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Arctic Triumph

Northern Innovation and Persistence

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Foreword: From Victim to Victor

Seals!

How do a Greenlandic diplomat and a German researcher meet? When the lead editor behind the book *Arctic Triumph: Northern Innovation and Persistence*, Nikolas Sellheim, and I first met, it was a seal that brought us together. Well, it wasn't just a seal or one seal. It was all seals. It was the issue of how the international community looked upon societies that hunt seals as part of their heritage and culture. It was specifically because the European Union was planning to legislate on the trade with seal products exported to the European market. And in this matrix of traditional heritage of hunting in the Arctic, a growing moralistic approach to the hunt of seals from animal protection organisations, legalistic tactics from policy makers, European parliamentarians finding a platform to create visibility on themselves and their values we met – with the same goal of creating nuanced information on the hunt of seals.

I am a Greenlander, born and raised in the capital of Nuuk, a result of a commonly seen marital arrangement between a person from the colonised country (Greenland, my dad is the Greenlander, the Kalaaleq/Inuk) and a person from the colonising country (Denmark, my mom is the Dane). So, I am also a Dane. And having said that, it must be noted that all Greenlanders are Danish citizens and hold Danish passports (thus, also EU passports). In this short five-line explanation of the physical or objective features of my identity, you have already met many grey zones, potential contradictions and contradistinctions.

And in many ways, that's what modern Greenland is all about. In many ways, that's what the Arctic of today is very much about. It's complex, it's full of paradoxes, it's full of historical heritage and antagonisms and it's full of strong emotions. And that is why it can enrich the rest of the world. In my opinion, and what is also reflected in this book, is that the richness of the Arctic lies in many features with contradictory characteristics that it encompasses at one and the same time. Its peoples and nature. Its beauty and harshness. Its vulnerability and strength. Its barter economy and market economy. Its traditional customs and modernity. Its hunting

and fishing and "westernised" supermarkets. Its dependency and independence. Its victimisation and victorious nature.

Sassuma arnaa: Mother of the Sea

The world is standing on a burning platform. Climate change and unsustainable use of nature's resources for the overwhelming consumption of the world's richest people are threatening the survival of our globe and ourselves. Many articles in the book put focus on this. The current disaster facing us on a global scale is, frankly, the environmental destruction of our globe. For a solution, or a comfort, maybe we should (re)turn to simple principles – some of which we can learn from Inuit mythology.

The pan-Arctic myth of the *Mother of the Sea*, called *Sassuma arnaa* in Greenlandic and referred to as "Sedna" in the English-speaking Arctic community, can teach us a thing or two on sustainability.

In *Sassuma arnaa*, the hunt in Inuit Nunaat has for a long time failed and people are starving. An *angakkoq* (shaman) is sent to the Mother of the Sea to find out why the animals stay away. When he arrives to the mighty lady at the bottom of the sea, it turns out that all the animals have been tangled in to her long black hair along with dirt. After a struggle between them, the *angakkoq* is allowed to comb her hair, thus allowing all the animals to swim freely into the sea so that people can hunt and get food again. The reason for the animals being tangled up in her hair is that people have stopped being spiritually aware, have stopped living life properly and have started to take food for granted.

The morale of the myth is that if you are greedy, it will harm the nature you live off and that you are dependent of, and thus you harm yourself. Or to put bluntly: you must be good to Mother Nature or you will die. This is a way of spiritual thinking and living that the rest of the world can benefit from in these days of disastrous climate change, unsustainability and insecurity. This is a way of thinking that could or maybe should be revitalised – even for the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, many of whom are moving away from this spirituality for different reasons caused by pursuing modernity. It is a simple message to tell; it is a simple message to understand, but it is a hard morale to follow in an era determined by consumption where economic growth is the compass for the many.

Another difficulty of attaining this simple principle lies in the history of the power struggles of the legitimacy of principles. Historically, colonial powers have had the "truth on their side" and have had to define the reigning principles that were – often – far from indigenous principles – some of which we hear of in *Sassuma arnaa*. Some of the articles in this book argue that maybe today we see a window of opportunity for other principles – than the old colonial ones – to have a say, i.e. Inuit principles as they have been implemented over hundreds of years to uphold life and nature. And if this will be the case, we might be on a more sustainable path for the world we live in.

Colonial Heritage and the Inferiority Complex

The interesting question – in my view – in terms of reaching genuine triumph in the Arctic is whether the Arctic has overcome its colonial heritage or not. Obviously, the nature of the question is rhetorical. A former colonised country or people(s) will always bear witness of its historical circumstances. However, can the (indigenous) peoples of the Arctic detach themselves from the straitjacket of the colonial heritage – a term that, in this context, was introduced by Greenlandic artist, Julie Edel Hardenberg, who has worked with straitjackets containing or made up by the Greenlandic and Danish flags, respectively?

Regardless of the fact that, e.g. Greenland has had extensive autonomy since the Home Rule Agreement of 1979 and the 2009 Self-Rule Agreement and, with the exception of foreign and security policy, judicial issues, monetary matters and citizenship, has had the possibility to rule its own affairs for the past nearly 40 years, I would argue that genuine and spiritual decolonisation has not found its way. Greenland is not anymore colonised by another state in a traditional manner. However, Greenland is being colonised by its own inferiority complex. And this inferiority complex has found its way on all levels: societal, political, economical and personal.

One could argue that the (indigenous) peoples of the Arctic find themselves in a straightjacket with different symptoms of colonial heritage forcing them to "stay put" or hindering a detachment from the straightjacket. How is this seen? Well, the numbers of indigenous peoples who share a dire fate when it comes to abuse, misuse, suicide, suicide attempts and low educational level, placing them low in the hierarchy of today where "knowledge is power", speak its own language. And this is the straightjacket that we must break out of first and foremost. An empowerment of and in ourselves rather than an empowerment from someone.

We must move from a stagnant portrait of ourselves as victims of certain circumstances to a picture of ourselves as victors of our own development giving indigenous peoples a leverage to influence global living.

Moving forward with this endeavour is trying to see developments in a new light as a starting point. Developments in 2018 and onwards are not necessarily binary. Should indigenous peoples of the Arctic of which there are approximately 400,000 out of the approximately 4 million inhabitants of the Arctic really view future developments in terms of, e.g. dependency vs. independence? Or should it be viewed through the lenses of interdependency? Or through a totally new concept that I do not have the innovative capacity to formulate?

It is refreshing that this scientific publication, *Arctic Triumph: Northern Innovation and Persistence*, has the audacity to focus on Arctic triumphs and Arctic achievements rather than on the Arctic disasters.

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Lastly, even though we are scholars that some assume to live in an ivory tower, we do have private lives. And work as a scholar can be marked by long days, short nights and mental absence. It would therefore be more correct to say that instead of living in an ivory tower, (some) scholars have the tendency to live in their own world(s). And since that is the case, support from families, loved ones and dear ones is more important than anything else. The biggest "thank you" thus goes to all the people that we hold dear and that, more importantly, hold us dear in their hearts.

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Nauja Bianco was born in Nuuk as the daughter of a Greenlander from Eastern Greenland and a Dane. International awareness caught her from a very early stage in her life by travelling around the world. All these trips and experiences were done with Greenland and the Arctic deeply embedded in her heart and always with a view to inform and communicate about the Arctic. Central to her career has been internationalisation – whether working for increasing the educational level of the Greenlandic population, as part of Greenland Government's Department for Foreign Affairs, at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at the Nordic Council of Ministers.

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Acronyms

A5	Arctic Five
A8	Arctic Eight
AC	Arctic Council
ACIA	Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
AEC	Arctic Economic Council
AEPS	Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AHDR	Arctic Human Development Report
AMAP	Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
APECS	Association of Polar Early Career Scientists
ARR	Arctic Resilience Report
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BEAR	Barents Euro-Arctic Region
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BRC	Barents Regional Council
CAFF	Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CESCR	Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CLCS	UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
COMAAR	Coordination of Observation and Monitoring in the Arctic for Assessment and Research
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DRR/R	Disaster Risk Reduction and Response
ECRI	European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
ESPO	Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean Pipeline
FCSAP	Federal Contaminated Sites Accelerated Action Plan
FPIC	Free, Prior and Informed Consent
FUDS	Formerly Used Defense Site
GOELRO	State Commission for Electrification of Russia

HoDs	Heads of Delegations
HRC	Human Rights Committee
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICC	Inuit Circumpolar Council
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICOMOS	International Council of Monuments and Sites
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPHC	International Polar Heritage Committee
IPS	Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat
IPs	Indigenous Peoples
IPY	International Polar Year
IR	International Relations
IUCH	International Union for Circumpolar Health
LINKS	Local and Indigenous Knowledge Systems Programme
NEP	New Economic Policy
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSIDC	National Snow and Ice Data Center
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAME	Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
PBSG	Polar Bear Specialist Group
POPs	Persistent Organic Pollutants
PPs	Permanent Participants
RAIPON	Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
RGS	Royal Geographical Society
SAO	Senior Arctic Official
SAR	Search and Rescue
SDWG	Sustainable Development Working Group
SLCF	Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers
TFCBF	Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum
UArctic	University of the Arctic
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDRIP	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
WCIOM	Russian Public Opinion Research Center

Chapter 1
A Light at the End of the Arctic Tunnel? Introducing a Triumphant Discourse on Arctic Scholarship

Nikolas Sellheim, Yulia V. Zaika, and Ilan Kelman

Abstract When looking at the current state of affairs and the developments in the Arctic, one might quickly give in to the increasingly negative discourse on the Arctic's future. And given the role of the Arctic in the globe's climatic system, the Earth's future looks bleak. But all is not lost. With every disaster comes also triumph – a characteristic that this book attempts to highlight. From indigenous rights to triumphant geopolitics; from forced resettlement as the source of a northern home to increased efforts to protect the Arctic's cultural heritage; or from increased disaster reduction and response to on-the-ground cooperation between the US and Russia - the triumphant stories in the North are manifold, providing a silver lining in a world of Arctic disaster.

Keywords Disaster · triumph · Arctic scholarship · narrative · discourse

1.1 Tales of Disasters—Disasters of Tales?

It is difficult to pinpoint when the current end-of-the-world mood took grip on the discourse of world politics, on international law and ultimately on the Arctic. And indeed, the current developments and processes in different spheres of the environmental, social, political, or legal dimensions are worrying—to say the least.

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The decision of current US President Donald Trump to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, which he announced on 1 June 2017 in the Rose Garden of the White House, certainly did not contribute to put the world's perception at ease. To the contrary, his decision has earned tremendous opposition and criticism from all over the world while this opposition was paired with an apocalyptic narrative (e.g. Watts and Connolly 2017). Yes, this is the end. After all, one of the biggest greenhouse gas emitters of the world is withdrawing from an agreement which aims to curb greenhouse gases (irrespective of what the agreement would actually achieve in reality). This in turn will lead to the inevitable further increase in these gases in the atmosphere and thus to the irreversible and final warming of the planet. This is the end. Of course, what this apocalyptic narrative leaves out is that one does not just 'withdraw' from the Paris Agreement from one day to the next, but that any announcement of withdrawal would take effect only on 20 November 2020. Until then, the US is still bound to the provisions of the Agreement. And one needs to remember that the next presidential elections in the United States will take place on 3 November 2020. In other words, the president-elect might, as his/her first act in office, immediately reverse the political decision to withdraw from the agreement. But, of course, that is all in the realm of speculation.

The point of the above is to demonstrate that, while specific trends are indeed worrisome, the underlying processes are significantly more complex. And we should be careful not to give in to narratives that paint an end of the world and remember that the apocalypse or the impending "end of the world as we know it"—to quote R.E.M. (R.E.M. 1987)—has been an integral part of human existence from the very beginning. Some even argue that this is the very core of religious thought and that this is an inherent trait of human consciousness (e.g. Harris 2004). While it is thus easy to discredit concerns over the state of our world, these lines are not meant to achieve this. Instead, these lines are to add another notion to the narrative. A silver lining, so to speak. Namely, that there is hope. That there are also positive developments taking place and that human beings, with all their flaws, are capable of countering those developments that dominate our current discourse of and on the world.

1.2 Narrating Arctic Disaster

As a student of the Arctic—irrespective of discipline or field, but particularly in the social sciences—we would ask you to do one thing: close your eyes and think about how many times you have come across the sentence "The Arctic is changing." This sentence has in all likelihood occurred in all different kinds of settings, be it academic or political conferences, scholarly literature, popular literature or documentaries. And indeed, as it has always been doing, the Arctic is changing with the changes today being particularly rapid.

This has best been established in the 2004/05 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 2005) which has impressively and worryingly shown what kind of drastic

changes the Arctic is undergoing. Supported by other reports, such as the *Arctic Human Development Reports* (AHDR 2004; Larsen and Fondahl 2015), the *Arctic Resilience Report* (Carson and Peterson 2016) and the extremely large body of scholarly literature, the impact of the industrialised world on the Arctic has been demonstrated. And with the changes in the Arctic come changes for the whole world. After all, the Arctic is not an isolated region, but is one of the key drivers of the Earth's climate system. As a consequence, when the Arctic changes, the globe changes and whatever affects the Arctic affects the rest of the world. While, or possibly even because, this is the case, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was established in 1992, followed by the Arctic Council in 1996. The ongoing changes in the Arctic, paired with relieving tensions after the end of the Cold War prompted Arctic states to launch cooperative efforts that counteract these assumed-to-be worrying trends of Arctic change (Keskitalo 2003). Up until the time of writing, the Arctic Council has become the key regional body of Arctic governance, as the increasing number of applicants for observer status—both state and non-state actors—impressively shows.

But narrating the Arctic as a region of disaster is not a recent phenomenon, instead having accompanied it for centuries. Paired with notions of heroism, the cold of the North has claimed many lives while, at the same time, has provided non-Arctic, emerging industrial states and regions with a wealth of resources. These, in turn, have marginalised the indigenous populations, exploited abundant Arctic resources and created narratives on life and peoples in the North. This violent Arctic history prevails up to this day (McCannon 2012).

Disaster, however, has never deterred others from engaging with the Arctic. To the contrary—disaster has spurred further European encroachment and, ultimately, also contributed to more disaster. The infamous expeditions searching for the lost (and now found) Franklin ships bear witness to this (Craciun 2016). At the same time, disasters of the past have led to changes in behaviour in the present. Countless examples can be put forward in this context—the manifestation of international human rights norms after the disasters of the Second World War are but one example in the myriad of positive developments emerging out of disasters of the past.

1.3 About This Book

The Arctic as a global and globalised region (Finger and Heininen 2018) is no exception in this regard. Yet a large body of Arctic literature deals primarily with the negative—disastrous—developments that have taken or are taking place in the North. In the present volume, the Editors aim to provide the contemporary, negatively connoted narrative of a 'changing Arctic' with a positive touch. Yes, the Arctic is changing with major negative consequences—but it is also changing to the good. As the contributions show, the negative developments of the past have also had positive effects on the contemporary Arctic.

In Part I, *Narrating Indigenous Fantasies*, **Julian Reid** (University of Lapland), introduces this book by normatively discussing discourses on the Arctic's indigenous peoples, philosophically approaching the concept of resilience. He argues that it is not colonial concepts such as resilience, which are fostered by entities such as the Arctic Council, that contribute to an emancipation of indigenous peoples, but rather the words, images and poetry inherent to indigenous cultures that enable them to break with the colonial past.

Similarly, **Reetta Toivanen** (University of Helsinki) presents the struggle of indigenous peoples against the non-indigenous narrative of them being 'nature peoples'. By using the example from the Finnish Sámi, she shows how arguments of fairness towards the Sámi have been replaced by political and legal strategies to make their voices heard. Both national and international strategies are being used to successfully achieve change.

In Part II, the Arctic shifts *From Homestead to Homeland*. **Susan Barr** (formerly Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage) delves into the exploitative history of the Arctic and the current state of the cultural heritage, particularly in Svalbard and Greenland. She shows that despite the changing climatic conditions, which severely affect the state of this heritage, it is the need for increased means of preservation that has yielded new approaches to cultural heritage. She argues that it is threats that bring out new initiatives to counter them.

How drastically the notion of 'home' can change is presented by **Yulia Zaika** (Lomonosov Moscow State University) in her auto-ethnography. She shows how forced resettlement of her family during Stalin's reign has led to her developing an own Arctic identity. Her family disaster of forcefully having lost their home has thus been the seed for something new.

In Part III, *Making Rights Work*, we see how the current legal status of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic has yielded some positive results. **Tuyara N. Gavrilyeva** (North-Eastern Federal University), **Natalia Yakovlev** (Newcastle University London), **Sardana I. Boyakova** (Russian Academy of Sciences) and **Raisa I. Bochoeva** (North-Eastern Federal University) present the example of a social impact assessment of industrial projects, initiated on the territory of indigenous people, and its implementation in Yakutia. The triumphant outcomes of such 'anthropological expert review' can be applied in other Arctic territories of Russia, ensuring the rights of communities.

Nikolas Sellheim (University of Helsinki) documents how the Arctic Council, despite indigenous peoples not being decision-makers in the strictest sense, has fostered the rights of indigenous peoples on a normative level. By conducting an analysis of Arctic Council meeting documents, he makes the approaches of Arctic Council member states to indigenous rights visible and shows how each state engages in different facets of rights implementation and fostering.

In Part IV, *Risky Business and a Silver Lining*, **Nadia French** (University of Birmingham) discusses Arctic exploration patterns through environmental lenses in search for social and ecological balance. By comparing alternate interests and intentions of Arctic states in their past and present, describing lessons learned, she

highlights the shadowy emergence of new Arctic environmental relations and concepts as being triumphant in a competitive, complex and nationally framed Arctic environment.

Patrizia Duda (University College London) and **Ilan Kelman** (University College London and University of Agder) explore how triumph can grow from disasters. The Arctic environment paired with the region's increasing accessibility open the door for multiplying numbers of environmental disasters. By examining regional bi- and multilateral rescue efforts and exercises to evaluate the efficiency of measures and current gaps, the authors conclude with recommendations on existing cooperative approaches to disaster risk reduction and response for vulnerable Arctic environments and communities.

The question of whether Arctic geopolitics could be triumphant is raised by **Klaus Dodds** (Royal Holloway University of London) and **Chih Yuan Woon** (National University of Singapore). Taking the infamous 2007 flag planting as an example, they suggest that the Arctic Five, and later the Arctic Council, have benefitted from reconciliation and reclamation. Paired with alter-geopolitics, which involves non-state actors, a new form of geopolitics beyond the boundaries of nation states has emerged that challenges contemporary state-based paradigms.

At the times of foreign policy discrepancy, disaster diplomacy can play a triumphant role between countries. **Yekaterina Y. Kontar** (Tufts University) argues that on the back of geopolitical tensions in between US and Russia, continuous cooperation of disaster experts and practitioners creates opportunities for further cooperation leading to the development of solutions to common challenges. She exemplifies increased cooperation of disaster experts by focusing on US–Russia relations which, in her opinion, should go beyond forums such as the Arctic Council but should include other stakeholders as well. Only then—the signs of which are already clearly visible—is disaster risk reduction truly possible.

1.4 Narrating Arctic Triumph

The Arctic is indeed a region that has been marked by disaster—in all its different facets, forms, shapes, contexts, and natures. With this book we wish to lift the curtain that has veiled our vision on the Arctic as a region of triumph. Even though disaster has carved its undeniable and unmistakable mark into the Arctic, each such disastrous change has also brought about developments that have contributed to positive change. In *Arctic Triumph: Northern Innovation and Persistence* we are telling a few of these stories. We firmly believe that a more positive approach towards the Arctic will benefit not only us as human beings, but also the world as a whole. For it is easy to be overwhelmed by the massive social and environmental changes that have struck the Arctic and will strike the Arctic in the future. The approval of the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in October 2018 that paints a very bleak picture of the world's future is but one

example for a projected disaster of a global scale. While that may or may not be the case, it may contribute to the world finally taking substantive action to reduce greenhouse gases.

Upon reading this book, the reader may also concur with our view that narrating Arctic Triumph is not an easy task. After all, each triumph in this book is somehow a response to a disaster. A precautionary triumph—a triumph that occurs before disaster strikes—is difficult to depict, a struggle frequently faced in garnering attention for successful disaster risk reduction. And if that is the case, it is effectively an impending or possible disaster that triggers this triumphant development. But as the chapters of this book show, all stories of success, with a triumph/disaster dialectic or continuum at their core, also plant a seed for bigger future developments. Indeed, there is a multifaceted Arctic and it is impossible to foresee how these different Arctics will develop. But one thing is clear: the social and natural sciences, center-periphery paradigms, geopolitical dichotomies, and many more contexts paint pictures of an Arctic that calls for more stories on Arctic Triumph.

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Part I
Narrating Arctic Indigenous Fantasies

Chapter 2
Narrating Indigeneity in the Arctic: Scripts of Disaster Resilience Versus the Poetics of Autonomy

Julian Reid

Abstract The capacity to inhabit and cope with living in disastrous environments is what social scientists widely label resilience. It is a capacity that peoples inhabiting the Arctic are especially renown for, and one that is attributed in particular to indigenous peoples living here. Indeed policy makers, concerned as they currently are with attempting to formulate policies designed to help people cope with the coming era of disasters portended by climate change, are attracted to indigenous peoples of the Arctic on account of their perceived abilities to live in a state of permanent disaster. The ability to adapt to disastrous events is seen to be the key component of the life-worlds of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, such as the Eurasian Sámi people, which inhabits Arctic Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, and the resilience of the Sámi is said to be a living testimony of their strength. Within the Academy, anthropologists are currently being mobilised to provide ethnographic studies of the practices and forms of knowledge that enable the Sámi to do so. As such the Sámi are held to be a model for the rest of humanity, faced as it is with a coming era of climate disasters and global ecological catastrophe. Rather than join in with the chorus of celebration concerning Sámi resilience in the Arctic, this chapter will critique the strategic and colonial rationalities shaping it. Knowledge around resilience, concerned as it might seem to be with promoting the rights and empowerment of the Sámi, is constitutive of processes for the production and disciplining of their indigeneity, rather than being simply a deep ethnographic description. This disciplining of the Sámi, as well as every other target population in the Arctic, by proponents of resilience, forces them into accepting the necessity of a future laden by disastrous events. As such this chapter urges critical thinkers and practitioners concerned with indigenous politics in the Arctic to be more circumspect when confronting claims about the inherent resilience of indigenous peoples living here. It argues for the

This chapter reworks ideas and findings also developed in my article 'The Cliche of Resilience: Governing Indigeneity in the Arctic', *Arena Magazine (forthcoming in 2019)*

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necessity of examining resilience as an element within a narrative strategy for the scripting of the Arctic and the life-worlds of indigenous peoples inhabiting it, rather than an expression of the agency of indigenous peoples as such.

Keywords Resilience · Indigenous peoples · Sámi · Imaginaries · Agency

2.1 Introduction

Indigenous peoples of the Arctic have long since attracted the interests of anthropologists, biologists, zoologists, ecologists and other proponents of the life sciences. From the beginning these interests were motivated by the colonial desire for conquest and underpinned by racial narratives of white supremacy. In the nineteenth century they entailed objectifying the distinctive features of the skulls, for example, of Sámi populations, comparing them with the skulls of Inuit populations. Even as late as the 1970's, the Oxford professor of biology and physical anthropology, John R. Baker, could be read remarking as to the size of the differences between the skulls of Sámi (still then described as 'Laplanders') and Inuit (described as 'Greenland Eskimos'), such that 'a child of six years, provided with a number of Laplander and Greenland Eskimo skulls of various sizes, could separate them correctly into two groups', he argued, 'without the necessity for any previous instruction' (Baker 1974, p. 195). Today craniology has been widely discredited for its roles in racial science and in perpetuating myths of racial superiority in the Arctic as much as elsewhere (Wolfe 2006), but the interests of the life sciences in indigenous peoples of the Arctic persists, albeit in new and different forms.

Are the interests which the life sciences take today in indigenous peoples of the Arctic any less racial or colonial than they were historically? In this chapter I am interested in the mobilisation of the life sciences to research the 'resilience' of indigenous peoples in the Arctic and the ways in which this apparently new scientific knowledge is shaping how indigenous peoples of the Arctic are today being constructed, in policies aimed supposedly at enhancing their wellbeing. Resilience has already been widely critiqued in International Relations (Chandler and Reid 2016; Evans and Reid 2014) as a concept that does immense harm to people, especially the global poor, but critical work on its implications for the Arctic and for indigenous peoples living there is almost non-existent. Instead what exists is a literature that simply promotes 'indigenous resilience' as if it were a non-contestable benefit (Ulturgasheva et al. 2014; Bals et al. 2011; Forbes et al. 2009; Berkes and Jolly 2002). The abilities of indigenous peoples living in the Arctic to cope with the disasters which have hit them, and recover from experiences of extreme social and cultural change, including 'epidemics, forced relocation, cultural colonization, and genocide' (Wexler 2014, p. 74) is heralded as a source of 'learning' for peoples, both indigenous and non-indigenous, everywhere.

2.2 Arctic Resilience?

One of the chief proponents of this new narrative of indigenous resilience is the Arctic Council itself. The end of 2016 saw the publication of the *Arctic Resilience Report* (Carson and Peterson 2016). The report is the final product of the Arctic Resilience Assessment, a project launched by the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, which ran from 2011 until 2013, and was preceded by the Arctic Resilience Interim Report of 2013 (Arctic Council 2013). The report is written in response to the large and rapid changes said to be occurring in the Arctic; the environmental, ecological and social changes, caused largely by processes occurring outside of the Arctic itself, especially climate change, but also migration, resource extraction and other human activities, and which are said to portend large impacts upon the Arctic and communities living there, including notably indigenous peoples, whose livelihoods look set to disappear and whose places of abode will become uninhabitable, as these changes occur (Ibid., p. x). Indeed these euphemistically described 'changes' represent no less than a catastrophe for many indigenous peoples, given the scales of the devastating losses they are said to be faced with.

Resilience, as the report defines it, and as has become the norm in resilience research worldwide, refers to the capacities of humans, as well as all living systems, to absorb and adapt to the shocks generated by disastrous events, and respond to them by either maintaining or changing one's form, evolving with them, and potentially growing stronger from their occurrence (Carson and Peterson 2016, p. ix—x). It is a concept which originated largely in ecology during the 1970s and early 1980s to describe the capacities of non-human living systems to evolve in exposure to disasters, and which gradually mutated into social and human sciences as a way to understand the abilities of human beings to absorb shocks and withstand disasters of multiple kinds. In the era of Sustainable Development it became a capacity identified especially with the 'Global Poor', given their excessive exposure to events and shocks of a disastrous nature (Reid 2012). And in more recent years it has become a capacity attributed to indigenous peoples (Chandler and Reid 2018; Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen 2016). In fact indigenous peoples are perceived to be particularly exemplary when it comes to resilience. While the approach of practitioners to the Global Poor has been largely about teaching them how to become resilient on account of their supposed 'ecological ignorance' (Folke et al. 2002), the approach to the indigenous has been about learning from them on account of their supposed ecological intelligence.

Intriguingly it is some of the same scientists responsible for labelling the global poor 'ecologically ignorant' who are now vouching for indigenous ecological intelligence. Fikrit Berkes, whose book, *Sacred Ecology*, is credited with creating the concept of 'traditional environmental knowledge' (Grove 2018, p. 216; Berkes 1999), has also carried out influential collaborations with the leading ideologue of resilience, Carl Folke (Berkes and Folke 1998). While these scientists clearly place a high value on the 'traditional knowledge' of indigenous peoples they do so because they identify a 'functional utility' in that knowledge. This utility derives from a

potential for synthesis with western ways of knowing and deployment in and for the West's own drive towards sustainability (Grove 2018, p. 216–218).

What is happening to indigenous peoples in and of the Arctic, in terms of their subjection to the resilience agenda, has to be understood, therefore, in context of a more or less global strategy being applied to indigenous peoples living everywhere. Policy makers not just in the Arctic but the world over, concerned as they currently are with attempting to formulate policies designed to help people cope with the presumed coming era of disasters portended by climate change, are attracted to indigenous peoples on account of their perceived abilities to live in a state of permanent crisis. Within the Academy, anthropologists are currently being mobilised to provide ethnographic studies of the practices and forms of knowledge that enable indigenous peoples to do so. For example the Oxford-based anthropologist Laura Rival has detailed the ways in which the Makushi, an indigenous people living in the borderlands of northern Brazil and southern Guyana, live with severe drought and flooding as normal conditions of life (Rival 2009, p. 300). This is a people as well adapted to a world of floods as much as it is to extreme drought, and able to cope with whatever the climate throws at them, if we are to believe the anthropology (Ibid., p. 302). As such they are a model for the rest of humanity, faced as it is with an assumed coming era of climate disasters and global ecological catastrophe.

From its origins, as Melinda Hinkson observes, anthropology 'has existed in a state of complex symbiotic dependency with government' as anthropologists 'have been materially and practically dependent on state support to fund research, and the direction anthropological work has taken in any particular period has been crucially influenced by state needs for certain kinds of information with which to govern its Indigenous populace' (Hinkson 2010, p. 5). Never was this observation truer than today in the context of the mobilisation of anthropologists to produce knowledge about indigenous resilience. The arguments and conclusions of anthropologists are mirrored in policy reports such as that published by UNESCO, titled *Weathering Uncertainty* (Nakashima et al. 2012), and which likewise describes how indigenous peoples, on account of their high-exposure sensitivity to extreme weather events, are thought to be especially resilient to climate change (Ibid., p. 1–8). The indigenous are of interest and value to policy-makers because they have a proven track record of 'resourcefulness and response capacity in the face of global climate change' (Ibid., p. 9).

The *Arctic Resilience Report* of 2016, following in the wake of a now burgeoning academic and policy-making literature, likewise extols the virtues and capacities of indigenous peoples, specifically those living in the Arctic. On the one hand it laments their extreme exposure to the effects of climate change, the loss of livelihoods and habitats which are sure to be caused by climate change, while on the other hand celebrating the 'resilience' of these same peoples; a resilience which of course arises from the very exposure and vulnerability it otherwise laments. Sensitivity to change and crisis is seen to be the key component of the life-worlds of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, such as the Sámi, who inhabit Arctic Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, and the resilience of the Sámi is said to be 'a living testimony of the strength of these societies and the autonomous capacities of their

subsistence economies' (Arctic Council 2013, p. 32). The ability to adapt to pressures is seen to be a fundamental part of the identity of indigenous peoples of the Arctic, such as the Inuit of Greenland, as James Van Alstine and William Davies have observed (2017, p. 99).

'Arcticism' is a term used before to describe the ways in which (in echo of Edward Said's account of the orientalism of the West's representations of its eastern other) patronising images of the indigenous are generated and naturalised in western discourses on the Arctic (Ryall et al. 2010, p. x). The Arctic Council, drawing on the support of anthropological knowledge and discourse, is itself a key resource for the deployment of the particular Arcticism surrounding resilience.

2.3 Race in the Arctic

In one sense the attraction to and focus on the knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples might seem to represent a reversal of the long history of colonial denigration of indigenous knowledge and practices. Historically, colonial powers disparaged indigenous peoples for precisely the same reasons they now seem to revere them. In earlier phases of modernity indigenous peoples were seen as degenerate on account of their having too little a sense of their own exceptionality from nature, and too much in common with other non-human species. Colonial practices revolved around containing the indigenous, and preventing their contact with 'higher cultures' in order to secure the human from its feralisation (Valayden 2016). Today the reverse would seem to be true, but neither the discourse nor practices are any less racialised. The indigenous have in effect shifted, from being a figure that imbues 'white' humanity with a fear at its potential to 'slip back into and blend with nature' (Valayden 2016, p. 3), to now inciting desire, longing and admiration on account of that same purported proximity to the natural world. This shift testifies not to the end of race in its application to discourses around indigenous peoples, but to the changing nature of racialisation. In a world in which threats to the security of the human species are seen to emerge from a propensity of peoples to see themselves as separate from and transcendent of nature, in ways that end up impacting on fragile environments, so indigenous peoples, in their supposed contentment with mere survival, are seen to promise a new image of perfectibility.

A recent article in the journal *Science* reported the findings of the research of a group of geneticists into the genetic adaptations of Greenlandic Inuit to the coldness of the climate of Greenland. How does a people such as the Inuit of Greenland learn to cope with the 'challenging environmental conditions of the Arctic' (Fumagalli et al. 2015, p. 1346), it asked? The consequences of inhabiting the 'challenging environment' of the Arctic are testified to, the authors of the article conclude, in the genetic make-up of Greenlandic Inuit, which demonstrate 'evolutionary consequences' including for both their height and weight (Ibid., p. 1343). The Inuit of Greenland, within this geneticist discourse, are transformed from being represented as the degen-

erate other of the white European race of nineteenth century biology and anthropology into the super-adaptive and resilient exemplars of the twenty-first century.

In his celebrated lecture series, *Society Must Be Defended*, Michel Foucault demonstrated the ways in which racism emanated from the biopoliticisation of power relations that accompanied the birth of modernity in Europe and beyond (Foucault 2003). Biological thought impacted upon political practices by producing the idea of a new type of enemy and threat; one which does not simply make designs on your territory, resources or people, but which threatens the degeneration of the species as a whole on account of its genetic inferiority. Up until 1945 the idea that some racial groups could claim superiority to others and that the future of the species as a whole would be improved were inferior races to be destroyed was dominant, and applied not just by the Nazis but by liberal regimes driven by the desire to 'make life live' practically everywhere, both within their own social boundaries as well as externally in their colonising missions (Dillon and Reid 2009, p. 48–52). The historical destruction of indigenous peoples was but one expression of such racism. After 1945, and the reckoning with the Holocaust amid the collapse of European empires, liberal biopolitics has taken new forms, in order to avoid the charge of favouring some races over others. However it is difficult to make life live in ways that don't favour some life forms over others, and thus fall back into similar racist traps. When geneticists espouse the superior adaptivity and resilience of indigenous peoples, as much as when anthropologists claim to observe it in their ethnographies, or when governmental regimes celebrate it in their reports, they do so in ways that are consistent with the discourse of racial struggle which Foucault unearthed the origins of. Through these origins certain races are entitled to define the prevailing norms on which society is organised, and in contrast with whom other racial groups are seen to deviate (Ibid., p. 61). Resilience is the calling card of the new biopolitical racism.

2.4 Governing by Cliché in the Arctic

Many are those who interpret this reversal in attitudes of the West towards the indigenous as a step forwards in the decolonisation of relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, and as an expression of the power of indigenous counter-discourses, 'answering back', as it were, 'from the Arctic' (Ryall et al. 2010, p. xi). For it challenges the West's teleological sense of its own superiority, debunking it even, and placing the indigenous on a pedestal once reserved for the western subject of modernist tradition (Lea 2012, p. 196). What such enthusiasts seemingly don't recognise is the problematic nature of the entanglement of this reversal with white Western strategies of power. The ascriptions of resilience and ecological intelligence to the indigenous is not something being achieved simply by anthropologists working to the left of Western states or other colonial institutions. It is a mantra being repeated by colonial states and deeply powerful Western actors worldwide. Such that the representation of the indigenous as possessing exceptional capacities to care for their natural environments, to adapt to climate change, and deal with

extreme weather events has become a governing cliché of white and Western neoliberal governance.

It is a powerful and dangerous cliché. For the indigenous functions within these international discourses as an exemplar of a neoliberal subject. A subject defined by its capacities to adapt to the dangers of the world in living a life of ongoing survival and exposure to endemic disaster (Chandler and Reid 2018; Chandler and Reid 2016; Evans and Reid 2014; Reid 2012). This cliché is powerful and dangerous in so far as it functions to discipline the indigenous themselves into performing their own resilience. What happens to indigenous peoples, both individually and collectively, when for whatever reason, they don't show resilience? Are they somehow to be deemed less indigenous? Or are they examples of failed indigeneity? Are they less ecologically intelligent than other indigenous peoples? The answer to these questions lies in the reality that performing resilience is practically a condition of existence for being indigenous in today's world of neoliberal governance. Knowledge around resilience, concerned as it might seem to be with promoting the rights and empowerment of indigenous peoples, is constitutive of processes for the production and disciplining of indigeneity, rather than being simply a deep ethnographic description. This disciplining of the indigenous, as well as the 'Global Poor', and every other target population of the resilience agenda, is integral to the containment strategy for dealing with surplus humanity, forcing peoples into adjusting their expectations and accepting the necessity to be self-reliant.

There are few clearer examples of this reality than the *Arctic Resilience Report*. The report assesses the resilience of different indigenous peoples located in the Arctic and categorises them in terms of their relative capacities for resilience. Some, such as that of the Yamal-Nenets, a reindeer herding community of Western Siberia, it regards as success stories of resilience. Others such as the reindeer herders of Teriberka, it regards as failures (Carson and Peterson 2016, p. 100–101). Successful resilience it diagnoses as arising from the abilities of peoples to "self-organize, experiment, learn and adapt" and failed resilience from the absence of these abilities (Ibid.).

Of all the case studies on which the report is based, one stands out — seemingly an example for Arctic triumph. It is that of the Inuit of Cape Dorset, Nunavut who have, according to the report, reinvented themselves, in the face of the loss of their traditional livelihoods, as 'international art sensations' (Carson and Peterson 2016, p. 109). The artworks of Inuit living in Cape Dorset are offered for sale, largely on the Internet, by urban gallerists, often for as little as a few hundred Canadian dollars. How much of a cut the gallerists take, and how much of the fee for which Inuit art is sold reaches the Inuit themselves, can only by speculated upon. Inuit artists themselves describe the desperate circumstances that have forced them to turn to art as a way of making a living. 'There are no jobs', explains one Inuit artist, Manasie Maniapik (quoted in Rathwell and Armitage 2016, no pagination). 'We don't have jobs, it's the only way to make money' explains another, Oqituq Ashoona (Ibid.). Another of these 'international art sensations', Madaline Oumauataq, explains how the making of the art helps her to deal with the trauma of the 'heavy changes' which the Inuit of Cape Dorset have gone through in the last few decades (Ibid.). Therapeutically, the production of the art, often depicting the effects of climate

change upon landscapes and livelihoods, enables the Inuit to cope with the devastations of the losses entailed. More importantly, it enables them to survive economically in the context of the disappearance of their traditional livelihoods. None of this suffering and desperation is conveyed in the *Arctic Resilience Report's* celebration of them as 'international art sensations' and exemplars of 'resilience' and 'transformation'. No consideration is given either to the colonial relations of exploitation which continue to mediate the abilities of these Inuit to survive, given their dependence on the commodification and sale of their art, by urban gallerists. Western theorists, such as Kaitleen Rathwell and Derek Armitage, who argue that the enabling of the Inuit to make art enhances their resilience fail to recognise any of the extent to which these practices represent the wholesale neoliberalisation of the communities in question, the debasement of their traditions and livelihoods, the commodification of the catastrophes they have suffered, and their subjection to western economic reason (Ibid.).

Resilience is advancing in the Arctic, as well as across the world, as a major discourse for the development and implementation of neoliberal governance and subjectification. Indigenous peoples are but one target population of strategies for the making of resilient subjects in the Arctic as elsewhere. Nevertheless they are a crucial one, given the nature of the arguments being made for their exemplary status. This chapter urges critical thinkers and practitioners concerned with indigenous politics in the Arctic to be more circumspect when confronting claims about the inherent resilience of indigenous peoples living there. For the risks in accepting such clichéd and politically loaded representations of the indigenous are, as I have suggested here, vast, and ultimately complicit with colonial power and neoliberal exploitation. We know much by now about the long history of colonial violence that arose from the western desire to destroy indigenous peoples on account of their perceived inferiority. We recognise and understand much less of the violence which arises from the apparent desire to protect indigenous peoples and 'the ontological alterity they purportedly embody (Bessire 2014, p. xi). Yet that is a form which colonial violence now takes. From the Amazon to the Arctic, indigenous peoples must resist the violence embedded in neoliberal strategies of resilience, while the anthropologists who study them must beware being drawn into the latest ideologically driven project to govern the lives of indigenous peoples (Hinkson 2010, p. 3).

2.5 Indigenous Imaginaries in the Arctic

What this calls for, then, is a suspicion towards this new discourse, and a political intelligence capable of avoiding the fall into the traps now being set for indigenous peoples in the Arctic by powers seeking to govern them and the whole region with a strategy of resilience. In the Northern Sámi language the word for trap (*giela*) is the same as the word for language (*giela*) itself (Gaski 1997, p. 11)). Possibly the foremost Sámi poet of all time, Paulus Utsi, penned a collection titled *Giela giela* which translates as 'Ensnare the Language' (Ibid.). It was language itself which Utsi

urged his fellow Sámi to hunt and trap. Never was that injunction of Utsi more urgent than it is today.

Another widely regarded Sámi poet, Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, himself a relative of Utsi, once condemned 'the self-righteous grandeur' of the colonisers of the Arctic tundra, and sought to give counter-representation to 'indigenous peoples' values and philosophy', those of the Sámi, but also of all other indigenous peoples with whom Valkeapää identified (Gaski 2010, pp. 301–305). What would Valkeapää say today, were he still alive, in observation of the importance now given to indigenous knowledge, by the Arctic Council that governs his own land, Sápmi, as well as by so many other states and powers?

Poetry itself can be a powerful resource for equipping peoples with the intelligence and necessary cynicism with which to avoid discursive traps and make language and concepts work for and not against peoples. Not least because poetry incites the imaginations of peoples by deploying images in ways that open up the possibility of new worlds, rather than simply governing worlds in the ways that states and international institutions seek to (Chandler and Reid 2016).

The poetry of Valkeapää contains many different ideas, images and thoughts, but is well known for the importance and beauty it attaches to the image of reindeer. The reindeer herd is a central motif in many of Valkeapää's works (Gaski 2010. p. 312). On the one hand this motif might seem simply to embody the poet's defence of Sámi traditions and non-human nature over and against the hubristic humanism of the coloniser (Ibid., pp. 306–307). On the other hand, however, within the poetics through which Valkeapää constructs his images of reindeer the reader can encounter ideas that speak to the interests of indigenous peoples, including the Sámi, in maintaining their autonomy from western powers. In *The Sun, My Father,* for example, the first reindeer Valkeapää poeticises is described as *Menodahkes* (Gaski 2010, p. 320). *Menodahkes* represents not just any reindeer but the reindeer who 'thrives best by itself', and which 'is in the habit of trying to avoid being taken hold of' and 'prefers to keep to itself' (Ibid.). It relates to the verb, *eaidat*, 'to become a stranger to something or someone, to keep apart by itself, without having anything to do with others' (Ibid.).

Becoming a stranger, maintaining distance, avoiding being taken hold of; these are fundamentally political practices the poetics of which are integral to Valkeapää's work and ethics, and to Sámi poetics and practices as a whole. Elsewhere I have written of the importance of concepts of autonomy and self-mastery to indigenous thought and practice (Reid 2018). The Yaqui shaman, Don Juan, whose life and teachings are notoriously documented in the anthropology of Carlos Castaneda, described a set of practices that come close to *eaidat*, and a way of being *Menodahkes* as it were. Like Valkeapää, Don Juan taught respect for the Earth and for species of life other than humans, while at the same time being immensely concerned with the arts by which we humans can best live (Ibid.). He taught the arts by which the indigenous subject can 'build a fog' around itself and cultivate the 'ultimate freedom of being unknown' (Castaneda 1972, p. 31). Don Juan emphasised the importance of disconnection as life practice and as the basis of ethics. 'Your friends, those who

have known you for a long time, you must leave them quickly,' he advised Castaneda (Ibid., p. 42).

In her analysis, Kathleen Osgood Dana has argued that Valkeapää is best understood as a 'shaman-poet' whose vision penetrates time itself, employing poetry as a power to look into the past, future and reality itself (Dana 2004, p. 9). *The Sun, My Father* is itself, she argues, a kind of shamanic drum, 'capable of seeing into other worlds, into the past, and into the future' (Ibid., p. 9). Like Don Juan, what Valkeapää is really concerned with is truth: the search for it, and the ability of the subject to align itself with its own truths, to act without doubt or remorse. 'I have no doubts or remorse,' Don Juan says, 'everything I do is my decision and my responsibility,' because in this world 'there is no time for regrets or doubts. There is only time for decisions' (Castaneda 1972, p. 56). Don Juan seeks to free the self from doubt and attain the power of decision that is the hallmark of sovereign subjectivity.

In much of the literature on indigeneity today we encounter the claim that indigenous subjectivity is defined by a sense of the interconnectedness of the self to others. The life histories of indigenous peoples are said to show a moral ordering of sociality that emphasises mutual support and concern' (Moreton-Robinson 2015, p. 15). Doubtless these are aspects of indigenous cultures and life practices that are important for their full understanding. Indigenous cultures, however, are also mines of ideas about how the self cannot just support but achieve power over others, hunt and trap, deceive, and outwit the other.

In the West the power to deceive, hunt and trap the other has, since Plato at least, been understood to owe to the power which some humans hold over the imaginations of other humans, the ability to deploy images, and make the illusory appear true (Reid 2017). In the Western tradition it has been seen to be at the root of many human problems, from madness to political fanaticism to illegitimate government. In indigenous cultures too, though, we can encounter the same ideas, involving power and imagination, but in a more affirmative way. Valkeapää writes, in *The Sun, My Father*, much of images, employing the Sámi words *govva*, to evoke a world which, in Osgood Dana's descriptions of it, is itself *govvás máilbmi*, a 'world full of images', or world-as-image (Dana 2004, p. 9). The word *govva* evokes, in Northern Sámi language as much as in its Finnish language equivalent *kuva* (picture/image), Osgood Dana also argues, the particular image of a drum, and the drum of the shaman himself especially, an instrument for the making of images (Ibid.). At the same time, it also evokes the power of the hunter, for both *govva* in Northern Sámi and *kuva* in Finnish were originally terms for decoys used by hunters to lure birds (Dana 2004, p. 9). The image, in Valkeapää's poetry is unambiguously powerful, as a means with which to hunt and trap, empower the self, and live more. As Dana expresses it, images are, for Valkeapää, 'potent emblems of life itself, written both on the drum and on the land' (Dana 2004, p. 13).

The suppression of Sámi culture in the Arctic proceeded through the confiscation and destruction of Sámi drums; the *govadasat*, with which they conjured images (Ibid., p. 19). The war on indigenous peoples in the Arctic, as conducted more or less worldwide by Western colonial regimes, was a war upon their image-making powers, a war to either extinguish or control their imaginations. As it was for those

indigenous peoples unfortunate enough to have encountered the Jesuits who colonised their imaginations, not just by placing pictures before their eyes but by imprinting pictures upon the bodies of natives, 'so that they would take possession of their viewers' imaginations and dreams' (Belting 2011, p. 40). The emancipation, empowerment and eventual triumph of indigenous peoples, including all those living in the Arctic, can only happen through the restitution of those same powers of imagination.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has questioned the rationalities shaping discourses of indigenous resilience in the Arctic. The spread of this discourse has been enabled by sciences with problematic histories of involvement in the colonisation of indigenous peoples and racial depictions of indigenous peoples as inferior. It is also shaped and spread by the Arctic Council, which has made resilience the foundation of its strategy for governing the region and its peoples. There is very little indigenous to the discourse itself, in spite of attempts to indigenise resilience as if it were a concept integral to indigenous cultures. The fact is that resilience does not even have a place in the languages of many indigenous peoples living in the Arctic (Kelman 2018, p. 2) and is difficult to translate. Much more integral to indigenous cultures and languages, in the Arctic as much as elsewhere, is the concept of imagination. If the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are to triumph and enjoy a future free from colonialism it will be because they have employed a power fundamental to political subjectivity, that of imagination itself. The words, images, and poetry of indigenous peoples will be a much more beneficent resource in their struggle for emancipation than the discourses of colonial states and their sciences.

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Chapter 3
European Fantasy of the Arctic Region and the Rise of Indigenous Sámi Voices in the Global Arena

Reetta Toivanen

Abstract In 325 BC the great Greek explorer Pytheas of Massalia travelled in the north of Scandinavia and wrote about the place where the sun never goes to sleep. His stories told about a sublime territory, cold and harsh, inhabited by an isolated, 'backwards' people whose lives were shrouded with mystique. Since then, being so far away from civilisation, an imposed and dominating narrative took form in Europe about the region now called Lapland and the North Calotte. The place also became imagined as a cornucopia: a place of immense richness. In many ways, this narrative still lingers today. With examples from the Finnish context, this article argues that the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are, still centuries after the voyages of Pytheas, the object of a European fantasy. They are framed as guardians of the treasure chest that is the Arctic and as an ancient people of 'nature' rather than 'culture' and thus doomed to the unpolitical. They are all too rarely given agency. Still today, the states do not listen to their voices. However, the Sámi in the Arctic have today carved out another path to political leverage. They have taken part in the global narrative of indigenous resistance against the conquest and oppression by their states. This article presents examples from the Finnish context, where this global discourse has helped Sámi in Finland to reach the global centres of power in New York and Geneva and gain leverage with the state on land rights issues. Adopting this global discourse however, requires indigenous minorities to adopt a specific narrative of 'minority-ness'; it requires emphasis on unity and homogeneity and a history of violent conquest, even though the Sámi both historically and contemporarily are more complex and diverse than that. The adoption of this discursive strategy exemplifies the dialectic between disaster and triumph that lies in the core interest of this volume; finding the trail of success through a story of disaster. However, one can still ask on whose terms this current trail is cut out and who it will benefit in the end. Is it the states or the indigenous peoples?

Keywords Narratives · Sámi · indigenous peoples · human rights · Finland

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3.1 Introduction: European Imaginaries About Lapland and Its Inhabitants

The Greek explorer Pytheas of Massalia travelled in the north of Scandinavia around the same time when Alexander the Great conquered the world in the south (McPhail 2014). It has been estimated that Pytheas was, if ever, conducting his travels around 325 BC. Later paraphrasers of his now lost work told about a land surrounded by ice where the sun never sets (Chevallier 1984; Duffy 2013, p. 125). The accounts of Pytheas' voyages influenced the stories told about to Arctic for centuries to come (Nansen 2012, p. 44). The Arctic was for long an area which functioned as a "blank canvas upon which the European imagination could project sublime territories and beings", as Duffy (2013, p. 125–126) describes it. It was "shrouded in mystery" into the late nineteenth century (Ibid.).

Since then, there has been a great variation of stories and myths about the region now called Lapland and the North Calotte, located in the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Most of them, however, imagine these areas as the periphery of Europe, a remote, harsh and unforgiving environment, often depicted as 'primitive' (Bærenholdt and Granås 2008). Finnish Lapland has long been depicted as a place of terrifying Noids, witches that could change their embodiment to beasts (Pentikäinen 1995, p. 160–169). These old stories painted a picture of a people of the wilderness who lived in total isolation and poverty.

Still today, many stereotypical portrayals of the Sámi include ideas of a nature people and as exotic and mystic (Ridanpää 2015), ancient and traditional as opposed to the binaries of culture and modernity (Ridanpää 2007; Ryall et al. 2010; Reimerson 2013). This has in many instances placed the Sámi on the outside of "culture" and "politics" of states and as having no agency (Baglo 2014; Nickul 1984; Pääkkönen 2008, p. 211–212). Nature does not do politics; it just goes on its natural course. Scholars have subsequently suggested that this imaginary of the Arctic and its people could be called 'Arcticism', in a similar manner to Edward Said's (1978) 'Orientalism'(e.g. Ridanpää 2007; Ryall et al. 2010). The Nordic states have, also on their part, managed to create an international image as the benign caretakers of the Sámi. Sámi history is presented in a manner in which Sámi people are depicted as nature people who depend on the kindness of the Nordic states (Toivanen 2003).

Up until the 1960s, also the academic interest with indigenous peoples has been on myths, cosmologies, languages and human-animal relations. There is still plenty of scholarship researching these questions. Indigenous peoples and their languages, cultures, traditions, systems of belief, cosmologies, use of plants or relationships with nature, have been the primary object of study. The focus has primarily been on victimhood in global and state politics within a frame of colonialism, while *agency* and more nuanced histories of cultural meetings and local politics have been ignored (Baglo 2014).

3.2 The Arctic as a Treasure Chest and Indigenous Peoples as the Protectors of Nature

Even though the North was imagined as a sublime and dangerous place, it was also seen as a 'cornucopia' (from the Latin term *cornu copiae*, a horn of plenty) and "a resource frontier" (Steinberg et al. 2015, p. 16). The map below by Olaus Magnus (Fig. 3.1), a bishop who travelled in Scandinavia in order to accomplish a map which would describe the life in the Arctic area, is fuelled with imagination of beasts and fantasies of the North. However, one can also depict vessels of transport and business as well as several churches. Lapland of that time was far from being an isolated place. It was another central region of the world and several routes of business crossed it. The two poles of the narrative, possibilities and threats, were present already then.

This imaginary remains still today in many respects; the Arctic is of increasing interest to extractive industries (Arbo et al. 2013; Valkonen 2003, Wilson and Stammler 2016; see also Husebekk et al. 2015; and Lipponen 2015). Forest, water, minerals, oil, gas, and vegetation are all of high economic value and much wanted by governments and transnational companies (Arbo et al. 2013; Wilson and Stammler 2016). Due to exploitation, large areas traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples have turned into unviable wastelands. The waters have been dammed

Fig. 3.1 Map by Olaus Magnus: Carta Marina, 1539

and polluted, forests have been cut and mines have forced people to leave their traditional homes (see Mustonen et al. 2010).

Private global actors are increasingly present on state lands prompting some authors to speak of an incoming or already ongoing land rush (e.g. Arbo et al. 2013). The effects of extractive industries raise concerns for the harm they cause to Arctic environments and local lands and communities (Jokinen 2014; Valkonen 2003, p. 197–198, Wilson and Stammler 2016). Local and indigenous culture and livelihoods; fishing, hunting, gathering and reindeer herding – are highly dependent on land, and it goes without saying that contemporary extractive activities are a great threat to them today (Daes 2005; Jokinen 2014; Revelin 2013; Schanche 2001).

Stammler and Ivanova (2016) use the concept "utilitarian logic": a discursive frame in which natural environments are seen as only of instrumental value – for humans to use for resources. This is a common discourse for international extractive enterprises and states alike, also in the case of Finnish Lapland and the Arctic (Arbo et al. 2013; Valkonen 2003). This utilitarian approach as part of modern state politics is often found dichotomous to indigenous peoples' cosmologies (Stammler and Ivanova 2016): West versus Arctic, ancient versus modern, natural versus political, indigenous cosmology versus western consumerism and individualism and so forth (Pääkkönen 2008, p. 211–212; Valkonen and Valkonen 2014). Today there is an ongoing discursive change regarding the need to preserve the natural environment and to use nature sustainably. Globally and in Finland indigenous peoples have gained a central function in this discourse (Jokinen 2014; Schanche 2001; Valkonen and Valkonen 2014). 'Nature' has come to provide an aspect in the political identity projects of indigenous peoples. In the fight for rights to their lands, being a people of the nature provides a "greater moral right" than others to use their traditional lands (Valkonen and Valkonen 2014, p. 35). This discursive function has also been utilised by environmental movements which use it in their quest to protect vulnerable environments. For example, *Greenpeace* in Finland has often collaborated with Sámi activists in their fight against extractive industries in the Arctic areas of Finland. The website *Valitse Metsät [Choose the Forests]*, (accessible at https://metsat.greenpeace.fi [last visited October 1, 2018]) demonstrates this collaboration (see also Jokinen 2014). In the global discourse, the Sámi, along with other indigenous peoples, have gained a special role as having knowledge of sustainable use of nature (Schanche 2001, Valkonen 2003, p. 178, 190; Valkonen and Valkonen 2014, p. 34–35). This discourse is also prominent for example in the program *Saamelaisten kestävän kehityksen ohjelma* [The Sámi program for sustainable development] issued by the Sámi Parliament in Finland in 2006 (Sámi Parliament 2006).

The dichotomy of the colonising state and economic market powers on the one hand and indigenous peoples on the other is, however, inherently more complex, particularly with regard to the actual local experiences of extractive projects. As Wilson and Stammler (2016) point out, extractive industries often induce hope for economic prosperity and jobs in Arctic areas where the economic situation is often critical: for example, in Finnish Lapland the unemployment rate is 13% in comparison with the national average of 6,5% while in villages it can be over 25% (Statistics Finland 2018). However, even though hope is often raised, many extractive industries

are highly risky since markets fluctuate and are hard to predict. Many forms of extractive projects are not long-term solutions; mines are exhausted and waters go dry of fish. A survey done in Finnish Lapland on local peoples' attitudes towards extractive industries showed that local people who identified as non-Sámi were on average more positive towards new extractive projects (Jokinen 2014). However, Jokinen (2014) points out, that there are many diverging attitudes also among those who identify as Sámi: some were positive towards the consequences of extractive industries on their lives. Furthermore, sustainable use of nature has gained value also in the utilitarian discourse. Jokinen (2014) and Hallikainen et al. (2008) point out, that 'untouched' nature is also seen as having economic value today: nature tourism and also nature livelihoods such as fishing and reindeer herding are a big part of the economic viability of many communities in Lapland today, both for Sámi and non-Sámi inhabitants. For example, Jokinen (2014) remarks that sustainable use of forests is even believed to create more jobs than extractive industries. Thus, a straightforward dichotomy of sustainability versus economic profit or of indigenous peoples versus extractive industries is difficult to uphold (see also Wilson and Stammler 2016).

The success of adopting a utilitarian versus a 'nature people' approach when opposing state and enterprise extractivism diverges. Stammler and Ivanova (2016) found in their study of Arctic local populations and extractive projects that the local populations which had adopted a utilitarian logic were those that managed to make the best deals for themselves when extractive industries entered their lands. On the other hand, cases from Finland show that in collaboration with international organisations such as *Greenpeace*, Sámi communities have managed to put international pressure on industries that want to save their reputation given that nature conservation and sustainability are highly valued norms today (Jokinen 2014). However, being labelled as a traditional 'nature people' causes further difficulties to include contemporary ways of conducting Sámi livelihoods. For example, Valkonen (2003, p. 191–192) demonstrates the contradictions that Sámi face when arguing for their rights to develop reindeer herding while making it a viable industry by the use of 'modern technology' such as snow mobiles. The inclusion of modern technology seem to clash in the public discourse with the arguments of 'traditionalism' and the 'natural universe' into which Sámi culture and livelihoods are situated.

Indigenous peoples' ways of life are not a historical curiosity. Already in 1994, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations confirmed that traditionality and modernity are reconcilable (United Nations 1994). Their livelihoods are strongly connected to the vitality of their cultures and languages, to their well-being today and to their survival in the modern world. After all, the subject matter of debate circles around livelihoods which have adapted to strongly changing environments and which have 'survived' until the present day through the waves and by the help of modernisation.

3.3 Sámi Gaining Political Leverage: The Rise of Sámi Global Rights Discourse & Gaining Voice in Land Rights Issues

Indigenous people's rights slowly took form in post-war Europe, and during the 1960's indigenous movements around the world started to unite (as well described in Saul 2016). The Nordic Sámi Council was established in 1956 and it also participated in the establishment of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Eidheim 1997). At the same time, in international law, the legal category 'indigenous people' took form, and became the core of legal protection for indigenous peoples all around the world (see Niezen 2003). The definition of the category and the answer to the question "Who is indigenous?" is however frequently still debated. The internationally rather widely acknowledged criteria include that the indigenous peoples must have lived in the area before a state was established, have maintained a specific way of life, social structure, livelihoods, habits, traditions, culture and language distinct from the majority population. The moral basis for granting these special differentiated rights is, however, that all indigenous peoples have suffered under political circumstances during which their cultures, languages, religions or beliefs, livelihoods and the spaces for their livelihoods have been compromised or even destroyed on behalf of religious missionaries, state geopolitics, military interventions and wars (see Deschênes 1985; United Nations 2009, p. 1) and, last but not least, due to extractive industries (see Anaya 2011).

Indigenous peoples have consequently gained leverage in their claims for their lands. Extractive industries are themselves becoming more ethically informed also when it comes to the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples (Wilson and Stammler 2016). The Arctic Council has played a central role in the process (Arbo et al. 2013). The several international legal frameworks for the right of indigenous peoples to maintain and foster their culture provide a legal basis for the protection of indigenous peoples lands today (Schanche 2001). For example, the EU Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2016, p. 7) in their proposal regarding further developments of the EU's policy towards the Arctic state that "the EU is ready to work with the Arctic states, indigenous peoples and relevant Arctic regional and multilateral fora to share experience, expertise and information on climate change, impacts, adaptation and resilience".

Also the *Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments Regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities* (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2004) as part of the Convention on Biological Diversity requires that all state plans, also those that further the economies of the state, have to be based on the needs and views of indigenous peoples.

For example, the Finnish state owned company Metsähallitus (2013) published guiding principles for their actions based on the *Akwé:Kon guidelines* in 2013. They now should apply the guidelines on all their plans in the Sámi homeland region. The guidelines today state, that before any project can be carried out, there should be detailed and comprehensive impact assessment done in collaboration with Sámi.

Furthermore, UN Resolution 17/4 on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, adopted without a vote in 2011, is based on the Report *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights* (United Nations 2011). Also the Arctic states' governments have adopted action plans to ensure its full realisation. According to the UN resolution, states have the responsibility to protect their inhabitants from human rights violations by companies and businesses. States are thus responsible for their protection as well as for remedies while companies which do not carry out cultural, environmental and social impact assessments should not be allowed to operate in these countries.

Who are the Arctic indigenous peoples who are protected by these frameworks today? Only four million people live in the Arctic region and approximately 10% of them belong to one of 40 different indigenous peoples, depending on how they are defined (Arctic Centre 2018). Apart from Sámi who live in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northwest Russia, also Nenets, Khanty and Evenk in Russia, Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada, Inuit (Kalaallit) on Greenland and Inuit (Iñupiat), Aleut and Yupik in Alaska are some of the indigenous peoples in the region (Ibid.; see Ethnologue 2018). What then is different with Arctic indigenous peoples when compared with indigenous peoples of other regions of the world? The process of colonisation was different in the European North when compared, for example, with the *indígenas* of Latin America or the Indian tribes of North America. In the Arctic region of the Nordic countries, archaeological and historical linguistic investigations show that the history of inhabitation has not only been that of violent conquest but more a colonialisation of minds (Carpelan 1996; Lehtola 2012, p. 15–17; Semb 2001). Rather, the Arctic indigenous peoples of today are a mixture of diverging population histories. New people have arrived and partly acquired the livelihoods of those already there: hunting, fishing and gathering. Simultaneously, the earlier inhabitants have partly adapted to the livelihoods of the newcomers, such as small-scale agriculture and slash-and-burn agriculture. For example Lehtola (2012, p. 29–30) argues that Sámi language, livelihoods and cultures were diverse and partly isolated from each other, partly engaged in conflict, and partly mixed with each other at the turn of the twentieth century. He argues that at least during the nineteenth century, one cannot yet talk of a unified Sámi identity or cause. The colonisation history of indigenous peoples can therefore, according to Lehtola (2012, p. 29–30), not solely be seen as a straightforward global story of violent conquest. Instead, it has complex regional and local variations.

As I argue elsewhere, however, the claims of Sámi and all other indigenous peoples still rest on this unified narrative of nature people, homogenous, traditional, and ancient with a unified voice, even if this does neither comply completely with history nor current diverse and modern ways of being Sámi (see Toivanen 2001, 2003, 2004).

The main national representative organ for Sámi today is the Sámi Parliament, the main institution through which their voices are being heard. Such parliament exists in Norway, Sweden and Finland respectively. The Russian Sámi parliament is still rather a non-governmental organisation (NGO) than a state-financed institution (Overland and Berg-Nordlie 2012). However, it was the Nordic Council that ignited the need for Sámi Parliaments, and further urged these separate national institutions to form a common, cross-border Sámi Council in order to gain full membership in the Nordic Council (Toivanen 2003, p. 214), which also represents the Sámi in the Arctic Council. Therefore, the Sámi Parliaments are not natural institutions which would have any historical similarity with the *siida*-system of self-governing villages (Toivanen 2007). The Sámi Parliament is rather an invention by the Nordic governments fulfilling a need for a partner for discussion. This a primary example for what Bell (1999) calls "mimesis": the imitation of hegemonic societal structures and discourses in order to get vulnerable communities' voices heard and ensure cultural protection. Even though there is clear research evidence that communities are socially and legally constructed through struggles for rights and resources (Coombe 2011; Huizenga 2018), policy makers and NGOs alike seem to deploy the term 'community' as a primordial, naturally given structure.

Korpijaakko-Labba (1989) argues that also Sámi have had forms of land ownership before the state incorporated their lands. Their historiography depicts Sámi ancestors as rational landowners with an individualistic way of life, who did not form a closed ethnic group but were always cultural hybrids in the modern sense, which does not fit into the picture of 'global indigeneity' (Toivanen 2003, 2016). However, this is often neglected in a rights discourse where Sámi are 'given' land rights and not that land rights that had already existed are being ensured (Schanche 2001). This is yet another way, in which imagining Sámi as having only a 'natural' and given relationship to nature and the environment, has enabled state powers to rule out the 'political' when protecting the 'nature peoples'. It is important to engage with these two opposing postulates in order to identify the influence of the dominant historicism that is elementary to power. This structural power imbalance has helped to keep the Sámi movement at the periphery of modern politics, and entrusted the Sámi Parliaments with cultural but no economic or substantial political autonomy. Thus, the role of the Nordic states in producing a canon of Sámi history has been double-edged: by stressing the harmony in which the Sámi encounter their environment and the disinterest in ownership battles while, at the same time, underlining the distinctiveness of the ethnic group called 'Sámi', it has been easy for the states to declare the forest and field land of Lapland as state property (Korpijaakko-Labba 1989). One could thus suggest that this is still an example of indigenous people being framed as a naturalised people, doomed to the unpolitical.

What then does these discourses of indigeneity and Sámi mean for their political leverage today? In the next section I demonstrate, first, how I believe that Finnish Sámi, concerning land rights issues, are still not listened to by the state and, second, how their power today lies in surpassing the state and finding another international discursive field for their voices.

3.4 Are Sámi Heard by the Finnish Government Today?

From a perspective of international law and international human rights law, it is without any doubt clear that the development of the Arctic area should take place according to the wishes and needs of the local and indigenous peoples. But is this factually the case? And what do the local people in Finnish Lapland think regarding the consideration of their concerns?

Based on a survey done for my research in three Arctic municipalities in the Barents Sea area, Porsanger in Norway (N = 109), Lovozero in the Russian Federation (N = 49) and Inari in Finland (N = 297), 1–9% responded that they trust the Finnish or Norwegian parliaments or the Russian Duma to understand their local concerns. The typical answer in my interviews was, that the people from the South have simply no interest in the fact that there are people living in the Arctic area (see also Jokinen 2014). They have the experience that when Parliamentarians in Oslo, Helsinki and Duma in Moscow spread their fantasies about the Northern Sea Route, they do not take into account that their plans might affect human beings, not to speak of entire cultures. They only talk about these new maritime routes, rail routes and harbours as responses to the global market. Climate change in this discourse is partly seen as an enabler, as it opens up new shipping pathways in the Arctic.

Let us now look at public discourse on extractive issues in the Arctic. Rather recently, a group of experts, on behalf of the governments of Finland, Sweden and Norway, issued a report with a very telling name: *Growth from the North – How can Norway, Sweden and Finland achieve sustainable growth in the Scandinavian Arctic?* (Husebekk et al. 2015). Already the title constructs the states as active subjects and the Arctic as an object from which they can retrieve treasures. The report frames the need for emancipation of local communities and indigenous peoples in the Arctic as follows:

> We believe that sustainable growth in the High North is a prerequisite for sustainable communities – and vice versa. Without investment and new growing businesses in various sectors there will be no jobs, no houses being built, no ground for communities to flourish. And without flourishing communities our Scandinavian Arctic will become an empty husk, a treasury of resources to be emptied or a vast nature reserve with little significance to people and development outside the region. If we truly want to see the Scandinavian Arctic as part of our future success stories, then both sustainable growth and sustainable communities are needed (Husebekk et al. 2015, p. 12).

In a very telling way, the report argues in this example, that the North is helped only in order for it to help ‘us’. The Arctic is turned into a treasury of resources, and a ‘part of our future success stories’. In this equation, the thriving of local populations has a mere instrumental value: it needs to be protected in order to keep the lands and its treasures sustained. The extract above also depicts the Arctic as an area under the threat of disaster: of becoming an empty treasure chest. The report further emphasises the ‘uncertainties’ of the North when stating that “[t]he potential for sustainable growth in the Arctic is great, but there are significant uncertainties as well” (Ibid., p. 9). The report further explains, that Arctic growth is facilitated primarily

through business cooperation with the neighbouring countries, without which development is not possible. The companies must join forces to build power lines, roads and hotels, and develop mining technologies in all three countries. Indigenous peoples are scarcely referred to in the report and they are merely mentioned as parties of the "open dialogue" the report aims for (Ibid., p. 18).

Another example is from a report issued by Former Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo Lipponen, who was commissioned to write a report reflecting the EU's interest to become a member of Arctic Council and the role of Finland in this process. The report *A strategic vision for the North – Finland's prospects for economic growth in the Arctic region* (Lipponen 2015) mentions Sámi peoples twice: in rather laconic style, the report says that the Sámi peoples' and NGO's possibility to influence have to be secured. None of his 10 key recommendations has anything to do with the people living in the Arctic area.

Another issue related to getting local and Sámi voices heard in Finnish Lapland today is related to regionality. In Fig. 3.2, one can see how the former areas of Sámi home territory has shrunk over the course of just a few decades.

The southernmost line, the light green area, shows the reindeer herding area in Finland. In this area, reindeer herding is allowed regardless of land ownership or right of possession according to § 3 of the Reindeer Husbandry Act (848/ 1990). In these areas reindeer herding has traditionally been a livelihood. According to the Reindeer Husbandry Act (848/ 1990) § 53, the state has to consult reindeer herders in the hole reindeer herding area when land use plans are made which may have an significant impact on reindeer herding.

The black line, above the southern line of the reindeer herding area, indicates the area north of which the traditional Sámi villages, the *siidas*, existed. The dark green area above that line, is the area *specifically* intended for reindeer herding. According to § 2 of the Reindeer Husbandry Act (848/1990), the lands in this area are not allowed to be used in ways which can significantly harm reindeer herding. Also according to the Mining Act (621/2011), reindeer herders in the area specifically intended for reindeer herding have to be consulted before mining can take place.

The yellow area shows the Sámi homeland area, where the Sámi today have self-governance in matters of language and culture. The Finnish Ministry of the Environment (Ympäristöministeriö 2011) has ruled, that land use in the Sámi homeland area should follow the voluntary *Akwé:Kon guidelines*. For example, the state owned company *Metsähallitus* (2013, formerly the Forest and Park Service), has to consult the Sámi Parliament before allowing forestry to take place in the Sámi homeland area. Even though the emphasis in the guidelines are on the protection of Sámi culture and language, also 'local communities' are mentioned in the guidelines. As Koivurova et al. (2015) show, the Sámi homeland area has quite high protection against mining projects. As the mining registry upheld by the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (accessible at http://gtkdata.gtk.fi/kaivosrekisteri/ [last visited October 1, 2018]) shows, just a little bit south of the Sámi homeland area there is geographically an extensive increase in mining and several reservations for future mining. At the same time, this is the area where many people who self-identify as



Fig. 3.2 Map of the current administrative areas related to Sámi rights in Finland

indigenous peoples live but without any kind of protection or nobody to convey their concerns to those in power. By thus pushing the 'Sámi territory' north, the state has managed to gain the highest say in areas which have traditionally been used by Sámi, and where many Sámi still today live.

3.5 Learning the Correct Vocabulary – A Case Study

During my ethnographic work in different regions on the Barents Sea area, it has become clear that the only way for Sámi today to get their voices heard is by adopting the international discourse of human rights and the international discourse of indigeneity. It needs to be said that it is a very effective way to raise a voice through the United Nations mechanisms and through international human rights and environmental NGOs. To demonstrate this translation of legal concepts a real-life situation from Inari, Finland, serves as a case study.

Elias (pseudonym) is a reindeer herder in Inari, in Upper Lapland in Finland. He does not make his living solely on reindeer herding, but it constitutes an important part of his salary. He and his brothers are some of the last members of the indigenous people of Sámi who feed their reindeer only naturally which means that they do not feed them additional hay and forage. In 2005, the Finnish Forest industry company *Metsähallitus* planned to cut down the trees in a forest that was an excellent winter grazing area for Elias' reindeer herds. Elias aired his protest to the municipal authorities and in the local public. As he did not receive any sufficient support, he aired his complain directly to *Metsähallitus* and in the Ministry for Agriculture. Finally he sought legal solution at the local court. He did not only find support among other Sámi people but especially among other indigenous people in Canada and the USA, among environmental activists of *Greenpeace* but also among academics and artists.

He protested against a decision by *Metsähallitus* to cut down forests on an important winter-grazing area, which, since the forest was needed for traditional Sámi reindeer herding, was from his perspective an impossible decision. At first, unfairness lay at the core of his arguments. He stressed that the decision would be inherently unfair since it would endanger his livelihood and the traditional Sámi way of living. He referred to the Finnish Constitution that guarantees special rights and protection to the Sámi as an indigenous people, and to the Law on Cultural Autonomy enacted in 1995. He argued that if he was no longer able to feed his reindeer in a traditional manner naturally, this would mean that his right to living based on his traditions as Sámi would be denied. When he received more and more external support for his matter, his argument and the arguments used by his supporters started to shift slightly but significantly: his matter of concern was now formulated in a language of universal human rights and the emphasis was now placed on the matter that it was his human right as a member of indigenous community was fighting against the forest industry, his reindeer cooperative – and administrative unit – decided that he has too many reindeers and his reindeers should be slaughtered. He felt that the cooperative did not understand his way of 'natural reindeer breeding' which did not include additional feeding of hey to the animals in winter and therefore argued that he was treated unfairly and wrong.

Notably, when basing his arguments on (un)fairness his possibilities to be heard at the local, national and international arenas were meagre. This was quite the opposite when he used a human rights-based argumentation: he received the attention of

the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous matters, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, and the expert of the UN Secretary General for Human Rights, Hina Jilani, both wrote a letter to the Finnish government in which they inquired what Finland plans to do about the forced slaughter. Also the Finnish League for Human Rights took the position that Elias and his brothers should be protected. The feeling of unfairness did not change but as a consequence followed by the interaction with human rights organisations and activists Elias changed the way in which he from now on argued his case.

What led to this change in the line of argumentation? *Greenpeace*, lawyers of the Sámi Parliament, his friends from other first nations in Canada and others taught him another way of protesting, a way that was much more effective and ultimately more triumphant way than writing to local authorities or newspapers: when the protest was formulated in human rights language, it became very effective. To reinterpret experiences and feelings of wrong treatment and unfair codes of conduct means that the personal, individual experience is carried over to an institutionalised and regulated framework of interpretation – one has to take distance to the own agenda, give up those experiences for which there is no legal basis in the human rights discourse and stress those experiences where the articles of the human rights treaties find words.

3.6 Conclusion: A New Narrative of Emancipation or Still an Imposed Imaginary?

The case of Elias, the reindeer herder, fighting against the powerful forest industry company in order to guarantee his livelihood shows that an experience of unfairness, when translated into another language, namely to the language of human rights, obtains a new meaning and weight. The judicially pre-structured conditions decide in a way, which aspects of the given experience should be stressed.

To conclude, the fantasies about the Arctic, how the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are or should be, are part of a grand narrative of Arctic lives. The indigenous peoples of the Arctic were forced to start talking and even thinking of themselves in terms that may be contradictory to what they really are and wish to be. The international discourse on indigenous peoples' rights is, of course, on the one side the story of advancing human rights and a story of emancipation. On the other hand, however, the indigenous peoples of the North have come to accept the politics of representation that stresses their internal homogeneity, ties them to a narrative of history that represents them as a people who have lived in total isolation, with unchanged livelihoods, one culture and one language. They are confided in imaginaries of 'the nature people'. This is of course not to say that nature and lands are not integral to Sámi and local people's lives and culture – they are. However, new ways of being Sámi on the individual's terms are being limited.

Who is fostering these kind of constraints? For example in the Nordic countries and in Russia, the narrative emphasises reindeer herding as a key profession of Sámi (even though merely ca. 5% of Sámi are reindeer herders). Sámi peoples actually never were one people. The need to speak with one voice, the need to show cultural and even mental unity, is just another form of cultural colonisation: it was the Nordic states that pushed for establishing Sámi institutions such as parliaments in order to have an institutional counterpart. It was in case of Finland of great state interest to shrink the home area of Sámi to such a small area. Now when we have an on-going debate on who has the right to call herself or himself Sámi in Finland, few realise that also this debate or friction was brought to them from outside. So, to be allowed to be Sámi and represent the Sámi, you have to please the dominant stereotypes on how Sámi are.

Human rights are a legal framework of hope for fairness and justice. Yet they are prone to be exploited for misuse. This is because they are not born out of a vacuum but also within the strongest interests of prevailing governments. After all, it is states that are to implement/monitor international human rights law. Human rights law cannot not easily be separated from international politics (Koskeniemi 2011). As Elenius (2008) argues, the Cap of the North also bears cases of internal colonialism in the post-colonial sense: these structures are visible in the discursive tug of war between different local interests, between minority movements and states, between the local and global, and between the states as well as international institutions. I argue that this is something that should be paid attention to: it was the policies of Nordic countries towards Sámi populations, influenced by international standards of minority rights that essentialised and homogenised the diverse Sámi cultures. Creating an image of the homogeneous, group-centred, and changeless nature of the pre-modern Sámi society made them eligible for the rights of indigenous people. However, the global identity project called 'indigeneity' has induced local tensions and conflicts around the question of who is allowed to embrace this global name.

The indigenous movement is becoming stronger and at the same time increasingly more global. Due to the unprecedented level of modern communication, indigenous populations around the world are uniting and acting in a concerted fashion. The links between groups separated by borders of states, are now accessible via high speed internet, at least for those who share a common language. This evokes a belief in post-nation states politics and to sovereignty that a peoples, such as Sámi living in four different countries, could reach together. However, already in 1995 Jeff Corntassel and Tomas Hopkins Primeau (1995, p. 363) wrote on indigenous sovereignty, that "[c]o-opting the term sovereignty to fit indigenous perspectives of autonomous freedom has done far more harm than good." Why is this?

In my research this boils down to the paradox of rights: the establishment of Sámi parliaments, cultural and language autonomies, different (hundreds) paragraphs in legislation, policy programs etc. seem like a grand story of emancipation of a people, a nation. Even so, one can be still with reason sceptical regarding whether this is the whole story or whether it should be interpreted as part of majority power, control and their invitation to imitate the nation state's structures.

This is one special danger in the field of minority rights and in the field of rights of indigenous peoples; those who have best served the agenda of those in power: adapted to the right forms of self-representation and gained a self-evident place for representing the minority, may be blind (innocently) or ignorant (with purpose) for minorities inside their 'group'. The reason being that they try so hard to please the expectations that governing diversity and accepting the unknown unknowns (Chandler 2014, p. 50). This becomes untenable: they fear that accepting a more heterogeneous form of group would endanger all the rights gained today. Whereas one can ask whether the indigenous peoples' rights discourse have managed to emancipate the people they aim to protect, it must be acknowledged that the internationalisation of the indigenous agenda, as described in this article, has given representatives or activists of indigenous peoples unprecedented power to go against the governments of the countries they live in. According my observation, for example in Finland, the people working in the ministries are clearly afraid of upsetting the Sámi Parliament because this has already many times led to the intervention by the UN Special Rapporteur of Indigenous Issues or by other international institutions.

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Part II
From Homestead to Homeland

Chapter 4
Cultural Heritage, or How Bad News Can Also Be Good

Susan Barr

Abstract The material cultural heritage of the High Arctic encompasses evidence of both indigenous and non-indigenous presence all over the area. Indeed, the term "Arctic wilderness" in the popularly-accepted understanding of areas that are untouched by humans, scarcely exists. Humans have left their mark all over the tundra in the form of unnatural stone arrangements that might have been a camping site from a few thousand years ago or a sign to show the way, mounds that indicate a collapsed dwelling site, or piles of animal and fish bones where a small group of families had their village long ago. In areas with no indigenous population, such as the archipelago of Norwegian Svalbard, humans first began their resource-exploiting activities in the early seventeenth century, and successive waves of hunters, explorers, prospectors, scientists and tourists have left behind the ruins and relics that we today consider to be heritage worthy of protection as sources of interest, appreciation and, not least, knowledge into the past.

Climate change is challenging the preservation of the Arctic cultural heritage as coastal erosion and milder, wetter and wilder weather conditions break down what was once protected by a dry and frozen climate. Work to protect and manage the heritage sites can seem as depressing as the stories of diminishing and threatened polar bear populations. However, also here there are several sides to the story and this chapter will present some of the positive results and implications of the climate change scenario on Arctic cultural heritage. These include enhanced understanding of the "population" of heritage sites and thereby of the whole history of the High Arctic, as well as increased international research and cooperation which has brought professionals in Arctic and Antarctic fields closer together.

Keywords Cultural heritage · Svalbard · Tourism · Threats · Positive developments

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4.1 Introduction – Cultural Heritage Attracts Travellers

A rather random and not very scientific glance through several websites advertising Arctic Cruises and Arctic Expedition Cruises indicates that polar bears and "untouched wilderness" dominate as bait to catch the eye of the expectant holiday planner. Surprisingly there is little immediate information about the wealth of historical sites that in practice often are the goals for many of the shore excursions that such cruises contain. One website describes the experience thus:

Each day is planned to take advantage of local ice and weather conditions. Svalbard is one of the few places on the planet to offer such a plethora of natural and historical extravaganzas [this author's underlining]. Spend the next 9 days exploring the remote polar regions. Visit ice-sculpted fjords with breathtaking mountain scenery, and glaciers crashing into the sea. Spend time exploring pack ice edges in search of polar bears hunting seals. At one or more of the stops, it's possible to encounter Svalbard's Arctic fox and the region's unique reindeer (*G-Adventures* 2018).

As we see it is mainly the plethora of natural extravaganzas that is meant to lure the tourists into the company's net. However, with more experience of the Arctic it is possible to argue that the term "Arctic wilderness" in the popularly-accepted understanding of areas that are untouched by humans, scarcely exists and that those nature seekers who go ashore at various sites will almost inevitably also be exposed to cultural heritage. The Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard has been rapidly increasing as a cruise destination for many years now. The number of passengers who are put ashore at sites around the archipelago outside the main settlement areas increased from 29,340 in 1996 to 84,104 in 2015 (MOSJ 2017). The coastal areas are dotted with remains of human activities dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century when whalers — mainly Dutch and English — established land stations at suitable bays and beaches. They were followed in rapid succession by other temporary inhabitants in search of other resources for hunting and trapping or for mineral exploitation. Scientists and explorers have also left their mark and even World War II did not leave this once-remote archipelago alone. Further inland, in the areas that are not covered by glaciers, there are naturally enough fewer cultural heritage sites, but even so one can here and there find evidence that others have been there before, be it land surveyors' cairns or remains from prospecting or scientific work.

In the larger areas of the Arctic that have had an indigenous population for thousands of years the tundra can be dotted with stone formations from paleo-Eskimo dwelling sites, cairns that point the way along ancient hunting or migration routes, mounds of turf, large bones and stones that indicate a collapsed dwelling, middens (historic 'rubbish dumps') of fish, bird and animal bones where a small group of families stayed for a longer time. Very often it takes a trained eye to spot and interpret these historical sites that cannot match the splendour of castles and cathedrals in other areas, but which are equally important and irreplaceable for their ability to help us understand and appreciate the past in this region.

Despite the glimpse into cruise websites mentioned above, experience shows that nature is not enough for many cruise operators to offer their guests. If an historical site is to be found on the way, it will inevitably become the event of the day. According to the reports on *TripAdvisor*, this can strike the tourists in quite different ways. For example from the ruined Norse stone church on Hvalsey, south Greenland, a selection of reviews (TripAdvisor Undated) tell us:

> It is a cool place for history lovers. Viking era and viking trails. You will enjoy the scenery of the beautiful Greenland

> The ruins are interesting if you are "into" that sort of thing. It is certainly not worth a trip to Greenland just to see these.

> A trip to Hvalsey church is well worth the effort. The ruin itself may not be as impressive as buildings of similar age in Europe, but this is more than made up for by its stunning location at the end of a fjord.

What the wealth of websites offering cruises and other tourist visits to the Arctic *can* tell us is that the Arctic, and particularly the High Arctic, has been opened up to tourism in a way never known before. It is not necessary to delve deep into the climate statistics for most people to have gathered by now that the Arctic is warming and that there is less sea ice. As a result of this, cruise ships now sail where only ice-strengthened ships previously could go with any degree of safety and success. In 2010, Norwegian polar expeditioner Børge Ousland with three companions sailed a glass-fibre catamaran through both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passages, thus circumnavigating the Arctic in one season (Amtrup 2010). At the same time the Russian sailing boat *Peter I*, with Captain Gavrilov and crew, also completed the circumnavigation (Dormer 2010). One hundred years earlier it would have taken the specially-designed and built ships such as Fridtjof Nansen's *Fram* and Roald Amundsen's *Maud* about 6 years to manage the same.

So now we are getting to the crux of the matter. Climate change and increasing tourism go hand in hand, and with them go the extra impacts on the cultural heritage in the Arctic today. Tourism to the Arctic is not new. Gentlemen travellers in their own or hired yachts were sailing to Jan Mayen and Svalbard at the end of the nineteenth century both for the travelling experience, for hunting (walrus and reindeer were popular trophies in addition to polar bears) and not least for the collecting of facts about the geography and nature of the areas; anything they could record was new information. Lord Dufferin's "Letters from High Latitudes" describes just one example of such a trip and this travelogue achieved great and international success in its time (Dufferin 1857). "Package tourism" for the relatively wealthy without their own yachts rapidly followed, and not least spectacular exploration expeditions such as the Swedish balloon expedition led by S.A. Andrée which attempted to fly from Virgohamna in northwest Svalbard to the North Pole in 1896 and 1897 drew boatloads of tourists to the area both at this time and later. The same Virgohamna was the scene for American journalist Walter Wellman's more or less serious attempts to fly to the North Pole by airship in 1906, '07 and '09. Remains of both Andrée's and Wellman's base camps litter the bay today and are since 1974

(Andrée's) and 1992 (Wellman's) protected by the cultural heritage law for Svalbard. The fixed and movable objects and artefacts shall neither be disturbed, damaged or removed. Norwegian Arctic scientist and leader of the Fram expedition across the Arctic Ocean in 1893–1896, Fridtjof Nansen, visited Virgohamna during a scientific cruise to Svalbard with his own yacht in 1920 and noted:

The most of useful and valuable objects, particularly of metal, had by now I presume been plundered, but there was still much left – trappers and tourists had not yet managed to get it all (p. 145). […] And then the tourists come here and scratch their names everywhere, and help themselves to souvenirs (Own translation; Nansen 1920, p. 145, 146).

4.2 A Pan-Arctic Population of Cultural Heritage Sites

The Arctic is full of history, stretching over thousands of years and leaving behind a wealth of cultural heritage sites that are current witnesses to the stories of the past. Despite their often extreme modesty in an overwhelming natural landscape, the sites are as important to the complete history of mankind as are more imposing sites such as the pyramids in north Africa and South America. Without the Arctic sites we would know far less about the spread of mankind from Asia, across the high north of Alaska and Canada, and down the coasts of Greenland. It would be difficult to piece together the history of the earliest peoples who appeared and disappeared as living conditions tipped back and forth from the barely possible to the impossible. It would in addition be difficult for us to imagine and understand how early entrepreneurs scraped their living in a climate that cost hundreds of explorers their lives (Barr et al. 2013).

Broadly speaking the cultural heritage of the Arctic has two main categories: indigenous heritage and the heritage which has its origins in cultures further south, usually from individuals or smaller groups which moved north mainly to exploit natural resources by hunting, trapping, fishing, whaling and mining, but also for other purposes such as exploration, research and social work. The many-facetted cultural sites and landscapes of the Arctic have values that are important to people, from the individual to the international level. They are our main source of knowledge of how humans interacted with the Arctic nature over time. They reflect the motives behind this interaction and the ways in which the Arctic has been understood and interpreted. They are the inspiration for stories of human endeavours and achievements. For indigenous peoples they are also associated with both the intangible heritage and contemporary living, thus forming a basis for self-definition and sense of place in an historical context that stretches into the future (Ibid., p. 6, 7).

Internationally significant Arctic sites have qualities that are different from many other sites around the world that are recognised as internationally important. They tend to be less recognisable as physical structures and they challenge the notion of

culture as being separate from nature. At the same time they are not hidden by the growth of higher vegetation and by later cultural layers, and the climatic conditions have up to recent time ensured a remarkable preservation of organic materials not seen further south. In addition, the sites that represent the early exploration of the Arctic have gained a mythical quality that has been disseminated in art and literature through many generations (Ibid., p. 7).

The high Arctic territories belong to five different nations: Russia, Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland), Canada and USA. Each nation has its own laws and policies relating to cultural heritage. A complete inventory of the "population" of cultural heritage sites is as difficult to obtain as a scientific estimate of the total population of polar bears as explained by the Polar Bear Specialist Group (PBSG):

> For the 14 subpopulations with scientific estimates, the sum of the mid-point estimates is 18,349 bears (….). The PBSG expects that the number of bears ranges from several hundreds to a few thousands [this author's underlinings] in each of the subpopulations in Chukchi, Kara, Laptev and East Greenland, bringing the midpoint estimate to approximately 25,000 (PBSG 2014).

Fixed cultural heritage sites should reasonably be easier to count than wandering bears, but there can be differences of methodology, definition and access to information that make a total estimate difficult also here. The Law on Environmental Protection for the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard (Norway 2001) sets 1.1.1946 as the cut-off date for automatic legal protection of all fixed and moveable cultural heritage regardless of provenience and condition (Ibid., § 39). Therefore, there can be protected rubbish dumps from activities during World War II or from international scientific activities pre-dating 1946 that have the same level of recognition and protection as the remains of early seventeenth century whaling stations or early nineteenth century hunters' and trappers' simple wintering cabins. This all-encompassing status of automatic legal protection with pre-1946 as the cut-off dating makes as a starting point a potentially uneven definition of cultural heritage in a pan-Arctic connection where other national cultural heritage regimes have their own definitions of cultural heritage worthy of legal protection. In Svalbard a total of 2684 legally-protected heritage sites and monuments have been registered in Askeladden, the national database of protected cultural heritage throughout Norway (Directorate for Cultural Heritage, Norway). This number includes two younger complexes: a large system from the 1950s to 1960s for coal transportation from the mines to the shipping quay and a scientific station from the International Geophysical Year 1957–1958 consisting of 10 separate buildings. It does, however, open for the question as to whether a site containing several monuments is to be counted as one or several. As an example, if a seventeenth century whalers' graveyard is registered as one site, but contains 20 graves, how will the diminishing of the site through coastal erosion — i.e. separate graves being gradually washed into the sea — be registered? By not registering each grave separately it can be difficult to quantify the actual loss.

In contrast, the Greenlandic Cultural Heritage Law (Greenland 2010) sets 1900 as the cut-off date for automatic protection, which excludes the Danish and Norwegian hunter/trapper cabins from the 1920s to 1940s that are a large feature of the protected Svalbard heritage. These cabins in both areas were established by the same types of people in the same time period and using similar designs and materials. It must be mentioned, however, that the cabins in northeast Greenland are to a great extent restored in recent years by a private interest group and with the permission of the heritage authorities.

In other regions of the Arctic the component of indigenous heritage is naturally large and can consist not only of the remains of longer- or shorter-term dwelling sites, but also of hunting, burial sites and spiritual practices. These remains can date from as far back in time as several thousand years BC. Specific examples are the alpine ice patch sites in Yukon and Northwest Territories, Canada which are evidence of caribou hunting that has been radiocarbon dated to more than 9000 years ago (Hare et al. 2004), and the caribou-hunting driveline cairns (inuksuk) and tent rings dated to over 4000 years ago that cover a large area of the Agiak Lake district of Alaska (National Park Service 2018).

4.3 Threats to the Arctic's Cultural Heritage

The long-held axiom of the cultural heritage in the Arctic being 'frozen in time' is suffering badly now under the effects of climate change. The axiom became particularly famous in 1987 when a book was published about autopsies that were performed in 1984 and '86 on the corpses that had been buried on Beechey Island during Sir John Franklin's disastrous Northwest Passage expedition in 1845. One hundred and forty years after the burials it was still possible to recognise the corpses and their clothing and take samples of hair and soft tissues for analysis (Beattie and Geiger 1987). Negative effects relating to cultural heritage of the warmer, wilder and wetter Arctic climate are seen through the lack of sea ice causing more coastal erosion, the thawing permafrost that disturbs structure foundations and exposes buried organic material to degradation, more rot and mould destroying wood, more stormy weather that damages fragile structures, and more visitation as mentioned in the *Introduction* above.

A map of the 100 most prioritised legally protected cultural heritage sites in Svalbard shows that they without exception are located around the coast (Sandodden 2013, p. 8). Similarly, this applies to many of the Arctic sites. This was a result of logistical and geographical circumstances: access and appropriate resources were to be found near the coast and people found little reason to travel inland. However, as the increasing lack of sea ice, also in winter, removes the barrier against wave erosion that the land-fast ice edge previously could provide throughout much of the summer and certainly the winter, and as wave action itself increases due to more

stormy weather in the Arctic, so does the coastal area around the whole Arctic suffer from increased erosion (Parry 2011). Thus in turn the coastline moves closer and closer to the cultural heritage sites which ultimately erode into the sea. The erosion can be greatly accelerated in areas with larger ice layers or lenses within the permafrost when the exposed ice thaws and the bonding effect of the ice within the ground sediments is lost.

Away from the coast thawing permafrost can add to the stress on cultural heritage by destabilising the foundations of buildings and structures. Many of the simple, but historically important wooden buildings left by trappers, prospectors, explorers and others in the Arctic were established directly on the frozen ground. As the climate becomes relatively milder and wetter, the wood is exposed to deterioration from rot and mould. This is not necessarily a new situation, but an accelerated one in the new climatic conditions.

And again, sites and monuments that have rested in peace from visitation through decades and centuries are now increasingly becoming goals for individuals and groups as the barrier the sea ice once presented retreats. Most visitors do of course not intend to have a negative impact, but both the sites and the vegetation and terrain around them are often highly sensitive to even a few boots which can inadvertently dislodge small plants which have protected or stabilised the site, and crush already degrading wooden remains of structures or artefacts. In addition, some few visitors are quite obviously oblivious or indifferent to the damage they do, perhaps by applying graffiti or with careless handling of artefacts or even by taking away "souvenirs" from sites.

4.4 A Dismal Picture or a Background to More Positive News?

We could stop here now and state that the present situation for Arctic cultural heritage is gloomy and the future is probably disastrous. But would this be the whole truth? Happily, even though admitting that the description above is correct, it is still possible to add more details to the picture to make the story both more positive and more complete. The following are areas that can give encouragement to those who are concerned about the state of the Arctic cultural heritage population. Listed in random order they are:

- Increased attention to preserving the remaining cultural heritage
- Increased historical information
- Technological advances
- Natural sciences enhanced by the humanities
- More attention given to indigenous and local knowledge
- Arctic and Antarctic heritage professionals developing cooperation and exchanges

4.4.1 *Increased Attention to Preserving the Remaining Cultural Heritage*

Joni Mitchell sang "Don't it always seem to go / That you don't know what you've got / Till it's gone" (Mitchell 1970), lyrics that it might be tempting for Arctic cultural heritage managers to have as a daily reminder. Luckily the impacts of climate change that are described above have both heightened awareness of the risk of losing invaluable heritage monuments and sites, and also given impetus to actions to save as much as possible before it may be too late. This is not to say that little was done beforehand, but to highlight that the situation today encourages new and expanded action in addition to the steady work that has taken place over many years.

In the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago, where this author has worked for many years, discovering and registering heritage monuments and sites began in a small way in the late 1970s following the first legal protection act in 1974 of all cultural heritage pre-dating 1900. Gradual appreciation of the actual population of international cultural heritage around the islands led to the cut-off date being changed to 1946 in 1992 and to a steady expansion of resources both to continue registering around the islands and to set the political ambition of less than 0.1% annual loss of cultural heritage monuments (Sandodden et al. 2013, p. 50). Without knowing what you have to start with, you cannot measure the loss. So the work to complete registration of sites and improve the quality of the database has been prioritised and is steadily being refined. At a conference on research in Svalbard held outside Oslo, Norway, in November 6–8 2017, where 300 scientists from all over the world met, the recurring theme was the need for cooperation and coordination in order to address the current global challenges. Sharing of data and open access to databases was also a major theme along the same lines (Barr, personal observation). A hope for the future is that national databases of cultural heritage around the Arctic can be made available to give us a complete overview as a basis for combined efforts to protect a representative selection of monuments and sites in the best possible way.

As a step towards international agreement on the need for and methods of protecting the cultural heritage of the Arctic, this author suggested and ultimately led during 2010–2013 a project within the auspices of the Arctic Council's Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). The project to assess internationally significant cultural heritage sites around the whole Arctic and to recommend best practice for site management was born as a result of the increasing High Arctic tourism and interest in visiting famous historical sites such as the Franklin Beechey Island graves mentioned above. The project group consisted of experts from Norway (including the Sámi cultural sphere), Greenland, USA, Canada and Russia with additional input from the Netherlands (which has important Arctic sites), Sweden, the Aleut International Association, Finland and the Faroe Islands (Barr et al. 2013).

The Arctic Council's *Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation*, which was signed at the Fairbanks Ministerial meeting on 11 May 2017 (Arctic Council 2017) will hopefully be able to enhance further cooperation directed towards acknowledging and protecting the cultural heritage of the Arctic in

addition to facilitating scientific cooperation in the disciplines which traditionally receive the most attention.

4.4.2 Increased Historical Information

It follows naturally from the work of registering and considering the cultural heritage as mentioned in the examples of the previous paragraph, that the need arises to research further into the origins and meaning of the sites that are discovered or found worthy to be entered into national databases of Arctic monuments and sites. A pile of stones may be from an historical dwelling site or it may indicate a grave or a cache. There is also the challenge of dating many of the remains of human activity owing to the fact of a longer preservation time in the Arctic climate and the limited diversity of materials at hand. Expert analysis and historical research is needed to be able to categorise according to age, cultural type (for example the various early Inuit cultures in Greenland), provenience of sites from visiting cultures such as explorers and resource exploiters. A simple wooden cabin or a tent ring of stones can appear at first sight to be of a significant age for protection, but with investigation into historical accounts and archives can be shown to be relatively recent.

Not least the fact that tourism to the High Arctic continues to increase leads heritage managers to act not only by introducing regulations and limitations, but to a large degree also by presenting the visitors and the tourism operators with as much information about the various historical sites as possible. Once a visitor is told or can read that this or that site was actually the very place where an important historical event took place, or is an amazingly preserved example of the will and the way to survive under far more severe climatic conditions than one meets today, then in almost all cases he/she will treat the sites with reverence and care, taking only away some photographs and a memory of a unique experience relating our own time to events long past.

In this situation of need-to-know and need-to-inform, the historical information around the various monuments and sites in the Arctic continues to grow and in turn provides material for more popular books about the history of the Arctic which hopefully in their turn increase serious interest in the region. An inspiring idea for the future would be a “David Attenborough type” documentary series that could be made about the treasures of Arctic heritage sites and the challenges facing them.

4.4.3 Technological Advances

Television documentaries can perhaps be squeezed into the category of technological advances considering the revolutionary ways in which they now can portray their subjects. Regardless of this, new technology is also bringing advantages to

cultural heritage work in the Arctic. Repair and restoration are traditional methods of protecting and prolonging the life of buildings and structures. In seldom cases actual moving of a monument such as a small building threatened by erosion has also been used. In April 2015 a highly-prioritised trapping station from 1927 in Svalbard — *Fredheim* — consisting of a main house and two smaller buildings, was moved 37 m further in from the shoreline. Measurements of the rate of erosion started at the site in 1987, when the main house then stood 17.7 m from the edge. In 2011 the distance had shortened to 8.74 m (Sandodden et al. 2013, p. 71). Already in 2001, the oldest hut in the complex, which by then lay only 3 m from the erosion edge and was in obvious danger of falling into the sea, was moved 6 m back from the edge. While measurements in 2012 showed that the main house stood 8.5 m from the edge, in 2014 it was only 6 m away. The only alternative to letting the monument go was to move it.

Monitoring the effects of natural impacts such as erosion and degradation of wooden materials, and of human-caused impacts such as wear and tear on the heritage sites and surrounding vegetation, is an important method and such work will continue. Attention is increasingly being paid to the use of new technology in this respect. Drones can be sent to monitor sites and measure changes such as erosion increase without the operator having to set her own boots on the ground. *Historic England* describes the varied uses of drones thus:

Drones provide a useful low-level aerial platform for recording historic buildings, monuments, archaeological sites and landscapes. They can carry a wide variety of sensors including cameras, multi/hyperspectral imaging units, and even laser scanners. Drones can provide dramatic illustrative photographs of sites, but can also be used to create metrically accurate records for survey and conservation work (Historic England 2018).

In Cajamarquilla, the largest mud city on the Peruvian central coast dating back to 600 and 730 AD, drones are used to keep track of damage and invasions from human or natural causes, in order to gain a clearer understanding of the threats and develop prevention plans (livinginperu.com 2015). Many other examples exist around the globe, including from Arctic sites where erosion is particularly in focus (Geens 2016).

In addition, the development of monitoring satellites that cover the Arctic area opens a new and promising field of possibilities for remote information gathering. The European Union *Copernicus* Programme is exciting in this respect. It is aimed at developing European information services based on satellite earth observation and in situ (non-space) data (Copernicus Undated). The introduction of remote-sensing tools opens a whole new world of cultural heritage monitoring in remote environments and gives the opportunity for far more intensive studies of particular sites without the detrimental accompaniments that traditional expeditions to the areas unavoidably give, including air and sea transport emissions and direct human impact on the sites.

A further technological advancement that has been introduced to and embraced by heritage professionals is the use of scanning technology. Detailed measurements, photographs, scaled drawings and written descriptions have been the staple methods of documentation of monuments and sites. To enable this documentation to speak for itself, independent of the actual object in question, extreme care and accuracy are required which in turn means time and other resources spent in the field in gathering the documentation. By using 3D laser scanning, extremely complicated heritage sites can be captured in a short time by a pair of operators. Work on the data collected admittedly takes time, expertise and appropriate software and computer capacity in the aftermath for large collections, but this work is done back in the office and the actual field time is short and effective. This author has been involved in the total scanning of the complicated industrial and now deserted whaling stations on South Georgia in sub-Antarctica where two operators have used only a few days in the field to cover an entire station inside and out. One example can be found on *YouTube* (Geometria Ltd. 2015). Since the state of these derelict stations precludes normal visitation without special permission from the island authorities and special asbestos-protection clothing, the scanning results can be used not only for virtual visits and tours of the historical whaling stations, but also for a variety of research projects concerned for example with station layout and architecture, land use, more general whaling history and for examining details of buildings and structures perhaps with regard to possible protection of specific elements.

The technique has come to the High Arctic as well. In 2010 a laser scan was made of the historical site of Fort Conger at Lady Franklin Bay, Ellesmere Island, Canada. The paper written about the project explains that:

> Fort Conger is currently at risk because of the effects of climate change, weather, wildlife, and human activity. In this paper, we show how 3D laser scanning was used to record cultural features rapidly and accurately despite the harsh conditions present at the site. We discuss how the future impacts of natural processes and human activities can be managed using 3D scanning data as a baseline, how conservation and restoration work can be planned from the resulting models, and how 3D models created from laser scanning data can be used to excite public interest in cultural stewardship and Arctic history (Dawson et al. 2013, p. 147).

The paper gives an excellent description of the use of this technology, which can be applied to all sizes and types of objects and sites.

4.4.4 Natural Sciences Enhanced by the Humanities

Having just mentioned how the cultural heritage professionals can benefit from modern technology, it is also a fact that heritage work can benefit the natural sciences in various ways. The challenge is to get the natural scientists to become aware of this, but there is definitely a trend underway for funding agencies to insist on more cross-cutting between these traditionally too separate disciplinary worlds.

The fact of climate change in the Arctic lies behind much of what has already been written above, and the details of the changing climate have been collected through various natural science disciplines and spread to the general public through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and many other channels. However, in addition to this extensive work with observations and measurements by the natural science community, the humanities can also inform on and confirm the matter through our own disciplines of history, archaeology, historical archaeology and associated work with the material heritage.

History can tell us when a building or structure was first established and perhaps details of its situation with regard to the landscape at the time. This in turn may help to document coastal erosion. For example, it may be mentioned in the diary of a scientific expedition member how far the camp was established from the shore, or photographs of a prospecting or mining settlement may show the same. Diaries of others who used the buildings or structures afterwards may also give clues to the rate of erosion. One such example is the trapping station *Fredheim,* mentioned above. In other expedition reports and diaries there can be a wealth of information concerning meteorological conditions, sea ice, flora and fauna that can contribute to fill the picture of earlier climatic conditions where there are no long measurement and observation series. The historic state of sea ice in the Arctic has been pieced together with the help of logbooks and diaries from seafarers and whalers; in an article entitled *Piecing together the Arctic's sea ice history back to 1850* Florence Fetterer, principal investigator at the US National Snow and Ice Data Centre (NSIDC), states how sources such as whaling ship logbooks and mentions of the sea ice edge positions in the North Atlantic between 1850 and 1978 in various sources such as newspapers, ship observations, aircraft observations and diaries have helped to fill gaps and extend the Arctic sea ice record back to 1850 (Fetterer 2016).

Insight into permafrost changes have been gained through archaeology. Excavations of seventeenth century whalers' graves in northwest Svalbard carried out in 1980 showed corpses with traces of skin and hair, and with woollen clothes that could almost have been taken out and put on by the archaeologists. In 2016 and '17 similar graves in the same area were excavated and such finds were almost non-existent owing to the lowered state of the permafrost that no longer "froze the objects in time". Similarly, permafrost thawing is destroying organic material in middens in West Greenland that contain evidence of the three main Greenland cultures of up to 3500 years ago — Saqqaq, Dorset and Thule (Salomonsen 2015). The realisation that this unique archaeological material can be lost forever in 80–100 years has prompted targeted research by permafrost scientists in Denmark. Their studies show that the bacteria that normally eat away at organic materials (wood, bone, soft tissues, etc) lie dormant in permafrost, but once that thaws the bacteria become active again and in the process produce heat that in turn helps thaw more permafrost — an interesting study arising out of interaction between archaeologists and permafrost scientists.

4.4.5 More Attention Given to Indigenous and Local Knowledge

During the past few years, and particularly since the fourth International Polar Year (IPY-4) cooperation between scientists and local and indigenous residents has increased. The Framework document for IPY-4 stated that "IPY 2007–2008 must strengthen the dialogue and links between Arctic residents and the research community, and must engage Arctic residents in the design and implementation of IPY science, education and outreach programmes" (Barr and Lüdecke 2010, p. 310). Despite some scepticism from scientists, local and indigenous knowledge is receiving increasing attention in connection with the effects of climate change which are felt in force in the Arctic and which are changing the traditional way of life for many local societies. At an international conference organised in Paris by UNESCO in October 2017 the aim of the conference was promoted as:

> Ahead of the 2017 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP23), the UNESCO Local and Indigenous Knowledge Systems programme (LINKS) is inviting key partners and institutions to share their own successes and lessons learned in mobilizing local and indigenous knowledge for climate change (UNESCO Undated).

One spectacular result of bringing indigenous knowledge into the scientific sphere has been the discoveries of the exploration ships *Erebus* and *Terror* in the Canadian Arctic in 2014 and 2016 respectively. The two ships were commanded by Sir John Franklin who with 128 men set off from England in 1845 to find a navigable route through the Northwest Passage north of the Canadian mainland. The disappearance of the ships and men unleashed an extensive search in the following years and the story has remained the source of myths, books, poems, songs and projects to find the remains of men and vessels. Inuit have from the beginning been able to give information relating to what they or their ancestors had seen, but were often dismissed as unreliable or fantasy tellers. Luckily attitudes change, and the government agency Parks Canada reported in 2017 that: "The discovery of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror would not have been possible without Inuit knowledge" (Parks Canada 2017).

4.4.6 Arctic and Antarctic Heritage Professionals Developing Cooperation and Exchanges

Finally it will be mentioned that the negative effects of climate change that are described above for the cultural heritage of the Arctic are also seen with respect to the Antarctic cultural heritage, even though the warming of the climate in the southern polar region is not as dramatic thus far as in the north. Again, in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic the negative impacts have both natural and human causes. The wood of explorers' huts is degrading more rapidly, changing precipitation patterns

of snow and rain add to the challenges, and increasing polar tourism and scientific activities cause additional wear and tear to monuments and sites. Recognising the similarities between cultural heritage work in both polar regions this author was instrumental in 1999–2000 in founding the International Polar Heritage Committee (IPHC) of the international cultural heritage organisation ICOMOS (International Council of Monuments and Sites). The IPHC brings together professionals working in one or both areas to exchange knowledge and discuss challenges and methods in order to enhance both their own work and the protection of polar cultural heritage in general.

4.5 Conclusion

There is no doubt that the cultural heritage of the Arctic is suffering under the current climate changes. Bad news is easy to find in this respect. However, we need not only concentrate on the negative. If we look beyond the immediate disastrous effects of the warmer, wetter, wilder Arctic climate we can see that there is also good news to be found. New technology, developing relationships across scientific disciplines and between scientists and indigenous and local people, increasing attention paid to Arctic heritage and an increase in the knowledge being gathered around the history both of individual monuments and sites and of the various cultures associated with such sites are on the plus side. Much of this could have developed without the threat of climate change hanging over us, but it is not certain that it all would have. There is nothing like a serious threat to bring out new and strengthened initiatives and effort.

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Chapter 5
Rehabilitation of the Northern Home: A Multigenerational Pathway

Yulia V. Zaika

Abstract The very beginning of Soviet times was marked by repressive politics of the state, targeting different individuals including prosperous peasants (*kulaks*). While being rich but hard-working farmers, these families were seen as one of the most important bases for the economic growth of the country. The 'soft' collectivisation to consolidate individual land and farms was therefore suggested by state economists and rejected by Stalin. Instead, the expropriation measures and repressive policies (*dekulakisation*) were largely applied throughout the country, dramatically influencing people's destinies. A large number of peasant families was relocated to the harsh northern environments in order to build the industrial potential for the country's prosperity. Later on, subsequent rehabilitation measures undertaken by the post-Stalin government brought little to no relief for the acceptance and understanding of this new Northern home. But this is a changing reality which spreads through several generations.

This chapter is an autoethnography of a member of a family which has been forcibly relocated by the state during early 1930s from Pskov to the Murmansk region. It discusses the development and evolution of identity and the sense of the Northern home through four generations of a single family, from the painful disastrous relocation of great grandparents to the harsh unfriendly Arctic environment, and finally, towards the peaceful triumphant acceptance of the sweet Northern home by their great grandchild.

Keywords Russia · Northern home · Arctic identity · Relocation · Rehabilitation

To my family

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5.1 Introduction

The history of the Arctic as a populated region is reflected in people's destinies, told and untold stories of this land, and shapes the social infrastructure of the area as the basis for its existence and development. Multidimensional aspects of living in the Arctic reveal different frontiers of attachment to the place and its identities. A nomadic way of life, indigenous cultures, industrial towns and fishing villages, reindeer herding communities, resident populations, and commuting workers to name a few, all have their stories. My story starts in the Pskov region and ends by now in the Murmansk region of Russia.

Be that as it may, the Pskov region remains the unknown home to me where I have never been and know nothing about. In present days, the Pskov region like the Murmansk region is part of the Northwestern Federal Okrug[1] of Russia and lies 1400 km southward from where I live now. My family had a large farm there, and were peasants involved in flax production, forcibly relocated by the state to the Murmansk region in the 1930s during the '*dekulakisation*' campaign. *Dekulakisation* (Russian – '*raskulachivanie, раскулачивание*') is "to deprive from the peasant (kulak) his land and rights (in the times of collectivization in USSR)" (Efremova 2000, p. 688). Dekulakisation was the Soviet campaign that consisted of the expropriation of the properties of kulak households (to be used to fund the new collective farms) and their expulsion from the village (Viola 2008). Aimed at arrests, deportations and executions of millions of peasants, dekulakisation brought many families to new hostile environments and places in the remote areas of the North, Ural, Siberia, Far East and Kazakhstan. My family has been relocated thrice, firstly to the Murmansk region, then to Kazakhstan and back to the Murmansk region with the final destination being the town of Kandalaksha.

As discussed by many authors (Bolotova and Stammler 2010; Shaskov 1993; Shashkov 2004; Bojkov 1983) the dekulakisation campaign increased the population of the Murmansk region in different years for thousands of people, as Fig. 5.1 demonstrates starting the data of the first general census of population. For the Murmansk region, such an inflow of population brought the work-force which played the substantial role in the industrialisation process within the territory which was rich for mineral deposits.

At that time the formulaic identities of relocated people, namely my own family, were merely attached to the labels given by the state from '*kulaks*' to '*spetsperese-lentsy*' (explained below), while the territorial and personal identity remained from the Pskovian home left behind. While identifying oneself is the inner act of cognitive self-representation or representation of *Self*, a label is the description applied from outside and can hardly represent the self-identification of an individual. Those labels were mostly *ideologemes* – fundamental units of Soviet ideology

[1] *Federal okrug* is not the subject or any other constitutional part of administrative-territorial division of the Russian Federation but was established by analogy with military or economic districts in May 2000. Currently, Russia has 8 federal okrugs.



Fig. 5.1 Population of Murmansk region from 1897 to 2016
1897 – The first general census of the population; 1920 – The first Soviet census of population; 1926 – The first All-Union Census of the Soviet Union (without population of Kandalaksha); 1937 – The second All-Union Census of the Soviet Union (the most controversial); 1939 – The third All-Union Census; 1959 – The first post-World War II census; 1970 – The second post-World War II census; 1979 – The third post-World War II census; 1989 – All-Union Census; 2002&2010 – Russian Census; 2016 – Murmanskstat. Sources: Lokhanov (2012), Murmanskstat (2017)

at that time. Even these days, while searching historical dictionaries for definitions of foregoing labels, one can find a variety of descriptions attached to the same word. For example, *kulak* – prosperous peasant constantly using hired work-force (Efremova 2000); the Russian name for rural *bourgeoisie* originated during social differentiation of peasantry (Soviet Encyclopedia, 1981). Or, *spetspereselentsy* – the largest category of special population contingent of Stalin's epoch; the group of peasantries relocated in the extrajudicial procedure from the place of residence to the special devoted territories under the control of special agencies (Lamin 2009).

Larger discussions on the usage of labels versus identities, and which of these are more important if not both, are that they are similar and how they are understood in different contexts (Piazza and Fasulo 2014; Biddle et al. 1985; Safran 2008) can be found elsewhere and are endless. Labels are quite common and are all around in our everyday life at present. They can have positive or negative connotations which mostly depends on matters, situations, periods and events they are used, and the affect they might have on someone's life. In the situation of my own family, which is the main focus of this chapter, labels are definitely seen as negative because during the historic period of the 1930s they were the basis for dramatic changes in which people's lives and destinies were affected – from forcible relocation away from homelands to incessant attempts throughout several generations of relocated people to get rid of disgraceful labels. At present one can hardly imagine what does it mean to be 'the enemy of the people' – one of the labels and clichés of political rhetoric of the Stalin period.

Identity as a theory as well as identity formation are the complex subjects discussed at different dimensions from philosophical, political, social and psychological sciences (e.g. Stets and Serpe 2016). As described by the Cambridge Online Dictionary (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/), *identity* reflects who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others; the reputation, characteristics, etc. of a person or organisation that makes the public think about them in a particular way.

Following my personal interest as a geographer and the scope of this chapter, I will dive more deeply into the concept of *territorial identity* which is more important when studying the development of *Northern identity*, and then will look into the discussions related to *attachment to the place* which, from my point of view, plays the predominant role in shifting territorial identities of relocated groups of people. Relocations themselves, especially in the Northern context, were amply studied and discussed during the MOVE ("Moved by the State") project (Schweitzer 2010). Among the outcomes of this project, one can explore interesting findings of perceptions of the North as a home among community members and individually relocated families, indigenous and non-indigenous groups of Arctic populations, narratives and perceptions of places and geographic locations, and pathways of post-relocation within the Circumpolar North from Alaska to Kolyma.

As mentioned earlier, my great grandparents were farmers which means that land and territory played an essential role. In fact, to them the land was their life, and territory was their geographic space for residence and work. Territorial identity and usage of land resources reveal personal identity on the basis of human-environment relations, which changes over time and with places during the consequent shift to other environments. The coherent triangle 'territory-land-environment' will be mentioned on multiple occasions in this chapter, in order to avoid a misunderstanding, the vision and difference between each meaning is to be explained. In this context "*territory*" is an area within the Pskov and the Murmansk regions that my family and myself holds a connection to, be it through belonging or originating from. "*Land*" refers to areas in the Pskov region that used to be owned and/or cultivated by my past family members and consist of farmland and land holdings as well as the land resources (in agricultural meaning) found within them. Finally, *"environment"* is the overall natural conditions within both the Pskov and the Murmansk regions that has played the major role in shifting my family's identities.

Territorial identity as a phenomenon is used by different disciplines within their own theoretical concepts and knowledge, and thus "impose various readings (spatial–regional–local identity–self-identification–consciousness etc.)" (Karlova 2015, p. 5). The communications that are based on emotional, cultural, historic, social perceptions of the place and its population as a whole with a common identity, connected to the informal local groups of people and their interpersonal and group interactions give way to the *vernacular (mental) regions identity.* This for me is the most interesting parts of territorial identity. Such regions are 'intellectual inventions' and a form of shorthand to identify things, people, and places. Vernacular regions reflect a "sense of place", but rarely coincide with established jurisdictional borders (Scheetz 1991). Examples of such regions spread from a macroregional,

e.g. Siberia, to microregional levels, such as the name of a particular district within the city.

In her chapter devoted to the theory of attachment, Maria Giuliani discusses the concept through the lens of environmental psychology and human-nature interactions where individuals develop affective bonds with their physical environment. Giuliani argues that the "very variety of terms used to refer to affective bonds with places – rootedness, sense of place, belongingness, insideness, embeddedness, attachment, affiliation, appropriation, commitment, investment, dependence, identity, etc. – seem to indicate not so much a diversity of concepts and reference models, but as a vagueness in the identification of the phenomenon" (Giuliani 2003, p. 138).

Rubinstein et al. define "*attachment to place*" as a set of feelings about a location that emotionally binds a person to that place as a function of its role as a setting for experience (Rubinstein and Parmelee 1992). In this light, the concept of *topophilia*, developed by humanist geographer Yi-Fu Tuan in the 1960s, might help to uncover roots of mental attachment to the place. The term topophilia is defined as the affective bond with one's environment–a person's mental, emotional, and cognitive ties to a place (Heimer 2005). In his research devoted to topophilia and the quality of life, Oladele A. Ogunseitan discusses the roles of both natural and constructed environments in relieving mental stress (Ogunseitan 2005). He refers to Hartig and Staats describing *"restorative environments"*, which in the tradition of environmental psychology are defined as specific geographical contexts that renew diminished functional capabilities and enhance coping strategies and resources for managing stress (Hartig and Staats 2003). While forced shifts of environments in the history of my family induced mental stress, could it be possible that gradually gained environmental familiarity with the Arctic conditions developed into perception of the Arctic as a "restorative environment", which in its term cultivated the Arctic topophilia in succeeding generations?

Undoubtedly, this tight human-environment connection is of most importance for this chapter especially when discussing *Northern identities* and self-identification as a *Northerner*. While the *Arctic Human Development Report II* (Nordic Council of Ministers 2015) largely discusses Northern identities within indigenous communities, peoples and cultures, it very briefly mentions "*other identities*" that also exist in the Arctic among other residential non-indigenous populations. Such dichotomy is a very pronounced sign of forgotten identities and personalities. By ignoring the fact that there are a lot of "other identities" in the Arctic, we deplete the history and culture of the region. As some authors discuss (Schweitzer 2010; Khlinovskaya Rockhill 2010; Thompson 2008) the indigenous subject has monopolized Northern studies. As Khlinovskaya Rockhill mentiones, "Anderson (2000), Ingold (2000); Kerttula (2000), King (2002), Krupnik (1993), Rethmann (2001), and Vitebsky (2005) have conducted research on reindeer husbandry, gender relations, property rights, shamanism, nationalism and ethnic identity – all focusing on indigenous people (Khlinovskaya Rockhill 2010, p. 44). Thompson argues that European settlers "offer themselves as a foil against which are built rich descriptions of indigenous lifeways, identities and cosmologies" (Thompson 2008, p. 213). I have a lot of

friends among indigenous groups in different regions of the Arctic, all of which are amazing, sincere and honest people, and whose cultures I have a fascination for. I am fascinated by their culture. However, once I had a conversation with an indigenous activist who very expressively told me that "*You all came to our land!*". Knowing the story of my family by that time I felt offended, I answered "*It was not the intention of my family to come here, but this place became a home for us*". When settling into any geographical area, by building the social environment around themselves, people introduce their own traditions and cultures to the area too, which later develops into a sense of attachment to the place.

When thinking of attachment to the place in the light of relocations, the other important side of the story emerges – people's perception of the place as a temporary or permanent place of living. This idea in the Northern context has been discussed for the relocated population of Kolyma (Khlinovskaya Rockhill 2010). While there are still some state programs of relocation from the North to other geographical locations in Russia, the problem of personal preferences and perceptions stay unstudied.

In this chapter I attempt to trace the development of a coupled phenomenon "*identity-attachment to the place*" within the relocated family. The disaster-triumph concept accurately frames the narrative revealing maxima at both ends of the family's timescale: from disastrous forced relocation to the unwanted environment and place to triumphant development of the sense of the same place as the home framed with topophilia in succeeding generations.

5.2 Applied Methods

Authoethnography is the core method of this chapter. Being an environmental scientist and geographer, this method was a new concept to me bringing the challenge of self-reflection and self-understanding through the scientific thinking and reanalysis to assimilate historical observations of a single family throughout several generations. Even though sociological studies are not new in my professional trajectory, telling a story from the first person perspective and investigating my own family and own perceptions was challenging especially on such a sensitive (personally and nationally) topic, and took me a year to settle this idea in my head.

The context of "*scientific-personal*" dualism which, following the authoethnographic methodology in many aspects, in my case, helped me to evaluate and reflect many hidden frontiers of self-identification and revealed some important edges that I have never thought of before.

Authoethnography as a method is a very profound tool for qualitative research though very disputable within the scientific community. Traditional scientific approaches, still very much at play today, require researchers to minimise their selves, viewing self as a contaminant and attempting to transcend and deny it. The researcher ostensibly puts bias and subjectivity aside in the scientific research process by denying his or her identity (Wall 2008). Sarah Walls discusses the positivist

paradigm which breaks down the façade of objectivity in science and lends support for research methods that rely more on subjectivity, such as qualitative methods as a whole (Wall 2006, p. 2). Within the Arctic scope this paradigm and methods have staged the scene during the last 10 years bringing in traditional knowledge of indigenous communities not only to accompany 'too objective' Arctic research but, most importantly, to underline and justify it. In this regard, telling the story, or better to say reflective writing, becomes a powerful tool of qualitative research but is not the only method I have used for this chapter.

When getting back to the very beginning and thinking of the timeline of my so-called autoethnography research, I should state that it took me 12 years of conscious investigation and self-reflection from understanding of importance of knowing the family history to analysing and summarising my observations and conclusions to this particular chapter. I have started to become more interested in my family history since my university ages when I saw my grandmother receiving and carefully collecting documents and papers that confirms the '*status*' of the family and herself. What was that 'status' and why it was so important to her that she has spent more than 30 years of her life to obtain it? I didn't know, or more precisely, I have never been told. When coming to my grandmother's apartment during my younger school ages, we always sat at the table, had tea and read through the papers with official stamps that I didn't even understand. Later, I have found what they meant (Fig. 5.2). I would rather call it *gradual immersion* to the family history as there were particular reasons for my constrained ignorance (*See section* "*From Pskov to Murmansk and Kazakhstan*").

In the context of this chapter, the other method I have used can be described as *archival research*. Since the middle of the first decade of the 2000s, I have collected and scanned all the documents that my grandmother obtained as well as searched through the state and regional archives in order to find any supplementary information. By now, I have the collection of historical documents related to my family along with the photographs and some personal paper letters. I was able to put together the family tree back to five generations which contains the knowledge that almost no one from our present family have after my grandmother passed away 3 years ago.

In the course of my own PhD thesis in socio-economic geography, I have used interviewing of local population within the geographical area of my research as one of the methods to collect information and data. If we include informal family discussions and conversations on the topic of this chapter into account, then I can describe the other research method as *in-depth unstructured interviews* which I undertook unintentionally at early stages and later intentionally with the members of my family. Whilst the unintentional conversations mostly with my grandmother regarding the patterns of her life are less constructive in the scientific sense and can be described as probing and creating a pathway towards the later structured interviews, where topics were more targeted and focused. These interviews brought a more comprehensive understanding of personal perceptions of the Northern home.

By outlining the methodological approaches of self-research and applied methods, I have attempted to structure my own consciousness of personal identity and



Выдается один раз.
В дальнейшем пользоваться копиями.

МВД РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
Управление Внутренних Дел
Псковской области
180600, г Псков, Октябрьский пр., 48
№ 4616 от "23" января 1998 г.

Справка
о реабилитации

АБРАМОВ Николай Степанович
(фамилия, имя, отчество)

Год и место рождения 1913 года рождения, уроженец д. Рублево Островского района Псковской области

Место жительства до применения репрессии по месту рождения

Где, когда и каким органом репрессирован в 1931 году по решению Островского райисполкома как член семьи раскулаченного выселен в Мурманскую область .

Основание применения и вид репрессии по политическим мотивам в административном порядке
Постановление СНК и ЦИК СССР от 1.02.1930 г.

На основании п. "в" ст. 3 Закона Российской Федерации от 18 октября 1991 г. "О реабилитации жертв политических репрессий"

АБРАМОВ Николай Степанович
(фамилия, имя, отчество)

реабилитирован(а)

Начальник УВД
Псковской области (печать) С.Ф.Щадрин

А.Н.Киреев.

Fig. 5.2 Statement of rehabilitation status
Statement of rehabilitation is issued by the Department of Internal Affairs of Pskov region as of 23.01.1998 concerning the "rehabilitation of Abramov Nikolay Stepanovich repressed in 1931 by the decision of Ostrovsky district executive committee as the member of kulak family and relocated to Murmansk region". Basis for rehabilitation: point "в" article 3, Law of the Russian Federation from 18.10.1991 *"About rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions"*

perception of the Arctic within the conceptual paradigm: *Arctic is the home – Home is the Arctic*. Summarising all the mentioned above methods, I can with some certain confidence say that the *participant observation* method has been largely applied during all 12 years of my interest.

To conclude, peer-reviewed, academically valid research is not the aim of this chapter. This chapter is an attempt to understand my own place and self within the geographical space of the Arctic region.

5.3 Pskov Region: The Home I Have Never Known

The Early 1900s Is The Period That I Was able to restore with the memories of my grandmother. At that time my family resided in the Pskov region[2] which along with the Novgorod region were famous for flax production in the Russian Empire. Flax has been known as the "*Northern gold of Russian land*" and was considered an original part of the Russian culture (Kondratiev 2011, p. 210). The very beginning of the nineteenth century was marked with growing flax production which was the result of the development in *spinning* machinery, and the Pskov region held the first place among all the regions of Russia involved in flax manufacturing.

During that period the population of the region counted at 1,188,000, 93% of which were peasants. As described by Vasiliev, before the revolution of 1917, the Pskov region did not have any large factories (Vasiliev 2013). The social stratification of the Pskovian population reflects that 60% of farms belonged to the poor and farm laborers (*bednyak*, *batrak*), 25% of farms to "*serednyaki*" and over 15% to a prosperous upper class of peasants (*kulaks*). After the abolition of serfdom and peasant reform (Emancipation Manifesto of 1861), peasants became independent and were given different rights from purchasing and leasing of land to founding of own enterprises. Due to different economic conditions several classes of peasants existed at that time, among them: *bednyak, batrak* (Russian for 'beggar') – a hired (seasonally) farm worker which owned a small amount of land or for the majority none at all; *serednyak* (Russian for 'averaged') – a peasant who owned the small land, did not hire any workers and was usually described as the class between batrak and kulak; and *kulak* – the upper class of better-off peasants (Osipov 2004). The most important feature was the right of purchasing of their own land by peasants which at some cases accounted for up to 23% of allotted lands, and the Pskov region was one of the most active regions for such bargains.

Comprehensive descriptions of everyday life in villages within peasant communities can be found in different works which includes architectural, historical, anthropological, political and cultural overviews (Lantsev 2015; Plisak 2008;

[2] Current Pskov region at the time of Russian Empire was called "*guberniya*" (county, province, government). Guberniya was the highest unit of administrative-territorial devision of Russia from 1708 to 1929. The head of guberniya was "*gubernator*" (governor), the word is also used nowadays to name official positions of the heads of Russian regions.

Nikitina 1999, 2012, 2015; Nikulin 2009; Shubina 2000). Thus, Lantsev describes the farmyards as mostly constructed within a one-story roofed yard, in which all the buildings adjoin to each other including constructions for cattle. Houses were mostly built from wood and clay, representing traditional Russian wooden architecture. The main feature of yards was the flexibility and possibility to transform constructions, so-called "growing houses", where all elements are unique and represents the harmony with the landscape (Lantsev 2015).

The social life of peasants included working days, and days of leisure with large celebrations and festivals. In this context, Nikitina discusses the importance of community life and community attachment for peasants. It was the institute to unite public and personal interests, to preserve traditions and moral qualities of peasant community (Nikitina 1999). Plisak in the article devoted to famous "Diaries of peasant" shows how important communicative practices were. Peasants used to discuss agronomical practices, cooperation, news from other regions, fiscal issues, including reading and discussing newspapers. The traditional prejudices of a "peasant being tied with the land" was just a stereotype (Plisak 2008). The land works usually stopped in autumn which opened the opportunity for travelling large distances, not only within the region. Traveling for economic reasons and seasonal work was quite usual (so-called "*othodnichestvo*") to the capital St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia.

Nikitina describes the North-West of Russia as the region of specific climatic conditions, which prevented peasants to grow corn. Nonetheless, North-West Russia fields and the pastures were pleasant for cattle breeding and flax production (Nikitina 2015). Shubina discusses the traditional to Pskovian peasants flax manufacturing. She notes that it was mainly women's work which also had metaphysical context connected to the way of thinking that was prevailing among peasants and connected to space, time, life, destiny, and the general world view. Flax manufacturing required specific skills which had been passed over from generation to generation. Families of peasants were usually large, including 8–10 children who were involved in everyday work (Shubina 2000).

The reconstructed story of my family begins from 2 villages in the North of the Pskov region: *Skugry* (Dnovsky area) and *Rublevo* (Ostrovsky area) where the farms of my great-grandfathers Abramovy and Dmitrievy were located. Both villages still exist on the map of the Pskov region and resides at around 150 km from each other. The pathways of two families crossed when Marfa Fedorovna Dmitrieva (Skugry) met Nikolay Stepanovich Abramov (Rublevo) – the parents of my grandmother Galina Nikolaevna Abramova and her sister. Both families were matched at the time of relocation, and my great grandparents were preparing for the wedding. As my grandmother Galina used to memorise from shared memories of her mother and my great grandmother Marfa (Galina was born at the labor camp during the relocation):

"Mom used to tell me about their farm and house. When she was young girl, they had large house with a lot of children. Let me count: Izot, Sergey, Ivan, Lukeria, Matrena, Irinya, Tatiana, and herself Marfa. They all were hard workers, when having the land, it is impossible to stay out of work. They woke up at 4 am every day to take care of their land and cattle. They manufactured flax products and always wear beautiful dresses and clothing. Grandfather sold flax at the market and always returned back to the village with presents to his children. Girls of the family were very stylish. They were a good family, they always gave work for those jobless in the village."

Such memories clearly reflect that our family was from the upper class of peasants labeled as kulaks. Nevertheless, the region and Pskovian peasantry at that time experienced tremendous social and political disturbances as the result of the Russian Revolution of 1917 which led to the Civil war of 1917–1922. As Vasiliev describes in his PhD thesis devoted to the Pskovian peasantry of that period, such Soviet administration systems as military communism and surplus appropriation (*Prodrazvyorstka*) led to the repartition of the land among different classes of peasants in which the confiscated plots of land were given to *bednyak* and *serednyak*. This, in turn, led to the dissolution of large farming areas in the region. Such averaging (*osrednyachestvo*) of peasantry resulted in plain redistribution of resources rather than an increase of agricultural capacity, and resulted in a lack of crop yield, cattle, equipment, and seed grains (Vasiliev 2013).

Prodrazvyorstka debilitated farming as it required peasants to give the surplus to the state. This had a fatal influence on people's psychological condition. Peasants lost their interest to develop the land and husbandry (Brutszkus 1995). Farming became naturalised to produce volumes required only for own family consumption. Flax production also decreased as it became unprofitable, flax crops amounted to 13,4% in total when compared with pre-revolution volumes. The need to minimise own husbandry induced economic depression and consequently changed the ideology and views of peasants (Vasiliev 2013).

The market-oriented 'New Economic Policy (NEP)' was introduced by V.I.Lenin in 1921 in order to foster the economic growth of the country, which experienced unprecedented social and economic losses after the Civil War. 1927 was a transitional year in the Soviet regime's relations with the peasantry: it marked the beginning of the end of the NEP and the reemergence of repression as the basic modus operandi for Soviet rule in the countryside (Viola et al. 2005). Later, the NEP was declared as a "too soft policy" which was not enough for the country's economic growth, and was abolished by Joseph Stalin in 1928 (Shaskov 1993). Policies of *collectivisation* were largely implemented throughout the country at that time. Collectivization included consolidation of individual farms into collectives – *kolkhoz and sovkhoz* – at the end of the 1920s and 1930s (Osipov 2004). This led to confrontation and mass social protests among peasantry, especially those from the

prosperous upper class. Such reactions accelerated state-induced repressive measures – forced relocation – towards different groups of the population (See Annex I). Peasants were considered enemies, and together with their families, they were arrested, exiled or executed. This relates to my family as well. One might ask why they were considered enemies? The state intended to repossess everything that families had carefully developed, lovingly grew and rightfully earned. During this time peasants did everything they could to prevent this including killing their cattle and burning their own homes in order not to give it away.

When reading research papers and manuscripts devoted to this historic period (e.g. Stepanov 2009; Lekontsev 2016; Dobronozhenko 2012; Shashkov 2004), I have found myself in a very challenging situation. Different authors suggest different views to that period, connotations and narratives spread from negative to positive, and at times reminds me of maximalist moods. Stalin's repressive politics are still disputable and a very sensitive topic even within present day Russia. For example, in June 2017 the Russian Public Opinion Research Center – WCIOM (https://www.wciom.com/) undertook a survey among different groups of the Russian population older than 18 years on the mass repressions of the twentieth century. Results indicate that over 90% of respondents know about "Stalin repressions" but only 9% are well aware of the destinies of their repressed family members, and 6% know nothing about the destiny of their relatives (WCIOM 2017). I can certainly share my story with these numbers knowing only the part.

5.4 From Pskov to Murmansk and Kazakhstan

My great grandparents were relocated from the Pskov to the Murmansk region in 1931 (See Fig. 5.2 above). Unfortunately, this is the most hidden and blank period of our family story. I know almost nothing about my great grandfather and where he is buried. Our family photo archive does not even contain his picture or any other documents that could help to restore any information about him. We only know that he died during the Great Patriotic War (according to a death notice) as public enemies were sent to the front as "food for the flames". Here is what my great grandmother Marfa Fedorovna told to my grandmother Galina about past events:

> *"They came at 3 a.m. to our house and ordered to get ready in 30 minutes. Each family member was allowed to take small sack with some personal things. We were placed in dirty railway cabins together with other families. Several days we have spent there without any conveniences, sanitary was disastrous. The most dramatic in such conditions was to take care of children and elders. Few days later cabins full of exhausted people arrived at our new destination."*

As mentioned earlier, my family was relocated trice: from the Pskov to the Murmansk region, from the Murmansk region to Kazakhstan, and back from Kazakhstan to the Murmansk region in 1940s. There was a reason why it happened.

The present day Murmansk region is known for its strong industrial profile. Mining enterprises, nuclear power, the Atomic Fleet, large and active transportation systems are some main features of the region's economy. Such giants in the period of active industrialisation of the Soviet country required strong and powerful electrification according to the GOELRO plan. GOELRO is the transliteration of the Russian abbreviation for "State Commission for Electrification of Russia"; the plan represented a major restructuring of the Soviet economy based on the total electrification of the country. Rich for natural water resources, namely rapid rivers, regional environment provided lots of destination for labor camps to build power networks.

When relocated to the Murmansk region, my family was assigned to "NivaGESstroy" (in Russian stands for *Niva* – the name of a local river in Kandalaksha area, *GES* – hydroelectric stations, *stroy* – construction) – an enterprise established to build hydroelectric power stations. This was to be the first hydroelectric power network located above the Polar Circle in the Soviet Union. According to archival records, populations of labor camps as of data for 02.10.1931 was 12,000 people, who lived in severe conditions in tents and barracks. *Spetspereselentsy* were supplied with bread and sugar, no other products were available. Most of them still used bast shoes as the stock of warm clothing was not enough. Such conditions jeopardised work capacity and survival in the cold Northern environment.

Among *spetspereselentsy* were peasants, former officers, churchmen, engineers – the people with strong characters and personal features. Nevertheless, cold, polar night, hopelessness, loss of property and homesickness drove them to despair (Kiselev 2008). But most of them still stood strong, tried to keep families, survive and build new places of living. In such a context one hardly can use the word 'home', but as one of the remarkable evidence of people's willingness to live and keep families was the birth of Anna Abramova, the sister of my grandmother, in 1937–6 years after the relocation.

In 1941 with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (the Russian context of World War II), enterprises and industrial equipment were evacuated to the East-Kazakhstan region of the USSR. People and facilities from "NivaGESstroy" were relocated to Ust-Kamenogorsk where my grandmother was born in 1942 (see Fig. 5.3). It is hard to restore any memories or senses our family members experienced during the second relocation from the place which they never called 'home'.

By reading research papers devoted to that period, we can partly unfold the picture of events which took place there (for example, Shaymukhanova and Makalakov 2012). Not all members of the family were relocated to Kazakhstan. Some stayed in the Murmansk region and worked at different places during the war, for example in the hospital (as could be seen from the records in labour book). When the war ended in May 1945, family members were resettled back to the Murmansk region for restoration and reconstruction of facilities after military activities (see Fig. 5.4).

Fig. 5.3 Great grandmother (in the middle) Marfa Fedorovna Abramova (Dmitrieva) with her little daughter and grandmother Galina Nikolaevna Abramova on hands, 1940s, relocated from Murmansk region to a camp in Kazakhstan

Fig. 5.4 Great grandmother Marfa Fedorovan (on the left) at NivaGESStroy upon the third relocation from Kazakhstan

One of my biggest regrets is that family history became open to me too late, only after I had entered university, and later on I supported this interest with historical literature reading and archival work. My grandmother passed away and I did not get to ask her the questions that I would have asked her today, which was due to my,

already mentioned, constrained ignorance. Once, when I tried to ask my grandmother about my great grandparents she immediately kept silent. Later, I heard she told my mother: "Don't tell anything to Yulia, it's a shame and pain, she shouldn't know". My mother stayed true to her word and I did know nothing until some time ago. It was common for people who suffered from repressive politics to not talk about it even amongst themselves. The history of collectivisation of Soviet agriculture has long been obscured by official taboos, historical falsification, and restricted access to archival source material (Viola et al. 2005). The CEO of WCIOM Valery Fedorov when presenting results of a public survey about mass repressions said in 2017: "This is the stamp of silence. It is a taboo which was enforced. It was denied to talk about even when repressions ended, even when Stalin died, even when this all was gone". Unconsciously following such *behavioural* traits under silent taboo and when working on this chapter, I felt mentally naked. Such silence might be a very common thing at the beginning but later on it might be explained as a protective measure for future generations to avoid psychologically disruptive reactions from youngsters to family tragedies. Someone said, "By reverting from oblivion even one human life, we retrieve memories about these people". Here I can certainly say, in the search of my family's historical pathway and upon finding the truth, I have found myself.

When discussing identity and place attachment in the context of constant relocations, disappointment, silent taboos, family separation and homesickness, I would rather refer to "*past identities*". My family members clearly knew who they were before relocation experiencing heavy homesickness, but they did not understand or did not think about who they were within the given time and space due to the severe conditions which required strong survival abilities. They were no longer involved in land farming but rather construction, they experienced environmental assimilation and adaptation to new nature conditions. It was rather short in historical perspective, a time period of 40 years full of political changes and perturbations, personal shocks and tragedies, and there was no time for self-reflection. People tried to keep and restore memories of a past life rather than develop new narratives. As revealed from family interviews, my great grandparents never spoke about getting back to the Pskov region nor about permanently settling in Murmansk.

5.5 Murmansk Region: The Home of My Self

Once during our conversations with my grandmother, I asked her: "*When does a place become home?*" She immediately answered: "*When you start your own family there, get married, give a birth to your kids and have a place where you live all together*". Families of relocated people were not allowed to travel out of specially indicated zones and especially back to the regions from which they were relocated. They had no passports, except those which were stored in a commandant's office. My great grandmother got her passport back only in the mid-1960s, and together with her daughters she travelled to Skugry village (Pskov region) in the 1970s.

There still were some people who knew our family, some distant relatives, one of the family houses was used for as offices for the local administration and the other for a school at that time. This trip might have also been a trigger for understanding that the Pskovian home is now completely left behind.

The Murmansk region became home to our family with the life story of my grandmother Galina. She was married here, had children – my mother and aunt – and worked in Kandalaksha town for her entire life. However, for the most part of her life – almost 30 years – she fought to get the 'not guilty' status for the family and thus, to get rehabilitation from the repressive Soviet politics. It was not the easiest process – to collect archival documents, to find witnesses from the Pskov and Murmansk regions who can provide oral evidence in court, and to get in touch with the administration of former kommandatura. Later, in 1998 – almost 70 years after the repressions – she got that precious *Statement of Rehabilitation, Справка о реабилитации* (see Fig. 5.2) issued as a single copy. That single paper was the triumph for her, the sign of freedom for several generations of our family. It certainly was. If we get a look back to the timeline mentioned in this chapter, it appears that even if we will count from 1861 (the abolition of serfdom) up to the 1960s (when my great grandmother received her passport) no generation of my family was actually free.

As for the present day, my parents and family of my aunt still live in the Murmansk region, in Kandalaksha town which I call "*hometown*" because I was born there in 1984 (Soviet Union) and spent my kindergarten and school ages there. I also studied at the university in the Murmansk region and even today I am still working here. I have never lived somewhere outside the region though I am travelling a lot. Writing through the historic pathways of my family was interesting on the one hand and hard on the other. It was hard because I tried to stay neutral and emotionless when reading and writing about the past, the tragedies my family experienced and passed through. This sensitive topic is still much disputed among Russians. There is plenty of literature and people who justify Stalin's politics. I often hear comments that *kulaks* were greedy, lazy people who forced other poor people to work at their farms which still tens of years later is the effect of Soviet propaganda. Nevertheless, it was interesting writing too. I have discovered hidden corners of our family history which helped me to enrich and understand my own identity and answers to some personal characteristics. I can now explain why I am fond of planting and do it successfully at our summer house (*dacha*), why I am eagerly travelling around the world, why I am a responsible and hard-working person, and finally why I have this very strong sense of justice, which at times, I suffer from. Looking back to all the characters of our family members, at stories of what kind of people they were, I felt like I look in the mirror, their personalities and characters reflected in who I am.

Along my scientific career I have been asked plenty of times by my colleagues why I have not moved somewhere else, why I am still staying in the depopulating North, why I am not leaving to other places where I can get more opportunities and a better life. The answer is simple. I am attached to this place, I am attached to my family. I feel homesick every time I am away longer than 2 weeks. I love this cold Northern nature, forests, rivers, lakes, seas, tundra, rocky mountains, polar day and

even polar night, magic auroras, all 4 seasons of the year and the strong spirits of the people who live here.

And even though our family now lives in different cities of one region, the very warm and cosy family traditions of celebrating birthdays, Christmas, New Year brought all of us together at one table to share successes and happy moments, to talk about those relatives who passed away, to chat about everyday life and smile to each other. Home is all about family traditions which we also have: the spring tradition of celebrating May and getting to the summer house for planting, the autumn tradition of gathering berries and mushrooms, and year-round tradition of family fishing.

My strong ancestors made everything so that the future generations of their family can call this place '*Home*'. There is a Russian proverb, equivalent to "My house is my castle", saying: "When you are at home, even the walls help you, Дома и стены помогают". I feel spiritually strong when I am at home, and I call this place *home* as much as my parents do. I am (identifying myself as) a Northerner (*Severyanka*) in the fourth generation and am very proud of it.

5.6 *Severyanin*[3]: The Russian Construct of the Northern Man

I would call *Sever* (The North) a vernacular region of Russia where people share not only common geographical space but also stories and conditions of their life to which they have successfully adapted. The population of the Russian North is diverse. Along with indigenous groups there is a non-indigenous population which have lived in the territory for several generations like my family. Rapid depopulation of the North influences the social infrastructure of these territories. The unique legacy and experience of several generations of people to adapt and settle in the Northern conditions subsequently disappear. This concern has been discussed by several authors (e.g. Lazhentsev 2010; Dregalo and Ulyanowskiy 2011) as a permanent population is the crucial element for further development of the North and the Arctic.

In this context, *Severyanin/severyanka* is not the ethnical construct but rather the overarching geographical framework which includes both indigenous and non-indigenous populations. The strong self-identification as *Severaynin* of the northern population of Russia is reflected in many aspects, from economic to personal. To be *Severyanin* means to get state preferences (certain level of wages, reduced living costs, compensations) which, nevertheless, currently is a disputed topic and is subject to state regulations. Depending on the region, professional specialisation or mode of living, it might be very disadvantageous to live in the severe North. It is one of the main reasons for outmigration. From the other hand, while the younger popu-

[3] *Severyanin* (masculine gender) and *severyanka* (feminine gender) refers to the Northerner, it is the resident of the Northern part of the region or a country, antonymous to *yuzhanin* (yuzhanka) – the Southerner.

lation is migrating in search of more profitable life, the older groups of the population refer to *rootedness* and *attachment to the place* as one of the major factors to stay. The Northern territories of Russia are not only depopulating, but also ageing.

As the part of IPY (International Polar Year) project PPS Arctic (www.ppsarctic.nina.no), between 2008 and 2010 I was responsible for interviewing the local population in the Murmansk region. As an international project, the survey was developed for its purposes. The word '*Arctic*' was mainly used in the questions to population which constituted the questionnaire. As the result of interviewing, I was not only able to receive and analyse opinions and information but also observe the reactions the local people had when I used the word '*Arctic*'. At that time, for all of us the area where we live was still the Far North rather than the Arctic. In its turn, the Arctic was imaged as the area around the North Pole with ice, white snow and nothing around for hundreds of kilometers. Respondents did not understand why I called the territory of their living as 'Arctic'.

In the light of this discussion, it is important to mention the rising change of geographical concepts and thus identities among northern population of Russia. The linear at first glance space "North – Far North – Arctic" (in Russian "Sever – Krayniy Sever – Arktika", Север – Крайний Север – Арктика) is constantly boosting with the governmental interests and decisions. Though, the Arctic is narrower in geographical sense than the North, it has been framed within state legislation only 10 years ago with the formulation in 2008 of *Basics for State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period of 2020 and Further Perspective* (Russian Federation 2008). Before that, the northern population of Russia lived in the Far North.

The *Far North of Russia* is a diffused geographical concept which mostly refers to socio-economic regulations. There are Far North and the areas recognised (by legislation) as equivalent to the Far North. In different years these equivalent areas have changed depending on the purpose of local regulations (different cost zones, wages, transportation regulations, seasonal delivery of goods to the Northern territories – Northern Delivery *Severny Zavoz*, etc.) and lobbying by regions themselves. For example, in 1970, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1982 and 1985 the list of Northern regions was expanded to include areas within the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Krai, Chita and Tomsk regions, which were later excluded from the list (Gavrilieva and Arkhangelskaya 2016).

The *Arctic territory of Russia* is now determined by the *Presidential Decree about the Land Territory of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation* №296 as of 02.05.2014 (Russian Federation 2014). Present statutory wording includes 9 subjects of Russia which territory partially or fully is included in the Arctic zone. These are: fully included – the Murmansk region, Nenets Autonomous Okrug (district), Chukotka Autonomous Okrug; and partially included – Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Republic of Karelia, Komi Republic, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Krasnoyarsky Krai, Arkhangelsk Region. While the Development Strategy and the Program for development of the Russian Arctic are in force, there is still no basic

legislative document. This being said, *The Law of the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation* has been drafted several times from since 2010 but needs more detailed work as certain corresponding amendments need be done to other legislative documents and acts of the country.

The Russian Arctic is part of the Far North. Nevertheless, the word 'Arctic' has already superseded 'Far North' in different contexts, which is also reflected in people's perceptions. They now live in the Arctic but still call themselves *Severyane* (Northerners) as I do.

5.7 Conclusions

This autoethnography is at the same time the tragic and triumphant story of how the Arctic, as part of the North, became home. Getting back to the conceptual paradigm: *Arctic is the home – Home is the Arctic*, I can certainly say that Arctic as a geographical space is my home, and home as my personal secure space is the Arctic. For me, it is the answer to an endless search of Self in the world of diverse identities. Northern people obtain poly-paradigmic and volumetric identities throughout their lives and experiences rich in cultures and surrounded by different contexts. Attachment to the place, to the Arctic plays an essential role in self-reflections and development of an own identity. Knowing family history can bring new edges of self-identification which at times are not as accidental as it might seem. Starting with the Arctic being 'not a home' for my great grandparents through environmental and mental coping strategies for survival in disastrous circumstances this chapter ends with the Arctic topophilia and a blossoming of an Arctic identity.

This is only one side of my family story which comes from my mother's line. My father's line is no less disastrous as almost every second family in the Russian Arctic shares a similar story. This gives an even stronger and even more triumphant taste to this chapter. However, my next target is to explore the Pskov region, the home I have never known and the suitcases are already packed.

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Annex I

Decree of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR 'On the measures of the agriculture socialist reorganization increase in the regions of the dense collectivization and kulaks' fighting', 1 February 1930.

In order to guarantee favorable conditions for socialistic reorganization of agricultural sector, the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR claim:

- To abolish in the regions of total collectivization operation of the law of land lease and hired labor in individual peasant farms. The exclusion could be made upon a special mutual decision of the regional and district executive committees only with respect to the peasants of average means (*serednyak*).
- Local authorities had emergency powers 'up to the complete confiscation of kulaks' properties and their eviction outside the certain regions and territories'. The confiscated properties, for the exception of the part which was intended for paying off the kulaks' duties to the state and cooperation bodies, are to be given over to the indivisible collective farms' funds (*kolkhozy*) as a fee on behalf of poor peasants and farm hands joining them.
- To suggest to authorities of union republics in order to foster present decree pass on required instructions to local authorities and executive committees.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR – M.Kalinin
Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR – A.Rykov
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR – A.Enukidze

Resource: Presidential Library, https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/618998

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Part III
Making Rights Work

Chapter 6
Compensation for Impact of Industrial Projects in Russia to Indigenous Peoples of the North

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Abstract This chapter that was funded by a grant from Russian Foundation for Basic Research № 17-02-00619 examines procedures for social impact assessment in industrial projects in the Russian Federation (later referred to as Russia), focusing on assessment of impact on 'small-numbered indigenous peoples of the North' in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (later referred to as Yakutia), a region in the north-east of Russia. In April 2010, a regional law on Anthropological Expert Review (AER) was adopted in the region of Yakutia, which is implemented during industrial projects that are initiated on the territories of indigenous peoples of the North. This law was developed under pressure from regional non-governmental organisations, following public debates about potential impacts during the construction of Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean oil pipeline in 2006–2008. This is the first and only regional law on social impact assessment for indigenous peoples in Russia, the potential for which had been discussed in Russia for over 20 years but has never been fully implemented. This regional law on is a triumph of the civil society in Yakutia, which in 2018 has been followed by federal government discussions for opportunities of developing a similar federal level law. The chapter evaluates the effectiveness of existing methodology for compensation to indigenous peoples of the North in Yakutia, by examining the regulation, industry reports and regional development

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strategies. It examines the cases of completed social impact assessments and damage compensations, conducted during major industrial projects in Yakutia. The study discusses the features and shortcomings of AER methodology and compares it with existing practices on compensations in other Russian regions. It recommends revising the use of income-based calculation of compensations which treats groups of indigenous peoples of the North that lead traditional activities of reindeer herding as commercial enterprises. The research suggests extending the existing methodology by incorporating an ecosystem services approach and taking into account long-term sustainability impacts of industrial projects on communities of indigenous peoples. Special attention is given to the assessment of effectiveness of the Anthropological Expert Review as an institution for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples in Russia.

Keywords Yakutia · Indigenous rights · Anthropological expert review · Traditional natural resource use · Corporate social responsibility

6.1 Introduction

Protection of traditional lifestyles and cultures of indigenous peoples and the promotion of sustainable development of indigenous communities is a well-recognised challenge in countries located in the circumpolar North and the Arctic (Popkov 2014; Pelyasov 2015). The Russian Federation (later referred to as Russia), with a sizeable area in the Arctic and a number of indigenous peoples residing in the area (Gavrilyeva and Kolomak 2017), protects especially the rights of certain groups of indigenous peoples, residing on its territory, which are defined by the Russian regulation as 'indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russia' (later referred to indigenous minorities of the North). This group of indigenous peoples reside in ancestral, traditional settlement areas and maintain traditional economic activities such as reindeer herding and hunting while having a population no greater than 50,000 people (Russian Federation 1999, changed in 2018). Essentially, they are indigenous minorities in Russia. However, many indigenous peoples who are numerically larger reside on the vast territory of Russia, but who are not considered to be in need of protection (Yakovleva 2014). According to the Census 2010, the total population of indigenous minorities in the Russian North reaches 257,895 people (40 peoples), less than 0.2% of the total Russian population; the protection of their rights is an area of active public discussion, given the recent surge of industrial developments in their traditional territories (Bogoyavlenskiy 2012).

Indigenous minorities' relations in Russia are governed by a two-tier nested regulatory system: first, the federal level regulation that includes legislation adopted by the Parliament of the Russian Federation – the State Duma – and regulation approved by the Government of the Russian Federation. This affects all regions of Russia; second, the regional level regulation that includes legislation adopted by regional legislative bodies and regulations approved by regional governments (Yakovleva 2011a). This chapter examines the experiences of developing regional level regulation in the sphere of protection of indigenous minorities of the North and its implementation during industrial projects, which take place on territories of traditional

nature use and traditional economic activities of indigenous peoples in Yakutia, a remote Russian region located in the northeast of the country.

Worldwide practice of large-scale investment projects demonstrates a mixture of socio-economic impacts on the lives of indigenous peoples' communities. Development of transport, energy and social infrastructure can lead to physical and economic displacement of communities and can cause damage to local ecosystems, adversely affecting the traditional economy of indigenous minorities.

Up to this point, research has predominantly focused on the study of industry sectors related to exploitation of land and other natural resources, including forestry, mineral resources extraction as well as development of transport and industrial infrastructures such as oil and gas pipelines. Research questions have circled around the impact on the natural environment, sovereignty of indigenous communities, impact of industrial projects on cultural heritage, health, traditional resource use, traditional knowledge and well-being indigenous communities (e.g. Hipwell et al. 2002; Ali 2004; Anderson et al. 2006; O'Faircheallaigh 2008; Kirsch 2007). This chapter aims to examine the effectiveness of regional regulation in Yakutia in protecting the rights of indigenous minorities through: (a) review of regional legislation on social impact assessment, i.e. Anthropological Expert Review ("etnologicheskaya ekspertiza" in Russian legislation, abbreviated here as AER) adopted in 2010 in Yakutia; (b) analysis of eight completed AER during 2012–2016; and (c) examination of current methodology for compensation of indigenous minorities of the North during industrial projects. The chapter concludes with recommendations for improvement of current methodology and suggestions to shift towards ecosystems services approach.

The data collected for the conclusions on the state AER stem from the official website of the Ministry for Development of the Institute of Civil Society of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), https://minobchestvo.sakha.gov.ru/. Open feasibility studies and business plans for investment projects were used for the assessment of the impact of industrial projects on indigenous peoples of the North, including information posted on official websites of companies and developers, the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), national and regional media:

- *Big Power News:* http://bigpowernews.ru/news/document40004.phtml
- *Free Electronic Library - Methodology, Instructions, Manuals:* http://www.metodichka.x-pdf.ru/15raznoe/193865-1-utverzhdayu-generalniy-direktor-appronkin-proekt-vipolnenie-rabot-obektu-kompleksnie-geologo-geo-fizicheskie-raboti-o.php
- Pandia: http://pandia.ru/text/78/631/14634-3.php
- Electronic fund of legal and scientific and technical information: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/460277383
- HintFox.com: http://www.hintfox.com/article/oao-hatistir-fakti-i-kommentarii.html
- *Ministry of Nature Protection of the Republic of Sakha Yakutia (Facebook):* https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=294504380740274&story_fbid=298896213634424
- Sakha Press: http://sakhapress.ru/archives/191985

- EastRussia: https://www.eastrussia.ru/news/v-2016-g-alrosa-gotova-vlozhit-8-mlrd-rubley-v-stroitelstvo-karera-na-verkhne-munskom-mestorozhdenii/
- Archive of the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): http://www.yakutia-gov.ru/doc/36074

6.2 Background

Yakutia is home to five indigenous minorities – Evens, Evenks, Dolgans, Yukagirs and Chukchis – comprising a population of 39,936. Yakutia became part of Russia in the middle of the seventeenth century (Leonov and Shevareva 2017). Industrial development in the region has resulted in the displacement of local communities including those of indigenous peoples of the North from the territories of their traditional economic activities and traditional nature use. Until the discovery of major mineral deposits of gold in the 1920s in Southern Yakutia and diamonds in Western Yakutia in the 1950s, the economy of the region was mostly dependent on agriculture, subsistence farming and local use of renewable natural resources, which from the 1950s has changed to mineral resource extraction (Gavrilyeva et al. 2018). Until the middle of the twentieth century, the influence of industrial projects and enterprises on indigenous minorities in Yakutia was limited due to the isolated location mainly of mining enterprises, the settlements of workers and transportation routes. To some extent, this allowed the indigenous minorities to maintain their culture and traditional ways of life surrounding reindeer herding, fishing and hunting. In addition, the state maintained an interest in supporting their traditional economic activities for the supply of food and other products to industrial and transportation enterprises (Boyakova and Vasilyeva 2015). Although a series of reforms introduced by the Soviet state from 1917, including those of collectivisation of indigenous minorities' communities, led to changes in settlement patterns, working conditions and the structure of traditional economic industries while impacting traditional livelihoods, it was primarily industrial construction that significantly expanded the production areas of mining enterprises. This, in turn, led to the increase of labour and to a significant influx of migrants from other regions of the country (Trubina 2013). During this period, the indigenous population turned into a minority on its territory, and the existing legislation and regulatory framework did not ensure the protection of traditional natural resource use and traditional way of life of indigenous minorities (Degteva 2015).

For many regions of the Russian Arctic, the situation was aggravated by a painful process of transferring the nomadic way of life of many indigenous minorities to a sedentary one, encampment in specially created settlements and collectivisation of reindeer herding and hunting (Gavrilyeva and Kolomak 2017). These socio-economic transformations, initiated by Soviet state authorities, were informed by an ideological drive to eradicate the nomadic way of life as measures to 'civilise' indigenous minorities of the North. Inevitably, the impact on traditional economic activities of reindeer herding, fishing, hunting and gathering and working condi-

tions of indigenous peoples were significant and threatened the way of life of indigenous minorities. This state policy led (1) to a subsequent abandonment of any special settlement system for the indigenous populations; (2) a decrease in population (3) enlargement of settlements; and (4) acceleration of assimilation processes (Filippova 2007). The organisation of collective and state farms and resettlement of indigenous minorities from small, and sometimes temporary, villages into larger townships and cities resulted in unprecedented consequences. The purpose of this campaign was to assimilate indigenous minorities into modern Soviet socialist society, increase the standard of living, and integrate the indigenous communities into the Soviet socialist economic system, based on state property management. However, critics suggest that one of the possible goals of the state policy was the intention to free the areas for large-scale industrial development (Petrov 1998). During the Soviet period, traditional communities were forcefully resettled, some monetary compensation was carried out, and the state provided housing and assistance in resettlement into new townships and cities, partly compensating for the loss of traditional lifestyles. As a result, in 1926–1989 the number of rural settlements in Yakutia decreased from 11,743 to 718 units. (Gavrilyeva and Kolomak 2017).

The current stage of industrial development in the Russian Arctic occurs in different legal and socio-economic conditions. The compliance of Russian legislation with international law has made it possible that indigenous minorities are the only social group whose interests are taken into account during the implementation of industrial projects that involve land seizure and changes in access to natural resources.[1] International organisations such as United Nations or the International Labor Organization recognise the rights of indigenous minorities to land and natural resources due to the significant impact of industrial development on local indigenous groups and their economic activities, affecting traditional nature use and management (Mostakhova 2016). From the middle of the twentieth century, a series of international documents was developed and supported by many countries, including Russia. These include the International Labor Organization Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 1989) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007). These documents are also reflected in the business regulations. For example, the one of the seven standards of the International Finance Corporation used for lending projects

[1] Federal Law of 30 April 1999 No. 82-FZ "On guarantees of rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Russian Federation"; Federal Law of 7 May 2001 No. 49-FZ "On territories of traditional natural resource use of indigenous small-numbered nations of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation"; Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 4 February 2009 No.132-r "On concept of sustainable development of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russia Federation"; Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 17 April 2006 No536-r "On approval of the list of indigenous small-numbered people of the North, Siberia and Far East of the Russian Federation"; Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 8 May 2009 No631-r "On approval of the list of places of traditional settlement and traditional economic activity of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Russian Federation and the list of types of traditional economic activity of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Russian Federation"

worth over $ 10 million or for companies that are entering an IPO for the first time is about rights of indigenous peoples exclusively (IFC 2012).

6.3 Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the North: Review of Regulation in Yakutia

In Russia, the main block of legislation on protection of the rights of indigenous peoples was adopted in the period from 1999 to 2009. The Constitution of Russia guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples of the North in accordance with generally recognised principles and norms of international law and international treaties signed and ratified by Russia (Popkov 2014). In Yakutia, the regional legal framework for the protection of indigenous peoples is more advanced than in other regions of Russia. So far, six regional laws have been adopted, aimed at preserving and developing indigenous small-numbered peoples. Among them is the Law of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) "On the Territories of Traditional Nature Use and Traditional Economic Activities of Indigenous Peoples of the North of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)" adopted on 13 July 2006, 370-3 №755-11 and the Law on nomadic patrimonial community of Yakutsk, October 17, 2003, No. 175-111. Currently, a new legislation on the concept of sustainable development of districts and places of compact residence of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is being developed (Savvinova et al. 2015).

In accordance with federal and regional legislations, indigenous peoples of the North organise themselves into nomadic and tribal communes, which are considered to be non-profit organisations. In Yakutia, tribal communes of indigenous peoples of the North go through a procedure of legal registration at the Office of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). As of 1 July 2017, 172 communities were registered in Yakutia, 25 of them are located in Aldan District, 27 in Neryungri District, where the largest industrial projects are currently being implemented (Gavrilyeva et al. 2018). Types of indigenous communes differ by traditional economic activities and specialisation: tribal nomadic communes (TNC) and tribal communes (TC or communes of non-nomadic people). In addition, indigenous peoples engage in small, for-profit business: agricultural cooperatives (AC); production cooperatives (PC); agricultural and production cooperatives (PAC); and peasant farms (PF). Also, in the areas where indigenous people reside, types of organisations such as the Municipal Unitary Enterprise (MUE) or Municipal Unitary Reindeer-Fishing Enterprise (MURFE), and joint-stock company (JSC) are also common (Litvinenko 2014).

Thirteen types of traditional economic activities of indigenous peoples are legally recognised in Russia: animal husbandry, including nomadic (reindeer husbandry, horse breeding, etc.); fishing and the exploitation of aquatic biological resources; hunting, processing and marketing of hunting products; processing of

livestock products; dog breeding; animal breeding, processing and marketing of fur farming products; beekeeping; agriculture (gardening); harvesting of timber and non-timber forest resources for own needs; gathering; extraction and processing of common minerals for own needs; art crafts and folk crafts; the construction of national traditional dwellings and other structures necessary for the implementation of traditional economic activities (Leonov and Shevareva 2017).

One of the mechanisms for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and expanding the access to land resources is the development of territories for traditional nature use (TTNU). In Yakutia, 59 territories of traditional nature use and traditional economic activities were created by the decisions of representative bodies of local self-government; 9 of them were formed within the boundaries of municipal districts, 49 were within the boundaries of municipalities and 1 was within the nomadic tribal community "Olom" in Mirninsky District. Out of these TTNUs, 55 territories have been registered in the State Real Estate Cadaster – a special database about real estate property rights. However, various problems with registration of land exist. First, the legal regime and status of these territories, as well as the rights of indigenous peoples to use land, are not certain. Second, the strict regulation on environmental protection within the territories of traditional nature management may contradict with traditional natural resource use of indigenous peoples. Third, there is no clear definition of the conditions and grounds for awarding land rights and rights for other natural resources to indigenous small-numbered peoples within these territories (Savvinova et al. 2015).

In Yakutia, indigenous minorities of the North reside on the territory of 21 municipal regions of the Republic while traditional settlements and areas for economic activities spread over 70 rural villages. In 20 municipal regions of Yakutia as much as 179 enterprises are registered, holding 381 areas while being licensed to engage in traditional natural resource use and traditional economic activities on the territories of traditional settlement (Samsonova et al. 2017). The main instrument that regulates the relationship between investors and commercial companies, state bodies and communes of indigenous peoples of the North is the Anthropological Expert Review ("etnologicheskaya ekspertiza" in Russian legislation, AER), which has been acknowledged in the federal level legislation. This is a type of social impact assessment that has been designed to assess impacts on indigenous peoples of the North. It includes "the analysis and forecast of demographic stability of settlement and their ethnic communities; issues of social and economic sustainability; problems of ethno-cultural and socio-psychological integration of local communities; problems of securing population's health" (Stepanov 1999, p. 121). The Anthropological Expert Review supplements the mandatory Assessment of Impact on the Natural Environment, a Russian equivalent of environmental impact assessment, and meets the broad objectives of socio-economic impact assessment used elsewhere (Sawyer and Gomez 2008).

In the two-tiered governance system of indigenous minorities' relations in Russia, the implementation of AER, mentioned in federal legislation since 1999 has been placed at the regional level of governance (Sleptsov 2015, p. 17). Attempts to

develop regional laws and regulations on AER were made in Nenets Autonomous Orkug and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug that face oil and gas developments on the territories of indigenous minorities of the North. However, these legal projects were not sufficiently supported by corresponding regional bodies and no laws were adopted (Zander et al. 2014). Yakutia has become the first region to successfully adopt a law on AER in Russia in 2010 by the regional legislative body, Il Tumen. The law 820-Z No 537-IV On Anthropological Experts in Places of Traditional Settlement and Traditional Economic Activity of Small-numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was adopted following widespread public discussion of industrial impacts on local communities during the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, whose route crossed the territory of Yakutia along 1468 km and which was constructed between 2006 and 2009.

The regional government has actively supported the change of the route of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. Originally it was meant to pass next to Lake Baikal, intended to increase regional oil production and to improve the industrial infrastructure, which would add to the competitiveness of regional industrial enterprises, increasing employability and budget revenues. Developers of the oil pipeline insisted that the pipeline route would not affect large settlements and townships and would not result in displacement of local population. Nonetheless, the regional public was concerned about the pipeline route and its possible effects on agricultural and rural economic activities, particularly those of indigenous people and other population affected by the construction of ESPO. Transit population of Yakutia, or communities that reside along this oil transit infrastructure, were excluded from decision-making concerning the oil pipeline route and its possible impacts on the natural environment and socio-economic development (Yakovleva and Manday 2010, p. 13).

During series of public hearings on the impact on the natural environment, conducted after the route has been approved by the state and the company, several regional civil society organisations questioning the impacts of this pipeline formed the coalition *Our home Yakutia.* Their aim was to express public opinion during the interaction with project developers and state bodies. These organisations launched an alternative, independent 'ecological expert review', which refuted the findings of the 'Assessment of Impact on the Natural Environment' conducted by the project developers. The coalition demanded the implementation of a wider 'anthropological expert review' to assess the project's impacts on local and indigenous populations (Yakovleva 2014). As a result, *Transneft* compensated several communes of indigenous minorities of the North who were officially registered as users of land for traditional natural resource use and traditional economic activities directly on the route of the oil pipeline (Ibid.). Those who could not present valid official documents for their right to use certain lands, though *de facto* conducting economic activities directly on the territory of the pipeline route, were excluded from compensation payments. Groups of indigenous minorities of the North, having plots in close proximity to the pipeline and whose traditional activities would be affected by

changes in the migration of wild animals, were also excluded from the discussions and compensations (Yakovleva 2011b).

The construction of the ESPO oil pipeline occurred swiftly, project documents were prepared in short timeframes and during the construction several contractors were changed, which affected the quality of construction. In 2010 and then in 2014, small oil spills were detected on the oil pipeline along with air pollution resulting from exploitation of the oil pipeline. These confirmed public concerns about environmental impacts and the wider threat of industrial expansion in the North (Gavrilyeva and Stepanova 2016). Questions regarding further potential social conflicts with industrial projects that extract and transport mineral resources in the complex climatic conditions of the North were again brought to the fore (Pakhomov and Mostakhova 2016).

The adoption of the Law on State Expert Review allowed to formulate clear 'rules of the game' for interested parties in the region, including mandatory informing about proposed activities, their possible impacts on the natural environment, the holding of consultations and public hearings, and coordination of projects with the local population. The law was adopted after heated discussions in Il Tumen, the Parliament of Yakutia, between representatives of industrial companies and officials of national districts and municipalities, as well as people from nomadic tribal communes. Unlike other regions of Russia, where the 'anthropological expert review' implies a *public* expert review and which is either part of the state environmental impact assessment or state historical and cultural assessment, in Yakutia, the AER is carried out by the *state*. This means that its results have legal force and are binding. The most effective research instruments that become a part of major findings of the assessment are anthropological, sociological, economic and legal studies and an assessment of compensation to traditional economic activities of indigenous minorities of the North (Sleptsov 2015, p. 18).

From the introduction of the law in 2010, a state body authorised to conduct the AER in the region was the Department of Peoples Affairs, which established a procedure for carrying out the AER and which developed a regulation for provision of this public service (Yakutia 2011). At present, the authority to conduct and AER has been transferred to the Ministry for Development of Institutes of Civil Society in Yakutia, created in 2016.

6.4 Cases of AER Conducted in Yakutia During 2012–2016

Between 2012 and 2016, as much as eight Anthropological Expert Reviews were conducted on the territory of Yakutia (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). Out of those, 5 related to projects planned in the Aldan district of Yakutia, 2 to projects planned on the territory of Neryungri, Olekminsky and Olenek districts, and 1 to a project planned to operate in Bulunsky, Anabar and Zhigansky districts of Yakutia. The amount of compensations for damages to indigenous minorities of the North conducting traditional economic activities significantly varies from project to project (Fig. 6.1).

Table 6.1 Industrial projects that implemented state "ethnological expert review" in Yakutia

No.	Project	Year of anthropological expert review approval	Investor	Project value in million RUB	Project value million USD	Districts of Yakutia affected by the project
1	Construction of Kankyn hydroelectric station	2012	RusHydro, South Yakutian hydro-electric complex company	110,000.0 (2006 prices)	4047.9	Neryungrinsky and Aldansky districts
2	Complex of geological and geophysical works on adjoining of leno-Tunguska oil and gas province and Laptev potentially oil and gas area	2015	JSC YUZHMORGEOLOGIYA	730.0	11.9	Bulunsky and Anabarsky districts
3	Construction of two electricity transmission lines NPS-15 and NPS-16	2015	Vostok Branch in Khabarovsk of JSC "Centre for Engineering and Construction Management"	13,800.0	225.1	Aldansky and Olekminsky districts
4	Construction of the bridge over river Aldan on Aldan-Olekminsk-Lensk motoway	2015	State institution "Management of motor roads of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)"	284.0	4.6	Aldansky district
5	Gas pipeline "Power of Siberia"	2015	"Gazprom transgaz Tomsk" Company	799,900.0	13,050.1	Neryungrinsky and Aldansky districts
6	Operation of spaceport «Vostochny»	2016	Center for operation of space ground based infrastructure	Not available	Not available	Vilyusky, Verkhnevilyusky, Zhigansky, Olekminsky and Aldansky districts
7	Development of diamond deposit "Verkhne-Munskoe" 2016	2016	Joint-stock company "ALROSA"	63,000.0	937.6	Oleneksky district
8	Development of alluvial diamond deposits at the rivers Bolshaya Kuonamka and Talakhtakh	2016	Joint-stock company "Nizhne-Lenskoe"	Not available	Not available	Oleneksky district

Table 6.2 Assessment of impact of industrial projects on communities of indigenous peoples of the North

No.	Project	Communities of indigenous peoples of the North	Number of communities members, people	Total area of land (aquatic) extracted from traditional natural resource use, square km	Amount of compensation for damages, million RUB	Ratio of compensation to value of the industrial project, %
1	Construction of Kankyn hydroelectric station	8 units, including 7 TNC ("Bugat", "Nyurbagan", "Anamadjak", "Idjek", "Buta", "Kurung-Kunku", "Timpton") and JSC "Khatystyr"	89	258.80 (water area)	238.41 (one-time compensation) and 409.67(annual payments during 49 years)	0.37%
2	Complex of geological and geophysical works on adjoining of Leno-Tunguska oil and gas province and Laptev potentially oil and gas area	8 units, including MUE "Taimylyrsky", PF Skrybykin I.G., AC TNC "Uottakh-Khaya", PC TNC "Ulahan Kuell", TNC Evenks "Terpey", TC Dolgans "Uele", MURFE «Arctica», MURFE "named after I. Spiridonov"	157	26,720.0 (aquatic area)	5.93	0.81%
3	Construction of two electricity transmission lines NPS-15 and NPS-16	4 units including TNC "Amga", TNC "Sergelyakh", TNC "Kien-Yuryakh", PAC TNC "Kindigir"	64	3.79	10.24	0.07%
4	Construction of the bridge over river Aldan on Aldan-Olekminsk-Lensk motoway	JSC "Khatystyr"	42	0.383	2.62	0.92%

(continued)

Table 6.2 (continued)

No.	Project	Communities of indigenous peoples of the North	Number of communities members, people	Total area of land (aquatic) extracted from traditional natural resource use, square km	Amount of compensation for damages, million RUB	Ratio of compensation to value of the industrial project, %
5	Gas pipeline "Power of Siberia"	6 units including 2 MUE ("Iengra" and «Zolotinka»), 3 TNC ("Bugat", "Amin", 'Kien-Uryakh") and JSC "Khatystyr"	143	5189.18 (data for 3 TNC)	19.71 (annually) and 53.26 (one-time payment)	0.01%
6	Operation of spaceport «Vostochny»	7 units including, 5 TNC and TC ("Ugut", "Bes-Yuryuakh", "Khapparastaakh", "Oluu" and "Eyiim"), PAC "Zhiganski" and JSC "Khatystyr"	83	15,315.30 (fallout area)	0.50 (one-time payment for 1 launch, payment to communes on the territory of which the waste will be found)	–
7	Development of diamond deposit "Verkhne-Munskoe" 2016	13 units including: 9 TC ("Beke", "Sopko", "Kulunchuk", "Biirikte", "Muna", "Sonord'ut", "Hotugu Sulus", "Eneen", "Olenek"), 2 Ltd. companies ("Teey'e" and "Orlan"), PAC "Chuostaakh" and MUE "Oleneksky"	190	7.91	35.03	0.06%
8	Development of alluvial diamond deposits at the rivers Bolshaya Kuonamka and Talakhtakh	2 units: MUE "Zhilindinsky" and MUE "Oleneksky"	84	7.42	41.86 (annually, during project implementation of 10 years)	–



Fig. 6.1 Compensation for damages to units of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North in Yakutia for land extracted from traditional natural use and under industrial influence, rubles per hectare per year

Compensation per square km of land, extracted for industrial activities and under stress from industrial projects, is higher for relatively small land sites. For aquatic areas, the compensation amounts are much lower than for land sites. For example, damage during the project "Complex of Geological and Geophysical Works on adjoining of Leno-Tunguska oil and gas province and Laptev potentially oil and gas area" (*JSC YUZHMORGEOLOGIYA*) is valued at 221.93 roubles (3.62 USD) per square km per year. Data comparison demonstrates that the amount of compensations to communes of indigenous peoples of the North does not exceed 1% of the project value (see Table 6.2). The overall amount of compensation per one member of the community of indigenous peoples of the North varies from 7600 to 372,500 roubles (from 113 to 6077 USD) (see Fig. 6.2). The range of values is explained by the area of land used for industrial projects, as well as approach to compensation payments – either one-time or annual.



Fig. 6.2 Average amount of one-time and annual compensation payments for damages caused to traditional economic activities of indigenous peoples of the North in Yakutia according to 8 ethnological expert reviews conducted in 2012–2016

6.5 Methodology for Compensation Valuation – Critique and Recommendations

Currently, in Yakutia, especially in areas of industrial development, reindeer herding has suffered significant losses during the years of socio-economic crisis in the 1990s. Most indigenous households rely on subsistence economy, and are forced to survive on gathering (berries, mushrooms, medicinal raw materials, and waterfowl), hunting of wild deer for furs, and producing crafts such as reindeer skin boots, traditional clothes, souvenirs for personal use and moderate commercial sales. Studies show that incomes of members of indigenous peoples' communes is two times lower per capita compared to averages for regional population due to high proportion of members of under and over working age (Burtseva et al. 2012, p. 16).

Monetary income of indigenous minorities of the North in Yakutia consist of old age pensions and social benefits for families with children, as well as budgetary subsidies and subventions for reindeer herding. In 2016, the amounts of subsidies per reindeer head were 760 rubles (11.31 USD) per year. Currently, as much as 1292 people in the region are engaged in reindeer herding, state subventions for reindeer herding in Yakutia amounted to 467.7 million rubles (6.961 million USD) in 2016 and 694.2 million rubles (11.906 million USD) in 2017 (*Arctic Consult*, 2017, p. 30, 42). If the average annual income of one reindeer herder of working age ranges from 261.0 to 387.4 thousand rubles (4476.2–6644.0 USD) per year, the calculated compensations per member of the commune are equivalent to one annual income of a reindeer herder. Although it is a significant amount per reindeer herder, in many instances, this is a lump sum, a one-time payment.

Indigenous minorities, that reside in Yakutia, occupy the land and lead traditional economic activities, often do not have formal legal rights to use their traditional land areas. Large land sites withdrawn for industrial use from traditional natural resource use regime, in many cases, are outside of municipal land of settlements and belong to state property of regional or federal governments. However, these plots of land are regularly used for traditional economic activities by the indigenous communities for livestock, hunting, fishing and gathering, social and cultural activities (Yakovleva and Grover 2015). Due to the lack of formal land rights for use of land, for example in the case of the Verkhne-Munskoe diamond deposit in Olenek district, *ALROSA* did not pay compensation to indigenous communes. A plot of land, chosen for construction and development of the diamond deposit, was removed from the inter-settlement territory. This land had previously been classified as a zone of 'absolute tranquility of the nature reserve of regional significance', a so-called "Erkeei Sire", according the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2 April 2011 No 591-r. (Mostakhova 2016).

Lack of compensation payments awarded in other industrial projects, undertaken on the territory of traditional nature use of indigenous peoples of the North in the region, stipulates a need to improve the regulatory framework of Anthropological Expert Review and revises agreements between indigenous minorities' communes and industrial developers. First of all, it is necessary to introduce compulsory payments, as well as to provide payment schedules, for example, 'before the start' or 'at the end of the first year' of construction. Also, it is necessary to determine the circle of compensation recipients and the form of compensation for damages. Some experts do not support the idea of monetary compensation for damages paid only to members of indigenous peoples' communes, because it excludes the wider local community residing near industrial activities. The population could belong to another ethnic background and may not be part of indigenous minorities' communes while being employed in other industries such as education. Researchers suggest that compensation could be conducted through rehabilitation of polluted areas and investment into socio-economic and cultural development of indigenous peoples of the North through investment into social infrastructure housing and implementation of social programmes (Potravny and Baglaeva 2015, p. 46).

Discussions on AER results are a subject of ongoing academic discussion, which, however, is also taken to federal officials from time to time. The spread of damage valuations is a result of discrepancy in approaches of expert groups to valuation and indicates the imperfection of valuation methodology for calculation of damages caused to indigenous peoples of the North and was developed on the basis of methodological recommendations in 2006 (Mikhalev et al. 2007; Russian Federation 2009).

Following the review of the methodology, we note that:

- The methodology is based on a generally accepted algorithm of cost-benefit analysis, which allows to determine lost profit. It is envisages carrying out calculations using normative indicators to determine possible volumes of products lost as a result of anthropogenic factors. Methodological recommendations include

101 indicators, which are proposed for calculation to produce the result, of which 24 are coefficients, a significant part of which is determined by experts and conceals bias and subjectivity (Velichenko 2016, p. 20–21);

- Special studies should be conducted to test this methodology and the responsibility for carrying out these studies should be with the state bodies of Yakutia. In 2011, studies on development of normative indicators at the regional level have begun, but were stalled due to the lack of adequate data and their assessment in archive material with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Policy of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and other data on quality of land in traditional natural resource areas (Burtseva et al. 2012, p. 18).
- Many natural resources that are used by indigenous peoples of the North do not have a market value as they are not traded but consumed by local population for personal use. In order to assess the value of natural resources in a comprehensive manner during the valuation of resource productivity of territories of traditional economic activities, a development of regional economic normative for valuation of natural capital is required which then can be used for valuation of damage caused (Potravny et al. 2017, p. 12).
- The methodology allows to estimate potential economic damage but cannot evaluate the damage to ethno-social environment – language, culture and traditional knowledge. Negative processes include the emergence of risks of adaptation processes, loss of ethnic identity, transformation of traditional values in indigenous communities and communes, and the decline in the prestige of employment in traditional reindeer husbandry and northern fisheries (Pakhomov and Mostakhova 2016).

Methodological recommendations have not been revised for 10 years whilst normative indicators for the productivity of ecosystems, which should be approved by state bodies at the regional level, have not yet been developed. The delay in a methodological and normative indicator database for valuation of damages of industrial development in Yakutia reduces the effectiveness of AER as an instrument on protection of the rights of indigenous minorities of the North. We propose several measures for improvement of the Anthropological Expert Review: (1) widening of the list of ecosystem services; (2) revise the profit approach of the damage valuation; (3) development of regional normative indicators; (4) consideration of impact of several projects on the same territory. These are discussed below.

First, it is necessary to widen the list of ecosystem services included in valuation of damage to traditional economic activities. At present, the damage is valued for 4 types of traditional economic activity – reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing and gathering – which are referred to as productive types of ecosystem services. However, other ecosystem services used by indigenous peoples of the North such as use of wood and forest resources and water ecosystems are not considered by the compensation methodology. Moreover, the full range of ecosystem services include environment-forming function, recreation and other services, which could be included in the valuation (Porfiriev and Terentiev 2016).

Second, we suggest the rejection of a cost-benefit method for valuation of damage, which is currently being adopted for AER. It implies an assessment of possible damage based on the income that communes can receive, minus the fixed and variable costs necessary to carry out traditional economic activity. In fact, this method aims to determine the profit of indigenous minorities' communes, whereas they are considered as agricultural enterprises, which produce goods for the market. According to economic theory, long-term profit of any enterprise always equals to zero due to market competition. Unlike competitive markets, isolated communities that conduct traditional economic activities are involved in subsistence and semi-subsistence economy. Small farms have a less important role on the market, but they are important in the rural areas as they provide food and social security for the population while contributing to environmental preservation through the use of traditional production methods (Alexandria et al. 2015). Therefore, a cost-benefit approach will lead to a decrease of damage valuation. We thus suggest using the total income as a basis for damage, taking into account a significant share of products that are produced for internal use, and the remoteness of indigenous peoples' settlements from markets where these products could be sold.

Third, when developing normative indicators for the productivity of ecosystems that contribute to estimating the incomes of the indigenous communes, we suggest taking into account environmental differentiation of natural areas, as well as productivity of local ecosystems that are affected by seasonal climatic conditions. For example, during the winter of 2016–2017, several Arctic districts of Yakutia encountered abnormal, record high levels of snow: during a period of 2 months, a 5-month precipitation rate fell. This led to widespread death of reindeer and horses and negatively affected winter catch of fish (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Policy of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 2017). Changes in productivity of local ecosystems due to climatic and technogenic impacts and their influence on sustainability of local communities remains poorly understood and require further monitoring and the creation of a database of observations. Therefore, the normative indicators for the productivity of ecosystems should be adjusted in accordance with the results of regular ethno-ecological monitoring. In determining potential damage, one should take into account that natural resources are systemically undervalued with regards to other resources consumed during traditional economic activities (fuel, vehicles, communications, etc.). Having full access to nature, isolated indigenous communes face higher transportation costs and a lack of funds to purchase goods from outside.

Fourth, the development of large-scale mining projects does not occur in isolation and is accompanied by projects relating to transport and energy infrastructure. Inevitably, several industrial projects are put in place on the same territory. For instance, the territory of the indigenous minorities' JSC "Khatystyr" in Aldan district could be affected by three major projects, which led to maximum levels of compensation for damages. Only the refusal to proceed with the Kankyn hydroelectric station in the areas prevented relocation of indigenous communes in Aldan district. However, the financial crisis of 2013–2014 limited the opportunities for investment in the regions of the Far East. We suggest that the methodology should

not only assess the damage, but measure the sustainability of affected communities and communes, considering the area of land impact, the overall stress levels in the territory of traditional natural resource use and forecast of local ecosystem conditions. We urge that on the basis of scientifically grounded information, it is necessary to establish threshold values of sustainability, exceeding of which would result in absolute elimination of conditions for continuation of traditional economic activities. The damage in this case should be determined on the basis of alternatives - the costs of resettlement and community adaptation in new territories. If traditional economic activities are abandoned, compensation must be sufficient for the construction or purchase of real estate, as well as resettlements considering the wishes of community members.

6.6 Conclusions

All positive expert opinions of the Anthropological Expert Review contain recommendations on concluding and implementing agreements on social and economic cooperation between corporations, public authorities and local self-government, public organisations of indigenous minorities, including support for sustainable development of traditional nature use, and in some cases, creation of committees on corporate social responsibility. AER can potentially have a positive impact on the development of corporate social responsibility in Russia, if expert reviews are followed by voluntary social responsibility agreements and programs. The development of such mechanism can thus serve as a role model for other regions in the Arctic.

AER was institutionalised by the state administration of Yakutia under pressure from regional NGOs and other public organisations which demonstrates a formation of functioning civil society in the Russian Arctic. However, the current methodology applied in the AER suffers from several shortcomings, especially if several projects are planned on adjacent territories. At the moment, AERs are conducted using project documentation that do not allow to value the damage to the natural environment and indigenous minorities' communities and other groups in their entirety, and contrast these with overall benefit from development of several projects including commercial, budgetary, taxation and other economic and public impacts with the use of comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.

AER allows to determine the damage to one social group, indigenous minorities of the North who conduct traditional economic activities in the territories registered for traditional natural use and are directly affected by proposed industrial projects. It could become part of a wider social impact assessment that could study impacts on wider local communities, who reside locally, use local natural resources, live on adjacent territories and are not necessarily members of indigenous minorities of the North, but those who can potentially experience negative impacts from planned industrial projects.

The maintenance of outdated approaches in the industry, where interests of the industry dominates in discussions with regional governments, local municipal governments and indigenous minorities' communities generates mistrust and can lead to environmental and social protests. Transparency, openness and cooperation should become new principles of interaction between commercial developers implementing projects on the territory of traditional economic activities and traditional natural use. To improve the effectiveness of the Anthropological Expert Review, existing methodological and regulatory flaws need to be eliminated and a systematic study of ethno-ecological and socio-economic monitoring to develop regional standards and assessment of sustainability of indigenous minorities' communities and communes using factors of environmental and technogenic nature should be conducted.

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Chapter 7
The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights

Nikolas Sellheim

Abstract The Arctic is undoubtedly in crisis. The ice is melting, the tensions between the 'West' and Russia are increasing and the Arctic environment is at a crossroads towards unprecedented systemic shift. The picture looks indeed bleak. But amongst these potentially disastrous developments Arctic governance has developed as a triumphant means for advancing indigenous rights, constituting a characteristic of primary importance in a world of increased possibilities for conflict. Especially the Arctic Council as the primary forum for Arctic governance has incorporated elementary aspects of international indigenous rights law into its working procedures. This article examines how the Arctic Council has embedded standards of indigenous rights as a normative basis into its functioning despite its member states struggling with domestic challenges pertaining to indigenous rights. Drawing from primary documentation of the Arctic Council it is shown that within the Arctic Council all member states place equally great emphasis on advancing the wellbeing and rights of Arctic indigenous peoples.

Keywords Arctic Council · Arctic governance · Indigenous rights · Arctic states · Wellbeing

7.1 Introduction

Current Arctic governance structures have been ascribed a significant lack of adherence to international human rights standards, particularly because of the Arctic Council's (AC) lack of endorsement of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) or the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Bratspies 2015, p. 175). Yet despite this, the AC has played an important role in strengthening indigenous peoples' representation in international law (e.g. Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006). Indeed, one may even speak of a triumph for indigenous rights.

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Despite the lack of official endorsements of specific human rights instruments, especially the AC has contributed to normative advancements and potential institutionalisation of international standards pertaining to indigenous rights (e.g. Bratspies 2015). As part of evidence-based human rights research this chapter uses primary documentation available on the AC website as the sources for the study. It is, however, merely the *intention* of the application of indigenous rights standards rather than its translation into the *realities* on the ground which is primarily being dealt with (see De Feyter 2009, p. 217). Due to the ever-increasing number of observer states and organisations to the AC, this intention is considered to have significant normative impact. After all, as the Council's Rules of Procedure state, "[a]ny Observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Council's Declaration shall have its status as an Observer suspended" (AC 1998, para. 37). With this in mind it appears reasonable to assume that the application of certain indigenous rights within the working procedure of the AC serves as a baseline for observer states and organisations as well. Whether or not this baseline is being followed by each individual observer, however, cannot be determined and it is of course uncontested that the AC's purview does not deal with domestic legislation. This being said, with the now three legally-binding agreements that have been concluded under the auspices of the AC, a norm-implementation and norm-institutionalisation process has begun (see also Betts and Orchard 2014) which indeed influences domestic application of Arctic-specific law.

7.2 Methodology

As the basis for this chapter serve the rights and obligations enshrined in the two most prominent international legal documents on indigenous rights, namely the ILO Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 (ILO 1989) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP 2007). Based on these documents, more than 40 rights and explicitly ('States shall') or implicitly ('Indigenous peoples shall have the right') expressed obligations were coded. In the interest of scope, however, 7 fundamental rights – land rights; the right to free, prior and informed consent; the right to participation; the right to health; the right to employment and socio-economic development; and the right to education – are considered for the purposes of this paper.

In order to identify state behaviour as regards the rights of indigenous peoples, the latest official country reports produced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and its Human Rights Committee (HRC); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR); the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI); and additionally case law of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) were consulted. These give summarised insight into the performance of Arctic states as regards their indigenous populations and mirror

specific shortcomings in the respective state. Since Iceland does not have an indigenous population, the country was omitted from this section.

In order to assess how the AC member states have addressed specific issues relating to indigenous rights *vis-à-vis* the country reports, a detailed analysis of all available meeting minutes of the meetings of Senior Arctic Officials (SAO); Ministerial meeting reports; Ministerial Declarations; and chairmanship programmes throughout all chairmanships until the start of the current Finnish Chairmanship 2017 was undertaken. Documents were coded and analysed using *Atlas.ti*® with the identified rights in mind. This occurred when these rights – or slight variations thereof – were brought up directly or contextually, or when the rights were indirectly referenced by raising issues which are inherently linked with them, such as reindeer husbandry and land rights. Moreover, the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and the right to participation are used interchangeably (OHCHR 2013).

7.3 Indigenous Rights within Arctic Governance

Indigenous peoples have become active voices in Arctic governance since the 1990s. This is best exemplified in the 1991 Rovaniemi Declaration (Rovaniemi Declaration 1991) which established the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the 1993 Kirkenes Declaration (Kirkenes Declaration 1993) establishing the Barents cooperation. Both declarations reflect the full acceptance of the regional indigenous peoples as inherent rights holders by utilising the term 'peoples' instead of people, holding important implications for self-determination as well as potential statehood under international law (e.g. van Genugten et al. 2014; Åhrén 2016). While the then recently adopted ILO Convention 169 had only been ratified by Norway in 1990, the Kirkenes Declaration nevertheless sets out a normative inclusion of indigenous peoples by referencing Chapter 26 of Agenda 21, concluded at the Rio Summit in 1992. Chapter 26, itself also referring to 'people', provides a roadmap to strengthening the rights of indigenous 'people' and to empower them. The AEPS and the Barents cooperation thus provided for a normative recognition of indigenous peoples in their working processes irrespective of how indigenous peoples were perceived under international law at that time.

The AC, on the other hand, which was established in 1996 as a successor to the AEPS following the Ottawa Declaration (Ottawa Declaration 1996), initially refrained from using the term 'peoples'. In the Preamble the Declaration reads that the Arctic states recognise "the traditional knowledge of the indigenous people of the Arctic and their communities" and desire to "ensure full consultation with and the full involvement of indigenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of the Arctic" (Ibid., Preamble). However, in the Chapeau of Article 2, the Declaration reads: "Permanent participation equally is open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with majority Arctic indigenous constituency." The term 'peoples' is marked with an asterisk and an accompanying footnote which remarks that "[t]he use of the term 'peoples' in this Declaration shall not be con-

strued as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law." While no distinction between the preferences of the different Arctic countries as regards the utilisation of the term 'peoples' is referred to, this changed in the 2002 Inari Declaration (Inari Declaration 2002), following the third Ministerial Meeting. Throughout the Declaration the term 'indigenous peoples' is consistently used. However, the footnote accompanying the first occurrence of the term highlights that "[t]he United States notes that the use of the term 'peoples' in this Declaration and related documents shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law." This footnote, or slight variations thereof, can be found until 2009 when the Tromsø Declaration, following the sixth Ministerial Meeting, was concluded (Tromsø Declaration 2009). Contrary to its predecessors, the Tromsø Declaration no longer holds a footnote, nor do its successors until the 2017 Fairbanks Declaration. It can be assumed that the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007 has influenced the AC's utilisation of the term 'indigenous peoples.' Indeed, the Tromsø Declaration also recognises "the rights of indigenous peoples" in its Preamble although the United States and Canada initially objected to the UNDRIP while Russia abstained – both the US and Canada finally voiced their support in 2010 and 2016 respectively. The other AC member states were from the beginning supporters of it. In other words, although three of the eight AC members did not endorse the UNDRIP at the time of the Tromsø Declaration, the AC as an organisation endorsed it in the name of all of its member states. Moreover, the meeting minutes available reflect a consistent utilisation of the term 'indigenous peoples' from its very beginning. Ultimately, in its working structure it appears the AC has considered indigenous peoples as peoples irrespective of the debates surrounding their legal status under international law.

7.4 The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic States

To understand the special role the AC plays in the application of indigenous rights, a brief examination of the performance of the Arctic states towards its indigenous populations is necessary.

7.4.1 Sweden

Sweden has not ratified the ILO Convention 169. Despite its 2011 constitutional amendment which recognises the Sámi as an indigenous people Sweden shows deficits in the recognition of Sámi land rights (CESCR 2016a; CERD 2013; HRC 2016), which the ECRI report identifies as the primary concern for the Swedish Sámi population (ECRI 2012). This is particularly reflected in the increasing expansion of extractive industries on Sámi lands, impacting traditional livelihoods, undermining the free, prior and informed consent of the Sámi population. Sweden's policy of

placing the burden of proof on the shoulders of the Sámi puts significant hardship on rights claimants. Sweden has shown rather little progress to make this burden lighter in legal and financial terms (CESCR 2016a). Sweden has shown its willingness to politically strengthen the Sámi by allocating increasing funds to the Sámi Parliament. It has however thus far refrained from establishing a truth commission to investigate the plight of the Sámi in Swedish history, which was recommended by the Sámi Parliament in 2014 (Ibid.).

Reindeer herding has been identified as being under severe pressure. Two issues are at play: first, mining and wind-power projects aggravate reindeer herding, leading to the overall challenges surrounding land and land rights. Second, the protection of reindeer herds conflicts with the protection of specific predators under Swedish law, which has led to the killing of reindeer by these predators and to the inability of reindeer herders to effectively protect their herds. Thus far, Sweden has failed to install an adequate compensation mechanism for damaged herders, which CERD recommends the country to do (CERD 2013).

7.4.2 Finland

Since 1995 the Sámi have been recognised as an indigenous people under Section 17 of the Finnish Constitution and several acts to protect their rights to culture, language and livelihoods have been adopted. However, Finland has not ratified ILO Convention 169 and negotiations regarding the Nordic Sámi Convention are inert (Bankes and Koivurova 2013). Although Finland has recognised the Sámi as an indigenous people with specific rights, the situation in Finland, particularly as regards land rights, is problematic and decisions made on land use are made without free, prior and informed consent (CERD 2017a). For example, the 2016 Act on Metsähallitus, the Finnish forest management agency, does not require consultation with the Sámi before issuing land use permits. Also as regards the issuing of fishing permits, Sámi land users or the Sámi Parliament are not consulted, such as in the Teno River Fishery Agreement concluded between Finland and Norway in 2016 (see also Wesslin 2017).

The second major concern regarding the Sámi in Finland concerns the Sámi languages. Due to the limited speakers of different Sámi languages, access to health services in Sámi is limited also in the Sámi homeland. Although language revitalisation programmes have been initiated, the sustainable teaching of children in the regional Sámi language cannot be assured. Moreover, the majority of the Sámi population lives outside the Sámi homeland. Although funding is available for the teaching of Sámi languages outside the Sámi homeland, the number of teachers to do so is low, making language programmes unsatisfactory (CERD 2017a; ECRI 2013a).

ECRI (2013a) notes that throughout Finland knowledge on the Sámi is not well developed, resulting in lack of training for civil servants in culture and Sámi languages. In order for the Sámi situation to improve in Finland on a broader scale, ECRI thus recommends the substantive teaching of Sámi culture in schools and society.

7.4.3 Norway

Norway was one of the first states to ratify ILO Convention 169 and the Sámi Parliament is increasingly consulted on matters that affect the Sámi people (ECRI 2015; CESCR 2013). Nevertheless, implementation of indigenous rights is inert (Ravna 2011). Both the CESCR (2013) and CERD (2011) note that Norway still falls short in its obligations to adequately preserve and promote the Sámi culture. This is particularly the case for the East Sámi and the Sea Sámi and their traditional reindeer grazing and fishing rights respectively. On a larger scale, CERD remarks that the geographical scope of legal recognition of Sámi land use and rights, for instance in the Mining Act, merely focuses on the northernmost Finnmark Region and does not take into account Sámi regions beyond (CERD 2011).

Lack of preservation of Sámi culture also manifests itself in the language situation in Sámi areas. While officially the Norwegian state is obligated to provide bilingual services, adequate interpretation in legal and medical matters cannot be found. This results in difficulties for Sámi speakers to access health care and legal services – a situation which the lack of Sámi language instruction in the Sámi areas may make worse in the future (CESCR 2013; CERD 2011).

While, generally speaking, on a state level the situation for the Sámi in Norway appears to be improving, they nevertheless still experience discrimination, hate speech and xenophobia on a day-to-day basis. Stereotypisation as a 'problematic' people in the Norwegian press and common depictions of the Sámi as underdeveloped and incapable of speaking the Norwegian language are challenges the Sámi face in Norway (HRC 2011; CERD 2011; ECRI 2015). The HRC remarks that "hate speech against the Sámi people, and xenophobic, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic statements" (HRC 2001, para. 14) persist and thus links its existence with Norway's reservation towards article 20, paragraph 1, of the ICCPR ("Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law"). However, Norway is not the only Nordic state that has maintained its opposition against this paragraph and Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have voiced similar concerns based on their strong adherence the principle of freedom of speech and freedom of expression under national and international law (Kearney 2007, p. 156).

7.4.4 Denmark

Denmark ratified ILO Convention 169 on 22 February 1996 and voted for the UNDRIP on 25 September 2007. This notwithstanding, in its latest report on Denmark (CERD 2015), CERD has identified several human rights issues concerning Greenlandic Inuit in Denmark as well as in Greenland. First and foremost, the absence of any legislation or body in Greenland (as well as in the Faroe Islands) which works towards the eradication racial discrimination constitutes a significant shortcoming in the implementation of anti-discrimination laws. While this may be

the case, in 2014 the mandate for the Danish Institute for Human Rights, the main monitoring body of human rights in Denmark, was extended to Greenland, yet not to the Faroe Islands.

Particularly problematic is the situation of Greenlanders on the Danish mainland. According to CERD and ECRI, social marginalisation, prejudice and racial discrimination are commonly experienced by Greenlanders, leading to socio-economic isolation, substance abuse, homelessness, low education and unemployment. In order to tackle these problems, the Danish government has responded in 2013 by initially initiating a strategy until 2017 to alleviate these problems. The strategy has been prolonged until 2020 and focuses on social integration primarily of recently arrived Greenlanders and their children in addition to funding for the five largest municipalities in Denmark to improve the situation of Greenlanders. However, while funding appears adequate, progress of these initiatives is limited (ECRI 2017).

CERD remarks that the Thule Tribe in Greenland has been too little consulted as regards its perception as a distinct people in Greenland. The issue dates back to the late 1996 when descendants of forcefully relocated families in 1953 took legal action against the Danish government. In the course of the case the Thule Tribe claimed to be considered a distinct people in the sense of the ILO Convention 169 as they retain their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, according to the tribe's own definition. The Supreme Court dismissed this claim and considered the Thule Tribe not distinctly different to other Inuit tribes in Greenland. Irrespective of these findings, CERD has repeatedly recommended the consultation of the Thule Tribe as regards "self-identification as a fundamental criterion in the identification of people as a distinct indigenous people" (CERD 2015, para. 21).

7.4.5 Russian Federation

Russia has not ratified the ILO Convention 169 and has abstained from its vote on the adoption of the UNDRIP. The 2017 Concluding Observation of the CERD (2017b) ascribes Russia significant shortcomings in the implementation of rights for indigenous peoples. The numerical limit of 50,000 persons to be rights holders as an indigenous people strips larger groups from any possibility to be considered an indigenous people with associated protection of lands, resources and livelihoods in Russia. Although the country adopted Federal Law on Territories of Traditional Nature Use of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East in 2001 which was to establish protected areas for further utilisation of indigenous peoples, CERD notes that no such territories have *de facto* been established. With the amendments to the 2001 Land Code in 2014 through Federal Laws 171-FZ and 499-FZ, traditional land use and ownership were further weakened, making an implementation of the above mentioned Federal Law on Territories of Traditional Nature Use increasingly difficult. The government's encroachment on traditional lands to bolster extractive industries has further led to failure to impose

the principle of free, prior and informed consent. In addition to legislation and practices directly adversely affecting the protection of fundamental rights for indigenous peoples in Russia, the updated Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in combination with the 2002 Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity now increasingly labels NGOs as 'foreign agents' or 'undesirable organisations.' As a result, also NGOs supporting the rights of indigenous peoples as well as human rights have been disbanded. In the wake of this development, RAIPON – the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North – was temporarily disbanded in November 2012 due to its statutes having been perceived to violate federal law, yet following national and international protests was reinstated in March 2013 (Staalesen 2013). However, even though the overall legal position of RAIPON has changed, its current president, Grigoriy Ledkov, is member of the State Duma and chair of the Duma Working Group for Nationality Issues. This Working Group develops drafts for federal legislation concerning indigenous peoples' rights in Russia (AC 2015a).

The Russian Federation has been plagued by racism for many years, particularly targeting people of 'non-Slavic' appearance. Although the number of racist attacks has decreased the ECRI report of 2013 highlights the high number of racist attacks in the Russian Federation (ECRI 2013b). While the report does not single out Arctic indigenous peoples, but focuses on Muslims, Roma and other minorities, problems with access to education as well as discrimination in educational institutions constitute major human rights shortcomings in the Russian Federation. In combination with the historical trauma many Arctic indigenous populations have to endure as well as other socio-economic stress factors, isolation, lack of access to health services have led to rather high suicide rates in Arctic indigenous communities, particularly in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka, Taymyr and Yakutia (Sumarokov 2016, p. 12).

7.4.6 Canada

Canada has not ratified the ILO Convention 169 and has initially voted against the adoption of the UNDRIP. In 2010, it voiced its support for the Declaration although declaring it merely an 'aspirational document' without the need to more specifically follow-up on its provisions. This position was reversed in 2015 when then-Minister of Indigenous Northern Affairs, Carolyn Bennett, announced before the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues that Canada is "now a full supporter of the declaration, without qualification" (Fontaine 2016), which was substantiated by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau before the UN General Assembly in September 2017 (Trudeau 2017).

The major human rights issue accompanying indigenous rights in Canada relates to the free, prior and informed consent primarily as regards extractive industries. In its recent concluding observations, HRC (2015), CESCR (2016b) and CERD (2017c) highlight lack of consultation of indigenous peoples and legal proceedings between indigenous peoples and the federal government deriving therefrom as an

ongoing financial and legal burden to the indigenous peoples. Although Supreme Court rulings have been in favour of indigenous claims, intrusions into indigenous lands, such as for the construction of dams, have proceeded despite significant opposition, causing financially burdensome litigation procedures (CERD 2017c; HRC 2015).

Moreover, the socio-economic disparities between indigenous and non-indigenous persons in Canada give rise to concerns by the CESCR, which notes that particularly as regards housing, access to healthcare and education these disparities persist (CESCR 2016b). This corresponds to the continuing disappearance of indigenous languages, lack in childcare services and deficits in the meeting of basic needs for indigenous people in Canada (HRC 2015). Of particular concern is moreover the situation of indigenous women who disproportionately face violence, homicide and disappearance. The rate of indigenous women who have been murdered or have disappeared is four times higher than the rate of other women in Canada (IACHR 2014, p. 11). While British Columbia has responded with legislation that addresses this issue, on a federal level initiatives to properly address this problem are still missing (HRC 2015).

On 23 April 2013 the *Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking Relief from Violations of the Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada* was submitted (Athabaskan Petition 2013). The Petition stressed that Canada is directly responsible for the infringements of basic human rights of Athabaskan peoples, such as the right to property, health and culture, caused by global warming due to the country's black carbon emissions – a significant greenhouse driver. At the time of writing, it remains unknown whether the petition will be considered admissible by the IACHR.

7.4.7 United States

The human rights situation in the United States is complex and many intergovernmental and non-governmental institutions have identified numerous human rights violations caused by the US. These shall not be dealt with in this chapter, however. In 1977 the US has signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969. The US has not ratified ILO Convention 169 and initially voted against the UNDRIP. However, President Barack Obama announced on 16 December 2010 that the United States would fully endorse the Declaration (The White House 2010).

Indigenous peoples living in the US face problems as regards access and protection of their sacred sites caused by urbanisation, extractive industries, industrial development, tourism, the construction of border walls and fences as well as contamination (CERD 2014; HRC 2014). These developments, particularly as regards extractive industries, industrial development, tourism and urbanisation reflect upon the lack of the legal and practical guarantee of free, prior and informed consent of

the indigenous peoples involved (CERD 2014; IACHR 2015, p. 141). Although on 6 November 2000 President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13175, which requires federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Indian and Tribal governments, the situation appears not to have significantly improved. President Obama issued Executive Order 13007 on 1 August 2011 to better include sacred sites issues into the work of the US Forest Service. Whether this Executive Order has effectively contributed to better protection of indigenous sacred sites cannot be ascertained.

Indigenous and human rights in combination with the right to an unspoiled environment were brought to international attention with the filing of a petition by Inuit in the US and Canada to the IACHR on the negative effects of the US climate policies (Watt-Cloutier 2005; see also Koivurova 2007). Although the petition ultimately failed, it nevertheless linked a problem previously perceived as being environmental with a human rights dimension. It furthermore bridged boundaries caused by national jurisdictions between the US and Canada. Russian and Greenlandic Inuit, however, were not part of the petition as they are not covered by the Inter-*American* Declaration. Furthermore, the petition symbolised sophisticated legal skills as regards overcoming distinctions between private and public law, traditional law/culture and human rights, or civil society and nation states (Osofsky 2007). Officially the US government has not responded to the petition although then-Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now Council; ICC), Sheila Watt-Cloutier, gave a testimony before the US Senate's Committee on Science, Commerce and Transportation on 15 September 2004 (ICC 2004).

7.5 The Arctic Council and Indigenous Rights

Each country with an indigenous population faces its own domestic challenges and parallels between the indigenous peoples in all Arctic states exist (see Table 7.1). First and foremost, this is reflected in challenges surrounding land rights and FPIC, both of which form the baseline for other problems pertaining to the

Table 7.1 Arctic states' support for and problems related to indigenous rights

			Problems identified in country reports					
	ILO 169 (ratifications)	UNDRIP (support)	Land rights	Language / Culture	FPIC	Compensation / financial obligations	Discrimination / Racism	Health
Sweden		X	X			X		
Finland		X	X	X	X			
Norway	X	X		X				
Denmark	X	X					X	
Russia			X	X	X		X	X
Canada		X		X	X	X		X
USA		X	X		X			

implementation of indigenous rights: encroachment of industries on indigenous lands; devaluation of sacred sites; lack of political participation; lack of recognition; access to health; education; and indigenous languages. These issues translate into several rights under the ILO 169 and UNDRIP: land rights; the right to FPIC/participation; the right to health; the right to development; the right to subsistence; the right to housing; the right to employment; the right to cultural heritage; the right to education; and collective rights. We will now turn to the way the AC has responded to these rights by screening primary documentation. This demonstrates how despite these domestic shortcomings the AC has been a driver in setting new normative baselines for recognising indigenous rights.

7.5.1 Land Rights

Specific rights to land are not explicitly dealt with under the AC as they *ipso facto* fall within the purview of domestic legislation. It is thus not surprising that the available minutes contain the term 'land rights' only once under the Finnish Chairmanship 2000–2002 when the issue surfaced as part of a conference on gender issues in the Arctic (AC 2001a, p. 21). However, there are indirect references that can be located within the discourse on land rights. Under the AC several projects related to reindeer herding and reindeer husbandry have been carried out which in the Nordic countries are closely tied to the issue of land rights (e.g. Widmark 2006). For instance, under the Finnish Chairmanship 2000–2002 a project entitled Sustainable Reindeer Husbandry was initiated under the SDWG. During the development of the project, its leader Johnny Leo Jernsletten is quoted at the SAO meeting in Inari in October 2002 that "[t]he loss of this industry could mean the loss of many Arctic cultures and of the bedrock of the identity of many indigenous peoples" due to "the loss of pasture land, predators, the expansion of the oil and gas industry and evolving infrastructure" (AC 2002, p. 10). The final product of the project refers to the loss of pastures and land use conflicts – which point to conflicts over different rights to land – as the major challenge for reindeer herders in the Arctic states (Jernsletten and Klokov 2002). Similarly, the SDWG project EALLIN – The Voice of Reindeer Herding Youth 2012–2014 explicitly refers to land use conflicts in its final report and identifies this as one of the threats to the longevity of the reindeer herding tradition. The report notes that "reindeer herders and reindeer husbandry have little to no rights acknowledged by the states to their traditional lands. The key word here is land" (International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry 2015, p. 71).

Although the AC does not explicitly refer to land rights in its official documentation under analysis, recognising the rights of indigenous peoples since the Tromsø Declaration discursively links the AC's output to the rights to land. Furthermore, by supporting or even initiating projects on sustainable reindeer herding, which place great emphasis on the question of land rights, the AC strengthens the voice of indigenous reindeer herders and indirectly influences their position within the domestic

legal systems pertaining to land use and ownership. Moreover, the AC has furthermore initiated research on sacred sites in the Arctic. Already in the Barrow Declaration (2000) it is noted that Arctic states "encourage the evaluation of the conservation value of the sacred sites of indigenous inhabitants as a component of the Circumpolar Protected Area Network" (Barrow Declaration 2000, para. 9). As a result, the CAFF Working Group, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) and RAIPON, funded by the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, initiated research on sacred sites in Russia, which showed the close interlinkage between indigenous livelihoods, customary land utilisation, customary law and sacred sites (CAFF 2004). Moreover, the AC actively fosters the discourse on linking biodiversity conservation with the conservation of indigenous lands – inevitably, once again indirectly, fostering land rights of indigenous peoples. At the SAO meeting in Inari, Finland, in 2002, the Sámi Council pointed to this interlinkage and "pointed out that many of the areas throughout the world that are relevant from the perspective of biodiversity conservation are areas where indigenous peoples live" (AC 2002, p. 8). The Inari Declaration thus "**take**[s] note of the recommendations generated by projects on […] sustainable reindeer husbandry and sacred sites and **encourage**[s] further dialogue among stakeholders on this basis" (original emphasis; Inari Declaration 2002, para. 7). Indeed, the programme for the Russian Chairmanship 2004–2006 highlights the importance of the "problems connected with the traditional lifestyle of indigenous peoples under the contemporary market conditions, preservation of their ethnic identity and cultural and *historic heritage*" (own emphasis; Russian Federation 2004, p. 6). Also Canada supports the questions surrounding sacred sites as it co-financed a workshop on Arctic sacred sites in 2007 (AC 2007, p. 4).

Even though in Sweden, Finland and Norway issues relating to reindeer herding and land rights have resulted in long-lasting legal battles, the countries do not take any deviating position within the AC and show equal support for reindeer herding projects. In fact, no AC member state appears to take a critical position towards projects strengthening traditional livelihoods and land use.

7.5.2 The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent, and the Right to Participation

Political participation of IPs within the work of the AC dates back to the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat under the AEPS in 1994, which was financed by Denmark. Canada has from the outset supported the IPS financially and thereby strengthened its role in the emerging Arctic governance while, according to the 1998 Iqaluit Declaration all Arctic states were requested to "consider the financial questions involved in securing the participation of the Permanent Participants in the work of the Arctic Council" (Iqaluit Declaration 1998, para. 29). The United States has supported its national indigenous groups and has thus abstained from endorsing the IPS financially. However, during the US Chairmanship 1998–2000

US SAO Richard Norland attempted to obtain funding for the IPS from outside sources, namely the MacArthur Foundation (AC 1999a).

Close consultation with the PPs has resulted in *de facto* co-decision-making between member states and PPs: if PPs object to a pending decision, it will not be taken (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006). As an example serves the rejection of the application of the Arctic Circumpolar Route for observer status during the Meeting of the SAO in Inari, Finland, during the Finnish Chairmanship 2000–2002 which occurred at the behest of the PPs (AC 2002, p. 4). Even though the AC has been criticised for its state-centric structure, this approach is rather unique and advances the normative recognition of indigenous peoples in international decision-making. As a consequence, PPs themselves are rather silent as regards lack of participation in the working procedures of the AC. In fact, meeting minutes do not reflect any concerns concerning lack of participation until the Russian Chairmanship 2002–2004 when in the process of the Coordination of Observation and Monitoring in the Arctic for Assessment and Research (COMAAR) initiative as a preparation for the International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2008 "PPs expressed concern about the lack of their involvement" (AC 2005, p. 10). In the chairmanships to follow, minutes only occasionally point towards a lack of participation or involvement in the working group and in projects directly affecting indigenous peoples.

To the contrary, it was rather states themselves that have invited PPs to participate while highlighting the importance of the inclusion of PPs into the working procedures of the working groups and task forces. For instance, Sweden remarked it is imperative "that projects are not launched unless funding of Permanent Participants' participation in them has been assured" (AC 2003, p. 7). Also on the ministerial level the involvement of the PPs has been stressed on numerous occasions. It is highlighted as one of the most important factors of the work of the Council, e.g. during the Norwegian Chairmanship 2006–2009 when the chair of the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat considered the "AC as model of cooperation between governments and indigenous people" (AC 2008, p. 10); or in the Nuuk Declaration 2011 at the end of the Danish Chairmanship, which emphasises that "the continuous engagement of indigenous peoples and communities is the *fundamental strength* of the Council" (own emphasis; Nuuk Declaration 2011, p. 11). Towards the end of the second US Chairmanship 2015–2017 this wording was somewhat scaled down and the Fairbanks Declaration merely refers to the "commitment to consult and cooperate in good faith with Arctic indigenous peoples and to support their meaningful engagement in Arctic Council activities" (Fairbanks Declaration 2017, p. 2).

7.5.3 The Right to Health

Health in the Arctic and among indigenous communities in particular has been part of the AC's work from the very beginning and already the Ottawa Declaration points to improving health conditions in the Arctic as one of the Council's goals. Not surprisingly, therefore, the International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH) has

been an observer to the AC since 1998. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) has thus far released three reports on human health in the Arctic, in 2002, 2009 and 2015 (AMAP Undated). The SDWG, on the other hand, has carried out 13 projects on human health in the Arctic since 2000 (SDWG Undated) and when the SDWG asked for formal approval of four different human health projects at the SAO meeting in Ilulissat in April 2010, "[t]here was broad support among SAOs" (AC 2010, p. 10). Especially the US has shown leadership in advancing health-related infrastructure, particularly telemedicine, since the late 1990s. Indeed, when the Sustainable Development Program as per the Ottawa Declaration was established, it was the US which called for human health standing high on the priority of this programme (Norland 1998, p. 1). Not surprisingly, the US has invested in the advancement of health infrastructure and telemedicine with health issues ranging high on the agenda of the US Chairmanship programme also in 2015 (United States 2015). Other Arctic states put significant efforts into advancing health, mental health and overall wellbeing and the issue is a recurring element in the meeting minutes available. When Norway took over AC chairmanship in 2006, Norway, Denmark and Sweden released joint priorities for their successive chairmanships which "stress the need to further strengthen the cooperative efforts in the area of Arctic human health" (Denmark 2009, p. 3).

Health was particularly relevant for Russia during the US Chairmanship when the winter 1998–1999 caused severe hardships in the Russian Arctic. The US provided humanitarian relief while Russia advocated the acceptance of the Red Cross as an observer to the AC (AC 1999b, 1), which was granted at the Barrow Ministerial Meeting in 2000.

7.5.4 The Right to Employment and Socio-economic Development

Employment is not explicitly referred to in the documents under analysis. Merely the Icelandic Chairmanship programme explicitly refers to "employment opportunities" (Iceland 2002, p. 1). This is not to say, however, that the issue of employment is normatively absent in the Council's work. To the contrary, since it falls under the larger aspect of socio-economic and social development in the Arctic, which has taken a centre stage since the Ottawa Declaration.

Quite obviously, the right to employment cannot be seen in isolation from other rights and feeds into the right to social and economic development, the right to health and education or land rights. The AC has from its very beginning placed significant emphasis on socio-economic and cultural development in the region and can be considered a primary body that also implements the right to employment on a pan-Arctic level. Improving the socio-economic conditions in the Arctic naturally concerns all Arctic residents and is not confined to Arctic indigenous peoples. Russia in its chairmanship programme however summarises the Council's approach as follows: "The Arctic Council activities in economic, social and environmental

areas should fully correspond to the needs of the Arctic indigenous peoples, ensuring their access to all benefits of civilization, high quality social, health, transport and educational services" (Russian Federation 2004, p. 6). Iceland stressed when the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group was formally established that it is important to consider socio-economic issues when dealing with the threat to the Arctic marine environment (AC 1999c, p. 6).

How normatively important the aspect of socio-economic development and concurrently employment as part of the Council's work is show the discussions surrounding the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which was initiated as one of the first major projects of the AC. Even though the lead was taken by AMAP and CAFF and was thus a natural-sciences-based assessment from the outset, during the US Chairmanship 1998–2000 it became quickly clear that socio-economic issues must be included in the project. All member states, AMAP and CAFF, as well as the PPs stressed on numerous occasions the importance of including socio-economic issues in the report even though these lay outside the mandate of AMAP and CAFF. But even though this was the case the report found support from the member states and it was Iceland who suggested to change the mandates of the working groups for them to be able to incorporate also socio-economic aspects (AC 1999b, 19).

During the Canadian Chairmanship 2013–2015 the Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum (TFCBF) was created to develop a platform for business-to-business interaction in the Arctic. The work of the task force resulted in the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) in September 2014, an independent body whose core comprised of three AC member state business representatives and three provided by PPs as well as businesses interested in conducting business activity the Arctic, and micro, small and medium businesses. The AEC works in close cooperation with the AC and both have their respective secretariats in Tromsø. One of the underlying principles of the AEC and its – thus far – four working groups is to "[d]efine actionable recommendations and variables that will raise the standard of economic development in the Arctic" (AEC Undated). With the establishment of the AEC, the AC has thus strengthened its profile as an organisation fostering economic growth and thus employment opportunities in the Arctic.

7.5.5 The Right to Education

Fostering education in the Arctic has ranged on the AC's agenda since its establishment. While, once again, education lies in the purview of domestic legislation and policy, the AC has no direct influence on how the right to education is implemented in each member state. This being said, the AC has fostered the establishment of the University of the Arctic (UArctic), a network of education institutions all over the circumpolar north. While not explicitly focusing on indigenous peoples, the minutes of the SAO meeting in Anchorage in May 1999 shows that from the outset

"support for indigenous representation and programs" (AC 1999c, p. 14) was a high priority for the network and it was to be established as a network "about the North, for Northerners, in the North" (Ibid., p. 15). From the outset, Finland took the lead in establishing the UArctic, also by providing funding for its secretariat, which was to be located at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi. Even though the country faces problems concerning Sámi languages and Sámi representation, by strengthening UArctic it also strengthens the position of UArctic's Sámi member institutions. Education-related issues have surfaced throughout the AC's existence from the beginning and the establishment of the UArctic is a sign of the Council's vested interest in supporting capacity-building particularly in indigenous communities.

7.5.6 Other Rights and Issues

While the above has referred to some specific rights of indigenous peoples under the ILO 169 Convention and the UNDRIP, the AC furthermore fosters other rights implicitly. For instance, the promotion of projects relating to reindeer herding and sacred sites points towards a normative recognition of the right to subsistence; the right to cultural heritage; or to collective rights, given the collective-based land ownership systems of pre-colonisation, which stand in conflict with resource development (Rode 2017). In this sense, without explicitly addressing specific rights, the AC has incorporated these into its working structure.

The AC is silent on the right to proper housing, which does not surface on any occasion in the documents under scrutiny. While this may be the case, the right to housing may well fall under the umbrella of fostering of socio-economic development in the Arctic. Especially the work of the AEC, it can be argued, provides for the improvement of housing through its ability of business advancement in the north.

Indeed, the diversity of the AC's work results in addressing numerous other rights not explicitly referred to. Some commentators even consider the AC to be a forerunner in promoting one of the most crucial rights for human survival: the right to water (Freeman-Blakeslee 2017). And indeed, the AC closely collaborates with other entities and bodies that foster human and indigenous rights, health care, education or infrastructure. In the documents under analysis especially the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which itself is an important bridge between residents of the Barents region, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region are close partners within Arctic governance.

Even though in general the AC does not explicitly address domestic issues, it does not ignore them either. Especially in the case of RAIPON's temporary outlawing, at the SAO meeting in Haparanda in November 2012, the AC, including the Russian SAO, "express[ed] concern about the absence of RAIPON from the work of the Arctic Council […]" and "request[ed] the Senior Arctic Official of the Russian

Federation in close cooperation with RAIPON and the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation to facilitate, as appropriate, the fulfilment of RAIPON's important role as a permanent participant in the Arctic Council" (George 2012). Neither the Haparanda meeting minutes nor the AC website contain the original statement.

The petitions before the IACHR have not been directly addressed by the AC. However, it can be argued that the Council puts significant emphasis on climate change mitigation. Concerning the Athabaskan Petition it is particularly the AC Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCF) which is of relevance. The SLCF was in existence between 2011 and 2013 and has produced a major *Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for Black Carbon for the Arctic Council* (AC 2011). Even though neither the report nor the meeting minutes post-2013 address the human rights dimensions of black carbon, mitigation ranges high on the Council's agenda. This is especially the case since the 2015 Iqaluit ministerial meeting when the Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane was established with a voluntary framework plan to reduce emissions (AC 2015b).

7.6 Conclusion

The above demonstrates that even though the Arctic states face significant domestic challenges as regards the recognition and implementation of indigenous rights, these are not reflected in the working structures of the AC. Even though strictly legal issues, such as the recognition of the Thule Tribe or the Inuit and Athabaskan petitions, or domestic legal and managerial issues, such as housing, employment, or land rights, are not explicitly touched upon, the AC puts great emphasis on equal participatory rights of indigenous peoples. This right to participation and with it the right to free, prior and informed consent is a key triumph the AC has established. Indeed, the Council also advertises this participation in other fora (e.g. AC 2001b) although concrete human rights-related language is absent in its work. Instead, the United Nations' sustainable development goals are advanced, which essentially address human rights as well albeit in political commitment rather than legal language.

Notwithstanding, participation is the most important issue concerning the advancement and promotion of indigenous rights. Moreover, the AC advances the normative and legal discourse on health in northern and indigenous communities; traditional land use and livelihoods; cultural protection; indigenous languages; education; and socio-economic development. Although decision-making in the AC is still conducted by the nation states and is thus rightfully being criticised within post-colonial discourses (e.g. Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen 2018), it nevertheless has incorporated and normatively advanced the discourse on indigenous rights, particularly bearing in mind the increasing number of observers to the AC. One Arctic example for this increasing recognition of indigenous peoples also within other contexts is the project Bridging Early Career Researchers and Indigenous Peoples in Nordic Regions, carried out by the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists

(APECS) between 2013 and 2015 (APECS 2015). Indeed, if strengthening the rights of indigenous peoples through supporting projects and political participation work in the Arctic, why would it not work elsewhere?

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Part IV
Risky Business with a Silver Lining

Chapter 8
Not All Black and White: The Environmental Dimension of Arctic Exploration

Nadia French

Abstract The modernist narrative of human progress noticeably shifted under the climate change paradigm, which brought into the Arctic discourse both slow long-term processes resulting in shifting biophysical properties of the entire planet and rapid tipping events and their effects onto its nature and people. While literature abounds with images of mythical opposition between the Arctic nature and the industrial advances of the increasingly resource-dependent world, the lessons learned from the decades of exploration are often taken matter-of-factly. This chapter explores the modern environmental history of polar exploitation and probes for ways in which changing representations of the Arctic environment have shaped our interactions with it. While taking stock of regulatory, political and attitudinal shifts is an important thought experiment, the overall lesson is that the 'catching-up', action-before-knowledge approach may not hold up in the future.

Keywords Arctic exploration · Environment · Extractive industries · Cleanup · Preservation

8.1 Introduction

Human and technological 'triumph' or 'disaster' in the Arctic, true to Kipling's words, are both 'impostors' when it comes to nature. The modernist narrative of human progress noticeably shifted under the climate change paradigm, making popular in the discourse both slow long-term processes resulting in shifting biophysical properties of the entire planet and rapid tipping events and their effects onto nature and people. In Latour's words: "what could have been just a passing crisis has turned into a profound alteration of our relation to the world" (Latour 2018, p. 9). Yet, 'not-going' and 'not-doing' (and maybe even not talking about the Arctic) is what tends to escape political imaginaries these days. But is there not more than one side to this story? There have been examples of not only proactive but

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also reactive actions towards the Arctic environment in the past few decades, including the Central Arctic fishing moratorium (Hoag 2017) and the cleanup schemes throughout the circumpolar North. Can this age of renewed Arctic interest reset the clock and set a higher environmental standard and level of responsibility over economic advances in the North? While there is no zero risk human activity and no such thing as safe industry, it is important to take heed of what has been achieved and the 'special treatment' for the Arctic across North America and Eurasia.

The Arctic of the twentieth century was a place of active exploration and retarded environmental regulation—the understanding of environmental impact that human activities in the northern latitudes and beyond would have on the biophysical properties would be the result of the many years of observation, scientific work, and civil and political action that succeeded rather than preceded the Arctic boom. From *Raubwirtschaft* of whaling, sealing and fishing (e.g. Allen and Keay 2001), via the gold rush and destructive mining, to discoveries of biological adaptations of Arctic biota, biophysical role of the Arctic in regulating the climate, to recently found cold-water coral reefs and biodiversity of polar ecosystems, and, finally, to realisation of irreversibility of anthropogenic interference, the new "cold rush", discussed in earnest about a decade ago, has taken a more measured pace than initially anticipated (see e.g. Young 1985; Sale and Potapov 2010; Troubetzkoy 2011). The Arctic environment, together with economic feasibility, technological capability, and political climate, played an important part in slowing down what was meant to be the 'race' for the Arctic resources.

In the atmosphere of more acute environmental alertness, it has become commonplace for researchers and the public alike to prioritise the risks over achievements (see e.g. Ellis 2010; Rosen 2017; Cózar et al. 2017; etc.). The overwhelming rhetoric on the Arctic with emotionally charged jargon of urgency and doom (see e.g. Wadhams 2017; Rosen 2017) as well as the alarming imagery (e.g. Conkling et al. 2013) may and probably has already created a hiatus between internal and external views of the Arctic—that of those who live and work there and of those who observe, manage it or would suffer from its effects from afar. Ignoring the steps taken to prevent, account for and counteract anthropogenic disturbances in the High North in the past several decades is comparable to refusal to acknowledge the hard-earned lessons of what has been and what should not be done.

The Arctic environment was in many ways collateral to the political, military and economic expansion of the post-war era. Yet, through trial and error, research and balancing of the environmental and social priorities, the twenty-first century just may be a different chapter to the Arctic story. This chapter will look at historical cases pertaining to resource exploration in the twentieth century and their ecological damage. Also concrete examples of retroactive and preventive, remedial actions that have been taken to tighten the governance framework across the national and international jurisdictions of the Arctic states are taken into account. While the author recognises that there is no safe industry and that the Arctic environmental problems transcend climatic borders, this chapter nonetheless serves as a useful exercise to highlight the learning curve within environmental awareness and conservation that the development in the Arctic has helped shape.

8.2 Changing Paradigms: Climate Change and Arctic Agency

In 2009, Barry Zellen wrote that despite steadfast predictions dating back to 1970s and 1980s, the age of the Arctic had not arrived but, with the advent of climate change, it was once again imminent (Zellen 2009). Almost 9 years later, we find ourselves in a situation where the Arctic age may still be around the corner or as distant as about three decades ago when Oran Young pointed at the North as "a strategic arena of vital significance to both of the superpowers" (Young 1985, p. 160). The Arctic, though affected by rising temperatures (see e.g. NOAA Arctic Report Card 2016) (Richter-Menge et al. 2016) remains a challenging destination for economic colonisation.

Climate change has shifted the paradigm not only in the academic field, affecting questions asked and methods applied to study this particular part of the world. The region has been incorporated in the legal, governance and public discourse of global affairs (e.g. Christensen et al. 2013). Jamieson (2011, p. 39) writes,"[t]he very idea of climate change involves a particular paradigm – call it the 'stability/change' paradigm". What this dual dynamic meant for the Arctic was an increased level of economic and political activity and the sense of environmental and social responsibility, set against various degrees and sources of uncertainty. Its recognition came as a paradigm of the earth-humanity relationship tipped and shifted towards a more limited and finite view of the planet and a more significant anthropogenic impact onto the natural environment than previously conceived (see e.g. Finger 2016; Körber et al. 2017).

The understanding of the Arctic has been transformed into the plurality of its past, present and future dimensions: from the nineteenth to early twentieth century's 'Arctic sublime' (e.g. Loomis 1977), to the resource base and political chessboard of the second half of the twentieth century, to the space unsettled and de-objectified through climate change paradigm shift, a place for international cooperation and dialogue, an unpredictable and disruptive force that may have far-reaching consequences.

Moreover, the Arctic space has been assigned with an agency, as an ability of the environment to exert force onto and influence the human-nonhuman interactions therein. For instance, modelling results showed that by the mid-twenty-first century near-surface permafrost in the Northern hemisphere may shrink by 15–30% with seasonal thawing increasing by 50% or more in the northernmost locations. This would affect a significant part of the 25% of land territory of the Northern hemisphere underlain with permafrost (Anisimov and Reneva 2006) while the multi-year sea ice is predicted to retreat (Notz and Stroeve 2016). The inherent dynamism of the physical Arctic is affecting the way the region is approached and interpreted by both economic and political actors. This new unravelling agency is inseparable from the interactions between societies and the polar region as it materialises through them as a space of action or inaction (e.g. fishing moratorium vs. offshore drilling).

A distributional concern over fragility of the Arctic nature, bordering on paternalism, has become a mainstream opening remark for politicians, experts, corporate spokespeople and scientists alike (e.g. Rosen 2017; Putin 2017; Equinor 2018). The extent of Arctic agency varies from a mere risk factor for economic exploitation and development to active force affecting the rest of the world through atmospheric fluxes (for instance, short climate forcers, e.g. methane emissions from thawing permafrost (e.g. Sand et al. 2016)), shifting thermoregulation between the sea and the air (e.g. melting multi-year ice and its consequences—changes in the weather, extreme events, etc.), declining biodiversity and loss of habitats (e.g. a shifting isotherm, etc.), transboundary oceanic pollution affecting fish stocks from the Pacific to the Atlantic (see e.g. AMAP 2017), indirectly affecting the climate through extracted hydrocarbons. The Arctic cryosphere, for instance, was described to constitute four tipping points with global catastrophic potential (Lenton et al. 2008; Nuttall 2012; Wadhams 2012; Young 2012), including: the ice cover with its albedo effect; the effects of methane release both on land and in the sea; acidification of the Arctic Ocean; and changing ocean currents. And while the tipping point model is not unchallenged, the picture these predictions paint is rather powerful. Emmerson in *The Future History of the Arctic* (Emmerson 2010) defined the Arctic as nature's frontline, on the one hand, and a 'storehouse' of things to be discovered and researched on the other, evoking a notion of Pandora's box.

While 'danger' and 'change' are widely resonant in the academic literature, romanticism of polar exploration can still be found in a public domain (e.g. Christensen et al. 2013). More recently, a focus on the role of science and technology in the production of knowledge about the environment of the Arctic has undoubtedly become more pertinent (see e.g. Doel et al. 2014; Wormbs and Sorlin 2017). The interpretative shift and 'production of Arctic futures' has been largely due to "the reality of anthropogenic climate change, and the concomitant sense that the Arctic is about to undergo significant and uncertain changes" (Avango et al. 2013, p. 432). It is as important to monitor feedback loops of such shifts in perception within physical interactions between men and the Arctic environment. And while acknowledging dominant discourses, some ambivalence in Arctic paradigms should not be discounted—nature can still be seen as both "an attraction and a nuisance, there to be admired and enjoyed, or alternatively overcome and exploited, whichever seems more immediately appropriate" (Pryde 1991, p. 250) keeping the way to the past and the future equally open.

8.3 Modern History of the Arctic: Nature of Exploration and Exploration of Nature

Looking at the environmental history of Arctic exploration in the twentieth century, industrialisation and colonisation, ecological negligence, pollution and degradation were prominent. But not without its lessons. First discoveries of the planetary-scale

human impact on the environment date back to at least the 1950s when the Arctic haze phenomenon was first observed (it was, however, only studied in the 1980s (Shaw 1995; Quinn et al. 2007)) coinciding with major resource discoveries and exploration across the circumpolar North. The main culprits of the general atmospheric pollution were the Soviet Union and North America. Organic toxins and trace metals, originating from the south as well as burgeoning northern industrial centres, were detected in the Arctic soil, air and biological material (Oehme and Ottar 1984; Pacyna and Oehme 1988.). Although discovery of oil prompted interest and funding in Arctic ecology, initially studies focused on small-scale practical issues of oil spills and trail damage (e.g. Walker 1996). The late 1980s and 1990s saw an emergence of comprehensive studies of the effects of the extractive industry, restorative ecology and south-north atmospheric fluxes as well as climate change in the high latitudes.

Such belated response does not only reflect the logic of its times, but also poses a question as to the extent of change in the present day approach towards the Arctic nature. But do we just think differently or do we act differently, too? The history of Arctic exploration has been similar across the East and the West despite their political differences, but have lessons been learned and actions taken to reverse this trend of delayed responsibility across the circumpolar world? At first, we will look at the industrial and military activities that took place across both hemispheres in the twentieth century as well as their environmental lessons. Then we will look at present day activities aimed at remediating and restructuring the relations between the society and the environment in this particular part of the world.

The bellwether of Arctic extractive activities, the gold rush of 1890s in Canada and early 1900s in Alaska (e.g. Alaska's Juneau mine or Canada's Klondike gold rush), started and finished abruptly leaving behind abandoned settlements, waste and devastated creeks. "To get at gold […] miners took whole ecosystems apart" (Morse 2009, p. 91). Both Alaska and Yukon are to date dotted with sites of historical gold mining awaiting to be assessed and cleaned. Management of tailings, waste produced after ore extraction, was not regulated until the 1960s —70s, closure plans or reclamation standards for ore mining industry were not in existence either.

Later, also Canada's uranium mines produced waste-related problems: tailings were deposited directly onto land or dumped into lakes, while the understanding of environmental and health effects of long-term radiation was unregulated until after the 1970s (Clement and Stenson 2002). Canada's Port Radium (in operation from 1931 to 1960), called 'Village of Widows', and Rayrock mine are notorious examples of environmental neglect of former industrial practices. Remediation works in both sites did not begin until the 1980s and carried on through 2000s. Other non-ferrous, precious metals and minerals mines, including asbestos, in the North of Canada and Alaska deployed similar approaches to waste and tailings management on their sites and shared a similar fate of abandonment and belated remediation (e.g. Silver Bear mining complex (1960–1980s) in NWT).

Meanwhile, in the Soviet Arctic coal mining in Pechora Coal Basin since 1930s and nickel smelting in Kola and Taymyr peninsulas since 1939 have been major sources of local soil and atmospheric pollution (see e.g. Zhulidov et al. 2011; Kovalchuk and

Hardinge 2002; Jaffe et al. 1995). Built by convict labourers with few if any environmental regulations in place, all sites have been subject to retroactive plans of action to remediate and reverse accumulated and continuous damage to the regional environment (e.g. Norilsk Nickel 2017 Sulphur project).

Unlike many other sources of pollutants, oil was recognised as a potential source of contamination early on—formally in the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (in force from 1958). International law as well as the environmental movement developed also in response to major oil spills (e.g. Torrey Canyon in the English Channel in 1967, Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989) and the Arctic to a certain extent reaped the benefits of a maturing international and national regulatory framework for oil extraction and shipping as well as budding environmental activism. Scholars, too, kept emphasising the high degree of uncertainty related to oil spills in terrestrial and marine environments of the Arctic from as early as the 1960s (e.g. Dunbar 1968; Clark and Finley 1982) and vouched for precaution.

The first commercial oil production in the American Arctic began in the USA in 1977 and centred around the Prudhoe Bay oil field on Alaska's North Slope. The oil fields of the North Slope are the largest single source of US oil and also one of the most studied environments in North America as a result of the US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 (Maki 1992). With many monitoring programmes studying the effects of oil production on the biota of the North Slope, it was possible to establish the baseline conditions and conduct impact assessments for subsequent mediation (Herlugson and Parnell 1996).

The Soviet Union started search for oil and gas in the polar regions in 1930s (Ust Port, Taymyr) but major field discoveries were not made until late 1960s and production began in late 1970s. This pioneering approach to northern industrialisation often implied ad hoc solutions and in situ engineering. Only basic environmental data, such as water and fuel consumption, was collected at the time. Associated infrastructure and unique environmental dangers were not taken into account, including off-road vehicle trails causing snow compaction and long-term damage to vegetation, effects related to construction of roads, industrial facilities, pipelines, seismic exploration or drilling. Direct disturbance to wildlife habitat and indirect through noise, vibration, pollution and other was not accounted for either.

While Norway was a pioneer in offshore hydrocarbon production in the northern seas, there have been no offshore platforms in Norway above the Arctic Circle until fairly recently (Snøhvit, 71.6°N 21°E, started production in 2006). In Canada exploratory offshore drilling began in the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie delta in the 1970s after thorough research on the potential impact of the oil spill (Beaufort Sea Project Reprints) but was abandoned for economic reasons. In the USA first offshore exploration wells were drilled in the Chukchi Sea in 1989–1990 with oil production beginning in 2001. But exploration was abandoned in 2015 by Shell. The Obama administration announced in 2015 new lease conditions of exploration in Chukchi and Beaufort Seas as well as cancelled future auctions of Arctic offshore leases. Offshore exploration in the Arctic followed technological, environmental and political lessons of drilling in more southern areas with environmental

activism playing a significant role (e.g. Fort Bragg in 1988) in ensuring safer operation and preventing blowouts, spills and tanker collisions that had cost the industry in millions of production losses, cleanup expenses as well as public confidence (Sabin 2012).

Another controversial source of historical pollution in the Arctic has been anthropogenic radiation which was mainly the result of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing between 1945 and 1980, particularly those in Novaya Zemlya, an Arctic archipelago (Stone 2015; Kirk 1996). After the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which recognised the impact of the atmospheric fallout onto the environment and public health and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the share of anthropogenic radiation in the Arctic has significantly decreased.

Industrial expansion in the northern frontiers of the Arctic rim in the twentieth century was not the only practical lesson in environmental impacts in polar regions. Overfishing, trophy and unsustainable hunting, population rise and increased use of carbon-based fuels, 'alien' materials, expansion of settlements and towns, mass consumerism, increase in minor spills and leaks throughout the circumpolar north—all have been written in the environmental history of the region. "Regrettably, history must deem the 1970s and 1980s as decades of net environmental losses. This is equally true in both the United States and the Soviet Union, where striking parallels exist in the context of environmental problems" (Pryde 1991, p. 291). At the same time, Arctic and other remote environments became a deciding factor for a global effort to regulate the chemical pollution by persistent organic pollutants (POPs) (UNEP 2001). And there has undoubtedly been a silver lining found in increased environmental cooperation, such as the Arctic Council, the Barents cooperation, the Russian-Norwegian oil spill response regime, or the OSPAR Commission, to name a few. Moreover, environmental regulations have been tightened in all countries and regions involved in the above-mentioned activities, while environmental awareness has grown significantly. Above all, a shift in the paradigm from conquest to safeguarding nature and internalising costs related to preventive environmental management has occurred.

8.4 Return to the Arctic

Since the late 2000s, governments and major hydrocarbon operators, infrastructure and shipping companies have invested billions to explore resources and opportunities of the Arctic coast, outer continental shelf and the Arctic waters.

All Arctic Ocean states published and recently updated their Arctic strategies. All of them pledged, in one form or another, responsible development and protection of the Arctic nature:

- Norway: stronger focus on energy and the environment (Norway's High North strategy (2006) and Arctic strategy (2017)),
- Denmark: "development with respect for the Arctic's vulnerable climate, environment and nature" (Denmark's Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (2015)),

- Finland: leading the way in sustainable development and "combating climate change and mitigating its impact" (Prime Minister's Office 2013),
- Canada:"social and economic development" and "protecting the North's environmental heritage" (Government of Canada 2009), in 2017: sustainable economies and "conserving Arctic biodiversity through science-based decision making" (Trudeau's Towards a New Arctic Policy Framework),
- Russia: comprehensive social and economic development, environmental security, science and technology development (Russia's Strategy of Arctic Development and National Security (Russian Federation 2013)),
- USA: responsible stewardship, sustainable development of economic and energy resources, providing for future US energy security (US National Strategy for the Arctic Region (The White House, 2013) and Strategy (2017)).

All of the states stressed the importance of protecting the fragile natural environment and acknowledged uncertainties pertaining to the changing climate. Some, e.g. USA and Norway, made attempts to toughen regulations in oil and gas operation safety and environmental protection in the Arctic. Indeed, the Norwegian government commissioned a report on the current state of environmental protection in the petroleum industry, which was published in 2017 and will serve as a basis for new measures (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association 2017). Others are still working on the legal and regulatory framework in their Arctic region: the Russian authorities, for instance, have been deliberating on the comprehensive Arctic law since 2012, but such a document regulating social, economic and environmental relations in the Russian Arctic and affirming the region's special status is yet to be approved.

In politics, as in economy, change seems to be the only constant—oil prices, investment climate, administrations and even regimes change and what is deemed status quo in the Arctic rarely abides. The most recent example is former US president Barack Obama's plan to 'permanently' ban sales of new offshore rights in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas that is now being revised by the Trump administration. In April 2017, Trump signed an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy executive order to extend offshore oil and gas drilling to areas in the Arctic in direct contradiction to Obama's offshore drilling plan (White House 2017). The USA has recently reviewed its environmental standards in order to tighten regulations for future exploratory drilling in the Arctic waters (US Department of the Interior 2016). Similarly, Canadian Arctic policy under its previous prime minister, Stephen Harper, who was in office between 2006 and 2015 (see Lackenbauer and Dean 2016) sought to "unleash the tremendous potential of this region" (ibid., p. 13) whereas Trudeau's 5 year ban on new licensing in Arctic waters intended to symbolise a pro-environmental shift in Canada's northern policy. But with Northwest Territories' premier Bob McLeod and Alaska's senators openly speaking for expanded oil and gas development in their respective regions and against central policies Alaska: Senators move to revoke Obama's offshore drilling ban of April 2017, it is clear that the American Arctic future will be contingent on the balance of power between south and north and the continuous interpretation of risks and benefits (CBCNews 2017; Offshore Energy Today 2017).

In 2014, Greenland called its mining resources a pivot of the nation's economic development in its Oil and Minerals Strategy (Government of Greenland 2014). Greenland's recent 'resource rush' was largely spurred by its political independence from Denmark, newly found sovereignty over subsoil resources and subsidised revenue losses that followed the home rule of 2009. The predicted hydrocarbon boom has not however materialised as commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits are yet to be found. Notwithstanding, a large part of the island remains unexplored and new discoveries are possible.

On the other side of the Atlantic, after tumultuous 1990s that saw a slowdown in industrial exploration in the northern frontiers as well as re-writing of laws, including those on nature. The 1984 Decree on "Increased environmental protection in the areas of High North and marine areas adjacent to the northern coast of the USSR," which was discontinued after the collapse of the Soviet Union with no alternative up until present day serves as an example. The Arctic reappeared on Russia's domestic agenda in the late 2000s (Russian Federation 2008, 2013). The objective was to pick up where the Soviets left off and industrialise the North through development of hydrocarbons and other terrestrial and marine natural resources and develop the Northern Sea Route. While financial struggles of such projects are not too dissimilar to those in other Arctic states, geo-economic and technological limitations have been a significant factor in the Russian Arctic since 2014 onwards. Thus, offshore exploration has been affected by sanctions, dissolved partnerships with foreign investors, lack of own corporate resources and technologies. In 2016 the government imposed a moratorium on 20% remaining undistributed offshore licences, while the other 80% are held by two state-owned companies, Gazprom and Rosneft, that are to resume exploratory works in the EEZ in 2017–2019.

While exploration in the Arctic can hardly be called fixed in time and place and uniform throughout the region, what has been consistent across political discourse of the Arctic states was that, regardless of the development scenario, environmental prerogatives are resonant now more than ever in the history of the Arctic exploration. Or to use Lisa Murkowski's words: "This is not a choice between energy and the environment. We are past that" (cited in Siegel 2017). Similar rhetoric is present across the ocean, too, for instance, in Russia, its former minister of natural resources stated that "the Arctic is not only and not so much of economic importance. Now we have started considering 'feedbacks' and we understand that the Arctic is where climate is formed and unique ecosystems are preserved" (Donskoy 2017).

8.5 Arctic Cleanup and Preservation

Apart from Arctic-specific environmental regulation, there has been another trend, particularly recently in Russia, of remediating past environmental damage in the Arctic. Russia, similarly to the USA and Canada, inherited the North bearing scars of half a century long industrialisation, militarisation, and development of the Northern Sea Route, with disastrous effects in some areas (see e.g. Bruno 2010;

Josephson 2014). During the 1990s Siberia and the High North experienced a mass abandonment of its military bases, airports, mines, settlements throughout the North, as a result, piles of construction materials, fuel tanks, vehicles, buildings, cabins, communication and energy infrastructure as well as significant amounts of hazardous waste were left behind. In addition to terrestrial ruination, from 1964 to 1991 the Russian Arctic seabed was used as a burial ground for nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear reactors and other radioactive objects and about 17,000 containers with solid nuclear waste (Korolev 2016). The removal of nuclear waste from Russia's north-west coast has been under way for over a decade in collaboration with Germany, France and others.

The cleanup of the Russian Arctic first occurred in the context of the Barents cooperation (e.g. Sellheim 2012). Vladimir Putin picked up on it again in 2010 and it was reiterated in the Strategy of the Russian Arctic zone development through to 2020: "liquidation of the environmental damage caused by past economic, military and other activities in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation" (Russian Federation 2013). Since then 6 islands of Franz Joseph's land, north of Novaya Zemlya, Bely and Vilkitsky isles, town of Amderma, Kolguev island, Cape Schmidt of Wrangel island, New Siberian Islands and other sites have been or are still in the process of being cleaned of the accumulated historical waste (e.g. Spiridonova 2018). The costs are borne by the state and private sector donors.

The term of 'accumulated environmental damage' was introduced to the Russian federal legislation in 2016 (Pravitelstvo Rossii 2016). By 2017 the Arctic regions of Russia carried out an inventory of sites of accumulated environmental damage classified according to the urgency of rehabilitation required and would expect to receive state funding for the removal and remedial works as part of the state 'road map' to free the Russian Arctic of accumulated pollution. While the 'road map' prioritised only 102 sites, Murmansk Oblast alone counted 149 objects of accumulated environmental damage, including illegal landfills, radioactive objects, military bases, etc. *Greenpeace* Russia made a list of 399 sites in the Russian Arctic ranging from metal scrapyards to radioactive wastelands to mining pits and landfills, which they submitted to the government in hopes of expanding the coverage of the programme (Greenpeace 2017).

Similar activities have been taking place in Alaska, where some of about 600 military installations were abandoned after the end of the Cold War, since the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund, was enacted. Among such sites were:

- four remote radar stations in the North Slope region removed in 2014–2015 on behalf of the United States Air Force;
- Manning Point Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS), where fuel, lubricant and oil drums were removed from the Jago river delta by D (USACE) in 2010–2011;
- DEW (Distant Early Warning) line sites (see more on research in Lackenbauer et al. 2005), including Kogru River;

– the cleanup of 136 Alaska test wells drilled prior to 1982 in the National Petroleum Reserve funded by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the US Army Corps of Engineers between 2002 and 2015 (18 wells) and through Helium Act of 2013 up to 2019 (50 wells) (BLM 2013). That included nine wells drilled between 1940s and 1950s in Umiat area, considered one of the most polluted in the country (N.A 2001).

In the Canadian Arctic ongoing cleanup efforts date back to at least late 1990s and are partially driven by the political urge to restore the relations between the indigenous peoples and the federal authorities. Canada has had a long history of mining in the North; its abandoned, orphaned and legacy mines (e.g. Faro Mine, Giant Mine, Rankin Inlet, etc.) as well as other contaminated sites have only recently attracted political attention. Federal Contaminated Sites Accelerated Action Plan (FCSAP) was set up in 2005 to clean up and rehabilitate thousands of such sites throughout Canada. FCSAP has so far been divided into three phases spreading over 2005–2020 and was estimated to be worth CAN$3.5 billion in liability (Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated Discussion Paper 2007).

In the Canada's Arctic territories (Yukon, Nunavut, Northwest Territories) the contaminated sites are addressed under the Northern Contaminated Sites Programme. The contaminated sites among others included DEW lines built in the Canadian North, mostly in Nunavut, in 1950s and jointly operated by the USA and Canada which were turned over to Canada in 1993. The sites were abandoned in the late 1990s and buildings, infrastructure, landfills, barrels, asbestos, fuel, contaminated soils, and PCBs were left behind. 21 of 42 have been scrapped and cleaned over almost two decades. The site at Cape Dyer on the east coast of Baffin Island took 9 years to clean up. Other cleanup sites included Cape Hooper, Cambridge Bay, Kugaaruk, and Cape Perry. The remediate works were partially funded by the USA.

Senator Douglas Roche wrote in 2000 that "The DEW Line stations were constructed in an era when there was little or no appreciation from non-native Canadians of just how fragile the Arctic ecosystem actually is" (Roche 2000). His remark, while referring to the American Arctic, is true for both Eastern and Western hemispheres. While a lot of the impacts would have been visible at the time of operation, the utilitarian mentality, the urgency of a cause, secrecy and lack of scientific understanding of chemical pollution have taken decades to find their way to policy and law-making of the USA, Canada and the USSR/Russia alike.

While in all the countries remediation and cleanup required considerable amount of state funding, the disruption of ownership in the USSR-Russia transition economy and bankruptcy of Canadian mining companies in the 1990s made it more difficult to enact the 'polluter pays principle'. In Russia some state-owned and private companies (Gazprom, Rosatom, Nornickel…) engaged with the cleanup and other ecological initiatives as part of their social responsibility strategy. Rosatom, for instance, signed an agreement with the Murmansk region government in 2014 to provide assistance in remediating and preventing past and present environmental damage: the sites of joint effort included temporary nuclear waste storage facility OAO 'TsS Zvezdochka' and solid nuclear waste facility 'Gremiha' as well as others.

Gazpromneft-Yamal, too, together with Yamal district administration carried out a large-scale cleanup on the Obe estuary coast.

In addition to regulation of economic activities in the region, past several decades saw a dramatic change in land and sea protection as well. Before the Second World War there were very few protected areas in the terrestrial and marine Arctic (Lapland and Kandalaksha reserves in the USSR; subarctic park in Alaska Denali (1917)), whose borders or even existence were hardly set in stone. The 1980–1990s saw the largest increase of protected areas throughout the circumpolar North (for instance, e.g. Northeast Greenland National Park, Aulavik National Park and Pingo National Landmark in Canada, Putorana and Gydan nature reserves, Franz Joseph's Land in Russia and others). Thereafter many countries adopted a more systematic approach to conservation. For instance, the USSR almost doubled its nature reserve network, enacted a national wildlife law and produced its first red books of endangered species between 1970 and 1990.

Recently, new protected areas, including Láhko (2012) and Sjunkhatten (2012) national parks in Norway, national parks Russkaya Arktika (2009) and Beringia (2013) in Russia, and Tallurutiup Imanga—Lancaster Sound National Marine Conservation Area (2017) in Canada, have been established to protect the landscapes and the biodiversity of the Arctic fauna and flora. Canada's addition is the country's largest marine protected area, which at 109,000 square km, contributes to Canada's commitment under the Convention on Biological Diversity of reaching 10% of marine and coastal area by 2020 (Wong 2017) as well as domestic pledges to attain to 2020 Biodiversity Goals and Targets to conserve "at least 17% of terrestrial areas and inland water, and 10% of coastal and marine areas" (Government of Canada 2016). The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology reported that it would too aim at meeting Aichi Targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity through its northern regions with the plan to increase the area of protected territories in the climate change sensitive north of the country by 11% by 2023 using the financial help from the German Federal Ministry for the Environment (Russian Federation 2017).

Cooperation in the field of conservation and environmental protection has also been expanding since about 1970s in the form of cross-border species conservation, heritage programmes and institutional, scientific and legal cooperation (from military cleanup agreements to international organisations and fora, such as the Arctic Council and the Polar Code).

It is a misconception that the cooperation in the Arctic between the West and the East began after Mikhail Gorbachev's seminal speech of 1987 in Murmansk. In fact, the first international conference on permafrost took place in 1963 in Indiana, USA (Permafrost International Conference 1963) and the second in 1973 in Yakutsk, USSR (Permafrost Second International Conference 1973a, b); the issues stemming from development of northern territories were a common ground between the countries even amidst the Cold War. The International Agreement for the Conservation of Polar Bears and their Habitat of 1973 is another such example where Canada, USA, USSR, Norway and Denmark came together to solve a common regional problem of declining species numbers. The Shared Beringian Heritage Programme

has been running for 27 years since its inception in 1991 by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev as an attempt to join efforts in the field of environmental protection, science and cultural exchange between Alaska and the Russian Far East.

In 2012, the US and Russian governments stated their intention to create a transboundary area spanning over Beringia National Park in Chukotka, Russia and the Bering Land Bridge National Preserve and Cape Krusenstern National Monument in Alaska, USA. However, geopolitical tensions brought the initiative to a halt. While neither of these environmental instruments are immune to changes of geopolitical climate, they have nonetheless been generated and propelled by the rising level of environmental consciousness across the Arctic rim. Such is a case of the 16 year moratorium on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean agreed between Arctic states and other interested parties following the open letter signed by more than 2000 scientists from all over the world. In 2015, the Oslo Declaration manifested a will of the Arctic Five to prevent unregulated fishing in the High Arctic (Regjeringen 2015) and in 2017, nine countries and the European Union concluded Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (U.S. Department of State 2017).

8.6 Conclusion

The European view of the Arctic's environmental history has been that of observation and discovery. While most of the prognoses about the Arctic of the present, whether regarding the growing militarisation and the advent of another Cold War or pressures of overpopulation and resource chase, are either yet to materialise or have been significantly smaller in scale or impact than predicted. And the temptation is high to look for causes of discrepancies between predictions and reality, and some do find them in economic, political or haphazard events, it may be that the Arctic development has altogether changed its trajectory and is no longer on the course favoured by writers of 'doom and gloom'. It may as well be that the future of the Arctic is no longer rooted in dichotomy of choice between exploitation and pristineness. And while social and economic development and natural environment are not in clear-cut opposition, willingness to recognise and mitigate anthropogenic impact together with the growing environmental awareness can help overcome the modernist binary supposition of the active and aggressive development versus passive natural environment.

Pro-environmental rhetoric of recent years and, more importantly, tighter regulations, restoration of the Arctic landscape and reclamation of land across Eurasian and American hemispheres, international efforts to mitigate the damage and prevent loss demonstrate that governments, companies and societies can learn from past activities whether they were economic advances or military experiments.

It is tempting to see the development and industry as intrinsically destructive, the standard against which we define and measure destruction (destructiveness) has a tendency, as was demonstrated, to shift across time and space, while the narrative

generally remains polarised. Acknowledging this discrepancy should not mislead us into believing that development and environmental governance are in equilibrium or to disregarding varying short-term, long-term and tipping event time scales that society and nature co-exist in. Instead, it should open up a new field of inquiry—the 'learning curve' of social and ecological balance in the Arctic as new relations and contexts are being redefined in formerly exploited and new areas.

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Chapter 9
Arctic Disaster Risk Reduction and Response as Triumph?

Patrizia Isabelle Duda and Ilan Kelman

Abstract Disaster risks and disasters are frequent around the Arctic. Hazards range from the usual sudden-onset suspects—such as earthquakes, avalanches, landslides, floods, and meteorites - to long(er)-term or less familiar changes such as climate change impacts, including sea level rise or microbes unleashed by melting permafrost. Simultaneously, the Arctic region has experienced changes to vulnerabilities – especially the growth and development of the energy, shipping, resource extraction, and tourism industries – increasing the potential of further disasters. That is, with more people and infrastructure potentially affected by hazards, disaster risks rise, especially if vulnerabilities are not counteracted or if they are created through unsustainable development practices. However, while much discourse tends to view Arctic populations as passive players experiencing the consequences of environmental hazard influencers, including but not limited to climate change, in reality, Arctic populations have been actively tackling disaster risks and response. This chapter establishes this point by focusing on the region's existing disaster risk reduction and response (DRR/R) efforts as demonstrated by the wide range of bi- and multilateral cooperative agreements created to contribute to a less vulnerable Arctic. By analysing them in the context of DRR/R, this chapter highlights that, while unique cooperative measures are in place to address disasters when they occur, these efforts are insufficient to manage the dynamic challenges the Arctic is facing. A shift to a focus on reducing disaster vulnerabilities in the first place is as necessary in the Arctic as it is elsewhere.

Keywords Disasters · Disaster risk reduction and response · Search and rescue · Arctic cooperation · Paradiplomacy

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9.1 Introduction

Operating on the premise that what happens in the Arctic has global effects—and vice versa—outsiders are showing a growing interest in disasters and disaster risk reduction and response (DRR/R) in the Arctic. These outside perceptions of the Arctic are fraught with misconceptions. Often, these can be found on either extreme of the 'wild paradise vs. disaster area' spectrum. According to the former, the Arctic is still perceived as a feral, pristine, untouched expanse; a view that evokes public dreams of escape and adventure that the marketing teams of many Arctic tourism vendors are all too keen to promote (Wang et al. 2018).

On the other hand, climate change discussions and images of ice-free Arctic waters, starving polar bears and, more recently, doomsday scenarios of pandemics induced by thawing permafrost (as has been popularised by the successful television show 'Fortitude') are increasingly creating the perception of an 'Arctic of disasters'. This notion dominates much of the international political, environmental and legal discourse and it is readily repeated and sensationalised by international media coverage (Grant 1998; Young 2011; Fjellestad 2016; Loftsdóttir 2015; Pincus and Ali 2016). Coupled with often insufficient knowledge of Arctic populations and cultures, we suggest that this damning picture is mostly seen through guilty, post-colonial eyes emphasising this tragic situation to be one to which Arctic populations have only minimally contributed (e.g. Downie and Fenge 2003). In the context of DRR/R, the resulting image often portrays Arctic populations as passive victims of a situation that is not of their own making while their ability to properly react to the changing Arctic is supposedly compromised.

Yet even a cursory look at discourses coming from within the Arctic region suffices to reveal the acute awareness of the problems — on local, sub-national, national and international levels — as well as the ideas, will, and subsequent initiatives to tackle them. What is more, while disaster researchers generally bemoan the lack of much-needed cooperation on DRR/R as an apparently general feature (Ansell et al. 2010; Boin and Lagadec 2000; Perrow 2007), in the Arctic, cooperation appears to be a cornerstone of everyday life, including on disaster-related matters (Huppert and Chuffart 2017; Byers 2017). Thus, at least in the case of DRR/R, the reality on the ground in the Arctic is such that we might need to adjust or balance the victimising view of the Arctic, and instead look to the region for lessons of value to DRR/R globally (Marsden 2017).

Against this background, this chapter provides an overview of the disasters and disaster risks faced by Arctic populations and the resulting need for DRR/R. Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Barents and the surrounding region provides an illustrative example of DRR/R cooperation leading to Arctic triumph. This chapter begins by introducing the concepts of disasters and DRR/R. It then briefly explores the various hazards, vulnerabilities and disasters around the Arctic together with their unique challenges and opportunities, before turning to SAR as an example of Arctic DRR/R which might turn potential disasters into potential triumphs. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of Arctic DRR/R suggesting key future directions on this subject.

9.2 Understanding Disasters and Disaster Risk Reduction

What is a disaster? Intuitively, we tend to recognise and accept the impacts of the 1931 China floods, the 1986 Chernobyl reactor meltdown or the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami as disasters. Often, these fit one or more of the characteristics of fast-onset, large, visible, deadly, destructive and/or costly 'extreme events', usually demonstrating either nature's force or human-induced events with major consequences.

Defining other events as disasters results in more controversy. Financial crises or 'fuzzy' events and developments such as failed states/regions, perhaps even the "environmental consequences of modernity" (York et al. 2003, p. 279) might be classified as disasters, too. When compared to the first examples, they often cost as many or even more lives, resources and the lost promise of individual opportunities. Terrorist attacks should also be included in disaster studies (Alexander 2005, p. 43; Perrow 2007) as well as, more controversially, (creeping) political and social choices that impact society such as austerity ideology (Hiam et al. 2017a, b). Consequently, it can be difficult to define disasters as, depending on one's perspective, everything from individual calamities to incremental historical developments lasting centuries can ultimately be defined as disastrous.

Scholars agree that disasters are in fact easier to recognise than to define (Barkun 1974, p. 51; Britton 1986, p. 255; Kreps 1985; Quarantelli 1998, p. 236). The field of disaster studies has been at pains to define disasters since its formal beginning in contemporary times with Prince's study of the 1917 Halifax explosion (Prince 1920). To date, no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a disaster, with regards to both characteristics and consequences, exists (Mohamed Shaluf 2007, p. 24). The linked references to disaster agents, physical impacts and their evaluation or social disruption when using the term makes it somewhat of a 'sponge' concept (Quarantelli and Dynes 1970, p. 328) with most scholars not having done enough to clarify the term (Quarantelli 1985).

Over time, one of the most important contributions has been the 'vulnerability approach', which includes not only social vulnerabilities, but also technological and systemic ones resulting from interdependencies. It thus advances two of the most useful propositions in the search for a definition of disaster. The first emphasises that, without appropriate action, disasters are 'normal' or 'inevitable' elements of life rather than being events, extremes, or one-off phenomena (Hewitt 1983; Kousky and Zeckhauser 2006; Mileti 1999; Perrow 1999; Wisner et al. 2004). Seen this way, disasters do not necessarily display a well-defined beginning, middle and end. That is, neither onset nor consequences may be clear. Instead, they are viewed as deeply complex and inherently "episodic, foreseeable manifestations of the broader forces that shape societies" (Tierney 2007, p. 509). Among others, this view brings often ignored slow-onset phenomena such as famines, epidemics, and involuntary mass migrations, into the disaster realm (Kreps and Drabek 1996, p. 132).

Second, with the acceptance of the vulnerability paradigm, scholars have articulated a clearer focus on human responsibility for driving disaster vulnerability,

which is of particular pertinence to the Arctic region. This has led to increased efforts for disaster risk reduction, and the more recent conception of 'disaster risk creation' (Lewis and Kelman 2012), or 'disaster risk production' (Chmutina and Bosher 2015). Including this component in disaster definitions emphasises not only agents of disasters but also considers the social and physical preconditions (namely vulnerability) that serve as causes of disasters (Britton 1986, p. 259). Specifically, these formulations adopt a sustainable development perspective by arguing that factors such as globalisation or unsustainable development decisions can produce disasters which must be then explained by reference to those forces (Kousky and Zeckhauser 2006; Mileti 1999; Wisner et al. 2004). According to Tierney, this focus is a necessary step to move beyond the disasters-as-events notion and instead put greater emphasis on the "decisions and actions of government, elites and their financial supporters, and global industries and financial institutions that make disasters inevitable" (Tierney 2007, p. 510).

However, "the proposition of disaster as a social product should not be regarded as an end-product in the quest for a definitive identification of a disaster. Rather, this approach is illustrative of the continuing maturation and the widening understanding of this field of research" (Britton 1986, p. 260). Thus, in parallel with the various attempts and developments to define disasters, some scholars have discussed whether these attempts are at all feasible or even desirable (Alexander 2005; Al-Madhari and Keller 1997, p. 19–20; Kreps 1989; Oliver-Smith 1999). Others have pointed to the abundance of discussions as to what qualifies as a disaster and the lack of discourse on disaster-related decision-making processes, such as the importance of who identifies a disaster and why (Stallings 1991). Often, disasters are declared on political grounds with vast implications for resource allocation. Kirschenbaum (2003), in examining the political dimension of the field, states, "[i]n the United States, a disaster has occurred when the president says it has" (Kirschenbaum 2003, p. 7–8). In fact, much of what is declared a disaster today is defined "to fit bureaucratic organizational survival needs [in which] disaster parameters are to a large extent an artificial, bureaucratic 'make-work' definition [and would by many] not even be considered or scrutinized as a potential disaster [but] accommodated by various means to assure survival" (Ibid., p. 26–27).

Indeed, the term disaster is highly contextual and relative. What constitutes a disaster lies often in the eye of the beholder (Collins et al. 2014, p. 2) making the need to 'define' disasters through local eyes acutely clear. A disaster will always mean different things to different people based on their varied backgrounds and experiences. For instance, disasters in Bangladesh will "almost invariably will be associated with the word 'flooding'; on the other hand, when one thinks of disaster in the context of Ethiopia, 'famine' immediately comes to mind" (Al-Madhari and Keller 1997, p. 18). This approach not only conflates hazard and disaster at times, but also creates and perpetuates stereotypes and misnomers.

Thus, and following from the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) annotated definition ("UNISDR", 2017), a broader concept of disasters and subsequent DRR/R measures is necessary which, among others:

- emphasises a wide conception of disasters including a host of natural- and human-induced 'hazard agents' (Burton and Hewitt 1974), events and inherent societal processes;
- views disasters as "collective stress situations" (Barton 1969, p. 38) that are an "expression of the vulnerability of human society" (Britton 1986, p. 254) and driven by issues of power, class, gender and other "axes of inequality" (Bradshaw and Fordham 2014; Tierney 2007, p. 503). Thus, a disaster is "primarily a social phenomenon" (Quarantelli and Dynes 1970, p. 24), yet, with strong interdependencies between social and physical systems (Wisner et al. 2004), making disasters an inevitable part of life in the absence of appropriate action;
- is aware of wide-reaching spatial or longitudinal/inter-generational effects;
- accepts that what constitutes a disaster is often local, contextual and/or subjective. Thus, disasters are not always visible to everyone and likely subject to biases, such as from media or externals' viewpoints.

As such, disasters are phenomena that are more complex than the above-stated 'obvious' examples may have us realise. They move well beyond the assumption that the hazard – e.g. an earthquake, flood, or avalanche – is the disaster. Against this background, decades of disaster research emphasise the need to better understand and invest more resources into the many and often indirect ways by which disaster risks can be reduced; i.e., DRR.

9.3 Hazards, Vulnerabilities, Disasters and DRR/R Challenges in the Arctic

Hazards around the Arctic include earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, avalanches, epidemics, wildfires, extreme weather, pollution from afar such as persistent organic pollutants, spills from local industries such as fossil fuels and mining, nuclear material, and climate change impacts including ocean acidification, permafrost thaw, and changing ecosystems (Antonovskaya et al. 2015; Bronen 2014; Bronen and Chapin 2013; Brunner et al. 2004; Buchwał et al. 2015; Clark and Ford 2017; Duerden 2004; Fraser et al. 2014; Fritz et al. 2017; Jones et al. 2015; Kanao et al. 2015; Law et al. 2014; Marchenko et al. 2012; Mileski et al. 2018; Müller and Jokat 2000; Tolstoy et al. 2001; Pincus 2015).

Not all these hazards are necessarily viewed as entirely negative. Climate change is seen by some as a force positively affecting economic development and opportunities around the region. For instance, the Arctic is experiencing a sharp increase in tourism which is expected to rise even further due to factors such as increased accessibility following warmer temperatures, infrastructure expansion, and the decline in snowfall levels in traditional European ski areas. Adding to that are the clever marketing strategies positioning Arctic and sub-Arctic destinations as new and exciting tourist destinations, as has been the case with Lapland, Iceland and Svalbard (Chen and Chen 2016; Lasserre and Têtu 2015; Lee et al. 2017; Loftsdóttir

2015; Ojanlatva 2008; Saarinen and Tervo 2006). From an extractive industries perspective, the region is thought to contain a significant amount of the world's remaining untapped oil and gas resources, with rising temperatures presumed to increase their accessibility (Mileski et al. 2018; Wilson and Stammler 2016). This said, the implications of changing storm regimes on industry safety have not yet been fully considered. Meanwhile, the melting of sea ice seems to promise reduced shipping distances via increased and potentially year-long accessibility of northern routes, yielding significant reductions in shipping costs (Eguíluz et al. 2016; Mileski et al. 2018). Again, though, changing storm regimes have not been fully investigated.

However positively these changes may be viewed, they also have the potential to significantly increase disaster risks by amplifying vulnerabilities. These developments not only add strain on current DRR/R efforts but also add unique challenges of their own, generating concerns about insufficient prevention, response, and SAR (Mileski et al. 2018). With rapidly changing weather, often limited resources and preparation, scarce physical and communications infrastructure, technology and physical infrastructure not adjusted to the changing conditions, and often long distances to the next point of help, even minor incidents can quickly become major disasters. In other words, when vulnerable people follow opportunities to high-hazard areas without adequate measures, disaster risk increases (Bankoff 2003; Bankoff et al. 2004; Edwards 2009).

Thus, the challenges to DRR/R for Arctic communities are immense in terms of the plethora of hazards, difficulties in accepting the implications of these hazards, limited preparation and response capability, reluctance to tackle vulnerabilities such as huge inequities, and conflicting perspectives of risks versus opportunities. In particular on the vulnerabilities side, Arctic communities have often suffered from political, geographical and institutional isolation and marginalisation. While the most presumed difficulties for Arctic DRR/R are often articulated as being distance, the lack of infrastructure and so-called harsh environmental conditions, more important factors – typically not admitted, yet, standard vulnerabilities which are the root causes of disaster – are political will, inequity, marginalisation, inadequate governance, and disrespect for Arctic populations. In other words, disaster risk and disasters around the Arctic have not necessarily been recognised or acknowledged by political leadership, most notably the governance centres generally more to the south.

Disasters in the Arctic tend to be marginalised or misrepresented for at least two more reasons. First, there is a general tendency amongst media, politicians and institutions (including DRR/R-tasked non-governmental organisations) to ignore disasters with low casualty numbers, especially creeping vulnerabilities such as poverty and poor development. These are often less visible or less attractive to donors and media alike, rarely making it onto the front pages (Wisner and Gaillard 2009; Von Meding et al. 2013). The cumulative effect of disasters involving only slow-onset changes (i.e. no rapid-onset hazard) or disasters with smaller scales of impacts can be higher in terms of destruction, casualties, and disruption than those involving high-impact, fast-onset hazards (Below et al. 2007; Lewis 1984; Marulanda et al. 2010). Thus, with the Arctic constituting a periphery in most peo-

ples' minds in terms of geography and population, disasters in the Arctic – despite their prevalence – rarely make it beyond local or regional media outlets.

Second, the Arctic usually experiences a situation whereby DRR/R needs and foci are hijacked, so to say, by the 'best paying clients'. That is, much of the contemporary disaster-related discourse focuses on the safety and security of the industries driving economic developments externally, notably shipping, resource extraction, and tourism. Much has been afforded to think about what measures to take to prevent or respond to oil spills; the possibility of cruise ships sinking or experiencing epidemics while in Arctic waters; and how to establish mechanisms to make cross-Arctic industrial shipping viable and safe. In short, the DRR/R needs of local peoples are often invisible (compare with Lewis 1984) unless connected to the 'best paying clients', so that these industry-related safety concerns tend to take priority (Arbo et al. 2013; Ellis and Brigham 2009; Loe and Kelman 2016). As is typical within the DRR/R field, hazards and external interests are given much more attention and prominence than vulnerabilities and local perspectives and needs.

9.4 Cooperation for Arctic DRR/R: The Example of Search-and-Rescue

The challenges outlined above show that DRR/R—whether in the Arctic or elsewhere—is a multifaceted and dynamic cross-boundary activity, that involves joined efforts of various players and pooling of diverse resources (Sydnes et al. 2017, p. 109). In the Arctic, where access to resources and infrastructure is often limited, distances between settlements may be long and environmental conditions often require a fast response to ensure survival of those affected by difficulties, the importance of cross-border and often international cooperation and coordination is particularly clear.

Arctic populations have been active players in this regard. Around the Arctic, settlements, peoples, and communities have been actively and cooperatively pursuing DRR/R initiatives. Examples include flood-related cooperation in the form of knowledge exchange between North American and Russian communities (Bodony 2016), paradiplomacy on environmental and related issues between cross-border Arctic settlements such as Nickel and Kirkenes (Joenniemi 2014; Eliasson 2015; Joenniemi and Sergunin 2013; Kireeva 2017), and the paradiplomatic relations between Greenland's community and non-Arctic actors (Ackrén 2014).

These cases are of immense importance. To scope this section into an illustrative example for discussing DRR/R as 'Arctic Triumph', it explores what has emerged as one of the most visible and dominant aspects of Arctic cooperation for DRR/R: bi- and multilateral agreements such as the Arctic Council's Search-and-Rescue-(SAR)-related agreements, the Norwegian-Russian Oil Spill Response regime, the 2015-initiated Arctic Coast Guard, and Barents Regional Cooperation. All these are of particular prominence and are a testament to the perception of cooperation as a

fundamental principle of Arctic DRR/R. While their mandates and foci differ, they all deal in one way or another with preventing or responding to disasters, often through the lens of SAR or advancing (technical) progress on environmental protection and related issues. Developed through formal and informal relations, the high volume of dialogue, joint exercises, and other operative cooperation demonstrate the every-day importance placed on these agreements and cooperative regimes.

For instance, since the initiation of dialogue on different levels led to the relatively recently founded Arctic Council (1996), comprising a collection of Arctic states and indigenous representatives (Permanent Participants) not all of whom are necessarily allies or seek cooperation, a gradual (albeit deemed as insufficient) increase in Arctic SAR and environmental cooperation has been observed (Sydnes et al. 2017; Graczyk and Koivurova 2015; Kankaanpää and Young 2012; Kao et al. 2012; Huebert et al. 2012). Whether or not such changes can be directly or indirectly attributed to the Arctic Council is a challenging question. Nonetheless, with its six working groups[1] tasked with different aspects of cooperation on SAR, environmental protection and sustainable development, the Arctic Council is creating webs of dialogue and cooperation, whilst embedding DRR/R (in the form of SAR) into various international/regional systems and so potentially even influencing regional stability (Exner-Pirot 2013). Thus, the Arctic Council demonstrates the importance of cooperation in the region and Arctic states' and peoples' rising tendency for cooperation at the multilateral level. This success was illustrated especially through the achievements of the 2011 first-ever binding "Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement" and the 2013 "Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic". The former especially can be considered a major multilateral step in the realm of Arctic DRR/R, deriving success from establishing norms of cooperation and joint SAR strategy in the region (Sydnes et al. 2017).

A similarly wide approach has been taken by the 1993 initiated cooperation in the Barents region, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) (Hønneland 2017). BEAR is divided into two levels: the Barents Regional Cooperation (BRC) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (BEAC). Consisting of thirteen counties/subregional entities in Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden, the Barents Cooperation's primary task is to promote sustainable development in the Arctic. This is done by encouraging cooperation and interregional exchange through people-to-people contacts and economic development on numerous issues including culture, development, health and environment ("Barents Cooperation", 2018a). A focal point of the BEAR are the biennial rescue exercises organised in the country of the respective BEAC Chair. In 2017, this aspect was further strengthened by the initiation of the "Joint Committee on Rescue Cooperation". Its mandate is to provide operational guidance with regards to the "Agreement on Cooperation within the field of

[1] Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)

Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response" to respond effectively and in concert to emergencies such as vehicle crashes, forest fires, tourism-related incidents, floods, ice plugs, and industrial and chemical accidents, all while making the most of the scarce resources available ("Barents Cooperation", 2018b).

Outside of BEAR but adjacent to the region, Svalbard provides an operational example of Arctic SAR cooperation in action. In October 2017, a MI-8 helicopter crashed 2–3 km off the coast of the Russian settlement of Barentsburg. Authorities in the neighbouring settlement of Longyearbyen were informed almost immediately, but none of the eight passengers on board survived. In fact, efforts to find the helicopter lasted several days and, after 5 days, only one body was recovered. Various Russian and Norwegian agencies and rescue personnel were involved in the SAR effort (Sabbatini 2017), leading to uncertainty and differences of opinion regarding the division of authority and responsibilities. Sure enough, on the national and sub-national levels, both sides used the disaster to flex at least some political muscle (Staalesen 2017a, b). In spite of the emphasis on cooperation on both sides, the SAR effort proved difficult on account of both operational capabilities and de facto cooperation. The apparent lack of preparedness is surprising not only given the region's strong emphasis on operational capacity and cross-border cooperation, but also since Svalbard's SAR authorities can be reasonably expected to be prepared. This is especially true given that a similar helicopter crash occurred in the almost same location in March 2008 killing three people and yet another one near Pyramiden which left two dead in 1991.

The Arctic provides plenty of similar examples from across the region. Perhaps the most high-profile recent incident is the sinking of the Russian submarine *Kursk* in 2000. Despite international offers to assist in the SAR effort, Russia's authorities reacted with lethargy, giving the impression of being more interested in Russian pride than in saving the lives of the 118-person crew on board, all of whom perished due to SAR failures (Mikes and Migdal 2014). Evidently, while Arctic SAR cooperation and agreements are indicative of, for the most part, positive and evolving Arctic geopolitical relations, they are not free from political intrigue and organisational challenges, thereby hampering SAR efforts (Wood-Donnelly 2013).

In the Arctic context, SAR is an illustrative cooperative facet of DRR/R that relates to cooperative thinking regarding needs, best practices, and local interests while extending to operative elements including common SAR exercises and sharing of information and resources. The increase in Arctic tourism, shipping and resource extraction highlights the continuing need, and the changing needs, for Arctic SAR cooperation, covering not only response after something has happened, but also using SAR principles for DRR/R to encourage training, prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. The examples here focus on the Barents and surrounding region but these successes do not always translate beyond SAR or outside the area covered. They can be used as a baseline for developing, testing and implementing other cooperative approaches aiming for success in Arctic DRR/R.

9.5 Arctic Cooperation as DRR/R Triumph?

In this chapter, we addressed the issue of DRR/R in the Arctic, demonstrating that despite the challenges and difficulties, Arctic DRR/R efforts provide scope for success, optimism and triumph. While outsiders' perceptions can paint a picture of the Arctic as a region of disasters, this image is unjustly victimising. Our chapter shows Arctic populations as active players in shaping and determining their future by keenly engaging in DRR/R issues and actions. This is particularly visible in the case of SAR activities, illustrated by the Barents and surrounding region, where local Arctic players have shown immense progress. In doing so, cooperation is, and in many ways should be, the cornerstone of DRR/R.

Against this background, can we call these cooperative regimes really 'triumphs' in Arctic DRR/R? How far are mechanisms that predominantly focus on operative cooperation to respond to emergencies and disasters capable of truly reducing disaster risks? Could the successes in Arctic SAR leave major gaps in wider Arctic DRR/R through hampering deeper thinking about DRR/R? The answer seems to be that although SAR activities and cooperation in the Arctic are significant, so are the challenges faced. There is effectiveness in formalised, classic, top-down, command-and-control-based mechanisms, but they cannot provide everything, especially when there is the need to deal not only with anticipated emergencies but also those that are more complex, interconnected or supposedly 'unexpected' (Alexander 2014).

Pooling information, resources and response efforts have often proven more challenging than expected, as the 2017 helicopter crash on Svalbard shows. Some difficult operating conditions might simply not be possible to overcome, such as remoteness for SAR vehicles, fog, darkness, ice, and large distances between settlements and fuel dumps (Mileski et al. 2018). Relying on SAR mechanisms without accepting their limitations could generate a false sense of security. Indeed, some professionals in this field are "divided in their views regarding whether the regime is capable of handling joint SAR operations in a sharp situation" due to the uncertainties and complexities involved with respect to, for instance, the availability of SAR resources or complications related to transnational DRR/R (Sydnes et al. 2017, p. 129).

The sinking of the South Korean trawler *Oryong 501* in the Bering Sea in December 2014 supports these concerns. Longstanding cooperation and agreements existed for such an instance. Nevertheless, Russia did not accept help until the next day and provided neither base or aircraft support to assist with what should have been a joint international SAR effort (Klint, 2014; Pincus 2015). Out of at least five dozen crew members, only seven survived and, ironically in the context of DRR/R, the body identification – when people are dead already, rather than averting fatalities – was highlighted as a good example of international disaster-related cooperation (Chung et al. 2017).

Despite uncertainties regarding SAR capabilities, this disaster demonstrated that despite ostensible cooperative preparedness on paper and exercises between nations, the unpredictability of institutional and political dimensions can hinder success

(Pincus 2015, p. 7). With respect to the former, this is especially true when we consider the increased activities across the Arctic, exacerbating the already present lack of SAR capabilities within the individual mandate areas. Though both SAR activities and cooperation have been extensively highlighted in Arctic literature and practice, "[c]urrently there is no one organization of voluntary cooperation that exists to address the problem of mishaps in the Arctic" (Mileski et al. 2018, p. 135), limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of such initiatives. In short, individual historical and cultural legacies coupled with contemporary economic and political interests can lead to situations such as with the *Oryong 501*.

This, in turn, is intimately linked to disaster researchers' calls for going beyond establishing operational and technological capabilities and ensuring a vulnerability focus. As per the earlier discussion regarding the definition of disasters, the field of disaster research has long identified vulnerabilities as causing disasters rather than hazards or environmental conditions (Hewitt 1983; Wisner et al. 2004). Vulnerabilities within Arctic communities are rarely admitted and redressed within DRR/R, because the preference instead continues to be highlighting hazards and hazard influencers. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the plethora of literature dealing with the hazard influencer of climate change on Arctic populations, covering all eight Arctic countries, compared to the dearth of material on vulnerabilities of Arctic populations to hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and epidemics. Irrespective of the triumphs evident in Arctic DRR/R such as through SAR in the Barents and surrounding region, a significant gap remains in terms of analysing Arctic DRR/R from a vulnerability perspective, as the decades of disaster studies literature dictate.

Nonetheless, Arctic communities have long had and continue to have control over aspects of their own DRR/R actions, especially through recently developing and implementing cooperative approaches to DRR/R that could serve as examples to the rest of the world. DRR/R efforts in the Arctic have a long way to go and, to build on known successes and triumphs, should focus on (1) broader inclusion of people and institutions to be actively involved in DRR/R, and (2) a broader and deeper view on disasters going beyond (mass) emergencies and the most immediate climate change effects, in order to fully embrace the wide-ranging and long-standing definitions and causes of disasters promoted by the scientific literature.

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Chapter 10
Triumphant Geopolitics? Making Space of and for Arctic Geopolitics in the Arctic Ocean

Klaus Dodds and Chih Yuan Woon

Abstract This chapter contends that the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident in the North Pole has ushered in a form of triumphant geopolitics insofar as it enabled the renewing of the imaginative and material grip of the five Arctic coastal states (Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, A5) on the maritime Arctic. Triumphant geopolitics, in our conceptualisation, is anchored on two separate but inter-related registers. On the one hand, it involves the process of reconciliation and reclamation whereby reactions to the 2007 event provoked the A5 to first reconcile their differences over the legal status of the central Arctic Ocean via the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration before reclaiming the inter-governmental forum of the Arctic Council as a space to regulate and manage other players including Permanent Participants and state observers. On the other hand, it is simultaneously underpinned by expressions of alter-geopolitics, with indigenous peoples and extra-territorial parties challenging the Arctic states' framings of the region in order to posit alternative geopolitical imaginaries and relationships. Explicating these dimensions thus foreground triumphant geopolitics as a useful optic to pursue the contested imaginaries, materialities and practices at play in the (re)making of Arctic geopolitics at different geographical scales.

Keywords Triumphant geopolitics · Arctic Council · Reconciliation · Reclamation · Alter-geopolitics

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10.1 Introduction

In 2001, Felix Driver published his masterly overview of what he termed 'Geography Militant', an interrogation of cultures of exploration and empire (Driver 2001). Taking the period between the eighteenth and twentieth century as his time frame, Driver's scholarly meanderings contemplated the role and scope of British geography as an imperial discipline/science par excellence. The Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in London is integral to this geographical audit – acting as archive, debating chamber and academic bazaar for a medley of armchair geographers, military surveyors, publishers and travellers. The RGS and its learned journal, the *Geographical Journal*, was a repository for descriptive accounts and mappings of the world, including the Polar Regions (Bell et al. 1995; see also Carroll 2015).

The inspiration for the title of this paper came from Joseph Conrad's 1924 *National Geographic* essay 'Geographers and some explorers' (Conrad 1924; see also Rothenberg 2007). In the exposition that followed, Conrad outlined a trinity of epochs – the first being 'Geography fabulous' a long period of human curiosity about the world often made manifest in extravagant maps and lurid depictions of monstrous beasts lurking in faraway places (at least from the perspective of ancient European map-makers and explorers); what followed was 'Geography Militant' a period between the voyages of discovery involving Captain James Cook in the eighteenth century culminating in the so-called 'scramble for Africa' in the nineteenth century; finally giving away to 'Geography Triumphant' in the twentieth century. In the case of the latter, modern tourism for Conrad at least replaced earlier eras of speculation, exploration and discovery. Travellers were, thus, condemned to follow in the tracks of earlier explorers. Conrad did not necessarily welcome the consolidation of 'Geography Triumphant', arguing in the essay that there was something melancholy-like about this phenomenon (Driver 1995).

The British geographer, Halford Mackinder, writing some 20 years earlier than Conrad's essay, was rather more circumspect (Mackinder 1904). In his reading of global history and geography, Mackinder warned that there would be ramifications and reverberations for empires and states such as Britain, France and Germany because there would be far fewer territories to explore, colonise and exploit (Kearns 2009). This led him to caution that the potential of conflict to radiate across the world was now that much greater because of higher levels of interconnection and mobility across the earth. While Mackinder and Conrad's schemas vary, both men are guarded about what the future might hold in the light of humanity's exploration, colonisation, occupation and administration of the earth's land surface.

As the twentieth century demonstrated, however, exploration did not disappear from the portfolio of human activities. Geography militant continued in the form of underwater, aerial and polar exploration in particular, supported by a military-academic-industrial complex which in turn provided specialist technology, logistical support and geoscientific expertise (Naylor and Ryan 2009; Turchetti and

Roberts 2014). Oceans were explored and mapped, Antarctica's ice cap probed and rockets and satellites also circulated around and beyond the earth's atmosphere. If there was a high point of geography militant, then we might point to the 1957–8 International Geophysical Year (Belanger 2010). A veritable 'scientific Olympics', the polar regions were integral to a worldwide collection of scientific information and processing (Collis and Dodds 2008). Research stations were established on drifting icebergs, mechanised vehicles crossed the polar continent and scientists interrogated the land, sea, air and ice of remote environments.

Some 90 years later, Conrad's reading of global militant geography appeared to be resuscitated when a titanium Russian flag was gently deposited on the bottom of the central Arctic Ocean in August 2007. Mirroring British and American flags being planted on mountain tops, polar plateaus and the moon, the cadence of the flag was much remarked upon. Was the flag indicative of a geography militant? Was it a form of triumphant geography in the sense that one of the occupants of the submersible was a high net worth tourist (Dr. Frederick Paulsen) following in the footsteps of military submariners (CNN 2007)? The images that did circulate after the flag-planting incident offered a vista into a mysterious submarine world that had once been the purview only of American and Soviet naval submarines during the Cold War.

In this chapter, we consider whether the flag-planting incident of August 2007 might be usefully thought of as a form of Triumphant rather than Militant Geopolitics. And we do so, knowingly, in the sense that there has been considerable commentary on the incident itself (e.g. Emmerson 2011). While we use Conrad's term 'militant' to highlight the manner in which the titanium flag rekindled earlier episodes of colonial appropriation in the Arctic, we posit that the incident might be productively read as something different. If interpreted as a form of 'triumphant' geopolitics, we read the flag planting incident as renewing the imaginative and material grip of the five Arctic coastal states (Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, A5) on the maritime Arctic. We argue that there are two sides to this 'triumphant geopolitics', which we don't posit as fixed and stable: on the one hand we have reconciliation and reclamation and conversely we have alter-geopolitics accompanied by what we term 'possession anxieties'.

As political geographers such as Phil Steinberg and colleagues note, the A5, in May 2008, affirmed their collective commitment to the Law of the Sea regime, and their role as 'environmental stewards' for the Arctic Ocean (Steinberg et al. 2015). Reconciliation was followed by the reclamation of the intergovernmental forum of the Arctic Council and its management of others including Permanent Participants and state observers (especially new observers from Asia such as China and Singapore). Finally, conversely, we explore how articulations of what Sara Koopman (2011) terms alter-geopolitics help us better understand the role of indigenous peoples (Permanent Participants in Arctic Council) and Arctic observer states and non-state actors in positing different visions of and for the Arctic.

10.2 Institutionalising Triumphant Geopolitics

When national flags were and are planted in apparently remote areas of the earth (mountain top, ocean floor, deserts, polar region or moon), the act itself is not politically innocent, as best exemplified in imperial songs dealing with flag planting (Richards 2001; see also Morrison 1995). As countless indigenous peoples discovered to their considerable cost, the flag was integral to what Patricia Seed (1995) described as 'ceremonies of possession'. Using examples from Spanish, English and French encounters with the New World, Seed interrogates how flags, guns, plaques, proclamations and acts of settlement were endemic to European colonialism. They helped to constitute, perform and circulate acts of white European possession of the non-European world. From the Arctic to Australia, indigenous peoples were dispossessed and European forms of law, culture and politics introduced. Indigenous sovereignty was disavowed in favour of the white property owning subject (Miller 2012).

In the time period described by Conrad as Geography Militant (c.1760s–1880s), European explorers, scientists and administrators were active in claiming, possessing and occupying non-European lands. While Britain and France expanded their empires across Africa, Asia and the Americas, Russians were consolidating their grip on the vast hinterland to the east of cities such as St Petersburg and Moscow. As historical and political geographers such as Mark Bassin and Derek Gregory remind us, geographical knowledge was essential to the colonisation and occupation of the non-European world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries onwards (Bassin 2008; Gregory 2004). Mapping, surveying and resource evaluation were integral to the European including the Russian colonial project. Flagging, mapping and charting were just three activities which went hand in hand with the development of imperial trading networks, administrative apparatuses, and legal regime development. At its most egregious, the European coloniser such as the British in Australia took resources and land from a *terra nullius* (subsequently sanctioned by an imported legal/property owning system) while indigenous peoples were conceived as property-less and living in a state of nature (Moreton-Robinson 2015).

At the end point of Conrad's geography militant, the term geopolitics is first used and begins to circulate in European academic exchanges (Dodds and Atkinson 2000). Formally coined in the 1890s, geopolitics acts as a signifier of interest in the intersection of resources, territory, knowledge and imperial power. Put simply, geopolitical conversations pivot around four threads: the role of geographical factors in shaping national and imperial power; the relationship between a country's population size (people power or in the original form 'man-power') and state territorial power; the role of resources in shaping patterns of state competition and conflict; and finally, if less developed in earliest iterations of geopolitics, examples and incidents of resistance to dominant forms of geopolitical thinking and practice. More recent scholars such as Paul Routledge and Sara Koopman have used the terms anti-geopolitics and alter-geopolitics respectively to acknowledge and investigate

expressions of dissent and alternative geopolitical strategies and imaginaries (Koopman 2011; Routledge 2017).

Our interest in triumphant geopolitics is not intended to signal an endorsement of past acts of colonial occupation and violence. Rather we draw attention to those moments when particular geopolitical visions and practices appear to enjoy considerable effectiveness and legitimacy amongst some, if not all, possible audiences (Dijink 1996). To give an example, it is only remarkably recently that settler colonial states such as Australia and Canada have been persuaded/forced/shamed into recognising the ongoing violence of colonial occupation, the imposition of alien cultural, legal and policing systems on indigenous communities, insidious racism and the myth of *terra nullius* (Lowman and Baker 2015). Prior to official apologies and land claims settlements, for example, we could argue that a particular geopolitical imaginary of the settler colonial state endured (triumphantly) in the sense of affirming and valorising particular territorial, state and provincial boundaries and apparatuses of administration. To the point that sovereign states such as Canada are thought of as settled spaces free to conduct foreign and security policies with other recognised state entities – and thus to posit the original peoples, the indigenous, the aboriginal as 'problem' rather than the 'settler'.

Classical geopolitics was triumphant in composition. Imperial states, sovereign 'man', white supremacy and colonial occupation and administration are assumed to be the norm (Weber 2016). Geographical factors and physical environments were conceptualised as either constraints and/or opportunities for the national-imperial state. When Halford Mackinder worried about 'man-power' in the context of Britain and its empire, he was referring to white European men and their capacity to serve the Empire. Britain's colonised subjects in Africa, Asia and the Americas were integrated into wider assessments of territory, resources and non-native populations (Mackinder 1905).

The Arctic in triumphant geopolitical calculations was a space for sovereign expansion, resource exploitation and territorial consolidation (Farish 2010). Cold War era political geographers and scholars of International Relations (IR), while largely eschewing the term geopolitics due to its controversial association with Nazism, addressed security and surveillance agendas informed by the need for strategic knowledge on terrestrial and marine environments as well as meteorology and oceanography (e.g. Hamblin 2005). American and Soviet physical and environmental scientists were funded by their respective militaries, and provided logistical support for those wishing to work across and under Arctic environments. The Arctic was measured, information circulated and articulated on the basis of making visible data and information used to classify and evaluate environments, resources and territories (Sörlin 2013).

In the post-Cold War era, a different form of geopolitical theorising began to challenge classical geopolitical writings. A self-consciously critical geopolitics questions the manner in which world politics was discursively underpinned by a set of assumptions about the nation-state, territory and resources and the legacies of colonialism and imperialism. The Cold War era of superpower competition arguably blurred not only persistent colonial legacies regarding the fate of indigenous

and global South peoples but also underplayed expressions of geopolitical dissent, resistance and anti-geopolitics. In Anglophone critical geopolitics, writers such as Paul Routledge articulated an agenda focussing on dissent and resistance in complex post-colonial contexts.

In the Arctic, indigenous activism in the 1970s onwards pointed to challenges to settler colonial states and resistance to marginalisation and discrimination. Across the North American and Nordic Arctic, indigenous peoples challenged Cold War/colonial developmental-geopolitical agendas and the normalisation of categories such as under-development and primitive. The Soviet Arctic was somewhat different due to the marginalisation and discrimination against so-called 'Little Peoples' by successive communist governments. Scholarship and activism by indigenous peoples and settler scholars contributed to a tranche of writing and other creative outputs challenging the triumphant 'sovereign man' and accompanying geopolitics. These critical counter-currents of Arctic geopolitics, however, unfolded at a time when the ending of the Cold War was being heralded as a new opportunity to recast the international rather than intra-national relations of the Arctic. Highlighting, what post-colonial historian Ann Stoler terms as 'duress', moments when the hardened constraints and confinements of colonialism make themselves manifest in considerations of land, territory and human and civil rights (Stoler 2016). Her point is that inequities in the form of racism, violence and dispossession mark fault lines of duress in many countries, including those with Arctic constituencies.

For all the progressive intent of the Arctic Council, established in 1996 following the Finnish-sponsored Arctic Environment Protection Strategy, this post-Cold War intergovernmental forum does not disrupt dominant geopolitical imaginaries and practices (English 2013). Framing themselves as the 'Arctic states' (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) hardwire a particular meta-geography of the Arctic. As the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council noted:

> [The Arctic Council] provide(s) a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic (Arctic Council 1996, article 1; footnote omitted).

Initially three and now six indigenous organisations were identified as so-called Permanent Participants but do so at the behest of those Arctic states, and everyone else is identified as an 'Observer'. While this state-centric ordering and classifying is not unique to the Arctic Council, we argue it reinforced a particular topographical imagination of the Arctic region, which prioritises not only geographical proximity but also uses the category of 'Arctic states' to position non-Arctic states as 'outsiders' and Permanent Participants as Arctic state-sanctioned (Steinberg and Dodds 2015).

The rules of engagement for the Arctic Council ensure that the Permanent Participants and Observers have to comply with certain restrictions. For example, the Arctic Council's original terms of reference make clear that Permanent

Participants can never exceed the number of members. In other words, it might be possible, if accepted by the eight Arctic states, to increase their number to seven – but no more. Observers, as defined by the Ottawa Declaration notes that the category is open to 'non-Arctic states', inter-governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations. As part of the condition for entry, therefore, countries such as the UK, France and the Netherlands were forced to accept a disavowal of their past historical and geographical relationships with Arctic territories and peoples (e.g. Albrethsen 1989; Kraus and Holland 2007).

The Arctic region is never defined in the Declaration. It is simply assumed that the follow national territories are emblematic of it:

> THE REPRESENTATIVES of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Arctic States) […] (Arctic Council 1996, Preamble).

And thus these terms of reference cemented a particular fixed geographical relationship with the Arctic region, which was paradoxically at odds with the Arctic's colonial and Cold War experiences. In the case of an original Observer such as the UK, ports and cities such as Aberdeen and Hull were important nodes in trans-Arctic resource extraction, and nuclear submarines leaving from British ports criss-crossed Arctic waters (David 2000). British trading companies for several hundred years developed networks with the North American and Russian Arctic, as well as operated out of islands such as Spitsbergen. Rather than being near-Arctic states, Britain and others such as France and the Netherlands are described as 'observers' (Kruse 2013).

By agreeing to be an Observer and Permanent Participant, one arguably participated in what the French political scientist Bernard Badie terms a 'diplomacy of connivance' (Badie 2012). According to Badie, the contemporary international system is illustrative of club or connivance diplomacy, whereby an oligarchical assemblage of states (that consider themselves as the most powerful) attempts to divvy up the task of world leadership amongst themselves. This form of diplomatic arrangement, as Badie goes on to qualify, is defensive of its privileges, occupies a partway between competition and cooperation and is mostly precluding in its practices. Indeed, the Arctic Council can be said to be engaging in connivance diplomacy. For all its positive qualities and attributes, the Arctic Council in actual fact consolidated the grip of the eight self-defined Arctic states to define who, what and where was to be associated with the Arctic region (Nord 2015). This intergovernmental forum also decided not to discuss military/security matters (at the behest of the group's superpower, the United States) and used its structure and composition [two former superpowers with a middle power (Canada) and five Nordic states] to present a vision for a post-Cold War Arctic where environmental protection and sustainable development would be used to 'cover-up' the toxic legacies of colonialism and the Cold War (Koivurova 2010).

Footnote two of the Ottawa Declaration also reminds readers that "The use of the term "peoples" in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law". In other

words, when the Declaration speaks of 'indigenous peoples', it does not imply that Arctic states such as Canada and Russia are granting such peoples any additional international legal recognition. It would take Canada until 2016 to embrace the principles embedded in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Short and Lennox 2016). The Declaration was developed initially about the same time as the Arctic Council was established (1996/7) and took 20 years of negotiation to bring to a final agreed draft, and the previous Harper government in Canada described it as 'aspirational' and failed to implement its contents (Geise 2015).

The connivance comes, therefore, in parties to the Arctic Council not questioning or challenging what was being presented as past, present and future of and for the Arctic. Triumphant forms of geopolitics do not have to be spectacular in order to be triumphant. It can also be about the 'little things' like accepting routinely that there are self-appointed 'Arctic states' and that Permanent Participants are treated as respected participants in Arctic Council business, while at the same time concerns continue that indigenous peoples are being enrolled continuously in relationships with settler colonial states, which fail to live up to the expectation of partnership, respect and reconciliation. Canada, for example, has yet to harmonise the provisions of UNDRIP with Canadian law despite adopting its provisions in May 2016 – recognising a nation to nation relationship (Moirin 2017).

10.3 The Return of Militant Geopolitics

In August 2007, a Russian oceanographic expedition was collecting scientific data on the Central Arctic Ocean seabed. The context for the voyage was rooted in an earlier Russian decision to submit materials to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in New York. Under Article 76 of the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states such as Russia are entitled to submit scientific materials to the Commission for the purpose of establishing the outer limits of continental shelves appurtenant to relevant coastal baselines. The Commission, after carefully considering such submissions, issues what are termed 'recommendations', which are technical assessments rather than legal judgements. The original Russian submission (2001) asked the Commission to consider continental shelves in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. The Commission was not able to issue a recommendation pertinent to the Arctic Ocean and requested the Russian authorities conduct further oceanographic and geophysical research (Byers 2013).

The 2007 expedition itself was, therefore, very much in keeping with Russia simply following a formal recommendation from a UN body. Indeed, Russia was the first to submit materials to the CLCS and until that point very little attention had been paid to coastal states attempting to extending their sovereign rights to exploit resources on and below the seabed. This collective lack of curiosity was surprising given the scale of underwater territory at stake. In essence, Article 76 allows coastal states to expand considerably their sovereign rights over the seabed, subject to guidance from the UN Commission and negotiation with other coastal states which

might be affected. The so-called flag-planting incident in August 2007 transformed global interest in the Arctic, coinciding as it did with new reports of a record low in sea ice extent (Dodds and Nuttall 2016).

After images of the flag planting were released, media organisations such as the BBC in the UK ran articles with ribald phrasing such as 'scramble for the Arctic'. The framing was not innocent. Echoing previous colonial encounters in the global South, cadence of the Russian flag was difficult to ignore. No longer a superpower in disrepair, Russia under the then leadership of President Putin (2000–2008) was an altogether different proposition. While the flag planting had a whiff of absurdity about it, international reaction ranged from bemusement to the often-cited comments of a former Canadian Foreign Minister who expressed disbelief that such an action was undertaken. Foreign Minister Peter Mackay memorably noted that, "This isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say: 'We're claiming this territory'" (cited in Hønneland 2017, p. 87).

But flag-planting of the sort referred to by Mackay not only remained endemic in the twentieth century (Moon, Antarctica, Arctic, oceans) but also all too easily overlooks the enduring legacies of European flag planting in the Americas for indigenous peoples. Flag planting is profoundly incantatory and remains so. What the Russian flag, regardless of the financial, political and legal provenance of the submarine voyage, had done was to unleash geopolitical fears that the Arctic was a thinly governed space, available for further territorial and resource colonisation (e.g. Sale and Potapov 2009). While remote, barely visited and of uncertain resource value, the subterranean spaces of the Central Arctic Ocean proved capable of generating new geopolitical imaginaries. Coupled with concerns about diminishing sea ice, the apparent 'opening up' of the Arctic unleashed anxieties that other coastal states such as Canada would need to secure its own sovereign rights to Arctic seabed. Perhaps, unwittingly or not, the Canadian Foreign Minister's reaction pointed to dispossession anxieties – something being taken unexpectedly from a settler colonial state (as opposed to indigenous peoples), which then in turn produced geopolitical disorientation and fear of humiliation (Laidlaw and Lester 2015).

Within a year of the flag-planting episode, the Danish government convened a meeting of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States, A5) in Greenland. What resulted was the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, which affirmed the role and responsibility of the A5 as environmental stewards for the Arctic Ocean, and publicly committed to resolving any outstanding legal issues through the framework of the 'Law of the Sea' (Dodds 2014). Unable to reference UNCLOS because the United States remains a non-signatory, the Declaration was designed as a counter-measure to global speculation about the fate of the Arctic Ocean.

As with the genesis of the Arctic Council, a smaller number of Arctic states take it upon themselves to act in the following way:

> By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position to address these possibilities and challenges. In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean as discussed between our representatives at the meeting in Oslo on 15 and

> 16 October 2007 at the level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims (Ilulissat Declaration 2008).

Although mindful that their sovereignty and sovereign rights and jurisdiction applies to 'large areas of the Arctic Ocean', the Declaration recognises in passing that 'large' does not equate to 'entire'. The five coastal states are in an apparently 'unique position' because of the following: a smaller state (Denmark) was eager to position itself as a distinct Arctic/Nordic state from others such as Iceland and Finland; a Russian flag in 2007 unleashed speculation about an ungoverned Arctic; and geophysical state change in the Arctic Ocean was encouraging further speculation that ice was no longer a sufficient barrier to the mobility of other extra-territorial even newer parties such as China.

The militancy of the Declaration, therefore, lies in its prioritisation of the A5 as opposed to the broader community of eight Arctic states and the Permanent Participants. The latter were not consulted about the Declaration and Russia's actions regarding the mapping and surveying of the Arctic seabed, provided further impetus to other A5 members such as Denmark and Norway and later Canada. The Canadian government under then Prime Minister Stephen Harper became particularly belligerent about Canadian Arctic sovereignty (Burke 2017). The United States, as a non-signatory, was also collecting relevant data off the Alaskan continental shelf and accepts as customary international law the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Geographically, the Arctic Ocean between 2007 and 2015 attracted a surge of investment in mapping and oceanographic/geological analysis for the expressed purpose of making formal submissions to the CLCS (Jensen 2016).

More than ever, the Arctic Ocean was actively imagined in the 2008 Declaration as a volumetric space. With distinct opportunities for the A5 to steward and securitise its surface, columnar and subterranean dimensions:

> The Arctic Ocean is a unique ecosystem, which the five coastal states have a stewardship role in protecting. Experience has shown how shipping disasters and subsequent pollution of the marine environment may cause irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance and major harm to the livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities (Ilulissat Declaration 2008).

The reference to 'indigenous communities' appears opportunistic given that PPs were not formally represented at the meeting in May 2008. The Declaration in effect takes for granted existing legal and geopolitical structures, while extending the role of the A5 to manage water, fauna, and indigenous communities potentially affected by adverse developments in the Arctic marine environment. The livelihoods of indigenous peoples are to be protected and assimilated into the national security/stewardship concerns of the A5.

The Declaration did provoke immediate upset within the three uninvited Arctic states (Finland, Iceland and Sweden). This schism was reinforced further by a fol-

low up A5 meeting in Canada in 2010. Iceland, in particular, was reported to have been the most upset at this particular expression of militant geopolitics – eager itself to assert its credentials as an Arctic Ocean coastal state because of geographical proximity (Dodds and Ingimundarson 2013). Intriguingly, the 2010 A5 meeting was revealed as a divisive affair because the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticised Canadian hosts for failing to invite representatives from indigenous organisations to the meeting in Chelsea, Quebec. The meeting also highlighted the very different qualities of the A5 itself – the United States as the least engaged 'Arctic nation', Canada and Russia as the most enthusiastic Arctic Ocean coastal state representatives, Norway's presence largely due to its sovereignty over Svalbard (with disputes ongoing about how far Norway's sovereign rights extend from the coastline as noted in the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty) and Denmark representing the interests of Greenland (which had recently secured further autonomy over sub-surface resources from Denmark in 2009) (Gad 2014).

The division between A5 and A8 was arguably a crisis for the Arctic Council and it is perhaps not coincidental that the inter-governmental forum sought to reconcile and consolidate the role of 'Arctic states' in the aftermath of the 2008 Declaration. Understanding (or perhaps connivance) was secured in two areas: the future management of observers and the development of agreements designed to consolidate Arctic state co-operation. At the 2011 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Greenland, the Arctic states agreed to produce an Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies (which was updated subsequently in 2013, 2015, 2016) and sign through the auspices of the Arctic Council an Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Knecht 2016). Both legally-binding agreements reaffirm the collective role of the Arctic states and their shared role in the Arctic region. It also insists that observers to the Arctic Council, both established and new candidates, reaffirm their public commitment to respect the collective sovereignty and sovereign rights of the eight Arctic states, regardless of whether they are Arctic Ocean coastal states or not. This once again, demonstrates how the Arctic Council embodies the tenets of connivance diplomacy – the powerful Arctic states setting the rules of the game to ensure that their individual vested interests can be collectively managed amidst broader ('external') calls for inclusivity and involvement into the region's affairs.

The modifications to the rules and expectations of observers to the Arctic Council proved crucial to the admissions of the five Asian states (China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea) in May 2013. After a great deal of feverish speculation, China and the four others were admitted alongside one other applicant state, Italy. In so doing, the composition of state observers to the Arctic Council shifted away from its overwhelming European focus to embrace Asian states. Arguably, it consolidated this particular form of what we term triumphant geopolitics – as new observers actively acclaimed and recognised the sovereign rights of those Arctic states and Permanent Participants. It also acted to reaffirm the consensual qualities of the Arctic Council, as Arctic states agreed (despite opposition from Finland in particular) not to consider the contentious application of the European Union for observer status (Knecht 2017).

10.4 Challenging Militant and Triumphant Geopolitics

The preceding sections have highlighted how the Arctic Council's subscription to connivance diplomacy has ushered in a new form of triumphant geopolitics which has allowed for the reconciliation and reclamation of Arctic space and relations. But as Bernard Badie pointedly argues, the concentration of power within connivance diplomatic routes does not help necessarily produce international solidarity; rather, there are possibilities that feelings of humiliation and resentment and even violent politics may ensue, which in turn reduces the chances of existing problems/challenges being resolved (Badie 2017). However, drawing on Sara Koopman's idea of 'alter-geopolitics', we argue that such debilitating emotions and conflictual relations may not necessarily emerge out of interactions within the Arctic region (Koopman 2011). Indeed, in focusing on new proposals that challenge hegemonic geopolitics and create new geopolitics, alter-geopolitics helps to document already existing geopolitical practices that foster solidarity between peoples in different places for (peaceful) interventions against dominant power structures. The emphasis here then is on tracing and investigating the critical processes, actors and potentialities at a variety of scales. Hence, in what follows, we will highlight some of the ways in which existing militant and triumphant geopolitical practices and arrangements in the Arctic region are being contested and resisted by a variety of seemingly 'marginalised' groups and polities.

Specifically, it is our contention that Arctic states' connivance and their diplomatic characterisations of the Arctic (Council) as occupying a multiplicity of in-between positions enables other actors to carefully negotiate (and even exploit) these ambivalent spaces. The Arctic Council is inclusive yet exclusive, cooperative yet competitive and this works arguably to advance their own geopolitical agendas and projects in the region.

In April 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) issued an Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty. Created in 1979, the ICC is one of the permanent participants to the Arctic Council. ICC chair, Patricia Cochran was quoted as saying at the time that:

> Our declaration addresses some of these questions from the position of a people who know the Arctic intimately. We have lived here for thousands and thousands of years and by making this declaration, we are saying to those who want to use Inuit Nunaat for their own purposes, you must talk to us and respect our rights (ICC 2009).

The Declaration explicitly challenges and questions the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration by the A5 in Greenland. The ICC choose the Norwegian northern city of Tromsø to publicise the Inuit Declaration because Arctic Council foreign ministers were meeting at the same time – and thus they wanted to disrupt prior expressions of connivance.

Echoing Sara Koopman's 'alter-geopolitics', the 2009 Declaration – which was followed by a second in 2011 on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat (ICC 2011) – actively disrupts hegemonic meta-geographies of the Arctic. By reg-

istering their Declaration in not only other forms of international law (UNDRIP not UNCLOS) but also making explicit the ongoing negotiations at a nation to nation level, the ICC also offered a provocation to Arctic states in particular to engage in different forms of geopolitics, which are more attentive to memory, indigenous rights, and consultation. As the follow-up 2011 Declaration noted:

> 3.1 Resource development in *Inuit Nunaat* must be grounded in *A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic*, adopted by the Inuit Circumpolar Council in April 2009.
>
> 3.2 *A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* identified many principles that are relevant to the governance and carrying out of resource development in *Inuit Nunaat*, including the importance of the rule of law and recognition of the rights of Inuit as an Arctic indigenous people under both international and domestic law (ICC 2011, 3.1 and 3.2).

The declarations, on sovereignty and resource development, identify only too clearly the challenge facing indigenous peoples in the Arctic. As Gary Anderson noted in his book, *Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian*, the ideology of settler colonialism is rooted in the practice of removal (Anderson 2014). Indigenous peoples are well aware of how 'invaders' appropriate, remove and then justify their presence through ideologies of 'improvement' and 'stewardship'.

For over 500 years, white settlers have extracted Arctic resources from animal skins and pelts to timber and mineral-bearing rocks such as copper and uranium. When Arctic Ocean coastal states such as Canada and Denmark claim to act as environmental stewards, they do on the back of several centuries' worth of mapping and surveying, extraction and administrative policing of indigenous territories. In 2008, Prime Minister Harper even claimed that Canada had "no history of colonialism" (cited in Wherry 2009, no pagination). Extending their sovereign rights offshore, at the same time as promoting 'reconciliation' with indigenous peoples and First Nations, Arctic states such as Canada have been at the forefront of cementing a triumphant geopolitics – where indigenous peoples and their unresolved land claims and self-government agreements do not interfere with European settler sovereignty onshore and offshore. Reconciliation, therefore, gets rendered as indigenous peoples being told to reconcile themselves to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Canada (Kaye 2016). But the Inuit Declarations remind Canada and other Arctic states that reconciliation can mean something different altogether. Under land claims agreements, Inuit in northern Canada have rights to be consulted over offshore matters. In other words, Arctic states need to reconcile themselves to being partners and not sovereign agents in the maritime Arctic (Huebert 2017).

On a rather different register, the admittance of the five Asian states into the Arctic Council in 2013 has provoked some unexpected developments. While the Arctic states were able to come up with a shared list of rules for the Asian states to comply with in the Arctic Council through the Nuuk Criteria and the observer manual, they were not in full agreement about how the 'conduct of conduct' should develop in the region more broadly. For instance, there is no consensus around the often-discussed idea of the Arctic Council growing from its current 'decision-

shaping' status to a 'decision-making' body. On one hand, the US is committed to the Council remaining a 'forum' for coordination and has thus expressed little concerns about the composition of the observer membership. Canada and Russia, on the other hand, are worried that a greater number of Arctic Council participants, even in the capacity of observers, could make arriving at agreements more difficult and time-consuming, particularly if the desired goal of a strengthened mandate for the Council was to be achieved. Part of the problem here lies in the widespread scepticism imbued in the Arctic states' reception towards their Asian counterparts' forays into the region (Solli et al. 2013). Indeed, there are almost hints of 'Polar Orientalism' at work here whereby the 'true' intentions of Asian interventions in the Arctic are being questioned incessantly (Dodds and Nuttall 2016). This is most evident in the case of China whereby its 'rising' status has fuelled intense speculations about its hegemonic ambitions in the Arctic (Woon 2014). As one China Task Force report notes, "Unfavorable factors include the restrictions of the Arctic governance mechanisms on China's participation" (Zhang et al. 2015, p. 7).

Although the aforementioned account appears to suggest that Asian states' participation in Arctic affairs has reached an impasse, it must be pointed out that the actual situation on the ground provides a much more dynamic and complex picture. As alluded to earlier, the initiation of triumphant geopolitics in the Arctic is closely intertwined with a set of governing rules, regimes and boundaries. All of the Asian observers have underlined very explicitly that they respect the sovereignty of Arctic states and accepted the premises of international law in governing the region, particularly the UNCLOS (Jakobson and Lee 2013). And to further allay suspicions of their involvement in the Arctic, the Asian states have downplayed the geopolitical dimensions of their initiatives, whilst emphasising, in line with the Nuuk criteria, their capacity to contribute to scientific and environmental research in the region. This deference to the authority and priorities of the Arctic states does not mean that these Asian actors are passively accepting the dominant dictates of what they can or cannot do in the Arctic. Rather, in actively mobilising the tenets of recognised legal regimes in the Arctic region to pursue their ends, extra-territorial states such as China, Korea (and others such as the EU) have insisted that there are areas of the Arctic Ocean that are international waters and seabed likely to be classified as 'The Area' under UNCLOS and are thus of concern to the wider international community. Notably, from 2014 onwards, the A5 have had to embrace 5 extra-territorial parties in discussions about the future management of the central Arctic Ocean. Fishing negotiations (and in the future biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction) reveal another group of actors demanding that they should be consulted over future developments in the maritime Arctic. In this sense, the A5 are arguably paying the price for their triumphant form of Arctic geopolitics.

Additionally, some of the existing challenges that confront the Asian states within the Arctic Council forum have not stopped them from exploring their interests and options 'elsewhere'. Referring back to Koopman's radical concept of alter-geopolitics (Koopman 2011), new formations and solidarities can emerge to engage in new form of geopolitics that cannot be neatly captured and circumscribed by existing (dominant) institutional frameworks and structures. For example, Bennett

has usefully underscored how some Asian states namely Singapore and South Korea have been forging new alliances with Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council due to dissatisfaction with current structural arrangements (Bennett 2017). To finance these new partnerships to look into issues pertaining to the preservation of indigenous peoples' traditions, cultures and interests, a new Álgu Fund has been established since 2017, which aims to raise $30 million to support the Permanent Participants' involvement in Arctic Council activities. Crucially, this fund lies outside the purview of the Arctic Council and it gets away from the perennial challenge on relying on the individual discretion of Arctic states in providing monetary support for these indigenous groups (and their partners) to carry out various programs. Alternatively, the Asian observers have also begun more formally to discuss their Arctic interests amongst themselves. In April 2016, South Korea, China, and Japan participated in the First Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on the Arctic in Seoul (a similar dialogue session took place again in Tokyo in June 2017 and Shanghai in June 2018). During this momentous event, "The three HoDs [Heads of Delegations] discussed the guiding principles of the trilateral Arctic cooperation and shared the view that the three countries should continue their commitments of contribution to the Arctic Council and enhance their cooperation within various international fora. The three HoDs also explored the possibilities to cooperate in such areas as scientific research" (South Korea 2016). They made this commitment outside the auspices of the Arctic Council. One could imagine the discomfiture among the Arctic Council Member States if the Trilateral High-Level Dialogue were to invite the Permanent Participants. Hence, it can be argued that such an arrangement signifies the workings of a different kind of geopolitical project, a governance mechanism that bypasses and excludes the Arctic sovereign states altogether.

10.5 Conclusion

Triumphant geopolitics in the Arctic, we argue in this paper, pivots around *reconciliation* and *reclamation* on the one hand and on the other hand, *alter-geopolitics*. Reaction to the 2007 event provoked the five Arctic Ocean coastal states (A5) to reconcile their differences over the legal status of the central Arctic Ocean via the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. As part of their reconciliation process the Arctic states more generally invested considerably in consolidating the Arctic Council as a site of intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation – legally binding agreements were signed and a secretariat established. Finally, we note expressions of alter-geopolitics, epitomised through statements such as the 2009 Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, and ongoing negotiations involving extra-territorial parties over the central Arctic Ocean. In their different ways, indigenous peoples and extra-territorial parties have challenged the Arctic states' framings of the Arctic and posited alternative geopolitical imaginaries and relationships. While some have declared it to be indicative of a 'global Arctic', we offer a different optic to pursue the contested imaginaries, materialities and practices at play.

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Chapter 11
Fostering US-Russia Cooperation in the Arctic Through Disaster Diplomacy Efforts

Yekaterina Y. Kontar

Abstract Warming Arctic temperatures raise concerns about emerging disaster risks caused by the increasing levels of resource extraction, maritime shipping, and other development in the region. This chapter illustrates the role of disaster diplomacy in reducing risks and simultaneously fostering peace in the region through cooperation between US and Russian disaster experts. The analysis consisted of an in-depth review of historic and current bilateral cooperation agreements and joint agreements with other Arctic states, and case study analysis of individual US-Russia cooperative efforts in the Bering Strait. The analysis revealed that the two states are already engaged in disaster diplomacy efforts through the Arctic Council agreements. However, bilateral disaster-related collaborations in the Arctic had been ceased after the 2014 friction between Russia and the United States over the conflict in Ukraine and consequent geopolitical tensions in the lower latitudes. The paper illustrates that the mere signing of the Arctic Council binding agreements cannot ensure effective cooperation and coordination among Russia and the United States. To be effective, the agreements should also include cooperation measures that involve all relevant participants – scientists, disaster practitioners, Indigenous and local knowledge holders, policymakers, NGOs, and industry – from both sides. This chapter also illustrates continuous US-Russia cooperation, in spite of geopolitical tensions, as an Arctic Triumph. The ability of US and Russian disaster experts to pursue opportunities to collaborate on the mutual goal of disaster risk reduction and find solutions to common challenges in the times of restrictions on bilateral contacts is triumphant.

Keywords Disaster diplomacy · Disaster risk reduction · Russia · United States · Arctic Council

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11.1 Introduction

Since American independence, Russia and the United States have had a dynamic and multi-faceted diplomatic relationship. Over this period, the two states have competed for political and economic influence, but also often put their differences aside to jointly address global challenges. Even during the Cold War – the decades-long struggle for global supremacy marked by mutual distrust and propaganda, the US and Russia (then the Soviet Union) continued to cooperate. In fact, the grandest US-Russia cooperation to date, the *Apollo-Soyuz* Mission, took place during the midst of the Cold War in 1975. Bound by mutual scientific goals, such as space exploration, the two countries have continued to collaborate despite political barriers.

Scientific cooperation between Russia and the United States has been especially prominent in the Arctic. The two countries share a maritime border along the Bering Strait. They also share an interest in advancing economic development and preserving the environment on both sides of the strait. The cooperation has intensified in the last two decades, however stalled after the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, due to assumptions of climate change opening new shipping routes and facilitating access to oil and gas resources. New opportunities, however, pose additional challenges to the region, such as oil spills, ship wrecks and other disasters. Due to climate change, the characteristics of climatological and hydrological hazards are also rapidly changing in the Arctic.

The primary goal of this chapter is to illustrate the role of disaster-related science diplomacy (hereinafter disaster diplomacy) in reducing disaster risks in the US and Russian Arctic while simultaneously fostering peace in the region through disaster-relevant expert cooperation. The chapter elaborates on the importance and challenges of disaster risk reduction in the high latitudes, introduces key concepts of disaster diplomacy, provides examples of the existing US-Russia disaster diplomacy efforts, and suggests strategies to foster these opportunities and create new ones.

The current tensions between Russia and the United States over the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the imposition of sanctions on Russia, and accusations of Putin's administration in the hacking of the US 2016 presidential election have led to bilateral tension worse than it has been since the Cold War. Yet, the Arctic remains a place of peace. Bound by the mutual goal to advance Arctic development, while anticipating and reducing risks, Russia and the United States continue to cooperate. This chapter illustrates continuous US-Russia cooperation, in spite of geopolitical tensions, as an Arctic Triumph. The ability of US and Russian disaster experts to pursue opportunities to collaborate on the mutual goal of disaster risk reduction and find solutions to common challenges in the times of restrictions on bilateral contacts is triumphant.

11.2 Disaster Risk Reduction in the Arctic

Disaster risk reduction is a relatively new concept in disaster-related research and management. It entails the development and application of policies and practices to lessen, or ideally eliminate, a population's vulnerability to disasters (UNISDR 2017). It incorporates disaster preparedness, mitigation, and prevention within the broad context of a community's sustainable development (see also Duda & Kelman in this volume).

A large number of academic disciplines – including but not limited to geography, ecology, economics, psychology, anthropology, and political science – have applied their concepts to various aspects of disaster risk reduction. Thus, no universally accepted definitions of the key concepts yet exist. This paper draws heavily on the vocabulary produced by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) in 2017 due to its mass acceptance among academics as well as practitioners and policymakers, but also incorporates other commonly accepted definitions. Thus, *risk* is defined in this chapter as the likelihood of a specific hazard occurring and resulting in loss, injuries, damage and destruction to vulnerable individuals or communities (Wisner et al. 2012; UNISDR 2017). *Hazard* is "a physical phenomenon, technological incident, or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation" (UNISDR 2017, no pagination). *Vulnerability* represents the characteristics of an individual or a group and circumstances that influence their capacity to anticipate, resist, and recover from the adverse impacts of hazards (Wisner et al. 2012; UNISDR 2017). Vulnerability is the result of the range of economic, political, institutional, social, and psychological factors and processes that shape communities.

The underlying idea behind disaster risk reduction is to proactively manage disaster risk to minimise and ideally prevent its adverse impacts, as opposed to reacting to the disaster crisis (UNISDR 2017). The benefits of a more proactive disaster management approach are especially evident in high latitudes, where disaster response is challenged by the region's geographical and climatological features. Brutal weather, vast distances, limited physical and communication infrastructure, and seasonal lack of daylight pose significant obstacles to emergency response in the Arctic (Kontar et al. 2018b).

Inadequate risk assessment and emergency training further complicate disaster response in many parts of the North (Kontar et al. 2018b). Disaster practitioners' reports from Alaska (USA), for instance, have repeatedly indicated many complications and delays during disaster relief operations. In most cases, federal assistance is crucial, but rarely timely. Major emergency responses (i.e., national disaster responses) are launched from the southern hubs in lower latitudes, which are relatively long distances away from the impacted communities. Responders from the south are often unfamiliar with the geographic area, as well as the unique logistical

and cultural features of the North. Moreover, processes used to trigger federal assistance vary between jurisdictions, creating additional complications and delays in disaster relief (McCarthy 2010).

Furthermore, future climate projection reports suggest there will be rapid changes in the frequency and intensity of some climatological and hydrological disasters (IPCC 2014; NAS 2016). Considering everything mentioned above, not investing in risk reduction in the Arctic and continuing to rely predominantly on disaster response and crisis management will ultimately put many northern peoples and communities in the United States and Russia at risk.

As stated above, disaster risk results from the complex interactions between a series of physical processes and human activities that generate conditions of hazard and vulnerability. Thus, reducing disaster risk requires accurate identification and assessment of hazard and vulnerability, which is possible only through interdisciplinary research. Interagency collaboration also needs to be established and fostered to ensure the allocation of the necessary resources and appointment of the appropriate institutions to develop, implement, and analyse disaster risk reduction policies. Drivers and impacts of disasters often cross geopolitical borders, requiring international cooperation in prevention, monitoring, and response (Kontar et al. 2018a). Disaster risk reduction efforts in the US and Russian Arctic benefit critically from drawing on experiences and identifying best practices among bilateral experts.

Through bilateral expert cooperation, disaster diplomacy provides opportunities to improve disaster risk reduction in the region, while simultaneously fostering peace between Russia and the United States.

11.3 Disaster Diplomacy: Key Concepts, Opportunities, and Challenges

Disaster diplomacy (as used here) entails collaborations among disaster experts from various relevant disciplines and practices to address mutual challenges in disaster risk reduction and crisis management, while simultaneously building and fostering cooperation and peace between states where relations could otherwise be strained (i.e., Russia and the United States) (Kelman 2012; Kontar et al. 2018a).

Disaster diplomacy takes many forms as it can originate on inter-national, intra-national, and sub-national levels. It can also arise during any of disaster-related activities including prevention, preparedness, disaster risk reduction, response, recovery, and reconstruction (Kontar et al. 2018a). Examples of disaster diplomacy in academic literature, practitioners' reports, and media are plentiful, with the prominent case studies featured on www.disasterdiplomacy.org.

The case studies reveal a series of potential benefits disaster diplomacy could bring to American and Russian disaster experts and diplomats alike. For example, bilateral disaster-related expert collaborations can help to reduce research costs, and provide access to valuable additional expertise, thus helping to avoid duplication of

efforts. Peer-to-peer efforts also have a potential to result in more thorough and coherent risk assessments that would lead to better-informed decision-making relevant to the sustainable development in the region. Other objectives of disaster diplomacy include generating new knowledge through both short-term and long-term collaborative research, gaining access to knowledge, materials, and techniques not otherwise available, and making progress in fields in which the other state has superior standing. Disaster diplomacy endeavours are also beneficial to diplomacy, as they provide a positive rationale for maintaining cooperation even in the face of disagreements on other issues. The increased peer-to-peer dialogue could also help foster greater contacts and improve understanding and trust between US and Russian populations.

Despite its potential benefits, disaster diplomacy faces significant barriers. Case studies reveal politics as key barrier to effective disaster diplomacy (Kelman 2012). Leadership change, long-existing prejudices and distrust, and belief that historical conflicts trump advances in disaster risk reduction are few of the examples of political incentives to disregard and scuttle disaster diplomacy opportunities. A nation's foreign policies, such as travel or visa restrictions, the ability to freely meet in third-party countries, can significantly hinder disaster diplomacy efforts.

Barriers to effective disaster diplomacy also arise from the lack of clarity of the partners' goals and motivations (Kontar et al. 2018a). In the midst of cooperation, scientists in less powerful partner-countries can find themselves placed in the role of field assistants or technicians rather than peers and, in extreme cases, do not even share in authorship of professional publications resulting from those scientific endeavours (Mäki 2013). Such lack of reciprocity frequently originates due to an economic imbalance when scientists in the richer state may be enthusiastic about examining a problem in their counterpart state, whose scientists have no means of their own to reciprocate (Kontar et al. 2018a). In this scenario, the scientific and diplomatic value of the peer-to-peer collaboration is diminished and can even lead to tension.

The case studies also reveal that for disaster diplomacy efforts to be effective, they should be incorporated into the nation's foreign policy agenda (Kontar et al. 2018a). Individual peer-to-peer collaborative efforts might advance scientific discovery and practical knowledge relevant to risk reduction and crisis management and foster rapport between individuals and small groups from the opposing states, but have insignificant impacts on détente.

11.4 US-Russia Disaster Diplomacy Efforts in the Arctic

Due to climate change, Russia and the United States face rapid changes in the frequency and severity of hazards in the Arctic (IPCC 2014; NAS 2016). Decreasing Arctic sea ice is assumed to provide both states with more opportunities to enable the exploitation of hydrocarbons and minerals (Arctic Council 2009). The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that the Arctic holds as much as 13% of

the world's undiscovered oil, and 30% of the word's undiscovered natural gas (Gautier et al. 2009). Most of these reserves are located in increasingly accessible offshore waters. Increased resource extraction poses an amplified risk of oil spills and other environmental contamination. Currently, neither Russia nor US is adequately equipped to deal with a large oil spill or another significant ecological disaster in the Arctic region (Sharp 2011).

The depletion of Arctic sea ice also assumed to facilitate increases in cruise-ship tourism and greater access to maritime shipping. As the ice-bound Arctic waters open up more and remain ice-free for longer periods each year, the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route are seen to become viable alternatives to the existing shipping routes (Sharp 2011). Although the increase in maritime tourism and shipping provides great financial opportunities, they might also raise a concern about the ability of both states to coordinate mass search-and-rescue operations in timely and efficient manner if a large ship had an emergency.

As the potential for technological and environmental risks in the Arctic has begun to increase, risk reduction is a strong incentive for Russia and the United States to cooperate. Opportunities for joint disaster-related research cooperation are especially plentiful. As mentioned above, disasters result from the complex interactions between a series of physical processes that generate conditions of hazard and human activities that generate conditions of vulnerability. Transdisciplinary research, which combines scientific analysis with non-academic expertise from disaster practitioners as well as local and Indigenous knowledge holders, is vital in accurately assessing the physical, social, economic, and political drivers of disasters. Through the bilateral cooperation, US and Russian (non)academic experts in the fields ranging from geophysics to economics, could advance their knowledge of the existing and potential disaster risk drivers and impacts – and how to address those risks.

Foreseeing the numerous benefits of disaster-related collaboration, the two states have initiated a series of bilateral collaborations, that have been stalled in the last four years, as well as joined pan-Arctic partnerships aimed at reducing disaster risks and improving crisis management. Via their active involvement with the Arctic Council – an intergovernmental forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the eight Arctic countries, Russia and the United States are cooperating on enhancing joint research efforts and improving search-and-rescue and oil spill response coordination (Arctic Council n.d.; Arctic Council 2011; Arctic Council 2013).

Understanding the myriad of benefits of the joint research efforts, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation was concluded under the auspices of the Arctic Council, and signed by the foreign ministers of all Arctic states including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the then-US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (Arctic Council 2017). The Agreement aims to help facilitate inclusive disaster-related research through the following objectives: (1) facilitation of entry and exit of experts and their equipment, (2) facilitation of access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, (3) encouragement of the Indigenous and traditional knowledge in disaster risk assessment, and (4) advancement of education, career development, and training opportunities for students and early-career

scientists (Arctic Council 2017; see also Shibata forthcoming). Although encouraging scientific cooperation in the Arctic between Russia, the United States and other Western states, the Agreement does not identify specific avenues necessary to facilitate such efforts. As a result, US-Russia joint scientific efforts continue to face political barriers, such as travel and funding restrictions (e.g., Kintisch 2015; Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017).

In 2011, also under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Agreement) in the Arctic was adopted (Arctic Council 2011). Russia and the United States signed the agreement along with the other Arctic states, compelling the two countries to pursue increased cooperation in establishing search-and-rescue interoperability in Arctic waters. The cooperation has been taking place predominantly in the form of joint tabletop and live full-scale exercises to build contacts between both states' maritime forces (e.g., the US and Russian coastguard) and reduce risk in future emergency situations (Sydnes et al. 2017). Tabletop search-and-rescue exercises (e.g., SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and 2013, Arctic Zephyr 2015 and Arctic Chinook 2016) are perfect examples of disaster diplomacy, as they help build trust and reciprocal relationships between US and Russian disaster experts, identify challenges in the existing national, bi- and multi-lateral risk reduction strategies, and advance disaster preparedness and response.

For example, the SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 – the first full-scale live search-and-rescue exercise conducted under the Arctic Council SAR Agreement — revealed that the Arctic SAR regime as an emergency response system needed to improve its procedures for cooperation and communication and establish a common understanding on how to apply them (Arctic Council 2016). The exercise also revealed other challenges, such as the lack of adequate planning and trained personnel for evacuation operations, coordination problems among emergency medical units, and malfunctions of crisis communication at various levels. The joint exercise report provided a series of detailed recommendations for the different phases of the search-and-rescue operations (Arctic Council 2016).

The SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was conducted only a year later to address the challenges identified by its predecessor. The exercise resulted in a series of joint recommendations on search-and-rescue operations, including enhancement of communication, use of common log system, and strengthening the manning of the Joint Arctic Command (SAREX Greenland Sea Report 2013).

The Arctic Zephyr 2015 was a tabletop exercise conducted to test command and control, and coordination among the Arctic nations' relevant stakeholders at various levels during a mass rescue operation (Coast Gard News 2015). The exercise revealed challenges with communication channels, targeted messages, and media, as well as situational awareness, resources, logistical support, and coordination and planning (Sydnes et al. 2017).

Although the exercises mentioned above have been conducted with participants from all Arctic states, rather than solely among US and Russian counterparts, currently they provide the only opportunity to foster US-Russian cooperation in the Arctic waters. Bilateral search-and-rescue exercises and other disaster-related

cooperation have been stalled in the last four years as a result of US sanctions and restrictions on bilateral contacts after the Russian involvement in the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution.

Another disaster diplomacy example in the Arctic is states' cooperation on oil spill prevention and response. In 2013, Russia and the United States signed the Arctic Council's Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (OSR Agreement), which binds the two states to "promote cooperation and coordination by endeavoring to carry out joint exercises and training, including alerting or call-out exercises, table-top exercises, equipment deployment exercises, and other relevant activities" (Arctic Council 2013). The agreement encourages also US and Russian disaster response groups to build trust by exchanging best practices and technologies in oil spill prevention and response.

Unlike the SAR Agreement, the OSR Agreement was built on the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements between Arctic states (Arctic Council 2013). For example, the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Government of the United States of America concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations was signed at the very end of the Cold War in May 1989, eight years before the establishment of the Arctic Council. According to the Agreement, both states agree to provide assistance to each other in combatting pollution incidents that may affect the areas of responsibility of the parties, regardless of where such incidents may occur (USCG n.d.).

The Joint Contingency Plan against Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas (1997) was originally created with the agreement and was updated in 1997 to change USSR to the Russian Federation and include the proper competent national authorities after the fall of the Soviet Union. The contingency plan is based on three elements – planning, coordination of joint response, and communication — and calls for tabletop exercises to be conducted every two years and meetings of the joint response team to be held at least every 18 months (USCG n.d.). No bilateral exercises have been conducted since 2014 due to the restrictions of bilateral contacts (Sydnes et al. 2017).

Yet, US-Russia cooperation on pollution preparedness and response in the Bering Strait is becoming more crucial as it turns into an area of amplified risk. The database on *Locations of sub-Arctic and Arctic shipping accidents and incident causes, 1995–2004* by the Arctic Council demonstrates that almost a third of the Arctic marine accidents, such as fuel spills, occur in the Bering Sea (Arctic Council 2009). These incidents are more likely to result in fatalities and severe environmental damage. As warming temperatures continue to accelerate sea ice decrease and levels of human activities in the region, these risks are also more likely to increase and spread north into the Bering Strait (McKenzie et al. 2016).

The Bering Strait is a critical marine habitat, which supports Indigenous peoples with subsistence lifestyles along the US and Russian northern shores. This ecosystem is forced to co-exist with increasing maritime activity in a region that is largely devoid of the infrastructure needed to support the rapidly increasing development (McKenzie et al. 2016). A large oil spill would be devastating to both Russia and the

United States, as it could destroy this fragile habitat thus impacting numerous communities on the both sides of the strait. Moreover, oil spill response and clean-up operations are immensely expensive, as proven by the 1989 *Exxon Valdez* disaster, which amounted to $6.8 billion (Cohen, 2010). An oil spill response would also be further complicated in an environment that is either completely or partially covered by ice. Thus, it is critical for the wellbeing of the populations on the both sides of the strait that US-Russia cooperation on oil pollution preparedness and response and other environmental disaster in the Bering Strait is reinstated despite the sanctions.

The examples above demonstrate that existing international agreements, such as the Arctic Council binding agreements, are necessary but not sufficient to foster US-Russia cooperation in the Arctic. Additional bilateral agreements are necessary to foster resilience and peace in the region. To be effective, the agreements must address specific disaster cooperation efforts, list all key stakeholder groups from each state along with their responsibilities, and relevant operational measures. A key goal of the bilateral agreements is to foster continuous communication between disaster experts in the United States and Russia along with data and information sharing as these elements are critical to research and operational cost effectiveness.

Overall, there are numerous opportunities for disaster diplomacy between the United States and Russia in the Arctic. Additional opportunities arise from joint education ventures, facilitated through individual universities and through the University of the Arctic – an international cooperative network based in the Circumpolar Arctic region, consisting of over 170 higher education and research institutions with an interest in promoting education and research in the Arctic region (UArctic n.d.). The Fulbright Arctic Initiative also provides opportunities for bilateral and interdisciplinary disaster-related research, as the program encourages unique science, policy and diplomacy collaboration (Fulbright n.d.).

Despite the restrictions on bilateral contacts, multiple entry points for US and Russian disaster researchers and practitioners still exist to engage in disaster diplomacy through established international and Pan-Arctic consortiums and collaborations. To advance disaster diplomacy in the Arctic, it is vital for US and Russian scientists to make active efforts to develop policy-relevant research programs in their Arctic studies, with research questions informed by pressing disaster-related questions, with interdisciplinary teams. Scientists should also not develop the research program in isolation but consult with a diversity of Arctic stakeholders beyond academia, potentially including Indigenous leaders and knowledge holders, government leaders, NGOs, industry, and international relations interests.

11.5 Conclusion and Recommendations

Disaster diplomacy provides a myriad of opportunities for the United States and Russia to advance their disaster-related research and management, and foster peace in the Arctic.

With the possibility of ice-free summers in the near future, Russia and the United States face new development and financial opportunities associated with increased access to resources, and maritime shipping and tourism. These opportunities, however, also pose a great potential for significant disasters. Proactive strategies to reduce or ideally eliminate risks are vital in facilitating sustainable development in the US and Russian Arctic.

The two states are already engaged in disaster diplomacy efforts through the Arctic Council agreements. Although these efforts are valuable, additional bilateral disaster-related cooperation is necessary to ensure that both Russia and the United States are well prepared to face emerging risks. The paper illustrates that the mere signing of the Arctic Council binding agreements cannot ensure effective cooperation and coordination among Russia and the United States, especially in the times of intense bilateral tensions. These agreements must be strengthened by institutionalising processes through the Arctic Council working groups. To be effective, the agreements should also include cooperation measures that involve all relevant participants, including scientists, disaster practitioners, Indigenous and local knowledge holders, policymakers, NGOs, and industry.

The key recommendation is to decouple the Arctic from other aspects of the US and Russian bilateral relationship. Bilateral tensions in the lower latitudes have posed barriers, such as sanctions and travel restrictions, to effective risk reduction efforts in the Arctic region. Neither state has the ability to affectively respond to a major disaster in the Bering Strait Region. At the same time, the possibility of amplified disaster risk in the region is alarming.

Another recommendation is to increase bilateral collaboration on non-maritime disasters. The two states share numerous risk of inland disasters, ranging from springtime floods and avalanches to wildfires and earthquakes. Both states would benefit from disaster diplomacy efforts in the Arctic by expanding their scientific expertise on diverse disasters, reducing disaster risks, and demonstrating international leadership through diplomacy.

The United States and Russia have a shared interest in safe economic development, environmental protection, and increased security in the Arctic Region. The most effective way to accomplish these goals is through disaster diplomacy – a cooperative, bilateral approach, which leverages the strengths and resources of both nations.

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