

9/11 and the Academy

Responses in the Liberal Arts and the 21st Century World

Edited by

Mark Finney · Matthew Shannon

palgrave macmillan

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Foreword

In November 2015, a conference was held at Emory & Henry College in beautiful, southwestern Virginia, focused on "9/11 and the Academy." The papers presented offered a surprising diversity of approaches, disciplines, perspectives, and expertise, all engaging the fundamental question of whether (and how) 9/11 had changed particular academic disciplines and the liberal arts. The talk titles were as wide-ranging as "Shakespeare after 9/11," "Global TV after 9/11," "American Empire and Ancient History," "Psychology confronts 9/11," "Studying the Presidency after 9/11," and "Growth and Uncertainty: The Impact of 9/11 on Security and Intelligence Studies."

Implicit and explicit in these presentations were the larger questions of what exactly had changed on 9/11, and more to the point, how did the events of that day affect the way we think. The papers not only explored particular areas of study and the frameworks within which we teach our students, but also the impact of those events on the world we inhabit and the future we will bequeath to the generations that follow us.

In offering the keynote address on the first evening of the conference, I focused on the challenges we had faced in creating the 9/11 Memorial Museum. The planning team had been charged with developing a

memorial museum whose mission was to commemorate the victims of the 9/11 attacks and document the history. The museum was to open to the public just over a decade after the attacks that had been witnessed by an estimated two billion people—one-third of the world's population—on September 11, 2001. Inevitably, we struggled with precisely the same set of questions as the conferees, albeit for a broad, general audience, rather than for specific fields of study within the liberal arts.

How would our choices of artifacts and the narrative sequencing necessary to provide a coherent historical account impact the historiography surrounding 9/11? Would our choices, intentionally or not, codify the history even before historians and scholars had a chance to analyze the historical record? How would we successfully balance the equally valid, though not always compatible, expectations of various stakeholders—among them, victims' family members, survivors, first responders, local residents, recovery workers, and landmark preservationists—for whom this history is deeply personal? How does one contain a story that is not over yet, or characterize an event whose repercussions are continuing? How does a museum teach about a historical event when, upon opening, the vast majority of visitors will come in with their own experiences of that very event seared into their memories? How do you explain the significance of an event that has influenced contemporary global politics and social routines, from airport screening to mobile device encryption, to a generation of students who have no lived memory of the event, and for whom this event is already past history?

Our way in was through storytelling—history as experienced by those who were there, as witnesses, as survivors, as victims. As a storytelling museum, our focus has been not so much on historians' interpretations of history as on the human experience of a historical event. At the 9/11 Museum, we present history in the first person. Whereas museums of the American Civil War might rely upon diaries and letters to convey the immediacy of personal experience, we could, as a twenty-first-century museum, draw on the multiplicity of resources provided by contemporary media, especially radio transmissions, cockpit voice recordings, emails, and voicemails. In other words, history as captured in the human voice.

The impact of this approach to public history is that the focus shifts from the teller of the tale to those who lived it. The 9/11 Museum is

a museum about all of our stories. It is a museum that focuses on the impacts of terrorism on real people, people who got up and went to work one morning, or who boarded an airplane for business or pleasure, and got caught in a vortex of unthinkable destruction; people just like you and me. In crafting an experience that enables our visitors to see themselves in the story, the point of entry and the emphatic relevance of the narrative become grounded. Visitors cannot help but ask: What does this have to do with me, with my understanding of the world? What can I learn from the way people responded on that terrible day and in the days and weeks that followed, responses that, for the most part though not exclusively, reflected solidarity and compassion, selflessness and service?

In this respect, like the many, diverse disciplines nurtured within the liberal arts academy, the 9/11 Memorial Museum offers a path toward deep and personalized understanding. We can come to knowledge along a multitude of paths, in museums, in classrooms, and through many disciplines. There are indeed many ways of knowing, and this book provides scholars and students with a range of interdisciplinary approaches to understanding the impact of 9/11 on American higher education. The chapters that follow and the work of the 9/11 Memorial Museum offer parallel and, at times, intersecting paths that lead to a better understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live.

New York, NY, USA

Alice M. Greenwald
President and CEO, National
September 11 Memorial and
Museum, Director of 9/11
Memorial Museum

Preface

This book is a collaborative process that has its origins in a November 2015 conference hosted on the campus of Emory & Henry College that brought together scholars to discuss interdisciplinary questions related to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter, 9/11). The conference, like this book, was titled *9/11 and the Academy*. The conferees took advantage of Emory & Henry's campus culture of service and scholarship, bringing to bear a spirit of interdisciplinary cooperation and critical discourse toward the creation of a lively and rigorous dialogue. That dialogue took place within four panels on media studies and representation, history and international studies, education, and psychology and trauma. The conference brought together these seemingly disparate fields to determine how, precisely, different disciplines in the social sciences and humanities responded to or were affected by the changes wrought by 9/11. Alice Greenwald, the director of the 9/11 Memorial Museum, delivered the keynote address. We, as the organizers of the conference and co-editors of this volume, were convinced that a book was necessary to record and contextualize the conversations that took place in Emory, Virginia in 2015. During the intervening years, we solicited papers on additional topics written by scholars who did not

participate in the conference. The resulting chapters do not represent all fields in the academy, nor do they claim to offer the final word on the fields that they do discuss. We hope that this book will initiate a conversation and reach readers with interests in 9/11, higher education, the liberal arts, and the specific fields discussed in the forthcoming chapters.

In the process, we have accrued many debts. The first is owed to the individuals who supported the conference from its initial conception. Emory & Henry's then dean of academic affairs, Dave Haney, translated his academic roots in the humanities into humane support of our conference. In addition, colleagues at Emory & Henry were supportive in every way. A special thanks to Joe Lane, Tal Stanley, and Jim Dawsey for their support. Other colleagues served as commentators on various panels and, in a way, were the first peer-reviewers of the book. Thank you to Janet Crickmer, Tracy Lauder, Joe Lane, Jill Smeltzer, and Jack Wells. Second, we want to extend a gracious thanks to all of the original conference panelists. A special thanks to Matthew Biberman, Craig Caldwell, and Heather Pope for their intellectually stimulating conference papers, and to those on the original education panel: Marilyn Chipman, Joe Miller, Travis Proffitt, and Tal Stanley. This book would not have been possible without them, as all of the original panelists confirmed to us the vitality of the liberal arts and interdisciplinary learning in the twenty-first century. Finally, thanks to all the students who participated, including those from Adams State University and Coastal Carolina University who joined students from Emory & Henry in presenting their own research on the first night of the conference. We are especially grateful to those who worked for the conference, including Kaelee Belletto, Jackson Feezel, Chaz Jones, Catherine Wiedman, and any others who helped in some way to make the conference run smoothly.

Since the conference, we have accrued additional debts. One of those is to the collective patience of the contributors, as four years passed between the initial presentations and the publication of revised and expanded versions of those papers. Thank you to the peer-reviewers, especially for their prodding to consider the broader societal context for these, at times, complex and narrow areas of academic inquiry and historiographic debate. Samantha Ball Shannon assisted with the

twin tasks of editing and indexing, and for that we are grateful. Eleanor Christie and Becky Wyde at Palgrave Macmillan not only found merit in our concept, but also helped us through every step of the publishing process. Finally, we extend our warm appreciation to liberal educators and their supporters everywhere.

Emory, USA

Mark Finney
Matthew Shannon

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1

Setting the Unsettled: An Introduction to 9/11 and the Academy

Matthew Shannon

"Any great disturbance in the world of action or of intellect produces very noticeable effects upon the methods and controlling thought patterns of historians" (Nichols 1948, 78). It seems suitable, as it was for Eric Foner in his 2003 essay on September 11, 2001, or "9/11," to open with a quote that rings true, not only for historians, but for most social scientists and humanists. The authors of the following collection of essays find that 9/11 affected, though rarely dictated, the "thought patterns" of scholars in the "liberal arts" fields for nearly two decades. During these years, 9/11 moved from event, to memory, to history, though such categories are quite permeable. One thing is certain amid uncertainties. As Foner wrote years earlier, "September 11 is a remarkable teaching opportunity. But only if we use it to open rather than to close debate. Critical intellectual analysis is our responsibility – to ourselves and to our students" (2003).

This book turns President George W. Bush's assertion that 9/11 was "the day that changed everything" into a question and directs it toward

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the academy. A range of interdisciplinary scholarship, most notably the six-volume collection *The Day That Changed Everything?* (2009), has found that Americans responded to those 102 minutes on September 11 by altering the practice of politics, entertainment, religion, philosophy, law, business, psychology, and education. This volume's focus, by contrast, is on the production of critical scholarship and creative pedagogies since 2001. These functions of the academy remain vital, particularly because the events of September 11 came to most Americans in the form of "9/11," an unsettled, or "unmastered" history. Gavriel Rosenfeld draws on scholars of Germany to define "the concept of an 'unmastered' past" as "a historical legacy that has acquired an exceptional, abnormal, or otherwise unsettled status in the collective memory of a given society" (2009, 126–127). This introduction draws on Rosenfeld to demonstrate that, while most histories are never *settled*, events such as 9/11 require, more than others, multiple *settings* to comprehend.

The most literal setting for the book is the liberal arts as they are taught and studied at colleges and universities across the United States. But what is meant by "liberal arts," or "liberal education?" Here it refers to a liberality in one's approach to academic inquiry. In a university setting, this means engagement with different disciplines and methodologies; critical inquiry into individuals, societies, and texts based on empirical and/or theoretical rigor; and a belief in *praxis,* or a fusion of thought and action. In other words, pluralism of the mind and curiosity about the world.

This definition is different than others. Many onlookers associate liberal learning with medieval universities, the seven original liberal arts (grammar, logic, and rhetoric; arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy), and the Renaissance-era rediscovery of the classics in Europe (Colish 1997; Pedersen 1997). Many others think of a tradition-bound form of learning rooted in a homogenizing set of "western" texts and geared toward elites with the aim of graduating "generalists" rather than "specialists" (Jones 2016). These are simplistic generalizations, and as Jones notes, rather than a rigidly defined curriculum or a gatekeeper of tradition, liberal learning

has continually changed over time and thrived in American higher education.

Beyond broad surveys of higher education in the twenty-first century (Bastedo et al. 2016), writers offer a diverse array of arguments about the liberal arts in higher education. Some authors focus on accessibility and democratization (Delbanco 2012), while others tout the "life changing" impact that small colleges have on the lives of students (Pope 2012). Some employ the "crisis" paradigm (Blumenstyk 2014), and others offer "defenses" (Zakaria 2015) to the challenges of neoliberalism, anti-intellectualism, and STEM education (LaCapra 2018). While humanists (Nussbaum 1997, 2010; Roche 2010) and social scientists (Morson and Schapiro 2017) make cases for liberal learning, recent popular books have come from unlikely sources. In 2017 venture capitalists (Hartley 2017), strategic innovation consultants (Madsbjerg 2017), and journalists (Anders 2017; Stross 2017) penned calls to keep the humane around for the technology boom.

Other influential voices are university presidents and professional organizations. Michael Roth, the president of Wesleyan University, defines a "liberal education" as the combination of a "philosophical thread," or the "spirit of critique" that one finds on campuses more often than convention centers, and a "rhetorical thread" that asks students "to appreciate or to participate in traditions of compelling cultural interest" (Roth 2015, 4–5). This allows room for the specialization *and* broad-based training needed for a humane, attentive, and innovative society. Other voices capture the diversity and relatively recent democratization of the liberal arts. Educators such as Carol Geary Schneider have, since the 1990s, ensured that diversity informs the mission of the American Association of Colleges & Universities (Schneider 2013). The AAC&U has, in the twenty-first century, broadened its understanding of diversity to promote "global learning" in a way that linked "America's promise" in the aftermath of 9/11 to a "liberal education" (Hovland 2014).

Central to any definition of the liberal arts is a nuanced understanding of how various disciplines relate to a curriculum or, in this case, an area of inquiry. The term "interdisciplinary" implies "an integrative and reciprocally interactive approach that actualizes a synthesis of

diverse disciplinary perspectives." This can, at times, lead to the creation of new disciplines, or what Christine Muller describes in her chapter as an "interdiscipline." While liberal educators have for many years placed this idea at the center of unified core curriculum sequences, the so-called "menu" general studies model is more "multidisciplinary" in that it introduces students "to knowledge that is drawn from diverse disciplines but the research questions and methods stay within the distinct boundaries of each discipline." This book is a multidisciplinary collection of chapters, most by interdisciplinary scholars. But the book is the result of a "transdisciplinary" project that spanned nearly five years, beginning with the original conference, and saw "members of many disciplines *together* conduct research that addresses a holistic phenomenon" to offer "a common conceptual-theoretical-empirical structure for research" (Fawcett 2013, 376–377). In this case, the focus was on the academy's paths to and from 9/11.

While there is tremendous variation in the chapters that follow, the authors collectively make two points about the intellectual and professional trajectories that flowed to and from 2001. The first is that various forms of external pressure—some caused by 9/11 and others less directly related—have come to the university and altered scholarly considerations and work environments. That pressure has resulted in calls for "relevance," whether to the national security state at a time of "crisis" or to private industry in a neoliberal historical moment. While this benefitted some fields, it worked to the detriment of others. The second point is that an effective way to respond, not only to these pressures, but to the societal and intellectual need to understand 9/11, is through an integrated and pluralistic approach to learning. Because 9/11 is unsettled, the setting for studying it must include myriad modes of inquiry, multiple voices, and critical scholarly perspectives. *9/11 and the Academy* explains why, by addressing what might be the most important event of our time—the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath—the liberal arts continue to enrich higher education, stimulate critical discourse, and remain vital to the United States and the world moving toward the third decade of the twenty-first century.

1.1 The Far and Near Settings of the Post-9/11 Academy

In addition to the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the relationship between 9/11 and the academy sits in two additional settings: the *far* and *near* historical settings. The "far setting" refers to the period from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century that witnessed the development of the modern university in the United States. The "near setting" refers to a more recent historical moment that began, not with a "historical rupture" in the 1960s, but with the "rearranged world" that followed (Varon et al. 2008, 3). It was the late twentieth century world that informed the academy's encounter with 9/11 as much as the circumstances that subsequently emerged in the early twenty-first century. In both settings, liberal learning has been at the center of some of the most significant rupture moments—real and perceived—in U.S. history.

The question of "historical rupture" lends itself to theoretical and empirical scrutiny, and it is a question that most of the chapters in this book address. Stuart Hall notes that it is theoretically important to consider "the significant *breaks*" in history. Hall defines such rupture points as moments "where old lines of thought are disrupted, older constellations displaced, and elements, old and new, are regrouped around a different set of premises and themes." The causal factors oscillate between the intellectual and material and the individual and collective. "Such shifts in perspective reflect," Hall writes, "not only the results of an internal intellectual labour, but the manner in which real historical developments and transformations are appropriated in thought." After 9/11, as in other historical moments, "It is because of this complex articulation between thinking and historical reality, …and the continuous dialectic between 'knowledge' and 'power,' that the breaks are worth recording"—or reconsidering (Hall 1980, 57).

The first such rupture moment that affected the liberal arts came in the last third of the nineteenth century. Then, the United States was recovering from a devastating Civil War that cost more than 600,000 lives (Faust 2009). In addition to the social and legislative impacts that the Civil War had on higher education, Americans also reckoned with

the introduction of "modernity," a development that compelled people around the world to reassess how best to train young thinkers and citizens for a world of competing nations and networks, industrial economies, and scientific modes of learning (Rosenberg 2012).

The United States had two answers. One answer was the land-grant university. After secession, the Northern-controlled Congress passed the Morrill Act of 1862 to establish the land-grant system. Land-grant institutions balanced research and teaching to focus on "practical" fields such as industry and agriculture for local communities (Brunner 1962; Rasmussen 1989). The Morrill Act transformed the United States and, later, the world (Schrum 2019). But its initial reach was limited. One author assessed that the act "had done little in Maryland" (Hawkins 2002, 7). For that reason, there was space for private colleges to innovate. Johns Hopkins University offered the second educational response to the questions of modernity: the research university. This answer was a German import, and its first port of call was in Baltimore in 1876. While Hopkins was a research institution based on the Humboldt model, its curriculum fused, in the words of one educationalist, "the two great sides of human activity – art and science" (Huxley ctd. in Hawkins 2002, 70).

As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, a rich academic landscape balanced the liberal arts alongside new, "modern" research lines and curricula. As Roth notes, "The American research university that developed after the Civil War did not attempt to replace colleges but to add an additional level of education." Moreover, "American universities, unlike their European counterparts, attempted to place vocational learners side by side with those studying traditional academic subjects" (Roth 2015, 111–112, 116). Yet the challenges from the land-grant and German research models were formidable enough by 1915 to compel a group of educators to form the American Association of Colleges. The founders of what is now the AAC&U were concerned because "'careerist' agendas threatened the validity of the old liberal arts curricula, with their foci on the humanities and languages" and with an emphasis on "broadening and deepening the character of the men (mostly) who went through it" (Jones 2016). These debates between liberal educators and advocates of vocational training resembled the one

that took place between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois; with the latter arguing cogently for "the ideal of 'book learning'" (DuBois 1994, 5 and 51–54). Such balance ensured that the United States would remain a "land of colleges" (Potts 2010).

Another potential rupture point in the far setting came in the mid-twentieth century with another federal intervention into higher education. New forms of government support for American universities were part of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, but such support took off during the Second World War as the greatest thinkers lent their minds to the state, most notably in the Manhattan Project and the enlistment of academics such as James Conant in the nuclear age (Hershberg 1993; Hughes 2003). The eras of world war and Cold War provided the template for the cooperation between academy, government, and industry that followed 9/11.

There is a rich literature on the globalization of education during the twentieth century (Garlitz and Jarvinen 2012), but Christopher Loss offers a most sophisticated account of the domestic scene by focusing on the "big three" (2012, 4) pieces of educational legislation that Congress passed between 1944 and 1965. The first was the G.I. Bill of 1944. It infused millions of new students into public systems that, for the first time since the Morrill Act, had to expand. This time, expansion came in the form of branch campuses across states to help former soldiers transition to civilian life (Cohen 2003). The second and third of Loss' "big three" were the 1958 National Defense Education Act and the 1965 Higher Education Act. Spurred on by the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik and the process of decolonization across Africa and Asia, Democratic and Republican administrations alike demonstrated a steadfast and often controversial commitment to higher education at the height of the Cold War. The acts of 1958 and 1965 infused dollars into "big science" and "area studies" because missile technology, nuclear power, and knowledge of other societies and languages were deemed national security imperatives (Loss 2012).

Now champions of liberal education had to explain their model amid demands for "relevant knowledge" (Geiger 2008) and during a moment of "crisis." Liberal educators offered an explanation for the postwar years that was at once similar to and different

from post-9/11 educational responses. James Conant reported from Harvard in 1946 that the university's general studies model could sustain a "free society." In other words, totalitarian societies had plenty of technocrats but few free thinkers. On this point, there is much to commend. Yet Conant's argument did not tolerate socialist ideas, and the perspective was overwhelmingly white, male, and economically privileged (Conant 1946). While liberal arts colleges offered some of the best educational settings for young women and innovated with programs such as the "junior year abroad" (Walton 2005), liberal learning at mid-century was neither integrated nor inclusive in terms of race, class, or gender. In other words, Conant and his colleagues built on older ideas about "western civilization" that later generations of liberal learners and interdisciplinary scholars would have to deconstruct in their curricula and their research areas (Allardyce 1982).

In the 1960s students demanded a more meaningful and representative form of education. An early voice was Mario Savio. Known for his leadership of the Free Speech Movement at the University of California at Berkeley, his "An End to History" embodies the critical spirit of the liberal arts. The piece was published in late 1964 when Savio was locked in a public confrontation with the state system's president, Clark Kerr. As Savio saw it, the California system was stale because it was based on "the conception…that the university is part and parcel of this particular stage in the history of American society." Working toward that limited end, Kerr's so-called multiversity had become "a factory that turns out a certain product needed by industry or government." Everyone needs work, but Savio thought that "the 'futures' and 'careers' for which American students now prepare are for the most part intellectual and moral wastelands." The educational model for which Savio advocated was quite different. His "conception of the university…is that it be in the world but not of the world." In other words, "The university is the place where people begin seriously to question the conditions of their existence and raise the issue of whether they can be committed to the society they have been born into" (Savio 1964).

The challenges from students, intellectuals, activists, and politicians during the 1960s produced, in the following decades, a new intellectual

dynamic in the United States. Daniel Rodgers' research proves instructive here. Rodgers describes the quarter-century preceding 9/11 as "a great age of fracture," or "an era of disaggregation" that saw "the intellectual assumptions" that prevailed during high modernity "challenged, dismantled, and formulated anew" through a series of "multisited battles" (2011, 2–3). While the most consequential site for liberal learning was the university, broader societal factors brought change to the lives of scholars and students who live, study, and work on campuses. The most significant changes include turns toward critical scholarship, diversification and internationalization, and deconstructionist methods and postmodern theory; change also came from the entrance of the "culture wars" and neoliberalism into higher education. These five trends frame the near setting to 9/11, and they inform in various ways this book.

The first transformation to the post-sixties liberal arts came in the critical tone of scholarship, especially when contrasted with the immediate postwar years. As explained by various scholars (Kraus and Joyce 1985; Latham 2000; Amadae 2003), the Cold War produced an intellectual "consensus" based in "rational choice liberalism" that asked social scientists to explain societies through an all-encompassing "theory of modernization." After witnessing the violence in the American South and in Vietnam, many baby-boomers built on the writers of the New Left (Mills 1956; Williams 1959) to break the Cold War consensus. Many went to graduate school and then worked in universities, started new programs, and found new means of realizing a democratic ideal that, over time, challenged the hitherto impregnable "myth of American exceptionalism" (Hodgson 2009). Critical scholars thus introduced a healthy skepticism of macro-theories such as modernization that has carried into the twenty-first century.

The second piece to 9/11's near setting is the diversification of the liberal arts. Just as nineteenth-century reforms eroded the predominance of classical languages, "the movement" of the sixties (Anderson 1995) ended the "western civilization" model in academic programs (Allardyce 1982) and introduced new interdisciplinary areas of inquiry. In the early 1970s Gerda Lerner taught the first women and gender studies seminars at Sarah Lawrence College to fuse interdisciplinary inquiry with consciousness-raising (Lerner 2003; Loss 2012,

204–207). By the 1980s, Temple University's Molefi Asante had founded the *Journal of Black Studies* and launched the first doctoral program in Africology and African American Studies (Gerstle 2001, 349–357). In addition to changes at home, the increasingly interdependent world internationalized fields ranging from security studies to American history (Bender 2000).

The third transformation of the post-sixties era came in the realm of epistemology. The "turns" toward culture and language during the 1980s and 1990s birthed new modes of inquiry that often favored discourse over structures, understood culture as sets of symbolic meaning rather than lists of "great books," and introduced subjectivity and relativism to create new intellectual parameters on the cusp of the new millennium (Allardyce 1982; Green and Troup 2016; Rodgers 2011). This volume places chapters on the applied social sciences and various administrative and pedagogical functions of the academy alongside chapters by humanists and social scientists who employ deconstructionist methods and discourse analysis. In particular, many chapters reference Michel Foucault's notion of "power-knowledge" (1980) and Edward Said's theory of "Orientalism" (1979) which, to some, explain the U.S. response to 9/11 and how the war on terror has reified essentialized categories at home and abroad.

The fourth shift came with the "culture wars." For the first time since the mid-nineteenth century, the debate about the liberal arts was no longer between generalists and careerists, but between the generalists over whether there should be a "canon" and, if there was, who and what should be included (Searle 1990). Alan Bloom's (1987) suggestions appeared to offer a "hierarchical and antidemocratic" reversion to the Greco-Roman/Judeo-Christian curriculum (Roth 2015, 139, 142). After 9/11, it became clear that appearances were not misleading, as classicists such as Victor Davis Hanson attempted to actualize the myth of the "West"—as NATO had in the Cold War (Hitchcock 2010)—for the purposes of security. Hanson penned an op-ed on the day of the attacks to advocate for a military response (2002a), and he also wrote on the "Western Way of War" (1989) and other subjects relating to "the West" (2002b). In 2007, in a confluence of the knowledge-power nexus, George W. Bush awarded him a National Humanities Medal (Hoover 2007). Hanson remains a vocal critic of the prevailing trends in liberal learning (2018).

The fifth and final pillar to the near setting of 9/11 is economic in nature. While the 2008 recession is having the most immediate impact on higher education today, it is not without precedent. In the mid-1970s "the higher education economy was in shambles with the macro-economy" (Loss 2012, 219) and "doctrinaire free market beliefs" went mainstream. This ideological turn resulted in legislation that "privatized the burdens and benefits of college going" by, in 1978, moving from a student grant to loan model and, in 1980, changing patent law to incentivize market-driven research (Loss 2012, 225–226). Privatization (Morphew and Eckel 2009; Newfield 2008) and changes to labor laws (McNay 2013) have compounded old concerns about the "relevance" of the liberal arts. As authors in this volume write, the "neoliberal university" has created a "peculiar educational environment" that affects everything from hiring practices to "post-9/11 pedagogy."

While not all chapters address the economic context of academic work, they all speak to the question of whether or not 9/11 was a rupture point in U.S. educational and intellectual history. The answers vary considerably, and they are often discipline-dependent. They are, for the most part, based less on mutually exclusive "pre" and "post" categories than on nuanced engagement with the five aforementioned dimensions of 9/11's near setting.

In this sense, *9/11 and the Academy* treads on ground that other books and articles have been preparing since the immediate aftermath of September 11. Philip Wegner argues that there was a post-9/11 moment. Wegner sees in the cultural products of the "long nineties" evidence of a liminal decade between the "deaths" of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001. He argues that "it is only with the fall of the twin towers that the destruction of the symbolic universe of the Cold War is finally accomplished and a true new world order put into place" (Wegner 2009, 9). Another American Studies scholar, David Holloway, argues that "in the post-9/11 era what was most striking was the absence of clean breaks" (Holloway 2008, 4). He finds it concerning that "representation of 9/11 as the moment when everything changed became the ideological lynchpin of the 'war on terror'" (Holloway 2008, 4).

The stakes are indeed high, and "epochal fallacies" (Cooper 2005, 19–22) are potentially dangerous. As the legal historian Mary Dudziak wrote in 2003, "The idea of change affects the way an event enters historical memory. It also constructs present-day politics. If circumstances are new, then arguably the policies needed to address them should be new as well" (3). For that reason, there have been many interpretations of the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy. The diplomatic historian Melvyn Leffler wrote that "both supporters and critics make the case for revolutionary change" (Leffler 2005, 395). To Paul Wolfowitz and other "neoconservatives" in the Bush administration, the notion of rupture vindicated their regime-change logic (Immerman 2010, 196–231). To opponents of preventative war in Iraq, such change was indication of an "imperial presidency" (Schlesinger 1973) that necessitated an "American Empire Project" to critically analyze (Bacevich 2011; Chomsky 2004; Johnson 2004).

This book follows Rodgers in framing the post-1960s ruptures as the intellectual world into which the United States and, by extension, the post-9/11 academy, entered. Rodgers' Cold War did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall, but with the breakdown of the Cold War consensus as the United States emerged out of the 1960s. The 1990s were not, to Rodgers, a liminal decade between two monumental events, but a period intimately tied to the social and intellectual trends of the preceding decades. Rodgers writes that "the age [of fracture] ended in….the destruction of the World Trade Center towers in 2001" (Rodgers 2011, 12–13). But he also found that, when 9/11 occurred, the "pieces of old and new social paradigms" that were "full of promise and full of danger" often "formed the fragments out of which the new century's debates would be constructed" (Rodgers 2011, 271).

The intellectual and institutional climate of higher education on September 11, 2001 possessed its own liminality. What emerges from the chapters that follow is a characterization of "9/11" as a hinge that swung many of the interdisciplinary social sciences and humanities into the twenty-first century in a way that allowed them to address the most critical issues of the day with methods and theories that had served liberal learning well in previous settings.

1.2 9/11 Across the Disciplines

How does one measure the impact of 9/11 across the disciplines? "Impact" meant that scholars felt compelled to ask new research questions moving out of 2001. Some fields turned immediately to 9/11 as a subject of inquiry, whereas others were affected by the subsequent wars abroad and political polarization at home. At times, old paradigms proved woefully insufficient for addressing the terror attacks. At others, older innovations held explanatory power. The impact of 9/11 also meant that national security considerations, especially the new emphasis on "homeland security," intervened to create new programs and organizations, along with new obstacles and funding patterns in many fields. With regard to teaching, interdisciplinary programs and integrated core curricula offered creative responses to the questions that new generations brought to the classroom. Within this spectrum of difference, the critical social sciences and humanities felt an impact from, and have been self-consciously reflective about, September 11.

One of the only chapters in this volume from a traditional discipline is by Robert Demski. A psychology professor and decorated teacher at Adams State University, Demski explains that previous moments of crisis, especially the world wars, called on psychologists to test existing theories and develop new ones. After 9/11, the profession became immersed in scandal because of its endorsement of the Bush administration's "torture memos" (Jones 2012). Psychologists were also asked to explain the American response to 9/11 and the motivation of the nineteen hijackers. This was no small task, and one fraught with problems. But as Demski demonstrates, psychologists adapted a range of theories to post-9/11 circumstances. The "integration model," for example, implicitly calls on psychologists, religion scholars, sociologists, and historians to peel back the different layers of the same complex phenomenon.

Tam Parker, a professor and chair of Religious Studies at Sewanee, explains that her field was not dissimilar to Psychology. While the reasons were different, many students turned to Religion departments

for answers because the 9/11 hijackers were from Muslim-majority countries. But whereas psychologists often adapted old theories to new questions, the dominant trends in Religious Studies had few satisfactory answers in 2001. As Parker has written elsewhere, "Though religion was obviously a central factor in the events of 9/11, overly phenomenological and essentialist construals of religion were suddenly and starkly at a loss in making sense of how and why" (2011). After 9/11, Religion departments sought out specialists on Islam, broadened the traditional Judeo-Christian focus within an Abrahamic framework, and offered courses on world religions to address earlier shortcomings and support new lines of research.

Demski and Parker both call for more social context, and this is especially important for considering the U.S. "war on terror" and its impact on area studies. Post-9/11 interest in "area studies," along with Arabic and other regional languages, did not always produce welcome results in the academy. Zachary Lockman (2010) wrote about the problems that affected the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), the flagship organization in the field, as commentators attacked the field for being too critical of Israel and allegedly sympathetic with Islamism. Martin Kramer's 1998 book *Ivory Towers Built on Sand* captured the conservative critique of the field as it developed in the last decades of the twentieth century. Then, in 2002, Daniel Pipes established the ominous *Campus Watch* organization. Scholars have since reflected on the history (Khalil 2016) and assessed 9/11's impact on Middle East Studies (Keskin 2018).

The interdisciplinary nature of area studies programs meant that 9/11's impact was far-reaching. The American Anthropological Association (2007) refused to support the embedding of scholars with the U.S. military abroad, and the Network of Concerned Anthropologists formed in response. The anthropologist Hugh Gusterson (2008) recognized that while his field "could help smooth out some of the cultural misunderstandings between U.S. troops and locals," the ethical conflict to anthropologists lies in the fact that "they cannot control the use of the information they collect for the military, and thus, cannot ensure it isn't used to harm communities they study."

An edited collection by sociologists (Steinmetz 2013) reveals the "imperial entanglements" of their discipline, too.

This book includes a chapter on area studies by Matthew Unangst. A historian of German colonialism in Africa informed by postcolonial theory and spatial history, Unangst makes the case that, "Although the Global War on Terror has had a more visible impact on Middle East studies, African studies provides a clearer case study of the effects." He decries how African Studies was politicized with the expansion of the war on terror onto the continent. Rather than work within the established professional infrastructure that had, since the 1960s, centered on the African Studies Association and the major "Title VI" centers, advocates of the "clash of civilizations" thesis (Huntington 1997) established the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa in 2007. This was not the first schism in the field, but the post-9/11 environment superimposed new geostrategic considerations upon long-established patterns of state-academy relations. Unangst demonstrates how, as Rodgers described it, "the little platoons of society" (Rodgers 2011, 180) offer policymakers and others in positions of political and cultural power their own self-referential communities.

The disciplines that analyze American culture and politics confronted a different set of issues after September 11. "In this era of direct administration of Muslim lands abroad and intensified surveillance, harassment, and even violence against those perceived to be Muslims at home, American studies scholars have responded with a growing body of work treating American perceptions of the Islamic Orient" (Dorman 2015). They, along with historians, have examined the Barbary Wars (Allison 2000) and reconceptualized earlier events as America's first brushes with terrorism (Farber 2005; Bowden 2006). Books published prior to 9/11 on U.S.-Middle East relations were reissued with new introductions and conclusions (Little 2004; McAlister 2005) and historians edited two of the most prescient early volumes on 9/11 (Dudziak 2003) and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Bailey and Immerman 2015). Moreover, the subfield of military history has, since 9/11, added research lines on the broader societal and cultural contexts of war (Bailey 2009; Biddle and Citino 2014).

Christine Muller, an American Studies professor and director of the honors program at Wilkes College, explains in this book that her "interdiscipline" offers a path into Trauma Studies, a field to which many turned after 9/11. As Muller writes of American Studies, "What began as an endeavor to delineate the distinctiveness of a homogenous American culture – framed through narratives of 'American Exceptionalism' – has developed into an exploration of the everyday lives and practices of the diverse peoples materially and inextricably involved in that American culture." The field abandoned its exceptionalist pretenses, but the public reaction to 9/11 demanded analyses of the myth's enduring resonance. Methodologically, Muller sees continuity with the preceding century. And while some scholars argue that "9/11 remains subject to a crisis in criticism" and American Studies "a compromised interpretive field" (Bond 2011, 733), Muller posits that theorists such as Foucault and Said provide a critical humanist vernacular for deconstructing the new cultural situation and for helping researchers and students confront the multifaceted impact of 9/11 on American life.

There are similarities between American Studies and other post-sixties humanities fields. On the one hand, the emphasis on postmodern theory remains strong. Matthew Biberman, a panelist at the original conference and editor of a book on *Shakespeare After 9/11* (Biberman et al. 2011), demonstrates how theoretical engagement can produce surprising conclusions about the relationship between September 11 and a range of texts. It is not surprising, then, that there is vast scholarship on post-9/11 literature (Gray 2011; Johnson and Merians 2002; Keniston and Quinn 2008; Miller 2014; Pozorski 2014; Versluys 2009) and the arts (Bleiker 2006; Ritter and Daughterty 2007). On the other hand, many interdisciplinary "studies" programs have delved into the contemporary contradictions of exclusionary post-9/11 notions of Americanism. Excellent work comes from the intersectional feminist critique about the securitization of the female body after 9/11 (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2017), along with studies on how African American women narrated the event (Mattingly et al. 2002). Sociologists and scholars of immigration and ethnic studies have also

written extensively on how post-9/11 immigration policies exacerbated social tensions (Rodriguez 2008) and contributed to the "Islamophobia" of the twenty-first century (Awan 2010).

The most significant "studies" field represented in this volume is Mass Communications, or Media Studies. Chiara Ferrari and Mark Finney, media studies scholars working in northern California and southwest Virginia respectively, focus their attention on how "self" and "other" are represented in the media and other cultural products. Finney, a specialist on conflict and news, discusses how scholars criticized the post-9/11 media environment that othered Muslim Americans. Ferrari, a specialist on mass communication design, shows that "9/11 has not necessarily changed the representation of Arab characters in Hollywood media, but has instead intensified those problematic depictions" that existed prior. Finney goes further on the question of representation by identifying various levels of exceptionalist messaging in the media, drawing heavily on the ideas presented in Said's (1997) book *Covering Islam.*

Despite their disciplinary similarities, Finney and Ferrari differ in two other ways. As a social scientist, Finney is somewhat concerned about the space that post-modernism has, ironically, created for culture warriors to challenge "facts." Yet he offers the measured judgement that postmodernism can still do more to explain the recent attack on "truth" than it did to cause it (Hanlon 2018). From a more radical perspective, Ferrari finds the increasing "disdain for some of the cultural discourses produced in and by academia highly problematic." More interestingly, their chapters result in different answers to the question of whether 9/11 was a rupture moment. While Finney finds a complex situation, Ferrari declares: "To say that media studies changed drastically that day is an obvious understatement."

Stephen Farnsworth, a political scientist and director of the Center for Leadership and Media Studies at the University of Mary Washington, focuses his attention on Presidential Studies. As Farnsworth notes, Richard Neustadt's 1960 book was the first shot in a field that evolved considerably over the decades (Neustadt 1990). After the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal pulled the attention of historians to decision-making in the Oval Office, Fred Greenstein brought a unique form of political psychology to the study of the presidency (Seelye 2018).

Farnsworth provides a model for how scholars can, in the twenty-first century, study the trend toward personalization in American political contests. He does so by tracing self-definitions of presidential "character" across the three post-9/11 administrations. Like Unangst and Finney, Farnsworth finds that applied social scientists struggle to change the behavior of the institutions they study, whether the White House, national security bureaucracy, or the fourth estate. It is important that, rather than cede the charge to pundits, Farnsworth brings a social scientific perspective to the study of a major American institution.

The same can be said for Joseph Fitsanakis, a politics professor at Coastal Carolina University and deputy director of the European Intelligence Academy who writes on Intelligence and National Security Studies. He makes clear that "the prolonged period of war and global insecurity that followed 9/11 directly affected critical scholarship." Fitsanakis' field, more than any other represented in this volume, has been intimately tied to the growth of the post-9/11 national security state. He explains that the two separate fields of Intelligence Studies and National Security Studies moved along different paths that rarely intersected with each other, let alone the academy, until Mercyhurst University started the "world's first standalone intelligence program" in 1992 with the goal of producing "analytical generalists." It was 9/11, however, that prompted the "meteoric rise" of the integrated study of intelligence and security at the undergraduate level everywhere from the nation's capital to central Appalachia. As is the case with Finney and Farnsworth, Fitsanakis' critique of the field's applied side indicates that social scientists retain the potential to moderate professional debates by introducing history, politics, classic texts, and humane interdisciplinarity to the classroom.

Other fields not covered in this volume experienced comparable programmatic growth. Whereas degree programs relating to "homeland security" did not exist prior to 9/11, by 2011 there were 250 institutions with bachelor's programs and 50 with master's programs (Hopkins 2011). This development has had a profound impact on Sociology, with some moving to study terrorism and work in the homeland security apparatus (Verrico 2009). While these programs are geared toward tacticians, the Hertog Foundation funded a series of grand strategy programs, with the flagship seminar at Yale, to introduce students to

traditional liberal arts texts (Marcus 2008). The idea was that, as had been the case with the liberally-educated George Kennan, the classics could help future strategists think critically, though in a limited way, about war and peace. In a broader sense, political theorists wrote about "Thucydides beyond the Cold War" after 9/11 (Lane 2005).

As in other areas of the academy, the first two decades of the twenty-first century presented the field of International Education with a bundle of promises wrapped in layers of red-tape and cultural baggage. Celeste Gaia is a psychology professor and director of international education, and Marcelo Leite was the first Fulbright scholar at her institution, Emory & Henry College. They together explain that the Patriot Act of 2001 mandated the creation of an online system for tracking international students, and that the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003 prompted the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These organizations securitized international students in the United States, a development that Gaia and Leite consider alarming, and one that contributed to a downward slide in the international student population in the United States immediately after 9/11. Beyond security issues, exceptionalist beliefs created a situation where, as Gaia and Leite write, "the U.S. lags behind other countries regarding the appreciation of global perspective, language training, and cultural understanding." But most understand the need for a global perspective. Even business professors began after 9/11 to emphasize broader social and cultural fields of interaction (Hopkins 2011). And as Gaia and Leite note, the 9/11 Commission Report viewed international education as a pathway to a more peaceful world and declared "ignorance of the world is a national liability." Whereas the 2008 recession had a profound impact on university administrators of all kinds, it is clear that 9/11 made life for international educators different in the 2000s when measured against the experiences of the previous century.

What about teaching 9/11 in the classroom? This is a delicate subject. In the early 2000s culture warriors publicized lists of scholars that were, in their minds, too critical of the Bush administration (May 2003, 49). Many will have read about the travails of Ward Churchill (2002) at the

University of Colorado and, more recently, a professor at the University of North Carolina (Dent 2015). Although tempered to some extent when compared to the early years of the Cold War, post-9/11 opponents of free and open debate were "evoking McCarthyite tactics" (May 2003, 49) and attempted to restrict academic freedom (Beinin 2015; Bilgrami and Cole 2015; Carvalho and Downing 2010; Doumani 2015). Potential controversy aside, the contributors to this book have been intentionally thoughtful about the place of 9/11 in the classroom and, in some cases, have taught courses that relate to the "post-9/11 world."

This is especially true for Finney and Joseph Lane, the provost at Bethany College and former honors director at Emory & Henry College. They co-taught a first-year honors seminar on 9/11 in fall 2015 to coincide with the "9/11 and the Academy" conference. The seminar was part of the College's Core Curriculum that has, since its modern conception in the late 1970s, provided an interdisciplinary grounding to each student's college career. In 2015 the first-year course was designed to help students "transition" to college by engaging in a collaborative and socially relevant research project. Finney and Lane demonstrate in their chapter how liberal arts curricula provide exciting opportunities for innovation and a safe space for all involved to explore the many uncomfortable aspects of 9/11. In addition to addressing pedagogy, their chapter features samples from eight student research projects to demonstrate how creative engagement with 9/11 can at once meet learning objectives and help students develop emotionally, socially, intellectually, and professionally.

Samantha Ball Shannon, a community college instructor involved with the original conference, contends in the book's final chapter that the academy in the early twenty-first century was part of a larger memory community that attempted to grapple with a set of questions that were, at the time, important for understanding the causes, implications, and meanings of 9/11. This is not to say that durable research cannot be published so shortly after the event under analysis, but the existing literature necessarily violates the unspoken rule that it takes the passing of at least one generation to gain perspective on potentially epochal events (Blight 2011). Beyond the inescapability of the memory question, Ball

demonstrates that Memory Studies scholars, including historians of memory and practitioners of public history, influenced the conversation in multiple ways. They were involved with the formal process of commemoration in helping to select the design for the 9/11 Memorial Museum at "ground zero" in Lower Manhattan. By contrast, an interdisciplinary group of scholars turned the attention to less formal forms of commemoration, especially those that were created spontaneously in cities across the country in 2001. Finally, as is the case with many fields, the "digital humanities" (Svensson 2010) have become an important means of knowledge dissemination, with private sites and that of the 9/11 Memorial Museum offering visitors a tantalizing range of interactive digital artifacts to interpret. Either way, there has been a "boom" in memory talk in the academy and public forums.

Regardless of the field, these chapters foreground the importance of academic freedom and the right to question cultural norms and assumptions. Those rights are signposts of an open society, characteristics of an educated and engaged citizenry, and essential components to the approaches to liberal learning highlighted in this volume. After all, "liberal" comes from the Latin word meaning "of or pertaining to free men [and women]" (Zakaria 2015, 20 and 42).

1.3 Conclusion

While new intellectual currents and institutional circumstances shaped academic life during the years after 9/11, the five trends of the post-1960s moment informed interdisciplinary liberal learning in the social sciences and humanities as they are represented in this book. Yet as the 2010s draw to a close, many speculate that, if there was a post-9/11 moment, American higher education might now be in a "post-post" 9/11 moment.

One must consider what is different in the academy and the country at large in the late 2010s when compared to the far setting, the near setting, or the immediate aftermath of 9/11. While challenges and challengers confronted the liberal arts in the settings prior to 2001, interdisciplinary modes of inquiry and investigation evolved throughout the twentieth century to advance research and pedagogy and otherwise address the demands

of an increasingly technocratic global society. While the Bush administration's militaristic response to 9/11 led to "exploding war expenditures, a booming federal deficit, and an economic recession," all of which hit budget lines relating to education particularly hard (Newfield 2008, 240), economic pressures accelerated after the 2008 recession and ushered in a "lost decade" for higher education (Mitchell et al. 2017). While the debates about the future of education during other potential rupture moments were a lot of things, they were rarely anti-intellectual. The striking irony is that, after 2001 and with more momentum after 2008, everyone from politicians to educationalists seem willing to abandon the "American system" that, in the near and far settings, made the higher education landscape in the United States "distinctive" (Zakaria 2015). Still, educationalists are thinking beyond the horizon to repackage and, in some cases, reconceptualize the liberal arts to enrich learning at their colleges and universities and to sustain the diverse intellectual landscape that has, for centuries, defined higher learning in the United States.

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2

Changed Worlds? American Studies, Trauma Studies, and September 11, 2001

Christine Muller

Journalist Ron Suskind has reported a conversation from the summer of 2002 with a senior adviser to then-President George W. Bush that aptly introduces why the notion of a "changed world" after September 11, 2001 matters to the fields of both American Studies and Trauma Studies—let alone to the actual world that each purports to study. He recalls that

> [t]he aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors … and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." (Suskind 2004)

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This anecdote effectively itemizes what has been at stake within the fraught post-September 11 historical moment—the "real world," so to speak—as well as for journalists, scholars, and others seeking to understand that moment: how to answer questions as existentially and epistemologically fundamental as "what is the world," "what happens to and within it," and "who gets to make sense of that world?" This adviser, working within the U.S. government, even makes a uniquely unambiguous affirmative claim on behalf of the nation he serves, stating, "We're an empire now."

September 11 brought to the fore the acute entanglement of ongoing intellectual preoccupations across multiple disciplines. They include the prevalent theoretical recognition within the academy of the interdependent relationship within discourse between knowledge and power; the American Studies concern with how this relationship has shaped contested notions of "American Exceptionalism" and an "American Empire;" and a Trauma Studies interest in abrupt and violent disruption to what is regarded and experienced as ordinary life—the world as we (thought) we knew it.

Like any other event but on a vastly larger scale than most, September 11 left a footprint on contemporary cultural consciousness and has occasioned reflection about the ever-contingent and always relational processes of characterization, interpretation, and response. What is said about the world around us and who gets to say it channel in circumscribed ways how it is understood, which in turn lead to reactions constrained within finite terms. Following cautions by Thomas Kuhn (1996), Michel Foucault (1980), Edward Said (1978), and Judith Herman (1997), among others, theorists across the sciences, humanities, and social sciences have come to recognize the methodological challenges, hermeneutical implications, and therefore the imprints of politics and power that "the study of" anything entails.

I will begin by delineating the vantage points within which I write, positions conditioned by training within the fields of American Studies as well as Trauma Studies. After rendering these starting points transparent, I will then move through the interrelations of characterization, interpretation, and response to examine how September 11, by seeming to augur a precipitously-changed world, manifests as a trauma through

popular culture representation, particularly within the literature and film of the early twenty-first century. At the locus of popular culture, the fields of American Studies and Trauma Studies intersect to reveal how forms of entertainment accessible to most Americans without expectation of particular expertise engage fixedly with the disruptions of subjectivity, agency, and responsibility prompted by September 11 and sustained by its fallout.

2.1 American Studies: Knowledge, Power, and Culture

Since its nascence as a focused area of study, American Studies has pursued a problem-oriented and therefore methodologically- and disciplinarily-dynamic approach. That is to say, American Studies scholars have persistently confronted the conceptual terrain of the "American," which has raised rather than followed the questions of disciplinary organization and method. Necessarily, such questions have evolved over time along with the contemporary assumptions and preoccupations of academic thought. Consequently, while the interest in understanding the term "American" and refining the (inter)discipline[1] of "American Studies" has endured from the field's inception, the resulting trajectory of theoretical production manifests stark changes in priorities and values.

What began as an endeavor to delineate the distinctiveness of a homogenous American culture—framed through narratives of "American Exceptionalism"—has developed into an exploration of the everyday lives and practices of the diverse peoples materially and inextricably involved in that American culture—or counternarratives to what would come to be viewed as the imperialist imposition of power flowing from exceptionalist conceptions of the nation. In one sense then, the history of American Studies is a history of knowledge as power, of scholarship

[1]Americanists draw on cultural studies, history, literature, media studies, philosophy, psychology, sociology…in effect, any discipline whose theoretical investments and methodological approaches can support fruitful inquiry about American culture. Terming the field an "interdiscipline" most efficiently foregrounds the interdisciplinarity at the heart of the practice of American Studies.

as capable of setting the terms—the discourse—for who and what is known, how, and with what consequences. A self-aware critique of discursive formations and their implications pervaded the practice of American Studies by the end of the twentieth century, shaping how Americanists would approach September 11, 2001 and its aftermath.

The early intertwining between the national culture Americanists sought to study and their own ideological predispositions has rendered the notion of American Exceptionalism a critical and enduring preoccupation of the field. Robert Gross argues that the "founders of the American Studies 'movement' made this idea of exceptionalism the central problematic" of that movement (2000, 385). But many critiques have since emerged. Illustrating one category of critique, Michael Bérubé contextualizes this project within a Cold War era in which academic research complemented national interests (2003, 109). As Paul Giles succinctly summarizes, "the end of the Second World War led to a patriotic desire to identify certain specifically American values and characteristics; this led to various mythic idealizations of the American spirit in seminal critical works of the 1950s" (1994, 335) so that scholars contemplating how the U.S. could be understood as a novel nation produced scholarship that elaborated singular qualities within its history. Yet as Gross points out, "Ever since the Puritans, spokesmen for America have claimed a special destiny…Whatever the version, Americans have repeatedly deemed themselves an 'exceptional' people, favored by history" (2000, 384–385). For Gross, scholars of American culture in the early- to mid-twentieth century were trying, not necessarily to advocate for this view, but rather to explicate and evaluate a pre-existing conceptualization dominating a nation's rhetoric about itself (385–387). Whether Americanists are regarded as having endorsed or challenged the idea that the U.S. occupies a special place in world history, that idea has persisted within American cultural consciousness and therefore has persisted as a focal point for American Studies research. The notion of American Exceptionalism still sufficiently mattered in both American culture and American Studies scholarship by September 11, 2001 to occasion continued, and by then increasingly expressly critical, assessments of the term as a phenomenon with real effects in the world.

Those increasingly and expressly critical assessments emerged forcefully by the end of the twentieth century. Informed by developments within other disciplines, American Studies scholars began to adhere more explicitly to a particular set of conceptual premises. Drawing on roots in phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, and other theoretical constructs originating largely within continental philosophy, frameworks matured for understanding how systems of meaning operate throughout cultural contexts without recourse to some form of objective authority or teleological explanation. Fundamental insights have included the relational interaction between observer and observed, subject and object, through the self-regulated and self-referential structure linking signifier to signified—a structure in which difference generates meaning—and the idea of representation as mediating rather than reflecting or recording reality. French philosopher Michel Foucault (1980) has argued that knowledge, as well as the subject once considered the origin of knowledge, are historical productions, neither given nor natural. In effect, he has asserted that language constructs reality and produces knowledge, and in the vacuum of indeterminate possibilities, power intervenes to determine what counts. His conception of discourse generally engages this sense of the mutually constitutive relationship between power, truth, and knowledge. Such insights have inspired transformations within the humanities, social sciences, as well as the philosophy of science, whose theorists have become more skeptical about truth claims and more active in seeking to dismantle the unequal power relations that such claims sustain, including through the mechanisms of common, pervasive forms of representation—popular culture.

Accordingly, Americanists by the end of the twentieth century were especially wary of politically self-serving ideological constructs such as American Exceptionalism, particularly as a manifestation of substantial institutional power. Granted, Robert Berkhofer writes in 1979 with suspicion, characterizing as a “guise” the “broadening of [of] the conception of American Studies…from high to popular culture, from elite to masses and minorities,” regarding these approaches as “practical expedients for retaining students and funds” amidst a “countercultural revolution and minority demands” (341). He foresees that “Innocence, nostalgia, confidence, mission, and exceptionalism will

prevail" (345). But, by 1994, Giles acknowledges that "other scholars aggressively challenge any idea of American exceptionalism" (336), with comparative work opening possibilities for posing such challenges. By 2003, Bérubé argues, "Today, by contrast, American studies is defined emphatically by its wholesale rejection of exceptionalism, its success at putting American race relations at the center of cultural analysis, its increasing willingness to expand its intellectual interests beyond the borders of the United States nation-state, even to consider changing its name to reflect its geopolitical concerns more adequately" (109). Such internal assessments of American Studies at the turn of the century signal the field's already prominent commitment by 2001 to interrogating discourses differentially serving national power. Bérubé's comments in 2003 affirm a pre- through post-September 11 continuity of investment within American Studies in disrupting discursive frameworks, such as American Exceptionalism, that uncritically and unilaterally advance U.S. dominance.[2]

A similar point can be made about the internationalization of American Studies pre- and post-9/11. Already in 1993, Michael Kammen speculates, "Perhaps the next item on one or another agenda… will be the question: how exceptional *was* (past tense) American exceptionalism" (33)? In 1996, Jane Desmond and Virginia Domínguez argue for the internationalization of American Studies to address real-world inequalities of power by redressing differentiations within the academy privileging American scholarship about and over other national cultures. In 2000, Gross points to the turn toward internationalism as evidence of the "hostility to exceptionalism" (387), with the American Studies "foray into transnationalism…ratify[ing] anti-exceptionalism" (392). He characterizes "transnationalism [as]…a way to fuse domestic and international concerns into a critical tool for democratic change…[T]he new outlook retains the oppositional spirit that has animated American Studies since the 1960s" (380). Others advocating before 2001 for a transnational or internationalized American Studies to counter notions

[2]The title of David W. Noble's (2002) book, *Death of a Nation: American Culture and the End of Exceptionalism*, indicates confidence about this ideology's demise.

of American Exceptionalism and its imperial manifestations include Janice Radway (1999), John Carlos Rowe (1998), Priscilla Wald (1998), and Donald Pease (2000). All contend that situating the U.S. as merely one among nations, rather than as a model above them all, not only produces more fruitful research that responds more faithfully to lived experience, but also actively contributes to a more just and responsible political posture for the U.S., both domestically and globally.

As noted earlier, American Studies encompasses a variety of disciplinary approaches informed by intellectual developments across other fields of study. Palestinian-American literary theorist and public intellectual Edward Said's influence enabled consideration of the specific conditions of empire and the Middle East. Drawing upon Foucauldian elaborations of the contextually-specific character of knowledge, he explained how knowledge both derives from and forms one's position in the world and, ultimately, the mutually-constitutive character of knowledge in relation to power. In *Orientalism*, Said (1978) develops this framework of knowledge/power in a critique of how Western art, scholarship, and popular culture have formulated knowledge of the "Orient" that enables, justifies, and manifests Western dominance over the area thus constructed. In this way, Orientalism instantiates the knowledge/power dynamic. Said's critique usefully foregrounds how Orientalism instrumentalizes Western hegemony, potently aggregating a regional, religious, and racial entity for subordination. Yet Said's critique itself evidences the possibility of fracturing this hegemony with alternate knowledge/power constructions—or deconstructions, as Derrida would assert. At the very least, Said's critique usefully dismantles the decadent monolith that the Orient has represented by exposing Western hegemony and asserting alternative perspectives. In fact, Said's contribution to cultural theory draws not only on the deconstruction of the "Orient," but also, as subsequent scholarship would demonstrate, the deconstruction of the "West" itself. In other words, Said's application of Foucault's power/knowledge formulation provided strong foundations for broader understanding, and therefore challenging, of how power operates through dominant cultural formations. Said's intervention, specifically in

the relationship between Western representation-as-power and the geographic space termed the "Middle East," would provide a schema apt for Americanists seeking to contextualize the events of September 11 within that very same relationship.

Long before September 11, scholars within American Studies began tracing an intellectual debt to Said by engaging postcolonial studies (which Said helped to found), but also by attending specifically to how the U.S. functions as an empire. Increasingly, American Studies research has interrogated how the U.S. unexceptionally has imposed power in the service of government and business interests in ways not very different from European empires that—unlike the U.S.—have been commonly acknowledged as such. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease's collection, *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, appearing in 1993, offers close historical scrutiny of U.S. global power. Kaplan dedicated a 2003 presidential address to the American Studies Association to Said's memory (1), noting that the notion of a "U.S. empire" had emerged from a concern once relegated to those on an agitated Left into a now taken-for-granted premise within mainstream political discourse (2004, 2–7).[3] In 2004, John Carlos Rowe traced Said's influence on the field, finding "*Orientalism*…the work most frequently cited as a model for a new American Studies committed to the critical study of the United States as an imperial power" (36). Near the end of the first post-September 11 decade, Pease (2009) continues to argue that exceptionalist discourse masks U.S. imperialism (19) and to advocate for a transnational/global orientation of the field (20–21), marking fifteen years of seeking a "post-exceptionalist American Studies" (19). In sum, by 2001, American Studies scholars were already assessing the footprint of U.S. power in the world, with September 11 compellingly occasioning persistence in this analytical direction, particularly in connection to the Middle East.

Importantly, this trend of critically situating the U.S. in relation to world power has also attended to domestic power relations, with the two contexts dynamically linked. In 1986, Michael Denning was

[3]Shelley Fisher Fishkin (2005, 21), and Pease (2006, 74) make this same argument.

reviewing the "labors of reconstructing a critical and emancipatory understanding of American culture" (372), with attention to how the U.S. has functioned within the framework of "a specifically 'settler colonial' capitalism" (364). In 1989, Linda Kerber argues, "empowered by our new sensitivity to the distinctions of race, class, and gender, we are ready to begin to understand difference as a series of relationships of power, involving domination and subordination, and to use our understanding of the power relations to reconceptualize both our interpretation and our teaching of American culture" (429). Such reconceptualizations have included awareness. In 1992, Alice Kessler-Harris writes of American identity as constructed, contested, fluid, and relational (311), in 1995 George Lipsitz painstakingly outlines the "possessive investment in whiteness" that structures "racialized social democracy" (369), and in 1997 Mary Helen Washington foregrounds the troubled relationship between center and margin by asking the discipline of American Studies to consider what it would mean to centralize African American Studies (1). While Elaine Tyler May (1996) makes an explicit call for Americanists to fully and consciously embrace a unity of scholarship with activism, in 1998 Lipsitz traces the relationship between American Studies, globalization, and the history of social movements. Writing with September 11 just a few years away, Lipsitz offers a kind of prophetic pronouncement for how the field could connect research with political action, forecasting that,

> Scholars who work through social movement institutions as well as academic institutions, who refuse to separate social identities into mutually exclusive realms, who understand the always international dimensions of U.S. culture and the connections linking low-wage labor and racialization to sexism and citizenship, and who embrace the ways in which new eras demand both new forms of cultural expression and new methods of cultural criticism, will be prepared for the demands of the future in a way that does honor to our past without getting trapped by its contradictions and shortcomings. (Lipsitz 1998, 222–223)

By the turn of the century, the field of American Studies had become fully immersed in questions not only of how social constructions of identity

determine the positioning of whole categories of people within both international and domestic power relations, but also how Americanists could intervene through their scholarship and through activist politics.

This positioning would frame responses within American Studies to September 11 and its aftermath. Addressing the American Studies Association in November of 2001, George Sanchez (2002) had to reckon with the immediate impact of 9/11 on his field. Sanchez initially claims, “The horrific events of September 11, 2001, and the aftermath of a new-fashioned global war on terrorism, have transformed the thinking and direction of many of us who study and interpret social and cultural life in the United States.” Yet immediately following that claim, he asserts, “For me to make sense of my own world in these troubling times, I have deliberately returned to work that I have done for over a decade that gives meaning to my own life as an academic” (2002, 1). This suggests, rather than a rupture, a pre- and post-September 11 continuity within the practice of American Studies.

In that same speech, Sanchez (2002) calls for public engagement (6–7), while acknowledging tension with contemporary patriotic displays, affirming that the field has “tried to move to a ‘postnationalist’ American Studies that does not triumph in an exceptionalist America in contrast to the rest of the world” (8). In effect, he sees constructive promise in what Americanists could contribute to public discourse through the embrace of “tolerance of difference…and global interconnectedness” (10). In 2002, Heinz Ickstadt affirms this entanglement within American Studies between progressive-oriented politics and scholarship by celebrating the “logic of subversive democracy that lies at the heart of American studies itself” (548). In 2006, while terming the September 11 hijackings “ruptural events” (73), Pease characterizes contemporary American Studies scholars as an “academic formation in which contestation over normative assumptions had become the rule” (77) which could do the “work of constructing an oppositional common sense to form a community of justice in their war of position with the post-cold war state” (80). In sum, post-September 11, Americanists were continuing a pre-September 11 commitment to social activism in both research and practice that challenged any imposition of national power construed as exceptionalist and imperialist.

In political alignment with the field of American Studies, law professor Muneer Ahmad wrote in 2002 about the need for the "[d]ecentering of September 11" (101). This would open possibilities for solidarity (111–112) in confronting post-September 11 discrimination against "Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians" reminiscent of other race-based structures in U.S. history that produced a divide-and-conquer separation among communities with otherwise shared interests (101–102). He argued, "By examining the recent phenomenon of hate violence and racial profiling aimed at Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, I seek here to situate our current moment of crisis within multiple histories of racial oppression in the United States" (102). This concern persists throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century among those studying American culture. In 2011, literary scholar Carol Fadda-Conrey similarly contends that the "reductive perception of Arab Americans in the US" predates September 11 (533), and the policing of Muslim and Arab identities echoes prior domestic measures against suspect populations with the effect of undermining activist alliances (534–535). The interconnectedness of scholarship and political activism that Americanists had been explicitly advocating[4] persisted in the fraught post-September 11 terrain of the War on Terror, with an ongoing awareness that the academy can, and perhaps even must, address power within lived, material conditions. Drawing on years of activist positioning, scholars of American culture expressly embraced an interventionist role in the discourse through the construction of that day's history, representation, and effects.

As noted earlier, popular culture has long been recognized as participating in the production of history and its effects through the work of representation. May traces American Studies attention to popular culture as far back as the 1930s, with heightened awareness beginning in the 1960s of how popular culture texts provide insight into the cultural lives of those ordinarily marginalized by constructs such as race, gender, sexuality (1996, 189–190). Similarly,

[4]Fishkin argues that "criticizing your country when you know it to be wrong is *as American as Mark Twain*" (2005, 19).

Rowe has asserted that "American Studies has traditionally claimed the mass and popular media as indispensable fields of study" (2002, xxii). Referencing the "crisis of representation" in 1990, Lipsitz points out that national boundaries, canons, distinctions between "high" and "low" culture, and notions of art as reflective of a unified culture, among other mainstays of early American Studies practice, no longer made sense within contemporary strains of continental thought as articulated by Foucault and others (617). Instead, theory should attend to other concerns, including those otherwise discounted or discredited, or located outside of academic discourse, such as "popular culture [which serves] as a crucial site for the construction of social identity, but also as a key terrain for ideological conflict" (618). In effect, he argues, popular culture provides ground for contesting power, with meaning formulated through the interaction of life with art (624–625). Reminiscent of Said, Lipsitz calls for self-reflexivity about how "language positions the subjects and objects of knowledge" (619). Ultimately, he advocates for American Studies theory that,

> refuses hypostatization into a method, that grounds itself in the study of concrete cultural practices, that extends the definition of culture to the broadest possible contexts of cultural production and reception, that recognizes the role played by national histories and traditions in cultural contestation and that understands that struggles over meaning are inevitably struggles over resources. (Lipsitz 1990, 621)

In sum, Lipsitz regards American Studies as de-privileging dominant discourses and awakening to possibilities for alternative thought and practice, a critical move explaining why the study of popular culture forms, such as film and television, could be viewed as legitimate and productive sites for interrogating the cultural imprint of September 11 and its aftermath.

Taken together, these brief outlines of signature moments in the development of American Studies mark the field's primary influences, interests, and approaches at the time of September 11, and therefore the pre-existing lenses through which that day and its fallout could be explored. In keeping with its origins as question-oriented

and methodologically-diverse, the interdiscipline has engaged in cross-disciplinary scrutiny of September 11. Complementary sites of investigation include cultural studies, history, law, literature, and media studies, among other areas of study. Above all, by drawing on years of dismantling notions of American Exceptionalism and challenging the operations of empire, such investigation has focused on critiquing the political implications of September 11-oriented discourse and representation. By the time September 11, 2001 arrived, inquiry within American Studies was already focusing on how culture—including the culture of academic discourse—serves as a site for meaning and knowledge production, contestation, and negotiation, preparing the way for a practice of contextualizing the day and its aftermath within and against dominant political ideologies. At least for the field of American Studies, September 11 did not pose an abrupt, stark, and destabilizing change to long-held intellectual positions and values. Rather, the day and the subsequent War on Terror occasioned an enhanced investment in advocating for those positions and values under conditions of heightened stakes and imminent consequences for the world.

2.2 Trauma Studies: Knowledge, Power, and Abrupt Harm

The study of trauma originated in psychology but developed into a robust subset of the humanities toward the end of the twentieth century. What began around the turn of the twentieth century largely as paternalistically-inflected clinical observations of so-called hysterical women and shell-shocked World War I veterans transformed after the end of the Vietnam War into the formally-recognized psychiatric diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).[5] These developments afforded social legitimacy and productive therapeutic treatment for patients who

[5]The American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition* (DSM-5) associates a number of "trauma- and stressor-related disorders" with the aftermath of a traumatic event (2013, 265).

exhibited specific kinds of symptoms following profoundly troubling and disruptive life events. At the same time, memoirs and other texts confronting the Holocaust contributed to budding interest in trauma within cultural, literary, and historical studies, which often reflected on the fraught and complex terms through which violent history might be represented and understood. By the late 1990s, scholarship on trauma—what is called "Trauma Studies" within the humanities—was proliferating, just in time for the unprecedented global witnessing of the unexpected violence occasioned by the live broadcasts of September 11.

As is the case with American Studies, the Trauma Studies literature engages with many disciplines. Whatever the disciplinary inspiration, dominant scholarship within Trauma Studies has pointed to the a-, anti-, or reactionary political tendencies wrought by a focus on individualized trauma in regard to September 11. Trauma Studies scholars view such a focus as a discursive framework that could confine responses within a victimized domestic sphere preoccupied with individual affect at the cost of globally- and historically-contextualized critique. This concern resonates with the commitment within American Studies to avoid claims of an exceptional American experience in favor of situating that experience within domestic and international power relations. As a paradigmatic case of exceptional experience—post-traumatic symptoms, after all, derive from an encounter regarded as outside the range of expectations for ordinary daily life[6]—trauma has been characterized as an event rupturing connection to the past so completely that meaningful representation, which depends on the familiar to communicate the unfamiliar, has been construed as impossible.

Accordingly, Lucy Bond has wondered whether the "discourses of trauma…may be said to mystify, rather than elucidate, the conditions of both analysis and experience" (2011, 734), since she worries that "limit narratives threaten to create the very void in understanding they lament" (735). Sabine Sielke has also cautioned that "the rhetoric

[6]The DSM-5 elaborates what such encounters and resulting disorders might include (2013, 265–290), with "exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence" among the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (271).

of the unrepresentable remains a risky business" in terms of its political consequences (2010, 405), while the "trope of fracture" obscures political continuities with deep historical roots and complicated contexts to make more possible particular kinds of state action (395). Likewise, Melanie McAlister (2002) has traced how the forgetting of history and the exclusive foregrounding of personalized loss can inhibit any process of informed, considered policy decision-making. According to Bond, trauma theory's expanse and "overpersonalization of the American public sphere," which pre-date September 11, have shaped its discourse (2011, 738). In effect, she "suspect[s] that the ubiquity of these narratives [of personalized rupture] is tied to the prevalence of traumatic tropes in American culture prior to 9/11, meaning preexisting paradigms were imposed upon the attacks as the optimum method of interpretation without adequate time for reflection" (755). Yet, while expressly desiring a "convincing, antihegemonic counternarrative…to be created for 9/11 and its aftermath" (756), she stops short of articulating what that counternarrative might be, if it even exists, or if it would be a singular, rather than a plural, phenomenon. Richard Crownshaw considers one possibility: that narratives of trauma could create space, literally and figuratively, for "deterritorializing" the concept of the "Homeland" (2011, 757). He, like the other Americanists mentioned here—Bond, Sielke, and McAlister—have turned to popular culture[7] to explore how representation participates in the production of history and of public understanding of that history.

These concerns and approaches accord with the outline of American Studies commitments at the dawn of the twenty-first century that, as elaborated earlier, dwell primarily on how cultural constructs reinforce and even advance Western hegemony. These commitments both espouse and enact the importance of pre- and post-September 11 continuity, urging an attentive memory of real-world developments and the adopting of an ongoing critical posture when analyzing those developments.

[7]I include literature within the category of popular culture in the sense that the fiction I address here is readily-available to any interested reader, rather than accessible only to an elite or specially-trained few (apart from those with literacy skills).

Bond's sense that notions of trauma prevalent before September 11 were employed in interpreting the event without necessarily being altered by the event would suggest that, like American Studies, Trauma Studies as a field within the humanities has remained fundamentally—at the level of theoretical premises and methodological practices—unchanged after September 11, with the day explored within pre-existing paradigms and themes. As noted earlier, Bond, Sielke, and McAlister have characterized this approach as politically problematic. Here, I depart on a different trajectory.

Instead, I take seriously the possibility that September 11 did incite a kind of violent rupture with significant cultural implications. Ordinary people's fears, rooted in the event itself—rather than any institutional superimposing of a dominant characterization or interpretation of the event—fueled responsiveness to extreme political reactions. In other words, rather than interrogate the discourse *about* trauma and its effects, I seek here to assess through the mediation of popular culture how trauma functions *as* discourse, a force by which knowledge is done and undone. I consider the phenomenon of trauma as itself a crisis of knowledge and power, noting the basic features—beginning on the individual level but extrapolating toward a larger scale—that render an event such as (but not only) September 11 sufficiently powerful to catalyze abrupt, stark, and destabilizing cultural change.

To orient this approach, I return to the psychology-based roots of Trauma Studies. I draw first on the work of psychiatrist Judith Herman (1997), whose research with populations as diverse as Vietnam veterans and rape survivors distinguishes certain commonalities in individuals' post-traumatic symptoms. From these commonalities, she formulates a view of traumatization as a process of injury and disempowerment through physical and volitional violation—that is, overpowering of a victim's body and will. When one cannot do or be what one chooses—when one must do or be precisely what one would not choose—what, then, would power and knowledge mean in the traumatic context? On what terms could utter powerlessness make way for a renewed sense of control? On what terms does incomprehensible horror become bound within the effable, and how are terms for the effable constructed?

What struggles does horrific knowledge produce, what are the stakes of these struggles, and what are the possible implications? Such questions, grounded in trauma, point to the parameters and demands of subjectivity, agency, and responsibility under conditions of constrained choice and action. Traumatic experience uniquely, painfully, unavoidably, and undesirably makes survivors and witnesses feel very much isolated, trapped alone within the trauma and its aftershocks. Yet at the same time, trauma violates selfhood, exposing its shortcomings as a construct of physical and psychological independence and integrity. This disruption of one's sense of self—one's autonomy, one's judgment, one's identity—points to trauma itself as a form of power and knowledge.

Additionally, I draw on the work of psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, who has argued that trauma shatters three foundational assumptions developed during infancy that lay the groundwork for understanding the nature of the world and one's place in it. These three assumptions, "The world is benevolent/The world is meaningful/The self is worthy" (1992, 6), at first might seem unwarranted universalizations. In fact, Janoff-Bulman admitted that not everyone necessarily would have such assumptions (6); of course, those who suffer abuse and/or neglect since birth likely form different assumptions. However, her elaboration of these assumptions suggests that they do play a meaningful role in orienting most people's involvement with their surroundings. In this way, people go about their lives with underlying beliefs about the world and their relationship to it that most of the time work well enough to enable them to function readily in ordinary life. Ultimately, trauma violates, and therefore warrants the reconstruction of, these worldview assumptions. But it does not directly determine what form new assumptions might take. Instead, an individual—or a culture, if the idea of fundamental assumptions is extrapolated to recognize the premises shared within and taken for granted by whole communities—is left in the wake of trauma surrounded by shattered pieces awaiting reconfiguration.

This extrapolation leads to questions about how shattering fundamental cultural assumptions might prove traumatic. Consider the hypothetical premise that traumatic cultural disruptions might occur more often, not through singular violent and dramatic events, but

through other direct challenges to the dominant paradigms of knowledge and power. Such disruptions would prompt similar contradictions to fundamental illusions offering meaning and security and require similar recovery through reconstruction of meaning and security on new terms. For example, American literature scholar Rosemarie Garland Thomson points out that the disabled body manifests a contradiction to the Emersonian doctrine of self-reliance, dominant within American cultural values, by evidencing the fiction of the fully autonomous individual. In effect, she contended, "In a world increasingly seen as free from divine determinism and subject to individual control, the disabled figure calls into question such concepts as will, ability, progress, responsibility, and free agency, notions around which people in a liberal society organize their identities" (1996, 47). As Janoff-Bulman discusses regarding others' avoidance of trauma survivors who personify the illusory nature of their fundamental assumptions, Thomson notes that disabled bodies provoke similar discomfort for similar reasons. While terming the encounter with difference unsupported by dominant cultural paradigms as culturally "traumatic" initially might seem problematic, a problem arises only if it is assumed that only those who are "in the right" can be traumatized—as if the kinds of fundamental cultural concepts that trauma violates are solely those worth preserving. Yet such an encounter can present a contradiction to troubling paradigms sufficient to instigate a paradigmatic crisis of knowledge and power. In such instances, the crisis can prove destructive, with hegemonic values that view difference as dangerous reasserting themselves with greater vehemence. Or, the crisis can prove constructive, occasioning the formation of new paradigms more responsive to the realities of lived lives than the protective fictions they replace.

And so, traumatic encounters with the imminence of mortality provoke troubling questions about knowledge and power. The violation of functional assumptions about bodily integrity and personal will that characterizes trauma poses for witnesses as well as survivors existential and epistemological crises, foregrounding these assumptions as problematic and unstable. In effect, traumatic events serve as sites of knowledge effacement and production, replacing taken-for-granted notions about health and agency with an indelible understanding of

vulnerability. In the wake of a perpetrated event, survivors and witnesses must return to life with any previously comforting presumptions corrupted by their new, intimate knowledge of the human ability to endure and inflict great harm. On September 11, 2001, those seen jumping from the World Trade Center towers embodied an appalling predicament that those on-hand, and millions of media viewers worldwide, probably never before imagined. It was a new and unique knowledge—formed quickly but assimilated haltingly—about life possibilities that one neither wants nor readily forgets.[8]

2.3 Popular Culture Narrative and September 11, 2001

In effect, traumatic events contradict the premises of meaningful human life, disrupting the narrative flow—the connections between cause and effect, actions and intended consequences, efforts and commensurate results—with which individuals make sense of daily living. Those who witnessed September 11, whether in person or through television coverage, all shared exposure to a stark, unanticipated, violent contradiction of cultural expectations about what ordinary life involves. Conditions featured confusion, vulnerability, and doubt, challenging taken-for-granted presumptions about one's ability to know how to act safely and purposefully in the service of the most fundamental concern: self-preservation. What kinds of new stories would engage this fraught and threatening terrain? Early twenty-first century popular culture, across multiple forms, has persistently showcased preoccupations with existential crisis, vulnerability, and moral ambivalence. These conditions are counter to traditional American values of optimism, self-determination, and belief in a just world that serve as indices of a common, cultural trauma (Muller 2017). Here, I select from the two

[8]See Tom Junod (2003) for a reflection on the cultural implications of witnessing those falling from the twin towers.

sites of literature and film sample narratives with distinct approaches yet compatible concerns that evince such preoccupations.

Post-September 11 literature has proliferated. Texts range from those, such as Don DeLillo's *The Falling Man*, that explicitly dwell on the day and its aftermath, to those, such as Joseph O'Neill's *Netherland*, that take a more circuitous route. Jess Walter's *The Zero* confronts September 11 as a force provoking an immediate and enduring struggle for a fathomable world. The novel features a main character, Brian Remy, precipitously and uncontrollably propelled through fragments of time, proceeding chronologically forward from September 11. Remy's time travels leave him disoriented, suspicious in moments of lucidity of the nefarious operations he realizes he must be performing when not fully conscious. Cumulatively, these travels signal the destabilizing transformation September 11 has posed for the former New York City cop turned security expert, when the firm ground on which his sense of self and world stood literally and figuratively collapsed.

Mid-way through the novel, by which time Remy has come to expect, if not accept, the time disjunctions jolting his daily life, he finds himself grilling dinner on his girlfriend's fire escape. He starts to wonder,

> Maybe this was not some condition he had, but a life, and maybe every life is lived moment to moment. Doesn't everyone react to the world as it presents itself? Who really knows more than the moment he's in? What do you trust? Memory? History? No, these are just stories, and whichever ones we choose to tell ourselves…there are always gaps. (Walter 2006, 160)

His musings raise important and common existential questions for any individual, but for someone who has walked away from an unexpected brush with large-scale death, they assume intensified significance. After all, when the unexpected arrives, how else can one react but by responding moment-to-moment as events unfold? When the unprecedented occurs, what existing stories can make sense of the new, unfathomable reality? Remy's jarring jumps through time replay in every instance the startled confusion, adrift fear, and urgent need to act—in spite of that confusion and fear—that September 11 first occasioned. The apparent disconnect, from the perspective of those under attack that day, between

cause and effect, action and fate, reproduces itself through every scene in which Remy arrives unaware, accountable but always without warning.

When he returns to Ground Zero—or "the Zero" as the novel's characters term it—Remy contemplates what might be lacking, not only in his own mental resources, but also in those of the nation. He reflects,

> The ground is where history lay…They were the same: ground and place – plowed and scraped and rearranged, sure, but still you knew that in this place the soil was tamped with bone and gristle and bravery. That was important. The ground was important, imprinted with every footfall of our lives…the full measure and memento of every unremarkable event, and every inconceivable moment….Maybe his mind was a hole like this – the evidence and reason scraped away. If you can't trust the ground beneath your feet, what can you trust? If you take away the very ground, what could possibly be left?…God, they scraped it all away. No wonder they couldn't remember what it meant anymore…How can you remember what isn't there anymore? (Walter 2006, 307–308)

In this passage, Remy literally and explicitly connects the physical ground with the "groundedness" of his own and his nation's identity and worldview. Ground alone, in this sense, can keep movement through time, however it is paced, from losing its grip on the past while orienting to the future. "Ground," the word absent from but implied in the title *The Zero*, serves as the implicit theme and missing anchor underlying Remy's leaps in time away from September 11. In this sense, the term offers an elusive alternative, an aspirational but not-yet-secured remedy, to the cultural disjunctures provoked by the trauma of September 11 and evoked by the narrative of *The Zero*.

Like literature, film has explored September 11 and its fallout through multiple genres and varying degrees of ambiguity. I look to the film *Star Trek* to elaborate the parameters of the no-win scenario that has proven pervasive within the popular entertainment of the first decades of the twenty-first century. With this movie, Director J.J. Abrams presents viewers with a 2009 reboot of the 1966–1969 science fiction television series *Star Trek*. To do so, he integrates familiar characters and plot elements with a narrative designed to re-launch a continuing film franchise. These familiar elements prominently feature Captain

James T. Kirk (Chris Pine), known for his brash, quick-thinking, never-say-die, youthful leadership of a loyal crew, and the stalwart starship the USS *Enterprise*. In keeping with his characterization, Kirk is known within *Star Trek* lore for having been the only Starfleet Academy cadet to have defeated the Kobayashi Maru. This training exercise, engineered to preclude participants from any possibility of a successful outcome, aims to introduce command-track individuals to no-win scenarios. In this way, they should learn how to cope with circumstances of the highest duress. In effect, the test itself is a cheat, always programmed to circumvent any cadet's attempt to "win," which Kirk regards as grounds for his own "innovative" response: he rigs the test himself to permit a positive resolution (*Star Trek* 2009).

The no-win scenario cultivated by the Kobayashi Maru figures centrally in *Star Trek*. The film begins with the USS *Kelvin* under attack by a superior foe in deep space. The starship's doomed captain, summoned to the aggressor vessel, rapidly dispenses orders for Kirk's father, George (Chris Hemsworth), to become the acting captain in his absence. George Kirk assumes command while Captain Robau (Faran Tahir) rebuffs suggestions of finding back-up by insisting, "There is no help for us out here." Words marking stark loneliness set the tone both for the vulnerability of space exploration and the unblinking courage of its pioneers. Soon, Captain Robau is killed, the *Kelvin* comes under fatal fire, and George Kirk is able to buy time for a full evacuation only by remaining on the damaged ship until it is destroyed. It is at that moment of the *Kelvin*'s explosion and his father's death that James T. Kirk is born on an escaping medical pod (*Star Trek* 2009).

The story soon and repeatedly revisits the concept of a no-win scenario that began the film and the protagonist's life. Christopher Pike (Bruce Greenwood), here Kirk's mentor, tells him that he wrote his dissertation on the *Kelvin*. He says, "Something I admired about your dad. He didn't believe in no-win scenarios," to which Kirk replies, "Sure learned his lesson." Pike responds, "Well, that depends on how you define winning. You're here, aren't you?" It turns out, according to Pike, that George Kirk saved 800 lives at the cost of his own. This fact opens Kirk's eyes, and perhaps spurs the creativity that later leads him to decide that, if the Academy's Kobayashi Maru is a cheat, then he should

put himself outside the game and set his own terms for success. On his third attempt at the exercise, he rescues the endangered, escapes with all crew intact, and eliminates the enemy, a feat precluded by the exercise's original programming. He emerges unscathed only because he changed the conditions of the test. While this act of ingenuity earns him an academic integrity inquiry, the inquiry is interrupted by a Romulan attack (*Star Trek* 2009).

When confronting the Romulan ship, Pike is exposed to the same danger that killed the *Kelvin*'s captain and resulted in that starship's demise. Yet this time, the outcome changes. Once Kirk becomes captain of the *Enterprise*, Pike is rescued, the Romulans are defeated, and all of Earth—and the Federation—are saved (*Star Trek* 2009). With the first decade of the twenty-first century comprehensively preoccupied, across forms of popular culture, with the absolute futility of the no-win scenario (Muller 2017), it would seem that the antidote to the fear of a no-win scenario lies only in the unreal realm of fantasy: a cocky fictional captain convinced that he cannot fail because he must not. It is also about the equally fantastical, and improbable miracle, of luck—luck, and a charmed starship.

2.4 Conclusion

By the dawn of the twenty-first century, the field of American Studies had become persistently critical of discourse that advanced national power. Critiques of notions such as "American Exceptionalism" and U.S. imperialism developed before September 11, 2001 and intensified as the War on Terror emerged, with no end in sight (with or without the use of the specific term "War on Terror"). Rather than a changed world, Americanists' intellectual frameworks encountered a fathomable progression post-September 11 from already long-standing state practices. This framework would inform suspicion of the rhetoric of trauma, whereby Trauma Studies scholars' interests in fracture and singular, unrepresentable experience were construed as discourses rationalizing problematic political responses to the September 11 hijackings.

However, here, I view trauma as itself a crisis of knowledge and power, a discourse that indeed ruptures familiar ways of knowing and acting in the world and thereby frustrates stable and productive choices and actions. The phenomenon of a conceptually "changed world," in which fundamental, familiar cultural beliefs and practices seem no longer to apply, signals an existential destabilization rooted in people's encounters with September 11 that poses fraught implications. As the two samples of narrative discussed here instantiate from across a broader array of popular culture sites, ordinary, non-expert readers and viewers have engaged with dramatizations featuring complex, consequential challenges that preclude readily-accessible, plausible resolutions applicable for the real post-September 11 world. Rather than a rhetoric that necessarily favors particular political policies, trauma as discourse erupts fertile ground from which new ways of thinking and being—for better or worse—can unfold.

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3

Psychology Confronts 9/11: Explanations, Shortcomings, and Challenges

Robert Demski

September 11, 2001 could arguably be described as a day that psychologically changed the United States of America. By the end of the day, two commercial planes slammed into the World Trade Centers, another plane hit the Pentagon, and a third crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. In the end, about 3000 people were killed. President George W. Bush received the news while visiting a second-grade classroom in Sarasota, Florida. Many Americans viewed these life changing events in real time. The national response, led by President Bush, was swift and decisive.

In the weeks and months that followed, Americans responded with anger. Ibish (2003) reported that in the 13 months following the attacks, about 80 Arab American passengers were removed from airplanes either for being Muslim or for having names that sounded Muslim. Also, within nine months of the 9/11 attacks, about 700 violent incidents focused on Arab Americans occurred. Immediately following the attacks, one survey showed that 55% of Americans were

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willing to sacrifice some of their civil liberties. This is compared to 29% in 1997 (Huddy et al. 2002). In addition, support for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein went from 52% before the attacks to 74% after the attacks (Foyle 2004).

Anger was complemented by positive and prosocial reactions. Morgan et al. (2011) reported that some Americans responded by wanting to know more about Islam, by wanting to encourage tolerance, and by wanting to appreciate friends and family. Heinrich (2002) reported that blood donations surged in the weeks after the attacks, but then declined to pre-attack levels by the end of 2001. In addition, increases in volunteering, charitable donations, and displaying the American flag occurred (Morgan et al. 2011). Finally, researchers found that trust in local and national government increased (Hetherington and Nelson 2002), while the approval ratings of both Congress and the president increased (Jones 2003).

Historical events, such as 9/11, often provide psychologists with the opportunity to test existing theories or to develop new theories. World War I (WWI) provided psychology the opportunity to develop programs and theories of intelligence testing and personnel selection. The trauma that some soldiers experienced during both world wars and the Vietnam war provided psychologists the opportunity to understand the causes of what was then called "shell shock." This syndrome is currently known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Psychology's project is to develop universal laws of behavior and mental processes. Horgan (2017) appropriately suggests that terrorism is behavior, and is therefore within the realm of psychological inquiry. Yet psychology's focus has been on the trauma experienced by victims rather than understanding terrorist behavior. Psychology's current use of the ubiquitous laboratory experiment is the method used to identify causal relations by decontextualizing psychological phenomena. The complexity and definitional problems of terrorism may not lend themselves well to the experimental paradigm. However, when the 9/11 attacks occurred, psychology had a number of theories that were used to explain America's response.

This chapter has three goals. The first is to describe the application of three theories psychology used to explain American responses to 9/11. These theories are sacred-value protection theory, terror management theory, and inter-group emotion theory. The second goal of this chapter is to review psychology's understanding of the perpetrators' motivations. I do so by applying Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model of human development, while at the same time suggesting how psychological research can move off campus to better understand subjects such as violent extremism, suicide bombers, and martyrdom. My recommendations are in line with those of Ginges et al. (2011), who proposed that psychology diversify its research methodologies, expand the populations it studies, and become more interdisciplinary. The final goal of this manuscript is to describe the role psychology has played since 9/11 within national security agencies, a role for the profession that dates to WWI and has included psychologists serving as government advisors and playing an important role in national defense operations.

3.1 Psychology Explains America's Response to 9/11

While the 9/11 attacks did not necessarily generate new psychological theories to explain threat responses, existing theories were applied to understand America's response. Sacred-value protection theory explains both the positive and negative reactions to the attacks as reflections of moral outrage and moral cleansing. Terror management theory views America's response to the attacks as reactions to the existential threat of death. Inter-group emotions theory explains responses as the result of in-group identification and inter-group dynamics. These psychological theories do not deny the importance of political, economic, or historical influences. Rather, these other influences create the stage on which psychological processes operate. Moreover, the explanations offered by the above three theories should not be viewed as justifications, but rather potential explanations for America's response to the 9/11 attacks.

The targets of America's reaction (Muslims in general, Arab Americans, Saddam Hussein, Iraq) were not the actual perpetrators, but only symbolic targets. When there is no clear outlet for vengeance and moral outrage, such responses can be dysfunctional at the national level.

The 9/11 attacks were physical, but many on all sides considered them to be moral and cultural attacks. From the American perspective, unjust and undeserved harm had been done. The attacks hit two cultural symbols of American economic prosperity and military strength, the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon. The first theory that explains America's response to 9/11 is sacred-value protection theory. It is a framework for explaining how people cope with threats to their moral and cultural worldviews (Tetlock et al. 2000). Sacred values are values that a society views as having infinite and transcendental importance. Such values are not to be compromised or traded-off by utilitarian considerations. Sacred values can be either religious (e.g., faith in God, the Bible as the word of God) or secular (e.g., belief in free enterprise, autonomy of the individual, democracy). When threats to sacred values occur, people respond by reaffirming and reestablishing their sense of moral order and by affirming central personal/cultural beliefs and values.

Moral outrage and moral cleansing are the two routes through which people respond to sacred-value threats (Tetlock et al. 2000). Moral outrage involves cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Cognitive responses include harsh personal attributions for those who are perceived to transgress sacred values. Such attributions can be accompanied by anger, disgust and contempt for transgressors, and enthusiasm for people who reaffirm threatened values. Violators may be socially ostracized or punished, and those who demand retaliation against violators are viewed admirably. An alternative and complementary response is moral cleansing. Moral cleansing involves efforts to wash away or clean oneself of the taint or contamination caused by personal and cultural value violation. Moral cleansing can involve symbolic behaviors that make a person or culture feel better. Such behaviors function to reaffirm solidarity with one's moral community and reaffirm exemplary cultural norms. Examples of moral cleansing behaviors can include reminding

oneself of goodness, doing volunteer work, making donations, and reaffirming our love and affection for others.

Sacred-value protection theory has received support from laboratory experiments. For example, between 1991 and 1994 a series of experiments were conducted with undergraduate college students (Tetlock et al. 2000). In one study, students were asked how willing they were to allow secular-secular or routine trade-offs (e.g., paying someone to clean one's house) versus secular-sacred or taboo trade-offs (e.g., paying someone else to serve one's own jail time). The results showed that the taboo trade-offs triggered more outrage than the routine trade-offs. Also, Republican, Democratic, and Socialist participants expressed more outrage at taboo trade-offs compared to Libertarian participants. The reduced moral outrage expressed by the Libertarians may have been due to a more secular versus sacred view of the trade-offs. Also, compared to the Libertarians, the Republican, Democratic, and Socialist students were much more willing to accept the volunteering (i.e., moral cleansing) opportunity. These results suggest that some choices may violate transcendental values (i.e., paying another to serve one's own prison time), and that such violations can trigger moral outrage and moral cleansing.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, using a sample obtained from the Internet, researchers assessed the validity of sacred-value protection theory (Skitka et al. 2009). Participants were obtained from Knowledge Networks, which recruits people to respond to Internet-based surveys. The demographic profile of Knowledge Network members is similar to the profile of the U.S. census data. Moral outrage was assessed by questions that asked how willing one was to seek vengeance, how willing one was to support the use of nuclear weapons against the attackers, and how strongly one saw the attackers as evil to the core. Moral cleansing was assessed by whether and where the American flag was displayed, whether blood was donated, whether church attendance increased, and whether one increased attempts to be kinder to family and friends. The results showed that anger was strongly associated with moral outrage and modestly associated with moral cleansing. Moral cleansing was more strongly associated with fear. Also, higher moral outrage was

associated with reduced political tolerance, while moral cleansing was associated with higher political tolerance.

Further support for sacred-value protection theory was reported by Skitka et al. (2009). They reported that 37% of Americans responded with high levels of moral outrage and moral cleansing. Moral outrage was exemplified by the following examples. Twenty-five percent of a national sample said that the Bush administration had not gone far enough in restricting civil liberties to fight terrorism. Over half of Americans expressed unfavorable attitudes toward Arab Americans and Muslims in general. According to the Skitka et al. (2009), there were 281 hate crimes against Muslims in 2001, compared to 28 in 2000. Finally, of those who believed that Iraq was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, 58% agreed to go to war with Iraq without U.N. approval. Skitka et al. (2009) also reported that about 75% of those who displayed the flag after 9/11 did so as a reaction to the attacks. The flags were flown to express an affirmation of American values and to increase a sense of American solidarity. Also, blood donations were 2.5 times greater in the first week after the attacks when compared to the same week in 2000. Finally, $1.9 billion were given to charities related to 9/11. This was more money than had been given to any relief effort up to that time.

Both sacred-value protection theory and a second theory, terror management theory, focus on explaining responses to threats. Terror management theory proposes that threat situations consciously or unconsciously activate thoughts of mortality (Greenberg et al. 2008). It is the existential threat of inevitable death that can motivate threat responses. The anxiety of death can be reduced by efforts to increase self-esteem and efforts to bolster one's faith and adherence to one's cultural worldview. Cultural worldviews are composed of beliefs about the nature of reality, norms for appropriate behavior, and aspirational values. In the presence of threat, worldviews can provide meaning, comfort, and structure to life. For example, Gailliot et al. (2008) found that mortality salience (awareness of thoughts of death) increases compliance with social norms when people are made aware of those norms. Other research has shown that terrorist threats increase prejudice against Muslims and immigrants, but only when mortality salience is present (Kastenmuller et al. 2011). Hundreds of empirical studies have explored

hypotheses derived from terror management theory (for a review see Greenberg et al. 2008).

In times of threat, it is predicted that people will intensify core ideological beliefs. According to terror management theory, the deaths due to the 9/11 attacks made mortality salient to individual Americans. In part, many Americans responded by calling for a stronger international military presence and by supporting restrictions on civil liberties, presumably to combat terrorism. This conservative shift is predicted by some terror management theorists (Huddy and Feldman 2011). In their review of the conservative shift hypothesis, Huddy and Feldman report that there is evidence that Americans tend to increase support for conservative politicians in times of perceived threat. Also, a number of terror management studies show support for the association between death anxiety and political conservatism. Finally, evidence of a conservative shift was found in Spain after the 2004 Madrid train bombing. According to Burke et al. (2013), political conservatism may have some psychological advantages in times of national threat. In times of threat, people prefer a simplified and certain understanding of their social and political worlds. Viewing the world in straight-forward, black and white terms, which affirm the existing social order, may be more comforting and less cognitively taxing than seeing the world in shades of gray.

In contrast, other terror management researchers have proposed that mortality salience intensifies any political ideology, whether liberal or conservative. This has been labeled the ideological intensification hypothesis (Huddy and Feldman 2011), or the worldview defense hypothesis (Burke et al. 2013). In contrast to the conservative shift hypothesis, Huddy and Feldman report that data from the General Social Survey show that, in 2002, the percent of Americans who identified as liberal did not change from 2000. Also, there was only a very slight increase from 34 to 35% of conservatives from 2000 to 2002. To assess the validity of the worldview defense and conservative shift hypotheses, Burke et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis on the effects of mortality salience on political attitudes. The results showed a medium effect size for the worldview defense hypothesis, and a small effect size for the conservative

shift hypothesis. This means that, although mortality salience can shift some people to more conservative positions, this is not inevitable. Burke et al. (2013) conjecture that conservative shifts may more likely occur in conservative political eras, such as the Reagan and Bush presidencies. Liberal shifts may more likely occur during progressive eras, such as the Roosevelt and Kennedy presidencies. It appears that the conservative shift can be overridden by research methods that make salient other components of one's worldview such as compassion and tolerance.

The 9/11 attacks were viewed by terror management theorists as a naturalistic versus lab-induced mortality salience manipulation. If a terrorist threat induces thoughts of death and therefore increases affirmation of one's cultural worldview, how might people respond to the perpetrators of threat? Using a sample obtained from the Internet, Luke and Hartwig (2014) hypothesized that mortality salience and reminders of the 9/11 attacks would both increase the acceptance and perceived effectiveness of harsh interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding. The results showed that thoughts of death did increase acceptance of harsh interrogation, but not the perceived effectiveness of harsh interrogation techniques. Reminders of 9/11 had no impact on the acceptability or perceived effectiveness of harsh interrogation. This may be due to mortality salience activating thoughts of an impending and inevitable coming threat, while 9/11 reminders in 2014 presented no current threat. It is interesting to note that, even though the harsh techniques were not viewed as very effective, their use was still acceptable. This suggests that acceptance of harsh techniques may be motivated more by a need for retribution. Between October 2001 and March 2002, the Threat and National Security Survey, a national phone survey, found that 50% of Americans felt very concerned about a future attack. Thirty-seven percent felt somewhat concerned. Eleven percent reported feeling anxious very often, and 36% reported feeling anxious sometimes. In a later survey wave, those who felt anxious reported lower approval ratings for President Bush and less support for the Iraq War. In contrast, those who felt more anger at the terrorists and Saddam Hussein viewed military action as less risky; they supported the Iraq War more strongly and

they believed that war would not hurt the American economy. Huddy and Feldman (2011) propose that these survey results are in line with what inter-group emotion theory would predict. That is, anger is associated with reduced perceptions of risk and increased support for military action, while anxiety leads to overestimation of risk and reduced support for war.

The third theory that pre-dated 9/11 that can explain America's response to it is inter-group emotion theory. It seeks to better understand the emotions that can be directed toward out-groups. Emotional reactions toward out-groups are derived from one's own group identification and membership, and from causal explanations associated with out-group offenders (Mackie et al. 2000). More specifically, anger can result from appraisals that one's in-group has been harmed, that the offenders are completely responsible, and that the in-group can effectively retaliate. For anger to arise, one does not have to be individually threatened or attacked. If members of one's in-group are attacked, and in-group membership is salient and strong, the threat is viewed as a threat to the self. In contrast, fear and anxiety can result if it is believed that the in-group resources are not available for effective retaliation. Mackie et al. (2000) and Huddy and Feldman (2011) report laboratory research that supports these conclusions. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, harm was obviously done, but not to all Americans. Yet President Bush's militaristic response became very popular with many Americans.

Why? Media reports clearly showed that harm was done. Politicians told Americans that the perpetrators were crazy and insane. These dispositional attributions placed responsibility squarely on the perpetrators, as opposed to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Political rhetoric emphasized that the 9/11 attacks were attacks on *all* Americans. This made more salient a threatened and unified American identity. Flags were waved by many American to express in-group solidarity and patriotism. The stronger the in-group identification, the greater the anger and desire for retaliation. Finally, politicians told Americans that the U.S. was a military superpower and therefore had the resources to effectively retaliate against the attackers and their sympathizers.

Inter-group emotion theory also proposes that emotions can be felt at the group level (Smith et al. 2007). Group-level emotions can occur for four reasons. First, people can feel guilt for events that were perpetrated by one's in-group before they were born. An example is the guilt felt by some Americans for the institution of slavery. Second, people can feel anger toward the victimization of other in-group members. Second, the stronger the group identification, the stronger the felt emotion. For example, Smith et al. (2007) report that shortly after the 9/11 attacks, those who more strongly identified as Americans felt either stronger fear or anger at the thought of another terrorist attack. Third, similar emotions can be collectively felt within a group. This convergence of emotions can be seen at sporting events in the cheers of a victory, or the mass anger at a bad call. Fourth, group-level emotions can affect judgments and, therefore, attitudes and behaviors directed toward in-group and out-group members. For example, group anger at outsiders can increase positive attitudes toward the in-group and increase motivation to retaliate against the out-group. In the case of 9/11, political rhetoric and media reports were effective in arousing a common national emotional response in many Americans. According to Smith et al. (2007), strong group-level emotions are likely to be seen as more valid because they are shared and are likely to create a heightened sense of a common fate and group cohesion. These intensified group dynamics may then increase the influence of powerful in-group leaders, as exemplified by the power the U.S. Congress and the media in persuading Americans to support the retaliatory wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Finally, research by inter-group emotion theorists has revealed some interesting findings related to risk assessment and attributions. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2000) propose that different emotions are associated with different risk appraisal tendencies. In one study, they found that the more fearful participants were, the more they avoided uncertainty, while those who were angrier were more likely to embrace risk. Another study found that anger was associated with higher perceived levels of certainty and control. A third study found that those who were angry and faced with ambiguous outcomes for some action were more optimistic for positive outcomes, compared to those who were fearful. In relation to 9/11, inter-group emotion theory

proposes that the heightened sense of power, certainty, and optimism that Americans had for war may have been triggered by collective anger.

If these three theories—all of which predated 2001—can help explain American reactions to the 9/11 terror attacks, what can psychology contribute to the understanding of the motivations of violent extremists?

3.2 Explaining the Motivations of the Perpetrators

In the following sections, I will briefly review the academic literature about the perpetrators of violent extremism. In doing so, I will apply Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model of human development to integrate different levels of analysis. The model is visually represented by concentric circles with the person (terrorist) at the center. This is followed by the groups, or microsystems (terror cells), that social psychologists study. These microsystem groups can interact with each other, creating mesosystems (families, mosques, political and administrative offices, local businesses). Microsystems are also affected by social settings where the person does not have a role, and this type of interaction is represented by the exo-system (governments and officials at the regional, national, and international levels). All of these interacting systems exist within a macrosystem, which is the broader, social-cultural, historical, political, and economic context. Finally, all these interacting components move through time; this is the chronosystem.

Modern terrorism arguably began in 1970 when four airliners were hijacked by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Then, in 1972, an attack on the Israeli Olympic village in Munich, Germany killed eleven Israeli athletes and five terrorists. This was followed by the car bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Merari (2007) reports that 583 suicide attacks occurred between 1981 and 2004, with 435 attacks occurring between 2000 and 2004.

Almost 90% of these attacks occurred in six countries: Sri Lanka, Israel, Russia, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. From a historical viewpoint, suicide attacks are relatively uncommon in Europe and America. Such attacks appear to have four characteristics according to Bandura (2004). They include the public fear resulting from the unpredictability of terrorist attacks, the amount of destruction that can be caused, the uncontrollable nature of the attacks, and the social and personal vulnerability they create.

Let's first examine the person, or the terrorist. Merari (2007) found that the average Lebanese suicide bomber's age range was between 16 and 28. The age range of most Palestinian suicide bombers was between 18 and 23. The age range of the 9/11 al-Qaeda attackers was between 20 and 33. Most suicide attackers are single and male. Merari reports that Palestinian terrorists come from all socioeconomic sectors of society. Also, the educational level of Palestinian suicide bombers was higher than the Palestinian average. Having experience living in a refugee camp and desiring revenge for the killing of a close family member or friend were important factors for Palestinian suicide attackers. However, Merari concludes that, in most cases, militancy precedes desires for personal revenge. Ginges et al. (2011) report that many al-Qaeda members have attended some college and often study engineering and medicine. Case studies show that religious motivation is not always an important predictor of who becomes a terrorist.

Case studies and field research reveal some interesting personality characteristics of terrorists. Contrary to what might be commonly thought, interviews reveal little psychopathology, no common personality type, and little evidence for suicide risk factors such as depression and substance abuse (Merari 2007; Post 2007). Kruglanski et al. (2017) combine motivational and cognitive psychology to understand terrorists. They propose that, when the need to dominate others (i.e., the need to matter and garner respect) is combined with an ideological narrative (i.e., anti-Western, anti-modernization, culture of honor), violent extremism can result.

However, there are sources of interpretive difference. Merari (2010) reported that the results of interviews with would-be imprisoned Palestinian suicide bombers found relatively high levels of avoidant-dependent personality disorder symptoms, symptoms of

depression, and suicidal tendencies. But Gill (2012) believes that the results may have been skewed because the interviewees could have been suffering the effects of just having being arrested by security forces. Instead of dichotomous distinctions between terrorist versus non-terrorist and psychopathology versus non-psychopathology, Gill and Corner (2017) propose that researchers need to think more in terms of two continuums. Also, McCauley (2004) reports that the so-called average person can become a terrorist. The moral disengagement, which is diagnostic of antisocial personality disorder, does not take the form of self-sacrifice, and terrorist groups would not be able to function if psychopathology was prevalent. McCauley proposes that anger—not due to personal frustration or insult, but due to group insults and frustrations—may play a role. More importantly, documents found in the luggage of the 9/11 attackers contained no list of injustices, but rather feelings of connection with God, doing God's work, and fighting evil.

How do political extremists view their cause? The cause must be extremely important to lead to martyrdom. Ginges et al. (2011) propose that war and political violence may be driven by the particular values that people hold, and that the values that drive people to violence can be considered protected or sacred values. Sacred values do not necessarily need to have a basis in religion. Secular values such as freedom, fairness, and collective identity can also be seen as "sacred." Sacred values can be compared to instrumental values, which drive decisions based on cost-benefit analysis. Based on a series of studies, Baron and Spranka (1997) propose that sacred values have six characteristics that set them apart from instrumental values. First, sacred values are absolute, in other words, they are not open for negotiation. Second, sacred values are quantity insensitive, meaning that the amount of damage that is done to protect the value is not important. Third, sacred values are agent relative, that is, protection of the value requires action versus inaction. Fourth, sacred values carry a universal moral obligation to uphold, independent of what other people think. Fifth, sacred values require that anything can be sacrificed to maintain the value. Finally, the violation of the value results in anger and shame. McCauley (2017) proposes that humiliation, which he defines as the combination of anger

and shame, may play a motivational role on terrorism. Humiliation can be experienced at the personal and group level. McCauley suggests that in asymmetric conflicts, such as terrorism, the strong can humiliate the weak, but the weak can also humiliate the strong.

Is there a connection between sacred values and violent extremism? Ginges and Atran (2011) surveyed 656 Jewish settlers on the West Bank who moved there after the 1967 war. They found that willingness to participate in violent actions was predicted by the perceived righteousness of the action. In contrast, willingness to participate in non-violent illegal actions was predicted by the expected effectiveness of such actions. Ginges and Atran (2011) report that lab studies showed that participants were more willing to go to war against a brutal country in a fictitious scenario, regardless of how successful the war would be. This supports the proposal that, when decisions are driven by sacred values, such decisions are quantity insensitive. They also report in a survey study of almost 5000 Israelis and Palestinians from 2004 to 2009 that Israeli settlers would not trade any West Bank land in exchange for peace because they felt that the land was given to them by God. In turn, over half of the Palestinians would not give up their rights with regard to Jerusalem for peace. The full sovereignty of Jerusalem was viewed as a sacred value.

A sampling of the research shows that individual terrorists are often young, male, educated, single, and lack symptoms of psychopathology. Despite these traits, there does not appear to be a single personality profile. Survey and experimental research shows that people who are willing to support or advocate political violence often do so based on sacred values associated with the respective cause.

The next level in the ecological model is the micro-system. This is the realm of social psychology. Here we will explore what the research suggests about the internal group dynamics of terrorist cells. The micro-system level of analysis involves describing how people influence each other in face-to-face interactions. Groups form due to some common interest or cause. Like-minded people come together and camaraderie develops. In the case of terrorist groups, larger national or religious causes are linked to the small group. McCauley (2004) reports that this linkage gives meaning to a person's life. Extreme action becomes justified by

the sense of overwhelming threat and crisis. Belief that reform will occur fades, so the personal and group response shifts from anger to violence. McCauley (2004) proposes that the transition from anger to large scale violence is incremental. The terrorist group wants to trigger fear, uncertainty, and a violent response in the target out-group. A violent response can activate greater support for the terrorist cause and group.

Integration into the terrorist group begins with recruitment and selection. Hunter et al. (2017) propose that principles from industrial and organizational psychology can help to explain this process. Recruitment can be facilitated by the use of the Internet and social media. Selection may involve meeting with the recruit and assessing their capabilities. Indoctrination into the group and the development of commitment to the group by making a public pledge to the group's goals continue the transformation (Merari 2007). These elements were identified by interviews with captured Palestinian terrorist group members whose role was to train new group members for suicide missions. Indoctrination was conducted by group leaders and consisted of emphasizing nationalistic and religious themes. The purpose of the indoctrination was to strengthen motivation of members to complete their missions. Developing commitment was sometimes achieved by training members in groups of two or three. These small subgroups then carry out the mission together. This small group training helped to develop bonds between the trainees that were difficult to break. The public pledge of commitment was achieved by videotaping each trainee's intentions to carry through with the mission. These tapes are often shown to family members as a farewell message. This kind of public pledge is hard to renege on. These group processes of indoctrination, commitment, and the public pledge facilitate mission completion. McCauley (2017) reaffirms that, through these small group processes, belief and behavior can become more connected and more radicalized. Belief can shift from no opinion to a strong moral obligation to do something. Behavior can move from no action to violence.

Personal identification with the group also appears to be an important basis for the development of group loyalty. In other words, group membership and the group cause become important to one's sense of self. In a series of lab experiments, Van Vugt and Hart (2004) found

that the stronger the group identification the greater the group loyalty and the greater the desire to remain in the group, even when attractive ways to leave the group were offered. Strong group identification was found to be based on positive impressions of group membership. High group identifiers were more likely to attribute group failures to outside causes. Indoctrination into the group's worldview and commitment to the group facilitates personal identification with the group.

In addition, the nature of the social relationships that follow from group membership are proposed to provide different kinds of moral motives (Rai and Fiske 2011). For example, groups such as families, teams, military units, and terrorist cells have social interactions characterized by communal sharing. That is, the focus of social interaction is on caring for and supporting the integrity of the group. Group members have a sense of collective responsibility and a common fate. For such groups, Rai and Fiske (2011) propose that the moral motive associated with communal sharing is to maintain the unity of the group. This is achieved by emphasizing common interests, values, and causes. It can also be achieved by uniting against outside threats which need to be eliminated. Great personal and group sacrifice can be triggered to maintain the group's integrity. Violence aimed at the out-group threat is therefore viewed as morally praiseworthy.

To conclude on the microsystem level, psychologists have found that small group dynamics can trigger the processes of personal identification with the group, commitment to the group's worldview and mission, and moral justification for the group's mission. These group processes make the terrorist cell stronger and more committed regardless of the outcome.

The next system is the meso-system, which consists of the interaction between different micro-systems. Some social psychological research explores the meso-system. Families, mosques, and neighborhoods may interact with terrorist cells by providing moral support and new members. Very little research explores how small groups interact with each other to reinforce a culture of martyrdom. However, Merari (2007) reports that families are proud of members who commit themselves to carrying out suicide missions. Videotapes, typically showing a son with rifle in hand and declaring intentions to carry out the mission,

are presented to families as a final farewell. Also, Ginges et al. (2009) propose that participation in religious group activities facilitates what they call coalitional commitment. They found through a national survey that frequent mosque attendance, but not strong religious devotion, predicted support for suicide attack among Palestinians. Thus, the social organizations can act to reinforce and support the terrorist cell. How small groups interact with each other is an especially ripe area of research for social psychologists who study small group inter-dynamics. The challenge for psychology is to extend what is known about internal group dynamics to intergroup processes. This research line could be an important area of growth for group process researchers and theorists.

Further outward from the person is the exo-system. Much psychological research does not explore this system, which is composed of decision makers and social settings in which the terrorist is not a member. However, this system affects the immediate social settings in which the person is a member. For example, two of the preconditions that facilitate terrorism, according to Moghaddam (2004), are perceptions that one's existing social order is illegitimate and unjust, and perceptions that there is a lack of means of bringing about change. This implies that government, legal, corporate, and military leaders are making decisions that have negative impacts on the immediate lives of common people, yet the people have little effective recourse to respond. In a similar vein, Pyszczynski et al. (2003) report that much discontent in the Middle East comes from failing political and economic systems run by royal families and wealthy elites. Such political systems can be viewed as failing to allow a voice for everyday people, and corrupt economic systems may be viewed as not providing equal opportunities to many. In addition, U.S. government support for Israel, and the decision to maintain a strong military presence in many Middle Eastern countries, triggers resentments. Existing areas of psychology such as group decision making, persuasion and influence, and person perception could be extended by exploring the dynamics of decision making by the powerful. This would mean that researchers would have to move out of the lab and use interviews and case study methods to understand such decision making. Survey methods could also be used to explore how populations perceive such decision

making. Again, this is an area of relatively unmet opportunity for psychology.

Another level—the macro-system—is composed of the broader social, cultural, historic, political, and economic conditions produced by the other systems. Other than exploring how these conditions affect individuals, psychologists play little role in studying the general characteristics of these social conditions. This system appears to be more in the realm of sociology and history. However, Estes and Sirgy (2014) reviewed archival documents from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to develop a quality-of-life assessment of 27 Islamic countries. They found a number of social and material conditions that foster "market demand" for the Jihadist cause. These include, among other factors, an increased awareness of inadequate youth employment opportunities, the torture of Jihadists, the Western meddling in Middle Eastern governments, and the decline of influence of Islamic societies. Increased Islamic religiosity and increased perception of Western decadence were also conditions that favor violent extremism. Political, economic, social, and technological indices were found to be associated with terrorism. More specifically, Estes and Sirgy found that declines in social, cultural, political, and economic development were associated with increases in terrorist activity. They also found that terrorist activity increased as a nation's failed state status became more evident. In addition, as the number of years of independence from colonial rule increased, the level of terrorism also increased. Finally, as perceived national corruption increased, so did terrorist activity. How do these and other macro dimensions of culture facilitate or inhibit the emergence of terrorism? Some have attempted to answer such questions (Hofstede 2001), but this could be an area of growth for cultural psychology, especially with the increased availability of world-wide Internet data collection sites.

Finally, all of the systems feel the effects of time, or the chronosystem. One way to assess the effects of time is to determine whether terrorist attacks have increased or decreased across time. It is also important to determine whether the locations of attacks have shifted across time. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) defines terrorism as "the threatened

or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain political, economic, religious, or social goals through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015). The START Global Terrorism Database shows that between 1979 and 2007 the number of attacks globally ranged fairly steadily between 1000 and 3000. Then attacks began to rise from 3682 in 2008 to 9213 in 2012 and 9739 in 2013. Interestingly, before about 1996, most attacks occurred either in Latin America or Africa. After 1996, a geographic shift to the Middle East and a few Asian countries began. Compared to other countries, the U.S. experiences very few terrorist attacks. The upward trend in attacks could imply that ineffectual governmental responses to violent extremism could be associated with increases in terrorism.

In conclusion, Bronfenbrenner's ecological model of human development can be a useful tool to understand the development of modern terrorism. The value of the model lies in the different levels of influence reflected in the various interacting systems. Psychology has historically been most suited to explore the person, the microsystem, and possibly the mesosystem. However, most psychological research uses college students in lab settings. Some psychologists have used interviews and case studies of Jihadists to explore their motivations. Field research may be most suited to understanding meso-, exo-, and macro-systems. If psychologists are willing to step outside the lab, existing work in decision making, social influence, intergroup dynamics, and culture could be extended to better understand the rise of terrorism. Interdisciplinary work with sociologists, economists, political scientists, and historians may provide advances in linking the macro-system and the person.

3.3 The Role of Psychology in National Security

Psychology has a long history of involvement with national security organizations. For example, psychologists have been involved in mental aptitude testing, personnel selection, solving problems in

perception and decision making, understanding and facilitating team leadership, developing morale and cohesion, inoculating against the strains of imprisonment and interrogation, and increasing interrogation effectiveness. According to Brandon (2011), the national security psychological infrastructure is composed of three communities: One community embedded in the military is composed of operational or clinical psychologists who are involved in intelligence gathering, training, and daily operations. Staal and Stephenson (2013) view operational psychologists as consultants to defense and intelligence decision makers. Topics of consultation can include interrogation and detention, counterintelligence, risk management, and policy development. The second group includes research psychologists embedded in military and intelligence organizations. The third community has industrial and academic psychologists, external of military operations, who conduct research for national security agencies but are isolated from those agencies. Psychologists initially became part of the national security establishment during WWI and had become more involved by mid-century. Old forms of cooperation between the state and the academy were confronted with new questions relating to 9/11 and the conduct of the "war on terror."

The era of total war transformed psychology. When WWI broke out, psychology was involved in the selection, examination, recruitment, and training of military personnel. By 1918 over 1,700,000 men had taken mental aptitude tests (Brandon 2011). By 1919 the army had created a Division of Psychology within the Medical Department. With the onset of WWII in 1939, an office which eventually became the Army Research Institute was involved in the construction, standardization, and validation of personnel assessment tests. In addition, early human factors psychology, which explores the interface between humans and technology use, had its origins during this time period. One of the early projects involved training recruits to use microphones and telephones under extremely noisy conditions. During WWII, psychologists were also involved in research to improve military morale. Psychologists also helped develop effective propaganda and with the psychological analysis of Adolf Hitler. During the Korean War, psychologists explored why prisoners of war were willing to divulge

information. They found that physical assaults were not as effective as non-coercive interrogation methods. An early review of the ineffectiveness of "enhanced interrogation" was published by Biderman and Zimmer (1961).

The Cold War was equally as transformative. From the 1950s to the 1970s psychologists were involved in testing the effectiveness of psychoactive drugs as mind control agents (Brandon 2011). The project went by the code name MKULTRA. Psychoactive drugs were administered to witting and unwitting human participants. In a similar vein, Donald Hebb (1904–1995), who is considered to be the father of modern cognitive psychology, was federally funded to study the effects of sensory deprivation as a form of mind control. He found that after 48 hours of deprivation in a small cubical, some of his subjects began to hallucinate (Cotton 2013). In the years following, about 200 articles were published describing the effects of sensory deprivation. Another program created by Jessen and Mitchell sought to inoculate soldiers against the stresses of imprisonment. This was called the SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape) project. SERE trainers "captured" the trainees and placed them in a mock prisoner of war camp. The trainees were then stripped of all personal belongings, put in solitary confinement, deprived of sleep, exposed to loud noises, and even waterboarded. The training slowly increased their stress levels in a gradual and controlled manner. This was meant to prepare the soldiers for real imprisonment. Between 1992 and 2001 over 26,000 cadets went through the training. Cotton (2013) maintains that the training itself was torture. After 9/11, Mitchell recommended that SERE instructors and methods be used against prisoners at Guantanamo (GTMO). Eventually the GTMO command set up the Behavioral Science Consultation Team to assist in interrogations. This team was trained by Louie Banks, a former SERE psychologist. Banks was to later serve on an American Psychological Association (APA) ethics task force in 2005.

Given psychology's involvement in national security, how did the APA respond to the 9/11 attacks? In general, the APA rallied to identify how psychologists could help mend the country, assist national security agencies in ongoing efforts, and help to prevent future attacks. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the APA Board of Directors created

a subcommittee to identify the role that psychologists could play in addressing the impact and threat of terrorism (Hoffman et al. 2015). It was determined that increased counseling services would be necessary for first responders, bystanders, and relatives of the victims. Also, the APA's Science Directorate created a list of psychological consultants knowledgeable on issues of terrorism. Before and during this time, the APA maintained good relations with the Department of Defense (DoD). The APA had operational psychologists at the CIA and FBI, however, the APA itself had no significant contacts with the CIA before 9/11. But it was a former president of the APA, Martin Seligman, who developed the theory of learned helplessness that inspired the SERE project of Mitchell and Jessen. By December 2001, the APA drafted a "Resolution on Terrorism" which called for psychologists to advocate for the increased use of its expertise to respond to the threat and impact of terrorism, to develop a greater understanding of terrorism's roots, and to develop strategies to identify, defeat, and prevent further terrorist activities.

In 2002 the APA's Ethics Code Task force published a revision of Standard 1.02. Previously, Standard 1.02 read that when there was a conflict between the APA's ethics code and the law, and when the conflict was unresolvable, the code permitted the psychologist to follow the law. The 2002 revision expanded the language to include adherence to regulations and the directions of governing legal authorities. In addition, changes were made to Standard 8.05, which allowed the dispensing of informed consent where it was permitted by the law or institutional or federal regulations. The critics of these changes charged that they were the result of the APA's collusion with the DoD. At this time the DoD wanted ethical support for its program. The distinction between "torture" and "enhanced interrogation" was made possible by the government's narrow definition of torture. The *Hoffman Report* (Hoffman et al. 2015) found no evidence of collusion between the psychological and defense communities, but it did say that the loosening of the code had the unintended consequence of supporting enhanced interrogation at GTMO, Abu Ghraib, and CIA black sites around the world. Rather, the report found that the changes were more likely motivated by a desire of psychologists to shield themselves from liability in areas unrelated to the war or terrorism.

As a result of articles published in the media regarding the role of psychologists in enhanced interrogation at GTMO and Iraq in 2004, the APA began to organize a task force focused on ethics and national security. In 2005 the APA Presidential Task Force on Ethics and National Security (PENS) was created. In 2006 the task force published 12 ethical guidelines that were adopted as official APA policy. According to Hoffman and colleagues (Hoffman et al. 2015), the PENS report stated that psychologists could act as consultants in national security interrogations consistent with the APA ethics code. However, psychologists could not be involved in torture and must ensure that the interrogation techniques were safe, legal, ethical, and effective. Psychologists were to act as "safety officers." The PENS report did not provide a definition of torture. Also, in quoting the APA principle of beneficence and non-maleficence, the phrase "do no harm" was excluded. The word "harm" was left out, apparently because the PENS task force could not decide on a definition. Finally, defenders of the PENS report said that psychological support was intended to involve rapport building techniques and not support physically aggressive techniques. But the PENS report does not mention this. Given the Bush administration's narrow definition of torture, the position that detainees at Guantanamo Bay were enemy combatants not covered under the Geneva Conventions, and widespread media reports of abusive interrogation techniques, it should have been obvious to the authors of the *Hoffman Report* and to the PENS members that operational psychologists would be asked to assist in techniques beyond rapport-building.

The PENS report was not without its critics. Abeles (2010) reports a number of criticisms. Some charged that the PENS report allowed psychologists to use information to exploit the prisoner's weaknesses, while ethically psychologists are bound to protect individuals from harm. Some claimed that the PENS report was the result of the close relationship between the APA and the DoD. An additional charge was that Mitchell and Jessen were responsible for training military interrogators in such techniques as waterboarding. Others argued that some psychologists knew about torture, but did not report it. Finally, in 2008 an APA petition ballot was passed by the membership declaring that torture took place at GTMO. The petition charged that psychologists

played a role in the torture and that psychologists should not violate international law or the U.S. constitution, unless they are working to protect the persons being detained. Critics of the referendum said that it would restrict the practice of operational psychologists, that it was not enforceable, that it was too broad, and that the APA had already passed resolutions condemning torture.

In response, the APA Board of Directors in 2014 requested an independent review of the allegations. The law firm of Sidley Austin LLP issued its report (Hoffman et al. 2015) in the summer of 2015. The main findings related to the PENS Task Force. The investigation found that key APA officials colluded with important DoD personnel to loosen ethical guidelines so that the DoD was not constrained in its enhanced interrogations. This collaboration was kept confidential within the PENS Task Force and is described as "improper or dishonest" in the report (p. 65). The report concludes that the APA's main motive was to gain favor with the DoD. More specifically, the APA wanted to develop good public relations and keep the growth of psychology unconstrained for military operational psychologists. In addition, APA officials engaged in a pattern of clandestine collaboration with the DoD to defeat efforts to introduce and pass resolutions to prohibit psychologists from participating in GTMO enhanced interrogations. The *Hoffman Report* found no evidence that APA officials knew about the existence of GTMO enhanced interrogation techniques. But evidence was found that APA officials intentionally took measures to avoid gaining information to confirm the existence of harsh interrogations. Also, the investigation found that between 2001 and 2004 the APA participated in interactions with the CIA on the topic of interrogations. These interactions were motivated by a desire to gain favor with the CIA. In regard to the revision of Standard 1.02 in 2002, which states that when the ethical code conflicts with laws or regulations, the psychologist may follow the regulation without ethical conflict. Sidley LLP found that such substantial changes were made before 9/11. During the revision process, the "Nuremberg defense" was raised but there failed to be any follow up. Shortly after the *Hoffman Report* was made public, Dr. Norman Anderson (C.E.O. of the APA), Michael Honaker (Deputy C.E.O. of the APA), Rhea Farberman (APA

Executive Director for Public and Member Communications), and Stephen Behnke (APA Ethics Director) resigned. Soon after the above resignations were announced, the APA Council of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution stating that psychologists

> shall not conduct, supervise, be in the presence of, or otherwise assist in any national security interrogations for any military or intelligence entities, including private contractors working on their behalf, nor advise on conditions of confinement insofar as these might facilitate such an interrogation. (*Monitor on Psychology* 2015, 8)

The APA's new stance is now in alignment with the U.N.'s Convention Against Torture position against the cruel and inhuman treatment of detainees.

Although psychologists have played a role in enhanced interrogation, little is known about its effectiveness. A brief review of the literature finds recent articles that call for developing rapport with the detainee as a way of educing information. Abbe and Brandon (2012) report that very little research has been done on the role of rapport in investigative interviewing. The goal of rapport building is to acquire participation, and seek disclosure and admission of information from the detainee. Rapport building can be interest-based, that is, the detainee realizes that there is something to be gained by providing information; it can be relationship-based, where the detainee senses an affiliation and sense of identity with the interrogator; and it can be identity-based, where the interrogator attempts to show a commonality in self-concept, beliefs, and values with the detainee. Abbe and Brandon (2012) call for research to explore the efficacy of rapport-building in interrogation.

One of the few empirical studies on the effectiveness of rapport-based interrogation was conducted by Alison et al. (2013). This field study examined 418 filmed police interviews of suspects who were eventually convicted of a number of terrorist offenses. The researchers were interested in determining the effects of rapport-based interviewing techniques. The interviews were coded for five aspects of the rapport-oriented interrogation approach. Those five aspects include the degree of positive regard for the suspect, the extent to which the

interviewer understood the suspect's perspective, the degree to which the interviewer was able to adapt to responses by the suspect, the ability of the interviewer to draw out the views of the suspect, and interviewer support for the right of the suspect to reveal information. Results showed that the rapport-based interrogation was associated with the suspect adapting to the interview situation, which resulted in an increase in informational yield compared to non-rapport-based interrogation. Alison and Alison (2017) say that interrogators need to stop what they call "revenge interrogation" and move to more humane, ethical, science-based, and effective techniques.

Psychology can contribute to national security concerns, not only by conducting research on effective interrogation techniques, but also by suggesting measures to counter terrorism, build resilient communities, and foster peace. According to Sarma (2017) one way to counter terrorism is to better identify who may pose a risk for violent extremism. One of the challenges of risk assessment is being able to predict a low occurrence event that can take many forms. Sarma proposes that professional judgments should combine the use of a checklist of risk indicators and professional experience. One way to develop more resilient communities is to build meaningful connections within and between communities (Ellis and Abdi 2017). More specifically, relationships between community members, government officials, and researchers need to improve. Ellis and Abdi also propose that disaster preparation should be bottom-up and not top-down. Finally, Davis (2004) proposes four strategies that psychology can use to more effectively combat terrorism. First, there is a need to train more psychologists in understanding and working with people from diverse cultures. Second, there is an increased need for global information sharing. Davis reports that the most comprehensive terrorism database, compiled by the German Ministry of the Interior, is available only in German. Third, international psychological organizations need to be better utilized by stakeholders. Finally, psychology has an opportunity to educate the public on terrorism. Davis says that the public needs to have an accurate and reliable source of information about terrorism. He proposes that legitimate terrorist grievances need to be taken seriously and responded to with constructive government policies.

Coming from a peace psychology perspective, Wagner and Long (2004) propose that psychology can contribute to global security by suggesting three types of constructive responses. These responses are peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. Peacekeeping involves placing neutral troops between two warring groups. Peacemaking is viewed as a more promising approach. Peacemaking involves righting real injustices and providing food and security for all groups involved. Peace building involves building goodwill and trust across both groups. This response attempts to build an understanding and appreciation of the protagonist. Given the current international situation, Wagner and Long propose that these approaches should be pursued.

3.4 Conclusion

The 9/11 attacks shook America. Psychology, like the rest of the nation, asked what happened. Existing theories used to explain America's response were predominantly generated by lab research. Theories such as terror management, value protection theory, and inter-group emotion theory seemed to carry explanatory power. No significant modifications were made. The same laboratory approach worked less well in understanding the motives of the terrorists. Interviews, case studies, and surveys conducted in the Middle East and elsewhere were valuable. In American psychology, theory construction is predominantly a laboratory exercise. But models used to explain violent extremism need to be generated and tested in the field. Psychologists need to step outside the lab to better understand terrorism. Finally, psychology has a long history assisting national security efforts. The apparent participation of psychologists in what the U.N. labels torture may have reflected the sentiments of some Americans. However, the "do no harm" ethic was seemingly overridden, either by a desire to educe information or seek vengeance. Much research is required to identify effective and humane interrogation strategies. In the future, such research may help to remove the stain that psychology incurred at GTMO and elsewhere in the post-9/11 War on Terror.

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4

Religious Studies and September 11, 2001: Religion and Power in the Ruins

Tam K. Parker

Though scholars of Religious Studies are trained to elucidate religious phenomena, most of us watched in stunned silence as the Twin Towers fell on September 11, 2001. It seemingly occurred out of the blue, an act that many likened to the shock of the Trojan horse or the dropping of the atomic bombs. But once beyond the initial affect, Religious Studies scholars employed their training to grapple with the religious nature of the event. The events of 9/11 provoked new theoretical frameworks and also spurred an acceleration of trends already at work in the field.

In particular, comprehending 9/11 demanded an analysis of the intersections between religion, politics, and global socio-economic systems. Starting in the early 1990s, seismic shifts in the field were articulated along methodological fault lines as scholars divided over their positions on the discipline's historic and, to some, current involvement in the global histories of colonialism, imperialism, globalized capitalism

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and, more recently, neoliberalism. As for so many other fields, the religiously-driven suicide bombings and mass murders, what one scholar has called "human bombings" (Strenski 2010, 142–186), ignited a disciplinary crucible on the social location, commitments, and methodological approaches of the Religious Studies scholar. Within a few years after 9/11, sub-fields such as Islamic Studies and Violence Studies were developed, and a messy public battle broke out regarding role of the Religious Studies scholar in a world of conflict (McCutcheon 2003, 2006; Orsi 2004).

4.1 Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Genealogies

When twenty-first century Religious Studies contends with the events of 9/11, it does so while still attempting to purge itself of its nineteenth century hangover. 9/11 acted as an accelerant for pre-existing trends in the field and generated self-reflective analyses of the linkages between the historical study of Islam and the global processes of capitalism and colonialism. Like many modern disciplines, Religious Studies has its origins primarily in the Christianized European academy of the nineteenth century. The questions asked and methods employed to answer them, therefore, came from the religious thinkers and theologians of the early modern period interested in the intellectual-religious endeavor of discerning "natural religion." These seekers of natural religion posited an essence of religion that was universal, transhistorical, and accessible to all through God-given human capacities. Natural religion spoke through historical religions, but it ultimately transcended them. In particular, natural religionists, on the eve of the Enlightenment, were enamored with the capacity of "reason" to discern truths that had previously been known only through revealed religion. Ivan Strenski (2006, 18–29) argues convincingly that, in this "quest," a "proto-academic" approach was formulated. This approach shaped the trajectories that emerged more clearly in the Religious Studies scholars of the nineteenth century.

There were multiple historical conditions that gave rise to the search for natural religion. The first was the multi-generational sectarian religious war of Post-Reformation Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries between Protestants and Catholics. These wars drove the likes of Jean Bodin and Herbert of Chertbury to find religious truths through a "reason" to which all could "naturally" consent, so as to avoid the bloody combat that followed from the irreconcilable revealed truths of particular traditions. According to Strenski (2006, 9–32), the second factor that drove the interest in natural religion was the early expansion of imperial Europe into parts of the globe that held strikingly different cultures. In this sense, the nascent religio-intellectual "quest for natural religion" was born on the heels of colonialism and spawned attempts to theorize and categorize the world's newly-discovered human diversity and ways of being. Such ideas became more fully articulated by Deism in the Enlightenment proper, and this futile exercise was guided by a taxonomic imperative to classify different religious cultures along developmental models, synchronic and diachronic. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw developmental models at every intellectual turn, from Darwin's theory of evolution to the insidious Social Darwinism and the Eugenics movements, and from Marx's and Engel's economic analysis of capitalism to Rostow's modernization theory.

What in the twentieth century would eventually be called Religious Studies originated in the European and Anglo-American colonial paradigm. Some employed comparative analysis to categorize and rank an expanding world of human difference. Taking off from the philological discovery of a long-extinct Indo-European root language that proved a familial tie between European and Indian languages, scholars such as Max Mueller (1823–1900) continued the search for "natural religion." He argued for a proto-religion of solar-worship that "fell" into the linguistic babel of diverse religious cultures, only to "rise" again in the rational rhapsodies of the bucolic in German Idealism. This historical model directly echoes the Christian doctrine of "the Fall," a reading of Genesis based on the human fall from grace into sin, only to be redeemed in death through the resurrection of Jesus as Christ. In Scotland, after a sojourn through the Middle East dressed as a bedouin, William Robertson Smith (1846–1894) expounded a theory about the

development of Christianity out of the older, and hence more "primitive," Israelite religion. Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917), examining the historical gamut of religions with evolutionary taxonomic zeal, argued that the most "primitive," or first religion, was animism. This belief system endows objects and animals with agency and spirit, and it was most visible to Europeans as they began to conquer the interior of the African continent. Tylor's argument was that the historical process allows religions to slowly make their way out of allegedly erroneous magical-thinking and into the so-called modern period with its acceptance of scientific explanations of phenomena.[1]

Despite the fact that Mueller and Robertson Smith were religiously motivated scholars of religion, and that Tylor made a case for the "primitiveness" of religious ways of knowing, all of these nineteenth century thinkers shared a profound faith in variant versions of the same story. Their work is framed by an assumption that human "progress" reaches its pinnacle in the contemporary cultures of Europe and Anglo-America. Like so many other nineteenth century thinkers across the new universities, their comparative and taxonomic work conformed to the paradigm of developmentalism that mapped colonial worlds in ways that reserved a privileged place for their own racial and religious groups, especially those that were predominantly white, Protestant, and male. There is a shared affective tone of triumphalism in nineteenth century studies of religion whose vestiges remained when scholars began to confront 9/11 in 2001.

The field today is also the product of the progressivist paradigm that took two turns in the twentieth century. The first turn was abandonment of nineteenth century historiographical models of dialectic and inevitable advancement. Both world wars and their concomitant moral horrors shook those models to the core. The second turn, and this bears directly on Religious Studies scholarship on 9/11, was a nuanced transformation of nineteenth century triumphalist developmentalism into the discourse of universality. Claims, or unstated presumptions,

[1] I am indebted to the in-depth analysis of these early writers' theories and autobiographies in Strenski (2006).

about the universality of religious forms, were deployed as a means to bring sameness to a world of religious difference and to meet the challenges that came with the scientific study of religion.

The methodology of phenomenology, utilized by secular scholars and confessional theologians, still mostly white and Protestant, began to emerge in the late nineteenth century and, in large measure, held sway for most of the twentieth century. Phenomenology was an approach to the comparative study of religions that began with an empathetic privileging of the perspective of the individual religious practitioner, usually called "the believer." The early goal of phenomenological work was to catalog religious phenomena from around the world through description rather than explanation. In large measure, early phenomenologists reacted to the growth of "scientific" methods for studying religion, such as those of Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim that read religious experiences and beliefs as being psychologically and sociologically generated and sustained. Phenomenologists protested this view, and what they posed in the place of an external framing of religions was the study of religion *sui generis* (of its own kind). In other words, they framed religion as a unique realm of human experience that could not be fully, or even honestly, explained from outside of the enchanted circle of the believer.

As this methodology was embraced by increasing numbers of confessional theologians and scholars of comparative religion, Religious Studies took a "hermeneutic," or "interpretive" turn. The task of these scholars was to interpret the meaning of texts, religious pronouncements, activities, and events as understood by the believer. This framing consistently defined religion as a matter of personal belief and interior experience. It privileged the spoken and written word as the essential site of religiosity and it suggested, in a return to the quest for "natural religion," that the comparative study of religions found correlations that pointed to a universal and essential core of religion as a whole.

The most predominant practitioner of this version of *sui generis* phenomenology was Romanian-born Mircea Eliade (1907–1986). Before and during his career at the University of Chicago, Eliade embarked upon a prodigious cataloging campaign of global religions across human geography and history (space and time). He argued that

the study of religious practices (rituals) and religious beliefs (myths) showed that the human soul was, around the world, animated by what he called “an ontological thirst for being” (Eliade 1987). *Homo religiosus* is the universal believer with profound affective craving for contact with “the Sacred.” This metaphysical Sacred revealed itself to the metaphysical *homo religiosus* in each individual throughout the ages by means of “hierophanies,” or manifestations of “the Sacred” in the concrete world. Comparing diverse religious practices and beliefs through this lens, Eliade saw into the shared and transcendent essence of all religions.

The Eliadan, onto-theological models of religion, were forged in the twentieth century in reaction to the march of secularization and modernity. The child of nineteenth century developmentalist thinking, what became known as Secularization theory was regnant until the late twentieth century. In general, Secularization theory posited that the inexorable forces of modernity—including science, technology, capitalism, and the nation-state—had reshaped the “western” world and, though imperial expansion, transformed the globe. In the process, modernity was “disenchanting” the traditional world and fast replacing the traditional authority of religion, both on the social and individual levels. The assumption of Secularization theory was that religious ways of being and doing were inevitably shrinking into the private sphere and losing their explanatory, motivational, and socio-political power. In Europe, the appeal of Christianity started its long-term decline, and after the Scopes Trail in 1925, American Christian fundamentalists temporarily retreated from the public and political sphere. Many Protestant theologians, influenced by early twentieth century existentialism, were deeply disturbed by this trend, so much so that one could define Eliade’s religio-academic mission with one word: re-enchantment. By the 1960s, Secularization theorists were announcing the end of religion (Cox 1965).

In the late 1970s a renewed and politically active trend in American Christian fundamentalism began to take hold. Beginning with the Moral Majority, white Evangelicals found their political sea legs and, in a 40-year groundswell, they radically altered American political discourse and practice. In 2016, 81% of white evangelicals helped

put Donald Trump in the White House. This religio-political trend is not confined to American Christianity, however. Across the globe, right-wing, orthodox religious movements are making their presence felt in the social, cultural, and political realms. In the Middle East and North Africa, Islamist movements have been at the center of political and cultural contestations for power. Examples include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda globally. These are just a few of the many Islamic movements that consider it a religious duty to make their socio-political surroundings more "authentically" Muslim. In short, Secularization theory, though reflective of some trends in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, distorted the reality of resurgent religiosity across the world.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, methodological shifts in the field were beginning to chip away at this surreptitiously theologized theory of religion. One of the early and influential thinkers was the anthropologist of religion Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), whose work focused on the cultural construction of meaning in particular religions. In his influential *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), Geertz set aside the Eliadan mission and vast ontological claims. He instead put forth a theory of religion as a "system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in people." To Geertz, each religious culture has its own symbol system which functions as a model of and for reality; it provides both worldview and ethos (Geertz 1973, 90 and 93). The task of the scholar of religion is largely the hermeneutical endeavor to discern and interpret the meaning of this symbolic system for the religious culture under examination. In other words, they must discern how religion helps individuals make sense of their lived reality.

In 1993 the cultural anthropologist Talal Asad (1932–) wrote a book that set the stage for how Religious Studies would react to the events of 9/11. In *Genealogies of Religion*, Asad analyzes the Geertzian linguistic or interpretive turn, as well as related *sui generis* theories of religion. His critique was devastating to the old paradigms. According to Asad, Religious Studies in the 1990s *still* had not unshackled itself from its colonial past and continued to engage in evangelizing self-promotion

about Protestantism as the height of religious thinking and the universal essence of all religions. It now appeared that the projects of Eliade and other twentieth century scholars had, in fact, been crypto-theology in the guise of objective religious study. In Eliade's "onto-theology," the metaphysical entity/power entitled "the Sacred" stands in for a personalized deity. According to Asad, Geertz's theory of religion, though abandoning the metaphysical assertions of Eliade, was still unknowingly mired in a Western colonial framing. Despite its anthropological focus, Geertz defined religion as something essentially discursive and abstract, as if the symbolic systems had meanings not founded by, or grounded in, socio-political conditions. For Asad, analysis of the relationship between the tangible and intangible workings of power had disappeared in both the linguistic and *sui generis* models of Religious Studies. By defining religion as having a universal essence known through inner belief, the political, social, and economic conditions and practices of power that authorize a symbolic system are completely obscured. Arguing along the lines of Foucault, Asad suggested that material practices, social institutions, and socially expected behaviors can "render an idea a truth" (Asad 1993, 50).

The power of religious symbols is directly related to the societies in which they circulate. But the claim about an "essence" of religion is rooted in Protestantism and based on the conviction that an individual feels religion inwardly; that the vehicles for communing with the "Sacred" are primarily linguistic, affective, and cognitive; that the meaning of religious symbols floats independent of the material and social worlds; that religion is essentially private, not public; that it transcends other human realms; and that "belief" is the central act that renders one authentically religious. The multitude of religious forms found around the world does not measure up to this essence. Asad argued that the deployment of this essentialist, crypto-Protestant definition of religion led thinkers to serve the colonial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For that reason, Religious Studies was in need of a radical restructuring to account for the many religion-related factors of 9/11.

But Asad's voice was, prior to the twenty-first century, in the minority, and the reigning *sui generis* onto-theological heritage of Religious Studies did the field no favors when scholars had to make sense of 9/11. That event was motivated by religious ideas *and* practices

developed within global socio-economic and political power dynamics as the European empires and, then, the Cold War superpowers, competed for influence in Muslim-majority countries. If religion is always something universal, abstract, and beyond the material world, residing only in realms of discursive meaning or in the heart of the believer, then Religious Studies cannot explain 9/11. Asad's critique—published eight years before 9/11 and contemporaneous with the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993—offered scholars new perspectives and set the stage for critical analyses based on the imbrication of ideology and material practices in religious forms after 2001.

4.2 Struggling to Explain Sacralized Violence Pre-9/11

Prior to 9/11, several models were available for analyzing the relationship between violence and religion. The question was long considered by scholars of apocalyptic and eschatological traditions, and quite often by textual scholars whose object of study remained the scripture. Neither group put forth a comprehensive analysis of religion and violence per se. Analyses of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature, which came forth under the pressure of Greek and Roman oppression, remained mostly in the realm texts and in the historical contexts from which they originated. After the mass murder/suicide in Jonestown, Guyana in 1978, the field found itself struggling to theorize what had occurred there, but sufficient analyses were not offered by the simple and standard explanation that Jonestown was a "cult" and hence inherently violent (Strenski 1993).

The 1980s and 1990s saw more expansive field theories articulated and deployed to understand religion-violence connections. The descriptions of cults and sects switched to discussions of New Religious Movements (NRMs), which did not necessarily imply millenarian or apocalyptic orientations. Study of potentially violent NRMs broadened to examine the internal logics and religious narratives of movements in conjunction with their socio-political and economic contexts.

By the time of the siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco Texas in 1994, scholars in this subfield jumped into the public conversation. They unsuccessfully warned authorities that the vociferousness and hostility of their tactics conformed to the group's apocalyptic narrative.

Theorizing moved beyond NRMs produced multiple arguments that began to chip away at the pedestrian assessment of religion as essentially "good." There is an ongoing current within the field that focuses on the work of French Anthropologist Rene Girard. Girard's exceedingly broad theory suggests that mimetic rivalry is the basis of human violence, and that the act of sacrifice is the first religious and social act. The act of communal sacrifice of a scapegoated victim is the primordial act of religion and the founding act of society because it brings the free-for-all mimetic violence to an end by heaping hostility onto the scapegoat. Other, perhaps overly ambitious, field theories prior to 9/11 included the work of Regina Schwartz. She argues in *The Curse of Cain* that the exclusivity of monotheism engenders the affects of jealousy and envy, and is hence a source of violence itself. A related argument is that of Hector Avalos. He asserts in *Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence* that religion generates a notion of scarcity of resources such as holiness, identity, and salvation. The work of Mark Juergensmeyer, whose influential work, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, was published in 2001 prior to the 9/11 attacks, offers a more complex analysis of the historical and socio-economic dynamics that allow for religion to legitimate violence for some. Scholars thus argue that these factors compel actors, mostly young men whose sense of pride has been wounded by said social conditions, to tap into "the nature of religious imagination, which has always had the propensity to absolutize and to project images of cosmic war" (Juergensmeyer 2001, 248).

The events of 9/11 pushed the field's analysis of the social context of religious violence toward the direction in which Juergensmeyer pointed. The single-causal explanations—the nature of religion, of cults, of Islam—did not prove sufficient. Central to comprehending the motivations of the al-Qaeda attackers are questions that also force the

discipline into ever more interdisciplinary modalities. Those questions relate to: European and American domination of Muslim nations, the late entry of Muslim-majority nations into secularized modernity, the birth of anti-modernist religious ideologies including Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, the hopes and failures of Pan-Arabism and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the flooding of the Middle-Eastern "market" with foreign-made weaponry, the growth of martyrdom as a form of spiritual discipline, growing European and American Islamophobia, and hostile representations of the "other" in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The list goes on, but these examples highlight the intricate imbrication of social forces that comprehending the religiosity of the 9/11 demanded of Religious Studies.

The old binarism of religious versus secular was completely outmoded and unable to handle 9/11. Like violence in other faith traditions, the 9/11 hijackers and their al-Qaeda handlers saw their political act as religious in nature; they were enacting divine imperatives in the concrete world, the structures and dynamics of which were/are considered ungodly and in need of change. Though these movements all share a strident critique of what they see as the failures and sins of secular culture, they also avail themselves of the "modern" world flows of cash, information technology, weaponry, and political power. Unlike the Amish or Jewish Ultra-Orthodox communities, they do not live in insular isolation against the "secular" world. The hijackers did not understand their holy task as separate from American cultural hegemony after the Second World War, the more recent U.S. military adventures in Muslim lands, or the failures of non-religious Muslim nation-states to provide for their citizens. To understand the self-understanding of the 9/11 hijackers, then, requires a definition of religion capacious enough to discern the ideological, material, and affective constitutive conditions of their religious act.

What follows are several trajectories within Religious Studies that relate directly to the challenges 9/11 presented to the field. Though this list is not meant to be exhaustive, it highlights some of the most pressing problems in terms of scholarly demographics, lingering Islamophobia, the contestation of fundamental categories, and ongoing questions about the relationship between religion and violence.

4.3 Opening the Academy to Islam

The most immediate shift in Religious Studies was in the ability, or in many cases, the inability, to articulate what the acts of 9/11 had to do with Islam. There were multiple issues at hand, including a dearth in scholars of Islam in Religious Studies departments. This absence was keenly felt on September 12th when scholars found themselves, in the classroom and in public forums, having to clarify how Islam factored into the attacks and concomitantly, how the attacks were not representative of the 1.5 billion practicing Muslims around the world.

The most pressing issue was the relatively small number of scholars of Islam in the American academy compared to those of Christianity and Judaism. In the fall of 2001, that provenance was still visible in the number of positions in Islam filled and available in higher education.[2] For small liberal arts colleges, it was typical to have several positions that covered multiple areas of Christianity and Judaism, and perhaps one person to cover all Asian religions. And then came 9/11. As Islamic Studies scholar Jane McAuliffe has said about the shift: "That was a watershed moment for the university, the American public, and the field of Islamic Studies. Suddenly, anyone with expertise in Islam and the Muslim world was in high demand" (McAuliffe 2012, 219–228).

The events of September 11 encouraged many Religious Studies programs in the United States to advocate for new lines in Islam or, upon the retirement of a Christian-focused scholar, to replace them with a specialist in Islamic Studies. While the number of academic positions in Religious Studies has stagnated since the 2008 recession and the growth of extremely popular interdisciplinary majors such as Environmental Studies, positions in Islam have remained highly competitive. Scrambling to catch up to demand, Islamic Studies graduate training is flourishing in stand-alone programs and within Religious Studies departments. The last two decades have seen an appreciable increase in

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[2]This was also the case for other religious traditions such as African Animisms, syncretic Caribbean religions, Indigenous American religions, and to a lesser extent, Asian religions. By 2001, the field began to diversity its objects of study and to show a dramatic shift in diversity of people doing the studying.

newly-minted doctorates in the study of Islam, both contemporary and ancient, despite external financial pressures on the academy.

An ongoing and much more intractable challenge is the uptick in Islamophobia in American society, the media, and among students in Religious Studies classrooms. Scholars struggle to present critical thought about Islam in an atmosphere that is often hostile and, at times, staggeringly uncritical.

Glaring public examples of this challenge came in the October 2014 interviews with New Testament and Early Christianity scholar Reza Aslan that were aired on various television stations. One of the interviews was part of HBO's *The Bill Maher Show.* This discussion panel, which included New Atheist writer Sam Harris, devolved into a veritable verbal brawl. Both Harris and the host, Maher, are ideologically devoted to a disdain of all things religious; they reserve most of their vitriol for Islam and portray it as "essentially" violent. In the CNN interview with Don Lemon and Alisyn Camerota, Aslan was forced to repeatedly dispel stereotypes and outright "bigotry" being put forth by his interviewers. One of the central characteristics of any humanistic or social science discipline is to complexify the understanding of the topic or situation at hand. In these explosive interviews, Aslan attempted to offer a nuanced portrayal of the vast world of contemporary Islam, only to be presented with grossly generalized, simplistic, and essentialist definitions and characterizations of Islam as inherently violent, misogynistic, and imperialistic (Parker 2011; Byers 2014).

In both the media and in the classroom, Religious Studies scholars have had to contend with waves of negative affect when discussing Islam in the post-9/11 American context. As Sarah Ahmed (2004) suggests, the cultural circulation of a hostile affective economy has a "stickiness" that attaches to the objects of disgust, hatred, or fear; in this case, the "objects" were Muslim subjectivities. Though the immediate aftermath of 9/11 had its own emotionality, the degree of Islamophobia in the U.S. has not subsided. In fact, the Pew Research Center tracked a 2016 spike in hate crimes against American Muslims that shot well past the previous 2001 highpoint. The most obvious correlation is the campaign and presidency of Donald Trump that encouraged hate toward many groups, including immigrants and Jews (Kishi 2017).

The current rise of authoritarian and xenophobic politics in the United States could be read as a latent response to 9/11, and part of a virulent reaction to an African-American president with the middle name "Hussein." For a certain American demographic, the forty-fourth president marked a moral profanation that "stuck" to his administration regardless of policy. Arguably, the Trumpist turn is a rightwing populist revolt against the very notion of a pluralist and cosmopolitan democratic society. It has unleashed targeted hatred without the official restraint that held sway in the crisis moment that came immediately after 9/11. Islamophobia, like other forms of bigotry, flourishes when oxygenated by public expression.

Teaching about Islam as a religious tradition under these conditions can be a minefield of affective outbursts of obdurate fear and hatred. Though many college students are eager to learn more about different faith traditions beyond what they see in the news, classroom conversations must navigate these affective currents of scapegoating all Muslims and equating "Islam" with terrorism.[3] Still, many students are influenced by post-9/11 Islamophobic discourses that they encounter in the media and in the work of writers such as Christopher Hitchens and Samuel Huntington (1996) who framed the "war on terror" as a civilizational battle between "Islam" and the "West" in a reductively binary fashion that ignores the ways in which Islam helped created that very "West."

4.4 Opening "Experience" to 9/11

The reigning category in the *sui generis* school of religion is the notion of personal experience. Correlated with Protestant piety, it is also the first "native" category for American students when they begin to think

[3]Many scholars have dropped the use of the term "terrorism" altogether because its deployment in the discursive and affective economies of American political power which often paints all non-state violence as illegitimate "terrorism," and in which "terror" is automatically linked with "Islam."

about definitions of religion. As Tim Murphy (2006) noted, it is such a completely familiar and untroubled category for students that they often struggle to see religiosity in religious traditions that do not emphasize personal experience. Being "set apart" from the social sacralizes the "native category" of the personal and the political, as is the case for the metaphysical category *homo religiosus*. Personal experience has a naturalized authority for many and, for them, serves as the gold standard of truth. Nothing impedes the absolute validity and sanctity of the private psyche as the site of unfolding religion. For these reasons, instructors find that defamiliarizing personal experience for students is an uphill battle (Murphy 2006, 198).

The issue is compounded by the cultural ubiquity of neoliberalism and its categories of individual willpower and the concomitant Social Darwinism. Read without a critical lens, evolutionary theory is reduced to the slogan "survival of the fittest," usually with no awareness of the environmentally relative and fluid nature of the category of "fitness." It is often asserted that, with the right "can-do" attitude, nothing social or structural can impede the desires of the strong individual. And like any ideology, neoliberalism justifies and naturalizes its material conditions, in this case, that of globalized capitalism and its colonial flows of power and wealth. Within this paradigm, the notion of "personal experience" is even further sacralized as an unquestioned and uncritical category, as the agential linchpin of neoliberalism.

Studying 9/11 as a religious event often challenges students because they are reluctant to apply their sacralized category of personal religious experience to the acts of the hijackers. If what makes a religious perspective legitimate and authentic is how strongly it is held, which is the default assumption of most American students, then the 9/11 attacks make many feel uncomfortable. Pedagogically, deploying 9/11 as an example of religious activity can be a means to disrupt and defamiliarize the category of personal religious experience as the sole measure of religiosity. By their own standards, the attackers were strong believers and hence devout. Teaching 9/11 as a religious journey of sacrifice on behalf of Allah forces students to imagine a religious personal experience radically different and shockingly similar in

disconcerting ways. This pedagogical move also helps students analyze the communal construction of selfhood and identity, bodily sacrifice, cognitive and affective motivations, and the interconnections of history, structural oppression, and colonialism. In short, examining the personal religious experiences of the hijackers allows for a lateral opening of students' own notions of personal experience to external and structural factors.

Another fruitfully disruptive rethinking of "experience" is Robert Sharf's notion that the *qualia* of personal experience is completely non-ostensible to the outside observer. Sharf uses the analogy of people in the 1990s who were convinced that they had been abducted by aliens. They were deeply moved, sometimes traumatized, and fully sincere in relaying, what was to them, a real experience. Just like descriptions of spiritual or religious experience, the observer can vouch for the believers' sincerity and affective commitment to the internal event, along with its meaning in their life and the life of their community. But the scholar has no access to those experiences. Sharf, speaking directly to the heritage of twentieth century *sui generis* versions of religion, argues that Religious Studies should stick with ostensible data only. What people say about their experiences is data, but the experience itself is not available as data.

Yet in the post-9/11 world of Religious Studies, other trajectories suggest an opening and complexifying of the category "experience" beyond its *sui generis* model. Instead of deeming experience a no-go zone, there is a current florescence of reconsideration of experience as a category for critical examination. Much of this work is happening at the crossroads of neuroscience and affect theory, and it examines the category as biologically and culturally embodied (Taves 2009; Schaefer 2015). As will be seen below, some of the most insightful twenty-first century examinations of 9/11 utilize reconstructed categories of religious experience as part of their analyses. Suffice it to say, teaching 9/11 as a religious act requires an admixture of, on the one hand, phenomenological bracketing of student affective reactions to an experience not their own and, on the other hand, an examination of the material conditions that give rise to other religious experiences.

4.5 Immediate Conflicts in the Field

Two years after 9/11, Russell McCutcheon's (2003) book *The Discipline of Religion: Structure, Meaning and Rhetoric* set off a firestorm in the field by arguing that the very category "religion" was the product of Euro-American academics and that it has always served the interest of colonial and capitalist powers. Applying a genealogical analysis, a la Foucault, to the history of the modern discipline of Religious Studies, McCutcheon argues that the interests of power drive the study of religion. As one observer suggested, "McCutcheon thus understands the concept of "religion" as pertaining to a strategic, discursive space which is constructed to confirm a certain social formation and structure of identity" (Albinus 2006, 524–528). McCutcheon's method of analysis, known as "rhetorical-social," is related to that of Talal Asad's discourse analysis in that it examines relations of power and domination embodied in religious language and acts. It also reconceptualizes the real world "work" that religion does in terms of structuring modes of existence and knowledge production. McCutcheon goes so far in his Nietzschean suspicion of the motivations of the field as to imply that it cannot begin to comprehend 9/11 through its own categories because they are too close to the workings of discursive power.

Though self-critical awareness, however painful, behooves any scholar in any field, McCutcheon's suggestion that the category of religion itself be dispensed with altogether has not gained much traction. Even though the term "religion" was coined in seventeenth century Europe and has no cognates in ancient languages such as Sanskrit and Hebrew, it does refer to distinctive and divergent spheres of human life. In many ways, McCutcheon's suggestion about relegating "religion" to the dust heap of imperial history marked an inversion of the *sui generis* model and disappeared all religious phenomena into other realms of human activity. The entanglement of religion with other spheres of life is a central focus of critical interdisciplinary scholarship, and 9/11 made evident the density of religious, political, and economic assemblages that scholars must consider. The answers offered

are often messy and complex. But that is desirable because, as fields across the liberal arts demonstrate, simplistic and tidy claims darken counsel.

A more recent and fertile critical analysis of the entanglement of Religious Studies with the workings of colonialism and global capitalism is found in the work of David Chidester (2014). A South African scholar, his work traces the interconnections between European imperial endeavors in Africa and the explosion of the study of comparative religion in the nineteenth century. Following the lead of Asad, Chidester argues that scholars of comparative religion used as their source material the accounts of colonists, missionaries, indigenous informants (often converts), and military allies whose task it was to "pacify" and displace those already upon the land. In doing so, their work helped empower the colonial discourse and paradigm by which indigenous peoples were classified and subjugated. The categories of "primitive," "savage," "civilizing," and "civilization"—the intellectual infrastructure of nineteenth century comparative religion—provided the rhetorical rails upon which the colonizers rode.

The rhetorical-social methodology has been a boon to the post-9/11 field of Religious Studies in the extensive scholarly activity on empires ancient and modern. Again, the backstory to 9/11 is awash in the reverberations of empire. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda inner circle founded their base for training and operations in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. The Taliban themselves are the successors of the Mujahideen, Islamic fighters funded and armed by the U.S. in the proxy war to drive out the Russians in the 1980s. Long known as the "graveyard of empires," Afghanistan thwarted the British Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, the Soviet Union in the late twentieth, and currently ensnares the United States in its longest war. The long and destructive arc of empire is a principal lens in contemporary Religious Studies, and that lens is applied everywhere, from the study sacred texts that were forged under the pressure or privilege of empire, to analyses of the religio-political movements that engage in contestation with the material and ideological assertions of empires. As the field has opened up to the examination of smaller, local, and syncretic

religious traditions, the rhetorical-social methodology of tracing out the currents of power exerted in the rhetorical tropes of religious discourses and practices continues to be fruitful.

A second public argument erupted in 2006. It involved McCutcheon and Robert Orsi, a scholar of American religion who was then the president of the American Academy of Religion. This debate played out in the pages of the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* and sparked a field-wide reconsideration of how religious scholars represent religious subjects in their scholarship. Although quite rancorous, this debate revealed the challenges that Religious Studies scholars encountered when attempting to make sense of 9/11.

The first disagreement was over the nature of the discipline. Orsi objected to McCutcheon's rhetorical-social methodology because, Orsi claimed, it led to problematic representations of the subjects under analysis. Orsi found McCutcheon's discussion of the "data" to be "dehumanizing" and "chilling." It appeared to Orsi that those being theorized about had no "voice to speak back to the italicizing theorizer" (Orsi 2004, 88). Much like the earlier battles over this or that scholar's religious or anti-religious agenda, McCutcheon responded as a "scientific" scholar thwarting an attack by a moralizing humanist who chided scientific approaches to the subject. McCutcheon charged that Orsi erroneously presupposed that, in sharing "a common human nature and thus dignity, both scholar and religious participants are involved in a consensual conversation" (McCutcheon 2006, 722). He disputed the notion that Religious Studies scholarship should be driven by the telos of dialogue, advocacy, or political solidarity. Such scholarship, he continued, loses its potential for objectivity and raises the possibility that the researcher would only be in dialogue with the religious participants with whom they agree.

The second major source of the post-9/11 disagreement between McCutcheon and Orsi came over the issue of personal identification, or lack thereof, with subjects of study, and the question of how one classifies those subjects. This dispute is a contemporary reworking of the abusive taxonomic assessment of religions that has haunted the field from its founding. Religious Studies scholars have long been

aware of the power inherent to certain classificatory schema, but even today, when most scholars have allergically jettisoned any developmental or progressive frameworks, the representation and explanation of others' religious lives is fraught with ethical anxiety. As McCutcheon asks, "Do our methods differ, all depending on who it is we are studying" (2006, 732)? He aimed the question at what he sees as residue from the twentieth century phenomenological emphasis on empathy with the practitioner as the scholar's "prime directive." Whereas Orsi suggests that empathy opens the possibilities for analysis, McCutcheon argues that such empathy is doled out on a preferential basis and produces skewed analysis when a religious Other appears "threatening" to the researcher.

This cuts to the heart of the problem that researchers and teachers face when analyzing the many religious dimensions of 9/11. The Orsi-McCutcheon debate pushed scholars to be increasingly self-aware of their own positionality and affective relation with their religious subjects. This way, scholars could avoid either "debunking or advocacy" (Strenski 2006, 337–345).

There is therefore a kernel of truth to both scholars' claims. On the one hand, McCutcheon is correct to note that, when scholars analyze the words and behaviors of religious subjects, they out of necessity "ventriloquize." Religious Studies scholarship is not simply a repetition of a subject's own words, but an attempt to contextualize and explain those words from a position of distance, regardless of one's own religious or non-religious orientation (McCutcheon 2006, 740). On the other hand, Orsi is correct to note that some degree of empathy is necessary to understand what religious actors are doing and saying. One cannot "agree" with or "hate" the 9/11 hijackers if the goal is to analyze and explain their actions as religious acts. There are very few people in the field who today make the case for the possibility of complete objectivity. But in order to attain any degree of comprehension of the religious actors on the morning of September 11, the scholar of religion must make sense of the belief systems and social structures that contributed to such an egregious act of mass murder.

4.6 Re-Theorizing "Religion"

As is the case with any substantial academic row, the benefit is in the intellectual dust that gets stirred up. Trying to understand and explain 9/11 as a religious act engendered a deeper dialogue regarding the "nature" of religion. Whereas the twentieth century was heavily influenced by Christian confessional theological concerns and focused on linguistic forms of religiosity such as doctrine, texts, and assertions of faith, the opening of the twenty-first century saw an upsurge in new paradigms that purported to explain religion. These trends were present before 9/11, but the event begged for more analysis because the old and relatively flat model of religion as belief in God(s) and assent to sacred truths ignored what Durkheim referred to as the "dynamogenic social forces" at work in religious acts of such intensity and magnitude. The rhetorical-social methodology discussed above was crucial for analyzing 9/11 and other religio-political phenomena because of its focus on discourse and socio-cultural context. Another major trajectory for re-theorizing religion as a category of analysis after 9/11 appeared in the form of neo-materialist and affect theories.

The materialist dimension of religion has always been a subtheme in Religious Studies and usually came in the form of discussion of rituals and rites. But a result of the Protestant domination of the field was the ignoring of the material aspects of religion, or a dismissal of them as evidence of more "primitive" forms of religion. The twentieth century saw movement toward a reconsideration of materiality. But the last three decades of the twentieth century saw the rise of postmodernism and deconstructionism to the theoretical cutting edge. For that reason, 9/11 coincided with the faltering of theorizing that suggested religion, like all things human, is simply about discourse. At the turn of the millennium, scholars were beginning to theorize on how bodies and their desires and affects, physical performance of identity, physical environments, images, objects, and material culture were part and parcel of religion.

The gestation of the field within a Christian framework and alongside long-standing Neo-Platonic tropes in philosophy remained visible

in the continual denigration of matter and the valorization of "spirit" that one sees in the scholarship of this period. Attention to the bodily aspects of religions produced models that gave long-needed insight, not only into how people physically live out their religiosity, but also how materiality can function as a source and authority for religious phenomena. It was as if the field suddenly discovered the long unseen obvious: clay has its own agency. Two scholars that offered a post-9/11 corrective to prevailing trends by theorizing religion materially were Brigit Meyer (2014) and Thomas Tweed (2006).

Meyer's work focuses on moving past what she calls the "Protestant bias" and "Eurocentric configuration" in which "seemingly universalistic claims camouflage typically Western sensibilities" (Meyer 2014, 209). The Western model privileges belief and creates a "mentalistic bias" (Meyer 2014, 208) that sees faith as untethered and unpolluted by the material world and, as a result, interprets the nature of a religious experience based on the immediacy of the encounter with sacred presence. Her theorizing is not a simple reversal of emphasis, nor a refusal to consider experience, but rather an "integrated" approach that seeks to elucidate the ways that materiality, the felt sensorium, mediates the relations between the self and the rest of the world. Religion is, therefore, "the very tangible ways through which humans 'fabricate'—by mobilizing texts, sounds, pictures, and objects and by engaging in practices of speaking, singing, being possessed and so on—a sense of presence of something 'beyond.' Foregrounding fabrication prompts very concrete empirical questions about the specific practices, materials, and forms employed in generating a sense of something divine, ghostly, sublime or transcendent" (Meyer 2014, 214).

In her larger work, Meyer outlines how the feelings of religious experience reported by religious practitioners are materially mediated and generated. Meyer's focus on material fabrication and the power of the fetish in generating sacrality avoids two pitfalls. It avoids the onto-theological assertion of "the Sacred," as well as the ongoing jeremiad from Sigmund Freud to Timothy Fitzgerald that religion is ultimately an illusion or category error. It is worth noting that this contextual approach avoids the inherent religious or anti-religious bias in analyzing religious phenomena. Such a methodology helps makes sense of 9/11 without collapsing into either extreme.

Tweed's influential book, *Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion*, derived from his ethnographic study of the Cuban American community in south Florida and their religious festival for the Our Lady of Charity Madonna. Their religious enactments are inextricably bound up in their socio-political displacement from their Cuban homeland, and the affective flows of grief, relief, and longing that attend any forced diaspora. Tweed argues that all religious doings and conceptualizations are materially and culturally situated, even appeals to transcendent religious truth are clothed and enabled by the situational location. He understands religion as situational and provisional, and he defines religions as "confluences of organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries" (Tweed 2006, 54). Emphasized here are movement and performativity. Tweed's "religion" is a mental/affective/bodily activity that establishes, and at times transgresses, established boundaries in the ongoing process of making and sanctifying individual and communal belonging. Applied to the events of 9/11, Tweed's theory of religion opens the analytic possibilities for understanding the motivations of the 19 hijackers. These possibilities move far beyond frameworks of Islam and terrorism, and they eschew characterizations of such actors as anti-modern fanatics whose sole motivation was to put murderous beliefs into practice. 9/11 demanded that Religious Studies think beyond the belief/practice dyad that had long ruled, and the materialist and affect theory interventions charted ways forward.

4.7 Still Struggling to Explain Sacralized Violence Post-9/11

One of the most glaring challenges for scholars of Religion on the morning of September 11, 2001 was how to explain how religiosity and violence could walk hand-in-hand. Despite the long and bloody history of religious violence, many people around the world refute the notion that religion and violence belong in the same category. Thinking along the lines of the sociology of religion of Emile Durkheim, communities endow certain objects, persons, or ideas with sacrality.

From this perspective, nothing about those objects, persons, or ideas is inherently sacred. Rather, the affective charge of a communal event, the feeling of intense belongingness, or what Durkheim calls "collective effervescence," is externalized onto an object that then functions as a symbol of the shared feeling. The investiture of sacredness renders that object separate from ordinary or profane considerations. It strikes the community for which the object is sacred as utterly abominable that it be mixed with the profane. This explains the recoil many religious practitioners feel when confronted with the reality that religion is connected with violence. Examples of religiously motivated or related violence from their own tradition often cause practitioners to respond with the rhetoric of "authenticity," which emphasizes how the "purity" of their tradition is transgressed by the person(s) committing the atrocity. In other words, a Christian or Muslim that commits an act of violence in the name of religion are not, in fact, "real" believers. Here again, the essentialism that plagued the field of Religious Studies until the twenty-first century raises its head in colloquial understandings of what religion is, and what it is not.

The field was moving past this sacred-essence, purity-obsessed definition of religion prior to 9/11, but the task became all the more urgent afterward. Seeking explanatory models for 9/11 pushed the portion of the field studying religious violence to complexify their analyses along the line of those suggested by Talal Asad in 1993. This debate remains raucous and in no way settled, but the events of 2001 pushed the critiques of Asad and others toward more embodied, dynamic, non-binary, intersectional, non-universal, and provisional definitions of religion. The theologically tinged and fully-charged onto-theological definitions that appealed to metaphysics, stasis, absolutes, and transhistorical universal essences looked all the more curiously like a reflection of deities worshipped in the West. These mid-twentieth century models struggled to shed light on 9/11 and the global currents of human life that contributed to such a horrific act on the morning of September 11.

Bruce Lincoln (2003) and Ivan Strenski are prominent thinkers who not only fixed their sights on 9/11 and other religio-political acts of violence, but also explained them outside of the tropes of twentieth century phenomenology and *sui generis* religion. Both writers illuminate

the flows of power and resistance to power, and they place such acts within a framework that takes seriously the religiosity of the acts. In analyzing the religious context within which the actors understand their actions as acts of sacred sacrifice, Lincoln and Strenski unpack the religious dynamics of such attacks and apply their conclusions to articulate expanded theories of religion in general.

Lincoln's *Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11* came out in 2003 and was one of the first substantial accounts of 9/11 in the field. The book is based on a discourse analysis of speeches given by bin Laden, George W. Bush, and Pat Robertson, along with the spiritual instruction given to the hijackers as they carried out the attacks. Most striking is his theorization about the religiously inflected assertions of power found in the rhetoric of members of al-Qaeda and the American government. In all cases, Lincoln finds a reversion to dualistic tropes of good versus evil, and a justification of violence to protect their respective sacred communities and core values. Lincoln lays bare the religious scripts and narratives arrayed against perceived evil, and he outlines the ways in which such scripts are enacted as weaponized power.

In a theoretical move, Lincoln references Asad's critique of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, as discussed above. Lincoln argues that, despite Geertz's culture-specific anthropological approach, the emphasis is still placed on the discursive and symbolic meaning of religion (Lincoln 2003, 1–2). Lincoln follows Asad's lead in connecting symbolic systems with structures of global power, and Lincoln mirrors the work of Bourdieu and his notion of *habitus* as physical and discursive ways of being that at once structure human existence and are, in turn, structured by human action.

Writing after 9/11, Lincoln reads religion as cultural, but with a twist that takes seriously the dynamics of real world power deployed in religious symbolic systems. In the first chapter he offers a definition of religion in four "domains" that includes "discourse, practice, community, and institution" to demonstrate how "single" traditions are often multivocal in process and contention. In particular, he examines the documents left behind by Mohammed Atta, including a theological outline of how and why the hijackings, and more to the point, the self-sacrifices,

fit within the context of Wahhabist Islam; such an act was "a deed that God loves and will accept" (Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* 2003, 11).

Lincoln's theory of religion addresses two issues in Religious Studies. The first issue relates to the belated but welcome move away from the Enlightenment-era *sui generis* definition that understands religion first and foremost in individual terms. Second, Lincoln speaks to the complexity and fluidity of religious phenomena that other disciplines have identified as central components to the workings of authority and power in other realms of human existence. His definition opens the door to comprehending 9/11 as a religious event. As he wrote, "Religious discourse can recode virtually any content as sacred, ranging from the high-minded and progressive to the murderous, oppressive, and banal, for it is not any orientation that distinguishes religion, but rather its metadiscursive capacity to frame the way any content will be received and regarded" (Lincoln 2003, 6). This capacity, "above language," is an affective charge that attaches to objects within the material and discursive horizon and works toward "recoding" reality. Lincoln's connecting of the power-investing "meta-discursive capacity" is a boon to new and old trajectories in Religious Studies when examining the dynamics of sacralized violence. He implies that the source of religion's connection to violence is not tradition-specific and does not reflect the "essence" of religion as a whole. Rather, Lincoln points to the linguistic-affective dynamic of religious phenomena that is enmeshed in the material, along with socio-political configurations and flows of power. This materially-based narrativizing acts as a cipher, charging reality with the affective currents of sacredness and profanity. Gone is Geertz's free-floating symbol system; the script of the religious actor is always entangled in the materially human world and its spheres of power.

Related to Lincoln's analysis is the neo-Durkheimian "cultural-sociological" methodology practiced by Gordon Lynch in his analysis of the generation and power of "sacred forms" in a society of any scale. He argues the sacred is a "cultural structure rather than grounded in the ontology of the human person or cosmos" (Lynch 2012, 114). As Durkheim suggested, the power invested in the sacred form can engender violence when aspects of society, or in the case of 9/11, other societies, are coded in totality as antithetical to the sacred form, or in religious language, evil. As Lynch writes,

"If we are appalled by the human capacity for collective evil, it is the sacred – whether in 'religious' or 'secular' guise – of which we should be more wary than religion per se. Under the power of the sacred, the normal codes and conventions of mundane life can be suspended" (Lynch 2012, 115). Paralleling Lincoln's discourse analysis of religiously coded rhetoric, Lynch's discussion of the sacred form elucidates how deployment of such rhetoric affectively construes the "other" as violators of the sacred form and, hence, worthy of destruction.

Lincoln and Lynch stand with others in Religious Studies and other disciplines in pushing back against the language of "terrorism" and "fundamentalism." In doing so, they are not arguing on behalf of mass murder or violent forms of religion. Rather, they are attempting to maintain critical distance from highly coded and charged euphemisms deployed by certain actors on both sides of the conflict that are set within scripts that aggregate, essentialize, and dehumanize others. Likewise, Religious Studies scholars do not refer to the targets of Islamic violence, as do the perpetrators, as "infidels." Lincoln instead uses the terms "minimalist" and "maximalist" and applies them across the global religious board in the place of misleading alternatives such as "fundamentalist," which is historically specific to North American Christian movements (Lincoln 2003, 5). In this reading, minimalist religious practitioners, individual and communal alike, make few demands of their societies to conform to their religious vision. Religious maximalists, by contrast, demand that society conform. Nearly always coded as restorative of an early and "authentic" version of their tradition, maximalist demands are hegemonic, even when they can only deliver via the destruction of a symbol, or a sanctified sacrifice on behalf of the sacred form.

In agreement with Lincoln, Strenski argues that "religion" is still a viable and necessary category to discuss 9/11. Like others, he parses the configurations of power in acts of religio-political violence to suggest that the 9/11 actors envisioned themselves as more than jihadists, which is the only Islamic category used by American commentators to describe the attackers. Strenski argues that they also saw themselves in the religious terms of sacrifice and martyrdom. Using the term "human bombers," he outlines how martyrdom in Islam is more than an assertion

of coercive power against an empire. Strenski also places their actions within the frame of *auctoritas*, a public demonstration of the sacrifice of the body that endows them with even greater religio-moral authority. In this sense, the human bombers perform a religious rite that makes viscerally visible the power of Allah. It is also an act of sacralization of the body and the site of the bombing. (Strenski 2010, 176–177). The construction of something or someone as sacred is a collective endeavor. Human bombing is a "sacrifice [that] projects *auctoritas* because it "authorizes conceptions of an ideal community, energizes a society to flourish, it inspires it to resist extermination, it weaves the networks of obligation that make societies cohere" (Strenski 2010, 176).

All three of these thinkers—Lincoln, Lynch, and Strenski—attempt to theorize religious violence, or sacralized violence, but with limits. In other words, there are globally ubiquitous patterns and sets of communal dynamics that are shared amongst widely divergent cultures. For example Girard's discussion of the scapegoat mechanism appears to be a human phenomenon, rather than one relegated to any particular religion, as does the communal authorizing of sacred forms. But post-9/11 theorists are wary of grand field theories into which one can sweep any and all examples of sacralized violence. One of the benefits of the theoretical tracking of sacralized violence is that it makes space for identification and preventative measures as religio-political movements are starting to "percolate" (Appleby 1999). Much like the work over the last few decades on genocide prevention, spotting the patterns before blood is spilled makes for more effective intervention or mitigation efforts (Power 2002).

4.8 Conclusion

If September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was an ominous augury of what might await an increasingly interconnected planet with new transnational players and emerging national powers. Historically, Religious Studies was underequipped to contend with 9/11 in light of earlier analyses that downplayed how religion factored into the broader processes of violence, globalization, and

colonialism. The events of 9/11 provoked new theoretical frameworks and spurred an acceleration of trends already at work in the field. In seeking to explain 9/11, Religious Studies finds itself facing a situation akin to what the earliest progenitors of the field faced, namely widespread violence between religiously-driven political powers and politically-driven religious powers. But unlike those proto-academic theorists of religion, contemporary Religious Studies scholars are not seeking a universal religion that would transcend religions and eliminate conflict. Instead, the discipline seeks to understand religion as we find it, on the ground, even in the ruins and mass graves of 9/11.

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Media Studies: Why 9/11 and Digital Media Pose New Problems and Opportunities for the Study of News

Mark Finney

In the years since 2001, Media Studies has undergone considerable changes, some of which are related to 9/11. The field, which provides training for students and an arena of scholarship for the study of media, bridges these two important and sometimes contradictory goals. As scholars of media and instructors of future media professionals, many of us are mindful of our two missions.

Media Studies scholarship about news today remains, in many ways, influenced by the terror event of 9/11, which caught news and entertainment media off guard. The collective inability of media to anticipate 9/11 animated one of the starkest and most meaningful trends in the post-9/11 scholarly environment. Scholars began to ask: How was a news media, so focused on conflict, unable to anticipate 9/11 or other such acts of violence against the United States?

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This question has dramatically influenced practitioners of news media, too, yet the focus here is on how it offered a meaningful avenue of research to scholars. I will respond to the question by exploring five distinct—yet related—lines: First, how does news present domestic issues differently from international issues? Second, how has reporting changed since 2001? Third, what are some of the content differences across news delivery platforms? Fourth, in what ways are political influences exerted over news presentations and the coverage of particular issues? And, finally, how are diverse national, social, political, racial, and religious groups represented in news media?

Each of these points will be addressed in this essay, but two items must first be discussed. The first relates to terminology: Readers should note that I define the term "issue" to mean events happening in the world that merit news coverage. This choice reflects the need to separate the actual goings-on of world events from the news coverage of said events. To refer to both events and the coverage of events as "news" is to conflate them in such a way that undermines the now accepted finding that news is not, in fact, reflective of events. Instead, what decades of Media Studies research has demonstrated is that news represents a particular view of world events, one that is typically wealthier, whiter, more American, more polarized, and more violent than reality. News represents particular sets of issues in the world; those that emphasize conflict, along with the effects and costs to Americans. Distinguishing between the events that happen in the world (issues) from the coverage of those events (news) creates a step of critical distance that brings into view the mediation and representational choices that take place in the production and consumption of news content.

The second requisite item relates to the question of correlation or causation. While there is compelling evidence to suggest that the field of Media Studies has changed in the years since 2001, what has been less convincingly explained to date is the extent to which those changes are the result of 9/11. In the final section of this essay, I will discuss this question in more detail. The important point is that, methodologically, the field has shifted in the post-9/11 environment in that methods have become more refined and digital technology is now used to greater effect than before. Media Studies are still concerned with meaningfully

describing media artifacts, using quantitative and qualitative content analysis, and the study of news consumers as aggregate and disparate communities meaningfully engaging with and being influenced by news content. Media Studies also continues to study the process of news production across platforms. In the best of cases, empirical studies are meaningfully related to existing social science theories in a way that is interdisciplinary and helps make sense of the world, while also facilitating scholarly self-reflection. The inclusion of diverse and meaningful concepts in the study of media is not new, but I will argue later that Media Studies has begun to reflect upon and employ different scholarly fields in the post-9/11 environment.

In exploring the five questions, a disciplinary shift emerges that is related to 9/11. At the very least, the institutional environments in which we find ourselves working has changed. However, I temper such absolutist claims by arguing that, while 9/11 was not a catalytic event that generated changes to Media Studies, the post-9/11 environment is different, and many of those differences are related to the events of that day.

5.1 Domestic and International News

There is clear evidence of the differences in both style and content between news coverage of international and domestic issues. These differences are well documented by such media watchdog institutions as the Pew Research Center, which in 2006 reported on the changing agenda of network television news coverage in favor of stories about terrorism and foreign policy. While the Farsnworth chapter found that the American population emphasized the importance of domestic over foreign policy issues during this period, the media chose to highlight war and terrorism over domestic issues such as politics, drugs, technology, and crime (Journalism, n.d.). The same report also demonstrates differences in the international topics covered. Between 2001 and 2006, Pew notes, coverage of international issues spiked and focused on terrorism, U.S. foreign policy, wars and armed conflicts, and foreign dateline stories, while coverage of domestic issues was down. The Pew data also

shows that the coverage of international news was dominated by hard news stories, often placed side by side with soft news and day-in-the-life stories that contextualize the domestic experience (Journalism, n.d.). As this vignette illustrates, the post-9/11 coverage of international issues tends to focus on crisis, conflict, and violence—not because people demanded that coverage, but because journalists and news organizations deemed these topics newsworthy and sought them out.

The differing content and style between domestic and international news coverage represents a key finding for critical Media Studies scholarship, as it provides insight into how and why Americans continue to embrace and sustain the notion of "American exceptionalism" in the post-911 world. Domestic news coverage, with its wider net of newsworthy stories, provides American audiences with greater context and understanding of those features that make the United States a complex society and polity. This in turn leads to a sense of heterogeneity among the population. For example, news coverage about a police shooting in an American city will typically be represented alongside a story about local politicians, citizens, or police speaking about or debating laws to alter the dynamic of police/citizen relations. This kind of contextualization is much less likely to appear in the coverage of a similar attack in Syria, for instance. Instead, audiences are notified of the attack and the death toll; audiences are expected to understand the context of the story (Spencer 2005). Here, we see that, instead of complexity, audiences are informed of stark homogeneity. Foreign leaders are taken to represent entire populations, and the acts of some are subtly, though not necessarily deliberately, used to represent larger populations.

Rebecca Roberts, Senior Lecturer in the Communication and Journalism department at the University of Wyoming, explains that the enduring coverage of international events creates a sense of "pervading fear" in audiences. News coverage of international and domestic issues serve the social purpose of pulling Americans together, in part by constantly drawing lines between "us" and "them" to reify a sense of fear of those deemed outside a narrowly perceived community. She noted, for instance, that for several years the Arabic news agency Al Jazeera has been "painted as a terrorist organization. That they represent al Qaeda" (Personal interview, April 11, 2015). In contrast to this assertion, the

government-owned Al Jazeera is based in Qatar and its mission is "to be recognized as the world's leading and most trusted media network, reaching people no matter who or where they are" (Aljazeera, n.d.).

Roberts' assertion reflects the findings of research into "fear appeals." A relatively new area of Media Studies, this research attempts to parse the coverage of world events to understand the role of media in creating or reaffirming emotional responses that "motivate and drive behavior" (Passyn and Sujan 2006, 584). As Passyn and Sujan explain, "Fear is the response to threat and uncertainty (Smith and Lazarus 1993). The key appraisal associated with this negative emotion is other-accountability, or situational accountability. Fear provokes thoughts and actions to escape the crisis and not problem-oriented actions to address it. Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) has also shown that fear appeals generate denial (Keller and Block 1996). Fear is the emotion of flight" (584).

Brian Ott, Professor of Communication at Texas Tech, locates findings like these within the scholarly context of "societies of control," in which media are part of a series of institutions tasked with controlling and regulating citizens and society (Personal Interview, April 11, 2015). Likewise, Gilles Deleuze (1990) argues that Michel Foucault's conception of a society maintained by discipline has been replaced by an "organization of vast spaces of enclosure." Deleuze writes, "The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws: first, the family; then the school ("you are no longer in your family"); then the barracks ("you are no longer at school"); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment" (3). News, from this perspective, helps define institutional boundaries and, referring back to Roberts' assertion about pervading fear, asserts the rules, laws, or limits above which one might transcend.

Ott's work focuses on the aesthetic experience of museums since 9/11. Arguing that museums proscribe the body in space, Ott explains that many museums are now focused on reviving nationalism and aimed at achieving a persuasive goal through the aesthetic experience (Personal Interview, April 11, 2015). In his keynote address to the 2015 Rocky Mountain Communication Association, Ott described

the Counterterrorism Education Learning Lab (CELL) as one such museum where the visitor is both physically and aesthetically compelled to experience the exhibits in a way that promotes nationalism, patriotism, and fear of terrorism (Keynote). He explains that museums serve as spaces for the naturalization for these ideas. The context of the museum, as well as the seeming naturalness of the concepts therein, obscure what might otherwise be understood as tools of propaganda (Personal Interview, April 11, 2015).

5.2 Questioning Reporting Practices

Another long-standing track in Media Studies which has been prominent since 9/11 is newsroom sociology. This subfield examines the study of news production and the ways in which news products are constructed. Newsroom sociological studies have shown that news products are representative of reality, but that such representativeness is not a reflection; instead, production practices themselves contain biases.

Prior to 9/11, scholars demonstrated that the mere act of efficient reporting results in news products that are biased in favor of the perspectives of the powerful. In the 1970s, Gaye Tuchman and Edward Epstein published findings explaining how news is produced within the confines of organizations whose goals are to yield profit. While they do not argue that such an aim influences the production of every story, they find that the institutional pressure to make profit shapes "the logic by which [a story] is selected, shaped and reconstructed into news pictures" (Epstein 1974, 41). Shortly thereafter, Mark Fishman (1980) and others found that newsrooms promote a crime-and-punishment mentality, run on a schedule that favors bureaucratic needs, and function in ways that undermine the perspectives of those in opposition to existing power and bureaucracies (see also Tuchman 1978). Efficient reporting means locating journalists in places where "news" is likely to occur (keeping in mind the prior distinction between issues and news) and keeping attention focused on "newsmakers" and their practices (Fishman 1980, 44–45). These early studies of newsroom sociology contribute to the study of news in the post-9/11 environment.

My research (Finney 2010) on CNN's coverage of the conflict between the United States and Iraq following 9/11 and the subsequent war in 2003 describes a host of organizational biases that influenced the production of news about the conflict. It was not, as many asserted after the war took place and WMDs were not found, that CNN and others had deliberately misled the American public or engaged in propaganda. Rather, the "structural and cultural factors - such as the social dynamics of journalists covering government officials, journalists' professional norms, beliefs, and particularly their adherences to the strictures of "objectivity" - that shaped CNN's news products in particular ways and according to particular plotlines" (10). Frequently, newsroom sociology is combined with content studies to connect news content with the processes by which it is gathered and produced. The other line of inquiry in my book, *Knowing Is Half the Battle* (Finney 2010), is to approach CNN's content from a conflict studies perspective in order to explore the role of news in the trajectory of the conflict. This represents a trend in post-9/11 Media Studies research to blend scholarly disciplines for understanding media production, content, and its effects in new and significant ways. My research shows that CNN's coverage was not biased toward or against George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, WMDs, Democrats, Republicans, or some other individual or group view. Rather, my research finds a pervasive bias in favor of "polarity over complexity, ethnocentrism and emotions over reasoned argument, and violent conflict over negotiated settlement" (11). I arrived at these conclusions by focusing on the text of CNN's content between President Bush's inauguration in January 2001 and the start of the Iraq War in March 2003. Examining text using both qualitative and quantitative methods enabled me to study the rhetoric employed by CNN's commentators. It also allowed me to compare the quantity of messages about particular ideas, and the relative favorability ascribed to CNN when doing so.

However, it is noteworthy that such text-based analyses are not the only way to examine television news content, and a wealth of research has emerged in the last few decades that examine the visual content of television news. Increasingly, visual rhetoric has become a prominent part of the television news viewing environment, and so has its study

by Media Studies scholars. Just as with the study of text, visual analyses are focused on the study of rhetorical acts that “mobilize symbols to influence diverse publics” (Olson et al. 2008, 9). Though not scholarly, the film *OutFoxed* explicates the visual rhetoric on the Fox News Channel, explaining how such visual images reinforce the rhetoric of favored speakers and draw audience attention to certain ideas, sometimes in conflict with the textual rhetoric taking place simultaneously (Greenwald et al. 2004).

According to research conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2014, as a media organization, Fox News has a more consistently ideological audience than the other news organizations (Mitchell, n.d.). Fox News was an early adopter of the narrowcasting business model for cable television programmers that caters content to a homogenous audience. As the Pew Research Center (2014) and others have shown, Fox News and (less successfully) MSNBC present more opinion content than reporting (Is MSNBC…). Fox News has had clear success in implementing this business model that caters to a particular audience’s tastes, not just with opinion content, but by also reporting on the kind of stories that conform with audience expectations.

It is not the content of these studies that deserve the focus of our attention. Instead, it is the phenomenon of their presence. OutFoxed, the Pew Research Center, PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, and others have joined the fray in the twenty-first century to provide interested audiences with insight into the ways that media organizations work. They also check the facts and expose the biases that exist in mainstream news content. These principally non-scholarly organizations have joined academics such as Douglas Kellner, Mark Fishman, and Bob McChesney in this line of work. There is, in short, a proliferation and popularization of scholarship and lay-research bent on exposing the biases in mainstream news.

Of course, the proliferation of non-academics making forays into this line of work presents its own challenges. Methodological rigor, conceptual applications, and scholarly dispassion have the potential to fall by the wayside as untrained practitioners gain greater prominence in media and other sectors of society. For instance, the headline of a

story on TownHall.com states “President Trump Is Correct – Study Shows 90% Of Administration Media Coverage Is Negative” (Meads). Reporting that a recent content study shows bias against Trump, the news piece praises President Trump, who “unloaded today on the mainstream media for contributing to the dilapidated state of trust in America’s institutions and his administration.” The article cites the Media Research Center as the source of the data, but the linked press release contains no information about methodology, sample size or reliability of data—all of which are needed to demonstrate the validity of the findings.

While the value of these organizations’ methods, bases, and findings are legitimately questioned, what is unquestionable is that they have helped proliferate the idea that news is not a mirror image of life. Instead, audiences are regularly made aware of the constructedness of news presentations, though perhaps not of the news-collection environments and processes. Non-scholarly studies and organizations have opened a door to the value of content analysis for many who might otherwise have consumed news content unquestioningly.

But without newsroom sociology, content analysis is unable to respond to the “why” question. What is frequently lacking in non-scholarly content research is a clear conceptual basis, or an explicit rationale for undertaking the research. FactCheck.org, for instance, has no conceptual rationale. Their mission claims that they “are a nonpartisan, nonprofit ‘consumer advocate’ for voters that aims to reduce the level of deception and confusion in U.S. politics” (About Us, n.d.). Its neglect of the conceptual is a fundamental challenge to its validity and social good because it leaves individual audience members to fend for themselves in developing their own conceptual basis for understanding the news, which opens the door to interpretive variability. In addition, media watchdog organizations can be accused of hiding their bias when they fail to disclose their own conceptual basis. Organizations like the Media Research Center, by presenting poorly-conducted and ideologically driven content studies, undermine the popular validity of all such content research by obfuscating the differences between methodological rigor and its relationship to valid findings.

5.3 Cross-Platform Analysis

There is no doubt today that, preceding the Iraq War in 2003, the Bush administration and others engaged in a sophisticated marketing campaign to sell the idea of war to the American public. Subsequently, we definitively learned that Iraq had no active WMD program, did not pose a threat to the United States, was not aiding al Qaeda, had not acquired aluminum tubes for the production of nuclear weapons, was not using mobile chemical weapons labs, and therefore was not in non-compliance with United Nations resolutions on Iraq's possession and use of such weapons. Yet during the period preceding the war, these ideas proliferated across the news media landscape in the United States (though not so much abroad). They were asserted and debated in mainstream news media content across platforms; there were some news sources that questioned the assertions about Iraq and Saddam Hussein, but they were overwhelmed by the significant majority of high-profile sources (Finney 2010, 86).

According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 71% of "U.S. adults watch[ed] local television news" (Olmstead et al., n.d.). Comparatively, in the same article Pew reported that 38% of Americans "access news online at home from a desktop or laptop computer" (notably, this data does not include the access of sites on mobile devices). According to their State of the News Media 2015 report, Pew cites data from Nielsen Media Research and Alliance for Audited Media to assert that network news and local news audiences are ascending, while cable news and newspaper audiences are declining (Mitchell, n.d.). Pew reports that advertising revenues for newspapers declined in 2014, while revenues for all other news media platforms increased (Mitchell, n.d.).

Pew has also collected data on the correlation between news consumption habits and knowledge. Their research has shown a consistent decline in public knowledge about political information, despite the proliferation of alternative news sources. In 2007 Pew released survey data which showed that the greater availability of electronic and television sources had not helped Americans become more knowledgeable. In the majority of categories about domestic politics, Americans were less knowledgeable in 2007 than similar research revealed about 1989

(Public Knowledge, n.d.). More revealing, for the purposes of this essay, is that their research also shows that

> Overall, 35% of the public was classified as having a high level of knowledge - on average, 18 correct answers out of the 23 total questions. Half or more of the audiences for six media sources scored this high: the comedy news shows and major newspaper websites (54% in the high knowledge group), the NewsHour (53%), National Public Radio (51%) and Rush Limbaugh's radio show (50%). Regular readers of news magazines were not far behind (48%).
>
> By contrast, the regular audiences for many other sources scored no higher than the sample average. The audiences for morning news (34% high knowledge), local TV news (35%), Fox News Channel (35%), blogs (37%), and the network evening news (38%) were not significantly different from the norm for the whole sample (35%). The audiences for CNN, internet news sites such as Google and Yahoo, local newspapers, and TV news organization websites scored slightly higher (41%-44% high knowledge). (Public Knowledge, n.d.)

While this report was principally oriented toward uncovering how audiences' attention to particular news programming affected their knowledge about public information, it is also representative of a trend in post-9/11 Media Studies to parse the differences between news content, production methods, and the effects of consumption across platforms. Dated at this point, this research from 2007 marked an early attempt to understand how audiences for NYTimes.com differ from audiences of The Daily Show or The O'Reilly Factor. This research is especially significant because, for years, print media revenues have been in decline while television and Internet news revenues have ascended.

One meaningful paradigmatic frame for this scholarship has been gatekeeping. While it is true that many Americans are looking to the Internet for their news today, it is also true that the most popular websites are operated by mainstream news organizations. According to Alexa Internet (2015), a company that specializes in calculating web traffic data, the top five news websites (in order) were Reddit.com, News.yahoo.com, CNN, Huffington Post and NYTimes. Three of

these are major news organizations. One (Yahoo) is one of the biggest Internet companies, and the other, Reddit, is an aggregator of other news sources.

Let's pause and consider the case of Reddit. This website is not on most rankings of popular news sources. Reddit.com, as a popular aggregator of stories, allows users to easily reach beyond the mainstream for their news consumption. As a user-generated source, Reddit puts the power of sourcing on the community, and the kinds of posts that reach the "front page" are arrived at democratically by users voting up or down for each post. As a consequence, Reddit's top news posts are frequently from non-U.S. sources, and non-mainstream sources regularly make the front-page as well.

While the argument that the Internet has become a source of news democratization since 9/11 is not unwarranted when considering the case of Reddit, I will offer two points to dispute the legitimacy of that claim. The first point is that information on the web is subject to gatekeeping. While traditional media outlets such as NPR or CNN are most associated with gatekeeping, there are still gatekeepers at Reddit, called Subreddit Moderators, and they exert a significant degree of control over the content by setting subreddit rules and determining whether posts meet the criteria for those rules. For instance, one of the rules on the subreddit Conservative (2015) (referring to the Conservative wing of American politics) is "Don't complain about a topic or content of an article without offering substantive criticism" (r/conservative). While this can be seen as a valuable directive oriented toward raising the level of dialogue among community members, a vague rule such as this can be wielded by moderators to stifle discussion or silence unwanted ideas. Reddit offers a valuable example of how even non-mainstream news sources employ gatekeeping, and as mainstream sources are happy to point out, gatekeeping on non-mainstream sources is sometimes capricious, carried out anonymously and conducted without transparency. Reddit posters frequently complain that their posts are deleted without warrant by moderators who provide no rationale.

The second point relates to the trend of increasing consolidation on the web. More and more web traffic is being directed to the Big Six media companies, which either own the most popular websites or are

on their ways toward acquiring them. On the one hand, the Internet has become a central part of mainstream news sources' work since 9/11. CNN, Fox News, NBC, and NPR all have robust web presences that reproduce the work of their flagship outlets while simultaneously enabling them to do things that cannot be done in their principle medium. NPR.org, for instance, in addition to posting audible versions of nearly every story that airs on the radio, offers additional depth on stories through web-only features, infographics, and extended interviews. On the other hand, the most popular websites on the Internet are and continue to be purchased and owned by major media corporations. Reddit.com, which is perhaps one of the least mainstream popular news websites, is owned by Advance Publishing, owner of Conde Nast Publications and ranked by Forbes (2015) as America's 44th largest private company (America's Largest Private Companies, n.d.). In fact, most of the top websites in the United States are owned by "the Big Six" media companies that, according to Business Insider in 2012, "control 90% of the media in America" (Lutz 2012).

Scholarship abounds about content, processes, and effects with regard to individual media platforms, and some emerging scholarship is involved in comparing and contrasting them. The Pew research represented above is one such study that compares the relative merits, audiences, and revenues across platforms. Still, it is worthwhile to recognize that media platforms do matter. They engage audiences in different ways, involve different methods of production and rhetorical emphases, and frequently appear different to audiences. Danny Ledonne, a filmmaker and former Visiting Assistant Professor of mass communication at Adams State University, notes the unique characteristics of documentary film. "Documentary filmmaking is a subjective work. The filmmaker makes choices aimed at achieving a deeper truth as a conceptual goal" (Personal Interview, April 11, 2015). He explained how documentary filmmakers like Michael Moore who worked in the post-9/11 environment were concerned, not just with the representation of facts, but also with the use of facts to reflect a political moment. He describes documentary filmmaking as "one of the essay formats of the 21st century," explaining that documentary films are a distinct form of issue-focused media (Personal Interview).

Ledonne's conception of documentary film as distinct and issue-focused contrasts with twentieth century beliefs that news media is supposed to focus on the representation of facts in such a way that enables audiences to form their own opinions. However, his conception corresponds well with what we have seen in some of the emerging news trends in the post-9/11 environment. Fox News, for instance, is much more issue-focused than traditional media. In fact, though Fox News started in 1996, it only became the dominant television news source it is today in 2003, after the start of the Iraq War. Recalling the work of Brian Ott, museums are also heeding the call to be more issue-focused in their representations of ideas, art, and events. Another news phenomenon is represented by programs such as Vice News, the Daily Show, This Week Tonight, and Breitbart News. These outlets are news-like, but they are clearly distinct from news in terms of their overt application of some kind of filter, including humor. According to Ledonne, "While The Daily Show and similar programs are known for their personality-driven host's commentary, they often also produce news reports that, while comedic, often also hit upon deeper truths and even scandalous reportage that traditional news outlets wouldn't touch. So perhaps comedy news is very much a short documentary format in its own right - replete with the same limits and opportunities as more traditional docs" (Personal Interview).

In the post-9/11 environment, cross-platform studies focused on explaining how different platforms are utilized by media producers and audiences in different ways and to achieve different goals. However, as with other trends, it is unclear the extent to which 9/11 has driven this area of inquiry. The analysis of media products across platforms is a post-9/11 trend, but it is due mainly to the proliferation of consumer technology. There appears to be a clear post-9/11 industry shift toward more issue-oriented media products, as seen in the ascension of Fox News, the popularity of documentary filmmaking, and the emergence of Vice News and other news outlets that have become much more popular in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

5.4 Attention to Political Manipulation

John Kellner and other researchers have spent a great deal of intellectual energy demonstrating how groups such as Al Qaeda, the George W. Bush administration, and others have engaged in the manipulation of media following 9/11 to evoke a desired response from audiences. In the post-9/11 world, research on manipulation has focused on the rhetoric and methods of advertising to explain the role of emotional and historical appeals in evoking responses in audiences.

In 2006, Distinguished Professor of Education at the University of California Los Angeles, Douglas Kellner, wrote a piece entitled "9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation," in which he argued that both the Islamic terrorists and the Bush administration engaged in sophisticated media manipulation campaigns following 9/11 (Kellner 2006, 42). As Kellner notes, terrorism is, by its very nature, an act of media manipulation that uses the means of fear to accomplish political ends. In many ways, 9/11 was an act of media manipulation on the part of the perpetrators, designed to frighten the American public and to promote particular political objectives. "The spectacle conveyed the message that the US was vulnerable to terror attack, that terrorists could create great harm, and that anyone at any time could be subject to a deadly terror attack, even in Fortress America" (44). Kellner also argues that the 9/11 perpetrators were not the only ones engaging in media manipulation on and around 9/11. Instead, "There followed a media spectacle of the highest order. For several days, US television suspended broadcasting of advertising and TV entertainment and focused solely on the momentous events of September 11…The images and discourses of the US television networks framed the 9/11 attacks to whip up war hysteria, while failing to provide a coherent account of what happened, why it happened, and what would count as responsible responses" (44).

These initial days of media manipulation were followed, according to Kellner, by weeks and years of similarly structured accounts in media that were carefully designed to manipulate audiences' perceptions of the events and the appropriate responses to them. "The Bush administration would take up the same tropes with Bush attacking the 'evil'

of the terrorists, using the word five times in his first statement on the September 11 terror assaults, and repeatedly portraying the conflict as a war between good and evil in which the US was going to 'eradicate evil from the world,' 'to smoke out and pursue…evil doers, those barbaric people'" (45). In research that echoes Farnsworth's findings in this volume, Kellner describes the Bush administration's use of easily understood American tropes, such as cowboys and Indians, and liberty and freedom, in its call to arms against "terrorism" (45).

Regardless of who invokes the term, "terrorism" is both highly contested and emotionally evocative. Kellner describes "terrorism" as a term that is both ill-defined and loaded (i.e., evocative of emotional trauma), explaining that, "In a global media world, extravagant terror spectacles have been orchestrated in part to gain worldwide attention, dramatize the issues of the groups involved, and achieve specific political objectives" (42, 43). It is precisely this imprecision in the term that makes it so effective. John Collins, Professor of Global Studies at St. Lawrence University, explains how tropes of terrorism are applied by political leaders in established countries to describe "political enemies" (156). Citing Edward Said, he argues that its use evokes an active form of engagement that appeals to our "pseudopatriotic narcissism" while whitewashing the "darker chapters of the history" of the United States (156). In this sense, "The very idea 'terrorism' is the product of specific efforts by specific people to define certain examples of political violence (typically violence committed by those who are opposed to U.S. policies in the world) as illegitimate" (157).

This scholarship is in direct response to the wars that followed 9/11. Collins' essay appears in a book titled *Collateral Language* (2002), edited by Collins and Ross Glover, that aims to "expose the tyranny of political rhetoric used to justify 'America's New War'" (1). In it, they compile scholarly essays to:

> Illustrate that while language always shapes our lives, the effects of language during war are unique. Just as 'collateral damage' describes military damage in addition to the intended targets, 'collateral language' refers to the language war as a practice adds to our ongoing lexicon as well as to the additional meanings certain terms acquire during wartime…

> Language, like terrorism, targets civilians and generates fear in order to effect political change. (1–2)

Numerous texts and scholarly articles have been written after 9/11 to explain how politicians and others have used news media to manipulate the public. Collins and Glover provide a useful and intriguing account of some of the most egregious linguistic maneuvers undertaken in the War on Terror. In addition to "terrorism," they describe the newly coined term "enhanced interrogation technique" and many others that have been either created or adapted by powerful sources in the post-9/11 environment.

The significance of this finding comes into focus when compared with the trends that are noted by Farnsworth elsewhere in this book. Arguing that presidential rhetoric has changed since 9/11, Farnsworth notes that the character of the president and the president's role as commander-in-chief have taken on renewed significance in the post-9/11 environment, particularly with regard to presidential prerogatives in shaping the news. As multiple other chapters in this volume confirm, politicians, though authoritative and invested with immense sources of knowledge, often do not wield it judiciously. Instead, like many actors engaged in conflict, politicians use rhetoric to score points against their opponents and to move toward what they perceive as "winning."

Of course, the study of rhetoric is not new. After all, rhetoric is one of the original liberal arts. What does appear to be new is the way that rhetoric was employed in the post-9/11 environment and the number of articles and books that have been directed toward the study of presidential rhetoric as represented on newscasts (see chapter by Farnsworth). At the same time, scholars appear unable to use their scholarship to change the rhetoric of politicians or even the ways that rhetoric is reproduced as news in the short term. Despite the uptick of news organizations correcting the records of statements made by President Trump and others, countless examples of unchecked rhetoric exist in nearly every newscast, every day, nearly two decades after 9/11. Even when inaccuracies are corrected, the news retractions have been shown to have little to no positive effect, and in many cases they have a negative effect. According to Jonah Lehrer, who was

interviewed on NPR's On the Media in 2011, when a scientific study has been retracted, "the number of citations for the paper which has been soundly refuted don't decrease, and in fact that they remain, years and years after being refuted, [cited] 17 times higher than the refuting papers." The interviewer, Brooke Gladstone, agreed with Lehrer, stating "well we know that in the mainstream media, once an impression is made, it's very hard to unmake." Indeed, retracted assertions, post hoc analysis, and refutations have shown few results in either mainstream or scientific news (Gladstone).

5.5 Coverage of Others (Especially Islam)

The coverage of "others" is one such area where no amount of retraction, explanation, or correction seems to have had much of a positive impact (nor has it become the mission of news organizations to do so). Instead, as Edward Said (1997) and many others have pointed out, the coverage of Islam since well before 9/11 has been particular, principally negative, borne of and supporting irrational fear, and resulting in a fundamental misunderstanding of the religion, its followers, those who use it to perpetrate terrorism, and the realities in Muslim-majority countries.

One of the most prominent and influential studies of American coverage of Islam was written by Edward Said in 1981 and reprinted in 1997. In *Covering Islam*, Said lays out the case of

> Western and specifically American responses to an Islamic world perceived, since the early seventies, as being immensely relevant and yet antipathetically troubled and problematic. Among the causes of this perception have been the acutely felt shortage of energy supply…the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis…, alarming evidence of what has come to be called 'the return of islam'…the resurgence of radical nationalism in the Islamic world and, as a peculiarly unfortunate adjunct to it, the return of intense superpower rivalry there. (l)

Said argues that the only encounters with Islam that entered the consciousness of the American media landscape in the 1970s were those

involving political and violent clashes between the United States and others. The oil crisis, along with the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis, all compelled U.S. media outlets to cover Islam, and in so doing those outlets provided Americans with a (false) sense for what Islam was and who Muslims were. In the remainder of the book, Said demonstrates how the American coverage of Islam during the 1970s was framed through the lenses of oil and terror and "has given consumers of news the sense that they have understood Islam without at the same time intimating them that a great deal in this energetic coverage is based on far from objective material. In many instances 'Islam' has licensed not only patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even radical hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostility" (Said, ii).

In the post-9/11 environment, Said's words have become only more salient. The scholarly study of news and media about Islam has kept pace with the increase in coverage. A database search on Academic Search Complete using the terms "media" and "Islam" shows 1291 peer reviewed articles since 2002 (August 9, 2018). This is in addition to countless books on the subject in the same period. Yet there has been and continues to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the American public about Islam, Muslims, Islamic countries, Islamic radicalism, and terrorism. Countless polls have shown that American attitudes toward Muslims trend toward negative, especially for Americans who are older, Republican, or have strong affiliations with Evangelical Christian faiths. Other polls show that Americans tend to fear that Muslims are violent and that many "doubt that Muslim-Americans or Arab-Americans would be able to perform in a government post without their ethnicity or religion affecting their work" (Huffington Post 2015; Barna 2013).

Akin to Said's work, media scholarship about Islam in the post-9/11 environment has focused principally on the juxtaposition of coverage between Islam and other populations. Like Said, these researchers have consistently found trends in coverage that associate Islam and Muslims with terror, war, violence, economic conflict, religious discrimination and othering, and threat. Frequently, these characterizations of Islam are contrasted with depictions of Americans, Christians, and

West Europeans as heroic and virtuous. An article by Kimberly Powell (2011), a professor of communication and women and gender studies at Luther College, is representative of this type of scholarship. Titled, "Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11," Powell's article "reveal[s] a thematic pattern of terrorism coverage in which fear of international terrorism is dominant, particularly as Muslims/Arabs/Islam working together in organized terrorist cells against a 'Christian America'" (91).

Powell, like many others, draws a direct line between terrorism and media. "The direct victims of terrorism are rarely intentionally targeted, rather they are injured or killed to gain attention and to send a message to the main target, which may be the government of the country in which the attack occurred, or the culture or values of that country" (91). The violence of terrorism is almost incidental to its actual goal. Instead, the purpose of terrorism is to create fear or change policy. This is meaningful because the attack on 9/11 was a terrorist attack designed to garner media attention. As such, it was extremely successful. However, the point is that media scholarship on this topic since 9/11 has revealed a picture of a media landscape that is drawn to terrorism and consistently connects terrorism with Islam. Powell makes a point that Fitsanakis makes in this volume, namely that, while Islamic terrorism is a focus in mainstream media, the more prevalent threat to the American public, domestic terrorism, "is cast as a minor threat that occurs in isolated incidents by troubled individuals" (91).

Presentation discrepancies between domestic and Islamic terrorism cases show a pattern of connecting Islam with terror as well as a pattern of representing Islam in negative ways. As Powell explains, in U.S. coverage of terrorism since 9/11 "terrorist agents were quickly labeled or suspected as Muslim" (96). "For those who were Muslim, this identity was repeated in every story, solidifying the connection between terrorism and Islam…Assumptions are made from names, without first verifying religious identity. If one looks different, sounds different or has an unfamiliar name they are given 'other' status. the assumption that a terrorist is Muslim before any proof outside of name and action, is proof of Orientalism and fear of outsiders, versus those from within" (97).

Powell's research describes the coverage of domestic terrorist agents as "includ[ing] naming the agent as intelligent and as a planner. The agent was also heavily personalized and often labeled as being mentally unstable" (98–99). This contrast, wherein international terrorist suspects are treated as representative of Islam and domestic terrorist suspects are provided with agency, clearly delineates the conceptual grounding for Orientalism and American Exceptionalism. Whereas foreign actors are stripped of their individuality, inscribed with cultural stereotypes, and presumed to stand in as representatives of some indefinable threat, Americans are separated in the coverage from domestic perpetrators through an emphasis on the perpetrators' individuality and agency, their back-stories, and the circumstances of their lives.

Another take on the interrelationship between Islam and media is R.S. Zaharna's (2010) book, *Battles to Bridges*, which analyzes U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy in the Arab world since 9/11. Zaharna argues that "little understanding or appreciation for the intended audiences" led the Bush administration to do a poor job of public diplomacy (2). "Despite the urgency and importance attached to public diplomacy in the war on terrorism and the impressive array of creative initiatives, U.S. public diplomacy under the Bush administration failed to crack the code for how to effectively communicate with publics in the Arab world and Islamic regions" (2). Zaharna's research repeatedly and persuasively points out how American corporate, government, and media elites failed to understand the needs and personalities of the Arab world. She finds instead that the repeated application of Cold War public diplomacy efforts were unsuccessful.

These two texts by Powell and Zaharna, as different as they are, represent some of the great diversity that exists in Media Studies since 9/11. While similar in subject, the two pieces are very different in terms of object of analysis, method, and outcomes. Powell's is a quantitative, content analysis, attempting to engage with the representation of terrorism and, as a byproduct, the misrepresentation of Islam in media content. Zaharna's qualitative and historical analysis is focused on the ways that contemporary public diplomacy is and is not reflective of appropriate social science theory and historical lessons. Her study reveals how fundamental misunderstandings of Islam, the historical context, and

changes in the media landscape contributed to the development and implementation of inappropriate content and delivery systems directed toward Islamic audiences in the Middle East. Nonetheless, both scholars approached the topic in creative ways, and their work signals that media scholarship has studied Islam and the American media with critical intensity since 9/11. As the American media landscape has become more focused on the issue of Islam, terrorism, Muslims, and Arabs, so has the discipline, pursuing the topic through a myriad of ways but developing findings which are remarkably consistent. Those findings can be summarized thusly: Americans tend to misunderstand and fear Islam and Arabs, this fear is complicated and is perpetuated by the American media, and there is a corresponding misunderstanding about how the United States should approach Arab and Muslim communities via media.

5.6 Conclusion

Media Studies over the years since 9/11 has evolved within a context that has been both expanding and constricting. The sheer number of scholarly works related to the study of news has expanded dramatically, as have the number of non-scholarly sources undertaking the task of news and media analysis. At the same time, the study of news in academic settings has become increasingly constrictive, as political and economic pressures have limited opportunities for funding and critical engagement.

In 2007, Ward Churchill, Professor of Ethnic Studies as the University of Colorado at Boulder, was fired for academic misconduct. Churchill's firing was politically motivated, and it occurred not long after his essay, "On the Justice of Roosting Chickens," was publicly shamed on the Internet. Written just weeks after 9/11, Churchill argued that the 9/11 attacks were retributive, that they were not unwarranted, and that the victims of 9/11 were not innocent.

> True enough, they were civilians of a sort. But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of America's global

> financial empire – the "mighty engine of profit" to which the military dimension of U.S. policy has always been enslaved – and they did so both willingly and knowingly. Recourse to "ignorance" – a derivative, after all, of the word "ignore" – counts as less than an excuse among this relatively well-educated elite. To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs and consequences to others of what they were involved in – and in many cases excelling at – it was because of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was because they were too busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into their cell phones, arranging power lunches and stock transactions, each of which translated, conveniently out of sight, mind and smelling distance, into the starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I'd really be interested in hearing about it. (Churchill 2003)

Over the next several years, Churchill fought to keep his job at the University of Colorado against an administration that was determined to fire him. As a graduate student at CU-Boulder at the time, I witnessed the lengths to which Churchill's work was investigated, for political reasons, in order to find what was determined to have been sections of scholarly work plagiarized from his former wife and scholarly partner. Ultimately, the courts determined that Churchill was wrongly fired, but awarded him only $1 in damages and did not compel the university to reinstate him (Johnson and Steeyle 2009). This extreme example of administrative pressure offers a glimpse into the academic culture in which media and other scholars write and teach. The study of media in the United States is inherently political and, to the extent that critical analysis is sometimes unpopular, scholars must be attentive to stories like this one.

Yet Media Studies scholars, as featured here, have maintained an ability to critically engage with media since 9/11. In particular, the scholarship reviewed in this chapter suggests that Media Studies has done considerable work on 9/11 and related topics.

There appears to be a pervasive and longstanding unwillingness on the part of media to identify 9/11 as a consequence of American activity abroad. From the reporting of 9/11 as an act of aggression without

precedent, to the coverage of subsequent wars, torture, and foreign policy decisions, there is a distinctive anti-contextual trend in American media. This idea emerges throughout the literature, from Zaharna's study of public diplomacy blunders to Ott's work on museums. Context, or the long-term view of what the United States does, has done, or will do, is a glaring omission in most media accounts. Surely, this is due to some extent to the pressure for time and space that all mainstream media organizations face, but it has become increasingly apparent to media scholars that this omission is dramatically important and has significant implications. Unfortunately, this omission is normalized in mainstream news content, which is presented in a dispassionate and professional style that de-emphasizes the differences between news and issues.

It has thus become the job of the media scholar to disentangle news from issues. It has also become the job of media scholars to broaden the application of this task, to take on new kinds of media for demystification, and to draw attention to the methodological similarities across media platforms. Interestingly, this task does not mesh well the training or intention of many media scholars, as we are principally conceptual in our orientation. Separating mediated images from reality is a kind of lower-level intellectual endeavor for media scholars, yet its importance to the general population cannot be overstated.

This is especially the case when it comes to topics like Othering and, in particular, the damaging and distinctly different ways that non-"white" actors are portrayed in media content. Othering takes place in both domestic and international news coverage, especially with regard to the coverage of other nationalities, races, religions, and ethnicities. American perpetrators of violence are more likely to garner contextual justification for their actions in the coverage than Islamic perpetrators. These justifications humanize American perpetrators and constitute another form of Othering.

But where does news bias come from? Why do news organizations continue to use terms like "Islamic terrorism" and why do news organizations represent international and domestic issues through a lens of xenophobia and American Exceptionalism? It is clear that, in most cases, the answer to these questions is not rooted in an overt bias among

journalists or even among news organizations; it is not that these people and organizations are attempting to foist some ideology upon unaware audiences, though there are some important exceptions that prove the rule. Rather, the bias in news is tied to the monetization of news in a competitive marketplace and the need to be efficient. News bias is also tied to the deference to power that is exhibited in newsrooms and media representations, which affords those with the most political and economic power access to the news production process. Finally, there is the intense competition that all news organizations face over acquiring and maintaining audiences. Audiences, as it turns out, are more interested in having their beliefs confirmed than they are with being confronted with conflicting or contrary ideas.

Even when news is “unbiased” and where audiences are confronted with legitimate data and ideas, news and information have very little capacity for changing minds and altering opinions. Audiences are extremely resistant to change, and individuals have strongly held beliefs and ideas created over time in complex and frequently non-rational ways (Gladstone). Even if news and other media were to confront audiences with the same, incontrovertible, yet unpopular facts, the potential for short-term impact would be limited in a competitive news marketplace.

But this factor, perhaps more than any other, is the basis for studying news. It also marks the greatest achievement and change since 9/11. Media Studies scholarship has come a long way in helping audiences understand that their consumption of media does not necessarily inform them in the traditional sense. Though continuing to resist changing their opinions, since 9/11, news audiences have become much more skeptical of news presentations, more willing to challenge the narratives offered on news, and more capable of doing their own fact-checking. As good as this news, is however, the phenomenon of confirmation bias still exists in fact-checking.

How then has Media Studies changed since 9/11? Importantly, the perceived importance of the field has improved since 9/11, as has the use of interdisciplinary approaches and concepts. The field’s increase in popularity has been due, in no small part, to the post hoc analysis of President George W. Bush’s media campaign in the interim

between 9/11 and the Iraq War, and the realization that such work has broad-reaching social, political, and humanistic implications.

The terror event of 9/11 also influenced the ways that Media Studies has taken up the task of multi-modal, cross-platform analyses, employing scholarship and methods from across disciplines, in order to draw attention to the significance of media in daily life and long-term socio-cultural trajectories. Media Studies scholars now employ ideas and methodologies from sociology, political science, psychology, economics, and other social science disciplines. One also finds the methodological applications of the humanities and the arts, especially in scholarship on media texts and extra-textual factors. Media Studies has always borrowed from other disciplines, but a consequence of 9/11 has been the concurrent application of new and emerging scholarship from Media Studies and findings outside the field.

Finally, I would argue that the field has been affected by 9/11 in terms of the kinds of questions that are being asked in the study of news. Scholarship across disciplines today is consumed by the question of information and knowledge, and Media Studies contributes meaningfully to this area of inquiry.

Equally pressing today are questions of representation, American Exceptionalism, and Orientalism, as described by Edward Said and others. American society's notions of hegemony, privilege, and representation are being challenged by Media Studies scholars.

This new interdisciplinarity in Media Studies and the use of new questions to drive the research has been complemented in the post-9/11 environment by a renewed focus on methodology. Media Studies scholars have expanded their range of methods and, as a field, Media Studies is now increasingly concerned with non-traditional media venues. In addition, scholars needed to amend traditional methods of studying media in order to account for the increasing importance of the Internet. Finally, Media Studies has created new methods in the post-9/11 environment, mostly due to the development of valuable digital resources for quantification and explication.

In the end, Media Studies has changed considerably in the post-9/11 environment. Does this mean that 9/11 has changed Media Studies? Certainly. Can one argue that these changes would not have occurred

without the catastrophic events on 9/11? No. The subject matter would certainly have been different, but the development of sophisticated new methods, the adaption of contemporary concepts and ideas, and the continued integration of methods from other disciplines would have taken place irregardless of 9/11 (though invariably in different ways). At the same time, the methodological and conceptual changes that have taken place have been those that tended to help Americans understand 9/11 and related subjects. It is also clear that the intellectual and institutional environments in which Media Studies research is carried out today have been influenced by the changes generated by 9/11.

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6

Spectacle, Trauma, Patriotism: Media and Media Studies in the Aftermath of 9/11

Chiara Ferrari

I moved to the United States in July 2001. I arrived in Tucson in early August to start my masters in media arts at the University of Arizona. Classes began at the end of August. Two weeks into the semester, on a Tuesday, the phone rang before 7:00 a.m. My roommate Celine answered the phone and after a few minutes ran into my room, crying. The horror of September 11, 2001 was happening and we watched it, incredulously, on our black and white, impossibly small 10-inch television. In retrospect, the apparently trivial detail of our television's screen size bears enormous significance now: initially, the terrifying "spectacle" of 9/11 was slightly less terrifying as long as we watched it on that device. Once we found access to a bigger, color television in our neighbors' house, the magnitude of the tragedy hit us like a brick wall. Those iconic, omnipresent, endlessly repeated images were both terrifying and spectacular, and the whole event felt unthinkable yet (sur)real.

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Later on that day, and in the days following September 11, messages from Italy began flooding in from family and friends who wanted to make sure I was okay. The messages surprised me, since Tucson was thousands of miles away from New York. Those questions made me realize how homogenous and hard to grasp America was in their minds. As I reassured my family, however, I had the distinct feeling that things had irreversibly changed. I wondered how that day was going to affect the entire country I was just getting to know.

A personal introduction usually sounds inappropriate in a scholarly paper. Yet, a great many authors writing about September 11 (Brady 2004; Jenkins 2004; Rich 2004; Kaplan 2005) do just that. They offer a precise account of the first moment they experienced 9/11, painfully re-living that occasion, remembering the feelings that accompanied them as they watched the live broadcast, and pondering the meaning that day has had on their lives since. In the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks, I found myself trying to adjust to a country that needed to adjust to its new broken self. Similarly, I experienced the struggle of understanding the intellectual world of academia just as it was trying to re-frame itself within new discourses and new meanings.

To say that media studies changed drastically that day is an obvious understatement. While Finney's chapter in this volume suggests a different answer to the question of continuity versus change in media studies pre- and post-9/11, I argue that the field was turned on its head on September 11, 2001 (and the following weeks, months, and years) because media themselves were catapulted in a vortex of change.

Change came in three areas. First, as Alice Greenwald, president and director of the 9/11 Memorial Museum, reminds us, on September 11, 2001 "media provided the window through which the entire world watched 9/11."[1] Media, through both official and amateur videos, provided primary evidence of the event and the chaos that ensued in New York. Secondly, media offered a narrative that made 9/11 more personal by telling the stories of the victims and those involved in the attacks. In addition, media took it upon itself to provide an explanation for the event.

[1]The statement was shared during a Q&A at the "9/11 and Academia" Conference held at Emory and Henry College in November 2015.

As a discipline, history has the luxury of time, and historians need *time* and *distance* to make sense of events. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, media needed to provide an immediate response to a country in desperate need of reassurance. Lastly, media contributed to the strengthening of an American sense of patriotism, opening the way for and justifying the "war on terror."

Clearly, the last point is not limited to the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but it has had lasting consequences that have shaped the media landscape significantly in the decades following the attacks. Other factors, however, have contributed to major shifts in media industries in the last eighteen years. They are unrelated to the 9/11 events, and yet fundamental to understanding the different discourses that originated in academia. The proliferation of social media sites has dramatically changed the way people communicate and has revolutionized the world of journalism, both in terms of production and consumption of news (Goode 2009; Hermida et al. 2012). This new approach to journalism has brought about not only different relations between audiences and news, but it has also modified the relation between news organization and political institutions. News have become commentary, and reporting now stands in clear partisan opposition to, or in a symbiotic relationship with, political power. This makes many news organizations—on both sides of the ideological spectrum—anything but credible (at least to those who watch them with a critical eye).

In addition, the digital era has affected both media production and distribution, facilitating access to technology and thus promoting user-generated content (Ryan and Hearn 2010; Berry and Schleser 2014). The same shift has greatly modified viewing consumption thanks to both YouTube and streaming services such as Amazon Prime, Hulu, and Netflix. Given the significant shifts to the core meaning and function of media, it is no surprise that academia has paid closer attention to the industry of media, both adapting traditional theories and methodologies to new phenomena and producing new discourses to discuss its impact. Expanding on Michelle Hilmes' analysis, Matthew Freeman discusses the recent emergence of "the specific turn to focusing critically on the industrial structures, processes, and practices of the media's

workings – or media industry studies" arguing how it "has to do with a lot of changes in the industry itself" (Freeman 2016, 3).

On the basis of this premise, this chapter offers an overview of the themes, methodologies, and theoretical frameworks that have shaped media and media studies in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. In addition to reading, examining, and summarizing seminal works on the subject, my approach toward this survey includes a variety of personal conclusions based on my own experience with media studies since the events of 9/11.[2] Such conclusions were made more coherent thanks to a series of emails and discussions with colleagues that have either suggested additional sources or have been kind enough to brainstorm methodological and theoretical frameworks in post-9/11 media studies. With their help, I have tried to identify trends, discourses, methods, critiques, and pedagogical discussions that have informed the field across diverse areas of inquiry.

Recent works have taken on the responsibility to catalogue film, television, and texts of popular culture (Dixon 2004; Cettl 2009; Kellner 2010) and trace a historical trajectory into recurrent post-9/11 genres, political themes, and visual motifs. From films directly related to 9/11 (*Fahrenheit 9/11*, 2004; *United 93*, 2006; *World Trade Center*, 2006) to texts that metaphorically discuss terrorist violence (*The Dark Knight*, 2008; the *Saw* and *Hostel* franchises; and the television series *24*, 2001–2010), authors look at the ways American political climate and U.S. foreign policy after the September 11 attacks have affected the production of Hollywood blockbusters and hit television series. Additional works look specifically at the horror genre (Briefel and Miller 2011) to explore how audiences dealt with on-screen violence after experiencing horror in real life. Others examine "torture porn" (Kerner 2015) and its aesthetic, narrative, and ideological tropes to illustrate how it is a quintessential post-9/11 American (sub)genre.

[2] I anticipate leaving out some elements that other scholars might find fundamental in order to understand the many ways the field has changed as a consequence of 9/11. For this, I would like to apologize in advance.

In "9/11 Film and Media Scholarship" David Slocum reviews this series of scholarly works, detecting three main overall goals. They include, firstly, to "manage and make sense of the sheer volume of images and narratives that have appeared and circulated" since 9/11. The second goal is to look at how "the institutional transformation" of U.S. media industries "should potentially refigure critical approaches to post-9/11 media." Lastly, Slocum explains "how scholars might understand and engage with the new technologies, fragmentation, and interactivity increasingly characterizing twenty-first-century media" (Slocum 2011, 181).

The scope of my research deals primarily with Slocum's second goal. In an attempt to map the field of media studies in post-9/11 academia, I look at the development of specific critical approaches and scholarly discourses that have informed the field of media studies. Particularly, I consider the way different scholars have examined, responded to, and criticized media texts, cultural phenomena, and industrial practices from an array of diverse interdisciplinary methodologies. They include: postmodernism, trauma studies, narrative criticism, global media studies, political economy, and audience reception studies (including shifts in consumerist behaviors). I have intentionally left out two important areas of media and media studies that have significantly been affected by September 11: the news coverage of the attacks and the representation of Muslims and Middle Easterners in post-9/11 Hollywood entertainment. The reason for this omission is in no way based on a lack of interest in these essential topics, but it is justified by the prolific scholarship produced in these areas. In the months following 9/11, analyses of the news coverage of the attacks were omnipresent in both television commentary and in academia. Finney provides an in-depth analysis of 9/11 news in this volume, along with a sophisticated analysis of how Muslims have been "othered" in the post-9/11 media landscape.

As far as Muslim representation, building on Edward Said's seminal book *Orientalism* (1978) and Jack Shaheen's *Reel Bad Arabs* (2001), later works found that 9/11 did not necessarily change the representation of Arab characters in Hollywood media, but has instead intensified those problematic depictions Said and Shaheen had described earlier. One

fundamental work to understand this shift (beyond media and media studies and into academia at large) is Steven Salaita's "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism: Arab-Americans Before and After 9/11" (2005). Salaita champions ethnic studies as the "possible solution to the […] pragmatic strength of imperative patriotism" and the discipline that can transform "the American way of life" into "American ways of life" (2005, 165–166).

6.1 Media Studies, Spectacle, and 9/11: A Postmodern Symbiotic Relation

Shifting the focus back to media studies, what emerged from the research and intellectual discussions with colleagues and friends is a discipline dramatically affected by 9/11. These changes have occurred in ways that are uniquely linked to the role media have played on and since September 11, 2001. The dramatic function played by the news covering the attacks on 9/11, the gravity of the presidential announcements broadcast in the aftermath of the tragedy and later to declare war on Afghanistan and Iraq, the rhetorical strategies utilized by the media to support the "war on terror," and the touching memorials produced by various networks to remember the victims and to rebuild a sense of unity in a shattered nation are only some examples of the fundamental role media have played in post-9/11 American history, politics, culture, and society.

Some of the questions posed in this volume have been recently explored in the documentary *9/11 in the Academic Community* (directed by Adnan Zuberi in 2013 and based on the Toronto Hearings of 9/11, held in 2011).[3] The documentary explores a variety of conspiracy theories discussed within academia (from the Humanities and Social

[3]Megan O'Toole provides a brief summary of the Toronto Hearings events in this blog: http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/the-truthers-are-out-there-toronto-hearings-on-the-events-of-september-11.

Sciences to Physics and Engineering) and criticizes universities that have ostracized scholars who have tried to ask (and answer) the "only truly important questions" about 9/11. The main thesis pushed forward in the documentary is that academia has passively confirmed and conformed to the government's narrative and rhetoric used to promote the "war on terror." The documentary pairs government and media as working in tandem to push forward that single and unchallenged master narrative. More broadly, Zuberi and some of the professors he interviews accuse academia of what they see as an endemic theoretical laziness and a cowardly lack of activist practices, both of which have allowed "several academics [to] identify themselves with this story while they are harsh critics of the US administration's war on terror" (*9/11 in the Academic Community*).

While I agree with some of the claims and accusations the documentary advances, particularly the urge for scholars to be more activist in their investigations, I find the film's disdain for some of the cultural discourses produced in and by academia highly problematic. Consider the following passage:

> Here's a transformative event, which involves so called global war on terror, increase in military budget, a reformulated foreign policy, restrictions of civil rights… so a massively important and a watershed event, and… what's the university doing? You know, writing some ethereal postmodern critique of it, but are they asking the basic question: what happened on that day? Who did it? (Graeme MacQueen in *9/11 in the Academic Community*)

Some of these "ethereal postmodern" critiques include the illustrious series published by Verso Books on the occasion of the first anniversary of the tragedy. Titles in the series are Jean Baudrillard's *The Spirit of Terrorism: And Requiem for the Twin Towers* (2002), Paul Virilio's *Ground Zero* (2002) and Slavoj Žižek's *Welcome to the Desert of the Real* (2002). The series' goal was "to comprehend the philosophical meaning of September 11" and to "leave untouched none of the prevailing views currently propagated" (Verso webpage:

http://www.versobooks.com/series_collections/34-9-11). From their European perspective, and therefore enjoying a privileged position of *distance* from 9/11, the authors explore the symbolic and powerful iconography of the attacks (Baudrillard), discuss the elitist role of technology in creating a dystopian and modern form of sub-proletariat (Virilio), and question the role of global capitalism in the rise of Muslim fundamentalism (Žižek). What emerges from these precise analyses (reprised—but also criticized by many in academia) is a post-modern investigation (informed by strong Marxist undertones) into a series of paradoxes associated with the terrorist attacks. Those paradoxes include the visual "spectacle of 9/11" and how it was appropriated by the terrorists, the implications of a new movie-like concept of the "real," and the uncomfortable familiarity audiences around the world felt "because [they] understood the language of 9/11 as [their] own" (Jung 2010, 13).

Another source that explores the powerful role of images in contemporary American society from a highly ideological and Marxist viewpoint is *Afflicted Power: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (2005), written as a collective effort by the intellectual community Retort. Utilizing Guy Debord's *Society of the Spectacle* (1967) as a starting and inspirational source, *Afflicted Power*'s goal is to turn Debord's "hypotheses back to the task for which they were always primarily intended – to make them instruments of political analysis […], directed to an understanding of the powers and vulnerabilities of the capitalist state" (Retort (Collective) et al. 2005, 17). Similarly to Baudrillard, Virilio, and Žižek, the Retort authors investigate the 9/11 attacks as a case study to reconfigure the connection between "spectacle" and "capital," specifically in the form of how images—particularly those related to September 11th—have colonized (and commodified) everyday life (Retort (Collective) et al. 2005, 19–20).

"Everyday life" was a concept hard to regain and reconfigure after 9/11. In this volume, Demski points out how the attacks were once physical, moral, and cultural. In his analysis of the psychological response to 9/11, Demski discusses how "sacred-value protection theory" helps explain why individuals and collectivities respond to threats

to their moral and cultural worldviews by acting in ways that reaffirm their core values and convictions.

In the days immediately following the attacks, the media worked tirelessly to counteract the violence of 9/11 images (paradoxically, while still looping the terrifying footage of the attacks) and create a sense of unity and patriotism among Americans. In so doing, the media was reestablishing a sense of moral order, as Demski explains. Perhaps the most striking example of counter visual symbolism is Thomas E. Franklin's photograph *Raising the Flag at Ground Zero*. Recalling Joe Rosenthal's iconic *Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima* (to which the image's title clearly refers), Franklin's photograph had at least two major consequences. The first was to instill new hope in the American people via a rhetorical exercise in nationalist propaganda. More subtly, the image reminded Americans of the glory and the "just cause" of the Second World War. Considering how tragedy on September 11 struck the United States a few months before the country's sixtieth anniversary commemoration of Pearl Harbor, the reference to the last "good war" framed the symbolic reverberations of 9/11 and its media representation.

E. Ann Kaplan discusses the connection between the Second World War and 9/11 in her powerful analysis *Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature* (2005). Similarly, in "America Under Attack" Marcia Landy (2004) explores the way media represents history, tracing parallels between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. This historical connection would reveal itself to be fundamental in the Bush administration's efforts to justify the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and create consent among the American population for those wars. Kaplan and Landy, however, move away from the strictly ideological aspects of the comparison (but they certainly do not ignore them) and focus instead on the distressing aspects of both tragedies, utilizing trauma culture and theory as a methodological approach in their 9/11 discourses. Kaplan's study is highly personal in nature and is founded on the author's memories of World War II bombings while she was a child in London and how 9/11 involuntarily brought back those memories. Kaplan justifies her theoretical approach by reminding how "most people encounter

trauma through the media, which is why focusing on so-called mediatized trauma is important" (2005, 2). The author utilizes the mediated experience of trauma as a starting point, but enriches her analysis with a commentary of the personal images she took in the streets of New York in the days immediately following the tragedy. What the media showed in the aftermath of 9/11 was a united front of citizens who flooded the streets to help clean up New York, while desperately looking for reassurance within their community. Demski provides again an important framework to understand the psychological implications of the trauma caused by 9/11, this time in his discussion of "moral cleansing."

The coming together of New Yorkers of all classes, races, and ethnicities testifies to this need for moral cleansing, and the narrative constructed by the media at the time reinforced this sense of moral catharsis on a national level. Kaplan, however, provides a different perspective. What is particularly revealing in her analysis is the recognition that, as a New Yorker, she experienced a very different *narrative* in the streets of Manhattan than the one she watched constructed in the media:

> The media aided the attempt to present a united American front. But this proved to be a fiction – a construction of a consensus in a Eurocentric and largely masculine form […] While a "disciplining" and homogenizing of United States response was at work through the media, on the streets something fluid, personal, and varied was taking place. (Kaplan 2005, 13–15)

What Kaplan denounces is a phenomenon that the discipline of media studies had discussed long before 9/11: the idea of *media framing* juxtaposed to the concept of *individual framing* (Scheufele 1999, 106). Scheufele discusses how "viewing media or news frames [is] necessary to turn meaningless and nonrecognizable happenings into a discernible event" and how "frames serve as the bridge between … larger social and cultural realms and everyday understandings of social interaction" (1999, 106). Applied to 9/11, this dichotomy between mediated and individual framing was a central element in creating counter-hegemonic keys of interpretation against the master narrative that was manufactured by the government through the media.

Similar to Kaplan, Landy examines another episode discussed on television, one in which the trauma for the 9/11 attacks was treated as a subjective and gender-based trauma—as opposed to a collective tragedy. Landy examines Peter Jenning's interview with Sheila Wood, a 9/11 survivor, and the explanation that Alvin Poussaint (guest psychiatrist on the show) gave of her experience a couple of days after the attacks:

> Comparing the attacks to a rape, Poussaint portrayed the victims in terms of similar feelings of violation. He described the "towers as phallic symbols" and the attack as "a kind of symbolic or attempted symbolic castration," thus reducing the public event to a subjective experience, completely unaware of the reductiveness of his analysis that fit well with the popular psychologizing characteristic of this historical event. (Landy 2004, 82)

Landy's critique of the numerous discussions that paired psychiatrists and historians on television talk shows and news programs following the September 11 attacks points to the consistent rhetoric perpetrated by the media. Landy is especially critical of media outlets for finding an emotional connection between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 and for preparing the ground for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Landy is precise in pointing out how references to both Vietnam and the Gulf War were absent in those rhetorical discussions. He argues that those two wars failed to produce "a decisive battle" and a "decisive victory" respectively (Landy 2004, 86), whereas the Second World War could provide a more effective counterpoint to 9/11 and its violent aftermath.

Other scholars have supported the use of "trauma" (and trauma theory more broadly) as an effective approach to examine 9/11, as Muller's chapter in this volume demonstrates within the context of American Studies. James Trimarco and Molly Hurley Depret (2005) discuss Morgan Freeman's 2002 controversial remarks about 9/11 not being "a national trauma" (Trimarco and Hurley Depret 2005, 29). In response to Freeman's idea that, "if you were not in New York on September 11, what you saw was an event on CNN" (Freeman in Trimarco and Hurley Depret 2005, 29), and following a theoretical point similar to E. Ann Kaplan's, Trimarco and Hurley Depret explore the concept of "mediated

trauma" by discussing how American media consciously constructed the conditions for a national trauma to unfold after 9/11. In order to do so, they survey a variety of definitions of "trauma" and discuss how they can fit within the collective experience of September 11, specifically though the sharing of a horrific memory, the construction of a "graveyard trope" like Ground Zero (2005, 37), and ultimately through the "media and political representation of September 11 as a distinctly 'national' attack" (Trimarco and Hurley Depret 2005, 35).

Linking pedagogy to theory and trauma, Henry Jenkins recounts his teaching experience at MIT on the day of the attacks (and the following weeks), and the way both faculty and students felt a strong and immediate drive to make sense of what was happening, especially as it was represented and discussed in the media.

> As we read earlier attempts to theorize catastrophe, some rang remarkably hollow, preoccupied as they were with describing and critiquing discursive practices so they lost sight of the human cost. In other cases, theory proved enormously comforting. (Jenkins 2004, 93)

The faculty and students at MIT's Comparative Media Studies Program (which Jenkins ran at the time) launched the online platform *re:constructions* on the Monday morning following the attacks to provide essays, summaries, and commentaries of "media coverage in some twenty countries or regions" (Jenkins 2004, 95). What Jenkins seems to cherish most about that collective intellectual and emotional experience was the ability to demonstrate how "it was possible, at least for short bursts of time, to move theory out of the academy and into a larger public dialogue" (Jenkins 2004, 95).

This is an early example of media activism, achieved through the use of digital technology. Internet and social media activism has since become a staple factor in contemporary discussions about civic engagement and media studies, a notable example being the Arab Spring of 2011 (Gerbaudo 2012). An interesting text that can be used to understand the role of media studies in the discussion of media activism pre-9/11 is Graham Meikle's *Future Active: Media Activism and the Internet*. Published in 2002, the volume explores and speculates about the future

of interactive media and the consequent potential of media activism. In sinisterly prophetic ways, Meikle warns against the perils of right-wing populism (2002, 196) as one of the potential results of Internet activism. He simultaneously points out that the "rhetoric about cyberspace echoes what's been said before" (2002, 2), and therefore the medium might not be as revolutionary. In terms of theoretical discourses, Meikle starts from an important assumption: "that it no longer makes sense – if it ever did – to treat the Net as an entirely separate realm" (2002, 4).

The book provides a refreshing look at the uncertainty that characterized media studies at the turn of the millennium in their attempt to explore and record the coming of "new media." Championing works by William Gibson (*Neuromancer*, 1984), Donna Haraway (*Cyborg Manifesto*, 1984), and Derrick De Kerckhove (*The Architecture of Intelligence*, 2001), new media studies embraced the visionary nature of their utopian worlds—where boundaries were pushed and overcome—as new media seemed to provide tangible evidence of those visions. One of the consequences of 9/11 and the post-9/11 culture that followed was to move media studies away from the visionary realm of new media to focus instead on the (much dystopian) ideological implications of media as a highly hegemonic apparatus.

6.2 American Television: Industrial, Narrative, and Cultural Context

Evidently, post-9/11 America cannot (and should not) be discussed "simply" and exclusively in relation to the terrorist attacks of September 11. The United States has faced a devastating global economic crisis, struggled in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, lived through two distinctly different presidential eras (under Bush and Obama), and are now facing a third one under Trump. Similarly, media conglomerates—particularly the television industry—have undergone drastic changes in their institutional practices that help clarify and situate the influence 9/11 has had on media production, distribution, and consumption.

American television has repeatedly been labeled, in the academic discussions of the last ten to fifteen years, as either *post-9/11* or *postnetwork*

television. The terms are sometimes used interchangeably, because the two phenomena have come to coincide—at least chronologically—in American television history. It is important to remind ourselves, however, how "postnetwork television" tends to have an *industrial* connotation attached to its use. The term refers to a series of changes in production and distribution practices after the consolidation of media conglomerates, the multiplication of television channels due to deregulation, and the growing role of globalization in international media markets—among other factors. "Post-9/11 television," however, tends to take on a more *cultural* and *ideological* connotation, referring to the generic trends, the political agenda, and the renewed consumer culture produced in and by the media after the events of September 11, 2001.

Television scholar Lynn Spigel has focused her latest research on both of these labels, mapping television and television studies within the industrial and cultural conditions of postnetwork and post-9/11 America. Her article "Entertainment Wars: Television Culture after 9/11" provides a rich analysis of these conditions. What makes the piece particularly significant is the way Spigel contextualizes the nationalistic surge present in the media in the weeks after 9/11 within the broader—industrial—context of the multi-channel era, an era in which audiences are not as uniform and one-dimensional when it comes to cultural reception. Spigel examines American media after the September 11 attacks and their consistent attempt to create narratives of patriotism and nationalism across all genres, with the aim to re-establish order and normalcy to the audience viewing process and its "repositioning [...] back into television's fictive time and places" (2004, 238). The response, in these cases, has generally been the construction of patriotic narratives aimed at reassuring the American public against the fear of U.S. vulnerability, while re-establishing traditional American values such as individualism and capitalism.

Spigel laments the almost exclusive attention that academia paid—at the time—to the news coverage of the attacks, instead of exploring

how these narratives and ideologies were pushed forward by a variety of genres, stars, and characters (Spigel 2004, 238).[4] An example of these "narratives of patriotism" can be found in a series of prime-time dramas. Although officially created before the events of 9/11, "in what appeared in retrospect an eerie sort of precognition" (Hark 2004, 121), dramas like *24* (Fox, 2001–2010), *Alias* (ABC, 2001–2006), *The Agency* (CBS, 2001–2003) and *The West Wing* (NBC, 1999–2006) have strongly been affected—especially in their subsequent plot development—by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Television genre scholar Jason Mittell discusses *The West Wing* as an example of network television's ability to create hegemony and consent among audiences on different sides of the political spectrum by "offering an idealized sanctuary for Democrats during the Bush administration" (Mittell 2010, 281). However, the "show's construction of an ideal Democratic President [...] mixes liberal policy initiatives with an underlying patriotic and militaristic ideology that typically is seen as more conservative" (Mittell 2010, 281).

While *The West Wing* offers an example of mixed ideological narratives, *24* has been discussed unanimously in media studies as the flagship program in support of Bush's "war on terror," although it has achieved great popularity beyond its intended audience. A number of authors (Van Veeren 2009; Hall 2013) and the entire second section of Steven Peacock's edited anthology *Reading 24: TV Against the Clock*—"America under Siege: Terrorism, Globalization, and the Politics of (American) Morality"—offer a series of essays that highlight the series' depiction and support for torture, in addition to discussing *24* as a quintessential example of post-9/11 television and American (masculine) culture. A couple of articles (George 2005; Woolf 2007) even identify the series' consumerist aspects, discussing product placement and the overall campaign utilized by aggressive advertisers to sell more (manly) American products via Jack Bauer, the show's protagonist.

[4]Excerpts of this discussion have previously been published in *Prosopopeya*, 9 (2014–2015): 59–60.

Dana Heller (2005) has explored the broad consumerist culture that developed as a consequence of 9/11 in her edited volume *The Selling of 9/11: How a National Tragedy Became a Commodity.* Heller argues that it "was important to understand the consumer logic of post-9/11 political culture as well as the political logic of post-9/11 consumer culture" (2005, 5) in an attempt to delineate the new meaning of national identity in post-9/11 America, since "patriotism and consumerism are our mutual obligations" (Heller 2005, 24). The book traces the characteristics, but also the contradictions that marked consumers' behavior in the days and months following 9/11. For example, the author points to the paradox in the record sale of American flags in 2001–51.7 million—67% of which were manufactured in China (Heller 2005, 16). Offering an exploration of traditional American culture that includes a sampling of Wal-Mart, country music, advertisements, miscellaneous memorabilia, and nostalgic imagery, the book makes a provocative case for the return to "normalcy," a return that could only be achieved through a return to old traditional forms of consumerism. Spigel also depicts a post-9/11 America that was in desperate need to "go back to 'normalcy,' that is, to commercial entertainment and consumer culture" (Spigel 2004, 241).

Heller, Mittell, and Spigel offer key examples of the ideological framework of media studies in the years after the September 11 attacks. Academia was accurate in detecting and denouncing the exploitative nature of post-9/11 media rhetoric in direct support of consumer capitalism and renewed patriotism and, indirectly, of the use of torture. As mentioned in the beginning of the section, this dominant agenda is precisely what justifies the term "post-9/11 America" and the overall "post-9/11 culture" that has permeated media texts since 2001. As I explore in the conclusions to this chapter, the post-9/11 Americanness of Hollywood media is an important aspect to consider when discussing the success of U.S. products abroad, and how the increasing nationalist elements of Hollywood narratives are received globally.

6.3 How Can We Go Back to Laughing? Comedy, Satire, and "Fake News"

One important aspect that academia did not notice right away was the contradictory nature of 9/11 and its effects on the media audience. In fact, "9/11 [also] provoked counternarratives and political dialogues. In particular, 9/11 made people aware of new prospects for communication in a rapidly changing media environment" (Spigel 2004, 260). Confirming this line of thinking, Birkenstein, Froula, and Randell champion the "significance of popular culture" in the years following 9/11 and how it has "become a creative space in which nuanced participatory debates take place among public citizens rather than with (and between) our elected representatives in Washington, DC" (2010, 2). Both Spigel and the three editors of *Reframing 9/11* highlight how post-9/11 media have been able to provide a critical forum and a public sphere for (democratic) debates, an idea that brings evidence against the monolithic theses about media as systematically promoting the rhetoric of the "war on terror."

Critics and commentators of popular culture failed to examine the complex and multi-layered consequences of 9/11 in the media, and "summarily declared that the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center had brought about the 'end of irony.'" (Spigel 2004, 236). Contradicting this thesis and exploring adult cartoons like *Family Guy* and *South Park*, Matthew Hughey and Sarah Muradi discuss how both programs represent significant examples of post-9/11 television, more specifically of "how post-9/11 culture (re)produces political comedy in ways that blur the line between satire and that which is satirized" (Hughey and Muradi 2009, 208). Thus, adult cartoons generally testify to how 9/11 did not bring about the *end* of irony, but instead push forward a *new* kind of irony and satire that "rely upon, and simultaneously produce, a blurring of the line between 'authentic' and 'satirical' racism/nationalism" (Hughey and Muradi 2009, 210). Animated series, and especially those targeting an adult audience, have become the flagship of counterhegemonic narratives of and for post-9/11 American television, while simultaneously being very much part of the consumer capitalist

system they question and mock (through DVD sales, merchandising, and outsourcing). Matt Sienkiewicz and Nick Marx take the industrial analysis of adult cartoons a step further, discussing how their "aggressive use of incendiary identity-based humor are well-suited to the economic goals of convergence-era television" (Sienkiewicz and Marx 2014, 105).

Someone who had a hard time putting a smile on his face in the aftermath of 9/11 was *The Daily Show* host Jon Stewart who, in his first monologue after the attacks, apologized to his audience for failing at what he normally does best (and what he is paid to do):

> I'm sorry to do this to you. It's another entertainment show beginning with an overwrought speech of a shaken host and television is nothing if not redundant. So, I apologize for that, it's something that unfortunately we do for ourselves so we can drain whatever abscess is in our hearts and move on to the business of making you laugh, which we haven't been able to do very effectively lately…
>
> Our show has changed, I don't doubt that. What's have become I don't know, subliminable [*sic*] is not a punchline anymore. One day it will become that again, and Lord willing it will become that again…

Jon Stewart voiced a concern that many comedians shared in the days following 9/11 about the seemingly impossible task of going back to matters of humor and satire while respecting the viewers' grief. While Jon Stewart has traditionally "downplayed" his role in post-9/11 America and television, arguing that his mission is "simply" to be a comedian,[5] national surveys about the credibility of "official" news programs versus so-called "fake news" seem to suggest the contrary. In an article from 2008, revealingly titled "Is Jon Stewart the Most Trusted Man in America?" *The New York Times* reported:

> Mr. Stewart, the fake news anchor, came in at No.4, tied with the real news anchors Brian Williams and Tom Brokaw of NBC, Dan Rather

[5]Examples can be found in at least two interviews, one on Fox with Chris Wallace: http://video.foxnews.com/v/1007046245001/exclusive-jon-stewart-on-fox-news-sunday/#sp=show-clips and one on MSNBC with Rachel Maddow: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWrkGu4XpZQ.

> of CBS and Anderson Cooper of CNN. And a study this year from the center's Project for Excellence in Journalism concluded that '*The Daily Show* is clearly impacting American dialogue' and 'getting people to think critically about the public square. (Kakutani 2008)

While they have now changed format or hosts, shows such as *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report* attracted hordes of young adults eager to take a more critical look at national and world news. Supported by a savvy use of new media technologies, these younger viewers seemed to have systematically moved away from "respected" news outlets and turned their attention to liberal commentators who were not afraid to unveil the hidden ideological agendas behind "official" information. Scholarship about the impact of television satire has taken different forms, from the way it is consumed—mainly by young adults—(Holbert et al. 2007; Hmielowski et al. 2011), to the post-modern characteristics of contemporary political irony (Colletta 2009; Jones and Baym 2010) and a critique of television satire's own agenda (LaMarre et al. 2009).

6.4 Post-9/11 Pedagogy

In 2004 *Cinema Journal*, the official publication of the Society for Cinema and Media Studies, published an issue dedicated to "Teaching 9/11." A variety of scholars (Brady, Giroux, Jenkins, Projansky, Rish, Spence, and Dixon) reflected on their challenges in dealing with pedagogy and teaching in the aftermath of 9/11. A common struggle among media professors seemed to involve the difficult battle between pushing students to critically examine what they saw and read in the media (to detect rhetoric and ideology) and the risk of forcing them out of their comfort zone (and need for grief).

The majority of the contributors to this discussion recounted their immediate response to the tragedy and their delicate effort in encouraging students to share their feelings about the attacks. In addition to Jenkins at MIT who worked with colleagues and students in creating the online platform *re:constructions*, other scholars have offered insights

into both the challenges and the responsibilities of teaching 9/11. Specifically, Brady (2004) discusses how, with her students at Long Island University, she questioned the media's "apparent agenda of manufacturing public consent for war" (96). Her concern, shared by other teachers, was to find ways to create effective critical tools for students to utilize to critically interpret the images they saw. Rich points out some frustration for having to rely on old theoretical models that might not properly and effectively apply to the specificity of 9/11. Rejecting "stale ideas and procrastination," she actively calls for "intense scholarly engagement as well as educated leaps of the imagination" (114), considering 9/11 as a dramatic, and yet unique opportunity for academia "to rise to the challenge and provide leadership" to society (113). Giroux closes the series of essays by providing an overall analysis of his colleagues' pieces. Giroux discusses their teaching methods as political acts, reminding readers how pedagogy should always be considered a political practice and education should be seen as an expression of democracy. He wrote in the special issue of *Cinema Journal* that "the moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that our responsibility as educators cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimize, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students" (122).

In the days immediately following the terrorist attacks, I also had the chance to experience post-9/11 pedagogy as a graduate student. On September 13, 2001, my professor and mentor Daniel Bernardi dedicated our entire New Media Theory and Practice course to discussing the attacks and our feelings about them (classes were cancelled on 9/11). The original final assignment for the course was an interactive module to be created in Adobe Macromedia Flash, dealing with any critical aspects of the media in which we were interested. That day he proposed we focus on elements related to 9/11, and we worked as a group to highlight different aspects of how the media had reported the event. My class consisted of five American students, a Korean young woman, a Japanese young man, and myself. Everyone declined the invitation but me.

I understood the reluctance my classmates felt in embarking on an assignment about 9/11 that would have forced them to re-live that

day for the entire semester. I asked if my working on a project about September 11 would offend them or hurt their sensibilities, but all I received was respect and the assurance that I was indeed working on something of great importance, something that was too much for them to handle alone, though. As a foreigner, I was certainly "blessed" with a level of objectivity my American classmates did not have, and there was something about those images that inspired many research questions. I remember discussing the "spectacle" and the "horror" of the broadcast, using Baudrillard's *Simulacra and Simulation* and Debord's *Society of the Spectacle* as my theoretical ground. In terms of production, in each page I juxtaposed an iconic image of 9/11 with images of explosion scenes from renowned action films. Each page also included a quote from different contemporary media, while in the background I added a soundtrack that consisted of famous songs about New York City (Frank Sinatra's *New York, New York*; Billy Joel's *New York State of Mind*; Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel's *The Boxer*). My idea was to highlight the contrast between the images' cinematic "beauty" and their horrific (real) meaning, as it was described in the media. In retrospect, I realize I needed to understand 9/11 intellectually (on an emotional level it seemed impossible) and I am grateful my professor gave me the opportunity to do so.

Discussing my graduate school assignment with colleagues that were also in school at the time of the September 11 attacks has taught me that our experiences were greatly different. Many colleagues had professors that were not willing to deal with 9/11 and simply wanted to "follow and go on with the syllabus." This could have been for many reasons. Not all professors consider their disciplines immediately relevant to contemporary events, some professors may have been afraid of getting sidetracked and not being able to cover the entire program, and others were not emotionally ready to bring that tragedy into the classroom. Whatever the reason, my colleagues unanimously feel that they lost an invaluable opportunity to approach 9/11 from a theoretical and intellectual perspective. Fortunately, I did not miss out on the opportunity.

A discussion about post-9/11 pedagogy and teaching strategies cannot be complete, however, without mentioning the peculiar educational

environment many faculty members have faced as a consequence of the devastating global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although slowly recovering, many universities in the last decade have dealt with dramatic budgets cuts, furloughs, increased number of students for the same teaching load, minimum tenure-track hires, and a progressive restriction of funding for research and travels. The very "sanctity of tenure" has been put into question (Scott Walker's conservative politics in Wisconsin are just an example), causing an implicit and inevitable limitation in intellectual freedom. While clearly depending the nature of the institution, controversial themes related to post-9/11 America have become increasingly hard to teach "comfortably" in environments where research opportunities or job security are not guaranteed. Teaching controversial subjects, including 9/11, has become easier after I received tenure and U.S. citizenship rights.

How has pedagogy shifted, then, in the last decade? How do we teach 9/11 now, considering that many of our undergraduate students barely remember a pre-9/11 America? Inevitably, trauma and grief have given way to less emotional approaches in the study of the terrorist attacks. Historians and critics have had enough time (and distance) to create discourses that situate 9/11 in much broader contexts. Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have generally been harshly criticized and in part blamed for the new insurgence of ISIS and the wave of immigrants flooding Asian and European countries. The rhetoric of terrorism is slowly fading as the main ideological strategy utilized to threaten and manufacture the consent of American citizens; the rhetoric has been substituted by a series of conservative agendas that try to contain the discussion of minorities' rights, especially after the presidential election of 2016. No less important is the exponential rise of social media platforms that has created a body of students whose attention span, generally speaking, is significantly shorter, and whose critical abilities in detecting a source's credibility are often poor. Now, more than ever, students need increasing critical tools to detect the fallacies and ideological bias of media outlets.

6.5 Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, a variety of essays and books have explored the consequences of 9/11 on American media from diverse and intellectually rich perspectives. These works provide important models for understanding the impact 9/11 has had on academia, but they come from the exclusive point of view of American media and popular culture. Similarly, critical discussions about global television, such as *Global Television Formats* (Oren and Shahaf 2013) and *Planet TV* (Parks and Kumar 2003), are rich and provocative, but they tend to focus on the production and circulation of global television formats or the increasing role of media convergence, without exploring the specific realm of 9/11 themes—as they are produced, perceived, and consumed abroad.

The scholarship about the consequences of 9/11 on global media productions remains scarce. A source worth mentioning is Andrew Martin's and Patrice Petro's (2006) *Rethinking Global Security: Media, Popular Culture, and the "War on Terror,"* which focuses, as the title suggests, on issues of fear and insecurities created as a consequence of 9/11. The edited volume, however, while taking into consideration global media, still concentrates its attention on the effects of global phenomena on post-9/11 U.S. audiences and society. It, therefore, does not explore narrative shifts or industrial practices that might have happened internationally.

Wheeler Winston Dixon has posed some interesting questions about global audience perception in relation to quintessential post-9/11 American cinematic texts: "How will these films shape the perception of other nations, for whom the American cinema is now our dominant cultural export? What sort of dialogue do these films establish? What kind of public do they construct as their ideal viewer?" (Dixon 2004, 2).

Taking his questions as a starting point, I aim to open up a wider series of questions that can ultimately connect two different conversations: the ongoing debate about the global consequences of 9/11 and the ever-growing field of global and convergent media. In addition to Dixon's concern with international audience reception, I would like to

explore the way national productions and narrative conventions might have changed globally. Have genres and formats (and fiction in general) changed as a consequence of 9/11? Examples could include the Indian adaptation of *24*, or the production of *Hatufim* in Israel, the original inspiration for *Homeland*. What are some post-9/11 international films *par excellence*, and how do films such as Mohsen Makhmalbaf's *Kandahar* (2001) differ from post-9/11 American films? How have television news changed internationally? Have official news channels lost their credibility and satirical programs proliferated as has happened in the United States? Does *Al-Bernameg* in Egypt function similarly to *The Daily Show* in the United States?

Another area concerns shifts in industrial practices among different international media markets: What processes of adaptation (audiovisual translation, censorship) do post-9/11 U.S. products go through when exported abroad? How have media industries changed in the Middle East, a region where the consequences of 9/11 were directly felt, and yet were radically different than the United States. The Pakistani media industry is a particularly interesting case study in this respect because the government deregulated the television sector in 2002 and allowed for private channels to broadcast openly (Pakistan Press Foundation).

Finally, there are a number of cultural and ideological concerns to take into consideration when addressing the global impact 9/11 might have had on international viewers. How does a foreign country—where the consequences of 9/11 might not be as strongly and ideologically present as they are in the U.S.—import a post-9/11 film or television show? How can a text remain a post-9/11 text in a country lacking a post-9/11 culture? Have consumer culture and the very practices of media consumption changed globally after 9/11? How do international audiences perceive and "consume" 9/11 narratives?

Considering the impact 9/11 had globally, it seems odd that academia has failed to acknowledge how media worldwide have been affected by the September 11 events and all that followed. My intent is not to assume a cultural imperialist thesis that places the United States at the center of distribution practices in international media

markets. On the contrary, I want to detect ways in which national and local media industries have responded to 9/11, especially in countries directly affected by its consequences, and trace different narratives than the ones produced by media studies (exclusively) for American academia.

To conclude, I would like to problematize the concept of a post-9/11 America and ultimately argue that we are moving into a new era, a shift which academia should acknowledge. While it might be easy to determine the beginning of post-9/11 America, the United States has not yet found official closure, not even after the capture and execution of Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the terrorist attacks. What can determine the end of post-9/11 America? A theoretical paradigm shift? A historical event? A change in presidency?

President Obama played an incredibly significant role in post-9/11 American society, and yet, he transitioned the United States into a new era. Notwithstanding the two terms served by the first African-American president, many scholars have criticized the utopian myth of a "post-racial America" (Tesler and Sears 2010; Kaplan 2005; Parks and Hughey 2011) and the idea of a nation "with liberty and justice for all." Police brutality against African-American citizens, the rhetoric against LGBTQ civil rights, the anti-immigration policies supported by the Trump administration, the controversy over Planned Parenthood and women's rights, and the increasing gun violence perpetrated in the United States all seem to indicate that these critiques are justified. However, discussing these current cultural and social phenomena as "simply" post-9/11 is clearly reductive. Chronologically speaking, they undoubtedly are "post-9/11." Yet, these phenomena are increasingly moving away from post-9/11 themes and issues to potentially shape a new American nation. During Donald Trump's presidency, terrorism might be one of the least pressing concerns for Americans, given their country's internal violence, threats to legal institutions and civil society, and political polarization.

My perception is that academia is ready to take on and deconstruct this important cultural shift, providing new insights into American society and finally coming to terms with 9/11 to get some much needed closure.

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7

Studying the Presidency After 9/11: Re-considering Presidential Character in Domestic and International Contexts

Stephen Farnsworth

From 9/11 to the subsequent "war on terror" in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the George W. Bush presidency reminded scholars and journalists of the key to presidential power: what Richard Neustadt (1990) described as "the power to persuade." Even in ordinary times, the modern media environment provides the White House with wide-ranging opportunities to shape public perceptions of the president and U.S. policy. And the post-9/11 environment hardly qualified as an ordinary time. From the moment George W. Bush stood atop a wrecked fire truck at Ground Zero days after the Twin Towers fell, the new president demonstrated the overwhelming news framing advantages a president has during a crisis (Frum 2003).

While presidential critics also can take advantage of today's expanded media opportunities to frame issues for domestic and global news consumption, chief executives routinely command more attention than do

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their rivals in political discourse, particularly in times of trouble. Scholars studying the post-9/11 presidency have taken particular note of how international crises provide a White House with considerable latitude—and often success—in shaping the news (Entman 2004). While aggressive reporters and lawmakers may undermine presidential narratives as more information becomes available and declassified over time, counter-narratives that challenge the White House tend to rise only after policy actions are well underway. This was the case with respect to George W. Bush's war in Iraq (Robinson 2013; Woodward 2006).

White House reporters, who can offer the first draft of presidential scholarship, pay relatively little attention to substantial policy debates and instead focus on horse-race journalism and the clash of political egos. Even so, reporters and presidential scholars have noted that presidential character increasingly has become the core of the president's efforts to shape domestic and international discourse (cf., Farnsworth 2009; Scacco and Coe 2016). Bush's ability to portray himself as a tough Texan, and the U.S. public's longing for a such a figure in the anxious days after 9/11, explained why a president who came to power less than one year earlier, thanks to a contentious 5-4 Supreme Court ruling, suddenly commanded a 92% approval rating (Edwards 2003). Moreover, other chapters in this volume offer some explanations as to why the American public may have been in search of such a figure in the aftermath of 9/11.

Since 2001, journalists, scholars, and average U.S. citizens have considered presidential character when selecting candidates and evaluating presidential policy-making (Balz and Craighill 2014; Denton 2009; Schier 2016; Shear 2011). Likewise, international news reports relating to the U.S. president post-9/11 consider the presidential self when evaluating both the president and the nation he (and someday she) leads (Farnsworth et al. 2013). This examination of this trend in presidential studies employs both U.S. public opinion surveys and an extensive content analysis of international news coverage of the U.S. to illustrate the ways that scholars of the presidency have adjusted their research in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001.

7.1 Studying Presidential Framing Efforts Post-9/11

Even before 9/11, chief executives were dominant voices in U.S. national political conversations. While members of Congress struggle to be heard in national media, presidents can play a key role in shaping the news whenever they wish (Cook 2005; Farnsworth and Lichter 2006; Klar et al. 2013). In the highly partisan U.S. political environment, modern White House teams frequently attempt to use the media to enlist public support to give the president leverage in convincing Congress to back the administration's legislative priorities. This strategy involves two steps: presidents sell themselves and their policies to the public; then the citizens who receive these media messages encourage lawmakers to support the president's policy agenda (Kernell 2007). Although results of the "going public" strategy are mixed at best, presidents devote enormous energies to selling themselves and their policy preferences to the public (Edwards 2004; Scacco and Coe 2016). Perhaps they are optimistic that they possess skills that previous presidents lacked. Or perhaps they believe that the series of foreign policy crises that occurred in the wake of 9/11 created an environment friendly to White House framing of presidential policies and the presidential self (Farnsworth 2009). In other words, journalists and academics have found that post-9/11 presidents increasingly focused on going public through personality-based narratives.

The most powerful example is George W. Bush's presentation of his character shortly after the terrorist attacks. Bush offered an uncertain America a quasi-cinematic image of a frontier Texas sheriff, one of the most heroic archetypes of Hollywood filmmaking (Scott 2011). His demeanor and accent, and his statement that Osama bin Laden was "Wanted: Dead or Alive," were more Midland than Massachusetts, more oil patch than Ivy League. Presidential watchers noted that Bush made sure he was photographed driving a pickup truck, clearing brush on his ranch, and otherwise appearing physically fit—an image of personal and national toughness that seemed designed to personify a muscular foreign policy post-9/11 (Bumiller 2002, 2003). Bush labeled

himself “the decider” and demonstrated he would not second-guess—some might say he would not learn from—his previous decisions (Kinsley 2003).

Scholars observed, though, that exceptional moments for decisive presidential leadership tend to be fleeting. When voter sentiment turned against the Iraq War and elected Democratic majorities to both houses of Congress in the 2006 midterms, Bush ignored the political setbacks and vowed to escalate the war by staging a so-called surge in troops (Abramowitz and Weisman 2007). That stubbornness, coupled with the perceived mishandling of the Katrina disaster recovery a year earlier in 2005, eventually undermined Bush’s ability to dominate the public discourse (Fiorina 2008). And Bush’s declines stemmed at least in part from the rise of a competing character-oriented narrative as the public anger over 9/11 gave way to frustrations over the Iraq occupation and Hurricane Katrina (Jacobson 2008). As growing numbers of citizens viewed the president as incompetent, Bush’s political position weakened. But even then, critics of the increasingly unpopular president hesitated to go too far, worried that Bush could still use the media against the lawmakers who tried to extricate the country from his wars (Shanker and Cloud 2007). Despite steadily increasing public opposition to Bush and his policies, the post-9/11 wars continued.

When Barack Obama was elected president in 2008, many scholars noted that he campaigned for the office through a personality-based strategy that resembled the public appeal that served Bush effectively in the days after 9/11 (cf., Ceaser et al. 2009; Teasley and Ikard 2012). Though they are men of very different temperaments, researchers observed that Obama likewise appreciated the importance of presidential framing of self and policies in the years after the terrorist attacks. As a candidate and as a president, Obama sought to maximize the impact of this character-oriented approach in domestic and international contexts. From a 2008 public campaign rally in Berlin, Germany that drew hundreds of thousands of adoring Europeans, to his 2009 inauguration that brought one of the largest crowds ever to the Washington Mall, Obama’s media strategists recognized the importance of reaching out on a personal level via both traditional and new media (Farnsworth and Lichter 2011a). He connected with younger voters, and with their parents, via cable news, as well as Facebook and YouTube (Owen 2009).

Researchers also noted Obama's status as the first African American president created a positive media narrative about America's racial inclusiveness (Teasley and Ikard 2012). The profound unpopularity of incumbent President George W. Bush, together with the continuing problems of the U.S.-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 economic crisis, created a receptive environment for Obama to present himself as the candidate to deliver a major national and international course correction (Ceaser et al. 2009). Thanks in large part to the careful framing of the president's capacity to deliver change in the midst of economic and foreign policy crises, news coverage of Obama's first year was notably more positive than the first years of other recent presidents who took office following partisan transfers of power (Farnsworth and Lichter 2011b).

As reporters and scholars had more opportunities to examine the successes and failures of actual policies, news coverage and academic assessments of the Obama presidency became notably more critical in subsequent years. This shift returned the U.S. to the norm of largely critical news reports that exist away from moments of crisis like the 2001 terrorist attacks (cf., Farnsworth et al. 2013; Heith 2012). Scholars noted that the advantages presidents may have during crises, be they related to 9/11, troublesome occupations, or economic decline, are not long-lasting. After all, America's for-profit media are highly responsive to citizen preferences, and news content focused on the negativity of the government therefore is a market-maximizing strategy (Soroka 2014). After four years in office, a Pew Research Center content analysis project found that Obama's news coverage was mostly negative and that he fared little better in social media outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs (Pew 2012).

Some scholars and journalists found that some media outlets were more resistant to Obama's framing efforts of himself than others. From the start of his campaign, Obama consistently faced suspicions, fueled by conservative media and conservative activists, that he was not really born in America. Future president Donald Trump led the charge, and many "birthers" claimed that Obama was a Muslim, or at least not a Christian (Rutenberg 2008; Shear 2011). Obama sometimes behaved in ways that helped build the counter-narrative that he could not relate

to ordinary Americans. During the nomination campaign of 2008, Obama briefly refused to wear a pin featuring a U.S. flag. Although he said it was a matter of principle, it was also a matter of politics. Matters of patriotism continued to resonate as the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued. Reporters seized on the matter, and eventually Obama's advisers convinced him that the controversy distracted the media and the public. Obama relented, but the extensive media reports on the matter left some voters with a sense that he might not be as patriotic as other candidates (Ceaser et al. 2009). After that, reporters remained focused on this question of whether Obama was a "real" American. A stunningly poor performance in a bowling alley, and the release of a secretly recorded conversation where Obama remarked that some Americans were bitterly "clinging to guns and religion," fueled those negative media narratives throughout 2008 (Owen 2009). Without the intense personality focus offered by President Bush after the terrorist attacks, and without the efforts by candidate Obama to also focus on presentation of the self, these character issues might have faded more quickly. Instead, they became a central topic for scholarly and journalistic analysis.

7.2 Obama's Uneven Efforts on Discourse Domination

Once he became president, Obama seemed more hesitant than George W. Bush—or even candidate Obama—to attempt to dominate the mainstream media discourse. Despite the powerful advantages a president has in the shaping of domestic news content, and the firmly established media and public expectations for presidential discourse dominance, Obama's first-term team tended to be relatively deferential in domestic policy matters. The Obama White House left the many health care legislative details to Capitol Hill and gave Congress considerable authority to shape the economic stimulus package and regulatory reforms for the banking industry. An easily told and aggressively promoted narrative—like George W. Bush's claim after 9/11 that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction—found a ready public audience

and a largely uncritical mass media post-9/11 (Entman 2004). The relative lack of critical journalistic assessment of White House narratives was particularly notable in the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003 (Kurtz 2007). But the media landscape, and the presidency itself, had changed by the time that Obama entered the White House.

Despite the evidence of media framing success from Bush's first term, Obama was not as consistently aggressive in trying to dominate the discourse about his policies or himself. Presidential and media scholars have long noted that journalists are highly competitive and rely on leaks to advance a journalistic career. This creates a situation where savvy White House media operations can keep reporters off balance by favoring some and ignoring others in a never-ending struggle to maximize the amount of positive media coverage (cf., Grossman and Kumar 1981; Kernell 2007). With the demand for information greater than the supply, the media dynamics in presidential relations are far from fair and create an uneven playing field for journalists. As scholars have noted, the post-9/11 environment, with its emphasis on national security and other international matters, provided even greater advantages for a president to shape the public narrative, especially when compared to reporters or other elected officials (cf., Entman 2004).

Simply put, the White House holds the political advantage because it possesses the information that others want. This is truer than ever for foreign policy issues of the kind that dominated presidential action in the immediate post-9/11 years. When reporting on foreign policy, journalists have few sources of information beyond the White House, in contrast to the many sources of information on domestic matters. Yet presidents who hesitate to shape their media narrative with newsworthy statements, travel, and leaks often find that their critics fill the gap in ways that are not conducive to presidential popularity and policy success.

As was the case during Obama's presidency, critics can be particularly effective in shaping the narrative of a president's personality or character when a president fails to be aggressive in doing so. The flag pin controversy and the "bitter" remark discussed above are two examples where Obama's media narrative of the presidential self was upended by his critics. But nowhere are the consequences of failing to drive the narrative of one's own identity clearer than in the substantial numbers of Americans

who wondered whether the president was a Christian or a Muslim, a key issue in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks.

Obama's identity as a practicing Christian was made clear during one of the major religious issues of the 2008 campaign, namely the controversy over the sermons of his pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright (Denton 2009). Despite the contradictions inherent to such claims, the president's critics were able to reshape the character narrative for many citizens, as shown in Table 7.1. Despite the high-profile controversy involving Rev. Wright, only 34% of Americans were convinced in August 2009 that Obama was a Christian, down 14 percentage points from a March 2009 survey. While less than one in five Americans believed that Obama was a Muslim, after a year in office a surprising 43% said they did not know his religion. In both the "Obama is a Muslim" and the "don't know" responses, the truth about Obama's

Table 7.1 Many Americans uncertain about Obama's religion

	Believe Obama is Christian		Believe Obama is Muslim		Don't know	
	Aug. 2010	Change from 2009	Aug. 2010	Change from 2009	Aug. 2010	Change from 2009
Total	34	−14	18	+07	43	+09
White	35	−15	21	+10	40	+08
Black	43	−13	07	+01	46	+10
Republican	27	−20	31	+14	39	+11
Independent	34	−11	18	+08	44	+06
Democrat	46	−09	10	+03	41	+09
White Evangelical	27	−12	29	+09	42	+09
White Mainline Protestant	36	−15	22	+12	40	+08
White Catholic	32	−19	18	+08	46	+10
Unaffiliated	38	−09	13	+07	44	+07

Source Pew (2010). "Growing Number of Americans Say Obama is a Muslim," released August 19, 2010. The Pew Research Center survey was conducted among a random national sample of 3003 adults contacted by telephone between July 21 and August 5, 2010. http://www.pewforum.org/2010/08/18/growing-number-of-americans-say-obama-is-a-muslim/

Christianity loses out to the falsehoods spread by his critics. This issue had particular resonance in the years after 9/11 and during the U.S.-led military actions in several Muslim majority nations, and this issue gained even more resonance after the election of Donald Trump as president.

7.3 Presidential Spinning: Domestic and International Public Opinion

In the wake of 9/11 pollsters, journalists, and academics frequently turned to questions of presidential character as they sought to gauge public support for Bush and later for Obama. As shown in Table 7.2, a variety of *Washington Post* surveys focused on character questions during the past two presidencies. On the crucial foreign policy question of whether the president is a strong leader, we see that before 9/11 voters had their doubts about Bush. But after the terrorists struck, Bush's approval measure on that score increased dramatically. It stayed quite high during the start of the Iraq War in 2003, and even into the early stages of the problematic occupation that eventually dogged his presidency. As a result of the occupation and the discovery that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, a related question about whether Bush could be trusted in a crisis showed significant declines during his second term.

These character assessments have been particularly important in the post-9/11 environment. This is because, when international crises may be closer at hand, a president's personal temperament and judgment matter more than in times of peace.

Around the time of his 2009 inauguration, Obama basked in the glow of highly positive character assessments. Obama is "a strong leader," said 72% of those surveyed, while 69% said he "could be trusted in a crisis" and 72% believed that he "understood the problems of ordinary people." All of those figures were far higher than the comparable numbers for Bush before 9/11 and during his second term. Those 2009 figures were also much more positive than were citizen assessments of Obama by the time of the 2010 midterm elections or during his second term.

Table 7.2 U.S. public opinion on character traits of presidents, 2001–2014

Q: "Please tell me whether the following statement applies to [Obama/Bush] or not." "He is a strong leader."			
		Yes	No
Obama	10/26/14	46	52
	9/7/14	43	55
	1/23/14	48	51
	11/17/13	46	53
	9/15/13	54	44
	1/13/13	61	37
	1/15/12	51	48
	11/3/11	48	51
	6/5/11	55	44
	6/6/10	57	43
	3/26/10	65	33
	1/15/10	63	35
	7/18/09	71	27
	4/24/09	77	22
	1/16/09	72	18
Bush	1/19/07	45	54
	5/23/04	62	37
	7/15/02	75	24
	7/30/01	55	43
Q: "He can be trusted in a crisis."			
		Yes	No
Obama	10/26/14	49	47
	4/24/09	73	21
	1/16/09	69	18
Bush	1/19/07	42	56
	5/23/04	60	39
	7/30/01	60	37
Q: "He understands the problems of people like you."			
		Yes	No
Obama	10/26/14	46	51
	9/7/2014	49	48
	1/23/14	47	52
	12/15/13	52	46
	11/17/13	47	51
	1/13/13	55	43
	1/15/12	51	47
	11/3/11	49	49

(continued)

Table 7.2 (continued)

Q: "He understands the problems of people like you."			
		Yes	No
	6/5/11	49	49
	1/16/11	58	40
	9/2/10	50	48
	6/6/10	51	48
	3/26/10	56	43
	1/15/10	57	42
	7/18/09	63	35
	4/24/09	73	25
	1/16/09	72	24
Bush	1/19/07	32	67
	5/23/04	42	57
	7/15/02	57	41
	7/30/01	45	54
Q: "He is a good manager."			
		Yes	No
Obama	10/26/14	45	51
	11/17/13	41	56
Q: "He is willing to listen to different points of view."			
		Yes	No
Obama	4/24/09	90	10
	1/16/09	89	09
Bush	1/19/07	36	63
	5/23/04	49	50
Q: "He is honest and trustworthy."			
		Yes	No
Obama	4/24/09	74	22
	1/16/09	75	19
	12/14/08	67	22
Bush	1/19/07	40	57
	5/23/04	53	45
	7/15/02	71	26
	7/30/01	63	34

Source Balz and Craighill (2014). This *Washington Post*–ABC News Poll was conducted by Abt-SRBI of New York by telephone October 23–26, 2014, among a random national sample of 1204 adults using both conventional and cellular phones. Historical data obtained from previous *Post* surveys. Undecided and "don't know" responses are not reported here. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/washington-postabc-news-poll-oct-2326/2014/10/28/ea827c96-5e4a-11e4-827b-2d813561bdfd_page.html

As the world seemed smaller to Americans in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, global concerns increasingly became a part of the political, media, and academic discourse. As a result, increasing attention was paid to international presidential assessments (cf., Hamilton and Jenner 2003; Hannerz 2004; Hess 2005). While there was substantial national variation in the level of support for Obama when he took office in 2009, people surveyed in nearly every major country examined reported far more positive assessments of the new president than the outgoing president. As shown in Table 7.3, Obama led Bush by double-digit margins, and often by substantial double-digit margins. Global citizens had greater confidence that Obama "would do the right thing regarding world affairs" than would Bush. A 2015 survey found that many of the initial enthusiastic assessments remained, even as his second term drew to a close. While his numbers generally declined from the 2009 figures, the results for Obama in 2015 remained far above the assessments of Bush at the end of his presidency in 2008. The only two nations that recorded more negative assessments of second-term Obama than second-term Bush were Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu frequently clashed with Obama over Middle East policies, and Russia, where President Vladimir Putin aggressively challenged Obama in Ukraine and Syria, among other locales.

The massive differences in the international assessments of these two U.S. presidents come despite foreign policies that are, themselves, less different in substance. Some scholars have even argued that Obama's foreign policies were not all that different from those of Bush's second term (Singh 2012). The examples abound. Obama promised to close Guantanamo prison, the location where many of the "war on terror" suspects have been indefinitely detained, but he did not do so. He did not extricate the U.S. military from Afghanistan as he wished; in fact, Obama oversaw a surge in troops in Afghanistan comparable to Bush's surge in Iraq years earlier. In Iraq, Obama's record is mixed, as he withdrew troops at the end of 2011 only to quietly reintroduce U.S. forces to combat ISIS. Obama's use of drone strikes suggests a continuing American unilateralism that was panned, particularly internationally, during the Bush years. And the idea that Obama's presidency would mark the start of a less volatile role for the U.S. in the Middle East

Table 7.3 International evaluations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, 2008–2015

Q: "For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all [George W. Bush/Barack Obama]" (The percentages below combine the first two categories)

	Bush 2008	Obama 2009	Obama 2015	Change 2008 v. 2015
U.S.	37	74	58	21
South Korea	30	81	88	58
France	13	91	83	70
Italy	43[a]	–	77	34
South Africa	32	–	77	45
UK	16	86	76	60
Canada	28[a]	88	76	48
India	55	–	74	19
Germany	14	93	73	59
Japan	25	85	66	41
Poland	41	62	64	23
Brazil	17	–	63	46
Spain	08	72	58	50
Mexico	16	55	49	33
Israel	57	56	49	−08
Turkey	02	33	45	43
China	30	62	44	14
Lebanon	33	46	36	03
Palestinian Terr.	08	23	15	07
Pakistan	07	13	14	07
Jordan	07	31	14	07
Russia	22	37	11	−11

[a]Results from 2007 survey

Dashes signify that the question was not asked by Pew in that country in that year

Source Pew (2015b). "Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture." Report released June 23. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/global-publics-back-u-s-on-fighting-isis-but-are-critical-of-post-911-torture/

through the strategic "pivot to Asia" was belied by the continuing chaos in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the high levels of instability in Syria, Libya, Egypt and, increasingly, Turkey.

What was different, above all, was Obama's demeanor and his willingness to work more collaboratively on international matters than

Bush. This "soft power," or "smart power" approach, had its domestic critics, to be sure. But Obama's aggressive outreach efforts to connect with European and Middle Eastern publics during visits to European capitals in 2008, and to Cairo and Istanbul in 2009, paid considerable public relations dividends. In an era when policy coverage often gives way to the softer news favored by social media, and when traditional media outlets are trying to keep pace with the new media, a president's character may matter as much as an administration's actual policies to both domestic and international audiences (Farnsworth et al. 2013).

7.4 Presidential Spinning: Consequences for Domestic and International News Coverage

Although they are not the primary targets of White House media marketing efforts, international media outlets likewise have access to the same news releases, public events, and many other presidential efforts to shape the domestic discourse. In the post-9/11 environment, with the United States fully engaged with the world, scholars of presidential behavior in the media needed to internationalize their frames of reference.

The results of a Media Tenor content analysis of domestic and international coverage of the U.S. government provides a brief case study of this line of research. In the main, the data demonstrate that America is an important part of the international news diet of many global news consumers. (For details on the dataset and more extensive analysis, consult Farnsworth et al. 2013.)

Table 7.4 examines the more character-oriented international news coverage of Bush and Obama in the years after 9/11. Especially important are the volume and tone of the coverage, on nine international and four domestic television news programs, of two topics: personality coverage and reports that relate to the president's ability to govern. The net tone of that coverage is calculated as the percentage of stories coded as mainly positive minus the percentage of stories coded as mainly negative; stories coded as neutral, the vast majority of the stories in most categories, do not affect the calculation of net tone.

Table 7.4 International news coverage of presidential personality and ability to govern

News outlet	Topic	Obama		Bush	
		Jan. 1, 2009–June 30, 2010		Jan. 1, 2005–June 30, 2006	
		Net tone	*N*	Net tone	*N*
ARD Tagesthemen	Personality	14.4	125	3.6	55
	Govern	8.4	431	−6.7	120
ZDF heute journal	Personality	19.8	207	4.1	74
	Govern	7.9	582	−11.2	241
BBC 1 10 news	Personality	10.4	240	−14.3	49
	Govern	−8.0	338	−18.5	65
BBC 2 Newsnight	Personality	15.3	470	−7.9	251
	Govern	−19.6	199	−18.0	167
Al-Arabiyah	Personality	13.0	653	7.9	140
	Govern	3.9	129	−9.5	243
Nile News	Personality	4.4	342	0.0	15
	Govern	0.0	41	−3.6	112
LBC	Personality	0.0	281	–[a]	–[a]
	Govern	–[a]	–[a]	−21.7	83
Al-Manar	Personality	7.5	94	−44.8	96
	Govern	42.9	14	−20.1	467
Al-Jazeera	Personality	19.4	160	−5.9	17
	Govern	38.1	42	−6.8	235
ABC	Personality	7.3	507	−3.5	314
	Govern	−2.8	324	−18.9	127
CBS	Personality	5.9	273	−3.8	291
	Govern	−21.7	152	−11.4	228
NBC	Personality	8.1	596	−3.6	419
	Govern	−12.3	171	−17.6	227
Fox	Personality	−8.4	633	−7.1	857
	Govern	−16.2	612	−14.9	471

[a]Insufficient number of cases to classify (less than 10)

Source Farnsworth et al. (2013)

N = Number of statements. Net tone is calculated as positive tone minus negative tone. The Obama results are based on a content analysis of 29,954 statements relating to Barack Obama on nine international television news networks and 46,890 statements on four U.S. television news networks from January 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. The Bush results are based on a content analysis of 19,114 statements on evening newscasts from nine international television news providers and 43,276 statements on evening newscasts from four U.S. television news providers from January 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006

The relatively positive tone of the reports of personality coverage helps explain why presidential candidates and presidents emphasize personal matters as they try to shape news coverage. During Obama's first 18 months in office, all four European broadcasters offered news content relating to the new president's personality that was at least 10% more positive than negative. Coverage of personality matters for Obama was only, on balance, more negative than positive for one U.S. outlet, Fox News. Significantly, Obama received majority-negative coverage from none of the Arabic-language broadcasters.

While we do not have comparable data for George W. Bush's first 18 months in office—and even if we did, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 would make comparisons with Obama's first months in office of dubious validity—it is nonetheless striking that coverage of Bush's personality during the first 18 months of his second term was positive, or at worst modestly negative, on most outlets. The findings for Bush demonstrate that even second term presidents with relatively low public opinion numbers can still salvage some positive treatment from domestic and international media when they try to frame news coverage of the president around character matters.

7.5 Domestic Preferences Return After 9/11 Memories Fade in the U.S.

Scholars have found that the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks had a declining impact in terms of salience to Americans, and this is true for international issues generally.

As shown in Table 7.5, a series of Pew surveys demonstrate that domestic matters routinely trump international concerns in the minds of most voters. Even in January 2002, shortly after the terrorist attacks, voters viewed domestic policy as more important than foreign policy by a margin of 52–34%. The only time that foreign policy approached parity with domestic policy post-9/11 as a focus of U.S. public attention was in January 2007, shortly after Democrats secured control of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate, and around the time of the Bush administration's "surge" in Iraq. At that point, 40% of those surveyed

Table 7.5 U.S. public preferences regarding domestic versus foreign policy, 1994–2015

Q: "Right now, which is more important for President Obama [previously Bush, Clinton] to focus on… domestic policy or foreign policy?" (items were read in random order)

	Domestic	Foreign	Both (volunteered)
Obama			
January 2015	67	20	08
January 2014	78	09	08
January 2013	83	06	07
January 2012	81	09	05
January 2011	78	11	07
January 2009	71	11	14
G.W. Bush			
January 2008	56	31	08
January 2007	39	40	15
January 2006	57	25	13
January 2005	53	27	16
January 2002	52	34	11
Clinton			
September 1998	56	30	11
January 1997	86	07	05
December 1994	85	07	04

Source Pew (2015a). "Public's Policy Priorities Reflect Changing Conditions at Home and Abroad." Report dated January 15. http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/15/publics-policy-priorities-reflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad/

The 2015 results here are from a nationwide telephone survey of 1504 U.S. adults conducted January 7–11, 2015. The results from the full survey have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points. The question was not asked by Pew in all years. Undecided and "don't know" responses are not reported here

considered foreign policy more important, as compared to 39% favoring domestic matters. During the Obama presidency, and after the 2008 economic recession, two-thirds or more of those surveyed considered domestic policy more important than international matters. This public preference occurs despite continued, if not increased, international discord in the years since 9/11.

But that does not mean that terrorism disappeared as a concern. Indeed, a 2015 Pew survey of specific policy challenges demonstrates

that the fear of another terrorist attack is the only international policy issue that drew a significant level of citizen interest. With terrorism, of course, there is a domestic dimension. Beyond that topic, Table 7.6 demonstrates that the top areas of concern for Americans were entirely domestic and included the economy, education, Social Security, health care, Medicare, and crime. Two other topics that straddle the domestic and international arenas—defense and immigration—ranked 11 and 12 on the list.

Taken together, the largely domestic orientation of U.S. public opinion in recent years indicates that the country's views have changed less than some might have expected after 9/11, and when they did change, they did so in ways that one might not initially expect. This data also offers one explanation as to why presidents consistently are given such latitude in foreign and military affairs. If the public's concerns remain largely domestic in orientation, then members of Congress, elected by those citizens, likewise will focus on domestic matters. As a result, presidents face relatively little public or legislative constraints regarding international matters.

As long as presidents are successful at preventing another 9/11-type terrorist attack inside the U.S., researchers have found that they will likely be given considerable leeway to engage in military operations, surveillance activities, and drone strikes. This indulgence is not all that new: presidents were also given considerable leeway during the Cold War, for example. But for those studying the American presidency, the considerable willingness in the post-9/11 era of U.S. citizens to acquiesce to extensive international military operations is telling. It also demonstrates the importance of considering character and personality matters when evaluating presidents. The growing media focus on horse-race journalism, and the use of game frames to discuss political issues, likewise creates an environment where presidents can more easily attain their policy preferences if they successfully frame their presidential character and personality.

In a broader context, it is worth noting that nearly two decades have passed since 9/11, and the nation's embroilment in international crises has continued, if not intensified. While Al-Qaeda poses less of a threat than it did in 2001, the rise of the Islamic State and the brutal

Table 7.6 U.S. public preferences for U.S. policy, 2015

Q: "I'd like to ask you some questions about priorities for President Obama and Congress this year. As I read from a list, tell me if you think the item that I read should be a top priority, important but lower priority, not too important or should it not be done" (items were read in random order)

Results in percentages	Top priority	Important
1. Defending the country from future terrorist attacks	76	19
2. Strengthening the nation's economy	75	22
3. Improving the job situation	67	28
4. Improving the educational system	67	27
5. Taking steps to make the Social Security system financially sound	66	27
6. Reducing the budget deficit	64	28
7. Reducing healthcare costs	64	26
8. Taking steps to make the Medicare system financially sound	61	33
9. Reducing crime	57	32
10. Dealing with the problems of poor and needy people	55	35
11. Strengthening the U.S. military	52	31
12. Dealing with the issue of immigration	52	34
13. Protecting the environment	51	37
14. Addressing race relations in this country	49	33
15. Dealing with the moral breakdown in the country	48	28
16. Reforming the nation's tax system	48	37
17. Dealing with the nation's energy problem	46	41
18. Reducing the influence of lobbyists and special interest groups	43	37
19. Improving the country's roads, bridges, and public transportation	42	47
20. Dealing with the role of money in politics	42	37
21. Supporting scientific research	41	44
22. Dealing with global warming	38	29
23. Dealing with global climate change	34	33
24. Dealing with global trade issues	30	50

Source Pew (2015a). "Public's Policy Priorities Reflect Changing Conditions at Home and Abroad." Report dated January 15. http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/15/publics-policy-priorities-reflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad/
The results here are from a nationwide telephone survey of 1504 U.S. adults conducted January 7–11, 2015

interventions in war-torn Syria pose major problems for any administration. Compounding presidential difficulties are the Russian efforts to hack elections in the U.S. and elsewhere across the "free world." The rising tide of Islamophobia and hate crimes in the United States, along with the angry reactions to the refugee crisis that threaten to unravel the European Union, suggest that subsequent leaders will face international challenges at least as vexing as those from the perilous post-9/11 years (Jaffe and Nakamura 2016).

7.6 The Confusing, Contradictory Trump Presidency

One might conclude, given Donald Trump's presidential campaign and first two years of his presidency, that Trump was the first post-post-9/11 president. His campaign discourse focused on domestic economic anxieties, particularly those relating to the pain felt in economically troubled areas, including manufacturing, coal, and agriculture (Ceaser et al. 2017). The opening acts of his presidency likewise focused on white working class insecurities, as Trump continued to hold campaign-style rallies emphasizing familiar "Make America Great Again" themes (Farnsworth 2018). In yet another nod to his divisive, domestic-oriented perspective, Trump even said that all sides were to blame for the killing of a counter-protester objecting to a neo-Nazi rally in Charlottesville, Virginia (Clement and Nakamura 2017). Trump's virulent condemnation of the media, which he dubbed "fake news" (Owen 2017), and his long-standing push for criminal charges against rival Hillary Clinton, exhibited a leader intent on retaining, if not intensifying, the nation's divisions (Ceaser et al. 2017). Trump's approach to the presidency is precisely the opposite of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, both of whom, in their own ways, tried to reunite the divided nation during their terms in office.

Internationally, one can also see that Trump had little concerns for promoting democracy abroad, for building international consensus, or for even retaining the close relations with allies that allowed for

cooperative international efforts in the wake of 9/11 (Quealy 2017). Further, Trump's aggressive efforts to tear down trade deals, to support authoritarian leaders abroad, and to attack traditional European allies underscored the extent to which he veered from the points that presidents emphasized during the Obama and Bush years (Rogin 2017).

Other aspects of the Trump presidency suggest the opposite interpretation: that the New York businessman's political outlook is shaped to a significant degree by 9/11 and its aftermath. Trump's repeated, chaotic efforts to block Muslim immigration into the U.S. through executive orders, and his public statements on those exclusionary efforts, suggest that he is the third president to be shaped deeply by 9/11 and its aftermath (MacWilliams 2016). The isolationism that has marked Trump's foreign policy seems to him, and his supporters, to be a rational response to the wars in the Middle East that are now measured in decades, not years. Thus, while Trump's policies are less inclusive and less consistent those that of his predecessors, they are shaped by the events of 2001 and the years that followed. In other words, in some ways the Trump presidency is a continuation of the post-9/11 presidency, but it other ways it is not.

As both of these conflicting interpretations of the new president remain viable, scholars have returned to the use of personal character to try to explain presidential behavior. Trump's policy inconsistencies in a variety of areas are explained, according to some observers, by his extreme focus on personal status. He discards policies, and aides, whenever his short-term political calculations justify doing so, or when he wants to get even with those who are perceived to have wronged him (Isenstadt 2017). While psychologists often hesitate to assess the character of presidents in office, Trump's exceptional use of lies in public discourse, and his unusual public belittling of even the most loyal subordinates, has encouraged some mental health professionals to point to the president's troubling personal temperament as an explanation for his inconsistent behavior (Mayer 2017). So far, though, scholarly analyses of the Trump presidency have mainly sought to explain the inconsistencies. The question of whether the Trump presidency is actually a post-post-9/11 presidency, to this reading, remains unresolved.

7.7 Conclusion

Many scholars have noted that the modern White House engages in non-stop marketing campaigns through domestic media to build and retain public affection and support for the president, and that those efforts expanded in the wake of 9/11 (cf., Farnsworth 2018; Farnsworth and Lichter 2006; Han 2001; Heith 2013). Presidents who go public imagine that the American people will support them (Kernell 2007). Although little evidence suggests that going public is an effective domestic political strategy over the longer term, presidents frequently cultivate their public image and public response with an intensity that borders on obsession.

As presidential experts have noted, the war on terror initiated by George W. Bush reminded Americans and the world of the great importance that presidential personality plays in U.S. foreign policy. Although the Constitution provides that going to war requires congressional concurrence, the lessons of the Bush and Obama years (as well as the early months of the Trump presidency) are that Congress rarely defies the president when military policy options are being discussed. Few members of Congress challenged the dubious evidence regarding the alleged links between Iraq and the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, nor did many object in any substantial way to the warrantless wiretaps, the expansion of the "war on terror," or the massive financial costs of Washington's Middle East policies. Thanks to congressional acquiescence, the Obama administration's drone strikes and other military initiatives continued to rely on the 2001 anti-terrorism resolution passed by the shocked Congress in the days after 9/11. That same legislative acquiescence remained as Trump tore into traditional Republican Party policy views of such as skepticism regarding Russia, support for free trade, and participation in international alliances. This continued legislative deference regarding military policy provides one president after another with a largely free hand in foreign affairs. Personality factors are of great importance for unilateral actors, however. In the post-9/11 world, the main restraints on presidential military policies increasingly appear to be internal, in the character of the president.

As media scholars have observed, changes in the news environment since 9/11 have greatly expanded the channels through which presidents and presidential candidates communicate with Americans and international audiences. Those channels also give the president's critics new venues to reach both domestic and international publics. The now wide-open global media landscape also gives citizens around the world greater opportunity to join in the political debate via e-mails and social media. In whatever media outlets are available, post-9/11 presidents continue to spin the news, emphasize personal matters, and attempt to frame the narrative about themselves to advance their favored policy agenda with far fewer external constraints than was the case in previous eras.

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8

Re-inventing the Heart of Darkness for the Twenty-First Century: African Studies and the War on Terror Since 9/11

Matthew Unangst

At the beginning of November 2007, a group of scholars studying the Middle East and Africa announced the creation of a new scholarly organization, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA). The new organization would have all the trappings of its older peers, including an annual conference, a journal, and research funding. Undisclosed private donations provided the association's initial funding. In a press release, ASMEA's leaders explained its founding as a response to "the increasing politicization of these fields, and the certainty that a corrupt understanding of them is a danger to the academy as well as the future of the young people it purports to educate." Bernard Lewis, the most famous figure in the new organization, declared that politicization of the study of the Middle East and Africa had "affected not only the basic studies of language, literature and history, but also has affected other disciplines, notably economics, politics and social science. Given the importance of these regions, there is an acute need for objective and accurate scholarship and debate, unhampered by entrenched interests and allegiances." Mark T. Clark, another

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key figure in ASMEA, declared that the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) had ignored these concerns because of, "for lack of a better word, apartheid," a troubling comparison to make to professional scholars of Africa. The new organization would allow for a far greater range of perspectives, it was claimed, despite the fact that its leadership was ideologically homogenous and its leaders felt compelled to tell reporters that the organization was "not neoconservative at all" (Jaschik 1997).

ASMEA's primary focus was on countering the influence of the Middle East Studies Association, as demonstrated by Clark's statement and the preponderance of scholars of the Middle East among its initial leadership. But the organization included Africanists, as well. African studies, like Middle East studies, was not lacking for a major scholarly organization; the African Studies Association (ASA) attracts about 2000 attendees to its conference each year and publishes two peer-reviewed journals with Cambridge University Press. ASMEA's initial conference displayed where its leaders saw the connection between the Middle East and Africa. Titled, the "Evolution of Islamic Politics, Philosophy and Culture in the Middle East and Africa: From Traditional Limits to Modern Extremes," the conference featured no papers on sub-Saharan Africa. It instead laid out the organization's focus on countering political Islam (ASMEA 2008), adopting a spatial reference similar to the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. While of interest to policymakers, Clark stated that the organization's greater goal was to reshape the academy. He thought it necessary for scholars to account for strategy, by which he meant the national defense of the United States (Jaschik 1997).

ASMEA is the starkest example, but its creation signaled a larger shift, or split, in the study of Africa in the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Although existing scholarly organizations continued to study the same topics and employ the same methodologies as they had before 9/11, increased U.S. government funding for African studies and the creation of new organizations stemmed from the War on Terror. That new form of U.S. engagement with Africa created new forms of funding for scholars studying issues deemed important to the U.S. national interest, developments which promise to transform African studies in the coming decades. Since 9/11, funding and

publishing opportunities for African studies scholars in the United States have pushed the field toward a focus on security and military issues, much to the deficit of the issues that the leading figures in African studies had deemed worthwhile in preceding years.

The shift has transformed Africa into a place of "danger" for the United States. This transformation has resuscitated such nineteenth-century tropes of the continent as the "Heart of Darkness," to borrow from Joseph Conrad, or a space where danger demanded imperial domination and colonized knowledge in the name of "civilization."

8.1 African Studies Before 9/11

African studies, as a discipline in the United States, emerged after the Second World War with decolonization and the creation of independent states in Africa. Its development before 2001 was in many ways similar to that of other area studies disciplines, though it also reflected American racial politics and changes in African regimes. By the late twentieth century, the discipline was almost completely divorced from the national security state. Nonetheless, many American Africanists pursued research in fields that indirectly benefited American interests on the continent. This research, however, attempted to deal with Africa on its own terms, rather than from an American security perspective.

American scholars across the disciplines evinced little interest in the study of Africa through the 1940s and early 1950s. Whereas the initial impetus for the formation of other area studies fields came from private foundations that sought to create a knowledge base to support the United States as a global power, African studies remained more informal when colonial European powers still controlled the continent (Lockman 2016, 3, 17). The Carnegie Corporation took the lead in funding what scholarship there was through the British Dominions and Colonies Program, mostly in the form of grants to white South Africans. That program funded the creation of the first Africanist academic program in the United States at Northwestern University in 1948. As British interest in and funding for African issues faded with decolonization, American organizations and scholars gradually took the lead

in the field (Martin 2011, 64–65). Following Ghanaian independence in 1957, a group of scholars and officials from the U.S. government, corporations, and foundations founded the ASA, the first American scholarly organization dedicated to the study of Africa (Martin 2011). By the late 1950s, African studies was established in the American academy.

African studies was tied up with political concerns from its birth as a separate field of study. ASA's founders saw it explicitly as a means of countering Soviet influence in Africa. U.S. Government money built Africanist programs around the country, funded the expansion of the ASA's membership, and supported the creation of publications dedicated to African studies. Further support for African studies came through Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1965. The act declared expertise in area studies as vital for "the security, stability, and economic vitality of the United States" in the wake of "[d]ramatic changes in the world's geopolitical and economic landscapes." It authorized funding for area studies programs and fellowships in language study (United States Congress 1965). African independence led to more funding for scholarship on Africa in order to replace European colonial knowledge.

This period was one of growth for other area studies and international studies programs, as well. Spurred by the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik and fears that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in terms of knowledge, scholars of other regions founded their own area studies associations: Asian studies in 1948, International studies in 1959, and Middle East studies and Latin American studies in 1966. Each of the organizations began with ties to policymaking communities, and with sentiments that existing disciplinary organizations did not provide space for the interdisciplinary work necessary to study different regions of the world. Grants from the Ford Foundation and/or the Carnegie Endowment were crucial at this early stage (International Studies Association 2017). The study of other parts of the world became increasingly centered in universities, as they were the places most able to support increased work on international issues, particularly as the Ford Foundation shifted to bulk grants. From the 1950s, growth in area and international studies programs consistently outpaced growth in the academy as a whole (McCaughey 1984, 135–136; Lockman 2010, 148).

The tensions that led to the creation of ASMEA date to this period. Bernard Lewis' rivalry with MESA began at organization's founding. With a new, more critical generation coming of age in the 1960s, Lewis and other orientalists continued to claim that only they could ascertain the essence of Islamic civilization, and that there was one to begin with (Lockman 2010, 131–132). According to Lewis and other orientalists, Islam was a monolithic entity, or something that could be studied as a static phenomenon across historical time. Lewis compared it to communism in terms of its conflicts with the "West" over freedoms, and he periodically published new articles that argued Islamic societies were incapable of change because they were fundamentally different from western democracies (Lockman 2010, 176–177). The conflict that generated ASMEA dates back over fifty years, but it was not visible in African studies until after 9/11.

Though Africa was at that point a front in the Cold War ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union, most of the new generation of American Africanists pursued a different intellectual path. They aimed to create a space for the open examination of the ideas of Africa's new leaders and to discover African voices in the past whose influence had been obscured by European colonialism. The histories and other scholarly works they produced replaced studies of Africa written by colonial officials. After the initial rush to establish influence in Africa, scholars devoted little effort to understanding strategic concerns beyond the basic dichotomies of the Cold War.

Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the relationship between African studies and policymakers deteriorated. The U.S. Africanist community split during the 1960s over the ASA's lack of support for black American scholars and its acceptance of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Many American Africanist scholars joined the rival African Heritage Studies Association, which had an agenda of international justice. The remaining alliances between the academy and the government fell apart over the Nixon-Kissinger policy of supporting white rule in South Africa and American support for Portugal in its wars against the independence movements in Angola and Mozambique. In the early 1980s, the conflict between the government and academy reached a peak. It was then that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) offered

four Title VI African centers extensive annual funding in exchange for their service in developing reports on the continent. Rather than immediately accept the funding, the director of each center demurred until meeting with the other centers' directors. After that meeting, all eleven centers jointly decided to reject the funding. That rejection developed into a broader policy in the U.S. Africanist community to reject military and intelligence funding, despite government offers and university pressures. The Association of African Studies Programs and the ASA signed on to that policy soon thereafter (Wiley 2012).

Together with MESA and the Latin American Studies Association, ASA authored a resolution in 1993 that called for the defense community to stop providing funding in education. The organizations claimed that such funding would make research more difficult and endanger scholars working in many parts of the world (Lockman 2010, 245). Africanists increasingly saw American foreign policy as conflicting with their attempts to create knowledge.

Before 2001, scholars of Africa in the United States were, for the most part, able to resist government and administrative pressure and pursue research agendas that did not necessarily serve the U.S. national interest, unless indirectly. There was a growing body of scholarship on Islam in African Studies, though it was focused less on political Islam as a security threat than on Islam's role in history and identity politics on the continent. It is therefore difficult to argue that the pre-9/11 Africanist community ignored important issues, such as Islam, only to be taken up by ASMEA at a later date. Nor did Africanist scholars ignore issues related to state problems or war on the continent; those were central issues in the field. In the six years leading up to the September 11th attacks, the *African Studies Review*, the leading interdisciplinary journal in African studies in the United States, published at least fifteen articles or extended review essays on war and violence (including one entire issue in April 1998), three articles on Islam, and one article on security in Africa. But the scholars who wrote those articles attempted to understand its place in local and regional politics, and they did not depict them primarily as threats to the United States (Ammons 1996; Gorman 1996; Copson 1997; Gershoni 1997; Durotoye and Griffiths 1997; Lemarchand 1998; Ndikumana 1998;

Newbury 1998; Mama 1998; Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Awe 1999; Strauss 2000; Salamone 1996; Collins 1999; Sharkey 2001; Burgess 1998). Scholars in African studies, then, contributed to American knowledge about Africa, creating knowledge relevant for policy while refusing direct connections with the national security state.

The study of Africa on its own terms came at a cost to Africanist scholars, however. As U.S. government interest in the continent faded, so did the prominence of African issues in the popular media. Whereas earlier African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere had great success in publicizing their nations and programs in the 1950s and 1960s, leaders of the following decades slipped out of the public consciousness in the United States. Other than Nelson Mandela, few other African leaders made a significant mark on the American public consciousness in the long decade between the end of the Cold War and 9/11.

For the future scholars of ASMEA, however, Africa was becoming a bigger threat to the United States. Bernard Lewis' "The Roots of Muslim Rage," published in *The Atlantic Monthly* in September 1990, expanded the scope of his warnings about Islam's threat to the United States. With the Cold War ending, Lewis argued that Islam would pose the greatest threat to the United States in the coming years, and that Islam's menace provided an explanation for conflicts beyond the Middle East. Specifically, he claimed the Eritrean War for Independence, nearing its end, was an expression of the "Muslim Rage" of his title. In writing the article, Lewis demanded the expansion of thinking about civilizational conflict to include Muslim-majority parts of Africa (Lewis 1990).

African studies faces particular challenges from neoconservative scholars because of the prevalence of Islam on the continent and the lack of knowledge of Africa among most Americans.

8.2 Foreign Policy and Africa Before 9/11

Much American involvement on the African continent before 2001 centered on containing the spread of communism, real or imagined, to newly-independent African states. U.S. operations on the continent

were often top secret and, in some cases, remain partly classified today. They ranged from assisting Belgium with the assassination of the democratically-elected president of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, to support for the apartheid regime in South Africa in its invasion of Angola (De Witte 2001; Minter 1994). Non-violent interventions focused on "development," following the five-step framework that social scientist Walt Rostow developed at the height of the Cold War and applied as a national security official in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Latham 2000). Many Africanists criticized that approach for its economic determinism and one-size-fits-all understanding of "modernity," along with the ways in which modernization theory was used to justify American interventions in the so-called third world.

Yet the old paradigms fell apart in the late twentieth century. Modernization theory fell out of favor by the end of the 1980s. The Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union also fell, as did many of the United States' most notorious African allies during the 1990s. For these reasons and others, the future of American involvement in Africa was not clear at the beginning of the new millennium.

American foreign policy treated Africa as a sideshow to its more pressing interests in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Security was largely left to proxies, such as Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire and apartheid South Africa. Prior to the War on Terror, three different U.S. "commands" shared responsibility for Africa, demonstrating the United States' relative lack of interest in Africa during the Cold War.[1] Speaking to Jim Lehrer on PBS' *Newshour* during his first campaign for the presidency, George W. Bush declared his belief that "while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them" (Bush 2000). Africa did not seem like a future site of extensive American intervention.

The 9/11 attacks shifted U.S. foreign policy toward the African continent. As a *New York Times Magazine* article described the situation,

[1]The European Command was responsible for the majority of the continent, Central Command for Egypt, Sudan, the Horn, and Kenya, and Pacific Command the islands of the Indian Ocean.

"The Sahel soon became a laboratory for the United States to test its policies in the 'global war on terror," a second front after Afghanistan. The U.S. State Department, together with Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, created the Pan-Sahel Initiative for security in 2002 (Schmidle 2009). Former U.S. ambassador to Chad, Donald R. Norland, told the House Africa Subcommittee in April 2002 that, "for the first time, the two concepts – 'Africa' and 'U.S. national security' – have been used in the same sentence in Pentagon documents" (House International Relations 2002, 8). Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Christopher Henry told Congress that "Africa…is emerging on the world scene as a strategic player, and we need to deal with it as a continent" (McFate 2008, 11). The Bush administration created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in 2002 and promised it $100 million the following year, including $14 million for "Muslim education" (Lyman and Morrison 2004). The 2002 National Security Strategy announced that U.S. security was now more threatened by failing states than conquering ones (President of the United States 2002, 1). That meant, of course, that Africa became a focus, and its governance difficulties a national security problem.

Islam in Africa became a subject of particular interest. In 2004 Stephen Ellis noted a new "keen interest" among "strategists, policy-wonks and Beltway insiders" around the issues of oil and terrorism. One of the major factors Ellis identified was the fact that "West Africa contains a large number of Muslims and therefore has the potential for radical Islam" (Ellis 2004). Princeton Lyman and Stephen Morrison called for a more "holistic" approach to fighting the War on Terror in Africa in 2004 (Lyman and Morrison 2004). The article included a table listing the total population, Muslim population, and percentage of Muslims for selected African nations. The existence of a Muslim population thus appears as a possible threat to the United States, no matter whether that population had ever carried out terrorist attacks or made aggressive actions toward the U.S. The lack of context and logic is startling.

By 2006, the U.S. National Security Strategy included an entire section on Africa (President of the United States 2006, 37). Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia joined the Pan-Sahel Initiative in

2005, and the organization became the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). As part of the arrangement, American special forces trained local armies in battling insurgencies (Schmidle 2009). In 2009, the State Department created the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (PREACT), the counterpart of TSCTI. PREACT's mission is to build "counterterrorism capacity and capability" in Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Two years earlier, in 2007, the Bush administration created the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) to direct American military actions in Africa. President Bush announced that AFRICOM would serve to "strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa…enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa" (President of the United States 2007). Africa assumed a central role in American security policy during George W. Bush's presidency.

AFRICOM's presence in Africa has militarized African regimes and increased violence on the continent (Taguem Fah 2010, 81). American military operations in Africa reached a level not seen since the North Africa campaign of the Second World War. Under these circumstances, William F.S. Miles has noted the "unprecedented level of overlap between defense and development missions with respect to engagement with Africa" (Miles 2012, 28). There was also an imbalance in funding and support between different departments. A senior Department of State Officer estimated there were about seven military employees working on U.S. Africa policy for every one State or USAID employee in 2009 (Wiley 2012, 154). The consequences of a militarized foreign policy extended beyond a tilt toward defense agencies in Washington. Jeremy Keenan argued that the War on Terror's "linking of a narrow military idea of security to development, have had an adverse impact and already destabilized many African countries." American military support allowed African regimes to crack down on and create enemies out of Muslim groups that had previously been peaceful. These examples indicate that development and security have become inextricably linked in American discourses on Africa since 9/11 (Keenan 2008, 16).

8.3 Responses from the Africanist Community

ASMEA's combination of Middle East studies and African studies into one scholarly organization reflects broader changes in the academy since 2001 and the pressures that have reoriented American foreign policy. Although the War on Terror has had a more visible impact on Middle East studies, African studies provides a clearer case study of the effects.

Across area studies programs, the U.S. government and private, right-wing organizations have pushed for a greater focus on research that serves a narrowly-defined national security interest. New approaches to Africa as a theater for United States security operations have placed a burden on African studies. Critiques of Middle East studies as not serving the national interest predate the War on Terror by decades; in African studies they are largely a result of 9/11 and its aftermath. At least one scholar has expressed concern about the new "whole government" approach to security, arguing that it calls into question participation in formerly independent government initiatives such as the Fulbright program, and that it is leading to increased suspicion of American researchers in Africa (Wiley 2012, 157). Though some of these changes were underway before 2001, 9/11 accelerated them gave greater voice to "experts" outside of the existing area studies framework.

Some members of the African studies community challenged the changes to the field. Rita Abrahamsen argued that Africa has undergone "securitization" in academic debates, as well as in foreign policy discussions. This process has turned discussions of Africa from "development/humanitarianism" to "risk/fear/security" and placed Africa within the War on Terror framework. There has been a shift in the United States from seeing Africa as a place of economic underdevelopment, political mismanagement, and suffering to seeing the continent as a threat to the security of the United States and its allies. This "securitization," in Abrahamsen's estimation, justifies emergency actions to solve problems. Failed states became dangerous spaces for the West where military order needs to be imposed (Abrahamsen 2005, 59–60, 69). Studies of African politics and history in these ways become part of the national security state.

Here, again, African studies tracks broader changes in the academy. As early as 2004, Cary Nelson, then vice president of the American Association of University Professors, warned of the increasing influence of the national security state on academic affairs. Nelson lamented the lobbying of right-wing figures for greater governmental oversight and control of academia (Nelson 2004). Charles King has noted a trend of scaling back education and research on international affairs in the United States in favor of the "militarization" of scholarship. The Minerva Initiative, a Department of Defense program, has especially oriented research toward national security, King claims. He cites the lack of language knowledge in international studies as evidence, and argues that the changes were created by the culture wars. Other causes are a determination to spend money only on research related to national security in the War on Terror, and private foundations changing funding models to favor "disruption" (King 2015). Henry Giroux sees a "creeping militarism" at work, which is attempting to turn the academy into a "hypermodern militarized knowledge factory" (Giroux 2009, 205). The War on Terror has produced calls for the academy to serve American national security, and that transformation, as King and Giroux note, undermines scholarship, particularly on parts of the world that do not share U.S. military goals.

Most of the African studies discipline did its best to resist the process of securitization. The eleven Title VI African centers reaffirmed their policy of refusing funding for projects with an explicit security or intelligence purpose in a 2008 statement. They declared they would "oppose the application for and acceptance of military and intelligence funding of area and language programs, projects, and research in African studies…We believe that the long-term interests of the people of the U.S. are best served by this separation between academic and military and defense establishments…This separation ensures that U.S. students and faculty researchers can maintain close ties with African researchers and affiliation with and access to African institutions without question or bias." Despite political and economic pressures, academic freedom remained vitally important to African studies, and the relationship between the foreign policy establishment and ASA remained strained after 9/11.

8.4 ASMEA Enters the Field

ASMEA stepped into the climate of cool detachment between the American foreign policy establishment and the ASA, and its founders depicted the organization as filling a gap between the ideals of the academy and the realities of the post-9/11 world (Lockman 2010, 271). ASMEA railed against what it saw as the politicization of the field, but it became apparent that what ASMEA's founders wanted was not the elimination of politics from the academy, but a reorientation of those politics.

The papers at ASMEA's initial conference in 2008 reveal a belief in Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis and an expansion of the neoconservative imaginary to Africa. The presentation topics revolved around questions of whether violence is inherent to Islam, and they even included historical papers on various methods for fighting jihadists in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa (ASMEA 2008). As ASMEA member Donovan Chau described it, the ASMEA conference is "a conference that is rooted not in the ideals of ivory towers but in the realities of the history, politics, and culture of two important regions related to the defense of the United States, namely, the Middle East and Africa," a conference for "those seeking thorough academic freedom" (Chau 2010a). ASMEA has been careful to depict itself as non-partisan, and the organization's videos carry the disclaimer, "ASMEA is a non-partisan, non-profit academic society" (ASMEA 2009a). It has declared that "Academic boycotts are inimical to academic freedom and open debate…Inserting political agendas and bias into the study of the regions does a grave disservice to these noble disciplines" (ASMEA 2017a). In the ASA's attempt to avoid politics, it again becomes clear that the goal was less about apolitical research than a recalibration of the academy's politics.

ASMEA's "private donations" allow it to offer funding that the ASA cannot provide, giving private funders greater control over scholarship. While other area studies organizations were created with outside money, usually from private organizations such as the Ford Foundation or the Carnegie Endowment, that funding was more transparent than was the case after 9/11. As funding sources can play a role in directing

research and conclusions, the lack of disclosure is troubling. However, such opacity in scholarly funding is not limited to ASMEA, and it was underway in the academy before 9/11. Legislation in the 1980s facilitated partnerships with corporations, and many university science laboratories became de facto extensions of corporate research and design departments. In the neoliberal university, with ever-increasing pressure on budgets, the at times undisclosed grants become markers of "excellence" rather than a problematic practice that raises dubious questions about the resulting scholarship. It is unfortunate that the War on Terror converged with larger neoliberal trends to give rise to organizations that appear hostile to the idea of academic freedom. In such an environment, universities are often driven by profit motives and endowments rather than by educational concerns (Nelson and Watt 1999, 84–87; Giroux 2014).[2]

Because of its profile, ASMEA provides the exposure necessary for its members to become visible experts on any given issue. Bernard Lewis, unlike ASMEA's other leaders, was already prominent as the holder of an endowed chair in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and as an advisor to Bush administration officials. Lewis, however, was not a mainstream figure within Middle East studies. His debates with Edward Said after the publication of Said's *Orientalism*, both in-person and in written form, signaled a political battle over the future of the discipline (Lewis 1982; Said and Grabar 1982). Lewis became an increasingly marginal figure in Middle East studies, even as his ideas became central to neoconservative foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s. His claims that Said's ideas had taken over the Middle East Studies Association were prominent in attacks on MESA in the 2000s. Though, as Juan Cole has noted, Said was not as integral to the discipline as his critics claimed (Cole 2003). Despite his marginalization among critical area specialists after 9/11, Lewis became one of the media's preferred experts on the Middle East.

[2]An example of these concerns arose at Temple University in 2014. Two economics professors, Simon Hakim and Erwin Blackstone, wrote a working paper and a series of op-eds based on it that claimed private prisons saved money with no decline in services. They did not disclose that they had received funding from companies that operated private prisons (Flaherty 2014).

ASMEA scholars have used their positions within the organization, government support for it, and general ignorance in the United States about Africa to obscure the difference between politics and expertise and advance their opinions in contemporary public debates. ASMEA's primary expert on African studies is J. Peter Pham, who serves as the organization's vice president and the editor-in-chief of its journal (ASMEA 2017b). Pham also serves as the Director of the Atlantic Council's Africa Center (Atlantic Council 2017a). The Council, which former Secretaries of State Christian Herter and Dean Acheson founded in 1961, exists to serve the mission of strengthening the trans-Atlantic U.S. alliance system. Its efforts concentrated on Europe for the first few decades of its existence, particularly on educating the public about the importance of engagement with international communities (Atlantic Council 2017b). The Council only started its Africa Center in 2009 with the goal to "promote strong geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect U.S. and European policy priorities towards strengthening economic growth and prosperity on the continent" (Atlantic Council 2017c). The Africa Center represents a new interest in Africa as a field for American strategic and economic interests and analysts.

Pham has taken advantage of his positions at the Atlantic Council and with ASMEA to become one of the most visible public voices in the United States on African issues. His status as a public figure exists even though Pham has no formal training in African studies in any discipline. He has a Ph.D., but he wrote his dissertation on the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, a Swiss Catholic theologian (Pham 1999, 280). After completing his Ph.D., Pham worked in the late 1990s for the libertarian Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty, where he did not write on African subjects. Pham served in the Vatican diplomatic service for a few years in the early 2000s, after which time he published a book on papal successions (James Madison University 2017). Pham turned his Vatican experience into a position as a professor of political science and Africana studies at James Madison University. From there, he had a venue to further influence media depictions of Africa.

The first issue of ASMEA's journal, *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, was almost entirely dominated by Lewis' paradigm of

conflict between Islamic cultures and states and non-Islamic ones: in the Western Sahara, between Muslim and Christian groups in contemporary Nigeria, in the rivalry between Israel and its Arab neighbors, in the historic borderlands of the Horn of Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, and, of course, as a cause of terrorism in South Africa. One paper, by Donovan Chau, is particularly revealing, as it tracked the tension between Somalia and Kenya back to Somali jihadists in the early twentieth century. According to Chau, "the nature of the threat" from al Shabaab "remains as it was a century ago." Kenya is doomed to face conflict, Chau argued, due to its position at the "crossroads of cultures" (Chau 2010b). From its outset, ASMEA set out to legitimize Lewis' cultural essentialism in the study of Africa.

A 2009 conversation reveals how Lewis' framework exemplified how many ASMEA members studied contemporary issues in Africa. In the conversation, Pham and Gérard Prunier, an ASMEA member and former director of the Centre français des études éthiopiennes, discuss the reasons why the United States evinces a "need for a comprehensive policy" toward Africa. Prunier had become a media expert in France on conflicts in the Sudan, Somalia, and the Great Lakes region. ASMEA exposed him to the larger American audience. Prunier, falling back on his experience in East Africa, said that he did not think terrorism "really existed" in Africa until recently. He defines terrorism as "basically, radical Muslims running haywire." Pham traced the rise of terrorism to development issues, stating that terrorists had become such because of the lack of governance in Africa, which prevented rule of law and in turn prevented economic growth. He claimed the most important question for American security in Africa was whether the U.S. could "help Africans to be more self-reliant" (ASMEA 2009a). In this sense, security issues in Africa were linked to the extension of capitalism to the continent.

ASMEA has been a reliable supporter of the securitization of American foreign policy in Africa and the linking of security and development. Pham has described African countries since 9/11 as "ungoverned spaces and other areas where, perhaps, something might pop up" that endangers the United States (ASMEA 2009a). He expressed support for AFRICOM in a 2014 article. Pham wrote that security is a necessary step before Africa can prosper (Pham 2014). Prunier called for an escalation

of the conflict in the Sudan, asserting that "the return of violence is not necessarily a bad thing," because, he reasoned, it would be less devastating than famine. According to Prunier, the logic in separating South Sudan from the north had been flawed from the beginning. The nation's conflict was not between the Muslim north and the Christian south, but it instead came out of "the Arab government's exploitation of various non-Arab groups on the country's periphery…since the 19th century." Only the south had been aware of that exploitation, however, "because it was neither Arab nor Islamic." Prunier claimed that "[t]he rest of the country lived for more than 150 years under the illusion that it shared fundamental values with the Arab center" (Prunier 2012). He thereby made the Sudan a front in Lewis' long-running civilizational conflict, an argument that contradicts most scholarship on the issue.

ASMEA generally expresses disdain for the field of African studies as it exists in the United States. An article by Greg Mills blamed development experts "on the left of the political center" for creating perverse incentives in African development that prevented economic growth and the rule of law from taking hold on the continent. Development aid "encourage[d] a culture of dependency" rather than the capitalism necessary for democracy and growth (Miles 2011, 122, 124). A roundtable on Boko Haram ASMEA hosted included not a single panelist with formal training in African studies. In addition to Pham, it featured Lauren Blanchard from the Congressional Research Service and Jacob Zenn from the Jamestown Foundation, a conservative think tank. Additionally, the roundtable signaled its politics in its subtitle, "Islamism and Anarchy to What End?" (ASMEA 2014). The organization does not engage in dialogue with other scholars, but presents itself as the only American center of expertise about Africa, a position that few credible scholarly organizations take in the twenty-first century.

8.5 Recent Developments

ASMEA's growth as an organization and its transition to a reliable academic backer of U.S. foreign policy shapes what Americans think about Africa and what is possible in American interactions with African

nations. In addition to the articles in major publications and appearances on popular television programs, the organization's presence can be seen in several other forums. When the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security in the House of Representatives held its first hearing on Boko Haram in November 2011, it invited four experts to give testimony. Two of them were ASMEA members, J. Peter Pham and Ricardo René Larémont. There was no representation from ASA (United States Congress 2011), which possessed the collective expertise of more than six decades.

The sidelining of the ASA comes despite the organization's focus on the key post-9/11 issues before 2001. As noted earlier, the ASA remains a venue for discussing and publishing on issues such as security and Islamism, issues that have recently been deemed important to ASMEA and the foreign policy establishment. In addition to an entire issue on gender-based violence, the *African Studies Review* has included at least twenty articles or extended review essays on war and/or violence since 2002. Topics have included the means of ending conflict continent-wide; genocide and ethnic conflict; child soldiers; natural resource management in conflicts; the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire; and post-election violence in Kenya (African Studies Association 2012; Newbury 2002; Nyamnjoh and Jua 2002; Martin 2002; Murphy 2003; Rashid 2003; Shafer and Black 2003; Brinkman 2004; Martin 2005; Lemarchand 2005; Richards 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Autesserre 2006; Minter 2007; Martin 2009; Baines 2010; Bird and Ottanelli 2011; Kanyinga and Long 2012; Boone 2012; Mundy 2013; Lance 2014; Verweijen 2015). The journal devoted an entire issue to Islamism in West Africa in September 2004 that featured articles on Senegal, the Gambia, Nigeria, and Niger, and it has published two articles on Islamism elsewhere (Villalón 2004; Darboe 2004; Mahmud 2004; Charlick 2004; Whitsitt 2003; Last 2013). Its articles on security have included discussions of Nigerian security agencies and South African defense (Adebanwi 2011; Truesdell 2009). The *African Studies Review* has published articles explicitly about terrorism, as well as an issue on "Africa in the Age of Obama." Another important topic that the journal has addressed is the relationship between China and Africa, at times a key issue in American

foreign policy toward Africa over the last fifteen years (Barnes 2005; Berman 2006; African Studies Association 2010, 2013a, b; Li 2005; Adem 2012). ASMEA's claims about the irrelevance ASA scholarship are therefore suspect.

Nevertheless, ASMEA is more prominent in American government and media discussions of Africa. J. Peter Pham was called to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' hearing on "Responding to Drought and Famine in the Horn of Africa" in August 2011. There he called for improved security and a halt to mass emigration. He also focused on efforts to reduce the power of al-Shabaab in the "increasingly important subregion at the crossroads of the [sic] Africa and the Middle East." Pham demonstrated ASMEA's seeming mission in Africa, namely the expansion of neoconservative foreign policy beyond the Middle East to all parts of the globe touched by Islam (Pham 2011). Pham called Mali the "African Afghanistan" in an article in the *New York Times* in January 2013 (Pham 2013). CNN gave Pham a forum to link the *Charlie Hebdo* murders to the actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria, arguing that both were "motivated by an Islamist extremist ideology that rejects a modern world shaped by political, economic, and social liberalism" and that believes "no deed is too brutal or tactic too low" (Pham 2015). Despite the fact that his area of expertise is thousands of miles to the north, Pham was Fox News' choice to explain the legacies of Nelson Mandela upon the leader's death in 2014. The segment focused on Mandela's attempts at reconciliation and his avoidance of "radical ideologies" that others had proposed during apartheid (Fox News 2013). ASMEA's willingness to support a U.S. foreign policy mission in Africa certainly plays a role in its high public profile.

Allowing ASMEA such a venue provides the basis for a wider transition to militarization and privatization in American involvement with Africa. One example is the NGO Spirit of America, which allows American donors to pay to outfit Nigerian army units fighting Boko Haram. Donations to a nonprofit becomes military equipment and leads to greater violence in Nigeria (Anyadike 2015) as well-meaning Americans with little understanding of the facts on the ground become part of the securitization process. Such involvement with Africa does not help people on the continent, nor does it advance American

security. It creates more short-term involvement with Africa, defined by war, not by development.

ASMEA and its allies threaten to undo much of the work of Africanists over the past half century. For example, in Gérard Prunier's "special presentation" on the conflict in the Sudan at ASMEA's 2009 conference, Prunier used the outdated terminology of "tribe" and presented an extremely reductionist view of ethnicity in Somalia, criticizing ethnic groups he defined as "black Africans" for trying to become "Arabs" and comparing them to "Jews joining the SS." In Prunier's view, "Islam is more a way of legitimizing" the hierarchy of Sudanese society than anything else (Prunier 2009). In another venue, Prunier described the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s as "very primitive, brutal, retrogressive" (ASMEA 2009b). Pham spoke to PBS, which had chosen him as its expert on Boko Haram, in February 2014. He accused Boko Haram of wanting to create a "fantasy" caliphate, "fantasy" because it had no basis in history (PBS 2014).

ASMEA's rhetoric is evocative of European colonialist rhetoric from the nineteenth century. Then, figures such as the Catholic Primate of Africa, Charles Lavigerie, called for a new crusade against Islam in Africa. Lavigerie told audiences across Europe that "fanatical" Arabs in Africa had created racial divisions between Arab and African, and saw Africans as "fit only for the yoke" (Herder'sche Verlagshandlung 1888, 218). He founded a mission society, the White Fathers, specifically for stopping the Arab slave trade. His call to arms inspired a German military intervention in East Africa that created a brutal colonial regime whose existence depended on military means. At the same moment in the Sudan, rhetoric around Muhammad Ahmad, better known as the Mahdi, created enthusiasm in the United Kingdom for the colonization of Africa (Lewis 1987). While nineteenth-century Europeans depicted Africa as the Heart of Darkness, ASMEA's rhetoric is similar in that it denies the history of Islam and anticolonial movements in Africa.

Such interpretations lead ASMEA members to distort the nature of the contemporary problems that face Africa in their media appearances. The ongoing civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has involved countries across the continent and resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, is largely unknown in the United States.

Meanwhile, the American media devotes coverage to Boko Haram, Somali pirates, Kenyan terrorists, and other groups it can classify as Islamic threats. Along those lines, the militarization of American policy toward Africa has continued. In 2014, at its U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit, the White House announced the Security Governance Initiative to create "an enhanced approach to security sector assistance" (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014a). It also announced partnerships to counter terrorism, in particular Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014b). As William F.S. Miles has noted in the *African Studies Review*, the replacement of aid workers with soldiers creates a particular image of the United States in Africa, one based around American violence (Miles 2012, 33). Africa for the United States is a military theater of the War on Terror.

The securitization of the field has had a major effect on funding for the academic study of Africa in the United States. The U.S. government cut support for the Title VI area studies centers by 46% in 2011 and suspended the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Abroad, Faculty Research Abroad, and Summer Cooperative African Language Institute programs. There is now approximately fifty times as much funding for the study of Africa in U.S. security agencies than in American universities. Two Title VI Africa centers have now decided to accept funding from the Department of Defense, despite the dissent of their faculty, a decision that seems to epitomize today's neoliberal university climate (Wiley 2012, 158). The long-term effects of new forms of university funding cannot yet be known, but their objectives point new directions in the study of Africa in the United States. The new direction will undermine attempts to create general knowledge about Africa, knowledge that might be useful to American policymakers to face future threats outside the War on Terror.

8.6 Conclusion

While the nearly two decades since the September 11th attacks have seen a greater engagement with Africa by the United States and increased government funding for the study of Africa, it is difficult

to argue that these changes have been positive for African studies as a field. The increased engagement by the foreign policy community, as epitomized by ASMEA, mirrors pre-independence African studies and fails to reckon with Africa on its own terms, but rather as a theater for American fantasies and fears about Islam.

ASMEA's founding is the culmination of trends in higher education that existed before 9/11, but which events that day accelerated. First, ASMEA's dependence on undisclosed private donations is just one of many cases of academic organizations becoming increasingly entangled with corporate interests, often without public knowledge. Second, the organization is part of a larger movement on the political right to redefine academic freedom from the right of academics to express unpopular opinions to the right of conservatives to have representation in academic institutions, no matter the quality of their scholarship. That element of the organization's founding is closely tied to a third factor, the idea that scholars and universities who receive public funding have a duty to provide research for national security interests, narrowly defined. Together, these trends drive a division between political knowledge produced for specific purposes and ideal knowledge for a better understanding of the world. This makes dialogue between scholars and policymakers more difficult.

Africa is again the Heart of Darkness, a place little understood by Americans in which dangers allegedly lurk. One hopes that the ASA can successfully create counter-narratives and continue to provide space for African voices in shaping American understandings of Africa. The stakes are high: the future of African studies as an independent, scholarly field.

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9

Growth and Uncertainty: The Impact of 9/11 on Intelligence and National Security Studies

Joseph Fitsanakis

The United States of America suffered a collective trauma on September 11, 2001. It has been estimated that 20% of Americans were personally acquainted with at least one person who died or was injured in the attacks. In the days following 9/11, up to one in seven Americans experienced depression that was either directly caused or exacerbated by the attacks. In New York alone, nearly 35,000 people sought treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder in the months after the tragic events (US Department of Health and Human Services 2002).

In the academic arena, especially in the social sciences, the prolonged period of war and global insecurity that followed 9/11 directly affected critical scholarship in terms of scope, funding, and output (Silke 2007). Few academic disciplines, however, were affected as drastically by the events of 9/11 as Intelligence and National Security Studies (INSS). The historical emergence of security and intelligence structures is inextricably connected with the evolution of the modern state apparatus. At their core, intelligence and security agencies are parts of the broader human

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effort to curtail the destabilizing tendencies of social systems. Thus, despite their often-controversial reputation, security and intelligence agencies tend to emerge from the understandable need of organized societies to preserve the stability of their institutions, especially in transitional periods. In that sense, the emergence of intelligence and security agencies is part of a wider effort to avoid catastrophic surprises and thus protect and preserve the structures of government, as well as their social function.

Almost from its conception, classical political philosophy explains the emergence of organized government as a product of some of the most powerful human impulses, such as virtue, rationality, and fear. Pioneering philosophers like Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes developed the fundamental tenets of their political worldview by studying these core human impulses. They both explained—and defended—the principle of organized government as a response to natural human impulses (Lockyer 1988). In the works of Hobbes, although seemingly antithetical, these impulses are treated as functionally interrelated, producing an amalgam of human desires that gradually prompt their bearers to seek the establishment of organized state structures. Their very existence, Hobbes explains, is a product of humanity's "campaign against irrationalism [and] barbarism" (Forsyth 1988). He concludes that it is volatility and anarchy that inspire humankind to devise, attempt, and endure the establishment of an organized system of government. The latter emerges gradually "under compulsion, that is, when man is subject to extreme fear" caused by the chaos of living in a "state of nature" (Forsyth 1988). The evolution of the field is thus rooted in the foundational texts of many liberal arts programs, along with required readings in subjects ranging from political science to history. Likewise, concepts such as national security incorporate numerous aspects that are of interest to students of politics or government studies. In classical political philosophy, therefore, the institutions of the modern liberal-democratic state are seen as owing their emergence to the protracted human desire to satisfy a number of central societal impulses. Namely, the preservation of human virtue; the deployment of rationality against the unpredictability of existence; and the curtailment of the anomy that is inherent in the natural state of existence.

Being as they are core components of the liberal-democratic state, intelligence and security agencies have for centuries contributed to this human endeavor, with an admittedly mixed record of success. In his book *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, the American political scientist Mark Lowenthal explains that the institutional task of intelligence and security agencies is nothing less than the preservation of liberal-democratic states. He adds that the bureaucratic mission of intelligence and security agencies that operate within democratic systems is markedly complex. It includes trying to curtail uncertainty by preventing strategic surprises and providing support to executive decision-making by systematically collecting and analyzing information. Moreover, Lowenthal notes that the protection of state secrets from the prying eyes of domestic or foreign adversaries is another core function of contemporary intelligence and security agencies (Lowenthal 2009). Lowenthal specifically refers here to intelligence and security agencies that operate within liberal-democratic political systems.

Comparative examinations of such agencies indicate that their institutional character and idiosyncrasies tend to reflect the wider political context in which they operate (Gill 1994). They also tend to mirror the broader cultural, economic, and societal values that have informed their evolution. In an important sense, intelligence and security agencies, whether Danish, Cuban, Chinese or South African, operate under broadly similar organizational principles and exercise broadly similar technical methods. From a political standpoint, however, their main difference is in their degree of independence from, or domination over, executive power. In his seminal *CIA and American Democracy*, historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones notes that, no matter whether it operates in the second or twentieth century, or headquartered in Washington or Moscow, an intelligence agency's proficiency rests on its ability to fulfill its mission while abstaining from all forms of political influence (Jeffreys-Jones 1989). It follows that there should—ideally—be major differences in the institutional character of, to take two Cold War examples: the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Soviet Union's Committee for State Security, known by its Russian acronym, KGB. If differences between them are not easily discernible, then a set of broader

research questions should be raised about the deeper nature of the American and Soviet political systems during that period.

While the above comparison is indicative of some of the interdisciplinary themes explored in the contemporary INSS field, the incorporation of two disciplines—intelligence *and* national security—into a single field of study is a crucial parameter in this discussion. The discipline's intelligence component embodies the "academic inquiry into the processes and topics related to intelligence" (Coulthart and Crosston 2015), with the latter term defined as the systematic collection, assessment, and evaluation of information that is important for national security. This inquiry is contextualized with reference to the character and behavior of government institutions, and methods for the collection, assessment, and evaluation of information that are practiced in a variety of public and private settings. Alongside its intelligence component, the field takes into account the nature of contemporary threats to the security of the nation-state, thus relating the discipline of intelligence to national security. But INSS looks specifically at the intersection between the methodologies of intelligence, on the one hand, and efforts to sustain organized government, on the other. INSS, therefore, focuses on the uses of intelligence in the service of national security. After discussing the field's origins, this chapter is organized around four questions about how INSS relates to homeland security, intelligence, counterterrorism, and civil liberties.

9.1 The Field Before and After 9/11

Prior to 9/11, the field of INSS was limited almost exclusively to the graduate domain, with few courses sporadically available in the undergraduate domain, usually in liberal arts colleges. These courses were typically multidisciplinary, and primarily led by political scientists and historians. Indeed, the historical project consistently formed the majority of INSS scholarship for many decades. That was so despite the strong element of secrecy, which has traditionally stymied—sometimes understandably, other times needlessly—scholarly research in intelligence and security. Historians have tried to circumvent secrecy by relying

on insider accounts produced by former and current practitioners, including defectors. In some cases, scholars have relied on government-sanctioned histories, such as the recently published multivolume history of the United Kingdom's Security Service (commonly known as MI5) by Cambridge University's Christopher Andrew, though they do so with an understandable dose of healthy skepticism (Andrew 2009). Historical research in INSS has been aided significantly by the standardization of declassification practices in countries like the U.S. and Russia in recent years. It has also been aided by the end of the Cold War, which produced a flurry of relevant documentation from state archives, both in the West and in the former USSR.

The experience of the Cold War has been instrumental in shaping the scholarly concentration, as well as the professional direction, of INSS. The Cold War was fought largely through covert channels and resulted in the unprecedented expansion and empowerment of intelligence and national security institutions in the American and Soviet blocs. The growth and increasing visibility of these agencies caused scholars to view intelligence and security as routine organizational functions of the modern state. It did not take them long to reach the conclusion that these institutions and their activities could and should be studied in a systematic fashion, just like every other security-related function of government, including law enforcement, diplomacy, and defense. This treatment of intelligence and security as political and bureaucratic phenomena in need of scholarly examination brought about their introduction—initially in the realm of research, and eventually in the domain of teaching.

The academic study of intelligence began when, in the 1950s and 1960s, some intelligence practitioners, mainly from the CIA, issued limited calls in favor of offering undergraduate academic courses on the subject. But there were no calls in the age of Eisenhower and Kennedy to create entire programs in intelligence (Coulthart and Crosston 2015) as there would be after 9/11. By the early 1990s, a few dozen courses were being regularly offered in universities in Europe, North America, and Australia, most of them training the "five eyes" in the graduate domain. The sole exception to the rule was Mercyhurst College (today Mercyhurst University), which launched the world's first standalone

intelligence program in 1992. The stated goal of the program was to produce what its creators called "analytical generalists," namely graduates who could apply the principles of intelligence analysis to any subject, regardless of topical or regional expertise (Landon-Murray 2013). This was an important moment in the evolution of intelligence studies because it helped distinguish it from the parent fields of history and political science.

The study of national security began in the late 1940s as a direct result of the global devastation caused by the world wars. It was prompted by a recognition by governments and academia alike that the concept of national security should inform peacetime statecraft aimed at the avoidance of war (Taylor 2012). That led to the creation of a handful of graduate programs in the U.S., which specialized in the study of national security as an area of political science and government studies. Instrumental in that gradual evolution was the establishment, through a joint effort by the U.S. government and the private sector, of Research and Development (RAND) in 1960. The idea behind RAND was to create a research institution that could operate as a think-tank ancillary of the Department of Defense. Today, scholars describe the establishment of RAND as a watershed moment that signaled the beginnings of national-security studies as its own, separate academic discipline (Walt 1991). In the ensuing years, research that came out of RAND grappled with the question of the relationship between national and international security—namely the extent to which a nation's internal security is connected with the state of international security, and vice versa. It also questioned the extent to which "transnational challenges could genuinely be regarded as national security issues" (Taylor 2012, 3). Yet in a superpower competition dominated by nuclear states, questions of national and international security prevailed in the academy over newer, less predictable transnational threats.

While the question of "rupture" is perhaps less decisive in other interdisciplinary fields of study, the impact that the tragic events of 9/11 had on the growth of INSS cannot be overstated. In the words of national-security expert Brendan Taylor, the question of "whether transnational challenges could genuinely be regarded as national security issues was settled […] when commercial airliners plunged into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001" (Taylor 2012, 3).

Indeed, 9/11 prompted a drastic reappraisal of the two disciplines and quickly brought them together in light of the new security challenges demonstrated by the attacks. At the same time, increasing demands for qualified intelligence personnel by government agencies prompted a rapid expansion of the field from the graduate to the undergraduate domain. These same pressures led to increasing specialization within the field, prompting one knowledgeable expert to state in 2011 that "the growth of more specialized intelligence studies, departments and programs […] since September 11, 2001, is rapid and undeniable" (William Spracher ctd in Smith 2013). By 2006, four of the 25 highest-rated universities in the *US News and World Report* annual list offered INSS courses. Seven years later, over half of them offered individual courses or entire programs in the field (Zegart 2007a; Smith 2013). In 2015, a study located nearly 30 graduate and undergraduate INSS programs in the U.S., with its authors noting that the discipline had witnessed a surge after 2009 (Coulthart and Crosston 2015) (Fig. 9.1).



Fig. 9.1 Cumulative number of degree-granting INSS programs by year (Adapted from Coulthart and Crosston 2015)

Less than three years after 9/11, a group of INSS educators established the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) as a "professional association that would span [the] diverse disciplines [of its members] and provide a catalyst and resources for their development and that of Intelligence Studies" (IAFIE 2004). Today, in addition to promoting collaboration between INSS academics, the stated aim of the association is to expand professional development in intelligence education and sponsor research to deepen academic knowledge in the field. The association liaises between other academic groups, professional bodies, think-tanks, and institutes. Since its establishment, IAFIE has worked alongside the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association and today collaborates with similarly-themed groups in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere. By 2016, when IAFIE held its 11th anniversary conference in the Netherlands, it featured a European branch, IAFIE-Europe, which aimed to "promote intelligence studies that take the specifics of European intelligence requirements, principles and methods into account" (IAFIE-Europe 2015). Another international conference, held in Greece in the summer of 2017, was co-hosted by IAFIE and IAFIE-Europe.

Outside the U.S., the two most notable scholarly groups in existence are the Security and Intelligence Studies Group (SISG) of the United Kingdom Political Studies Association, based in Dudley, United Kingdom, and the International Intelligence History Association (IIHA), based in Würzburg, Germany. The newer of the two is SISG, which was established in 2000 to promote systematic academic research and policy-focused studies on intelligence and security services (SISG 2000). Unlike IAFIE, which focuses on developing intelligence methods, SISG draws on "the comparative and historical tradition" in intelligence research (ibid.). Its mission is therefore methodologically closer to the IIHA, which was founded in 1993 "to promote scholarly research on intelligence organizations and their impact on historical development and international relations" (IIHA, n.d.). There are smaller groups in existence, too. They include the European Intelligence Academy in Athens, the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies in Graz, and the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association in The Hague, as well as groups in Australia and Canada.

Some of these groups have spearheaded recent developments in the field, especially research that highlights INSS experiences outside the so-called "Anglosphere," or studies that focus on geographical areas other than the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The year 2013 saw the publication of *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere* (Davies and Gustafson 2013). The volume, edited in Great Britain by Philip Davies and Kristian Gustafson of Brunel University's Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, includes chapters on Iran, India, Pakistan, Japan, Finland, Sweden, Indonesia, Argentina, and Ghana, among other countries. Four years later came the publication of *Intelligence Beyond the Anglosphere: Mediterranean and Balkan Regions*, edited by John Nomikos (European Intelligence Academy) and the present author. The volume contains material from countries such as Cyprus, Portugal, Kosovo, Bosnia, Malta, Israel, and many others (Nomikos and Fitsanakis 2017).

The multitude of courses and programs, as well as research themes, that have emerged since 9/11, center on three main scholarly avenues: first, the study of intelligence (and, more recently, counterintelligence) as an organizational activity of government or the private sector; second, research on counterterrorism (both domestic and foreign); and third, a preoccupation with the theory and management of domestic (or homeland) security. At the same time, programmatic approaches to INSS began to focus on two relatively distinct paths. On the one hand, there has been considerable growth in the academic study of intelligence and security aspects of government. This growth rests on the view of intelligence and security as distinct social and political phenomena worthy of systematic study. On the other hand, there has been a steady rise in vocational-oriented instructional courses aimed at current and future intelligence professionals.

9.2 The Homeland Security Question

Both INSS trends, the academic and the vocational, are equally prolific in the U.S., where public debate on intelligence and security matters has been relatively open in comparison to other democracies.

This tendency, which is exemplified by case studies on the U-2 incident, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the *Pentagon Papers*, the Watergate scandal, or the Iran-Contra affair, was only reinforced by the events of 9/11. The latter represent an intelligence and security catastrophe, which led to the biggest terrorist attack on U.S. soil in history.

The ensuing public debate centered on the fact that the coordinated attacks that struck America on that fateful day occurred despite the gargantuan size of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Zegart 2007b). Moreover, the homeland was attacked and thousands of people were killed despite the fact that the U.S. was spending more financial resources on its armed forces than the rest of the world combined—a trend that has since only accelerated. One observer remarked at the time that 9/11 would "remain forever an indictment of the failure of U.S. defense and intelligence policy and practice" (Higgs 2002).

In response to these criticisms, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, Jr., established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The creation of the DHS in November of 2002 came in direct response to 9/11. It represented the largest reshuffle of America's state apparatus since the National Security Act of 1947 (Ketl 2014), which had created the Department of Defense and the CIA. The DHS incorporated no fewer than 22 distinct government agencies, which made it—practically overnight—the third largest Cabinet department in the U.S. government. Its stated mission is to mobilize in the civilian sphere in order to prepare for, thwart, or effectively respond to domestic threats and emergencies, with particular emphasis on terrorist attacks.

But despite its impressive size—a feature that seems indicative of U.S. responses to most contemporary security challenges—and ample budget, the DHS has not been able to clearly demonstrate that the U.S. is more secure as a result of its programs (Faddis 2010; de Rugy 2010). Additionally, the very establishment of the DHS has prompted a major methodological question in INSS scholarship: Why is it that, despite the immense size, funding, and technological prowess of the Department of Defense, the U.S. finds itself in need of yet another department to protect the homeland? More important, does the establishment of the DHS imply that the federal military forces of the U.S.

are unable to defend American citizens from attacks? And if not, then what precisely is their purpose? The implied answer seems to be that the Department of Defense is charged with military actions abroad, which inevitably leads to critical questions about the nature of American foreign policy and its instruments in the twenty-first century.

Research into the administrative logic behind the establishment of the DHS appears to show that the U.S. military is not able to confront asymmetric security challenges posed by non-state actors such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (Morgan 2008; Owen 2011). Unlike the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or other traditional adversaries of the U.S., non-state actors are decentralized, operate almost exclusively underground, and do not subscribe to the norms of traditional statecraft, diplomacy, or military strategy. The argument goes that the U.S. military is "doctrinally fixated on high-intensity, decisive battles" (Conetta 2000) of the kind that the world witnessed during World War II, or in the early stages of the Korean War. These types of battles, however, are representative of large-scale warfare, which is increasingly rare nowadays. Thus, the U.S. military of today can be described as an immensely skilled and powerful machine whose tactical training and strategic postures are outdated. It follows that the U.S. armed forces are essentially designed to fight the wrong types of wars. There is, therefore, a crucial "mismatch between the Pentagon's tool kit and today's missions —and this manifests itself in reduced efficiency and reduced effectiveness" (Conetta 2000).

Furthermore, it is the unprecedented might of the U.S. armed forces that appears to prompt adversaries to antagonize American power asymmetrically. In the words of counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, the only possible outcome in confronting the U.S. military symmetrically is outright defeat (Kilcullen 2009). Therefore, Washington's adversaries—who tend to be rational strategic actors (Crenshaw 1998), despite arguments to the contrary (Post 1998)—choose to challenge American dominance through attacks on 'soft' civilian targets. Such attacks have included the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York or the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. More recently, fears have been raised about possible attacks by America's adversaries in the cyber domain (Macdonald and Mair 2015).

In stretching this argument to its logical conclusion, one may posit that the comparative might of America's military is so vast that it practically encourages its adversaries to act asymmetrically. Consequently, as the U.S. armed forces are becoming increasingly irrelevant in the twenty-first century, America's overall security is actually decreasing due to the ascendancy of asymmetrical thinking among Washington's non-state—and even state—rivals, and Washington's failure to evolve its defense posture accordingly. These failings were aptly demonstrated on 9/11.

9.3 The Intelligence Question

While most analysts, including those with the 9/11 Commission, focused on the alleged intelligence failures that led to 9/11, this section turns to the relationship between intelligence and national security in the aftermath of the attacks. Though protracted and multi-leveled, America's response to the attacks of 9/11 was principally military in nature. The American invasions of Afghanistan in November 2001 and Iraq in March 2003 were highly controversial from the beginning. They were also met with strong resistance from within and without the U.S.—including official condemnations by the United Nations (UN) in the case of Iraq (Falk 2008). It is equally true that coalition military actions in Afghanistan enjoyed far wider popular support than the US-led war in Iraq, and it was only after successive setbacks that U.S. popular opinion turned gradually against both wars (Groeling and Baum 2015; Holsti 2011). In the months leading to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush administration was able to amass limited support for its plans to invade Iraq among the American electorate. It did so by arguing that the government of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was actively harboring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687. Adopted in April 1991, shortly following the Gulf War, the resolution authorized the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to act as an inspection force. Its mission was to ensure the identification and destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological, and missile stockpiles. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 687 authorized the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect and destroy all nuclear weapons facilities on Iraqi soil.

The U.S. Intelligence Community is uniquely tasked with supporting the policymaking process with accurate and actionable information. It therefore had a central role in informing the president's decision, as well as his administration's public rhetoric, about the war in Iraq. It is true that the Bush administration's WMD argument, which is universally described in the relevant scholarship as "the central premise for the Iraq War" (Cap 2015), was challenged by many in the U.S. Intelligence Community. That is described in detail in the 2004 *Report on the US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq* by the U.S. Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence (US Senate 2004). One notable dissenter was U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which opposed the Intelligence Community's majority opinion, as expressed in the 2002 *National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE). However, the INR and other dissenters were unable to overturn the NIE's majority conclusion, which was that Iraq had "started reconstructing its nuclear program" in 1998 (US Government 2002). The same NIE stated "with high confidence" that Iraq maintained an active biological weapons program (ibid.).

Such discrepancies point to a dangerous tendency among senior U.S. intelligence managers, as well as among policy-makers, to dismiss analytical products when they conflict with their personal ideological convictions or political designs. The term used in the INSS field to describe this phenomenon is 'politicization of intelligence,' defined as "the systematic slanting of intelligence collection and analysis to serve policy interests" (Goodman 2008).

The Bush administration's politicization of intelligence influenced the 2002 NIE, a document whose massive failure was extensively and painfully dissected by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding WMD. The panel, commonly referred to as the Silberman-Robb Commission, was formed by the White House in 2004 in response to widespread criticism about the inaccuracies in the Bush administration's public justifications for the Iraq War. In its 2005 *Report to the President of the United States*, the Commission said that the United States Intelligence Community's planning, analysis, and execution in the lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom took place "in an environment that did not encourage skepticism" (US Government

2005). Moreover, intelligence estimates were based on patently unreliable sources whose statements regarding alleged Iraqi WMD programs were rarely cross-referenced for accuracy. The effects of those blunders were amplified by the intelligence agencies' reliance on information provided by individuals or groups who later turned out to be fabricators and deliberately misinformed U.S. intelligence personnel. According to the Silberman-Robb Commission Report, these sources willingly concocted fabrications in order to direct the U.S. against the administration of Saddam Hussein, or in order to elevate their own usefulness as a means of securing Western protection for themselves and their families. Additionally, American intelligence personnel were found to have relied on "transparently forged documents" pointing to alleged commercial contacts between the government of Iraq and at least one uranium-producing country (US Government 2005).

However, while pointing out the numerous deficiencies in the U.S. Intelligence Community's output, the Silberman-Robb Commission made it clear that its executive mandate did not include an investigation of how "policymakers used the intelligence they received from the Intelligence Community on Iraq's weapons programs" (ibid.). It is worth noting that this critical question has never been the subject of an investigative committee. The Bush administration seemed eager to place the responsibility for the Iraqi WMD fiasco on the Intelligence Community, while the succeeding administration of President Barack Obama showed no interest in revisiting the issue in any meaningful way (Carey 2011).

Fortunately, there is a cadre of INSS scholars to critically analyze the actions of U.S. presidential administrations with special attention to the politicization of intelligence. The predominant—and largely unchallenged—view in the INSS literature is that the Bush administration systematically hyperbolized the threat posed by Iraq to American national security, and that it consciously tried to promote a fictitious connection between Iraq and the organization that planned and executed the 9/11 attacks, namely al-Qaeda (Pillar 2011; Bamford 2004; Woodward 2008; Russomano 2011). It is equally true, though less often stated in the literature, that the White House blatantly ignored grave warnings by the Intelligence Community about the challenges involved in

securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq following an eventual collapse of Saddam Hussein's government.

Only months after the U.S. invaded Iraq, it was revealed that the CIA had disseminated to the White House at least two intelligence reports that explicitly warned about the negative consequences of a possible U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. Prepared in August 2002 and January 2003, the reports suggested that the toppling of the Hussein regime would lead to a dangerous and unpredictable period of large-scale violence in Iraq. One of the reports, entitled "The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq," cautioned that a U.S. invasion would be met by protracted guerrilla warfare led by supporters of Iraq's Ba'athist government who would wage war against U.S. forces "either by themselves or in alliance with terrorists" (Diamond 2008). Moreover, the reports predicted that the removal of the Iraqi regime would fuel internal sectarianism and lead to "a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other" (Diamond 2008). Intelligence reports were also pessimistic about the possibility of Western-style democratization in the country and suggested that the Sunni-Shiite divide within Iraq would be dangerously reflected in electoral outcomes. Last, though not least, there were warnings of Iranian expansion. Iran, it was predicted, would actively court Shiite elements inside Iraq, which had been suppressed during Hussein's rule, in an effort to install a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad that would be "tolerant of Iranian policies" (Diamond 2008). Remarkably, the CIA reports went as far as to suggest that, not only would Iraq break up into ethnically based states under the weight of sectarian violence, but that the ensuing anarchy would be "exploited by terrorists and extremists outside Iraq" (Diamond 2008). That, warned the reports, would fuel "militant Islamism" and lead to a "surge of global terrorism" that would hurt U.S. interests (Diamond 2008).

These reports were remarkably accurate. But they were ignored by the Bush administration, which proceeded with its prearranged plan of sending nearly 200,000 U.S. troops to the Middle East. Speaking anonymously to the press in 2004, American intelligence professionals said the CIA warnings had been "undermined by an administration in which ideologues often had the final say over policy-making, as well as by the

[CIA's] management, which they believed was overly compliant with Pentagon and White House hardliners" (Goldenberg 2004).

A more recent case of intelligence politicization, which directly relates to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, surfaced in the summer and fall of 2015. A source identified in press reports only as "a defense official" said that an analysts' "revolt" had been prompted by the experience of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that time "poorly written intelligence reports suggesting Iraq had WMD, when it did not, formed the basis of the George Bush administration's case for war." That same unnamed official continued by noting that the analysts "were frustrated because they didn't do the right thing then and speak up about their doubts on Iraq's weapons program" (Harris and Youssef 2015).

In August of 2015, a number of U.S. news outlets again reported that the U.S. Department of Defense was investigating claims that some of its officials had doctored intelligence reports to give a falsely optimistic account of the campaign against the Islamic State. Known also as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the Islamic State is a militant Sunni organization that grew out of the sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq and whose strength was fueled by the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011. Citing "several officials familiar with the inquiry," the *New York Times* stated in a leading article that the Pentagon had launched a probe following a complaint that was filed by at least one analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon's primary human-intelligence agency (Mazzetti and Apuzzo 2015). According to the analyst, intelligence reports were deliberately tweaked by officials at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the Pentagon body that directs and coordinates American military operations in Egypt, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

The above indications are grounds for concern for every intelligence professional and academic involved in the INSS project because they subvert the fundamental principle outlined by Professor Jeffreys-Jones that was noted earlier—namely that intelligence agencies in democratic societies must safeguard their independence from the Executive. This is inevitably among the major intelligence questions in the INSS field today: To what extent is the accuracy and effectiveness of intelligence products subverted by doctrinaire policymakers? Moreover, to what

extent are intelligence agencies capable of safeguarding their analytical impartiality from interference by the White House or other customers in the federal government? In the case of the U.S., answers to these critical questions will determine the institutional rapport between the Intelligence Community and the Executive and will have ramifications for the nature of democratic government, civil society, and the social contract today.

9.4 The Counterterrorism Question

In the post-9/11 era, America's growing homeland-security apparatus is predominantly preoccupied with Muslim radicalization. This is understandable, given the current wave of political radicalization that is sweeping Muslim communities across the globe. At the same time, however, the overwhelming attention given to Islamic-inspired militancy runs the danger of neglecting threats posed by the "long-standing right-wing paramilitary tendency in American society" that scholars like Mark Hamm delineate in their work (Hamm 2003).

Some government employees understand this, too. In the spring of 2009, DHS employee Daryl Johnson penned an official assessment in which he warned that "domestic non-Islamic extremism" was being neglected in favor of Islamic radicalism. Johnson, a senior analyst for the DHS' Office of Intelligence and Analysis, produced the report on behalf of the Extremism and Radicalization Branch of the department's Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division. The data behind the assessment had been gathered by Johnson's six-member analytical team in coordination with the FBI. The report correctly predicted that the then-recent election of Barack Obama as the first black president in America's history would rapidly become a "driving force for right-wing [*sic*] extremist recruitment and radicalization" (US Government 2009). It added that right-wing extremists would "attempt to recruit and radicalize returning [military] veterans in order to boost their violent capabilities" (US Government 2009). The DHS study echoed concerns expressed in a series of earlier reports on the same subject by the FBI, which had warned that "right-wing terrorists pose[d] a

significant threat" to the U.S. because of their increasing sophistication. It cautioned that some neo-Nazis were attempting to infiltrate law enforcement organizations, while others were becoming "ghost skins," meaning that they exercised discretion about their extremist views in an attempt to blend into mainstream society. The FBI even went on to report that members of white supremacist organizations had "evinced interest in broader campaigns of suicide terrorism" (Smith 2012).

Following a concerted social-media campaign by Tea Party activists and other conservative campaigners, the DHS retracted Johnson's assessment, dismissed him, and reduced the size of his unit to a single analyst who is today tasked with monitoring every suspected case of non-Islamic political extremism on American soil. This contrasts with the over 40 DHS analysts who monitor radical Islamist threats. In a 2012 interview, Johnson claimed that the DHS was neglecting its mission of performing domestic counterterrorism operations and questioned why there had been no Congressional hearings about "the rising white supremacist threat, even though there has been a long list of attacks over the last few years," far larger than the number attacks perpetrated by Muslim extremists. The government's approach to counterterrorism was "out of balance," he said (Ackerman 2012).

In February 2015, CNN reported that it had accessed the most recent domestic terrorist assessment by the DHS, which was produced nearly three years after Johnson's departure from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. According to the news agency, the report brought to light that "some federal and local law enforcement groups view the domestic terror threat from [anti-government, so-called] sovereign citizen groups as equal to —and in some cases greater than— the threat from foreign Islamic terror groups, such as ISIS, that garner more public attention" (Perez 2015). The decision to overwhelmingly concentrate government resources on combating Muslim-inspired radicalism is puzzling, given that, since 9/11, "nearly twice as many [Americans] have been killed by white supremacists, antigovernment fanatics and other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims," according to a recent study by the New America Foundation (Anonymous 2015).

In reality, the counterterrorism emphasis given on Muslim radicalism reflects arbitrary political preferences, rather than a data-driven

security policy on behalf of the U.S. government. Moreover, the intense post-9/11 counterterrorist—and even scholarly—preoccupation with Islamic-inspired extremism has developed at the expense of other critical threats to the homeland. This one-sided approach may in fact be distracting INSS scholars from studying the growth of domestic far-right militancy, which, paired with the increasingly unregulated domestic gun market, poses significant threats to the security of the country.

While terror groups such as Al Qaeda attract the attention of most analysts, the most historically significant white nationalist terror group in the U.S. is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Founded in Tennessee in 1866, the KKK has gone through at least four distinct historical phases in its history. The second wave, which lasted from 1915 until the end of World War II and culminated in the early 1920s, was arguably the most successful in the Klan's history. During that time, the KKK's membership peaked to six million, with some historians claiming that the organization had enlisted nearly one in every six eligible voters in its ranks (Tooze 2014). Historians estimate that, throughout its existence, the KKK has been responsible for tens of thousands of murders and hundreds of thousands of acts of violence, including vandalism, as well as verbal and physical threats (Wade 1998).

In light of these statistics, one may be surprised to learn that many scholars specializing in political violence refuse to classify the KKK as an American terrorist group. It is equally as intellectually jarring to see that many of the same specialists fail to define the KKK—an organization that emerged out of mainstream Protestantism, and whose symbol is the fiery cross (Baker 2011; Fox 2011)—as a Christian terrorist group. There is also a widespread tendency to blend the deadly actions of the first KKK into the wider social upheaval of the period known as Reconstruction in the American south, or to classify them today as 'hate crimes' committed by lone-wolf delinquents. But these views ignore, often intentionally, the systematic fashion in which groups like the KKK indoctrinated, organized, and mobilized their membership before, during, and after Reconstruction. As Hamm states, the terrorist crimes of the KKK "were not caused by individual pathologies of offenders. Rather, they emerged from a long-standing right-wing paramilitary tendency in American society" (Hamm 2003).

Aside from the KKK, which retains a relatively small but increasingly vocal and militant base, this alarming historical tendency is expressed today by groups such as the radical militia movement, violent racist organizations like the National Alliance or the Aryan Nations, as well as by secular or religious militant groups such as the National Socialist Movement and the violently anti-abortionist Army of God. Authorities also have to concern themselves with the self-styled Sovereign Citizens movement whose—mostly armed—membership dismiss the U.S. federal government as an illegitimate entity and routinely refuses to abide by federal laws. In one recent case involving so-called Sovereign Citizens, offices from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department were confronted by hundreds of armed anti-government activists in Nevada who chased them off the property of a farmer who owes the U.S. government over $1 million in unpaid grazing fees (Lenz and Potok 2014).

One of the most important instances of far-right domestic radicalism occurred in 1995. On April 19 of that year, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma's state capital was bombed, resulting in the deaths of 168 people and the injury of 680 others. The perpetrators, Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and Michael Fortier, were anti-government activists hoping that their violent action would prompt a nationwide revolt against what they saw as a tyrannical and oppressive government (Moghadam 2006). The Oklahoma City bombing—at that time the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil—was overshadowed by the coordinated attacks of September 11, 2001, which in turn prompted the federal government to turn its attention to Islamic militancy.

While it is often said that the primary message the 9/11 hijackers delivered to the American people was that the U.S. was not immune to Islamist terrorism (Ross 2006), this view overlooks the long and bloody history of terrorism perpetrated on American soil by white nationalist and racial supremacist groups. For that reason, many in the federal government and with non-profit groups fear that the nation's concentration on radical Islam is allowing radical right-wing groups to rearm and grow in relative obscurity (Lenz and Potok 2014).

9.5 The Civil-Liberties Question

In the summer of 2013, nearly 12 years after 9/11, American computer expert Edward Snowden made headlines by defecting to Russia. Snowden, a computer systems administrator who had been employed as a contractor in the U.S. Intelligence Community, took with him to Russia digital copies of an estimated 1.7 million classified documents belonging to the National Security Agency (NSA) and several other American and Western intelligence agencies (Zakaria and Strobel 2013). Since his defection, Snowden has vehemently justified his decision to seek political asylum in Russia as an act of political defiance in defense of civil liberties worldwide. His self-justification is strongly contested by the U.S. government, which has charged him with theft of U.S. government property. Snowden is also facing charges of violating the U.S. 1917 Espionage Act by communicating national-defense information without prior authorization. But the North Carolina-born computer expert rejects these charges from his new home in Russia, and he has proceeded to publicly disclose a fraction of the documents he transported with him into voluntary exile. His periodic disclosures, which appear fastidiously timed and controlled, have repeatedly dominated international headlines and have contributed to the souring of relations between Washington and a host of foreign nations, notably Russia, Brazil, France, Germany, and Indonesia. Some of these disclosures concern operations conducted inside the U.S., which point to a trend of sweeping surveillance measures, ostensibly in defense of national security. But the majority of Snowden's *exposés* concern America's post-9/11 technical intelligence-collection directed at foreign targets or targets abroad.

For instance, some of Snowden's early revelations brought to light an NSA signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection program called XKEYSCORE, which internal NSA documents describe as the Agency's "widest-reaching" digital collection effort. According to the leaked documents, XKEYSCORE allows NSA data collectors to sift through massive online databases containing millions of individual users' browsing histories, emails, and chats, which the NSA calls Digital Network Intelligence (DNI). Authorized NSA analysts are able to target

individual Internet users simply by entering their name, email address, Internet Protocol (IP) identification, or telephone number into the surveillance program. Upon entering a target's identifying information, an NSA DNI collector can allegedly tap into almost the entire spectrum of actions performed by a typical Internet user online, including the content and metadata of email correspondence, website browsing history, and every search term used. In an interview with British newspaper *The Guardian*, Snowden suggested that an authorized DNI collector only needs to know an individual's email address in order to effortlessly monitor them, regardless of their location (Greenwald 2013).

Another advanced intelligence-collection program disclosed by Snowden concerns the NSA's so-called Special Collection Service (SCS). According to German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel*, which disclosed its existence in 2013, this clandestine electronic monitoring program operates through specially designated listening posts located in over 80 American embassies and consulates worldwide, many of them in European capitals. These listening posts facilitate a variety of offensive cyber operations that often target the host countries without their knowledge or permission. The list of SCS' principal targets includes the headquarters of the UN in New York City. According to *Spiegel*, a SCS operation conducted in the summer of 2012 was able to penetrate the building's internal videoconferencing system by compromising the encryption software used to secure the communications of resident UN diplomats. One internal NSA document allegedly seen by the German newsmagazine hails the "dramatic improvement of data [collected] from video teleconferencing and the ability to decrypt the traffic" (Anonymous 2013). The document goes on to state that intercepted communication exchanges occurring at UN headquarters rose from 12 to nearly 500 within three weeks following the SCS penetration.

If Snowden's public disclosures are to be believed, the NSA's analytical capabilities are not constrained by universal encryption standards currently in use in the U.S. and abroad. Its technical collectors are even able to routinely circumvent Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) cryptographic protocols and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), as well as encryption protection standards in fourth- (and possibly fifth-) generation cellular telephones. It can therefore be presumed that the NSA has unprecedented

access to the content of billions of encrypted messages exchanged daily by the users of some of the Internet's most popular email service providers, including Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo!, and Facebook. In other cases, the NSA appears to have collaborated with select online service providers to build so-called "entry points" into industry products. This public-private interface brings to mind the lengthy policy battle of the early 1990s between the U.S. government and the country's communications industry over the so-called 'clipper chip.' The device was designed to provide the NSA with backdoor access to the communications of Internet users. But the plan was shelved after it was met with concerted resistance by industry and civil-liberties groups. That prompted the NSA to "set out to accomplish the same goal by stealth," according to *The New York Times*, which in 2013 disclosed details of the NSA's SSL circumvention efforts. Based on information provided by Snowden, the paper said that, although the Agency was still unable to break some forms of encryption, it maintained substantial access to global Internet communications through a variety of means. These included code-cracking, hacking, legal injunctions, and exercising "behind the scenes persuasion" aimed at large Internet service providers (Perlroth et al. 2013).

Perhaps the most salient feature in the overall pattern of NSA's technical intelligence-collection efforts, as reflected in Snowden's disclosures, is the targeting of allies and adversaries alike with nearly identical levels of intensity. The assessment of *Der Spiegel*, which has served as one of Snowden's primary channels of disclosure following his defection to Russia, was that America spied on its European allies with the same frequency and force that it typically unleashed on adversarial countries like China and Iran. The magazine was reacting to allegations that U.S. intelligence operatives had placed sophisticated interception equipment inside the offices of the European Union (EU) in Washington, D.C., before infiltrating the building's secure computer network (Poitras 2013). Other facilities that were allegedly heavily targeted by the NSA include the offices of the EU delegation to the UN in New York City, and even the EU's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Germany, one of America's closest European allies, features prominently in Snowden's disclosures as a target of American cyber-operations. It is difficult to say whether that is because German communications networks have been

heavily targeted by the NSA, or because Snowden's disclosures have deliberately favored a German-centered narrative. In any case, it appears that, in addition to systematically targeting German politicians, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, the NSA has been monitoring data from half a billion communications exchanges taking place within Germany each month (Poitras et al. 2013). In 2013, the revelations about the NSA's extensive cyber-operations in Germany prompted the country's Minister of Justice, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, to protest that the sheer size and intensity of the targeting was "reminiscent of methods used by our enemies during the Cold War" (Hecking and Schultz 2013).

This strikingly aggressive mode of intelligence collection appears to have been employed domestically after 9/11. According to available evidence, the interface between the U.S. Intelligence Community and the private telecommunications sector became increasingly intimate following the 9/11 attacks, aided by the relevant provisions of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Webb 2007). The PATRIOT Act also formed the basis for the President's Surveillance Program (PSP), a pervasive telecommunications-monitoring scheme that was directly authorized by President Bush. The PSP provided the legal underpinnings for the NSA's STELLARWIND program, a wholesale effort to data-mine the communications of American citizens, with the crucial help of service providers. The program was eventually revealed to the public through a series of disclosures by whistleblowers such as Thomas Tamm, Mark Klein, Russell Tice, and William Binney. The government's response was to charge them with violating the 1917 Espionage Act, while at the same time taking legal steps to protect service providers from privacy-related lawsuits (Aid 2009).

The fallout from controversial programs such as XKEYSCORE and STELLARWIND, which many American critics condemned as unconstitutional (Hayden et al. 2014), caused waves of protests inside and outside the U.S. They prompted many to recall the illegal surveillance programs that the U.S. Intelligence Community was found to have authorized for many decades leading to the Watergate scandal, and which contributed to what one knowledgeable observer described as

the "historic breakdown of [American society's] Cold War consensus" (Olmsted 1996). Even though the U.S. Intelligence Community doggedly resisted Congressional attempts to impose even basic transparency rules on its operations after the Watergate scandal, it eventually had to agree to a permanent form of Congressional oversight, which today continues to govern—albeit with problems and limitations—its activities. However, given the change of pace, as well as extent, of the surveillance regime after 9/11, a central question that hangs over current INSS research concerns the extent to which the American Constitutional order is threatened by the national-security directives pursued by the U.S. Intelligence Community. Regrettably, it is not an easy question to answer.

9.6 Conclusion

In the preface to his seminal book, *Enemies of Intelligence*, Columbia University Professor Richard K. Betts notes that, on 9/11 "citizens and policymakers were shocked into recognizing the importance of intelligence in averting disasters" (Betts 2007). Indeed, academics and policymakers alike should have never permitted the detachment of intelligence from national-security decisions. Educators teach students to focus on the traditional aspects of governance and power, such as organization, material resources, or military and diplomatic maneuvering. But we do not focus nearly enough on information and communication, the two aspects of governance that can make the difference between catastrophe, survival, and success in an increasingly complex world. As Betts points out, "[w]hatever the foreign policy of the world's leading power should be, it should not be ignorant." The least that a government should do in today's age is "know as much as possible about threats and opportunities […] in time to do something about them," says the Harvard-trained scholar. And he adds meaningfully that "the intelligence function […] is integral to national security" (ibid.). It is the goal of INSS to cultivate the deep integration of intelligence and national security so that a detachment of the two disciplines is never again repeated, as was the case before 9/11.

And yet, it must be recognized and accepted that, whether the focus is on democratic or totalitarian political systems, the study of security and intelligence institutions is controversial, almost by nature. Controversy is thus part of the scholarly amalgam that informs the meteoric rise of INSS in America after the tragic events of 9/11. Undoubtedly, the discipline is still in the process of being shaped in terms of theme, methodology, and scope. The years after 9/11 have been particularly turbulent for American intelligence agencies and their relationship with Executive power. These tensions have been directly felt in the relevant scholarship. The experience of the so-called "Global War on Terrorism" has directed scholars' attention to the nature of the relationship between the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Executive. The role of the former in the decision-making process after 9/11 appears to have been either minimal or substantial, arguably for the wrong reasons. Its erroneous estimates were espoused by the Executive when they suited its foreign-policy goals, while accurate estimates were blatantly dismissed by the White House in pursuit of wider national-security objectives. The result has arguably been damaging for American national security, as illustrated by the unprecedented rise and chaotic fall of ISIS in the Middle East.

Long-standing American conceptions of national security are also being challenged in the post-9/11 era, while the very concept of protecting of the homeland appears to be in a transitional phase. America spent much of World War II and the entirety of the Cold War preparing for the possibility of facing a broadly symmetrical adversary. But, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated in a dramatic fashion, the country was confronted with a radically different national-security landscape at the dawn of the twenty-first century. As INSS scholars are grappling with the asymmetrical nature of America's current national-security threats, the implications of this phenomenon for the country's military posture and national-defense doctrine remain to be seen.

In the meantime, the INSS discipline appears to reproduce the unproductive and dangerous fixation of national-security and intelligence institutions on Islamist radicalism, which is occurring at the expense of systematically analyzing other critical threats to the homeland. Paramount among those is the rapidly growing phenomenon of

far-right militancy, which, along with gun violence, poses significant threats to the security of the country. The INSS discipline must broaden its post-9/11 research scope so as to challenge the tacit association of terrorism with foreigners—and Muslims in particular—which is as erroneous as it is dangerous.

The traditional technological superiority of the U.S. helped shape the style of intelligence-collection exercised by the country's Intelligence Community in the post-9/11 era. America's intelligence-collection is technologically-focused and largely automated, as can be seen in recent disclosures of communications-interception programs involving the NSA. These programs, however, which are both domestic and international in scope, are arguably going to have major long-term effects on Washington's rapport with its allies, as well as on the relationship between state and civil society in twenty-first-century America. Critical scholarship in the INSS discipline must engage further with this topic and continue to be a strong voice in the relevant social and political debates.

The above questions are reflective of some post-9/11 scholarly challenges, which the nascent field of INSS must confront in the coming years. The field's dedication to critical scholarly approaches, as well as the intellectual precision needed to answer these and other questions, will determine the shape of the discipline in the decades to come.

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10

International Education in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons Learned from 9/11 and Cautious Hope for the Future

A. Celeste Gaia and Marcelo da Silva Leite

In this chapter, we begin by describing the importance of international education and the nationwide movement to internationalize colleges and universities in the United States. Next, we highlight how 9/11 has played a role in internationalization, with a specific focus on changes in the monitoring of international students, student mobility, and public attitudes toward immigrants in the U.S. Finally, we discuss the U.S. government and education response to 9/11, the future of international education, and why the continued promotion of global awareness and cultural competency is critical to higher education. Events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have far reaching implications for international educators and the strategies they use to educate global citizens in the twenty-first century.

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10.1 The Importance of International Education

The term *international education* is used to describe a variety of approaches and fields of study including the academic approach of comparative and international education, K-12 education with international components, international schools worldwide, and the professional field centered on the internationalization of higher education (Dolby and Rahman 2008). For the purposes of this chapter, the primary focus is on the professional practice of international educators at colleges and universities. International educators share a wide variety of responsibilities including strategic planning, program development, assessment, study abroad advising, immigration assistance, on-campus programming, and the development and maintenance of international partnerships. To be successful, international educators must have broad knowledge of global citizenship education, U.S. and other immigration policies, current events, and an understanding of how these factors shape global academic exchange and attitudes toward internationalization efforts. In other words, international educators need the broad skill set that educators at liberal arts institutions hope to instill in their students.

Over the past 30 years, the term *internationalization* has been used to communicate how global citizenship education should be integrated into the overall educational experience, rather than occur on the margins (Green and Olson 2003). The pervasive movement to internationalize college and university campuses prepares graduates for success in the twenty-first century (ACE 2012), as scholars found that students who are educated as global citizens are more likely to engage in behaviors that reflect intergroup empathy, social responsibility, and environmental sustainability, and are less likely to exhibit prejudice and intolerance (Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2013). As students graduate and pursue their professional lives, their appreciation of diversity and cultural understanding will, a range of theories posit, help to foster peaceful relations within a global and multicultural society. The American Council on Education (ACE) Blue Ribbon Panel on Global Engagement emphasized the responsibility within higher education for the development of graduates as globally informed citizens, stating,

"It is the obligation of colleges and universities to prepare people for a globalized world, including developing the ability to compete economically, to operate effectively in other cultures and settings, to use knowledge to improve their own lives and their communities, and to better comprehend the realities of the contemporary world so that they can better meet their responsibilities as citizens" (ACE 2011, 14).

Ideological, political, and economic rationales have driven the growth of international education. A vital aspect of campus internationalization involves hosting international students and scholars, which is why events such as 9/11 can have wide-ranging repercussions within higher education. International members of the campus community enrich the educational experience through cultural exchange and by providing an alternative perspective in and out of the classroom. The knowledge and skills that students learn during authentic interactions with individuals from other cultures are invaluable for personal and professional growth. For example, domestic and international students can learn more about intercultural communication and understanding, reduce the use of stereotypes and other cognitive sources of prejudice (Arkoudis et al. 2013; Deardorff 2006; Lee et al. 2014), further their understanding of their own culture, and develop a more nuanced global perspective (Yefanova et al. 2015). The presence of international students also provides economic benefits to the U.S. In 2017/18, international students contributed $39 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 455,000 jobs. According to a NAFSA (the Association of International Educators) economic analysis, three jobs result for every seven international students attending a U.S. college or university (NAFSA 2018).

Building a campus climate of internationalization is a gradual process. In this regard, international educators must overcome varied obstacles, among them a limited understanding of the importance of cultural competency and skills required for success in the twenty-first century, the narrow accessibility of study abroad, and inadequate institutional support. The somewhat isolationist perspective and inward-looking educational system in the U.S., along with the pervasive belief that it is unnecessary to learn a language other than English, has hindered past internationalization efforts (Green 2002; Hudzik 2011; IIE 2014).

In 2018, the Pew Research Center reported that 92% of European students learn a second language in primary and secondary school compared to 20% of students in the U.S. Many European countries report that 100% of their primary and secondary students are learning a second language (Devlin 2018). Here again, one sees the negative impact that American Exceptionalism, a topic discussed in many chapters in this volume, has on the higher education environment, especially global learning initiatives.

Surprisingly, although the U.S. federal government increased funding for foreign language education post-9/11, the response within higher education institutions appeared less enthusiastic. In fact, the requirement of a foreign language for graduation declined in all types of institutions from 53% in 2001 to 37% in 2011. When looking at four-year institutions only, this decline seemed less dramatic (71–65% for baccalaureate; 82–73% for doctorate granting institutions), but nevertheless reflected a decreased curricular interest in having students learn a second language (Hudzik 2011). Language course enrollments also have declined 15.3% from 2009 to 2016 (Looney and Lusin 2018). There is evidence, however, that despite the reduced curricular requirements for foreign language in U.S. higher education since 9/11, public interest in international travel has increased. In 2016, more U.S. citizens were prepared to travel abroad than ever before—U.S. passport ownership has increased from 17% in 2000 to 42% in 2018 (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs 2018). Though global literacy scores remain somewhat low ($M = 55\%$), a majority of U.S. students indicated that knowledge of international relations, global issues, and non-U.S. cultures was extremely important to their education (Council on Foreign Relations and National Geographic 2016).

Although international educators, business leaders, and most of the general public have agreed that study abroad is essential to a twenty-first century higher education, the percentage of U.S. students who go abroad for study remains small. In 2016/17, 10.9% of college students reported an international academic experience, leaving almost 90% without this essential part of a global education (IIE 2018a). Cost is often a primary challenge for U.S. students, as are family concerns, social constraints, and curricular requirements (Commission on the

Abraham Lincoln 2005). Colleges and universities work to make study abroad affordable; however, they are challenged both by the cost of overseas programs and the perception of study abroad as exclusively for elite, affluent students. Furthermore, participants have traditionally been Caucasian women from liberal arts institutions (Hoffa 2007; IIE 2018b; Commission on the Abraham Lincoln 2005; NAFSA 2015). Minorities, male students, nontraditional aged students, community college students, and students with disabilities have had the lowest level of participation (Dessoff 2006; IIE 2018b). Although there is some evidence to suggest that the U.S. mindset might be changing gradually, it is clear that the U.S. lags behind other countries regarding the appreciation of global perspectives, language training, and cultural understanding.

In order for internationalization efforts to be successful, institutional leadership must promote a vision that consistently communicates to students, faculty, and staff that international education is critical to the comprehensive educational experience. The Center for International and Global Engagement (CIGE) has promoted a model of internationalization comprising of an articulated institutional commitment; administrative structure and staffing; curriculum, co-curriculum, and learning outcomes; faculty policies and practices; student mobility; and collaboration and partnerships. Such a commitment to internationalization requires financial resources, time, personnel, effort, and support from all campus constituents. If institutional support is lacking, internationalization efforts are unlikely to be successful (ACE 2012). Considering these challenges, the field of international education is particularly sensitive to events such as 9/11 due to the complicated interconnections among public attitudes, educational trends, world events, U.S. international relations, and issues related to international students and scholars living in the U.S.

10.2 Changes in International Student Monitoring

The former chair and vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, clarified the importance of international education to the United States in a post-9/11 society. According to them, “The

U.S. cannot conduct itself effectively in a competitive international environment when our most educated citizens lack minimal exposure to, and understanding of, the world beyond U.S. borders. If we lack the ability to see ourselves as others see us—a skill imparted through the direct experience of living and studying abroad—then we diminish our ability to influence and persuade foreign governments and world opinion. Ignorance of the world is a national liability" (Kean and Hamilton 2008, 9). The 9/11 Commission clearly endorsed campus internationalization, as did professionals in the field. One year after 9/11, a survey of approximately 500 international educators indicated that 98% continued to see international exchange and study abroad as an essential part of U.S. education (IIE 2002). At the same time, however, international educators across the U.S. experienced a shift in the responsibility for the monitoring of international students.

The desire to tighten U.S. visa regulations after 9/11 resulted in new legislation and calls for action within Congress. In addition to the 2001 Patriot Act and the demand for enhanced monitoring of international students, individual members of Congress expressed concern and encouraged further restrictions on U.S. student visas. For example, one senator called for a six-month complete moratorium on the issuance of student visas, but later retreated and agreed that if international educators worked closely with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to maintain records and reporting, then a moratorium might be unnecessary. In reaction to this proposal, and in an effort to express their willingness to work with INS, professionals in higher education proposed policies that would help to ensure visa compliance, such as reporting any students who did not arrive on campus within 30 days of the academic term start date (Curry 2001).

One of the most obvious ways that 9/11 affected international education was through the rapid implementation of a new electronic tracking system for international students. The INS was already working to develop a system meant to streamline the overall immigration process; however, the post-9/11 changes to the visa system specifically targeted international students. This was most likely based on the false belief that multiple 9/11 attackers arrived in the U.S. on student visas and overstayed their eligibility, although the 2004 *9/11 and Terrorist Travel*

Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States indicated that only one of the attackers had entered the U.S. on a student visa (Eldridge et al. 2004). Incorrect claims about the 9/11 hijackers' visas have been perpetuated by media sources and lawmakers who support stricter visa regulations. NAFSA has questioned why U.S. policy makers continue to repeat this misinformation, particularly because student visas accounted for only 6% of issued visas in 2012 and because these students are monitored more than any other type of visa holder in the U.S. Some argue that this belief originates from fear rather than an actual threat (Farley 2013). Although some of the changes in the visa process were already underway before 2001, the speed and nature of the changes appeared to be a direct response to 9/11.

In order to understand the scope of the changes in international student monitoring, it is important to understand the history of the U.S. student visa process and the role of international educators as advocates for international students and scholars. There are three visa categories used for international students: F visas for academic study; M visas for vocational study; and J visas for cultural exchange. These visas grant temporary non-immigrant status that must be renewed on a regular schedule. Prior to 9/11, Congress enacted the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), requiring F-1 and M-1 schools and universities, as well as J-1 exchange visitor sponsors, to collect information regarding international students' attendance, academic standing, and any change in visa status.

After 9/11, the Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the foreign student tracking system and required that the new system be fully operational by January 1, 2003. The expansion included the monitoring of students in air flight, language training, and vocational schools, or any "other approved educational institutions" deemed appropriate by the Attorney General and Secretaries of State and Education. In 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act increased student monitoring and closed perceived loopholes. This resulted in the creation of the electronic Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS), which evolved into the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), providing

an online tracking system for international students. The sudden shift to collect and maintain all information electronically made a formidable impact on college and university personnel. Until this time, most data collection had been done manually and was required to be electronic only "where practical." Furthermore, the new requirements and regulations placed international education professionals in a primary role to assist the INS in tracking international students. SEVIS automated the data collection process and was fully operational for incoming students on February 15, 2003. This date was also the deadline for all institutions to apply for Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) certification and for entering all new students into the SEVIS system (Siskin 2005).

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 disbanded the INS, and effective March 1, 2003, the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsumed most INS functions. Within DHS, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was responsible for the new electronic system used to track international students. SEVIS provided a way for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and DHS to more easily identify students who violated the terms of their student visas. Designated School Officials (DSO) at higher education institutions were required to report whether a student had arrived to campus within 30 days of the class start date, when a student dropped below a full course load without prior authorization, and the start date of the next term. The DSO also had the authority to terminate a student's record for non-compliance. By requiring university personnel to fulfill these responsibilities, this tracking system helped to identify individuals who obtained student visas but did not intend to study in the U.S. Even at institutions with a small number of international students, the added duties of SEVIS reporting reduced the time available for personal interactions with international students, and as a result, decreased on-campus support and advocacy efforts (Starobin 2006). Although educational institutions had a legal mandate to comply with the new system, there were no additional funds available to support the required personnel.

The IIRIRA mandated that, by April 1, 1997, educational institutions collect a fee, not to exceed $100, from each international student; this

fee would be remitted to the Attorney General to fund new regulations at the federal level (Siskin 2005). Though international educators supported enhanced monitoring to bolster national security, they expressed little support for the new I-901 fee and publicly contested passing on the responsibility of fee collection to educational institutions. An amended rule removed this responsibility, but students still were required to pay the separate fee electronically before submitting a visa application and fee. As the largest professional organization of international educators with over 10,000 members, NAFSA routinely serves as an advocate for international students. To this end, in November 2003, Executive Director and CEO of NAFSA Marlene Johnson sent a letter to ICE reiterating disapproval of the fee payment process, stating that it was not based on law and served as a deterrent to study in the U.S. Johnson emphasized that the IIRIRA mandated that the fee amount should be based on the cost "of conducting the information collection program" and in no way stipulated that students pay a fee prior to the visa application. In 2002, the DHS enlisted the KPMG accounting firm to recalculate an appropriate fee amount based on changes since 1999. KPMG recommended that a $54 fee would cover the expenses required; however, the DHS proposed $100 as the fee amount (Johnson 2003). In 2008, ICE increased the I-901 fee paid by F-1 or M-1 visa applicants to $200. Ten years later, the DHS proposed that this fee be increased to $350. It also proposed that the fee paid by colleges and universities for the initial SEVP certification petition needed to enroll F-1 and M-1 students be increased from $1700 to $3000. DHS also proposed to add a fee of $1250 for institutional recertification, which must occur every two years (DHS and ICE 2018). As of March 2019, these proposed fee changes were under review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

These fees in large part were created to support federal expenses associated with the SEVP monitoring system that was implemented after 9/11. NAFSA argued that if these fee increases were approved, they would contribute to the trend of international students choosing to study in countries other than the U.S. Moreover, they argued that the proposal for the fee increases misrepresented SEVIS and portrayed it as an anti-terrorist tool, though its primary purpose was to identify non-compliance and, in reality, tracks only a small percentage (5–6%) of non-immigrant visa holders (Welch 2018b).

The new system of electronic monitoring also created a perception of international educators as "Big Brother," who must report any suspicious behavior to the DHS (Tella 2010; Urias and Yeakey 2005). To illustrate this point, in 2003 a student at Carnegie Mellon University expressed that, although he had lived in the U.S. since he was 14 years old and never felt like a foreigner, the new SEVIS regulations led him to grow concerned about the violation of his privacy. He worried that, "When it becomes efficient, it becomes easier. It just cascades and all of a sudden the government's got every little bit of information about me, my credit card number and whatever. It kind of scares me" (Schackner 2003, A-1). International educators worked to overcome this misconception, though there was no denying that many were perceived as agents of the DHS. They also feared that the more complicated and time-consuming student visa application process would deter students from study in the U.S. and decrease inbound student mobility.

10.3 Visas and Changes in Inbound Student Mobility

Student mobility in international education involves incoming and outgoing students who choose to study abroad, typically through bilateral exchanges, direct enrollment at universities, or through third party providers. The period of study can be a few months, a semester or quarter, a full academic year, or the full period required to earn a degree. While a comparative analysis of the pre- and post-9/11 international education environments reveals some telling statistics on the U.S. position in the world, increased difficulty in obtaining student visas influenced the five-year decline in inbound student mobility following 9/11 (IIE 2003; Lowell et al. 2007; Walfish 2002).

There was a noticeable downward slide in inbound international student mobility in the U.S. after 9/11. Prior to 2001, numbers had increased steadily since 1949 (IIE 2009). Two years before 9/11 (1999/00), the number of international students at U.S. colleges and universities was 514,723, a 4.8% increase from the previous year. Following

9/11, a steady downward trend for international student enrollment began and continued for approximately five years. The country of origin that saw the greatest decline after 9/11 was Saudi Arabia (−25.2% in 2002/03), the home country of 15 of the 19 men involved in the 9/11 attacks.

However, the post-9/11 decline in the number of international students studying in the U.S. was brief, and since 2007, this number has continued to rise, with the exception of the two years following the 2008 recession (IIE 2016a; see Table 10.1). In 2015/16, the number of international students in the U.S. reached over 1 million, with 1,043,839 studying at American colleges and universities. In 2017/18, international students comprised 5.5% ($N = 1{,}094{,}792$) of the approximately 20 million total students in U.S. higher education (IIE 2018b).

How did the students' countries of origin change after 9/11? Prior to 2001, the majority of international students in the U.S. were from China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea (South), and Taiwan. In the two years following 9/11, the origin countries remained similar, with the exception of Canada replacing Taiwan (IIE 2003). It is noteworthy that although Saudi Arabia experienced the greatest decline immediately following 9/11, 10 years later it was in the top 15 countries of origin. The largest increase occurred in 2006/07, with an almost 129% increase in Saudi students from the previous year. Overall, the number of students from Saudi Arabia studying in the U.S. in 2016/17 was 20 times higher than in 2005/06 (from 3035 to 61,287). With the exception of Saudi Arabia, there were no significant changes in the most common countries sending students to study in the U.S. The considerable increase in students from Saudi Arabia after 9/11 was an outlier in the Middle Eastern region, considering there was little change in the number of students originating from neighboring countries.

Indirectly, then, the 9/11 attacks and the various alliance-building initiatives between Washington and Riyadh in the subsequent "war on terror" led to the rise in Saudi students studying in the U.S. Due to the post-9/11 strained relations between the U.S. and the Saudi governments, in 2005 Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and U.S. President George W. Bush came to an agreement that resulted in a Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission (SACM) Scholarship Fund to enhance cultural and educational partnerships between the two countries

Table 10.1 Number of international students in U.S. 1999/00–2017/18

Year	International students in U.S.	% change
1999/00	514,723	4.8
2000/01	547,867	6.4
2001/02	582,996	6.4
2002/03	586,323	0.6
2003/04	572,509	−2.4
2004/05	565,039	−1.3
2005/06	564,766	−0.1
2006/07	582,984	3.2
2007/08	623,805	7.0
2008/09	671,616	7.7
2009/10	690,923	2.9
2010/11	723,277	4.7
2011/12	764,495	5.7
2012/13	819,644	7.2
2013/14	886,052	8.1
2014/15	974,926	10.0
2015/16	1,043,839	7.1
2016/17	1,078,822	3.4
2017/18	1,094,792	1.5

Source Institute of International Education (2016a)

(Taylor and Albasri 2014). The scholarship provided each eligible student from Saudi Arabia with up to $200,000 for tuition and benefits to enroll at U.S. colleges and universities. However, since 2016, the growth in the number of students from Saudi Arabia has slowed due to reduced government funding for the scholarship and a more academically competitive application. In 2016/17 Saudi Arabia remained the third most popular country of origin; however, it was the first time since 2005/06 when the growth in students from Saudi Arabia was less than 10% from the previous year (IIE 2016b). From 2015/16 to 2016/17, the number of Saudi students in the U.S. declined 14.2%, and subsequently another 15.5% in 2017/18. Nevertheless, in 2017/18 there were eight times more Saudi students in the U.S. than in 2001/02 (IIE 2018a).

Whatever the students' country of origin, following 9/11, obtaining a U.S. student visa became a more arduous task than before. Applicants were required to participate in personal interviews, which often led to lengthy delays and little explanation in cases of visa denial (Yale-Loehr et al.

2005). In September 2002, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was implemented to require all male non-citizens between the ages of 16 to 45 from 25 Asian and Middle Eastern countries to register as they entered the U.S. and check in with immigration officials regularly. If students violated these new regulations, they could be fined, jailed, or deported. Security checks were instituted at U.S. embassies, and these same students were subject to a 20-day waiting period (NAFSA 2004; Vanzi 2004). After the waiting period was phased out in 2002, such applicants then became subject to Visa Condor checks, a special name check clearance procedure (Garrity 2003; Yale-Loehr et al. 2005). Applicants who met certain criteria (e.g., country of origin, field of study) were subject to a mandatory Security Advisory Option (SAO), but consular officers could also request a SAO if they believed any applicant posed a security risk. Other applicants were subject to a Visa Mantis check, which safeguarded against individuals who might pose a risk for the theft of U.S. goods and information (NAFSA 2004). After 2004, the United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program (replaced in 2013 by The Office of Biometric Identity Management) required students to provide biometric information (i.e., digital photo, fingerprints) in order to obtain entry and exit documents that could be read electronically (DHS 2018). The new security checks led to a sharp decline in F-1 visa issuances.

Visa issuance data during the decade-and-a-half after 9/11 is instructive. Two years after 9/11, the overall number of visas issued decreased 36% (from 2001 to 2003). The U.S. government began keeping statistics in 1952, and the two largest drops in visa issuance were in 2002 and 2003. In part, this may have been attributable to the backlog of applications due to new visa regulations following 9/11 (Ante 2004). However, this decline was short lived. In 2005, the number of F-1 visas issued increased 9.4% when compared to 2003, and in 2006 the number was almost 28% higher than 2003, with a number comparable to the pre-9/11 years. After 2007, the number steadily rose until 2016, when there was again a 36.6% drop in the number of visas issued. From 2016 to 2017, the decline in F-1 visa issuance was 17%. In 2016 and 2017, the F-1 visa refusal rate of 34% to 35% was not much different from 2002/03 (see Fig. 10.1; U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs 2017).



Fig. 10.1 U.S. F-1 visa issuances 2001–2017 (*Source* U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs)

When considering visa issuances versus actual student enrollment, caution must be used because changes in visa duration and other requirements may influence application frequency. For instance, a 2014 U.S. visa policy change that allowed Chinese students, the largest international student population in the U.S., to obtain 5-year rather than 1-year F-1 visas, led to a decrease in visa applications but not student enrollment. However, overall visa issuance and denial cannot be ignored in light of the declining number of international students who choose the U.S. for foreign study (ICEF Monitor 2018).

Following 9/11, visa rejection affected students from throughout the world, but it affected Muslim-majority countries the most. Though only 13% of international students in the U.S. originated from Muslim countries, they accounted for 24% of the denied visa applications though 2003 (Lowell et al. 2007). However, it is important to acknowledge that students from the Middle East and Muslim countries were not the only ones affected by changes in the visa application process. Economic and political events after 2001 led to changes for all student applicants, including the South American countries of Venezuela, Columbia, and Argentina, where visa issuances dropped by 20%. For almost two years after 9/11, some international educators felt that the visa application and issuance process in the U.S. moved away from "core principles" such as openness and embracing multiculturalism,

and toward "zero tolerance for any ambiguity that might have security implications" (Yale-Loehr et al. 2005, 3). Prospective international students cited the difficulty in obtaining visas as a deterrent to study in the U.S., and some professionals in international education argued that 9/11 "fundamentally changed the face of recruiting, introducing layers of security checks and alienating many students and their families in the process" (McMurtie 2005, A8). In 2019, the student visa process remained much the same.

Following 9/11, the U.S. suffered a loss of scientific and technological talent that formerly had been provided by international students and scholars. Students who studied subjects on the Department of State's sensitive/critical fields watch list (e.g., nuclear technology, physics, information security) had the most difficulty obtaining visas (Brumfiel 2003). Approximately 75% of universities surveyed reported difficulties in helping scholars gain admission into the U.S. (NAFSA 2003), and there were those who argued that the SEVIS monitoring system "sent unwelcoming messages to the world's academic communities" (Starobin 2006, 1). In response to the difficulties in obtaining visas in the years following 9/11, the DHS regularly updated SEVIS and the student visa application process, often in direct response to the issues identified by international educators. They also began to develop cooperative partnerships with identified countries to promote academic exchange.

During this time, professional organizations such as NAFSA made public statements indicating that, while they supported national security efforts, they also strongly believed in the value of academic exchange and encouraged further improvements to the visa process. In 2009, NAFSA Senior Public Policy Advisor Victor Johnson stated, "The visa process should serve as a barrier to people with criminal or terroristic intent…But it should also be a gateway for people with the talent our economy and society requires" (Kaplan 2009, 132). In collaboration with a group of science, academic, and engineering professionals, NAFSA issued a 2009 statement to the federal government directly addressing the problems international scholars experienced in obtaining entry visas (Brumfiel 2003). International educators consistently communicated the important role of academic exchange in preparing citizens for the twenty-first century (McMurtie 2005; NAFSA 2003). They also made clear that, with continued improvements, many issues with the SEVIS system could be effectively mitigated (Starobin 2006).

10.4 Other Possible Reasons for Post-9/11 Inbound Student Mobility Changes

While international politics and visa restrictions were significant, the increased competition for international students from other countries (possibly influenced by the global economic recession following 9/11) and the rising cost of higher education in the U.S. also might have been deterrents. Other possibilities include a decline in favorable attitudes toward the U.S. (Lowell et al. 2007) and a climate of prejudice and discrimination surrounding immigrants and international students (McMurtie 2001).

In 2017/18, the number of international students in the U.S. appeared substantially large at 1 million; however, because the U.S. has the largest capacity in higher education across the world, this number must be considered proportionally to understand how other countries are becoming more attractive to international students. For instance, in 1999 the U.K. instituted an international student recruitment strategy that increased the number of students by 118,000 by 2006, which was more than two times the U.S. increase during that time. Between 1999 and 2005, international student enrollment in the U.S. increased almost 17%, whereas the U.K. saw 29% growth, Australia 42%, France 81%, and 46% in Germany (ACE 2006). Similar to the U.K., other countries, such as Australia, Canada, Germany, and New Zealand, have developed strong recruitment strategies to attract international students (Kless 2004; McMurtie 2001). Some historically less traditional destinations (i.e., New Zealand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore) have worked to become more popular with international students by providing spousal benefits and easier immigration procedures (Mooney and Neelakantan 2004). Though the U.S. had the largest market share of international students in 2017 (24%) compared to the U.K. (11%), China (10%), and Australia (7%), overall growth in the U.S. has slowed. In 2016/17, 40% of U.S. colleges and universities reported a decline in international applications (Redden 2017). Reasons included more stringent visa regulations, fear of discrimination, lack of post-completion employment opportunities, a decrease in

available funding for international students, and an overall global economic decline (Lowell et al. 2007; Quinton 2018). Professionals in the field have argued that the U.S. has neither developed an official national strategy for international student recruitment nor a climate that embraces the skills and knowledge offered by international students and scholars.

The global economic recession following the 9/11 attacks also may have influenced the declining growth of international students. Although there is some debate as to whether the 9/11 attacks contributed substantially to the economic recession of 2001, there is certainly evidence that the event was a catalyst for negative economic repercussions within the U.S. airline and tourism industry. Economic effects extended beyond the U.S. to the international financial and trade markets, influencing international capital flow and the value of the dollar, and consequently, the economic stability of other countries (DePietro 2017; Economic Effects of 9/11 2002).

In combination with the recession, the rising cost of higher education in the U.S. made it increasingly difficult for international students to afford U.S. colleges and universities. Compared to other countries post-9/11, the U.S. and Japan consistently ranked highest in overall cost (i.e., combined costs of tuition and living) at approximately $25,000 a year. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have ranked second, ranging between roughly $10,000 and $15,000. Countries with some of the lowest costs of education were found in continental Europe, where total costs ranged between $5000 and $10,000 (Usher and Medow 2010). In order to remain competitive as a destination for international students, the U.S. must address the cost of higher education, as well as immigration policy, because students can find a less expensive quality education and more progressive visa and residency policies in other countries (Verbik and Lasanowski 2007). In 2006, the Department of Education and NAFSA recommended that, to encourage international student applications, the U.S. should remove restrictive visa regulations and provide a clear path to permanent residency for international graduates with specialized advanced training in STEM fields (NAFSA 2006; Spellings Report 2006).

In addition to increased competition for international students and rising costs of education, the declining image of the U.S. in the eyes of the world may have contributed to the slowed growth in international students. Before 9/11, polls indicated that, in Western Europe, attitudes toward the U.S. were generally positive, ranging from 62% favorability in France to 83% in the U.K. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, these numbers dropped substantially in 2004, with 37% of French respondents and 58% of U.K. respondents indicating favorable attitudes toward the U.S. (Pew Research Center 2015). In the Islamic world, leaders were divided; approximately half indicated that individuals in their countries held favorable views of the U.S. and the other half indicated unfavorable views. At the same time, world leaders overall reported that people in their country believed that 9/11 was the result of U.S. policy and that it was "good that Americans know what it is like to be vulnerable" (Pew Research Center 2001, 1). In the same poll, respondents indicated that they had a favorable opinion of the U.S. because it continued to represent the land of opportunity and democracy, not because they approved the actions of U.S. leaders. Disapproval of the U.S. was greatest among citizens of primarily Muslim nations, and much of this animosity stemmed from U.S. policy toward the Arab world (Zogby 2003). Among international students, a 2005 study found that they most strongly agreed with the statement, "American people like to dominate other people" ($M = 4.06/5$), and indicated most disagreement ($M = 2.47/5$) with the statement, "Americans are peaceful people" (Fullerton 2005, 135–136). The negative perceptions of the U.S. immediately after 9/11 were aimed at "U.S. power" rather than the people who lived in the country (Pew Research Center 2001).

While the 2001 Pew Survey found the image of the U.S. had become somewhat less favorable following 9/11, U.S. attitudes toward other countries and immigrants also became more negative. Immigrants in the U.S. experienced increased prejudice, which led to further complications for international students. In general, studies have found that international students in the U.S. report higher levels of perceived discrimination and homesickness than their U.S. counterparts (e.g., Rajapaksa and Dundes 2002) and that they are conscious of the possible negative perceptions of their home countries (Min-Hua 2007).

In addition, domestic students may lack cultural understanding of their international peers, which can lead to international students feeling academically and socially excluded (Lee and Rice 2007). Due to media portrayals of immigrants, international students may feel inferior and interpret negative reactions to accented or non-fluent English as intolerance of foreign cultures (Poyrazli and Lopez 2007). Students from regions other than Europe, particularly the Middle East and Africa, have reported greater levels of discrimination than European students (Hanassab 2006), though racism and discrimination are not isolated to Arab and Muslim students (Frey and Roysircar 2006; Poyrazli and Lopez 2007).

Though it is difficult to identify 9/11 as a direct cause of the prejudice directed toward international students, particularly ones who appeared to be Muslim or of Middle Eastern descent, the event may have served as a catalyst for renewed xenophobia and greater ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism can set the stage for greater disparaging of the out-group and more allegiance to the in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). After 9/11, much of the negative attitudes toward immigrants focused on anyone who appeared Arab or Muslim, including South Asians and Sikhs, rekindling historical feelings of Islamophobia (Beydoun 2018). These groups became the target of hate crimes, racial profiling, bullying, shootings, and murder much because they appeared to share the national heritage or religion of the 9/11 hijackers. Following 9/11, 20–60% of Muslims in the U.S. reported that they had experienced discrimination (Human Rights Watch Report 2002). A majority of the Muslim-Americans reported negative aftereffects of 9/11, including verbal harassment and greater suspicion during airport security (Abu-Raiya et al. 2011). In an October 2001 public opinion poll in the U.S., 47% of Americans had a favorable view of Islam; however, in 2010, a similar poll indicated that this number had dropped 10 points to 37%. Indirectly, changes in the words used to discuss terrorist events may have fed negative behaviors. Jason Villemez (2001) noted that the term “9/11” became part of the American lexicon, as did “al-Qaida, Taliban, ground zero, radicalism, extremism, anthrax and the Axis of Evil.” After 9/11, international students, particularly those from the Middle East and South Asia, were more likely

to seek academic study in countries other than the U.S. (Urias and Yeakey 2005).

In January 2017 an executive order, which repeated the myth that many of the 9/11 terrorists had entered the U.S. on visitor, student, or employment visas, established a temporary travel ban on individuals from seven countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (White House 2017). In September 2017, the Trump administration dropped Sudan and added the countries of Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela to the ban (eventually omitting Chad). The Director of the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College, Philip Altbach, expressed concern that the "extreme vetting" promised by the U.S. administration under President Trump would add to the difficulties that international students and scholars have experienced since 9/11. In addition, Chair of the Department of Educational Policy and Leadership at the State University of New York Albany, Jason Lane, compared the 2017 visa situation to 9/11 when he stated that, "There will certainly be a lot of attention on what the Trump administration does in terms of student visas, particularly J-1 visas that allow students to work, which Trump has suggested may need to be somehow revised" (Bothwell 2016, 1). Though the revised travel ban was suspended by federal courts for some time, a June 26, 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision upheld the travel ban, which led to international educators again publicly expressing their concern. Serving as an advocate for international students, Jill Welch, NAFSA Deputy Executive Director for Public Policy, issued a statement in reference to the ban:

> At a time when we should be making every effort to create connections and ties around the world through robust international exchange with all nations, especially those in the Middle East, the Supreme Court's decision poses a grave threat to our national security and keeps us from building those necessary relationships abroad. While universities and colleges work tirelessly to welcome international students and scholars, the chilling effect of this policy and the uncertainty for our international students and scholars will undoubtedly continue the current downturn in U.S. international student enrollment as the world wonders whether America will

> hold true to our values. Today, the United States can be seen as a country that bans people from our shores, not on the basis of what they have done, but for where they are from. (Welch 2018a)

The March 2018 announcement that officials within the Trump administration pushed to ban visas for Chinese students was disheartening for international educators. NAFSA Executive Director and CEO, Esther D. Brimmer, reacted by stating, "Generations of foreign policy leaders agree that international students and scholars are one of America's greatest foreign policy assets. If the administration imposes restrictions that will further prohibit students and scholars from choosing the United States as their destination, we will suffer devastating impacts for decades to come…International students and scholars create jobs, drive research, enrich our classrooms, strengthen national security and are America's best ambassadors and allies. Students should never be used as bargaining chips, and we cannot afford to lose this valuable resource" (Brimmer 2018).

10.5 The U.S. Educational Response to 9/11

Following 9/11, it was clear that expertise in foreign language and cultural competency had been lacking in U.S. education (Green and Olson 2003; Lane-Toomey 2014). Therefore, the U.S. government, global foundations, and educators reemphasized the importance of learning about other cultures, languages, and the political, economic, and cultural implications of globalization at all levels of education. In 2007, Stephanie Bell-Rose, then President of the Goldman Sachs Foundation, stated the importance of international education to bridging relationships among nations:

> International education is going to be the primary means by which we are able to bridge the cultural and linguistic divides that exist not only within our country, but also globally. Without an appreciation for other cultures, other languages, national history of other countries, and the problems and contributions of other countries, we think that school

> children in America will not be able to become effective global leaders. We need them to become effective global leaders and we believe that 9/11 was a very vivid illustration of the compelling case for promoting a better understanding of and appreciation for other people, other cultures, other religions, and other geographies. (Bell-Rose 2007)

The U.S. response was increased federal funding for academic programs in Area Studies (i.e., the development of a subspecialty in language or an area of the world), language training, cultural exchange, and study abroad. President George Bush invested $114 million in the 2007 fiscal year to establish the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI), "a plan to further strengthen national security and prosperity in the twenty-first century through education, especially in developing foreign language skills." The intent was to encourage the study of critical languages by U.S. citizens through educational programs that target K-12 education, college/university level students, and working professionals (Powell and Lowenkron 2006). Critical languages are considered to be critical to U.S. national security and include languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Indonesian, Korean, Russian, and Turkish (NSEP 2017). The NSLI shared similarities with the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which was passed to counter fears that the U.S. was losing its technological edge in the Cold War with the Soviet Union (History, Art, and Archives 1958). Seventy-five percent of the NSLI was funded through the Departments of State and Education, and the Department of Defense invested more than $750 million to train employees in critical languages over six years from 2007 to 2011 (Capriccioso 2006). Although immediately after 9/11 U.S. policy makers believed that international students and scholars were a national security threat, NAFSA and other organizations recognized that international exchange was critical to national security in the future (NAFSA 2006).

Other enhanced federal programs included the U.S. Department of State's Critical Languages Scholarship Program (CLS), which is a fully funded language and cultural program for U.S. undergraduate and graduate students. According to the Modern Languages Association (MLA), these programs were effective. Between 1998 and 2002, U.S. college enrollment in Arabic doubled. In addition,

a MLA ad hoc committee examined the language crisis following 9/11 and proposed a new and an integrative approach for teaching foreign languages to achieve "deep translingual and transcultural competence" (Geisler et al. 2007, 237). The MLA committee agreed that the language crisis must be addressed at all levels of education, not only at the university. They also reiterated the importance of study abroad as a path to learning about language and culture. In 2012, the Department of Education emphasized this commitment in its first International Education Strategic Plan (U.S. Department of Education 2012).

As the importance of global learning was reemphasized, leaders in higher education renewed the promotion of global citizenship education as an essential learning outcome for the twenty-first century. In 2005, the American Association of Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) launched its Liberal Education and America's Promise (LEAP) initiative, and published the goals and learning outcomes in *College Learning for the New Global Century*. By including diversity and global learning experiences as part of high-impact practices in higher education, this professional organization endorsed global citizenship education. Knowledge of human cultures, civic engagement, and intercultural understanding and competence were all identified as components of the AAC&U essential learning outcomes (AAC&U 2005).

After 9/11, leaders in higher education also began stronger promotion of study abroad. In his November 2001 remarks at the President's Associates Dinner, Harvard University President Lawrence H. Summers responded to 9/11 by stating, "These are issues that will require us to address globalization at every level. Whether it is making sure that more of our students have the opportunity to study abroad, to be in developing countries, and experience and see cultures very different from our own…" (Summers 2001). The National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC) declared that "internationalization is the single most important leadership challenge of the 21st century" (NASULGC 2004, 17). Since then, other institutions and organizations have followed suit. The 2014 IIE Generation Study Abroad initiative boasted a $2 million commitment, and the goal

was to double the number of U.S. students abroad by 2017/18 (IIE 2014). The 2016 Paul Simon Study Abroad Program Act provided competitive grants to students, with a specific initiative to increase access for minorities, students with financial need, and non-traditional students. The goal of this program was to increase the number of U.S. students abroad to 1 million in 10 years (Commission on the Abraham Lincoln 2005).

However, it is noteworthy that, while the federal government supported increased language learning and professional organizations and college administrators lauded study abroad, many colleges and universities decreased or eliminated foreign language as a graduation requirement. This seemed contradictory to the goals of international education and was a surprising reaction to the foreign language and cultural competency priorities that arose after 9/11. Educators recognized the need for foreign language education, but that did not translate into enhanced integration of this requirement into higher education curricula. This disconnect must not be ignored as international educators consider the future of global citizenship education.

10.6 Conclusion

Looking to the future, international educators acknowledge the wide range of factors that play a role in the mission to internationalize higher education. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in increased challenges, most prominently a more complicated visa process and the increased monitoring of international students and scholars. At the same time, 9/11 also led to positive developments including a more concerted and organized advocacy system for academic exchange, a working partnership between international education professionals and U.S. immigration officials, and an increased commitment to global education.

What do these developments mean for international education? When considering the legacy of 9/11, international educators must remember the mission of the profession. Though this chapter focused primarily on international education in the U.S., the mission of internationalization inherently transcends national borders. With continued

support from professional organizations such as NAFSA, IIE, ACE, the Forum on Education Abroad, EAIE (European Association of International Educators), and others, the field has continued to promote global citizenship education as the core of peaceful international relations, human rights, and social justice. International educators have emphasized that academic exchange is not an impediment to, but rather a part of, the national security solution. Restricting the movement of international students and scholars is detrimental to U.S. scientific, political, economic, and social interests. In the future, the role of international education professionals as advocates for academic exchange will become increasingly critical. There are forces beyond higher education that challenge the promotion of cultural exchange, and indirectly, cultural understanding. It has been clear that misinformation and fear of the "other" have contributed to misguided legislation that makes it difficult for international scholars and students to gain entry into the U.S. While acknowledging national security concerns, international educators have a continued responsibility to educate the public regarding the advantages of welcoming students and scholars from abroad into the U.S.

It is noteworthy that the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report viewed international education as a pathway to more peaceful relations with those abroad. The report stated, "The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope" (Eldridge et al. 2004, 377). The commission also stated, "Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamic terrorism" (Eldridge et al. 2004, 378).

Though the 9/11 Commission focused on national security concerns related to terrorism, the message that "education teaches tolerance" is one of the fundamental components of international education. As institutions of higher learning continue to educate global citizens for the twenty-first century and beyond, there should be a cautious hope that international education can nurture global leaders who respect all people. Academic exchange reduces the use of stereotypes as catalysts for discrimination and fear of the other, and it can facilitate a sense of responsibility,

not only to local communities, but also to those across the globe. This mutual interdependence and goal sharing leads to decreased intergroup competition and increased cooperation among individuals and nations. It is more difficult to make decisions that harm people who are familiar and known. In this regard, J. William Fulbright stated, "The essence of intercultural education is the acquisition of empathy—the ability to see the world as others see it, and to allow for the possibility that others may see something we have failed to see, or may see it more accurately. The simple purpose of the exchange program…is to erode the culturally rooted mistrust that sets nations against one another. The exchange program is not a panacea but an avenue of hope…" (Fulbright 1989).

As internationalization efforts continue, 9/11 serves as a reminder that a country's response to tragic events can either embrace international partners and foster positive collaboration, or alienate them, resulting in damage to the progress made by international educators and world leaders over the past century. U.S. political leaders have an obligation to maintain the safety of citizens; however, they can do so while welcoming and understanding the advantages of a multicultural society. The benefits of campus and community internationalization are clear, and if policy decisions are based firmly on evidence acknowledging that academic exchange serves to strengthen national security, rather than threaten it, then policy makers and international educators can work together to promote the importance of global awareness and its inextricable ties to human rights and well-being for all.

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11

Teaching 9/11 in the Core Curriculum

Mark Finney and Joseph Lane Jr.

An increasingly prevalent feature of today's liberal arts curriculum—the first-year seminar—presents challenges and opportunities. They are typically designed to support students' transitions to the academic and social culture of an institution, provide students with a set of useful academic skills, and help students create community in their cohort. In addition, first-year seminars provide academic institutions with important tools for charting student progress toward academic goals, improving retention, and engaging students about subjects such as 9/11.

Choosing a first-year seminar topic is a difficult and important decision. Because the roster for first-year seminars tends to be interdisciplinary, the course content must be clear yet broad-based and disciplinarily

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inclusive. In the fall of 2015, 9/11 was selected as the content focus for a section of Emory & Henry College's first-year seminar course: Transitions. The topic of 9/11 accommodated the broad range of student interest in the class. Moreover, it provided the instructors with an opportunity to consider questions about different kinds of learning, the differences between history and memory, and the constructedness of contemporary history. In this essay, the instructors for the course narrate their experiences, highlighting the generalizable features of the course and what was learned about 9/11 through its implementation. In the final section, the authors highlight some of the research essays that were written by the students in the course and make recommendations for how 9/11 can be successfully integrated into similar courses.

11.1 Institutional Opportunities

Constructed to fit within Emory & Henry College's Transitions curriculum, "9/11: the day that changed everything?" was designed to achieve several overlapping goals. The course was mandated by the College Catalogue to introduce "students to the concepts and methods of a liberal arts education, teach students to use different methodological proficiencies to explore and analyze complex ideas, encourage students to develop their curiosity and creativity, and urge students to take responsibility for their own learning." It was also designed for a cohort of Honors students, which carried with it another set of expectations. Finally, the topic itself was selected to create a tie between the course and the "9/11 and the Academy" conference, which was held the same semester in November 2015.

Transitions is the first of a Core Curriculum sequence through which Emory & Henry College students progress. According to the College's website (2016),

> At the heart of Emory & Henry's curriculum is a series of courses deemed so important to a liberal arts education that the faculty have established them as curricular requirements for all students. This four-year program engages students intellectually, encourages the integration of knowledge and essential skills, expands curiosity, and promotes learning and service as lifelong commitments.

Emory & Henry College professes a strong commitment to the liberal arts, and the Core Curriculum is designed to be taken alongside a student's disciplinary coursework. As the College catalog and website (2016) explain, "Students encounter topics that arise from the arts, humanities, sciences, and religion; develop thoughtful responses to ethical questions; and seek to understand their political and social responsibilities as citizens in an interconnected world." Each seminar topic is selected by the instructor to meet these goals through a "focus on one topic, idea, problem, or concept." Though Transitions courses share a unified structure, the content of each Transitions course is determined by the instructor and, in the case of the Honors Program, is selected by the incoming class of students who will take it.

At the time, the Transitions unified course objectives were that students would be able to:

- Collaborate effectively and respectfully,
- Write in a clear manner that is grammatically correct and well-informed,
- Think critically about the topic of this course and consider the ethical implications of our actions individually and as a global society,
- Compare and contrast events across time and geography in a qualitative and quantitative manner, and
- Discuss, develop, initiate, and take responsibility for their personal goals and passions.

In addition to these institutional structures, the Honors Program has a set of unique traditions for the Transitions curriculum to accommodate those needs that are specific to the entering Honors student. Three distinctions in particular stand out:

- The Honors cohort is responsible for reading and responding to a course text prior to matriculation,
- The students are responsible for developing the content and structure of the second half of the course, and
- A significant research essay is required.

These three variations from the standard curriculum are designed to push Honors students beyond the scholarly requirements of other first-year students by providing them with the opportunity for increased depth of study, leadership, and content synthesis, and establishing an expectation for academic rigor.

11.2 Course Design and Objectives

Interdisciplinarity, critical discourse, and lively and rigorous dialogue were the three ideas that drove the creation of the course structure. As course designers and instructors, we wanted to use 9/11 as a case study to provide students with opportunities to situate themselves disciplinarily, and consider real-world and scholarly applications for their future work. This was to be accomplished in three ways. We wanted them to consider:

- How intellectual thought comes to be within particular contexts, and how thought has been and continues to be affected by world historical events (i.e., how the academy is shaped by contexts outside its control);
- The role of academic and other influences in setting broad political, social, environmental, and legal agendas; and
- Finally, we wanted to ask how the newest scholarship has been driven by methodological and technological innovations, and the political context, of the early twenty-first century.

The course was oriented toward examining the directions of research agendas, political ideologies, and technological developments. At the same time, the course content was supposed to acclimate students to the work and culture of higher education. The assignments that were implemented and utilized in this course were developed to achieve these content and contextual goals.

Timeliness was a key pedagogical tool that the instructors used throughout the course. Because 9/11 occurred fourteen years prior to the course's implementation, the students were alive when the

event happened but were probably young enough to not have a direct memory of it, though a few knew of family members or friends of family who had been 9/11 victims. For the most part, we anticipated that the students might have constructed memories or emotional impressions tied to the memories of others, as described by Hooker and Friedman (2005). They note that "adults [are] seen as having an important role in helping [children] understand events." A significant number of the early class sessions was spent interrogating students' "memories" of 9/11 and the extent to which they were direct. This was achieved principally in two ways. Over the summer, in addition to reading and responding to a text, students were asked to write an Intellectual Autobiography, or "a typed statement about [themselves] and [their] intellectual goals." While the assignment was not specifically tied to 9/11, the context of the course meant that many students dealt with 9/11 in their responses.

This assignment achieved two importantpedagogical goals early on. First, it encouraged students to situate themselves in a scholarly tradition and to consider who they were intellectually as they started college. In addition, the assignment asked students to consider who they hoped to become and what they hoped to know, both at the conclusion of their college career and throughout their lives. Quite a lot of scholarship has demonstrated the value of reflective practice in academic work. Specifically, research shows that students who are actively reflective about themselves and their intellectual pursuits are able to make more appropriate connections across disciplinary boundaries and engage in ethical and critical thinking in related practical work (Bloom 1956; Sweitzer and King 1999). For these reasons, the intellectual autobiography assignment is revisited at the end of the semester and again before graduation. Second, the intellectual autobiography was an icebreaker activity that was both light and significant, compelling and fun. Instead of introducing themselves to each other, students were partnered and tasked with introducing each other. This required reading each other's intellectual autobiography and meeting to discuss the presentation prior to class. If there is one thing that years of instruction has taught us, it is that students will write more carefully and include different information when writing for each other than they will for their instructors. In reading and thinking about their partner's intellectual autobiography,

students began to get a sense for the breadth of interests in the room and how the different personalities around them would shape the course of the semester. Finally, the most engaged students also demonstrated attention to differences related to self and other that they carried into their understanding of 9/11.

The course was also designed to facilitate connections between the course content and the "9/11 and the Academy" conference. Several students were selected to work for conference organizers to provide logistical support. In addition, students were informed early on that there would be a Student Symposium at the conference where they could present their research essays alongside other undergraduate students working on similar projects. Six essays were selected from the cohort to present alongside another five from other institutions. In the end, like the conference, the course assignments, which increased in scope and complexity over the semester, were designed to help students develop the critical skills needed to interrogate the conception of 9/11 as a watershed moment.

11.3 Course Assignments

The three broad objectives for the course were to familiarize incoming students with college-level work, provide them with an engaging and rigorous academic experience, and situate 9/11 in the historical and contemporary United States and the world. The course was designed to achieve these objectives through pre-matriculation work, in- and out-of-class assignments, instructor-facilitated discussions, and student-led discussions. No formal examinations were given.

In addition to the intellectual autobiography, students were assigned a summer reading text and a series of essay-style response questions. The e-book, *After 9/11: A Collection of the New Yorker's Award-Winning Coverage of 9/11 and its Aftermath*, includes journalism, poetry, investigations, and op-eds, and it was selected for its breadth of styles and coverage. The book provided students with a wealth of historical information and personal stories about 9/11, and it helped to set the stage for our course. Students were tasked with responding to the text

through six essay-style questions, which were developed in order to provide the instructors with meaningful data about the incoming class. The following questions were posed to students in April, due in August, and accompanied a memo introducing them to the course.

1. Which piece appeals to you the most in this e-book? Describe the piece. Explain why that piece helped you understand the consequences of 9/11 in a different way than you had considered before.
2. Opposite of question 1: What piece rubbed you the wrong way? Describe the piece. Explain what about it is problematic for you and why.
3. Heroes and villains: Throughout the book we read about the heroes and villains who made this event what it was. Supporting your argument with evidence from the text, write about how the authors define "hero" and "villain." Are these descriptions appropriate?
4. Some of the most fascinating essays in the text are those that describe the al Qaeda perpetrators: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others. What do you think about these essays? What do you think are the authors' intentions? Do they change your opinions about these men?
5. Thinking about your intended major or area of study: In what ways was your point of view, field, or research interests integrated into the e-book? Using examples, explain where you saw references to your intended work, and describe how you might think about 9/11 in your field of study.
6. Interview one person (in your family, a friend, someone who lost someone, etc.) about their experience on 9/11 and how it changed their view of the world. Tell us what you learned from that interview.

Our assessment of student responses was not oriented toward assigning a grade, but toward establishing a baseline academic threshold from which to operate. It provided us with information about students' writing and researching abilities, displayed their existing knowledge about 9/11, and created a common currency of knowledge that we could use for the remainder of the semester. The students' responses were also used in last-minute tinkering with the course structure and content.

Three written assignments were required throughout the course, and they included two short essays and one major research essay. The first short

essay asked the students to address this prompt: "Fourteen years later, how well do the ideas and arguments from the summer reading book stack up against reality? In this essay, take one of the essays from the book and compare/contrast its major findings or thesis about 9/11/01 with 9/11/15." This critical essay pushed students to engage historically with one of the essays in the summer reading and to critically consider it alongside their own outside research. The second short essay asked students to attend a panel at that semester's conference and "compare the research you've done on your own project with what you observe at the conference." This essay ensured that the students attended the "9/11 and the Academy" conference. It also gave them an opportunity to experience an academic conference, communicate with professors from around the country, and reflect on how their work connects with the broader world of scholarship.

Finally, students were tasked with composing a large-scale research essay. The assignment was broken into a set of smaller tasks throughout the semester, including a proposal, bibliography, and other such assignments. The prompt read:

> Your research product will be a 20-page (approx.) essay that combines research and interpretation. In the essay, you must argue a thesis about a major social/ethical issue, using good research. Your thesis, and hence your essay, must be related in some way to the course content, but you may approach 9/11 from virtually any angle. The possibilities are endless, and we hope you will use the opportunity to find a topic that makes the course fun and exciting for you.

The research essay was a unique component to the Honors section of the Transitions program, as it provided students with a more rigorous academic experience. These were the essays that some students presented at the end of the semester on the first night of the conference.

11.4 Structure of Class Sessions

Because it was a seminar course, our goal was to ensure that students were actively engaged in dialogue. It was our intention to have focused and productive conversations during class sessions. Once the semester

began, we divided the course in half, with the instructors leading discussion in the first half and students taking charge in the second half. To begin, students were divided into small groups based on shared affinities toward topics and methodologies. They then worked with the instructors to develop week-long sessions involving assignments, readings, and facilitated dialogue. During the first half, four structures were implemented to ensure that class sessions were productive and engaged. A comprehensive (yet tentative) schedule of discussion topics was distributed; class discussions were tied to passages and ideas from the summer text with the occasional additional reading; students were assigned brief response pieces for each new topic; and "scribe" duties were assigned to a different student every day so that there was a record of each class session.

For each of the nine Class Discussion Topics employed in the first half of the semester, the students completed reading on their own and came to class prepared for discussion. For instance, one day students were tasked with rereading *Talk of the Town* by John Updike, composed on September 24, 2001, and responded to the following prompt:

> How has 9/11 changed us psychologically? Can we speak of a different cultural psychology before and after (or after and long after)? What does it feel like to board a plane – do you remember boarding planes before 9/11 (or have you heard about it)? Have we experienced a collective Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and what steps are we taking to overcome it?

The prompt asked students to consider how the passage of time changes authoritative points of view, and it provided opportunities to collect and analyze data to support their answer. It also required students to apply critical reading skills to text that, in this case, is written in the strongest terms: "The nightmare is still on. The bodies are beneath the rubble, the last-minute cell-phone calls - remarkably calm and loving, many of them-are still being reported, the sound of an airplane overhead still bears an unfamiliar menace, the thought of boarding an airplane without old blasé blitheness keeps receding into the past" (Loc 217). The coordination of the personal and empirical in this essay provides students with an opportunity to consider their own use of data, the power of rhetorical argument, and the differences between popular and academic

argumentative styles. In addition to their own responses, we also required that students reply to at least two of their colleagues' responses. This part of the exercise asked them to consider opposing arguments and to prepare to rebut or defend their own.

In order to foster rigorous discussion during class sessions and discourage students from attempting to multitask, each class session was assigned a scribe, or a single student who was responsible for keeping and producing notes for the entire class. Scribes had the additional responsibility of posting their notes on our Moodle page within a few days, so that students could refer to them throughout the term. Because of the course schedule and number of students enrolled, each student served as scribe at least twice. Scribes were tasked with learning to take efficient and meaningful notes, especially since they had to share those notes with their colleagues. This exercise taught students to consider what notes to include and which to leave out, and when to note speakers, ideas, arguments, and conclusions. In addition, student scribes learned in a very direct sense the transitional power of authorship. Akin to Michel Foucault's (1979) notion that an authored artifact becomes reflective of the author (and therefore a part of society's judgment of that author), our students quickly learned that their scribing choices became a part of how the other students in the class considered them.

In the second half of the semester, students were put in charge of creating week-long lesson plans containing readings, assignments, and class discussions and activities. As stated on the syllabus:

> Each group will prepare a syllabus memo; a 2-page argument for including a certain section in the course. On the first page, you should lay out your plan for the readings, assignments and activities you would like to include in your section of the course, and how you intend for student learning to be assessed. Suggestions for the content of your section are listed on this syllabus – but you are not limited to these. You will need to do research, preview possible readings, and make choices about what to include and what to exclude. On the second page, you should explain these choices and why you think a certain collection of readings or a particular assignment is the best way to approach a worthwhile topic and why you think that topic is important for our class study of 9/11.

Topics ranged from exploring the psychological effects of 9/11 to xenophobia, religion, and national security. In addition to the scholarship and disciplinary knowledge that was required for this assignment, leadership was a central component. The students met with instructors regularly as they prepared, and this enabled us to check in on the group dynamic and ensure that the work was being conducted rigorously. We addressed these issues in the prompt, too, by reminding all students that "we expect the members of that group *to lead class*, and we expect all members of the group to participate in doing so." That meant that all readings and discussion questions were to be "prepared and circulated in time for members of the class to prepare…in the on-line forums." Moreover, "Different members of the group may perform *distinct tasks*, but each member of the group should make *an equal contribution* to the performance of these duties."

The discussion forums revealed the extent to which 9/11 can serve as a broad-based and interdisciplinary platform upon which instructors can build a successful first-year seminar. The unique attributes to 9/11 opened up space to consider the topic from multiple perspectives; fostered an avenue through which we could consider the relationship between memory and history; and provided opportunities to think about the academy in its broader cultural, political, and social contexts.

11.5 Project Examples

Evidence supporting the usefulness of 9/11 in a first-year seminar course can be found in the students' research essays. The unique attributes of 9/11 opened up space for students consider the topic from multiple perspectives and engage in scholarship of their own, with varying degrees of sophistication. This section presents excerpts from these essays to highlight the creativity and engagement brought to bear on 9/11 by a generation of students a step removed from the experiences of September 11, 2001.

One thread of interest among the students was how 9/11 changed politics and culture. One student, interested in film and culture, developed a pre- and post-9/11 comparison of the representations of Islam

and Muslims in American popular cinema. Kaelee Belletto's (2015) qualitative comparative exploration of the changes in representation found that, after 9/11, "filmmakers have had much more opportunity to include Muslim characters through media that covered the 'War on Terror,' predominantly in war film." While she found it "incredibly difficult to find representations of Muslim individuals in film dealing with the attacks themselves," she discovered that "the resultant actions to the acts of terrorism—ones that seem to provide the direct, on-screen appearances of Muslim and Middle Eastern people—are much more commonplace." Scholars in film and cultural studies (see Frost 2011; Hantke 2011; Stubblefield 2015) argue that representations of Muslims and Islam after 9/11 are related to the industry mandate to produce films about contemporary topics that can generate profit. Belletto writes, "Prominent and direct contributions to stereotyping through their representation of Muslim or Arab characters in film developed very noticeably in the wake of the attacks." She also argues that "there is evidence to suggest a strong correlation between viewership and the potential for judgement and bias on the basis of race." On the basis of her qualitative empirical analysis of filmic representations, she speaks to the ways that those representations play into and against contemporary American myths and memories about 9/11. In particular, her "examination of *Zero Dark Thirty* and *American Sniper* expose[s] a startling amount of prejudice reinforcement, as well as a disturbing lack of respect for the lives of non-American entities in the films." She concludes her essay with this note: "The presentation of Muslim Americans in cinema—both allegorically and directly—is intrinsically linked to perceptions of Middle Eastern individuals by other cross-sections of culture in the United States" (Belletto 2015).

Because Belletto's analysis is based in the examination of content, she is careful to not overstep by speculating about the impact of such films. Using a similar methodology, Liam Davidson (2015) wanted to understand how the political and social changes wrought by 9/11 were reflected in American popular cinema, especially in the context of place:

> Before, New York City seemed to become the city that was always destroyed. It seemed that whenever a giant monster or natural disaster

> appeared, New Yorkers were always going to be affected. New York City seemed to become the backdrop of disaster movies, like *Godzilla* (1998) or *Armageddon* (1998). But as cinema was brought to life by 9/11, people wondered if that was going to change. The answer: a big, resounding, "HELL NO" from Hollywood executives. The film industry soon began their fiction destruction of New York in movies like *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004), which features New York being wiped out by first a tidal wave, then the fourth Ice Age, and *Cloverfield* (2008), about yet another giant monster destroying New York. However, Hollywood did change the formula to make the disasters seem fantastic as to deliberately avoid comparisons to the 9/11 attacks. Not only were these films well received by the public, but they proved that mainstream audiences liked the fictional destruction of New York City, even after the events of 9/11. (Davidson 2015)

Yet, despite this, Davidson found evidence of sensitivity in Hollywood, including in the consequent use of editing through newly available digital technology to alter the New York cityscape. As he wrote in his essay,

> …In the days following the 9/11 attacks Hollywood was thrown into utter chaos. Approximately 45 films that were scheduled for public release were delayed, altered, or in one case, cancelled. 12 movies, including *Zoolander* (2001), *Men in Black II* (2002), or *Kissing Jessica Stein* (2001), had the Twin Towers edited out of the final cuts. These edits came from the decision by Hollywood executives who believed the presence of the World Trade Center towers would be traumatic for audiences. They also deleted scenes that involved the smoking ruins of buildings in New York for the same reason. Movies about terrorism were also put on hold, especially Arnold Schwarzenggger's *Collateral Damage* (2002). The film was originally scheduled to be released in fall 2001, but due to the attacks, it was pushed back to April 2002 (Quay and Damico). The movie *Big Trouble* (2002) was also delayed until April of 2002, as one of the major plot points involved a bomb on an airplane. (Quay and Damico; Davidson 2015)

Just as important as the theme of representation at home is how American actions were perceived abroad. In a different take on

representation, Brandon Minton (2015) examined how U.S. counter-terrorism policies after 9/11 were viewed outside the United States. Minton's broad study of U.S. foreign policy and international law quotes widely from practitioners and scholars alike. Like so many others, he found that "The attacks of September 11 changed the way that the United States conducted foreign policy and the way that they combatted foreign enemies." Borrowing from scholars such as Mary Buckley, Minton found that the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq "confirmed widely held fears across the globe that unchecked United States unilateralism was a dangerous world threat" (Buckley 2003). He concludes his essay by suggesting that the U.S. foreign policy response during the so-called war on terror had a damaging impact on the integrity of multilateral institutions and global norms: "It can also be said that if the war on terror does not begin to head in a drastically different direction very soon, the world of international law could be destined for more of the same in the future." Minton's attention to how emotional salience to domestic audiences is not a necessary indication of a policy's potential for success, or its positive reception abroad, is an important reminder to readers about the relativistic and contextual nature of such debates (Minton 2015).

The three pieces by Belletto, Davidson and Minton indicate how 9/11 can be used pedagogically, not only to teach students that representational choices are viewed differently by different audiences, but to speak to the production and reception of knowledge. These ideas also challenge students to think about the tenuous though compelling linkages between representation in entertainment and how representation functions in policy and decision-making.

It is policy to which Rachel Smoot (2015) turns to interrogate the processes through which the U.S. government has dealt historically with cataclysmic events such as 9/11. She is, like Emily Rosenberg (2003), interested in the similarities between the attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and those that occurred nearly sixty years later on September 11, 2001. She is especially interested in how "the United States entered into war following each attack" after "legislation was hastily passed" and "prompted by fear and a desire for increased security." She likewise looks at domestic policy to compare and contrast

Executive Order 9066 and the Patriot Act. These and other examples, Smoot writes, aimed at "a quick resolution…to console widespread fear." Moreover, they were "initially supported" but later "became controversial" as it became evident that these and other similar policies "often cause negative repercussions." The U.S. government eventually "issu[ed] a formal apology and pa[id] reparations to the victims or immediate heirs" of Japanese Americans interned in camps simply because of their race. More recently, "the Patriot Act of 2001…limited individual privacy and expanded government surveillance, which many have found to be a direct violation of the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution." She relies on Schuster (2014) to analyze how the United States passed controversial and often ill-fated legislation "after emotion-filled national tragedies." Smoot's account of historical policy-making demonstrates how U.S. responses to tragedy have not always been rational, let alone just (Smoot 2015).

How and why such policy failures take place was a question also taken up by Mariana Mendez (2015). She writes, "While the horror and sharply negative connotation associated with terrorism holds to be an almost universal concept, defining it in concrete, expository terms, however, is a relatively modern plight." She found, as have other chapters in this volume, that there is little "consistency or absolute standard for what is truly considered 'terrorism'" and that "the definition varies from country to region, and even more down at the individual level." Relying on scholars such as Oliverio (1998), she argues that distinguishing terrorism from other crimes is a process that "relies heavily on the interpretation of the motives and the political or ideological statement made through the acts of violence." Tapping into a timely and important question for modern international and Media Studies scholarship, Mendez's research attempts to interrogate the various formal and informal ways that definitions of "terrorism" contribute to understanding and misunderstanding of the complex phenomenon. She reminds readers that even formal definitions are laden with cultural relativity, writing that while most societies "acknowledge terrorism as an existing evil and social wrong, cultural differences, religious differences, and geographic location all come to clash" when defining a term and then taking action based

on such understandings. Perhaps most important concerning military strategy is her reminder that, "The fact that the United States has engaged itself in a 'war on terror' highlights a startling point—if there is no real definition for terrorism then what is it that we are fighting?" (Mendez 2015).

Equally as troubling are Jacob Dye's (2015) findings about how 9/11 has been used by candidates for elected office in the United States. In his essay, Dye writes that "the public's perception" was "firmly established… by the immediate presidential rhetoric following the attack." Irregardless of one's personal beliefs, "presidential candidates must match their rhetoric with the perception of the public," which "makes the anniversary of 9/11 a unique day politically." Building on the work of Thomas Hollihan (2009) and others, Dye found that, on 9/11, voters are especially attentive to how a candidate's image relates to what politicians say and do on September 11 (Dye 2015).

Other students investigated psychology. A psychology major, Katherine Meyers (2015) wrote about the emotional and physical effects of 9/11, even among those who were too young to remember what happened or those who were removed enough from the attacks that they were seemingly inconsequential to their lives. Another psychology student, Marissa Marcus (2015) argues that whatever the attackers are called in media or by politicians, they are viewed through peoples' preexisting ideas and from within existing emotional contexts. Drawing on Borum (2014) and Hasanov (2005), Marcus offers this assessment of the "absolutist tendencies" in American thinking:

> Thinking in terms of extremes is arguably the most influential disposition because the very nature of this phenomenon fuels four resulting tendencies: confirmation bias, othering, impulsivity, and sensitive detection of injustices. Each of these occurs in a domino effect that continue to feed each other in a positive feedback loop. The extreme personality shapes how an individual will interact with others in his environment as people with this disposition are likely to also display a certain dogmatism, in psychology known as confirmation bias, that prevents an individual from logically interpreting and accepting any evidence against his own claim. (Marcus 2015)

The approaches of the previous essays demonstrate the relevance of 9/11 to modes of inquiry across the social sciences and humanities. However, students from the natural and physical science also wrote compelling essays. One student, Rafe Hagee (2015), considered the technical evolution of structural engineering, contextualized the World Trade Center's design, and explained how related fields have changed after 9/11. As he wrote,

> The designers could have never imagined that one day [planes] would purposely crash into those buildings and cause them to collapse. Sadly, this possibility became a reality for the next generation of architects and building planners. They were left to pick up the pieces and rebuild, just as the rest of the country had to do. However, despite all the odds that they faced, the 'Freedom Tower' was designed and built. (Hagee 2015)

Characteristic of the interdisciplinary charge of the course, Hagee nods to the social science implications of his work by considering how engineering and architectural decisions are not made in a vacuum. As he correctly points out, design requires attention to context, both current and future; it also requires an understanding of broader societal issues. He asks, "Will we ever be able to accomplish enough change to our physical infrastructure to protect our citizens, so that they will truly feel safe and no longer afraid of attacks like September 11?" (Hagee 2015)

Another case study that falls outside of traditional disciplinary boundaries is Zane Moran's (2015) essay on baseball. He uses baseball as a case study for examining the ways in which the United States has historically coped with tragedies. As he explains, "baseball has been so intertwined with… the nation's history" that it has "played a major role in political and social change" in the country. "In particular, the game has aided in the recovery and continuity of the American people and their confidence to overcome. The healing after 9/11 is one of the strongest examples of these principles holding true." Moran draws on a range of sources to highlight how, following 9/11, then-commissioner Bud Selig made the decision to resume the Major League Baseball within a broad social context (Neyer). Given the national impact of 9/11, Selig contacted President Bush for guidance as to when it would be appropriate to resume games (Castrovince). As Selig remembered,

"In baseball's function as a social institution, we wanted to be not only sensitive, but we wanted to play our little part in the recovery process. It was a painful time, an emotional time, but we did fulfill that role" (qtd. in Castrovince). And as Moran describes the scene, "On that first night back in New York, baseball began the task of rebuilding spirits across the country." Drawing on Sherman (2013), Moran describes the game-winning homerun that propelled the Mets to a win over the Braves as the hit that "closed out an improbable victory, and rejuvenated a city" (Moran 2015).

11.6 Conclusion

These excerpts were selected for inclusion in this chapter to convey the potential breadth of academic inquiry that is available to professors seeking to use 9/11 to frame a general education course. The various elements of the course objectives can be measured through these essays as the students attempt, through their various methodologies, to wrestle with the event itself, its aftermath, and the ways that their disciplines have contended with the post-9/11 world. Beyond specific instances of cultural, societal, and political change, the students went to great lengths to explore the ways in which their disciplines evolved, or did not, after 9/11. In these ways we see how the Core program objectives created a space for students and faculty alike to explore a subject such as 9/11.

Another element of the Emory & Henry Transitions curriculum that was especially important was the emphasis on project-based work that links student passions to their academic interests. For instance, Jacob Dye's decision to write on 9/11 and American politics reflected his desire to go into politics and, someday, hold a national office. Similarly, Katherine Meyer chose to write about the trauma experienced by child witnesses to 9/11 because she wants to pursue a career in psychology. In both cases, and in many others not featured here, the students were encouraged to consider the course material from within their pre-existing scholarly and personal goals. As an exemplar of the first-year seminar course, the Emory & Henry College Transitions curriculum is

uniquely positioned to help students better understand themselves and their societies by studying 9/11 for a semester.

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12

9/11 and the Memory "Boom"

Samantha Ball Shannon

In 2009 Andreas Huyssen stated that "9/11 neither began nor ended on 9/11" (155). These words, like the preceding chapters in this book, speak to the liminal nature of September 11, 2001. The events of that day had pasts, presents, and futures—all of which were mediated by memory, and by Memory Studies scholars who approached the subject from a range of interdisciplinary perspectives. The field, another interdiscipline not new to the twenty-first century, has undergone a dramatic "boom" over the past two decades. This boom has taken place in scholarly writing on memory and in public forums (Langenbacher 2010, 17–18). While the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an increased interest in commemorating and otherwise remembering mid-century flashpoints such as the Second World War and the Holocaust, the commemoration culture of the twenty-first century has far surpassed that of previous decades.

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The historian David Blight describes a “rage” in memorial culture (2010), and this chapter demonstrates that the events of 9/11 were pivotal to this moment.

On the morning of September 11, an estimated two billion people around the world gathered in front of television sets and bore witness, many in real time, to the most devastating attacks on American soil (Opotow and Shemtob 2018, 1). In the U.S., according to Erica Doss (2011, 30), this collective activity “…generated a sweeping sense of national unity…” and served as a common reference point in the days and months that followed. Such senses of nationalism and patriotism have historically been problematic, and exceptionalist notions of Americanism created problems for the United States as the war on terror became a fixture in the Middle East and in American political debates. But before the dust settled, and after only 102 minutes on September 11, witnesses faced the seemingly impossible task of attempting to make sense of the tragic loss of life—2977 people killed—that they observed (National September 11 Memorial and Museum Website, FAQ). This immediate outpouring of thoughts and emotions on and around 9/11 constituted the foundation for the scholarship that followed; it also created a wealth of primary source evidence for scholars to use for their teaching and research.

The field of Memory Studies has grown after 9/11, and this chapter examines that growth in three areas. First, it is important to note that, in September 2001, there was already an established cohort of historians and other scholars available to engage in various ways with the memory of the terror attacks. In other words, there were few experts on 9/11 in the early 2000s, but there were experts on memory who could explain whether the event was with or without precedent. These scholars also helped to guide the country through the process of determining if and how to commemorate the terror attacks. Second, this chapter explores the creation of “grassroots,” or makeshift memorials, in the fall of 2001 and the ways in which scholars of memory turned to them to understand how Americans in New York and around the country spontaneously commemorated the loss of their compatriots and loved ones. Third, scholars have utilized the technology of the digital age to revise their methods of inquiry, pedagogy, and historic preservation. This is

clear in the digital archives—especially the resources available on the website of the 9/11 Memorial and Museum—that have found new ways to explain the various aspects of the traumatic international event (National September 11 Memorial and Museum Website, Collections). These three areas of 9/11 memory and scholarship reflect a robust body of literature that speaks to many segments of the population and various levels of life in the academy.

12.1 Sites of Scholarship, Sites of Mourning

Some of the earliest voices to weigh in on 9/11 were historians of memory whose areas of expertise were far afield from Islam, the Modern Middle East, or U.S. foreign policy. These scholars, most of whom specialized in the wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had developed their research lines on history and memory during the last decades of the twentieth century. To their amazement, these scholars were asked to contribute to broader conversations about 9/11 and, in some cases, they were called upon be part of the formal commemoration process at "ground zero."

The historian David Blight, for example, recalled that he received a phone call from a journalist less than forty-eight hours after the attacks and was asked for his opinion on how to memorialize the events. Surprised by the question, Blight responded, "I have no idea, call me back in ten years" (2010). Blight eventually became an informal consultant for the 9/11 Memorial Museum, but the fact that he was contacted so soon after 9/11 indicates that Americans were already thinking about how best to commemorate the tragedy. To borrow from Jay Winter's (1998) seminal book, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning,* these historians applied their narrow "sites of scholarship" to a "site of mourning" whose meaning was part of an unfolding collective memory of 9/11.

All of these scholars, in one way or another, owe an intellectual debt to the early theorists and historians of memory. In 1925, Maurice Halbwachs, a French philosopher and sociologist, was the first to articulate the idea of "collective memory" in a way that helped

move considerations of the mind out of the jurisdictions of psychology and philosophy and into the social sciences and humanities. For this reason, it is difficult to find a book on memory that does not make reference in some way to Halbwachs (1992). Second generation scholars of memory, such as Pierre Nora (1989; Nora and Kritzman 1996) and Paul Fussell (1975), built upon Halbwachs' ideas. These scholars examined the French past and memories of the Great War, respectively. In turn, French historians and intellectuals paved the way for U.S. historians such as David Blight (2001) to study how memories of the Civil War mediated the relationship between "race and reunion" prior to the First World War, and for Michael Kammen (1993) to deconstruct the "mystic chords of memory" in the American past. By employing new methodologies and writing new cultural histories, these scholars, many of whom worked in traditional archives, updated frameworks for understanding death, trauma, and collective memory.

The work of Jay Winter (1998) is instructive, as he engaged with Fussell over a question that is related to this book's approach to 9/11 and the academy, namely the question of rupture, or epochal change. Whereas Fussell argued that the First World War marked the advent of "modern memory," Winter contends that traditional "sentimentality" revolving around "patriotic certainties" and the "hallowed dead" informed European memories of the war, rather than "a new language of truth-telling" in the cultural arena (Winter 1998, 2). As with the Great War, 9/11 "remembrance is part of the landscape" and, especially in the days and weeks that followed in 2001, "transcendence was a privilege, not a commonplace experience" (Winter 1998, 1–2).

Scholars of memory in the post-9/11 era are left to contend with the question of whether efforts to memorialize the loss of life on September 11 constitute a traditional or a modernist approach to the subject. According to Amy Sodaro (2018), the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum marked the emergence of a "new cultural form of education and commemoration," one that the planners for the 9/11 Memorial Museum followed. Sodaro argues that the latter, in turn, constituted "a cultural form that in this twenty-first-century iteration engages new technologies and modes of remembrance, while reflecting the form's

political roots" (2018, 139). These debates, rooted in the first decade of the twenty-first century, will continue to inform scholarship related not only to commemoration in general, but to the commemoration of 9/11.

Equally as important to the ongoing debate was James Young. Prior to 9/11, his scholarship focused on Holocaust memory, as well as the construction of Holocaust memorials (1994, 2010). The 1990s saw tremendous interest in the Holocaust in the United States and around the world. In 1993 the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum opened in Washington, DC, and Stephen Spielberg's *Schindler's List* hit screens across America. Although the Holocaust was a European phenomenon, the memory of it was important across the Atlantic. As Eric Langenbacher notes, some "…wounds have been muted over years but can quickly reopen or explode to dominate public consciousness at home and abroad…" (2010, 13). In 1997 Young was on a committee that developed a memorialization plan in Berlin meant to commemorate the Holocaust (Crownshaw et al. 2010, 82). In evaluating the situation in Germany, Young reflected that, "Because we did not see Holocaust memory in Germany as a zero-sum project, we concluded that there was indeed room in Berlin's new landscape for both commemorative spaces and pedagogically-oriented memorial institutions" (Crownshaw et al. 2010, 84). This idea of using a space for both commemoration and education would be seen again in the efforts to commemorate and teach 9/11. Therefore, Young's work in Berlin was significant in that it established the scholar as an expert in memorialization, both from an academic and a professional standpoint. He helped address German problems of commemorating the Holocaust and was called upon again, several years later, to solve similar challenges in lower Manhattan.

In 2003 Young was appointed to the World Trade Center Site Memorial Jury, a committee whose job was to choose a design for the 9/11 monument in New York (Young 2016, 46). The committee was chosen by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation and consisted of individuals with a range of professional experiences and areas of expertise. The committee included, as Young describes in detail:

> …design architects and artists (Enrique Norten, Michael Van Valkenburgh, Maya Lin, and Martin Puryear), arts community professionals (Public Art Fund president Susan Freedman, art consultant Nancy Rosen, and Harlem Studio Museum director Lowery Stokes Sims), academic and cultural historians (Carnegie Corporation president Vartan Gregorian and me), political liaisons (Deputy Mayor Patricia Harris and former Deputy Governor Michael McKeon), a family member (Paula Grant Berry), and a local resident and business community leader (Julie Menin). (Young 2016, 37–38)

Between April 2003 and January 2004, the committee met to address the suggestions and concerns of all parties. As Young explains, the process for determining what to do with the voided space left behind after the terrorist attacks became a contentious debate. Families and loved ones of those who were killed on 9/11 had differing ideas about how best to move forward, and these debates shaped the vision for various planning committees; not just the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, but also the 9/11 Memorial Foundation, which was funded by then-mayor Michael Bloomberg with private funds rather than tax dollars (Young 2016, 40; Crownshaw et al. 2010, 87). While there are critics, Young and many others maintain that the memorial and the related process were essential to "animate and reinvigorate" Manhattan (2016, 28). Rather than "paralyze" the location of the attacks (2016, 28), Young and his fellow committee members attempted to redefine the space and, "Remember, Rebuild, Renew" (2016, 23). However, some were concerned about what this potential memorial might come to symbolize, especially since the memorial process got its start as the trauma of the attacks began to move into the realm of memory. Even Young warned against this possible negative backlash: "Our memorial to the destruction of the towers and the lives lost also could even become the terrorists' victory monument. Our soaring shrine to the victims and our sorrow could become the murderers' triumphal fist, thrust into the air" (2016, 28).

The selection process for the winning design took place over several months. With 5201 entries from which to choose, Young and his fellow committee members had the difficult task of evaluating all of the

proposals. The entries came from all over the world—63 countries in total—and were assigned numbers during the selection process to maintain anonymity (Young 2016, 40). The winning design, "Reflecting Absence," came from Michael Arrad, an Israeli-American working in New York in the early 2000s (Young 2016, 65; Loos 2011). His proposal seemed to have the themes that Young and the jurists prioritized and found appealing (2016, 49). The combination of water and the void, or the absence of the Twin Towers, articulated the feelings of loss that, to many, define the memory of 9/11.

On January 14, 2004, the 9/11 committee issued a press release explaining its decision:

> In its powerful, yet simple articulation of the footprints of the Twin Towers, "Reflecting Absence" has made the voids left by the destruction the primary symbols of our loss. By allowing absence to speak for itself, the designers have made the power of these empty footprints the memorial. At its core, this memorial is thus anchored deeply in the actual events it commemorates— connecting us to the towers, to their destruction, and to all the lives lost on that day. (Young 2016, 68)

In less than three years, the efforts to make sense of 9/11, and to commemorate the lives lost in the attacks, had been determined. And, on the tenth anniversary of September 11, the memorial opened to the public. But, did this constitute a new approach to commemoration? To engage with the Fussell-Winter debate, was the 9/11 memorial and the commemoration process "traditional," "modern," or something else?

This section presented evidence for both cases. On the one hand, unlike other atrocities and instances of mass death before it, 9/11 marked a new trend in commemorating a tragic event immediately after its occurrence, rather than waiting for historical narratives to be shaped over longer periods of time. In this case, the formal commemoration process offered a first draft of the historical narrative. Perhaps most unique was the involvement of an entire community of established Memory Studies scholars and practitioners of public history and museum studies in the planning process. Many of these scholars would

henceforth give shape to the literature that was written on the commemoration of 9/11. On the other hand, perhaps little has changed in terms of approaches to commemoration. There was new language to explain the Holocaust—not only Lemkin's "genocide" (1944), but also the move in the 1970s from "shoah" to "holocaust," a new term that spoke to Nazi crimes against victims from all religious, ethnic, or political backgrounds (Marcuse 2010, 53). New discourses related to mass death and "terror" emerged after 2001, but there were remarkably traditional elements to the 9/11 memorial. To borrow again from Winter, the memorialization process was driven by a societal need for "patriotic certainties" and a desire to honor the "hallowed dead" (Winter 1998, 2).

12.2 Grassroots, or Makeshift Memorials

While the construction of an official 9/11 Memorial and Museum sparked intense debates within a formalized process about public and collective memory, there were other, more spontaneous acts of commemoration throughout the United States. One of the ways in which people responded to 9/11—and hence a memory phenomenon that has attracted the attention of interdisciplinary scholars since 2001—was by creating "grassroots" or "makeshift" memorials. These memorials emerge with mourners "…placing memorabilia, as a form of social action, in public spaces, usually at sites where traumatic deaths or events have taken place" (Margry and Sanchez-Carretero 2011, 2).

In an edited collection on grassroots memorials that marks the most comprehensive examination of the phenomenon to-date, ethnographers Peter Jan Margry and Christina Sanchez-Carretero found that this phenomenon was not new to the American memory landscape. It began in the 1980s, but prior to 9/11 they were used most frequently to mark the site of a roadside accident (Margry and Sanchez-Carretero 2011, 1, 4). What was new in fall 2001 were the number and variety of these "grassroots memorials." Ever since, they write, "These forms of memorialization are now socially sanctioned and, in a way, they are expected to

appear as part of the commonly ritualized practices that deal with unexpected death and the causes of these deaths" (2011, 2). These grassroots memorials could be found in the vicinity of where the terror attacks took place on 9/11, and they served as primary sources for Memory Studies scholars across a range of disciplines.

A unique manifestation of the makeshift memorial phenomenon came in the form of the missing-persons posters that were hung throughout the city and whose meaning changed over time. At first they were calls to find love ones. But as those loved ones were pronounced dead, the signs remained as makeshift memorials dotted the urban landscape. James Young wrote extensively on this point:

> These photos and descriptions of loved ones were the spontaneous commemorations of loss and grief. Replete with images and descriptions of fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, these flyers read almost as epitaphs on paper instead of stone, as perishable and transitory as the hope that inspired them. These families' missing loved ones were, in turn, remembered and mourned by all who came across these ephemeral, 'found memorials'. (2016, 21)

As the work of Young and others make clear, the images and language associated with these posters changed over time to become some of the first memorials to 9/11 in New York.

Writing in the *American Quarterly*, Devin Zuber noted that, in New York, one found makeshift memorials above and below ground, especially in the subways where "the miles of platforms became a primary space for collective memory" (2006, 280). This collection of individualized posters and personalized language transcended their immediate space and came, to many, to represent the collective response to 9/11. For his part, Zuber found the missing-persons posters turned makeshift memorials particularly impressive.

> Thousands of posters and pictures of missing people began to appear within hours after the towers' collapse, but unlike other ephemera displayed in the subways, they remained in place for months thereafter, disappearing slowly and only as the materials disintegrated. They also

> became sites of ritualized mourning, with flowers and messages periodically taped onto their fragile surfaces. The Manhattan commute thus became a daily visual contact with the dead, the underground transformed into a veritable underworld. (2006, 280)

Critical methods and perspectives, based in the deconstructivism and post-modernism associated with scholars of cultural studies such as Jacques Derrida, have been significant in bringing memory into established fields ranging from English to History, and from Ethnography to American Studies, in the post-1960s era. Scholars of grassroots memorials, grounded in these post-modern theories, have made important contributions to the history of 9/11 memory. For instance, Margry and Sanchez-Carretero sum up the findings on grassroots memorials in the fifteen years after 9/11, declaring them to be "performative" in nature (2011, 3). In other words, "The creators of grassroots memorials are active producers of meaning and symbolism, thanks to the input of a substantive, narrative dimension" (2011, 30). They balance what Young's committee did in Lower Manhattan, and they serve as evidence of the near-impossibility of "transcending" the memory of 9/11.

While most of the scholarship has focused on the sites of the attacks, recent observations point to a need to place responses within other contexts. Writing about the memory of the attacks at the "folk level," Charles Strozier, a renowned psychoanalyst and professor at the City University of New York, wrote that "memorials to 9/11 have sprung up in literally thousands of sites around the country…Most were temporary and have already faded into the night. Others have endured along busy highways, in backyards, in murals, and in brightly colored tattoos on the backs and arms of citizens" (Strozier 2011, 231). Thus Strozier encourages scholars to study the memory of 9/11 in more localized and regional contexts.

The local efforts to commemorate 9/11 helped to create a renewed commemoration culture outside of cities such as New York and Washington as it related to another important flashpoint in American collective memory: the Second World War. Following the completion of the National World War II Memorial on the National Mall,

similar memorials were created in Austin (2007), Alaska (2008), Hawaii (2008), California (2008), Oregon (2014), and most recently in Houston, Texas (2018). All of these local remembrance efforts provide Memory Studies scholars with a range of topics beyond 9/11 to study in the future.

With regard to 9/11, an especially important starting point for this type of research is the work of Jonathan Hyman. A well-known photographer, Hyman was instrumental in documenting cultural expressions, which "…were spontaneous expressions of grief and memory by people in their everyday lives" (Strozier 2011, 231). For five years, between 2001 and 2006, Hyman took an estimated 15,000 images of spontaneous memorials throughout the U.S., and this work became instrumental for scholars in the field of memory studies (Strozier 2011, 231; Linenthal et al. 2013). From May 2016 to May 2017, Hyman's work was displayed in an exhibit at the 9/11 Memorial Museum, and it has subsequently been displayed at galleries throughout the United States.

While the formal commemoration process claimed to be "national" in its scope, makeshift memorials reveal two additional loci of memory: the local and the global. Many memorials of various varieties are, as Marcuse states, "addressed to transnational audiences" and "explicitly represent multiple meanings" (2010, 54). Makeshift memorials are a transnational phenomenon. According to Konrad Kostlin, an Austrian ethnologist, grassroots memorials can be seen throughout Europe, dating back to the 1960s, in response to instances of sudden tragic death (Margry and Sanchez-Carretero 2011, 6). Other examples can be found in countries ranging from Mexico to Australia (Margry and Sanchez-Carretero 2011, 7). While already a pre-existing form of mourning and remembrance, the post-9/11 moment is perhaps unique in the means that scholars, archivists, and photojournalists have to record, organize, and digitize these memorials for present and future appreciation and analysis. If globalization influences Memory Studies scholarship and grassroots forms of commemoration, digitization has also had a profound impact on the ways in which scholarly and public audiences engage with, narrate, and remember 9/11.

12.3 9/11 Memory and Digitization

Over the past two decades, new technologies and methodologies have allowed sites of memory to develop robust, vibrant, and engaging electronic and digital exhibits and collections. On the technological changes of the late twentieth century, historian Jay Winter noted that, "by 1980, video cassette players were within the reach of millions of families." New, mobile recording technology, Winter continued, "revolutionized the preservation of the voices of historical actors, from the most modest to the most prominent." For that reason, "The archive on which history rested suddenly expanded radically" (Winter 2008, 8). New technology, including the Internet and the digital revolution of the early twenty-first century, has revolutionized how scholars of memory collect and analyze evidence. Technological changes have also changed how public historians and others display artifacts from events such as 9/11. The following examples from the digital humanities provide teachers at all levels with material with which to creatively engage today's students.

Numerous websites and databases devoted to collecting and storing witness testimonies and documentary evidence such as photographs were created in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The "Voices of September 11th" website and archive is one example, and it contains an estimated eighty-five thousand entries in its "9/11 Living Memorial Project" (Strozier 2011, 227; Voices of September 11th Website). Similarly, the "September 11 Digital Archive," affiliated with the Library of Congress, houses a large number of primary sources (Opotow and Shemtob 2018, 3). According to its website,

> The *Archive* is contributing to the on-going effort by historians and archivists to record and preserve the record of 9/11 by collecting and archiving first-hand accounts…as a way of assessing how history is being recorded and preserved in the twenty-first century and as an opportunity to develop free software tools to help historians to do a better job of collecting, preserving, and writing history in the new century. (September 11 Digital Archive Website)

The Sonic Memorial Project is especially unique in that it focuses solely on recorded audio material (Opotow and Shemtob 2018, 3). Created by NPR's "Lost and Found Sound" program, this archive contains sounds from 9/11 from both inside and outside of the World Trade Center buildings, as well as voicemail recordings and personal testimonies (http://www.sonicmemorial.org/sonic/public/index.html).

In many ways, these websites and online databases have changed the manner by which historians and scholars of memory think about and access primary source data. Only in the twenty-first century, when digital archiving and the Internet became widely accessible, did these projects become possible. Other examples of 9/11's entrance into the digital humanities abound.

A most important example is a project titled "WhereWereYou." The designers of this project were quite intentional in their mission to collect and store first-hand accounts. During the year after September 11, 2001, this website collected an estimated 2500 online entries. According to Lee Jarvis (2011), an American Studies scholar writing on memory, this database provided "a far more complex reading of 9/11 than that often found within more authoritative claims about the attacks in the immediate aftermath" (796). The website asked very specific questions of its site visitors, prompting more thoughtful data, and Jarvis argued that this project constituted a "breakthrough in social memory" (2011, 795 and 798). The collection is largely free from any official, politicized narratives concerning 9/11, and it "…represents a significant social memory project precisely as a refusal of efforts to forge one, singular, narrative on the attacks" (Jarvis 2011, 814). While, as Eric Langenbacher notes, "…collective memories usually cannot retain their emotional intensity and political influence forever…" (2010, 28), databases such as "WhereWereYou" preserve the intense and often emotional individual memories that were recorded on 9/11 and in the immediate aftermath.

Then there is the 9/11 Memorial Museum in New York. It opened to the public on May 15, 2014 and embodies many of the characteristics of modern memorial museums. Alice Greenwald, the current director of the museum, has written extensively about the process that went into its conception (Greenwald and Chanin 2013; Greenwald and Bloomberg

2016; Greenwald and Lubell 2014). As with many other scholars of memory and practitioners of history, Greenwald was involved in a range of public history initiatives since the 1980s. In 1986 she began a nineteen-year affiliation with the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, serving initially as a member of the "Design Team" for the Permanent Exhibition and later as Associate Museum Director for Museum Programs. Located in Washington, DC, the USHMM is arguably the first of this genre of museums, which seeks to educate and inform visitors in an effort to "…confront hatred, prevent genocide, and promote human dignity" (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). In 2006 Greenwald began her oversight of 9/11 Memorial Museum process (Greenwald 2014). In action, the 9/11 Memorial Museum exemplifies Cubitt's assertion that "Truth, justice and memory (or the prevention of forgetting) have long been closely interwoven concepts" (2007, 55), and there is an important continuity in personnel between these two memorial museums.

Both the physical space and the online presence of the 9/11 museum seek to commemorate and educate the public, fitting the "activist-style" archetype of modern museums through digital exhibits and interactive displays. The exhibits housed in the museum offer a diverse array of lenses through which to view 9/11. These include photographs of New York's skyline over the past forty years, official FEMA photographs from Ground Zero, an exhibit on sports in the post-9/11 era, and an interactive exhibit that allows museum visitors to record themselves as they answer prompted questions. In addition to these exhibits, the museum also hosts a regular lecture series, highlighting important scholars, artists, poets, and area specialists, all aimed at educating the public on important topics and issues related to 9/11 and its aftermath (National September 11 Memorial Museum Website).

An impressive online database that is well-organized and accessible to the public can be found on the 9/11 Memorial Museum website. This digital archive includes images of nearly two thousand objects, pictures of artifacts from Ground Zero, personal stories, and a small collection of government-related documents from 1996 to 2011. This wealth of online data and primary sources, alongside digital archives and databases, provide an excellent foundation for scholars of memory to assess 9/11 in its historical context. These are examples of how digitization

has given rise to new forms of commemoration that, in turn, have transformed public history. More broadly, the digital humanities have created new pedagogical possibilities for teachers everywhere from community colleges to the nation's most elite universities.

12.4 Conclusion

Where has this all taken the academy? Some scholars of memory question the usefulness of the "boom," or "rage" in scholarship, and innovation in digital resources. On the one hand, the field of Memory Studies has experienced growth in the quantity and quality of the scholarship. The journal *Memory Studies* was established by an international group of scholars in 2008 to carry the premier research in the field. The Memory Studies Association was, as its website indicates, established even more recently, holding its inaugural conference in the Netherlands in 2016. On the other hand, the proliferation of new methodologies for studying memory and commemorating the past can be disorienting. In reference to the online databases, Winter argues, "We historians are being carried along on a fast-moving stream of memory studies, which we did not create and do not control" (2008, 9). This sentiment among historians and scholars of memory is demonstrative of the major shift in the field, most exemplified by the responses to 9/11.

Nonetheless, it is important for all scholars of 9/11 to recognize that they, too, are writing in this particular memory moment of the early twenty-first century. It is a moment dominated by an apparent need to commemorate more people and events, and in closer proximity to the people and events being memorialized. A *Washington Post* article, published in the summer of 2018, highlights these trends, especially as they relate to the National Mall in Washington, DC. While the Korean War memorial finished its construction in 1995 (Carnes 2007, 168), the World War II memorial was opened to the public in 2004, almost sixty years after the official end to the war (Montgomery 2018). This was almost twenty years *after* a memorial was built for the more recent Vietnam War, whose creator, Maya Lin, later served on the committee that determined how best to commemorate 9/11 at ground zero.

Comparatively, the 9/11 memorial was constructed in even less time than the Vietnam memorial, making it the quickest-commemorated instance of mass death in American history. And, even more national memorials are in the construction process. Between the years 2020 and 2024, four additional memorials are expected to be completed in and around the National Mall, marking perhaps another "boom" in American commemoration culture (Montgomery 2018).

As the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century approaches, one wonders if this "memory boom" and the intense efforts toward commemoration will continue, or eventually "bust." As Huyssen points out, "For 15 to 20 years, we have been living in a memorial culture in which traumatic histories and victimization discourses of all kinds have taken front billing in the media and in public debate as well as in artistic practices and academic research" (2009, 155). However, some scholars disagree with this assertion. Writing in 2013, Amy Corning and Chuck Schuman posit that "…the resonance of 9/11 commemorations may have decreased over time; commentators have noted fatigue and even cynicism in response to the plethora of memorials" (436). While it is difficult to determine whether American commemoration culture has peaked, it is clear that the events of 9/11 caused a dramatic increase in interest and scholarship related to Memory Studies as well as public and private acts of remembrance.

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