4

Adam Smith

4.1 Smithian Realism

Despite having asked Black and Hutton to burn all his papers, Smith wanted to spare from the flames some philosophical essays. In these essays, Smith sought to confront Hume's phenomenalism that denied substance.[1] With Schliesser, and contrary to Griswold, we will show that Smith does not "suspend judgement"[2]: clearly, he asserts the existence of substance.[3] Although in some of his statements, Smith seems to approach the idea of an "overcoming of metaphysics", he writes—talking about the work on moral philosophy by his friend John Bruce—"It is as free of metaphysics as is possible for any work upon that subject to be. Its fault, in my opinion, is that it is too free of them".[4] According to Smith, we value greater capacity of perception in objects not because

[1]Griswold (1999, 29–39) and Ross (2004, 40–59).

[2]Schliesser (2006) and Griswold (1999, 336–344).

[3]See Vivenza (2001, 206–209) and Trincado (2006a). On his epistemological option and Newtonianism see also Schliesser (2005), Montes (2009), and Fiori (2012).

[4]Corr. 296.

E. Trincado, *The Birth of Economic Rhetoric*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14306-0_4

it is useful, but because it draws us closer to reality as originally "we approve of another man's judgment, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality".[5]

According to Smith, we sense the external objects thanks to time passing and experience: "though the sensations of heat and cold do not necessarily suggest the presence of any external object, we soon learn from experience that they are commonly excited by some such object".[6] "We consider it, therefore, as what we call a Substance, or as a thing that subsists by itself, and independent of any other thing".[7] Nouns instead of adjectives, Smith says, were the first words created, due to an intuitive knowledge of substance, before touch and sight. "Do any of our other senses, antecedently to such observation and experience, instinctively suggest to us some conception of the solid and resisting substances which excite their respective sensations…?".[8]

It is to be noted that, although Smith had read the works of Hume and other idealists, he never uses the word impressions or phenomenon as synonymous with perception. If there is an intuitive knowledge of substance, as Smith acknowledges, objects must not be perceived by "impressions" (phantasy for the Pyrrhonic school). Perception is for Smith not a plain image. "The tangible world… has three dimensions, Length, Breadth and Depth. The visible world… has only two, Length and Breadth. It presents to us only a plain or surface… (in the same manner as a picture does)".[9] For Smith, it is thanks to movement—in time—that we can perceive the variation of perspective.[10] If at any point we have perhaps confused flatness with depth, we only need "time" to situate ourselves in the intuitive position capable of understanding perspective.

[5]Smith (1976a), TMS I.i.4.4, 61.
[6]Smith (1980), External Senses 21.
[7]Smith (1980), External Senses 8.
[8]Smith (1980), External Senses 75, 164.
[9]Smith (1980), External Senses 50–52, 150–152.
[10]Smith (1980), External Senses 59, 155.

This greater capacity of perception was shown in the case of the blind mathematician Saunderson, who developed supernormal powers of touch and hearing. His experience encouraged an outburst of philosophical writings about blindness in the eighteenth century, including Diderot's, Berkeley's and Reid's. Smith also mentions him. According to Smith, when the blind man "was just beginning to understand the strong and distinct perspective of Nature, the faint and feeble perspective of Painting made no impression upon him".[11] Perception is different from image as the whole object is perceived at once. In the same vein, Gestalt theory speaks of perception as something whole. "Shapes" are perceived in an immediate, intuitive way.[12] In this sense, the beauty of perception is the intimacy with the object. Aristotle, in his most original idea on aesthetics, said that only that which is perceptible may be called beautiful. Limited things please because they may be embraced by the senses, sight and memory. So, we see them fully and better and they are made more transparent.[13] Actually, Smith quotes Aristotle on several occasions as he owned his Collected Works.[14] According to Vivenza, he was unconsciously Aristotelian.[15]

By the same token, while in Hume's theory time and self-existence were called into question by his definition of perception as an unending succession of impressions, according to Smith, the intuition of personal identity is needed even to perceive solidness. "When he lays his hand upon the table… he feels it therefore as something external, not only to his hand, but to himself".[16] Smith comments that in the beginning of the formation of language, human beings must have faced the difficulty that the word "I" was very special. The verb structure "I am" does not derive its existence from facts, but rather from existence itself.[17]

---

[11]Smith (1980), External Senses 67. See also External Senses 52, 65–67, 151–152, 159–160.

[12]Marchán (1996, 239–240).

[13]Tatarkiewicz (1987, 159).

[14]Mizuta (2000, 14–16).

[15]Vivenza (2001, 2). Also Fleischacker (1999) and Griswold (1999) or Carrasco (2004).

[16]Smith (1980), External Senses 3–8, 135–136.

[17]Smith (1983), LRBL, Languages, 34, 221.

4.2 Perception and Pleasure

The definition of "pleasure" is different in Hume and in Smith. Humean passions are based on a certain structure of the mind: the search for the habitual pleasures and association of ideas, threatened by the survival desire and, in short, by the death instinct. We are carried away irremediably by an instinctive pleasure and by the attraction to objects, but it is "the good" for men; instinctive pain, that we can not avoid, is "the evil" for men. So, as Hume himself tells us, men are slaves of their own passions. In Hume, the idea of beauty is communicated through sympathy. The simple contemplation of a beautiful object is agreeable, and virtue consists in the production of this beauty that we relate to the self. The utility of an object pleases its owner because it suggests the pleasure and convenience it can produce, so the owner is proud of the relation of the object with himself. The spectator sympathizes with the owner's pride and with the pleasure he imagines that the object creates. This reflection is secondary to the original pleasure; but finally, it becomes the more important recommendation of riches and the main reason for our desiring them or admiring them in others.[18] Society is for Hume a collection of atomic subjective beauties perceived only individually and based on the idea of the self. As beauty is defined as a taste or sensation, it can be concluded that it is no more than a shape that provides pleasure, and deformity pain. Apart from instinctive pain, which seeks survival, Hume's notion of beauty is centred on the motives of habit and fashion.[19]

On the contrary, for Smith, utility is only an image that we chase in our mind. In the quest for utility—or for riches—we do not value the pleasure or pain foreseen but the reducing of an anxiety we feel in the seeking for an accurateness of an imagined system in which means seem to be adapted to ends. The search for utility is therefore love of system, a love that creates temporal or fictitious illusion, but not pleasure. The

[18]Hume (1964).

[19]For different concepts of utility, see Long (1990, 12–39) and Stigler (1950, 58: 4: 307–327 and 58: 5: 373–396, p. 392).

conceited son of the poor that, to obtain the conveniences that he supposes the rich enjoys, courts his hateful enemies and lives in an endless intrigue, is looking only for an image of pleasure, never attaining it.[20] Utility is a vain object of desire. Haakonssen and Vivenza freed Smith from the utilitarian label in his moral theory and in his law theory.[21] The problem of Smith's utilitarianism has also been presented, amongst other works, in Griswold and Trincado.[22]

But is there for Smith any really satisfying pleasure? For Smith, seeking an image is frustrating, but there is a pleasure that is not a reflexive perception but a propensity. As Schliesser comments, Smith appears to view human nature as a collection of human propensities.[23] For instance, the original propensity to feel with others makes us construct language and language makes us construct division of labour as a necessary consequence of the faculty of reason and speech. In the same way, if anticipation is to Hume the source of pleasure, to Smith pleasure does not need anticipation.

> Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.[24]

Smith defines pleasure as a propensity to feel with people, things and events. This gratitude is felt in calm events, from which pleasure can begin. Happiness consists of and depends on tranquillity and enjoyment. A wise man will be in every situation of his life equally calm, joyful and satisfied. He is not blinded by frivolous pleasures. Smith himself said that "I have, however, a mortal aversion to all anticipations".[25]

---

[20]Smith (1976b, 181–183).

[21]Haakonssen (1981, 97–110) and Vivenza (2001, 143).

[22]Griswold (1999, 540) and Trincado (2003b).

[23]Schliesser (2009).

[24]Smith (1976a, 77–78).

[25]Smith (1987, 270).

Our great evils come from not knowing the price of our own happiness and wanting to change it for an illusory one.[26] For Smith, "nothing is more graceful than habitual cheerfulness, which is always founded upon a peculiar relish for all the little pleasures, which common occurrences afford".[27] That is the case of the contemplation of Statuary and Painting, in which we enjoy the pleasure of perception of embraceable objects and the satisfaction of knowledge; or of the performers of Dancing and Music, in which we enjoy the pleasure of movement.[28] "After the pleasures which arise from the gratification of the bodily appetites, there seem to be none more natural to man than Music and Dancing".[29]

Pleasure for Smith is neither corporal nor mental. Smith criticizes the Epicurean system, which considered the search for corporal pleasure and the avoidance of corporal pain—the body as a centre of sensations—as the only motive of action and the last and final objectives of natural desire and aversion.[30] According to Epicurus, every mental pleasure or pain is derived from one of the body and from the self-preservation principle; but mental pleasures and pains are more acute than corporal pleasures. The body only experiments the present sensation, while the brain can also feel past and future sensations, the one through memory, the other through anticipation. So, it consequently suffers and enjoys more. When we are exposed to the greater physical pain, Epicurus said, we will always find, if we pay attention, that it is not the suffering of the present moment that basically torments us, but the recall of the past and the fear of the future. The present pain, alone and separated from what happened in the past or is bound to come, is a trifle that does not deserve consideration. At the same time, when we enjoy the most intense pleasure, we will always find that the physical sensation of the present moment is just a little fraction of our happiness

[26]Smith (1976a, 149).
[27]Smith (1976a, 41–42).
[28]Smith (1980, 176–207).
[29]Smith (1980, 187).
[30]Smith (1976a), TMS VII.ii.1.19–22, 275–278.

and that our enjoyment emerges mainly from the evocation of the past or the bringing forward of the future.[31] But, in Epicurus' system, future uncertainty is painful; so, abstaining from the seeking of pleasure lets man live quietly, without fears, awaiting unavoidable death. When the body is free from pain and the brain from every anxiety, the added sensation of physical pleasure is of little importance.

Smith refutes this need of apathy and asserts that the wise man is sensible to whatever pleasure. Epicurus falls into the most customary error of science: excessive simplification. All his theory is based on the seeking of prudential pleasure, not in the correction of active sensations, since for Epicurus human action is passive—or reactive.[32] In this sense, for Smith we do not seek this mental tranquillity to free ourselves from uncertainty and the anxiety of anticipation.[33] We seek tranquillity because only from that mood of our mind does reality emerge and we are capable of having sensations (the opposite of "apathy"). So, the hedonistic idea of pleasure and pain imply that sensations are ex post to movement.

> Those sensations appear to have been given us for the preservation of our own bodies… But the desire of changing our situation necessarily supposes some idea of externality; or of motion into a place different from that in which we are; end even the desire of remaining in the same place supposes some idea of at least the possibility of changing. Those sensations could not well have answered the intention of Nature, had they not thus instinctively suggested some vague notion of external existence.[34]

Unlike the Stoics, for Smith, it is not only our sensibility to others' feelings that is compatible with a self-commanding nature, but it is the very same principle on which it is based. The propriety of our feelings and sensations seems to be exactly in proportion to the force and vivacity with which we enter into and conceive the feelings and sensations

[31]Smith (1976a, 294–300).

[32]Smith (1976a, 299).

[33]Smith (1976a), TMS VI.iii.21, 246.

[34]Smith (1980, 167–168).

of others. The individual that feels most the joy and sorrow of others is better endowed to obtain the fullest control of his own joy and sorrow.[35] Some authors attribute this idea to the Stoical influence on Smith, as Smith's system points to a moral minimum and a moral maximum.[36] But according to Smith it is human feeling, personal memories that acts, not the absence of feeling with the logos acting as a self-commander.[37] Smith argues that the judge of our actions is not "other people" in general, but certain individuals who evoke wonder and admiration and inspire emulation in us.[38]

Contrary to Hume's argument, Smith says that the virtues and passions we acquire by habit are not so admired, because we find it difficult to enter into another person's habit, as we have not acquired it by ourselves. This is the case with inferior prudence. In consequence, we approve of prudential self-command, in which a present object interests us as much as a future one, but we do not admire it. The search for self-preservation is implicit in nature and, according to Smith, all the necessities and conveniences of the body "are always very easily supplied".[39]

But prudence not addressed to the care of one's self is necessarily admirable.[40] Self-command allows us to address our passive feelings to the objective of Justice and Magnanimity. Aiming for the accomplishment of virtue, it can control fear and rage, or the longing for comfort, pleasure or applause; and it is "independent of the beauty, which it derives from its utility".[41] Thus, when we observe someone controlling his fear of death addressed to a noble motive,[42] the decrease in his fear of death allows us to empathize with his noble search without being blocked by the sympathy with his pain. Thus, self-command increases

[35]Smith (1976a, 152).
[36]Waszek (1984).
[37]For Stoics influences in Smith, see Lázaro (2012).
[38]Klein (2016).
[39]Smith (1976a, 213).
[40]Smith (1976a, 216).
[41]Smith (1976a, 238).
[42]As in Smith (1976a, 238–239).

our admiration.[43] This is due to the fact that, according to Smith, and as Griswold points out, the fear of death is a pain of the imagination and, in consequence, it is easier for us to sympathize with it than with a corporal pain.[44]

This idea of pleasure, obviously, challenges the homo oeconomicus rational calculator of pleasures and pains constructed in the nineteenth century.[45] The higher moral standard implies a dialogue between materialistic and moral concerns. Actually, between the first and last editions of TMS, the taste for luxury and conspicuous consumption became widespread in Great Britain, but Smith decided to consider superior prudence and magnanimity the best way to keep society away from moral deception. Inferior prudence depends on the expectation of external success, superior prudence depends on wisdom of moral character,[46] which at best "imitates the work of a divine artist, which can never be equalled".[47]

4.3 The Self

But Adam Smith is not lacking in contradiction. Smith says that a person growing up in some solitary place could not think of his own character or of the propriety or merit of his own sentiments and conduct.[48] As Smith intended to confirm "that our judgments concerning our own conduct have always a reference to the sentiments of some other being",[49] in the formation of the self, Smith presupposes the idea of the observer, which is in fact what he wants to explain.[50] If the process of creating the self consists in observing elements external—another's

[43]Meardon and Ortmann (1996), Montes (2004, 76–86), and McKenna (2006).
[44]Griswold (1999, 119).
[45]Persky (1995).
[46]Morrow (1923) and Garbo (2016).
[47]Smith (1976a), TMS VI.iii.25, 247.
[48]Smith (1976a), TMS III.i.3, 111.
[49]Corr. 49.
[50]Smith (1976a), TMS III.i.2–5, 109–112; TMS IV.ii.

smile, and rewards—and achieving their acceptance, and the self of the Other has also been shaped in a similar way, everything is a reflection of a reflection, pure semblance, a mask foreign to the individual himself. This contradiction earned Smith innumerable criticisms.[51] From literature, we know that to insist on this idea can create a duplication of the self, which can draw us into labyrinth-like feelings. This duplication has been described by Borges, who continually ventured deeper and deeper into his own private labyrinth.[52] Moreover, Smith recognizes that the imaginary spectator of our own conduct examines it when we are about to act and afterwards, but never when we are acting.[53] Consequently, it cannot motivate the action, and to justify the act he uses the self-deceiving mechanism.[54] The process of socialization is key for the adaptive function of the self[55] but this adaptation is based on a Hobbesian fear of death.[56] Smith says that we even sympathize with the dead.[57] According to Griswold, the sympathy with the death implies that Smithian sympathy is self-referencing as the dead cannot feel what we are feeling.[58] But actually, when we sympathize with the dead we are feeling something: a void of reality. And, in order to avoid this feeling of void, we create a reactive self. This is Hume's definition of the self.

But Smith's praise for self-command implies a belief in the existence of a free, self-restrained "self", immune to pleasure–pain pulsation.[59] According to Smith, there seems to be an active and grateful self, and a reactive and possessive self in all of us. The former is always present, and from it perception and active principles are bound to emerge; the latter

[51]See the objections by Stewart and Thomas Reid in Thomas Brown lectures. Reeder (1997, 143–144).

[52]See Trincado (2006b).

[53]Smith (1976a), TMS III.4.2–4, 157.

[54]Related in TMS III.iv.4–6, 157–159. Self-deception in the Impartial Spectator is studied in Gerschlager (2002).

[55]Smith (1976a), TMS III.

[56]Cropsey (1957) and Pack (1991).

[57]Smith (1976a), TMS I.i.1.13, 12.

[58]Griswold (1999, 89).

[59]See (Montes 2004, 101–114). But, curiously, in the Glasgow edition of the TMS there is only one reference to the word 'liberty' (Harpham 2000).

is dependent, unreal and mortal, with reactive principles of movement. It is thanks to the first self that human beings seek an emotional bond with people in the present and create relationships with present things.

For instance, when he talks about "dignity", Smith expresses two ideas: one, the virtue of self-command; the other, the notion of social rank. It is an inherent value of people, but in the first case it implies that we command a self intrinsically worthy of dignity, and in the second that we create an image of a social self. Both cases depend on affective human nature, based on a power or faculty of mind, not rational or divine.[60]

Considering the existence of an active principle of the self, it is easier to understand why self-love is a positive ethical principle.[61] This self is a grateful reality, not a manmade construction. When Smith looks in the mirror, he expresses self-love that is neither self-referencing nor dependent but that is grateful or friendly to reality.

> One's own face becomes then the most agreeable object which a looking-glass can represent to us…; whether handsome or ugly, whether old or young, it is the face of a friend always.[62]

Perhaps Borges' fear of mirrors was due to their making him feel more unreal for lack of self-love: the reflection did not differ from the thing reflected.

4.3.1 The Reactive Self

Let us explain then, how the reactive and the active self work in Smith's morality. For Smith, the death instinct cannot be the target of our action since fear of death is "the great poison of human happiness".[63] The lack of fear of death makes humans more sensitive,[64] and for that

[60]Debes (2012).

[61]For the question of self-love, see Black (2006).

[62]Imitative Arts I.17, 186.

[63]Smith (1976a), TMS I.i.1.13, 13.

[64]Smith (1976a), TMS V.ii.11, 208.

reason, for instance, soldiers evince a "character of gaiety, levity, and sprightly freedom".[65] That is, when people allow themselves to be swayed by the imagination of nothingness, their movements are reactive and evasive, not free.

In this sense, "the idea of death" implies a break in time where, as above mentioned, the individual lives in a vacuum "in the present". It implies some type of "not accepting of reality" and this should mean some type of non-existence. So, in such a situation, the only thing the individual can do is try to forget the vacuum by placing a veil over his or her imagination. In fact, "utility" is that image, and "uses" the present for its self-determination.[66]

This leads to an anxious search for utility that wipes out any possibility of a relaxed present, and our own image enslaves us. As we said, in the final stage of his life, the arriviste understands that wealth and splendour are "no more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquillity of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys".[67] Only through an understanding of the value of "Time, the great and universal comforter"[68] could self-command dominate passion, enjoying beforehand that tranquillity which we foresee the course of time will restore to us in the end. Moreover, the idea of death can be a utility to be admired or accepted, something religions have managed to promote. This may be a reason why Smith challenged the church as an institution.[69]

However, Smith became increasingly sceptical of the judgement of popular opinion[70] and perceived the influence of a tribunal in moral judgement different from others' judgement.[71] Smith says:

> You will observe that it is intended both to confirm my doctrine that our judgements concerning our own conduct have always a reference to the

[65]Smith (1976a), TMS V.2.6, 203.
[66]Smith (1976a), TMS IV.i.1–6, 179–180.
[67]Smith (1976a), TMS IV.i.8, 181.
[68]Smith (1976a), TMS III.iii.32, 151.
[69]See Griswold (1999, 10–11).
[70]Corr. 48–57.
[71]Smith (1976a), TMS III.ii.32, 130.

sentiment of some other being and, to shew that, notwithstanding, this real magnanimity and conscious virtue can support itself under the disapprobation of all mankind.[72]

4.3.2 The Active Self

In Smith's theory, moral sentiments, like self-command, are not totally based on education or custom. "The principles of the imagination, upon which our sense of beauty depends… may easily be altered by habit and education… the sentiments of moral approbation… are founded on the strongest… passions of human nature; and… cannot be entirely perverted".[73] The principles of the imagination are contrasted with the sentiments of moral approbation. Besides, self-command does not imply negating oneself. The passions, instead of disappearing, "lie concealed in the breast of the sufferer".[74] Self-command is self-actualization of certain principles of justice and enables us to express "the highest contempt of death and pain",[75] increasing the admiration of the spectator.

Although some scholars have considered Smith's impartial spectator to be a collective person,[76] if this were so he would not approve of an action that all humanity would disapprove of. The existence of a tribunal not dependent on imagination seems to imply a momentary psychological break with the image of the self. The man "sees, with grief and affliction, in how many different features the mortal copy falls short of the immortal original".[77] "In such cases, this demigod within the breast appears, like the demigods of the poets, though partly of immortal, yet

[72]The Correspondence of Adam Smith, Letter 40 to Gilbert Elliot, Glasgow, 10 October 1959, p. 49 (ed. Mossner and Ross).

[73]Smith (1976a), TMS V.ii.1, 200.

[74]Smith (1976a), TMS V.ii.11, 208.

[75]Smith (1976a), TMS V.ii.9, 206.

[76]Hope (1989, 9) and Campbell (1971).

[77]Smith (1976a), TMS VI.iii.25, 247.

partly too of mortal extraction".[78] This self is the one that makes depth perception possible which supposes an identification with ubiquity, and it resolves the contradiction of the existence of an impartial spectator who, at the same time, sums up others' judgement and disapproves of all humanity. The imaginary man requires an impulse "from outside" to act; an active "self" acts "towards the outside". It requires, as Ricoeur (1984, 53) says, to be present in the passage.

As we have said, for Smith the sense of merit is made up of a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions.[79] But the demigod within the breast has as its motive life itself and sympathizes with the gratitude of people affected by it. In TMS Smith says that "whatever is the cause of pleasure naturally excites our gratitude".[80] In its first stage, this gratitude is inseparable from wonder and the sense of reality.[81] Probably, the faith in an ordered world, emerges then. Haakonssen points out that Smith's is based on Samuel von Cocceji's theory, which asserts that the individual should understand his life to be a personal gift from God.[82]

The active "self" does not necessarily imply the existence of a Kantian transcendental ego or of innate ideas. A non-eidetic self can be placed in the observer of memory, which covers the present as a whole, out of succession of time. This self has active principles as it does not oppose the outside.[83] It does not want to observe an image; it wants a correspondence with life and to find a sense of freedom and gratitude shared with its peers.[84]

In his work, Smith talks about some active principles of movement, which depend to some extent on self-command. The first active

[78]Smith (1976a), TMS III.ii.32, 131. See also Smith (1976a), TMS III.v.9, 168; Smith (1976a), TMS III.ii.12, 121.

[79]Smith (1976a), TMS II.i.v.2, 74.

[80]Smith (1980), Astronomy III. 2, 48.

[81]Smith (1980), Astronomy III.2, 49.

[82]Haakonssen (1996, 135–148).

[83]See Trincado (2003a) and Huxley (1963).

[84]Trincado (2004).

principle is joy, very closely related with "the willingness to live" and contrary to the idea of suicide. "Nature, in her sound and healthful state, seems never to prompt us to suicide…"[85] Smith was prompted to write this by Hume's posthumous publication "On Suicide". As in Husserl, this self implies a direct perceptive contact, a "now" that retains but also seeks the future and does not conceive of "no future". Actually, in Husserl, and after Ricoeur, time is not defined as a succession of moments, but rather the following of a narration, with a past, a present and a future.[86] For Smith, confidence in the "divine plan" allows the wise person to face all types of adversities, including death, "not only with humble resignation… but… with alacrity and joy".[87] He submits to reality because it is right, regardless of the effect on his happiness in the afterlife.[88]

Curiosity and wonder are also active principles that are part of Smith system. Wonder leads men in the direction of novelty and does not necessarily seek "any expectation of advantage from its discoveries".[89] Curiosity needs in some way self-love, which, as opposed to selfishness, is a morally positive principle, as it is the basis for the capacity to understand: he/she who does not believe in himself (or herself) shuts off their intuitive capacity, losing one of the underpinnings of existence, that is, "attention to life".

> Those unfortunate persons, whom nature has formed a good deal below the common level, seem sometimes to rate themselves still more below it than they really are. This humility appears sometimes to sink them into idiotism.[90]

And for self-love to activate itself it is essential that there be a consciousness of reciprocity and belief in the other. "The man who had

[85]TMS VII.ii.1.34, 287.

[86]Ricoeur (1984, 27).

[87]Smith (1976a), TMS VI.ii.3.4, 236.

[88]Smith (1976a), TMS VII.iii.3.13–14, 325. For comparison with utilitarian theory, see TMS VII.ii.3.21, 305–306.

[89]Astronomy III.3, 51.

[90]Smith (1976a), TMS VI.iii.49, 260.

the misfortune to imagine that nobody believed a single word he says, would feel himself the outcast of human society".[91] In Astronomy II Smith also describes wonder in terms of uncertainty about the future and as a painful sentiment which gives rise to anxious curiosity.[92]

Two other principles that Smith briefly sketches are creativity and play. In Smith's treatment of political economy, active play implies reciprocity. Certain types of work—the repetitive and mechanical—undermine the meaning and value of personal life and stupefy people. Time becomes cyclical in eternal repetition. Lázaro relates this feature of Smith's theory to Nicolas Grimaldi's philosophy, for whom work is marked by a sense of creativity and gift: work opens the worker to all those who may benefit from his work.[93] In WN, active play is persuasion and it is displayed in the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. Solitary and self-referring play can be harmful, based as it is on reactions. "The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men has of their own abilities"[94] leads them to "The contempt of risk and the presumptuous hope of success".[95] However, Smith does not explore the concept of creativity in the WN. He does that in his theory of Rhetoric and aesthetics, which we will subsequently study.

4.4 Rationality

Another of the common elements of the Scottish Enlightenment was its critique of rationalism. In this period, the authors of "the analysis of riches" normally raised the mechanical efficiency principle to the category of beauty. They talked about organic beauty, or adaptation of a shape to the environment, and about mechanical beauty, the perfect adaptation of the shape to its end, use or utility.[96] Berkeley in his *Theory of Vision* and

[91]Smith (1976a), TMS VII.iv.26, 336.
[92]Schliesser (2006).
[93]Lázaro (2010, 76–77), quoting Grimaldi (1998).
[94]Smith (1976b), WN I.x.b, 124.
[95]Smith (1976b), WN I.x.b, 126.
[96]Marchán (1996, 50).

in *Alciphron* was a more earnest defender of the functionalist theory, in which all beauty depends on imagination of the subordination of the uses to the ends.[97]

The imagination for Hobbes is the "weakened sense", the image that stays when closing your eyes in the darkness. There is no active principle to create it: when it weakens further it is "memory" and a lot of memories are "experience", which is obtained with years and independent of individual will. The sequence of thoughts is "mental speech". It is not an arbitrary succession but it is "not–guided", created without intention by a desire (to digress); or "regulated" by some desire or plan (to deliberate).[98]

Hume, following Hobbes and Hutcheson, claimed that reason is only a reflection of a feeling. And Smith subsequently reasserts this idea. When they refute reason as the principle of approbation, they were criticizing the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) who considered that ideas of right and wrong are antecedent to all law and experience.[99] For Hume, reason can only have two effects: excite a passion by informing us of the existence of something that is its proper object, or discover the connection of causes and effects, to give us the means to execute a passion. The person may be wrong in what will produce an imagined pleasure, but it is an involuntary error, in fact, that cannot be a source of guilt or criminality. Sometimes, Hume says, calm actions are mixed with those of reason. For him, what we call mental strength is no more than the prevalence of calm over violent passions. But these calmed passions are known more by the effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. Tasset says that Hume mixes reason with peaceful passion without justification.[100] Stroud argues that Hume fails to demonstrate why gentle passions (which are supposed to be less strong) manage to affect behaviour and are the cause of quiet inclinations.[101]

---

[97]Berkeley (1709, 1732).

[98]Hobbes (1989, 43).

[99]Carrasco (2004).

[100]Tasset (1999, 47).

[101]Stroud (1977, 167–168).

According to Hume, after many experiences, "we retain a degree of belief, which is sufficient for our purpose, either in philosophy or common life".[102] A demonstration is a belief (for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow). It is an experience of the sensible part of our natures, rather than the rational part, a fruit of imagination. Only by giving an impulse in the opposite direction to a passion might reason operate, but reason does not produce impulses. Therefore, Hume does not allude to reason as an ability of the practical type, which directly determines conduct, but rather conduct is affected by reason in an indirect way, through passion.[103]

Smith also asserts that the first perceptions of good and evil cannot derive from reason, but from the immediate feeling and emotion. Even cause and effect is a type of beauty that impresses men strongly, the same as animal and vegetable kingdom beauty does, the great natural ecosystem in which every element seems to fit as a great puzzle and every specie suits the niche for which it seems to have been created.

But, unlike previous authors, for Smith systems of reason deal with objects that we consider independently of any relation with us or the individual whose feelings we judge. We admire them because they refer to something external of which we are common spectators and that we share.[104]

> When the sentiments of our companion coincide with our own in things of this kind, which are obvious and easy, he seems to deserve no praise or admiration on account of them. But when they not only coincide with our own, but lead and direct our own; when informing them he appears to have attended to many things which we had overlooked, and to have adjusted them to all the various circumstances of their objects; we not only approve of them, but wonder and are surprised at their uncommon and unexpected acuteness and comprehensiveness, and he appears to deserve a very high degree of admiration and applause… The utility of those qualities, it may be thought, is what first recommends them to us;

[102]Hume (1964a, 476), Treatise: I: IV: I. See Livingston (1984).

[103]Tasset (1999, 50). On the several meanings of the term "reason" in Hume, see Tasset (1999, 47–59) and Norton (1982, 96–98).

[104]Smith (1976a): TMS: 67–68, I: I: IV.

> and, no doubt, the consideration of this, when we come to attend to it, gives them a new value. Originally, however, we approve of another man's judgment, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality.[105]

We do not admire the special capacity of perception of objects, both natural and humane, due to its utility, but because it is wise and brings us closer to reality without creating a barrier of incredulity. In this case, therefore, not only is it the coincidence of imagined feelings that produces pleasure, but the surprise and the gratitude for a common reality.

Unlike Hume, Smith does not hold that moral distinctions derive from sentiment *as opposed to* reason.[106] For Smith, our aptitude for reasoning arises from language, and reason itself is a type of language. Therefore, it arises from the desire to coincide with the feelings of others and is a reflection of moral feelings, not the other way round. It adapts to temperament and the historical age, but people also adapt their reason to language, and their reason is perverted by the perversions of language. In his *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, Smith considers the subjective side of the scientific enterprise. He argues that human beings engage in science primarily in hopes of soothing the imagination by accounting for the chaos of appearances. In this sense, all scientific theories are "mere inventions of imagination". Therefore, every theory must remain forever subject to revision. Science is a permanently open activity, one that is prompted by our passions and forged by the imagination.[107] This does not mean, however, that reality does not exist: only that science is an imagined product that tries to represent or account for the regularities of nature. As Hühn says, it stresses the fact that the *values and sentiments of scientists* are involved in knowledge generation which must be based in humility: scientists must never make claims of absolute truth.[108]

---

[105]Smith (1976a, 68–69), I: IV.

[106]Darwall (1999, 142).

[107]Rasmussen (2017, 41).

[108]Hühn (2017).

But, who are the epigones of Hume's and Smith's concept of rationality? We may find in the theorists of bounded rationality and different decision-making procedures, including behavioural economics, the successors of Hume.[109] Smith's imprint is to be seen in Popper's work. Popper has an evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning but also a methodological proposal for the social sciences known as "Situational Analysis", which has an "objectivist" and "subjectivist" version.[110] Even Schumpeter's distinction between the "rationality of the observer" and the "rationality in the observed" may be considered included in the Smithian concept of rationality.[111]

4.5 Sympathy

Both Hume and Smith consider that, as against Hutcheson, morality springs not from an innate, God-given moral sense but rather from the operations of sympathy. For them, our moral sentiments are acquired and developed over time, not written directly into human nature.[112] They coincide also in considering that right and wrong are established by the sentiments that we feel when we adopt the proper perspective that corrects for personal biases and misinformation. So, for both it is not true that whatever feels right is right. Hume thinks that to make an accurate judgement of an action or character we must surmount our own circumstances and adopt a "general point of view" or the "common point of view", the viewpoint of the judicious spectator. We must consider the effects of the actions on ourselves and on those who have any commerce with the person we consider. Likewise, Smith holds that proper moral judgment requires adopting the standpoint of an impartial spectator.

[109]Simon (1957), Rubinstein (1998), and Thaler (1994).

[110]Popper (1957).

[111]Schumpeter (1991).

[112]Smith (1976a), TMS III.4.5, 158; VII.iii.3, 321–327.

But Hume also differed from Adam Smith in his definition of "sympathy". Smith himself, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, wanted to get rid of that earlier meaning of the term sympathy: "'Sympathy', though its meaning may originally have been the same, can now fairly properly be used to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever".[113] The Greek term of sym-patheia—suffering with—had the sense of compassion. In English, sympathy and compassion have no semantic identity but in the English usage of the seventeenth century, sympathy included compassion. Sympathy is now a broader term than compassion: it implies sharing a feeling, while compassion, especially during the eighteenth century, acquires its current meaning and implies commiseration, grief or pity towards the other and, therefore, an implicit inequality.

From these different concepts, two radically different views of morality arise. Hume had spoken of a sympathy that can be opposed to antipathy: it consists in the characters being hateful or pleasant for us. Hume considered that the spectator shares sympathy with the pleasure of the benefit; Smith believed that sympathy is with the affections and motives of the person who acts, and we sympathize with the gratitude of the person who is acted upon.[114] For Hume, therefore, we cannot sympathize with pain without a certain aversion. For Smith, the shared gratitude is sufficient payment for the spectator. The moral approval and propriety of an action consist in the coincidence of the feelings of the spectator with the motives of the agent. Smith tried to criticize the theory that reduces sympathy to the egocentric self-love in which man, aware of his weakness and need for help from others, rejoices when another adopts his own passion because he is sure of his help.[115]

As gratitude leads naturally to the search for correspondence, man reflects on his fellow beings and makes them the subject of his gratitude. The objective of human action is then to feel loved by their fellow creatures and to be in consonance with others' judgements. In addition,

[113]Smith (1976a), TMS: 1: 1: 1: 52. See Fricke (2016, 181–183) and Rasmussen (2017, 90–94).

[114]Smith, TMS: I: 1: V.

[115]See Holthoon (1993, 45).

this is the moment when moral sentiment emerges, with the recognition of our equality with another being and his seeking to harmonize his feelings with our own.[116]

Smith explains the difference between his theory and that of Hume:

> II. There is another system which attempts to account for the origin of our moral sentiments from sympathy, distinct from that which I have been endeavouring to establish. It is that which places virtue in utility, and accounts for the pleasure with which the spectator surveys the utility of any quality from sympathy with the happiness of those who are affected by it. This sympathy is different both from that by which we enter into the motives of the agent, and from that by which we go along with the gratitude of the persons who are benefited by his actions. It is the same principle with that by which we approve of a well-contrived machine. But no machine can be the object of either of those two last mentioned sympathies. I have already, in the fourth part of this discourse, given some account of this system.[117]

This is targeting the theory of David Hume directly. Subsequently, as David Raynor points out, Hume silently complains that he was not cited and tries to correct Smith's simplification of his theory in an anonymous review of the book.[118] However, he knew perfectly well that their theories differed, and that Smith was taking advantage of his opposition to Hume's.

This difference in their concepts of sympathy may be exemplified by their understanding of suicide. For Hume, as we have seen, suicide is morally admirable; for Smith, it is an object of commiseration and a consequence of a lack of self-command. Hume sympathizes with the avoidance of pain in a life that he thinks not worth living. He considers admirable the self-command that entails opposing the human instinct for survival. But in the sixth edition of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* of 1790, Smith says that although suicide is not criminal, it

[116]For the importance of love in smith, see Griswold and Uyl (1996).

[117]Smith (1976a), TMS VII.iii.3.17, 327.

[118]Raynor (1984).

is reprehensible for an impartial spectator. According to Eckstein, the fact that Smith did not consider suicide punishable was contrary to contemporary opinion.[119] But the important question is that, for Smith, the principle of praise of suicide is a philosophical refinement. Nature, in her sound and healthful state, never impels us to suicide. It is true, he says, that there is a kind of melancholy that seems to be accompanied by an appetite for self-destruction. But "The unfortunate persons who perish in this miserable manner are the proper objects not of censure but of commiseration". It is never a sign of strength, but of weakness (and pride). But "I do not remember to have either read or heard of any American savage who, upon being taken prisoner by some hostile tribe, put himself to death in order to avoid being afterwards put to death in torture".[120] However, pretending to punish a person when they are out of reach of any human sanction is as absurd as it is unfair. The punishment can fall only on their surviving friends and relations, who are always perfectly innocent, and must be devastated by the final decision of the loved one.[121] Smith, as we see, does not consider suicide proper, as he cannot sympathize with the motive of the agent—avoiding pain is not admirable, only an instinct; and neither does he consider it meritorious as he sympathizes with the gratitude—in this case, indignation—of those relatives affected. Finally, he might reject the non-gratitude to life of the person committing suicide, which is related to the pride of considering some life not worth living.

We may account for some other differences in the concepts of sympathy of both authors. For Hume sympathy is passive, almost a mechanical process, an emotional contagion. For Smith, it is more active projection and we sympathize not so much with the real circumstances of the person, but with what those circumstances would be for a wise and fair person, who is in touch with reality. The fact that human beings are capable of indignation shows that sympathy can be distinguished from the "emotional contagion" or complete identification,

[119]Foot 36 of Smith, TMS: VII: II: I: 287, ed. Raphael and Macfie.

[120]Smith (1976b), TMS: VII: I: II, par. 34.

[121]Smith (1976b), TMS: VII: II: I: 504–505.

which disallows any chance of dissension between people.[122] Smith insists with examples such as the fact that we feel pity for someone who has lost the use of reason even if she appears perfectly content or that we feel sorry for someone's death.[123] For Smith what makes us approve or disapprove of moral action is propriety and merit, which are not to do with feeling happy or sad or angry, but with motives. Neither of them is based on pleasure, but on the gratitude for some intention to benefit someone.

Darwall has proposed that we use "empathy" instead of "sympathy" when referring to the Smithian imagined change of position.[124] Pleasure in the form of gratitude can be felt equally by the agent and the spectator. Fontaine defines Smith's sympathy as a "complete empathetic identification". However, Smith is only speaking about "harmony of sentiments", about an identification with the other when we agree with the motives.[125] For that reason, the theory could be better defined as an empathizing sympathy, or as a critical empathy. The self that can criticize feelings of others needs to be outside the imaginative process. The Smithian idea of natural "sympathy" requires a profound belief in the notion of external existence and the possibility of empathetic sympathy. For Smith, we like to see that we can sympathize with people's real motives, even when they consist of pain. So, we want to get to know others, not in search of utility, but to feel and get to know the reality of things.[126]

Then, the concept of the "empathizing sympathy" implies that we can imagine the circumstances of the other person, and even our own, without possessing an admirative or critical ability with respect to those circumstances. Then, we sympathize with his—our—feelings. Nevertheless, when the imaginative process becomes independent of the imaginary self, and we observe it from a time outside succession, our

[122]Tasset (1995, 101). See also Griswold (1999, Ch. 6); or Vivenza 2001.

[123]Fleischacker (2012, 276).

[124]Darwall (1998, 264–269).

[125]Fontaine (2001, 388). Raynor (1984) differed from Fointaine's claim.

[126]Smith (1976a), TMS VII.iv.28, 337. Smith (1976a), TMS VII.iii.1.4, 317.

relationship with time opens up. Then, we "realize" that an independent and active feeling occurs, a feeling of admiration, of indignation, of compassion, of gratitude. This is because we seek gratefulness to reality from the other person, and not finding it causes surprise. In many cases, this capacity of comprehension is obstructed because, in fact, "we do not want to understand". We prefer to maintain our comfortable situation of inactivity or we do not want to recognize a previous mistake—the self-deceit. However, it is possible for a sufficiently moving experience to expand our understanding again, and sometimes it can help us make a break with our previous acceptance connections. One familiar case of this sudden shift of mind is Hume's mental crisis[127] or the one suffered by John Stuart Mill.[128]

For instance, Smith shows in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* that indignation is the feeling on which the notion of justice is based. The foundation of justice is another topic about which Smith diverges from Hume.[129] According to Hume, rules are necessary for the existence of society and, then, authority emerged due to this need for external control. Hume's description of society seems to agree with the idea of "possessive individualism",[130] since it gives importance to the desire for possession and to the problems posed for coexistence by the opposing individual desires. However, Hume is not monist about social motivation. Men do not only want wealth and power; they live their passions by comparison, something that rules out an exclusive tendency to possession, since what matters is not the objects themselves, but how they appear in the social light.[131]

Conversely, Smith considers justice a feeling and precisely it is a non-adaptive feeling. Justice is a feeling of propriety, not based on the volatile enjoyment of pleasure or flight from pain but on indignation when we see an improper act. The basis for justice is not utility or

[127]Mossner (1980, 66, 70).

[128]Mill (1971).

[129]Haakonsen (1981, Ch. 4), Fleischacker (2004, 151–154), Pack and Schliesser (2004, 61–63), and Frazer (2010, Ch. 4).

[130]Macpherson (1970).

[131]Tasset (1999, 243–244).

reason, which are an outline of the future that would use punishment for an imaginary end. Justice is for Smith a feeling in the present.[132]

> The revenge of the injured which prompts him to retaliate the injury on the offender is the real source of the punishment of crimes. That which Grotius and other writers commonly allege as the original measure of punishments, viz the consideration of the publick good, will not sufficiently account for the constitution of punishments.[133]

Indignation is a feeling that precedes the law. The state must acknowledge this feeling, the state does not create it.[134] Disapproval in terms of (im)propriety and (de)merit comes now from the criminal motives and the rage of the affected person. Pack & Schliesser note that in TMS revenge gets replaced by resentment of the injured and the sympathetic observer.[135] Therefore, Smith stresses the idea of the spectator both in his ethics and in his theory of law. Smith's theory of morals led to his theory of jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence led him to his history of economics.[136]

References

Berkeley, G. (1709). *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*. Dublin: Printed by Aaron Rhames.

Berkeley, G. (1732). *Alciphron or, the Minute Philosopher*. London: J. Tonson.

Black, R. A. (2006). What Did Adam Smith Say About Self-Love? *Journal of Markets & Morality, 9*(1), 7–34.

Campbell, T. D. (1971). *Adam Smith's Science of Morals*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

[132]Trincado (2000, 2004).

[133]Smith (1978), LJ 104.

[134]Smith (1978), LJ 547 and LJ (B): 475: 182. See Fleischacker (2004, 151).

[135]Pack and Schliesser (2004).

[136]Fitzgibbons (1995, 22).

Carrasco, M. (2004). Adam Smith's Reconstruction of Practical Reason. *The Review of Metaphysics, 58*(1), 81–116. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130424.

Cropsey, J. (1957). *Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Darwall, S. (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. *Philosophical Analysis, 89*, 221–282.

Darwall, S. (1999). Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith. *Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28*(2), 139–164.

Debes, R. (2012). Adam Smith on Dignity and Equality. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 20*(1), 109–140.

Fiori, S. (2012). Adam Smith on Method: Newtonianism, History, Institutions, and the 'Invisible Hand'. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 34*(3), 411–435.

Fitzgibbons, A. (1995). *Adam Smith's System of Liberty, Wealth and Virtue: The Moral and Political Foundations of the Wealth of Nations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fleischacker, S. (1999). *A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fleischacker, S. (2004). *On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fleischacker, S. (2012). Sympathy in Hume and Smith: A Contrast, Critique, and Reconstruction. In C. Fricke & D. Føllesdal (Eds.), *Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl* (pp. 273–311). Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag.

Fontaine, P. (2001). The Changing Place of Empathy in Welfare Economics. *History of Political Economy, 33*(3), 387–409.

Frazer, M. (2010). *The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fricke, Ch. (2016). Adam Smith: The Sympathetic Process and the Origin and Function of Conscience. In J. Berry, M. P. Paganelli, & C. Smith (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith* (pp. 177–200). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Garbo, L. (2016). Adam Smith's Last Teachings: Dialectical Wisdom. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 38*(1), 41–54.

Gerschlager, C. (2002). Is (Self-)Deception an Indispensable Quality of Exchange? A New Approach to Adam Smith's Concept. In C. Gerschlager

(Ed.), *Expanding the Economic Concept of Exchange: Deception, Self-Deception and Illusions* (pp. 27–52). Boston and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Grimaldi, N. (1998). *Le Travail*. París: París University Press.

Griswold, C. L. (1999). *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haakonssen, K. (1981). *The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haakonssen, K. (1996). *Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harpham, E. J. (2000). The problem of Liberty in the Thought of Adam Smith. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 22*(2), 217–237.

Hobbes, T. (1989). *Leviatán, La materia, forma y poder de un Estado eclesiástico y civil*. Madrid: Alianza Universidad.

Holthoon, F. L. V. (1993). Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy. *Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 5*(1), 35–49.

Hope, V. (1989). *Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hühn, M. P. (2017). Adam Smith's Philosophy of Science: Economics as Moral Imagination. *Journal of Business Ethics*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3548-9.

Hume, D. (1964a). *A Treatise of Human Nature Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (The Philosophical Works)* (Vol. 1). London: Scientia Verlag.

Hume, D. (1964b). *A Treatise of Human Nature Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (The Philosophical Works)* (Vol. 2). London: Scientia Verlag.

Hume, D. (1964c). *The Philosophical Works: Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (Vol. I). London: Scientia Verlag Aalen.

Hume, D. (1964d). *The Philosophical Works: Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (Vol. II). London: Scientia Verlag Aalen.

Huxley, A. (1963). *The Doors of Perception*. New York: Harper & Row.

Klein, D. B. (2016). *Adam Smith's Non-foundationalism* (GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 16–08). Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740837. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2740837.

Lázaro, R. (2010). Adam Smith, Anthropology and Moral Philosophy. *Revista empresa y humanismo, 13*(1), 145–184.
Lázaro, R. (2012). Stoicism in the Moral Thought of Adam Smith. In A. Vigo (Ed.), *Oikeiosis and the Natural Bases of Morality: From Classical Stoicism to Modern Philosophy* (pp. 263–293). Hildesheim, Zurïch and New York: Georg Olms Verlag.
Livingston, D. W. (1984). *Hume's Philosophy of Common Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Long, D. G. (1990, May). 'Utility' and the 'Utility Principle': Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill. *Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 2*(1), 12–39.
Macpherson, C. B. (1970). *La teoría política del individualismo posesivo*. Barcelona: Fontanella.
Marchán, S. (1996). *La estética en la cultura moderna*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
McKenna, S. (2006). *Adam Smith: The Rhetoric of Propriety*. New York: State University of New York Press.
Mill, J. S. (1971). *The Autobiography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mizuta, H. (2000). *Adam Smith's Library: A Catalogue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Montes, L. (2004). *Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of Some Central Components of His Thought*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Montes, L. (2009). La Influencia de Newton en Adam Smith. *Anuario Filosófico, XLII*(1), 137–158.
Morrow, G. R. (1923). *The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.
Mossner, E. C. (1980 [1954]). *The Life of David Hume*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Norton, D. F. (1982). *David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pack, S. J. (1991). *Capitalism as a Moral System: Adam Smith's Critique of the Free Market Economy, Aldershot, Hants, England*. Brookfield, WI: Edward Elgar.
Pack, S. J., & Schliesser, E. (2004). Smith's Humean Criticism of Hume's Account of the Origin of Justice. *Journal History of Philosophy, 44*(1), 47–63.
Persky, J. (1995, Spring). Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9*(2), 221–231.
Popper, K. (1957). *The Poverty of Historicism*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rasmussen, D. C. (2017). *The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Raynor, D. R. (1984). Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments". *Journal of History of Philosophy, 22,* 51–80.
Reeder, J. (Ed.). (1997). *On Moral Sentiments: Contemporary Responses to Adam Smith*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Ricoeur, P. (1984). *Time and Narrative* (Vol. I). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ross, I. S. (2004). 'Great Works Upon the Anvil' in 1785: Adam Smith's Projected Corpus of Philosophy. *The Adam Smith Review, 1,* 40–59.
Rubinstein, A. (1998). *Modeling Bounded Rationality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schliesser, E. (2005). Some Principles of Adam Smith's Newtonian Methods in the Wealth of Nations. *Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, 23,* 33–74.
Schliesser, E. (2006). Wonder in the Face of Scientific Revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton's "Proof" of Copernicanism. *British Journal History of Philosophy, 13*, 697–732.
Schliesser, E. (2009, July 27). *From Adam Smith to Darwin*. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440166. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1440166.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1991). The Meaning of Rationality in the Social Sciences. In R. Swedberg (Ed.), *The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism* (pp. 316–338). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Simon, H. (1957). *Models of Man*. Oxford: Wiley.
Smith, A. (1976a [1759]). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Vol. I). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. (1976b [1776]). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. II* (Vols. 1 and 2). Indianapolis: Oxford University Press and Liberty Classics.
Smith, A. (1978 [1896]). *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (Vol. V). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, A. (1980). *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, *with Dugald Stewart's Account of Adam Smith* (Vol. III). Indianapolis: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press [1795, with Dugald Stewart in 1797].
Smith, A. (1983 [1958]). *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (with Consideration Concerning the First Formation of Languages)* (Vol. IV). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Smith, A. (1987). *The Correspondence of Adam Smith* (Vol. VI). Indianapolis: Oxford University Press.
Stephen J. M., & Ortmann, A. (1996, February). Self-Command in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. *Rationality and Society, 8*(1), 57–80.
Stigler, G. J. (1950). The Development of Utility Theory. *Journal of Political Economy*, *58*(4), 307–327 and *58*(5), 373–396, 392.
Stroud, B. (1977). *Hume*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Tasset, J. L. (1995, December). Sobre la simpatía en sentido moral (Elementos para una crítica de la razón pasional). *Télos. Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas*, *IV*(2), 97–128.
Tasset, J. L. (1999). *La ética y las pasiones*. La Coruña: Servicio de Publicacións de Universidade da Coruña.
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1987). *Historia de la Estética, 1, La estética antigua*. Madrid: Ediciones Akal.
Thaler, R. H. (1994). *Quasi Rational Economics*. New York: Russell Sage.
Trincado, E. (2000). El iusnaturalismo no utilitarista de Adam Smith. *Información Comercial Española, 789,* 95–99.
Trincado, E. (2003a). *Crítica a la doctrina de la utilidad y revisión de las teorías de Hume, Smith y Bentham*. Madrid: UCM.
Trincado, E. (2003b). Adam Smith: crítico del utilitarismo. *Télos. Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas, XII*, 1.
Trincado, E. (2004, July). Equity, Utility and Transaction Costs: On the Origin of Judicial Power in Adam Smith. *Storia del Pensiero Económico, 1*, 33–51.
Trincado, E. (2006a). Adam Smith Criticism of the Doctrine of Utility: A Theory of the Creative Present. In L. Montes & E. Schliesser (Eds.), *New Voices on Adam Smith* (pp. 313–327). New York and London: Routledge.
Trincado, E. (2006b). Borges, Cortázar y los sistemas económicos. In L. Perdices Blas & L. M. Santos Redondo (Coords.), *Economía y literatura* (pp. 595–636). Madrid. Ecobook.
Uyl, D., & Griswold, C. (1996). Adam Smith on Friendship and Love. *The Review of Metaphysics, 49*(3), 609–637. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129898.
Vivenza, G. (2001). *Adam Smith and Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waszek, N. (1984). Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin. *Journal of the History of Ideas, 45*(4), 591–606. https://doi.org/10.2307/2709375.