

Public Administration, Governance and Globalization

Alexander R. Dawoody *Editor*

Public Administration and Policy in the Middle East



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Public Administration, Governance and Globalization

Ali Farazmand, Series Editor

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Editor

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Contents

Civil Society and Democratic Governance in Turkey: Prospects and Challenges	1
Naim Kapucu	
Democratic Governance Reforms in Turkey and Their Implications	25
Hüseyin Gül and Hakan M. Kiriş	
Dynamics of Post-crisis Reform in Public Policy: The Case of Education Policy in Turkey	61
Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ	
Challenges to Governance Reform and Accountability in Egypt	83
Jennifer Bremer	
The Evolution of Corruption and Optimal Level of Corruption Reduction: Evidence from Cross-Country Studies	103
Hamid E. Ali	
Iraq's Revolutionary Cul-de-Sacs	115
Samir Rihani	
Iraq's Pressing Need to Legally Binding Conceptual and Procedural Models for Public Policy Making	129
Kaa'ed Al-Hashimi	
The Innovative Approach for Accounting and Accountability of Government Revenues in Iraq	143
Talal A. Al-Kassar, Mahmoud Al-Wadi, and Alexander Dawoody	

The Role of Organizational Culture and Management Behavior in Organizational Innovation: A Case Study of the Agricultural Extension Organization (AEO) in Iran	163
Ahmad Yaghoubi-Farani, Iraj Malek Mohammadi, and Reza Movahedi	
Saudi Arabia and the Mirage of Decentralization	173
Mohamad G. Alkadry	
Decentralization in Lebanon	189
Thomas W. Haase and Randa Antoun	
The Third Wheel in Public Policy: An Overview of NGOs in Lebanon	215
Khaldoun AbouAssi	
Solving Problems Informally: The Influence of Israel’s Political Culture on the Public Policy Process	231
Nissim Cohen	
The Management of Museums in Sharjah	247
Daniel Simonet and Clément Vincent	
Public Policy Making Process in the United Arab Emirates	263
Simon H. Okoth	
Governance Challenges in Bangladesh	281
Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Md. Shahriar Islam	
Implementation of Policy to Control Industrial Pollution in Bangladesh: Major Drawbacks	297
Md. Shahriar Islam	
The Arab Spring of 2011: A Perspective	319
Alexander Dawoody	
Restructuring the Hierarchy of Needs: A Case for Sound Governance in the Middle East	341
Alexander Dawoody	

Introduction

Nearly 3,500 years ago, the arts and science of administration was discovered by the scribes of Mesopotamia. Administration then became a viable tool for the foundation of the first state in history, known as Akkad. Administration was also the main responsible element for the creation of writing, an instrument that early Mesopotamian scribes needed in order to record offerings to the temples.

Administration in the Middle East continued to flourish, giving birth and sustainability to many powerful empires, such as the Persian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Umayyad, and Abbasid empires. Because of such sophistication in administrative affairs, universities, libraries, hospitals, cities, irrigation systems, and military industries were created. Although governance was marred by socio-political conflicts and often manipulated administration for the benefits of the ruling oligarchies at the expense of vast sectors within the population (with the exception of periodical manifestation of sound governance as reflective of impulse by few extraordinary rulers, such as Cyrus the Great, Darius, Hammurabi, Ommar bib Al-Khattab, Muawiyah bin Abu Sufyan, Jaffar Al-Manur, Haron Al-Rasheed, and Al-Mamoon, than a systemic development), the arts and science of administration was responsible for transforming the region into a center of important achievements in philosophy, science, music, poetry, and arts for more than five centuries.

Regrettably, however, and particularly after the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 and the destruction of most administrative systems of the Abbasid state, the Middle East as a region sunk into an abyss that had never recovered from to date. Subsequent foreign invasions, internal strife, and economic disparities further exacerbated the situation and contributed to the demise.

Governance in the Middle East today is experiencing a cocktail of authoritarian to marginal democratic systems. Decades of manipulating governmental apparatus in order to siphon public resources for the benefits of the ruling oligarchies and justifying prolonged family and tribal grip on power through various facades of demagoguery had created a system of dysfunction that exhibits corruption, ineffectiveness, nepotism, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, censorship, and oppressive

police state. However, marginal reforms, either in response to popular demands or uprisings or due to the foresight of some extra-ordinary leaders, are also emerging in various parts of the region. Although the reform remains to be slow, anemic, and minimal, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction that may contain the pregnant-seeds for larger and more robust reforms that may yield the legal framework for true progress toward sound governance.

Within this trajectory administration is trying to catch up by mimicking other models in the world while losing originality, innovation, and effectiveness that is particular to the region. Such incapacitation is disabling the effective role of administration and rendering it as a separate entity that is tightly connected to the dictation of the political branch and its whims than becoming a true guardian for public affairs.

This book deals with various issues of governance in the Middle East that exhibit some of these characteristics and addresses the endemic challenges residing with public policy and administration in the Middle East. As a first volume of such analysis of issues of governance in the Middle East in a series by the Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration (AMEPPA), the book tangles complex issues through specific case studies and analysis, dividing the approach into the examination of various issues in public affairs in three types of state blocks based on size and complexity: larger states (represented by Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) and smaller states (represented by Lebanon, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and Bangladesh).

It is worth noticing that the grouping of cases in such manner does not negate the historic, political, social, cultural, and economic differences between the grouped states. Perhaps at times there may be more commonality between a larger and a smaller state in the Middle East than between the larger or smaller groups themselves. However, and for the sake of referencing we deemed grouping based on size was more useful for identification purposes than based on issues, especially when issues of public policy and administration in the Middle East are so complex and relative to the particularity of the individual state. In our next volume we perhaps can approach grouping case analysis based on issues and give the reader another perspective of emerging issues of public policy and administration in the Middle East.

The first chapter of this book is by Naim Kapucu. In this chapter, Naim addresses the issue of civil society and democratic governance in Turkey. According to Naim, there is debate regarding the definition of civil society and its development. However, today civil society is perceived as one of the main actors in public policy and decision-making processes. The chapter defines the concept of civil society and its development in western societies. Further, the chapter presents a brief background of civil society in Turkey and provides a spectrum of civil society organizations from the country. The role of training and capacity building and the educational capacity of educational institutions are also analyzed in this chapter with an emphasis on the influence of civil society on Turkish democratic governance.

The second chapter also looks at Turkey and addresses the issue of democratic governance reforms and their implications. In this chapter, Hüseyin Gül and Hakan M. Kiriş look at Turkey, as a rapidly developing and changing country, has undergone extensive administrative, political, and economic reforms since the late 1990s.

These reforms have helped realign the powers, functions, and relations of the central government and local administrations, the state, the market, and the civil society. As a result of the recent reforms and a strong one-party government and political stability since 2002, Turkey has achieved a steady and high economic development and improved its governance system. Yet, there still seems to be some shortcomings and problems, and thus a need for further institutional change and reforms in Turkey, particularly in the areas of democratization, central–local government relations, human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, political party, and election systems. The first goal of this chapter is first to present and discuss the recent wave of reforms in Turkey and their contents and driving forces. For this purpose, a short review of the administrative and political system in Turkey and its historical development is presented. The second goal is to assess and examine the contents of the reforms in the areas of economic liberalization, decentralization, deregulation, governance, among others. The final goal is to make some comments about the transformation of the governance system in Turkey and discuss its implications and future prospects. In this respect, the chapter concludes that the future reform efforts should be focused on the creation and implementation of real and functional participatory and democratic governance processes and mechanisms at the national, regional, and local levels along with the enhancement of the political system, democracy, and the rule of law in Turkey.

The third chapter looks at Turkey from the dynamics of post-crisis reform in public policy and examines it as a case of education policy. In this chapter, Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ aims to investigate how crises translate into major changes in public policy, in the case of education policy in Turkey. He indicates that the post-crisis interventions of governments tend to redistribute the fiscal burden on public purse by employing a three-level preference set: economic policy priorities versus social policy priorities; among the sectors belonging to the same policy family; and among different levels/institutions of the same policy field. The chapter, thus, attempts to develop a categorization of post-crisis reform strategies departing from the findings of the empirical analysis.

The fourth chapter is by Jennifer Bremer as she discusses challenges to governance reform and accountability in Egypt. According to Jennifer, the Egyptian Revolution of January 2011 has arguably changed the landscape for public governance and accountability in Egypt. It has not yet had a discernible impact on governance itself, however. Jennifer aims to examine Egypt's governance challenges post-Revolution. While the author herself question whether the term "revolution" is appropriate to describe what has happened in Egypt, she follows the prevailing usage in Egypt and applies the term to describe the events of early 2011 and the transitional period that has followed. The discussion begins with a brief examination of the country's public governance landscape, describing the structure of government, the historical legacy, and the political and institutional setting within which governance reform must proceed. Following this overview, the chapter will offer two brief case studies chosen for their importance to governance reform in Egypt: decentralization to improve local governance and e-government to improve accountability. The chapter concludes with a look forward, to the extent that future directions can be glimpsed at all in the current uncertain environment.

The fifth chapter addresses the evolution of corruption and optimal level of corruption reduction in Africa, with particular attention to Sudan. In this chapter, Hamid Ali investigates the causes of corruption are associated with particular historical, cultural tradition, level of economic development, political institutions, and government policies. According to Hamid, history can repeat itself, and historical patterns corruption emerged in stages as country's total productivity increases. It becomes a conventional wisdom that poor countries are corrupt than rich countries and so does Europe dated back few centuries. Hamid discusses the extent to which corruption as an evolutionary phenomenon is driven by institutional development in the context of the modern African states. Second, the chapter examines the optimal level in corruption reduction by reconstructing the history of institutional development using GDP as a proxy measure of institutional and economic development in Africa in the context of market economy. The evolution of corruption is observed while focusing on cross-sectional account of GDP as determinant of corruption level. The chapter uses perceived corruption index and group countries as pre-modern, modern, and post-modern corruption countries and reconstructs dense series of countries for the period 1998–2009. As the GDP expand, society leaps from one rudimentary stage of corruption to the next stage where corruption tends to covert with higher rewards before they are leveled-off when GDP growth accelerates. In other word, the evolution of corruption inverts a U-shape by using world historical experience and much of the predictive or explanatory power rests with countries' level of GDP. Reduction of corruption is costly at pre-modern and modern corruption stages. At no time corruption is able to be reduced to a zero and society must accept some level of corruption with minimum marginal costs.

The sixth chapter is by Samir Rihani and it addresses the issue of Iraq's Revolutionary Cul-de-Sacs. The chapter, however, is not about agonies of Iraq: a simple Internet search will yield thousands of highly depressing documents on the subject. It is also not about a US/Israeli conspiracy against Arab countries: Arabic sources have not left much to be said on this subject. The focus considers instead the sustainability of countries that have met with stress over a long period. Iraq with its coup-de-tats, wars, sanctions, and communal conflicts presents a useful case study, but the conclusions drawn are applicable to other locations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

According to Samir, Iraq has endured half a century of coup-de-tats, wars, and lately ethnic and religious divisions. Deterioration accelerated rapidly after the 2003 war. That event seems to have been the starting gun for a revised US policy for MENA that emerged openly in 2005/2006 when Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State at the time, described an approach based on "creative chaos" to forge a "new Middle East." Her statements coincided with a flurry of activity on a project called the "Broader Middle East and North Africa." Annual meetings were held from 2004 in Sea Island, Rabat, Manama, and the Dead Sea. It is difficult to establish whether current turmoil in MENA is a product of that US policy but it is not possible to dismiss a linkage either.

The chapter also seeks to provide explanations of how continual turmoil intentional or otherwise, seriously compromised Iraq's performance as a complex

adaptive system. It is perhaps helpful to point out that reference to “creative chaos” has links to complexity theories. Deteriorating conditions have generated a number of responses; from calls (mainly by foreign commentators) for division of Iraq into statelets drawn on ethnic and religious grounds, to accusations (mainly by Middle Eastern commentators) of ill-intentions, planned and executed by international, regional, and domestic conspirators. However, looking at Iraq as a complex adaptive system that does not respond well to brute force and command and control, see later, provides a more plausible explanation of what befell Iraq, and by implication what might be usefully done to rectify matters. It has become quite clear, however, that the process of regeneration must be seen as a long-term task devoted to improving Iraq’s social capital by focus on education and health of all its citizens regardless of religious and ethnic affiliations coupled with sustained improvement to governance throughout Iraq’s social and political structure.

The seventh chapter in the book also addresses Iraq and focuses on Iraq’s pressing need to legally binding conceptual and procedural models for public policy making. In this chapter, Kaa’ed Al-Hashimi addresses the issue of absence of any legal text to impose any rational approach to formulate, implement, and evaluate public policies in Iraq as official decision makers and policy drafters tend to improvise and they can’t be held responsible for whatever policies they draft and/or adopt. The inevitable results of such a demerit are inefficient public services delivery, corrupted public sector known for being one of the most corrupted in the world, and thus unsatisfied citizens. What really needed for the federal and local governments of Iraq to enhance their performance is unified legally binding conceptual and procedural models for formulating, implementing, and evaluating public policies they adopt to address Iraq’s public issues. The chapter is an applied study of the public policy-making process currently practiced in Iraq. It, in addition, reviews and elaborates on the relevant legal framework of Iraq. It also presents and recommends a rational conceptual model specially customized for this country’s situation to be legislated and adopted by Iraqi governments. It also recommends translating this conceptual model into a procedural model by which clear responsibilities and specific time frames are explained and imposed.

The eighth chapter also addresses Iraq and the innovative approach for accounting and accountability of government revenues. In this chapter, Talal A. Al-Kassar, Mahmoud Al-Wadi, and Alexander Dawoody indicate that accountability of government revenue procedures is sufficient, adequate, and well developed and illustrates new control bodies that parliament has created (such as the Commission of Integrity) in addition to the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) to fight financial and managerial corruption. The chapter covers both theoretical and empirical aspects. The theoretical side includes literature review, defining the accountability, audit of revenues, performance audit, taxation policy, and the sources of governmental income. While the empirical side includes studying the economic influence of government revenues in Iraq, different sources of government income, governmental control bodies, and the auditing procedures used by the BSA. The chapter also considers how the contribution of oil revenue and tax revenues can be measured. It shows that the Iraqi Government depends almost totally on oil revenues (about 93 %

in 2012). The situation has deteriorated since 2003, when Iraq was first occupied, in spite of increased revenue from taxation. Finally, the chapter highlights that the State should increase its role from different organizations to control all expenditures and develop revenue streams in other sectors. Although there is an emphasis on financial and budgetary measures for financial accountability, the use of non-financial measures in determining outcome accountability is increasing.

Moving from Iraq to Iran, ninth chapter addresses the role of organizational culture and management behavior in organizational innovation through a case study of the agricultural extension organization (AEO) in Iran. In this chapter, Ahmad Yaghoubi-Farani, Iraj Malek Mohammadi, and Reza Movahedi explain that in order to achieve new ideas and know how to manage innovation successfully, organizational development is one of the most serious challenges facing management. Although organizational innovativeness is a complicated phenomenon which involves many organizational and environmental factors, the chapter has mainly focused on two important factors: management behavior and organizational culture. The main purpose of this chapter is to explore how management behavior and organizational culture can affect organizational innovation in the Agricultural Extension Organization (AEO). The study has used both correlation and descriptive-analytic methodologies. A sample of 215 expert employees (at least B.Sc. holders) of AEO was randomly selected. The data were collected by using the questionnaire and processed within SPSS. The questionnaire as a research tool was initially developed based on an extensive review of literature and finalized after both pre-testing and face validity review by a team of experts. The data were collected by an interviewing team using the questionnaire. Results showed that despite the importance of the two organizational factors, organizational culture, and managerial behavior, these factors were not supportive enough for facilitating a suitable environment for organizational innovation in AEO. Moreover, a rather low level of organizational innovation was observed, as well as positive relationships were found between organizational factors and organizational innovation. In order to change the organizational structure of AEO based on organizational innovation, it was recommended that informal organizational relationships should be encouraged, a decentralized planning system, and participatory decision making need to be applied, and formal, hierarchical, and complicated control should be eliminated.

In the tenth chapter Mohamad G. Alkadry addresses the issue of decentralization in Saudi Arabia. According to Mohamad and without taking a position on centralization versus decentralization, local government hierarchies in Saudi Arabia seem to suggest a higher degree of decentralization, while the actual separation of powers between local and national levels of government suggests a high degree of centralization. This raises questions about electoral politics at the local level—where little power resides. The chapter provides a thorough background on Saudi's demographic, political, administrative, and economic conditions. Then, it considers the issues that are specific to local governance including local government structure and organization. The final section addresses the main claim of this chapter about the effectiveness of local governance in Saudi Arabia and makes some recommendations.

Moving from larger states to smaller states, Thomas Haase and Randa Antoun start in the eleventh chapter by addressing the issue of decentralization in Lebanon. According to Tom and Randa, the Ta'if Accord, which brought a formal conclusion to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989), mandates that the Lebanese government implement wide-scale decentralization at the level of local administrative units. The signatories of the Ta'if Accord anticipated that administrative decentralization would provide Lebanese citizens, particularly those in rural communities, with the capacity to participate in local government, and consequently, greater social and economic prosperity. Notwithstanding the significance of these aspirations, in the years since the conclusion of the Civil War, Lebanon has made little practical progress toward the adoption and implementation of policies related to administrative decentralization.

While the Ta'if Accord has provided Lebanon with a framework for political stability, its terminology has created a situation whereby policy discussions about administrative decentralization have become intertwined with notions of political authority and other forms of decentralization. If the Lebanese state actually intends to pursue administrative decentralization, then these discussions must be placed within a context that enables policy makers to transform the aspirations of the Ta'if Accord into practical reality. To succeed in this endeavor requires that contemporary discussions about decentralization move beyond general descriptions of what could, or should, be done. Contemporary discussions must also seek the diagnosis of administrative problems, at both the national and municipal levels, and link these diagnoses with prescription, or how to best remedy these administrative problems. It is only through the proper identification of these linkages that policy makers will be able to confront Lebanon's administrative problems, which may or may not be resolved by reforms that encourage administrative decentralization.

The eleventh chapter contributes to ongoing discussions about decentralization within the Republic of Lebanon. To this end, the authors of the chapter do not argue that reforms based upon notions of administrative decentralization are an appropriate solution for the country's administrative problems. Nor do they advance specific recommendations as to how Lebanese policy makers should formulate the content of comprehensive legislation that would bring about wide-scale administrative decentralization. It is the community of stakeholders within Lebanon's complex, and often confrontational, political processes who make such determinations. The purpose of this chapter is more contextual: to clarify important elements of Lebanon's long-standing dance with decentralization, especially for those interested research on the country's administrative system.

The chapter also opens with an overview of the various forms of decentralization, with specific attention directed toward the mechanisms of administrative decentralization. The subsequent sections provide an overview of Lebanon's primary administrative structures, the Lebanese Municipal Act of 1977, and why the Ta'if Accord does not, in isolation, provide policy makers with the guidance they need to formulate reforms based upon notions of administrative decentralization. Moving beyond the language of the Accord, the chapter then directs attention toward the factors that may explain why Lebanon has not made any progress toward administrative decentralization. The chapter concludes with a review of some of the

general recommendations that have been advanced by Lebanese researchers and policy makers on the matter of administrative decentralization. To the extent that this chapter does advance a central argument, it is that Lebanese policy makers have at their disposal a wide variety of options, many of which only require the central government to decide not to execute its administrative authority, which if pursued could move Lebanon toward administrative decentralization without comprehensive national legislation.

Also addressing Lebanon and the issue of NGOs as a third wheel, Khaldoun AbuAssi discusses in twelfth chapter that Lebanon is relatively a small country in the Middle East with an area of 4,035.5172 sq. miles and a population of 3,759,136 (CSA 2007). The geographical location at the Mediterranean Sea and the diversity in the socio-cultural milieu favored Lebanon as a bridge between the East and the West. Before the civil war (1975–1990), the country witnessed an economic boom and was the spotlight of the world; Lebanon was labeled as the Switzerland of the East to characterize its unique status. Khaldoun continues to state that Lebanon has a very rich history. The history could be traced back to the Phoenicians, as evident in the various archeological excavations, and had been definitely shaped and transformed by the Arab heritage and civilization. Although all Lebanese are supposedly equal before the law, in reality they have serious limitations on citizens' rights. Adding to this is the widespread of corruption in the public sector caused further citizens' alienation. Government effectiveness is rated at -0.64 and the control of corruption at -0.83 . Lebanon's political stability is estimated to be -1.94 and the rule of law at -0.73 . There is no separation between state and religion. On the contrary, religious leaders are key players in the political arena and even in the civil lives of people. Each religion has its traditions and institutions recognized and supported by the government. Civil status affairs are strictly organized according to and by each of the 18 religious communities; seculars have failed to introduce a voluntary civil marriage into the Lebanon society due to the furious opposition of religious leaders. In many cases, publications and productions are withdrawn and suspended under the pressure of religious institutions. These institutions also own material properties and have extended arms in the private and NGO sectors. Amidst all this, NGOs tend to halt their activities in periods of political conflict in order to avoid being affiliated with any side; in cases of emergencies, some NGOs shift their interest and focus to relief efforts. Disappointingly, NGOs continue to fail civil society in their unsuccessful efforts to ease political tensions. In addition, some NGOs feel pressured by political or religious groups that do not agree with their mission and objectives; these NGOs might decide to exit specific areas if not suspend their activities.

Moving from Lebanon to Israel, Nissim Cohen addresses in the thirteenth chapter the issue of solving problems informally by examining the influence of Israel's political culture on the public policy process. In this chapter, Nissim describes and explains the informal influence of Israeli political culture on the public policy process. He demonstrates how informal elements are rooted in Israeli society and are an integral part of its public policy and administration. Specifically, he explains the impact of a particular type of political culture, called "alternative politics" in the

Israeli literature, on public policy and institutional settings. Alternative politics is based on a “do-it-yourself” approach adopted by citizens to address their dissatisfaction with governmental services. When such a mode of political culture is diffused to all sectors and levels of society, all players, including bureaucrats and politicians, are guided by short-term considerations and apply unilateral strategies that bypass formal rules either through illegal activity or by marginalizing formal rules. Hence, the notion of alternative politics is not confined only to the Israeli experience, as elements of this issue emerge as part of the dialogue about political culture in Arab countries, as well as in other societies around the world.

The fourteenth chapter examines the Management of museums in Sharjah (in the United Arab Emirates). In this chapter, Daniel Simonet (with concluding remarks by Clément Vincent) notes that the role of museums in the Arab world has recently become an important topic of discussion. Sharjah is the third largest of the seven Emirates, which together form the United Arab Emirates. With a settlement in existence for over 5,000 years, Sharjah embarked on an ambitious program of cultural development, winning the prestigious UNESCO award of being “The Cultural capital of the Arab world” in 1998. Its cultural strategy confirms the vital role that culture plays in developing a sense of community that aims at developing people’s inherited artistic and aesthetic sense. In contrast to other more tourist-oriented Arab destinations like Egypt, cultural tourism in the GCC region is still relatively new with Sharjah seeking a distinctive niche. While Dubai promotes itself as a leisure destination, Sharjah plans to focus on its history, culture, and heritage. Museums offer kaleidoscopic opportunities for education, knowledge creation, and self-development for individuals, communities, and societies. The existence of a cultural hub makes significant contribution to Sharjah’s economy. The emirate received 1.5 million visitors in 2008, a significant increase from 600,000 visitors in 2001. Twenty-seven percent of these tourists were from GCC states. Developing a successful cultural hub poses many challenges. Accordingly, Daniel attempts to answer what makes museums popular and what factors explain their success, and, what are the main barriers to museum development and how can one foster a museum-going culture?

The fifteenth chapter examines another issue in United Arab Emirates by focusing on the issue of public policy-making process. In this chapter, Simon H. Okoth explains that as “governance” gains momentum as one of the trajectories of the twenty-first century, the interest among ordinary citizens and practitioners in understanding how governments make policies is picking up speed as well. Simon explores how policy agenda is set, formulated, and comes into law in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Selected theoretical models of policy making and how each might explain this important activity in the UAE are also examined.

Moving from the United Arab Emirates to Bangladesh as the final small state in our public policy and administration examinations, sixteenth and seventeenth chapters pay particular attention to the issues of policy and governance in Bangladesh. In the sixteenth chapter Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Shahriar Islam talk about the issue of governance challenges in Bangladesh by asserting that Bangladesh is confronted with a number of governance challenges. The authors analyze three major governance challenges facing the country. All these challenges

have far-reaching implications for the future progress and development of the country unless properly addressed. First and foremost challenge is the institutionalization of the democratic governance system in the country. Second, eradicating corruption from the polity is one of the most important challenges of today. Corruption has spread like cancer in all walks of life throughout the nook and corner of the country. Third, avoiding the tendency to politicize public services for narrow personal, group and political interest is another key challenge of governance in Bangladesh. Politicization of public services is a continuing practice since the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country in 1971. Quick mitigation of the three challenges will enable institutionalization of democracy, eradication of the curse of corruption and merit and performance-based public service. At the end of the day effectively facing the governance challenges will benefit citizens of the country.

In the seventeenth chapter Shahriar Islam returns to examine the implementation of policy to control industrial pollution in Bangladesh. In this chapter, Shahriar explains that the implementation of policy is very much important as the success of any policy depends upon the implementation thereof. He then attempts to find out the major drawbacks in implementation of policies made to control industrial pollution in Bangladesh. Despite having an industrial policy Bangladesh faced a mass unplanned industrialization in some particular areas which could create severe damage to the local and national environment. Analysis of institutional and administrative system to control industrial pollution by implementing relevant policy affirms absence of laws, acts, and regulations based on contemporary economic condition of the country, lack of enough efficient and neutral street level bureaucrats, partiality in policy implementation, corrupt and politically motivated maneuvering of policy implementation system and deficiency of latest technology are the major drawbacks of industrial pollution control policy implementation.

Finally, in the eighteenth and nineteenth chapters I address the issue of governance in the Middle East as a regional by examining the Arab Spring in the eighteenth chapter and the challenges to sound governance in the nineteenth chapter. In the eighteenth chapter I state that stability is often used in linear analysis as an excuse for suppressing unobserved risks and system volatility. This is in order to sustain systemic order through artificial engineering beyond its natural collapse. In public policy, decision-makers follow this dangerous path that often results in crisis, and then try to explain causality by looking at the last event as a catalyst. Blaming the bubble is an example during the financial crisis or the rise in the prices of goods or unemployment as the catalyst for the revolutions in the Middle East. This naïve analysis avoids looking at the entire system, especially the ups and downs caused by systemic volatility and observation low-probability risks under the surface that may not appear on the horizon but eventually makes the system extremely fragile and bring it to collapse. Hence, eighteenth chapter looks at issues of volatility and low-probability tail risks in a complex system analysis of selected policy issues. The chapter examines the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East and how policy makers in the USA missed reading the low-probability indicator. It observes the political dynamics in the Middle East from a complexity point of

view, offering causal explanations of the factors that went into the making of these revolutions, and lessons to be learned from these dynamics.

In the final chapter, I use Abraham Maslow's hierarchal structure in order to examine challenges to governance in the Middle East as a case study. Maslow placed basic human needs for food and shelter at the bottom of the pyramid. Then, he placed security and safety as the next stage in the structure. However, one cannot move to the second step until he has secured access to the first stage. The third stage in the hierarchal structure is preserved to sentiments and belonging. A person who had secured stages one and two in the hierarchal order can now move to this third stage. The progression in the hierarchal order of needs continues, until one reaches the final stage in the pyramid: achieving self-actualization. Progression through needs, according to Maslow, is bottom-up, moving upward through stages that start with attaining physiological needs, moving upward until reaching self-actualization.

Accordingly, public policy builds on Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It identifies social programs as stage one in policy construction, moving upward toward security, and continuing until reaching self-actualization in attaining the American regime values. Due to national security, however, public policy often juggles between these steps, placing importance on safety while downgrading other needs. The result is mis-prioritization of various elements in societal needs and the impediment in reaching the actualization of the policy itself. This is especially true in the Middle East where security issues take precedence over other needs in governmental policies.

Sound governance based on complexity sciences remedy this defect by reconstructing the hierarchal structure of needs into a multi-dimensional, interconnected network. Within this network there is no starting or ending points. All stages are treated as interconnected parts of one whole that relate to one another through collaborative, interactive, and dynamic relationships without control. The symbiotic relationship between the network and its environment enables it to adapt to change through mutual causality and feedback loop and attain self-actualization through the dynamics of processes and being in the moment.

The chapter reworks Maslow's hierarchy of needs in public policy according to sound governance based on complexity sciences. It offers a reconstruction of such hierarchy that is complex, multi-dimensional and benefits from the processes of agent-based model, whereby each need is treated as autonomous agent interconnected with other needs within a dynamic network that is better capable in dealing with change in its environment and better able to adapt, self-organize, and allow for collapse of older structures through phase shifts and morphology in order for newer and more dynamic structures to emerge.

All these nineteen chapters address specific public policy and administration issues in the Middle East. We are mindful that other cases from countries such as Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, Qatar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan were not included. However, this is the first volume of a series in such an attempt. The next volumes will include cases from these countries in hope of reflecting a comprehensive view of issues of governance in the region of the Middle East.

The main theme of this volume is an assessment of national strategies for reform in public administration and policy, how these strategies have fared in implementation and what challenges must be overcome to achieve real and sustainable progress. The main objectives of the book are to present different examples of specific public policy and administration issues in the Middle East so that policy makers (both in the region and the world who are interested in the Middle East), as well as practitioners, scholars, and graduate students can utilize the book as a study guide to better understand various dynamics in governance in the Middle East. This approach enables the volume to bridge global perspectives on governance development with regional perspectives and experience, bringing shared expertise, intellectual inquisitiveness, and experience in the professional practice of public policy and administration to bear on these common challenges.

What differentiates this volume is the in-depth, country-specific analysis of the policy and governance reform processes from a critical perspective. The exploration of each country's experience will enable the reader to gain an understanding of the commonalities and differences of the policy process as experienced across the region. The book underlines the connective elements among the various country experiences and the challenges they face, each presented in its own specific development context to draw out the shared and distinct features that characterize the explanation of the Middle East as a region.

The innovative aspect of the volume is that it brings together critical studies of how different Middle Eastern countries are addressing key reform and governance issues through complementary case studies. The issues to be addressed have high salience for current reform processes but also enduring importance: decentralization and local government, non-profit organizations, political culture, and reform of the policy process. The introductory and concluding analyses will permit the reader to appreciate the interconnections of these issues both as topics and as distinct elements in the regional reform experience. This book also presents these topics from a critical perspective in the voices of scholars and practitioners who are from the region and/or currently living and working there.

Finally, this is not a textbook; rather, a reference book, with exceptional appeal for adoption as either a primary or supplementary reading for upper undergraduate and graduate courses on Middle East and North African governance, public policy, and public administration. It is a fresh new book rich of up-to-date dynamics of the highly volatile region of Middle East Governance, Policy and Public Administration, a work which is unique.

The book is primarily aimed at researchers, public servants (non-profit, NGO and government employees and contractors), and graduate students in the field of public policy and administration in the Middle East. Those who may benefit from purchasing it may include libraries, bookstores, researchers, faculty, staff at international organizations and donor agencies, and graduate students, as well as policy makers interested or engaged in issues of Middle Eastern public policy and administration. Those who may benefit from reading it may include public policy and administration students and scholars, think-tanks, NGOs working or interested

in working in the Middle East, journalists, comparative analysts, and professionals in the field of public policy and administration.

The book can be an excellent addition to many academic libraries and it can be utilized as a reference book, with exceptional appeal for adoption as either a primary or supplementary reading for upper undergraduate and graduate courses on Middle East and North African governance, public policy, and public administration. The subject of the book has an international appeal outside of the UK because it covers public policy and administration issues in the Middle East. With Middle Eastern development growing as a phenomenon of global interest, researchers, investors, non-profit organizations and NGOs, policy makers, as well as graduate students in public policy and administration studies will find the book a useful study guide to familiarize themselves with such important topics as national and local governments, non-profit organizations and NGOs, political culture, policy process, implementation and evaluation, decentralization, administrative and procedural models, reforms, and regulations as applied in a group of countries that each have their own history and challenges yet share historic, regional, cultural, and political ties. The countries covered include the major nations in the region and selected smaller countries: Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and Bangladesh. The book's subject area is both widely taught and researched. With public administration developing as a growing field of study both in the Middle East and the world, scholars, researchers, and students no longer are constrained by a single ontological model. As globalization and worldwide development processes increasingly demonstrating the interrelationships among different country experiences as the Middle East emerges as an important player in global affairs, the study of governance in the Middle East is becoming more urgent, relevant to a broader range of students, and an integral part of public policy and administration study on the global level.

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Civil Society and Democratic Governance in Turkey: Prospects and Challenges

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Introduction

Civil society and the role of civic organizations have been expanding as societies evolve. By the end of the cold war, democratic administration and non-governmental organizations, a critical component of a democratic society and governance, spread all around the world. Concepts like good governance, democracy, and open society were discussed and defined through the strength of civil society and the role of civic organizations (Sunar 1997; Toksoz 2008).

Civil society is not a new phenomenon and its roots originate in ancient Greece (Ehrenberg 1999; Wiarda 2003; Winter 2010) may be even earlier. Though, it did gain a new impulse and became fashionable in the beginning of the 1990s because of advancements led by publicly minded intellectuals of the 1980s (Keane 2003). There is no consensus on the definition of civil society (Winter 2010) and it is often more difficult to define when it varies globally across societies and cultures. Nevertheless, currently, civil society is mostly associated with western societies since it's prevalent in western democracies. The way the concept of civil society spreads to and grounds within other societies is different for each case. Muslim societies, particularly, face

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challenges in establishing civil society institutions despite the fact that they demand more democratic rights and civil liberties. Recent developments and the “Arab Spring” revolutions in the Middle East are clear indicators of this trend and the demands of civil society have become louder in most of the countries in the region (Stevens 2012).

Considering these demands, it can be said that Turkey plays a critical role since it geographically and culturally bridges the Muslim world and Western countries. It was one of the few democratic and secular Muslim countries, if not the only one, for a relatively long period of time and it expended efforts to become a member of the European Union. Therefore the foundations and development of civil society in Turkey is an important factor to examine in understanding the strength of democratic values in society. Looking at Turkey’s foundation it is important to mention the “Turkish Model” which considers Turkey “an example for the evolution of political Islam” (n.p.). In this model strength is placed in the areas of “balancing a Muslim nation with a secular state and in Turkey’s current electoral support of the moderate Islamic AKP” (n.p.). These foundations are important because the highlight of Turkey’s civil society processes is the bridge that has been created between religion and politics somehow finding a neutral ground to build off of.

This chapter examines the current state of civil society in Turkey and exposes the contributions, most of which are organized as associations or foundations, of civil society to democratic governance. Also, civil society organizations and their contributions to a particular area are compared with their Western counterparts. Moreover, this chapter examines whether Western types of civil society can be implemented in Turkey. The chapter provides a background of civil society and its origins, and then focuses more specifically on to civil society in Turkey. Historical and cultural aspects of civil society in Turkish culture are discussed, some civil society examples are presented, and civil society in Turkey is compared with the ones in the Western world.

Civil Society: Definition and Background

Civil society is often considered as the space (public sphere) between the individual and the state and is comprised of like-minded groups of people who form to protect the interest of their members (Kapucu 2010, 2011; Keane 1998; Ozdalga 1997; Schiavo-Campo and McFerson 2008; Tibi 1997). Civil society is also considered as a set of institutions (Mardin 1995). Political scientists emphasize society’s civil nature, the influence of civic organizations, protecting citizens’ rights, and enhancing political participation and civic engagement. Sociology emphasizes the intermediate nature of civil society, and views it as a bridge between state and commerce. It is comprised of various non-state or other civic organizations not linked to a governing political force, including non-governmental organizations, voluntary civil and civic organizations, residential community organizations, as well as interest groups. Civil society can also serve as a complimentary role to government function as well as act as a counterweight to unpopular government decisions. Democratic governance cannot prosper without a sound, developed civil society structure or “associational network”

of “public sphere” (Habermas 1996, p. 359). However, some see the concept questionable in terms of the maturity of it as an analytical tool and as a concept for promoting democratic governance (Beckman 1997; Bevir 2010; Tibi 1997).

Many scholars (Taylor 1990; Hall 1995; Anheier et al. 2002) define civil society as a set of voluntary social relationships among social (civic) organizations, and institutions that build the foundation of society’s operation, which is independent from state and commercial institutions. The collaboration of these three components, state, commercial institutions, and civil society form the structure of a society. Salamon and Anheier (1997) define civil society as an innovation of the twentieth century which occurred in every corner of the world to make available mechanisms through which people can provide their own individual initiatives with public purposes.

Winter (2010) defines civil society as the sum of individual and collective voluntary actions (shared values, interests, purposes, and standards) which are purposed to improve the lives of people. CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests.” Hall (1995) defines civil society as an opposite of despotism and a space where social groups can exist and operate with more tolerable conditions of existence. Anheier et al. (2002) believe that civil society, for some is defined as, organizing against global capitalism, for others managing the infrastructure for spreading democracy and for others it is assisting poor or those who are in need or for some it means social networking, environmental and human rights activities. Civil society as it is mentioned above has a wide spread definition which includes all spheres of modern society.

Gramsci’s (1971) seminal work presents civil society as an arena in which hegemonic ideas concerning the organization of economic and social life are both established and contested; it is not distinct from the state or market, but rather includes both. Civil society is the agora or public sphere, “an arena for public deliberation, rational dialogue and the exercise of active citizenship in pursuit of the common interest” (Edwards 2004, pp. 54–55).

Civil society can also be presented as values and norms or as the “good society” where social capital is built through volunteerism and engagement in democratic societies (Putnam et al. 1993; Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag 2011). Van Rooy (1998) views civil society as an anti-hegemonic movement disengaged from formal sociopolitical processes working underground, or as an antidote to the state but encompassing the market (sharing resistance towards state power). If we understand the civil society as a public arena, then people interact through a large and diverse array of formal or informal, organized or ad hoc, structured or unstructured, temporary or permanent, and defined or undefined connections. Spelled-out goals, financial status, organizational characteristics, targeted beneficiaries, and relationship forms are secondary, while a shared vision or inspiration is imperative (Heinrich 2005).

The way civil society is defined depends on the process of development of such a society. A real issue of concern is the possible monotheistic understanding of what the civil society is and what it does. This concern is exacerbated especially in a comparative perspective where there is a variation in the level of development in the economy and the society which makes these organizations more like residuals of

other local sectors, or international actors, or global forces. The difference in legal systems also leaves room for confusion and concern. In countries applying common law, these organizations are loosely controlled or identified and have more privilege and space to work on and for the public interest; in countries of civil laws, everything is written and spaces are defined in a set of legal texts.

Finally, historical factors, especially in the Middle East, are prominent. Salamon and Anheier (1992) argue that “the shape and character of the institutional landscape outside the market and the state are importantly shaped by a range of historical factors that are sometimes difficult to capture conceptually” (p. 132). These factors include the role of religion and its relationship to the state, the degree of autonomy during the process of development, and traditions which shaped the role and structure of the nonprofit sector (such as solidarity in Christianity and Zakat in Islam).

The Period of Pre-modern History

In order to fully understand the concept of civil society it is important to briefly skim through its historic development. Taylor (1990) indicates that the term civil society is an age-old term which has been used for centuries as synonym to political society. This classical understanding of civil society as a politically organized idea was formed in the cities of ancient Greece (Ehrenberg 1999). This understanding was dragged from the desire to live in a society with principles of moral life by involving all citizens of Greece.

In ancient Greece, civil society was recognized as a political association managing social conflicts and relationships through the mandating rules that restrain citizens from harming each other (Edwards 2004). Ehrenberg (1999) quotes Athens’ general and statesman Pericles who stated “...we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own affairs; we say that he has no business here at all” (p. 3). This statement indicates the importance of man’s participation and involvement in social life and politics. Philosophers of the classic period, such as Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, and Cicero emphasize participation in conflict resolution, dedication to a common good and importance of the idea of a good society (O’Connell 1999; Ehrenberg 1999). However, philosophers in the classical period did not separate state and society but, rather accepted the state as a civil form of society represented by the requirements of good citizenship (Edwards 2004).

The transition from the classical period to the middle ages was summarized by Ehrenberg (1999) as “the passage from an ideal of self-sufficiency to recognition of dependence” (p. 29). The political and social structure of West had dramatically changed after the Thirty Years’ War where feudalism overtook the idea of classic civil society and formed absolutism (Edwards 2004). This period explicates the rule of monarch who had sources to build their own armies and bureaucracies. Moreover, in Western societies the Church was a political instrument in the middle ages which had authority to provide state legitimacy through religion and theology (Ehrenberg 1999). However, the local administration and custom had a strong influence on

monarchs, as a result they had to consult with their dependent populations and local bodies (Ehrenberg 1999).

Hobbes believed that civil society is an artificial conception of a state which helps it to manage and provide peace and security in societies (Wiarda 2003). Ehrenberg (1999) quotes Hobbes highlighting the need of a powerful state to sustain civility in society and in his *Leviathan* states “civil society cannot exist in the absence of state power” (p. 70). Moreover, Hobbes believes that rationality and self-interest required human beings to coexist in agreement and to empower sovereignty to a common power. This notion enabled him to declare a theory of state without concerning with tradition, revelation, the divine right of kings, canonical interpretation, or other apparatus (Ehrenberg 1999). Intellectuals and philosophers in the middle ages perceived civil society as a part of the state and emphasize the coexistence of state and civil society.

In Islamic societies, civil and religious institutions were tightly and intimately bonded. Knutsen (1997) states that the “Abbasid state was, in essence, a theocracy – not in the Western sense of a state ruled by the Church and the clergy, since neither existed in the Muslim world, but in the more liberal sense of a polity ruled by God” (p. 20). Moreover, in contrast to Western societies in Islamic societies, the originating source of civil society was central authority, not economic and social classes (Caha 1994, 2003b). The source of this arrangement is grounded in the nature of Islam and its practice which encourages getting along well with everybody in society, even with members of different faiths (Knutsen 1997; Caha 2006). This statement can be further supported considering the ideas of the “Turkish Model” because of which it is stated that Turkey is “the most supportive of Arab countries’ revolutions” and has goals to connect Muslim and Western societies as allies. Caha (2006) argues that civil societies have always existed even under authoritarian and rigid governments including the Muslim societies.

The Period of Modern History

Many thinkers and philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel were influenced by the French Revolution and started a new era criticizing conflicts and inequalities among different political and economic interests (Edwards 2009). Ehrenberg (1999) states that “Like Kant, Ludwig van Beethoven, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and many others in his generation, Hegel recognized the Revolution as the dawn of a new era” (p. 122). Hegel, influenced by liberation movements completely changed the meaning of civil society and coined it a “system of needs” which emphasizes individual interest and private property (Ehrenberg 1999). However, Wiarda (2003) states that the German practice of civil society, which was initiated by Kantian and Hegelian ideas, emphasizes law and order which requires a strong law-governed state. Ehrenberg (1999) states that “Hegel’s conception of freedom stands at the beginning of all modern theories that consider civil society apart from the state” (p. 124).

The same opinion was further expressed by Karl Marx who illustrates civil society as a tool for fostering the interests of the advanced capitalist class (Edwards 2009). Moreover, Marx believes that state is not a mediator in solving problems, but rather a defender of the interests of advanced and bourgeoisie (Edwards 2004). On the other hand Karl Marx does not believe in the occurrence of common good created out of individual interests, but rather he perceives it as a force which is able to destroy proletariat (Cox 1999). Another criticism comes from Gramsci (1971) who strappingly criticized capitalism. Gramsci underlined the crucial role of civil society as the contributor of the cultural and ideological capital required for the survival of the hegemony of capitalism (Ehrenberg 1999). These thoughts led to developing communist ideas in Europe and the new era in civil society development which include the aftermath of the World War II period till late the 1970s.

As the changes in Europe rocketed, American civil society got its impulses as well. Wiarda (2003) explains Tocqueville's thoughts on American civil society with his visit in the 1830s as "what most impressed this perceptive visitor was the incredible strength of intermediate associations or civil society in America, those groups that lie between the individual and the state, that serve as transmission belts for conveying private interest concerns to government decision makers and back down again as implementers of public policy, that help to mediate between state and citizen, and that serve both as expressions of popular sentiment and as limits on arbitrary government" (p. 21). The first thing that amazed Tocqueville in America was the weak state and strong (civil) society, whereas in Europe it was the opposite, a strong state weak (civil) society (Ehrenberg 1999; Cox 1999).

Since the late 1980s civil society has been discussed in the academia more than ever before (Taylor 1990). The collapse of the Soviet Union indicates a huge movement of civil society formed by opposition groups. The start for a new modern era of civil society is recognized by many scholars (Kumar 1993; Ehrenberg 1999; Cox 1999; Caha 2003a) as the Eastern Europe movement of intellectuals against socialism. Cox (1999) explains this period as follows, "Real socialism' has collapsed; the anti-imperialist struggle in the former colonial world has resolved itself into a series of new states seeking a *modus vivendi* in subordination to global capitalism; the Left in Europe is searching uncertainly for an alternative to neoliberal globalization while in the main are adapting to it; even the Islamic revolution in Iran is hesitatingly moving towards an adjustment to dominant world economic forces" (p. 3). In essence, there are multiple reasons for the eruption of civil society movements in the 1990s, such as globalization, regime changes, and technological advancement.

Some intellectuals perceive civil societies as a recovery tool for their nations from difficulties; however others identify them as a concept which does not respond the conditions of western societies (Kumar 1993). Caha (2003a) states that in the 1980s there were two main models debated, British and French models. The British model was based on a more deliberative angle of the issue, while the French model was on the command and control side. After the collapse of the Socialist regime in the 1990s most newly emerged states in Central and Eastern Europe had chosen the Anglo-Saxon system because it was more realistic towards human values, as well as more liberal and democratic (Caha 2003a).

Civil Society and Democratic Governance in Turkey

Good governance is the set of tools and powers that societies use to administer their activities (Ozdalga 1997; Toksoz 2008). Recently, civil society is gaining visible strength in Turkey. Because of the strong philanthropic roots of the society, citizens and corporations take initiatives to provide certain vital services to which the government cannot provide sufficiently. For instance, Turkcell, one of the major telecommunication companies in Turkey launched a program in collaboration with the ministry of education called “Bridges among Hearts” (Gönül Köprüsü) which proposes the exchange of students among different regions of the country to strengthen society make up (Turkcell 2008; Hurriyet 2008). Moreover, many unnamed small associations and individuals support education for economically handicapped people via scholarships and providing the necessary infrastructure. These functions help to create a participatory process which involves civil society or citizens in the creation of applicable policies, procedures, and ideology. Direct citizen participation can be seen as a hindrance as well as a benefit; this is due to the fact that involvement by citizens helps to create comprehensive solution but also delays political processes if opposition is created (Nabatchi 2012). A healthy interactive civil society can help combat these issues as individuals learn to put aside religious and political separations and work towards the goal of a more effective civil society. It can be said that Turkey recently has succeeded in these processes through bridging the gap between national secular and political differences and commitments.

Civil society in Turkey arises from the rich philanthropic history and nature of the society (Cizakca 2006; Singer 2008). Ottoman had a different government culture than the Republic of Turkey because of the fact that Turkey is now more affiliated with the western world than its predecessor. With the transformation of society and the government based on the experience of economic crises and EU membership requirements, the demand for transparency and democratic governance became evident in all aspects of government and society.

An important obstacle for civil society organizations in Turkey to navigate for operational purposes is the legal aspect which is identified with the Constitution of 1982 (Toprak 1996; Caha and Karaman 2004). Two other challenges recognized by Caha and Karaman (2004) that halt the success of civil society operations are economic aspect which is explained by a lack of free market economy and state monopolization. In this regard Caha and Karaman (2004) infer that state monopolization of the free market “breaks down competition and thus overshadows the fairness of economic life, so the monopolization of social life under the influence of an official ideology hinders the development of civil society” (p. 11).

Development of the Civil Society in Turkey

As a part of the Islamic World, Turks as nomads had different traditions which are explained through the recognition of the state’s complete independence of action and handling legislation on public issues independently from Islamic Law (Inalcik 1998).

Inalcik notes that these regulations which exist independently from Islamic Law “led public life in the highest interests of the state and community, giving elasticity in formulating state policies and interpreting the stipulations of Islamic Law in the most liberal manner” (Inalcik 1998, p. 1). This innovative vision was further explained by the canonical principle of *maslahat* which necessitates the preference of well-being of the Islamic community. Later on these ideas of policy making opened doors for harsh debate among modernists and reactionaries.

Societies need three basics to develop civil society: they are differentiation, forming organizations, and the development of an autonomous sphere. These three basics of civil society are present in Islam as well (Caha 2006). According to Caha (2006) “Islam contains within its own epistemology the idea of opposition by individuals against the views imposed by the state who may even make the state to accept them; such examples were not infrequent in the early years of Islam” (p. 3). Moreover, Islamic rulers have always been willing to visualize social participation.

Civil society in Turkey can be discussed in three stages. The first stage touches on the Ottoman era (until 1923) in general and presents an introduction to civil society in contemporary Turkey. The second stage is the first republic era (1923–1980) which presents influence and autonomy of a strong centralized government on society. The third stage presents the second part of the republic which lasts from 1980 to present. This stage is the era when civil society in western terms became visible and spread. Civil society in Turkey has developed in accordance with these three periods in emerging from religious or political roots. Religious civil society movements and organizations often present a neutral or positive stance towards government while civil society with political motivations usually stands in opposition (Simsek 2004; Turam 2004).

Considering the historical background of the Ottomans, it is important to highlight the heritage of Islam in the Ottoman administrative structure. Caha (2006) divides civil society perspectives of the Ottomans to three periods; in the first period, dynamism of social life is determined by the elements of civil society and operated independently from the state. The second period is known as the climax of Ottoman power where “‘social differentiation,’ ‘tolerance’ and ‘freedom’ were guaranteed” (Caha 2006, p. 6). The third stage in Ottoman’s civil society includes the period between the nineteenth century and 1920s which was dominated with centralization of the government and activation of civil society with the spread of modernity and secularity.¹

Caha in his study on local democracy in Turkey describes the formation of the Turkish administrative and local governance where he emphasizes the period of development from the Ottoman administrative system to the republic. The Ottoman administrative system had a strict centralized administrative body and the first steps in changing this system were taken in 1864 by accepting the Province Act which initiated formation of local governments. Further, steps were taken to develop localization of the administrative government by forming the General Administration of Provincial Order and Special Provincial Administration. Toprak (1996) describes the beginning of the reforms in Ottoman with the Tanzimat period in 1839 which is characterized by the declaration of civil rights and followed with the development

¹ Vakf (trust or foundation) should also be included as part of a strong civil society initiatives during the Ottoman era.

of various political parties, chambers of commerce, business associations, and cooperatives.

After proclaiming the Republic in 1923, Turkish administrative reforms were more focused on strengthening the central government which was explained by forming two separate administrative bodies depending on the central apparatus. Caha explains this dependence as not having a participative policy of citizens at the local level, insufficient local government, no authority of local administration on employment policy, and an absence of principles of accountability. In today's climate it is found that a participatory process is considered a healthy part of government. This is because a "specific gain 'can be' realized through participation in a particular issue or decision" as well as the creation of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy in policy issues (Nabatchi 2012, p. 9).

The major impediment in developing civil society in Turkey is the overpowering bureaucracy which did not leave any room for personal initiatives and collective pursuit of interests (Toprak 1996). The newly born republic maintained its predecessor's modernization efforts. These efforts consisted of narrowing down the role of religion in social life and government and injecting Western "modern" values and systems. Laicism was one of the most important criteria that the Turkish republic adopted from Europe. As a result of the laicist regime in the country, a significant portion of religious institutions (i.e., sects, dervish lodges, and madrasahs) were closed and prohibited. Additionally, the government created an office to administer religious affairs in the country. Although, supposedly laicism requires government affairs to be separated from religious affairs, the new regime created an "official Islam" which could be kept under control, and expelled traditional Islam religion from the public sphere (Sunar 1997; Turam 2004). For Caha and Karaman (2004), the period between 1923 and 1950 in Turkey was the period of the disappearance of both the traditional and modern components of civil society. However, adoption of western values and establishing the foundation for a secular legal system with democratic values such as gender equality, secular education, and even democratic elections turned out to be the spark for development of civil society particularly after the 1980s (Toprak 1996).

The period between 1950 and 1980 in Turkey is known as an epoch of political processes characterized by the institutionalization of party politics, building democratic procedures, and guaranteeing the civil rights of citizens (Toprak 1996). Developments during this period planted seeds of political civil society organizations in the country. Karpat (1972) calls the triumph of the Demokrat Party in 1950 as a turning point in Turkish political and social life. The beginning of the 1950s carried a new breeze of civil society elements inspired by the Demokrat Party and multi-party systems (Toprak 1996; Caha and Karaman 2004; Tuzgiray 2005). However, the period between 1950 and 1980 is marked with contests of ruling and oppositional parties which led to political polarization and violence between opposing groups (Toprak 1996). Political crises and street violence were considered military interventions to political issues in 1960, 1970, and 1980. Although the 1950 elections were a cornerstone in the development of democratic governance in Turkey, it took 30 years of civil society development in Turkey to burgeon and become similar to its Western counterparts.

The political pathway in Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 coup was focused on two main topics: the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of civil society (Toprak 1996). Following the coup in 1980, a new constitution was drafted under the supervision of military. The new constitution brought significant limitations to civil society activities. Political parties, labor unions, interest groups, and many other types of civil society organizations' actions were either totally prohibited or truncated. After the military partially withdrew from the political field and political parties took control of politics, a series of privatization programs and reforms towards liberalism were carried out during the 1980s. These liberal policies and advancement of market economy enabled different social groups to become more active in public life and strengthen civil society (Caha and Karaman 2004). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Turkish political elite increased its interest in civil society and understood that a strong state does not have any prosperity both in terms of material and moral wealth.

Civil Society Movements and Organizations in Turkey

Despite the fact that laicist tendencies in Turkish Republic excluded religion from the public sphere, religious civil society groups supported the government. Religious movements in Turkey could be classified in two groups, the first group is political Islamists and the second group is non-political social movements.

The political Islamist movement was represented by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan was the founder of the *Milli Gorus* (nationalist outlook) movement and political view. Although Erbakan and his political views were perceived as a threat to both the government and representatives of Sharia governments in Iran and Saudi Arabia, *Milli Gorus* was nothing than a center right political movement with religious flavor. For example, Ozdalga (2007) views Erbakan more like a smart businessman selling promises to his constituents than an Ayatollah in Iran. Erbakan has always managed to be part of the coalition of governments since he started his political career, having consistent voting support until 2002. He was a follower of the idea that development of the country could take place by supporting industries and the private sector. After *Milli Gorus*'s biggest political defeat in 2002, younger and more pragmatist branches of the movement blossomed such as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) with a different political tone. The new dynamism and impulse on developing democratic principles and civil society in Turkey has gained a new emphasis after coming into the power of a younger generation of *Milli Gorus* movement supporters in the 2000s (Kuru 2005). Kuru indicates that the AKP party founded by this younger generation "has become a leading supporter of Turkey's membership in the EU" (p. 272). Kuru (2005) and Keyman (2007) explain AKP's pro-globalization perspective with the support it received during the legitimacy crisis right after the 2002 elections and rejection of political Islamism.

Recent developments in Turkish history indicate a strong movement in increasing civil society institutions. There are many factors that influence this flow, such as EU membership candidacy, technology enhancement, and the government's

democratic policy. Keyman and Icduygu (2003) emphasize the role of globalization in renewing interest on civil society. The post 1980 period of social groups in Turkey was organized to defend particular rights, such as air pollution, health, environment, human rights, religious practices and women's rights, instead of changing the political system (Caha and Karaman 2004).

Caha (2003a) indicates that the West is the center and the genesis for civil society organizations in the modern world and is not limited by the public sphere of any country but instead reaching the universal level. The example of deliberative democracy in Western societies emphasizes the capitalist democratic principles which allow civil societies to function liberally. This conceptual framework analyzes the conditions which make possible the ability of civil society organizations to operate in Turkey as well as their contributions to democratic governance.

The role of civil society in promoting democratic values especially in developing countries is enormous. Contributions made by civil society organizations to democratic development, civic engagement, and community service are worth high praises. Turkish civil society organizations constitute one of the pillars of the success of today's Turkish political and economic stability that have been craved for many years. In the front line of organizations that contributed to the democratic development of Turkey is *İnsan Hakları Derneği* (IHD) (the Human Rights Association) and *MAZLUMDER* (the Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People) (Caha 2003a; Caha and Karaman 2004). According to a recent study by Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı (TUSEV), there are 153,604 civil society organizations in Turkey. Most of them are in the form of associations, foundations, trade unions, chambers, cooperatives, and federations and confederations (TUSEV 2011).

IHD was established in 1986 as a reaction to the 1980 military coup and has 34 branches with about 13,000 members all around Turkey (Coban 2006). IHD is the oldest, long standing, most rooted, most successful, and the most "civil" civil society organization in Turkey (Coban 2006). Moreover, Coban (2006) states that IHD is a street civil society organization which has learnt its theory from practice. IHD's most meaningful contribution to Turkish society is that it illustrated and taught society to bring issues to the deliberative level and solve them. IHD deals with human rights issues without considering the race, gender, religious, or political views of target groups or individuals (Coban 2006). The other large contribution of IHD to Turkish democracy is its ability to bring together trade unions and women's organizations to collaborate.

Another civil society organization that contributes to Turkish governance and democracy is MAZLUMDER which was established in 1991 by "54 people, 'and' consists of lawyers, authors, publishers and businessmen" (Yavuz 2001, p. 8). The main goal of this organization is to defend the rights of people who are deprived from justice and unjustly treated, despite their ethnic, religious, or gender differences (Yavuz 2001). MAZLUMDER provides a variety of voice and visual publications to improve human rights and freedom (MAZLUMDER 2011). It also offers all types of religious, historical, social, cultural, and economic research, surveys, translations, and publications for experts. In the first half of the 1990s, the organization "has focused primarily on the repression of Muslims and dwelled on religious freedoms and rights" (Yavuz 2001, p. 10). However, in recent reports MAZLUMDER has started to deal with the poor treatment of patients in state-run hospitals (Yavuz 2001).

Civil Society's Contribution to Democratic Governance

There are a significant number of variables to measure and evaluate the influence of various dimensions of civil society organizations on democratic governance in any country. However, it is important to note that the most important characteristic of civil society organizations in advancing democratic governance is the level of participation of the masses. Civil society groups are the most important stakeholders in the process of collaborative governance (Kapucu et al. 2009; Phillips 2012; Warren 2011). Democratic deficits and states' incompetency to solve these deficits, even in democratic societies, makes civil society associations a part of the solution by enhancing participation, consultation, transparency, and accountability in global governance (Scholte 2002).

The issue of evaluation of the success of a civil society and its contribution to democracy and democratic governance is too broad. It also varies across cultures and regions. For instance, Lowry defines some variables that identify the dynamics of civil society organizations, such as the past of the organization, the legal framework under which an organization is established, the capacity of the organization, the accountability of the civil society organizations, the role of the organization in democratic change, and the stage of political development of the respective country. These variables can be helpful in determining the dynamics and contributions of civil society organizations in Turkish democracy.

Brinkerhoff (1999) highlights the state-civil society partnership which promotes a more responsive, transparent, and accountable government. Brinkerhoff (1999) emphasizing the perspective where neither government nor the nonprofit organization see in each other opposite sides, but a team which is willing to enhance democratic governance. However, unfortunately this perspective seems to be impossible in autocratic regimes. Consequently, Brinkerhoff (1999) identifies four variables that influence state-civil society partnerships which are; regime type, level of trust among stakeholders (state and nonprofit), legal framework and regulation, and the nature of the policy.

Scholte (2002) indicates six contributions of civil societies on global governance. The first contribution is related to giving a voice to stakeholders that can be exemplified by opening political space in social groups with limited access, such as the poor, minorities, and women (Scholte 2002). The second contribution is public education. The third contribution of civil societies is the ability to fuel debates on global governance (Scholte 2002). The fourth and fifth contributions of civic mobilization to global governance are presented by Scholte (2002) in terms of transparency and accountability respectively. The six contribution is, legitimacy, a consequence of all preceding five contributions which is stated by Scholte (2002) as the process of "[e]ngagement between civil society and regulatory mechanisms 'that' can- if it gives stakeholders voice, bolsters public education, promote debates, raises transparency, and increase accountability-enhance the respect that citizens accord to global governance" (p. 194).

Analyzing studies on democratic governance and the contributions of civil society on democratic governance, as well as the historical process of developing civil society in Turkey, it is safe to diagnose the positive development of this process in

terms of improvements in democracy, human rights, and freedoms (Bumin 1981; Caha et al. 2010; Keles 1990; Ozbudun 1997; Toros 2007). In order to analyze the main contributions of civil society groups in democratic governance the legal framework, the level of participation, public education, transparency and accountability, and the ability to promote debate and trust among stakeholders can be considered as the main determinants. Moreover, the Turkish EU membership candidacy has an important influence on legal and social ground up improvements. For instance, Diez et al. (2005) claim that the process of Europeanization (EU membership candidacy of Turkey) substantially empowered civil society movements which have led to significant changes in Turkey.

Table 1 presents the influences of civil society in the democratic governance process. The table shows that Turkey has a moderate civil society which is active but does not have enough influence on some issues, such as human rights, women

Table 1 Civil society influence on democratic governance in Turkey

Type of contribution	Sources
Legal framework	Recent legal reforms, referendums; EU membership candidacy made substantial legal reforms (Diez et al. 2005). "...reforms and restructuring movements in the public sector (modernization of public policies, law and regulations, independent regulatory higher committee, changing role of the state)" (Kovanci 2005, p. 191). Changes on Associations Law on 11.4.2004 which takes off the limitations on membership of individuals despite their age, gender, and profession (Ersen 2010)
Participation	The recent reforms in the public sector based on partnership and civil society activities increased the consciousness and ownership of governance in different fields, such as industry, education, rural development, health, social services, and tourism (Kovanci 2005). However, according to Business Anti-Corruption Portal (BAP) Global Integrity reports that in recent years there hasn't been any progress in involving civil society in the policy-making process (BAP 2011)
Public education	Although Turkey is behind EU in the number of civil society organizations, it has active 80,757 associations which means that one person out of every 866 people is involved in civil society activity (ATO 2004). The bulk of civil society activities are focused on five big cities of Turkey (Istanbul 13,600, Ankara 6,986, Izmir 4,029, Bursa 2,965, and Konya 2,224) which illustrates the weakness of public involvement and education in rural areas (ATO 2004). Despite ATO's (2004) critique on the limited number of civil society groups there is evidence on public education processes brought by civil society movements (Aras and Caha 2000). TI provides trainings to citizens on transparency and accountability with project of "Call for Transparency Center" (Seffaflik 2011)
Transparency and accountability	In this respect Turkey accommodates several civil society groups, one of them is Transparency International (TI) which has done numerous research and reports on the transparency and accountability of public organizations (Seffaflik 2011). Moreover, TI has prepared several reports on ethics, bribery, and corruption issues
Trust	According to the world values surveys, among 29 countries, on trusting somebody from outside the family, Turkey is in 27th place which indicates a very low trust rate with only 10 % trusting individuals outside of the family

rights, and environmental issues. The Business Anti-corruption Portal (BAP) (2011) reports that political parties in Turkey do not want to collaborate with civil societies which indicate their political weakness, and present the issue of not being recognized as equivalent to the state. However, it is seen that civil societies are very active in public education which does not require collaboration with state organizations and parliament. Moreover, the EU membership candidacy process has a significant role on the improvement of a legal foundation for civil society in Turkey. It is safe to state that since the 1980s civil society has substantially improved participation, public education, transparency, and accountability within Turkish society. Though, there are still issues with trusting public organizations and the central government, which has already started the process of decentralization through a constitution project (AK Party 2011).

Training and Capacity Building Opportunities for Civil Society Organizations

Practical organizational development and capacity building and organizational effectiveness are important aspects in civil society organizations' operation. The way a civil organization operates and the nature of the civil organization is very important in responding to a certain issue. For instance, Shaw and Goda (2004) in their research on response of civil societies to the Kobe earthquake in Japan conclude that civil societies would be sustainable if daily services are provided by local resident associations. However, some issues, such as famine in Africa, might require the involvement of more stakeholders and even international actors. The first such large-scale disaster in Turkey was the 1999 Izmit earthquake which tested the government and NGOs capacity in responding to disasters (Jalali 2002). Jalali (2002) indicates that the Turkish government and Army failed to respond to the Izmit earthquake which took the lives of almost 17,000 people. She claims that within first 2 weeks state organizations were not at the scene and "Kizilay (Red Crescent — the Turkish equivalent of the Red Cross) was not seen in the area for five days after the disaster had struck" (Jalali 2002, p. 125). First on scene rescue and relief efforts were done by neighbors, relatives, spontaneously organized groups and well maintained NGOs. Afraid of public criticism, the central government banned NGOs' operations in the earthquake area and froze the bank accounts of some civil society organizations, such as IHH and MAZLUMDER (Jalali 2002).

The Izmit earthquake case shows the need for the development and training of civil societies in order to appropriately organize and respond to disasters or any other social issue. There is no doubt that today Turkish civil society is very active and more experienced in taking actions than it was a decade ago by providing various training and capacity building programs. One of these trainings is conducted by the Civil Society Development Center (CSDC) which is focused on helping to civil society organizations overcome economic weakness and lack of courage through

improving performance by trainings (STGM 2011). For instance, CSDC provides need-based trainings for civil society organizations based on their requests. Target group NGOs operating on a local level which deal with gender, sexual orientation, ecology, youth, human rights, disability rights, child rights, and cultural rights can benefit from these need-based trainings (STGM 2011). The other capacity building project is Civil Society Academy (CSA) which was built to expand the area of individual freedom by strengthening civil society organizations and increasing their capacity (STA 2011). Moreover, there are a large number of civil society organizations which are involved in the education sphere. Marangoz (2009) states that civil society organizations operating in the sphere of education enormously help public organizations by reducing the burden.

In order to develop an effective and productive civil society these organizations must be prepared and have a strong stand. Keyman (2004) claims that when we think of civil societies as NGOs we face issues, such as civil societies being an organization looking for financial resources, and focusing only on capacity issues by undertaking their main functions, bringing social problems to public debate. In order to deal with the real issues of democratic governance training and capacity building for civil society organizations should be well maintained.

Educational Opportunities for Civil Society Organizations

The role of capacity building for civil societies is enormous because it covers the main goal of these groups which is to encourage participative decision-making and public education. This presents many questions; What are the strategies? Should this process be held on national level or with local organizations or branches? How to attract regular citizens and enhance participative democracy? These questions should be the main fundamentals for educational capacity building in the civil society sector.

Considering the recent administrative reforms and constitution, it is safe to claim that the atmosphere for civil society is becoming more moderate. The Turkish prime-minister in his speech on the eve of parliament elections highlighted that strong democracy is possible only by the resurgence of political organization and civil society (AK Party 2011). In light of these events, Turkish civil society has a great opportunity to collaborate with governments in power to develop strong fundamentals for educational capacity. Moreover, it is possible to see in the future civil society and NGO courses in the department of every university of major cities (see Appendix 3).

The process of capacity building in the civil society sector can be furthered by integrating with local governments and small businesses. Moreover, it is important to develop a voluntarism culture for the public good. Pratt (2002) states that volunteering, for many decades, has been a major force for development. In many countries volunteerism is seen on the local and community level which advances the participative decision-making process and contributes greatly to democratic governance

(Pratt 2002). Pratt (2002) states that “there is a visible connection between the use of volunteers and the development of local social capital and capacity” (p. 108). Volunteerism can be encouraged by highlighting several benefits to volunteers, such as extra credits at schools and preference in job interviews or finance applications. The collaboration of universities and schools with nonprofits, in recruiting volunteers, is a normal occasion in the US. Consequently, collaboration with educational institutions and local government education headquarters is vital. Several civil society organizations complain about the way the ordinances (Gonulluluk yonetmeliği) and their implementations. The rules and regulations should be helping the civil society to grow and prosper.

Conclusion

Overall, Turkish legislation and society is ready to develop a strong civil society culture. However, on the flip side of the coin, there are some legal and administrative obstacles that civil society organizations have to deal with. Again everything can be related to capacity building which could develop a stronger support of citizens towards democratic values and a sound voice for the oppressed and disadvantaged. This chapter evaluated the compatibility of the Western type of civil society in the Turkish setting. Civil society is viewed from a critical point, as an essential condition for democratization. The historical comparison of civil society’s global perspectives and Turkish ideals allows observation of the differences and similarities of this phenomenon. Under the light of the conceptual framework, this chapter determines the contributions of civil society on Turkish democratic governance. This part of the chapter also defines the level of applicability of Western type civil society in the Turkish setting. It is safe to claim that generally it is possible to implement Western civil society strategies in Turkey; however it should have a gradual character of integration with educating public first priority. Overall, Turkish civil society has substantially progressed in terms of generating an operable basis. However, there is an urgent need for collaboration with government agencies and businesses because democratic governance is the process of involvement of all stakeholders.

For further research, this work provides an opportunity to launch a study with any other Middle Eastern or Central Asian country’s civil society development by comparing Turkish civil society, which is closely related to the mentioned countries culturally and religiously. Moreover, this study indicates the main factors influencing democratic governance in Turkey and highlights the educational capacity of the Turkish civil society.

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Appendix 1: Historic Development of Civil Society in Turkey

The period of functioning	Type of civil society organizations	Number of organizations	Source
Ottoman Era	Education, health, religion, construction of roads, bridges, foundations, canals, palaces, public baths, inns, and monuments	35,000 foundations	http://www.istr.org/conference/istanbul/conf_thirdsector.htm
Turkish Republic, After 1923	Traditional “charitable” foundations, social services, civil society and civic engagement, democratization, and development	4,500 “new” foundations and approximately 80,000	http://www.istr.org/conference/istanbul/conf_thirdsector.htm
Turkish Republic, 2000	Religion, sports organizations, aid organizations, development organizations, civil rights organizations, social life organizations, culture, and environment organizations	60,931 nonprofit organizations	http://www.todayszaman.com/news-247462-turkeys-civil-society-organization--ncrease-by-44-percent-in-10-years.html
Turkish Republic, 2011	Religion—15,511, sports organizations 15,289, aid organizations 14,789, development organizations 10,291, civil rights organizations 853, social life organizations 6,253 culture 3,707, and environment organizations 1,594	88,210 nonprofit organizations 7,385,538 members (1,182,155 women)	http://www.todayszaman.com/news-247462-turkeys-civil-society-organization--ncrease-by-44-percent-in-10-years.html
Turkish Republic, 2001	Associations, foundations, trade unions, public workers’ unions, chambers, and cooperatives	90,720 institutions	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-8216civil-society8217-far-behind-european-average-chp-2011-03-15
The period of functioning	Type of civil society organizations	Number of organizations	Source
Turkish Republic, 2011	86,272 associations, 4,494 foundations, 96 trade unions, 54 public workers’ unions, 4,794 chambers, and 58,090 cooperatives. However, the report suggested that the number of association has increased 41 % in the last decade	153,800 institutions	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-8216civil-society8217-far-behind-european-average-chp-2011-03-15

Appendix 2: Training and Capacity Building Programs on Civil Society in Turkey

Institution	Type of program	Source
Capital Markets Board of Turkey, 2010	Improving the overall awareness of the population to the capital markets through financial education and other possible means	http://www.cmb.gov.tr/
Turkish Red Crescent, 2011	The Turkish Red Crescent Society trains volunteers in first aid and disaster response and also partnered with other civic sector organizations and the Ministry of Education to develop and disseminate natural hazard risk awareness and household risk reduction education for the general public and school children	http://www.kizilay.org.tr/

Institution	Type of program	Source
Center for the Research of Societal Problems (TOSAM), 2011	Developing Turkish civil society based on the principles of multiculturalism, tolerance, political pluralism, and democracy in Turkey. TOSAM provides training to over 280 high school seniors and university students on democracy, non-violence, conflict resolution, and multiculturalism	http://www.wmd.org/resources/whats-being-done/participation-youth/civic-education
Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey (TEGV), 2011	Its mission is to provide and develop after-school, educational, and training programs that encourage children to become rational, self-confident, creative, respectful, and tolerant individuals	www.tegv.org
Project Cycle Management, 2011	Teaching project development and management.	http://www.stk.net/duyurular/153/proje-dongusu-yonetimipcm-egitimi.html

Appendix 3: Educational Programs in Turkish Educational Institutions Turkish Educational Institutions

Name of the institution, location	Department	Level	Name of the course
Middle Eastern Technical University (METU), Ankara	Department of Sociology	Graduate Course	State and Civil Society in Eurasia
METU, Ankara	Department of Sociology	Graduate Course	Social Movements and Civic Action
METU, Ankara	Department of Sociology	Graduate Course	Global and Local Debates on Civil Society
Bogazici University, Istanbul	Master of Arts Program in European Studies	Graduate Course	Civil Society and Democracy in Europe
Bogazici University, Istanbul	Department of Management	Undergraduate Course	NGO Management
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Institute for Social Sciences	Graduate Program	International Public Relations and Applications
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Public Administration	Graduate Program	Social Services and Law
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Public Administration	Graduate Program	Theories of State and Civil Society
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Public Administration	Graduate Program	Social and Cultural Structure of Turkey
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Social Structure and Social Change	Graduate Program	Economic and Social Impact of Globalization
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of International Relations	Graduate Program	State Theory and Civil Society
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Public Administration
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Current Civil Society and the Use of Human Rights and Freedoms
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Political Sociology
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Political Comparative Politics
Middle Eastern Technical University (METU), Ankara	Department of Sociology	Graduate Course	State and Civil Society in Eurasia
METU, Ankara	Department of Sociology	Graduate Course	Social Movements and Civic Action
METU, Ankara	Department of Sociology	Graduate Course	Global and Local Debates on Civil Society

(continued)

(continued)

Name of the institution, location	Department	Level	Name of the course
Bogazici University, Istanbul	Master of Arts Program in European Studies	Graduate Course	Civil Society and Democracy in Europe
Bogazici University, Istanbul	Department of Management	Undergraduate Course	NGO Management
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Institute for Social Sciences	Graduate Program	International Public Relations and Applications
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Public Administration	Graduate Program	Social Services and Law
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Public Administration	Graduate Program	Theories of State and Civil Society
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Public Administration	Graduate Program	Social and Cultural Structure of Turkey
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of Social Structure and Social Change	Graduate Program	Economic and Social Impact of Globalization
Istanbul University, Istanbul	Department of International Relations	Graduate Program	State Theory and Civil Society
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Public Administration
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Current Civil Society and the Use of Human Rights and Freedoms
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Political Sociology
Uludag University, Bursa	Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences	Undergraduate Course	Political Comparative Politics

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Democratic Governance Reforms in Turkey and Their Implications

Hüseyin Gül and Hakan M. Kiriş

Introduction

Turkey is a country located astride two continents and at the crossroads of the regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, presenting both some opportunities and threats. She is a rapidly urbanizing, developing, and changing country. During the Justice and Development Party (JDP or AKP in Turkish) governments within the last 12 years, she has achieved a steady and one of the highest economic growth rates in the World despite some slow down after the 2008 global economic and financial crisis. Today, Turkey has a globally integrated, technologically advanced and market-driven economy, which is considered in the G-20 major world economies (Kaplan 2012, pp. 298–299; SPO 2003, p. 125).

Turkey has a 75.6 million population with a medium age of 30, 77.3 % of whose lives in cities and towns, and 67.6 % of the population is between the ages of 15 and 64 (TurkStat 2013). Around 70–75 % population is made up of mainly the people of Turkish ethnicity¹ but includes people from various ethnic backgrounds, which have in turn resulted in ethnic, religious, political, democratic, and human rights problems. In terms of the land area and population, she is one of the largest countries in her region and in Europe. These unique geographical and demographical characteristics both shape the cultural, economic, social, and political landscape of the country and help explain the wave of recent reforms in the country and her socioeconomic, political, and administrative transformations.

¹In the 1982 Constitution (Article 66), the term “Turk” is not used in its ethnic sense and accordingly defined as “anyone who is bound to the Turkish state by the bond of citizenship” in its legal meaning. Thus, “Turkish” refers to the citizenship of Turkey. Yet, this definition is criticized for its assimilative connotations.

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Turkey, according to Friedman (2009, p. 117), is in her way to become one of the key countries in this century despite some of her problems such as a divided look between secularists and Islamists, statist and liberals, and Turks and Kurds. Similarly, Kaplan (2012, p. 298) points out that Turkey has relatively high human development capacity compared to most countries in the Middle East. It is ranked 79th in the world and thus is classified under the high human development countries (Brzezinski 2012, pp. 142–143). Due mainly to the progress started by Atatürk and the developments especially during the 1980s and after 1999 when she was officially announced as a candidate country for EU membership, Turkey has turned out to be one of the most, if not the most, democratic, secularist, and modernist country among the Muslim World (Aydın and Keyman 2004, p. 19; Friedman 2009, pp. 114–115; Khanna 2011, pp. 81–82; Walker 2012).

Turkish democracy is a relatively developed parliamentary democracy with a system of free elections and several competing parties. Turkish democracy continues to have shortcomings and problems and to function according to a patch-work constitution prepared and enacted under the Military regime in 1982. Thus, Turkey still has some ground to cover in the areas of basic human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy (Kubicek 2002, p. 2; Gül 2008). According to the democracy index prepared by Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey is considered as a flawed democracy and ranks 88th out of 167 countries in the world (EIU 2011). Besides, in the Rule of Law Index 2012–2013, Turkey performs poorly with regard to government accountability (68th out of 97 countries) and with regard to human rights (76th out of 97 countries) due to deficiencies in the functioning of auditing mechanisms, political interference within the judicial system, and poor performance in protecting the freedom of expression and privacy (WJP 2012, p. 39). Moreover, in terms of the freedom of the press, Turkey is considered as partly free, and ranks 117th out of 197 countries in the World (Freedom House 2012). Furthermore, Turkey ranks 54th in perceived governmental corruption out of 176 countries in the world (Transparency International 2012).

Even though put forward 10 years ago, Kubicek's observations regarding democracy in Turkey still hold. He argued that Turkish democracy is handicapped by a strong state tradition, which fosters paternalism and constrains civil society, pluralism, and independent voices. He maintains:

“Traditionally, civic groups have been seen as accessories of the state, not as genuine partners able to initiate action on their own... The state has therefore been traditionally hostile to independent groups with their own agenda, concerned that they could rip apart the interwoven fabric of Turkish society... Efforts to expand democracy in Turkey ... have run up against this barrier, and hence there has been no complete democratic ‘breakthrough’ in the country” until the 1980s (Kubicek 2002, p. 4).

Another area to pay attention is the status of women in the political, economical, and social life in Turkey. Despite an increase in the proportion of the female representatives in the National Parliament from 9.1 % up to 14.4 % after the 2011 national parliamentary elections, their representation in local councils and elected positions continues to stay under 1 %. Besides, Turkey ranked 77th in gender inequality index among 146 countries for which an index score was calculated in 2011.

Moreover, female population ages 25 and older with at least secondary education was 27.1 % compared with 46.7 % of male population same age with the same level of education in 2011, showing the disadvantaged position of women in educational attainment. In much the same way, in terms of average educational attainment, it is 8 years for men while 6 years for women in the same year. Furthermore, the labor force participation rate is much lower for women than men. In 2011, only 24 % of women at working age participated in the labor market whereas 70 % of men of the same age were in the labor market (UNDP 2012, pp. 139–142). These percentages clearly indicate that there is a clear need to improve women’s status in political, social, and economic life in Turkey.

How to Approach and Study This Subject?

The general review given on Turkey presents a mixed picture. Yet, considered together with the recent governance and economic reforms, overall there are many reasons to be optimistic about Turkey’s democratic, administrative, and economical progress. The history of the Republic of Turkey, including the last century of the Ottoman Empire, is itself represents a story of strong reform initiatives, westernization, and increasing ties with Europe. This fact is nothing unknown to those who have done studies on Turkey. This chapter firstly aims to study and understand what has been happening in Turkey in recent years. The study and contemplation of what happens today requires an inspection of the past and the deliberation of the possible reflection of what happened in the past on today. Besides, it also involves a prediction of the future and the possible reflection of the future on what happens today. Or put another way, what happens today is the reflection of the imposition of the future on the present because today is shaped by the future expectations, wills, and intentions. “The basic idea is that expectations about the future and experiences of the past are efficient in converting environmental requirements into institutional forms and practices... The resulting indeterminacy in outcomes within a particular environmental context provides a possible role for deliberate political action” (March and Olsen 1995, pp. 10–11).

Another issue regarding the approach taken in this chapter involves the way of determining the aspects or dimensions (i.e., political, economic, administrative etc.) of what happens today and the method of exploring, examining and, even, explaining, if possible, those changes, their aspects, and interactions. Many reform programs, suggested by international organizations such as the EU, WB, IMF, UNDP, and OECD and implemented by particularly developing countries, are often called as structural or institutional adjustment or transformation programs especially since the 1980s. The main focus of these programs is to transform the structure of the state and/or public administration by enhancing the rule of law and the rules of the game (i.e., democratization, transparency, and accountability), by improving market mechanism and by introducing market mechanisms into the public sector, privatizing the public sector, increasing efficiency, reducing costs and red-tape, among others

(UNDP 2007, p. 2). Yet, the methods have been various. In the 1980s the market was taken as the new basic driver of development instead of the Keynesian welfare state. Starting in the 1990s, the efforts are concentrated on improving competitiveness in the market and the capacity of the public administration or the state as the facilitator of good governance as the market has still continued to be the driving force (Baimyrzaeva 2012; Güler 2004, p. 27; 1996). According to the EU rules, candidate countries have to meet the economic and financial standards (Maastricht or convergence criteria) and Copenhagen (accession) criteria, including a free market economy, a stable democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the acceptance of all EU legislation, including of the euro. Specifically, the basic areas for institutional transformation involve the betterment of public policy making processes, the enhancement of the rule of law, accountability, transparency, auditing, and efficiency as indicated in the SIGMA Program of the EU on the reform in public administration (Peretó 2007).

Similarly, democratic governance practices by UNDP in developing countries focus on such thematic areas as access to justice, the rule of law, human rights and security sector governance, local governance and civic engagement, public administration reform and anti-corruption, women empowerment and gender equality (UNDP 2013). These ideas seem to be based on a changed role for governments. In today's world, "government is less the producer of goods and services, and more the supervisor of proxies who do the actual work" (Kettle 1993, pp. 21–22). In much the same way, Frederickson (1997, p. 85) states that governance is seen to include hyperpluralism with complex interactions among political parties, legislative bodies and their subdivisions, public organizations, interest groups, intermediaries, organizations, clients, the media, vendors, and so forth. Besides, governance is characterized by high levels of delegation and decentralization mixed with fuzzy boundaries between sub-elements of the organization, its clients or customers, and other organizations (Frederickson 1997, p. 86). The wave of the recent reforms in Turkey seems to include almost all of the above mentioned dimensions or aspects, particularly the reform of the central, regional, and local administrations and of their relations among themselves and with the market and society along with the enhancement of the political system or democracy. Yet, Turkey is considered to be in need of realizing further institutional change and reforms in her financial, judicial, personnel, auditing, taxing, central, and local administration system, of realigning the responsibilities and resources among the central, regional, and local administrations, and of continuing her struggle against poverty (OECD and EU 2005, p. 6; UNDP 2007, p. 2). These reforms are seen necessary to strengthen the sustainability of economic growth and democratization.

A final issue to consider is related to how one would explain what happens today. There is not much space to get into a detailed discussion of change or reform theories or approaches here. However, it would be appropriate to shortly touch upon the fact that the wave of the changes since the 1980s could be considered to fall under the framework of the general theories on public management reforms, which mainly includes the new public management (NPM) and the new public governance (NPG) paradigms (Ferlie 2012, p. 237). Ferlie (2012, p. 243) argues that these two paradigms

present entrepreneurship in public administration as a reform instrument to accomplish the goals of service modernization, strategic change, and capacity rebuilding particularly in the public administration. However, there are contrary approaches opposing to see public administration as an entrepreneurial organization driven mainly by the market principles. Barth (1996) argues that autocratic management styles have to be changed to more participative, bottom-up styles; and that governance may offer new solutions and flexibility in this respect. Even though the new developments offer new opportunities, the notion of competition that is stimulated by entrepreneurialism can be problematic in the public sector. The implication of living in an interconnected world is the need for more teamwork, collaboration, and communication, not increased fierce competition (Barth 1996, p. 195). Citizens are not customers and public administrators do not act on the base of competition, risk taking, and profit making. But rather, public administration should foster public interest, educate citizens and facilitate citizen participation, manage diversity and change properly and responsibly, and utilize teamwork and communication in the public administration (Barth 1996). Similarly, as Frederickson points out, public benefit, the equal distribution of public services, social justice, and equality of opportunity are some of the basic principles that guide the policies and actions of public administration (Frederickson 1997, p. 107). Public administration also has to be sensitive to the needs of the underrepresented or disadvantaged groups and minorities. Providing the necessary services to the public is the primary goal for the public sector whereas profit motive is the dominant incentive in the private sector. Emphasizing choice, competition, and decision-cost perspectives tend to be favorable to those who are in a position to make free choices and who can compete in the free market (Frederickson 1997, pp. 87–88).

Accordingly, this chapter is an attempt at presenting the political and administrative structure as well as constitutional principles in Turkey, the transformation in these structures, and the driving reasons and dynamics behind them. Besides, the recent reforms are reviewed and discussed, and their implementation and outcomes are evaluated. In this respect, economic liberalization, decentralization, deregulation, changes towards governance and efforts to democratize and shrink the state, the impact of European Union and globalization, among others are presented and examined. The last section concludes the chapter by presenting and discussing implications for public administration and public policy and future prospects.

Political and Administrative Structure in Turkey

The centralist structure and the efforts of modernization and/or westernization in Turkey were inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Kılıçbay 1995; Kongar 1999; Mardin 1962; Ortaylı 2002). The basic features of this heritage have been a dominant state control over the society and economy, and the dominance of the center over the periphery (Mardin 1973, 1991; Tural 2009, pp. 20–21) exercised mainly through the power of tutelage and central budgetary control. The duality between secularist—modernist state elites and the religious oriented peripheral movement

has existed in Turkish modernization process over the two centuries but become more obvious in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and after Turkey's transition into a multi-party democracy after the Second World War.

Almost all scholars studying on Turkish political life accept the duality of the center and periphery as a key concept for explaining the structure of the political competition in Turkey (Mardin 1973). Today, it can be said that the center and periphery relations are more complicated. Turkey has been ruled by political parties and elites supported by the periphery since 1950. In other words, ruling parties have been formed by a peripheral base till 2002 elections. This type of parties placed at the center right of the political spectrum established a refined consensus between the central elites and peripheral mass in the process of elections and government formation. However, especially after the 2007 elections the JDP cadres seem to have put an end to this consensus. The JDP cadres unlike the other cadres of the former center right parties in power have risen from the grassroots to the national politics. Moreover, the JDP governments have refused to share power with the military, the supreme courts and the civil bureaucracy on the one hand, and initiated a reform of these institutions on the other hand. Thus, the JDP seems to be in an effort of establishing a new type of political contra-elites, sympathizer institutions, and socioeconomic groups.

The Turkish economy has developed under the leadership of the public sector especially until the 1980s. A combination of statist approach and centralization was considered as an efficient method to build nation state, achieve economic development, keep the country intact, and ensure consistent administration (Ortaylı 1979, p. 287; Mardin 1994). Besides, the centralized administrative system was generally regarded as functional at the beginning years of the Republic because it helped implement top-to-bottom modernization and westernization reforms that were the Republic's core targets (Heper 1985; Heper and Keyman 1998). In this process, the interesting point is that the Republic of Turkey was established by a war, the War of Independence, given against "the western countries." As Ortaylı points out that we, Turks, have to both adapt to the modern world and protect our history and identity against the modern world (Ortaylı 2006, p. 56).

Since its establishment, Turkey has sided with the West in defense of freedom, democracy, and human rights through membership in organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (CAIMED 2004). Another concrete example of continuing aspiration for westernization is Turkey's integration efforts to the EU. Turkey has close economic relations with the EU since 1963 when Turkey participated in a free trade agreement with the EEC, and then these relations turned into a Customs Union in 1996 (Winkler 2005). Turkey began full membership negotiations with the European Union in 2005. Meanwhile, as a result of being a bridge between the West and the East, Turkey has continued to foster close political, economic, and industrial relations with the Eastern world, particularly with the states of the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia.

Another important reason for the centralized state structure in Turkey was the fear that the unitary form of the state and the soul of nationhood would have been harmed and separatist movements would have been fueled if the powers of central government

were decentralized and local administrations were strengthened (Narlı 2000, pp. 108–109). The social, cultural, and religious diversity of the Ottoman Empire was mostly transferred to the Republic which was used to justify state centrism and bureaucratic advocacy in the process of nation building and the consolidation of the nation state. In fact, in order to assimilate various ethnic groups and foster a common Turkish identity, Turkish laws severely restricted the public use of languages other than Turkish as well as open expressions of separate cultural identities until recently, such as Kurds or Alevis (a large and diverse group of Muslims living Islam liberally in Anatolia and differentiate themselves from the Sunni Muslims in Turkey) (Flam 2004, p. 176).

Basic Structure of the Current Political and Administrative System

The 1982 Constitution sets up a unitary state and a centralized political and administrative system in Turkey. As stated mainly in the first and second articles of the Constitution, *the main principles of the political system and state structure in Turkey* are republicanism; respectfulness to human rights; secularism; democracy; the rule of law; welfare state; the separation of powers; constitutional government; unitary state; judicial review of administrative decisions and acts through administrative courts. The 1982 Constitution recognizes the principle of decentralization as a basis for the organization and functioning of local administrations whereas the principle of centralization is for the organization of central government (Polatoğlu 2000, p. 80). In other words, the centralized structure of the public administration system is balanced by autonomous local administrations along with the local branches of the ministries of central government. According to the Article 123 of the 1982 Constitution, Turkey employs the principle of *deconcentration* within the organizational hierarchy of the central administration transferring power and resources to local branches and to officials of central administration. The Article 123 states that the public administration should function in unity and coherence in order to maintain the integrity of the whole body of national administration including provincial and local ones. However, the system is still very centralized and in turn causes administrative, political, and democratic problems.

According to the Article 123 of the Constitution, the administration is a whole and indivisible mainly because of the fact that Turkey is a unitary state. On the other hand, the essential features of the Republic of Turkey are indicated in the Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution:

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights; loyal to nationalism of Atatürk.

There was a committee made up of representatives from the four political parties in the Parliament working to write a whole new constitution. This new constitution would have introduced some sort of a presidential system and a system of much

autonomous local and regional administrations. Yet, the 1982 Constitution is still in effect and its concepts and principles as well as the established traditions and culture have affected the structuring and functioning of the public administration in Turkey. For instance, Article 123 of the Constitution introduces the concepts of (a) *centralization*—concentrating all the authority at the center; (b) *decentralization*—delegating authority to the local units; and (c) *deconcentration*—in which the center delegates parts of its authority to its hierarchically controlled field units.

Political and Administrative Structure at the Central Level

Turkey has a parliamentary representative democracy based on the separation of powers between legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. The legislative power is vested in the unicameral parliament, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, making up the government, own actual executive powers and are responsible before the GNAT. The judiciary is independent of the executive and legislative branches, and the Constitutional Court is charged with ruling on the conformity of laws and decrees with the constitution. The Council of State is the tribunal of last resort for administrative cases, and the High Court of Appeals for all others.

The Parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, is composed of 550 representatives, who are directly elected by the people once in every 4 years. A representative is a member of the Parliament representing the whole nation, not just the district from where he or she gets elected. To avoid excessive political fragmentation and to make it easy to establish a government, only parties winning at least 10 % of the votes cast in a national parliamentary election gain the right to representation in the Parliament. This 10 % threshold is considered to limit the representation in the Parliament as in the 2007 national parliamentary elections when only three parties formally entered the parliament compared to only two parties in 2002.

The executive branch is dual: The President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers or the Cabinet. The president is the head of the state and used to be elected only once for a 7-year term by a round of votes in the parliament. But after the constitutional amendments in 2007, the presidents are to be elected for a 5-year term by direct popular elections. He or she mainly has limited and symbolic powers. Empowered by the 1982 Constitution, the president is also considered as a part of the executive branch, exercising some administrative powers without political responsibility. For example, the president can preside over the meetings of the Cabinet if he or she chooses to do so, and he or she chairs the meetings of the National Security Council (NSC, *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*). The president also appoints several high ranking public officials. It could be further argued that the president was further empowered by the change in the method of his/her election method by popular vote in 2007. Considering the continuing pressures from the government for a shift to a presidential system, the election method by popular vote may ignite a change from parliamentary governmental system into some sort of a (semi-) presidential system.

Table 1 Central government structure in Turkey

The Parliament	The Executive Branch	The Judiciary
<p><i>Turkish Grand National Assembly</i> 550 representatives are elected for a 4-year term by open, competitive, and fair elections.</p>	<p><i>A. Central Government</i> The Presidency, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and ministries <i>B. Field Administrations of the Central Government</i> Regional branches, provincial branches, and district-based branches <i>C. Advisory Bodies:</i> The National Security Council, The State Council, The Court of Accounts <i>D. Autonomous Bodies:</i> Higher Education Council, autonomous regulatory bodies such as Privatization Authority, Competition Authority, and Capital Markets Authority etc., and some others.</p>	<p><i>A. Supreme courts</i> Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, the State Council <i>B. Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors</i>^a <i>C. First level of specialized courts in the provinces</i></p>

^aIt is a body with administrative, auditing, and disciplinary power over judges and public prosecutors directly after they are appointed

As in many other parliamentary governmental systems, the prime minister is the most powerful political leader in Turkey. The prime minister is appointed by the President to form a government and he or she is normally the leader of the party having the highest number of seats in the Parliament. The central administration includes the Presidency, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, ministries, and consultative agencies. The Cabinet needs to be approved through a vote of confidence in the Parliament and is at the top of both the political and administrative system. The Prime Minister (PM), according to the 1982 Constitution (the Articles 112, 109), is the head of both the Cabinet and the public administration. The PM, as the chairman of the Cabinet, ensures cooperation among the ministers and supervises the implementation of the policies of the government. If necessary, the PM may take corrective measures including the dismissal of a minister through a proposal to the president. Each minister is responsible to the PM for the conduct of the affairs of one’s ministry and for the activities of the subordinates in ministries (Table 1).

Field and Local Administrations: Each ministry is based in Ankara but have the units in the provinces serving on their behalf in a hierarchical organizational structure. For administrative purposes, Turkey is divided into 81 provinces (*il*) on the basis of geographical situation, economic conditions, and public service requirements as stated in Article 126 of the 1982 Constitution. Provinces are the main administrative units for central government activities and they are headed by provincial governors (*Vali*). Yet, each ministry has a provincial and/or regional director of its provincial or regional field organization. The provincial governor also has the authority and responsibility for the supervision of the “field organizations” of each ministry. Provinces are further divided into districts (*ilçe*), headed by the sub-governor (*Kaymakam*).

Within the administrative organization of Turkey, the position of provincial governor is very important since he (or rarely she) is the chief executive of the

provincial administration and has the responsibility of coordinating and controlling the operations of different field agencies of the central government (Polatoğlu 2000, p. 93). At the provincial level, there are not only the field branches of the central government under the supervision of the provincial governor but also local administrations enjoying some autonomy. Local administrations include province-wide metropolitan municipalities (*büyükşehir belediyesi*) and district municipalities (*belediye*) in 30 provinces, and special provincial administrations (*il özel idaresi*), city and town municipalities (*belediye*), and villages (*köy*) in the remaining 51 provinces. There are also functionally autonomous local bodies such as universities, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), and state economic enterprises. These functional local administrations provide specific services without any geographical restriction and can be located at the center or periphery.

The geographical local administration in Turkey is divided into three main administrative tiers, consisting of the municipalities (and metropolitan municipalities, a new tier of the local administrative structure established in 1984), the special provincial administrations and villages. The decision making and executive bodies of these local administrations are all elected by popular vote, except for the chair of the special provincial administration. The municipalities are the most autonomous type of local administrations and headed by elected mayors and councils. The special provincial administrations, established in 51 provinces, and the village administrations are also autonomous local administrative entities responsible mainly for the provision of local public services. Yet, the special provincial administrations also carry out some of the duties of central government and provide assistance to the local branches of the central government, if needed. Accordingly, the governor who is appointed directly by the central government has a dual role in the province. As of 2014, there are 81 provinces and 51 special provincial administrations, 1,400 municipalities, 30 metropolitan municipalities, 850 districts, and 18,000 villages in Turkey.

A new law (enacted in 2012 and numbered 6360) established province-wide metropolitan municipalities in 29 provinces with a population of 750,000 and over to be effective after the 2014 local elections. In a short while, the number of the provincial metropolitan municipalities was increased to 30 with another law passed by the Parliament. According to the 2012 law, all the other local governments in those 30 provinces with the newly established provincial metropolitan municipalities were abolished after the 2014 local elections, accounting more than 50 % of all the local governments in Turkey. 30 provinces are to have only provincial metropolitan municipalities as the upper-tier and district municipalities as the lower-tier of the provincial metropolitan municipalities. As in many other countries, city or town municipalities in Turkey also have responsibilities for the production of public works and infrastructure and for bringing substantial local public services to the local citizens within their municipal boundaries. Similarly, every province used to have a province-wide local administration, called as the special provincial administration. Duties regulated by law and ranging from education to construction, from agriculture to social assistance are given to the special provincial administrations to be delivered within the entire area of a province, particularly in rural areas. Now,

Table 2 The regional and local administrations in Turkey

Regional administrations	Local administrations		
	Geographical		Functional
	Two-layer province-wide municipalities in the 30 most populous provinces	Other local administrations in the remaining 51 provinces	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) – Regional Development Administrations to manage regional (inter-provincial) development projects stimulated and managed by the central government. They are established in mainly comparatively underdeveloped regions such as the Southeastern or Eastern Anatolia Regions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Two-layer province-wide metropolitan municipalities with an elected mayor and metropolitan council – District municipalities with an elected mayor and council. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – SPAs – City and town municipalities with an elected mayor and council – Villages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – State universities – State theaters – State research institutes – Turkish Radio and Television Corporation...

after the 2012 provincial metropolitan municipality law was put into effect in 2014, only those 51 provinces without a provincial metropolitan municipality have a special provincial administration, city and town municipalities, and village administrations.

Although the local governments are autonomous decentralized units, they are subject to close scrutiny and control of the central government exercised through the power of tutelage, which is the guaranty of the indivisibility of administration and the country. In this regard, the provincial governor is given some authority to oversee the autonomous local authorities as well. In fact, the governor is the head of the special provincial administrations. In addition, the principles of the “indivisibility of administration” along with the “indivisible integrity of the state and nation” also reflect the centralized and hierarchical structure of the administration in Turkey. The “maintenance of law and social order” and the “unity of the nation” have been major historical principles of the Turkish state (Polatoğlu 2000, p. 110; Heper 1992). Thus, one could argue that there is still a centralist state structure and limited local autonomy in Turkey (Table 2).

Turkey had no real regional administrations until 2006 because largely of its possible implication for separatism. The law numbered 5449 was enacted on 25 January 2006 and provided for the legal framework for establishing regional development agencies (RDAs) in the 26 NUTS II regions throughout Turkey. The RDAs are defined as separate local-regional administration units, but national coordination among the RDAs is to be done by the Ministry of Development. The main objectives of the RDAs are to invigorate and support local and regional potential for

economic development, to organize economic development and related research and education activities in their respective regions, to enhance the cooperation among public, civic and private sectors, and to enable an efficient and suitable utilization of public resources, among others. Agencies are created by a decision of the Council of Ministers on the basis of NUTS 2 regions and the Council of Ministers is also allowed to rearrange regions.

Changes in Turkey Since the 1980s and Their Reasons

The beginning of the neo-liberal era and the related reforms starts with the 24 January 1980 economic decisions to liberalize economy and the army coup later in the same year that suppressed social unrest and attempted to overcome political instability. The 1980s witnessed the adaption of a new constitution with some authoritarian leanings and strong statist and centralist characteristics, and a change from import substitution to export-oriented growth policies. As a result, the Turkish economy was opened up to the market forces and globalization, and in turn state intervention in the economy was declined and a change in the political and administrative structure begun (Akdoğan 2010; Bayar 1996, p. 779; Gül and Memişoğlu 2007; Öniş 2004; Sallan Gül 2006, pp. 281–300; Shaker 1995). In a politically suppressed milieu, people could not raise much opposition to such changes.

The policies in the 1980s were in general successful in reviving economic growth, economic liberalization, and the shift in the economy from import substitution to export orientation (Öniş 2004; Sallan Gül 2006). Yet, the political and administrative reforms were very slow and, thus, the centralistic, undemocratic, and statist aspects of political and administrative system continued to exist into the new millennium (Hicks 2001, p. 78; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000, p. 482; Heper and Keyman 1998, p. 266). Öniş (2004, p. 114) asserts that Özal Governments had defects particularly in building a strong legal infrastructure for a well functioning and competitive market economy and sustainable growth and in understanding and institutionalizing the rule of law. Besides, in the 1990s, increasing public sector and foreign trade deficits, concomitant chronic inflation, the 1999 earthquake, the economic and financial crises in 1994 and 2000–2001, high inflation, a weak banking sector, and increased macroeconomic volatility all have had adverse side effects on political, economic, and social lives, making it absolutely imperative to deal with the macroeconomic imbalances with permanent measures and structural adjustments. Therefore, in 1999, the government embarked upon a comprehensive economic reform program to address the long-standing economic problems, to reduce inflation and to achieve a sustainable growth. Kemal Derviş, working for the WB, was invited to Turkey and appointed as the minister responsible for the economy and for the implementation of a structural adjustment program, focusing on shrinking the size of the state and its role in the economy, and separating the economy from the politics (Derviş et al. 2006, pp. 63–64 and 102). Besides, some amendments to the 1982 Constitution were passed enabling privatization and economic liberalization.

Another problem from which Turkey has suffered is the undemocratic military influence and political instability due to weak coalitions and frequent elections in the 1990s. The problems related to democracy, the rule of law, and basic rights and freedoms along with the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism and the revival of political Islam have added to the increased influence of the military on the political and administrative system (Hicks 2001, pp. 78-79; Öniş 2004, p. 130). Of course, the privileges and prerogatives granted to the army by the 1982 Constitution and laws have also played an important role in this outcome. The concerns of the Turkish military were about the indivisible integrity of the country, the unitary, and secular character of the state (Aydın and Keyman 2004, p. 19; Kubicek 2002, p. 4).

All these developments and problems of the late 1990s and the early 2000s shook Turkish democracy and political and administrative system and paved the way for the JDP governments and reforms. The new JDP government, established at the end of 2002, declared itself as a reform government and explicitly stated its will in realizing comprehensive reforms. The strong one party JDP governments launched a new wave of democratization, deregulation, liberalization, and decentralization, contributed to the enhancement of democratic governance, the protection of individual rights and freedoms, the enhancement of public service delivery, and the marketization and globalization of the economy started during the previous coalition government. These reform attempts were justified on the base of an obvious need for economic recovery, political stability, democratic governance, active, efficient, decentralized and flexible public administration to facilitate economic development in accordance with the EU norms (Aydın and Keyman 2004, pp. 16–17). The increased global standards and Turkey–EU relations seem to have triggered the transformation and to provide an anchor for the JDP governments to proceed with the reform efforts. It is particularly worth mentioning, as Aydın and Keyman (2004) state, that the accession process to the EU has functioned as the most important driving and guiding force for the reforms. In addition, it was argued that the centralist state structure, military influence over democratically elected governments, and the tutelary powers of the center over the local administrations had gone beyond the legal limits. Thus, there was a clear need for political, economic, and administrative reforms to improve flawed democracy, to establish fair competition and consumer rights, to eradicate chronic inflation and public sector deficits, to remedy the extreme centralization and bureaucratization of state and administration structure, to prevent delays, complexities, rigidities, and excessive red-tape in service delivery, to enhance service quality, and to meet people's expectations (Çelenk 2009, p. 50; Öniş 2004, p. 114; Sezer 2002).

The recent wave of the reforms and changes were also necessitated by such domestic causes as population growth, huge waves of migration to urban areas, increased and diversified citizen demands, absolute and rigid administrative structure procedures and regulations, among others. Other group of important triggering factors in the processes of reform and change has been global dynamics and developments such as globalization, the relations with IMF, WB, OECD and UN, the fall of Soviet Block, proliferation of neo-liberal capitalist market ideology, weakening nation states, revolutionary changes in ICT technologies, among others (Al 2002;

Cılga 2004; Çelenk 2009, p. 41; Farazmand 1994; Gül 1998, 2005; Kettle 2000; OECD and EU 2007; Ökmen 2005). These factors all have forced many national political and administrative systems as well as the Turkish system to take necessary steps and precautions to adapt to these changes and meet international standards. Accordingly, a general tendency towards democracy, the protection of human rights through international mechanisms, the NPM, governance, e-government, decentralization, privatization and marketization of public services have developed and have been widely put into practice (Aksoy 2004, pp. 38–40; Bozlağan 2003; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Gül and Özgür 2004; Ömürgönülşen 2003; Özer 2005; Sallan Gül 1999, p. 70; Sözen 2012; Yıldız 2003).

The undemocratic structure of the 1982 Constitution, written under military rule, has been one of the most important reasons for political reforms. This is because, as argued by the chief commanders of the 1980 intervention, the main concern of the Constitution is to protect the state, the nation, and the unity against misbehaviors and fragmenting forces. In order to achieve those goals, the military was given important prerogatives in the political system. Compared to the state of human rights and freedoms in the 1961 Constitution the approach of the original version of the 1982 Constitution was very restrictive. For instance, according to the Article 13 of the Constitution, the restriction of human rights and freedoms could be based on such vague notions as the protection of “public interest,” “public morals,” and “the unity of the country and state” (Tanör 1997, p. 105). Besides, the constitution had additional restriction measures under each article of the Constitution regulating basic rights and freedoms. Therefore there has emerged a need for amendments in the Constitution or for many people a need for a new constitution regarding the protection of human rights.

Other group of reasons for the latest reform wave was related to a lack of participation in public policy making processes of those who “may be affected” by these policies and the inadequacy of transparency, accountability, and dissemination of information with the public or interested parties. Within the structure created by the 1982 Constitution, the notion of participation has been restricted to elections and election campaigns. Hence, membership in NGOs and participation in public policy making processes continue to be very low in Turkey. It is also the same with women’s participation in general and specifically female representation in policy making bodies and managerial positions against the fact that women got their suffrage rights in the early 1930s. Moreover, the civil society has never been as strong in Turkey as they are in developed western countries to influence governments. Furthermore, the established system of auditing was not effective because it was largely based on legal compliance. Tools to hold administration accountable were exclusively confined to compliance with the laws and regulations and legal accountability is maintained by the system of judicial review. Every citizen has the right to appeal to administrative courts against the actions of the public administration. Yet, it did not allow for true transparency because performance based accountability and the principles of good governance were not implemented and the results of auditing functions were not disclosed to the public.

Religious and ethnic revival as a result of global developments as well as population growth and urbanization have also contributed to the revival of ethnicity

and religious issues (Kepel 1994) that has had important impact on the recent reform efforts and diversified citizen demands. Besides, democratization has increased individual freedoms, created a permissive environment for the religious and ethnic groups and Islamic charities to thrive and feed religiousness and ethnicity in the world as well as in Turkey (Huntington 2008, p. 212; Yavuz 2005, p. 16). It should however be mentioned that it was the 1980 military coup that started the revival of religious sentiments and triggered Kurdish separatism. The military regime made religion courses with a Turkish Sunni version compulsory for the secondary and high school students as a precaution to prevent any leanings towards Communism and to strengthen the national unity. Besides, the number of religious secondary and high schools has steadily increased after 1980. Due to these developments, conservatism and religious sentiments grew. Interestingly, the developments towards marketization and commercialization in the same period seem to have feed increased conservatism and religious sentiments in a hope to keep the society and families intact. All these developments have also influenced the Turkish politics and, in turn, the political parties with Islamist and conservative references have enhanced their societal base (Fuller 2008, p. 101).

Main Aspects of Changes Towards Democratic Governance in Turkey

The most important aspect of the recent political reforms involves changes in some laws and the amendments to the 1982 Constitution. “There is little doubt that the original text of the 1982 Constitution contained severe defects, which rendered it hardly compatible with universal democratic norms” (Özbudun 2007, p. 195). The 1982 Constitution has been amended 17 times, especially since 1999 fairly radically. The general directions of these amendments were to improve the protection of fundamental rights, to enhance democracy, to bolster the rule of law, to limit the military’s influence on the political system and to diminish the intervention of the governments in the judiciary and the market. A constitutional reference was made to privatization for the first time, in Article 47, by the amendment of August 13, 1999, thereby removing some of the legal obstacles before privatization. The constitutional amendments of 2001 and 2004 enhanced human rights, the rule of law, gender equality; included provisions for the prevention of torture and ill-treatments and for the abolishment of death penalty; and curbed the influence of the military on the politics (Özbudun 2007, p. 195). Besides, international agreements on human rights signed by Turkey are placed above the domestic laws. If a conflict emerges between the laws and such international agreements, priority shall be given to the international agreements not to the national laws. Moreover, Turkey signed some international agreements banning death penalty and made necessary amendments in the Penal Code accordingly (Sokullu-Akıncı 2011, pp. 155–156).

The 1995, 2005, and 2010 constitutional amendments extensively dealt with political parties and increased liberties for the political parties and its members.

Özbudun (2007, pp. 180–192) states that the 1995 constitutional amendments brought about improvements in the status of associations, trade unions, public professional organizations and cooperatives, and abolished the ban on the political activities of such organizations. In general, the most radical and comprehensive constitutional amendments were those of 2001 and 2010, which involved changes to more than 30 articles in the 1982 Constitution in each case mostly about human rights. These changes included reducing custody time, further protecting private life, abrogating very general reasons mentioned in the 13th article of the Constitution designed for the restriction of human rights by laws, making the closure of political parties difficult, clarifying the decisions of the NSC to be advisory; and increasing the number of civilian members in the NSC.

There are distinct ethnic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Laz, and Abkhazians, making Turkey a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. Internationally recognized minority groups involve Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. Kurds are largest non-Turkic ethnicity, concentrated mainly in the Southeastern provinces of the country, and makes up around 15–18 % of the total population. Other ethnic groups besides the Kurds constitute an estimated 10 % of the population. Yet, these groups are not considered as minority but equal citizens of the Republic of Turkey.

Kurdish problem in the form of suppressed cultural rights and freedoms along with armed confrontations in the Southeastern Region of Turkey, where many Kurds live, has become a major issue after the mid-1980s and intensified in the 1990s. During the 1990s, the military raised its discomfort with the polarization in the politics, the sluggish performance of the Parliament, and over-emphasis on the democratic, cultural, and ethnic rights of the Kurdish people (Saybaşılı 1995, p. 75). The military along with many politicians and bureaucrats considered the demands for the recognition of the Kurdish identity as threats to the territorial integrity of the state and the unity of the nation. Accordingly, some measures, mostly military, were taken to fight against the problem. Besides, Kurdish identity had been neglected and even denied until the early 1990s. According to the official rhetoric, Ergil (2001, p. 171) argues, there was the problem of terror but not an ethnic Kurdish problem, and in turn such an approach has contributed to the strengthening of the Kurdish Communist Party (KCP-Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan in Kurdish and Kürdistan İşçi Partisi in Turkish). Although the Kurdish language had been banned by the administrative decrees since the late 1930s, the use of the language in public was prohibited after the early 1980s. However, as Aydın and Keyman (2004, pp. 34–35) state, these policies led to serious human rights abuses, a significant degree of mistrust between the state and the people in the region and mass migration to the cities nearby and in Western Turkey.

Overall, triggered by the emergence of EU conditionality there has been significant progress accomplished regarding the Kurdish issue in recent years. Aydın and Keyman (2004, p. 35) state that the October 2001 amendments to the 1982 Constitution removed the restrictions on the use of Kurdish language and on the broadcasting in local languages and dialects as long as such broadcasts were not against the main principles of the Turkish Republic and the unity of the state. The Civil Registry Law was amended in July 2003 to permit parents to name their

children in Kurdish. More importantly, in April 2010 the TBMM voted for a law permitting political campaigning in languages other than Turkish. The reform packages in 2003 became widely famous for lifting Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (thus further expanding the freedom of speech), putting the extension of broadcasting rights in Kurdish and the freedom of the press into effect, strengthening the fight against torture, easing the procedures for establishing associations, and making the retrial of cases on the basis of the decisions taken by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) possible. Moreover, a number of restrictions on the freedom of expression have been abolished to meet the standards of the European Convention of Human Rights (Ayđın and Keyman 2004, p. 27).

However, it is not enough discussing the religious identity problems of Sunni dominant groups or Kurdish people in Turkey. There have been attempts to extend the cultural rights to the Alevi people and gypsies as well. As a religious community with a major identity and recognition problem, Alevis have raised their voice against the preference of a legal Turk—Sunni Islam synthesis of the post-1980s and mandatory religion courses in which a Turk—Sunni version of Islam is taught (Van Bruinessen 2009, p. 122). These mandatory courses were made optional in 2012 but due to neighborhood oppression and a lack of teachers for other elective courses many do not have a real option other than choosing whatever course is offered for them. Thus, there does not seem that much progress has been achieved in this respect. The main reason for this is that participation of and national dialogues with all different ethnic groups have been limited in this process. Besides, indirect restrictions on the political participation and representation of different ethnic groups in politics, such as the 10 % national threshold, worsen the conditions by causing unfair representation and in turn trust and legitimacy problems (Ayđın and Keyman 2004, p. 39). Similarly, undemocratic party system and party leaderships, limitations and oppression on the effective use of freedom of the press and expression, and labor rights all deteriorate the existing problems.

Increased Control of Civil Government over Military

Even though Turkey has a parliamentary representative democracy, the military has had an influential position in the political system (Bilgiç 2009, p. 803; Hale 1996, p. 256). The roots of the influence of the armed forces on the political system could be traced back to the role of the military elite in both the modernization of the Ottomans and the formation of the Turkish Republic in the early 1920s (Hale 1996, p. 256). It may be because such a role was taken in modernization, the armed forces have a self-perception of the guardian role of the state and of its founding principles such as national unity and secularism (Dađı 1996, p. 124; Narlı 2000, pp. 108–109). However, the 1980 military intervention had far reaching aims and “tried to change the political attitude of people and to de-politicize the whole society in an attempt to prevent in future the political and ideological fragmentation and polarization which had characterized pre-coup Turkey” (Dađı 1996, p. 125). The NSC as the

main body of the coup with General Evren as the leader who overthrew the government forbid all political activities, suspended newspapers and publications, banned many books and collected them, abolished political parties and prohibited the main politicians from involvement in active politics, and put them under custody (Schulman 2007, p. 15).

The constitutions and some other legal regulations have contributed to the armed forces' considering themselves as the guardian of the state and its principles. The major source of the influence of the military has been through the NSC. Karpat (2010, p. 246) argues that the influence was increased and institutionalized after the 1960 intervention by the establishment of the NSC. By the NSC the military has had a decisive role on the internal and external security issues as well as on some foreign policy matters. Özbudun (2007, p. 193) states that the status and powers of the NSC were strengthened by the amendments in 1971 and particularly by the 1982 Constitution because "the wording of the 1982 Constitution no doubt strengthened the morally binding character of NSC decisions."

However, Flam (2004, pp. 174–175) states that such an influential role of the military on the political system is not consistent with the principles of modern democracy and has constituted one of the main obstacles in Turkey's accession to the EU (Cizre 2004, p. 107; Narlı 2000, p. 107). In fact, the preconditions of the EU for membership in the Turkish case are the realization of government's control over the military and the consolidation of the democracy (Bilgiç 2009, p. 803). Accordingly, since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, there have been efforts to curb the power of the army on the Turkish politics and to meet the Copenhagen political criteria regarding democracy and human rights (Müftüler Baç 2005, p. 18). In 2007 the armed forces tried to intervene in the politics once again, but the JDP was able to avoid this attempt within the Europeanization and globalization context. This attempt has given a way for a new political period which has been started with the 2002 elections. Özbudun (2007, p. 195) argues that "recent constitutional and legislative reforms have eliminated a large part of the privileges and prerogatives granted to the military by the 1982 Constitution." Yet, he maintains that "Further steps towards civilianization and the establishment of full civilian control over the military seem to depend on the overall consolidation of democracy and the successful completion of accession negotiations with the European Union" (Özbudun 2007, p. 195). After the 2010 amendments to the 1982 Constitution, the chief officers of the 1982 intervention are now being prosecuted. It could be argued that this has further contributed to the reduction of the role of the armed forces in the Turkish politics.

Enhancement of Legal System and the Rule of Law

The power, structure, and independence of the judicial system are crucial for the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and freedoms. One of the significant changes made in the judicial system was the abolition of the State Security Courts (SSCs) in 2004 after soldier members of the SSCs, established to

protect the state and the unity of the nation, were replaced with civilian courts in 1999. Another change involves banning the power of military courts to try civilians (including juveniles) (Aydın and Keyman 2004, p. 40). Besides, the rights of the detained persons were improved, custody periods were reduced to 24 h (extendable to a maximum of 4 days upon the written order of the public prosecutor in the case of collective offenses), and the conditions of detention in law enforcement and interrogation facilities have been enhanced (Aydın and Keyman 2004, p. 23). Moreover, a very recent change in the Criminal Code is that special-authority courts are abolished and their authority is transferred to the heavy penal courts, which are authorized to try only cases involving organized crime and terrorism. Finally, another judicial package just passed at the beginning of 2013 provides freedom to defend oneself before the courts with a language other than official language; and the State Council has just decided that the attorneys have freedom to be present in court rooms with their head-scarves to defend their clients.

However, there are some changes that are difficult to see as improvements in the judicial system. One of them is the requirement for the administrative courts to make their rulings on stopping execution by the administration after getting the defense of administration. This, it can be argued, would delay the protection of the rights and freedoms of people and even harm them if acts and actions of administration are against the laws. Another revision is related to the prison sentence of the people who have breached the law allegedly on behalf of an outlawed organization even if it cannot be precisely proved that they are not a member of the organization. Such an article creates a potential for misuses.

The 2010 amendments to the 1982 Constitution provide the government to appoint several members in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the State Council. Besides, the 2010 amendments establish an ombudsman system in order to provide confidential and impartial assistance in mediating and resolving complaints and disputes between individuals and the public administration. However, recent changes increase the power of the government to oversee and influence the judicial system that is supposed to function in accordance with the principles of the independence of the courts and the security of tenure of judges (Article 159 of the 1982 Constitution). For example, despite its overall contribution to improve democratic characteristics of the political system in Turkey, the new changes allow the Ministry of Justice to sit as the president in the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (SCJP), a body with administrative, auditing, and disciplinary power over judges and public prosecutors after they are appointed. Another significant change involves the election of 10 of the 20 members of the SCJP by judges and prosecutors. Yet, the effects of the Ministry of Justice on the election process are criticized. Therefore, it is difficult to consider these changes as a progress in the rule of law because the influence of the government over the SCJP and judicial system in general continues.

A last, but not the least, change is that the issues regarding human rights can be brought to the Constitutional Court before pleading the case to the ECHR. The success of this amendment, it could be argued, will depend on the decisions of the Constitutional Court. If the Court strictly follows the decisions of the ECHR, the

amendment could be an improvement. Otherwise, this amendment would function to delay pleading to the ECHR. In July 2012 a revision of some articles of the laws regarding judicial process, known as the third judicial package, was passed. The revision included provisions in accordance with the sixth article of the ECHR that anyone has the right to be judged by independent and impartial courts and to ask for carrying his/her trial out in a “reasonable period of time.” In recent years, the excessive workload of the judiciary and a very slow process of trials cause the breach of the right to be judged within a reasonable period of time and fulfillment of duty of the state to trial in a reasonable period of time. For this reason, the ECHR decided that Turkey had to pay compensation in such cases.

Realignment of the State and Market Relations

During the 2000–2001 economic and financial crises, some amendments to the 1982 Constitution were passed enabling privatization and economic liberalization for the successful implementation of the structural adjustment program. The structural adjustment program and new reforms have been strictly followed and implemented by the JDP governments after 2002. These amendments gave autonomy to the organizations such as the Central Bank of Turkey and the Council of Capital Markets. Accordingly, the elimination of public monopoly in some public services, the establishment of unemployment insurance, enhanced financial transparency, and tightened control on budget expenditures in the public sector were put into effect. Especially, the establishment of autonomous regulatory bodies, such as the Banking Regulation and Supervising Agency, the Competition Authority, and the Privatization Authority, was a significant step towards regulating and administering rationally and effectively the related markets. It helped develop properly functioning markets without being influenced by the political developments and being interfered excessively by the governments (SPO 2003, p. 71). Besides, the Competition Authority has been working with increasing effectiveness to eliminate unfair competition in the market. Moreover, the new Penal Code was also amended to provide for the prevention of unfair competition. Furthermore, the right for civil servants to establish trade unions and right to collective bargaining without a right to strike has been introduced to public administration system in Turkey in 2001. In contrast to civil servants, public workers had enjoyed wider labor rights such as right to strike and right to be a member of a political party until the 1980s. Yet, labor unions have lost their power since the 1980s and a great majority of their members due mainly to neo-liberal policies and changes in economic structure and globalization.

Another aspect of unfair competition in the market is related to the protection of consumers and the pervasiveness of the informal market. A lack of properly functioning consumer protection system and regular market mechanisms resulted in unfair competition in the market, inefficiencies, and the violations of the basic rights. To solve such problems, a Consumer Protection Law was enacted in 2004 by the Parliament, establishing a sufficient mechanism and penalties to protect

consumers and help to create a fair and competitive economic environment. Another change regarding the market involved leaving the disagreements on international public service deals out of the duty of the public courts. Besides, in order to overcome inadequate transparency and accountability in public administration, and to ensure competition and fairness at public tenders, the Public Tender Authority was established as a public legal entity, which is administratively and financially autonomous. Moreover, the 2004 Public Procurement and the Right to Information Acts made it compulsory to provide access to the information about all administrative decisions and actions upon request. Especially, the Right to Information Act may contribute to the responsiveness of the public administration. Similarly, the sessions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly are now broadcasted live by the Turkish Radio and Television. These reforms have helped Turkey make tremendous progress towards developing a good governance structure and becoming a more market oriented and competitive economy, integrated with the world economy.

General Administrative Reforms

The JDP governments have continued the wave of reforms launched by the coalition governments at the end of the 1990s and during the early 2000s with an increasing momentum. In addition to its government program, the first JDP government announced an urgent action plan providing the ground for the reforms. The reform package included the goals of restructuring public administration, simplifying bureaucracy, meeting diversified needs and demands of the society and economy, reducing public deficits, accelerating the decision making process, shrinking the role of the state, and increasing the use of market mechanisms.

The most radical attempt to reform the state and public administration was the 2003 Public Administration Reform Draft Law. The overall goals of the draft law were to restructure relations between central government and local administrations and to realign the functions and the size of the public administration according to the principles of the NPM. For example, the draft law included provisions for the empowerment of the market and civil society and for a public management system built upon good governance principles such as transparency, accountability, participation, responsiveness, human rights, and individual freedoms, etc. (Gül 2005). Besides, the draft law was to restrict the authority of the central government and to limit its services to such areas as justice, national defense, domestic security, foreign policy, fiscal and economic policy, national education, social security, coordination among public organizations and agencies, and the preparation of plans at the national level. Some of the central administration's responsibilities for such public services as health, local, and regional economic development, environmental protection, the preservation of cultural and historical heritage, social assistance, welfare and social services were to be transferred to the regional and local administrations. Accordingly, the roles and functions of the ministries and public agencies in the central government were to be limited to policymaking, monitoring, and

supervisory functions whereas the delivery of basic local services was to be left to the local administrations. Thus, the central government no longer would have had the authority to assume duties which explicitly left to the local administrations. In fact, the local administrations were granted a general competence to decide or take action on any local issues or to meet any local needs. Besides, public services at all levels were allowed to be provided in accordance with the market principles and mechanism with consumer-orientation, efficiency, and competitiveness (Gül 2005). However, this draft law failed in the Parliament.

Despite the failure of the Government to pass the draft reform bill, the Prime Minister Erdoğan insisted on putting the main principles of the draft reform law into practice. As a first step to achieve this goal, some government agencies such as the General Directorate of Rural Services and the local branches of several ministries were abolished and their responsibilities were transferred to local administrations. Besides, several specific laws were enacted including the Act on Public Financial Management and Control, the State Auction Act, the Act on Ethics in Public Administration, the acts on regional and local administrations, and acts on social security. The Act on Public Financial Management and Control is a good example of Turkey's accelerated efforts towards harmonizing its public internal financial control system with the EU and international standards, increasing transparency and accountability in public financial management, enhancing the efficiency of auditing and fiscal control systems. The Law is also expected to help reduce the public debt and expenditures. Similarly, the State Auction Act helps to fight corruption and aims at transparency, competition, and accountability in the process of public auctions. The reform laws on social security are an attempt to reduce the deficits of social security institutions and to create new sources (see also Sallan Gül and Gül 2006). The social security reform, especially Health Transformation Program, liberalizes social security and health sectors, and opens them to the market and competition.

The essence of the other reform laws involves devolving some responsibilities and resources of the central government to local and regional administrations, give them a general authority to meet all the common needs of local citizens, privatizing or making it easier to use market mechanisms and providers in the delivery of public services, and to hire temporary and part-time personnel on contract. In other words, the reform laws both aim to shrink the role of the central government in the administrative system and of the state in the economy and society by dispersing its powers downward to the local and regional governments, the NGO's, and the market.

Turkey has continuously faced major problems in establishing and implementing a system of objective public recruitment and employment. This resulted in the appointment of people who are not qualified, but close to the political party in power. Besides, training has been a headache in the public administration system. Despite introducing a general entrance exam for public employees, Turkey has failed to establish an impartial and sound system for promotion in civil service. A lack of training seems to be one of the factors that prevent efficiency and effectiveness in the civil service. Recently, training has become compulsory for promotion for public employees of local governments. Wider use of objective criteria is a new practice

whereby staff promotions are made only after the candidates attend certain in-service training courses and pass subsequent examinations. These examples of recruiting and promoting staff on the basis of merit could be considered as concrete steps towards good governance. In addition, Turkey has spent enormous efforts to reach the level of European e-government systems in the recent years. Under the 2003 Urgent Action Plan, a comprehensive strategy for establishing an e-government system which fully complies with the EU standards was set up and e-Transformation Turkey Project was adopted to coordinate information society activities, carried out under different topics by different institutions. Through this method, people are provided with the opportunity to obtain some services online such as the payment of taxes and the application for and obtainment of passports or registrations. Similarly, the Prime Ministry and Ministry of Interior also launched a local net project with the purpose of providing a complete source of data and information related to local administrations, and increasing accessibility to local government services. All above mentioned reforms define new parameters for the public governance in Turkey signaling an important change and transformation in the traditional administrative structure and culture.

Local and Regional Administration Reforms

The changes regarding local administrations started in the 1980s, which empowered local administrations financially and increased their capability of generating some of their own resources and of implementing their projects in accordance with the principles, standards, and national and regional plans defined by the central administration (Canan 2004; Gül and Özgür 2004; Gül 2005; Gül and Memişoğlu 2007). A new reform of local and regional administrations started after the inauguration of the JDP government at the end of 2002 and the reform laws except for the one on the village administrations have been enacted by the Parliament since 2004. These laws regulate municipalities, metropolitan municipalities, special provincial administrations (the SPA), local administration service unions, and the RDAs. As a traditional and spontaneously formed local government type, villages managed according to the Village Act of 1924 (numbered 442) have been out of the reform waves so far but is also in the process of amendment by the current government. With the 2012 act numbered 6360, all the village administrations in the 30 provinces with province-wide metropolitan municipal administrations were abolished and turned into the neighborhoods of the district municipalities in whose limits they were located.

The reference law regulating the SPAs was the Act of Provincial Local Administrations first issued as a temporary law in 1913 and amended by the 1987 law. The SPAs have become dysfunctional to a great extent because most of their functions have been given under the responsibility of newly established or existing local and regional branches of central government agencies over the years. The new law numbered 5302 was enacted in 2005. The 2005 act empowers these province-wide

local administrations to some degree by decentralizing several responsibilities of the central government to these local administrations; and increases the autonomy of the SPAs by allowing the provincial general council to select its own chair and to meet more frequently. Yet, some argue that the new law restricts the responsibilities of the SPAs by enumerating them more precisely (Marcou 2006, p. 7). Besides, a governor still is the general administrator of a special provincial administration, represents its public legal personality, and has important formal and informal powers on provincial general council and the affairs of the SPAs. However, their power could be expected to diminish as the reforms are carried on successfully and the local society and politicians absorb the goals and principles of these reforms. The 2012 act numbered 6360 also abolished all the SPAs in the 30 provinces with province-wide metropolitan municipal administrations and transferred their responsibilities mainly to these new local administrations. As villages, the SPAs continue to exist and function in the remaining 51 provinces in Turkey.

Until 2005, municipalities were regulated by the 1930 Act of Municipality numbered 1580. This old act enumerated the duties assigned to the municipalities in 76 items and classified them as compulsory and optional duties (Polatoğlu 2000, pp. 109–110). Yet, due to the inadequacy of their own revenues and the funds transferred from the central government, the municipalities had never been able to even deliver some of their compulsory duties. As a part of the reform wave started after the inauguration of the JDP government in 2002, a new law, the Municipality Act numbered 5393 was enacted in 2005. The new act defines the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the municipalities in general, but do not enumerates them, enhancing their capacity to respond to local demands. Besides, it has provisions enhancing participation, local governance and autonomy.

On the other hand, as a new type of local administration in the most populated urban centers, metropolitan municipalities were established by the 1984 act numbered 3030. These metropolitan municipalities had the responsibility of providing metropolitan wide services overcoming the scale and the capacity of district municipalities, such as utilities, garbage collection, public transportation, social aid, urban planning, road construction and maintenance, among others. The 1984 act established a two-tiered system and district municipalities and town municipalities within the limits of metropolitan municipalities continued to provide some basic local municipal services such as building inspections, health inspections, public parks, kinder gardens, etc.

A new act on metropolitan municipalities (numbered 5216) was passed in 2004. The new act did not change the two-tiered system but included provisions to increase the power, duties, and responsibilities of these municipalities. Another 2008 act on the Formation of New Districts within all the Metropolitan Municipalities numbered 5747 turned all small town municipalities within the limits of metropolitan municipalities into district-based local administration units. As a result all first tier municipalities became the same type and the number of municipalities dropped from 3,225 in 2007 down to 2,964 in 2008 (TurkStat 2012). On the other hand, a 2005 act numbered 5355 on Local Administration Unions provides that the services that could not be provided by municipalities singly and/or by other local administration units, except for metropolitan municipalities, can be delivered by local

administration unions. This new act strengthens cooperation among local administration units on a single service basis.

At the end of 2012, a new law related to metropolitan municipalities numbered 6360 was enacted. The 2012 law establishes 13 new province-wide metropolitan municipalities and turns the previous 16 metropolitan municipalities with authority within only city limits into new province-wide municipalities with authority in the entire limits of the respective provinces. Within a few months, another province was also added to the list. In those 30 provinces, all the special provincial administrations, small town municipalities, and villages are abolished. Thus, there is only a two-tiered metropolitan municipal administration with the district municipalities under the umbrella structure of the metropolitan municipality to serve the entire province. The new law creates a new and powerful mayor model. In this model, the mayor is to represent and manage the whole province, not just the one city or metropolitan area. In this new model, the locally elected mayor seems to be placed in a position to represent the whole province and, thus, may become a much stronger political figure than the governor in a province. Besides, these provincial mayors may even come to compete with the leaders of their political party and they may become strong speakers for the rights of the local ethnic groups such as Kurds and Alevi. Moreover, the new system may lead to the consideration of some of the new province-wide metropolitan municipalities, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian Regions, as autonomous regional administrations or even state governments of some sort of a federative system. The efforts to change the existing parliamentary system into some sort of a (semi-) presidential system in Turkey may be seen to contribute to these arguments. Furthermore, 30 provinces where the new provincial metropolitan system will be effective are the most developed and urbanized provinces having more than 75 % of the total population in Turkey. So, these provincial metropolitan municipalities will be very critical local entities with important expectations to foster economic development in those provinces. Finally, the new law also has some provisions on the duties of the governors as local agents of the central government regarding the coordination of economic development and distribution of development funds in their provinces.

Turkey had no regional administrations until 2006 because largely of its possible implication for separatism. However, some sort of “regional” agencies apart from the RDAs and regional policies have always existed in Turkey and the regional units have been established as the branches of central government agencies because of some technical and service delivery necessities (i.e., road construction and maintenance, economic development public safety etc.) at the local and regional levels. The ministries or other central government agencies have established hundreds of different administrative “regions” throughout Turkey. Some of them are organized over the entire country whereas some others, over some parts of it. For example, “the state of emergency regional governorship” (OHAL) was established in the Southeastern Anatolian Region as a result of security policies in 1987, but abolished in 2002.

However, there wasn't any legal definition of regions until the adaptation of NUTS system (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) (levels 1–3) as statistical units in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). The law numbered 5449 was enacted on 25 January 2006, establishing RDAs in the 26 NUTS II regions

throughout Turkey. The RDAs are defined as separate local-regional administration units, but national coordination among the RDAs is to be done by the Ministry of Development. The main objectives of the RDAs are to boost and support local and regional potential for economic development, to organize economic development and related research and education activities, to enhance the cooperation among public, civic and private sectors, and to enable an efficient and suitable utilization of public resources, among others. The members of the decision making bodies of the RDAs include members from the public, private, and civic sectors that could be seen as a clear sign of a governance model. However, there is a hesitation in using the word “regional” in calling or naming the RDAs as a result of the concerns about separatism and centralist heritage, and thus the RDAs are often called as the DAs (development agencies) in Turkey.

An Overall Evaluation of the Governance Reforms

Overall, the recent reforms on local and regional administrations expand the responsibilities and powers of local administrations and clarify the limits of central government’s power and influence over local administrations. The local governments have operated under excessive central supervision of the central government until recently. That is the main reason why they are not called as local governments in Turkey. The local administration reforms have helped decentralize this centralist system and helped pave the way for local governance by establishing some participative decision and policy making processes and mechanisms and by devolving some administrative and financial powers down to the local and regional administrations. For example, the elected bodies of the local administrations are empowered to meet every month and can only be removed or dismissed from the office by a decision of the State Council (functioning as a higher administrative court as well, called “Danıştay” in Turkish). Besides, more opportunities for public and civic organizations to involve in local decision making process are provided. The new municipality laws include provisions for more local participative commissions and a city council as an advisory and participatory entity. NGOs, universities, the chambers of commerce, some public agencies, and professional organizations are to be represented in the advisory city council and local commissions. Overall, a more autonomous, democratic and participatory governance structure is established at the local and regional levels. Thus, changes or new working principles introduced into the local and regional administration system by the reform acts could be considered as a considerable shift from a local administration model to a local governance system.

The reform laws have given an active role in local and regional economic development initiatives to the local and regional administrations and allow them to develop and implement their own projects in accordance with the principles, standards, and national and regional plans defined by the central administration. Besides, the 2008 act numbered 5747 increased the revenues transferred from the central

government budget to the local administrations. Moreover, the reforms have introduced market principles into decision making and service provision processes such as transparency, accountability, participation, responsiveness or customer orientation, entrepreneurship, choice, efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, performance, and competitiveness. In fact, local and regional administrations are also granted the legal authority to provide services by using market mechanisms such as privatization, outsourcing, and contracting-out. Furthermore, the reform laws include requirements of strategic planning and performance based budget preparation at the provincial level by the special provincial administrations, at the city level by municipalities and, development plans at the regional level by the RDAs.

Conclusion: General Evaluation, Policy Implications, and Future Prospects

As presented in Table 3, the reforms could be classified under three main areas. These reforms have helped reorganize the powers and functions of the central government and local administrations, and the state and the market. They have in general decentralized and democratized the system to some extent. As a result of these reforms and a strong one party government and political stability since 2002, Turkey has achieved a steady and high economic development and a significant shrinkage in public deficits. Besides, she has solved many problems in public service delivery, the protection of human rights and freedoms, undemocratic influence of the military on the political policy making processes, among others. Moreover, these reforms have a potential to enhance the collaborative capacity among localities towards more efficient use of local resources and mobilize local synergy and dynamics for economic development. There has been very strong support for these reforms not only from the economic actors and the elites believing that democracy is necessary for economic stability but also from the ordinary people. The voters, who remember 1990s' politically and socially instable and economically crisis-oriented structure, appreciate this process. Of course, the EU accession process and negotiations have been exploited as an anchor by the governments to achieve these transformations.

However, strong state tradition, centralism, the continuing habits of centralized and local bureaucracy, a lack or low levels of civic democratic culture and participation by the NGOs and the public, relatively weak democratic structure of political parties, continuing dominance of the center over the local and region, among others, seem to have limited the success of the reforms, especially at the stage of implementation. Similarly, some reform attempts (such as recognition of the cultural rights of Kurds, decentralization, the establishment of the RDAs or new province-wide municipalities, among others) have been considered as harmful to the unitary form of state and notion of one nation and steps towards separatism or a form of federalism. For example, 30 newly created province-wide municipal administrations, as some argue, may be considered to create the risk of producing new small states at

Table 3 Contents and consequences of the recent reforms in Turkey

Reform area	Consequences of reforms
<i>Administrative streamlining and decentralization</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Deconcentration – Decentralization – Enhancing bureaucracy – Governance reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – More power to subordinates and local branches of the central government within the hierarchical structure of the administration – More power and resources to local and regional administrations – Simplifications in bureaucracy – Reduced red-tape and e-government – Increased efficiency, effectiveness, speed, accessibility, and quality in the delivery of public services – Enhancement of transparency and accountability of the public administration to the public and civil society – Enhancement of local participatory mechanisms (advisory city council, ...)
<i>Political reforms and governance</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Amendments to the 1982 Constitution – Redesign of the relations between the state and society – Governance reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Increased individual freedoms and rights – Increased recognition of diversity – Establishment of civilian authority over the military – Empowerment of civil society – Increased participation and involvement of the NGOs in the process of public policy making particularly in such fields as social assistance, negotiations with the EU, gender equality, human rights, etc. – Enhancement of transparency and accountability of the government to the public and the private and civil sectors – Ombudsman to resolve the conflict between the people and the public administration
<i>Economic decentralization</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Redesign of the relations between the state and market – Empowerment of the market – Introducing market mechanisms into the public sector – Governance reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Privatization of state monopolies – Opening up of some sectors predominantly occupied by state enterprises to private sector – Deregulation – Commercialization and marketization of public services – Shrinking the size of the state and limiting its intervention in the market – Increased competition and performance evaluation in the public sector – Transparency and accountability in public auctions – Establishment of the autonomous regulatory bodies to administer some of the commodity markets

the local level and to fuel nepotism and political patronage. However, this is ironic if one considers the fact that France, whose administrative system was adopted by the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, has reformed its administrative structure, adopted decentralization as a constitutional principle and introduced administrative units at the regional level to coordinate public investments and economic development efforts since the 1980s.

There still seems to be a lack of will in the central government to devolve especially financial powers down to local and regional administrations and civic organizations (such as unions, social help organizations etc.). The remnants of the strong statist and centralist tradition and concerns both about neutral, objective, and effective use of

resources at the local and regional levels and by civic organizations play a role in this unwillingness. Besides, the reform efforts so far do not seem to lessen financial burdens of many small to large local administrations or to strengthen their administrative capacity to handle the devolved duties and responsibilities. One could argue that the view of the central government as the “nanny-state” may be a factor for the above mentioned shortcomings of the reforms. Moreover, the understanding of the “nanny-state” seems to be transformed into mini “nanny-states” at the provincial level. This is because of the continuing high expectations of the people from the public sector and the high desires of the public officers, especially the field agents of the central government, to continue being strong agents at the local and regional levels. Of course, the inadequate levels or lack of participation habits among the local people to come together and cooperate for a common cause also worsen these problems.

Thus, transforming mentalities and thoughts and focusing on successful implementation require that the statist, centralist, and hierarchical structures and practices have been changed into a governance structure formed by the recognition of interdependency and power of each actor in the process and by participation of and negotiations among related actors and groups. Thus, future reform efforts should be focused on the creation and implementation of real and functional participatory and democratic governance processes and mechanisms at the national level as well as local and regional levels. Democratic governance requires fostering participatory public policy making processes and a culture of initiative taking and participation among local people. With regard to democratization, Turkey may have to expand the linguistic and cultural rights of the groups such as the Kurds and Alevis, and to lift restrictions on expressions of cultural identity and on cultural practices. For this purpose, Turkey could be expected to find a way to undertake a gradual shift from its traditional interpretation of the Turkish nation to a redefined notion of political community, which requires a more inclusive concept of citizenship and the recognition of cultural and ethnic pluralism in the country. However, a very large proportion of the population still fears for the partition of the country.

The JDP governments have been carrying out the transformation process without any major disruptions so far. Yet, there seems to be a slow-down in the speed of and a change in the contents of these reforms within the last a few years. The way the reforms are implemented has become more centralized, top-to-bottom and less participatory and democratic. Besides, there are continuing abuses of basic human rights and freedoms, such as continuing incidences of torture, pressures on the freedom of the press, expression and unionization, and unfulfilled cultural rights of the Alevis and Kurds. Turkey had been ranked 1st in the appeals to the ECHR for many years, a great majority of whose were judgments against Turkey for human rights violations, particularly the right to life and freedom from torture. Turkey’s human rights record continues to look troublesome since it ranks the second after Russia in the number of appeals to the Court in 2012 and a high number of journalists in jail.

Another major problem is related to a majoritarian, rather than pluralistic, understanding of democracy. The government has become more concerned with the Islamization of educational, cultural, and social life; and in turn with deciding what

is right and wrong for people. For example, the prime minister has declared that one of its goals is to educate a new generation according to Sunni Islamist values and has made changes in the curricula of the national education system accordingly. Therefore, there is an increase in the number of people who fear that the method through which Turkey's democratization is handled may lead to an authoritarian political environment and even system if a very strong one man model of presidential system replaces more pluralistic and balanced system of parliamentary democracy (Kamalak 2013). Ortaylı (2012, pp. 187–188) argues that the process of Islamization is prone to increase the tensions between secular and Islamist groups in several areas of social, cultural, political, economic, and everyday life. In this regard, the JDP is presented as the representative of the periphery and of the religious groups that oppose the centralist strong state, the system, and the center. Moreover, there are others who are concerned that the emphasis on ethnic and religious aspects may result in a resurgence of more extreme manifestations of religious primacy in social affairs and separatist movements. That, so far at least, has not happened. In fact, as Brzezinski (2012, p. 135) and Yavuz (2005, p. 27) argue that a more robust Turkish democracy accompanied by sustainable economic growth would gradually reduce the appeal of religious fundamentalism and ethnic separatism and help prevent the radicalization of the Islamist or separatist groups. However, considering the recent rhetoric and policy implementations of the JDP government and the efforts of the government to influence the judicial system, there is a clear tendency towards authoritarianism, and thus, an apparent need for upgrading Turkish democracy into a more developed, pluralistic, and participatory democracy, for establishing the rule of law more strongly and for providing better protection for basic human rights and freedoms.

Regarding the future prospects, public opinion survey carried out in Turkey reveals that the JDP without Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership would lose an important part of its voter base. As Mr. Erdoğan declared, he limits himself with three terms of deputyship and thus this legislation period is going to be his last deputyship. In fact, Mr. Erdoğan has decided to run for the presidency as the candidate of the JDP in the presidential elections in August of 2014. Because of these reasons, the issue of changing the parliamentary governmental system of Turkey to a presidential one has been raised and discussed publicly. A 2012 law establishing a new model of metropolitan municipality with authority over the whole area of a province and an elected mayor that is to manage the whole province, not just a city, should also be seen as an indication of the desire for some sort of a presidential or semi-presidential system and more freedom for regional or local administrations. The new system is to be effective in 30 provinces that are the most developed and urbanized provinces with more than 75 % of the total population in Turkey. What makes Mr. Erdoğan get excited about the new system is not only the fact that he will most probably get elected as a strong president but also he will have the opportunity to determine the candidates for the mayors of the 30 new provincial metropolitan municipalities since the general local elections is going to take place

when he is still the leader of the JDP and the prime minister. It could be argued that Mr. Erdoğan believe the new (semi-)presidential system, if adopted, would allow him to be able to lead the country and economic growth even if a new strong one-party government is not established after the next national elections.

This tendency could be taken as an indication of a strong preference of the Erdoğan Government for economic development over the enhancement of democracy and human rights. In fact, this has been a trend during the history of the republic especially during the strong one-party governments with a strong leader, including the governments by Adnan Menderes in the 1950s, by Süleyman Demirel during the second half of the 1960s, by Turgut Özal during the 1980s, and now by R. Tayyip Erdoğan since 2002. Of course, other political leaders, especially Bülent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan, also emphasized economic development during their governments. As for the last Erdoğan government, there are reasons, as mentioned above, to assert that such a tendency has become much stronger since economic development and stability seem to have become the first priority compared to the enhancement of democracy and human rights. In short, this tendency seems to have led to “a dilemma of the ruling party” during strong one-party governments with a strong leader since there is only the JDP as a hegemonic one-party in the system without any considerable opposition from other parties and any considerable chance of their becoming an alternative to the JDP. The JDP or other strong ruling one-parties tap on economic development and stability programs to win and maintain the support of the electorate. And, the weakness of the opposition parties seems to contribute to this outcome. Öniş (2006, p. 131) makes similar observations by saying that “The AKP (JDP), as a new force benefiting from the lack of a powerful rival, capitalized on the situation and presented itself to the electorate as a progressive force that could bring benefits from the positive aspects of economic globalism and the free market; and that could reform the state in the direction of a post-developmental regulatory model.”

Despite several reforms and improvements, it is still imperative for Turkey to aim for further improvements in democracy, human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the judicial system, women’s position and gender equality, civil society, participation and self initiative taking at the local level, political party and election systems, and the media. The consolidation of the democracy in Turkey would be possible by further improvement on these issues and the preparation of a new constitution presents a new opportunity to upgrade the Turkish governance system, enhance democracy, human rights, and freedoms. Yet, this need for further reforms and the successful implementation of these reforms and the geopolitical location of Turkey require strong political leadership and political stability, which in turn seems to create a dilemma for Turkish democracy through the dilemma of the hegemony of the ruling party. These aspects of the Turkish political, administrative, social, and economic system will be tested over the period between 2014 and 2016 when Turkey is going to go through local, national, and presidential elections.

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Dynamics of Post-crisis Reform in Public Policy: The Case of Education Policy in Turkey

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Introduction

Major structural changes in the policy process in capitalist countries are mostly, and inevitably, associated with critical turning points in the history of capitalism, all triggered by deep economic crises. This chapter argues that it is not helpful to explain post-crisis policy reforms, mostly neoliberal in spirit, by asking how a superior economic logic translates into new modes and structures of policy-making and implementation. A better starting point is to pay attention to the mechanisms that transmit, and translate such crises into reforms in the policy process, which involves the question of how the crisis is perceived and interpreted by the policy makers and the public opinion; and to the question of how restructuring attempts interact with the past policy practices. The education policy in Turkey, shaken by several international and domestic economic crises since the introduction of neoliberal policy reforms in 1980, offers a fruitful ground to examine how these dynamics unfold¹.

It can be argued that education is a policy field in a state of constant crisis. Here, by crisis, not only do I mean economic crises, though, but also political crises as well as the political consequences of economic crises. Economic crises restrict the availability of financial resources required by the public services, thereby narrowing the room for manoeuvre for the policy-makers for a particular period of time (until the end of the economic decline). In the case of education policy, the client base is

¹By the time the last version of the chapter was prepared, the recent wave of (post-2012) reforms had not been introduced yet. Thus, those reforms fall outside of the historical scope of the chapter. Those changes, however, deserve further analysis in light of the discussions developed herein.

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large and heterogeneous in terms of their expectations and demands, and the service provided assumes a complex set of ideological, social and political functions (Carnoy 1985, p. 170; Şimşek 2005; Plank and Keesler 2009). Therefore, the sort of post-crisis instability experienced in other policy fields gains a constant character in education policy, turning the field into a contentious one.

According to McCarthy education policy is characterised by a set of tensions, namely those between: Immediate results vs long-term goals; Equity goals vs standards-based reforms; Government vs Nongovernmental actors in education; Local control vs the advancement of national education goals; the tensions across levels and branches of government involved in education services (McCarthy 2009, pp. 844–846). These tensions, I argue, suggest the existence of a tri-partite screening mechanism that determine how post-crisis intervention strategies translate into solid policy programs and changes: (a) the composition of the service recipients (the degree of heterogeneity of the service recipients, and the nature of service demand); (b) the ideational factors (significance of education for the political system and the social justice); (c) the political bargaining power of the policy implementers. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the first two factors.

The Selectivity Problem

Plank and Keesler, in an attempt to explain why the state's role has been shrinking in the field of education, put forward an interesting argument:

In practical terms, the growing weight of expectations that schools bear is a challenge that the education system is almost certain to fail. Under circumstances where more and better education is proposed as the solution to a wide array of social and economic problems, no amount of education can ever suffice; even being 'best in the world' falls short, as rivals strive to catch up. Moreover, the persistence of the problems that the education system is expected to solve breeds cynicism and distrust about the capacity of schools and teachers to accomplish public goals, and a corresponding reluctance to increase the quantity of resources in the system without solid evidence of success (2009, p. 698)

There are two conclusions that follow: (a) the policy paralysis in education is not necessarily a direct result of economic crisis. An economic crisis, indeed, can serve as an excuse for policy-makers to target this paralysis; (b) and, yet, the scope and aims of any public service can play a crucial part in determining its resilience to political onslaught at times of austerity. Hence, the more weight is placed in a society on the shoulders of education as a way out of complicated socio-economic problems, the more complicated the policy challenges will get, and the more dispersed and diversified will become the administrative structure established to meet various, and sometimes conflicting policy goals to be achieved. At this point, the heterogeneity of demands and the composition of the service recipients gain significance.

As noted, neoliberal policy reforms were partly presented by the governments as a response to the problems raised in the above quote, in an attempt to justify market oriented changes. To narrow down the set of goals to be achieved through education,

it has been interpreted as a means to enhance national economic performance/competitiveness and as a service accruing benefits to individuals that could be exchanged in the market. Although the resultant reforms in education further deepened social inequality (one of the key problems education has been supposed to meet) (see Ball 1993; Hall 2001; Hursh 2006; Hill 2007) and created new complications in administration of education, still the experience in neoliberal reforms in education indicates that economic crises might actually serve as an excuse, or serve as a corrective moment, to intervene with instability in a particular field of public service.

Homogenisation of the service recipient (in the neoliberal case: as individual customers, independent from their class position, ethnic background etc.) can be seen as a strategy to shape the demand structure. Nevertheless, in practice, this homogenisation process requires that the policy maker choose between different types of policy recipients. This takes place at three different levels: (a) a strong preference for economic concerns over the social ones (preferring a family of policy fields—economic, financial, industrial, employment—over the others—health, education, social security) (Reimers 1991, p. 349); (b) preferring a particular policy field over the others, within the same family of policy fields (such as preference for social security over education); (c) preferring particular policy programs and services over the others, in the same policy field (preference for higher education over primary and secondary education). Hence, simplification of the policy process—neoliberal in spirit or not—inevitably results in biased results in terms of its social outcomes,² and it becomes important to pay attention to the question of how this selectivity is constructed politically.

The Ideational Dimension

Especially in the case of education, ideational tensions play a critical role as economic crises, and subsequent shifts in public service finance are translated into new policy directions and programs. I argue that these tensions find their expressions along two, sometimes overlapping, axes of political dispute: (a) those concerning social (in)equality (private vs public education, access problem); (b) those about national unity (social cohesion and reproducing the legitimacy of the state) and strength (in both political and economic terms).

²What is more, this amounts to increased selectivity in service provision. Yet, as Standing convincingly argues, increased selectivity in the fields of social policy results in further complications:

The more you target, the more you design criteria for selectivity, the more conditions that are applied, then the more complex the necessary procedures of identification, implementation, monitoring and auditing. In most countries, it is cynical or naïve to advise governments to adopt finely-tuned targeting, given poor administrative structures, lack of information, fear and lack of knowledge among potential beneficiaries, poorly trained, inadequately paid and overburdened officials, and pervasive distrust between applicants and officials. The system will end up being highly discretionary, prone to corruption and demoralizing for all concerned. (2001, pp. 23–24)

Table 1 The policy making and implementation structures in educational policy

Dimensions of ideational tension in education	National integrity (+)	National integrity (–)
Social justice (+)	(A) Centralised policy making (national curriculum) + Centrally controlled, universalistic implementation structure (standardised school systems and personnel management + free schooling and improved access)	(B) Decentralised policy making (local curriculums) + Centrally funded implementation structure (standardised school systems and personnel management)
Social justice (–)	(C) Centralised policy making (national curriculum) + Dispersed, but closely supervised, policy-implementation structure (see, for example, Wrigley 2009, pp. 64, 70) (heterogeneous school systems and personnel management + access determined on economic power of the households)	(D) Multiple school systems coexisting, with different curricula and personnel regimes. Community based schooling

The institutional structure of education policy in a particular country could be seen as a product of historically formed policy preferences in terms of the degree of political significance attached to education, and the presence/absence of social justice in the policy agenda. Table 1 provides a rough sketch of the possible outcomes of different preference combinations. Here, the axes of variation should be seen as ideal-types, representing the extreme cases, rather than an exhaustive description of real world of education.

To reiterate, these preference sets and the resultant policy frameworks are historical products, and economic crises could be seen as turning points, triggering transition from one configuration to another (cf. Şimşek 2005). Recent changes in education policy around the globe reflect an agenda characterised by a concern with national integrity and disregard of social justice (Ball 2007; also see Cookson 2001, pp. 31–33). Yet, departing from Ozga and Lingard's following conclusions about contemporary education policy,

1. That at international level a coherent set of policy themes and processes (globalised policy discourses) has emerged, through which policy makers (at national, international, and transnational levels) seek to reshape education systems.
2. That there has emerged a globalised education policy field situated between global pressures and local vernacular education policy responses.
3. That these globalised policy agendas and processes interact with traditions, ideologies, institutions, and politics that have developed on national terrains, resulting in vernacular education policy outcomes (Ozga and Lingard 2007, p. 69);

I argue that this tendency is not necessarily a natural response to global economic crisis, and that a possible move from one combination to another will be far from a smooth process. Especially, concerns with national integrity and an imposed global

agenda (especially in developing world) prioritising a pro-market (global) education policy will have to co-exist, creating further confusion in education policy, thereby postponing the reform process in education.

Education Policy in Turkey

Education has had a political mission since the inception of the Republic of Turkey, that of building a nation. Indeed, the very same day the founders of Turkey abolished the sultanate and caliphate (March 3, 1924), and established separate administrative bodies for religious affairs and the chief of command of the army, thereby taking strong steps towards secularisation of the state and guaranteeing the political autonomy of the army; they also passed the Law on Unity of Education. These three laws were to fortify the political basis of the young republic, established few months ago (October 29, 1923).

The first three, irrevocable, articles of the constitution (see article 4) (1921, 1924, 1961, 1982) underlie the ideational basis—and the conflicts around the priorities—of the education policy in Turkey (<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=78>, accessed on 28 April 2010). Especially the principles of secularism, national solidarity, and indivisibility necessitated construction of a centralised policy making and implementation structure (Table 1A, B). Nevertheless, the principle of free and compulsory (primary) education for citizens, as a reflection of the social state principle, entered the constitution 38 years later (Constitution of 1961, article 50: <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa61.htm>, accessed on 28 April 2010; Constitution of 1982: Article 42, Articles 130–132). This, I think, has to do with the fact that that period was one of experimentation with different policy-implementation structures. This was a result of the lack of human (teachers) and other resources immediately available to establish a widespread and accessible education system, as well as an ideological fight between the communitarian and liberal wings of the founding cadre of the republic, over the proper nature of the state-society/economy relations (see Bayırbağ 2007).

Another point worth mentioning here is that vocational education, which was given strong emphasis especially during the formation years of the republic

Table 2 Changing priorities in secondary education between 1950 and 1981

Years	Number of students in general high schools (000)	Number of teachers in general high schools	Number of students in vocational high schools (000)	Number of teachers in vocational high schools
1950–1951	22	1,954	53	4,488
1960–1961	76	4,219	108	8,333
1970–1971	245	11,219	235	15,021
1980–1981	535	41,334	355	33,690

Source: <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/DPT.portal> (section: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler (Economic and Social Indicators): 1950–2006)

(1923–1950), was left aside later. As of the education year of 1970–1971, the number of students in general secondary (high) schools had already passed the number of students enrolled in the vocational schools (Table 2). In the case of teachers, the transformation was complete as of the education year of 1980–1981. Here, it is interesting to note vocational education lost significance, despite the fact that industrialisation took the central stage in economic policies during the period of 1960–1980. Two potential explanations could be put forward. First, that the industrialisation strategy relied on labour intensive sectors did not cause a demand in trained workers. Secondly, the main motive for reforms in education was political, rather than economic. In fact, a striking feature of the political history of Turkey is that major political turning points and reforms (the coup d'états and the one-party governments) followed severe economic crises (global and national), and that the political reforms were also to facilitate the new economic regimes. Yet, in the case of reforms in education, political concerns such as national integrity and protection of secularism seem to have dominated the agenda rather than economic concerns. Below, we will analyse the major reform attempts in the education system, concentrating on the major legal changes in that area.³

An initial examination of the major legal changes in education since 1923 leads one to conclude that there have been three sorts of regulations:

- (a) Those about the general structure of the Ministry of National Education (MONE), mainly reform laws (number/year: 789/1926; 1739/1973; 3797/1992).
- (b) Those with heavy political undertones, targeting certain levels/institutions of the education system (430/1924; The new alphabet law/1928; 3803/1940; 6234/1954; 222/1961: this particular law could also be considered in the below category; 4306/1997: this particular law could also be considered in the category above).
- (c) Those aiming to alter the education system through partial modifications, either to improve certain levels or sections of the system (especially vocational education), and/or to transform the implementation procedures in service delivery. These changes mainly reflect the neoliberal agenda in education (625/1965; 3035/1985; 3308/1986; 4702/2001; 4855/2003; 4967/2003; 5002/2003; 5005/2003; 5079/2004; 5204/2004; 5257/2004; 5381/2005; 5450/2006).⁴

Departing from the timing of these laws, a number of initial conclusions could be drawn about how ideational considerations have influenced the policy making and implementation in education in Turkey, and in what ways economic crises have been

³A recent detailed report produced by the Ministry of National Education (MONE—Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı) outlining “Organisation of Education System in Turkey, 2008/9” (MONE 2009) gives the highlights of the major legal changes made in the system. Yet, the discussion that follows also benefits from a detailed query in the legal changes made in the relevant legal code, available from the parliament’s website (http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/kanunlar_sd.sorgu_baslangic); as well from the website of the national union of cram schools (<http://www.ozdebir.org.tr/TR/Icerik.ASP?ID=376>).

⁴There are two more laws, 5504/2006 and 5927/2009 which were introduced to make two minor procedural changes. So they are not included in this list.

translated into policy programs through such ideational dynamics. First, a quick glance at the earlier history of education in Turkey indicates that the concern with national unity and secularism/enlightenment was prioritised over that of establishing a universal education system, based on social equality. That the law on unity of education preceded a foundational law on re-establishing the ministry of education (as inherited from the Ottoman Empire), and that the principle of compulsory free education entered the constitution 38 years later can be seen as striking evidences in that regard. It is also worth noting that changes introduced into the education system with political concerns tended to be focused rather than comprehensive. Particular levels of education, and especially primary education were targeted (the examples of village institutes and the laws on primary education dated 1961 and 1997). Such interventions were formulated into distinct large-scale policy programs.

Secondly, radical political shifts followed major economic crises, and facilitated the crisis intervention programs and major policy reforms in economy. Yet, in the case of education, large-scale reforms did not follow immediately. Indeed, two comprehensive laws on the education system (coup d'état of 1960: 1739/1973; coup d'état of 1980: 3797/1992) came more than a decade after such radical breakthroughs, adopting a hands-off approach in the mean time. This trend seems to have come to an end, especially since 2001. Instead, now we witness the rise of another type of policy-making: constant and active state intervention, yet through incremental changes (cf. Aksit 2007, p. 129), rather than a coordinated approach to problems in education.

Thirdly, it should also be noted that such comprehensive reform laws were produced by coalition governments,⁵ not single party ones, which suggests that political stability is not a pre-condition for such reforms. Even, it can be claimed that single party governments, which generally come to power following big economic/political crisis tend to prioritise economic issues. The coalition governments, on the other hand, have to be constructed on political compromises based on social demands and can be seen more sympathetic to reforms in education.

Fourthly, it is also noticeable that education does not seem to have constituted a privileged area for post-crisis policy reforms. Foundational laws/reforms about/in the education system seem to have come as ex-post-facto interventions, to give order to, and to rationalise an incrementally developing, rather dispersed and fragmented implementation structure. It could be suggested that this dispersed and fragmented structure has been a result of experimentation in education and political disagreement and/or confusion over, or a central paradigm about the proper nature of education as a public service.

Lastly, this lack of a central paradigm, especially remarkable during the period of 1950–1980, ended with the introduction of neoliberal ideology into the education system, slowly overriding the fights around the secularity of education system, the last one fought during the late 1990s. Especially the post-2001 crisis reforms in education marked the turning point, in that regard. The tendency of neoliberalisation

⁵For the service period of past governments in Turkey: www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pCabinet-Root.aspx.

has been going hand in hand with the rise of conservatism (Okçabol 2007; İnal 2009). Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that the party currently in power does have an articulated view of curriculum yet, despite its pro-conservative policy interventions, as acknowledged by a recent report by a think tank close to the party (see Gür and Çelik 2009, pp. 30–33). Hence, even the presence of a strong single party government, even prepared to reform education system, is not a sufficient condition for the formation of a well formulated and coherent policy agenda in education. I think, this partly stems from the fact that the single party government in Turkey emerged as a political solution to the crisis in the political system (the fight between a radical political Islam and a secular state), as well as to the socio-economic crisis, with a mission to strike a balance between an austerity program formulated in 2001 (forcing the government to pursue a zero-budget-deficit policy), and to contain the discontent of an increasingly poverty-stricken population (Mecham 2004; Atasoy 2008; Bayırbağ 2009).

We will continue to build upon the above conclusions, by especially focusing on a neoliberal post-1980 period. In particular, we will analyse how the selectivities of the new education agenda shaped the policy making and implementation structure.

The Selectivity Question

As noted, post-crisis strategies in education, and especially those adopted during the neoliberal era have been constructed on the basis of a tri-pillar policy preference set, so as to respond to the pressures on the budget caused by structural adjustment agreements with the IMF and the World Bank: (a) preference for economic policies over the social ones; (b) preference for a particular policy over others within the same family of policy fields; (c) preference for a particular level/section of the policy-implementation structure/unit over others. Below, we shall discuss different levels of the neoliberal policy preference set that came as a response to a major economic crisis in Turkey.⁶

Reimers, through a detailed examination of the Latin American case, convincingly argues that “education, a long-term development activity, suffered disproportionately from adjustment programs with a short-run bias” (Reimers 1991, p. 320). In the late seventies a Latin American consensus emerged to enhance the education services of those countries by their respective governments, and this commitment and the emergent long-termed policy programs were soon hit by economic crises during the 1980s. While Turkey did not have such a strong commitment to education during the 1970s, the effect of structural adjustment programs on education policy was similar. Both Heyneman (1990) and Reimers (1991, p. 321) emphasise that reductions in education spending is a function of increases in the debt service

⁶For a broader overview of neoliberalisation of education policy in Turkey, especially during the 2000s, see Okçabol (2007), Soydan (2007), Sayılan (2007), Acar (2008), Gül (2008), and İnal (2009).

of the governments, and this was especially true for Turkey. Despite the fact that the post-1980 era (until 1988), unlike the previous period, witnessed a fast increase in public investments surpassing the level of private investment, the share of education and health in such investments decreased considerably. For example, while the average share of public investments in the prioritised sectors of energy and transportation (combined) between 1963 and 1979 was 37.3 %, this average was 50.5 % for the period of 1980–1989. For education and health sectors combined, this average fell from 11.2 % (1963–1979) to 6.2 % (1980–1989) (Karahanoğulları 2003, pp. 264–265).

Heyneman's analysis of changes in education expenditure in a number of developing countries also supports this observation. His work indicates that in Turkey, between 1972 and 1986, central government expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure dropped from 18.1 to 11.9 %, while this change was from 3.2 % in 1972 down to 2.2 % in health sector in 1987; and from 15.5 % in 1972 to 13.5 % in 1987 in defence sector. This sharp fall in government expenditures also found its reflection in the fall in per-pupil (primary school level) spending between 1980 and 1984/1985, placing Turkey at the second lowest place among a list of 33 developing countries compiled by Heyneman (1990, p. 120). Obviously, education was one of the first areas severely affected by budgetary cut as a result of a crisis bailout program. These observations also indicate that, while fields of social policy were affected negatively by the post-crisis economic strategies, it was especially education that had to bear the consequences.

This observation about the 1980s as a post-crisis decade is also true for another post-crisis decade, the 2000s (after the international crisis of 1998 and the domestic crisis of 2001). A recent think tank report on financial policies of the government indicates that during the crisis-recovery period, the share of education in total social policy expenditures has been in a state of constant decline (down from 30 % in 1999 to 22 % in 2008) when compared with those made for health (rising from 24 % in 1999 up to about 29 % in 2008) and social security (rising from 46 % in 1999 up to about 49 % in 2008) (TEPAV 2009, p. 17; also see Karaarslan 2005, p. 50).

Preceding analysis of the post-crisis trends in public spending indicates that it was education which had to bear the negative impact of austerity policies most, even when compared with other social policy sectors. Below, we shall discuss how the post-crisis periods altered the policy priorities in education. We will examine how different levels of the education system have been affected, and how public spending in education has responded to crises, by concentrating on longitudinal changes in different cost categories (investment, personnel, other recurrent expenditure, transfers).

Data provided in Table 3, and Fig. 1, help us to compare and contrast how public spending in primary and secondary education differed from the spending in higher education, in relation to changes in GNP. The italicised values in column 1a indicate those years when there was a sharp fall in GNP. Figure 3 clearly indicates that spending in primary and secondary education has been much more sensitive to economic fluctuations, than higher education, which might be explained by differences in the bargaining power of different levels of education, as Reimers (1991) suggests.

Table 3 The share of public expenditure on education in GNP (1980–2003)

Year	(1) GNP (1,000 TL)	(1a) GNP change % (by 1987 prices)	(2) Ministry of NE bud spending (1,000 TL)	(3) Higher Education Council + Universities bud spending (1,000 TL)	(4) (2 + 3) total bud spending on education	(5) (2/1)	(6) (3/1)	(7) (4/1)
1980	5,303	4.4	91	26	117	1.72	0.50	2.2
1981	8,023	5.7	136	40	176	1.70	0.50	2.1
1982	10,612	4.6	175	48	223	1.65	0.45	2.0
1983	13,933	4.2	259	82	341	1.86	0.59	2.45
1984	22,168	7.1	365	112	477	1.65	0.51	2.15
1985	35,350	4.3	506	167	673	1.43	0.47	1.90
1986	51,115	6.8	718	243	961	1.40	0.48	1.88
1987	75,019	9.8	1,189	384	1,573	1.58	0.51	2.10
1988	129,175	1.5	2,043	603	2,646	1.58	0.47	2.05
1989	230,370	1.6	4,711	1,308	6,019	2.04	0.57	2.61
1990	397,178	9.4	9,988	2,855	12,843	2.51	0.72	3.23
1991	634,393	0.3	17,533	5,340	22,873	2.76	0.84	3.61
1992	1,103,605	6.4	34,524	9,876	44,400	3.13	0.89	4.02
1993	1,997,323	8.1	62,725	18,438	81,163	3.14	0.92	4.06
1994	3,887,903	-6.1	89,695	31,001	120,696	2.31	0.80	3.10
1995	7,854,887	8.0	152,612	58,189	210,801	1.94	0.74	2.68
1996	14,978,067	7.1	308,669	127,065	435,734	2.06	0.85	2.91
1997	29,393,262	8.3	680,610	280,295	960,905	2.32	0.95	3.27
1998	53,518,332	3.9	1,435,675	497,801	1,933,476	2.68	0.93	3.61
1999	78,282,967	-6.1	2,481,260	830,848	3,312,108	3.17	1.06	4.23
2000	125,596,129	6.3	2,460,792	1,256,792	3,717,584	1.96	1.00	2.96
2001	176,483,963	-9.5	5,145,078	1,875,366	7,020,444	2.92	1.06	3.98
2002	273,463,168	7.8	8,043,014	3,108,077	11,151,091	2.94	1.14	4.08
2003	356,680,880	9.4	8,757,055	3,584,103	12,341,158	2.45	1.01	3.46

Source: Baykal (2006), p. 95

Note: A calculation mistake in row 1986 was fixed here




Fig. 1 The MONE and higher education spending’s share in GNP (1980–2003). *Source:* Produced by the author, employing the data in Table 3




Fig. 2 Change in MONE spending in relation to change in GNP. *Source:* Produced by the author, employing the data in Table 3. *Note:* The value is 1 where the rate of annual change in expenditure is equal to the rate of annual change in the GNP. “>1” is where former exceeds the latter, and “<1” is vice versa

To have a better idea of how annual changes in MONE spending responded to the annual changes in the GDP, and thus to see the policy significance attached to primary+secondary education in relation to national economic performance, I have produced Fig. 2. It displays changes in an indicator constructed by dividing annual change in MONE spending (year2–year1/year1) by annual change in GDP (year2–year1/year1). A number of observations follow: relative increases in the indicator are actually a result of the spending remaining relatively constant, while the GNP takes a dive, and decreases could well be explained by increases in the GNP, again the spending being constant. There are, however, spots that do not fit into this pattern, especially where the indicator value decreases, even while the GNP takes a dive. This is especially the case with the MONE values for the post-1997 period. The unstable pattern between 1999 and 2003 indicates that especially after the international crisis in 1998 and the domestic financial crisis of 2001, the relative decrease in MONE’s spending was much faster than the dropping growth rate. The increase in year 2001 actually reflects the sharp fall in the GNP in that year. Yet, after 2001, and despite the fact that the recovery started in 2002, change in the MONE spending remained well behind the change in the GNP.

It is also important to note that the new compulsory primary education act (the Basic Education Law) was passed in 1997 (4306/1997) and that it was supported by earmarked resources for investment, exempted from the changes in budgetary allocations. Thus, once the buffering effect of those earmarked sources are left aside, it is possible to argue that the real impact of a decrease in resources dedicated to education has been worse, and felt particularly on “investments in secondary education”, as well as on the “salaries of teachers” at both levels of education. In fact, a recent report by the UNESCO on the impact of the 2008 crisis on education services in ten developing countries lends support to this observation. According to the report,

When education budgets were affected, financing for primary education remained most intact while post-primary levels experienced the most cutbacks. This is because technical/vocational and higher education tend to consume more non-salary current and capital spending, which are often the first areas to be cut. Furthermore, educational peripheral goods and services, including research and development (R&D) and national library services, are more vulnerable to budget cuts than core educational services (2009, p. 12).

In fact, despite that fact that non-salary items are the first ones to be hit by an economic crisis, the personnel expenditure also came under pressure, especially in a context where the investment expenditure was secured through earmarked funding. Confirming the insights by Reimers (1991) and Mundy (2005), a World Bank report observes that:

While the investment budget is largely financed through earmarked resources under Law 4306, personnel allocations are based on pooled government revenues and have to compete for appropriations with other claims on resources. In this sense, the MOF [Ministry of Finance] can impose certain restrictions on Personnel allocations, even if investments are properly funded (2001, p. 79).

Table 4 (and Fig. 3) seems to lend support to the above observation. Although the values reflect the sum of expenditures of different authorities responsible for education, obviously, the personnel expenditure seems to have been under constant pressure since the initiation of neoliberal policy reforms in Turkey.

As for the implications of the policy interventions and spending for inequalities in primary + secondary education, as already noted, social justice rarely made it to the top of the priority list of the policy makers, although it was not totally out of the agenda. Yet, it looks like the Basic Education Law of 1997 seems to have changed the picture, to a certain extent. Let’s first briefly touch upon the impact of this law on inequalities in education, and then discuss what this law tells us about the broader direction of education policy in Turkey. In fact, the reform seems to have helped overcoming the inequalities, at least in public spending at the level of primary schools.

The expansion of compulsory schooling to eight years had the immediate effect of improving the distribution of public education spending across poor and rich households, at least at the primary level, where the share of expenditures for the lowest quintile of households increased from 15.8 percent in 1994 to 21.7 percent in 2001 [And the share of the richest quintile decreased, from 20.3 percent in 1994 to 13.9 percent in 2001] ... Nonetheless, secondary schooling continues to pose an equity challenge: only 13 percent of secondary school expenditures reached the poorest 20 percent of the population in 2001 [an improve-

Table 4 The share of education (MONE + Higher Education Council + Universities) in the national consolidated budget expenditures (in respective categories)

Year	Recurrent	Personnel	Other recurrent	Investment	Transfer	Total
1980	27.7	39.8	7.2	10.5	1.4	16.6
1981	27.1	39.1	7.1	10.1	1.3	15.1
1982	26.6	38.9	6.8	9.6	1.2	14.7
1983	26.6	38.3	6.8	9.7	1.3	14.2
1984	25.6	38.4	6.4	7.9	3.4	14.3
1985	25.3	37.4	6.4	7.2	4.6	14.5
1986	24.6	36.9	6.0	6.6	4.8	14.1
1987	25.5	34.0	7.1	9.4	4.2	15.1
1988	26.2	34.4	7.3	14.6	3.4	16.5
1989	28.4	34.9	6.4	17.9	3.4	20.2
1990	30.5	36.0	7.8	20.7	5.7	24.1
1991	29.3	33.5	8.9	21.0	3.9	21.5
1992	30.0	34.1	8.5	31.6	5.5	24.5
1993	30.5	34.5	9.5	25.4	3.9	22.0
1994	27.8	32.7	7.9	24.6	3.3	20.1
1995	27.7	33.2	8.1	23.5	2.8	18.6
1996	27.7	34.1	7.3	23.4	2.7	17.8
1997	27.2	34.1	7.2	23.7	2.2	16.6
1998	29.1	36.4	7.5	31.5	3.4	20.5
1999	28.6	35.8	6.7	33.2	2.6	19.1
2000	27.3	34.9	6.5	29.1	2.7	18.0
2001	27.7	34.9	6.8	23.5	2.5	17.8
2002	29.0	36.1	8.4	23.3	2.1	17.5
2003	28.5	35.6	8.1	22.7	2	17.1

Source: Baykal (2006), p. 90




Fig. 3 The share of education (MONE + Higher Education Council + Universities) in the national consolidated budget expenditures (in respective categories). Source: Produced by the author, employing the data in Table 3

ment from 8.7 percent in 1994] while the richest quintile captured the highest share, 24.2 percent ... (Mete 2005, p. 100; also see The World Bank 2001, p. 82 for the information given in brackets).

Here, few more words are needed on the motivation behind the 1997 reform. In fact, the anti-poverty orientation of the law went hand in hand with a deeper concern for the ideological basis of the secular republic. Indeed, the economic policies of the post-1980 period placed the burden on the working class. The return to populism especially after 1989 was no cure to the problem, as the consequence was the economic crisis of 1994. The Islamist Welfare Party skilfully seized upon the masses' demand for social justice, beginning with the local elections in 1994, and capturing the government in 1995, as the major partner in a coalition government (Öniş 1997; Mecham 2004). Hence, the military memorandum and the subsequent anti-Islamist policies of the post-memorandum government aimed at both targets of poverty and the allegedly breeding ground of the Islamist movement: the Imam-Hatip schools (The Imam and Preacher Schools) which involved grades 5–8 and the high school. Originally established to control the teaching of Islam under the supervision of the State (in the spirit of the Law of Unity of Education), opening new Imam-Hatip schools has been effectively used by the national politicians as an election promise to garner the support of conservative voters, especially after 1950.

By extending the duration of compulsory education from 5 to 8 years, the duration of education in these religious schools fell from 6 to 3 years. What is more, those schools are considered to be vocational schools. In that regard a coefficient system was introduced into the centrally run national university entrance exam, which discriminates against the vocational schools by reducing the exam score of a vocational high school graduate who applies for a department falling outside the specialisation of her/his school. Thus, the aim was both to prevent the Imam-Hatip graduates attending the key universities/departments, which would allow them to capture key posts in bureaucracy and other fields of political and economic activity, and thus to render those schools unappealing to masses. Ironically enough, though, the students who attend such schools, along with other non-religious vocational high schools, are mainly from poor families. Hence, although the Basic Education Law helped redressing injustice in primary education to a certain degree, it seems to have created a deadlock for a considerable number of students from poor households in the high school system, who constitute around 1/3rd of the students in secondary education, as of 2009 (MONE 2009, p. 136). What is more, it is also worthy to note that not all vocational high schools are Imam-Hatip schools. Hence, the secularity concerns seem to have contributed further injustice in the high school and university system.

Of course, our foregoing discussion mainly departed from an initial analysis of public spending. As long as private spending for education is concerned, the amount of private expenditures had already more than doubled the public spending as of 2002/2003, when the neoliberal reforms began to gain speed with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party. This very much has to do with commercialisation of education. In their field study dated 2003, Ertürk-Keskin and

Demirci (2003, pp. 37–42) detected 30 different items of private expenditure in primary and secondary education, one of the foremost being the “contribution” fee introduced in 1995 in public schools (a year after the crisis of 1994).⁷ Conducting a field survey, and taking into account most common 18 private expenditure items, the authors found that a family on average paid around 1,398.15 TL as total contribution to public school funding, annually. Of course, this does not include the fees for cram schools that began to fill in the gap between the lowered quality of general high schools and highly selective university system (Gür and Çelik 2009, pp. 29–30).⁸ The authors calculated the average annual fee for a cram school around 2,000.00 TL (the average in Ankara).

Then, it could be argued that, especially for the students in grades 10 and 11 (and after 2005 grade 12 was added) the annual total cost for a pupil’s family was around 3,400.00 TL, almost equal to the annual minimum wage, 3,672.00 TL (306.00 × 12). Hence, for the families living on minimum income, it has been impossible to send their children to cram schools, thus blocking the path to vertical social mobilisation. Again, in the same year, the income per capita in Turkey was US\$3,383.00 (<http://www.belgenet.com/eko/die310304.html>, accessed on 08 May 2010; and annual average exchange rate was US\$1: 1,493 TL: http://www.ekodialog.com/istatistik/doviz_kur.html, accessed on 08 May 2010), and 5,050.82 TL. Hence, it could be suggested that even for average citizens, making the second and third quintile in the income distribution, it has been very difficult to send their children to the cram schools, thereby making it only possible for the upper-middle and high income groups’ kids to attend such schools, and be successful in the university exam.⁹ In fact, the profitability of the cram schools does not seem to have subsided, if not gained speed. The number of cram schools jumped from 2,615 in 2003 (Ertürk-Keskin and Demirci 2003, p. 10) to 4,167 in March 2010 (ookgm.meb.gov.tr/rapor/html, accessed 31 March 2010).

⁷The authors also cite tragic news of poor pupils not being admitted to the classes and sent back home for even smaller amounts of contribution fees. In fact, such news are still on the media, especially during the registration period, including enforcement of parents of those kids who could not pay the fees to clean the school, or to do—mainly humiliating—tasks requiring physical labour.

⁸For example, in 2003, 1,502,644 students entered the exam. According to the national examination centre, 1,171,719 students were successful, and placed into a higher education institution. (<http://www.osym.gov.tr/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFFAC8287D72AD903BEB6FAF75C3ACDF77C>). Yet, 195,139 students were placed into the Open University (education from home) (<http://yayim.meb.gov.tr/dergiler/sayi51/tekin.htm>). So, it was 976,580 students who were accepted into real tertiary education, and it should be noted that not all high school students enter the exam, and some of the entrants are those who take the exam a second time. So, around half of the high school graduates who enter the exam are eliminated by the system.

⁹In fact, there was a recent news of tragic death of a young man committing suicide due to their debt to a cram school. As the family could not pay for the debt, his mother was sued and jailed, putting him into psychological depression ... In fact, such stories have been an important reason why the author of this chapter decided to study education policy

Concluding Discussion

The post-1980 education policy, mainly formulated and implemented in the context of a series of economic crises, seems to have placed much stress on the shoulders of secondary education, and general high schools in particular. It is also interesting to note that a strange combination of social equality concerns with a concern with the ideological roots of the country seems to have contributed towards this imbalanced structure in the education system. This imbalanced system also finds its reflection in the institutional structure of the high school system. According to Gür and Çelik, there are currently 79 different types of secondary schools functioning under six separate general directorates of the MONE. There is also a hierarchy among these different types of schools, which include special high schools giving education in English (Anatolian High Schools), the Science High Schools, etc., with differences in curriculum, classroom sizes and class hours, varying from 30 to 45 h of classes per week in grade 12 (Gür and Çelik 2009, pp. 24–25).

I think this variation in school quality is partly a result of the experimentation policy, in an attempt to better the secondary education as a whole. Yet, it also looks like this incremental strategy backfired by resulting in new hierarchies inside an already overstretched secondary education, especially letting the general high schools stay well behind such specialised schools in the quality of education and success in university entrance exams, thereby further deepening social injustice in the education system. It also has to be noted that such special schools accept their students through another national entrance exam (in the past it used to be a single exam, now taking place over a number of years, turning the grade 6–8 students also dependent on the cram schools). In that regard, it is not surprising to hear recently that the Minister of Education, then, Mrs. Nimet Çubukçu, introduced the program to restructure all general high schools in Turkey as Anatolian High Schools by 2013 (<http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/05/07/duz.liseler.anadolu.lisesi.oluyor/575289.0/index.html>, visited on 08 May 2010). This attempt can also be seen as an attempt to standardise the high school system, to a certain extent.

Here, one is tempted to conclude that a holistic approach to education policy could well have reduced overcrowding, waste, and injustices in education policy. It looks like especially in a policy field where incrementalism is the dominant mode of policy-making and implementation, economic crises seem to have worsened the problems, ever increasing the necessity for reform and policy coordination, while rendering the endeavours for reform much more complicated, thus contributing to a vicious circle in education policy. In that regard, for example, even attempts to address inequality in education such as the busing system and regional boarding schools introduced in the underdeveloped regions of Turkey resulted in new types of social injustices and waste. According to a World Bank report,

What is more, programs designed to enhance the access of poor children to schools, especially in eastern and southeastern anatolia, like the busing system, produced worse outcomes in that around 25,500 schools were closed during the school years of 1998/9 and 1999/2000 (11,000 and 14,500 respectively), while the pupils per teacher also increased significantly in the schools where those students were directed, thereby lowering the effectiveness of teaching in the central schools (2001, p. 85).

What is more, in these primary boarding schools, pupils have to leave their families at quite early ages, resulting in psychological problems, again finding their place in the media in saddening news.

Ironically, and despite the apparent problems associated with a fragmented and diversified implementation structure, the governments, and especially the current government, continue to create new fragmentations especially in education finance. This involves decentralisation of school funding, increasingly relying on contributions by the parents. In fact, two recent articles by Ertürk-Keskin (2005, 2008) indicate that privatisation of education finance was initially designed at the central level through a national charity organisation (Milli Eğitim Vakfı) soon after the coup d'état of 1980 (1981) under the control of the MONE, also as a source of earmarked funding for education (the Özal government).

Yet, this centrally controlled funding mechanism eventually left its place to school based funding, especially with a protocol between the MONE and the MOF, allowing the parents' union of the schools to run the properties of the school as managers (like running the schools' front yards as parking lots when the schools are empty), dated 15 March 2004. The author rightly relates this decentralisation to the influence exercised by the World Bank on the governments, through its credit agreements (Ertürk-Keskin and Demirci 2003; Ertürk-Keskin 2004). I think that this shift within neoliberal approach to education finance also indicates that the governments are already overstretched in funding primary and secondary education, and were thus forced to give up on a privilege they enjoyed by centrally controlling an informal budget, which could well be utilised for clientelistic purposes by the national politicians.

Following this logic, it could also be suggested that earmarked funding (by centrally channelling either public or private sources) also has its practical limits. Given these initial observations; given the already fragmented nature of education finance in Turkey (The World Bank 2001, p. 76); and given the fact that private funding also seems to have reached its limits, thereby increasingly narrowing the set of real beneficiaries from the education system (deepening social injustices to the degree of harming the government's legitimacy), the governments will be forced to re-centralise and universalise the education finance (cf. Mundy 2005, p. 9). Most probably, they will continue to rely on private contributions to a certain degree, but will attempt to diffuse costs by introducing mechanisms like a voucher system. Another expected, and already in progress in Turkey, development is internalisation of certain cost items like teaching material (books), thereby increasing the transfer costs (see Ertürk-Keskin and Demirci 2003).

Given the limits to private funding, the governments have to choose between investment or personnel expenditures. Here, the current decentralisation program of government in education (for a detailed analysis see Acar 2008) which involves the proposals for transferring the responsibility for personnel management to provincial local governments suggests that the verdict is against teachers. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the current government is very much interested in installing the quality check schemes in service provision (like the Total Quality Management system; the educational regional scheme, and the pilot schools project), to standardise an education system on the way to be decentralised.

So far, the empirical discussion indicated that policy-making and implementation process in Turkey has been mainly incremental in nature, and that political concerns, national integrity being first and social justice second, have dominated the policy agenda. Nevertheless, once these priorities continue to be implemented incrementally, especially in the context of economic crisis, the policies informed by such policies backfire, thus throwing the national governments in the middle of a hard dilemma between political legitimacy (and other political concerns) and the pressures on the budget. In fact, although essentially incremental in nature, “focused policy programs” strategically targeting certain parts of the education system could be seen effective instruments of policy change. According to Dülger, for example.

‘The Rapid Coverage for Compulsory Basic Education Program’, with its special provisions for poor children, is considered Turkey’s largest poverty-alleviation program. The program was designed and implemented during a period of severe economic crises and short-lived coalition governments. Given economic and political instability, the government chose a “big bang” approach to basic education reform. By acting quickly, it became too difficult for potential opponents to overturn the reform or cut its financing. Yet, the approach precluded the government from building coalitions, developing more quality-enhancing components of the program, or undertaking complementary steps to assuage different interest groups and populations (2005, p. 146).

To reiterate this striking insight, the big-bang approach, although effective in the short term to operationalise a program in administrative and financial terms, is not politically sustainable. In other words, two major concerns emerge here, which might help us to develop a typology of public policy responses to economic crises: the scale/focus of change and the temporal design of reform. If we re-think the above concerns in the form of a matrix, I think a typology of reform approaches/alternatives to economic crisis could be produced (Table 5).

We have seen that the history of policy change in education in Turkey, in response to economic crises, has been mainly piecemeal, and mainly incremental (A) except for few focused interventions (B) like the once described above. Two other options are those mainly comprehensive in nature, with different time dimensions. The option C stands for those reform attempts where the whole education system is affected (instead of choosing between different levels, for example). The interventions are made at once, and mainly into the factors such as the personnel regime and the service finance, without changing the overall institutional structure of service provision. D, albeitly, speaks for itself, and looks like the most difficult option to pursue for many governments. Yet, as I have also suggested in Table 1 the pressure

Table 5 A suggested typology for reform approaches/alternatives in the context of economic crisis

	Scope and size	
Time dimension	Piecemeal	Comprehensive
Short	(A) Incremental/eclectic modifications, additions	(C) Rationalisation attempts
Long	(B) Big-bang approach	(D) Structural reform

on governments, especially after this latest crisis in education, will push them to pay more attention to national/social integrity and justice concerns, which definitely requires a structural reform along with a degree of standardisation in education services. In fact, according to Carpentier

The relationship between education and economy is an evolving construct, potentially subject to continuity as well as change. The reversal of the relationship between education and economy after the Second World War, however, presents a challenge for the policy-makers. Received wisdom, since the 1970s, has been that public spending, including that devoted to education, must be restrained during periods of slowdown. Prior to 1945 [since the 1830s], however, evidence suggests not only that public expenditure on education increased during periods of economic crisis, but also that it provided a way out of crisis. (2007, p. 38, emphasis original)

Given our above reasoning regarding the legitimacy challenge before the governments, it could be argued that the historical reversal in the relationship between economy and education in 1945 is once again to be reversed. Yet, this time, spending has to be reconstructed through adoption of alternative funding mechanisms given the fact that the burden of spending had already been shifted to the household budgets.

Then, which path to reform will be chosen? Şimşek has an answer,

The ongoing reform debate in education since the early 1980s have produced three lines of reform proposals: decentralisation, choice and privatisation, and systemic reform ... we have most likely exhausted the creative energy of educators and policy makers to frame the crisis in abstract terms and to develop working models to resolve the crisis. There is enough evidence that implementation of these three reform proposals for change have been proceeding at full speed internationally, the rest of the reform efforts in the coming years will most likely be concentrated around further implementation, revision, and perfection. (2000, p. 22)

Hence, according to him, even if there is to be a reform, it will increasingly be more pragmatic in nature, falling into cell (A). In fact, the history of education policy in Turkey confirms this insight, to a certain degree. Nevertheless, we have also seen that this pragmatism is not a product of this current era, and nor was there a lack of active interventions of the sort discussed earlier. Moreover, we cannot simply assume that policy change stems from the wishes or creativity of educators or policy-makers, leaving aside the social and political function of education. Apparently, there will always be social pressure on education and education policy. Here, I would like to benefit from another insight by Şimşek, who conceives the reform process itself as a chaotic one (2000, p. 1), to argue that the politics of reform, and especially bureaucratic politics (the role played by teachers and educators), could well play a critical role in the formulation of new alternatives, or in forcing the policy-makers to adopt a certain reform strategy, in the midst of chaos. Hence, further analysis of the impact of economic crises on public policy and administration, particularly in the field of education, should pay further attention to the bureaucratic politics of reform.

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Challenges to Governance Reform and Accountability in Egypt

Jennifer Bremer

Introduction

The Egyptian Revolution of January 2011 has arguably changed the landscape for public governance and accountability in Egypt. It has not yet had a discernible impact on governance itself, however. At the time this assessment was written, 2 years after these momentous events, no conclusion could be drawn as to whether the Revolution would fulfill its promise of better governance. To reach such an outcome, the post-Revolution government must not only confront the challenges that stymied Mubarak-era efforts at governance reform but also overcome the additional barriers arising from the Revolution and its aftermath.

This chapter aims to examine Egypt's governance challenges post-Revolution. While many (including the author) question whether the term "revolution" is appropriate to describe what has happened in Egypt, this chapter will follow the prevailing usage in Egypt and apply that term to describe the events of early 2011 and the transitional period that has followed. The discussion begins with a brief examination of the country's public governance landscape, describing the structure of government, the historical legacy, and the political and institutional setting within which governance reform must proceed. Following this overview, the chapter will offer two brief case studies chosen for their importance to governance reform in Egypt: decentralization to improve local governance and e-government to improve

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accountability. The chapter concludes with a look forward, to the extent that future directions can be glimpsed at all in the current uncertain environment.

Any examination of Egypt's governance challenges must be grounded in an understanding of the country's unique governance legacy. The key feature of this legacy is an excessively large government that dominates and constrains private sector and civil society activities across all elements of society. Any government, whether liberal or Islamist, military or socialist, must act within the confines defined by Egypt's setting, one highly unfavorable to good governance and crippling to many earlier efforts at reform. The result is a government that is strikingly ineffective at meeting the country's urgent development needs yet highly effective in resisting reform.

It must be said that the past does not necessarily define the future. Nearly every country has had to overcome a legacy of bad governance to achieve lasting progress in governance. Governments have implemented reforms to meet the legitimate expectations of the citizens, providing essential services and increased accountability back to the citizenry. The first step toward putting Egypt on a path that can meet the heightened post-Revolution expectations must be an understanding of how weak governance systems have blocked past reform efforts.

Egypt's Governance Legacy: The Setting for Governance Reform

While Egypt's bureaucracy shares features with other government bureaucracies, its unique history has given it particular characteristics that make it resistant to reform. Some of these characteristics, including the state's huge size and dominant role in society, are evident even from casual acquaintance, but others are less easy to recognize. Formal structures that appear superficially similar to those in countries with good governance may operate in an entirely different manner, one that effectively forestalls fulfillment of their assigned role in governance or service delivery.

Egypt's bureaucracy is arguably the oldest in the world, dating back roughly 5,000 years. It is also proportionately one of the largest. Analysis of data provided on World Bank, International Labor Organization, and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs websites indicates that the central government employed approximately 5.7 million people in 2007 (the latest available), or about 73 for every 1,000 people. Including employees in public sector companies and authorities, this rises to 6.4 million or 82 per 1,000 citizens. While this is not a global high, it nonetheless exceeds the level in many countries generally considered to have a large bureaucracy, such as India (16 per 1,000) and Brazil (58 per 1,000).

These high levels must be seen in the context of Egypt's low labor force participation rates (48 %, the 12th lowest out of 184 countries reporting this statistic). Public sector employment accounts for 29 % of all civilian employment and a whopping 50 % of all wage-earners (i.e., excluding those who are employers, self-employed, or family workers).

The Egyptian bureaucracy is also one of the most centralized in the world. From the lowliest worker or village head to the president, all government workers are part of

a single unitary structure. Throughout this army of officials, only one—the president himself—is elected. Whatever the fate of Morsy’s presidency and the Revolution more generally, the holding of a truly competitive and generally fair vote to seat Egypt’s first democratically elected president will stand as a landmark in the country’s history.

The new constitution adopted in 2014 may or may not change the extreme centralization of the bureaucracy that the president leads. It provides for parliament to modify the laws governing the local administration, currently controlled by Law 143 of 1979, but also provides for administrative units to “enjoy legal personality.”

Within Egypt’s highly rigid governance system, the management and structure of public authorities and state-owned enterprises have seen substantially more modifications. New structures have been introduced to remake the governance of major economic functions, in particular. The first independent regulatory authority, for telecommunications, was established in 2004 and new regulators for water and electricity followed, as well as a competition authority, a unit to promote public–private partnerships for infrastructure investment, and other regulatory bodies needed for the smooth functioning of a market-led economy.

These changes took on increased importance following the partial privatization of the previously dominant state sector. Never popular (Baker 1981; El Fiqi 2011), these reforms have been implemented gradually in the decades since President Sadat announced the Open Door Policy in 1974, with periods of accelerated progress in the early 1990s and beginning in 2004 with the entry Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s reformist government.

Despite the progress made in some areas, the international rankings on governance and government functioning show clearly that Egypt’s legacy of a large and dominant bureaucracy has taken a heavy toll on governance and accountability, as well as on government effectiveness generally.

The tables presented here bring together rankings from several of the more widely used systems, including those developed by Transparency International, Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, and the World Bank’s Doing Business and Governance Indicators programs. The tables compare rankings in three areas: political governance, economic governance, and corruption. The scores and percentile rankings have been recalculated where necessary to express them all on a 100-point scale for comparison, with 100 representing the best performance in each case. The scores are those calculated by the organizations, while the percentiles represent Egypt’s position among all countries ranked in the respective analysis.

Table 1 brings together the most recent World Bank Governance Indicators and the Freedom House rankings on political governance. The World Bank scores are somewhat lower than those calculated by Freedom House. The top Freedom House scores were earned for Internet freedom and press freedom, however, neither of which was ranked by the World Bank. The Bank assessments were also completed in 2011, a year very much affected by the Revolution. Thus it is not surprising that the lowest score was awarded for political stability and absence of violence, where Egypt ranked in the 12th percentile.

Egypt’s performance in the economic reform rankings has been somewhat better. Indeed, Egypt was named the top reformer for 2008 by the World Bank’s Doing

Table 1 Selected political governance rankings

Source	Indicator	Egypt score (out of 100)	Percentile rank	Year
FH	Freedom on the net	59	N/A	2012
FH	Freedom of the press	57	N/A	2011
FH	Accountability and public voice	37	N/A	2012
FH	Civil liberties	28	N/A	2012
FH	Rule of law	38	N/A	2012
FH	Political rights	38	N/A	2013
FH	Civil liberties	38	N/A	2012
WBG	Voice and accountability	27	16	2011
WBG	Political stability/absence of violence	24	12	2011
WBG	Government effectiveness	38	32	2011
WBG	Regulatory quality	43	41	2011
WBG	Rule of law	42	43	2011
	Average	39	29	

Abbreviations: *FH* Freedom House, *WBG* World Bank Governance Indicators, and author's calculations. Details of sources consulted may be found prior to the reference section

Table 2 Selected economic governance rankings

Source	Indicator	Egypt score (out of 100)	Percentile rank	Year
HF	Overall economic freedom	55	29	2013
HF	Property rights	35	49	2013
HF	Business freedom	63	45	2013
WBDB	Overall	N/A	41	2013
WBDB	Starting a business	N/A	86	2013
WBDB	Dealing with construction permits	N/A	11	2013
WBDB	Getting electricity	N/A	46	2013
WBDB	Registering property	N/A	49	2013
WBDB	Getting credit	N/A	55	2013
WBDB	Protecting investors	N/A	56	2013
WBDB	Paying taxes	N/A	22	2013
WBDB	Trading across borders	N/A	62	2013
WBDB	Enforcing contracts	N/A	18	2013
WBDB	Resolving insolvency	N/A	25	2013
	Average	51	42	

Abbreviations: *WBDB* World Bank Doing Business, *HF* Heritage Foundation, and author's calculations. Details of sources consulted may be found prior to the reference section

Business unit, although this achievement is now more accurately labeled “most improved.” Egypt remains in the lower half of the rankings, at 41 % World Bank Doing Business (2013). Table 2 compares the most recent Doing Business rankings with a ranking prepared by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative U.S. think-tank.

Egypt's scores in fighting corruption, shown in Table 3, are consistent with these rankings, falling between the political and economic rankings, arguably reflecting the reality that corruption is both a political and an economic phenomenon.

Table 3 Selected corruption and governance rankings

Source	Indicator	Egypt score (out of 100)	Percentile rank	Year
FH	Anti-corruption and transparency	24	N/A	2012
TI	Corruption perceptions index	32	32	2012
WBG	Control of corruption	36	27	2011
HF	Freedom from corruption	29	39	2013
	Average	30	33	

Abbreviations: *FH* Freedom House, *WBG* World Bank Governance Indicators, *TI* Transparency International, *HF* Heritage Foundation, and author's calculations. Details of sources consulted may be found prior to the reference section

All in all, these rankings place Egypt in the lower-middle ranks globally, below the half-way mark but considerably above the worst performers. They tell a story that sheds light on two of the most important factors contributing to the 2011 Revolution: popular disgust with the deepening corruption of the Mubarak regime and anger at poor governance that failed to deliver either broad-based growth or social justice.

In view of evident linkage between governance and the Revolution, it is surprising that governance reform was not a major focus of either public debate or government programming during the first two years following the Revolution. Attention was indeed directed at the top-most levels of the governance system, particularly the drafting of the 2012 constitution, and at the bottom-most levels, where a number of officials were prosecuted for perceived governance-related crimes. Between these two extremes, however, neither the MB-dominated government, civil society, nor the press emphasized reform of government structures and operations to improve accountability or to deliver on citizens' expectations.

This puzzling inaction during the first two years following the Revolution, has endangered the gains for which hundreds gave their lives. The punishment of individual instances of past misbehavior, while psychologically satisfying, cannot substitute for putting in place the systems and procedures that can prevent future corruption or hold decision-makers responsible for how well they serve citizens' needs.

The individualized and backward-looking approach also failed to draw a line under past behavior so that new investments and urgently needed government decisions could go ahead with some security. Although some progress has been made in resolving contested privatizations and land deals, for example, many more remain unsettled and new cases are still being brought as of this writing. Because the rules governing what is acceptable and what is not remain unclear, both local and international investors as well as government decision-makers remain uncertain as to whether they will face future punishments for deals entered into now, even if they are acting in good faith. The result is a dangerous paralysis at a time when action is urgently needed to restart the economy, reduce the budget deficit, and improve services.

Overall, the current environment of uncertainty and instability is not conducive to the articulation of a concerted strategy, much less to rapid progress on such complex challenges as corruption, economic governance, and political accountability. It is too early to judge the Revolution a failure in delivering on these difficult goals.

Other countries, from eighteenth-century France to twentieth-century Eastern Europe, have taken not years but decades to make the transition from post-revolutionary chaos to a functional new system. Each country must find its own way forward on fundamental reform. At this writing, a scenario of a difficult but eventually successful transition or a descent into sustained economic collapse and civil unrest both appear plausible.

Can the 25 January Revolution Open the Door to Real Governance Reform?

Although we cannot yet predict the long-term impact of the Revolution on governance and accountability, we can assess the challenges that will face whatever government exercises power during this transitional period. Many questions remain to be addressed by the new parliament to be elected later in 2014. A key task for this body will be to fill in the gaps in the framework defined by the constitution and define a path to achieve real progress on the governance and accountability agenda of the Revolution.

New laws will likely shape a way forward in both of the areas that form the focus of the remainder of this chapter. In the area of decentralization, legislation will define the degree to which this strategy moves beyond scattered, donor-dependent pilot efforts to allow the citizens to choose local officials through elections and to levy local taxes that will enable truly local development strategies to be defined.

In the area of transparency and accountability, new legislation is needed to ensure freedom of information and to promote broader use of information technology to improve citizen services. E-government, key to progress in both areas, has expanded greatly over the 10 years since the reformist Nazif government took power, but there is still a very long way to go before Egypt approaches the standard set in this area by other middle-income countries, such as Brazil or Chile.

The uncertainty surrounding the election of a parliament following the coup that removed President Morsy and the election of former Field Marshal al-Sisi prevent any conclusion as to whether the new government will follow up on its promises to implement genuine governance reform.

The primary objective of any revolutionary group, however disorganized, must be to seize power. Only then can it implement policies to address the concerns that led to the Revolution in the first place. To do this, the revolutionaries or those taking power in their name must do more than simply take over the existing machinery of government: they must introduce new structures, new ideas, and new ways of doing business to deliver on the Revolution's promises to the people.

Sadly, these reforms did not follow Egypt's Revolution. During the first two years following Mubarak's departure, the public discourse revolved primarily around the largely structural and procedural issues of the constitution, the prosecution of crimes accumulated during the previous regime and the Revolution itself.

Maneuvering by all sides in search of short-term political advantage in whatever round of elections was coming next pushed serious dialogue on policy choices to the side. There were plenty of opportunities for political distraction, as parliamentary and presidential elections and referenda followed each other with dizzying rapidity. At this writing, election of yet another parliament under the 2014 Constitution and elections to reconstitute the local bodies are still to come.

So far, the Revolution has brought Egypt the rebirth of politics but the death of policy-making. Far from establishing a coherent government team capable of steering the country through the complex transition and treacherous economic waters in which Egypt finds itself, these changes have distracted political actors in government and outside it from their core governing tasks. The bureaucracy has been left to its own devices and the citizens left to struggle onward as best they can. The demands of the Revolution for bread, freedom, and social justice have become mere slogans with only token programmatic measures put in place to achieve them. The feral bureaucracy has retreated into its den to wait it out, with each successive minister failing to take control or set directions, hesitant to make decisions or even to sign routine documents, lest he find himself, like his predecessors, hauled up on charges of corruption. In its waning months, the Freedom and Justice Party apparently expanded efforts to insert its own people into second-tier positions in the government, but whether or not this could have mobilized the bureaucracy to support the party's agenda, these steps were too little, too late, and were in any case reversed by the coup.

In these conditions, it is not surprising that the ship of state drifted into dangerous territory, with foreign reserves sinking toward disastrously low levels and worsening shortages of basic commodities. The Morsy government, with one eye on scheduled elections and the other on protests growing progressively more angry and violent, was unwilling to take the highly unpopular measures needed to bring the macro-economy under control. The International Monetary Fund and other foreign donors were left waiting on the sidelines, unable to come to the aid of a government that could not articulate a coherent reform strategy, much less implement one.

The increasingly polarized political scene and the weakness of the main opposition groups in the run-up to the coup contributed to the absence of a real dialogue on the critical policy choices facing the nation. Without such dialogue, it proved impossible to form a policy consensus on such inevitably very difficult issues as the phasing out of energy subsidies and the reduction in the overall budget deficit. These reforms must be tackled to bring the economy into balance, but any hope that the liberal opposition would put the national interest ahead of its own proved misplaced.

While the new al-Sisi government has not yet presented a coherent approach to reform, any government would face very high barriers to governance reform even in the absence of these conditions. Egypt's governance systems are locked into a dysfunctional structure that undermines governance effectiveness and at the same time poses tremendous barriers to reform. Three interlocking constraints together form a "vicious triangle" highly resistant to reform.

The three aspects making up the vicious triangle are bad governance systems, bad financial management, and bad human resource management. “Bad governance,” as used here, means that there are not effective systems in place to ensure that the senior ranks of the government act in the long-term interests of the citizens. Existing systems do not provide accountability, whether upward to higher levels of the government or downward to the users of the system. Information is often unavailable nor is it reliable when available. Strategic management functions are poorly performed and the results are not effectively communicated to the line officers responsible for implementing the strategy.

“Bad human resource management” weakens the systems that should link individual performance to the organization’s strategy. Deficiencies in this area include poorly defined position descriptions and reporting relationships; limited oversight but, at the same time, very constrained scope for personal initiative; inadequate pay and benefits; inability of officials up and down the chain to hire and fire in order to meet changing needs or to maintain a high-quality workforce, and poor training systems, among others.

“Bad financial management” encompasses a range of systemic failures that deny the government the ability to generate and use financial resources effectively. Among such failures are a dysfunctional tax system, high rates of informality, poor money-management practices, and procurement systems that lead to wasted resources, corruption, and rigidities in budgeting and expenditure throughout the government.

Failures in any one area reinforce the failures in the other two, making it difficult to achieve reform without tackling all three constraints simultaneously. This is of course an extremely tall order in the best of times and nearly impossible under the current crisis conditions.

A brief example from the public sector tertiary education system will illustrate how the interaction among the three legs of the triangle undermines government performance at the sectoral level as well as at the national level. The cascading failures of the public university system are particularly detrimental to development, as they undercut the nation’s ability to generate analysis for decision-making and to produce young leaders who can support reform, drive innovation, and build a high-growth economy.

To begin at the top, where bad governance is most detrimental, we find university government boards with a membership made up largely of senior professors, thus entirely lacking independence. Senior management has almost no ability to restructure operations and rigid systems govern course offerings, blocking innovation. Financial management failures begin with the extreme constraints imposed by the “no tuition” policy, but are exacerbated by inflexible and inefficient procurement and expenditure systems. Bad human resource management practices ensure a lack of accountability: all faculty are tenured for life as soon as hired, right out of college, as teaching assistants; inbred hiring systems establish a norm whereby most faculty hold degrees only from the same institution where they work; and huge class sizes (sometimes well over 1,000 students) and weak oversight combine to permit cheating and financial corruption to penetrate the system.

Each triangle leg reinforces the others: the lack of financial resources limits salaries so faculty often take on outside work and too often extract funds from vulnerable students by, for example selling “textbooks” that they themselves author. The ineffective human resource management systems do not hold faculty or staff accountable for poor performance, and the absence of independent governance systems presents few barriers to inefficient use of financial and human resources. While some faculty are academically excellent and dedicated, such corrosive problems as nepotism, grade-selling, and multiple jobs are widespread (see El Masry 2013, for a recent account of corruption in public universities).

The challenge to reform posed by the vicious triangle lies in the ineffectiveness of strategies that address only one aspect, on the one hand, and the difficulty of undertaking the multi-part reforms needed to address all three legs at once, on the other.

The government’s inability to break the vicious triangle’s stranglehold on public sector performance has had a pernicious impact on reform, regardless of which sector is targeted for improvement. The determination and political will needed to break the triangle’s hold have not been evident, dooming one reform effort after another.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the situation is hopeless, however: a post-revolutionary government motivated by a commitment to systemic reform and held accountable by citizens at the ballot box could reform government systems over time. Successful reforms have as much potential to be mutually reinforcing as do the negative forces just described. It would nonetheless be naive to argue that the current political situation in Egypt is conducive to the type of long-term, patient, but determined effort needed to weaken and ultimately dismantle the vicious triangle.

Reforming Governance: The Case of Decentralization

Decentralization is one of the most complex reform areas within the governance agenda. It requires making decisions that combine technical, political, and financial factors affecting nearly all aspects of the government’s operations and a large share of public employees. For much the same reason, it is among the most important and has received regular attention from the donor and academic community for decades. Assistance to develop local governments’ capacity and programming was among the first areas to receive concentrated attention when U.S. foreign assistance resumed in Egypt in the late 1970s as part of the peace process and was still a focus of aid right up to the 2011 Revolution.

Nonetheless, Egypt’s local administration law, Law 143 of 1979, has received only minor amendments since it was introduced. This law provides for the election of local popular councils at levels from the village to the governorate, but endows these councils with only limited oversight and review powers (CIPE n.d.).

Egypt does not have true local government, as noted above. All heads of local unit, from governor to village *omda*, are appointed by the central government. In any case, the power of these entities is starkly limited in scope and authority.

Taxation is the sole prerogative of the central government. Local units are confined to imposing fees and fines, receiving grants, taking loans, or deriving income from projects. Without a broad revenue base, these units are almost entirely dependent on the central government for funding.

Personnel functions are centralized in the Central Authority for Organization and Administration (CAOA), which oversees both personnel and government buildings. Even governors lack authority to hire staff and can only reassign or fire them.

The budget is also determined at the national level, although there is considerable scope for the governors, mayors, and local heads of central ministry units to influence the process during budget formulation, based not on formal powers or approval procedures, but on a highly personalized and politicized process.

No authority below the parliament has the authority to issue a law. This has led to heavy reliance on decrees, particularly those issued by governors, which can bridge this gap to some extent. Localities regulate only such minor local issues as street-cleaning.

Most important, the staff responsible for key government functions—education, health, roads, housing, finance, agriculture, etc.—are organized into “directorates” that have a dual reporting relationship to their respective central ministries and to the governors. The central ministries control policy, priorities, and program content, with only limited scope to adjust these locally.

Some of the critical infrastructure functions, including water/sanitation, electricity, and telecommunications, are even further removed from local control by being placed into corporatized structures that report to national holding companies or ministries.

Certain powerful ministries, notably those affiliated with security and military functions, operate their own extensive facilities in cities and rural areas. In addition to bases, these may include factories, residential facilities, hotels, and other operations effectively outside local control even if they occupy key locations for urban development. The military retains a veto over any decision on land use and directly controls large areas of open land, particularly in desert areas, including the coastlines. Local officials have very limited input into any decisions involving these powerful actors.

The local administrative function is overseen by a separate national ministry, the Ministry of Local Development (MOLD), but it does not have line authority over any of the local units and does not control their budgets or staffing. Its function is primarily to provide technical support and to serve as a vehicle for donor collaboration.

A Legacy of Failed Reform

During the 40 years of the Sadat and Mubarak presidencies, the local councils evolved into arms of the now-disbanded regime party, the National Democratic Party (NDP). Blatant election rigging was used to ensure that the NDP dominated all local popular councils. In the last elections held before the Revolution, the NDP emerged with 97 % of the seats, with the two semiofficial opposition parties each taking 1.5 % and Muslim Brotherhood (MB) candidates (running as always as independents due to the organization’s illegal status) effectively frozen out.

This welding of the local elected bodies to the central regime naturally undercut any potential for independent representation and encouraged corruption.

Several efforts have been made over the years to introduce reforms that would strengthen local accountability, enable local administrations to develop into full-fledged local governments, and give localities direct control over budgetary and programmatic matters of concern to them.

Recent examples of such efforts include the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative, a USAID project, and programs by the German GIZ and the United Nations Development Program. Each of these has included measures to build up the capacity of the local administration in selected “pilot locations,” analytic and training activities centered in MOLD, and conferences intended to carry forward a dialogue on decentralization issues, promoting future action.

These projects reflect the long and largely unsuccessful experience of donor-supported programs to encourage decentralization and pave the way for its supposed implementation. Early examples of such programs, such as USAID’s Development Decentralization I, Local Development Fund, Basic Village Services, Provincial Development Fund, and Neighborhood Urban Services, can be traced back to the late 1970s, when USAID reinitiated programming in Egypt (Samaan et al. 1983).

While many of these programs generated benefits at the local level, there is at the end of the day very little to show. Despite countless person-years spent in training programs and conferences or devoted to analysis and documentation of the decentralization process, the structure and functions of the local administrations have remained essentially unchanged.

While laws to remake this structure have perennially been stated by news accounts and government officials to exist in draft and indeed to be on the very verge of adoption, in fact no law emerged from parliament to modify the local administrations or the local councils in any substantive way during the three decades of the Mubarak regime. Shortly after the Revolution, the local councils at all levels were disbanded. The 2012 and 2014 Constitutions specified that changes in the local governance system are to be determined by law, but provide little further guidance.

Options for Improving Governance Performance and Recommendations

The summary recitation of the limitations on the local administrative units provides a useful basis for identifying options going forward, should the will to reform materialize:

- Election of the heads of local authorities, ideally including not only the governors and the mayors of the major cities but extending to all cities, towns, and villages (indeed, the village *omdas* were previously elected, but it was decided that this posed a security risk).

- Election of local councils with the authority to enact laws and regulations within the scope of national legislation and to approve budgets for citizen-facing entities in their locale.
- Delegation of taxing power to local councils tied to a broad revenue base, be it property, sales, or income. Experience in China and elsewhere demonstrates that total revenue generation can be substantially increased if local officials are given the authority to retain a large share of what is generated (Bremer 2009).
- Decentralization of the key citizen-facing ministries, such as education and health, with transfer of staff and other resources to the local level, leaving the central ministries to exercise a regulatory and oversight role.
- Restructuring of the infrastructure holding companies to report to the local authorities and to limit national bodies to a regulatory role.

Reform for Accountability: The Case of E-Government and Online Disclosure

As illustrated by Egypt's low placement on global corruption and transparency rankings, corruption is a major barrier to better governance and citizen service in Egypt. A frontal attack on this problem would require a determined and well-resourced effort to tackle all three sides of the "vicious triangle" described earlier. Given the scope of the problem, strategies that address just one aspect, such as the performance of public employees, are unlikely to achieve real progress if they do not also tackle the broader governance questions, such as lack of reporting and accountability, or the financial issues that constrain efforts to reform the incentives and resources that shape employee performance.

Corruption efforts are also hampered by the very pervasiveness of the problem. Should "grand corruption" (that occurring at the higher levels of government) be targeted first or should initial efforts work on "petty corruption," the bribes and tips expected from any Egyptian trying to complete routine government processes? In the former area, the Revolution creates new opportunities to go after the "big guys" who clearly could not be held to account previously because of their links to or even positions within the highest ranks of the previous regime.

E-government tools and approaches can contribute to overcoming corruption and have been used to tackle the corruption scourge at many different levels (OECD 2010). One promising approach to address grand corruption would be to require more complete and Internet-based disclosure of the financial operations of government units, including state-owned companies and joint ventures. This would enable increased citizen oversight of major expenditures. Use of Internet-based platforms to perform routine services for citizens can also reduce opportunities for petty corruption, not to mention improving the overall quality of the operation from the users' perspective in a society rapidly expanding use of the Internet.

Both of these strategies have been used in Egypt as part of a broader push to apply e-government tools, led by the Ministry of State for Administrative

Development (MSAD) (OECD 2010). This program has also included efforts to apply e-government in ways that reform such core government functions as procurement and hiring to enhance transparency, expand competition, and promote openness, thus in principle reducing opportunities for corruption.

Despite noteworthy progress, this effort still lags far behind best practice in other middle-income countries. Information technology (IT) alone cannot deliver the benefits of e-government. Effective use of e-government requires redesign of procedures to reduce unnecessary approvals; cumbersome multi-party approvals, and, arguably most difficult of all, a shift from an atmosphere of mutual distrust between the government and the citizen to one where delivering high-quality, citizen-centered services is the aim of the government official. None of these can be accomplished through IT interventions. The following discussion relies in part on a review of information available on Egyptian governmental websites as of early 2013. A list of the websites mentioned below is provided in consolidated form at the end of this chapter.

A Legacy of Failed Reform

Efforts to use IT to promote better governance and accountability have been ongoing in Egypt for three decades. Egypt initiated adoption of information technology in government well before the creation of the Internet, with the establishment of the Information Decision Support Center (IDSC) as a unit within the Prime Minister's office in 1985 (Wheeler 2003). The IDSC was headed by young and technologically sophisticated young Egyptians who were eager to apply new technologies to solve Egypt's problems. Many of these technocrats would later go on to take positions of leadership in the government over the ensuing two decades, notably computer engineer Ahmed Nazif, who became Egypt's first Minister of Communications and Information Technology in 1999 and then prime minister in 2004, and Ahmed Darwish, who assumed the leadership of the MSAD under Prime Minister Nazif, a position he used to spur adoption of e-government approaches across the government.

Despite the very high-level support afforded by the IDSC alumni, e-government adoption in Egypt has tended to stall at the demonstration project phase and has not been broadly implemented across the government. As with decentralization, the assignment of the lead responsibility to a ministry of state, rather than a fully functional line ministry, has proven a barrier to full adoption of the reform. MSAD lacks the authority to mandate adoption of e-government (or indeed other reforms) and is therefore limited to launching its own demonstration initiatives or to providing support when requested to do so by other ministries.

One of the most notable projects initiated by MSAD is the Bawaba (portal), an ambitious effort to bring together a large number of services and information sources in one location, www.misr.gov.eg. A number of useful services have been successfully integrated into the Bawaba, such as train reservations, ordering of birth certificates, reservation in university hostels, and submission of complaints and inquiries. The Bawaba also serves as a single entry point providing links to government ministry

and governorate offices. It has hosted a number of experiments in broadening e-government, including trials of a more elaborate suite of services in pilot governorates, an e-procurement site, and a site for government jobs.

Despite some noteworthy successes, few of these experiments have grown to scale and many of them continue to be beset with technical difficulties. When the author visited the Bawaba in March 2013, for example, none of the three trial governorate websites was working. The e-procurement site showed only about 125 upcoming procurements, which is obviously a tiny fraction of the government's purchasing activity; moreover, the tenders awarded page listed only five closed procurements for the entire previous month and did not provide any information on the awardee nor the amount of the award. Similarly, the jobs site listed only 82 jobs—this in a bureaucracy of over six million.

Overall, however, there can be little doubt that e-government has progressed in the years since the IDSC and MSAD began their pilot experiments. A steady progression in the level and quality of information available online is evident across the government. Although the Bawaba-supported site for Cairo Governorate was not working, for example, the governorate has another site providing a wide range of useful information. The Cairo Governorate office of each of the ministries serving governorate citizens (education, health, etc.) is represented and in several cases forms and instructions for government services are provided. The site offers very little in the way of interactive services, however, and the quality of individual pages varies widely, with some clearly not updated for several years.

One legacy of the Revolution is a wider recognition of the value of the Internet for communicating with citizens. When visited in early 2013, Cairo Governorate's Facebook site, established in late 2012, provided up-to-date information and links to press articles, but had only 414 "likers." The Armed Forces Facebook site, by contrast, boasted over 1.9 million "likers," while then-President Morsy's official Facebook site had 1.2 million (all sites were visited in early April 2013).

One area where Egypt has made less progress is in implementing mobile-based e-government services. This rapidly spreading technology would appear to offer important advantages in view of Egypt's very high mobile penetration, which reached 115 % in October 2012, although only a little over half of all individuals reported having a mobile (ICT Indicators website). Regulatory restrictions, which to date have just begun to allow mobile-based payment systems to be introduced in Egypt, currently rule out the introduction of mobile-based e-government applications, however.

Despite Egypt's high rate of illiteracy, computer use is spreading rapidly. The share of households reporting computer use in the past 12 months rose to 35 % in 2012 from less than 25 % in 2008. Availability of high-bandwidth service is also rising rapidly (ICT Indicators website).

The major barrier to broader use of e-government services is therefore not the customer side, but rather the government. Only 55 % of government organizations reported having a website or web presence, as of 2011, although 80 % of agencies reported using the Internet. Whereas about 90 % of these users cited email as a service used in the agency, only 40 % stated their agency provided e-government services (ICT indicators website).

A number of impediments to greater use of Internet-based services can be identified, ranging from the lack of information in computer-ready form to government units' desire to maintain control over information and service provision. The bureaucracy is capable of putting up considerable resistance to the conversion of services to the Internet, particularly if they fear such a reform could threaten jobs, reduce control over agency processes, or, indeed, reduce opportunities for corruption.

Options for Improving Governance and Recommendations

The measures needed to extend e-government, to improve the availability of information, and thus to strengthen accountability to citizens are not difficult to identify. Four measures, none of them particularly expensive, would dramatically improve the quality of e-government in Egypt:

- Set mandatory, government-wide standards for the design, content, and updating of all government websites based on good practice in other emerging market countries
- Assign specific responsibility for implementing these standards not only at the national level but also within each agency and local administration unit
- Establish clear lines of accountability, deadlines for achieving progress, and public reporting on progress in achieving the deadlines, as well as regular review and rating by the national agency responsible for standard compliance
- Adopt freedom of information laws to mandate proactive, Internet-based provision of information on every unit of government, its budget, leadership, activities, and achievements

Providing greater access to information about how government is doing its job does not by itself assure good governance and accountability, but it is an essential step in that direction.

Into Uncharted Territory

The overall prospects for governance reforms of the type briefly outlined above appear much less promising at this writing than they did during the immediate post-Revolution period. It is not at all clear whether the Revolution will lead to broad and effective implementation of governance reform, rather than simply a continuation of previous dysfunctional patterns with new labels, or when such a coherent reform program might be articulated and set in motion.

The state of the country more than years after the Revolution is hardly encouraging. Real progress on governance and accountability has not been realized. Far from seeing in the promised aggressive program of reform, successive post-revolutionary governments have instead brought a further crumbling of already weak governance structures. At this point, the country's very stability cannot be assured.

The MB's failure to move ahead on a governance reform agenda can be seen as particularly surprising in light of the role played by popular dissatisfaction with Mubarak-era governance failures in setting the stage for the Revolution. As outlined above, governance deficiencies were evident in the weak performance of the public schools, inadequate public infrastructure, corruption both petty and grand, appalling public health services, the strangling regime of business regulation and rising informality in economic activities, and oppressive security forces.

Despite the urgency of addressing governance failures that was evident in the months leading up to the Revolution and the widely acknowledged need to achieve inclusive growth, concrete progress was impeded by the paltry public discourse on policy issues facing the country, the dysfunctional courts, the rubberstamp legislature, the lack of freedom of information and accountability, and excessively centralized, opaque, and autocratic operations of government at all levels. Although Mubarak's last Minister of Finance, Yousef Boutros Ghali, made commendable efforts to tackle the finance leg of the vicious triangle, the failure to make real advances in addressing either the governance or the human resource legs meant that overall progress as seen in the quality of citizen services or broad-based economic growth was very limited.

Why, then, did the post-Revolution regime fail to mount a frontal attack on bad governance, to tackle the elements of the vicious triangle described above, or to provide the greater accountability demanded by citizens?

The failure of Egypt's first democratically elected president to act on this urgent agenda cannot be analyzed in detail here, not least because the military pulled the plug on the young regime even before its first birthday. No doubt, the early years of the Revolution will be examined by researchers and policy analysts for decades to come. It is nonetheless important to take stock of the barriers that have impeded and still block progress for any government, including the newly-elected al-Sisi regime.

Several factors contributed to a disengagement between the political level and the operational levels of the Morsy government. First, the leaders of the new regime, from the president on down, had very limited experience in government. The previous regime systematically excluded Muslim Brothers and other Islamists from any position of authority. Consequently, they had little knowledge of how the government works at any level. They lacked a cadre of experienced experts on whom they could call to replace old regime stalwarts.

Second, the Brothers had for decades operated their own illegal though quite effective parallel government. MB clinics and hospitals delivered health care, MB offices helped clients to get social services or provided direct support in the form of financial assistance and in-kind donations. The broad clientele built up through this strategy extended to both middle class and low-income community members across the country and was crucial to the group's electoral victories.

As is often the case with any organization, the MB's strengths were also its weaknesses. Little consideration was given to the role of their extensive field organization, painstakingly built up over decades of unrelenting oppression and hardship, once the Brotherhood took control over the same official bureaucratic structures with which they had long competed? The MB leadership faced a complex conflict of interest, in which success at getting the bureaucracy to function could directly

undermine their own parallel structures, on which their base of support and some of their revenue sources relied and which provided valued social positions for many of their members.

All of these factors contributed to a failure to seize the reins of government and direct it onto a new and more promising path. These factors led instead to a severing of the previously tight connection between the highest echelons of the government and the bureaucracy. As one rotation of ministers and governors has followed another in close succession, the ability of the government's top management to guide and control the machinery of government has shriveled.

The new regime, opposed in many cases by hangers-on from the old regime who continued to occupy the upper tiers of the bureaucracy, was not able to establish its authority over the bureaucracy who, at the end of the day, determine whether the government meets the citizens' needs. This failure was seen most strongly in the regime's inability to bring the police under control and thus to exert the necessary degree of controlled force to reduce street crime and disorder.

These challenges came on top of those caused by the extended period of unsettled legal and security issues that had distracted the leadership and paralyzed all three branches of government. Together, these factors brought the government to a virtual standstill well before the coup. Future directions were not articulated, much less transformed into concrete plans for the bureaucracy to take up and implement. Severe financial and economic difficulties, worsened but by no means caused by the Revolution further distracted the new government from acting on its campaign agenda, the Nahda (renaissance) plan, including its stated governance reform objectives.

If this situation had not been so threatening to the well-being of ordinary Egyptian citizens, to the inspiring goals of the Revolution, and indeed to near-term national stability, it could be termed ironic. In light of the July 2013 coup, it might better be described as tragic. Far from launching a reform agenda that could deliver on the raised expectations of the Revolution, the new Muslim Brotherhood government failed to establish sufficient legitimacy even to begin to deal with the country's deepening and interlocked economic and political crises. It remains to be seen whether Egypt's new strongman will do any better.

Government of Egypt Websites Mentioned in the Text

Bawaba

Main portal

<http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/general/mobile.aspx>

Government Jobs Portal

<http://jobs.gov.eg/jobs.aspx>. Accessed March 2013.

Government Procurement Portal.

<http://www.etenders.gov.eg/en/index.php>. Accessed March 2013.

Cairo Governorate

Facebook site

<https://www.facebook.com/MhafztAlqahrt?filter=2#!/MhafztAlqahrt?filter=2>

Ministry of Information and Communications Technology

ICT indicators

<http://www.egyptictindicators.gov.eg/en/Pages/default33.aspx>

President Mohamed Morsi

Official Website.

<http://www.facebook.com/President.Mohammed.Morsi>.

Official Facebook page of President Morsi

<http://www.facebook.com/Egypt.President.Morsi>

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

Facebook page.

<http://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Armed.Forces>.

International and Nonprofit Organization Websites Used in Data Analysis

Freedom House

Freedom in the World:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores>

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2011/methodology>

Freedom of the Press:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press>

Freedom on the Net:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202012%20-%20Tables%20and%20Charts%20FINAL.pdf>

Countries at the Crossroads: Egypt:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/egypt>

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Countries%20at%20the%20Crossroads%202012%20-%20Booklet.pdf>

Heritage Foundation

2013 Index of Economic Freedom. <http://www.heritage.org/index/explore.aspx>
Accessed February 2013.

International Labor Organization (ILO)

LABORSTA Labor Statistics Database.

<http://laborsta.ilo.org>.

Transparency International

http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/in_detail/

United Nations

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, CD-ROM Edition.
<http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm> January 2013.

World Bank

Worldwide Governance Indicators.

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The Evolution of Corruption and Optimal Level of Corruption Reduction: Evidence from Cross-Country Studies

Hamid E. Ali

Introduction

Treisman used cross country studies to explain the underlying causes of corruption. According to him, the causes of corruption are associated with particular historical, cultural tradition, level of economic development, political institutions, and government policies (Treisman 2000). Corruption emerged as productivity increases. It becomes a conventional wisdom that poor country are corrupt than rich countries and so does Europe dated back few centuries. For example, pre-modern Europe today resemble by sub-Saharan Africa in many facets such as violence, corruption, and level of development. Beneath the surface of pre-modern state we postulate violence, wars, and corruption,¹ while in post-modern states we witness stability, rule of law and accountability, and lesser degree of corruption. Juxtaposing pre-modern and post-modern states, the corruption and human history are intertwined and evolve around human instinct of pursuing the pleasure and self interest that can only be constrained by institutional development and rule of law. Moreover, corruption has been cited as reasons for failure of economic development in some of the countries by impacting investment and economic growth (Mauro 1995). Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic offices and can be petty or grand, organized or unorganized (Inegbedion 2004).

¹Corruption is covert and redefined by ethical and moral premises that govern the state, and it is a misuse of public office for private gain. It encompasses abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, and abuses and bribery linking public and private actors include extortion, influence peddling, and fraud (Inegbedion 2004).

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States with developed institutions include legal, financial, and governing institutions usually sets guidelines to define the conduct of public officials at all level to allow the market operate and economic development to take-off. Consolidation of legal institutions precludes economic development. The legal system with few amend can curtail corruption and allows the market to function. Recent financial crisis in 2008 and henceforth has revealed the rules can be bended and loopholes can be exploited to pursue questionable economic activities and bonze schemes in incomplete markets with devastating economic and social consequences. However, in less developed countries with weaker institutions, the officials use discretionary rules to avert intend of the laws to build economics and political empires without accountability and transparency. Therefore, the level of economic development is a reasonable proxy for institutional development. Higher GDP growth implies well developed institutions and better internal controls and lesser corruption practices of bribery and stealing states assets. In case of less developed countries, lower GDP and weaker institutions internal controls and corruption practices were masqueraded as compensations for low wages in the government sectors. However, we recognize that corruption levels are unformed across the countries and more prevalent in some countries than others. However, in the modern world corruption associated more with legal formality, especially constitutional principles where it is viewed as an act done with intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others and it subvert the governing process and undermine the economic development.² Nearly 40 % of Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost annually in corruption related practices (Lumumba 2010).

In this chapter we discuss first, to what extent the corruption as evolutionary phenomena is driven by institutional development in the context of the modern state.³ Second, what is optimal level of corruption reduction? We will reconstruct the history of institutional development using GDP as a proxy measure of institutional and economic development in the context of market economy. The evolution of corruption is focusing on cross-sectional account of GDP as determinant of corruption level. Using corruption index and group countries as pre-modern, and modern and post-modern corruption countries and reconstruct series of countries for period 1998–2009. As the GDP expand, the society leaps from one rudimentary stage of corruption to the next stage where the corruption tends to be covert with higher rewards and then leveled-off as GDP growth accelerated. In other word, the evolution of the corruption has inverted U-shape using world historical experience and much of the predictive or explanatory power rests with countries level of GDP. If our reasoning is correct, we should expect expanding GDP growth, the lesser the perceived corruption index. For the second part of the question reduction

² See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (1990).

³ The state is considered as entity greater than government.

of corruption is very costly at the pre-modern and modern corruption stages than post-modern corruption. There is no time in history that corruption reduced to a zero level. Society must accept some level of corruption with minimum societal marginal costs.

The chapter is organized as follow: second sections gives literature review; third section presents background on power of state and corruption; fourth section discusses the evolution of corruption. Fifth section presents movement from pre-modern to post-modern corruption. Sixth section presents theoretical specifications of optimal level of corruption reduction. Last section discusses the conclusion and policy implications.

Literature Review

Corruption is a result of the failure of the power of implementing public laws where top business interest can affect the state policy (Rose-Ackerman 2004). Transparency, accountability, procurement regulation are closely related to corruption and good governance (Rose-Ackerman 2004). In some developing countries corruption is high and costly to economic development that could be one of the reasons for underdevelopment. Moreover, countries that have weak government do not control agencies corruption levels (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Therefore weakness of the governance system allows different government agencies and bureaucracies to impose independent bribes on private entities (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Rose-Ackerman 2004). Bureaucrats raise the red tape to extract bribes and corruption undermines the very purpose of regulation (Bertrand et al. 2006). Investment can shift from the highest value projects such as health and education into less value projects and discourage investment and economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995).

Several institutional factors are crucial determinants of investment and growth; bureaucratic efficiency and political stability indices are positively related GDP per capita (Mauro 1995). Corruption undoes the investment through protracted government procedures, overlapping and conflicting laws and regulations. Streamline services, simplifying government procedures, and upholding public office induce investment and growth. Local importers in China are evading to avoid tariff and increase tax is not optimal solution to raise review (Fisman and Wei 2004).

However, using perceived corruption index as dependent variable, countries with protestant traditions and those with more developed economies with higher quality of government and perceived corruption (Treisman 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). As scale of economic activity expands, better institutions become affordable and hence government performance should improve (La Porta et al. 1999). This notion reflects the current western economies. Olken (2006b) examined the accuracy of beliefs about corruption rather than corruption itself, however there remains a question of how those beliefs were formed. However, the political theories focus on redistribution rather than efficiency, and hold that policies and institutions are shaped by those in power to stay in power and to transfer resources to themselves (La Porta et al. 1999).

Power of State and Corruption

Before discussing the state power and corruption, we define the concepts of the states and then lined with corruption. Weber (1964) argued that states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them. Furthermore, Stepan (1978) describes Weberian perspectives and the state must be considered as more than government. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive systems that attempt not only structure the relationships between civil societies but also to structure relationship within the civil societies as well. Hintze (1975) thought of state as organizations controlling territories, stand at the intersection between domestic sociopolitical orders, and the transnational relation within which they must maneuver for survival and advantage in relation to other states. Hintz gave broader latitude to the state power than Weber, but both share the notion that state as sphere of highest government authority and how that authority will be exercised will determine the level and stage of corruption. The modern notion of the state can be traced back to Machiavelli's treatment: a sovereign political entity, supreme in its territory and over its people, organized to enhance its power and to protect against threats posed by other states. To keep state as a whole he emphasis the rulers force, craft, and immorality. In Machiavelli's type of state, corruption is embodied with the coercive power of the state and those who have the access to corridors of power can create the conditions favorable to corruption.

In the Machiavellian definition of the state, here is no distinction between weak and strong state and the corruption level. Corruption is more prevalent in less developed economies than developed ones. The state apparatus needs resources to expand and so do the citizens need for the services, to accommodate the competing needs; corruption is one of venue to avert possible violent confrontation between the state and its objects. The absence of functioning government systems is due to nepotism and tribalism and the absence of rule of law. In some instances public employees go unpaid for months (Eker 1981). Government has monopoly of the economy and contract wards; together with the accelerated pace of economic development, provides a fertile ground for corruption (Eker 1981).

Also the government was viewed as arena where competing groups or allied with one another to make public policy decision or benefit allocation. The states matter not only because of goal-oriented activities but because their organizational configurations, a long with overall patterns of activity, affect political culture and encourage some forms of group formation and make possible raising certain political issues but not others Tocqueville (2000). Since corruption is one of the tools that are used by groups to exploit the fragmentations of the governing institutions to lured material or psychological gains at expense of the society in general the corruption practices will continue further weaker the state. A strong state has greater coercive powers and collective of officials may be able to formulate and implement policies (Shefter 1994). Corruption is deemed to occur when state institutions are weaker and when the state officials collude with other parties to promote their own benefit. Understanding the strength of the state—weak or strong—can determine the level of corruption, the weaker the state the more powerful the kleptocrate or *rule by thieves* like Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Democratic Republic of and Central Africa under Bocaso.

Evolution of Corruption

Though evolution of corruption can pursue a number of different evolutionary tracks or trajectories that go in quite different directions and that movement down one track may block movement in another it creates divergence or spiral. There is uncertainty about which track would prove the best, however the institutional processes and social forces could validate and strengthen one trajectory over other. Therefore the corruption is determined by culture and level of social and economic development. As shown in Fig. 1 as per capita income increases the corruption level is decreasing for cross-sectional country from 1998 to 2008. Also Fig. 2 shows the corruption level by income. For example the high income countries (HIC) and upper middle income countries (UMI) are less corrupt. Also, the low middle income countries (LMI) are less corrupt than low income countries (LIC). The richer the country the lower the corruption level in general.




Fig. 1 Inverse corruption index and GDP per capita (in dollars)




Fig. 2 Average corruption index (1998–2007)

Figure 2 results could be extended to classify the corruption levels determined by the different factors; for example, corruption in one set of countries is different from other sets as per capita income is different. Therefore, corruption is composed of distinct different categories and stages: pre-modern corruption, Modern corruption, and post-modern corruption. The movement from one stage to another stage is intriguing but the coercive power of the state in conjuncture with the economic development and evolution of the institutions corruption level declines; it will be discussed in details, in section below.

Pre-modern Corruption

First stage of corruption is “pre-modern corruption” where the lack of the institutions and cycle of violence can germane the corruption activities, from hoarding the vital commodities to engagement in smuggling and extortion. The society in the process of state-making, violence, and political instability is the reality. The state authority is decimated and corruption practices were germane in every quarter of the society, preoccupied with conspiracy and favors. The object of the states was citizens without entitlements for accountable government. The pre-modern corruption is undermining the legitimacy of existing social institutions and more prevalent in fail states than in weaker states. The longer the conflict persists, the more difficult controlling corruption.

As Fig. 3 shows as GDP rises also does the corruption grow; Sudan, Kenya, and Chad resemble similar patterns these countries have weaker institutions, and conflict their political behavior resemble the practices of pre-modern society. Moreover, pre-modern corruption will deepen when society is engaged in warfare, because wars create a subjective environment, where every act is justifiable. The absence of security and oversights breed the incentive for corruption and undermine economic development.




Fig. 3 Corruption index and GDP (in billion of dollar)

The manifestation of the informal sector is response of the society to the lack of institutions and incessant corruption of the bureaucrate, the informal sector steps up to fill the gap of lack of trust on current governing institutions, where most of transactions are in cash. The informal sector continues to evade the regulation, and free riding the formal private enterprise which burden by taxations and regulations. For example, what we defined as “money laundering” in developed economies is a luxury definition not applicable to pre-modern corruption practices since the banking institutions are weaker than in developed countries. Therefore, underdevelopment and corruption go hand-in-hand.

Modern Corruption

The modern corruption associates with weak and semi-strong state (UMI). The actors of modern corruption are inspired by foreign or local entities; it focuses on strategic assets such as oil field and diamond mines, and they have tendency to bribe the public officials. For example, in Angola until 1990s the foreign oil companies kept secret their taxable income and other payments, resulting in disappearance of Angolan state oil revenues (Transparency International 2003). Complicity with state corrupt officials the oil revenues channeled into a hidden funds. Similar stories had happened in Nigeria and Algeria as well. Another example of “blood diamond” during 1990s, billions dollars of diamonds were imported into Belgium through Liberia by companies colluding in the laundering of stolen diamonds (Gberie 2010).

Jordan and South Korea are showing patterns of declining of corruption as GDP rises. Mexico and Malaysia are showing cyclical patterns but declining level of corruption. In modern corruption, there is intimate links between the family networks that hold critical margins of power and business interest where boundaries are not well defined. However, during the Cold War this type of corruption is rewarded by donors and international institutions for strategic and pure economic reason. Foreign asset inflow into country ends up in Swiss bank accounts as happened in Congo, under Moboto where he built hundred of palaces in and across Europe and the USA and shore up his bank account with billions of dollars.

Recent sellings of the state-own enterprise create political and economic oligarch that aiming at liquidating state assets for the benefit of few under the umbrella of privatization. The long term implication at this stage of corruption if it ignored is not only weakening the state but it will plant the seeds for violence and social disorder as level of inequality and polarizations intensify.

Post-modern Corruption

The third stage of corruption is post-modern corruption which is dominant paradigm in current policy debate. This stage of corruption is resulting from conflict of interest, fraud, lack of transparency, and the revolving doors between business and government. Countries that experience the post-modern corruption have high level of economic wellbeing and fragmented forms of government. Free and open media help expose levels of corruption and abuses. Figure 5 shows OECD countries are




Fig. 4 Upper middle income countries corruption index and GDP (in billion dollars)




Fig. 5 Corruption index and OECD countries (GDP in billion of dollars)

relatively less corrupt, however, after 2007 scandals in the financial industries and the corruption index falls.

Examples of post-modern corruption are recent financial meltdown, corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom, and corruption of arms trade which emits wave of concerns to global corporate sector and severely mutate the public trust in the business integrity. The post-modern corruption is weakening by the technology that promote accurate flow of information—the media and the public accountability for corporate and individuals is visible.

The actors in post-modern corruption are the political elites and governing clique who control the wealth and critical margin of power. Party's bribes through political contribution and corporate world control the political process and the outcomes. Therefore, the post-modern corruption subverts the rule of law and distorting policy outcomes and weakening the institutions to lesser degree than pre modern and modern corruption levels.

Movement from Pre-modern to Post-modern Corruption

In this chapter, I treated the post-modern corruption as ideal level of corruption, that society might tolerate as long as not subverting the rule of law and the system of government. The evolutionary movement from pre-modern corruption to modern corruption is materialized by breaking the level of violence and promotes the values that nurtures in the society prior to the war.

In warring societies, measures to build trust or social capital are essential for the private sector to leap to modern corruption stage. Restoring trust can simultaneously break the level of violence and corruption. There is immense difficulty in restoring the social trust but if the international community succeeds in that endeavor, it will legitimize the state and promote from within types of regime system that can have dividend in the future.

As dividend of peace realized the institutions will grow and strengthen the social fabrics. The root causes of per-modern corruption can be tackled by efforts to nurture economic development that empower the social and political capital evolve through time without imposing structures from outside. Outside imposed structures create new opportunities empowering the political oligarch and further eroded the social and economic wellbeing of ordinary citizens.

The far-reaching political reform failed to produce tangible results in pre-modern corruption societies. For example, the recent elections in sub-Saharan African countries, including Sudan, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, and republic of Cong, have not produced accountable, transparent government, it produces only political oligarchy. In pre-modern corruption societies the issue of clientelism, vote buying, weak institutions, and corrupt officials makes it a cumbersome for democratic values and private enterprise to strive and nurtured. The effort of the economic reform should be vested in basic education and health. The norms of the informal sector should be basis to allow the system to develop not to suppress and impose super structures or introduce changes in societies that might resist.

Theoretical Specification Optimum Corruption Reduction Levels

The reduction of corruption is depending on the stages of corruption. For example, the marginal reduction of pre-modern corruption is social costly compared with modern or post-modern corruption levels. The pre-modern corruption is inefficient, however it generates economic activities with given level of economic development. Any aggressive attempts to fight corruption will slow-down economic activities and production levels. As economic developed proceed, the country has enough resources to adopt better control measures such as accountability and rule of law to reduce the corruption levels. The country can leap from pre-modern to post-modern corruption levels. As shown in Fig. 6 the level of corruption reduction denotes C_R and CC_R is denotes cost of corruption reduction (society benefit and of corruption reduction). Pre-modern corruption level (PMC^B), modern corruption level (MC^A) and post-modern corruption ($POMC^H$). The corruption reduction C_R moves from left to right, the maximum level of corruption reduction is zero, where R_A , R_B , and R_H are reduction levels for MC^A , PMC^B , and $POMC^H$ respectively. If the society imposes uniformed standard for the corruption reduction, then line that where R_A , R_B , and R_H equalized represents the one size fits all measure. However, using this uniformed standard, the cost of corruption reduction is too high for pre-modern corrupt countries followed by modern corruption ones. However, if we allow for the institutional and economic development, the evolutionary process will result in an optimal level of corruption reduction indicated by point A, B, and C where LIC can bear minimum costs for R_B , reduction rather than the uniform point of reduction at the point (R_A , R_B , and R_H). Therefore, the connection of points B, A, and H gives us the inverted U-shape, where the corruption reduction follows the evolutionary trajectory rather than uniformed standard.




Fig. 6 Optimal corruption reduction levels

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Understanding the evolutionary process of the corruption is important for any future regulatory measures adopt by the international communities. Uniform standard to root out post-modern corruption is different from the pre-modern corruption. In the post-modern society for example the regulatory requirements of transparency in business transaction or political parties' contributions could reduce the corruption level. However those measures are impractical and add very marginal value to root out pre-modern corruption.

Anti-corruption laws are enacted in West Africa and more anti-corruption bodies were created, they were ineffective in curbing corruption. For example Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Commission failed to bring a single case against senior government official since it was found in 2000. In Sierra Leone, a crack down on police extorting bribes from drivers at check-points led to arrest just 41 police officers in 2001, that number should be arrest per minutes if there is a serious effort to curb corruption (Inegbedion 2004).

These ineffective institutions do not fit to address modern corruption. The modern corruption can be fought by measures that encourage pluralism and empower the civic society. The political participation should flourish at the expense of political control exerted by political oligarch. Economic aid should not be tied to government commitment to fight corruption; it should be tied to governments' improvement on basic education, health, and civic society. The current reforms initiated by the international community are more relevant to post-modern society and doom to failure in modern corruption societies.

Countries that enter or leap to post-modern corruption stage should be concerns about collusion between corporate, auditors, and bankers to manipulate the accounting process for personal gains. However in modern corruption stage it is less concerns the idea of collusion between corporate and their regulator to gain any advantages over the share holders. Because the informal sector renders those measures ineffective. Transparency and disclosure are important to deter post-modern corruption but not modern corruption because the rules are made to be violated. The family network that embodied in the political and business interest can hardly distinguish any rule that effectively constrain the state institutions and limit the abuse of power.

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Iraq's Revolutionary Cul-de-Sacs

Samir Rihani

Introduction

This chapter is not about agonies of Iraq: a simple Internet search will yield thousands of highly depressing documents on the subject. It is also not about a US/Israeli conspiracy against Arab countries: Arabic sources have not left much to be said on this subject. The focus considers instead the sustainability of countries that have met with stress over a long period. Iraq with its coup-de-tats, wars, sanctions and communal conflicts presents a useful case study but the conclusions drawn are applicable to other locations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Kajikawa (2008) provided an excellent review of papers published in three of the leading journals that cover sustainability and these demonstrate the major strides taken in revealing the factors that enable social systems, such as nations, to sustain themselves (i.e. to continue to operate effectively) under fluctuations in their internal or external conditions. The MENA region is going through an unusually turbulent period at present. The sustainability of most of the countries concerned is now under severe stress; not only as recognisable states but also as coherent social structures.

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Iraq has endured half a century of coup-de-tats, wars, and lately ethnic and religious divisions. Deterioration accelerated rapidly after the 2003 war. That event seems to have been the starting gun for a revised US policy for MENA that emerged openly in 2005/2006 when Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State at the time, described an approach based on “creative chaos” to forge a “new Middle East” (Karon 2006 and Global Research 2006). Her statements coincided with a flurry of activity on a project called the “Broader Middle East and North Africa” (see www.bmena.state.gov). Annual meetings were held from 2004 in Sea Island, Rabat, Manama, and the Dead Sea. It is difficult to establish whether current turmoil in MENA is a product of that US policy but it is not possible to dismiss a linkage either.

The chapter seeks to provide explanations of how continual turmoil, intentional or otherwise, seriously compromised Iraq’s performance as a complex adaptive system. It is perhaps helpful to point out that reference to “creative chaos” has links to complexity theories. Deteriorating conditions have generated a number of responses; from calls (mainly by foreign commentators) for division of Iraq into statelets drawn on ethnic and religious grounds, to accusations (mainly by Middle Eastern commentators) of ill-intentions, planned and executed by international, regional, and domestic conspirators. However, looking at Iraq as a complex adaptive system that does not respond well to brute force and command and control, see later, provides a more plausible explanation of what befell Iraq, and by implication what might be usefully done to rectify matters. It has become quite clear, however, that the process of regeneration must be seen as a long-term task devoted to improving Iraq’s social capital by focus on education and health of all its citizens regardless of religious and ethnic affiliations coupled with sustained improvement to governance throughout Iraq’s social and political structure.

Nations Are Complex Adaptive Systems

There are two fundamentally different families of systems: mechanistic systems and complex systems. The first, such as a rocket in flight, are predictable and follow simple rules of behaviour. They are, therefore, easier to manage. During the twentieth century more became known about another group of systems called complex systems, including those able to adapt to changing conditions in their environment. All living entities fall into this category. When human beings come together into social groups (companies, nations, etc.) the resulting structures are also complex adaptive systems. Understanding how these systems behave is, therefore, of key importance to the study of how communities function and respond to internal and external perturbations.

Complex systems are less predictable and hence they require a different style of “soft” management based on constant review and adjustment; a learning process in which the achievement of a desired “direction of travel” is often all that could be accomplished. Cumulative, usually modest, improvements over long periods are

essential for sustainability and progress; evolutionary change being the main route to success (Kauffman 1993, p. 173; Coveney and Highfield 1996, p. 118). Conversely, command-and-control and direction from the top, favoured by military leaders and occupying forces, are counterproductive in this style of adaptive strategy.

The above features have profound significance to the fortunes of nations. They, incidentally, illustrate the fallacious nature of declared intentions rapidly to export Western style democracy by dictate to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Essentially, nations could be divided between those who implicitly recognise and work within the rules of complex systems and those who do not. The first group has become known as developed, industrialised, advanced, etc. The second group includes nations that are left behind. It is often said that they suffer from lack of governance, democracy, connection to the rest of the world, and so on (as argued by Barnett, 2005, for instance). Looking at the matter from a complexity perspective explains why these attributes are of such critical importance (as argued by Rihani 2002, for example). Sadly, intentionally or otherwise leading powers apply principles of complex systems to themselves but try to impose mechanistic principles on nations that they occupy or seek to help. The fundamental question is not whether a nation decides to behave as a complex adaptive system but how to do so effectively.

The Dynamics of Complex Adaptive Systems

Complex systems (including adaptive ones that are of primary concern here) are made up of numerous interacting elements, often themselves complex systems. Interactions between the elements are the driving force that enable a complex system to function; well or badly. The human body is a complex adaptive system and interactions between heart, blood, kidneys, etc., keep it in a condition of homeostasis when all is well. The elements, generally people in social structures, must be capable of interacting and able to interact within simple rules. If interactions cannot take place the system stops functioning (death in a living organism) while if the interactions were significantly impeded then the system's performance is reduced accordingly (illness in a living organism).

The parallels with the performance of a nation, or a group of nations, are obvious. Capability of individuals to interact, i.e. to participate in the multitude of activities within a nation, is affected by various factors; especially education and health. However, educated and healthy people might be unable to interact freely; as would be the case under too many regulations imposed by oppressive dictatorship or restrictive religious or social prohibitions. Too few simple and acceptable rules (i.e. inadequate governance) is also problematic; for instance during civil war and absence of effective government, as it results in haphazard interactions that push the nation into wasteful chaos. The task for a nation is to remain in a zone that lies somewhere between "inaction" and "chaos"; a feat that could not be achieved overnight but one that differentiates successful from failed states.

The vast number of interactions reduce the ability to predict outcomes in complex situations. This feature is yet to be fully grasped by too many decision-makers; especially dictators and military leaders. However, even advanced governments with elaborate checks and balances fall into the same trap. They launch costly wars and then find that they are not in control of events; as seen, for instance, in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is not a new discovery. President Lincoln wrote in 1864, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me”.

These features of complex adaptive systems are understandable intuitively. Lincoln did not have to know anything about complexity to realise that political life was full of surprises. Wilhelm II, German Kaiser from 1888 to 1918, is another leader who was unaware of complex systems. He pursued an enlightened social, education, and health policies that uplifted Germany to world status.

From the middle of the twentieth century onwards intuition was augmented by science. Extensive research on complex adaptive systems was undertaken; including their relevance to economics, development, and public policy; see, for instance, Rihani (2002) and Geyer and Rihani (2010). Actions that would help a nation to maintain and improve its sustainability and resilience as a healthy complex adaptive system are now well understood. Equally, the opposite is also true: actions that could reduce the ability of a nation to perform well are also understood and in some cases adopted as part of domestic and/or foreign policy to control and subjugate.

Iraq: From Complexity Through Rigid Order into Chaotic Disorder

Nations operating efficiently present to the observer features that are orderly (laws applying to contracts say) mixed with conditions that are disorderly; involving crises, changes in government, economic upheavals, and so on. Wise leaders accept a degree of “disorder” as an unavoidable, and creative, part of national life. Presumably that was what Condoleezza Rice meant by “creative chaos”. On the other hand, there has to be a measure of order as well and it is not clear whether Rice understood this duality. Trying to shift a nation into a totally “orderly” mode of operation almost invariably proves to be misguided as it could easily lead to stultifying “inaction”. This is the sequence of events that military coup-de-tats often unleash, as happened in Iraq from the late-1950s. Up to that point Iraq existed within the messy complexity zone that combined some order and some chaos; an existence that presented successes, reverses, compromises, and many uncertainties. Coup-de-tats (and Saddam’s brutal years) were intended to “restore order and certainty”. The chaos of post-2003 war then propelled Iraq to the other extreme; wasteful chaos.

The 1958 coup-de-tat replaced the royal family by an army-led republic. The coup coincided with the turbulent transfer of hegemony from Britain to the USA. The 1952 coup-de-tat in Egypt (CIA Project FF) and the CIA coup that temporarily brought the Shah of Iran back to power in 1953 (CIA Operation Ajax) which

preceded the 1958 event in Iraq are examples of that handover. The unintended consequences endured today were hardly dreamt of back in 1958: the coup was popular. The conspiracy by Britain, France and Israel to attack Egypt during the Suez war of 1956 affected events. The Baghdad Pact, a madcap scheme created in 1955 involving Iraq, Turkey, and Britain to confront external aggression (presumably by the USSR) was another factor. The Pact continued the terms of the hated 1930 Treaty with Britain (Tripp 2007, p. 136).

Qasim came to power in Iraq on the back of the 1958 coup-de-tat. Interestingly, in the context of post-2003 focus on religious and ethnic factionalism, he came from mixed Sunni and Shiite/Kurdish parentage and exhibited "evident lack of religious fanaticism..." (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1990, p. 77). He withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1959. The West considered that a big mistake. He relied on the communists to combat the popularity of Arab nationalists inspired by Egypt's Nasser. That was another mistake. Then he laid claim to Kuwait in June 1961 although Iraqi forces were mostly stationed in northern Iraq in anticipation of trouble with the Kurds. Qasim's worst transgression might have been his domestic policies which suggested, to Western powers, leftist leanings. He "...trebled the number of pupils and students at all levels of education", funded school and hospital building programmes, and introduced more enlightened labour laws (Tripp 2007, p. 161). Action to remove him was swift. The CIA mounted an unsuccessful attempt on his life in October 1959 by a group of Ba'thists, including a 23-year-old Ba'th party member called Saddam Hussain! (Sale 2003) Eventually, a coup-de-tat brought the Ba'th party closer to power in February 1963. Qasim was executed together with his close associates. "The months between February and November 1963 saw some of the most terrible scenes hitherto experienced in the post-war Middle East". (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1990, p. 85) The Ba'th party finally assumed power openly in July 1968 and Saddam was installed officially as president in July 1979. By that stage Iraq had moved into an orderly era of rigidly controlled order founded on repression that lasted until 2003. Iraq was wrongly and wastefully managed as a mechanistic system.

In summary, the USA brought the Ba'th Party, and ultimately Saddam, to power and then after 40 punishing years the USA attacked Iraq to rid that hapless country of the same party and leader! That process unfolded over a long time; spanning several administrations and involving expenditure running into trillions of dollars and many thousands of deaths. This is not an isolated incident confined to Iraq. The Taliban which the USA has been fighting for long in Afghanistan originated as Pakistani-trained and US funded Mujahideen in northern Pakistan set up to combat communist expansion in the region. Similarly, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright acknowledged the 1953 Iranian coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship between the USA and Iran and said, "...the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development... it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs" (Risen 2000).

The reasonable level of governance that existed in Iraq before 1958, relative to standards in the region, evaporated rapidly. Saddam was disposed to war and brutality by nature but he was also easily manipulated. It did not take him long after becoming leader to launch a war against Iran in 1980. On that occasion Kissinger

said: “Let them kill each other” and that seemed to typify attitudes in Washington. Heikal (1992, p. 65) reported, “...whenever one side seemed in sight of victory Washington would begin secretly helping its opponent”. US approval of the war was evident. Iraq was placed on the list of countries that supported terrorism when it nationalised its oil industry in 1972. Once the war began US views changed and Iraq was eventually removed from the list in 1982 (Rihani 2002, p. 229; Clark 1998, p. 4). There was obvious hope, by Saddam as well as by the US administration, that the war would bring the Islamic revolution in Iran to an end.

The grim aftermath of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war was summarised in a report for the *Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces*: “it was estimated that the total war dead was 262 000 Iranians and 105 000 Iraqis... Iraq spent between US\$74–US\$91 billion on the conduct of the war and another £41.94 billion on military imports, whereas Iran’s costs were US\$94–US\$112 billion and £11.26 billion respectively. As for the indirect cost due to the loss of income from oil and agricultural produce, it was estimated that the sums were US\$ 561 billion and US\$ 627 billion for Iraq and Iran respectively”. (Dexter Teo 2003). The end of the war in 1988 was itself only a halt on a downward spiral. The war was an economic catastrophe to Iraq. Debt repayments alone amounted to half Iraq’s oil income in 1990 (Tripp 2007, p. 242). Agricultural production declined and by the end of the war, 70 % of Iraq’s food had to be imported (Simons 1998, p. 137).

The Iran–Iraq war was inconclusive. It left Iraq with severe economic and social problems but with powerful and experienced armed forces and a leader who was now seen as a “loose canon” by Washington. Problems with Kuwait soon emerged and observers are evenly divided in apportioning blame for the escalation of hostilities. Conditions were ideal to push someone of Saddam’s psychological nature into a disastrous war. He thought, mistakenly it seems, that he had been given a green light for an invasion of Kuwait. In August 1990 Iraq was devastated by an attack by a coalition of forces led by the USA. Sanctions were imposed by the UN Security Council ostensibly to force a withdrawal from Kuwait. As Simons documented, food became a weapon of choice in degrading Iraq as a functioning nation. The damage caused by the Gulf War was described by a United Nations survey team as being “apocalyptic”. The Ahtisaari report concluded the bombing has relegated Iraq “to a pre-industrial age” and warned that the nation could face “epidemic and famine if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met” (Lewis 1991). Iraqis’ capability and ability to interact continued on their downward spiral.

The grounds for justification of the sanctions imposed on Iraq only a few days after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait were expanded to cover weapons of mass destruction. In essence, once introduced the sanctions proved too useful to lift; they were finally rescinded only after the 2003 war. Many publications are available that detail the impact of the UN sanctions on Iraqi society. A Cambridge University paper provided an excellent list and summary of United Nations agency reports on the subject (Rowat 2000). The scale of human deprivation caused by the sanctions was revealed by Denis Halliday; appointed UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq in September 1997, when he resigned in October 1998. He suggested the overall effect was akin to genocide. His successor, Hans Von Sponeck also resigned for the same reason.

On the other hand, Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, described the consequences as a “price worth paying”. For full and up-to-date analysis of the sanctions see Al-Ani and Al-Ani (2012).

The sanctions ostensibly imposed to weaken Saddam had the opposite effect. Iraqis were living on food handouts provided by his government. Education and health facilities Iraq enjoyed previously had virtually ceased to exist as coherent systems. The same could be said of water, electricity and fuel. The exhausted population was not in any shape to overthrow Saddam's regime. On the other hand, George W Bush, possibly influenced by the neoconservatives and certainly by the tragic events of 11 September 2001, decided to declare a “war on terror” and launched a war in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The decision to attack Iraq remains a controversial one to this day. A few years after the 2003 war, the CIA and other agencies had to admit they found no weapons of mass destruction. The links to terrorism were also found to be unfounded. Books have been published about the cost of the war (see Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008), supposed American mismanagement and incompetence (see Ricks 2006) and the fiasco of post-war reconstruction (see Phillips 2005). Casualties of the war are difficult to estimate. A 2006 report in the *Lancet*, a British medical journal, suggested about 600,000, while the Iraq Body Count estimated the number at about 100,000. U.S. authorities reported in July 2010 that another 77,000 Iraqis were killed from the beginning of 2004 to August 2008. A representative of the Iraqi government commented, “This number has social consequences. Behind the number of dead are scores of handicapped people, widows and orphans”. (Fadel 2010) Two million Iraqis are now refugees abroad and two million more are internally displaced. Few Christians, a significant element in Iraq's professional sector, remain in the country (Jenkins 2010).

The accumulated burdens of coup-de-tats, sanctions, and wars must be seen as components of one process. Education, health, governance and other essential components that enable citizens to be capable and able to interact have assumed secondary importance at best. Iraq has entered a “chaotic” phase that is just as wasteful as the “orderly” phase that crippled it before 2003.

Physical Damage Tells Only Part of the Story

Destruction of the infrastructure as well as casualties of coup-de-tats, sanctions, and wars is an important element in Iraq's decline. Sustainability and resilience are influenced greatly by factors that do not capture the headlines. Successive events in Iraq set a trend that has endured: at each bout of turmoil a whole strata of experienced people were dismissed, imprisoned, or liquidated and replaced by a new cadre of less experienced people, supposedly loyal to the new masters. The same is happening at other locations in MENA. The negative effect on governance and public administration requires no elaboration. However, after the 2003 war this informal process assumed the power of “law” under the US campaign for “de-Ba’thification of Iraqi society” as specified in Coalition Provisional Authority (CAP) Order No. 1.

Bremer, the US ruler of Iraq, had strict instructions from Rumsfeld, conveyed by Under Secretary Feith, to issue the order immediately on arriving in Baghdad “even if implementing it causes administrative inconvenience” (Bremer 2006, p. 39). It might have been “administrative inconvenience” to Rumsfeld and Feith but it was a catastrophe for Iraq; a quantum step in stifling healthy interactions. Some of those dismissed (or worse) were Ba’thists in name only. They had to be to secure employment during Saddam’s era.

De-Ba’thification was part of a two-pronged process. In May 2003 Bremer signed CAP Order No. 2 that dissolved the Iraqi army and all other “entities” (Bremer 2006, p. 57). In this case the driving force behind that action was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz besides Feith. Iraq was left at the mercy of domestic and foreign troublemakers and looters. In that chaotic absence of governance, ability for people to interact was substantially reduced. Significantly, one of the first locations for serious looting was the Iraqi Museum, followed by theft and destruction of Iraq’s archives (BBC 2003). There was a focus on the country’s symbols of culture, history and unity. Rightly or wrongly, location of US military bases on archeological sites such as Babylon, exposed in a report by experts from the British Museum, was interpreted as such (McCarthy 2005; BBC 2005). Such actions were viewed by some as “cultural cleansing” (Baker 2010).

Lack of appreciation of Iraq’s culture and history was accompanied by an equally dismissive concern for its social harmony and national unity. These traits were shared by the occupying forces as well as by many of the newly emerging local leaders. Von Sponeck, who resigned in protest as UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq during the sanction years, expressed amazement at the presumptuousness of “foreign voices” pronouncing on the future of Iraq: “The proposals to divide Iraq into three parts or the introduction of quota system in public services based on ethnicity and religious affiliation is frightening in its callousness” (Adriaensens et al. 2012, p. 32).

Focus on ethnic and religious divisions plunged Iraq into a state of conflict that is proving difficult to overcome. Dr. Haseeb (a well-known Iraqi political economist and past Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq) at a talk he gave at Georgetown University on 5 April 2006 pointed out “The CPA never used the term Iraqi people in their different dealings with Iraq. They started using “Kurds”, “Turkmen”, “Arabs”, “Sunnis”, “Shias”. He added, “Of the different prime ministers who took office between 1920 and 2003, eight were Shia and four were Kurds. Out of 18 military chiefs of staff, 8 were Kurds. As for the Baath party itself, the majority of the members were Shia... Out of the 55 people on the “Wanted List” that the occupying authority published, 31 were Shia. So what the occupying authority was practicing in Iraq was something new...” (http://www.iraqsnuclarmirage.com/articles/Haseeb_Wash_DC.html).

A brief look at Iraq’s history since the 1920s demonstrates the degree of polarisation that has now gripped that country. Apart from calls by the Kurds for independence, an ongoing activity that involves Turkey, Iran, and Syria as well, Iraq was a stable and well-functioning country with highly developed health and education sectors and a rich multicultural life. Conditions were not ideal but, on the other hand, Iraq was most certainly not “a country that never worked” as suggested by Peter W. Galbraith (see below). The biggest headache for the government was walking the tightrope between looking after the nascent national interest, on the one hand, and

satisfying demands coming from the British government and oil companies, on the other. These pressures led to the suicide of the Prime Minister in November 1929.

It is worth pointing out that Jewish Iraqis played a prominent role in the cultural, official, and business life of Iraq. Heskell Sassoon was the first Minister of Finance and went on to occupy the post again later on. Abraham Elkabir, another prominent Jewish Iraqi, was Accountant-General and Director General of Finance between 1927 and 1948 (see The Scribe at <http://www.dangoor.com/issue76/articles/76060.htm>). Christians were to be found at all levels of business and government. They were especially conspicuous in the professions such as medicine, engineering, law, and journalism. Saddam's Foreign Minister was Christian. Finally, it is necessary to record that the Department of Education selected the best students each year for further education abroad and those listed were chosen on educational ability rather than religious or ethnic grounds.

Iraq was not a model of tolerance and harmony. Few countries could claim that level of idealism. The MENA region, including Iraq, has a combination of attributes that create ideal conditions for conflict. Oil and Israel are obvious causes that do not need much elaboration. It is assumed by powerful consuming countries that oil security lies in keeping the states in the region small, weak, and divided. Sadly, this is also seen by successive Israeli governments as the best strategy for Israel's security. Whether these assumptions are right or otherwise is besides the point: they are there and they form the foundations of the foreign policies of several powerful states. Calls for the subdivision of Iraq into smaller statelets are part of that unarticulated strategy. However, there are factors at the domestic and regional levels that allow these policies to gain traction. The ancient religious animosity between the two major sects of Islam has developed a geopolitical dimension as well in the shape of two contending regional hegemonic aspirants: Iran and Turkey. That rivalry has localised spinoffs: Iranian influences on parts of Iraq and some of the Gulf States and Turkish influences on parts of Syria and Iraq. Jordan does not escape cheaply as there are Israeli calls to turn it into "the" Palestinian State. At the same time, Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran are grappling with Kurdish calls for independence.

Suggestion that Iraq is ripe for subdivision into three statelets; Kurdish north, Sunni middle, and Shiite south should be seen in that broader context Anderson and Stanfield (2004) exemplify the pro-division lobby. To underline the argument Peter W. Galbraith stated in his comments on the dust jacket of the book, "This is a provocative, readable, and realistic examination of a country that never worked". This last assertion would come as quite a surprise to most Iraqis. Galbraith is also the author of *The End of Iraq* (see in particular 2007, p. 191, *The Three State Solution*). After the 2003 war he advised Kurdish leaders on the best negotiating means to achieve autonomy. As Galbraith related he put the finishing touches to *The End of Iraq* while staying at the "Baghdad headquarters of the Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani".

The onslaught on Iraq's credentials as a viable unified state hardly faltered since 2003. The viewpoint was expressed most directly in the report of the US Special Inspector General on Iraq reconstruction efforts after the 2003 war. He wrote, "In their efforts to build an independent state, British officials faced the challenge of melding three distinct social structures (tribal, clerical, urban), three ethno-religious groups (Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs), and three territorial regions (north,

central, south)” (US Special Inspector General 2009, p. 4). That, one assumes, summarises the US official viewpoint on the subject.

It is perhaps helpful to mention that the wish to divide MENA into small states has been on the agenda of western powers since the end of the First World War and the demise of the Ottoman Empire. A secret agreement was negotiated by Sir Mark Sykes on behalf of Britain and Georges Picot representing France in May 1916 to that end. The agreement was contrary to pledges given by Britain to Arab leaders to encourage them to mount a revolt in the Arabian Peninsula against the Ottoman Empire. Since that time there have been two conflicting lines of argument: a local wish for greater levels of unity and cooperation (see AHDR 2004, figures 6.3 and 7.2) and an opposite determination to retain the model of divided Arab states championed by Western powers and implicitly supported by existing domestic leaders.

The push to subdivide Arab states even further is not confined to Iraq. Following the overthrow of Gadaffi there were regular reports about the possible break-up of Libya along ethnic and/or economic lines (Macalister 2011; Stephen 2012; Radhwan 2012). The same was said later about the likely carve up of Syria into separate statelets (Adnan 2012; Imad al-Deen 2012). Arab suspicions invariably drift back to the Sykes-Picot agreement mentioned above. Heikal, an Egyptian political commentator, suggested that the aftermath of the Arab Spring is in some ways a rerun of the Sykes-Picot plan. In the modern scenario, he added, the USA, Europe, Turkey, Iran, and Israel are all involved in pursuit of their own diverse interests (Ezzat 2011). In each instance, the emergence of a well-organised and properly functioning Arab country, or countries, is contraindicated for obvious reasons.

The division, and further subdivision, of Arab states generally, and Iraq in particular for the present purpose, was highlighted as it has a key bearing on the functionality of nations as complex adaptive systems. Good performance of such systems relies heavily on connectivity. This is a feature that is recognised even when commentators are not directly concerned with complex systems. A small country focused on ethnicity or religion remains shackled by that burden of exclusivity. Cooperation within and between such states becomes difficult as might be reasonably expected with the three state “solution” for Iraq. The current friction between Turkey (and some Gulf states) on one side and Iran and Iraq on the other is a case in point. Israel of course is an extreme example of the same preoccupation with religious and ethnic purity. A large state by contrast is better able to embrace diversity; ethnic or religious, and turn it into a positive asset. The USA is a perfect example of the utility of size in accommodating, and valuing, diversity.

Long-Term Degradation of Iraq’s Human Capital

Both capability and ability of Iraqis to interact within rules that command popular acceptance were drastically reduced through coup-de-tats, wars, crippling sanctions and questionable decisions by occupying authorities after 2003. The previous section highlighted the deterioration in Iraq’s current human stock and ethnic and

religious fissures that have emerged which exacerbated the situation. However, there are other threats to the country's human capital that will have even longer term implications. These mainly relate to health and education factors.

After years of uninterrupted turmoil, there is an "epidemic of mental illness" that Iraq is "ill-equipped to cope with" (The Washington Post 18 June 2010). More disturbing, there are credible reports of large increases in cancers and birth defects in certain locations in Iraq; including Fallujah and Basra that have been linked to "neuro-toxic metal contamination" such as lead, mercury, and depleted uranium (BBC News Channel 4 March 2010, The Independent 14 October 2012, and The Guardian 25 October 2012). A WHO report on the subject was expected in 2013.

After 2003 another sinister element emerged that is just as significant; an attack on Iraq's future human capital. Professional people, especially doctors and senior academics became a primary target. The activity involved kidnapping accompanied by demands for ransom and threats of further action unless the persons concerned left the country. There were also unexplained assassinations. Targeted people soon expanded to include journalists, artists, and other communicators. The overall picture could not be worse: "...deaths of over 1 million civilians; the degradation in social infrastructure, including electricity, potable water, and sewage systems; the targeted assassination of over 400 academics and professionals and the displacement of approximately 4 million refugees..." (Baker 2010, p. 4). The effects on women have been highly significant. About 65 % of Iraqis are now women, of which approximately one million are widows.

The proceedings of a seminar held at Ghent University in March 2011 which were published under the title of *Beyond Educide* give a comprehensive view of the dire state that education has reached (Adriaensens et al. 2012). The chapter penned by Hans von Sponeck is especially significant as he discusses the use of the expression "educide" and links that to the "genocide" of the sanctions that resulted in his resignation from his post at the United Nations.

Conclusion

Iraq's vulnerability when it crumpled after few hours of war in 1991 and then shattered into scores of antagonistic factions after another brief war in 2003 stands in sharp contrast, for instance, with the way Britain managed to survive through 5 years of gruelling war between 1939 and 1945. Clearly Britain enjoyed resilience and sustainability that Iraq does not possess. Looking at events from 1958 to the present as components of one process and analysing Iraq as a complex system helps to explain the fundamental reasons why Iraq had exhausted what resilience it had previously.

The analysis points unerringly to what needs to be done to restore Iraq's functionality as a healthy system. The recipe is simple: improve education and health for all and rebuild governance to allow citizens to be capable of interacting and able to do so within simple rules that are acceptable to most Iraqis. This might seem like an impossible task; especially when it is recalled that complex systems do not respond

to command-and-control and rigid planning. The lengthy process will have to happen at many levels and through a multiplicity of organisations; both official and unofficial. The natural response to such a proposal is scepticism. How could a nebulous “project” of that description come about? In reality that happens routinely. Complex adaptive systems destined to survive have a “network of processes” and sets of beliefs and understandings that allow them to reproduce themselves despite major changes in their environment (Chapman 2002, p. 42).

The remedial process offers no guarantees, but there is enough evidence to suggest it is already in operation in Iraq. This could be seen even at government level and despite the obvious fact that those currently in power are inexperienced to say the least. Some are accused of counterfeiting university qualifications and of widespread corruption. Most owe their position to this or that religious or ethnic faction. Nonetheless, despite all that some progress does inevitably go on. For instance, a Scholarship and Capacity Building Program was announced recently by the Ministry of Higher Education to fund 10,000 scholarships for postgraduate studies at universities abroad. A previous scheme launched in 2009 involved the provision of scholarships to 50,000 students over 5 years. The ambitious programme might not be implemented in full and some graduates might remain abroad but some would go back with positive contributions for the future. Additionally, infrastructure projects are being implemented and these also would have a positive impact.

Other countries have their own programmes to assist in rebuilding the region’s human capital. The Middle East and North Africa Scholarship Programme (MENA Scholarship Programme) initiated and fully funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an example. The programme has a specific module related to Iraq (see MENA Scholarship Programme 2012, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education).

However, the most effective means to restore resilience and sustainability to Iraq lies beyond official channels; into civil society, and this is where the Internet is playing a major role. In the chaotic aftermath of the 2003 war and the absence of even rudimentary levels of governance there was an explosion of television stations and newspapers (see www.menavista.com/iraq for listing). These did belong in the main to the plethora of factions that emerged after the war. However, they provided an outlet for virtually every conceivable point of view. This media frenzy was soon followed by a vast number of websites that provided access to writers of an even wider spectrum of opinions. Some of the websites specialise in promoting the artistic and cultural life of Iraq (see for example Iraqi Art Gallery at www.iraqi-art.com and www.shebaketeldur.info). Others focus more specifically on its long history and traditions (see for example www.nbraas.com and www.Iraq4all.dk).

A third tranche that has become noticeable is the associations that have come into being with the declared purpose of addressing social and political issues relating to the Middle East including Iraq. Space does not allow a full listing but the following represent only a sample:

Centre for Arab Unity Studies: www.caus.org.il.

Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies: www.dohainstitute.org

Arab Scientific Community Organisation: www.arsco.org

The Middle East Research and Information Project: www.merip.org

Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration: www.ameppa.org

Finally, articles are being published throughout the Middle East that address social, and religious, issues in an open and provocative manner that would have been virtually unthinkable only a few years ago. An article penned by F. Al-Qasim (and published in Arabic in the Qatari Sharq newspaper on 9 December 2012) suggested that “changing people is better than changing heads”. There are indications also that Islamic extremism has produced an almost inevitable backlash. This is taking the form of humour and satirical commentary, arguably unusual in Arabic culture.

Will all the above set Iraq on a different direction of travel? Almost certainly the answer is yes. Will it create a better Iraq? That, as in most matters relating to complex systems, is unpredictable. Will it take Iraq back to an earlier, some would say happier, past? This could be answered with confidence: no it would not. Complex adaptive systems never go back to an earlier state. Equally, that is what makes the study of the evolution of nations both irritating and exciting at the same time.

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Iraq's Pressing Need to Legally Binding Conceptual and Procedural Models for Public Policy Making

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Introduction

In spite of the confusion that can be caused by the so many definitions in the literature, public policy can be simply defined as whatever approaches a government and/or its branches adopt to address public issues. In a logical chain of cause and effect, successful policies often produce successful solutions, and therefore, result in citizens' satisfaction. A major factor to influence whether a policy would succeed or fail is the way that particular policy is made. That way or methodology is often called public policy making process, and it is closely related to and influenced by the characteristics of the political ideology adopted by governing bodies (Buşoi 2010). Public policy making process in democratic countries, for instance, is often characterized by being participatory; whereas totalitarian governments tend to adopt more centralized process of policy making. In addition, to make public policies, governments tend either to justifiably follow specific models or cycles of policy making process, or they just let policy drafters and policy decision-makers adopt whatever methodologies they prefer. The latter approach often results in policies that serve individuals or specific groups' interests, and/or comply with the pressures under which those policy decision-makers run their offices such as in the cases of many undemocratic countries. Therefore, it's fairly axiomatic to say that following a proper public policy making model would result in proper approaches, alternatives and solutions (policies), whereas improvisation by individuals would, on the other hand, result in improper policies.

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A close look at the Iraqi legal frame work shows that the accountability system in the public sector is entirely focused on combating corruption, whereas poor performance in managing public affairs is almost ignored. The absence of the needed legal texts to hold Iraqi official decision-makers responsible for the effectiveness of the public policies they adopt can be easily noticed. In addition, findings of a specially customized needs-assessment survey conducted in six Iraqi ministries by an international administrative reform project showed that Iraqi officials do not follow any specific model for public policy making process; instead, they just improvise enjoying the unaccountability provided by the absence of any relevant legal text. However, a very simple pattern could be observed when analyzing various cases of real public policy making by Iraqi governmental organizations. After examining the observed pattern of public policy making in Iraq and compare it to some of the well-established models adopted by various developed and under-development nations, Iraq's federal and local governments are invited to adopt a specially customized model for this purpose. The suggested conceptual model holds some essential characteristics that match the constitutional, political, and legal mandates of the governments of Iraq. These characteristics include, but not limited to:

- Participatory—that goes hand in hand with the democracy and transparency mandated by the constitution and law
- Thorough and comprehensive research for which substantial time and efforts are dedicated to analyze public issues
- Scientific evidence-based formulation of policies
- Objective and scientific evaluation of adopted policy's direct outcomes and long-term impacts where established indicators and indexes are used

As this conceptual model is recommended to be adopted as a general framework for public policy making process in Iraq, a procedural model that consists of specific practical steps is developed and recommended to be adopted as an interpretation of the conceptual one. These practical steps were designed based on a full understanding of the administrative and financial laws, regulations, practices followed in Iraq's public sector. This claimed understanding of how Iraqi governments and their branches are functioning was established through many years of experience working in and close to governmental offices in this country.

Public Policy Making in Iraq

Legal Framework of Public Policy Making in Iraq

The legal framework through which Iraqi officials are performing their duties consists of 27,543 legal texts (Constitutional Articles, Laws, Diwany Decrees,¹ Regulations, etc.²) Although some of these legal texts were designed to explicitly

¹ Decrees by the Council of Ministers.

² The Iraqi Legal Database/I.L.D. was created by the UNDP-Iraq in cooperation with the Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, can be browsed through <http://www.iraq-ild.org>.

limit and clarify the financial authorities in different levels of the decision making in Iraq's governmental offices, none of them imposes or suggests any criterion as of what methodology should be adopted to address public issues. One could observe that the term "public policy" is mentioned in many of those texts, but phrases such as "good public policy making process should be..." or "the criteria of public policy making process are" never show up. For instance, some of the currently effective constitutional articles (78, 80, 110, 112, and 114) merely refer to the ownership of public policy making and implementation. In other words, they assign responsibilities of who should create policies in specific areas and who should implement them. Neither these articles, nor any other legal texts discuss the nature or the characteristics of the approaches that the governmental offices should follow when drafting, adopting, or implementing public policies. Another example would be those legal texts that regulate public budget execution such as the amended Law #28 (1940).³ Those legal texts explain and impose financial authority specific ceilings for all governmental offices to consider and limit their budgets within when implementing policies, but these legal texts, once again, never mention specific methodologies for formulating policies or specific instruments for implementing or evaluating them.

While assigning public policy responsibility and ownership is poorly addressed by only some of the texts of the Iraqi legal framework as mentioned, evaluating public policy's impact and effectiveness is not mentioned at all. It is strongly believed that ignoring this crucial aspect of public policy making process affects the overall accountability system negatively, hence, encourages, if not causes, poor performance in public sectors (Atkinson et al. 2007; Fox and Butler 2004). Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that Iraq's public sector is an exception for this rule of thumb. The findings of the needs-assessment survey mentioned earlier showed that almost all the governmental organizations of Iraq have specific offices within their organizational structures to perform various monitoring tasks, but these tasks are merely for monitoring by which progress in projects and plans implementation is reported to make sure that original plans are strictly followed. Outcomes and effectiveness of plans are completely out of the scope of these monitoring offices spread all over Iraq public sector.

Actual and Current Life Cycle of Public Policy in Iraq

Although called here a cycle, it is actually never a cycle in Iraq because there isn't a recognized phase of policy evaluation at all. Once a policy reaches an implementation phase, it stays there. It's true that many policies (specifically legislations) have been revised and amended, but this happens only when interests of very powerful entities get in conflict with those specific policies.

To figure out the exact types of issues and where they lay within the public policy making process in Iraq, it is very necessary to understand the basic and standard stages that any Iraqi public policy would go through during its life cycle. Interestingly

³Law 28/1940 of "the Principles of Public Accounting."

enough, it is regardless the economic ideology and the political governing approach adopted by governments of Iraq, public policy normally passes through the basic phases described below:

- **Public Issue Occurrence or Higher Agenda Adoption:** public issues are whatever concerns (affects or may affect) a substantial portion of a population of a community. These issues can be public problems such as an occurrence of an infectious disease among a population of a specific area with a good chance to be spread out all over. On the other hand, public issues can also be public opportunities such as discovering a vein of gold or an oil reserve of commercial amounts, or an unexpected climate change where a substantial increase in rain occurs in a country that is used to have dry seasons. All these kinds of public issues normally require adopting public policies to address them. Another possible trigger for the public policy life cycle would be the adoption of a broader national policy on the level of the central or federal government. Ministries, provinces, and departments normally consider sectoral or local public policies to implement the national policies adopted by federal or central governmental offices.
- **Reporting the Public Issue and Agenda Setting:** a media report or an official memorandum from a concerned individual(s) or a public or private agency normally reports the occurrence of the public issue to authorities. Or, according to the other scenario, the central government office communicates the adopted national policy to its branches for implementation. An essential decision should normally be made in this phase to continue, or to end up the public policy life cycle at this point. A policy advocate(s) usually tries to emphasize the importance of a specific policy and to insert it into the agenda of responsible organization(s). Authorities decide on the importance of the issue; that is whether to ignore it,⁴ or to address it as an important public issue. If authorities find the emerging public issue significant and important enough, some advisor(s) would be assigned to look at the situation and develop recommendations. This step is considered an official check-off of the public policy making process. Another possibility—occur in many real life situations—is that nobody is assigned to study the situation and do this job. Instead, decision makers simply leave doors opened to any suggestions by anyone within the senior management of their organization.
- **Policy Formulation and Policy Decision Making:** In this phase, one can easily observe the lack for most of the democratic, logical, and scientific practices applied by governments of developed nations that are approved to emphasize good governance. Some advisor(s) is usually assigned, as mentioned, to study the situation, formulate alternatives, and recommend one of them as the best

⁴This happens usually when authorities consider the emerging issue as a non-public issue, meaning that they decide that it doesn't belong to the public, rather it belongs to a specific group of people such as a corporate in the case of corporate issues and policies.

solution. After reviewing a huge number of policy proposals and memos, one can say that rarely any real consultation or a scientific research has been ever conducted by assigned policy drafters for this purpose. And hence, scientific evidences and numeric facts are not essential parts of these policy proposals. Sensitive issues such as security, defense, and many other pertaining policies are usually centrally addressed and formulated by personnel in the highest authorities. The outcome of this phase is a set of alternatives with one as the most recommended. This could be presented through a white paper (policy proposal) attached to a policy memo, or even through one simple immature memo. This whole phase of policy formulation is sometimes severely shortened by a decision maker deciding on what to do regarding an emerging public issue without any thorough thinking, analysis, or consultation. After submitting policy proposals, decision makers make their minds. They either go for what is recommended, or they got inspired by the alternatives presented and come up with unlisted solutions (this includes the alternative of ignoring the public issue and keeping things as they are—the status-quo.)

- **Policy Implementation:** In this phase, adopted policy is to be implemented. It may be proposed to be drafted and passed as a law or an administrative decree first to legitimate policy implementation. A governmental entity(s) is usually assigned the responsibility of implementing the adopted policy with a given time framework. Depending on how broad is the policy, implementation may go through translating the adopted policy into programs, and each program into projects. People of this country rarely heard a public organization's spokesman talking about a policy outputs, outcomes, and desired impact. Most of the organizations in the Iraqi governments implement whatever policies they are assigned just to comply with orders, and never showed deep understanding of policies' short- and long-term targets. This phase is normally the last one in public policy life cycle in Iraq because there isn't a recognized evaluation phase after it.

Example Case 1: The Ministry of Electricity's Policy to Address the Shortage in Power Provision

Policy Owner: The Ministry of Electricity in Iraq

Time Frame: 2004–2012

Brief Background: The Gulf War of 1991, 1990s economic sanction, and 2003 war have caused serious damages to the electric power supply system in Iraq. Whereas demand to power substantially increased as the population grew, power supply severely decreased due to wars, aging, and lack for proper maintenance. The Iraqi Government/Ministry of Electricity had to deal with a huge shortage in power provision necessary for homes and industries.

In spite of all the calls to liberate this sector, the federal GoI decided to keep its full control on the national power system starting at production down to low voltage distribution, and not to allow private businesses to participate. And to address the power supply shortage in Iraq, the MoE fluctuated since 2004 from one approach to another without achieving the target. Most of the time, the focus was on the supply side (power production) with completely neglecting the demand side (consumption). One time, the ministry focused its resources and allocations on gas turbine projects to increase the amount of electric power produced and supplied, and therefore, made what's called the MEGA DEAL with G.E. and SIEMENS in 2008 to provide a huge number of gas turbine units. Somewhere in the middle of the implementation of its policy, the ministry shifted its focus towards projects of diesel generators of the lower capacity but quickly-installed units. The MEGA DEAL was frozen until 2011 when a newly appointed minister decided that the ministry should resume its original plan of the MEAG DEAL, and to abandon the diesel generators ambitious plan. In the mean time, the ministry awarded some contracts to provide and install steam turbine power plants as well. In addition, every now and then, the ministry of oil kept announcing its limited ability to secure the needed amounts of the needed types of fuel to operate those power plants. After spending US\$27 billion⁵ of its annual allocations in the Iraqi national budgets of the years between 2004 and 2012, the ministry of electricity failed to properly address this deteriorating public issue. In summer 2012, the power provision rates barely reached 40 % of the demand.

Case Analysis

For its huge influence over every single aspect in Iraqi citizen's life, this issue was almost always in the priority lists of the governments of Iraq. No team was specifically assigned to address this issue; instead, successive ministers of electricity kept discussion and suggestion doors opened to their senior management personnel, and nobody else. Those senior officials, without any deep scientific analyses, formulated and suggested various alternatives, and the ministry was jumping from one to another. The ministry never consulted citizens, university specialized professors, specialized consultancy companies, or think tanks. Under the absence of any kind of policy evaluation systems that can hold decision makers responsible for their decisions, personal interests and political influences played a great role in shaping the ministry's policy decisions. Influential personnel barely avoided clear and easy-to-be-caught corruption. The ministry has been implementing various alternatives since then without achieving its targets.

⁵According to the Iraqi Minister of Finance, Dr. Rafi Al Essawi's announcement in 2012.

Example Case 2: *The Policy of Nineveh Province to Address the Issue of High Rates of Primary School Drop-Out in the Province*

Policy Owner: The local government of Nineveh province—northwest Iraq

Time Frame: 1996–2001

Brief Background: In July 1996, a national daily newspaper carried a column about an official report belong to the directorate of education in Nineveh province announcing unprecedented rates of primary school drop-out in the province for the year 1995–1996. The drop-out rate in that specific year reached 15 % (overall—boys and girls, grade 1 throughout grade 6) whereas that same indicator used to fluctuate below 4 % in the 1980s and between 7 and 11 % in early 1990s.

Under some pressure from the central government in Baghdad, the governor of Nineveh decided that the issue was an important public issue and deserved to be addressed. He assigned one of his assistants—who was a powerful politician but with modest educational qualifications—to study the situation and come back with suggestions. The governor's assistant had one phone call with the head of the directorate of education, read few pages from the official report, and had a brief discussion with some of his colleagues in Nineveh head quarter of the ruling political party.

After 2 days from receiving his assignment, the governor's assistant submitted a two-page memo that repeated parts from the official report and offered only one alternative. That policy memo suggested re-enforcing Law 118 (of year 1976) of the compulsory education by assigning the staff of the ruling party in the province (who used to serve as an additional security system in the whole country) to track down parents of the students who dropped out school. The governor adopted that suggested policy, and sent a request in this regard to the Nineveh headquarter of the ruling party. In August 1996, the assigned political-security staff started a campaign of tracking down parents and families of students who dropped out elementary school last year.

The directorate of education recorded some increase in primary school enrolment rates for the period from the beginning of the academic year 1996–1997 to the midterm examination of the same year. The annual report issued in July 1997, however, reported even higher rates of drop-out in the elementary school because the high pace of following up and tracking down families remained for only 3 months.

As the ruling party took over the responsibility of every aspect in the country, nobody followed up the implementation of the adopted policy. The assigned political-security staff started to mellow in doing this job as more assignments were given to them every day. Re-enforcing Law 118 was the officially adopted policy of the governor and his administration until he was replaced by another governor in 2001. Drop-out rates in elementary schools in the province were reported between 16 and 19 % in the following years up to 2001.

Case Analysis

This is another typical case of policy making in Iraq. One single individual was assigned, without considering his actual qualifications, to address a very important public issue. And typically, no really relevant research and/or consultation were conducted. Immature single alternative was developed and adopted in the absence of any scientific evidences or analyses. As no evaluation is requested by any regulations, nobody measured the direct results and impacts of the policy under implementation, thus the policy stayed in the implementation phase wasting public resources just for nothing.

The First Relevant Survey: Its Findings and the Process Analysis

A customized survey was conducted during the first half of 2012 by an international development organization to assess the process of public policy making in Iraq.⁶ Sixty seven official Iraqi decision makers from six selected ministries participated in answering the survey's questionnaire. The questionnaire was composed of 103 open-ended and multi-choices questions distributed on three major parts:

1. *Part One*: Elements of Public Policy Making Process

- Policy priority setting
- Participation in the central annual planning for government's program
- Preparations for policy proposals
- Preparation for legal drafts
- Intra-governmental consultations
- Submission to government office
- Review by government office
- Review by ministerial committees
- Decision by the cabinet
- Parliamentary process and passage
- Policy implementation
- Policy evaluation

2. *Part Two*: Thematic Issues

- Stakeholder consultation
- Strategic communication
- Evidence-based policy making
- Administration and financial management of policy
- Policy evaluation

⁶“Iraqi Ministries’ Needs Assessment for Public Policy Bureaus” by TARABOT (a USAID-Iraq project).

3. *Part Three*: Participants' Recommendations

Although biased answers were extremely difficult to be avoided due to specific political and cultural attitudes, the questionnaire findings generally supported this chapter's hypotheses regarding the deficits in the process of policy making in Iraq. These findings basically illustrated that the way public policy is currently made in Iraq obviously lacks for some elements that are crucially important for any rational policy making process to produce sound and practical alternatives to address public issues. These elements were:

– **Participation and Inclusiveness:**

It's found that Iraqi policy makers rarely consult other stakeholders while forming public policies. It's neither mandatory by laws, nor a habit by nature for Iraqi policy drafters and decision makers to consult anybody out of their much closed loops (if any) when running their businesses in the government. Putting aside the corruption that requires keeping control in hand, a number of recognized cultural and psychological factors are also encouraging the tendency of Iraqi officials towards severe individualism in performing their assignments. Political complexities are another worsening factor where officials tend not to trust opponent or differently affiliated officials. Corruption that requires keeping things under personal control is another one. Now, this is being said, and considering the absence of any legislation that imposes transparency and integrity in policy making by publicizing all relevant information, consulting other stakeholders, and/or reflecting as much opinions as possible on the formulated and recommended alternatives, a simple logical question emerges—*what would make any Iraqi official ask other stakeholders about their opinions?* The answer is simply “nothing.”

– **Thorough and Comprehensive Research:**

If quite few Iraq policy makers would include some stakeholders from around their closed circles, almost none of them tend to conduct a thorough and comprehensive research while considering different alternatives to address public issues at hand. This was obvious and one of the major findings of the survey. As scientifically evidences-based formulation of policies could be the most time/effort consuming phase of the proper policy making process, and under the shade of the absence of any relevant accountability legislation, why should the Iraqi nation expect any Iraq policy maker to take this burden.

– **Policy Post-Implementation Impact Evaluation:**


None of the survey findings clearly referred to a formal and documented process of objective and scientific evaluation of the direct outcomes and long-term impacts of adopted policies for which established indicators and indexes are used. This is clearly related to the absence of any accountability legislations that usually impose such an evaluation. Although usually requires some resources to be conducted, such an “impact evaluation is the needed incentive to put more efforts in research and studying public issues” (Kovacic 2005); hence is very crucial for a healthy policy making process. And with the absence of such evaluation, who of the Iraqi policy making entities and individuals would take the burden of revising their already-adopted policies?

Proposed Conceptual and Procedural Models

Since the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline that stands by its own, many public policy making models have been suggested to explain the process. Each model suggests following specific steps such as those of Cochran et al. and Palumbo et al. of the four basic stages—agenda formation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy review (Cochran et al. 1982; Palumbo et al. 1981). Another example would be the eight-step policy cycle suggested by Althaus et al. (2007) in their book titled *The Australian Policy Handbook*. This model includes Issue Identification, Policy Analysis, Policy Instrument Development, Consultation, Coordination, Decision, Implementation, and Evaluation. Although suggests different steps and various life cycles, those models and almost all other models in the literature actually present similar themes and basic concepts. Those themes typically include participatory approach that is driven by believing in democracy, emphasis on transparency, and result-oriented effort. Now, considering the political, cultural, administrative, and legal circumstances through which public policies are made in Iraq, a specially customized conceptual model is suggested to be adopted by Iraq's federal and local governments for their policy making process (see Fig. 1). This model suggests specific stages to be considered by governments after a decision is made to address a public issue; meaning that the model assumes that the public issue has occurred, it's already on the government agenda, and some advisor(s) has been assigned to develop a white paper to present available alternatives to address that public issue.

The various roles suggested by this model are supposed to be distributed among the policy drafters, policy decision makers and legislators, policy implementing organizations, and policy evaluating independent parties to insure the integrity of each separate phase. According to this model, assigned policy drafters should first clearly identify public issues, and then create a comprehensive understanding about their roots, dimensions, and possible solutions. An objective scientific research should be conducted for this purpose in this phase. Then, the drafters along with decision makers should correctly identify all the stakeholders of each specific issue and start consulting them and collecting their perspectives. This step would ensure that nobody would be “taken aback” when a policy is announced. A healthy environment for the needed political support, moreover, can be established through the discussions that occur during consultations. Based on the understanding created so far, some alternative should be properly formulated and supported by a cost–benefit analysis. The ultimate result of this phase should be a well-written firm policy paper that provides all needed information about the public issue in addition to recommended solutions and alternatives.

The ball now is on the court of the decision makers who have to decide on what to do regarding the public issues at their hands. Decision making process, by its turn, has been widely studied by socio-political scientists. Several theories have been developed to explain how decision is made in public sector. There is, for instance, the Rational-Comprehensive Theory, the Incremental Theory (Anderson 1999), and the Mixed-Scanning Theory (Etzioni 1967); each of specific assumptions and results



* A public issue can be a public problem that needs to be addressed, or a public opportunity that needs to be sought

Fig. 1 Suggested conceptual model

that are widely elaborated elsewhere. This phase produces a policy decision that chooses one of the recommended alternatives by the submitted white paper, or even to come up with a new alternative that is driven out from the original policy analysis. Before the implementation phase starts, the decision made is to be interpreted into a proposal of a law, decree, or any form of legally binding declaration.

The law or legislation to be suggested should articulate assigning implementation responsibility to some implementing organization. The implementation phase can be the most time-and-resources-consuming phase. And implementation can be as complicated as creating programs and projects, or as simple as just granting country access (visa) to the citizens of a friend nation. High level plans—at least—for policy impact evaluation should be placed early in the public policy making process, and detailed action plans along with firm grounds for the evaluation phase should be set during the implementation phase. Normally, and regardless of the political forms of the governing regimes, any policy making process of any nation has some kind of implementation phase; what really makes a difference is the impact evaluation (for the adopted policy) and performance evaluation (for policy implementation.) Although very significant for policy effectiveness and efficiency, the performance of implementing organizations should not be considered part of the policy making process; it's normally an important administrative aspect that has to do with another field of public administration—that is organizational performance. On the other hand, policy impact evaluation is crucially important to enforce the integrity of all previous stages of policy making process.

Obviously, the suggested conceptual model provides broad titles and descriptions of the phases that public policy making process should pass through. Therefore, as official public policy drafters and decision makers normally need more time-framed, specific, and detailed description of the steps they would be asked to follow, a detailed procedural model is suggested for practical application. Such a procedural model can be legislated to be a legally binding policy making process; otherwise, it is not guaranteed or even expected at all that Iraqi policy makers would collectively volunteer to adopt a completely different work style that they never adopted before. As concepts, in addition, are merely here for providing general layouts and guidance, presenting the conceptual model is not sufficient enough to enhance the policy making process in Iraq. The outline-providing conceptual model needs to be interpreted into the procedural model that can be clearly and effectively imposed by acting a law or any kind of legislations. Directly driven from the mother conceptual model, the procedural model is suggested to have the shape and content illustrated by Fig. 2.

In addition, a standard checklist form that includes fields for detailed descriptions, justifications, and notes is suggested to avoid different interpretations, to simplify the implementation of the model, and to provide a measuring and evaluation criterion for accountability purposes. The first two pages of the suggested additional form are to provide information about policy drafters, sponsoring office, level and rank of the needed decision making process, background description, legal references, etc. The following pages are to include itemized table fields to provide information regarding the standard steps that the procedural model suggests. This information should include dates at which each step was conducted, full description of the course of actions taken, justifications for any variations.




Fig. 2 Suggested procedural model

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The Innovative Approach for Accounting and Accountability of Government Revenues in Iraq

Talal A. Al-Kassar, Mahmoud Al-Wadi, and Alexander Dawoody

Introduction

In Iraq, accountability of revenue audit, as an important domain of public auditing, has been engaging the attention of the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) and in other institutions [namely the Commission of Integrity (COI) and the Inspector General of each ministry] for quite some time. Normally, the Ministry of Finance has its own financial control on its directorates especially for revenues and expenditures. Therefore, the COI was linked to parliament for special duty, which has a special duty for financial and managerial corruption, and submitted their reports to the Justice Ministry and to the Integrity Committee at the parliament for big corruption. While government revenues are derived from two sources, tax receipts and non-tax receipts, the major source of national revenues is tax receipts raised through fiscal statutes.

The taxation policy of a government generally seeks to apply the following desirable fiscal principles (ASOSAI report 2010, p. 2):

- (a) The subjects of every State ought to contribute to the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State. The observation or neglect of this maxim reflects what is called the equality or inequality of taxation.

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- (b) The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.
- (c) Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.
- (d) Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.

Most developing countries are interested in governmental revenues, because they have a great role and provide the means to build the required and right economic base. Developing countries are, therefore, looking to increase their revenues from different sources. It is important to find the best method to control these revenues and achieve the necessary development in different fields that the government wishes to support. A new approach to building economic and social infrastructure emerged at the end of the twentieth century and this is related to the privatization of public projects. This has been tried in fully developed nations and is also relevant in developing countries. Whilst privatization provides a basis to resource more development, auditing bodies still need to address accountability and audit of the use of public funds. This might increase their revenues, but this situation still required more attention from the high auditing institutions to continue their control (accountability and audit) because of their ratio in tax revenues.

In summary, the main concern of a modern state is to provide services to its citizens and lead the country on the path toward development. The state can discharge its duties only if sufficient resources are at its command. These resources are generated through various government revenues. The research has been carried out, in one of the developing countries, namely Iraq, according to two reasons. The first was the rapid dependence of this country on oil revenues and an emergence of foreign investment in different sectors. Second was the new direction of democratic regime since 2003, including elections, central, province and local governments, and effective parliament. The objectives, problems, and scope and methodology of this chapter are below.

Research Objectives

The chapter seeks to realize the following objectives:

1. To measure the State's dependence on oil revenues relative to others.
2. To develop and increase dependence on other revenues.
3. To highlight and to ensure that auditing of governmental revenue in Iraq is sufficient.

Research Problem Statement

The research problem focuses on how can the researcher measure the contribution of oil revenue and tax revenues to government revenues in Iraq and the accountability and audit to governmental revenues and their percentage of total revenues.

Methodology

The chapter will cover both theoretical and empirical materials. The theoretical side defines the accountability, audit revenues, performance audit, taxation policy, and the kinds of governmental revenues. While the empirical side includes studying the economic influence of government revenues through real figures from Iraq to different types of government revenues and the auditing procedures by the BSA.

Different materials, articles, reports, and sites have been used to assist the chapter. Thus the proposed paper attempts:

1. To show varying sources of governmental revenues.
2. To define the auditing procedures control bodies.
3. To link the legislation related to government revenues.

Therefore, the chapter will present, in brief, the subject from researcher's point of view. Thus, the chapter seeks to fill this important gap in the literature by exploring the need of accountability of government revenues in particular taxes.

The chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides a review of literature. Sixth section begins by overview of the meaning of accounting and accountability including internal and external indicators. Seventh section presents types of government revenues. Twelfth to fourteenth section presents control bodies, audit planning, auditing methods of government revenues, and human resource management. Finally, last section includes discussion findings, limitation, further studies, and conclusions.

Literature Review

The audit process is superimposed on an accountability framework. A traditional definition of accountability is the obligation to answer for a responsibility conferred. This definition often is interpreted as implying two distinct and often unequal partners: one who confers and the other who is obliged to answer. In so doing, it does not reliably address several realities in today's public management. These include (OAG 2005, p. 16):

- The emergence of alternative delivery approaches, such as arrangements between the federal and provincial governments, where responsibilities may not be conferred from a senior party to a junior one, but agreements nonetheless assume accounting for results;

- The call for a much increased focus on performance-based management and results in public sector; and
- The importance of transparency as an essential feature of public sector accountability.

Beechy (2007) mentioned in his study that “a different concept of accountability is embodied in the Canadian accounting standard on non-profit organizations (NPO) accounting” (p. 4). The CICA Handbook emphasizes the purpose of the statement of operations, section 4400:

...provides information about the cost of the organization’s service delivery activities for the period and the extent to which these expenses were financed or funded by contributions and other revenue. The information provided in the statement of operations is useful in evaluating the organization’s performance during the period, including its ability to continue to provide services, and in assessing how the organization’s management has discharged its stewardship responsibilities.”

In recent years, many studies (Pollitt 1993; Kloot 1999; Barton 2000; Gendron et al. 2001; Earl 2005; Beechy 2007) have been conducted in different countries in the area of accountability and auditing. Some of these studies investigated the role of accounting and accountability. Others studies focus on audit and accountability. Kloot (1999) uncovers a great deal of literature on performance measurement and accountability in government. Governments around the world have invested large amounts to develop performance measurement systems—the results of which are mediocre, at best. There is also a growing recognition that financial performance measures alone measure only limited aspects of an organization’s performance. In order to improve performance measurement systems and accountability to different stakeholders, non-financial indicators have been developed for the for-profit sector. Prior research in the local government sector in the state of Victoria, Australia, showed low levels of accountability and very little performance measurement taking place. However, significant changes have been imposed on the sector, enhancing local and central accountability, making it more business-like and focusing on the need to measure performance.

This chapter studied the extent to which performance measurement systems are currently being used in practice in Victorian local government, the factors which lead to the use of performance measurement, and the extent of non-financial indicators. The results revealed a substantial increase in the level of use of performance measurement in the sector, which is related to increased emphasis on accountability and organizational changes imposed on the sector by the state government. The performance of both people and programs is now being measured. Although there is an emphasis on financial and budgetary measures for financial accountability, the use of non-financial measures in determining outcome accountability is increasing. Customer service and quality are two of the areas in which non-financial performance measures are being developed.

Barton (2000) notes that investigation of public heritage facilities—national parks, art galleries, and museums and so on—is now required by professional accounting standards in Australia to be valued and included in government general purpose financial statements as assets. The article explains the nature and significance of public goods and how they differ from private goods. It explains why

commercial accounting principles are irrelevant for public heritage facilities because their objectives are social rather than financial and why commercial valuations are irrelevant and unreliable if applied to them. Finally, it is contended that the facilities are assets held in trust for the nation by government and hence should not be included in its general purpose financial reports.

In their study Gendron et al. (2001) investigate the role of the state auditor in Alberta. They have analysis of the Office of the Auditor General of Alberta's annual reports to show the role of the Office has significantly changed to promote and encourage the implementation in the public sector of a particular type of accountability informed by new public management. The authors argue that the Office has increased its power to influence politicians and public servants about the merits of its specific understanding of what accountability should be. However, as the Office becomes more powerful, it also becomes more vulnerable to complaints about a lack of independence from the executive. Indeed, the Office is now so closely associated with new public management that we believe that it is difficult for the Office to sustain the claim that it is able to provide independent assessments of public-sector administration.

Accounting and Meaning of Accountability

Much of the accounting literature assumes that accounting and financial reporting in a country is a function of its environment (Elsayed and Hoque 2010). Accounting, performance auditing, and accountability can be considered as those parts of the formalized information used by the organizations of state to influence the behavior of their managers that leads to the attainment of organizational objectives. Accounting is gathering, organizing, and reporting information that describes performance (Earl and LeMahieu 1997). A performance audit is a systematic, purposeful, organized, and objective examination of government activities. It provides parliament with an assessment on the performance of these activities based on information, observations, and recommendations designed to promote accountable government, an ethical and effective public service, good governance, sustainable development, and the protection of the state's legacy and heritage (OAG 2005, p. 13).

In light of these new realities, a restatement of the underlying principles, practices, and tools of accountability, which incorporates the traditional definition, could be as follows: a relationship based on obligation to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in light of agreed upon expectations. In this view, accountability is about the requirement to answer for what you have or have not accomplished that is of significance and value. This restatement implies that accountability does not require hierarchical relationships, since there is no necessary "conferring" taking place. Accountability is rather seen to be assumed and/or agreed to by each party in a recognized accountability relationship, even when one party does indeed delegate responsibilities to the other, as in the traditional case.

Earl (2005) has mentioned that accountability and data are the heart of contemporary reform efforts worldwide. Accountability has become the watchword of education, with data holding a central place in the current wave of large-scale reform.

The statutory role of the auditors is to provide the management with independent and objective assurance on the reliability of financial statements and of certain other information provided by the organization. However, auditing of government revenues plays an important role in decision making. In particular, a fundamental use of accounting information is to help several parties make an effective decision concerning their investment portfolios. This is a vital role of accountability which is the conversation about what the information means, how it fits with everything else known, and how to use it to make positive changes (Earl and LeMahieu 1997).

Pollitt (1993) has noted that the issue of consultant accountability for decisions remains unresolved, and consequently, attempts to identify the role of audit, and the issue of clinical quality, in the wider context of changing attitudes and policies toward professionally provided public services in general. The focus here will be on audit in secondary and tertiary settings, although Pollitt believes that most of the points made are also applicable to general practice.

Accountability is the current mantra both for non-profit organizations and for government (Beechy 2007). There is a wide range of definitions to accountability. A few of the many definitions that can be found on the internet are as follows (more details could be found in Beechy):

1. Accountability has several meanings and is the subject of a broad debate in American governance. Some of the simpler definitions include: responsibility or capable of being held responsible for something: capable of being explained: being held to count, scrutinized, and being required to give an account or explanation.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accountability>
2. Accountability is the capacity to account for one's action; or as a representative of one's organization, to account for either your actions or the actions of your organization. The term is usually used in the voluntary sector to refer to the responsibility a non-profit organization has to inform donors of the manner in which their gifts were used.
<http://envision.ca/templates/profile.asp?ID=56>
3. The responsibility of program managers and staff is to provide evidence to stakeholders and funding agencies that a program is effective and in conformance with this coverage, service, legal, and fiscal requirements.
www.crc.gov/tobacco/evaluation_manual/glossary.html
4. The obligation to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in light of agreed expectations. There is a difference between responsibility and accountability: responsibility is the obligation to act; accountability is the obligation to answer for action.
www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/cs/fas/as/sds/appd_sds03.shtml

Although the context and wording of these definitions vary considerably, their overall sense is that managers are responsible for explaining their actions to outsiders, whether to funders, donors, clients, or the community at large.

Perks and Glendinning (1981) have shown in their paper that: "Accountability in the private sector is based on conventional financial accounts with emphasis on profit, while, public concern with aspects other than profitability alone such as social performance" (p. 22). Therefore, performance indicators can play an important role

in government revenue—namely in protection of the public. Thus, (Kloot 1999) noted the following.

...there is a great deal of literature on performance measurement and accountability in government. Governments around the world have invested large amounts to develop performance measurement systems, the results of which are mediocre at best. There is also a growing recognition that financial performance measures alone measure only limited aspects of an organization's performance. To improve performance measurement systems and accountability to different stakeholders, non-financial indicators have been developed for the for-profit sector (p. 565).

However, Barton's study (Barton 2000) talks about,

...the nature and significance of public goods and how they differ from private goods. It explains why commercial accounting principles are irrelevant for public heritage facilities because their objectives are social rather than financial and why commercial valuations are irrelevant and unreliable if applied to them (p. 219). While Gendron et al. (2001) posit the role of management has significantly changed to promote and encourage the implementation of a particular type of accountability informed by new management in the public sector.

In Iraq, in general has two accounting systems (on annual basis): one for government directorates (non-profit organizations) namely governmental accounting system, and the other one is unified accounting system (UAS) for profit organizations. Ministry of finance is responsible of the first one, while the BSA is pursuit of the second one. This promotes the control of these expenditures through instructions and regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance and other regulatory authorities. The information is a corner stone by which executing is done as intended. It is an attempt to evaluate the government revenues in meeting the demand of users of the system. Therefore, BSA is responsible to audit the outcome of two systems in organizations and issue its report according to that. In light of these new realities, a restatement of the underlying principles, practices, and tools of accountability, which incorporates the traditional definition, could be: a relationship based on obligation to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in light of agreed upon expectations. Therefore, performance indicators can play an important role in government revenues—namely in protection of the public. In order to improve performance measurement systems and accountability to different parties, non-financial indicators have been developed for the for-profit sector. As there is also a growing recognition that financial performance measures alone measure only limited aspects of an organization's performance. Thus, BSA has used both financial and non-financial indicators in the performance evaluation reports. This includes two main groups of indicators which cover the meaning of accounting and accountability as an innovation model from the BSA in Iraq. These groups of indicators are outlined below (the BSA Report 1994):

1. Internal indicators

The indicators which can cover the information from inside the project (whether are in production or service) and this include:

- (a) Production indicators.
- (b) Productivity indicators.
- (c) Financial indicators.

- (d) Marketing indicators.
 - (e) Personnel indicators.
 - (f) Special indicators (which related to the nature of the project).
2. External indicators
- The indicators, which can cover the information of economic, social, political, and environmental, for a project and the extent of their effect on the results, this includes:
- (g) Economic indicators
 - (h) Social indicators
 - (i) Political indicators
 - (j) Environmental indicators.

Thus, all performance evaluation reports contain most of the indicators. The results revealed a substantial increase in the level of use of performance measurement in the governmental sector, related to increased emphasis on accountability and organizational changes imposed government. Although there is an emphasis on financial measures for financial accountability, the use of non-financial measures in determining outcome accountability is also increasing.

Types of Government Revenues

The State does not depend on a single source of revenue, there are several revenue streams that the State exploits to raise funds. These sources vary widely and are developed over time under the influence of political and economic forces in operation. The governmental revenues in Iraq can be classified as follows:

1. Oil revenues: make a large contribution to the state budget.
2. Taxes:
 - (a) Direct taxes (like income tax, wealth tax, agriculture income, and estates taxes including corporations and companies taxes).
 - (b) Indirect taxes (like commodity taxes, customs, and other dues).
3. Revenues of the state enterprises (like the governmental enterprises revenues, capital revenues, revenues of selling and renting state properties, and other revenues).

Table 1 provides an overview of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP which is classified by revenue sources as a percentage of total revenue.

This table indicates that taxes do not play a significant role in providing financial resources to the state of Iraq and are mainly used as an effective method to tackle disparities in income levels of the citizens which are the objective of the tax laws in Iraq. Prior to 2005, all Iraqi state employees were tax exempt. The decrease in tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue, during the past decade (from 1993 as shown in Table 1) preceding the economic sanction imposed on Iraq since 1990, is

Table 1 Tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue

	Tax revenue as percentage of G.D.P.	Revenue sources as percentage of total revenue			
		Direct taxes	Indirect taxes	Trade taxes	Others (including oil revenue)
Developing countries (average) ^a	18.5	29.7	28.1	27.6	14.6
Iraq (1993) ^b	2.3	40.5	9.7	0	49.8
Iraq (2008) ^c	7.0	0.66	0.37	0	98.97
Iraq (2012) ^c	5.0	2.0	0.5	0	97.5
Iraq (2013) ^c	5.5	2.1	0.6	0	97.3

Source: Prepared by the researchers, ^aASOSAI report (2010), ^bSupreme Audit Board report (1994), ^cMinistry of Finance and Ministry of Planning, Baghdad, Iraq (2009), (2012) and (2013)

Table 2 Percentage of tax revenue to expenditure and GDP

Year	Tax revenue (ID million)	Expenditure budget of state (ID million)	Percentage of (2)–(3)	G.D.P. (ID million)	Percentage of (2)–(5)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1966	68.1	158.6	42.9	864.4	8.0
1976	179.8	1,387.7	13.0	4,696.8	3.8
1986	985.0	3,854.0	25.6	13,086.0	7.5
1993	2,594.0	6,877.0	37.7	128,300.0	2.3
2008	728,800.0	56,256,000.0	13.0	10,411,429.0	7.0
2011	5,963,822.0	64,022,625.0	9.2	84,136,000.0	7.1
2012	8,190,200.0	117,500,000.0	7.0	163,872,400.0	5.1
2013 ^a	9,620,000.0	138,000,000.0	7.0	184,000,000.0	5.3

Source: Prepared by the researchers, Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports, 1967, 1977, 1994, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013^a (estimated budget) Baghdad, Iraq. ID= Iraqi Dinar (each 1\$= 1,180 ID in 2008) (normally 1 ID=US\$3.3 before 1993)

due to increased dependence on oil revenues (increasing at oil price) and exemptions of income taxes for all Iraqi governmental employees.

Table 2 illustrates the percentage of tax revenues relative to both the general state budget and G.D.P. The table illustrates the decline from 1986 to 1993, increasing thereafter although it still did not reach the levels of 1993 by 2008 and 2012. In 2013 the estimated budget shows that oil revenue is in Iraqi Dinars (ID) (120,165,300,000,000 ID) or in US\$ (\$101,835,000,000) on the base 3,100,000 barrel per day at \$90 per barrel. The percentage of tax revenue to oil revenue in 2012 is equal to 3.2 %. Non-oil revenues will contribute less than 8 % of the total public revenues in 2012, and reflects the dominance of oil revenues on public revenues and the low contribution of non-oil activities. However, withholding support for public sector industrial projects puts a significant constraint on economic development in the country's strategic direction. Since industrial development is the key to any

subsequent development in other economic sectors, this leads to diversification of income sources.

The expected increase in tax revenues in obtaining tax revenues from foreign oil companies will be 360 billion ID in 2013. The corporate income tax rose from 250 billion ID in 2011 to 304 billion ID in 2012, and to 370 billion in 2013 a change of over 21 % for both 2012 and 2013. Most deficit in Iraqi budget is related to operating budget. The shortage of investment budget is another reason. In general there is a lack of foreign investment due to security situation in general and to political conflict position especially between different parties.

The complex tax laws in Iraq and the lack of appropriate management systems in the emergence of the tax difficulties prevent the measure adequate revenue to fund important services provided by the government without a large deficit in the general budget and the consequent effects on the macroeconomic level.

In 2008 tax revenues from various sources totaled more than 0.7 a trillion Iraqi dinar, around \$530 million, an increase of 16 % from the previous year. While in 2012 there is more improvement about 37 % from 2011, but taxes still account for just a tiny fraction of government revenue in a state almost entirely reliant on oil.

Taxes include personal and corporate income taxes, excise taxes, and tariffs. Other revenues include social contributions—such as payments for social security and hospital insurance—grants, and net revenues from public enterprises. Normalizing the data, by dividing total revenues by GDP, enables easy comparisons across countries, and provides an average rate at which all income (GDP) is paid to the national level government for the supply of public goods and services.

Audit Organizations

The BSA

Diwan of Financial Control is the Arabic name of the BSA. The date of its foundation was 1927, when the first Iraqi state audit department was established as a very small department. In 1968, law no. 42 was issued to establish BSA as an independent department of the executive, to give it powers to act on behalf of the legislature, to audit the accounts and review the accounting systems, and to act as a financial controller of the state enterprises. The phrase, “financial controller” as applied to BSA, does not mean that they are engaged in the day to day management of the state enterprises. Their role is that of an outside monitoring body examining such matters as the budget.

In 1980, a new law (no. 194) was issued superseding law no. 42. The new law gave the BSA more power and authority to execute its activities and to play a bigger role in the economy. It made the department responsible for financial control in Iraq; therefore, its chairman has been directly linked to the President of the Revolution Command Council. It issues financial and accounting instructions which have to be followed by the accountants in state enterprises, mixed capital companies, and all foreign companies. It is the department responsible for the practice and

control of the UAS, according to the resolution no. 1260 in 1982. Also, it has the authority to penalize and prosecute offenders.

In 1990, a new law (no. 6) was issued granting more power to evaluate the performance of state enterprise. The main objectives are:

1. To audit all the state enterprises, mixed and foreign companies.
2. To provide technical assistance to all state enterprises in the fields of accountancy, administration, and organization.
3. To evaluate the performance and efficiency of state enterprises to ensure the correct procedures in using their economic resources.

Now, the BSA is linked to the Parliament and has the same objectives and power. Its annual financial reports are presented to the parliamentary financial committee. The president of BSA has two deputies. Each deputy is responsible for three auditing sectors. Each sector controls a number of ministries and directorates, examples of which are the Finance Ministry and Central Bank.

Each sector is responsible for the external financial assessment of the enterprises in its field and has groups of officials to carry out its duties. If the enterprise administration does not respond to the audit report the matter is reported to the concerned Minister, and if the Minister also fails to respond, the matter is reported to the Prime Minister. The follow-up procedure of an audit report is very strict (such as invite the Minister to the Parliament).

The COI

The COI is an innovation occupation office and an independent governmental body that is responsible for fighting corruption. It was established in Iraq as the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), pursuant to a statute promulgated by Iraq Governing Council and according to delegation of the dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in order 55 of 2004. In 2005, the Iraqi permanent constitution considered the CPI an independent commission, subject to the Parliament and changed its name to the COI. This change was made through article 102, which states “High Commission for Human Rights, High Independent Electoral Commission and COI are, hereby considered an independent authority, subjected to the Iraqi Parliament and the law of Iraq.”

The COI is designed to prevent corruption, using legal means in implementing its function as a high authority consistent with section (3) of the law annexed to 2004 order 55 to work, as appropriate, for any investigation purposes. It is divided into two primary areas:

1. Legal—this area has four responsibilities: (1) investigating corruption cases by investigator under a judge; (2) proposing legislations for the purpose of fighting corruption and fostering the culture of integrity, honesty, transparency, accountability, and submission to questioning and fair dealing with government; (3) to

require Iraqi officials to disclose their financial status; and (4) to promulgate code of conduct for public sector employees.

2. Educational, informative, and instructive—this area is responsible for developing curriculums to align ethical values, in coordination with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education; preparing research and studies; training; media campaign and mass communication activities; holding symposiums; educating public sector employees and ordinary people (this includes supporting their demands, through transparency, accountability, and investigation).

The Commission consists of six directorates: investigations, legal affairs, prevention, education and public relations, non-governmental organizations, and administration. The Commission is chaired by a commissioner, which is a Minister-level position appointed by the Prime Minister. The commissioner may not be removed, unless his removal is approved by the Parliament—a provision which is applicable to cabinet ministers. The Commission has one deputy commissioner, which is a deputy minister position. The COI is acting under article (6) and (36) of UN Convention against Corruption that Iraq has verified, according to law 35 of 2007.

Normally many countries have a three-tier system of raising revenues (ASOSAI report 2010): (a) federal taxes and non-tax sources, (b) state/provincial taxes and non-tax sources, and (c) local taxes and non-tax sources. In Iraq, revenues are raised through legislatures such as:

- The State General Budget Law.
- The General Accounting Law.
- Taxation Laws.
- Customs Law.
- Companies Law.
- The Distribution of Profits of Public Economic Enterprises Law.
- Other Laws.

Revenue auditing in Iraq is subject to the law of the BSA (No. 6 in 1990) and other laws like the General Accounting Law and the General State Budget Law. Auditing of government revenues aims to review and evaluate the results of the implementation of revenue policies and plans. Governmental revenues are audited with reference to the revenue laws. However, auditors must keep abreast of the following factors:

- Emergence of new sources of revenue and the decline/abandonment of old ones.
- Change of different revenue resources in keeping with the economic and political changes.

The audit process is completed in accordance with accountancy standards and principles. Bodies in charge of auditing are authorized to have access to all files concerned with revenues including, review such files, and issue appropriate, related financial statements.

In fact, the financial control of public revenue is very much a concern of the BSA. Accordingly procedures of checking, auditing, and reviewing are devised to

examine the procedures followed by the various administrative units to achieve their aims and suggest appropriate measures to avoid deficiencies that might prevent them from achieving these aims. These procedures are also used to identify systematic weaknesses and individual errors.

Audit Procedures and Methodologies in Revenue Audit

The methodologies and techniques of revenue audit have evolved over time depending on the local circumstances. The methodologies have been designed to achieve the objectives provided in the audit mandates:

- The object of receipt audit is to seek evidence that revenue is assessed and collected according to law and errors of omission and commission are avoided. It also seeks assurance that pre and post-control systems (described later) operate efficiently and in accordance with the stated objectives in the sovereign and subordinate legislations.
- The collection and accounting system of government revenues are checked in audit to assess whether internal procedures and controls adequately provide for regular accounting of collection and allocation and credit of the collections to the government account.

Despite the variation in the nature and extent of different government revenues, the BSA in Iraq follows a comprehensive auditing system, which could be summarized as follows:

1. Compliance Audit

This kind of audit control examines the compliance to laws and instructions to estimate, realize, collect, and deposit the revenues and also checks out that revenues are accounted, recorded, obtained, and classified in accordance with accountancy standards and principles. This audit has two facets:

- (a) Legitimacy auditing—determines the compliance with law and instructions.
- (b) Financial auditing—determines the compliance with known accounting principles followed in applying, classifying, and summarizing financial procedures to be explained within the financial data

2. Performance (Operational) Auditing

This is the most important type of auditing practiced by the BSA. This includes all financial and non-financial aspects to assure the soundness of statements and the extent of achieving the desired objects of institutions and their laws. Article 3 of the law of the BSA provides for an annual plan for performance audit. There was a study under way to evaluate the performance of the tax system in Iraq under the annual audit plan of 2011, as well as the previous 2 years.

In Canada, the scope of performance audit includes the examination of economy, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and environmental effects of government

activities; procedures to measure effectiveness; accountability relationships; protections of public assets; and compliance with authorities. The subject of the audit can be a government entity or activity (business line), a sectoral activity, or a government-wide functional area (OAG 2005). Similarly, in Iraq, performance auditing consists of many procedures which seek to examine:

- (a) The efficiency of the internal control systems and the effectiveness of other systems and the financial procedures and employee understanding of these systems and procedures and their capabilities to achieve the task;
- (b) The efficiency, adequacy, and comprehensiveness of the accounting system in the administrative unit;
- (c) The efficiency of data which are produced by the system to meet the user needs in different administrative levels related to planning, implementation, follow-up, and control; and
- (d) The efficiency of the laws and legislations (i.e., whether the objects and financial policies are clear).

Audit Planning

The BSA in Iraq prepares an annual general plan of its work and specific plans for different sectors. The Board has specific plans for offices such as Income tax, Customs, etc. These plans are prepared according to scientific norms depending on the available audit resources. While implementing the audit plans, the Board ensures that the objects of the plan are administered in an effective and efficient manner while supporting routine activities related to the audit, review, and follow-up. The Board seeks assurance:

1. That the auditees have achieved the policy and program objectives;
2. That treatment and classification of the revenues were done according to the established accounting standards; and
3. That the related instruction, systems, and laws have been applied to the fullest extent.

Auditing Methods for Government Revenues

The main duty of BSA is preparing a report in which it explains its opinion about the results of the audit statements according to the produced facts and data. The Board follows several methods of audit checks according to the nature of its work:

1. The pre-control—this task is achieved according to the law and a previous agreement of higher authority in Iraq.
2. The periodic (immediate) control—the control institutions check the accounts in the same year.
3. The post-control—the Board's checking during the post— process focuses on the two operational stages:

- (a) The estimation stage—this task is done by the technical departments to check and determine tax.
- (b) The implementation, levying, and collection stage—this is done by the department responsible for levying and collection of tax.

Human Resource Management

BSA membership exceeds 1,700 auditors which cover all the state. Revenue audit has been accepted as a specialized area requiring adequate skill formation and ongoing improvement. Most of the BSA members are responsive to the training needs in this area and are trying to develop or have developed strong task forces to carry out an effective mission in this branch of audit. Various internal and external training courses and workshops are organized by the BSA and the University of Baghdad through the creation of a diploma program in auditing. In order to equip the work force with the necessary theoretical and empirical inputs, this program takes 3 years to complete.

Since revenue audit is largely a legalistic audit, the complexities and nuances of the tax laws and case laws have to be clearly understood and appreciated by auditors for any meaningful analysis. Maintenance of a properly documented and accessible system of case laws, national and international, is necessary to keep the knowledge and information current. In addition, it is necessary to present many conferences and workshop in many countries.

Stages of the auditing process and the role of the specialized departments in the tax offices are as follows:

A. Audit checking of the technical department

- To realize the efficiency of internal control systems
- To ascertain how far the tax estimates are accurate
- To insure that tax estimates are fair and based on a sound footing and on adequate data
- To ensure the soundness of tax procedures
- To ensure that procedures are being followed properly

B. For departments engaged in collection of revenues, the following checks are applied:

- To ensure that all revenues are collected during the financial period in fact represents all the revenues which are due for collection during the period under the laws.
- To compare the actual collections with the budget estimate.
- To analyze the reasons for arrears in collection.
- To assure that all revenues are deposited in the banks accounts.
- To ensure that all records (journal, ledgers) have been fixed by law.
- To ensure that the system for collection of revenues is working efficiently.
- To ensure that demand notices have been issued to the tax payers.
- To ensure that proceedings have been initiated against tax defaulters.

C. Questionnaire on internal control—this method is used for obtaining accurate information related to the soundness of financial procedures to check the following points:

- The extent of soundness of the accounting and financial systems and the adequacy of the records used by tax offices
- The soundness of the internal control systems which help determination of the size of the sample of audit
- To ensure that the procedures related to collection of revenues and other procedures are accurate

Discussion

Government revenues increased as global oil prices remained persistently high for much of 2012. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their economic potential. The task of rebuilding the country after 2003 remains immense and is made harder by sectarian politics and prolonged violence. Iraq's reconstruction requires not only the rebuilding of its infrastructure, but also of its economic and social institutions and the creation of a business environment that attracts capital and brings with it new technology and skills to modernize the economy. Iraq's huge oil reserves could, in principle, provide the revenues needed to finance the reconstruction, but strong institutions and favorable business environment are needed to use these resources effectively. The longer-term outlook is strong as domestic and foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector is bearing fruit. According to the Ministry of Oil, oil production reached 3.3 million barrels per day (mbpd), of which 2.6 mbpd are exported, and extraction and exports are projected to increase considerably in the years ahead. Nevertheless, Iraq's economic prospects continue to be subject to significant risks, deriving mainly from institutional and capacity constraints, oil prices volatility, delays in the development of oil infrastructure, and an extremely fragile political and security situation.

From 2009, parliament took an unprecedented step and indicted some government ministers through the Integrity Committee and utilizing financial reports. The following years have been showed many invitations to Prime Minister and Ministers in Parliament. The interesting situation was the Minister of Trade whose indictment was televised as when he was accused of corruption, arrested, and imprisoned. However, due to the political influence of his party, they tried to smuggle him outside of the country, but was captured at airport. Another example of corruption was the case of the Minister of Electricity. He was smuggled from the country because of his US nationality.

The role of the parliament should be changed to promote and encourage the implementation in the particular type of accountability informed by new public management (for instance the Inspector General of each ministry).

Parliament has begun to take important steps in limiting corruption. However, it needs to assume a larger role and increase its power in order to educate politicians and the leading political parties about the merits of the accountability system. It must also give more attention to governmental auditing reports and issue strict instructions to rein in the corruption. Table 3 shows the influence of country-wide corruption by presenting the audit results from the COI in 2009. Table 4 shows the influence of corruption in the capital (Baghdad) by presenting the audit results from the COI in 2009.

Table 3 above provides a summary of the ratios of the extent of bribery detected by the COI in Iraq during 2009. The table indicates that the percentages of detected bribes reduced from 20.65 % in June to 10.35 % in December (20.65–14.62 % in accumulated form for the period from June to December). Results summarized in

Table 3 Number of forms checked and bribes detected by the commission of integrity in Iraq 2009

Month	No. of forms checked	No. of paying bribery	Bribes detected (%)	Accumulated no. of forms checked	Accumulated no. of paying bribery	Bribes detected (accumulated) (%)
June	10,641	2,197	20.65	10,641	2,197	20.65
July	8,059	1,533	19.02	18,700	3,730	19.95
August	7,561	1,378	18.32	26,261	5,108	19.45
September	9,653	1,438	14.90	35,914	6,546	18.23
October	15,563	2,145	13.78	51,477	8,691	16.88
November	16,647	1,905	11.44	68,124	10,596	15.55
December	14,815	1,533	10.35	82,939	12,129	14.62

Source: Commission of integrity report, 2010, Baghdad, Iraq

Table 4 Number of forms checked and bribes detected by the commission of integrity in Baghdad 2009

Month	No. of forms checked	No. of paying bribery	Bribes detected (%)	Accumulated no. of forms checked	Accumulated no. of paying bribery	Bribes detected (accumulated) (%)
April	897	321	35.79	897	321	35.79
May	1,773	445	25.10	2,670	766	28.69
June	3,445	475	13.79	6,115	1,241	20.29
July	3,338	568	17.02	9,453	1,809	19.14
August	3,883	381	9.81	13,336	2,190	16.42
September	4,919	404	8.21	18,255	2,594	14.21
October	7,466	542	7.26	25,721	3,136	12.19
November	6,777	379	5.59	32,498	3,515	10.82
December	6,505	323	4.97	39,003	3,838	9.84

Source: Commission of integrity report, 2010, Baghdad, Iraq

Table 3 for Iraq or consistent with the results provided in Table 4 indicate a reduction of detected bribes in the capital Baghdad from 35.79 % in April to 4.97 % in December (35.79–9.84 % in accumulated form).

Findings, Limitations, and Further Studies

Revenue audit has been recognized as an important area that requires greater attention and more specialization. In this era of trade globalization and shift to a market economy, every country will be opening avenues of investment. Governments' fiscal policies and laws will in turn tend to change according to the new economic environment. Consequently audit will have to adapt itself to the changed pattern of government revenues and define its auditing standards according to further studies.

For example, a Value Added Tax (VAT) may replace the existing indirect taxes in Iraq and a liberalized tax regime may reduce the tax rates to attract investments without reducing the share of government revenues. Audit will have a role to play in ensuring that appropriate tax laws are in place to translate the changes and also to assure laws are implemented properly to safeguard government revenues in an era of liberalization. Information Technology (IT) audit is another area of challenge which will have its own momentum of development in a new Iraq.

The Central Bank has successfully held the exchange rate at about 1,180 Iraqi dinar/US dollar since January 2009. Inflation has remained under control since 2006 as security improved. However, Iraqi leaders remain hard pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into an improved standard of living for the Iraqi populace. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country despite a bloated public sector. Encouraging private enterprise through deregulation would make it easier for Iraqi citizens and foreign investors to start new businesses. Rooting out corruption and implementing reforms—such as restructuring banks and developing the private sector—would be important steps in this direction.

The government should encourage develop countries to invest in Iraq in different sectors and not in oil sector only, by issuing the law of infrastructure, which parliament rejected according to the political conflicts. Therefore, political differences may delay many useful laws in parliament.

The main conclusions that can be drawn from this study relate to government revenues in Iraq. Government revenues depend totally on oil revenues in spite of increasing tax revenues. It is clear from Table 1 that government revenues in Iraq do not reflect the situation in developing countries. The auditing rules are sufficient enough for the existing situation, but there will be a need to improve the new kinds of government revenues such as VAT and IT. The researcher recommend that the parliament increases its role in ensuring that most government expenses are legal and far from financial and managerial corruption. Parliament should create and support new control bodies to oversee the new revenues and expenditures. It should also activate a role related to state taxes and reduce exemptions.

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The Role of Organizational Culture and Management Behavior in Organizational Innovation: A Case Study of the Agricultural Extension Organization (AEO) in Iran

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Introduction

Almost all organizations face a dynamic environment, characterized by rapid technological change, shortening product life cycles and globalization. Thereby, organizations need to be more creative and innovative than before to survive, to compete, to grow, to lead, and to succeed (Gumusluoglu and Ilsev 2009). Additionally, organizations are continually under competitive pressures and forced to develop new innovations. Innovations have always been essential for organizational long-term survival

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and growth, and currently play an even more crucial role in a company's future to follow the rapid pace of market evolution (Santos-Vijande and Lvarez-Gonzlez 2007).

Business and technological changes also are threatening organizational sustainability, and modern management faces many challenges (Koc 2007). Therefore, becoming an innovative organization is a means to compete in this dynamic and changing business environment (Dooley and Sullivan 2003; Wong and Sang Chin 2007). However, one of the most serious challenges facing a company, particularly a high-technology firm, is how to manage innovation as the organization evolves (Koberg et al. 1999). It is apparent that in order to satisfy the customer's unlimited expectations, companies need to orientate themselves to their customers' wants, as well as latent needs, and as a result, provide products and services which are perceived to be valuable. In fact, achieving successful innovation is not simple for most organizations as it innately is no easily interpreted (Dougherty and Hardy 1996). A combination of innovative ideas and good organizational innovation management (OIM) is the key to sustaining competitive organizational innovation in the long-term (Adams et al. 2006; Ahmed 1998; Wong and Sang Chin 2007).

An innovation can be a new product or service, a new production technology, a new operation procedure, or a new management strategy to an enterprise (Liao et al. 2008; Nonaka and Yamanouchi 1989; Skerlavaj et al. 2010; Tushman and Nadler 1986). As revealed by several researchers in this field, innovation is one of the paths to maintaining growing and promising organizational performance (Cottam et al. 2001). It is also an essential element for sustaining competitiveness and ensuring an organization's future potential (Krause 2004).

Organizational innovativeness is a complicated phenomenon. Conventional research on the subject has explored the determinants of an organization's propensity to innovate. Although researchers have analyzed the influence of individual, organizational, and environmental variables (Baldrige and Burnham 1975; Kimberly and Evanisko 1981), most of the research has focused on organizational structure (Lam 2004).

Keegan and Turner (2002) state managers play an important role in creating and facilitating innovative environment. Managing innovative ideas is an important step towards effective organizational innovation (Wong and Sang Chin 2007). It is a strong predictor for realizing innovative ideas and management of organizational innovation as innovation begins with top management who believe organizational innovation is the way to survival (Lee and Chang 2006). Top management, with an effective leadership style, also creates an environment for innovation within the company. It should be able to inspire and motivate the entire work force and encourage employee involvement, development, and learning (Borgelt and Falk 2007).

Christensen (1999) describes the management of innovation as an overriding responsibility of today's managers. Product innovation, for instance, entails developing new goods and services. Managing such innovation may help firms meet or even drive changing market demands. Likewise, process innovation involves creating or improving methods of production, service, or administrative operations. Effective process innovation may enhance organizational efficiency and responsiveness (Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 2001; Khazanchi et al. 2007).

In regard to the factors affecting organizational innovation, the literature has shown that organizational culture plays an important role in creating an innovative environment within organizations (Khazanchi et al. 2007). According to Jassawalla

and Sashittal (2002) “an innovation-supportive culture is defined as a firm’s social and cognitive environment, the shared view of reality, and the collective belief and value systems reflected in a consistent pattern of behaviors among participants” (p. 43). In addition, culture may provide an overarching frame of reference, helping align employee behavior with organizational objectives of innovation and meet paradoxical demands for control and flexibility. Organizational culture is defined broadly as a collection of values, beliefs, and norms shared by its members and reflected in organizational practices and goals (Khazanchi et al. 2007).

McGourty et al. (1996) found that an organizational culture may be modified by specific management practices through strategic direction, employee selection, rewards and recognition, employee deployment, support of idea generation, and multifunctional teaming to encourage innovative behavior. Idea generation and innovation are two interrelated factors within an organizational environment. Innovation starts with ideas and therefore is regarded as an important variable of the innovation capacity of an organization. The way individuals and organizations collect, disseminate, exchange, and use knowledge influences idea generation. Additionally, management of the flow of technological information leads to effective generation of ideas as an important part of an organization’s innovation capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Macdonald and Williams 1994; Koc 2007).

According to Peters and Waterman (1982) and Pinchott (1985), middle managers play an important role in informally encouraging employees to innovate and take risks. These middle managers provide political and organizational support for “skunk work” activities that result in innovative ventures (Hornsby et al. 2001). Kanter (1985) and Quinn (1985) also noted the importance of middle managers in promoting autonomous or informal corporate entrepreneurial activities. Middle managers can do this by providing rewards (mostly intrinsic) that allow employees to experiment with, and explore the feasibility of, innovative ideas (Hornsby et al. 2001).

Obviously, many organizational and environmental factors may affect organizational innovation, but this research has mainly focused on the two important factors of management behavior and organizational culture. As reviewed in the literature, management and culture affect multiple other organizational aspects. Therefore, it is vital to know how these two factors would affect organizational innovation, as well as how managers and policy makers should prepare necessary conditions, facilities, and innovative environments for changing management behaviors and organizational culture in organizations.

Purposes and Objectives

The main purpose of this chapter was to explore how management behavior and organizational culture can affect organizational innovation in Agricultural Extension Organization (AEO). To do this, the research has mainly focused on the two important factors and the roles of other organizational factors such as external environment were not dealt with. The other objectives in this study were:

- To describe demographic profile of the respondents,
- To identify the employees’ perceptions of AEO towards management behavior,

- To determine the employees' perceptions of AEO towards the organizational culture,
- To assess the level of organizational innovation, and
- To analyze the relationships among two independent variables and organizational innovation.

Methods and Materials

The study used correlation and descriptive-analytic methodologies. The statistical population included the employees (experts) who were working at AEOs in Iran ($N=5,345$). Based on a regional classification of provinces into six regions, six provinces were randomly selected. Then, the affordable number of samples (the expert employees) was randomly selected in terms of frequency of employees at the AEOs. The estimated size samples were 215 ($n=215$), when the Cochran formula of calculating size samples was used.

A questionnaire was initially developed according to an extensive review of literature and finalized after both the pre-test and the face validity process. Questionnaire reliability was estimated by calculating Cronbach's Alpha, and it was 0.86 ($\alpha=0.86$). Face validity of the questionnaire was also assessed by a panel of both agricultural extension experts in AEO and some faculty members at Tehran University. Some changes were made to the questionnaire as a result of review by the panel of experts.

The questionnaire consisted of two separate parts. The first part included some questions about the quality of management behavior and organizational culture as independent variables. The second part included the questions about the level of organizational innovation as dependent variable. A Likert-type scale ranged from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) was used to quantify the responses in all parts.

The data were collected by an interviewing team using the questionnaire. Descriptive statistics (i.e., frequencies, valid percent, the means, and standard deviations) were used to describe the data. Spearman correlation test was also employed to determine whether or not relationships exist between the independent variables and the level of organizational innovation as dependent variable.

Results

A demographic profile of the respondents showed that the average age of respondents was 38.7 ($SD=8$). Respondents had an average of 13.8 years of experience in the organization. A majority of the respondents (66.8 %) had completed a bachelor level program in agricultural science. Most of the employees (85.4 %) were married.

The following are the findings describing the quality of management behavior and organizational culture based on the employees' perceptions.

Table 1 Employee perceptions of management behavior

Management behavior	<i>n</i>	Mean ^a	S.D.
In my organization, management encourages the development of new ideas and new ways of operating	214	2.46	1.25
New ideas are supported by management	211	2.55	1.18
My manager evaluates employees based on doing job description properly	210	2.89	1.32
The management likes challenges and different opinions	208	2.11	1.17
Management is risk-taker in decision making	213	2.49	1.24
Management considers different matters of the employees' point of view	214	2.03	1.29
Management tries to recruit creative persons	206	2.28	1.30
In my organization, there is a specific system for employees' suggestions	213	2.28	1.42
In my organization, employees' innovation and creativity is important and valuable	214	2.60	1.27
In my organization, there is enough authority and freedom for employees to work	211	2.43	1.36
Management tries to solve problems by using participative decision making	209	2.54	1.23
Management uses different management styles on different situations	210	2.48	1.23
Management prefers to delegate the authorities of duties	211	2.81	1.34
Total	214	2.40	0.86

^aScale: 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, 5 = very high

Management Behavior

The employees' perception of management behavior in AEO is presented in Table 1. As indicated in this table, management's efforts regarding encouragement and development of new ideas and new ways for operation were calculated between low and moderate ($M=2.46$). Applicable new ideas were not widely supported by management ($M=2.55$). According to employees' perceptions, managers evaluate employees moderately based on job analysis ($M=2.89$). The mean magnitude showed a rather weak attitude of the management regarding whether or not management likes to face challenges and to accept different ideas ($M=2.11$). Managers were moderate risk-takers in decision making ($M=2.49$) and their recruitment of creative persons was somehow low ($M=2.28$). Overall, the management behavior in this organization was assessed between low and moderate and this shows that management behavior is not suitable enough to provide necessary conditions for developing organizational innovativeness.

Organizational Culture

As shown in Table 2, there is moderate communication between management and employees for solving problems ($M=2.62$). In the organization, personnel were not encouraged to expand their capacity for achievement ($M=2.08$) and the

Table 2 Employees' perceptions of the organizational culture

Organizational culture	<i>n</i>	Mean ^a	S.D.
In our organization, there is a common way to communicate manager and employees for solving problems	214	2.62	1.22
Personnel are continuously encouraged to expand their capacities to achieve more	212	2.08	1.08
Organization tries to foster the employees potential	214	1.90	1.25
Failure is seen as an opportunity learning and getting experiences	211	2.05	1.24
There is a strong emphasis on teamwork in our organization	210	2.18	1.24
Our organization has a widely belief that innovation is an absolute necessary for the organization's future	209	2.60	1.18
Employees are encouraged to continually look at things in a new ways	207	1.94	1.22
Confidence, trust, and accountability are words which describe how management treats the employees	211	2.60	1.20
Employees are evaluated based on the value of their thought and ideas	214	2.01	1.23
In our organization, employees are the key to success	214	2.27	1.31
In our organization, employees decide the way of doing their jobs	213	2.14	1.27
There is a strong commitment to organization and its goals	213	2.72	1.38
Employees feel that they are their own boss	214	2.08	1.30
Total	214	2.25	0.981

^aScale: 1=very low, 2=low, 3=moderate, 4=high, 5=very high

organization's attempt to foster the employees' potential was definitely low ($M=1.90$). Based on workers perceptions, considering failure as an opportunity was low ($M=2.05$) as well as emphasis on teamwork ($M=2.18$). Overall, the total mean shows the organizational culture is not suitable for facilitating and developing innovation in the organization.

Measuring Organizational Innovation

The level of organizational innovation as dependent variable was measured with indicators related to innovative activities and renewal in plans and procedures. As indicated in Table 3, respondents assessed the level of innovation and renewal in plans and procedures between low and medium ($M=2.51$). The level of organizational innovation as dependent variable was measured with indicators related to innovative activities and renewal in plans and procedures.

Correlation Between Independent Variables and Organizational Innovation

Table 4 shows the results of using Spearman correlation test to determine the relationship between independent variables (management behavior and organizational culture) and organizational innovation as the dependent variable. Positive significant relationship was observed between management behavior and organizational

Table 3 Employees' perceptions of innovation and renewal in plans and procedures in organization

Descriptors	n	Mean ^a	S.D.
New and different plans or activities in last 2 years	211	2.80	1.18
New and different ways in doing plans or activities	211	2.67	1.12
Trying to find new clients and customers	213	2.79	1.16
Replacing old methods and procedures with new ones	212	2.61	1.11
Testing new methods in doing organizational activities	213	2.39	1.03
Improving and modifying structure and rules for facilitating organizational activities	211	2.41	1.06
Setting new organizational units or departments	210	1.91	1.08
Total	212	2.51	0.85

^aScale: 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, 5 = very high

Table 4 Relationship between independent variables and organizational innovation

	Management behavior	Organizational culture
Organizational innovation	$r=0.593^{**}$ Sig=0.000	$r=0.628^{**}$ Sig=0.000

**significant relationship at 0.01 level

innovation at the $p=0.01$ level. Also, a positive significant relationship was found between the organizational culture and the level of organizational innovation in this organization. According to this finding, it can be suggested that the higher organizational factors such as management behavior and organizational culture are, the greater organizational innovation will be.

Conclusions and Implications

Organizational culture and managerial behavior as two important organizational factors were not supportive for facilitating suitable environment for organizational innovation. Moreover, a rather low level of organizational innovation was observed as well as positive relationships were found between organizational factors and organizational innovation. Accordingly, this indicates that the existing organizational environment is not suitable enough to improve organizational innovation at different levels of the organization. Therefore, it is recommended that structures and rules of the organization should be modified based upon a culture and environment supportive of organizational innovation.

The managers need to behave in a manner in which they apply human oriented styles of management so that the employees are able to better create new ideas. To do this, a supportive reward system needs to be planned. In order to provide a suitable environment for developing organizational innovation, it should be strongly in the role of organizational culture and management behavior. Therefore, it is necessary for the managers and other policy makers to realize how organizational culture and management behavior should be modified in order to facilitate organizational innovation.

Finally, in regard to modifying the organizational structure towards organizational innovation, the following suggestions are given:

- Improve organizational innovation by creating informal relationships,
- Shift from current planning systems to decentralized planning systems,
- Apply participatory decision making approaches in which all stakeholders are involved,
- Make control and monitoring informal without complicated organizational hierarchy,
- Change the available reward system based on the employees' competencies and their innovative behavior, and
- Make training programs about organizational innovation processes available for both employees and managers.

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Saudi Arabia and the Mirage of Decentralization

Mohamad G. Alkadry

Introduction

Around the world, countries adopt centralized and decentralized administrative models. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. This chapter does not try to fall on either side of the argument on decentralization. It rather makes a descriptive statement about a case where the hierarchy suggests a decentralized model while at the same time a high degree of centralization is being practiced. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a nation-state that has the hierarchy of a decentralized administration while at the same time most decisions affecting local and regional governments are made by the central government in Riyadh. This system has proven to fail on several occasions. Yet, the government is taking even more steps to institutionalize this decentralization schizophrenia. Arguably, the King's move to hold local elections does not necessarily strengthen local governance because much of the decision-making continues to occur centrally.

In this chapter, I first take a closer look at the context of governance in Saudi Arabia by looking at the context of local governance in Saudi Arabia including population, form of government, organization of civil service, and legal context. The following section looks specifically at issues of local governance including local government structure and organization. Then, the final section addresses the main claim of this chapter about the effectiveness of local governance in Saudi Arabia and makes recommendations for the future.

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Background

In 2010, the Saudi Population was 25,731,776—82 % lived in urban centers while 13 % lived in rural communities. Saudi Arabia is the 43rd largest country in terms of population size. There are an estimated 5,576,076 non-nationals who reside in Saudi Arabia. It is estimated that 33 % of the Country's female population and 17 % of the Country's male population is illiterate. The Capital of Saudi Arabia is Riyadh with 4.7 million residents, followed by Jeddah with 3.2 million residents, Mecca with 1.5 million residents, Medina with 1.1 million residents, and Dammam with 902,000 residents. The median age is 24.9 years. The population has been growing at a rate of 1,548 annually. It is estimated that 100 % of Saudi nationals are Muslim (UNDESA 2004; Index Mundi 2011).

Geographically, Saudi Arabia is the 14th largest country in the world. It is 2,149,690 km². The country is divided into 13 manatiq (singular—mintaqah) which are Al Bahah, Al Hudud ash Shamaliyah (Northern Border), Al Jawf, Al Madinah (Medina), Al Qasim, Ar Riyad (Riyadh), Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern), 'Asir, Ha'il, Jizan, Makkah (Mecca), Najran, and Tabuk. Each mintaqah has several jurisdictions that fall under it. Some of these jurisdictions are called cities, some are called vil-lages, and some are called provinces.

The County's nominal GDP in 2011 is estimated at \$483,900,000,000. Agriculture contributed 4.5 %, industry contributed 55.2 %, and services added 40.3 % of that GDP. Government consumption represents almost a quarter of the GDP (23.2 %). Military spending accounts for 11.6 % of the GDP—there are 105,000 people employed by branches of the armed forces, while education employees amount to 295,000 (UNDESA 2004). Public employees number nearly one million people.

History and Political System

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established by King Abdulaziz bin Abdelrahman Al-Saud in 1932. While Shari'ah law remains the source of Saudi Arabia's basic system of government, King Fahd introduced a new Basic Law for the System of Government (called the Nizam and is equivalent to a Constitution). The Nizam codifies public administration procedures and functions.

King Fahd also introduced the manatiq System and Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative Council). There are 13 manatiq in Saudi Arabia. Majlis al-Shura consists of 150 members, mostly highly educated and academics, and a chairman—all appointed by the King for a period of 4 years. Half of the members must be newly appointed. The Majlis has the authority to initiate legislation which is then forwarded to the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) for approval and execution. The king decides on disagreements between the Cabinet and the Majlis Al-Shura.

The King of Saudi Arabia plays executive, legislative, and judicial roles and has the final say in matters decided by the three branches. The king is constrained by

Islamic law, consensus among members of the royal family and consultation with religious and political leaders. The Royal Diwan is the primary executive office and it is where the King holds his consultation majlis.

The King is the highest authority of the land. He—currently Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (since 1 August 2005)—is King and Prime Minister. Heir Apparent is Crown Prince Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud who is also half-brother of the monarch. The monarch is both the chief of state and head of government. The Crown Prince is also Minister of Defense. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) is appointed by the monarch every 4 years and includes many royal family members.

The monarchy is hereditary. So far, sons of King Abd al-Aziz have taken turns at ruling the country—a king serves for life but is succeeded by the oldest of his brothers and half-brothers. The Allegiance Commission created by royal decree in October 2006 established a committee of Saudi princes that will play a role in selecting future Saudi kings.

The Legislative branch is not very well developed in Saudi Arabia nor is it based on any electoral principles. As mentioned earlier, the Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura has 150 members and a chairman. The Council of Ministers announced in October 2003 its intent to introduce elections for a third of the Majlis al-Shura incrementally over a period of 4–5 years. However, to date no such elections have been held for the Majlis although elections for some local officials (municipal councils) have taken place.

The legal system of Saudi Arabia is intertwined with Islamic Law (Shari'a). Although the King has the final say in some judicial matters, the judiciary, through a 1975 Judicial Law, is deemed independent. The judiciary is managed by a special office in the Ministry of Justice. There are four types of courts in Saudi Arabia—all use Shari'a law for overall guidance. The Limited Courts hear civil and criminal case with limited penalties. The General Courts hear more serious criminal cases, tort cases, personal and family law and real estate. The Court of Appeal has three or more judges and rules based on majority. The Supreme Judicial Council is the final court of appeal for all the Shari'a courts. The Supreme Judicial Council also manages the judicial system and has the role of appointing, promoting, and transferring judges (UNDESA 2004).

Economy

Saudi Arabia has an oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves in the world and the petroleum sector produces about 75 % of the country's public revenues, accounts for 32.7 % of the country's GDP and 88 % of the country's exports (UNDESA 2004). The Country possesses about 20 % of the world's proven petroleum reserves, ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 80 % of budget revenues, 45 % of GDP, and 90 % of export earnings. Saudi Arabia is encouraging the growth of the private

sector in order to diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Diversification efforts are focusing on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. The Country's GDP in 2010 was \$622.5 billion up from \$599.7 billion in 2009.

Almost six million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, particularly in the oil and service sectors, while the central government is struggling to reduce unemployment among its own nationals. Saudi officials are particularly focused on employing its large youth population, which generally lacks the education and technical skills the private sector needs. Riyadh has substantially boosted spending on job training and education, most recently with the opening of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology—Saudi Arabia's first co-educational university. As part of its effort to attract foreign investment, Saudi Arabia acceded to the World Trade Organization in December 2005 after many years of negotiations. The government has begun establishing six "economic cities" in different regions of the country to promote foreign investment and plans to spend \$373 billion between 2010 and 2014 on social development and infrastructure projects to advance Saudi Arabia's economic development.

Government System

Saudi Arabia has a large, yet simple, intergovernmental relations structure. It is large in the sense that there are elaborate organizational structures at the local level, at the provincial and *mintaqah* level, and at the national level. It is simple in the sense that almost all planning and spending of resources decisions are made at the national level. The hierarchy of the local government organization often leads to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. It is also simple in the sense that the role of many local government leaders involves mere monitoring the execution of programs and advising the national government on priorities and execution problems.

The national government has engaged since 1970 in mega-planning with the 5-year plans. The 5-year plans are equivalent to American Capital Improvement Plans—except that the scope of the 5-year plans covers much more than local development. The 5-year plans include local infrastructure projects, roads, utilities, and many municipal-type and economic development services. Lately, the government started creating 10-year plans which have the same idea as 5-year plans except that they cover longer range planning (SAMIRAD 2011).

In Saudi Arabia, there is heavy reliance on government agencies to provide services. The non-profit sector has a limited reach into the provision of services. The rise in oil prices and the dependence of government funding on oil has resulted in little, if any, downsizing, de-concentration, outsourcing, contracting to the private sector. Even religious infrastructure and buildings, like mosques, are government controlled and government funded and are not controlled locally by the different *masjids* (mosques). The private sector, on the other hand, is very well integrated in the economy. While there has not been a substantial increase in the phenomenon of

contracting out of government services, the private sector has historically provided several infrastructure projects on a contracting-out basis. One of the major government initiatives in recent decades has been the Saudization of the labor force. Slowly, the government is taking actions to increase the number of Saudis in different sectors of the economy. In some sectors, like the public sector, it is rare to find agencies that are willing to hire non-Saudis if skilled Saudis are available (Looney 2004).

Public participation is primarily conducted in the form of majlis or forums held by each of the governors. People can voice their grievances at these majlis and the governor typically listens to the feedback and makes decisions accordingly. Al-Sulami (2008) argues that the municipal elections in Saudi Arabia—in which people selected half of their local government officials—represent a no-turning-back point toward more transparency and accountability in government. However, since the municipal elections, very little progress has occurred. And, the municipal councils hold very little if any power as we will discuss in this report.

Civil Service

The interest in organizing the civil service in Saudi Arabia is not recent. King Abdulaziz identified the organization of the civil service as a fundamental function of the Saudi Government in 1927. The “Initial Instructions”—which came with the formation of the Kingdom—in 1927 included the foundations of general rules to regulate the affairs of state employees with special attention to the prevailing conditions. This was followed by several steps that took into consideration the conditions of the different regions then.

In 1929, a Human Resources department was established to take care of administrators. Civil service jobs were classified using a three-tier classification system. There was a registrar within the Attorney General’s Office that took care of keeping personnel records. This marked the first attempt in the Kingdom to manage personnel affairs. In 1931, the function of maintaining central personnel records was enhanced through the establishment of the “Subordinates Rules.” These rules included the principles and new administrative organizational issues (Ministry of Civil Service 2011).

In 1939, The Office of Subordinates and Accounts Receivable was founded by the Ministry of Finance to manage public personnel. In 1945, this office was renamed to “Office of Employees and Retirees.” The 1953 reorganization of the Cabinet brought recognition of the need for a professional agency that would manage public personnel matters. In the same year, a decision was issued to move the office of public personnel to the Prime Minister’s office and away from the Ministry of Finance. In 1963, the office was headed by a cabinet-level appointment and was charged with all public administration personnel matters (Ministry of Civil Service 2011).

In 1977, Royal Decree M/48 (dated 07/10/1397H) created “the Civil Service Board”—a civil service rule making and enforcing body chaired by the Prime Minister. The Board draws general policy of the civil service and develops plans and

programs needed to implement them. It also issues regulations relating to the affairs of civil servants. The Bureau of Employees was also renamed as the “General Bureau of Civil Service.” A subsequent decision of the Council of Ministers in 1978 required the application of the rules of the civil service system to the staff of most public institutions (Khagegkshi 2007; Ministry of Civil Service 2011).

The Royal Order No. (A/28) in the 01/03/1420H established the Ministry of Civil Service to replace the General Board of Civil Service, and to oversee the affairs of civil servants in ministries and government departments of public and various government entities. The Ministry is charged with conducting studies and research in the civil service and raising the efficiency of workers and developing rules and procedures for filling job classifications. It is also charged with setting salaries, allowances, and bonuses. It also ensures compliance with the rules of job classification and the preparation of rules and procedures for keeping records of state employees and cooperation with the Departments of Personnel in government agencies. The Ministry also examines staff grievances referred to it by the different authorities (Khagegkshi 2007; Ministry of Civil Service 2011).

The 1977 Royal Decree to Promulgate Civil Service regulations promulgates the regulations that define “the public functions, officials, their functions, duties, allowances, indemnities, awards, compensation, termination of service and general and transitory provisions.” (UNDESA 2004, p. 10). In 2004, another Royal Decree was issued to re-form the Civil Service Commission for a period of 3 years (UNDESA 2004). In summary, a civil service law exists and had undergone several healthy amendments in the past few years and decades. It is unclear that the existing human resource management system is effective.

Decisions about salary increases are made based on a schedule which in turn is based on an elaborate classification system. The salary schedule and classifications are set by the Bureau of Employees at the Central level. Even local government employees salaries are set nationally at that level. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs is essentially the human resources manager of all local and regional government employees. This is an important function that is centrally controlled by the Riyadh national government.

Salaries in the public sector are lower than those in the private sector. Many employees tend to migrate from the public sector to the private sector—for the more lucrative salaries. In terms of pensions, all civil servants have defined benefit retirement programs. Most pension benefits are equivalent to half the last salary earned by employees. Retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women. The 2003 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks Saudi Arabia as 46th among 133 nations that range from highly clean (a score of 9.7) and highly corrupt (a score of 1.3). Saudi Arabia’s CPI score is 4.5 (responses ranged from 2.8 to 7.4) (UNDESA 2004).

The control of corruption measure refers to the “extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, and the extent to which the state is controlled by elite and private interests.” The United Arab Emirates is ranked at 82.16 percentile in 2008 while Saudi Arabia’s percentile ranking was 61.4 in the same year slightly down from 66.5 in 2003 (Data Monitor 2009).

The Saudi civil service classification divides public servants into three principle classes: Ranks 2–10 are reserved for front line employees. Ranks 11–14 include management categories. Anyone who reaches a rank higher than 15 is a *wakeel* (a rank equivalent to the Senior Executive Service Rank). Once retained, all public service will normally have tenure.

Local civil servants are subject to the same regulations as national level civil servants. Essentially Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) hires and sets the rules and compensation for all local employees. Once a position is vacant, application and hiring decisions are made by MOMRA and the Bureau of Employees. For all intents, local government officials are considered employees of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, and are subject to the same personnel rules and guidelines as any other public servant working for other ministries.

The Institute of Public Administration (IPA) is the main training institution for civil service employees in Saudi Arabia. It dates back to 1961 when it was founded by Royal Decree. The Institute has four branches: Riyadh (headquarters), Dammam, Jeddah, and Women's Branch in Riyadh (established in 1982). IPA is considered an autonomous government agency and is headed by a Board of Directors and a Director General who is assisted by two Deputy Director Generals. The Director General is the executive and chief academic officer of IPA and has a ministerial rank (UNDESA 2004).

The IPA is an independent agency headed by a cabinet-level appointment. IPA announces different training programs to agencies. Training programs are evaluated by Bureau of Employees to decide the number of continuing education credits that could be counted for purposes of promotion and salary increases. Agencies will nominate individuals and all applications are examined by IPA. IPA does not issue bachelor degrees but issues a limited number of diplomas and sometimes provides training for people going into the public sector for the first time. Assad (2000) studied training programs in Saudi public service and found that:

It was found that the majority of the employees had a bachelor's degree, but had no formal qualification in administration, had no experience in similar job, and did not do jobs which corresponded to their educational major. Therefore, not surprisingly, more often than not employees felt that their jobs did not make use of their skills and abilities. Many of them also seemed to be underemployed.

It may be stated also that training programs have been offered to employees and that the majority of those who attended indicated that training was valuable. On the other hand, it appears that most of the employees under investigation have not had adequate and appropriate training. Problems with training could be attributed to the organization itself, to the training programs offered, and to a lesser degree to the trainees themselves.

Many employees have indicated that they have not formally received any on-the-job training when they joined the organization, they were usually told how to do their job informally by their colleagues and/or the supervisor. They have gained knowledge and skills by trial and error. They were not offered training on any regular basis; and the situation of contract employees, was even worse as they usually received little or no training; office equipment have made it difficult for trained employees to apply what they had learned.

In addition, training programs have not been offered during working hours and were often not related to trainees' jobs. Last but not least, some employees have

been unwilling to apply what they have learned, and some employees had even no desire to participate in training programs. Assad recommended several strategies to enhance the quality of the Kingdom's training programs. Some of the changes involve the better recruitment of qualified public sector workforce, better efforts to ensure that trained employees are identified in strategic way and to ensure that they have an opportunity to apply what they learned in the past.

Main Themes

Local Government

The first law to organize municipalities was issued as part of the "Initial Instructions" of the Kingdom by Royal Decree on 1926. Section VIII of these instructions identified the rules for public municipal councils. Section IX focused on the management of municipalities. By 1927, additional rules were added to govern the creation and management of municipalities. The 1927 rules included 62 sections and regulated the municipal administration of Mecca, Mina, and Alshuhadaa. These rules were considered integral to sections VIII and IX of the basic instructions of the Kingdom (Khagegkshi 2005).

In 1938, new rules were issued to organize the secretariat of the capital and municipalities. This was considered the first law (with 83 sections) that deals exclusively with municipal organizations. The law cancelled the provisions of the old system that organized municipalities. Under article VI, the secretariat of the capital reports to the Attorney General while other municipalities would report to local governors or Emirs. When the Ministry of Interior was formed, it became the manager of all municipalities and it created a special administration for municipal affairs (Khagegkshi 2005).

In 1962, as a result of the growth of municipal services provided to citizens, the Cabinet provided for the development and upgrading of municipal administration and the establishment of an agency for the municipal affairs linked to the Ministry of Interior. This agency was charged with oversight of all municipal affairs, water resources, and the development of other natural resources. This agency also carried out the responsibilities of studying and planning for the development of municipal services in the Kingdom. In 1964, a Royal Decree appointed the first deputy minister to oversee this agency. In 1975, another Royal Decree elevated the status of this deputy minister to the highest level (Khagegkshi 2005).

Also in 1975, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs was created by Royal Order No. (A/266 dated 10.08.1395H) has been entrusted with the responsibility of urban planning for cities in the Kingdom including the provision of roads and infrastructure and improvement and beautification of cities and their economic development, in addition to the management services required to maintain a cleaner, healthier environment in the Kingdom. In 1977, the Higher Committee for Administrative Reform (No. 78 12/06/1397H) adopted the organization of the Ministry of Municipal

and Rural Affairs and established special bureaus for different regional and local government (Khagegkshi 2005).

Each of the three manatiq (regions, singular: mintaqat) is ruled by a governor or Emir. Governors, mostly members of the Royal Saud family, report directly to the King. Each mintaqat oversees local governments and provinces in its jurisdiction. Larger provinces are divided into districts and sub-districts—all reporting back to the governor of their mintaqat. The governor is charged with planning functions, economic development, public security, and adherence to Shari'a law (Khagegkshi 2005).

In 2003, King Fahd introduced for the first time in the history of the Kingdom the idea of elected municipal consultative councils—half of which are elected and the other half are appointed. These councils, however, hold little power more than the ability to propose projects to the central administration. Local governments have no power of the purse, and as such have very limited power. Planning and funding of major local projects is done at the national (Khagegkshi 2005).

The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs is the central body that ensures coordination, provides logistical support to decision making, ensures recording and monitors implementation of decisions. The Saudi Arabia Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) dates back to 1975 and is charged with overseeing municipal government functions, including administration, urban and rural planning, infrastructure projects. Municipal leaders report to the Minister of Municipal Affairs. MOMRA is essentially the agency that manages personnel and major projects at the local level (Khagegkshi 2007).

According to government policy, the local/provincial emirs and councils provide input on local priorities to the Ministry of Interior Local Affairs Division and to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs—and through these two ministries and sometimes directly to the Prime Minister—who currently is also the King. In practice, we do not know the extent to which these priorities are admitted into 5-year plans, the 10-year plans and other projects identified by the Central government. In the policy preparation cycle, there appears to be no mechanisms to assess the impact (budgetary, economic, social, and environmental as well as practicability of implementation) of policies. Fiscally, there is little if any separation between national and municipal financing. The central government spends about 7 % of the government's total budget on municipal administration and municipal projects.

The Saudi interaction between local, provincial, and national government is unique in many ways—it is unlike any other western separation of powers system. This complicates matters but at the same time alleviates many of the intergovernmental relations that are characteristic of many transactions in country with clearly delineated powers designed to each of the government levels.

The majority of the Saudi population is concentrated in the six largest cities: Jeddah, Riyadh, Mecca, Madina, Dammam, and Abha. The migration from rural areas into these cities has accelerated significantly in the past few decades. It also created two serious challenges for local governments. First, rural governments had to provide services to areas that are vast geographically, but are becoming increasingly less dense. The promise of economies of scale that come with population

growth in rural communities is simply disappearing. This is an experience that is not very much unlike the experience of some American communities where the population is migrating out of these communities. The second challenge is that of growth management in large cities. Saudi cities like Riyadh and Jeddah have grown at a pace that is very rare. This stress on local administrations in these cities is tremendous not only in terms of providing transportation and basic infrastructure, but also in terms of filling newly created positions with qualified employees (MOMRA 2011; Khagegkshi 2005).

Local Government Organization

The system that initially attempted to do some local organization is the Emirates System in 1940. The system gave the Emir of each region the responsibility to help collect taxes and at the same time does some economic, social, cultural, and health development. The Emir issued reports directly to Minister of Interior. However, the Emir has no authority to interfere in administrative projects or affairs conducted in his jurisdiction. He could provide advice to the local managers but has no authority over them.

In addition to the Emir, there is an administrative deputy, similar to an under-secretary function. The Emir also heads a seven-member local council which oversees the management and implementation of government policies. The Emirates System was not very effective and was largely ambiguous, but has largely provided the basis for the Muqataat system in 1963 and the Manatiq system in 1991. The Manatiq system is much more comprehensive and clear in identifying the role of the local administration vis-à-vis the central administration. It still falls short of any form of meaningful decentralization of decision making to any level below the national government agencies.

The 1991 Manatiq System identifies three levels of government: Mantiqah (region), muhafaza (province), and Markiz (locality). Every Emir heads the Mantiqah's administration and is supported by a deputy, a wakeel (similar to function of county/city manager), the heads of the administrative units operating in the jurisdiction (they are identified by minister of interior and appointed by Prime Minister), and no less than ten educated citizens also appointed by the Prime Minister based on the nomination by the Emir and the approval of the Interior Minister. Ameen–albaladiyya heads larger municipalities equivalent to provinces, Raees-baladiyya heads smaller municipalities. The 1991 Mantiq system gives the mantiqah council several responsibilities:

- (a) Identify needs of the region and propose the inclusion of these needs in the central government's economic development plan
- (b) Identify and prioritize useful projects and propose their inclusion in the annual budget
- (c) Study the comprehensive plans for cities and villages within their jurisdiction and monitor their completion after they are adopted and funded
- (d) Coordinate the region's economic and fiscal planning (MOMRA 2011; Khagegkshi 2005; Khagegkshi 2007).

Although slow, there has been a concerted effort in recent years to provide more authority to local administrations. However, such authority is associated with several systems of control by the Central government. Several ministries provide these systems including: the Cabinet, the Minister of Interior, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, other ministries that perform functions in local governments and other auditing agencies of the government.

Local governments in Saudi Arabia have limited financial resources under their authority. Therefore, they have to increasingly rely on agencies and ministries of the Central government for planning and execution of local projects. By comparison to the local jurisdictions outlined above, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs:

- (a) Urban planning for all cities including road and infrastructure planning
- (b) Administration of general services needed to maintain the environment and city improvement and beautification
- (c) Maintenance of basic infrastructure
- (d) Improving rural areas that fall outside municipal boundaries
- (e) Planning and conducting feasibility studies to improve municipal services
- (f) Improvement of the management of the Ministry to allow it to conduct the above functions (MOMRA 2011; Khagegkshi 2005; Khagegkshi 2007)

Although issues of efficiency and effectiveness are functions of the Central government, the local government, and the emirs of the Manatiq, it is unclear that benchmarking and performance measurement is widespread in the Saudi local government and central government administrations. Administrative reform in Saudi Arabia is very prevalent in all administrative units. It seems that many ministries underwent a major overhaul of its organizational structure and reporting lines. However, most changes tend to focus on organizational structure and not on processes. There has been no effective decentralization of power to the local level. Garba (2004) summarizes the issue of lack of power, decision making and financial, at the local level:

In terms of the decision-making and policy framework, Saudi Arabia has witnessed significant improvements in the capacity for both national and local governance. The management system has, however, evolved in such a way that decision-making and policy guidance is centralized at the national level while local management is restricted to implementation. The centralized structure burdens the central administration and its agencies with decision-making on issues that are of limited national importance. This leads to delays in formulating policies, carrying out necessary reform and in general decision-making. The situation limits local initiative in management and has also resulted in resistance to change in administration. (p. 605).

Additionally also, there is an inherent lack of clarity in the definition of the fundamental role of local governance. In most countries, development issues are addressed in a complementary form by both national and local governments. National governments usually establish the framework for the operation of local governments, identifying issues of national concern, issues that are common to both levels of government and issues that left to local governments to handle. Within such a framework, local governments are then free to evolve their approach and practices in local governance and to address issue of local development importance or concern.

Local Government Planning

The case of Jeddah's floods in 2010 and 2011 is perhaps a case in point on the lack of comprehensive planning and coordination of several major infrastructure projects. Saudi Arabia does not have the same fiscal problems that are consistent with developing nations and even with most developed nations. Saudi Arabia spends substantial amounts of money on infrastructure projects. The Country seems to fall short in producing services, storm water management, and wastewater management in the case of Jeddah that deal with major infrastructure challenges (floods in the case of Jeddah).

The problem, it appears, is twofold. On the one hand, there is a lack of power at the local level to conduct major planning initiatives or to fund expensive feasibility studies for major infrastructure projects. Garba (2004) argues that "policies, especially national government policies are formulated without due assessment of impact on the spatial development of local areas. As a result, some of the policies have exacerbated or generated urban problems" (p. 605).

On the other hand, the many central agencies and ministries involved in the planning, execution, and oversight of major infrastructure projects seem to do little comprehensive planning—a coordinated local level Capital Infrastructure Plan or a Comprehensive Plan that starts with an assessment of the existing infrastructure and a study of the current and future needs. Such plans will also coordinate different projects so that a street paving is not done before water lines, sewer lines, stormwater systems, and other underground systems are evaluated and upgraded.

Planning laws are not comprehensive enough to handle the challenges of urban sprawl in large cities and out-migration of the population from rural areas. There have been several commissions, such as the High Commission on the Development of Riyadh, and studies that found that oversight and planning law enforcement organizations are under-staffed and under-resourced and their labor force is often under-trained in the areas of comprehensive planning and urban development (Robert and Hugh 1979, p. 102; HCDR 1997, p. 17; Garba 2004).

There also some serious issues with coordination, horizontal coordination both at the local and the Central agency level, and vertical coordination between local and central agencies. Garba (2004) describes:

Management of development in the city also suffers from a poor coordination of activities by the various participating agencies. There is a problem of both horizontal coordination among local agencies managing growth and vertical coordination between the local agencies and agencies of the central government. There is poor coordination between the agency planning the development of the city and the agency responsible for the development and subdivision control process (HCDR 1997, p. 132).

Also most ministries and other central government agencies are involved in delivering one form of service or another in the city without adequate coordination with the local management agencies. The combined result of the lack of coordination is wastefulness in spending, duplication of activities, and general inefficiency in resource utilization. The local management agencies also lack adequate resources necessary to effectively manage a city of the size of Riyadh (Garba 2004; Mubarak 2004).

Public Finance

Property taxes and other taxes and fees charged at the local level usually make up the bulk of the local government budget. However, in Saudi Arabia, taxes are not collected and the few fees collected at the local level represent a very small portion of the money spent on local projects and administration.

Although there are requests for projects raised to the central government by local officials, most of the major infrastructure projects are managed centrally. The local government's jurisdiction is not to collect revenues and when it does such revenues go to the central administration. There is no transparency in terms of the size of the local government budget. Mid-year adjustments are allowed and occur often (interviews).

The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs receives budget requests from heads of the local governments and they make determinations on whether or not to fully or partially fund these requests. The money is transferred to local government where the local accounting division dispenses the money for the specified projects and following line-budgeting methods (interviews). Local government units do not have the authority to borrow money to fund their operations or investments on their own. Nor do they have the power to levy property or sales taxes. In fact, the entire country does not have property, income, or sales taxes (interviews).

Procurement Process

The Saudi Government Contracting and Procurement Law sets the central government rules for procurement. Local procurement follows the same rules as the Central government procurement policies and procedures. There is still no central procurement agency in Saudi Arabia. This is a function that is left to the individual agencies or ministries which have full contracting authorities. When a government project becomes available, it has to be first advertised in the Saudi Gazette. Then, the agency will notify its pre-registered vendors of this availability.

There are universal rules and regulations that govern the opening of bids. Once a contract is given to any company, information about the company, date, financial value, brief description, duration, place of execution, and point of contact information are announced by the agency. The rules for advertising calls for bids and soliciting bids are very similar to most procurement systems in the USA. There is transparency in that process up to the point of opening the bids. What happens after the opening of bids in terms of deciding who wins a bid is remarkably less transparent. Finally, the largest problem in the procurement process is the process of contract management. Going back to the Jeddah floods, one can easily see that a proper contract management system would have exposed deficiencies in the delivery of systems that cost \$2.7 billion Saudi Riyals and was supposed to prevent the storm water and sewer lines malfunction that ensued after the 2011 floods.

According to the Kingdom's procurement law, preference in procurement is given to Saudi nationals and companies where Saudis hold a controlling (51 %) interest. Companies that do not meet these criteria are required to subcontract part of their contracted services (30 %) to Saudis and Saudi-owned/controlled companies. There is a possible exemption to this rule in case Saudi companies are not available or interested in the sub-contracts. There is also a preference given to products that come from a Saudi or other Gulf origins. There is a 10 % price preference for these products.

In its accession to the WTO, Saudi Arabia committed to initiate negotiations for accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Although Saudi Arabia became an observer to the WTO Committee on Government Procurement in December 2007, it has not yet begun accession negotiations. Saudi Arabia, however, published revised government procurement procedures to bring them in line with GPA requirements in August 2006. Every Agency has a wakeel-level individual who is in charge of procurement.

At the local level, once a need for a project is identified, the central government could initiate the project. Alternatively, the Ameen (mayor) could write to the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) and ask for funding. MOMRA has to determine that a certain project is needed and determine the source of funding or the funding program for that project. Once the budget is given, the local government will announce the availability of the project publicly through the Saudi Gazette and privately by notifying registered vendors. Once bids are submitted, all sealed proposals are opened at the same time. The winner is announced and the project is awarded. The Ameen also announces a supervisor who supervises the whole project—acting as the Project Manager from the awarding agency side. Infrastructure projects are usually assigned a supervisor from the Engineering Department (interviews).

A concerted effort to audit performance of government is absent both at the Central and local levels. In 2003, the Saudi Council of Ministers required increased transparency in government procurement. The requirements include the announcing of the names of the parties, financial value, brief description, duration, place of execution, and a point of contact for every contract issued. There is room for local officials to work on improving project management skills.

Contract Management

Contract management is also done at the agency level, or even at the local level if the contracting agency is a local government. The agency head, a minister in cases of ministries, an emir in case of mintiqah and wakeel or amen al-baladiyya in case of local governments would appoint an individual to supervise the execution of the project. Essentially, this individual will act as the agency's project manager and the person in charge of ensuring that the project complies with all contracted specifications.

As mentioned earlier, during the latest Jeddah floods, it was obvious that project supervision and comprehensive planning were major issues. After spending of billions of Saudi Riyals to deal specifically with the infrastructure woes of the second largest City in the kingdom, floods in 2009 and 2011 claimed hundreds of lives and exposed a mal-designed and poorly implemented system that failed. The villain was corruption and lack of appropriate oversight of mega-contracts that were awarded to deal with the potential flooding years earlier (Shaheen 2009; Omar 2011) Currently, there is not a system of program evaluation or performance measurement. There is not a Saudi agency that is charged with conducting performance audits. The Emir of the Mintiqa usually writes an evaluation letter after the completion of the project but it is unclear that there is a requirement for him to do so.

Conclusion

The most critical issue facing the organization of local government in Saudi Arabia is the lack of empowerment of local officials in setting priorities. The organization structures are elaborate at the local level but it is unclear that the local government officials are empowered to plan and execute projects at the local level. This is precisely what creates the mirage effect. On its face, the structure is there to support a decentralized system. When one looks at the number and type of local decisions that are made at the national level, it is hard to describe the Saudi system being anything but very centralized. This also raises questions about the importance of holding local elections when local governments have little control.

A first step to dealing with this ambiguity about decentralization, it is critical for the Saudi officials to decide what type of system they want to have. If their desire is to have a decentralized system, there are many western and eastern experiences that have a reasonably effective local governance with effective and not merely ceremonial local elected or non-elected institutions. It is neither important nor expected for the Saudi system to emulate these other systems, but it stands to gain efficiency and effectiveness if it does. The Saudis might also not want the decentralized system. In that case, there are also many examples of systems that are centralized and work well. To start down that road, there is little need for the type of hierarchy that exists at the local level.

Finally, Saudi Arabia is a country with an abundance of natural and financial resources. Public service employment is important and affordable to the central government. On the one hand, the status quo involves having local government hierarchies that are capable of much more than they actually do. On the other hand, the status quo involves having central government control of planning, financing, and implementing local projects. The status quo, in both dimensions, might be a deliberate way to achieve central government's full control while improving public sector employment at the local level.

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Decentralization in Lebanon

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Introduction

The Ta'if Accord, which brought a formal conclusion to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989), mandates that the Lebanese government implement wide-scale decentralization at the level of local administrative units. The signatories of the Ta'if Accord anticipated that administrative decentralization would provide Lebanese citizens, particularly those in rural communities, with the capacity to participate in local government, and consequently, greater social and economic prosperity. Notwithstanding the significance of these aspirations, in the years since the conclusion of the Civil War, Lebanon has made little practical progress towards the adoption and implementation of policies related to administrative decentralization.

While the Ta'if Accord has provided Lebanon with a framework for political stability, its terminology has created a situation whereby policy discussions about administrative decentralization have become intertwined with notions of political authority and other forms of decentralization. If the Lebanese state actually intends to pursue administrative decentralization, then these discussions must be placed within a context that enables policy makers to transform the aspirations of the Ta'if Accord into practical reality. To succeed in this endeavor requires that contemporary discussions about decentralization move beyond general descriptions of what could, or should, be done. Contemporary discussions must also seek the diagnosis of administrative problems, at both the national and municipal levels, and links these diagnoses with prescription, or how to best remedy these administrative problems. It is only through the proper identification of these linkages that policy makers

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will be able to confront Lebanon's administrative problems, which may or may not be resolved by reforms that encourage administrative decentralization.

This chapter contributes to on-going discussions about decentralization within the Republic of Lebanon. To this end, the authors of the chapter do not argue that reforms based upon notions of administrative decentralization are an appropriate solution for the country's administrative problems. Nor do they advance specific recommendations as to how Lebanese policy makers should formulate the content of comprehensive legislation that would bring about wide-scale administrative decentralization. It is the community of stakeholders within Lebanon's complex, and often confrontational, political processes who make such determinations. The purpose of this chapter is more contextual: to clarify important elements of Lebanon's long-standing dance with decentralization, especially for those interested research on the country's administrative system.

The chapter opens with an overview of the various forms of decentralization, with specific attention directed towards the mechanisms of administrative decentralization. The subsequent sections provide an overview of Lebanon's primary administrative structures, the Lebanese Municipal Act of 1977, and why the Ta'if Accord does not, in isolation, provide policy makers with the guidance they need to formulate reforms based upon notions of administrative decentralization. Moving beyond the language of the Accord, the chapter then directs attention towards the factors that may explain why Lebanon has not made any progress towards administrative decentralization. The chapter concludes with a review of some of the general recommendations that have been advanced by Lebanese researchers and policy makers on the matter of administrative decentralization. To the extent that this chapter does advance a central argument, it is that Lebanese policy makers have at their disposal a wide variety of options, many of which only require the central government to decide not to execute its administrative authority, which if pursued, could move Lebanon towards administrative decentralization without comprehensive national legislation.

Decentralization Conceptualized

For countries that would like to improve their administrative structures and processes, the concept of decentralization is often a central point of discussion. In certain instances, however, policy makers may come to embrace the idea of decentralization without even reaching a consensus on what the concept actually means. Such situations might lead to problems, which could threaten the success of the reform process, even in the most committed of countries. On the one hand, the lack of an agreed upon definition prevents the emergence of an intellectual touchstone, which provides those interested in decentralization with a common point of reference. On the other hand, the lack of an agreed upon definition can prevent policy makers from undertaking a comprehensive review of the various forms and mechanisms of decentralization that are available for consideration. To avoid these

problems, this chapter adopts the definition of decentralization advanced by Pollitt (2005, p. 373): “the notion of authority being spread out from a smaller to a larger number of actors from a central authority.”

The conventional wisdom is that decentralization can improve a country’s capacity to develop and administer public policy (Kulipossa 2004). The success of an administrative reform movement, however, depends on more than just having a group of policy makers reach a consensus about the meaning of decentralization. Policy makers must also agree on the type(s) of authority that will be decentralized, and more importantly, how these type(s) of authority will be pushed away from the central actor, usually the national government. To reach an agreement on these points requires that policy makers appreciate that there are four primary forms of decentralization: political decentralization, market decentralization, fiscal decentralization, or administrative decentralization. The appropriateness of a given form, or a given combination of forms, is dependent on contextual factors within the country that undertakes such reforms. In other words, there is not a “one-size-fits-all” model of decentralization (Sharma 2005).

The United Nations Development Program (1998) provides policy makers with two additional pieces of advice about the nature and purpose of decentralization. To begin, policy makers should be aware that decentralization does not simply represent a set of public sector reforms. Such reforms are actually undertaken to increase the participation of “all social actors, whether governmental, private sector, or civil society” (United Nations Development Program 1998, p. 1). More importantly, decentralization does not represent “an alternative to centralization” (United Nations Development Program 1998, p. 1). Rather, the concepts described by the terms *centralization* and *decentralization* are not mutually exclusive; they reflect opposite ends of a continuum. The purpose of decentralization is not to create a confederation, but to balance national control with local participation on matters of public policy. Building upon these foundational concepts, we now turn to a brief review of the four primary forms of decentralization.

Political Decentralization

The first form of decentralization is political decentralization, which pushes decision-making authorities traditionally reserved for the central government down towards local jurisdictions (Litvack et al. 1998). The goal of political decentralization is to increase the level of participation that citizens have in the creation and implementation of public policy, primarily and evidently at the local level. The justification for political decentralization is based upon the idea that local populations are better informed about community needs, and can therefore select the policies that are best suited to fulfill these needs. The role of the central government is not eliminated, as national actors continue to support sub-national units through training, technical and legal support, policy coordination, and budgetary oversight.

Fiscal Decentralization

The second form of decentralization is fiscal, which focuses on the financial relationship between the central government and local governments. Fiscal decentralization is undertaken to ensure that local governments have the revenues they need to carry out their responsibilities and policy choices (Litvack et al. 1998). This can be accomplished in one of two ways. To begin, the central government can provide local governments with the authority to develop fiscal structures that enable the generation of resources at the local level. Such structures usually authorize local governments to collect and administer income tax, sales tax, property tax, as well as fees collected for government goods and services. Likewise, local governments can be given the authority to raise revenues through borrowing or the issuance of municipal bonds. Alternatively, the central government can reallocate resources that are collected at the national level, for example tax revenues, to local governments through revenue transfers and grants.

Market Decentralization

Another option is to pursue market decentralization, which shifts responsibility and risk away from the public sector towards the private sector. Here the goal is not to push central authority down to local jurisdictions, but to rely on market forces to improve the provision of public goods and services. Governments can employ a variety of strategies in their pursuit of market decentralization. The first is *deregulation*, which reduces governmental oversight of the economy and encourages private actors to compete for the opportunity to supply public goods and services. The second is *privatization*, which transfers, outsources, or sub-contracts elements of the public sector to the private sector, leaving the selection and production of goods and services to be determined by the free market. A third strategy is *public-private partnerships*, which enable the public and private sectors to share the risks and responsibilities related to the production of goods and services used by the public. Partnerships can help to attract capital for infrastructure projects, facilitate planning, and increase the operational efficiency of public organizations by relying on private sector management expertise.

Administrative Decentralization

The final alternative is administrative decentralization, which is defined as the redistribution of “authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government” (World Bank 2012a). The World Bank (2012) elaborates on this definition by indicating that administrative decentralization involves the “transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and

its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities.” Administrative decentralization differs from political decentralization, which seeks to increase public participation in the decision-making processes. Conversely, administrative decentralization transfers the responsibility for the design and implementation of public programs from national units to sub-national units. In an attempt to balance national control and local participation, central governments tend to be selective with the type(s) of administrative activities they choose to decentralize.

Mechanisms of Administrative Decentralization

Policy makers have at their disposal a variety of forms of decentralization. The specific form that would elect to adopt, however, will depend on contextual factors such as the overall political situation, the capacity and capability of the central government, and the needs of local communities. These factors will also influence the selection of the mechanisms that policy makers can use to implement their decentralization preferences. With respect to administrative decentralization, which is the specific form of decentralization mentioned in the Ta’if Accord, policy makers have multiple options. According to Cohen and Peterson (1999), the mechanisms of administrative decentralization include: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution.

Deconcentration

Deconcentration represents the “transfer of authority over specified decision-making, financial and management functions by administrative means to different levels under the jurisdictional authority of the central government” (Cohen and Peterson 1999, p. 24). Often referred to as the narrowest of the three mechanisms, deconcentration involves the creation of regional offices for the central government, which will be used to carry out the policy decisions and administrative activities of the central government. This structure enables the central government to maintain tight control over tasks such as information collection, the granting of licenses and permits, law enforcement, and the provision of health care services, while improving its ability to respond to the needs of the citizens, whether at the regional or local level.

Delegation

Delegation represents “the transfer of government decision-making and administrative authority for clearly defined tasks to organizations or firms that are either under its indirect control or are independent” (Cohen and Peterson 1999, p. 27).

While the sub-national units that receive such decision-making authority are not necessarily under the direct control of the central government, the units remain accountable to the central government for their actions. Delegation is used in a variety of circumstances, for example, the provision of public utilities, communications systems, low-income housing, and the management and operation of transportation infrastructures.

Devolution

Devolution, the final mechanism of administrative decentralization, represents the transfer of authority from the central government to sub-national entities that enjoy a special legal status (Cohen and Peterson 1999, p. 26). Municipalities are often the recipients of this special status, and they can be authorized to undertake a variety of responsibilities within their geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. These could include the preparation of the budget, the management of human resources, and the setting of public policy. As devolution can involve the transfer of significant authority to sub-national entities, it is not a simple process. According to Cohen and Peterson (1999, p. 27):

[D]evolution requires that there be national legislation and supporting regulations that (1) grant specific local-level units corporate status; (2) establish clear jurisdictions and functional boundaries for such units; (3) transfer defined powers to plan, make decisions, and manage specified public tasks to such units; (4) authorize such units to employ their own staff; (5) establish rules for the interaction of such units with other units of the governmental system of which they are a part; (6) permit such units to raise revenue from such specifically earmarked sources as property tax, commercial agricultural production tax assessments, license fees, public utility charges, or from grants and loans provided by the central ministries; and (7) authorize such units to establish and manage their own budgetary, accounting, and evaluation systems.

The Decentralization Gamble

While decentralization may provide solutions to a variety of administrative problems, policy makers who wish to pursue decentralization often find themselves needing to justify why decentralization is necessary. These arguments that policy makers elect to use can take many different forms. In his review of the concept of decentralization, Pollitt (2005, pp. 381–382) identified the six primary arguments used to support decentralization reforms. The first argument is that decentralization can improve public sector efficiency by streamlining the decision-making process that can become overwhelmed in centralized systems. The second argument is that, by pushing the decision-making processes towards local jurisdictions, the public sector can improve its ability to respond to the specific needs of its client population. Similarly, decentralization can also improve the public sector's ability to adapt the delivery of goods and services to the specific needs of a heterogeneous

population, which often creates political challenges in developing countries. The next argument is that decentralization can reduce political tension by eliminating what is considered to be interference by the central government in local matters. At the same time, there is also the argument that decentralization can promote innovation by providing local jurisdictions with the capacity to undertake policy experiments without endangering the entire nation. Finally, in civil service terms, decentralization can improve the morale of public employees, who can often feel like nothing more than a number in a large centralized bureaucracy.

Despite the often-cited benefits of decentralization, there is no guarantee that a country that pursues administrative decentralization will see improvements in the quality of its public sector or its administrative structures (Joaquin 2004). Nor does administrative decentralization guarantee social and economic development (Jütting et al. 2005). As Pollitt (2005) carefully notes, *can* is the operative word in each of the six arguments for decentralization. Likewise, the United Nations Development Program (2010) also cautions policy makers, especially those in Lebanon, against rushing towards decentralization. The reason why both Pollitt and the United Nations hedge their bet, so to speak, is that they recognize that decentralization is a long-term process that requires the central government to prepare local jurisdictions in advance for a transfer of authority and responsibility. In short, decentralization reforms can be a gamble because, without being properly conceived and implemented, they may undermine goal achievement, as well as the status quo.

There are many problems that policy makers should be concerned about. The most important problem relates to the extent to which local jurisdictions are actually prepared to undertake the administrative tasks passed along to them. While pushing administrative responsibilities down to jurisdictions that are not fully prepared for such responsibilities is clearly not advisable, such scenarios do happen. A significant example of this relates to the need for financial resources. If local jurisdictions do not have the appropriate revenue structures in place at the time that decentralization occurs, they will not be able to secure the resources they need to implement their policy decisions (Jara 2010). The second problem relates to corruption, which can occur when local officials become susceptible to pressures that lead to their capture (Treisman 2000; Bardhan 2012). When such problems occur, the size and scope of interventions undertaken by the central government may increase, as national actors respond to technical and financial shortcomings at the local level. Likewise, interventions on the part of the central government can also increase when there is a need to eliminate, or moderate, the sources and consequences of corruption.

Lebanon's Administrative Structures

The ebb and flow of time have left an indelible mark on Lebanon's administrative structures. The administrative structures related to Lebanon's present-day national government came into existence upon the ratification of the Lebanese Constitution on May 23, 1926. These structures are highly centralized, with most of the country's

daily affairs being directly managed by the national government. Lebanon's local administrative structures, in contrast, emerged almost 100 years earlier, with the creation of the Council of Wilaya. The Council of Wilaya, formed in 1833, was established to address governance issues in the city of Beirut (Antoun 1995). The relationship between Lebanon's local administrative structures and the administrative structures of the ruling establishment, whether the Ottoman Empire, the French Third Republic or the current Lebanese Republic, has always been complicated. Summarizing the relationship between these administrative structures, Rawdah El-Balah (1968, pp. 25, 26) states:

If we examine the Lebanese system of municipal government in the scale of change from the past to the present, it would seem that the system has changed very slowly, and in essence, very slightly. [Throughout history], municipal movement came from the central government and not from local communities. It follows that when the central government felt the need ... [to] strengthen the role of municipalities to achieve and promote national policies, it increased their jurisdiction while retaining control over them.

Historically, both the Ottoman Empire and the French Third Republic employed similar administrative structures in the region that is now known as modern-day Lebanon. It was the Ottoman Empire, however, that first standardized the governance of local jurisdictions in the year 1840. These reforms, which drew upon French ideas of "centralization, chain of command, hierarchical structure, executive domination, and legislation subordination," were implemented to help the Ottoman Empire modernize its administrative structures (Rawdah El-Balah 1968, p. 9, *citing* Alderfer 1964). These structures, which relied upon centralization and uniformity, were used to administrate large geographic regions. Interestingly, Rawdah El-Balah (1968, p. 23) notes that the Ottomans did not have to address questions about the vertical distribution of authority between the central administration and local governments because, "from 1516 to 1877, municipal government in its modern sense, responsible for a town or city, did not prevail." The emergence of municipal governments forced the Ottomans to respond in 1877, with the promulgation of the Vilayet Municipal Law. This administrative reform legally acknowledged municipal entities, which were governed by municipal councils charged with the responsibility of managing and improving local conditions. Rawdah El-Balah (1968, p. 23) *citing* (Zein 1965) also speaks to limited scope of municipal authority, reporting:

This law gave municipalities' wide jurisdiction, increasing their importance as local entities in such perspectives as social services, public works, health and sanitation. Further, the law prescribed certain conditions, which limited municipal power in order to avoid the damage of the public interest.

Following the conclusion of the First World War, and with the subsequent collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the territory that includes modern-day Lebanon was placed under the control of the French government. In 1920, the French authorities implemented "a centralized system of government under the supervision of the French High Commissioner who was granted full authority" (Rawdah El-Balah 1968, pp. 18, 19). Two years later, they enacted a new municipal law throughout the newly established Greater State of Lebanon. Despite the shift in national authority, the French municipal law retained many of the core elements of the Ottoman Vilayet Municipal Law. Citing Ritscher (1932), Rawdah El-Balah notes the continuity,

noting that, under the French Mandate, “municipal affairs [were] supervised and controlled by the national government through the Ministry of the Interior by means of its administrative officers in the various levels of government” (Rawdah El-Balah 1968, p. 21). Continuing to describe the administrative officials who worked within the administrative structures in place during the French Mandate, Rawdah El-Balah emphasizes that “these officials exercise a constant and vigilant surveillance over the municipalities within their jurisdiction with powers even more extensive than of [officials] in France, thus bringing municipal government well within the highly centralized system of national government” (1968, pp. 21, 22).

While a detailed exploration of the complexities behind the emergence and evolution of Lebanon’s administrative system is beyond the scope of this chapter, three patterns run throughout the country’s administrative history. To start, although Lebanon’s administrative structures have been modified over the years, their primary spans of authority and functions have largely remained unchanged. In the second place, and perhaps most importantly, the Ottomans and the French developed governance structures that ensured that the central government retained significant oversight and control over local authorities (Antoun 1995). Finally, when the central authorities felt it was necessary to transfer authority to the local governments, it did so to “achieve and promote national policies, [increasing] their jurisdiction while retaining central control over [the local governments]” (Rawdah El-Balah 1968, p. 26). These patterns not only set the context for understanding the design of Lebanon’s contemporary administrative structures, they also help to explain why some of Lebanon’s policy makers have made repeated calls for administrative decentralization, whether for national interests or otherwise.

Structure and Authority: Muhafazat and Qada’

Before turning to a discussion about decentralization in Lebanon, it is important to review the country’s contemporary administrative structures in greater detail. Lebanon’s primary set of administrative structures are called Muhafazats, which sub-divided into entities called Qada’. Although Muhafazats are often referred to as provinces, this is where the similarities end. A more literal translation of the word Muhafazat suggests that the administrative units more closely resemble governorates. Unlike provinces of many western countries, a governorate is an administrative unit that is under the direct control of the central government. In Lebanon, this means that Muhafazats implement the policy aspirations and instructions of the national government and its ministries.

Muhafazat and the Muhafiz

Lebanon is organized into six separate Muhafazats (Administrative Organization 1959, Article 1). The Muhafazats are formed by the central government and, as explained above, do not enjoy any legal personality or independent authority.

The Governor of the Muhafazat, also known as the Muhafiz, is a grade of one civil servant who is appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities. The Muhafizs are charged with a variety of responsibilities. For instance, they are responsible for maintaining public security, health, education, personal freedom, and when necessary, protecting private property. They also have security forces at their disposal, which can be used to perform the tasks entrusted by law to the Muhafazat (Administrative Organization 1959, Articles 10 and 11). Perhaps the Muhafiz's most important responsibility is to put into practice the political directives and laws promulgated by the central government. In doing so, the Muhafiz is also obliged to inform the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities about the political and economic situation within the Muhafazat (Administrative Organization 1959, Articles 8 and 9).

In all regions except for Beirut, a Council of the Muhafazat assists the Muhafiz (Administrative Organization 1959, Article 47). The council is an advisory body composed of all the Qa'immaqams (the leading Qada' officials) in the Muhafazat and presided over by the Muhafiz. Also serving on the Council are the Head of Finance for the Muhafazat and two representatives from each Qada'. These representatives, who are appointed by a decree from the Council of Ministers, represent the civil society component of the Muhafazat, as they characterize the interests of the professions, unions, and similar institutions. As an advisory body, the Council is to present opinions on matters related to the budget, economy, infrastructure, health, social welfare, and the improvement of villages (Administrative Organization 1959, Article 48). In reality, however, the Council has almost no influence on the public policy decisions made within their jurisdictions.

Qada' and the Qa'immaqam

Lebanon's Muhafazats are further subdivided into 25 district level units called Qada' (Administrative Organization 1959, Article 1). Like the Muhafazats, Qada' are geographical and legal subdivisions that enjoy neither legal personality nor financial autonomy. Twenty of Lebanon's Qada' are administered by Qa'immaqam, each of which are a grade-two government employee who is appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities. The remaining five Qada', Sidon, Baabdah, Zahleh, Tripoli, and Nabatiyyeh are considered the capitals of their respective Muhafazat, and as such, are administered by a Muhafiz.

The Qa'immaqam performs functions similar to the Muhafiz (Administrative Organization 1959, Article 28). The duties of the Qa'immaqam include supervising the general situation in the Qada' and informing the central government of any developments within the Muhafazat. The Qa'immaqams are also charged with the administration of the regional offices of government ministries located in the Qada', the control and supervision of public employees, the implementation of rules and regulations, and the preservation of public order. They must also manage the agricultural sector, grant hunting and fishing licenses, impose health measures, and

oversee the appointment of low-level public employees. Although the *Qa'immaqams* enjoy a number of legal prerogatives in the discharge of their administrative functions, they are, like the *Muhafiz*, entirely subject to the authority of the Minister of the Interior and Municipalities.

Structure and Authority: Local Municipalities

Municipalities represent Lebanon's second set of administrative structures. According to the Municipal Act of 1977, a municipality is a local entity that acts according to the powers entrusted to it by law (Municipal Act 1977, Article 1). The Act also states that municipalities are legal personalities that enjoy financial and administrative independence (Municipal Act 1977, Article 2). The governance of local activities is overseen by Municipal Councils, whose membership is determined by the number of citizens living within a jurisdiction (Municipal Act 1977, Article 9). The members of the Municipal Councils are elected according to the procedures espoused within the Municipal Act and Lebanon's election laws. After the elections are complete, Municipal Councils select a President and a Vice-President by secret ballot (Municipal Act 1977, Article 11).

Municipal Councils are legally responsible for working in the interest of those who live within their jurisdictions (Municipal Act 1977, Article 47). For instance, Municipal Councils possess the authority to establish police, fire, and rescue services (Municipal Act 1977, Article 83). They oversee the municipal budget and the determination of the municipal tax rates. Likewise, they establish the wages and salaries of municipal servants and workers, set the specifications needed to secure supplies and services, and regulate transportation activities within their jurisdiction, including the oversight of traffic laws and the establishment of the transportation fees (Municipal Act 1977, Article 49). At a broader level, Municipal Councils develop and manage public programs related to community aesthetics, infrastructure projects, public health, and the supervision of public utilities. They are also responsible for the creation of programs that deal with the needy and disabled citizens, and can work with civic associations to promote social, sports, health, and cultural activities. Finally, Municipal Councils are entitled, but not required, to establish public projects and programs that can be initiated and managed, either directly or indirectly, by the local authorities (Municipal Act 1977, Article 49).

The law appears to provide Lebanon's local municipalities with significant authority over their jurisdiction. Indeed, the initial articles of the Municipal Act suggest that local municipalities are legally positioned to develop and administer short-term and long-term policy decisions, including those related to social and economic development. A variety of legal constraints, however, many of which are contained in later sections of the Municipal Act, actually undermine, if not completely eliminate, the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs. Such limitations not only undercut public participation and democratic principles, but they also inhibit Lebanon's municipalities from initiating projects that best serve local needs and aspirations.

Dueling Administrative Structures

The administrative structures and authorities outlined in the Lebanese Municipal Act reflect the historical influence of Lebanon's national government over local activities (Municipal Act 1977, Articles 56–66). Like the administrative structures implemented by both the Ottomans and the French, Lebanon's municipalities remain largely precluded from formulating and administering their own public policy choices. In contemporary Lebanon, there are three governmental actors who can intervene in municipal activities: the *Qa'immaqam*, the *Muhafiz*, and the Minister of Interior and Municipalities.

The Qa'immaqam

According to the Municipal Act, it is the responsibility of the *Qa'immaqam*, the sub-governor of the *Muhafazat*, to authenticate certain decisions made by the Municipal Councils (Municipal Act 1977, Article 60). In reality, this oversight is expansive and includes the approval of municipal budgets, as well as the initiation and transfer of financial accounts. This oversight also extends to the fixing of the municipal tax rates and real estate transactions for which the value does not exceed 100 million Lebanese pounds. Also, when the value exceeds 10 million Lebanese pounds, the *Qa'immaqam* must authenticate the municipal activities related to needy and disabled citizens, as well as those related to social, sports, health, and culture. Finally, the *Qa'immaqam* must authenticate transactions related to the acquisition and provision of supplies and services when their value is between 8 and 30 million Lebanese pounds.

The Muhafiz

The *Muhafiz*, perhaps the most important administrative actor in Lebanon, operates as the governor of the *Muhafazat*. The *Muhafiz*, who is directly overseen by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, also possesses the authority to authenticate decisions that are made by Municipal Councils (Municipal Act 1977, Article 61). Many of these authentication requirements match that of the *Qa'immaqam*, but at higher financial thresholds. For instance, the *Muhafiz* must authorize transactions related to the purchase or procurement of supplies, works, and services when their value exceeds 8 million Lebanese pounds. The *Muhafiz* must also approve the purchase of supplies whose value exceeds 50 million pounds and real estate transfers whose value does not exceed 100 million Lebanese pounds. Finally, *Muhafiz* must authenticate decisions that relate to the establishment of markets, museums, hospitals, public housing, and waste disposal. Situated at the intersection between the

central and local governments, the Muhafiz enjoys tremendous administrative power. This is because the Muhafiz can overturn, in the interest of security, any decision made by a Municipal Council (Municipal Act 1977, Article 65).

The Minister of Interior and Municipalities

The final actor is the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, who also possesses the authority to authenticate decisions made by the Municipal Councils (Municipal Act 1977, Article 62). These decisions include the establishment and organization of municipal units, the composition of public personnel, and the qualifications, salaries, and wages of public employees. The Minister also has preview over the naming of public streets, squares and buildings, and the establishment of public monuments. This authority also includes establishing the specifications for the provision and procurement of services, supplies, and the purchase and transfer of public property. Finally, the Minister can order the beneficiaries of construction projects to contribute to the fees related to such projects.

While the preceding examples do not cover the full range of scenarios, Lebanon's central government clearly possesses substantial influence over municipal activities. In fact, according to the Municipal Act, there is almost no municipal decision that can escape the oversight of the central government. For instance, while municipal decisions are implicitly certified if any of these three actors fail to take action within 1 month of the date that the Municipal Councils register their decisions with the appropriate authorities, and this time limit is not applicable to decisions related to planning, budgeting, and management of financial accounts and loans (Municipal Act 1977, Article 63). Moreover, the central government can postpone, at least temporarily, the implementation of any decision made by the Municipal Councils in the interest of security (Municipal Act 1977, Article 65). Consequently, the Municipal Act of 1977, like the Ottoman and French laws, leaves Lebanon's municipalities with nothing more than nominal authority over their internal affairs (Antoun 1995).

Foundations of Administrative Reform

The difficulties created by Lebanon's administrative structures have encouraged calls for administrative reform. The calls for reform are often the loudest from those who simply wish to reduce the central government's control over municipal affairs. Paradoxically, however, the calls for reform have not necessarily been driven by concerns about the strength of Lebanon's central government, but rather, its lack of capacity to govern effectively, especially in the rural areas. In recent years, the central government has struggled to formulate a response to the increasing burdens of its administrative responsibilities, which has been reflected by poor performance in the delivery of public goods and services. It is the underperformance of the central government, at both national and local levels, especially in the delivery of goods

such as electricity, which has driven the call for decentralization. Given the national government's underperformance, and perhaps as a tactic to shift the focus away from them, Lebanon's political elite has suggested that decentralization might be the solution to the country's problems.

One argument is that decentralization would provide Lebanon's sub-national actors with the means to develop and administer public policy. Ideas about the redistribution of political and administrative authority in Lebanon, however, are as old as the modern Lebanese state. Given the complexities of Lebanon's present-day political environment, such reforms are often easier to discuss than to bring to realization. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Ta'if Accord, which ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war, did not expound upon what is meant by local empowerment (Saseen 1990). Regarding the matter of administrative decentralization, Section III of the Ta'if Accord (1989) states:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority;
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate service to the citizens and to meet their needs at the local level;
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national integration within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions;
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the small administrative units through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation; and
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan, capable of developing the provinces economically and socially, shall be adopted, and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipalities shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

Despite its aspirations, the Ta'if Accord simply is not a useful guide for matters related to administrative decentralization. One issue is that the Accord does not specify the jurisdictional level that would take the lead administrative role in Lebanese society. It simply outlines a vague model of decentralization described by phrases such as "national integration" and "common coexistence." To this end, the Accord indicates that there is a need for a strong central government, and that the powers and responsibilities of state and district actors should also be expanded and represented, to the highest extent possible, to ensure the delivery of public goods and services at the local level. The Accord also indicates that "expanded administrative decentralization" would occur at local jurisdictions to ensure public participation. While the wording suggests that both national and local actors would play a role in the governance, it does not clearly identify which actors would take the lead role in the formulation and administration of public policy within Lebanese society.

A separate issue is that the Ta'if Accord does not explicitly state which administrative powers and responsibilities would be decentralized, nor does it explain how the process of administrative decentralization would proceed. The Accord merely

indicates that “authority” will be pushed down to the local and district levels. What remains to be decided is the meaning of the word “authority,” both in terms of substance (fiscal, taxation, planning, employment, training, and contracting) and scope. The reality is that, other than affirming the goal of decentralization, the Ta’if Accord provides Lebanese policy makers with little practical guidance, leaving many important points subject to political discussion.

Decentralization Failures: Causes and Consequences

While Lebanon’s central government possess substantial powers of municipal oversight, the lack of political consensus makes it difficult to coordinate the development of national policies, or in the event that such coordination is achieved, to actually fund and oversee the effective administration of national policy at the municipal level. Although the topic of frequent attention, Lebanon’s administrative structures have escaped most attempts at systematic reform. The authors suggest that the inability of Lebanon to successfully implement administrative reform, especially with respect to decentralization, may relate to factors that include: a general ambivalence towards the administrative reform process; a lack of municipal capacity; the role perceptions of citizens; and domestic politics. Each factor is now briefly discussed in turn.

Ambivalence to Reform

The successful and continuous implementation of administrative reform, especially decentralization-based reforms such as those contemplated in Lebanon, requires firm commitment from policy makers. Even before the civil war, Lebanese policy makers called for, and expressed their commitment to, administrative decentralization. In practice, these expressions of commitment seem to be limited to the issuance of public statements and the publication of governmental reports. In the years since the adoption of the Ta’if Accord, Lebanon’s political class has actually worked to maintain and strengthen the centralized structures that have been in place since the time of the Ottomans. One possible explanation is that these structures have allowed Lebanon’s political class to protect their interests. Although they make mention of their desire for reform, the political elite remain ambivalent to the idea, in part, because decentralization is not in their interest.

Limited Municipal Capacity

The second factor that seems to explain Lebanon’s inability to move towards administrative decentralization may relate to the general low-level of institutional capacity within local municipalities. In the years since independence, Lebanon’s governmental institutions suffer from an imbalance of performance. While many

discussions about governance problems in Lebanon focus on the weaknesses of the national government, serious capacity issues also exist at the municipal level. Nevertheless, many supporters of decentralization point to the success of the Muhafazat of Mount Lebanon as an example of why administrative decentralization should be undertaken. Using such comparisons as a justification for decentralization, however, would be unwise. The most highly developed of Lebanon's six Muhafazats; Mount Lebanon possesses a sizable tax base and the administrative capacity to support the development and implementation of public projects. The other five Muhafazats, as well as their respective municipalities, do not have the fiscal or institutional capacity to undertake such responsibilities. It may be that Lebanese policy makers, even though they call for decentralization, recognize that decentralization, in and of itself, would not be a solution for the problems present in local jurisdictions.

Role Perceptions

The factors that explain why Lebanon has not embraced decentralization may relate to more than the lack of support of the political elite or the limited municipal capacity. One might also question the extent to which Lebanese citizens themselves believe that it is important to support calls for decentralization. Given the complex history of Lebanon, it may be that Lebanese citizens generally perceive that their role, vis-à-vis the government, is that of recipient of public goods and services, as opposed to a role where they are active participants in the public policy process. In a project called the *Arab Barometer*, a survey was conducted to identify Lebanese perceptions about politics, religion, culture, and society. The survey indicated that the Lebanese considered the "provision of basic needs such as food, housing, and clothing to all individuals" to be one of the most important features of democracy (Arab Barometer Survey Project 2007). In a follow-up survey, the provision of goods and services was considered the second most important feature of democracy, behind only the elimination of corruption (Arab Barometer Survey Project 2012). Interestingly, neither survey indicated that the citizens of Lebanon were particularly interested in becoming directly involved in the determination or the management of governmental affairs, for example, through public participation in local institutions. While the absence of data about the importance of public participation may be due to an oversight of the researchers, the lack of public interest in participation in matters of government seems to reflect a historical pattern, which includes public deference to the decisions made by the central government, especially on matters related to municipal affairs.

Political Deadlock

It should not be a surprise to learn that final factor to be discussed is politics, which permeates all aspects Lebanese life. Like its administrative structures, a detailed exploration of the complexities behind Lebanon's political system is

beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that, at the municipal level, whether in a confessional or a multi-confessional setting, the demographic, religious, and sectarian structures present within the municipalities, driven by historical rivalries among families and tribes, play a deadlocking role in the electoral and decision-making processes at work within the municipalities. The decentralization of the central government's authority to municipal actors, especially those related to economic and social development, may only exacerbate local power struggles. The intensification of such power struggles, or more precisely, shifting the primary location of these struggles from national institutions to local institutions, may reverse Lebanon's post-civil war efforts to achieve national integration. Ever fearful of political instability, Lebanese policy makers could give pause before taking serious discussions about administrative decentralization.

Towards Administrative Decentralization

The points mentioned in the preceding discussion are not to be interpreted to suggest that administrative decentralization, or some other form of decentralization, would not be an appropriate solution to Lebanon's administrative and political difficulties. One must simply acknowledge that it may take a substantial amount of time before Lebanese stakeholders agree, if ever, on comprehensive legislation that would reduce the authority of the central government. This does not mean that nothing can be done to empower Lebanon's local governmental actors, despite the presence of factors that have inhibited progress towards decentralization in the past. If the central government and policy makers are truly interested in realizing the aspirations of the Ta'if Accord, there are steps that can be taken to prepare Lebanon for a gradual shift towards decentralization.

Many of these steps have been outlined in a government publication released by Lebanon's Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. This publication, titled *Administrative Decentralization in 101 Questions*, provides a comprehensive overview of decentralization as it relates to the Lebanese context (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011). The topics addressed in this publication are not exhaustive. As Minister Ziad Baroud wrote, "although the questions and answers presented in this volume are generous, the book does not claim to cover all aspects of decentralization. Hence, it is an invitation to all those concerned to contribute alongside the Ministry in a way that promotes decentralization" (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 6). Minister Baroud envisioned that this publication would enable Lebanon to move beyond two-decades of questions about administrative decentralization. While not offering formal replies or recommendation to these questions, the answers discussed within this publication can be organized into three categories of recommendations. Action within any of these categories would shift Lebanon's administrative structures towards a decentralized model of administration.

Ensure the Self-Sufficiency of Municipal Entities

The first set of recommendations relates to the large number of municipalities within Lebanon. As of 2010, there were approximately 964 municipalities in Lebanon, many of which possess extremely small populations (Solh 2012). This is an extremely large number of municipalities, especially for a country whose population is estimated to be 4,259,000 (World Bank 2012b). According to the Municipalities Act, the sole authority to establish municipalities resides in the Minister of Interior and Municipalities. The Act indicates, “every city, town, and village in Lebanon is allowed a municipal authority provided that its population exceeds 300 persons and its annual revenues exceed LL 10,000” (Harb and Atallah 2003, p. 8). The Minister also has the authority to name municipalities and to determine their location and geographical boundaries.

The question is whether Lebanon’s municipalities, especially those that are extremely small in size, are self-sustaining. This does not appear to be the case. A report published by the Lebanese Minister of Interior and Municipalities states the nature of the problem (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 49):

[T]wo thirds of these municipalities have a budget that exceeds 100 million Lebanese pounds. This amount is very minor and does not cover the development needs of these municipalities or cover the financing of local plans, or even cover employee expenditures.

This brief excerpt suggests that many of Lebanon’s municipalities are simply too small to manage their own affairs. There are Lebanese villages that are so small that they do not even possess municipal authority. The point is that, lacking a sufficient tax base; many of Lebanon’s communities do not possess the administrative structures or the financial resources they need to deliver basic public services. The consequences of this situation are clear. They are unable to pave and maintain their roads, develop critical lifeline infrastructures, or design and implement programs within their jurisdictions. The reality is that administrative decentralization will do little, if anything, to improve the living conditions of those who make their homes within such villages and municipalities.

In response to this problem, the Lebanese government could adopt approaches that would address and improve the self-sufficiency of municipalities and villages. The first approach would be to prevent the emergence of new local entities. For instance, the Lebanese government could adopt legislation that would prohibit the establishment of previously unrecognized villages or municipalities. While such legislation would limit the emergence of new municipalities, it would do nothing to moderate the fundamental problems related service provision in previously established communities. This means that the national government would still need to design and implement programs that would increase the population and economic activity, and thus the self-sufficiency, of the villages and municipalities that already have legal or other form of recognition.

The second approach would be for the government to encourage municipalities to enter into Municipal Unions. Interestingly, Lebanese law already sanctions this approach. A Municipal Union is composed of several municipalities that have

decided to formally work together to resolve common public policy problems (Municipal Act 1977, Article 115). The authorities given to Municipal Unions are broadly defined. They include: “public projects of common interest from which all or some of the member municipalities shall benefit, or that cover more than the area of one single Union, whether these projects are existing or will be carried out in the future, such as roads, sewers, garbage, slaughterhouses, firefighters, organization of transportation, cooperatives [and] popular markets” (Municipal Act 1977, Article 126). This process of entering into such unions would enable municipalities to leverage their scarce resources by allowing them to work together to promote and implement public projects outside their individual capacities.

To facilitate movement towards municipal unions, the Lebanese government could provide incentives to the smaller municipalities. These incentives could be negative or positive. In terms of the negative incentives, the government could simply compel municipalities to form unions. This could be accomplished through the enactment of legislation that mandates the creation of municipal unions. In a similar vein, the government could impose ever-increasing financial constraints on underfunded municipalities, for instance, by restricting their access to tax revenues or grant programs. While these might seem to be straightforward strategies, they are not only wrought with political difficulties, they also undermine the participatory foundations of decentralization. In contrast, the government could promote the formation of municipal unions through the provision of positive incentives such as financial rewards. These incentives could take the form of block grants, which could be used to promote capital projects not ordinarily undertaken by municipalities, even in their unified form. Finally, the government could encourage the development of municipal unions by giving up some of its authority in exchange for the creation of local entities that have capacity to administer themselves.

Increase the Financial Independence of Municipalities

The second set of recommendations emphasizes the need to ensure that municipalities have the financial resources to provide public services to the citizens within their jurisdictions. This is not just a problem of resource acquisition. At present, many of Lebanon’s municipalities have difficulty getting the central government to approve even the most insignificant of purchases. From the perspective of Joseph Diab Al Maalouf, the Mayor of Zahle, the lack of financial independence is a significant constraint. According to Maalouf, “[t]o spend LL1 or LL1 million, [our municipality] need[s] at least 25 signatures” (Dhumieres 2011). Such oversight is clearly inappropriate for a municipality whose population exceeds 300,000 people. The report *Administrative Decentralization in 101 Questions* proposes two options to address this problem: reduce the central government’s involvement in the municipal budgetary affairs, and help municipalities to generate revenue (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, pp. 54–60).

The preparation of a final budget for a Lebanese municipality is no easy task. Although the mayor may formulate the initial budget proposal, the proposal must then be presented for feedback and revision at various levels within the central government. These actors involved include the Qa'immaqam, the Muhafiz, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, and in certain circumstances, the national comptroller (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, pp. 54–55). To improve the flexibility and responsiveness of the municipalities, the central government's influence on budgetary matters should be limited to oversight activities, for example, to ensure that there is a balance between expenditures and revenues and that public funds go towards projects that are in the public interest, loosely defined. The Muhafiz would also be responsible for reporting violations of budgetary procedure to the relevant authorities (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 55). The report cautions that additional steps are needed. The central government will need to help municipalities improve their capacity to manage the budgetary process.

Even if municipalities were provided increased levels of discretionary power over the formulation and substantive content of their budgets, there remain questions about whether municipalities have the capacity to generate the revenues they need to effectively implement public programs. This issue is particularly problematic in light of the differences in the revenue generating capacities of rural municipalities in general, as well as some of the urban municipalities. One option might be to allow the central government to completely subsidize the activities of the rural municipalities. This option, however, would undermine both the logic and spirit of decentralization-based reforms (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 55).

One alternative is dual financing, which has been successfully implemented in countries that seek to support the development of their rural municipalities. Dual financing means that municipalities support themselves to the best of their ability, with the national government stepping in to cover financial gaps or the costs of capital projects, usually through a nationally managed fund. Lebanon already has such a municipal fund. The fund, however, is in need of significant reform. The fund currently has difficulties raising the necessary level of resources due to antiquated fees structures and tax codes. There are also questions about the fund's independence and transparency, and its inability to facilitate the equitable distribution of assets amongst the municipalities most in need.

A report titled *Final Roadmap for Modernizing Municipal Finance in Lebanon* suggests that municipal financial reform is a necessary step towards strengthening economic and social development in Lebanon (ICCMA 2011). This report also indicates that municipal finance reform must be built upon six pillars (ICCMA 2011, pp. 140–141). These pillars are organized into two areas of emphasis. The initial area of emphasis contains two pillars, which focus on the processes used to generate and distribute financial resources for municipalities. The first pillar suggests that Lebanon should create an independent institution that has the administrative authority to oversee the collection and distribution of the municipality fund's resources. The second pillar suggests that the resource distribution criteria used by the fund be amended to consider resident population, socio-economic index, and tax effort exerted by municipalities in collecting local taxes.

The second area of emphasis, which contains four pillars, focuses on reforms related to revenue generation in municipalities, as well as their internal and external governance structures. Within this group, the third pillar calls for reforms that could increase local revenues, for example, through an increase in administrative fees and an enhancement of billing and collections procedures. Other reforms would include programs that reassess property values, imposes fines for violations of construction codes, and that increase the fees on rental properties. The fourth pillar calls for reforms that improve accountability for all levels of government involved in the management of municipal affairs. Not only would this require a rebalancing of the interactions between, for example, the municipal council and the municipal president, it would also require that the “Ministry of Interior and Municipalities streamlines its oversight over municipal finances and reduces its pre-approval role, the oversight agencies are empowered to conduct post-audit rather than pre-audit, and citizens participate in and have access to budget and financial decisions” (ICCMA 2011, p. 141). The fifth pillar emphasizes reforms related to human resources and the use of information technology. With respect to human resources, municipalities must be able to identify, secure, and maintain high quality employees. This would require modifications to current recruitment procedures, the expansion of public sector compensation and benefits, and the development and implementation of an employee performance monitoring system. With respect to information technology, municipalities should start to develop comprehensive information management systems, which can help coordinate property assessment, as well as billing and collection processes. The sixth and final pillar calls for increased cooperation between municipalities, for example, through the formation of the municipal unions discussed above, or through developing stronger relationships with the private sector organizations.

Reduce Central Government’s Authority Over Municipalities

The third set of recommendations reflects the long-stated argument that the Lebanese government’s direct authority over municipalities should be reduced, thereby increasing the role that local officials can play in the public policy-making process. Many of the recommendations that fall into this category seek to draw a legal distinction between the authority currently enjoyed by the central government, and the authority that should be enjoyed by municipal officials. Although many of these distinctions are already included in the opening articles of the Municipalities Law, the subsequent articles almost completely eliminate the authority provided to the local municipalities. Instead of seeking to draft alternative legislation that completely overhauls Lebanon’s current Municipalities Law, an intermediate solution might be to amend the contemporary administrative framework so that municipal actors have greater authority over their affairs.

The first legal amendment would adjust the oversight authority that the central government possesses over local municipalities. This amendment would speak directly to the authentication requirements previously discussed in this chapter.

Even a slight reduction in oversight authority would increase the operational freedom that municipalities need to develop and implement public programs. These amendments need not completely eliminate government oversight. Such a move would be counterproductive in that it would give rise to questions about transparency, accountability, and the central government's capacity to coordinate public policy at the national level. The most appropriate alternative would be to restrict the central government's oversight authority to post-hoc status. This would provide municipalities the ability to develop programs based on local contexts, without the prior approval of the central government. Once implemented, the municipalities would have to demonstrate to the central government that their decisions and programs are justified, and where necessary, effective. Pre-approval oversight of municipal decisions by the central government would be limited to matters that transcend municipal boundaries (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 28).

The second amendment would distinguish between the responsibilities possessed by the Qada' and the responsibilities possessed by the Municipal Councils. The report *Administrative Decentralization in 101 Questions* speaks to this matter, suggesting that there are two options (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 33). Option one would give the Qada' and municipalities overlapping responsibilities, meaning that both entities would have the freedom to develop projects for their respective constituencies. Although this would provide for an expansion of municipal authority, by reducing the Qada's authorization oversight, there remains the danger that the Qada' and municipalities would work against each other. Option two would divide responsibilities between the Qada's and the Municipal Councils. This division could be implemented on a sector by sector basis, "as is the case in France, where certain municipal councils specialize in setting up schools, hospitals, parks and sports clubs...while certain [Qada'] councils specialize in road planning, civil planning, public works and infrastructure" (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, p. 33).

Conclusion

Administrative decentralization is an issue that continuously moves on and off Lebanon's institutional policy agenda. While little has been accomplished towards meeting the vision of decentralization as espoused in the Ta'if Accord, many of Lebanese policy makers do seem to possess a strong desire to improve the government's administrative capacity. The essential questions, however, are whether elements of Lebanon's political elite believe that decentralization-based reforms are in their interest, and more importantly, in the interest of the citizens of the country. If the government of Lebanon wishes to make real progress towards the implementation of decentralized administrative structures, these questions must be answered in the affirmative.

There would remain many obstacles to overcome, however. These obstacles not only include a lack of a consensus amongst policy makers on the meaning and

purpose of decentralization, they also include the long-standing differences of opinion that are present within Lebanese society. While clarifying the meaning and purpose of administrative decentralization might help to overcome ideological and political differences, Lebanon's current political situation means that even government reports on the subject avoid providing specific definition of administrative decentralization. For instance, according to *Administrative Decentralization in 101 Questions*, "the administrative decentralization sought by a majority of Lebanese is an administrative system that offers ... people in different regions of the country an increased amount of authority in running the daily local affairs and giving the chance for each region whether it is a village, city or administrative zone the opportunity to determine its priorities on public goods and service levels, infrastructure and the different development projects" (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, pp. 54–60). The report continues, "[t]his in turn entails giving the sons of the Lebanese people the right to choose their local representatives through a free electoral mechanism" (Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 2011, pp. 54–60). Instead of providing a specific definition of administrative decentralization, the report offers a conceptualization that includes all of the various forms and mechanisms of decentralization that were discussed earlier in this chapter. Consequently, Lebanon's policy makers do not possess the intellectual touchstone that is needed to hold constructive discussions about administrative decentralization.

Perhaps the most critical lesson is that the unique political circumstances found in Lebanon will make comprehensive administrative reform difficult to obtain, especially given the lack of a consensus on what decentralization actually means. This conclusion does not suggest that national and local actors are without options about how to improve their capacity to govern their respective communities. It may be that the goal of mutual coexistence espoused in the Ta'if Accord may come into fruition, not through comprehensive reform, but through incremental policy reforms that gradually reduce the authority of the central government, while pragmatically expanding the authority and administrative capacities of municipalities. Such reforms would need to provide municipalities with an increased capacity to develop and implement public programs within their jurisdiction. The reforms must also help the central government to become more confident in the capacities of local institutions. For instance, by encouraging municipalities to develop cooperative mechanisms, the central government would begin to alleviate two of its greatest concerns: that municipalities lack the financial resources, as well as the institutional capacity that is needed for effective self-governance. It is possible for the central government to support the reform process by providing technical and financial assistance to municipalities without relinquishing its full authority.

The Lebanese central government must also provide municipalities with the authority to make policy decisions based upon their local contexts. At first, this decision-making authority need not be comprehensive. After an initial limited transfer of authority, the scope could be gradually expanded for municipalities that demonstrate that their policy choices have generated measurable and effective outcomes. This does not mean the central government would completely eliminate its oversight authority of the municipalities. It could simply limit its pre-approval authority,

for example, to matters that run counter to matters of national security, loosely defined. The central government could also shift its focus from that of pre-approval authorization of municipal decisions to post-approval monitoring and review of municipal projects and programs, with emphasis on transparency, accountability, effectiveness and compliance with national policy goals and aspirations. Although such incremental steps would not be the result of a comprehensive set of decentralization-based reforms, they could help to fulfill the aspirations of the Ta'if Accord: to balance the need for a strong central government that can advance a Lebanese national agenda, while providing municipal officials, many of whom possess dissimilar social, economic, and public policy aspirations, with the authority and flexibility they need to manage local affairs.

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The Third Wheel in Public Policy: An Overview of NGOs in Lebanon

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Introduction

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Lebanon and elsewhere are expected to actively engage in public affairs, influencing or being engaged with public policy, whether from inside or outside of state apparatus (AbouAssi 2014; Najam 2000). While the NGOs' role in public affairs vary between service delivery and lobbying and advocacy, the political, economic and social contexts impact the nature of the role and the relationship with government and other stakeholders. As important, NGOs' internal governance, management, and resources and inter-organizational relations impact their performance and ability to actively participate in delivering on or formulating public policy in Lebanon.

Lebanon: The Context

Lebanon is relatively a small country in the Middle East with an area of 4,035.5172 sq. miles and a population of 3,759,136. The geographical location at the Mediterranean Sea and the diversity in the socio-cultural milieu favored Lebanon as a bridge between the East and the West. Before the civil war (1975–1990), the country

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witnessed an economic boom and was the spotlight of the world; Lebanon was labeled as the Switzerland of the East to characterize its unique status.

Lebanon has a very rich history. The history could be traced back to the Phoenicians, as evident in the various archeological excavations, and had been definitely shaped and transformed by the Arab heritage and civilization. Lebanon was ruled under the Ottoman Empire for more than 400 years but distinctively enjoyed an autonomous status, which set the milestone for the country's political and administrative structure. After WWI, Lebanon was under the French mandate which shaped the country's political, economic, and social norms.

Political Environment

Lebanon is a democratic republic. The people are the source of authority and sovereignty; the constitution governs the state affairs and ensures that the relations among citizens are regulated and governed through constitutional institutions. The Republic is headed by a president elected by the parliament that is in turn popularly elected by the citizens. A prime minister is designated and forms a cabinet upon a vote of confidence by the Parliament.

In principle, all Lebanese are equal before the law enjoying equal civil and political rights as well as public obligations and duties. Nevertheless, influenced by the French mandate, the 1943 Independence established an unstable political system characterized by consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969; Salamey 2009) where power in government is divided among the country's 18 officially recognized sectarian communities. Political and administrative positions were equally and proportionally distributed among Christians and Muslim religious communities.

Although all Lebanese are supposedly equal before the law, in reality they have serious limitations on citizens' rights. For example, citizens have a quota for parliamentary seats or administrative positions according to the sect of which they are members. Appointees to public offices are made based on religion regardless of qualifications, abilities, or expertise.

The political picture would not be clear without recognizing the influence of Lebanon's neighbors—immediate or distant. Israel invaded South Lebanon in 1978 and then Beirut in 1982. Israeli occupation remained in Lebanon until 2000 which marked the withdrawal from South Lebanon. Nevertheless, Israel launched a series of attacks against Lebanon and its sovereignty; many of these attacks were destructive—in terms of human casualties and infrastructure. The most recent was the summer war of 2006 between Israel and Hizballah.

On the other hand, Syria had a major influence on Lebanon. The Syrian army was present in Lebanon for more than 25 years and Syria had the upper hand in controlling and running the country's political game. This was manifested in elections of presidents, formation of cabinets, or appointments to public office, as well

as cracking down on any political or civic opposition. The Syrian army left Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination of late Prime Minister Hariri and the up-rise of the Cedar revolution, under the pressure of UN resolution 1559.

According to Global Peace Index (GPI), Lebanon's rank has been ranging between 132 and 134 among all countries of the world since 2008. This reflects the unstable political situation and the security unrest. After the 2006 war, the opposition organized a sit-in located in Beirut downtown and withdrew its representatives in the cabinet. The Lebanese government was paralyzed and businesses in that particular vital area of Lebanon were impacted. The Parliament was not convened and a president was not elected for more than 6 months. Assassinations continued to target prominent political figures and tension intensified politically and religiously. In 2008, the country witnessed a mini-civil war between different factions where Hizballah practiced its force and was able to tighten its fist on the Lebanese political life. Civil society organizations stood helpless and could not act or react to stop the deteriorating situation or to address its aftermaths.

On the other hand, unfair electoral laws and controlled elections had discouraged political participation. The opposition was isolated; citizens were discouraged to exercise about exercising their rights of association or expression and civil society organizations were not allowed to play a role in monitoring elections until the last two elections with mounting pressure from the international community and its observers. Nevertheless, Lebanon recognized the rights of association and expression. NGOs are formed relatively easily and function without direct control or supervision by government. They can secure funding from different local and international sources and conduct activities in a wide array of fields and domains which might not favor the government. Lebanon has one of the most active media sectors in the region. There are tens of newspapers, hundreds of journals, dozens of local TV stations, and other broadcasting companies stationed in Beirut. However, the dominance of religious doctrines and the fact that many of these media outlets are controlled or sponsored by politicians forced Lebanon to score +0.43 on the Freedom House index.

Added to this, the widespread of corruption in the public sector caused further citizens' alienation. The public sector was perceived as Ali Baba's cave where nepotism, favoritism, and bribe were widespread without any control or reprimand further alienation of the citizens. The public sector is oversized with many vacancies and high average age of older employees. Many ministries are unable to perform duties effectively due to lack of human and technical resources or due to duplication of work and authorities. The judicial system was undermined and its hands tied up in any efforts to combat corruption. Efforts to fight corruption and introduce reform into the public sector by local reformists and civil society organizations with support from international community is yet to be productive.

To conclude, the following indicators reflect the political situation in Lebanon. Government effectiveness was rated at -0.64 and the control of corruption at -0.83 , according to World Bank's 2008 Governance Indicators, on an international range of -2.5 to $+2.5$. Lebanon's political stability was estimated to be -1.94 and the rule of law at -0.73 according to the same source.

Social Background

As mentioned earlier, the population of Lebanon is less than four million with a population density of 404/km². Since 1932, there has not been any national census; the ethnic background of the Lebanese is divided as 83 % Arab, 4 % Armenian, and 13 % other. Eighteen religious sects are recognized; however, conflicting figures confuse the percentile distribution by religion and sect. Cautiously reporting, Lebanon is composed of 56 % Muslims and 39 % Christians with a remaining 5 % Druze (Lebanese Information Center Lebanon 2013).

There is no separation between state and religion. On the contrary, religious leaders are key players in the political arena and even in the civil lives of people. Each religion has its traditions and institutions recognized and supported by the government. Civil status affairs are strictly organized according to and by each of the 18 religious communities; seculars have failed to introduce a voluntary civil marriage into the Lebanon society due to the furious opposition of religious leaders. In many cases, publications and productions are withdrawn and suspended under the pressure of religious institutions. These institutions also own material properties and have extended arms in the private and NGO sectors.

Lebanon is ranked 88th out of the 177 countries on UNDP's 2008 Education Index (EI), which measures the country's relative achievements in both adult literacy and combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment. According to the Central Administration of Statistics, one third of the Lebanese population attended school in 2007; illiteracy rate (10 years and above) was 9.3 %: 6 % among male and 12.4 % among female. Lebanon has around 1,400 schools; some of these schools are private and others are managed by NGOs. The educational system is governed by the Ministry of Education which controls curriculum and manages public schools. There are a considerable number of private schools with certain discretion on curriculum. Currently, 41 nationally accredited universities enrol students; and several of these universities are internationally recognized, including a prominent American university in the region, i.e., American University of Beirut.

Lebanon is also known for excellent health services with several leading medical centers serving the region. However, the Central Administration of Statistics reports that only 44.9 % of the Lebanese benefit from health insurance, mainly the National Social Security Fund's services (23 %); the remaining 53 % is left uninsured and benefit from health services that are provided on an ad hoc basis by NGOs and other organizations as well as the Ministry of Public Health. In addition, in a country that witnessed a long civil war, it is interesting to note that 2.3 % of the population (around 90,000) have some kind of disability.

Lebanon only witnessed a 0.11 % population growth between 2004 and 2007. According to the Central Administration of Statistics, 39.5 % of the population lives in Mount Lebanon, 9.6 % in Beirut, around 20 % in the North, 13 % in Beqaa, and 17.5 % in the South. The demographic comparison between 2004 and 2007 reveals minimal mobility between regions despite war and political instability; 49.4 % of the population is male and 50.6 % is female and 45 % under the age of 24 and around 13 % above 60. There is a main drop in the number of males of age 24 and

below and those above which could be caused by immigration and soliciting jobs abroad and which is reflected in the increasing number of single females and the drop in marriage rate.

Unofficial sources set the unemployment rate at 9.2 %. The Central Administration of Statistics reports employment to population rate at 39.5 % (19 % among women) while employment rate is 43.4 % of the total male population and 21.1 % of the total female population. Lebanon ranks 83 on the Human Development Index. UNDP fact sheet on Lebanon states that “poverty estimates place extreme poverty at 8 % of the Lebanese population in 2005 where around 300,000 individuals in Lebanon are unable to meet their basic food and non-food needs and around 28.5 % are below the upper poverty line of US \$ 4 per capita per day.” 7 % of the taxpayers provides around 87 % of the Income tax base and 1 % of the Lebanese owns about 30 % of the deposits in Lebanese banks (AbouAssi 2006). Such information needs to be further verified. Civil society organizations strive to provide assistance to the marginalized group along with or in the absence of governmental programs.

Despite the dire economic conditions, political turmoil and security instability that Lebanese face, it is said that Lebanon’s main asset and reason for survival is its human capital. The Lebanese are known to be talented and well educated. Lebanon has a vibrant market economy and a cosmopolitan diverse socio-cultural environment. There is a high level of entrepreneurial spirit especially with half of the population under 25. Lebanese are leaders in the fields of marketing, communication, design, medicine, etc. In addition, there is an evident growing culture of leisure and consumerism favoring hi-tech products and fashion, and more openness towards western norms and lifestyle than any other country in the Arab world. This is reflected in the nature of work some recently established NGOs undertake.

Economic Situation

Due to its geographical location, Lebanon has served as a bridge between the East and the West; this shaped the role of the country into a service-oriented economy with limited natural resources. However, Lebanon remains a developing country¹; its weak economy suffered from a civil war² and several wars and confrontations with Israel³ and Syria (AbouAssi 2006).

¹Fiscal indicators reflect the situation. The 2008 total revenue was around US\$7.5 billion; the GDP (purchasing power parity) is US\$44.07 billion while GDP (official exchange rate) is US\$28.2 billion. By the end of 2008, the public debt constituted 163.5 % of the GDP; the gross public debt stood at US\$47.01 billion while the net public debt reached US\$41.52 billion.

²The war broke out on April 13, 1975 and ended in 1990 through reconciliation imposed by foreign countries.

³The latest was in summer 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah.

The country heavily relies on external sources of revenues rather than on nationally generated tax revenues. This is reflected in the foreign currency debt which totaled US\$21.24533 billion in 2008. Around 9 % of that debt is in the form of foreign loans and more than 65 % in market-issued treasury bonds. It is useful to refer to two precursors. First, the government's executive body responsible for finding funds for and supervising the reconstruction and development efforts (CDR) is fully funded from external sources and not from the government internal revenues; in the 2009 budget, CDR's budget was estimated to be only US\$300,000. Second, a conference for the Friends of Lebanon organized in 2007 promised US\$7.5 billion in assistance for development projects and budget support.

This signifies the volume of foreign funding being channeled to Lebanon. In periods of crisis, foreign funding takes the forms of grants or soft loans. Following the 2006 summer war, US\$590.2 million was pledged for relief and reconstruction efforts in the form of grants and US\$121 million in the forms of soft loans.

As mentioned earlier, the Lebanese economy is service-oriented with a strong commercial tradition and heavy reliance on tourism. The country has a strong private sector which leads the economy and a vibrant NGO sector which substituted the government in providing public services during the 15 years of civil war. Many Lebanese families—and consequently the economy—rely on remittances coming from the Lebanese Diaspora (Trent 2012). Although there is not a reliable number, Lebanese immigrants and descendants are spread all over the world; many retain strong ties and commitments to the country. They continue to send remittances to their immediate families but also want to participate in the development of their villages and areas of their mother land; the development of schools, hospitals, and small businesses in some of the areas of Lebanon in the past could be contributed to Lebanese migrants who built these institutions and offered them to the government or NGOs to provide the staff to administer and run the services or who decided to come back and live in the country.

However, Lebanon's economy remains vulnerable. It is highly connected to the region's economies; Lebanon's exports are mainly to the Gulf countries and the country relies on transit services to the Gulf; the country cannot accommodate the supply of local labour that becomes a human capital export to the Gulf countries. Lebanon's geographical location at the sea and surrounded by Syria and Israel leaves the country with one exit through land: via Syria. Throughout the history between the two countries—including recent history, this reality was manipulated by the Syrian authorities during incidents of tension by suspending traffic or delaying transit services. In addition, domestic and regional politics as well as civil unrest further jeopardize the economy.

In light of this brief country background, both the political and economic situations in Lebanon are suitable for NGO work. The political theoretical perspective of nonprofits underscores political liberties and freedoms of speech and association as the basis for NGO sector growth (Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002; Clemens 2006). Lebanese society enjoys a degree of freedoms and liberty predicted by the social culture of communal support and solidarity (AbouAssi 2006). The economic demand model for nonprofit contends that offsetting failures of one sector leads to

the evolution and growth of another. Lebanese society has experienced a mix of market or trust or government failure (Hansmann 1980, 1996; Smith and Gronbjerg 2006; Steinberg 2006; Wagner 2000; Weisbrod 1977, 1998) when both government and the private sector were unable to meet demands during the civil war (1975–1990) or when the government is perceived with suspicion and mistrust.

The NGO Sector in Lebanon

Lebanon has a vibrant and dynamic NGO sector. Its development is traced back to the late nineteenth century. During the country's civil war (1975–1990) and with a shattered public bureaucracy, NGOs assumed primary responsibility for most of service provision (AbouAssi 2006, 2013). In general, the number of NGOs estimated at 15,000 serving a population of around four million. However, the number of registered NGOs is only around 5,000, approximately 700 of which are active on a regular and sustained basis (AbouAssi 2006). Lebanese NGOs are active in all aspects and domains of public life. In this subsection, I am going to address NGOs' governance, management, programs, human resources, financial resources, and inter-organizational relations.

NGO Governance

The formal NGO registration process is fairly easy, simple, and inexpensive. NGOs are legally required to submit written mission statements to the Ministry of Interior. Specialization in NGOs is rare; the mission statement is left as broad as possible (El-Haraka 2004; Moukheiber 2004). It is easier to have general mission statement than to go through the bureaucratic process of revising it at the Ministry. Beneficiaries, staff, and volunteers do not necessarily know the NGO's mission. The organization either does not have an organizational structure or its existing structure does not fit the stated mission and goals.

NGO internal governance is problematic. While democratic good governance typically positively correlates with the status and growth of an NGO, competitive election is avoided as it might lead to internal division and disagreement. Uncontested elections could also be an indicator of support and approval of incumbents' performance. Eighty-two percent of NGOs have an elected leadership (AbouAssi 2006). However, this is associated with several setbacks. Most NGOs do not separate the chair of the board position from the executive director position (Baroud 2004). Leadership succession planning is not established nor properly understood among most NGOs; the president remains the same for several terms or the ratio of turnover in elected offices does not exceed 25 % at any election. The role of the executive committee is fulfilled by a "ruling core," which "turns many Lebanese NGOs into entities run like personal businesses" (UNDP 2009, p. 18).

The State of Civil Society 2006 report questions the breadth, depth, and diversity of participation in NGOs. The report reveals that the membership of NGOs is not as wide as one would hope; 36 % of the Lebanese are members of NGOs and only 3 % are members of environmental organizations (AbouAssi 2006). The depth of participation in Lebanese NGOs can be understood through the role of members and the responsibilities of the general assembly. Members of only 53 % of NGOs have substantial influence on decision-making processes (AbouAssi 2006). They are mainly expected to attend public activities and contribute financially through membership fees. However, members do not fully commit themselves to the NGO. Many members do not attend meetings or pay membership fees. They serve a ceremonial role. That explains some challenges NGOs studied in this dissertation encounter. As for the general assembly, its focus is on electing the administrative committee and approving the annual report and budget (Baroud 2004). The responsibility to hold management accountable or to provide guidance to the organization is not recognized.

The diversity of participation is linked to the form the membership takes. In many cases, membership in Lebanese NGOs is limited and based on religious and political affiliation or it is selective and conditional (AbouAssi 2006). Some NGOs are hesitant to expand their membership basis, fearing the possibility of takeover by or dominance of politicized members. These organizations are interested in maintaining the “homogenous core” that gathered around a common goal and has been working through the NGO. Other NGOs are so concerned with maintaining the internal power that membership is further restricted only to newcomers who express loyalty. This has resulted in the exclusion of marginalized groups like women or people with disabilities (UNDP 2009).

Management and Programs

Furthermore, management and governance in the majority of Lebanese NGOs are not clearly separated. It is common for some NGOs to employ incumbent members of the executive committee (the governing body) as full-time staff. This sacrifices separation of authorities and intensifies conflict of interests. The situation is exacerbated by the absence of written managerial procedures and the lack of program performance appraisal and transparent regular budget expenditure systems and reporting (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009).

Many NGOs claim their projects are tied to their mission. However, “the value and clarity of programs implemented today was dependent on the clarity by which the mission was laid out at the time of the NGO’s establishment” (UNDP 2009, p. 24). This leads us to conclude that since many missions were originally vague or became outdated, the association between an NGO’s mission and its activities is more likely to be loose and the synergy between activities is more likely to be lacking. In many cases, the integration of project design and selection into the mission is “compromised to suit the requirements of potential donors or to allow for the implementation of activities that will maintain the NGO’s presence and visibility” (UNDP 2009, p. 15).

Most NGOs lack strategic plans; there are very few that have carried out such an exercise in the past few years, most of which were exercises funded by donor agencies. NGOs with professionals and academics serving on their executive boards are more engaged in these activities. However, the real challenge to Lebanese NGOs is twofold: (1) their inability to adopt systematic participatory approaches in their work and (2) the absence of needs assessment studies (AbouAssi and Trent 2012). NGOs want to claim they are consulting with and involving their beneficiaries; sometimes there are some participation mechanisms, but the effectiveness of this whole approach is questioned, as one expert in the NGO sector in Lebanon stated. On the other hand, needs assessment studies are costly and NGOs do not have the human or financial resources to engage in any; donor agencies are more interested in allocating their funding to on-ground activities rather than conducting studies (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009).

Human Resources

NGOs' human resources are barely adequate. Only 56.5 % of NGOs have paid staff, with the average number of staff in an organization standing at 10. Others rely exclusively on volunteers (AbouAssi 2006). Recognizing the capabilities and commitments of the volunteers, one cannot dismiss complaints about professionalism. The NGO sector offers easier access to jobs compared to the public or private sectors in Lebanon; however, salaries are relatively less competitive and benefits are limited (Helou 2004). A career path does not exist within the sector and mobility between NGOs is criticized as a form of competition. Some NGOs prefer contracting staff on a project-by-project basis in order to avoid paying the required social security allowances. Thus, in general, there is no interest among NGOs in recruiting highly qualified staff; qualified people are usually attracted by international organizations or donor agencies.

The majority of NGOs does not implement proper human resource management. A human resource policy either does not exist or is not shared with staff. Staff is hired in a non-transparent process and without clear job descriptions or formal induction or even employment contracts. NGOs do not usually invest in human capital. Staff is somehow marginalized; they are not usually involved in decision-making; training is not planned according to needs but rather is assigned on an ad hoc basis, influenced by either personal favoritism or staff availability regardless of position, skill, or training compatibility (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009).

Volunteering has cultural roots in the Lebanese society, related to the value of solidarity and the social obligation of involvement in the local community. In general, 57 % of the Lebanese have done volunteer work, but not necessarily on a regular basis or within the framework of an organization (AbouAssi 2006). However, NGOs have a volunteerism challenge. The challenge is multi-faceted. There is a poor understanding of the concept of volunteerism. Some NGOs do not rely much on volunteers in their activities; others are not active in recruiting volunteers. The

management capacity of NGOs that attract volunteers lags behind the supply of volunteers. There is a great confusion about how to treat and manage volunteers versus staff. In general, volunteers are wasted resources.

Financial Resources

One of the distinctive features of Lebanese NGOs is their ability to secure funding from various sources, including international donors, without any interference or control from the central government. The major sources of funding for Lebanese NGOs are membership fees, international donors, and government (Helou 2004). The percentile distribution of these financial resources should be looked at with scrutiny, taking into account an influx of donor money due to increased interest in Lebanon for various political and economic reasons. UN agencies have a strong presence in Lebanon, along with bilateral donors including The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Italian Cooperation, and other international organizations. As donors' preference is to work with NGOs rather than the government "which is often thought to be a drain on funds" (AbouAssi 2006), many local organizations try to diversify and tap these different sources of funding, but at the expense of their own internal revenues.

Lebanese NGOs manage a financial portfolio of one billion dollars a year (excluding periods of emergencies such as the 2006 War); the aggregate financial resource of social welfare NGOs is five times the budget of Ministry of Social Affairs. These financial resources come from a range of different sources. As the below chart indicates, estimates reveal that internal resources (membership fees, sales of products) form about 38 % of the total resources, leaving the rest to come from donations, contributions, and local and international funding (AbouAssi 2013). Donor funding is the largest single source of NGOs' revenues; this comes as a result of international donors' preference to deal with and channel aid and assistance to NGOs rather than to the public sector (AbouAssi 2006, 2013) (Fig. 1).

Private funding does not exceed 10 % of NGOs' financial resources; there are few isolated cases of such a practice. The Lebanese income tax law offers deductions on profit subject to tax if these deductions go to charity. However, being issued in the 1950s, it is very outdated; it specifies types of recipient NGOs and excludes other types that were not around back then. Further, individuals or corporations benefit from the exemptions if they contribute up to 10 % of their net annual profit (or 1 out of 1,000 of their gross annual profit in some cases) as long as the exempted donations do not exceed a fixed amount of \$10; the value of \$10 in today's market does not encourage donors to go through the bureaucratic process to get tax exemptions (AbouAssi 2006).

Individual donations, including Lebanese Diaspora and political contributions, and religious giving, provide NGOs with around one fifth of their revenues. Charitable giving has a long history in Lebanon; 71 % of Lebanese donated money or made other contributions to charity at an average of US\$136 per year, with more

Fig. 1 Percentile distribution of Lebanese NGOs’ revenues by source of funding




Table 1 Classification of sources of funding^a

Source	Accessibility and reporting	Expectations
Sales from social events and fundraising	Easy	Low
Government contracts	Difficult	High
Diaspora and community members	Easy	Low
Political figures/parties	Difficult	High
Religious-duties	Easy	Low
Membership fees	Easy	Low
Income-generating activities	Difficult	Low
International donors	Difficult	High

^aThe separate classifications are adopted from the UNDP’s Assessment of Capacity Building Needs of NGOs in Lebanon (2009), but then further interpreted by the author

than one third of the citizens donating less than US\$50. With an estimated individual annual income of \$8,336, this average constitutes 2 % of the citizen’s income. It is a common practice for individuals or families to give in-kind or monetary donations to organizations (and individuals) as social obligations or religious duties, especially during religious feasts. That is why religious organizations receive the bulk of charitable donations, which questions the civic motivation behind charitable giving versus obligatory religious titles.

According to the Capacity Assessment Report (UNDP 2009), these sources of funding are classified according to (1) easiness of accessibility and reporting and (2) associated conditions or expectation. “Easy funding” requires no managerial structure since there is open and direct access; no monitoring and reporting on funding is necessary and therefore accountability is weak. Easy funding appears to constitute the majority of CBOs funding, in both rural and urban areas (UNDP 2009).

“Difficult funding,” on the other hand, requires an elaborate managerial structure and organizational capabilities to secure the funding, implement projects, and then report on expenses, achievements, and impact. Funding could also be associated with certain expectations such as political loyalty and support or conditioned on adhering to certain norms such as anti-terrorism attestations. The combination of these classifications, depicted in Table 1, could restrict or jeopardize NGOs’ financial resources.

The Assessment of Capacity Building Needs of NGOs in Lebanon (UNDP 2009) clearly reveals the influence of donors on NGOs, even when it comes to program design. NGOs' board and staff might initiate certain programs. The former are usually interested in promoting their role in the NGO and try to secure funding for project ideas they bring to the table. The staff supposedly uses a more professional approach to develop project ideas based on needs, interests, and capabilities. Many NGOs are dependent on donor funding; "NGO management is approached by a funding agency that already has its own set agenda or plan and looking for a partner to implement it. Alternatively, an NGO's management would scope the funding priorities and design a program that bridges these priorities and its own mission or area or expertise" (UNDP 2009, p. 24).

NGOs in Lebanon do not perceive the tension between different accountability mechanisms as a challenge. Their aid dependency and the politicization of assistance do not negatively impact their work. NGOs continue to present themselves as the anchor of change and the main actor to lead the development process in the country (AbouAssi 2010). To many NGOs, the impact of their work should be perceived more holistically. First, their work is described as one continuous set of programs. Second, their impact can only be realized when you connect the dots of all development efforts; each dot represents one set of programs each NGO in Lebanon is implementing. However, the counterargument is that NGOs do not focus on sustainability which "is rather thought of as the sustainability of the NGO itself and the continuous implementation of services, rather than dealing with the root causes of the problems that cause these needs, or holding state institution accountable for improved services" (UNDP 2009, p. 26).

In general, NGOs are capable of submitting adequate financial and taxation documents as required by law or stipulated in grant agreements with donor agencies. However, the authenticity of some reports is questioned as rumors of corruption within the NGO sector continue to surface. What is evident is that many NGOs: (1) lack adequate financial management as they work with simplified balance sheets and not necessarily with budget; (2) are more interested in acquiring assets than in planning to utilize and maintain them; and (3) continue to use basic tools of fund development such as hosting social events compared to more advanced tools including solicitation campaigns or grant proposals (UNDP 2009).

Funding shapes NGOs' governance and managerial structure and dynamics. Members with close contacts to funding sources are allowed an increasing role in NGOs; NGOs that rely on external financial resources undermine the role of the general assembly for the sake of funders. Furthermore, the Capacity Assessment report reaches the conclusion:

The source of funding for NGOs is crucial to deciding what projects an NGO actually implements and how it assesses the impact. NGOs relying on donations or religious funding tend to think more of reaching out to a larger number of beneficiaries and seem not to be questioned about the value or the quality of the work they are providing. NGOs that depend on international funding follow project-based implementation and are encouraged to follow systemic planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation; they are frequently under pressure to justify the rationale, value and impact of their activities (UNDP 2009, p. 25).

Inter-Organizational relations

Networking among NGOs is weak and inter-organizational communication is inadequate. Umbrella organizations exist but their membership is relatively small or the assessment of their effectiveness is negative. Instances of collaboration remain isolated and temporal (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009). NGOs tend to cooperate on time-sensitive initiatives such as crises or elections, due to existing personal relations, or under donor pressure. Many Lebanese NGOs are members of national and international networks; this does not necessarily apply to small rural NGOs (Abdelsamad 2004). The effectiveness of these networks is questioned by the NGOs themselves; it might be evident in periods of crisis and less evident at all other times. Few NGOs are involved in theme- or case-based networks and campaigns; the successful example is on elections when tens of small and big NGOs came together to monitor and ensure free elections. A mild form of coordination occurs through sharing of information and facilities; this is frequently done by small NGOs that lack these resources (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009). In general, competition and individualism are more dominant.

NGOs' relationships with the Lebanese government are unclear or unstable (AbouAssi 2014). It starts from the beginning in the process of NGO registration that has been interpreted by the Ministry as a form of control over these organizations (AbouAssi 2006). This reflects the nature of the NGOs' relationship with the government, which is characterized by limited dialogue, considerable distrust, diversion of perspectives, suspicion over intentions, and lack of collaboration (Abdelsamad 2004; AbouAssi 2010, 2014). However, some weak mechanisms are in place; some government agencies provide some financial support to NGOs; the NGO Support Unit at the Ministry of Social Affairs which provides basic support especially for small NGOs; and the Social and Economic Council that includes representatives of NGOs (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009).

Many NGOs decline to engage in the public policy process at the national level. The few involved are mostly advocacy oriented or are politically supported or connected. In many cases, they wait for and rely on donor funding to implement projects to impact public policy; in other cases, they seize the opportunity of international pressure on the government to delve into policy issues (AbouAssi 2010; Abou Daye 2008; UNDP 2009). At the local level, the relationship does not get better. "Some actors tend to monopolize development; they consider themselves as the primary actor in a certain area and have the right to set priorities and activities" (AbouAssi and Trent 2012). Although several NGOs refer to good working relations with local governments, tension remains on development priorities and perspectives. Local governments in Lebanon focus on basic infrastructure while NGOs, especially the local ones, prioritize social and economic needs. One side tries to exclude or work independently from the other actors at the local level (AbouAssi and Trent 2012; UNDP 2009).

In light of these problems, NGOs' relationship with the media is not positive; it is "a reflection of the problems of the NGOs themselves and their working context,

including the lack of strategic thinking, poor networking between the NGOs, political polarization, and the marginalization of rural NGOs” (UNDP 2009, p. 29). NGOs use the media to cover activities in order to ensure visibility or to fulfill donor requirements. The number of NGOs using the media for advertisements and mass awareness campaigns funded by donors is increasing. The relationships sometimes develop into real partnership based on political or personal connections; these are the few elite NGOs that attract most of the media coverage (AbouAssi 2006).

NGOs’ relationship with the private sector can take any of three forms: sponsorship of events, in-kind donations, and formalized corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, in general, NGO-private sector relationships are not institutionalized. The relationship is still influenced by personal contacts and relations; it is also weakened by NGOs’ reliance on “shopping list” or “begging” approaches while dealing with the private sector rather than on a clear outlined proposal of aligning missions and interests. Although private businesses express a growing interest in CSR, their relationships with NGOs are not developing quickly for two main reasons. First, some private companies implement CSR independently and do not rely on or partner with NGOs working in the same field. Second, and more important, the private sector lacks the incentives to philanthropy; laws on tax exemptions for public benefit and philanthropy are either outdated or ineffective (AbouAssi 2006), as described above.

In summary, Lebanese NGOs are still struggling with their effort towards institutionalization. It is difficult to balance or bridge the gap between the need for voluntary membership and efforts to serve a common goal and the desire for institutionalized professionalism to effectively implement programs. Adequate financial, human, and technological resources continue to be insufficient, although unofficial figures can go as high as a billion US dollars a year⁴ and despite the fact that professionalism and human capabilities were considered to be behind the main driving force of the sector (AbouAssi 2006). NGOs’ inter-organizational relations are underdeveloped and unbalanced, characterized by tension with the government, indifference towards the media, amateurism towards the private sector, and submission to donors.

The political and security situation in Lebanon adds its toll. NGOs tend to halt their activities in periods of political conflict in order to avoid being affiliated with any side; in cases of emergencies, some NGOs shift their interest and focus to relief efforts. Disappointingly, NGOs continue to fail civil society in their unsuccessful efforts to ease political tensions (Kantar 2009). In addition, some NGOs feel pressured by political or religious groups that do not agree with their mission and objectives; these NGOs might decide to exit specific areas if not suspend their activities.

⁴The accumulated budget of social welfare NGOs is five times the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The 2009 national budget allocates US\$694.283 million for education, US\$293.165 million for health and US\$127.144 million thousands for social services out of the total US\$10.869 billion.

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Solving Problems Informally: The Influence of Israel's Political Culture on the Public Policy Process

Nissim Cohen

Introduction

Informal behavior and activities are an integral part of many societies in the Middle East and considered part of the political culture in the region. In their classic research, Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993) identified the concept of *wasta*, which they defined as a “hidden force behind the Mediterranean society” and an explanatory variable of decision making in Mediterranean societies. Literally, the meaning of the word in Arabic is “middle” or in declension, to push two sides of a dispute to a middle point or compromise between them. Nevertheless, in recent decades the word has come to mean to “receive dividends from the government” (through connections) or a method of overcoming societal obstacles such as obtaining employment through connections (Al Ramahi 2008; Kilani and Sakijha 2002).

While some may argue that the political culture in Western or democratic societies will always be completely different than the political culture in non-Western or non-democratic societies, in this chapter I will argue that such dichotomies will not always exist. Social processes do not need to be distinctive to a single national culture or to a cluster of culturally allied national cultures (Smith, Huang, et al. 2012, p. 147). Hence, in some cases, we may point to behaviors that stem from informal,

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culturally based practices as a dominant factor that influences public policy processes—regardless of the type of political regime. Therefore, under certain conditions, even after decades of democracy, informal activities whose purpose is to influence policy results may still exist in a society—while “traditional” channels of political participation are marginalized.

This chapter describes and explains the informal influence of Israeli political culture on the public policy process. In contrast to studies of formal public policy, the focus of the essay is on informal modes of influence and activities. As I will demonstrate, these informal elements are rooted in Israeli society and are an integral part of its public policy and administration. The chapter explains the impact of a specific type of political culture, called “alternative politics” in the Israeli literature, on public policy and institutional settings. Alternative politics is based on a “do-it-yourself” approach adopted by citizens to address their dissatisfaction with governmental services. These actions are described as *alternative*, because this informal behavior becomes an integral part of the political culture and political behavior processes. When such a mode of political culture is diffused to all sectors and levels of society, all players, including bureaucrats and politicians, are guided by short-term considerations and apply unilateral strategies that bypass formal rules either through illegal activity or by marginalizing formal rules. Hence, the notion of alternative politics is not confined only to the Israeli experience. Elements of this approach are evident in discussions about the political culture in Arab countries, as well as in other societies around the world.

The paper has four sections and is structured as follows. The next section presents and discusses cross-national examples of culture-based informal behavior whose purpose is to solve collective action problems. In this section, I will underscore the fact that this *modus operandi* is not unique to specific cultures and exists in various societies around the world. This review also substantiates my claim that informal activities do not depend on the type of government or regime. I will provide further empirical support for my claim in the third section, in which I will describe the Israeli political culture. While demonstrating how informal initiatives became an integral part of Israeli political culture, I will show that this pattern of behavior slowly defused to most Israeli policy domains and political players. I will also show how alternative politics and elements associated with this problematic phenomenon are becoming a dominant explanatory variable in Israel’s domestic and even foreign policy. The fourth section will be devoted to a discussion and a summary.

Using Informal, Culturally Based Practices in Order to Influence Policy Results

Behaviors stemming from informal, culturally based practices are a phenomenon evident in various societies around the world (Smith, Torres, et al. 2012). These behaviors all share the goal of solving social problems informally. The literature identifies at least six principal modes of interpersonal influence that have been

proposed as important but culturally distinctive: *wasta* in Arab countries, *guanxi* in Chinese cultures, *jeitinho* in Brazil, *svyazi* in Russia, *jaan-pehchaan* in India, and “pulling strings” in the UK.

Wasta is an Arabic word that means the intervention of a patron in favor of a client in an attempt to obtain privileges or resources from a third party. It is based on familial or clan loyalty, which Arabs leverage to obtain positions or promote their causes in government offices and sometimes academic institutions. If one is close with the group in power, he or she will receive preferable services. *Wasta* is a salient practice in many Arab nations (Ali and Al-Kazemi 2006; El-Said and McDonald 2001, p. 77; Kilani and Sakijha 2002; Mellahi and Wood 2003; Yahiaoui and Zoubir 2006).

In essence, *Wasta* is a strategy that people use in order to solve everyday problems. *Wasta* is used when people are dissatisfied with the given conditions and believe that formal influence channels are blocked or may be more costly to use than informal channels. Hence, they can achieve their goals through links with key persons in positions of high status. These links are personal and most often derive from family relationships or close friendships (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993). Thus, although *wasta* is often portrayed as a part of corruption, Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993, p. 191) argue for its social value in giving “individuals a sense of belonging to a social entity that provides unconditional acceptance, and assistance to the novice in solving problems that are commonplace to someone more experienced. These functions are positive for the individual and for society.”

By focusing on the political, economic, and social context of the Arab world Mohamed and Mohamad (2011, pp. 414–415) explain how internal and external threats lead Arab political leaders to create highly centralized administrations and place close confidants in key positions. Thus, in a short time, a powerful elite emerged that ruled and dominated society. In the absence of institutional structures, social networking becomes the key to conducting transactions. In his 1945 novel *Cairo Modern*, the Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz portrayed *wasta* as a cause and consequence of an ailing society. Nevertheless, various findings lead scholars to claim that *wasta* is strengthening rather than diminishing in Arab societies (Mohamed and Mohamad 2011, p. 416).

Informal, culturally based practices are not restricted to Arab societies alone. Scholars point to the phenomenon of *guanxi* (“connections”) as an important aspect of many kinds of interpersonal relationships in Chinese cultures (Michailova and Worm 2003) that can be used informally in order to solve immediate social problems (Gold et al. 2002, pp. 3–20). This phenomenon shares many of the informal elements described in the Arab context. Chen and Chen (2004, p. 306) characterize it as “...an informal particularistic personal connection between two individuals who are bounded by an implicit psychological contract to follow the norm of *guanxi*, such as maintaining a long-term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty and obligation....”

Guanxi is characterized by specific particularistic ties (Farh et al. 1998), the presence of perceived *guanxi* (Farh et al. 1998), the presence of specific behavioral consequences (Law et al. 2000), and especially by its pragmatic use in solving problems (Chen and Chen 2004). Those who do not follow its informal rules may lose face, honor, or status (Luo 2000).

As in the case of *wasta*, some describe *guanxi* relationships as making a positive contribution to societies (Xin and Pearce 1996), while others disagree and stress their potential for nepotism and corruption (Dunfee and Warren 2001). However, while *wasta* is inconsistent with Islam, *guanxi* is based on Confucian ethics that focus on strengthening collective ties (Batjargal 2007; Hutchings and Weir 2006).

In Brazil, there is another informal problem-solving strategy called *jeito* or *jeitinho*, which is sometimes recognized as positive (Amado and Brasil 1991). Meaning “little way out,” *jeito* or *jeitinho* is reported to be a strong characteristic of behavior in many segments of society in Brazil (Neves Barbosa 1995); Duarte (2006). The concept refers to creative ingenuity in rapidly achieving short-term solutions to problems. It is a favor, and rules are bent if not broken. When there are positive personal feelings between the two parties, the request is made in a polite and friendly fashion, and the requestor puts himself at the mercy of the potential giver of the *jeito*. No money changes hands, there is no expectation of a return in kind from the individual who has granted the favor, and reciprocity is maintained between these stakeholders as well as “with society” (McCarthy et al. 2012, pp. 30–31). As Duarte (2006, p. 509) describes it, it is a “social mechanism that entails bending or breaking the rules in order to deal with difficult or forbidding situations....” Barbosa (2006) positions *jeitinho* in between favors and corruption. However, as in the case of *wasta* and *guanxi*, it may sometimes be viewed as positive, as it essentially involves ways of achieving one’s goals that are quick and indirect but do not threaten the preservation of harmony (Torres and Dessen 2008).

In Russia, there is another informal problem-solving strategy called *blat/sviazi*, an unofficial system of exchange of goods and services based on principles of reciprocity and sociability (Fitzpatrick 2000). This exchange of favors evolved under the conditions of shortages and a state system of privileges. This strategy provides access to public resources through personal channels and connections (Ledeneva 1998, p. 37). *Blat/Sviazi* is usually accomplished through personal connections with families, friends, and peers. It involves a favor grantor and a favor recipient, and society as a participant in the sense that the obligation to utilize *blat/sviazi* as a member within one’s personal network is a culturally embedded expectation (McCarthy et al. 2012, p. 31).

India provides another example of a culture in problems are solved informally through a system called *jaan-pehchaan*. The term refers to close-knit relationships that can lead to increased cohesiveness and efficiency in decision making by leveraging personal connections. The use of *jaan-pehchaan* has at times reduced the opportunity costs borne by millions of Indian citizens trying to navigate around the country’s slow, inflexible, and bureaucratic rules of government, an example of weak formal institutions (McCarthy et al. 2012, p. 32).

The above cross-national examples come from non-Western cultural contexts. However, that does not necessarily mean that such behaviors exist only in non-Western societies. Scholars have already suggested that such informal activities exist in Western democracies. For example, the British term “pulling strings” is an idiomatic phrase that refers to a method of obtaining favors particularly through links with influential persons. Smith, Huang, et al. (2012, p. 5) explain that this phenomenon has not been the subject of academic study, and there are no published

suggestions that the phrase refers to a process that is indigenous to the United Kingdom (ibid.).

To conclude, the literature points to the existence of various methods around the world for solving social problems informally. Many of the cases are in non-Western or non-democratic countries. However, the existence of terms such as “pulling strings” in the United Kingdom indicates that this type of phenomenon may exist, at least to some degree, in any society. As I will show next, the Israeli case provides a good exemplar of my claim that under certain conditions this pattern of behavior may slowly diffuse and become a dominant element of the political culture and public policy processes.

Using Informal Initiatives in Order to Influence Policy Results

As the literature already demonstrates (Ben-Porat and Mizrahi 2005; Cohen 2012; Cohen and Mizrahi 2012; Mizrahi 2012; Mizrahi and Meydani 2003), a variety of structural factors and social processes cause many members of Israeli society to adopt a pattern of behavior that can be described as creating *faits accomplis*. Such actions arise when the government fails to provide public goods and services in the quantity or quality that satisfies the public. Citizens, therefore, take matters into their own hands and find other means of satisfying their needs. This pattern of activity is known in the literature as “alternative politics.”

What Is Alternative Politics?

As in the cases of *wasta*, *guanxi*, *jeitinho*, *svyazi*, *jaan-pehchaan* and pulling strings, individuals adapt in order to solve immediate problems such as obtaining more responsive and better quality services from the government (Mizrahi 2012). This pattern of behavior includes increased use of alternative channels for the immediate provision of services in areas such as education, social welfare, and internal security. Originally, a process of this kind was meant to help achieve specific goals in the short run. When this process includes a wide range of policy areas and lasts for decades, it becomes internalized within the Israeli public as an acceptable approach to acquiring public goods and services (Cohen 2012). The public comes to believe that the regular channels will not fulfill their needs, so they must make use of alternative channels. Thus, many Israelis participate in alternative politics rather than using normative political participation.

Alternative politics is a multi-dimensional term that refers to the use of informal institutions by individuals and organizations to acquire the public goods or services which, according to the social contract, the government is supposed to supply. This term has both narrow and broad definitions. The narrow definition of alternative politics relates to the self-supply of public goods in which individuals and groups are involved without the interference of administrative factors. The informal elements include both the supplier (individuals and groups as opposed to the government) and

the manner in which the products are supplied. Such “do-it-yourself” actions fall within a gray area because they tend to be semi-legal or illegal (Cohen and Mizrahi 2012).

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize that the legal consumption of various services and goods in the private market is *not* alternative politics. Alternative politics relates to the self-supply of public goods and services illegally or semi-legally. Individuals who make use of alternative politics are dissatisfied with the public goods that the government institutions supply and feel that they cannot participate effectively in the decision-making processes that affect them. They also do not trust those institutions to supply the desired goods in the future. Instead, they would rather bypass those institutions if they can afford to, seeking the goods and services they want through other channels and thereby creating *faits accomplis*.

The literature that deals with alternative politics also considers the structural conditions that promote such behavior. Researchers (Lehman-Wilzig 1991, 1992; Mizrahi and Meydani 2006) have pointed to deep gaps between social groups, financial issues, the need to allocate large amounts of the national budget to security, political instability and the centralization of administrative systems, all of which limit the ability of decision makers to govern effectively. Given this context, we can view issues such as corruption, bribes, and the use of personal connections as part of the broader perspective of individuals trying to solve supply problems independently within a political and cultural system that acknowledges alternative politics as an acceptable approach.

Alternative politics is generally embedded as an integral part of a given culture. Therefore, we expect it to diffuse to most of the layers and actors in the society. Hence, the broad definition of the term alternative politics also refers to the manner in which public goods are supplied, which includes the activities of the suppliers of public goods and services, namely the politicians and the bureaucrats (Cohen 2012). Thus, the decision makers themselves use informal institutions during the process in which they supply public goods (Mizrahi and Meydani 2003). When structural conditions prove difficult, we should expect to see the phenomenon in many areas, not confined to specific areas of policy or particular public groups (Mizrahi and Vigoda-Gadot 2009; Mizrahi et al. 2009). Indeed, interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats will all resort to alternative politics in order to achieve their desired results. As the public comes to understand through collective learning that such practices work, the use of alternative politics will be extended to all sectors and layers of society. Those in the area of public policy will pay greater heed to short-term demands and create unilateral initiatives that bypass the formal rules through illegal or semi-legal activities.

The Origins of Alternative Politics in Israel

Israeli political culture, as well as its influence on public policy processes and reforms, has recently been the focus of many studies. Although one cannot ignore the strong influence of the Ottoman Empire on the Jewish community in Palestine, Israeli society and political culture were largely shaped under the British Mandate in Palestine from 1917 to 1948. As already Mizrahi and Meydani explained (2003),

the Jewish community in Palestine under the British Mandate had a relatively large measure of autonomy in managing its own affairs in most fields of life (Arian 1998; Horowitz and Lissak 1978, 1989; Sprinzak 1999). The Jewish leadership, elected via a relatively independent political system, created its own organizations, separate from those of both the British authorities and the Arab community, to accelerate economic development, provide public services such as health, education, and welfare, and develop an infrastructure such as electricity, roads, water supply, and building construction. Thus, the idea that the Jewish community should not trust others and had to create its own institutions and organizations gradually became a building block of the Zionist ethos.

At the same time, facing significant challenges from the Arab population and a British ban on widespread Jewish immigration, as well as the aspiration to expand Jewish settlement in Palestine, the Jewish leadership gradually built illegal paramilitary forces that had three main goals: fighting the Arab paramilitary forces, organizing illegal Jewish immigration, and establishing and defending illegal settlements. These channels of activity were not only “alternative,” but also illegal as far as British mandatory law was concerned. The political culture passed down to generations of Israelis included not only improvisation as a dominant characteristic of Israeli public administration (Sharkansky and Zalmanovitch 1999), but also the idea that acting via unilateral initiatives that might skirt the letter of the law, and sometimes even operate outside formal regulatory structures, was not only permitted, but actually served national goals. To a large extent, this became the *modus operandi* of Israeli society (Lehman-Wilzig 1992; Migdal 2001; Sprinzak 1999).

Due to a high level of centralization, the Jewish, and later the Israeli, institutional setting enabled politicians to repress similar initiatives directed towards the Jewish, or Israeli, system itself (Aharoni 1998; Horowitz and Lissak 1989; Sprinzak 1999). Nevertheless, as explained elsewhere, in the 1970s and 1980s the central systems consistently failed to respond to the demand for public services (Ben-Porat and Mizrahi 2005). Faced with a situation that they interpreted as blocked influence channels, significant groups in Israeli society turned back to a problem-solving approach they knew well—unilateral initiatives and alternative politics.

During the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, many groups and individuals in Israeli society used non-institutionalized initiatives to create alternatives, often illegal or extra-legal, to governmental services. The 1980s were characterized by a significant growth in the black-market economy—particularly the illegal trade in foreign currency (Bruno 1993), gray-market medicine—the semi-legal, private supply of health services using public facilities (Chernichovsky 1991; Cohen 2012), gray-market education—the employment of privately paid teachers and the evolution of independent private schools (Yogev 1999), and pirate cable television—all of which were alternatives to inadequate government services (Lehman-Wilzig 1992). These processes intensified during the 1990s and the 2000s (Mizrahi et al. 2009, 2010), when unilateral initiatives and alternative politics were expanded to other policy areas such as internal security, social welfare (Gidron et al. 2003), and even the policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict (Ben-Porat and Mizrahi 2005).

Indeed, in recent decades, it became clear to many that, for the most part, only initiatives of this kind could help people access the services they needed (Mizrahi and Meydani 2003). Furthermore, the Israeli government responded positively to these initiatives by changing its policies in the direction demanded by the groups. In this process the legislative and the executive branches of government were weakened, while the Supreme Court, which enjoyed public legitimacy and trust (Sperling and Cohen 2012), gained considerable strength (Mizrahi and Meydani 2003). As government financing shrank, the prevalence of alternative politics in Israeli society and the learning processes the society had undergone also encouraged the evolution of quasi-exit strategies. How does alternative politics affect various policy areas in Israel?

Alternative Politics in the Israeli Health Care System

Cohen's (2012) typology of informal payments for health care identifies black market payments as the most discussed and critiqued type of informal payments for health care. These payments are in essence the clients' attempts to obtain services on their own via semi-legal and illegal channels. Black market payments for health care are corrupting and considered part of the shadow economy (Schneider 2007; Schneider and Buehn 2009). Nevertheless, scholars see them as an integral part of the Israeli health care system (Cohen et al. 2012), making them a classic exemplar of alternative politics.

However, as in the other cases around the world reviewed above, the literature also points out that informal payments for health care may be paid in indirect and circuitous ways, further complicating the identification of the phenomenon. Suppliers of public health care services may not be paid directly or immediately. They may be paid for their services in the future or in another area of services. Those who are close to the group in power receive preferential treatment, including health care services. Hence, in the context of health care, the Israeli term "protektisia" (receiving preferential treatment from a friend or a family member) became a synonym in the Israeli literature for gray medicine (Lachman and Noy 1998). This phenomenon also became an integral part of the Israeli health care system and recently has received even limited support in Israeli public opinion. When asked in a recent survey (Cohen et al. 2012) to indicate on a 5-point scale where 1 indicated "strongly disagree" and 5 indicated "strongly agree" the degree to which they agreed with the statement, "When it is necessary and I am able to, I would use my personal connections to provide a member of my family or myself with preferable health care or educational services," the average response was 3.34 (SD: 1.39).

Cohen and Mizrahi (2012) claim that alternative politics is likely to expand to all levels and sectors in society, and thus also characterizes the responses of governmental players such as politicians and bureaucrats. They demonstrate that in recent decades such actions have expanded throughout society. They are now evident in the process through which the basket of health care services is decided and the process and activities that led to the decline in the public share of financing the health care system. Hence, alternative politics has seeped into various elements in the

Israeli health care system and characterize the behavior of the public, interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats (Cohen 2013).

Alternative Politics as Political Participation Through the Judicial System

By using Hirschman's (1970) model of *exit, voice and loyalty*, Mizrahi and Meydani (2003) argue that in an attempt to create alternative policy decisions, many groups in Israel appeal to the Supreme Court. They adopt this approach as part of a quasi-exit strategy, having little faith in other avenues of political participation. Although all sectors of Israeli society are potentially capable of adopting this strategy, those who do so must be suitably knowledgeable and well informed in order to overcome the problem of collective action. In addition, they must possess a measure of self-interest that will make the appeal worthwhile.

Hirschman (1970) argues that when people are dissatisfied with a certain product or their place of work, they may choose either the voice option and protest for better outcomes or the exit option and simply leave the product or their place of work. The choice between the two options depends on the level of loyalty to the brand name or to the place of work. As the level of loyalty increases, the greater the chance of the voice option being chosen, and vice versa. Transferring this model to the political arena, dissatisfaction with policy outcomes or the whole political system may lead people to protest or exit depending on the level of their loyalty. However, argue Mizrahi and Meydani (2003), when protest activities do not succeed in bringing about fundamental changes in political performance, the public may turn to alternative channels.

In its encouragement of appeals and its willingness to accept petitions without over-questioning the justiciability and standing of these petitions, the Israeli High Court of Justice has become a willing partner in this use of alternative channels for advancing organizational and political interests (Mizrahi and Meydani 2003) demonstrated how groups dissatisfied with government decisions would bring their grievances to the Supreme Court. As a result, politicians started to consider the possible attitudes and positions of the Supreme Court in any policy making process. Thus, the Israeli parliament's (Knesset) legal adviser now activates a system that checks the fit of any legal proposal brought to the legislature with the Basic Laws (fundamental pieces of legislation that function as an informal constitution). In that way, the parliament avoids even considering bills that contradict the Basic Laws and actually adopts an approach of restraining legislation (Mizrahi and Meydani 2003, p. 131).

Alternative Politics and the Transformation of Society–Military Relations

Levy and Mizrahi (2008) analyzed alternative politics strategies with regard to society–military relations in Israel. According to their analysis, alternative politics is the result of the undermining of what is termed the *republican contract*. This contract represents

the willingness of citizens to sacrifice their lives and wealth by bearing the costs of war and the preparations for it in return for civil, social, and political rights as well as other rewards granted to them by the state. Levy and Mizrahi suggest that when citizens are dissatisfied with their relationship with the army and their obligations to it, they first try to improve their outcomes through conventional channels of influence by utilizing a wide range of strategies of collective action targeted at the state's civil institutions and the army. However, if citizens feel that these channels of influence are blocked, they will turn to other strategies of alternative politics in a way that pressures the government through semi-legal or even illegal activities.

Indeed, in an attempt to influence Israeli policy, some groups have used strategies such as conscientious objection. *Yesh Gvul* ("There is a Limit"), which emerged during the 1982 Lebanon War, was the first Israeli conscientious objection movement. Its members were not pacifists but rather called for the right to selectively refuse to serve ("yes to military service and no to Lebanon"). When the first Intifada broke out in December 1987 and when the Al-Aqsa Intifada led to the renewal of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 2002, *Yesh Gvul* continued to object to the use of the military. In the 2000s, *Yesh Gvul* was joined by Courage to Refuse, a movement that selectively refused to serve in the Occupied Territories. Courage to Refuse distinguished itself from *Yesh Gvul* by positioning itself at the heart of the Zionist-left camp. Within this framework of illegal political action, more than 280 members of Courage to Refuse have, in fact, been court-martialed and jailed for periods of up to 35 days. Unlike previous displays of disobedience, the refusal of groups such as Courage to Refuse and other groups consisting of high-ranking officers, pilots, and members of elite units to serve in the Occupied Territories were considered more effective (Levy and Mizrahi 2008, p. 43).

Whereas explicit refusal to serve may demand a high personal cost, gray refusal is far more widespread, and hence more problematic, from the Israeli army's perspective. Thus, officers and soldiers express their discomfort with sensitive missions that might involve attacks against civilians, negotiate with their commanders, and have themselves removed from the assignment (*ibid.*). Another example of alternative politics with regard to the army is the rebellion of reservists. In this case, soldiers who feel they are being discriminated against relative to their peers who do not serve and feel ignored by civilian politicians but still feel obliged to honor their military commitments may embark on an alternative politics strategy that takes the form of a revolt (*ibid.*, pp. 45–46). Last is the example of Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch), a civil rights movement founded in 2001. The members of this organization monitored the behavior of soldiers and police at the checkpoints through which Palestinians enter Israel in order to ensure that their human and civil rights were protected, and reported the results of their observations to the public. As in the above cases, the activists of this organization believe that neither the reliance on the internal military networks of information nor the reliance on the institutional, voice-produced modes of civilian supervision of the army will bring about the restraint of aggressive behavior at the checkpoints. Hence, they choose to bypass the formal participation channels and influence public policy through this unique type of monitoring.

Alternative Politics in Israeli Foreign Policy

The use of alternative politics as a major element in Israeli political culture is evident not only in its domestic policy but also in its foreign policy and even the policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict. As Ben-Porat and Mizrahi (2005) explained, segments of the public may undertake semi-legal or illegal initiatives that eventually shape foreign policies. They define these initiatives as alternative politics. Using an empirical analysis of the dynamics of Israeli society from 1992 to 2004 and the debates over the territories occupied in the 1967 war, they explain how the public can threaten the government's monopoly on public products, compelling politicians to change foreign policy in accordance with the public's demands. Ben-Porat and Mizrahi find this mode of behavior to be a central feature of the political culture in Israel and a significant explanatory factor of both domestic and foreign policy processes.

According to Ben-Porat and Mizrahi's analysis, during the 1990s and the 2000s, Israeli policymakers adopted two policy paradigms. The first, the "New Middle East," highlighted the role economic cooperation could play in the transformation of the conflict. The second, "unilateral withdrawal and the security fence," was based on Israeli perceptions that there was no partner on the Palestinian side with whom they could discuss peace. While the New Middle East never materialized and proved to be a disappointment to the Arab business communities as well (Cohen and Ben-Porat 2008), unilateral withdrawal and the security fence were translated into a concrete plan. According to Ben-Porat and Mizrahi, the main difference between the two paradigms lay in the changes in the political culture and participation patterns of Israeli society. While the "New Middle East" paradigm was a top-down effort by policymakers and the economic elite, the unilateral initiatives and the security fence were a bottom-up process compatible with the transformation of Israel's political culture. Hence, the construction of a separation fence between Israel and the Palestinian territories in the West Bank begun in the summer of 2002 by the Likud-led government was a response to both pressures from the public for security and the political culture of unilateral initiatives. Hence, the Israeli public is likely to adopt such strategies under certain cultural and structural conditions in which other influence channels are blocked. When the peace process encountered more obstacles and was further undermined by new cycles of violence, ideas about cooperation and a "New Middle East" gave way to interim agreements and a zero-sum dynamic between the negotiating sides (Ben-Porat and Mizrahi 2005, pp. 188–189).

Summary and Discussion

This chapter describes and explains the informal influence of Israeli political culture on the public policy process. One of the main claims in this chapter is that political culture is an integral part of public policy—regardless of the type of government.

I described the phenomena of *wasta*, *guanxi*, *jeitinho*, *svyazi*, *jaan-pehchaan*, and pulling strings as elements that exist, in various degrees, in many societies around the world. While these elements are often discussed within the context of business organizations, one cannot ignore the fact that these elements will never be limited to a specific scenario. Political culture will always be influenced by the local culture. Hence, under certain conditions, informal activities may become an integral part of the political culture and a dominant part of the policy process in all societies, not just non-democratic societies.

Through examples from the Israeli health care system, the political system, the relationship between society and the military, and foreign policy, we can see how alternative politics has become a dominant pattern of behavior in Israel. When such a process, originally intended to help achieve specific, short-term goals begins to encompass a broad range of policy areas and persists for decades, it engenders a particular type of activity. As a result of this shift to a broadened and longer term mentality, the Israeli public concludes that participation in the regular channels cannot assure receipt of the required public goods or services, leading individuals to take extra-legal actions in order to obtain these goods and services for themselves. It follows that that the political activity of many Israeli citizens is based on alternative politics rather than on more traditional routes of political participation (Mizrachi et al. 2009, p. 153).

Some will claim that, in normative terms, the development of alternative politics in Israeli society is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, as it may strengthen political participation, increase citizens' involvement in public policy and the civil society and serve as a "safety valve" in a complex world. This claim, however, is incorrect. Such a political culture poses a danger to the stability of the democratic system, especially the mentality that condones illegal activity or activity that falls in a gray area, and the instilling of social norms based on circumventing the existing formal apparatuses. As these norms become engrained in the national culture, Israelis feel compelled to think in the short term and to find courses of action that circumvent the democratic rules of the game and the standards of proper administration. Consequently, in the long run, the effects of this phenomenon can be destructive to Israel's democratic values.

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The Management of Museums in Sharjah

Daniel Simonet and Clément Vincent

Introduction

The role of museums in the Arab world has recently become an important topic of discussion. Sharjah is the third largest of the seven Emirates, which together form the United Arab Emirates. With a settlement in existence for over 5,000 years, Sharjah embarked on an ambitious program of cultural development, winning the prestigious UNESCO award of being “The Cultural capital of the Arab world” in 1998. Its cultural strategy confirms the vital role that culture plays in developing a sense of community that aims at developing people’s inherited artistic and aesthetic sense. In contrast to other more tourist-oriented Arab destinations like Egypt, cultural tourism in the GCC region is still relatively new with Sharjah seeking a distinctive niche. While Dubai promotes itself as a leisure destination, Sharjah plans to focus on its history, culture, and heritage. Museums offer kaleidoscopic opportunities for education, knowledge creation, and self-development for individuals, communities, and societies. The existence of a cultural hub makes significant contribution to Sharjah’s economy. The Emirate received 1.5 million visitors in 2008, a significant increase from 600,000 visitors in 2001. Twenty-seven percent of them were from the GCC states. Developing a successful cultural hub poses many challenges. What makes museums popular and what factors explain their success? What are the main barriers to museum development and how can one foster a museum-going culture?

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Sharjah: The Cultural Emirate

Ever since it was named UNESCO's cultural capital of the Arab World in 1998, efforts were made to strengthen Sharjah position as the "cultural" Emirate. Established in 2006 and with funding from the Government of Sharjah, the Sharjah Museums Department is an independent government organization that manages existing museums and oversees the development of new museums. Along with the Sharjah Art Foundation (SAF), established in 2009, both are major actors of the cultural development of the emirate. Four new entities were added between 2006 and 2010: the Maritime Museum; the Aquarium; the Botanical Museum (the Botanical Museum was a new addition to the Natural History Museum); and the Museum of Islamic Civilization. That total of 19 museums is more than the rest of the emirates put together. Out of the 19 museums, 16 are managed by the Sharjah Museums Department. The Natural History and Botanical Museums (and the wild-life center) are managed by the department of environment and preservation. Further proof of the emirates commitment to museum development lies in the Sharjah Museum Department's increasing staff numbers, which have doubled to 520.

Key Themes

The Museum sector is divided around three key themes (Discovery and Sciences; Arts; Heritage and History). The Discovery and Science theme includes the following museums: the Sharjah Aquarium Museum, the Sharjah Archeology Museum, the Sharjah Discovery Center, and the Sharjah Science Museum. The Arts section includes the Sharjah Calligraphy Museum, the Sharjah Art Museum, and the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization. The Sharjah Heritage Museum, the Al Mahatta museum, the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization, the Sharjah Maritime Museum, the Sharjah Hisn Museum, the Bait Al Naboodah and the Majlis Al Midfa fall under the Heritage and History theme. Opened in 1997, the Sharjah Art Museum displays temporary exhibitions and permanent collections of Orientalist painters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in addition to over 300 works of art by artists from the Arab world. Sharjah used to be a major transit point in aviation history, housing the first airport (1932) in the Gulf, which was subsequently used as a staging post for commercial flights en route from Britain to India. Four of the original propeller planes, fully restored, stand guard in the museum hangar alongside the original refueling tanker. Twelve of Sharjah's museums are history museums, thereby illustrating the role that Sharjah played in the Arab world, long before the rise of Dubai. The Sharjah Heritage Museum and the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization act as "cultural mediators" between local hosts and foreign guests by providing in-depth knowledge about the region's history, culture, and religion and its overcoming of cultural barriers.¹ "People who are in charge of processes of

¹<http://www.arabianbusiness.com/culture-culture-16126.html>.

education and guidance, social and cultural upbringing must firmly establish the educational values without neglecting the main worthy principles which form the Arabic Islamic character. By virtue of those principles and beliefs we were and still would be the best nation,” Sheikh Dr. Sultan Bin Mohammad Al Qasimi, Member of the Supreme Council and Ruler of Sharjah. One of the most prominent cultural centers in the Gulf, Sharjah was then the venue of many erudite and well-mannered scholars along with knowledge seekers. The late Ibrahim Al Midfa published the first newspaper.

Emirate-Level Functional Structure

The government of Sharjah features directorates which play the same role as ministries at the national level, such as the Directorate of Public Works; the Directorate of Town Planning and Survey; the Real Estate Registration Department; the Sharjah Economic Development Department; the Department of Culture and Information and the Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority. This functional structure offers several advantages. Firstly, it allows a pooling of specialists, which is more appropriate when technical expertise is essential, but rare. Secondly, it facilitates career path and professional development in specialized areas. Established by an Amiri Decree number 20 on 30th of April 1981 under the guidance of H.H. Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Mohammad Al Qassimi, member of the Supreme Council and the Ruler of Sharjah, the Sharjah Museums Department is an independent government entity the purpose of which is to deliver the highest quality of museums services for the people of the Emirate of Sharjah and all its visitors, through its facilities, exhibitions, programs of learning, research, and community outreach. Sharjah Museums Department aims to achieve at the local and international level an understanding, appreciation, and respect for Sharjah’s identity and for its cultural and natural heritage. At a higher level, the executive council—the highest entity at the Emirate level—which is chaired by the crown Prince, determines appropriate cultural policies. The Sharjah Museum Department also benefits from the insights of related directorates and boards such as the board of Education and the board of Tourism via, for instance, memorandums of agreement, as with the Sharjah Education Zone and with the Sharjah Children Centers. The Sharjah Museum department also manages exhibitions and programs in coordination with government entities such as the Directorate of Art within the Department of Culture and Information but this does not necessarily determine priorities in exhibitions.

The Department of Culture and Information houses eight Directorates.

- The Directorate of Heritage has taken care of the preservation of old buildings and heritage sites all over the Emirate from the mid-1990s onward, including the House of Heritage, the House of popular games, the Souq Al Shwehiyeen, which was once the meeting place where Bedouins gathered to sell coal, wood, grass, etc. ;

- The Directorate of Antiquities is concerned with surveying, locating, identifying, and verifying archeological locations. Main archeological sites in Sharjah are Jebel Al Buhais (where archeologists found 6,000-year-old graves buried with jewels), and Mleiha (where archeologists found a 2,000-year-old castle with 4,000-year-old tombs);
- The Directorate of Cultural Affairs is in charge of various cultural and intellectual activities, including the “Sharjah Festival days,” cultural exchange programs, literature creativity, and poetry evenings. It oversees the Cultural Palace, the Art Square, the Music Square, the Sharjah Institute for Theatrical Arts, the University City Hall²;
- The Directorate of Arts oversees the Sharjah Art Gallery, the Sharjah Center for Arabic Calligraphy and Ornamentation, the Arabic Arts Center and the Sharjah Institute of Fine Arts;
- The Directorate of Cultural Awards;
- The Directorate of Theater;
- The Directorate of Libraries.

The Administrative Affairs Section of the Public administration Department provides all the administrative services necessary for the employees of the Department of Culture and Information.

The Sharjah Museum Department

Established in 2006 by his Highness Dr Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohammed [Al Qasimi], Member of the UAE Supreme Council and Ruler of Sharjah, as an independent government entity, the Sharjah Museum Department provides the highest standard of museums to Sharjah’s residents and visitors. Fully funded by the authorities, its new headquarters were inaugurated in October 2011 in the Al Layyah area. In addition to managing museums, it organizes specialized exhibitions, often as a joint effort with the Sharjah Art Foundation, launches educational programs, publishes research, and oversees management of the various sites, museums, and galleries that range from art, Islamic culture, archeology, heritage, sciences, aquaculture, and the history of the Sharjah Emirate. With its functional organizations, the Sharjah Museum Department shall meet the need of various groups (Emiratis, schools, tourists). Its education department collaborates with schools in Sharjah (via workshops that focus on school curriculum development) to promote school visits. For instance, the Natural History and Botanical Museum hosted almost 31,000 students in 2011.³ The Education and Interpretation Department is committed to promoting cultural awareness

²<http://www.sdci.gov.ae/english/culturalpalace.html>.

³Noorhan B. Museum braced for increase in school visits. *Gulf News*. September 21, 2012.

among all communities. Its tourism division works closely with Sharjah's Commerce and Tourism Development Authority (SCTDA) to promote the emirate's cultural offering.

Diversity of Offering

What strikes visitors is the number and diversity of museums in Sharjah.

- The Sharjah Maritime Museum was first opened in early 2003 in the Heritage Area to highlight the maritime life of the UAE. Relocated to Al Khan in 2009, it features traditional wooden seafaring dhows used for fishing, trading, and pearling. It also showcases genuine Arabian pearls. For thousands of years, the pearls of the Arabian Gulf were regarded as the finest in the world, and until the twentieth century the major markets for these pearls were in Persia and India. Pearls also reached Europe via Turkey.⁴
- The Sharjah Aquarium opened in Al Khan in 2008. Covering an area of 6,500 m², it consists of two floors equipped with 20 water aquariums. Each one is filled with 1.8 million liters of water and contains over 250 species, ranging from the smallest clown fish and eels to rays and reef sharks.
- First opened in 1993, the Sharjah Archaeology Museum moved to its current location in 1997 to serve as a permanent archive for all archeological findings recovered in the Emirate of Sharjah since the start of archeological excavations in 1972. Aimed at preserving, interpreting, and exhibiting archeological findings, it displays artifacts, coins, jewelry, pottery, and ancient weapons from the Stone Age to the present days, explores models of burials, and houses architecture along with the first forms of writing in the UAE. Among the most notable collections on display in the archeology museum is the 2,000-year-old horse skeleton, found in Mleiha, uncovered with its full golden bridle.
- The latest museum to reopen in 2012 (the original museum was first opened in early 2003) is the Sharjah Heritage Museum. It contains six galleries that range from "Landscape," "Lifestyle," "Celebrations," "Livelihood," "Traditional Knowledge" to "Oral Traditions" of Sharjah.
- Established in 1996, then renovated and reopened in 2008 on the Majarrah waterfront, the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization, originally called the Islamic Museum, houses more than 5,000 artifacts from all over the Islamic World with theme-based display areas in seven spacious galleries.
- Another testimony of the Emirates passion for motor vehicles is the Classic Car Museum that reopened in January 2013 and features 85 classic cars, two motorcycles and five bicycles.

⁴ <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/heritage-culture/nation-s-maritime-history-and-heritage-on-show-1.1679>.

- The Fine Art Library located at the Sharjah Art Museum contains over 4,000 titles written in Arabic, English, and other languages.
- The Sharjah Calligraphy Museum opened in 2002 in the building of the house of Hamad Al Midfaa, in the Sharjah Heritage Area.

More recently, his Highness Dr. Shaik Sultan Bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, member of the Supreme Council at Sharjah Museum Department and Ruler of Sharjah, signed an agreement with Miss Claudie Haigneré; Former Minister of Research and New Technologies, and First French woman to go to space, now President of Univescience, a leading French Science and Technology Organization; to establish a new Science Center in Sharjah.

Apart from museums and an aviation complex, Sharjah showcases private houses of prominent intellectuals. These allow the public to get a grasp of what life was like in the last century. For instance, the Majlis Al Midfa Museum commemorates the late Ibrahim bin Mohammed al Midfaa, who contributed to the cultural development of the UAE, and of Sharjah in particular. Al Midfaa was known for issuing the first newspaper in the history of the UAE, in 1927—the Oman newspaper. He subsequently issued the Sound of Birds (*Soutul Asafeer*). The house is also known for its wind tower.

The Bait Al Naboodah (house of Al Naboodah), built in 1845, originally belonged to a prominent pearl trader Obaid Bin Eissa Bin Ali Al Shamsi, nicknamed Al Naboodah, who had commercial ties with India, Africa, and France. It became a museum in 1995. Built around a large courtyard, the two-storey house displays traditional Gulf architecture along with unique decorative carvings, which allow visitors to get an insight into the daily life of Emiratis.

Challenges

Fostering a museum-culture is critical. The principal strategy to encourage museum visits lies in targeting younger generations. The Sharjah Museum Department staff reviews textbooks and identifies subjects related to collections held in the museums. In charge of the schooling system, the Sharjah Education Zone requires each class to visit a museum that holds a collection related to a particular school subject. Moreover, there is a person in charge of organizing class visits in every museum. Encouraging public participation in broader scientific projects is also instrumental in fostering that culture with “science citizens” and amateurs participating in scientific research (for instance, collecting and analyzing data), or spreading their benefits to a larger public, for instance, during the international Astronomy Day (which showcases astronomical tools and instruments that were used by Muslim scientists during the Islamic Golden Age), or the International Museums Day organized by the International Council of Museums, a non-governmental organization with formal relations with UNESCO.

Language can be a barrier as well. Translating from Arabic to English can be quite a challenge. Moreover, there were very few educational curricula in the field

museum management and a lack of specialized resources/material in Arabic. Expert knowledge in museum management, expertise in architecture, museography and exhibitions design, archeology, and heritage conservation was lacking. Hence, international consultants were originally hired to train staff and museum directors. The German-based Goethe Institute provides a full-time staff member to develop training programs. As museums expand, they offer more career opportunities for Emiratis. Currently, 90 % of the employees of the Sharjah Museum Department are Emirati nationals. Zayed University further contributed to this by developing a museum management program: the Master of Arts in Communications Specialization in Tourism and Cultural Communication.

Major Public Events

As opposed to permanent and static events, the Department of Culture and Information keeps culture lively by bringing together regular events such as the *Biennial*, the *Arab Youth Forum*, the *Cultural Exchange Program*, the *Sharjah Festival Day*, and the *World Book fair* in coordination with the Arabic Language Protection Society. These encourage active interaction with other cultures and other cultural, scientific, and artistic centers in the Emirate.

- Organized every 2 years since 1993, the Biennial is a major international cultural event that promotes the Arab and International Art movement with emphasis on contemporary art. A core initiative that creates opportunities for artists and artistic production, the Biennial is organized by the Sharjah Art Foundation and funded by the Government of Sharjah through the Department of Culture and Information. Invitations to the Biennial also open opportunities to showcase artistic creations before the Sharjah Art Foundation considers their acquisition.
- The Arab Youth Forum is an annual cultural event with sessions over one key theme. The main theme of the first session of the Arab Youth Forum was “Youth and the Environment,” the second Arab Youth Forum focused on “Youth and Globalization,” and the third session has the “Youth and the Arab question” as its main theme;
- The Cultural Exchange Program seeks to consolidate cultural ties and relationships among various Pan Arab nations via publications exchanges, exhibitions, cultural meetings, dialogues, and planned intellectual and scientific programs;
- In existence since 1982, the international book fair is a 10-day annual event usually held during the first half of December;
- The Sharjah Light Festival is a nightly art exhibit with local and international artists that takes place in public places. Local theatrical productions benefit from prizes worth a total of Dhs. 70,000 given in various categories, such as the best theatrical presentation, the best play writing, the best director, the best actor, the best actress, the best scenography, the best lighting, and the best costumes.

Community Impact

Families make up the primary target market for these initiatives. The SMD organizes family workshops within the Sharjah Maritime Museum (“Treasures from Oceans”), the Sharjah Art Museum, the Sharjah Archaeology Museum (“Make Your Own Artwork”), and the Sharjah Heritage Museum (“Traditional Musical Instruments”). The Discovery Centre that explores the dynamics of water, the five senses, travelling and construction mechanisms is very popular among families with children. In addition, yearly summer camps present a diverse range of scientific, educational, artistic, and cultural activities. As part of the “Knowledge Without Borders” project designed to promote culture within families, a library of 50 books was given to Emirati families. The Sharjah Discovery Center plans to showcase more sculptures and 3D work, as younger Emiratis show a strong interest in digital and graphic art.

Apart from families, the promotion of education is the other priority. The Heritage Directorate at the Department of Culture and Information organizes history courses for students. The Sharjah Art Institute under the Art Directorate organizes drawing, sculpture, graphic, ceramics, and art history courses for girls and boys. Every year, the Department of Interpretation and Education of the Sharjah Museums Department showcases its range of interactive programs to the Society Awareness and Humanitarian Services, Taweya. The Science Museum and the Discovery Centre organize joint scientific workshops for the public. Annual Exhibitions of UAE Artists are co-organized by the Emirate’s Fine Art Society, and the Directorate of Art with exhibitions of resident artists at the Sharjah Art Museum. The Uyoon Arabia exhibition displays creations of Arab Women Artists. The Natural History and Botanical Museum is very popular among primary or middle school children due to its man-made, pre-historic rain forest containing over 600 plants.

Museum Popularity: Changes in Preference?

Museum attendance is on the rise with a 20.93 % increase from 2010 to 2011 and a 9.14 % increase from 2011 to 2012, despite the closure of the Al Hisn Museum for restoration and redesign work in 2010. There were two major openings in 2012: the Classic Cars Museum and the Heritage Museum. As for the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization, which opened on June 1, 2008, it received 15,000 visitors from June 1 to July 24, 2008, compared with 9,435 visitors for the Natural History Museum and the Botanical Museum, and 3,260 for the Science Museum.⁵ In addition, the Sharjah Aquarium recorded 100,000 visitors during its first 7 weeks

⁵Arabian Business.com. Interaction vital for museum visitors. Sunday, 3 August 2008.

of operation, despite the fewer visitors in summer than in winter. Along with the Maritime museum and the Sharjah Discovery Center, the Sharjah Aquarium is the most successful institution, particularly amongst families. The Islamic Civilization Museum, the Archeology and Art Museums constitute the second group of the most popular museums. These museums have high return (re-visitation) rates, which are reflective of their success. Heritage museums are predominantly visited by tourists from outside of Sharjah. In 2009, 33 % of visitors were residents of Sharjah. Twenty-nine percent were from the other emirates.

Identifying Museum's Key Success Factors

A reason behind the success of the museum of Islamic civilization is its universal approach. It does not exclusively focus on religion; rather, it covers many disciplines—art, religion, science, and mathematics with contributions of the Islamic civilization.

For other museums, like the Maritime Museum, the source of their success can be sourced from the localization factor (“We need the people of our nation to tell their own history,” Ms Manal Ataya⁶). For the Museum’s oral history project, staff sourced and recorded accounts from a handful of men between 70 and 90 years old to tell about the Emirate’s maritime history, concepts “and sensibilities which are hard to explain but that those who are born and grew up here know instinctively.” Often, exhibitions are inspired by typical Arab themes such as courtyard spaces in the Islamic architecture, where “the objective political world and the introspective interest intersect cross over courtyard” and “where both elements of both public and private life intertwine” (Hasegawa 2013).⁷ Artistic themes are often intertwined, for instance, though music, art, films, and talks.

The quality of the artifacts is a key success factor. Generally museum collections in the museums are owned by his Highness or were acquired by the museum itself. On top of this add limited but generous public donations of artifacts to the museums. Loans from international and regional museums and institutions concern temporary exhibitions at the Sharjah Art Museum, the Calligraphy Museum, the Museum of Islamic Civilization and more recently the Archeology Museum and Heritage Museum. Moreover, some artifacts were discovered during excavation works. Reciprocally, Sharjah has lent two of its most prized possessions: a golden bridle and a silver horse figure to the Kentucky Horse Park’s International Museum of the Horse. One major feat of the Emirate is its ability to reconcile traditions and modernity, to house exhibitions that focus on traditional Arab societies and other exhibitions that appeal to a larger international market (“The Lure of Beauty” documents 100 years of fashion drawings, illustrations and photography, from the early part of the twentieth century till today).

⁶<http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/sharjah-rulers-vision-drives-a-cultural-emirate>.

⁷Hasegawa, Gulf News, Wednesday, March 2013, page A14.

Public participation; finding the right balance between attracting tourists, and engaging the local communities and residents via workshops along with the ability to understand expectations of the audience are also critical key success factors. The Education and Interpretation Department organizes workshops with museums, for instance *Stories of Emirati Sailors* in collaboration with the Sharjah Maritime Museum; *Historical Journey* with the Sharjah Archeology Museum; and the *Modernity of Islamic Art* with the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization. The Sharjah Archeology Museum organizes a monthly lecture program (*Historic Journey*) covering a wide range of local issues, for instance on *Desertification and its Impact on National Resources*. A *Traditional Rhythm* workshop introduces participants to traditional musical instruments. Another workshop, *Jewellery* at the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization focused on traditional ornaments and jewelry making. The Education and Interpretation Department too runs a series of awareness-raising interactive lectures (*History of the Al Mahatta airport*) on the historical development of UAE architecture. The Sharjah Museum Department is also active in local celebrations. Another key success factor is the provision of both education and entertainment during visits.

Constant renovation and upgrading are essential to attract visitors. Renovation extends to the revitalization of the heritage area in the Heart of Sharjah. The first phase of the Heart of Sharjah project include rebuilding the ruling family's residence and a neighboring fort, the houses behind Al Zahraa Mosque in Al Muraijah, the Al Midfaa family house and the Al Hisn area. As for the renovation of museum interiors, it focuses on site accessibility; providing directional signboards; ways to move from one piece of art to another; organization and alignment of artifacts together; labeling issues, description of artifacts; the use of a new typography; interactive display; the use of smart technologies including sound installation, audio story-telling and new lightning (e.g., spotlights rather than fluorescent lights).⁸

International collaboration is another key success factor. The Sharjah Calligraphy Museum hosted an art exhibition by the renowned Italian artist and calligrapher Bibi Trabucchi, titled "Qalam for Peace: A bridge of art from Rome to Sharjah." Collaborations is essential in sourcing artifacts for temporary exhibitions, for instance, from the Museum of Islamic Arts (Berlin); the African Art Museum (NY); and the Victoria and Albert Museum (London).

Recognition

Sharjah's efforts have been internationally acclaimed. The Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization was the only Museum in the Middle East and Arab region to be awarded the prestigious Museums Connect grant by the American Association

⁸AUS report Class of DES462 Exhibition Project Spring 2013.

of Museums.⁹ The Executive Bureau of Arab Council of Arab Tourism Ministers also selected Sharjah as the Capital of Arab Tourism for Year 2015. Moreover, the Ministers of Culture in Islamic countries chose Sharjah as the Capital of Islamic Culture in 2014.

The Marketing of Culture

Sharjah's status as a cultural hub generates several positive externalities. It boosts the tourism sector. Sharjah's prospering hotel industry now serves 1.5 million guests. Marketing tactics that appeal to a general audience include deals with travel agencies, airlines, and hotels. For instance, SMD is collaborating with the tour bus operator City Sightseeing's Sharjah. Since 2007, an Art Bus has been travelling to key arts fairs and events in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah, for instance, Art Dubai (every March); and Abu Dhabi Art (every November). Other potential partners include Air Arabia, the Emirate's budget carrier, and cruise lines, which have been expanding fast in the UAE (there are already 20 international cruise lines in Dubai).

The emirate of Sharjah is also increasing its footprints in international tourism fairs. The Tourism Commerce and Tourism Development Authority participated in the World Tourism Market 2012 in London; the Arabian Travel Market 2013; the Travel Bourse "ITB" 2012 in Berlin; the Moscow International Travel and Tourism Exhibition (MITT 2013); the Arabian Travel Markets Exhibition (ATM 2013); and the Beijing International Tourism Expo 2012. Marketing tactics imply the use of Cartoon characters as mascots of Sharjah Museums, the development of Art Cafes and a greater customization of the offering. For instance, SMD added a Russian version of its museum guide.

The Internet is quite influential in promoting the museums beyond the borders of the GCC. The Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization displays its artifacts on the website of "Museum With No Frontiers," an international online museum project that uses cultural heritage to foster intercultural understanding and create opportunities for local economic and cultural tourism endeavors. It houses the largest online storehouse of Islamic art and is the only platform to include all major Islamic art collections of the Arab world.

Concluding Remarks

While the Biennial is not commercial it has enjoyed a continuous financial support from the Government of Sharjah and now gained regional and international recognition in the contemporary art world. "Over the years it evolved from a regional craft

⁹Museums Connect is a joint initiative of the American Association of Museums (AAM) and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs whose mission is to build global communities through partnership, collaboration, and cross-cultural exchanges between museums and communities both abroad and locally.

fair to become a significant platform for contemporary art.” Since 2003, many specialized and non-specialized publications inside and outside the UAE (*Art Forum*, *Art in America*, *frieze*, *Le Journal des Arts*, *Monocle*, *The New York Times* to name a few) have reported on the Biennial and helped Sharjah present itself as a cultural center in the Gulf region and the Arab world.

Can the Sharjah Art Foundation be considered a new museum born from a Biennial? In its 4-year existence, SAF has accumulated a collection of art works currently totalizing 203 works. More than half of this collection is composed of photographs and prints, 109 pieces. The rest includes videos and video installations, 47 pieces, multimedia installations 25 pieces, sculptures 11 works, and painting/drawings 10 works (Nawar Al Qasimi 2013).

The focus of SAF is on contemporary Art. Like any other contemporary art museums or foundations, it acquires art works to enrich its collection. Its efforts mostly concentrate on organizing exhibitions and a variety of outreach events and supporting artists working or with roots in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia region (MENASA). The methods SAF employs to acquire new works are varied. Commissions to Artist for exhibitions and community events are used but the Sharjah Biennial can equally be seen as an “acquisition instrument” with its own mechanism.

When SAF’s curators invite artists to present their work at the Sharjah Biennial or commissions them to produce new works for the Biennial, the invitation opens opportunities to test the pieces on site with a local audience before considering its acquisition. “Usually Biennial years witness more acquisitions. There is no set number but we have collected more in the last two Biennials than in the past” (Nawar Al Qasimi 2013).

SAF has also developed a production grant and a residency program to host artists in Sharjah and to support regional artists. Hosting artists in residencies is a way to “test” pieces and artists too. Yet, the main purpose of a residency program is to help build long-term working relationships. As most resident artists invited to Sharjah are likely to be affiliated with other institutions and individuals in the art world the residency program could also be useful for developing new collaborations between the SAF and equivalent institutions in other parts of the world.

In this sense a residency program is a long-term investment for a contemporary art institution. Indonesian artist Tintin Wulia who was invited to participate in the 2013 Sharjah Biennial also returned as a resident artist to produce a work to be presented later that year at the Jogja Biennial.

This type of investment can have several effects. It facilitates the acquisition of artists’ work for the institution, help the advancement of the recognition of these artists, increase the valuation of their production and in fine, increase the valuation of the collection that contains some of their pieces. Additionally—as mentioned before—a residency program results in developing links with other cultural institutions specialized in the same field.

As it enriches its collection, builds long-term working relationships with artists and other art institutions around the world or expands its influence. SAF also works on its infrastructure. From 2009 to 2013 a series of renovations and the

construction of new venues were completed. These additions increased the Foundation's presence in the heart of Sharjah and its capacity to showcase contemporary art to the public and organize events such as conferences and provide its staff with new office spaces.

One of the characteristics of the Sharjah Art Foundation and the Sharjah Biennial is their social and architectural integration within the city. The Foundation's offices and the exhibition spaces that are permanently or temporarily used during are all located in the "heart of Sharjah."

The choice of this location, for the foundation's headquarter as well as the different manifestations it organizes throughout the year came before the larger plan to revitalize the heart of Sharjah in five phases scheduled to conclude in 2025. However, the combination of cultural and tourist amenities (boutique Hotel) will most likely increase the attractive quality of the site and draw more visitors to it (thenational. ae).

The contrast between local vernacular restored architecture from early to mid nineteenth century and more recent commercial and residential construction is striking but if we add to it the contemporary artworks on display, the public film screenings the mix becomes even richer and unique. "The international visitors who come for our events work in the arts. At the same time, we don't forget the local non-professional viewers who attend the exhibitions and education programs" (Sheikha Hoor Al-Qasimi in *Art in America*, June/July 12).

The proximity of the Sharjah old port and other commercial activities surrounding the area also contributes to bring everyday life and contemporary art together. Local residents can cross the heritage area, pass by an art work, attend a film screening and international visitors can get an idea of Sharjah's population and what everyday life looks like.

Architectural, cultural, social, and artistic integrations as seen in the heart of Sharjah all contribute to define what we consider an inclusive approach to the management of cultural public good. If Biennials can be considered as Marketing Cultural tools to attract visitors, it is also noticeable that in Sharjah's case a special attention to encourage local participation has been put forward.

The location where SAF develops its cultural activities participates in the renovation and revitalization of the heritage area. Cultural events attracts new visitors without excluding the residents. During the 2013 edition of the Sharjah Biennial new commissioned artworks such as Oasis gardens by Belgium architects David Van Severen and Kersten Geers successfully attracted local residents and visitors to enjoy and share the same spaces. Long after the 2013 Biennale ended, these public artworks created in pedestrian-friendly enclaves still exist and or now part of the urban landscape.

"The outdoor works, particularly the performance program, seemed to serve as a welcome point of overlapping encounter (if not direct communication) among Emiratis, immigrants, and biennial visitors" (Bishop 2013).

The permanent facilities commissioned by Sharjah Art Foundation between 2005 and 2013 are all situated in the heritage area in the heart of Sharjah, spread out in several sites. They include the renovation and construction of galleries and office spaces. The buildings completed in 2013 added 1800 m² of interior exhibition

spaces, 1400 m² of courtyards and exterior spaces, and 850 m² of roof terraces to the existing buildings. The venues are free of charges and open to all.

These latest additions were supervised by the Department of Public Works and the Sharjah Art Foundation for an overall cost of Dh49 million (13,340,412.19 USD) (khaleejtimes.com).

The construction of galleries to present exhibitions to the public is a long-term investment that all museums or art foundations do.

A museum is often, from the outset, dedicated to a specific topic, e.g. archeology, technologies and sciences, or fine arts. It can also produce temporary exhibitions to stay current and attractive.

Beyond the “birth of a museum-foundation”, we observe the integration of various missions that defines the policy of the Emirate in management of cultural public good. Over the past years, SAF has become a major cultural initiator, an advocate of social change through contemporary art, and a patron supporting artists while playing its part in the revitalization of a city and its touristic attractiveness.

The Sharjah Art Foundation founded in 2009 coincides with the ninth edition of the Biennial, an event first organized as a regional craft fair hosted in an exhibition hall in 1993.

The concept of a Biennial and aim of the Sharjah Art Foundation contain the promise of a constantly evolving and renewed collection of work through the exploration of different themes for each edition. The Sharjah Biennial does not distance itself from this concept and complements the 19 museums Sharjah offers.

SAF unlike a museum did not start with an already established collection of works to showcase. It is the creation of a Biennial and the invitation of artist to show their work, the acquisition and commissions of pieces that progressively built the existing collection. When its galleries are open to the public this is the mark of its success and the success of the cultural public good policy behind it.

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Sultan inspects new art projects.

Public Policy Making Process in the United Arab Emirates

Simon H. Okoth

United Arab Emirates: An Overview

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) became politically independent on December 2, 1971 (Internal Affairs 2012). The formalization of its federal structure came into effect in 1972 after Ra's al-Khaimah joined the rest of the emirates (provinces or states) that had agreed in 1971 to form a political union. The other six emirates include Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Qaiwan, and Fujairah (CIA Factbook 2013a). Geographically, the UAE is located in the Middle East. It lies astride the Persian Gulf and it's bordered to the southwest by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Oman to the southeast corner. Across the Gulf of Oman to the north and east is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mostly a barren desert, with low altitudes and scattered hills to the east, the country is endowed with huge deposits of petroleum and natural gas. See Fig. 1.

The UAE population is estimated at 5.4 million, with a growth rate of about 2.87 % per year (CIA Factbook 2013a). Of the total population, 19 % are Emiratis (or nationals) with the rest categorized as immigrant population. Islam is the official religion and Arabic, the national language. Compared to its neighbors in the Gulf States (i.e., Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain), the UAE is considered the most highly developed and fairly liberal. For example, according to 2012 Human Development Index estimates, the UAE's life expectancy stood at 76.91 years, literacy at 77.8 %, and per capita income at \$49,000 (CIA Factbook 2013b). These achievements can be attributed to the quality of policies that continue to shape its future.

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Fig. 1 Map of the United Arab Emirates. *Source:* CIA World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html>; 29/5/2013/

This chapter explores the process of policy making in the UAE specifically at the federal level rather than at the emirate (local) level. Of particular interest is how societal issues become part of the policy agenda to be considered for governmental action. More importantly is how the issues that make it to on federal agenda are translated into actual policies (or laws). Equally significant is the determination of who the actors are in the policy process. Hence the chapter is organized into four sections. Second section begins by clarifying the concept of public policy and why it matters in any given political entity. Third section explains the structure of government and highlights constitutional mandates with respect to the functions. It is in this section of the chapter that the process of policy making is explored, synthesized, and explained. Fourth section analyzes the interface between the policy process in the UAE and selected theoretical frameworks. The last section concludes the chapter.

Public Policy and Why It Matters

As the concept of governance and its practice picks up momentum in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the need for citizens to understand how policies are made is becoming necessary as well (Denhardt and Denhardt 2011). By understanding the policy process, citizens are able to appreciate the implications of a given policy and to make informed decisions whether or not to support particular initiatives. Moreover, understanding governmental policies increases trust between citizens and those who make the laws. At another level, those charged with the implementation of government programs will take up the tasks more readily when they understand the goals and the policy processes.

The policy process, defined as “the study of change and development of policy and the related actors, events, and contexts” (Weible et al. 2011, p. 3), can be complicated at times. That is why Lasswell (1971) broken into two types of knowledge

about the policy process. The first type is “knowledge in the policy process” that implies an understanding gained through analysis and evaluation (James and Jorgensen (2009). The second is the “knowledge of the policy process” that focuses “on the how and why of policymaking” (Smith and Larimer 2009, p. 6). The latter is the main focus of this chapter, although more emphasis is dedicated to the “how” and less to the “why.”

In order to appreciate the policy process, it is important to first understand what public policy is. Although several definitions have been suggested in the literature, only a few are highlighted here. Kraft and Furlong (2004, p. 4) define public policy as “a course of government action (or inaction) taken in response to social problems.” This definition implies that policies are meant to provide public services and to control behavior for the greater good. In short, it defines what the activity is and the purpose. Dye (in Morcol 2010, p. 52) defines policy as whatever a government decides “to do or not to do.” Wilson (2008, p. 154) views public policy as “actions, objectives, and pronouncements of governments on particular matters, the steps they take (or fail to take) to implement them, and the explanations they give for what happens (or does not happen).” In Wilson’s view, policymaking is an act of power. Another definition provided by the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office (2001, p. 7) is that policy is “the translation of government’s political priorities and principles into programmes and course of action to deliver desired changes.” Smith (2010) suggests even a more succinct definition: It is [the] act of “deciding what is and is not a problem, choosing which problems to solve, and deciding on solutions” (p. 1). However, when the concept of “public” is brought into the picture the “policy makers must carry *people* with them, if their determinations are to have the full force of policy” (Goodin et al. 2008, p. 5). John Kingdon (2003) views public policy as a process that includes agenda setting, identification of alternative choices, choice of an alternative, and the implementation of that choice (p. 3). For simplicity, the definition by Kraft and Furlong—“a course of government action (on inaction) taken in response to social problems”—will inform our analysis of the process in the United Arab Emirates in the sections that follow.

Other than the definitions, what is more important about public policy is why it matters. Although most public policies are consciously made in response to societal problems, at times they “reflect intentions and ideas,” some of which can be ambiguous, unintended, or simply routines (Page 2008, p. 207). While this is generally true, others contend that the political actors can get involved in the policy making expressly to “advance their own political interests and careers” (Schlager and Blomquist 1996, p. 652). Additionally, policies can be formulated in response to random events whose effects are widespread. For example, the spontaneity with which some public policies are created is necessitated by what John Kingdon calls “window of opportunity” (1995, p. 106). As Kingdon explains, a policy window presents itself whenever an event that requires immediate government action occurs. For example, immediately after the attack on the Trade Towers in New York City by terrorists on September 11, 2001 (i.e., 9/11), the U.S. government passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that created the Department of Homeland Security to institute new rules and procedures to curb future terrorist activities and to provide

enhanced security at the airports (“Public Law 107–297” 2002). Another important feature of the policy windows is their brevity and infrequency. If lost, another opportunity must be waited for in order to create or modify a policy direction. The dynamic nature of policy windows thus suggests that policies, for the most part, are about change although they can also be about stability when things are smooth and continuity is desirable (Wilson 2008).

The second but rather general purpose of policies is that they help solve societal problems (Coplin and O’Leary 1998). As Kraft and Furlong explain (2004), public policies are direct result of social problems for which the public or section of a given society requires government action. This could be poverty, lack of access to clean water, rising road carnage, high unemployment, illiteracy, rising crime rates, border insecurity, high inflation rates, or inadequate urban housing. Additionally, public policy ensures that resources are distributed or redistributed in a manner that benefits the majority and marginalized citizens. In the early 1950s, Harold Lasswell noted that politics is the exercise of determining “who gets what, when and how.” Thus a typical public policy must determine who, among the publics, is faced with unacceptable conditions and what kinds of intervention are required to address them. Generally in more democratic systems, the determination of an intervention and when it ought to be executed involves deliberation, arguments, and persuasion (Steiner et al. 2005; Goodin et al. 2008). Occasionally however, this process can be shortened or circumvented by the executive decrees when the need is urgent and requires immediate action.

The third reason why public policy matters is because it serves the public interest (or societal welfare). Although public interest is somewhat a convoluted concept, Stone (2002) has provided three possible meanings. One is the “individual interests held in common” (p. 21). This includes better schools, lower taxes, clean air, and improved standards of living. The other is societal goals over which there is general agreement and therefore deserves to be tackled first. The third meaning relates to preserving the survival of a community from encroachment by outsiders. Given that individual interest is a subset of the public interest, and at times deviates from the greater societal welfare, the challenge is how to provide benefits that meets both interests. Stone acknowledges that the two groups only converge where these interests cannot be fulfilled; the common problems. Somewhat related to Stone’s take on the public interest goal is Jeremy Bentham’s notion of Utilitarianism (Shafritz et al. 2005, p. 1). Bentham argued that the government’s principal goal should be to “do the greatest good for the greatest number” (p. 1). In other words, the societal welfare ought to be measured by “how well off each of its members were” (p. 2). The Rawlsian Welfare Function narrowed Bentham’s potential beneficiaries by suggesting that a just government policy is one that focuses on the distribution of welfare to the disadvantaged members of the society (Boot 2012, p. 8).

The fourth important but contentious goal of public policy is equity. Lasswell’s definition of politics as to “who gets what, when and how” conjures up the idea of distribution as one of the basic objectives of public policy. What is inherently contentious with the distribution is how to decide who gets what and who is to be left out when it comes to a given public program and service. Should the beneficiary be

based on membership, ranks, or internal divisions such as gender, age, tribal or income groups, party affiliations, or by geographical regions? Or, as Shue (2008) puts it, shouldn't it be based on the needs of future generation or on ethics, what is "good or bad" for everyone or a particular group? In short, "Who's In? Who's Out?" (p. 724). Stone (2002) has provided a more incisive analysis of the dilemma presented by the equity goal. The first challenge, according to Stone, is how a government can provide a benefit equally. Should it be based on the worth or the limits of the item? Let's say consensus is reached of who should benefit, what is the process to be followed: voting, competition, or quota system? These are some of the lingering questions that Stone (2002, pp. 39–60) raise about the paradox of equity. At the core of equity as a policy goal is—"what is equal?" Generally, and in highly capitalistic societies, and certainly in many welfare states such as the oil rich Middle East, equity is deemed as a good principle, but what is fair to one group can be unfair to another. That is the paradox.

Let's take equity and fairness a bit further. The British thinker, Jeremy Bentham, seemed to have advanced a model for arriving at something close to equity (Shafritz et al. 2005). To him a public good and service ought to be provided in a manner that satisfies one principle: the greatest good for the greatest number. Although by implication, controversies may subside once the greatest needs of the majority have been met, the minority left out of the distribution may form a faction to challenge their omission. If, however, their demand for reconsideration succeeds, the resultant redistribution may cause yet another controversy as the majority rejects the taking away of a portion of what they have already been allotted and giving it to the other. An Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto, argued that in any resource distribution it is impossible to make an individual better off without making the other person worse off (Ziegler 2006); a concept he termed "pareto optimality." He therefore suggested an allocation that will make an individual better off without making the other person worse off (i.e., pareto efficiency). That way the possibility of conflict is reduced to the minimum.

The fifth reason why policy matters is the need to ensure efficiency. The concept of efficiency implies the ability to get more of an output from a given input. It involves minimization of the costs and maximizing the benefits. The costs could mean time, human and financial resources, while benefits—goods, services, or values. Given the limited financial, human, and other physical resources needed to produce outputs, governments and private citizens tend to insist on using these resources in a way that avoid waste. The sixth goal of public policy is security. Security is defined in terms of need for survival. Consequently, it is considered a government role to ensure that all citizens have access to the basic needs such as food, water, clothing, and shelter. It also includes physical security (i.e., safety) from danger such as criminal activities and outside attack, hence the provision for police protection. As in other public policy goals we have examined, controversies surround security as well. How is eligibility for public need to be determined? What exactly is public need? (Stone 2002, p. 101).

Another reason why public policy matters, at least in predominantly capitalist societies, is when the market fails to provide or resolve certain societal problems. Kleiman and Teles (2008) and Weimer (2011) explain that market failure occurs

where voluntary exchanges create Pareto Optimal results in which a person is made better off while the other is made worse off. Monopolies, for example, operate because of the imperfections of the marketplace such as information asymmetries (Weimer 2011, p. 71) that stifle the possibility of perfect competition. Additionally, markets cannot be trusted to provide public goods such as security, national parks, and roads to citizens. The charges to citizen users would be prohibitive. That is why governments come in to regulate our behaviors, otherwise some people will misuse public resources. With these regulations in place, we are more likely to respect each other's property, use wisely our collective pool resources such as fishery, water, and air. Likewise, regulations ensure that we follow strict standards for producing things that we consume so that one does not buy a car that will roll over after the purchase and kill its driver and passengers, or the food we purchase to improve our well-being only to turn lethal. Regulation is therefore a critical element to a government's policy that aims to serve the public interest.

Now that we have a good idea about what policy is and why it matters, an understanding of the UAE government structure, its functions and how policies are made are briefly examined in the next section.

Federal Government Structure and Functions

The UAE government structure and its functions are codified in the national constitution (The Federal National Council 1997). Article 45 states that the Union shall consist of the Supreme Council, the President and his Deputy, the Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council, and the Judiciary. At the core of the government structure is the federal system. This provides for two levels of government: the national (federal level) and the local (emirates level).

Federal Level

The goals of the federation as specified in Article 10, Part 1 of the country's Constitution can be summed up as: "preserving the sovereignty, independence, security and stability of the federation of the emirates; pushing away any hostility against the federation's existence...; preserving the rights and freedoms of the people; achieving prosperity and advancement in all fields; providing decent lives for all citizens; and achieving cooperation between the seven emirates for their common interest..." (Prime Minister 2013). These goals can be translated into eight distinct *societal values* for the UAE: *Sovereignty, security, stability, solidarity, liberty, freedom, prosperity, and cooperation*. The UAE government is thus structured to preserve and to achieve these constitutional mandates and values through policy actions from time to time. Figure 2 illustrates the decision making structure at the federal and emirate levels.




Fig. 2 The decision making structure. *Source:* Davidson, Christopher M. (2005). *The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival*. In A. Ehteshami & Raymond Hinnebusch, eds. *The Middle East in the International System*, pp. 185–250. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc.

The Executive and the Supreme Council

The Executive (or the presidency), traditionally the ruler (or emir) of Abu Dhabi, is the head of the State and the chief foreign policy representative (Davidson 2005). He is also the guardian of all citizens and the entire federal government. He is elected from among the seven rulers of each of the emirates which constitute the Supreme Council (SC), the second highest political institution of the federal government (See Fig. 1). Although elected every five years, the position of the president is traditionally designated for members of the ruling families, and is generally from Abu Dhabi, the biggest of the emirates. The SC’s other responsibility is to elect a vice-president, who is also the prime minister. The position is traditionally held by the ruler of Dubai, the second biggest of the seven emirates.

1. *The Council of Ministers*

The Council of Ministers consists of the prime minister and a number of ministers. The ministers form the cabinet supervised by the Prime Minister who is also the Vice President of the country. By practice, the position of the vice-president is reserved for the emir of Dubai. The Council of Ministers has the following responsibilities: execution of federal policies that affect domestic and international affairs; proposal of federal policies, laws and regulations; development of Executive Orders and Decrees; preparation of government budgets; and implementation of federal court rulings, treaties, and agreements (Official Website 2013).

2. *The Federal National Council (FNC)*

Structurally below the Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council consists of 40 members drawn from each of the seven emirates based on the state’s

population. Presently, the representation to the FNC is as follows: Abu Dhabi—8, Dubai—8, Sharjah—6, Ra's al-Kaimah—6, Fujairah—4, Ajman—4, and Umm al-Qaiwain—4. To determine who gets to represent each of the emirates, an Electoral College system is followed. First, citizens of that emirate submit names to the ruler who must choose a number that is 100 times the numerical size of the emirate concerned. Second, the selected members of the college elect 50-percent of the FNC members for their emirate. The remaining half is appointed by the ruler (emir). An FNC member represents the federation and not the people of the Emirate that selected or appointed him. The Council's primary functions are legislation and supervision, of which review of proposed federal legislations is central (IHS Jane's 2012). Its supervisory functions extend to the summoning of cabinet ministers over the performance of their line ministries or departments.

3. *Federal Judiciary*

Chapter V, Article 95 of the Constitution provides for two tiers of judicial system: a Union/Federal Supreme Court (USC) and Union Primary Tribunals (UPT). The Union Supreme Council consists of five judges appointed by the Supreme Council. The court is headed by a president as the presiding legal officer. All the five judges are appointed by presidential decree but their nomination is approved by the Supreme Council. The judges have tenure of office. The USC's main responsibilities are to mediate disputes between the member emirates, and to examine the constitutionality of legislations promulgated by any of the emirates, especially if challenged for violating Union laws. Additionally, the court interprets the laws upon request by member emirates or by any element of the government; conducts trials of the cabinet and senior officials of the union accused on malfeasance; adjudicates over crimes affecting the Union such as security; and arbitrates on conflicts between emirates and between the federal government and emirates (FNC 1997, pp. 32–33). Even though the federal code takes precedence, each of the emirates relies “on its penal code and Islamic law” (IHS Jane's 2012, p. 2). The judiciary's independence is guaranteed by the federal Constitution. The Second tier of the judiciary is the Courts of the First Instance. These lower courts hear a wide range of claims such as commercial and maritime disputes.

The Policy Making Process

The policy process in the UAE somewhat follows closely the structure of the government described above, although with some variation. With the bicameral structure of government (i.e., federal and emirate levels), it is to be expected that the policymaking at the two levels may not necessarily mirror other federal political structures such as the USA or Ethiopia, for example. Nonetheless, given that the UAE is a constitutional monarchy, it is interesting to understand how policy decisions are made.

Foremost, it is important to recognize that the UAE's political structure and way of governance reflect the local Islamic traditions and elements of modern state

system. One can find the elements of democratic practices but at the same time, governance approaches typical of (constitutional) monarchies in the Gulf region. Nonetheless, the UAE has been able to find an intersection between the two opposing paradigms—democracy and monarchy—by incorporating models of governance that have brought about political stability and speedy growth.

Next, we begin the discussion of the policy process by looking at the agenda setting.

Agenda Setting

Generally accepted as the first stage of the policy process, agenda setting has been defined by John Kingdon (2003) as the process that reduces the list of problems or issues that the government will pay attention to and probably act upon. What is more intriguing according to Kingdon is why some issues never get onto the agenda while others make it on the list. This can be determined by several factors. First is the saliency of the issue such as social, economic, or political crisis, and how the general public reacts to the crisis. If the crisis or event is viewed as critical, then it is most likely to make it on the policy agenda. Second, a new development in knowledge, either domestically or internationally, deemed to be valuable to the society may be included in the agenda if and when policy makers have clearly understood its potentials for the society. In this regard, the media and research reports can be instrumental. Demographic pressures can alter the existing dynamics of supply and demand for goods and services, and therefore a consideration of what ought to be done by the government will make such issues part of the policy agenda. For ease of analysis, these sources of agenda can be collapsed into two: the politicians and the public.

Let's first examine the public as the source of policy agenda. In the United Arab Emirates, a number of issues that make it on the policy agenda come from the public. At the emirate level, the ruler's court, the executive council, the national consultative council (in Abu Dhabi and Dubai only), and the local *Majlis* all offer the forums through which issues can emerge to be the considered part of the agenda for consideration. *Majlis* is a consultative local council through which either the Sheikhs (rulers) or their representatives meet with ordinary citizens to hear their concerns. According to a government website, "The people have open access to their ruler and can raise issues of both personal interest and broader concern. The opinions expressed in the *majlis* are often reflected in the decisions taken by the sheikh" (http://www.abdhabi.ae/egovPoolPortal_/). Another mechanism, and not necessarily an institution, is the Shura or consultation. The Shura is employed on the federal level, particularly at the Federal National Council to enable issues brought by citizens to be heard and debated. A similar forum at least in Abu Dhabi is the Crown Prince Court (or Consultative Office). Here citizens can walk in to express their concerns even though for the most part it has become a forum for personal assistance requests. The media is another source of public issues that get attention on the policy table.

Policy Formulation and Adoption

Policy decisions at the federal level can be divided into two. One is through the legislative process involving the Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council, the Executive (i.e., the presidency and his cabinet), and the Supreme Council. The other mode of policy making is by presidential decrees.

1. Policymaking by Legislative process

According to the UAE Constitution, the Supreme Council, consisting of the seven rulers with one from each emirate, is mandated to “initiate policy, to review and reject laws passed by the ministerial government” (Davidson 2005, p. 189). Article 60(2) of the constitution further states that the Council of Ministers, consisting of the Prime Minister, his two deputies, and a selected number of ministers, initiate drafts of the federal laws and submits them to the Federal National Council before they are raised to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council for sanction (FNC 1997, p. 21). Let’s examine what happens in practice.

As Fig. 3 illustrates, the first step, at least according to the UAE constitution, begins with the Council of Ministers. Their task is to initiate and draft policy proposals (FNC 1997, p. 21). Once the process is complete at that level, the proposed policy is forwarded to the FNC for review and recommendations. It is here that the laws are synthesized and scrutinized with the help of specialized house committees and technical research team who provide vital information (Davidson 2005). This process enables the FNC members to make recommendations that are sent back to the Cabinet for final consideration and approval. It is important to note that the amendments by the FNC of draft laws are to ensure that they represent and suit the needs of UAE citizens (Staff Reporter 2009). Additionally, the FNC serves as a forum where ministers who have drafted the laws are questioned. According to the stated source, there is evidence that the amendments and recommendations made by this legislative body “have been adopted and included laws by the government” (p. 1). Take, for example, the case of greater investment in youth drug control brought up by the body for consideration to the




Fig. 3 Policy making process at the federal level—UAE

Council of Ministers. This proposal was accepted and developed by the Supreme Council (Al-Nuhayan, in Davidson 2005). However, there are situations in which the FNC has not been successful with new proposals. Take, for example, the attempt to have the price of petrol decreased by asking the minister concerned to show a plan of action. Unfortunately, no action was taken by the ministry and the initiative was put aside indeterminately. This was in 1994 (Davidson 2005).

The FNC's stated roles somewhat echo its founding based on the Islamic principle of *shura*—which means “mutual consultation” in Arabic (El-Sergany 2010, p. 1). According to El-Sergany, the idea of consultation can be found in the Quran in which the words of Prophet Mohammad underscores the importance of consultation in making decisions that affect the people. Hence the “shura people” who make such decisions must possess “qualities such as justice, knowledge, opinion and wisdom” (p. 1). Similarly, Davidson (2005, p. 192) has observed that the FNC was intended to function more like direct and/or representative democracy (or *majles*) through which citizens could raise and debate issues that affect them. It is in this context that in 2006, a form of democratic procedure was institutionalized by the UAE government in the form of Electoral College to elect half (or 20) of the total 40 members and the remaining half appointed by the rulers (FNC 2013). Also to broaden the links with citizens and to facilitate broad participation on policy matters, the Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs was created by Federal Decree number 10 of 2006 (Al Khouri 2012, p. 6). The long-term goal of this specialized ministry is “to enhance political participation and improve parliamentary life in a tolerant, cohesive and engaged community” (Home Overview 2012).

In the third step of the process, the draft law moves from the FNC to the President of the Union; see Fig. 3. The president reviews the draft together with his team of advisors. If satisfied, he forwards it to the Supreme Council (SC) who reviews and finally sanctions the laws. This role is institutionalized in Article 47, para 1, 2 and 3 of the constitution (FNC 1997, p. 15). It specifically stipulates that the SC formulates policy and sanctions the various laws of the Union before their promulgation. At this point if there is agreement among the SC members, the final version of the law is sent back to the president who signs it into law.

2. *Policymaking by Decree*

Ever since Neustadt (1960) wrote his book on presidential power, the subject has attracted a growing body of researchers. For the most part, these scholars are interested in the rationale for use of executive orders, decrees, or proclamations. Some of these studies suggest that presidents use these powers, as in the case of the USA, to circumvent the possibility of defeat of legislation important to his party or to the interest of the entire nation. More importantly, to change, maintain, or modify policy preferences. According to this school of thought, the use of executive orders or decrees is purely strategic. Substantively, such unilateral decisions shape economic, social, and political policies.

Another interesting aspect of this unilateral policy making by presidents is the potential personal and/or societal benefits. Available studies demonstrate that the benefits can enhance personal power or protect the environment, grant presidential

pardons, or declare war. In the U.S. for example the power to declare war rests with Congress. Presidents can also use veto powers to block a legislation considered inimical to the interest of his political party or if it is considered harmful to the greater good. The same studies have also found that most presidential decrees or executive orders are specifically provided for in the statutes of the Constitution. It is therefore not an illegal use of power, although this varies from country to country.

It is also important to recognize that laws or decrees in general have greater chance of becoming accepted and honored by the citizenry if they are introduced through persuasion (Neustadt 1960; Goodin et al. 2008). But as these authors, including Smith (2010), acknowledge, other forms of communication are equally important. For example, the exercise of policy making may involve arguing, bargaining, compromise, or outright orders—not forcefully but by following the law—such as Executive Orders in the USA. In essence, the means of communicating a policy becomes an important part of policy making and its practice.

With this brief background, we return to the policy making by the executive in the United Arab Emirates. Chapter II, Article 113 of the constitution states as follows:

Should necessity arise for urgent promulgation of union laws between sessions of the Supreme Council, the President of the Union together with the Council of Minister may promulgate the necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force of law, provided that they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council within a week at the maximum for assent or rejection. If they are approved, they shall have the force of law and the Federal National Council shall be notified at its next meeting. However, if the Supreme Council does not approve them, they shall cease to have the force of law unless that it has decided to sanction their effectiveness during the preceding period, or to settle in some other way the effects arising therefrom (FNC 1997, pp. 38–39).

Chapter III, Article 114 is specific to “Ordinary Decrees.” It states that “no decree may be issued unless the Council of Ministers has confirmed it and the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, according to their powers, has ratified it.” Article 115 of the same chapter provides that

While the Supreme Council is out of session and if necessity arises, it may authorize the President of the Union and the Council of Ministers collectively to promulgate decrees whose ratification is within the power of the Supreme Council, provided that such authority shall not include ratification of international agreements and treaties or declaration or remission of martial law or declaration of a defensive war or appointment of the President or Judges of the Union Supreme Court.

Although the use of decrees in the UAE may at times appear intermittent to the public, their pronouncements are within the limits of existing constitutional statutes. In general, decision making in the country reflects Islamic principles of shura (consultations) and caring for each other, tribal cultures, family and kinship, solidarity, connections (or *Wasta*), justice, and fairness (Rugh 2007). According to testimonies by scholars more familiar with the traditional practices and leadership in the UAE, such decrees are not merely unilateral statements made by the presidents to express personal interests or to make decisions on important issues of the day, rather they

are pronounced after intensive consultations within the government, the ruling families and the tribal leaders (Jane Bristol-Ryhs, March 2013, personal communication; Amir AlIslam, 10 June 2013, personal communication; Eugenie Samier, 26 September 2013, personal communication). The goal is to seek broad support from the majority otherwise a unilateral decision, even if it is well-intended, may divide the rather closely knit tribal groups. The 1972 federation of the different emirates involving various tribal groups was, for example, achieved after lengthy efforts by the founder—Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahayan (*May his soul rest in eternal peace*) and other emirates leaders (Rugh 1999).

The policy making process is generally considered incomplete if it does not include the implementation activities of the sanctioned policies. What goes on at this stage is examined briefly.

Policy Implementation: Once the policy has been signed into law or after the policy has been pronounced by the president in the form of decree, the cabinet ministries take up the responsibility to implement all the programs for the whole country. In addition to the cabinet implementing the policies, Dubai, Sharjah and Abu Dhabi have Executive Councils that not only are responsible for enacting policies at the local level but implements national programs passed on by the federal government. Moreover, there is continued consultation between the federal implementing agencies with the local emirate officials to ensure success (Naeema AlMenhali, 28 September 2013, personal communication). In this regard, *diwan* (or the ruler's court) at each of the emirates take the lead in ensuring that not only their own local government programs are implemented but also those of the federal government.

Theory-Policy Nexus in the UAE

The convoluted nature of the policy process calls for a way to simplify our understanding of behaviors therein and the intended outcomes. That is where policy theories come to our aid. By and large, theories are meant to explain why and how things work (Kraft and Furlong 2004, p. 70). Because they are expected to be scientifically consistent, theories generally should assist users to predict future behaviors and occurrences as well. Moreover, theories clarify the factors that shape how and why certain decisions are made within the government. The efficacy of some of the theories is supported by a growing number of policy theories (Meier 2009) that are featured in the literature. However, like any theory, the challenge is in their limitations.

One is that theories have dissimilar goals (Meier 2009, p. 6). Two, they vary on the range of issues that they can explain or predict. Meier puts it more succinctly: “theories themselves have different purposes and different scopes. Some theories want to explain why policies work or do not work..., others are more concerned with why policies are adopted..., or why key events shape policy discourse..., or perhaps how all of this fits into an ideological process of governing” (p. 6). As the review of selected theories will attempt to show later in the chapter, policy making process can be explained variously. Moreover, different policy issues attract differ-

ent kinds of theories. This will become clear with discussion of how these theories relate to the policy formulation in the United Arab Emirates.

Some of the theories that attempt to explain the policy rationale, the process, and who are involved include the following: Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD); Multiple Streams; Advocacy Coalition Framework; Policy Diffusion; Punctuated-Equilibrium; Social Construction; The Science of “Muddling Through”; Mixed Scanning; Elite Theory; Group (Pluralist) Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Political Systems Theory; and, the Policy Process Model (Nowlin 2011; Sabatier 2007; Kraft and Furlong 2004). Another model that explains a policy activity is the Executive Proclamations (or Decrees). I review three of these (i.e., the IAD, Group Theory, and the Policy Process Model) and simultaneously assess how each or any their aspects explains the policy process in the UAE.

Institutional Analysis and Development Frameworks (IAD)

Originally developed by Elinor Ostrom (2007a), the IAD (or the Institutional Rational Choice theory) provides a framework that begins by examining the type of institutional structure, the role of the external environment, and the rules within those institutions. Rules are particularly important because they prescribe what is allowed and not allowed (Sabatier 2007, p. 36), and therefore can determine both the process and policy outcome. Within governments, the rules are to be found in the constitutions, legislative statutes, and government departments. As Sabatier points out, the degree to which the rules provide stability in how decisions are made and their outcomes are determined by the inherent shared meanings (p. 36) within the institution or the community. In this regard, the practices that inform UAE’s policy formulation, their outcomes and stability include the Islamic shura (or mutual consultations) and the cultural values or shared beliefs such as solidarity, family and kinship, tribal and religious identities (Rugh 2007).

Stakeholder Theory

This theory attempts to identify those with interest or stake in an organization either by virtue of the shares that they hold in the company or as citizens with interest in the government that represents them. Freeman and Reed (1983) defines stakeholders as those who “affect or are affected by the corporation,” and therefore are key to the organization’s survival. Stakeholder theory thus stresses the added value stockholders get from the actions taken by corporate executives. The success of this relationship depends on the degree to which the stakeholders are consulted by the decision makers. The aim is to align stakeholder interests with that of the executives. In the public sector, this theory translates into government officials keeping the interests of constituents and consulting them at all times. This is necessary for

two reasons: One, citizens are generally affected positively or negatively being the actions of their political representatives. Two, citizen's participation either directly or indirectly is essential to successful governance. In this regard, I find the theory quite relevant to explaining the kind of decision making approaches at the UAE's federal and emirate levels. For example at the emirate level, the rulers meet regularly with local citizens in what is known as the majles to listen to and discuss their concerns. It is in such forums (or ruler's court—as popularly known) that citizens raise potential policy topics and debate upon them in the presence of diwans. As a minister of information and culture is quoted (in Davidson 2005) to have said,

On matters more directly affecting the individual, such as the topic of unemployment among young UAE graduates, debates often tend to begin in the majelis, where discussion can be fast and furious, before a consensus approach is evolved that is subsequently reflected in changes in government policy (p. 198).

Policy Stages (or Process) Model

This is the most commonly applied theoretical models to explain and understand how policies are formulated. Its usefulness lies in the specification of different stages of the process that include Agenda Setting, Policy Formulation, Policy Legitimation, Policy Implementation, Policy and Program Evaluation, Policy Change (Kraft and Furlong 2004, p. 78). Although considered to have outlasted its usefulness by Sabatier (1991, p. 147), Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p. 2) do agree that the “stages heuristic has provided a useful conceptual disaggregation of the complex and varied policy process into manageable segments.”

The Agenda Setting begins by identifying and defining the problem. How it is defined determines whether it will reach the list of agenda to be considered for action by those in authority. There is no doubt that there is competition about which issues will make it on the list (Cobb and Elder 1993). Therefore the necessary question is: where do the issues come from? Both Cobb and Elder answer this question by distinguishing between systemic agenda (i.e., issues the public consider important) and institutional agenda (i.e., issues the government consider important). The next stage of the process is policy formulation. It is here that alternative solutions are critically assessed with the help of policy analysts, public administrators, and other interested parties to determine their potential to be approved by the designated government body. At this stage the alternative solutions are scrutinized and checked for political and cultural acceptance and whether they will be technically, administratively, and economically feasible (Kraft and Furlong 2004, p. 85). The third stage entails policy legitimation. This is where the proposed program goes through approval process by the authority. The authority may be checked against the budget, standards or existing provisions of the law. The fourth stage is that of implementation. At this stage the policy is handed over to the public administrators (or civil servants) to implement. They must in turn work out logistics and organize the resources to put program into reality (Jones 1984). The final stage involves the actual evaluation of the program to

ascertain whether it works or not. If the program is found to be wanting, some adjustments in one or more of the stages may be necessary. But if the program is not meeting its goal and viewed as a waste of public resources, a decision to change or abandon it altogether may occur.

As already explained of what takes place in Fig. 3, within the UAE the first stage of the process, although not too obvious to the public, is agenda setting. Issues that eventually reach the Supreme Council, the Supreme Court or to the Chief Executive (or president) for consideration, are raised by the public at the emirates levels at the regularly scheduled majlis or meetings involving constituents. Some issues are brought are highlighted by the media especially if they have some potential negative social or economic implications for specific community or the society at large. In this context, agenda setting stage fits the model. On the policy formulation and finding alternative solutions to the policy problems under consideration, the Council of Ministers (COM), as already discussed, drafts the policies and then forwards them to the FNC for review. After their review process, and occasionally back to COM for refining, the proposed policy is forwarded to the president, who with his team of experts peruses the document, before forwarding it for final passage at the Supreme Council. Here all forms of alternative solutions to the issue are examined and assessed for viability. What is not clear is the extent of the debate or jostling for a preferred solution by a group, if any, within the Council. The latter then sends it to the president for signature. Once the policy becomes law, it is sent to the relevant ministries for implementation. These stages in the UAE mirror, at least in theory, the policy heuristics model.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the policy making process in the United Arab Emirates is informed, at least, by three theoretical models: institutional analysis and development framework (IAD), Stakeholder theory, and the policy process model. Despite being a constitutional monarchy, the UAE's political institutions—the Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council, the Supreme Council, and the presidency—generally adhere to their constitutional mandates in making public policies especially at the federal level. The executive (or the president), for example, employs decrees cautiously and only after thorough consultations with his group of experts and emirates leaders. Moreover, a decree may not be issued until it is authorized by the Council of Ministers, the President of the Union, or the Supreme Council. The idea and the practice of consultations with the public have been institutionalized through the *shura* and *majles* systems. These mechanisms provide the avenue through which issues of concern are brought up for consideration by the public and then debated upon before making their way onto policy agenda. It also noted that the consultations in policy making is not only part of Emirati cultural practice but is reinforced by Islamic teachings of the Holy Quran.

Additionally, the practice mirrors the local political culture and integral values such as solidarity, family, kinship, and tribal identities.

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Governance Challenges in Bangladesh

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Introduction

Bangladesh as a developing country in South Asia has been witnessing many challenges in achieving good governance. Many national and international policy actors have been pushing the country to rectify the problems which are seriously affecting governance as a whole. Before discussing ways and means for achieving the goals and objectives of good governance it is important to analyze the major impediments toward governance in Bangladesh. Since the independence in 1971 Bangladesh has observed many upheavals in the governance system as democracy suffered as a democratic system was turned into a one-party monolith; and successive military rulers established an autocratic system within the polity. There have been many attempts by scholars, practitioners, and academia to create a link between governance and democracy which have demonstrated that these two concepts are reciprocal to each other and help a polity to be an effective one in achieving overall development goals. Throughout the last two decades the country has been run by the elected representatives of the people, but the institutionalization of norms, values, and practices of democracy has not taken roots in this country (Moniruzzaman 2009; Azad and Crothers 2012).

Apart from the problem of institutionalization of democracy Bangladesh has been plagued with other problems of governance. Among those, rampant corruption is one of the most important one which is damaging the motivation and trust of both

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public service deliverers and receivers. Corruption has spread like cancer in all walks of life throughout the nook and corner of the country. Everyone is affected by this curse in one way or the other. Politics, economy, and society are facing the consequences of unabated growth and practice of corruption. Both the supply and the demand sides of the economy are being encountered severely by the corrupt practices of people in charge of administration and service delivery (Khan 2003; Knox 2009). Sector wide corruption has hampered the efforts of delivering the services to the citizens with desired efficiency and also demolished the moral strength of the governance machineries (Knox 2009).

Although the country is already in crisis due to mal institutionalization of democracy and raging corruption it is hurt further by politicization of public services for narrow personal, group, and political interest. Politicization of public services is a continuing practice since the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country in 1971. This practice has had several negative consequences for the entire public sector. Many bright young people are becoming increasingly disinterested to join the civil service. Due to politicization of all the aspects of public personnel process, i.e. selection and recruitment, training, placement, promotion, and discipline; the quality and effectiveness of the civil service have been adversely affected resulting in low morale of public servants and resultant low productivity. The chain of command in public personnel administration is on the verge of collapse. Political victimization of bureaucrats in some cases has replaced political control. This has had a negative impact on the morale of bureaucrats in general.

These three aspects absence of democratic practice, corruption, and politicization of public service are closely interrelated with the practice of governance and the prospect of achieving good governance. The country's governance has been facing many challenges since its independence. But the major challenges need to be immediately addressed in order to foster the development. Considering the condition of governance based on the abovementioned three aspects this chapter analyzes three major governance challenges in Bangladesh. All these challenges have far-reaching implications for the future progress and development of the country.

First and foremost challenge is the institutionalization of the democratic governance system in the country.

Second, eradicating corruption from the polity is one of the most important challenges of today.

Third, avoiding the tendency to politicization of the public service is another key challenge of governance in Bangladesh. Quick mitigation of the three challenges will enable institutionalization of democracy, eradication of the curse of corruption, and merit and performance based public service. Ultimately, effectively facing the governance challenges will benefit citizens of the country.

This chapter before moving into the discussion on major three challenges to governance in Bangladesh delineates conceptual and theoretical issues of governance followed by the state of governance in Bangladesh during last two decades. This chapter puts forward some policy prescriptions, based on the analysis of major three governance challenges in Bangladesh before making concluding arguments.

Governance: Conceptual and Theoretical Blend

Governance is a comprehensive and all-inclusive term with far-reaching implications (Khan 2002, p. 63). Governance is “many things, including a buzzword, a fad, a framing device, abridging concept, an umbrella concept, a descriptive concept, an empty signifier, a weasel word, a fetish, a field, an approach, a theory and a perspective” (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 3). An outdated notion of governance is not acceptable by any state in this era of globalization and intense competition (Khan 2003). That is why governance is now viewed as an interdisciplinary research agenda that encompasses within its reach and matters within the state and beyond. Governance is rapidly becoming a broad concept that is at the heart to the study of political, economic, spatial, and social order to the understanding of the dynamics of change of capitalist democracies in particular (Levi-Faur 2012, p. 3).

Good governance is a derivative from the term governance, is coined, introduced, and popularized by international development agencies and financial institutions sometimes as preconditions for technical assistance and development project financing (Khan 2003). Over the years some of the key characteristics of good governance have emerged. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), in order to determine the nature and extent of good governance in a country, developed indicators of governance which have received acceptance all over the world as those indicators provided the countries with a clear understanding of good governance. Thus, the indicators of good governance are: voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann and Mastruzzi 2003, pp. 3–6).

Good governance concept and its principles have, to some extent, made it easier for polities which are confronting tough challenges of governance as a whole. In recent times the notion of governance has seen a new shift from good governance to collaborative governance. Recently new studies see governance as the engagement of a single or multiple organizations outside the public sector at any stage of the policy process, including problem identification, identification of preferences, prioritizing among policy preferences, selecting a policy approach, adopting, implementing, and enforcing policy (Blomgren 2008). This sort of governance is termed as collaborative governance and researchers believe that through collaboration the traditional characteristics of good governance may be achieved. Blomgren (2008) sees the failure of hierarchical administrative pattern in addressing problems as the prime reason as to why governance outplayed the notion of government. According to her governance means a collaborative effort outside a single organization which enables stakeholder participation in a bottom-up policy process. This new type of governance is now well appreciated in most of the countries.

But it is hard to ignore the definition of governance from an earlier era when it came into prominence. Right at the beginning when theories and concepts of governance were emerging, Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1991, p. 304) defined governance as the process of “how people are ruled, how the affairs of the state are administered and regulated as well as nation’s system of politics and how these

functions are related to public administration and law.” Chopra sees good governance as “a system of governance that is able to unambiguously identify the basic values of the society where values are economic, political and socio-cultural issues including human rights, and pursue these values through an accountable and honest administration” (Chopra 1997). These two definitions of governance delineate a relationship between politics, administration, and resource use in pursuing the overall development of people.

There appears to be a realization that good governance is useful because of its multifarious beneficial effects (Khan 2002, p. 67). These are: it facilitates social and economic development; contributes to the creation of an environment where human rights are respected; accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability can result from community participation; strong presence of civil society leads to participatory development; and democratization of the polity is possible due to adequate opportunities for participation in all segments of political life (Khan 2002, p. 67).

Other contemporary theories of governance such as network between public service delivery organizations (Denters and Rose 2005; Entwistle and Martin 2005), partnerships between public and private sector (Osborne 2010; Kooiman 2000) emphasizes entrepreneurship and limited role for the government. Osborne (2010) points out some interesting aspects of governance in today’s world where state does not possess the monopoly in delivering public service and questions are raised as to how corruption can be combatted in a complex setting characterized by public–private mix. Considering the growth of globalization and regional cooperation Mayntz (2003) sees governance as the process of steering the state and establishing inter- and intra state cooperation where organizations both inside and outside the government see that organizational boundaries are almost blurred. He sought to develop theories of governance based on the regional cooperation and the importance of different sectors and stakeholders who play an important role in shaping public policy and public service delivery techniques of a state. According to Mayntz (2003), in this era of globalization, one cannot perform alone and needs to involve stakeholders both from inside and outside the state boundary (Stoker 1998).

Furthermore, governance has been seen through the window of democracy when the world started to witness the “third wave of democracy.” The breakdown of previous Soviet Union and turmoil in other communist countries led to mass democratization in newly independent nation states in late 1980s and early 1990s. Hence, democratic governance clearly refers to the system of governance which is based on the principles of democracy but includes also all the elements of governance (Landman 2009). Landman (2009) defines democratic governance from two dimensions, i.e., economic and political. From the political dimension, democratic governance is a system which consists of rule of law, government’s accountability to public through legislature, government’s legitimacy, and competency along with the existence of human rights in every sphere of life. Bevir (2010) sees the concept of democratic governance as a concept which is the result of attempts to extend the definition of good governance with some democratic principles. Thus democratic governance truly can be outlined as the concept which blends democracy with governance.

Norris (2012) argues that democracy and governance cannot stay aloof from each other because democratic institutions strengthen the capacity of governance as those institutions hold the government accountable and ensure that government processes are transparently carried out.

Governance is the concept which has been developed based on the assumption that a system in which public service is delivered efficiently, effectively, and regularly according to the laws and regulations framed by the parliament while the public service deliverers and policy actors are accountable to the people through the parliament. But many changes and shifts in philosophy and research on public administration have given the corridor to scholars, academia, researchers, and practitioners to redefine, retheorize, and reconceptualize the perception of governance. In recent times governance has been recognized by many as the system in which both political and administrative institutions are needed to get a proper mix to ensure the welfare of the people by involving them both as individuals and members of groups. This implies that engagement of stakeholders and community in the process of public administration, politics, and public service delivery can help to adhere to the set indicators of governance. Not surprisingly, various governance concepts construct the scheme which can make a society free of corruption, with practicing and viable democratic practices and having public service delivery based on the norm of efficiency, effectiveness, regularity, and equity.

Governance in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Post-1991 Period

Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) developed governance indicators to identify the extent of good governance within a polity. This chapter illustrates the state of governance in Bangladesh since 1991 by evaluating against each indicator developed by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).

In terms of voice and accountability, the first indicator, Bangladesh is well behind the standard mark because of the highly dysfunctional formal accountability mechanism, i.e., parliament and its standing committees (Ahmed 2011; DFID 2008). According to the Constitution of Bangladesh parliamentary committees are the most useful means to hold the government accountable to the people's representatives. But unfortunately, most of the parliamentary committees have been ineffective in holding the executives account since 1991 (Khan 2006). These committees do not even know how to receive information and ideas from alternative sources and public (Ahmed 2012).

People's voices remain unheard and their aspirations are neglected by the legislature and the executive while formulating and executing laws, regulations, policies, and strategies. Press and electronic media have partially attempted to ensure accountability of the government and represented voice of the people but it remains like sailing in a turbulent sea with a small boat. In recent years third sector organizations especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) have assisted the citizens to raise their voice on important

issues that affect them. The third sector organizations have been involved during last two decades to gather information through public participation in community-driven project design and implementation of projects involving large number of people and diverse groups. But most people are still outside the loop of policy formulation, execution, and evaluation. It is important to mention that “unaccountable” governments have been in power since 1991 and doing whatever they wish and think right. This clearly ushered in corruption and dysfunctional administration (Zafarullah and Khan 2001).

Accountability of policy actors to the citizens has not been possible as elites of the society try to maintain the status quo so that they can retain and further their narrow political and economic interests. Many reforms during the last two decades have been initiated to strengthen the tools to hold the responsible people accountable but convergence between political leaders and policy actors and colonial legacy propelled the strong resistance to those suggestions for reforming governance (Zafarullah 2003).

Amid a flawed practice of accountability few other related concerns are indicating a dismal future for governance in Bangladesh. Amongst those, political stability is one of the major ones. Political stability is also another indicator which is closely related to institutionalization of parliamentary democracy. Presence of unstable political climate is a regular feature in Bangladesh. Confrontational politics often creates serious doubt about the viability and functioning of democracy itself. Without a sound political culture there is a very low possibility of institutionalizing parliamentary democracy. In Bangladesh absence of sound political practice has hampered the governance and subsequently the country has been performing unsatisfactorily in terms of rest of the governance indicators (Zafarullah 2003).

Confrontation is the regular scenario for people of Bangladesh as the two major political parties rarely adopt a conciliatory approach to deal with important political issues. This kind of unstable political culture has let the policy actors and responsible persons, who are in charge of dispensing service to the people, go off the hook due to lack of proper accountability mechanisms. Not surprisingly, because of unstable political situation, weak accountability mechanisms and absence of democracy (Brewer and Choi 2007) elites and wealthier persons of the society have found it easy to demolish the effectiveness and efficiency of the government as those upper-class people ignored the motives of neutral public service delivery which has to cover each corner of the society. Furthermore, the government’s efficiency and effectiveness has been highly suspect because of bureaucracy’s involvement in partisan politics and this adversely affects policy implementation and service delivery (Khan 2003; IGS 2008). Based on the interlink between weaker accountability mechanism, unstable politics, and government’s ineffectiveness it can be stated that Bangladesh has been going through a very rough patch to achieve order in which government can perform effectively.

During last two decades many campaigns of “hollowing state” and new public management (NPM) (Christensen et al. 2008) provoked Bangladesh to become a regulatory state. It means the government of Bangladesh behaves like a regulator. Government as a regulator usually facilitates broader participation of people in policy

cycle through other channels, excepting parliament, as in recent times many private and community-based organizations compete with each other to serve the public (Christensen et al. 2008). In Bangladesh's governance perspective, regulatory quality of the government and condition of its agencies are quite poor as many instances demonstrate the failure of the government to regulate the environment for the growth of the private sector and consequently people continue to suffer. Non-compliance to rules and regulations by political leaders in power and bureaucrats often destroys the regulatory quality which impedes the development of market-based service delivery.

Haque (2002) and others, who favor government as the sole agent of public service delivery, see that competitive market-based service delivery hampers the governance in developing countries like Bangladesh and increases inequity. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that failure of public sector in delivering services to the people has been a major drawback of governance in Bangladesh. That means people presume that private and non-for-profit organizations have the expertise to deliver the services to them with desired efficiency level and it can only be ensured by making a just platform for competition between potential deliverers (Tanner 2007). In that case, government needs to regulate effectively through knowledge and wisdom generated by regulation and law. Unfortunately many instances during the last two decades portray the landscape which is full of scandals involving both government (regulator) and potential deliverers. It implies that political leaders and bureaucratic elites have forgotten their roles as regulator and chose the path of corruption to gain financially to pave the way for inefficient and corrupt business people.

As has been mentioned earlier the parliament has failed to hold the government accountable. Judiciary is usually considered as people's last resort to get justice and to be treated as equal under rule of law. Rule of law has been another prime concern for people of Bangladesh in terms of governance during the last two decades. The rule of law is a basic feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Notwithstanding, constitutional provision pertaining the rule of law, human rights, freedom, equality, and justice but the reality is quite different. During the last two decades human rights of people have suffered badly. Principles rule of law has also not been adhered to as extra judicial killing of anti-social elements and terrorists is almost a daily occurrence. Creation of Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) to contain terrorism was a good move to bring those people under prosecution. Unfortunately, RAB was given indemnity to kill those terrorists and anti-social elements without judicial scrutiny. This has been the hallmark of deteriorating state of rule of law and human rights. Meanwhile, government has passed Right to Information Act 2009 to improve condition of freedom of citizens. Unfortunately, people are not being provided information as per this act and they remain as deprived of information as before. The chemistry between other elements of governance has not created the essential platform on which people can really get justice and enjoy freedom in the true sense of the term. Judiciary has always been considered as the last resort of people and can ensure rule of law and justice for them. But the lower judiciary, it has been alleged, is tainted by corruption. In recent times quite amazingly Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), a subsidiary of Transparency International (TI), Berlin, an international corruption-fighting organization, has showed in its report that the judiciary

is largely corrupt and lack efficiency and speed in its proceedings. In the last two decades under democratic governments the appointment of Supreme Court judges has purely been done on the basis of political consideration rather than competency and efficiency of the candidates. This has left the judiciary with a question mark in terms of its integrity. Moreover, the Ministry of Law still controls promotion, transfer, and other service-related matters of judges. So the independence of judiciary from the executive has become a mirage (Khan 2010).

Last but not the least, corruption has increased leaps and bounds and has engulfed most of the public and private sectors. Corruption is rampant in all spheres of public life. In fact, corruption has been institutionalized in Bangladesh (H.A. Khan 2007; Khan 2009). Corruption is a key impediment for practicing good governance and ensuring welfare of the people, as it affects ordinary citizens the most. Corruption has increased inequality and further widened the gap between the rich and the poor in the society. This subsequently buttressed elitism and encouraged perpetuation of patron-client culture (Kochenak 1993) which is a deterrent to build a system of good governance where government is accountable; its operations are transparent and effective; where media functions with no fear and oppression, and politics operates in fair, constructive, and tolerant manner to institutionalize democracy. Efforts like the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) as an independent commission have also failed because neither the ACC is fully independent from government nor possess adequate and competent personnel.

Governance in Bangladesh in post-1991 period has given us a wide-range of failures in terms of non-institutionalization of democracy, corruption-ridden society, and inefficient and anti-people service delivery. It is significant to note that many institutions are present in the country to govern the entire polity efficiently. Misuse of laws, regulations, and corrupting the present system has made the situation even worse. Consequently, the country, according to the present state of governance, is now facing three major governance challenges, i.e., institutionalization of democratic governance, corruption-free polity, and neutral civil service.

Major Governance Challenges in Bangladesh

Institutionalization of Democratic Governance

It is recognized that institutionalization of democratic governance system is one of the prime challenges and successful institutionalization of that kind of system could improve the state of governance to face other challenges effectively. Norris (2012) points out that both governance and democracy complement each other and have a reciprocal relationship. Hence, the failure in institutionalization of democratic governance system makes the road more turbulent for governance. It is important to discuss the reasons why institutionalization of democratic governance system is one of the major challenges of governance in Bangladesh.

After a long drawn-out struggle for two decades the people of Bangladesh were able to defeat the forces of autocracy and return to a much coveted parliamentary democracy in 1991 (Khan and Husain 1996). It rejuvenated the aspirations and expectations of the people for good governance which could bring prosperity and development in their daily lives. The exhilaration withered away soon as the subsequent “democratic” governments were found involved in misuse of public funds and contribute to mal-governance. Members of Parliament (MPs) and the ministers have been alleged to be corrupt. Parliament has been dysfunctional most of the time without participation of the major opposition party and unable to regularly check and effectively monitor the executive. The legislature has been unable to monitor the activities of the bureaucracy. Law and order situation deteriorated significantly due to the involvement of political parties’ cadres in criminal activities and terrorism (Khan and Islam 2012). Freedom of press has been restricted due mostly to the nexus between rich owners of print and electronic media and powerful and corrupt elements in the society leading to the murder of honest journalists (Islam 2007). Confrontational political stance of two major political parties (Bakshi 2005) has led to a situation where everyone finds him/herself in a difficult situation. It appears that the institutionalization of parliamentary democracy during last two decades turns from an exhilaration to exhaustion.

During last two decades both national and local level elections have witnessed use of black money and hiring of goons by major political parties. Bureaucracy and the Election Commission (EC) have not been always able to play a neutral role. Rather, there has been a persistent tendency, on the part of the party in power, to use the bureaucracy and the EC to work as its agents during election time. Money and muscle power have become the two major determinants of winning the elections. Nominations are usually given by big political parties to those candidates who can spend money beyond the limit drawn by the EC and can control people’s voice by demonstrating muscle power (Moniruzzaman 2009). It implies that lack of trust in democratic practice by political parties and their affiliate organizations have forced them to rely on black money and gun power to win elections. This, in turn, has destroyed the spirit of good governance as people’s voice has been ignored.

Unfortunately, election-related corruption, violence, and confrontation between two major political parties namely Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Awami League (AL) still dominates the political scene. Political unrest is a phenomenon often observed in the country as there has been a rise of Islamic extremist groups and intolerance between the two major political parties during last two decades (M.M. Khan 2007). Parliamentary democracy, a major pillar in the process of institutionalization of democratic governance, has received severe jolt when the two major parties have offered the country nothing but the greed to capture and stay in power. In most cases after winning the elections, the parliament becomes dysfunctional or ineffective because of the long-drawn absence (nearly 60 % on an average) of main opposition party (see Table 1). The opposition takes to the street and indulges in destructive behavior and demands resignation of the elected government; then the ruling party also retaliates by using government machinery to restore

Table 1 Opposition's presence and boycott of parliament

Parliament				Opposition		
Under study	Tenure	Sessions	At work (days)	Boycott (days)	Presence (days)	Absenteeism (%)
Fifth (1991–1996)	4 year 8 months	22	400	300	100	75
Seventh (1996–2001)	5 years	18	382	156	126	40.83
Eighth (2001–2006)	5 years	23	373	223	150	59.78
Total			1,159	679	376	58.78

Source: Moniruzzaman, M. (2009). Parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of the Parliament during 1991–2006. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 47(1), 100–126.

Table 2 Party representation in different parliamentary elections (1991–2008)

Parliament ^a	Tenure (in months)	Turnout in elections (%)	Party-wise distribution of MPs and votes (%) (N=300)				
			AL	BNP	JP	BJI	Others
Fifth	56	55.4	29.3 (30.1)	46.7 (30.8)	11.7 (11.9)	6.0 (12.1)	6.3 (15.1)
Seventh	60	74.9	48.7 (37.4)	38.7 (33.6)	10.6 (16.4)	1.0 (8.6)	1.0 (4.0)
Eighth	60	74.8	20.8 (40.2)	64.1 (42.3)	4.7 (6.5)	5.7 (4.2)	4.7 (6.8)
Ninth	2009	86.3	76.6 (48.1)	10.0 (32.4)	9.0 (7.1)	0.6 (4.6)	3.8 (7.8)

Values in parenthesis indicate the percentage of votes secured by different parties

Source: Ahmed, N. (2011). Critical Elections and Democratic Consolidation. *Contemporary South Asia*, 19 (2), p. 141

Notes: N=Number of MPs

^aThe author could not present reliable data for the sixth Parliament as the Election Commission does not have data for several constituencies

public order and protect lives and properties of the citizens. Multi-faceted political unrest and hunger for power of two major political parties hampers the unity among people regarding issues like accountability of executive, people's participation, curbing corruption, and effectiveness of government. When there is a clear difference among people on common governance issues due to unhealthy political practices, in the name of institutionalization of democracy, governance faces stiff challenge.

In true sense the parliament members who are meant to be the people's representatives have not represented the people in parliament and the parliament has been a dysfunctional one to hold the government accountable. In most instances the bills and resolutions proposed by the government are passed by the parliament even in the absence of the opposition in the House. The opposition was not given opportunity to make its presence felt (see Table 2).

The statistics shown above raises question as to what degree the democratic governance has been institutionalized because in most cases, during the last two decades, accountability of both MPs and government has been kept in dark and parliamentary

procedures have not been followed in a transparent manner. In this way Bangladesh has been underperforming in terms of governance while democratic governance remains uninstitutionalized and consequently aggravated the state capacity.

Without people being integrated into every sphere of governance it is very tough to develop a nation. In Bangladesh's case this notion is not different either. Democratic governance has to be institutionalized as quickly as possible. Otherwise, governance cannot be in a desired state as the present scenario depicts. Due to below par practices in politics, accountable, transparent, participative, effective, efficient, and corruption-free administration and public service delivery is not possible. That is the reason why institutionalization of democratic governance system is a major governance challenge in Bangladesh.

Corruption-Free Polity

Corruption has been one of the major roadblocks to governance and growth of the polity as a whole. In the present governance framework people of Bangladesh perceive corruption as bad or immoral act perpetuated in the public sector. Corruption is not limited to public sector alone. Public, private, and non-profit organizations are adversely affected not only by bribery, rent-seeking, and misappropriation of funds but also the performance, lobbying, delay in delivering services, larceny, irresponsible conduct of officials, bureaucratic intemperance, patronage, and unaccountable way of doing things (Zafarullah and Siddiquee 2001). TIB in Household Survey (2012) finds that 63.7 % respondents experienced corrupt practices while having service from both public and private organizations. It implies that nearly two-third of the people are suffering due to corruption. The several institutional mechanisms such as ACC and Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) office have been operating to combat administrative malfeasance and are rendered ineffective by a non-committed political leadership, a carefree bureaucracy, weak accountability structures, and unproductive legislative labors. Ostensibly independent bodies like ACC and CAG are under suspicion as these bodies often serve the purpose of political parties in power (Zafarullah and Siddiquee 2001; TIB 2012).

State of corruption indicates that it has severe impact on the state capacity and governance as it invites further politicization of administration and bureaucracy. Nepotism and clientalism led by corruption, and unstable political environment, where money is presumed as the most important key to reach power, have contributed major weaknesses in the system of governance and (Zafarullah and Rahman 2008). Governance in Bangladesh is immeasurably threatened by rampant corruption. Apart from a malinstitutionalization of democratic governance system, corruption is another major challenge to governance because corruption remains as a sturdy impediment for institutionalization of democracy. Linkage between corruption and institutionalization of democratic practices demands a corruption-free polity in achieving the goals of governance.

Neutral Civil Service

The preceding discussion on two major governance challenges in Bangladesh points out that civil service is a major component in the present governance framework and demands critical attention. Politicization of civil service has been a feature of governance during last two decades. Politicization has made the civil service inefficient and also alienated from the people. Civil servants see themselves as the masters of people rather than servants. Recruitment, selection, promotion, and transfer are major elements of civil service management in Bangladesh and these elements are often used by political parties in power to serve their own ill purposes (Zafarullah and Khan 2001). Civil servants feel that political interference is the main reason why they are unable to perform in their jobs neutrally.

NGOs, large business organizations, international donor agencies, and multinational corporations have also influenced the civil servants so that they can work in their favor. This has worsened the state of neutrality of the civil service. One of the outcomes of such a situation and is the emergence and sustenance of a vicious cycle of relationship among major political parties, large private organizations and international organizations allowing some civil servants to prosper in quick time. In the process people have been deprived of service and they are also unable to hold the civil servants accountable through their representatives in the parliament. Without impartial and accountable civil service it is always difficult to involve people in the process of participative policy implementation. Furthermore, civil service is plagued by partiality and partisan politics that adversely affect putting in practice the potential strategies for eradicating corruption and institute honest administration. Co-existence of accountability in the civil service and people's participation in the public service delivery help to achieve good governance.

Policy Prescriptions

In order to effectively face the above-mentioned three major challenges; we need to adopt both short-term and long-term strategies. Governance in Bangladesh has been under severe criticisms since 1991 as the country has been underperforming significantly against some critical indicators of governance. Keeping in view the context and extent of governance challenges in Bangladesh the following prescriptions are provided below. The policy prescriptions are:

First, establish democratic practice within political parties so that the leaders of all political parties are elected by party workers in open conventions.

Second, ensure that Election Commission (EC) plays a neutral role in conducting national parliamentary and other elections. EC should collect detailed annual statement/report from each political party that contains information about their activities, finance, governance, and democratic practices; EC should be empowered to cancel registration of political parties on the basis of their annual statement.

Third, civil society leaders and Members of Parliament (MP) should have a bigger role in the selection of chairman and members of EC and ACC in order to select honest, competent, experienced, and non-partisan individuals.

Fourth, a high powered commission to be headed by a retired supreme court judge should be formed to discourage media-political leadership nexus. This commission will regularly monitor the activities of media and recommend appropriate measures.

Fifth, reports of parliamentary committees on executive corruption and dereliction in duties should be made available on a regular basis in each designated elected local government office so that people have information as to the happenings in the executive branch.

Sixth, Ombudsman needs to be introduced and effectuated as mandated by the Constitution without any further delay.

Seventh, public procurement and contracting out and partnership deals have to be unambiguous and transparent so that other non-state actors cannot maneuver the civil servants for their benefits.

Eighth, by using Right to Information Act 2009 citizens and third sector organizations must be able to check what the civil servants are doing with respect to service delivery.

Ninth, Citizen Charter needs to be customer-friendly and properly institutionalized.

Conclusion

Governance in Bangladesh is now often questioned because of inefficient and fragile institutionalization of democracy and absence of service-oriented, neutral, and answerable civil administration. Corruption is widespread and destroying each and every of the society beset with deteriorated social values and morals. Bangladesh has not performed significantly better in all the indicators of governance. Many promises of improving governance have been shelved during the last two decades. It can be stated that institutionalization of democratic governance along with neutral civil service and corruption-free society hold the key to present a system of governance desired by the people of Bangladesh. Interconnectivity and reciprocal relationship between these three aspects can clean all the dirt that has been piled up since 1991. Institutionalization of democratic governance can provide breathing space to the present system of governance. This can boost the strategies to significantly reduce corruption in quick time. Similarly, strict rules and regulations and their proper implementation can prevent both the civil servants and politicians from politicizing the civil service. Neutral practice of civil servants in delivering service to the people can restrict the undesired access of politics in the administration. This does not mean the separation of politics from administration. It signifies the proper role of politics in shaping the administration and civil service so that the public servants are held accountable to the people's representatives. Governance in

Bangladesh is snowed under many criticisms and problems need to change the gear to improve the state in upcoming years. Institutionalization of democratic governance, eradicating corruption, and instituting impartial civil service are the current major governance challenges that can be effectively faced if political commitment, bureaucratic acquiescence, and popular support are properly mobilized.

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Implementation of Policy to Control Industrial Pollution in Bangladesh: Major Drawbacks

Md. Shahriar Islam

Introduction

Public Administration, in recent years, is called as public governance (Osborne 2010) where policies are mostly formulated and implemented in order to achieve public welfare by reflecting the public needs and aspirations. Public policy provides guideline to the public servants who are in charge of delivering public services in achieving public welfare. Public Policy starts when the legislators legislate and finally ends when the executives execute or implement the policies. From the previous studies it has been found that there is not much problems in policies in the legislation phase but problems are found in execution or implementation of those legislated policies (Rose 2005). Implementation of policy is very much important as the success of the policy depends upon the implementation thereof. Thus the study of program implementation is concerned with what happens to a policy or program after it has been formulated (Birkland 2007, p. 263). This chapter is focused to find out the major drawbacks in implementation of policies meant to control industrial pollution in Bangladesh.

Implementation of industrial pollution control policy is not an effectual one which results in the increase in pollution created by industries by 70 % from 1990 to 2008 (SEHD 2001). In Bangladesh, industrial units are mostly located along the

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Map 1 Bangladesh (with major cities and industrial areas)

banks of the rivers (i.e., Dhaka, Narayanganj, Chittagong, Tungi) (see Map 1). There are obvious reasons for this such as provision of transportation for incoming raw materials and outgoing finished products. Unfortunately as a consequence, industrial units drain effluent directly into the rivers without any consideration of the environmental degradation. The highest number of industrial establishments in the country is located in the North Central (NC) region, which comprises about 49 % of the total sector.

The most problematic industries for the water sector are textiles, tanneries, pulp and paper mills, fertilizer, industrial chemical production, and refineries. A complex mixture of hazardous chemicals, both organic and inorganic, is discharged into the water bodies from all these industries usually without treatment. Small and Medium Enterprises are one of the key industrial sectors through which the pollution has been generated.

The Industrial Policy 2005 of GOB backed up the growth of SMEs. In order to further strengthen the country's industrialization process, the government identified the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) as a priority sector and as the driving force for industrialization (Government of Bangladesh 2005, p. 12). Department of Environment (DoE) and Ministry of Industries (MoI) with the assistance of Asian

Table 1 Bangladesh—share of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) lost by cause and environmental contribution

Cause	%	Environmental factor	Share of cause (%)	Share of total (%)
Respiratory infections and diseases	17	Indoor air pollution	30–50	5–8
		Urban air pollution	6–10	1–2
Perinatal causes	14	Not applicable	–	–
Diarrhoeal disease	12	Low access to safe water, poor sanitation and hygiene	80–90	10–11
Injuries	11.5	Not applicable	–	–
Nutrition/endocrine	10	Not applicable	–	–
Malignant neoplasm	2	Agro-industrial toxics	5–25	0.1–0.5
Other	33.5	Arsenicosis	–	0.3–0.4
Total	100		–	16.4–21.9

Sources: Streatfield et al. (2001)

Development Bank (ADB) carried out a study on pollution aspects in Bangladesh, which conclude the ranking of the major polluting industry sector as follows:

- Paper and Pulp
- Textile/Garments
- Tanneries

Despite having an industrial policy Bangladesh faced a mass unplanned industrialization in some particular areas which could create severe damage to the local and national environment. Kaliakoir Thana in Gazipur District to the north-east of Dhaka is one such industrial cluster where rapid, unplanned industrial expansion has led to serious local pollution. This area was historically an important rice growing area but its close proximity to Dhaka has gradually led to more industries locating there over the past 15 years. There are now several types of industry in the area including a tannery, poultry farms, and pharmaceutical industries but it is dominated by textile manufacturers, including dyeing and printing units. The above industrial sectors are major pollutants due to the high discharge level of organic materials and chemicals which are hazardous to environment. It is estimated that in Bangladesh about one-fifth of the total burden of disease may be associated with environmental factors (see Table 1).

Two of the three causes of death and sickness in Bangladesh are respiratory illness and diarrhoeal disease, both of which are strongly associated with the quality of the environment, and both of which have particularly significant impacts on the health of children. Management of these environmental risks presents an important development challenge. There are few initiatives to address the immediate problems, for clean-up programs for the serious industrial pollution caused by existing industries. Clear measures for ensuring compliance with the environmental laws and regulations, including enforcement, are lacking. For example, the enforcement officers from DoE do not visit the industries regularly, there is no activity from the DoE to

test the quality of water and air in every three months period, there is no mechanism to test the physical conditions of the industry workers. Without clean-up action in and around the main cities, water quality will continue to worsen in the foreseeable future, constituting a major threat to millions of lives and livelihood, especially of the very poor. Industrial effluent is the main cause of pollution created by industries. DoE of GOB is the authority to look after whether the Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP) is working properly or not. It has been noted from the previous statistics that ETP is not been used or even installed by all the industries (World Bank 2006).

This chapter discusses the machineries and actors of policy implementation which seek to control industrial pollution in Bangladesh. A conceptual framework is delineated to analyze the present system of policy implementation to control industrial pollution in Bangladesh. After analyzing the current system, this chapter depicts the major drawbacks in implementation of policy to control industrial pollution in Bangladesh. Before concluding this discussion some recommendations are produced to improve the situation.

Conceptual Framework

Public Policy

Public policy can be generally defined as the course of action or inaction taken by governmental entities (the decisions of government) with regard to a particular issue or set of issues. According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984) policy is: expression of a desired state of affairs, specific proposals, decisions of government, formal authorization, programmes, outputs, outcomes, and a process. Strategic Policy Making Team—*Cabinet Office UK (1999)* has defined policy as “the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver desired changes in the real world.”

Policy Cycle

According Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 4) the policy cycle includes: Deciding to decide, Deciding, how to decide, Issue definition, Forecasting, Setting objectives, Analyzing options, Implementation, monitoring and control, Evaluation and review and Policy maintenance, succession or termination (Fig. 1).

Policy cycle is a useful framework which helps to analyze a very complex process in real world (Parsons 1995). Parsons (1995) sees the policy cycle a framework and links it to the real world practices of policy process. On the other hand c (1984) suggests that policy cycle does shows or reflects the reality of the policy making. With the help of many suggestions from different policy researchers and theorists the UK government (2007) said that policy cycle is something which provides a perspective model of rational policymaking which has worked well in some areas.




Fig. 1 Policy cycle. Source: Hogwood and Gunn (1984)

Policy Implementation

Policy implementation resides nearly at the end of the policy cycle. It is the action of the policy decision taken during the policy formulation as it is shown in the policy cycle. Many literatures are available to find out what has been said regarding the policy implementation. Many theories of policy implementation have been given by many scholars (O’Toole 2001; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980). The extent of agreement is surprising; most of these authors cover a similar picture of past work and advocate analogous paths for future work. These reviews emphasize the need for closure and consistency in the theoretical models. O’Toole’s (2001) reviews of more than one referring to over three hundred key variables of policy implementation. Implementation research always faced a debate of top-down or bottom-up approach to policy implementation. Thus the debate has formulated the two schools of thought in the implementation research (Hill and Hupe 2002).

Top-Down Model of Policy Implementation

Top-down models (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, 1980) see implementation as concern with the degree to which the actions of implementing officials and objective groups correspond with the goals personified in an authoritative decision. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, p. 20) define implementation

as “The carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions” The starting point is the authoritative decision; as the name implies, centrally located actors are seen as most relevant to producing the desired effects. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) have given six variables and a model (see Fig. 2) of policy implementation on the basis of those six variables. Their model is merely concerned with the top-down approach although they suggested bottom level participation in the policy formulation stage. According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) “implementation will be most successful where marginal change is required and goal consensus is high” (cited in Sapru 2010, p. 224).

Six variables developed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) are:


1. Policy standards and objectives
2. Available resources and incentives
3. The quality of inter-organizational relationships
4. The characteristics of the implementation agencies
5. The economic, social, and political environment
6. The “disposition” or “response” of the implementers involving three elements: their cognition or the policy, the direction of their response to it and the intensity of that response.

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) defend their top-down view that those who make policy are democratically elected. The concept of “perfect implementation” derives from the work of Hood (1976). He suggests:

One way of analyzing implementation problems is to begin by thinking about what ‘perfect implementation’ would be look like, comparable to the way in which economists employ the model of perfect competition. Perfect administration could be defined as a condition in which ‘external’ elements of resources availability and political acceptability combine with administration to produce perfect policy implementation. (p. 6)

Bottom-Up Model of Policy Implementation

Michael Lipsky’s analysis of the behavior of front-line staff in policy delivery agencies, whom he calls “street-level bureaucrats,” has had an important influence upon implementation studies. He argues that “the decisions of street level bureaucrats, the routine they establish and the device they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policy they carry out (2010: xii).” He also adds “street level bureaucrats perform the function in a very corrupted condition pressured by top level bureaucrats.” In these circumstances the street level bureaucrats develop their own method to implement the policy as they know the grass root level problem and actual impact of the implementation upon the target people or client. Under these conditions, according to the bottom-uppers, if local level implementers are not given the freedom to adapt the program to local conditions it is likely to fail.



Source: Meter and Horn (1975:463)

Fig. 2 Model of policy implementation

Research Method and Data Collection

Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used for this research. Qualitative method depicts unstructured analysis, such as likes and dislikes about a specific matter, subject or person. Qualitative research adds new scope for an issue or question under the study (Easterby-Smith et al. 2004). Quantitative research is used to measure things while qualitative methods are mainly used to obtain an understanding of the subject (Malhotra and Birks 2006). This research has not followed the quantitative method directly to collect the primary data. Quantitative method is used only to interpret data those are found in numbers and statistical from secondary sources. Qualitative method is used to collect the primary data and also analyzing those to draw the final results and findings. This research is, in particular, a descriptive as well as explanatory research with cross-sectional time dimension. Empirical data have been collected through the in-depth interview during the months of July and August, 2010. Interviewees were asked 26 questions through an unstructured questionnaire which were formulated to cover all the issues related to the objective of the research. The freedom with open-ended questions can help interviewers to tailor their questions to the interview context/situation, and to the people they are interviewing (Babbie 2008). Sample of population for interview was 11. The researcher opted purposive sampling technique to get information from key potential informants. Two from the Dhaka Deputy Commissioner's Office, four from the DOE including the director general (DG) of the department, one judge of environment court (Dhaka), assistant country director of UNDP Bangladesh, chief researcher of BCAS¹ (NGO), executive director of CNRS (NGO), and member of Law Commission, Bangladesh.

Policy Context in Bangladesh to Control Industrial Pollution: Organizational Capacity, Policy Implementation, and Administrative System

The Institutional Context for Environmental Management

After independence of Bangladesh in 1971, some of the key environmental initiatives undertaken by the government were the enactment of the Water Pollution Control Act, 1973, the Environmental Pollution Control Ordinance, 1977. It was the 1980s that environmental issues became seen as much more linked to broader development issues and became institutionalized in 1989 with the establishment of the present Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). Formal responsibilities for

¹ Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies is a NGO which conducts researches on environmental issues.

environment management are vested in MoEF, but many other institutions, directly and indirectly, are involved in managing or shaping the environment. These include public sector, private sector, and civil society organizations. At the highest level, the National Environment Council (NEC), established in 1993 and headed by the Prime Minister, and the Executive Committee of the National Environment Council (ECNEC), headed by the Minister of Environment and Forest, are designed to provide guidance to line Ministers on national environmental issues. Moreover, the Planning Commission of the Ministry of Planning has the authority to supervise and coordinate cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial activities influencing the use of environment and natural resources. The potential role of this Ministry is important since it controls funding for the implementation of the Government's Five Year Plan.

Development partners and civil society have also exerted an important influence on environmental decision-making, with a range of NGOs now active on both "green" and "brown" environmental issues. While the institutionalization of environmental issues into broader development practices has been gradual and in many respects (such as EA law) donor driven (Ahammed and Harvey 2003), since the beginning of the 1990s the Government has taken a number of important steps to strengthen environmental management in Bangladesh. An enabling legal environment has been created, in particular through the Environment Court Act (2000), and the Environmental Conservation Act (1995) and Rules (1997), followed by a series of new pieces of environmental legislation issued since 2000. Important policy documents in this respect which concern over industrial pollution control are, the Environment Policy (1992) and especially the National Environment Management Action Plan 1995 (NEMAP). These have been formulated for providing action plans to address environmental issues and to promote sustainable development (ADB 2004). Formal Institutional framework of environmental management in Bangladesh is illustrated in Fig. 3. Policy comes as directives to the implementing agencies from parliament and then it is the duty of the ministry and departments under it to implement the policies. The flow of the policy from its formulation to implementation in managing or controlling pollution in Bangladesh is very important aspect for the institutions set for keeping a healthier environment for all. Policies related to controlling environmental pollution which includes industrial pollution as well generally come from the parliament by following democratic process. In Fig. 4 the policy Framework regarding the industrial pollution control policy in Bangladesh is illustrated (Table 2).

Institutional arrangement to control pollution created by industries in Bangladesh comprises of Ministry of Environment and Forest. The ministry has three departments under its supervision.

1. Department of Environment
2. Department of Forest
3. Forest Research institute

Ministry of Environment and Forest is headed by a minister and the each department is headed by a senior civil servant ranked as joint secretary/additional secretary. DoE has seven offices in seven administrative divisional headquarters.

Fig. 3 Hierarchy of environmental management in Bangladesh. *Source:* DoE (2007): 20




Fig. 4 Policy framework in Bangladesh. *Source:* Khan and Zafarullah (2001)




Table 2 Policy legal and regulatory framework, and actions programs to address the industrial pollution

Pressures	Policy, legal and regulatory framework	Program undertaken	Possible options to address the problem
Industrial effluent	Industrial policy, environmental conservation act and regulation, guidelines for industrial EIA	There is very limited action program. Need institutional strengthening, and enforcement of laws and regulations	Installation of treatment plant, land zoning, enforcement of ECA and ECR
Ship-breaking and lube oil discharge at sea	Bangladesh signed the UN convention on the law of the sea in 1982. Environmental Conservation Act & Regulation	There is very limited action program. Need institutional strengthening, and enforcement of laws and regulations	Enforcement of ECA and ECR, West reception and treatment facilities at port.

Source: SoE study team (State of Environment: SoE), Government of Bangladesh (2001)



Map 2 Administrative divisions and districts in Bangladesh

Each division is under the supervision of a director. Divisions are Dhaka, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Khulna, Barsial, Chittagong, and Sylhet (see Map 2). DoE is the chief government or public agency which deals with the policy implementation to control industrial policy. DoE has its own rules and regulations for enforcement and implementation of the policy along with the legislative directions.

Industrial Pollution Control Policy and Process

DoE has enforcement system without disturbing the development of the industrial sector. They have even listed the industries in three different categories, viz. Green, Orange, and Red, in accordance to the pollution related factors particularly for the

new or proposed industrial units both for local or overseas investors. DoE has the full authority to consult on the issues of foreign strategies adaptation, with other ministries and departments. National Environment committee includes all the government ministries and agencies to create a network for policy and its improvement. Figure 4 shows the execution and implementation channel of policies which is formulated in the Parliament. Parliament gives the main Acts, Rules, and Policy to the agencies as shown in the Fig. 4. The agencies work according to the hierarchy. Very much Top-Down approach of policy implementation is followed.

Administration in Bangladesh is quite similar as it is in the UK because of the Westminster type Parliament is followed in Bangladesh. Thus the policy implementation needs the similar kind of Administration. The civil service and its administration in Bangladesh are similar to the system of Whitehall. Page (2010) pointed out the Whitehall model by four distinctive characteristics of it. The “Whitehall Model” tends to be found in four main features of the British civil service. First, the idea that civil servants are politically “neutral”: civil servants reach the top of the profession through a merit system of promotion dominated by career civil servants and there is no top level of political appointees who come and go with change of government, or even a change of minister. Second, civil servants are “generalists”; they are not trained in specific disciplines related to their subsequent positions and their careers are not limited to dealing with a narrow range of subjects. Third, a career in the bureaucracy was to be a career for life. This aspect of the civil service is hardly a distinctive “Whitehall” trait, as it is found in many bureaucracies of continental Europe and elsewhere. Finally, in the Whitehall Model the civil service holds significant political power as the monopoly (or near monopoly) provider of policy advice to ministers. Similar kind of civil service administration is run by the government of Bangladesh (Rahman 2008; Zafarullah and Khan 2005; Khan 2006; Jamil 2008). Although the British administrative system has gone through many changes but the essence of top-down approach is still there (Fig. 5).




Fig. 5 Administrative setup in Bangladesh (field and central linkage). *Source:* Zafarullah and Khan (2005)

Department of Environment (DoE): Key Institution to Implement Policies to Control Industrial Pollution

The DoE was formed in 1989 with a mandate for environmental management later formalized under the Environment Conservation Act 1995 (ECA 1995). The DoE is headed by a Director General, with Divisional offices in Dhaka, Chittagong, Bogra, Khulna, Barisal, and Sylhet. As the technical arm of the Ministry, DoE is responsible for environmental planning, management, monitoring, and enforcement. The mandate of the Department has expanded over time, evolving from an exclusive focus on pollution control to include natural and environmental management, now covering:

- Monitoring environmental quality
- Promoting environmental awareness through public information programs;
- Controlling and monitoring industrial pollution;
- Reviewing environmental impact assessment and managing the environmental clearance process; and
- Establishing regulations and guidelines for activities affecting the environment.

In addition to the above duties, DoE also coordinates implementation of a number of international protocols and conventions to which Bangladesh is a signatory. In economic terms, most of the functions that DoE is mandated to serve (e.g., monitoring environmental quality and industrial pollution, environmental awareness and education, establishing regulations and guidelines) are public goods. One exception is the environmental review and environmental clearance process which is a service that DoE provides for a fee to developers, which has both public and private good characteristics.

Industries Are Polluting: Major Snags of Implementation of Policies to Control Industrial Pollution

In Bangladesh there is no formal separate integrated pollution control policy (World Bank 2006). Bangladesh has only the Environmental Conservation Act, 1995 and Environmental Conservation Rules, 1997. There are Environment Policy, 1992 and National Environment Management Action Plan (NEMAP), 1995 clearly stressed on industrial pollution control in Bangladesh (DoE 2007). No separate commission has been set up by the government of Bangladesh excepting very inactive parliamentary committee on environmental protection. Generally very weak parliamentary committee system makes the situation ineffective to hold the implementation accountable. In the Fifth Parliament, the highest number (49) of committee reports was submitted while the corresponding figure is the lowest in the Seventh Parliament (only 28). The frequency of report submission by each committee during the full term (usually five years) of the Parliament in Bangladesh ranges between 0.61 and 1.07. This data indicate a very poor performance of the committee system in

Table 3 Performance of the standing committees in the fifth, seventh, and eighth parliaments (JS Jatiya Sangsad)

Performance indicators	Fifth JS	Seventh JS	Eighth JS	Ninth JS
Committee formed	46	46	48	46
Total committee meetings	1,388	1,485	1,242	NA
Average meeting (per committee, per year)	6.03	6.46	8.63	NA
Reports submitted	49	28	47	NA
Average number of reports submitted (per committee)	1.07	0.61	0.98	NA
Committees that did not produce any report	30	29	10	NA

Source: Rahman (2008)

Table 4 Current staffing of DoE (2009 December)

	Staffing in 2007	Present staffing	Proposed staffing in 2007	Changes till 2009	Deficit in staffing based on the proposed staffing
Officer and inspectors	127	177	332	50	282
Supporting staff	140	257	403	117	286
Total manpower	267	334	735	167	568

Source: DoE (2010)

Bangladesh at the implementation stage (Rahman 2008). Table 3 shows the performance of the parliamentary committees of last three parliaments in Bangladesh.

Accountability of bureaucrats to the Parliament through the Ministers is also largely ineffective due to the absence of functional Parliamentary Standing Committees. Parliamentary Committees cannot be effective in making the bureaucracy accountable as the politically chosen Secretaries, considering the Committee members fellow “party men,” respond poorly to the queries and in implementing recommendations of the Committee. On the other hand, the Committee members also hesitate to take any stern action against them for similar “fellow-feelings.” Accountability of bureaucrats to the people is even more ineffective. When the officials follow the instructions of political masters they fail to be responsive to the people. The effectiveness of accountability mechanisms is thus affected by politicization in a pervasive way. There is a public demand of having an effective parliamentary system with committees which hold the government agencies responsible for policy implementation, accountable for the actions (*Public Survey by USAID 2010*).

The street level bureaucrats are the officers of executive departments and agencies of each ministry and also the executive magistrates who operate the mobile court and these magistrates are responsible for “on the spot prosecution” (DoE 2007). The DoE officers act as street level bureaucrats but number of current staffing (Table 4) is not enough to cover all the major regions of Bangladesh. Bureaucrats in Bangladesh usually practice top-down approach where there is no real effort from the bureaucrats to ensure the interaction between policy cycles. The senior and top level bureaucrats influence the process in Bangladesh. Khan and Zafarullah (2001)

Table 5 Population and manpower ratio under DoE in selected Asian countries

Country	Manpower	Population	Manpower and population
Singapore	3,115	4,492,150	1: 1,442
Philippine	23,960	8,94,68,677	1: 3,777
Hong Kong	1,500	69,90,000	1: 4,660
Malaysia	1,568	2,43,85,858	1: 15,552
Thailand	1,500	5,40,00,000	1: 36,000
Pakistan	1,064	16,58,03,560	1: 1,55,830
Bangladesh	267	14,73,65,352	1: 5,51,930

Source: DoE, Bangladesh, 2008

described, “the public bureaucracy in Bangladesh is still laden with traditions that are colonial in nature. Being still largely elitist in character, bureaucrats, as a social group, are insulated from the rest of society; a wide gap exists between the bureaucracy and the people at large.”

Corruption is an important issue in Bangladesh public bureaucracy (TIB 2010). Low level of pay and wage makes the public bureaucrats corrupted (*Survey on Public Officials 2002*). The survey states, “The average monthly salary of surveyed officials was about 7,000 Taka (\$100), with ministry officials earning 37 % more than the district officials. Although measures of adequacy of government wages are difficult to obtain, public salaries are normally considered low.”

Inadequate logistic support, limited number of offices, lack of infrastructural and technical capacity, and substandard coordination with other ministries are the key causes that hold back the institutional development in Bangladesh to implement the policy to control industrial pollution (DoE 2007). Man power is a very key issue for Department of Environment in Bangladesh. From the Table 5 shows the manpower ratio under Department of Environment of few selected Asian countries. Bangladesh falls at the bottom of the list which means one staff of DoE of Bangladesh has to deal with most number of people comparing to other countries’ DoE. It does not help to increase the level of efficiency of the staffs.

According to DoE, industries that are most responsible for creating pollution are Tannery, Textile, Fertilizer, Cement, Pesticides, Ship Breaking, and Dock Yard. DoE made a list of industries in terms of their environmental friendliness. They are,

- a. Green (lowest pollution created by these industries)
- b. Amber A
- c. Amber B
- d. Red (Highly polluting)

Both new and old industries need to have environmental clearance certificate from DoE to comply with the existing policy. DoE implementation team contains the philosophy which denotes “polluters must be payers.” Regarding the enforcement system of DoE the Director of DoE’s Dhaka Division stated, “191 cases have been filed to Environmental Court of Dhaka Division. Usually the enforcement team visits the industries according to the schedule and then they fine or notice the industries

that are found to have been responsible for causing pollution or not maintaining standards set by the DoE. The DoE helps launching mobile courts. Mobile court is performed by the Deputy Commissioner's office of each district."

According to Mobile Court Act 2009 the DC delegates the authority to an Executive Magistrate² to run the mobile courts.

On the basis of Environmental Conservation Act 1995 the mobile court executes the missions. But there are only two sections of the Environmental Conservation Act 1995 which are being dealt with by the mobile court. The sections are, section 6: smoke from the vehicles that causes air pollution and 6(A): chemicals used and produced that pollute air, water, and land. A staff from the DoE acts as the prosecutor during the process of mobile court. In terms of punishment first time the accused is fined BDT5,000 (\$75), second time BDT10,000 (\$140) and then infliction of maximum one year imprisonment. Section 6B: hazardous material selling, storing, displaying and distributing for commercial purpose. Punishment is infliction of maximum 6 months imprisonment and BDT1,000 (\$14) fine. This type of range of fine is not proper because it ignores the amount of pollution done by a particular industry. According to the Environmental Conservation Act 1995 there is no difference in fine whether the polluter is large emitter or not. There should be a mechanism of fining the large emitters more than the small emitters. But due to weak laboratory testing system of DoE the amount of pollution is not quickly measured to prosecute in mobile court. It is also accepted by one of the enforcement officers of DoE that the capacity of the laboratory should be improved. According to an enforcement officer of DoE, "most of the tests done in the DoE laboratory are correct, but the laboratory needs to be equipped with new technologies and equipments to give more test reports quickly with correct results. Those laboratory tests are used to file the cases."

The executive magistrate who was the in charge of mobile court operation of Dhaka Deputy Commissioner's office said during 2009–2011,

DOE sometimes makes complaint or initiates requisition for launching a mission of mobile court. The work plan regarding the mobile court mission depends upon the Magistrate in charge. Each Deputy Commissioner office of each administrative district has a mobile court team and the minimum limit of mission of a mobile court is 12. There has to be minimum 12 mobile court missions in a month. All the activities and coordination with DoE, Police and other law enforcement agencies are done by the Magistrate in charge who also selects the number of people to be involved for a single mission. There are complaints from the general people although the number is not that high. Through phone calls the citizens make complaints. Sometimes they post letters to the officer in this regard. People who are aware of the entire process of mobile court are willing to cooperate the launching of mission of the mobile court. Formal complaints by the general people is possible but the number is very low because the delay in postal services and the location of the DC office is not much convenient for all due to traffic jam and crowd at the office. Access to the office for the citizens is not easier as well. The Magistrate in charge of mobile court has to submit a report to the DC after completion of the missions. Political pressure only comes when a mission is scheduled against the big industries because the owner of big industries have strong

²Magistrates without judicial power and authority. They just can deal with the prosecution in mobile courts.

political backup and also have a good relationship with high ranked officers within administration. Police, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and other law enforcing agencies provide security support to the mobile court. There is no individual motivation in terms of financial incentives and other substantive benefits for the people involved in mobile court operation. Honorarium is only 100 BDT (\$1.5) per operation.

He also responded when he was asked about the media coverage of mobile court operation. From his statements it is clear that media coverage about each action and the procedure thereof are available to the public. But secrecy is maintained before a move is made against pollution. Reason is that the people who will be brought under the mobile court operation may run away. Environmental protection laws and regulations are frequently updated to minimize or eradicate the pollution caused by industries. DoE and the lack of monitoring of cases do not allow conclusion of the cases in time. The panel-lawyers working for the DoE also do not have of proper legal and technical knowledge to win the cases. The DoE fails to succeed in most cases. In most of the cases the decision goes in favor of the defending party because the DoE fails to adduce enough proof and evidence to substantiate the alleged of pollution. The efficiency of the DoE to identify the pollution caused by industries is not high enough. It is also evident that DoE has been failing to implement the decisions of the court which goes in its favor. Corruption is another common feature which often comes to public through the media.

Judge of Environment Court, Dhaka said,

Lack of facility to test of materials from the industrial wastes is very crucial. There is no independent organization which can support the court by providing testing facilities. That is why sometimes court cannot make proper decision as the court does not have enough evidence provided by the DoE. Huge number of cases along with shortage of judge to deal with the cases is a big problem in the process of enforcement and implementation. There are environment courts in six divisional headquarters. It is needed to have environment courts in each district or at least in the major districts where some sort of important industries are located. There is no foreign exposure of the street level bureaucrats who are implementing policies to control industrial pollution and same thing happens with the judges who are dealing with cases of environmental pollution over all. That is why even they do not know much about developed or other countries' strategies. Due to this most of the times attempts to adapt strategies of developed countries have failed.

Industrial pollution and degradation by industries and human intervention goes unabated as only 38 cases out of a total 340 filed till May 31 have so far been ended in conviction since the establishment of Environmental Courts in 2002. According to information available with the Department of Environment, since the establishment of the courts, 340 cases were filed till May 31—166 in Dhaka, 87 in Chittagong, and 87 in Sylhet. Of the 304 cases, 63 have been disposed of, 60 are under trial, and 185 cases are now under investigation, while proceedings in three cases have been stayed by the High Court. In the rest 29 cases, the department has filed final reports saying that no evidence could be found to prove the charges. Only 38 cases ended in conviction of the polluters. In 19 cases, the accused factories and individuals were acquitted of the charges. The department, however, is yet to know about the judgment in the rest six cases disposed of. According to the Environment Courts Act 2000, none can file a case directly with the courts without permission of

Table 6 A summary of enforcement activities by DoE

Description	Number of industries	
	Visited industries	Industries
Hospital/clinics/others		160
Total		855
Needed to set up ETPs	471	
Number of industries with ETPs before the start of enforcement activities	120	
Number of ETPs set up after the inception of enforcement activities	27	
Number of ETPs found working during the visit & number of ETPs found non-working during the visit	<i>Data not available</i>	
ETPs under construction after the enforcement activities	39	
Industries without ETPs	285	

Source: DoE (2007)

the Department of Environment. An inspector of the Department of Environment said “they received a good number of complaints every month, but cannot conduct a thorough inspection due to manpower shortage.” In Dhaka division there are only three inspectors working, he added. According to the Environmental Conservation Act 1995 all industries are required to obtain environmental clearance certificate from the DoE. Through this process the industries are accountable to the DoE. According to the Environmental Conservation Rules new industries have to take the clearance certificate. There is limited integration with ministry of industries in practice although there are some rules of procedure providing provisions of having consultation with other ministries to coordinate the activities of the DoE. In terms of auditing the industries DoE has certain parameters to measure the pollutants. The department also does audit and inspection whether the effluent treatment plant (ETP) is working or not. From the Table 6 it is seen that DoE only covered 695 industries whereas in major areas like Dhaka, Chittagong, Kaliakair the number of industries is around 10,000 including SMEs.

Conclusion and Recommendations

All the pollution created by industries in Bangladesh is the result of inefficient and ineffective policy implementation and lack of proper enforcement of the rules and regulations (DoE 2007). Lack of involvement of the citizens in the policy implementation due to inadequate organizational capacity is one of the major problems in Bangladesh. Bangladesh as a developing country always suffers due to lack of resources and that is why the country’s government or public bodies cannot

implement the policies to satisfy the citizens (IGS 2008). Corruption is a big issue in Bangladesh which does not facilitate effective policy implementation. The National Household Survey 2010 by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) shows that about 72 % of total respondents gave bribe to the service sector in the period of 2007–2009 (TIB 2010).

Involvement of the industrialists into politics gives them such power through which they influence the inspectors of DoE or policy makers. Implementation of policy is characterized by the interaction between public and private actors (Knoepfel et al. 2007). The private actors possess much power than the public actors in the process of implementation of industrial pollution control policy in Bangladesh and the private actors try to influence the public actors in numerous occasions. Influence by the industrialists does not help to achieve efficiency and neutrality in the process of implementation (Jamil 2008). The absence of an effective Politico-Administrative Arrangement (PAP) (i.e., organizational capacity, efficiency of staffs, neutrality in service delivery and well connected government departments) in Bangladesh is one of the major drawbacks of implementation of policy (Jamil 2008). This study like Jamil (2008) identifies absence of laws, acts, and regulations based on contemporary economic condition of the country, lack of enough efficient and neutral street level bureaucrats, partiality in policy implementation, corrupt and politically motivated maneuvering of policy implementation system and deficiency of latest technology are the major drawbacks of industrial pollution control policy implementation. In order to overcome these hurdles strategies stated below can be adopted.

- Political leaders and parties are progressive to improve the policy implementation.
- Formulation of independent “national industrial pollution policy” with the aim of providing protection and sustainable management of industrial pollution.
- Implementation of laws and policies depends upon the well conversant, committed, trained and skilled personnel entrusted with the task and therefore the DoE and related organization must be manned by such knowledgeable and efficient people.
- Bureaucratic attitude and inflexibility have to be removed. Efficient and skilled staffs should be assigned with the task of implementation of policy.
- The DoE has to be manned by expert and skilled personnel and the people working with the area of industrial pollution and its control must have experience and training particularly from the developed countries so that they can ably practice the strategies learnt from those countries in Bangladesh.
- Attention has to be paid for conducting research and assisting other authorities and agencies in management and improvement of the industrial pollution situation.
- Public participation through consultation in policy process needs to be ensured.
- The government should let the people to know the existing policies and their implementation situation and the prospect of adaptability of other countries’ strategies for effective implementation of policies.

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The Arab Spring of 2011: A Perspective

Alexander Dawoody

Introduction

With the bankruptcy of nationalism in the Middle East and the infusion of individual freedoms through Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that provides wider access to information, a second movement is emerging. Examples of this movement can be seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Algeria. Tyrannical regimes of the past are falling one after another, along with their decaying nationalistic political paths. Unarmed people are facing tanks, helicopters, security snipers, police guns or batons, and foreign mercenaries with their bare hands, ready to die in order to have their voice heard and bring true change to the region. These voices are echoed and heard around the world through the newly emerging global participant-observer (GPO), demanding openness, transparency, accountability, and sound governance. This new wave that is taking the world by surprise is a new and second wave of political movement in the Middle East. This chapter examines, through content analysis based on a conceptual model the generation of a trajectory within a qualitative study that can answer the following research questions:


1. What are the factors that contributed to the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East?
2. What are the characteristics shared by the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East?

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Fig. 1 Conceptual model


3. What is the historical context of the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East?
4. What is the impact of political changes in the Middle East on geopolitics?

Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual model of this chapter.

The relationship between the layers in this model is interconnected. As ICT impacts the citizen on an individual level, the citizen then impacts his/her inner circle and those he is associated with electronically, especially on local levels. The composite of interchange will result in a cluster of new informed global citizens (GPO) that impacts, through their activities, their nation. A change in one nation then will lead to changes in the region of such nation. Regional changes then lead to global changes. For example, citizens in Tunisia who were impacted by the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi forced changes in their localities that led to changes in Tunisia as a whole and resulted in the toppling of Ben Ali's regime. The toppling of this regime then impacted the entire region of the Middle East, witnessing revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, and toppling the regimes of Mubarak in Egypt and Qaddafi in Libya. These changes are now impacting the globe with GPO, for example, in New York taking out to the street in Occupy Wall Street Movement to demand changes, accountability, and transparency.

The theoretical framework used for this model is complexity sciences' Scattered Matrix (Eden et al. 2002) that observes system analysis of political structures in the Middle East as causal elements in the formation of the 2011 revolutions. S-Matrix is a departure from a linear observation of a phenomenon that attributes change to singular causality. Instead, it looks at a random network of agents (composed of both events and their corresponding systems) and the genesis of change. This approach is more accurate as it does not trace causal relations along a linear line. Figure 2 illustrates this theoretical framework, with the S representing systemic analysis and its attachments as consequential events.

Fig. 2 S-Matrix



A Complexity Perspective

In life, we typically inherit two systems: a linear and a complex. The linear system is characterized by its predictability and low degree of interaction among its components. This allows us use mathematical methods that make forecast reliable. In a complex system, there is an absence of visible causal links between elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. These systems are misunderstood because we obtain knowledge throughout history as a linear system without properly transferring it to the complex domain (Taleb and Blyth 2011).

We also fear randomness, which is a healthy trait to enhance fitness and increase chances of survival. Thus, we interject ourselves in systemic evolution (such as in policies) to avoid randomness and avoid fluctuation in the name of stability. This type of interjection is called “artificial engineering” which is non-organic and problematic to systemic self-organization and natural evolution. The artificial suppression of volatility in the name of stability is both misleading and dangerous since it pushes policy-makers not to observe low-probability risks. When a naïve analysis of stability is derived from the absence of past variation, confidence is mistakenly maximized (ibid.).

Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become very fragile while exhibiting, at the same time, no visible indications of risks (Goldstein et al. 2010). This is because complex systems tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Artificially constrained systems become very vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from statistical norm and are largely unpredictable to a given set of observation (Taleb and Blyth 2011).

Complexity teaches us that we cannot explain events, such as the revolutions taking place in the Middle East today, simply through a linear observation and identifying a particular event as a catalyst cause. It is the system and its fragility that had caused these revolutions, not an event. It would be foolish, for example, to attribute the reason for a heart attack in a person to the last hamburger that he ate.

Inventing the Middle East

Nothing about the official political structure of the Middle East is organic. Most nation-states in the geographically region known today as the Middle East are created by European colonial forces. Even the term “The Middle East” is a Western invention and was first introduced by an American lecturer named Alfred Thayer Mahan in the *National Review* of London in 1912, referring to the area between Arabia and India (Koppes 1976). The term was later popularized by a journalist named Valentine Ignatius Chirol in the *Times* and included areas relevant to British interests. Thus, the region of the Middle East that was invented by Mahan was extended by Great Britain to include Persia, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Afghanistan, and Tibet (Adelson 1995). After World War I, Winston Churchill used the term to establish a Middle East Department in his cabinet that expanded it to further include the Suez Canal, The Sinai Peninsula, and Trans-Jordan. Afghanistan and Tibet, however, were dropped from the British term as they did not seem to possess (at the time) of any particular interest to British colonial calculation. As for the United States, the first official use of the term was introduced in the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine (Davison 1960). Today, the term includes a vast area that stretches from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west (Cleveland 2008). Based on this historical examination of the term “The Middle East,” it is therefore devoid of any cultural, linguistic, and geographical validity and considered by many researchers to be a fraudulent term representing nothing but Western interests (Hanafi 1998).

Nation-States in the Middle East

Six years after the invention of the term “The Middle East” by Mahan in 1912 and after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917 during World War I, Western colonial forces also invented many of the current nation-states in the Middle East (Kamrava 2011). The emerging nation-states made no sense to the local population except for Western colonial logic. Pro-Western leaders were chosen from selected tribal chieftains and were installed as the new heads of these nation-states. This was done in order to safeguard colonial interests through local elements (Long et al. 2010).

The discovery of oil further intensified colonial interests in the region, bringing the United States into the fray of affairs, especially during the period after World War II (Howard 2008; Telhami 2002). Local rulers were entrusted to protect colo-

nial access to oil resources while getting paid with certain percentage of oil revenue as royalty for these services. This created a new dependant class on the artificially crated nation-states that saw its survival through its ties with colonial powers and foreign interests. Majority of the populous, however, continued suffering through poverty, unemployment, or under-employment. Figure 3 illustrates the political map of the Middle East as formulated by the West.

The gap between the rulers and the populous widened as the rulers' wealth increased while the population's welfare declined. State machinery such as the media and information systems was placed under the state and security apparatus in order to protect the ruling class' interests (Al-Obaidi 2007). Demagogy, often illustrated in attention toward a foreign enemy (whether real or fictional) was utilized to siphon public anger and direct it toward outs, away from the ruling class.

The major point of demarcation in historical narratives that signified the region's first popular uprising came shortly after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech. One of the points in the speech called for the sovereignty of former Ottoman occupied areas outside of the newly emerging Turkey, igniting the populous to revolt and call for self-determination (Waldman 2010). Unfortunately, British and French colonial powers suppressed these revolutions, often through brutal military offensives in favor of installing their local tribal agents in positions of power (Dodge 2005; Gelvin 2011). Opposition to both colonial powers and their local representatives continued for decades, un-wavered by the West's theatrical formation of the new nation-states in the Middle East, or their subsequent independence under colonial satellites.

In 1948 Israel was created. The resulting Palestinian issue served as a perfect vehicle to be manipulated by Middle Eastern regimes in order to channel public anger outward. Slogans such as "All Rifles Must Point toward the Enemy" and "No Voice shall Trump over the Voice of Battle" were crafted to shift focus from demands for equality, social justice, and freedom toward an ongoing manufactured and sustained conflict with Israel (Goldschmidt and Davidson 2007; Lewis 1994; Keating 2005).

Several military coups managed to overthrow some of these regimes and install a political system based on nationalism and a shift in foreign policy orientation from the West toward the Soviet Union. Examples of these military coups were Nasser's in Egypt, Qassim's in Iraq, the Baath's in Syria, and Salal's in Yemen (Pollack 2004; Schwedler and Gerner 2008). However, the emerging nationalist regimes that replaced the pro-colonial former regimes morphed into authoritarianism that while utilizing the welfare state to obtain public support through state-sponsored employment and subsidies, but at the same time developed incompetent state machinery centered on the single and undisputed "Great Leader" cult and a heavy security apparatus that penetrated every aspect of life. The emerging nationalist regimes resemble one another, with one leader rising above the political currents and the nation-state that embodied them, and then passing his authority upon his death or old age to a member of his family (often a son). Constitutions were drafted as well and periodically were modified to sustain this order through rubber-stamp assemblies that lacked any true representation of an electoral process (Billingsley 2010; Makiya 1994; Perthes 2004).

Northern Africa and the Middle East



Fig. 3 The Middle East in African, Asian, and European context. Source: Nations Online (www.nationsonline.org)

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With the failure of the nationalists in providing answers to mounting challenges in the Middle East and due to their colossal military failures, such as the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, the 1980s Iraq–Iran War, the 1991 Gulf War, and 2003 Iraq War (Choueiri 2001), communists groups in the Middle East offered themselves as alternative. The Communists, however, were too weak to fill-in the gap, especially after their fatal errors in insulting traditional religions and cultural sentiments, alienating themselves with the Soviet Union and falling with it (Ismael 2007; Ismael 2009; Kreutz 2002).

The United States and Western countries were agitated in the beginning by the arrival of the nationalist to power in the Middle East and see their interests threatened or replaced by an orientation toward the Soviet Union. Attempts to intelligence-coordinated coups increased and few were successful. However and with time, the United States and Western countries were able to shoe-in their influence and redirect some of the nationalists toward the West. In exchange, the United States and the West supported these nationalists despite the regimes' blatant disregard to human rights and suppression of their populations (Khalidi 2005; Wawro 2010).

Within this process, the West was more comfortable in dealing with repressive regimes and safeguard its interests that allowing for interests to be threatened by a democratically elected government. A tyrant, whether autocratic or a nationalist was much easier to convert toward protecting Western interests in the region that a true representative of the people. In 1953, for example, Mohammad Mosaddeq, the democratically elected Prime Minister in Iran, ousted Western-puppet Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and nationalized Iran's oil. The United States and its Western allies were not happy about this process, even though it represented Iranian people's will. As such, the CIA-orchestrated a coup in Iran, overthrew Mosaddeq, and reinstated the fleeing Shah back to power (Kinzer 2008). Another example took place in Iraq. In 1959 the nationalist government of Qasim nationalized percentage of Iraqi oil production that was manipulated by England. As a result, the CIA-orchestrated another coup and ousted Qasim through the thuggish Baath Party in 1963 (Dann 1969; Sluglett 2008; Tripp 2007). These interferences illustrate dangerous orientation in American and Western policies toward the Middle East that were completely devoid of any consideration for local aspirations and solely concentrated on protecting their own interests. In response, people in the Middle East came to resent the West for its one-sided orientation. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran is a translation for such resentment (Kurzman 2005).

Therefore, some people in the Middle East object to U.S. and Western hypocrisy, for example, in defending human rights when it is only convenient to serves U.S. and Western interests. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded the western borders of Iran in 1980 and engaged in an 8-year war with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States and its Western allies were eager to help him through military intelligence and weapons of mass destruction (Hiro 1990). Saddam's brutality, suppression of Iraqi dissidents, and the bombing of Kurdish minority with mustard gas did not deter U.S. support or awakened its "human rights" conscious (Fernandes et al. 2007). However, when Saddam no longer was America's best ally and had stepped outside of his permitted boundaries, all of the sudden U.S. and Western

conscious was awakened and the Kurds were remembered for falling under his brutalities (Hiro 2003). Another example is the U.S. and the West supported the Arab Spring in oil-rich Libya and dispatched NATO to get rid of Qaddafi's regime. However, both the United States and the West are reluctant to help the Arab Spring in oil-less Syria despite 3 years of carnage and destruction caused by the Assad's regime's war crimes and its murder of more than 90,000 civilians in Syria and felling millions to the nearby countries as refugees.

For decades, U.S. policy toward the Middle East has been based on narrow self-interest in supporting tyrants at the expense of fairness, justice, and freedom, the very principles that the United States espouses (Chomsky 2004). This policy had created substantial damages and threats to the very narrow self-national interest of the United States. The consequences of such repeated blunders were often corrected through even greater errors, such as direct military interventions and wars. The Iraq Wars of 1991 and 2003 are examples of such greater errors (Chomsky 2004; Hagan and Bickerton 2008).

As a consequence of all this and the absence of democratic means for people to express their thoughts and opinions, and due to continuous suppression of individual liberties, censorship of information, lack of civic institutions, and the hegemony of tyrannical regimes, a third movement offered itself as an alternative: political Islam. This movement was able to capture public sentiments and capitalize on the void left by both the nationalists and the communists in order to craft a new direction based on a return to Sharia Law and reigniting past glory of Medieval Islamic empires. The movement, however, failed because of its tendencies for returning to the past and for friction within its many factions that did not agree on the ideal model of a modern Islamic state (Mirahmadi 2010; Moussalli 1999; Shadid 2011).

The failure of the movement gave birth to its extremist faction in order to monopolize public frustration and use it for its apoplectic tendencies. The United States used this faction as well through CIA-trained operation, such as those in Afghanistan during the 1970s, in order to serve U.S. interests in the region. The honeymoon between the United States and these groups, however, was short-lived once U.S. troops began to station in the region (especially in Islam's Holy Land in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War of 1991). To force U.S. military evacuation from the region and ending its support of tyrannical regimes, extremist groups moved their operation outside the Middle East through acts of terror against U.S. and Western targets in Africa, Europe, Asia, and within the United States itself. These acts resulted in increased U.S. support of tyrannical regimes in the region in the name of fighting terrorism and also through direct and increased military involvements (Allawi 2008; Galbraith 2008).

The cycle of action-reaction continued with the U.S. getting itself further and further involved in failed policies and quagmires in the Middle East (Chomsky 2007). Example of this failed policy is the Iraq War of 2003 and the subsequent military occupation of Iraq (O'Brien 2009). This failure had further damaged an already tarnished image of an empire when the justification for the war was later proven to be based on lies. The consequence of such blunder caused nearly one million Iraqi civilians and more than 4,000 American soldiers to be killed, nearly two

million Iraqis became refugees abroad and another two millions became dispersed refugees within Iraq, and nearly \$2 trillion in cost of operation that had bankrupt U.S. economy (Bilmes 2008; Brecher et al. 2005; Hedges et al. 2009; Iraq Body Count 2011). The war also resulted in war crimes, such as the torture of prisoners (Otterman 2007; Sharrock 2010) and the bombing of cities (Fallujah, for example) with white phosphoric bombs (Democracy Now 2005). The Iraqi populous best expressed its opinion of the American adventure in Iraq with one of its journalists throwing a pair of shoes at President George W. Bush during his last visit to Baghdad in 2008 (BBC 2008).

Factors Influencing the 2011 Revolutions

In understanding the historic context for the political development in the Middle East within a matrix of scattered yet interconnected events, we can use complexity to observe the continued interconnected randomly emerging events within the matrix that led to the eruption of the 2011 revolutions. These events may vary from one context to another. However they share common characteristic that together they posed to be causal factors in the subsequent developments that led to the 2011 revolutions.

The Sultanic Dictatorships

The revolutions of 2011 in the Middle East are primarily directed against Sultanic Dictatorships. These types of dictatorships, from Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia, to Mubarak's regime in Egypt, Qaddafi's regime in Libya, Saleh's regime in Yemen, Al-Khalifa's regime in Bahrain, Al-Saud's regime in the Arabian Peninsula, the Bouteflika regime in Algeria, and Assad's regime in Syria: all share, according to Goldstone (2011), Shehata (2011), and Anderson (2011) the following common characteristics:

1. Appear when a national leader expands *his* (emphasis is on the male gender since all Sultanic dictators are male) personal power at the expense of formal institutions.
2. Have no ideology (with the exception of Syria) and no purpose other than maintaining their authority.
3. Appoint supporters in key positions.
4. Declare state of emergency.
5. Promote external fear (such as from U.S. or Israel) or internal fear (such as Islamic fundamentalism). With Israel reaching peace with Palestine and Obama elected as President of the United States, it is harder to use Israel and U.S.-bashing as means for external threats. With decreased influence of Islamic fundamentalism and the killing of Ben Laden, it is also useless to use such internal threat as a pretext.

6. Amassing great personal wealth for the Sultanic dictator and his immediate family members.
7. Corruption is the norm, not the exception.
8. May promote economic development through liberalization to attract foreign investments in order to enrich the ruler's wealth and that of his cronies.
9. May support education in order to encourage foreign investments.
10. Seeking relationships with foreign countries and promoting stability in order to increase foreign investments through controlled contacts with the ruler. Thus, funds come to the country while channeled only through the Sultanic dictator.
11. Distributing the armed forces across an intentionally un-coordinating array of units and controlling the military elites by keeping them divided.
12. Separating security apparatus into several groups, with one watching over the other while all reporting directly to the ruler. The Sultanic dictator, in return, monopolizes communication between these groups and other parts of the government and the public in order to present himself as essential for stability and investments.
13. The lacking of unity among the security apparatus leads to division that can easily be controlled by the Sultanic dictator and reduce risks of deposing him. Yet, this very division makes the security apparatus susceptible to defection during popular uprisings.
14. Avoiding the appointment of a possible successor (except through a family member when the Sultanic dictator is too old or dies) by promoting fears based on the myth that stability and foreign investments will disappear without the ruler fully in charge.
15. Weakening public administration and civil society, prohibiting political parties (except for one that speaks for the ruler), imposing censorship through regime-controlled media, and limiting non-governmental and community-based organizations.
16. May allow some form of controlled democracies (elections, national assembly, or a constitution) while ruling over them. The ruler controls elections to keep the public apolitical and unorganized. Thus, he pays the populations off with subsidies (such as for food, housing, electricity, gasoline) in return for their loyalty, disconnect, and passivity.
17. The rapid unraveling of the Sultanic regimes often arrives unexpectedly due to its inherent weakness and hollow foundation.
18. Drawing on military loyalty (such as in Libya and Syria) may lead to slower pace of collapse and may result in massive bloodshed and civil war.

Sultanic Successions

The weakness of the Sultanic regimes is emphasized when the ruler ages and the question of succession becomes more sensitive. Some of these rulers may be able handing over their positions to one of their sons if their regime is relatively efficient

and has elite support. However, if the regime suffers from high degree of corruption that alienates the elite, issue of succession becomes problematic. Also, the importance of the Sultanic regimes can work against a smooth transfer of power since most officials are identified with the ruler himself, not his successor, and will perceive a succession as a threat to their interests (Goldstone 2011).

In Egypt and prior to Mubarak, for example, succession was only a trend practiced during the monarchic regimes of pre-1953 revolution. The opposition, especially during Sadat's presidency, was allowed to protest elections and have some modest representation in Parliament while the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) maintained two third majority and control over the organs of power. Mubarak, however, and in order to pave the way for his son, Gamal, to succeed him, he violated this agreement and imposed constraint on the opposition's ability to organize and contest elections. The latest was his manipulation of the 2010 parliamentary elections in favor of the NDP by denying all opposition groups any representation (Shehata 2011).

Mubarak's succession plan did not go well with Egypt's military as well. The military elite controlled some local business and had resented Gamal for building his influence through business and political cronies rather than the military, which led to the emergence of an alliance between the Mubarak family and the business elite of corrupt bankers and politicians. This alliance bought public lands, companies, obtained state license and contracts, benefiting from governmental contracts and foreign investments, and exploiting the profit of economic freedom to turn their contracts with the regime and international market into vast wealth. The military resentment of Gamal and his business friends made it less likely to crack down on the uprisings. Its officers and soldiers refused to turn their guns against their own countrymen in order to keep Mubarak's family in power (Goldstone 2011).

Corruption and Dysfunctional Regimes

The countries that are witnessing popular uprisings in the Middle East suffer from the decay/incompetence of public administration, corruption and predatory nature of the private sector, heavy security apparatus directly reporting to the rulers, and a disfranchised and disempowered populous (Anderson 2011). This dysfunction varies from one country to another. While some countries has more sophisticated public bureaucracies and private sector emerging, such as Egypt and Tunisia, other countries, such as Libya, suffer from years of artificially induced insufficiency in everything from simple consumer goods to basic medical treatments (Goldstone 2011). Lack of services forced the populous to rely on tribal networks. Libyan society, for example, is divided along tribal and regional lines, including the military (ibid.). The Qaddafi regime is maintaining such divide for its advantage while promoting extravagance, dogmatism, poor education, prohibitions of retail trade, private ownership, free press, civic institutions, national identity, public administration, and political parties in the name of maintaining a permanent revolution (Shehata 2011).

In the absence of good governance and professional public administration to provide safety and access to services, the regimes' capacity to divide and rule no longer can go on without protest (Anderson 2011). Since the Sultanic dictators suffer from narrow support base, lack coherent economic policy, suffocate political freedom, weaken public administration, promote corruption, aim to amass personal wealth at the expense of a widely unemployed and improvised population, and govern by fear, their vulnerability increases over time (Goldstone 2011). Other vulnerability arrives if the economy grows and education expands, yet the number of educated people is unable to find jobs. This is true also when the population grows but economic gains go to the ruler, his family, and the elite.

In general, the Sultanic regimes, according to Shehata (2011) and Anderson (2011) possess the common characteristics:

1. Irretrievably inept, unjust, and perceived as a threat to the country's future by wide segments of the population.
2. The economy exists under the shadow of security services and sidestepping majority of the populous.
3. Rising prices, lack of economic development, continuation of prevalent poverty in the midst of excessive wealth.
4. High unemployment, especially among the youth. The more educated a young person is the more difficult for him/her to find a job, get married, and form a family.
5. Government's inability to provide basic services, coupled with wide spread unemployment and poverty.
6. The elites (especially in the military) are separated from the regimes and not willing to defend them. They may hide their feelings toward the rulers until a critical moment arrives.
7. The United States and Western countries are no longer willing to defend them.
8. International pressure can turn the tide and speed-up the downfall of the Sultanic regimes.

The Impact of Rhetoric

In 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson delivered his Fourteen Points Speech to Congress (Waldman 2010). The speech called for 14 important issues, among them peace, sovereignty, removal of economic barriers among nations, security of life and opportunity of autonomous development for people of the Middle East, and the establishment of the League of Nations. His speech sparked the popular movement in the Middle East with people demanding liberation, self-determination, and sovereignty. Then, the region went into coma, ruled by colonial powers until the 1930s, followed by proxy local chieftains subordinate to colonial powers until the 1950s, then military dictators who arrived to power through coups while espousing nationalist ideology. And, a Sultanic dictators that emerged during the past five or six decades which continue to rule to date.

In 2009, Barack Obama, another university professor (as Wilson) became President of the United States. 111 years after Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen-Points speech, Obama delivered a speech in Cairo, declaring the following:

An universal belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere. (White House 2009)

The speech did not immediately spark revolutions of 2011 but it established an understanding among people in the Middle East that the new direction in the United States is different from before and if there was an uprising against the rulers for democracy and human rights, the United States will support it, or at least would not oppose it (Anderson 2011). The Obama speech, however, short-lived in its expectation and was disappointing when true needs for U.S. support materialized in Syria but he chose to stay on the sideline and watch betray his own call for supporting freedom. Only in oil-rich Libya did Obama lead from behind and followed France and United Kingdom in supporting the Arab Spring there. In Syria, however, his rhetoric on supporting the rule of law, the administration of justice, and freedom was sunk by a disappointing inaction that bears more of a trait of hypocrisy than being a champion of human rights.

Al-Jazeera, ICT, and WikiLeaks

Before 1996, television stations, radio broadcasting, newspapers, and other print media in most Middle Eastern countries were under the direct control of the state. Information, as such, was controlled, representing only these regimes' official propaganda. Underground opposition press existed in form of leaflets or weak clandestine radio stations, but could not reach out to the wider population on a regular basis and information they obtained was scares, if not inaccurate. These regimes, accordingly, were able to keep the populous in dark through systemic censorship and top-down filtration (Makiya 1994).

In 1996 a new television station started its broadcasting in Qatar that became known as Al-Jazeera. This new television station was different from many other Middle Eastern news networks. It broadcasted events as they took place on the ground without censorship, editing, filtration, or reflecting the regimes' propaganda (Trismtam 2011). The station was revolutionary in a sense that it connected the public with actual events both nationally and internationally exposing propaganda both by the Sultanic regimes and Western powers (Allied Media 2001). As a result, the station became an important player in information broadcasting and educating the public with what is taking place on the ground or behind the scenes.

Another important development in information communication is the development of social media network and ICT, such as Facebook, Twitter, the Internet, cell phones, and Youtube (Dawoody 2011). With ICT, people were able to by-pass the

official propaganda machine, ignore censorship, and connect with one another in shard and interconnected information network. The regimes' crackdown on dissidents, as such, could no longer go unnoticed or hidden from the public. They were broadcasted world-wide through ICT medium (ibid.). When Mohamed Bouazizi, for example, burned himself as a protest to the deteriorated economic situation in Tunisia and subsequently died because of his wounds, the youth in Tunisia created a page for him on Facebook, demanding change. What followed was a mass protest that toppled the Ben Ali regime through the nonviolent Jasmine Revolution (Abouzeid 2011). When a young Egyptian man named Khalid Said was beaten to death in 2010 by Egyptian police in Alexandria, Egyptian youth created a page on Facebook called "We are All Khalid Said" that too galvanized a popular movement that eventually was able to topple the Mubarak regime (Shehata 2011).

As for WikiLeaks, its impact cannot be ignored. The website was pioneer in affirming through leaks of communication between various international institutions what the Arab masses had been suspected to be true for long time: the corruption of their rulers. With availability of this information through various social media networks, it became apparent to majority of people in the Middle East that their corrupt rulers were amassing personal wealth at the expense of the populous. Regime-controlled media could not offset the damage caused by the leaking of this information, nor could it conceal it through the regimes' security apparatus (Malinowski 2011). For example, WikiLeaks reported that Ben Ali's family in Tunisia was predatory in its corruption. More than half of Tunisia's business elites were related to Ben Ali through his three adult children, seven siblings, and his second wife's ten brothers and sisters whom together created a mafia-type network known as "The Family." WikiLeaks reported that Ben Ali's family became so predatory that new investments and job creation were stifled, which provoked large resentment and indignation (Anderson 2011).

The New Direction in the Middle East

As the historical narratives had revealed, the political path had emerged since the creation of the modern Middle East in post-World War I. This path remained nationalistic, although with different manifestations. The first manifestation was patriarchal which was born as a result of newly developed middle class that was educated abroad and had exposed to western bourgeoisie national ideologies. This new class formed political organization espousing patriarchal nationalistic ideologies in order to lead the populous against colonial powers and seek independence. Existentialist identities and racial Puritanism became the hallmark of such movement. Examples of these political organizations are the Baath Arab Socialist Party, the Arab Socialist Union, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The patriarchal leaders who had emerged within these parties included Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, Hafez Al-Assad of Syria, Mummar Qaddafi of Libya, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

The patriarchal nationalist movement institutionalized the “Great Leader’s” cult as the cornerstone in identifying and defending the regime. Strong alliances were established between these leaders and the regimes that they represent, and the former Soviet bloc (Behbehani 1987; McNamara 2003). With increased Soviet aids, especially in military arsenal form, the militaristic tendencies of these regimes increased in order to intensify their focus on the perceived external enemies at the expense of economic development and individual freedoms. Such intensified focus always represented itself through colossal wars efforts, such as the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, and the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, forcing the public to reject such a movement as a paranoid Hobbesian political order of the worst kind (Golan 1990; Oren 2003; Porter 1986; Primakov 2009).

Although at the beginning the patriarchal movement generated large popular support and galvanized wide anti-colonial sentiments, it eventually grew isolated and became unpopular because of its inability to resolve social problems through civic institutions, competent public administration, sound economic development, and constitutionally protected individual freedoms. The increased tyrannical nature of these regimes could not rescue its unpopularity despite old cliché of tired and redundant revolutionary slogans.

With many leaders in this movement enriching themselves and members of their family with funds embezzled from the state and its deals with foreign investors, and while majority of the people were living below poverty line, add to this lack of freedom, civic infrastructure, and democratic institutions and increased level of censorship, manipulation of information, fear, intimidation, deterioration of service, corruption, ineffective state-controlled planning, personality cults of the regimes’ leaders, this movement gradually eroded and exposed as nothing but mere self-serving and out of touch parasitic entities.

The second political manifestation in the Middle East grew primarily in opposition to colonial powers and then continued in its opposition to the replacement of colonial powers by local tribal chieftains and then by the patriarchal manifestation. This second political manifestation espoused a Marxist ideology and aligned itself with the former Soviet Union. The Communists attracted large number of followers during mid twenty century, benefiting from the Cold War and the portrayal of the Soviet Union as a friend of the oppressed in the Third World. However, by insulting religious sentiments, persecuting opponents, and forming weak and opportunistic alliances with the patriarchal movement, the Communist movement’s ability to move beyond dogma was severely handicapped, rendering it both ineffective and marginal (Golan 1990; Ismael 2009). With the fall of the Soviet Union, Communism in the Middle East fell as well, although it continues to exist as sporadic isolated pocket.

The third manifestation that grew as a third alternative was political Islam. This movement was made of several factions, ranging from moderate to extremists. Collectively, it espoused religious sentiments that enabled it build bridges with the populous and establish a strong popular base (Franzen 2011; Ismael 2007; Jabar 2001). The moderates within this movement grew stronger in the beginning, espe-

cially the Muslim Brotherhood, but eventually they were sidestepped by the extremists who were better prepared to channel public anger toward the Sultanic dictators and their Western supporters as the economic situation grew worst and foreign interventions had increased (Mirahmadi 2010).

The peak in extremists' strength emerged after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Iraq War provided a pretext to justify the extremists' political ideology (Gerges 2011; Hagan and Bickerton 2008). However, because of their tactics in not differentiating between targeting civilians from military targets (Tawfeeq 2011), and because of world-wide condemnation of these tactics, and with the latest killing of one of their leaders, Osama Ben Laden (MSNBC 2011), as well as because of shift in U.S. Middle Eastern policy after the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, the popular support for extremism in the Middle East is decreasing, if not diminishing.

With the failure of nationalism in all its three manifestations, some Middle Eastern countries moved toward open market economy and suspended the welfare state created by the patriarchal manifestation. In doing so, subsidies that lower-income families had relied on for decades, as well as job guarantees for university graduate, had suddenly disappeared. As a result, state expenditure declined and public spending on social services deteriorated (Goldstone 2011). Factory worker, landless peasants, government employees, and those who produced goods for the local market suffered greatly (ibid.). Instead, a well-off middle class began to emerge, creating a new two-tiered system in the society, a majority that became increasingly marginalized, and a small minority that was prospering and forming the support base for a Sultanic dictatorship. Many of the workers took to the street to express their frustrations over their economic conditions (Shehata 2011). Unfortunately, their demands met with silence by the regime or often with crack down and intimidation by the security apparatus. Youth activists joined the frustrated workers while connected through ICT (Dawoody 2011). The shared characteristics of this movement are the following:

1. Possessing no ideology.
2. Aspiring good governance, freedom, and democratic representation.
3. Rejecting the previous three historic nationalistic political manifestations (patriarchal, socialism, and Islamic fundamentalism) to resolve complex socio-economic problems.
4. Leaderless.
5. Disciplined and possessing a capacity to maintain order.
6. Sharing a common cause for personal dignity.
7. Possessing legitimate grievance over deteriorating economic conditions.
8. Possessing high tolerance for free expression.
9. Spontaneous.
10. Composed of fluid citizen mobilization.

Table 1 Contrast between the Sultanic regimes and the 2011 revolutions

N	Sultanic regimes	The second movement
1	Hierarchical	Horizontal
2	Strong leader	Leaderless
3	Control	Spontaneous
4	Repressive	Open
5	Male-dominated	Egalitarian
6	Corrupt	Demands good governance
7	Sultanic	Popular
8	Inflates internal/external fear	Builds on hope
9	Tyrannical	Democratic
10	Elitism	Collectivism and individual rights
11	Older generation	Youth
12	Heavy use of security apparatus	Community networks
13	Incompetence	Competence based on innovation
14	Out of touch	Globally interconnected
15	Divided	United
16	Censorship	Freedom of speech
17	Juggles between patriarchal, socialism, and political Islam	The second dimension

11. Reveals a sharp generational divide filled with angry and frustrated youth.
12. Promoting nonviolence and refusing to be aggravated by thugs (except in the case of Libya, which was forced to taking arms as a measure in self-defense against Qaddafi’s campaign of genocide).
13. Focusing on changing without shifting focus toward external elements.
14. Inclusive and egalitarian, involving the poor, rich, male, female, urban, rural, and people from various ethnicities, religions, and sects.
15. Distrustful of the Sultanic rulers and forcing real change under the slogan “People demand the Toppling of the Regime.”

In pairing the characteristics of the new second political movement against the old guard that represented in the Sultanic regimes, we arrive to two sets of contrasts, with one canceling the other. Every trait within the second dimension is exclusively directed in an opposite to the Sultanic regime. As such, the new movement is emerging as a pure anti-Sultanic in every sense. This morphology can be made possible only when the collective elements of the second dimensions had cancelled out the collective elements of the Sultanic regimes. As long as some of the Sultanic elements remain un-cancelled, the possibility of these regimes to once again creep-in to the political arena and abort the revolutions from with remains a constant threat. Table 1 and Fig. 4 illustrate this context.




Fig. 4 Contrast between the Sultanlic regimes and the new dimension

Conclusion

For decades, most regimes in the Middle East seized power through military coups or installed by colonial powers. Absence of democratic means contributed to the deficiency in civic institutions, increase in police state practices, public administration coercion, and the augmentation of human rights abuse. Individual freedoms were suppressed and brutality, corruption, and abuse of power were institutionalized and justified under the guise of security, patriotism, and defending national interest against outsiders. Voices of dissidents were silenced through torture and summary executions without objection by international public opinion or political institutions.

The West supported tyrannical governments in the Middle East because of the false assumption that they were indispensable and we could not do without them in preventing Islamic fundamentalists to threaten us. We did so because it was also profitable for the military industrial complex. The results, however, were catastrophic. The West had alienated the populous in the Middle East and turned them against it. At the same time, the void of freedom and democracy was filled by

extremists who gave voice to disfranchised populations (Khalidi 2010). The West had also supported these repressive regimes in order to obtain cheap access to energy sources and protect our economic interests in the region. American tax-dollar, for example, helped supporting these regimes through military aid and technologies to improve the security apparatus that were used to suppress the populous.

With the proliferation of information and communication systems (ICT), a moderate shift in American and some European countries' foreign policies, and a combination of factors ranging from corruptions, poverty, deterioration of the economy, coercion of public service, massive unemployment, increased resentment by a population largely made of the youth, public resentment to regimes' practice of succession, division within the regime's camp, and international pressure to impose reforms, a second dimension had emerged in 2011 to present itself as an alternative to the previous three political manifestations and their morphed Sultanic dictatorship. This new movement is calling for democracy, openness, good governance, shared power, and accountability. It was manifested first in Tunisia through the Jasmine Revolution and rapidly moved to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and Algeria. Governmental grip on information is increasingly loosened and people in the Middle East are able to get express their demands for change through spontaneous, leaderless, and random demonstrations. ICT is utilized as a catalyst to connect people and force change through shared information, openness, and accountability. The world is participating to give this new movement a voice through the support of the GPO.

Although the experience with government performances of regimes emerged from the Arab Spring, such as in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen has been disappointing and often non-democratic, such inadequate measures ought to be expected in a region that is experiencing a transitional period. The long domination of tyrannical governments, the destruction of any viable democratic movement, and the near absence of civic organizations and democratic intuitions throughout the region's history had enabled non-democratic forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to ride the Arab Spring and use the vacuum created by the collapse of tyrannical regimes in order steal public sacrifices for their own narrow and opportunistic political agenda. However, such occurrences are only temporary. The public's demand for better governance continues and these bubbles will eventually evaporate and give space to true democratic forces to take hold.

The road toward sound governance through democratic means is bumpy and will experience many ups and downs, especially in a region that was not allowed to experience any truthful democratic means. The Arab Spring of 2011 was a catalyst that has opened the Pandora's Box in the Middle East. It is only one step toward the long marathon for freedom, and not an end by itself.

With freedom, there will no longer be poisonous environments for extremism to grow. Supporting the new dimension in the Middle East is more in line with global security by eliminating threats emerging under either tyrannical conditions or extremist groups. It is also less costly (both in financial and human terms) because it can eliminate the need for engaging in constant militarily adventures, as the US is currently doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We may not be able to know the type of political systems that will replace the current regimes in the Middle East. This is natural since with freedom comes some unpredictable fluctuation (Taleb and Blyth 2011). There is no freedom without noise and no stability without volatility. As Jean Jacques Rousseau had wrote, “a little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom” (ibid.).

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Restructuring the Hierarchy of Needs: A Case for Sound Governance in the Middle East

Alexander Dawoody

Introduction

According to Farazmand (2004), sound governance is having quality characteristics in governance that are technically, professionally, organizationally, managerially, politically, democratically, and economically sound. Such type of governance is also sound in terms of capacity, anticipatory behavior, responsiveness, and competence. Sound governance, thus, promotes participation and interaction in an increasingly complex, diverse, and dynamic environment. Relying on classic Newtonian linear sciences in order to construct a system of “sound governance” within a complex, interconnected, and emerging global environment is not feasible. We need a better understanding of the complex world in order to better devise our political and administrative systems. Here, complexity sciences become important.

Complexity sciences involves many paradigms, such as autopoiesis, syn-referentiality, mutual causality, bifurcation, scattered matrix, quantum mechanics, the butterfly effect, fractal, emergence, collapse dynamics, and chaos. Since the work of Poincare in 1881–1886, continuing with works by Max Planck, Poincare, Einstein, Lorenz, Kondrachov, Schrödinger, Prigogine, and Kauffman, these sciences had made their ways to most areas of natural sciences, offering Newtonian science of linearity, gravitation, and hierarchal order new perspectives and interpretations of the natural phenomenon (Wheatley 2006).

The introduction of complexity to natural sciences benefited humanity in achieving greater strives and discoveries in scientific inquiry and progress. Regrettably, on the other hand, the infusion of these ground-breaking theories in social sciences has been very slow and often rejected either due to ignorance or the resiliency of the

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linear model in taking hold within the social sciences. Because of this, many linear interpretations and approaches that were numerous challenged in application continue to persist as leading paradigms. One of these models is Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1998).

In governance and public policy, Maslow's hierarchy still is the leading theory and guiding principle in constructing a political agenda. Yet, when measuring the effect, impact, and consequences of these policies, results demonstrate that they are no longer capable in adapting to today's complex environment. This is particularly true in national security arena, foreign policy, and economic policy of most nations, particularly in the Middle East.

In today's globalization, network interconnectedness of players and interacting agents/forces, a hierarchal structure based on needs is no longer applicable to the interchangeable needs, players, stages, and priorities. With the Arab Spring illustrating the needs for a much more "sound" form of governance in the Middle East, a new approach is needed that will flatten the hierarchal structure into a loop of interconnected forces/agents, whereby each agent interacts and collaborate within other agents in the network through symbiotic relationships.


Complexity sciences can offer such an alternative through vigorous applications in the construction of a new system of sound governance in the Middle East, such as agent-based model (Gilbert 2008). This chapter reworks Maslow's hierarchy of needs in Middle Eastern public policy by reconstructing it into a complex and multi-dimensional loop of association. Within this loop, all needs are treated autonomously while interconnected with one another within a dynamic network better capable in dealing with change in the environment to adapt, self-organize, and allow for older structures to collapse and for newer and more capable structures to emerge.

The Features of Complexity in a Sound System of Governance

Complexity offers a new direction in constructing a sound system of governance. It is a perspective that opens up possibilities for consideration of multiple perspectives and unexpected order (Miller and Page 2007). The model that best explains this new approach in funding public education is the agent-based model (Gilbert 2008). Using this model, every identifiable need in a policy will become an agent within a matrix and interconnected network. Each agent will be autonomous and interact with its environment, other agents, and networks. In this nonlinear point of view, each particular agent has the potential of influencing the entire network as well as other associated networks, benefiting from the "butterfly effect" in which a single event can be dramatically magnified into an exponentially increasing dynamic (Dawoody 2008). Within this transformation, both the agent and the network will go through self-reorganization and restructuring in order to cope with the changes in the environment (Juarrero and Rubino 2008).

For this dynamic to work, the network of association must be flexible, unrestricted, non-hierarchal, and possesses a greater adaptability in the face of change. This means the entire network of connected agents and environments form

Fig. 1 Complex adaptive system in sound governance



a complex adaptive system with a capacity for ongoing adaptation to environmental changes (Kaplan and Glass 1997). If the system is not operating in such a complex and adaptive manner, it will either die completely or result in an unwanted worse state of affairs (Brown 1995). Figure 1 demonstrates such a dynamic. It illustrates the interconnectedness of a complex system that morphs from one stage to another, transforming within each stage into different evolutionary phases that is self-organized and adaptive to changes in the environment.

These phases are also circular, moving in a constant state of change from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium to disequilibrium and so forth. The primary phases of these self-organizing stages start at random from awareness of the environmental changes as a Stage One, morphing to an analysis of the system’s structure in Stage Two, leading to the transformation of the system in Stage Three. This is in order to correspond with changes in the environment, and then progressing to sustainability of the complex system for a limited period of equilibrium until another kick in the environment forces a new set of changes, leading the complex system once again to go through the same self-organizing dynamic of awareness, analysis, transformation, and sustainability (Kiel and Elliott 1997).

Addressing political needs is better thought of as a complex adaptive system along the lines of scenario described above. In order for public policy to live within a continually changing environment, it must act as a dynamically adapting system. This complex system is composed of many interacting and autonomous agents residing in the system of government that identify needs and coordinate within a network of association to respond to each need while autonomously integrated with each need’s environment. Each need/agent is associated with the other as partners (Harrison 2006). In such a scheme, no single need/agent is posited as in a position of control to derive centralized decision-making. Instead, the autonomy and network nature of the associations among the agents make possible a continuing transformation of internal structures meshing more suitably with changes in the external structures making up the environment (Overman and Loraine 1996). The complex network is characterized as (Capra 2004; Elliott and Kiel 1996; Goldstein 2007; Morgan 1986; Prigogine 1996):

1. Transparent in its operation to those both within and outside observing it
2. Operating out of mutual causality and influence

3. Focusing on the present moment where adaptability proceeds and accordingly realizing that long-term predictions and planning may drastically alter in the “fog” of battle
4. Pattern seeking by way of creative disequilibrium and disorganization that enables an ongoing shifting into new structures
5. Paradoxically preparing for unexpected consequences and uncertain outcomes
6. Evolving by benefiting from the “butterfly effect”
7. Self-transcending in the sense of emerging out of the interactions of autonomous agents

Autonomous needs/agents in interaction with each other have the potential for prioritization based on coordination, relationship, and environmental impacts (Gilbert 2008). Moreover, because these agents are embedded in a larger network of connections, they can rely on each other and the system of the whole in a manner not thought possible before (Capra 2004). Collectively all agents work together in order to operate as one while maneuvering and making decisions as autonomous units.

The relationship between the agent and the environment will operate on the basis of mutual causality, with one factor impacting the other, producing feedback that is either positive (more changes in the environment leading to more changes in the system’s structure, and fewer changes in the environment leading to fewer changes in the system’s structure) or negative (a change in the environment initiates a change in the opposite direction within the system’s structure, with more changes in the environment leading to fewer changes in the structure and fewer changes in the environment leading to more changes in the system’s structure) and vice versa (Morgan 1986). Since the “kick” in the environment is unpredictable, the changes associated with it in the agent can be experienced as random, yet containing the possibility of morphing the agent’s structure from static equilibrium to a state of chaos and disorder with the potential for self-organizing into innovative new structures and practices (Kaplan and Glass 1997).

Hence, out of seeming “chaos” new structures can emerge that are sustainable since they are a better fit with the changing conditions in the environment. Any particular stability is not possible without experiencing turbulence created by the environment. Because of this dynamic association between the agent and the environment, the structure will always be able to reorganize itself and produce something new that can thrive more effectively under new conditions (Strogatz 2001).

Replacing Hierarchy in Sound Governance

Maslow’s construction of needs is hierarchal (Maslow 1998). In sound governance, however, that needs are interconnected and lack hierarch setting (Farazmand 2004). Public policy that is designed on hierarchal prioritization of social needs often found itself trapped in dead-end pathways and avert to modify its structure (although within

yet another hierarchal structure). Instead of re-arranging needs within a hierarchal order, positioning these needs within an interconnected network will correspond more effectively to today's complex dynamics in the socio-political interactions.

The hierarch model describes a phenomenon clock-wise. Time and motion, according to this model, are reversible (Prigogine 1996). A phenomenon is reduced to parts, functions, and building blocks. Possible interpretations outside this mechanical approach are collapsed in sake of rationality and one-dimensional observation (Strogatz 1994). Complexity-based sound governance, instead, does the opposite. It welcomes pluralistic and multi-dimensional view of an observed phenomenon, defies rational tools, and looks at a dynamic system as a composite of interconnected relationships (Capra 2004). The main prism of such an approach is that simple systems demonstrate complex behaviors which are self-organizing (Wheatley 2006).


In a world of uncertainty, we can no longer rely on a naïve confidence that long-term results can be accurately predicted. Instead, the emphasis needs to shift to a much greater flexibility which prepares any current structure to respond adaptively to unprecedented changes (Prigogine 1996). When changes occur in the environment, we need to have organizations that can allow for changes to take place within their structure even to the degree, sometimes, of collapsing the existing order to make way for the new (Kaplan and Glass 1997). This bold and courageous understanding will enable us to embrace change and emergence of the new. Indeed we are finally beginning to recognize that stasis is not what is inevitable but radical, in the etymological sense of “getting to the root,” transformation is.

No longer are we able to assume that our experiments and observations tell us anything concrete about reality. Whatever reality is out there, it has fuzzy indeterminacy. The world is a world of participatory collusion among particles in which entities separated by space and possess no mechanism for communicating with one another can exhibit correlations in their behavior (Elliott and Kiel 1996). Also, something that occurs in region A can have an effect in region B instantaneously regardless of how far apart these two regions happen to be. This notion, also known as non-locality or non-local causation, runs against the traditional local causation in traveling the space between building blocks.

This non-local way of nature is characterized by a continuous flux shaped by the dynamic interplay of yin and yang (a metaphor referring to the dark and sunny sides of a hill). The world is determined by a flow of opposite energies through which all trends eventually reverse themselves (Morgan 1986). Complexity, as such, shifts the emphasis from object to events, from building blocks (elementary particles) to a web of interconnectedness. These building blocks and subatomic particles do not have any meaning if examined or observed as isolated entities. Rather, they must be understood as interconnections between themselves and their environment (Brown 1995; Harrison 2006). In order to do so and to reconstruct a hierarch model of needs into a network of “sound” policies, the following steps can be taken:

1. Getting rid of positioning “needs” in a hierarchal order
2. Identifying needs as they emerge
3. Identifying temporal and spatial zones that interact with each emerging need

Fig. 2 Restructuring Maslow's hierarchy into a loop of temporal/spatial networks of interconnected needs



4. Constructing these interconnected zones within a nexus
5. Randomly placing the emerging “needs” within the nexus
6. Connecting between the needs and the temporal/spatial zones through available data on their interactions
7. Identifying other elements, actors, and forces that are interconnected with these need and placing them within their networks in the overall mapping of the nexus
8. Identifying causal relation elements between needs and their networks based on feedback
9. Using the complexity paradigms of autopoiesis, bifurcation, mutual causality, and S-Matrix to explain internal and external changes within the nexus
10. Identifying systemic changes and impacts on needs
11. Allowing for collapse and self-organization to take place
12. Constructing policies based on emerging scenarios.

Figure 2 explains this dynamic.

Achieving Self-actualization in Governance

In transforming “needs” from a hierarchal structural order into a nexus, self-actualization is transformed from a final stage in a hierarch setting into an element within a complex and interconnected process that is integral to the process itself. Here, self-actualization is not regarded as a separate part of progression. There is no duality between process and goal. Instead, goal and process are interconnected within a web of holistic treatment, observation, and morphology. In essence, the process is transformed in doing so into self-actualization through phase-shift toward

emergence. In discovering and rediscovering needs within this process of self-actualization, governance self-organizes itself to deal better with its environment through an interconnected series of interplay based on an autonomously emerging dynamic network. Within the morphology of this process, integrated needs are either mature, collapse, or morph to other needs and contribute to the systemic self-actualization of sound governance.

Implication of Network-Based Approach to Needs

By restructuring needs public policy and governance from a hierarch order into a loop of association, old structural procedures both in political dialogue and administrative systems will have to identify societal and national needs not according to hierarchal order, influence of special interests, or as a response to events. Rather, these needs have to be connected together as integral parts of one nexus that requires collaboration among various players for the purpose of resource allocation, programming, and strategic planning based on coordination. Policymakers and public administrators in the Middle East must allow for internal changes take place within the political and administrative systems in response to changes in these systems' environment. Among these changes are the following:

1. The impact of social, political, and economic forces on policy formulation and implementation.
2. A democratically elected legislative dynamics in placing a policy on an agenda and fund allocation processes
3. The impact on the public budgetary process
4. The impact on the interactions within the branches of government
5. The impact on citizen participation and the democratic process
6. The impact on public administration

Conclusion

Maslow's hierarchy, Newtonian physics, and the subsequent linear interpretation of the world that came out of them were obviously a tremendous step in progress for human knowledge that unveiled new frontiers and understanding of the world around us, even enabling humans to land on the moon. These understandings shaped both natural and social sciences. It was the accomplishments of these world-views which led to the undergirding of much of modern decision-making processes, analytical thinking, and interpretations of the world. However, new discoveries in sciences and mathematics have revealed an entire new world understood much better through the constructs of complexity that strict hierarchal and linear analyses are incapable of producing. The new findings transcend a narrow focus on hierarchal structure, linear rationality, singular cause and effect, certainty, predictability, hierarchy, formal organization, centralization and control, even inertia in the face of change.

In governance the new science of complexity offers new approaches that the hierarchal and linear models are incapable of entertaining. However, this frontier is so new and despite its already proven success in so many arenas of application in natural sciences, it has not yet been widely accepted or practiced in the social sciences. Nevertheless, with the Middle East yearning for changes in governance toward more of a participatory, transparent, competent, and sound system of governance, now is the time to relook at the problems within the current political and administrative structures in the Middle East and arrive to new solutions. In shifting public policy and administration in the Middle East from a linear understanding to a complex understanding, new windows of opportunity will emerge that may force the region look at governance from a different perspective that will change the way it conducts public affairs.

We are no longer live in a linear, predictable world. Policies can no longer be treated as linear models based on the hierarchy of distributing “goods.” Political and societal needs can no longer be placed within such an order. Goals are no longer utopian parts of end results distinct from the process. Time and space are no longer separate. Nations and people are no longer separate. We are part of an interconnected dynamics, linked together through interplay of parts that are integral and units of an indivisible network. Structures, networks, processes, and goals are parts of one dynamics. In-the-moment and process morphology is itself a self-actualizing dynamic. There is no starting or ending points. Rather, all points are interconnected and play together, no matter the size, magnitude, or dimension of a particular point, on the overall morphology of the network and its process.

The world is not hierarchal. We live in a continuous state of unpredictable change that we are incapable of predicting. Designing policies based on hierarchal order and long-term prediction no longer fit with today’s complex, interconnected and nonlinear environment, and potentially catastrophic. Instead, we have to regard each social and political need as parts of one interconnected dynamic and each is autonomous. These agents exert influence on other needs and the entire political-administrative system as a whole.

With such an understanding, governance in the Middle East must be “networkalized” to capture multi-dimensional players, forces, and events. At the same time, governance ought to adjust according to the unpredictable changes in the environment in order to correspond with uncertainty. The association between parts within governance network has to be coordinated towards pushing the internal dynamics toward achieving self-actualization through living in the moment and responding to needs as they emerge without hierarchy and based on coordination, sharing of expertise and resources, and autonomy in decision-making. Agents that are incapable of meeting the coordinated efforts toward achieving sound governance goals in self-actualization must be assessed collectively by the entire political and administrative system in order to uncover the reasons for their incapability through mutual causality and positive and negative feedback. This is how complexity answers the competition for scares resources and the arrangement of needs within a system of sound governance and its political and administrative process. In restructuring hierarchy into loop governance can rid itself of the some of the ills that had alienating it from the citizenry and resulted in popular uprisings such as the Arab Spring.

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