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A Gendered Prestige: The Powers at Play When Doing Psychology with Ink Blots/Statistics

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In this chapter, we outline the perhaps surprising commonalities between women and the Rorschach ink blot test (Rorschach, 1921) in the history of Psychology. Both have been considered 'subjective,' easily influenced, and of having the opposite attributes required for 'objective' science. Statistics, by contrast, have been conceptualized in a more masculine manner—that is: objective, logical, and resistant to influence. In drawing such comparisons, it is not our intention to argue for or against the Rorschach's reliability, validity, or indeed whether it *works*. Nor, are we making claims about the reliability or validity of statistical procedures in Psychology. Such a debate is not within our interests. Instead, we

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are interested in how constructions of 'science' are implicated by ideas about gender and different tools used by Psychologists. We do not argue that either the Rorschach or statistical methods are legitimate or objective, but rather Psychology incorporates subjectivity in *all* areas and that wider social beliefs structure decisions about what is and is not considered legitimate. Specifically, we are drawing connections between beliefs about women and beliefs about projective tests (such as the Rorschach), and contrasting these to the history of belief in statistics in Psychology. In doing so, we provide a short analysis of the epistemic powers at play in the history of Psychology and its construction as a legitimate science.

Both the Rorschach and statistics have, at various times, been powerful tools in the hands of psychologists. Constructions of these tools as valid (or not) are revelatory of the discursive powers at work when psychologists decide what is legitimate, objective and scientific. By treating the discipline of Psychology as our subject matter (see Richards, 2002), we align ourselves with one of the aims of this book, to view Psychology through a lens of Science and Technology Studies. Specifically, in drawing together interdisciplinary thought, including feminist approaches, we offer some demonstration as to how societal beliefs impact the technologies and tools utilized by psychologists and vice versa. Entrenched within such explorations of gender, scientific legitimacy, and construction of knowledge, is power. Therefore, this chapter will centrally consider the power dynamics working within these histories and how such power contributed to the historically gendered nature of prestige within Psychology.

In the following, we first consider how polarizations of subjective/objective, women/men, invalid/valid are entrenched within ideas of what science ought to look like. This emerges in the next section as important for not only what the *science* looks like but also what the scien*tist* looks like. Second, we briefly outline the history of women in Psychology with particular reference to those involved in projective tests and the Rorschach. Finally, we consider one case study where the Rorschach, a woman psychologist, and the use of statistics, came together. In this example, we hope to show how belief in psychological methods and tests is key to viewing Psychology as legitimate, rather than an inherent legitimacy or objectivity. As illustrated in this example, such beliefs have real social consequences for marginalized groups.

(God-Trick [Prestige ~ Power])

In 2000 the APA Task Force on Women in Academe reported on the obstacles and inequities that prevent women from fully participating in research and leadership. These included pressures for women to conform to gender stereotypes by over-performing service, such as having heavy loads of committee administrative work and mentoring. Studies across academia, especially STEM, show women continue to be disassociated from traits valued within positivist epistemologies, such as agency and scientific competency (Madera, Hebl, & Martin, 2009; Rees, 2011). These processes, not to mention wage disparities and the ever-present reality of sexual harassment, perpetuate the 'leaky pipeline' of women's career development in academia (Gasser & Shaffer, 2014).

Beyond such structural barriers, women in Psychology have had to contend with their politicized presence in a field that eschews explicit politics. Naomi Weisstein challenged the supposed ideological neutrality of psychological research by endorsing the use of experimental methods as a political tool, and traced the importance of social context in the activity of nerve cells (Rutherford, Vaughn-Blount, & Ball, 2010). Feminist psychologists have made great strides in dispelling the gender essentialism and prejudices that maintained this tension in the past (see Hyde, 1990), yet as demonstrated in the brief examples above, the devaluing and (pejorative) politicizing of women's psychological work remains. Gendered epistemological power, as well as lingering prejudice, structures this imbalance of prestige.

Psychology, in its hegemonic Western form, rests upon a foundation of positivist epistemology and a scientific method borrowed from the natural sciences (Gergen, 1973). Aspirations of objectivity hold the greatest prestige as the key to 'pure' inquiry. At one time in Psychology, this was thought to be best achieved through the Rorschach ink blots test (especially in the US), now it is embodied by statistical methods. Similarly, it was also thought to be best embodied by men as achieving the most objective science (Madera et al., 2009; Rees, 2011). Hegarty (2007, p. 83) described the notion of scientific 'purity' as inherently embroiled with power and calls for:

> psychologists, and historians of psychology, to collectivity consider how our unthinking attempts at objectivity, impartiality, and expertise might be motivated by anxieties about positioning ourselves on the safe side of hierarchal value-laden category boundaries which go unspoken.

These boundaries (objective/subjective, nature/nurture, hard/soft science) position un marked-ness and outsider status as necessary to practice scientific inquiry—performing Haraway's "God trick … promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully" (1988, p. 584). The centrality of the god-trick to positivist scientific practice draws sharp boundaries between those whose view is marked or unmarked. The supposition that women's perspectives are inherently subjective, determined by internal processes of emotion and physicality, locates women as a group firmly *somewhere*—outside of the 'nowhere' required for objective observation. Men, who are not marked as 'having' gender, can therefore occupy an objective and dislocated position from which to construct universal knowledge. Decolonial theories identify the same processes in the "zero point epistemology" used to abstract Western, colonial perspectives from context; Western scientific thought became hegemonic through constructing racially and ethnically marked (colonized) people as inherently geographically, historically, and physically grounded, and therefore incapable of the universal and objective thought produced by racially unmarked White Europeans (Mignolo, 2011; p. 80). Being 'marked' has historically positioned that person as further from the white male norm with which concepts of 'objectivity' are aligned. This symbolic asymmetry developed throughout the history of Western science; the gendering of mind/body dualism (men as mind, women as body) during the Enlightenment proliferated to contemporary gender perceptions that mark women as representatives of their groups, while men remain individuals (Amâncio & Oliveira, 2006). The same can be said of the marking of people of color as representatives of their culture, while white people remain racially and culturally unmarked (Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018). Like Haraway (1988), we are critical of this idea of objectivity—that scientists are able to abstract themselves from their object of study, or that it would even be desirable to do so.

Feminist Psychology has responded to women's exclusion from the god-trick of positivist science using two major strategies; reframing

positivism to include feminist epistemologies, and challenging the devaluing of situated perspectives. Feminist standpoint theory emphasizes the epistemic privilege of the 'view from below'; oppressed groups are better able to see and articulate sociopolitical structures by virtue of being subject to them (Haraway, 1988; Wylie, 2004). This approach pushes back against the devaluing of subjectivity that has left women at the margins of Psychology. Feminist philosophers of science have attempted to reposition feminist epistemologies within positivist frameworks by redefining notions of objectivity to allow for epistemic advantage to be recognized (Harding, 1992). Despite this, feminist work, particularly feminist qualitative research, continues to be disparaged as overly influenced by the personal and political, in opposition to statistics and 'unmarked' work conducted by 'unmarked' researchers.

As psychological tools, the practices of quantitative analyses and experimental designs involve politicized and subjective interactions between researcher-and-materials and researcher-and-subject. Yet, statistics and experimental methods have been taken up as the sole tools of positivist epistemology, and stripped of their subjectivity and politics. The politics of statistics and the failure of conventional experimental procedures to meet standards of objectivity are under-articulated, allowing for their prestige to be maintained (see Spears & Smith, 2001). The recent replication crisis in Psychology signals a potential paradigm shift; anxieties over the influence of subjectivity on statistical analyses have led to calls for strict rules of practice (e.g., preregistration) and analysis (e.g., requirements for more extensive reporting of analyses) (Rovenpor & Gonzales, 2015). What has failed to culminate from this 'crisis' is an open dialogue on the epistemological assumptions underlying statistical practice and whether alternative epistemic models might benefit the future of psychological work.

Gender, the Rorschach, and Statistics

As evidenced in the above, socially entrenched ideas about gender have been enduring, and Victorian and post-Darwinian conceptualizations were clearly evident in the early stages of Psychology becoming an organized discipline. Shields (2007) has argued that women's traits were

seen as being naturally complementary and inferior to men's traits. For example, she quotes Victorian Psychiatrist Henry Maudsley who said in 1879 "the life is more developed in proportion to the intellect in the female than in the male, and affective the influence of the reproductive organs upon mind more powerful." A few decades later, Maudsley gave (initially anonymously) a substantial sum of money to London County Council to open a new psychiatric Hospital which finally opened in 1923. The 'Maudsley Hospital' became one of the main mental health hospitals and sites for Clinical Psychology training in Britain. It was at the Maudsley that the wave of criticism toward projective tests in Britain first emerged. For example, one-time keen eugenicist Aubrey Lewis was Chair of Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry positioned at the Maudsley in 1946 and had described the Rorschach ink blot test as of 'limited or doubtful value' as early as 1934. This one example illustrates how the development of Clinical Psychology in Britain was tied with (a) thinking about projective tests and (b) attitudes toward women.

In contrast to men's logic, mental strength and intelligence, Shields (2007) argued women were positioned as easily influenced, damaged and vulnerable. Women were framed as naturally submissive and inferior and so were not encouraged into education for the most part. Gender essentialism in part structured these framings; uteri were believed to be more likely to cause havoc on the mind and body than testes, and these supposed physiological differences in turn impacted societal beliefs about physical strength and the ability to be educated. Such beliefs about women's bodies and physical capabilities continued well into the twentieth century: it was not until 1984 that women were allowed by Olympic officials to run a marathon race following substantial protest and action by women athletes (indeed, it was not until 2008 that women's 3000 m steeplechase was included, see Burfoot, 2016).

That is not to say, however, that women were not present within the history of Psychology, even at the very beginning (or that they did not run marathons before 1984) (see Fancher & Rutherford, 2012). This is the key issue of how history gets told—those who are considered 'legitimate' and are in power, are often those who get to choose which stories get told, retold and *how* they get told. The efforts of women have therefore often gone unspoken within the *his*tory of Psychology

(Bernstein & Russo, 1974; Furumoto, 2003). Because of the misogynistic positioning of women throughout the majority of the twentieth century and androcentric history telling, the global effort to re-place women in the history of Psychology has been undertaken by feminist psychologists and historians.

Since the end of the twentieth century the feminist action to re-place women in the history of Psychology has gained substantial traction (see Bohan, 1990; Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986; Morawski & Agronick, 1991; Rutherford, Vaughn-Johnson, & Rodkey, 2015; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1989). The venture to write women's history in Psychology is ongoing and one of the major contemporary projects is Psychology's Feminist Voices.[1] In the US, Furumoto and Scarborough (1986) studied the lives of the first 22 women psychologists who achieved their doctorates around the turn of the twentieth century. All of those who attained assistant professorship or higher were unmarried and each experienced discrimination. Milar (2000) found that in the first group of women psychologists, only 50% had a professional rank compared to 65% of psychologists who were men. All of those professional women were single and worked predominantly in women's colleges; many also had to work for free or for very little pay. Most women colleges only employed unmarried women. Such 'marriage bans' did not take full effect in British Universities, though Liverpool University did try to establish one (Valentine, 2008).

Women, unlike men, were pressured to choose *either* career or marriage (Milar, 2000). Still, both Oxford and Cambridge Universities were reluctant to accept women students (Shields, 2007). Higher education in both the US and in Britain was often only available to higher class women who had independent finances or were supported by rich relatives- some women at this time were said to 'rebel' against their fathers in order to gain doctoral level educations (e.g., Margaret Lowenfeld, see Hubbard, 2018). Because women were less likely to be afforded

[1]See http://www.feministvoices.com/ a project which provides first-hand accounts of feminist psychologists and highlights women's contributions to Psychology's past and recognizes the voices of contemporary feminist psychologists.

opportunities for academic training and careers in Psychology, their work remained largely invisible and was less often cited (Stevens & Gardners, 1982).

Nevertheless, in Britain women were present at the beginning of Psychology, though their work often went largely unrecognized. Valentine (2008, 2010) considered the positions of women in early British Psychology, and suggested that women found Psychology as a discipline more accessible than other sciences, especially Physiology. This was perhaps, Valentine (2008) suggests, because of the efforts to increase the numbers of the recently formed British Psychological Society (BPS). Or perhaps, particularly after the First World War, because Psychology was such a new science that men's dominance had yet to gain a foothold. The majority of the women involved in early Psychology were middle/upper-class, worked in teaching roles, and two-thirds (11/16) were unmarried. However, despite women's presence, gender issues remained. For example, Alice Woods, one of the founding members of the BPS, described how in 1913 all of the women attending the very first reading of Sigmund Freud's work were asked to leave the room (Valentine, 2008).

Other areas of Psychology were similarly resistant to the presence of women. In the US the postwar 'Servicemen's Readjustment Act' (1944) and the 'Vocational Rehabilitation Act,' commonly known as the 'G.I. Bill' prioritized veterans who wished to train in Psychology, increasing the influx of men into Clinical Psychology. Many military positions for psychologists were closed to women entirely (Bohan, 1990). From the 1950s new members of the Committee of Professional Psychologists in Britain were increasingly likely to be men and Clinical Psychology as a subdiscipline began to dominate Psychology as responses to war-related trauma were needed (Hall, 2007). There was also a deliberate attempt following the war to not only provide men with jobs (including in Psychology), but also a keen desire to ensure women returned to their roles as homemakers again following the relative occupational opportunity afforded during the War (Morawski & Agronick, 1991).

Following the Second World War, there were some areas of Psychology that were considered better suited to women. Child, or developmental, Psychology was one such area, due to societal beliefs

about women's apparently natural abilities in child-centered nurturing, nursing and care work (Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986; Rutherford et al., 2015; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1989). Stereotypes of women's nurturing abilities opened Developmental Psychology as the most appropriate field for women; and it was within this framework that Mamie Phipps Clark developed her Master's thesis on racial identification. The boundaries of science/politics and objectivity/subjectivity permeated this field still; when Clark, along with her husband Kenneth, applied this research to the *Brown vs Board of Education of Topeka* decision there was dissent among legal scholars who asserted the incompatibility of scientific research and politics (Guthrie, 1990).

Another area which was considered suitable for women was psychological testing. Furumoto (2003) argues that these testing practices had a large impact on the overall development of Psychology, especially in its unprecedented growth after the First World War. Testing was viewed, despite its importance and impact upon Psychology, as lower status and was thought to require less technical knowledge. It was therefore deemed suitable for women and so provided them with opportunities in lower salaried jobs than their men counterparts (Bohan, 1990). Unsurprisingly then, testing boomed in areas such as employment, educational and developmental Psychology where there were higher concentrations of women working (Bohan, 1990; Furumoto, 2003). Under the control of mainly women psychologists, applied Psychology and testing practices greatly advanced the profession of Psychology.

One area of testing which was particularly prominent following the Second World War was projective testing. Projective tests are those which provide ambiguous stimuli and the person being tested is said to 'project' their psychology onto their interpretation of the stimuli. The most famous projective test and the one which was most successful in terms of popularity was the Rorschach ink blot test (Rorschach, 1921). The Rorschach ink blot test became the most used psychological test following the Second World War in the US, having been used to test potential officers in the US military (see Hegarty, 2003a; Hubbard & Hegarty, 2016). The Rorschach was also used to 'detect' gay men and those malingering as gay in the Second World War in the US (Hegarty, 2003a). With the Rorschach at the center, projective testing grew

in popularity all over the world including the US (Buchanan, 1997; Brunner, 2001; Hegarty, 2003a; Lemov, 2011); and Britain (Hubbard & Hegarty, 2016; McCarthy Woods, 2008).

Largely mirroring the patterns of popularity of projective tests in the US, Britain's projective test movement gained a foothold in the 1940s, resulting in a dedicated journal and society (Hubbard & Hegarty, 2016). In Britain especially, there was a higher proportion of women involved in the projective testing movement compared to other areas of Psychology. For example, in the British Rorschach Forum in 1958, there were eight women and five men on the committee, and women occupied 62–71% of committee positions until 1969. In December 1966, a register showed that 48% of all society fellows, members, and associates were women. Among the first authors of publications in *The Rorschach Newsletter* from 1952 to 1968, 41% were women. However, following the 1968 International Rorschach Congress which was held in London and headed up by Theodora Alcock, the presence of men increased. At the December 1968 Annual General Meeting, just months after the International Rorschach Congress, one woman and seven men were elected onto the committee of the re-named British Rorschach Forum and Society for Projective Techniques (see Hubbard & Hegarty, 2016).

Therefore, women have been present in the history of Psychology, but the areas in which they were able to negotiate access and practice were those areas deemed suitable to their gender specifically. Projective testing was one area which was recognized as being relatively accessible to women, as testing occupied a lower status (Bohan, 1990). However, once clinical Psychology and projective tests gained some element of prestige, for example following the World Wars and the International Rorschach Congress, the proportion of men in those areas increased, and women were less likely to be in positions on committees. Later, the legitimacy of projective tests became highly questioned and their prestige was soon to drop in both Britain and the US.

Rorschach criticism was apparent very near the beginning of its introduction to Britain (e.g., Lewis, 1934, see Hubbard & Hegarty, 2016) and those at the Maudsley Hospital were at the forefront of this criticism. In 1942 Lewis employed Hans Eysenck in the role of Senior

Research Officer. At the Maudsley, Eysenck oversaw the training of the first British clinical psychologists at the Institute of Psychiatry (Buchanan, 2010). In the early days, the Rorschach was taught by Swiss expert Maryse Israel to trainee psychologists, however, this training was discontinued as early as 1955. A 'critical discussion' meeting was held on Saturday May 21, 1955 and all members of the Committee of Professional Psychologists were invited to give their comments on this decision. The discussion appears to have done nothing but confirm their anti-Rorschach position. The Maudsley training program dominated clinical teaching in Britain producing twice as many graduates as the Tavistock, whose courses declined further in the 1970s (Buchanan, 2010). Eysenck's position at the Maudsley undoubtedly impacted the institution's approach to projective techniques. In 1959 he wrote a review and concluded that "the Rorschach has failed to establish its scientific or practical value" (Buros, 1959, p. 277).

As projective methods' popularity began to wane, other tests gained in popularity, especially those with a statistical underpinning. More 'objective' standardized tests (named according to the *Mental Measurements Yearbook* projective/objective dichotomy), such as cognitive and IQ tests increased in use as the use of projective tests decreased (Buchanan, 1997). From the 1950s there was a growth in concerns surrounding validity, reliability and the statistical nature of tests (e.g., Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). This was particularly exemplified in the development of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual from 1952 (DSM, Grob, 1991), and the American Psychological Association's 1954 attempt to standardize the Rorschach. In 1961 the MMPI overtook the Rorschach as the most popular psychological test in the US (Buchanan, 1997).

In Britain, the Standing Committee on Test Standards was established by the BPS in 1980 and investigated test popularity amongst psychologists as the use of psychological testing began to come under social scrutiny (Tyler & Miller, 1986). Findings showed that cognitive/intelligence tests were the most commonly used, followed by achievement/attainment tests, then personality tests, and finally developmental tests. For personality tests, questionnaires were the most popular measure, with attitude measures and personal construct measures

following a close second. Projective tests came in third place. Overall, in the responses the Rorschach was criticized more often than it was supported.

Therefore, just as women had been viewed as not suitable for Psychology earlier in the century, the Rorschach and other projective techniques were similarly positioned as such at the end of the century. Beliefs about what can be considered 'legitimate,' or reliable and valid knowledge in Psychology has changed historically. In a broad sense, the actions of Psychology have delegitimized groups of people as well as the tools used by (some) psychologists in order to provide an impression of legitimacy and to imply a striving toward 'truth' and objective science. This is highly important considering the problematic nature of Psychology's past and present. Psychology has been deeply implicated in histories of eugenics, racism, colonialism, homophobic and transphobic practices and, as we have gone only a small way to show, sexism. What psychologists say about different groups of people and the tools psychologists use *does* a great deal—especially to those people being talked about (see Hubbard & Hare, 2015). In this next brief example, we wish to illustrate how sometimes problematic practices in Psychology's past have been disrupted by the actions of women wielding Rorschach cards, showing how these histories are not just similar, but have also clashed into one another at certain points in time.

Ink Blots + Statistics = Evelyn Hooker and the 'Overt Male Homosexual'

In 1957 Evelyn Hooker published 'The Adjustment of the Overt Male Homosexual' in *The Journal of Projective Techniques.* It was also published in the *Mattachine Review*—the magazine of the Mattachine Society, the gay organization from which Hooker had recruited many of her gay participants. Hooker began this study in 1953 upon the request of her gay friend and previous student Sam From (see Minton, 2002 for a full account of Hooker's work and role in US emancipatory science). Hooker tested 60 men—30 gay and 30 straight—using the

Rorschach ink blot test. Men from each of the two groups were paired, being matched for age, intelligence and IQ. Each pair of Rorschach responses were then anonymized and Hooker asked two Rorschach clinicians, including the Rorschach expert Bruno Klopher with whom she worked with at UCLA, to report back which response was from the gay participant and which was from the straight participant. She found that despite the fact that the Rorschach was being used to diagnose 'homosexuality' (as this was a considered a mental illness by the APA and included in the DSM until 1973), these clinicians could not, above the level of chance, distinguish between the two groups. This work therefore seriously drew into question the legitimacy of 'homosexuality' being considered a clinical entity and psychological illness. Hooker's work both in the 1950s and later, including her role on the 'Task Force on Homosexuality,' was shown to be pivotal in the shift of attitudes in Psychology about the mental health of queer people (see Minton, 2002).

What is additionally interesting given the focus of this chapter, is how Hooker's 1957 paper depended on the legitimacy of the Rorschach. Without the Rorschach being considered a legitimate reliable psychological test at the time of the study, this paper could not have been so effective in motions to remove the pathologization of 'homosexuality.' Without belief that it was a reliable and valid test for detecting homosexuality, the results would have been meaningless.

Hooker utilized statistical methods to demonstrate that the clinicians' readings of Rorschach responses were no better than chance. Hegarty (2003b) specifically discussed Hooker's use of significance testing: Hooker's conclusion that there was no difference between the gay men and straight men's Rorschach responses might hinge on whether Hooker conducted independent or paired sample t-tests. Hooker argued that in a clinical setting psychologists would not receive two matched-paired Rorschach responses. She therefore did an unmatched analysis. Had she has chosen otherwise, it might have been possible for her to argue that there *were* distinguishable differences between the Rorschach responses of the gay men and straight men. Hegarty (2003b) highlighted how gay men gave more distinct responses than straight men, and also had more of the 'gay signs' according to Wheeler's (1949)

signs for identifying gay men. Whether these can be considered 'significant' or not however, utterly depends on how we interpret statistics. Statistics require interpretation just as interpreting ink blots does; perhaps the most obvious example being the chosen significance level of 0.05. This point at which results are described as 'significant' or not, is subjective—it's a chosen point agreed upon by the discipline. To quote Hegarty (2003b):

> …significance testing is an inexact process, and that the means by which marginally significant results are determined to be 'significant' or 'non-significant' forms part of the historical process by which scientific 'facts' about sexuality are constructed. (p. 31, see re-print 2018)

Hooker utilized the contemporaneous prestige of the Rorschach and statistics, from her suppressed positionality as a woman, to help gay men (see Hubbard, 2017; Minton, 2002). Despite the impact of this study such issues continue to permeate the discipline, though to a lesser extent. Historical accounts of women in Psychology tend to trace the same balancing act performed in Hooker's work; in order to claim a place in Psychology women have had to negotiate gender stereotypes about the fragility of women alongside the dominance of positivist epistemology.

Alternative models of prestige and practice could be drawn from existing feminist psychological scholarship, which utilizes a broader spectrum of methodologies and epistemologies. Qualitative work in particular has previously been devalued as being too subjective, and therefore its use within feminist Psychology becomes associated with gender stereotypes of emotionality and assumptions of subjectivity/political investments (Shields, 2007). This narrative is complicated by the value of the personal-political in feminist thought generally, and in feminist standpoint theory specifically (Harding, 1986). Feminist work is more often reflexive, qualitative and from experience, and less likely to have passive voice expectations in writing. Feminist psychologists are forced to navigate critiques of 'insider' research; the 'hybrid insider/outsider position' adopted by many feminist and minority researchers offers valuable insights, yet continues to be devalued by hegemonic

psychological science (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2013). The same is true for scholarship conducted by other marginalized groups; decolonial scholarship documents similar processes by which the perspectives of Global Majority (non-Western) people are devalued (Mohanty, 2003).

Conclusion

In highlighting the androcentric history often told about Psychology and indicating how Psychology's tools are also implicated in social beliefs about what is 'legitimate' we hope to show the value and importance of feminist history. Here, we are not attributing legitimacy to types of psychologists or particular methods (be they ink blots or statistics). We instead explore how historically the discipline has attributed characteristics such as 'subjective' and 'legitimate' to different genders and to different tools. In doing so, we demonstrate how beliefs about these things are mirrored in wider societal beliefs about gender and what 'objective science' should look like. In taking a particular feminist perspective, we note how women were at a particular disadvantage, as were other marginalized groups (and especially those women who embodied a variety of marginalized identities). Consideration of these intersections is vital when conducting historical and critical analysis of Psychology's past to avoid re-telling, or emulating, histories which have uncritically concentrated on the stories of white straight middle and upper-class cisgender men.

Throughout this chapter, we have attempted to give a short analysis of power using a few examples of gendered power in the history of Psychology. Dynamics of power and marginalization permeate who has been allowed to become psychologists and what tools are available to them. It is important to remember that as we discuss the powers at work within Psychology, that we must keep sight of why these dynamics matter—because Psychology's power flows outwards, as well as inwards. The processes of exclusion, stereotyping, and epistemic violence described in our chapter have effects far beyond the careers and wellbeing of women in Psychology. For this reason, it is imperative that we uncover and disrupt Psychology's power for our science to be both equitable and ethical.

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