Chapter 9
Change and Continuity Among the Priorities of the Arctic Council's Permanent Participants

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Abstract Indigenous peoples' organizations provide leadership in the Arctic Council and augment leadership by Chairs and Member States. How have the priorities of the Arctic Council's Permanent Participants changed over time? How have their priorities stayed the same? How do they differ from the priorities of Member States and the Chairs of the institutions? How do the Permanent Participants provide leadership, and clash with leadership in the institution? These major questions frame the analysis in this chapter. The Arctic Council is the region's most important international forum, allowing a leadership role for all Arctic states and Indigenous peoples' organizations. It is unique in that it presents Indigenous peoples' organizations a form of membership in the institution. They are termed Permanent Participants, signifying that their participation is not subject to the whims of states. In the two decades that the Council has contributed to Arctic regional governance, Member States and Permanent Participants have worked together in a number of ways. This analysis measures the priorities of the Permanent Participants by examining their sponsorship and contributions to Council projects, accomplished through textual and statistical accounting of reports by Senior Arctic Officials. This work reveals that Permanent Participants are more likely to support local community priorities than are Member States.

Keywords Arctic Council · Indigenous peoples · Non-state actors · Permanent participants · Global governance

The leadership of the Arctic Council flows from its Member States and the Chairs of the body, as is the case in most international institutions. Yet, it is unique because it gives a group of non-state actors a state-like status, specifically Indigenous peoples' organizations. These actors contribute leadership in ways non-state actors cannot in other international institutions. They often work together with the Chairs of

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the institution, but sometimes clash over differences of priorities. To understand leadership in the Council, we must examine this situation.

As an international forum for all eight countries located at least partly in the Arctic region, the Arctic Council is similar in some ways to international institutions such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian States or the European Union. Yet, in other ways, it is very different. The Arctic Council is the only international institution in which non-state actors, namely Indigenous peoples' organizations, has a form of membership (Gwich'in Council International 2018). These organizations are termed Permanent Participants in institutional parlance, and so this chapter refers to Indigenous peoples' organizations in this way. Beyond this distinction, there is no formal treaty establishing the role of the Arctic Council like the European Union's 1992 *Maastricht Treaty*. Further, the Council encourages co-operation among members in a somewhat narrow set of areas – no currency policy or free trade, but environmental protection and sustainable development. Unlike other international bodies, it has only recently facilitated the creation of formal multilateral agreements. It mostly develops assessments, expedites information sharing about the region and serves as a venue to create technical environmental projects (Fenge 2012).

In other international institutions, states must approve work by non-state actors and can block them from attending meetings. In the Arctic Council, Permanent Participants can sponsor projects, initiate work and represent the views of their constituents in any discussion. However, they are not equal to states because Permanent Participants cannot vote on Council decisions. Only a consensus among state delegations is necessary to carry out an action. Similarly, only Member States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) take turns chairing the Council. Permanent Participants operate with small delegations of part-time employees as opposed to large state bureaucracies. This chapter explores the leadership provided by these unique actors and their response to the leadership efforts of the Chair.

This chapter answers four research questions. How have the priorities of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants changed over time? How have their priorities stayed the same? How do they differ from the priorities of Member States and the Chairs of the institution? When do the Permanent Participants provide leadership, and when do they clash with leadership in the institution? Six Indigenous peoples' organizations – the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), the Gwich'in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council (SC) – are Permanent Participants within the Arctic Council. They represent more than 650,000 Indigenous peoples from seven of the eight Arctic countries – all save Iceland. Their role is significant because it represents a rare instance in global governance in which states recognize that Indigenous peoples (or residents of a particular region in general) should have a formal role in leadership and decision-making at the international level. In a small way, it is a step toward the democratization of international decision-making

(a concept discussed by Michael Zürn 2000). As noted, Permanent Participants and Member States have frequently worked together since the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996. Yet, conflicts have emerged. Permanent Participants have complained that they have to rely on non-guaranteed funding from governments to attend Council meetings in far-flung Northern locales. The future of the Arctic Council might involve Permanent Participants taking turns as Chairs, as Member States do now. They lack the same staffing levels as the Arctic Eight. Despite inadequate staffing levels, they have served as Chairs of the body's Working Groups and led projects successfully.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. The first two sections describe literature about the Council and Permanent Participants, as well as the method employed in this analysis. The third section shares the results of the analysis, while the fourth section explicitly links these to the overall themes of this volume. The fifth addresses the significance of the results with respect to the initial research questions. This inquiry examines the priorities of Permanent Participants by categorizing the several Council projects and initiatives they sponsored and then compares these to the projects sponsored by Member States. Overall, this chapter concludes that Permanent Participants are more likely to support Arctic local community priorities than are Member States (i.e., those projects that specifically support development in Arctic communities, as opposed to national-level goals).

Together, the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council represent more than forty unique Indigenous peoples. Two domestic groups that act for Aleutian people in the United States and Alaska formed the Aleutian International Association in 1998, which was 2 years after the Arctic Council came into being (Aleutian International Association 2018). Aleutian people live on islands off the coast of Alaska and through the Bering Sea area. The Arctic Athabaskan Council came together in 2000 as a result of a treaty signed by seven domestic Indigenous organizations and governments representing seventy-six Athabaskan communities in Alaska, Northwest Territories and Yukon (Arctic Athabaskan Council 2018). The Gwich'in Tribal Council formed the Gwich'in Council International in 1999 to advocate for Gwich'in peoples in Alaska, Northwest Territories and Yukon (Arctic Council 2015a).

The other three Permanent Participants are much older, predating the Arctic Council itself. Inuit activists founded the Inuit Circumpolar Council to advocate for the rights of Inuit peoples at the international level in 1977 (Inuit Circumpolar Council 2018). The Inuit traditionally live in current day Alaska, Greenland, Labrador, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Quebec and Chukotka, Russia. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North came together in 1990 as an umbrella organization for thirty-five domestic Indigenous organizations representing forty-one different Indigenous groups within the Russian Federation. (Arctic Council 2016). The oldest group is the Saami Council, which activists founded in 1956 to reflect the aspirations of the Saami peoples of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden (Saami Council 2018). It is tempting to look at Permanent Participants as one monolith, but it is important to acknowledge they have distinct cultures,

Table 9.1 Permanent Participant Organizations

Organization	Year founded	Year joined Arctic Council
Saami Council	1956	1996
Inuit Circumpolar Council	1977	1996
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North	1990	1996
Aleutian International Association	1998	1998
Gwich'in Council International	1999	1999
Arctic Athabaskan Council	2000	2000

economies, languages, territories and traditions. These groups share many interests, too, and often work together in Arctic Council activities by developing joint priorities and leveraging their combined influence to achieve goals (Table 9.1).

9.1 Why Focus on Permanent Participants?

The priorities of Permanent Participants are worthy of study because it allows an opportunity to examine the leadership role of non-state actors when they have formal power in an international institution led by state Chairs. As earlier mentioned, the Arctic Council is the only international institution in which a non-state actor possesses guaranteed influence. Most scholarly work on this topic examines how non-state actors influence states outside of formal power arrangements through "information gathering, standard setting and behaviour modification" (for example, work by Bridget Hutter 2006, p. 1). Essentially, non-state actors provide useful information that alert states to a problems they must address. They help to define state interests, or create norms that restrain state behaviour. Permanent Participants can do all of these things, but they also have the authority to design Arctic Council work and participate in formal negotiations. This unique power begs scholarly attention.

Previous academic work views the priorities of the Permanent Participants as different from states to some extent. Most researchers who study the Council, including Terry Fenge (2012), Olav Schram Stokke (2007a, b) and Oran Young (2005), see the Council as a state-centric institution. Based on the fact Permanent Participants lack voting rights, it is difficult to disagree with this fact. Yet at the onset of the Council, several news articles predicted that Permanent Participants would have significant state-like power in the institution (Schneider 1996 and Rosborou 1996). However, some such as Jennifer McIver (1997) warned that, "Excluding Indigenous peoples from holding equal status in the Arctic Council is a short-sighted approach to environmental management of the Northern region" (p. 147). Much literature since emphasizes the role of states in the Arctic Council and debates the impact of Permanent Participants on institutional outcomes.[1]

[1] Such as works by English, Fenge, and Koivurova cited in this section.

Various scholarly works have argued that Permanent Participants contribute ideas and priorities that are different from those put forward by Member States. Evan Bloom (1999) writes that these groups "participate in all aspects of the Council's work" (p. 712). Timo Koivurova (2010) says these groups have "contributed to a new way of perceiving how Indigenous peoples should be involved in international policy making" (p. 153). John English (2013) says that the structure of the Arctic Council itself reflects "lobbying and pressure" by Indigenous peoples (p. 176). Yet, these same academics note major challenges with which Permanent Participants must contend. Andrea Charron (2012) notes that Permanent Participants "are often dependent on Arctic states for a variety of sources of funding" (p. 772). Former Yukon Premier Tony Penikett (2017) says that the Council does a good thing by including the voices of Indigenous peoples, but should do the same for "settlers," or non-Indigenous Arctic residents (p. 24). Current literature views Permanent Participant priorities as unique; what makes these priorities unique is not always clear.

This chapter contributes new insights into Permanent Participant priorities and contributions. When allowed, non-state actors contribute within the limits of institutional norms to represent the unique interests of their constituents. Page Wilson (2016) writes that Permanent Participants support a vision of the Arctic Council as a regional steward, as opposed to an institution that must resolve conflicts. She carries out an analysis of key Council documents, events and rhetoric. The present chapter seeks to contribute to this analysis by analyzing and categorizing all of the Council's projects to determine patterns across time. It also contributes a new insight regarding the behaviour of non-state actors in formal positions of power. It suggests that the Arctic Council is a state-centric institution that gives Permanent Participants the ability to represent the interests of local communities.

9.2 Methods Utilized

The method employed in this chapter to examine Permanent Participant priorities is a descriptive statistical analysis of all Council projects. All Arctic Council projects were manually reviewed and numerically divided into categories corresponding to different priorities. At the same time, the process identified which states and Permanent Participants sponsored the various projects. The Arctic Council divides its work into projects, led by state or organization sponsors. Examples of projects include environmental assessments, international agreements, emergency response simulations, action plans and information exchanges. Identifying which Member States and Permanent Participants championed projects corresponding to these various categories reveals differences in emphasis or support. All projects were divided into seven thematic categories based on the key priority of each initiative: contaminants, conservation of living resources, environmental threats, human health, sustainable livelihoods and communities, infrastructure and economic development. The categories come from an articulation of the institution's long-term

priorities found in a news release from 1999 (Arctic Council 1999). This document is the earliest articulation of the Council's priorities beyond the broad categories of environmental protection or sustainable development (found in the 1996 *Ottawa Declaration* and 1998 *Iqaluit Declaration*) (Arctic Council 1996, 1998). Using descriptive statistics allows a methodical comparison of the activities of various actors. The data, or information on Council priorities and projects, come from bi-annual reports by Senior Arctic Officials.[2] There are advantages and disadvantages of this data source, relating to the accuracy and thoroughness of these reports. It is sometimes necessary to make judgement calls as to which project belongs in which category.

Three expectations guide this analysis. First, Permanent Participant groups represent northern residents who often face serious human security challenges and fundamental development issues, such as inadequate access to health services, affordable food and quality education. For example, in 2011, just 41% of Canadian Inuit aged 25 to 24 had graduated high school (Statistics Canada 2016a). Meanwhile, about 87% of Canada's overall population has a high school diploma (Statistics Canada 2016b). As noted earlier, a major purpose of Indigenous peoples' organizations is to represent the interests of local communities. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that Permanent Participant groups support more Council projects that serve community priorities, namely human health, sustainable livelihoods and communities, infrastructure and economic development.

The second expectation is that Member States tend to respond to national- level priorities and must represent non-Arctic peoples. All of the Arctic governments, at some point, have acknowledged that climate change is a profound global public policy challenge. A consensus within the literature is that Permanent Participants represent more local priorities in the Arctic Council. Thus, we can expect some contrast with the priorities of the Member States. It is reasonable to expect that Member States will more readily support Council projects that serve broad national interest, namely the environmental priorities of contaminants, conservation of living resources and environmental threats. Of course, environmental issues also are of local significance. Yet, all of these concerns relate directly to climate change, which is an international issue, as much as a local issue.

The third expectation is that, with such divisions of interests, Permanent Participants and Member States may clash frequently in the Council. Each actor represents somewhat difference constituencies with their own distinctive priorities. Logically, these contrasting interests would come into conflict from time to time. Working with limited funds, one might expect Permanent Participants would champion projects for local communities, while Member States would seek to support

[2] As noted elsewhere in this volume, each Council member-state takes a two year turn chairing the institution. A Senior Arctic Official, who is generally an experienced state diplomat, leads the activity of each state delegation during this time. At the end of each national turn as Chair, the Senior Arctic Officials oversee the completion of a report detailing the Council's work over the last two years, including the projects initiated or completed, as well as which states and Permanent Participants sponsored which projects. Information comes from nine of these reports (Arctic Council 2000, 2002; 2004a, b; 2006; 2009; 2011; 2013; 2015b and 2017a, b).

national projects that will win the support of citizens outside of the Arctic. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that Permanent Participants and Member States might come into conflict over these local versus national priorities.

In which ways do some categories represent Arctic local community priorities and other categories represent national environmental priorities? Community priorities are those projects with the aim of helping Arctic residents in the areas of human health, sustainable livelihood and communities, infrastructure and economic development. These are different from the institutional community priorities at the Arctic Council that tend to serve national-level interests. Environmental priorities are those projects that benefit people beyond the Arctic in the categories of contaminants, conservation and environmental threats. This division is imperfect; certainly, environmental projects benefit local communities and projects that focus on small communities can contribute to national prosperity. Environmental priorities, such as climate change assessments, have local, national and global consequences. Yet, community priority projects more directly benefit Arctic communities, such as projects curing disease, increasing mental health resources in the North, building roads and protecting small-scale economic resources in the Arctic.

9.3 What Do We Find?

Permanent Participants contribute leadership to the Council by bringing forward their own priorities, distinct from Chairs or Member States. In this regard, we are interested in the following questions: How have the priorities of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants changed over time? How have their priorities stayed the same? Projects by the Permanent Participants have changed in that they more frequently concern Arctic community priorities today (i.e., projects that support development in local communities), but have stayed the same because national environmental priorities also loom large in their interests. As well, community projects have always been a priority for Permanent Participants to some extent.

Early in the history of the Arctic Council, the majority of the projects championed by Permanent Participants concerned local community priorities (nine out of thirteen projects). Examples include a Saami Council project on best practices for coastal fishery management (economic development) or an Inuit Circumpolar Council/Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North project on recommendations to reduce toxic substances in the North (human health). Then, between 2006 and 2011, the majority of Permanent Participant projects had to do with environmental priorities (eight out of ten projects). An example is co-sponsorship of the development of an ecosystems management approach by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. In the last five years, the majority of Permanent Participant projects have been in the area of local community priorities (eighteen out of twenty-seven projects). An example is an Inuit Circumpolar Council project on cataloguing resources to promote mental health in northern communities. Permanent Participants have sponsored or co-sponsored more projects in categories to do with local community priorities (thirty versus twenty-three), representing

Table 9.2 Categorized Sponsorship by Permanent Participants, 2000–2017

SAO report	Total projects sponsored	Environmental priorities (contaminants, conservation, environmental threats)	Community priorities (human health, sustainable livelihood and communities, infrastructure, economic development)
2000	3	0	3
2002	5	2	3
2004	5	2	3
2006	5	4	1
2009	4	3	1
2011	1	1	0
2013	3	2	1
2015	11	3	8
2017	16	6	10

continuity over time. Table 9.2 breaks down the project sponsorship or co-sponsorship by Permanent Participants since 2000.

The reasons for why the priorities of the Permanent Participants shifted between 2006 and 2013 is due to an increased overall focus on climate change in the Arctic Council. In 2004, Council states released the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,* which was, to that point, the most significant project undertaken by the Council. The assessment report on climate change was initiated by the United States compiled by 24 authors and spread across more than 1000 pages. Researchers found many alarming facts, perhaps most famously that the extent of summer sea ice has fallen 20% since 1974 (Arctic Council 2004a, b, p. 10). It, along with assessments from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, helped bring climate change to the forefront.[3]

The success of the Arctic Council in this area led to follow-up projects focused squarely on environmental protection, such as the 2009 *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment,* 2011 *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment,* and the 2013 *Arctic Biodiversity Assessment.* The environmental work of the Permanent Participants during this time was part of this trend of work inspired by climate change. For example, in 2013, the Aleut International Association co-sponsored the *Baseline Study on Contaminant Issues in Indigenous Communities to Identify Priorities* with Russia and Sweden. This project was a joint attempt to locate the most important sources of dangerous contaminants in participating Indigenous communities and then eliminate those sources through community action (Arctic Council 2013, p. 19). Climate change became an institutional priority for the Arctic Council, which the Permanent Participants assisted by making significant contributions to relevant Member State projects as well as creating their own projects focused on community implications.

How do the priorities of Permanent Participants differ from the priorities of Member States and the Chairs of the institution? Table 9.3 shows which Member

[3] Google Scholar shows that researchers have cited the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* summary more than 660 times, which is comparable to the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change summary report for policy makers (587 citations)

Table 9.3 State and Permanent Participant Project Sponsorship, 2000–2017

	Contaminants	Conservation of living resources	Environmental threats	Human health	Sustain livelihoods and communities	Infrastructure	Economic development
Canada	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Finland	X	X	X		X	X	X
Iceland	X	X	X		X		X
Norway	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Russia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
AIA	X	X	X		X		
AAC		X			X		
GCI	X	X	X		X		
ICC		X	X	X	X		
RAIPON	X	X		X	X		X
SC		X			X		X

States and Permanent Participants sponsored projects in the various categories. An "X" in a column indicates that the actor sponsored at least one project in the category between 2000 and 2017.

Clearly, as a consensus-based body, Chairs, Member States and Permanent Participants support all of the established priorities of the Council. A conservative estimate is that the Council had an average of 47.6 projects ongoing at a time between 1998 and 2017. This ranged from a low of twenty-seven projects in 2000 to a high of ninety-eight in 2017. Nearly all Member States sponsored projects in nearly all categories (at least six out of seven), representing some support for environmental and local priorities. Permanent Participants, meanwhile, sponsored only 39 projects in this period. One Permanent Participant, in fact, sponsored projects of five of seven categories; the rest sponsored projects in two to four categories. There is Permanent Participant work in all categories except for infrastructure, which is surprising considering it is a work area supporting local communities.

In some cases, Permanent Participants work together to accomplish projects, such a 2008 symposium in Norway "for Arctic Indigenous peoples from throughout the circumpolar region to build on each other's knowledge and experience to develop practical ways for the preservation, revitalization and further development of Arctic Indigenous languages" (Arctic Council 2009, p. 16). The Aleut International Association, Inuit Circumpolar Council and Saami Council all worked together to create the report *Meaningful Engagement of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in Marine Activities*, which was a guide on how to include local communities in marine monitoring efforts (Arctic Council 2017a, b, p. 77). Overall, the Council's work skews more to national environmental priorities than local community priorities. This fact is due to the reality that Member States sponsor the majority of all projects. In 2015, the Council completed sixty projects in environmental priority areas and twenty-three in community priority areas. In 2017, the Council completed sixty-eight projects in environmental priority areas and thirty in community priority areas. Permanent Participants need to be selective with their project support.

How do the Permanent Participants provide examples of leadership and when do they clash with leadership by offered by Member States and Chairs of the body? Even though Permanent Participants sponsor many projects, they can come into conflict with Member States over the fact that the Permanent Participants cannot provide sponsorship as frequently as the Arctic Eight. Yet Senior Arctic Officials reports show few obvious conflicts over the content of projects.

Some examples can be provided of projects in various categories that have been sponsored by Permanent Participants. The Gwich'in Council sponsored a contaminants project to reduce PCB emissions in electrical generating equipment in the Arctic (2004); together with the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, it also sponsored the Indigenous Peoples Community Action Initiative on contaminants (2009–2013). A long-term Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North project on conservation was a research project on *The Biological Significance of Sacred Sites of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic* (1998–2006). The Aleut International Association sponsored the Bering Sea Sub-Network to support

conservation efforts (2004–2009). The Inuit Circumpolar Council has sponsored human health projects, such as a study of cancer rates (2015b). Sustainability projects included a Saami Council youth camp (2000–2002) and a jointly sponsored project on languages (2011). Economic projects include Saami Council projects on coastal fishery management (1998–2004) and reindeer herding (2013–2015). This work is substantial and impactful; yet, overall, the sponsorship of projects by Permanent Participants is far less than Member States.

Table 9.4, below, summarizes their sponsorship of projects over time. The reason that Permanent Participants sponsor fewer projects in priority areas is clearly due to major financial limitations. This has been a continuing concern of both the Permanent Participants and the overall Council. A survey of Senior Arctic Officials reports reveal that every Council meeting has contained at least some discussion of the financial difficulties faced by Permanent Participants.

The Permanent Participants also can show leadership in the Arctic Council by participating in Member State and Chair projects that they do not sponsor. For example, three of the eighteen chapters of the 2004 *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* contain Indigenous traditional knowledge, the result of workshops led by Permanent Participants. Leaders of the Permanent Participants went to small communities and interviewed elders about the changes in the climate observed over their lifetimes. This information provided illustrations of the dynamics of climate change, generated hypotheses and contributed data to studies otherwise employing the scientific method.

Nonetheless, Permanent Participants do not contribute to a majority of Council projects. Previous work has shown that Permanent Participants take part in about 20% of the Council's work (see Chater 2015, p. 269). Indigenous leaders have reported contributing to some projects in a quite limited way to ensure that Council work does not present conflicts with the interests of Indigenous peoples (Chater 2015). This sort of activity constitutes another way that Permanent Participants can show leadership in the Arctic Council.

Beyond funding, Member States and Permanent Participants have clashed over the role of Observers. Most international institutions allow attendance of non-members. In the case of the Council, these are the institutional Observers.

Table 9.4 Total Project Sponsorship by Permanent Participants, 2000–2017

SAO report	Total projects sponsored by permanent participants	Total projects	Percentage
2000	3	27	11
2002	5	33	15
2004	5	29	17
2006	5	62	8
2009	4	30	13
2011	1	32	3
2013	3	35	9
2015	11	83	13
2017	16	98	16

Currently, the Council includes thirteen Observer states, thirteen intergovernmental organizations and thirteen non-governmental organizations. Previous research (Chater 2017) demonstrates that these organizations rarely comment during Council meetings or sponsor Council projects. To be an Observer, a state or organization must accept the status quo regarding the legal situation in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2018). Significantly, they also must, as per the Council's updated rules of procedure, "respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants" and "have demonstrated a political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples" (Arctic Council 2018). Yet, their presence can be a source of conflict. On an individual basis, most Observers only send a couple of representatives to each meeting. Collectively, these representatives can outnumber the Permanent Participants (Chater 2017). A persistent concern of the latter is that Observers will "drown out" the perspectives of Indigenous peoples.

The question of whether the European Union should be an accredited Observer of the Arctic Council is a relevant case challenging the leadership abilities of Chairs, Member States and Permanent Participants. The regional body has attended meetings of the Arctic Council since 2001. The Permanent Participants, in particular the Inuit Circumpolar Council, have resisted the European Union having any sort of ongoing Observer status. The European Union has obvious interests in the Arctic region. As part of Europe lies in the Arctic, there is a good case to be made that it should be considered as a significant Arctic actor. Diplomatic cables produced by WikiLeaks reveal that the Inuit Circumpolar Council has successfully blocked accredited status for the European Union in retribution for its ban on the import of seal products, even though the ban includes an exemption for products harvested by Indigenous peoples (as discussed in Chater 2015, p. 286–287).

The rest of the Council countries are open to European Union Accredited Observer status, particularly Finland and Norway (as discussed in Chater 2015, p. 286–287). The Arctic Council, under the leadership of European Union-member Sweden, revised its rules of procedure in 2013 to ensure Permanent Participants have a strong role by suggesting that Observers must support the efforts of Indigenous peoples. As a result, the European Union can attend Council meetings, but it must win approval for its Observer status before any activity in the Council.

On both sides, the move is symbolic. The European Union gains little by becoming an accredited Observer; it can already attend Council meetings and participate in its activities. In various ways, it has co-sponsored Council projects. The Inuit Circumpolar Council gains little blocking its Observer status; the European Union would not have any greater power practically if it were an accredited Council Observer. The European Union seeks recognition that it is an important Arctic player. The Inuit Circumpolar Council's move is retribution for a European Union policy that has hurt the livelihood of the Inuit. This case demonstrates the influence of Permanent Participants. Even though states could bypass the Permanent Participants, there exists a norm that states not oppose the will of Permanent Participants too vigorously.

Another clash between Member States and Permanent Participant affecting leadership abilities was an episode involving the membership status of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (or RAIPON). It represents a case in which a Permanent Participant has been openly at-odds with a particular Member State. In November 2012, the Russian Department of Justice deregistered RAIPON as a non-governmental organization in Russia. The motives for this move are multifaceted, such as concerns over its growing power, the influence of foreign entities on its membership, its opposition to oil and gas development as well as separatist fears on the part of the Russian government (as discussed in Chater 2015, p. 288). As a result, there was concern that Russia was attempting to block RAIPON from attending Arctic Council meetings. Since RAIPON technically no longer existed in a legal sense in Russia, one could question whether the group existed internationally. At its November 2012 meeting, the Permanent Participants and Council states signed a letter supporting continued participation by RAIPON. Ironically, the Russian Senior Arctic Official signed the statement, as well. Russia re-accredited RAIPON in April 2013. This case represents a time when the position of a Permanent Participant appeared threatened. Yet the normative protection for Permanent Participants proved robust.

9.4 The Permanent Participants and the Chairs

To address one of the major themes of this book, it should be noted that all of the Chairs of the Council have paid at least some attention to the wishes of the Permanent Participants and have before initiated at least one project to engage with Indigenous peoples organizations. As seen elsewhere in this volume, the Chairs of the Arctic Council can identify priorities for the institution in meaningful ways. The United States (1998–2000) initiated the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, which included Indigenous traditional knowledge. It also made human health in the region a priority. Finland (2000–2002) co-sponsored a project on habitat conservation with RAIPON as well as projects on capacity building, sustainable development, youth and gender equality in the "sustainable livelihoods and communities" category. Iceland (2002–2004) made information technology for Arctic communities a priority during its turn as Chair. Russia (2004–2006) co-sponsored projects on ecosystem conservation with RAIPON. As mentioned, previously Norway (2007–2009) held a symposium on Indigenous languages during its term as Chair, in 2008. Denmark (2009–2011) undertook multiple projects to do with mental health in the region.

Designated meetings between Permanent Participants and Chairs have occurred since Denmark's turn as Chair, usually closed-door, informal breakfast meetings at some point during the Council's bi-annual meetings. They have also worked in cooperation with the Permanent Participants in advancing specific projects of mutual interest. Sweden (2011–2013) co-sponsored the *Baseline Study on Contaminant Issues in Indigenous Communities to Identify Priorities* with Russia

and the Aleut International Association. Most significantly, it also oversaw the articulation of the importance of the Permanent Participants in the Council's revised Rules of Procedure (discussed previously in this chapter). Canada (2013–2015), which a chapter in this volume considers to have had an overriding concern with development, co-sponsored five projects with the Inuit Circumpolar Council that had to do with local community priorities, as well as two with the Aleut International Association and Gwich'in Council International. About 15% of the projects that the United States sponsored during its turn as Chair (2015–2017) were co-sponsored with at least one Permanent Participant, including both community and national environmental priorities. The United States also included Permanent Participants in its 2016 Arctic Science Ministerial meeting.

In 2016, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat re-located from Copenhagen, Denmark to Tromso, Norway, to coordinate its efforts with the Arctic Council's Secretariat. The Permanent Participants also created a trust fund for its Arctic Council activities, the Álgu Fund, based in Sweden. The most recent Finnish Chairmanship has sought to strengthen the role of the Arctic Council Secretariat, noting that it can help permanent participants (Arctic Council 2017b: 16). It is clear that the Chairs of the Arctic Council pay special attention to the interests of the Permanent Participants and respond accordingly.

9.5 What Does This All Mean?

In returning to the expectations guiding this work, it is clear that the leadership of Permanent Participants is distinct from the leadership offered by Chairs and Member States in the institution. Nearly 57% of projects sponsored by the Permanent Participants relate to local community priorities. Almost 67% of the projects sponsored by Permanent Participants since 2013 have dealt with local community priorities, showing that the salience of these issues is increasing. Overall, Permanent Participant groups support more Council projects that serve community priorities. A major purpose of including the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council is to represent the interests of local constituents, as opposed to the national interest of the countries in which they reside. Since projects in human health, sustainable livelihoods and communities, infrastructure and economic development respond to issues faced by Arctic residents, this support is logical.

In 2015, 72% of Council projects involved environmental priority areas, compared to 28% in community priority areas. Member States sponsored 87% of these projects. In 2017, 76% of Council projects were in environmental priority areas, with states sponsoring 82% of Council projects. Less than a quarter of the Council's projects involved local community priorities after 2015. Thus, states support more Council projects that serve the national interest. Since projects to do with contaminants, conservation of living resources and environmental threats benefit national populations as well as local residents, this support is logical. However, Permanent Participants and states do not clash as might be expected over local and national

priorities. The major disagreement between Member States and Permanent Participants concerned funding for projects and the representation of Permanent Participants. In the case of the European Union, the Inuit Circumpolar Council blocked its accreditation and secured recognition of the rights of Permanent Participants under the re-vamping of the Council's rules of procedure led by the Swedish Chair. In the RAIPON case, the Permanent Participants asserted the membership of the organization outside of the wishes of the Russian government. The leadership of Permanent Participants is distinct form Chairs and Member States in the institution.

The implications of these findings for Arctic Council leadership are clear. States and Permanent Participants appear to have developed an understanding as to the relevant niches each fills within the work of the Council. The leadership of Permanent Participants is robust. Yet, the fact that there are more environmental projects and community projects can result in a power disadvantage. More power in the Council lies with Chairs and Member States than other bodies. It is possible that this situation will improve if Permanent Participants could be Chairs of the institution.

9.6 Conclusions

The Arctic Council tends to be led by the priorities of Chairs, but the priorities of Permanent Participants can also animate the activities of the institution. The Chairs of the Arctic Council organize the work of the institution, provide logistics and put forward several privileged priorities. Member States sponsor projects and vote on Council matters. Permanent Participants cannot vote, but contribute to organizational leadership by sponsoring projects and representing unique priorities. Projects by the Permanent Participants have changed in that they more frequently concern local community priorities than in the past. They have stayed the same because both environmental and community projects are important. Indigenous peoples face numerous human security challenges and one of the explicit purposes of Indigenous peoples' organizations is to advocate for these issues while promoting Arctic stewardship. Comparing Member States, Chairs and Permanent Participants, the work of the Permanent Participants is similar to Member States in that it is clear that both support all categories of Council work. They differ in that Permanent Participants need to choose projects to sponsor more carefully. States frequently pursue projects that mitigate or adapt to climate change, not surprising given the profound national consequences of these problems. The Chairs of the institution introduce projects specifically to appeal to the Permanent Participants.

We often think of the leader of the Arctic Council as the Chair of the institution. However, Permanent Participants provide leadership, as well. Permanent Participants provide leadership by sponsoring projects. They can clash in that Permanent Participants do not sponsor projects as frequently as they no doubt would like. Permanent Participant groups also can provide leadership by contributing to projects

that they do not sponsor. In the end, Indigenous peoples' organizations have fundamentally different interests than those of national governments. Permanent Participants represent the interest of local Indigenous communities. Member States respond to these local interests, but also must respond to national interests and environmental challenges of global concern.

The existing literature finds that the interests and contributions of Permanent Participants differ in key aspects from one another and that Permanent Participants make unique contributions. This work suggests that, overall, Indigenous peoples support local priorities more frequently than Member States. News articles written around the time of the founding of the Arctic Council predicted that Permanent Participants would have powers equal to those of states. This research effort suggests that the Permanent Participants are not as powerful as states in the institution in that they contribute to only about a fifth of the Council's projects. Yet, McIver's 1997 prediction that Permanent Participants would have little power has not come to be. This particular research inquiry argues that Permanent Participants have significant power in that they are able to sponsor projects of community interest. Koivurova and English are correct that the Permanent Participants have made significant contributions to the Council. Fenge, Schram Stokke and Young also are correct in that the Council is state-centric institution. Bloom is correct that the Permanent Participants "participate in all aspects of the Council's work," but not to the same extent as states, in line with work by this author. This research contributes to this work by showing that Permanent Participants sponsor projects of relevance to communities and provide significant leadership in the Council. The bottom line is that Permanent Participants need to respond to local residents, and so focus on their interests. National governments need to please local residents and citizens thousands of kilometres away from the Arctic, leading to a wider array of work. The success of Permanent Participants is proof positive of the benefit of more democratized global governance.

A subject worthy of consideration is whether in the future it would be beneficial for Permanent Participants to take turns as Chair of the institution. This change would acknowledge the Permanent Participants as members of the Arctic Council on a similar level to states. Permanent Participants have chaired working groups and have provided leadership on a number of complex Council projects. Yet, Permanent Participant organizations lack the same funding and staff support as Member States. Permanent Participant organizations only have about half a dozen staff members at Arctic Council meetings, including unpaid volunteers and non-Indigenous consultants. Unless there is significant investment by governments, it seems unlikely that Permanent Participants could be Arctic Council Chair in a similar manner to Member States. Perhaps a Permanent Participant and a Member State could co-chair the institution during specific leadership periods. Permanent Participants would need to be able to secure a full-time staff of several individuals for two or three years to have an impact. There exist people with experience among the Permanent Participants that could fill such positions. However, without additional support funding, the burdens of leadership tasks could weaken the overall capacity of Permanent Participants to contribute to Council projects. Either the Permanent

Participants will be provided with new financial resources or a new model of a Chairmanship is necessary in the Arctic Council in the future. Providing adequate funding for Indigenous peoples to create their own projects, participate in others and potentially help chair the organization pays dividends both in terms of the ability of Indigenous peoples to represent themselves as well as achieving necessary results for the Council.

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