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Leadership for the North

The Influence and Impact of Arctic Council Chairs

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To Geoff, Gunnel, and Kjell—all leaders from the North

Preface

This edited volume focuses on the various leadership roles played by chairs within an international body. Specifically, it looks at the influence and impact of the Chair of the Arctic Council over the past two decades. It seeks to highlight the various ways in which the rotating head of this organization has facilitated the growth and development of the institution over this period and contributed to its emergence as the primary forum for the discussion of Arctic concerns.

The examination of "leadership from the chair" is not a subject that has received substantial attention within the existing literature on international organization. The assumption has been made that chairs of international bodies do not exert a significant amount of influence over the institutions they head or have a major impact on their decision-making. Yet increasingly the evidence of the real impact of the chair within contemporary international negotiations and diplomacy suggests that such an assumption may no longer be valid. Using both formal and informal methods and tools at their disposal, the leaders of such diverse bodies as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the recently concluded Paris Climate Negotiations can all be seen to have left a major imprint on the bodies they have supervised.

This volume makes a similar argument with respect to the Arctic Council, a far less prominent actor within the international community. Nonetheless, as this international body has endeavored to become the leading venue for the discussion and investigation of Arctic problems and aspirations, the influence and impact of its successive chairs can be clearly seen in its evolution. The Chair of the Arctic Council over the past two decades has helped to provide focus and direction for the organization. It is most likely that in the future, the occupants of this post will continue to perform a significant leadership function within the body. Exactly how this has been done—and will be done in the future—is the common thematic concern of this volume.

This book has its origins in a series of discussions emanating from the Ninth International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA) meetings that were held in Umeå, Sweden, in June of 2016. At that time, two successive scholarly panels were convened to examine the efforts and consequences of the last four Chairs of

the Arctic Council (Sweden, Canada, the United States, and Finland). A number of the contributing authors to this volume took part in these discussions. All came away from this experience feeling that there was a need to capture the insights gained there and to engage in further comparative analysis of the influential roles played by the Chair of the Arctic Council both within the institution and in the realm of circumpolar diplomacy.

As the convener of the two IASSA panels, I volunteered to see if it would be possible to provide a volume that might address such matters. I engaged several of the original panel participants to provide their insights on the leadership roles played by the most recent Arctic Council Chairs. I prevailed upon other colleagues knowledgeable about the affairs of the Arctic Council to add their findings and observations regarding the impact and influence of its head. An effort was made to not only describe and account for the different paths taken by these successive leaders of the body but also to see how such leadership efforts were regarded by the different actors within the organization—the Member States, the Permanent Participants, and the Observers. The resulting volume is that which now appears before you. I am most grateful to all who took part in this collective effort and to their helpful contributions in furthering our understanding of leadership within the context of the Arctic Council.

Umeå, Sweden Douglas C. Nord

Acknowledgments

I have come to believe over a number of years that the study of cooperation in politics is far more complex and rewarding than the investigation of conflict. It requires little effort to determine why individuals, communities, or nations come to blows with one another, while the reasons for why they seek to work with one another in a harmonious fashion often seem to be more subtle and nuanced. Such is the case of the Arctic today. There are many potential sources of tension within the region, and yet the area and its people continue to operate in a generally harmonious fashion. Often to the wonderment of outside Observers, the contemporary circumpolar community has functioned as a relatively conflict-free zone within a global community that has seen much disorder over the past two decades. This is the "good news" that comes from the Far North, and, sadly, it often goes noticed and unreported. I believe that the Arctic Council has made important contributions to building and solidifying this spirit of cooperation, and it is one of the reasons I have chosen to study its contributions and operation over several years.

The present volume is also an example of this spirit of cooperation, and there are several contributions to its fulfillment that I wish to acknowledge here. The first of these is the effort of the several chapter authors. Despite already having busy lives and heavy research commitments, each of the contributors was able to carve out some time and attention for this collective inquiry into the operation of leadership within the Arctic Council. They all willingly answered my call to participate and composed essays that provide us with new insights and a better understanding of this complicated relationship. They responded in good humor with my repeated calls to stay focused and on schedule and did not grumble too much when I presented them with suggested revisions and edits. To all of you (Amy, Doug, Gosia, Niklas, the two Heathers, Timo, Andy, and Diddy), I owe a debt of gratitude. You have reinforced my interest in the study of cooperation.

A second acknowledgment of assistance goes to those scholars and practitioners of international organization and diplomacy who have helped shape and refine my thinking about the Arctic Council and the leadership within it. A number of individuals such as Oran Young, Jonas Tallberg, John English, Gustaf Lind, and Björn Lyrvall have helped me wrestle with this central research question. Several other

colleagues have provided useful insights along the way including Heather Exner-Pirot, Timo Koivurova, Joel Plouffe, Heather Nicol, Sverker Sörlin, and Jennifer Spence. To all a hearty thanks!

This volume would not have been completed without the timely assistance from several folks along the way. I wish to thank Marianne Røgeberg and Kyösti Lempa of NordForsk in Oslo who connected me with other international and Nordic scholars interested in the contemporary Arctic. For the same reason, I wish to thank Peter Sköld and Gabriella Nordin of Umeå's Arctic Research Centre (ARCUM). They are adept in focusing our attention on the needs and aspirations of the North. Deep appreciation is also directed to Marie Olsson, Christine Boström, and Magnus Blomgren who saw to my needs within the Political Science Department throughout the course of this inquiry.

Finally, a word of sincere thanks goes to my all my friends and colleagues at Umeå University with whom I shared morning coffee and afternoon *fika*—and an occasional extended conversation down the corridor—during the length of my investigation including Anders Lidström, Patrik Johansson, Chris Hudson, Camilla Sandström, Thorbjörn Bergman, and Olof Johansson. Your insights as well as your patience and good humor were much appreciated. And to my stalwart supporters, Gunnel Gustafsson, Kjell and Gertrud Lundmark, Kerstin Kolam, and Martin Strand, I cannot adequately express all that I owe to each of you! I look forward to many future gatherings.

Umeå, Sweden Douglas C. Nord

Contents

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About the Editor

Douglas C. Nord is an established scholar in the fields of international relations and comparative politics. His areas of specialty include the foreign and northern development policies of Canada, the Nordic states and Russia as well as the United States. He has written extensively on the relations between the countries of the circumpolar north and on the emergence of the Arctic as a central concern of contemporary international politics. Professor Nord has taught and undertaken research inquiries at various educational institutions across the region. He presently conducts his studies at the University of Umeå in Sweden where he is an associated research professor at the Arctic Research Centre (ARCUM). He presently serves as the Chair of the Scientific Advisory Board for NordForsk's Nordic Centres of Excellence in Arctic Research. Professor Nord has studied the Arctic Council for over twenty years and has published two earlier volumes on the organization: *The Changing Arctic: Creating a Framework for Consensus Building within the Arctic Council* (2016) and *The Arctic Council: Governance within the Far North* (2016).

Authors' Biography

Andrew Chater serves as a fellow at Polar Research and Policy Initiative with an interest in Arctic governance. He is presently an assistant professor of political science at Brescia University College in London, Ontario. He completed his doctorate at the University of Western Ontario and was previously a graduate resident at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. He holds a master's degree from the University of Waterloo. His research interests include Arctic governance, geopolitics and security, as well as Canadian foreign policy. In 2013, he was part of the Arctic Athabaskan Council's delegation at the Arctic Council meetings in Whitehorse, Yukon.

Douglas Cost is an assistant professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) in the School of Education (SOE). He completed his PhD in Cross-Cultural Education and Future Studies as a National Science Foundation and IGERT fellow in Resilience and Adaptation at the UAF. While doing so he was awarded a TUNDRA fellowship and studied at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø. He has an MFA in Poetry and an MA in Educational Leadership and Policy Studies. Dr. Cost's research focuses on the role of compulsory education in the resilience of Arctic Alaska communities. He is also a scenarios and future-thinking researcher using these concepts and methods to approach questions of youth leadership, teacher education, and educational reform. Currently he instructs Teaching Methods, Multiculturalism, and Developing Literacy in the Content Area courses to student teacher candidates in the SOE.

Niklas Eklund is a senior lecturer and associate professor in political science at the Department of Political Science, Umeå University. His current research focuses on different aspects of public administration, security, and crisis management, and he regularly teaches a master-level course in leadership. As a researcher, Eklund is affiliated with the Arctic Research Centre at Umeå University (Arcum). He is the permanent university representative on the board for Pax Nordica, a yearly symposium about Nordic and Arctic security. Among his recent publications is "Refracting

(Geo)political Choices in the Arctic" (2017) with Lize-Marié van der Watt in *The Polar Journal*, and he is currently working on the chapter about Sweden in the *Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security* which will soon be published.

Heather Exner-Pirot is the managing editor of the *Arctic Yearbook*. She is a regular contributor to Radio-Canada's Eye on the Arctic website, a board member for both The Arctic Institute (TAI) and the Saskatchewan First Nations Economic Development Network, an editorial board member for the *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, and the chair of the Canadian Northern Studies Trust. She is currently a strategist for outreach and indigenous engagement at the University of Saskatchewan and has held previous positions at the International Centre for Northern Governance and Development and the University of the Arctic. She completed her doctoral degree in Political Science at the University of Calgary in 2011, focusing on Arctic regionalization and human security. Her additional research interests include indigenous and northern governance, economic development, health care, and postsecondary education.

Diddy R. M. Hitchins is an emeritus professor of political science and international studies at the University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA). She earned her BSc (Social Sciences) at the University of Southampton and MA (Political Behavior) and PhD (Government) at the University of Essex. Her first academic appointment, while completing PhD research, was at the University of Ghana. Subsequently, Hitchins served as chair of Political Science and director of International Studies at the UAA. She was also the founding director of the UAA's Canadian and North Pacific Studies Programs. Her teaching areas are in Comparative Politics and International Relations. She has conducted extensive research in Canada, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, as well as China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. She was president of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States (ACSUS). Since 1985, Hitchins has been British honorary consul for Alaska and has served on UK Observer delegations to the Arctic Council. Queen Elizabeth II honored her with a Member of British Empire (MBE) award in 2005.

Timo Koivurova is a research professor at the University of Lapland. He serves currently as the director of the Arctic Research Centre, which is a national and international hub of information and center of excellence that conducts multidisciplinary research in changes in the Arctic region. As a researcher, he has specialized in various aspects of governance in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. Koivurova has led many international and national research projects and has been involved as an expert in international processes generally and in the Arctic region. Koivurova is a member of the board of directors of the Arctic Research Consortium of the United States (ARCUS), an executive committee member of the European Polar Board, and an editor-in-chief of *The Yearbook of Polar Law*.

Amy Lauren Lovecraft is a professor of political science at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) and the director of the Center for Arctic Policy Studies at the International Arctic Research Center. In her research, Dr. Lovecraft explores power dynamics in social-environmental systems. In particular, how are problems defined and policies designed in the light of climate change and development uncertainties in the Arctic? Her research explores the question from transdisciplinary standpoints seeking to bridge the domains of science, policy, and civic life. Dr. Lovecraft has been a Dickey Scholar at Dartmouth College and a Fulbright research scholar in Norway at the Center for International Climate Change and Environmental Research (CICERO). She has served two terms as a member of the US National Academies Polar Research Board and currently serves NordForsk in evaluating the Nordic Centres of Excellence (2017–2021). In 2017 she was elected to the Norwegian Scientific Academy for Polar Research.

Heather Nicol is a professor of political geography at Trent University, where she teaches in the School of the Environment. Nicol's research interests are in global relations and regional structures, borders, and policies. Her work explores the contemporary and historical border between Canada and the United States, regional structure of Caribbean political and economic cooperation, Canada-US relations, and most recently circumpolar regional governance and geopolitics. In 2015–2016 Nicol was the University of Washington's Fulbright visiting chair in Arctic Studies during which she studied the US chairmanship of the Arctic Council. She is the author of numerous books and articles exploring the political geography of the circumpolar region, including *One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Governance* with Whitney Lackenbauer and Wilfrid Greaves, *The Networked North* with Whitney Lackenbauer, and *Climate Change from a Northern Point of View* with Lassi Heininen.

Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek is a political scientist and researcher at the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, in Rovaniemi, Finland. In her research Gosia studies international environmental regimes, Arctic governance, and questions of science-policy interface. She has taken part in numerous projects including most recently "Finland's Arctic Council Chairmanship in Times of Increasing Uncertainty" for Finland's Prime Minister's Office (2016–2018). Gosia has been a fellow of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) since 2014, representing the IASC at the Arctic Council, and was co-chair of the IASC Action Group on Communicating Arctic Science to Policymakers (CASP). She was also the co-organizer of the fourth China-Nordic Cooperation Symposium and a participant in the science diplomacy course of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Vega Fellowship program on science communication and leadership. The latest project that she has been developing is the "Women in the Arctic."

List of Figures

List of Tables

Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Providing Leadership for the North

Douglas C. Nord

Abstract This chapter provides a brief overview of the need for leadership in the contemporary Arctic. It considers how the process of Arctic governance has evolved over the past quarter century and how the Arctic Council has become a central actor in this endeavor. It looks at how recent Arctic Council Chairmanships have played significant roles in developing a response to pressing Arctic concerns. It notes, however, that the precise means by which successive chairs of the organization have advanced its work has rarely been examined or compared. This is the overall focus of this volume. Its individual chapter inquiries are noted and briefly summarized.

Keywords Leadership · Arctic Council · Governance · Diplomacy · Chairmanships

Over the past few decades, the Arctic has become a region of growing importance within the international arena. Important environmental, economic, security and development concerns can all be seen in evidence within its borders. Similarly, change in the Arctic has been shown to have direct consequences for those residing beyond its borders. No longer a distant and remote region of the world, today's Arctic has become a significant influencer of international trade, meteorological conditions and resource development. Climate change, international shipping, defense preparedness and energy security have also been linked to ongoing change within the circumpolar North. Consequently, there appears to be a growing need to become more familiar with these and other significant challenges and opportunities that affect both the Arctic and the broader global community.

Clearly, there is also a need for effective leadership to address and respond to the changing conditions of the North. How concerted effort is organized to deal with major concerns of various communities has become a growing concern of the social sciences over the past quarter century. The study of leadership, and particularly is

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capacity to mobilize response to pressing issues and needs, has been broadly considered.[1] Yet the study of leadership within international organizations has been less well examined (Nye 2008). There remains a significant gap in our present knowledge of how leaders within such international bodies emerge, perform their functions and deliver necessary results. A proposed examination of leadership in the North within such a context would contribute important new understanding to the field.

Over the past 20 years or so, the primary institutional vehicle for doing so has been the Arctic Council. This "high level forum" was founded in 1996 and brings together under its auspices national governments, representatives of indigenous peoples and a variety of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations interested in the future of the Arctic and its global impact. (See Table 1.1 below.) The Arctic Council has provided the mechanism for establishing a focused circumpolar effort at research of Arctic issues and relevant policy recommendation along with the first steps toward establishing a governance framework for the relatively new international organization has contributed both good science and innovative ideas for collectively responding to the needs and challenges of Arctic environments and peoples.

Table 1.1 Composition of the Arctic Council

Ministerial Meeting (Biennial)
Member States 8
Permanent Participants 6
Senior Arctic Officials Group Meeting (normally biannually)
Working Groups 6 (meet on a scheduled basis)
Task Forces (vary in number and frequency of meetings over time)
Observers Non-Arctic States 13 Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations 13 Non-Governmental Organizations 13

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

[1] The scholarly literature on leadership is extensive. Some of the more useful studies that have contributed to the perspectives contained within this volume include R.H. Axelrod (2010) *Terms of Engagement: New Ways of Leading and Changing Organizations (second Edition)*. San Francisco, CA: Berret-Koehker Publishers; J. M. Burns (2003) *Transforming Leadership*. New York: Grove Press; G. Buseberg (2001) "Learning in Organizations and Public Policy" in *Journal of Public Policy* 21(2) 173–189; S. De Rue (2011) "Adaptive Leadership Theory: Leading and Following as a Complex Adaptive Process" in *Organizational Behavior* 31,125–150; Heifetz et al. (2009) *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership. Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World.* Boston: Harvard Business School; O. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society" in. *International Organization* 45 (3) 281–308.

In recent years, a series of studies have been undertaken of this international body's agenda and actions. Several analysts have noted the expansion of its efforts over time and the increasingly sophisticated means by which it has accomplished its purposes. Some Observers have taken note of the ways in which the institution has collectively sought to address pressing Arctic challenges and needs. Much has been made of the means by which the research communities from several Arctic states have been collectively harnessed to provide new scientific insights and suggestions for action (Fenge and Funston 2015). A great deal of this investigation has been done under the rubric of regional governance in the North (Lackenbauer et al. 2017). The ways in which governments and non-state actors endeavor to work with one another to establish common norms, rules and agendas for the region has also been broadly considered and investigated (Spence 2017). However, few Observers have looked closely at the specific influence and impact that the individual Chairs of the organization have had on its work. This volume endeavors to make up for this deficiency.

One of a number of distinctive features of the Arctic Council is its rotating Chairmanship (Nord 2016a). In sequential fashion each of the eight founding Member States (Canada, the United States, Finland, Iceland, Russia, Norway, Denmark and Sweden) have the responsibility and opportunity of serving at the helm of the organization for a two year term. In so doing, each of the Arctic Eight have a chance to advance their distinctive vision of the Arctic and the goals and objectives that it believes to be of primary concern at a particular point in time. Although the Arctic Council operates according to the principle of "group consensus", there exists a real capability for an individual Chair to direct the course of the body's discussions, and influence its actions. This ability to provide "leadership from the chair" has been a significant but often underreported dimension of the organization's history (Nord 2016b).

Like many other studies of international organizations, the assumption has been too often made that the Chair of the Arctic Council has had a minimal profile and limited influence and impact. However, is this the case? Increasing evidence from both within the Arctic Council and in similar international bodies suggest that the Chair can have a surprisingly strong influence in charting and direction of the organization and, as such, can make a distinctive leadership contribution (Young 1991). By utilizing both formal procedural and informal consultative powers, the Chair of the Arctic Council can be seen to play a significant leadership role within the institution and exert a substantial impact on the agenda, discussions and actions of the body. These "powers of the Chair" and the resulting leadership role of its occupant are continuing interests of this book and will be investigated in the context of recent Arctic Council history.

Following this introduction, the present volume begins by providing the reader with a broader setting for this investigation. Professors Amy Lovecraft and Douglas Cost of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks explore in Chap. 2 the ongoing environmental and societal changes that confront the Arctic and the particular challenges

they provide for efforts at governance within the region. Under the heading of "policy paradoxes", they consider the complexity of the decision-making processes that both residents and representatives from Arctic communities must engage in today. They note that the urgent need for action across several dimensions of concern do not lend themselves easily to neat policy solutions. This is the challenge of leadership that needs to be addressed from the local arena upwards to the setting of the Arctic Council.

The next contributing author, Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek of the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi Finland provides an overview of the Arctic Council's past efforts to provide leadership for the Arctic region and to offer an institutional means for encouraging circumpolar and global cooperation on issues pertaining to the region. In Chap. 3 of the volume, she chronicles the development of the Arctic Council from a low-profile international body to becoming a major actor in Arctic research and diplomacy of today. Of particular relevance to this volume, she examines the distinctive leadership contributions of successive Chairs of the Arctic Council during the first two decades of its operation. Professor Smieszek takes note of the continuing tension between advocates of environmental protection and sustainable development that were in evidence during the early period of the organization's history and remains as an underlying concern of the institution today.

Chapter 4 of the book is authored by Professor Douglas Nord from Umeå University in Sweden. He considers the position of chairs within most international organizations. Omnipresent but usually viewed as having limited influence and impact, the heads of such bodies can be seen, nonetheless, to perform critical leadership functions for their organizations. Professor Nord examines the unique "powers of the chair" and the distinctive leadership styles that can be pursued by such figures before turning his attention to the specific case of the Arctic Council. The origins and structure of this institution are reviewed as they pertain to possible leadership responsibilities and capabilities of its head. These dimensions are further developed and discussed by Professor Nord with the goal of providing an analytical frame for considering the specific Chairmanships of the Arctic Council that are examined in subsequent chapters of the volume. The chapter concludes by considering four ongoing leadership challenges that must be faced by all who operate from the helm of the body.

The next section of the book examines, in some detail, the four most recent Chairmanships of the Arctic Council from a comparative perspective considering their influence in establishing goals and objectives for the organization and in guiding its efforts to address multifaceted change within the polar region. It offers individual case studies of the leadership roles played by Sweden, Canada, the United States and Finland and examines the particular goals, styles, strategies and methods that each pursued during its term of service as head of the body. Each of these chapters considers how the program and priorities of a specific Chairmanship can be seen as being reflective, in part, of its own distinctive national foreign and domestic policy goals as well as broader Arctic needs. Each author endeavors to evaluate the accomplishments of a particular national Chairmanship with these background concerns and other factors in mind.

Professor Niklas Eklund of Umeå University examines the 2011–13 Swedish Chairmanship in Chap. 5 of the volume. He discusses how the particular contributions of Sweden in this leadership role were both critical to the organizational development of the Arctic Council and reflective of the nation's overall concerns regarding international diplomacy both within and outside the Artic region. He describes how this "reluctant" Arctic state came to play a decisive part in furthering efforts at problem solving within the circumpolar community and how its role as an "honest broker" at the head of the Arctic Council enabled it to advance the body's agenda and goals. Professor Eklund also observes how this approach was reflective of specific Swedish views of international affairs and diplomacy. He notes, as well, the distinctive domestic setting in which this Chairmanship took place. The author suggests a careful analysis of the Swedish Chairmanship holds many of the keys to understanding Sweden's overall stance toward the Arctic both then and in the future.

The 2013–15 Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council is examined and assessed by Professor Heather Exner-Pirot of the University of Saskatchewan in Chap. 6 of the volume. She notes that during its leadership term, Canada attempted to shift the policy focus of the organization from that of environmental protection to sustainable, or as it termed it, responsible development. Making full use of its "powers of the Chair" the Canadian Chairmanship adopted an entrepreneurial leadership role in promoting Arctic regional development and business enterprise. This was frequently in opposition to the preferences of other Council members who favored a continued focus on climate change and the contributions of scientific research. Professor Exner-Pirot explains why these new Canadian priorities espoused during its Chairmanship were reflective of distinctive Canadian domestic concerns and interests and how the Harper government of the day chose to become an advocate of both within the national and international arenas. She goes on to consider how this distinctive Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship had consequences for the subsequent American and Finnish leadership terms.

The particular case of the U.S. Chairmanship is examined by Professor Heather Nicol of Trent University in Chap. 7 of the book. There she considers the most recent American Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the means by which it moved its distinctive agenda forward in the period between 2015 and 2017. Professor Nicol discusses, in some detail, how this agenda was formulated and how it represented a harmonization of traditional American security concerns in the Arctic with a strong interest on the part of the Obama Administration in environmental protection and climate science. She also notes some of the tensions that emerged between the national environmental security interests of Washington D.C. and the specific economic development priorities espoused by the State of Alaska. She discusses how the U.S. also pursued an entrepreneurial leadership role as Chair of the Arctic Council but one that was more subtle and adept than that of its Canadian predecessor. Professor Nicol describes the exceptional manner in which the U.S. government reinvigorated, deepened and institutionalized American investment in the Arctic Council during its term as its head and reestablished the U.S. an interested and

involved Arctic actor. She also considers the likely consequences of the new Trump Administration's approach to the region.

Professor Timo Koivurova of the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi explores the present Finnish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in the last chapter of this section of the volume. He explores the Finnish leadership term at its halfway point and its program of "Exploring Common Solutions" to Arctic needs and concerns. In Chap. 8 of the volume, he focuses the reader's attention on how and why this thematic program was chosen and the progress that the latest Finnish Chairmanship has made, thus far, in advancing its objectives. The specific elements of the Finnish Chairmanship Agenda are discussed both as a reflection of Finnish views and priorities within the Arctic as well as the consensually endorsed ongoing interests of the Council as a whole. Finland's decision to adopt more of a "professional" role as Chair of the Arctic Council is considered in this regard. Specific leadership methods, strategies and attitudes are also examined within this context. Professor Koivurova offers comparisons between the Finnish leadership approach and that of earlier Swedish, Canadian and U.S. efforts and emphasizes the importance of continuity in Chairmanship agendas in facilitating the ongoing work of the Arctic Council. He also suggests ways in which the Finnish Chairmanship may represent a new era of leadership within the body.

The present volume not only examines the challenges of leadership from the vantage point of the occupant of the Chair, but also endeavors to consider other perspectives within the Council including the specific views of the Indigenous Permanent Participants and non-Arctic state Observers. Within the next section of the book, an effort is made to consider the methods and actions of the Chair from the vantage point of those with significant interest but, perhaps, less institutional clout. It is from this viewpoint that observations can be made regarding why and how Chairs need to be responsive to these other participants. Each author in this section of the volume endeavors to consider this interaction and offers an assessment as to the extent to which recent Arctic Council Chairs have reached out to include the views of these groups as well as the representatives of the Arctic Eight. The consequences of so doing—or not doing so—for the future effectiveness of the organization are also considered. So too is the particular leadership contributions that these groups can make within the organization now and, perhaps, in the future.

Professor Andrew Chater from Brescia University College in Canada offers in Chap. 9 of the volume a unique insight into the efforts of the Permanent Participants who also take part in the work of the Arctic Council. He is interested in exploring the priorities of these indigenous organizations as they pertain to the Arctic. In particular, he undertakes an effort to determine the degree to which their interests and those of the Member States are in accordance with one another and whether there are any noticeable differences between them. Professor Chater's inquiry leads him to investigate the nature of the Permanent Participants support for the several research projects that have been undertaken by the Working Groups of the Council over the past two decades. He also considers the degree to which successive Chairs

of the Arctic Council have reached out and attempted to support the active participation of the Permanent Participants in the work of the body and with what effect. He goes on to consider the distinctive leadership roles that the Permanent Participants can play within the organization and beneficial effects of encouraging such initiatives. In so doing, he argues that an enhanced Arctic Council requires the active inclusion of indigenous voices and perspectives.

This consideration of the involvement of the Permanent Participants within the Arctic Council is matched in the subsequent chapter by an equally adept examination of the roles played by the several Observers to the Arctic Council. In Chap. 10 of the volume Professor Diddy Hitchins of the University of Alaska, Anchorage provides a timely consideration of the undertakings of this expanding group within the Council. She notes that this is a heterogeneous community composed of non-Artic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary bodies as well as non-governmental organizations. An effort is made to detail the various contributions that the Observers can make to the Council and the manner in which their involvement has evolved over the years—especially during the last four Chairmanships. Professor Hitchins examines the character of this interaction between the Observers and the Chair and notes why a good relationship between the two are necessary for the healthy development of the Arctic Council. She also considers what contributions to leadership both within and without the body this increasingly prominent group can offer.

Leadership for the North concludes with a review of the major findings presented by the several authors regarding leadership within the Arctic Council. Professor Douglas Nord examines these insights in Chap. 11 of the volume and offers a perspective of how one might best compare and contrast the influence and impact of different Chairs of the body. He considers whether there are common measures that can be utilized in such evaluations and how best to identify and apply them. He also assesses the extent to which the "powers of the chair" can be effectively utilized within such an organization as the Arctic Council and whether they are somewhat constrained by both external and organizational factors. The final chapter of the volume also provides a suggested list of proposed actions that incoming Chairs might consider taking when organizing their leadership terms. These recommended "best practices" are deemed to be of help in contributing to more effective leadership for the Arctic.

In undertaking these various efforts, the present volume seeks to provide the reader with both an enhanced understanding of the opportunities faced by leaders within many contemporary international organizations and the particular challenges that each must confront. It points to their potential to help build cooperation and accord between their varied members around major issues of common concern. In the particular case of the leadership within the Arctic Council, the book endeavors to contribute to our expanding knowledge of the impact an influence of Chairs within the body and the manner in which they can assist in providing necessary focus and direction in addressing the concerns and aspirations of the region.

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Part II
The Arctic Council and its Chair

Chapter 2
Policy Paradoxes: Challenges Confronting the Contemporary Arctic

Amy Lauren Lovecraft and Douglas Cost

Abstract There is both continuity and change in the challenges facing governance of the contemporary Arctic. Since the inception of the Arctic Council, the Chairs have played a significant role in highlighting or reducing the importance of different variables related to the region's interlinked social and environmental changes. We argue that many of the current challenges confronting Arctic residents and stakeholders are in fact paradoxes – examples of irresolvable tensions at the top of the world that can be researched and managed, but are unlikely, without a significant unanticipated event, to be resolved. This chapter approaches the challenges faced in the twenty-first century Arctic from a perspective that recognizes the complexity of the agenda-setting that an Arctic Council Chair encounters. In the past 20 years interest in the poles has grown and the conduct of research has evolved, yet there remain disconnects between local, national, and Pan-Arctic actors' policies and the security and vitality of the region. As more information about Arctic systems - social, ecological, and geophysical – becomes available at ever-faster speeds, the meaning of this information to diverse and competing actors is also evolving. The Arctic Council Chairmanship process has a role in promoting a better fit over time between Arctic Council governance and government policies in the North.

Keywords Arctic Council · Policy paradox · Problem definition · Arctic governance · Arctic policy · Co-production of knowledge

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2.1 Introduction

In considering what Arctic nations collectively face in a period of rapid Arctic change, it behooves us to consider what sorts of challenges can be resolved and which ones are better conceived as tensions to be managed well into this century. Understanding the difference between these types of "Arctic problems" can encourage strategic leadership spanning multiple Chairs and promote continuity in Arctic Council efforts. It has been suggested that:

> While the Arctic Council has been able to accommodate some issues that were not prominent when its structure was first created, the current set-up has not facilitated the inclusion of new issues and perspectives. There is thus a need for the Arctic Council to think about ways in which learning can be facilitated, especially for issues requiring a broad range of expertise or which may be politically contentious. As challenges extend across spatial scales, the notion of *governance fit* is better applied to the organizational capacity for learning than to identifying the best scale and scope of governance arrangements (italics added, Nilsson and Meek 2016, 4).

This observation, made in light of the research and results from the Arctic Resilience Interim (2013) and Arctic Resilience (2016) reports highlights a key concern related to the ability of the Arctic Council, itself, to adapt as the intertwined socio-cultural, economic, and environmental processes in the circumpolar north change. It also points out that rather than seeking new forms of governance structures right now, the Arctic Council and other concerned parties ought to focus on the functional capacity of current governance to adapt, to better "fit" ongoing policy and research concerns (Folke et al. 2007; Young 2002). Young and Underdal (1997) explain, "The problem of fit asserts that the effectiveness and the robustness of social institutions are functions of the fit between the institutions themselves and the biophysical and social domains in which they operate." This definition is generally accepted and has been used to explain misfits, for example in Finnish wolf policy (Hiedanpää 2013), poor fits between subsistence use of walrus and animal conservation rules (Robards and Lovecraft 2010), and the concept of adaptation as it promotes better fits in marine mammal management (Meek et al. 2011). In the Arctic the links between good policy outcomes – appropriate fit between the planet's bio-geophysical systems, the services they provide people (Eicken et al. 2009), and the stewardship of ecosystems by humans (Chapin III et al. 2015) – often rest on mutual understanding of policy legitimacy. It is noted that, "In particular the concept of fit in indigenous communities includes fit to cultural norms, local framings of legitimacy, and contemporary social patterns" (Meek et al. 2011, 468).

Part of what creates a good match between governance structures and outcomes is the functionality of an organization to create and implement adaptive strategies. There is continuity and change in challenges facing the governance of the contemporary Arctic. Since the inception of the Arctic Council, the Chairs have played a significant role in highlighting or reducing the importance of different variables related to the region's social-environmental changes. We argue that many of the current challenges confronting the security of Arctic residents and stakeholders are in

fact paradoxes – examples of irresolvable tensions at the top of the world that can only be researched and managed, but are unlikely, without a significant unanticipated event, to be resolved. Furthermore, as explained below, these tensions themselves are in fact often paradoxical as "winning" can be claimed from "loss" and vice versa. For example, attention by non-Arctic actors enhances the input of expertise into the Arctic Council, but at the same time pressures the organization to adopt different modes of research, value-sets, and governance tied to non-Arctic interests. As additional scientific work in the region secures more data, it also exposes key gaps in understanding and disconnects over what "Arctic Science" actually is. Also paradoxically, the Arctic Council enables governance and yet has no capacity to implement or enforce policies because it is not a government. The capacity of any Arctic Council Chair nation to understand these tensions and work within them to improve fit between policy and outcomes without the assumption that there is a singular "right" answer is vital to the ongoing peaceful governance of the North and transfer of power within it.

2.1.1 Problem Context: The Arctic Environmental System in Rapid Change

While the earth is generally warming, the rates at the poles are much faster than mid-latitudes and Arctic scientists often prefer to discuss "climate change" as a suite of factors rather than unidirectional rise in temperature alone. This is because changing temperatures are only one part of the earth system flux occurring due to significant greenhouse gas additions to the earth's atmosphere over the last century (Solomon et al. 2009). NASA has reported that the sea ice extent in the Arctic reached its maximum on March 17 of this year and that 2018 now joins 2015, 2016, and 2017 as the four lowest maximum extents on record. In the Arctic, the nature of the Earth's cryosphere - a word stemming from the Greek word "kryos" referring to cold or frost – is of paramount importance. Over time plants, animals, and societies have evolved and adapted to the annual cycle of freeze, melt, and thaw that now faces disruption. In modern usage, the cryosphere refers to all locations on the planet where water is in its solid form either above ground as freshwater ice or sea ice, glaciers, and snow, or below ground as permafrost. In addition, one cannot ignore the impacts on lower latitudes. For example, changes in the northern circumpolar jet stream due to Arctic warming are linked to increased frequency of extreme winter weather in the United States (Cohen et al. 2018) and the mid-latitudinal changes tied to seasonal cycles of, for example, precipitation (Francis et al. 2017).

In brief, the most recent NOAA Arctic Report Card (2017) indicates that the average surface air temperature, for the year ending in September 2017, was the second warmest since 1900—with 2016 representing the warmest year. The report states that the "Arctic shows no signs of returning to reliably frozen region of recent past decades" and it calls this "a new normal characterized by long-term losses in

the extent and thickness of the sea ice cover, the extent and duration of the winter snow cover and the mass of ice in the Greenland Ice Sheet and Arctic glaciers, and warming sea surface and permafrost temperatures." In early March 2017, satellites observed the sea ice cover to be relatively young and thin with multiyear ice (more than 1 year old) comprising only 21% of ice-cover in 2017 compared to 45% in 1985. The August 2017 sea surface temperatures in the Barents and Chukchi Seas were up to 4 ° C warmer than average, which contributed to a delay in the autumn freeze-up in these regions. Recent data on sea ice extent indicates that 50% of the summer sea ice extent and 60% of its volume have disappeared in the last several decades (Meier et al. 2014).

Inside the Earth, permafrost is thawing with new record high mean annual ground temperatures recorded at many permafrost observation stations across the Arctic and near the surface the "active layer," where permafrost thaws and freezes seasonally, is freezing up two months later than usual (Romanovsky et al. 2017). Permafrost temperatures in 2016 at many observation sites around the Arctic were among the highest on record. Permafrost is particularly worrisome because, unlike sea ice melt, when it thaws it releases stored carbon into the atmosphere as previously frozen organic matter decomposes (USGRP 2017). Boreal forest wildfire activity has increased both in the boreal forest and on arctic tundra, and wildfire risks are only projected to increase due to warmer, drier conditions in the North (Francis et al. 2017). The U.S. Global Change Research Program's most recent Climate Science Special Report also indicates significant decreases in snow cover extent across the Northern Hemisphere and that the annual average of Arctic-wide ice mass from glaciers continues to decrease every year since 1984 (USGRP 2017).

2.2 Problem Definition and Policy Paradoxes

When one examines institutions, rules, policy-making, and debates over decisions from a rational choice perspective that assumes a linear, lucid, empirically researched process of making decisions that is often all one sees. But this is a partial reality. The same examination from a standpoint that does not ignore human passions, moral convictions, and the motivations for political action through policy can be more revealing. Stone notes that: "In the real world, we are often forced to entertain paradox, but we are able to live with it because paradoxes are paradoxical only from within one worldview. Politics is one way we help each other see from different perspectives. If we can get outside one viewpoint, we can do a better job of living together and solving common problems" (Stone 2012, p 10).

Put another way, we argue for realization that two seemingly opposed perspectives can both be understood as true when one broadens the scope of analysis. A poignant example in many Arctic nations is the boom-bust cycle in extractive resource production and distribution (Pretes and Robinson 1989). Consider that on an individual level, most people prefer low prices for oil and gas, because it benefits their ability to run machinery and lowers transportation and heating costs.

Simultaneously, the same people can benefit in their local and national economies from high prices on the barrel because it creates revenue streams. Clearly a viewpoint would be "high costs of oil are bad" but equally true when one expands his or her political thinking is that "low costs of oil are bad." Explained in more detail below, one of the biggest challenges any Chairmanship has is deciding what goes on that nation's particular two-year agenda. This agenda setting is inherently bound up in asking, "What's the problem?" We argue that by understanding the existence of policy paradoxes there could be an ongoing and more productive interpretation of continuity of issues across Chairmanships. This can provide greater insight across nations and cultures about how Pan-Arctic stewardship might make progress to lessen the tensions of these challenges even if never resolving them. Such an attitude can generate an adaptive leadership culture over time that would enable the Arctic Council to be more nimble as social-environmental conditions change (DeRue 2011).

2.2.1 How do We Define Policy Problems?

Research and governance of natural resources across the globe, more than ever before, has accepted science as the mainstay of policymaking. The foundations of science rest in a rational model of empirical testing that is generally accepted to produce truths about reality. In addition, the last several decades have witnessed a new acceptance in many fields of study of Indigenous Knowledge (Lovecraft and Eicken 2011). The primary goals of the six Working Groups in the Arctic Council demonstrate a focus on scientific and empirical processes to better understand the North and its attributes. Yet, the nature of the Arctic-of-the-future in light of climate and social trends is uncertain. Agency officials, politicians, corporations, social groups, researchers, and the public can find it difficult to make certain decisions or support certain actions related to policies without reliable predictions of sea ice, outmigration patterns, permafrost loss, or the price of ores. Each rotation of the Arctic Council Chairmanship can build on the work and products of the working groups that are ongoing, and yet each nation's turn as Chair will set an agenda related to what programs and questions matter most and which are further down the list. This process of agenda setting is directly tied to the policy concept of problem definition.

One must remember, there is the Arctic Council, and there are eight, quite similar, national Arctic policies that generally uphold commitments to four policy areas – Indigenous interests, environmental protection, national security, and responsible economic development. Yet, while national level priorities and actions set the stage for the behavior of governments in the North, they do not necessarily determine government activities, largely due to diverse and competing interest groups that flourish in democracies. Most formal national policies towards the Arctic are vague enough in their language to permit multiple political interpretations. In other words, much of what is "Arctic Policy" – the actual governance by

governments in Arctic and sub-Arctic locations - is determined by national legislatures, state/territorial/provincial governments, co-management regimes with Indigenous peoples, local-scale legislatures, and even the activities of major city councils (e.g. zoning, education, taxation). Sometimes these actors are at a considerable distance from the Arctic, spatially and cosmologically. This means that the day-to-day politics in any one country may alter the interpretation of what that nation's Arctic policy means in implementation.

2.2.1.1 The Policy-making Process

Numerous studies have demonstrated that public policy is not made in a mechanical "stages heuristic" but through a process, sometimes decades long, of convergence among purported problems and proposed solutions. In other words, among the governments and societies of the Arctic Eight there is a generally accepted understanding that policies are formed because people bring issues to the attention of government and then a linear sort of process follows that sets an agenda, formulates policy, seeks support (legitimation) for the policy, implements it, then evaluates it and considers changes (Kraft and Furlong 2018). However, this "black box" of public input, government operations, and policy output does not contain a linear process, or even, at times, a rational process. At any time, each of these stages noted above is introduced or manipulated by actors with competing ideas and belief systems that vie for public attention. Each of the Arctic Council nations, has its own variant of democratic practice that contains various forms or units of collective action (e.g. community activist groups, political coalitions, specialized interest groups) that seek to convince the existing government or social coalitions to push for stability or to promote change in a given issue arena (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 2003; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

Within nations and their subgovernments, as well as across the Arctic and globe, there are different networks of public and private organizations and individuals who are concerned with policy outcomes related to a specific issue. In policy jargon, these form "policy subsystems." For example, the collection of actors, rules-sets, and information related to shipping, or animal conservation, or Indigenous rights. Such subsystems of policy development, implementation, and evaluation often have overlapping concerns and actors. For example, consider the policy regime needed to conserve marine mammals in relation to subsistence hunting in the Bering Straits as more ships use the narrow passage.

Across these subsystems and interests, advocacy coalitions form over time. An advocacy coalition consists of "actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 2–4). Multiple advocacy coalitions may exist in any given policy subsystem and they may form or dissolve at any time. Prior to the most recent International Polar Year, for example, most of the world did not think

about sea ice and, even in the Arctic, there was not yet a full understanding of its rapid diminishment and the effects. Today, in the Arctic Council and its nations, there are many stakeholders in the process of forming coalitions to demand different kinds of research and rules related to open water access, species management, scientific research, and other activities. The "glue" that creates these coalitions, and that may dissolve under changing circumstances, is the shared set of core beliefs among members. Members in these coalitions may have limited minor disagreements but will maintain core beliefs and work to translate these shared beliefs into public policy (Mintrom and Vergari 1996). In short, the debates among competing coalitions related to Arctic policy within a nation and across the Arctic are not simply over costs, organizational concerns, or scientific research, but over fundamental beliefs about how the world does work and how it should work (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Fischer and Forester 1993; Bosso 1994).

2.2.1.2 Problem Definition in Setting Policy Agendas

Problem definition in policy-making involves both the objective monitoring of indicators of change and the subjective perceptions of actors in the policy process. Conditions and problems are different. This difference arises from the perceptual, interpretive element of human behavior. Defining any problem requires that participants recognize that a problem actually exists – what is problematic about my, or my group's, condition? Can, or should, the problem be addressed by government? Is the existing information sufficient or inadequate to assess and deal with the problem given a set of policy tools and ideological limitations? Furthermore, policy scholarship indicates that the policy process is one in which problems found to exist by different actors are constantly fitted to new or revised solutions. In short, each Arctic nation, as well as the diverse interests within it, will have coalitions already interested in neoliberal or socialist or conservationist (one can pick from many different ideological labels) modes of addressing Arctic concerns. Kingdon notes that:

> Demonstrating that there is indeed a problem to which one's solution can be attached is a very real preoccupation of participants in the policy process. It becomes a major part of the policy debate…Constructing an indicator and getting others to agree to its worth become major preoccupations of those pressing for policy change. (2003, p.93)

Problem definition involves recognition mechanisms such as indicators, focusing events and feedback, as well as values, political agendas, and budgetary concerns. Decision-makers are asked, through various social and governmental processes, to recognize certain conditions that could be construed as problems (Seidman and Rappaport 1986). Yet problems are not self-evident in indicators. If knowledge is not satisfactory, one way of better defining a given problem is by designing the research that investigates it; this is one major way that perceptions and biases influence problem definition. This generative process of scientific research in the Arctic, as well as how this research reflects and sets government agendas, has been criticized for leaving out the type of information that Indigenous Knowledge can

provide through its generations of empirical observations that in many cases have been woven into the cultural fabric of the Permanent Participants (ICCA 2015; Larsen and Fondahl 2015; Barnhardt and Kawagley 2005; Whitt 2009; AMAP 2017). There has been a recent shift across the Arctic Council Working Groups, as well as the institutions that many of their researchers are affiliated with, to include Indigenous participants at the research development phase of asking questions (Daniel and Behe 2017). This is recently described as a co-production of knowledge, "the realm of knowledge co-production, which we define as the collaborative process of bringing a plurality of knowledge sources and types together to address a defined problem and build an integrated or systems-oriented understanding of that problem" (Armitage et al. 2011, pp 996).

Often some type of crisis or symbol is required to motivate participants in the policy process (Kingdon 2003). One frequent catalyst is a "focusing event" that brings to the attention of the public, political and governmental officials, and a particular agency or organization certain facts about the world (e.g. scientific agreement on climate change) and the behaviors in relation to the issue (e.g. planning for sea level rise can reduce infrastructure costs). Natural disasters, disease outbreaks, police investigations, environmental accidents, or other events that focus scrutiny on public policy goals and agency deliverables are examples of focusing events and are directly related to the potential for organizational learning in governments and entities like the Arctic Council (Birkland 2006). But an "event" need not be a short-term disaster. It can be the slow-moving, but perceptible to humanity in a single life-span, process of Arctic warming and the cascading regional effects of the diminishing cryosphere (Blair et al. 2018). The scientific agreement on the existence, nature, and extent of climate change in the last decade has been such an event. The opposition to this paradigm shift in understanding planetary processes (Dunlap and McCright 2011) has only further focused public debate over climate change policies.

One can see how values – expressed by individuals, agencies, or nations - are integral to defining what a problem is, and in the case of this volume which problems will be adopted by an Arctic Council Chair. In fact, values also come into play in determining whether a given problem can or should be addressed by government, highlighting one of the key differences in governance among Arctic governments. Governmental agendas constrain the important set of topics that any suite of governing institutions may address. The status of a certain problem, or its general category (e.g. salinity in the Arctic Ocean, thawing permafrost, extent of national continental shelves, Indigenous language proficiency) on the current agenda can either amplify or mute the perception of problem severity. Budgets also tend to constrain the definition of new problems by dampening enthusiasm for expensive new proposals (Kingdon 2003), although some budget expansions provide opportunities to attach a variety of solutions to newly 'defined' problems. For example, if thawing permafrost is viewed as a military problem rather than a problem of rural villages near military installations, funding may be found to address a shared problem, but one posed in a way that taps one budget rather than another.

2.3 Arctic Policy Paradoxes

What has the Arctic Council learned from the decades of successive Chairmanships? This volume explores this in detail; here we simply want to note that a "learning organization" exhibits adaptive capacity to apply new information through recognition of error or success to future policy decisions (Mahler 1997, 519; Busenberg 2001, 2004). In this sense, we use *learning* with the positive implication that organizations seek to change their structure and or behaviors to better meet public policy goals for the collective good rather than simply changing protocols to suit a narrow constituency or redefining a policy "problem" to make it disappear (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Stone 2012). In considering the Arctic Council as a whole, for example, one could look at the aims of the six working groups and ask how each can better fulfill its mandate by learning from the past twenty-four years. Clearly, the focus of the Arctic Council, its members, and working groups has shifted since the mid-1990s when pollution and regional cooperation were foremost on the minds of its creators.

We next explain the contemporary challenges of Arctic governance across four examples. Two stem from the traditional Westphalian nation-state approach that has dominated our understanding of international relations (Nuttall 2014) for centuries – territory and identity – and two from our recent decades in the Anthropocene – climate change and modern economic development. These policy concerns press us to think more flexibly and prepare us to act more nimbly than the current model of Arctic Council organization. Across all four one must attend to both linear trends (e.g., global warming, ocean salinity) and cyclical patterns (e.g., electoral cycles, new seasonal weather patterns) to reveal policy paradoxes confronting the Arctic Council and its leadership. Grappling with "policy paradoxes" in pan-Arctic global governance can help to build an adaptive culture across Chairmanships by working towards better fit between policy and lived reality (Trainor 2017).

2.3.1 The Challenges of Nation–states in Relation to Territory and Identity

Issues of nation-state territory and the symbolic claims to "Arcticness" among the Arctic Council members pervade the circumpolar north. Artur Chilingarov planted the Russian flag under the North Pole in 2007. The Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, has been 10 years in the making and will formally open on the 150th birthday of the nation. Finland's development of Arctic emojis to celebrate its Chairmanship include both "*sisu*" and the endangered Saimaa ringed seal. These symbolic devices demonstrate the political nature of policy-making and the Arctic. They stem from the political passions that can construct policy paradoxes. The challenge of how to act in a unified pan-Arctic way,

when the unity of purpose must come from eight quite different systems of government and ideological approaches to the Arctic, is not going away until the Westphalian model does.

2.3.1.1 Territory: Cooperating to Compete in UNCLOS III

The first paradox is the process of territorial claims under the Arctic Ocean. On the one hand, each nation makes an individual claim, but on the other, the process of mapping the sea floor has been one of national cooperation and coordination. In an era of shrinking budgets nations with distinct, and often competing, interests in the Arctic will more often be pressed to cooperate in research that is complicated and costly. In short, the self-interests of individual nations may in fact require collective actions of collaborative research and investment in the Arctic.

The 1994 Agreement on Implementation to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has set the stage for multiple national claims to territory under the Arctic Ocean. Some nations have been engaged even prior, for example, Canada ratified in 2003, having signed it in 1982 when the treaty was first open to signature. On the other hand, the United States first submitted the treaty for Senate approval in 1994 but that body has still not acceded to it. Under this Convention, coastal countries are able to control access to their territorial seas, subject to other states' innocent passage, up to 12 nautical miles from their shorelines. Coastal states have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing, the natural resources in the water column and seabed up to 200 nautical miles from shore. Under the treaty, a nation can assert sovereign rights to explore and exploit non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles if it can provide acceptable scientific data about the extent of its continental shelf. Because a nation has 10 years from its signing of UNCLOS to submit data supporting its assertion of sovereign rights over the natural resources of seabed and subsoil, Canada had to do so by 2013. Russia submitted claims in 2016. The majority national claims have been made possible by a series of continental shelf surveys focusing on the Lomononsov Ridge and deep-sea exploration by scientists of many nationalities sharing or coordinating resources and data. It may in fact have been impossible to learn about these deep ocean regions without international competition over resources, something noted by geophysical scientists (Krajick et al. 2007, p.1525).

This process of scientific cooperation by regional actors has also resulted in at least one significant step, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation in 2017. This demonstrates how a narrow view of equating competition for seafloor resources as negative would limit a policy-maker's ability to engage the paradoxical relationship and take advantage of what it might mean. The agreement is a substantial step for creating and sharing scientific data in an era of environmental uncertainty. It demonstrates that national science programs and international disagreements over resources can produce collective good, here in the form of an institution guiding behavior. The next Chairs will further grapple with the interests

of China and others in the Arctic. While interest itself is not a threat, these inputs or pressures do create a need for policy cooperation among the Arctic Eight to coordinate a governance approach toward non-Arctic nations that can be continued across the rotating Chairmanships.

2.3.1.2 Identity: Governments Destabilize and Secure Indigenous Identities through Education

Larsen and Fondahl have noted in a major study of human development within the Arctic region that:

> The Arctic is changing rapidly in ways that interact and fundamentally affect the region's ecosystems and societies…Climate change is important, but it is not the only driver of rapid changes in the Arctic. In many contexts, social, political and economic drivers may be of greater importance than global climate change (Larsen and Fondahl 2015, pp. x and 32).

The second paradox we present relates to Indigenous identities within a system of eight nation-states. Except for Iceland, there is a centuries old tension between colonial and settler governments creating, and recreating, identities for Indigenous peoples, when at the same time the majority of these groups would prefer to determine their own destinies. Indigenous peoples are simultaneously invited into governance and told their own modes of governance are not acceptable (Dhillon 2017). One paradox is that nation-states can and do use the same mechanism of compulsory schooling, and education in general, that was wielded to destroy culture and assimilate people as a purported tool of advancement for Indigenous peoples in the modern social-economic system today. A related example of the paradox of identity is directly tied to colonial and settler governments' own efforts to create infrastructure related to food and goods for remote rural places. This has both helped and hindered nutritional security for Indigenous people.

Compulsory education creates a system of governance of minors in which they are acculturated into ways of knowing about their social-environmental systems. Education can be a powerful force to liberate Indigenous self-determination by providing skills to address identity politics and numerous policies across the Arctic that affect Indigenous livelihoods and life paths. At the same time national policies on education often dismiss Indigenous knowledge, do not fund programs in Indigenous languages, resist alternative learning, and the act of Western schooling itself can be a form of cultural isolation (Cost 2015). Education, broadly considered as social learning, is directly connected to Arctic resilience at the community scale, where educational practices are generally defined, but also at the pan-Arctic scale when one considers the uncertainty of the future and the need for diverse forms of knowledge to anticipate, define, research, and solve problems.

Consider the example of the International Whaling Commission's setting of a zero quota for bowhead whale hunting in 1977. This would have deeply cut into not only the subsistence food for Alaska Natives but also the entire socio-cultural process of the Inuit to enculturate future generations. The quota was arrived at using "Western" science from the United States government based on whale surveys.

However, the whaling captains of northern Alaska communities recognized this number as erroneous based on their Indigenous Knowledge of the species and its habitat. This led to the formation of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) that conducted its own census. The Inuit knew that bowhead whales swam under ice while the currently accepted scientific wisdom was that bowheads avoided ice and only swam in open water (Wohlforth 2004). In brief, thousands of whales were not counted in the government survey. The AEWC produced, in concert with others, far more accurate numbers resulting in the quota being changed. This example demonstrates the need for the paradox of education to be carefully navigated by the Arctic Council and its working groups. On the one hand, education in general needs to be improved across rural and remote locations, but at the same time, the transfer of Indigenous Knowledge systems happening in these same locations must continue. Even if one rejects the moral argument of cultural survival, this process is vital to ensure a diversity of empirical evidence needed for policy fit from Arctic governance.

In light of the first quote of this chapter, Tengö et al. propose a "multiple evidence based approach" to enhance environmental governance. They note,

> Cross-fertilization among a diversity of knowledge systems can contribute new evidence and also improve the capacity to interpret conditions, change, responses, and in some cases causal relationships in the dynamics of social–ecological systems. Further, it may also lead to innovation and the identification of desirable trajectories or pathways into the future. (2014, pp. 582)

Community resilience across the Arctic is directly connected to social learning, but this learning, in order to create livelihoods for the future, must be, in part, tied to the social-environmental system, respecting both Indigenous and Western languages and cultures alongside science and values (Cost 2015). We argue that education in the Arctic, including language instruction, should be encouraged in two modes and be governed through techniques that foster both modes actively in students of all ages. Otherwise, the negative outcomes of schooling—those that divide community members from one another and from their culture—will be repeated. Without Indigenous and non-Indigenous people exchanging and building shared knowledge about the Arctic, there will be far less observational expertise to inform adaptation.

2.3.2 The Challenges of the Anthropocene

We argue that the Anthropocene, the distinct geological epoch defined by significant impacts of the Earth by humans that would not be otherwise present (Crutzen 2002; Waters et al. 2016), is itself a paradox. The lifting of billions of human lives out of poverty, the incredible breadth of goods humans produce, and the expanse of modern science has been underwritten by humanity's fundamental alteration of the planet. This success by our species may also doom us in the coming centuries, and many non-human species far sooner, if we cannot stabilize the climate variables

related to ocean circulation, air temperatures, and other planetary processes that have been present in the last several millennia in which large-scale human food production has been possible.

2.3.2.1 Climate Change: The Faster the Warming, the Quicker the Development

Climate change has become an unavoidable concern and in some cases, a driver of the social problems noted above. It has come to be accepted as part of the future of the Arctic, though globally mitigation efforts seek to slow it. One of the most prominent among the changes in the cryosphere is the extent of summer sea ice, which has been in dramatic decline since 2007 compared to previous years' data (Serreze and Stroeve 2015). This affects a whole range of species, as well as the ability for people to travel and access a range of ice-dependent socio-economic and cultural services (Lovecraft 2013). With a potential near total lack of summer sea ice by 2030, there is no question that Arctic communities, and thus their governments, will grapple with new opportunities, problems, and issues such as increases in marine shipping and tourism and heightened interests in Arctic security (Meier et al. 2014). Sea ice loss also threatens food security (ICCA 2015), which in turn threatens culturally significant aspects of Indigenous Knowledge education and enculturation such as language learning and retention, landscape and seascape observational capacities, and reinforcement of Inuit and other Indigenous values.

This suite of changes has led to an arctic paradox already often discussed. Across scales of governance (local to global), there is simultaneously a drive to promote the hydrocarbon industry for economic development and to protect humans and their environments from the results of this drive. Palosaari and Zellen present different perspectives on this issue. The former argues directly for framing the paradox as follows: the faster we burn fossil fuels, the faster thawing and melting in the Arctic will make those resources accessible (Palosaari 2012). Zellen argues a longer view and one with a more critical eye towards the global industrial production of wealth in the Arctic. He makes the case that the "winners and losers" argument in the Arctic is flawed in its subjectivity by the lack of consideration of the land claims processes in North America and Greenland. He advances the case that in the coming decades, much of the valuable surface and subsurface territory desired for economic development of natural resources and economic integration through marine traffic will be owned or governed by the Inuit and other Permanent Participants. Zellen notes the possibility that with "land claims settled now across the entire Arctic coast of North America, the Inuit have vast ownership rights to both the surface and sub-surface, and substantial governmental and regulatory powers, and new economic resources for training and economic development – making it possible for the Inuit to enter this new world with us as partners, not as dependents, and not as a colonial possession" (Zellen 2009, p163). He further makes the claim that the process of home-rule in Greenland is likely to create "winners" there as well "with increased sovereignty over their traditional homeland, the Inuit could emerge as tomorrow's equivalent of

today's Saudi royal family, in command of great wealth, and in control of vital strategic resources and waterways" *(ibid.*). However, Zellen's propositions rest on the policy maintenance of direct Indigenous participation in governance within, or with, established nation-states. But these nations can alter Indigenous status as citizens and policy participants. The discussion in April 2018 by the Trump administration of changing U.S. Indigenous identity to a racial category, thus nullifying federal commitments to tribes, prompts us to remember the long history of governments in the Arctic forcibly taking resources and moving people. In a different line of thought related to development, one might wonder whether the diminished cryosphere of the mid-century would still necessitate the use of heavy icebreakers that have been such a source of Arctic competition. China launched its domestically produced heavy icebreaker *Xuelong 2* in September 2018 and Russia has a fleet of fourty-one total in different classes. In the U.S. calls demanding a national replacement for the heavy icebreaker *Polar Star*, and non-functional *Polar Sea*, have come from multiple government agencies and officials. But such technology may take up to a decade to produce. Even if production began in 2020 one runs up against models forecasting shrunken and thin Arctic sea ice with virtually no sea ice by mid-century in summers. By the time the U.S. produces a heavy icebreaker it may not be critical for Arctic access and medium class ships are far less expensive to build.

2.3.2.2 Economic Development: A Richer but Poorer Arctic

The Arctic is an expensive place to do business due to distance, remoteness, and a lack of infrastructure. Add to this the differing regulations that are designed to protect arctic lands and waters and the cost is higher. It is not surprising that peaks in Arctic attention to economic development have come when there is a financial climate that makes Arctic resources (e.g. whales, furs, gold, and petroleum) cost effective to acquire. Paradoxically, successful regional economies based on high prices for finite natural resources can be the largest threat to Arctic system stability when combined with unknown effects of climate disruptions, noted above, on the natural world and economies.

Communities in the high North often lack efficient access to modern marketplace economics due to their remoteness and related costs of living, internet/technology capacity, housing, transportation, local access to education for college, career and livelihood readiness. The nature of communities across the Arctic are diverse, for example, some are large and have had established ports on the Arctic Ocean since the medieval era such as Arkhangelsk, Russia. However, many people, in particular in North America and Greenland, live in small settlements, often with a majority of Indigenous residents, and primarily rely on subsistence fishing, hunting, and gathering for food, material goods, and cultural continuity. These "mixed subsistence" locations also differ from "hub" communities (approximately 2000–6000 people) where there is greater access to markets for both buying and selling goods, and smaller villages of a few hundred or less. This contrast in livelihoods and place-based experiences means any efforts to facilitate access to markets must be sensitive

to scale and local conditions when evaluating the role and development of further connectivity. For example, regulations tied to subsistence practices as well as restrictions on local-scale participation in the regulatory process can depress the growth of small businesses that could take advantage of global markets. In the late 1990s estimates of the value of rural subsistence harvest in Alaska was about $160–$260 million U.S. dollars. In Canada, figures from Nunavut alone carried an estimate of $30 million CN dollars (Thornton 2001). What is the paradox? Government rules, in other words, may create institutions that do not fit very well with local material needs. Across the Arctic there are different national rules, for example, related to polar bear and whale hunting in relation to economic possibilities. In the U.S. case there are strict rules related even to the type of "handicrafts" an Alaska Native person may offer for sale depending on which animals have been used (Robards and Lovecraft 2010). Protecting animal species and their habitats while simultaneously creating conditions for Indigenous markets to flourish are in tension.

One could consider the less contentious possible expansion of a market for reindeer products. Market access in Arctic communities can enable competition of vendors and can lower costs of goods; it also means goods produced in the Arctic may be able to make it to markets in the U.S. and abroad. Market access can stimulate community development, for example, by building up broadband and other communication resources, in combination with postal services, new opportunities for marketplaces are possible. However, paradoxically, this process can also bring influences that may be unwelcome to communities. Such problematic influences may be related to infrastructure development, demographic shifts, or black-market goods that do not fit with a community's values.

In many areas, Arctic communities do not have diversified economies, but rather depend on a single large source of revenue (e.g., oil and gas extraction, mining, or fishing). To increase economic diversity and sustainability of livelihoods there are two major aspects of the North that are important to understand. First, as Goldsmith, an Alaskan economist, explains "money doesn't stick." The cash generated in remote regions generally does not stay there. This is because of the money generated; the bulk of it goes into producer profits, governmental taxes and royalties. Another concern is that many resident households and businesses cannot or will not purchase locally; money that does come into the region goes out when people spend elsewhere. Likewise, many extractive industries "fly-in" and "fly-out" their workers from a region. Changes in the economies of the Arctic that can increase access to market flows will be related to a suite of government and private drivers. Perhaps of largest concern is government spending, as it slows it affects many jobs directly, or indirectly (e.g., government contracts) dependent upon it. New jobs not tied to extractive industries are likely to be in the "information sector" which carries the advantage of having remote workers, but these will require education and advanced training. There are many small-scale business opportunities related to tourism and the arts, food production, and other local businesses that Arctic communities need that have the potential to grow with investment. But investments, like budgets can chage what goes on the government agenda as a problem.

Rapid economic growth can produce good results, but global businesses produce local externalities. There are models where strong local involvement over resource exploitation and regulatory systems can temper unsustainable or negative externality-producing growth while creating capacity at the local level to deal with other challenges. Arguably this paradox needs careful attention so that economic growth leading to the resource exploitation that produces wealth is not poorly regulated, thus depleting the adaptive capacity of any location. The benefits of extractive industries must be balanced with local-scale co-management to avoid fragmented landscapes and pollution potential that can create a less resilient Arctic in the long run, in particular for people who are heavily depend on healthy ecosystems for their livelihoods.

2.4 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts

Because humans work under uncertainty as they strive to best utilize their environments, planning in a way that can recognize oppositional truths about societies in the Arctic may be initially rife with tension. It is this difficulty that drives the evolution of individual and organizational learning in relation to dynamic and complex social-ecological systems (Fazey et al. 2005). Learning comes from creative tension between what is already known and new knowledge; the way we have done things versus exploring adaptations in light of what change presents us.

If we consider that one way to stabilize the Arctic social-environmental system is to mimic as closely as possible a scenario of benign non-interference, we realize that no matter the paradox certain elements of change are going to move forward in the North. A theoretical sudden halt to Arctic development is problematic in two ways. Firstly, global capitalism is not predictable, extractive industries generally face booms and busts over time, and we do not know what positive technological outcomes may arise. Innovation and wealth creation through a rise of interest in the Arctic can be of great benefit to Arctic inhabitants. Secondly, Arctic peoples are living in democracies that to varying degrees reflect their interests; it is not possible to "leave them alone." Furthermore, it is not desirable from the perspective of most minority and marginalized populations who would like the opportunity to develop economically and benefit from the opportunities in their region. Balancing economic development as an effective counterweight to poverty with the legacies of colonialization is vital. The key is to create the correct incentives in the political-economics of the region to encourage effective environmental stewardship and responsiveness to local-level priorities. This is a place where continuity in planning, or at a minimum strategy, across Chairmanships could greatly reduce some of the negative boom-bust cycle effects.

What each of these paradoxical examples promote is creative thinking in terms of policy design and implementation that moves beyond a narrow view of "winners and losers" in the coming decades to consider different ways that some "losses" may become "wins" if we expand the scope of our political thinking to include

more perspectives on the Arctic. For example, a bust in oil prices has allowed the intensity of hydrocarbon extraction to lessen, thus allowing cleaner and more efficient technology to develop and ecosystems to potentially recover until the next boom. Accepting paradox in governance can help a politician, official, manager, or citizen to also comprehend the diversity of interests in the Arctic and perhaps understand or represent those interests in different ways for a better fit between rules and needs.

The Chairs of the Arctic Council are themselves holders of institutional memory and can increase capacity for policy that fits the context across all actors if they plan their own Chairmanship agenda with consideration to long-standing policy paradoxes. Tensions that are not easy to resolve require a shift in thinking. They require the Arctic Council, over time, to take up new perspectives that some organizations and institutions may not yet be ready to address. This pivot towards multiple evidence bases can help the Arctic Council innovate in ways that can reduce tensions surrounding long-standing problems and remain relevant to the next generation.

The Fourth International Polar Year (2007–2009) was a teachable moment, a focusing event, in its own right. It brought forward a suite of social and environmental trends that have come to define the energies of the Arctic Council in terms of adapting to change. The scientific and political repercussions of global attention on the Arctic have shaped the nature of the Council's successive Chairs. Coming together in this recent IPY demonstrated the significant gaps that still remain in Arctic regional collaboration. But, the Arctic Council remains a credible organization and membership, is desirable. We strongly suggest that the Chairmanships use this fact to create continuity through encouraging arctic stewardship (Chapin III et al. 2015) by non-Arctic nations. Having science organizations, administrators, and others from non-Arctic nations involved at the international level can acculturate their national interests to shared Arctic values. In other words, multinational scientific communication, education, and cooperation should be further encouraged at the community scale and across the regional and national governments. Such exchanges are often the bridge between citizens and the ears of government and agency officials. In order to build capacity across Chairmanships to enable effective fit between policies and needed collective outcomes in the Arctic, our final suggestion is to let the Permanent Participants serve as Chair. The value of a greater focus on developing research and policy informed by multiple sources of empirical evidence presses us to engage the Permanent Participants more strongly as pan-Arctic agents of governance.

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Chapter 3
The Arctic Council in Transition

Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek

Abstract Over the course of its twenty-year lifetime the Arctic Council (AC) has undergone a transition from a low-profile regional institution known to only but a few, to an acclaimed primary forum for circumpolar and global cooperation on issues pertaining to the Arctic. Established as a body void of most features of traditional international organization, the Council has managed to find for itself a niche among other international institutions and gradually enhanced both its structures and position, despite no change in its legal foundation and mandate. How did this process unfold? More importantly, from this contribution's perspective, what was the role of the Arctic Council Chairmanship in this evolution? The chapter aims to address both of these questions.

Keywords Arctic Council · Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy · Chairmanship · Institutional evolution · Institutional reform

3.1 Introduction

The Arctic Council celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2016. Over the course of its twenty-year lifetime, the Council has undergone a transition from a low-profile regional institution known to only but a few, to an acclaimed primary forum for circumpolar and global cooperation on issues pertaining to the Arctic. This twentieth anniversary milestone offered an opportunity to look back at the Council's achievements as well as to reflect on the challenges lying ahead of it, as of a forum for facilitating regional cooperation in addressing environmental protection and sustainable development in the rapidly transforming North (*Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* 1996). At its twentieth anniversary, the Arctic Council received many appraisals, some criticisms, and was subjected to numerous reform proposals put forward by various scholars and practitioners alike. Among commentators on Arctic affairs, there was a consensus that the Council's

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accomplishments and contributions had far exceeded what anyone present at its beginnings in 1996 could have expected from a body founded on a basis of a very general declaration and without the support of a permanent secretariat and a stable budget (Kankaanpää and Young 2012). Established as "a high-level forum" void of many features of traditional international organization, the Council has managed to find for itself a niche among other international institutions and has gradually enhanced both its structures and position to become a primary body for matters pertaining to the Arctic. Thanks to its unique participatory arrangement where organizations of indigenous peoples sit as Permanent Participants alongside Arctic state officials, the Council has become an important mechanism for increasing recognition of the concerns of the Arctic's indigenous peoples (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006).

The Arctic Council has become also the main generator of knowledge on changes within the circumpolar North. It paved the way for recognition of the Arctic as a distinct region in the international political consciousness (Keskitalo 2007; Keskitalo 2004) and provided critical input to international conventions such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and the Minamata Convention on Mercury (Minamata Convention on Mercury 2013; Stockholm Convention on POP 2001). Finally, the Arctic Council has offered a negotiating space for several circumpolar legally binding agreements and catalyzed formation of new regional entities such as the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum.[1]

How did this process unfold? Even more specifically, what was the role of the Arctic Council's Chairmanship in that process? This chapter addresses these questions in the following order. First, it revisits the history of the Arctic Council and Arctic cooperation from its start with the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) signed in 1991. This portion of the chapter includes a discussion of the negotiations leading to the inception of the Arctic Council and a review of the first decade of its operation. It also takes note of changes within the institution and its external environment that began unfolding around 2007. The second portion of the chapter approaches the process of the Council's evolution from the perspective of subsequent Arctic Council Chairmanships, starting from the first Canadian Chairmanship (1996–1998) and concluding with the second Finland's Chairmanship (2017–2019). As several of these Chairmanships are addressed in a detailed manner in other chapters in this volume, the aim of this section is to provide an overview of outstanding elements from each of the past Chairmanships of the Arctic Council. This section also draws attention to issues worth consideration in advancing scholarship on the role and power of the Chair in international institutions and organizations.

[1] Arctic Economic Council https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/, accessed on 26 June 2018.

3.2 From Rovaniemi Process to the Ottawa Declaration

The idea of a forum for broad circumpolar collaboration, when it came to fruition with the foundation of the Arctic Council in 1996, was not itself new. As early as in 1970s scholars, predominantly from Canada, pondered ways of diminishing the levels of confrontation in the Arctic and the conception of an Arctic Basin Treaty (Cohen and Pharand as quoted in Keskitalo, fn. 192 in Nilsson 2007). It was, however, not until nearly two decades later that the idea of circumpolar collaboration took off with the historical speech of Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk in 1987. In his speech, the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union called for making the Arctic a "zone of peace" and fruitful cooperation. He also suggested that the region might benefit from the coordination of scientific research in the North and enhanced cooperation in protecting Arctic's natural environment. Whereas the former theme provided a boost to efforts aimed at founding the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC),[2] the latter effort was vigorously undertaken by Finland and led to signing the *Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment* and the *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy* (AEPS) in 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland. Accordingly, the AEPS' focus was on the Arctic environment – primarily directed toward developing environmental monitoring, deepening scientific understanding of pollution in the region, and assessing on a continuous basis threats to fragile northern ecosystems. In order to achieve those objectives, the Strategy called for establishment of four Working Groups: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency, Preparedness, Prevention and Response (EPPR) and Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). Each working group was tasked with conducting their respective programmatic activities and realizing their individual mandates (Young 1998).

The AEPS promptly began to operationalize itself and work on its first projects and assessments. However, from the onset it was criticized by some countries for its limited focus on selected environmental issues and insufficient inclusion of the human dimension of the Arctic within its activities. Canada in particular, because of its large indigenous population and the high profile of northern issues on its domestic political agenda, was an active proponent of establishing a new multilateral decision-making organization with wide-ranging authority that would also attend to other matters such as sustainable development in the North. Not all Arctic parties, however, shared this view. The United States made it clear that it would not join any such type of organization. It complained of the high operating costs of such new international organization and the potential of duplication of effort with other existing bodies like the AEPS. The American position, in turn, rendered the Canadian initiative futile in the eyes of most of the other circumpolar governments.

[2] IASC was, in fact, the first circumpolar collaboration institution, established in 1990, a year before signing the AEPS (Rogne et al. 2015; Smieszek 2017).

Because of the stance taken by the United States, the negotiations aimed at creating a new Arctic body were much protracted and it was not clear whether they would conclude with any tangible output. Eventually they did. The final result, however, was only a minimalist version which could not be farther from original ambitious Canadian proposal for a vibrant Arctic international organization (English 2013; Scrivener 1999). Instead, provisions of the *Ottawa Declaration*, the founding document of the Arctic Council, could be more precisely described as 'what [the Arctic Council] was *not* to be' (English 2013: 235). Consequently, the Council was set up as a small in scale "high level forum" designed to promote cooperation "among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues" (*Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* 1996).

Like its predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the Arctic Council was adopted by means of a declaration, rather than a treaty, reflecting a political – but not a legal – commitment by its Member States to circumpolar collaboration (Bloom 1999). This resulted in the emergence of a "soft law" arrangement rather than a traditional international organization – a new entity without a legal personality. It was also decided it would operate without a permanent secretariat or a stable budget, solely on a basis of voluntary contributions from Arctic states and engaged parties.

Thus, effectively, the negotiations leading to the Ottawa Declaration did not manage to remove any major shortcomings of the AEPS such as its own tenuous organizational structure and weak financial footing. Instead, they raised new discord over the relationship between existing environmentally-oriented Working Groups of the AEPS, soon subsumed under the Council, and that body's possible future actions related to sustainable development (Haavisto 2002; Scrivener 1999). Moreover, there was no agreement among the Arctic states on the meaning of the concept of sustainable development itself. As consequence, it was not possible for the Member States of the Council to agree to even a list of priorities, much less to create a comprehensive sustainable development program.[3]

The Ottawa Declaration provided for three categories of participants in the Arctic Council. The first category, of Members, was reserved exclusively for Canada, Denmark,[4] Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States (*Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* 1996). A second category was for Permanent Participants. This was an innovative and largely

[3] In result of this discord, it was decided at the Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit in 1998 that the Sustainable Development Program would comprise of a series of specific projects (Bloom 1999), a practice that has largely prevailed until today. Only in 2017 the Sustainable Development Working Group of the Arctic Council had its first Strategic Framework developed and approved.

[4] This was the original wording of the Ottawa Declaration. Today the usage is the Kingdom of Denmark, which denotes the fact that the Kingdom comprises in addition to Denmark, two autonomous, constituent countries, Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

unprecedented arrangement under which selected organisations of Arctic indigenous peoples would have their representatives sit alongside Arctic Ministers and Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs)[5] to ensure their "active participation and full consultation" on the Council's activities (Arctic Governance Project 2010; Bloom 1999; *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* 1996; Fenge and Funston 2015). Finally, a third category of Observers was created for non-Arctic states, global and regional intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations and nongovernmental organizations "that the Council determines can contribute to its work" (*Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* 1996).[6] In accordance with the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, the primary role of Observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council, where they are expected to contribute and engage predominantly at the level of the Arctic Council's Working Groups (Arctic Council 2013a).

All decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies are taken by consensus among all eight Arctic Member States (*Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* 1996).[7] It was decided that the Chairmanship of the Council would rotate among the Member States on a biennial basis – a measure envisaged as means of cost-sharing, where – in absence of a permanent secretariat – the host country would provide much of the operational and support resources needed to operate the Arctic Council over a two-year period. Consequently, "the 1996 Ottawa Declaration set forth key understandings on the purpose and structure of the Arctic Council, but required further work be done to flesh out the details of how the Council would operate" (Bloom 1999). The fleshing out of the terms of reference for the Council took the next 2 years and "[o]nce the debilitating wrangling over procedural matters was terminated in an exhausted – although far from exhaustive – consensus, the Council had at least a chance to operationalise itself" (Scrivener 1999: 57).

[5] Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs – formerly, under the AEPS, Senior Arctic Affairs Officials, SAAOs) are the high-ranking officials (usually at the ambassador level) who are designated by each Arctic state and meet at least twice a year. Their main task is to oversee the work of Arctic Council's Working Groups and its other subsidiary bodies in order to ensure implementation of the mandates issued by Arctic Ministers at the biennial Arctic Council's Ministerial Meetings.

[6] Originally, fourteen Observers were present at the signing ceremony of the declaration in Ottawa in 1996. Today there are thirty-nine, including states like China, India and Japan, and organizations such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the National Geographic Society and WWF. In addition, the group encompasses also the European Union (EU), which is recognized as the de facto Observer of the Arctic Council.

[7] Even though, technically speaking, only eight Arctic states are considered to determine whether consensus on any given matter has been reached, the status and moral authority of Permanent Participants grants them participation in most of the discussions on a footing equal to Members of the Council. As such, Permanent Participatns have been also occasionally able to influence the course of taken resolutions (Fenge and Funston 2015).

3.3 The Arctic Council 1996–2017

Negotiating the Rules of Procedure and developing other operational measures for a new institution proved to be a complicated and extended exercise that consumed most of the efforts of the inaugural Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (1996–1998). It also required some effort to fold the AEPS into the new Arctic Council. At the same time, it was during that period, when the first major deliverable of the AMAP Working Group, *AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues* came out. It provided information on the state of Arctic environment, including essential information on persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the region, on polar ecology and peoples of the North (AMAP 1998), and established a lasting precedent for the conduct of scientific assessments by the Council.[8] Among other accomplishments that could be listed by the end of the first Arctic Council Chairmanship was also the establishment of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).

The United States took over the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council from Canada in 1998 and led a newly established institution during its first active phase (1998–2000). Although some scholars view critically the engagement of the United States in the Council throughout its "rather lackluster chairmanship" (Nord 2016a, b: 25) and point to the fact that "much of the original excitement and enthusiasm associated with the Ottawa Declaration had been dampened" (Nord 2016a, b: 26) by the time of the Council's second Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska in 2000, it is worth noting that it was the United States that launched and largely funded the most influential and ground-breaking product of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (ACIA 2004, 2005; Rogne et al. 2015).[9]

It was the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment that established the Arctic as a prime location of global climate change, which is likely to warm twice as fast as the rest of the planet, with profound consequences for humans and ecosystems in the region and beyond. The assessment also contributed to shifting the image of the Arctic from a 'frozen desert' to the one of 'Arctic in change' (Fenge 2013; Koivurova 2009; Stone 2015). This trend was further exacerbated by the series of events that received unprecedented attention of the media, the public and government decision-makers worldwide. These events included a widely reported planting of the Russian flag on the seafloor at the North Pole in August 2007 and a record decrease in the extent of the Arctic sea-ice in September of the same year (NSIDC 2007). Furthermore, in 2008 the United States Geological Survey published new estimates according to which the Arctic could be holding up to thirty percent of world's undiscovered oil and gas reserves (U.S. Geological Survey

[8] Strictly speaking, even if the Ottawa Declaration provided for inclusion of the AEPS and its Working Groups, the formal transition of these programs to the Arctic Council and the termination of the AEPS, occurred only at the AEPS Ministerial Meeting held in Alta, Norway in June, 1997 (Fenge and Funston 2015). Also, whereas the delivery of the product itself took place only in 1997, the majority of work on it was conducted under the AEPS and not under the Arctic Council.

[9] For more detailed account regarding the ACIA see (Nilsson 2007, 2012).

2008). This was followed by the announcement that the Arctic Ocean could become ice free as early as in summer between 2030 and 2100 (NSIDC 2009). The world's attention was further drawn to the North by media speculation about possible geopolitical tensions, alleged emerging conflicts over Arctic resources and prospects of new economic opportunities in the increasingly accessible Arctic Ocean (Borgerson 2008; Graff 2007). All of these events combined resulted in much greater interest in Arctic affairs expressed by an increasing number of non-Arctic actors. Many of these submitted their applications for Observer status within the Council. Questions were raised concerning the adequacy of the existing Arctic governance structures vis-à-vis challenges faced by the region (European Parliament 2008; Graczyk and Koivurova 2013).

All those developments coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Arctic Council. The Council until that time was used to operating as a scientific, more than a policy, forum and away from the limelight and international attention. This growing interest from the outside world presented new challenges to the Council. One of them came from several Arctic states themselves. In May 2008 representatives of Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States (the so called Arctic Five) met in Ilulissat, Greenland to reassert their exclusive legal sovereign rights and obligations as coastal states of the Arctic. Their intention was to cut short discussions about the need for a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Despite assertions from the states present at that meeting that its format was justified in the light of surging interest in the Arctic (Pedersen 2012), some excluded Member States of the Arctic Council – Iceland, Finland and Sweden – and the Permanent Participants expressed their deep disapproval of the new forum. They argued that it was impeding existing formats and patterns of circumpolar collaboration and excluding long-term partners and Arctic indigenous peoples from the table. In result, the Ilulissat meeting not only raised some tension among Arctic actors and states, but it also cast serious doubt about the Arctic Council as a preeminent forum for matters pertaining to the Arctic (Pedersen 2012).

That point was further exacerbated when some of the Arctic Council's Observers began to express their discontent and question positions assigned to them in the Council (Graczyk 2011; Graczyk and Koivurova 2013; Young 2009). Whereas the matter of Observers would occupy the Council's attention in the following years (see Chap. 10 of this volume) a debate about the Arctic Five format as an alternative to the Arctic Council came to halt in 2010. At the second meeting of the group in Chelsea, Canada the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly dismissed the Arctic Five gathering, consequently confirming the primary position of the Arctic Council among other northern fora. It made it also for the time being the only relevant forum for general discussions on Arctic matters and effectively led to enhancing the Council's position (Pedersen 2012).[10]

[10] In May 2018 Denmark, together with Greenland, invited representatives of all eight Arctic states and the Council's Permanent Participants to Ilulissat, Greenland to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the declaration from 2008.

With these concerns as background, the Arctic Council set out on a path of internal reforms and adjustments.[11] Among these efforts, the Council adjusted its rules concerning the admission, role and functions of the Arctic Council's Observers. It agreed to the new and more specific criteria for Observers in 2011 and eventually incorporated them into the revised Rules of Procedure adopted by the Arctic Ministers at their meeting in Kiruna in 2013 (Arctic Council 2013b; a).[12] The Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna drew also unprecedented global media attention due to a decision of the Council on granting an Observer status to new non-Arctic states and entities. Ultimately, the Arctic Council decided in favor of admitting China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea as Observers, while it deferred a decision on the European Union (Arctic Council 2013b). Additional new Observers were accepted at the Ministerial Meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska in 2017 and today the Council has 39 Observers.[13]

Following a successful experience with a shared Secretariat during the three successive Scandinavian Chairmanships, the Arctic Ministers took a major step in 2011 in addressing some of the Arctic Council's observed operational deficiencies by deciding to establish a standing Arctic Council Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (Arctic Council 2011). The Secretariat provides several support functions to the Council including the administration and organization of its meetings. It works closely with the SAO Chair and their team to advance the Council's outreach and communications efforts (Arctic Council 2012). Moreover, in archiving the materials of the organization, the Secretariat starts to serve as the institutional memory of the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in 2011 also became a milestone in the Council's history for another reason. The Arctic Ministers who gathered in Nuuk, Greenland signed the first legally-binding agreement that was negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic* (SAR Agreement). The SAR Agreement was followed by the second one, the *Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic* (Oil Spills Agreement),[14] signed

[11] The proposal to review the AC's structures, provide for regular evaluation of the Council and consider ways of improving its efficiency and effectiveness was included in Norway's program for its Chairmanship (2006–2008, effectively 2009) as well as in the joint program that Norway, Denmark, and Sweden announced in 2007 for their consecutive Arctic Council's Chairmanships 2006–2012 (Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006; "Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006–2012").

[12] Following their adoption, an applicant for an Observer status is now to, among others, recognize Arctic states' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic; respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples, and demonstrate a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arctic Council (Arctic Council 2013a).

[13] They include 13 non-Arctic states, 13 intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and 13 non-governmental organizations (Arctic Council Observers, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers, accessed on 25 June, 2018), with the European Union recognized in practice as a *de facto* Observer and participating in meetings of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies as any other admitted actor.

[14] Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (signed in Nuuk on 12 May 2011, entered into force 19 January 2013) 50 ILM 1119 (2011) (SAR

at the Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna in 2013. A third agreement on enhancing international scientific cooperation in the region was concluded at the end of the second US Arctic Council Chairmanship in Fairbanks in May 2017.[15] Since the Arctic Council has no independent legal personality, however, none of those agreements are in reality "Arctic Council's agreements". Instead, they are all concluded among eight Arctic states, with a focus on a particular aspect of cooperation in the circumpolar region. Nevertheless, even if the Council served mainly as a catalyst for their launch and a forum for their negotiation, the agreements triggered much discussion about the Council moving from a policy-shaping toward a policy-making body, a development praised by many and further reaffirmed by Arctic Ministers in their statement "Vision for the Arctic" (Arctic Council 2013c).[16]

All these legally-binding agreements came from the work of Arctic Council Task Forces, a new element added for the first time to the institutional architecture of the body in 2009.[17] A Task Force is established by a decision of the Arctic Ministers. Each has a specific mandate and is targeted to deliver concrete results within a limited time period. There have been three Task Forces which have served as the negotiating fora for the aforementioned legally-binding agreements. Moreover, the Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum under Canadian Chairmanship (2013–2015) led to formation of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC). The Arctic Economic Council has been the first among a series of satellite bodies that have their roots in the Council and are expected to complement its work. While those bodies operate independently of the Council, there are some functional and organizational overlaps between them and the Working and Experts Groups of the Council.[18]

Agreement); Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (signed in Kiruna on 15 May 2013) <www.arctic-council.org/eppr> accessed 15 Jan 2017 (Oil Spills Agreement).

[15] The scientific cooperation agreement entered into force in May 2018.

[16] At the same time, a number of scholars pointed to potential shortfalls stemming from the increasing focus on the Council's regulatory functions and decision-making powers; inadequacies of such solutions in relation to major challenges facing the Arctic; and finally, noting the limited extent of the adopted agreements (Kao et al. 2012; Rottem 2015; Spence 2017; Young 2016).

[17] The first two Task Forces (TF) were the Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers and the Task Force on Search and Rescue, both installed in 2009. They were followed with Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response (2011); TF for Institutional Issues (2011); TF to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum (2013); TF on Black Carbon and Methane (2013); Scientific Cooperation Task Force (2013); TF on Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic (TFTIA) (2015); TF on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC) (2015), and TF on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic (TFICA) (2017). The Arctic Council Rules of Procedure stipulate that the Council may establish working groups, task forces or other subsidiary bodies to carry out programs and projects under the guidance and direction of Senior Arctic Officials, with their composition and mandates agreed by the Arctic states in a Ministerial Meeting (Arctic Council 2013a).

[18] Two other bodies include the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum formed in November 2015 and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum founded in October 2015. While all of those bodies operate in principle separately from the Arctic Council, their composition largely corresponds to this of the Council and their Chairmanship goes in hand with the rotation cycle of the Arctic Council.

Opinions regarding the Task Forces vary. On the one hand, some view their increasing use as a sign of Council's "commitment to translate its science and assessment work into policy and action" (Fenge and Funston 2015: 11). On the other hand, there are also those who express concerns over the Council's growing fragmentation, arising and potential duplication of work between existing Working Groups and newly established units, and possible competition over, in any way, restricted funding and human resources (Rottem 2016; Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, The Russian Federation 2015).

In order to address this issue and to enhance the ability of the Arctic Council and its bodies to work together as a coherent whole, the Council has now embarked on the development of its first strategic plan. Discussions on this idea began during second US Arctic Council Chairmanship (2015–2017). In the Fairbanks Declaration the Ministers of all eight Arctic states[19] jointly instructed their Senior Arctic Officials to develop such a plan for the Ministers' approval at their next Meeting in 2019. The process was to be led by Finland which, as the Chair of the Council 2017–2019, aims to "further strengthen Arctic cooperation by looking into the possibility of setting commonly agreed long-term goals" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2017).

Arguably, the strategic plan and the process to devise it could be a tool for the Council to prepare for the changes and challenges that the region and its main cooperation forum might be facing until 2030. As the volume of issues on the Council's agenda grows, and the number of participants from outside the Arctic steadily increases, the challenge becomes one of bringing together the Council, its satellite bodies and initiatives into a coherent and cohesive whole. The strategic plan could be one means to address this challenge. First, it could enhance the Council's ability to focus on priority areas and to channel the efforts of the Working Groups toward them. Second, it could allow for assessing gaps in the existing structure of the Council. Finally, it would direct the Council toward a more structured cooperation with external institutions and organizations in order to achieve the Council's goals and the vision Arctic states set out for the region. The final product of the strategic planning process will be delivered in 2019 when Finland will conclude its second Arctic Council Chairmanship. With the term of the country that initiated negotiations of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy coming to an end, the time is ripe to reflect on the role of the Chairmanships in the evolution and development of the Arctic Council up to date. The next portion of this chapter turns attention to this matter.

[19] The Ministerial Meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska in 2017 was the first one in the Council's history, where all Member States were represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs or, in case of the United States, by the Secretary of State. Arguably, this fact – the rank of ministers and officials attending the Arctic Council's meetings – speaks itself to the growing importance and attention paid the Arctic Council, particularly in the United States. Hillary Clinton was the first sitting Secretary of State to attend the Council's Ministerial Meeting in Nuuk, Greenland in 2011.

3.4 The Role of the Chairmanship in the Evolution of the Arctic Council

As outlined in the first part of the chapter, the confined role assigned to the Arctic Council Chair was mainly a result of a position taken by the United States in the negotiations leading to signing of the Ottawa Declaration in 1996. From the onset the United States sought to minimise any potential for the Council to acquire its own separate identity and mandate. It also attempted to limit the role of the Arctic Council Chair largely to the actual Ministerial Meetings of the Arctic Council (Scrivener 1999). While this did not happen entirely, it appears fair to say that the office of the Arctic Council Chair has grown in importance throughout the lifetime of the Council by default, rather than design or will of the institution's originators (Smieszek and Kankaanpää 2015).

The Arctic Council Chairmanship rotates biennially among the Member States. Its second leadership cycle began in 2013 when Canada assumed the Chairmanship of the Council for the second time since the body's inception in 1996. In the first round, Arctic states proposed themselves to take upon the role of the Chair,[20] which moved consequently from Canada (1996–1998) to the United States (1998–2000), Finland (2000–2002), Iceland (2002–2004), Russia (2004–2006), Norway (2006–2009),[21] Denmark (2009–2011) to Sweden (2011–2013). The second leadership round was again begun by Canada (2013–2015) and has since rotated to the United States (2015–2017) and Finland (2017–2019).

Some analysts hold a critical view of the early Chairmanships of the Council, including that of the United States which in 1998 "took the chair of the organization more out of a sense of obligation rather than out of any feeling of enthusiasm" (Nord 2016b: 43). The successive Finnish, Icelandic and Russian Chairmanships have also been argued to have lacked the "interest, resources, focus, and political will" (Ibid.: 44) to make distinctive imprints during their terms. Nonetheless, it might be useful to consider how the specific contributions of the Chairmanships in the early days of the Council assisted its evolution.[22] Such perspective not only provides a longer-term historical view, but it might also point to some features or issues related to the role of Arctic Council Chairs that are worthy of deeper inquiry.

[20] Or the Host Country, as stipulated by the first Arctic Council Rules of Procedure from 1998 (Arctic Council 1998).

[21] As listed in Norwegian, Danish and Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006–2012, "the Ministerial Meetings could be moved to the spring to take advantage of the more favorable weather conditions in the Arctic during the season" ("Norwegian, Danish, Swedish Common Objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006–2012" 2007), which resulted in postponing of the Ministerial Meeting ending the Norwegian chairmanship from fall 2008 to spring 2009.

[22] While doing so, it is also important to take note of a fact that after the end of the Cold War and before the media-hyped events of 2007–2009, the Arctic was of much smaller general interest – both internationally and within Arctic states.

As previously discussed, the first Canadian Chairmanship (1996–1998) was devoted almost exclusively to development of the Arctic Council's Rules of Procedure (Arctic Council 1998) and other operational matters. The United States first Chairmanship that followed from 1998–2000, reflected to a large extent its federal government's fairly disengaged attitude to formalized Arctic collaboration.[23] That being said, it was the United States during its time at the helm of the institution that initiated and mostly funded the seminal, ground-breaking Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). According to some Observers, the importance of this effort is "difficult to overstate (…) in the still unfolding process to reform and strengthen the Arctic Council, and to the evolution of its substantive agenda" (Fenge 2013:19; Koivurova 2009).[24]

The following first Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship (2000–2002) is often recalled for putting on the Council's agenda the improvement of internal workings of the Council and "rationalizing Council's work" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2000). As the Chair of the Arctic Council Finland carried out the first, and up to now the most comprehensive, internal study of the Council and its structures (Fenge and Funston 2015; Haavisto 2001; Rottem 2016).[25] To conduct the task, Finnish Chair commissioned a study from a consultant and Finland's former Minister of the Environment, Pekka Haavisto, who prepared a report with assistance from the chairs of the Arctic Council Working Groups and delivered it to Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) in June 2001. The study identified a series of problems in the structure and work of the Arctic Council, including: overlaps, gaps, unnecessary competition, financial problems and cost-efficiency (Haavisto 2002) – many of which remain concerns within the Council even today.

From Finland, the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council moved to Iceland for the period 2002–2004. It was during Icelandic Chairmanship that the final report of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment came out and the "considerable wrangling and difficult debate among SAOs and permanent participants" (Fenge 2013) regarding policy recommendations flowing from its results took place. Eventually, they were successfully completed, also thanks to skills and commitment of the then Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials, Mr. Gunnar Pálsson, who facilitated overcoming

[23] In its result, Washington D.C. surrendered much of it Chairmanship role to the State of Alaska.

[24] Moreover, the United States and the role and position it took in the process of ACIA is worth noting for how domestic politics and changes within it can find its reflection in the work of the Arctic Council. In case of the ACIA, it was well visible in its two stages. First, when actions pursued within the Council to launch the assessment corresponded with climate policies of the Clinton administration. Second, when the delivery of the final ACIA report and formulation of its policy recommendations became subject of contentious negotiations in 2003, in the first years of the George W. Bush presidency (Nilsson 2007; Stone 2015), much less susceptive to concerns over climate change and its implications.

[25] Interestingly, the country's program for its Chairmanship term reflects how Finland viewed the continuity between the AEPS to the Arctic Council, when it wrote in 2000 that cooperation among eight Arctic states at that moment "has continued for so long – almost ten years" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2000), providing the additional rationale for a study and possible restructuring of the Council.

impediments and finding common grounds to proceed (Smieszek and Kankaanpää 2015). This points to a very important role of individuals standing at the helm of the institution and their personal competences and dedication (see Young 1991). The Icelandic Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials acted as well as a spokesperson for the Arctic, seeking to increase international attention given to the region as a global climate change bellwether. As a result of those efforts and other developments, the Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Reykjavik in 2004 was the first one that received global publicity and media coverage (Fenge 2013).

It was up to the next, Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2004–2006) to follow up on recommendations of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. In addition to this, the Russian Chairmanship focused also on the Fourth International Polar Year (IPY) (2007–2008).[26] At the conclusion of the Russian Chairmanship, in the 2006 Salekhard Declaration, a request was made by the Ministers that the Senior Arctic Officials should examine again the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. This is an element that has since become a continuing instruction within all subsequent declarations (Arctic Council 2006; Fenge 2013).

The ongoing evaluation of the work of the Council was also included in the common objectives of the three successive Scandinavian Chairmanships of Norway, Denmark and Sweden over the period of 2006–2012 ("Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006–2012" 2007). While the existing leadership model of a rotating Arctic Council Chairmanship has created space for a host country to promote its own priorities, a two-year window has oftentimes proven to be too short to address effectively some of the major challenges facing the region. With this in mind, the Scandinavian governments announced together in 2007 a joint "umbrella program", which served to form a common agenda (Nord 2016a) and provide greater continuity to work of the Council (Smieszek and Kankaanpää 2015).[27]

These efforts, however, did not shield the Council from the impact of other institutional challenges that became particularly visible during Danish Chairmanship of the Council (2009–2011). These included the question of Observers to the Arctic Council which rose to the top of its agenda and consumed most of the energy and efforts of the Chairmanship team (Graczyk 2011; see also: The Kingdom of Denmark 2009). The matter was eventually brought to successful conclusion by the end of the Sweden's Chairmanship of the Council (2011–2013), which used its traditional strengths as an international diplomat to build a consensus around the Observers' question that would be acceptable to all Arctic Council's parties (Nord 2013, 2016b). In executing the Chairmanship, one could well see how Sweden, free from the domestic constraint of a northern identity and without vested national Arctic interests, acted as an" honest broker" in the process. It focused on organiza-

[26] For the development from the fourth International Polar Year to the launch of the negotiations on the agreement on enhancing international scientific cooperation in the Arctic see (Smieszek 2017).

[27] To clarify, each of those countries still presented their individual programs at the outset of their respective Chairmanships but they agreed to move all their efforts forward collectively.

tional reforms within the body and efficient and successful completion of undertaken tasks. (See Chap. 5 of this volume for a more detailed discussion of this approach).

At the same time, as reported by the Swedish National Audit Office, the government of Sweden, while significantly strengthening the processes in the Arctic Council during its Chairmanship, failed to ensure "an effective process for implementation [of relevant recommendations from the Arctic Council] in Sweden" (Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, The Russian Federation 2015: 26). Although much of this concern falls outside the competence of the Chairmanship and relates more to the general practice of the Arctic Council, it is worth noting, seeing, in particular, that a follow-up to the Council's recommendations remains one of the major deficiencies of this institution (Dubois et al. 2016; Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, The Russian Federation 2015; WWF Arctic Programme 2017). It also points to an area, where the Chairmanship of the Council executed by Arctic states could play an important and, thus far, unexploited role – using the formal position and time of the Chairmanship for aligning domestic and internationally promoted and advanced interests.

A new round of Chairmanships began when Sweden passed the gavel of the Arctic Council to Canada in 2013. Canada's second time at the helm of the institution (2013–2015) drew attention to how domestic political pressures can influence the course of events and the tone of cooperation in the circumpolar arena. For that matter, Canadian Chairmanship proved to be controversial in its insistence on economic and development matters, which were reflected in pressurizing for the creation of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC). Moreover, the country's Chairmanship was noted for "its hard line with Russia and its difficult management style under Minister for the Arctic Council Leona Aglukkaq" (Exner-Pirot 2016).[28] As such, style of Canadian Chairmanship could be described "entrepreneurial" for its primary focus on advancing national interests and indigenous concerns on the international arena because of domestic political pressures. Furthermore, Canadian downplaying of environmental concerns in the period 2013–2015 did not help to build consensus among Arctic states and consequently, the Chairmanship was viewed rather unfavourably, despite the lengthy list of deliverables presented at the Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit in 2015 (ibid.). Additional detail on the Canadian Chairmanship is provided in Chap. 6 of this volume.

Arguably, the opposite assessment could be made about the second Arctic Council Chairmanship of the United States (2015–2017). Amidst international tensions following Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the United States as the Chair took purposeful conciliatory efforts, rather than pursuing a confrontational approach to circumpolar collaboration among all the Member States. It sought

[28] At the same time, basing on its outcomes and deliverables, the Canadian Chairmanship can be considered productive and effective, as illustrated, among others, with the launch of the Arctic Economic Council in September 2014 and the development of the Framework on Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions.

to shield the Council from broader geopolitical conditions and to maintain it as an open channel of communication and cooperation between Russia on the one hand and the United States, Canada and five Nordic states on the other hand. In that respect, the U.S. Chairmanship could be described, like Canada's, as being "entrepreneurial" but of a different character. The United States put a lot of emphasis on seeking a common ground among the Members and the Permanent Participants of the Council as well as on closer engagement of the Observers in the Council's work. In contrast to its first Chairmanship the federal government of the United States took a very active role in advancing an Arctic agenda of its own seeking to balance concerns over environmental protection, climate change and sustainable development in the North.[29] This development came, yet, under question when, as during the first US term in 1998–2000, the United States experienced radical change on its domestic arena with the results of presidential elections in 2016. Additional detail concerning the second American Chairmanship can be found in Chap. 7 of this volume.

Thus, it was in a very different international environment that Finland took over the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2017 from that which had existed even a few years before. Nonetheless, it took the lead in drafting the first-ever Arctic Council strategic plan. Conceivably, the country's long history and experience of finding its way and balancing interests between Russia and the western allies provides it with important assets in the process. With its "professional" type of leadership, Finland's focus on advancing non-controversial priorities is, arguably, the best one for steering the Council through this phase of its existence and through a shifting landscape of world's international relations. Additional discussion of the current Finnish Chairmanship is provided in Chap. 8 of this volume.

This last point also draws our attention to one of the most important, but often under-reported functions of the Arctic Council Chair. This is the actual ability of the Chair to steer the conversations within the Council to topics and issues of the highest concern, while avoiding potential divisions in the Council's work. Often this is furthered by the adept use of the "powers of the Chair" as noted in Chap. 4 of this volume. Ensuring mediation and resolution of emerging disagreements over procedure or policy options is indisputably of the utmost importance in the body operating at all levels on the basis of consensus, where divisions can be detrimental not only to reaching the short-term objectives but also to the long-term operating and viability of the Arctic Council.

[29] The comparison between the first and second United States Chairmanship of the Council serves as a useful illustration of both the evolution of the Council itself and of place and continuously growing importance of the Arctic within Arctic states and internationally (Smieszek and Koivurova in: Lackenbauer et al. 2017).

3.5 Conclusions

The existing literature in international organization suggests that a Chairmanship is a potentially powerful platform for leadership in international negotiations and multilateral bargaining (Tallberg 2010: 261). Even if most of the Chair's role could be considered procedural and confined to assigned tasks and routine behavior, the potential political importance and weight of the Chairmanship should not be underrated. The growing appreciation and focus on questions pertaining to the Arctic Council Chairmanships, expressed by practitioners and Arctic governance scholars alike, testify to this reality. This volume presents an important contribution to discussion on this topic, filling a notable gap in our understanding of the structure and operation of the Arctic Council.

As illustrated in this chapter, the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council offers an excellent case study for numerous issues related to leadership and its execution within international institutions. Those include the role of individuals in the process, the impact of domestic politics and external developments on the functioning and evolution of the institution, as well as the questions of how increasing international attention influences a country's approach to their Chairmanship function. The following chapters of this volume address in greater detail the consecutive Arctic Council Chairmanships from 2011 onwards, exploring each country's view of the region and its contributions to moving forward an Arctic agenda and governance.

One of the most important issues ahead of the Arctic Council over the coming years is its ability to provide enhanced leadership in an environment where there are a growing numbers of actors and interests at stake from both within and outside the North. The existing Arctic Council Rules of Procedure have left enough scope for each of the Member States to use their term as the Chair to promote their own national priorities—even though their leeway has been somewhat constricted by the consensual nature of decision-making in the Council. The Arctic Council has served as an arena for the advancement of states' national interests, great or small, depending on the country's profile and importance of the Arctic to its domestic politics (E. C. H. Keskitalo 2004; Smieszek and Kankaanpää 2015).

In general, it could be said that the Council has been fortunate with its current rotating Chair system. Most of the countries, when taking upon themselves the role of the Chair, have provided significant resources to the position and have carried out collective goals and interests with a significant degree of dedication and goodwill. Even if many Senior Arctic Officials and their teams change on a regular basis, the Council, itself, serves to support and maintain amical relationships between its participants. Plausibly, part of the reason behind the collegial atmosphere of the body is its lack of extensive bureaucratic structures and the character of its meetings oftentimes held in distant northern locations. The Arctic Council has managed to continue its work even in the face of recent international tensions and arising great power rivalries.

With regard to its future, in light of rapid changes in the Arctic, and transformational developments in the global arena, the precise evolution of the Arctic Council

and its requirements for leadership cannot be fully discerned. What remains clear, however, is that the Council's ability to address future challenges facing the Arctic will call for "a downplaying of individual national priorities and preferences in favor of addressing the collective needs of the Circumpolar North" (Nord 2016b: 159–160).

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Chapter 4
Chairs and International Organizations: The Case of the Arctic Council

Douglas C. Nord

Abstract This chapter considers the position of chairs within most international organizations. Omnipresent but usually viewed as having limited influence and impact, the heads of such bodies can nonetheless be seen to perform critical functions for their organizations. These are outlined and discussed with an eye to their ability to provide both power and leadership capabilities to the occupants of such organizational chairs. The specific "powers of the chair" and the alternative leadership styles that can be pursued are discussed. The particular case of the Chair of the Arctic Council is then considered. The origins and structure of this body are reviewed as they pertain to possible leadership responsibilities and capabilities for its head. These dimensions are further developed and discussed with the goal of providing a common analytical frame for the consideration of specific Chairmanships of the Arctic Council in subsequent chapters of the volume. The chapter concludes by considering four ongoing leadership challenges that must be faced by all who operate at the helm of the body.

Keywords Chairs · International organization · Leadership style · Powers of the chair · Institutional challenges

As discussed in the previous chapters of this volume, the Arctic and the Arctic Council have become more important features of the global system over the last several decades. Both the peoples of the circumpolar North and the wider global community have become more aware of the significant environmental, economic, social and cultural challenges faced by the region. The initiatives and work of the Arctic Council to address these concerns have received greater attention and the necessary leadership provided by this international body has become critical in dealing with a growing agenda of required response.

The question that sometimes troubles both Observers of the Arctic and the Arctic Council is whether the response will be sufficient and timely (Evengård et al. 2015).

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As the Arctic continues to face unprecedented change along multiple dimensions, can an adequate response be mounted in time before the Arctic truly "melts away"? Such concerns focus attention on the role of leadership within the global community and within international organizations like the Arctic Council. It raises the questions of whether such multilateral institutions can become more responsive to pressing needs and what will be the contribution of those who occupy the helm of such bodies? In the case of the Arctic Council, can the Chair of the organization make a difference? The question of "leadership from the chair" is a focus of this chapter and a continuing analytical thread that connects the remainder of the volume.

The present essay begins by considering the influence and impact of Arctic Council Chairs within a broader analytical context. It looks first at the common assumptions made regarding the power and capabilities of those who occupy the helm of any international organization. The frequently accepted view of limited leadership from the chair is explained and, in turn, questioned. Then the essay turns to examine the traditional roles that many chairs have performed within most international bodies over time. These four, functionally based roles are summarized and discussed. Note is taken of how each embodies the potential for chairs to have a significant say in charting the direction and course of the organization. It is pointed out, however, that not all chairs choose to make use of these possible sources of influence and that those who elect to do so, may not play these roles in similar ways. This discussion is augmented by a consideration of how the specific features of any international organization may set limits on how a chair can exercise these capabilities. Note is also made of how the specific personality and cultural origins of the chair might encourage or constrain their efforts.

The essay then moves on to consider the several "leadership styles" that a chair of any international organization may adopt. The focus and features of each are detailed and discussed. Key strategies and methods associated with these alternative leadership styles are outlined. Note is made of the fact that successive heads of the same body may elect to employ different leadership approaches depending upon their own objectives, capabilities as well as the current needs of the organization itself. It is argued that the ability to adopt a leadership style that is in accordance with each of these factors may be central to providing effective organizational leadership. Attention is also given to the specific "powers of the chair" that can be utilized in this effort.

From this broad analytical discussion of the influence of chairs within all international organizations, the essay turns its attention to consider the distinctive position of the Chair of the Arctic Council. It looks briefly, at how the history and evolution of this particular international body has set specific parameters for the actions and the degree of influence of its head. The essay examines the organization's progress from being simply a "high-level forum" to become a more traditional international organization—albeit with the some remnant features of its earlier form. From there, some of the present key structural and operational elements of the Arctic Council are examined with an eye to how the head of the body

may undertake "leadership from the chair." An assessment is offered as to the degree of latitude that current chairs can enjoy in setting a direction for the organization.

The final portion of the essay looks at four prime leadership concerns that both contemporary and future Chairs of the Arctic Council must address from their institutional position. They include the challenges of insuring the inclusion of both Arctic and non-Arctic voices within the body; securing adequate resources for the operation of the organization and its initiatives; creating and maintaining consensus among the membership; and providing a common vision and sense of purpose for the organization. It is argued that true test of being able to provide effective leadership for the North may center on the ability of the Chair of the Arctic Council to facilitate successful undertakings in each of these domains.

4.1 How do Chairs Operate in International Organizations?

Many Observers of world affairs and international diplomacy tend to share a particular vision of the nature of the chair within any international organization. It tends to be a somewhat limited and constrained view. For many, the chair of any international body is seen simply as the presiding officer who attends to the smooth operation the organization. The chair sits at the head of the table and makes sure that the particular debate or negotiation is conducted according to the established agenda and rules. As an entity, itself, the chair is normally regarded as having minimal power and limited influence over the outcome of events (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004).

Omnipresent, but largely impotent, the impact of chairs over the affairs of international organizations is frequently regarded as marginal at best. As a consequence, the role played by chairs in the development and the activities of such bodies is rarely investigated. A review of the extensive literature on international diplomacy and negotiation provides limited insights. Until very recently, most chairs from nearly all international organizations were portrayed as performing basically the same functions and conducting themselves in the same manner (Thomson 2008).

Traditionally, the efforts of the chair were seen to be organized around four functions or undertakings. The first was to insure the smooth unfolding of organizational meetings or negotiations. In this "convening" or "presiding" role, the chair had the responsibility for initiating discussion and for recognizing subsequent speakers. The chair was also tasked with the assignment of insuring that any agreed agenda was followed and that the time schedule and rules of procedure were observed (Elgström 2003). As a particular organization grew and developed, the chair might also take on certain longer-term operational responsibilities. Within this second, "management" role, the chair would endeavor to oversee its key internal operations and external activities. Often working in concert with a support staff or a secretariat, the chair would issue reports to the membership and supervise budget and funding allocations. In this role the chair would be responsible for the smooth functioning of the body (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). A third possible role for an organizational

chair was seen to be "representational" in character. The chair would take on the task of presenting the views and program of the organization at other international meetings or forums. The chair might also assume the responsibility of providing a face and voice for the organization. In so doing, the chair would serve to offer a visible or audible reference point for a variety of external audiences (Bengtsson et al. 2004). Finally, the fourth and last of the key functions of the chair could be seen to be that acting as a facilitator of agreement and common commitment among the members of the body. In this "go-between" or "brokerage" role, the chair would seek to build consensus and maintain harmony within the organization or negotiation. Often utilizing informal means of information sharing and extended discussion, the chair would endeavor to perform the important tasks of reconciling opposing viewpoints and bridging differences between contending groups within the membership (Odell 2005).

While most current analysts agree that these four roles continue as the modal patterns of behavior for most chairs within international organizations, increasingly it is pointed out that the manner in which they perform these functions can vary significantly. These observed variances in chair behavior may be reflective of differences in personality or cultural background, the nature of the organization of which they are a part, or the particular style of leadership that a chair adopts. Each of these factors may contribute to the creation distinctive chair profiles.

The impact of personality and culture on chair behavior has been studied with growing frequency in recent years. It has been noted that a chair's degree of extroversion or introversion may have a significant impact on their role behavior. They may feel confident or alternatively ill at ease in a group setting or in taking on the responsibility of representing the organization to the external world. Some individual chairs may demonstrate strong or assertive personalities while others may reveal more of a passive profile (Tallberg 2010). These differing personality traits may also have a distinctive impact in the manner in which they perform management or brokerage roles (Young 1991). More broadly, specific societal traditions or cultural values may suggest appropriate norms of behavior that influence chair conduct. The chair may come from a either a society that prizes individual initiative or, on the other hand prefers, a collectivist approach to action (Bjurulf 2003). Their cultural inheritance may also encourage them to foster either a direct or indirect manner in dealing with others.

The nature of the body that the chair heads may also have an influence over their specific behavior. Some international organizations are large and complex entities while others are small and streamlined. As such, their chairs may have different types of management roles to perform. Some international bodies are long-established and have clearly identifiable profiles and constituencies. Other organizations may not be as well known or followed on a day-to-day basis (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As a consequence, the "representational" roles performed by their chairs may be significantly different. International organizations can also vary in the manner in which they select their chair and the length of term that is served by that chair. Some have appointed heads. Others elect their leader from within their membership. Still others like the Arctic Council maintain a system of rotational

Chairmanships (Nord 2016a). The terms of service for a chair may vary in length from a month, to a year, to multiple years. It has been observed by a number of scholars that chairs of international organizations may perform their roles in different ways depending upon each of these organizational characteristics (Schemiel 2004).

Finally, chairs may adopt a distinctive style of leadership that may arise from a combination of the factors listed above. Some may see themselves as committed to promoting a very specific agenda that embodies either their own national or personal objectives or the internal organizational priorities of the bodies they head. This "entrepreneurial" style of leadership tends to emerge when a chair enjoys a significant degree of autonomy in performing its various roles and where it can exercise a substantial degree of influence over desired outcomes (Young 1998). Alternatively, some chairs adopt a leadership style that has at its core a preference for advancing a more inclusive agenda that reflects collective and membership needs. This "honest broker" style of leadership tends to emerge when the chair does not possess a burning ambition to promote their own individual projects and has only a limited control over ultimate decision outcomes within the organization (Nord 2016b). A third possible leadership style is that of the "professional". It is adopted primarily when existing internal norms within the international body call for the chair to play a limited role in its agenda formation and in its day-to-day operations. It requires an individual with a neutral and unbiased personality who projects a minimal individual profile (Tallberg 2004). In the following chapters of this volume the leadership style that is selected by recent Chairs of the Arctic Council are examined and compared.

Regardless of the leadership style that is adopted, the chairs of most international organizations can—and do—exercise significant influence in performing their several roles. This fact, however, has not always been adequately acknowledged or discussed in many studies of international relations and global diplomacy. Prime attention tends to be allocated to the power dimensions of countries and the behavior of the individual nation-state participants within multilateral negotiations. Their actions and interactions when exercising their clout and influence tend to be the focus of attention and discussed in great detail. The individual influence and impact of organization leaders is often neglected (Tallberg 2010).

When the "power of the chair" has been considered, it has been usually limited to the context of its role as the convening or presiding officer of the body. Some acknowledgement is usually made of the inherent power of the chair that is secured by determining who shall speak, for how long and in what order. Also, on occasion, the chair's influence is sometimes considered when note is made of its contributions in setting the agenda of the body and in insuring that its rules and procedures are observed. It has been a long-established truism of international diplomacy that control of the agenda and the speakers list in any negotiation is truly empowering (Nye 2004).

Yet other forms of potential power that can be exercised by the chair may be overlooked. It is often forgotten that the chair can also exercise considerable influence through its managerial role within an organization. This can be seen in its

ability to help shape operational budgets and to allocate staff and other support services. It can also be discerned in its involvement in the release of information, data and reports coming from the organization (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The chair can also exercise its power through its "representational" role. In becoming the "voice and face" of the body it can help determine which of the organization's programs and objectives are prioritized in the minds of external audiences. In undertaking this role, chairs can also contribute to the development of an identity and mandate for themselves and for their organization that may be independent of that of its nation-state members (Tallberg 2004). Similarly, in performing its "go-between" or "brokerage" role, the chair can exercise a form of transactional influence that may not be available to other participants within the organization (Odell 2009). This is particularly the case within fairly recently established bodies like the Arctic Council. Taken together these separate avenues of influence contribute to a considerable base of potential power within the organization and with regard to the membership (Tallberg 2010). A number of recent examples of successful "leadership from the chair" within prominent international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or during multilateral negotiations like the Paris Climate Negotiations suggest that this behavior is becoming more prevalent and quite worthy of additional investigation.

4.2 The Arctic Council as an "International Organization"

It should be pointed out before undertaking any consideration of the operation of the Chair of the Arctic Council that this particular body encompasses both elements of a traditional international organization and at the same time lacks certain features of the same. As such, the Arctic Council could, perhaps, be best described as a *proto* or *quasi*-international organization in its present form. It occupies a growing niche of international and regional deliberative bodies that appear to merit recognition as significant policy actors in their respective domains yet at the same time lack the full capacity to engage in the actual process of governance. This distinct status makes such entities particularly worthy of careful examination, as it appears that their number and significance will most likely to continue to grow over the coming decades. Their expanded presence may also require a change in the traditional definition of what constitutes an "international organization" (Young 2010).

As was noted in the Chap. 3 of this volume, the founding of the Arctic Council featured a prolonged debate over the exact basis for its operation and its actual role and status within the international community. At that time, some argued that the body should have its roots in an international treaty or agreement and possess its own individual personality under international law. As such, the resulting international organization would not be overly beholding to its founders and would enjoy a significant degree of autonomy in its actions. Others, including the United States, contended that the organization should come into existence through a ministerial declaration arising from its member states and possess no separate legal status or

identity. As such, the Arctic Council would be a creature of these founding states and routinely responsive to their wishes.

In the end, the latter viewpoint emerged victorious—much to the chagrin of some the Arctic Council's earliest proponents (English 2013). It was established on the basis of a "soft law" ministerial declaration with both the extent of its profile and scope of operation closely circumscribed. The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 pointedly described the new entity as a "high level forum" whose primary function was to "provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitant on common Arctic issues" (Arctic Council 2018). The precise focus of the Council's attention, and the specific means by which it would perform its functions—including the role of the Chair—were left largely unspecified. These were to be determined by its members as the organization established itself and evolved.

It was clear, however, the Arctic Council was not originally designed to become a fully operational international organization. A number of specific measures were taken from the outset to inhibit any growth its own institutional identity and autonomy. It was provided no guaranteed budget nor allowed to hire any permanent employees. It would have no permanent chair, secretariat or institutional home. It could take no formal action or make any official statement without the full agreement of the governments from each of its member states. Instead of being allowed to determine its own functional units, it was provided with much of the inherited institutional framework of the previously established Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Many of these measures were supposedly adopted as a means to promote organizational efficiency and "cut costs", but they also the effect of ensuring that the body would not act in any way contrary to the preferences of its founding members (Bloom 1999).

Nonetheless, during the two decades since its creation the Arctic Council has gradually acquired features that one might normally associate with the operation of any traditional international organization. It has an identified membership and criteria for the admission of new participants. It has a specified mandate and established rules of procedure. It has regularly scheduled meetings for its constituent units and provides agendas and recorded minutes of their deliberations. In the last few years, it has been afforded the opportunity to establish a standing secretariat in Tromso Norway and to hire permanent employees for it. Increasingly it has begun to participate on its own part in a number of international conferences and forums. It has also directly engaged residents of the circumpolar region and the broader global community by means of its own specific outreach efforts and communication strategies. It has also begun the process of initiating and sponsoring specific international agreements that seek to encourage collaborative efforts to address safety and environmental protection issues within the Arctic (Nord 2016a).

As a consequence, the Arctic Council appears now to have moved well beyond many of its original parameters as a limited "high-level forum." Interestingly, much of this expansion of its activity has come with the full knowledge and at the behest of its Member States and its other participants. In order to provide an effective

response to the needs and challenges of the contemporary Arctic, most have accepted the idea that the body needs to be more visible and empowered than was first conceived. However, despite this emerging consensus, some of the original constraints on the Arctic Council's performance of specific governance responsibilities still remain in place and result in a less than clear understanding of its exact role and status. Often this ambiguity as to what it is, or is not, creates serious misconceptions and sometimes major disagreements over what the Arctic Council does or could do in the future. It also tends to place some constraints on how the Chair of the organization operates (Koivurova 2009).

4.3 The Chairmanship of the Arctic Council

In addition to its unique tripartite membership structure, another distinctive organizational feature of the Arctic Council is its rotating Chairmanship. Instead of having a permanent Chair elected from among its members, the Council is one of a limited number of international organizations where the institutional leadership passes from one Member State to another for a prescribed time and according to an established order. Within the Arctic Council each of the "Arctic Eight" normally serves a 2 year leadership term following a rotation that begins with Canada and ends with Sweden (See Table 4.1 below). The Council is currently operating towards the first part of its second round of leadership rotation with Finland having assumed the Chairmanship role from the United States in May of 2017.

As discussed earlier, this migrating leadership scheme was adopted at the outset of the Arctic Council, in part, as a cost-sharing measure. It was originally assumed that much of the operational and support resources needed to fund the organization could be provided by the country temporarily occupying the Chairmanship post. It was also thought to be an appropriate means of ensuring that all Member States of the Arctic Council—large or small—would have their turn at the head of the table. Such an arrangement affords each of the Arctic Eight governments an opportunity to place their own distinctive general policy imprint on the body during their leadership term. It also allows each of the incoming chairs the scope to suggest key

Table 4.1 Chairs of the Arctic Council and years of service

Canada	1996–1998	2013–2015
United States	1998–2000	2015–2017
Finland	2000–2002	2017–2019
Iceland	2002–2004	
Russian Federation	2004–2006	
Norway	2006–2009	
Denmark	2009–2011	
Sweden	2011–2013	

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

projects or initiatives for the organization to undertake during its leadership period. This ability to focus attention and prioritize action is well illustrated by the efforts of the Canadian Chairmanship to bring about the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council (McGwin 2014).

Some Observers initially thought that such a shifting leadership scheme might also create significant inefficiencies and discontinuities in the long-term work of the body. Concern was expressed that the organization might move in the same direction of the European Union during the 1990s where its regularly rotating presidencies had seemingly contributed to a degree of institutional instability and lack of sustained focus (Tallberg 2010). However, generally, this has not proven to be the case over time for the Arctic Council. Instead, the two-year term of the Chairmanship has offered an effective means for allowing each Arctic country an opportunity to offer their own perspectives on the Arctic and to demonstrate their individual commitment to the organization. On occasion, successive national Chairmanships have worked together to establish a long-term leadership plan. Perhaps the best recent example of this cooperative effort was the "umbrella program" of the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish governments which moved forward a common agenda for the Council from 2007–2013 (Nord 2013).

Normally, each national Chairmanship is headed by a senior official selected from the government of the host state. Often—but not always—it is the foreign minister of that country who assumes this responsibility and becomes the Chair of the Arctic Council for a 2 year period. Because this individual has other significant government responsibilities beyond those related to this role, the work of the Chair is usually supported by a number of additional national staff members who are usually drawn from key ministries of concern and other related government departments (Please refer to Table 4.2 below as an example). The members of this group work together and collectively form the national Chairmanship of the Arctic Council over the two-year period. They share the common responsibility of helping the organization to develop and advance its major activities over this period.

Table 4.2 U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship Group

Chair of the Arctic Council	Secretary of State John Kerry
Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials	Ambassador David Balton
U.S. Senior Arctic Officials	Julia Gourley
U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic	Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr.
Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Arctic Matters	Hon. Fran Ulmer
Senior Advisor to the SAO Chair	Dr. Nikoosh Carlo
Deputy Senior Arctic Official	Dr. Adrianna Muir
Arctic Affairs Advisor	Nomi Seltzer
Arctic Press and Public Affairs Officer	Erin Robertson
Administrative Officer	Matthew Kastrinsky

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

Perhaps the most important actor within this usually small Chairmanship Group is the person who is designated to be the Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Group. This individual heads that body, but also orchestrates the other efforts of the Chairmanship Group and oversees the day-to-day affairs of the Council as a whole. The Chair of the SAOs also maintains regular close contact with the each of the Heads of Delegation of the Member States, Permanent Participants and Observers along with the Chairs of the Council's Working Groups and designated Task Forces. This individual also works in close coordination with the Director of the Secretariat of the Arctic Council and briefs the Chair of the Ministers Group on a regular basis. Often it is the quality and character of leadership emanating from such a key position that may determine the overall success of a specific program. This important dimension of organizational leadership will be addressed in some detail during the following chapters of this volume.

In addition to taking on the presiding role at all formal meetings of the Arctic Council, the Chairmanship performs a number of other significant formal and informal functions for the organization as a whole. It provides a public face and voice for the organization and can be empowered to speak on behalf of the Council as a whole. It also offers a program of action for the Council to consider and adopt that reflects both its own sense of priorities for the region as well as the continuing concerns of the body as a whole. This Chairmanship Program provides the focus for the Council's activity during each Member State's two-year leadership term (Heininen 2011).

Working closely with the Secretariat, the Chairmanship also establishes the meeting dates and locations for the SAO sessions and some of the Council's Working Groups during this period. Many of these meetings are carefully placed in locations within the northern communities or one of the major cities of the host country. This affords the Chairmanship an opportunity to highlight specific local concerns of the Chairmanship Program or to better acquaint the Council members with the variety of community profiles to be found within their own national Arctic areas. Such visits also provide the Council with "listening opportunities" where the organization can hear directly the concerns of local northern residents (Nord 2016a).

The Chairmanship, working with the Secretariat and the heads of the several national delegations also helps to establish the agendas of all Council and SAO meetings and those of some of its other subsidiary units. The presiding Chair also performs the traditional role of recognizing speakers, determining the length of their interventions and ensuring that the established time limits and schedule of all meetings are observed. The Chair insures that all representatives have an opportunity to be heard and their words are properly translated, if necessary, and accurately recorded.

Beyond these expected functions of the presiding officer, the Chair can also perform some less visible but equally important informal roles. Perhaps most significant of these is the Chair's ability to steer the conversation of the Council to those topics and issues of its highest concern. By setting forth the Chairmanship Program at the outset of their leadership term, the host country can communicate quite effectively which matters it wishes to focus the Council's attention upon and which it

would prefer to give less significance (Exner-Pirot 2012). In addition, by skillful crafting of the agendas of all meetings, the Chair can reinforce this underlying message. As a consequence, successive national Chairmanships of the Arctic Council tended to be associated specific thematic priorities that may differ significantly from one another. Thus, the Canadian Chairmanship of 2013–15 was known for its emphasis on the "human dimension" of the Arctic and the subsequent U.S. Chairmanship has had as its focus the challenges of climate change.

Equally significant is the informal role played by the Chairmanship in keeping tabs on potential divisions within the Council and seeking to resolve or mediate them. As a body operating on the basis of consensus, emerging disagreements over procedure or policy options can be destructive to the long-term health and vitality of the organization. This potential was witnessed within the Arctic Council during the period between 2009 and 2013 when the question of who was to be allowed to become an Observer member of the body threatened to embroil the organization in discord. During that time, the successive Scandinavian Chairmanships sought to use their "good offices" to resolve an emerging rift among Member States, themselves, and with some of the Permanent Participants over which new Observers were to be welcomed into the body. The Swedish Chairmanship, in particular, took it upon itself the responsibility to reach out to each of the contending sides and to the new Observer applicants, themselves, so as to foster a compromise on the matter that could be accepted by all (Nord 2016b). As noted earlier, it is these "conflict resolution" and "brokerage" roles are quite significant but often overlooked features of the role of the Chairmanship in most international organizations. They are particularly salient for a consensus body like the Arctic Council. These types of leadership will be considered in some detail in the following chapters of the book.

4.4 Leadership Challenges Facing Chairs of the Arctic Council

As discussed in previous chapters, ongoing change within the Arctic—and the challenges associated with it—will provide an imposing agenda for action on the part of all participants within the Arctic Council over the coming decades. Providing adequate solutions and needed response to a wide variety of environmental, economic, social and political problems will be the major focus of leaders within the body during the foreseeable future. The adeptness of the Chair of the organization in facilitating such efforts will be a prime indicator of effective leadership within the organization. The contributions made by recent Chairs of the Arctic Council will be explored in the subsequent chapters of this volume.

In addition to this undertaking of directly addressing urgent needs in the North, effective "leadership from the chair" must also embody a willingness to wrestle with major institutional challenges within the Arctic Council itself. The breadth and complexity of these internal reforms and monitoring efforts are often quite daunting

and not easily dealt with within the boundaries of a single Chairmanship. An effective effort to respond to them requires ongoing attention and action across a number of leadership terms.

Sometimes lumped together under the heading of initiatives aimed at "strengthening the organization" they consist of four major leadership challenges that need to be addressed on an ongoing basis. The first of these is that of providing adequate representation and participation for the several Arctic communities. As has been noted, the Arctic is not a single, homogeneous entity. Instead, it consists of a series of distinct ecosystems, societies and political communities. The Arctic Council, since its founding, has struggled with the means to capture this diversity. One of the most distinctive ways in which it has sought to come to grips with this reality is through according representation to a variety of actors within the body including the governments of Arctic countries, indigenous peoples of the region, and those from outside the circumpolar area who, nonetheless, have demonstrated a strong concern for the future of the Far North.

This effort to be "inclusive" has been an ongoing concern of Arctic Council and its successive Chairs (Nord 2010). However, it has never been an easily accomplished objective. One of the continuing problems has been how to strike an acceptable balance between the status of governments of Arctic nation-states and the representatives and the indigenous peoples who inhabit the region. Tensions between the prerogatives of the Member States and the Permanent Participants have existed from the outset of the operation of the organization and efforts to accommodate the desires of both groups have been and regular aspect of the Chair's role and are detailed in Chap. 9 of this volume. Similarly, it has never been an easy task to find agreement among the membership regarding who should be granted Observer status within the body. The differing views on this matter between some Arctic Eight countries and certain non-Arctic states and organizations have not always been easy to accommodate and at times have threatened to derail entire Chairmanships as is discussed in Chap. 10 of this book. Beyond the question of admission to the organization, "inclusion" discussions have also been heard at times within the organization regarding whether the national governments or indigenous representatives are better positioned to speak for the native peoples of the North. Efforts to accommodate these alternative perspectives have become a regular feature of the Chair's leadership undertakings.

The second leadership challenge that the Chair of the Arctic Council must confront is the question of funding. Unlike some other international organizations, the Arctic Council is not funded primarily on the basis of subscriptions from each of its members and does not have an inclusive budget covering its operations. As noted earlier, at the time of the organization's founding, there was strong sentiment on the part certain of the Member States that the body should not become a "bloated bureaucracy" and, as such, require mandatory financial contributions from its members. Instead, what funding requirements that were deemed necessary for the work of the organization would come from voluntary subscriptions given in support of particular research projects. The day-to-day operations of the Arctic Council would

be the responsibility of the current occupant of the chair with administrative and staffing funding being their primary responsibility over their two-year term (English 2013).

Such an arrangement proved to have a detrimental effect on the work of the organization during the first decade of its operation. Chairs during this period found themselves scrambling to encourage voluntary contributions to agreed-upon research projects and performing their necessary leadership roles on shoestring appropriations from their own national governments. It became obvious by 2006 that such arrangements could not continue. Under the rubric of "building a stronger Arctic Council", the common program of the three Scandinavian Chairmanships called for the investigation of new ways of operating and funding the body. These included the establishment of a permanent Secretariat to provide, in part, regularly budgeted staffing to support some of the administrative work of the Chair and a consideration of new ways that more regularized contributions from Observers could be directed toward the work of the organization. Most of these reforms were enacted by the end of the Swedish Chairmanship in 2013.

However, even with these useful reforms, the Chairs of the Arctic Council still find themselves in a weak funding position relative to the overall needs of the body. They along with the heads of the several Working Groups must spend a significant portion of their time cajoling Member States to contribute resources to a steadily growing number of research projects and program initiatives. Most Chairs are still highly dependent upon the funding that their own national governments can provide for operational needs of the Chairmanship and specific initiatives of their two-year program. Fortunately, recent organizational chairs like Canada, the United States and Finland have all benefited from a high degree of Arctic concern on the part of their own government funders, but there is no guarantee that this pattern will continue through the remainder of this cycle of leaders. Equally ominous has been the inability of the organization to come up with an ongoing mechanism to secure adequate funding for the Permanent Participants to fully take part in all the meetings of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary units. Nor has any final decision been made on exactly how all Observers will contribute to the funding needs of the organization on an ongoing basis. Clearly there is an urgent need for the body to address these several resource concerns and it will be the task of the Chair to facilitate further discussion of some form of permanent budgetary solution (Fenge and Funston 2015).

The third leadership challenge confronting Chairs of the Arctic Council remains that of fostering consensus among the membership. As a consensus-based body, the organization cannot fulfill its mandate if there is significant disagreement among its participants. At a time of growing international tensions and rivalries, the Arctic has remained fortunately one of the few regions of the globe where a spirit of collective resolve and cooperative interaction has been the norm. Historically this has not always been the case as the example of the Cold War reminds us. Nor is there a guarantee that future confrontations will not take place within the circumpolar area. As such, it needs to remain a priority of Arctic Council Chairs to facilitate common accord as they seek to advance their specific agendas and the overall work of the organization.

In achieving this objective, the Chair will have to make full use of the complete menu of leadership resources and strategies at its disposal that have been discussed above. The personal and professional skills related to problem solving and accommodations are likely to be increasingly in demand for Arctic Council leadership. Recent Chairmanships have provided a mixed record of accomplishments in this area of leadership. The following chapters of this volume offer a series of case studies of both successful and less-effective efforts at consensus building within the organization on the part of its Chair.

The "lessons to be learned" from these experiences of Arctic Council Chairs will help to better equip future heads of the organization as they embark on their term at the helm of the body. The various methods and strategies pursued by recent heads of the organization may be of use to these new Arctic leaders as they chart their own course of actions. New insights are also to be gained in further understanding how cooperation and consensus can be fostered through skillful diplomacy and dialogue. As the organization and its concerns becomes increasingly visible within the international community such undertakings hold out the hope that Arctic accomplishments in the realm of consensus building can be seen to be instructive to the undertakings of other international bodies within other areas of the globe (Byers 2012).

A fourth organizational challenge that confronts Chairs of the Arctic Council is that of crafting a common vision to guide the body during their leadership term and beyond (Arctic Council 2017). As has been noted by more than one Observer, without a commonly shared vision and sense of purpose any international organization is likely to be ineffective (Nye 2004). Most analysts agree that the Arctic Council was fortunate at its beginnings to have both. Unfortunately, in more recent times there seems to be less confidence that there is an agreed path forward to guide the work of the organization.

Clearly, it is part of the responsibility of the Chair of the Arctic Council both to help create and maintain this shared vision and sense of purpose. The organization continues to some extent to suffer from lingering disagreements over whether "environmental protection" or "sustainable development" should be the directing force behind the main efforts of the body (Keskitalo 2004). The competing pulls between these two perspectives are discussed in several of the chapters that follow. So too is the ongoing discussion of what elements of security—"hard" or "soft"—should be included within the mandate of the organization (Kraska 2011). The effort to create a guiding strategic plan for the Arctic Council is also considered within this volume.

Ultimately, it is clearly within the domain of the Chair of the Arctic Council to foster discussion of these contending perspectives and to encourage, if possible, an accommodation between them. In this way, a common vision and purpose for the organization can be fostered. Like the earlier discussed challenges of inclusion, funding and consensus building, fostering a common sense vision and purpose for the body should remain as a central concern of those who occupy its chair. Clearly, "leadership from the chair" entails taking on such complex issues and striving to help resolve them. The efforts to do so are detailed throughout the remainder of this volume.

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Part III
Recent Arctic Council Chairmanships

Chapter 5
The Swedish Chairmanship: Foresight and Hindsight in Arctic Activism

Niklas Eklund

Abstract The Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2011–2013 still holds many of the keys in understanding Sweden's overall stance in Arctic affairs. When Sweden took the chair in early 2011, many Observers were skeptical of its likely impact on the region not only because the organization and its role in circumpolar economic and social development were contested at the time. There were also misgivings about Sweden's role as a "reluctant" Arctic nation. Sweden, nevertheless, contributed during its term as Chair of the Arctic Council to significant organizational revitalization and moving its Arctic agenda on soft security concerns forward. The chapter revisits the leadership goals, strategies, roles and achievements of the Swedish Chairmanship. These are then compared and contrasted with subsequent Swedish activity within the Council. The potential for a Swedish return to an active leadership role in the Arctic is then considered against the background of a changing international setting and increased policy relevance of the Arctic to Sweden.

Keywords Swedish chairmanship · Strategy · Diplomacy · Honest broker · Administrative dualism · Globalization

The Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2011 to 2013 still holds important keys to a better understanding of Sweden's overall stance in Arctic affairs. As the Swedish government took the chair, many Observers were skeptical not only because the organization and its impact in circumpolar affairs was in question at the time. There were misgivings, as well, concerning Sweden's status as a "reluctant Arctic nation" and how this might affect its leadership role within the Arctic Council. The Swedish Chairmanship nevertheless, ultimately contributed to both organizational revitalization and the provision of necessary direction toward advancing Arctic awareness and concerns within the global arena.

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As described by Douglas Nord in his seminal book, *The Changing Arctic,* the first Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council left a significant legacy by going beyond declarative foreign policy and making things happen, addressing actual Northern needs and working to establish a consensus among Council members regarding both environmental and development issues. Under Swedish leadership, a permanent Arctic Council Secretariat was also established for the organization and located in Norway. Several new Observers were brought into body, and, generally, an ailing international organization was provided with political vision for a stronger, more focused future (Nord 2016, pp. 113–129).

Considering the wide international acclaim accorded to the achievements of the Swedish Chair, there was a surprising lack of domestic Swedish response to its efforts. In effect, and as a cursory search of Swedish websites will indicate, the Swedish Chairmanship passed by the Swedish nation quietly and largely unnoticed. Contrary to the affirmative tone of international Observers, public agencies in Sweden remained either indifferent or even skeptical of its efforts. An illustrative example comes from the evaluation report given by the Swedish National Audit Office (2013). In its assessment, the Swedish government of the day was severely criticized regarding the manner it operated the Swedish Chairmanship citing a lack of transparency, effective communication with the Riksdag and realistic implementation plans. More generally, it can also be suggested that Sweden's brief spell as a leader under the Arctic sun went largely unnoticed by a good portion of country's broad public. There is, at least, no public record of the Swedish government suffering either positive or negative electoral consequences as a direct effect of the way its Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2011–2013 was handled.

How can this division of Arctic issues from domestic concerns in Sweden be understood? As pointed out by Nord (2016, pp. 129–134), despite the visionary drive of the Swedish Chairmanship certain policies were absent from its Arctic agenda, most notably those concerning indigenous rights and gender equality, both long-standing items on the Swedish domestic and foreign policy concern. Furthermore, consensus building around climate issues, which is another important national policy goal, achieved only partial attention from the Swedish Chair of the Arctic Council. It is hard, therefore, to sustain the notion that the 2011–2013 Swedish Chairmanship was some kind of simple reflection of its national foreign policy agenda or a straightforward application of domestic Swedish priorities. It seems, rather, that the Swedish government pursued a more specialized agenda in its leadership role from the point of view of both international and domestic Observers alike. The overarching question, nevertheless, remains: Why did the Swedish Chairmanship go in this direction and ultimately prove to be so successful, despite some domestic criticism, in "attempting to strike an acceptable balance between its own preferences for action and what the overall membership was willing to support"? (Nord 2016, p. 134)

The chapter divides its inquiry into five parts. In the first section, an effort is made to review the work and results of the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in the period between 2011 and 2013. It examines the type of leadership that it offered the organization and the nature of the specific leadership style it

pursued—that of the "honest broker." It examines the composition of its Chairmanship agenda focusing on what initiatives it promoted and which topics were not pursued and the reasons for each. An assessment is made of the overall endeavor and in what areas significant accomplishments were achieved.

The next portion of the of the chapter places Sweden's work within the Arctic Council within a specific national context. It considers why the country has sometimes been known as a "reluctant Arctic nation" and the specific domestic and geopolitical factors that have contributed to such an appellation. It examines the significance of the 2011 *Swedish Strategy for the Arctic Region* that was issued by the government as a prelude to its assuming leadership of the Arctic Council. It notes the way this document both set limits and provided new opportunities for Swedish activism in the Arctic. Finally it considers whether as a consequence of its Arctic Council Chairmanship Sweden can continue to be considered a "reluctant" actor within the region.

The third section of the chapter seeks to identify the key factors that led to Sweden's overall success as a Chair of the Arctic Council. It takes note of how prior experience, the right personnel, favorable timing and continued focus all made significant contributions to the nation's accomplishments. It describes the impact of each factor and its specific consequence. An argument is made that there may be important "lessons to be learned" from the Swedish approach to leadership that might be profitably studied by future Chairs of the organization.

The fourth portion of the chapter endeavors to explain why there was some domestic criticism of the Swedish Chairmanship. It points to the specific nature of "administrative dualism" within Swedish public administration and policy development. It notes how the manner in which the Swedish Chairmanship was organized and the way it conducted its business were significant departures from the norm within the national political system and why this might have made it a subject for domestic criticism.

The final section of the chapter looks to the future. It is written using more of a narrative style[1] than the analytical approach seen in the previous portions of the chapter. It begins by seeking to answer the question: What is likely to be the nature of Sweden's involvement in Arctic affairs over the coming years? It is suggested that it is to be a more involved role than that which was seen prior to its first Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. The limits and the opportunities for Swedish activism in the Arctic are examined here. It notes that there are some dark clouds on the international horizon that might constrain such efforts. Most important for the

[1] To form this narrative section, conversations were held with two senior Swedish officials charged with Arctic affairs. They were asked to talk about their own view of Swedish activism in the Arctic Council, knowing that the author was asking for help constructing this book chapter. The conversations were not research interviews, however, and it was understood that nobody would be quoted verbatim. The narratives in this chapter including any mistakes or misinterpretations, therefore, are attributable to the author only. Many thanks for their enthusiasm and openness of mind are due to Björn Lyrvall and Ellinor Blomberg. The narrative rests on the reflections of the author and represents an effort to begin to fill what seems to be a knowledge gap with regard to why and how Sweden acts in a certain way in the Arctic context.

theme of this volume, it suggests what were some the more significant insights to be gained with regard to organizational leadership that can be learned from experience of the Swedish Chairmanship of 2011–2013.

5.1 Sweden Becomes an 'honest broker' in Arctic Diplomacy

One significant factor in helping us to understand the distinctive impact of the Swedish Chairmanship is to become better aware of the particular leadership stance that the country adopted during its term as head of the Arctic Council. A number of Observers have noted that effective leadership is required if any organization is to be successful (MacGregor Burns 2003, Nye 2008, Heifetz et al. 2009). Yet not all leaders adopt the same stance or role. Within most international organizations, however, one of three basic types of leadership roles tend to predominate. As described by Nord in Chap. 4 of this volume these three options are: the professional role, the honest-broker role or the entrepreneurial role. In Sweden's case during its Arctic Council's Chairmanship, it elected to become an "honest broker." By this, it is meant that Sweden chose not to advance its own its particular national vision of the Arctic or its own specific foreign or domestic policy priorities within the region. Instead, it chose an active role of trying to build agreement and foster consensus among the different members of the body in support of mutually agreeable organizational initiatives and priorities. In so doing, Sweden did not entirely abandon its own perspectives on the Arctic, but it did sublimate these, on occasion, to the preferences of the group.

Some analysts suggest that such an "honest broker" approach to leadership may be adopted when a member does not have strongly developed opinions regarding the topics being debated within the organization or if a basic tenet of its approach to international relations is to seek cooperation and mutual support (Tallberg 2004, 2010). Not having a particular stake in the game or being oriented toward consensus building seem to support this particular leadership stance. In the particular case of Sweden, both of these factors were operative and will be discussed later in this chapter.

One should not view the "honest broker" leadership role as a weak one. In fact, it potentially gives the occupant considerable power within an international body like the Arctic Council. As an organization operating on the basis of consensus, the Chair of the Arctic Council has the potential to exercise considerable influence over its operation and direction. In choosing not to press its own national priorities, a country that adopts an honest broker leadership stance has the key ability to facilitate agreement between opposing sides and to shape the character of the eventual commonly agreed position of the organization. This brokerage function is not frequently observed in public, but behind the scenes, it can be a potent force.

Sweden was adept at exercising this skill throughout its leadership term. Its ability to foster a final agreement on the admission of new Observers to the body after a decade of discord within the institution was emblematic of this approach. So too

was its ability to build support from opposing camps for a new even-handed approach to the environmental protection and sustainable development discussion. In similar fashion, it used its brokerage abilities to forge a consensus for adopting a potentially divisive document like *A Vision for the Arctic* that called for the Council to adopt a more of a long-term planning process and one that would be more directly policy relevant.

Similarly, the representative functions of a chair of an international organization—those of being the face and voice of the body—can often be best accomplished by that of an "honest broker". Not feeling obliged to promote its own national agenda or set of priorities, such a leader can labor on behalf of the body itself and help create an institutional vision that may be more encompassing and effective than one derived from perspectives that are more limited. In the case of the Arctic Council, having someone to be able to articulate its collective goals and aspirations was critical for the growth and development of the organization at the specific time that Sweden became its Chair. With this in mind, the Swedish Chairmanship took a special interest in the way the organization presented itself and its efforts to the circumpolar region and the broader global community beyond. It pressed for a major revision of the institution's website and urged a more user-friendly way of communicating its scientific and policy-relevant initiatives to the public. It introduced the widespread use of social media within the body for similar purposes. The Chairmanship team also played a role in directly representing the Arctic Council at variety of regional and international conferences and meetings and in articulating the views of the North. Under its leadership, the body achieved greater visibility and delivered its message of concern for the Arctic more effectively than any previous time in the body's history.

Also, it is often the "honest broker" type of leader who in their administrative role focuses attention on how the institution conducts its internal business and how it might do so more effectively in the future. Without the need to promote special initiatives or to protect pet projects, such a leader can conduct an honest appraisal of the strength and weaknesses of the body and recommend needed changes. Making the organization stronger and more effective in its structure and operations tends to be a hallmark of the leadership style of an honest broker. Without vested interests of its own to protect and with an ability to look objectively at the needs of the body as a whole, it is a type of leadership that seeks to promote organizational reform albeit within the comfort area of all members.

This approach was, also, much in evidence during the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. From the outset, the Swedish Chairmanship noted that its chief mission was to facilitate the Council "doing its work" (Swedish Chairmanship Programme 2011). This meant, in part, clearing the procedural path for action on a variety of fronts. It consistently stressed the importance of "deliverables" and directly assisted the SAOs, Working Groups and Task Forces to advance their work efforts. The result, was a remarkable amount of completed reports, recommendations and calls for action that were presented at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in 2013. These ranged in topic from the reduction of green-house gases in the Arctic, to the protection of the marine environment of the Arctic Ocean, to the sponsorship

Table 5.1 Swedish Chairmanship Group for the Arctic Council

Chair of the Arctic Council	Foreign Minister Carl Bildt
Minister of the Environment	Minister Lena Ek
Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials	Ambassador Gustaf Lind
Sweden's Senior Arctic Official	Andreas von Uexküll
SDWG Chair	Mikael Anzén
Deputy Director, Climate Division Ministry of the Environment	Fredrik Hannerz
Vice Deputy Director, Climate Division Ministry of the Environment	Patricia Enhörning
Special Advisor to the Swedish Chairmanship	Paola Albornoz
Desk Officer	Annette Rosenberg
Press Officer	Karin Nylund

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

of a formal international agreement guarding against possible future oil spills in the region. In similar fashion, it pushed forward with a series of internal organizational reforms that included the establishment of a permanent Secretariat for the Arctic Council and a reinvigoration of its Sustainable Development Working Group.

This is all the more remarkable given the relative small size of the Swedish Chairmanship Group and the fact that many of its participants were new to Arctic concerns. (Please see Table 5.1). Although small in number, they were a focused and dedicated group that knew how to encourage forward movement within an international body. As will be discussed later, several had pertinent experience from prior involvement in other Swedish diplomatic leadership efforts and applied relevant skills and approaches in using the "powers of the chair" to advance their efforts.

Generally, the Swedish Chairmanship in adopting an "honest broker" leadership style managed to both reinvigorate the Arctic Council and to make it be seen and heard as an international organization with legitimate concerns in the global arena. Yet despite its transformative fervor and relative degree of success, the Swedish Chair had to make what Nord (2016, p. 129) calls "significant omissions from its list of accomplishments." The Swedish Chair failed to deliver in two key areas in which it had promised action in its original Chairmanship Programme document. One was to address concerns of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic and the other was to promote greater gender equality within the region. Nord suggests that these omissions may have been the result of a crowded schedule and the lack of time to advance all agenda items. However, he also notes that this Swedish decision not to push these two particular areas of concern were ultimately concessions made to other Member States which reservations regarding both issues. In sacrificing these concerns, the Swedish Chairmanship was able to encourage their cooperation and participation in its other areas of its brokerage and consensus building efforts. This calculated decision, as pointed out earlier, was not reflective of national Swedish domestic priorities and as such was to incur criticism from the Swedish National Audit Board and other domestic policy groups.

The Swedish Chairmanship of 2011–2013, nevertheless, made significant political and organizational imprints on the Arctic Council as an international organization. Above all, Sweden was successful in playing the role of 'honest broker' among a group of nations with divergent interests in both the Arctic region and other parts of the world. As will be shown in subsequent sections of this chapter, a wide variety of factors beyond this particular leadership style impinged upon Swedish Arctic activism at that time. Furthermore, these same factors continue to contribute to how the Swedish government thinks about its current work in the Arctic Council and, not least, its preparation for its next stint as head of that body. Sweden's reputation as an 'honest broker' in the Arctic was well earned, but circumstances in the broader global arena may have also had an impact at that time and in the future.

5.2 The Swedish Context: Still a Reluctant Arctic Nation?

In the Swedish political context, the Arctic figures most prominently in discussions about climate change. The country was swept by the same interest in the Arctic as other European countries "responding to a series of media-friendly events in 2007-2008", among other convergent events most notably the planting of a Russian flag at the North Pole but also the "spectacularly low sea-ice minimum in 2007" (Eklund and van der Watt 2017). With a long-standing tradition of involvement in different areas of Arctic exploration and research, Sweden has continually contributed to international scientific knowledge-building about the Arctic, over time directing more time and resources to environmental and climate change issues (Doel et al. 2014, Sörlin 2016). With its two northernmost counties, Norrbotten and Västerbotten, as participating members of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Sweden has also taken part and supported transnational interaction and people-to-people development in the European High North (Elenius et al. 2015; Staalesen 2016). Over the past decade, there has also been an upsurge in Swedish research on northern indigenous peoples, particularly driven by an interest in the Sami people (Sköld 2016).

Whereas both climate change and social cohesion can be seen as significant drivers of the overall Swedish political agenda in the European High North, the country's relationship to other forces in the area of hard security within the region remains somewhat tenuous (Kraska 2011). This dimension of the Swedish view of the Arctic remains only partially developed and not well understood or articulated by either policy makers or the general public. Both seem more comfortable in discussing security matters focusing on the Baltic region rather than the Arctic.[2]

[2] At a recent security conference jointly sponsored by SIPRI and the Swedish Foreign Ministry the topic of the future of the Arctic Council was tacked on to the broader heading of "Managing Complexity: Addressing Societal Security Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region" Stockholm June 11–12, 2018.

Geopolitically as well as militarily, Swedish security political thinking is steeped in the Baltic Sea Region with which it has interacted through a patchwork of international cooperative schemes, organizations, national traditions and changing security solutions Outside of the Arctic Council there are no similar links for Swedes to the circumpolar world. Recently, it can be argued that the Baltic Sea Region has received new emphasis and attention by Swedish policy makers in the wake of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and, particularly, after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. On the other hand, the features of Arctic security remain elusive and only partially conceived in the minds of Swedish leaders (Granholm 2012).

In summarizing the approach of many circumpolar leaders, Dodds and Nutall observe that "powerful agents of Arctic geopolitics, such as prime ministers and presidents, pick and choose where possible." (2016, p. xiv.) This is clearly the case for Sweden's leaders in their limited interaction action with the Arctic region. Swedish foreign policy has for long been guided by principled ideas about free-trade, multilateralism, scientific and regional cooperation. Membership in the United Nations went from being a contentious issue in the 1950s to becoming a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy. Participation within the European Union, which was more contentious in the 1990s, than now, has followed a similar trajectory (Bjereld 2007; Brommesson and Ekengren 2007). Beginning as divisive political issues requiring Swedish adaptation to international change, over time membership in the United Nations and European Union have been integrated over time with the Swedish national interest. The same cannot be said of the Arctic or the Arctic Council.

Not yet burdened by recent Russian power projection in South Eastern Europe or, for that matter, the American retreat from globalizing cooperation and transatlantic relations, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that Sweden managed to play the significant role that it did within the Arctic Council as its head from 2011–2013. At that time, finding a new outlet for its desire to multilateralize international affairs, the Swedish government more or less latched on to the renewed interest in the Arctic among some of its established partners, most notably from the European Commission which began to show a serious concern for the region as early as 2008–09 (Keskitalo 2014). The Swedish agenda in the Arctic was driven by an interest in de-securitization in the Arctic and by the idea of change driven by economic and scientific cooperation. Not being a littoral Arctic state like its neighbors Norway and Denmark, it lacked a geopolitically driven agenda for the region. Sweden, as a consequence, would favor an agenda focused on more familiar issues of global trade, climate change, scientific cooperation and social cohesion (Government Offices of Sweden 2011).

In 2011, in conjunction with its assumption of the Arctic Council Chairmanship, Sweden released its *Strategy for the Arctic Region*. This document remains as the only comprehensive statement of its national goals for the Arctic. It offers support for the twinned efforts of the Arctic Council in environmental protection and sustainable development. It calls for a strengthening of the organization through institutional reforms and a renewed focus on policy development. Its contents also stress the need to adopt a mulitlateralizing market- and non-state-actor- driven political agenda for the region. Both sustainability and control are emphasized with regard to

traditional industrial development in the North such as natural resource extraction and forestry. Additionally, emphasis is given to providing support for local and regional livelihoods such as fishing and reindeer husbandry. In sum, the Swedish *Strategy for the Arctic Region* offers a developmental agenda, according to which increased and modernized shipping in Arctic waters can be reconciled not only with industrialization, but also with increased tourism and with the traditional livelihoods of indigenous Arctic peoples (Government Offices of Sweden 2011, Nord 2016 pp. 62–68).

Reviewing the focus and tone of the document Carina Keskitalo has observed that: "The strategy thus highlights economic development and distances itself from the traditional frontier-related discourse on the Arctic. Furthermore, with regard to Sweden's aims in Arctic cooperation, the strategy supports the EU view that the Arctic should remain a low-tension area when it comes to security policy…" (Keskitalo 2014, p. 309). The Swedish *Strategy for the Arctic Region* document constantly targets soft- or low-political areas in the fields of economic and social development. This very clear statement of a functionalist, non-security related agenda for its 2011–2013 Chairmanship and may have paved the way for Sweden's role as an "honest broker" (Nord 2016). Alternatively, one can suggest that the activities and focus of the Swedish Chair were timely given both the internal conditions of the body and the external forces it faced from the international environment. In 2011, Sweden, the European Union and its partners in the West were only beginning to enter into an era of what Richard Sakwa (2013) has termed 'cold peace'.

At the time of this writing, however, it seems as if both the international and Swedish contexts for national engagement with the Arctic have changed somewhat. No longer an entirely "reluctant" Arctic nation, Sweden still finds it difficult to determine and articulate what its role within both the region and the organization should be. In a far more complex world and domestic setting than that which existed even 5 years ago, the nation's links to the Arctic remain somewhat tenuous, unspoken or outright neglected. Before considering what future role Sweden might play within the Arctic and the Arctic Council, it is important to take note of some of the contributing factors that led to a relatively successful Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. While some of these are distinct to this particular case, others are more universal in nature and, thus, applicable to the situations likely to be faced by future leaders of Council. Identifying these factors may be helpful in constructing a set of guideposts for effective leadership on the part of the Chair.

5.3 Lessons from the First Swedish Chairmanship 2011–2013

Looking back on the experience of the Swedish Chairmanship there are four factors that seem to have contributed to its success. The first and, perhaps most significant was that of experience. As they say experience counts, and in the case of Sweden, while it lacked recognition as an Arctic state, its credentials as an international diplomat were impeccable. Both a small state and a neutral country, Sweden has

long sought international cooperation not only as a vehicle by which to forward its national interest but to gather experiences from a wide variety of international, cooperative settings. Politicians and staff throughout Swedish government structures are used to participating within the frameworks of international organization and incorporating an international aspect both in making and implementing government policy. Its diplomats have occupied top posts within the United Nations for many years. Since 1995, Sweden has also a member of the European Union and its particular experience in organizing the EU Presidency in 2009 was still fresh in the run-up to assuming the Arctic Council Chairmanship. The EU Presidency also provided the Swedish government with the opportunity to introduce and negotiate significant elements of the EU's new Arctic policy, most of which was closely coordinated with other interested Nordic EU partners, particularly Finland (Nord 2016, pp. 81–111, see also Bengtsson et al. 2004).

Importantly, this previous experience was accompanied by the movement of key personnel from one political arena to the next. It was the same center-right Swedish government which chaired the Swedish Presidency of the EU that later functioned at the head of the Arctic Council. The capabilities of Carl Bildt, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, cannot be overlooked from this perspective. His reputation for successful leadership in international contexts, including that of the Balkan region in the 1990s, was helpful to Swedish leadership efforts within the EU. Likewise, his extensive personal networks, knowledge of the global scene and a clear, straightforward leadership style also worked to Sweden's advantage. As a capable politician, he was able to carry this content and style of his leadership over into preparations for the Arctic Council Chairmanship. Inspiring and driving forward the work on Sweden's agenda, his political leadership role was probably crucial to the speed and success with which Swedish state secretaries, aides and other staff in Swedish government structures prepared for the Chairmanship.

This carry-over of personnel from the EU Presidency to the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council was also in evidence in the appointment of Gustaf Lind as Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials Group. Lind had proven his ability to organize and implement a focused diplomatic effort both before and during the Swedish EU Presidency in 2009. Though new to the Arctic, he had a tested record in international organization and diplomacy. According to Nord, Gustaf Lind and Carl Bildt were in "a relationship of agreed minds" (2016 p. 85) when it came to Swedish positions on the Arctic and, above all, with regard to what needed to be done to move international cooperation in the Arctic Council forward. Having the right personnel with operational experience, and an agreed upon set of common goals and strategy were thus crucial to facilitating the relatively smooth and politically unchallenged preparations for and the implementation of the Swedish Chairmanship. Together they represent the second explanatory factor that contributed to its success.

The third element that was critical to the effectiveness of the Swedish Chairmanship was timing. By the time it assumed the leadership role within the Arctic Council, concern over climate change and the protection of Arctic species and habitat were receiving extensive regional and global concern. As earlier noted,

the international media was offering regular attention to the warming of the environment and the decline of sea ice in the Arctic as well as the plight of the polar bear. Given the political climate of the day, it was unlikely that other governments would seriously question Sweden's strategic focus upon climate, pollutants and regional economic and social resilience issues. To the contrary, the Swedish Chairmanship agenda was structured along the lines of similar UN documents and a set of international agreements of the day concerning global environmental, social and economic change. The Swedish Arctic strategy also provided an opportunity to forward well-established Swedish ideas and notions about the need for multilateral cooperation in different policy areas without recourse to or restraint from either military or security concerns. In other words, the international political climate in the early years of the new century was still conducive to cooperation, multilateralism and global thinking.

Also given the absence of Arctic affairs from the domestic political agenda in Sweden, the Swedish government did not have to operate in the face of domestic political opposition to its efforts. The more daunting task was to introduce a new Arctic element to Swedish politics. The perception at the time was that the Swedish population did not have an Arctic identity and certainly did not associate their state or government with leadership in Arctic affairs. As noted earlier, successive Swedish governments had had to tread carefully with respect to carving out a leadership role for themselves in the European Union for fear that the divisive issues of political identity belonging to earlier heated political debates over EU, might resurface. The Swedish government in power in 2011 did not have to walk the same perilous path with regard to the Arctic.

Except for the widespread realization that environmental and other climate change issues existed in the Arctic, the Swedish public did not possess much knowledge regarding the Arctic. A contested Arctic identity, in whatever shape or form, was a long way away from entering the minds of Swedes. A poll taken before the Swedish Chairmanship started in 2011 revealed that there was only limited national interest in Arctic affairs. The same poll revealed that only 27 percent of the Swedish population sample had ever heard of an organization called the Arctic Council (Nord 2016 p. 57, Ekos Research Associates 2012). The relative public silence in Sweden, during which its government sat at the head of the Arctic Council, needs be seen against this backdrop. Still struggling to find its new identity in European politics, the Swedish electorate would have been loath to the introduction of yet another identity debate. In 2011, however, the Arctic, for many Swedes was either located somewhere on the margins of their interest or seen as the specific concern of somebody else. Given these conditions, the Swedish government of the day could pursue its Arctic agenda with the minimum of public oversight and concern. The timing was perfect for an exercise in high-level diplomacy that seemed ripe within the broader international context.

The fourth factor that was instrumental in bringing about a successful Swedish Chairmanship was its decision to focus its energies on institutional reform, Rather than scattering attention across a wide domain, the Swedes zeroed in on what they considered the pressing need for making the Arctic Council function more effectively.

As a leadership team experienced with the limitations of other international institutions, it recognized immediately that a failure to enhance the way the Council conducted its business would be detrimental to the body's long-term existence. While due attention was give the continuing issues of environmental protection and sustainable development—and the need to better reconcile these two orientations within the Arctic Council—Sweden reserved most of its critical energies for enhancing the organizational structure and processes of the institution. It lead the charge to re-write its rules of procedure, implement a new and effective communication strategy, resolve the lingering question of who should be an Observer to the body and finally establish a Permanent Secretariat. It also regularly stressed the need to develop a collective view of the Council's work and to facilitate the delivery of key scientific and policy-relevant findings.

In these undertakings, Sweden demonstrated its real leadership skills in assessing the common needs of the body and in building consensus for action in each of these areas. It pursued it honest-broker strategy with great effectiveness and earned the support and admiration for its efforts by all elements of the Arctic Council. Sweden's major impact on the body was in the areas of problem solving and defusing conflict. This is something that the nation and its government had long experience in doing in other global arenas. It was a clear case of "playing to your own strengths" and not burdening oneself with too broad of an agenda or attempting to move into areas where one does not have extensive knowledge or resources. The Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council represented a clear matching of leadership interest with capabilities. It also benefited from the contributions made by prior experience, key personnel and fortunate timing.

5.4 What Accounts for Some Domestic Criticism of the Swedish Chairmanship?

Another lasting lesson from the first Swedish Chairmanship concerns the overriding importance of consensus in international cooperation. The idea that a shared geographic location, a common history or even a cultural affinity between states necessarily leads to consensus among the representatives of national governments is not a perspective that the Swedish officials tend to adopt without some reservations. A long history of cooperation with the other Nordics nations illustrates how there can be an easy meeting of minds on many issues, particularly when it comes to issues of sustainability and climate change. Yet there can be a the cross-cutting dimension of national security which leaves otherwise territorially and culturally close countries, like Norway and Sweden, at near opposite directions in military planning and preparations (Granholm 2012).

In the Arctic context, however, coordination usually takes place in non-security related policy areas that bring other types of national interest to the fore in Arctic diplomacy. The Nordics have different types and different levels of Arctic economic

activity including differences in population density and type. From the perspective of Sweden, a cross-cutting dimension of national interest, at par with the backdrop of security political choices among Arctic countries, stretches out between users and protectors. Users will be countries who are heavily invested in different economic activities in Arctic areas, anywhere from deep-sea fishing and mining to reindeer herding, whereas protectors will be countries with less economic interest or outlook. The lure of big words and fanciful promises is always present in Arctic diplomacy but, from a Swedish point of view, it is only when the organization gets down to business and actually puts things on paper to be implemented that it is possible to talk about any kind of progress.

Sweden since the time of its Chairmanship has steadily expanded the circle of domestic state agencies involved in Arctic affairs. Whether or not this is related to the some of the criticism delivered by the Swedish National Audit Agency is difficult to ascertain. Most notably, the Ministry of the Environment and Energy (2016) now has an Arctic strategy of its own, perhaps indicative of a continued Swedish Arctic focus on the environmental aspects of change in the region. Interest also seems to be growing among other state agencies, such as those involved the fields of transportation and logistics. There appears to be an increased willingness among departmental and agency staff to consider Arctic problems and perspectives in their day-to-day work. There is also a growing awareness of the activities and agendas of the Arctic Council and its various Working Groups. This expanded awareness and attention given to Arctic concerns among national government and local government actors and agencies, is almost developing to point where official Sweden has begun to create an awareness of itself as an Arctic nation.

There is a particular institutional component of the Swedish political system that comes into play here that is often referred to as "administrative dualism." (Jacobsson et al. 2015, pp. 27–31). Comparatively, Swedish agencies are highly autonomous vis-à-vis government ministries. Public administration in Sweden is carried out by the agencies in their separate administrative spheres, usually without direct ministerial steering. The direct influence of an individual Minister upon programs for various state agencies is limited and, importantly, the Directors of public agencies have the constitutional right to question the legality of a proposed "political" program. This particular relationship between policy makers and policy implementers is more or less unique to Sweden, but nevertheless crucial to an understanding of how new and unfamiliar elements like an Arctic strategy can be introduced and politicized in Swedish governance.

It is possible that the critique from the Swedish National Audit Office (2013) should be read as an expression of two parallel political shifts taking place in Sweden as the Arctic Council Chairmanship unfolded. Considering the speed and efficiency with which the Chairmanship was prepared and implemented, one shift was probably a spreading sense of marginalization among Swedish government agencies. As noted above, Swedish government pivots on a particular relationship between policy makers and policy implementers. It is possible to speculate that much of the negative criticism of the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council that was offered by the National Audit Office had to do with the way both the

preparation and execution of the Chairmanship was conducted a close-knit group of people around the Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. The leadership style chosen by Bildt may have been seen as "too ministerial" for Swedish government agencies steeped in, and constitutionally regulated by, a different administrative tradition.

Another source of the domestic criticism that was directed toward the Swedish Chairmanship may have its origins in the prevailing political mood that existed in the country at the time. The center-right party coalition that had been governing Sweden since 2006 was in its final years in office at the time of the Swedish Chairmanship and was increasingly unpopular. There was a growing general dislike among the public regarding how the country was being led both in domestic and foreign policy spheres. Carl Bildt and his international efforts were far less popular than they had been in earlier years. Thus while the Swedish model of government of administrative dualism probably can explain a lot of the criticism expressed in the report by the National Audit Office, it should not be seen as the sole factor. The relationship between Swedish government activism in the Arctic Council and the broader political unhappiness that existed at the time cannot be totally ignored. Each had an impact.

5.5 What will be Sweden's Role in Arctic Affairs in the Future?

Successful diplomacy starts at home. Considering that Sweden will not again become Chair of the Arctic Council until 2028, there is no immediate sense of urgency on Sweden's part to consider the role it might play. However to be successful at the Chair, many things have to be achieved before actually assuming the position. Giving proper shape to a program and formulating an appropriate agenda demands both forward planning and careful consideration. The Swedish government believes that is too late to start such undertakings only 6 months before taking the helm of the organization. This was a significant lesson learned from the just-in-time character of the planning effort that went into the first Swedish Chairmanship. Preliminary work, particularly in the area of consultation, need to start somewhere in the vicinity of 2 to 3 years before the actual Chairmanship begins. The identification and recruitment of top officials should be also be done early.

From the perspective of the Swedish government, there are two particular aspects of the Arctic Council that facilitates such preparation. The first is that the Arctic Council is a global organization with a global agenda. In this light, functional and knowledge spillover from other Swedish initiatives in other global organizations can be applied and utilized in a manner that makes sense to political and administrative leaders. By framing Arctic affairs within these broader themes, a useable policy making tool is created. The absence of military-strategic considerations within the Arctic Council agenda also contributes to keeping this policy tool sharp. The second aspect of the Arctic Council that is relevant to Sweden is that it is not a large

organization requiring many officials and staff with a specialized knowledge background. As learned from its first Chairmanship, Sweden can provide effective leadership with a limited number of actors who need not all be Arctic experts. As a long-standing participant in global diplomacy, Sweden possesses the ability to mobilize a significant internationally experienced and linguistically prepared staff that can be placed speedily at the disposal of such an undertaking.

Supporting a globally focused agenda in the Arctic Council also comes with the benefit of not being overly dependent upon identity politics. As noted throughout this volume, there are real pitfalls within the domestic arena of different Member States in pursuing such an identity politics. To the extent that the Arctic Council agenda can be seen as a global agenda, focusing as it does on issues of climate, safety and resilience, it is easier to forge commonalities of interest than a common identity. Thus far, it seems that members of the Arctic Council are working in this direction, despite political disagreement in other parts of the world. The Swedish contribution to this effort seems to be that of constantly highlighting the collective interests of the body and in advancing forward common Arctic agendas.

There are, nevertheless, some dark clouds on the political horizon. Although the next Swedish Chairmanship is still a decade away, some particularly ominous political developments can already be observed. For Sweden, Russia's return to great-power politics and its projection of military power is a major national security concern and a potential threat to Arctic collaboration. Similarly, the United States' retreat from global economic and environmental leadership under the current Trump Administration also brings new perils to Sweden's international agenda of cooperation and multilateralism. Both threaten to undermine its call for common commitment and common cause in the circumpolar region. Will there be any space for an agenda based on these principles by the time Sweden next takes the helm of the Arctic Council? Will there be any ability for an "honest broker" to promote collective effort and consensus among its membership? These questions are unanswerable this far ahead of the event but are worthy of careful consideration by Swedish policy planners and the broader Arctic community.

5.6 In Conclusion

Regardless of what the more distant future may hold, there seems to be little doom and gloom regarding current Swedish attitudes toward the Arctic Council. The appointment of Björn Lyrvall in 2017 as Sweden's Arctic Ambassador to the Council, seems to reaffirm the Swedish government's desire for a proactive stance. Selecting a skillful and highly experienced diplomat, Sweden seems to be saying that it is no longer a "reluctant" Arctic nation but one that takes both its Arctic presence and related opportunities to work with partners seriously. As suggested earlier in this chapter, the first Swedish Chairmanship more or less kick-started a new process in Swedish society in which the prevailing attitude toward the Arctic as something remote and unrelated to the Swedish national interest is gradually being

replaced with a new view of the Arctic as something close, interesting and reflective broader global concerns. As also described in this chapter, this Swedish experience contains an element of "Arctification" as an elite process, as opposed to a popular movement or demand from below. From such a vantage point it is clear that the lessons learned from the first Swedish Chairmanship belong first and foremost to the parallel worlds of government and diplomacy.

Whether or not Sweden will be able to sustain its proactive multilateralist stance within the Arctic Council remains an open question. With the next Swedish Chairmanship a decade away, many things can happen in the interim. It is clear that small states like Sweden will have to monitor and follow changes in the global climate, politically as well as environmentally. A growing domestic interest in Arctic affairs among Swedish agencies and organizations probably has less to do with identity, and more to do with a growing realization that the Arctic is undergoing fundamental change. Swedish actors will have to prepare for an Arctic Ocean that is ice-free in the near future. Such an occurrence will not only severely alter climatic conditions in the European North, but will also radically alter the social and economic realities of the people who live throughout the circumpolar region.

In this light, the future prospects for Swedish activism in the Arctic would seem to hinge upon a new understanding of Arctic commonalities among all countries involved. This may be reminiscent of the need for common cause and concrete action that pervaded the Arctic Council during the second decade of its existence and which paved the way for Swedish success in its first-ever Arctic Chairmanship in 2011–2013. Contributing to a common strategy document for the Arctic Council, which is scheduled for completion in 2019, will most likely occupy the near-term planning efforts of the Swedish government. How to implement that strategy and to effectively respond to challenging forces from the wider international arena will be central to its longer-term undertakings.

Regarding the role and impact of leaders within international organizations, the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council conveys the clear message that the leadership endeavor is not a simple or easy exercise. To be successful, a leader of an international organization must be attuned to both external forces within the international environment and to internal concerns within the body itself. Furthermore, an Arctic Council Chair must determine which type of leadership style to utilize and identify the ways it can be most effective in playing its part. In the case of Sweden's term at the helm of the Arctic Council an "honest broker" approach seemed to be best reflective of both its national objectives and its specific capabilities at the time. In the process of providing leadership, the Swedish Chairmanship came to recognize the important contributions that can be made by experience, focus, timing on the one hand, and the progress that can be secured through innovation, adaptability and persistence on the other. Each of these factors was partially responsible for the success of the undertaking and each seemingly has a message to convey to those who would seek to lead the organization in the future.

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Chapter 6
Development or Bust: Canada's Arctic Council Chairmanship 2013–15

Heather Exner-Pirot

Abstract Canada chaired the Arctic Council from 2013–15. During its tenure, Canada attempted to rebalance the policy focus of the Arctic Council from environmental protection to sustainable, or as it termed it, responsible development. These efforts were met with resistance from many within the Arctic Council epistemic community. Critics feared that its support for resource development compromised efforts to combat climate changes; and that the agenda favored business stakeholders over scientific ones. This chapter describes and assesses Canada's efforts to prioritize Arctic development at the regional level. It evaluates the extent to which its development agenda gained traction not only during its Chairmanship, but subsequently in the American and Finnish Chairmanship agendas and through the ongoing work of the Council. Finally, it provides some reflections on the style and impact of the Canadian Chairmanship.

Keywords Canada · Arctic Council · Canadian foreign policy · Chairmanships · Northern development

6.1 Introduction

The Arctic Council has been labelled a "Canadian Initiative", following the efforts in the 1990s by successive Conservative and Liberal Canadian governments, in concert with Indigenous and particularly Inuit Canadian leaders, to establish a regional intergovernmental forum focused on both sustainable development and environmental protection. It was in Ottawa in 1996 that the Arctic Council was formally inaugurated. Canada has since carried a kind of parental concern for the forum, and a longstanding desire to advocate for the inclusion of Indigenous peoples and a focus on the issues that matter most to northerners.

Institutionally, however, the Arctic Council is oriented towards protecting the Arctic environment through its scientific Working Groups. While environmental

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and marine issues are well suited to regional action, development ones are often better addressed at local and national levels, despite the efforts of the organization's Sustainable Development Working Group. In the past decade, the Arctic has become nearly synonymous with climate change to those from outside the region, and concomitantly the Arctic Council as a forum is increasingly called upon to mitigate and address the effects of warming.

It was within this context that Canada assumed the role of Chair of the Arctic Council in 2013. Eager to make a mark on Arctic governance, Canada promoted a very specific agenda, seeking to rebalance the Arctic Council's priorities towards economic development. Although it provided leadership on the issue, it attracted few followers. Canada's Chairmanship was widely seen to be, by Arctic Council standards, controversial. The promotion of economic development in the Arctic is generally associated with the extractive industries and coalitions of scientists, environmentalists and some Indigenous groups seek to protect the region from such activity. The fact that the Canadian Chairmanship came during the tenure of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his Conservative party only served to exacerbate concerns of some that "development" was code for exploitation.

This chapter will describe and assess Canada's efforts to prioritize Arctic development at the regional level. It will evaluate the extent to which its development agenda gained traction not only during its Chairmanship, but subsequently in the American and Finnish Chairmanship agendas and through the ongoing work of the Council. Finally, it will provide some reflections on the style and impact of the Canadian Chairmanship.

6.2 Arctic Development: For Whom and for What?

The concept of development is highly contested in an Arctic context. What is actually meant by the term is not always clear. Nonetheless there is general consensus that "sustainable development" is normatively good and worth pursuing. However, the standards for what is sustainable are often significantly higher in the Arctic than in other regions of the world.

The Arctic region is sparsely populated, has few large urban centres, and is reliant on three northern economic pillars: the resource extraction, public and traditional/subsistence sectors (Huskey 2005). Its remoteness, sparseness, lack of infrastructure and relatively low educational attainment, especially in the Russian and North American (Alaska, northern Canada and Greenland) Arctics makes manufacturing and service delivery generally unfeasible. Shipping is largely destinational, designed around exporting raw materials to urban centres; or transpolar, with few Arctic stops along the route. Tourism may provide pockets of economic growth but is very unlikely to be an economic driver for the region as a whole. Fishing and other bio-resource sectors need to achieve scale in order to be profitable, something that is difficult to achieve without better transportation infrastructure.

With higher than national levels of unemployment and poverty; significant demands for social, health and education services; and overwhelming infrastructure gaps, especially amongst Indigenous communities across the Arctic, the circumpolar North requires funding that currently only resource rents or government transfers can provide. Due to the desire amongst Northerners, especially Indigenous Northerners, to exercise self-determination, dependence on central government transfers is not ideal.

Resource development offers by far the best – in the sense of most reliable – opportunities for Arctic communities to generate revenues significant enough to pay for public infrastructure and create training and jobs for local residents. In Greenland, resource development is recognized as necessary to reduce dependency on transfers from Denmark and eventually establish independence. In Canada, inherent and Treaty rights mean Indigenous peoples can demand meaningful engagement in and benefits from resource development. Land claims in many areas make them the owners of resources. In Alaska, Indigenous peoples are shareholders in regional corporations and village corporations established under the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, and have surface and sub-surface rights to a combined 44 million acres.

Yet, for many Indigenous and non-Indigenous environmentalists, the extractive industries are problematic, especially in the Arctic. Non-renewable resource development, including mining and oil and natural gas extraction, is inherently unsustainable, in the sense that it cannot be conducted without imposing environmental costs. The Circumpolar North has a long history of environmental damage. Popular and scientific conceptions of the Arctic see it as a region of unique environmental importance and vulnerability. Also because it has experienced the impacts of climate change more severely than mid-latitude regions, there is particular distaste for oil and gas extraction activities in the Arctic. This comes despite the fact that Arctic warming is primarily a result of global, rather than regional, greenhouse gas emissions.

The result is an unresolved tension between sustainability and development in the Arctic. Both are needed but gains in one seem to come at the expense of the other. Compared to the rest of the developed world, this tension is heightened. Although Arctic social development needs are greater than in the southerly regions of the Arctic states, the general public is uncomfortable with levels of environmental impact in the North that would be acceptable in the South (See Fig. 6.1 below).



Fig. 6.1 Perception of development activities in the Arctic

6.3 The Arctic Council and Development

When the Arctic Council was established it adopted a twin mandate. As suggested by the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996 it was to be a high-level forum created to:

> provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, *in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic* [emphasis added] (Arctic Council 1996).

The Arctic Council arose out of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) of 1991, which referenced "sustainable economic development" but had a primary concern with environmental issues (Bloom 1999, p. 713). The establishment of Arctic Council thus represented a shift in organizational attention towards development issues. However, as Evan Bloom argued, there was "considerable disagreement" over what that would mean in practice and "it was not possible for the Arctic states to agree to a comprehensive sustainable development program, or even a list of priorities" (ibid, p. 715).

These differences were evident throughout Arctic Council negotiations, and they were primarily between Canadian and Nordic perspectives. As Staples (1998) noted in a WWF Arctic Bulletin at the time:

> Throughout the conference, the Canadian Arctic experience with sustainability emerged as issues of community development and community empowerment - an experience that has been dramatically mirrored in the land claim agreements of the last two decades. In contrast, the Scandinavian and European experiences were defined generally as the vertical integration and coordination of actions and responsibilities across national, regional and local governments, and horizontally the integration and cooperation of sustainable development initiatives across social and economic sectors (Staples 1998, p. 15).

As alluded to by Staples, the Canadian focus was related to the prominence of Indigenous and northern issues in Canadian federal polices, especially during that time when the new territory of Nunavut was being established. As Scrivener (1996) described it:

> More generally, Arctic issues were less prominent in the domestic politics of the other Arctic states, compared with the Canadian case. In some ways, the whole Arctic Council idea could be seen as an external projection of the internal political processes related to Indigenous peoples of the Canadian north (p. 13).

Sustainable development had become a popular international organizing concept as the Arctic Council was being negotiated, popularized by the Brundtland Commission and endorsed at the Rio Summit in 1992. A Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) for the Arctic Council was formalised in 1998, after 2 years of negotiations following the Ottawa Declaration establishing the Arctic Council. It joined the four pre-existing AEPS Working Groups that had been grandfathered in to the Council (the Arctic Contaminants Action Program was formalized as a Working Group in 2006). The SDWG became the main vehicle for the Arctic Council's sustainable development focus, often acting as a catch-all repository for

all people-oriented (as opposed to environment-oriented) issues. High-profile SDWG projects have focused on mental health, renewable energy, traditional foods and Indigenous knowledge. However the economic aspects of development have been mostly left off of the agenda.

It is not that the Arctic Council has been historically opposed to economic aspects of development. The specific term "economic development" is referenced in every Arctic Council Ministerial Declaration except Nuuk's in 2011. (See Fig. 6.2 below). There are two explanations for the Arctic Council's inability or unwillingness to tackle economic development. The first is its structural in character. As a regional-level organization with no legal character and limited funding, the Arctic Council is not well-positioned to develop or implement policy that could impact economic development. Capacity-building is usually best conducted at a local level; regulatory and trade policies are best conducted at a sub-national or national level. Those Arctic-wide regulatory regimes that are needed to manage economic development have been conducted largely outside the Arctic Council: shipping regulations at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and fisheries in an ad hoc gathering of the five Arctic coastal states plus Iceland, China, Japan, Korea and the European Union.

A second contributing factor is the culture and values of the Arctic Council. As a forum organized around environmental protection, and as a region characterised by climate change and Indigenous ways of life, economic and business development is



Fig. 6.2 References to "Economic" and "Business" in Arctic Council Declarations, 1996–2017 Searches for "Economic" excluded names of UN agencies. Searches for "Business" excluded procedural matters. A compilation of all Arctic Council Declarations is available on the Arctic Council website at [https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/94/EDOCS-1200-v4-All_Arctic_Council_Declarations_1996-2017_Searchable.PDF?sequence=7&isAllowed=y]

not a natural fit. The body has preferred to discuss environmental concerns and has utilized a framework to do so that is rooted in research and scientific analysis. Business issues and priorities have seemed somewhat foreign and confusing. Historically, the organization has felt uncomfortable discussing economic gains and losses within the context of its established routine.

In an effort to address this gap in attention and concern, the Arctic Council established a Task Force on a Circumpolar Business Forum in 2012. It was co-chaired by three states: Canada, Finland and Russia, who historically have seen their northern regions as major economic drivers within their societies. The work of this Task Force would culminate in the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council in 2014 under Canada's Chairmanship.

6.4 Canada's Arctic Council Chairmanship 2013–15

Given the predictable, rotational nature of Arctic Council Chairmanships, the timing of the Canadian leadership role had been known for years. Speculation on what and how the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) should focus its agenda began to be examined as early as 2009 (e.g. Griffiths 2009; Exner-Pirot 2011; and Axworthy et al. 2012). This is a scrutiny unique within the region and can be attributed to the preponderance of Arctic social scientists in Canada on the one hand; and the unusually high level of national and international interest in the Arctic leading up to 2013 on the other. Northern Canadian politics are somewhat more complicated than in other states, due to a number of factors including: the struggles between often competing jurisdictions; the potency of Indigenous issues in the public domain; and the resonance that the North and the Arctic has on the Canadian psyche and identity. Arctic policy is not a simple issue of foreign policy or climate change policy for Canada, but a matter of importance to a spectrum of stakeholders.

6.4.1 Northern Consultations

Prime Minister Stephen Harper named Leona Aglukkaq as Canada's Chair of the Arctic Council in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, on August 23, 2012. As an Inuk, the then Minister for Health, and MP for Nunavut, she seemed to be an obvious choice for the position, and became the first Chair of the Arctic Council to actually be an Arctic resident. However her selection was not totally uncontroversial. Aglukkaq was the first Chair of the Arctic Council who was not also the sitting Foreign Minister for that country. A few commentators questioned not her abilities, but her Cabinet mandate and the competency of her office to address the larger foreign policy framework that the Arctic Council entails, such as relations with Russia (Michael Byers, as quoted in Boswell 2013).

Aglukkaq's team began organizing northern consultations immediately, with visits to Iqaluit on October 27, Whitehorse on November 2 and Yellowknife on November 3, 2012. There she met with MLAs, Indigenous organizations, private businesses, and other stakeholders to develop priorities for the Canadian Chairmanship (Bell 2012). Soon after the consultations, the Chairmanship priorities were publicly announced by Canadian Ambassador Kenneth McCartney (standing in for Aglukkaq) on November 29, 2012 at a SIPRI workshop in Stockholm, Sweden on "The Arctic Council in Transition: Nordic to North American Leadership" (Exner-Pirot 2016a). There, McCartney announced the overarching Canadian Chairmanship theme of "Development for the People of the North" with three subthemes of:

- Responsible Arctic resource development;
- Responsible and safe Arctic shipping; and
- Sustainable circumpolar communities.

Aglukkaq went on subsequently to tour a number of the Nordic Member States of the Arctic Council in January 2013 to discuss and build support for the themes, including Iceland, Denmark, and Finland, before giving a speech on the Chairmanship agenda at the influential Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromso, Norway. There, she also participated in a roundtable with Arctic Indigenous groups and Permanent Participants, and met with the Foreign Ministers of both Norway and Sweden, the latter being the Arctic Chair at the time (DFATD 2013).

The level and amount of consultations conducted by Aqlukkaq leading up to the Canadian Chairmanship was unprecedented for the Arctic Council at this time. However it was very consistent with northern political culture in Canada which places a premium on such things. In many cases involving Aboriginal rights and land claims, it is actually required by law, through the "duty to consult" provision as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada. Although there was no formal requirement to consult northerners on the Chairmanship, there would have been significant political costs at home for not conducting them. Process is almost as important as outcome there, and the decision to focus on human development without first garnering local feedback would have appeared odd from a Canadian perspective (Exner-Pirot 2016a).

6.4.2 The Canadian Chairmanship Theme: Development for Arctic Peoples

Aglukkaq referenced her own Arctic roots when explaining the decision to focus on Arctic peoples, saying that she would bring a different perspective to the table. She noted:

> As a northerner, I want to say – first and foremost – that people in the North want development…We want it!…For 16 years, the Arctic Council has been very focused on research –

> science research…we talk about this as an area that's developing – Canada's North is developing, the Arctic region of every country is developing. But it's the private sector that's actually going to develop those regions – not scientists (Boswell 2013).

Aglukkaq's implicit antipathy to the role and prominence of science in the Arctic region marked a sharp departure from Arctic Council norms, which place a high value on scientific research. The focus on development – especially taken in the context of resource development – was furthermore a point of contention for Arctic stakeholders and Observers, and reflected some of the fundamental tensions in the region over what policies to prioritize (Exner-Pirot 2016a).

In particular, many European and Asian stakeholders, as well as environmentalists, view the Arctic as a place to be established – or preserved - as a "common heritage of mankind". The European Parliament's 2008 resolution seeking an Antarctic-like treaty for the Arctic is the best example of this. However the concept was anathema not only to many Indigenous and local inhabitants, who rejected the notion of the Arctic as a *terra nullius*, but also to the governments of Canada and Russia. As Yevgeny Lukyanov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia's Security Council suggested, "for the majority of Russians, the Arctic and everything connected to it, is not an abstract concept or a romantic exotica, but a practical and a vitally important reality" (Sevunts 2013). From this vantage point, the Arctic, as well as the sub-Arctic, are not places to be set aside for nature, but form an integral part of their respective national economies. In the case of Russia, its Arctic economy is well-developed and accounts for up to twenty percent of its GDP (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2012).

Canada also had limited moral leadership in 2013 to undertake a shifting of the Arctic Council's policy preferences. The Conservative Government under Stephen Harper diverged ideologically from the agenda of the liberal institutionalist Arctic Council, and embraced a pro-development program that was ambivalent to climate change concerns. This set him apart from the leaders of most of the other Member States and their favoured environmental protection efforts in the Arctic.

Canada's position within the Arctic Council was not criticized solely for being pro-resource development. It was also criticized for privileging the local versus the global. This was a stance that was completely sensible from a Canadian perspective, but increasingly unacceptable to the Arctic Council's many European and Asian stakeholders. It clashed as well with the views of many concerned global environmentalist who saw the Arctic as a global commons for which all have a shared responsibility to protect (Exner-Pirot 2016a). As one commentator stated when Canada assumed the Chairmanship in May 2013:

> To call the Canadian vision unfashionable (except in the north) would … be an understatement. Whereas the emerging mainstream view treats the Arctic as a space undergoing inexorable globalisation, the Canadian programme treats the Arctic as a bounded region. Whereas the mainstream view holds that a globalising region should be managed in a similarly global way, the Canadian vision is that the Arctic's inhabitants have particular interests, distinct from non-Northerners', that take priority (Willis 2013).

The U.S. Senior Arctic Official, Julia Gourley, confirmed many of these worries at the first SAO meeting under the Canadian Chairmanship in Whitehorse in October 2013. She noted at that time that she sensed "a diminishment of the priority" of science and research under Canada's helm and that "the United States would never allow any threats to science work at the Council, so we would defend it. That might be something that's a little different between Canada and the U.S., actually – science will be central to our chairmanship" (Wingrove 2013).

Supporters of the Canadian Chairmanship instead saw an opportunity to provide a new balance to the Arctic Council's activities. One of the key outcomes of the Canadian Chairmanship was the establishment of an Arctic Economic Council (AEC) in January 2014. The AEC was to be a circumpolar business forum established consensually by all members of the Arctic Council to foster business development, engage in deeper circumpolar cooperation, and provide a business perspective to the work of the Arctic Council (Arctic Council 2014). Many of the traditional participants within the Arctic Council viewed the AEC suspiciously. They worried that it would provide corporate interests with preferential access to national governments (Axworthy and Simon 2015) or even "[set] the frame for a new era of exploitation of the Arctic" (Neil Hamilton, as quoted in Quaile 2014). These same critics alternately accused the AEC of causing confusion by adopting a mandate that "is virtually the same as that of the Arctic Council" (Axworthy and Simon 2015) and "negating its prime function" of protecting the environment (Neil Hamilton, as quoted in Quaile 2014). Needless to say, the very idea of business development in the Arctic provoked disquiet among many traditional proponents of the Arctic Council.

While the Canadian Chairmanship focused to a large extent on development, it had many deliverables which demonstrated a continuation, rather than break, from conventional Arctic Council fare. Amongst these were:

- The formal opening of the Permanent Secretariat in June 2013.
- The development of three frameworks, on (1) Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions; (2) Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic and (3) Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas.
- The establishment of both a telecommunications infrastructure experts group and a Task Force to assess future needs for a regional seas program.
- Approval of *Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines: Systems Safety Management and Safety Culture*; a *Guide to Oil Spill Response in Snow and Ice Conditions in the Arctic*; and an *Arctic Migratory Bird Initiative Action Plan* (Exner-Pirot 2016a).

Indeed, the *Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions*, which was co-chaired by Canada and the United States marked, according to the representative for the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Chief Michel Stickman, "the first time that Arctic nations have formally agreed to work together to mitigate climate change … sending a hugely important political message

that climate change mitigation can be organized regionally as well as globally" (Stickman 2015).

6.5 Economic Development in the U.S. and Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanships

Politically, the 2013–15 Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship acted as a lightning rod for many environmentalists due to its theme of "Development for the People of the North", which many saw as a thinly veiled threat to promote non-renewable resource development (see for example Quaile 2014; Greaves 2013). Has the topic remained as controversial in regional politics since the Iqaluit Ministerial? Many breathed a sigh of relief when the gavel was passed from the Canadian Chair, Leona Aglukkaq, to the American Chair, John Kerry. Has there been space within the following U.S. and Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanships for an emphasis on economic development in the region?

6.5.1 U.S. Chairmanship 2015–17

The United States, which took over the Arctic Council Chairmanship in April 2015, initially favored a return to the status quo of prioritizing environmental protection and renewing the Council's focus on climate change, consistent with the values and objectives of the Obama Administration (Papp 2014). However it very soon confronted opposition from stakeholders in Alaska, who supported the work of the Arctic Economic Council and prioritized economic development over climate change mitigation. The Alaska Arctic Policy Commission Co-Chairs Bob Herron and Lesil McGuire, for example, wrote in an open letter to US Special Representative to the Arctic Admiral Robert Papp Jr. and Ambassador David Balton that they were "very concerned that our number one priority, jobs and economic opportunity for Arctic residents, is being ignored" and that "Alaskans' voices in this matter of promoting resource and economic development are being overlooked" (McGuire and Herron 2014). Similarly, Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski, questioning Papp on his policy priorities at a Senate Energy Committee hearing, declared that: "an economy that allows for the people of the North to not only exist but to thrive is critical" (Bennett 2015). The Alaskan Senate even made the unprecedented move of passing a resolution articulating support for, and recommendations to, the Arctic Economic Council, over which it has no authority (Alaska State Legislature SJR 16: 2015).

Although the American State Department was initially lukewarm to the idea of the Arctic Economic Council in particular, and to economic security in general, it did eventually respond to some of the voiced concerns of the Alaskans. For instance, "improving economic and living conditions" in the Arctic became a more prominent

feature of its leadership term and one of three pillars of its Chairmanship agenda. This was alongside "Arctic Ocean safety, security and stewardship" and "addressing the impacts of climate change" (U.S. State Department 2018). The innovative Alaska Arctic Council Host Committee that Alaskan Governor Bill Walker established at the onset of the U.S. Chairmanship was well populated with business advocates and their perspectives during the period. The efforts of the Arctic Economic Council to promote business enterprise and investments in the Arctic also progressed significantly during the American tenure.

6.5.2 The Finnish Chairmanship 2017–19

Amongst the Arctic states, Finland has generally maintained a positive outlook on business development in the region, alongside Canada and Russia. Its stated priorities for its Chairmanship – environmental protection, connectivity, meteorological cooperation and education – are not overtly economic. However, the description of its goals (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2017) mentions specifically economic and business development several times. It also calls for the "economic potential of the region [to] be harnessed in a way that brings prosperity to, and guarantees the livelihood and social progress of, Arctic inhabitants and communities" (p. 7). Finland also notes that during its Chairmanship it would seek "to increase the cooperation between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council to support the goal of facilitating business-to-business activities and responsible economic development" (p. 5); and identifies "well-functioning communication networks and services [as] a lifeline for human activities and a prerequisite for economic development in the Arctic" (p. 7).

The Finnish government has previously coined the term "snow-how" (see Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland 2010), a play on 'know-how', to market their expertise in cold weather and snow e.g. for transportation, infrastructure development and maintenance. The CEO of the Finnish icebreaker company, Arctica Group, Tero Verauste, is currently the Chair of the Arctic Economic Council and has been given a large platform by the Finnish Government to communicate its snow-how and promote a cold weather-adept business sector. However, for a variety of reasons, there has been little angst shown about the embracing of economic and business development in the Arctic under Finland's Chairmanship, as there had been during the Canadian, and to a lesser extent, the American leadership terms. Overall, it is fair to say that economic development has been normalized, if still subservient to environmental issues, in Arctic Council politics since the Canadian Chairmanship.

6.6 Canada's Chairmanship Style

Opposition to Canada's development agenda was not simply a reaction to the content, but to the style and the actors involved. Canada's 2013–15 Chairmanship style may be best described as what Nord identifies as an "entrepreneurial" style in Chap. 4 of this volume.. This style of leadership sees Chairs "promoting a very specific agenda that embodies either their own national or personal objectives" (Nord 2013).. It was a not a good match for the Arctic Council. Arctic diplomats are notoriously discrete, and it is difficult to prove this point beyond the anecdotal; but behind the scenes there were many grumblings about the Canadian Chairmanship's insularity and parochialism.

Throughout its term in power the Harper Government was publically sceptical of the value of international institutionalism, and it showed during the Chairmanship. Harper had reduced Canada's foreign diplomatic and development presence and, particularly in the years when he led a minority government, made limited efforts to gain influence on the world stage. The Conservatives' gaze was fixed on domestic politics instead. The Harper Government failed in its bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council in October 2010, the very first time Canada was unsuccessful in a campaign for a Security Council term. Canada later pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2011 and withdrew from the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 2013, which the Conservative Foreign Minister John Baird called "a talkfest"; becoming the only state to not become a signatory.

Canada's foreign policy position under the Harper Government is best encapsulated by a point made by Minister Baird in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 2011: "Canada does not just 'go along' in order to 'get along'" (as quoted in Wherry 2011). This attitude was on regular display during its Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and influenced its approach to leadership within the organization.

Harper, himself, described his foreign policy approach as being "principled" on several occasions. It was this language that Aglukkaq borrowed to describe Canada's decision to skip a meeting of the Arctic Council's Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane that took place in Moscow in April 2014. She suggested that Canada was taking a "principled stand" against Russia over its incursion into Crimea (Mackrael 2014). The tension between Russia and Canada during the Canadian Chairmanship was palpable and damaging to the organization's ethos of cooperation and consensus building.

Without defending Russia's actions in Ukraine, one can establish that the cleavage between Russia and Canada was outside Arctic political norms. The Council has long enjoyed compartmentalization from broader international affairs that has allowed it to function and progress irrespective of external events. There is not much, culturally, environmentally or otherwise, that one can effectively accomplish in the Arctic region without Russia's involvement. Yet Aglukkaq asserted in the run-up to the event that she would use the Canadian Ministerial as an opportunity to confront Russia on their actions in the Ukraine. Not surprisingly, the Russian

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov subsequently declined to attend the Iqaluit Ministerial, the first and only one he has missed during his tenure. The Iqaluit Ministerial also had no traditional "family photo" taken of the participants reflecting the tense atmosphere of the meeting. Canada's use of the bully pulpit to express and impose its principles on matter outside the purview of the Arctic Council was viewed poorly. The effect was an eliciting of sympathy and support in Iqaluit - not for Canada or Ukraine, but for Russia - as almost every Minister and Permanent Participant used their five minute statement period at the Ministerial Roundtable to emphasize the importance of maintaining cooperation in the Council and the region.

The Canadian Chairmanship deviated from Arctic Council norms by privileging development over protection and "principles" over consensus. However, it also differed with respect to which actors it privileged. As mentioned above, rather than attempt to make space for non-Arctic voices – including both "Southerners" from Arctic states and anyone from non-Arctic states, e.g. continental Europe and Asia – it sought to marginalize them. It is worth noting that no additional Arctic Council Observers were admitted during Canada's time at the head of the body. Whereas the Canadian Chairmanship disregarded much of its international and southern domestic audience, the United States Chairmanship made the latter a priority, for example through the publication of its "Our Arctic Nation" book which highlights Arctic contributions from each of the 50 states of the country (U.S. State Department 2016).

Similarly, business interests seemingly took priority over scientists during the Canadian Chairmanship. This was clearly a reversal of past practice. This was evident in the fact that the Arctic Economic Council was the only attending group that got face time with the Ministers in Iqaluit. The Working Groups – organizational bodies composed of experts, governmental representatives and researchers who focus primarily on scientific projects – were sidelined.

In addition to the non-traditional appointment of Aglukkaq, rather than the Foreign Minister, as Chair, Canada took the unusual step of selecting Patrick Borbey as the Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials—a position usually seen as being the face and voice of the Arctic Council. Borbey at the time was the President of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, a governmental body not usually associated with Canadian foreign policy. Although Borbey had had a long and distinguished career in the federal public service of Canada, he had limited diplomatic experience. The signal from the Harper Government was clear: economic development expertise would supersede international diplomacy skill during its Chairmanship.

Both Aglukkaq and Borbey's appointments within the Canadian Chairmanship also raised questions regarding how effectively its internal operations would function with three different Ministries being involved. The answer, apparently, was that they would not function well with so many different cooks in the kitchen. Thus, half-way through the Canadian Chairmanship, Borbey was quietly replaced by Vincent Rigby, a seasoned diplomat at the Department of Foreign Affairs (See Table 6.1 below). This was the first time that such disruption had taken place involving the Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials.

Table 6.1 Roles and affiliations of Senior Canadian Arctic Council Representatives, 2013–15

Role	Appointee	Department
Chair	Leona Aglukkaq	Minister, Health Canada (until July 2013) and later Environment Canada
Chair, Senior Arctic Officials	Patrick Borbey (May 2013–June 2014)	President, Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CanNor)
	Vincent Rigby (July 2014–April 2015)	Diplomat, Foreign Affairs
Senior Arctic Official for Canada	Susan Harper	Diplomat, Foreign Affairs
Canadian Head of Delegation, Iqaluit Ministerial	Rob Nicholson	Minister, Foreign Affairs

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

6.7 Analysis

Canada's foreign policy goals in the Arctic region have long included improving the socio-economic conditions of its Northerners, especially in Indigenous communities. It was Canada that pushed to establish an Arctic Council inclusive of a sustainable development mandate and containing Indigenous Permanent Participants in the first place. That its 2013 Arctic Council Chairmanship agenda would focus on development should have been no surprise. Yet a combination of factors made it controversial.

The first was serious disregard existing between the Chair and many members of the organization. The liberal global institutionalist distaste for the Harper Conservative government and its pro-resource development, anti-conservationist agenda was palatable. So was the Conservative government's distaste for the environmentalism and science-centeredness of much of the Arctic Council which Aglukkaq saw as detrimental to Northerners' quality of life. The Harper Conservative values were not compatible with the historic priorities and established culture of the organization. A comparable agenda under a Justin Trudeau Liberal government, or the actually similar American agenda under Barack Obama Democrats, would not have fomented so much suspicion among one another.

Second was the international attention around Arctic development at the time. It came with the popular conception of the region as seen through a normative lens where protection is good and resource development, especially oil and gas, is bad. Greenpeace's "Save the Arctic" campaign was objectively a success during this period from a public relations perspective. The mainstream media similarly reinforced narratives of a vulnerable and changing Arctic environment. Relatively little context for local concerns, lived realities and political agency in resource development, was provided or absorbed in the general, non-Arctic public of the Arctic states.

Third, the Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship came at a time when tension between local and global actors and their respective rights to influence regional Arctic governance were probably at their highest. Global interest from the European Union, Asian countries, international organizations like the United Nations and environmentalist groups such as Greenpeace, as well as from multi-national corporations like Shell and investment firms such as Guggenheim was peaking. Meanwhile Indigenous rights holders in Alaska, Canada and Greenland saw revenue generation opportunities at the high end of a commodities super cycle.

Despite the unusual level of scrutiny and discord, it seems as if the Canadian Chairmanship contributed, at least in part, to normalizing economic development in the Arctic and ensuring a role for the Arctic Council in promoting it, through the Arctic Economic Council and beyond. It was eventually to be embraced by the United States Chairmanship, with some urging by Alaska, and has become normal business under Finland's leadership.

In addition, Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, where land rights are well-established, have become increasingly supportive of responsible development and many northern and Indigenous governments actively seek such investments. There was backlash from many northern Canadians and Alaskans, for example, when Barack Obama and Justin Trudeau declared a moratorium on oil drilling in the Arctic Ocean in December 2016 without consultation or consideration of northern interests. However, with commodity prices generally down since the Canadian Chairmanship began in 2013, the stakes for both pro-development and pro-conservation sides have subsided somewhat and the policy debate seems less urgent. Events over the coming decade will determine whether they will again return to prominence within the affairs of the globe and the Arctic Council.

6.8 Conclusions

The Arctic Council is not an institution known for controversy. To the extent that the Arctic Council ever projects tensions externally, the Canadian Arctic Chairmanship of 2013–2015 represented a low point in its previous record of diplomatic cooperation and accord (Exner-Pirot 2015). Of particular contention during this period was how and whether the Arctic Council should support and promote economic development, especially in the context of resource exploitation.

Despite initial apprehensions, it is fair to say that since 2013 the Arctic Council has come to embrace and recognize as legitimate a role for its members in promoting economic development. This is evidenced most explicitly in the establishment of an Arctic Economic Council, which was designed as and remains an independent body but reflects Arctic Council timelines and goals. Moreover, economic development has become an intended outcome of many other Arctic Council activities, such as connectivity, good health, and education. The Canadian defence of Arctic economic development in 2013–15 was not elegant; but in retrospect, it was successful.

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Chapter 7
The U.S. Chairmanship: Round Two

Heather Nicol

Abstract This chapter explores the platforms, leadership processes, agenda and resulting complexity of the US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2015–2017). It examines the making of the "strategic agenda" that was at the foundation of the U.S. Chairmanship's Program and then assesses the Chairmanship itself. What has the U.S. Chairmanship meant for the Arctic Council? What did the Arctic Council mean for the U.S. Chairmanship? What did it contribute to the long- standing work plan of the Arctic Council and its transition to the Finnish Chairmanship in the second half 2017? It concludes that both an entrepreneurial approach to the role of the Chair, and disaggregate agenda-setting effort contributed in no modest way to the stability of the Council's transition, particularly as it has offset the potentially tumultuous impacts of the U.S. political landscape after the election of Donald Trump.

Keywords United States · Arctic Council Chairmanships · Entrepreneurial leadership · Assessment

7.1 Introduction

For two decades now, the Arctic Council has been the subject of speculation, analysis, criticism and praise. The story of its origins is now relatively well-known (see English 2013, Fenge 2013, Keskitalo 2004, Lackenbauer et al. 2017), and speculation surrounding its future – either as an intergovernmental forum, international regime or treaty area – is robust (Brigham et al. 2016; Halinen 2016; Nord 2016; Spence 2013). Most policy-makers, academics, commentators, and others who watch the Arctic Council closely, suggest that irrespective of the future, it has already become a successful intergovernmental forum, having gained momentum and influence in regional policy-making over the past two decades (Brigham et al. 2016; Fabbi et al. 2017; Fenge 2013; Spence 2013). Each of the eight Arctic Member

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States has contributed substantially to this organization's agenda and outputs through ongoing participation, leadership, financial contributions and Chairmanship functions.

This is no small accomplishment, and the Arctic Council, it is generally described as an exceptional organization whose powers are decidedly 'soft' (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006) and yet is able to evoke binding decision-making where necessary (Fenge 2013; Spence 2013). Equally important, however, is the assessment that the Arctic Council has made effective use of its institutionalized Working Groups, in order to "to orchestrate large science-based assessments and major studies", making the role of the Arctic Council one of knowledge creation as well as policy-making (Brigham et al. 2016).[1] Exner-Pirot (2015) suggests that in this regard, a threshold has been passed. The Arctic Council has gone from a policy shaping to policy-making intergovernmental organization. Much of this policy stems from active engagement with applied science and scientific assessments of the circumpolar region and its changing conditions and environment.

The idea, that the Arctic Council provides a coherent common policy platform for Member States is appealing, as is the vision that the organization's job is to develop directly scientific policy and cooperation. However, this is not an accurate portrayal in either case. Such portraits belie the complicating influence of different vested national interests, as well as the manner in which distinctive state, sub-state, non-state and interstate structures have had an impact upon the organization. Moreover, leadership, and leadership style also factor into the equation. The distinctive approaches, roles and influence of the successive national Chairs of the Arctic Council need to be recognized. Nord (2016) asserts that the recent U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council was arguably much more collaborative than was its Canadian predecessor. He notes that: "Americans have seemed to favor more of an 'entrepreneurial' style of leadership than either a 'professional' or 'honest broker' approach" (Nord 2016, p. 133). By this he means a style of Chairmanship focused upon a significant degree of autonomy in function and outcomes, as opposed to one that minimizes the specific impact of the Chair or focuses largely on conflict resolution as had been seen in some earlier Arctic Council Chairmanships.

Furthermore, it is not only the Member States, the indigenous Permanent Participants and Observers as unitary actors that influence the work of the Arctic Council. As Spence (2013) observes, Arctic state involvement in the body is facilitated through the contributions of a number of their own internal departments and agencies as well as sub-national and non-state actors. These, according to Spence (2013) contribute to a network of programs and policy ambitions. The result is an organizational agenda developed through "function-specific networks" which although actively managed by states and their delegates, do so in particular ways around specific issues and projects.

[1] For example, regional reports generated through the Arctic Council, such as the ACIA assessment of climate change, or the Arctic Human Development Report, have become foundational to Arctic science.

Spence uses the 2013–15 Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council to make the point that a more disaggregated model of analysis may be required to understand fully its operation. A focus upon the horizontal and lateral connections that shape Arctic Council operations (both within and between states) reveals a fascinating complexity. Spence indicates that there is more to the Arctic Council than a progression of successive Chairmanships embarked upon a direct and pre-determined path towards regional policy-making and "soft law" governance. Often the identification of both national and collective interests in the Arctic is the product of many hands and voices.

Both Nord and Spence's perspectives on the impact of Arctic Council Chairs are useful. Together they provide important analytical perspective, particularly when exploring and assessing the recent U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. While it is tempting to see the American Chairmanship as having emerged as a consensus shaping exercise both in response to earlier Arctic Council efforts and extensive consultation among American stakeholders prior to its initiation, there is much more to the story. The development of the Arctic Council agenda under the U.S. Chairmanship also reflected a clear statement of U.S. strategic interests in the region, adept efforts at agenda setting and carefully aligned policy collaboration, as well as promotional discourse, subsequently refined by and through Arctic Council programming. That the two agendas (the U.S. Chairmanship Programme and the continuing concerns of the Arctic Council) were to dovetail so neatly did not happen without a significant degree of effort on the part of the U.S. leadership group. It also required a significant degree of finesse.

While the work of the Arctic Council continued apace in areas where projects, task forces and initiatives were carried-over from previous years, the U.S. Chairmanship clearly departed from the course of the earlier Canadian leadership's emphasis on economic development, and focused largely on climate change and Arctic science. This new agenda, derived, as we shall see, from specific U.S. strategic and State Department interests, prevailed throughout the entire American Chairmanship, despite some voices of dissent from within.[2] Add to this the different agendas of both national and state governments (Washington D. C and Alaska), as well as the somewhat different foci and aspirations of Indigenous Peoples Organizations, stakeholders and NGOs and a complex landscape of agency emerges. This chapter will focus on the fact of this complexity and how it factored into the making of the "strategic agenda" that was at the foundation of the U.S. Chairmanship's Programme. It then assesses the Chairmanship itself. What has the U.S. Chairmanship meant for the Arctic Council? What did the Arctic Council mean for the U.S. Chairmanship? Or, put another way, what did both the entrepreneurial approach of the Chair, and the disaggregated agenda setting character of the body contribute to the final result?

[2] There are dozens of different Departments within the U.S. Government – all involved in creating or enforcing policies which are somehow related to the Arctic region, as well as distinctive organizational, institutional and governmental interests – see GOA 2014 and Alaskan Arctic Policy Commission final report at http://www.akarctic.com/final-report-executive-summary-and-implementation-plan/website.

7.2 A Contested Policy-Shaping Landscape

We begin this analysis by situating the U.S. Chairmanship within the organizational framework of the Arctic Council and its rotating leadership. The U.S. Chairmanship effectively began its efforts after the Iqaluit Ministerial Meeting in May 2015 with the announcement of the U.S. Chairmanship Program. Shortly thereafter, in June 2015, delegates from the Arctic Council's eight Member States, six indigenous Permanent Participant organizations and six permanent Working Groups met in Washington D.C. to consider the future. They began to move forward on the adopted Chairmanship Programme, much of which had been shaped by the U.S. State Department in consultation with other federal governmental agencies and selected NGOs. This seemingly smooth transition was typical of the process of recent Arctic Council leadership successions. Although behind the scenes, the U.S. had to scramble a bit to meet many areas of its own timelines (Alaskan Arctic Policy Commission 2013). Admiral Robert Papp, U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic, suggested, nonetheless, that the U.S. agenda for its Chairmanship would be the most focused and ambitious to date (Showstack 2015).

This degree of engagement by the U.S. national government was welcomed news to the members of the Arctic Council for two reasons. First, the new U.S. Chairmanship followed a rather difficult period in institutional history, in which the previous Canadian Chairmanship had been fraught by both internal tensions and external discord. Second, the earlier record of American engagement with Arctic Council issues had not always been stellar. The United States had chosen to play a mostly minor role in during the early history of the body. One analyst has notes: "It was not until the Arctic assumed greater geopolitical importance in the mid-2000s, as a consequence of climate change and its conspicuous effects in the Arctic that the United States began to devote more protracted attention to the region." (Exner-Pirot 2015).

This new situation was not lost on those within the U.S. State Department, the national agency that assumed responsibility for the Chairmanship agenda. Secretary of State John Kerry, technically the new Chair of the Council, named David Balton as the United States' Senior Arctic Official (SAO) and the head of that critical body. This was a major appointment of an individual with expertise and interest in the work of the Arctic Council. Balton had previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries in the Department of State's Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science. He had been responsible for coordinating the development of U.S. foreign policy concerning oceans and fisheries, and overseeing U.S. participation in international organizations dealing with these issues. Moreover, his portfolio included responsibility for managing American foreign policy relating to both the Arctic and Antarctica. In Balton, the U.S. signaled its strong commitment to environmental themes in its role as Arctic Council Chair and its intention for real engagement with issues of concern not just to the U.S. Arctic, but the entire circumpolar region. That Balton's leadership would lead to U.S. support for the development of strong regional and international structures and agencies was evident in his insistence that American initiatives should be seen to enhance "the safety and good

stewardship of the region" as well as contributing to the protection of America's Arctic (Balton 2017).

While this new, strong U.S. national leadership role might seem unremarkable to many, it should be remembered that during the first U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship (1998–2000), Washington D.C. had ceded a good deal of its responsibility for the Arctic Council to the State of Alaska. Consequently, Alaskan officials had anticipated they would also play a substantial role in this second leadership round. Although the appointment of a strong SAO like David Balton and a supportive leadership team facilitated a robust U.S. Chairmanship agenda focused upon building capacity for issues of national and international interest, it also served as a source of concern and irritation for Alaska. The Obama Administration's broad national Arctic agenda often seemed to preclude the specialized priorities and aspirations of the 49th state. This was to create tensions between the two levels of American government.

Before proceeding to discuss the American agenda for the Arctic Council, it is worth looking at the ways in which the U.S. Chairmanship changed the focus of the organization from that of the previous Canadian Chairmanship, as this figures into the overall assessment of its efficacy and outcomes. As discussed in Chap. 6 of this volume, the Canadian Chairmanship had attempted to shift the focus of the Arctic Council to better address the issue of "economic development" that Ottawa believed to be inherent within the sustainable development pillar of the organization. One of the most specific legacies of the Canadian Chairmanship had been the creation of an Arctic Economic Council (AEC).[3] Its establishment at the behest of the Canadian Chair in 2015 was reflective of the desire of both the top levels of the Canadian government and a number of its national and sub-national departments, agencies and indigenous groups to improve the quality of life for all northern peoples.

It also spoke to the interests of a larger circumpolar business community and international financial institutions. The World Economic Forum had developed in 2015 an Arctic Investment Protocol that anticipated the formation of a regional banking structure for circumpolar investment in infrastructure and economic development (Nicol 2017). The result was a rather new perspective on the relationship between Arctic communities and business interests – and, indeed, a movement to understand this is less parochial and state-centered terms. The Canadian sponsorship of the AEC marked the recognition of the role of private corporate actors in the work of northern policy and affairs. It also infused a more general concern with sustainable development within an Arctic Council that had been largely focused on environmental protection.

Prior to the United States assuming the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, there had been some speculation regarding a "common North American agenda" that would be pursued by both Ottawa and Washington D.C. Some believed that the traditional business orientation of the United States would lend itself easily to a continuation of the Canadian northern economic development initiative. It was soon clear, however, that American agenda for the Arctic Council would probably eschew

[3] For more information about the AEC go to https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/

the Canadian priority on development, and instead be more heavily invested in the theme of Arctic science and climate change. These types of priorities were also well developed within the departments and agencies of the U.S. federal government and among influential environmental interest groups.

Indeed, disappointment with the Canadian Chairmanship's economic agenda within the Arctic Council led some analysts to observe that this initiative would be "corrected" as new American leadership would shift the body's focus away from economic development and toward a soft security and international relations orientation.[4] Anticipating such a reorientation, the more environmentally concerned Arctic Institute suggested as early as July of 2014 that "unlike Canada, the U.S. is placing less emphasis on economic development and is focusing more on maritime issues, security, and shipping" (Bennett 2015). It also speculated that the U.S. would ensure that environmental protection and science did not take a back seat in Council deliberations.

At nearly the same time, however, a strongly pro-development Alaskan Arctic Policy Commission painted a picture of a federal government scrambling to "get up to speed" on Arctic issues and to co-ordinate a plethora of federal agency interests and responsibilities regarding the Arctic Policy portfolio. Unlike the Arctic Institute, it suggested that regional economic development should remain as a priority for the U.S. Chairmanship – a position it has maintained consistently and which it identified in its Final Report in 2015 (Alaskan Arctic Policy Committee Website).

Much of this public jostling for position ended when the U.S. Arctic Chairmanship Programme was formally released at the 2015 Iqaluit Ministerial Meeting. *One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities* was to be the American Chairmanship's overall theme and it rested on three broad pillars. These included Arctic Ocean safety, security and stewardship; improving economic and living conditions, and addressing the impacts of climate change (Arctic Council 2015).

While there was nothing overtly controversial in the announced program, it was, nonetheless, met by many analysts with a wait and see attitude. What would this

[4] For many in the European North, however, the problems of underdevelopment in the North American Arctic were seen by some as "inward looking". Bennett (2015) suggests that "In essence, the Canadian chairmanship "shifted the gaze of the Arctic Council inwards and towards maritime and telecommunications issues." She went on to add:" The Iqaluit Declaration reads like an extended version of the theme of "Development for the People of the North." The declaration's headings are "Sustaining Arctic Communities," "Protecting the Unique Arctic Environment," and "Building a Stronger Arctic Council." The first line after the preamble notes the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), the Canadian Chairmanship's signature achievement in concretizing its vision of northern development within the official edifices of the Arctic Council. Although the AEC may have a name, board members, three working groups, a slogan ("Fostering Circumpolar Business Partnerships"), a Twitter account, and a website, it still does not have funding, meaning its future may be in doubt despite America's promise to continue to support it. In phrasing it this way, Bennett actually highlights the real division between understandings of the Arctic that have plagued the Arctic Council when it comes to the issue of its regional impact and mandate. The U.S. Chairmanship departed significantly from the Canadian Chair in its focus and programming in this issue area, turning attention back to what it considered to be more 'global' themes.

mean for the role of the Arctic Council in economic development and regional well-being, a focus championed by the previous Canadian Chair? Was this to be what scholars from some European Arctic states believed to be a much-needed shift in perspective (Bennett 2015; Nord 2016)? The Russian academic Alexander Sergunin summed up this speculation when he reported that:

> The U.S. chairmanship agenda presented in Iqaluit was neither disappointing nor particularly inspiring. Rather, it was predictable because various American diplomats, including Admiral Robert Papp, the U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic, have already publicized, on several occasions, the U.S. Arctic Council program for the next two years. As expected, the U.S. AC program will focus heavily on traditional Council issues, like global warming and renewable energy, but less so on the human aspects the Canadian chairmanship had prioritized. Good news, however, that Washington – contrary to the past – takes the Council seriously and calls for multilateral cooperative efforts in the region.

Sergunin suggested that the U.S. Chairmanship Program would take the Arctic Council into some new areas, but not into others. Moreover, while the U.S. agenda represented a bending away from the previous Canadian program, it did not otherwise constitute a "break" from the Arctic Council priorities over the previous years. For some researchers, this signaled either a return to "normalization" (Bennett 2015); for others, an opportunity lost (David 2016; Nicol 2017).

7.3 Global Arctic Agenda or the National Interest?

If the U.S. eschewed development concerns, why did it do so and what did it see as its own priorities? This section of the chapter traces the evolution of the U.S. Arctic Council agenda in terms of the complex landscape of U.S. domestic interests, politics and agencies it represented. It begins with examination of the *U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region* (United States 2013) and its role in orienting U.S. Arctic policy and then turns to assessments of how the State Department saw the Arctic Council as an opportunity to evolve its own national and strategic priorities.[5]

By 2013, Washington D.C. felt some urgency in developing both a national Arctic strategy and an implementation plan for this strategy.[6] The State Department

[5] One other significant development that was to influence the U.S. Arctic Chairmanship program, and its general engagement with the Arctic Council, occurred well before. In January 2009 the U.S. adopted the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD -- 66 / -Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD – Arctic Region Policy - 25 (https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.pdf). This directive highlighted six priorities, the most important being 'national security interests'. The Directive also prioritized other issues - such as protecting the Arctic environment and promoting regional cooperation, supporting scientific research and empowering indigenous Arctic communities - in ways that aligned them with U.S. security goals. as well.

[6] Hossain and Barala (2017) suggest that the Obama Government reinvigorated Directive 66 through the release of the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Directive 66 did not display much of a departure from past U.S. Arctic policy. It was "based on three lines of endeavor,

believed that both needed to be in place by the time that the U.S. Chairmanship began. What was to become the *U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic* would further articulate U.S. national interests in its Arctic region and in concert with its *Implementation Plan* "steer the Arctic region in the right direction" (Hossain and Barala 2017, p. 2). The U.S. Chairmanship agenda would ultimately be derived from these national Arctic strategic goals and be reflected in its specific priorities for the Arctic region. Indeed, as Hossain and Barala remind us, U.S. Arctic interests are largely based upon its strategic capabilities "to enable both infrastructure for resource development, including offshore oil and gas, and safe transit in the region using the Arctic sea routes." (Ibid). They go on to suggest that he U.S. was considering at this time how the Arctic Council might help to advance the specific security, commercial and environmental objectives of the United States then and in the future.

Indeed, if we explore the 2013 National Security document more closely, we see that Goals 2 and 3 and its Principles 2 and 3 are central to the specific agenda of the coming U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship (See Table 1). As will be seen, this was to be a tightly organized and calculated effort at policy coordination. Key to this approach was a recognition that U.S. security in the Arctic encompassed a broad spectrum of efforts ranging from supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to activities more directly linked to national defense. In the view of the *Strategy* document, science was to inform decision-making in all these areas and in this manner advance broad security interests. Equally important, however, the same document specifically couples climate change with American security interests in the Arctic. It notes that: "There may be potentially profound environmental consequences of continued ocean warming and Arctic ice melt…and the consequent increase in pollution as emissions of black carbon and other substances from fossil fuel consumption—could have unintended consequences on climate trends, fragile ecosystems and Arctic communities." (United States 2013). This notion that U.S. national security interests could be broadened to include a clear environmental agenda helped American policymakers to align the U.S. vision with the work of the Arctic Council in ways that not been previously possible (Fig. 7.1).

Equally important to this discussion was the subsequent release of the *U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Implementation Plan* (United States 2014). This document contained the process for transforming the objectives of the *U.S. National Strategy Plan* into concrete initiatives to be pursued by the U.S. government within the Arctic region. Included among these action areas were communications infrastructure, clean energy, maritime domain awareness and security, hazardous, material spill prevention, containment and response, ocean stewardship, black carbon, scientific cooperation and health, to name but a few. Clearly, there

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namely strengthening international cooperation, steering the Arctic region in the right direction, and promoting the security interests of the U.S. in the Arctic by safeguarding peace and stability in the region. The U.S. policy goals included taking into account the best science-based knowledge, as well as the traditional knowledge held by the indigenous Arctic peoples, so that national interests are balanced against regional dynamics" (Hossain and Barala 2017, p. 1).

Figure 7.1: Relevant Goals (G) and Principles (P) of the *U.S. National Strategy Plan for the Arctic Region* Implemented in the Arctic Council Program under the U.S. Chairmanship.
G1. Advance United States Security Interests - We will enable our vessels and aircraft to operate, consistent with international law, through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic, support of lawful commerce" and efforts to "achieve a greater awareness of activity in the region, and intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities, including ice-capable platforms as needed. **U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national defense."**
G 2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship – We will **continue to protect the Arctic environment and conserve its resources; establish and institutionalize an integrated Arctic management framework; chart the Arctic region; and employ scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic.**
G 3. Strengthen International Cooperation – **Working through bilateral relationships and multilateral bodies, including the Arctic Council, we will pursue arrangements that advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, and we will work toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention).**
P2. Make Decisions Using the Best Available Information – Across all lines of effort, decisions **need to be based on the most current science and traditional knowledge**.
P3. Pursue Innovative Arrangements – Foster partnerships with the State of Alaska, Arctic **states, other international partners**, and the private sector to more efficiently develop, resource, and manage capabilities, where appropriate and feasible, to better advance our strategic priorities in this austere fiscal environment. (United States. 2013, emphasis mine).

Fig. 7.1 Relevant goals and principles of the *U.S. National Strategy Plan for the Arctic*

were to be but a few short steps from the announcement of this strategy plan to its implementation through the Arctic Chairmanship agenda itself.

The American government soon began this process by recruiting a leadership group that would assist John Kerry and David Bolton. One of its key members was to be Mark Brzezinski. As the recent American ambassador to Sweden, and being the son of a former U.S. National Security Advisor, Brzezinski possessed the appropriate credentials and background to be selected for appointment in August of 2015 to the position of Executive Director of the newly formed Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC). This body was to oversee the implementation of the *National Security Strategy Plan* within the broader Arctic Council agenda. The Obama Administration had established the AESC in January 2015, in anticipation of the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship, but also in recognition of the need for coordination of the multiple agencies and departments within the U.S. government responsible for domestic and international Arctic policy (Hossain and Barala 2017). The AESC had been designed to support broad Arctic efforts meaning that it provided guidance to U.S. executive departments and agencies in order to enhance the coordination of Federal Arctic policies "across agencies and offices as well as with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments, academic and research institutions, and private and nonprofit sectors" (United States 2015a).

Even more specifically, as Brzezinski later noted, the AESC mandate was to implement the *Arctic Strategy* document. As Executive Director of the AESC, Brzezinski was able to contextualize U.S. security needs, to explain the connection between broader security goals and more specific ones that were clearly in the

national interest. Weaving together the themes of security, climate change and strategic interests, he suggested, for example, that: "Our national priorities in the Arctic include national security, sovereign rights and responsibilities, maritime safety, environmental stewardship, scientific research, management of natural resources and preservation of indigenous culture and language." He then went on to add: "While the Arctic provides a preview of future impacts of climate change, it also offers an opening for a collective and effective response." (Hoag 2016). In effect, Brzezinski universalized U.S. strategic ambitions for the Arctic region as a whole.

This was no small feat. It would require careful leadership and direction. However, what was accomplished is striking. By the conclusion of the Obama Administration, the importance of the Arctic Council to U.S. Arctic interests, and the tight connection that had developed between the Arctic Council agenda and U.S. security agenda, was evident to all. Yet it was more than a discursive effort. It amounted to a securitization of environmental concerns. This occurred at an important moment in the life of the Arctic Council as it strengthened its role as a policy-making institution (Exner-Pirot 2015).

7.4 Scoping the Arctic Council Agenda

As we have seen, one of the main priorities of the State Department in setting its Chairmanship agenda was to create a seamless link between Arctic Council policy and U.S. strategic and national interests. There is clear documentary and discursive evidence to these ends. This section of the chapter examines the problems faced by certain sub-national actors like the State of Alaska in injecting regional interests and thematic goals within this strategically engineered national Arctic Council Chairmanship agenda. If the U.S. brought a new commitment, resources and engagement to the Chair of the Arctic Council that was to some extent unprecedented, it did so in what Nord suggests was an "entrepreneurial" style that emphasized policy articulation and limited consultation. Clearly, the opportunity to meet goals of the *National Strategy for the Arctic Region* were of highest concern and inspired the State Department to act boldly in forming a coherent and robust agenda. However, in doing so, it also had to work with a host of other American actors who had their own interests or responsibilities in the Arctic. Many of their priorities were accorded far less consideration.

The State of Alaska, in particular, felt that many of its proposals for economic and resource development in the region were given minimal attention by key policymakers in Washington D.C. As noted earlier in this chapter, it had anticipated that its particular concerns would be prioritized during this U.S. leadership round, as had been the case during the first American Arctic Council Chairmanship. It had formed its own Arctic Policy Commission to give counsel and offer advice to the Federal government. It held hearings and took testimony from citizens across the across the state on Arctic issues and concerns with the goal of providing specific recommendations to the U.S. Chairmanship and the Obama Administration. Many of the Alaskans who offered their views favored an agenda that would

emphasize natural resource development, employment and an improved quality life for those who inhabited the American Arctic. Though these local perspectives were received by policymakers in Washington D.C. with due solemnity, it became evident that they were to have little impact on their thinking or planning as they tended to run counter to their broader, national priorities of security and environmental protection.

On the other hand, the State Department reached out specifically to certain NGOs to inform its Arctic Council Chairmanship, inviting representations and participation through open workshops and representations. Among these was Arctic 21, a coalition of NGOs favoring environmental priorities in the Arctic. It urged the State Department to prioritize climate change within the U.S. Arctic Chairmanship agenda, noting approvingly that: "The U.S. has made the right decision to focus on climate change….Now the U.S. must communicate to the world the profound changes in the Arctic to heighten the urgency of mitigating the risks of global climate change." They went on to urge that: "The Obama Administration, as Chair of the Arctic Council for the next two years, propose and implement concrete and binding steps to begin to rein in this alarming trend" (United States 2015b).

Indeed, the top leadership of the U.S. federal government responded positively to such urgings. It took steps to both promote its environmental security agenda and to dampen opposition to its efforts by Alaskans and others. The U.S. Chairmanship, with strong support from the Obama Administration developed a toolbox with several strategies for policy promotion at its disposal. All of these were carefully aimed at prioritizing what was determined to be "national interests" in the Arctic as opposed to parochial concerns. An example of this effort was its promotion of the Arctic Research Plan for 2013-17 that came on stream during this period. This national research endeavor was strategically focused on seven priority areas whose central concerns included terrestrial and ice ecosystems, sea ice physics, atmospheric studies, climate and observations systems, human health, and adaptation or resiliency for local communities. These concerns were often pointed to as having national and international significance in marked contrast to what was portrayed as the "local" interests of Alaska. Another example of this approach came when the U.S. Department of State sponsored a major conference in Alaska in the summer of 2015. Instead of featuring Alaskan development issues and economic concerns, the GLACIER (Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience) conference focused on what Washington D.C. considered to be the distinctive contribution of Alaska to its Chairmanship, its position as a region vulnerable to climate change. Noting this particular framing effort one Observer suggested that: "The United States appears to be employing Alaska, its doorstep to the polar region, as a setting to work toward the widespread international consensus needed to forge the ambitious emissions treaty." (Arctic 2005)

Overall, despite regular consultations with a number of local and non-state actors and agencies, the U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council remained focused on advancing broad national U.S. approaches to the Arctic—those seen in terms of the national interest. There was considerable emphasis placed on distinguishing between limited Arctic policy concerns, represented by various American government agencies and committees, and the broader agenda of the State Department that

had remained at the heart of its Arctic Council program. This broader set of national interests was emphasized by David Balton in the lead-in to the Fairbanks Ministerial Meeting in May 2017 (U.S. Department of State 2017) and reflected how the State Department and the U.S. SAO used their influence during the Chairmanship to emphasize issues that were deemed to be of true significance for region-wide Arctic development and cooperation.

For example, in assessing the American record, Balton argued that some of the most important achievements under the U.S. Chairmanship included those targeted towards region-wide infrastructure development and cooperation in scientific data sharing. He pointed to the significance of the new binding agreement on enhancing scientific cooperation in the Arctic and noted that: "We are especially proud to announce a landmark scientific cooperation agreement, through negotiations led by the United States and Russia, which will usher in a new era of Arctic science by breaking down the barriers to research and exploration in the region. Together, we will increase our knowledge about the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic (United States 2017)". Similarly, he suggested that the U.S. Chairmanship's focus on telecommunications was of groundbreaking importance for the entire circumpolar community: "For the first time ever, there is an assessment of the telecommunications infrastructure in the Arctic. Any of you who have spent time in the Arctic will know that there certainly are gaps and limitations in telecommunications here in the Arctic. Here, we spent two years taking a hard look at that, with the idea that gaps will be filled over the next few years." (Balton 2017).

David Balton was correct in seeing these and others as important achievements of the U.S. Chairmanship. His self-assessment is also instructive regarding how the American federal government prioritized its goals during its leadership term. Throughout this period, Washington D.C. remained concerned with broader issues of international responsibility and environment that "focused on initiatives that enhance the safety and good stewardship of the region". For Balton, as well as the entire U.S. Chairmanship group more generally, their prime objective had been to extend U.S. national interests to the work of the Arctic Council and to harmonize American security efforts with those of the international body. From such a vantage point, Bolton argues that the United States and the Council had "worked together to…help prepare and protect U.S. from potential challenges in the future." (Balton 2017).

7.5 Assessing the Chairmanship

No one can seriously question the success of the U.S. Chairmanship in advancing Arctic Council goals or in showing decisive leadership in several important areas. *The Fairbanks Declaration* presented in May of 2017, indicates that the U.S. was successful in a number of ways related maritime cooperation in the North. It created a long overdue Task Force to assess the need to manage international cooperation and coordination in the Arctic Ocean (Task Force on Marine Cooperation). The Task Force identified specific challenges and shared needs, as well as potential mechanisms to meet those needs (Hossain and Barala 2017). The *Fairbanks Declaration*

also took note of the fact that under the U.S. Chairmanship the existing Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation made important recommendations to strengthen marine stewardship. (Fairbanks Declaration 2017). Also of significance was the development of an Arctic Ship Traffic Data (ASTD) project, which "collects historical information about shipping activity in the Arctic from the Arctic States for Use in trend analysis. The intended outcome is a "User- friendly maritime traffic analysis of Arctic shipping data" (Hossain and Barala 2017). The U.S. Chair also advanced plans to digitally map the region (ArcticDEM project) and to draft a Polar Code under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO): "in order to have a strong set of rules for all ships sailing in the polar seas" and to "increase the safety of shipping operations and mitigate the impacts on the people and environment in the remote, vulnerable and potentially harsh polar waters."(See Hossain and Barala 2017).

Within a different policy domain, the U.S. Chairmanship also struck a much-needed Task Force on Telecommunication Infrastructure (TFTIA) – a topic that had been under discussion within the Council for a number of years but never acted upon. It also advanced to completion the negotiation of a binding treaty on scientific cooperation (The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation). The AEIASC, was the third legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council. Its aim was to "increase effectiveness and efficiency in the development of scientific knowledge about the region as well as strengthen scientific cooperation in the Arctic region and encourage its implementation by all parties following its entry into force" (Fairbanks Declaration 2017).

There was also a host of other undertakings, some initiated by the U.S but most advanced as continuing concerns of the Arctic Council's agenda. The Network of Marine Protected Areas made significant headway, including the preparation of an Indicator Report on Arctic Protected Areas (Hossain and Barala 2017). The existing Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane (EGBCM) was particularly active, producing many recommendations for reducing emissions while the Arctic Contaminants and Action Program (ACAP) identified best practices for reducing black carbon emissions (Hossain and Barala 2017). The U.S. Chairmanship also fostered significant progress in biodiversity studies. The CAFF working group developed the State of the Arctic Marine Biodiversity Report (SAMBR) (Hossain and Barala 2017).

In each of these areas, a real sense of continuity was to develop with the subsequent Finnish Chair. The U.S. focus on scientific data sharing has contributed to the Finnish concern with meteorology. Similarly, American initiatives in telecommunications and shipping assessments have continued under the Finns. Moreover, the Finnish focus on education and sustainable development, while differing from the U.S. focus on energy infrastructure, is nonetheless concerned with regional sustainability. Furthermore, both the U.S. focus on international consensus, region "writ large", and the development of long term planning capacity have also been taken up within the Finnish Chairmanship.

In relation to its theme of "bettering the living conditions of Arctic peoples", however, differing assessments of the efficacy of the U.S. Chairmanship have emerge. Hossain and Barala (2017) suggest a successful program was concluded in this area. The U.S. Chairmanship developed a project named the Arctic Remote

Energy Networks Academy (ARENA) to consider renewable energy and energy efficiency within the region. It also continued a focus on health and suicide prevention that had been started under the earlier Canadian Chairmanship.

Yet within this sphere of activity, and in some other domains, the U.S. Chairmanship may have also floundered a little. A lack of attention to development issues, marginalized U.S. leadership in this area of concern within the Arctic region, and in doing so, by extension, lessened the interest and ability of the Arctic Council to deal with these issues. Indeed, Nilsson (2016) argues that while extractive resources are central to Arctic state economies, the subject has not been adequately addressed by the Arctic Council and that the American Chairmanship paid limited attention to the issue despite the urgings of Alaska and others. Regarding mining she notes: "The Council has done practically nothing, perhaps because the main social and environmental impacts are viewed as local rather than international issues" Nilsson 2016).

Several other Observers concurred with this view. *The National Interest* for example, suggested that the start of the American Arctic agenda had no "substantive development component" and that "one was badly needed" (Carafano 2015). At the conclusion of the Chairmanship, it still had not seen progress. In March 2018, *The National Interest* suggested that the kind of Arctic policy orientations which had supported the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship were leading to a dysfunctional situation – one in which the Arctic was being developed by powers outside of U.S. influence, while the U.S. failed to engage with regionally significant policies. It noted that "The U.S. policy community and press is more inwardly focused on the climate change in or near the Alaskan Arctic; even though most of those efforts cannot prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign right to host foreign investment and resource-extraction projects…." (Rosen 2018). It is hard to reach any other conclusion that top officials in Washington D.C. deliberately chose to marginalize economic development priorities during the U.S: Chairmanship in favor of other strategic and environmental priorities (David 2016).

7.6 Success or Failure? or Both?

Although the U.S. Chairmanship failed to offer a compelling economic development agenda, its earlier described efforts in the area of telecommunications, scientific data sharing and marine cooperation were consistently applauded. During its leadership term, the American Chairmanship was also praised for its encouragement of the development of a Circumpolar Local Environmental Observer (CLEO) network, the release of a report on the Arctic freshwater system in a changing climate, and the development of crosscutting efforts aimed at preventing the introduction of invasive alien species. It was also hailed for strengthening of the region's search and rescue (SAR) capacity and for encouraging efforts to support a pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas (MPAs). It was a leader in building capacity and promoting community-based Arctic leadership on renewable energy micro

grids. Indeed, although less attention-grabbing than the negotiation of binding agreements, the latter type of initiatives are among the most interesting and perhaps effective ways in which the Arctic Council harnesses its agencies and actors to promote cooperation through the establishment of new task forces, a working groups and projects.

There is also a consensus that the U.S acted to strengthen the Arctic Council as an institution. There were two areas, in particular, in which American leadership facilitated real progress. These were in the domains of long term planning mechanisms and securing additional funding for Permanent Participants. Both had been seen as critical needs for the organization over a number of years (Nord 2016).

In the area of long term planning, the U.S. leadership was strategic. With American leadership, a political will emerged within the body to begin a long-term strategic planning process. Indeed, the American Chairmanship "got the Arctic Council to take a step back from its day-to-day work and think about the longer term," (Rosen 2018) including discussion that looked the future need for long term funding and programming. John Balton spearheaded this effort. He noted that: "You can't always plan very easily if you don't know what the funding stream's going to look like three, four years down the road. At a minimum, I think we need to move to a world where the funding for the Arctic Council becomes more predictable" (Eye on the Arctic 2016). He urged the development of long-range planning within the organization. One of the real achievements of the U.S. Chairmanship was to develop consensus on the need for a "strategic plan" to guide the Council's efforts over the next decade or two – moving away from the more limited agendas arising from two-year Chairmanships.

Indeed, the U.S. Chair pushed to develop an "overarching and long-term plan" to accomplish what it saw as a necessary program development. It effectively argued that "As a growing organization with an expanding mandate and steered every other year by a new country with a different set of priorities, this was increasingly becoming necessary" (Rosen 2018). Not only does the initiative add a degree of continuity and stability to the work of the Council, but it addresses the need for stability in the development of long-term agendas surrounding climate change, protected areas and environmental protection strategies, and the roster of new and broad issues which are increasingly being incorporated in to the Arctic Council program.

This U.S. Chairmanship effort to develop interest in long term strategic planning can also be seen to contribute to a greater ease in transition among future Chairmanships. The Arctic Council's program is iterative and consensual, meaning that it is strongly oriented towards adapting and modifying individual Chairmanship interests and styles into a broader program. Momentum for long term planning serves to better integrate national interests and styles within a larger framework of goals and programs.

The second area where the U.S. Chair contributed to the strengthening of institution was in improvement of the day-to-day business operations of the Council. It worked to update and enhance communications, operational and governance documents. It developed new guidelines governing the relationship of the Arctic Council to various external bodies. The U.S. Chair also sought to expand the body's engage-

ment of its Observers and to oversee development of funding for Permanent Peoples participation.

Under the U.S. Chairmanship, for example, Permanent Participants witnessed the establishment of the long awaited "Álgu Fund". This funding mechanism operates "independently of, but alongside the Arctic Council to provide stable, predictable funding" for Permanent Participants, who otherwise lack resources to participate fully in the working of the Council (WWF 2017). Its purpose is to provide predictable funding for indigenous Permanent Participant access to expertise and research related to the Arctic, to build capacity for enhancing the collaboration and organizational strength of indigenous Permanent Participant organizations, and to facilitate the involvement of indigenous Permanent Participants in the work of the Arctic Council. The Álgu Fund has two components: "The first is an endowment that will distribute funds annually to the participating Permanent Participants. The second is a Project Support Mechanism that will facilitate our collaboration on specific initiatives" (Álgu Fund website).[7]

The establishment of such a fund was no small achievement. Permanent Participants themselves had noted that "In the Council's 20-year history, each Ministerial declaration has recognized the need for an appropriate funding mechanism to ensure the Permanent Participants can fully engage in the business of the Arctic Council" (WWF 2017). However, under auspices of the United States Chairmanship a new consensus emerged that something, now, needed to be done. After considerable hard work and persuasion, the Álgu Fund emerged. As a consequence, "Projects which advanced human rights, Indigenous knowledge and science, Arctic Ocean cooperation, renewable energy projects and mental health and suicide prevention have been implemented" (WWF 2017).

While the U.S. Chairmanship cannot be fully credited with the initiation of the new receptivity to indigenous rights within the Council, it certainly advanced the cause. U.S. SAO David Balton had indeed been clear about this goal from the beginning: "the growth of Arctic Council initiatives has placed an exceptional burden on the Permanent Participants who wish to be involved. Some of the burden is financial, particularly a dearth of money for travel. Some of the burden has to do with human capacity – simply finding enough people from the indigenous communities who can afford to spend the time and effort on Arctic Council work" (Arctic Council 2015).

With all these real accomplishments in mind, it is still rather disappointing that the United States failed to address during its Chairmanship issues concerning economic development—some of which are strongly supported by the Permanent Participants. In promoting a strategic space for its own scientific and environmental priorities, the U.S. Chair came no closer to resolving the thorny issue of how to accommodate economic interests within a multi-lateral governance structure like the Arctic Council. This is not to say that other Arctic nations have not acted similarly in the past. In shaping its agenda in this way, the U.S. actually became an "engaged" Arctic nation (Exner-Pirot 2015). However, its overwhelming interest in

[7] For more information of this organization see https://www.algufund.org/about/

advancing specific strategic goals did not help to address other types of concern that will again appear on future agendas of the Arctic Council The U.S. has contributed in large measure to an empirical analysis of Arctic environments, less so to the crafting of policies with significant socio-economic import.

The U.S. Chair pursued what Nord (2106) might call an "entrepreneurial" style in managing its own agenda and program and successfully generalized its strategic interests within the Arctic Council. It worked because of the way in which the United States set it agenda in relative autonomy in the sense that it looked to its own national strategy first, finding ways to implement its agenda priorities through the landscape of departments and agencies and then adopting strategic priorities that could be broadly supported within the Council. Spence's (2013) understanding of the complexity of policy development, that the work of the Arctic Council as reflective of more than the consensus of unitary political actors is also relevant to our understanding. Indeed, it helps us to establish where and how the U.S. Arctic Council agenda emerged, and why there were limitations, at least when viewed from the perspective of the seemingly unified voice of intergovernmental discourse.

It also alerts us to the fact that the Arctic Council agenda, itself, needs to be sensitive to these shortcomings. The plan for long-term strategic planning within the body may be one way to overcome the shifts and turns in policy directions at times when consistency is needed most. Arctic Council priorities need to be set in ways that overcome a "flavor of the month" approach or the aspirations of a national Chair that is not attuned to preferences of the full membership body. Had the U.S. Chairmanship begun under the current Trump Administration, for example, it is likely that much on the Fairbanks Declaration – or at least significant text relating to climate change—might not have seen the light of day.

Finally, despite the clear priorities of the U.S. Chairmanship, and its strongly entrepreneurial leadership style, it would be wrong to think that the transition to the Finnish Chairmanship would not continue to be a fairly easy process. The leadership style and ambition of the U.S. Chairmanship has reinvigorated the Arctic Council's agenda and contributed greatly to the identification of key areas of concern, despite the fact that strategic orientations of both Chairs may differ somewhat. The Finnish Chairmanship's focus on meteorology, for example, has its origins in the U.S. Chairmanship, where identification of linkages between infrastructure, connectivity, climate, data and search and rescue, health and wellbeing were articulated as central. Still, unlike the case of the U.S., the Finnish Chairmanship's focus on meteorology does not come at the expense of economic development. Its larger emphasis upon the role of education and the Arctic Economic Council, the latter a development from the Canadian Chairmanship, suggests that from the Finnish perspective science, and climate change, is one piece of a larger and complex landscape of embodying both social, economic and environmental policies.

Overall, the lessons to be learned from the U.S. Chairmanship are many. It did not shy away from establishing an agenda that was strongly focused on issues of national importance- although these were pitched in ways that universalized and

"led" the work of the Council in specific directions. The engagement of the U.S. in its role within the organization was striking. Despite the election of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency towards the end of its term, the U.S. Chairmanship's programming continued to be robust and collaborative in nature to the end. It remained focused on environmental concerns rather than those of development. However, at the same time, helped to re-contextualize some aspects of "development" in ways that embedded them within the more acceptable "sustainability pillar." If this behavior was the result of pursuing an engaged, entrepreneurial style of Chairmanship, then it may well be that by adopting such approach to leadership was providential, if only because the momentum of the broad scientific and international agenda established through the confluence of agency, interest and political will had gained too much momentum for it to be easily derailed. The *Fairbanks Declaration*, for example, did not shy away from noting the significance of climate change to the region, regardless as to the incredulous position of both President Trump and then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

Moreover, current Arctic policy discussions among U.S. agencies and research communities are not yet appreciably different than they were during the Obama era. Although the Trump Administration has orchestrated the opening up of the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve for oil exploitation and has thumbed its nose at the Paris Climate Accords, this new political agenda has not yet been reflected broadly in U.S. Arctic diplomatic discussions or in the workings of the American government bureaucracy. While the White House is now more neglectful of, and disinterested in, Arctic policy, many U.S. agencies and actors like the Arctic Policy Commission, and the Arctic Science Commission continue to advocate for scientific research, environmental oversight, and new forms of cooperation in the region. The U.S. has continued to show leadership in the Arctic Council even through its term as Chair has concluded. Finland inherited a well-developed set of programs and agenda for action that have remained relatively intact, despite the new political attitudes in the White House.

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Chapter 8
Finland's Chairmanship of the Arctic Council: Setting Priorities and Implementing Them

Timo Koivurova

Abstract Finland became the Chair of the Arctic Council in May of 2017. It has now passed the halfway point in its leadership term with its program of "Exploring Common Solutions" to Arctic needs. This chapter focuses its attention on how and why the specific elements of this thematic program were chosen and the progress that the Finnish Chairmanship has made, thus far, in advancing its objectives. The specific sponsored initiatives of the program are discussed as a reflection of both Finnish priorities and current institutional efforts. Finland's leadership goals, methods, and roles are examined within the context of providing the Arctic Council with the necessary direction to achieve its long-term objectives. Consideration is given to the particularly challenging international environment in which the Finnish Chairmanship operates.

Keywords Arctic Council · Arctic affairs · Chairmanship · Chairmanship Program · International institutions · Finland

Finland assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council from the United States on May 11 2017.[1] It chose as the theme of its leadership effort: Exploring Common Solutions. Traditionally, the country has had a strong focus on Arctic issues, given that it commenced the whole eight Arctic state co-operation by initiating negotiations for what became the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).[2] The AEPS was integrated into the Canadian initiative of the Arctic Council during

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[1] During the same time, Finland became also the chair of the Arctic Economic Council, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum. All these international forums are directly or indirectly catalyzed by the Arctic Council, even if they are independent from the Council.

[2] See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 14 June 1991 *ILM* 30, at 1624–1669 (1991) (hereinafter AEPS).

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a transition period from 1996 to 1998.[3] Finland had previously served as the Chair of the Arctic Council from 2000 to 2002.[4] Carrying out the current Chairmanship is more challenging than earlier, given that the Arctic Council has expanded, and become a more complex and ambitious inter-governmental forum.

The Chairmanship of any intergovernmental forum or organization is a role that is identified and defined by the specific international institution. Hence, the Chair is expected to advance the goals, values and objectives of that intergovernmental institution, rather than use the Chairmanship to advance its own interests.[5] Drafting a Chairmanship Program differs from the process of producing a national Arctic strategy, which defines the main interests of a particular state with regard to the Arctic. For instance, when Finland revised its National Arctic Strategy in 2013, Finnish business interests in the Arctic received a lot of attention. There was a mistaken expectation on the part of some that a similar focus would be projected by Finland when it assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2017. It was a shock to some then when this did not happen. Some Finnish economic actors criticized the Arctic Council Chairmanship Program as being insufficient to advance national business interests.[6] This was due to misunderstandings on their part regarding what should be the focus of a Chair of the Arctic Council. It is not supposed to directly advance national economic interests. Rather its attention should be on the collective needs of the Arctic. The organization has specific responsibilities to advance environmental protection and sustainable development throughout the region.[7] It is the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), which exists as an independent international body that looks to advance business interests in the region.[8]

[3] See the History of the Arctic Council at https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council. Also see Evan T. Bloom, "Establishment of the Arctic Council," *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no. 3 (1999): 712–22.

[4] The Program for the Finnish Chair of the Arctic Council 2000–2002 can be found at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1781

[5] This is at least so in principle. While national interests often loom in the background, the Chair's priorities also serve to consolidate that nation's Arctic expertise.

[6] Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 can be accessed at https://vnk.fi/documents/10616/334509/Arktinen+strategia+2013+en.pdf/6b6fb723-40ec-4c17-b286-5b5910fbecf4

[7] Interviews with Aleksi Härkönen (2.5.2018) and Tero Vauraste (3.5.2018, done by Heikki Kontro).

[8] For instance, the Canadian Chairmanship was more business-oriented, but this business orientation was manifested in facilitating the establishment of the AEC. It seems that these misunderstandings were solved when the AEC and the Arctic officials started discussions, which were seen as fruitful by both sides and led also to better understanding of what can be attained both with the AC chairmanship and the AEC chairmanship. The foreign ministry's Arctic officials perceive that Finland's chairmanship priorities also advance business interests, albeit indirectly. For instance, better connectivity and meteorological information provide information infrastructure for companies to function, not simply in the Finnish north, but in the entire Arctic region. It would be difficult to imagine how the Finnish Chairmanship could actually be more business-oriented, especially that digitalization is one of the priorities, which directly links up with the main focus of the current AEC work.

The main emphasis in this chapter is given to two issues. First, what are the priorities that Finland has chosen for its period as Chair of the Arctic Council and why exactly were these chosen? The second concern is: How has the country implemented its Chairmanship which is now halfway completed? An attempt is also made to identify some of Finland's good practices when developing and implementing the Chairmanship. The chapter concludes by taking a bigger picture on how can we evaluate Finland's Chairmanship of the Council in the long-term and with certain geopolitical perspectives in mind.

8.1 What were the Priorities that Finland Chose for its Chairmanship Period?

Like any state preparing for its Arctic Council Chairmanship, Finland was bound to define its priorities in a way that would serve the values, goals and objectives of the organization as a whole. These cross-cutting goals would speak to common concerns of the institution and reflect ongoing interest of the body. Its Chairmanship Program needed to be acceptable to the other seven Arctic Member States and also to the Permanent Participants representing a series of indigenous organizations.[9] Yet, within these broad limits set by the Council, Finland also had the opportunity to advance some of its own priorities that, to a certain extent, may reflect its national interests. The main cross-cutting priorities for the Finnish Chairmanship Program became combatting climate change and advancing UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). The individual Finnish priorities for its leadership period were focused on connectivity, education, meteorology, and environmental protection.[10]

Finland's Foreign Ministry's Arctic officials commenced planning for its own Chairmanship Program almost immediately after the United States assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in Spring of 2015. At the time, two main persons led the preparations efforts: Aleksi Härkönen who was to become the Chair of Senior Arctic Officials under the Finnish Chairmanship and René Söderman who then later served as Finland's Senior Arctic Official during this period. Over time, additional members joined the Arctic team within the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Minister of Finland has served as the formal Chair of the Arctic Council since the start of the

[9] Indigenous peoples organizations (Permanent Participants) have a unique role in the Arctic Council, since they need to be fully consulted before any decision-making. Hence, any future chair needs to pay attention to their acceptance of chairmanship programme as well. On the role and participation of permanent participants in the Arctic Council, see Dalee Sambo Dorough, "The Rights, Interests and Role of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants," in *Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States*, vol. 84, Publications on Ocean Development (Brill Nijhoff 2017), 68–103.

[10] See Exploring Common Solutions, Finland's Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2017–2019 (hereinafter 'Chairmanship Program').

Table 8.1 Finland's Arctic Council Chairmanship Team

Timo Soini (Foreign Minister)	Chair of the Arctic Council
Aleksi Härkönen	Chair of Senior Arctic Officials
René Söderman	Finland's Senior Arctic Official
Pekka Shemeikka	Chair of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)
Tuuli Ojala	Head of the delegation of Finland to the SDWG

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

Finnish Chairmanship in Spring of 2017. (See Table 8.1 above for a listing of the Finnish Chairmanship team).[11]

Although the main officials preparing for the Finnish Chairmanship came from the Foreign Ministry, a concerted effort was made to consult and discuss their efforts with the responsible Arctic Affairs Committee, which consisted of various ministries and other officials. The main concern that arose during the initial period of preparation was to ensure that there was continuity in the transition from the U.S. Chairmanship to Finland. This was something that the officials saw as important in preparing for Finland's Chairmanship and hence there were extensive consultations with responsible U.S, officials during the Fall of 2015.[12]

At the beginning of the preparations, another issue of concern was whether Finnish economic interests would be sufficiently advanced through the Chairmanship. As mentioned earlier, these had formed the core of the Finland's National Arctic Strategy. This became a slightly contentious issue at the start as many of the leading Finnish economic actors did not really understand what the Arctic Council Chairmanship was all about. The issue was soon resolved, however, when Tero Vauraste, the future Chair of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), was able to join the planning discussions. He better understood the distinction between the two undertakings and was able to assist Finnish business leaders to understand that their country's specific economic interests could not be directly advanced through the Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship. They could be pursued, however, by means of the AEC.[13] Nonetheless, Tero Vauraste has maintained a view that Finland's government could have done more to advance the nation's economic interests by emphasizing more some aspects of its Chairmanship Program.[14]

[11] In the Foreign Ministry, the Arctic team consists also of Harri Mäki-Reinikka, Annariina Kukkoen and Marta Rissanen. Obviously there are other officials in other ministries that have various duties during the Finnish Chairmanship. The current author is co-lead of the Social, Economic and Cultural Expert Group (SECEG) together with Saara Tervaniemi from the Sami Council. Arja Rautio from the University of Oulu is the lead of the Arctic Human Health Expert Group. Finland is also leading the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council, but these are independent organizations from the Arctic Council.

[12] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (Done by Heikki Kontro, 2.5)

[13] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (Done by H.K, 2.5.).

[14] Interview with Tero Vauraste (done by H.K 3.5.).

There were many other preparatory discussions that were held both within Finland and abroad prior to the first formal presentation of the Finnish Chairmanship Program at the October 2016 SAO meeting. Following the good practice established by the previous Chairs, Finland consulted with all the other Member States about its proposed priorities ahead of their announcement. Finland also organized a joint meeting with the Permanent Participants. This was apparently the first time that all of the Permanent Participants were able to comment on the proposed priorities of the Chair. As the most important indigenous representative body in Finland, the Finnish Sami Parliament was also consulted, despite the fact that it did not have a seat on the Arctic Council. This demonstrates how carefully Arctic officials in the Foreign Ministry wanted the country's priorities discussed and agreed upon, well ahead of the start of the Finnish Chairmanship.[15] Some discussions were also undertaken with various Observers of the Arctic Council.

Everything seemed to be ready for Finland to commence its Chairmanship Program, given the fact that all the Member States and Permanent Participants had been consulted and had accepted the incoming Chair's priorities. However, something unexpected occurred. Finland received final confirmation that its priorities were acceptable during the October 2016 Portland SAO meeting. This was during the period of the U.S. Chairmanship when the Obama Administration directed that nation's Arctic affairs. This was potentially all to change when just a few weeks later it was replaced by the current Trump Administration which had very different policy priorities for the Arctic.

In fact, just before the May 2017 Fairbanks Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, representatives of the new American government challenged the adoption of the Fairbanks Declaration. This placed a question mark over whether the U.S. would continue to endorse Finland's Chairmanship priorities. At the time, this was seen as a real challenge for Finland's ability to implement its Chairmanship Program.[16] Fortunately, diplomats from all the other Arctic countries were able to convince the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Rex Tillerson, of the importance of moving forward with the Arctic Council's declaration whose provisions had been negotiated prior to the change in American administrations.[17] As such, the Fairbanks Declaration was accepted and references support for the Paris Climate Change agreement. This despite Secretary Tillerson noting at the final session of the Ministers Meeting that the current U.S. administration had not yet taken a final stance as to whether they would remain a Party to the Paris Agreement.[18]

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[15] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (done by H.K., 2.5.)

[16] Personal observations.

[17] Personal discussions in Fairbanks with officials from many Arctic countries.

[18] Personal observations from the Ministerial Meeting. Now we know what that stance is since Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris agreement. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, June 1, 1017 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/; U.S. Department of State, Media Note dated August 3, 2017: Communication Regarding Intent To Withdraw from Paris Agreement, U.S. Department of State can be accessed at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm

8.2 How Have the Priorities of Finland Started to Take Shape?

As noted earlier, Finland has organized its Chairmanship priorities around four individual goals (environmental protection, connectivity, meteorological cooperation, and education) as well as two cross-cutting priorities (the implementation of the Paris Agreement and advancing UN Sustainable Development Goals in the Arctic Council). In addition, its Chairmanship Program outlines areas of ongoing work by the Arctic Council (environment and climate, seas, people, and strengthening the Arctic Council) that Finland will continue to support and seek to advance through the efforts of the several Working Groups of the Council. Hence, Finland through its Chairmanship Program lists all the relevant actions that it needs to undertake in order to move forward the full agenda of the Council. Some of these undertakings are based on projects that were instituted prior to its Chairmanship. Others are more directly tied to its specific priorities. The following discussion focuses on these latter concerns, tracing the evolution of both individual and cross-cutting priorities of Finland's Chairmanship Program. The reader's attention will be first directed to the individual priorities of the Chair.

8.2.1 Individual Priorities of the Finnish Chairmanship

Finland's individual priorities stem, in part, from the areas in which it had already achieved a certain reputation and global status. Its education initiative was characteristic of this link. It focused on improving the capacities of teachers who are committed to educating the younger generation in the Arctic region. It is widely agreed in Finland that an emphasis on qualified, respected teachers is one main reason for the strong status of the country's own education system. Finland also took a strong role in creating the University of the Arctic (UArctic), which was the first organization to be catalyzed by the Arctic Council. The Circumpolar Coordination Office of the UArctic was established in 1999 as part of the University of Lapland, and in 2001 the official launch of the UArctic took place in Rovaniemi, Finland. Together with the UArctic, the Chair's aim is to create a network of educators, with a goal of developing new methods such as how to use the potential of digitization for education in the Arctic and best practices to assist Arctic teachers at early-childhood, primary and lower secondary education.[19]

Meteorological research has also had strong standing in Finland and with the Finnish Meteorological Institute forming the lead institution. Foreign Ministry officials perceive that cooperation in meteorological and oceanographic fields has much to contribute to understanding the Arctic, given that better ice monitoring and weather services are needed, and that air and ocean observation networks need to be

[19] See Finland's Chairmanship Program *supra* note 10 at 9.

strengthened. Importantly, better meteorological and oceanographic cooperation will assist in attaining more accurate climate science results. With this in mind, Finland proposed in its Chairmanship Program that cooperation among the Arctic states also included "collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization".[20] When the Finnish Chairmanship Program was being prepared, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) had already filed its application to become an Observer in the AC.[21] This status was conferred during the Fairbanks Ministerial Meeting in 2017.[22] Discussions with the leadership of the Finnish Meteorological Institute and the Foreign Ministry influenced how this priority area emerged.[23] The fact that the current Secretary-General of the WMO is a Finn (Petteri Taalas the former Director of the Finnish Meteorological Institute) quite likely had an impact on how this priority came to emerge and also included a role for the WMO.

Finland also has a strong high-tech track record, so connectivity was seen quite early on as a primary focus area. In the minds of the Arctic officials in the Foreign Ministry who were preparing the program, a good deal of preliminary work had already been done by the Task Force on Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic (TFTIA) within the Arctic Council. This was important, as it made it easier to focus within the Finnish Chairmanship on connectivity in general. Also important here were discussions these officials undertook with the forthcoming chair of the AEC, Tero Vauraste. They agreed that the Chairmanship would be able to incorporate the strategic work that the AEC already had completed in the field of connectivity. Foreign Ministry officials said that these discussions with the AEC and its leadership were important in establishing the focus for this priority area: namely to create well-functioning communication networks and services, including basic infrastructures such as satellite connections, mobile communication systems, low-bandwidth transmission, and sea cables.[24] These are all seen as lifelines for human activities in the Arctic, given the region's sparse population and the long distances between communities. Additionally, the Finnish Chairmanship Program recognizes that broadband access facilitates e-learning, enables the development of digital health and social services, and also allows connectivity to media.[25]

Finland also possesses a relatively strong environmental protection system. The country has actively participated in global environmental protection efforts in a number of settings but primarily as a member state of the European Union. When

[20] Ibid., at 8.

[21] For more information on the WMO's Observer profile, see http://aim-council.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/461-observer-wmo

[22] See the Fairbanks declaration (specifically paragraph 44) https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1910/EDOCS-4072-v5-ACMMUS10_FAIRBANKS_2017_Fairbanks_Declaration-2017.pdf?sequence=9&isAllowed=y . For more information on the WMO's Observer profile, see http://aim-council.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/461-observer-wmo

[23] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (H.K., 2.5.2018).

[24] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (H.K., 2.5.2018).

[25] See Finland's Chairmanship Program *supra* note 10 at 7.

the Chairmanship Program was in its infancy, Finnish officials were thinking that Finland would have only three individual priority areas, similar to the United States Chairmanship Program. At first, environmental protection was seen as being too obviously represented by the overall efforts of the Arctic Council, especially in its work on climate change and biodiversity, both areas in which the officials from the Ministry of the Environment have been working from the beginnings of Arctic inter-governmental co-operation.[26] For this reason, the Foreign Ministry officials initially thought that a separate individual priority area was not needed. However, after meeting with the leadership of the Ministry for the Environment, it was decided that environmental protection still needed to be defined as an individual Chairmanship priority, in addition to being addressed in many other ongoing program areas. This rather late addition of a new priority area is reflected in the fairly meager descriptive content accompanying it. It emphasized that the Arctic Council should continue its focus on "biodiversity conservation and pollution prevention, as well as mitigation and adaptation to climate change", given its more general attention to environmental protection and monitoring efforts.[27] Two specific issues remain as stand-alone goals for its environmental protection. First, Finland wants to place more emphasis on communicating the results and recommendations of Arctic Council assessments in global forums. Second, it proposed, albeit in a somewhat abstract fashion, to expand the exchange of information on best practices and emerging technologies it sees as promoting sustainable and responsible development in the Arctic. It is important to emphasize here that a good deal of the work in the Arctic Council is related to monitoring the state of the Arctic environment and its protection. These activities continue to be addressed within their respective Working Groups without interference from the Chair.

8.2.2 Cross-cutting Priorities of the Finnish Chairmanship

As noted earlier when Finnish Foreign Ministry officials also commenced drafting the program, one of the major agenda items was to consult with officials from the United States. The U.S. position has been highly visible, if occasionally inconsistent, with regard to climate change.[28] The international momentum leading to the adoption of the Paris Agreement was a highly influential element during the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship under the Obama Administration. Finland followed suit in choosing it as one of its cross-cutting priorities and in an effort to remain true to the Council's policy of continuity. However, as mentioned above,

[26] Interview with Aleksi Hörkönen (H.K. 2.5.).

[27] See Finland's Chairmanship Program *supra* note 10 at 6.

[28] See Proposed U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship Program 2015–2017 (February 2015) at 22. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1433/USCHAIR_Doc1_Proposed_US_Chairmanship_Program_Feb_2015_AC_SAO_CA04.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

when the Trump administration came to power in the United States, different policy priorities started to shape that country's climate policy.

Of special interest with regard to the latter has been Finland's interest in the consequences of the adaptation to climate change. The Paris Agreement[29] deviates from previous decisions and instruments adopted in the global climate regime in that it no longer focuses primarily on developing states in the policy field of adaptation, but instead cover all states. Since climate change adaptation is more relevant in the Arctic and acknowledging work being done on mitigation such as the program aimed at reducing black carbon and methane, Finnish officials felt that focusing on this concern would be highly relevant. They felt that by doing so, the adaptation work of the Arctic Council would be strengthened and would receive more prominent visibility in the global climate change agenda discussions. As such it would be a good choice as a cross-cutting priority for the Finnish Chairmanship.

From the earliest stages of preparing the program, Finnish Arctic officials considered how the Chairmanship might include the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the work of the Council.[30] Although the organization has focused on sustainable development from the beginning of its existence, no previous Chair of the body has ever tried to allow UN sustainable development agenda to directly influence the work of the Arctic Council.[31] Clearly, the UN SDG agenda is highly relevant to the Arctic.[32] However, it was by no means clear that UN SDG should be introduced into the work of the Arctic Council, since until then sustainable development issues in the Arctic Council had not been connected to the UN's work on sustainable development. Therefore, it may be reasonable to ask: Why Finland included this as a cross-cutting priority in its Chairmanship Program?

Similarly to other Nordic states, Finland had made a substantial investment in putting the UN SDGs into domestic practice, and the country has progressed well with its national SDG implementation.[33] Hence, there was significant expertise and a political will in the country for broadening the work on the SDGs in other cooperative forums. Finland was also the first Member State of the Arctic Council to develop its Chairmanship Program after the SDGs had been formally adopted by the UN General Assembly in September of 2015.[34] The SDGs were also incorporated to

[29] The Paris Agreement 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016 in accordance with Article 21(1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) No. 54113. Article 7 of the Agreement has a special focus on adaptation.

[30] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (H.K. 2.5.).

[31] There is one tiny exception to this, since Finland as a chair gave a presentation on the work of the Arctic Council at the UN's 2002 Johannesburg Summit. The document can be accessed at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/512/ACSAO-FI03_5_Johannesburg.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

[32] SDG Conferences.

[33] See the country ranking at https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-meldungen/2016/juli/countries-need-to-act-urgently-to-achieve-the-un-sustainable-development-goals/

[34] See the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 25 September 2015, UN G.A. A/RES/70/1 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

form a significant part of the Arctic Council's SDWG Strategic Framework (2017–2030)[35] and that this undertaking would be initiated during the start of the Finnish Chairmanship. The SDGs also fit very well into the Arctic Council's overall work, since the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) seeks to advancing sustainable development in the region.[36]

8.3 Finland's Current Chairmanship: What has Happened so Far?

Even if the Chairmanship leads the Arctic Council during its two-year term, as has been seen in previous chapters of this volume, this does not mean that it will individually supervise all of the work. Yet in order to provide adequate oversight, the Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) needs to be aware of what happens in all the component parts of the body. Finland's responsibilities as Chair include organizing (together with the Arctic Council Secretariat) the meetings of SAOs, the sessions of the Sustainable Development Working Group, and obviously, the final Ministerial Meeting that serves as the culmination of its Chairmanship.[37]

The Chair of SAOs is expected to oversee many issues in its Chairmanship period, based on the consensual approval of all of the Arctic Member States. For instance, the Chair is in charge of disseminating information and participating in relevant international seminars, conferences, and meetings of other intergovernmental organizations. Important duties include maintaining contact with the Observers and representing the Arctic Council in other forums, if so agreed in advance by the other Arctic states. Good leadership is not only about following procedural rules, but also includes ensuring compromise and steering countries toward consensus and away from tensions and disruptive issues which could bring multilateral cooperation to a halt. This point is aptly emphasized by Smieszek in Chap. 3 of this volume.

There are now several projects under the SDWG that advance the education goals of Finland's Chairmanship Program, perhaps most clearly the project on "Teacher Education for Diversity and Equality in the Arctic".[38] The goal of this

[35] See Arctic Council SDWG Strategic Framework

[36] See Terms of Reference of the SDWG https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/sdwg. Recently, high level Conferences were organised for promoting a better understanding of the SDGs for the Arctic. See 'The SDGs in the Arctic', International High Level Conference organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 1 December 2017. Available at http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/the-arctic/the-sdgs-in-the-arctic/. See also Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit Conference: http://www.rovaniemiarcticspirit.fi/news/UN-Sustainable-Development-Goals-in-the-Arctic-region-–economy,-science,-and-the-next-generations/xcybq3lk/f6fa20d2-4ffc-47d6-b7c9-20833edc378e

[37] This will be organized in May 2019 in Rovaniemi, Finland.

[38] More information on the project can be accessed at http://www.sdwg.org/activities/sdwg-projects-2017-2019/teacher-education-for-diversity-and-equality-in-the-arctic/

action is to advance teacher education as means to promote teachers to become creators of a sustainable future in the Arctic. This work is also aimed at continuing part of the University of the Arctic's thematic network in this area.

The Finnish Chairmanship's individual meteorology priority has led to the first Arctic Meteorology Summit that was held in conjunction with the SDWG and SAO meetings in Levi, Finland (March 2018). The results of the summit were presented during a recent SAO meeting.[39] The final Arctic Meteorology Summit during the Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship will be organized in 2019.

The Finnish Chairmanship's individual priority on connectivity is advancing primarily through the Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic (TFICA).[40] The Task Force aims to "compare the needs of those who live, operate, and work in the Arctic with available infrastructure, and work with the telecommunications industry and the Arctic Economic Council to encourage the creation of required infrastructure with an eye toward pan-Arctic solutions, and report to Ministers in 2019".[41] As mentioned above, most of the work in the Arctic Council is related to environmental protection. As the Chair of the Council, Finland's most concrete contribution to advancing this priority is the SDWG project "Good Practice Recommendations for Environmental Impact Assessment and Public Participation in the Arctic", which aims at "providing Arctic-specific recommendations that can be applied in the vulnerable and changing Arctic environment, taking into account the indigenous peoples and other inhabitants living there".[42]

The cross-cutting priority focused on Implementation of the Paris Agreement is moving forward on several fronts. It is tied to many actions that are progressing in the Arctic Council, related to the scientific assessment of climate change, adaptation to its consequences in the region, and perhaps most importantly for advancing this priority, to reducing black carbon and methane releases. This work is currently carried out in an Expert Group in support of the implementation of the Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane.[43] Finland is currently heading this Expert Group. Its efforts have attained a fairly high-profile since the Member States were

[39] Personal observations from the SAO meeting. News from the meeting can be accessed here https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/486-sao-levi-2018-02

[40] More information on the Task Force can be found here https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/subsidiary-bodies/task-forces

[41] See the Fairbanks declaration (specifically Article 19) *supra* note 21. Also Refer to the Senior Arctic Officials' Report to Ministers 2017, Fairbanks, Alaska, United States (11 May 2017) at 83.

[42] See at http://www.sdwg.org/activities/sdwg-projects-2017-2019/arctic-eia/arctic-eia-new/. Of interest is that during the AEPS, the predecessor of the Arctic Council, there was a project that ended with the endorsement in 1997 of the Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic. See also Timo Koivurova et al., *Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: A Guide to Best Practice* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).

[43] See Black Carbon and Methane Expert Group https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1167. See also Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions. An Arctic Council Framework for Action. Annex 4 Iqaluit 2015 SAO Report to Ministers.

able to come up with a political agreement to reduce black carbon at the Fairbanks Ministerial Meeting. Finland's President Sauli Niinistö has taken up the matter of black carbon in his bilateral talks with both President Putin of Russia and President Trump of the USA, which is perhaps surprising given the past public stances Putin and Trump have taken towards climate change. Recently, President Niinistö has suggested that a possible Heads of Arctic States Summit could be planned and organized around this issue.[44]

Finland has also been able to catalyze efforts within the Working Groups of the Council to examine what UN SDGs might best be applied to their work. Some of these Working Groups have started to use SDGs as one set of criteria for use in the approval of projects. The SDWG has taken the lead on this but this practice may well spread to other Working Groups. Currently, one of the Expert Groups of the SDWG—the Social, Economic and Cultural Expert Group (SECEG)—is examining whether its future role could be to advance research and synthesis outcomes that embody these objectives. Clearly, under the leadership of the Finnish Chairmanship, the United Nations SDGs are likely to become deeply imbedded into the structures of the Arctic Council. As Finland is also tasked with leading the negotiations for the first ever long-term strategy for the Arctic Council, SDGs will likely serve as one of the guiding frameworks for developing the long-term strategy of the Arctic Council.

8.4 Best Practices Developed by Finland's Chairmanship

Finland has already demonstrated some leadership good practices while both preparing for Chairmanship Program and implementing its provisions. As mentioned above, Finland carefully consulted all of the Member States prior to the start of its Chairmanship. It also organized a special consultative session with all of the Permanent Participants and consulted Finnish Sami Parliament separately. This can be considered to be a very good leadership practice. For it clearly demonstrates the Chair's desire to take indigenous interests seriously and incorporate their views before preparing the Chairmanship's formal priorities.

Another good leadership practice stems from how Finland went about insuring that its top officials were familiarized with the broad array of Arctic issues and concerns prior to the start of the Chairmanship. Due to regular professional rotations, many foreign policy civil servants and their colleagues from other ministries and agencies who are given the responsibility of running a Chairmanship do not possess a long terma background in Arctic affairs that would enable them to follow these matters within the context of the Arctic Council and wider circumpolar diplomacy. The Finnish government recognized early their need in this area and sought expert advice.[45]

[44] See in Finnish at http://www.kaleva.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/ulkoministerio-lannen-medialle-suomi-tavoittelee-yha-arktisen-alueen-huippukokousta/791550/

[45] The author would like to thank Gosia Smieszek for having identified this as a good practise.

The Finnish government and bureaucracy are generally seen as being open to bringing in expertise from the outside and a relatively broad system of advisory services have been developed in the country. Finland's Prime Minister's Office opens a call for advice every year on topics that are of immediate policy importance to the government. Of interest here was a specific call that was launched to provide analysis relevant to the Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship in March 2016. It requested a proposal for a consortium of Arctic advisors.

The Arctic consortium was selected and put in place far ahead of the start of the Finnish Chairmanship. Under the leadership of the present author, it has been able to provide various briefings and background reports to those who are charged with directing it. Specifically, a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of Finland's ministries and official agencies charged with implementing the Chairmanship of the Council have received a series of briefings and background reports from members of the Arctic consortium. These efforts have continued throughout the Finnish Chairmanship and will continue until its formal conclusion in May 2019.[46]

A third good leadership practice that Finland has advanced relates to the treatment of Observers of Arctic Council. The Chair of the Council has some discretion as to how it involves the Observers in SAO meetings, SDWG sessions and in the final Ministerial Meeting of its Chairmanship. Finland has indicated that it would like to see the Observers play a larger role within the Arctic Council and has already taken steps to actively include them in its activities. At the recent Oulu SAO plenary meeting (October 2017), the Finnish Chairmanship convened a session where attending Observers had the opportunity to present the type of pollution prevention work they have undertaken in conjunction with the Arctic Council.[47] In the SAO meeting in Levi (March 2018), Observers were given the possibility to directly interact with Working Groups of the Arctic Council.[48] In May 2018, the Finnish SAO Chair also took part in a meeting with non-Arctic state Observers of the Arctic Council (and the EU) in Poland, Adopting the so-called Warsaw format, this was to be the fourth such meeting where the non-Arctic states could have direct interaction with the Chair of the SAOs.[49] The previous Chair, the United States, had also

[46] The consortium based at the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi won and is run by the current author. It includes experts from the Arctic Centre, the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA) and the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE). This is an inter-disciplinary (within social sciences) group of experts, many of whom have followed - and directly participated in the work of - the Arctic Council and/or Arctic affairs for years. See the website https://lacris.ulapland.fi/en/projects/finlands-arctic-council-chairmanship-in-the-times-of-rising-uncertainty(a485f3a2-8218-4696-8874-48aa1c1edb95).htm.

[47] Summary Report, SAO Plenary meeting, Oulu, Finland, October 2017 10–11. Other documents from the meeting can be retrieved at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2030

[48] See Summary Report, SAO Plenary meeting, Levi, Finland, March 2018 (especially item 14) https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2165/SAOFI202_2018_LEVI_Summary-Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

[49] SAO Chair Aleksi Härkönen was invited to the meeting in Poland on May 11 2018 by the non-Arctic states Observers to the Arctic Council. This was an extension of a tradition begun under the Danish Chairmanship.

conducted these forms of engagement of Observers. Finland was clearly following the lead of the United States and seeking to emphasize the need for continuity in this area.

Still another good leadership practice continued by the Finnish Chairmanship was the increased involvement of northern regions of the host country in helping to organize the meetings and events associated with each Chairmanship. It has been a tradition within the organization to have some participation of this sort. However it was not until the time of the U.S. Chairmanship that a formal "host committee" was constituted by Alaskans[50] These most northern residents of the United States organized this effort both as an instrument to showcase their traditions, knowledge and capabilities and as a means to increase the leverage of Alaska in drawing the Chairmanship Program within the United States.[51]

Lapland, as the most northern region of Finland, decided to continue this tradition, and with a fairly similar set of purposes. The idea has been to showcase Lapland's Arctic expertise in Arctic Council meetings, most of which are held in Finnish Lapland. The Finnish Foreign Ministry has overseen the official portions of each gathering, however, it does not have the capacity to do more than that. For this reason, it is useful to have a host committee that can provide a program for delegates outside of the formal meetings, and that showcase their local Arctic expertise in different ways. The Lapland Arctic Council Host Committee also has decided to use the increased attention that Finland's Arctic Council Chairmanship brings to the region to further educate people through discussion forums and presentations about the Arctic Council and Arctic issues. The host committee has also served to create new connections between all regional actors, since it is steered by the main public and private agencies in Lapland, as well as by the Sami people.[52] The host committee was present at the SDWG meeting in Inari in September 2017 and also at the meetings of the SDWG, the SAOs and the Arctic Meteorology Summit that all took place in Levi in March 2018.[53] The next Chair of the Arctic Council, Iceland, has also shown interest in the host committee idea and seems that this good leadership practice may well continue into the foreseeable future.

It is also worth pointing out that the chairmanship team in the Foreign Ministry has, together with WWF Finland, devised principles (and implemented those so far) on how to organize environmentally sustainable meetings. The guidelines, for instance, emphasize the purchaser's responsibility for choices related to catering,

[50] See the Alaskan Arctic Council host committee webpage, at http://fm.kuac.org/term/alaska-arctic-council-host-committee

[51] Ibid.

[52] The current author is the chair of the steering committee meeting, and in general the Arctic Centre (of the University of Lapland (especially Anne Raja-Hanhela) is part of a team that is planning the meetings in different Lappish localities. All the members of the steering committee can be seen from the website of the host committee.

[53] See the website of the Lapland Arctic Council host committee, at https://www.laplandhostcommittee.fi/LaplandHostCommittee

procurements and planning of informal events and programs. Since the planning of all the meetings that take place in Lapland are done by the foreign Ministry together with the Lapland Host Committee, also other than environmental concerns can be taken up. In the recent Levi SAO and SDWG meetings one restaurant option was abandoned due to the images that were seen as ethically controversial from the viewpoint of indigenous peoples. The Lapland Host Committee contacted its Sami representatives, who were against that restaurant, after which the Ministry decided that it will not be used.

8.5 Concluding Thoughts

When we try to find reasons for why certain priorities emerged within the Finnish Chairmanship Program, it is of utmost importance to perceive the Chairmanship as being part of the Arctic Council's history and ethos: a body in which a country is expected to serve the goals of the institution. Finland's current Chairmanship Program differs significantly both in scope and character from that which it pursued as a country when it first headed the Council from 2000 to 2002.[54] Today, Finnish Chairmanship Program is much more ambitious and broader in scope than it was in that period of time. Likewise the style and manner in which the Finnish government conducts its Chairmanship is much more publicly visible and monitored than 18 years ago.[55]

The primary reason for the difference between the previous and current Chairmanships is not that Finland somehow wanted to invest more in its role this time than during its 2000–2002 tenure. Rather it is the character of the Arctic and the Arctic Council, itself, that have changed. Both have become much more visible and the latter has evolved to become an ambitious governance institution, with broader array of activity areas. This is well illustrated in the differences between the two Finnish programs approach to Arctic maritime matters. In Finland's first Chairmanship Program, the Arctic Ocean was not broadly discussed or addressed as a separate consideration.[56] The current Finnish Chairmanship Program addresses the topic of the Arctic Ocean at several points and contains a sizeable section on Arctic Ocean related policies. This is a reflection both of the growing international interest in the globe's "new ocean" and the fact that the Arctic Council's current work contains so many projects addressing the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas.

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[54] Timo Koivurova and Malgorzata Smieszek, *From the Rovaniemi Process to Exploring Common Solutions: Finland's Priorities in the Changing Arctic*, at http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/08/rovaniemi-process-exploring-common-solutions-finland%E2%80%99s-priorities-changing-arctic

[55] See Finland's First Chairmanship program *supra* note 4.

[56] Ibid.

Finnish Foreign Ministry officials also have repeatedly said that an important inspiration for prioritizing certain areas of action over others within the Chairmanship Program came from those institutions that had a deep understanding of what the Arctic Council Chairmanship entails, and who were committed to making a positive influence on it. For instance, their discussions with the leadership of the Arctic Economic Council and the Finnish Meteorological Institute were clearly important in influencing the fairly strong role of the AEC in the Finnish Program as well as the priority area of meteorological cooperation.[57] Ministry officials also felt that connections with the scientific and research communities were important including contacts with the University of the Arctic. Those research institutions that have had long-standing expertise in Arctic issues (such as the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland - lead by the present author) have been utilized in many ways by the Finnish Chairmanship team.[58] However, this is both a natural and logical result, given that the government officials who are now implementing the Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship have focused on Arctic issues only for a few years due to the normal rotation of diplomatic personnel.

If we are to examine Finland's approach to Chairmanship in terms of the leadership styles identified in Chap. 4 of this volume (see also Nord 2016b), it can be seen to entail an element of all of them, but comes perhaps closest to being seen as a "professional leader" and to a lesser extent, an "honest broker". Characteristically, Finland's approach to organizational leadership sees as one of its most important task that of continuing the efforts of the previous Chair (the United States) and preparing the way for the next Chairmanship (Iceland). As has been discussed, it also has its own priorities but these are very much linked to the established interests of the institution it leads. Finland has very much focused on first serving the interests and goals of the Arctic Council. It has not advanced its own national economic priorities, even though there was an initial domestic effort to push the Chairmanship Program in this direction. Yet, it is also important to note that Finland does advance its national interests in a more indirect way, by taking up priorities that entail more possibilities for Finnish institutions to gain further competence and leadership in Arctic meteorology, education and connectivity.

Finland's approach to drafting its Chairmanship Program can be understood in light of what one might normally expect of a small state that relies heavily on international institutions and international law. Finland wants its program to make the Arctic Council stronger in many ways.[59] The country also places substantial empha-

[57] Interview with Aleksi Härkönen (H.K 2.5.).

[58] The Arctic Centre is currently leading the team that provides knowledge to the chairmanship team and is also leading the Lapland Arctic Council host committee. See the project 'Finland's Arctic Council Chairmanship in the times of rising uncertainty' *supra* note 41. The Arctic Centre is also disseminating information about Finland during the chairmanship via its Arctic-Finland portal https://www.arcticfinland.fi/EN

[59] For instance, cooperation between outgoing and incoming chairmanship, stronger co-operation with independent organizations that have been established directly or indirectly by the action of the AC (in particular the AEC, but also UArctic, and less so the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the

sis on global regulatory developments that have been negotiated under the general auspices of the United Nations, such as the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. While this fits with Finland's foreign policy approaches, we have to also keep in mind that paying attention to global developments is a natural action for any country assuming the leadership role of the Arctic Council. This is due to the fact that as a regional intergovernmental forum with environmental protection and sustainable development as main parts of its mandate, the Council by necessity deals with global and regional normative developments.

This reliance on global regulatory frameworks is nowadays becoming more difficult to maintain because of the current geopolitical turmoil. It is fair to say that Brexit, the coming of the Trump Presidency, and the Russian annexation of Crimea have all served to lessen national reliance on global frameworks of law and governance. Finland has had to face some of these problems from the beginning of its Chairmanship. The new U.S. leadership tried to challenge the Fairbanks Ministerial Declaration. Since then, the United States has also consistently made sure that even if UN Sustainable Development Goals are mentioned in Arctic Council proceedings, no individual goals or sub-goals of the SDGs can be formally identified.[60]

So far, the tradition of Arctic Council co-operation has shown its strength in dealing with these issues, even if the Russian and the U.S. leadership do not seem to fully support the values upon which the Arctic Council is founded and generally find themselves at loggerheads with each other on many foreign policy issues. The work on climate change by means of new meteorological co-operation and other ongoing projects in the Council has continued and the general geopolitical tensions between the Western states and Russia has not yet impacted the broad efforts of the Arctic Council.

In many contexts, Finland has been able to voice the importance of the Arctic Council co-operation in keeping channels of communication open, even during this difficult period. This is also something that Finland's officials perceive as a significant value of the current Chairmanship, that is, that Finland can continue to mediate relations between Russia and the United States and the other Western countries. Even if general relations between Russia and the United States continue to be difficult, the countries have still been able to work together within the Arctic Council and to advance Arctic co-operation in specific areas. An example of this can be seen in the recently concluded Arctic Fisheries Agreement.[61] For Finland, overall, this has been important as its traditional role has been to mediate between Russia and the Western states, and via the Arctic Council this has been made concretely possible.

Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum) and long-term strategy for the Arctic Council. Finland also places strong emphasis on the work with the Observers, and has already presented the program to vast amount of Observers.

[60] Personal observations in SDWG meetings in Inari and Levi.

[61] Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (12 June 2018) can be accessed here https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A0453%3AFIN

The role that Finland's President Sauli Niinistö has played within the Finnish Chairmanship is also interesting in this regard. Although it is the Foreign Minister that formally heads the Arctic Council, Finland's President has used opportunities provided by the Arctic Council Chairmanship to discuss issues with both President Putin and President Trump. In conjunction with his responsibilities in Finnish foreign policy, President Niinistö has the opportunity to raise Arctic issues in his meetings with various heads of Arctic states. His efforts might still result in a summit among the leaders of Arctic Council Member States that was mentioned in Finland's Chairmanship Program.[62] Such an occurrence, during the Finnish Chairmanship would provide the country with a further opportunity to play its traditional role of mediating between the interests and views of Russia and the Western states.

At this half-way point, Finland's leadership efforts as Chair of the Arctic Council can be judged to be successful and highly effective. It followed a careful path that called for adequate preparation and consultation in its preparation of its Chairmanship Program. All of the Member States and Permanent Participants were fully consulted and their views taken into consideration. Finland has also been able to identify and advance its priorities in a relatively successful manner and also to promote a degree of continuity in the Arctic Council's agenda. It has also either created or continued good leadership practices that can inspire and enhance future Chairmanships. As the Chair of the Council, Finland is now hard at work leading the institutional effort to produce the first ever long-term strategy for the body. It is likely that this effort will enable longer term priorities favored by Finland to develop within the institution, and help to guide future Council endeavors.[63]

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[62] A summit to confirm long-term strategic goals for the Arctic Council. See Finland's Chairmanship Program *supra* note 10 at 17.

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Part IV
Contributions and Perspectives of Other Participants

Chapter 9
Change and Continuity Among the Priorities of the Arctic Council's Permanent Participants

Andrew Chater

Abstract Indigenous peoples' organizations provide leadership in the Arctic Council and augment leadership by Chairs and Member States. How have the priorities of the Arctic Council's Permanent Participants changed over time? How have their priorities stayed the same? How do they differ from the priorities of Member States and the Chairs of the institutions? How do the Permanent Participants provide leadership, and clash with leadership in the institution? These major questions frame the analysis in this chapter. The Arctic Council is the region's most important international forum, allowing a leadership role for all Arctic states and Indigenous peoples' organizations. It is unique in that it presents Indigenous peoples' organizations a form of membership in the institution. They are termed Permanent Participants, signifying that their participation is not subject to the whims of states. In the two decades that the Council has contributed to Arctic regional governance, Member States and Permanent Participants have worked together in a number of ways. This analysis measures the priorities of the Permanent Participants by examining their sponsorship and contributions to Council projects, accomplished through textual and statistical accounting of reports by Senior Arctic Officials. This work reveals that Permanent Participants are more likely to support local community priorities than are Member States.

Keywords Arctic Council · Indigenous peoples · Non-state actors · Permanent participants · Global governance

The leadership of the Arctic Council flows from its Member States and the Chairs of the body, as is the case in most international institutions. Yet, it is unique because it gives a group of non-state actors a state-like status, specifically Indigenous peoples' organizations. These actors contribute leadership in ways non-state actors cannot in other international institutions. They often work together with the Chairs of

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the institution, but sometimes clash over differences of priorities. To understand leadership in the Council, we must examine this situation.

As an international forum for all eight countries located at least partly in the Arctic region, the Arctic Council is similar in some ways to international institutions such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian States or the European Union. Yet, in other ways, it is very different. The Arctic Council is the only international institution in which non-state actors, namely Indigenous peoples' organizations, has a form of membership (Gwich'in Council International 2018). These organizations are termed Permanent Participants in institutional parlance, and so this chapter refers to Indigenous peoples' organizations in this way. Beyond this distinction, there is no formal treaty establishing the role of the Arctic Council like the European Union's 1992 *Maastricht Treaty*. Further, the Council encourages co-operation among members in a somewhat narrow set of areas – no currency policy or free trade, but environmental protection and sustainable development. Unlike other international bodies, it has only recently facilitated the creation of formal multilateral agreements. It mostly develops assessments, expedites information sharing about the region and serves as a venue to create technical environmental projects (Fenge 2012).

In other international institutions, states must approve work by non-state actors and can block them from attending meetings. In the Arctic Council, Permanent Participants can sponsor projects, initiate work and represent the views of their constituents in any discussion. However, they are not equal to states because Permanent Participants cannot vote on Council decisions. Only a consensus among state delegations is necessary to carry out an action. Similarly, only Member States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) take turns chairing the Council. Permanent Participants operate with small delegations of part-time employees as opposed to large state bureaucracies. This chapter explores the leadership provided by these unique actors and their response to the leadership efforts of the Chair.

This chapter answers four research questions. How have the priorities of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants changed over time? How have their priorities stayed the same? How do they differ from the priorities of Member States and the Chairs of the institution? When do the Permanent Participants provide leadership, and when do they clash with leadership in the institution? Six Indigenous peoples' organizations – the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), the Gwich'in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council (SC) – are Permanent Participants within the Arctic Council. They represent more than 650,000 Indigenous peoples from seven of the eight Arctic countries – all save Iceland. Their role is significant because it represents a rare instance in global governance in which states recognize that Indigenous peoples (or residents of a particular region in general) should have a formal role in leadership and decision-making at the international level. In a small way, it is a step toward the democratization of international decision-making

(a concept discussed by Michael Zürn 2000). As noted, Permanent Participants and Member States have frequently worked together since the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996. Yet, conflicts have emerged. Permanent Participants have complained that they have to rely on non-guaranteed funding from governments to attend Council meetings in far-flung Northern locales. The future of the Arctic Council might involve Permanent Participants taking turns as Chairs, as Member States do now. They lack the same staffing levels as the Arctic Eight. Despite inadequate staffing levels, they have served as Chairs of the body's Working Groups and led projects successfully.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. The first two sections describe literature about the Council and Permanent Participants, as well as the method employed in this analysis. The third section shares the results of the analysis, while the fourth section explicitly links these to the overall themes of this volume. The fifth addresses the significance of the results with respect to the initial research questions. This inquiry examines the priorities of Permanent Participants by categorizing the several Council projects and initiatives they sponsored and then compares these to the projects sponsored by Member States. Overall, this chapter concludes that Permanent Participants are more likely to support Arctic local community priorities than are Member States (i.e., those projects that specifically support development in Arctic communities, as opposed to national-level goals).

Together, the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council represent more than forty unique Indigenous peoples. Two domestic groups that act for Aleutian people in the United States and Alaska formed the Aleutian International Association in 1998, which was 2 years after the Arctic Council came into being (Aleutian International Association 2018). Aleutian people live on islands off the coast of Alaska and through the Bering Sea area. The Arctic Athabaskan Council came together in 2000 as a result of a treaty signed by seven domestic Indigenous organizations and governments representing seventy-six Athabaskan communities in Alaska, Northwest Territories and Yukon (Arctic Athabaskan Council 2018). The Gwich'in Tribal Council formed the Gwich'in Council International in 1999 to advocate for Gwich'in peoples in Alaska, Northwest Territories and Yukon (Arctic Council 2015a).

The other three Permanent Participants are much older, predating the Arctic Council itself. Inuit activists founded the Inuit Circumpolar Council to advocate for the rights of Inuit peoples at the international level in 1977 (Inuit Circumpolar Council 2018). The Inuit traditionally live in current day Alaska, Greenland, Labrador, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Quebec and Chukotka, Russia. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North came together in 1990 as an umbrella organization for thirty-five domestic Indigenous organizations representing forty-one different Indigenous groups within the Russian Federation. (Arctic Council 2016). The oldest group is the Saami Council, which activists founded in 1956 to reflect the aspirations of the Saami peoples of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden (Saami Council 2018). It is tempting to look at Permanent Participants as one monolith, but it is important to acknowledge they have distinct cultures,

Table 9.1 Permanent Participant Organizations

Organization	Year founded	Year joined Arctic Council
Saami Council	1956	1996
Inuit Circumpolar Council	1977	1996
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North	1990	1996
Aleutian International Association	1998	1998
Gwich'in Council International	1999	1999
Arctic Athabaskan Council	2000	2000

economies, languages, territories and traditions. These groups share many interests, too, and often work together in Arctic Council activities by developing joint priorities and leveraging their combined influence to achieve goals (Table 9.1).

9.1 Why Focus on Permanent Participants?

The priorities of Permanent Participants are worthy of study because it allows an opportunity to examine the leadership role of non-state actors when they have formal power in an international institution led by state Chairs. As earlier mentioned, the Arctic Council is the only international institution in which a non-state actor possesses guaranteed influence. Most scholarly work on this topic examines how non-state actors influence states outside of formal power arrangements through "information gathering, standard setting and behaviour modification" (for example, work by Bridget Hutter 2006, p. 1). Essentially, non-state actors provide useful information that alert states to a problems they must address. They help to define state interests, or create norms that restrain state behaviour. Permanent Participants can do all of these things, but they also have the authority to design Arctic Council work and participate in formal negotiations. This unique power begs scholarly attention.

Previous academic work views the priorities of the Permanent Participants as different from states to some extent. Most researchers who study the Council, including Terry Fenge (2012), Olav Schram Stokke (2007a, b) and Oran Young (2005), see the Council as a state-centric institution. Based on the fact Permanent Participants lack voting rights, it is difficult to disagree with this fact. Yet at the onset of the Council, several news articles predicted that Permanent Participants would have significant state-like power in the institution (Schneider 1996 and Rosborou 1996). However, some such as Jennifer McIver (1997) warned that, "Excluding Indigenous peoples from holding equal status in the Arctic Council is a short-sighted approach to environmental management of the Northern region" (p. 147). Much literature since emphasizes the role of states in the Arctic Council and debates the impact of Permanent Participants on institutional outcomes.[1]

[1] Such as works by English, Fenge, and Koivurova cited in this section.

Various scholarly works have argued that Permanent Participants contribute ideas and priorities that are different from those put forward by Member States. Evan Bloom (1999) writes that these groups "participate in all aspects of the Council's work" (p. 712). Timo Koivurova (2010) says these groups have "contributed to a new way of perceiving how Indigenous peoples should be involved in international policy making" (p. 153). John English (2013) says that the structure of the Arctic Council itself reflects "lobbying and pressure" by Indigenous peoples (p. 176). Yet, these same academics note major challenges with which Permanent Participants must contend. Andrea Charron (2012) notes that Permanent Participants "are often dependent on Arctic states for a variety of sources of funding" (p. 772). Former Yukon Premier Tony Penikett (2017) says that the Council does a good thing by including the voices of Indigenous peoples, but should do the same for "settlers," or non-Indigenous Arctic residents (p. 24). Current literature views Permanent Participant priorities as unique; what makes these priorities unique is not always clear.

This chapter contributes new insights into Permanent Participant priorities and contributions. When allowed, non-state actors contribute within the limits of institutional norms to represent the unique interests of their constituents. Page Wilson (2016) writes that Permanent Participants support a vision of the Arctic Council as a regional steward, as opposed to an institution that must resolve conflicts. She carries out an analysis of key Council documents, events and rhetoric. The present chapter seeks to contribute to this analysis by analyzing and categorizing all of the Council's projects to determine patterns across time. It also contributes a new insight regarding the behaviour of non-state actors in formal positions of power. It suggests that the Arctic Council is a state-centric institution that gives Permanent Participants the ability to represent the interests of local communities.

9.2 Methods Utilized

The method employed in this chapter to examine Permanent Participant priorities is a descriptive statistical analysis of all Council projects. All Arctic Council projects were manually reviewed and numerically divided into categories corresponding to different priorities. At the same time, the process identified which states and Permanent Participants sponsored the various projects. The Arctic Council divides its work into projects, led by state or organization sponsors. Examples of projects include environmental assessments, international agreements, emergency response simulations, action plans and information exchanges. Identifying which Member States and Permanent Participants championed projects corresponding to these various categories reveals differences in emphasis or support. All projects were divided into seven thematic categories based on the key priority of each initiative: contaminants, conservation of living resources, environmental threats, human health, sustainable livelihoods and communities, infrastructure and economic development. The categories come from an articulation of the institution's long-term

priorities found in a news release from 1999 (Arctic Council 1999). This document is the earliest articulation of the Council's priorities beyond the broad categories of environmental protection or sustainable development (found in the 1996 *Ottawa Declaration* and 1998 *Iqaluit Declaration*) (Arctic Council 1996, 1998). Using descriptive statistics allows a methodical comparison of the activities of various actors. The data, or information on Council priorities and projects, come from bi-annual reports by Senior Arctic Officials.[2] There are advantages and disadvantages of this data source, relating to the accuracy and thoroughness of these reports. It is sometimes necessary to make judgement calls as to which project belongs in which category.

Three expectations guide this analysis. First, Permanent Participant groups represent northern residents who often face serious human security challenges and fundamental development issues, such as inadequate access to health services, affordable food and quality education. For example, in 2011, just 41% of Canadian Inuit aged 25 to 24 had graduated high school (Statistics Canada 2016a). Meanwhile, about 87% of Canada's overall population has a high school diploma (Statistics Canada 2016b). As noted earlier, a major purpose of Indigenous peoples' organizations is to represent the interests of local communities. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that Permanent Participant groups support more Council projects that serve community priorities, namely human health, sustainable livelihoods and communities, infrastructure and economic development.

The second expectation is that Member States tend to respond to national- level priorities and must represent non-Arctic peoples. All of the Arctic governments, at some point, have acknowledged that climate change is a profound global public policy challenge. A consensus within the literature is that Permanent Participants represent more local priorities in the Arctic Council. Thus, we can expect some contrast with the priorities of the Member States. It is reasonable to expect that Member States will more readily support Council projects that serve broad national interest, namely the environmental priorities of contaminants, conservation of living resources and environmental threats. Of course, environmental issues also are of local significance. Yet, all of these concerns relate directly to climate change, which is an international issue, as much as a local issue.

The third expectation is that, with such divisions of interests, Permanent Participants and Member States may clash frequently in the Council. Each actor represents somewhat difference constituencies with their own distinctive priorities. Logically, these contrasting interests would come into conflict from time to time. Working with limited funds, one might expect Permanent Participants would champion projects for local communities, while Member States would seek to support

[2] As noted elsewhere in this volume, each Council member-state takes a two year turn chairing the institution. A Senior Arctic Official, who is generally an experienced state diplomat, leads the activity of each state delegation during this time. At the end of each national turn as Chair, the Senior Arctic Officials oversee the completion of a report detailing the Council's work over the last two years, including the projects initiated or completed, as well as which states and Permanent Participants sponsored which projects. Information comes from nine of these reports (Arctic Council 2000, 2002; 2004a, b; 2006; 2009; 2011; 2013; 2015b and 2017a, b).

national projects that will win the support of citizens outside of the Arctic. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that Permanent Participants and Member States might come into conflict over these local versus national priorities.

In which ways do some categories represent Arctic local community priorities and other categories represent national environmental priorities? Community priorities are those projects with the aim of helping Arctic residents in the areas of human health, sustainable livelihood and communities, infrastructure and economic development. These are different from the institutional community priorities at the Arctic Council that tend to serve national-level interests. Environmental priorities are those projects that benefit people beyond the Arctic in the categories of contaminants, conservation and environmental threats. This division is imperfect; certainly, environmental projects benefit local communities and projects that focus on small communities can contribute to national prosperity. Environmental priorities, such as climate change assessments, have local, national and global consequences. Yet, community priority projects more directly benefit Arctic communities, such as projects curing disease, increasing mental health resources in the North, building roads and protecting small-scale economic resources in the Arctic.

9.3 What Do We Find?

Permanent Participants contribute leadership to the Council by bringing forward their own priorities, distinct from Chairs or Member States. In this regard, we are interested in the following questions: How have the priorities of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants changed over time? How have their priorities stayed the same? Projects by the Permanent Participants have changed in that they more frequently concern Arctic community priorities today (i.e., projects that support development in local communities), but have stayed the same because national environmental priorities also loom large in their interests. As well, community projects have always been a priority for Permanent Participants to some extent.

Early in the history of the Arctic Council, the majority of the projects championed by Permanent Participants concerned local community priorities (nine out of thirteen projects). Examples include a Saami Council project on best practices for coastal fishery management (economic development) or an Inuit Circumpolar Council/Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North project on recommendations to reduce toxic substances in the North (human health). Then, between 2006 and 2011, the majority of Permanent Participant projects had to do with environmental priorities (eight out of ten projects). An example is co-sponsorship of the development of an ecosystems management approach by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. In the last five years, the majority of Permanent Participant projects have been in the area of local community priorities (eighteen out of twenty-seven projects). An example is an Inuit Circumpolar Council project on cataloguing resources to promote mental health in northern communities. Permanent Participants have sponsored or co-sponsored more projects in categories to do with local community priorities (thirty versus twenty-three), representing

Table 9.2 Categorized Sponsorship by Permanent Participants, 2000–2017

SAO report	Total projects sponsored	Environmental priorities (contaminants, conservation, environmental threats)	Community priorities (human health, sustainable livelihood and communities, infrastructure, economic development)
2000	3	0	3
2002	5	2	3
2004	5	2	3
2006	5	4	1
2009	4	3	1
2011	1	1	0
2013	3	2	1
2015	11	3	8
2017	16	6	10

continuity over time. Table 9.2 breaks down the project sponsorship or co-sponsorship by Permanent Participants since 2000.

The reasons for why the priorities of the Permanent Participants shifted between 2006 and 2013 is due to an increased overall focus on climate change in the Arctic Council. In 2004, Council states released the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,* which was, to that point, the most significant project undertaken by the Council. The assessment report on climate change was initiated by the United States compiled by 24 authors and spread across more than 1000 pages. Researchers found many alarming facts, perhaps most famously that the extent of summer sea ice has fallen 20% since 1974 (Arctic Council 2004a, b, p. 10). It, along with assessments from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, helped bring climate change to the forefront.[3]

The success of the Arctic Council in this area led to follow-up projects focused squarely on environmental protection, such as the 2009 *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment,* 2011 *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment,* and the 2013 *Arctic Biodiversity Assessment.* The environmental work of the Permanent Participants during this time was part of this trend of work inspired by climate change. For example, in 2013, the Aleut International Association co-sponsored the *Baseline Study on Contaminant Issues in Indigenous Communities to Identify Priorities* with Russia and Sweden. This project was a joint attempt to locate the most important sources of dangerous contaminants in participating Indigenous communities and then eliminate those sources through community action (Arctic Council 2013, p. 19). Climate change became an institutional priority for the Arctic Council, which the Permanent Participants assisted by making significant contributions to relevant Member State projects as well as creating their own projects focused on community implications.

How do the priorities of Permanent Participants differ from the priorities of Member States and the Chairs of the institution? Table 9.3 shows which Member

[3] Google Scholar shows that researchers have cited the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* summary more than 660 times, which is comparable to the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change summary report for policy makers (587 citations)

Table 9.3 State and Permanent Participant Project Sponsorship, 2000–2017

	Contaminants	Conservation of living resources	Environmental threats	Human health	Sustain livelihoods and communities	Infrastructure	Economic development
Canada	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Finland	X	X	X		X	X	X
Iceland	X	X	X		X		X
Norway	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Russia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
AIA	X	X	X		X		
AAC		X			X		
GCI	X	X	X		X		
ICC		X	X	X	X		
RAIPON	X	X		X	X		X
SC		X			X		X

States and Permanent Participants sponsored projects in the various categories. An "X" in a column indicates that the actor sponsored at least one project in the category between 2000 and 2017.

Clearly, as a consensus-based body, Chairs, Member States and Permanent Participants support all of the established priorities of the Council. A conservative estimate is that the Council had an average of 47.6 projects ongoing at a time between 1998 and 2017. This ranged from a low of twenty-seven projects in 2000 to a high of ninety-eight in 2017. Nearly all Member States sponsored projects in nearly all categories (at least six out of seven), representing some support for environmental and local priorities. Permanent Participants, meanwhile, sponsored only 39 projects in this period. One Permanent Participant, in fact, sponsored projects of five of seven categories; the rest sponsored projects in two to four categories. There is Permanent Participant work in all categories except for infrastructure, which is surprising considering it is a work area supporting local communities.

In some cases, Permanent Participants work together to accomplish projects, such a 2008 symposium in Norway "for Arctic Indigenous peoples from throughout the circumpolar region to build on each other's knowledge and experience to develop practical ways for the preservation, revitalization and further development of Arctic Indigenous languages" (Arctic Council 2009, p. 16). The Aleut International Association, Inuit Circumpolar Council and Saami Council all worked together to create the report *Meaningful Engagement of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in Marine Activities*, which was a guide on how to include local communities in marine monitoring efforts (Arctic Council 2017a, b, p. 77). Overall, the Council's work skews more to national environmental priorities than local community priorities. This fact is due to the reality that Member States sponsor the majority of all projects. In 2015, the Council completed sixty projects in environmental priority areas and twenty-three in community priority areas. In 2017, the Council completed sixty-eight projects in environmental priority areas and thirty in community priority areas. Permanent Participants need to be selective with their project support.

How do the Permanent Participants provide examples of leadership and when do they clash with leadership by offered by Member States and Chairs of the body? Even though Permanent Participants sponsor many projects, they can come into conflict with Member States over the fact that the Permanent Participants cannot provide sponsorship as frequently as the Arctic Eight. Yet Senior Arctic Officials reports show few obvious conflicts over the content of projects.

Some examples can be provided of projects in various categories that have been sponsored by Permanent Participants. The Gwich'in Council sponsored a contaminants project to reduce PCB emissions in electrical generating equipment in the Arctic (2004); together with the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, it also sponsored the Indigenous Peoples Community Action Initiative on contaminants (2009–2013). A long-term Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North project on conservation was a research project on *The Biological Significance of Sacred Sites of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic* (1998–2006). The Aleut International Association sponsored the Bering Sea Sub-Network to support

conservation efforts (2004–2009). The Inuit Circumpolar Council has sponsored human health projects, such as a study of cancer rates (2015b). Sustainability projects included a Saami Council youth camp (2000–2002) and a jointly sponsored project on languages (2011). Economic projects include Saami Council projects on coastal fishery management (1998–2004) and reindeer herding (2013–2015). This work is substantial and impactful; yet, overall, the sponsorship of projects by Permanent Participants is far less than Member States.

Table 9.4, below, summarizes their sponsorship of projects over time. The reason that Permanent Participants sponsor fewer projects in priority areas is clearly due to major financial limitations. This has been a continuing concern of both the Permanent Participants and the overall Council. A survey of Senior Arctic Officials reports reveal that every Council meeting has contained at least some discussion of the financial difficulties faced by Permanent Participants.

The Permanent Participants also can show leadership in the Arctic Council by participating in Member State and Chair projects that they do not sponsor. For example, three of the eighteen chapters of the 2004 *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* contain Indigenous traditional knowledge, the result of workshops led by Permanent Participants. Leaders of the Permanent Participants went to small communities and interviewed elders about the changes in the climate observed over their lifetimes. This information provided illustrations of the dynamics of climate change, generated hypotheses and contributed data to studies otherwise employing the scientific method.

Nonetheless, Permanent Participants do not contribute to a majority of Council projects. Previous work has shown that Permanent Participants take part in about 20% of the Council's work (see Chater 2015, p. 269). Indigenous leaders have reported contributing to some projects in a quite limited way to ensure that Council work does not present conflicts with the interests of Indigenous peoples (Chater 2015). This sort of activity constitutes another way that Permanent Participants can show leadership in the Arctic Council.

Beyond funding, Member States and Permanent Participants have clashed over the role of Observers. Most international institutions allow attendance of non-members. In the case of the Council, these are the institutional Observers.

Table 9.4 Total Project Sponsorship by Permanent Participants, 2000–2017

SAO report	Total projects sponsored by permanent participants	Total projects	Percentage
2000	3	27	11
2002	5	33	15
2004	5	29	17
2006	5	62	8
2009	4	30	13
2011	1	32	3
2013	3	35	9
2015	11	83	13
2017	16	98	16

Currently, the Council includes thirteen Observer states, thirteen intergovernmental organizations and thirteen non-governmental organizations. Previous research (Chater 2017) demonstrates that these organizations rarely comment during Council meetings or sponsor Council projects. To be an Observer, a state or organization must accept the status quo regarding the legal situation in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2018). Significantly, they also must, as per the Council's updated rules of procedure, "respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants" and "have demonstrated a political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples" (Arctic Council 2018). Yet, their presence can be a source of conflict. On an individual basis, most Observers only send a couple of representatives to each meeting. Collectively, these representatives can outnumber the Permanent Participants (Chater 2017). A persistent concern of the latter is that Observers will "drown out" the perspectives of Indigenous peoples.

The question of whether the European Union should be an accredited Observer of the Arctic Council is a relevant case challenging the leadership abilities of Chairs, Member States and Permanent Participants. The regional body has attended meetings of the Arctic Council since 2001. The Permanent Participants, in particular the Inuit Circumpolar Council, have resisted the European Union having any sort of ongoing Observer status. The European Union has obvious interests in the Arctic region. As part of Europe lies in the Arctic, there is a good case to be made that it should be considered as a significant Arctic actor. Diplomatic cables produced by WikiLeaks reveal that the Inuit Circumpolar Council has successfully blocked accredited status for the European Union in retribution for its ban on the import of seal products, even though the ban includes an exemption for products harvested by Indigenous peoples (as discussed in Chater 2015, p. 286–287).

The rest of the Council countries are open to European Union Accredited Observer status, particularly Finland and Norway (as discussed in Chater 2015, p. 286–287). The Arctic Council, under the leadership of European Union-member Sweden, revised its rules of procedure in 2013 to ensure Permanent Participants have a strong role by suggesting that Observers must support the efforts of Indigenous peoples. As a result, the European Union can attend Council meetings, but it must win approval for its Observer status before any activity in the Council.

On both sides, the move is symbolic. The European Union gains little by becoming an accredited Observer; it can already attend Council meetings and participate in its activities. In various ways, it has co-sponsored Council projects. The Inuit Circumpolar Council gains little blocking its Observer status; the European Union would not have any greater power practically if it were an accredited Council Observer. The European Union seeks recognition that it is an important Arctic player. The Inuit Circumpolar Council's move is retribution for a European Union policy that has hurt the livelihood of the Inuit. This case demonstrates the influence of Permanent Participants. Even though states could bypass the Permanent Participants, there exists a norm that states not oppose the will of Permanent Participants too vigorously.

Another clash between Member States and Permanent Participant affecting leadership abilities was an episode involving the membership status of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (or RAIPON). It represents a case in which a Permanent Participant has been openly at-odds with a particular Member State. In November 2012, the Russian Department of Justice deregistered RAIPON as a non-governmental organization in Russia. The motives for this move are multifaceted, such as concerns over its growing power, the influence of foreign entities on its membership, its opposition to oil and gas development as well as separatist fears on the part of the Russian government (as discussed in Chater 2015, p. 288). As a result, there was concern that Russia was attempting to block RAIPON from attending Arctic Council meetings. Since RAIPON technically no longer existed in a legal sense in Russia, one could question whether the group existed internationally. At its November 2012 meeting, the Permanent Participants and Council states signed a letter supporting continued participation by RAIPON. Ironically, the Russian Senior Arctic Official signed the statement, as well. Russia re-accredited RAIPON in April 2013. This case represents a time when the position of a Permanent Participant appeared threatened. Yet the normative protection for Permanent Participants proved robust.

9.4 The Permanent Participants and the Chairs

To address one of the major themes of this book, it should be noted that all of the Chairs of the Council have paid at least some attention to the wishes of the Permanent Participants and have before initiated at least one project to engage with Indigenous peoples organizations. As seen elsewhere in this volume, the Chairs of the Arctic Council can identify priorities for the institution in meaningful ways. The United States (1998–2000) initiated the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, which included Indigenous traditional knowledge. It also made human health in the region a priority. Finland (2000–2002) co-sponsored a project on habitat conservation with RAIPON as well as projects on capacity building, sustainable development, youth and gender equality in the "sustainable livelihoods and communities" category. Iceland (2002–2004) made information technology for Arctic communities a priority during its turn as Chair. Russia (2004–2006) co-sponsored projects on ecosystem conservation with RAIPON. As mentioned, previously Norway (2007–2009) held a symposium on Indigenous languages during its term as Chair, in 2008. Denmark (2009–2011) undertook multiple projects to do with mental health in the region.

Designated meetings between Permanent Participants and Chairs have occurred since Denmark's turn as Chair, usually closed-door, informal breakfast meetings at some point during the Council's bi-annual meetings. They have also worked in cooperation with the Permanent Participants in advancing specific projects of mutual interest. Sweden (2011–2013) co-sponsored the *Baseline Study on Contaminant Issues in Indigenous Communities to Identify Priorities* with Russia

and the Aleut International Association. Most significantly, it also oversaw the articulation of the importance of the Permanent Participants in the Council's revised Rules of Procedure (discussed previously in this chapter). Canada (2013–2015), which a chapter in this volume considers to have had an overriding concern with development, co-sponsored five projects with the Inuit Circumpolar Council that had to do with local community priorities, as well as two with the Aleut International Association and Gwich'in Council International. About 15% of the projects that the United States sponsored during its turn as Chair (2015–2017) were co-sponsored with at least one Permanent Participant, including both community and national environmental priorities. The United States also included Permanent Participants in its 2016 Arctic Science Ministerial meeting.

In 2016, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat re-located from Copenhagen, Denmark to Tromso, Norway, to coordinate its efforts with the Arctic Council's Secretariat. The Permanent Participants also created a trust fund for its Arctic Council activities, the Álgu Fund, based in Sweden. The most recent Finnish Chairmanship has sought to strengthen the role of the Arctic Council Secretariat, noting that it can help permanent participants (Arctic Council 2017b: 16). It is clear that the Chairs of the Arctic Council pay special attention to the interests of the Permanent Participants and respond accordingly.

9.5 What Does This All Mean?

In returning to the expectations guiding this work, it is clear that the leadership of Permanent Participants is distinct from the leadership offered by Chairs and Member States in the institution. Nearly 57% of projects sponsored by the Permanent Participants relate to local community priorities. Almost 67% of the projects sponsored by Permanent Participants since 2013 have dealt with local community priorities, showing that the salience of these issues is increasing. Overall, Permanent Participant groups support more Council projects that serve community priorities. A major purpose of including the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council is to represent the interests of local constituents, as opposed to the national interest of the countries in which they reside. Since projects in human health, sustainable livelihoods and communities, infrastructure and economic development respond to issues faced by Arctic residents, this support is logical.

In 2015, 72% of Council projects involved environmental priority areas, compared to 28% in community priority areas. Member States sponsored 87% of these projects. In 2017, 76% of Council projects were in environmental priority areas, with states sponsoring 82% of Council projects. Less than a quarter of the Council's projects involved local community priorities after 2015. Thus, states support more Council projects that serve the national interest. Since projects to do with contaminants, conservation of living resources and environmental threats benefit national populations as well as local residents, this support is logical. However, Permanent Participants and states do not clash as might be expected over local and national

priorities. The major disagreement between Member States and Permanent Participants concerned funding for projects and the representation of Permanent Participants. In the case of the European Union, the Inuit Circumpolar Council blocked its accreditation and secured recognition of the rights of Permanent Participants under the re-vamping of the Council's rules of procedure led by the Swedish Chair. In the RAIPON case, the Permanent Participants asserted the membership of the organization outside of the wishes of the Russian government. The leadership of Permanent Participants is distinct form Chairs and Member States in the institution.

The implications of these findings for Arctic Council leadership are clear. States and Permanent Participants appear to have developed an understanding as to the relevant niches each fills within the work of the Council. The leadership of Permanent Participants is robust. Yet, the fact that there are more environmental projects and community projects can result in a power disadvantage. More power in the Council lies with Chairs and Member States than other bodies. It is possible that this situation will improve if Permanent Participants could be Chairs of the institution.

9.6 Conclusions

The Arctic Council tends to be led by the priorities of Chairs, but the priorities of Permanent Participants can also animate the activities of the institution. The Chairs of the Arctic Council organize the work of the institution, provide logistics and put forward several privileged priorities. Member States sponsor projects and vote on Council matters. Permanent Participants cannot vote, but contribute to organizational leadership by sponsoring projects and representing unique priorities. Projects by the Permanent Participants have changed in that they more frequently concern local community priorities than in the past. They have stayed the same because both environmental and community projects are important. Indigenous peoples face numerous human security challenges and one of the explicit purposes of Indigenous peoples' organizations is to advocate for these issues while promoting Arctic stewardship. Comparing Member States, Chairs and Permanent Participants, the work of the Permanent Participants is similar to Member States in that it is clear that both support all categories of Council work. They differ in that Permanent Participants need to choose projects to sponsor more carefully. States frequently pursue projects that mitigate or adapt to climate change, not surprising given the profound national consequences of these problems. The Chairs of the institution introduce projects specifically to appeal to the Permanent Participants.

We often think of the leader of the Arctic Council as the Chair of the institution. However, Permanent Participants provide leadership, as well. Permanent Participants provide leadership by sponsoring projects. They can clash in that Permanent Participants do not sponsor projects as frequently as they no doubt would like. Permanent Participant groups also can provide leadership by contributing to projects

that they do not sponsor. In the end, Indigenous peoples' organizations have fundamentally different interests than those of national governments. Permanent Participants represent the interest of local Indigenous communities. Member States respond to these local interests, but also must respond to national interests and environmental challenges of global concern.

The existing literature finds that the interests and contributions of Permanent Participants differ in key aspects from one another and that Permanent Participants make unique contributions. This work suggests that, overall, Indigenous peoples support local priorities more frequently than Member States. News articles written around the time of the founding of the Arctic Council predicted that Permanent Participants would have powers equal to those of states. This research effort suggests that the Permanent Participants are not as powerful as states in the institution in that they contribute to only about a fifth of the Council's projects. Yet, McIver's 1997 prediction that Permanent Participants would have little power has not come to be. This particular research inquiry argues that Permanent Participants have significant power in that they are able to sponsor projects of community interest. Koivurova and English are correct that the Permanent Participants have made significant contributions to the Council. Fenge, Schram Stokke and Young also are correct in that the Council is state-centric institution. Bloom is correct that the Permanent Participants "participate in all aspects of the Council's work," but not to the same extent as states, in line with work by this author. This research contributes to this work by showing that Permanent Participants sponsor projects of relevance to communities and provide significant leadership in the Council. The bottom line is that Permanent Participants need to respond to local residents, and so focus on their interests. National governments need to please local residents and citizens thousands of kilometres away from the Arctic, leading to a wider array of work. The success of Permanent Participants is proof positive of the benefit of more democratized global governance.

A subject worthy of consideration is whether in the future it would be beneficial for Permanent Participants to take turns as Chair of the institution. This change would acknowledge the Permanent Participants as members of the Arctic Council on a similar level to states. Permanent Participants have chaired working groups and have provided leadership on a number of complex Council projects. Yet, Permanent Participant organizations lack the same funding and staff support as Member States. Permanent Participant organizations only have about half a dozen staff members at Arctic Council meetings, including unpaid volunteers and non-Indigenous consultants. Unless there is significant investment by governments, it seems unlikely that Permanent Participants could be Arctic Council Chair in a similar manner to Member States. Perhaps a Permanent Participant and a Member State could co-chair the institution during specific leadership periods. Permanent Participants would need to be able to secure a full-time staff of several individuals for two or three years to have an impact. There exist people with experience among the Permanent Participants that could fill such positions. However, without additional support funding, the burdens of leadership tasks could weaken the overall capacity of Permanent Participants to contribute to Council projects. Either the Permanent

Participants will be provided with new financial resources or a new model of a Chairmanship is necessary in the Arctic Council in the future. Providing adequate funding for Indigenous peoples to create their own projects, participate in others and potentially help chair the organization pays dividends both in terms of the ability of Indigenous peoples to represent themselves as well as achieving necessary results for the Council.

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Chapter 10
Non-Arctic State Observers of the Arctic Council: Perspectives and Views

Diddy R. M. Hitchins

Abstract The 1996 Ottawa Declaration establishing the Arctic Council allowed for three categories of Observers within the body: non-Arctic states; intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations and non-governmental organizations that the Arctic Council deemed might contribute to its work. At the first opportunity during the Iqaluit Ministerial in 1998, four non-Arctic state Observers, three intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and four non-governmental organizations were admitted as Observers. There are now a total of thirty-nine accredited Observers within the Arctic Council. What has brought about this major increase? Who are these Observers and what roles do they play within the organization? What are their perspectives on the operation of the body and the challenges of leadership within it? Have their roles and perspectives changed over the last four Chairmanships? What have been the nature of their interactions with the Chair? This chapter will endeavor to address each of these questions.

Keywords Observer · Arctic Council · Non-Arctic state · Working groups · Senior Arctic Officials · Chairmanship

The focus of this volume is leadership in the Arctic Council. This chapter will contribute its perspective by examining the role of Observers within the organization. The Arctic Council has been consistently described as unique amongst international bodies due to the fact that the organizations representing the indigenous peoples of the Arctic region are included as Permanent Participants. As the Arctic Council operates on the basis of consensus, no decision can be taken by the organization without the concurrence of its Permanent Participants. In the earlier Rovaniemi Process that resulted in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and lead to the eventual establishment of the Arctic Council, indigenous people's groups along with a few other types of non-state actors had been invited to participate and were recognized as Observers. The focus of this inquiry is to describe the evolution

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of the role of the Observers from their full participation in the Rovaniemi Process to their progressive limitation and marginalization under the Arctic Council. Special attention is given to the status and activities of the non-Arctic state Observers and their impact—or lack of impact—on the current operation of the organization. An effort is also made to consider their interaction with the successive Chairs of the body.

The surge of interest in the Arctic that followed the publication of the Arctic Council's *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* in 2004 generated a raft of new applications for Observer status including applications from several Asian non-Arctic states including China. The inquiry will consider the reasons for these applications and the intentions of the applicants. In addition, an effort will be made to describe the response of the Arctic Council and the eventual reconceptualization of the Observer role that allowed for the admission of new non-Arctic state Observers at the Kiruna Ministerial. The chapter will also consider the reasons for the continued participation of Observers at the Arctic Council since 2013 and their possible future roles.

10.1 Non-Arctic State Observers from the Beginning

Throughout the Cold War period, the Arctic was a strategic frontier between the two hostile super-powers – the USA and the Soviet Union – and as such was off limits to all but military and security activity. International Arctic cooperation was unimaginable. By the end of the 1980s, however, this situation had begun to change. In 1987, Mikael Gorbachev delivered his Murmansk Speech calling for the Arctic to be an area of peaceful cooperation through the coordination of scientific research aimed at protecting and monitoring the natural environment of the Arctic. In 1989 Finland followed up on this suggestion by creating the Rovaniemi Process. A number of non-Arctic states that had historically been involved in exploration, discovery and furthering scientific understanding of the North, voluntarily chose to respond to Finland's invitation to become involved in these activities. The United Kingdom, Poland and Germany and the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) participated in the work of the Rovaniemi Process from the outset and were accredited as Observers at the first ever Ministerial Meeting of the eight Arctic States in Rovaniemi in 1991. There the *Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment* and the *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy* (AEPS) were adopted and their four signatures added to the document.

Shortly thereafter, four Working Groups (WGs) – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Emergency Preparedness, Protection and Response (EPPR); and, Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) – were established by the AEPS to achieve its objectives. These WGs operated as scientific entities and not according to any diplomatic protocol. The non-Arctic state Observers (whose ranks were increased by the addition of the Netherlands and Japan) furnished environmental experts

already working in the field to the efforts of the WGs. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, the British Foreign Office facilitated and encouraged scientists based at the Scott Polar Research Center at Cambridge University to take part. Their inquiries had focused on issues of pollution in the Arctic region since the Chernobyl incident and on global warming. These scientists joined the ranks of the AEPS Working Groups.

When the Arctic Council was established by the *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* (Ottawa 1996), the four AEPS Working Groups were subsumed under the new body but continued to operate as they had under the AEPS. The non-Arctic states of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK, whose scientists had worked under the AEPS were present at the signing of the Ottawa Declaration. Shortly thereafter, in 1998, they became the first Arctic Council non-Arctic state Observers.[1] They continued to send their scientists to participate in the ongoing efforts of the WGs and to have them contribute to reports on the state of the Arctic.[2]

For the first decade of its existence, under the consecutive Chairmanships of Canada, the US, Finland, Iceland and Russia, the Arctic Council operated on a rather limited and constrained basis continuing the scientific and environmental work of the AEPS. During Canada's initial Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (1996–1998), much of its energy as Chair was devoted to developing rules of procedure for the new high-level forum for Arctic state cooperation with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities as Permanent Participants (PPs). When the US took on the second Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (1998–2000) it was without much enthusiasm for the new organization. Leadership at the top of the organization was lackluster.

Despite this fact, the solid scientific work of the AEPS continued within the Working Groups of the Arctic Council. They embarked upon new efforts including the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment as a joint project between AMAP and CAFF and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) that now became an NGO Observer.[3] This type of research partnership became a model for subsequent Observer involvement in the work of the Arctic and reflected their role in the organization as had been set out in the *Ottawa Declaration*.

The Arctic Council's most important report, the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA) was delivered in 2004. For several years after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, much of the world's attention had been riveted on the Middle East and terrorism with little or no attention being paid to the Arctic. The publication of the ACIA report, however, drew worldwide attention to the impact of climate change on the circumpolar North and stimulated broad discussion

[1] The Ottawa Declaration established 3 categories of Observers: non-Arctic states; intergovernmental (IGO) and inter-parliamentary organizations; and non-governmental (NGO) organizations that the Council determines can contribute to its work. There were 12 original Observers in 1998.

[2] Japan was also present at the signing of the Ottawa Declaration and had participated in the Rovaniemi Process but did not pursue Observer status with the AC at that time.

[3] IASC had been an AEPS Observer and became an original Arctic Council Observer in 1998 in the NGO category.

of the potential for resource development in the region and the possible creation of new shipping routes through the melting of the Arctic ice.

Yet, as interest in the Arctic began to increase following publication of the ACIA, the specific overall contributions of the Arctic Council were subjected to increasing questions. Issues relating to the ownership of Arctic resources were being handled by the IMO in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). The Russians had planted a flag on the seabed under the North Pole without consulting the body. The five Arctic Ocean littoral states hat met separately and issued their *Ilulissat Declaration* (2008) asserting their rights over the Arctic Ocean. It appeared that the Arctic Council, which had been operating for over a decade, was impotent and irrelevant. Lacking focus and direction and without legal authority to act on its own, this "preeminent forum" for Arctic decision making seemed to be rapidly becoming yet another diplomatic talk shop.

Despite this concern, the Working Groups of the Arctic Council carried on with their scientific research efforts just as they had during the less publicized era of the AEPS. They continued to do so largely unimpacted by the adoption in 1998 of the new Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. These new Rules of Procedure relegated the Observers to a less active role in the organization largely within the confines of the more formal structures of the body. The scientists from Member States and the non-Arctic state Observers continued to sit side by side at most Working Group meetings. Observers discovered, however, that they were not always so well accommodated at SAO and Ministerial meetings. Many of these sessions have taken place in Arctic locations and it has not always been easy to find meeting places large enough to include all who wished to participate. At Working Group gatherings, additional tables could be set up in a classroom at a school or other public building to accommodate all the scientists attending. At SAO and Ministerial Meetings, however, the arrangements have to be more specific and formal to meet diplomatic requirements. Normally, the Chair and the Secretariat sit at the top of the table. The delegations from the eight Member States and the six Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council are distributed on two of its sides. At the foot of the table, sit the Chairs of the Working Groups. Often there was not sufficient space in the meeting room to provide tables for the Observers. In the early days of the Arctic Council, at SAO and Ministerial meetings, Observers were simply relegated to whatever space remained, often just in seats at the back or far sides of a room. Since there was virtually no security for these early meetings, local residents who were interested could just wander in and sit down amongst the Observers. Consequently, Observers might find that there were no spaces left to accommodate them.

Nevertheless, with the surge of public interest in the region, the Arctic Council, as the only existing established governance structure for the circumpolar North, attracted a welter of new applications for non-Arctic state Observer status. By 2006, the total number of all classes of Observers had increased from the original eleven in 1998 (4 non-Arctic States; 3 Inter-parliamentary/IGOs; 4 NGOs) to twenty-six participants (6 non-Arctic states; 9 Inter-parliamentary/IGOs; 11 NGOs). This occurred at the same time that many of the existing Observers were less than happy with their increasingly constrained roles and the Permanent Participants felt

increasingly threatened by the prospect of the admission of more non-Arctic state Observers that might decrease their status.

The original non-Arctic state Observers (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK) continued to contribute their scientific expertise to specific WGs in their research areas of interest rather than according to any national foreign policy directive from their foreign ministry. In the case of the UK, for example, the scientists involved were mainly working with CAFF, in which they took a leadership role, and with PAME. Yet gradually, over time, interest levels among this group of scientists began to wane. Sometimes their contributions to the work projects of the Council were not fully acknowledged. Often at formal meetings, they were not accorded opportunities to speak regarding their efforts or were given slots to do so under the heading of "other business".

Despite this indifferent treatment, Observers under the terms of the Arctic Council's Rules of Procedure were expected to send diplomatic representatives to SAO and Ministerial meetings. They were to come, however, only to observe—not to actively take part in these gatherings. Often this rather meagre type of representation came at a high financial cost to the Observers as many of these sessions were held in remote northern communities. Those who attended felt increasingly on the margins of the Arctic Council's efforts.

This growing sense of unhappiness with the situation was soon to be voiced. At an SAO meeting in 2008, the non-Arctic State Observers delivered a joint statement indicating that they wished not only to contribute to the scientific work of the Arctic Council but also to the decision-making making process within the organization. They noted that, in the past, their countries had made significant contributions to Arctic exploration, economic development and technological advancement in the North and that they wished to have a continuing dialogue with the peoples of the region. They were joined by the other classes of Observers in noting that the prevailing atmosphere of the Arctic Council had been inhibiting of such efforts and that new ways needed to be developed for Observers to have a voice and a role in its affairs.

This criticism came at a time when the future direction and agenda of the Council was already subject to both internal and external critique. The leadership of the organization now had to deal with an "Observer crisis." This "crisis" was multifaceted in nature. Agreement had to be reached regarding the following maters: How many new Observer should be added to the body? Which specific applicants for Observer status should be selected? What should be the future role of Observers within the institution? An additional dimension of the problem was that the answers to all these questions had to emerge from a consensus among all the Member States and the Permanent Participants not all of whom saw eye to eye on these matters. The Permanent Participants were generally opposed to the admission of new Observers. They worried that increased Observer representation - particularly of powerful non-Arctic states - would diminish their own voice and influence within the Council. The Member States were more generally inclined to welcome new Observers, but they were divided among themselves regarding which ones should be given priority. Should important non-Arctic powers like China, Japan, Korea and the European Union be given first consideration? Which additional intergovernmental bodies

might be admitted? Should regionally relevant NGOs—some with high public profiles—be encouraged to take part?

A solution had to be secured. In the interim, starting in 2007, all new applicants for Observer positions within the Arctic Council were accorded *ad hoc* Observer status on a meeting-by-meeting basis. They were given the chance to demonstrate their suitability and *bona fides* as they awaited decisions on their final acceptance.

10.2 Resolving the "Observer Crisis"

The Arctic Council was able to move forward in its effort to rebuild its image and reinvigorate itself through the application of effective leadership during the second decade of its operation. It benefited from three successive Scandinavian Chairmanships (Norway 2006–09, Denmark 2009–11 and Sweden 2011–13) that gave priority to making sure that the organization continued to produce first-rate scientific studies of the changing Arctic and saw to it that the necessary institutional reforms were undertaken. Resolving the "Observer crisis" would represent a major step in both undertakings. This became a common commitment within their "umbrella agenda" that they jointly pursued during their respective times at the helm of the body.

It fell to the Danish Chairmanship to take the lead in assessing the needs and requirements for Observer status within the Arctic Council by instituting a performance review that was far more systematic and thorough than anything that the organization had ever utilized before. Its criteria would serve as a benchmark for the granting, reaccreditation or withdrawal of status. This review particularly focused on the role of non-Arctic state Observers and how to neutralize the perceived threat they posed to the Permanent Participants' unique status in the Arctic Council compared to all other international organizations where states have all the power and the seats at the decision-making tables and indigenous voices are not heard. Observers–particularly non-Arctic state Observers–were encouraged to develop and provide their own statements of Arctic policy to clarify their suitability for engagement with the Arctic Council. This motivated many to develop formal Arctic policy statements for the first time, such as the United Kingdom's 2013 report: *Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic*.[4]

The conclusions of this Observer review were presented in the SAO Report to Ministers at the Danish Chairmanship Ministerial Meeting in May of 2011 in Greenland. (Annex 1 of the May 2011 SAO report was a "Framework for strengthening the Arctic Council"). The adoption of the SAO Report at the Nuuk session essentially established a new set of criteria for the selection of all Arctic Council Observers and mandated a new Task Force on Institutional Issues (TFII) to

[4] Polar Regions Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; www.gov.uk/government/publication

embody these within clear principles and rules for the admission and role of Observers within the Arctic Council. (See Fig. 10.1 below)

The Danish Chairmanship essentially used the Observer review as the basis for both developing the new rules relating to Observers and their engagement, and as an educational process for both established and applicant non-Arctic state Observers who were reminded of the criteria and performance requirements of their newly restated role. These included requirements for them "to observe and respect the sovereignty of the Arctic Eight with the involvement of the Permanent Participants in regional decision-making; to contribute through their engagement primarily at the level of working groups both scientific expertise and funding for projects; to support Permanent Participants; and to bring Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies". During the review process period, different meeting formats were tried by the Danish Chair to engage Observers both established and *ad hoc*. This included having them directly participate in the Arctic Council Deputy Ministers' meetings in 2009 and 2010. The Danish Chairmanship also held a session with Observers in Warsaw in March 2010 that was co-sponsored by Poland. It also organized a symposium featuring the efforts of the Working Groups and Observers in May of 2010 in Copenhagen. The subsequent Swedish Chairmanship followed this Danish engagement effort by holding informal breakfast sessions with Observers at SAO meetings in 2011 and 2012.

Sensing the importance of resolving the "Observer crisis" the Scandinavian Chairs led the way in addressing Observer concerns and issues and paying careful attention to their treatment The Observer delegations were provided with more satisfactory working conditions than in previous years and treated with due respect during the review process. The application of key leadership skills in each of these

As set out in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council and governed by the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic States, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional; and non-governmental organizations that the Council determines can contribute to its work.
In the determination by the Council of the general suitability of an applicant for Observer status, the Council will, *inter alia*, take into account the extent to which Observers:

- Accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa declaration.
- Recognize Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.
- Recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean.
- Respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants.
- Have a demonstrated political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples.
- Have demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Council.
- Have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arctic Council including through partnerships with member states and Permanent Participants bringing Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies.

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

Fig. 10.1 Criteria for admission of Observers

areas was crucial in bringing about an agreed consensus on the criteria for the admission of Observers and in defining their roles.

The Swedish Chairmanship was given the equally difficult task of mediating the actual selection process of the new Observers to the Arctic Council. Armed with the principles adopted at the Nuuk Ministerial, and the more specific criteria and rules developed by the Task Force on Institutional Issues, it worked behind the scenes throughout its leadership term to foster a consensus among Member States and Permanent Participants that would allow for the selection of new Observers and an acknowledgement of their specific roles within the body. Finally, at the Kiruna Ministerial in May of 2013 these efforts bore fruit with the adoption of new *Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,* and an *Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies* along with the admission of six new non-Arctic state Observers (China, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore).

By grasping the nettle of Observer engagement in the Arctic Council, the Danish and Swedish Chairmanships succeeded in not only breaking the logjam regarding the admission of new Observers but also significantly improving the effectiveness of the Arctic Council thereby earning the organization enhanced status in dealing with regional issues. Particularly during the Swedish Chairmanship, when the candidates for non-Arctic state Observer status were submitting their credentials and being examined for potential admission according to the new criteria, the Observers had the perception that they, and their potential roles, were being assessed very seriously by the Arctic Council for the first time in its history.

10.3 Observers in the Second Round of Chairmanships

The May 2013 Kiruna Ministerial not only ended the work of the three coordinated Scandinavian Chairmanships but also marked the conclusion of the first round of all eight Arctic Council Chairmanships. The Arctic Council was in a far more satisfactory situation and operating on a much firmer basis than it had been just six years earlier. This to a significant degree was a reflection of the effective leadership efforts pursued by the Scandinavian Chairs and the careful manner in which they had addressed and dealt with the "Observer crisis." The next round of Chairmanships would witness new elements of interaction between Observers and the leaders of the organization.

The focus of the second Canadian Chairmanship (2013–2015) of the Arctic Council was not only very different from the preceding Swedish Chairmanship but was also completely at variance with the first Canadian Chairmanship. The first Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council – the founding Chairmanship - had been under the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien and had the hallmark of multilateral Arctic internationalism with a focus on the environment and indigenous peoples. The second Canadian Chairmanship was under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper, the theme for which was, *Development for the Peoples of the North* with three thematic objectives: Responsible Arctic Resource

Development; Fostering Safe Arctic Shipping; and, Securing Sustainable Arctic Communities. It also was committed to enhancing the participation of indigenous peoples within the Arctic Council.

While demonstrating sustained interest and commitment to making the Arctic central to Canadian domestic affairs, the Harper government seemed less interested in its specific leadership role and responsibilities within the Arctic Council. As a result, Canada spent little time or energy in furthering efforts at consensus building or cooperation among the Member States or to engage with Observers except, on occasion, trying to get them all on board and involved in development projects with the new Arctic Economic Council that it promoted. Specifically with respect to the new Arctic Council Observers (China, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore), Canada's thrust was to try to get them involved in Arctic resource development and shipping infrastructure ventures that would provide employment for indigenous inhabitants of the Arctic.

In some respects, the first and second U.S. Chairmanships of the Arctic Council were also almost reverse images of each other. The first U.S. Chairmanship was reluctant to create anything more than a very limited forum for Arctic discussions and let the State of Alaska – which was mainly concerned with resource development and job creation - take the initiative in deliberations. The second U.S. Chairmanship as discussed in Chap. 7 of this volume was far more high-profile in character and emphasized national U.S. interests in the Arctic.

In pursuit of its theme, *One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities*, the U.S. Chairmanship made significant efforts to engender support and cooperation for its initiatives among the Arctic states and Permanent Participants. It also tried to ensure that the Observers of the Arctic Council were able to contribute to these initiatives. To this end, the US Chairmanship organized a Special Session on Observer Engagement in conjunction with the October 2015 SAO meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.[5] The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to facilitate Observers' participation in the Arctic Council and to make sure that the Arctic Council fully benefited from the contributions that the Observers had to offer. At this session, all attending Observers were given an opportunity to speak. Many of the new Observers expressed their frustration at not being able to participate or not knowing whether they would have the opportunity to voice their views at Working Group and Task Force meetings. This was a major concern given the travel costs they incurred in attending such sessions.

Another U.S. Chairmanship initiative that was popular with all Observers was the convening of joint Working Group sessions in Tromso, Norway in September of 2015 where Observers were encouraged to attend and maximize their participation opportunities. The Observers appreciated the relative flexibility of the Working Group sessions in including them within their discussions despite the Arctic Council's adopted rules of procedure. This session was regarded as being a valuable step in getting Observers reengaged with the scientific investigations and research

[5] The author was present at this meeting in her capacity as accredited UK Observer and took full notes from which this description of the meeting was reconstructed.

efforts of the Council after the relative lack of attention they had received under the Canadian Chairmanship. There was a general view expressed at the Tromso meetings that the Arctic Council could take more advantage of the support that Observers were offering and that it had been worthwhile to apprise WG Chairs of the contributions available from Observers – especially from the new ones - for enhanced collaboration. It was suggested that perhaps WGs in conjunction with their regular gatherings should have breakfast meetings with the Observers. The U.S. pledged to continue the earlier Scandinavian practice of having special Observer sessions in conjunction with SAO meetings throughout its term.

The first SAO meeting of the second US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council was held in October 2015 at the capacious Anchorage Convention Center where accommodation for the Observers was at tables with power outlets, similar to that provided at the head table for the Member States and the Permanent Participants. The second SAO meeting of the second US Chairmanship, however, was held in March 2016 at the Wood Center at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a much smaller facility. There Observers once more found themselves in seats at the back of the room without tables or power outlets for their electronic devices. At an Observer breakfast with David Balton, the US SAO Chair, on the second day of the Fairbanks session, the Observers expressed their dissatisfaction with these accommodations and suggested that they felt limited in their ability to be professionally engaged in the meeting. At subsequent meetings during the US Chairmanship, Observers were seated at tables with power outlets comparable to the accommodation provided for the Arctic Council Member States and the Permanent Participants.

Very soon after the joint Working Groups session in Tromso, however, the Observers were to express new unhappiness about being marginalized from the processes of the organization. The cause of their concern were the efforts of an Arctic Council Task Force comprised of just the Member States and the Permanent Participants that had been working since 2012 to draft an Agreement on Science and Cooperation. Several of the long-standing Observers were concerned that the wording of the draft agreement would limit the perceived value of the scientific contributions of non-Arctic states. In December 2012, the UK, France and Germany had produced a joint statement suggesting alternative wording to prevent the agreement putting non-Arctic states' science at a disadvantage. Thereafter, the Observers continued to monitor and unsuccessfully argue for this change to be incorporated into the draft agreement. Again expressing their concern that these modifications had still not been made, they renewed their lobbying of the U.S. Chairmanship. After extensive negotiations with the Observers at the SAO meeting in Fairbanks in 2016, the U.S. added the desired wording to the draft agreement. The Observers, having had their views listened to, were satisfied with the final language of the Agreement on Science and Cooperation and its adoption as a legally binding document at the Fairbanks Ministerial in May 2017.

The present Finnish Chairmanship has so far continued the practice of its American predecessor in listening to the concerns of Observers. It also followed the practice of the Scandinavian Chairs and that of the U.S. in arranging for special Observer input sessions in conjunction with SAO meetings to further the Council's

engagement of the Observers. The Finnish Chair also took the unprecedented step of seeking the views of Observers as part of its consultative efforts prior to proposing its Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council in 2016. Prior to its assumption of the Chair Finland was also a strong advocate of the World Meteorological Organization being admitted to the Council as an intergovernmental Observer. Like its Nordic neighbors, earlier, the Finns have seemed to recognize that the organization cannot operate in an effective fashion without the broad and extensive engagement of Observers from all classes.

10.4 Concluding Thoughts and Observations

Despite improvements in accommodation, the sense of frustration amongst Observers at not being able to fully participate at meetings of the Arctic Council is persistent. For the longest serving non-Arctic state Observers, they have worked out a *modus vivendi* within the organization: their scientists are engaged in relevant Working Groups and often serve as experts. Thus, their work informs decisions that are made by the Arctic Council. In general, however, it seems that the Observers were frozen out from a good portion of the scientific work of the Arctic Council after 1998. There are now 13 non-Arctic state Observers who generally attend SAO and Ministerial meetings but are rarely represented at most Working Group meetings unless their scientists have become established as the experts on specific subject matters. (See list of current Non-Arctic State Observers of the Arctic Council in Table 10.1 below.)

New and old Observers alike, they often find SAO sessions and Ministerial Meetings frustrating since they are really only able to observe and rarely speak. At

Table 10.1 Non-Arctic State Observers

Country	Year of admission	Ministerial meeting
France	2000	Barrow
Germany	1998	Iqaluit
Italian Republic	2013	Kiruna
Japan	2013	Kiruna
The Netherlands	1998	Iqaluit
People's Republic of China	2013	Kiruna
Poland	1998	Iqaluit
Republic of India	2013	Kiruna
Republic of Korea	2013	Kiruna
Republic of Singapore	2013	Kiruna
Spain	2006	Salekhard
Switzerland	2017	Fairbanks
United Kingdom	1998	Iqaluit

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

these meetings it is representatives of the foreign ministries –diplomats or government bureaucrats—not the scientists who have to sit and listen. It is their job to do so and they are paid to be present. At SAO meetings the non-Arctic state Observers are represented in general by lower-level foreign ministry personnel who are there to report back to their respective Arctic or Polar bureaus regarding what happened at the latest Arctic Council meeting. They spend a lot of time sitting in the meetings listening and concurrently doing their email on their cellphones. If there is a topic of interest, then they may organize gatherings amongst themselves to form a common position to present at the end of the meeting's agenda. During breaks in SAO or Ministerial meetings, the Observers frequently confer amongst themselves. The long-standing Observers are more likely to get together on their own than with the new Observers. The new Observers (since 2013) are more likely to rush to catch individual Arctic state representatives during the breaks and confer with them. There does seem to be a significant difference in impact between the long-standing non-Arctic state Observers – who are more likely to have their scientists working as Experts with WGs – and the new non-Arctic state Observers – who are more likely to be involved in bilateral Arctic resource development projects with the Member States. (See Table 10.2 below for a list of current Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organization Observers of the Arctic Council.)

There has been a remarkable silence on the part of non-Arctic state Observers – both old and new – regarding the 2013 denial of Observer status for the European Union (EU). It is well understood that the denial arose from Permanent Participants objections largely because of the EU ban on the import of seal fur. The main objection came from the ICC which represented Canadian Inuit who engaged in fur seal hunting and who organized all of the Permanent Participants to effectively block the EU application since consensus is required for all Arctic Council decision-making. The ICC argued that the EU position on fur seals demonstrated a lack of understanding or sympathy for indigenous values and the likelihood that the EU

Table 10.2 Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organization Observers

	Admission	Ministerial
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)	2017	Fairbanks
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	2000	Barrow
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (ICUN)	2000	Barrow
Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)	2000	Barrow
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO)	2004	Reykjavik
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO)	2000	Barrow
OSPAR Commission (OSPAR)	2017	Fairbanks
Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)	1998	Iqaluit
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE)	1998	Iqaluit
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2002	Inari
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	1998	Iqaluit

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

would not be supportive of the incorporation of Traditional and Local Knowledge (TLK) within the body. The fact that while this issue was being debated, all four of the original non-Arctic state Observers (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK) and the two more recent non-Arctic state Observers (France and Spain) were EU member states and therefore participating in and bound by the EU ban, made for an embarrassing situation. As a consequence, they all preferred not to become embroiled in it. Some small effort was made to lobby fellow EU Member States (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) but generally they dissociated themselves from the issue by keeping silent.

The refusal of the Arctic Council to consider an application for Observer status by the NGO Greenpeace provides additional insight into how opposition from both Member States and Permanent Participants can limit the opportunities for NGOs—particularly politically active ones—to play a role within the affairs of the Arctic Council. Having originally viewed the Council as being potentially sympathetic to its environmental activism, Greenpeace submitted its application for Observer status during the first decade of the Arctic Council's existence. However, the increasingly high profile campaigning of Greenpeace against whaling and sealing in the Arctic was to earn it the enmity of several Permanent Participants and certain Member States. By the time of the Swedish Chairmanship, it had few supporters within the institution and many critics who argued that the organization would not benefit from accepting controversial participants more interested in conflict than consensus. The Swedish Chair actively lobbied the membership to table preemptively an application from any group that was deemed to operate against the work or the values of the body. Greenpeace responded by picketing and protesting at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting. (See Table 10.3 below for a list of current Non-Governmental Organization Observers of the Arctic Council.)

Between 2007 and 2013, it seemed to be the case that the Observers did not fully appreciate or respect the significance of the Permanent Participant role in the Arctic Council. Nor were they in support of the idea that Traditional and Local Knowledge had to be incorporated into all of the work of the Arctic Council. The Danish Observer Review (2009–2011) was in part an educational process that made both existing and would-be Observers aware of the Arctic Council's new criteria and requirements for Observer status which included not only respecting the sovereignty of the Arctic Eight but also the involvement of the Permanent Participants in regional decision-making. The new criteria adopted at the May 2013 Kiruna Ministerial (*Arctic Council Rules of Procedure,* and the *Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies*) were accompanied by the admission of the six new non-Arctic states who had by then acquiesced to these new requirements as Observers. Through the same review process, the existing Observers were also held to these new criteria. Many of the long-time non-Arctic state Observers felt somewhat peeved that their engagement within the Arctic Council was further restricted and circumscribed because of these new requirements and the admission of new Observers.

The status of the Arctic Council as the preeminent regional forum for the discussion of Arctic issues is now firmly established and the role and participation of Observers has been clarified and refined. It is now evident that since many Arctic

Table 10.3 Non-Governmental Organization Observers

	Admission	Ministerial
Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS)	2000	Barrow
Arctic Institute of North America (AINA)	2004	Reykjavik
Association of World Reindeer Herders (AWRH)	2000	Barrow
Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU)	2000	Barrow
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)	1998	Iqaluit
International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA)	2000	Barrow
International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH)	1998	Iqaluit
International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)	2002	Inari
National Geographic Society (NGS)	2017	Fairbanks
Northern Forum (NF)	1998	Iqaluit
Oceana (O)	2017	Fairbanks
University of the Arctic (UArctic)	2002	Inari
World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program (WWF)	1998	Iqaluit

Source: Arctic Council Secretariat

issues are global not regional, much decision-making relative to the Arctic will not take place in the Arctic Council but in other multilateral fora where non-Arctic states have full membership status that affords them access to effective participation in the decision-making. This means that they can advocate for Arctic Council positions in these fora and can therefore serve as useful allies for the Arctic Council. The frenzy of interest in the Arctic and in Arctic Council Observer status that occurred in the middle of the first decade of the current century has abated to some degree and has been dispersed to be dealt with in a number of different appropriate multilateral forums. The regional work of the Arctic Council proceeds with limited input from the Arctic Council Observers.

The Arctic Council is unique amongst international organizations and arose from a special set of circumstances at the end of the twentieth century. It is a very recent creation and reflects specific liberal internationalist values of the period. It is the only international organization that has indigenous peoples at the table who participate in the consensus decisions of the Arctic Eight. Perhaps its exclusivity – that only eight states qualify for full membership - makes it able to have this unique configuration. A region that had more states and a larger population could not operate in the same way. The exclusivity of membership paired with both the fragile Arctic environment and the existence of abundant and valuable unexploited resources makes the Arctic Council an organization in which some non-Arctic States wish to have influence. The existence of an Observer status makes this seem possible, and yet the current limitations on that role, takes away much of that possibility.

It is a conundrum yet unsolved. It does, however, seem as if some of the urgency in seeking a resolution to this conundrum has diminished somewhat. The emerging Arctic governance regime is not playing out exclusively within one institution or organization. Arctic governance is becoming a shared responsibility amongst a variety of organizations of which the Arctic Council is but one, albeit, a very important one. Many current Arctic Council Observers may be able to fully participate in and influence other organizations – such as the IMO – which make decisions that are equally crucial for the development of the Arctic. However because of its perceived exclusivity, the Arctic Council must be observed by those who are truly interested in Arctic developments and wish to be fully informed, and be seen as having a stake in its policy making capacity. Given modern communications, the day could soon come when those who wish to observe the meetings of the Arctic Council will be given the opportunity to do so by electronic means rather than by attending the meetings. What then would be the benefits of being an accredited Observer if anyone with an internet connection could have the same access? Would the cost of formal diplomatic representation then outweigh the benefits?

When the melting of northern ice first opened up opportunities for Arctic shipping and resource development, a torrent of applications were seen. This required the leadership skills from the three consecutive Scandinavian Chairmanships (Norway, Denmark and Sweden, 2006–2013) to adequately address the demand. Even given the new criteria that limit opportunities for Observers to directly influence Arctic Council decision-making, there is still a relatively strong demand on the part of new states, NGOs and inter-governmental bodies to take part. They want to be part of its efforts. This is a reflection of the fact that the Arctic Council is no longer the obscure regional body that operated once on the margins of international diplomacy. Observers, and would-be Observers, want to be included within the primary forum for discussion of broad Arctic concerns and issues. The challenge before them, now, is how can this participation be made more meaningful? These non-Arctic state Observers have the potential to not only provide resources and representation within the Arctic Council but also support the concerns and issues of the North in other relevant international bodies. Within these other organizations and fora in which they enjoy full membership, they can play roles that are more consequential and may, in fact, occupy key leadership positions. This being the case, it is to the clear interest of the Arctic Eight – and the Permanent Participants—to have the confidence and support of the non-Arctic state Observers, who can advocate Arctic Council positions in these other multilateral settings.

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Part V
Insights on Leadership

Chapter 11
Findings and Conclusions

Douglas C. Nord

Abstract This final chapter of the volume provides a summary of the key findings and insights that the several contributing authors to the volume offer regarding leadership within the Arctic Council. It presents these within the framework of five interrelated questions. The first of these is what have we learned about the particular contributions of the most recent occupants of the Chair? The second one is, how should we evaluate their efforts? The third is dual in character: What is the overall impact of the "powers of the chair" and what constraints limit their application? The fourth question focuses on what are the "best practices" that can be taken away from this consideration of organizational leadership. The fifth question relates to what are the type of challenges that future Arctic Council Chairs are likely to encounter and how the organization will have to evolve if it is to continue to provide leadership for the North?

Keywords Leadership · Effectiveness · Best practices · Powers of the chair · Vision

This volume has sought to address the question of leadership within the Arctic Council. More specifically, it has endeavoured to examine the role played by successive Chairs of the body in providing focus and direction for its efforts at dealing with ongoing change within the circumpolar North. It has attempted to give some specific attention to the challenges encountered in providing this type of leadership and the various approaches and strategies that recent Chairs of the organization have pursued in addressing regional and institutional needs. The separate chapters of the book have offered some unique insights into the manner in which leadership within the Arctic Council has evolved over recent years. In this final chapter of the volume, an effort is made to address five main questions. The first is what have we learned about the particular contributions of the most recent occupants of the Chair? The second is how should we evaluate their efforts? The third question is dual in nature.

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What is the overall impact of the "powers of the chair" and what constraints limit their application? The fourth question focuses on what are the "best practices" that can be learned in providing effective leadership from this position at the helm of the organization? Finally, we ask, what are the likely roles that Chairs of the Arctic Council will play in the coming decades? This concluding chapter of the volume seeks to provide some answers to each of these important questions.

The authors of the preceding chapters provide a number of insights into the leadership contributions that have been provided by the Chairs of the Arctic Council. In addressing the Swedish Chairmanship, Professor Niklas Eklund reminds us that even a "reluctant" Arctic state can offer important leadership capabilities to such an evolving international organization. He notes that the extensive prior diplomatic experience of the Swedes provided their Chairmanship with the ability to assist the Arctic Council in addressing long-standing needs for internal restructuring and helping to resolve the festering Observer question. He points to the fact that the Swedish Chairmanship was endowed with capable personnel who had learned from previous assignments how to get things done within an international body. Eklund further notes that in addition to experience, the Swedish Chairmanship was able to provide the organization with a clear and focused agenda that was aimed at building cooperation and consensus within the institution. By adopting an "honest broker" strategy, the Swedish Chair was able to advance concrete measures and to establish a desirable balance between proponents of environmental protection and sustainable development. Professor Eklund observes that, in general, the Swedish Chairmanship was advantaged in its position by the fact that the Arctic had not become an important domestic concern of the nation. However, he notes that this lack of domestic constraint does not mean that the country can continue to operate without a more defined vision of its role within the Arctic. He suggests that in planning for future leadership responsibilities within the Arctic Council, Sweden has undertaken the first steps in defining this position. Thus, both hindsight and foresight are useful ingredients to the evolving Swedish leadership role within the Arctic.

The recent experience of Canada at the head of the Arctic Council seems to have been in marked contrast to that of the Swedes. Rather than having learned from its earlier leadership experience, the Canadian government set out to forge a new path and utilize a new approach to its second Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Professor Heather Exner-Pirot suggests that the Harper Government of the day had very little tolerance for established diplomatic practice within the organization and a clear commitment to leading the body in a new direction and to utilizing a different leadership approach. She notes that at the heart of the most recent Canadian Chairmanship was a desire to focus the organization on the benefits of business enterprise within the circumpolar region. Thus, one of its chief priorities was to encourage establishment of the Arctic Economic Council, and more generally, to encourage new economic opportunities for the "peoples of the North." These undertakings were seen as efforts to strike a new balance between the advocates of environmental protection and sustainable development —with an advantage going to the latter. Exner-Pirot notes that the Canadian Chairmanship adopted an "entrepreneurial"

approach in advancing its cause and was not particularly interested in seeking support from its fellow Council members. She cites the statement by the Canadian foreign minister of the day that "Canada does not just 'go along' to get along." This attitude was emblematic of its approach to leadership from the helm of the Arctic Council. Canada offered lots leadership but encountered saw few followers. Despite this fact, Professor Exner-Pirot reminds us that several important innovations and accomplishments emerged from the second Canadian Chairmanship. For the first time an indigenous resident of the Arctic and non-foreign minister, Leona Aglukkaq, served as the Chair of the Council. Additionally, the Canadian Chairmanship focused new attention on indigenous concerns and priorities. Most importantly, however, it opened up space within the agenda of the body for consideration of economic development issues that have continued as subjects of conversation during subsequent Chairmanships. Yet in ardently pressing for this consideration of economic development matters, the Canadian Chairmanship came perilously close to "busting" as Exner-Pirot also observes.

The recent U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council also provides some significant insights into how leadership can be exerted within the organization. Like Canada before it, this was the United States second time serving as head of the body. It also went in a different direction from its first leadership term. Professor Heather Nicol notes that in this "second time around" the U.S. federal government was far more engaged. It worked carefully to develop a focused and coherent plan for American leadership of the Council that sought to integrate its national strategic interests with the ongoing concerns of the organization. Contrary to Canada's efforts, it reemphasized the importance of environmental security in both its national Arctic strategy and in its Chairmanship Program. It too adopted an "entrepreneurial" style in its leadership role but was far accommodating of the views and opinions of other Members States, the Permanent Participants and Observers. Its goal was to build wide support for its agenda and it made full use of the "powers of the chair" to advance this objective. Nicol points out that one distinctive features of the American leadership of the Council was its ability to integrate and direct the views of vast a national bureaucracy and to accommodate wide number of domestic interest groups. While the future of the Arctic was not a broad political concern in the United States as it had been in Canada, the Obama Administration still had to work out a modus vivendi with one particular interested community—the State of Alaska. Professor Nicol shows how this effort at both accommodation and the assertion of a federal prerogative in U.S. Arctic policy development took place. She also shows how American leadership responsibilities as the Chair of the Arctic Council not only influenced the organization's efforts but had an impact on the nation itself. With respect to the latter, Nicol discusses how such responsibilities led to a solid reengagement of the United States in the efforts at Arctic governance and collaboration. She argues that this enhanced position as a central Arctic actor is likely to weather the current political unrest and uncertainty resulting from the coming of the Trump Administration.

The current Finnish Chairmanship also offers new insights regarding the conduct of leadership at the helm of the body. Professor Timo Koivurova suggests that

Finland has preferred to pursue a "professional" style of leadership rooted in the desire to focus on continuity within the organization. Following such a path, Finland has largely eschewed issues that do not already have a substantial foundation of interest and activity within the body. Thus, its Chairmanship agenda reflects thematic initiatives that either have been long-standing concerns of the organization like environmental protection and meteorological cooperation, or represent logical extensions of global initiatives of relevance to the entire circumpolar community such as furthering the Paris Climate Accords and building support for the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Such an approach to organizational leadership avoids projecting too broad a profile of national priorities in the Arctic. This is in stark contrast with the strategy pursued under the second Canadian Chairmanship. However, it is not one that totally avoids acknowledging national interests and capabilities. This can be seen in Finland's championing the causes of connectivity and teacher education in the North. The Finnish Chairmanship is one that seeks to incorporate acknowledged areas of national expertise into more broadly shared community priorities and concerns. Throughout this effort, Koivurova stresses the fact that Finland as head of the Arctic Council is largely trying to advance existing agendas and priorities rather create its own. Continuity of action seems to be a major concern From such a perspective; the Chair's role is primarily to assist the organization in conducting its business in a collegial fashion. Such a "professional" style of leadership is based on extensive consultation and incorporating the views of all participants. Koivurova discusses how this was done during the preparatory stages of the Finnish Chairmanship and throughout its subsequent evolution. He notes also how such a stance is reflective of the normal efforts of a small state within a complicated global environment—a position which Finland has long occupied—and one that offers the potential of facilitating dialogue between current rivals like the Russia and the United States. It is a leadership position that values securing adequate information before acting and promotes the advantages of long-range planning. Koivurova describes Finland's efforts in all these areas.

Important insights regarding the conduct of the Chair are also provided by Professors Andrew Chater and Diddy Hitchins in their respective chapters on Permanent Participants and Observers. Both note that while their respective players have been limited in performing their roles within the Arctic Council, they still represent significant interests and voices that the Chair must endeavor to accommodate. It is clear that a failure to do so can cause serious problems for the head of the organization and can impede its efforts. Thus, all of the recent Chairs have endeavored to reach out to both the Permanent Participants and the Observers. Their leadership capabilities have been judged, in part, with regard to how successful their approaches have been and what concrete results that have stemmed from such undertakings. Both Professors Chater and Hitchins remind us, as well, that both groups can make their own leadership contributions both in and outside the framework of the Arctic Council.

11.1 Evaluating the Performance of National Chairmanships

Having examined in some detail the conduct of successive Chairmanships of the Arctic Council, it becomes apparent that not all have chosen to follow the same leadership path. Each Chair has utilized a different combination of strategies and approaches in operating at the helm of the organization and chosen to make use of the "powers of the chair" in varying degrees. They also can be distinguished from one another regarding which style of leadership—professional, entrepreneurial or honest broker—they have felt most comfortable in pursuing. Some have chosen to tightly direct the affairs of the Council while others have been content to let the body follow its own course. Some have introduced major new agenda priorities within the organization while others have sought to advance established institutional concerns. Some have decided to leave their own particular brand upon the Council while others have endeavored to foster a spirit of consensus and collegiality. No matter which leadership path that has been pursued they have all had an impact on this most significant and evolving governance platform for the Arctic region.

The question remains, however, of whether these leadership impacts have been of equal importance and benefit to the body. How should we go about attempting to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of each of these Chairmanships? A number of options suggest themselves. One could focus on the image and reputation that each Chair has earned from performing such a leadership role. Was the Chair seen to be prepared, organized and adept in performing its functions? Alternatively, one could consider the actual results and consequences of each Chairmanship. What was actually accomplished and with what benefit? Finally, one could assess the correspondence been Chairmanship abilities and organizational needs at a specific point in time? Was this the right leadership fit for the body at this particular juncture?

As a provisional effort to come up with a common rubric for the assessment of all Arctic Council Chairmanships, the following framework is suggested in Table 11.1 and listed below).[1]

Table 11.1 Evaluation Rubric for Arctic Council Chairmanships

Function	Exceptional	Satisfactory	Poor
Organization of meetings and negotiations			
Management of operations			
External communications and visibility			
Consensus-building			

[1] The present author is indebted to Professor Heather Exner-Pirot who developed this assessment framework. He is responsible, however, for the particular categorization and placement of the efforts of the four most recent Chairmanships within the template.

It focuses its attention on the key functions that all Chairs of the body need to perform and it is accompanied by a simple scoring assessment of their performance of these tasks.

Such an evaluation tool is fairly easy apply to the four most recent Arctic Council Chairmanships drawing upon the analysis and assessments provided by the authors of the chapters contained in this volume. In so doing, the individual evaluations could be represented as follows. The Swedish Chairmanship would be seen to be quite effective as portrayed in Table 11.2 below.

Table 11.2 Evaluation of the Swedish Arctic Council Chairmanship

Function	Exceptional	Satisfactory	Poor
Organization of meetings and negotiations	X		
Management of operations	X		
External communications and visibility		X	
Consensus-building	X		

The Canadian Chairmanship would be seen as somewhat less effective. This is seen in Table 11.3 below.

Table 11.3 Evaluation of the Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship

Function	Exceptional	Satisfactory	Poor
Organization of meetings and negotiations		X	
Management of operations			X
External communications and visibility		X	
Consensus-building			X

The United States Chairmanship would be seen as generally effective. This is seen in Table 11.4 below.

Table 11.4 Evaluation of the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship

Function	Exceptional	Satisfactory	Poor
Organization of meetings and negotiations	X		
Management of operations		X	
External communications and visibility		X	
Consensus-building		X	

The Finnish Chairmanship, as of the time of this writing, would also rank as being quite effective. This is seen in Table 11.5.

Table 11.5 Evaluation of the Finnish Arctic Council Chairmanship

Function	Exceptional	Satisfactory	Poor
Organization of meetings and negotiations	X		
Management of operations		X	
External communications and visibility		X	
Consensus-building	X		

Such an evaluation tool is heuristic in nature pointing to the particular strengths and shortcomings of each Chairmanship. It is provisional in nature subject to the addition of new categories of assessment and subsequent inquiries into the conduct of each leadership term. However, it does provide us with a common evaluative framework that can be utilized in our common efforts to evaluate both past and future Chairmanships of the Arctic Council.

11.2 The Powers of the Chair and their Limits

The general argument of this volume has been that Chairs matter. It has been suggested that like other international bodies, the Arctic Council is partially the reflection of the leadership that has been provided to it over the years of its operation. It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that each of the successive Chairs of the organization have had an impact on the body. They have utilized their separate roles as presiding officer, organizational manager, resolver of conflicts and the representational face of the body to further its efforts. Some, as has been seen, have been more successful in performing these functions than others. However, all have made use of the powers of the Chair to advance their cause.

Nonetheless, one should not go away from this inquiry with the mistaken impression that the Chairs of the Arctic Council operate from a position of carte blanche in their leadership capacity. There are a number of important constraints that limit and direct the conduct of the Chair. First among these are the institutional framework and expectations of the body. As has been pointed out regularly throughout the volume, the Arctic Council operates on the basis of consensus. Nothing of lasting significance can be done without the unanimous agreement of the Member States and the effective buy-in of the Permanent Participants. Any national Chairmanship, even a highly motivated and focused one, cannot operate effectively without the commitment and support of its colleagues. This institutional requirement serves as an important constraint on what can be done. To be effective in such a body, a Chair must focus its efforts on consensus building and promoting a sense of collegiality with the organization (Bengtsson et al. 2004).

A second important constraint on the actions of the Chair is the institutional expectation that has existed from the outset of the Arctic Council that the head of the body should not operate too much on an autonomous basis. During the prolonged negotiations that led to the establishment of the Council in 1996 it was made clear by several of the Arctic Eight that the Chair should remain accountable to the Member States and should be responsive to their wishes and needs. The idea of a rotational Chair was deliberately put in place to make sure that each successive national head of the organization would have only a brief period to press their specific views and priorities. Even as the Arctic Council has evolved to incorporate new aspects of an independent international organization, its Chair has remained firmly linked to the collective interests and goals of the members. There is no sign on the horizon that this bond will disappear any time in the near future (Nord 2016c).

A third constraint on the actions of the Chair come from those internal qualities that each leader brings to the position (Odell 2009). As illustrated in several chapters in this volume, the past diplomatic experience and capabilities of those who come to populate the Chairmanship at any particular point in time may be critical to their success. Like many other international organizations, the Arctic Council operates most smoothly when those at its helm have had previous diplomatic experience (Nye 2004). Similarly, personality may be a factor here. Those who tend to develop a rapport with their colleagues seem to have more of an ability to advance their agenda than those who do not have an ability to operate in a collegial fashion. This orientation may be also reflective of the Chair's own national cultural values and expectations. Some are more outwardly oriented in their conduct than others. Some hold to a broad and collectivist vision of the Arctic while other espouse a more narrow national perspective. Each of these variables can be seen, at times, to direct a Chairmanship with regard to what it feels it can and cannot do from its leadership post.

A fourth constraint on the conduct of Chairs, are the external forces that impinge upon their efforts. The global context is constantly changing and may have either a supportive or a detrimental impact on any Chairmanship (Tallberg 2004). As has been discussed in several chapters of the volume, the coming of major climate change within the Arctic and across the globe has been a powerful force behind national efforts to address these needs through the Council. It has also contributed to the increased visibility and importance of the organization itself. On the other hand, the emergence of major power rivalry in international affairs has set some limits on what can be done even in a body that has had a remarkable record of insulating itself from such events. The impact of the new tensions between Russia and the United States have the potential to make Arctic cooperation more difficult to achieve. This new reality is illustrative of how sudden change in the global setting can potentially derail even the most carefully planned Chairmanship agenda.

A fifth and final limit to the independence of the Chair can be seen in the growing desire on the part of Arctic Council participants for continuity in the efforts and vision of the organization. Rather than having the Chair lead the Council in new directions every two years, there has been a growing rejection among participants of a "flavor of the month" approach to leadership within the body in favor of continuity in both planning and operation of the organization (Fenge and Funston 2015). Thus, there has been new emphasis given over the past decade of continuing projects and initiative across Chairmanships and for incoming Chairs to consciously link their particular agendas with that which preceded it and that which is likely to follow. This attitude is also supportive of the current effort to produce a strategic plan for the organization by the end of the current Finnish Chairmanship.

Yet with all these constraints and limitations, the impact of Chair remains significant. The Chair of the Arctic Council retains some degree of flexibility for autonomous action and no small ability to direct the course of the organization's business. With this reality in mind, it seems appropriate to consider the lessons that have been learned from recent Chairmanships regarding their leadership potential and to

outline what might be considered as "best practices" leading to effective leadership from such a position. These will be addressed in the following section.

11.3 Lessons to Be Learned from Recent Chairmanships

Stepping back from the particular studies of the recent Chairmanships of the Arctic Council it is clear that there are leadership lessons to be learned from their experiences. As noted by Professor Lovecraft and Cost is Chap. 2 of this volume, an effective organization of any sort must have a learning capacity. This is particularly the case with international bodies that have complex forms of interaction and rapid turnover in leadership like the Arctic Council. It is essential that an accepted and utilized framework for providing focus and direction to the body be established. In the particular case of the Arctic Council, this can be seen to be constructed from an acknowledged list of "best practices" of leadership that evolved over the past decade or so.

The first of these best practices relates to preparation. It has been observed that good Chairmanships stem from adequate planning and foresight. If a country is to adequately address the challenges and opportunities of both the region and institution, one must allocate adequate time to study and preparation. This is something that successive Chairmanships have come to recognize over time. It is no longer the case that effective leadership cannot be delivered on a "just in time basis." Most analysts suggests that preparatory work must be begun a number of years ahead of occupying the chair (Nord 2017a). A country, particularly if it has not been a central player within the organization, must become fully familiar with the issues and concerns of the body. It must conduct consultations and seek advice from all participants—Member States, Permanent Participants and Observers. It must learn where potential divisions of opinion may exist, and begin the process of constructing an adequate agenda and program. As a general rule of thumb, such preparatory work should begin at least two leadership terms ahead of one's own effort. This will allow sufficient opportunity to fully brief oneself and allow for adequate discussions with one's predecessor at the helm to insure coordination and continuity between leadership terms.

Second, one must assemble an adequate and skillful staff. It need not be a massive group, but it should be a collection of individuals who are focused and committed to the task ahead of them (Nord 2016b). The Chairmanship group, ideally, should have some prior diplomatic experience and contain representatives from two or three key government ministries or agencies that have an interest in Arctic affairs. However, it should not be inclusive of all government departments. There is a danger of getting too many cooks involved in the process of preparing the effort as was witnessed in the latest Canadian Chairmanship. Having a coordinating board to represent and articulate various bureaucratic perspectives is useful as was seen in both the recent U.S. and Finnish Chairmanships. Having a skillful, confident and politically attuned Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials Group is a useful resource as

was seen in the instances of the Swedish and U.S. Chairmanships. The Chair of the SAOs, nor for that matter the rest of the Chairmanship staff, need not have an extensive background in Arctic affairs. The Swedish and Finnish Chairmanships provide good examples of how staff can be educated and informed on Arctic matters. However, it is clearly an asset to have within one's staff, key individuals who are directly familiar with northern communities and circumstances. This was of benefit to both the Canadian and U.S. Chairmanships.

A third "best practice" relates to maintaining focus while operating at the helm of the organization. The Chairmanship must develop a clear and well-organized agenda and program for its leadership term. The head of the body needs to know what is priorities are and that there is sufficient support for them among the members. It should avoid the temptation of over promising or the appearance of trying to solve all problems by itself. The Chair should have a limited number of deliverables that it seeks to secure from the Council and must monitor carefully the progress being made in advancing them. Perhaps the best recent example of this ability to focus, to know what is necessary, and possible, and to see that it is accomplished, comes from the Swedish Chairmanship (Nord 2017a). However, even in that case, not all the promises made could be adequately delivered. One wants to avoid appearing to come to the table with a long shopping list of possible projects and initiatives that may or may not have any chance of being addressed during one's leadership term. The Canadian Chairmanship suffered from this practice, while the Finnish Chairmanship seems to have made the art of the possible one of its signature features.

A fourth element of effective leadership within the Arctic Council is for the Chair to be familiar and respectful of the norms and expectations of the body (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This means, for instance, that the Chairmanship will thoroughly consult with all participants ahead of the announcement of its program and agenda, as seen in the case of Finland, and will maintain regular interaction with all the Member States, the Permanent Participants and Observers throughout its leadership term. This is particularly important with respect to the latter two groups as Professors Chater and Hitchins have pointed out in this volume. These groups have tended to be somewhat marginalized over the years, and an effective Chair must take steps to reach out to them and to listen to their interests and concerns. All of the four recent Chairmanships can be seen to have taken such steps, but even more efforts may be required in the future. Similarly, an effective Chair must not be viewed as operating autonomously according to its own set of preferences as opposed to the group's priorities. As a body organized and functioning on the basis of consensus, such proclivities are in opposition to established norms and expectations of the organization. One of the major perceived limitations of the Canadian Chairmanship was its tendency to go in its own direction no matter what others thought. Thus, as Professor Exner-Pirot points out there was a lot of leadership behavior on display but few followed in its path.

A fifth good practice for the Arctic Chair is that of being flexible and accommodating of changes in the external environment (Nord 2017c). As noted earlier, the constant evolution of the global system will provided both unexpected and

sometimes unwanted challenges to even the best organized Chairmanship. Clearly, the international setting has changed significantly since the founding of the Council in the final decade of the twentieth century. In this new millennium, both rapid climate change and the re-emergence of great power rivalries pose special problems and some opportunities for an organization like the Arctic Council. The Chair of the body must be aware of these potential threats and be flexible and nimble in responding to them. Chairmanships must avoid the tendency to project their own national foreign and domestic policy priorities within the common work of the organization and to create unnecessary divisions among the participants. Unfortunately, the Harper government did exactly that during the Canadian Chairmanship. A better example of the type of nimble leadership required comes from the current Finnish Chairmanship that has both sought to respond to pressing global concerns in its agenda and has held out the possibility of serving as a communicative bridge between Russia and the United States. This type of leadership stance is the preferable one.

A sixth leadership effort that each incoming Chair of the Arctic should aspire to is to perform effectively the several roles that are required of the head of such a body. This means that in its presiding capacity, the Chair must see to it that all meetings are adequately prepared, focused on agreed agendas, conducted according to established procedure and timelines and adequately recorded. The Swedish Chairmanship represents the model to be followed here (Nord 2016b). It also means that the Chair must be an adept manager of the internal operations of the organization. Working in close cooperation with the Secretariat, this means maintaining an oversight of resources and personnel and developing new internal strategies and routines to foster organizational efficiency and responsiveness. An incoming Chair of the Arctic must also learn to become the "face and voice" of the body. This requires the ability to communicate effectively its goals and priorities to all elements of the circumpolar community and to the broader global audience as well. As the Council gradually acquires additional features of a traditional international organization, performing this representative role will be increasingly important undertaking of the Chair. Both Sweden and the United States during their respective Chairmanships were exemplary in performing such a role.

Similarly, the Chair must learn to master its role as problem solver and conflict manager. It will need to continue to quickly identify possible sources of tension and division within the organization whether this is a question related to the status and role of Permanent Participants and Observers or the ongoing debate between the proponents of environment protection and sustainable development. Building bridges and fostering consensus among the membership remains an important and challenging function to be performed by any Chair of the Arctic Council.

A seventh good practice of a Chairmanship is the ability to make use of the full array of the "powers of the chair" to advance organizational efforts and to promote common accord (Tallberg 2010). While the Chair of the Arctic Council needs to respectful at all times of the norms and values of the organization, it should not shrink from utilizing resources and capabilities at its disposal to assist the Council in doing its work. This means being in the forefront of promoting and publicizing

the Council's projects and initiatives. The recent U.S. and Canadian Chairmanships did this effectively. It means taking a leading role in assisting the organization to focus its efforts on difficult but necessary undertakings. This is epitomized by the ongoing efforts of the current Finnish Chairmanship to create a long-term strategic plan for the Arctic Council. It also suggests that the Chair should not shy away from using its "good offices" to help resolve a long-term barrier to organizational advancement. This was clearly the case when the Swedish Chairmanship directly intervened to help negotiate a resolution to the Observer crisis. An effective Chair of the Arctic Council is one that is active whether it adopts a professional, honest broker or entrepreneurial style of operation. In the final section of this chapter, an effort will be made to address some of the challenges that will confront future Chairs of the Arctic Council and how the character of leadership from this position must evolve as the Arctic, itself, changes

11.4 Continuing Questions

As noted in Chap. 4 of this volume, there appear to be four continuing challenges that a Chair of the Arctic Council must address and attempt to resolve. These are the institutional requirements for inclusion, consensus, funding, and vision. The individual studies of the recent Chairmanships of the body have discussed the steps taken by successive heads of the organization to come to grips with various aspects of these concerns. However, much still remains much to be done by future leaders. Clearly more of an effort must be undertaken to make all interested parties in the Arctic feel welcomed within the Council. As the Arctic progressively becomes a global concern, room must be found for the interests and contributions of both those who live within the circumpolar region and those who reside outside it (Koivurova 2009). The Arctic Council must continue to operate as a forum and a voice for Arctic peoples. However, at the same time, new space must be found under its institutional umbrella for the efforts of others who would assist in its protection and development. Future Chairs of the Arctic Council must strive to come up with an acceptable balance that does not diminish the status or role of Arctic residents but also provides for new opportunities for the rest of the global community to take part in its efforts (Nord 2017b).

Equally challenging to future Chairs of the Arctic Council will be the need to secure adequate resources to fund the body's operation. It is increasingly apparent that as the Arctic Council evolves as an organization it will no longer be able to function solely on the basis of voluntary, project-oriented contributions. During the first decade of its operation, as the institution worked to establish itself, such limited resource allocations were, perhaps, adequate. Now, however, more than 20 years in existence and becoming more like a maturing international organization, the Arctic Council can no longer operate on limited "allowances" given by its members. Mandatory resource allocations are now required from all its participants to guarantee its ongoing efforts. The initial step in this direction took place under the

Scandinavian Chairmanships when mandatory contributions for support of the Secretariat were accepted. Additional progress down this road must be encouraged by the leadership of the Council (Nord 2017b) Similarly, future Chairs of the Arctic Council must strive to expanding the funding opportunities available specifically to the Permanent Participants. While some limited actions like recent establishment of the Álgu Fund during the U.S. Chairmanship have been taken, much more needs to be done to enable these representatives of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic to take part fully in the various efforts of the Arctic Council. Persuading funders to commit to such support will remain an ongoing responsibility of future Chairs of the body (Nord 2016a).

To the same extent, the challenge of promoting consensus within the Arctic Council will remain a continuing concern of future leadership within the organization. As a concept, the idea of consensus has been regularly supported within the body. However, it has not always been easy to secure in when advancing particular research efforts or policy initiatives (English 2013). This may be particularly evident in coming years as the international environment may become more tense and competitive in character. Future Chairs of the body will need to choose their opportunities for collective action carefully and seek the chance to encourage consensus around initiatives of obvious common benefit that are far from the sharp edge of potential conflict. The recent international accords sponsored by the Council under the Swedish and U.S. Chairmanships may be models of such undertakings. Such efforts will require Chairs who have a fully developed understanding of the global context for their initiatives and sophisticated diplomatic skills and abilities to contribute to such undertakings.

Finally, future Chairs of the Arctic Council must be fully aware and attuned to the need for vision within the organization. They must accept the idea that their best efforts are not short-term in nature but contribute to the much broader and ongoing work of the institution. As has been discussed earlier, continuity of leadership is becoming an increasingly necessary and valued practice within the body. Much of the current work under the Finnish Chairmanship to create a strategic plan for the Arctic Council has its roots in such a perspective. Inspired by the *Vision for the Arctic* document (Arctic Council 2013) that was presented at the Kiruna Ministerial, this effort to couple the needs and aspirations of the region with a concrete plan directed toward action has been subsequently championed by the U.S. and the Finnish Chairmanships. Canada, Sweden and other members of the Council have also contributed to its development. It is hoped that future Chairs of the Council will be provided with a useable document that will assist their efforts to provide focus and direction for the organization. It should be a document that allows future assessment of organizational performance and follow through. It should also be flexible enough for future leaders to adapt it to evolving needs and conditions. Provided with such an instrument, future Chairs can work successively to implement its objectives, processes and strategies.

As noted earlier in this volume, when the idea of having a two-year rotating chair for the Arctic Council was first broached many analysts had severe reservations. Some like the current author had concerns that the fairly quick movement of

leadership from one state to another might inhibit the development of an effective organization and impede progress toward continuity of action on its part (Young 2010). However, evidence from past two decades of the Council's operation suggest that these fears may have been unwarranted. Although the Council during its first rotational cycle did encounter some challenges in the area of coordination between one Chairmanship and another, the benefits derived from having several countries present their own visions and priorities for the Arctic seem to have outweighed these types of initial concerns. Such a rotational arrangement helped to redress the unfortunate, but commonly held belief that the entire Arctic region looks the same. Successive Chairs have demonstrated the differences as well commonalities in its natural and social environments. They have also facilitated the eventual acceptance by all of the participants within the Council that they each had specific contributions to make in addressing the various challenges and needs of the region. Small states as well as large countries can make important contributions. Even "reluctant" Arctic states like Sweden and the United States came to recognize a role for themselves in the region and see the importance of Arctic cooperation on an ongoing basis.

This recognition of differences as well as commonalities points to another particular insight into organizational leadership that can be gained by examining successive Chairs of the Arctic Council. This is an awareness that all leaders need not operate in exactly the same manner to be effective. While it is necessary that each Chair attend to the different responsibilities and functions of the position, they need not do this in exactly the same manner. They can pursue different strategies or styles of leadership. Some states, as has been seen, feel more comfortable in following one path while others may prefer a second or even a third approach. This may be reflective either of their own position in the international context, their own distinctive national priority given to Arctic concerns or their own specific views regarding the nature of leadership itself. Similarly, changing times and circumstances can require different types of organizational leadership. The fact that there may be no single template for successful leadership helps one to better understand the multidimensional character of chairs and the multifaceted contributions that they can make to international organization (Nord 2015).

This volume has also drawn attention to the fact that Chairs, by themselves, may not be the best judge of their own effectiveness. Those who receive direction from the Chairs can also be important assessors of their performance. In the case of the Arctic Council, the views and opinions of fellow Member States, and the sentiments of the Permanent Participants and Observers must be given due consideration. There needs to be a positive acceptance of a Chair's leadership from these groups in order for it to seen as truly effective. As noted before, there must be willing followers and a sense of participation in the common endeavour to have successful leadership from the Chair. In the case of the current views and limited roles played by the Permanent Participants and Observers this is something that future Chairs of the Arctic Council should seek to enhance. It is also important to consider, as has been done in this volume, how the Permanent Participants and Observers can provide their own contributions of leadership within and outside the organization. The Arctic Council might benefit from greater efforts in these directions.

Today the Arctic is changing and the primary body that addresses its concerns, needs and aspirations must evolve as well. It is most likely that the Arctic Council will continue to grow in profile and influence within both the circumpolar community and the broader international arena. As it does so, its features are likely to come to resemble more closely that of other established international organizations. It is important that a continued effort be made to study the influence and impact of the Chairs of the Council under these changing conditions. For it is they, along with the other participants of the Arctic Council, who will continue to provide needed leadership for the North.

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