CHAPTER 4

The Historical, Political, and Demographic Context of Leadership in Africa

Bettina Ng'weno

4.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the political, economic, social, and demographic context in which leadership takes place within the cultural and historical variety and complexities of Africa. Contrary to much of the literature on leadership in Africa, visible on the ground in various African countries is a wide range of different kinds of leaders: young as well as old, female as well as male, transformative, flexible, struggling, undermined, determined, and successful. This volume looks at leaders and leadership experience in Africa outside of the context of politics to better illustrate the diversity of leaders in Africa, their aspirations, and ideas for a different future. In this chapter, we focus on the complex contexts and histories from which leaders operate in the five countries highlighted in the case studies chapters.

Since 2000, Africa has gone through substantial changes that affect the experiences, demands, and perspectives of leadership of African leaders and those with whom they work. These changes have been political (decentralization), economic (rapid growth), social (urbanization), educational

B. Ng'weno
University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, USA
e-mail: bngweno@ucdavis.edu

E. Jordans et al., *Developing Global Leaders*, Palgrave Studies in African Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14606-1_4

(expanded), and demographic (productive portion of population surpassed 50%). They have been productive of new African societies, cultures, and work environments. Our overall study highlights some of the similarities and differences experienced by African leaders as they face these changes. This chapter gives a contextual framework to African leadership by focusing on some of the major dynamics of this interface between difference and similarity. Rather than search for convergence we strive to capture "the variety and complexity of the leadership and management phenomenon that may exist within the continent" (Nkomo, 2011, p. 378). Throughout this chapter there is a tension between what is similar and what is different between and within African countries. General trends move most African countries in one direction but specific histories, cultures, demographics, and politics heighten or reduce a general trend and give it a local specific aspect that is felt differently in different parts of Africa. In addition, there are many values (e.g. respect for elders) and cultural practices (e.g. consensus building) that are important across Africa, but are embodied and enacted in radically different ways, such that what one person might do or say in one country or region would not be the same for another person, country, or region.

This volume incorporates survey material from a wide range of African countries but looks specifically at leadership case studies in two West African countries (Ghana and Nigeria) and three East African countries (Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania). These countries make up just under 10% of Africa's 54 countries. Nevertheless, they represent 28% of Africa's total population, now estimated at 1.216 billion people. While the countries on which this volume focuses through case studies vary greatly in population, gross domestic product (GDP), resources, history, and culture, and as such, can give only an idea of the totality of leadership in Africa, they are also Anglophone countries who recognize English as one of their official languages and where English often predominates in government and business affairs.

Our volume documents the process of change taking place in many parts of Africa as well as the desire for change and the struggle about how it should be achieved. This chapter looks at the cultural and social diversity, as well as the changing political, economic, and demographic context, that allow the reader to understand the action of leaders in the five countries case studies. Of particular note, in these five countries, age stands out as a dividing line on how people understand and want leadership to be. Young leaders not only have a different take on leadership, but they also want to be different. However, they find they do not have readily available role models, support, access, or spaces to put their ideas into practice. This chapter puts this dynamic, among others, into context.

4.2 Cultural and Social Diversity

One striking thing about African countries is their internal diversity as well as intracontinental. Thus, the vast majority of African leaders exist in multicultural, multilingual, pluri-ethnic, and cosmopolitan societies. These societies additionally share colonial and postcolonial processes that structure institutions, organizations, and government. As a result, these societies hold multiple conceptualizations of tradition, culture, values, authority, and purpose. At the same time, the similar colonial structures, the process of decolonization, the restructuring during structural adjustment, the revolution of information technology, and the demographic shift towards a majority productive population give the appearance of a uniform continent where life appears similar across countries. African leaders working in their own countries or across Africa are then faced with familiar circumstances or institutions, but also radically different societies and cultures.

Culturally, leaders in Africa deal with different styles of interpersonal interactions including whether it is culturally acceptable to be humble or proud, direct or indirect, self-referent or self-effacing, formal or informal, attentive to hierarchy or treat all people the same, display wealth or not, which vary considerably across the continent. They have thus learned to be very flexible in their interactions. This is most obvious in the negotiation of conflict and consensus, which has resulted in management styles that may be considered “typically African” in that they are very flexible, without being specifically representative of any one country or individual. As most of this chapter shows, African populations are rapidly changing and a leader in Africa will be confronted with extremely varied cultures of management and ideas about conflict and consensus due to age, mobility, gender, and location.

In many circumstances African leaders find themselves having to learn from new situations and peoples, adjusting to cultural and political contexts, acquiring familiarity with new technology, and having to innovate to manage dynamic situations. As such, flexibility is a key ingredient to successful leadership. For example, one senior male business leader from Kenya described having to adjust to working in Zimbabwe as follows:

He first had to adjust because of institutional procedures, and then because of cultural differences, and finally because of institutional hierarchy expectations. As he notes, in the end it was he, the leader, who had to change to be effective.

Senior male business leader personal experience: "Noticing differences as a leader in Zimbabwe"

The methods that I had and culture that I had in Kenya did not apply in Zimbabwe. For instance, in Kenya if someone steals, and you have sufficient evidence, you ask them to leave in a fairly direct fashion. There is very little to discuss. In Zimbabwe, they steal, you have evidence, there is a due process that you have to go through, where they bring lawyers, etc. as part of labour law.

In Zimbabwe there is an expectation that you greet everyone every morning and the greeting is usually initiated by the more senior person. I was informed that I don't greet people. So, I retorted that they did not greet me either and I never refused to respond to any greetings I received. They said, "but you are the boss you are supposed to greet first." I said where I come from we greet each other, rank notwithstanding.

In Zimbabwe you are expected to behave more in line with your position and hierarchy than in most places I have worked. I learnt that you have got to play the game according to the set rules and you will not get the respect of your peers if you behave differently. You can get away with it if you are the top boss but not as a peer. What I learned is that it is a different culture from what I knew, and I had to unlearn many things, understand how things are and operate in this environment. You either fit in or change the culture. But you can't change a culture if you are one person alone. Capo, senior male business leader, retail and media sector

The cultures of the five countries in the case studies vary both because of the many societies that make up each country and the different histories and locations of each country. Between each country and within each country there are regional and local ways of dealing with things such as conflict and management of the legacies of colonialism. Major events that affect cultural understandings of leadership include histories of war, slave trade, colonialism, and genocide that have forced a reconsideration of leadership at different moments in history.

4.3 Structures of Political Authority

Leaders in Africa have rich and diverse traditions of political leadership on which to draw and with which they must deal in their work as leaders. These traditions range from acephalous societies to kingdoms, democracies to military regimes, and colonial to socialist governments. As such, the structuring and importance of hierarchy varies greatly across Africa.

Societies in Africa have grown out of a range of political traditions, some of which were highly centralized such as kingdoms with extremely powerful individual leaders, and others were highly decentralized such as acephalous states where leadership was a collective effort and individual leaders rose as needed (usually in religious or military contexts) but had no permanent positions. In both of these forms of societies, kinship, age, and gender were very important for structuring power and remain so in much of contemporary Africa. Kinship, age, and gender were particularly important to the governance of acephalous societies, in the form of matrilineal or patrilineal lineage, age groups, and reproductivity.

In the five countries of our study the whole range of kinds of authority is present within each of the countries. Countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and Rwanda have famous kingdoms such as the Ashanti kingdom of Ghana while at the same time having acephalous societies such as the Chakali also in Ghana (Daannaa, 1994). Tanzania, with the exception of Zanzibar, is perhaps the country least wedded to hierarchy both traditionally and today, due to having decentralized states in the past, as well as a socialist government after independence.

These different forms of local political authority were disrupted, enhanced, reinvented, and/or fundamentally changed by European colonialism. European interactions with these African countries also differed substantially. Nigeria and Ghana had a much longer intense trade relationship with Europe that structured internal markets and politics going back a few hundred years, that later turned into a colonial relationship. In contrast, the East African relationship had almost no period of trade before the colonial presence, besides the Portuguese along the coast. In addition, Kenya is the only country that was a settler colony of Britain set aside for European settlement. Tanganyika and Rwanda were first part of German East Africa and after the First World War Tanganyika was mandated to Britain and Rwanda to Belgium. Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Ghana, Nigeria, and the ten-mile coastal strip of Kenya were all British Protectorates while the rest of Kenya was a crown colony.

4.3.1 *Indirect Rule and Local Government*

After the First World War, due to lack of resources, European powers in Africa enhanced their systems of indirect rule—which was the administration of people in the colonies through "local authorities", in particular, chiefs (Berry, 1992). In the case of Rwanda, this had long been the practice with the Germans ruling through and enhancing the powers of the kings. Likewise, in Zanzibar the British upheld the power of the Sultans, and in Ghana the power of the chiefs and kings, and regents in place of kings. In most places where there was an elaborate system of chiefs and the colonial powers enhanced the power of these chiefs while removing their basis for rule. That is to say, the colonial power severed the tie with the community as the source of chiefly power and replaced it with a European mandate. In places where there was no system of chiefs, or where the leaders had risen temporarily in order to deal with the European presence (such as military leaders), colonial powers invented systems of local chiefs to administer on their behalf, giving individual benefits to the rulers. The result of indirect rule was a system of chiefs/kings whose power was now obtained from the colonial, and later postcolonial, state but whose legitimacy was supposed to come from the community. With time these "traditional" authorities have gained power through colonial and postcolonial administrative privileges, collection of market taxes, and power over the distribution of land.

The incorporation of the system of chiefs into local government across independent Africa was meant to co-opt the local authorities under a national banner and at the same time not "disrupt" tradition with the overall aim of legitimizing the state. This produced a legacy of tensions between the roles of chiefs as representing a community or representing the state (colonial or postcolonial). This tension bubbles up to the surface every now and again depending on local politics.

Thus, most republics in Africa have had to deal with traditional authorities of different varieties that predate them as polities. In many countries there have been movements to promote the power of local authorities at different times since independence. One such movement was led by the late Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi who sponsored and convened traditional kings, sultans, sheiks, and tribal leaders in an effort to produce a unified cross-continental African government and to by-pass elected government rulers. The appeal of traditional leaders, then, is not just a recovery of ancient ways of ruling but very much a politics of the present that reaches back to ideas about the past to legitimate new ways of ruling. Such processes of legitimation increase in appeal when people are wary of current institutions and politicians. The variety of locations of authority mean that tradition and custom are important to the success of leaders in Africa. This was expressed by one senior male information technology (IT) consultant in Nigeria:

Senior male consultant personal experience: "Understanding the importance of culture in Nigeria"

As a leader in Nigeria, you should take into account the context of the cultural norms of the people you are leading and adapt this to suit your specific leadership style. Some cultural norms create structure and breaking this then creates chaos, not progress.

Leadership and styles of Leadership are not constant. Leaders in Nigeria need to analysis their environments constantly, react to changes and adjust their leadership style to suit the constantly changing environments. **Mr R.,** senior male consultant, IT sector

Chiefs are the strongest in places that had strong kingdoms and in general carry more power in West Africa as compared to East Africa where the vast majority of chiefs were a colonial invention. Today the position of the chief in East Africa functions as the most local form of local government and is not necessarily related to the community, but is expected to continue to function as the distribution of local authority. Chiefs in West Africa and in Ghana in particular, although stripped of some of their independence with the postcolonial state, remained in control of land and land distribution and as such wield considerable power. With growing urbanism chiefs often became beneficiaries of the conversion of rural to urban land (Ubink, 2007).

4.3.2 Political Leaders of Postcolonial States

Although this volume focuses on leadership in Africa outside the context of politics, our respondents in surveys and interviews used political leadership as a point of comparison. Publicly on an international scale, the concern over political leadership is highlighted by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize for Achievement in African Leadership (awarded to ex-presidents), which, established in 2006, sets out to improve leadership and governance across Africa. When the foundation feels that no leader is deserving of the prize it does not award it. The last recipient of the prize was ex-president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2017 for her work on reconciliation and nation building. Respondents often talked about political leaders as role models for what, or what not, to do. The leaders they turn to as examples were political leaders who were instrumental in bringing about important moments of change like, Nelson Mandela (end of Apartheid), Julius Nyerere (independence and unification of Tanzania), and Paul Kagame (end of the genocide in Rwanda). These particular figures are also important as they are understood as selfless and uncorrupt leaders.

In 1957 Ghana was the first country, of the five we focus on, to gain independence. Tanganyika became independent in 1961, Rwanda in 1962 and Nigeria, and Zanzibar and Kenya in 1963. In 1964 after the Zanzibari revolution that removed the sultan, Zanzibar and Tanganyika unified to form Tanzania. All these countries achieved independence through a negotiated settlement, except for Kenya, which as a settler colony gained independence through armed struggle (Mau Mau).

In terms of politics, Tanzania has had the most stable civilian government. Ruled as a one-party state until the 1990s, it had a smooth succession of civilian rulers throughout its independent history who have alternated between representatives of the mainland (Tanganyika) and of Zanzibar until recently with multi-party elections. Kenya too has only had civilian rulers but a lot fewer. Also, a single-party state until 1992, Kenya now has term limits for the presidency. However, its election politics have turned violent since the reintroduction of multi-party elections. Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda have had both civilian and military rulers and coup d'états that have put in military rulers. The power of the military in those three countries is much greater than in Kenya or Tanzania. Nigeria and Rwanda faced devastating wars, including the Nigerian/Biafra civil war in 1967–1970 in the case of Nigeria, and the 1994 genocide in the case of Rwanda. However, today the rulers of these five countries are elected, although Rwanda's president Paul Kagame and Nigeria's president Muhammadu Buhari both have military backgrounds. President Kagame, who led the military end to the genocide, became president in 2000 and has ruled for 19 years, the longest of any of the presidents of the five countries. A constitutional referendum was held in Rwanda in December 2015. The amendments to the constitution allowed President Kagame to run for a third term of office in 2017, as well as shortened presidential terms from seven to five years, although the latter change would not come into effect until 2024. Tanzania was the sole socialist country in the group with long standing ties to China.

4.4 Economic Context

In 2016 the African Development Bank declared Africa to be the world's second-fastest growing region (2017). According to World Bank data for 2018, six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world are in Africa (World Bank, 2018a). The fastest growing African countries were Ghana (8.3%), Ethiopia (8.2%), Côte D'Ivoire (7.2%), Djibouti (7%), Senegal (6.9%), and Tanzania (6.8%) (Adegoke, 2018). The World Bank forecasts that Africa will expand its average overall growth from 3.1% in 2018 to 3.5% in 2019 (Adegoke, 2018). This overall growth rate is affected by the slow pace of growth in three oil and mineral rich countries, Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola, who make up about 60% of sub-Saharan Africa's annual GDP (Obulutsa, 2018). Nigeria is Africa's largest economy with the largest population (15% of the population of Africa) and a GDP of $376.3 billion. Leaders in Africa face this dynamic moment of growth from varied positions, histories, and cultures and with access to very different recourses.

The five case studies presented here—Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania—differ considerably economically because of their history, political climate, and topography. Between 2010 and 2015, "GDP across Africa grew at 3.3 percent a year, markedly slower than its 5.4 percent average annual growth rate between 2000 and 2010" (Bughin et al., 2016, p. 2). For countries with oil, this growth was slowed by the falling oil prices. Thus, in some countries GDP growth is decelerating (including Nigeria) and in others it is accelerating (including Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania).

4.4.1 Economic Structure

Many African countries have similar economic structures that depend on the production of raw materials. The African Development Bank argues that most of Africa's growth "reflects an economic structure that depends heavily on primary commodities and the extractive sector, with little progress in labor-intensive manufacturing" (2019, p. 2). In addition, African countries have been actively connected to the rest of the world through trade for centuries. West African countries in general have a long history of cross-country trade where traders, both male and female, journey considerable distances in order to trade. East Africa was connected across the Indian Ocean to Asian traders and markets.

Nigeria and Ghana are oil rich countries but also have many other important minerals. Nigeria is Africa's largest oil exporter and has the largest natural gas reserves in Africa (World Bank, 2018b). Tanzania has a number of minerals as well and since 2010 it has witnessed further exploration and discoveries of significant quantities of natural gas. In contrast, Rwanda and Kenya have been highly dependent on agriculture as the backbone of the economy. In terms of climate Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda have higher rainfall and more fertile soils than either Tanzania or Kenya which are both very susceptible to droughts. All five countries have expanding manufacturing, digital technology goods, and services (World Bank, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e).

Today Nigeria is the world's 27th largest economy but has the lowest growth rate of any of the five countries. After a decade of over 5% growth, Nigeria's growth hit negative numbers (−1.62%) in 2016 due to falling oil prices since 2014 (World Bank, 2018b). Nevertheless, it is expected to grow at 2.8% in 2019. Ghana has a more varied and diversified economy including hydrocarbons and industrial minerals but also shipping, agriculture (in particular cocoa), and digital technology. Ghana had a GDP growth of 14% in 2011 that fell to around 2.9% by 2014. It has slowly been growing out of that dip due to oil and gas production reaching 8.1% in 2017 (Dontoh & Van Vuuren, 2018). Kenya is more dependent on agriculture and services and had a GDP of 5.7% in 2018 which is projected to increase in the following years (World Bank, 2018d). Due to the genocide, Rwanda had −50% growth in 1994 but with the help of international aid afterwards, by 1995 had 35% growth rate which slowly fell to around 13% by 2002 and was 8% in 2011 and has been around 6% in 2016 and 2017. Finally, Tanzania is able to expand both agriculture and industry and has grown steadily at a moderate rate since 1992. The World Bank argues that Tanzania has "sustained relatively high economic growth over the last decade, averaging 6–7% a year" (World Bank, 2018e). The Annual GDP growth (in %) of the five countries over the last decade is presented in Fig. 4.1. The graph includes also the average for GDP growth of the world, which shows that the five countries' GDP growth has been much higher than the world's average (with only a few exceptions).



Fig. 4.1 GDP growth (annual in %). (Source: World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG)

4.4.2 Structural Adjustment and Inequality

Since the 1980s "almost 40 African countries have pursued programs of economic reform supported by balance of payments loans from the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and/or the World Bank, and shaped by the policy conditionality attached to those loans" (Loxley, 1990). These economic reforms, called structural adjustment programmes, asked the participating countries to fundamentally reform their economies including the devaluation of currency, reduction in government employment, privatization, liberalization of markets, and reduction of tariffs and taxes. In addition, reflecting a global trend of an increasing gap between the rich and the poor, leaders in Africa must contend with disparities in resources within and across countries and regions.

Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania went through World Bank imposed structural adjustments of their economies in the 1980s and 1990s. The immediate effect of the structural adjustment programmes was lack and loss of government jobs, growing disparities of wealth, high international competition, as well as political instability. Ghana was seen as the country best able to implement and benefit from structural adjustment programmes. Rwanda was able to mobilize loans post genocide to rebuild

Rwanda. This growth was predominantly government driven and as such stands as an exception to the structural adjustment cutbacks.

All five countries face some level of inequality due to uneven economic growth and have varied approaches to poverty alleviation. In Nigeria "inequality in terms of income and opportunities has been growing rapidly and has adversely affected poverty reduction" (World Bank, 2018a), but this is also the case in Ghana and in Kenya (African Development Bank, 2019). The African Development Bank argues that "Kenya continues to face the challenges of inadequate infrastructure, high income inequality, and high poverty exacerbated by high unemployment, which varies across locations and groups (such as young people)" (2019, p. 156). Out of the five countries, Rwanda has managed to address the issue of inequality the best. The African Development Bank argues that "in terms of social developments, Rwanda has translated its strong growth into reduced poverty and improved equality)" (2019, p. 170). The context of inequality and growing disparities is reflected in the concern that leaders in Africa give to the social as well as economic work that they do. The importance of creating opportunities or better futures and building nations stood out in many interviews, especially among youth leaders.

4.4.3 Informality and Corruption

Today, young people in Africa cannot expect government employment and are more likely to be informally or self-employed (Chakravarty, Das, & Vaillant, 2017). Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) use a definition of the informal economy particularly relevant for the African context. They define the informal economy as "the diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, jobs and workers that are not regulated or protected by the state" (WIEGO, 2019).The African Development Bank argues that "one of the most salient features of labor markets in Africa is the high prevalence of informal employment, the default option for a large majority of the growing labor force […] While data on informal employment are sketchy, it is clear that Africa has the highest rate of estimated informality in the world, at 72 percent of non-agriculture employment—and as high as 90 percent in some countries" (African Development Bank, 2019, p. xvii). The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that 85.8% of African employment is informal (ILO, 2018). They go on to add that "globally, when the level of education increases, the level of informality decreases" (ILO, 2018).

Some youth leaders have turned this unstable position into entrepreneurship and continuous side hustles. Informality has also had repercussions for growth throughout the economic sector. Bughin et al. argue that that African companies "grow faster than their peers in the rest of the world, and they are more profitable than these peers in most sectors" (2016, p. 23). They go on to state that in wholesale and retail, food and agri-processing, health care, financial services, light manufacturing and construction, large African companies are both more profitable and faster growing than global peers. Nevertheless, although there are many companies in Africa, there are few large companies outside of South Africa, partly due to a high degree of informality (Bughin et al., 2016). Particularly difficult is the transition from small companies to large ones due to corruption, monopolies, and other barriers to entry, as long-term capital is harder to come by than in Europe or the USA.

In any system with large disparities of wealth there are ready entries for corruption. The five countries of our study are no exception. Corruption has economic as well as social costs. It was frequently brought up in our survey and interviews with African leaders, who voiced their concern and demand for integrity and honesty among leaders. All countries make varying attempts to eradicate corruption, with limited success so far. Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) argue that in Nigeria, for example, economics and politics depend on existing networks of patronage and clientelism that have consolidated and expanded, causing corruption to remain a critical issue. They argue that as such, anti-corruption campaigns pose "serious danger of the material basis of elites and the possibility of their continued reproduction" and thus are ferociously attacked (2011, p. 187). They add that the progress of anti-corruption campaigns is "often determined by the changing location and fortunes" of social forces in the country (2011, p. 188). In particular they argue that the meshing of the dominance of rule centred in a patron with that of dominance of rational-legal bureaucratic power, means that any challenge to corruption comes about in the context of specific politics that ironically was created within the same structural order. As such, the overall structure ends up "neutralizing the emergent subversive institutions (law and organization) and the elements organized around it" (2011, p. 189).

In spite of the entrenched nature of corruption, it was highly criticized by our respondents. Respondents favoured integrity and wanted change. The youth especially critiqued the unequal societies built through corruption and expressed desire for structures that helped others, pulled up society, or built the nation, rather than the individual or corporation. Leaders in Africa then face the challenge of transforming entrenched practices or finding ways in which to operate in spaces they would like to change.

4.5 Social and Demographic Context

Most nation states in Africa are around 50 years old, although they contain societies that are a lot older. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, age and gender have been dividing lines for power and authority in Africa that were further enhanced in the colonial and postcolonial context. It is not a surprise, then, that the IMF argues that "being young and being female both serve as disadvantages in the labor market, and that these disadvantages are additive" (Chakravarty et al., 2017, p. 7). These disadvantages are enhanced by the context of informality. Nevertheless, what should be a surprise is that compared to the rest of the world, Africa is doing better on both fronts of youth and gender participation in the labour market (ILO, 2016). The ILO argues in their *World Employment Social Outlook: Trends for Youth* 2016 report that, in terms of both gender and age, there are large differences between the statistics for North Africa and for sub-Saharan Africa, where North Africa is doing a lot less well than the rest of Africa. As the five countries of our study are sub-Saharan countries, this chapter focuses on the statistics for sub-Saharan Africa in reference to youth and women.

4.5.1 Urbanization

Urbanization is often thought of as a way to boost the economies of countries. Cities are seen as some of the most economically dynamic regions of the world as urban productivity is "more than double that of the countryside" (Bughin et al., 2016, p. 6). Saghir and Santoro argue that the GDP of many sub-Saharan African countries "is concentrated, and even reliant, on the productivity of its urban centers" (2018). Nevertheless, "Africa is currently the least urbanized continent, but its urbanization rate of 3.5 percent per year is the fastest in the world" (Population Connection, 2019). The increasing urban population has political and economic consequences and the change is particularly rapid. "In 1980, only 28 percent of Africans lived in urban areas. Today, the number of Africans living in cities is 40 percent, and is projected to grow to 50 percent by 2030" (Population Connection, 2019).



Fig. 4.2 Urbanization (%). (Source: https://www.statista.com/)

Yet again, urbanization is a space where the diversity of African countries is important. There is variability in the levels of urbanization by region of Africa and by country. In general, West Africa is more urbanized than East Africa. For instance, in 2017 Ghana was 55% urban and Nigeria 49% while Tanzania was 33%, Kenya 26%, and Rwanda 17% urban (Statista, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e). The rate of urbanization is also higher in West Africa, which in between 2007 and 2017 was the highest in Nigeria (8.7%) and also high in Ghana (6.8%), whereas it was also relatively high for Tanzania (6.9%), but lower for Kenya (4.1%) and stable for Rwanda (0.2%). This is reflected in Fig. 4.2.

In addition, Lagos is the largest city in Africa with a population of 11.2 million people (Population Connection, 2019). Because of the political and economic importance of cities, leaders often arise in these spaces. In this volume we focus on leadership in rural as well as urban areas to get a wide sense of the different leadership challenges in different African settings.

4.5.2 Youth

Unlike the rest of the world, Africa is marked by its youthful population. Across Africa, since independence every generation is seen as fundamentally different from the previous one. The distinctions between the youth and the elderly and age in general have been mobilized in politics, labour disputes, and cultural productions. Gray argues that "while in most areas of the world populations are decreasing or flatlining, in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa they're increasing. Nearly half of the world's young live in Sub-Saharan Africa" (2018, p. 1). While the large young population and its difference from past generations is striking today, it is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is made more visible because in other parts of the world the populations have grown older. What is interesting is the changing dynamics of the youth demographics—they are more educated, they have a higher access to technology, they are more connected to the rest of the world, and they will live longer. And finally, and most importantly, although a larger overall number, there are less youth as a proportion of the population in Africa today than previous decades.

This high youth population was once seen as a burden to Africa, but in a rapidly ageing world it is now seen as a highly valuable asset and as a growing labour force. Important to the conceptual shift about African youth from burden to asset is a change in the demographics of African countries. While Africa remains the region of the world with the most youthful populations, due to expanded life expectancies, much lower birth rates, and innovations in health and healthcare, the population under age 18 no longer makes up the majority of the population of most African countries. This means that the majority of the population of Africa is of productive age, that is, between 18 and 65 years of age. The economic potential released when this occurs is called the demographic growth dividend (Drummond, Thakoor, & Yu, 2014).

A similar change occurred in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s and contributed to the economic growth that is reaching its peak at present. Africa's own demographic transition started later, in the mid-1980s (Drummond et al., 2014, p. 7). Drummond et al. (2014) argue that Africa should reap the benefits of this dividend until around 2090 although about 29 African countries will peak around 2050. They also argue that by 2060 Africa will have the highest working age population of any continent. Drummond et al. argue that "with declining mortality and fertility, Africa's share of the working age population will increase from about 54 percent in 2010 to peak at about 64 percent in 2090. The rising share of Africa's working age population is increasing its productive potential at a time when most of the advanced economies face an ageing population. Africa's share of the global working age population is thus projected to increase from 12.6 percent in 2010 to over 41 percent by 2100" (2014, p. 4).

At present in most African countries, over 50% of the population is between 18 and 30 years, creating a youth bulge. This is the space of greatest potential. So, while Africa is young, it is no longer characterized by a larger dependent than productive population, and its productive population have years, decades even, of production ahead of them. Thus, Africa has increasing numbers of youth entering the productive age (18–65 years) while the rest of the world have increasing numbers of elderly leaving it. However, the ILO points out that youth unemployment has been increasing faster than the unemployment of the rest of the population. Partly this is due to the youth bulge where there is the highest total number of people to employ in the youth category, if half of your productive population is between 18 and 30 years old. For instance, in Ghana "the national unemployment rate has hovered around 5–6% in recent years, but is notably higher among Ghanaian youth (10–12% between 2010 and 2013)" (ICEF Monitor, 2016b).

Although according to the ILO, in 2017 youth unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa was the lowest of any continent, the nature of available employment is poor quality, being of low productivity, low income, and low opportunity for growth, and usually being irregular and informal (ILO, 2016). The ILO argue that 90% of new jobs are in the informal economy (Muchira, 2017). Bengelstorff writes that "at no point in its history did Africa have a more educated youth population than today. But at no point in its history did so many young people compete for so few formal jobs" (2019). In the IMF study of eight African countries, including Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania, "71.7% of the working youth were engaged in self-employment" (Chakravarty et al., 2017, p. 2). The African Development bank argues that "Africa's labor force is projected to be nearly 40 percent larger by 2030. If current trends continue, only half of new labor force entrants will find employment, and most of the jobs will be in the informal sector. This implies that close to 100 million young people could be without jobs" (2019, p. 45).

Leadership in Africa is often produced through a combination of formal and informal channels. However, access to formal employment, including in government, is highly dependent on higher levels of education and thus favours men. Bengelstorff notes however that youth no longer look to the government for work, but rather to entrepreneurs. For instance, she cites a young man in Ghana, William Senyo, who states that "political leadership has failed us consistently. The entrepreneurs have actually shown more capacity to lift us up than our political leaders. They have created opportunities" (2019). The youth also look to technology to be able to provide a source of livelihood.

4.5.3 Gender

Sub-Saharan Africa has a low gender gap in youth unemployment and according to the IMF, "the ratio of female to male labor force participation rates is higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region" (Chakravarty et al., 2017). In sub-Saharan Africa the gender gap has remained pretty constant for the last 25 years (at between 4 and 6 percentage points) (ILO, 2016). This means that young women are only slightly less employed than young men in sub-Saharan Africa. In North African countries, on the other hand, the gender gap has become worse between 1991 (15% points) and 2016 (21% points) (ILO, 2016). In addition, although the female labour force participation rates are higher in sub-Saharan Africa, they mask underlying challenges for women. As Chakravarty et al. state, "A large majority of employed women work in vulnerable employment. In addition, youth unemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are double those of adult unemployment" (2017). They go on to argue that, in addition, women are employed differently from men. They are less likely to be employees or employers, but rather they are likely to be self-employed or family workers; in other words, in informal work.

Nkomo and Ngambi (2009) argue that there have been few studies of women leadership in Africa and of the few that existed by 2008, they focused mainly on South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana and only a small percentage focused on leadership styles, while most focused on obstacles or barriers to women's advancement. This is understandable considering that "discrimination, whether overt or institutionalized, can diminish young women's job prospects especially when they are unable to accurately signal their abilities in the formal labor market and employers rely on implicit judgments of their abilities" (Chakravarty et al., 2017). Nkomo and Ngambi found that the main barriers that hinder access and ascent to leadership and management for women were "early socialization, limited educational attainment, multiple roles, gender stereotyping, subtle discrimination, and organizational policies and procedures" (Nkomo & Ngambi, 2009, p. 55). A number of these challenges were highlighted in our interviews and surveys.

In addition, Nkomo and Ngambi (2009) argue that women have fared far better in political leadership and public sector management than in the private formal sector. For instance, they mention President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, as well as a number of female deputy/vice presidents (Uganda, the Gambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Burundi). Using statistics from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Chalaby argues that "in every year since 2004, Rwanda has had more women in parliament than any other country around the world. For the last four years, it has had a record 64% of its lower house made up of women" (Chalaby, 2017). Although women hold 38% of parliament seats in Ethiopia (World Bank, 2018c), in 2018 the prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, appointed a gender balanced cabinet announcing that "our women ministers will disprove the old aphorism that women can't lead" (Allo, 2018). In addition, Sahle-Work Zewde became Ethiopia's first female president. While the president is a symbolic role, powerful cabinet positions also went to women, including that of defence.

Nevertheless, World Bank data for 2017 show the large variation between countries in Africa of women's political participation, where Rwanda has 61.3%, Tanzania has 36.4%, Kenya has 21.8%, Ghana has 12.7%, and Nigeria has 5.6% women in parliament (World Bank, 2018c) (see Fig. 4.3). The data show a higher than world average proportion of seats held by women in Rwanda and Tanzania and lower than average in the other three countries.



Fig. 4.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%). (Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS)

4.5.4 Education

As Africa's demographics shift to be predominantly of productive age, their education greatly affects their ability to transform or lead transformations of African economies. Africa's young population means that there is a growing demand for tertiary education and Africans seek this education both locally and abroad. Since 2004, all five countries that make up the focus of this book's study of leadership offer primary education for free (up to eight years). Beyond that, there is a great variety of education levels across the five countries allowing some countries to take better advantage of the demographic dividend of their youth bulge. Importantly, some countries started expanding their high school and university offering in the 1980s which has allowed them to educate a significant number of students who make up today's youth bulge. This has allowed people to translate informal self-employment into formal entrepreneurship.

Nigeria launched the Universal Basic Education (UBE) in 1999 and made UBE free since 2004 for the first nine years of schooling. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/International Bureau of Education (UNESCO/IBU) estimates that in 2005/2006 at the primary level (first six years) the net enrolment ratio (share of children of official primary school age that are enrolled in primary school) was 84.2% with more boys enrolled than girls. However, a smaller percentage (77.7%) finish primary school and an even smaller percentage (50%) go on to junior secondary (UNESCO/IBU, 2011a, p. 12). The overall estimated secondary school enrolment rate is 31.4% which leaves over seven million young people not enrolled (UNESCO/IBU, 2011a, p. 16). In addition, there was a massive decline in enrolment from 2006 to 2008 due to attacks on schools by extremists, then there was a slight increase only to fall again in 2014 due to falling oil prices and declining economy (UNESCO, 2018c). According to David Ajikobi (2018), since 2006 this net enrolment rate for primary schools reduced to 65% by 2016, with completion rates also dropping. In addition, Nigeria maintains a disparity between boy and girl education with boys participating at higher rates than girls. Tertiary enrolment is increasing in Nigeria and "is projected to more than double from 2.3 million students in 2013 to 4.8 million by 2024" (ICEF Monitor, 2015).

In 1996 Ghana instituted the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) programme for all children of school going age (6–14 years) which was amended in 2008 to include two years of pre-primary education. This includes both primary and junior high school. In 2007 for primary schools the "net enrolment ratio was estimated at 83.4%" (UNESCO/IBU, 2011b, p. 13) which rose to a high of 87% in 2014 and by 2017 was around 84.59% (UNESCO, 2018d). For junior high schools "the net enrolment ratio was estimated at 53%" in 2008 (UNESCO/IBU, 2011b, p. 13) showing a considerable reduction of enrolment, although the education remains free. At the level of senior high schools, the gross enrolment ratio was estimated at only 32.2% in 2008, but increased to 56% by 2017 (UNESCO, 2018d). Ghana has high tertiary education participation, rising from 8.63% in 2008 to 16.6% in 2017. In primary education from 2012 through 2014 there was little difference between girl and boy child education participation, and since 2015 girls have slightly out participated boys. In secondary school the gap remains but is rapidly closing with little difference in 2017. The gap is widest at the tertiary level.

Since 2003, similar to Nigeria and Ghana, Rwanda had nine years of Basic Education including pre-primary, primary, and lower secondary. In 2003 the estimated net enrolment ratio was 78.3% but increased to 93% and 95.8% in 2004 and 2007 respectively (UNESCO/IBU, 2011c, p. 11). Rwanda maintained these high participation rates through 2017 with a rate of 93.93% (UNESCO, 2018e). Throughout primary education since 2008 girls have had higher participation rates than boys, with a shift to a slight increase in boy participation in 2016 for the first time (UNESCO, 2018e). In spite of these immense increases in primary education, at the secondary level the net enrolment in 2007 was only 13.1%, only slightly up from 9.4% in 2000 (UNESCO/IBU, 2011c, p. 17). Nevertheless, by 2016, it had reached 27.67% with girls out numbering boys. Tertiary level is the only place where boys outnumber girls in Rwanda with an overall participation rate of 7.64% in 2017 (UNESCO, 2018e).

Kenya instituted free primary education in 2002 and is slowly moving towards an education system structured similarly to countries in West Africa. In Kenya, there is marked disparity between cities and rural areas in pre-primary education. At the primary level (first eight years) the estimated net enrolment rate increased from 77.3% in 2002 to 86.5% in 2006 and the completion rate increased from 60% in 2001 to 81% in 2007 (UNESCO/IBU, 2011d). At the secondary level, the gross enrolment ratio increased from 25.7% in 2002 to 32.2% in 2006 with an almost 90% completion rate (UNESCO/IBU, 2011d). By 2009, the gross enrolment rate had reached 58% and the net enrolment rate was 48.3% (UNESCO, 2018a). Finally, tertiary education enrolment significantly increased from

4% in 2009 to 11.66% in 2016. This increase came from both public and private increases in higher education institutions. In 2016 there were "68 higher education institutions in Kenya, up from 58 since 2011 alone. Twenty-two are public and the rest—which are responsible for the greatest expansion in Kenya's higher education capacity—are private" (ICEF Monitor, 2016a). However, at all levels rates were higher for boys than girls. By 2016 gross enrolment ratio are equal between boys and girls at primary level for the first time but by the tertiary level have become substantially different again. In addition, "learning outcomes are better in urban areas, non-arid areas and non-poor households" (Uwezo, 2016, p. 7).

Tanzania has compulsory primary education lasting seven years. Kiswahili is the medium of instruction in primary schools but switches to English in secondary schools and university. Also, instruction in mainland Tanzania and in Zanzibar varies in content and execution. In mainland Tanzania in 2008, the estimated net enrolment ratio was 97.2% dramatically up from 66% in 2001 (UNESCO/IBU, 2011e). In Zanzibar, the estimated net enrolment in 2006 was 75.7% (UNESCO/IBU, 2011e). In fact, Tanzania's total net primary enrolment increased profoundly between 1998 and 2008, increasing from 49% to reach over 96%. Sadly after 2008 it began to drop again, to reach only 80% by 2014 (Knoema, 2018; UNESCO, 2018b). For secondary school (forms 1–4) the net enrolment ratio was 24.4% in 2008, up from only 8.4% in 2004 (UNESCO/IBU, 2011e) and dropped again to 23.2% in 2017 (UNESCO, 2018b). In 2015 Tanzania had a participation rate in tertiary education of 3.92%. Generally, since 2010 girls have slightly outnumbered boys in primary education but this switches dramatically in secondary education when in 2017 it was about equal (UNESCO, 2018b). Similar to Kenya, at the tertiary level this disparity is most pronounced with men participating almost twice as much as women (UNESCO, 2018b).

Overall, enrolment is much higher in primary school than in secondary education in the five countries. In most countries, enrolment figures have gone up over the last decade with the exception of Tanzania and Nigeria. Tanzania had the highest enrolment rates in 2009, but they decreased to just below Kenya, Rwanda, and Ghana over the decade. Nigeria had a massive decline in enrolment due to Boko Haram attacks on schools and the sharp decline in the economy with dropping prices of oil.

In terms of studying abroad, Ghana "is now the second-largest source of Sub-Saharan students in the US, after only Nigeria and after having edged out Kenya for the number two spot as of the 2014/15 academic year" (ICEF Monitor, 2016b). Institutions such as the British Council, who encourage students to study in the UK, project that "Nigeria will lead the world in tertiary-age population growth through 2024. The country's population of 18-to-22 year-olds is forecast to grow from 16.1 million in 2013 to 22.5 million by 2024" (ICEF Monitor, 2015) while "Kenya will have a population of 5.7 million college-aged students by 2024, up from 4.2 million in 2011" (ICEF Monitor, 2016a). As such, soon Africans of university age will outnumber university aged people in other parts of the world. Students abroad sometimes remain there contributing to the "brain drain" but also often do not settle permanently abroad and return with different skills and ideas of leadership that complement those already in use locally.

4.6 African Leaders and Leadership Experience

Education, in combination with the youth bulge, is rapidly changing workspaces in Africa. The large number of educated youth entering employment, both informal and formal, means that the workforce is more ready with ideas, more capable to carry out tasks and to innovate, and most importantly, more demanding of their leaders. The contrast between youth expectations and older leadership, the economy or the institutional structure's ability to meet those expectations, were raised as leadership challenges by a number of leaders in our survey and interviews and is an important challenge with which African leaders are grappling.

Leaders in Africa must deal with countries that are internally and regionally diverse, but have similar historical events and economic or political restructuring such as the timing of independence, structural adjustment, and demographic change. Although facing similar demographic, economic, technological challenges, or circumstances, African leaders draw on a diverse history and tradition of authority and leadership to frame their actions which produce different leadership styles in different countries. Because of the different kinds of local authority developed in conjunction with, or in resistance to, colonial and postcolonial state authority, African leaders often have to have to negotiate authority on multiple levels and especially navigate authority vested in age, gender, and kinship ties when working in business, organizations, or government.

After a number of lean years following the structural adjustment period of the 1980s, Africa is currently continuing an economic growth spurt that took off around 2000, producing an exciting moment for leadership in Africa. The expanding economies create new opportunities for leadership as well as new leaders. Growing as well, however, is the divide between the wealthy and the poor, and between youth and general employment, enhancing already existing social divides. In addition, both youth and women are over-represented in the informal sector which remains a large part of African economies. The expanding African economies are partially a result of urbanization, education access, and the demographic shift from predominantly dependent population structures to predominantly productive ones. Today, the population of most countries in Africa is in the productive ages of 18–65 years old, allowing for the potential of a demographic dividend. This potential is enhanced by the increased access to education and increased urbanization. At the same time, a growing proportion of the educated and of the workforce is female. This means that leaders must deal with a rapidly changing economic environment, new technology, and a new and newly educated workforce, demanding flexibility, adaptability, and continued learning.

Stella Nkomo argues that leadership in Africa has been understood through two interconnected discourses: one of transformative change to create a renaissance and the other of persistent failure (2011). She argues that "both reduce the causes of Africa's contemporary problems to a crisis in leadership and management" which she sees as dangerous because it hides the connection between the colonial past and the postcolonial present (2011, p. 368). In place of these interconnected discourses of renaissance or failure, Nkomo calls for a descriptive rather than prescriptive study of leadership in Africa. This volume presents such a descriptive study of leaders and leadership in business and organizations in Africa. It emphasizes the context, doubts, struggles, and successes of leaders and presents their experience and advice on how to deal with the rapidly changing environment in which they find themselves. While focusing on leadership experience generally, the volume specifically highlights the challenge of mid-level leaders in the rural government in Rwanda; leaders in science and academic scholarship in Ghana; project management leaders in large business firms in Nigeria; gendered experiences of leaders in private business and governmental boards in Kenya; and intergenerational dynamics of leaders in donor and non-governmental organizations in Tanzania.

References

Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2011). When corruption fights back: Democracy and elite interest in Nigeria's anti-corruption war. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 49*(2), 185–213.

Adegoke, Y. (2018, January 14). Africa's economic outlook is promising for 2018, but there are clouds on the horizon. *QuartzAfrica*. Retrieved January 2, 2019, from https://qz.com/africa/1179387/africas-economic-outlook-is-promising-for-2018-but-there-clouds-on-the-horizon/

African Development Bank. (2017). Africa remains world's second-fastest growing region. Retrieved January 2, 2019, from https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africa-remains-worlds-second-fastest-growing-region-17036/

African Development Bank. (2019). *Africa economic outlook 2019*. Retrieved January 21, 2019, from https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf

Ajikobi, D. (2018). Factsheet: Grading Nigeria's progress in education. *Africa Check*. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-grading-nigerias-progress-in-education/

Allo, A. K. (2018). The power of Ethiopia's gender-balanced cabinet. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved January 24, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/power-ethiopia-gender-balanced-cabinet-181019110930577.html

Bengelstorff, A. (2019, January 10). Africa's youth rising: Inspirational stories from Ghana, South Africa and Uganda. *The Elephant*. Retrieved January 24, 2019, from https://www.theelephant.info/features/2019/01/10/africas-youth-rising-inspirational-stories-from-ghana-south-africa-and-uganda/?fbclid=IwAR2rqkSzgtaYi404likkJEHzdHKkXs3ghZsVt_inBtAwtVgx-U9GBCJbyTMg

Berry, S. (1992). Hegemony on a shoestring: Indirect rule and access to agricultural land. *Africa, 62*(3), 327–355.

Bughin, J., Chironga, M., Desvaux, G., Ermias, T. J. P., Kassiri, O., Leke, A., et al. (2016). *Lions on the move II: Realizing the potential of Africa's economies*. McKinsey Global Institute. Retrieved January 22, 2019, from https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/lions-on-the-move-realizing-the-potential-of-africas-economies

Chakravarty, S., Das, S., & Vaillant, J. (2017). Gender and youth employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A review of constraints and effective interventions. World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper, 8245.

Chalaby, O. (2017). Ranked and mapped: Which countries have the most women in parliament. *Apolitical*. Retrieved January 22, 2019, from https://apolitical.co/solution_article/which-countries-have-most-women-in-parliament/

Daannaa, H. S. (1994). The acephalous society and the indirect rule system in Africa. *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 26*(34), 61–85.

Dontoh, E., & Van Vuuren, A. J. (2018). Ghana's economic growth rate more than doubles in 2017 to 8.5%. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-11/ghana-economic-growth-rate-more-than-doubles-in-2017-to-8-5.

Drummond, P., Thakoor, V., & Yu, S. (2014). *Africa rising: Harnessing the demographic dividend*. International Monetary Fund Working paper.

Gray, A. (2018). What you need to know about the world's youth, in 7 charts. *World Economic Forum*. Retrieved January 22, 2019, from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-worlds-young-people-in-7-charts/

ICEF. (2015). Nigeria projected to be one of the world's fastest-growing markets for postgraduate studies. *ICEF Monitor*. Retrieved February 24, 2019, from http://monitor.icef.com/2015/02/nigeria-projected-one-worlds-fastest-growing-markets-postgraduate-studies/

ICEF. (2016a). Kenyan students staying home in greater numbers but quality concerns persist. *ICEF Monitor*. Retrieved February 24, 2019, from http://monitor.icef.com/2016/02/kenyan-students-staying-home-in-greater-numbers-but-quality-concerns-persist/

ICEF. (2016b). Ghana emerging as an important sending market in Sub-Saharan Africa. *ICEF Monitor*. Retrieved February 24, 2019, from http://monitor.icef.com/2016/06/ghana-emerging-important-sending-market-sub-saharan-africa/

ILO. (2016). *World employment social outlook: Trends for youth 2016*. International Labour Organization. Retrieved January 22, 2019, from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-dgreports/%2D%2D-dcomm/%2D%2D-publ/documents/publication/wcms_513739.pdf

ILO. (2018). More than 60 percent of the word's employed population are in the informal economy. *International Labour Organization News*. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_627189/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm

Knoema. (2018). Tanzania—Adjusted net enrollment rate in primary education. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from https://knoema.com/search?query=tanzania+net+enrollment+in+primary+education&pageIndex=&scope=&term=&correct=&source=Header

Loxley, J. (1990). Structural adjustment in Africa: reflections on Ghana and Zambia. *Review of African Political Economy, 17*(47), 8–27.

Muchira, N. (2017). Sub-Saharan Africa fast becoming hotbed of unemployment. *The East African*. Retrieved February 24, 2019, from https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/SubSaharan-Africa-unemployment/2560-3808378-bp8m5g/index.html

Nkomo, S. E. (2011). A postcolonial and anti-colonial reading of 'African' leadership and management in organization studies: Tensions, contradictions and possibilities. *Organization, 18*(3), 365–386.

Nkomo, S. M., & Ngambi, H. (2009). African women in leadership: Current knowledge and a framework for future studies. *International Journal for African Renaissance Studies, 4*(1), 49–68.

Obulutsa, G. (2018, April 18). UPDATE 1-Sub-Saharan Africa GDP growth to rise to 3.1 pct in 2018—World Bank. Retrieved January 2, 2019, from https://www.reuters.com/article/africa-economy/update-1-sub-saharan-africa-gdp-growth-to-rise-to-3-1-pct-in-2018-world-bank-idUSL8N1RV4A7

Population Connection. (2019). African urbanization. Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.populationconnection.org/article/african-urbanization/

Saghir, J., & Santoro, J. (2018). *Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Meeting challenges by bridging stakeholders.* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International Studies.

Statista. (2019a). Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/455827/urbanization-in-ghana/

Statista. (2019b). Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/455860/urbanization-in-kenya/

Statista. (2019c). Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/455904/urbanization-in-nigeria/

Statista. (2019d). Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/455919/urbanization-in-rwanda/

Statista. (2019e). Retrieved January 20, 2019, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/455940/urbanization-in-tanzania/

Ubink, J. (2007). Traditional authority revisited: Popular perceptions of chiefs and chieftaincy in Peri-Urban Kumasi, Ghana. *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 39*(55), 123–161.

UNESCO. (2018a). *Kenya: Participation in education*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved February 19, 2019, from http://uis.unesco.org/country/KE

UNESCO. (2018b). *United Republic of Tanzania: Participation in education*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved February 19, 2019, from http://uis.unesco.org/country/TZ

UNESCO. (2018c). *Nigeria: Participation in education*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved February 19, 2019, from http://uis.unesco.org/country/NG

UNESCO. (2018d). *Ghana: Participation in education*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved February 19, 2019, from http://uis.unesco.org/country/GH

UNESCO. (2018e). *Rwanda: Participation in education*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved February 19, 2019, from http://uis.unesco.org/country/RW

UNESCO/IBU. (2011a). *World data on education: Nigeria* (7th ed.). United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/International Bureau of Education. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Nigeria.pdf

UNESCO/IBU. (2011b). *World data on education: Ghana* (7th ed.). United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/International Bureau of Education. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Ghana.pdf

UNESCO/IBU. (2011c). *Données mondiales de l'éducation: Rwanda* (7th ed.). United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/International Bureau of Education. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Rwanda.pdf

UNESCO/IBU. (2011d). *World data on education: Kenya* (7th ed.). United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/International Bureau of Education. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Kenya.pdf

UNESCO/IBU. (2011e). *World data on education: Tanzania* (7th ed.). United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/International Bureau of Education. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/United_Republic_of_Tanzania.pdf

Uwezo. (2016). *Are our children learning? Uwezo Kenya sixth learning assessment report*. Nairobi: Twaweza East Africa.

WIEGO. (2019). About the informal economy. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing. Retrieved February 25, 2019, from http://www.wiego.org/informal-economy/about-informal-economy

World Bank. (2018a). *Global economic prospects: The turning of the tide?* World Bank. Retrieved January 2, 2019, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects?mc_cid=628fd74c1c&mc_eid=f32c014688

World Bank. (2018b). *The World Bank in Nigeria*. Retrieved January 15, 2019, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview

World Bank. (2018c). Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. *World Bank Data*. Retrieved January 23, 2019, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS

World Bank. (2018d). Kenya's economy poised to rebound in 2018 and remain robust through 2020. *World Bank News*. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/10/kenyas-economy-poised-to-rebound-in-2018-and-remain-robust-through-2020

World Bank. (2018e). The World Bank in Tanzania: Overview. World Bank. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/overview