

Chapter 6

Police Integrity in Russia

Serguei Cheloukhine, Sanja Kutnjak Ivković,
Qasim Haq, and Maria R. Haberfeld

Abstract This chapter explores the contours of police integrity in Russia. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index suggests that Russia is perceived as a highly corrupt country. With about 1 million employees, the Russian police are one of the largest police agencies in the world. This chapter relies on the police integrity survey conducted in 2012–2013. Questionnaires were distributed to the police officers in two regions of the Russian Federation: Southern District–Rostov Region and North Caucasus–Karachaevo Cherkessia. With two exceptions, the respondents did not perceive the behaviors described in the scenarios as very serious. While most of the respondents did not have any problems recognizing these behaviors as rule violating, they supported and expected police agencies to mete out no discipline for the majority of these behaviors. Finally, the results suggest that the code of silence covers all of the behaviors described in the questionnaire.

Keywords Militia · Police integrity · Russia · Soviet Union · Survey

Introduction

The Russian Federation, commonly known as Russia, extends over a substantial part of northern Eurasia (Asia and Europe). Russia is the largest country in the world by land area, and its population is the ninth largest in the world. About three

S. Cheloukhine (✉)
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: scheloukhine@jjay.cuny.edu

S. Kutnjak Ivković
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
e-mail: kutnjak@msu.edu

Q. Haq
Hunter College, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: qhaq@jjay.cuny.edu

M. R. Haberfeld
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY, USA
e-mail: mhaberfeld@jjay.cuny.edu

quarters of the 142.5 million people in Russia are Russian; in addition, there are more than 190 ethnic groups represented in Russia (The World Factbook 2014). Levels of religiosity are relatively low, an enduring legacy of the Soviet era; about 15–20% of the Russian population belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, about 10–15% are Muslim, and 2% belong to other Christian denominations (The World Factbook 2014).

During the Soviet era, Russia (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) was a constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia became the Russian Federation, with the land area, population, and industrial production of the Soviet Union located in Russia. The Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) determines that the Russian Federation comprises of 85 federal subjects:

- 47 *oblasts* (provinces)
- 21 republics (states), enjoying a high degree of autonomy on most issues and corresponding to some of Russia's numerous ethnic minorities
- 8 *krais* (territories)
- 6 *okrugs* (autonomous districts)
- 2 federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg)
- The Jewish Autonomous Oblast.

The history of Russia traces back to the ninth century. By the thirteenth century, Moscow surfaced as an influential cultural center. Following more than two centuries of Mongol domination (thirteenth–fifteenth centuries), the principality of Muscovy reemerged and gradually conquered the surrounding princedoms (The World Factbook 2014). In the subsequent centuries, the boundaries of the Russian Empire extended across Siberia to the Pacific and, from the eighteenth century, to the Baltic Sea. During the nineteenth century, additional conquests extended the borders of the Empire throughout Europe and Asia (The World Factbook 2014).

In 1917, in the midst of World War I, the Russian Empire was overthrown and the USSR formed (The World Factbook 2014). Turbulent events unfolding at the time established Vladimir Lenin as the leader and communism as the prevailing ideology of the newly established Soviet Union. Following Lenin's death in 1924, Joseph Stalin emerged as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union until his death in 1953. Over a period of nearly three decades, marked by considerable brutality and disregard for human rights, millions of people have been imprisoned in correctional labor camps and deported to remote areas (Getty et al. 1993). Departing from Lenin's New Economic Plan, Stalin favored a highly centralized economy. The ensuing *industrialization* and collectivization served to facilitate a swift transformation of the USSR from a primarily agrarian society to an industrial power (Wheatcroft et al. 1986). The three decades following Stalin's death in 1953 were marked mainly by economic stagnation. In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced domestic policies known as *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring; The World Factbook 2014), leading toward some degree of modernization of Soviet ideology. His shifts in foreign policy contributed to the end of the Cold War. However, the economy faltered and a crisis ensued, leading to increasing political instability and crisis. Following

the August 1991 coup and subsequent events, the USSR dissolved in December of 1991. In the post-Soviet era, Russia (the Russian Federation) experienced a multifaceted crisis, including a financial collapse in 1998, followed by a period of economic growth (The World Factbook 2014). Recent events in Russian history are reviewed throughout the remainder of this chapter as they pertain to the key subject matter of police integrity.

This chapter examines the contours of police integrity in Russia. The chapter first explores the larger social and political context of the Russian police integrity and then focuses on the empirical part of the study. In 2012–2013, questionnaires aiming to measure police integrity were distributed to police officers in two regions of the Russian Federation: Southern District–Rostov Region and North Caucasus–Karachaevo Cherkessia. The chapter explores how police officers view hypothetical scenarios describing examples of police misconduct. They were asked to assess how serious misconduct is, what they think that the appropriate and expected discipline is, and whether they would be willing to report for such behavior.

The Police in Russia

The first police force in Saint Petersburg was established as the Main Police on June 7, 1718 by decree from Peter the Great. Anton de Vieira was appointed as the first General Polizmeister. On January 19, 1722, the Governing Senate established the Moscow Police. The Detective Department was founded in 1866 operating under the police department of the Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD; the Ministry of the Interior) and, by 1907, similar departments had been created in other major cities of the Russian Empire, including Moscow, Kiev, Riga, Odessa, Tiflis, Baku, and Rostov-on-Don. Other districts were policed by rural police or gendarmerie units (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

The 3500 strong police force of Saint Petersburg provided the main opposition to the rioting, which marked the initial outbreak of the February Revolution in 1917. After the army units garrisoning the city defected, the police became the main target of the revolutionaries and a number were killed. The Police of the Russian Empire was dissolved on March 10, 1917, and on April 17, 1917, the Provisional Government established the People's Militia (*Militsiya*) as a new law enforcement body. The name *Militsiya* originates from the early Soviet history, when the Bolsheviks intend to associate their new policing authority with the self-organization of the people and distinguish it from the “bourgeois class protecting” police. *Militsiya* was created in 1917 under the official name “the Workers’ and Peasants’ *Militsiya*.”

The Police Service in today's Russia is the most powerful and multifunctional Russian law enforcement agency. The legal basis for its operations is the Law on *Militsiya*, passed on April 18, 1991 (with subsequent amendments), in accordance with which the Militia protects the life, health, rights, and freedoms, as well as the property and interests of individuals, legal entities, society, and the government (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

In 2009, then President Medvedev announced a new law on the Russia's police service and the beginning of the police reform. The focus of the police reform was on increased efficiency of the police, decreasing the level of corruption in the country, and improving the public image. The 2008 European Social Survey showed that, compared to their counterparts in other European countries, the Russian public showed one of the lowest levels of trust in the police. This low level of confidence was directly related to the people's willingness to contact the police and their responses to the crimes. Kosals (2010, p. 2) elaborated:

According to public opinion polls, less than 40% of crime victims contact the police to register a crime, to request that they open a criminal case, or to seek compensation for damages that they have suffered. Most people report that they were unhappy with the police reaction to their inquiry, and only slightly more than a quarter expressed satisfaction (nearly one third claimed that the police did nothing at all in response to their request for help). Victims who contacted the police seeking assistance evaluate police activity more negatively than those who have no personal contact with them.

Victims who did not report crimes to the police cited a variety of reasons for their reluctance to seek help. Two percent said that they had suffered from police criminality. While 2% seems like a small number, taking into account that 2.3 million people filed official complaints...nearly 70,000 Russians suffered from the unreported crimes committed by policemen.

Distrust in the police is so high in Russia that more than a tenth of the victims polled do not report crimes to the police and try to take care of the problem on their own. If these numbers are accurate, more than 200,000 people annually go around the police system to seek their own form of justice.

During the reform, the militia were expected to downsize by 20%, salaries would be increased by 30%, and police officers with connections to organized crime should be fired (Russia Today 2011). However, the number of police officers before the reform remains a secret and the targeted number of police officers post-reform is not known. Russia participated in the Fifth UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of the Criminal Justice Systems and, according to the information provided there, the number of police officers increased from 1.5 million in 1990 to 1.8 million in 1994 (UN Office on Drugs and Crime 1994). After 2000, there are no systematic data on the number of sworn police officers in the country (Kosals 2010, p. 2). Occasional accounts provide some estimates (e.g., about 1.4 million police officers in 2009). However, as Kosals (2010, p. 2) emphasizes, “[a]ll police statistics and data gathered through sociological surveys done in-house or by external research centers are classified and only a few facts and figures are provided to the public after police approval.”

The most obvious change resulting from that reform has been the service's name—it changed from the Soviet-era term *Militsiya* to the more universal *Politsiya* (police). The police are now the federal law enforcement agency in Russia, operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was established in 2011 replacing the *Militsiya*, the former police service. The reform also resulted in a more centralized control over the police; the responsibility for the oversight of the police agencies in the regions was removed from regional and municipal authorities and put under the direct control of the MVD in Moscow (Kulikov 2011).

Among the very recent restructuring moves, some key departments from the MVD were transferred to other ministries and vice versa. For example, the

responsibility for the correctional institutions was transferred to the Ministry of Justice, firefighting was subordinated to a newly created the Ministry for Emergency Situations. Currently, the main components of the Ministry include the following units: The MVD central administration, the MVD federal/regional administration, the Police Service, Internal Military Troops (*Vnutrennie Voyska*), Federal Migration Service (*Federal'naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba*), and the MVD forensic, logistical, research, and educational institutions of central subordination (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

Theory of Police Integrity and the Russian Police

Organizational Rules

The first dimension of the theory of integrity emphasizes the existence of the official rules. Klockars and Kutnjak (2004, p. 1.4) argue that it is relevant not only that the official rules are made but also how they are communicated and understood by the police officers (Klockars and Kutnjak 2004, p. 1.4). Police agencies of high integrity are expected to have the official rules that prohibit misconduct, as well as to enforce them when the violations occur (Klockars 2006).

Little has been known about the *Militsiya's* organizational rules because their work has been covered by the veil of secrecy. Officially, the police operate according to the Law on Police, which has been approved by the Federal Assembly and was subsequently signed into law on February 7, 2011 by the then President of Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. The Police Law was based on the one adopted in 1991 (Semukhina 2013). Medvedev's 2011 Law on the Police, reflected a serious effort to make the MVD more legitimate and effective. However, Galeotti (2012) asserts that this attempt was indeed very weak, including the lack of a powerful constituency for change within the MVD and a clear concept of the reform.

Between 1989 and 1991, work on legislation addressing the growing crime phenomenon (particularly in the post-Soviet economy and privatization of Soviet property) was underway in the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Russian Federation. After the collapse of the USSR, these state institutions, including the MVD of the USSR, disappeared, as did their drafts. To empower the unpopular *Militsiya*, the new Russian state has tried to resume this unfinished legislative process. While the privatization of the former Soviet State property was ongoing, in 1995, the state Duma of the Russian Federation considered simultaneously three drafts of the Law on the Fight of (Organized¹) Crime, two of which were published in the media. The

¹ The concept of organized crime was foreign to *Militsiya*; officers could not operate or press charges because the Criminal Code did not prohibit such behavior. Thus, growing organized crime activity in the newly established capitalist economy and the old Soviet Criminal Code put *Militsiya* in a bystander position.

Council of the Federation rejected all of those bills. The reason was related to the unacceptability of certain provisions, which were classified (Cheloukhine 2008).

It was not until January of 1997 that the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Chap. 22, defined “offenses in the area of economic activity.” The definition was included in the chapter sections of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and comprised a structure of crimes, the majority of which were relevant to the developing market economy. An essential characteristic of the new criminal code is the specific targeting of organized crime. Article 35 provides the legal definition and establishes that a group of persons, a group of persons having a prior agreement, an organized group, or a criminal association can be held responsible for participating in the organized crime. For example, a person who creates or supervises a criminal association (criminal organization) is subject to criminal responsibility for his or her organization and supervision, and for all the crimes committed by the association if the crimes were within the person’s intent. The commission of crimes by a criminal association entails more severe punishment (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011). The new offenses appear to be typical responses to white-collar crime, but, in the Russian context, they are closely associated with organized crime and corruption. They include related crimes combined into the following categories: illegal entrepreneurship; illegal banking activity; fraudulent entrepreneurship; legalization (laundering) of money assets or other property acquired by illegal means; illegal receipt of credit; compulsion to conclude or refuse to conclude a transaction; and production or sale of counterfeited credit cards or other payment documents.

A very novel feature of the special part of the criminal code is the introduction of legal rules prescribing punishment for economic crimes (Chap. 22), crimes by corporate executives in violation of their official duties (Chap. 23), environmental crimes (Chap. 26), and computer crimes (Chap. 28). With a few exceptions (such as smuggling and consumer fraud, traditionally called “economic” crimes in Soviet criminal law), the majority of the specified crimes are new phenomena in Russia, and the difficult process of building a market economy has dictated the necessity to create some responsibility for committing these transgressions. All these were new and major challenges to the police. Despite significant changes in the Russian Criminal Code, between the years 1996 and 2004, the success in combating crime was very limited. Both white-collar and organized crimes referred to under the same umbrella of “corruption,” continued to rise and Militsiya still operated within the context of the old criminal code.

Police Detection and Investigation of Police Misconduct

The second dimension of the theory emphasizes the police agency’s own methods of detection, investigation, and discipline of rule violations (Klockars and Kutnjak 2004; Klockars 2006). Methods of controlling misconduct could be either reactive (e.g., reactive investigations, discipline of officers who violated the rules) or proactive (e.g., education in ethics, training, and integrity testing). Police agencies

of high integrity are expected not only to have an elaborate system put in place but also to use it efficiently.

The above theoretical assumption is predicated on the notion that the organization is truly interested in the investigation of the police misconduct and imposition of the proper discipline. As McCarthy (2014, p. 6) elaborated on the accountability system by the Russian police:

Police are not accountable to any local, regional, or national government officials or to the public. All accountability is vertical and within the MVD. Officers answer to both their local/regional superiors as well as to all of the people above them in the sub-unit that they belong to, all the way up to the federal level.... In practice, this system of multiple accountability leads to excessive bureaucratic reporting requirements with each boss asking for multiple, often duplicative information.

The Russian police, as a large semi-military organization, have the capacity to deal with misconducts of its employees. Empirical studies suggest that they would have their work cut out for them. The data on the number of employees investigated and disciplined/punished for misconduct are not publicly available. The publicly available Annual Report of the Ministry of the Interior for 1994 revealed that, out of all the “personnel of the law enforcement structures,” 29% were involved in corrupt and illegal activities. President Medvedev reported that, during the first 6 months of 2009, out of the more 4500 cases of corruption were brought to prosecution and individuals eventually convicted, more than 700 were police officers (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

Furthermore, the most frequent complaint by the citizens (32%) expressed in the VTIOM’s (All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (*Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения*)) 2010 public opinion survey “about the work of personnel of the organs of the Ministry of the Interior” was that “[t]hey have no respect for the law and they break the law, they are engaged in illegal activities” (Russian Analytical Digest 2010). In the same survey, more than 80% of the respondents perceived that the “illegal activity of militia personnel [is] a regular occurrence, or...merely isolated cases of illegal activity” (Russian Analytical Digest 2010, p. 11). At the same time, about 35% thought that the illegal activities are a regular occurrence and about 45% thought that they are occurring only occasionally (Russian Analytical Digest 2010, p. 11). Moreover, the majority of the respondents who provided answers to the question about the need to reform the Ministry of the Interior agreed that such a reform is necessary (Russian Analytical Digest 2010, p. 11). When asked about the specific elements that should be included in such a reform, the three most frequent choices were “human resources policy (stricter selection criteria, higher level of professionalism),” “increased transparency and control by society,” and “fight against corruption” (Russian Analytical Digest 2010, p. 11). At the same time, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (73%) thought that a radical reform of the militia will not occur and that “everything will boil down to decorative renaming and a reshuffle of the leadership of the militia” (Russian Analytical Digest 2010, p. 12).

However, according to Pustintsev (2000), despite the reforms introduced by Medvedev, two fundamental dilemmas remain in place. Pustintsev (2000) stipulates

that the public in Russia views its police as the enforcer of the will of those in power who are not necessarily interested in the role change of police organization, and are fine with the way the police operates so far, with primary interest of protecting the racketeers or corrupt officials.

Curtailling the Code of Silence

The third dimension of the theory of police integrity discusses the code of silence and the police agency's efforts in curtailling it (Klockars and Kutnjak 2004). Although the code of silence exists in each and every police agency, undertaking serious efforts in curtailling it is a sign of an agency of high integrity (Klockars and Kutnjak 2004). Consequently, police agencies of low integrity would have a strong code of silence that would protect almost all behavior. By contrast, in police agencies of high integrity, police officers would be willing to report misconduct and supervisors would be willing to investigate it and discipline police officers who have engaged in misconduct.

Kosals (2010) argues that the marketization—the development of large-scale informal economic activities by police officers—is a feature and a problem of policing in Russia. According to the studies such as the Open Society Institute (Kosals 2010), police officers not only engage in economic activities outside their regular work hours, but also during their regular hours. In particular, Kolennikova et al. (Kolennikova et al. 2008) reported that about one half of the respondents engaged in after hours work and that about one fifth engaged in additional income-producing activity during their regular hours. Similar results were reported in the study by Gudkov and Dubin (2006); about 60% of the respondents interviewed in the study are earning off-duty income and about 20% earned additional income during regular work hours. Kosals (2010, p. 3) states that this process of marketization has clear consequences, including the institutionalization of bribery:

For example, if a traffic officer wants to patrol in a lucrative area (for example, where he potentially can collect personal payments in lieu of fines), he has to pay his direct boss for this privilege; if an inquiry officer wants to meet his arrest quota, but there are no true crimes in the region that he patrols, he has to pay an investigator to avoid punishment, and so on. Another important area of marketization is one's personal career. In some cases, officers must pay to win promotion to a higher post (especially, if this post opens the path to informal earnings). Sometimes these fees can be as high as hundreds of thousands of dollars. Of course, then the newly-promoted officer must develop large-scale business activities to recoup his investments.

In the case of such institutionalized and entrenched misconduct, very few officers would be motivated to blow the whistle. McCarthy (2014, p. 6) explains why police officers may not be motivated to do so:

The strong hierarchical subordination also makes it difficult for well-meaning lower-ranking officers to refuse to participate in corruption schemes if they do exist. For example, it may fall to a lower-ranking officer to collect bribes from local businessmen for police protection, but usually a large part of that money gets set up the police hierarchy... When

the bosses are corrupt but allow their subordinates to benefit from the corruption, whistle-blowing becomes even less likely since everyone benefits just enough to keep the corrupt practices going.

If police officers dare to do so, they would probably face severe consequences. For example, Sergei Magnitsky was a lawyer who learned about organized and widespread corruption among public officials (Poduzov 2010). Rather than leading into a scandal, investigation by an independent committee, and a subsequent reform of the police, the events have taken a different turn. Magnitsky was arrested, spent almost a year in pretrial detention, and eventually died in prison (Poduzov 2010).

The most famous whistle-blower in the recent Russian police history is Major Aleksey Dymovsky. He and several other police officers “jeopardized their careers to appeal directly to the Russian president to end the lawlessness inside the police system” (Poduzov 2010, p. 8). In his video appeal to Putin, Dymovsky claims that corruption is endemic and that other forms of misconduct, such as framing innocent citizens to meet the official arrest quotas, are widespread (2009). In the video, Dymovsky speaks directly to Putin: “You talk about reducing corruption... You say that it should not be just a crime, that it should be immoral. But it is not like that. I told my boss that the police are corrupt. And he told me that it cannot be done away with.” Dymovsky (2009) also stated that, “I’m sick and tired of being told to solve crimes that don’t exist. I’m sick and tired of being told to put [innocent] people in jail. I’m sick and tired of made-to-order criminal cases.” Dymovsky was eventually fired, arrested, and prosecuted (Levy 2010).

The videos received widespread public support and thousands of people posted comments online supporting police officers (Harding 2009). As a reaction, on July 22, 2010, the Russian Criminal Code was amended. The revised Article 286.1 now contains a norm that makes it criminal for the subordinate police officers to criticize the decisions of the superiors. Poduzov (2010, p. 9) related the whistleblower videos and the legislative changes, “[u]ndoubtedly, this norm appeared in response to Dymovsky’s Youtube video and the widespread public reaction to it. However, the effect is to paralyze any public discussion about the police by policemen because they will always be under the threat of criminal prosecution.” This norm has also effectively eliminated any realistic hope that scholars seeking to study the code of silence empirically would be successful in their endeavors.

Influence of Social and Political Environment

The fourth dimension of the theory puts the emphasis on the fact that each and every police agency is directly influenced by the society at large (Klockars and Kutnjak 2004). A police agency in a society which tolerates misconduct of its public employees should have a lower level of integrity than a police agency in a society which is critical and addresses misconduct by its public employees.

Corruption and bribery during Soviet times appeared to represent a universal system and, in this sense, the roots of contemporary corruption had been established already. By the 1970s, illegal resale of scarce goods by retail employees had

become widespread. It also included bribes to officials responsible for the allocation of consumer goods and other recourses, quotas for scholarships in the education system, and the falsification of official reports. Within the Soviet legal system, the battle against corruption was practically nonexistent, although there was a system of punishments, in addition to public and party censure, for the abuse of official positions. The fundamentals of Soviet corruption were structured by a totalitarian system and, in particular, by the system of resource allocations during conditions of constant shortages of goods and services. Therefore, the major spheres of corruption were logistics, capital investments, and the drawing of plans and reports on their performance, accompanied by huge falsifications of official data. This system, from one viewpoint, was the social illness corrupting the morals of society. From another point of view, the plan-distribution system in the economy could not function without this “lubricant,” without decisions being made in the allocation of funds and “limits” (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

The Russian democratic transition, a combination of ill-designed legal, economic, and moral actions, fed organized crime and corruption, which was now aspiring to absorb the state. Russia has become a state with continuous anarchy, where people, radioactive materials, weapons, and narcotics are easily bought and sold. As if these threats were not troublesome enough, the truly frightening aspect of the new Russia is the cold-blooded organized crime groups and corrupt government executives working together to generate not so much a new market economy as a truly new criminal state. Kosals (2010, p. 4) argued:

...the police who were essentially competing with the criminals reached a kind of symbiosis with the mob. Ultimately, they began “racketeering the racketeers” and captured the criminal business. Step by step they accumulated economic wealth, initially spending their money on consumer goods... Then, during the second part of the 1990s, they started to invest, first in retail trade...and other sectors. This was potentially damaging to the authorities’ efforts to maintain control over the police.

The new Russian elite who came to power after the collapse of the USSR played a key role in the criminalization of Russian society at the post-Soviet stage of its development (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011). If the party and administrative control restricted the activities of the old Soviet *nomenklatura*, the new, market-oriented elite who did not abide by any restrictions, because they could easily get around laws, would not have emerged. Russia’s new ruling class consisted of corrupt officials who freely mixed government service with business activities. The emerging market economy, which began to gain strength in the late 1980s and was legalized in the early 1990s, was inevitably permeated with criminality. The market economy effectively deformed and neutralized the new state, undermining its capacity to act against crime and corruption (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

The post-Soviet Russian state proved to be incapable of effective resistance to the onslaught of criminal elements in different spheres of society. It undermined its own policing agencies such as MVD, courts, and *Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti* (FSB, formerly known as KGB), which initially were assigned to fight crime. No reforms in either structure or in the courts were implemented

until 1995 (the reform of the court), which also led to the tremendous increase of crime and corruption. The failed state generated a monetary starvation and a subsequent pervasive corruption that was a direct consequence of the governmental malfunction, therefore creating new conditions for economic crimes (Cheloukine and Haberfeld 2011). The publicly available 1994 Annual Report of the Ministry of the Interior suggests that 47% of the public servants in the ministries, committees, and other institutions, 29% of the police, and 13% of the employees of the financial and banking system were involved in corrupt and illegal activities.

Despite some successes against crime (the 2008 headline figures saw a 10.2% drop in total crimes, although in part this was because of under-reporting rather than a genuine decline), most Russians continue to see the police as at best incompetent, at worst corrupt extortionists and heavy-handed Kremlin goons. According to a number of Russian researchers, between 30 and 35% of the public prefers to avoid any police contact, even in life threatening situations (Makarova 2011; Semukhina 2014a). Semukhina (2014b, p. 1) summarized the results of the existing empirical studies on the public support of the police:

Longitudinal studies examining levels of trust and satisfaction with police in Russia indicate that at least 50% of Russians do not trust the police in any given year; in some years the levels of public trust and satisfaction plummeted to 30%. International studies, including the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), New Europe Barometer (NEB), European Social Survey (ESS), Gallup World Poll, and World Value Survey (WVS) consistently rank Russia as one of the lowest countries in both public trust in and satisfaction with police.

On November 12, 2009, then President Dmitry Medvedev, during his address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, assessed the current state of corruption as one of the main obstacles to his government. He expressed a conviction that it is quite clear that the fight against corruption must be waged on all fronts: from legislation, through law enforcement, and the judicial system to the social intolerance of these evil phenomena, including domestic ones.

As then President Medvedev stated, during the first 6 months of 2009, more than 4500 cases of corruption were brought to prosecution, 532 officials of government authorities and local self-government bodies were convicted, as were more than 700 law-enforcement officers (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011). One of the speakers during the same Assembly session, the Minister of the Interior, provided additional figures: during the first 10 months of 2009, his ministry alone investigated 40,000 cases, up by 11% from the previous year. Russians pay US\$ 300 billion in bribes each year, according to the government's own figures. According to the most recent interview with two-star General Alexander Bastyrkin, head of the Inquiry Committee of the Main Public Prosecutor Office, and the two-star General Alexei Anchikhin, head of the Investigative Committee of the Ministry of the Interior, it appears that corruption, referred to as a cancerous phenomenon in Russia is spreading with an excessive speed. The generals provided quite well-documented facts during the interviews (Cheloukhine and Haberfeld 2011).

Kosals (2010, p. 4) argues that the reforms in the 2000s (e.g., removing the penitentiary system out of the Ministry of the Interior; removing the firefighters out of

the Ministry of the Interior; the 2003–2006 criminal campaign and prosecution of “werewolves in uniform”; the 2009 political drive against corruption and the police reform) have not been very effective:

All these actions were not reforms aimed to provide better security services to the public and to cut criminality. The main content of these measures were, and remain, organizational restructuring, criticizing corrupt officers in the media, and punishing select individuals according to various political needs. During the 2000s the police did not provide better security services to the public or change the bad habits developed by officers. The police force remains a militarized, opaque system focused on making money while ignoring the needs of the public.

As recently as February 2010, the newly unveiled great corruption scandal created a shock in the public opinion in Russia. This time it concerned the (*Otryad Milit-sii Osobogo Naznachenia—Отряд милиции особого назначения*) OMON (special purpose police squad), the elite Russian police (*Militsiya*) formation. According to “The New Times” (*Novoye Vremya*), a prestigious Moscow’s weekly newspaper, within the OMON formation, a gigantic and systemic corruption phenomenon was firmly in place, which involved practically all OMON members, from the very top commands to the lowest bottom level. The scandal was exposed when a group of variously ranking officers from the formation sent a report to the president of the Russian Federation and to the main prosecutor office providing, in detail, facts about what was going on within the unit (The New Times 2010). Given the current situation in Russia, where corruption is so common and so far-reaching, including even a great part of law-enforcement high-ranking officers, Medvedev’s appeal to the Russian Federal Assembly (. . . zero tolerance of corruption should become part of our national culture, and an intrinsic part of who we are),” appears to be a truly ambitious goal.

Measuring Police Integrity

Questionnaire

The questionnaire used in this chapter includes hypothetical scenarios originally developed by Klockars and colleagues (Klockars 2006). The scenarios describe various examples of police misconduct, ranging to both types and severity. Five scenarios describe police corruption, four scenarios describe the use of excessive force, one scenario describes a failure to execute an arrest warrant, and one scenario describes the planting of evidence and the falsification of the official report. Scenarios describing the same type of misconduct vary in terms of their seriousness. For example, scenarios focusing on police corruption range from the least serious forms of police corruption, such as the acceptance of gratuities, to the most serious forms of corruption, such as a theft from a crime scene and the acceptance of a bribe.

The scenarios were translated into Russian and prepared for pre-testing. In the process, we discovered that scenario 6 (officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner) does not fit well with the Russian conditions. In particular, the scenario states that:

In responding with her male partner to a fight in a bar, a young, female officer receives a black eye from one of the male combatants. The man is arrested, handcuffed, and, as he is led into the cells, the male member of the team punches him very hard in the kidney area saying, “hurts, doesn’t it.”

Yet, police officers in Russia have control of the arrestees for a very short period of time and have to transfer them to the detention centers, which are not run by the police agencies. Although police officers would have an opportunity to hit the arrestee while making an arrest, they would not have an opportunity to lead the arrestee into the cell and punch the person there. Therefore, we omitted scenario 6 from the Russian version of the questionnaire.

Each scenario is followed by the set of seven questions. These questions inquire about the police officers’ knowledge of the official rules, their views about the seriousness of the described behavior, views about the appropriate and expected discipline, and their willingness to report this misconduct. Questions about the appropriate and expected discipline had to be adjusted to fit the Russian conditions. Thus, the Russian version of the questionnaire includes a six-point Likert scale: 1 = “none,” 2 = “public reprimand,” 3 = “fine up to 10% of salary,” 4 = “fine up to 20% of salary,” 5 = “reassignment to a different position,” and 6 = “dismissal.” The questionnaire concluded with a few demographic questions. In particular, the questionnaire asked about the respondents’ gender, length of service, assignment, and rank, as well as whether they were employed in a supervisory position.

The Sample

In 2012–2013, questionnaires were distributed to the police officers in two regions of the Russian Federation: Southern District–Rostov Region and North Caucasus–Karachaevo Cherkessia. The *South Federal District*, an administrative region of Russian southern part, has a population of about 13,910,000 (Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2011). The administrative center of South Federal District is Rostov-on-Don city. *Karachay-Cherkessia Republic* (also spelled *Karachaevo-Cherkessia*) is part of North Caucasian Federal District, that has a population of about 472,000 (Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2011). The capital of the region is Cherkessk. The number of the police employed in each district is classified.

Both districts underwent a reform from the *Militsiya* into the police. The reforms process was initiated in 2011, with a plan to conclude it by 2013. By the end of the period, both MVD District Headquarters reported to Moscow on successful transformation. It was required that all personnel take specific tests and attestation according to responsibilities and the new law on police. By the end of the time frame set by the central MVD administration, all *Militsiya* departments and personnel

Table 6.1 Respondents' demographic characteristics

	Number of respondents	Percent of respondents
<i>Length of service</i>		
Up to 5 years	12	11.3%
6–10 years	61	57.5%
11–15 years	32	30.2%
16–20 years	1	0.9%
<i>Supervisory role</i>		
Non-supervisors	49	46.2%
Supervisors	57	53.8%
<i>Type of assignment</i>		
Patrol	1	0.9%
Detective/investigative	33	31.1%
Communications	6	5.7%
Special operations	16	15.1%
Administrative	46	43.4%
Community policing	4	3.8%
<i>Gender</i>		
Male	85	80.2%
Female	21	19.8%

went through the required reform and change. During informal interviews, several potential survey respondents expressed mixed feelings about the reforms. They mentioned that they had been trained at the Police Academy by the supervisors who served in Soviet *Militsiya* and who rejected and disapproved of the new reforms.

The Russian sample includes 106 police officers. Police officers were surveyed at the Rostov Police University (3rd year of study; all were at the rank of Junior Lieutenant), local police precinct stations, and district headquarters. About 90% of the sample includes police officers from the Rostov Police University. Police officers attending the Rostov Police University were enrolled in a 5-year program leading to the Juris Doctor Degree and a rank of the Police Lieutenant. They were surveyed during their regular classes. All participants in the survey went through a mandatory internship in the precincts.

Most of the respondents in the study were experienced police officers (Table 6.1); only 11% had been police officers for 5 years or fewer. The majority of the respondents (57.5%; Table 6.1) had between 6 and 10 years of experience. At the same time, about one half were supervisors (Table 6.1). There is a clear relation between the length of service and the supervisory position; the more years they have served as police officers, the more likely they were to be supervisors (Table 6.2).

In terms of their assignment, the respondents were mostly employed as detectives/investigators (31.1%) or administrators (43.4%; Table 6.2). Only a few respondents worked as either patrol officers or community policing officers (Table 6.2). Finally, the overwhelming majority of the respondents were men (80.2%, Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Years in service by supervisory position

Years in service	Supervisory position	
	No	Yes
3–5 years	7 (58.3%)	5 (41.7%)
6–10 years	33 (54.1%)	28 (45.9%)
11–15 years	9 (28.1%)	23 (71.9%)
16–20 years	0 (0.0%)	1 (100%)

The Results

Seriousness

The first question the respondents in the study were asked inquired about the seriousness of the behavior described in the scenario. They were also asked to estimate how serious most police officers in their agencies would evaluate them. The respondents were offered answers on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “not at all serious” to “very serious.”

The respondents’ evaluations of scenario seriousness suggest that there is very little variation in the perceived seriousness of the ten scenarios. In particular, in eight out of ten scenarios (Table 6.3), the mean values of the responses are all clustered on the nonserious side of the scale, between 1.25 and 2. This implies that the respondents did not perceive any of the eight scenarios as serious, regardless of the fact that a number of them included not only violations of official rules but also explicit violations of criminal laws (e.g., scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback).

On the other hand, there are two scenarios with the means on the serious side of the scale. The scenario describing unjustifiable use of deadly force (scenario 4)—the most severe type of force available—was evaluated as very serious (with the mean value of 4.46; Table 6.3). However, the scenario evaluated as the most serious of all ten scenarios involved (only) verbal abuse (scenario 7: verbal abuse —“Arrest an Asshole Day”). It is a rather surprising finding that an instance of verbal abuse, which corresponds to the lowest point on the use of force continuum, is evaluated as more serious than the use of deadly force, which corresponds to the highest point on the use of force continuum.

A comparison of perceptions of seriousness across the scenarios belonging to the same form of misconduct reveals illuminating conclusions. All five scenarios describing examples of police corruption (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback) were evaluated as not very serious at all. In fact, regardless of whether the scenarios described a kickback, theft, or the acceptance of gratuities, the respondents evaluated them to be about the same in terms of their seriousness. Although it may be surprising that the respondents really did not differentiate across different examples of police corruption, it comes as no surprise that the respondents did not perceive cases of

Table 6.3 Police officer perceptions of seriousness and violation of rules

Scenario number and description	Own seriousness		Others' seriousness		Mean difference (own—others)	t-test	Violation of rules	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank			Mean	Rank
Scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants	1.82	7	1.52	2	0.30	6.738***	4.42	6.5
Scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant	1.53	2	1.64	6	-0.11	-1.692	4.10	2
Scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene	2.02	8	1.82	7	-0.20	3.354**	4.17	4
Scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force	4.46	9	4.69	10	-0.23	-4.819***	3.15	1
Scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands	1.55	3	1.55	4	0.00	0.00	4.47	8
Scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Scenario 7: verbal abuse—"Arrest an Asshole Day"	4.98	10	3.98	9	1.00	43.070***	4.16	3
Scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident	1.27	1	1.56	5	-0.28	-6.438***	4.42	6.5
Scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback	1.77	5.5	1.53	3	0.24	5.842***	4.96	10
Scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer	1.76	4	2.01	8	-0.25	-5.842***	4.18	5
Scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating	1.77	5.5	1.25	1	0.52	10.261***	4.93	9

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

police corruption as very serious. In a country that has consistently ranked in the bottom third of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2014), and in which close to 90% of the respondents on the Global Corruption Barometer (2013) perceived that the police are corrupt/extremely corrupt, corruption—particularly public sector corruption—seems to be a way of life. In an environment in which corruption is tolerated by the society at large and it permeates through all aspects of society, it is by no means surprising that our respondents evaluated scenarios describing police corruption as not serious as all. In the broader context, these scenarios are so low on the grand seriousness scale of corruption that, in the eyes of our respondents, the differences among them may be so small that our scale did not capture them.

The questionnaire featured three scenarios describing the use of excessive force (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 7: verbal abuse—“Arrest an Asshole Day,” scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating). The scenario describing the supervisor’s omission (failure to intervene and stop the beating) was evaluated to be by far less serious than both the explicit use of deadly force and the explicit verbal abuse. On the other hand, the respondents provided little differentiation between verbal abuse and use of deadly force. This is rather surprising because these two match the opposite ends of the use of force continuum. At the same time, both of these behaviors, unlike cases of police corruption, were evaluated as serious.

A comparison of the respondents’ own estimates of seriousness with their estimates of how serious others would evaluate the same behaviors revealed several key findings. To begin, the differences were statistically significant in seven out of ten scenarios (Table 6.3). At the same time, these differences were mostly below the threshold of 0.50, established in prior research as a gauge for substantive importance.² In fact, these differences were above 0.50 for only two scenarios (scenario 7: verbal abuse—“Arrest an Asshole Day”; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating; Table 6.3). Respondents’ evaluations of seriousness of these scenarios were higher than their respective assessments of others’ evaluations of seriousness. While both scenarios describe variations on the abuse of force theme, they were evaluated as being of quite different levels of seriousness (i.e., verbal abuse in scenario 7 was evaluated as the most serious behavior in the questionnaire and the Sergeant’s failure to stop the beating in scenario 11 was evaluated to be in the middle of the range).

The exploration of the two sets of rankings—a relative measure suggestive of how serious the scenario was perceived compared to other scenarios in the questionnaire—yielded that these rankings are similar, but, at the same time, that they are far from identical. For example, the scenario describing the failure to arrest a friend with an arrest warrant (scenario 2) was evaluated as one of the least serious scenarios according to their own estimates of seriousness, while they perceived that it would be evaluated by others to be somewhere in the middle of the scale. Similarly, the scenario describing the Sergeant’s failure to stop the beating (scenario 11) was evaluated as being in the middle of the scale by their own accounts, while they

² Following the rule of thumb established in prior work (Klockars 2006, p. 26), we consider only the differences of 0.50 or larger to be meaningful.

assumed that the others would evaluate it as the least serious scenario in the questionnaire.

Violation of Official Rules

The next question inquired of the respondents to state whether the behaviors described in the questionnaire could be classified as examples of rule-violating behavior. The respondents could have selected an answer on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “definitely not” to “definitely yes.”

All of the behaviors selected for inclusion in the questionnaire constitute violations of official rules and many are violations of criminal law as well. Indeed, the respondents seemed to have no problems recognizing and acknowledging this fact; with one exception, the behavior in all scenarios was evaluated as rule violating (i.e., the mean values were all above 4; Table 6.3). In fact, two scenarios (scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating) had means very close to 5 and approached the end of the scale. Nonetheless, despite being recognized as definite violations of official rules by virtually all police officers in the sample, our respondents did not regard these scenarios as serious at all (Table 6.3).

The only scenario that does not fit the broad pattern of being recognized as a violation of official rules is the scenario describing the use of deadly force (scenario 4). While it provides an example of use of deadly force—the most severe use of force on the use of force continuum—and has been evaluated by the respondents both in relative and absolute terms as one of the most serious violations in the questionnaire (Table 6.3), the respondents were quite ambivalent about whether it constitutes a violation of the official rules. A more detailed analysis of their answers revealed that this mean, lower than any of the other means in Table 6.3 was not driven by a few outliers. Rather, it represents the majority view (71% of the officers selected “3” which is the middle choice on the five-point scale). It is quite possible that the history of serious violations of human rights, committed with the approval and even request of the politicians, created an atmosphere in which the use of excessive force is tolerated and had not been considered a “big issue” (Maxim 2010).

A comparison of the respondents’ answers about the rule violations with their estimates of seriousness for the same scenarios point toward a rather weak similarity between the rankings (Table 6.3). It almost appears as if, the more likely the respondents were to evaluate the behavior as rule violating, the less likely they were to evaluate it as serious. For example, while they definitely evaluated the kickback (scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback) as a rule-violating behavior, they did not view it as very serious. On the other hand, they had most problems evaluating the use of deadly force as rule violating, yet, they perceived this scenario as very serious.

The correlation (Spearman's correlation coefficient = -0.323 ; n.s.) which was not statistically significant, further confirms the conjecture of a weak and negative relation between their perceptions of misconduct seriousness with their evalua-

tions of the behavior as rule violating. However, the relation was stronger for their estimates of others' evaluations of seriousness and knowledge of the official rules (Spearman's correlation coefficient = -0.839 ; $p < 0.01$).

Appropriate and Expected Discipline

The next two questions asked the respondents to share their views about the appropriate discipline for the behaviors described in the questionnaire, as well as estimate what discipline would be meted out in their agencies for such behavior. As discussed earlier, the answers were adjusted to fit the Russian conditions and included: "no discipline," "public reprimand," "fine up to 10% of the employee's salary," "fine up to 20% of the employee's salary," "reassignment to a different position," and "dismissal." The respondents' views were evaluated in three different ways. The results were first presented for the respondents' views of the discipline the respondents thought was appropriate and then for the discipline the respondents expected to be meted out by the police agencies.

First, the assessment of the appropriate discipline relies on modal values (Table 6.4). To begin, there is very little variability across the scenarios, with the respondents most likely selecting either no discipline at all ("none") or most lenient discipline possible. In particular, in six out of ten scenarios the respondents thought that no discipline should be appropriate (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating), in three out of ten scenarios (scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback) they thought that the least severe discipline should be used ("public reprimand"), and in only one out of ten scenarios (scenario 7: verbal abuse—"Arrest an Asshole Day") they thought that "reassignment" was appropriate.

The six scenarios in which the respondents thought that no discipline should be appropriate encompass a heterogeneous set of behaviors, from the acceptance of free meals (scenario 1) and the cover up of police DUI and accident (scenario 8) to the use of deadly force (scenario 4) and falsifying an official report (scenario 10; Table 6.4). While a number of them are on the less serious side and are evaluated as such by the respondents (e.g., scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident), some of them are very serious forms of misconduct (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 10: false report on drug dealer) and may have been evaluated as such by the respondents as well (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force, but not scenario 10: false report on drug dealer). At the same time, five out of six scenarios were recognized by the majority of the respondents as violations of the official rules. Strikingly, despite their knowledge of the official rules, the respondents thought that the police officer who engaged in such obvious rule violating should not be disciplined.

Table 6.4 Views about appropriate discipline (should) and expected discipline (would)

Scenario number and description		Mode	Rank should	Rank would	None	Some discipline	Dismissal	Chi-square test	Phi
Scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants	Should	None	1–6		99.1%	0.9%	0.0%	0.19	0.140
	Would	Public reprimand		6–9	1.9%	98.1%	0.0%		
Scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant	Should	Public reprimand	7–9		47.2%	52.8%	0.0%	106.00***	1.000
	Would	Reassignment		10	47.2%	52.8%	0.0%		
Scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene	Should	Public reprimand	7–9		0.0%	100%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	Public reprimand		6–9	0.9%	97.2%	0.0%		
Scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force	Should	None	1–6		100%	0.0%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	None		6–9	96.2%	1.9%	0.0%		
Scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands	Should	None	1–6		100%	0.0%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	None		1–5	100%	0.0%	0.0%		
Scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner	Should	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Would	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Scenario 7: Verbal abuse—“Arrest an Asshole Day”	Should	Reassignment	10		0.0%	100%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	Public reprimand		6–9	0.0%	100%	0.0%		
Scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident	Should	None	1–6		99.1%	0.9%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	None		1–5	100%	0.0%	0.0%		
Scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback	Should	Public reprimand	7–9		100%	0.0%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	None		1–5	75.5%	0.0%	24.5%		
Scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer	Should	None	1–6		100%	0.0%	0.0%	N/A ^a	N/A ^a
	Would	None		1–5	100%	0.0%	0.0%		
Scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating	Should	None	1–6		99.1%	0.9%	0.0%	52.50***	-0.704
	Would	Public reprimand		6–9	1.9%	98.1%	0.0%		

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

^a The chi-square test could not be computed because there was no variability in either should and/or would measure (i.e., all the respondents selected the same answer)

For the scenarios for which respondents thought that some discipline should be appropriate, the most frequently selected disciplinary option was “public reprimand,” the least serious form of discipline possible (scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback). In one scenario (scenario 7: verbal abuse—“Arrest an Asshole Day”), they picked “reassignment,” one of the harshest forms of discipline. The behaviors described in these scenarios (with the exception of scenario 7) are some of the most serious forms of police misconduct (e.g., stealing from the crime scene, accepting kickbacks); they surely violate official rules in any country. However, although the respondents were able to recognize them as rule-violating behaviors, they typically did not perceive them as very serious (with the exception of scenario 3).

Second, the respondents’ views about the appropriate discipline were further analyzed via the percentages of police officers who selected either “no discipline,” “some discipline,” or “dismissal” (Table 6.4). There was not a single scenario in which not even a slim minority of the respondents thought that dismissal was appropriate. In fact, in seven out of ten scenarios (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback; scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating) the overwhelming majority—99 or even 100%—thought that the police officer who engaged in such behavior should not be disciplined at all (Table 6.4). In one additional scenario (scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant), about one half of the respondents (47.2%; Table 6.4) thought that no discipline should be the appropriate response. In other words, there was only one scenario (scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene) in which the majority of the respondents (100%; Table 6.4) thought that some discipline should be appropriate. In that case, describing a serious form of police corruption that definitely violates official rules, all of the respondents uniformly selected “public reprimand”—the least serious form of discipline—as the appropriate discipline.

Third, the relation between the respondents’ perceptions of the appropriate discipline and their perceptions of misconduct seriousness was explored as well. However, the comparison proved to be difficult because the respondents’ views of the appropriate discipline were so tightly clustered in only three categories and many scenarios shared the same ranking (six scenarios had the same modal value of “none” and shared the rankings 1–6; three scenarios had the same modal value of “public reprimand” and shared the rankings of 7–9). Consequently, although the size of the Spearman’s correlation coefficient (0.344, n.s., for own perceptions of seriousness and 0.284, n.s., for others’ evaluations of seriousness) suggests at least some positive correlation between the respondents’ views of the misconduct seriousness and the appropriate discipline, neither correlation was statistically significant. The results were very similar for the relation between the respondents’ views of the appropriate discipline and evaluations of behavior as rule violating, with the opposite direction of the relation (−0.242, n.s.).

The second question about discipline tapped into the potential discipline that the police agency would mete out for such misconduct. The results are again presented by using modal values, percentages, and correlations.

First, the analysis of data using modal values of expected discipline (Table 6.4) showed that the respondents thought that police officers who engaged in any of the behaviors described in the questionnaire—including very serious forms of police misconduct that violate not only official rules but the rules of criminal law as well—would not be dismissed for such behavior. In fact, in five out of ten scenarios, including use of deadly force and acceptance of a kickback (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback; scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer), the respondents did not expect their police agencies to mete out any discipline. In the one half of the scenarios in which they expected some discipline to be meted out, modal values indicated that the respondents expected the most lenient form of discipline. In particular, in four out of five scenarios (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 7: verbal abuse—“Arrest an Asshole Day,” scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating), they expected “public reprimand.” The only scenario in which they expected the more severe discipline of “reassignment” was scenario 2 (fail to arrest friend with warrant).

Second, the percentage analysis confirmed the basic findings from the modal analyses and further refined the findings. Indeed, in none of the scenarios did the majority of the respondents expect dismissal to follow. In only one scenario (scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback) was there a substantial minority of the respondents (24%; Table 6.4) who thought that their police agency would fire police officers who accepted a kickback and the majority of the respondents expected that the police officer who engaged in this behavior should be reassigned (Table 6.4).

However, our respondents’ dominant view about the possible discipline was far from dismissal. In five out of ten scenarios (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback; scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer), or one half of the scenarios, the overwhelming majority of the respondents—at least 75% and in some instances, even 100%—expected no discipline to be meted out (Table 6.4). Additionally, about one half of the respondents did not expect any discipline for scenario 2 (fail to arrest friend with warrant). The results imply that the respondents felt comfortable engaging in these types of misconduct, including some very serious forms of misconduct such as the use of deadly force and the acceptance of a kickback, without fear of discipline from their agencies.

Finally, there were four scenarios (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 7: verbal abuse “Arrest an Asshole Day,” scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating) in which the overwhelming majority of the respondents—97% or more—expected some discipline. In all these cases, they expected the most lenient form of discipline, namely “public reprimand,” despite the fact that some of them included very serious forms of police misconduct, such as stealing from a crime scene.

Third, the exploration of the relation between the expected discipline and respondents' views of misconduct seriousness was also confounded with the fact that there was very limited variability in modal answers, resulting in a large number of scenarios sharing the same rank (five scenarios had the same modal value of "none" and shared the rankings 1–5; four scenarios had the same modal value of "public reprimand" and shared the rankings of 6–9). Although the sizes of the Spearman's correlation coefficients (0.373, n.s., for own perceptions of seriousness and 0.141, n.s., for others' evaluations of seriousness) are suggestive of a positive correlation between the respondents' own views of the misconduct seriousness and the appropriate discipline, these correlation coefficients are not statistically significant.

On the other hand, the correlation between the respondents' evaluations of rule-violating behavior and the expected discipline is statistically significant and negative. Specifically, the more likely they were to recognize the behavior as rule violating, the less likely the respondents were to state that harsher discipline would follow (Spearman's correlation coefficient -0.589 , $p < 0.05$). This relation could be sensitive to the potential methodological and substantive issues affecting the measurement of the rule-violating behavior (e.g., with one exception, the mean values were clustered very closely between 4 and 5; the respondents had most problems recognizing the use of deadly force as rule-violating behavior).

Finally, a comparison of the results for the appropriate and expected discipline indicates that the respondents' views about appropriate discipline and the discipline they expect their agencies to mete out are similar. In particular, modal analysis indicates that the modes were identical in five out of ten scenarios. In three scenarios (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating), the modal expected discipline was harsher than the modal appropriate discipline, suggesting that the respondents would evaluate such discipline as too harsh. For two of the scenarios, the respondents thought that there should be no discipline, while they expected their police agencies to apply some discipline, albeit the least severe discipline possible. On the other hand, there were two scenarios (scenario 7: verbal abuse—"Arrest an Asshole Day"; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback) in which the respondents thought that the harsher discipline is appropriate than the discipline they expected their agencies to mete out.

In eight out of ten scenarios, the distribution of answers across "none," "some discipline," and "dismissal" categories was almost identical, to the point that it was not even possible to calculate the chi-square test (Table 6.4). For example, 100% of the respondents selected "none" as their answer on the question about the appropriate discipline for scenario 10 (false report on drug on dealer) and 100% of the respondents selected "none" as their answer to the question about the expected discipline. In two scenarios (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating), the distribution of answers for the appropriate and expected discipline differed substantially. In both scenarios, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (99%) thought that a police officer who engaged in this behavior should not be disciplined at all, while about the same percent of the respondents (98%) expected that the police agency would mete out some discipline—public

reprimand—for such behavior (Table 6.4). In these two scenarios, the respondents thus perceived any discipline, including the most lenient discipline such as public reprimand, as too harsh.

Finally, the correlation coefficient measuring relation between the respondents' views of the appropriate and expected discipline indicates a moderate correlation (0.357, n.s.) that, at the same time, is not statistically significant.

Willingness to Report Misconduct

The last two questions after each scenario asked the respondents to express how willing they would be to report the described misconduct and to estimate how willing other officers in their agencies would be to do so. The answers ranged on a five-point Likert scale from “definitely not” to “definitely yes.”

An analysis of the means of their own reporting suggests that the code of silence would protect almost all of the behaviors described in the questionnaire (Table 6.5). Specifically, in nine out of ten scenarios, the mean values are clustered on the non-reporting side (all are between 1 and 2), suggesting that the majority of the respondents would be reluctant to report a police officer who engaged in any of these behaviors. In fact, some of the scenarios (e.g., scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer) had means of 1 or very close to 1, indicating a very strong homogeneity of the views. Even in the only scenario with a mean value of above 2 (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force), the mean value is not even reaching the midpoint of the scale. In other words, even for this scenario describing the abuse of the most severe type of force, the mean value stays on the non-reporting side of scale, suggesting that even such behavior would be covered by the code of silence.

The analysis by the type of misconduct is simple. The code of silence seems to be strong and protects all forms of police corruption described in the questionnaire, regardless of whether they include the acceptance of free meals (scenario 1) or the acceptance of a kickback (scenario 9) and the theft from a crime scene (scenario 3). There is some minimal variation within the use of force types of misconduct. In particular, all abuses of the right to use force described in the questionnaire would be protected (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 7: verbal abuse—“Arrest an Asshole Day”; scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt a beating), with the abuse of the deadly force (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force) being the least likely to be protected (Table 6.5).

The respondents' unwillingness to report was closely related to how serious they evaluated the behaviors (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.590, $p < 0.05$); the more serious they perceived the behavior to be, the more likely they were to say that they would report it. Their reporting preferences were also negatively correlated with the likelihood that the behavior is a violation of the official rules (Spearman's correlation coefficient = -0.677, $p < 0.05$); in a counterintuitive manner, the more likely they were to evaluate the behavior as rule violating, the more likely they were to say that they would not report it. Furthermore, the reporting preferences were

Table 6.5 Police officer perceptions of willingness to report

Scenario number and description	Own willingness to report		Others' willingness to report		Mean difference (own—others)	t-test
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank		
Scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants	1.37	4	1.28	2.5	0.09	0.895
Scenario 2: failure to arrest friend with warrant	1.80	8	1.75	6.5	0.05	0.587
Scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene	1.78	7	1.86	8	-0.08	-1.421
Scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force	2.87	10	2.84	10	0.03	1.000
Scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands	1.56	6	1.75	6.5	-0.19	-2.311*
Scenario 6: officer strikes prisoner who hurt partner	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Scenario 7: verbal abuse—"Arrest an Asshole Day"	2.00	9	2.00	9	0.00	N/A ^a
Scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident	1.00	1	1.55	5	-0.55	-6.289***
Scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback	1.28	3	1.28	2.5	0.00	N/A ^a
Scenario 10: false report on drug on dealer	1.01	2	1.29	4	-0.28	-6.438***
Scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating	1.51	5	1.05	1	-0.46	7.029***

^a t-test cannot be computed because the difference was zero and the standard error of the difference was also zero

related to the perceived severity of the expected discipline (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.704, $p < 0.05$); the more severe the discipline they expected, the more likely they were to say that they would report such behavior. At the same time, the estimate of the strength of the relation with the perceptions of severity of appropriate discipline, though non-trivial in magnitude, was not statistically significant (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.409, n.s.).

The analysis of the means for the estimates of others' willingness to report yields very similar results to the analysis of the means for their own willingness to report. Specifically, the results indicate that the code of silence is strong and that it would protect almost all of the behaviors described in the questionnaire (Table 6.5); in nine out of ten scenarios, the mean values are all between 1 and 2, suggesting that the majority of the respondents perceived that their colleagues would be reluctant to report a police officer who engaged in any of these behaviors. The only scenario with a mean above 2 is the only scenario describing the use of deadly force (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force). In this scenario, the mean is above 2, but does not cross the midpoint into the reporting side of the scale. Simply put, the mean value suggests that even abusing deadly force would be protected by the code of silence.

Similarly, the analysis by the type of misconduct reveals little variability. All five scenarios with police corruption examples (scenario 1: free meals, gifts from merchants; scenario 3: theft of knife from crime scene; scenario 5: supervisor offers holiday for errands; scenario 8: cover-up of police DUI accident; scenario 9: auto body shop 5% kickback) have means below 2, suggesting that the officers perceived that other police officers would protect them in silence. Although all three examples of the abuse of force (scenario 4: unjustifiable use of deadly force; scenario 7: verbal abuse—"Arrest an Asshole Day;" scenario 11: Sgt. fails to halt beating) would be protected by the code, the mean value for the use of deadly force scenario (scenario 4) is the highest and, thus, least likely to be protected by the code.

The respondents' estimates of the code of silence among other officers were strongly related to how serious they perceived that other officers would evaluate the scenarios (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.854, $p < 0.01$). The relation with their own estimates of seriousness was neither strong nor was it statistically significant (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.388, n.s.). Their estimates of others' willingness to report yielded statistically significant correlations with neither appropriate discipline (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.349, n.s.) nor expected discipline (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.283, n.s.).

A comparison of the respondents' own willingness to report and their estimates of others' willingness to report reveals that these estimates are very close (Table 6.5);³ in all but one scenario, the differences are small, below the cutoff of 0.50. The cor-

³ The *t*-test could not be computed in two scenarios (scenario 7 and scenario 9) because the difference between the means was zero. The differences were not statistically significant in four scenarios (Table 6.5), and were statistically significant in four scenarios (scenario 5, scenario 8, scenario 10, and scenario 11). However, out of the latter four scenarios, the application of the rule of thumb suggests that the differences were large and meaningful in only one case—scenario 8.

relation analysis also supports the view that these two measures are closely related (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.744, $p < 0.01$).

The only scenario in which the difference is above 0.50 is scenario 8 (cover-up of police DUI accident). In this scenario, the respondents assumed that others would be somewhat more likely to report than they would. The respondents evaluated this scenario as the least serious by the respondents, but they also thought that the others would evaluate it as somewhat more serious. At the same time, the respondents both expected no discipline and supported such a disciplinary outcome.

Conclusion

As Cheloukhine and Haberfeld (2011) assert, the phenomenon of corruption in Russia has penetrated political, economic, judicial, and social systems so thoroughly that it has ceased to be a deviation from the norm and has become the norm itself. A government plagued by corruption will tend to rely on a corrupt law enforcement agency that will not only facilitate the existence of such government but, in addition, will develop its own modality of misconduct. The effects of the larger environment and the culture tolerant of police misconduct are traceable in our empirical findings. On the one hand, the overwhelming majority of the officers were able to recognize that all the forms of misconduct included in the questionnaire constitute violations of the official rules. On the other hand, with the exception of the use of deadly force, they did not perceive that any of the described forms of misconduct were serious and, accordingly, approved and expected no severe discipline. In the environment in which corruption is entrenched into everyday life and everything is for sale (see, e.g., Kosals 2010), the acceptance of kickbacks (scenario 9) and thefts from the crime scene (scenario 3) are the new "normal." In the situation in which planting of evidence on innocent people and falsification of official records to bust the arrest records are occurring on a regular basis (see, e.g., Dymovsky 2009), falsification of a police record (scenario 10) and a failure to exercise an arrest warrant on a friend (scenario 2) are also becoming the new "normal."

For the past two decades, the perceptions of Russian citizens of its police force have been consistently negative (e.g., Semukhina 2014b). Various international surveys, from the International Crime Victimization Survey and the World Value Survey, to the New Europe Barometer and the European Social Survey, demonstrate that, compared to the level of confidence in the police in other countries, the level of confidence in the Russian police is quite low (Semukhina 2014b). Despite the police reforms carried over the years (e.g., Kosals 2010), distrust toward the police remains very high, to the point that citizens actually avoid all contacts with the police, both as an organization and with the police officers are its representatives (Semukhina and Reynold 2014).

Some highly publicized police scandals may have had an additional influence on the way the Russian citizens view its police. Such negative perception of the organization and its employees can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which police officers whose behaviors are already condemned by the population they serve become more tolerant of its own misconduct. The subcultural themes of “being on the side of the angels” (Crank and Caldero 2001) can contribute to the way police officers interpret violations of organizational rules, especially under constant criticism and distrust from the public they are charged to protect.

On a positive note, despite the corrupt governmental institutions in Russia, it is encouraging to discover that there is indeed a quite clear recognition, at least in police officer perceptions, that the behaviors described in our questionnaire represent various kinds of professional misconduct. On a more somber note, however, it is also quite clear that the respondents, despite the awareness of rule-violating behaviors, did not think that serious disciplinary action should be applied.

References

- Barabanov, I., & Aronov, N. (2010). Raby OMONa, *The New Times*, January 2, 2010.
- Burger, E., & Cheloukhine, S. (2013). *Counterterrorism in areas of political unrest: The case of Russia's Northern Caucasus*. New York: Springer.
- Cheloukhine, S. (2008). Problem of policing economic crime in Russia. *Law Enforcement Executive Forum Journal*, 8(4), 185–193.
- Cheloukhine, S. (2009). Corruption as a Condition Promoting Infiltration of Organized Crime into the System of Public Service. In G. Barkovsky & V. Vereschagin (Eds.), *Russian anti-corruption policy*. Russia: Rostov Law School Press.
- Cheloukhine, S., & Habersfeld, M. R. (2011). *Russian organized corruption networks and its international trajectories*. New York: Springer.
- Cheloukhine, S., & King, J. (2007). Corruption networks as a sphere of investment activities in modern Russia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 40(1), 107–122.
- Crank, J., & Caldero, M. (2001). *Police Ethics: The Corruption of Noble Cause*. Cincinnati: LexisNexis.
- Dymovsky, A. (2009). Russian police officer's message to Vladimir Putin. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=38Ma_kSJWS4. Accessed 22 Jan 2014.
- European Social Survey. (2008). ESS Round 4. www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
- Galeotti, M. (Ed.) (2010). *The politics of security in modern Russia*. Ashgate.
- Galeotti, M. (2011). Medvedev's Law on Police: A quiet revolution? <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mark-galeotti/medvedev%E2%80%99s-law-on-police-quiet-revolution>. Accessed 9 Sep 2014.
- Galleotti, M. (2012). Purges, power and purpose: Medvedev's 2011 police reforms. *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, 13, 1–32.
- Getty, A., Rittersporn, G. T., & Zemskov, V. N. (1993). Victims of the Soviet penal system in the pre-war years: a first approach on the basis of archival evidence. *The American Historical Review*, 98(4), 1017–1049.
- Gudkov, L., & Dubin, B. (2006). Privatizatsiya Politsii/Index proizvola pravoohranitelnykh organov: otsenki sotciologov I kommentarii pravozashitnikov. M.: Obshestvennyi verdict. 2005. p. 11–13 (*Гудков Л., Дубин Б. Приватизация полиции // Индекс произвола правоохранительных органов: оценки социологов и комментарии правозащитников. М.: Общественный вердикт, 2005. С. 11–33*).

- Harding, L. (2009). Russian police officer sacked after exposing corruption on home videoblog. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/09/russia-police-videoblog>. Accessed 9 Nov 2009.
- Klockars, C. B. (2006). The contemporary crises of marxist criminology. *Criminology*. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.1979.tb01389.x (7 Mar 2006).
- Kolennikova, O., Kosals, L., Ryvkina, R., Simagin, Y., & Wilson, D. G. (2008). The 'economic activities' of the Russian police. *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 10, 37–40.
- Kosals, L. (2010). Police in Russia: reform or business restructuring? *Russian Analytical Digest*, 84(19), 2–7.
- Levy, C. J. (2010). Videos rouse Russian anger toward police. *New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/world/europe/28russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed 28 July 2010.
- Maxim, T. (2010). Moscow cop jailed over supermarket rampage. CNN, February 19, 2010. <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/02/19/russia.cop.jailed/>
- McCarthy, L. (2014). The day-to-day work of the Russian police. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 151(30), 5–8.
- New World Encyclopedia. (2013). Russian Federation. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Russian_Federation. Accessed 24 Jan 2014.
- Poduzov, S. (2010). Is police reform taking place in Russia: a view from the regions. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 84(19), 8–9.
- Pustintsev, B. (2000). Police reform in Russia: Obstacles and opportunities. *Policing and Society: An International Journal*, 10(1), 79–90.
- Russia Today. (2011). Russia's rebranded police initiated with major layoffs. <http://rt.com/politics/police-reform-major-layoff/>. Accessed 24 Jan 2014.
- Russian Analytical Digest. (2010). Reputation and reform: opinions on the Russian militia. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 84(19), 10–13.
- Russian Federal State Statistics Service. (2011). http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/
- Semukhina, O. (2014a). Public contacts with Russian police in life-threatening situations. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 3(2), 12.
- Semukhina, O. (2014b). From militia to police: the path of Russian law enforcement reforms. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 151(30), 1–4.
- Semukhina, O. B., & Reynolds, K. M. (2013). *Understanding the Modern Russian Police*. Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor&Francis Group.
- Slade, G. (2010). Russia: crisis, crime, and police reform. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/gavin-slade/russia-crisis-crime-and-police-reform>. Accessed 28 Jan 2014.
- The Constitution of the Russian Federation. (1993). <http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm>. Accessed 22 Jan 2014.
- Transparency International. (2013). Global Corruption Barometer. <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=russia>. Accessed 29 Jan 2014.
- Transparency International. (2014). Corruption Perceptions Index. <http://www.transparency.org/search>. Accessed 29 Jan 2014.
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime. (1994). *The Fifth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1990–1994)*. <http://www.uncjin.org/Statistics/WCTS/WCTS5/wcts5.html>. Accessed 30 Jan 2014.
- Wheatcroft, S. G., Davies, R. W., & Cooper, J. M. (1986). Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered: some preliminary conclusions about economic development between 1926 and 1941. *Economic history review, new series*, 39(2), 264–294.
- (CIA) World Factbook. (2014). Russia. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>. Accessed 2 Mar 2014.