduction in the role of the magistrates in favour of administrative prevention practices. The rhizomatic development of the prevention model over a period of almost 40 years has however created numerous contradictions of various kinds which pose serious problems to the effectiveness of the model and above all the risks that this entails for its ability to balance resocialisation policies with security and the resulting implications for the democratic stability of the member countries. For an extended discussion on conceptual contradictions and confusions, see Chap. 9.

8.3.1   *Prevention and Deradicalisation Tools*

In Europe, the different indication models mentioned above are based on the assumption that there is a predictive relationship between radicalisation and terrorism somehow generated by the adoption of ideas and behaviours that are different from the majority.

For this reason, the various indication systems proposed by governmental and para-governmental entities focus on what is right or wrong in Islam or more generally in the ideologies of the prisoners. In the French and Italian systems[9], for example even commentaries on political events, such as 'criticism of Western intervention in Muslim countries' or 'criticism of the Italian government and institutions', are becoming relevant (see Figs. 8.1 and 8.2).

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[9] GDAP 0384043 dated 14-11-2015, GDAP 0385582 dated 16-11-2015 and GDAP 0248805 dated 20-7-2016.

APPARENCE/ COMPORTEMENT / VIE QUOTIDIENNE	Oui	Non	Observations/Motifs
Porte des signes ostensibles de sa confession			
Détient des objets religieux			
Adopte un régime alimentaire spécifique (sans porc, végétarien, ne prend pas le plateau)			
Refuse la télévision / tout objet avec représentation humaine en cellule			
S'intéresse particulièrement à l'actualité			
Adopte ou tente d'adopter une attitude de domination vis-à-vis des autres détenus			
S'entoure de personnes détenues identifiées comme radicalisées			
Se montre influençable par les autres détenus			
Adopte une attitude de repli sur soi			
Refuse d'avoir affaire au personnel féminin			
A subitement modifié son comportement en détention			
Organise sa cellule d'affectation de manière rigoureuse et très entretenue			

Fig. 8.1 Example of old checklists

Methods that adopt and modify forensic psychiatry (such as the traditional HCR-20 and SAVRY) to determine potential risks of extremism and terrorism are more widespread at a European level compared to these raw indicators based on religion. Vera2R (Pressman and Flockton 2014) and ERG22+ (Lloyd and Dean 2011), the first of Canadian-Dutch and the second of English derivation, are used most frequently today (see Fig. 8.3).

The comparison between rating sheets such as HCR-20 and VERA2 (or VERA2R, the advanced version) clearly shows that the difference is entirely in the relevance of ideological and religious themes. That is because VERA2 and ERG22+ are tools of a strong ideological and political character, while HCR20 is a clinical tool (see Fig. 8.4).

In comparing VERA2R and ERG22+, we note how the two tools are similar in terms of psychometric properties and some assessment parameters but differ in their use (see Fig. 8.5).

Appearance/Behaviour/ Daily Life	Yes	No	Observations/ Reasons
Bears conspicuous signs of his confession			
Holds religious objects			
Adopts a specific diet (without pork, vegetarian, does not take the tray)			
Refuses television/any object with human representation in cell			
Is particularly interested in news			
Adopted or attempted to adopt an attitude of domination with other inmates			
Surrounds themselves with detainees identified as radicalised			
Is influenced by other inmates			
Adopts an attitude of withdrawal			
Refuses to deal with female staff			
Suddenly changed his behaviour in detention			
Organises their assigned cell in a rigorous and well-maintained way			

Fig. 8.2 Example of old checklists translated to English

Item I.D.	Factors
A.	Attitudes/Mental Processes
A.1	Identity confusion/problems
A.2	Strong feelings of injustice and grievances
A.3	Group, country cause of injustice
A.4	Dehumanization of the identified responsible cause
A.5	Internalized martyrdom, die for cause
A.6	Need for political/religious/ideological cause
A.7	Attachment to ideology justifying violence
A.8	Need for group bonding and belonging
A.9	Alienation from society
A.10	Low empathy for those outside own group
A.11	High level anger and frustration
A.12	Rejection of society and values
A.13	Low self-esteem
A.14	High need for approval and acceptance
A.15	Desire for revenge
C.	Contextual/Social Factors
C.1	Participant/user of extremist websites
C.2	Peer/community support for violent action
C.3	Contact with violent extremists
C.4	Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country
H.	Historical Factors
H.1	Early exposure to violence in home
H.2	Family support for violent action
H.3	Prior criminal violence
H.4	Military, paramilitary training at home
H.5	Travel abroad for non-state sponsored training/fighting
H.6	Glorification of violent action
P.	Protective Factors
P.1	Shift in ideology
P.2	Rejection of violence to obtain goals
P.3	Change of vision of enemy
P.4	Constructive political involvement
P.5	Significant other/peer support

Fig. 8.3   Risk assessment factors of VERA2-`

HCR-20 V3

Rating Sheet for Version 3 of the HCR-20
Kevin S. Douglas, Stephen D. Hart, Christopher D. Webster, & Henrik Belfrage

Name		Record Number	
DOB		Gender	
Nature/Purpose of Evaluation			

HCR-20 V3 Items	Presence Omit	N	P	Y	Relevance Omit	L	M	H
Historical Scale (History of problems with…)								
H1. Violence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H2. Other Antisocial Behavior	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H3. Relationships	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H4. Employment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H5. Substance Use	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H6. Major Mental Disorder	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H7. Personality Disorder	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H8. Traumatic Experiences	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H9. Violent Attitudes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
H10. Treatment or Supervision Response	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
OC-H Other Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Clinical Scale (Recent problems with…) Rating Period: _____								
C1. Insight	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
C2. Violent Ideation or Intent	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
C3. Symptoms of Major Mental Disorder	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
C4. Instability	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
C5. Treatment or Supervision Response	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
OC-C Other Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Risk Management Scale (Future problems with…) Rating Period: _____ Context: ☐In ☐Out								
R1. Professional Services and Plans	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
R2. Living Situation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
R3. Personal Support	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
R4. Treatment or Supervision Response	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
R5. Stress or Coping	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
OC-R Other Considerations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Future Violence/ Case Prioritization	Serious Physical Harm	Imminent Violence	Recommended Reassessment Date
☐Low ☐Moderate ☐High	☐Low ☐Moderate ☐High	☐Low ☐Moderate ☐High	YY/MM/DD: _____

Evaluator	Signature	Date

Fig. 8.4 HCR-20 third version rating sheet

ERG 22+	Vera 2-R
Engagement	Beliefs
Intent	Context-Intent
(Included in intent and engagement)	Commitment and motivation
Capability	History and capacity
(considered as being the positive side of risk factors)	Protective items

Fig. 8.5 Comparative chart of risk assessment tools

The common peculiarity of these psychometric systems is that they mix structured forensic analysis models (SPJs) traditionally focused on mental illness and deviance with other models of intelligence analysis that have strong ideological and political connotations (Pressman 2009). These psychometric tools such as those based on religion all use ambiguous factors of ideological and political evaluation, such as 'Anger at political/ foreign policy actions of a country', 'Need for political/religious/ideological cause' or 'Strong feelings of injustice and grievances'. From this perspective, the process of radical escalation whether linear or not would be the result of 'an incorrect representation of cultural and religious tradition'.

> *In this regard, it is shared opinion—also at an international level—that correct teaching and religious practices can be counted among the appropriate measures for fighting ideological indoctrination, as they constitute support for prisoners in the development of their personalities, which are often fragile in terms of culture, family and economics, putting them at risk of becoming victims of jihadist propaganda.* (Ministero di Giustizia 2018: 23)

From this derives the basic idea of a form of prevention labelled 'deradicalisation' according to which it would be the task of states, police forces, intelligence agencies and civil society to identify, oppose and repress extremist and dangerous ideas even when these do not represent a crime or are not connected to any 'fact'. According to the theorists of VERA2:

> *De-radicalization is the opposite of radicalization. It is the process of becoming less radical. De-radicalization as a process requires the rejection or moderation of a belief or ideological system. Groups or individuals may renounce a radical ideology. This may occur when the decision is taken that radical or violent actions are no longer relevant to the world view. Disengagement occurs when there has been a voluntary behavioural disconnect from the extremist organization. Disengagement is not sufficient to guarantee de-radicalization, but it often can precede de-radicalization. Rehabilitation, re-socialization and de-radicalization programs are all designed to support a shift in attitude and ideology. The violent extremist who is committed to an ideology will be difficult to de-radicalize unless he or she has already experienced some doubt (a cognitive opening) and some disengagement. Complete de-radicalization on a collective level means that the movement has ceased to exist or at a minimum has changed its goals. De-radicalization on an individual level means that an individual has ceased violent activities. De-radicalization programs have been developed in Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Singapore, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Great Britain, and Norway.* (Pressman 2009: 21)

This model of 'deradicalisation' which is spreading from the prisons into society and even into the virtual world where the private individual replaces the state in the function of preventive censorship presents many risks, firstly, for its detachment from criminal and legal practices and, secondly, for the prevalence of psychiatric factors in the preventive criminal analysis. However, criminologists as well as psychiatrists seem to have forgotten that their interventions in these areas are intricately bound up with the legal issue of rights. The Joint Settlement Process between the New York Police (NYPD) and the mosques in the legal case 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JO before the NY District Court concretises the matter. The case directly concerns countries such as Italy because its model of prevention indicators is the fruit of an old European project called 'Violent Radicalisation—Recognition of and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups Concerned' (European Commission 2008), which, by explicit admission of the ministries in member countries that have adopted it, is based on the famous manual of the NY Police entitled 'Radicalisation in the West'.[10] In the American case, the NYPD was accused of having:

> *Engaged and continue to engage in a policy and practice of targeting individuals for suspiciousness surveillance and investigation on the basis of their religion of Islam, stigmatizing Plaintiffs and violating their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, and the Free Exercise Clause of the New York State Constitution (the "Complaint").* (NYPD News 2016)

The legal settlement led to the forced withdrawal[11] of the text that forms the basis of the various European models for its:

> *Religious profiling, adding a provision for considering the impact investigations have on people who are not targets of investigations, establishing reasonable time limits for certain investigations, and adding a civilian member to an internal NYPD Handschu Committee. As part of the settlement, the NYPD has also agreed to remove from its website the 2007 report "Radicalisation in the West", which the NYPD does not and never has relied upon to open or extend investigations.* (NYPD News 2016)

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[10] Now available in: https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/radicalization-in-the-west-the-homegrown-threat-nypd-2007pdf/

[11] The legal settlement is available in: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1211._stipulation_of_settlement_and_order_1.7.16_0.pdf

The case of the NYPD among many highlights how risk assessment products aimed at profiling suspects on the basis of multiple risk scales, whether they are 'Moghaddam's staircase' or the English Home Office's 'pyramid of terrorism' (Christmann 2012), VERA2R and ERG22+, expose the administrations and their users to various risks. We risk to put an excessive emphasis on ideas and 'types of perpetrators' with respect to the 'facts' and 'actions' which are normally the subject of criminal investigations. Moreover, we risk to underestimate the corresponding contradictions emerging from the evaluation of the phenomenon of multiculturalism in European prisons and societies, where behaviours and ideas may assume a multisemantic dimension and canno be interpreted through the judiciary or security lens only. As we shall see, both these aspects have important legal and practical implications since they implement 'preventive measures of belonging/identities' based on the insertion of a subject in a category of alleged risk with respect to the legal asset that is intended to be defended. These models come within the scope of what legal scholars have defined as 'types of perpetrators':

> *The common assumption of all these measures is not the committing of a crime or other offence, but belonging, according to the "type of perpetrator" scheme, to one of the categories of people listed in art. 1 (December 27, 1956, No. 1423) and mostly identifiable according to generic symptomatic elements.* (Ferrajoli 1997: 820)

Furthermore, those who designed these tools and their indicators as well as having a very poor knowledge of Islam did not take into consideration Pareto's sociological theory on ideas as derived. On the contrary, from current practice we know that ideas or narratives can often be assumed as justifications for different and deeper human actions through which individuals manipulate the reality. An inmate can take on Muslim narratives and repeat slogans on '*Ummah*' or the '*Khilafah*' full of '*Allah huwa al-Akbar*' simply for protection due to identity problems, to obtain better food or for a thousand other reasons and not least anger against foreign policy or the state, regardless of whether or not they are well-founded. The external aspect of the narratives is only a small part of the work of observation, and the use of labels such as 'Salafite', 'radical', 'Wahhabite', 'jihadist', etc., does not help because often those who use these terms do not understand their polysemic import in their specific cultural context which is precisely the work of orientalists. All European deradicalisation

models are exposed to the risk of becoming (1) too generic in terms of the social risk criteria, tainted by prejudice, politicisation or specific ignorance, which (2) generates unpredictability in the monitored subjects/communities which they often do not even understand given their cultural distance and therefore (3) they open up wide spaces to the arbitrariness of the administrative authorities in the practices of prevention, (4) above all in the absence of judicial supervision.

In Europe Muslim communities and the Old Continent's NGOs will sooner or later become active in the European courts (ECtHR) similar to what happened in the NY District Court. While a clear legal definition of the term 'suspect' does not exist under EU law, the proliferation of suspects for pre-crimes remains a matter of serious concern from the substantial and procedural justice. As a consequence of this incongruence, the whole apparatus of the analysis profiles used by the DAP (Italian Department of Prison Administration), European police forces, EU agencies like Europol, Frontex and Eurojust and intelligence services will be put at risk with serious legal consequences for the preventive actions undertaken in the meantime which risk being branded as discriminatory. However, it will also have serious consequences for European security, because we all need to prevent crimes and threats while excessive pressure on vulnerable groups risk to backlash. Also on this question the EU and many member states have so far not grasped that the very idea of 'deradicalisation' is increasingly the subject of strong criticism from many parts, not least the United Nations, who define it as an 'ideology conversion system which was applied in a discriminatory fashion with a view to altering the political opinion of an inmate' (UNODC 2016). Hence, the UNODC's decision not to use the concept of 'deradicalisation' and replace it with the definition of 'disengagement' from violence in its work on the subject. The distinction is significant, since 'deradicalisation' refers to the framework of ideas, while 'disengagement' refers to a 'fact' (violence) which is often a crime and therefore requires preventive measures. When one tries to seriously define 'risk indexes', one cannot but note the quite evident fact that in European penitentiary systems the detained population is increasingly multicultural, multireligious and multiracial. This poses new challenges for police forces and justice systems on how to interpret behaviours, ideas, polysemic indicators and cultural patterns that are different from those to which we are accustomed. A good example is provided by a recent sentence of the al-Mutahharik case (Italy). In these legal cases the investigators, prosecutor office and judge of preliminary

investigations confused the 'Shahada' (acceptance of Islam, the first pillar of the Muslim faith) with the 'istishhad' (martyrdom) and the complex legal procedure to get a valid 'tazkiyah' (document to access the territory of Islamic State) with a simple allusive phone conversation. Knowledge gaps on foreign cultural movements and their juridical background may produce risks of misinterpretation and justify suspects of associative crimes of terrorism in a 'liquid' and intangible form, without tangible linkages or connections, while in reality the association to Islamic-inspired movements like ISIS or al-Qai'dah occurs with very well-formalised and 'solid' procedures (the so-called bay'ah).

The multicultural aspect of investigations and sentences increases the risks connected to the operators' ability to identify actual risk signals with respect to prejudices or even simple misunderstandings. Every false positive or negative that derives from it hides very large risks, which can produce unwanted effects on the order of the penitentiary system or on security, as well as on the legal level. However, it also increases the difficulties of prisoners to understand what is required of them which affect the predictability of prevention actions.

This is perhaps the main reason why the academic and scientific world has expressed harsh criticism (Scarcella et al. 2016) of these predictive preventive tools. They saw the risk not only of discriminating against entire social, ethnic and religious groups or individuals but also the objective danger of encouraging escalation towards terrorism due to the detachment that invasive practices of profiling, intelligence and deregulated pre-investigation are created in minority communities with respect to institutions and democratic methods of social transformation. In short, many studies have shown that the radicalisation/terrorism relationship cannot be considered as given (Cartlett et al. 2010), nor can radicalisation be criminalised, in the absence of a clear legal framework and when we know that it can contribute to positive social and political changes. There have been radicals and extremists in the histories of every country, such as Mandela or Menachem Begin, who changed the world for the better. From this point of view, it is not easy to use 'radicalisation' as a risk indicator for preventive measures as it is happening indiscriminately today under the pressure of the media, governments and International organisations.

In reality, the problem with the use of these theoretical tools and prevention models goes far beyond these important political, academic, cultural and scientific aspects. If understood in the context of the historical evolution of prevention models, the use of these tools poses much more serious and systemic problems of policy and practice. For a discussion on

how Black, Asian and ethnic minority law enforcement agencies can potentially enhance counter-radicalisation efforts in contexts similar to France and Germany, see Chap. 10.

8.3.2 Risks for Criminal and Intelligence Analysis

We need to take into consideration another aspect when deciding on the use of these assessment tools. This is a specific risk which exposes both law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although criminal and intelligence analysis are activities tasked by different 'clients', they both have in common the necessity of integral 'premises' manageable through logic-deductive inferences with the objective to avoid judiciary mistakes or false predictions. It is part of the EU discourse that excessive use of 'secret' and 'opaque' intelligence data (e.g. informants) as inputs for investigations represents a serious concern in relation to procedural rights. However, by blurring the lines between radicalisation and terrorism, we are exposed to the risk of using limited and politically influential premises to produce ideologically conditioned inferences, which holds a major risk for criminal and intelligence analysis. This may lead to excessive oversimplifications, inadequate samplings, mistaken causes or the so-called false dilemma. Unfortunately the ongoing counter-radicalisation tools are ideologically limiting the complexity of the premises in the multivariable processes of inference. While including some 'factors' they exclude elements such as legislative, social, material facilitators of radicalisation as well as legitimate aspects of the ethnic-religious belongings, misconducts of institutional (and other) actors, role of media, logistic and structural weaknesses of the environments, etc. Moreover, when they include specific factors that are mainly behavioural, ideological and religious, these premises and facts are framed within bias and prejudices (within the intelligence community, the phenomenon is known as 'mistaken cause'). Considered from the perspective of the criminal analysis, the counter-radicalisation assessment tools belong to the typology of analytical tools classified as 'logic-inductive'. They go beyond the facts and build frameworks which do not grant the qualitative neutral analytical inference, even though some premises may be partially or completely correct. This results in a strong reduction of the statistical probabilities of both quantity of the premises considered and relative frequency of past events, impacting therefore on the theoretical and subjective estimations. This aspect jeopardises greatly the strategic intelligence analysis in addition to the potential consequences on the operational analysis including those criminal and intelligence models underpinning the

effective long-term planning at the policy level. The intrinsic limits of these tools for reliable intelligence analysis can be easily tested by applying their methodology and checklists to exemplary historical cases ex post. As an example using Vera2R or ERG22+, the former Israeli Prime Minister and Nobel Prize Menachem Begin (or Mandela) would be still in chains within a prison.

8.3.3   Security and Intelligence First?

In most constitutional European countries, information aimed at prison observation[12] is traditionally used in the scientific observation of individuals for the purposes of individualised and tailor-made rehabilitation programmes and treatments as an essential part of the reconstruction of individual responsibility. At the basis of these models is a clear awareness of the importance of balancing all socio-psychological and security factors within the prison mission. In Italy also the security component has grown since 1993 due, amongst other things, to its connection with the different prison circuits. However, even here it remains subject to specific limitations (where there is 'danger of escape or disturbance of order and security, but contextually…with regard to probation criteria'[13]). The rationale of the various reforms over time has always been to keep the two pillars of treatment and security in balance, at the same time as jealously guarding the prerogatives—the capital of skills and experience of the different operators, as well as their functional autonomy. The ability to balance 'treatment' and 'security' remains one of the secrets of successful prevention practices in many countries. Unfortunately the prevention policies emerging in several European countries put this balance at risk as the security approach prevails wherever they are faced with cases of multiple vulnerabilities typical of the radicalisation phenomenon (extremist ideologies adopted as a response to social, psychological or mental problems). Measures aimed at the prevention of radicalisation risk to be based on parameters that are too indeterminate in terms of risk assessment which turn out to be *de-socialising* as a result of the restrictions imposed on the person, suspect or prisoner, thus making one of the two pillars of the system fail. The recurring criminogenic effects of these choices have been known to criminology for some time.

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[12] D.P.R. 30 giugno 200, n. 230.

[13] Ministero della Giustizia-GDAP-0445731-2011, Circolare 3594/6044

This leads us to the paradox that the new security policies with their potential de-socialising effect lead to the impossibility of applying other instruments of community legislation, such as the Framework Decisions 2008/909-829-947. From the Italian Ministry of Justice's DERAD project, which has been considered a best practice by the Council of the European Union, it is clear that detainees who are on the radicalisation radar are neither transferred to their countries nor benefit from alternative measures. As Bricola (1974) rightly states, the result of applying personal measures aimed at preventing crime can paradoxically lead to new crimes being committed, thus promoting precisely the criminal escalation that we aim to weaken. Seen from another perspective, we could say that extremist deradicalisation practices contribute to developing a phenomenon of radical escalation due to their de-socialising component, which is today also evident in the statistics. This is not just an Italian phenomenon. Indeed, Italy inherited it from the EU policies of 2004, when the EU included radicalisation prevention practices within its antiterrorism strategy,[14] building a multidimensional and multi-agency model structured on four pillars clearly copied by the UK 'Prevent' system[15]—one of the products of which is the radicalisation indicators.[16] With this strategy which continually repeats the slogan that prison is the cradle of radicalisation, the security pillar is reinforced compared to resocialisation. Everywhere in Europe, as in Italy, the information from prison observation considered relevant to the radicalisation indicators becomes part of a new process of intelligence analysis and profiling, previously unknown to the 'colour' circuit model (white, green, yellow and red), when the evaluations were in any case more objective (crime/sentence, mafia association, disciplinary violations, etc.)

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[14] European Security Strategy-A secure Europe in a better World, Brussels, 12.12.2003, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world; The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 1 December 2005, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/87257.pdf; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM(2010) 673 final of 22.11.2010); Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy Implementation Paper, Brussels, 14 July 2015, 10854/15; European Council, June 2016, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the EU Foreign and Security Policy.

[15] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance

[16] The first document is GDAP0093040 dd. 13-3-2015, following the initial EU strategy in the same year.

despite the broad technical discretion.[17] Furthermore, a gradual process of unstructured remodelling of internal decision-making processes begins as well as the transformation of some key roles of the institutional penitentiary architecture.

In this way without realising it, many European countries have adopted police and judicial cooperation models in their legal systems and practices that were inherited from the principles of Sir Peel (1829),[18] according to which critical events such as radicalisation see the prevalence and ownership of the police forces increasingly expanded with intelligence functions that are very different to those of similar, traditional enforcement agencies. The problem is that these models have been adopted without any organic legislative and regulatory framework to regulate them. One consequence of this is that with the sudden entry of radicalisation in prison practices as a theme of antiterrorism, this specific type of religious, ideological and behavioural information derived from prison observations departs from the 'social space of rehabilitation' and like other confidential information becomes administrative security data. How a Muslim prays or dresses or what a Muslim thinks of foreign policy is no longer just a sociological fact for the rehabilitation team to work with, but becomes 'investigative or pre-investigative information'. His praying and his political judgements do not end up in the prisoner's file, as is the case with the other prison observation data managed by the resocialisation team (the so-called *équipe*, traditionally responsible for rehabilitation practices), but is managed separately in appropriate IT structures (like SIAP/AFIS) in the context of targeted applications aimed and set up for security procedures. Moreover, contrary to judicial information or the hypotheses of crime, the data on radicalisation does not end up on the prosecutor's table because, obviously, the crime is missing: there is generally only the risk index according to new, vague prevention criteria defined by a project funded by the EU. The decisions on profiling with all the related implications as regards surveillance and limitation of freedoms are adopted according to intelligence profiling models by a central police body with new functions of an 'intelligence-led police agency', according to American

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[17] 'In fact, it depends not only on subjective and objective assessments, but also on the logistical and security characteristics of the institute, on the personnel provided and on the availability of the vehicles, as well as on the confidential information held by the institute's managers' (GDAP-0445732-2011, Circolare 3594/6044: 17).

[18] https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf

Internos FIES del grupo A, condenados por pertenencia o colaboración con grupos terroristas. En este grupo existe un riesgo elevado y una presencia de ideología radicalizada constatada que motiva el especial seguimiento al que están sometidos. Se trata de internos condenados por pertenencia o vinculación al terrorismo yihadista con un fuerte arraigo de valores e ideología extremista, amparados, a su vez, por organizaciones terroristas activas.

Internos FIES del grupo B, enmarcados en una actitud de liderazgo captador y proselitista que facilita el desarrollo de actitudes extremistas y radicales entre la población reclusa. Se trata de internos que llevan a cabo una misión de adoctrinamiento y difusión de ideas radicalizadas sobre el resto de internos, llevando a cabo actividades de presión y coacción.

Internos FIES del grupo C, radicalizados o en proceso de radicalización extremista, que incluye todos aquellos internos con un mayor o menor nivel de riesgo y vulnerabilidad hacia el proceso de captación, asumiendo un papel más pasivo pero que pueden protagonizar incidentes regimentales ligados a interpretaciones radicales de la religión islámica. Se trata de internos que han manifestado actitudes de desprecio hacia otros internos no musulmanes o musulmanes que no siguen sus preceptos, y de los cuales puede inferirse, de forma razonable, un proceso incipiente o consolidado de radicalización.

Fig. 8.6 The three FIES levels in the Spanish prisons

and Anglo-Saxon models, and no longer by the multidisciplinary rehabilitation team, as in the traditional multidisciplinary system of penitentiary circuits. The information collected through these procedures becomes administrative data. It is classified according to periodic behavioural reports from which preliminary intelligence analysis is produced by the Central Investigation Group (NIC) and other intel agencies, classifying the 'suspect' detainees on a scale of three levels of risk (see Figs. 8.6 and 8.7).

Whenever necessary these 'confidential' data classified as R 'confidential' or S 'secret' are shared with central multi-agency bodies (on the model of the Italian C.A.S.A. at the Ministry of the Interior), i.e. with other police forces and intelligence agencies at national, European or International levels. Once they have entered this circuit the prison observation data becomes a piece of intelligence in all respects. In technical terms, we could define the whole activity as 'non-targeted surveillance' aimed particularly at specific groups (Muslims, Arabs or foreigners in prison) regardless of their crime, gender, age or legal status in the absence of specific suspicions (Bigo et al. 2013). From this perspective prison surveillance carried out by LEAs and intel agencies is very different from the traditional prison observation carried out by multidisciplinary prison

Internal FIES of group A, convicted of belonging to or collaborating with terrorist groups. In this group there is a high risk and a confirmed presence of a radicalised ideology that motivates the special monitoring to which they are subjected. These are inmates condemned for their presence or connection to jihadist terrorism with a strong rootedness of extremist values and ideology protected, in turn, by active terrorist organisations.

Internal FIES of group B, framed in a leadership attitude among the reclusive population. These are inmates who carry out a mission of indoctrination and dissemination of radical ideas about the rest of the inmates, carrying out pressure and coercion activities.

Internal FIES of group C, radicalized or in the process of extremist radicalisation, which includes all those internally with a greater or lesser level of risk and vulnerability towards the process of recruitment, assuming a more passive role but who may star in regimental incidents linked to radial interpretations of the Islamic religion. These are non-Muslim or Muslim inmates who do not follow their precepts, and from which a process of incipient or consolidated radicalisation can be inferred in a reasonable manner.

Fig. 8.7   The three FIES levels in the Spanish prisons translated to English

Fig. 8.8   Number of Muslim radicals in prison in France

operators because the surveillance is focused on a specific type of actors. This is due to the ethnic-religious nature of the indicators. The numbers are very clear: in Italy 506 inmates that had come under the radicalisation radar by the 31st of December (2017) are all Muslim. A very similar situation is evident in France, as shown in the figure below (see Fig. 8.8).

Belgium and the UK are not exceptions (see Figs. 8.9 and 8.10).

Fig. 8.9   NOMS data on radicals

Region (# prisons/36)	# Radicalised Prisoners
North (17+136)	82
South (16/36)	128
Brussels (3/36)	18
	228

Fig. 8.10   Number of radicalised in Belgium prisons 1-3-2018

This data highlights the creation of a specific risk prevention category based on religion and ethnicity. The exclusion of the magistrates from the decisions concerning the profiling system is a sign of a tendency which is now standard practice in Europe, but which poses problems that are difficult to overcome within procedural law and prevention rules, as to be discussed. In general, at the European level, data related to the capture and following investigation/indiction/appeal or conviction of people for terrorism-related crimes under Directive 2017/541/EU are sending worrying signals on the application of criminal laws based on ethnicity and religion. Muslims, especially those of Arab origins who went to Syria to fight or collaborate in different ways with groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and others, different from Da'ish or al-Qai'dah, have been arrested in the

majority of the European countries. Some European countries take citizenship or the permit to stay away from them. On the other hand, Europeans (and Western people in general) that went to the same conflict areas to fight with the groups allied to the Western countries, such as the Kurds or Christian anti-Da'ish and anti-Turkish militiamen close to the PKK, will not suffer from the same treatment. These differences in treatment are used by terrorist groups to discredit the European Justice system.

8.3.4   When Risk Assessments Replace the Law

The new administrative procedures for risk assessment or 'penitentiary intelligence' defined as 'investigative and pre-investigative information', which are in reality 'hybrid investigations' following the real analysis of profiling shared with intelligence agencies, have very serious consequences for inmates in many European prisons both in relation to prison life and to the time after completion of the prison sentence, after the end of the term and beyond. They can activate safety and preventive measures that in many countries increasingly exclude the involvement of magistrates and alter the provisions of the sentence, the resocialisation programmes and even the principle of equality before the law. In countries like Italy where the judicial authorities play a very strong third-party balancing role, these effects are less noticeable with rare but serious exceptions in terms of prevention. However, here the tendency is growing following the recent introduction of new measures.[19] In countries such as France or England, this new European model heavily promoted by practitioner's networks raises serious issues of law and justice and threatens an imbalance in the institutional arrangements between the powers of the state and legal coherence with the general legislature and fundamental rights. In France, for example if an inmate is convicted of a property crime, and is the labelled as 'radical' following the prison observation, regardless of the conviction and the provisions of the sentence, the inmate may be transferred to specific special prisons ('Quartier de prise en charge des détenus radicalisés—QPR' e 'Quartier d'isolation—QI') with very strict regimes and preventive measures, where inmates are forced into re-education processes with 'French values' at their core. The preventive measures concern visits, contact, surveillance and social relations or in short the whole area of so-called civil

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[19] DL 20 febbraio 2017, n. 14, recante "Disposizioni urgenti in materia di sicurezza delle città" (in GU n. 42 del 20 febbraio 2017).

Fig. 8.11 The new management model for radical prisoners in France (Table processed by Agenfor, 2018)

rights.[20] Decisions of this type are the result of the risk assessments conducted with the VERA2R instrument combined with an indicator checklist very similar to the Italian one which produces the so-called QER final synthesis report, a document shared with the penitentiary administration, intelligence and judges. In France as in all of Europe, the profiling of Muslim prisoners (especially of Arab origin) and of foreigners, in general, is massive today, resulting in the collection, management and exchange of information on a national and international basis (see Fig. 8.11).

In England the profiling of inmates defined as 'Tact and Related Offenders' includes both judicial data (sentences over 12 months) and ideological and behavioural observations. Special extremism units (ExU) with intelligence functions have been set up within the NOMS.

Responsible for developing the strategic, policy and procedural responses appropriate to the risks presented by terrorists, extremists and radicalisers. It receives intelligence and information on extremism from all prisons in England and Wales and uses this information to produce strategic analysis to assist operational colleagues in prisons and to inform future intelligence gathering. The ExU works with Regional Counter Terrorism Coordinators (RCTCs) based across the regions in England and Wales to develop intelligence and to monitor and manage terrorist or extremist prisoners in custody. RCTCs work with key

[20] DL 20 February 2017, n. 14, recante "urgent provisions on the safety of cities" (in GU n. 42 20 February 2017).

partners such as Probation, Police and Security Services to share information and help manage the risk these offenders pose. Probation CT leads work closely with the RCTC.[21]

Ending up on these lists of proscribed persons may have very serious and long-lasting consequences for a person that go far beyond the end of the sentence. In fact, "Tact" offenders end up being targets of permanent surveillance by the police:

An individual who meets these criteria will need to register with police, on an annual basis, details of their name, address, NI number and date of birth. There may also be the requirement to notify Police of certain information prior to travelling outside of the UK. As with Sex Offender Register, the individual will be required to notify Police of details of any addresses they are resident at for 7 days, or any shorter periods which add up to 7 days. The length of notification requirement may be in force for up to 30 years, and will depending on the sentence initially received.

Because the profiling meshes are increasingly narrow and the intrusive surveillance mechanisms create reactions in communities and minorities, the number of Tact offenders is growing continuously with increasing numbers of convicts and remand prisoners, men, women and children but above all Muslims who are now the main target of surveillance policies (see Fig. 8.12).

In England since 2016 and more recently in France, inmates classified as extremists by the SC Committee due to extensive use of intelligence information are allocated to special sections called 'separation centres' to prevent them from promoting wrong ideas or recruiting others with very severe restrictions on their civil rights. All these preventive decisions are taken by administrative means through the revision of the Prison Rules and with specific Prison Service Instructions (see Fig. 8.13).

In France similar to England and many European countries who adopt these models or the 'Info-Houses' type of assessment systems (Denmark), risk assessment has become a new law added to the conviction and the police, intelligence or administrative bodies, including local public or private entities, and determines almost everything in the life of an individual considered radical. The measures are almost always taken in the absence of

[21] NOMS HQ, National Probation Service, Managing Terrorist and Extremist Offenders in the Community, AI 13/2014- PI 10/2014.

Fig. 8.12   Data from NOMS

Fig. 8.13   The Danish model of Info-Houses

judicial procedure, but simply by administrative procedure. France, England and Belgium are special cases of 'extremism of counter-radicalisation', but the basic trend is common to all EU member states. Spain for example has seen an increase in prisoners for crimes related to terrorism (see Fig. 8.14).

Fig. 8.14   Prisoners for jihadism in Spain, El Pais

This dynamic has led to an increase in risk assessment practices also for prisoners convicted for other reasons but inserted under the radar of radicalisation (see Fig. 8.15).

Since 2018 Spain has adopted its own radicalisation analysis model with a 'triage' risk assessment system based on a 'tool' and associated analysis methodology (see Fig. 8.16).[22]

To understand the implications of these assessment models well beyond the penitentiary system, it is sufficient to consider that almost all member states participate in the compilation of databases managed by several institutional bodies, both European and international, where

[22] The Role of Religion in Exit Programmes and Religious Counselling in Prison and Probation Settings, Ex Post Paper, RAN Centre of Excellence, 10-11 October 2017, Madrid, available from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_role_of_religion_in_exit_programmes_10-11_10_2017_en.pdf

RADICALIZED INMATES

Data as of 1st January of each year

95

76

85

79

April 2018

59   59

2014   2015   2016   2017   2018

Source: Ministry of the Interior of Spain EL PAIS

Fig. 8.15 Radicalised inmates in Spain, El Pais

suspects of radicalism are registered. These lists are then processed and disseminated by supranational agencies or used by third countries (even the least developed in terms of civil liberty and democracy) to take preventive and surveillance measures that affect transnational mobility, access to social or legal benefits, work, etc.

While a coherent legal definition of 'suspects' does not exist under EU law, there are a variety of informal EU-level policing and security cooperation mechanisms aimed at sharing information on radical suspects beyond international treaties or legislation. These include: the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), the Group of Six (G6, composed by Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland) and the 5+5 Group with a specific focus on 'Islamists' (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya). Informal mechanisms to maintain coordinated databases exist also in all MS built on the model of CUTA (Belgium) and JTAC (UK) whose coordination is facilitated through the Madrid Group, a network of European fusion centre officials operating since 2008. These informal and extra-judiciary policing mechanisms aimed at profiling suspects have produced a long list of 'pre-criminal' individuals. At the beginning of 2016 Amnesty International reported that 457 individuals were on the terrorism watch list of OCAM; French authorities are reportedly monitoring around 15,000 individuals who are suspected of being radical; in Germany in 2017

Fig. 8.16   Graph drawn up by CSD, Bulgaria

a list of 548 Islamists has been reported and in the UK more than 3500 suspected radicals are under surveillance (Gutheil et al. 2017). These extra-judiciary policing practices are the reason for serious concerns for the EU legal system. The difference in radicalisation prevention practices among European countries opens the problem of harmonisation and impact on the concrete possibility of creating a legal formula of judicial cooperation. To understand how the penitentiary systems started diverging due to

counter-radicalisation measures, it is sufficient to compare the procedures for the allocation of radical prisoners in different countries. While in the UK and France, practices have mainly consisted of an administrative nature based on risk assessment tools, and in Italy the AS2 (high Security 2) assignment is completely based on the jurisdiction. The inmates classified as AS2 are organised by the DAP based on the presence of juridical title of conviction (at different stage of the legal proceeding) linked to a national or international terrorism-related crime. They can be investigated or convicted; however, the judicial system (at least one impartial judge, GIP/GUP in the preliminary stage of the investigation) should issue a provision decree on the model of the precautionary custody order which is legally challengeable (not even the prosecutor office is sufficient for such a decision). The inmate under AS2 is not supposed to experience any limitation of their rights exceeding the art. 4bis of the penitentiary code, as established by law. Any further limitation should be based only on the crime and prescribed in the court decision, in so far as this crime the person is investigated/indicted/appealed/convicted of is included in the scope of art. 14 bis of the Penitentiary Code (L. 354/75). This article excludes or limits the access to some benefits, but the denial of any benefit should be done by the surveillance judiciary. The enhanced surveillance or reinforced surveillance is regulated by art. 14 bis of the Penitentiary Code and consists in an administrative provision done by the DAP and notified to the subject. This administrative provision should be duly motivated and its content should comply with the law. It is difficult to outline the application of these constitutional principles, for example with the counter-radicalisation practices of a country like Belgium where the so-called two-track hybrid policy is used for the placement in the specialised Wings 'D-Rad:Ex sections' (1 Hasselt + 1 Ittre) or within 5 'satellite prisons' of 'prisoners who pose a severe risk regarding radicalisation (active or passive) and/or who are showing ongoing commitment in armed/violent actions from religious and/or ideological motives' (action plan radicalisation, 11/03/15).

Emerging EU practices such as those presented above are just one example among many that touch the heart of the problem that is not 'what works better' or who is better among the MS; the problem is represented by the risk of inconsistency of the newly established 'deradicalisation' policies often adopted under the pressure of politicians or media with the fundamental laws and practices at national level including international legal concepts such as the principles of: legality, materiality of the crimes, the presumption of innocence and even personal freedom (e.g. articles 25,

154 S. BIANCHI ET AL.

27 and 13 of the Italian Constitution, respectively). Today, these are amplified by the problem of privacy and data processing (GDPR compliance). In conclusion, an intrinsic contradiction seems to characterise several policies and practices promoted at EU level. From one side several governments and agencies promote the public-private approach based on multidisciplinary methodologies; however, on the other side they securitise the information collected within these 'open partnerships', therefore exploiting non-security agencies for 'pre-investigative' activities, thus hindering the deployment of rehabilitative functions through preventive security or police measures and additionally impeding the free exercise of fundamental rights to defence and appeal by secreting large parts of the information collected. The first case law has already landed on the ECtHR tables from where clear positions are expected. They are the applications no 46538/11 Bilal GULAMHUSSEIN against the United Kingdom lodged on 21 July 2011 and no 3960/12 Kashif TARIQ against the United Kingdom lodged 10 January 2012.

8.4   Divorce Between Prevention and Law

Precisely what is meant by prevention and more specifically the prevention of radicalisation such as the prevention of an ideological nature in an area of pre-crime halfway between the political and the religious remains the crux of the matter, just as it remains to be understood (and regulated) who can and should activate practices to prevent radicalisation with which procedures and which are the tasks of the various agencies involved. Another question concerns judges and courts:, how can the ricognitive functions of judges be exercised in a prevention procedure with respect to purely potestative functions (Ferrajoli 1997). Putting practices that traditionally belong in the field of social policies under the umbrella of judiciary, security and antiterrorism due to their ideological and religious components has a whole series of practical, legal-procedural and political consequences.

8.4.1   Prevention of Radicalisation: Quality of the Law and Predictability of Measures

Normally preventive measures are detached from the committing of a crime and are applied on the basis of risk indications in accordance with specific laws (according to the medieval principle of 'prius ergo est suspicio'). In the case of radicalisation preventive measures are not connected to the criminal

responsibility of the subject in the field of terrorism since it is not a crime; nor is it based on the evidence of guilt of 'the fact' which is an element of the crime, but:

> *They find reasons, such as security, in the social-criminal risk; they are implemented through the partial social interdiction of the subject and tend to their recovery into ordered civil life.* (ruling of March 23, 1964 No. 23 and 17 February 1994, No. 48)

They can, therefore, be afflictive but not include sanctions (Cass 2012) even if jurists have not yet put an end to this debate. Based on the legislation of different countries prevention measures require the examination of various risk indicators normally established by law. These indicators tend to change with the evolution of society. In Italy for example Law 575/1965 (so-called anti-mafia law) extends prevention measures to persons suspected of belonging to mafia associations. Law 152/1975 extends the regulation to further risk categories with the aim of preventing phenomena such as terrorism. Numerous laws reformulate the personal and patrimonial measures in various ways (e.g. 327/1988, 55/1990, Legislative Decree 306/1992, conv. into Law 356/1992). The Legislative Decree 92/2008, converted into Law 125/2008, introduces significant modifications: the extension of the anti-mafia law to new types of crimes, and therefore the extension of the applicability of preventive patrimonial measures, to individuals suspected of committing one of the crimes provided for by article 51, comma 3-bis, Code of Criminal Procedure, and to persons engaged in criminal trafficking or who habitually live from the proceeds of crime (as per article 1, Nos. 1 and 2, Law 1423/1956). The Legislative Decree of September 6, 2011:159, which came into force on October 13, 2011, reorganises the subject of prevention measures followed by some modifications that envisage new risk categories for the prevention of sporting violence (Legislative Decree 119/2014, conv. into Law 194/2014) and international terrorism (Legislative Decree 7/2015, conv. into Law 41/2015, containing urgent measures to combat international terrorism). With this last decree which is also relevant for the purposes of radicalisation, new terror-related offences have been included in the Penal Code, in particular the one relating to foreign fighters travelling for the purposes of terrorism. The scope of personal (and real) prevention measures has also expanded and a new measure has been introduced that allows the confiscation of passports and identity cards, anticipating the

practices of other European countries and recent Community Directives. Radicalisation indicators and risk assessment procedures could therefore be legitimately associated with methodologies used to define the risk index that underlies prevention measures. In some cases the legitimacy of indexes linked to specific limited groups of people and behaviours has also been recognised but in this case there is some doubt related to associating ethnic and religious minorities with risk indexes as happens in practice. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the preventive measures applied by the administrative authority restricting freedom of movement alone (with particular attention to the ability to expel foreigners, DASPO and warnings) is recognised as well-founded and in line, for example with article 16 of the Constitution. In Italy, this practice is regulated by law (article 13 of Legislative Decree 25-07-1998, No. 286) both in Italy and in most other countries with rare exceptions (see Fig. 8.17). However, critics are emerging for the differentiated legal treatments.

Nevertheless in general terms at a European level, the ECtHR recognised the compatibility of personal prevention measures distinguishing between privative and restrictive measures of personal freedom. The privative measures are subject to rigorous conditions provided for by article 5 § 1 (letters a to f). The restrictive measures are instead provided for by

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Ben Khemais versus Italy (24 February, 2009)

Sentenced in Tunisia in his absence to ten years' imprisonment for membership of a terrorist organisation the applicant had been extradited to Tunisia on account of his role in the activities of Islamic extremists. Although in March 2007 pursuant to Rule 39 (interim measures) of the Rules of Court, the Court had indicated to the Italian Government that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and of the smooth progress of the proceedings before the Court to stay the order for the applicant's deportation pending a decision on the merits, the applicant was deported to Tunisia in June 2008.

The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention on account of the applicant's deportation to Tunisia. It further found a violation of Article 34 (right of individual petition) of the Convention regarding Italy's failure to comply with the measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

See also: Trabelsi v. Italy, judgment of 13 April 2010; Toumi v. Italy, judgment of 5 April 2011; and Mannai v. Italy, judgment of 27 March 2012.

Fig. 8.17 Ben Khemais versus Italy

article 2 of the additional protocol 4, which protects freedom of movement with a protection conditioned by different requirements, including: (1) provision by law, (2) the need to ensure the protection of the interests listed in the same art. 2 in § 3 (national security, public security, public order, prevention of crime, protection of health and morals or the rights and liberty of others) and (3) proportion between compliance with the law guaranteed by the norm and the needs of the community. However, in the case of 'De Tommaso versus Italy'[23] the European Court in Strasbourg defined a series of new criteria[24] regarding the applicability of prevention measures and the quality of the law. These criteria can be extended with extreme precision to the phenomenon of radicalisation understood as an indicator of social risk. With this very recent judgement the ECtHR reaffirmed some fundamental principles in relation to 'prevention' and recalled its previous well-consolidated jurisprudence on the topic.

8.4.1.1 Prohibition of Interference

104. The Court reiterates that Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 guarantees to any person a right to liberty of movement within a given territory and the right to leave that territory, which implies the right to travel to a country of the person's choice to which he or she may be admitted (see Khlyustov v. Russia, no. 28975/05, § 64, 11 July 2013, and Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 61, ECHR 2001-V). *According to the Court's case-law, any measure restricting the right to liberty of movement must be in accordance with law, pursue one of the legitimate aims referred to in the third paragraph of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and strike a fair balance between the public interest and the individual's rights* (see Battista v. Italy, no. 43978/09, § 37, ECHR 2014; Khlyustov, cited above, § 64; Raimondo, cited above, § 39; and Labita, cited above, §§ 194–195).

8.4.1.2 Quality of the Law

106. The Court reiterates its settled case-law, according to which the expression "in accordance with law" not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable

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[23] https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22De%20Tommaso%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-173433%22]

[24] MAUGERI, Preventive measures and cases of general danger: the European court condemns Italy for the lack of quality of the "law", but a swallow does not make spring; VIGANÒ, The Court of Strasbourg takes a severe blow to the Italian discipline of personal prevention measures, in: www.penalecontemporaneo.it

as to its effects. (see Khlyustov, cited above, § 68; X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, § 58, ECHR 2013; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 140, ECHR 2012; Rotaru versus Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V; and Maestri versus Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I).

8.4.1.3 Foreseeability

107. One of the requirements flowing from the expression "in accordance with law" is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct; they must be able—if need be with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Such consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 49, Series A no. 30; Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 40, Series A no. 260-A; Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III; and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 141). *"108. The level of precision required of domestic legislation—which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality—depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed"* (see RTBF v. Belgium, no. 50084/06, § 104, ECHR 2011; Rekvényi, cited above, § 34; Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 48, Series A no. 323; and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 142). *"It is, moreover, primarily for the national authorities to interpret and apply domestic law"* (see Khlyustov, cited above, §§ 68–69).

Furthermore, the ruling referred to a well-established precedent on civil rights in prisons, a fact that makes this ruling very important for the European penitentiary system. For the first time, the combined arrangement of these two aspects of the judgement in the case of *De Tommaso versus Italy* opened up a long series of prospective fundamental technical and legal issues for the adoption of prevention measures in the broadest sense and for the prevention of radicalisation in the strict sense, which forced a profound revision of the models of 'deradicalisation' and 'disengagement' in place at the European level.

8.4.2   Quality of the Law

Some passages of the judgement raise the question of merit concerning the quality of the law as a criterion for the assumption of legitimate personal prevention measures:

> 117. *The Court observes that, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitutional Court has intervened on several occasions to clarify the criteria to be used for assessing whether preventive measures are necessary, the imposition of such measures remains linked to a prospective analysis by the domestic courts, seeing that neither the Act nor the Constitutional Court have clearly identified the "factual evidence" or the specific types of behaviour which must be taken into consideration in order to assess the danger to society posed by the individual and which may give rise to preventive measures. The Court therefore considers that the Act in question did not contain sufficiently detailed provisions as to what types of behaviour were to be regarded as posing a danger to society.*

By analogy it is evident that if they are used today as a 'test' of the 'sufficiently detailed provisions' for the purposes of preventive measures, behaviours deriving from the radicalisation indicators used up to now, there is a risk that the entire system of radicalisation prevention will collapse. This is especially so since many of these indicators could even be challenged before the same court via other articles concerning fundamental rights as happened in the USA in the case of the NYPD.

8.4.3   Predictability and Risk of Abuse

A second element is introduced by the Court in its own judgement where it identifies the criterion of 'predictability' as a precondition for the adoption of personal prevention measures:

> 122. *Lastly, the Court is not convinced that the obligations to 'lead an honest and law-abiding life' and to 'not give cause for suspicion' were sufficiently delimited by the Constitutional Court's interpretation, for the following reasons. Firstly, the 'duty for the person concerned to adapt his or her own conduct to a way of life complying with all of the above-mentioned requirements' is just as indeterminate as the 'obligation to lead an honest and law-abiding life', since the Constitutional Court simply refers back to section 5 itself. In the Court's view, this interpretation does not provide sufficient guidance for the persons concerned. Secondly, the 'duty of the person concerned to comply with all the prescriptive rules requiring him or her to behave, or not to behave, in a*

particular way; not only the criminal laws, therefore, but any provision whose non-observance would be a further indication of the danger to society that has already been established' is an open-ended reference to the entire Italian legal system, and does not give any further clarification as to the specific norms whose non-observance would be a further indication of the person's danger to society. The Court therefore considers that this part of the Act has not been formulated in sufficient detail and does not define with sufficient clarity the content of the preventive measures which could be imposed on an individual, even in the light of the Constitutional Court's case-law.

123. The Court is also concerned that the measures provided for by law and imposed on the applicant include an absolute prohibition on attending public meetings. The law does not specify any temporal or spatial limits to this fundamental freedom, the restriction of which is left entirely to the discretion of the judge.

124. The Court considers that the law left the courts a wide discretion without indicating with sufficient clarity the scope of such discretion and the manner of its exercise. It follows that the imposition of preventive measures on the applicant was not sufficiently foreseeable and not accompanied by adequate safeguards against the various possible abuses.

These two important criteria find their rationale in a deep concern of the Court which is in some way the heart of the relationship between citizenship and freedom and abuses by the state:

118. ….Thus, the Court considers that the law in force at the relevant time …. did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the domestic courts, and was therefore not formulated with sufficient precision to provide protection against arbitrary interferences and to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct and foresee to a sufficiently certain degree the imposition of preventive measures.

123. The Court is also concerned that the measures provided for by law and imposed on the applicant include an absolute prohibition on attending public meetings. The law does not specify any temporal or spatial limits to this fundamental freedom, the restriction of which is left entirely to the discretion of the judge.

The combination of these three elements, the quality of the law, predictability and the prevention of abuses deriving from excessive discretion, forces us all to rethink radicalisation prevention policies in a new light.

In fact, if behaving like a 'radical' is not a crime (as it still is not) on the basis of this judgement, we now also know that such behaviour can hardly form the basis for preventive measures given that this is not directly required by law and, moreover, it is difficult for persons belonging to cultures and contexts that are very different from our own to understand or to 'predict'. Finally, it can be applied with extreme discretion in the absence of adequate guarantees against possible abuses considering above all that the matter is connected to fundamental human rights. Many of the actions on the basis of which some entities often not even the authorities define the radical dimension and therefore the social risk are not perceived as such or even as 'potential' risks by entire population groups both within the member countries and in their countries of origin whether inside or outside prison. It therefore poses a problem of *unpredictability* both with respect to the list of persons to whom the measures could be applied and with respect to the *content* of the measures themselves, i.e. that which is actually measured by the prevention indicators and tools, and reported in the summary reports, which form the basis for profiling and the consequent measures.

8.4.4   *Procedural Defects*

This aspect of the quality of the law and the unpredictability of the measure is all the more serious since no prior warning, nor any warning from the authorities, is given to proscribed radicals, as is the case with other suspects of very serious crimes, such as mafia association. It is clear from these details such as the classification of information resulting from the new penitentiary observation that it makes them inaccessible both to prisoners and their legal representatives and the involvement of intelligence agencies in the management of data makes any possibility of rights of defence or revision very complex or in any case makes it very difficult to exercise them (Amodio 1975). Equally worrying is that in administrative proceedings relating to radicalisation the proscribed persons are not provided the guarantees provided by the administrative procedure such as being informed of the start of the proceedings. The constant use of secret prevention procedures in many European countries including in court trials and not to mention administrative procedures is a problem that the European Commission cannot continue to pretend not to see, as recently highlighted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA 2017). The acquisition of functional tests for prevention measures

should in principle take place with the so-called summary procedure, i.e. through reference to articles 666 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 185 of the transitional implementation arrangements 'without any particular formalities'. In this case, however, the use of the provisions of Law 3-8-2007 No. 124 which regulates the activities of the secret services is certainly not a facilitating factor for the parties. In short, the whole subject appears confused and fragmentary especially considering the relevance of the threat and the general legal implications in terms of law and civil rights in the broadest sense.

8.4.5   *Risk of an Institutional Mess*

One of the consequences of the historical evolution of the prevention systems that we mentioned at the beginning is the creeping transformation of the profile of the police forces, the intelligence services and their institutional duties with respect to other social bodies both public and private. Here, the watershed moment remains in the fateful 1970s when in the wake of preventive socio-psychological theories the competencies of the police expanded to a greater degree of collaboration, first with civil bodies (municipalities, public agencies, etc.) and then also with the private sector following the model of the Neighbourhood Watch project which supports the police community in England. In that famous programme of the 1970s citizens were organised in patrols that carried out surveillance and reporting duties for the police for the purposes of crime prevention. New approaches to modern police prevention were developed from these models in the form of 'crime reduction partnerships', 'broken windows', 'problem-oriented policing' or 'intelligence-led policing' (Wilson and Kelling 1982). In Europe, this model became the basic antiterrorism doctrine from 2004 onwards with the corollary of hybrid European agencies such as Europol, the EU Working Party and diverse networks such as RAN and ESCN that was dedicated to the recruitment of civil society in processes of 'deradicalisation' (see Fig. 8.18).

In some countries today it is no longer surprising to see a prison run by the private sector or to read about civil society organisations involved in collecting security information (espionage or denunciations). Neither is it surprising to see police forces or their special cores (ROS, DIGOS, GICO, NIC, etc.) perform functions considered to belong within the remit of intelligence using special investigative techniques (SIT) nor to see LEAs carrying out activities that were traditionally the prerogative of welfare

Fig. 8.18 Stakeholders and first-line practitioners in CVE

agencies or vice versa. However, there are risks in the 'mess' as we have seen in the previous paragraph. The ancient borderlines between separate jurisdictions and powers, keys, doors and guardians which guaranteed a fair system of checks and balances tend to fall in the new model of 'prevention policing' which seems to have freed itself from all the complexes that historically linked this concept to totalitarian regimes and ideological repression. Civil society in the United States has also been a trailblazer on this matter. In fact this historical process has profoundly reshaped the FBI, its roles, policies and investigative practices, and it is often accused of operating outside the Handschu Guidelines[25] (the set of rules and procedures which the NYPD has been forced to observe since 1985) following the class action *Handschu versus Special Services* Division[26] due to its espionage activities against political, religious and minority groups.

At the core of the Handschu Guidelines was the prohibition of starting an investigation concerning political, ideological or religious activities, 'specific information has been received by the Police Department that a

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[25] Now in: https://theintercept.com/series/the-fbis-secret-rules/
[26] http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20070215_nycruling.pdf

Figure: Countering Violent Extremism is Different from Counterterrorism

Source: GAO analysis of information from the White House, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); FBI (adapted photographs); Art Explosion (clip art). | GAO-17-300

Fig. 8.19   From civil society to investigations

person or group engaged in political activity is engaged in, about to engage in or has threatened to engage in conduct which constitutes a crime' (see Fig. 8.19).

Since then the debate surrounding the activities of 'intelligence-led police' and the limits of police intelligence powers in pre-investigations (prevention, in fact) has never stopped, especially after the leakage[27] of secret parts of the *Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide* and the legal settlement *Raza versus City of New York*.[28]

In the 'Raza' case, Muslim communities contested the fact that the police carried out targeted surveillance on entire religious and ethnic communities (community mapping and management of intelligence databases, monitoring of mosques, use of informants and infiltrators, targeted online surveillance, etc.) without them having committed any crime.

[27] Now in: https://theintercept.com/series/the-fbis-secret-rules/
[28] https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/raza-v-city-new-york-order-approving-stipulation-settlement

The NYPD's warrantless surveillance of our clients profoundly harmed their religious goals, missions, and practices. It forced religious leaders to censor what they said to their congregants, limit their religious counselling, and record their sermons, for fear that their statements could be taken out of context by police officers or informants. It also diminished attendance at mosques, prompted distrust of newcomers out of concern they are NYPD informants, and prevented the mosques from fulfilling their mission of serving as religious sanctuaries. Our lawsuit charged that the NYPD, through its discriminatory surveillance program, violated our clients' constitutional right to equal protection, as well as their right to freely exercise their religious beliefs.[29]

In America, the dispute ended with a tough settlement which among other things referred the NYPD to the obligations of the Handschu Guidelines, the prohibition of conducting investigations in cases in which race, religion or ethnicity are investigative cues with the obligation of having detailed facts in the matter before starting investigations and within well-defined time limits. The provisions of the settlement are supervised by a specially appointed civilian supervisor who scrutinises their compliance with fundamental rights and has full reporting powers to the court which prohibits the mayor from changing the civil representative without the approval of the judge. Such a scenario is easily projected today onto European investigative activities with a solid foundation in the Convention on Human Rights before the ECtHR. Therefore, it would perhaps be worthwhile to prevent such an outcome and to review the modalities of pre-investigation on Muslim communities for the purpose of preventing radicalism, defining clear and different roles and competencies for the subjects involved, all the more so since this subject also involves professional associations and civil society, who have repeatedly made their voices heard in cases where the obligation to report to the police conflicted with their ethics codes (Summerfield 2016).

8.4.6   *Rights of Radicalisation Suspects*

When it comes to radicalisation and risk assessment, the crux of administrative prevention procedures in several European countries opens up another interpretative question which in reality risks conflict with some of the fundamental principles of rule of the law at the basis of the European legal system.

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[29] https://www.aclu.org/cases/raza-v-city-new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program

The question could be put another way: what are the rights of suspects, and how can they be exercised in the procedures in the context of prevention? While in countries with common law systems or in member states where states of emergency have been declared administrative, procedures have been used for the adoption of preventive measures (e.g. 'Tact' offenders in England). In Italy as in most constitutional countries courts require full juridicalisation of the proceeding (Puglisi 1998) when it intervenes in single provisions, fully recognising the rights deriving from article 24, comma. 2, of the Constitution (ruling of June 14, 1956, No. 2, and March 12, 2010, No. 93). The principle is that where there are no afflictive measures, there is no need to duplicate criminal trials and therefore there remains the need for a fair prevention procedure that ensures the rights of all parties involved which involves a full consultation (the measure of prevention anyway being aimed at limiting freedom of movement). This becomes a mandatory condition with regard to the deprivation of liberty and security measures. In Italy all legislative changes regarding prevention from the first Law 575/1965 up to the last Legislative Decree 7/2015 (convention into Law 41/2015) have always firmly maintained the full juridicalisation of procedures. The only exception is article 13, paragraph c) of Legislative Decree 25-7-1998, 286 on immigration, or, in cases of DASPO, stalking, urban security or drugs. The provisions of Legislative Decree 286/1998 have until now been applied for the expulsion of radicals from third countries by administrative means but without ever clarifying whether the administrative procedure followed was in line with the right to information and defence. However, we will soon find out as the first appeals against expulsion have already been lodged. What is certain is that as the number of citizens involved in these radicalisation processes grows, such rules will tend to lose their impact, and ever more legal preventive procedures will have to be applied. Therefore, these must be built on foundations that hold up during the trial.

The issue is a little more complex at the European level because the guarantees provided for by the Stockholm Roadmap on the presumption of innocence,[30] etc. would seem to apply only to criminal proceedings in

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[30] More specifically Directive (UE) 2016/343 dated 9 March 2016, often recalled by rights activists.

the sense given by the interpretation of the European Court of Justice. However, the wording 'without prejudice to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights' opens up issues of procedure that do not make this assumption an easy one. This flaw in the system was remedied for the first time explicitly by the De Tommaso judgement. In fact, by condemning Italy for the violation of article 6 of the Convention, the Court established the right of every person to the effect that (Article 6 Paragraph 1):

> *Their case is examined fairly, publicly and within a reasonable timeframe by an independent and impartial court, built by law, which is called upon to rule on disputes over their civil rights and duties, or on the validity of any criminal charge made against them.*

The public process is a clear condition set by the ECtHR:

> *138. The Court reiterates that, as it has consistently held, the exclusion of the public from proceedings for the application of preventive measures concerning property amounts to a violation of Article 6 § 1* (see Bocellari and Rizza, cited above, §§ 34–41; Perre and Others, cited above, §§ 23–26; Bongiorno and Others, cited above, §§ 27–30; Leone v. Italy, no. 30506/07, §§ 26–29, 2 February 2010; and Capitani and Campanella v. Italy, no. 24920/07, §§ 26–29, 17 May 2011).

Despite the initial admission of guilt by the Italian government with the request for a partial revocation of the role, the decision of the Court to admit and discuss this part of the De Tommaso case was motivated precisely by the fact that:

> 138. *However, it notes that there are no previous decisions relating to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to proceedings for the application of preventive measures concerning individuals, and thus to the question of public hearings in such proceedings, which, moreover, are conducted in the same way as those for the application of preventive measures in respect of property.*

And by the fact that*:*

> 146. *…the present case is characterised by the fact that the preventive measures applied to the applicant did not constitute a deprivation of liberty pursuant to art.5, c.1 of the Convention, but restrictions on his freedom of movement.*

This choice marks a clear change from previous rulings of the ECtHR explicitly pointed out by the Court favourable to the application of the civil aspect of article 6 of the Convention in cases that might initially seem not to affect a civil right but that can have direct and significant repercussions on a private right of an individual (Portogallo 2012). On this basis working towards a consolidated ruling the Court equated the preventive measures restricting freedom of movement with those relating to restrictive measures of civil rights in prison making them all fall into the same category of preventive limitation of civil rights protected precisely by article 6, c.1, of the Convention. The conclusion was categorical:

> *149. The Court also concluded that any restriction affecting the civil rights of an individual must be capable of being challenged in the course of a judicial proceeding, due to the nature of the restrictions (for example, the prohibition of receiving more than a certain number of monthly visits from family members, or the continuous monitoring of correspondence and telephone conversations) and their possible repercussions (for example, difficulty in maintaining family ties or relationships with people other than family members, or exclusion from outdoor physical activity)* (ibid., § 106).

By analogy therefore the question opens up as to the legitimacy (and legality) of the use of preventive measures limiting the 'civil rights of prisoners and restricted persons' on the basis of radicalisation indicators and their profiling as happens with their placement in special sections (AS2) including enhanced surveillance or limitations of their equal rights with respect to all other detainees restricted for similar offences, but who are not 'listed' as radical. Preventive measures towards prisoners considered radical on the basis of different risk levels as applied in many member countries and in some of them on an administrative basis are configurable as those identified by the Court in the cases of Gülmez v. Turkey, No. 16330/02, §§ 27 31, May 20, 2008 (limitation of visits), Ganci v. Italy (No. 41576/98, §§ 20–26, CEDU 2003 XI), Musumeci v. Italy (No. 33695/96, § 36, January 11, 2005) and Enea v. Italy ([GC], No. 74912/01, § 107, CEDU 2009) that are all related to visits, the monitoring of correspondence and telephone conversations and limits to outdoor physical activity or Stegarescu and Bahrin v. Portugal (No. 46194/06, §§ 37–38, April 6, 2010), which established visits limited to 1 h per week and only behind a glass partition, outdoor physical activity limited to 1 h per day and the impossibility for the first applicant to continue his studies and

take exams. Therefore in the De Tommaso case the court also dissolved the crux of both the juridicalisation and the prevention procedures in relation to a dispute[31] involving 'civil rights' since:

> *In this regard, the character of the legislation governing the methods for determining the matter (civil, commercial, administrative law, etc.) and the authority vested with jurisdiction in this matter (ordinary court, administrative body, and so on) have no decisive consequences.*

In this context therefore the problem of relations between the supervisory authority and the prison officers must be placed in the framework of the decisions concerning the security information on radicalisation which can no longer remain at a verbal and informal level since the preventive measures that affect civil rights are all the responsibility of the judicial authorities. This is evidently valid both in the case of measures pursuant to art. 18-ter (temporary restriction of correspondence, access to newspapers, visas, monitoring envelopes without reading them, etc.) and also and above all in the decisions regarding the benefits of the law and early releases which the monitoring authority must take but there have been difficulties formulating the relevant information: a true paradox. The issue is more complex on a cross-border and European level as it brings out certain legislative contradictions inherent in European law. The first concerns the applicability of Framework Decisions 2008/909-829-947 on the transfer of prisoners and on the use of alternative measures at a pan-European level; the second concerns the applicability of the EIO (Directive 2104/41/EU) in transnational investigations.

In both cases the use in the framework of legal and operational procedures of diversified risk measurement scales, leading to the adoption of very different preventive and safety measures, data collection and transfer as well as their authorisation, poses problems that are difficult to overcome for European judicial cooperation. In fact there emerges the risk that pan-European investigations will meet the same end as detainee transfers when it comes to radicals, for instance, that they remain inapplicable due to the inherent contradictions and fragmentation of systems at the national level.

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[31] Paragraph 144. Please see also Mennitto c. Italia [GC], n. 33804/96, § 23, CEDU 2000 X; Micallef c. Malta [GC], n. 17056/06, § 74, CEDU 2009; e Boulois c. Lussemburgo [GC], n. 37575/04, § 90, CEDU 2012).

8.5   Discussion

More recently as part of the EU-funded TAKEDOWN project,[32] we analysed the transformation of judicial policies and practices from a new perspective (Bianchi 2018)[33] resuming with a certain degree of freedom the sociological theories of Robert Michels (1911), Vilfredo Pareto (1916) and more recently Thomas Ferguson (1995). At the centre of our analysis is the role and circulation of the elites in governance processes interpreted in the context of the evolution of state and legislative institutions in the post-Westphalian era according to models of 'global governance'[34] as originally defined by the United Nations[35] and then reworked by the Global Administrative Law Project.[36] The synthesis of that work[37] is that new asymmetric actors

[32] https://www.takedownproject.eu

[33] 'While Garland analyse the developments from the perspective of the dichotomy welfare/control, we prefer to consider the unbalanced evolution of institutional bodies in the light of the relations between executive powers/judicial powers/civil society or private sector. In our opinion, the real change from the seventieth is represented by the disproportionate role which politician assigned to executive agencies, like intelligence and LEAs, at the expenses of judges and prosecutors; (1) the extension of the security "field" (as defined by Garland) to sectors, traditionally not considered as part of the security competences; (2) the intrusion of private actors into the security scene. These relevant changes occurred within legal and institutional frameworks which maintained a certain degree of stability, therefore generating contradictions, procedural conflicts, inhomogeneous practices and policies and, last but not least, conflicts among citizens. To summarize, security became a battle field for politicians and media, with all the related consequences on the public opinion. What Garland defines as the new culture of control is not only a phenomenon resulting from the removal of security from the welfarist theories, but rather their merging with the advanced models of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) in the form of prevention of terrorism' (Bianchi 2018: 14).

[34] For the concept of 'Global Governance' please refer to: Yunker, G.A., *The Idea of World Government: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Routledge, 2011; Rosenau J.N., Czempiel E.-O., *Governance without Government: Order and Chance in World politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Mazover M., *Governing the World: History of an Idea*, New York, Penguin, 2012; Cassese S., *The Global Polity: Global Dimension of Democracy and the Rule of Law*, Sevilla, Global Law Press, 2012.

[35] The UN Report of the Commission on Global Governance goes back to 1992 and was published in 1995 with the title *Our Global Neighbourhood*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.

[36] The reference is the Global Administrative Law Project, which started in 2005, thanks to the researches of the New York University School of Law. The main concept was proposed by B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R.B. Stewart, *The Emergence of Global Administrative Law*, in: Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, n. 3-4, 2005.

[37] Bianchi S., 2017, *Understand the dimensions of organized crime and terrorist networks for developing effective and efficient security solutions for first-line practitioners and professionals*, in TAKEDOWN EU-Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No 700688, D.2.4 Documentation of the OC/TN response approaches and policies.

have penetrated the 'game of security' which has widened its spectrum of action profoundly modifying the decision-making rules, procedures and modalities with a primary impact on the level of rights and above all with substantial modification to the constitutional equilibrium and relations of *check and balance* that guarantee the democratic stability of national systems. In particular in the 1970s Europe also began a process of profound institutional transformation. From a functional and sectoral political aggregation centred on economic and financial cooperation, the EU became a primary actor in matters of security through different and changing processes of judicial cooperation and security. The ways in which this path was realised between the European Council of Rome on 1 December 1975, when the 'Trevi Group' was established and the Lisbon Treaty of December 2007 when the EU took on new judicial and security powers are 'grassroots' ways as they say, for example fragmentary, informal, gradual and based on systems of 'comitology'.

In our historical research (Bianchi 2017) we noted how the driving forces of these legislative, political and practical processes will become new bodies called 'policy-enabling technostructures'. With their hegemony in these technostructures and in the resulting comitological decision-making processes, the political elites of the member states initiate new models of competition by perpetuating the dynamics of the national conflict in new operational theatres on a European and international scale, but with new means and tactics. Only in this sense can we speak today of a new post-Westphalianism[38] which, in reality, perpetuates (but also dampens) the traditional models of competition. 'Post-Westphalianism' is a scheme of competition between national and supranational powers played through hegemony in international organisations that changes the balance in the member countries, thus in some way violating the heart of Westphalianism which is represented by the principle of national non-interference (Kissinger H. 2014). From the 'bottom-up' the legislative process which was once the heart of national sovereignty together with defence and security has become 'top-down' and from national it becomes supranational. Many laws are no longer made in parliaments and parliamentary commissions as in the past when the elected representatives brought the problems and the demands to be addressed from

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[38] In 1998, at a symposium on the continuing political relevance of the peace of Westphalia, the former NATO secretary-general Solana pronounced a famous speech criticising 'the original Westphalian order…the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration' (Solana, Securing Peace in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Symposium on the Political Relevance of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, Munster 12 November 1998).

the territory to the centres of political systems. Today a large percentage of soft and hard 'laws' originate in the supranational committees of experts, entering ordinary or special legislative processes, and from there descend to member countries with direct (regulation) or 'dual' processes with varying degrees of modification in the form of 'directives', 'framework decisions' or the softer 'recommendations' and 'guidelines'.

There are four main outcomes from these complex post-Westphalian dynamics in terms of security and prevention:

1. Firstly, security priorities are largely influenced by supranational comitology with no real connection between national threat analysis and the prioritisation of policies, practices and resources. An example of this perverse mechanism is the overestimation of the phenomenon of radicalisation (and terrorism) in the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe where the phenomenon is statistically not very relevant compared to organised crime or simple criminality (see Figs. 8.20 and 8.21).

2. The second outcome from this post-Westphalian process of new creeping nationalism is the emergence of new hybrid policing models half-way between intelligence services and law enforcement agencies (LEAs): the so-called intelligence-led police, which in Europe will often take the form of prevention police. The slogan of these new policing models is the magical word 'multi-agency' which hides a profound deinstitutionalisation of procedures with many risks in terms of rights.

3. The third product of these processes is the marked de-juridicalisation of prevention processes. European and international security police and agencies (Europol, Interpol, etc.) will assume previously unknown powers while judges, prosecutors, lawyers and the judicial elite in general will remain marginal. We must have the courage to admit that behind the failure to implement art. 86, par. 4, of the Treaty of Lisbon which provides for the establishment of a European prosecutor, there is the defeat of the judiciary as a European techno-institutional elite to the benefit of administrative preventive practices which today have a free hand in the areas of pre-crime. This area includes many new aspects of contemporary criminology with the consequent retributive justice, community penalties or the automatism of sentencing.

4. Finally, the last outcome is so-called public-private cooperation of which the field of security that was once a sector rigidly and jealously guarded by the state apparatus has been extended to private individuals from the execution of the sentence (private prisons) and surveys (e.g. Internet governance) to prevention (the Danish Info-Houses and their corresponding models in the Netherlands, UK, USA, etc.).

EUROPE 603 morts dans des attentats islamistes depuis 2004

Les lieux des attaques, les tués*.

Date	Pays	Lieu	Tués
18 août 2017	🇪🇸	Cambrils	1**
17 août 2017	🇪🇸	Barcelone	13**
3 juin 2017	🇬🇧	Londres	8
22 mai 2017	🇬🇧	Manchester	22
20 avr. 2017	🇫🇷	Paris	1
7 avr. 2017	🇸🇪	Stockholm	5
22 mars 2017	🇬🇧	Londres	5
19 déc. 2016	🇩🇪	Berlin	12
26 juil. 2016	🇫🇷	St-Étienne-du-R.	1
14 juil. 2016	🇫🇷	Nice	86
13 juin 2016	🇫🇷	Magnanville	2
22 mars 2016	🇧🇪	Bruxelles	32
13 nov. 2015	🇫🇷	Paris et St-Denis	130
26 juin 2015	🇫🇷	St-Quentin-Fallavier	1
19 avr. 2015	🇫🇷	Villejuif	1
14 févr. 2015	🇩🇰	Copenhague	2
9 janv. 2015	🇫🇷	Paris	4
8 janv. 2015	🇫🇷	Montrouge	1
7 janv. 2015	🇫🇷	Paris	12
24 mai 2014	🇧🇪	Bruxelles	4
22 mai 2013	🇬🇧	Londres	1
18 juil. 2012	🇧🇬	Bourgas	7
19 mars 2012	🇫🇷	Toulouse	4
15 mars 2012	🇫🇷	Montauban	2
11 mars 2012	🇫🇷	Toulouse	1
7 juil. 2005	🇬🇧	Londres	52
2 nov. 2004	🇳🇱	Amsterdam	1
11 mars 2004	🇪🇸	Madrid	192

*nombre de vicitimes décédées. **bilan provisoire au 18 août 2017.

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Figs. 8.20 and 8.21   Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland: data on casualties and attacks 2000–2017

All these themes play a central role in the context of prevention policies and more specifically in the context of 'political' prevention, i.e. 'deradicalisation', whether it deals with problems related to religiously inspired crime phenomena or touches those issues that today go under the label of 'polarisation'. The EU and the European Court of Justice and the ECtHR have assumed undeniable importance in the regulation of these matters. Therefore, in a post-Brexit age an independent EU guarantor of the interests of all member states which has its foundation in the rule of law can no longer postpone the formulation of an organic legislative corpus of indi-

Living with terrorism
Terrorism in western Europe and selected events within years

Figs. 8.20 and 8.21   (continued)

vidual and patrimonial prevention rules. Given the importance in terms of security and civil rights, we cannot continue to proceed in a fragmented manner, building procedures and policies on the basis of ever-changing cases or worse still the pressure of public opinion, the media or conflicts between the powers of the state. Under Directive 2017/541/EU, the Union and its member states have significantly expanded the scope of 'terror-related crimes' to all so-called preparatory acts.

Furthermore, article 13 of the Directive has established a new principle of criminal investigation and of the cognitive judgement of the judge:

For an offence referred to in Article 4 or Title III to be punishable, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed, nor shall it be necessary, insofar as the offences referred to in Articles 5 to 10 and 12 are concerned, to establish a link to another specific offence laid down in this Directive.

The extension of these penal measures in such a flexible form probably allows the introduction of 'factual elements' typical of criminal processes in prevention procedures, similarly to what happened in Italy with the 'Royal Law' on the application of prevention measures towards 'politically dangerous subjects.'[39] This element could make all the work, effort and investment in ideological prevention on which the EU and its agencies concentrate today as well as a myriad of other projects, superfluous. Bringing back the phenomenon of prevention into an equal relationship with criminal law we will have clear procedural rights derived from the ECtHR's jurisprudence and the 'Stockholm's Roadmap' as well as other European directives such as EIO, whereby European security systems can still balance security and justice, prevention and law, rights of the suspects and efficacy of the penal action. An organic framework for prevention norms in the form of a directive can start from this by reviewing the errors made up to now in the prevention of radicalisation.

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[39] On the evolution of preventive measures in Italy, please see Manna, *Misure di Prevenzione: aspetti comparatistici e prospettive di riforma*, QG, 1995, 2, 311 e sgg.; Guerrini-Mazza, *Le Misure di Prevenzione-Profili sostanziali e processuali*, Padova, 1996.

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Countering Radicalisation in the United Kingdom: A Community-Based Approach

Arif Sahar

9.1 Introduction

Radicalisation as a new weapon of terrorism with new forms and new characteristics has been a linchpin in the national security discourse across the West. This new form of terror is mostly induced by citizen—status terrorist(s)—loosely labelled under the umbrella of home-grown terrorism. The frequency and intensity of destruction inflicted by home-grown terrorists, above all, represents an evolution in militant jihadism and adds additional difficulty to the efforts fighting the phenomenon. Until late, the terrorist organisations encountered the West and invaded their interests 'over there', through those "who held particular grievances associated with their immediate socio-political environments, radicalised with the assistance of local facilitators, prepared acts of violence within their community, and travelled to their Western targets to carry out attacks" (Wilner and Dubouloz 2010: 33). More recently, terrorist networks have effectively transformed their strategy of fighting the West overseas to a battle of communities within the Western borders, by inflicting terror through

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their home-grown sympathisers. It is worth noting that while home-grown terrorism is not a novel development, there are certain features inherent to the phenomenon that differentiate it from more traditional operating behaviours of terrorism. These features include more sophisticated means of communication, greater inclusion of female actors as well as the increased capacity for highly destructive and disruptive attacks. Moreover, home-grown radicalisation "is generally associated with transnational socio-political grievances not easily addressed unilaterally or at the local level and is an altogether distinct and complex security challenge" (Wilner and Dubouloz 2010: 33). Brown and Saeed (2015: 1952), gauging the implications of home-grown radicalisation in the UK's higher education context, state that "yet, despite concerns raised over the extant understanding of radicalisation, the UK's current strategy considers radicalisation as a cause for state concern". In social context, "the emergence and growth of home-grown radicalisation raised concerns not just about the threat of future terrorist attacks, but it also played on deeper anxieties about Britain's growing diversity and apparent loss of a cohesive identity" (Wilner and Dubouloz 2010: 33). Prevention and de-radicalisation efforts, therefore, must find a middle ground that is inclusive of women and broker reconciliation with those struggling with a sense of belonging and looking for validation measures such as social acceptance.

To prevent youth from becoming radicalised and counter the spread of radicalisation, the UK government introduced the Prevent strategy in 2003 as part of an overall post-9/11 counter-terrorism approach (CONTEST). The prime aim of the strategy focused on preventing the radicalisation of individuals to terrorism. In 2015, the strategy became a legal duty for public sector institutions, and as such, its reach has extended much deeper into society (Qurashi 2018). The strategy, despite being praised for its efficiency in addressing the causes and narrowing down of the breeding spaces of radicalisation, has also attracted fierce criticism (Qurashi 2018). Such critiques, while valuable to societal and political debates, fall outside the proposed scope of this chapter and therefore are not covered in the following commentary.

The growing violence attributed to home-grown Muslim-led terrorism not only induces enduring fear into the social infrastructures of its host communities but also implicates Muslim communities in a myriad of ways. Already under intense scrutiny in recent years, particularly since the 11th of September 2001 and 7th of July 2005 attacks on New York and London, respectively, Muslim communities in the West would increasingly be

subjected to unprecedented scrutiny and tagged as a suspect community and driven to constant apologies (Briggs and Birdwell 2009; Hasan 2015). In the UK, "the rhetoric of political leaders expanded the threat of Islamic radicalisation leading to terrorist violence from a strategic danger to an existential threat to values, freedom and the British way of life" (Lynch 2013: 242; Jackson 2005; Fekete 2004). Several studies have highlighted that "it seems almost trite to state that since 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings, Muslims in the UK are increasingly viewed through a lens of suspicion, cast as aliens and considered permanently vulnerable to 'radicalization'" (Brown and Saeed 2015: 1952; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Vertigans 2010). The impact on Muslims of the growing terrorist activities and their portrayal in the media has been expansive and includes Islamophobia, increases in stop and searches, social prejudice and increased reports of hate crime (Brown and Saeed 2015). It is against this wider backdrop of deepening cleavage between Muslim and non-Muslim communities that the root causes of home-grown terrorism and the UK's response should be viewed and analysed.

Since the 7th of July 2005 London bombings, the extent of home-grown radicalisation problem has become clearer as new plots have been unearthed by police across the Western world, and a succession of trials and profiling of perpetrators have provided rare glimpses into the lives of the radicals (Bartlett et al. 2010). As such, this chapter assesses the root causes of radicalisation in the UK and highlights the potential for community-based resilience as an approach to counter-radicalisation. It elaborates the capability of community-based resilience in helping Muslims to construct social activism and critical citizenship to challenge institutions and narratives that assist in advancing the legitimacy that radicalisation draws support from. Community engagement particularly gains in significance—as a tool to counter-radicalisation—in a time when irregular migration of people has increased drastically around the globe due to a host of reasons including civil unrest, economic instability and conflicts (Miller et al. 2017). Over the past couple of years (2015–2016), the influx of migrants into the EU has raised concerns about the radical jihadi/terrorist permeation of refugee streams and communities, potentially leading local communities to undergo dramatic transformations. This development necessitates a more robust management to mitigate the potential security risks associated with the flow of irregular migration. In other EU states it has been highlighted that "this threat is often compounded by short staffed, overburdened complex infrastructure systems unable to handle

the massive unregulated border crossing into and within the Schengen area where governments, that do not oftentimes share critical information, are ill-prepared to cope with human-induced terror disasters" (Miller et al. 2017: 189). As such, this chapter draws on community engagement as a means to counter-terrorism by denying radicalisation a political legitimacy, helping win the hearts and minds of disenfranchised communities and facilitating a greater social integration.

The chapter begins with a contextual analysis of the socio-economic and political conditions of the Muslim communities in the UK, followed by a brief analysis of the West's views toward Muslims. The next section presents a critical assessment of conceptual confusion over the definition of radicalisation and problematises the concept on how and where to demarcate the boundary between destructive radical ideas and constructive ones, which might at times provide a solution to the undesired situation. In the following section, the chapter offers a brief discussion on theories of radicalisation, which focus mainly on the root causes of the phenomenon, and sets the scene for a detailed discussion on potential for community-based resilience as a means of addressing the challenge of radicalisation in the UK. The chapter concludes that community-based resilience by (1) denying the terrorists popular support and ideological legitimacy, (2) helping win the hearts and minds of potential terrorist individuals/groups and (3) facilitating integration and connection with non-integrative enclaves can function as a powerful tool to address radicalisation in the UK.

9.2   Contextual Analysis: Muslim Communities in the UK

According to a recent survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre, the number of Muslims in the UK is set to triple in 30 years rising from 4.1 million in 2016 to 13 million in 2050 (Pew Research Center 2017a, b; Rudgard 2017). The survey demonstrates that the United Kingdom has been the major destination for economic migrants coming to Europe, while Germany has been the top destination for refugees, and an estimated 43% of all migrants to the UK between mid-2010 and mid-2016 were Muslims. The data also suggest that the gaps in fertility rates between Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK are significant, with non-Muslim women having an average of 1.8 children compared to the 2.9 had by

Muslims. This implies that even if migration were to stop completely, the Muslims' population share would rise by more than 3% in the UK (Rudgard 2017). This trend will leave the country with the highest overall population of Muslims in the European Union (EU), at 13 million, making up 16.7% of the population (Rudgard 2017). The Muslim demography indicates that the community has the youngest age profile of all faith groups; in 2001, one-third (33.8%) were under the age of 16, compared to one-fifth of the population overall (20.2%), and the average age is 28, 13 years below the national average (Samad and Sen 2007). This has a bearing on the extent and nature of radicalisation within the Muslim community, with most of terror-related violence being youth-led and youth-induced.

Equally, the socio-economic condition of Muslim communities may be consequential in creating an enabling environment in and through which radical groups and networks may work and seek to influence potential recruits. This enabling environment may be exacerbated further by the tough social and cultural conditions that the Muslim communities experience in exercising their rights to benefit from public services including education, health and judiciary. Research has revealed that the Muslim population in the UK is one of the most disadvantaged in the state (Lynch 2013). Similar studies have highlighted that the Muslim communities in the UK experience a higher degree of socio-economic deprivation. Lynch (2013: 245) states that in the Muslim communities in the UK, "unemployment, poor educational attainment, poor health, poor relationships with police, high incidences of imprisonment and poor prospects all round, mark the experience of many members of this population" (see also Samad 2004). The Muslims experience a dual difficulty of overcoming these difficult socio-economic deprivations as well as coping with pressures inflicted by a growing hostile view from their host communities. Although surveys indicate that Western societies continue to express mixed views of both Muslims and Islam (Pew Research Centre), on some measures, opinions about Muslims have declined in recent years. The Western views toward Muslims are discussed in detail in the following section.

9.2.1   *Western Views Toward Muslims*

The growing violence attributed toward radicalisation across mainland Europe has raised significant discussions in the media, policymaker and academic circles about the integration and assimilation of Muslims into

Western societies. Despite this, little cross-national study has been carried out to chart Western attitudes toward Muslims (Briggs and Birdwell 2009). Of the studies that do exist, a portion has suggested that Islam is perceived in the Western views as inherently incompatible or less inclined to reconcile with the Western values. Alexander (2000) goes as far as to suggest that the Muslims have emerged as the new folk devils in the British popular and media imagination. Another study highlighted that in popular discourses, Muslim men are not only conceptualised as dangerous individuals with a capacity for violence, but also as culturally dangerous—as threatening the British way of life (Archer 2003). A survey carried out by multiple Muslim groups found that since the 9 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America, 80% of Muslim respondents reported to have been subjected to Islamophobia; 32% reported of having been subjected to discrimination at UK airports; and 68% felt they had been perceived and treated differently (FAIR 2004). Another survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006) revealed that many Muslims are uncomfortable with life in the UK. The poll further suggests that Muslims in the UK were more inclined to envisage a clash between Islam and modernity, more concerned about the future of Muslims in the UK and more likely to self-identify along religious lines than national lines (cited in Briggs and Birdwell 2009). More recently, another survey was conducted on UK attitudes toward Islam in which over two thousand British adults were questioned online by ComRes for the charity Ahmadiyya Muslim Youth Association. The poll found that the majority of Britons questioned believe Islam is not compatible with British values, and almost a third of participants believe Islam is a violent religion and promotes acts of violence in the UK (Talwar 2016). The Council of American-Islamic Relations (2011: 47) found that "between 2009 and 2010, there has been a 50% rise in anti-Muslim vandalism, a 150% rise in Islamophobic rhetoric, and a 300% rise in violence". However, there are numerous studies which highlight a mixed view toward the Muslims in the West (Rockenbach 2017; Lipka 2017).

In societies characterised by heterogeneous subtleties of religious and ethnic communities such as the United Kingdom, waning sense of mutual trust can leave them more politically divided. In distrustful societies, citizens are more likely to identify stronger with local identities and do business in ways that benefit their own social class, subcultures, religion or other affiliated groups. Rather than seeking outward interactions that

generate higher social returns and capitals, they engage in more inward practices that make it more difficult for other groups to seize on inter-community communication opportunities. This 'trust deficit' reinforces a cycle of greater mistrust and leads to a distrust trap (Tabarrok 2016), denting societal structures and activities. The chapter now turns its attention to the conceptual discussion on radicalisation, starting with an analysis of the conceptual confusion followed by the problematisation of the concept. The subsequent section presents a discussion of the relevant theories on the root causes of radicalisation and their contribution to radicalisation.

9.3 Radicalisation: A Conceptual Confusion

The concept of radicalisation is essentially contested and even flawed and disingenuous (Githens-Mazer 2012), so are the concept's analysis frameworks. There is no single and agreed upon definition of radicalisation. However, a diverse set of theoretical frameworks including rational choice theory (Sandler and Arce 2008), strategic choice theory (Goodwin 2006), relational frame theory (Dixon et al. 2003) and social network theory (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006; Sageman 2004) have been tested to explain the motivations and mechanics of processes of radicalisation which lead to extremism. Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011: 13) state that "more often than not the terms 'radicalisation', 'radicalise' and 'radical' are employed in a way that suggests they are self-evident concepts. Even worse, the terms are often used in a circular fashion: a radical is someone who has radical ideas or who has been radicalised". In recent times, the globalisation of jihad, sophistication in communication and the global outreach of terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda have added to theoretical complications (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Berrebi 2007). Amid this confusion, the field of radicalisation study lacks a conceptual clarity and a definitional theory that can sufficiently capture the processes and accounts for the mechanics of radicalisation. This conceptual confusion is evident in definitions promulgated by the existing literature. Hannah et al. (2008: 2), for instance, define radicalisation as "the process whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal, into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme". Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 798) describes radicalisation as "a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order". Similarly, Veldhuis and

Staun (2009: 4) view radicalisation as "the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goal". Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 798) adds the term violent radicalisation as a subset of radicalisation and describes radicalisation as "a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts". This definitional discrepancy demonstrates the weakness of existing literature to 'problematise' the research on radicalisation and highlights the challenges inherent in formulating a definition for radicalisation that is versatile and adaptable to different yet particular contexts. This is problematic because some definitions of radicalisation are as broad and vague as can potentially criminalise or disregard lawful and legitimate political opinions. There is notable concern that on such occasions individuals may be persecuted socially, politically and potentially through the powers of the state, because they are not seen to fully conform to the normative social opinion. Furthermore, it risks blurring the boundary between ideas that lead to violence and those that can potentially lead to reasoning, problem-solving and a change for good. As such, these conceptual limitations have not been properly contextualised and communicated and have entered government and public discourses on terrorism in the West, causing serious repercussions for responses aimed at countering radicalisation. A commentary on portrayal of radicalisation in the British media by Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2009: 1–2), for instance, is explanatory:

> ...The term radicalisation has become part of the rhetorical structure of the waging of the 'War on Terror' without any reflexive interrogation of its distinctiveness, genealogy or function, in describing a 'root cause' of terrorist activities which thus requires a policy and/or tactical response (i.e., 'de-radicalisation'). Such clustering affords a false certainty to media reporting and commentary.

This 'war of conceptual paradigms' shows that the current research on radicalisation bears the danger of glossing over the conceptual caveats generated by a disagreement on definitions of radicalisation and reducing the possibility of critically engaging in questions; (1) why do some people radicalise? (2) Why some do not radicalise? The next section attempts to bring to light this conceptual caveat by problematizing the concept of radicalisation.

9.3.1 *Problematising the Concept of Radicalisation*

Drawing a distinction between radicals (those who hold non-violent radical ideas) and violent radicals (those who hold radical ideas that countenance violence) is critical. This helps develop a more nuanced insights into the processes and pathways through which individuals and groups engage in violence. It also helps understand whether holding radical ideas necessarily leads to violence and terrorism and whether those who hold radical ideas but do not act upon them should be considered extremist/terrorist. A critical analysis of literature on security study reveals that in debate between the Western security discourse and the notion/view of positive radical ideas, the former prevails undermining the whole idea of entitlement to radical views and freedom of speech. As discussed in previous sections, with an increase in terrorist-induced incidents in recent times, the boundaries between the notion of right to freedom and security and intelligence landscapes are increasingly blurred. This condition can potentially lead to the limitation of space and options for people to express their ideas and identities without fearing of being stigmatised as radical or extremist with an intention to infringe violence. Also, some prominent factors such as economic background, relative assimilation into 'host' cultures and failed integration into the mainstream society lead some people to accumulate a sense of dissidence with the state and the system, without necessarily resorting to violence. Moreover, characterising all categories of radical ideas under the single narrative of extremism and/or terrorism might lead to failure to account for why some people act violently and others do not. Furthermore, extending the characteristics of a non-representative sample to the whole population might make it more problematic for theories of radicalisation to accurately predict violent behaviour.

Currently, in the intersection between increasing heightened security measures and terrorist attacks, the danger of extending these events on everyone with radical ideas except the real culprits becomes highly likely. This approach, at times, can be counter-productive while violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies; non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies (Bartlett et al. 2010). With a transformation in the genealogy of radicalisation and the discourse surrounding the concept, the debate around the causes of radicalisation and its implications constantly changes. It is, therefore, important to contextualise the concept of radicalisation by drawing a clear distinction between the harmful and harmless radical ideas instead of deploying a 'one size fits all' approach.

The next section critically evaluates this trend and the major causes of radicalisation relevant to this chapter, by examining the key factors that contribute to, or mitigate, the processes of radicalisation.

9.4   RADICALISATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

9.4.1   The Root Causes of Radicalisation

For governments and policymakers to be able to address the problem of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism effectively, they need to develop insights into the root causes which lead individuals to engage in terrorism-related activities. Research over the years has highlighted that root causes are not static; rather they are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing (Sinai 2007).This dynamism is "the case within and between groups, as well as the changing political paradigm in which terrorism is viewed (Cold-War versus post-Cold War; pre-9/11 versus post-9/11; post-9/11 versus post-7/7), and the changing disciplinary approaches to viewing and understanding violent methods, for instance the impact of poverty versus the impact of globalisation" (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011: 23). Research has also shown that there is a causal relationship between underlying social, economic, demographic and political conditions and terrorist activity (Newman 2006). This proposition suggests that certain underlying conditions and grievances help explain how, where and why terrorism occurs (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011). However, despite the fact that these relationships are endogenous and hardly lend themselves to test empirically and cause methodological limitations (root causes capture a wide range of issues and cannot be grouped within a single social category, e.g. social exclusion), it still remains an important area to consider (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011). As discussed below, failure to understand the connections between these underpinning conditions and violence may culminate in inadequate counter-radicalisation policies. Several studies have suggested that "ignoring this relationship may contribute to the exacerbation of the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism and in turn intensify the terrorist threat" (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011: 23; Newman 2006; Mani 2004). In the following subsections, the chapter presents a thematic analysis of main theoretical frameworks, which engage with the root causes of radicalisation and are considered to constitute the underlying reasons that lead individuals/groups to radicalisation. The chapter focuses only on religious influence and ideologies, political justification and cultural and

socio-economic discriminations, which are considered to be more effectively redressed through community-based resilience.

9.4.2 Religious Influence and Ideologies

Religious ideology that refers to a worldview or set of beliefs that guides individual or collective action is frequently debated in terrorism studies (Glazzard et al. 2015: 11). However, in discourses on the underlying causes of Islam and terrorism, the significance of ideology in mobilising masses behind a cause has become contested and politicised. Some commentators go as far as asserting (controversially) that Islam, or at least Islamism, is inherently violent (Lewis 2002; Pipes 1989). Della Porta (2001) states that ideology should be seen more as an enabler, reducing "the psychological costs of participation in terrorist organisations", by promoting doctrines of legitimacy and positive emotions leading to a sense of self-righteousness. In the face of growing terrorist attacks across the Western world in recent years, the roles that ideology and religion play in radicalisation are increasingly becoming contentious. It is especially after 9/11, where influential authors including Paul Bremer (2001) emphasised that a qualitatively new brand of terrorism with complex characteristics was emerging. Stren (2004) argued that the brand was motivated by religious fanaticism and ready to go to further lengths and at greater human cost to achieve their objectives.

Despite this politicisation of the underpinning relationship between Islam and terrorism, research has revealed that Islam as an ideology has a particular capability to transcend national boundaries and rally people around a cause at global level. Gleave (2014), for instance, states that while Islam itself does not necessarily lead to violence, but there are certain forms of ideological theology inherent in it and have greater potential to pose a security risk than others. Gleave (2014) refers specifically to the ideological narratives created by Salafists in the 1970s and 1980s which ultimately led to the global jihadist movement. Khan and Azam (2008) have raised the importance of religion and theology in radicalisation processes and argue that religion has been an effective tool utilised by terrorists to deceive believers into a militant interpretation of the religion in question. More recently, however, "the fundamental 'newness' of al-Qaeda inspired terrorism has been questioned, with influential terrorism scholars leaning towards the view that more things unite 'old' political terrorism and 'new' religious terrorism than divide them" (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011: 40). Some scholars

have suggested Islamic ideology while providing a harbinger for certain values which can potentially bind different segments of Muslim communities together to struggle for a single cause has failed to achieve its primary objective of mobilising a worldwide revolution against the existing order (Holbrook 2014). Milelli (2008) by analysing the major works by Islamist ideologues including *bin Laden* and his associates elucidates the distinctive messages of each articulated in ideological framework and varied from a notion of defensive jihad to a doctrine of preemption or defence through aggression and to creating a territorial base sustained by permanent war. This indicates that ideology and its adaptability have been manipulated by certain brands of terrorism in response to the changing conditions as an effective tool to promulgate violence.

A sense of belonging to an overarching religious ideology, which serves as a medium of promoting unity across the Muslim communities and demarcating boundaries between the Muslim 'self' and the antagonistic non-Muslim 'other', is another driver of radicalisation. Roy (2006) and Silke (2008) note that identification with the broader Muslim community plays a critical part in promoting radicalisation processes. Ansari (2005) has examined the interconnecting roles of national, ethnic and religious identity in a sample of British Muslims. He demonstrates that within the identity hierarchy, religious identity superseded ethnic identity that itself superseded national identity. He has also demonstrated that Muslim identity was positively correlated with the perceived importance of jihad and martyrdom as opposed to British identity that negated these attitudes. The journey to radicalisation of the British teenager Safaa Boular highlights how religion can function as a saviour for vulnerable people who feel left out and isolated within their family and the larger community. Safaa was found to have transformed after the deadly ISIS-induced attacks in Paris in November 2015 and began articulating whether she was under a duty as a Muslim to help Islam and fight the infidels, given her exposures to extremist views about being a good Muslim (Casciani 2018). Moreover, in regions where ideological militancy has been part of the public's experiences for a long time and people are socialised through militancy for religious causes, indulging in violence becomes normalised. In Palestine, for instance, the social status developed through revolutionary rhetoric such as 'heroic soldiers' and 'participation in a great struggle' has been a key driver of suicide and jihadi recruits (Siobelman 2004; Moghadam 2003). Radicalisation trends amongst Muslims in Europe reveal that collective grievances arising from the occupation of Palestine, Russian military

aggressions in Chechnya and the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria feature prominently in jihadi rhetoric and stand out as the single most important motivational factor at the group level (Nesser 2006).

9.4.3 Political Justifications

Political justifications behind terrorism-related activities are related to a form of governance. Terrorists have sought to exploit the popular grievances attributed to political systems that the terrorists believe are corrupt and ignorant of the difficulties (social, economic and political) the Muslims experience. The recent wave of rebellion against the elected governments in the Middle East in the embodiment of 'Arab Spring' to a great extent underpinned and accelerated radicalisation and/or violent extremism/terrorism. Numerous studies have revealed that the prime aim of Islamic extremist/terrorist organisations is to politicise religion or a particular ideology (Piazza 2008; Ardila 2002; Ibrahim 1993) by toppling secular governments (Walter 2017; Reid 2002), establishing authentic Islamic governments (Ali 2006a, b) and implementing Islamic laws and its world view (Jacoby 2010; Sageman 2004). Moreover, extremist movements blame their governments for failing to defeat the enemy of Islam, especially the Christian West, Jewish Zionism and atheist communism (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011). They believe that the political systems are serving those who have abdicated their duties toward Islam (Ibrahim 1980) resulting in endemic political corruption, moral decay and weakening of Islamic values in the Islamic world (Tanveer 2005). As such, the terrorist organisations perceive the political systems that exist in Arab countries as undemocratic (Isam 2006; Ghadbian 2000). These "governments are seen as either stooges of the West or authoritarian regimes which are no longer representative of the people's will or reflecting the 'true path of Islam'" (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011: 25). The alleged complicit assistance of local governments supplements the argument that the West has been invading and looting the treasures of the Muslim world, leading to the poor Islamic world that is increasingly sinking deeper in economic austerity—an argument that has found significant resonance amongst the disenfranchised Muslim communities (Aggarwal 2009; Campain 2006). The Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the humiliating defeat of three Arab countries by Israel in 1967 (Pape 2003; Summy 2002) exacerbated by the clash of values and ideology (Hirst 2007; Richmond 2003) has played a critical role in bolstering radicalisation processes in the West.

The tensions between the West and Islam have been important to the course of world events for centuries and have been increasingly gaining in salience since the 09/11 terrorist attacks on America and the subsequent US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2004. These invasions have led to a perception in the Muslim world that the West is at war with the Muslim world, which must be responded with all available means, including violence. The Muslim communities view these interventions as seamless efforts for introduction and extension of Western culture, technology and organisational forms (religious and cultural liberalism), exerting a destructive influence over Muslim communities (Ignatius 2015). Research has revealed that a major factor in driving individuals and groups to extremism is the perceived cultural dominance of the West and injustices inflicted (Hashim 2014). As a result, those who fight the Western interests are conceived as not traitors, or even extremists, but people who deserve some admiration to fight for justice (Bartlett et al. 2010). This view is particularly growing deeper in countries such as the USA, Canada and the UK which are involved militarily in a Muslim majority country (Bartlett et al. 2010). It is worth mentioning that these points are not merely about grievances resulting in or justifying terrorism-instigated activities, but it is more about conceptualising radicalisation, terrorism and violent extremism.

9.4.4   Socio-Political Discrimination

Socio-political deprivation, both in native and host communities, is shown to have a profound impact on individuals being drawn to radicalisation. According to Silke (2008), Horgan (2007) and Kepel (2005), discrimination resulting from (perceived and/or real) injustices and a sense of alienation perpetrated by local or external actors may drive participation in radical milieus. These authors further state that perceived political, economic and social discriminations play a critical role in the radicalisation processes. Other similar studies have highlighted that a desire to respond to grievance appears to contribute to radicalisation both at individual and group levels (Argo 2004; Siobelman 2004; Alonso and Reinares 2006). These perceived grievances could be inflicted on the individual personally or on the larger collective group with whom the individual closely identifies (Davis and Cragin 2009). Crenshaw (1981: 394) states that "if there is a single common emotion that drives the individual to become a terrorist,

it is revenge on behalf of comrades or even the constituency the terrorist aspires to represent".

The acts of terrorism increasingly involving highly qualified individuals imply that social status per se is an insufficient condition for radicalisation processes. For instance, 'Jihadi John', the ISIS executioner, gained a university degree from a British university (Dearden 2015). Anwar al-Awlaki, leader of al-Qaida, before participating in terrorist movements, attended a doctorate course at George Washington University (Bergen 2015). The 9 September 2001 hijackers in the USA, the 7th of July 2005 suicide bombers in London and the 2004 train bombers in Madrid all came from privileged backgrounds and enjoyed high educational and social status in their communities and movements they affiliated with. This indicates that extremist organisations tap on a wide range of social resources of radicalisation targeting the recruitment of all groups of people including professionals, particularly those who are more vulnerable (primarily due to accumulated socio-economic deprivation) to be attracted to extremist propaganda. In response, the people who feel grieved and see their identity and culture threatened by the Western dominance participate in radical adventures (Table 9.1). It also shows that extremist organisations have

Table 9.1 Analysis of drivers of radicalisation (Crenshaw 1981; Francis 2012)

Category	Sub-categories		Examples
Situational	Pre-conditions	Enabling	Developments within modernity, for example, the Internet; expansion of modern education; women's participation in political/social/economic spaces
		Motivating	Racial and religious discrimination and divisions, economic and social exclusion, abusive legal system, pervasive corruption
	Precipitant		Foreign policy, such as the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Palestine
Strategic	Long term		Defeat of Western modernity/morality, establishment of grand Caliphate
	Short term		Attention for aims, fear, adventures, etc.
Ideological			Non-negotiable beliefs about what is good for society, clash of civilisations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities

permeated various communities and influenced the individuals' psycho-cognition construction of new identities that constitute a significant part of these individuals' moral being based on religion and shape their behaviours that are often changing and moulding to serve the purpose of these organisations. Also, see Chap. 4.

The chapter now discusses ways how community-based resilience can potentially lead to nurturing an inclusive culture and environment where individuals are able to thrive, irrespective of their race or ethnicity by enabling the flow of information and trust to increase safety against human-induced terror disasters in today's borderless society.

9.5   Community-Based Resilience: A Response to Radicalisation

As discussed in previous section, terrorism is increasingly becoming multifaceted and embedding within their host communities. Within the context of the new normal necessitated by the Paris, London and Brussels attacks, policies to violent radicalisation infiltrating communities must place the strength of communities at their centre. As such, Longstaff et al. (2010) state that:

> [a] community's adaptive capacity is a function of the ability of individuals and groups to: i) store and remember experiences; ii) use that memory and experience to learn, innovate, and reorganize resources in order to adapt to changing environmental demands; and iii) connect with others inside and outside the community to communicate experiences and lessons learned, self-organize or reorganize in the absence of direction, or to obtain resources from outside sources.

Community resilience as a sustained ability of communities to utilise available resources and generate a common platform to counter radical individuals and groups has a unique capability to narrow down the breeding ground for radicalisation. It allows for the adaptation and cohesion of a community after a disaster strikes and helps communities minimise security threats and maintain social confidence and integrity in the aftermath of human-induced terrorism. As discussed below, community-based resilience can function as a measured, intuitive and effective response to homegrown radicalisation.

Fostering community resilience in Europe becomes increasingly important as a mechanism of protection against human-induced terrorist disasters, at a time when "irregular migration of people has increased drastically around the globe due to civil unrest, economic instability, genocide, and a host of other reasons" (Miller et al. 2017: 179). Since in recent years, "security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home" (Coaffee and Wood 2006: 504), this necessitates to develop a more nuanced strategy that has the capability to counter-radicalisation and political violence, by challenging the corrupt interpretation of theology that results in moral hypocrisy on the war on the West. As such, the nexus of communities, terrorism and counter-terrorism gains in significance. Several countries including Britain, the United States, Australia and other liberal democratic societies place significant emphasis on the centrality of communities in the prevention or support of terrorism (Spalek 2014). In Britain, for instance, rooted within the Northern Ireland experience, the discourse of "communities defeat terrorism" through community-based resilience has become an accepted counter-terrorism maxim as evidenced by the Prevent Strategy (Briggs et al. 2006: 6). Community-based resilience can potentially provide effective defence against violent extremist ideologies by enabling local institutions and local communities with a willingness and awareness to work with one another and government as part of community-based initiatives to address extremists' threats (Miller et al. 2017). These initiatives can take multiple forms and the relevant ones are discussed thematically in subsequent three sections. The first section discusses how these initiatives might lead to a denial of political support and ideological legitimacy that the terrorists manipulate to justify their activities. See Chap. 10 for a discussion on how the UK black, Asian and minority ethnic law enforcement agencies can supplement the counter-terrorism efforts, by engaging communities and enhancing community resilience.

9.5.1   Section One: A Denial of Popular Support and Ideological Legitimacy

There is an agreement amongst all concerned with radicalisation and counter-radicalisation—scholars, Western governments and jihadists—that ideology matters (Sedgwick 2012: 359; Antúnez and Tellidis 2013). Islam since its inception has demonstrated a unique capability to aptly respond to socio-political conditions and rally its followers and uphold its

original activist spirit, which takes the form of protests and can readily evolve into militia tactics or fully military expansion (Milani 2015). Traditionally, jihadists aware of this power have devoted significant attention to religion in their effort to promoting their ideology and building popular support by developing growingly sophisticated communication strategies and media operations in the process. Analysing the way jihadist groups manipulate ideological interpretation of Islam, Antúnez and Tellidis (2013) state that the terms usurped and capitalised upon by al-Qaeda and other similar terrorist and extremist organisations have a special place in Islamic culture and a particular resonance with Muslim populations. Numerous studies (Turner 2014; Gregg 2010; Payne 2009) suggest that ideology is a central element in jihadism and the single narrative that can transcend ethnic boundaries to build a global mass support. As such, in order to combat radicalisation, denying the radical individuals/groups the ideological legitimacy in and through which they justify their cause is of critical effect. Sedgwick (2012: 359) argues that "it is the jihadist course of action—jihad—that is not widely accepted, and this is the element of jihadist ideology against which counter-ideology should be directed". Nesser (2015) sketches a conceptual framework for Islamist terrorism in Europe and seeks to analyse a regional phenomenon with a global outreach, by proposing a typology of jihadi terrorists. Based on motivations that drive Muslims to join jihad, Nesser divides these individuals in four different categories, subsumed in two larger groups. According to Nesser, the first group comprises the politically and ideologically driven groups of "entrepreneurs" and "protégés", who fight for the cause of jihad. The second group comprises psychologically driven groups of "misfits" and "drifters," who fight in revenge for personal misfortune or for "compensation" of social injustice (Ghaemmaghami 2017). Many Muslims, including jihadists, are more concerned with moral factors and with systems of law revealed by God. For instance, 85% of Egyptians and 76% of Jordanians recently told pollsters that Islam has a positive impact on politics (Pew Research Center 2010: 11 cited in Sedgwick 2012: 365). In other words, denying extremism a popular support and ideological legitimacy will result in their denial of flexibility, human resources and a transnational outreach.

In most of the communities in which terrorism has found support, it is highlighted that while a popular support may be negligible at the start of any conflict, terrorists wield public allegiance and mobilise support, during the course of their terrorist campaign (Crenshaw 1981). The tacit

support in communities has been instrumental in enabling terrorists to plan and execute their activities. This support even, if passive, may comprise the 'backbone' of terrorist action, in that only one passive supporter is needed to aid and/or allow a terrorist at any one time (Galam 2002). To mitigate the influence of radicalisation processes, it is of critical importance to understand and face community perceptions of the legitimacy, or not, of the use of violence (Anderson 2011). Numerous studies have highlighted wider support from within Muslim communities living in majority Muslim societies, or in minority that are receptive of extremist ideology, to be a pivotal risk factor for jihadist terrorism. This enables jihadist terrorists to find the justifications and means through which to engage in violence. According to Kohn (2002: 4):

> *The strategic centre of gravity for militant Islamic terrorist groups is the popular support of the Muslim world. Popular support provides the terrorists invaluable sources of funding, manpower, legitimacy, and the real potential to threaten entrenched governments in Muslim countries. Without this popular support, Osama bin Laden and other violent global Muslims will not be able to achieve their desired end-state. Within different militant groups there are also differences regarding acceptance and use of violence and its targets.*

However, the notion that Islamism constitutes the core threat to the West's future security has been challenged by British research. Lambert (2007) in his study on ways and means of preventing al-Qaeda in London suggests that radical Muslims have worked hard to engage in counterterrorism initiatives. However, he also argues that treating community members as partners and not suspects or informants can be particularly effective in underpinning radical groups' credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness in the communities to which they belong. The next section assesses ways how community-based resilience might help win the hearts and minds of disenfranchised individuals and groups, which might ultimately help to address radicalisation.

9.5.2   Section Two: Winning Hearts and Minds

The significance of winning 'the hearts and minds' battle in the war on terror is critical to addressing radicalisation and is echoed in academic literature (Egnell 2010; Dixon 2009; Fitzsimmons 2008; Mockaitis 2003) as well as in policy papers (CONTEST 2011). This is because terrorism is

inflicted by organisations with a recognisable structure and goals beyond seeking havoc on their enemies (Mockaitis 2003: 21). More recently, terrorist organisations have shown to have been embedded, through home-grown radicals, within their target communities to train and plan operations. Equally, some communities are highlighted to provide sanctuary allowing these clandestine organisations to blend with general population, tacitly if not actively supporting them (Mockaitis 2003: 21). In an era in which jihad has become truly global and many terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) have penetrated vast communities across the Western world, while understanding how to respond to radicalisation is important, understanding how *not* to oppose radicalisation is equally of critical importance. This is because a blanket assault on 'Islam' and Muslims is not the answer to radicalisation; it rather complicates the relationship between Islam and non-Islamic world in the face of Islam becoming a rapidly growing religion with 1.57 billion people who identify with the faith (Milani 2015). As discussed in previous sections, multiple and multifactorial processes are at play that drive individuals to being 'turned' away and include mainly the internal and personal narrative construction of the individual and the wider narrative construction of the community, society or group (Milani 2015). As such addressing the causes of discontent upon which extremism feeds must comprise a critical pillar of efforts aimed at countering radicalisation.

Indeed some research has criticised the incumbent measures undertaken by governments in the EU states for failing to create a meaningful reconciliation dialogue between the migrant communities (mostly the Muslim communities) with their host communities (Miller et al. 2017; d'Appollonia 2015; Pipes 2015). These studies go as far as suggesting that in many parts of EU, 'no-go zones' (a political criticism against the state's incapacity to control migrant communities and mainly the male members of Muslim minorities) exist in abundance and are growing (Miller et al. 2017: 186). These zones of exclusion are most often socially constructed by the ways politicians, neighbouring communities and existing and emerging nationalist groups react and stigmatise the social, religious and cultural distinctiveness inherent to the migrant communities. d'Appollonia's (2015: 9) quote is illustrative:

> … *the negative perceptions of immigrants and minority groups both fuel and are fuelled by the media and politicians. They depict newcomers, domiciled migrants and their children as common criminals, urban rioters, and,*

occasionally, potential terrorists. There is strong evidence that this type of characterization goes beyond prior comparable cases of exclusion and discrimination. Their current construction of the "enemy inside" is the product of a combination of actual threats (the evidence being attacks committed by home-grown terrorists) coupled with an overestimation of symbolic threats-based on a variety of economic, social, and cultural concerns. Membership of a particular ethnic or religious community therefore constitutes, in itself, a security threat.

This stereotyping of Muslim communities in particular has resulted in mutual hostility from the Muslim and other migrant communities. In Sweden, for instance, this hostility has culminated in an environment in which "on a routine basis, firefighters, ambulance workers, and even social workers meet with hostility and violence" (Pipes 2015). Recounting his visit to Rinkeby, Sweden Pipes (2015) quotes a law enforcement officer he interviewed, stating:

If we're in pursuit of a vehicle, it can evade us by driving to certain neighbourhoods where a lone patrol car simply cannot follow because we'll get pelted by rocks and even face riots. These are no-go zones. We simply can't go there.

However, Pipes (2015) after visiting over 26 of the no-go areas in Sweden highlights that the people in these communities hold different perceptions toward ordinary citizens and state authorities. He states that for a regular citizen there is no such a place where non-Muslims cannot enter concluding:

Whether or not Molenbeek, Rinkeby, and the Marseilles slum are no-go zones, then, depends on what aspect one chooses to emphasize—their accessibility to ordinary visitors at ordinary times or their inaccessibility to government officials in times of tension. There are also no-go gradations, some places where attacks are more frequent and violent, others less so. However one sums up this complex situation—maybe partial-no-go zones?—they represent a great danger.

Regardless of how the perceptions of migrant and host communities toward each other and the state authorities' views are interpreted, losing the battle of 'hearts and minds' in the war on terror will have deep ramifications for addressing radicalisation. These case studies reveal that the further the bridge between these two sets of communities fall apart, the more ground for radical individuals and networks will open to be exploited for ideo-political purposes. It also increases the likelihood of growing mistrust

between different communities. In the case of France, for example, Robert Spencer who directs a non-profit organisation that monitors extremists' behaviours is quoted in Scarborough (2015a, b): 1) stating that resident leaders in the no-go areas operate as if they are the authority:

> … *there are no-go areas not just in Paris, but all over France, where they are effectively in control…They're operating with impunity, apparently secure in the knowledge that authorities cannot or will not act decisively to stop them.*

Scarborough (Scarborough 2015a, b: 1) further argues that "a backdrop to the massacre in Paris … by self-professed al-Qaeda terrorists is that city officials have increasingly ceded control of heavily Muslim neighbourhoods to Islamists, block by block". This penetration of vacuums and exploitation by extremist individuals/groups can best be redressed through meaningful community engagement. Building mutual trust helps communities develop resilience that in turn promotes a holistic community stakeholder with realistic expectations. Several studies on radicalisation challenges in Sweden, Brussels and France (Miller et al. 2017: 190; d'Appollonia 2015; Pipes 2015) have highlighted that "prevention work … should be limited and carefully focused on reasonably suspected targets intent on committing or substantially facilitating violence, or high risk targets for extremist recruitment efforts". The studies have further shown that a meaningful collaboration from the 'suspect community' can promote a more stable social position for disillusioned individuals and builds in them a societal confidence and fosters hope and belief in the host country's institutions, ideals and culture. As such, this spirit of community-based resilience facilitated through the combination of social integration, open education and economic success of individual/communities is an effective means of winning hearts and minds of disenfranchised individual/communities, which can ultimately supplement the counter-radicalisation efforts. The next section discusses how community engagement might function as a means of enhancing the integration processes of migrant communities into their host societies.

9.5.3   Section Three: Integration and Connection with Non-integrative Enclaves

Like radicalisation, "integration is a nebulous concept which resists a single definition or description, and varies significantly with political and

research focus; and often appears to refer to very separate processes and goals" (Casey 2016: 19). Cantle refers to integration as the idea of "'living together'—in which we share a sense of belonging; build acceptance of (most) common values and behaviours; use a common language to communicate: develop our personal intercultural confidence/competence and religious literacy; and become comfortable with difference and plurality". Kaufmann (2017: 7) promotes a concept of "multivocalism, something qualitatively distinct from both multiculturalism and the current policy of civic nationalism. This recognises that in allowing diverse people to attach to Britain in their own way, we strengthen, rather than weaken, British identity". The Runnymede Trust focuses on economic development, suggesting that government policies on integration should give priority to tackling the concentration of poverty in both people and places.

Research on the links between social integration and community cohesion across the industrialised societies has revealed that poor integration most often leads to "non-integrative enclaves" which can provide a fertile ground for radicalisation (Miller et al. 2017: 185; German Marshall Fund 2011). In the contexts where security threats are intertwined with home-grown radicalisation, the host communities are blamed to have most often failed to reach the root causes of social disengagement and address the issues of colonial history, social deprivation and cultural exclusion that constitute the core of social disintegration. Bisk (2015 cited in Miller et al. 2017: 186) argues that "decades of fashionable multiculturalism and postcolonial guilt have enabled Muslims to create ethnic communities, extended often to parallel societies with a degree of economic and social self-regulation". This condition has a potential for propelling non-native communities in an "exclusion and self-exclusion state which has ultimately produced a dialectic of religious political radicalisation of youth" (Miller et al. 2017: 186). In Muslim communities characterised by poor integration, social regulations embodied in practices and symbolic orientations including adherence to certain aspects of Sharia law and severe moral public control of women engagement with society are galvanised by charismatic leaders and are new forms of expression of cultural self-exclusion against the dominant state culture (Miller et al. 2017; Bisk 2015; d'Appollonia 2015). A case study of the 'exclusion zones' and/or 'non-integrative enclaves' in Paris and Brussels (Miller et al. 2017) and numerous similar studies (Chin 2015; Pipes 2015; Scarborough 2015a, b) have highlighted that local authorities lose control in these zones, often leaving a fertile ground for radical/terrorist networks to take

root and as well as for the right-wing and nationalist groups and media to stigmatise and stereotype the Muslim communities as culturally and socially non-integrative.

The "record influx of asylum seekers fleeing conflicts in Syria and other predominantly Muslim countries" (Rudgard 2017: 1) adds additional complexions to the integration and counter-radicalisation processes in many ways. Firstly, the 2015 migrant crisis caught Europe off guard, with little funding, limited manpower and no contingency plans in place (EUROACTIV 2018: 1), over-stretching public services including health, education and housing. Secondly, international migration has traditionally been one of the most cited, yet also most contested, areas of the security agenda in the West (Wohlfeld 2014). In recent years, "the duality of threats apparently caused by migration to both national sovereignty and human security are largely reflected in much of the recent academic literature" (Thompson 2013). In the aftermath of irregular migrants flow in 2015–2016, open borders afford not only innocent civilians an opportunity to enter Europe, but also terror groups and lone wolf actors have the opportunity to infiltrate the civilian migration waves and adapt a temporary identity of "asylum seeker" hoping to settle down in Europe (Miller et al. 2017: 180). These migrants could also recruit or be recruited by radical extremists and then unleash fatal terror invasions on the civilian population in their host communities. Frontex (2016: 7) states:

> …[t]he Paris attacks in November 2015 clearly demonstrated that irregular migratory flows could be used by terrorists to enter the EU. Two of the terrorists involved in the attacks had previously irregularly entered through Leros (Greece) and had been registered by the Greek authorities. They presented fraudulent Syrian documents to speed up their registration process.

As a result, irregular migration has been a catalyst sparking fear amongst many EU lawmakers who associate uncontrollable immigration and a lack of migrant and refugee integration into society with a direct threat to local and national security (Miller et al. 2017: 180). Research on the challenges of social disintegration in many European states including Belgium, France and Sweden suggests that "local and national security is greatly enhanced within a deeply integrated society when active, engaged, and committed citizens from different segments of the community work together" (Miller et al. 2017: 190; Pipes 2015). These studies conclude that inter-community dialogue fosters deeper integration and helps redress local problems more

swiftly that ultimately reinforces cohesion and addresses the underlying weaknesses that lead to extremist infiltration.

Social integration, moreover, has been advocated not only as an effective means of reducing the spaces for radicalisation, but also as a means of recovery for individuals in post-engagement recovery (Barrelle 2014). Research indicates that most people who join extremist groups eventually leave (Moghadam 2003), and it is therefore, critical to understand under what conditions this disengagement can endure and former extremists reconnect with society. Recently, the Pro-Integration Model (PIM) has been promoted as a way in and through which a sustainable disengagement in post-exit from extremism can be developed. PIM is a new conceptualisation of disengagement from violent extremism and reintegration into society that combines the relevant empirical and theoretical literature (Barrelle 2014: 133). PIM has been tested for its capability to enable disengaged extremists with building social relations, coping with addressing personal issues and drawing on suitable social support networks; stop identifying with the former extremist groups and develop a clear sense of personal identity; refuse violent ideology; and accept the society as the system as legitimate and action orientation and active involvement in prosocial/community activities (Barrelle 2014: 138–139). Table 9.2 describes PIM's key constituent parts and their associated functions.

It is argued that a good way a person gains another's trust is through social interaction, which in itself is possible only "when people are

Table 9.2 Domains and themes for leaving extremism and subsequent social integration (Barrelle 2014: 133)

Domain theme	
Social relations	• Disillusionment with group members
	• Disillusionment with leaders
	• Relations with 'Others'
Coping	• Physical and psychological issues
	• Social support
	• Resilience, skills and coping
Identity	• Reduction in group identity
	• Emergence of personal identity
	• Alternate social identity
Ideology	• Disillusionment with radical ideas
	• Find own ideas
	• Acceptance of difference
Action orientation	• Disillusionment with radical methods
	• Stop or reduce radical methods
	• Prosocial engagement in society

interconnected and know something about each other's past behaviour or can reasonably anticipate what the other will do, they are more likely to trust one another" (Miller 2007: 56). However, with a growing migration to the UK and a lack of meaningful social, cultural and religious interactions, few opportunities exist for cultural exchange relationships that can potentially hamper the development of constructive relationships between migrant and the host communities (Miller et al. 2017; O'Toole et al. 2012). As such, community-based resilience is a powerful tool to promulgate meaningful "'integration' in which all barriers to full participation in a society have been dismantled" (Kymlicka 2012: 15).

9.6   DISCUSSION

The threat to UK's national security posed by radicalisation appears to grow and recently, the security agencies have treated it as the most serious danger that the country has had to face over the course of the last century. Within the current policy and research paradigms, the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism is attracting the chunk of attention. Moreover, as terrorism grows increasingly multifaceted and multifactorial, larger number of individuals and groups are implicated in the nexus of radicalisation, terrorism and criminal behaviours. This complexion, by default, has necessitated a more robust and comprehensive approach to radicalisation that can develop an atmosphere where fear and surveillance have minimum consequences for social control and freedom of movement and speech, potentially leading to greater inter-communal interactions. However, the Muslim communities have borne the brunt of counter-terror efforts, at times, proving counter-productive with serious potential to push these communities deeper into social and cultural marginalisation. To curb on radicalisation spaces, the Western states have resorted to multiple mechanisms with a prime focus on addressing the socio-cultural, religious and political grievances of the Muslim communities. These measures have been tested in numerous ways including community engagement, greater recognition of religious and cultural diversity and investing in local institutions to advance a counter-narrative to the extremist interpretation of Sharia law and Islamic norms.

This chapter has attempted to highlight the main causes of radicalisation in the UK and discusses its current efforts directed at radicalisation processes, by presenting an analysis of key theoretical frameworks on the root causes of radicalisation and assessing the potential for community-based

resilience to reduce the threats of human-induced violence. It argues that if the problem of home-grown radicalisation is to be addressed effectively, alienation and stigmatisation of the second and third generations of Muslims is to be avoided. The chapter also advances that to redress the communal grievances marking the relationships between the migrant and host communities, it is important to engage with these groups in more meaningful ways. It equally becomes critical to understand the complexities of community politics and come to a more nuanced understanding of the rich mosaic of political mobilisation that is now flourishing across large parts of the UK's Muslim communities (Briggs and Birdwell 2009). In the absence of an effective community mobilisation, the war on terror will have little, if any, impact—as a significant part of these communities might remain voiceless and denied a platform where they can debate the entrenched challenges associated with marginalisation experienced by many Muslims and exploited by terrorist organisations for ideo-political purposes. The chapter concludes that community-based resilience by denying terrorists a popular support and ideological legitimacy, helping win the hearts and minds of disenfranchised individuals/communities and facilitating social and cultural integration, bears a genuine potential to counter-radicalisation in the United Kingdom.

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Enhancing Community Resilience: Assessing the Role That Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Law Enforcement (LEA) Staff Associations and Networks Can Play in the Fight Against Radicalisation

Bankole Cole and Nadia Habashi

10.1 Introduction

In the fight against radicalisation and countering violent extremism (CVE), an emerging approach, that of community resilience, is garnering plaudits in Europe (see European Commission 2015) and other parts of the world, for example in Kenya (Van Metre 2016) and the USA (Ellis and Abdi 2017; Van Metre and Calder 2016; Weine et al. 2013; Weine and Ahmed, 2012; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2011). The push for community resilience as an approach to tackling radicalisation

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215

stems in part from (1) the recognition of the fact that many people who are similarly experiencing social, economic or political adversities or those who support or accept the ideologies or religious doctrines that others have quoted to justify extremist violence are not, themselves, prone to violence and (2) the belief that there are elements within communities 'at risk' that are counter-violence whose energies can be harnessed to ensure peace. Accordingly, a public health approach to dealing with violence is gaining grounds that sees the problem as a disease, shifting the emphasis from traditional law enforcement per se to understanding the root causes of the problem and adopting a 'progressive and holistic approach' which emphasises support to communities 'from the ground up' and establishing strong multi-agency relationships with key people in education, social services and child and adolescent mental health teams, to start to share information, work together on positive interventions and think long term (HM Government 2018; WHO 2015).

Although not an entirely new way of dealing with social problems, what is strategic in the public health approach is the emphasis that is placed on:

> … *the full participation of communities to engender a sense of ownership of this problem and solutions to empower people and their communities to see violence not as an inevitable consequence of modern life but as a problem that can be understood and changed.* (Mercy et al. 1993: 8)

This approach in *collective efficacy* is believed to have the potential for greater impact and long-term sustainability (Weine et al. 2013; Sampson et al. 1997; Mercy et al. 1993).

This chapter examines the concept of community resilience in countering radicalisation and highlights the importance of the need for Europe to consider making more effective use of their minority ethnic law enforcement (LEA) officers in community engagement activities to enhance community resilience in the fight against radicalisation and other CVE activities that are specifically linked to minority ethnic groups and their communities. It is argued that building 'social connection' through the harnessing and enhancement of the role and participation of minority ethnic police officers in counterterrorism activities can provide the much needed effective community engagement to build resilience through genuine culturally sensitive partnerships that are based on trust and confidence (see Ellis and Abdi 2017).

10.2 Defining Community Resilience

The concept of *community* is a contested one with different meanings imposed by different disciplines; but central to these different definitions of community is a sense of 'belonging' either (1) in a geographical sense, for example through a neighbourhood or (2) socially, whereby people who hold the same interests, social leanings, sexualities, ideologies, religions or cultural values identify themselves as belonging to specific or recognisable *communities* that may transcend geographical or even international boundaries (Cooper 2008; Hillary 1955). *Community* is increasingly being recognised as a social phenomenon whereby particular social groups, 'bound' together by their histories, 'race', religions and cultures, commonly refer to themselves as *communities* 'undivided' by geographical boundaries.

Resilience is an equally complex concept. From its roots in psychology and psychopathology, the term has grown and has become contextualised in many different ways by many disciplines including social policy, politics, engineering, youth studies, urban studies and medicine. Central to the definitions of resilience is the idea of having the ability or capacity to withstand adversity or disaster or having the ability to 'bounce back' after experiencing significant adversity or being able to function well 'despite the odds'. In humans, resilience was primarily defined as an individual attribute conceptualised in terms of personal traits and capabilities to manipulate risk and protective factors in order to overcome adversity. The concept has developed over the years and is now commonly regarded not as an individual attribute but the outcome of a *process* of systematic interaction between the individual and the wider sociocultural or environmental influences (see Ungar 2008, 2011). There is now an overwhelming acceptance of the fact that resilience is culturally relative concept and that much depends on the quality of the interaction to achieve it (Ungar 2008; Ungar et al. 2005).

Michael Ungar defined resilience as the product of strategic and positive relationship between the individual and resource providers (e.g. state services, welfare support agencies, NGOs, LEAs, etc.) to enable a community to overcome an adversity (Ungar 2011). In this relationship, the individual must demonstrate capabilities in terms of having skills, abilities or willingness to want to overcome the defined adversity; and the resource providers must provide resources to meet these needs or desires. What is important is that the resources must be provided in a culturally meaningful way so that the individual will naturally 'navigate' towards them. Most important

in this resource-focused relationship is that what is finally decided as the requirements to 'bounce back', recover from or overcome the adversity is 'negotiated' and agreed. In this definition of resilience, therefore, the individual is 'empowered', supported and encouraged to achieve a desired goal. For an extended discussion on community resilience, see Chap. 9.

The key ideas in Ungar's (2011) definition are: (1) the existence of particular relevant individual skills and capabilities—a definitive or genuine desire to want to overcome an adversity or social problem, (2) the existence of resource providers who are able to provide resources (support) not in a generic terms but in a manner that is culturally meaningful to the recipients and (3) the ability of individuals to navigate to these resources. This implies that the individuals are aware that these resources are there, accept them as desirable resources and are able to 'navigate' towards them willingly and without fear of discrimination; and (4) what is finally agreed must be negotiated in a manner that is fair and culturally acceptable. Because the process is negotiated and agreed, the chances of resilience occurring are high.

This chapter adopts Ungar's (2011) concept of resilience and applies it to communities. Community resilience is the ability of a community to 'bounce back' from a position of adversity or overcome a significant crisis or problem, that ability being the outcome of a *process* in which community capabilities are harnessed and supported by the provision of outside resources designed to enable the community to recover from adversity or rebuild itself. The chapter concurs with the view that resilience will not occur where resources to support community ability to recover are not presented in a culturally acceptable manner and, more importantly, not negotiated bottom-up but 'imposed' top-down. The willingness to 'want to bounce back' must be present and the resources to support this must be culturally meaningful. This definition of community resilience rejects the notion that resilience is the individual and specific attribute of a community. No community can be by itself resilient, however coherent, strong or determined the community is to overcome its problems. Resilience is not simply about self-discipline or self-determination; the concept is used in this chapter to refer to situations where the adversity to be confronted requires significant efforts beyond what the community, by itself, can handle, for example, tackling violent extremism or a significant physical disaster.

It is important that the ability or willingness to recover (capabilities) is identifiable and recognised or even measurable, and the resources provided must not override but support these community competences such

that the community feels valued, empowered and enabled through effective partnership and participation to work towards rebuilding their communities. The community 'navigates' to these resources not because (1) they are there, (2) they are provided by government agencies or through outside organisations that are known for particular relevant skills or expertise in dealing with the relevant problems or (3) they are provided by those who claim to have worked with comparable communities in the past (e.g. NGOs or third-sector organisations, civil rights organisations, etc., with a 'track record' of similar work). 'Navigation' will only take place where the community has trust and confidence in the resource providers who, on their part, must also have the necessary cultural knowledge and competence. Trust and confidence in an organisation can emerge from the fact that the organisation has shown genuine interest in past community affairs, for example, on issues that involve the community's welfare or safety to the point that they are valued and respected by the community.

10.2.1   Community Capabilities

The capacity or capability of communities in the context of resilience can be defined in terms of social capital or community competence, including having a sense of commitment to the community (see Ellis and Abdi 2017). Social capital is defined by Heywood as 'the levels of trust and sense of social connectedness that help to promote stability, cohesion and prosperity; what turns the "I" into "we"' (cited in Newman et al. 2004: 379). Norris et al. (2008: 139) articulate that social capital consists of three social psychological elements as follows: *sense of community*, *place attachments* and *citizen participation*. *Sense of community* refers to the way in which communities share concerns and values and is bound by a high level of interest in community issues coupled with ingrained sense of community service and respect (Sonn and Fisher 1998). *Place attachment* is linked to a sense of community and infers an emotional connection to a neighbourhood. For Perkins et al. (2002), place attachments are integral to the need for communities to regenerate and therefore critical to community resilience. *Citizen participation* is the engagement of community members within support groups or formal organisations and support networks. In addition to this social connectedness, there must be optimism, hope and positive social intelligence, namely being able to identify and define the community's needs in practical terms and make meaningful demands on needed resources.

Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2013) also identified community leadership as a key requirement of community resilience—a leadership that is authentic and grassroots—one that has credibility because it comes from within the community and truly represents its uniqueness and aspirations. However, the definition of community leadership has to be strategic as different groups within a community may identify with different leaders or leadership structures. Most important, perhaps, is the ability of a community to organise themselves and work together to identify and prioritise goals in a realistic and achievable manner (Ellis and Abdi 2017; Ganor and Ben-Lavy 2013; Norris et al. 2008).

The fact that a community has these attributes does not mean that it is resilient. It simply means that it has the ingredients (capabilities) within it that can enable it to address problems or 'bounce back' from a position of adversity. Communities will need support to build social bonding and a strong social identity through effective partnership and engagement with resource providers or agencies with skills and competences to bolster individual and community identity, alleviate fears and misconceptions, encourage social bridging and promote inclusion and positive attitudes (Al Raffie 2013; Spalek 2013; Weine 2012; Schanzer et al. 2010). Studies undertaken by Ellis et al. (2014, 2016) indicate that social bridging can be associated with less openness to violence. What is important in this relationship is the cultural competence of the resource providers. There is a basic requirement of understanding and appreciation of cultural nuances and/or religious practices many of which cannot be gained by simply reading a book or research reports written by 'outsiders'. Furthermore, provisions must aim at being as inclusive as possible, including underrepresented populations as well as those in the majority (Ganor and Ben-Lavy 2013). As indicated above, trust and confidence in the service providers are also very crucial to community resilience. Also, see Chap. 9.

10.2.2   Cultural Competence

It is the position of this chapter that the ability of external resource providers to provide community resources that are adequate enough to build community resilience to counter radicalisation will depend very much on their cultural competence. Organisations or agencies that claim to have 'professional' knowledge but are not culturally aware are most likely to engage badly and the process of negotiation will be weak as trust and confidence of the community will be lacking. Cultural competence includes

having cultural knowledge and understanding of the life experiences of the different ethnicities, religions and faiths in the community and also of lifestyles, for example minority ethnic youth cultures. Cultural competence is more effective if based on cultural affiliations (e.g. where the providers are of the same ethnicity or religion) but, in addition, there must be an existing relationship whereby the provider had, in the past, shown genuine interest in the affairs of the community through help and support given during past crisis situations.

10.3 Engaging Communities to Foster Resilience Against Radicalisation

Fostering community resilience as a form of disaster readiness has been adopted in the UK where the emphasis is on:

> … *informing engaging and empowering communities' with specific reference to 'not creating or identifying a whole new community network or a one off response to a recovery from an incident, but rather an ongoing process of using and enhancing existing relationships to better improve the emergency preparedness of an area*. (Cabinet Office 2016: 8)

In its Inquiry into Radicalisation, the UK Home Affairs Select Committee (HC 135, 2016) recommended the importance of building a resilience programme aimed at enabling:

> *young people better develop critical skills required to be conscious of manipulation and grooming and to actively question information they receive—both offline and online. It is only when they are equipped with these skills that they will be able to develop the resilience and tenacity necessary to deal with the complex issues of faith, identity.* (Home Affairs Select Committee, HC 135, 2016:30)

Positively, the Select Committee recognised the importance of external factors in building community resilience and therefore specifically recommended that programmes to build community resilience to counter radicalisation must be developed in conjunction with community organisations, policing bodies and education experts (for UK Government response to the Select Committee report, see HM Government, 2017).

The UK government's response to the Select Committee recommendation on resilience was the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (HM Government, 2015) which introduced (in section 26), as part of the state *Prevent* agenda, a general duty, known as the 'prevent duty', on specified public bodies enjoining them to have, in the exercise of their duties, due regard to the need to prevent people from being radicalised or drawn into terrorism. These specific public bodies include local authorities, criminal justice agencies, health and social care providers, childcare and educational institutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department 2017, Cm 955: 16).

Generally, the UK *Prevent* agenda is structured on the realisation of the need to utilise or enhance community resilience through the involvement of a variety of agencies in the tackling of radicalisation in communities where the potential for radicalisation is believed to be high (HM Government 2008, 2011). *Prevent* has been criticised on a number of fronts (see Mohammed and Siddiqui 2013). One of the key criticisms is that the decisions on the resources that are needed in targeted communities to booster resilience in order to counter radicalisation are not negotiated with communities but imposed by central government or local authorities on the basis of official understanding or 'expert' views on the causes of radicalisation. Community competence in terms of community willingness to tackle radicalisation is often not recognised as these are communities that should not be trusted (Kundnani 2007). Instead, engagement with 'suspect communities' has been mainly through their professed community and faith leaders. However, the bulk of *Prevent* work, for example, with 'vulnerable' youths is often done without these leaders but 'professionally' by agencies that operate within their own defined professional knowledge of 'youth issues'.

A positive point in favour of *Prevent* is the recognition of the need to see radicalisation as a 'health issue' and to encourage the participation of a variety of agencies or organisations to work alongside law enforcement and security agencies in order to build community resilience where it is believed that opportunities to embrace violent extremist ideologies are high and, therefore, radicalisation is an issue. It has not been made clear, however, how the 'mix' of agencies is reached for particular communities (presumably, *Prevent* activities in communities will vary depending on the assessment of 'needs') and the nature and extent of community involvement in the process is not adequately documented. As it is not always clear

how much of *Prevent* inputs have been negotiated with the communities, the issue of navigation on the part of communities is problematic. If 'navigation' had taken place (judged in terms of 'participation' by communities in *Prevent* activities), it is often not clear how much of the 'navigation' is voluntary, in which case community empowerment is also problematic. Most importantly, it is often not clear whether the skills and capabilities within the communities have been properly assessed or utilised. Instead, decisions are often made in terms of perceived needs of target groups (young people) and what research has revealed on the causes and routes to radicalisation. Thus the agencies/service providers become the custodians of what radicalisation is (not what the communities think that it is), and the solutions are 'professionally' defined.

A great omission in the *Prevent* approach to tackling radicalisation, however, is the assumption that communities acknowledge the legitimacy of the agencies/service providers that have been chosen or that they recognise and accept them. In *Prevent*, professionalism seems to override the need for cultural competency, trust and confidence. More important is the fact that the role of LEAs in *Prevent* is not well defined. Service providers/agencies working on *Prevent* activities in a community are likely to be seen as working for the police or the government. This 'dual role', which is not unknown, to communities, has led to *Prevent* activities being seen by some communities as government's 'snooping' exercises (Kundnani 2007, 2014; Spalek 2013; Lambert 2011).

Nevertheless, LEAs and security agencies are central to counter-radicalisation and CVE activities in EU and other countries. What is important is how this significant role is defined. In the UK as in most EU countries, the role of LEAs in building community resilience to counter radicalisation is not clearly stated but loosely defined in various forms, under the general umbrella of *community policing* or police-community engagement. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) do not normally have specific community resilience agendas to counter radicalisation. It is doubtful whether communities expect LEAs to be helpful in rebuilding communities and offering social support, for example, to young people who are prone to being radicalised. LEAs have historically been seen as agents of governments and therefore cannot be seen as helping those who harbour revolutionary or anti-state views.

10.4   'RACE' AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

There has been a longstanding push on diversity in the UK criminal justice system (CJS) which is underpinned by the notion that the CJS should reflect the community it serves (MacPherson of Cluny, Sir William 1999; Scarman 1981). This is on the basis that a diverse workforce is thought to be better able to understand the issues and needs facing diverse communities and therefore able to improve BAME trust and confidence in the CJS (OCJR 2005a; Confidence Unit 2003; Bowling and Phillips 2002). It is felt that this will have a knock on effect on encouraging people to report crime, come forward as victims and witnesses, stay with the prosecution process and participate as jurors (OCJR 2005b). Most importantly, in relation to BAME communities, a diverse workforce is perceived as creating the perception of fairness in the CJS through the involvement of BAME staff (HM Government 2007; Home Office 2005). For a discussion on how judicial systems might contribute to counter-radicalisation efforts, see Chap. 8.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 and more specifically after the 7/7 London terrorist attacks, the need to draw up an ethnically diversified CJS, particularly in the police, have gained grounds in UK government narratives on tackling radicalisation and the perceived proneness to violent extremisms particularly in Muslim communities (Spalek 2012, 2013; Lambert 2011; Kundnani 2007, 2014; Innes 2006). As a result, the majority of CJS agencies in the UK have developed and to a lesser extent sustained various forms of governance arrangements with diverse communities and in particular Muslim communities aimed at improving confidence, fairness and professional standards (Lammy 2017; Myhill 2006; Braithwaite 2009; Taylor 2003). Whereas the UK government acknowledges the contributions that BAME staff of CJS and other agencies could play in tackling radicalisation through effective community engagement, there have been no strategic guidelines on how this can be done.

However, previous research in several areas of the criminal justice system has shown that minority ethnic peoples' confidence in the system is more likely to be high where criminal justice practitioners that they interact with are from the same ethnic groups (see Calverley et al. 2004). Compared with the other UK criminal justice agencies (e.g. the British probation service), it is yet to be ascertained whether or not the involvement of BAME police officers has had any impact on crime prevention in the UK despite the efforts that have been made to increase recruitment of

BAME officers since the 1981 Scarman report was published. Although general public surveys have been carried out that, including members of BAME communities, showed general public satisfaction in policing (Clancy et al. 2001; Green et al. 2004), the findings have not been linked to the ethnic composition of police officers nor to the specific activities of BAME officers.

10.5   UK Minority Ethnic Police Officers Involvement in Counter-Radicalisation

In a report in 2006, the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (OHCNM) noted that in some countries there was an absence of institutional mechanisms to support the interaction and cooperation between police and persons belonging to national minorities. This, it claimed, was:

> … the result of lack of appropriate training for operation in a multi-ethnic society, an often mono-ethnic composition of the police service and discriminatory practices, police have generated negative reactions among national minority communities in a number of situations and even become a conflict catalyst. (OHCNM 2006: 1)

The report argued that good policing in multi-ethnic societies is dependent on:

> … the establishment of a relationship of trust and confidence, built on regular communication and practical co-operation, between the police and the minorities. All parties benefit from such a relationship. The minorities benefit from policing which is more sensitive to their concerns and more responsive to their requirements for personal protection and access to justice. The police benefit from greater effectiveness, since good communication and co-operation are keys to effective policing in any community. The state benefits both from the integration of minorities and from the greater effectiveness of its policing. (OHCNM 2006: 3) (see also MacPherson of Cluny, Sir William 1999; Scarman 1981)

It has long been recognised that minority police officers can play a significant role in building bridges with Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities and by so doing play a key role in crime prevention generally. This view has also been extended to counterterrorism specifically. In a significant study in London, Basia Spalek found that Muslim

police officers who were members of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), a counterterrorism policing unit formed in the aftermath of 9/11 by members of the Metropolitan Police special branch, were instrumental in building bridges with members of Muslim communities and developing trusting relationships (see Spalek 2010). Whereas these officers brought 'cultural and religious understanding' to the MCU, the success of their engagement with these communities depended much on their religious credibility in the community and community trust and respect. Gaining trust and confidence is a key issue especially as those who are most likely to embrace violent Islamic doctrines and bent on radicalising others are likely to see police officers as enemies of Islam and Muslim police officers involved in counterterrorist community policing as hypocrites. This problem is likely to be more acute in communities where anti-police or anti-state sentiments are already high.

Spalek (2010) also highlighted the dilemma of the Muslim officers who were engaged in counterterrorism in Muslim communities in terms of whether, as Muslims, they had trust and confidence in the aims and objectives of the counterterrorism operations that they were being asked to engage in and the fear of reprisals if they were not trusted by members of the community. Most important was the question of whether these Muslim police officers felt that they had other skills or 'resources' that could usefully be drawn upon when building trust with Muslim communities other than the simple fact that they were Muslims. Given the opportunity, would minority police officers have taken a different approach to community counterterrorism? Spalek (2010) concluded (at p. 809) that Muslim police officers can play an important role in community-based counterterrorism policing but the involvement of Muslim police officers is still a complex issue.

Nevertheless, the number of Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) police officers engaged in community counterterrorism work in the UK is extremely low. The apparent paucity of BAME police officers and particularly Muslim officers and staff in counter-radicalisation was noted in the House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee on Leadership and Standards in the Police (2013) with the recommendation that:

> … *police forces must recognise that diversity is more than simply ticking a political correctness box: true representation is critical for public acceptance and knowledge of communities and different mind-sets can bring real operational advantage as well as everyday improvements in relation to the public.*
> (House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee 2013: 31)

Two years later, at the oral evidence session presented to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Counter-Terrorism, following the case of three girls who were believed to have travelled to Syria to join ISIL (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, HC 933), the issue of the underrepresentation of BAME police officers in counter-terrorism activities, especially in the context of *Prevent*, was also raised. The Committee made reference to former Metropolitan Police Chief Superintendent Dal Babu's comments in the press that "the lack of Muslim staff in the ranks of the Prevent scheme is hampering efforts to stop vulnerable young people, particularly women, from travelling to Syria to join Islamic State" (The London Evening Standard 2015: 1).

The Committee agreed to the need to increase police diversity in counterterrorism, especially in the area of *prevent*, referring, again, to Dai Babu's comment in the press that "If you are going to fight terrorism effectively then your key operatives need to reflect the people that you are dealing with and that is not happening here" (cited in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015: 7). Low numbers and not being in position of strategic command imply that very little is known about Black, Asian and minority ethnic officers' real contributions to the UK's counter-radicalisation *Prevent* programme.

10.6   The UK Black and Muslim Police Associations and Networks

The UK National Black Police Association (NBPA) was formed in 1998 as a result of pressures within British police forces for a fairer deal for BAME police officers and staff and for race to be taken seriously in the work of British police forces. The aims of the association are:

> … *to seek to improve the working environment of Black staff by protecting the rights of those employed within the Police Service and to enhance racial harmony and the quality of service to the Black community of the United Kingdom, thereby assisting the Police Service in delivering a fair and equitable service to all sections of the community.* (see http://www.nbpa.co.uk/)

The organisation's objectives are:

1. To advise, consult and intervene on matters of racism nationally, which could have negative effects on communities.

2. To work towards improving relationships between the police and Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities within the United Kingdom
3. To influence the direction of policies nationally and in line with equality issues and anti-discrimination
4. To work towards improving the recruitment, retention and progression of officers and police staff members within the police service

The organisation currently has 13,000 members including uniformed police officers, police community safety officers (PCSOs) and other police civilian staff.

There is evidence that the BPA and the Muslim Police Association (MPA) have been working with UK's BAME communities in various ways to build trust and confidence in the police and prevent crime and antisocial behaviour. For example, the Metropolitan arm of the National Black Police Association (the MBPA) has been active in London in the Met's efforts to engage with BAME in the inner cities. What is significant is that 'engagement' has not been strictly in the context of law enforcement but also by showing interest in these communities through, for example, the initiation of positive activities for young people or being present whenever there was a crisis, to show solidarity and provide support and safeguarding to those in need. For example:

- In the case of the murdered schoolboy, Damilola Taylor (in 2000), the BPA played a significant role in sourcing officers to engage with the local Black community in Peckham, South East London; this helped to secure the eventual conviction of the perpetrators of the crime.
- In the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire in London (14th of June 2017), the Met BPA organised its members to undertake voluntary patrols in the area to provide support to the community as part of the disaster relief effort.
- In the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, in the Caribbean and the Bahamas (30th of August—13th of September 2017), the Met BPA organised its members to ensure that they were part of the UK disaster relief effort to the affected countries.

This approach of being involved and showing interest in the problems of BAME communities strengthens trust and confidence and builds the

foundation for effective engagement, when the organisation then shows up in other areas, such as helping to counter radicalisation. Engagement based on having specific 'expertise' and/or track record of 'relevant' workfor example by agencies or faith-based groups and institutions that have worked with BAME communities and groups, is likely to be less effective especially where these organisations show up as 'crisis managers' not friends of the community. These agencies may command respect because they are 'known' or have been named by governments; trust and confidence in them may be an issue. Unfortunately, the majority of agencies involved in community-based CVE work belong to this category.

Communities have never had a say in who is selected to help them solve their problems, especially crime and violence problems. Needless to mention is the fact that no negotiation is done to ensure that what is being provided by the agencies is acceptable to the communities concerned. It is no wonder that communities have complained about the relevance of CVE/*Prevent* activities and negative perceptions have prevailed especially in Muslim communities about the overall intention of *Prevent*—to demonise Muslim communities (Kundnani 2007). It is reasonable to assume that 'navigation' to the resources provided by these agencies will be poor; hence, resilience is not happening in these communities even though there are elements within these communities who are genuinely committed to tackling radicalisation.

The position taken in this chapter is that the role of BAME LEA practitioners should be explored as a mechanism to boost community resilience. They are a valuable form of social capital. Our ongoing work with the National Black and Asian Police Association has highlighted that the 'added value' that they bring into British policing is being underutilised. We believe that they could do more in terms of engagement with Muslim communities and, possibly, contribute significantly in the fight against radicalisation; their cultural competences and having an engagement approach that is directed at building the trust and confidence of the community become useful when they are seen as being involved in counterterrorism activities.

10.7   Discussion

Resilience is a social interactive process, the outcome of which is often associated with the successful adaption to or recovery from adversity (Pfefferbaum et al. 2015, 2005). The term is used in the context of being

RESILIENT COMMUNITIES
Ready to tackle adversity/crisis (e.g. radicalisation)

Positive Resource Focused Relationship
(Negotiation)

Navigation
(Empowerment)

Provision/Policy
(Cultural Competence)

Trust Hope Agency
Confidence Optimism
Positive Social Intelligence

| Community capabilities and competences (Skills, structures, leadership, commitment etc.) | Partnership (Historic Relationship) | Resource Providers (Governments; Agencies, LEAs, Schools etc.) Community-based resources to tackle crisis/ adversity |

Fig. 10.1   Building community resilience to tackle radicalisation

in a position of adversity from which the individual is required to 'bounce back', recover or experience improved health or social conditions. Resilience is not an individual attribute but the end product of a course in which individual attributes or capabilities are harnessed through the provision of resources in a manner that makes perfect sense, sensible or culturally meaningful so that the individual will feel empowered and will naturally navigate to these resources and it is in this process that resilience occurs (see Ungar 2008, 2011).

It is argued in this chapter that resilience is not an inherent attribute of a community; it is a *process* of strategic interaction between the community and resource providers/agencies in a culturally sensitive and mutually agreed use of resources to build the necessary platform (resilience) to tackle the adversity or problem. Community resilience in the context of tackling radicalisation is the process whereby community capabilities are harnessed through a process of engagement and negotiation with resource providers; it is based on trust and confidence and the cultural competency of the service providers. It is argued that communities will naturally 'navigate' to these resources and will see them as empowering if their cultural relevance is made clear. Figure 10.1 explains this process, diagrammatically.

Community resilience, therefore, is an acknowledgement that communities have competencies or capabilities that can be harnessed to address an adversity (e.g. radicalisation) and that resources to help the communities

are acceptable to the communities and have been negotiated so that both the communities and resource providers are partners in the joint effort of tackling radicalisation.

In this chapter, staff associations within the British Police, namely, the Black Police Associations and the Asian and Muslim Police Association, were used as examples of LEA groups that work within a law enforcement/CVE agenda but have developed effective engagement with BAME communities in London and other parts of the UK by showing interest in BAME communities and supporting them in times of crisis. In addition, these LEA officers have the cultural competence that is crucial to counterterrorism efforts. Unfortunately, however, the skills of these officers are not being harnessed by the UK police. In spite of the acknowledgement that BAME officers are disproportionately underrepresented in counterterrorism duties (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2015, HC 933), no efforts have yet been made to rectify this.

Whereas some studies have highlighted some of the problems that may occur where Muslim police officers are utilised in *Prevent* duties in Muslim communities (Spalek 2010), the Metropolitan Police's effort highlighted in that study is a recognition of the fact that a *Prevent*/counterterrorism activity in Muslim communities that includes only white officers will have a very limited chance of success.

There are no quick solutions to radicalisation. Developing community resilience to tackle radicalisation will take time, sustained resources and effort. However, there is a very real potential that focusing on making communities resilient to radicalisation, though engagement, partnership, harnessing community competences and providing culturally sensitive resources, could restore community confidence in state approaches to radicalisation because of the very simple fact that communities are at the heart of the solution.

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CHAPTER 11

The 'Choice to Challenge' Extreme Views in the Classroom? Counter-Radicalisation and the Prevent Agenda in the University Context

Amy Steadman, Jamie Grace, and Rhiannon Roberts

11.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the process of intelligence collation, namely, the gathering of information by the police, about those students at Universities who are prone to being radicalised. This process takes place

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within the wider UK strategy on counter-terrorism, known as 'CONTEST'.[1] As such, this chapter is concerned with particular UK government policy in relation to what is known as the 'Prevent duty', now taking effect under statute across wide swathes of the British public sector and its engagement with private organisations, groups and individuals. This chapter focuses in particular on the nexus between higher educational and policing bodies, as explored below. The Prevent duty is formally the duty to have due regard to the need to prevent individuals being drawn into terrorism.[2] In pedagogic settings, this typically boils down to an employment duty on academics to consider whether particular challenging behaviour, which is extremist and potentially radicalising, is that which might draw students into terrorism and, if so, to act upon this finding by flagging or reporting the student(s) concerned to a University hierarchy.

This chapter is based on our scoping research project, which hints toward a recommendation that academics should be placed under a stricter legal duty than currently exists, to discuss extreme and challenging views with students and colleagues, just as much as they are under a duty to report concerning behaviour or even more so. There already exists a duty in 'soft law' terms to challenge extremism in the classroom and on University campuses.[3] This is balanced with a duty to have a 'particular regard' for the need to protect the freedom of expression of staff and students in Universities (Greer and Bell 2018),[4] but is backed with the aforementioned duty to have 'due regard' for the need to take measures to prevent individuals being drawn into terrorism while a part of university life.[5] In suggesting that government should create a strong(er) legal duty to both require and to empower academics to challenge students in the classroom (and to actually prefer this to triggering a possible Prevent referral to the CHANNEL programme for de-radicalisation activities), and to protect their 'choice to challenge' under the law, we agree with Joanna Gilmore (2017: 9), who has called for classrooms to be 'a safe

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[1] See the CONTEST strategy, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest (accessed on 27.02.2018).

[2] S.26 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

[3] S.29 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and para. 22 of the Prevent Duty Guidance for Higher Education Bodies (PDGHEB) in England and Wales

[4] S.31 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, discussed in Steven Greer and Lindsey Bell, 'Counter-Terrorist law in British Universities: a review of the "prevent" debate' (2018) P.L. 85.

[5] S.26 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

space for open discussion and debate in order to resist the harmful chilling effects of Prevent':

> *This could include, for example, integrating a discussion of academic freedom at the beginning of a module which makes it clear that respectful debate and discussion, and independent research beyond the set reading, are actively encouraged. Students should also be encouraged to discuss and debate the Prevent strategy in seminars and workshops, and interrogate the definitions of "extremism" and "British values" upon which the policy is based. This would require staff to introduce competing academic perspectives on Prevent in order to encourage students to express their own viewpoints and share experiences.*

This is a set of recommendations we would support. The Prevent duty, as embodied in guidance to Universities in England and Wales, focuses on joint duties to have due regard to prevent persons being drawn into terrorism and the particular regard to protecting freedom of speech on campus. However, more specific binding duty on academics to *challenge* extremism, and to interrogate it pedagogically, would accord with the academic value of challenging contentious and unpleasant views in a rational manner and would cut through the competing perceptions that the Prevent duty is both necessary and discriminatory (as our survey respondents told us). Using the choice to challenge extreme views in the classroom is arguably essential to protect vulnerable students on the one hand and to refrain from creating an atmosphere where students are (self) censorious on the other. We would suggest that the tentative findings of our pilot-style survey of an academic university department, presented in this chapter, bear this out as a sound recommendation, or at least one worth exploring.

11.2   The Choice to Challenge Extreme Views in the Classroom

This chapter aims to make a practical argument in relation to the 'Prevent duty'—namely, that in operating this intelligence collation duty in higher education (HE) institutions, more support, guidance and investment should be given over to ensuring that Universities in the UK implement the duty with intellectual rigour and with pedagogic intent, as opposed to via a bureaucratic compliance culture. This would involve the supplementing of current duties (to play a role in protecting students and members of

the public and attempting at the same time to ensure freedom of speech on campus) with a specific legal duty on academic staff, in effect, to discuss and to challenge the basis of extreme views in the classroom or campus context. This duty would go beyond the recommendation currently found in Prevent duty guidance for higher education to ensure a balancing of opposing views at contentious events, for example, and the 'soft' duty to challenge extremist ideas which risk drawing people into terrorism. In effect, our view is that the legal protection of academic freedom of expression could be better enlisted through a new legal duty that entailed the Prevent duty is deployed critically and quite literally in an academic manner. This would however entail a respect for academic judgement that if an idea has been challenged when presented in an academic environment, then that is the end of the matter—representing an undermining of the securitisation narrative (for once).

Implementing our recommendation would address the perception shared by at least some academics that the Prevent duty side-lines the normal process of challenging dangerous ideas and at the same time extends the work of the state in a manner that is worrisome, i.e. directly into the classroom. This can be said particularly with regard to the idea that academic staff are expected to conduct teaching and student support activities with an eye or an ear open to potential extremism presented by their students (Greer and Bell 2018: 94).[6] Better steps should on the whole have been taken to ensure that Universities are not adopting piecemeal, scant or superficial training approaches in order to 'upskill' academics in turning them into intelligence officers, of sorts. The relevant government guidance places a duty on Universities in England and Wales, for example, to adopt basic Prevent training for staff.[7] But the template introductory training materials made available for adaptation locally in an institution place only a focus in their set of five linked case studies on detecting risk of

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[6] Strictly speaking, university educators will be under employment law duties of contract to their institutional employers to report extremist views/worrying, potentially radicalising behaviour based on their training. A university itself may take the decision to then report the matter to the police. As Greer and Bell explain, 'if the staff in a given students' welfare service think any concerns raised about a specific student may require it, they may make a formal referral to a chief police officer who may then refer to a local authority panel, but "only if there are reasonable grounds to believe the individual is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism', referencing the provisions of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in s.36(3). See Greer and Bell, p. 94.

[7] PDGHEB para. 22.

Islamic radicalisation[8]—when there is good reason that foci should be placed on other sorts of extremism (Dearden 2018).[9] There is evidence in a report published by HEFCE[10] that implementation and bureaucratic compliance with the Prevent duty has been near-universal across the University sector—but the main academic trade union, UCU, would have called for a complete boycott of the implementation of the Prevent duty if it had the legal ability to do so (Greer and Bell 2018).

11.3   The Context of Our Recommendation for Stronger Duty to Challenge on Academics

Generally speaking, violent extremism and terrorist acts are a human rights issue globally due to the potential for human rights atrocities occurring on a large scale or even when solely focusing on UK terror attacks within the last 12 months. The General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in February 2016 adopted a resolution for the Secretary-General (SG) to create a plan to prevent violent extremism from occurring (UNGA Res 70/291 2016).[11] The report (Ibid) states that:

Violent extremist groups pose a direct assault on the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…. are undermining our efforts to maintain peace and security, foster sustainable development, promote respect for human rights and deliver much needed humanitarian aid.

Following this action, the UN held a conference over 2 days in April 2016 concerning the next steps to prevent violent extremism (Ibid), with the aim to expand the legal framework from the Secretary-General and allow international members, senior experts and heads of national and international practices to share their practices and experiences to build on

[8] See Universities UK/Safer Campus Communities, 'The Prevent duty in Higher Education: An Introduction', PowerPoint training presentation.

[9] For example, consider the thwarting of four far-right terrorism plots since the Islamist attack in Westminster in London in 2017: see Lizzie Dearden, 'Four far-right UK terrorist plots foiled since Westminster attack, police reveal', *The Independent*, Tuesday 27th February 2018 (accessed at 27.02.2018).

[10] HEFCE, 'Analysis of prevent annual reports from higher education providers for activity 2015–2016' (HEFCE 2017) http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/HEFCE,2014/Content/Pubs/2017/201711/HEFCE2017_11.pdf. Accessed 26 February 2018.

[11] UNGA Res 70/291 'The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review' (1 July 2016).

the SG's plan while retaining and respecting the State's individual sovereignty (Ibid: 2), with the intention that states comply with these obligations under international law and the UN Charter (Ibid). Resolution 70/291 was adopted in July 2016 by the General Assembly of the UN and was titled the United Nations *Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, with the recommendation that Member States implement the suggestions of the plan in order to counter the growing concern of violent and non-violent extremism (Ibid).

Just over 1 year later, during which time there had been a number of deadly terrorist attacks in England, Home Secretary Amber Rudd noted in her speech at the 2017 Conservative Party conference that: 'We all have a role to play. Prevent isn't some "Big Brother" monolithic beast. It's all of us working together, through local initiatives set up by local people, schools, universities and community groups' (Rudd 2017).

It is without doubt the case that *some* men and women may be radicalised, or further radicalised, while University students—but it is not necessarily true that an institution itself or student experiences within it—play a role in that radicalisation per se. Also, it may indeed sometimes be the case that University educators may overhear, discuss, be confronted with or somehow learn of a student's tendency toward extremism and might, without appropriate guidance, be unsure of how to act in such a scenario, without that guidance. But one would imagine that the amount of dangerous views and irrationally held beliefs, clung to by a particular student, that are academically and *safely* challenged on any course could number many more times over.

There are examples, too, of successes arising from the Prevent duty (Department for Education (DFE), 2017)[12] and seemingly missed opportunities (Mendick et al. 2017). Beyond these vague conclusions about Prevent, what can certainly be said is that as researchers new to the area of study, we are dipping our toes into an ideological battlefield. Prevent is undoubtedly seen as toxic by some commentators. Wragg has noted that 'the prevent duty—and other measures like it—are not so much a slippery slope as one long descent into darkness. They are the sort of measures on which fascism is built' (Wragg 2016: 60). Another critical perspective on

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[12] See, for example, anonymised case study A from Annex A to Department for Education, *Advice note: Safeguarding vulnerable individuals in Higher Education from terrorist groups*, from http://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk/uploads/files/2017/05/advice_note_safeguarding_in_he_050517.pdf (accessed at 27.02.2018) p.11.

Prevent is focused on an anxiety that 'voicing criticisms [of Prevent] is itself construed as evidence of extremism, or of people being influenced by extremism and therefore, perhaps, of being drawn into terrorism' (McGovern 2016: 57; Sutton 2015). On the other hand, there is an emerging literature that criticises the view that Prevent is truly toxic at all and condemns attacks on the Prevent duty as hyperbole, on the basis that there is little evidence (yet) of Prevent as discriminatory, stigmatising or marginalising. As Greer and Bell (2018) have observed, for example, critics of Prevent in the University setting:

> *Fail to offer a viable alternative… and it is not at all clear what participation in them requires nor how success or failure is to be measured. Would, for example, a refusal by an academic to warn university authorities about another Andrew Ibrahim, on the grounds that she regards herself as "an educator not an informant", be regarded as a campaign triumph even if he successfully became a suicide bomber?*

In our research for this chapter we are also entering a complex policy minefield as part of the aforementioned ideological battlefield—principally due to one salient process: 'Brexit'. Of course, the Prevent duty could hardly exist usefully alone, and it operates in policy terms as part of a wider counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation framework in the UK.[13] In mid-February 2018 Theresa May, UK Prime Minister, gave a speech at a security conference in Munich that sought to outline the dimensions the UK government sought within the legal settlement for 'Brexit' in national security terms—with particular attention paid to collaboration between EU bodies, the EU 27 states and the UK, in terms of combined information and intelligence sharing as well as military and security logistics (Olterman 2018). The UK government had previously observed that:

> *The exact contours of the UK's future relationship with the EU on internal security will need to be agreed in the course of negotiations. During those negotiations, the UK considers that the focus should be on the areas of cooperation that deliver the most significant operational benefit, to ensure the best possible outcome for both the UK and its EU partners* (HM Government 2018).

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[13] See the CONTEST strategy, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest (accessed on 27.02.2018).

European Union strategy on combating radicalisation, as stated since 2005, needs to balance human rights duties under the European *acquis* and wider human rights commitments in international law, with rational domestic, EU-wide and collaborative commitments to fighting radicalisation and extremism.[14] Brexit entails that the UK relationship with the EU on national security, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation issues must reinvent itself against a backdrop of withdrawal from the EU *acquis*—including, expressly, UK severance with the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2018).[15]

In this UK-specific context, then, for a strategy such as Prevent compliance was crucial, with regard that other vital European legal system, namely, that of human rights law based upon the European Convention on Human Rights. The entering into law of a statutory Prevent duty for the University sector was always going to precipitate much debate, many clashes and ultimately one or more legal challenges. The first of these challenges to occur was in the case of *Butt*, to be addressed in a later section of this chapter.

Debate over Prevent in UK universities has elided into a tense focus on free speech on campus (UK Parliamentary Inquiry 2017).[16] There is to be a review of Prevent, we are told (Masud 2017), following a series of terror attacks in the UK in 2017, but as highlighted above, the Home Secretary at the time of writing has made it clear that Prevent is here to stay. Public pressure has now, following the Manchester and London attacks, rendered the counter-terrorism policy review more necessary and urgent than it has been previously (Greer and Bell 2018). In practice, Prevent has been viewed as a corrosive exercise, focused particularly on those students within Universities who are at risk of contributing to values of extremism, in an overly sweeping manner, leaving some student-consumers in the HE sector fearing to express their opinions due to the anxiety of becoming

[14] See the EU counter-extremism strategy published at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/ (accessed 27.02.2018).

[15] See Equality and Human Rights Commission, Brexit and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: our concerns, from https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/what-are-human-rights/how-are-your-rights-protected/what-charter-fundamental-rights-european-union-0 (accessed at 27.02.2018).

[16] See details of the UK Parliamentary inquiry that is currently asking 'Is Government policy on free speech in universities coherent?', from https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/news-parliament-2017/freedom-of-speech-uni-launch-17-19/ (accessed at 27.02.2018).

reported as a risk (Yezza 2015). David Anderson QC raised the point, as a former independent reviewer of UK terrorism legislation, that Prevent is creating resentment from the Muslim Community, alongside removing a stable and supportive environment for students to discuss issues regarding terrorism and extremism, leading them to discuss such issues on non-University platforms (Ibid). In a highly problematic fashion, these other platforms and outlets for radicalism would lie outside institutional and educational boundaries of behaviour and, in the online environment particularly, would be absent a number of safeguards.

So this all begs the question as to how Prevent might actually be further reformed as a policy or augmented in practice—and to answer our own question we must begin by addressing the recent reforms to the legal basis for the aspect of the Prevent duty extended into the university setting.

11.4   THE PREVENT DUTY AND CONTROVERSY AROUND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES FOLLOWING THE 2015 REFORMS

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 was adapted to accord with the CONTEST Counter-Terrorism strategy published in 2011, with the purpose being to draft a new policy to limit and prevent radicalisation.[17] Section 26 (1) of the 2015 Act places a general duty, more commonly known as the 'Prevent Duty' upon specified public authorities within the UK (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015),[18] since: 'A specified authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism' (Ibid). The Act, under Schedule 6, also specifies the authorities whom the general duty to 'Prevent' then falls upon, such as local governmental authorities, criminal justice authorities, health and social care providers, the police force and, particularly of interest given the focus of this piece, upon childcare and education providers, including Universities in England and Wales (Ibid).[19]

Statistics published by the Home Office from April 2015 to March 2016 found that 7631 prevent duty referrals were made overall (Home

[17] Home Office, *CONTEST, The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (Cm 8123, July 2011) 1–125.
[18] Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 26(1).
[19] Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Schedule 6

Office 2015).[20] One third of these overall referrals came from the education sector, with individuals referred to the police as vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Referrals in the education sector were made by the relevant providers, who have the duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, namely, organisations such as schools, colleges and universities employing teachers and lecturers. It is not known how many of the third of the total number of referrals in the year to March 2016 came from the HE sector in England and Wales, however. Although it is known that the total number of 7631 referrals, 4274 of these referrals were for individuals aged under 20 (Ibid). For a discussion on the potential role of judicial systems in mitigating the underlying causes of radicalisation, see Chap. 8.

With the duty having a clear impact in educational settings, with the education sector accounting for one third of Prevent referrals, clearly it is important to assess whether the legislation currently complies with human rights structures. We focus here particularly upon the European Convention on Human Rights and the rights provided in articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.[21] Implemented in UK law via the Human Rights Act 1998, these are some of the chief rights which have the potential to be infringed upon by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and the operation of the Prevent duty (Human Rights Act 1998).[22]

Article 10 of the Convention defines freedom of expression as a right which every person is entitled to and includes the freedom to hold opinions, receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities, albeit with considerable qualifications (European Convention on Human Rights 1950).[23] The UK is required to both positively take action to protect the right in particular circumstances and (as a negative duty) not interfere with the right as part of the duties within Article 10. Article 10, which has been described as 'most intimately linked with the Prevent duty' (Greer and Bell 2018), does not specify the forms of expression which would be deemed as illegitimate per se or define

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[20] Home Office, *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme*, April 2015 to March 2016 (Statistical Bulletin 23/17, 9 November 2017) 4

[21] The freedom to manifest religious belief (under Article 9 ECHR) and the supplemental freedom from discrimination in the enjoyment of ECHR rights (under Article 14 of the Convention) may also be engaged by the operation of the Prevent duty; however, the leading *Butt* case, discussed later in this chapter, did not significantly address these issues.

[22] Human Rights Act 1998.

[23] European Convention on Human Rights, article 10 (1).

particular usages of expression which have the automatic seriousness to 'trigger' the need to gather information to be issued a referral, under the Prevent strategy, to the Channel Programme (DFE 2017).[24] Rather, what is required is known as a proportionality assessment, leaving the precise application of the right, to some extent, open to the interpretation of the person recording the information. There is of course subjectivity in assessing whether a person, expressing a particular view which differs from social 'norms' concerning radicalisation or extremism, within a particular setting such as education, is an individual who is to be subsequently reported under Prevent. As such, such reporting has the potential to be a violation of article 10 of the ECHR if it were an incorrect (in the sense of being a disproportionate) referral without a reasonable basis (and which, in either case, under the Human Rights Act 1998 it is to be interpreted as a disproportionate and unfairly balanced decision overall).

A report of an individual to the Channel programme under the Prevent strategy and within the legal framework created by the 2015 Act, such as a student within University setting, also has the potential to interfere with Article 8 of the Convention, namely, the qualified right to respect for private and family life (European Convention on Human Rights 1950).[25] This is since the sharing of their personal data with governmental agencies may have clashed with any 'reasonable expectation of privacy' that they may have had in relation to the context in which they expressed their extreme ideas—such as the reporting of an assumedly confidential but ultimately troubling conversation with a lecturer in a discussion about a classroom task or coursework assessment.

However, as article 8 ECHR is a qualified right in a similar vein to article 10, using the requisite proportionality analysis should an individual actually be determined to enjoy a 'reasonable expectation of privacy', an individual's right may still be interfered with *lawfully*, if upon the final application of the 'fair balance' test (as part of the analysis of the interference with the qualified human rights of that individual), it is ultimately in the greater interest of the wider population to do so.[26] The criteria applied

[24] See Department for Education, *Advice note: Safeguarding vulnerable individuals in Higher Education from terrorist groups*, from http://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk/uploads/files/2017/05/advice_note_safeguarding_in_he_050517.pdf (accessed at 27.02.2018).

[25] European Convention on Human Rights (1950), article 8.

[26] *R. (on the application of Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2011] UKSC 45.

within article 8 ECHR cases such as that of *Quila*, in order to determine whether a qualified right could be interfered with lawfully, in a manner which is therefore proportionate, are those stated by Lord Wilson as follows:

1. (a) Is the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right? (b) Are the measures which have been designed to meet it rationally connected to it?
2. Are they no more than necessary to accomplish it?
3. Do they strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community?[27]

The proportionality analysis approach in itself is a fairly flexible, 'contextualisable' and fact-based concept, which works alongside states being given a 'margin of appreciation' as a working principle. Under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the concept of the 'margin of appreciation' allows for a degree of subjectivity and flexibility of a state's interpretation of what it deems to be a legitimate and necessary interference with a Convention right, such as the nature of a referral under the Prevent duty for an expression of views within a university setting, and the retention of intelligence about that episode. Our view as to whether or not any interferences with the article 8 ECHR or article 10 ECHR rights of those subject to Prevent referrals are within the margin of appreciation afforded to the UK as a state must be informed largely, at the time of writing, by the case of *R (Butt)* versus *Home Secretary*,[28] which will be discussed further in this chapter, below.

From a legal perspective, Greer and Bell make the point that the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 was not after all deliberately passed to create a direct violation of the Convention (Greer and Bell 2018); and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that primary and secondary legislation must be interpreted to be compatible with the rights established under the Convention 'so far as it is possible to do so', acting as a legislative safeguarding mechanism with regard to rights, to an extent (Human Rights Act 1998).[29] If for any reason this 'mechanism' has failed under section 3, then section 4 of the Human Rights Act allows

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[27] Per Wilson LJ at para. 45.
[28] [2017] EWHC 1930.
[29] Human Rights Act 1998, s 3.

for a 'declaration of incompatibility' to be issued by the courts following a judicial review claim (Ibid).[30] Currently, no such declaration has been issued; nor has there been any declaration of illegality in relation to the statutory guidance issued to universities in England and Wales, suggesting that the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 does not, as legislation and code of practice read as a whole, despite the relevant challenge in the recent *Butt* case, contravene the Convention or violate human rights.

To some authors, however, harms which have been associated with Prevent have been assessed as occurring not just at a policy level but rather also at the level of educators and their individual implementation of Prevent duty policy in institutions, due to a lack of understanding, some ambiguity and a shortfall of expertise when exercising the duty within higher education (Qurashi 2017).

Three key bases for criticism of the Prevent duty are: (1) the great breadth of the definition provided by the government for the concept of 'extremism', (2) the differing sensitivities around Prevent in higher education and (3) a comparison of Prevent against the Equality Act 2010 given the potential of 'profiling' by academics to discriminate against those with protected characteristics such as 'race' or 'religion' with regard to the language of the Equality Act.

Firstly, the guidance published by the government to be followed by the authorities required to enforce Prevent, such as universities, provides a definition for extremism which is very broad indeed, as it reads: 'Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, and individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for different faiths and beliefs' (Home Office 2011).[31] But the phrase which has attracted most criticism is the very use of 'fundamental British values' (Ibid), as this has the implication that any views an individual expresses which are not perceived as 'traditionally British' could then be wrongly referred to the police by an institution under their Prevent duty to have 'due regard to the need for people being drawn into terrorism' (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015). Suke Wolton (2017) makes the point that 'British values' and democracy within an application the Prevent duty are a direct contradiction of one another. 'Fundamental British values' include a key concept on tolerance of others' views, but the literal intolerance encapsulated within the Prevent duty

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[30] Human Rights Act 1998, s4.
[31] Home Office, *Prevent Strategy Guidance* (Cm 8092, 2011) 107.

means that British values are clearly hard to pinpoint exactly within contemporary society in pure policy terms. While as Wolton notes, a shared moral consensus does not exist and will not exist, a clear-cut concept of 'values' does not emerge from the legislation or government guidance for higher education providers on how to exercise their positive duty alongside democracy, which leaves the relevant guidance open to interpretation (Ibid). Wolton also argues that the idea of democracy and 'British values' are going to remain logically opposed, due to 'British values' appearing to be a fixed concept within the Prevent strategy, while democracy 'needs to be affected and contested by the changing views of the population' (Ibid). It is also important to note that 'culture' and 'traditionalism' alongside democracy are also evolving concepts, so what may have been 'traditionally British' when the government proposed the CONTEST strategy in 2011 and provided this definition for extremism is likely to be different to current definitions, meaning that perhaps, due to development of what is perceived as 'traditionalism', much more detailed definitions could be more beneficial to all those whose duty is to implement Prevent and to positively have due regard for individuals and their likelihood to being drawn into terrorism.

Secondly, there is that problem of the different standard for Prevent compliance and discretion over making referrals required of higher education bodies under Section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) provides that:

> *When carrying out a duty imposed by section 26(1) a specified authority to which this section applies must have particular regard [emphasis added] to the duty to ensure freedom of speech if it is subject to that duty and (b) must have particular regard [emphasis added] to the importance of academic freedom if it is the proprietor or governing body of a qualifying institution.*[32]

Taking the 'standard' definition of Prevent to be the requisite 'due regard' shown toward preventing individuals being drawn into terrorism under section 26(1), given this requisite 'particular regard' for freedom of speech and academic freedom under section 31 of the same Act, the question is raised as to whether 'particular regard' and 'due regard' are to be

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[32] Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s31.

equally weighted in terms of duties, or whether one of these phrases, namely, 'particular regard', takes precedence over the other. These concepts again will be subjective and open to interpretation and evaluated on a case-by-case basis; however, to prevent a challenge under article 10 ECHR by students or academics in a University, section 31 may be interpreted that having particular regard toward freedom of speech is a more weighty duty as there is a crucial Human Rights Act duty to be upheld.

Thirdly, to add complexity to any analysis and application of statutory wording, in order to adhere to the Public Sector Equality Duty found under section 149 of the Equality Act, public authorities must have due regard to the need to prevent discrimination toward individuals or groups who share a protected characteristic, including religion, ethnicity and/or race, when as public authorities they carry out their public function. The Act also states that authorities, including higher education providers, need to have 'due regard' to the need to advance the equality of the people who possess this characteristic and those who do not and foster good relations between societal groups as a result (see Equality Act 2010).[33] This then raises the question as to exactly how a body, such as a university, should prioritise the Prevent duty of referring an individual for Channel guidance over their Public Sector Equality Duty to have due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity for groups of, say, Muslim students, and in particular while avoiding infringement of Convention rights that might arise from overly keen application of the Prevent duty. The Equality and Human Rights Commission considered this a sufficiently problematic legal balancing act that it has moved to offer guidance to clarify the situation—albeit with minimal advice beyond reiterating legal principles in the light of Home Office guidance on the Prevent duty for higher education bodies in England and Wales (see Equality and Human Rights Commission 2017).[34]

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[33] See Equality Act 2010, s 149, (1)(a)(b)(c).

[34] See Equality and Human Rights Commission, 'Delivering the Prevent duty in a proportionate and fair way', from https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/delivering-prevent-duty-proportionate-and-fair-way (accessed at 27.02.2018).

11.5   THE VIEW ON PREVENT, AND PREVENT TRAINING, FROM STUDENTS AND STAFF IN ONE ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT

Having obtained the requisite ethical approval from our institution, we designed and promoted a largely qualitative survey via e-mail, without incentives, to both staff and students in one academic Law department at an English university. The survey concerned respondents' perception of the Prevent duty itself and, in relation to those survey responses made by university staff, also their perceptions of the internal University training on the Prevent duty offered to academics with classroom teaching and other roles. The department concerned includes around 1500 undergraduate and postgraduate students and more than 60 staff. Overall we received 37 responses, with six from lecturers and 31 from students. We acknowledge that this is a small sample of responses from a large potential cohort of respondents, with a likelihood therefore that those with the strongest pre-disposition toward the Prevent duty as a positive or negative influence on higher education would be more likely to complete our survey as respondents, and that since this was only a single academic department which was surveyed, it is particularly hard to generalise any finding from the small amount of qualitative data collected, but we feel that some themes emerge from the data nonetheless. In this way, our survey could be seen as a kind of pilot study, and our thematic analysis has revealed, we feel, where future research might need to be addressed.

11.5.1   A Discussion of Our Survey Results

First, we asked our respondents what were their views on or experiences of the adoption of the Prevent duty in higher education, if any; we then asked of our lecturer respondents, secondly, what were their experiences of the Prevent duty training offered by your higher education institution, if they had undertaken this, and whether they had any thoughts as to how this training could be improved. We asked all our respondents whether they thought there were any advantages or disadvantages in including the Prevent duty as a key part of law or criminology curricula, and lastly, we asked about any relevant personal experiences of our respondents in relation to the operation of the Prevent duty.

Our thematic analysis raised a mixed collection of concerns about the adoption of the Prevent duty in higher education and some positive

outlooks on the adoption of the duty although it must be noted that scepticism and concern about the Prevent duty operating in the higher education predominated overall, across the responses to our survey.

11.5.2   Discrimination

The strongest theme that emerged from our survey responses was one of the perceived potential for discriminatory treatment of some groups of students, namely, Muslims, as a result of the roll-out of the Prevent duty into higher education. Respondents observed that Prevent 'fuels suspicion and not academic discussion', '…*is a blatantly discriminatory tactic*' and '…*seems unfairly target (*sic*) at those of Islamic faith rather than those at risk of involvement/coercion into extremist behaviours in other areas. i.e. white supremacy…*'—while one respondent explained that:

> I think it's stupid that Muslim students (disproportionately) will be spied on… We were all outraged at a Muslim registry in America by trump (sic) but we forget we already have one…

Furthermore, a potential for discrimination against and between students was something which several respondents perceived as a risk was the Prevent duty to be made a key part of curricula in an academic department or was something which respondents already had perceived. As some respondents observed: '*People might feel they are being targeted if taught incorrectly. There may be incidents of discrimination and racism after lessons if taught incorrectly…*', and '*Depending on the way it is taught, it might make an already marginalised group of Muslim students feel even more targeted…*'. One respondent considered whether:

> Would it make classes more uncomfortable for those likely to be targeted by the duty, even if the result was a more critical shared understanding? How would it be perceived to see it on a module plan if you were not planning on going to the lesson?

11.5.3   Censorship and Self-Censorship

A second concerning theme that arose from our analysis of our survey responses was that of the perceived potential for both censorship and self-censorship that might arise from the implementation of the Prevent duty

in a university setting. Prevent was described as potentially 'censoring seminars', as students may not wish to express their views through fear of being reported. A respondent noted that a misapplication of the Prevent duty might be 'an overreaction verging on hysteria' and concluded that: 'the danger of this could be that individual students become disaffected and alienated'. One further respondent who raised concerns about censorship or self-censorship observed that Prevent:

> *May create a climate where lecturers and students are less willing to raise or discuss certain ideas which are perceived as extreme. This has clear implications for freedom of speech, and may stifle criticism and debate. An important means of countering extreme views is to discuss them openly, subject ideas to counter arguments and critical thinking. By making students less willing to raise ideas due to fear of being reported, Prevent may be actually counter-productive, and mean students are less likely to hear their views challenged.*

Worryingly, another student respondent noted that:

> *As a Muslim student, I have been very wary of researching some cases and certain legislations (sic) for my essays as I don't want this to be on my university search history and be flagged for radicalism…*

11.5.4   Necessity

Some respondents, of course, explicitly observed that the Prevent duty in higher education was 'good', 'a good idea' or 'a good thing'. There was considerable further emphasis however on the *necessity* of the Prevent duty amongst the respondents who wrote positively about some aspects of the policy. Specifically, the Prevent duty was variously described as a 'good idea to ensure Universities accept some responsibility for the safety of the country and its students', 'a comforting initiative', 'a necessary thing' and 'needed to help decrease terrorism', while for one respondent an explicit inclusion of the Prevent duty on law and criminology curricula would raise 'awareness of the seriousness of the issue' since the 'idea of being drawn into terrorism seems miles away to most people'.

11.5.5   Student Vulnerability

A key sub-theme of the view from some respondents on issues of necessity was a particular necessity to implement something like the Prevent duty to protect students because of their vulnerability. Respondents observed that this need arose because of a 'diverse student population and potential influences which may occur as a result of being away from home', while it is 'necessary to have measures in place to stop students from being radicalised', and that 'higher education staff have the duty to help student (sic) susceptible to being drawn into terrorism'. It was noted by one respondent that 'people are getting lured into terrorism due to feeling isolated from our society'.

11.5.6   A Need for Support and Clarity in Approach

There was some mention by our survey respondents of a need to remedy what was perceived as poor quality internal University-led training and the variable extent of support offered to academics in applying the Prevent duty, as it were, as: '…better understanding [from] training on the issue would allow for wider and more informed discussion in the area'. One respondent, who identified themselves as a legal academic, commented at length that:

> It is not clear to staff what the lines of reporting are, and, as a lawyer, I'm perturbed that the training offered no analysis of the duty to protect freedom of expression which is a key issue in higher education and can create the potential for conflict. The scenarios given were useful but the answer to each one appeared to be "it depends, some people would do x, some would do y, some would do nothing". For lecturers in the classroom this offers little insight and gives no structured way to reach a decision [to refer a matter on to senior colleagues under the Prevent duty policy concerned].

11.5.7   Raising Awareness and the Need for Critical Education on the Detail of Prevent

It is also clear from our survey responses that a thorough and critical approach to education in the curricula of our surveyed department on the Prevent duty would be beneficial, since it would 'raise awareness', 'counter misconceptions and foster a climate of open debate and free speech' and 'facilitate critical discussion'. One respondent felt that 'students might

be reassured that lecturers have not bought into the duty uncritically'. This last theme of findings from our survey data we felt could be the basis of an argument, to be better developed in future research, for the 'choice to challenge' extremism in the classroom.

11.6   A Discussion of the Responses to Our Survey

The Home Secretary has made it clear that we all have a role to play in operating the Prevent duty in the educational institutions of England and Wales. However, our survey responses have shown that the Prevent duty in the University context is an issue riven with an inherent difference and a tendency toward opposite views: between fear of (self) censorship and discrimination on the one hand, versus a feeling of necessity to protect vulnerability on the other. We feel that the third, smallest strand of responses to our small-scale survey might provide the answer—a remodelling of the Prevent duty on an empowerment of students and academics to challenge extreme views in the classroom and on campus might satisfy some critics that the main object of Prevent in HE is not stigma nor safeguarding, but a pursuit of truth.

Some academics have proposed that universities should be excused from the Prevent duty guidance within the public sector setting as to ensure academic freedom, as universities found that early proposals for extent of the Prevent duty within the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act to be 'unworkable, lacking understanding, vague and unnecessary' (Qurashi 2017). However, as Fahid Qurashi goes on to explain, as universities are legally bound by the statute, compliance was assumed and continuously monitored due to non-compliance being in contempt of court (Ibid). Measures were put in place by Prevent Duty guidance for bodies in higher education to implement a standard for external speakers, if they were perceived as 'controversial', and this has at least allowed universities to have an element of control over students being 'brainwashed' and subsequently drawn into terrorism (Ibid). However, Qurashi emphasises the fact that many disciplines and ideas in their infancy were controversial and that many ideologies are expressed which initially do not conform to societal understanding and are rejected and then in time are more accepted (Ibid), giving the perception that the current standard for assessing the appropriateness of any external speaker on campus under the Prevent guidance for higher education in time might only ever need revisiting in any case. The policy framework set by the Home Office in their guidance

also makes the assumption that 'human agency and rational decision-making' are not present in both students and lecturers within universities, Qurashi argues, giving another perception that in being vulnerable in situations exposed to external speakers, controversial materials and discussion about extremist ideological concepts, both students and lecturers are seemingly unable to make rational decisions on whether to accept a controversial ideology (Ibid: 205). We feel that the legal emphasis on the need for both students and lecturers to challenge any controversial ideas on campus needs to be stronger and that the Prevent duty guidance for Universities in England and Wales needs to be restructured and re-weighted to emphasise this issue.

11.7   THE BIGGER PICTURE

Earlier in this chapter, we outlined the legal framework that posits the Prevent duty in Universities as human rights issues and one that could well be adjudicated upon by the courts. Unfortunately, as far as judicial commentary provides, the situation remains unclear. The recent case of *Butt* is the only case to date to touch on this complex issue. As the claimant possessed perceived extremist views, the Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) processed Butt's personal data on three separate occasions, following publicly expressing views at universities likening homosexuals to paedophiles and supporting female genital mutilation.[35] The challenge from the claimant was based on two grounds, firstly the lawfulness of government guidance documents for the prevent duty, more specifically, PDG (Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales) and HEPDG (Higher Education Prevent Duty Guidance). The second ground of challenge was the 'collection storage and dissemination' of data personal to him, as undertaken by the EAU. Both grounds were rejected in this case, firstly since Butt's standing as a 'victim' under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 could not be established in a case of this type, since Butt himself was not a student or an academic, but a visiting speaker with no particular positive right to speak at universities. His freedom of expression, in the sense of his ability to espouse his radical Islamic views on a website he edited, was essentially unaffected by the fact that far fewer universities and student societies were inviting him to speak; and he had not been banned from campuses as such.[36]

[35] [2017] EWHC 1930 at para. 202.
[36] *Butt* at paras. 81–95.

In an application, in part, of the 2015 police intelligence database case of *Catt*, where it was found that the retention and storage of personal information was not an unlawful infringement of the article 8 rights of the claimant,[37] it was also held in *Butt* that the collection, storage and dissemination of the three analyses of Butt's potential extremism were not a breach of his Article 8 right to respect for private and family life.[38] Notably his expression of his views on a public website was not regarded as his private information; nor was his record of publicly speaking (at universities) on controversial views. The key factor determining that Article 8 ECHR was not engaged in the case was that Butt did not have 'a reasonable expectation of privacy',[39] a test notably implemented in the other key police intelligence case of *JR 38*.[40] The question is then: what would be a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the Prevent Duty? Views expressed in a classroom by a student, by way of contrast with the issue of campus speeches delivered by Dr. Butt, may well be more likely to be accorded at least some greater human rights protection under the 'reasonable expectation of privacy test'—as the airing of formative views in a classroom exercise might be more expected to be protected by privacy rights.

11.8   Discussions

Despite the varied problems or particular concerns raised by Rights Watch (UK) (2016), academic commentators and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Prevent duty is currently imposed upon the authorities specified under schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act. Several academic writers highlight the flaws within the Prevent duty such as vague and ambiguous terms and contradicting legislative principles and the problems public authorities face when carrying out their legal duty, with the possibility of infringing the human rights set out by the ECHR, under articles 8, 9, 10 and 14. However, until a challenge is brought to the courts by a student or lecturer, directly concerning the lawfulness of the content within the Prevent guidance, or the structures of the 2015 Act, and whether it is legally valid, it is unlikely that

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[37] *R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland* [2015] UKSC 9.

[38] *Butt* at paras. 254–255.

[39] *Butt* at paras. 227–237.

[40] *In reJR 38* [2015] UKSC 42; although see the criticism by Lord Kerr of a simplistic application of the reasonable expectation of privacy at para. 56.

campaigning alone will effect greater political change around the Prevent strategy and duty.

That said, one of our survey respondents summarised our logical conclusion: 'An important means of countering extreme views is to discuss them openly, [to] subject ideas to counter arguments and critical thinking'. And if this is so, then we must consider a legally more binding duty to discuss extreme views in the classroom and a legally- or policy-based mechanism to give individual educators in their classrooms or courses greater freedom to decide when to *challenge*, *rather than to report*, a student in their class.

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Mothers' Agency As an Alternative to the War on Terror

Ulrich Kropiunigg

12.1 WHY MOTHERS?

When speaking about terror and terror prevention, most people distinguish between 'hard' and 'soft' approaches. The former became epitomised in the formula of the *war on terror*, the latter comprises a wide range of scholars who are devoted to empirical research and promote social work instead of predominantly legal and martial measures. While this chapter emphasises the benefits of soft approaches, it will also point out its deficits and will then consider the potentially beneficial role of mothers in their preventative capacity. Prevention amounts to little if we fail to penetrate the surface phenomena. Two of the following problematic approaches are particularly frequent: first, recognising psychodynamic forces at play but doing nothing to link them to family dynamics, and, second, identifying fully-fledged terrorists but ignoring the fact that all terrorists grow up in families who usually are unaware that their sons or

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daughters may gravitate towards violent extremism. The situation is in no way simple. As a recent study (Schlaffer and Kropiunigg 2015) has shown, mothers are confronted with paradoxes: first, mothers clearly see the dangers of radicalisation but lack the conceptual understanding to counter these influences; second, mothers clearly look for allies to prevent their children from being influenced by terrorism but do not trust institutions from government to police; and third, mothers acknowledge personal deficits regarding self-esteem, parenting skills, and social know-how but lack the concepts to overcome them.

12.1.1   Fighting Terror

Research into terrorism has not yet provided a clear understanding of the phenomenon. Its definition seems to be 'a long-standing bone of contention that will not be sorted out any time soon' (Roberts 2014: 63). As long as this lack of clarity prevails the public will tend to rely on hubristic definitions from institutions who can take the epistemic power (Leander 2005) to tell us what terrorism is and what can and should be done against it. In this logic, prevention by military personnel becomes the dominant and undisputed method that will, as a direct consequence, also continue to be perpetuated by the media. A disturbing example is McChrystal's account of increasingly sophisticated military operations in the war on terror. In using a so-called F3EA approach (find, fix, finish, exploit and analyse), the first identified and found target—that is to say a terrorist—can be expected to produce two hitherto unknown targets (McChrystal and Rose 2013). Although framed in this manner, the true meaning of prevention is not relevant here. Unfortunately, military and police typically only go after full-fledged terrorists. While this will prevent those who have been identified from inflicting further harm on individuals, it will not likely deter other terrorists from perpetrating acts of violence. Moreover, military interventions and occupations tend to motivate terrorists and can be the very cause 'of at least some terrorist campaigns' (Roberts 2014: 67). By taking on the epistemic power (who is a terrorist and who is not?), governments go as far as to identify young boys and girls with little more than provisional and immature world views as terrorists and even denounce refugees as potential terrorists. At the same time we lack workable concepts in two respects: we know little about how to successfully deter the young from going to Syria in the first place and then to integrate them (or at least some) when they return as 'lost sons'. Indiscriminate imprisonment

is unconstructive and takes away the potential of so-called *formers* to inform us about specific dynamics in recruitment. The fact that we currently deny foreign fighters the option of embarking on rehabilitation programmes is also problematic. Confiscating passports (Germany) or barring individuals from the fast track citizenship option (Austria) are just two of the many variants of laws and draft proposals that European Member countries have chosen to pursue (for further details see Bakker et al. 2013). These methods have little to nothing in common with rehabilitation programs. In May 2014, Great Britain even passed a law making it possible to strip someone of their dual nationality, effectively rendering someone stateless (Reed et al. 2015). Before the emergence of sociology and psychology as scholarly disciplines, Friedrich Schiller's pre-enlightenment drama *The Robbers* showed how the decision to deny a person his or her desire to repent for the sins can encourage revanchist and murderous actions on the part of that individual. To be sure, an individual in crisis, whose individual rights have been curbed, tends to be more prone to detrimental influences. As has previously been the case, one-sided security approaches that do not consider the dynamics and motives of terrorists will effectively hinder rather than promote reconciliation.

An effective approach needs to abandon the notorious 'wait and hit' approach of security agencies and start to implement approaches that view terror as a multifaceted phenomenon. In referring to Ginges (1997), one researcher emphasises 'that a strategy of denial and punishment tends to oversimplify terrorist motivations and contributes to a hardening of their resolve, whereas a reintegrative strategy takes into account the terrorists' feelings of rejection and alienation' (Crenshaw 2000: 417). But this is not a simple solution and demands a stance which Hans-Georg Gadamer has formulated as follows: 'Understanding is provisional consent' (Gadamer 1990: 183). In other words, the ability to admit—at least for a short while—that the other side is right, even if he/she is perceived to be completely wrong. If we stay the course and take defensive measures merely on the basis of suspicions, many vulnerable individuals will continue to become 'active'—or, in psychoanalytical terms, 'reactive'. Combat and torture are the least effective of the epistemological instruments. Instead, security forces must be trained to view their 'adversaries' as human beings. We should not only abstain from enhancing the problem through repressive measures carried out by state institutions (Böllinger 2009), we should also avoid *disease mongering*—the process of projecting problems onto adolescents.

12.1.2   *Understanding Terror*

A significant amount of energy spent on combating terror by force likely stems from traumatised responses to September 11, which had the effect both of dividing the world's citizens into 'good' and 'bad' ones and justifying martial measures in which the 'good' party must fight the 'bad' (cf. Hollander 2010: 13–18). In recent years, such oversimplifications have indeed been challenged by researchers in the field. Considering that terrorism-related research, as a scientific field, only emerged in the wake of the terror attack at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, it has come a long way. This is especially true with respect to its shift in focus from profiling terrorists to exploring psychodynamics at play. Post et al. already mentioned 32 critical variables (Post et al. 2002), while Horgan (2009: 9)—a few years later—spoke of 'a sequence of events that are usually ordered and/or interdependent'. Even so, none of the scholars addressed deeper 'causes' stemming from an impaired psychodynamic development.

For all of the research that has been conducted into the field of terrorism, our knowledge about its root causes remain surprisingly inaccurate. It appears as though scholarly research 'walks in old boots' or tries—as one expert put it—'to adapt their off-the-shelf disciplinary insights to terrorism' (Sageman 2014: 566). This problematic situation is further aggravated by the lack of shared information between the intelligence community and academia, thus 'preventing us from developing useful and perhaps counterintuitive insights into the factors leading people to turn to political violence' (Sageman 2014: 576). Against the background of these hindrances, it is clear that there is a need for effective alternatives on the ground—alternatives that are far more effective than short-term military interventions. If the global efforts to understand and curb violent extremism are to stand a chance of succeeding, we should 'broaden the effort to civilian-led programmes' (Boeke 2014: 6). Apart from the lack of cooperation among stake holders and an insufficient degree of interest in the psychological dimension, there is also a neglect of systematic transitional research in the search for alternative approaches (Aly et al. 2014; Williams and Lindsey 2013; Davies 2009).

12.1.3   *Preventing Terror*

Adolescents appear to be the most vulnerable group. It is at this stage in their lives that individuals at risk are most prone to joining radical or terrorist groups. Yet the precise starting point in the process of radicalisation

continues to divide scholars. Because it is assumed to be a process (Horgan 2008), we can deduce that it precedes actual acts of terror or the joining of a certain terrorism-affiliated group. Lone actors, for example, tend to be between the ages of 15–69, with the vast majority (modus 22) being in early adulthood (Gill et al. 2014). Let us consider the average ages of offenders across a range of radical groups: 20 was the average age at which members joined the Columbian guerrilla (Florez-Morris 2007), 25 for those volunteering with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (Gill and Horgan 2013), 26 for those joining an al-Qaeda group (Sageman 2004) and 35 in the case of dissident veterans of PIRA (Horgan and Gill 2011). We can assume that radicalisation starts much earlier and almost certainly at some point during adolescence. During this developmental period a person finalises his or her decision to become an integral part of society. While we know little about the effects of developmental stages on people who ultimately will choose a violent political lifestyle, the same applies to all other young people. Seth Schwartz points to a complete absence of studies, especially about the impact different developmental stages exert on 'normal' and deviant adolescents (Schwartz 2005). It is not surprising, therefore, that most terror research limits itself to cases in which radicals and terrorists can be characterised by measurable factors. However, individual identity at the age of 16 is not only dependent on easily measurable societal circumstances (e.g. poverty, criminal records and unemployment) but also on long-term effects going back to the first year of life, when either trust or mistrust is built. If the latter is the result of early communication patterns between a baby and its immediate environment, this most likely will become a dominant feature of its world view. A sense of mistrust will almost certainly inform these individuals' decisions. Insecurity, which comes from mistrusting oneself, will prompt an individual to search more intensely for an unwavering ideological outlook.

Crisis, according to Marcia, denotes a 'period of engagement in choosing among meaningful alternatives' (1966: 551). The course of adolescence is fairly predictable in this respect, yet the literature in the field of radicalisation and terror is full of examples that indicate unforeseen events like a sudden interest in religion or an unexpected insight during prayers (Post 2005: 626), followed by a deep commitment to 'the cause'. The desire for an identity that makes one feel equal or more worthy than others is a common manifestation of adolescence. Avoiding ostracism and seeking admiration are strong private motives, regardless of the logic that is applied: 'Perpetrators of armed attacks were seen as heroes' (Post 2005: 626).

While relatively few people are likely to embark on a career in violent extremism, the fact remains that an individual is most susceptible to this scenario during adolescence. The characteristics that make a young person vulnerable are determined by a number of developmental stages that have their starting point at birth. Yet a framework that captures these factors and impacts is rarely applied to radicalisation research.

12.1.4   One Step Deeper: What Triggers the Trigger?

Earlier research that conceptualised terrorism as a dynamic process in a person and between that person and their family and environment originates from studies of the West-German terror scene. Böllinger (1981) uses Erik Erikson's (1979) concept of psychosocial developmental stages and views the decision to embark on violent extremism as a product of (a) specific deficits acquired during childhood and (b) the demands from the 'crisis of puberty' to find one's identity. Böllinger (1981: 179) argues that psychologically unprepared individuals unconsciously 'process' their deficits and develop a terrorist personality. Although he does not use Adlerian concepts explicitly, he regards feelings of inferiority as the result of psychological deficits that fuel tendencies towards overcompensation and demonstrations of power. Böllinger therefore speaks of exclusionary 'existentialistic fantasies' like 'he or me' (Böllinger 1981: 210). It is commendable how early on he included psychoanalysis in his terror research. Despite Crenshaw's (1986) praise for this specific approach, it was never developed further. Consequently, there is a lack of sophisticated psychologically based research. Böllinger (2009) regrets the 'shelving' of relevant research into developmental processes. If we continue merely to focus on the superficial and measurable contributing factors, we will not fully understand terror and why individuals might opt for this path. Manès Sperber's *Schleiermotivation* (veiled motivation) offers an insightful viewpoint in this respect: 'For a terrorist the real motivation is inexpressible and is entirely concealed by ideological extremism' (Sperber 1983: 186, my translation from German). Rather, they believe to be serving a glorious cause.

Studies that analyse extremists on the basis of psychoanalytic interpretations are rare. Radicalisation, in this view, is the outcome of an individual's unsuccessful struggle over time particularly during the formative stages in life, and against the background of various environmental conditions. One such case study (Kropiunigg 2010, 2013), based on Kadim, a former

Saudi extremist in his adolescence and early adulthood, identifies a series of formative and challenging situations that contributed to an increased vulnerability for radical ideas and solutions. Kadim's idealisation of the West (he watched and adored Clint Eastwood) and his praise of independent thinking (he read Western philosophers) were discouraged by nearly all official and unofficial representatives of Saudi society. Radicalisation then comes as no surprise when early acquired mental schemas (cf. Chang 2009) and *fictions* (cf. Stone 2011) come up against dominant societal values and rules that curb individual liberties.

12.1.5 *Identity Formation Is Part of Family Life*

Understanding terror requires considering two spheres that run parallel to one another. Although there is no doubt about the leading role of 'hard' approaches, 'soft' approaches are in direct competition with them. One result of this uncoordinated endeavour is the overlooking of several causes of terror and measures to prevent terror. While psychology is not neglected in terror research, it is nevertheless underestimated. Most research is sociological or psycho-sociological at best. Psychodynamic approaches are rare, despite their potential to answer the question of vulnerability within a certain societal context. The other problem is that terror research and prevention focuses chiefly on actors like soldiers and perpetrators. Parents, who must be considered the first line of defence, are completely absent in research and prevention work.

What is almost completely neglected is the fact that all radicals and terrorists grow up and live in families like any other young person does. Most maintain close connections to their families and often ask for permission to embark on jihad. Others begin their 'missionary' work while living with their parents—forcing or trying to force them into a devoutly Muslim way of life, including the ban of music, television and other behavioural changes mandatory when observing the difference between haram and halal. For a Saudi takfiri it was and still is not unusual to literally smash television sets in front of their family (Kropiunigg 2013). At least two factors speak for the inclusion of families into terror research and prevention. First, radicalisation grows silently in families and goes mostly undetected. Despite its centrality and despite being 'the primary means of establishing conventional, pro-social bonds' (Altier et al. 2014: 653), the family is often overlooked when studying the interplay between radicalisation, family and society. Second, to join a violent extremist group is a personal

decision: every terrorist is 'motivated by his own complex of psychosocial experiences and traits' (Horgan 2005: 35). This does not mean that there are no 'external' push and pull factors, but all of them are processed by very personal motivations, a particular psychological state of mind and mental constructs. Only a deeper understanding of 'processed' push and pull factors—that are most prevalent during adolescence—can better help us to translate essential factors into preventative measures and methods to enable disengagement and de-radicalisation at times when even a potential terrorist is naïve about his or her future path.

In response to an increased awareness for the need of preventative, bottom-up strategies that complement 'hard' approaches, several countries have already endorsed programs at the community level (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Weine et al. 2013; Aly et al. 2014). Most have been implemented in schools (Davies 2009), unfortunately failing to engage and include mothers and fathers. It is puzzling to think that this aspect has been neglected for more than 40 years.

As the main factor in identity formation, the family structure provides the most important context, also in the process of radicalisation itself (Schwartz 2005). The family is the medium through which individuals develop into maturity; identity is key in this process. We should not allow terrorist groups to understand our children better than we do. Mothers and fathers have to resume their roles as the main facilitators of identity in their children.

In the case of some children, it is the promise of an 'alternative family' that terrorist groups will use as bait: 'First, terrorist groups tend to recruit adolescents and emerging adults, for whom identity issues are most salient' (Schwartz 2005: 304). Terrorist groups are the beneficiaries of problematic processes of identity formation. In filling an acute gap, terrorist groups present themselves as rescuers of the youth. At first it seems as if they know best how to solve the troubles of someone who feels left behind or misunderstood. To counter this appeal, parents must focus on the child's identity struggle: 'To encourage prevention of terrorist recruitment, it is important to identify the identity-related characteristics that terrorist groups look for when recruiting' (Schwartz 2005: 305). From Schwartz's perspective, the family is in direct competition with groups on the outside. The most dangerous groupings are those who offer a completely new lifestyle, which could be characterised as 'identity repair'. In order to compete with them, we need a deeper understanding of the parent's role in upbringing. What do they regard as dangerous, what are their parenting

skills and what support do they expect from society? A recent study by Schlaffer and Kropiunigg (2015) from the NGO Women without Borders has addressed these issues with respect to the role of mothers.

12.2 ASKING MOTHERS

Mothers are present throughout their children's lives. They have a deep connection and sophisticated understanding of push and pull factors, especially in regard to what excites them and upsets them and what might prompt their descent into violence. Mothers' concerns provide unique insights into the preliminary stages of radicalisation and help to fill a crucial gap in our understanding of the problem of extremism. Despite their unique position of access and proximity to their children, mothers have been largely overlooked by scholars and policy shapers. They present a missing link in the quest for gaining a deeper understanding of risk factors and are key partners in developing preventative, counter-violence strategies.

After recognising the unique position of mothers, Women without Borders launched a study to examine mothers' knowledge and interest in radicalisation prevention. Data from mothers living in regions affected by violent extremism—Nigeria, Pakistan, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine—was collected and analysed in a two-stage study (Schlaffer and Kropiunigg 2015). During the first stage, 200 in-depth interviews were conducted with mothers and experts in each of the countries to gain a deeper appreciation of the social and emotional environments of adolescent and young adult sons.

The questions were grouped into seven areas: family background, the children's life, the mother's role in their child's upbringing, proximity to extremism, societal factors (especially in regions affected by violence) and existing coping mechanisms for violent extremism, individually and collectively.

Results from the qualitative data analysis, based on the in-depth interviews, were used to construct a questionnaire that was then used in a survey with mothers across the above mentioned five countries ($N = 1023$).

Key takeaways emerged from both the interview and survey data regarding perceptions of a mother's role in countering extremist influences. First, the data across both the interviews and surveys strongly pointed to the fact that mothers were concerned that their children could be radicalised. Second, most mothers expressed confidence in their own

abilities to prevent their children from being lured into violent extremism. Moreover, a majority of mothers also stated that they would be able to recognise early warning signs in their children. Finally, during many of the interviews, mothers expressed a sense of urgency and eagerness to cooperate with other concerned mothers to jointly combat the growing problem of extremist recruitment.

12.2.1   Mothers' Fears

The data on risk factors is particularly important because this information is not accessible to local authorities, intelligence agencies and other actors involved in terror research. Given their unique vantage point, mothers' perspectives on initial extremist influences are therefore invaluable for the conceptualisation of prevention work. As researchers and policymakers have widely acknowledged, gaining a clear picture of the initial entry into extremism has important implications for effectively addressing radicalisation at its origin. Mothers' insights help to elucidate the most intricate details of this picture.

Asked about gateways of violent extremism, the mothers expressed their belief that extremist agendas are disseminated primarily through the Internet (78%), radical religious leaders (78%), political organisations (76%) and television (76%). These figures are not surprising, but the overall picture that emerges is noteworthy. These four diverse sources are given almost equal significance, indicating that on an average day, youth are confronted with radical messages from many different angles: the media, the Internet, schools and social networks. The breadth of these sources indicates that some communities offer very little protected space, therefore often leaving youth highly vulnerable to detrimental influences. Therefore, the pervasiveness of extremist messages, as reported by the mothers in the study, indicate the necessity for a security approach that focuses on building resilience in and around the home.

12.2.2   Mothers' Trust

Where do mothers turn when they have concerns about their children's safety and well-being? Which people or institutions do they trust in to provide support? When asked whom they trust the most in protecting their children from radicalisation, 94% of the mothers participating in the study stated that they trust in mothers above all others. Some 91% of

mothers viewed fathers as the next most trustworthy, followed by other relatives at 81%.

These findings indicate that a crisis relating to the early stages of radicalisation would best be managed through a family circle or should, at the very least, be considered as the primary source of support. Teachers, ranking fourth among the most trustworthy points of contact (79%), followed by community organisations (61%), are among the first institutions they turn to outside of their immediate social networks. Religious leaders received a trust score of 58%, which reveals a degree of ambivalence. State-level organisations earned some of the weakest trust scores: police at 39%, the army at 35% and local government at 34%. Coming in at 36%, international organisations earned similarly low scores. The federal government, however, earned the lowest trust score (29%).

The most important finding contained in this data is that mothers consider themselves and other mothers to have significant prevention potential. The existing security approach in many countries implements prevention strategies through national and local authorities; yet these two groups may evoke significant distrust. The mothers' responses indicate a trust gap between private and public spheres in the security realm. This fundamental problem was recently addressed in a *Terrorism and Political Violence* article entitled 'The Stagnation in Terrorism Research', which argues that government and private citizens need to cooperate to combat radicalisation (Sageman 2014). Therefore, a key step in countering terrorism is finding ways to enable cohesion and trust within communities. Arriving at this conclusion, it seems, would have been impossible without the input of mothers.

12.2.3   Mothers' Needs

How then do mothers assess their own needs with respect to prevention? What kind of support do they need to protect their children from violent extremist ideologies? After being given a list of needs, 86% of mother participants regarded increasing their knowledge of early warning signs of radicalisation to be the most important skill. This was followed by training in self-confidence (84%), parenting skills (80%) and computer skills (69%). Most of the participants also stated that trainings would help them to connect with other concerned mothers (80%).

These findings provide at least two insights: first, the mothers have an acute awareness of deficits, and second, mothers are willing to confront

radical influences impacting on their children but feel as though they are responding less effectively than they could. However, mothers' natural, underappreciated prevention potential can be developed with the right tools and knowledge.

Overall, it is clear there is an immediate need for a more diversified approach to counterterrorism, one that includes the expertise and strategic position of mothers. In a preventive paradigm, their voices and capacities are essential to develop new strategies and partnerships. This study sheds light on the gap in the existing security paradigm and seeks to counter recruitment from the ground up. In order to be effective, preventative strategies need to include and engage mothers because of their privileged access to their children.

In the wake of these significant conclusions, the final stage of the 'Can Mothers Challenge Extremism?' study applied the unique insights to develop a comprehensive model addressing the most important needs expressed by the mothers. Specifically, to recognise, support, equip and empower mothers with contextualised information and trainings. Based on these findings, Women without Borders created the Mother Schools (MS) model to address mothers' needs and to strengthen community resilience, starting from within the confines of the home and emanating outwards to the entire community.

12.3   THE MOTHER SCHOOLS MODEL

The nature of Mother Schools (MS) is grassroots by definition, engaging the most-affected, least-included members of civil society, they are bottom-up prevention strategies. To be sure, 'If we really want to identify and support resilience in communities under threat, we cannot do so from a distance. We need to listen to and observe its residents and learn about its history, culture, social structure, values, needs, resources, and daily experiences, in order to determine precisely what resilience means for them'(Weine et al. 2013: 330).

The MS model identifies mothers as natural security allies and arms them with the necessary skills to construct an effective foundation for community resilience. The curriculum, implemented through trusted community partners, includes specific exercises that facilitate dialogue, allows for an exchange of information and ideas and uses critical reflection through context-based techniques that apply to participants' daily lives.

This model provides mothers with the necessary space to deconstruct individual and social barriers, which help them to both address violent extremism and heighten their understanding of early warning signs. Mother Schools facilitate collective strategizing to effectively counter radical influences in at-risk children, families and communities at large.

Mother Schools have been implemented since 2008 in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Zanzibar and Nigeria. More recently, Belgium, Great Britain and Austria were added to the list. Mothers report that participating in Mother Schools provides them with more credibility in their homes and communities and has inspired the belief that they have agency within their families, even when they are surrounded by conflict. As one MS participant from Kashmir stated, 'We always think that such discussions can only take place among educated people and the elite in high profile societies. But, now we believe, after exploring this, our skills were within us, always—but unfortunately in sleeping mode. We see that we can also become friends with our children and help them to deal with any kind of problem so that they don't feel the need to look for any violent alternatives'. The findings emerging from these first Mother Schools also indicate that the MS curriculum provides mothers with key tools, better preparing them to identify and respond to radical influences.

Adolescence represents a window of opportunity for all sorts of influences. Radical recruiters appeal to dissatisfied youth at a time of heightened vulnerability, with promises of belonging and honour. But it is also a pivotal point for mothers and families to understand their role in creating a positive alternative to the appeal of detrimental pull factors. While adolescence is a period for self-exploration and greater independence, it comes with a degree of uncertainty that requires guidance and attentiveness on the part of families. This difficult task calls for mothers' courage as well as confidence and credibility in both their communities and in their role as mothers—skills that are rarely taught in society.

The Mother Schools curriculum includes ten modules spanning three stages and guiding participants through a process of gradual awareness building. The model provides mothers with the appropriate tools to respond to their children's needs and guides them through a healthy, well-adjusted period of adolescence. The curriculum focuses first on the self, then on the family and finally on the community. Ultimately, mothers will gain a deeper appreciation of their security role in families and communities.

12.3.1   *Developing Self-Confidence in a Safe Space*

The first four workshops aim to collectively create a safe and comfortable environment in which barriers can be deconstructed and productive dialogue can take place. This includes exercises in which mothers are guided through critical self-reflection, including identifying their strengths and weaknesses, along with analyses of their communities and their role within them. Individual and community identity, self-esteem, self-doubt and emotional competence are discussed in-depth, with a focus on individual narratives to contextualise and personalise these key subjects. The first modules strengthen confidence and self-awareness, a foundation for the subsequent skill training and targeted knowledge approach.

As one mother from Dal Lake, Kashmir, stated, 'Once you encourage someone here who shares her sad story or about the problems in their lives, just a word of encouragement makes them feel strong. They think they are not alone. They get the feeling of acceptance'. Another mother from Ledokombo, Indonesia, stated, 'We feel more powerful and strong in this group', while yet another from Mewat, India, reflected on how the program could help to improve her relationship with her children: 'The more confident we are, the more our children will seek advice and emotional support from us mothers'. This confidence, self-awareness and recognition are important preconditions for the subsequent phase of concrete skill building.

12.3.2   *Child Development in Context*

The next stage addresses parenting skills grounded both in theory and in the social political realities of the community. In drawing on Erik Erikson's concept of psychosocial development (Erikson 1968), mothers are made familiar with a series of so-called crises which a child has to master on its way to adulthood. The aim is to provide them with concepts to understand their children and to depart from binary understandings like those that categorise children as being either 'rebellious' *or* 'obedient'. Following the presentation of Erikson's concepts, mothers are encouraged to discuss the honing of parenting skills and to analyse their own relationships and interactions with their children in the context of existential and psychological needs. The mothers—most of them for the first time in their lives—move beyond binary concepts of either strictness or tolerance in educating their children. A Kashmiri mother from Srinagar explained how she applied

this knowledge in her home: 'It is a common belief that you don't give much importance to the children and listen to them every time and that instead you should be strict so that a fear is maintained and they have respect. But, in this class, I came to know that this is not the case… It is a misguided notion and it is much more important to acknowledge the problems of our children'. Another mother from Rawalpindi, Pakistan, asserted 'Instead of making the problems an excuse, we should develop positive thinking so that our children don't feel burdened and depressed because of us'. The aim is to allow mothers to arrive at their own conclusion in an organic manner, especially in regard to how they can better meet their children's needs. Only thus is it possible to find answers to intricate questions, like what and how can a mother contribute to her child's developmental needs of trust, autonomy, initiative and identity?

The workshop in this phase incorporates dialogue training that deals with context-specific political violence and encourages mothers to share information about how and in what way youth become involved. They then go on to discuss ways to engage with teenagers, particularly in difficult and sensitive situations. The Mother Schools in Kashmir, for instance, took place in the months leading up to an election. The participants recounted their children's varying degrees of involvement and the related problems they were confronted with as mothers. One woman from Srinagar shared how her son's friend had been killed for allegedly throwing stones in an act of political protest. Her son was deeply depressed and angry about political injustices, and she recalled how she comforted him and encouraged him to talk about it, which eventually led to a discussion about productive ways to channel his anger and grief. A mother from Kupwara, Kashmir, shared how, after a series of suicides in her community, she vowed to 'listen to my children. When I heard about [these suicides] I imagined that [those children] must have been going through some problem which they couldn't share with their families or loved ones so they took the extreme step… These incidents scared me so much and have given me reason to listen to my children. Initially, I had no idea what being away from my children's mind could lead to'. This intermediary stage facilitates reflection on parent–child dynamics, and it encourages discussions centring on ways to enhance overall support, especially with respect to security issues. Individual narratives play an important role in this part of the curriculum, not only because narratives foster a useful exchange of life experiences, but also because they strengthen the narrator's self (Ainsworth-Vaughn 1998) and the group's dynamics.

12.3.3   *Building Relationships and Including Fathers*

The last stage of the Mother Schools curriculum focuses on how to establish and reinforce resilience in the home. Mothers are provided with the necessary guidance to recognise and—more importantly—to react to early warning signs of radicalisation. Most warning signs are fairly obvious and thus also easy to detect (e.g. increased use of certain sites on the Internet, and sudden changes in dress codes and daily routines) but difficult to address. Common forms of alarming behaviour, like self-isolation, are one of the greater challenges for parents. In such cases, it is not helpful to advise parents to communicate with their children on a regular basis. Advice of this nature, however well-intentioned, tends to do little in the way of empowering parents. The Mother Schools therefore highlight the importance of listening skills and concepts that encourage empathy during conversations. Upon concluding this stage, mothers should have an increased awareness about typical threats of radicalisation, a deepened understanding of their own role and a broader and refined toolkit of parenting strategies. Moreover, mothers should also find partners in their husbands and view prevention as a profound family affair.

The overall goal of Mother Schools is to make mothers more aware of the potential dangers in their immediate environment and the signs of radicalisation in their children. Mothers should become more confident and competent in responding to their children's needs and in providing adequate support. Mother Schools' graduates are expected to embody the starting point for building resilience in families and communities.

12.4   Conclusions

Mothers are closer to the frontlines than many of the officials and law enforcement officers tasked with addressing threats like violent extremism. While the authorities tend to commence their work in the wake of an attack or incident (by intercepting youth at airports, making arrests and searching homes), mothers are distinct in being the witnesses of every stage in the process of radicalisation. In the absence of our ability, as a global society, to eliminate the myriad causes and sources of radical messages, our only option is to build resilience from within. Addressing the internal, emotional forces that leave the youth vulnerable to extremist ideologies (which tend to be based on anger, resentment, resignation or a lack of purpose and belonging) requires the attentiveness and support

of trusted, willing individuals. Violent extremism, understood here as a symptom of these emotional deficits, cannot be adequately addressed by governments and local authorities alone. In fact, it demands the involvement of civil society.

The involvement of mothers from the outset is the most critical ingredient of a constructive de-radicalisation program. Given their proximity to their children, mothers are often the first to recognise the warning sign, including behavioural changes like anger, anxiety and self-isolation. They are well positioned to develop unique relationships with their children, which can provide a necessary degree of stability when children begin to interact with the outside world and become subjected to potentially detrimental influences. When viewed in this way, mothers present themselves as a crucial element in building resilience into the social fabric. An effective and cost-efficient security architecture is made possible by tapping into mothers' preventative potential, establishing capacity-building mechanisms for them and conceptualising them as key security allies. Mothers are also unique in that they can master two roles at the same time: (1) they are able to build resilience in their communities from the ground up, starting in the early years of their children's development, and (2) they can recognise and respond to early warning signs of violent extremism. Their involvement in the security arena deserves attention. After all, it is not only the mothers and their families who will gain from this effort; society at large will benefit just the same.

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INDEX