Chapter 15
Education as Field and Market: The Case of Upper Secondary School in Stockholm, 2006–2008

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Introduction

In the last three decades, Swedish education has undergone profound transformations, including a gradually increased degree of privatization, commodification and marketization. For instance, the number of children in private preschools has risen from 10,000 in 1998 to 50,000 in 2014, and children in non-public compulsory schools have increased from 30,000 in 1998 to 134,000 in 2014. The corresponding figures for upper secondary school are 11,000 in 1998 and 83,000 in 2014. Furthermore, there are substantial regional differences. The larger metropolitan regions have developed more private options and formed larger educational markets, the most extensive one to be found in the Stockholm region. Today, at the upper secondary level where the tendencies are most pronounced, this market includes more than 130 private schools and 65 public schools competing for 75,000 pupils. In the central city of Stockholm, private schools dominate, constituting the major share, 70%, of the schools, and representing half of the pupils.

The implications of privatization, commodification and marketization of the public sector have been a major concern for research in different disciplines focusing on different aspects. In studies in economics, market reforms are largely understood within the framework of a deregulation of supply and demand in sectors such as education and health care enabling schools, hospitals and care centers and their owners to compete in offering services to families who make more or less well-informed choices based on their interest and willingness to invest in available options. By examining what is understood as correlations of causality between a market-based system, built on the choices of providers and customers, and outcomes

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such as economic efficiency, pupils' study results, social inequality or accessibility, this research seeks to determine the societal impact of market reforms (Böhlmark and Lindahl 2007; Bradley and Taylor 2010; Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008; Gaynor et al. 2013; Hoxby 2003; Propper et al. 2004). In another vein of research, common in social sciences, the introduction of market models in the public sector is seen as part of a neoliberal shift in society. Here, marketization is perceived as a new mode of governance, the market becoming a force in itself that penetrates social welfare, causing the decline of equity and the transformation of values traditionally connected to the public sector into market relations (See Ball 2007; Gewirtz 2002; Harvey 1989; Lubienski 2003; Reay 2004; Whitty and Power 2000).

In this chapter[1], we suggest that Bourdieusean sociology offers an alternative, more fruitful understanding of marketization as embedded in social fields with a particular history and structure (see also Lidegran et al., Chap. 3 and Dalberg, Chap. 17, in this volume). The distribution of material and symbolic assets in these fields, among producers as well as consumers, set the conditions for how 'economic' markets in the restricted sense of the word operate (Bourdieu 1979: 93–94, Bourdieu 2000: 113–114). Taking market-oriented reforms in Swedish upper secondary education as our point of departure, we attempt to contribute to the sociology of educational markets by focusing on one of these conditions, the social character of the 'demand' for education. We argue that far from being explained by the calculated choices of interchangeable consumers or by influences from market forces themselves, this demand is shaped by the long history lying behind the volume and structure of social groups' assets and the dispositions vis-à-vis education that the same history has produced. We relate the supply-side, the educational programmes and the schools, to the demand-side and conclude that marketization, privatization and commodification are unevenly distributed in the field.

Privatization, Commodification and Marketization of Upper Secondary Education in Sweden and in Stockholm

In order to understand the deregulation of state and public controlled upper secondary education in Stockholm, we need to differentiate between three different mechanisms, or dimensions: privatization, commodification and marketization (cf. Börjesson 2016). Firstly, it is important to note the difference between privatization and marketization. Privatization relates both to the control of how education is supplied and to its funding. While, in the Swedish case, the control of the provision of education was increasingly privatized in the early 1990s by improving the

[1]The article draws on the dissertation by Håkan Forsberg (2015) and is written within the context of the research programme *Families in the new educational landscape. Paths, assets and strategies 1985 to 2016*, directed by Mikael Palme and funded by the Swedish Research Council.

conditions for non-public so called independent schools at various levels, funding remained public through the implementation of a voucher system. Marketization, on the other hand, denotes a particular regulation of the educational offer vis-à-vis the demand for education in which schools compete for pupils and pupils (or families) compete for entry into schools (cf. Engwall 2007).

Furthermore, marketization does not necessarily presuppose privatization. One can create a market in the sense of a deregulated offer and supply-structure while maintaining public control and public funding of the supply. However, a deregulated relation between the offer and demand for education is likely to bring about what is often referred to as a commodification of education (cf. Ball 2009; Lynch and Moran 2006), in particular when it is combined with privatization and the growth of private, profit-run educational companies. Less clear as a concept, commodification has had profound effects on how schools and teaching are organised, how the educational offer is packaged and what working conditions for teachers look like.

Thus, we need to distinguish between three dimensions of state deregulation in education: privatization, commodification and marketization. To each one we can relate specific indicators:

1. The level of privatization of schools (How many are private and how large a share do they represent?)
2. The level of marketization (How many pupils are included in the market, do they all have the same possibilities to choose freely?)
3. The level of commodification (Are profits allowed? To what extent is market-orientation reflected in how schools and teaching operate and in teachers' conditions? How important are marketing instruments?)

In the following, we will analyse how privatization, marketization and commodification of upper secondary education in Stockholm have developed.

As regards privatization, it is clear that the number of private or independent institutions rose dramatically, especially during the early 2000s; see Fig. 15.1. The number of independent schools doubled from 10 to 20 during the 1990s, and doubled again up to 2003, just to double once more in the following 5 years (from 40 to almost 70). At the same time, the number of public schools remained fairly stable, around 30. In 2001, the independent schools surpassed public ones in number, and in 2007 they were twice as many. However, a notable characteristic of these independent schools was their relatively small size, in average approximately a third of that of public schools. Small size provided greater flexibility in finding suitable facilities and a possibility to establish new niches on the expanding educational market, offering profiled study programmes and small-scale educational settings that could be marketed as more 'personal' than those of the anonymous public schools (Palme 2008). Even if the rise in number of independent schools was not matched by their share of pupils, the proportion of pupils attending non-public institutions grew from around 10% in the late 1990s to 55% in 2016.

For commodification purposes, we will here use a simple indicator that has the merit of being easily accessible in public statistics: the number of schools owned by educational companies with for-profit status. Before the market reforms in the



Fig. 15.1 Number of municipal/county and independent schools in Stockholm city, 1987 to 2011. (Note: The counting of schools managed by municipalities/counties changed in 2012. Source: Forsberg 2015)

early 1990s, 11 independent schools existed in Stockholm County, all of which were owned by non-profit organisations or foundations. From, 1992 to 1998, 14 new independent schools were established – 8 in the form of share-holder companies. After 2000, when the vast expansion of independent schools occured, share-holder companies became the dominant form, constituting 38 out of 43 independent schools created in the period 2006 to 2008.

Let us finally turn to the rise of the educational market. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, upper secondary education in Stockholm developed in the direction of becoming a cohesive educational market with increasingly less formal obstacles for families' and pupils' choice of secondary education. At the beginning of this development, independent schools were few and pupils could choose between study programmes, but the ruling proximity principle did not allow a choice of which public school to attend. With the accelerating surge of independent schools challenging the public ones, municipalities had to reconsider the proximity principle. While it was abolished in the City of Stockholm in 2000/2001, surrounding municipalities engaged in facilitating inter-municipal pupil mobility in order to protect their public schools from the exodus to independent schools. For some years, the only remaining restriction prevented pupils living outside of the City of Stockholm from applying to the much sought-after study programmes provided by public schools in the city and oriented towards higher education. Finally, in 2011, this restriction was also eliminated, turning upper secondary education in Stockholm County into a unified market. From being limited to study programmes offered by the closest public schools and a few independent schools, families' and pupils' options, in 20 years' time, came to include the choice

between over 200 schools, whereof approximately 75 were public and close to 130 independent ones. In 2011 alone, municipal and independent schools competed for 75,000 upper secondary pupils representing an annual economic value in terms of school vouchers corresponding to roughly 900 million EUR (Forsberg 2015).

Marketization was not limited to school choice. The reforms of the early 1990s' also launched three innovations: the so called 'individual programme', the 'specially designed programme' and local profiles of the national study programmes. These changes made it possible to adjust the educational offer to both individual and local market demands, creating new niches in the educational landscape. In the period from 1987 to 2008, the total educational offer in the Stockholm region, grew from 650 to 850 educational options (study programme by school) (Forsberg 2015).

The expansion of schools and educational programmes coincided with a demographic increase of pupils, especially after the millennium shift. However, the growth in pupil numbers is far from explaining the proportionally larger surge in the number of schools, which suggests that the proliferation of independent (non-public) school operators was an effect of the market reforms. The new possibility to compete for the funding that pupils' school vouchers represented stimulated the establishment of schools increasingly owned by and operated as commercial companies. Further, competition between schools took the form of an expansion of tailored courses and study programmes as a central element for attracting potential pupils.

Field and Market

In a series of studies assembled as a book published in 2000, Bourdieu analyses the French housing market as being embedded in overlapping social fields (Bourdieu 2000). One of his major conclusions is that what economists call a 'market', regulated by the logic of supply and demand, only represents a small part of the social order in which the production and purchase of houses is inserted, and a part that cannot be understood by reference to itself. The 'economic' market, in the restricted sense of the word, presupposes a world of production that has a history of its own. This world comprises not only companies of different seniority, size and profile, but also the involvement of government agencies, stakeholder organizations and financing institutes, all inhabited by persons with a certain symbolic capital with regard to defining acceptable housing policies and with a different habitus depending on the positions they have come to occupy. Moreover, the market necessarily involves consumers whose preferences cannot be reduced to the economic resources they possess or to purely economic calculations, but make part of their reproduction strategies, tastes and lifestyles. For Bourdieu, the order that regulates the purely economic market depends not only on economic power, but as much on the distribution of symbolic power, accumulated under the condition that it is not connected to economic gains.

The social field approach applied here to the marketization of Swedish upper secondary education bears many resemblances with Bourdieu's study of the French house market. The educational market is to a large extent shaped by the State through government regulations, the most obvious example being the public funding of the school voucher that creates the market as such. It is further managed by municipalities with varying demographic compositions, political majorities and bureaucratic traditions. Organizations for different stakeholders play an important role in shaping policies at both national and municipal levels. Far from operating as a pure market defined by the interplay between offer and demand, its mode of functioning is the object of struggles between conflicting political, administrative and commercial interests. The outcomes of these struggles define the rules for the functioning of the 'market' in a narrow sense of the word. In the social field of producers of education, municipality owned schools compete for pupils with schools owned by foundations and, above all, commercial companies.

However, in this study, we do not set out to analyse the field of production of upper secondary education, considering various types of symbolic, social and economic capital at stake in the field, as in the fairly abundant analyses of social fields in the Bourdieusean tradition after *Le patronat* (Bourdieu and De Saint Martin 1978) and *Homo academicus* (Bourdieu 1984), such as those of Lebaron (2010) or Denord et al. (2011). Instead, we focus on one particular, but crucial aspect of the conditions for the competition between educational institutions: the social character of the audience attending the hugely increased number of schools and educational options that these institutions offer. While this indicator has obvious limitations, putting other types of institutional assets in the dark, it has the advantage of being accessible through statistical data. Moreover, as an indicator it has the merit of connecting the supply of education to the character of the demand. Focusing on the pattern of relations between social groups and the education offered by educational institutions, the analysis aligns to an existing tradition of studies in sociology of education (cf. Bertilsson 2014; Felouzis et al. 2013; Forsberg 2015; Lidegran 2009; Palme 2008; Poupeau et al. 2007). However, with the exception of Poupeau et al. (2007), Felouzis et al. 2013, and Forsberg (2015), educational markets have so far not been a major concern in this tradition.

We try to answer three sets of questions:

I. Firstly, how is the field of upper secondary education in Stockholm structured with regard to, on the one hand, gender and social origin, and, on the other hand, educational programmes at schools with geographical locations?
II. Secondly, where is the most obvious expression of privatization, the independent schools, located in the space? Do their positions differ from the public schools? And what internal differences among independent schools can be identified? Do for profit-driven schools attract other audiences than schools owned by non-profit organisations or foundations?
III. Thirdly, if we assume, with Bourdieu, that the educational demand is the expression of accumulated resources and socially shaped dispositions (habitus) which have taken time to develop and cannot be separated from other social

reproduction strategies, to what extent has the marketization of upper secondary education transformed the preferences for education as these are expressed in educational choices after the market reforms? In other words, does the structure of the educational field differ from earlier stages in the history of the field?

Applying Correspondence Analysis

In the competition for pupils brought about by the market reforms, upper secondary schools needed to shape the study programmes they offered so as to distinguish themselves from other schools. This competition is expressed in the growth of educational profiles that multiplied the possible educational choices (study programme per school) at upper secondary level. In the analysis presented here, correspondence analysis (CA) and agglomerative hierarchical classification (AHC), also called Euclidian classification (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004: 105ff.) were used for exploring the social structure of the educational choices made by all pupils at upper secondary level in 2006–2008, that is, at a time when the marketization, privatisation and commodification of the field had reached a certain magnitude and presence in the field. Using the 'bottom up' approach of Euclidian classification enables a more thorough investigation of how the recruitment to different study programmes and schools is related to their position in the constructed social space.

The analysis departs from individual data for the total pupil population in these years. Individual pupils are characterized by information on the choice of school and study programme (educational options), as well as on gender and social origin, the latter classified in 27 categories. In order not to treat gender and social origin as separate qualities, the 27 social groups in the social classification were divided according to gender, creating a total of 54 categories (daughter as opposed to sons of physicians, secondary teachers, small entrepreneurs, etc.). In addition, other statistically available information on pupils was included as supplementary variables in the analysis, for example on the grades received at the end of compulsory education, parents' educational level; the income and type of residential area of the household of origin, and on whether the pupil or parents had a migration background. The target population consisted of all students in Grade 2 in upper secondary education, representing a total of 71,000 individual pupils. Out of these, 62,000 were included in the analysis since information on their on social origin was available. In order to make the analysis more stable, educational options recruiting 35 pupils during the 3 years in consideration were omitted. As a consequence, 522 out of a total of 766 existing educational options were active in the analysis, attended by 57,660 pupils or 93% of the approximately 62,000 pupils.

In the analysed contingency table, the rows or 'individuals' represented the variable education, separating between all existing study programmes per school, i.e. all educational options. The columns, characterizing all existing educational options (rows), represented, firstly, social origin and gender put together, or more precisely, the number of daughters and sons from each of the 27 social groups

attending each educational option. These four dimensions – educational programme and school, on the one hand, and social origin by gender on the other hand – represented the two *active* variables in the construction of the space. The structure of the space is, then, an expression of the relationships between these active variables, for example the proximity or distance between educational options where daughters of lawyers or sons of blue-collar workers tend to be found. In addition, this structure of relations was further explored using supplementary variables, or non-active columns in the contingency table, whose position in the space was projected into the structure without affecting it. As indicated above, these supplementary variables provided information of both acquired and inherited assets among the pupils attending the various educational options. Finally, the distribution of modalities or categories pertaining to each variable was thoroughly analysed using Euclidean Clustering (see above).

The correspondence analysis generated 49 axes of which the first one had an eigenvalue of 0.267, corresponding to 25.8% of the total variance. The second axis contributed somewhat less to the variance with an eigenvalue of 0.180 (17.4%). Combined, the first two axes explained 43.3% of the total variance. The third axis had a much lower eigenvalue value, 0.047, explaining only 4.6% of the variance.

The Social Structure of Upper Secondary Education in Stockholm in the Wake of the Market Reforms

The result of the correspondence analysis uncovers two distinct dimensions of the social space of upper secondary education in Stockholm, when pupils' social origin and gender are taken as the point of departure and other characteristics mentioned above are used as supplementary variables. Since the educational options, study programmes per school attended by the pupils are many, they are omitted in Fig. 15.2 but will be briefly described in the following. The first and most significant polarity (opposition left to right in the figure, first axis) differentiates between educational options primarily chosen by girls and those almost solely populated by boys. The second polarity (opposition top to down, second axis) reflects a social class-related division, distinguishing between schools and programmes receiving pupils rich in inherited as well as acquired assets and educational options accommodating pupils with weak assets.[2]

If one considers the two polarities mentioned above in the multidimensional space generated by the correspondence analysis – one gender-distinctive and the other socially distinctive –, a triangular structure emerges. At the base of the triangle, pupils' inherited and acquired assets are small. Here, boys and girls are separated into preparatory vocational programmes with very different specialisations: edu-

[2]See Appendix Table 15.1 for the categories that contribute over the mean on the 3 first axis of the CA.



Fig. 15.2 Correspondence Analysis (CA) – the social space of upper secondary education in Stockholm 2006–2008, axes 1 and 2

cation oriented towards manual work in areas such as construction or industrial production opposes orientations towards caring professions. The further up towards the peak of the triangle one moves, the more evenly distributed boys and girls become. Study programmes preparing for higher education dominate at the same time as the importance of inherited assets, indicated by pupils' high social origin, increases.

Domains of Privatization in the Field of Upper Secondary Education

So far, the social structure of the field of upper secondary education has been analysed in terms of the social character of the demand. Let us now turn the attention to the educational programmes and schools, the 'supply' side. A first question to address is the extension of private/public options in the space (see Fig.



Fig. 15.3 (**a**, **b**) Study programmes at municipal (**a**) and independent (**b**) upper secondary schools in Stockholm County, 2006–2008. Axes 1 and 2. Study programmes at schools managed by municipalities ◯ Study programmes at independent schools. (Note: The size of the symbols is proportional to frequencies, i.e. study programmes with many pupils have larger size)

15.3a, b). The study programmes at municipal upper secondary schools are spread across the whole spatial structure, ranging from the elite schools in the inner city of Stockholm with a highly selective social and merit-based recruitment to the schools in the suburban municipalities offering vocational education that mainly recruit either girls or boys with small volumes of inherited and acquired assets. The independent schools show an almost opposite dispersion in the field. With a few important exceptions, the educational options offered by independent upper secondary schools recruit most of their pupils from a broad middle tier, considering social class origin and previously acquired school assets. These educational options are also more frequently attended by girls than boys, as is testified to by the strong presence of 'daughters' pertaining to the various social categories.

Further, a distinction needs to be made among independent schools between those run by for-profit companies and those owned by foundations and non-profit organisations (see Fig. 15.4). As argued above, this distinction serves as an indicator of the degree of commodification of education, here represented by the for-profit companies. As mentioned before, this category of owners has rapidly increased over the last decade. When the distribution of the two types of independent schools in the field is considered, it becomes obvious that the type of ownership divides the field. The educational options at schools run by for-profit companies are oriented towards the middle and lower part of the field, while they are completely absent at the socially and scholarly dominating part of the field in the upper regions of the figure. In contrast, in this upper region we find a concentration of educational options at schools owned by foundations and non-profit organisations. In reverse, these schools are rare in the lower, socially and scholarly dominated parts of the field.



Fig. 15.4 The positions in the space of educational options at independent upper secondary schools by type of owner in Stockholm County, 2006–2008. Axes 1 and 2. Study programmes at schools managed by municipalities ◯ Study programmes at independent schools. (Note: The size of the symbols is proportional to frequencies, i.e. study programmes with many pupils have larger sizes)

While the for-profit companies orient themselves towards the most populated areas of the field, where the largest number of pupils and thus the best conditions for profit are to be found, non-profit independent schools, often characterized by having a long history as institutions, are oriented towards a considerably narrower, small-scale social audience with abundant assets. Besides being non-public, these two types of independent schools have little in common. While independent schools owned by foundations and non-profit organisations primarily constitute a challenge to prestigious, traditional public grammar schools in the inner city and the wealthier suburbs, the for-profit schools compete among themselves and with public schools in socially heterogeneous municipalities in the suburbs.

In terms of geographic spread, the City of Stockholm has the largest proportion of educational options situated in the upper part of the structure where we also find pupils with the strongest inherited and acquired assets. Similarly, educational programmes offered by schools in the comparatively well-off northern suburban municipalities are mainly concentrated in the upper part of the structure. In contrast, very few educational programmes at upper secondary schools located in the poorer southern suburban municipalities can be found in this part of the space.

Nine Clusters of Educational Options (Study Programme per School)

While the structure disclosed by the correspondence analysis provides a general map of the upper secondary education landscape in 2006–08, Euclidean clustering makes it possible to take the analysis of this map a step further. By taking into account the coordinate positions of the educational options (rows) along the axes or planes produced by the CA, these options can be grouped together according to the principle that, at any given level of division (partitions), those that are closest to each other in terms of distance are grouped together in a cluster and separated from those pertaining to other clusters at the same level (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004). Starting from the bottom, with many divisions, this grouping creates a hierarchical tree of partitions in which, at the top, all educational options belong to the same class. In the tree of partitions, each level explains, to varying degrees, the total variance of the data, while taking into account both the within and between variance of the hierarchy classes. The choice of partitions has to be weighed against the importance of making a sociological interpretation of the concerned clusters. In the present case, we choose a partition that explains 71% of the total variance in the data and that generates nine classes of educational options (study programme in combination with school). Including still more partitions would not add anything to the sociological analysis. The distribution of these nine classes or clusters is displayed in Fig. 15.5.

By considering the modalities that are over- or underrepresented in each one of the identified nine clusters (see Appendix, Table 15.2, for an inventory of these modalities), we can make a more detailed sociological analysis of what characterizes the educational options in each cluster in relation to those in other clusters. In Fig. 15.5, the clusters are projected into the first and second planes of the space created by the CA.

Just below the center, we find educational options oriented towards business and dominated by pupils from the lower-middle classes and working classes or by pupils with migrant background (Cluster 5). Overlapping and slightly above, a cluster of educational options are located that prepare for higher education while being especially sought-after by lower middle class pupils (Cluster 6). It is noteworthy that one third of the educational options in this cluster are offered by profit-oriented independent schools run by business corporations. Moving further left, slightly



Fig. 15.5 Euclidian classification of upper secondary education in Stockholm 2006–2008

higher up in the spatial structure, we find a cluster of educational study programmes oriented towards social sciences and recruiting especially the daughters of the middle classes (Cluster 1). While here, too, the proportion of independent schools is large, 45%, a significant number of these schools are run by foundations or non-profit organisations. To the right, there is a cluster of educational options oriented towards technology, the vast majority of which are situated at public, municipal schools, and populated by the sons of the middle and working classes, (Cluster 8). The area at the bottom of the space is dominated by the opposition between a cluster of vocational study programmes inhabited by the daughters of the working classes on the left (Cluster 7), a cluster of male dominated vocational programmes inhabited by the sons from the same classes (Cluster 9). The latter cluster is the one most separated from others.

Moving to the upper part of the space, clusters comprising educational options favoured by fractions of the upper middle class appear. The most distinguished cluster is found highest up in the structure and consists of the elite educational options recruiting both sons and daughters of highly educated fractions of the upper middle class, the *Bildung*-fractions (Cluster 3). Here, the over-representation is strongest not only of sons and daughters of physicians, lawyers and parents with postgraduate degrees, but also of pupils with the highest grades from compulsory education, the scholastic elite. The traditional inner-city public schools occupy dominating positions, but we also find the largest proportion of educational options provided by independent schools (54%). However, all of these are owned by non-profit organisations or foundations and none by commercial educational companies. On the right, we find a cluster of educational options oriented towards science that are characterized by a particularly strong recruitment of sons from economically wealthy upper-middle class families (Cluster 4). This cluster is less homogenous than the previous one (Cluster 3) in terms of its distribution in the space. Finally, slightly below on the left side, we find a cluster of educational study programmes and schools dominated by daughters to cultural fractions of the middle class (Cluster 2).

The Euclidian classification brings forward differences underlying the axes discovered by the original correspondence analysis providing us with a more detailed understanding of its outcomes. The differences between the clusters – in terms of particular recruitment profiles to the educational options that they bring together, as well as with respect to the nature of these educational options themselves (vocational as opposed to preparatory programmes, social sciences as opposed to science, etc.) and the type of schools they are located at – suggest fine but systematic social distances that make up the educational landscape of upper secondary education in which the educational market operates.

A Stable Social Structure

Let us return to the third research question concerning the stability of the field and, in a concluding step, reconnect to the concept of education as social field.

The correspondence analysis that revealed the basic polarities of upper secondary education in 2006–2008 can be compared to similar analyses that had been preceding the market reforms for years (cf. Börjesson 2004; Palme 2008). It is notable that the basic oppositions between schools and study programmes (‘educational options’) are very similar. While on a first axis, female dominated programmes oppose male dominated ones, a second axis distinguishes education with selective social and scholarly recruitment to those with less selective recruitment profiles. The same triangular structure can be observed. At its base, girls and boys of working

class and lower middle class origin are separated in different types of vocational study programmes, while at the top of the triangle sons and daughters from upper-middle class families and with high grades from compulsory school meet in study programmes preparing for higher education.

At this level of analysis, the introduction of an educational market based on free choice and school vouchers does not seem to have transformed the basic social polarities in upper secondary education. Much to the contrary, the 'supply' of education under the market regime appears to have adapted to the pre-existing social balances between social groups with different assets and different dispositions towards education. A likely explanation is that the dispositions vis-à-vis education, as inseparable part of the life trajectories that shape the assets of which social groups dispose, are subject to an inertia that the educational market cannot but recognize. Moreover, the stability of the social structure reminds us of the fact that far from being 'free' in more than a juridical, formal sense, the choice of upper secondary education remains determined by the volume and structure of the assets or capital that social groups possess, not the least the probability of their offspring receiving high grades in compulsory education.

However, the Euclidean classification indicates that certain significant transformations probably do have occurred, although we lack comparable studies from previous years. The substantial expansion of schools and locally designed study programmes brought about by the reforms have likely resulted not only in an increased educational competition, but also in more stratified educational market niches of the type revealed by the analysis of the nine clusters. As could have been anticipated, inherited resources indicated by the social origin go along with acquired educational resources (high grades) in the selection to the most selective educational options in niches pertaining to the clusters in the upper region.

These results shed light on the transformation of the 'demand' on the educational market. What about the educational institutions providing the 'supply', pertaining to the field of production of upper secondary education? In the absence of a more thorough field analysis, we argued that the character of the recruitment to the educational options on offer could serve as a viable indicator of the structure of this field. In supplementation to the previous characterisation of the nine clusters, it can be noted that 10 years after the introduction of the educational market in Stockholm County, a substantial part of middle tiers pupils in upper secondary education tend to attend private commercial schools where the entry requirements are less competitive than at schools of elite character. The underachieving pupils of the working classes, including pupils with migration background from families without high levels of education, are relegated to what can be characterized as 'exposed' schools with low-performing pupils. While many of these schools are municipal, some are commercially driven. Finally, the children of the highly-educated 'Bildungs-bourgeoisie' stick to highly selective elite schools, many of

which are public schools in the inner city of Stockholm and some more recently established independent schools owned by foundations or non-profit organisations.

Conclusions: An Educational Market Embedded in an Educational Field

The analysis suggests that, in the Stockholm region, the educational market created in upper secondary education through state intervention resulted in a heavy expansion of the 'supply' of education in terms of schools and study programmes. We can note an increase as regards all three dimensions that we initially outlined: a proliferation of privatization by means of a rapid expansion of independent, non-public, schools; full-fledged marketization through the deregulation of the relation between the educational offer and the educational demand; and, finally, strengthened commodification in the form of for-profit educational companies rapidly expanding their share of the educational offer.

However, while these transformations can be experienced as dramatic, as the heated debate on education testifies, too, there is, at the same time, stability and continuity. As the analysis reveals, the relation between the supply of education and the 'demand' obeys social forces similar to those that structured the field of upper secondary education before the reforms, opposing higher social classes to lower ones and creating class-specific gender balances. While the strengthened segmentation and branding of schools indicated by the Euclidean classification have probably increased competition among educational institutions and their owners, as well as between pupils, families and social groups, the particular shape that this segmentation takes aligns to oppositions between social classes and class fractions. The social character of the demand sets limits for the options of the suppliers, relegating the commodified, for-profit schools to an audience with substantially weaker assets than the audience whose favours public and non-profit schools of elite character compete for. This stability reminds of the fact that the educational market is embedded in a wider social field of education with a historically developed structure of relations between educational institutions and the social groups using education, a structure to which the market and the ensuing commodification adapt. As the social field perspective suggests, the concept of educational market has limited explanatory value as such, since the rules regulating the market, as well as the forces shaping the character of both supply and demand, need sociological and historical explanations.

Appendix

Table 15.1 Correspondance Analysis (CA). Active categories (columns) contributing over mean of 2.0

Axis 1	Ctr	Crd	Axis 2	Ctr	Crd	Axis 3	Ctr	Crd
D-physicians	2.06	0.63	D-skilled workers in production	10.46	0.75	S-executive managers	3.14	0.38
D-senior civil servants in private sector	4.66	0.53	D-semi-skilled workers in production	10.11	0.73	S-senior civil servants in private sector	13.37	0.36
D-class teachers	2.06	0.48	D-semi-skilled workers in service	5.75	0.64	S-engineers	4.17	0.30
D-mid-level administrators	4.09	0.48	D-small entrepreneurs	2.74	0.59	S-mid-level administrators	4.40	0.20
D-technicians in private sector	2.41	0.43	D-clerks (commerce)	3.53	0.47	D-skilled workers in production	2.51	0.18
D-medical and health professions	4.05	0.42	D-medical and health professions	5.33	0.40	S-technicians in private sector	2.18	0.16
D-administration, clerks	2.50	0.40	D-administration, clerks	2.48	0.33	S-semi-skilled workers in production	2.94	−0.19
S-technicians in private sector	4.13	−0.55	S-mid-level administrators	2.91	−0.34	S-semi-skilled workers in service	2.48	−0.20
S-medical and health professions	8.62	−0.61	D-senior civil servants in private sector	3274	−0.37	S-skilled workers in production	6.17	−0.27
S-semi-skilled workers in service	4.27	−0.65	D-engineers	2.85	−0.51	D-physicians	4.08	−0.37
S-clerks (commerce)	4.32	−0.65	S-senior civil servants in private sector	8.2	−0.57	S-art producers	6.20	−0.47
S-administration, clerks	7.11	−0.66	S-engineers	6.29	−0.74	D-subject teachers	6.91	−0.65
S-small entrepreneurs	3.20	−0.75	D-physicians	4.20	−0.76	D-journalists	8.17	−0.70
S-semi-skilled workers in production	8.40	−0.79	D-lawyers	2.10	−0.80	D-art producers	18.29	−0.82
S-skilled workers in production	12.53	−0.94	S-lawyers	2.60	−0.92			
			S-physicians	6.63	−0.93			

Table 15.2 Euclidean classification. Characteristics of 9 clusters based on the 10 most over-represented categories

	% of in total population	Frequency in cluster	Over-representation
Cluster 1 – Social Science SPs of the daughters of the middle classes			
Daughters of senior civil servants in public sector	1,0	1,9	1,9
Daughters of executive managers	0,9	1,7	1,8
Daughters of journalists	0,7	1,3	1,8
Daughters of lawyers	0,6	1,0	1,8
Daughters of senior civil servants in private sector	4,2	7,2	1,7
Daughters of art producers	1,2	0,2	1,6
Daughters of midlevel administrators	4,5	7,2	1,6
Daughters of subject teachers	0,7	1,1	1,6
Students with medium to high grades (245–270)	20,1	31	1,5
Daughters of class teachers	2,2	3,4	1,5
Cluster 2 – Art SPs of the daughters of the cultural fractions of the middle classes			
Daughters of subject teachers	0,7	3,4	4,6
Daughters of art producers	1,2	5,5	4,5
Daughters of journalists	0,7	3,3	4,4
Very high grades (310–320)	6,6	23,8	3,6
Sons of art producers	1,3	3,9	3,1
Sons of subject teachers	0,7	2,3	3,1
Daughters of physicians	1,3	3,8	2,9
Sons of university teachers	0,5	1,3	2,8
Daughters of university teachers	0,4	1,3	2,8
Daughters of lawyers	0,6	1,6	2,8
Cluster 3 – Elite SPs of Bildung-fractions of the upper middle class			
Very high grades (310–320)	6,6	50,1	7,6
Daughters of physicians	1,3	7,3	5,6
Sons of lawyers	0,5	2,7	4,9
Daughters of lawyers	0,6	2,7	4,7
Sons of physicians	1,4	6,3	4,6
Parents with PhD	3,6	14,6	4,1
Parents with very high incomes (140,000–300,000 EUR)	6,3	25,7	4,1
Daughters of university teachers	0,4	1,8	4,0
Daughters of executive managers	0,9	2,8	3,1
Sons of university teachers	0,5	1,2	2,7

(continued)

Table 15.2 (continued)

	% of in total population	Frequency in cluster	Over-representation
Cluster 4 – science SPs of the sons of the wealthy upper middle classes			
Sons of university teachers	0,5	1,4	3,0
Sons of engineers	2,1	6,1	2,9
Sons of physicians	1,4	3,9	2,8
Sons of lawyers	0,5	1,5	2,7
Parents with very high incomes (140,000–300,000 EUR)	6,3	15,6	2,5
Sons of executive managers	1,0	2,2	2,2
Sons of senior civil servants in private sector	4,6	10,1	2,2
Parents with PhD	3,6	7,9	2,2
Sons of senior civil servants in public sector	1,0	2,1	2,1
Very high grades (310–320)	6,6	13,5	2,0
Cluster 5 – economy-oriented SPs of the sons and daughters of the lower middle classes, the working class and migrants			
Parents with 9-year compulsory school	6,2	11,6	1,9
Daughters of small entrepreneurs	1,4	2,5	1,8
Daughters of semi-skilled workers in service	2,4	4,2	1,7
Daughters of tradesmen	0,5	0,9	1,7
Daughters of semi-skilled workers in production	3,3	5,7	1,7
Born in Sweden with two parents born abroad	15,1	25,1	1,7
Daughters of skilled workers in service	0,7	1,2	1,7
Low grades (90–185)	28,0	43,5	1,6
Born outside Sweden	10,6	15,6	1,5
Very low grades (0–85)	5,0	7,7	1,5
Cluster 6 – University preparatory SPs of the sons and daughters of the lower middle classes			
Sons of law enforcement	0,6	0,8	1,4
Daughters of technicians in public sector	0,6	0,8	1,4
Sons of foreman	1,0	1,3	1,3
Sons of medical and health professions.	5,8	7,5	1,3
Sons of technicians in public sector	0,6	0,7	1,3
Sons of class teachers	2,3	2,9	1,3
Sons of clerks	4,1	5,2	1,3
Sons of technicians in private sector	3,4	4,3	1,3
Sons of semi-skilled workers in production	3,4	4,2	1,2
Sons of midlevel administrators	4,6	5,6	1,2

(continued)

Table 15.2 (continued)

	% of in total population	Frequency in cluster	Over-representation
Cluster 7 – vocational SPs of the daughters of the working class			
Daughters of skilled workers in production	3,2	9,3	2,9
Daughters of semi-skilled workers in production	3,3	9,1	2,7
Daughters of semi-skilled workers in service	2,4	6,1	2,5
Daughters of foreman	0,9	1,9	2,1
Daughters of small entrepreneurs	1,4	2,9	2,1
Daughters of clerks (commerce)	2,8	5,5	2,0
Daughters of clerks	3,9	7,7	2,0
Daughters of medical and health professions.	5,7	11,3	2,0
Daughters of skilled workers in service	0,7	1,4	1,9
Parents with 9-year compulsory school	6,2	11,5	1,8
Cluster 8 – technical SPs of the sons of the middle classes and the working class			
Sons of technicians in private sector	3,4	10,1	2,9
Sons of law enforcement	0,6	1,3	2,4
Sons of midlevel administrators	4,6	0,10	2,2
Sons of technicians in public sector	0,6	1,2	2,2
Sons of clerks	4,1	8,7	2,1
Sons of skilled workers in service	0,6	1,3	2,0
Sons of skilled workers in production	3,6	7,1	2,0
Sons of engineers	2,1	3,9	1,9
Sons of medical and health professions.	5,8	10,4	1,8
Sons of class teachers	2,3	4,0	1,8
Cluster 9 – vocational SPs of sons of the working class			
Sons of skilled workers in production	3,6	12,8	3,6
Sons of small entrepreneurs	1,4	4,4	3,0
Sons of semi-skilled workers in production	3,4	9,7	2,9
Sons of clerks (commerce)	2,6	6,8	2,6
Sons of semi-skilled workers in service	2,5	6,6	2,6
Sons of medical and health professions	5,8	14,3	2,5
Sons of clerks	4,1	10,1	2,4
Low grades (90–185)	28,0	66,2	2,4
Sons of foreman	1,0	2,2	2,2
Sons of skilled workers in service	0,6	1,3	2,0

In all the interpretation of the 9 clusters is based on 85 categories from 1 active and 6 supplementary variables (columns) together with information from the active row variable that includes school, municipality, study programme and specialization. For more information on interpretation of this data, please contact the authors

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