



Education for Decoloniality and Decolonisation in Africa

Edited by
Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu
Yusef Waghid

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“This outstanding and remarkable book makes a particularly important contribution to our understanding of this region in an era of increased racism and violence in Africa and all over the world. The issue of decoloniality and decolonisation is still largely uncharted water, and this collection presents a new, innovative conceptualization in a sophisticated, engaging and illuminating fashion. The explanation of concepts in the book can be implemented in other contexts, and the book is vital reading for anyone interested in these challenging issues.”

—Zehavit Gross, *Associate Professor of Comparative Education, Bar-Ilan University, Israel*

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Preface

This edited collection emanated from our collective concern with the decolonisation and/or decoloniality of education on the African continent. More specifically our focus is on Southern African Development Countries (SADC)—South Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia—along the lines of identifying themes according to which decoloniality and/or decolonisation manifested on an important part of the African continent, namely, southern Africa. Of course, we acknowledge from the outset that making pronouncements about Africa through the lenses of SADC is not always generalisable to the continent. The latter is by no means our intention. However, looking at the manifestation of decoloniality and/or decolonisation vis-à-vis SADC offers a snapshot in terms of which the processes of decoloniality and/or decolonisation can be explained. And, it might be that our enunciations of decoloniality and/or decolonisation might possibly offer new ways of considering the concepts. We have framed our understandings of an education for transformation and/or an education for democratisation along the lines of what it means to embark on an education for decoloniality and/or an education for decolonisation. Put more succinctly, our contention is that education cannot be decolonised or subjected to decoloniality if we do not do so in relation to what it means to transform and democratise education. Hence, central to all 13 chapters in this collection is an idea of change that education cannot be thought of in decolonial terms if

delinked from acts of democratic action and transformation. In this way, notions of equality, liberty and a recognition of diversity constitute what it means to pursue acts of decolonisation and/or decoloniality—actions related to developments in selected countries in SADC.

The contributions of colleagues have been mostly construed in terms of what sense they made of an education for transformation on the African continent. In relation to their situatedness and theoretically informed understandings of southern African education, they have endeavoured to conjure up some of the challenges that had to be overcome to achieve an education for decolonisation and/or decoloniality. We commenced this book project with a view that education in Africa should not be thought of *vis-à-vis* decolonisation as the British, for instance, is no longer in charge of education in Africa. Instead, we have pursued an understanding of education for decoloniality as an acknowledgement that patterns of exclusion, inequality and other forms of illiberalism and injustice are still prevalent albeit in subtle forms at many higher education institutions in Africa. Our preferred quest for decoloniality of education is premised on our collective concern to produce a plausible understanding of educational theories and practices on the African continent. Thus, in several chapters, authors have adopted an education for democratisation paradigm to show how education might be looked at critically, as well as in a flux of perpetual change—an idea that resonates with an education that remains in potentiality. In this sense, we already disclose our research paradigm in the book: critical-deconstructive thought *vis-à-vis* the democratisation of education in (southern) Africa. By an ‘education in potentiality’ we mean that such human encounters—that is, educative actions—are never complete and that there is still more to know and with which to engage. In other words, education is an encounter that makes possible human engagement and the sharing of ideas on the basis of deliberations. The upshot is that an education in potentiality accentuates the inconclusiveness of human engagements. There is always much to know, to learn and on which to reflect. Inherently, an education in potentiality reveals not only the nature of human engagements about the social contexts in which actions are embedded but also about that which is still to come. Hence, to refer to an education in potentiality lays bare how intrinsically viable education

is, and an openness towards human actions that remain in potentiality. In the first two chapters, Thokozani Mathebula, Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu and Yusef Waghid set out the framework according to which contributions ought to be considered. In the first place, we consider our work as constituted in an idea of African philosophy of education whereby authors proffer major challenges in and about higher education in relation to their own situational contexts. In a way, an African philosophy of education accentuates what innate concerns and/or problems constitute African societal actions. Then, such a philosophy of education offers an analytical framework of thought and action to address such concerns and/or problems. And, once identified, the ramifications of such concerns and problems are examined for education. Therefore, concomitantly throughout the chapters, contributors show how decolonisation of education and decoloniality of education could be enacted in response to societal and/or institutional concerns in and about human actions. One aspect that clearly emanates from the chapters in the book is the fact that authors were prepared to link understandings of decolonisation and decoloniality of education to democratic actions such as those couched in a language of equality, inclusion, diversity and difference. Without education being connected to such actions, we should hardly be speaking of an education for decolonisation and/or an education for decoloniality. What is evident from this collection is that higher education, specifically university education, has become a political and educational site for decolonisation, as aptly reminded by Mudenda Simukungwe, Celiwe Ngwenya, Lester Brian Shawa and Monica Zembere. That decoloniality of education has a pedagogical concern is invariably taken up by Faiq Waghid and Zayd Waghid, especially the aspect that undemocratic moments in teaching and learning encounters can most appropriately be remedied by an education for decoloniality. Pedagogical discomfort, as enunciated by Judith Terblanche and Charlene van der Walt, constitutes what it means to embark on decoloniality. Not far from an education for decoloniality is the notion of an education for cosmopolitan action as a corollary of cosmopolitanism's concern for recognition of the other and otherness in a sphere of diversity and difference, of which Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu so vividly reminds us. By implication, an education for decoloniality according to our enunciations in this book comprises

three dimensions: firstly, concerns in and about human encounters are identified on the African continent in institutions and/or society. Once these concerns or problems have been analysed, their implications are examined for educational discourses. Secondly, concerns in and about human encounters are considered in relation to democratisation and transformation of education. That is, to decolonise means that human encounters ought to be constituted by acts of deliberative engagement. Thirdly, reflecting openly about one's own societal connectedness in relation to an openness to unimagined and unpredictable openings seems to be at the core of what it means to pursue decolonial actions. The point is it does not seem possible to embark on a path of an education for decoloniality if a reflective openness to that which is known to one and to that which is still in becoming is not critically considered. In the latter regard, Joseph Hungwe and Joseph Divala do not disappoint. They offer an account of Afrocentrism that foregrounds both the notions of African individuality and community, that is, they show a reflective openness to the familiar. Our reading of their contribution on Afrocentrism is not a denial of 'western' but rather a way to accentuate the significance of moving away from extreme Eurocentrism. They develop this idea in their chapter as a way to enhance the notion of African indigenisation and its necessary connection with what is other. So, our take is that Afrocentrism is not a new form of essentialism, but rather an instance of how Africanism is placed at the centre of deliberations, whilst concomitantly drawing on other non-African traditions as well.

In the main, this collection not only reflects theoretical insights and practical innuendos of an education for decoloniality but also some bold attempts at democratising education within higher education in Africa. Away from the political euphoria of decolonising societal life, this collection takes an epistemological glance at how an education for decoloniality could seriously begin to take place at higher education sites of learning. We think that this collection lays bare what it means to educate and decolonise along the lines of spirited educational claims. On the one hand, the contributions accentuate differences in and about notions of decolonisation and/or decoloniality. However, on the other hand, similarities in understandings of decoloniality and/or decolonisation are poignantly highlighted. The contributions mainly emanated from doctoral

work, but we rather focussed on notions of decoloniality as they manifested in higher education instead of countries on the African continent. It could be that an instance of the decoloniality of education can be related to other countries not mentioned in the text. Consequently, we have focused on issues that seem to undermine the possibility of decoloniality of higher education in the chapters—already we highlight notions of recognition of differences, deliberations and connecting with otherness as common threads that constitute a notion of decoloniality of education. That is, one of the central themes in the book as it unfolds in the chapters is to show that decoloniality of education is synonymous with democratising education. Hence, we argue for a plausible notion of decoloniality which we couch as ‘authentic’ for the reason that it can be defended in light of the aspects mentioned in the previous response. Finally, in our view, most of the contributions relate to a critical-deconstructive theoretical framework of education on account that decoloniality is not just a transformative effort to actuate change within higher education but also to look beyond the taken-for-granted understandings of higher education discourse.

In **Chap. 1**, Thokozani Mathebula argues that decolonisation is primarily a knowledge project grounded in African philosophy, which is generally tied to indigeneity, which in principle is the idea that knowledge construction and pursuit must be relevant to the context of the people. Decolonisation as a knowledge project must necessarily seek clarification and critical evaluation of the very concept of decolonisation incessantly. As such, Mathebula holds that decolonisation must be understood in a strict theoretical sense instead of a popular ideological sense. This entails that decolonisation must recognise and transcend the inadequacy of indigeneity alone and should not be restricted to the binary of Eurocentrism and Afrocentrism. Decolonisation ought to be a demand for a democratisation of knowledge globally. In this vein, the author posits that decolonisation should entail a public debate with free discussion about the nature and substance of education where the education is relevant to the struggles of the people, going as far as challenging the typical neo-liberal models of modern education. Ultimately, for Mathebula, decolonising of an African university must provide the space for its stakeholders to be able to raise and find answers to questions about the socio-

cultural contexts of people as well as to meet the intellectual and material needs of African society. As such, the decolonisation project is about a critical appropriation and reappropriation of African indigeneity, knowledge production and capitalisation.

In **Chap. 2**, “Decoloniality as a Viable Response to Educational Transformation in Africa”, Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu and Yusef Waghid posit that the process of transforming education is an endeavour of social and global justice. As such, embarking on a decoloniality of education is in principle neither a political ideology nor a mere achievement of some perceived balance in the representation of perspectives in an education curriculum or a mere emphasis of what has been especially systematically marginalised. Instead, the authors argue that decoloniality of education is rooted in the ideal of democratic open-endedness towards knowledge (re)construction and otherness, governed by free inquiry and not being limited by a particularistic hegemonic tradition that determines the type of conceptual paradigms and objects of epistemological inquiry that are valid in academic inquiry. Manthalu and Waghid concede that the legacy of colonialism and its mutated form of globalism still informs epistemological marginalisation of African experiences in education in Africa. However, the authors argue against conflating decoloniality with an Africanisation that is essentially exclusive of otherness. While decoloniality is in a sense backward-looking and corrective, it is fundamentally a normative principle grounded in human equality and respect for human dignity, hence forward-looking too. This, the authors argue, implies that decoloniality ought to be guarded from an uncritical elevation of everything indigenous or abandoning everything Eurocentric or discounting the claims of Eurocentric knowledge. Making education essentially Afrocentric undermines the agency of being human in this interconnected world where geographical situatedness is not essentialist and definitive of being. Ideal decoloniality calls for a critical study of all perspectives as legitimate equal objects of knowledge without undue privileging and prejudicing some perspectives. The authors thus hold that it is incumbent upon African political leadership and higher education to initiate such transformation by providing both financial and conceptual resources.

In **Chap. 3**, “Decoloniality as Democratic Change Within Higher Education”, Yusef Waghid and Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu argue that decoloniality is in principle an ideal of democracy since sustenance of democracy is constitutive of the civic role of higher education. For a university to fulfil its democratisation role, it is imperative that the university be non-paternalistically and incessantly connected with the lived experiences of the society in which it exists, critically unearthing the impediments to democratic flourishing peculiar to individuals in a society and suggesting transformation approaches. Since democracy is also a social ideal, the university must engage the concrete rather than only generic challenges of the human condition by being responsive to structures of oppression that are uniquely embedded in different societies. The authors therefore contend that a university must engage the perspectives of the community without initially demanding that such perspectives be modelled in the hegemonic perspectives that typify higher education. For higher education to achieve this, there must be open dialogue, where the hitherto marginalised indigenous otherness and its epistemologies are understood as they are. Besides such openness and dialogue, the authors argue that there must be a removal of structural barriers regarding the constitution and scope of higher education to make such form of education accommodative of otherness. Equally indispensable in rendering African higher education democratic is the need for academic institutions themselves to reach out to the marginalised indigenous epistemologies because the power imbalances in relationships under the prevalent hegemonic neo-liberal global order render it difficult for indigeneity to reclaim its legitimate place in academic spaces singlehandedly. Ultimately, the authors argue that the university is a potentially double-edged sword that may either reproduce the inequalities of its society as a unit of society or, as a potent agent of democratisation, it may achieve democratic transformation of a society by necessarily being grounded in local concreteness.

In **Chap. 4**, focusing on national policy on higher education, Mudenda Simukungwe discusses whether such policy in Zambia enables universities to engage in knowledge production endeavours that could achieve a decolonised education. Although the national education policy for Zambia by implication is implicitly accommodative of decolonised education, institutions of higher learning, owing to their being grounded in

Eurocentrism, lack commitment to appreciate and enact decoloniality. Simukungwe argues that ultimately the Zambian education experience shows a rationalisation of endemic coloniality, regarding coloniality as a natural property of the modern world. This is so because the endemic and naturalised interpretive frames of Eurocentrism inherently repel tolerance of indigenous frames of thought; ultimately Eurocentrism reproduces itself in the academe, thus epistemically disempowering universities to achieve decoloniality. Simukungwe also highlights that until recently, African political leadership and policymakers have not meaningfully engaged African researchers and indigenous knowledge and aspirations in education policy formulation but overly relied on foreign expertise as policy consultants on account of their being well grounded in the Eurocentrism that drives modernity. Achieving decoloniality in Zambia, as Simukungwe highlights, would have to include indispensably revising the curriculum and curriculum texts in education institutions, reimaging criteria for academic performance, reconsidering cultural patterns in schools and the general self-image of localness in schools. Developing and implementing mother tongue languages for instruction in schools are also central requirements for progress towards decoloniality in Zambia. The chapter calls for Zambian higher education to aspire developing education models that are majorly grounded in the local socio-cultural context of the people of Zambia, responding to their challenges inasmuch as education aspires for global citizenship. The available policy frameworks, according to Simukungwe, provide room for endeavours of decolonising education systems and institutions in Zambia.

Lester Shawa argues in **Chap. 5** that meaningful decolonisation is one that goes beyond merely making over pedagogic styles and curricula content, as it is grounded in a robust reconceptualisation of the notion of education whose enactment inevitably achieves decolonisation. Drawing on Aristotelian notions of practical reason (ethical conception of an end and appropriate deliberation in achieving the end and potentiality of people to become what they can or cannot) and the liberating power of education as espoused in the Platonic allegory of the cave, the chapter proposes a form of education that connects with decoloniality. An education grounded in these ideals develops the right attitudes in understanding oneself and the other, considering recognition and respect of others

and their cultures. Ultimately, such education liberates beings from acquired and entrenched distortions about otherness, thus effectively achieving decolonisation. This chapter contends that, given the entrenchments of neo-liberalism that are perpetuating inequalities in access to higher education in many countries, the decolonisation project should be much more than effecting changes in curricula content or pedagogical styles, leaving intact the neo-liberal world view that is generating inequalities across the globe. Ultimately, Shawa argues that practical reasoning, potentiality and liberating education ought to play a central role in choosing content for a curriculum, in the establishment of styles of pedagogy and in the governance of higher education by ensuring compatibility and relevance of the university with the social dimension in a critical manner that respects otherness and promotes self-assessment and the liberative mission of higher education to the society.

In **Chap. 6**, Celiwe Ngwenya argues that decoloniality ought to be a theoretical cannon for conceptualising democratisation and transformation in contemporary South Africa, which still has enduring and active injustices since the public education systems and institutions are covertly characterised by coloniality. Ngwenya concedes that, although public policy in democratic South Africa aspires to reach equality in accessing higher education, which is a tool for social mobility, the majority of South Africans—owing to their poverty status—do not access this cardinal tool for social mobility. Furthermore, the pedagogical encounters of universities favour the prevailing undue privileges that were restricted to and monopolised by the white minority during the apartheid era. Ngwenya further argues that realisation of the promise for equality in accessing higher education, as well as pedagogical encounters that resonate with the situationality of African people, is obliterated by the politics and demands of the new neo-liberal global order that informed the public policy direction of post-apartheid South Africa. The major challenge regarding the neo-liberal order in the context of South Africa, as Ngwenya argues, is that education in the country sustains and perpetuates asymmetrical power relations in institutions of higher learning. Ngwenya further argues that the presupposed ‘fair’ competition among students disaffirms and nullifies as morally inconsequential the enduring inequalities most black students face due to their social and historical

situatedness. The neo-liberal demand for global competitiveness results in the marginalisation of African languages, a systematic endeavour of apartheid coloniality, placing such languages at the periphery of the higher education agenda; hence, they remain undeveloped for academic discourse, retaining the goals of apartheid and coloniality. Ngwenya contends that such trends of marginalising Africanness subtly rationalise coloniality as natural, and that all African students have to do is to embrace the new global norm that is nevertheless alienating in principle. Ideal education for Ngwenya is one that does not overlook national needs and contextuality that values care for the other and not unmoderated competition. To be consistent with democratic equality, Ngwenya argues that South African education must actively aim to restore the dignity of African people by embracing relevant African values and ideals in higher education. African languages should be centred in the university. The university must not prize free market capitalism and globalism at the expense of achieving democratic equality that is responsive to the historical and socio-cultural situatedness of the people.

In **Chap. 7**, Monica Zembere highlights the institutional disadvantagedness of students from rural secondary schools in accessing science education in Zimbabwean higher education institutions. Zembere uses the prism of decoloniality theory, particularly the concepts of getting in and getting through to analyse the interface between rural secondary schools in Zimbabwe and higher education that is equitable and accessible. Ultimately, Zembere shows how Zimbabwean students seeking to access higher education are restricted in both general access and the study fields for which they may enrol in higher education. The restrictions are typically socio-economic in nature as the disadvantaged habitus of such learners deprives them of the linguistic, cultural and economic capital to integrate seamlessly into higher education. Zembere argues that accessing higher education in Zimbabwe still subtly follows the social stratification criteria introduced by colonialism. As such, the disadvantaged socio-economic conditions of students from Zimbabwean rural secondary schools determine whether such students access higher education, and if they do, their background in principle determines which programmes they may study or not. Besides problems of access and choice of study programmes students from disadvantaged backgrounds face, once such

students join the university, there is also the challenge of epistemic access with which they have to grapple. By and large, Zembere argues that such access is embodied by possession (or a lack thereof) of English proficiency, which is scarcely the mother tongue of or the lingua franca for the rural communities in which the students develop; yet, it is the sole language of instruction, research and academic discourse in the university. In the light of such challenges, Zembere recommends that there must be renewed investment into transforming the social and school environment of rural school learners. The bureaucratic requirements for admission into higher education, such as especially higher fees for science programmes, must be reviewed so that they should cease to function as tools for filtering out rural-based students.

In **Chap. 8**, “Towards Decolonisation Within University Education: On the Innovative Application of Educational Technology”, Faiq Waghid argues in defence of a Rancièrian notion of democratic education, which he equates with a practice of decolonisation of education. The latter idea is innovative in itself considering that decolonising education is being considered tantamount to democratising education. The idea of democratic education he proposes is couched within a Rancièrian framework of pedagogical action whereby students in relation to teachers in university classrooms can articulate their intellectual equality. That is, they can come to speech by articulating their claims in inclusive pedagogical encounters. By drawing on examples in educational technology, Faiq Waghid shows how podcasts, clickers and social networking sites potentially enhance democratised pedagogical spaces through which teaching and learning can hopefully be decolonised. Although it seems Faiq Waghid is arguing for a position of changing the pedagogical institutional structures—a matter of making a case for decoloniality—his argument that equates what we would assert as decolonial pedagogical engagement accentuates the importance of addressing undemocratic concerns vis-à-vis the cultivation of an equal community of inquiry among teachers and students in a university setting.

In **Chap. 9**, employing a Senian notion of virtues of democracy, in “Examining an Education for Decoloniality Through a Senian Notion of Democratic Education: Towards Cultivating Social Justice in Higher Education”, Zayd Waghid argues that decolonial education ought to aim

at achieving a conscious individual and social shedding off of an often-unexamined neo-colonial mentality that characterises even decoloniality endeavours. Zayd Waghid argues that a Senian account of democracy, when embedded in education for decoloniality, expects of students to identify and challenge power hierarchies between students and the university and, more importantly, oppressive power hierarchies among students themselves that restrict them from exercising their basic political and liberal rights. Such neo-colonial tendencies among students mostly manifest through coercion to adopt essentialist decolonialisation positions that require an almost entire dismissal of one perspective of knowledge, replacing it with another largely ethnocentric one. Ideal education for decolonisation, as Zayd Waghid contends, ought to be about students acting through a sense of recognition of and respect for the rights of the culturally diverse student community and the wider society where members have diverse values. As such, the author posits that education for decoloniality should be about students conscientising and sharing perspectives with diverse others in a context characterised by mutual respect, harmony and accountability in order to achieve social transformation. Decolonisation demands of social justice, Zayd Waghid purports, must not be conceived in narrow forms of decoloniality, grounded in forms of solidarity such as cultural and racial identities that are immune to internal and external assessment. Such decoloniality is ironically neo-colonialist. Zayd Waghid's position is that education for decoloniality must incessantly conscientise students to identify and challenge a lack of transparency and accountability of dominant student groups vigilantly, irrespective of the nature of the basis of solidarity for such groups. Such students will have an awareness of the internal and external unfreedoms of their society that inhibit the full capabilities for human flourishing of all members of society. In the absence of self-reflexivity and practical reason, one could be narrow and essentialist in one's demands, ultimately not only disabling the capabilities of cultural and racial others to flourish, but such narrowness also disables one from flourishing in other spheres of one's life, such as economic, whose prospects are adversely affected by the demands of the narrowness.

In **Chap. 10**, Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu makes a case for an education for global citizenship that instead of marginalising the national

subjectivities of historicity, language and socio-cultural situatedness in the constitution of the citizenship conceptualisation includes such subjectivities as indispensable in the conceptualisation of a meaningfully global or cosmopolitan citizenship. Counter to prevalent dominant theories and practices of education for citizenship that are grounded in the objective commonalities of humanity across the world—hence grounded in the idea of the detached impartial autonomous self as epitomic of the cosmopolitan citizen—Manthalu argues that ideal cosmopolitanism is an achievement of unity between the dualities of the universal global and the particular local opposites. Employing Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) notion of deliberative universalism that starts with difference as an integral element of being, the chapter argues that education for cosmopolitanism should not be restricted to the transcendent self. This is because excluding the particularities of situatedness in global citizenship education not only denies the concreteness of the being of the peoples of the world but also compels them to assimilate into the mainstream culture that underlies the ostensible impartial education of radical cosmopolitanism. In the end, the chapter cautions that recasting education for cosmopolitanism is not about replacing one ideology with another but rather promoting the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism and education for cosmopolitanism and the linguistic, historical and cultural differences that typify peoples of the world.

In **Chap. 11**, “Leaning into Discomfort: Engaging Film as a Reflective Surface to Encourage Deliberative Encounters”, Judith Terblanche and Charlene van der Walt contend that achieving social transformation in an historical context characterised by race, economic, class, gender and cultural differentiation and encountering the other for deliberation are indispensable to achieve transformation. The authors, however, hold that since encountering the other is limited by the very ideological constructions of otherness, it is imperative that the school must trigger deliberation among learners with diverse backgrounds responsibly or else the deliberation will not take place. Employing Miroslav Volf’s (1996) idea of the drama of embrace and Yusef Waghid’s (2018) ideas on *ubuntu*, the authors argue for the role of film in pedagogy to initiate the imperative of encounter that awakens empathy and compassion for the other. Reflecting on and discussing a film creates room for cultivation of skills that would

assist the viewing students to take active but otherwise difficult steps of encountering the other. Waghid argues that the centrality of the film is that it projects the moral necessity of deliberately going through the discomfort of imagining the situationality of the other and taking active real-life steps in ways that are discomfoting, risky and vulnerable as the process may be. They thus argue that film is a medium full of potential for initiating a pedagogy of discomfort that emphasises students and teachers moving outside their zones of comfort so that, through the generated discomfoting emotions, the stakeholders come to identify and challenge dominant beliefs, practices, habits and prejudices in them and in society largely regarded as unproblematic in order to achieve social transformation. In relation to decoloniality, Terblanche and van der Walt hold that, apart from the discomfoting encounters surfacing, the entrenched structural epistemic violence against other people's forms of knowledge, pedagogical film engagement could also achieve further decoloniality by foregrounding content and theory that are local and exploring lived experiences that are institutionally regarded as irrelevant, such as indigeneity.

In **Chap. 12**, Joseph Hungwe and Joseph Divala present an exposition of the contradictory interplay between decolonisation and afrophobia in South African higher education. They argue that afrophobia encumbers the envisioned objectives of decolonisation of higher education in Africa. Decolonisation of higher education ultimately seeks to establish a dispensation that is underpinned by ideals of non-discrimination along race, ethnicity, nationalities and other forms of social diversities that characterise social composition of African higher education. It can therefore be claimed that decolonisation of higher education is tailored towards the promotion and sustenance of equal social relations in higher education, on the one hand. On the other hand, afrophobic practices and attitudes entrench and maintain perceptions of a society structured along cultural superiority and marginalisation. The concurrence of afrophobia and decolonisation of higher education in South Africa brings to the fore a conundrum, which this chapter exposes.

In **Chap. 13**, we present the central argument—that is, the project of decoloniality is not a political ideology but an ideal of democracy. The aftermaths of the colonial experience are still affecting present-day Africa.

Despite the attainment of political decolonisation, the education domain, especially higher education, still retains the colonial heritage. The discourse of decolonisation of education has for a long time largely pertained to eliminating educational content and symbols of colonisation in order to achieve representation of particular historically marginalised epistemologies and metaphysics of the oppressed people. This book, however, largely understands coloniality as oppressive and marginalisation forces that guide modernity and which are a mutation of the heritage of colonialism in African higher education.

We conclude the book with **Chap. 14**, which offers a look into the future in the sense that we analyse teaching and learning as an instance of African higher education in relation to the idea of play. Our main argument is a defence of decoloniality with education on the basis of play concomitantly with an enhancement of *Ubuntu* justice.

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1

African Philosophy (of Education) and Decolonisation in Post-apartheid South African Higher Education

Thokozani Mathebula

Introduction

In 2015, the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall campaigns at South African universities brought about renewed calls for the decolonisation (and Africanisation) of the content and pedagogies in higher education. So, what does it mean to decolonise South African universities from the primary role from the universities' point of view, that is, in terms of the promotion of scholarship? More importantly, do philosophers of education have anything to offer to the decolonisation of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa in particular and the world in general? As a starting point, building on African philosophy as an academic discipline and not as collective, spontaneous and unconscious beliefs, the author maintains that the clarification of general (every day), often vague (ill-defined), uncritical and unargued (collective singular) concepts like

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decolonisation that idle in our minds is a categorical imperative. The author shows that decolonisation is not only compatible with but also intimately and reciprocally linked to the notion of endogeneity—knowledge of Africans, generated by Africans and for Africans in higher education institutions. The author calls for a continual struggle by (or for) students against colonial neo-liberal universities in South Africa and beyond. In the end, I argue that education for decolonisation that fosters ‘knowledge democracy’ is not only feasible and desirable—but realistic in the context of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.

African philosophy is an academic discipline that “clarifies concepts, for the purpose of b) the critical evaluation of [general] beliefs” (Raphael 1990, 8).

As an epistemic project, decolonialisation “evokes the origin of the kind of knowledge identified as an internal product”—“an autonomous, self-reliant tradition of research and knowledge that addresses problems and issues directly or indirectly posed by African [scholars]”. (Hountondji 1990, 1, 1997, 17)

The contemporary university has turned into springboard for neo-liberal ideology, governance, and policies “hence the increasing calls for the decolonisation of our universities” (Hall and Tandon 2017, 7) this is “the next stage of struggle ... whose battle must be waged [by African scholars]”. (Gordon 2016, 177)

Education for decolonisation that fosters “knowledge democracy” is feasible, desirable and realistic “in post-1994 South Africa universities and the world at large”. (Jansen 2017, 162–171)

It is clear that neo-liberalism—and by implication a neo-liberal university—is the ‘new demon’ (Torres 2009, 2) of modern-day societies. Against this background, the decolonisation of universities has become “a necessary task that remain[ed] unfinished” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 1). It is not difficult to understand why this is so, as “the celebration of juridical-political decolonisation obscure[d] the continuities between the colonial past and coloniality” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 6). The struggle for decolonisation and decolonisation of universities is “fought for, won, lost, and won again” (Christie 2010, 6). If one thinks in these terms, the

struggle for decolonisation of universities calls for the thorniest theoretical questions that account for the reality of coloniality on a global scale. It is therefore reasonable to say that, if African philosophy is conceived as an academic discipline, asking for the meaning, defence and justification of decolonisation as an epistemic struggle is its subtext. I submit that South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle that gave rise to diverse knowledge systems in higher education is now out of view. In this chapter, the author argues that:

- decolonisation is first and foremost a knowledge project rooted in African philosophy as a self-conscious discipline;
- decolonisation is tied to endogeneity,¹ that is, knowledge of the people, by the people and for the people;
- decolonisation is part of the ongoing struggle by decolonialist scholars against colonial neo-liberal universities in post-apartheid South Africa and
- in the context of South Africa's constitutional democracy, the appropriate concept of education for decolonisation—philosophically, epistemologically and politically—would be 'knowledge democracy' that goes beyond 'narrow provincialism' and 'Western triumphalism'.

What Is Philosophy? What Is Western Philosophy? What Is African Philosophy?

As a point of departure, the term 'philosophy' comes from the ancient Greek words *philo* meaning love and *sophia* meaning wisdom—the love of wisdom (Akinpelu 1987, 1; Kanu 2014, 87; Lacey 1976, 59; Plato 1994, 190; Runes 1960, 234; Scruton 2007, 522). The concept is attributed to Pythagoras (575–495 BC), a Greek philosopher, scientist and religious scholar. In Plato's dialogue, *Protagoras* (1991), Socrates describes

¹Endogeneity refers to context relevant knowledge, that is, knowledge of Africans, generated by Africans and for Africans to address university problems and issues directly or indirectly posed by Africans.

Protagoras to his friend as “the wisest man alive” (1991, 1). Socrates’ friend concurs, “he is the only man who is wise ... one who is knowledgeable in learned matters” (1991, 2–4). Protagoras’s love for wisdom is neatly encapsulated in this Pythagorean public statement:

Philosophy is indeed, it seems, is a road ... chose that philosophy and that road to wisdom ... the philosophy which progresses through immaterial eternal intelligible objects that always remain the same and do not admit in themselves of destruction or change, like its subject-matter, is unerring and firm, producing grounded and unswerving proof. (O’Meara 1989, 42–43)

Interpreting *Protagoras*’ quote, we can see that philosophy is ‘a kind of agony’ (extreme mental suffering) (Stangroom and Garvey 2012, 76). The above metaphor of philosophy as a road takes one to the “intelligible world of truth postulated by the objects of knowledge, which are perfect, eternal and unchanging” (Dupré 2007, 9). Since then, Protagoras’ philosophy has passed into common usage. Recently, it has been given two meanings: a science of questions (asking wise and foolish questions) and a general set of beliefs (general outlook on the world) (Luthuli 1982, 19; Scruton 2007, 552; Standish 2014, 6; Waghid 2016, 455). As the reader will see in the next section, decolonisation of universities as an epistemic project in post-apartheid South Africa rests on a confusion between the popular (that which we believe), on the one hand, and strict (that which we know), on the other.

For our purpose, Raphael (1990, 8) interprets “the main tradition of Western philosophy as having had two connected aims: the clarification of concepts, for the purpose of the critical evaluation of beliefs”. In trying to clarify general, vague and uncritical concepts, such as decolonisation, three related purposes worth considering are analysis, synthesis and improvement of the word (decolonisation) itself. First, our analysis of decolonisation consists of a conceptual definition and specifying its central features (e.g. one can analyse or define decolonisation as a ‘true democratisation of knowledge’ and specify the elements that make up the concept). Second, our synthesis of decolonisation shows the logical relationships whereby the concept (as a unity of knowledge) implies or is implied by another (e.g. one can show a logical relationship between

decolonisation and its obligation to transcend the seemingly particular, opposite and irreconcilable Eurocentred and Afrocentred schools of thought). Third, our improvement of decolonisation involves recommending a definition or use that will assist to clarify the meaning of the concept (e.g. one can recommend, as the author does, that the concept 'decolonisation' should be used in a strict theoretical sense, and not in the popular, ideological sense).

Hountondji (1996, 33) defines African philosophy as "a set of texts, especially the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophy by their authors themselves". With this definition in place, Hountondji (1996, 47) argues, "African philosophy rests on a confusion: the confusion between the popular (ideological) use and the strict (theoretical) use of the word philosophy". Behind the popular (ideological) usage, "there is a myth at work, the myth of primitive unanimity, with its suggestion that in 'primitive' societies—that is to say, non-Western societies—everybody always agrees with everybody else" (Hountondji 1996, 60). Unfortunately, this collective, spontaneous and unconscious view is precisely what the concept 'decolonisation' as an epistemic project is, as understood in post-apartheid South Africa in general—a belief or that which people believe. And, as the reader will see, in a stricter sense, at universities, the word 'decolonisation' should be understood as an active, not passive, concept or a science that which scholars know. As a deliberate, explicit and individual activity, decolonisation is part and parcel of philosophy as a science of questioning—including itself through analysis, synthesis and improvement. For African scholars, then, by reorienting the decolonisation discourse in this way, decolonisation of higher education becomes a knowledge project firmly rooted in African philosophy as a self-conscious discipline. In this sense, but only in this sense, it seems we can speak of decolonisation as a product of a huge public debate: the origin of a knowledge product that comes from or at least is perceived by people as coming from inside their own restless questioning, free discussions and intellectual coming together.

In relation to the point above, for Horsthemke and Enslin (2005, 2008), African philosophy of education, that is, oral tradition, African traditional worldview (or narrow communitarianism) and 'African experience', is strikingly similar to characteristics of Fundamental Pedagogies

based on the ideology of Christian National Education (CNE), its history and its basic beliefs. In 1948, the Institute for CNE published a well-known pamphlet setting out Christian education policy. The introduction of the pamphlet stated

Afrikaans-speaking children should have a Christian-Nationalist education, for the Christian and Nationalist spirit of the Afrikaner nation must be preserved and developed. [...] By Christian, in this context, we mean according to the creeds of the three Afrikaner churches; by Nationalist we mean imbued with the love of one's own, especially one's own language, history, and culture. [...] Nationalism must be rooted in Christianity. (Federasie van Afrikaanse KultuurVereenigings 1948, 1)

Equally, the Extension of University Education Act (No. XX of 1959) established new racial and ethnic universities with a black-oriented education and black-oriented university curriculum “based on Black identity ... Black thought ... Black humanism ... the idioms of Black culture ... Black culture” (Luthuli 1982, 32–101). Three possible traps should be avoided in thinking about African philosophy of education:

- an essentialist definition of African identity that suggests that there is only one authentic set of characteristics which all African people share and which do not alter across time—“identities involve multiplicity, therefore rarely coherent and integrated” (Woodward 1997, 2);
- Africans are not a solidified, undifferentiated and homogenous mass of people: this tends to ignore differences and the fact that ‘Africans’ are individual subjects too and
- politics of collective identity that tends to accept historically inherited views escapes critical scrutiny and constructive criticism.

Such is—regrettably, as was the case with CNE and the Extension of University Education Act—decolonisation as a collective thought of Africans in higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. At the heart of decolonisation as knowledge project is the clarification and critical evaluation of the concept itself. As Strawson (1973, 828) puts it, “one remembers the Kantian tenet that concepts are empty, have no

significance for us, are not concepts for us, unless we can relate them to experiential conditions for their application”.

Decolonisation and Endogenous Knowledge: Popular (Ideological) or Strict (Theoretical) Use?

What is decolonialisation? The concept ‘decolonialisation’ is complex and contested even when discussion is confined to universities in post-apartheid South Africa. As I indicated in the previous section, decolonialisation of universities as an epistemic project in post-apartheid South Africa rests on a confusion between the popular (belief), on the one hand, and strict (knowledge), on the other. From the popular (ideological) point of view—that which we believe of decolonialisation to use Jansen (2017) words, first and foremost—decolonialisation means the Africanisation of knowledge. As a notable example, Seepe (2000, 119) writes, “Africanisation of knowledge ... refers to a process of placing the African world view at the centre of analysis ... [and] advocates for the need to foreground African indigenous knowledge systems to address [Africa’s] problems and challenges”. Second, decolonialisation is about “repatriation of occupied knowledge—the power to disturb not only settled knowledge but also settler society” (Jansen 2017, 163). Why is there a call to recentre an African world view and to foreground an indigenous knowledge outlook? According to Horsthemke (2015, 21), the motivation is easy to discern and explain considering the “denigration, suppression and exploitation of the traditional knowledge systems” from Western colonialism to date. To put it bluntly, Ochieng (2010) sees the call to Africanise knowledge as a response to Western barbarism. Santos (2014, cited in Le Grange 2016, 4) describes the dissemination of [indigenous] knowledge as “the murder of knowledge ... the death of the knowledge of the subordinated culture ... [t]he loss of epistemological confidence ... the epistemicides perpetrated by hegemonic Eurocentric modernity”. In the eyes of Lumumba-Kasongo (2000, 145), “[i]n Africa, knowledge within the Western educational context was transmitted

through the institutions associated with [slave] capitalism, colonialism and slavery, such as churches [and universities]”. So, does this mean that we are in the endless battle of the dominant European centre, on the one hand, and a push to recentring Africa, on the other?

From a strict (theoretical) use—‘soft versions’ of decolonisation to use Jansen’s (2017, 159) words—‘decolonisation’ refers to decentring of European knowledge. Put differently, decentring “restores the place of the African and African knowledge at the heart of how we come to know ... what changes is the relational position of an African-centred knowledge to the rest of the world, and the West in particular” (Jansen 2017, 159). Second, ‘decolonisation’ refers to additive-inclusive knowledge that “recognises and values existing canons of knowledge and its addition to established world knowledges” (Jansen 2017, 160). Third, ‘decolonisation’ refers to critical engagement with the settled knowledge, that is, empowering decolonialists to engage the settled knowledge by asking critical questions such as where the settled knowledge comes from. In whose interests does the settled knowledge persist? What does the settled knowledge include or what does it leave out? What are the settled knowledge’s authoritative claims? What are the underlying assumptions and silences that govern such knowledge? (see Jansen 2017, 161). Fourth, decolonisation is an encounter with entangled knowledges, a critical engagement with the settled knowledge, that is, “our knowledges are intertwined in the course of daily living, learning and loving” (Jansen 2017, 162). A universal knowledge system is not only possible, if I may say so in a Kantian spirit, but also a categorical imperative, especially in enabling Africa’s recentring project in the global ‘processes of knowledge production’ (Hountondji 1997, 13). However, the recentring project needs to confront the theoretical inadequacy of indigenous knowledge captured by Horsthemke and Enslin (2008, 217) as the ‘collective singular’ that is often employed in African philosophy of education—a single, collective, unreflective and implicit world view of African people—‘African reality’, ‘African experience in its totality’ and ‘indigenous African epistemology’ (Lebakeng et al. 2006, 76; Ramose 1998, vi). In the face of African philosophy as a universal enterprise, it is therefore crucial for

the advocates of decolonisation as an epistemic project to rethink their call and go beyond African and Western philosophies.

From this standpoint, Mbembe (2016, 37) asserts, “to decolonise the university universal knowledge means creating a less provincial and more open critical cosmopolitan pluriversalism—a task that involves the radical refounding of our ways of thinking and transcendence of our disciplinary divisions”. Moll (2002) supports the claim that a universal knowledge system is able to resolve the debate between ‘knowledge of Africa’ and ‘knowledge of the West’. To defend his position, Moll (2002) revisits a number of African philosophers and psychologists committed to a universal knowledge system that transcends Eurocentric knowledge and African knowledge. Starting with Amin’s (1989, cited in Moll 2002) defence of universal inquiry, Moll (2002, 11) maintains that Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, as two positions in the philosophy of knowledge, in fact entail each other, that is, Eurocentric thinkers are blind to the entailed opposite, while African thinkers believe there is nothing to be done about it. It is against this “mutual entailment [that we encounter the Eurocentric and Afrocentric] theoretical inadequacy [this compels the advocates of these positions to] start to develop Africa in a universal system of thought”. From this point of view, it is possible, as Le Grange (2007, 586) spurs us to disrupt the dichotomy between classical Western philosophy (that which we know) and an African indigenous world view (that which we believe) by creating a ‘third spaces or interstitial spaces’. As Odour (2012, cited in Horsthemke 2015, 18–19) aptly points out, “universalists would maintain that ... African philosophy is first and foremost philosophy before it is African”. Equally, Hountondji (1997, 13–18) expands this point by saying the integration of the Third World into the world processes of knowledge production entails “a push of endogenous elements of knowledge to the periphery ... the ability to shift from one mode of thought and one logical universe to another.... The endogenous become ‘indigenous’ in and through such a world-widening process”.

The universal philosophy as an inclusive, rational and reflective practice makes it possible to merge Western and African philosophies to form

a single knowledge system. As Hountondji (1997, 8–17) convincingly demonstrates:

[R]esearch in the peripheral countries is ... tied to the local scene, it is trapped in particularistic details, unable and unambitious to break to the level of universal ... it is in such a context that ... traditional knowledge must be placed ... [we] need to move beyond the present impasse ... beyond the mute coexistence of discourses, to examine each and every mode of thought within their specific frames, then, if possible, to bring them face to face within the unifying context ... such option for a rational approach requires ... to create bridges, to re-create the unity of knowledge, or in simpler, deeper terms, the unity of the human being.... Endogenous knowledge appear[s] to be a better choice.

There are three points worth noting about this ‘new knowledge space’. First, if we treat the so-called ‘Western thought’ and ‘African thought’ as unique, distinct, opposite philosophies, we are unwittingly perpetuating ‘narrow provincialism’, to use Amin’s phrase (1989, cited in Moll 2002, 11). Second, Kanu (2014, 92) maintains that philosophy is an “all-inclusive enterprise, a universal activity not limited to whites or blacks, nor confined to the peoples of the West and the East”. Third, instead, universal knowledge takes the context as the basis of international knowledge production—far from “permitting Western triumphalism or the retrieval of pre-colonial African tradition” (Enslin and Horsthemke 2016, 188). It is clear therefore that, in the wake of Protagoras’ concept ‘philosophy’, Jansen’s (2017) soft versions of decolonisation and Hountondji’s (1996) endogenous knowledge system, decolonisation of higher education is neither a collective world view—‘hard version’—nor individual philosophies (soft version) but a unity of knowledge, a call for the democratisation of knowledge the world over. As such, decolonisation as an epistemic struggle is squarely at the doorsteps of neo-liberalism²—by implication the neo-liberal university and its global education agenda.

²Harvey (2007, 2) defines neo-liberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework”.

Decolonisation of a Neo-liberal University in Post-apartheid South Africa

What is the function of the university? According to Kotzee and Martin (2013, 628–629), there are three accounts of the role of the university:

- social benefits through intellectual advancement, that is, identifying and educating future scientists, leaders, artists and intellectuals who will serve society (narrow social goods conception);
- fair distribution of life chances (distributive conception); and
- promoting scholarly excellence, that is the advancement of scholarly knowledge (knowledge conception).

The author argues that the narrow social goods and distributive justice accounts, while no doubt important, are insufficient. Instead, the primary role of the university is the advancement of knowledge for its own sake. For Kotzee and Martin (2013), scholarly knowledge conception is exemplified by Hamm's (1989) general enlightenment that is the capacity of African scholars to think, reason and act by themselves. In Hamm's (1989, 35) words,

Education is not merely a tool or instrument to do things with, such as to succeed in getting a job or provide one with a skill to obtain extrinsic ends. Education is valuable in itself and for its own sake. The knowledge and understanding obtained become features of one's person and shape one's sense of what is of ultimate value ... it is primarily concerned with the provision of worthwhile ends or goals of life.

In other words, Hamm's basic aim of the university is the pursuit of knowledge—*knowing everything*, that includes subjecting the decolonisation project to analysis, synthesis and improvement. But apart from this emphasis, scholarship is intrinsically valuable, worthwhile and desirable. A decolonisation project should therefore advance scholarly knowledge by all and sundry, that is professors, administrators and students. University teaching is the process of initiating students into intrinsically worthwhile activities, that is, conducting inward research on decolonisation to

provide solutions to the killing of knowledge systems at universities in South Africa and beyond. In addition, a decolonisation project should enable students to strive to comprehend and familiarise themselves with all the logical types of knowledge—“universal knowledge takes the locale as the basis of international knowledge production—far from permitting Western triumphalism or the retrieval of pre-colonial African tradition” (see Enslin and Horsthemke 2016, 188). Sadly, higher education institutions (mainly universities) are perceived “as the neoliberal university” (Peters 2007, cited in Le Grange, 2016, 4).

As already mentioned, neo-liberalism is a political economic theory committed to human rights (and individual freedom) as a springboard for a market-oriented society. Steger and Roy (2010, x) add that neo-liberalism “glorifies individual self-interest, economic efficiency, and unbridled competition”. As we shall soon see, Steger and Roy also conceptualise neo-liberalism in three intertwined dimensions: an ideology, a mode of governance and a policy package.

- ‘Neo-liberal ideology codifiers’ refer to a global power elite, managers and executives of large transnational corporations, corporate lobbyists, influential journalists and public-relations specialists, intellectuals writing for a large public audience, celebrities and top entertainers, state bureaucrats and politicians (Steger and Roy 2010, 11).
- Neo-liberal governmentality is rooted in entrepreneurial values, such as competitiveness, self-interest and decentralisation (Steger and Roy 2010, 12).
- Educationally speaking, neo-liberal public policies are in the ‘D-L-P Formula’: deregulation (rolling back state control of the education system); liberalisation (individual education as a springboard for a market-oriented society) and privatisation (higher education is a market product, rated, bought and sold) (Steger and Roy 2010, 14).

Additionally, Le Grange (2016, 4) asserts that neo-liberalism (neocolonialism) has three things in common: “a commitment to individual liberty and a reduced state; a shift in policy and ideology against government intervention; and a belief that market forces should be allowed to be self-regulating”. Torres (2009, 20) argues that today, “a sense of a

university's social mission is being eroded by the neo-liberal ideology and agenda" worldwide. According to Harris (1997), the neo-liberal agenda has shaped global education system(s), education discourse, education budgets, formal and hidden curricula and educational relations. For Mbembe (2016, 30), "universities today are large systems of authoritative control, standardisation, graduation, accountancy, classification, credits and penalties". According to Mbembe (2016, 30), we need to decolonise universities (systems of access and management) as they "turned higher education into a market product, rated, bought and sold by standard units, measured, counted and reduced to staple equivalence by impersonal, mechanical tests and therefore readily subject to statistical consistency, with numerical standards and units". Again, using Mbembe's (2016, 30) work, decolonisation becomes a necessary task since "universities substitute the goal of free pursuit of knowledge for another, the pursuit of credits ... [i]t is replacing scientific capacity and addiction to study and inquiry by sales-like proficiency". One hopeful note is that we can draw inspiration from our history of triumphant struggle to reclaim the right to university education that South Africans "fought for, won, lost, and [will win] again", to use Christie's (2010, 6) words.

Dembour (2010) identifies four schools of thought on human rights, that is, natural school (human rights as *given*), the deliberative school (human rights as *agreed upon*), discourse school (human rights as *talked about*) and the protest school (human rights as *fought for*). As already stated, the protest scholars view human rights as a struggle waged on behalf of those denied the basic rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship—neo-liberal education policy in South Africa that treats students as investors (and customers) who buy education in order to increase their competitive edge. In line with the position of the protest scholars, Dembour (2010, 3) maintains that they "look at human rights as claims and aspirations ... in favour of the oppressed ... they advocate relentlessly fighting for human rights, as one victory never signals the end of all injustice ... most of them are more concerned with concrete source of human rights in social struggles, which are as necessary as they are perennial".

There are four points worth noting about the concept of human rights as held by protest scholars. First, the protest school accepts that human

beings are rights holders, and that human rights are a call to ensure that the basic rights of fellow citizens are respected and protected. Second, protest scholars maintain that human rights injustices (and abuses) bring about an endless demand for, or need of, redress in societies. Third, the inability of human rights institutions to realise justiciable rights is the source of perennial struggle to give actual form to the ideal. Fourth, the protest scholars' call for a "return to true human rights" (Dembour 2010, 9) is a perpetual fight for the realisation of human rights for the oppressed, in particular. The phrase 'human rights are people's struggle' denotes what Arnstein (1969) refers to as curtailing the impact of neo-liberal ideology, governmentality and public policies that repress and attack individual liberty in post-apartheid South African universities.

Boyte (2005) argues that there is a re-emergence of civic agency of social movement struggles for equal rights and social and economic justice for "those experiencing continued oppression" (Suttner 2015, 74). As McKaiser (2015, 38–39) puts it:

#RhodesMustFall, and #RhodesSoWhite ... The bigger trigger was the collective experiences of many students of UCT as an untransformed institution, one that remains exclusionary and unjust in many ways, including in what it teaches, how it teaches, and in its institutional habits, like privileging certain bodies over others and staff demographics which betray a pathetic lack of effective effort to recruit black women academics.

Without doubt, the struggle for human rights starts with protests for those denied their justiciable right to education by neo-liberal ideology, governmentality and policies in post-apartheid South Africa. If this idea is accepted, "it is within the intersection of (non)existing rights that all South Africans should assume common responsibility, dissolve the illusion and structure political spaces by insisting on the full realisation of the right to university education" (Becker and Du Preez 2016, 72). As Freire (1970, cited in Torres 2009, 94) said, "the prophets are those that submerge themselves in the waters of their ... history and the history of the oppressed ... prophets know their 'here' and 'now' and ... they cannot only foresee the future, but they can realise it". Only a return to a source, that is, the struggle to reclaim our lost right reflected in the

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), can liberate educable students from the bondage of neo-liberal state ideology, governance and policies. After all, neo-liberalism as a theory of political economic practice is “radically inconsistent with the defence of human rights, if human rights are perceived in relation to suffering rather than as abstract ground rules governing the relations of individuals to the State” (Spren and Vally 2006, 353).

Education for Decolonisation in South Africa’s Constitutional Democracy

At this point, decolonisation as a knowledge project points to the following:

- a huge public debate that comes from restless questioning, free discussions and intellectual coming together;
- it transcends the seemingly particular, opposite and irreconcilable Eurocentred and Afrocentred schools of thought; and
- is the site of people’s struggles to curtail the influence of neo-liberal ideology, governmentality and public policies that repress and attack individual liberty in post-apartheid South African universities.

What then are the strategies for getting from where we *are* to where we *ought to be*? The long quotation from Gutmann (1987, 39) below is necessary in order to give meaning to the notion of conscious social reproduction:

Our task therefore is to find a more inclusive ground for justifying [decolonisation of higher] education.... We are committed to collectively re-creating the society that we share. Altogether we are not collectively committed to any particular set of educational aims (an agreement that could take the form of justifying a diverse set of educational aims and authorities). The substance of this core commitment is conscious social reproduction. As citizens, we aspire to a set of educational practices and authorities of which the following can be said: these are the practices and

authorities to which we, acting collectively as a society, have consciously agreed. It follows that a society that supports conscious social reproduction must educate all educable [students] to be capable of participating in collectively shaping their society.

There are three points worth noting about Gutmann's conscious social reproduction:

- it is an individual and collective right to choose a form of education for decolonisation that is appropriate in South African higher education institutions;
- it is a more general reflection and agreement about what education for decolonisation means at universities and beyond; and
- public dialogue results from free and unconstrained deliberation about this matter of common interest to all.

According to Benhabib (1996), the deliberative model of democracy of what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals. The “more collective decision-making processes approximate this model the more [it] increases the presumption of their legitimacy and rationality” (Benhabib 1996, 69). Similar to the Lipman (1998) and Sharp (1994) notion of community of inquiry, Benhabib's model seeks to educate citizens by promoting public dialogue among free and equal deliberators. Benhabib's version of deliberative democracy promises to educate for decolonisation by:

- treating the university community as moral and political equals;
- teaching deliberators practical reasoning, moral equality, freedom and respect;
- learning to speak across the divide or binaries; and
- building friendship and active, viable academic communities.

Benhabib's deliberative model of democracy is likely to promote active, critical enquiring students in post-apartheid South Africa.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Hall and Tandon (2017) argue for knowledge democracy as a vehicle to decolonisation of knowledge in higher education institutions. In relation to the point above, ‘knowledge democracy’ the authors maintain refers to

[A]n interrelationship of phenomena. First, it acknowledges the importance of the existence of multiple epistemologies, or ways of knowing [the unity of knowledge]. Second, it affirms that knowledge is both created and represented in multi forms, including text, image, number, story [individual and collective expression]. Third, an understanding that knowledge is a powerful tool for taking action in social movement and elsewhere to deepen democracy and to struggle for a fairer and healthier world [ongoing struggle against neo-liberal universities in post-apartheid South Africa]. And, finally, knowledge democracy is about open access for the sharing of knowledge, so that everyone intentionally linking values of justice, fairness and action to the process of using knowledge [endogeneity, that is, the context relevant knowledge]. (Hall and Tandon 2017, 13)

To drive home this point, Hall and Tandon (2017) show that there are elements of a ‘knowledge democracy’ discourse and decolonising practice in most of our universities. As a notable example, a Ugandan intellectual and civil society activist, Paulo Wangoola (date, cited by Hall and Tandon 2017, 9–10), “dedicate[d] himself to the creation of a village-based institution of higher education and research that is today known as the Mpambo Afrikan Multiversity, a place for the support of mother-tongue scholars of Afrikan Indigenous knowledge”. In South Africa, the authors write about “80 traditional healers in Mpumalanga province [who] created a biocultural knowledge commons for the systematic sharing of their knowledge among one another for the purpose of better serving the health needs of the people living in their province” (see Hall and Tandon 2017, 10). Still in South Africa, in 2005, Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shack-dwellers movement created their own University of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a space for the creation and sharing of knowledge (through song, ‘live action debates’ and documenting the knowledge in a web-based archive) about survival, hope and transformation where the shack-dwellers themselves are the scholars, the professors and the teachers.

There is, thus, no disagreement that ‘knowledge democracy’ is knowledge about the people, by the people and for the people that “addresses problems and issues directly or indirectly posed by Africans themselves” (Hountondji 2009, 1). But let us return to Hall and Tandon’s (2017) work after this apparent digression. There are two critical goals worth noting about ‘knowledge democracy’ in a university. First, it provides solutions to problems identified by people who live or inhabit the space. Second, it improves the entire process of knowledge production and the existing training and teaching practices “and enrich[es] the common international heritage of human thought” (Hountondji 1996, 70). If this argument is accepted, it means that we have to develop a conscious, self-critical and intelligible education for decolonisation with clear identifiable steps.

What does this task involve in practical terms? At philosophical analytical level, African philosophy should be perceived as an academic discipline to which scholars devote their time and energy. As such

- decolonisation of universities is part and parcel of philosophy as a science of questioning—including itself through analysis, synthesis and improvement;
- a clear statement about what is to be emphasised in education for decolonisation at this time (post-apartheid South Africa) is required. This is a request for direction about what is to be emphasised when universities educate for decolonisation;
- what is the purpose of education for decolonisation? This is a request for the articulation of the appropriateness of this specific teaching activity *in* education for decolonisation (e.g. teaching and learning goals and objectives);
- which version of decolonisation is worth considering, and why is this form of knowledge important? This is a request for justification of education for decolonisation; and
- what is the intrinsic value (properties) and extrinsic value (properties) attached to education for decolonisation? This is a request for a beneficial effect of education for decolonisation, for example, why is education for decolonisation worth pursuing?

Epistemology, decolonisation as a knowledge project, should at least address problems and issues directly or indirectly posed by university students in general:

- Decolonisation should enable students at universities to answer their own thorniest questions and meet both the intellectual and the material needs of African societies.
- The first step in this direction would probably be to formulate original ‘problematics’, original sets of problems that are grounded in a solid appropriation of the international intellectual legacy and deeply rooted in the African experience (Hountondji 1997).
- African scholars involved in African studies should have another priority, which is to develop first and foremost an Africa-based tradition of knowledge in all disciplines, a tradition where questions are initiated and research agendas set out directly or indirectly by African societies themselves (Hountondji 2009, 9).
- It demands that adequate measures be taken to facilitate a lucid, responsible appropriation by Africa of the knowledge available, and of the discussions and interrogations developed elsewhere (Hountondji 2009, 9).
- Such appropriation should go hand in hand with a critical reappropriation of Africa’s own endogenous knowledges and beyond, a critical appropriation of the very process of knowledge production and capitalisation (Hountondji 2009, 9–10).

At political level, decolonisation of the university intends to liberate and free students from the influence of neo-liberal ideology, governmentality and public policies that repress and attack individual liberty in post-apartheid South Africa.

- Scruton’s (2007) conciliatory idea of politics (the art of the possible) is likely to provide answers to the questions of political (philosophy) by emphasising the struggle against colonial neo-liberal notion of a university.

- The task of decolonising universities is in fact inseparable from political effort, namely the anti-colonial struggle in the strictest sense of the word.
- Education for decolonisation is struggled for and fought for—easily lost and won again.
- More importantly, a decolonialisation project remains a political, philosophical and collective struggle that seeks to liberate rather than domesticate those less fortunate than others.
- As democrats, we should take a leaf from protest scholars' conception of human rights to mean eternal vigilance, a perennial struggle to give actual form to the ideal, to decolonisation of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me put forward the following claim: African philosophy (of education) and decolonisation in post-apartheid South African higher education can be interpreted as developing a dialectic relationship. By this I mean a philosophical, epistemic and political analysis that began with a thesis (a colonial neo-liberal view of a university) and its antithesis (endogeneity—people's education for people's power), which together call for the third view point, namely education for decolonisation rooted in conscious social reproduction that aims to foster 'knowledge democracy' (synthesis). In a strict scientific sense of African philosophy, decoloniality is perceived as

- a science of questioning (philosophy)—an academic discipline to which African scholars devote their time and energy;
- an epistemology project—decolonisation should address problems and issues posed by professors, administrators and students in particular and the South African public in general; and
- at political level, decolonisation of the university intends to liberate and free students from the influence of neo-liberal ideology, governmentality and public policies.

Education for decolonisation that fosters 'knowledge democracy' is feasible, desirable and realistic in post-1994 South Africa universities and the world at large. For African scholars and universities in general, the major difficulty is educating for decolonisation for purposes of true democratisation of knowledge. There is a far nobler prospect of liberating our thought from the Africanists ghetto if we perceive decolonisation of universities in the active (that which we know) and not passive (that which we believe) sense.

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2

Decoloniality as a Viable Response to Educational Transformation in Africa

Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu and Yusef Waghid

Introduction

There are a myriad of challenges and obstacles towards the realisation of a just education for Africa. Resolving one obstacle for just education in Africa does not necessarily entail resolution of the problem of education justice on the continent. However, it is worth recognising that there are some barriers to just education in Africa that are more profound and wide-reaching in their influence than others so that addressing them would be a huge milestone in opening up further opportunities to achieve just education. The need for transformation of education in Africa is one

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such endeavour that would enable achievement of just education. However, at the centre of transformation of education in Africa is the need for decolonising education. Decolonisation of education is not just a matter of political ideological motivation where the curriculum is propped up to achieve some sort of balance of knowledge content. Rather than be reducible to mere representation in the curriculum of another knowledge body and pedagogical experiences, decoloniality ought to be regarded as a necessary result of educational justice that demands reimagining and reconstituting epistemological frameworks.

Given this point of departure, decolonisation of education is not a matter of achieving some ideal balance between forms of knowledge content, nor is it about emphasising whatever was marginalised previously. Decolonisation is not reducible to doing away with all aspects of the dominant position and making a reactionary ethnocentric elevation of the local situation at whatever cost. Decolonisation is not an exercise of restoring an ostensibly pristine past. Rather, decolonisation is about a democratic open-endedness to knowledge and otherness without being restricted and governed by surreptitious categorisations of what constitutes an epistemological regulative benchmark epistemology that serves as the basis for marginalising all otherness.

This chapter argues that the hegemony of Eurocentric epistemologies in African education in principle undermines the concrete being of African communities and individuals. As such achievement of transformation in African education necessarily demands decolonising African education. Decolonisation in this context means breaking the undue hegemony of Eurocentric epistemology in education. It also entails centring indigenous epistemologies to make (hybridised) African concreteness the object of academic inquiry in African education without qualification.

The Epistemic Status in Africa

By and large, the decolonisation Africa has achieved so far largely pertains to political independence only (Ramosé 2016, 548). Africa regarded attainment of political independence as the final moment of

self-reclamation; yet, it ought to have been the starting point for more meaningful self-reclamation (Mungwini 2016, 526). After independence, the most significant endeavours of “cultural, economic, and political restructuring and rethinking of the character and substance of independence” were strangely not undertaken (Mungwini 2016, 526). In education, much of what constitutes African epistemology has been unduly marginalised on the basis of mere prejudice against its credibility other than the quality and veracity of the knowledge claims (Mungwini 2017, 6).

The colonial experience was founded on “the metaphysical denial of African existence and therefore, on the myth of emptiness” (Mungwini 2017, 8). Epistemologically, Africa was regarded as empty of intellectual creativity ostensibly attributed to a lack of rationality in African world views (Mungwini 2017, 8). According to Mungwini (2017, 8), the effects of such marginalisation of African experiences are still riling Africa today such that transformation must necessarily demand an African “re-writing and re-righting” of its history.

There is a need to revisit and revise legitimate African knowledge that modernity “discarded and disparaged in the quest of building its own self-image” (Mungwini 2017, 9). The necessity of doing so becomes more forceful once we critically scrutinise the internationalist education, treaties, conventions and declarations of the modern global order that aspire to realise a borderless world of radical Eurocentric cosmopolitanism that regards subjective particularism as inherently inhibitive of cosmopolitan universalism (Zezeza 2009, 130). The formalising of the prevalent framework of human rights, for instance, privileges Eurocentric framing of human rights while leading to the discounting and subjugation of alternative human rights conceptions (Zembylas 2017, 398). The framing of human rights today is largely historically grounded in Eurocentric modernity’s liberal understanding of the human as an essentially “autonomous rational and sovereign ‘individual’” (Zembylas 2017, 398). As such, human rights education systematically de-emphasises the value of being in a community with others, who are caregivers that support and facilitate development of the self-determination capacity, in such a way that responsibility to others is conceived as obstructive and inhibitive of individual agency (Mkabela 2014, 288–289).

The epistemology underlying the law in South Africa leads to alienation of justice and contestation by the people of the conventional legal institutions, especially the constitution, which in principle have subordinated the law of the indigenous people into a Eurocentric one (Ramose 2016, 554; Thomas 2008, 53). In South Africa, the type and content of philosophy topics and what constitutes the core of problems of philosophy in university curriculums are essentially Eurocentric in nature (Ramose 2016, 554).

In African education, the systematic marginalisation of African indigenous epistemologies is almost the precondition for the hegemonic modernity that dominates education. The nature of the modern global order, according to Mungwini (2017, 9–10), is such that there are structures by which the powerful groups exclude individuals and/or groups of people from “the province of knowledge” motivated by prejudice that discredits the claims of some other knower. Denial of credibility to alternative epistemologies is not based on the veracity of the knowledge claims but rather on the basis of how the excluded are perceived by the dominant in society (Mungwini 2017, 10). For Mungwini (2017), the adverse implication is that undermining the other’s capacity as a knower in principle also fundamentally undermines such person as a human being (Mungwini 2017, 10). Disqualification of African experiences and knowledge claims from the philosophical domain were based not on the substance of the claims but rather on the identity of the indigenous and racial identity of the knowledge originators (Mungwini 2017, 12). Given the extent of internationalisation of education today, epistemic injustice is so entrenched across the world that prevailing social structures create and perpetuate the marginalisation of indigeneity and prevent it from contributing its experiences in shared meaning creation (Mungwini 2017, 10).

Due to colonisation, African sovereignty is still generally defective and weak due to the prevalence of epistemological colonisation. The global economy that is at the core of global interconnectedness is founded on the “ego-centred” rationality of the fundamentalism of the market that now shapes global and African public institutions (Ramose 2016, 548). However, there are and have been alternative modes of individual and collective being across the world and indeed in Africa.

Since colonisation, “the conceptual and epistemic terrain of Africa has been significantly reshaped” (Mungwini 2017, 12) by the conceptual categories of the dominant of the global society requiring that all knowledge be couched in the dominant frameworks, ultimately marginalising, misrepresenting and distorting the experiences of indigenous people. Global interconnectedness today necessitates cultivation of globally minded cosmopolitan citizens. Being cosmopolitan is no longer debatable nor is it a choice. However, what is problematic is the notion that cosmopolitan impartiality should necessarily strip partiality of normativity. In other words, the assumption that the universal and ostensibly higher ideals, epistemologies and skills of cosmopolitanism have a superior primary moral worth, and that localness can be dispensed with, without adverse normative consequences because localness is ostensibly secondary and morally inferior, is problematic.

Pursuit of exclusively impartial epistemologies in the name of cosmopolitanism is problematic on two grounds. Firstly, in the strictest sense, the context for knowledge construction that the knowledge embeds and presupposes is hardly impartial or neutral. There are a multiplicity of factors that contextualise and motivate the knowledge constructor, including prejudices, assumptions, cultural and gender perspectives that embed sometimes even the impartial knowledge (Code 2012, 92). Secondly, such exclusively elevated ‘impartial’ epistemologies as the epitome of knowledge are undermined by the concreteness of being for the less powerful people of the world whose way of life and languages lack global economic power as are the dominant philosophies of the developed nations.

Before independent Africa had adequately dealt with the heritage of colonialism, a new challenge in the form of globalisation emerged in the name of neo-liberalism (Canagarajah 2005, 196). For instance, as a decolonisation project, language of instruction policies in education was yet to be redesigned. So, to reconstitute the status of official language to be consistent with local concreteness by developing local languages and assigning them functional value, globalisation and neo-liberalism—which have overcome state sovereignty—are making demands that are in contrast with the decolonisation project, in principle recentring English and major foreign languages as the languages of education, science and

official communication (Canagarajah 2005, 195–196). The convenience of integrating into the global order at whatever cost has regrettably damaged endeavours of recognising and affirming the value of locality that was yet to be recognised. The imperativeness of globalising has in principle suppressed and retained the hegemony of some major languages and epistemologies across the world—and perpetuates it.

One immediate and profound expression of a lack of epistemic independence in Africa is reflected in Africa's language policies. Today, African languages are generally kept out of the education domain, entrenching the stigma brought against them by colonisation. The result is that modern-day Africans themselves find local languages to be of inferior value as far as climbing the social and global ladders is concerned (Kamwendo 2010, 279). As foreign languages assumed formal status, the indigenous ones were assigned informal if not inferior status ultimately excluding the majority of local people from actively participating in knowledge creation processes and activities (Mungwini 2017, 14).

Claiming that African education needs transformation because it is in principle colonised is not outlawing Western knowledge as being inherently dominating and incompatible with African interests. Ideal decolonisation is cognisant of the indispensable value of the inadequacy of any cultural perspective to resolve the modern challenges of the human condition single-handedly. Ideal decoloniality therefore allows for hybridity where a people respectfully and volitionally appropriate elements of other people. The absence of African languages in higher education as mediums of instruction and of conducting and disseminating research undermines the possibility of meaningful African appropriation of knowledge. Knowledge appropriation is achievable when problems, concepts and frameworks of thought are vernacularised. Vernacularisation refers to linguistic processes through which universalist claims are “contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked, posted and positioned” where concepts ultimately “never simply produce a replica of the first intended usage or its original meaning” but where the vernacularisation rather creates a “form of variation” that “transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever so subtle ways” (Benhabib 2011, 129). Mungwini (2017, 14) gives an example of missionaries who had the Bible translated into vernacular languages of indigenous peoples of Africa. The result was that the

peoples appropriated Christianity on their own terms at times, which were different from the expectations of the missionaries (Mungwini 2017, 14). Mungwini (2017, 14) therefore argues that if such interpretation were to apply in the other domains and disciplines such as science, similar knowledge appropriation would be achieved.

Understanding Decoloniality

Transformation generally is about enacting changes aimed at having representation of unduly marginalised interests and perspectives that resulted from systematic privileging of other entities such as “topics, concepts, voices, worldviews, perspectives, cultures” (Etieyibo 2016, 404). In other words, transforming the educational curriculum is about incorporating “insights, ideas, information, experiences, practices, worldviews and perspectives into programmes of studies” (Etieyibo 2016, 404). In the education and curriculum domains in Africa, transformation is about reformulating epistemic structures to rid them of the intellectual hegemony that inherently and unduly undermines indigenous epistemic paradigms and systems in academic inquiry (Etieyibo 2016, 404).

The undermining and marginalisation of indigenous epistemologies result in epistemic injustice that is rooted in prejudice against another epistemology on the basis of assumptions about the social identity of the people owning the epistemology (Anderson 2012, 165). Epistemic injustice occurs as long as the education curriculum is not meaningfully representative of the perspectives and experiences of a certain group (Etieyibo 2016, 405).

In the modern interconnected world, achievement of global and social justice is inextricably bound to achievement of cognitive justice (Zembylas 2017, 398). Meaningful education is education that is connected to the lived experiences of the learners where meaningfulness of words and knowledge is contextualised in the concreteness of the situatedness of the people (Freire 2014, 71). Much of the epistemology in African education systems today is regarded as impartial, and hence universal, ideal for the modern cosmopolitan citizen. However, the modern globalist tradition is rooted in Eurocentric scientific essentialism “which is inherently com-

parative and universalistic in its intellectual gaze and ambitions” (Zezeza 2009, 130). Since colonialism, aspects of African concreteness, as expressed through education, metaphysics and epistemology, have been marginalised as being particularistic and inhibitive of realisation of perfect impartial, objective knowledge. As Benhabib (1992, 167) observes, inasmuch as human beings share general similarities upon which the predominant traditional contractarian theories have grounded human equality and human rights, the ultimate recognition of the equal humanity in an individual does not reside only in such similarities at the exclusion of differences. Rather, individuals are recognised as equals when what constitutes their individuation has been taken into consideration as constitutive of their being human, because denying the difference and otherness that individuates a person as a peculiar person in principle denies such person being human (Benhabib 1992, 153).

An acknowledgement of the normativity of individual and collective concreteness across the world in the conceptualisations of being an individual problematises the exclusiveness and hegemony of internationalist education, international treaties, covenants and declarations that presuppose a Eurocentric essentialist conception of human nature. As Zembylas (2017, 398) holds, the prevailing conceptions of global institutions of human rights are grounded in Eurocentric conceptions of human nature that conceive an individual as a rational autonomous and sovereign being for whom the social order is relevant only with respect to strategic extrinsic value towards self-interest. One observes that such a conception of the individual excludes the role of affectivity in being human. Furthermore, this conception of the individual views being a person as only constituted in transcending the relations with others in a community. In other words, being an individual is epitomised by the ability to be detached from one’s social context that is ostensibly particularistic; hence, devoid of normativity (Mkabela 2014, 288). However, such exclusivist foundations of ostensibly universal and global knowledge fail to recognise that particularism has a central place in the constitution of being human. Such perspectives of being marginalise and undermine alternative forms of being not on the grounds of others’ normative validity, but only on the basis of their otherness.

Without necessarily being essentialist, it is worth noting that the individual-centric conception of human nature that informs modern epistemologies globally and indeed in much of the education in Africa does not adequately account for the communalistic conception of the individual that dominates much of African philosophy (Cornell and Muvangua 2012, 3). In the *ubuntu* conception of human nature, being an individual is not comprehended in detachment from others in the social order (Murithi 2007, 84). The concreteness of being human is inextricably linked with an interconnectedness with others, such that individual autonomy is as cardinal as responsibility to the well-being of other members of the human community (Radebe and Phooko 2017, 241). Self-actualisation must occur in concert with the flourishing of other human beings.

In African education, the relational rationality of *ubuntu* has been marginalised by the individual-centric one in educational epistemologies. This is despite the fact that, arguably, the concrete social arrangement, culture and languages of most African communities revolve around the communalistic conception of being a person (Cornell and Muvangua 2012, 3). As a result, the evolution of modern education—which de-emphasises collective well-being and collective virtues, and emphasises individual being—has led to education in Africa creating a chasm between the people’s communalistic concreteness on the one hand, and the exclusively individualistic demands of education on the educated person on the other. While modern education overemphasises self-development, self-actualisation and competition, education in African indigenous thought, besides these virtues, also emphasised responsibility towards community, togetherness and care for the other (Metz 2015, 1178). The Eurocentric conceptualisation of being human as being translatable into a transcendent self, which is detached from ostensibly oppressive communal obligations, informs education in Africa and almost the world over. For this conceptualisation of being human, communal obligations are at best discretionary to the free individual and antithetical to individual freedom at worst. There is therefore an ostensibly inherent incompatibility and exclusivity between individual freedom and responsibility to those others with whom one is in community, except when it is of strategic value to self-interest.

The ostensibly impartial education of the modern global world must be reconsidered because it embeds epistemic particularism, which is advanced as universal and non-particularistic knowledge. It is worth noting that in human beings, cognitive bias is deeply rooted in the minds of people and tends to operate more automatically and more consciously than conscious thought (Anderson 2012, 167). As such, cognitive bias is quite difficult to “control even by the most conscientious and well-intentioned agents” (Anderson 2012, 167). Epistemic or cognitive bias is not always just based on active prejudices against the other. Rather, with passage of time and transmission of knowledge from a generation to another, even those who have consciously taken active positions against exclusion and marginalisation of the other still inherit the epistemic structures and substance that are inherited by prejudice against alternative epistemology. Alternatively, the ‘default’ foundationalism of an epistemology that has for long been hegemonic is ultimately not sanitised and de-problematised owing to entrenched-ness of the foundationalism. In other words, one can hold that epistemic or cognitive marginalisation may not be internal to the moral agent but rather that it is strongly internal to the ‘impartial’ knowledge one receives as exclusively impartial and representative of all humanity across the world.

The idea of ‘impartial’ objective knowledge in education prevalent in Africa, which necessarily excludes particularity, ignores the reality of knowledge construction processes. Knowledge constructors are explicitly or implicitly motivated by particular gender, historical, social and cultural perspectives in their endeavours (Code 2012, 92). The knowledge embeds within it such concrete aspects of being human (Code 2012, 92). Legitimation of which knowledge passes for academic inquiry is informed, among others, by a particular social vision because the curriculum and pedagogy are grounded in dreams of a people that are characterised by culture politics (Giroux 2004, 33). With respect to the exclusively Eurocentric globalist curriculum, such knowledge imposes on learners not only acquisition of the dominant epistemologies and their accompanying cultures, but it also ultimately translates into othering and de-emphasis of locality. For example, to excel in the school in much of Africa, owing to their monolingual curriculums, teachers have to actively

discourage the use of vernacular languages in the school domain, at times with punitive sanctions, to foster acquisition of English (Bunyi 2005, 133).

It should be emphasised that demanding decoloniality as an attempt at transformation of education in Africa does not necessarily entail an essentialist return to a pristine African past and marginalising everything 'non-African'. Decoloniality also need not be conceived as centring on education whatever is called 'African epistemology' insulating it from critical examination. Rather, given the subtlety of cognitive bias, it is imperative that overcoming epistemic coloniality should be about making even and accessible the academic spaces by ridding them of inherent repulsion of any other epistemology that does not conform to Eurocentrism. Decoloniality will break the undue privilege and embedded marginalisation of Eurocentric epistemology in African education. Decoloniality would lead to transformation not only because it would allow the inclusion of African epistemologies into academic spaces. Much more, transformation will be guaranteed because, by breaking the hegemonic hold of Eurocentrism, education will be open-ended, giving room for other valid African and non-African epistemologies as well as Eurocentric ones. This will open possibilities for a more meaningful globality devoid of epistemic hegemony that is rooted in prejudice.

Decoloniality is about recognising that there is epistemic hegemony when some forms of knowledge have been unduly advanced as the exclusive universal standard of knowledge; yet, they are in significant measures particularistic and in principle only one of many other valid alternatives of realising universality. Decoloniality is about acknowledging that some hegemonic epistemologies at best marginalise and at worst deny the legitimacy of some other epistemologies of other peoples of the world. The implication therefore is that in the diverse yet immensely interconnected global world today, achieving epistemic justice is not only an inward-looking endeavour only but also one that is outward-looking (Papastephanou 2013, 170).

Decolonising education in Africa is a normative matter other than one of political ideology. It is imperative for African agency to assert itself in reclaiming and repositioning its epistemology and knowledge. Given the entrenched-ness, domination and embedded nature of cognitive bias, there is often the temptation to rationalise the prevailing cognitive bias as

being hard to overcome, as being past the time and that instead, it is Africa that must adapt and conform to the 'new world order' (Eze 2014, 238; Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, 202). The rationale for such positions is ultimately reducible to the financial cost of developing and implementing epistemologies grounded in African experiences. Confronted with the (false) dilemma of choosing either a normative obligation that is presented as secondary in value or merely choosing to integrate into the mainstream due to the financial cost of transformation, Africa needs to manage this choice of ostensible contraries as the false dilemma that it is. Each of the two has distinct incomparable worth, and complements the other in such a way that having one without the other undermines being human.

Here it is also worth commenting briefly on the reluctance to embark on transformation on the ostensible basis of a lack of consensus among Africans over what constitutes Africanness. Two brief responses. Firstly, not everything about what constitutes African and that ought to be included in African education today is contentious. Take the instance of language. While conceding that African communities are multi-linguistic, there are however shared dominant languages in and across nations that could effectively be employed and developed as languages of research and instruction in education. This however does not deny the existence of local debates about which language over competing others should be employed. However, such questions pertain to political policymaking and not to an inherent lack of capacity of an African language to serve effectively as a language of education. Secondly, even where there are contentions about what is African, the curriculum could accommodate the key contested positions polarised, as they may be, as competing theories about what is African. In any case, whatever each side would claim is African, would reasonably be expected to be part of the concrete experiences of African life. The question of whether one agrees with it or not would be secondary, as long as it would be an experience prevalent in Africa. In short, asserting Africanness together with its loaded contestations is paramount and indispensable in achieving transformation.

Potential adherents of the prevalent 'impartial' education would hold that emphasising particularism in the curriculum is counterproductive given how plural and diverse the modern world is. Rather, the critic

would further argue that the modern learner must be equipped only with knowledge and skills that transcend locality to manage global diversity effectively. Such positions, while conceding the existence and worth of diversity elsewhere, ironically deny the same to Africa. One cannot embrace global diversity, which is a recognition of the articulation of the concreteness of other peoples, while restraining oneself from recognising one's own concreteness. Such a position also presupposes that globality is culturally neutral. However, globality is inherited and governed by Eurocentric values and ideologies (Zezeza 2009, 130).

By holding that transformation must necessarily involve emphasising Africa at least initially, we need not conflate decolonisation with substitution of everything non-local with the local. Ideal transformation and decoloniality would necessarily have to consider the other non-local as part of the elements of the meaning-making endeavour for individuals as well as for collectives. This entails that other epistemic paradigms are not antagonistic with being assertive about one's inclusive concreteness. Rather, decoloniality demands that such other epistemic paradigms be recognised as the equal and mutual collaborators in understanding the world and devising modes of improving the human condition that they are. In other words, decoloniality is against the undue inherent exclusivity and ostensible absoluteness of one epistemic paradigm over any valid other, ultimately undermining the human dignity of the people under that paradigm. Decoloniality should not be conflated with an unconditional embracing of any other 'particularities' of human communities as constitutive of respecting concrete being, neither does it entail insulation of concreteness of otherness from external assessment.

Decoloniality should not be understood as a one-time event. Rather, it is an incessant regulative process that constantly guards against any undue dominance of one epistemic tradition over another. Understood this way, decoloniality is expected to be the act of ensuring openness of spaces of academic inquiry to include as diverse objects of inquiry as there can be. The other perspectives, world views and objects of inquiry must be understood on their own terms and not be forced to fit into the 'intelligible' Eurocentric frameworks of thought. Seen this way, it is the academy (not the other) that must first adjust by not predetermining what kind of knowledge is accorded legitimacy for academic inquiry.

Colonialism across the globe by few dominant nations paraded particularistic epistemologies that still dominate today as the impartial perfect universal epistemologies for a global world (Canagarajah 2005, 196; Masemula 2015, 176). However, as has been shown in this section, such ostensibly impartial epistemologies are inherited by particularism. Ultimately, one would reasonably contend that promotion of such epistemologies in their current form and contexts encourages the marginalisation of indigenous epistemologies, ultimately encouraging assimilation into the dominant mainstream. Put differently, the universal or impartial epistemologies that are ostensible pillars for building an equitable global human community, in principle, inherently counteract the existence and development of indigenous epistemologies. Ultimately, the ostensibly impartial epistemologies undermine the expectation of the diverse peoples of the world to have their concreteness recognised, which is an articulation of their being human (societies) in this world.

The hegemonic prevalence of modern impartial education exists in the context of global inequalities. Much of Africa is largely on the passive receiving end of modern education. Few developed nations orchestrate the constitution of education globally. The emergence of neo-liberalism exacerbates the situation in that it leaves very little room for developing nations to invest in that which makes them concrete societies. Usually, this is because what is epistemically concrete about them is found to be of no relevant value according to the market benchmarks of value of the neo-liberal order. Indigenous knowledge and skills are in other words deemed irrelevant and incompatible with the dominant global impartial epistemologies. This implies that going by the modern neo-liberal global order economically, less powerful nations can scarcely have their epistemologies become a meaningful part of the education process because the epistemologies will apparently devalue their learners rendering them non-competitive in the global arena. It is therefore evident that decolonising the global order would realise democratic transformation that yields global equity.

It is tempting to regard demands of asserting indigenous epistemologies as tantamount to being reactionary and resistant to global oneness. However, it is worth bearing in mind that impartialist epistemology positions ignore that boundaries of epistemic marginalisation coincide with

those of global inequalities such that an exclusive commitment to the Eurocentric impartial positivistic epistemologies undermines the indigenous philosophies of those disempowered by the inequalities of the global order (Anderson 2012, 170). This is because the concrete indigenous experiences of the globally disadvantaged of Africa may scarcely be intelligible to the perspectives of the advantaged because the available interpretive tools of the dominant epistemologies lack the capacity to comprehend experiences different from those of the advantaged (Anderson 2012, 170). Marginalisation of the reality conceptualisation of the globally disadvantaged is therefore regarded as trivial, not out of conscious prejudice, but out of sheer incomprehension of the meaningfulness of one epistemology to another (Anderson 2012, 170).

On Reconceptualising Global Universalism

It is arguably apparent that the challenge of transforming and decolonising education in Africa is grounded in the challenges generated by globalisation. As such, achieving decolonisation must necessarily challenge the hegemony that also involves globalisation and neo-liberalism, which in principle are mutations of the epistemic domination of colonialism. The endeavour of Africanising the educational curriculum in Africa is in principle engagement in an ethical revolution that pursues achievement of social and global justice (Ramosé 2016, 554).

Ideally, education ought to be about desiring the good for every individual or people without initially expecting this desire to further the achievement of some ostensibly grand purpose (Ramosé 2016, 552). Since decolonising the curriculum is a matter of (social and global) justice, the process therefore ultimately raises the question of what does or should constitute educational justice in Africa. An answer to this question cannot be given in abstract terms only. The answer ought to pertain particularly to the concreteness of the people. It is what happens or does not happen to the situatedness of a people that determines justice. Being a virtue of institutions (Rawls 1999, 6), justice cannot be detached from the people's lived experiences. Inasmuch as there are universal abstract principles of justice, how such principles get concretised greatly varies

and sometimes even contrasts across human societies without necessarily undermining consistency with the abstract ideal equality. For instance, in the curriculum, positions regarding questions of what should be the aim of education with respect to the individual versus the community may not be uniform. Different concrete societies will vary and even contrast in their (de-)emphasis of communal interests in education while not necessarily undermining individual autonomy (Mkabela 2014, 288–289). Indeed for some communities, individual autonomy is as cardinal as communal responsibility and the two cannot be decoupled without losing both (Cornell and Muvangua 2012, 3; Metz 2007, 335).

Implications of Decoloniality

Achieving decoloniality in education in Africa is not about substitution of the non-indigenous by the indigenous. On the contrary, among others, ideal decolonised education must be holistic and counter-dogmatic, and the ends of the education must be a means towards a concrete achievement of social justice (Ramosé 2016, 553). Holding that education must be connected with a people's lived experiences is conceding that education today must necessarily have universal and particular epistemic dimensions. This is because human existence today cannot be absolutely reduced to either local or trans-local. The human being today is at the same time local and global (Alexander 2016, 173). Decoloniality is essentially an aspiration to correct enduring reproduction of historical epistemic marginalisation of indigeneity. In other words, in the absence of a history and prevalence of marginalisation, the concept of decoloniality becomes logically and normatively empty. This means that decoloniality is not synonymous with an unconditional elevation of whatever form of indigeneity to achieve the same level of dominance as Eurocentrism currently does.

Decoloniality is an ideal that is rooted in human equality and dignity as it is against undue privileging and prejudiced undermining of one philosophical perspective in preference of another. Being human partly includes having capacity for agency, while respecting human dignity

entails respecting the free will of an individual in making choices. Respecting human dignity and equality therefore conversely demands that decoloniality ought to be against promotion of dogmatic knowledge that is immune against criticality. It is easy for decoloniality to slip easily into indoctrination or essentialism. Therefore, decolonisation must necessarily demand centrality of openness and criticality in the enactment of decoloniality to avoid replacing an Eurocentric cognitive bias with an ethnocentric one.

There is little presence and development of African philosophy in African universities (Zezeza 2009, 131). Decoloniality in Africa is about restoring and emphasising African existence making the African experience the springboard for understanding and interpreting African politics, history, education and philosophy (Mungwini 2017, 7). Decoloniality calls for an inclusion of a critical study of local perspectives that have long been marginalised. Cultural situatedness gives the individual a context for expression or a range of concrete options by and through which the individual realises his or her autonomy (Etieyibo 2016, 411). The capacity for self-expression is undermined when among others there is sustenance of a context that explicitly or implicitly assigns an inferior estimation of another culture (Etieyibo 2016, 411).

Decoloniality highlights and emphasises the responsibility for Africa to recognise the limitedness and concreteness-undermining nature of the prevalent ostensibly impartial education. Decoloniality also emphasises the need for Africa to make efforts out of normative necessity to assert and develop its epistemologies and concreteness.

Enacting Decoloniality

Since “education is for, by and through human beings”, education is in principle an ethical enterprise (Ramosé 2016, 552). Therefore, recentring African indigeneity is not tantamount to rejecting Western epistemology. Rather it is an endeavour to challenge the enduring subordination of indigenous knowledge by dominant knowledge paradigms, with the ultimate aim of promoting dialogue and mutual collaboration between ostensibly non-coexistent traditions of knowledge (Mungwini 2016, 529).

Among others, Africa needs to develop its conceptual resources, such as a local language through which to establish more immediately accessible and meaningful procedures and standards to comprehend and articulate situated experiences (Mungwini 2017, 13) as concrete beings. Language is therefore among the central pillars for achieving epistemic liberation and justice (Moyo 2003, 129; Mungwini 2017, 13; Nkuna 2013, 71). It is incumbent upon Africa to develop the capacity for its local languages to have functional roles in research and pedagogy. This is an African enterprise that requires African initiative and support. Africa must avoid the easy way of blaming outside forces for its lack of attaining epistemic liberation (Mungwini 2016, 526; Probyn 2005, 165).

It is also imperative that research in African higher education must centre on concrete African challenges and experiences. Inclusion of Africanness in the curriculum should not be merely tokenistic. Rather, there should be both intellectual and financial investment in making attempts to comprehend African indigeneity in whatever contested and hybridised forms. Achieving this, in part, demands confronting and challenging the education marketisation ideology of neo-liberalism. It is apparent that research in African universities is motivated by global interests that are essentially market-oriented and at the expense of under-researched local indigeneity owing to African indigeneity's lack of financial returns in the global arena (Divala 2016). Achieving the normative goal of decoloniality is therefore neither easy nor financially costless. Its normative cost however far outweighs its financial cost.

Conclusion

African education is an indispensable tool for the realisation of a developed Africa with equitable opportunities for a fulfilling and dignified life for its people. However, the nature of the prevailing education in Africa is in need of transformation. African education is structured in such a way that it involves, reproduces and sustains social equality.

One of the distinctive features of African education is its decentring and pushing to the relevant peripherals of African epistemologies and indigeneity. African education has in principle embraced Eurocentrism as

the default standard frame of thought. Such an education lacks dissonance with concrete African experiences and challenges to transform society.

It is worth emphasising that decoloniality is not necessarily making educational curriculums ethnocentric to get rid of Eurocentrism. At the same time, it is apparent that African indigeneity has been systematically and particularly marginalised by both the colonial experience as well as independent African education that is neo-colonial in character. Ultimately, part of meaningful decolonisation must result in the centring of African indigenous epistemologies, not as the end of decoloniality, but as part of the process of decoloniality.

Demanding decolonisation as transformation is not about dogmatic inclusion of whatever is deemed African. Rather, decolonisation is about connecting the experiences and challenges of society. It is about the university reflecting on the philosophical paradigms of society and recommending restructuring and reconstitution that will make such paradigms more responsive to equity and global justice.

Decolonisation is also about ensuring social transformation through a hybridity of cultural and intellectual perspectives that are grounded in mutual respect. The current structure of global interaction is skewed in terms of an equitable exchange of ideas across cultures. The dominance of the neo-liberal conception of personhood and the dominance of Eurocentric positivistic outlooks of reality characteristically trivialise alternative perspectives of reality. Decolonisation of education is the major indispensable step towards achieving social transformation in Africa and globally.

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3

Decoloniality as Democratic Change Within Higher Education

Yusef Waghid and Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu

Introduction

The hegemony of Eurocentrism in globality—especially in education—has resulted in demands for decolonisation of conceptualisation, practice and institutions of education across the world. African higher education is strategically potent to overcome the diverse forms of neo-colonialism that constitutes most African public institutions. Ironically African higher education itself is characteristically both Eurocentric and intolerant of indigeneity. This chapter argues that democratising higher education in Africa is a guaranteed way of achieving meaningful and sustainable

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decolonisation of education in Africa. This position is grounded on the premise that ideal decolonisation is not merely substitution of a Eurocentric epistemology with an Afrocentric one or merely ensuring balanced statistical representation of each world view in education. Rather, democratisation entails that the civic role of higher education necessarily demands that the university be incessantly connected in a non-paternalistic manner with society, centring the concrete enablers and disablers of collective democratic life as a major preoccupation of higher education. Without necessarily prescribing what constitutes locality and indigeneity—owing to the contestations that arise in such discourses—decolonisation as democratisation of higher education will escape the traps of ethnocentric essentialism and rigidity towards meaningful hybridity that is cardinal for the modern cosmopolitan world.

Democracy: The Goal of Higher Education

Among the core aims of education is its embedded commitment to democratisation and social justice. The university, through its academics and graduates, has a profound civic role aimed at achieving criticality and social justice (Waghid 2008, 20). Among its major mandates, higher education must endeavour to commit itself to “finding and dismantling social structures that sustain oppression” (Waghid 2008, 21). The university must not only give new knowledge and skills to the graduates, but most importantly, it must awaken in the graduates an alertness and responsiveness to the condition of the many in the wider community who are in dire suffering and deprivation (Waghid 2008, 21). Ideal education must therefore sustain and develop democracy.

Besides being committed to ensuring conditions for the attainment of individual freedom, democracy is also a social ideal in that it presupposes and aspires for a community of free individuals who are “bound together by shared experience and a commitment to the common good” (Schoeman 2010, 137). Higher education can perform its civic role towards the social order meaningfully by being connected and responsive to the challenges of society only when higher education itself is democratised in its

motivations, focus, structure and operations. Higher education that is detached from its social situatedness will glaringly fail to make a contribution towards social transformation. Democratic change within the university is therefore a prerequisite for achieving education that confronts structures of oppression and injustice in society meaningfully. The implication is that higher education should actively centre both individual and concrete collective interests if it is to fulfil its democratic obligation. Ultimately, one can hold that the commitments of education towards democracy and social justice are the flipside of meaningful interconnectedness between the domain of the university and the society for whom the university exists. Evidently, education and democracy have a normatively binding “collectively motivated goal” that is neither at odds with nor can be dispensed by extremist pursuits of individual liberty (Pais and Costa 2017, 8) as though the two ideals are mutually exclusive.

Education develops and sustains democracy and democratisation. Higher education can develop democratisation of society meaningfully only if it is itself functionally democratic. Making higher education liberating entails that the university should not impose its preferred metaphysical outlooks on the community, but through mutual engagement and deliberation co-construct knowledge (Waghid 2008, 20). This presupposes that the university should engage the perspectives of the community intrinsically as it is not in its interest of conforming communities into some ‘standard’ paradigm. Higher education cannot be indifferent to and alienated from the context and concreteness of the social situatedness of the students because injustice and inequality are comprehensible in the context of social situatedness. Social inequalities are mostly intelligible with reference to the historical, cultural, political and economic concreteness of a community. Among others, the oppression and injustice the university is committed to resolve reside in the marginalisation of local epistemologies and languages, and ultimately manifest in a lack of committed research into indigenous culture, art, literature and architecture on the part of the university. Therefore, the social order must incessantly be the subject of democratisation and therefore centred in higher education because the university is an institution that may embody concrete relations of power of a society. Across societies, power operates

through diverse ideological conceptualisations of values and viewpoints regarding the way people relate with each other and the way social goods, such as “education, employment property and equal opportunity”, are distributed among them (Blunt 2005, 1369). Higher education may either perpetuate or confront such power imbalances but cannot be neutral about them.

The necessity for the university firstly to democratise before it attempts to confront the injustices of society is based on the grounds that, despite the university being a potent agent for democratisation, it is more often itself susceptible through its operation and structures to reproduce society alongside the inequalities and injustices that characterise society, which the university ought to resolve. One of the challenges of most African societies today is that education and research in African institutions are not addressing the particularistic core challenges of the human condition in Africa largely because African higher education employs Eurocentric world views so that the people can hardly relate to African higher education.

The African university has hitherto played a passive role insofar as ensuring educational justice for its people—particularly with reference to epistemic justice—is concerned because the university itself is in need of democratisation. Mostly, the African university has failed to centre the modes of being human and the African condition meaningfully. As Zeleza (2009, 131) holds, the African academy has always been measuring African phenomena (humanity, history, civilisation, culture, ethics, economics technology and sociality) in European master frameworks by drawing from the Eurocentric prototype and systematically deeming African phenomena as deficient and imperfect versions of the European person (Zeleza 2009, 131). However, democratisation within higher education necessarily demands the African university to be grounded in and connected with the community without necessarily being restricted and controlled by it. This entails centring the interests, concerns, aspirations and needs of the community in academic inquiry in higher education. Centring the local in higher education is crucial for democracy because meaningful democracy needs to be incessantly “re-thought and reformulated” because democracy is “never finished and must be viewed primarily as a process of democratization” (Giroux 2004, 33).

In both principle and practice, education in African higher education is associated with and informed by a mainstream culture through the “norms of behaviour and communication that are expected in schools ... and these ways of being typically exclude racial and linguistic minorities” in the schools (Rodríguez 2009, 27). In modern higher education, globalisation of education has largely commodified higher education (Biesta 2007, 468; Waghid 2008, 19). The neo-liberal global order by large pursues and realises development at the expense of equity (Blunt 2005, 1371). Ultimately, the modern university has succumbed to economic pressure that has altered its prime function into the “training of a high-skilled workforce and the production of high-quality scientific knowledge” (Biesta 2007, 467). As a result, the arguably default mandate of modern university education is that it is expected as its primary goal to train a specially high-skilled workforce and also produce high-quality scientific knowledge that is to be consumed by the industrial market (Waghid 2008, 19). The dominance of economic interests in the academy is at the cost of other social interests that are more foundational to democracy.

The domination of neo-liberalism and corporate culture in both civil society and education “subordinates the needs of society to the market” (Waghid 2008, 23). The implication is that economically unattractive yet culturally and normatively pertinent interests of the society are discarded and spurned. In a sense, the advancement of economisation of society and education is arguably proportional to the trumping down of other situated cultural and localised interests. Such interests have normative value warranting preservation and promotion; yet, they are forced to succumb to the force of economisation.

Higher Education and Decolonisation

Under the prevailing neo-liberal hegemony, a person is to a degree dehumanised as the market principle of neo-liberalism mainly regards the human being as a resource only (Blunt 2005, 1369) ultimately extinguishing and devaluing the concreteness of being human in situated social contexts. Market-oriented higher education largely concentrates

on equipping students with specialised job-related skills, ultimately diluting or even slighting education for democratic citizenship that does not necessarily have such market skills at the centre (Waghid 2001, 460). Consequently, the implication is that knowledge has been reduced to an informational commodity whose value is restricted to production and global competition for influence (Blunt 2005, 1369). Ultimately, the mandate of higher education inherently marginalises centring of social justice.

Such embedded systematic marginalisation of collective values and interests in higher education is the reason for the emergence of calls for decolonisation of higher education. In this context, decolonisation of the university entails breaking the current default norm of turning students into “customers and consumers” (Mbembe 2016, 31) where students no longer value the social transformation role of knowledge but conceive of it only in self-aggrandisement terms. Decoloniality demands that higher education institutions exist and operate under the principle and context that “the creation of communities in which life as opposed to economic profit prevails” (Desai and Sanya 2016, 714).

African education systems and institutions are under neo-liberal pressure to “become part of a global ‘knowledge society’” (Blunt 2005, 1370). One of the characteristics of such universalising knowledge is its propensity to “tyrannically suppress difference” (Blunt 2005, 1369) by prioritising the positivist world views that embed exclusivity of otherness as being the benchmark for understanding reality. Modern life, which is influenced by positivist scientific world views, disintegrates the situatedness of everyday life (Biesta 2007, 473).

According to Zeleza (2009), besides neo-liberalism, the prevalent globality is also grounded in Eurocentrism whose inherent intellectual orientation is comparative and universalistic. Twentieth-century education has suffered from a particularistic conception of being that is advanced as essentialist and universal where to be human one has to meet a certain universal or essentialist norm, and education ought to ‘cultivate’ a particularistic conception of being human that is based on these standards (Biesta 2014, 18). The African university is organised in a manner that values and competes for status and prestige conceptualised in Euro-American terms (Morreira 2017, 287). The research output, the quality

of university research and the financial returns generated by universities are among the determinants of the competitiveness of a university today. However as Mbembe (2016, 39) observes, assuming the competition is necessary, after all, even “the terms of the competition are defined by the West”. Zeleza (2009) holds that even militant Afrocentrism, other than dismantling the hegemony of the Eurocentric epistemological order in the African university, has generally been about “investing Africa with the imagined positive attributes of Europe” ultimately failing to transcend “the seductions and sanctions of writing Africa by analogy” (Zeleza 2009, 131).

The scientific world view of Eurocentrism is not the only perspective for understanding reality, but it is a particular world view that is fit for scientific phenomena however clearly not always fit for all purposes, such as normative judgments (Biesta 2007, 476). This is mainly because “the expertise of science is limited and situated” (Biesta 2007, 475). Techno-scientists are able to create facts and machines that endure outside the laboratory simply because the laboratory itself is a recreation of the real world (Biesta 2007, 476). However, the real world scientific positivism attempts to replicate is characteristically complex, diverse and shaped by particular shared values among different human societies across the world and cannot be fully accounted for by positivist paradigms alone.

The African university is in principle Eurocentric in most respects. The neo-liberal pressure to globalise has escalated the alienation of the university from its locality. In the quest for being globally relevant and competitive, the African university has defaulted on its civic role. Not only has it failed to help build a democratic Africa in a meaningful way, but it is rather also itself in dire need of democratisation. Democratising the university partly entails making the African university responsive to local situatedness. There is a glaring absence of Africa as the object of academic inquiry in most African universities. African philosophy, literature, music, art and education hardly form the object of inquiry in academic institutions of Africa (Ramose 2005, 1187). More pronounced and with profound implications is the marginalisation of African languages from the academy. While it is imperative for African higher education to pursue globality, this must not be pursued in terms

of marginalisation of indigeneity that is embedded in Eurocentric globality (Kolawole 2005a, 1196).

Decoloniality as Democratising Higher Education in Africa

Coloniality is “the hierarchizing logic that places peoples knowledge into a classificatory framework” that valorises Eurocentrism (Morreira 2017, 292). While the African university has been investing in making itself globally competitive, it has, on the other hand, increasingly alienated itself from the concrete challenges facing Africa. The prevalent Eurocentric mode of the African university is inherently against indigeneity and exclusive of alternative epistemological frameworks, except for scientific ones. To decolonise meaningfully, African higher education must democratised itself first. Decoloniality is necessitated by the grounding of modernity in coloniality ideology because modernity creates and maintains a particularistic kind of epistemology as the exclusively legitimate and ultimate standard (Morreira 2017, 292).

The project of decolonisation is ultimately a call for democratisation of the African university. ‘Decoloniality’ or ‘Africanisation’ is not in this sense essentialist terms that call for a mere dominance of Afrocentric cultural referents in university. Rather, decoloniality is grounded on the premise that the prevalent systematic dissonance between higher education in Africa and local and indigenous concreteness is against respect for human dignity and equality. This is because respecting a people’s equality entails recognising what individuates or situates a people as being constitutive of their being human (Benhabib 1992, 161). What is celebrated as impartial and universal Eurocentric education across much of Africa is in the strictest sense particularistic, and its flourishing subtly and necessarily marginalises other epistemologies, ultimately rendering it both exclusivist and assimilationist. The African university in the post-colonial era must guard against a premature celebration of superficial global hybridity, which essentially sanitises neo-colonial hegemony as a ‘shared’ global culture (Zezeza 2009, 130). Most universities in Africa, lack autonomy

and, owing to the entrenchment of Eurocentric hegemony, “resist the moral and political imperative to become African universities. A university in Africa is not by necessity an African university” (Ramosé 2005, 1187).

The African university must be a “concrete reality that speaks to the African experience and charts implementable courses of action to solve Africa’s problems” (Ramosé 2005, 1188). To achieve this, the university must meaningfully and not tokenistically open to indigenous epistemologies and pedagogies without firstly transforming such epistemologies and pedagogies and benchmarking them with ‘intelligible’ Eurocentric paradigms. The normativity of the inclusion of indigenous knowledge is rooted in the reality that the knowledge is all-encompassing as it underlies the social structures, values, interaction, cooperation and even individual and collective decision-making, ultimately informing the education, law and resource management and distribution of the community (Kolawole 2005b, 1451).

The question, firstly, of African higher education necessarily presupposes African-ness or African identity (Le Grange 2005, 1209). African-ness is not necessarily an idea about finality but rather one about becoming, about coming into existence (Le Grange 2005, 1209). Understanding some knowledge as African is not necessarily making an ethnocentric claim, contrasting it in binary terms with Eurocentric knowledge. Rather, the idea of African knowledge is cognisant of the multiplicity of forms and sources of knowledge in post-colonial Africa (Morreira 2017, 288). More importantly, it is cognisant that motivations, attitudes and processes of knowledge construction are not disinterested endeavours. They are inevitably and necessarily steeped in the concrete situatedness of the community. In higher education, it is therefore worth acknowledging that there are certain fundamental elements of the knowledge production process that are pertinent and generally representative of African experiences. Among such elements is the employment of African languages in academic spaces. Secondly, there is also a need to bring those contested indigenous world views and epistemologies into academic spaces from where they have been systematically marginalised.

The project of democratising the African university depends, firstly, on reclamation of indigenous knowledge denigrated by colonialism and, secondly, on reimagining the substance and form of African knowledge (Le Grange 2005, 1209). Some colonial traits that are still inherent in education in Africa today are:

- limited access to higher education due to associating education with sustaining elitism;
- employment of a foreign language of instruction and research; and
- a limited curriculum that systematically de-emphasises local knowledge (Le Grange 2005, 1209).

A pristine Africa to which the African university must return does not exist. Therefore, the existential condition today is no longer a choice of either the Eurocentric global or the African local. What constitutes Africa and African-ness is loaded, complex and largely as contentious as it is diverse. Therefore, “the African University in the 21st century cannot (re)define itself outside of the challenges presented it by contemporary change forces of both a global and local nature” (Le Grange 2005, 1211). However, as a starting point of the democratisation endeavours, African education must of necessity challenge and overcome the immense influence of modern marketisation of education and knowledge that in principle serves and reproduces social and global inequalities where power is concentrated only in elites and mega-corporations who ultimately fund and determine the shape of higher education as the arguably sole consumer of higher education outputs (Waghid 2001, 460).

Decolonising higher education in Africa is dependent on achieving democratisation of the construction and legitimisation of knowledge in African universities. Decoloniality is not an ethnocentric exclusive displacement of Eurocentrism with Afrocentrism. The inherent unacceptability of Eurocentric exclusivity cannot be corrected by another ethnocentric exclusivity regardless of such exclusivity being African. However, given the sustained systematic marginalisation African indigeneity and epistemology have suffered from Eurocentric higher education, merely opening up academic spaces to be inclusive of objects of inquiry

may not by itself ensure representation or recentring of the other. There must be deliberately initiated interest or inclusion of hitherto marginalised indigeneity.

Culturally Relevant Pedagogy as Decoloniality and Democratisation

The civic role of the university requires of it to develop criticality in learners whose relevance is beyond examining abstract and academic texts. The ultimate criticality the university ought to promote is one that enables self-actualisation and restructuring of the social order to overcome the forms of inequality that constantly generate injustices that undermine and threaten both individual actualisation and the democratic context that secures minimal conditions for such actualisation. More importantly, criticality ought to make the student transcend an obsession with self-interest as the ultimate benchmark for education, justice and human flourishing and instead take into consideration the failure of others to flourish equally due to entrenched iniquitous nature of the social order as well as of the education systems. The university as a constituent and product of the social order may either perpetuate or overcome social injustice through its structure, operation and motivations. This is why a culturally relevant pedagogy in the African university is imperative. A culturally relevant pedagogy is concerned with “how student learning and academic achievement are contingent upon educators knowing and understanding the realities of students” (Kim and Pulido 2015, 18).

A culturally relevant pedagogy and education refer to the education and teaching that empower the intellectual, social, emotional and political being of learners by employing objects of culture to develop skills, attitudes and cultivate knowledge (Kim and Pulido 2015, 18). A meaningful culturally relevant pedagogy is dependent on academic success being hinged on developing a critical consciousness in the learners so that they effectively challenge the status quo of the prevailing social order and develop a self-determining capacity (Kim and Pulido 2015, 18). This entails that critical thinking for democracy and social justice that

education cultivates in learners is contextualised development of cultural competence as it empowers the self-identity of the learner (Kim and Pulido 2015, 18). In other words, the process of being educated should not be about tacitly coercing the student to unduly shed off his or her cultural situatedness in order to assume the dominant ostensibly impersonal one that is merely associated with the hegemonic culture of education.

In the context of globality and internationalisation, democratic education is about education addressing the injustices, imbalances, prejudices and endemic systematic marginalisation of the other in the global society to enable flourishing and actualisation of all human potential. Education cannot be reduced to a false choice between economics and impartial knowledge on the one hand and local cultural situatedness on the other, as though having both choices is unattainable (Giroux 2004, 32). It is important to scrutinise cultural politics within higher education because it is through culture that “the pedagogical site on which identities are formed, subject positions are made available, social agency enacted, and cultural forms both reflect and deploy power through their modes of ownership and mode of public pedagogy” (Giroux 2004, 32). Democratisation of higher education as critical pedagogy “emphasizes critical reflexivity, bridging the gap between learning and everyday life, understanding the connection between power and knowledge, and extending democratic rights and identities by using the resources of history” (Giroux 2004, 34).

Unlike viewing teaching and learning as a technical practice aimed at processing received knowledge, critical pedagogy regards education as a mode of political intervention that aims to create alternatives that will achieve social transformation in society and in the world (Giroux 2004, 34). Critical pedagogy goes beyond having an intellectual accumulation of and familiarity with ideas of and about democracy. Rather, critical pedagogy is about developing a mode of “being-in-the-world that engages real struggles” (Glass 2000, 280). As an agent of democratisation, critical pedagogy views teaching and learning as a moral and political practice aimed at not merely processing, but more importantly transforming received knowledge “as part of a more expansive struggle for individual rights and social justice” (Giroux 2004, 34). A critical

pedagogy is mindful that knowledge, values and social visions and relations are steeped in power relations at both the social and global levels (Giroux 2004, 34).

Democratising higher education in Africa should not be conflated with a stance of anti-Western knowledge. The idea of the African university lies in not returning to the past ignoring the transformative contributions of Western knowledge and science. Rather, the future of the African university lies in regarding contemporary forces and processes of change as possible avenues for expressing and articulating African-ness and African knowledge (Le Grange 2005, 1211). The ultimate implication is that culturally relevant pedagogy should be cautious not to over-assume about the relevance of cultural identification by confining itself to cultural referents without ensuring collaboration and communication with students regarding what is meaningfully relevant to them in the context of their cultural situatedness (Kim and Pulido 2015, 30).

Critical pedagogy would make African higher education democratic, which would inevitably achieve decoloniality that is not ethnocentric. The normative basis for the enterprise of decolonising African higher education is basically founded on the premise that the typical prevalent education necessarily has exclusive and hegemonic epistemologies and not because the dominant epistemologies are Eurocentric rather than being Afrocentric. Such exclusivity marginalises, undermines and denarrativises the concrete experiences of most African societies as being normatively inconsequential and thus unfit for inclusion in academic inquiry. Denying the concreteness of being human and grounding normativity of human relationships only in similarities effectively undermines what it is to be human. This is because individuated beings who are subjects of human equality are “embodied, affective, suffering creatures [with] memory and history, [and] their ties and relations to others” (Benhabib 1992, 161) and are considered part of the phenomenal realm, which in the hegemonic epistemology is not regarded as a site for objective realities and knowledge (Benhabib 1992, 161). Such perspectives and epistemologies regard only the commonalities of being human and experiences reducible to scientific standards as objective knowledge worth academic inquiry. Defining being human as independent of all the ends the self may choose and necessarily detached from any conceptions of the

good the self may hold undermines what is to be an individuated human being (Benhabib 1992, 161). However, denying the social attributes that engender the situatedness and concreteness of human communities undermines the shared philosophical perspectives of what it means to be a concrete human being and the requisite social order that must actualise such an ideal. Such perspectives are the means through which another individual expresses his or her individuation. He or she expects not only to be tolerated but also to be respected as part of acknowledging his or her equal human worth. Meaningful education must therefore centre the concreteness of a people. In other words, centring a people's concreteness in principle renders education democratic.

It is worth emphasising that the Africanisation of higher education must be understood in the context of democratisation. This is because what is unacceptable in terms of the prevalent order of higher education in Africa is its systematic maligning and exclusion of African concreteness and indigenous epistemologies. Such malignity renders the prevalent education system undemocratic because it compromises the capacity of the academy to probe, examine and demand structural changes to the social order that shapes the opportunities of people in society. The education undermines the indigenous epistemologies and perspectives as unworthy of study by unduly privileging a particularistic epistemic tradition and parading it as the ultimate impartial and absolute epistemology. Democratisation as decoloniality is therefore imperative for endeavours of decolonisation in Africa to avoid falling into the same exclusivity traps that unduly valorise everything in African epistemological canons in an essentialist manner. Unless the decolonisation process is fully understood as a democratisation process, it is very easy for anti-Eurocentric hegemony to slide into narcissistic Afrocentrism, which is as normatively blameworthy as Eurocentric exclusiveness. Decolonisation as democratisation will leave room for the contested imaginations of being African without unduly privileging one over the other, mindful that what constitutes shared fate for societies varies across societies and is dynamic. Democratisation will also further allow for meaningful hybridity, where there is an equitable exchange of ideas and recognised influences across different global cultures and societies on a platform of mutual respect and equality.

Pertinent Democratic Ideals for African Higher Education

The project of decoloniality as democratisation understands democracy not just as a state of having certain institutions or the performance of certain procedures or routines. Rather, democracy is an incessant process of probing, examining, assessing and reconstituting social structures so that they yield just outcomes (Giroux 2004, 33).

Given the diversity of sources of being and epistemologies for modern human existence, the concept of deliberation is central to the democratisation of higher education in Africa. Deliberation is necessitated by the reality that no single epistemology exclusively accounts for the concreteness of being human and the human condition in Africa. Deliberation in this context entails the academic spaces engaging different sources of being, the indigenous and foreign epistemologies alike.

Following Benhabib's (2011, 89) idea of democratic iterations, the values informing processes of knowledge production in higher education institutions should not be alienated from the situatedness of the people who undergo education. Education should not generally be about discarding indigeneity as a precondition for acquiring transcendent universal knowledge to which the local social order must ultimately conform. It is thus imperative that knowledge production be responsive to contextuality where the local people's perspectives and epistemologies are a core preoccupation of the university. Contextualisation of knowledge production and legitimation of knowledge will require that education actively engage various concrete indigenous philosophical traditions through the centring in higher education of civil society aspirations and its mode of perceiving reality. Among its core focus, higher education in Africa must centre on indigeneity and confront the challenges, dilemmas, aspirations, prejudices, opportunities and limitations for individual and collective flourishing of the African society through responses that are grounded in the concreteness of African societies. This way knowledge and its processes of acquisition are stripped of their parochialism and Eurocentric paternalism (Benhabib 2011, 89).

Dialogue with otherness as a democratic virtue is necessary because currently, progression on the neo-liberal education ladder for both students and academicians is synonymous with detachment from the cultural realities that shape the lives of students and of their communities (Rodríguez 2009, 28). An iterative approach to education demands that higher education recentre differences that constitute metaphysical and epistemological otherness. Such an approach is cognisant of the role of concreteness in relations of human equality (Benhabib 1992, 89). The concreteness of otherness is not an obstacle but rather a guaranteed avenue for achieving human equality in that it takes into consideration what individuates being human. Besides acknowledging the centrality of rationality as a common human attribute, the concrete otherness viewpoint goes further to regard individuation as residing in the idiosyncratic “concrete history, identity and affective-emotion constitution” of every human being (Benhabib 1992, 159). This moral standpoint recognises that a complete recognition of the equality of the other as a human being resides not only in acknowledging the rational capacity for agency all human beings share, because such does not tell us anything about individuation. Instead, acknowledging the equality of the other with all humanity also resides in recognising the value of otherness to the other. This compels us to comprehend and recognise ‘the needs of the other’, his or her motivations, what she searches for, and what she desires that “through which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete individual being with specific needs, talents and capacities” (Benhabib 1992, 159). It is also worth noting that the other is not a detached transcendent being. The concreteness of otherness presupposes a social situatedness of shared (and contested) values, world views, history and languages. One therefore cannot comprehend otherness in detachment from the social situatedness.

It thus follows that, under the concrete other moral standpoint, engagement of and with differences of the other is not a means of getting to a common embrace of certain universalist perspectives and epistemologies anticipating the other to integrate voluntarily into the mainstream. Rather, difference is valued as an end in itself because it is what constitutes the being of the other. Difference is the articulation of concrete being such that knowledge production must be contextualised in such concreteness. Democratic iterations therefore require re-envisioning

indigeneity in such a way that indigeneity should no longer be conceived as “immature versions of some Western prototype” (Beck 2002, 23). Transforming higher education in Africa entails production of new knowledge and “seeing new problems and imagining new ways of approaching old problems and, deconstruction and reconstruction or constant exploration beneath surface appearances” (Waghid 2002, 459). Among others, this would entail reconnecting education with the society by, among others, having a common non-alienating language between the academy and society. This includes literally demanding the placing of a functional role on indigenous languages in the academy to ensure a meaningful connection between education and its hosting civil society. As Mbembe (2016, 36) observes, “a decolonized university in Africa should put African languages at the center of its teaching and learning project. Colonialism rhymes with monolingualism”.

Historically, marginalised people were usually “excluded from theory building” and the mainstream traditional “forms of cultural capital typically subtract the knowledge and experiences” of the marginalised minorities (Rodríguez 2009, 26). This is where the democratic value of dialogue becomes central. In practice, education must promote dialogue between different people, cultural outlooks, experiences and the expected outcomes of the education system through pedagogical experiences and curriculum content.

The demand for the African university to decolonise is therefore in principle a call for the university to democratise. Calls for decolonisation are not political ideology matters, but rather they are normative imperatives to the core. Democratisation in this context entails that the institution of learning must be connected with the concrete challenges of the community. The virtues of criticality in students are aimed not at innovative thinking that would increase the profit returns of the corporate industry, but critical thinking is and primarily ought to be aimed at improving the human condition.

Democratic or reflective openness to the new and critical loyalty to the known (Hansen 2011) requires one to open oneself to others and vice versa (Waghid 2016, 2). For a democratic or transformative encounter to be meaningfully and mutually open, it is necessary that the agents be

open to each other for there to be transformative engagement, and such openness requires one disclosing oneself to the other (Waghid 2016, 3).

Democratic iterations are not meant to manage and contain difference. Rather they are meant to understand and situate difference in the shared public spaces as a necessary requirement for social justice. To achieve meaningful and authentic democratisation of academic spaces in African higher education, it is imperative that there be “the unveiling of the strange [that] requires of humans to take risks on the basis of disclosed-ness and demystification” where there is no concealment or censorship of the self (Waghid 2016, 3). The necessity of this imperative lies in the fact that, ‘unless people open themselves up’ substantively to one another, meaningful, “inclusion might not ensue, that is, transformation might be thwarted” (Waghid 2016, 3). Disclosed-ness, in this context, implies removing all institutionalised epistemic barriers in knowledge production and legitimation opening up the academic space and removing all unduly privileged particularistic obstacles that regulate what passes for an object of academic inquiry or not, and the paradigms under which such inquiry should be conducted. In the African context, given the enduring heritage of colonialism and the hegemony of neo-liberalism, both of which undermine indigeneity, the African university must not only be open to indigenous otherness but must rather be actively inviting to all marginalised and slighted epistemologies. Democratisation therefore cannot be achieved by only opening up academic inquiry spaces to indigeneity that faces systematic and sustained marginalisation under the existing frameworks of African higher education. Disclosed-ness on its own would be incomplete to ensure democratisation of higher education. Centring in the inquiry spaces, the structurally marginalised epistemologies will occur if and when the orientation of the university is reconstituted and deliberate strides are made to bring in those excluded.

There is no way the African university can meaningfully serve its civic role of engendering democracy and social justice as long as it remains detached and alienated from its social context. As Schoeman (2010, 133) observes, the fundamental assumption of democratic life is that human beings are not predisposed to live a life of freedom and responsibility reflexively. Rather human beings have a capacity to educate themselves or

be educated for freedom and responsibility (Schoeman 2010, 133). In other words, “democracy is less the enabler of education than education is the enabler of democracy” (Schoeman 2010, 133). Yet, paradoxically, unless the university itself becomes democratic being in concert with social concreteness, it is illusory to expect higher education to perform its civic role of engendering justice and fairness in society.

Among others, democratising higher education in Africa requires rethinking and reconstituting the aims of higher education. The African university should, among others, aspire to have its learners cultivate a sense of criticality not only about academic texts and abstract theorisation, but there should also be development of a criticality that is responsive to the concrete disadvantages, economic and linguistic imbalances, unaddressed historical inequities still reproducing inequalities, and marginalisation of non-dominant epistemologies on the mere basis of their otherness. Such a criticality would question the exclusive and absolutist claims of Eurocentric epistemologies dominant in modern internationalised education. The criticality would recentre indigenous epistemologies that have been regarded provincial and lacking normative weight. In matters of bringing together education and human equality, the central question is not one of choosing either education practices and epistemologies that achieve excellence (in all its varied forms) or achieving democracy by giving presence to all marginalised experiences and epistemologies. Rather the question is about whether “the excellence we naturally wish for can be democratic, [and] whether our democracy, which is about life in common, must mean a common life of mediocrity” (Schoeman 2010, 132). Democratising education or the civic role of the university does not always entail that the university must abandon forms of academic inquiry that are not connected with the civil society interests because not all aims of education are instrumental in nature (Waghid 2008, 22). Democratisation of education in Africa is about recognising the situation of unequal power relations behind epistemological interests and paradigms within higher education. This alienating and disempowering inequality is aggravated when African higher education, dominated by exclusive Eurocentric globality, regards the prevalent situation as natural, convenient and necessarily inevitable. Rationalising the unjust status quo this way is to accept the epistemological domination out of free will

and to serve the interests of the powerful at the expense of African interests: a dominance established on consent of the dominated other than on force (Blunt 2005, 1369).

Conclusion

Insofar as transformation and decoloniality are about recentring unduly marginalised perspectives, experiences and epistemologies into academic spaces, decoloniality comprises in principle democratisation processes. Thus understood, decoloniality will not be synonymous with merely displacing Eurocentric epistemologies with any other cultural referents of indigeneity. Instead, just as the wider society is not essentially Afrocentric but a hybridity of the many, it is equally imperative that the education domain reflects and connects with this multiplicity of sources of being. Ultimately, the university should not promote either Afrocentrism or Eurocentrism, but rather that which connects with the people, thus both the indigenous and the vernacularised foreign. However, the current situation of epistemic domination is a result of a historical past that actively marginalised African indigeneity from academic spaces. Today, African indigeneity is systematically provincialised and excluded by the systematically entrenched modern global order that emphasises 'shared' commonalities only while de-emphasising differences thereby stealthily promoting Eurocentric absolutism and exclusiveness.

The African university must vernacularise its knowledge construction and legitimisation procedures and standards. This requires centring indigenous epistemologies that have for so long been systematically marginalised. The ultimate implication of such vernacularisation will be the centring of the challenges of the African civil society, and the university will help contribute solutions to such challenges in a model that is intelligible to the situated people of Africa. Dialogue characterised by disclosed-ness coupled with deliberate invitation of marginalised epistemologies into academic spaces must epitomise the democratisation. Such decoloniality in principle meets some of the core demands of democratisation.

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4

Universities as Sites for Advancing Education for Decolonisation

Mudenda Simukungwe

Introduction

The question being addressed in this chapter is “How does the National Education Policy (NEP) in Zambia enable universities to advance the production of knowledge for decolonised education?” This question is being asked because, despite the debate to decolonise education having taken a centre stage in Africa, suggesting shifts in knowledge production in universities to be relevant (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 14; Waghid 2002, 457), there seems to be a distinct silence, showing a lack of engagement of academics and intellectuals in Zambia over decolonisation of education. Scholars from West Africa, East Africa and South Africa are advancing the decolonisation of the university and knowledge, as universities in Africa are Westernised (Mbembe 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 14). The

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result is a restructuring of the social sciences and humanities in universities in Africa as they are currently steeped in Eurocentrism (Lebakeng 2018). Accordingly, universities are implementing programmes that advance education for decolonisation (Arukwe 2014), while scholars in Zambian universities seem silent despite the universities by being transnational.

The NEP is central in the discussion of decolonisation of education because it is conceived as a blueprint for the provision of education in Zambia, which addresses problems that Zambia has encountered and those she is likely to face in the future (Ministry of Education [MoE] 1996, vii). It is almost 54 years after juridical-political decolonisation, and the Zambian education system is still largely Eurocentric. The academics and intellectuals in some African countries are engaging in debates to decolonise education and mapping out strategies to dismantle the colonial shackles by decolonising education (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013), while there seems to be no literature on decolonisation of education in Zambia. The questions with which I am wrestling are:

- Why are students, academics and intellectuals silent, despite facing the same issues as others on the African continent?
- If the NEP is the blueprint that addresses challenges of the present and of the future, does it benefit academics and intellectuals to rethink the university curriculum and subsequently the school curriculum to address the current epistemic violation?

My contention is that Zambian universities should join the cause for decolonisation of education to end epistemic violence, perpetuated by Western-dominated knowledge systems in which the education system is housed.

Decolonisation

The starting point is to understand the need for decolonisation. The need to decolonise stems from the shared experiences of the dire consequences of colonialism of international indigenous peoples across the globe who

endured the oppression of colonialism (Pratt et al. 2016, 1). In the group of colonised nations, African countries experienced slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, neo-colonialism, neo-liberalism in the past, and currently, they are experiencing globalisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11). The intensity of the effects of colonialism was not uniform across the globe, as colonialism took a different toll on indigenous peoples residing on different continents. Colonialism resulted in the invasion, conquest and direct administration of the colonised peoples (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 13). Particularly in Africa, it subverted traditional structures, institutions and values, making them subservient to the economic and political needs of colonial powers, with the total price for African people being epistemicide (Lebakeng 2018, 248). Colonialism came to an end in the post-1945 period through direct withdrawal of colonial administrators while those that were reluctant to withdraw faced confrontation from the national liberation movements (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 13).

What then is decolonisation? From the discussion above, decolonisation has three dimensions: political decolonisation, economic decolonisation and epistemological decolonisation. In each of the three dimensions, the adjective determines the area of emphasis. Although decolonisation was initially used to describe the direct withdrawal of colonialism from the colonies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 13), it is generally understood as the process of undoing the colonising practices. Decolonisation is also understood as a struggle for self-determination in response to histories of colonisation, where such histories and struggles take unique shape in specific contexts across global indigenous peoples (Pratt et al. 2016, 3). As this study was situated in higher education dealing mostly with cognition, my focus is on epistemological decolonisation, to which I will only refer as “decolonisation”.

Decolonisation is understood as an ongoing process of seeing oneself clearly in relation to others with whom one shares the universe (Mbembe 2016, 34). Decolonisation enables an individual (or group) to see self clearly as though emerging out of either a state of blindness or dizziness (Mbembe 2016, 34), as one recognises the active obscuring of white identity and cultures (McLaughlin and Whatman 2011, 371). It is engaging in a perspective that the universe is shared with differentiated human

beings, rejecting the European understanding of the human as European and the colonised people as sub-human (Mamdani 2016, 70).

To decolonise, one has to realise having been dominated, captured or colonised (Khala-Phiri 2017, 88), and to struggle to confront and challenge the colonisers in a quest to be independent of them. It is consciously acknowledging the implications of being colonised especially on the view of oneself in the universe. To decolonise is to reject the assumption that the modern West is the central root of Africa's consciousness and cultural heritage, and rejecting that Africa is not merely an extension of the West (Mbembe 2016, 35). It is about self-determination and clearly engaging in new ways of thinking and being within the framework of the dominator culture (Khala-Phiri 2017, 88, 93). To decolonise is to struggle against the coloniser's continuing epistemological damage.

Decolonising Education

Decolonising education means confronting and challenging the colonising practices that have influenced education in the past, and which are still present today. Decolonising education involves identifying how colonisation has affected education, and working to unsettle colonial structures, systems and dynamics in the educational contexts (Pratt et al. 2016, 1).

What is education? According to Kelly (1999, 1), education refers to a *system* (a school system), an *institution* (a school, a university), a certain *activity* (action exercised by an adult generation on those who are not ready for social life), *content* (curriculum and syllabus) or a *product* (an educated person). Similarly, Pratt et al. (2016, 1) view education as formal, structured through Western schooling, and other forms, such as those traditionally practiced within indigenous families and communities.

Education is the means by which an individual acquires knowledge either about him- or herself and/or the world around him or her. Schooling, which is one facet of education, eclipsed education under the colonial mandates, denying indigenous communities possibilities for education as broadly understood, privileging Eurocentric knowledge

systems (Pratt et al. 2016, 9). Colonisation naturalised schooling, which over the centuries has caused extensive harm to indigenous knowledge, languages, cultures and well-being, as the colonised internalised their own oppression, precipitating diverse decolonising responses (Pratt et al. 2016, 9).

Thus, the aim of colonising schooling was to eradicate indigenous modes of education, to stop the transmission of indigenous cultures, languages and knowledge from families and communities, thereby severing subsequent generations from their homes, traditions and cultural identities (Pratt et al. 2016, 10). The successes of the aim of colonising schools are noted in the path to learning for African children and the youth. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 11) notes that alienation of an African child from his or her African context begins the very moment the child steps into the school and university door, where African children or youths begin to be taught to hate their progenitors as demons and speaking of the mother tongue as a sign of being primitive, and ultimately that all knowledge they possessed before schooling must quickly be forgotten. Schooling delinked an African child or youth from his or her community and forced a new identity on him or her. As most education systems in Africa are Westernised systems, universities have been colonial outposts, used for colonial purposes to advance Eurocentrism.

Consequently, decolonising education means addressing the colonisation of the mind, of knowledge, of language and of culture, and the effects of colonisation at both personal and collective levels (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11; Pratt et al. 2016, 9). Decolonising education is about advancing the interests of Africans having realised that Africa is saddled with some irrelevant knowledge that disempowers individuals and communities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11), as education is never neutral but serves the interests of its producers (Arukwe 2014, 185). In decolonising education, Africa has to be placed at the centre and not be seen as a satellite of other countries. Things must be seen from an African perspective (Mbembe 2016, 35). Decolonising education calls for constant reflection to avoid the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11).

In decolonising education, Mbembe (2016, 35) notes crucial points of reflection from the questionings of Kenyan author, Ngugi wa Thiong'o:

What should Africans do with the inherited colonial education system and the consciousness it necessarily inculcated in the African mind? What directions should an education system take in an Africa wishing to break with neo-colonialism? How does it want "New Africans" to view themselves and their universe, and from what base, Afrocentric or Eurocentric? Who generates knowledge and from where? What then are the materials learners should be exposed to, and in what order and perspective? Who should be interpreting that material to them, an African or non-African?

Thus, the struggle in decolonising education includes considerations about what needs to be taught, and the terms over what should be taught to the African child. Knowledge is key in the decolonisation of education because it supports the creation of consciousness towards epistemic freedom.

Dilemmas in Decolonising Education

The articulations on decolonising education lay enough ground to speculate why students, academics and intellectuals seem silent in Zambia despite facing the same concerns as others on the African continent. Broadly, I shall argue, on one hand, that epistemic violence could be the cause and on another, that coloniality is subtle, creating dilemmas in the struggle for decolonisation.

Epistemic Violence

Epistemic violence is founded in the historicity of colonialism, subjugating people in Africa and other parts of the formerly colonised world through Eurocentric knowledge systems (Heleta 2016, 7). It is probable to argue that the silence by academics, intellectuals and students on decolonising education is caused by epistemic violence, which convinces students, academics and intellectuals that they do not have anything to

offer to the modern world, and their only option is to follow the “enlightened” colonisers, learn from them and adopt their world views (Heleta 2016, 7). This entails that the Eurocentric knowledge system intimidates the students, academics and intellectuals to develop their own intellectual lives as independent individuals, and constrain intellectuals and academics that they have no intelligentsia worth presenting to the education system housed in a Eurocentric knowledge system.

The Zambian education system is based on a Eurocentric epistemic canon. A Eurocentric epistemic canon attributes truth only to the Western way of knowledge production disregarding other epistemic traditions (Mbembe 2016, 32). It subjugates local knowledge and promotes Western knowledge as universal knowledge (Heleta 2016, 4). As Eurocentrism is hegemonic, it has set up interpretive frames that make it difficult to think outside these frames, and it actively represses anything that actually is articulated, thought and envisioned from outside these frames. The call to decolonisation suggests thinking outside the Eurocentric knowledge system. As the academics and intellectuals are products of the Eurocentric knowledge system, on the one hand, it is often challenging to imagine an alternative knowledge system without there being epistemic disempowerment. On the other hand, as products of the Eurocentric knowledge system, academics and intellectuals are reluctant to repudiate the system that resulted in who they are.

The Eurocentric knowledge system has destructive effects of obliterating the capacity of students, academics and intellectuals to make systematic forays beyond the current knowledge horizons (Mbembe 2016, 30; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11). Similarly, Arukwe (2014, 189) points out that colonialism came with the conquest of the mind of most peoples of the world. It is possible to assume that some academics and intellectuals might be silent because they perceive Western knowledge systems as constituting the only basis of higher forms of thinking, making the case for decolonisation irrelevant. Decolonisation is a struggle to unmask the violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies rife in the Eurocentric model, and as defined above, decolonisation allows individuals, such as students, academics and intellectuals, to realise that the Eurocentric knowledge systems is dominative, alluding nearly always to Euro-Americans as capable of reaching universality in knowledge production, and never fully

acknowledging others as being capable of producing knowledge (Mbembe 2016, 36).

The policymakers in the MoE might have contributed to the silence in decolonising education. Lebakeng (2018, 255) notes that African leaders who are policymakers have not fully engaged with African researchers (academics and intellectuals) but overly rely on foreign expertise as policy consultants. The seeming over-reliance on foreign expertise disempowers academics and intellectuals to challenge epistemic violation housed in the education system, which internalises the elevation of the Western knowledge system above all others. Decolonising education is an intellectual struggle, which requires policymakers, students, academics and intellectuals to be grounded in the historicity of colonialism and to engage in dialogues about decolonising education.

Subtleties of Coloniality

Coloniality survived decolonisation, that is, it survived the end of direct colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11). Coloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, with race as the organising principle that hierarchises human beings (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11, 13). It is a complex web of internalised oppression created by colonisation, which survived juridical-political decolonisation. Coloniality is maintained in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self and in many other aspects of modern experience (Maldonado-Torres 2007, cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 13). Which colonial subtleties then exist in the Zambian education system?

In Zambia, English is the official language and the medium of communication across the country. After juridical-political decolonisation, it was feared by the political leaders that divisions among the indigenous peoples of Zambia might result from the adoption of an indigenous language of communication, although there was no tension among the 73 ethnic groups; hence, the English language was adopted as a social unifier

and a medium of instruction. The internalisation of English as official language and as medium of instruction meant the internalisation of oppression in the Zambian education system. As realised, the use of English has not only marginalised the Zambian languages as variants but has also elevated English as the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated (Arukwe 2014, 184) by creating an intellectual elite.

Language embodies cultural knowledge, which is integral to community identities (Pratt et al. 2016, 7). Declaring English a medium of instruction in education legalised its ontological and epistemological domination. Zambians were induced to think that the English language has a unifying function making it possible for learners to achieve cross-cultural understanding and to make connections beyond the academy, but that requires learners (or individuals) to immerse themselves in the imported language to gain understanding. Thus, the internalisation of oppression coupled with the inducement resulting from the use of the English language creates dilemmas for academics and intellectuals to join the cause for decolonising education.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 14) recognises the movement from global colonialism to global coloniality as one of the most powerful myths of the twenty-first century. It is a myth because juridical-political decolonisation did not entirely eradicate the crude European and/or Euro-American exploitation and domination, as old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-European are still in place (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 14). The Zambian education system is deeply ingrained in colonial dynamics. According to Pratt et al. (2016, 4), the extent of the subtleness of coloniality in education is deep, as colonial education can exist even when explicitly assimilative systems of formal education have been closed and condemned. Realising the depth and invisibility of coloniality in the education system is challenging for students, academics and intellectuals to engage in decolonising education.

Decolonising education is not straightforward. Globally, there are concerns that higher education is too fragmented and nationalised at a time when economic integration worldwide is a new norm (Mbembe 2016, 37). It is argued that there is a need to:

- denationalise the education space to help increase the availability of a skilled labour force;
- foster transferability and compatibility of skills across boundaries;
- allow student mobility by commodifying knowledge;
- train people who hold outward-oriented global perspectives on all kinds of issues, that is, world citizens with local roots; and
- promote research collaborations between universities and transnational corporations (Mbembe 2016, 37, 39, 40).

Amid the enticing views of denationalisation, as students, academics and intellectuals are already situated in the Eurocentric education system, efforts to decolonise education are subtly challenged, creating dilemmas on the possibility of students, academics and intellectuals in Zambia to join the struggle to decolonise education.

In summary, decolonising education is a struggle. It requires an understanding of the complexity of the nature of the colonial influence and the existing subtleties resisting decolonisation of education. In a struggle, there is discouragement. However, students, academics and intellectuals in Zambia are called to examine their own positionality of avoidance of or silence on decolonising education. While positionality on silence on the side of academics and intellectuals is personal, I ask, whether there is any willingness to decolonise their minds, as I endeavour to examine how the NEP helps them to rethink the university curriculum and consequently the school curriculum to address the current epistemic violation.

Advancing Education for Decolonisation

In advancing education for decolonisation, I focus on the NEP in Zambia, which is conceived as the blueprint for educational provision. The reason is to establish whether there are any privileges in the NEP that empower academics and intellectuals to decolonise the Zambian education system, which is housed in Eurocentrism, to allow them to join in the struggle for decolonising education.

Roles, Functions and Responsibilities of Universities

The MoE (1996, 91–92) highlights important aspects regarding higher education of which universities are part, which I will outline in advancing education for decolonisation. The focus is on the roles, responsibilities and functions of higher education and how these subsequently advance the cause for decolonising education.

1. Higher education is of central importance to the economic and social development of the country (MoE 1996, 91). The discharge of this function requires that universities be committed to the highest standards of research that enrich society with knowledge, skills and qualities necessary for integral human development (MoE 1996, 91).
2. The activities of higher education institutions and the recipients advance a conservation and furtherance of the accomplishments of society by pursuing rigorous and sustained evaluation of past and present achievements of society, and because of such evaluations, charting the possible direction for future developments (MoE 1996, 91).
3. The MoE acknowledges its role in fostering the wholesome development of individuals at this level, in promoting the well-being of higher education institutions and ensuring that the principle of academic freedom, cardinal for the independent pursuit of knowledge, is maintained. Besides, higher education institutions, the academic staff and students who comprise them have the grave responsibility of being ever-responsive to the changing needs and circumstances of society, including legitimate interests of the state (MoE 1996, 91).
4. The function of higher education institutions is the provision of education to students that not only imparts bodies of knowledge in the various branches of learning but also develops creative and problem-solving skills, and capacities of students (MoE 1996, 91).
5. The higher education institutions have a responsibility of creating new knowledge and developing new insights through research. The creation and subsequent dissemination of new knowledge are important for individual, technological and economic development (MoE 1996, 91).

Of the outlined points, the themes emerging are relevance of higher education (1, 2), academic freedom and new knowledge (3, 4) and intellectual capacities (5), all crucial in decolonising education.

Relevance

For universities to achieve social and economic development, they must be relevant, which is one of the concerns for decolonising education. Currently, Africa—of which Zambia is part—is saddled with irrelevant knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11), as universities that are sites of knowledge production are Westernised, locally situated in Africa but capped in the Eurocentric academic model (Mbembe 2016, 32). This has resulted in Africa being a victim of externally generated knowledges that are not informed by the geo- and biographical contextual understanding of the African condition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 14) leading to persistent underdevelopment of the African continent (Lebakeng 2018, 252). The endogenous and indigenous knowledges of Africa that have been pushed to the margins of society (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11) by the current education system have been the missing link to sustainable socio-economic development in Africa (Lebakeng 2018, 252). The responsibility to meet the social and economic functions of the university encourages students, academics and intellectuals to decolonise education.

Universities being sites of knowledge production must pursue a rigorous and sustained critical evaluation of society's present and past achievements and, based on such evaluation, chart possible directions for future developments (MoE 1996, 91). The NEP encourages universities to generate knowledge for the furtherance of accomplishments by the Zambian society. Knowledges that advance the conservation of the Zambian society are indigenous and place-based knowledges, embedded in valuing the cultural heritage that the colonial education system dismantled. As decolonising education is the struggle over who generates knowledge and from where, the NEP assigns universities to generate knowledge from Zambia. This assignment demands that students, academics and intellectuals in these universities engage in decolonisation debates and answer why the university curricula are largely Eurocentric despite Zambia attaining juridical-political decolonisation nearly 54 years ago.

To achieve socio-economic development, the universities are required to undertake research that enriches society with knowledge, skills and qualities necessary for integral human development (MoE 1996, 91). The society whose needs universities are called to meet is the Zambian society, before meeting the needs of the global society. Zambia has to be at the centre of knowledge production. If this knowledge has to enrich the Zambian society with skills and qualities for integral human development, then it has to reflect connections to place and community. However, the university system is situated in the hegemonic Eurocentric model, which supports the notion of knowledge production. This idea of knowledge production has set up interpretive frames that make it difficult to think outside these frames, and actively represses anything envisioned from outside these defined frames (Mbembe 2016, 33). The Eurocentric knowledge system demands allegiances from students, academics and intellectuals in knowledge creation. Contrary to demands of allegiance, the process of decolonising education demands re-establishing links with the community to contextualise knowledge production rather than knowledge that others have constructed, about Africa and Africans (Lebakeng 2018, 254). The call for universities to undertake research that enriches the Zambian society supports the cause for decolonising education. I argue that the university should be socially grounded to deliver a relevant education that would help to overcome obstacles to the socio-economic development of Zambia and Africa.

Academic Freedom and Creation of New Knowledge

The NEP stipulates that the MoE acknowledges its role of ensuring the principle of academic freedom in higher education, cardinal for independent pursuit of knowledge (MoE 1996, 91). The prevalence of academic freedom in universities provides an opportunity for universities, students, academics and intellectuals to decolonise education. Universities as authorised centres of knowledge production as well as students, academics and intellectuals are granted the privilege of academic freedom to

incorporate indigenous knowledges in the design of university curriculum as well as the privilege to design programmes that integrate indigenous knowledge and thinking into their teaching and research.

Academic freedom is ensured in universities to contribute to the advancement of all forms of knowledge (Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Education [MESVTEE] 2013, 107) by enabling higher education institutions comprising intellectuals, academics and students to assume the responsibility of being responsive to the changing needs and circumstances of society, including the interest of the state (MoE 1996, 91). Academics are originators of learning programmes in universities with the capacity to interrogate all forms of knowledge to advance the establishment of new programmes, which could be of relevance locally, continentally and globally. Academic freedom allows academics and intellectuals in universities to engage in new ways of thinking about creating knowledge. Decolonising education is a call to reflection: are Zambian universities advancing all forms of knowledge? Whose knowledge matters in the current education system? As the MoE has placed the responsibility of being responsive to the changing circumstances of society on universities, to which society are Zambian universities responsive, the Zambian society or the global society?

Universities have the responsibility of creating new knowledge (MoE 1996, 91). Such responsibility provides an opportunity to decolonise education. Embracing the responsibility to create knowledge advantages universities to decolonise education as knowledge is never innocent since it expresses the interests of its producers and prioritises ways of knowing of the producer (Arukwe 2014, 185). Subsequently, there is usually tension in decolonising curricula in Westernised universities; and students, academics and intellectuals should not be discouraged to prescribe indigenous knowledge systems in Zambia. As knowledge creation centres, universities have a catalytic role for decolonising curricula by centring indigenous knowledges (McLaughlin and Whatman 2011, 366) in African universities to contribute positively to addressing the challenges faced by the African continent (Lebakeng 2018, 255).

Capacities in Individuals

The function of universities is the provision of education to students that develop creative and problem-solving skills and capacities of students, besides imparting knowledge in the various branches of learning (MoE 1996, 91). Universities are expected to prepare students as specialists, experts, research and managerial cadres that should carry out intellectual and creative work to meet national needs (MESVTEE 2013, 107). Consequently, higher education is aimed at encouraging students to develop the capacity to make systematic forays beyond our current knowledge horizons (Mbembe 2016, 30). Knowledge horizons are defined in the university curriculum. Questioning whether the university curriculum develops creative and problem-solving skills and capacities in students allows academics to rethink and embed changes to the education system that support the decolonisation of education. Currently, universities in Zambia are continuing to be consumers of global knowledge and representatives of universal knowledge, as the university system is largely Eurocentric.

Language of Instruction

As highlighted above, English is the medium of instruction in the Zambian education system. Learners who enter the school system are required to read and write and learn the content of subjects through the English language which is alien to them (MoE 1996, 39). The NEP acknowledges that the experience of learners in schools has not been satisfactory because the initial reading skills are taught in and through a language that is unfamiliar to the majority of learners (MoE 1996, 39). It is believed that the result of teaching and learning in the unfamiliar language has been backwardness in reading shown by many Zambian children (MoE 1996, 39).

Additionally, teaching and learning in the unfamiliar language are also attributed to foster rote learning, as from the outset the learners have difficulties in associating the printed forms of words with their real underlying meaning (MoE 1996, 39). The attributions are based on evidence

that learners learn literacy skills more easily and successfully through their mother tongue, and successful first language learning is believed to be essential for successful literacy in a second language and for learning content subjects through the second language (MoE 1996, 39).

Unfamiliar Language Epistemically Disempowering

While acknowledging the epistemic violation in the content of the curricula and use of the alien language as a medium of instruction, the NEP seems to have challenges in terms of how to deliver the curricula content in the most convenient manner. The first challenge relates to implementation, the second to developing and producing learning materials, and the third to human resources, that is teachers, to carry out the vision (MoE 1996, 39).

The NEP articulates that the introduction of a language other than English as the official medium of instruction would counter insoluble implementation problems (MoE 1996, 39). The possibilities of insoluble implementation challenges could be attributed to the education system being Eurocentric. The Eurocentric knowledge systems that define the Zambian education system reject anything defined outside their frames of references. Advancing the use of Zambian languages as medium of instruction creates space outside the identity that is constructed by the Eurocentric knowledge systems, hence possibilities of encountering insoluble implementation problems. In view of this challenge, the question policymakers should ask is who is in control of knowledge. An attempt to reflect on this question might support the cause to decolonise the Zambian education system.

The second challenge is that of the enormous costs both of developing and of producing learning materials (MoE 1996, 39). There seem to be enormous costs in producing learning materials, drawing from Lebakeng's (2018, 255) observation that policymakers have not made bedfellows with African researchers, but overly rely on foreign expertise. Policymakers need to work in solidarity with universities as nationally mandated sites of knowledge production, to mitigate for acknowledged epistemic disempowerment, which takes its course when the Zambian child enters the

school system. The observed epistemic disempowerment of learners should be treated as an appeal to policymakers, academics, intellectuals and students to change the Zambian education system to accommodate and support the educational needs of the Zambian child. The appeal calls for alternative thinking outside the present knowledge system, supporting the cause to decolonise education.

The third challenge is related to training teachers to use the newly produced materials (MoE 1996, 39), which implies the inadequacy of the university curriculum to empower students, specifically those with a creative mind. Universities currently have turned higher education into a marketable product, which deters students from the free pursuit of knowledge in pursuit of credits (Mbembe 2016, 30). The concern relating to the inadequacy of university programmes to empower students to manipulate new knowledge provides an opportunity for universities to design new programmes that enlighten students with capacities to explore new horizons. As decolonisation is a process, the faculties of education in universities, through teacher education, might open possibilities for continuous empowerment if teachers are introduced to programmes that conceptualise education differently from the Eurocentric model. The issue of language provides universities the possibility not only of redesigning curricula for the school system and the university system but also of introducing those housed in the Eurocentric education system of Zambia to support the cause to decolonise the Zambian education system.

Conclusion

In view of the debate and efforts to decolonise education across the colonised world, I have argued how the National Education Policy in Zambia has the potential for advancing production of knowledge for decolonisation. The cause to join the decolonisation process, on the one hand, was advanced by the argument on the roles, responsibilities and functions of universities, and on the other, by evidence provided by using English as the language of instruction, which alienates and epistemically disempowers Zambian learners the very moment they enter the school system.

As universities are sites of knowledge production, academics, students and intellectuals who attend them should be responsive to the epistemic violation prevalent in the Zambian education system. The National Education Policy allows Zambian universities to advance education for decolonisation and join in the struggle for decolonising education.

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5

In Defence of Education That Embodies Decolonisation

Lester Brian Shawa

Introduction

In higher education, the debate on decolonisation or decoloniality is important. Mbembe (2016) argues that in postcolonial Africa, the project of decolonisation was the same thing as Africanisation and was part of a nation-building project. He however contends that critics, such as Fanon (1925–1961), did not support the Africanisation project as led by the African postcolonial middle class because “it [the African postcolonial middle class] had totally assimilated colonialist thought in its most corrupt form” (Mbembe 2016, 33). African universities need to challenge ways of knowing or acting that perpetuate adherence to colonial thought without careful analysis of their own world.

In South Africa, for example, debates on decolonisation have recently been invigorated owing to a number of reasons, such as feelings of cultural alienation created by the apartheid regime along with its Western

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epistemologies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Nkoane 2006). The #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements have been catalysts to the recent decolonisation debates in the country. Many in South Africa see the university as perpetuating the apartheid legacy in prioritising Western forms of knowing at the expense of African or South African knowledge relevant to the continent (see Koma 2018; Makgoba 1996; Nkoane 2006). Such feelings have often led critics of university education in South Africa to call for decolonisation of curricula, pedagogy and/or the whole university (see Le Grange 2016; Mbembe 2016; Waghid et al. 2018).

In this chapter, I posit that decolonisation is a necessary project in society and especially in the South African higher education context. However, I argue that merely changing pedagogic styles and curricula content to reflect context without a robust conceptualisation of the notion of education cannot lead to decolonisation. I draw on Aristotelian notions of practical reason, *phronēsis* (conceiving the end to be achieved as well as correct deliberation on how to achieve it), and potentiality, *dynamis* (that people have the potential to become what they can or not). I further draw on the Platonic idea espoused in the allegory of the cave (the liberating power of education) to propose a concept of education woven within practical reasoning, potentiality and liberation that has intrinsic power to decolonise or which could prepare people better to decolonise. Such a decolonisation project is interwoven within the notion of education itself and capable of altering attitudes, such as those that engulfed the African postcolonial middle class and perpetrators of colonial attitudes. Once conceived and enacted, such a concept of education prepares the mind and forms right attitudes towards understanding oneself and other, fosters respect of others and their cultures, liberates beings from social distortions and opens real possibilities to decolonise. In other words, I contend that a concept of education based on practical reasoning, potentiality and liberation creates necessary conditions for decolonisation.

I start by engaging with the notion of decolonisation where I support the need to decolonise before proposing a concept of education based on practical reasoning, potentiality and liberation and argue that such a concept is necessary for the decolonisation project to succeed. I then show how the concept of education espoused in the chapter could be used to

decolonise university curriculum, pedagogy and governance and lastly, provide some conclusions.

Decolonisation as a Necessary Project

Colonialism inculcated a sense of an inferiority complex in the colonised in ways that have further undermined their knowledge production, development and ways of thinking and acting. While juridical-political colonisation is a thing of the past, the long-standing ways of thinking and acting that have been perpetuated by colonialism still exist and require challenging. These long-standing ways of thinking and acting, also known as coloniality (see Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013), tend to affect behaviour and world views. Drawing on the work of Quijano (2000) cited in Maldonado-Torres (2007, 243) posits:

Coloniality ... refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday.

Maldonado-Torres' (2007) sentiments show how coloniality is deep-rooted in peoples' ways of thinking and acting. Universities cannot challenge coloniality with superficial changes as changes in attitudes and ways of thinking and acting require a genuine rethinking of university education—such as one based on practical reasoning, potentiality and liberation.

For Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 15), decoloniality or decolonisation is “born out of a realisation that ours is an asymmetrical world order that is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to produce alienated Africans ...”. Such observations are important in imagining how to craft a concept of education that embodies decolonisation.

The #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall Movements

The #RhodesMustFall movement started at the University of Cape Town in 2015 when students demanded that the statue of Cecil John Rhodes on campus should fall (Ahmed 2017; Luescher 2016). Students perceived Rhodes as a British imperialist and racist and saw his statue as continuing the systematic dehumanisation of black people that started with colonisation. Following the #RhodesMustFall movement, was the 2016 #FeesMustFall movement that seriously raised the challenges of access to higher education in South Africa. Luescher (2016, 23) contends:

[W]hereas #RhodesMustFall and its derivatives represented a Black intellectual rage against ideological superstructure of South African higher education and its whiteness, the #FeesMustFall movement captured the imagination of students nationwide, as it brought things to the grassroots' level of the material conditions of student life, with the powerfully resonant demand for free education.

The two movements brought to the fore the need for transformation and decolonisation in South African higher education (Nyamnjoh 2017). The decolonisation debates have tended to focus on curriculum (content), pedagogy (how content is mediated), knowledge production (who produces what is accepted as knowledge and from what lens) and decolonising the whole university (see Council on Higher Education [CHE] 2017).

Proponents of the decolonisation of curricula argue for the provision of relevant content to students generally and/or specifically a need to advance subjects that draw on African scholarship (see Makgoba 1996; Nkoane 2006). According to the CHE (2017), others have argued for a need for changes in pedagogy—how knowledge is mediated by academics and how students experience and engage with knowledge. In terms of knowledge production, others have been concerned with the question of a Cartesian duality, 'cogito ergo sum' or, 'I think therefore I am', advanced by Descartes, which is said to characterise the Eurocentric canon (see Le Grange 2016; Mbembe 2016). The challenge with the Cartesian dualism

frame of knowing is that it separates the knower from the subject (to be known) but claims that the knower is able to discern universal knowledge applicable to the subject (Mbembe 2016). Unfortunately, this Western frame of thought has become hegemonic (Mbembe 2016). For Le Grange (2016), curriculum must be rid of Cartesian duality presented by Descartes' *cogito*, 'I think therefore I am' to one that embodies *ubuntu*, 'I am because we are'. He posits, "a decolonised curriculum is evidenced by a shift in subjectivity from the arrogant 'I' (of Western Individualism) to a humble 'I' that is embedded, embodied, extended and enacted" (Le Grange 2016, 8).

Echoing Le Grange's sentiments, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 12) argues that Descartes' 'I think, therefore, I am' translated into 'I conquer, therefore, I am' and is apparent in the 'coloniser and colonised' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 14) relationship. Such a relationship dehumanises the colonised. Le Grange (2016) suggests five phases in the process of decolonisation:

- rediscovery and recovery (process whereby colonised peoples rediscover and recover their own history, culture, language and identity);
- mourning (the process of lamenting the continued assault on the world's colonised or oppressed peoples' identities and social realities);
- dreaming (when colonised peoples invoke their histories, world views and indigenous knowledge systems to theorise and imagine alternative possibilities—in this instance, a different curriculum);
- commitment (when academics or students become political activists who demonstrate the commitment to include the voices of the colonised, in this case the university curriculum) and
- action (where dreams and commitments translate into strategies for social transformation).

For Mbembe (2016), decolonisation entails reconfiguring the whole university—buildings, the university classroom, large systems of authoritative control, the mania of assessment, methods of the evaluation of faculty and breaking the cycle that tends to turn students into customers and consumers. While in support of the several efforts and ideas on

decolonisation presented in the foregoing, I contend that such efforts and ideas need to be anchored by a strong concept of education for them to lead to decolonisation.

The Need to Rethink the Concept of Education

Given the challenges in attitudes and ways of thinking and acting created by colonialism, the decolonisation project should be a matter of urgency. Universities, being crucial sites for initiating and socialising human beings (Weidman et al. 2014), ought to respond to calls for decolonisation with an in-depth understanding. Calls that tackle decolonisation without basing their understanding and/or arguments on thick concepts of the notion of education itself are less likely to contribute coherently to the success of the decolonisation project. One such in-depth engagement with the project is to base decolonisation on a notion of education that prepares people for decolonisation. In fact, on what would changes in curriculum content and/or pedagogic styles be based without an elaborate concept of the notion of education itself to guide the process?

University education globally shows strong adherence to the global neo-liberal tendency (Lynch 2006; Peters 2012), which has generally commodified education and advanced what Peters (2012, 136) calls “consumer sovereignty”. Such a concept of education has limited the public role of the university generally. For example, it has perpetuated inequality to university access in many countries as those who cannot afford to pay fees fail to access university education. I argue that given such challenges, a decolonisation project that simply engages with changes in curricula content or pedagogical styles while maintaining, for example, the neo-liberal world view is inappropriate for decolonisation. I contend that there is a need for an education that decolonises the mind (Wa Thiong’o 1986), one that is girded by a concept of education that draws on practical reason, potentiality and liberation. I develop such a concept of education next.

Towards a Concept of Education Necessary for Decolonisation: Practical Reasoning, Potentiality and Liberation

In this section, I develop a concept of education based on practical reasoning, potentiality and liberation that embodies decolonisation. First, I engage with Aristotle's concept of practical reasoning—*phronēsis*. Second, I briefly explain Aristotle's notion of potentiality—*dynamis*. Third, I deal with Plato's allegory of the cave to explain the liberatory nature of the notion of education I advance. Lastly, I then show how these aspects of the notion of education embody decolonisation.

Aristotle's Notion of Practical Reasoning—Phronēsis as an Aspect of the Concept of Education

I propose practical reasoning—*phronēsis*—as an aspect of the concept of education because as a virtue, it embodies dispositions and aspects of ethical judgement, social dimension, deliberative reasoning and understanding of the whole using particularities (Austin 2016, 2018; Carr 2007)—which I consider pivotal in engaging with many social issues such as decolonisation.

For Aristotle, practical reasoning—*phronēsis*—means the capability to conceive the end to be achieved as well as correct deliberation on how to achieve the end (Taylor 2016). In other words, practical reasoning demands rational considerations and choices as well as deliberative mechanisms to achieve the intended goal. Thus, “in the simplest terms, practical reasoning is deliberation about what it would be best to do, both in particular situations, and with reference to one's life as a whole” (Austin 2018, 25).

For Aristotle, practical reasoning as a virtue differs from other mental states that he describes as scientific knowledge—*episteme*—and craft or craft knowledge—*techne*. Scientific knowledge explains things or aspects that are necessarily true and which cannot be otherwise (Birmingham 2004). Craft or craft knowledge depicts true knowledge with an aim of

production—for example, having knowledge about how to improve student reading (see Birmingham 2004; Carr 2007). For Carr (2007, 276) *techne* is basically ‘a type of instrumental practice undertaken in order to achieve some extrinsic or independently determined outcome’.

Both *episteme* and *techne* are different from *phronēsis* in that the latter is a form of ethical reasoning in which notions of deliberation and judgement are intrinsic (Carr 2007). Drawing on Aristotle (1999) and Birmingham (2004, 314) describes *phronēsis* as “a state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being”. Ethical judgement is crucial because the outcome of *phronēsis* is not only born out of a reasoned decision but a judgement that would be morally appropriate within the prevailing conditions (Dunne 1993, cited in Carr 2007). Birmingham (2004) contends that reflection does not only have moral implications as suggested by some theorists but is also essentially moral—the virtue of *phronēsis*. The ethical dimension of practical reasoning is crucial for the concept of education advanced in this chapter.

Second, the social dimension of practical reasoning is important in the concept of education that I advance. Austin (2018, 26) contends:

The social, political and economic environment in which a person grows up, and the practices and norms of [his or] her immediate and wider social groups, are primary influences on the development of [his or] her mode of practical reasoning—the basic structure of [his or] her personal concept of value.

The fact that practical reasoning develops within social environments, necessarily calls for assessment of societal beliefs some of which might be informed by distortions such as beliefs in apartheid or racial apartness and colonialism.

Third, *phronēsis* is pertinent to the concept of education in this chapter because it embodies deliberative reasoning. It calls for reflection on what one wants to do—thus it advances a form of reasoned decision-making or deliberation and/or self-assessment (Dunne 1993, cited in Carr 2007).

Fourth, *phronēsis* allows people to use the immediate situation or the particularities to grasp the significance of the whole (see Birmingham

2004; Carr 2007). This means that people can behave in a given situation while thinking about the significance of their actions on the whole. For example, Carr (2007, 277) notes that educators who draw on *phronēsis* “strive to achieve ... excellence intrinsic to their practice, develop a capacity to see the particularities of a concrete practical situation in light of its general educational significance ...”.

Aristotle’s Notion of Potentiality—*Dynamis* as an Aspect of the Concept of Education

I propose potentiality—*dynamis*—as an aspect of the concept of education because of its characteristic of becoming, which denotes constant reflection: continuously becoming better, ethical, deliberative and so forth.

In elucidating the concept of potentiality, *dynamis*, Aristotle opposes it to actuality, *energeia* (what something becomes or is) (Agamben 1999). For Aristotle what something could become is always in its nature (Morgan 2013). Agamben (1999) notes that Aristotle introduced two potentialities: one generic and the other existing and that the latter was of his interest. An example of generic potentiality is when we say, “a child has potential to know, or that [he or] she can potentially become head of state” (Agamben 1999, 179). Although it is conceivable that a child has the potential to know and indeed could become head of state, such potentiality is not based on knowledge or ability possessed by the child. On the other hand, an example of existing potentiality is “[when] we say of an architect that he or she has the power to build ...” (Agamben 1999, 179). The latter shows one has existing knowledge or ability.

Villamizar (2013) posits that what is appealing to Agamben is that potentiality in the Aristotelian sense means also the potentiality not to do—the impotentiality. In this way, Aristotle does not propound a static actuality or finality of potentiality. Potentiality has the capability of becoming as well as suspending the becoming. The ideas of potentiality and impotentiality are important when we think about choice, and are also related to the negation of finality of actuality. To hold a view that knowledge or abilities can be acquired to finality or actuality is to deny the capacity for constant questioning and ever striving for the good.

Thus, I contend that the view of knowing as actuality is problematic. Waghid (2014, 40) observes, “to absolutely know what education is [for example] suggests that students have found final answers that are conclusive and beyond doubt”. Such a view is deceptive as knowledge is not static.

Plato’s Allegory of the Cave—Liberatory Power of Education as an Aspect of the Concept of Education

I propose engaging Plato’s allegory of the cave as an aspect of the concept of education because of its liberatory power—the need to liberate oneself and others for the betterment of society. Adapting from Plato (1944, 222–230), I narrate the allegory of the cave as below:

The allegory depicts men prisoners who since their childhood lived in a cave underground with an entrance open to the light and a long passage all down the cave. The men had their legs and necks chained such that they could not turn nor move to see what was in front of them. At some distance higher up there was light from fire burning behind them, which cast shadows seen by the prisoners.

The shadows were cast not only by the prisoners themselves but also by other people and animals who made noise in the process. Since the prisoners could only see the shadows, they thought that the shadows made the noise (because of the echo).

If one of them was set free and went through the ascent, his eyes would first experience pain because of the light. However, his eyes would eventually acclimatise and he would see that what they used to see in the cave with his fellow prisoners, were mere shadows of real things. He would experience and see true reality and contemplate that in fact it is the light from the sun that caused all the shadows he and his fellow prisoners used to see.

Upon knowing the reality, he would feel happy for himself but sorry for his fellow prisoners. If he went back to the darkness in the cave his eyes would once again experience pain, now because of the darkness in the cave and he would struggle to see the other prisoners who would then laugh at him for having ruined his sight. Unhappy with this, the prisoners would,

if found, kill the person who would have made their friend climb the ascent. This is because they were used to the reality of the cave and its darkness.

However, if they all would leave the cave and the darkness and climb the ascent, their eyes would first experience pain because of the light but eventually get used to reality. In other words, the prisoners would get enlightened.

The power of this allegory is in its meaning that human beings can be enslaved within ‘caves’ in their lives and mistake such experiences as truths. As such, “enlightenment means not only counting oneself happy for seeing the sun (knowing the good), but also doing the good, even if that means returning to the cave despite the blindness caused by the re-entry to the darkness” (Peterson 2017, 274). A concept of education that allows for the liberation of the self and others is meaningful in challenging social ills, such as hegemonic tendencies, apartheid and colonisation. I now turn to elaborating how the concept of education advanced embodies decolonisation.

The Concept of Education (Practical Reasoning, Potentiality and Liberation) as Lens for Decolonisation

Drawing on the concept of education I have advanced, I now show how such a concept is necessary for decolonisation. As noted, the concept of education developed has three major tenets:

- practical reasoning—*phronēsis*: ethical judgement, social dimension, deliberative reasoning, using particularities to understand the whole;
- potentiality—*dynamis*: potentiality and impotentiality, becoming and
- Plato’s allegory of the cave: liberatory power of education.

I now show how these tenets of the concept of education enable decolonisation of curricula content, pedagogy and university governance.

Practical Reasoning as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise Curricula Content

Establishing the content of curricula takes into consideration a number of activities, such as planning and selection of the content by academics within departments. Generally, content needs to respond to the context to be relevant and there is a need to align modules coherently to the programme.

Basing the process of curriculum selection on practical reasoning means that planning and selection of content are done ethically and deliberately, engage the social dimension and reveal an understanding on the part of academics of the significance of their content choices and decisions (particularities) in relation to the whole field.

In a decolonisation framework, ethically, it means that academics do not just choose content that is African without applying ethical judgement within the process and in the nature of the content itself. For example, African content that may be shallow, biased and antagonistic to humanity as a whole would be avoided. That could happen when academics self-assess or reflect (deliberatively) on their process of selection of content and the content itself.

Engaging the social dimension is very useful because practical reasoning is shaped by the social beliefs that also need careful assessment. This means that content selected is not just accepted at face value because, for example, it is African and/or rooted in African scholarship but should be assessed for distortions that may be held normative in the social domain. Here, academics have to develop capacity to understand that the everydayness of human living can be informed by distortions or taken-for-granted aspects that require change or challenging (see Habermas 1987; Shawa 2013).

Drawing on practical reason in selecting curricula also means that academics need to pay attention to how the content selected within their context reflects or contributes to the development of the field as a whole. For example, content should not negatively affect students in understanding their fields in relation to global humanity. In other words, a decolonised content should not limit students' engagement with their fields holistically. The content should provide space for assessment.

Practical reasoning thus opens possibilities for decolonisation of curriculum content by inviting academics to be ethical in their content selection, to select content by being deliberative or reflective, to provide content that challenges the distortions that could normatively be accepted in society and to ascertain that the selected content contributes to the significance of the whole field critically.

Potentiality as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise Curricula Content

As noted, Aristotle's potentiality is both potentiality and impotentiality in its ability to become. By having choice to bring aspects to potentiality or not means that academics and students have the freedom in their enacting or not of becoming. Drawing on potentiality as an aspect of the concept of education in decolonising curricula demands academics to understand that the selected content, for example, that is rooted in African scholarship can be brought to potentiality or not. This provides space for both academics and students not to be bound by the selected curriculum content only but also to allow students to read widely and engage with the readings critically. In other words, understanding curriculum content in potentiality is to allow for constant evaluation of content and providing space for better knowledge production (e.g. about decolonisation). This also means that academics become open to students evaluating the curriculum content for improvement (see Waghid et al. 2018). Academics who view curriculum content in potentiality guard against indoctrination.

Potentiality thus opens possibilities for decolonisation of curriculum content by inviting academics to be less prescriptive of content and constantly encourage assessment to avoid mere indoctrination.

The Allegory of the Cave as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise Curricula Content

Plato's allegory of the cave has a liberatory message of education. Drawing on the allegory of the cave to decolonise curricula content allows academics to refrain from content that domesticates students—putting students

as prisoners in caves. Like the prisoners going up the ascent, both academics and students should allow the pain of making sense of a wide range of curricula and being able to help those who may be slow in understanding the texts. Further, liberating students from caves means that African students should not only be provided an African-related canon but should also be allowed to understand even the Western canon to provide comparative views that are helpful to understand their own better. The problem is when one particular way of knowing, such as the Western thought, becomes hegemonic.

The liberatory message of Plato's allegory of the cave opens possibilities of decolonisation of curriculum content by inviting academics to help students to learn together and be sensitive about helping those who may not easily grasp the content and to challenge hegemonic canons.

Practical Reasoning as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise Pedagogy

Pedagogy entails how academics mediate curricula or how they teach (CHE 2017). Pedagogic styles are ways in which students get to experience knowledge production or academic literacies (CHE 2017). Basing pedagogy on practical reasoning means that academics use pedagogic styles ethically and deliberately, tap into students' social dimensions, and use pedagogic styles that contribute to knowledge production in relation to the whole field.

While with decolonisation, there is a need to tap into African ways of knowing, drawing on practical reasoning entails adherence to ethical judgements about the best possible African ways of knowing that best suit the situation. For example, against the Cartesian duality, academics need to tap into African methods that denote the collective dimension revealed in African cultures—knowing together. A deliberative mechanism (for Aristotelian reflection) is required for academics to be able to choose ethical pedagogic styles. In other words, academics should guard against simply replacing what they may call Western pedagogic styles by African ways of knowing without applying moral judgement if they want to succeed in decolonising pedagogy.

As noted, paying attention to the social dimension in one's pedagogic styles is important because practical reasoning is shaped by the social beliefs that also need careful assessment. This means that selected pedagogic styles should not maintain, for example, distortions that are held as normative in a given society. For example, in some African societies, children or students may not freely challenge the elders or teachers as they tend to be passive learners. In such a case, one's pedagogic style, while tapping into the African readiness to listen, should also encourage students to form their voices and contribute to their learning freely.

Drawing on practical reason in choosing pedagogic styles also means that academics use relevant methods that are significant to producing knowledge in their field as a whole. Further, the selected methods aim to help students understand the significance of what they learn in particular situations to the whole field. For example, a method that allows students to question and engage deliberatively with academics in a Philosophy of Education class, prepares students to learn the art of constant questioning that is demanded by the field. In other words, a decolonised pedagogy should equip students with tools necessary to learn relentlessly and holistically within their fields.

Practical reasoning thus opens possibilities for decolonisation of pedagogy by inviting academics and students to use pedagogic styles that are ethical and deliberative, to tap into ways of knowing prevalent in their society and to assess the ways of knowing that might present distortions in their societies and to ascertain that the selected methods significantly contribute critically to knowledge production in the whole field.

Drawing on Potentiality as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise Pedagogy

Aristotle's concept of potentiality is helpful in conceiving a pedagogy that relentlessly questions without assuming finality of knowledge (Waghid 2014). Decolonised pedagogic styles call for both academics and students to devise styles collectively that innovatively contribute to knowledge creation. This means that simply tapping into some African pedagogic styles, such as storytelling, without thinking about how to improve this method,

means that such a method has reached finality and is in actuality. As such, while advancing African ways of knowing, both academics and students should allow space to improve on the methods by seeing them as in becoming, in potentiality.

Potentiality thus opens possibilities for decolonisation of pedagogy by inviting academics and students to engage critically with pedagogic styles they use in producing knowledge with an aim to improve the styles constantly.

The Allegory of the Cave as Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise Pedagogy

Pedagogic styles framed within the Platonic allegory of the cave put a demand on academics and students to engage in self-assessment to liberate themselves and others. Such pedagogic styles invite both academics and students to deconstruct their attitudes, thought processes and ways of doing things. For example, instead of simply relegating Western forms of knowledge production, a liberated decolonised education engages with both African ways and Western ways of knowledge production to facilitate assessment of these for the betterment of humanity.

The liberatory message of Plato's allegory of the cave opens possibilities of decolonisation of pedagogy by inviting academics and students to assess their pedagogic styles and share best practices with those who might not be able to discern improved pedagogic styles (liberating them).

Practical Reasoning as an Aspect of the Concept of Education in University Governance

University governance entails a great deal of organising the university in its functions of teaching, research and community engagement. Drawing on practical reasoning in university governance entails that the university leadership organises university activities ethically and deliberatively, attend to societal dimensions in their understanding of governance and strives for their decisions and/or policies to contribute to best practices in university governance.

Tapping into practical reasoning means that university administrators devise regulations or governance systems using ethical judgement and reflection (deliberation) to achieve the best possible practices in running the university at a given time. For example, simply borrowing the neo-liberal logic in organising universities in Africa is counter-productive and unethical.

University leadership drawing on practical reasoning ought to engage societies in which universities operate and learn from good practices mirrored in the societies while at the same time assessing ways or societal beliefs that present distortions and influence governance of the university negatively. For example, in most African countries, the big-man syndrome (see von Soest 2007) and other neopatrimonial aspects tend to permeate university governance and require challenging (Shawa 2013).

Drawing on practical reasoning in university governance also means that the university leadership in its policy and decision-making understands the significance of its actions in terms of university governance as a whole. In other words, decolonised university governance in Africa could draw on *ubuntu* values that enhance the African communitarian decision-making (Waghid et al. 2018) and rid itself of, for example, neo-liberal performative tendencies (see Mbembe 2016) in facilitating genuine teaching, learning and community engagement. Such university governance could help not only in creating an enabling environment for advancing knowledge (epistemological) but also in helping students to become (ontological) good citizens or global citizens (see Dall’Alba and Barnacle 2007; Nussbaum 1997).

Practical reasoning thus opens possibilities for decolonisation of university governance by:

- inviting university leaders to make policies or regulations about teaching, research and community engagement using ethical judgement and reflection;
- understanding social dimensions in which the university operates;
- making decisions that reflect the significance of university governance as a whole and
- facilitating an environment in which students not only grasp knowledge but also become responsible human beings.

Potentiality as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise University Governance

Drawing on the aspect of potentiality, university governance should be seen as becoming such that decisions taken to organise teaching, research and community engagement are not final but are open to constant assessment by the university community. In a decolonised university fashion, such assessments should centre on how the university facilitates an environment for African ways of knowing (epistemology) and being (ontology) without reifying them to finality. As noted, to conceive of particular ways of acting as in actuality impedes relentless questioning that is pertinent in improving leadership.

Potentiality thus opens possibilities for decolonisation of university governance by inviting university leadership to engage critically with decisions and university operations as in becoming, allowing the university community to assess the decisions and operations constantly and provide feedback on best practices in running the university.

The Allegory of the Cave as an Aspect of the Concept of Education to Decolonise University Governance

Plato's allegory of the cave is helpful in organising the university and creating an enabling environment for teaching, research and community engagement. The university leadership should constantly analyse its governance styles and discern better ways of acting. The leadership should be able to share their discerned better ways of governance to liberate themselves and others. For example, a decolonised university governance that rids itself of neo-liberal performative tendencies, which stifle the work of both academics and students, could then share with others new ways of acting that are more humane.

The liberatory message of Plato's allegory of the cave opens possibilities of decolonisation of university governance by inviting university leadership to assess their governance styles and allow for governance that is built on styles that aim at more humane engagements.

In summary, a conception of education based on practical reasoning, potentiality and liberation once conceived and enacted prepares the mind and forms right attitudes towards understanding oneself and other, fosters respect of others and their cultures, liberates beings from social distortions and opens real possibilities to decolonise.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued for a concept of education that embodies decolonisation. I have argued that while in support of the decolonisation project, merely changing, for example, curricula content and pedagogic styles without a robust conceptualisation of the notion of education cannot lead to decolonisation. I have developed a concept of education based on Aristotelian notions of practical reason (*phronēsis*) and potentiality (*dynamis*) and the Platonic idea espoused in the allegory of the cave and have shown how such a concept embodies intrinsic power to decolonise. Finally, I have drawn on this concept to show how it can be utilised in decolonising curricula content, pedagogy and university governance.

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6

Decoloniality and Higher Education Transformation in South Africa

Celiwe Ngwenya

First, I want to declare that subsequent to my critical analysis of transformation of the higher education sector in South Africa, through a decolonial lens, I found it difficult to be impartial when writing this chapter as my epistemic reading of the current system revealed patterns that embrace coloniality. Despite these sentiments, this chapter is based on fair and balanced judgement upon evidence scenarios of transformation in higher education. For example, the essential characteristics of our South African higher education system, such as access and access testing, have remained resolute in maintaining coloniality, and this still tends to foster classism and racism despite all the transformation policies and rhetoric since the dawn of democracy in 1994. The National Benchmark Tests project initiative (NBT), which is largely used by the South African university sector, as one of statutory requirements for university admission is one of such examples. Although some universities claim to employ the NBT

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results to assist students for placement in appropriate curricular routes, the reality seems to be the assessment of academic readiness of students; hence, my contention that the NBT could either increase or diminish students' chances of getting into higher education. To justify my assertion I would say, in the case of many black students, the NBT shatters hopes of ever accessing university, which is most needed as it is a tool for social mobility, as many of these students tend to lack capital required for contesting university placement, when attempting to gain access into higher education. Also, although the NBTs are aligned to the National Senior Certificate, the University of Cape Town (UCT) is the 'gatekeeper' of the NBT project as it collaborated with Universities South Africa (USAF) to develop a project that is geared towards the assessment of academic readiness of students amongst other objectives. This project was commissioned while USAF was still known as Higher Education South Africa (HESA) (Universities South Africa Online 2018). So one wonders if UCT can ever be objective when dealing with the needs of average students, since the university has a penchant for academic affluent students. If we go by the rhetoric of the Fallist Movements of 2015–2017 (#RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements, which overwhelmed many historically advantaged universities—and which challenged the disproportionate status quo and white privilege at universities), it can be argued that UCT is predisposed to disaffirm black students from poor schools because the university's historic admission systems favour students that are academic superior. As an example the details that indicate the university preference is depicted online in the application process page (UCT Online 2018), where faculties implement different access criteria that are to be met to gain access at this institution. Be that as it may, if some students do make it, they are likely to be relegated to Arts and Social Sciences, as most faculties are not easily accessible probably because the university sustains its academic reputation through them. The implication therefore is the likelihood of many black students from poor schools gaining access into higher education is from slim to nil. One also wonders whether UCT and others similar to it can ever be able to forsake coloniality and subjectivity and grant access easily to the majority of black students who come from poor schools.

To explain my assertion above about the policy framework that maintains coloniality, I draw on Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 487, 488) who explains coloniality as a concept that could help us understand colonial-like power relations that exist to this day, especially in countries like South Africa, which experienced direct colonialism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 487) advises that in the current systems, we should take note that coloniality is not easily recognised as it is now a somewhat invisible power structure, that is “well-maintained in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspiration of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience”. Over and above this, in the present world contexts, coloniality is perpetuated through globalisation and has been normalised by modern politics as it promotes free market systems, which is a way of life in our world. Decoloniality on the other hand becomes an antithesis of the concept of coloniality born out of the realisation that the very modern world is still as asymmetrical as in the era of colonialism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 489) corroborates this assertion and goes further to explain that, through decoloniality, we can be informed of ongoing struggles against inhumanity, unmasking coloniality as an underside of the modern world.

Departing from the above perceptions, the narrative from which I am expounding upon concealed colonial substructures in the present policy framework, I have split the sections into three parts. The first part discourses the aspect of the policy framework in higher education and challenges. The second part focuses on the covert oppressive themes within the higher education system, and finally, the chapter posits what the African vision should look like.

Policy Framework in South Africa After 1994

The foundation of this discourse is articulated from the position that wants to highlight how demoralising the higher education system can be to students from poor schools (myself included as I am a product of poor schools) especially if we take into consideration the shortage of black graduates from poor schools in the historically advantaged institutions

system. For those that make it into the higher education system, they equally do encounter experiences that are likely to leave them disempowered. As an example I allude to the struggles I have gone through, just like many historically disadvantaged students, in my journey in pursuit of higher education encounters. In this section, I discuss the symbolic promises that seem to have not been implemented to effect sound results because a large part of the policies after apartheid brought into the politics of the new world. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 486) aligns this to globalisation, which he argues that it is still driven by coloniality, which is a system that is disruptive and dehumanising. Perhaps as an example, I should compound this with a discourse on the vision of White Paper 3 of 1997 (Department of Education [DoE] 1997) and White Paper for Post-school Education and Training of 2013 (Department of Higher Education and Training [DHET] 2013) that are yet to materialise. The vision in White Paper 3 of 1997 was to transform higher education from apartheid and colonial ethos to a democratic system (see DoE 1997, 1), with aspirations to redress past inequalities and inequities, and to respond to new realities and opportunities. The anticipated outcome was to transform higher education to an extent that it responds to new realities and “stimulate, direct and mobilise the creative and intellectual energies of people towards meeting the challenge of reconstruction and development” (Department of Education [DoE] 1997, 11). Additionally, a single coordinated system with new planning, governing and funding arrangements was meant to ensure that all students benefit from the new system notwithstanding race, gender or culture. Essentially the context of the transition was to remedy the structural cruelty designed by the apartheid government.

Sadly White Paper 3 goals merely scratched the surface; hence, black students still seem excluded from higher education, like they were before 1994. Mouton et al. (2013, 288) claim that a large number of students that still struggle to gain access to higher education are black and mostly from poor schools as their schooling encounters leave them with mediocre capital to navigate higher education, not to mention capital to navigate the affluent university system. The Fallist Movement and scholars, such as Jansen (2002) who christened the policymaking of the new democracy as symbolic and inapt, corroborate the notion that the past and present policy framework can never work—especially as the transfor-

mation policies did not foresee how fixed the characteristics of apartheid were in the higher education system. Also, through this assessment, one wonders how else the transition would be undertaken, especially as the new democratic government that inherited fiscal constraints was also besieged by other unanticipated obstructions, such as the new neo-liberal ideology of globalisation that was creeping in at high speed. The new democratic government had to abandon the reconstruction and development plan, and compromised equity and redress programmes to make itself relevant to neo-liberal rules of the new world (Akoojee and McGrath 2003, 6). From Akoojee and McGrath's outlook, it can be argued that by the time the 2013 White Paper followed, the neo-liberal ideologies were essential elements of what South Africa was exhibiting herself to be, as the rhetoric conveyed the vision for the type of post-school education and training system that mirrors global views. This then meant the 2013 vision changed from working towards access and redress to creating platforms for global competition, such as developing training institutions and marrying work place sector to higher education in order to reproduce human resources for the labour market (Department of Higher Education and Training [DHET] 2013, 4). This meant ample learnership opportunities and the new Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) path that students could utilise instead of flocking into the university system. In my point of view, in a perfect and equal world, this would have been ideal for the country as there would be so much scope to choose from, but in South Africa, this could only mean that the TVET path was for black students from poor schools because they could not get into the university system as the university system seemed to be preserved to accommodate those whose pedagogical encounters were refined through white privilege encounters so they were able to enter elite universities without difficulty. Kane (2007, 354) who studied Frantz Fanon's theory of racialisation analyses Fanon's "racial optic" within colonialisation and decolonialisation. Kane perceives the racial optic concept as a representation of class distinction, to describe the gap in the economic substructures, and any prevalent social inequality. In a case that resembles the South African political landscape, which is discernible for its racial exclusion baggage, social inequality can be interpreted as the systems in higher education that still favour privilege and reject those with poor

schools education encounter. As I have argued earlier, the TVET path seemed to be carved for the students from poor schools, as they seem to be still on the outside. The implication therefore is either the present discomforts are the perpetuation of coloniality, for which we seek responsiveness from the custodians of higher education, or the neo-liberal demands are affecting the higher education system profoundly.

The question then is whether Vision 2030 (South African Government 2011) can build a fair, equitable, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa. To attain this vision will remain impossible due to the reasons I have mentioned earlier, as despite the policy framework declarations, the higher education system seems to continuously alienate black students as universities in South Africa “are still sites to reproduce coloniality” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 488). For example, after 1994, South Africa experienced institutional massification, which comprised a flood of students from low socio-economic income with longings for higher education encounters flocking into institutions of higher learning. The distress in this influx was that, while the students were looking for opportunities for social mobility, historically disadvantaged institutions were the only available option as most historically advantaged universities were keen to grant access to students who had private and Model C encounters, which would help these universities maintain their academic standing. These experiences are bludgeoning the hopes of underprivileged students as they seemed to be driven towards the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions, that is, if they did not decide to forsake their dreams. Considering that South Africa has had progressive transformation blueprints, one would have expected that the inclusion of black students from underprivileged schools would have been simple; instead, the asymmetry in pedagogical experiences and encounters between the students from underprivileged schools and students from affluent schools accentuated the imbalances.

As if this struggle is not enough, now poor students are expected to pull out all the stops to compete with affluent students to gain access into universities. When they are accepted into the universities, the expectation is that they have to perform as if they had similar pedagogical experiences as privileged students; yet, affluent students’ pedagogical experiences place them ahead of poor students. Nearly all higher education practices

seem to be punitive on black students from poor schools, as they disaffirm the existence of inequities in educational encounters. In short, higher education appears to be designed to embrace affluence, which suggests that the 2030 vision may never be achieved if inequities are nullified.

Another example of a policy framework that does not seem to work is the issue of language, which remains a pickle as African languages seem to have no place in the higher education system. African languages are not developed enough for academia. This suggests a rebuff of the existence of black students in the system. As in the apartheid era where African children were expected to forsake their mother tongue and be educated in either English or Afrikaans, African students are still expected to forsake languages they grew up speaking from early childhood to embrace English or Afrikaans, the languages that do not embrace any African customs or cultures. It is as though indigenous knowledge never existed, and the disdain of it has caused a destruction of known nuances in African languages. I will take the traditional healer concept as an example. In the English language, the traditional healer is referred to as a 'witchdoctor'; yet, in African languages, the traditional healer is known as *iSangoma* in isiZulu, or *iGqirha* in isiXhosa, which means 'healer'. Suffice to say; when the African nuances are translated into the English language, the meaning somehow becomes skewed, probably because of a lack of words to use, or a deliberate move to disparage African customs. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 11) says the above assertion denotes the articulation of subjectivity and being, with whiteness gaining ontological density far above blackness.

Furthermore, in many instances, the destruction of mother tongue often leads to a complete loss of identity and/or value system, and in the end, it becomes a loss of sense of belonging—which helps the coloniality as power structure flourish since those who have lost their sense of belonging are now identifying with colonial culture (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 11). Despite knowing this aspect, it is surprising to find language attrition perpetuated under the banner of equality in higher education. Institutions claim that students do not want to be taught in their mother tongue, as this would not help them get employed. Of course, students are likely to feel this way, as the world with which they are familiar is asymmetrically sustained by colonial power nuances that control the

manner the students think, and therefore the students are likely to laud Western knowledge and despise or reject their own African value systems.

On the basis of the above accounts, the current South African higher education system appears to be selling coloniality as normal, suggesting there is no need for African students to protest, as this is how the world is today. This attitude is predisposed to immortalise asymmetrical pedagogical experiences, classism and racism because Eurocentrism and Americanisation, which are synonymous with globalisation, have become the power structure, while Africanism is obliterated. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 48) concurs and states that globalisation is driven by coloniality—and this in South Africa may still perpetuate social inequality that is similar to the Apartheid era. Somehow, these harsh realities have been transported into the new systems, together with the visible hegemonic principles in them. What have become worse are the developments of the new South Africa, after dawn of democracy, which are either abandoned or debated to be unnecessary. I am referring to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), affirmative action, black economic empowerment (BEE) which later became broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE). These are either scorned or discarded, and have been replaced by globalisation, which promotes Eurocentrism and Americanism. In the promotion of Americanism, which could be seen as synonymous with globalisation as Ndlovu-Gatsheni has alluded above, privilege and partisanship triumph, and black students are expected to catch up. The popular comment in South Africa today is often, “it is now 24 years after independence; yet, blacks are still crying foul. Can’t they get over it?” What is often overlooked is how deep the cuts of colonialism, apartheid and coloniality are in the lives of African people. Apart from denying Africans the basic needs enjoyed by everyone, such as quality education, coloniality destroyed the sense of worth, which left the majority losing self-worth and not trusting their own capabilities; hence, to this day South Africa still have exclusion and inclusion challenges in higher education (Mouton et al. 2013, 288).

From this asymmetry and unfairness, decoloniality arises to point at the dichotomy in education encounters, which is often rebuffed as non-existent, or to some extent is assumed to have changed in 1994. Through

decoloniality, I am going to point at what seems to have gone wrong in the new policy framework.

Oppressive Themes in the Current Higher Education System

The characteristics of the present South Africa's post-school education and training (PSET), although argued to be a democratic system, tend to depict a hybrid system approach that exhibits both the continuous apartheid ethos and a discrete forceful system borrowed from globalised institutions, such as Harvard, which tends to be worrisome as this prestige university also developed from religious dogma to what it is today (Christensen and Eyring 2011, 101). Yet, South Africa does not seem to want gradual development. Furthermore, in the current higher system, there is evidence of the functional approach favoured by the apartheid government, which embraces mostly the Platonic and Calvinistic approaches in education, and there are also traces of Americanisation. The Platonic and Calvinistic elements seem to purport the idea that students should be prepared for civil duties, that is, each person has a particular position in life and God predetermined these positions (Noddings 1998, 47). Under these approaches, men are expected to make the best of their situation. This is pretty much what the White Paper on Post-School Education and Training seems to encourage, our youth finding their places in the ecosystem. This is not necessarily a ruthless idea. However, how then can South African youth find their places in society if societal structures still embrace coloniality? Former Minister of Higher Education and Training, Dr Blade Nzimande, corroborates my assertion and states that the White Paper for Post-School Education and Training represented "the government's thinking in the area of higher education and training and is in line with the country's key national policy documents including the National Development Plan, the New Growth Path, the Industrial Policy Action Plan and the draft Human Resource Development Strategy for South Africa" (Department of Higher Education and Training 2013, vii). So, for example, if the National Development Plan (NDP) speaks of

growing an inclusive economy and solving South Africa's complex problems of unemployment, poverty and inequality, then I should be forgiven for thinking that the White Paper came into being to fast-track what could be the crisis of unemployment caused by global forces within our education system and other spheres of South African public institutions.

The Americanisation of the PSET has meant that it has become an obsession for South African education institutions to want to be recognised and rated according to the standards of world universities. In essence, the globalised rating standards are a norm in the academic world, as many institutions want to emulate Harvard (Christensen and Eyring 2011). Unfortunately, these standards also seem to maintain and perpetuate coloniality, which in turn seems to continue to marginalise the same group that was marginalised because the ratings are based on what America and Europe deem to be the best, which happens to be embedded within coloniality, as I have alluded to earlier that Ndlovu-Gatsheni says if one looks for coloniality, they should look for it in books, criteria for academic performance and so on. The question to be asked then is how can we deliberately transform the South African higher education system so that it is free of coloniality, namely apartheid and neo-liberal characteristics that sustain the asymmetrical power relations at institutions of higher learning. Beyond this, one can then argue that if the higher education system is not taken apart in order to create a new system that could provide symmetrical education encounters, higher education is headed for a huge collapse.

For instance, if the present higher education system continues to promote the colonial hegemony, which mostly still perpetuates the issues of race, the transformation ethos born from the spirit of the New South Africa, which saw *ubuntu* at the heart of South African epistemic identity, will continue to be undermined. This means our higher education system will forever overlook the national needs and caring for the other in favour of neo-liberal perspectives, which constantly undermine the concepts of Africanisation and indigenous knowledge, in favour of individualism and competition, and which continue to devour the dreams of underprivileged students. This does not only affect the lives of students; it takes South Africa back to the colonial times. And unfortunately if South

Africa does not unshackle herself from coloniality, Europe and America will continue to dominate South Africans' thought processes.

To survive the new form of coloniality the students' resistance movements are necessary and need not be seen as anti-progressive but as barometers that help assess symmetry and asymmetry within the higher education space. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, 15) corroborates the necessity of decoloniality in academic spaces by stating, "decoloniality gives ex-colonised peoples a space to judge Euro-American deceit and hypocrisy and to stand up into subject hood through judging Europe and exposing technologies of subjectivation". More to the point is that the students' rhetoric speaks of decoloniality as an epistemological means to liberation of the higher education sector. As in Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the oppressed* (Freire 1985, 41) where Freire links realisation, conscientisation and collectivism as critical loops in emancipation of societies from all forms of social oppression, decoloniality therefore can drive processes to obviate disproportionate education encounters that continue to alienate underprivileged students. Furthermore, since underprivileged students also tend to doubt their potential even when they do manage to enter higher education, decoloniality could also be used as the lens to view what is lacking within the higher education institutions in relation to structures that may be alienating to underprivileged students.

From the above position, therefore, the fundamental question is how can we free the South African higher education system from coloniality? My idea posits the theorisation of an African vision that would embrace students from all walks of life. Primarily, the higher education system that embraces an African vision will accentuate systems that evoke and restore dignity of African people by embracing indigenous knowledge in the higher education system. My argument is drawn from Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2015, 489) outlook, from which he reasons that schools, colleges, churches and universities in Africa are sites for the reproduction of coloniality and that there are no African universities but universities in Africa. More to the point is, the systems need to be geared towards developing African languages into academic languages, so that the idea of having degrees that are conducted in African languages are not seen as ridiculous. The gap that is intensified by rising costs should be closed by introducing a realistic implementation plan on how free education could be

distributed and who should benefit. In essence, the new systems should not refute the plight of black students but accept there is a problem and then map the way forward. Additionally, the African vision should be mindful of the fact that neo-liberal policies tend to favour free market capitalism and globalisation, which leads to the marginalisation of the underprivileged, which in South Africa, tend to be black people. This therefore means a system will need to be created to address local needs before embracing neo-liberal politics. More than anything, the new higher education systems should not disparage Africanism.

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7

Decoloniality of Higher Education in Zimbabwe

Monica Zembere

Introduction

This chapter utilises the decoloniality theory to understand the educational conditions and experiences of students from Zimbabwean rural secondary schools in Zimbabwean universities. The chapter adopts the concepts of ‘getting in’ and ‘getting through’ to explore the interface between rural secondary schools in Zimbabwe and higher education. The chapter argues that access to university for learners from rural day schools is still fraught with restrictions as it was in the days of colonialism. Higher education is still elitist in principle and disadvantaged students from rural day schools suffer the effects of socio-economic environment on their scholastic achievements. The findings of this research are that very few students from rural day secondary schools in Zimbabwe enrol for science- and maths-related programmes at university. If they do enrol, few of them complete their studies in science- and maths-related programmes.

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The majority of them are concentrated in the faculties of Arts and Humanities. This is attributed to either inadequate preparation of students by rural secondary schools for science-related programmes or a lack of finance as science programmes demand higher tuition. In this regard, the chapter challenges higher education policy that there is need for the decolonisation of the education system in Zimbabwe by removing barriers to equal opportunities in higher education.

The wide performance gap between rural day¹ secondary schools that are run by local councils and government-run secondary schools together with the high rate of educational failure has motivated me to search for an explanation. I use the decoloniality theory Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) to explain the predicament of students from poorly resourced schools in higher education. The chapter demonstrates how the socio-economic conditions of learners from Zimbabwe's rural day secondary schools are essentially colonial. In support of Mignolo (2000), this chapter repudiates the notion that colonialism ended with the attainment of national independence in 1980 and further argues that, although the government of Zimbabwe has put in place policies to promote equity and access in university education, students from rural day secondary schools continue to be under-represented in science programmes at university level. The chapter used an interpretivist perspective. The focus of the study reported here was to gain a deep understanding of everyday experiences of students from rural day secondary schools studying at Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE). This called for an understanding of the culture and the circumstances and backgrounds of the students.

Before 1980, education in Zimbabwe was characterised by racial discrimination (Hwami 2011). Access to education was limited to a minority people while the majority were excluded. My argument is that

¹ These are schools that do not offer boarding facilities and are run by local councils. They receive government grants so that their fees remain accessible to rural peasants. Their fees and levies are very low. As a result, the schools are characterised by low pass rates because they are poorly resourced. This is different with government-run schools that are completely funded by the state in every respect. There are also some schools that are owned by churches, mining companies. Most of these offer boarding facilities are comparatively better resourced.

access to higher education in Zimbabwe is still stratified and colonial. The establishment by the state of universities in every province has not improved the distribution of educational opportunities to people from disadvantaged rural areas. Although there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of students from rural schools attending university, participation in science and technology degree programmes is low (Hwami 2014; Mawere 2014, 57). This means that the frameworks that have been put in place by government to dismantle inequalities in education have not fully materialised as inequalities in education still persist. These inequalities are rooted in history and have been advanced by the colonial government. This substantiates assertions by Mignolo (2000) that colonialism did not end with the attainment of political independence.

Observations from Hwami (2014) are that, while the higher education system in Zimbabwe has experienced substantial growth, participation by students from day secondary schools remains low in sciences at tertiary level (Hwami 2014). The implications are that concepts such as decoloniality of access in relation to epistemological access in university entry 'getting in' and 'getting through' need to be interrogated. This study therefore analysed the educational accessibility and underachievement of students from Zimbabwe's rural day secondary schools at BUSE in Zimbabwe.

In the study, rural day secondary schools were those that do not fall under urban municipalities. They are schools situated in communal areas anywhere in Zimbabwe and do not offer boarding facilities. The difference between urban and rural day secondary schools in Zimbabwe lies in their initial environment, skills, learning ability, availability of infrastructure and access to different teaching and learning facilities (Hwami 2014). What mattered in this study was the location of the school from where a student passed his or her A level studies. In Zimbabwe, universities are still modelled along Western tradition in all respects. English is a prerequisite to university entry for any degree programme and dominates other languages. Most students from rural day secondary schools are not fluent in English and this results in them being internally excluded.

Decolonising 'Getting In' in Higher Education

'Decoloniality', 'coloniality' and 'decolonisation' are increasingly becoming key terms for movements that challenge the predominant racial, sexual, liberal and neo-liberal politics of today (Maldonado-Torres 2007). As a theory, decoloniality ascertains that the presence of colonisation is rampant in most states that went through colonisation and that the presence of coloniality is felt everywhere (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). Decoloniality is defined by Maldonado-Torres (2007) as meaning the dismantling of relationships of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender and geopolitical hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern but colonial world. In short, "decoloniality is a particular kind of critical intellectual theory as well as political project which seeks to disentangle ex-colonised parts of the world from coloniality" (McCowan 2007, 585). For Hwami (2014), education is one of the many areas where coloniality tends to take hold and reproduce itself. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and many other aspects of our modern experience (Morrow 2009). It is therefore, manifested through the long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but which define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. Schools, colleges, churches and universities in Africa are sites for the reproduction of coloniality. Observations by Mazrui (2003) are that, after formal decolonisation, universities in Africa have continued to perpetrate coloniality on the African peoples that they should have freed. Thus, scholars like Nyamnjoh (2004), Mazrui (2003) and Faleye (2014) concur that the most enduring colonial institutions in Africa are the universities. In Africa, these universities have produced exogenously induced and internalised senses of inadequacy in African people, revalorisation and annihilation of African creativity, agency and value systems, cultural estrangement, self-hatred and a profound sense of inferiority (Nyamnjoh 2012a, 160). Mazrui (2003, 140) argues thus: "The capacity to be curious

and fascinated by ideas has to start early in the educational process". The spirit of intellectualism has to be nourished from primary school onwards, but it can die at university level if mediocrity prevails. This is continued coloniality (Nyamnjoh 2012b, 63).

This fits well into Mignolo's concept of coloniality. For Mignolo (2011, 9), coloniality is a system of management and domination that affects the ways in which people are able to be in the world, based upon the social categories to which they have been allocated by birth, geography or other circumstance. I find a strong resonance between Morrow's (2009) epistemological access and McCowan's formal access (2007). Both authors are concerned about how education could be used as a vehicle to advance social injustices. The injustices in education are rooted in what Morrow (2009, 104) refers to as 'epistemic deprivation'. In the Zimbabwean situation, this can be used to explain how rural disadvantaged students are denied quality higher education opportunities, because where students live and where they attend school have an influence on their access to higher education. For instance, their habitus reflects their writing styles and the way they articulate, reflects the rural social background of the student. This kind of socialisation has been equated to colonialism by Morrow (2009) and Naidoo (2015). From the social justice perspective, this means that students are denied equal participation in education; hence, they are denied epistemological access. These are the power dynamics, which manifest in marginalisation of rural day secondary school students when they enrol at universities. Institutions such as the universities have played a role in the classification of persons and in the creation of what is considered to be valid versus invalid ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge. Decolonial thinking aims to engage in 'epistemic disobedience' (Mignolo 2011, 9) in order to envision social life, knowledge and institutions differently. Decoloniality announces the broad 'decolonial turn' that involves the "task of the very decolonisation of knowledge, power and being, including institutions such as the university" (Mignolo 2011, 10). These are knowledge that do not question methodologies or the present asymmetrical world order.

'Getting in' refers to the stages preceding enrolment to university by students. The stages include student recruitment procedures, student readiness, admission processes and requirements and finally funding

(Morrow 2009). Getting in gives prospective students an insight into what is expected of them at university level. It conscientises them in terms of the admission requirements that they need to satisfy in order to qualify for university entry and what the costs associated with each programme. The explanation above places getting in in the category of equality of rights and opportunities, because for students from rural schools to get in, all the barriers to access to higher education would have to be removed. On the other hand, expansion in higher education does not correspondingly reduce inequality and may not increase opportunities for those underprivileged students. Expansion should translate into equality of opportunities. Equality of opportunities, according to Clancy and Goastellec (2007), is about levelling the playing fields and making access to higher education possible for all people, regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds, where they live or the schools they have attended. Clancy and Goastellec (2007) argue that when access is massified, inequalities are reproduced within higher education. The inequalities are perpetuated as students are differentiated in terms of institutions of higher learning or field of study. In Zimbabwe, universities are ranked according to the quality of programmes offered. Those institutions offering sciences and technology programmes are rated highly by parents and students. Thus parents would go out of their way for their children to pass sciences and technology-related subjects. Paying for extra lessons is one such effort made by the parents for their children. However, the majority of parents in rural areas in Zimbabwe cannot afford to pay for the extra tuition for their children as most of them are poor. The rationale is that higher education continues to be colonial if it privileges those with superior socio-economic resources at the expense of students from rural secondary schools.

The proportion of rural students enrolled at the Faculty of Science at Bindura University is far below the proportion of rural population in the province. Faculties of Social Science and Humanities have a far bigger proportion of rural students. The higher enrolment of rural students at Bindura University has been explained by Hwami (2014) as influenced by the location of the university, which has a comparatively higher proportion of rural day schools compared to other universities in the country. In order to reach the rural prospective students, Bindura University

has introduced outreach programmes and open days to market its programmes. They send recruiting teams to rural areas in order to reach all prospective students. However, despite these enrolment initiatives by the university, the current research found that faculties of science are still dominated by students from urban schools and rural boarding schools. This is further substantiated by Hwami (2014) who studied enrolment at the University of Zimbabwe and noted that “those students from rural schools who make it to university are more concentrated in the social science faculties” (Hwami 2014, 4). The observation by Hwami seems to imply that the majority of rural students do not even make it to university. This indicates that where students receive their secondary education has a bearing on their access to university education. This disparity calls for the need to improve the quality of schools and education in rural areas. The difference between rural and urban students is in their initial environment, skills, learning ability, availability of infrastructure and access to different facilities. A learning environment that cannot fully prepare students for university enrolment is inadequate. Student preparedness is demonstrated by their readiness for university study. In rural day schools under-preparedness is explicated through lacking science skills, language development and the ability to think critically (Jacobs 2013). It is important to point out that if students are under-prepared, dropout rates will increase. On the same note, students’ lack of skills and language development should not be blamed on the students but rather on university feeder schools. Rural schools are characterised by inadequate teaching and learning resources, especially for sciences and other cultural essentials ideal for success in higher education (Matavire 2014). Coleman et al. (2002) argue that the background of students more than anything else determines their academic achievement. They further argue that the inequalities imposed on children by their rural background and environment are carried along to become the inequalities with which they will confront universities and adult life at the end of tertiary education. This is substantiated by the findings of research conducted at the University of Zimbabwe by Chafika (2007, 2012), which revealed low enrolment in Computer Studies of students from rural areas. Chafika (2007) asserts that the overall enrolment figures at tertiary level mask the high concentration of students from rural areas in Arts and Humanities.

This explains that, regardless of the increased number of universities in Zimbabwe, access poses a challenge, especially for people from disadvantaged groups or of low socio-economic status.

In support of the above observations, a study by Matavire (2014) on the effects of sanctions on science teaching and learning in Zimbabwe revealed gross under-preparedness of rural schools in Zimbabwe to science teaching and learning as most of the schools have “incomplete laboratories, untrained science teachers and ill-equipped libraries” (Matavire 2014, 4). These disadvantages create inequalities that need redress in the school system because they have negative implications for the preparation of learners for university studies. The underlying argument is that students from rural day schools are denied epistemological access to higher education; which is tantamount to internal colonialism. This is so because their choice of programmes of study at university is limited since their schools also limit them. In addition, students in rural secondary schools are not fully guided on which subjects are needed to qualify for science and technology-related programmes. When they finally enrol for sciences, studies have shown that there is high discontinuation of their studies and dropping out of university (Bitzer 2010). Bitzer (2010, 303) further argues that the future of students are decided long before the point of transition to higher education where universities have most influence.

Despite efforts by the government of Zimbabwe to transform universities into equality of opportunity zones, inequalities still persist as there is still unequal distribution of educational opportunities at the lower level of schooling. This is substantiated by Morrow (2009) who argues that the increase of students enrolling for university programmes does not in itself reflect a shift in epistemological access to higher education. Morrow (2009) noted ways in which students from disadvantaged schools can be enrolled in institutions of higher learning but still be denied access to higher education (internal exclusion). According to Morrow (2009), language is one such issue that can be a barrier to students from rural day schools. Most students find the transition from school to university challenging. Although students are accustomed to being taught in English at high school, the rigours of university language make it difficult for students to cope with university studies. The challenges are that at high

school, teachers often alternate between learners' home language and English in order to make students understand complex concepts. This explains why students in rural secondary schools do not develop English proficiency, which is crucial to getting through in university studies. Language is crucial in knowledge acquisition and dissemination. The majority of students in rural secondary schools take English as a second language therefore cannot articulate concepts well when enrolled at university. This inability to articulate well is a barrier to getting through because in Zimbabwe, English is the official language of instruction at secondary and tertiary level but students from poor socio-economic backgrounds have challenges in the language because English is not a language of their wider community. The use of English presents linguistic challenges to both students and staff members. This results in the risk of cutting off students from the international university community.

Inequalities are further complicated by the use of English as a medium of instruction and as a prerequisite for enrolment for learners whose first language is completely different from English language. Morrow (2009) further points out that university culture is Western culture with English dominating other languages, but most students from rural schools are not competent in English resulting in them being denied entry to university or dropping out along the way. The implications are that learners from rural day secondary schools are hindered from reaching their full potential and achieving grades required for university entry (getting in). Universities thus privilege a particular knowledge at the expense of another.

'Getting Through' and Epistemological Access

The section above referred to two types of access, getting in and epistemological access. 'Getting in' refers to young people being admitted and registered as students at an institution. 'Epistemological access' refers to the knowledge that the university distributes. In the previous section, I outlined factors that may hinder students from rural day secondary schools from participating fully in their university studies. 'Getting through' refers to the period students spend within a higher education

institution. It highlights the support that students receive from their institutions in order to succeed (Mignolo 2011). In this case, 'getting through' may include the orientation that students receive as they enrol at a university, academic support for student and institutional culture. There are other non-student factors that could affect students' success at university. These are the academic environment and the pedagogical techniques used by the lecturer. Academic support is assistance that universities offer to students through mentoring and tutoring programmes. This is done to assist students in adapting well to the institutional culture. It bridges the gap between school and the first year of university experience. At BUSE, student mentoring and tutoring is compromised by large classes (Zembere 2018). The academic staff do not have adequate time to mentor individual students. As a result of poor mentoring, most students from rural secondary schools fail their first semester courses.

Funding is another crucial issue in promoting access to higher education. For instance, before potential students are admitted to college, they need to apply. Each application for a university enrolment should be accompanied by an application fee of US\$20 (2018 and 2019 application fees for state institutions). This amount may inhibit would-be students from applying because it is exorbitant especially for people in rural areas who rely on government support for subsistence. Application forms that are not accompanied by an application fee are not processed. Further to that, all state and private universities have stopped subsidising higher education. Although the government fixes tuition fees for universities in Zimbabwe, the fees are far too high for students from rural secondary schools who may wish to study sciences because programmes have different tuition fees. Science and technology programmes have higher fees than the Arts and Humanities. Extra fees in sciences are explained in terms of practical lessons that students undertake when studying science programmes. The disparity in tuition fees makes sciences a preserve of those from rich families. This explains epistemic deprivation of students from disadvantaged rural areas. Matavire (2014) revealed that some universities in Zimbabwe have resorted to enrolling students based on their ability to pay rather than on prior education excellence.

When students are admitted at an institution of higher learning, they are expected to get through the institutional culture and environment.

For students to get through, universities should make available student facilities like accommodation and institutional funding. In other words, 'getting through' is about institutional support that the students receive in order to be successful in their studies. 'Getting through' entails student readiness to deal with academic rigours of scholarship as well. In this regard, Hwami (2014) cites under-preparedness for higher education as a manifestation of poor secondary schooling and elaborates that universities that do not give students financial support are in a way denying students epistemological access. Students from rural day secondary schools require institutional funding, without which the dropout rate is high and completion of the degree programme is delayed. This means that disadvantaged students do not enjoy the positional benefits of higher education. For instance, universities in Zimbabwe are rated according to their programmes, with those into science and technology highly esteemed and rated. This automatically makes their degrees marketable. Students who are enrolled in science and technology-related degrees have higher chances of getting study scholarships and better job prospects than those in the Arts and Humanities. In this regard, the opportunities of rural day school students continue to dwindle because of poor high school background. In some instances, these students from disadvantaged schools will end up enrolling in poorly resourced institutions that are not popular, further widening the gap between them and those from advantaged schools. This conclusively means that widening access in higher education may not bring any benefits to students from disadvantaged school background if barriers to access are not removed. For McCowan (2013, 113), higher education systems are not fair if they restrict certain individuals and groups to institutional experiences that confer less positional advantage.

This chapter has illuminated the challenges faced by students from rural day secondary school system that have a negative influence on access to university education. Using the concepts of 'getting in' and 'getting through', the chapter demonstrated that, despite the efforts to widen participation in Zimbabwe, more needs to be done to reach out to students from rural secondary schools. This chapter further pointed out that more attention needs to be given to basic requirements, such as enrolment policy, residences and funding in order to assist deserving but needy

students from disadvantaged families in rural areas who wish to pursue careers in science and technology.

The chapter concludes that the rural secondary schools supply insufficient numbers of students who have the potential to pursue the sciences and technology-related degree programmes because students from rural secondary schools are not exposed to high-level cognitive activities, which could prepare them better for university education (McCowan 2013). This study revealed the entrenched social inequalities that are exemplified by the urban–rural divide.

I further argued that, while significant strides have been made regarding physical and epistemological access at Bindura University of Science Education, there is still a low participation rate in science-related programmes for students from low socio-economic backgrounds. Physical access is therefore still difficult to attain, as demonstrated by the findings on ‘getting in’ and ‘getting through’. I also highlighted in this chapter challenges related to ‘getting in’ and ‘getting through’ in science programmes at BUSE. Inadequate preparation by the school of learners for university studies is manifested in low enrolment and poor performance in science programmes at BUSE.

Based on the above, I make the following recommendations. First, it is vital to facilitate career guidance and counselling at school level, particularly in rural secondary schools. Second, first-year students need to be accommodated in residences, as this will help them adjust to university life and its demands. Funding should be made available to disadvantaged and needy students who wish to pursue careers in sciences, and application fees for sciences must be waived to promote access to these programmes by students from rural areas.

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8

Towards Decolonisation Within University Education: On the Innovative Application of Educational Technology

Faiq Waghid

Introduction

Traditional teaching and learning methodologies are proving to be inadequate to address the needs of higher education institutions. These traditional, chalk-and-talk pedagogies seem to have eroded one of the core values of higher education, namely, the cultivation of communities of inquiry. Higher education institutions, as places nurturing communities of inquiry, should ideally be democratised spaces according to which learning through deliberation and critical reflection can occur. It may be reasoned that, due to the inability of higher education institutions to affirm their standing towards the cultivation of critical reflection, we are experiencing protests calling for the decolonisation of curricula. We cannot assume that our students are empty vessels, needing to be filled with knowledge compiled by dominant and exclusive ideologies. For instance, expecting of students to acquire and apply practical knowledge compiled

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by a hegemonic world view for use in a specific context is proving to be tremendously ineffective. Examples of such issues have been seen in the African higher educational realm, where students are not necessarily trained to function effectively in the everyday contexts with which they are confronted on completion of their studies. Ensuring that curricula are not marred by such inefficacies, we need to ensure that higher education institutions remain democratised spaces where communities of inquiry can deliberate, collaborate and reflect, in order to remain attentive to the needs of students and, inevitably, the broader society.

As a result, there has been much debate regarding what would constitute the decolonisation of education. Extensive debate has stemmed from the real-world relevance of curricula, students' voices and domination of certain world views. This chapter envisages to contribute to those debates by exploring instances of the innovative use of educational technology as a means to flatten hierarchical control, whereby we are able to move away from teacher-centred approaches towards more democratic, inclusive forms of teaching and learning in the main, establishing communities of inquiry. The flattening of student–lecturer hierarchical relationships may ensure that students are exposed not only to hegemonic knowledge traditions but also to other forms of knowledge towards which they are able to contribute collectively during teaching and learning interventions. This may ultimately lead to a higher-quality curriculum, informed by the lived experiences of students and which are attentive to the needs of the broader society.

Innovative use of educational technologies espoused in this chapter focuses primarily on the creation of democratised spaces in which lecturers and students engage one another freely and equally. There already exists a plethora of research pointing towards the use of innovative educational technology fostering the creation of deliberative spheres, equalisation of pedagogical relationships and the opportunity for students to act as autonomous beings (see for instance (McHaney 2011; Beaudoin 2002)). Such research findings may already have confirmed that the innovative use of educational technology is able to ensure that the collective voices of our students, echoing different perspectives, experiences and epistemologies, are no longer marginalised.

By far one of the most significant aspects to which higher education institutions have to adhere in this era, is to remain responsive and relevant in relation to their teaching and learning offerings. However, the realisation of this aspect is often constrained by higher education institutions having to produce a student clientele that can function in a competitive global labour market economy. Higher education institutions have always played a pivotal role in preparing students for the workplace; however, a concern remains the influence colonialism and subsequently neo-liberalism continue to have on university strategies in an attempt to engender responsible and responsive students. Although every university in South Africa would claim to have its own individualised 'graduate attributes' it considers apposite for its graduates to acquire, there seemingly exist many synergies and parallels in relation to how universities conceptualise and advocate such attributes. In the main, defensible 'graduate attributes' ought to be constituted by an individual being critical, enlightened, technologically adept and becoming a globally informed citizen. If the aforementioned attributes were to be acquired by students, they may be favourably positioned to contribute towards enhancing Africa's socio-political and economic development.

As the term denotes, 'decolonisation' presents an endeavour to move away from what was colonised. By implication, it is universally recognised that colonisation represents a fractured approach to human living, resulting in the marginalisation of one group of individuals, as their ways of living are deemed to be insignificant to a dominant group. These ways of living may pertain to the cultural, intellectual and political ways of being, such as how the dominant Afrikaner apartheid government in the 1980s and 1990s prioritised their interests above the interests of all others. The decolonisation of education calls for the rupturing of dominant ways of thinking towards more representative assemblages of knowledge. This requires individuals to enact their autonomy by critically reflecting on underlying assumptions of the curriculum rather than having to be subservient. Here curriculum as espoused by Pinar (2004, 9), is described as being a "complicated conversation". As argued by Pinar (2004, 9) "academic knowledge, subjectivity, and society are inextricably linked". Therefore, the conversation pertaining to curriculum further requires

“intellectual judgement, critical thinking, ethics, and self-reflexivity ... [and] a common faith in the possibility of self-realization and democratisation” (Pinar 2004, 8). Here, ‘self-reflexivity’ and ‘democratisation’ refer to types of questioning that bring into controversy what people encounter without just endorsing uncritically, such as a curriculum and its goals. When students and teachers begin questioning a curriculum they rupture its knowledge interests subjectively, and thus put into question its reasonableness and legitimacy to respond to a transformative societal context. However, decolonisation alone does not only constitute questioning but also necessitate individuals to realise what Rancière (1992, 59) refers to as their “intellectual equality”, through the sharing of ideas and opinions that may contribute towards addressing societal concerns. The realisation of students’ “intellectual equality” aligns with one of the core values of higher education institutions, namely to remain democratised spaces fostering the creation of communities of inquiry. Calls for the decolonisation of education therefore require of higher education to reaffirm its place, fostering the creation of communities of inquiry, to expedite the rupturing of hegemonic ways of thinking promoted in some curricula, enabled by individuals enacting their criticality and autonomy. By implication, communities of inquiry necessitate the flattening of hierarchical control, shifting from teacher-centred chalk-and-talk pedagogies towards more student-centred pedagogies. Pedagogies, drawing on the innovative use of educational technologies, have therefore been deemed as a means to move away from teacher-centred pedagogies towards more open and reflexive pedagogies, and consequently to enable the decolonisation of higher education as they allow for students to share different perspectives, experiences and epistemologies.

A Rancièrian Enactment of Educational Technology for Decolonisation of Education

As discussed in the previous section, decolonisation of education espoused in this chapter necessitates that we democratise our pedagogical practices towards the adoption of more open and reflexive pedagogies, augmented through the innovative use of educational technologies.

However, a concern regarding the implementation of democratic education is that we assume that everyone who is not yet part of the sphere of democratic education should be included in it. Certainly, in relation to students enacting their autonomy by sharing their cultural, political and intellectual ways of being, it could be assumed that the innovative use of educational technology would offer every student an opportunity to be included in democratic educational practices and, hence, make possible the decolonisation of education. It is therefore taken for granted that democratic education practices would be advantageous for the learning of students if they (the students) were to be included in such practices. The problem with such a practice of democratic education is that the practice in itself is not questioned and it is merely assumed that the practice would in fact democratise students because something is done to them. That is, they are assumed to be organised under conditions of democracy. It is at this juncture that I find Jacques Rancière's view of democratic education appealing for recognition of students' voices.

Rancière (2006) challenges the insistence on current procedures of democratic education in particular in the book *Hatred of democracy*, and offers a more positive way of thinking about democratic education. The current procedures involve teachers and students being grouped together and organised so that they engage with one another and listen and respond to one another's views in a critical manner. As a brilliant student of Louis Althusser in the 1960s, Rancière distanced himself radically from his teacher's work, specifically his different treatment of the concept of equality (Masschelein and Simons 2011, 3). According to Rancière (2006), Althusser, views equality is a promise or reward in the distant future that people have to aspire to attain through democratic education practices. By conceiving equality as yet to be achieved, the Althusserian view holds that current inequality eventually has to be eradicated through democratic education practices (Masschelein and Simons 2011, 3). According to this view, a distance is maintained between a present inequality and a distant equality, and consequently the student and teacher remain separated. Following such a view of democratic education, those students who are incapable of deliberating and those who can deliberate remain apart because the task of democratic education would be to ensure that deliberation is attained in classroom practices. Such a

condition may not be conducive to efforts to decolonise education, as not all students' perspectives, experiences and epistemologies are represented.

Rancière challenges the aforementioned view of equality, and argues that equality is a claim to be made by all those who are considered as being 'outside' the practice of democratic education (Rancière 2006, 18). In other words, democratic education does not mean that those considered 'outsiders', who make the claim of equality, want to be included in democratic practices. Rather, as equals they "want to redefine the [democratic] order in such a way that new identities, new ways of doing and being become possible and can be counted" (Biesta 2009, 110). This implies that democratic education "is no longer a process of inclusion of excluded parties into the existing [democratic] order; it rather is a transformation of that order in the name of equality ... [and the] impetus for the transformation does not come from inside but from the outside" (Biesta 2009, 110). In a way, democratic education is about the power of those who have no or little power, those who are less qualified or less competent but who nevertheless intervene to install a momentary disruption and dissensus. They are intellectually equal in the very act of intervention and competent in view of the common [democratic practice] from which they are nevertheless excluded (Masschelein and Simons 2011, 5). And, for Rancière (2006, 18), "a dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions, or values; it is a division put in the common sense: a dispute about what is given, about the frame within which we see something as given" (Rancière 2006, cited in Masschelein and Simons 2011, 82). Put differently, when 'outsiders' intervene they verify their equality as beings that are able to disrupt hegemonic voices that promote their views above all others. Equality refers to the assumption (and not the fact) that we all are able to (be qualified), and does not refer to the classic idea that we all have equal capacities, share particular qualifications or should have equal opportunities. Equality for Rancière (2006, 18), is always intellectual equality and intellect or intelligence [and refers to] an ability to (speak, understand) (Masschelein and Simons 2011, 83). Therefore, assuming that everyone is equal implies assuming that everyone, regardless of their qualifications, 'is able to'. For instance, every student is able to participate in deliberative moments and has the ability to disrupt such conversations through his or her ability to speak and under-

stand. The hatred or fear of democracy therefore refers to the hatred of those who are dominant and more eloquent who think they have a particular reason to govern and control a democratic practice. The dominant actually fear those who intervene in the name of equality, namely the less dominant, often marginalised, other. Such a call for equality may be able to ensure that the collective voices of our students, echoing different perspectives, experiences and epistemologies are no longer marginalised.

The importance of Rancière's (2006, 18) work is that he thinks differently about democratic education and inclusion. For him, democratic education is sporadic in the sense that people from 'outside', in other words less powerful or less democratic people, disrupt or interrupt the perceived democratic education practices in the name of equality. The innovative use of educational technologies may therefore support these less powerful or less democratic voices, as students are encouraged to create new forms of learning and to discover modes of action to make things happen (Masschelein and Simons 2011, 6). In Rancièrian terms, students have the ability to speak, to understand and to reshape an educational practice, through the sharing of their cultural, intellectual and political ways of being. In this way, they are potentially able to disrupt hegemonic world views and consequently ensure the conditions by which the decolonisation of education can be realised. The innovative use of educational technology for the decolonisation of education espoused in this chapter draws primarily on a Rancièrian notion of democracy proposed in this section, whereby the intellectual equality of students, as autonomous beings, is recognised.

Innovative Use of Educational Technologies

Universities face many challenges in their attempts to decolonise education and, consequently, to ensure that they remain places fostering the creation of communities of inquiry. These challenges are also not alleviated by teacher-centred chalk-and-talk pedagogies. In addition, contextual variables, such as high student to teacher ratios and a densely packed curriculum, further overwhelming universities with an inability to remain responsive and relevant in relation to their teaching and learning offerings.

As mentioned earlier, chalk-and-talk pedagogies put primary emphasis on the actions of the teacher. These pedagogies do not necessitate an action from the student. As a consequence, students are seen as empty vessels that need to be filled with the knowledge that has been bestowed onto their teachers. Teaching and learning interventions of this order can be seen as mere information sessions or briefings whereby there is simply a dissemination of content information. Whether information exhibits cultural, political or intellectual bias towards a hegemonic group, is dependent largely on the interpretations of a teacher. Consequently, this pedagogy leaves little room for rupturing and the subsequent sharing of other perspectives, experiences and epistemologies. Opportunities for students to rupture the given order are further diminished by the students themselves who have been conditioned over many years with chalk-and-talk approaches to merely regurgitate knowledge acquired from teachers in order to pass examinations. But if universities are to remain responsive and relevant, an exploration of more innovative pedagogies is required. The innovative use of educational technologies has been seen as an answer to the calls for the decolonisation of education. Although there exists a multitude of educational technologies with the potential to support the decolonisation of education, I explore but a few instances of how open and reflexive pedagogies, augmented through the use of educational technologies, may facilitate the movement away from hegemonic views.

The Flipped Classroom—Podcasting

Educational technologies are seen as any form of technology, used to address teaching and learning needs, and one such technology that is used to address an array of teaching and learning needs is that of a podcast. Derived from the name iPod, an mp3 player developed by Apple incorporated, and the word 'broadcast', podcasts generically known as 'netcasts' are audio or video recordings that can be downloaded. Podcasting, as an educational technology, has long been used as a tool to facilitate revision and self-paced learning, as students can rewatch or relisten to recordings of lectures.

With traditional pedagogies, the following sequence is typically adhered to: a student attends a lecture, frantically tries to document what a teacher is conveying in a lecture, and then tries to make meaning of documented notes at home. Little or no time is therefore allocated for students to question or potentially rupture hegemonic views or sharing of other, different perspectives, experiences and epistemologies on the part of the students. With a flipped classroom, this sequence is essentially flipped around. A short podcast is typically used to convey a particular concept, rather than using valuable face-to-face contact time to disseminate content. This podcast is viewed at students' leisure, at home or a place of their choosing. Once students have had the opportunity to engage with the podcast, they are able to enact their autonomy by critically reflecting on underlying assumptions regarding concepts discussed in the short podcast, to engage with the teacher and peers in dialogue. Consequently, face-to-face time is therefore used more meaningfully for deliberation and the potential rupturing of hegemonic views. Flipped pedagogies can therefore be used to foster the creation of a sphere in which there is rich dialogue, rather than using valuable contact time for content dissemination. From a Rancièrian perspective, this innovative use of educational technology may allow for conditions whereby students may enact their equal ability to speak, to understand and to reshape an educational practice, through the sharing of their cultural, intellectual and political ways of being. As a consequence, this will ensure the disruption of hegemonic views and the subsequent condition whereby the decolonisation of education can be realised. It is therefore not podcasting as a tool per se that could flatten hierarchical student–teacher interactions, but rather the innovative use of this educational technology, that may disrupt traditional power relations present within traditional pedagogies.

Audience Response Systems—Clickers

As discussed earlier, over the years, students have become conditioned to remain mere passive participants in classrooms constituting chalk-and-talk pedagogies. As also mentioned, these pedagogies are not conducive

to fostering enabling environments in which the decolonisation of education can be realised. Another innovative use of an educational technology, which may facilitate the democratisation of pedagogical practices and subsequent decolonisation of education, is the use of audience response systems, commonly referred to as 'clickers'.

Clickers have been used since the 1960s in various areas of industry, such as in corporate meetings to get an anonymous reflection of individuals' true opinion. In education, clickers have been used to move students from passive to active learning. Teachers also make use of clickers to potentially move the focus of dominant voices in the class towards the entire classroom cohort. Such an innovative use of educational technology therefore has many congruencies with a Rancièrian notion of democratic education. McHaney (2011) suggests that clickers follow principles of game-based learning. Furthermore, he proposes that as students already use computer gaming for entertainment, there exists the possibility to foster the same level of excitement attained in gaming in their learning as well. Audience response systems typically collate the responses that students have made on small calculator-sized electronic devices. Typically, a teacher would set up a multiple-choice question and students are able to vote for the option that they feel is most appropriate.

Clickers by itself do not contribute to the decolonisation of education, as podcasts alone do not contribute to the decolonisation of education, but rather the innovative use of clickers can be seen as an enabler for the use of open and reflexive pedagogies required for the decolonisation of education. It is therefore up to teachers to use these educational technologies, such as clickers, to augment their teaching and learning practices towards the creation of enabling environments, through which students and teachers engage with one another as intellectual equals, free of any forms marginalisation, towards addressing societal concerns, in a democratic fashion.

Moreover, the successful implementation of clickers depends largely on questions posed by lecturers or students. Ideally, there is no right or wrong answer, but every response on the part of a student is an opportunity for the demonstration of the student's autonomy, as students share their critical reflections of underlying assumptions. These assumptions ideally pertain to resolving a societal issue, in which students are able to demonstrate their intellectual, cultural and political equality. In such an

instance, audience response systems or clickers could therefore serve as an enticement for students to participate in classroom practices, through which they (students) articulate their reasoning towards addressing societal concerns, moving away from teacher-centred practices that may be hegemonic in nature.

Social Networking Sites—Discussion Forums

The final innovative educational technology application to be discussed in relation to the decolonisation of education in this chapter is the use of social networking sites. Social networks have changed human interaction in a dramatic way. They have revolutionised the ways individuals interact, connect and share information (Towner and Munoz 2011, 34). Essentially, social networks are linked websites that give a sense of an online community to people in which there is a sharing of information on a person's character and interests (McHaney 2011, 81). Social networks encourage the communal exchange of text, audio or video in real time. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are but a few examples of social networks. Social networking allows users to set up online identities, known as profiles. These profiles can be viewed by others in this online community, and may display bio-geographical information, pictures and the likes and dislikes of the user, as well as what currently is on the mind of a user via a status update (McHaney 2011, 81). Since the inception of these social networking websites, there has been a redefining of the ways in which students study, do homework, read and partake in discussions (McHaney 2011). McHaney (2011, 81) avers that, in his research and surveys, all students emphasised the importance of social networks and that they interwove their academic experience with the social network community of which they form part. Given their level of personal involvement and the time students spend on social networking sites, as well as its potential for community development, teachers started trying to integrate social networking sites as part of teaching pedagogy (Towner and Munoz 2011, 35). Today, social networking sites are regarded as an essential part of students' social life, not only as a communication tool but also for electronic socialisation (Towner and Munoz 2011, 33).

Many students regard tertiary studies as being social experiences, and students are able to communicate with friends or friends of friends through these social networking sites groups to gain insight when writing reports or preparing for examinations (McHaney 2011, 80). This form of social interaction among students who form part of this community facilitates knowledge creation (McHaney 2011, 81). That being said, many connected individuals all contributing to knowledge production, through the sharing of ideas, perspectives and epistemologies, seems to be far more engaging than students acquiring knowledge on a particular aspect from a dominant source. The point I am making is that being engaged collectively is educationally far more enriching than being subjected to a process of transmission of knowledge, often in a non-engaged way, by a teacher. In this way, classroom practices are democratised through the engagement of students and teachers, rather than students being subjected to disinterested knowledge transmission by a teacher. The engagement of teachers and students therefore should be an assemblage that is both recuperative and disruptive of the striations that order the assemblage (Ringrose 2011, 613).

As social networking sites' popularity has increased, teachers and students have come into contact, as they share the same social space (Towner and Munoz 2011, 36). Mazer et al. (2009, 174) suggest that teachers with a rich self-disclosure on social networking sites increase students' motivation and affective learning, as well as the credibility of the teachers. These relationships, built on online spaces, result in students communicating more effectively in classroom practices, as students are more familiar with their teachers. This is in congruence with research conducted in the field of social networking, which indicates that online environments increase class satisfaction, a sense of community and student performance (Beaudoin 2002, 147)—which are necessary for the decolonisation of education.

Social networking sites offer students a convenient way to be in contact with their teachers, as teachers are not always afforded the opportunity to communicate with students to address students' post-lesson questions or issues of general enquiry (Li and Pitts 2009, 175). It allows students the facility to communicate with teachers when time constraints do not permit face-to-face interaction (Li and Pitts 2009, 175). This is in

consonance with the perceptions of students using social networking sites, namely that it is a learning tool for students rather than a means of instruction for teachers (Towner and Munoz 2011, 50). The negative perception of social networking sites, in particular that it could undermine a teacher's pedagogical authority, is due to the fact that there is a general lack of knowledge regarding the educational potential of social networking sites (Towner and Munoz 2011, 51). Social networking sites, as various other technologies, are improving in terms of functionality and features that contribute to it, thus becoming a credible means of knowledge dissemination (Towner and Munoz 2011, 51). It is up to teachers to implement social networking sites effectively to facilitate forms of learning that go beyond the perception that social networking sites are mostly used as a recreational tool and consequently an innovative means to democratise and consequently facilitate the decolonisation of education (Towner and Munoz 2011, 51).

As a result, social networking sites have the potential to engage students collectively, allowing them to interact with one another and with teachers autonomously. And, when the latter occurs, classrooms can be democratised because democratisation emphasises that students and teachers engage with one another, listen to one another's views, and offer responses to one another's claims about knowledge. By using social networking sites, students have an opportunity to be included not as 'outsiders', but as collective 'insiders' who can contribute meaningfully to the pedagogical process as they realise their autonomy, and consequently the decolonisation of education, through the sharing of their cultural, intellectual and political ways of being.

Conclusion

As denoted, colonisation represented a fractured way of living, resulting in the marginalisation of a less dominant group. The less dominant group may be represented by students who are habitually marginalised by traditional teacher-centred pedagogies. In this chapter, colonisation was equated with such teacher-centred pedagogies, as they both constrain the voices echoing different ideas and perspectives to that of the

dominant group. Decolonisation of education therefore calls for universities to reaffirm their places fostering the creation of communities of inquiry. These democratised spaces would allow for all students to realise their autonomy through critical reflection on the underlying assumptions and the sharing of diverse perspectives, experiences and epistemologies. It was proposed that the innovative use of educational technologies, described in this chapter, may augment open and reflexive pedagogies further, so that students may enact a Rancièrian notion of democratic education, whereby their intellectual equality can be realised. In this manner, it may be argued that the innovative use of educational technologies may enable the decolonisation of education, as the pedagogical activities that constitute student engagement would hopefully be democratised.

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9

Examining an Education for Decoloniality Through a Senian Notion of Democratic Education: Towards Cultivating Social Justice in Higher Education

Zayd Waghid

Introduction

During the heydays of apartheid, the segregationist curriculum in South Africa mostly underscored the interests of the dominant minority group at the expense of the social, economic and intellectual well-being of the majority. The aim of the post-apartheid South African government in redressing such social injustices inherited from the education system and ideology of the previous regime is manifested in the current regime's agenda of promulgating numerous education and economic policies, which directs the state and its institutions towards reaching its social imperatives and goals in and through higher education (Badat 2010, 4; Waghid and Hibbert 2018b). Teaching and learning remain at the fulcrum

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in (higher) education in responding to the (un)just relationships existing in both university and societal contexts. The South African Council on Higher Education (CHE) (2016, 143) further corroborates this by holding teaching and learning as:

- the key necessary for higher education institutions in addressing societal inequalities;
- a solution to the country's dire need for skills development;
- a means to economic growth and
- “the path that holds out the most hope for individual social mobility and financial security” (CHE 2016, 145).

Certainly, for universities to respond to advancing the intellectual capacities among university students requires university educators to be attuned to the needs of students, particularly with the recent call by the #RhodesMustFall movement in South Africa to ‘decolonise’ the education curricula. And, as academics in South African universities continue to engage in the discourse around the decolonisation of education curricula in higher education, more specifically in the responsive demands to place Africa at the centre of its own education, calls mount for (re)examining the seemingly entrenched colonial mindset that exists within contemporary South African society. In considering decolonisation as an attempt by an individual, government or party to break away from the confines of its colonialist history and ties, this chapter reflects on decoloniality, looking specifically at a conscious and deliberate breaking away from colonialist perceptions of society as a means to invoke in students the capacities to disrupt social injustices.

The concept of decoloniality I infer involves breaking away from the colonialist ties of South African education through which university students continue to be silently assimilated into a culture of a neo-colonialist society. This culture of neo-colonialism seems to be one in which universities continue to be out of touch with the African way of life as evidenced by the call by the #RhodesMustFall movement for a decolonised education curricula and particularly at historically advantaged universities. In this regard, breaking free from the persistent neo-colonialist links between university students and society, means that the capabilities of university

students, more specifically their basic political and liberal rights—that is, their rights to free speech as Sen (1999) avers—should be (re)examined to attempt to influence universities to move towards disrupting the inherent and perpetual undemocratic conditions that exist in contemporary South African society.

In this chapter, I reflect on certain democratic aims of an education for decoloniality as a means towards disrupting university students' unexamined neo-colonialist perceptions and assumptions regarding contemporary South African and the global society. It is for this reason I am attracted to a Senian account of democracy (Sen 1999), which I argue, is strongly linked to and frames cultivation of an education for decoloniality. In using this framework as a basis for my argument, I reflect on three virtues of Senian democracy, namely its intrinsic importance, instrumental contributions and constructive roles (Sen 1999) in relation to an education for decoloniality. I then reflect on the instances necessary for the process of cultivating an education for decoloniality and explore the internal Senian unfreedoms (Sen 1999) in a way that could possibly lead to a more profound and lasting decolonising of one's thoughts as a member of an unequal society.

Considering the Necessity of Senian Democratic Virtues for an Education for Decoloniality

The mental and intellectual subjugation of the colonised mind, which I posit as itself a form of unfreedom, can be attributed to an inherent reliance on cultures, values and, more importantly, identity not being attuned to the African context. For the colonised mind to be liberated from the confines and restraints of the neo-colonialist leash by implication means that democracy as an aim and underpinning of an education for decoloniality requires a means towards expanding the freedoms that people enjoy, or are entitled to enjoy (Sen 1999, 3). A Senian account of development (social and economic development of a country or society) requires the removal of the major sources of unfreedom: poverty, poor

economic opportunities as well as social deprivation, and neglect of public facilities together with intolerance of overactivity of repressive states (Sen 1999, 3).

If one accepts that the aim of an education for decoloniality ought to be that of cultivating students who believe in and are committed to social justice, such an educational approach warrants the need to transform pedagogic practices and hierarchies of authority or power in university classes. Sen's (1999) account of the intrinsic importance of democracy lies in its connection with the enactment, rather than the simple listing and recommendation, of basic political and liberal rights. I argue that the first virtue of democracy, which Sen (1999) describes as the intrinsic and direct importance of political and liberal rights in human living, is commensurate with basic capabilities (including political and social participation) and is necessary for the transformation and development of a higher education curriculum attuned to the needs of those who are considered to be—and/or perceive themselves to be—'colonised'. The intrinsic importance of political rights resides in the belief that people in society ought to be empowered in democratic conditions to contribute towards political discourse through free speech, and that free speech means that individuals have rights to disagree with the rhetoric used by a political party or government.

In the context of political rights, considering that much of the recent higher education rhetoric in South Africa has been aimed at the how and what of the decolonisation of university curricula, decolonisation or decoloniality means that students' social and democratic rights should not be infringed upon. I argue that this group whose rights have been infringed upon could and should include university students who are not in agreement with the violent protests of a politically driven student movement affecting the functioning of universities and would imply that this group of students should not be coerced or subjected to intimidation. Socially responsible student leaders thus ought to be aware at all times of their own actions and the consequences thereof and not force their ideologies on others for the sake of what they understand to be the 'decolonising' of higher education or for their own personal gain. This tendency ironically represents in fact a (re)colonising of the minds of

students who may feel pressured to shift their own values and identities to be in line with the status quo.

My argument is that any just or examined notion of an education for decoloniality would or should not require students to dismiss Western knowledge, values and attitudes comprehensively and vociferously. The question then arises: were some students within the wider movement to resist the total discounting and rejection of Western knowledge openly, would such an approach to education mean that these students are not in solidarity with those members of our society who are continuously subjugated and kept in poverty by the system that is in place in South Africa? When students who are not in agreement with some of the aims of the student movement towards a decolonised education—as ‘decolonised’ is understood by this movement—are compelled by student leadership to follow an ideology and, in so doing, abandoning their own views and identities for the sake of ‘Africanisation’, I would argue that this seems to impede their process of intellectual development. The very aim of democratic thinking under the guise of a decolonised education approach is essentially undermined when student leaders become consumed with the notion of totally eradicating Western knowledge and ideologies to the extent of hardening a strident ‘anti-West’ obsession.

Sen (2006, 92) presents an interesting account of the dialectics of the colonised mind, in the course of which he argues that, for individuals to consider themselves as the ‘other’ in essence imposes a heavy penalty on the lives and freedoms of people who are reactively obsessed with the West. An anti-West obsession, accompanied by violent destruction of university resources—the very resources needed to expand students’ freedoms—paradoxically exacerbates and adds to the unfreedoms experienced by university students. And when a group of such university students engage in destructive and criminal actions, they essentially limit some of the capabilities of other students from being enacted.

By not questioning an approach that leads to exacerbating such forms of unfreedoms, these stridently anti-Western knowledge students effectively lose their agency and in essence risk becoming (re)colonised under the guise of a different, more ‘legitimate’ ideology. Hence, it would seem clear that devising an education for decoloniality would or should not be

a straightforward or mechanical process of conceptualising the what or how of decolonising, but rather a way of respecting the rights of students who come from a range of different cultures, and hold a range of ideas and values, whilst at the same time conscientising and sharing these with others through respect, harmony and accountability.

What I am arguing for is an educational approach towards assisting university students and educators to reflect critically and in an informed way on the injustices of the past without becoming obsessed with the notion of decolonisation in its narrowest form, and determined on instantly compensating for and redressing past wrongs. Students, who are indoctrinated for the sake of achieving what they see as their economic rights, in essence ironically violate their social rights. And when they become oblivious to their own social rights being infringed upon, their political rights are in turn inadvertently affected. Thus, any understanding of the intrinsic importance of political and liberal rights should not be divorced from individuals' social and economic rights. Gyekye (1997, 143) corroborated this view as a comprehensive conception of deep democracy, linking it in profound ways with the renowned definition of democracy as "government for and by the people". Gyekye (1997, 143) suggests that the 'for' in this conception of democracy signifies the total and collective welfare of people—that is, their well-being in the social, cultural and political spheres of society. It is possible to relate such an understanding of democracy within Sen's (1999) conception of the intrinsic importance of political and liberal rights, including the basic and elementary capabilities of students. The elucidation of the understandings of Gyekye (1997) and Sen (1999) of the nature of political and liberal rights by implication, means that an education for decoloniality should always take into consideration helping students to be aware of the interconnectedness of their political and liberal rights, and their social and economic rights.

I further argue that Sen's (1999, 152) second virtue of democracy which he sees as the instrumental role of basic and political rights in "enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including their claim for economic needs)", as being necessary for an education for decoloniality. Alongside the instrumental role of basic and liberal rights, one needs to consider the

political incentives that function in governments and which act upon individuals who are in office and/or in a position of power (Sen 1999, 152). Governments obviously have reason to listen to what people want if they are to increase voter support and remain in office (Sen 1999). Sen (1999) gives an interesting account of famine or the absence thereof in an independent democratic country. For Sen (1999, 152) no significant amount of famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a reasonably free press. For a country such as South Africa, where people who are living in destitute conditions despite being afforded the right to vote for the ruling party, the question arises: how and why are their economic rights continually being infringed upon despite the intended aim of a democratic government to cultivate societal justice and equality 25 years into democracy?

Recently in South Africa, much of the discourse in Parliament has been around an amendment to the South African Constitution regarding expropriating land without compensation. Certainly, for the political analyst and commentator, such an idea represents simply an attempt by government, in the context of an imminent election to increase its vote count through using attractive political discourse. Critics of such an approach would argue that, when the economy suffers as a result of political discourse insensitive to foreign investors' needs, then one needs to probe how societal development can take place if holistically economic capabilities are being infringed upon in such a way that the most destitute are left worse off. While such a critic certainly has a valid argument from an economic perspective, such a view of development narrowly linked to economic growth implies that the critic himself or herself has become heavily influenced by the notion that social and economic development can only occur through foreign investment or as a result of intervention from the West or Europe. By holding this view, one can see this critic as him- or herself displaying some connection to Sen's (2006) account of the dialectics of a colonised mind.

There is little doubt that a contentious debate regarding land redistribution may not gain favour among those who possess land for economic survival and sustainability in South Africa and abroad. Critics may further argue that such an approach by government to redistribute land among the historically disadvantaged may not ultimately achieve social

equality. This issue has generated a range of arguments and viewpoints. More than 30 years ago, Le Grand (1982) offered an important counter-argument to the taken-for-granted assumption that welfare institutions (and in the context of this chapter, the state) have made society more equal, arguing that this had not always been borne out in practice. According to Le Grand (1982), it cannot be assumed that administering and distribution of resources to welfare users, and in particular to the historically disadvantaged, automatically creates an equal society. Instead, Le Grand (1982) argues, the Rawlsian notion that equality is determined by the act of allocating more resources to the least advantaged does not imply that the recipients of these resources would automatically be equal to others in society because the acceptance of such resources makes them more dependent on the state for welfare and therefore less motivated to be economically self-sustainable.

According to Letseka (2000, 183), while the (pre-colonial) 'African way of life' (related to *ubuntu*) inspires and is informed by the altruistic nature of individuals in society, it does not, condone "laziness, idleness, or encouraging people to rest on their laurels and do nothing to improve their welfare and opportunities in life, secure in the knowledge that their family and the community at large would be there to take care of their individual problems" (Letseka 2000, 183).

If one accepts this altruistic 'African way of life' concept, an education for decoloniality informed and influenced by the African way of life would surely acknowledge the political rights of students and the necessity of enacting individuals' economic capabilities with the idea of this 'enaction' assisting them in bettering their own economic conditions. However, being consumed with and narrowly focusing on an ideology of land being redistributed among the destitute does not guarantee that economic and social development will inevitably occur, particularly when those who are overzealous for such development to occur lack the capacity to transform land into some form of economic sustainability. In other words, having land does not guarantee that economic development will inevitably materialise. If the 'African way of life' is concerned with invoking in individuals their altruistic nature, it would obviously not condone instances of individuals burning state resources and invading privately owned land for the purposes

of erecting informal structures, accompanied by the argument that the land was previously 'stolen' by the colonisers. Such an attitude further perpetuates feelings of antagonism and animosity, which translate into unfreedoms.

Despite individuals in South Africa having inalienable political rights and a claim to fulfilment of their economic needs, the latter cannot materialise in society when the claim itself is linked to survival whilst claimants are dependent on the state for resources. In other words, the claim for economic needs to be fulfilled should not be solely linked to a geographic location, whilst the status quo in which poverty, social deprivation, unemployment and poor health care persist is maintained. This, I would argue, represents a somewhat skewed understanding of equality and societal development. If social and economic equality cannot be realised through the equitable distribution and provision of land, then it implies that the attainment of equality should be seen as a process that does not rely on receiving but instead one that is attained and manifested by what one does or enacts to contribute towards the upliftment of society. Equality should instead be conceptualised in the way that Le Grand (2007, 97) saw it, namely as "the extent to which equal treatment for equal need is observed". In this regard, equality through political rights (including the claim for the fulfilment of economic needs) does not mean sameness, but instead suggests being equally, responsibly and actively attentive to the needs of others.

Being equally attentive of the needs of others from a democratic perspective, as Dewey (1939, cited in Hickman and Alexander 1998, 342) conceived of it 80 years ago, is manifest "even when needs and ends or consequences are different for each individual", and "the habit of amicable cooperation is itself a priceless addition to life". If we apply the elucidation of a "democratic way of life" offered by Dewey (1939, cited in Hickman and Alexander 1998, 342) to the South African context, then the possibility exists for the 'colonised' and the previous 'colonisers' to conduct conflicts, controversies and disputes in the spirit of cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by awarding the other the opportunity to express themselves and to be heard, instead of adhering to forced suppression of the other party and their views through violence and intimidation from both parties.

Sen's third virtue of democracy (1999, 148) explores the constructive role of basic political and liberal rights in the conceptualisation of 'needs' (including the understanding of 'economic needs' in a social context). For Sen (1999, 154), political rights (including freedom of expression and discussion) are central to the conceptualisation of economic needs. Hence, a concrete understanding of the nature of economic needs warrants further scrutiny. In the context of economic needs, the starting point for Nussbaum (2000, 78–79) is that each individual is a worthy human being with his or her own agency, based on the idea that the individual him- or herself is able to:

- “imagine, think, and reason—and to do these things in a truly human way”;
- “form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection”;
- “live with and toward others” and
- “recognise and show concern for other human beings”.

An individual according to Nussbaum (2000, 79) has the ability to engage in various forms of social interaction—to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation (and) to have the capability:

- for both “justice and friendship”;
- “to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others (which) entails, at a minimum, protections against discrimination on the basis of sex, race, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin” and
- “to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other(s)”.

Nussbaum's (2000) elucidation of the individual in the context of economic needs largely seems to invoke the African concept of *ubuntu*.

For Nussbaum (2000, 79), individuals have certain capabilities: they are capable of showing 'concern for other human beings' and each is capable of working as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with others.

The latter, I contend, is a worthy point of entry to begin contributing towards an education for decoloniality, in particular regarding an in-depth conceptualising of economic needs and their fulfilment. In other words, acknowledging that people have a capability of showing concern for other human beings and of working using practical reasoning is a good starting point from which one can begin to think more deeply about attending to people's economic needs in relation to cultivating societal transformation.

Previously I alluded to the breaking free from neo-colonialist strictures imposed on the 'colonised' by the 'coloniser' as being dependent to a large extent on the 'colonised' himself or herself disrupting his or her neo-colonialist thoughts. For individuals in society to break free from the restraints of the neo-colonialist leash requires social institutions to have the conditions necessary for people to progress towards economic and social sustainability. The capabilities approach considers rights as entitlements to capabilities that have material and social preconditions, such as the provision of basic capabilities, among others, health care, education, sanitation, clothing and shelter, all of which in essence require state intervention and initiation (Nussbaum 2000, 77). Thus, by implication, the question that applies to an education for decoloniality should not primarily be concerned with what people desire but rather with what they are in a position to do or enact.

In essence, the capabilities approach is premised on the notion that all global citizens are entitled to certain basic capabilities, such as the ability to live to the end of their human life span, being able to have good health, move freely, use their senses, participate in political activities and engage in economic transactions (Nussbaum 2006, 81). Once these capabilities are enacted, people in society would have opportunities to improve their quality of life in the sense of having more freedom and choice, education, health as well as income and employment. They would receive and experience societal justice or, more specifically, actively exercise equality (in the sense of respecting the rights and entitlements of others), engage in solidarity, and recognise one another's rights (Nussbaum 2006, 82). Nussbaum (2006, 72) claims that societal justice manifests when one lives one's life in a 'truly human way'. The latter I submit implies that, to live according to capabilities that are made possible for all human beings in order to ensure their human flourishing in all societies,

is the minimum criterion necessary for cultivating social justice. For an education for decoloniality this means that university students need to be made sensitively and fully aware of the unfreedoms being perpetuated and exacerbated in society before they can imagine themselves in the contexts described by Nussbaum (2006). This kind of conscientisation, I contend, is necessary if we are to progress towards rehumanising society along the principles of particularly the African concept of altruism.

Towards Forming an Education for Decoloniality

Thus far I have discussed instances necessary and as a prerequisite for an education for decoloniality, one premised on Senian democratic virtues in assisting students to examine the external unfreedoms that hinder societal transformation and development. However, I argue that the external unfreedoms which Sen (1999) examines may further extend to include certain internal unfreedoms that currently prohibit individuals from shifting beyond their seemingly entrenched neo-colonial mindset. Hence, I am attracted to uncovering the internal unfreedoms that hinder democratic (and decolonised) thinking. The latter, I infer, may initiate university educators towards democratic education under the guise of a 'decolonised' education curriculum, which could possibly invoke in students by way of Senian democratic virtues a sense of autonomy through practical reasoning, communitarianism through the concept of *ubuntu*, and social conscientisation through self-reflexivity.

Considering that the Senian democratic virtue of the intrinsic importance of political rights is connected to cultivating an environment in which individuals are able to come to speech, then it is possible to link such a notion of rights to practical reasoning. Sen (2006, 32) makes an interesting case for the way in which we see ourselves influencing our practical reasoning, but this account is in no way linked in immediate terms to how and in which direction that influence may work. Sen (2006, 32) clearly argues that an individual may decide after careful reflection that he or she is not only a member of a particular group but also that for

that individual, this membership essentially gives him or her an extremely important identity. And, this, Sen (2006, 32) argues, in essence, plays an integral role in influencing the individual in the direction towards taking greater responsibility for the well-being and freedom of the particular group which Sen (2006, 32) sees as an extension of the obligation of that individual to be self-reliant. Sen (2006) infers here that the self is in this process being extended to cover others in the group with which he or she identifies. Thus, the individual is certainly not functioning in isolation. When one's community and culture determine one's identity then, as Sen (2006) avers, the feasible patterns of reasoning and ethics available to one are reflected on favourably for the benefit of the group. Hence, one's accountability to one's community or group influences one's integrity and morality.

While circumstances may not always enable the individual to question the moral actions of the group, this does not mean that the individual lacks the ability or agency to do so. Power imposed on an individual in the group under so-called leadership becomes the main constituent in exacerbating an internal unfreedom such as immorality in the individual. And this power is further amplified when an individual within a group does not have a voice to question this power. One could argue that one becomes obliged to follow the group to the extent that it is associated primarily with enhancing the economic sustainability of the group. And, considering that the most contested and inextricable issue arising in debates about freedom, is the question whether and when a lack of resources constitutes a restraint on the freedom of an individual or group. According to this argument, it makes further sense that the internal unfreedom of immorality is corroborated and reinforced by the external unfreedom, such as, for instance, a lack of access to economic resources (Miller 2003, 13). Hence, in instances where internal unfreedoms lead individuals to become involved in immoral actions, these individuals are linked to the absence of economic resources affecting other citizens despite such actions influencing other communities and citizens negatively.

An education for decoloniality through practical reasoning signifies that if the university student is one who is able to make sense of what he

or she has been taught in the class or for instance why the actions of his or her group are justified by a certain ideology and his or her sense takes on the expression of a particular way of thinking or being, then it is possible to argue that particular forms of action, that is, praxis or doing enables the university student to move from one position to another. Praxis is informed by both the ideas of theory and social practice. This is further corroborated by Habermas (1987, 200) who contends that such a form of transformative action makes people autonomous and liberates them from various forms of prejudice in their contexts. Simply put, praxis heightens both the reason for acting and the culmination of the act in social practices. Learning about instances of moral accountability in a classroom could therefore engender transformative action in students' societal contexts. By implication, there is a possibility that what students acquire in the university classroom in relation to an education for decoloniality premised on practical reasoning, reflects their capacity to relate means to ends and to reflect on such actions for the betterment of themselves and for their communities at large.

In view of the Senian virtue of the instrumental role of basic and political rights in augmenting individuals' voices in political and economic context, it is possible to link such a view of rights to the notion of communitarianism within the African way of life. My understanding of a communitarian notion that lacks the concept of *ubuntu*, that is humanness on the grounds of individuals being equal in society, is one which is counter to the African way of life. Those individuals who do not fit in with certain groups driven by power I contend, are essentially marginalised and removed from the group with which they used to identify, to the extent that the group loses, in terms of the African way of life, any sense of self-altruism, together with culture and identity. Not having a voice in the community may further vindicate an unfreedom, such as immorality. In addition, I argue that those individuals or groups who do not question, challenge, or reject alleged claims of immoral behaviour, and whose actions are governed by others in the group, in essence have surrendered their individuality for the group's cause or project. According to this argument, not moving beyond, or freeing oneself of, one's neo-colonial mentality is linked therefore to morality, particularly when one lacks the means to reflect critically on one's integrity or lack thereof.

An education for decoloniality premised on the notion of *ubuntu*—which is integral to the African way of life—explores ways in which the community can be advanced to benefit both the individual and the community and not solely the individual to the detriment of the group. Within the classroom, if a student is engaged with his or her peers in constructing and reinforcing stereotypes based on race, this only further serves to marginalise his or her thoughts and hinders his or her abilities to be open, democratic and critically responsive to the call for a genuine education for decoloniality. In other words, if the student assumes, for instance, that the notion of neo-colonialism in South Africa is primarily race-based, then such an understanding itself has the potential to lead to reverse discrimination. The notion of *ubuntu* suggests that, to disrupt the student's thoughts of race in relation to neo-coloniality, requires the student to look beyond conventional or common sense assumptions of race being linked to historical significances in South Africa. For Sen (2006), the well-integrated and well-functioning community premised on identity and one in which immediacy and solidarity are the principles of such community could ironically be the same community in which outsiders are violently subjugated through aggression and dismissal. Hence, I would argue that such identity conflicts—particularly in the educational context in South Africa—need to be broken down if *ubuntu* is to flourish for all communities and should lead to healthy social and economic development.

Since Sen's (1999, 148) third virtue of democracy is related to the constructive role of basic political and liberal rights in the conceptualisation of 'needs', it is possible to link such a view of democracy to student conscientisation through self-reflexivity. Thus, I argue that if and when university educators are to talk about an education for decoloniality they need to address the internal unfreedoms, which, in the context of decolonisation of the mind, include immorality, intellectual inequality and stereotyping, all leading to a process of heightened consciousness of the external unfreedoms in contemporary society and the need to eradicate such external unfreedoms. And power is the cornerstone of the process of intensifying such internal unfreedoms that exist in the neo-colonial mindset. For South African society to break free from the neo-colonial sphere and mindset, does not mean that we should be divorcing South

Africa from the world, but instead, we should be exploring the means by which Africa itself can be seen as the point of departure for governing its own actions based on accountability, transparency and sound moral values.

Students need to be perpetually (re)conscientised in terms of their rights to unite for heedfulness and for what they perceive to be a lack of transparency and accountability of dominant groups, including the academic institution. As Achebe (1989, 85) aptly described it 30 years ago, an education for decoloniality is concerned with human action in the pursuit of societal justice that could redress and counteract human and non-human injustices, such as genocide, human trafficking, ethnic conflict, wars of terror and environmental degradation, such as deforestation and climate change. The approach to education along the lines of democratic thinking advocated by Achebe “requires a healthy, educated, participatory followership, and an educated, morally grounded leadership” (Achebe 1989, 85). In other words, an education for decoloniality should always be attuned to cultivating pedagogical spaces in which the voices of university students remain at the fulcrum of their own learning and one in which individuals are accountable and critically self-reflective of their own actions.

I have argued earlier in this chapter that equality is certainly not linked to the perpetual and passive receiving of resources as this takes away individuals’ intellectual equality and agency. When individuals’ intellectual equality and agency are removed, they in turn do not question, resist or argue against the repressive values of a neo-colonial mindset—or do not have the capability to do so. Without intellectual equality, individuals and groups would remain in a neo-colonial sphere, silenced to the extent that they become acculturated to the very values and ideologies that they may inherently aim to internalise an opposition to—at least within the discourse of decolonisation. Hence, self-reflexivity through conscientisation would enable students to become effective agents of change in the university classroom and in their wider communities, specifically in relation to instances of power that often work against equitable educational conditions.

An education for decoloniality commensurate with the constructive role of basic and liberal rights has the potential to develop a credible form of democratic education in universities in South Africa. And, when such

an approach to education extends the political capabilities of humans into acts of empowerment and emancipation, human agency is essential to the project of decolonising students' neo-colonial thoughts and mindsets. Hence, an education for decoloniality means that the internal freedoms of university students need to be enacted rather than served up in lecture formats as part of a 'decolonised' curriculum, which, I argue, would represent an extension of the student and not the student as an extension of the curriculum. An education for decoloniality should therefore always conscientise students to the need to remove the internal and external unfreedoms in society so as to prevent the dehumanising aspect of a neo-colonial mentality. Personal autonomy and personal development are essential to students' empowerment to make their own decisions in social, economic and political spheres (Waghid 2014).

In the light of the aforementioned, an education for decoloniality needs to develop at its core pedagogical approaches whose aim is to disrupt instances of power, particularly when power as a corruptible and corrupting force encourages and increases behaviour motivated by selfish individual gain. Such a view of education for decoloniality serves as a reminder that students always need to be informed of the unequal power relations that exist in educational, political and social contexts (Walker and Unterhalter 2007). My argument for an education for decoloniality advocates the inclusion of pedagogical approaches (see Waghid and Hibbert 2018a, b) that place university students at the centre of their own education, and encourage political responses whose aim is to rehumanise society towards "gloabectical imagination"—that is, for students to be seriously concerned with the struggles of the marginalised and for the future of the globe (Wa Thiong'o 2012, 8; Waghid et al. 2018).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that an education for decoloniality is one which involves conscientising university students in terms of the inextricable relationship between their political and liberal rights, that is, their rights to free speech commensurate with the other elementary capabilities as described and espoused by Sen (1999). I argue that these are necessary

for the disruption, not only of the external unfreedoms existing in society but also those internal unfreedoms preventing individuals from mentally moving beyond the neo-colonial sphere. More specifically, I have explored such internal unfreedoms as immorality, intellectual inequality and stereotyping, particularly racial stereotyping, all of which prevent individuals from moving beyond their neo-colonial mindset. I have advocated for the linking of the cultivation of democratic thinking among university students in contemporary society to a rationale for creating opportunities for those who are considered—and consider themselves to be—marginalised. The enactment of this requires social practices whose aim is to enact constructive roles of university students in terms of ensuring their political and liberal rights. Sen (1999) certainly makes a reasonable case for democracy itself not being perceived in terms of a panacea to heal social or economic ills. The same argument can be applied to the project of education for decoloniality. I have also advocated, in line with Sen's (1999) elucidation of democratic virtues, the necessity for university students at all times to be attuned to the need to be critically self-reflexive of both the external and internal unfreedoms that exist in contemporary South African society. It is only through such informed self-reflexive practices that a shift can begin to take place towards a more independent and morally accountable holistic community.

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10

Recasting Cosmopolitanism in Education for Citizenship in Africa

Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu

Introduction

Global interconnectedness of humanity around the world today is now largely characteristic of human existence. In education for citizenship, such interconnection makes possible and urgent the cultivation of cosmopolitan citizenship, a conceptualisation of normative citizenship duties that transcend national boundaries. Contrary to prevalent theories and practices of education for citizenship in Malawi and most African nations, there ought to be no synonymising cosmopolitanism with a radical impartiality where the ideal cosmopolitan is deemed to be incompatible and indeed antagonistic with local belonging and the duties locality generates. One can hold that, inasmuch as cosmopolitanism aspires for becoming, it ought not to be a denial of the normative necessity of aspects of localness.

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In this chapter I argue that the prevalent form of cosmopolitanism in education for citizenship in Malawi and much of Africa, which in principle necessarily demands the global citizen to be detached from locality, and that deprives locality of normative value, is incongruent with ideal education and ideal cosmopolitan equality. Instead, I contend that ideal cosmopolitanism is achieved in the attainment of unity between the dualities of the universal–particular opposites. Conversely, an education for citizenship that is committed to radical impartiality and as such excludes locality undermines the concreteness of a people for whom the education is meant. I also argue that, in principle, an education for democratic citizenship rooted in such radical impartiality compels learners to assimilate into the ostensible impartiality that is in essence dominated by a particular localness.

Strong Cosmopolitanism and Its Prevalence

As a normative ideal, cosmopolitanism holds that since human beings are equal, the individual human being is the ultimate unit of moral concern, entitled to enforceable moral duties and entitlements (Benhabib 2011; Tan 2004). The implication of this is that there are certain moral duties and entitlements which the individual has that transcend particularities, such as of family, friendship, local community and nationality. In other words, there is arguable consensus that the stringency of such transcendent moral duties cannot be restricted by particularistic considerations. However, the question of the substance and constitution of cosmopolitan duties raises debate. The question of the normative value of particularistic commitments in the light of universalistic duties of cosmopolitanism embodies the debate. Is local particularism inherently asymmetrical with cosmopolitan universalism? Does cosmopolitan universalism necessarily exclude the normativity of particularity such as of nationality?

Education for democratic citizenship is one of the fields where conflict of the two ideals (particularism of local or national belonging and universalism of transcendent moral duties) manifests (Nussbaum 2002; Brighouse 2003; Miller 2007; Papastephanou 2015). Given the vastness and depth of global interconnectedness today, the idea of a global human

community is no longer an abstract concept intelligible only through imagination. Political, economic, technological, security, health and environmental developments in one corner of the world are almost instantly affecting others across the world. Global interconnectedness has therefore necessitated a reimagination of the scope of relationships one has with others, especially the geographically and culturally other. Globalness now demands that we broaden the scope of our moral duties. Meeting these demands greatly depends on education for citizenship in schools that must cultivate cosmopolitan skills and knowledge for harmonious coexistence of humanity across the globe. While education for democratic citizenship previously restricted citizenship to national borders, modern education for citizenship is arguably cosmopolitan by default. Pragmatic considerations of national self-insufficiency and normative considerations of equality of global humanity necessarily demand that education for democratic citizenship must be cosmopolitan and that education for citizenship should no longer be restricted to national borders (Nussbaum 2002; Papastephanou 2013a).

Confronted with and perhaps overwhelmed by the challenges of the profound diversity of humanity and challenges of global integration, the question of the nature of the modern citizen has been about identifying commonality among global peoples and anchoring cosmopolitan citizenship only in such commonalities of humanity. The underlying motivation has been that the subjectivities constituting global diversity are complex and therefore apparently incompatible with moral objectivity upon which cosmopolitan citizenship is grounded. The resultant cosmopolitanism therefore is one that normatively values only what is common among human beings of the world. It regards everything distinctive about a people such as cultural, linguistic, historic and territorial embeddedness as being morally arbitrary and inhibitive of realisation of global or cosmopolitan citizenship (Habermas 2001; Nili 2015). I refer to this brand of cosmopolitanism, following David Miller (2007, 43), as “strong cosmopolitanism”, owing to its necessary marginalisation of the national or local commitments as being inimical to cosmopolitan universalism due to the supposedly inherent lack of normative value of such local (or national) particularistic commitments.

Strong cosmopolitanism is a brand of cosmopolitanism that holds that since the individual is the ultimate unit of moral concern, he or she has universal moral duties and entitlements grounded in human equality, and that particularistic commitments the individual may have—especially based on national belonging—are morally arbitrary and devoid of moral value (Miller 2007, 43). Strong cosmopolitanism is particularly against nationality which has for so long been the anchor and host of citizenship. The cosmopolitanism regards national belonging commitments as promoting parochialism; hence being inhibitive of and inimical to cultivation of universalistic cosmopolitan commitments (Habermas 1994, 2001; Nili 2015). The exclusion of nationality by strong cosmopolitanism is aggravated by historical occasions where nationalism has catastrophically been employed as a basis of marginalisation of those others who do not share nativism, culture and race of the nation.

Strong cosmopolitanism is apparently motivated by the implications of commitment to human equality (Nussbaum 2002; Nili 2015; Arneson 2016). The core of the strong cosmopolitanism thesis originates from the premise that human beings as individual units of moral concern have equal moral duties and entitlements. Such moral duties and entitlements are rooted only in this equality and are hence universal. This universalism of moral duties overrides any other duties originating from different associations in both normative value and priority (Habermas 2001; Nili 2015; Nussbaum 2002).

With respect to citizenship, strong cosmopolitanism demands that citizenship should be reconstituted and should be about humanity across the whole world. Citizenship must out of normative necessity be decoupled from nationality and the nation-state (Habermas 2001; Nussbaum 2002). Nationality for such thought has no moral value (Habermas 2001). The grounding of citizenship in nationality was seemingly only for pragmatic purposes because nationality provided a community which the modern political state needed in order to develop (Habermas 2003).

For strong cosmopolitanism, the sense of community that nationality avails for establishing a political community is not inseparably bonded with nationality. In other words, once the political community takes off, it can dispense with the nation community. Critics of nationality in the

conceptualisation of citizenship contend that such a sense of community can be substituted by a civic community that is grounded in the common political values of constitutional proceduralism in the liberal state (Habermas 1994, 2001, 2003). In other words, national culture should be replaced by a civic or constitutional culture. The political community today, so argue strong cosmopolitans (see Habermas 1994, 2001, 2003; Bader 2005; Arneson 2016), is enabled by diverse people commonly sharing political values, which now characterise their society. Nationality is regarded as incongruent with the diversity of both the modern state and the world and may only serve to sideline others (Habermas 2001).

Thus, two things stand out for the strong cosmopolitan position. Firstly, nationality lacks moral value and is inherently inhibitive of moral universalism (Nili 2015). Secondly, upon being confronted by global diversity, strong cosmopolitanism only embraces what is universally common of all humanity of the world as being the exclusive ingredients in the conceptualisation of citizenship (Alexander 2016). In other words, one can draw that strong cosmopolitanism demands that commonality only, other than diversity, ought to be the foundation of cosmopolitan citizenship duties.

Ultimately, strong cosmopolitanism has unique demands on education for democratic citizenship. Among the major ones, it discourages the teaching of national history for learners in the school (Brighthouse 2003; Nussbaum 2002). National history is particularly targeted because it seemingly promotes parochialism which ultimately denies the other humanity, outside the nation, its due entitlements. This de-emphasis of nationality extends to justifications for using mother tongue instruction in the school. What one can glean is that strong cosmopolitan citizenship would accept or deny mother-tongue instruction not out of consideration for the normativity of the mother tongue as an object and medium for expressing local belonging. Rather, if strong cosmopolitanism accepts the mother tongue as a language of instruction, it is purely on the basis of the ability of the mother tongue to achieve successful teaching and learning effectively and efficiently. The acceptance would hardly be on the grounds that for the learners, the mother tongue embodies the particularity and concreteness of being.

Ideal Education: Towards Authenticity Alone?

Whether overtly stated as curriculum objectives or as principles that must be achieved by teaching and learning procedures, education cannot be divorced from some form of aims whether as objectives or general aims (White 2010, 5). The idea that education should promote the good and well-being of the individual is in modern times widespread, although this does not necessarily imply that it is the only aim of education among educators today (White 2010, 17). Nevertheless, the good of the learner dominates as the central preoccupation of education.

In the quest of developing self-actualisation and autonomy, modern education is concerned with learner-centred education. The concern however is that education should not overemphasise individual interest at the expense of collective life (Johnson and Morris 2010; Ramose 2010). Such orientations of obsession with individualism are informed by the radical liberalism concept of the detached autonomous individual, in which the support from his or her dependencies is ignored as normatively insignificant (Held 2006; MacIntyre 2002; Taylor 2003). A learner is not an abstract being but a concretely situated person (Benhabib 2011). Being a learner presupposes existing in a social context of a common language of thought processing and communication frames mutually shared with fellow learners, teachers and the host community. The school is contextualised in such a socially and culturally situated setting. Being a learner—like any other human being—also presupposes a sense of historical situatedness of the learner and the way the history affects the pedagogical processes and experiences (Miller 1995).

Education today is preoccupied with maximising room and ability for self-actualisation, mostly at the cost of other normatively weighty and necessary ideals. The implication one gets from such an approach is that there is an ideal critical, reflective person this learner must imagine and ultimately become. However, this chapter argues that whilst embarking on this becoming search, there is often a tendency to ignore and undermine the being of the present, regarding the situatedness of the learner as inhibitive of authenticity. Put differently, mostly, the subjectivities constituting the concreteness of the being human of the learner are necessarily marginalised as morally arbitrary. However, the contention of this chapter

is that becoming presupposes being, and being in the present, because being cannot come out of nothingness.

This chapter advances the thesis that a radical preoccupation with authenticity in modern internationalised education usually denies the concreteness of humanness of the learner in the present. From the perspective of this thesis, the language of instruction of the school is regarded as merely a matter of pedagogical technicality and not as a normative matter because the assumption is that all pedagogy is a means towards individual autonomy and authenticity and not itself a substance of value. In the process, the linguistic, cultural, historical, metaphysical and epistemological concreteness of the individual learner, with a capacity to become, are overlooked and undermined in the quest of becoming an autonomous impartial individual.

It should be noted, however, that besides learner-centred aims of education there are also others-centred aims that may include such expectations as that learners must have courtesy, have appropriate manners towards others (White 2010, 18), and must have the virtues of sharing, caring and togetherness (Ramose 2010). Such other-based ideals pertain to collective life and transcend individual interest. What is worth noting is that there are other even more substantively stringent other-based moral ideals that create and sustain the social context that provides care for realisation of the autonomous person (Taylor 2003; Held 2006). Human needs (which education must consider or help meet) are as many as they are complex. There is a real danger when only one aim of education is unduly elevated above all alternative and complementary others. Obsession with individual actualisation whilst almost marginalising aspects of concrete social situatedness and its demands may ultimately ruin the very project of self-actualisation as the enabling and supporting conditions for the actualisation are dismantled.

Embedded Partiality in Impartial Strong Cosmopolitan Education for Citizenship

In this section, I contend that strong cosmopolitanism, which informs the dominant conceptualisations of impartial global citizenship education, embeds partiality. This ironic partiality comes about because the

universalism anchoring such a cosmopolitanism is based only on what is common among human beings and is not accommodative of subjectivity, regarding it as morally arbitrary. Such universalism is ultimately traceable to neo-Kantianism's dichotomous conception of human nature (Benhabib 1992, 161). Under this paradigm, the essences of human nature reside in the fundamental dichotomies of the rational objectivity versus the affective subjectivity (Code 2012). For this perspective of human nature, normativity is exclusively a matter of objectivity. Subjectivity is not worthy of constitution in normative conceptualisations of citizenship or morality in general. In other words, what is common across humanity pertains to the objective and hence is fodder upon which to base global citizenship. On the other hand, what differentiates people across the world pertains to the subjective and can therefore not be constitutive of global citizenship conceptualisation.

There are two problems with this hegemonic conception of human nature in the ethics of global citizenship. Firstly, the exclusive promotion of the 'objective' as the sole substratum of normativity is surreptitious (Benhabib 2011). In other words, subjectivity, just like objectivity, has normative value and ought to constitute the foundation of normativity. As Benhabib (2011) observes, the grounding of morality in human similarities alone only acknowledges the commonality of humanity, marginalising the concreteness of gender, culture, history, economic status and nationality. The major challenge lies in that recognising the worth of an actual (rather than merely abstract) human being cannot meaningfully dispense with acknowledging the sources of concreteness that partly constitute individuality (Benhabib 1992). In individuality resides the peculiarity of being human (Benhabib 1992, 161). In other words, in the differences that constitute individuality lie the concreteness of humanity actualised from mere abstraction. The particularity of individuality is the embodiment of being human. To be human is not only to be an abstract being that commonly shares generic attributes all human beings possess. Rather, as Benhabib (1992, 161) observes, to be human is to acknowledge that whatever commonalities all human beings share are embodied in this particular flesh and blood being, with a particular history, a given language, a participant in a shared socio-cultural framework that shapes one and which one also shapes.

Recognising the integrity of the individual necessarily involves respecting his or her autonomy as a being capable of making choices and attaching value to those choices. It would therefore be counter-respect of autonomy if we only acknowledge the value-judgement capacity of the individual whilst simultaneously denying moral worth to the motivation and reasons behind the exercise of the agency, on the grounds that the motivation and reasons for action are not universally valued by all humanity (Benhabib 1992, 161). The danger with this approach is that it ends up denying the individuality of the person. This is because it restricts being human to having capacity for agency only, excluding the “actuality of my choices namely how as a finite, concrete, embodied individual I shape and fashion the circumstances of my birth and family, linguistic, cultural and gender identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my life’s story” (Benhabib 1992, 161–162). Denying normativity to what makes one a concrete human being, beyond the commonalities of humanity, on account of such subjective elements not having a universal value, concedes human commonality on the one hand whilst on the other it undermines what makes one an actual human person. Maligning the individual’s mode of self-expression is to deny him or her his or her way of being human. For an actual person, being human is not about possessing an abstract universal attribute general for all humanity. The core of being human resides in the particularities that enable individuation (Benhabib 1992). One can therefore safely conclude that the universal capacity for autonomy that neo-Kantianism cherishes is only a part of (not the exclusive element of) what it takes to be an individual.

Such unconceded value of subjectivity leads Benhabib (1992, 153) to argue that universalism must necessarily start from and with difference, which is that which makes the individual other. Respecting human dignity lies in acknowledging the subjectivity of otherness as being constitutive of what it is to be human, a concrete being (Benhabib 2011, 68). Respecting human dignity is about acknowledging the individual’s values and the historical, social and cultural situatedness that gives rise to these values, which the individual constructs, reconstructs and also co-constructs with others in the community.

This entails that the universalism that founds education for cosmopolitan citizenship ought not necessarily be a precast mould of objective

essences to which the world's peoples must conform. Rather, cosmopolitan universalism ought to be deliberative where diverse global others get to learn from each other what makes the other concrete (Benhabib 1992, 2011). Upon learning which particular subjectivities define the other, human equality sets moral incumbency to respect those self-articulations of being human by the other, without expecting the subjectivities to reform in order to fit into essentialist categorisations. Failure to make such an acknowledgement in principle denies the other his or her individuality.

The strong cosmopolitan maligning of subjectivity in the normativity of citizenship has extended to education as usually the objective–subjective categories also shape mainstream epistemology in education across the world (Ladson-Billings 1995; Andreotti 2011; Code 2012). Conventional educational thought owes its origin and heritage to Eurocentrism and neo-Kantianism (Andreotti 2011, 385; Code 2012). In Malawi and the greater part of Africa, much of conventional education was introduced through colonialism and European missionary expeditions (Banda 1982; Hauya 1997; Phiri 2004). The education is, however, being sustained albeit in evolved forms by enduring Eurocentric frameworks, especially coming from the demands of the inevitable global interconnectedness (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 2017).

Modern education is premised on the framework of the impersonal individual who is detached from local situatedness. The interests for such a person are supposedly exclusively universal: maximisation of individual freedom and (economic) self-actualisation (Pais and Costa 2017, 2). What it is to be human and a citizen is deemed objective. In other words, the ideal global citizen whom education must birth, must emerge in objective and universal terms that are necessarily detached from the subjectivity of localness or indigeneity.

This chapter posits that the concept of the detached person in education de-problematizes the attendant 'subjective' experiences that contextualise and make meaningful the selection of curriculum content, pedagogy as well as school practices. The embedded diversities, differences and inequalities which learners bring to the classroom, being 'subjective', are regarded as inconsequential in the normativity of pursuing an ostensibly universal education suitable for all the people of the world.

Home language, common culture, history and placed-ness of the learner are regarded as 'subjective' and thus normatively inconsequential in the normativity of teaching and learning and are systematically marginalised. The implication is that only common impersonal attributes of being human, skills, knowledge and competences that are detached from particularity are deemed epitomic of cosmopolitan citizenship.

The idea of pursuing an education for democratic citizenship that necessarily does not recognise the moral worth of aspects of local belonging, regarding them as irrelevant subjectivities in the normativity of citizenship configuration is problematic. The historicity, mother tongue, shared indigenous outlooks and metaphysical and geographical placed-ness of the learner are not mere accidental accessories that may aid learning. They are not, contrary to what Rawls (1999) says, mere morally arbitrary accidents, unworthy of inclusion in the conceptualisation of the normativity of citizenship. Rather, they are elements which are constitutive of the concreteness of learners, their actual way of being human as a people. Put differently, such concreteness is an indispensable constituent of being and the way the concerned people expect all other humanity to recognise them as individuated beings and peculiar collectives.

The second major problem one finds with the prevalent radically impartial cosmopolitan citizenship is that it is not essentially impartial owing to the particularism of the human nature conception that inspires the cosmopolitanism. An essentialist dualistic neo-Kantian approach to universalism strips historical, cultural, linguistic and social elements of the subjectivity of their normative value (Benhabib 1992, 161). One observes that the citizen prototype of the education for cosmopolitan citizenship rooted in such universalism is an impersonal transcendent individual whose commitment to virtues and demands of freedom optimisation necessarily detaches him or her from the ostensible shackles of collective life. It is worth highlighting that such a conception of human nature is not the only and exclusive conception of being human. In other words, the individual-centric conception of human nature that founds such a universalism is not the sole exclusive conception of human nature. It is essentially a Eurocentric one (Code 2012). There are other alternative normatively valid conceptions of human nature that differ from the Eurocentric neo-Kantian one. Some of such alternative conceptions of human nature con-

cede the centrality of individual freedom in moral cooperation yet simultaneously acknowledge relations as equally central and indispensable in understanding human nature. For such positions such as the *ubuntu* approach, individual freedom is as cardinal as are aspects of relational being without which the project of self-actualisation becomes impossible and individual autonomy is rendered incomplete as autonomy is fundamentally dependent on the care and support others give.

Malignity of Epistemologies of Developing Nations

The prevailing education for democratic citizenship in most African nations, such as Malawi, is largely informed by strong cosmopolitanism. This is because, the properties of such an education are such that they explicitly and in principle render aspects of local situatedness (arguably embedded in aspects of what is marginalised as nationality) as inherently inhibitive of the commitments of cosmopolitan universalism. Upon critical examination, the educational policies regarding democratic citizenship education in Malawi imply that such education for citizenship does not regard the teaching and learning of national history, employment of mother-tongue language instruction and local epistemologies, which are aspects of a people's concreteness, as necessarily having normative worth. Such an education particularly emphasises muting locality, substituting it with an impersonal detached individual as epitomic of universalism of human equality (Nussbaum 2002).

As highlighted earlier, strong cosmopolitan universalism is grounded in a Eurocentric individual-centric conception of human nature. One of the implications of such a conception is that being human is reducible to properties that are either morally objective or subjective. All other phenomena must be understood in such terms. If some phenomena do not fit into the objective, it must either be reconstituted to integrate or else it becomes part of the subjective that has no place in the foundationalism of normativity (Andreotti 2011).

It is arguable that global interconnectedness and education in Africa are inspired by Eurocentrism (Canagarajah 2005). Missionary expedi-

tions and colonial encounters pioneered conventional education in Malawi and much of Africa. Informed by the neo-Kantian paradigm of Eurocentrism, the education aspired to cultivate in the learners an ideal citizen who is detached from all particularity (Banda 1982; Hauya 1997). Not only was such particularity regarded as inherently incompatible with objective normative theorisation but it was also deemed inherently inappropriate, akin even to acceptable Western subjectivity (Banda 1982, 67; Chanunkha 2005, 2–11; Murray 1932, 129). This led to denigration of the local in education. In principle, the ‘incompatible’ local faced two fates: reform into neo-Kantian categories of intelligibility or be discarded not even as a subjective. As a consequence, at times coupled with pragmatic complexities, mother-tongue instruction was not worth prioritising out of normative necessity. Colonial education in Malawi pursued an impartial and objective citizen. The result was that there no longer was a necessity to establish a firm link between the local situated experiences of the learner and those of the school. The curriculum had some alien content to which the local learner could not relate (Banda 1982, 67). The medium of instruction in the school was inaccessible and largely alien to the learners. The implication for such practices was that the frames of thought and knowledge with which the learners were familiar and through which they comprehended both themselves and all other reality were largely considered incompatible with and inhibitive of realisation of the ideal educated person and modern civilised citizen.

At the political independence turn, Malawi and much of Africa were supposed to confront much of these adjustable systematic structures of colonial trivialisation of localness (Masemula 2015, 176). Due to a lack of political will, Malawi and much of independent Africa have only addressed the challenges of a substantially alien education in largely a tokenistic manner (Ramose 2004; Kamwendo 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). The situation of modern global interconnectedness has exacerbated the situation.

To begin with, the nature of global interconnectedness, despite its overwhelming potentialities for equal opportunities, is largely driven by the interests of very few powerful developed nations of the world (Pogge 2011). In global technology, education, trade, economy, environment, politics and legal institutions, it is the interests of the economically pow-

erful developed nations that dominate and dictate the nature of globalisation. Eurocentric values embed such aspects of global interconnection (Canagarajah 2005, 196; Singer 2002). Global interconnection has given flesh to the hitherto abstract idea of a world community. At no time were people across the world almost instantly profoundly affected by developments in another part of the world than people are today.

It is in this vein that the self-interested impersonal individual of Eurocentrism, which is driven by economic maximisation that is embedded in global interconnectedness, has spread exponentially alongside the ever-deepening global connectedness. Arguably, global capitalism is at the centre of global interconnectedness (Pieterse 2006, 1252). With respect to education, the main thrust in the constitution of modern principles and aims of education is to realise the employable and deployable impersonal, detached, non-localised ideally educated person equipped with skills tailored for global markets, who can fit in any part of the world (Pais and Costa 2017, 2). Thus, individual freedom and economic interest are now at the core of modern education. The Eurocentric and individual-centric conception of human nature thus still shapes modern education. Given the indispensability of global-ness, most developing nations have had only to embrace such forms of education as well as the metaphysics informing it.

Eurocentric epistemologies dominate education globally (Code 2012). It is worth noting that both normatively and pragmatically the epistemological orientation of a school cannot be separated from the particular metaphysical outlook of the community from which the learners hail. Education, in other words, is inseparable from the general cultural situatedness of the learners and their community. However, the neo-Kantian conception of human nature and its radically impartial model of a global citizen deny this normative reality about being human. Contrary to the neo-Kantian impersonality commitment, the school is not and can never be a value-neutral institution. In most cases, the school is characterised by the subtle and implicit “hegemonic domination” of other cultures by the mainstream dominant one (Delgado Bernal 1998, 556). In the context of global education and citizenship, the mainstream is the economically, scientifically and technologically dominant Eurocentrism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Elliott-Cooper 2017; Melber 2018).

Arguably, the nature and demands of modern education are informed by the ideal educated individual of the strong cosmopolitanism. Such a global citizen must cultivate skills, knowledge and competences that are universalisable (Code 2012; Ladson-Billings 2014). As such, strong cosmopolitanism necessarily outlaws particularism (Miller 2007; Papastephanou 2013b; Alexander 2016). The universalism of cosmopolitan citizenship is apparently incompatible with the locality embedded in localness, which is mostly perceived as national particularism. The normative implications of this have been that education in Malawi and much of Africa today demands that much of the learner's cultural background be necessarily muted and trumped down as normatively inconsequential. Ultimately, education expects the learner to shed off his or her cultural situatedness and assimilate into the dominant mainstream culture that is ostensibly compatible with and underlies modern globalist education and citizenship. The ultimate result is that in much of Africa, the learner usually achieves academic success largely at the cost of his or her "cultural and psychosocial well-being" (Ladson-Billings 1995, 475). Given the intense prevalence of neo-liberalism in modern education and global interconnectedness, it is deemed irrelevant that education should be responsive to the learner's socio-cultural situatedness, since today "the goal of education becomes how to 'fit' students constructed as 'other' by virtue of their race, ethnicity, language, or social class into a hierarchical structure that is defined as a meritocracy" (Ladson-Billings 1995, 467).

As highlighted earlier, the challenge with the prevalent radically neutralist approach to learners' concreteness and embeddedness in education that undermines particularism is that it is not the ultimate impartial benchmark of universalism that would in the end achieve human equality (Abdi 2015, 15). Modern education for citizenship is informed by neo-Kantian conceptions of human nature (Mignolo 2007; Zeleza 2009). A global citizenship that is firmly founded in such a conceptualisation of human nature risks alienating and marginalising those 'other' metaphysics and consequent epistemologies on the mere basis of their otherness and are deemed morally arbitrary subjectivities. For instance, the centrality of virtues of collective life and their indispensability in the realisation of individual autonomy is regarded as normatively unnecessary as per the demands of the individual-centrism of Eurocentric ethics. Such ethics is

grounded on the essentialist basis that virtues of the collective (insofar as they do not serve individual interest) are inherently morally subjective and are both secondary and inferior to individual preference.

Education ought not to be divorced from the social, cultural and economic context of its interlocutors (Waghid 2004). Education is largely about attaining the capacities for individual well-being and self-actualisation. Besides these subjectivities having normative value, human nature and the human condition show that a necessary condition for individual autonomy is the realisation of an ideal community of care of other autonomous human beings, whose community's subjectivities are indispensable in the attainment of individual autonomy (Held 2006, 81). Understood this way, a human community has particular institutions, outlooks, values and, consequently, duties that enable individual flourishing. Attainment of individual autonomy is inextricably connected with the virtues, values, interests, shared languages and shared communication frameworks of the community (MacIntyre 2002; Taylor 2003). The individual cannot achieve autonomy independently without the support and care provided by his or her community (Held 2006, 77). Such care is given asymmetrically; yet, at the same time, one is obliged to reciprocate care-giving although not necessarily to the ones who gave it to you (MacIntyre 2002). Such care is embedded in the language, shared culture and public institutions of the community, among others. This is why ideal education in its quest of developing the ideal community for the realisation of the ideal citizen, ought not to be divorced from the context of the historical and social-cultural situatedness of the people.

Ideal education for global citizenship therefore ought to be responsive to and compatible with the socio-cultural situatedness of the learners, aligning such situatedness with "criteria of academic success, cultural competence, and critical consciousness" (Ladson-Billings 1995, 477). Such demands of cultural responsiveness are usually dismissed especially by strong cosmopolitan perspectives from developed nations, mostly with an individualistic background, where critics usually retort that they have no culture, and as such, their education theory, curriculum content, pedagogy and education practice are culturally neutral. The contention of such critics is that the public institutions in a liberal democracy are informed and characterised by objective principles only, and that matters of culture pertain to the private sphere (Bader 2005; Gorski 2012;

Arneson 2016). However, such positions tend to ignore the social, economic and political power the culture of such developed globally dominant nations has acquired, “as the officially sanctioned and high-status culture, it just is” both locally and globally (Nieto 2008, 130). The seemingly impartial culture-neutral social and political cooperation in the democracies of such nations is inspired and sustained by the particular culture of the nation. Such a culture is in the end subtly and deeply embedded in the public economic and political institutions of the society. Ultimately, “tastes, values, languages, or dialects” of the most economically dominant group owing to its advantage of power tend to have high social privilege and dominate globally (Nieto 2008, 135).

Unlike in most developing nations, the learner in developed nations is not confronted with the complexity of daily negotiating through distinct cultural and linguistic worlds marked by the mother tongue and the official foreign language, which is the currency for meritocracy, marking the school. In a developing nation, the school necessarily demands the embracing of completely new linguistic, metaphysical and epistemological outlooks. Simultaneously, the school in principle necessarily requires casting away of linguistic outlooks, indigenous metaphysical outlooks about human nature, community cooperation and epistemological frameworks (Gay 2000; Ladson-Billings 2014). The indispensability of shared public culture in democracies of developed nations is so pronounced than is acknowledged such that the individual lacking competence in the underlying culture of the national community will not meaningfully participate in the political, economic, educational and social processes of the nation (Kymlicka 2002, 245).

The contention of this chapter is that the possibility of an autonomous individual from national communities whose cultures command international prestige, influence and dominance, having certain ‘neutral’ positions about their society’s more substantive culture, does not necessarily negate the actuality of the cultural outlooks of the society shaping the ‘impartial’ public institutions and practices of the democracy of that nation. In other words, the universalism and efficiency of the neutral principles (in achieving a non-oppressive and inclusive society), do not as a matter of necessity deny the rootedness in and the sustenance the shared public culture provides to democratic life. This is so because “culture is the rule-governing system that defines the forms, functions, and content

of communication” (Gay 2000, 79). In any given community, the linguistic and non-linguistic languages of communication are particularistic mechanisms through which the members of the community cipher, analyse, and categorise experiences to make meaning of the experiences (Gay 2000, 80). It is therefore evident that localness, social-cultural and indigenous situatedness are not inherently hostile to and incompatible with global citizenship. They are necessary for meaningful global citizenship.

It is arguably evident that modern education and prevailing education for citizenship embed a neo-Kantian heritage, and as such promote epistemologies of the heritage. Modern education and the cosmopolitan citizenship (which is effectively almost displacing localised citizenship) thus expect of learners to have competence and skills in the dominant Eurocentric culture underlying modern education as the determinant of success. Ultimately, meritocracy is established along the linguistic, cultural and social class-based constructions of otherness which the hegemonic Eurocentrism creates (Ladson-Billings 1995).

In Malawi and much of Africa, given the high premium that social mobility places on English, being educated is about acquiring the prestigious English language with a global-relevant proficiency. Despite English being spoken by less than 1% of the Malawian population as a household language (National Statistics Office of Malawi 1998), the pressure of global integration is so forceful that the Malawi government has made English the sole medium of instruction (Malawi Government 2013) right from the first year of primary school with the goal of being globally competitive (Ministry of Education 2005; Masina 2014). This policy has substituted the earlier policy, which offered mother-tongue instruction in the first four years of primary education (Hauya 1997; Malawi Government 2013; Masina 2014).

Furthermore, there is no longer offering of Malawi history at both primary and secondary school levels as it was substituted by the more neutral and largely democratic principles-based Social and Environmental Studies, which only makes sporadic references to Malawian history when explaining some democracy principle or processes (Ministry of Education 2005). Such trends reveal the systematic marginalisation of localness from the constitution of modern (global) citizenship. Thus, in education today, to realise the ideal, educated person who is the modern cosmopolitan citizen, the Malawian and African learner must adjust to the purport-

edly impartial perspectives of globality. Mostly, this by implication requires discarding their indigenous and local perspectives and epistemologies allegedly for being not only incompatible with but also inhibitive of the impartiality of cosmopolitan universalism, which is inherently exclusive of aspects of situatedness. In other words, modern education demands all otherness to assimilate.

In Malawi and much of Africa today, individual-centrism inspires and shapes the classroom structure, assessment practice (Beets and Le Grange 2005, 1200), pedagogical experiences, teacher–learner relationships, and explicit and implicit aims of education learners are made to perceive (Ramose 2010, 297), as well as the content of subjects about the central tenets of democratic life. But as highlighted earlier, individual-centrism is not the sole conceptualisation and exhaustive account of human nature. Human nature is complex. Despite the foundationalism of the individual in moral determination, it is erroneous to assume that all that is primary for individual flourishing is radical prioritisation and exclusivity of individual freedom at the expense of some related normatively weighty values. Take for instance, *ubuntu* ethics which generally inspires much of African thought and culture.

In *ubuntu*, being human is not only about attaining a self-determination capacity. Being human is simultaneously achieved in harmony with others (Cornell and Muvangua 2012, 3). In *ubuntu* ethics, one's concern is not only one's flourishing, but also that such flourishing in the context of a lack of flourishing of a member of one's community is meaningless. I consider the other, in *ubuntu* thought, not only as one receiving the unintended effects of my agency. Rather, as much as I have autonomy to be and become what I desire, I must consider the condition of the other and how my agency enhances or diminishes his or her humanness. *Ubuntu* therefore, places a more stringent demand on the agent to consider otherness in the free exercise of the agency. The demand is not one of mere rigid submission to otherness; rather, it is to engage it meaningfully, to be cognisant of its interests in relation to one's own agency. The ultimate end is that even where there is divergence of interests, one will still exercise one's agency with respect for the other. It is due to this orientation that *ubuntu* thought prizes a sense of community. Personhood in *ubuntu* is therefore about individual entitlements as much as it is about relational rationality. As such one can postulate that in *ubuntu* ethics, an

exclusive or radical individual-centrism that supplants relational being is undermining of the constitution of human nature.

Under the prevalent hegemonic Eurocentric education, learners in communities with metaphysical outlooks, such as those of *ubuntu*, will regrettably have to discard their relational rationality involuntarily when they get into the school domain and embrace individual-centrism, which is emblematic of modern education and its cosmopolitan citizenship education. The hegemonic mode of education necessarily demands this normatively undue discarding of local paradigms and embracing new ones if the learner is to achieve academic excellence. However, this is in principle tantamount to assimilation as it costs the learner his or her “cultural and psychosocial well-being” (Ladson-Billings 1995, 475) in order to attain educational merit. It should not escape one that achieving success in the school today is largely a matter of “power, ethics, politics, and survival” that inform the modernity that contextualises the school today (Delgado Bernal 1998, 556). Achieving academic merit, contrary to strong cosmopolitan impartiality is not about merely acquainting oneself with impersonal knowledge detached from particularism.

What is evident this far is that a cosmopolitan education for citizenship that necessarily extinguishes the normativity or value of situatedness that also constitutes the elements of global diversity, which is an embodiment and expression of people’s concreteness, hides and de-problematizes historical, linguistic, cultural, epistemological and educational imbalances in the constitution of education for democratic equality across the world. Such a global citizenship ignores the concealed particularistic hegemonic power that underlies and shapes the equality project of the strong cosmopolitan universalism through impersonality and impartiality, building on the lauded equalising potentiality of global interconnectedness.

Eliminating Assimilation in Education for Citizenship

It is worth emphasising that the thrust of the argument being made against the hegemonic nature of education and education for citizenship does not invalidate nor outlaw the normativity of objectivity and universalisation of normative ideals in moral reflection and education. There is

a fundamental place for 'objective' universalism in all valid normative reflection. Rather, this chapter contests the absoluteness and exclusivity of the framework of such universalism and the procedures leading to the attainment of the universalism that necessarily marginalises non-conforming 'subjective' epistemologies and perspectives that embody and express the concreteness of global people.

The contention of this chapter is that ideal cosmopolitan citizenship must be as committed to what is common about people as it should be committed to what differentiates them, making them the 'other'. In education for cosmopolitan citizenship, human equality will be achieved through the recognition of valid alternative epistemologies and diverse concrete ways of being human for the different people of the world. Ideal cosmopolitanism must therefore necessarily be equally committed to both locality and universality. It is worth bearing in mind that across the diverse world, localised human communities, living under nation-states, have unique social visions achievable when their contestable collective interests and values are recognised and affirmed through educational practice. However, such communities also have moral obligations to other collectives: ensuring that global societies of peoples relate in a mutually respectful and non-paternalistic manner (Papastephanou 2013b, 24).

An ideal universalism of cosmopolitan citizenship, as Benhabib (2011) holds, must be one that includes and starts with difference of situatedness, such as that of localness. It must be noted that what counts in recognising the peoples of the world as equal human beings, worthy of respect, does not reside only in what they share in common with all humanity. Regarding them as equal human beings lies in one people recognising the way of being in the world of others, not only as equal possessors of an agency capacity. Their particularistic way of being concrete human beings (Benhabib 1992) inspires the motivation for their exercise of agency; therefore, what is worth respect is not only the capacity for the people's agency but also the values and motivations behind such agency.

The case being made here is that cosmopolitan education for democratic citizenship must be responsive to a people's situatedness other than advance a 'universal' decontextualised impartial conceptualisation of a modern citizen. It is therefore imperative that education in Africa re-

examines which values should be included and emphasised in the quest of cultivating a globally competent citizen.

Being about the nature, status and acquisition of knowledge, epistemic claims and assumptions need not be understood as wholly essentialist and therefore entirely incontestable. Contextuality also inspires even some of the legitimately objective knowledge with universally applicable criteria for evidence, as Code (2012, 92) holds. Thus, the characteristics and contexts of the knowledge constructors embed, in the knowledge, aspects of particularism, and these encompass their subjective motivations for the inquiry, emotional attachment, social class and their cultural and historical influences (Code 2012).

Although such subjectivity considerations may not necessarily alter the objectivity of the knowledge claims, the considerations are however still crucial in debates concerning the normative assumptions and implications of the claims. Such knowledge, among others, is a product of and consolidates particularistic ideologies regarding the nature of knowledge, knowledge acquisition procedures, criteria for credibility, knowledge–power relationships, and “the place of knowledge in ethical and aesthetic judgments” (Code 2012, 93). Thus, knowledge generation and its hierarchical structuring in terms of its value and veracity are neither neutral nor entirely objective disinterested endeavours. Therefore the underrepresentation of African perspectives and indigenous epistemologies in global citizenship conceptualisation (Parmenter 2011, 368) is of real concern.

Malawi and Africa need critical epistemology that is symmetrical with the people’s philosophical outlooks (Ramosé 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). Such a critical epistemology must question the underlying generalisations and assumptions of the dominant positivist orientations of “objective truth versus subjective emotion” assertions (Delgado Bernal 1998, 560) about human nature and knowledge.

It is worth conceding that not all human interests, aspirations, values and emotions can be reduced to fit into some absolute universal categorisation of value as either normatively subjective or objective (Nyamnjoh 2012). An education for citizenship that is exclusively rooted in human similarity and necessarily precluding local (national) metaphysical and epistemological perspectives falls victim to such positivist hegemony about human nature and the human condition.

Conclusion

Human equality and the indispensability of global interconnectedness necessitate education for cosmopolitan citizenship across the globe. Cultivation of universal global citizenship skills is not incompatible with sources of concreteness for the diverse peoples of the world. The educational aim of developing authentic human beings characterised by autonomy presupposes a social order that accords care for the realisation of individual autonomous capacity. This chapter avers that in education for global citizenship, the consequence of embracing cosmopolitan models that necessarily exclude sources of concrete being is that the peoples of less powerful nations of the world have their ways of being and epistemologies unduly compelled to integrate into the hegemonic economically 'relevant' mainstream Eurocentric epistemology. In its constitution, ideal cosmopolitan citizenship must therefore necessarily begin from and with typifying differences such as that of indigenous epistemologies and metaphysics if the cosmopolitanism is to achieve, recognise and respect the worth of human beings in the quest of attaining human equality. Unless indigenous sources of being are duly considered in the cultivation of global citizenship and education for global citizenship, the prevalent form of cosmopolitan citizenship will continue being assimilationist, especially in African education for citizenship. Questions of mother-tongue instruction are not merely matters of efficiency and effectiveness in teaching and learning. History determines the democratic evolution of a political community, besides being constitutive (not in essentialist terms) of the being of the people in any nation. History and mother tongue instruction as elements of people's situatedness are therefore not inhibitive of cosmopolitanism. They are its necessary and indispensable constituents.

Recasting education for cosmopolitan citizenship is not about choosing either national or global, Eurocentric or Afrocentric paradigms of citizenship. It is neither about restoring a thick form of nationality or culture. Rather, it is about grounding cosmopolitanism in the contestable differences that typify global communities. Realisation of education for cosmopolitan citizenship, although hampered by global forces, however, is largely incumbent on the political will of African nations to achieve such a cosmopolitanism.

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11

Leaning into Discomfort: Engaging Film as a Reflective Surface to Encourage Deliberative Encounters

Judith Terblanche and Charlene van der Walt

Introduction

Within pedagogical scholarship concerned with the imperative for social transformation, the importance and vital nature of deliberative encounters, especially with those considered other, have been highlighted and proposed as a tool to facilitate change. Encountering the other, especially the ideologically constructed other, which despite full humanity, somehow become less human or essentially one-dimensionally foreign, often leads to experiences of discomfort as cherished ideas and constructions become fractured or wholly redundant. In order to reflect on the complex dynamic involved in encountering the other, we draw on the notion of the ‘drama of embrace’ as proposed by Miroslav Volf (1996) in

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his seminal work on the imperative of hospitality. With the purpose to bring Volf's reflection on encounter to the tertiary education setting in South Africa, we bring his theoretical insights into conversation with the work of Yusef Waghid on so-called *ubuntu* education. The shattering of deep ideological and long-held beliefs in social transformation pedagogical spaces has raised questions about classroom safety and the integrity of those present in the teaching and learning process that warrants further pedagogical reflection. On the one hand, the impetus for this contribution springs from the abovementioned concern about classroom safety and personal integrity, and on the other hand, the experiential knowledge that deliberative encounters are non-negotiable for social transformation. In order to slow down the process involved in the pedagogical facilitation of deliberative encounters, we draw on the notion of a narrative imagination, as proposed by Nussbaum (1997), as we explore the potential of film as a tool to cultivate compassion that could cultivate empathy. We propose that film become, considering the narrative and visual nature thereof, when engaged, a reflective surface that cracks open spaces to have creative and dynamic conversations pertaining to the complexity of issues as it becomes embodied within the intersection of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion, culture and socio-economic realities. Aligning with the insights from decolonial theory, we argue that pedagogical film engagement allows all those involved in the teaching and learning process to draw on different registers of embodied knowledge as it foregrounds the lived experiences of the viewer as he or she engages with the film and in subsequent discussions. As a contextual example embedded within the South African landscape and which makes visible something of the deeply painful chasms that exist in South African society in terms of especially race, class and gender, we will engage the 2017 film directed by Craig Freimond, *Beyond the River*. We aim to illustrate how a facilitated viewing and discussion of the inspirational visual tale of encounter beyond constructed boundary could ignite the possibility for similar deliberative encounters as part of a broader pedagogical process.

To Get Stuck In

“But Steve, you need to get stuck in. Get to understand something of his story. Find out what makes him tick.” With these words of challenge, a beautiful, yet painfully vulnerable journey of encounter starts between Steve and Duma in the 2017 film directed by Craig Freimond, *Beyond the River*. The gruelling Dusi Canoe Marathon, set against the picturesque KwaZulu-Natal landscape, follows the rural flow of the river in a three-day stage race between Pietermaritzburg and Durban. The preparations and training for and the actual endeavour of completing the marathon form the backdrop of the poignant tale of encounter, which is based on actual events. We meet Steve as a nine-time Dusi gold medal winner who loses his normal rowing partner to a communal friend and is therefore left with the complicated task of finding a new person with whom to partner for the next race. Steve, after busting out of his last solo Dusi, wants to make a return to K2-pair rowing and Duma, a young black man from Soweto, is proposed as a possible rowing partner. On the surface, the distance between Steve and Duma is painfully obvious. Steve, a teacher at a prestigious Johannesburg private high school, lives a seemingly comfortable life with his wife, Annie, and has easy access to everything that allows him to be at the pinnacle of his sport. Duma, on the other hand, lives in a small shack on the fringe of Soweto with his father and sister after the untimely death of his mother. Drawn to petty crime due to circumstances and the unsavoury influence of a less than upstanding childhood friend, Zama, Duma seems destined for a life of struggle and ill-fated encounters with those responsible for law enforcement. Through an inspiring act of wisdom and compassionate mentoring, Oupa, a rowing coach and enthusiast from Soweto, draws Duma back into the sport of rowing in which he excelled as a young man. Duma, known in rowing circles as Helicopter, due to his strength and speed, is set up with Steve as they embark on a trial period to discern whether the match-up could indeed be viable. The start of their shared campaign to conquer the Dusi is fraught with complications and a clear lack of flow. Steve, being the obviously more experienced rower than Duma, explains the mechanics of two rowers together in a boat, by saying that they must

become like one person, harnessing the power of two in a single combined power output. The rhythm is off between the two obviously different men and the visible lack of synergy in the boat is arguably symptomatic of the great physical and perceived divides between Duma and Steve. Although both of them inhabit the same geographical landscape, the disparities that mark their experience are painfully tangible.

The inequality that marks the South African landscape and informs both Duma and Steve's lived experience is highlighted by the National Planning Commission (2012) in their *National Development Plan 2030* where they address issues of inequality. When describing South Africa as a country, Dugard and Meyersveld (2017, 153) explain that although South Africa is "classed by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country, South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world". Kira Erwin (2017, 41) reflects on the reality of inequality in the South African landscape when stating:

I do not wish to underplay the tangible achievements of the government after 1994, for there are many, but it is equally important to remain critical of the failure to build a more equal and just society. Twenty years after the advent of democracy much has changed, but much has stayed the same. There are multitudes of statistics available illustrating the growing inequalities. Translating these figures into the daily injustices experienced by the majority of people living in South Africa is a depressing exercise in which stark contrasts are inescapable.

Similar to the range of rapids, white water, obstacles and moments of wide flat open water that mark the unfolding of the river in the Dusi Canoe Marathon, the two men navigate the complexities and intricacies of encountering one another in the midst of the history of inequality in South Africa. Spling (2018, n.p.) picks up on this metaphor when stating, "[t]hey're constantly breaking barriers, overcoming prejudices and inspiring others around them with the symbol of the river adding layers of meaning." Their embodied proximity compels the two men to collectively interrogate ideologically informed ideas and constructions of the other; stereotypical notions that due to their partial limitations and lack of nuance often render the other somehow less than fully human or

essentially one-dimensional. We find Steve having to adjust his demanding expectations of Duma when he becomes aware of the practical and structural limitations informing his everyday existence. In a poignant scene in the film we observe Steve as he reacts harshly when Duma arrives late for a 05:00 training, clearly not having any sense of what the viewer has been made aware of as we see Duma rising long before 05:00 in order to wash at a communal tap and make his way to the training water by having to catch three taxis, a commonplace experience for those that have to make use of the less than structured public transport system in South Africa. Similarly, the veneer of Steve's seemingly perfect life, on which Duma remarks in conversation with Oupa, is fractured when he in turn becomes aware of the traumatic backstory that keeps Steve isolated, incapable of expressing his vulnerability and connecting to those closest to him.

By drawing on themes and motives within the plot development of the film we would firstly like to reflect on the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings informing the imperative of encounter as a key moment that could potentially spark empathy and compassion for the other, movements that seem fundamental to the dynamics informing any attempt at constructive social engagement and transformation. When reflecting on the subtleties informing the process of encounter, we draw from insights and concepts such as the importance of recognition, the praxis of hospitality and the value of the African notion of *ubuntu*. Following from this foundational theoretical reflection in the final part of the chapter, we consider the implication of these concepts and ideas for the pedagogical facilitations of deliberative encounters that has proved to be pivotal in the process of teaching for change.

Encountering the Other

As a theoretical frame, to reflect on the process and dynamics involved in the moment of encounter between those constructed as 'other', we draw on the seminal work of the Croatian Protestant theologian and public intellectual Miroslav Volf. Volf (1996, 16) identifies "identity and otherness" as key concepts as he reflects on reconciliation within a pluralistic

ethical and cultural context. Volf's reflection is embedded within an ethic and ethos of hospitality. When Vosloo (2004, 71) reflects on identity within the praxis of hospitality he notes, "[w]hat is needed is not an emphasis on identity as such, nor on the alienation for identity, but an emphasis on a certain kind of identity—an identity open to the other and otherness." Vosloo elsewhere elaborates (2003, 66) by stating:

The challenge posed by the moral crisis does not merely ask for tolerance and peaceful co-existence or some abstract plea for community, but for an ethos of hospitality. The opposite of cruelty and hostility is not simply freedom from the cruel and hostile relationship, but hospitality. Without an ethos of hospitality it is difficult to envisage a way to challenge economic injustice, racism and xenophobia, lack of communication, the recognition of the rights of another, etc. Hospitality is a prerequisite for a more public life.

Miroslav Volf (1996, 141) explores the theoretical underpinnings and the implications of this openness to the other, which serves as the basis for an ethic of hospitality, by reflecting on the significance of a striking symbolical action, namely the aptly termed "drama of embrace". Volf (1996, 141–145) breaks down the action of embrace into four structural elements, and it is these movements that we would like to appropriate as a frame for our discussion on the imperative of encounter. With the purpose to bring Volf's reflection on encounter to the tertiary education setting in South Africa, we bring his theoretical insights into dynamic conversation with the work of Yusef Waghid (2018) on so-called *ubuntu* education. Each movement of Volf's embrace discussed below will thus be complemented by insights from the pedagogical landscape in order to accentuate the appropriation of these theoretical tools for the practical classroom setting in the context of teaching for social transformation.

As a first act, Volf (1996, 141) identifies the opening of the arms as a signal of desire to connect with the other and the acknowledgement of the limits of my own self-sufficiency and needlessness.

Open arms are a gesture of the body reaching for the other. They are a sign of discontent with my own self-enclosed identity, a code of desire for the other. I do not want to be myself only; I want the other to be part of who

I am and I want to be part of the other. More than just a code for desire, open arms is a sign that I have created space in myself for the other to come in and that I have made a movement out of myself so as to enter the space created by the other.

Waghid (2018, 56) connects with Volf by arguing that in this first phase of singling desire for the other, one has to “present themselves to one another on the basis of one another’s speech acts, that is, articulation and listening”.

Within the film, the need or desire for the other is informed by practical realities, mainly the fact that Steve needs a rowing partner in order to compete in the Dusi. From the outset, it is clear that gold in the Dusi is Steve’s primary motivation, and his connection with Duma is merely informed by the power and speed that he can contribute to the rowing duo. To a certain extent, Steve wants to benefit from that which Duma brings to the collaboration without committing to the vulnerable and decentring nature of true encounter and stepping outside himself to recognise and acknowledge the existence and inherent value of the other. It is only when acknowledging and risking the expression of mutual vulnerability that a true reciprocal encounter becomes possible between Duma and Steve. Zembylas (2005, 946), in reference to Megan Boler’s (1999) book *Feeling power*, remarks regarding the instrumental importance of the risk of vulnerability and the link of vulnerability to transformation, “vulnerability provides the turbulent ground on which to negotiate truths (e.g. new emotional rules that are less oppressive) that is a necessary foundation of transformation”. Steve needs an encounter with Duma in order to escape from his self-sufficient isolation that renders him distant and unapproachable. Duma in turn needs an encounter with Steve in order to solidify his sense of self and to develop trust in the authenticity of his voice and the expression of his position.

At this point in the argument and following from the description above, it would be important to acknowledge the risk involved in the encounter with the other. Although an openness to the other is imperative for any possibility of encounter and subsequent transformation, the very real risk of harm, humiliation and even annihilation should be noted. Ballantine (2017, 110) hints at an important dimension inform-

ing the risk of encounter when suggesting that in an encounter, we need to have “a readiness to lose—or at least loosen—those aspects of our social and personal selves that barricade us in, rupturing our common humanity”. Indeed, as Judith Butler (2004, 23) argues in the process of encountering the other, “one is undone, in the face of the other”; we thus allow ourselves to be undone by each other. Becoming undone is deeply painful, disorientating and informs experiences of loss, but it is fundamental to the ability to move beyond ourselves and discovering the gift of our collective humanity.

The second act, identified by Volf (1996, 142) in the drama of embrace describes the respectful posture of open arms reaching out to the other, but waiting for the other to wilfully enter the embrace.

By opening the arms, the self has initiated the movement toward the other, a movement for whose justification no invitation from the other is needed and no reciprocation on the part of the other necessary, a movement which is itself an invitation to the other and for whose justification, therefore, the simple desire of the self not to be without the other suffices.

The respect implied by this structural element of the embrace is commented on by Waghid (2018, 59) when he reflects on the nature of encounter and states:

Mutual respect in the first place implies that people listen attentively to the views of one another before making up their minds in relation to the ways in which they should respond ... Deliberation stands the best chance to be realised if different and/or contending views are conceived by one another.

This respectful dimension of encounter is beautifully depicted in the film as Steve and Duma negotiate the intricate dynamics of boat position. According to convention, Steve, being the more experienced and elder of the two rowers has to take up the position in the front of the boat as the person at the bow is responsible for steering and determines the rhythm of the combined rowing effort. Initially, after reflecting on the lack of synergy, when Duma suggests that the pair switch positions Steve reacts negatively as he cannot conceive of following Duma's lead. Through a

process of respectful listening and negotiation and after a heartfelt encounter, the willingness is developed in Steve to give the alternative set-up a go.

In the third act as proposed by Volf (1996, 143), we arrive at the apex moment in the drama of the embrace in the closing of the arms. “This is the goal of embrace, the embrace proper, which is unthinkable without reciprocity; each is both holding the other and being held by the other, both are active and passive. In an embrace a host is a guest and a guest is a host.”

Waghid (2018, 57–60) offers valuable resources when reflecting on this third movement as he ponders on the value of the African notion of *ubuntu* for the educational context. Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999, 34–35) defines Ubuntu as a term that is:

[V]ery difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the very essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘*Yu, u nobuntu*’; ‘Hey, he or she has *ubuntu*.’ This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person through other people.’ It is not ‘I think therefore I am’. It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong.’ I participate, I share. A person with *ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.

Waghid (2018, 57) continues from this foundational definition of *ubuntu* and proposes that an encounter amongst humans is “considered as a moment of empathy and compassion”. As stated in the discussion of the first movement of embrace as proposed by Volf (1996, 141), the prerequisite for encounter is the willingness to show up, to present yourself and to reveal something of your vulnerability to the other. The willingness to become vulnerable is key as it holds the potential to spark imagination that forms the basis of a compassion response and responsible

action. Nussbaum (2004, n.p.) emphasises the imperative of compassionate imagination that develops out of vulnerable encounters and jolts the imagination out of complacency when she states, “[w]e need theories of global justice and policies that implement these theories. But we need something more fundamental: the compassionate imagination, which can make other people’s lives more than distant abstractions.”

Besides holding the potential to express collective vulnerability and to spark compassion, this central moment in the embrace also holds the potential for recognition and affirmation of the other. Ward (2017, 578) reflecting on the process of decolonisation in the tertiary education sector argues for the “importance of affirmation” that stems from recognition. Through affirmation and recognition, the full humanity of the other is recognised and celebrated as of worth and importance and fundamental to the process of becoming fully human. In the film, Duma’s articulated longing to be considered ‘somebody’ is a poignant expression of the human desire to be recognised and affirmed.

The climax of the encounter between Duma and Steve is captured in the embodied action of embrace. Steve risks fragile vulnerability when he remembers traumatic events from the past that have kept him isolated and guilt-ridden, informing his distance from others, especially those closest to him. Both Duma and Steve show up to this encounter. They risk vulnerability and within the embrace, compassionate imagination for the other is sparked, moving from perceptions and ideas about the other to a true recognition and affirmation of the humanity of the other.

Finally, in the fourth moment of the drama of embrace as proposed by Volf (1996, 144), we find the opening of the arms after the embrace. “Embrace does not make ‘two bodies one’ by transforming the boundary between bodies into the seam that holds together one body. The other must let go finally, so that the ‘negotiation of difference’ which can never produce a final settlement, may be continued.”

Both men are transformed by the encounter and consequently propelled into a range of other engagements. The encounter is of pivotal nature and sparks transformed action. Steve is seen addressing the racist prejudices expressed by white middle-class men who form part of the rowing club and Duma, in part, flourishes in other contexts due to the pivotal recognition received from the encounter with Steve. Where once

he was cast as an aimless youth, he is now valued and respected as ‘somebody.’

In the final part of the chapter, we will endeavour to build on the insights drawn from the discussion above in order to reflect on the possible implications of facilitated deliberative encounters for pedagogical praxis.

Teaching for Change

The imperative of vulnerable encounter, as argued above, seems fundamental to the possibility of facilitating change and transformation. For stereotypes or ideological constructions of the other to be unmasked, destabilised and ultimately to become undone, an embodied encounter with the other seems crucial. Because the other is often not only ideologically removed but also physically functions in alternative spaces, even when staying in the same geographical area or city, it makes the possibility of insulation from the other and the lived reality of the other a tangible possibility. Remnants from the Apartheid Group Areas Act (RSA 1950), which stratified the South African landscape according to race, and the isolating and protecting function of socio-economic means still deeply inform race, class and gender divides in the South African landscape. Hofmeyr and Govender (2015, 9) elaborate on these divides when stating:

Legislated race-based discrimination was the defining feature of apartheid. Where you lived, where you worked, where you socialised, who you loved and, ultimately, where you died was largely predetermined by the colour of the skin in which you were born. Since South Africa’s first democratic elections, institutionalised racial discrimination has been removed from the statutes, but the apartheid geography of our cities and towns—as well as the distributional patterns of our economy—have largely remained in place to reinforce the template created by the architects of apartheid. Legislation is no longer required to sustain apartheid. It has evolved in ways that allow it to sustain itself up to the present day. While material inequities as tangible and incontrovertible manifestations of apartheid’s legacy have received their due attention in our public discourse over the

past two decades, many have preferred to gloss over the persistence of racial prejudice that they continued to reproduce. But the country's reluctance to confront this in a forthright manner has caught up with it. Many, today, experience a sense of deep social polarisation in which our separateness reinforces racial prejudice.

We, however, believe that pedagogical spaces, if well-constructed and skilfully facilitated could function as incubators for developing the skills and capacity for the 'drama of embrace' to play out in the vulnerable encounter with the other as proposed in the previous section.

Firstly, considering the complexity of encounter as described above and in order to slow down the process involved in the pedagogical facilitation of deliberative encounters, we draw on the notion of a narrative imagination, as proposed by Martha Nussbaum, as we suggest the potential of film as a tool to cultivate compassion that could in turn cultivate empathy. Nussbaum (2003) proposes three core values for cultivating humanity, namely:

- Socratic self-examination;
- world citizenship; and
- the narrative imagination.

It is especially this third dimension of Nussbaum's theory that seems particularly relevant for our reflection. In engaging this dimension, Nussbaum (2003, 270–271) argues:

But citizens cannot think well on the basis of factual knowledge alone. The third ability of the citizen, closely related to the first two, can be called the narrative imagination. This means the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person's story, and to understand the emotions, wishes and desires that someone so placed might have. The narrative imagination is not uncritical: We always bring ourselves and our own judgments to the encounter with another, and when we identify with a character in a novel, or a distant person whose life story we imagine, we inevitably will not merely identify, but also judge that story in the light of our own goals and aspirations. But the first step of understanding the world from the point of

view of the other is essential to any responsible act of judgment, since we do not know what we are judging until we see the meaning of an action as the person intends it, the meaning of a speech as it expresses something of importance in the context of that person's history and social world. The third ability our students should attain is the ability to decipher such meanings through the use of the imagination.

Considering its narrative and visual nature when dynamically engaged, we firstly propose that film become a reflective surface that cracks open spaces to have creative and dynamic conversations pertaining to the complexity of issues as it becomes embodied within the intersection of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion, culture and socio-economic realities.

The narrative landscape depicted and constructed within film offers viewers a reflective surface in order to enhance the process of sense-making and meaning-making as John de Gruchy (2006, 4) argues:

From the beginning of history we humans have told stories, whether in word, dance, drama or painting, to make sense of our place in the world; stories about our origins, who we are, why the world is like it is, and how we should live ... Telling such stories is a necessary and potent way of handing on wisdom from one generation to another, one culture to another, about our common humanity and distinct personal identities.

Through the act of viewing, interpretation and discussion, the messy, complex and painful world depicted in film becomes a dynamic space for ethical reflection and contemplation by contemporary viewers. In the engagement with narrative, through the telling and retelling of the stories, we learn who we are but also how we relate to others. Ackermann (2001, 18–19) continues along these same lines when stating:

Telling stories is intrinsic to claiming one's identity and in the process finding impulses for hope. Narrative has a further function. Apart from claiming identity and naming the evil, narrative has a sense-making function. The very act of telling the story is an act of making sense of an often incomprehensible situation, of a suffering and chaotic world in which people wrestle with understanding and in so doing seek to experience relief.

Film reflection and discussion thus become an incubation space for the development of skills that could assist viewers with the real embodied complexity of encounter with the other.

As argued by Schmahmann (2017, 131–132), we believe that film engagement and reflection could spark the possibility for transformation, but it can never be considered a substitute for the real work of embodied engagement and encounter. We thus propose that film engagement and reflection become a safe, controlled and protected environment to develop and nurture skills and attitudes necessary for embodied encounter. The ability to suspend judgement for a moment or to resist binary oppositional categorisation and to consider the embodied reality of another seems fundamental in the process of cultivating compassion and empathy, pivotal in the imperative of deliberative encounters. Bolter (2004, 117–131) describes the abovementioned development of emphatic capacity as a shift from “passive empathy” to “critical hope” as she describes critical hope as an emotional willingness to engage in the difficult work of possibly allowing one’s world view to be shattered; thus, creating space for compassion and empathy for the reality of another to develop.

Secondly, although film engagement and reflection might be one step removed from the possible destabilising effects of the embodied encounter with another, the possible discomfort created by constructing pedagogical spaces where teachers and learners have to engage the complex reflective surface projected in film, should not be underestimated. The genre and subject matter of films selected for pedagogical engagement are predominantly informed by the pedagogical intention to disrupt or deconstruct commonplace or traditional ways of thinking, feeling and evaluating. These, albeit controlled, destabilising interventions remain challenging and discomforting to those present in the teaching and space as it dismantles the securities of isolation.

By proposing the pedagogical potential of taking the considered risk of facilitating the viewing of complex and troubling films within the teaching and learning space we draw on the work by, amongst others, Megan Bolter and Michalinos Zembylas on the so-called pedagogy of discomfort. Zembylas and McGlynn (2012, 41) state:

A pedagogy of discomfort, as an educational approach, emphasizes the need for educators and students alike to move outside their 'comfort zones'. Pedagogically, this approach assumes that discomforting emotions play a constructive role in challenging dominant beliefs, societal habits and normative practices that sustain social inequities and in creating possibilities for individual and social transformation.

By drawing on the work of Boler (1999), Zembylas (2015, 166) argues that theoretically, the model implies that it is necessary to offer those involved in teaching and learning spaces the opportunity to "unpack their cherished worldviews and 'comfort zones' in order to deconstruct the ways in which they have learned to see, feel and act". Also referring to the insights offered by Boler (1999), Reygan and Francis (2015, 103) continue along the same lines when considering the value of a pedagogy of discomfort within the South African social justice landscape, "[a] pedagogy of discomfort provides new perspectives on the world, guiding learners and teachers to step out of their 'comfort zones' and away from strongly held beliefs so as to critique the manner in which they have been taught to feel, see and act."

It seems fair to argue that, within the South African landscape where much of the past is banished in order to forget the imperative to lean into the discomfort of facing the truth of past experiences and thereby acknowledging the fact that inequality is relational, is of paramount importance. The destabilisation and disruption of discomforting experiences, as facilitated in film engagement within a pedagogy of discomfort, go a long way towards doing some of the work as highlighted by Maré (2017) as he builds on Ndebele's (2009) work in the process of fostering social cohesion in South Africa. Ndebele (2009, n.p) reflects on pretence as a sort of coping mechanism employed by those finding it hard to engage with the complexity of diversity when arguing:

Pretence could be a coping mechanism in which one owns up to the fact that one is unable to respond confidently and appropriately to human relations conundrums of the kind that race, gender and class tensions can throw up from time to time. Resorting to pretence may not necessarily be an indication of hypocrisy, but rather a desire to buy time or a muted cry for help.

Maré (2017, 47) in turn continues by arguing:

Confronting and acting on inequality provides that “collective space of anguish” and also the clear demand for collective social action towards resolution. But first citizens must come to a realisation of the nature and consequences of an unequal world and society. We must disturb our unreflective cohabitation with inequality and not reduce the problem of poverty, where we can assuage the guilt through handouts or donations (valuable, but ...). Inequality is relational, with wealth and poverty, gross consumption by the few and starvation of others inextricably linked.

The shattering of deep ideological and long-held beliefs in social transformation pedagogical spaces, as argued above, has raised important and inevitable questions about classroom safety and the integrity of those present in the teaching and learning process that warrants further pedagogical reflection. As Zembylas (2015, 166) puts it, “safe space, then, is not about the absence of discomfort, but rather it is a way of thinking, feeling and acting that fosters students’ critical rigor”.

Considering these destabilising effects of the pedagogy of discomfort, the importance of skilled and mindful facilitation of these teaching and learning spaces is paramount and warrant further reflection. Besides preparing students for a complex film viewing by offering important background information and content trigger warnings before the screening, the importance of the reflection on relevant and appropriate theoretical insights and content could offer valuable tools to enhance the viewing experience and the hermeneutical process of content appropriation. The process-centred and possible collective dimensions of pedagogical practice could be an invaluable recourse in the negotiation of the facilitation of a pedagogy of discomfort. By actively investing in the reflective practice of pedagogical praxis reflection, a facilitator could enhance his or her teaching practice by learning from previous successes or failures and from the insights of others involved in the pedagogical process. A community of scholars that enables relationships of pedagogical accountability could go a long way in order to enhance the ethical dimensions of setting up uncomfortable and ideologically challenging pedagogical spaces. Besides drawing on the insights and reflections of fellow educators in the process

of pedagogical praxis reflection, the insights of those involved in psychosocial support could be instrumental when constructing the contours of discomforting teaching and learning spaces.

Another dimension pertaining to the facilitation of discussion spaces after a film viewing, especially when a diversity of voices are present in the discussion, is highlighted by Shanyanana and Waghid (2016, 116) within their equalisation-of-voice framework. According to this framework, specific attention should be given to marginalised voices within the discussion in order to facilitate an equality of voices and perspectives within complex discussions. Post-viewing discussions should not simply be a free-for-all engagement but should be constructed mindfully in order to optimise the contributions by all those present in the discussion and to harness the discomfort caused by the content of the film as a tool for social transformation. We argue that the post-viewing discussion space thus becomes an optimal space to engage complex issues that would give rise to divergent opinions amongst viewers, such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation and socio-economic realities. In terms of the film under discussion, the post-viewing conversation could offer a much-needed space in the South African society to engage with issues such as race and socio-economic realities and how this in turn affects dominant masculinity constructions and subsequent gender constructions.

Finally, and aligning with the overarching theme of this publication we would like to consider the value of pedagogical film engagement as outlined above for the imperative of decolonial education.

Heleta (2016, 1–2) highlights something of the reality of a lack of epistemological transformation in the South African education system post-1994 when stating:

Since the end of the oppressive and racist apartheid system in 1994, epistemologies and knowledge systems at most South African universities have not considerably changed; they remain rooted in colonial, apartheid and Western worldviews and epistemological traditions. The curriculum remains largely Eurocentric and continues to reinforce white and Western dominance and privilege ... In this process, colonial education played an instrumental role, promoting and imposing the Eurocentric 'ways' and worldviews while subjugating everything else. Thus, one of the most

destructive effects of colonialism was the subjugation of local knowledge and promotion of the Western knowledge as the universal knowledge. European scholars have worked hard for centuries to erase the historical, intellectual and cultural contributions of Africa and other parts of the 'non-Western' world to our common humanity.

In order to address the epistemological violence as highlighted above, we propose that pedagogical film engagement could offer creative decolonial recourses by firstly foregrounding locally produced content and theory developed from engaging this contextual content, and secondly, by foregrounding the lived experiences and embodied knowledge of the viewer as he or she engages with the film and in subsequent discussions.

Firstly, and as argued by Jansen (1998, 110–111):

Content matters, and it matters a great deal when a European-centred curriculum continues to dominate and define what counts as worthwhile knowledge and legitimate authority in South African texts and teaching; it matters very much in the context of the inherited curriculum, informed by apartheid and colonialism, in which only the more readily observable, offensive racism has been skimmed off the top.

When appropriating media and examples from popular culture in the pedagogical space in order to destabilise and disrupt common sense or commonplace ways of being in the world and to accelerate social transformation through teaching, the choice to adopt locally produced and contextually informed films could go a long way to address eschewed archives of white, Western and male privilege knowledge.

Secondly, and aligning with the insights from decolonial theory, we argue that pedagogical film engagement allows all those involved in the teaching and learning process to draw on or tap into different registers of embodied knowledge as it foregrounds the lived experiences of the viewer as he or she engages with the film and in subsequent discussions. As is imperative within decolonial thinking, the embodied knowledge of the viewer is foregrounded as the viewer draws on his or her own embodiment and understanding of the world in order to engage with the reflective surface that is the narrative of the film. As Naudé (2017) argues, the hermeneutical lenses that we employ to make sense of the world, also as

Africans, are deeply shaped by Western paradigms and in the process shapes all hermeneutical processes. By harnessing the embodied knowledge of the viewer as embedded within the South African context, we believe, with Bawa (2017, 139), that we are tapping into “the idea of what it means to be South African and opening up the possibility of fruitful discussion about social cohesion”.

In conclusion, the pedagogical approach and style highlighted above pose much the same challenge to those involved in the teaching and learning space as the one posed to Steve when he had to navigate his relationship with the physically and ideologically removed Duma mentioned at the outset of this contribution, namely to ‘get stuck in’. Setting up pedagogical spaces with the intention to contribute to the process of social transformation requires the vulnerability of risk and the willingness to enter into troubling spaces of discomfort. Pedagogy in this style is not simple, strictly rational or bound to the traditional classroom setting but requires commitment to change and an eagerness for imagination and innovation. Much of what has been discussed rests on a painfully simple prerequisite beautifully captured by the first moment in Volf’s (1996) drama of embrace as discussed above, the moment of realisation, of acknowledgement, that I am not enough or complete on my own, that the world does not exist only in alignment with my understanding, but that I need to encounter the other to become fully human. This realisation is in all probability not something that can be taught, but hopefully it can be discovered, nurtured and developed with the help of deliberative encounters in a pedagogy of discomfort.

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12

The Conundrum of Decolonisation and Afrophobia: A Case for South African Higher Education

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Introduction

Decolonisation of higher education is predicated on the imperative to learn, unlearn, deconstruct and reconstruct values, norms, beliefs and thought systems that were disseminated during colonialism (Mutekwe 2017). In that regard, decolonisation cannot avoid confronting the misconception that anything non-European and non-white is inferior as espoused in afrophobia. Conceptually, afrophobia refers to anti-foreign sentiments expressed exclusively and specifically towards foreign nationals from other African countries (Tafira 2011). In the context of South Africa, afrophobia occurs both in the broader society and in higher education, albeit in different forms (Department of Education [DoE] 2008; Lee 2017). Afrophobia impedes the possibility of social interactions across nationalities in higher education. Conversely, decolonisation of higher education is fundamentally an emancipatory discourse in which

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forms of social oppression and prejudices are supposedly eliminated (Mbembe 2016). Decolonisation of higher education encompasses the process of redressing the oppressive structural, cultural and systematic colonial values (Mbembe 2015). In its conceptual absoluteness, decolonisation seeks to uproot and cleanse the seemingly intractable colonial imprints and unequal social relations that are embedded in African higher education exhaustively. One cannot claim to be an advocate of decolonisation while simultaneously engaging in afrophobic practices and attitudes that marginalise other members of the society.

While we are alive to the fact that afrophobic practices and attitudes occur in most universities in African countries, we chose to locate this debate in South African higher education because of two seminally important reasons. Firstly, South Africa continues to be the leading host study destination for many African international students. For instance, in 2013, there were 74,000 international students out of whom 74% were from the Southern African region (Lee 2017; Lee and Schoole 2015). The leading top student-sending countries are Zimbabwe, Botswana, Nigeria, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland. Comparatively, South Africa has the best universities and a stable political and economic environment. Secondly, owing to the comparatively democratic space that both staff and students enjoy, South Africa has reignited and re-galvanised Africa to revisit the debate on decolonisation of education (Sayed et al. 2017). The highly publicised #RhodesMustFall campaign as well as demands for a decolonised university curriculum and culture all captured the imagination of the rest of the continent. On the realisation that the Western and 'white' ideals dominate the university curriculum, in 2015, South African higher education students and staff embarked on nationwide campaigns for a decolonised education (Morreira 2017). It is our submission in this chapter that the decolonisation of higher education debate that gathered momentum in South Africa will inevitably cascade to the rest of the higher education sector in Africa. As noted already in this introductory phase, besides better facilities, African international students are pulled to pursue university education because of the democratic space that South African students enjoy. Resultantly, the demand for decolonisation of higher education epitomises the availability of student democratic space in South Africa. It is essential to state that in most

repressive African countries, higher education students are denied the right to protest.

Nevertheless, the ideals espoused in the discourse on decolonisation of higher education are in sharp contrast to afrophobic practices and attitudes in South African higher education. Decolonisation of higher education is premised on the ideals of restoration, reclamation, reaffirmation and reidentification of social values and norms that were disrupted during the colonial era (Mutekwe 2017). On the other hand, afrophobic practices and attitudes are tailored towards ingraining social dominance and oppression over African international students. Since decolonisation tends to be rather ambivalent, it is crucial to some conceptual outline.

Decolonising African Education: Some Conceptual Considerations

In search of some theoretical elucidation on decolonisation, it is indispensable to make a distinction between political and educational decolonisation. Political decolonisation is a process in which liberation political movements and activists tenaciously confronted the colonial authority demanding majority rule and attendant civil rights (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). In Zimbabwe, for instance, such confrontation led to protracted violent civil wars in which many people were maimed or killed (Mlambo 2010). In some other countries, the political activists and liberation movements instituted political negotiations that ultimately resulted in the granting of independence. From its generic political connotation, it can be argued that most countries in Africa are decolonised through the attainment of political independence. Since colonisation had entailed the territorial occupation and imposition of rule by an external force (Hendricks 2018), political decolonisation as the converse implies the removal of the colonial authority. The public representatives, supposedly without regard to racial and ethnic orientation, assume leadership positions. The central supposition in political independence is therefore an end to political oppression (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015).

On the other hand, educational decolonisation, which is the key motif in this chapter, refers to the endeavours to eliminate oppressive colonial values, norms and beliefs that have obstinately remained embedded in African higher education after the end of political colonisation. Consequently, the conundrum is such that the attainment of political decolonisation does not necessarily imply the achievement of educational decolonisation. On average, most African countries have surpassed the 20-year political independence commemoration, yet educational decolonisation has persisted to be an ‘unfinished business’.

Primarily, decolonisation of education involves identification and elimination of influential colonial norms, beliefs, thought systems and values that continue to shape African higher education (Mutekwe 2017). Instead of establishing reaffirmation, reclamation and restoration, African higher education is often observed to be recreating and entrenching the colonial practices, values and thought systems (Mbembe 2016). In this regard, education perpetuates and re-enacts the presence of colonisers in their physical absence. Indisputably, decolonisation should be able to disrupt the perpetuation of colonial values and norms. Succinctly, the call for decolonisation is informed by the claim that “the books, theories and learning content predominantly reflect the thoughts of the previous Western colonial powers” (Van Jaarsveldt et al. 2018, 3). Decolonisation of education presupposes that at one historical moment, a form of colonial education was imparted to the colonised people. To decolonise, therefore, is a deliberate systematic erasure, recalibration and elimination of the residual colonial practices, values and representations in education. Arguably, the demands for decolonisation of education are an explicit acknowledgement of the inadequacies of political decolonisation.

Decolonisation of higher education in Africa can be theoretically analysed from what we will term ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ levels. The software level of decolonisation encompasses the intangible cultural value system that seeks to elevate remnant colonial norms while relegating the African student’s cultural normative system (Mbembe 2015). The software level is rather salient or latent. Pertinent issues to do with language of instruction, curriculum and history content fall under this category (Kiguwa and Segalo 2018). For instance, at both the Universities of Pretoria and of the Free State, there have been sustained calls for the

abandonment of Afrikaans as the dominant language of instruction. On the other hand, the hardware level entails the university architectural outlook as well as the racial composition of staff at the university. It could be argued that the hardware level of decolonisation is inserted in the post-apartheid transformation of education in South Africa. Accordingly, it is spelt out that both the student and staff composition of universities should reflect the social demographic composition of the broader society (DoE 2001). Inescapably, decolonisation identifies the university infrastructure and symbols that are suggestive of glorifying the colonial. Contextually, the demand for the removal of Cecil John Rhodes' statue and the request to change the name of Rhodes University are all contentious pointers to the imperative to address the remnant colonial hardware of the university. It is aptly noted that there are recognisable colonial continuities in higher education in Africa (Mamdani 2016).

There is a critical point to derive from this foreground on decolonisation of higher education in Africa Accordingly; decolonisation is ultimately tended towards a dispensation of social equality in African higher education. In other words, decolonisation of education in Africa must not be a vindictive programme that seeks to bring white supremacy on its knees (Mbembe 2015), while culturally 'elevating' the black African student. Ideally, the primary target of decolonisation of education is the eradication of colonial cultural hegemony that continues to define African higher education. It is therefore misleading to regard decolonisation as a reprisal period of 'correcting' the historical scoreboard against a certain racial or ethnic section of the social composition of the university. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to claim that black African students are the 'appropriate' sole custodians of the decolonisation of education debate as they are the yesteryear victims of colonialism (Makhubela 2018). Fundamentally, decolonisation is supposed to result in the realisation of equal social relations in which cultures and knowledge systems are valued. In our view, a decolonised higher education is accommodative of the diverse social composition along race, nationalities, religions and sexual orientations. Decolonisation of higher education as the antithesis to colonialism envisages the eradication of opinionated prejudices and stereotypes that often arise within the social diverseness of the social composition of the university. Accordingly, the following subsection delineates

afrophobia as a colonial historical output that hinders the attainment of decolonisation of education.

Afrophobia in South African Higher Education: An Impediment to Decolonisation

Afrophobia, as a general dislike or irrational fear of African immigrants in the South African higher education and the discourse on decolonisation higher education creates a conundrum within South African higher education. A conundrum is evidenced by the observation, “international students and in particular those from Africa are in a contradictory position. This is to say that on the one hand they are welcomed and encouraged to study in South Africa by universities and government institutions, while on the other hand they face the possibility of xenophobia” (Bolsmann and Miller 2008, 216). As foreigners, African international students are exposed to misconceptions, stereotypes and unfriendly social interactions in South African higher education (ibid).

Lee (2017) observes that African international students in the South African higher education tend to encounter social discrimination on the basis of their nationalities. In the same line of thought, afrophobia is constantly singled out as a social issue of concern at South African universities. The anti-African international students occur in both academic and social settings within South African universities (Obadire 2018). These empirical research findings are a testimony to the fact that afrophobia is an affront to the decolonisation of education discourse. It is emphasised that “given the pervasive xenophobic sentiments apparent across South Africa, the experiences, then, of non-South African black African students in South African universities both at the level of staff and students cannot be assumed to be positive” (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015, 87). Having given this synoptic description in South African higher education, it is incumbent to cite some forms which afrophobia takes.

The Selective Application of Foreignness in Universities

While decolonisation advances the ideals of social equality, the conceptual distinction between ‘international’ and ‘foreign’ exposes afrophobia in South African higher education. An observation is made that white European international students are referred to as ‘internationals’, while those from other African countries are termed ‘foreign students’ (Kavuro 2013). This chapter does not seek to dispute that international students are foreigners. Rather, the point to observe is that the conceptual distinction between ‘foreign’ and ‘international’ is a vital indicator of afrophobia. Ideally, the negative connotations and assumptions that are inherent in the conceptualisation of foreignness need to be eliminated within the scope of decolonisation of higher education (Mbembe 2015).

Language Contentions

Language of instruction is a highly contentious issue in the decolonisation of education discourse in South Africa. However, in demonstrating afrophobia, African international students are exposed to systematic linguistic exclusion that defies the decolonisation discourse. In this respect, dominant local indigenous languages are often used to exclude African international students socially. It is common that local students and staff use their local language such as Sotho, Zulu or Xhosa during academic sessions in the presence of international students from Africa, who may not be conversant in these languages (Singh 2013). African international students indicated that local students deliberately avoid to socially interact with them in favour of white international students from Europe (Lee 2017).

Illustratively, at the University of Venda, Obadire (2018) notes that African international students are often excluded when lecturers and South African students converse in Venda language during the course of a lecture. Venda and Sepedi are some of the official languages in South Africa spoken by the majority of local people in the region in which the

University of Limpopo is located. Equally, African international students may be negatively prejudged based on their English accent (Waghid 2009).

It is noted that “foreign black students, whom we have worked with, typically report that their failure to speak isiZulu, in our context the dominant indigenous language, provides the focal point for hostility” (Singh and Francis 2010, 305). At the University of KwaZulu-Natal, it was found out that “according to the foreign African students, one of the ways in which they experience xenophobia was local students and sometimes staff members would speak to them in local language such as isiZulu” (Muthuki 2013, 114). An African international student pointed out, “my South African classmates show great dislike of my presence, which is often characterised by local comments and words which I have come to learn are abusive, inhumane to such an extent I can’t write them, let alone imagine them” (Singh 2013, 100). *Kwerekwere* is a derogatory term that is used to refer to African languages that are not spoken in South Africa (Tella 2016). On the other hand, languages of European international students like France, Turkey and England are not derided as *kwerekwere*. An African international student stated, “some of the locals judge internationals by their ability to speak their language. This can prove difficult as there are eleven official languages and most internationals speak English and at least one language from their home” (Lee 2017).

The Perception of African International Students as Economic Threat

The central imperative of decolonisation is the attainment of a dispensation under which equal access to economic resources is established (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2016). Subsequently, it is unsurprising that Afrophobic practices are manifested through contestations around the distribution and access to scholarships, bursaries and financial grants within South African higher education. African international students as non-citizens are constantly reminded that they do not deserve to have access to the economic resources in both the university and the broader society (Lee

2017). In most instances, African international students are perceived negatively as economically poor while international students from Europe are considered potential tourists (Matsinhe 2011; Ramphele 1999). According to Bayaga (2011), there is a general perception that South Africa is not 'really' an African nation-state because of its relatively advanced and stable economy. The disassociation with Africa is precipitated by the negative image of Africa as a poor and primitive continent (Matsinhe 2011). From the economic threat perspective, African international students are often perceived as economic threats who scramble for the available financial resources in higher education (Obadire 2018).

It is advanced that "South African students tend to think that African international students left their countries because of civil wars, hunger, poverty and unemployment" (Monke 2012, 49). The notion that African international students are economic migrants is reinforced by the observation that they are likely to encounter severe financial challenges during their study period in South Africa (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015). European and American international students may not face severe financial challenges owing to their stronger financial currency in comparison to the South African rand. In addition, Muthuki (2013) observes that African international students complain that there are few bursaries and scholarships available for international students. In the same view, Lee and Sehoole (2015) note there is a view that African international students deplete the economic resources that are meant for local students.

According to Monke (2012), African international students are made to feel inferior as they are reminded by locals that they are undeservedly benefiting from the economic privilege of studying and residing in South Africa. Inevitably, such afrophobic assumptions contradict the fundamental objectives of decolonisation of higher education.

A point is made that "South African students complain that African students are stealing their jobs, while the same allegations are not levelled against students from Europe or America" (Lee 2017, 880). In the empirical study conducted by Lee (2017), higher education students from Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Uganda and Malawi raised their concerns about afrophobia. In the same study, European and American

international students attested to the warm reception they received from both white and black South Africans on and off campus.

The aspect of threat is significant because in afrophobia it is only the black African international students who are perceived as an economic threat. White and European international students are not considered to be an economic threat (Lee 2017).

Identifying a certain group of international students as an economic threat is not peculiar to the South African higher education landscape. Boafo-Arthur (2014) observes that in the United States of America, African international students are stereotypically viewed as a burden on the resources. The trend that most international students from economically less developed nation-states do not return to their nation-states on completion of their studies already sets them up as future employment competitors with the locals. This perception can only increase tensions between local and African international students.

The threat perception is encompassed in the sense of superiority that is often exhibited by local students towards the African international students. It is said, “the foreign African students felt that South African students exhibited a sense of superiority towards them” (Muthuki 2013, 117). The sense of superiority may be informed (misinformed) by prejudices that portray other African nation-states as economically poorer, rural and more impoverished than the host South Africa in this case (Matsinhe 2011). Accordingly, within the framework of decolonisation, it is important that the perception that African international students are draining resources should be discarded. In a country such as South Africa, which faces deficit challenges of critical skills, decolonisation can assist in the retention of skilled African international graduates.

Institutionalised Financial Exclusion

Ramphele (1999) observes that South African students invoke the ‘card’ of citizenship in instances where they perceive that they compete for financial resources with African international students. In South Africa, international students from the Southern African Development Commission (SADC) region pay tuition fees which are equivalent to

domestic South African students. In this context, the South African students complain that it is unfair for government to subsidise international students from the SADC (Ramphele 1999). Unlike international students from Europe and the United States, African international students who originate from nation-states with weaker currencies, are sometimes forced to scramble for the available scholarships and bursaries within South African higher education (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015; Mpinganjira 2012). For instance, the National Research Foundation (NRF) has some financial allocations that can be accessed by postgraduate international students. Consequently, tension emerges between African international students and their South African counterparts, which ultimately results in afrophobic attitudes and practices within higher education.

Lee (2017) points out that African international students note that they are regarded as people who drain financial resources that are legitimately meant for South African domestic students. A Ugandan student reported, “the general public’s perception towards international students is not good. The general thinking among most locals is that international students are using their government resources as well as taking their jobs” (Lee 2017, 880).

For economic resource competition in South Africa, black race is assumed to represent economic inferiority (Mbembe 2015). Therefore, the black race is a threat to the social structure. On the other hand, the white race, is representative of economic prosperity, and by this fact, international students from Europe are not perceived as a threat towards job competition upon graduation (Lee and Schoole 2015). It is through such analysis of the prevalence of race in informing the debates and discourses on economic competition that afrophobia manifests in higher education. In this regard, international European students may not be regarded as an economic threat in comparison to black African international students. The economic threat perception can only be decolonised by the appreciation of the fact that both the South African broader society can potentially benefit from the critical technical and academic skills that African international students may acquire during their study period.

Covert Hostilities

Covert hostilities manifest in subtle manners, which suggest the foreignness and the non-belonging of the African international students in South Africa (Obadire 2018). In higher education, there is an observation that “xenophobia may not be manifested in the form of physical violence, but in more subtle forms of making the non-nationals feel so unwelcome and despised in an environment that is made psychologically hostile” (Mogekwu 2005, 10). In this regard, covert hostilities are primarily attitudes and subtle acts that seek to exclude African international students socially. In terms of social interactions between South African and African international students, there is rather deliberate avoidance of mutual friendships between the two cohorts (Lee 2017). While this may be due to divergent cultural backgrounds, afrophobia occurs when social interactions are deliberately limited or avoided on the basis of nationalities (Lee 2017). Additionally, “the foreign African students expressed that black South Africans were largely hostile to their presence” (Muthuki 2013, 117).

Furthermore, African international students are of the view that the local South African students are unfriendly and unsociable towards them (Lee 2017). At institutional level, the higher education sector tends to be rather implicitly unfriendly in outlook towards African international students (Obadire 2018). A relevant point is made that “unfortunately, universities in South Africa continue to remain powerful mechanisms of social exclusion and injustice that succumb to external conditions of the wider society” (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015, 85). In addition, Pithouse-Morgan et al. (2012) point out that African international students find university structures such as the Student Representative Council (SRC) unreceptive towards them as they often convey the impression that they are mandated to give priority to issues pertaining South African students. In the same vein, African international students find it difficult to report cases of afrophobic practices and attitudes since offices like the SRC are usually manned by local South African students (Kavuro 2013). The perceptions and negative attitudes towards African

international students seem to be the key factor in determining the service provisions from administrative establishments in higher education.

There are observations that hateful language is sometimes used against African international students. For instance, African international students complained over the hateful utterances that were directed towards them from the other members of the student body at meetings that were intended to address issues related to student protests against annual tuition fee increases. From an institutional management perspective, there is a persistent resentment from South African students towards foreign (particularly African) students and a pervasive sense of 'outsider' amongst foreign students (xenophobia) (Obadire, 2018).

In view of the debate alluded to in this chapter, it has become apparent that afrophobic covert hostilities defy the logic of decolonisation under which both international and local students should have a sense of equal belonging. In other words, there is an assumption that higher education facilities belong to all enrolled and registered students as well as the lecturing and supporting staff (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015). To that end, attitudes and practices of hostilities towards a particular nationality in higher education contradict the basic tenet of equal belonging that is encompassed in decolonisation of higher education. Additionally, afrophobic covert hostilities are indisputably incongruent with the tolerance towards social diversity as intended in South African higher education (Makhubela 2018). Henceforth, management of social diversity is an essential and indispensable constituent of ideal decolonisation of higher education.

Conclusion

The primary occupation of decolonisation of education is dismantling the economic, cultural and social oppressive tendencies that proceed from the vestiges of colonialism. In this respect, it was shown in this chapter that decolonisation of higher education cannot sidestep the prejudices and negative nationalistic stereotypes that are espoused in afrophobia. It is a self-defeating conundrum that afrophobia and decolonisation can concurrently seek to 'outshine' each other in the

South African higher education. Colonialism in Africa was ideologically instituted and entrenched by the false narrative that anything African and black was essentially inferior to white and European. To a larger extent, the presence of afrophobic practices and attitudes bears testimony to the lingering colonial ideology of white superiority and the attendant black inferiority perception. To decolonise higher education therefore entails redressing the inculcated social assumption that African international students are 'undesirable' while white and European international students are the appealing cohort of international students in South African higher education. In consideration of the fact that graduates are supposed to develop capacities to live and work in socially diverse environments, the decolonisation of higher education in Africa cannot afford to bypass afrophobia. Decolonisation is about access, while afrophobia is a denial towards higher education in Africa.

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13

Decolonisation as Democratising African Higher Education

Chikumbutso Herbert Manthalu and Yusef Waghid

Introduction

This book reflects the subtle but profoundly alienating force of coloniality in modernity, such as a trivialisation of indigeneity in higher education, profit orientation of education and conceiving education as a social stratification tool, sustaining the social classes of colonialism. Colonialism was meant to disrupt the social dimension, discarding social concreteness of the indigenous people. In this book, the authors argue that colonialism has morphed into coloniality that underlies modernity, ultimately continuing with the colonialism project by having modern education in

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principle undermining the way of being of people across the world. African higher education thus perpetuates marginalisation, and therefore is counter-democratic education. While making such an argument, contributors in this book simultaneously argue for vigilance in the enactment of decoloniality because such a project has the potential to reincarnate coloniality by being itself marginalising, excluding others and inhibiting the flourishing of others not deemed part of the historically oppressed.

Decolonisation and Coloniality in African Higher Education

The anti-colonialism or decolonisation movement that was arguably spearheaded by African elites who mobilised peasant Africans for political independence however did not aspire for all-encompassing social justice for the liberated people upon achieving political decolonisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 488). As a result, colonialist systems were retained and still motivate African public institutions today, unintendedly replicating the goals of colonialism. Decolonisation is thus an endeavour that largely aims at removing particular symbols of imperial and political oppression.

While political colonialism was overcome by African nations attaining political independence, practices and conceptualisations of phenomena in most African higher education institutions are still informed by principles of colonialism: coloniality. The concept of coloniality refers to the sustenance and perpetuation of the systematic imbalances in power relations in modern systems that owe their heritage to the actual colonial experience (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). Coloniality is complex in its scope and breadth and typically structures phenomena in hierarchies of relevant versus irrelevant, superior versus inferiority, core versus periphery epistemic hierarchies, linguistic as well as aesthetic hierarchies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). Coloniality is “an invisible power structure, an epochal condition, and epistemological design, which lies at the centre of the present Euro-North American-centric modern world” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 488).

Besides profoundly marking the domains of authority, economy and general understanding of being, the colonial heritage today manifests in the “modern forms of exploitation and domination (power), and the coloniality of knowledge ha[s] to do with impact of colonisation on the different areas of knowledge production” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 242).

Decoloniality aims at dismantling the imbalances in power relations that follow along the othering hierarchies of coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). It is about breaking the hegemonic centralisation of one form of reason of dominant epistemology to re-centring marginalised forms of knowledge in the construction of a modern (global) order (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015).

As Maldonado-Torres (2007, 243) argues, “coloniality survives colonialism”. Coloniality does not depend on colonialism for its sustenance although colonialism gave birth to coloniality (Garcia 2018). Whereas colonialism “denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243), coloniality, on the other hand, “refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243). Unlike the intentional and explicit orchestration of structural marginalisation, hierarchisation and exclusion that are typical of the colonialism ideology—as most contributions in this book have observed—coloniality is subtly preserved and perpetuated in educational books, as a criteria for determining academic merit, in human nature conception such as that underlying the human rights discourses globally, and in conceptions of the categorisation and prioritisation of human interest for the modern human being (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243).

Colonial rule was built on social difference (Williams 2018). Likewise, the essence of coloniality is that it operates by converting differences into values and establishing a hierarchy of human beings ontologically and epistemically, ultimately ontologically assuming that there are inferior human beings and epistemically implying that there are some rationalities, and resultant epistemologies that are also inherently deficient and inferior (Mignolo 2007, 46). Colonialism essentially established hierarchies of knowledge production and validity that unduly privileged

Eurocentrism and simultaneously unduly dismissed indigeneity (Elliott-Cooper 2017, 334). The major challenge of coloniality as a heritage of colonialism is that it ‘coerces’ transformation of the other, compelling them to conceptualise and inscribe themselves through categories that are paraded as ultimate and exclusive of and incompatible with alternative forms of being and indigeneity (Williams 2018).

One of the core motivations of colonisation was competition for resources among the power nations such that capitalist competition was at the centre of the ideology of colonialism (Elliott-Cooper 2017). Education for the colonised people was largely a means of sifting out the most talented to aid the competitiveness of the coloniser efficiently. The other interests of the individual and his or her sightedness were morally and in terms of efficiency, irrelevant. Modern African higher education still retains these principles and tendencies. As the contributors in this work have argued, coloniality in modern African higher education sustains the legacy of trumping down the social dimension, stripping it of any normative value.

Decoloniality

The concept of decoloniality in this book, as a normative ideal for democratisation, has consistencies with that of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015), who conceives decoloniality to be a way of thinking, knowing and doing; hence, it is both an epistemological ideal and a political ideology. Decoloniality is a normative response to marginalisation and oppression that originate from the human struggle against the existential condition of the unjust historical experiences of slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015).

In this book, however, contributors have conceived decoloniality as not merely a backward-looking ideal that focuses only on the past, and generally attributing the human condition to the past. Instead, the necessity of decoloniality as a moral ideal is grounded in the reality that “the domains of culture, the psyche, mind, language, aesthetics, religion, and many others have remained colonized and as such decoloniality demands that there be an intellectual and ultimately structural re-examination of

the enduring and self-perpetuating harmful imperialist histories on the world today” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 485). Put differently, coloniality is “constitutive of modernity—there is no modernity without coloniality” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 156). The concept of decoloniality is not restricted to the conscious, deliberate systematic subjugation of otherness by imperialism. Decoloniality is neither conspiracy thought nor is rationalisation of the evils bedeviling humanity today by ostensibly taking away responsibility of formerly colonised communities from changing their own present situation. Rather, decoloniality is focused on marginalising entrenched epistemological and metaphysical perspectives that characterise modern life. In this sense, agents, systems and institutions that preserve and perpetuate coloniality are not necessarily defined by race or geographical areas despite coloniality having such features in its origin.

Why Decoloniality?

The immensity and indispensability of global interconnection in everyday life for all humanity across the world today cannot be disputed. Whilst in principle, globalisation has the rich potential of equitably connecting the diverse cultures of the world in multiple complex ways, it is also apparent that in practice, globalisation in general is not equitably advancing the interests of all the people of the world. Benefiting from and influencing the shape and nature of globalisation are determined and limited by geographies of global inequalities. In other words, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) observes, globalisation is constituted by coloniality. Global coloniality is characterised by domination, control and exploitation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). Decoloniality aims at dismantling the imbalances in power relations that follow along the othering hierarchies of coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). It is about breaking the hegemonic centralisation of one form of reason of dominant epistemology, to re-centring marginalised forms of knowledge in the construction of a modern (global) order (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015).

Modern globally relevant education is usually paraded as impartial and in the interest of all peoples of the world. However, contributions in this

work draw our attention to the often-ignored reality that, besides transmitting a specified set of mathematical and linguistic skills, education is:

[F]irst and foremost the transmission of a set of values and a vision of the relationship between citizen and power ... It shapes human interaction defining acceptable behaviour, reproducing class systems or inducing social mobility, promoting equality or reinforcing social stratification ... It gives an acceptable interpretation of national and world history". (Vieira 2016, 65)

The production and legitimation of scientific knowledge also reveal and observe the boundaries of global economic inequalities (Melber 2018). It is instructive to exercise caution and bear in mind that such inequalities in themselves are not the sole motivation of decoloniality, being cognisant that a myriad of factors inform global inequality. Furthermore, not all prevailing global inequalities are attributable to coloniality because such a position is essentialist and undermines the agency of global peoples. However, what is indisputable is that the perpetuation of such inequalities is to a large extent grounded in resilient neo-colonial principles that shape modernity. Contributions in this book have shown that in the academic domain, relevance remains defined by external globalist forces that compel African scholars to ignore local challenges for social justice as pertinent and credible objects of higher education inquiry (Melber 2018) in the pursuit of meeting global relevance at the cost of authentic local relevance.

Contributors have argued that in post-colonial African higher education today, the "neoliberal market ethos, which reinforces a Western bias in knowledge production and dissemination, has also permeated African universities and keeps them closely linked to global agendas they only comply with but do not influence" (Melber 2018, 7). Most South African universities, for instance, give more lucrative awards to academicians for publications in coveted prestigious international journals than in local journals (Melber 2018, 7). Most of such prestigious international journals are marketed by commercial-oriented publishers at a generally higher price, rendering the research inaccessible to most African scholars and public (Melber 2018).

The recurrent line of thought across the chapters in this book is that decoloniality is necessary because it is complementary to democratisation since decoloniality transcends having democratic institutions and processes because, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017, 75) observes, colonial injustices can be constitutionalised in a democratic constitution. In African higher education, decoloniality is about redeeming the African university from the hold of neoliberal market forces and reconceiving it as a public good, whose relevance centres on African experiences, with the university being accessible to all, rid of alienating institutional cultures and characterised by student–student and student–staff relations that are democratic (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017).

Summary of Argument

The contributors in this collection have mostly acknowledged the tracing of education injustice in African higher education to the political events of colonialism; hence, the urgency for decoloniality. However, two things set apart the trend of thought of the contributions in this collection from the mainstream decoloniality discourse.

Firstly, the contributors have tied the concept of decoloniality to realisation of democratic education. In other words, decoloniality is not merely addressing historical wrongs nor affirming whatever was marginalised for the curriculum or education to achieve some sort of balance in the representation of diverse perspectives. Rather, decoloniality achieves democratic education in that it centres the interests and perspectives of people that are being unduly marginalised in this sense undermining their concrete other than generalised ways of being human (Benhabib 1992). In this sense, what situates decoloniality into the discourse of education for democracy is the fact that decoloniality endeavours to attribute due moral normativity to subjectivities that are systematically and institutionally marginalised only on the basis of their indigeneity and otherness.

Secondly, the contributors in this volume have transcended decolonisation as a political ideology that involves two conflicting ideals: indigeneity and Eurocentrism, where through use of military conquest, the

indigenous is trivialised and de-historicised. However, the coloniality most contributors in this work address is one that thrives without calculated political marginalisation of one by the other. Whilst still cognisant of the traceability of neo-colonialism to political colonialism, most contributors have identified the subtle and mutative nature of coloniality that embeds and constitutes the core features of modernity. Such a recognition acknowledges that agents of coloniality are not reducible to a particular race, geographical or economic location. Furthermore, and more importantly, the position recognises the often-ignored reality that even the very drive for decoloniality can pursue ends and employ means that are essentialist and oppressive in nature; thus, in principle negating the very spirit of decoloniality as democratic transformation.

Although ultimately inheriting its heritage from colonialism, coloniality defines human relations across societies and the globe. Coloniality is not about North–South relations of oppression and imperialism. What is poignant is that within the politically decolonised South, there is active local agency of coloniality embedded in social institutions, systems and character of modernity that retain and perpetuate the inequalities of colonialism.

This collection has therefore endeavoured to guard against reducing decoloniality to a political ideology primarily motivated by addressing particular historical injustices. It has gone further by showing how modernity and its systems that define and distribute opportunities both locally and globally are underscored by coloniality. Whilst avoiding reducing the education for decolonisation project to essences of locality or indigeneity, this collection takes cognisance of the fact that modern education and its cosmopolitan appeal are steeped in cultural particularism and largely aim at prioritising the achievement of capitalist interest at the expense of the social good.

This collection contends that higher education in Africa has a civic obligation to cultivate democracy through conscientising its students as well as through pedagogical experiences of the university to identify and confront subtle forms of oppression socially and globally no matter how intimately embedded such oppression is in modernity or commonsensical social practice.

Making African higher education responsive to the concreteness of the context in which the university exists, among others, demands confronting the alienation of localness and indigeneity in African higher education due to the obsessive commitment to an ostensibly transcendent cosmopolitanism that largely satiates capitalist interest. It is about centring local interests alongside pursuing cosmopolitanism. One recurrent issue concerning conditions for achieving decoloniality that emerges across the chapters is the need to develop and empower African languages to be languages of instruction, research and science. For the latter to happen largely rests with the agency of Africa nations.

At the same time, African higher education must avoid achieving a form of decoloniality that is consistent with the marginalisation of one particular knowledge perspective or tradition over another. The decolonisation ideal as well as its procedures for implementation ought to be guarded from being tantamount to a reincarnation of coloniality in the garbs of decoloniality. In other words, decoloniality must recognise social and cultural diversity, even of being African, that is neither essentialist nor insulated from hybridity, nor insulated from internal and external critique.

Contributions of the Authors

Firstly, this collection advances a notion of decoloniality that delineates decoloniality from decolonisation, which is essentially a political ideology. The collection has attempted to show that demands that African higher education should be transformed are rooted in democratic justice. This is because decoloniality of education is inspired by the ideal of democratic open-endedness in knowledge construction, dismantling undue hegemonic domination that trivialises otherness, yet at the same time shaping conceptual paradigms and determining legitimate objects of academic inquiry. Decoloniality in African higher education is a democracy project in that, among the core civic obligations of the university is sustenance of democracy. Fulfilling this democratisation role fundamentally requires the university to be connected non-paternalisti-

cally with and to centre the lived experiences of the society in which the university exists, confronting the situated forms of oppression that are unique across societies. Given that democracy is a social ideal, the centring of indigeneity and otherness must not be premised on the condition that such otherness firstly adapts and fits into the 'intelligible standard' categories of thought. There ought to be caution as the decoloniality project may easily slide into another marginalising ideal that is essentialist and based on populist ethnocentric solidarity that regards internal and external criticism as extensions of coloniality. Through pedagogical experiences, students must be conscientised to confront oppression impartially irrespective of their affiliation to those advancing rights demands that undermine the flourishing of others in society, so that social transformation is achieved in a context of mutual respect, harmony and accountability.

Secondly, consistent with the democracy obligation of decoloniality of higher education, this collection has emphasised that decoloniality must be understood as a theoretical project aimed at reimagining education. In this sense, decolonised education must transcend the ideological binaries of Eurocentrism versus Afrocentrism and ultimately demand that the substance of education must be a result of incessant free public debate that exists in a context that values the relevance of the struggles of a people. Such a position concedes that coloniality in African higher education is or can be reproduced and sustained locally. This book argues that simultaneously, the hegemony of epistemological inquiry paradigms must constantly be challenged mindful of the reality that since knowledge construction is hardly ahistorical, even the ostensibly impartial scientific knowledges are inspired by and thus constitute particularism. The subjectivities of history, indigenous language and social-cultural situatedness are therefore not an impediment to knowledge construction but are indispensable differences that are constitutive of the way of being of the people of the world and cannot be decoupled from the modes of being human for the people of the world. Thus, decolonisation is about reimagining the primary motivation for education, challenging the devaluation of modern education of the social dimension in exclusive preference of economic profit.

Thirdly, the book argues that across Africa, there is largely a disconnect between the equality ambitions articulated in public policy documents aimed at achieving democratic transformation, and the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the people that deprive them of the prerequisite capacities to achieve social mobility. It is therefore imperative to confront the inherent inequality of neoliberalism and uneven competition in African higher education public policy. Conceptualisation of education in African higher education is steeped in neoliberal frameworks that are themselves a heritage of coloniality. As such, the education can hardly achieve democratic transformation. Such coloniality is subtly endemic in the content of the higher education curriculum, admission models, and general legislation ostensibly meant to optimise access to higher education, which ironically serves the contrary.

This book transcends the North–South historical relations of political colonialism and examines the subtle forms of coloniality today that are traceable to gender disparities in African higher education. Such coloniality is also enduring in the distribution, quality and neoliberal policies guiding basic education, which is the feeder for higher education. In other words, unless coloniality is identified in the earlier education levels prior to higher education, little transformation will ensue from African higher education.

Much of decoloniality discourse focuses on the nature of knowledge and knowledge construction in the education system. This book also shows that overcoming coloniality, besides using these domains, is more meaningful and practically identifying the enduring racial and socio-economic structures of coloniality that typify societies, student–student and student–teacher relationships. In such contexts, meaningful decolonial transformation is achievable on the condition that there be encounters between different others in the learning processes and spaces. The utilisation of different technological media and media platforms has the ability to initiate pedagogies of encounter, equality and agency ultimately breaking down the socially constructed prejudices and power relations that shape human relationships in the school and which are essentially rooted in coloniality.

Conclusion

Attainment of judicio-political decolonisation was misconstrued as opening of opportunities to African people. What was ignored was that political colonisation is sustained by and is a manifestation of endemic coloniality ideology embedding the basic institutions of society that distribute opportunities. Just as the African political decolonisation movement was regrettably only content with attaining political independence as amounting to levelling the playing field, so does modern Africa regard modernity, which underscores malignity of indigeneity in the name of cosmopolitanism.

This collection has argued that decoloniality is not restricted to Euro-Afro politics. Holding that decoloniality is not targeted at a particular geographical site or race, by implication concedes that agents and instruments of coloniality are not reducible to a race or region of the world, despite having such properties in origin. African systems created by Africans to pursue African interests may knowingly or unknowingly be grounded in and serve coloniality, thus furthering the marginalisation of others.

Besides problems about the alienating nature of educational content and research focus in African higher education, access into the university is still based on neo-colonial principles. It is imperative that the African university reconsider its civic responsibility. The African university must not be detached from the concreteness of its situatedness, and this requires rebelling against the neoliberal capitalist motivation for higher education. Being global or cosmopolitan should not be conceived as exclusive of localness and indigeneity. Besides utilising decoloniality to achieve these goals, the contributors have conceived decoloniality as a reimagination of education in the context of democracy. Mindful of the potential for liberating ideology to morph into an agent of oppression, the book also calls for decoloniality to be understood as a normative regulator of the processes of education reimagination, to ensure education remains loyal to democracy.

Contributions in this collection have urged for guarding against attributing all of Africa and African higher education challenges to colonisation and guarding against the impression that Africa is only a passive helpless

victim of coloniality whose actions or lack thereof contribute towards the condition in which the continent is. Legitimate questions about African responsibility in the current educational, socio-economic and political state in African nations remain. However, this collection has focused on the equally profound role of coloniality without necessarily contending that decoloniality is the single exclusive master key for opening the largely locked opportunities in Africa in general and African higher education particularly. While decoloniality is not in both principle and practice the solution to African higher education challenges, it is nevertheless an indispensable constitutive element of the solution.

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14

Post-colonial Teaching and Learning with Play

Yusef Waghid

Introduction

In my previous work, I proffered arguments in defence of teaching and learning as a pedagogic pilgrimage (Davids and Waghid 2018) and teaching and learning with care (Waghid 2019) on the basis of autonomous and deliberative pedagogical encounters. Central to an understanding of teaching and learning that recognises respect for persons and an opening to freedom and justice is a notion of caring beyond autonomy and deliberations. And, as intimated elsewhere, pedagogical encounters should consider traversing the realm of the sacred by linking such caring encounters to the idea of a spiritual pilgrimage. In this concluding chapter, I draw on Giorgio Agamben's (2007) notion of play to show as to why teaching and learning as play would be commensurate with an advocacy for the decoloniality of education.

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On Teaching, Learning and Play

Giorgio Agamben's (2007) idea of play offers a way as to how to extend teaching and learning beyond mere autonomous and deliberative encounters—that is, into the realm of decoloniality of education. In his book, *Profanations* (Agamben 2007, 76), he explains play as follows:

Children, who play with whatever old thing falls into their hands, make toys out of things that also belong to the sphere of economics, war, law, and other activities that we are used to thinking of as serious. All of a sudden, a car, a firearm, or a legal contract becomes a toy. What is common to these cases and the profanation of the sacred is the passage from a *religio* that is now felt to be false or oppressive to negligence as *vera religio*. This, however, does not mean neglect (no kind of attention can compare to that of a child at play) but a new dimension of use, which children and philosophers give to humanity.

My interest is in Agamben's (2007) explication of play in relation to what it means to profane. 'For to profane means not simply to abolish and erase separations but to learn to put them to a new use, to play with them ... in order to transform them into pure means' (Agamben 2007, 87). Three aspects emanate from the aforementioned understanding of profanation: Firstly, by creating a 'new use' for something implies 'deactivating an old use' of something and thus rendering the use of that something 'inoperative' (Agamben 2007, 86). For instance, the idea of an African philosophy of education, besides having been considered by many critics as not philosophy because of its reliance on oral narratives, as if human stories have no bearing on philosophical activity, is an example in case. A new use of the practice can be associated with an identification of problems and an examination of the implications of such problems for education, in much the same way, a child, plays with her drinking bottle and, discovers when she hits the bottle against the table, sounds emanate. The bottle soon becomes an instrument of making sounds for the child. The 'new use' of the bottle is that the child stopped using the bottle to drink and hits it against the table to make sounds and by implication, to

play through ‘pure means’ (Agamben 2007, 88)—that is, that notion which represents a deactivation and rupture from its previous use of the bottle. It is not that the child has temporarily abandoned the previous use of her drinking bottle. Rather, she has found a new use for it which can be considered as making sense of the bottle in a different and perhaps unexpected way.

Secondly, when someone plays she does so by reinventing the purpose of her toys. A child does not always use her pram in exactly the same way for the same purpose. It can also be that a pram is no longer used to carry a doll but also that it be used as storage for other toy pieces. The child learns to put her toy (a pram) to a new use—that is to play with it. When she does so, she not only puts her toy to a new use but also contradicts the initial purpose the toy (pram) was meant to be played with. In other words, the act of contradicting and perhaps abolishing the use of the pram is tantamount to showing dissent with a previous use of the toy. By implication, play opens up the possibility for dissent. Elsewhere, I argue that ‘dissent enhances the possibility for educational encounters to be controversial and informative, rather than just collapsing into moments of agreement without rupturing one another’s intellectual perspectives’ (Davids and Waghid 2018, 148). And, considering that play gives rise to an enactment of dissent, the possibility is always there for enhanced teaching-learning in the sense that dissent ‘offers the spaces and opportunities for encounters to be more thoughtful and provocative as both teachers and students would be urged by one another’s dissenting views to come up with even more plausible perspectives’ (Davids and Waghid 2018, 149). Put differently, dissent offers a gateway to renewed thinking and understanding so that the possibility is always there to look at things as if they could be otherwise.

Thirdly, to embark on play is tantamount to a political task of resistance (Agamben 2007, 77). Such an understanding of play, that is, one that strives to uphold political resistance against acts of despair and societal destruction seems to resonate with an idea of decoloniality that is gaining currency in African higher education today. I shall now show as to how decoloniality as an act of profanation offers hope for the future of teaching and learning in African higher education.

Cultivating Play Through Decoloniality: The Quest for *Ubuntu* Justice

Much of the debates in and about higher education transformation on the African continent and, specifically in southern Africa, revolves around practices of decolonisation and decoloniality. In this section, I prefer to talk of decoloniality for the reason that decolonisation is directly linked to counteracting and eradicating the impact of colonisation on the African continent. Undoubtedly, decolonisation has been an important political and moral process of change in the sense that African communities that were impoverished by the imperialist agendas of people from Europe and Britain were dealt a heavy blow by forces of democratisation and political autonomy on the continent. Inasmuch as many African countries had been decolonised from the political control of their colonisers, the impact of colonisation on societal and institutional structures such as university systems have been indelible. So, following Chinua Achebe's (1989, 85) attempts to redress human and non-human injustices such as genocide, human trafficking, ethnic conflicts and wars on terror, environmental degradation and deforestation are more in line with decoloniality rather than decolonisation. And, to be concerned with political and moral struggles of those peoples marginalised and excluded on the African continent is tantamount to reimagining a future whereby peoples are rehumanised (Wa Thiongo 2012, 10)—a matter of being concerned with the manifestation of decolonial actions. Considering the 'gateways to a new happiness' for African communities are situated in the act of play (Agamben 2007, 76), decoloniality could be described as a gateway to political resistance and emancipation in the same way play constitutes such 'a new happiness' (Agamben 2007, 87). The point I am making is that decoloniality is possible through the cultivation of play. Yet, the cultivation of play, and by implication decoloniality as has been mentioned above, rehumanises people such as when they begin to exert their human freedom and liberation in the quest to respond to the predicaments they (humans) encounter in their lives. The injustices, humiliations and struggles they encounter can be more appropriately rebuffed

in relation to acts of decoloniality on the grounds that the latter is inextricably connected to cultivating *Ubuntu* justice. Put differently, when decoloniality as an act of play is exercised, the possibility for cultivating *Ubuntu* justice on the African continent is more profound. It is to such a discussion that I now turn to.

Like play, decoloniality and *Ubuntu* justice are acts of political resistance. I cannot imagine the future of teaching-learning in higher education on the African continent being remiss of cultivating *Ubuntu* justice for the following reasons: Firstly, like play preserves profane acts of humanity (Agamben 2007, 71), decoloniality preserves *Ubuntu* justice by freeing and distracting humanity from moral injustices. Post-apartheid South Africa's appeal for human equality, freedom and justice for all is an example as to how *Ubuntu* justice disrupts inequality and inhumanity for the reason that *Ubuntu* 'is intertwined with the recognition of people's equality and, by implication, their humanity' (Waghid et al. 2018, 41). Put differently, play in the form of cultivating decoloniality is concerned with a kind of political resistance that speaks to counteracting any possibility of poverty, inhumanity and suffering. Secondly, decoloniality also recognises that *Ubuntu* justice can manifest in compassionate justice whereby Africans enact the virtue of *Ubuntu* in acknowledging the vulnerabilities people on the continent might suffer and to do something about their misery and pain. In other words, showing compassionate justice through the play of decoloniality is at once concerned with African people's vulnerabilities, in particular against exploitation and corruption (Waghid et al. 2018, 44). Thirdly, the play of decoloniality also urges people to enact restorative justice which 'has the potential to bring opposing ethnic factions to engage with one another for the purpose of building a shared community ... [o]n the basis of reconciliation and forgiveness' (Waghid et al. 2018, 47). In sum, the play of decoloniality invokes the notion of *Ubuntu* justice that can harness 'moral autonomy, compassionate action and among different ethnic groups and the potential for ensuing conflict might be thwarted' (Waghid et al. 2018, 47).

Play and Happiness: Cultivating Equality

What has been argued for above is that teaching and learning through the play of decoloniality can make happiness dawn on university teachers and students. In this concluding section I examine Agamben's thoughts on happiness and how it can possibly enhance the play of decoloniality. Agamben (2007, 20) posits that happiness does not depend on a state of consciousness but rather, 'on a magic walnut or an "Open sesame"'. In this sense happiness seems to be connected to an unexpected occurrence. So, following Agamben (2007, 20), someone who claims to be happy 'has already ceased to be so' on the grounds that happiness cannot be known in advance in one's consciousness. Such a situation in turn would render happiness as a human possession and not something instigated by 'magic' or some unexpected event or situation not thought of prior to its (happiness) occurrence. Moreover, Agamben (2007, 21) extends happiness to the realm of that which 'we could never dream of deserving'. In other words, happiness remains unimaginable and can be enjoyed only through enchantment.

'[H]appiness is reserved only for others (happiness is, precisely, for us) but that it awaits us only at the point where it was not destined for us' (Agamben 2007, 21). The point about happiness is that it comes as a surprise through 'magic'—that is, 'happiness coincides entirely with our knowing ourselves to be capable of magic' (Agamben 2007, 21). If teaching-learning is about playing in the quest for happiness, then such pedagogical encounters would remain about the unexpected (improbable), unimaginable and surprise. Such an act of play that is concerned with a teaching-learning encounter does not involve creating relationships but rather, being *summoned* by one another within an encounter—a matter of being called to happiness. And, to be summoned by a teacher to speak her mind is a matter of students being invited to exercise their equal intelligence and to come into presence (Rancière 1991). For once, teaching-learning would no longer be associated with an understanding that a teacher transmits knowledge to students. The latter implies that students would be able to think for themselves without always having to be told by teachers to do so. In other words, the authoritative position of a teacher as the one who possesses superior knowledge is at once broken down and his position of master explicator is brought into question.

Exercising one's ability to speak is connected to exerting one's equal intelligence (Rancière 1991). This implies that a teacher should resist to speak alone and encourage her students to come to their own speech—a matter of them (students) exercising their equal ability to speak and thus giving an account of their reasons. Moreover, limiting one's speech on the basis of not offering explanations all the time would create conditions for students to offer explanations themselves albeit incoherent or underdeveloped. The point about exercising intellectual equality on the part of both teachers and students has to do with them (teachers and students) exercising their equal intelligence (Rancière 1991, 10). Thus, teaching-learning encounters instigated by an exertion of equal intelligence are a matter of teachers and students summoning one another to speak their minds. Moreover, acknowledging that students can think and provide explanations themselves is not just a matter of them exercising their equal intelligence but also a matter of rupturing teaching-learning encounters. By doing so, they provoke one another to come into their own presences and opening up to one another as well as being open to that which is new and unexpected (Rancière 1991, 13). Only then would both teachers and students be prepared to take risks within teaching-learning encounters on the basis that taking risks has to do with them (teachers and students), in the first place, having the freedom to speak, explain and come into their presences—a matter of freeing themselves from domination and control. Put differently, teachers and students, expressing their equal intelligences, rupturing pedagogical relations, taking risks invariably remain inclined towards seeing things anew and with the purpose of doing things for new purposes—that is, to play. Such seems to be the future of plausible teaching-learning for African higher education—a situation, which, in turn, can contribute towards the eradication of authoritarian practices in the long run.

Conclusion

In sum, I commenced this postscript with a view that teaching-learning should be subjected to caring relations. Through caring within pedagogical encounters the possibility is there for play always to be enacted. Then, I made an argument for a play of decoloniality in African higher education

to be connected to the cultivation of *Ubuntu* justice. And, if decoloniality were to be aspired towards, *Ubuntu* justice might possibly manifest to give rise to a happiness that instigates teachers and students to exercise their equal intelligences. Such would possibly be the future of higher education in Africa on condition that plays of decoloniality would manifest in unconstrained human actions.

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